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**VALUES EDUCATION AND REPRODUCTION IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY:**

An Analysis Based on the Work of Jurgen Habermas

by

Ronald A. C. Henry, B.A.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Sociology/Anthropology

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario

13 Sept. 1988

c. September, 1988 by Ronald A. C. Henry

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An Analysis Based on the Work of Jurgen Habermas"

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13 Sept. 1988

ABSTRACT

"Radical" educational thinkers have suggested that schools in capitalist societies take on the role of ensuring the reproduction of existing social inequalities. This paper, using the work of Jorgen Habermas, demonstrates that the process through which this occurs is different from that presented in a variety of these "radical" theories. From Habermas' work, the central suggestion can be drawn, that contemporary society is characterized by a domination of scientific/technical knowledge over moral/practical knowledge. This domination manifests itself in the institutionalization of social organizations that systematically limit the context for moral/practical insight. One such organization is the school. Consequently, the process of education, which occurs within that organization, comes to be constructed as an instrumentally rational process. This event is illustrated through a Critical analysis of an educational program, purportedly designed to address moral/practical issues.

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Chapter One

Radical Theories of Education

"By now, it is clear to many that the liberal school reform balloon has burst." (Bowles and Gintis, 1976, p.6) These lines of twelve years ago pointed out that something was up in education. At the time Bowles and Gintis hoped that the failure of liberal school reform would provide an impetus toward a Radical educational theory and, following this hope, they set forth their program for such a theory. Instead of a widespread turning to Radical educational theory, however, we have witnessed educational thought become mired in a debate between those unwilling to let go of the ideals of the liberal school reform movement and those who would see a return to 'The Basics'. This polarity has become the focus of much of the academic thought on education and seems to have been received by most of the general population as the central issue in education today. In all of this, Radical educational theories have remained relatively isolated from general acceptance, even despite the proliferation of them.

The term 'Radical educational theory' demands clarification. By definition such theory must stand in juxtaposition to some form of 'Conventional' educational thought. However, as we have pointed out above, 'Conventional' educational thought is itself in turmoil, and consequently not easily described. What can be said is that 'Conventional' educational thought is either supportive of the schooling status quo or, at least, is supportive of the status quo in general such that, even if it is critical of the schools, it remains uncritical of the

assumptions that underlie schooling as a process. This point is important, for the enterprise of schooling in contemporary society is so pervasive and its effects so important, that the temptation to accept the assumptions made on behalf of and through it, as 'natural' and 'self-evident' truths, is great.

According to this context, then, 'Conventional' educational thought is to be understood as any way of thinking about schooling that is uncritically supportive of, and which is supported by, these assumptions. 'Radical' educational theories are those which attempt to expose the implications of these underlying assumptions. The question then remains: "What are these assumptions?"

These assumptions are many but they stem from a common root that can be easily identified. This root assumption is that schooling is the means through which an individual can achieve success in society. This assumption is largely identical to the claims made by those directly involved in the process of schooling and is reflected in common public conceptions of the role of schools. The claim is made that the enterprise of schooling in contemporary society is of universal benefit; it can provide for all the opportunity and means for material success and upward mobility. It is further suggested, that the unfortunate and real inequalities that exist in our society can be, at least partially, dealt with and removed through effective public education. The belief is that, through education, the slum

child can aspire to become Prime Minister. This root assumption is central to all 'Conventional' educational thought and is made explicit in statements of official educational policy. "Education must be conducted in such a way that each child may have the opportunity to develop abilities and aspirations without the limitations imposed by...forms of discrimination." (Ontario Ministry of Education, 1975, p.7) The utopian implication of this assumption can be seen in the following policy statement.

On behalf of the educational community and other citizens, the Government pledges to support an education that develops basic skills, knowledge, and attitudes, that endeavors to provide a fuller life during a child's years in the Primary and Junior Divisions, and that endeavors to nurture every child's growth so that each may be able to continue his or her education with satisfaction and may share in the life of the community with competence, integrity, and joy. (Ontario Ministry of Education, 1975, p.4)

It should be clear from this brief glimpse of 'Conventional' educational policy that the goal conceived for the enterprise of schooling is the improvement of society, the rendering less arbitrary of social inequality, in short, the making of the world into a better place for all.

This then is the defining characteristic of 'Conventional' educational thought; that schooling in general and public education in particular are, at least potentially, agents for social change. The debates within 'Conventional' educational thought take this point for

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granted and center around the factual problem that existing educational structures seem to be having little effect on the wider structures of social inequality. This problem is variously understood to arise from the failure to construct 'efficient' schools or from the failure of certain groups of students to learn 'efficiently' within the existing educational system. It can be initially stated here that much of 'Conventional' educational thought revolves around the instrumentally rational manipulation of the organizational structure of schooling (or of the creation and introduction of 'special' programs to deal with identified individual problems within the existing structure) in order to bring about a change in society in general. The importance of this point will become clear as the argument develops.

I will argue, as others have argued before me, that the failure of schooling to effect social change has to do with a fundamental self-misunderstanding of the role of schooling. Radical educational thinkers have pointed out that the role of schooling in a capitalist society is more accurately one of reproduction than of social change. The assumption which most Radical educational theorists begin from is that schooling in a capitalist society inevitably functions to reproduce the existing social structure. Fundamental to this suggestion is the positing of some form of relationship between the enterprise of schooling and the broader context of the political and economic condition

in which it is situated. This assumption derives from the works of Marx and the insights of Marxist scholars. Thus informed, 'Radical' educational theorists attempt to show the way or ways in which schooling is tied to the wider context such that it reproduces rather than changes existing social relationships.

This brief outline of the major difference between 'Conventional' educational thought and 'Radical' educational theory can serve only as a guide to the line of thought that will structure this paper. The insights of the 'Radical' educational theorists are too profound and compelling to ignore. Indeed, the strength of 'Radical' arguments demonstrating that 'Conventional' educational theories themselves are derived from and constructed according to the wider social and political context, should cause us to regard with suspicion the claims of the 'Conventional' theories. No further attempt will be made to explain or defend 'Conventional' educational thought in any of its forms, for this author believes that a 'Radical' understanding of the social processes involved in the enterprise of schooling renders these former conceptions obsolete.

The question that will be addressed by this paper is: 'How does schooling serve to help reproduce the existing social formation?' On this point the various 'Radical' theories of the educational enterprise part company. There exists a large diversity of such theories with each

claiming at least some exclusivity as 'the' most accurate description of the reproduction process. The differences between these theories can be understood as differences in the emphasis each places on the various elements of Marxist theory. In a recent attempt to summarize 'Radical' educational theories, Giroux has divided them into four main categories based on their common emphases. (1983) The following few pages will use these categories to provide an introduction to the general concepts, ideas, and insights addressed by the various 'Radical' educational theories.

The first of these categories, Economic-reproductive Models, describes the work of Bowles and Gintis (1976, 1980), Althusser (1969, 1970, 1971) and Baudelot and Establet (1971). These writers have as their common feature, an emphasis on the role of the economic base described by Marx. The central suggestion is that a capitalist society makes, as its defining feature, economic demands and that social institutions, including schools, tend to structure themselves in such a way as to meet these demands. This suggestion is expressed by Bowles and Gintis in the following lines. "Specifically, the social relationships of education...replicate the hierarchical division of labour." (1976, p.131) This statement leads to the claim that it is the structure of schooling, a structure dictated by economic forces, that "accounts for both its capacity to reproduce capitalist relations of production and domination and its inability to promote

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healthy personal development,...The actual content of the curriculum has little role to play." (corrected version given in Cole, 1983, p.484)

The limits of this view are quickly dealt with by Cole.

What about the emphasis in history on 'white ruling class men', the well documented sexist and racist content of textbooks, the way in which British imperialism is taught or the American Civil War? Of course this must contribute massively to the reproduction of capitalist relations of production, to the domination of capitalist over worker, white over black, male over female. (1983, p.484)

The sensitivity of Althusser and Baudelot and Establet to this issue led them to incorporate a conception of 'ideology' into their version of the Economic-Reproductive model. However, as the title of their category implies, the influence of the economic base remains predominant and we can suggest that by limiting the concept of ideology to unconscious or false conscious manifestations of economic imperatives, what is produced is an essentially static, ahistorical conception of social reproduction. According to this view what is meant by 'Reproduction' is the predetermined structuring of 'identical social relations. The limitations such a view places on human agency, on the ability of humans to have some control over their destiny, is a major weakness of this model.

The second category, Cultural-Reproductive Models, describes theories which emphasize the superstructural

elements of the capitalist social structure. One interesting example of this model is presented through the work of Bourdieu and Passeron (1977). According to models in this category, there is no simple connection of the structure and content of schooling to economic imperatives. Instead, the school is seen to be relatively autonomous, operating at the superstructural level according to its logic and with real and important effects. Issues of superstructural ideology are no longer to be understood as "imaginary relationship(s)" (Althusser, 1971, p.162). The level of the superstructure constitutes a real world in which human beings live, it is their culture. The nature of an individual's culture is, according to this view, affected by a large number of influences, with the economy being only one. Dominant and subordinate cultures result from access to power on all levels and get reproduced through 'symbolic violence', the subtle exercise of power that results in the interests of the dominant culture, and the class it defines, being represented as universal. One place where this symbolic violence is carried out is in the schools. "By appearing to be an impartial and neutral 'transmitter' of the benefits of a valued culture, schools are able to promote inequality in the name of fairness and objectivity." (Giroux, 1983, p.267)

It should be clear that the danger of replacing the previous economic-determinate model with a cultural-determinate model exists. Indeed when schooling can be

understood as "...nothing but the imposition of a cultural arbitrary." (Archer, 1983, p.201), as it can be in this model, then human agency is ignored to the same extent that it is ignored in economic-determinate models. Once this has occurred, the valuable insight that culture must be linked to actual human interests is obscured. So long as the dominant class retains power, schools will transmit their culture. So long as schools transmit the dominant culture, the dominant class will remain in power. This is little more than a restatement of the radical pessimism of the Economic-reproductive models.

The third category, Hegemonic-State Reproduction Models, introduces the concept of State in its role as mediator between the economic base and the cultural superstructure. Clearly the work of Antonio Gramsci is of central importance to this category. According to Gramsci's work, the State must be understood in a dynamic sense. It must be regarded as an historical moment, a process brought into being and perpetuated by a certain set of historical conditions. Most importantly it must be understood in its having the dual and contradictory role of "establishing the conditions for the accumulation of capital, on the one hand, and the ideological task of moral regulation on the other." (Giroux, 1983, p.277)

The process by which this is carried out, and the condition achieved when the process is successful, is 'Hegemony'. Hegemony is the process by which the ruling

class's right to rule is legitimated. It always takes place in the context of struggle; struggle between class interests, struggle within class interests, and struggle between human needs and the demands of capital. By definition, the interests and issues of the ruled class must be taken into account but, insofar as they are different from and potentially damaging to, the interests of the ruling class, they cannot be met without modification. Hegemony, in this sense, becomes the process of appropriating and modifying the real interests of the ruled or of creating new, false needs and presenting these to the ruled as real, in order to make the fewest concessions possible while maintaining legitimacy.

Insofar as schools are institutions controlled by the State, they can be understood as sites where particular interests (those of the rulers) are presented as universal interests and where discussion of the nature of these interests is destined to remain within narrowly defined and carefully controlled limits. It is in this sense that the role of schools as reproducers of the social order can be suggested.

The strengths of this model, with its emphasis on an historicization of the State and school and on the dynamic nature of social reality in general, are clear. It should also be clear that human agency remains an abstract concept insofar as the connections of the individual and her experience to the level of class and social group remain

undeveloped. Change, even in the form of reproduction, is the product of a process seemingly removed from individual human control.

The final category, that of the Resistance Model, is best described through the work of Willis (1977, 1981). This model will be addressed here in greater detail than those previous. The integration of many of the insights of the other models with a more dynamic and complex conception of the role of human agency in this model, make it particularly powerful.

The central characteristic of this model is that, while remaining firmly within a Marxist framework, it ascribes an active role to the working class. According to this view, the working class engages just as much as the dominant class in a creative self-formation through the active interpretation of their social reality. A key point here is that the working class and the dominant class have different experiences and consequently the results of their interpretations, their cultures, will be different as well. Willis identifies the process of creative self-formation as 'cultural production'.

In order to avoid rendering the concept of 'culture' completely static, Willis goes on to describe the process of 'cultural reproduction'. Cultural reproduction refers to the class specific and dynamic process through which the day to day life of the members of the class is constituted. Here 'culture' is not simply a product but forms an

important part of the process which produces the identity of the class. More clearly stated, the experiences of individuals within the working class are interpreted to form the perceived life-world of the class, its culture, but the experiences themselves are also subjected to constant interpretation through existing perceptions of life-world.

It should be clear now that 'social reproduction', the phenomenon described in each of the other models, can only occur after cultural production and reproduction (in both the dominant and working classes). 'Social reproduction, according to Willis, is the process of struggle leading to the momentary understanding of class relationships. This is similar to hegemony but does not assume that the interests of the working class are accessible to the dominant class nor that the working class can be easily duped by the concessions of the dominant class.

Further, social reproduction means the ongoing replacement of the relationship between the classes, a relationship that derives from the demands of capital. The important point here is that the assumption of replacement only extends as far as the relationship between the classes. It is the relationship that is reproduced and not necessarily the nature of each class. The working class of today may be quite different from the working class of a hundred years ago, but it remains the working class in relation to the dominant class.

The domination of one class by the other is perpetuated, according to this model, as the result of structural and ideological constraints of capitalist social relations in a manner similar to that proposed by the various Reproduction models. The newly introduced concept of cultural reproduction modifies this process somewhat. An example relating directly to the involvement of schools in this process should help make this point clear.

The 'lads' in Willis' study (a group of working class boys at school) embraced the world of manual labour as their own and affirmed its values. In doing so they often came at odds with the values of the school. It is not simply that the lads did not do well in school or that school 'weeded' them out. The lads played a quite active role themselves in the process whereby they left school as early and often as they could in order to get or keep a job. Further, the desire to get a job does not arise through liberal, dominant perceptions of the role of jobs in providing mobility and choice, but rather through an affirmation of the working class perception of the real world. Jobs are sought because of the understanding of the "overwhelming need of instant money, the assumption that all work is unpleasant, and that what really matters is the potential work situations hold for self and particularly masculine expression, diversions, and 'laffs'." (Willis, 1977/p.100) Through their affirmation of the 'real world' experience of the working class and their rejection of the

schools values, that is the values of the dominant class, the lads reinforce a breach between mental and manual labour that is actually supportive of the division between the classes. It is in this sense that cultural reproduction at the level of the working class moves to reproduce the relationship between the classes. "The seeing of strength in the physical, the dismissing of the mental 'book learning', provides an important element in the recreation of the ideological hegemony of the dominant classes." (Apple, 1982, p.99) This points out an interesting contradiction in the relationship between schooling and the demands of a capitalist social formation.

This contradiction occurs in the instance of the dominant culture's faith in more schooling and indeed compulsory schooling. It can be shown that this faith is, in some ways, dysfunctional for the interests of capital. If the schools were to actually meet their self-professed goals of equality and upward mobility, they would do great damage to the needs of capital. This point lead Willis to suggest that if the interests of capital were indeed primary to the dominant class they would freeze workers between the ages of thirteen and twenty and eliminate the 'free' or unneeded education that only creates increased value labour power that capital must then deal with. (1981, p.60) Schools, even now, are producing workers who, in many cases, are much more qualified than is necessary. The cost of their education added to the increased value

demanding for their labour power results in problems that capital must take into account.

Willis believes that the relative autonomy of the school is much better articulated here than it has been previously. The school can never be seen as a mirror reflection of economic or cultural imperatives, nor does it serve a purely functional role for a capitalist social formation. It must be understood in its functional as well as dysfunctional role as a site and process where the aggressively and oppositionally formed dynamic relationship between culturally distinct classes is reproduced.

The most important insight to be gained from this realization is the potential for action which is implicit in the oppositional behaviour of the lads. Willis describes this as a potentially counter-hegemonic force and means by this that in this oppositional behaviour is the genesis of force which would free the classes (Willis, I am sure, would suggest, most specifically, the working class) from the struggle of class conflict. This force must come from the working class because "The working class is the only group in capitalism that does not have to believe in capitalist legitimations as a condition of its own survival." (1977, p.123)

This, Willis finally asserts, must be the aim of a radical pedagogy; to identify and nourish the counter-hegemonic potential of subordinate class cultural production. He argues for the separation of cultural

production from cultural reproduction. We must strive to retain the creative nature of subordinate class cultural production without having it fall victim to automatic cultural reproduction. The latter leads to social reproduction by perpetuating the class relationship.

The value of this model lies in its introduction, in a real sense, of the active role each individual plays in the process of reproduction through resistance, and in its suggestion of the emancipatory potential inherent in oppositional behaviour. However, in tying this potential for emancipation directly to the counter-hegemonic potential of the working class, Willis clearly demonstrates one of the root weaknesses of this model and, indeed, of each of the previous models. These root weaknesses can be initially described as an underdeveloped conception of human agency and an overemphasis on a traditional conception of class structure. The next few pages will address these root weaknesses by connecting them to problems at the core of marxist theory.

It was earlier stated that most 'radical' theories of education rely, to some extent, on the insights of Marx. Indeed the previous section of this chapter has attempted to demonstrate the connections of 'radical' theories of education to the writings of Marx. While the variety of theories is clearly evident, it has been suggested that this variety stems from the differences in emphasis they place on particular elements of Marxist theory. There are

those that stress the economic and those that give primacy to the cultural and those that try to strike a balance between the two. Regardless of their particular view, however, they all claim validity and seek justification through their connection to important marxist concepts. One could suggest that such theories begin with the assumption that the world can be understood according to these concepts.. What this really means is that Marxist theory is conceived of as a 'world understanding'.

The concept of 'world understanding' will be used at several points during this thesis. It should be understood to describe a presented theoretical construction, a system of thought, which can be defended as an accurate description of the world. By definition, such an understanding must be taken seriously by its proponents. What is really being described through this concept is the 'Grand Theory' which informs the specific inquiries conducted in its name. The suggestion that Marxist theory can be represented, according to these criteria, as a 'world understanding', should be uncontentious. It should be clear, however, that central to the usefulness of this concept is the demand that the 'world understanding' be defensible. Clearly this means that the world understanding itself must be continually, and critically examined.

By taking for granted a Marxist 'world understanding', the radical theories of education described above must

limit themselves to discussing, as they have, the primacy of one or another of the concepts, or in connecting them in new ways. Once this has happened, the interpretations of these concepts and their interconnections substitute for truly critical analysis of the concepts and interconnections themselves.

The danger here is that, if the 'world understanding' is flawed, the theories built upon it, and the insights derived from them, stand at risk of being meaningless. If the world understanding does not accurately reflect social reality then its concepts may be imperfectly connected to that reality. Once critical analysis of the concepts stops, once they begin to be taken for granted, it is possible to miss or ignore flaws in the world understanding. I am suggesting here that a dogmatic conception of Marxist theory is a flawed world understanding and that the 'radical' theories of education described above are guilty of a loss of truly critical analysis.

It is left to Critical theory to provide this critical analysis. In order to establish a more accurate world understanding one must extend beyond the relatively dogmatic acceptance of marxist concepts, even those disguised by the rhetorical manipulation of their order. This is the task that Habermas has accepted and this is the task which has created some confusion about the connections of Habermas to Marx. His criticism of concepts considered

central to the work of Marx and his willingness to turn over some of the 'insights' of Marx could lead one to believe that Habermas considers Marxist theory to be fundamentally flawed. On the other hand, there remain many examples of Habermas' indebtedness to these same 'insights' and his defence of the important necessity to view Marx's work in its unity and with careful and respectful attention to its meaning. This would suggest that Habermas is actually quite sympathetic to the work of Marx.

The confusion between these two positions is unnecessary and can be dealt with quite quickly. It is my contention that Habermas understands quite clearly the value of Marx's work and that he can be seen to be conducting a reconstructed Marxist analysis of society. He criticizes Shumpeter (and perhaps it would not stretch the argument too far to suggest that he criticizes avowed marxists of the sort who endlessly debate the primacy of one or another concept) for failing to accept that "an isolation of the 'components' of Marxism, ..., only ends up with disjecta membra, torn out of the context of a dialectical understanding that comprehends the meaning of a theory envisaging society as a totality and related to praxis." (TP, p.205) Further, Habermas' commitment to a reconstructed Marxist analysis is clearly stated in Communication and the Evolution of Society. While explaining the reconstructive approach to Historical Materialism that is central to much of his work, Habermas

makes clear its connection to Marx; "reconstruction signifies taking a theory apart and putting it back together again in a new form in order to attain more fully the goal it has set for itself." (CES, p.95)

It is the failure of marxist dogma to adequately explain modern society, what Habermas calls Late Capitalism, and not some disloyalty on Habermas' part that demand this reconstruction. "(O)ne of the main concerns of Frankfurt social theory is to explain why revolution, as envisaged by Marx, has not occurred in the West. Habermas's contributions to social theory are predicated,...., on a similar concern." (Held, 1980, p.399).

This failure of Marxist social theory rests, according to Habermas, on two major problems. The first of these is an inadequate understanding of the concepts of labour and interaction. Habermas rejects the suggestion that social interaction can be reduced to an effect of a particular level of material production as Marx would seem to suggest when, for instance, he says; "In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of productions appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production." (1970, p.20) It can be clearly seen that, according to this view, as material forces are developed, as humans are required to struggle less forcefully to reproduce their material survival, the demands for a capitalist social

formation are less supportable and therefore a revolution against the unnecessary class divisions is more likely. However, productive forces have increased at an incredible rate since Marx's death, but nothing approaching this revolution has occurred in the West. Habermas hints at an explanation of this when he says, "Marx did not reckon with the possible emergence at every level of a discrepancy between scientific control of the material conditions of life and a democratic decision-making process." (TARS, p.58)

Herein lies the crux of the problem and herein lies the point of departure for Habermas from dogmatic interpretations of Marxist social theory. It is the case that Marx's concept of social labour "cuts too deeply into the evolutionary scale...to capture the specifically human reproduction of life." (CES, p.134-135) In order to capture this 'specifically human reproduction of life' the concept of social interaction must be given its own place as a concept interrelated with, but not reducible to, social labour. Habermas claims that, because it can be demonstrated to precede linguistic communication, social labour is fundamental to the distinction of hominids from animals. Truly human life, however, can only be posited with the addition of a "familial principle of organization" (CES, p.137) which arises out of the need for integration between two subsystems of society (male subsystem and female and child subsystem). This integration, which is

demanded by the developing productive forces, is only possible after the development of language which allows for the "moralization of motives for action". (CES, p.136) Only after language can society become the "social role system" (CES, p.136) that is a crucial element of the social theories of both Marx and Habermas. Marx missed this distinction and Habermas has reminded those of us who wish to continue marxist analyses that normative rules of action cannot be simply collapsed into or derived from, instrumental rationality. Indeed, understanding of human society demands an understanding of the way it reproduces itself through internal control as well as through control of external forces. This is the basis of Habermas' claim that "Labour and Language are older than man and society." (CES, p.137) This claim in turn forms the basis of his understanding of the social world of humans.

The second of the problems is not clearly stated by Habermas. Rather it derives from a reading of his general program. This is that the social integration of human society does not need to be understood as simply the result of a struggle between classes defined by their relation to the means of production and, consequently, that the potential for human (social) emancipation is not the property of one 'revolutionary' class. This is identified by some Marxist thinkers as a weakness of Habermas. The concepts of class struggle and the material origins of class identity are often considered immutable and therefore

any suggestion to the contrary is seen to be unacceptable.

Held, for instance, says with concern; "Critique is addressed to 'mankind as such' and not to any particular class or group." (1980, p.375)

It is my contention that Habermas understands as an historical fact the class-bound structure of capitalist societies. However, he further would claim that this structure and the consequences deriving from it cannot be understood solely according to the demands of a particular level of productive means. The issue of social integration as a distinct element in the formation of a particular society must be included. If this is the case then it becomes dangerous to assign, a priori, predominance to the struggle between classes defined purely according to criteria of material relations. Such an enterprise would be limited to one particular form of society and perhaps one particular form of that society, specifically the early form of capitalism. Habermas, in his discussion of Marx's understanding of the process by which forms of society come to exist, states this most clearly;

.....I am of the opinion that Marx already understood historical materialism as a comprehensive theory of social evolution and regarded the theory of capitalism as one of its subparts. (CES, p.125)

Habermas suggests that the 'capitalism' discussed above no longer exists when he points out the "very complex transition from liberal to organized capitalism." (LC,

p.33) If this is indeed the case then it seems more likely that the emphasis on class struggle, based as it is on a particular and no longer evident social formation, as the genesis of emancipation is unsuitable. It is possible to claim that the very concept of class and class struggle, especially insofar as they are defined in purely economic terms, can be quite successfully co-opted into the very system they propose to criticize. In organized capitalism the good guys and the bad guys are not so easy to see. The very many negative effects of oppression, which are the cornerstones of the marxist belief that the oppressed would rise up in rebellion, can be seen to affect even those individuals who, according to their economic status, would traditionally be considered members of the dominant class: Loss of control over the products of ones labour, loss of control over the structure of production itself, decreasing autonomy and increasing conformity. These problems, manifestations of organized capitalism, are felt by all members of society.

Habermas recognizes these 'Marxist' beliefs. Central to Habermas' work is the demand for human freedom and autonomy. Emancipation is a human potential. It is not to be found in the revolutionary will of one class but rather through the self reflection of all humanity. It is Habermas' claim that he is in the process of describing a theory which remains historical and which retains an interest in discovering the potential for emancipation but

which does not fall into the trap of prescribing a revolution based in the very structure that demands it. The holding up of one 'revolutionary' class is misleading and, in light of the more complex and ideologically bound nature of organized capitalism, dangerous.

Indeed the class presumed by traditional marxist thinkers to be the 'revolutionary' class, the working class, must deal with the issues of power and material survival in their everyday lives to the extent that they can have little time or energy left to contemplate the issue of emancipation. The form of a future society, the direction for emancipation, cannot drive solely from the reactive nature of an oppressed 'revolutionary' class.

...to Trotsky, this appeal to authenticity, as a legitimization of the progressive character of working class culture, unnecessarily restricts the horizon of future cultural development to the low current standard of a class struggling for material survival. (Wexler, 1981, p.252)

As will become clear later in this paper, the nature of organized capitalism affects the freedom and autonomy of all members of society and, as such, the critical self-reflection that becomes the basis for a movement to emancipation must be inspired in all. While it is true that Habermas seems to suggest that the genesis of this critical self-reflection must occur among the intellectuals in society, I think that a careful reading will demonstrate that Habermas believes this to be insufficient. The

movement to emancipation, while it may receive its start from the intellectuals, must be felt by all. As Gramsci has pointed out;

For a mass of people to be led to think coherently...about the real present world, is a 'philosophical' event far more important and 'original' than the discovery by some philosophical 'genius' of a truth which remains the property of small groups of intellectuals. (1971, p.325)

It is the goal of Critical theory, then, to provide an analysis of society which is accessible to all and which can lead to self-reflection by the individuals in society that constitute it.

The analysis mentioned in the previous sentence is identical in purpose to the concept of 'world understanding'. It should be clear by now that it is the contention of this author that the world understanding presented through the work of Habermas is more adequate than the world understanding which forms the basis of the various 'radical' theories of education. In addition to this, a theory of education based upon the more accurate world understanding would also be more adequate. This is, finally, the point behind this thesis. The orienting question 'How do schools influence the reproduction of existing (capitalist) social formations?', can be addressed more satisfactorily through the world understanding of Habermas than through the previous dogmatic world understanding based on the work of Marx. Therefore, the

overall aim of this thesis should be understood to be the application of the work of Habermas to an analysis of a particular element of the contemporary social formation, to be specific, schooling.

The following chapter will therefore attempt to clearly explicate Habermas' world understanding in order to provide the base from which an analysis of education in contemporary society can be conducted.

Chapter Two

A Better World Understanding

At the end of the previous chapter, two problems, which render the 'world understanding' of Marx problematic, were presented. These were; the problem of an inadequate conception of social evolution and the problem of an inaccurate analysis of contemporary society. It was also tentatively stated that a more adequate world understanding could be found in the work of Habermas. The adequacy of this world understanding derives from its successful resolution of these two problems. Finally, it was suggested that a more adequate world understanding could provide a more accurate conceptualization of the role of schooling in the reproduction of a particular social order.

The aim of this chapter will be to provide an introduction to the world understanding of Habermas which will be applied, in the following chapters, to an analysis of the role and process of schooling in advanced capitalist societies. For the purposes of this paper, this world understanding can be summarized through Habermas' analysis of contemporary society. The framework upon which this analysis is built, however, is too complex and important to allow the simple presentation of the analysis in isolation. Within this framework lie the concepts and arguments that form the language of the analysis. Consequently, its presentation forms the precondition to a comprehensible introduction to that analysis.

The framework arises directly from Habermas' addressing of the first problem, the inadequacy of a

dogmatic interpretation of Marx's theory of social evolution. Habermas begins with the articulation of a viable concept of social system. For Habermas, social systems have three characteristics; they have two dimensions (production and interaction), the two dimensions relate to the system in different ways, and they can be defined according to the relationship between the two dimensions.

The first characteristic posits a system which is required to deal with two forms of environment.¹ Firstly, the environment which is constituted by external nature, and which is dealt with through the dimension of production. This really means, as was hinted at in the previous chapter, that humans ensure their survival in the face of a hostile world, through social labour. It can be said, in this context, that the system constituted by the collectivity of humans moves toward an increasing autonomy (meaning, in this instance, freedom from immediate risk of extinction) to the extent that this external nature can be controlled. This control, in turn, derives from the application of "technically utilizable knowledge" (LC, p.9) in processes of production. An important distinction that Habermas introduces here is that the application is subject to rules which are themselves based on "utterances that admit of truth." (LC, p.9) The truth of these utterances is to be supported insofar as they take the form of validity claims which could be 'proved' in discussion.

This point will be returned to momentarily.

The successful dealing with external nature by a social system only partially fulfills its requirements for survival, however. The second ~~form~~ of environment which must be dealt with arises from inner nature. This inner nature refers to the individuals that constitute the social system. Clearly the system can only be maintained insofar as the potential impact of a multiplicity of individual, and competing, interests can be minimized. This is ensured through 'socialization', whereby the individuals in a social system are shaped into "subjects capable of speaking and acting." (LC, p.9) (In as much as the 'socialization' described above really refers to the provision of basic competencies necessary for interaction, and in order to remain analytically consistent, I have chosen to label this the 'dimension of social interaction'). The shaping of which we speak here is accomplished through normative structures which determine the 'correctness' or 'appropriateness' of specific interests or actions. This evaluation of correctness and appropriateness occurs through "norms that have need of justification." (LC, p.10) It should be clear that these 'norms' must also be based in validity claims that are discursively redeemable.

Here, for Habermas, is the connection between the two dimensions. Insofar as instrumental actions (dealing with production) and communicative actions (dealing with interaction) are both mediated through "discursive validity

claims" (LC, p.11), they are also both, of necessity, carried out in the context of "structures of linguistically produced intersubjectivity." (LC, p.10) Language is the key to the humanness of a system. Through language the truth claims and the norms, which must be initially experienced by the individual (that is, subjectively), can be shared or generalized. The result of this generalization is the creation of a symbolic world in which the individual lives; in the creation of a Life-world. It should be clear that, because "The structures of intersubjectivity are just as constitutive for experiences and instrumental action as they are for attitudes and communicative action" (LC, p.10) the Life-world consists of both dimensions. It is according to this context that the specific terms of 'System Integration' and 'Social Integration' can be understood. 'System Integration' describes the successful appropriation of outer nature and 'Social Integration' means the successful appropriation of inner nature. It is precisely because the demands of these two environments must be made comprehensible within the Life-world of the constituent individuals, that we speak of 'integration'. What this really means is that a social system, represented to its constituents through a Life-world, must provide the resources to deal with the pressures of the two dimensions if it is to be considered to be stabilized, if its identity is to be secured. These resources can be identified as the 'Goal Values' of a

society. It is pointed out that "The ~~goal~~ values of social systems are the product, on the one hand, of the cultural values of the constitutive tradition and, on the other, of the non-normative requirements of system integration." (LC, p.7) The connection between the Life-world and the "goal values" should be readily apparent. The goal values constitute the sign posts to which the constituents of the social system can point when describing the identity of the social system. Through the goal values a sense of a unified Life-world can be maintained. Because the goal values apply to both dimensions, we can suggest that it is the level of development of these dimensions (and the specific nature of their relationship to each other) that is determinate of the identity of the social system.

These levels of development follow "rationally reconstructible patterns" (LC, p.11) The rationality of this development derives from an inner logic in each dimension and is not connected to the other dimension. In the dimension of production this logic can be summed up by the suggestion that "cognitive advances cannot be simply forgotten" (LC, p.11) and really describes the empirically (and historically) evident progress of productive forces.

Less evident, and more important for our purposes, is that the dimension of interaction is also subject to its own logic of development, it too is a directional process. The direction it takes can be described through a series of reconstructible stages. Generally these imply a movement

away from ultimate (and consequently, it might be suggested, arbitrary) grounds for socialization, towards an increasing demand for "discursive redemption of normative-validity claims". (LC, p.11) This development is similar to the process of ego development in the individual, which has been described through, among others, the work of Piaget and Kohlberg.² Through the positing of this logic, Habermas is able to suggest that a given stage of development in the dimension of social interaction can "just as little be forgotten as can collectively gained knowledge." (LC, p.12)

The positing of two independent logics of development leads us into the second characteristic of social systems. It is suggested that the two dimensions are related to the system in different ways. Whereas the development of productive forces always increases the autonomy of the system (that is decreases the impact of the external environment on the system), this is not the case with development in the dimension of interaction.³ It has been pointed out that the logic of development in social interaction is based in internal imperatives and is not connected directly to the functioning of the system (as, for example, the logic of production is). Consequently, the possibility exists that some of the system autonomy gained through an increase in productive capacities will be cancelled out by development in the dimension of interaction which increases the complexity of the system

environment.⁴

The reasons for this stem from the insight that inner nature "does not belong to the system environment, in the same way as outer nature." (LC, p.13) Once a problem presented by outer nature has been dealt with through the application of productive forces, it is rendered immediately unproblematic. However, even after socialization an individual may present problems for the social system since "socially related individuals resist...being absorbed without remainder into society." (LC, p.13) When Habermas links this resistance to the process of "growing individuation" (LC, p.14), which derives from development in the dimension of interaction, he makes clear that such development actually renders the Life-world more complex. It can, therefore, be suggested that the constraints imposed by the complex demands of social integration are the ultimate source of the identity of a social system, for in these the limits on the goal values are realized. It is the normative structures implied in social interaction which "constrict the range of variation of the goal values." (LC, p.13) The rules through which production is organized must first be comprehensible according to the norms and morals that establish the nature of social integration in a society.

As a result of this constraint on the automatic movement towards 'system' autonomy (which is key to the articulation of 'systems theory'), Habermas makes the

distinction that;

Societies are also systems, but their mode of development does not follow solely the logic of the expansion of system autonomy (power); social evolution transpires rather within the bounds of a logic of the life-world, the structures of which are determined by linguistically produced intersubjectivity and are based on criticizable validity claims. (LC, p.14)

This leads into the third characteristic of social systems. The unique nature of the 'steering capacity', which is enabled through the goal values, of these systems results from the positing of a relationship between the two dimensions. Changes in that capacity occur as a "function of growing control over outer nature and of increasing integration of inner nature." (LC, p.14) The growth and increase are secured by an "automatic inability not to learn" (LC, p.15) which is descriptive of the human experience. This 'automatic inability' provides a constant source of surplus knowledge which can, at least potentially, be used socially. Thus, automatically assured learning is the motor behind the development of society. The level of development of a society can, therefore, be initially described according to the types and levels of learning permitted within it. To this must be added implications of the two dimensions. What this means is that, because each of the dimensions is connected to the social system differently, we can imagine that each requires its own unique form of learning or, more

precisely, knowledge.

This last point is important because it leads into the concept of 'Moral/Practical' knowledge. Two dimensions of social systems have been posited. It should be clear that the dimension of production requires "technically useful knowledge" (CES, p.142), that is, knowledge which can be brought to bear against external nature in order to control it. Learning in the dimension of production is rooted in, the gaining of this technically useful knowledge and the establishment of rules conducive to the application of that knowledge. Technically useful knowledge is applied through 'instrumental action'.

Moral/practical knowledge, on the other hand, is directly oriented to the dimension of social interaction. It is through moral/practical insight that the norms and the normative structures which secure the identity of the Life-world come into existence. The previously described centrality of the dimension of interaction to the crystallization of a social systems identity, should now make tenable the suggestion that any change in that identity demands (or presupposes) moral/practical knowledge. It should also be clear that the application of moral/practical knowledge occurs within communicative action. The central implication here is that, in as much as the identity of a social system is established through communicative action, moral/practical knowledge plays a constitutive role in it. This implication will be quite

important to later sections of the argument.

At this point the concept of 'Organizational Principle' must be discussed. In this concept, the concepts that have been previously described are linked and can be applied directly to the analysis of a social system. By 'organizational principle' Habermas means "highly abstract regulations arising as emergent properties in improbable evolutionary steps and characterizing, at each stage, a new level of development." (LC, p.7) If the phrase 'new level of development' means a change of identity (as it must), then, following the arguments presented above, a new subsystem of social integration must be implied. These 'organizational principles' then, are actually fundamental institutional bases which, initially, enable specific forms of social integration. The 'organizational principle' of a social system provides, in an analytic sense, a summary description of the evolutionary level of that society. "By principles of organization I understand innovations...which institutionalize new levels of societal learning. (CES, p.155) It should be clear, however, that the presentation, out of the context of a theory of evolution, of an 'organizational principle' would be quite unsatisfactory. Habermas himself recognized this and suggests that the concept requires elucidation according to "evolutionary features" through which the "forms of social integration (are) determined by principles of social organization"

(CES, p.154 parentheses added). The following few pages will attempt to demonstrate, using the concepts previously introduced, how such a program can be carried out.

The first point that must be made clear regarding Habermas' theory of social evolution is that it does not rely on a "species subject that undergoes evolution." (CES, p.140) While it might have seemed that the concept of a social system stands in danger of reification, it should also be clear that the emphasis on the Life-world of the constituents points directly to their role in the development of society. It is the individuals who constitute a society which are the subjects capable of learning. In turn, (or perhaps, at the some time) these individuals gain competencies through which learning experiences can be shared within their symbolic Life-world. Therefore, it is through the successful integration of these diverse subjects (through social integration) that this learning becomes accessible to the social system. This is what Habermas means when he states that "It is only in a derivative sense that societies 'learn'." (CES, p.121) The central point to be drawn here is that social systems rely on the "learning capacities of social subjects" in order to form structures (manifested through organizational principles) which can "solve steering problems that threaten their continued existence." (CES, p.154) It should be quite clear by now that it is learning in the sphere of moral/practical knowledge which is specifically

implied in the formation of structures that expand allowable learning.

The process of social evolution, then, would take the following form. Organizational principles establish the parameters within which a society can deal with problems presented by external nature and challenges from internal nature. Learning, in both dimensions, automatically occurs at the level of the individual and, through the Life-world, enters the system as potential resources which can be applied socially to deal with the problems and challenges. This learning continues even when it stands outside the limits that define the identity of the social system, and becomes excess knowledge (in the sense that it remains remote from action). Of course this learning cannot be thematized, as such, within the Life-world which is symbolically structured according to goal values that define what can be made intersubjectively intelligible. When problems and challenges overload the capacity of the present system (that is, cannot be dealt with through the limited knowledge allowed by the particular organizational principle), and this overloading is transferred to the Life-world where it becomes real for the individual, the Life-world itself becomes problematic. The identity of the social system is endangered, it is in a state of crisis. This crisis, by definition, cannot be resolved through the knowledge permitted within the social system. Instead, the excess knowledge already present in the individuals becomes

the source of evolutionary potential. Since we are referring to an identity crisis for the system, it is moral/practical knowledge which is necessary. "It requires not an expansion of our control over external nature but knowledge that can be embodied in structures of interaction- in a word, an extension of the autonomy of society in relation to our own, internal nature." (CES, p.146)

The actual evolutionary moment, then, refers to the institutionalization of a developmentally rational structure of social integration. This is to say, the establishment of a new Organizational Principle. This introduction sets new parameters for social integration which, in turn, establish a new range of problem solving potentials that are not threatening to the identity of the new social formation. The forces of production, which were hindered at the limits of the previous social formation, are now able to continue developing. The identity threatening problems which overwhelmed the previous social systems steering capacity can be comfortably handled within the new social systems steering capacity.

It was stated at the beginning of this chapter, that the framework (which ultimately finds its expression in Habermas' theory of social evolution) arose from the addressing of the inadequacy of a dogmatic interpretation of Marx's theory of social evolution. The similarity of many of the concepts is clear. Certainly Marx already

understood the mode of production (which is descriptive of a social formation) to contain both forces of production and relations of production. These latter concepts are also evident in Habermas as the dimensions of production and interaction. In Marx, however, the dimensions were too simplistically related. The forces of production demanded specific relations of production, progress in the former demanded parallel progress in the latter. The fault in this conception is the implication of a "unilinear, necessary, uninterrupted, and progressive development" (CES, p.139) such that five specific (and exclusive) 'Modes of Production' could be posited. By demonstrating the internal logic of development in each of the dimensions of the social system, Habermas has freed the theory of social evolution from the "technologicistic interpretation" (CES, p.144) which, for Habermas, places unnecessary limits on our understanding of social systems. According to that interpretation, one might examine the factual history of a particular society and identify the patterns leading from this as the process that any society must undergo to attain a similar level of evolutionary development. This "objectivism of philosophy of history" (CES, p.139) can be removed if we remind ourselves that "(m)any paths can lead to the same level of development;" (CES, p.141) In response to this reminder, Habermas' theory of social evolution has sought to demonstrate the broad structural sequences that a society must pass through if it is to be

considered to be evolving and not the actual processes of a particular society. It is for this reason that Habermas has substituted "organization principles" for "modes of production" in an attempt to correct rather than reject Marx. The 'organizational principles' describe parameters within which the two dimensions can be related or separated, not the specific identity of their relationships.

One of the important implications of this formulation of a theory of social evolution is that it allows room for a conception of human agency. That is, the individuals within a society are free to act within limits, not forced, as they would be in the dogmatic Marxist interpretation, to act in specific ways. It must be kept in mind throughout the remainder of this thesis that it is the 'individual' who gains moral/practical insight (as well as technical knowledge) and that a society can only be said to be 'learning' if the individuals within it are learning. Human agency, in this sense, means that each individual has the capacity to struggle to realize the potential implicit in her practical insights. Even in the instance that these insights cannot be thematized within the parameters of a given Life-world, they do constitute part of that individual's reality. Just as society 'learns' in a derivative sense, through struggle these insights have the potential to become social, even if only after the institutionalization of a new level of development. This

point is most important to keep in mind during later sections of this thesis when it seems to be suggested that individuals are powerless.

At the risk of exposing the argument too early, I will suggest here that it is not the case that the individual is powerless, but rather that she believes herself powerless. This betrays the workings of ideology. While a complete (and completely satisfying) elucidation of this concept is beyond the scope of our present discussion, some brief words about it are necessary. Ideology finds its birth, historically, with the rise of the first class society. Habermas has labelled this society, 'Traditional Social Formation', and describes its organizational principle as 'class domination in political form'. With the move from primitive to traditional society, system autonomy was greatly increased. The cost that was paid for this, however, was manifested in the domain of social integration, where domination by one group over another was institutionalized.⁵ The argument basically suggests that, because the evolutionary step to traditional society implies a rationalization of normative structures, such domination is problematic. This is dealt with through the establishment and justification of a "legitimate order of authority" (LC p.19). This order of authority is justified according to the level of moral/practical insight of the particular social formation. Therefore, in traditional societies it is justified according to "traditional world

views and a conventional civic ethic." (LC, p.19) The point that should be taken from this is that class conflict, inherent in all class societies (and all societies, from the traditional to contemporary have been class societies) is disguised under the influence of a justified order of authority. Moral/practical insight comes to be directed, towards this justification and not towards the rationalization of communicative action. This is what is meant by ideology. Ideologies "remove the counterfactual validity claims of normative structures from the sphere of public thematization and testing." (LC, p.19)

At this moment the result of the workings of ideology against communicative action becomes clear. This is evidenced in what Habermas calls 'systematically distorted communication'. What this means is that "at least one of the participants deceives himself about the fact that the basis of consensual action is only apparently being maintained." (CES, p.210) In as much as it is 'ideology' which sustains this 'appearance', which pressures the individual to accept the existing order 'on authority', the role of ideology in the systematic distortion of communication can be understood.

It is important to point out here that the evolution of class based social systems can be, to a certain extent, understood as the undermining of the justification of the existing order of authority and the replacement of it with a new justification which makes use of a new level of

moral/practical insight. It is, in a sense, a movement through the critique of ideology. The danger, Habermas would suggest, is that, as the justifications become rooted in higher levels of moral/practical knowledge, they become more difficult to penetrate. The importance of this point will become clear as the analysis of contemporary society is carried out.

An Analysis of Contemporary Society

Habermas' analysis of contemporary society, which I have previously argued describes his world understanding, represents the concrete application of the concepts which have, to this point, remained abstract in a general theory of social system/social evolution. A clear presentation of this analysis will serve the double purpose of providing the analytical tools and the methodological model which can be applied in an analysis of the role of schooling (a social institution) in contemporary society.

Habermas uses the label 'Organized Capitalism' to describe contemporary society. He suggests that organized capitalism is distinguishable from 'Liberal Capitalism' on the basis of its organizational principle. Indeed, organized capitalism must be understood to represent an evolutionary step from liberal capitalism. Consequently, a few brief points about the nature of liberal capitalism must be clarified.

The organizational principle of liberal capitalism was "the relationship of wage labour and capital". (LC, p.20) The introduction of wage labour, that is the assigning of a monetary value to work, permitted a commoditization of human beings. This commoditization is the key to understanding how the new organization principle provided a new range of potentials for social system identity maintenance. Once it had occurred, the ideological conception of an economic exchange of equivalents could be applied to social integration. This is to say that society ceased to be organized primarily through the medium of traditional values, which require legitimation, that is, which refer directly to human interaction. Instead, society was organized through the medium of economic exchange, which was capable of legitimating itself according to objectified, 'natural' rules. These 'natural' rules are actually manifestations of system integrative needs, they refer to the relationship between a system and its external environment. The very 'naturalness' of these rules implied a sense of universality. The result of this was that the separation of the dimensions of social production and social integration was finally complete.

However, this separation, and its consequent relegation of the State to a passive support role (facilitating the structural conditions favorable to production and the unhampered process of economic exchange), created a situation where economic imperatives,

stripped of moral content, could directly affect the dimension of social integration. In other words, the real power relationships between individuals in a capitalist social formation were disguised through reference to the nature-like process of an exchange of equivalents (clearly ideological); they were depoliticized.

In order for this to be effective, the dominant class had to "convince itself that it no longer rules." (LC, p.22) This was made possible through a scientific critique of tradition. In order to establish the institution of wage labour as the organizational principle of the new social formation, a scientific critique had to undermine the important elements of tradition which had previously provided the legitimation for particular forms of social organization.

The transfer of socially integrative functions to a subsystem that primarily fulfills system integrative functions is possible only because in liberal capitalism the class relationship is institutionalized through the labor market and is thereby depoliticized. (LC, p.25)

What this really means is that in liberal capitalism, through the scientific critique, the dimension of interaction was addressed directly using the language and concepts which, previously, were used in relation to the dimension of production.

The commoditization of humans, which is the real effect of this event, allows the generalization of specific

interests (exactly, the interests of those who hold economic power) as universal interests. It allows the disguising of the actual relationship between classes defined by power, it de-personalizes (and, as has been pointed out, de-politicizes) the power relationship. It can not, however, disguise the consequences that arise from the improper placing of elements of system integration into the dimension of social integration. These consequences manifest themselves as "interruptions of the process of accumulation" (LC, p.29) and represent moments of awareness of the intrusion of system integrative demands in the dimension of social interaction. These moments of awareness generally arise directly from crises in the economic sphere, and through them the actual class/power relationship is again made clear. Once this relationship is clear, demands for a reorientation of social organization, for a new collective identity, cannot be resisted for long. It is in this sense that we can say that in liberal capitalism, for the first time, economic crises (crises in the dimension of production) become identity crises (crises in the most meaningful sense, implying an evolutionary step in the dimension of social integration).

Important here is that these economic crises occur with some regularity in the market system of a capitalist society. Marx pointed out the mechanics by which a society based on private capital accumulation through the principle

of the relationship between wage labour and capital, will suffer cycles of falling rates of profit and consequently a reduction in the "impulse to the continuation of the process of accumulation". (LC, p.29) The end result of each of these cycles will be an interruption of the process of accumulation and a consequent reawakening of awareness of the unfairness of the class/power relationship.

These cycles of economic crises, so long as they remain in the domain of system integration, may well continue indefinitely, if learning in the dimension of production continues to create the productive forces necessary to solve them. However, it has been pointed out that these economic crises have intruded into the domain of social integration and become identity crises. Habermas has suggested that when a social system is suffering an identity crisis, learning in the dimension of social integration (an automatic process) will render more likely the evolutionary movement into a new form of social organization.

Habermas then suggests that this movement has occurred in the following manner. The economic/identity crises were manifested in realizations of "functional weaknesses in the market and dysfunctional side effects of the steering mechanisms" and resulted in a collapse of "the bourgeois ideology of fair exchange". (LC, p.36) The collapse of that ideology and of the social formation that was supported by it, occurred in the context of the application

of evolutionary potential and the result of that application is 'Organized Capitalism'. While there exists no consensus on this point, for the purposes of this thesis it will be suggested that the organizational principle of organized capitalism can be identified as 'State intervention in the relationship of wage labour to capital'. This is really a reintroduction of the State as an active influence into both the dimensions of production and of social interaction. This has the effect, primarily, of disconnecting the dimension of production from its direct influence on social system identity, but does so at the cost of once again requiring legitimation. As Habermas points out:

The state apparatus no longer, as in liberal capitalism, merely secures the general conditions of production (in the sense of the prerequisites for the continued existence of the reproduction process), but now is actively engaged in it. It must, therefore-like the pre-capitalist state - be legitimated, although it can no longer rely on residues of tradition that have been undermined and worn out during the development of capitalism. (LC, p.36)

This last point is important. The organizational principle of State intervention demands legitimation yet can neither derive this directly through reference to the bourgeois ideology nor from any historical precedents. This is the problem of legitimation and is one of the two central issues in the analysis of modern western society. The second issue is the rise of scientific rationality as an ideology. The importance of the issue of the increasing

dominance of scientific rationality to an understanding of the nature of legitimation in organized capitalism demands that it be dealt with first.

The concern over this issue is central to Habermas' world understanding and runs, as a clear theme, through most of his work. Indeed, just as much as liberal capitalism and its organizational principle were supported by the bourgeois ideology, the ideology of scientific rationality is the base upon which organized capitalism is built. The basic argument is that, in liberal capitalism, system elements entered and directly affected the dimension of social integration. This, combined with a depoliticization of the State, meant that problems of social integration were understood to arise as the result of system crises. Organized capitalism is designed to mitigate identity threatening system crises by managing the connection between the dimension of production and the dimension of social interaction. This then leads us to the central point of this analysis of contemporary society. The management of that connection can only be accomplished, in a capitalist social system, by translating practical problems (problems in the sphere of human interaction) into technical problems. In other words, through instrumental action. Consequently, scientific knowledge, the kind of knowledge useful for addressing technical problems, has come increasingly to dominate as the only 'legitimate' form of knowledge. Before this line of thought is pursued, some

basic points must be addressed.

Firstly, a separation of the forms of knowledge is posited. This separation was fostered, as previously described, under liberal capitalism as a way of freeing the dimension of production from dysfunctional elements of social integration (traditional values). The separation is described, somewhat ironically, by Horkheimer and Adorno as 'The Enlightenment' of which they say "The program of enlightenment was...the dissolution of myths and the substitution of knowledge for fancy." (1972, p.3) In this statement, 'the dissolution' means the undermining of traditions and 'the substitution' means the domination of scientific rationality.

Implicit in this argument is that scientific knowledge is uniquely tied to the dimension of production. In other words, that scientific knowledge and labour are inseparably connected. Of this Habermas says "Hence the modern sciences produce knowledge which through its form...is technically exploitable knowledge." (TARS, p.99) The phrase 'technically exploitable knowledge' really means that the knowledge can be applied, as labour, to realize some effect in the dimension of production; in the dealing with external nature. Accordingly, the success of scientific knowledge, its usefulness, is defined according to its ability to influence outer nature. It is in this sense that we can suggest that scientific knowledge is realized through instrumental action. Scientific knowledge

can claim to be self-legitimizing insofar as it can demonstrate an effect on the external environment. Once this claim has been accepted, the technical exploitability of scientific knowledge can be separated from the intent of the scientist.

What all this meant for the newly developing social formation of 'liberal capitalism' was that the unitary world views through which humans previously explained their collective and individual experiences were split into the cognitive (relating to scientific rationality) and the moral (relating to socially integrative rationality). Insofar as the former is self-legitimizing, and the latter seems to imply reference to some ultimate truth or values that were undermined during the rise of liberal capitalism, the cognitive has gained predominance as the model of knowledge. On a broad societal level this results in the effective disengagement of human intent from human activity. The criterion for defining 'correct' knowledge refers not to the wishes of the human constituents of a social system, but rather to the instrumental potential it contains. The ominous nature of this process is hinted at in the following lines; "Today, theories can become technical power while remaining impractical, that is, without being expressly oriented to the interaction of a community of human beings." (TARS, p.55)

It should be clear that the division discussed above actually describes the two dimensions which Habermas

suggests are fundamental to all social systems, the dimension of production and the dimension of social interaction. The problem is that in capitalism, for the first time, one dimension has come to dominate over the other and elements of it have spilled into the other. It has been shown that each dimension is related to the social system in a unique way and consequently it follows that elements of one dimension must be inadequate for dealing with problems in the other. In organized capitalism, the intrusion of elements of the dimension of production, in the form of the domination of scientific rationality, is formalized to an historically unique degree. The results of this are crises in the dimension of social integration that take the form of 'motivational crises'.

These crises are manifested at the individual level as a sense of loss of autonomy and, ultimately, in a collective sense of loss of autonomy. As the intrusion of instrumental action into the dimension of social integration render the Life-world of the individual more complex (as we have suggested is likely), each individual is forced to understand her existence as an increasingly complex system of contingencies. These contingencies confront the individual as problematical choices and dependencies. To the extent that these choices and dependencies occur within the dimension of social integration, yet are systematically denied access to moral/practical knowledge to justify them or assess their

appropriateness (as a result of the domination of scientific knowledge), they can be understood only as contingencies:

Contingencies that are irremovably attached to the bodily and moral constitution of the individual can be raised to consciousness only as contingency. We must, in principle, live disconsolately with them.
(LC, p.120)

This really describes the phenomenon whereby the Lifeworld loses its subjective nature in relation to the individuals that constitute it; it comes to be presented as an externally imposed reality. The ensuing consequence of this process is a sense of an "unresponsiveness of the world to the actor, which subjects him to forces he neither comprehends nor guides." (LC, p.120, quoted from Etzioni, A. The Active Society, 1968, p.618) This then leads to a tendency, as described above, to disconnect the formation of motives (inspiration to action) from the creation of norms (communicative action) and to reconnect it to the pursuit of technical potentials (instrumental action). This is the motivational crisis. We have ceased to ask what form of society we truly want, and have resigned ourselves to seeking only what we feel we can achieve within the constraints of an externally imposed social reality. This describes the condition whereby individuals in society have come to 'believe' that they are powerless. Once again it should be pointed out that this does not necessarily imply the actuality of powerlessness. The

'potential' for emancipatory action exists, but under the present circumstances the initial condition required for its realization is the recognition of the illusory nature of the 'belief' in the constraints of an externally imposed social reality.

It is in this context that the role of the State in organized capitalism can begin to be understood. This role is, most accurately, one of dealing with complexities of the system environment (including that environment constituted by inner nature), instrumentally. Horkheimer and Adorno define this process as the "enthronement of means as an end" (1972, p.54) and Habermas describes it in the following way;

In so far as government action is directed toward the economic system's stability and growth, politics now takes on a peculiarly negative character. For it is oriented toward the elimination of dysfunctions and the avoidance of risks that threaten the system: not, in other words, toward the realization of practical goals, but toward the solution of technical problems. (TARS, p.102)

This brings us to the next issue in an analysis of contemporary society, the issue of the problem of legitimation. It was stated that, in organized capitalism where the State is reintroduced as an active, indeed even central, component of the social organization, a repoliticization of world views would seem to be demanded. It should be equally clear that such a repoliticization is problematical. It must be remembered that, while organized capitalism is to be considered a new evolutionary stage, it

remains a capitalist form of social organization. In such a social formation, based as it is on the private (and unequal) appropriation of socially produced goods, an actual repoliticization (meaning a re-motivation towards communicative action through moral/practical knowledge) would immediately threaten the identity of the social formation. Habermas points out that "normative structures...are at odds with the growing steering needs of the political-economic system." (LC, p.129)

The problem of legitimation is, therefore, that the reintroduction of the State in an active role means repoliticization (allowing that the actual preceding insights in the dimension of social interaction are not simply ignored, as we have suggested they cannot be) but a repoliticization means the State must once again be legitimated. This legitimation cannot arise from the now dissolved bourgeois ideology nor can it arise from traditions which were dissolved by that ideology. This is the link between the two issues central to contemporary society, for it is the ideology of scientific rationality which "take(s) on the function of legitimating political power." (LC, p.100) A little elaboration is necessary for this point to come clear.

Legitimacy must be seen as "a contestable validity claim" (CES, p.178) which allows a political order to present itself as a worthy order. Legitimacy provides "the stability of the order of domination" (CES, p.178) in spite

of potential disputes over its rightness. In organized capitalism these potential disputes arise as a result of the contradiction between the privileged appropriation of socially produced goods and the realization, derived from the experience of liberal capitalism, that this leads to great inequities and unfairness. This is the contradiction that the State must reconcile in order to be considered legitimate. The importance of legitimacy cannot be overstated; "no political system can succeed in permanently securing mass loyalty - that is, its members willingness to follow - without recourse to legitimations." (CES, p.180)

The solution to this problem is found in the implementation of a system of 'Formal Democracy'. As has been suggested, the implementation of substantive democracy in organized capitalism would quickly bring to light the contradiction between the social production of goods and their continued private, privileged appropriation. In a 'formal democracy', however, the citizens are essentially limited to the choice of what group to place in a position of political power (interestingly, for the vast majority of us, even political participation has been turned into contingency, picking the 'best' from a set of pre-given choices). Once in power, and for the duration of their term of power, the administrative decisions (and these are really the form that instrumental action takes when it is applied in the dimension of social integration) of that group can be made "largely independently of specific

motives of the citizens." (LC, p.36) "The obviously resulting situation is a form of social organization where capital accumulation, and its consequent inequities, can continue while legitimation is secured through "the application of institutions and procedures that are democratic in form, while the citizenry, in the midst of an objectively political society, enjoy the status of passive citizens with only the right to withhold acclamation." (LC, p.37) Through this system of formal democracy, in which the political forum is "sustained in appearance only" (CES, p.120) the State establishes its right to rule, its legitimacy. In this sense the contradictory situation of a de-politicized repoliticization is made possible.

In order to prevent the thematization of this contradictory situation, two major effects of 'formal' democracy on the individual citizen must be dealt with. The first deals with the relative political weakness of the citizen. In this respect the government must make administrative decisions that prevent this weakness from directly impacting on the citizen. These administrative decisions are supported by "syndromes of civil and familial-vocational privatism" (LC, p.75) which are identical to the transfer of motives from practical issues to technical potentials, as mentioned earlier. In these, "interests in consumption and leisure...and in a career orientation suitable to status competition" (LC, p.75) determine the parameters within which the world is

conceived. Therefore, as long as the State ~~is~~ providing the opportunity for these to a sufficient degree, actual political weakness will not be thematized. The most obvious example of this is the development of a state welfare system, through which even the socially unproductive (and therefore potentially weakest political actors) have access to consumer goods and leisure. Another example, most important to this paper, is the institution of "structures of education and occupational systems that are regulated by competition." (LC, p.75) This point will be expanded on later in the thesis.

The second major effect is the "structural de-politicization itself" (LC, p.37) What this really means is that the real lack of political participation of each citizen, replaced as it is by the marking of an x in a box, must be explained to the satisfaction of the citizenry. This de-politicization is explained through reference to the ideology of scientific rationality. As has been pointed out previously, this ideology has led to the intrusion of techniques (instrumental action in the form of administrative decision making) into the sphere of social interaction. Insofar as techniques demand of expertise, the claim can be (ostensibly) justifiably made, that those who have expertise must be those who hold political office. According to this rationality, the ordinary citizen is excluded from political participation by her own lack of expertise, her own lack of cognitive knowledge. In this

case, the substitution of cognitive knowledge for practical inquiry (which has been previously described) means that, through the establishment of 'formal' democracy, even the ostensibly political sphere has become de-politicized.

The substitute program prevailing today, in contrast, is aimed exclusively at the functioning of a manipulated system. It eliminates practical questions and therewith precludes discussion about the adoption of standards; the latter could emerge only from a democratic decision-making process. (TARS, p.104)

This describes the situation which Habermas has called "a forcefully integrated action system". (LC, p.27) In this system, according to the ideology of scientific rationality and the conditions of formal democracy, what is understood as a 'need' is changed. Human needs have been redefined according to instrumentally rational rules. Legitimate needs have come to be identified with components of the process of capital accumulation as administered by the State, and are universalized.

Once such a universalization of needs occurs and is instrumentally satisfied by the State, a successful repression of needs has also occurred. This is due to the fact that the State, according to processes described above, contains only illusory elements of the dimension of social integration. It is not well equipped to deal with needs deriving from that dimension and must discount their validity. In this manner, a 'need' generated by the system and addressable through the media available to the system

(science/technology) renders unlikely, discussion about human needs (which, by definition, must derive from the sphere of morality), by replacing them. This is the situation that Habermas would identify as "Systematically distorted communication" (LC, p.27) and refers to the repression of real human needs through the legitimation and universalization of inauthentic needs. Insofar as the inauthentic needs derive from instrumental rationality and instrumental rationality implies control, the possibility of a true consensus, that is a consensus brought about solely by the force of the better argument, being realized, is limited. It is the imposition of a pre-established structure (in the case of organized capitalism, a structure deriving from a scientific/technical conception of the social world) onto communication, that limits the emancipatory potential implicit in communication. This is the meaning of 'systematically distorted communication'.

Finally we have arrived at the key to the reproduction of the existing social formation; systematically distorted communication. With the ideological institutionalization of systematically distorted communication (which is precipitated by the variety of processes described above), the dimension of social interaction is finally disconnected from access to practical knowledge. In other words, the potential implicit in insights within the dimension of social integration has been cut off by the removal of a context within which they could be understood as

meaningful. The effect of this is that practical issues, that is real human issues, are replaced by technical issues which, by definition, should represent system demands. This really means that the demands of system form the preconditions for social integration. Put another way, the steering capacity of organized capitalism (the range of variation possible without the move to a change in fundamental identity) is huge. Given this, it should be easy to see that social reproduction seems sustainable in the long term.

The important distinction between the traditional Marxist understanding of this and the understanding presented here is that this replacement, in organized capitalism, must be legitimated. This happens through the representation of technical rationality as political necessity. It is the representation of the world as contingency, that is, as demanding technical rationality, which provides the justification for the imposition of system demands on social integration. This representation is a representation to which all members of a social system fall prey. It is not, as Marx might assert, the subtle (or not too subtle) domination of one class by another class. It is the domination of all humanity through the blocking of the 'human' element of social systems. It is the perpetuation of a mistaken belief that human needs are identical to system needs. It is, as Habermas describes it, "the stabilization of a nature-like social system over

the heads of its citizens..." (LC, p.143)

It should be clear by now that this 'stabilization' is the result of the inappropriate intrusion of technical rationality into the dimension of social integration. This intrusion is 'inappropriate' for two major reasons. Firstly, the two dimensions are related to the social system in different ways. The most important implication of this is that "Socialization, the adapting of inner nature to society, unlike production, the adapting of outer nature to society, cannot be satisfactorily conceived of as a reduction of environmental complexity." (LC, p.13) As this is the case, technical rationality, which is by definition aimed toward the reduction of environmental complexity, will be inadequate for the task of 'socialization'.

Secondly, the intrusion and its legitimation will remove from discussion the sphere of moral/practical knowledge. This situation has occurred in organized capitalism. The social system in its entirety has fallen under the pervasive ideology of technocracy. This means that issues in the dimension of social integration are translated into technical issues. Consequently, real human needs, which by definition cannot be decided in other than the sphere of moral/practical knowledge, are pre-given and defined according to the structures of System Integration. This situation is made more dangerous under the ideology of technocracy because that ideology itself hides the possible

conception that "structures of intersubjectivity are just as constitutive for experiences and instrumental action as they are for attitudes and communicative action." (LC, p.10) The humanness of language, which previously provided the connection between the two dimensions, is forgotten, and language itself is instrumentalized. This is the final seal on the fate of moral/practical knowledge, for an instrumentalized language can only understand "utterances that admit of truth." (LC, p.8) The implications of this should, by now, be clear. Once norms and values can be expressed as 'truths', the insight that they should follow their own logic is lost. The criteria for assessing the validity of their claims is no longer to be found according to their 'correctness and appropriateness' as expressions of human interests, but rather their 'usefulness' in the organization of society.

All of these points lead to the same conclusion. The historical condition that is organized capitalism, is characterized by a blocking of the sphere of moral/practical knowledge. Insofar as this sphere is the proper source for insight (that is, for learning) in the dimension of social integration, its absence has real effects on the social system as a whole.

One clarification must be made here before this line of thought is pursued. It is not necessary for the social formation to be conceived as a completely static entity. Indeed, it has been hinted at earlier in this paper that

social formations are more adequately described by the term 'process'. What this means is that it is not necessary to conceive of an exact reproduction, a carbon copy, of a particular social formation. Such a conception would neither be supported by historical evidence, nor be supportable according to common sense. Therefore, what is meant by the concept 'reproduction' in this paper, is that the social formation as it is defined by a Principle of Organization, is reproduced.

It should be remembered that the concept of principle of organization allows the separation of the realized historical description of a social formation from the general structural limits within which it occurs. The latter are defined by the organizational principle. The identity of a social formation, according to this formulation, is attached to the organizational principle and not to the unique historical moments that constitute a social formation at one point in time. Simply stated, Canadian society and the society of the United States are historically different events, yet they both occur within the structural limits of the organizational principle of State intervention. More to the point for the present use, the Canadian society of today is different from the Canadian society of fifty years ago, but both Canadas are described by the term 'organized capitalism'.

One final point must be made clear. As has been pointed out, it is the individuals in a social system who

are the subjects that 'learn'. It is true that the individuals continue to learn in both dimensions (technical and practical) and that the insights provided should lead to evolutionary movements in the case where the existing social structure conflicts with the moral insights. What is suggested of the historical situation of organized capitalism is that the insights of the moral dimension, which continue to be realized at the individual level, are blocked from thematization at the collective level through the delegitimation of the moral/practical dimension. The blockage, which permits reproduction, occurs between the individual and the collective.

This blockage is the result of the separation of human intent and human action mentioned previously. It is the self-legitimizing success of instrumental action (which can be conceived of as human activity oriented by externally imposed reality), in the context of a scientization of society, which initially created that separation. Once this occurred, human intent could be reoriented according to system integrative needs. This is manifested in the sense in the individual of an "unresponsiveness of the world to the actor" (Etzioni, 1968, p.618) As has been suggested many times above, human intent becomes redefined as directed toward gaining control in that unresponsive world. The individual is forced to forget her role in the creation of the world and to attempt to appropriate it according to its perceived nature as imposed 'reality'.

The following chapter will demonstrate that this event, and the concepts that form its base, can be found in the social institution of education.

Chapter Three

Schooling and Education in Contemporary Society

The aim of this chapter is to describe, using the terms and concepts introduced in the preceding chapter, the nature of the role of schooling in contemporary society. It should be kept in mind throughout the reading of this chapter that the framework of the analysis of contemporary society, presented in the previous chapter, forms the model according to which this role will be described. Extensive use will be made of the concepts introduced there. Where sources for some of the statements made below are not immediately apparent, they derive from my experience with the institution of education; at first as a student and more recently as an educator.¹

To begin, it is necessary to briefly restate the orienting question for this chapter and to clarify the use of the concepts presented. At the beginning of the paper it was pointed out that the institution of schooling has been disappointing to those who had held it up as the way by which unfair social inequalities could be removed. 'Radical' educational thinkers have undertaken the demonstration that schooling actually serves to reproduce and perpetuate these inequalities. In most instances this demonstration has been attempted through reference to the imposition of the interests of one 'dominant' group over the interests of one or more 'subordinate' groups. This domination and the imbalance of power implied through it, becomes the central theme of these analyses.

It was then pointed out that historical circumstance

and initial theoretical misunderstandings render the centrality of this theme questionable. An alternate conception of contemporary society, with an alternate central theme, was then presented. Important to this presentation was the suggestion that a more adequate understanding of the nature of contemporary society would lead to a more accurate description of the role of the institution of schooling in that society.

The question to be addressed here then is; how can Habermas' 'world understanding' be applied to an analysis of the role of schooling in the reproduction and perpetuation of the organized capitalist social formation? The answer to this question revolves around the realization that the concepts introduced in that 'world understanding' accurately describe contemporary society. Specifically, it must be remembered that what is characteristic about organized capitalism is the separation of technical knowledge and practical knowledge and the increased importance assigned to technical knowledge that results from the formation of a 'manipulated system' based on the organizational principle of State intervention. In such a system, the insights of moral/practical knowledge, which defines the humanness of social formations, are forgotten in favour of technical/administrative knowledge that provides insights more suited to the manipulative skills necessary to solve system problems. The realization, at the level of the social system, of individual insights

stemming from moral/practical knowledge is blocked through the resulting systematic distortion of communication.

The concept of 'learning' is key to the linking of schooling in organized capitalism with the wider social system. Under organized capitalism, schools have come to be identified as the institutions within society where 'learning' occurs. There are two senses in which this claim can be understood. The first emphasizes the 'school' as an organizational entity, and will be described by the term 'schooling' in this paper. The term schooling refers to the actual institutionalization of the structural context within which 'learning' is to take place. In organized capitalism, schooling takes the form of a compulsory, public-funded, administratively defined subsystem. This subsystem retains many of the characteristics of a 'system' in the earlier sense. The structural characteristics that define it are actually derived from system imperatives.

The second sense of the claim that schools are the institutions within which 'learning' officially takes place, stresses the concept of learning itself. The term 'education' will be used, in this sense, to describe the process by which the acquired learning of a society is formally passed on. Clearly, in 'education' the emphasis is on process, which, in a human system, implies interaction.

In this chapter, the argument that these two senses of

'learning' are necessary elements of an understanding of the role of schools in an organized capitalist social formation, is important. It should be clear by now that the distinction presented above describes the distinction, running through this paper, between the dimensions of production (influenced by system imperatives) and interaction (influenced by imperatives of social integration). It should further be clear that, while each can be described somewhat independently, a unique analysis describing the interdependencies of the two is necessary for an adequate explanation of the role of schooling and education in contemporary society. To this end, the remainder of this chapter will be structured into three major sections; the first dealing with the concept of 'schooling' and the second dealing, with careful attention to its interconnections to the first concept, with the concept of 'education'. Finally, an attempt will be made to provide a brief summary of the entire argument up to that point, in order to facilitate a contextualization of the final chapter.

The Connection of Schooling and State

It has been demonstrated in the previous chapter that the State plays a central, indeed definitional, role in the social formation of organized capitalism. Further, State

intervention has been identified as the organizational principle of organized capitalism. Given this, it is little surprising to suggest a connection between 'schooling' (the institutionalization of a structural context for 'learning'), and the State. The connection is found in the use of the concept 'institutionalization'. In the sense it is to be understood in this paper, institutionalization can be identified as a form of State intervention. What is meant, then, is that the State establishes an administrative process as a response to a system problem, and then formalizes that process by co-opting it into the sphere of State control. In the case of 'schooling, this can be understood as the introduction of State control into a sphere of the social formation that was, under liberal capitalism, directed by the unfolding of 'natural' (economic) laws. The unfolding of these laws created the situation whereby rich men, who educated their "own children at College and in Ladies Seminaries" could balk at paying to "educate all the brats in the neighbourhood." (Schecter, 1977, p.373)

As we have seen previously, these 'natural' laws are identified, according to the bourgeois ideology, as laws based primarily on 'fair' exchange in the marketplace. It was also pointed out that, because of the understanding of these laws as natural, as economic crises occurred in the market, they were translated directly into identity crises for the social system; that is, they allowed conflict to be

thematized by bringing into consciousness the real inequalities and unfairnesses that occur under the unfolding of these supposedly 'natural' laws. In the case of schooling, these crises led to the potential introduction into consciousness of the essentially unfair inequalities that existed at the level of formalized education. That is to say, that an educational system based solely on economic grounds, on being able to afford school or not, is particularly susceptible to the thematization of conflicts, as the economic dimension of the social system is no longer able to sustain the role it assigned itself in the perpetuation of system identity. It is during these times of crisis that the dimension of moral/practical insight is reintroduced and questions deriving from it are posed, in one case, in relation to the unfairness of an exclusive schooling system. An historical example of this is described by Schecter when he points out the influence "the potential for social conflict and animosity" (1977, p.373) among certain working class groups in the nineteenth century, had on the establishment of 'free', common schools. It was clear at this point that a continued reliance in the unfolding of natural laws was untenable.

However, insofar as the 'natural laws' themselves are self-legitimizing, the inequalities of condition that are their result get thematized, in the area of schooling, as inequalities of opportunity. This is an important point, for within it lies the genesis of organized capitalism as

realized in the area of schooling. This is the introduction of an 'achievement ideology' which states that, all other circumstances being equal, the most worthy people will 'naturally' succeed. What this means is that the root of the recognized inequalities of conditions comes, under these circumstances, to be identified with the inequality of opportunity evidenced in an elite system of schooling based on economic capability. The thematized conflict centers around the inequality of access to schooling.

As we have suggested previously, this thematization of conflict is a problem for any capitalist social formation. In organized capitalism such problems are dealt with through State intervention. In this instance, that intervention takes the form of a formal institutionalization of a structure, what I have called here a subsystem, which is purportedly directed towards addressing these inequalities of condition through the provision of equality of access. "One might say that equality of educational opportunity is one of the axioms of modern civilization." (Fleming, 1974, p.3) The assumption that is made here is that with the realization of equality of opportunity (secured through equality of access), the realities of conditions will be based on merit, based on the achievement of human potential, rather than on the arbitrary workings of the economic subsystem. As the examples in the first chapter clearly point out, this is

the view that is held by most educators and citizens in society.

According to the rather common interpretation, equality of educational opportunity is a valid concept even in a society characterized by inequalities in status. All that is required is an equal opportunity for everyone to reach the top; that is, there must be provision for unimpeded social mobility. (Fleming, 1974, p.17)

Indeed, it was further pointed out that most 'radical' educational thinkers only suggest a more complex context for inequality of opportunity, but otherwise think similarly, that the proper addressing of inequality of opportunity will ultimately lead to the proper redistribution of conditions. "If equality of educational opportunity means equal rewards for the development of any socially acceptable potentiality, it implies a truly egalitarian society." (Fleming, 1974, p.17)

I would like to assert here that the translation of the issue of inequality of conditions into the issue of inequality of opportunity represents the actions of the ideology (I will call it technocratic ideology) that, in the previous chapter, was identified with the rationality under which the State operates. This rationality allows, it will be remembered, for the translation of practical problems into technical terms so that the State can manipulate them within the capitalist framework in order to defuse the potential thematization of conflict. Thus, where it can be suggested that inequalities of conditions

(a practical problem in a human society) can be dealt with through the establishment of the formal conditions necessary for equal access to schools (a technical solution), the State can present itself as a benevolent arbiter acting in the interest of all members of society. If this presentation is successful, then the ultimate consequence is that inequality of conditions can be more easily justified as the consequence of a fair, competitive process. This line of thought clearly smacks of the bourgeois ideology but it should be clear that because of the initial need for State intervention to establish the conditions necessary for the potential realization of equality of access, it does not fall into the trap of assuming that fair competition will automatically result from the unfolding of 'natural' laws. Habermas described this process of institutionalization through State intervention as the incorporation, for legitimation purposes, of "elements of an achievement ideology transferred to the educational system." (LC, p.37)

Here the connection between the State and schooling is made clear. The institution of a formal subsystem of schooling can fulfill the role of legitimating the State. This really means that, by being represented as one solution to the problem of inequality of condition, a state institutionalized schooling subsystem lends strength to the States claim to legitimacy. The importance of this statement must not be underestimated. Insofar as State

intervention is the organizational principle of organized capitalism, and the stability of the State can only be secured through legitimations, the legitimating influence of schooling must be quite important.

As suggested above, the process of this legitimation occurs through the institutionalization of ~~schooling~~, meaning the selective co-opting of elements of the bourgeois ideology into a techno-rational context accessible to the State. It has been demonstrated previously that one of the most powerful techniques for legitimation open to the state is the universalization of false needs. In the case where the State can identify a need and present that need as a universal human need (even though the need may be only a product of the system, and have little real connection to human needs), and can then address that need in a way that demonstrates the States 'role' in protecting individuals from the caprices of that system, the State can gain legitimacy. It can be suggested that schooling has come to be recognized as a universal need. The access to schooling has been understood, during economic crises, as one way of 'getting ahead' in society. When the State formalized the opportunity for access to education by instituting a subsystem of schooling and making participation in that subsystem compulsory and free, it implicitly recognized schooling as a 'need'. At the same time as the universalization of this need, and the evidence of the State dealing with it, increases the states

legitimacy, it also increases the justification of the claim that schooling is an universal need.

Insofar as it can be understood as an universal need secured by the State for individuals in the social system, schooling represents the formal institutionalization of a technical problem solving subsystem. It has been presented to the individuals in society as the 'means' to achieve a goal. Thus the perception that, by going to school, one can 'get ahead' in society comes to be the general condition under which schooling is understood. In other words, schooling comes to be understood according to its technical 'use value'. This view is clearly seen in the following statements:

Yet everyone recognizes that one of the 'keys' to economic survival in the last third of the twentieth century is education, and everyone recognizes that it is an essential weapon against poverty among less-favoured sections of the population. (Taylor, 1976, p.40)

The links between education and affluence, and lack of education and poverty, are almost absolute...In other words, education is worth cold, hard cash. The route to security in a decent job at decent wages runs directly through the educational system. (Adams et al., 1976, p.196)

As a result of this, the failure of the formal subsystem of schooling to directly affect the distribution of conditions of life has become a major concern. That failure is seen by most as the failure of schooling to live up to its purported 'use value'. Fleming, for example, attributes this failure in the Canadian school system to a

lack of 'public commitment' needed to overcome the difficulties presented to the technical rational manipulation of 'schooling'. Three of these difficulties are:

(a) The general acceptance of social inequality,...., carries with it the general view that it is acceptable to purchase special educational privileges...

(b) Pressures for provincial decentralization prevent the serious pursuit of equality of educational opportunity among provinces...

(c) There is insufficient public pressure or provincial government support for spending the large extra sums that would be required to bring opportunity as close as possible to the same level...
(1974, p.125)

The clearly technical rational conception of the 'problem' of schooling and its mandate demonstrates the central implication for society of the concept of schooling in organized capitalism. That is that, as a result of its connection to the State and consequent perception as a technical tool or 'weapon', the formalized context of schooling is just as vacant of political content, as is the State.

It should be clear from the previous chapters discussion of the absence of political content at the level of the State, that this situation means that practical questions, and the insights that might address them, are forgotten. Since they are forgotten and the forum in which they could be reintroduced (the political forum) is removed

from schooling, the debate about the solutions to the failure of schooling as a weapon can be understood only in technical terms. State intervention, insofar as it represents the capacity of the State for dealing with problems stemming from the contradictions in a capitalist social formation, comes to be understood as the only possible solution to the problems caused by this perceived 'failure'. In the carrying out of this intervention, of the technical manipulation of money, facilities, administrative and definitional structures, the State can represent itself as fulfilling its role, can support its claim to legitimacy. "The expansion of the educational system at all levels also enabled reformers to claim that schools were delivering on their democratic promise". (Schechter, 1977, p.403) In this manner the State and schooling, can be understood in their interdependent relationship. As schooling, in organized capitalism, has come to be understood as a universal need, its importance as an element of the social system has also increased. As its importance as an element has increased, so has its value as a source of legitimation.

The concluding argument here is that, according to this relationship between the State (with a central role in the reality of organized capitalism) and schooling, reproduction of existing social formations are made more likely. The universalization of schooling as a need and subsequent formation of a compulsory, public-funded,

administrative schooling subsystem, is already the 'enthronement' of means over ends. The ends are proscribed by the system, ('getting ahead', money, secure job, the provision of a prepared work force) and can therefore simply be reacted to. Human interest as defined by the dimension of the moral/practical, are sold out to system demands defined by the dimension of production.

A clarification is necessary here. At this point we are talking about 'schooling' as a legitimator of the State. This means the institutionalization of a compulsory subsystem that fulfills a legitimating role for the State.

It is not suggested that the State invented education, nor that the State directly controls the process of education. The suggestion here is that the State, by making compulsory a subsystem of education that could be represented as the means to a 'better life', to the improvement of society, gains legitimacy. It has represented itself as benevolent and truly interested in all members of the social system of which it is a part. At the same time, schooling, because it is institutionalized through State intervention, can only represent the framework upon which a technically rational organization can be built.

This conception of schooling as an organization has many implications. The point that should be understood from this first section of this chapter is that the structural framework of the organization that is schooling is closely associated with both the legitimation needs of

the State and the ideology that supports it. This point has been well documented by a variety of writers.² In the work of each of these writers, however, there is the understanding that specific forms of school organization derive from unique historical conditions. This point, that schooling, by definition, must operate within the context of the social system it exists in, already lends credence, and some understanding, to the claim that schools in organized capitalism tend to more actively play the role of reproducers than of reformers. The more important task of this point, however, is that it can be used as the starting point for an analysis of the process of education that occurs through schooling in organized capitalism.

The Process of Education in Organized Capitalism

It is through education, the actual process that impacts directly on the individuals in schools, that reproduction is largely secured. Certainly the broad structural constraints of a schooling subsystem play a role, as described above, but it is directly through the day to day acting of a particular process that individuals become the victims of systematically distorted communication. In as much as this has been described as the key to reproduction in organized capitalism, the important role of education, a process, should be clear. This section of the chapter will attempt to clarify this

role in two major steps. Firstly, some discussion will be presented dealing with the central theme in contemporary society and its connection to the major characteristic of the process of education. Secondly, six subcharacteristics of the process will be identified and discussed as examples of the manifestation of that characteristic relating directly to reproduction. These subcharacteristics can be identified as; a centrality of scientific/technical knowledge, the importance of control, the inculcation of administrative knowledge as a substitute for moral/practical knowledge, the establishment of a system of 'grade levels', the establishment of formal 'testing' procedures, and the official presentation of the world as contingency.

It has been often stated in this paper that the central theme in contemporary society is that the dimension of moral/practical knowledge is systematically absent from it. Briefly restated, this occurs in the following manner. The overreaching influence of the technocratic ideology extends to all sections of the social formation it defines. The model of scientific/technical knowledge and the rationality deriving from it, has become the dominant (indeed in some cases, only legitimate) form of knowledge and rationality. Once this is the case, as it is in organized capitalism, then other forms of knowledge must be discounted or de-emphasized. When this occurs, the model of knowledge and rationality that derives from the dimension

of production becomes, by default, the model according to which social processes (of which education is one) are organized.

From this central theme we can draw the central characteristic of the process of education. The theme points out that there is a systematically limited conception of knowledge open to the social processes in organized capitalist societies. The resulting characteristic of the social process of education is the adoption of a particular model of knowledge. Basically, this model understands knowledge to be quantifiable, concrete and directly useful for the accomplishment of a goal. Therefore we can initially state that, according to this model, the process of education can be characterized as the transmission of an 'objective', relatively static body of knowledge from one individual to, most often, a group of other individuals within a defined and formalized institutional structure. The first individual is said to 'have' knowledge and the second group of individuals is understood to 'not have' it. The importance of this point will soon become clear.

'Learning', which is generally conceived to be the desired goal of the process of education, consists, according to this characteristic, of two aspects. The first is the acquisition of the given knowledge. This aspect refers to the passing on of 'knowledge' from the individual who has it to the individual who does not.

Insofar as this transmission is successful, the latter individual will then possess that knowledge. This is the sense according to which 'knowledge' can be described as a possession. It can be conceived as a 'thing' that one can have or not have and something that one can give to or withhold from another. Knowledge comes to be commoditized. Once this has occurred, the value of knowledge for the possessor is determined according to its 'usefulness'. According to this aspect of 'learning', knowledge must be understood to be relatively objective and static, otherwise it could not be 'possessed'. Knowledge, in this context, is modelled after scientific/technical knowledge.

The second aspect of 'learning' refers to the coming to understand the presented nature of the particular model of knowledge as 'absolute' and to understand the relationship between that nature and its use. What this means is that one is considered to have learned, according to the educational process, once one can understand (and presumably, can apply) the rules for the use of 'knowledge'. It is according to this sense of 'learning' that the suggestion of a static nature of a commoditized knowledge, which seems to be implied in the first aspect, can be modified. Once the rules have been learned, then individuals presumably have access to knowledge that is not the property of others by applying those rules in unique ways to new situations. What must be remembered here, however, is that questions which stand outside the

immediate sphere of influence of this model of knowledge (in this case, moral/practical questions) are bypassed. In other words, once the usefulness of the dominant model of knowledge defines its value, questions which do not seem to be able to be addressed usefully by that model, are identified as illegitimate. According to this aspect, the rules for the use of knowledge are based in scientific/technical rationality.

The suggestion, presented as the central characteristic of the process of education, that that process can be defined totally according to the model of scientific/technical knowledge, is an uncomfortable one and needs some further clarification. The uncomfortableness of this suggestion is quickly apparent when one surveys official statements of the goals of education and the methods by which these goals should be achieved. The following examples from the principle official statement of goals and methods for junior/primary education in Ontario clearly demonstrate this uncomfortableness.

It is the policy of the Government of Ontario that every child have the opportunity to develop as completely as possible in the direction of his or her talents and needs. On behalf of the educational community and other citizens, the Government pledges to support an education that develops basic skills, knowledge, and attitudes, that endeavors to provide a fuller life during a child's years in the Primary and Junior Divisions, and that endeavors to nurture every child's growth so that each may be able to continue his or her education with satisfaction and may share in the life of the community with competence, integrity and joy... (Ministry of Education, 1975, p.4)....One of the main responsibilities of teachers

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is to help children to become effective problem-solvers and sensitive decision-makers. To accomplish this, teachers must provide pupils with a secure, stimulating environment that will support and encourage the growth of self-confident, creative individuals who are capable of making and being responsible for their own decisions, both now and in the future... (Ministry of Education, 1985, p.4)

The emphasis in the above statements on providing for the students realization of their own potential, and that the way this is to occur is for the teacher to act as a guide to 'help' students 'grow' into creative, self-confident, functioning members of society, clearly demonstrates the sensitivity of those responsible for educational policy to the suggestion that the educational process implies the rigid transmission of factual knowledge. This sensitivity and the response it fosters, miss the crucial point that is presented here. That point is that the goals, the end-states, have been pre-assigned and what is really being described are means of accomplishing those goals. Once pre-established goals exist and are justified according to system demands (as they have been in organized capitalism), the means employed in addressing them can only be technical ones. Even further, inasmuch as goals are given by system demands, they must be initially conceived within the framework of 'what is technically/administratively possible. This last point is supported by the work of Quarter and Mathews when they discuss the 'Back to Basics' movement that has characterized the past several years of educational

organization. (1987) A major implication of this movement is the adoption of a more characteristically managerial attitude on the part of the Ministry. This has been interpreted as a movement away from the couching of educational policy in the vague, Humanistic terms described above. I would suggest, further to this, that this movement stems, at least in some part, from the acknowledgement of the poor fit between the vague, 'child-centered' statements that have dominated (and continue to dominate) educational policy, and the actual implementation of that policy. For the reasons that have been suggested above, that implementation must be characteristically oriented by technical/administrative knowledge. The 'Back to Basics' movement can be understood, to a certain extent, as an official resignation to the perceived fact of techno/administrative necessity.

This is the meaning of the statement, made previously, that in contemporary society 'we have ceased to ask what we want (to define goals) and have resigned ourselves to seeking only what is technically possible (techno/administratively rational means)'. A clear example of this is presented in the following statement; "Computer competency is going to be important for the next generation because so much will be done by computers. Not to understand them will place one at a practical disadvantage and render one alienated from the central feature of the age." (Barrow, 1979, p.63).

Clearly, when Barrow says 'practical' in the above statement, he really means 'technical'. Knowledge of computers has nothing to do with the successful interaction of human beings. Indeed, the use of computers is directly tied to the rendering more efficient of the techno/administrative dealing with the dimension of production. This latter increase in efficiency is clearly the result of system demands. Therefore, what is essentially being presented in the statement above is that system demands are the source of justification for the goals which direct the process of education. This is clearly an example of just the conception of education which we have been attempting to describe up to this point.

The conditions in the subsystem of education are essentially similar to the conditions in the larger system which resulted in the institution of 'Formal Democracy'. In that instance, the realization of substantive democracy, of a truly political forum, was seen to be incompatible with the pre-given goals as defined by system demands. However, in response to sensitivities to the painful effects of the direct impact of these imperatives on the dimension of human interaction, a process of 'Formal Democracy' was instituted. This process identified itself with the conditions necessary for the formation of consensus and could then present its decisions as manifestations of consensus. The result was that these decisions could then be made without direct reference to

practical questions. They became administrative decisions, essentially instrumental actions.

In the instance ~~of~~ the educational subsystem, the realization of a truly political forum would also present problems to the social system. It should be clear that if, in education, practical questions (that is, political questions) were truly entertained and the knowledge that arose from them legitimated, the entire social system, based as it is on the dominance of scientific/technical knowledge, would be in jeopardy. Therefore, what I call 'Formal Education' has been instituted and rhetorically defended as the realization of a consensually decided learning process. What this means is that education is presented as a process which is defined by the conditions necessary for 'learning' about the world. Insofar as that world is presented, according to a perception supported by 'Formal Democracy' and the technocratic ideology, as an externally produced and unilaterally imposed reality, the goals of education can be identified according to the demands of that reality. With the goals justified according to that reality, the educational process is freed from the need for actual moral/practical debate. The day to day process of education can be conducted without constant need for a justification of goals.

Once this has occurred, the discussion about education and the educational policy that derive from that discussion can be centered around technical/administrative means.

Through this policy, attention can be directed towards the nature of the process as the most effective 'guiding' of individuals towards those goals. Educational policy, as the supposed instigator of educational practice, becomes the technical rationalization of educational methods. It becomes an administrative process which, just like the administrative process of the State, can be appropriated by 'experts'.

The point to be taken from the above argument is that it is not unreasonable to assert that the process of education is characterized, at its center, by the adoption of the techno/scientific model of knowledge. As has been pointed out, once this assertion is given credence, the goals of the process can only be understood according to their accessibility to technical/administrative knowledge. In the process of education in contemporary society, the goals are, most generally, the inculcation of the model of scientific/technocratic knowledge and rationality. This can be clearly seen in the rhetoric of the educational policy makers. The following is an example of an explicit goal and subgoal of education from the Ontario Ministry of Education.

8. Develop the ability to make informed and rational decisions.

*develop the elements of the scientific method i.e. acquire the skills of careful and objective observation, learn to distinguish between observation and inference, and use observations to test ideas, investigate ambiguity, and make predictions,

inferences and generalizations. (1976, p.21)

The statement above provides the key to the remainder of this section. As soon as the goals of the process of education can be understood in instrumental terms, then the process itself must be conceived of as an instrumental process. The educational process comes to be thematized as the technical means to achieve pre-given goals. This has occurred in contemporary society, where the talk about the 'improvement' of education centers around making education more 'efficient' and 'effective'. The measurement of the success of education is usually based on the degree to which it meets the goal of inculcating the knowledge/rationality model.

Up to this point we have been discussing the process of education in general terms. The point above introduces us to the first of the six subcharacteristics of the process of education. Each of these subcharacteristics derive from the central characteristic, that the process of education is represented through a particular model of knowledge and rationality which excludes access to moral/practical insight, and thereby participates in the reproduction of an organized capitalist social formation. It was earlier stated that this reproduction is actually the result of systematic distortion of communication at the level of the individual. The subcharacteristics can, in this context, be understood as manifestations, at the level of the individual of the central characteristic of the

educational process. They represent the ways in which communication (which should, in human interaction, be oriented by practical interests) is distorted and translated into technical terms, through the process of education. The remainder of this section will briefly describe and discuss the six subcharacteristics.

The first subcharacteristic has already been partially stated. It has been suggested that the educational process is explicitly conceived of as an instrumental one. A further example should make this suggestion clear.

However spontaneous it may appear, good education requires careful planning...But whatever the method, planning implies purpose and a careful correlation between means and end. The end result is curriculum, the particular arrangement of objectives, content, and learning experiences within the school...Individual teachers have the responsibility of selecting strategies, resources and activities appropriate to the needs of individual children, who should then get involved in setting short-term objectives, in devising ways and means of accomplishing tasks, and in choosing activities. (Ministry of Education, 1976, p.2-3)

As this example demonstrates, the teacher establishes the context within which the students operate, just as much as the central characteristic of the process of education establishes the context within which the teacher operates. In fact this subcharacteristic is, thus far, only a restatement of the central characteristic. The more interesting part of this subcharacteristic is that the educational process seems to have little of the success (meaning, use of technical/administrative means to affect

reality and achieve pre-defined goals) that constitutes the self-legitimizing force of techno/scientific rationality. The following statement illustrates this concern:

[There is a] remarkable constancy of educational results in the face of widely differing deliberate approaches. Every so often we adopt new approaches or new methodologies and place our reliance on new panaceas. Yet the academic growth within the classroom continues at about the same rate, stubbornly refusing to cooperate with the bright new dicta emanating from the conference room... (Stephens, 1967, p.9)

This 'failure' of the educational process to respond to efforts to more 'efficiently' achieve its goals, must be understood to be potentially threatening to the conception of the propriety of the application of techno/administrative rationality to the process. Indeed, it should be clear that it is this authors contention that this 'failure' is exactly an example of the weakness of technical rationality in dealing with social interaction (which the educational process, or any process directly involving humans, must be).

What has actually happened, however, is that the failure itself is conceived in technical terms. Consequently, a subgoal of the educational process is created; the elimination of the failure becomes the object of technically rational scrutiny. What this means is that the model of scientific/technical rationality is perpetuated even within debates about the failure of the process of education. In this sense the "widely differing

deliberate approaches" and the "new methodologies" which are adopted in an effort to improve the transmission of the knowledge/rationality model, are themselves representations of that model. What comes to be understood by all, including the clients of the educational process, is that the problems leading to the failure are objective and must be dealt with instrumentally. Further, the persistence in devising new 'techniques' for transmission, demonstrate that even failures should not deflect the technically rational process. Accordingly, these failures are prevented from being thematized as manifestations of the inappropriate application of technical knowledge to practical problems. Instead, the goal of academic growth, presented as the official goal of the educational process, is not put up to question. The educational process is considered, by definition, to be oriented towards finding the most efficient and productive way of transmitting objective knowledge. The pervasiveness of the conception of this social process as a technically rational one, even in the face of a lack of the success that justifies the 'truth' of scientific statements, cannot help but influence the individuals who are subjected to it. As it does so, it renders less likely the conceptualization within those individuals of the practical nature of this enterprise, and must increase the tendency to reproduction.

The second subcharacteristic of the process of education is that control is considered central to its

success. This stems from the commoditization of knowledge, from conceiving it as objective, relatively static and transmittable. The link here is that, when knowledge is understood in the above manner, emphasis in the process can be put on transmission, an essentially unidirectional process involving guidance by knowledge possessors. "...the professional educator will have a clear understanding of overall purposes, and of how the various activities planned for children fulfill these purposes." (Ministry of Education, 1976, p.3) These knowledge possessors must have control to ensure that the transmission is carried out according to the specified boundaries. Simply stated, if one conceives of knowledge as a possession (precisely the conception in contemporary society), and of its transmission as an instrumentally rational process, then it is the possessors who must define the nature of that process. Indeed, it is, by definition, implied that an instrumentally rational process is a controlled process and it is clear that the possessors of knowledge must be the locus of that control. The necessity for control over the process of education is clear. "Not every profitable learning opportunity can be planned in advance, but the overall direction of learning can and should be." (Ministry of Education, 1976, p.2)

This conception of the need for control invades all levels of the educational process. One need only spend a few minutes in a teachers staff room to get a clear idea of

the importance of control for teachers. It is implicit in any discussion among teachers that the teacher must have control in the classroom before any 'real' teaching can be done. Rules of classroom order are often the first things taught at the beginning of the school year, and these are almost universally established by the teacher. These rules are the manifestations of the perception of a need for control as a precondition for the transmission of knowledge.

One interesting effect of this demand for control is that the classroom comes to be structurally defined as an arena of conflict. It should be clear that control implies power, and power applied in control implies conflict. This conflict is clearly evident in the 'us against them' attitude held by most participants in the educational process. This does not imply violent conflict nor even dislike. It does imply that the perceived need for control and its influence in the establishment of rules, creates divisions between the possessors and the non-possessors of knowledge. These divisions can be, once again, conceived as manifestations of the inappropriate intrusion of technical rationality into the dimension of interaction.

Instrumental action derives from technical knowledge and denotes control. It means the manipulation of means to achieve a goal. The proper sphere of influence for instrumental action should be the dimension of production. Communicative action is action associated with practical

rationality and denotes consensus. It means the pursuit, free from the constraints of power, of mutual understanding. The proper sphere of influence for communicative action should be the dimension of interaction. Conceptually, the process of education is a process of interaction. That is to say, that individuals come together not for the purposes of production, but rather in order (ostensibly) to gain mutual understanding. It has been extensively suggested, however, that in contemporary society, the process of education is conceived of as a process of production, a technically rational process. Hence the introduction of control as a crucial element, and with that introduction, the creation of a conflictual relationship is realized. It should be clear that the establishment of systematic conflict renders impossible the conceptualization of a true consensus. Indeed the power relationship that is implied in a process where one human has control over another through, at least partially, the establishment of instrumentally rational rules, is the fundamental condition that results in systematic distortion of communication.

In a similar manner, rules exist at the level of the organization which establish the preconditions for who can transmit knowledge. These rules are seen in the heavy reliance on credentialism in the process of education. This means that there is careful attention paid to the certification of who can teach and to whom. The

establishment of formal 'Teachers Colleges' which purport to teach (and do so in an instrumentally rational way themselves) the 'techniques' of teaching and to which attendance is necessary in order to be able to teach, and the proliferation of certificates of specialty which are necessary to teach in 'special' circumstances, are manifestations of the need for control at this level. These manifestations arise from two sources. Firstly, as has been previously suggested, because the educational process is conceived of as an instrumentally rational one, control over the process is demanded. Secondly, there exists the realization that the actual administrative control over the day to day process in each classroom is impossible. Consequently, "the work is intrinsically uninspected..." (Weick, 1976, p.11) The solution to the problem created by these two conflicting elements (an instrumentally rational solution) is created in the structure of certification. Weick points out that the combination of the two elements demand that "the organization...have tight control over who does the work and on whom." (1976, p.11)

The emphasis on rules at these two fundamental levels in the process of education increases the likelihood of reproduction in the following manner. It impresses on the individual in the classroom that the following of rules is an important, indeed central, component of interaction. It perpetuates the illusion that the context of interaction is

given and that we are constrained by it. In other words, it contains the implication that social goals have already been consensually decided and we are left with the task of working toward these goals (or in the case of rebellious students, working against them, in either case the goals are assumed). The one way of doing this, as claimed by the process of education, is through the controlled administration of social interaction, through the application of instrumental rationality to it. Essentially, the emphasis on control in the process of education serves to meet the system need for conforming, rule-following individuals. As it does this it renders increasingly unlikely the thematization of practical issues at the individual level and tends to support reproduction.

The third subcharacteristic of the educational process deals with a particular form of instrumental action. It has been suggested above that instrumental rationality, when applied to the dimension of social interaction, is manifested in administrative knowledge. It has already been hinted at that technical knowledge, when transferred to the dimension of social integration, takes the form of administrative knowledge. In other words, this administrative knowledge is related to the educational process in the same way as the scientific/technical knowledge that represents its model. What this means is that administrative knowledge has become a subject to be taught in schools. "This technical/administrative knowledge

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was able to be accumulated. It acted like a form of capital..." (Apple, 1982, p.22)

The emergence of administrative knowledge as a subject matter for the educational process coincided with the change from liberal capitalism to organized capitalism. Once this transition was made, it became necessary to have not only technical skills relating to production but also technical skills relating to social integration which could take the place of the moral/practical knowledge that was, necessarily, blocked from thematization. Once again, the goals are given by the system. In the case of a capitalist society, these goals center around the expansion of markets, and in organized capitalism these goals are understood to be, at least partially, met through instrumental/administrative action organizing the relationship between production, people and labour. The teaching and learning of administrative knowledge in the educational process of contemporary society involves the inculcation of "social skills and attitudes upon which effective and responsible co-operation and participation depend." (Ministry of Education, 1976, p.22) The important point here is that social integration is understood to be directly addressable through transmittable 'skills'. Once this claim is taken seriously, the potential for thematizing practical insights as the locus of social integration is reduced and the cause of reproduction is forwarded. Some further implications of this point will be

given after the presentation of the next two subcharacteristics.

The fourth subcharacteristic of the process of education is that its clients are differentiated according to the degree of 'knowledge' they possess. These divisions take the form of 'grades' or 'levels' and represent the particular level of knowledge that the student is expected to have. It should not be surprising that, because of the perceived nature of knowledge as relatively static and objective, a strong connection is assumed between the amount of exposure to 'knowledge' the student has received and the level that she has achieved. While there exists some allowance for individual differences, generally it is understood that, as students are exposed to 'knowledge' they will absorb it. Accordingly, a structure has emerged which can be used to classify students according to the amount of 'knowledge' they possess. The title of this structure changes according to fashion, but its fundamental elements remain the same.

Childrens learning is developmental. However, when the behaviour of many Primary children is observed over time in a specific learning area, a general pattern of development appears. When this pattern is organized into a progression of identifiable steps, it reveals the developmental growth of children in the particular sphere of learning under observation. This hierarchical organization is known as a growth strand. (Ministry of Education, 1985, p.11)

It should be clear that this structure represents a technically rational process. Even despite the surface

appearance, in these words, that the 'growth strand' arises as a natural process out of childrens behaviour, it should be clear that the context within which that behaviour represents 'knowledge' is already given. The 'specified learning area' is determined a priori according to the rules of scientific/technical rationality. Legitimate knowledge, as has already been pointed out, is conceived in these terms and consequently the various 'learning areas' must also be. The important point here is that, to the extent that specified learning areas are pre-defined and in the effort to adhere to them, learning which occurs spontaneously in the dimension of practical knowledge is systematically ignored in the hierarchical structure of the educational process.

In order to move through this hierarchy, the student must demonstrate her possession of 'real' knowledge. Therefore the educational process in contemporary society contains the fifth subcharacteristic of structured evaluation based on knowledge possession. For example, according to the Ministry of Education, a student, in order to pass from the Primary to the Junior levels in the hierarchical structure, must be able to;

*master number facts related to addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division of whole numbers...
 *match, compare and order lengths, areas, volumes, masses, time, and temperature, using appropriate terms...
 *describe, identify, and classify objects by attributes such as shape, thickness, colour, and texture...
 *acquire an understanding of oral directions, messages, and reports...
 *master a

vocabulary that enables him or her to name, describe, reason, explain...*understand and use simple syntactic, phonemic and graphemic cues...*respond to print stimuli within the environment...*develop and use a variety of techniques for decoding words...*write legibly in a manner appropriate to his or her stage of development... (Ministry of Education, 1976, p.6-10)

The determination of success in the mastery of 'knowledge' is itself a technical process. It takes the form, in the educational process, of formalized testing. The role of the test in the process of education is major. Students are presented with a barrage of tests from the time they begin the process until the time they leave it. In a movement similar to the emphasis on certification for teachers, the passing of tests, the successful retention and use of 'knowledge' within a formalized structure, is crucial in a students career.

One of the most visible effects of the emphasis on testing is the production of a competitive system. This is to say that, once the level of 'knowledge' possession can be quantified, (once it can be represented on a scale of zero to one hundred) then comparisons are inevitable. This tendency to compare creates divisions between students and affects the perceptions teachers have of them. It becomes necessary to at least keep up with the other members of a students cohort, in order to ensure getting through to the next 'level'. Success in the system becomes contingent on favorable comparisons with other individuals in that system, success comes to mean getting more 'knowledge' than

the others. Indeed the combination of official 'level' and 'grade point average' play a central role in the definition of the identity of an individual within the process of education.

The major implication here is that, once these two conditions have occurred (an objectified, quantifiable system for comparison, and the identification of individuals with it), then individuals within the process can be understood instrumentally. This means that those who succeed in the system are valued according to their potential 'use value'. The more successful a student is, the more valuable she is held to be. Smollett identified this event clearly.

The children have, of course, been set against each other by the process of competitive grading, in which only a limited number can 'earn' good grades (translates later into good salaries), and in which each child learns that his gain must therefore be another's loss. (1976, p.202)

Once individuals can be understood instrumentally then two results are realized. They become commoditized, a good student is a valuable commodity and a poor student is a less valuable commodity, and they can become rationalized as system elements properly addressed through administrative knowledge. It was pointed out earlier that this commoditization of human beings is a central characteristic of capitalist social formations. The introduction of technical/administrative rationality is

unique to organized capitalism, and insofar as the process of education perpetuates the commoditization, and subscribes to an administratively rational model, it aides the reproduction of that social formation.

Earlier it was stated that an implication of the connection of administrative knowledge and the process of education was also tied to the fourth and fifth subcharacteristics. It was hinted that the dissemination of administrative knowledge, demanded by the inappropriate intrusion of instrumental rationality into the sphere of social integration, was largely the responsibility of the process of education. It will now be suggested that the educational process itself is structured according to techno/administrative rules and represents a model of the application of administrative knowledge (which is itself conceived in the context of the sphere of production). The organizing of students into categories by which they can be identified as quantifiable subjects, the imposition of an hierarchical structure with the suggestion that 'success' will facilitate upwards movement through it, the use of competition through the manipulation of rewards (good grades) and punishments (a vast array), even the previously mentioned pressure to follow rules that are dictated from above and relatively unconnected to negotiation, all of these are examples of the application of administratively rational means in order to achieve pre-given goals. As the student succeeds in this system of given goals, the

usefulness of administrative knowledge, which is implied to have provided the opportunity for that success, is confirmed.

This last statement contains the crux of this point. Elements of contemporary society are organized by the State as technically rational responses to system demands. That technical rationality manifests itself, in the dimension of social interaction, as administrative knowledge. This 'knowledge' is perpetuated and legitimated within the process of education. This impacts on the individual by providing her with a specific way of dealing with the perceived social world. Once again techno/scientific rationality impacts on the individual and assists the movement to reproduction.

The final subcharacteristic of education that will be considered in this paper, is also the most potentially interesting. The previous subcharacteristics have dealt primarily with the structure of the process of education and the ways that structure perpetuates reproduction by presenting a context, a perceived world (this point will be picked up on shortly), that limits the potential for conceptualization of moral/practical issues. This final subcharacteristic deals with the actual process by which the particular model of knowledge is inculcated and the other is de-legitimized. Simply stated, this subcharacteristic suggests that, in the process of education in contemporary society, the world is officially

presented as contingency.

2 It has been shown that the central characteristic of the process of education in contemporary society is the adoption of a model of knowledge that implies pre-given goals and therefore encourages the manipulation of means as a legitimate pursuit in all dimensions of life. This point can be restated to suggest that the goals of a human society are understood to be given and what is left for humans is to choose between instrumentally rational choices for action. This is what is meant, on the societal level, by the suggestion that the world is presented as contingency, or that "Life in capitalist society presents people with a multiple-choice world." (Smollett, 1976, p:201)

Legitimate human action is, according to this model (and encouraged in the educational process, which is given the task of inculcating it), simply the choosing between a selection of means to achieve given ends.

It was implied, in Chapter Two, that legitimacy for the State in organized capitalism depends, at least in part, on the belief among the citizens that they have some political power. In Formal Democracy this belief is supported by the suggestion that the 'choice' implied in a vote is identical to political action (the realization of political power). It was then pointed out that this 'choice' was little more than the successful co-optation of potential political will into a structure (a

techno/administratively rational structure) that effectively limited 'real' political action (defined as action deriving from the moral/practical dimension). It was then pointed out that 'Formal Education', which also lacks true political forum, is structured in a similar way (this is demonstrated in the previous subcharacteristics). In this sense, the process of education can be understood as the perpetuation of "an illusion of choice." (Smollett, 1976, p.201)

The evidence of this is readily available. Smollett suggests that "School children...spend so much time during their classroom life answering multiple-choice tests that the meaning of this experience needs to be examined." (1976, p.201) This meaning, one might suggest, is found in the rationality of the process itself. It has been pointed out earlier, that the process of education is conceived in technically rational terms, that is, it is understood to be a useful response to a system 'need'. In the case of the system need to perpetuate the illusion of choice, one clearly rational means of doing so would be to structure the measures of success in education (tests) to correspond with the perceived measures of success in the 'real' world (correct choices in given circumstances). The use of 'multiple-choice' tests are clearly a means of doing this and therefore, they become elements of the process.

A second technically rational element that is used, in the process, to further the presentation of the world as

contingency, is the concentration on 'form'. What this really means is that only certain types of information are presented to be important. Clearly, it is information which can be categorized as scientific or techno/administrative knowledge, that is emphasized. This emphasis invades all levels of 'teaching' and is, in real terms, an example of the systematic distortion of communication insofar as it implies the de-emphasis of practical knowledge (or learning). Once again, Smollett provides an interesting example of this process:

The children are presented with a 'reading-comprehension' exercise- a three-paragraph story about whaling, followed by multiple-choice questions to test 'comprehension'. The subject is introduced by a few remarks about whales - they are large mammals, larger than elephants, who frequent the cold waters of the North Atlantic near Scandinavia and so on. The substance of the selection then begins - a description of the work of whalers, past and present. A detailed account is given of how whaling used to be done, and how the work has been modified with the introduction of mechanized equipment. The multiple-choice 'comprehension' questions then proceeded to ask whether whales are smaller, larger or the same as elephants...and whether they are found in the North Atlantic, South Atlantic or Mediterranean. (1976, p.203)

That the children are required to pull out only the very specific kind of information that is addressed by the multiple-choice questions, points out the distortion of the communication in question. In this case the story comes to be understood, not as an idea to initiate discussion and interaction, but rather simply as a source of the information necessary to answer the questions. The story

is valuable to the students because it is useful to them in an instrumental fashion. This is the meaning of the suggestion that there is a concentration on 'form' in education. Students are taught that what is valuable in knowledge is what is 'useful', and that what is useful is what can be applied according to pre-established criteria. The criteria themselves are not questioned, indeed questioning of the criteria is discouraged (students who question the criteria instead of answering the questions will fail the test). In other words, students are 'taught' that there are structural constraints on choices for action, and these constraints are made real for the students in the process of education. It remains the case that 'someone' else determines what one must learn in order to graduate from the educational process. One final example from Smollett widens this analysis to society in general and demonstrates this point quite well.

...individuals [in contemporary society] are free to make the 'best choice' from among a prescribed set of alternatives. They have the freedom to choose which television channel to watch (without the freedom to influence the nature of broadcasting), freedom to choose between one doctor and another (without freedom to choose the character, purpose and organization of medical practice), freedom to choose between one candidate and another or one party and another in an election (without freedom to define the issues at stake)...the alternatives presented define and break up and structure social reality and social possibilities in ways that are not based on their interests. (1976, p.201 square parentheses added)

This is, succinctly, the world perception that is

inculcated through the process of education. Under the influence of this process, the individual comes to conceive of her role in society as one of 'fitting' into a social organization which is presented to be designed to give the collectivity of humans the greatest power in meeting the challenge of an objective, external, imposed social reality. In this case, the role of human influence in the creation of the goals of society is ignored, as system demands take over that role, and all that is left for the individual is to try to technically master the means by which survival and success in this complex, contingent environment can be achieved. Insofar as education is a process where this perception is perpetuated and which is presented to the individual as an important source of the skills necessary for this survival, it has real consequences for reproduction. Once the presentation is accepted, as I have suggested it is made more likely to be through education, the practical issues, questions and learning through which the realization of a society oriented ~~by~~ real human interests could be achieved, are rendered essentially inconceivable. It is according to this context that the claim that schools and education serve to reproduce the existing social formation can be understood.

One final point will be presented here before this chapter concludes with a brief summary of the general argument. This point deals with the actual mechanics of

the inculcation of the above presented world perception. While a complete analysis of these mechanics is well beyond the scope of this paper, the importance of the issue demands that it be, at least initially, dealt with.

It is not satisfying to suggest that system demands have been unilaterally forced onto the sphere of interaction, and the individuals who constitute that sphere. Despite the perception of individuals within society, even capitalist social formations remain human social formations. This is to say that the dimension of social interaction is just as extant in contemporary society as any other and remains, ultimately, just as distant from direct manipulation by technical rationality. There must remain room for human agency. Humans, as the constituents of the social formation, must play more than a passive, reactive role in the reproduction of it.

The link between the possessed perceptions of the world (as contingency) and the reproduction of organized capitalism through the mediation of human agency, is the concept of 'over-rationalization'. What this concept means is that individuals will attempt to explain their experiences in accord with their perceptions of the world. Insofar as that perception is a technically rational one, as it is in contemporary society, the explanation will follow the form of technical rationality. It has been demonstrated that this technical rationality admits only a specific form of knowledge and specific uses of that form,

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consequently the explanations that derive from it are, from the beginning constrained. Therefore, the important point here is that, these explanations will not reflect the 'real' experiences of the individuals, but will rather reflect the 'expected' (similar to perceived) experiences as defined by the perception. It has been previously suggested that the adoption of scientific/technical rationality as the dominant model has the side-effect of suppressing practical rationality. This is what was meant by that statement. It is in this manner that social interaction can be 'mistaken' as an instrumentally rational process and consequently subject to system integrative demands. What this really means is that social processes can be, indeed, are, understood as organizational processes. The suggestion is that human society is organized in order to meet pre-established goals and in this context the roles of individuals within the processes can be overrationalized.

While this might not be completely clear at the moment, a brief example using the process of education, should clarify the context of the concept 'over-rationalization'. The intent of this example will be to demonstrate a recognizable separation between 'real' experience and the 'expected' experience (This separation is really a manifestation of the poor fit of technical means into practical issues). This should help clarify the manner in which the 'mistaken' perception of

social reality through the imposition of an organizational paradigm, is supported by an over-rationalization. Implicit in this over-rationalization is the suggestion that it implies the forgetting of the real nature of social interactions.

If we are to begin with the conception of the educational process as an organizational one, a potential problem immediately becomes apparent. This is that the metaphor of a factory, a useful metaphor for conceptualizing the techno/administratively rational organization of human interaction, does not fit well. Stephens suggests a better metaphor:

If we must use a metaphor or model in seeking to understand the process of schooling, we should look to agriculture. In agriculture we do not start from scratch, and we do not direct our efforts to inert and passive materials...The crop, once planted, may undergo some development even while the farmer sleeps or loafs. No matter what he does, some aspects of the outcome will remain constant. (1967, p.10-11)

This represents the initial skepticism that technically rational organizational theory can adequately account for human experience. From this skepticism can be drawn the suggestion that, what is different about the metaphors is that the worker is working with qualitatively different material, that the worker in the educational process is 'linked' to her material differently. This form of linking will be called 'loose-coupling' below.

The term 'loose-coupling' describes an interesting

event. According to it, the two (or more) elements in the organization (in this case the process of education) are responsive to each other but each also retains its own identity and separateness such that the influence of one on the other does not form a completely predictable relationship. In the case of the opposite concept, that of 'tight-couplings', predictable relationships are formed. That is, the effects of one element on the other can be accurately determined and predicted.

It should be clear that a technically rational process implies tight couplings. In the case of the world perception that is characteristic in contemporary society, which is based on scientific rationality, tight couplings would be expected in social organizations (social processes). However, as March and Olsen suggest, "individuals find themselves in a more complex, less stable, and less understood world than that described by standard theories of organizational choice." (1976, p.21) The result, in contemporary society, is a context that provides little support for making sense of the world according to the given perception (technical rationality). It is suggested that, in response to this, individuals will devote;

considerable effort...to constructing social reality...in general one should find a considerable amount of effort being devoted to punctuating this loosely-coupled world and connecting it in some way in which it can be made sensible. (Weick, 1976, p.13)

This activity, in which the 'real' experiences of loosely-coupled human interaction are substituted for by a 'constructed' perception of social reality, represents the concept of 'over-rationalization'. The crux of this point is that, through this over-rationalization, individuals are able to act according to their 'mistaken' perceptions of the world. In this sense, human agency is retained. Individuals do not simply passively react to the perception of social reality in technical rational terms, they actively pursue the construction of the conditions under which that perception can be believed. One result of this pursuit, as has been suggested above, is the rationalization of the structural organization of the educational process as a tightly coupled one.

In this context, the subcharacteristic of the demand for control takes on an interesting meaning. It can be understood as a 'constructed' response to the looseness of coupling between the individuals that are engaged in the process. For example, the students are only loosely coupled with the teacher, they are individuals separate from the teacher and therefore the influence of the latter on the former cannot be established with the reliability that is demanded according to instrumental rationality. The instrumentally rational goals of the process can only be secured through the establishment of a 'constructed' social reality which takes the place of the absent tight

couplings. The transmission of 'knowledge' is ensured through the construction of rules which respond to instrumentally rational needs and oblige the students by force. In this manner, tight couplings are simulated, and the relationship between student and teacher is over-rationalized.

Another example is that the looseness of coupling between administrators and teachers, previously described to be the result of the impossibility of complete and constant evaluation of the day to day work of education, is addressed through the adoption of a formal system of certification. Once this system is adopted, questions of whether teachers need to be certified are short-circuited. Discussion comes to be centered around the structure of certification, which represents a 'constructed' coupling of administration and work. The issue of certification has come to be over-rationalized, it has come to be seen as a necessary element of the educational process.

This brief discussion of the concept of 'over-rationalization' can serve only as an introduction to an analysis of the actual mechanics of the perpetuation of technical rationality and the suppression of practical rationality. Interestingly enough, even though it has been, itself, only an introduction, it leads us into the conclusion of this chapter.

Conclusion

By now the general direction of the argument presented in this paper should be clear. This direction was initially provided in the second chapter, though a description of a particular way of looking at the world. In this last chapter, some of the concepts from that world understanding were applied to an analysis of schooling and education in contemporary society. The general theme that informs this whole paper is that schooling and education play a role in the reproduction of the existing social formation. The general structure of the argument up to this point consists of eight assertions:

The first assertion is that contemporary society is characterized by the theme of domination of the dimension of production over the dimension of social integration. The second is that, through State intervention (the organizational principle of contemporary society), this theme will be structurally established in all social processes that make up the social formation. The third is that the process of education is one such social process. The fourth is that the theme of techno/administrative domination renders unlikely the thematization of insights originating in the sphere of practical knowledge. Fifthly, one example of the blocking of thematization occurs, at the level of the individual, through the process of education. Sixthly, this blocking has the consequence of sustaining

the identity of the existing social formation despite the evolutionary potential implicit, at the individual level, in the sphere of moral/practical knowledge. The seventh assertion is that this sustaining of the identity of the social formation is identical to the reproduction of the social formation. Finally, insofar as the process of education is the site of the blocking of thematization, it is also an agent of social reproduction.

This last point has been the focus of most of this chapter. According to this chapter, the blocking of thematization stems from a variety of structural subcharacteristics of the process of education (and early structural implications of the concept of schooling) and the general manner in which this blocking occurs has been initially described. At this point, however, the entire discussion remains relatively abstract. While some examples of the structures that create this blocking have been given, the entire argument seems to need a much firmer grounding. To this end, the next chapter will focus directly on one element of the educational curriculum in Ontario schools, and will demonstrate that, even in the case of this close scrutiny, the argument, based on the general model of Habermas' understanding of the world, is both viable and insightful.

Chapter Four

The VIP Program

The argument that has been developed throughout this paper, that schools and the process of education serve to reproduce existing inequalities by contributing to a blocking of thematization of moral/practical insights, has remained relatively abstract. The following chapter will provide the grounding that was suggested at the end of the previous chapter to be necessary. This will be accomplished through the presentation and critical analysis (using the model described and discussed in the previous two chapters) of a particular program of suggested curriculum in the Ontario schooling system. The aim of this analysis will be to demonstrate that, in the concrete example of this curriculum suggestion, blocking of thematization of moral/practical insights do (or would) occur as a result of the situations and processes previously described. Structure for this chapter will, therefore, follow the model presented in the previous chapter. Initially, some general comments and discussion about the program (and others like it) will be presented. This will be followed by a discussion of the structural implications of the program. In the third section, the six subcharacteristics of the process of education will be identified in the program and the implications of these will be briefly discussed. Finally, a brief discussion of the implications for reproduction of one element unique to the chosen program, will be presented. It must be kept in mind throughout the reading of this chapter that it is an

attempt to apply the model (and concepts deriving from it) to a concrete historical situation: Arguments which, in the isolation of this chapter alone, may seem unsupported, derive from the context of the previous two chapters.

The first issue that must be resolved, however, is the choice of a program to subject to analysis. Clearly, if a program dealing with the instruction of mathematics were selected, one could easily demonstrate that the subject matter of that program was conceived to be objective, relatively static and open to possession. In such a case, this conception of knowledge is, more or less, appropriate. The point of this paper, that a particular model of knowledge intrudes in situations where it is inappropriate, can only conclusively be demonstrated in the instance of a program where such a model is inappropriate. For this initial reason, the "Values, Influences and Peers" program (VIP) has been selected as the subject of this chapter.

The VIP program is described in a Ministry of Education publication¹ and represents a relatively recent example of 'values education'. 'Values education' is a term that describes a vast array of programs. The general theme that ties these programs together is that they all purport to address practical issues, that is issues dealing with the successful interaction of human beings. In the case of the VIP program, this theme is made explicit in the statement of its aims when it is suggested that the program will 'help' the student "become aware of some of the basic

values of Canadian society, specifically the set of values considered essential to the well-being of the individual and the well-being of society." (p.7) The implications of such a program for this paper, which claims that practical issues cannot be dealt with through the educational system, are important. It should also be clear that, if it can be shown that the VIP program is unable to actually address these issues as a result of the limitations imposed on it through its connection to the educational subsystem, then the thesis of this paper is supported. This is to say that, if even the programs explicitly designed to address practical issues are unable to do so, and if that inability can be explained through reference to the model presented above, then the suggestion that the educational subsystem serves to reproduce existing inequalities (the orienting suggestion of this paper) is supported.

To begin, however, it is necessary to briefly describe the scope and structure of the VIP program. This program is presented through a 'resource guide' written by a 'provincial writing committee' under the auspices of the Ontario Ministry of Education. The general purpose of the program is to help students become aware of;

- the personal and societal choices with which they will be confronted;
- the possible consequences of these choices;
- the relationship of these choices to personal and societal values systems. (p.6)

The VIP program is aimed at students in Grade Six of

the Ontario educational system. It is described, in the 'resource guide', to use an "instructional" methodology and seeks, in this manner to instill the "skills and insights needed to examine the values issues inherent in particular circumstances." (p.6) Throughout the program, the issue of peer pressure plays a major role. Indeed at one point in the guide it is stated that "Peer pressure is one of the primary issues that this resource guide has been developed to treat." (p.6)

On a structural level, the program consists of twelve "Topics". At the beginning the topics are fairly broad and cover such issues as "personal and societal values and standards and how these are translated into rules and laws". (p.6) Later, the topics are more specifically developed and relate directly to 'anti-social' behaviour such as vandalism and shoplifting. The order of these topics is not considered incidental. In fact it is explicitly stated that the VIR sessions "should be presented on a regular and continuous basis from the first to the last topic". (p.37) The topics of the program are addressed, most characteristically, through a "systematic discussion of stories or vignettes" but may also include the viewing of films or the use of 'card sorts'.²

The implementation of this program is, ideally, to be carried out with the support and input of both the police and the parents of the students. The role of the police is supported by the connection, made explicit as a central

theme in the program, between values and laws. That role is predicted when one discovers that the Ministry of the Solicitor General is listed as a co-sponsor of the resource guide. The role of the parents is limited, according to the program guide, to "at least three meetings" (p.37) with the teacher responsible for its implementation. The need for these meetings is supported according to the explicitly stated understanding that the family must continue to hold chief responsibility for the development in children of values.

It should be clear from the above description that, even in its own terms, the VIP program is conceived to be a values education program. It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a detailed, descriptive comparison of the VIP program with all other 'values education' programs. For the purposes of this paper, the potentially contentious assertion that the VIP program is essentially representative of most 'values education' programs will be left largely unaddressed. However, some initial support for this suggestion can be found in the following statement; "Values education programmes, at least as the phrase is generally used, consist essentially of stimuli (generally fictional stories involving apparent moral dilemmas) designed to cause the student to articulate his values." (Barrow, 1979, p.90) The centrality of such stories in the VIP program has been previously described. It should be clear that, if this element, described by

Barrow as an essential element of most values education programs, is central to the VIP program, then the suggestion that the VIP program is generally representative of values education programs, is supported. Consequently, the choice of the VIP program as the subject of analysis in this chapter is also made more tenable.

The remainder of this chapter will be addressed directly to this analysis. In keeping with the model that is to be used for this analysis, the first thing to consider is the structural implications of the VIP program. It was demonstrated in the previous chapter that the establishment of a subsystem of schools could be understood as an example of State intervention. Essentially this means that the subsystem was institutionalized as a response to system problems. That institutionalization plays a legitimating role for the State, which could then be seen to be doing something about the problems. It was further demonstrated that as a result of this, the subsystem of schooling is, from the beginning, conceived of in technical terms, in terms of its 'use value'.

This structural model can be applied to the VIP program as well. This program can accurately be understood as a response to a particular set of system problems. This is clear in the rhetoric of the guide itself; "at the same time, society has frequently turned to the school for assistance in helping young people learn to cope with such problems as smoking, drinking and the abuse of drugs in

general." (p.5) The VIP program, then can be understood as a way of dealing with these 'problems'. The success of the program should, it would seem, be measured according to how well it reduces the effects of such 'problems'. That this is the central concern of the VIP program is demonstrated in the statement that;

Without these understandings and values, young people may become involved in a number of anti-social activities such as stealing and vandalism. They may be more inclined to show off, to react negatively to authority, and to become involved in truancy. They may also attempt to escape the difficulties they are having in solving their own personal problems by using alcohol or taking drugs. (p.6)

The statement above is ripe with examples of the very point that is most important here. Most of the 'problems' listed above are system problems. For example, the issue of the problem of truancy bears no necessary connection to true human interests. Indeed truancy is only a 'problem' once a formalized structure of schooling (a structure which demands compulsory attendance) has been institutionalized. Similar arguments can be made to demonstrate the nature of 'showing off' and even of negative reactions to authority figures to stem from the subsystem of schooling itself (the demand for control makes 'showing off' undesirable, authority is only in danger of receiving negative reactions if its legitimation is weak). The subsystem of schooling has been demonstrated in the previous chapter to be the institutionalization (for legitimation purposes) of a

structure to deal with a false need. The implementation of the VIP program can be similarly understood to represent (at least partially) a structurally organized response to the false needs that are introduced (in one instance) through the institutionalization of schooling. This represents exactly the point that schools (and in this case the VIP program) are vacant of political content. The problems (and goals) are initially given and debate and discussion centers around a forum that is pre-structured. The 'values' that are to be addressed by the VIP program are listed in the introduction of the program and what is really left is for the teacher to follow the guidelines of the program to inculcate these 'values' into the students. Consequently, even the discussions that form the largest part of the VIP program are really only means of ensuring this inculcation. What this really means is that discussion, which, in meaningful human interaction, is political (oriented to gaining practical insight), is co-opted into the technical rational conception of knowledge and becomes de-politicized. Discussion becomes a tool designed to instill a particular version of truth, a version pre-established by the systematic constraints of a capitalist society.

None of the above argument should be construed to suggest that many of the values that are the subject of the VIP program are not worthwhile. Indeed, peace, freedom and respect for life (among several others mentioned in the

program) are, quite conceivably, central to the survival of humankind. What is suggested by the above argument is that the articulation of these values as important is not sufficient. The meaning of them must be established, they must be interactively connected to human life through communicative action. They must, in short, remain practical issues.

Once they are simply stated, without elaboration, and without the context within which that elaboration could be carried out (that is, without a political forum), they are stripped of meaningfulness for real human interaction. Once the articulation of a static list of 'values' is accepted as the starting point of a values education program, truly practical insights are de-legitimated. What the VIP program represents, according to its own structural constraints, is a program which substitutes values articulation for moral inquiry and renders less likely the thematization of moral insights. It is, on this structural level, a program which, despite its noble claims, serves the reproduction of the existing social formation. Barrow makes this point well (even if for a different purpose);

The danger is that that exercise, which is probably harmless and might be invested with some sort of point, will be taken far more seriously than it deserves, because the tests used are the result of research, they are all systematized so that answers can be fed into the computer, and before long people will be assuming that it has something to do with moral education, which on the face of it, it certainly does not have. There is the added risk that the extensive use of such techniques in schools will encourage students to confuse a willingness to

state one's opinion with rational autonomy. (1979, p.91)

The distinction, made above, between 'values' education and moral education is central to much of the analysis that will be carried out throughout this chapter. This argument suggests that the general structural context of the VIP program de-politicizes its content, it removes morality from consideration. One more structural point must be discussed before we move into a direct examination of evidence of the six subcharacteristics of the process of education within the VIP program.

This point is that, by virtue of its being presented as a separate and defined subject, the 'values' education of the VIP program is fitted into the dominant model of knowledge of the schools. It should be remembered that that model is based on technocratic rationality and suggests that knowledge is objective, relatively static and directly transmittable. According to these characteristics, each subject can be taught as if it stood alone. Math, science, English, history and geography can all be separated and the subject matter of each can be taught in isolation. Even in the event that knowledge gained from two or more of these subjects is combined to solve a particular problem, the role of each is clearly understood.

This, then, is part of the structural context within which 'values' education is to be understood. 'Values'

education is simply another subject. It can be taught during 'values' education periods, it contains information which is only disseminated during those periods, and that information will be useful to the student. Indeed this conception is strongly encouraged within the program itself. The importance of 'finishing' the program (meaning, one must suppose, gaining 'knowledge' about values) is manifest. During a description of the methods for implementing a VIP program, the holding of "some kind of formal acknowledgement of the successful conclusion of the VIP program" (p.37), is suggested.

The point that is to be taken from the above is that 'values' education is understood to be largely identical to any other form of education in the school. Ultimately it is taught the way everything else in school is taught. It is fitted into the scientific/technical model of knowledge and transmitted according to that model. It has been demonstrated in the previous chapters that once this model is applied to elements of the dimension of social interaction, they are stripped of their moral content. Thus stripped, they cannot lead to moral/practical insight. The consequence of this is the rendering less likely of the thematization of moral/practical issues. Because it is set off as a separate 'school' subject, the structural context of the VIP program can only contribute to this blocking of thematization.

It should be clear that the combination of the above

two points demonstrates a clear structural limitation for the program. Once the VIP program is understood to be oriented toward solving a specific set of pre-defined problems (the first point) and is structured according to a technocratic model of knowledge (the second point), then the structural context within which this program is situated must impose limitations. These limitations, it has been argued, are manifested in an inability to address practical issues. It was suggested by Barrow that this situation is dangerous insofar as the program represents itself to actually be addressing these issues and this claim is taken seriously. It is this condition that is described when I suggest that there exists a systematic (meaning, structurally defined) blocking of the thematization of moral/practical insights. This blocking is to be understood as the fundamental element in the reproduction of contemporary society.

Up to this point we have been talking entirely about the structural context within which the VIP program is situated. It should be clear that this context places limitations on the program. The impact of these limitations is felt, however, in the day to day process of the program. The following section of this chapter will discuss that process. It will be structured according to the six subcharacteristics of the educational process which were identified in the previous chapter. The aim here will be to demonstrate the existence of each of these

subcharacteristics in the VIP program.

Two things must be kept in mind during the reading of the next section. Firstly, as has been emphasized above, the subcharacteristics must be understood to represent manifestations of the structural limitations described above. Secondly, and this point was made in the previous chapter, the subcharacteristics describe the manner in which the day to day process of education (in this case, the VIP program) acts directly on the individual to render less likely in her, the thematization of moral/practical insights. Given this interpretation, the following section should conclusively demonstrate that, despite its claims to be dealing with issues of morality (for example, at one point in the guide the statement is made that the program is aimed at discouraging "moral relativism" [p.4]), the VIP program actually serves forces of reproduction.

The first subcharacteristic suggests that the educational process is explicitly understood to be a techno/administratively rational process. What this means, is that the way classes are taught, is itself structured according to a specific model of knowledge and the rationality that supports it. There exists a demand, according to this subcharacteristic, for the careful planning and implementation of knowledge transmission. The pre-structuring of the learning context, which is implied by this demand, is a central element of the day to day conduct of the classroom. The impact this has on

reproduction is tied to its pervasiveness. If students are exposed, every day of their life, to evidence that learning is conducted in a particular way (in this case a techno/administrative way), then it seems reasonable to assert that that way will come to be conceived as the only way to gain knowledge. Once this occurs, knowledge that is gained (at least potentially) through other means is delegitimated.

It should be clear by now, that this subcharacteristic is identifiable in the VIP program. Initially, the existence of a resource guide might suggest that the demand for careful planning is central to the VIP program. The guide itself makes this theme clearly visible in its discussion of the process whereby the guide was developed.

In forming the provincial writing committee that was to prepare the initial draft of this resource guide, we were able to draw upon the expertise of educators and police officers who had a thorough knowledge of existing programs...This done, the writing committee prepared the initial draft materials for the pilot study...The pilot project was conducted with the cooperation of eight school boards and police authorities within each school board's jurisdictional area...Feedback was obtained from the teaching teams of the pilot schools, and this information, together with the results of a pre-test/post-test questionnaire, provided good direction for the modification of the draft manuscript. A validation exercise was carried out which provided guidance for further modification and improvement. In addition, a provincial advisory committee was established, which included among its members some of the leading values educators in the province. The committee examined the draft, made many valuable suggestions for its improvement, and helped to ensure that it was consistent with the educational and philosophical premises of the ministry resource guide on values education, Personal and Societal Values. (p.36)

The point behind the presentation of the long section above, is that the VIP program was, itself, developed through a technically rational process. The planning involved in this process, including the reliance on 'experts' and the quantification implicit in 'pre-test/post-test' questionnaires, is clear and, just as clearly, is intended to provide the most thorough, 'effective' way of teaching values. Certainly this planning must manifest itself in pressure on teachers to 'follow the program'. This forms the initial evidence of the first subcharacteristic in the VIP program.

In order to actually demonstrate the point that the process (the VIP program) is techno/administratively rational, however, it must be demonstrated that the rules of that rationality are followed in the implementation of the program. In this direction we are led to the section of the guide entitled "Implementing a VIP Program" (p.37). The 'recommendations' contained in this section are clearly recommendations of a techno/administrative nature. They deal with the nature of the forum ("a seminar format should be used"), the direction of the lessons ("To be most effective...sessions should be presented on a regular and continuous basis from the first to the last topic"), the scheduling of the lessons ("Sessions should be held...two or three times a week, or, in some cases, once a week"), and the duration of the lessons ("...sessions should be

from thirty to forty minutes in length"). It should be apparent that these 'recommendations' speak to the efficacy of the program in the transmission of pre-established content. In this sense the implementation of the VIP program can be said to be organized as a techno/administrative process, just as is the rest of the educational enterprise.

The point to be taken seriously here, is that, as a result of the techno/administratively rational context of the process of the VIP program, students may come to believe that values are connected to the educational process in the same way as, for example, the physical properties of objects. Once values come to be understood as objective, pre-defined and open to possession, then the propriety of a techno/administratively rational process can be assumed. This assumption is a major player in the blocking of the thematization of moral/practical issues by eliminating a context within which these issues could have meaning.

This describes, in a concrete example, the situation whereby the process is established in such a way that only a certain type of knowledge (technical/administrative) is considered legitimate. It is, in this sense, an example, in the VIP program, of the first subcharacteristic of the process of education.

The second subcharacteristic of that process was identified as the centrality of control within it. It

would be easy to simply state, at this point, that because we have demonstrated the existence of this subcharacteristic in the process of education and the VIP program is conducted within that process, it too has an emphasis on control. While this may have certain validity, it would not constitute a meaningful analysis. Therefore, we must turn once again to the guide to furnish us with examples of the impact of the issue of control in the VIP program.

It has been suggested that the nature of the adopted model of knowledge in the process of education demands that the knowledge possessor (the teacher) be the locus of control. This situation is evident in the VIP program. Despite the rhetorical emphasis on student directedness that is evident throughout the guide ("Students can examine...Students might work...the class can discuss" [emphasis added]), the fact that this is a teacher controlled program is clear on a closer reading. Certainly, it is the teacher who organizes the lessons in accord with the 'recommendations' that have been previously discussed. The Objectives section of each of the 'Topics' is introduced with the statement "Students should be given opportunities to;". Clearly, it is the teacher who will plan the manner through which these opportunities are given. It is the teacher who will select the films, and other teaching aids, as explicitly stated in one example, "The teacher selects a story...to generate a

discussion...". (p.13) } Indeed, the entire tone and direction of the individual VIP program in its implementation is under the control of the teacher as a result of her being the one with initial, and probably sole, access to the guide. Therefore, while the students may have some leeway within the discussion of each 'Topic', the locus of control as far as the planning and implementation of the program in general lies in the teacher.

It was pointed out in the previous chapter that the 'rules' of the classroom, which are also the rules that officially govern human interaction within that classroom, are usually the first thing 'taught' at the beginning of the year. The rules, it was further suggested, are the decision of the teacher and are imposed, generally without negotiation, on the students. A clear example of this rule-setting is provided in the VIP program. One of the 'rules' of the program is that no names will be used during discussions. The rationale behind this 'no-name' rule will be taken up later. What is important here is that it is explicitly stated in the guide that "The 'no-name' rule should be explained to the students in the introductory session and it should be strictly adhered to..." (p.37)

The rule is imposed on the students and taught as an initial element of the program. Clearly, some emphasis is placed on the need for control in the administration of this program.

Finally, it was demonstrated that this need for control was manifested at one level in an emphasis on certification, that conditions were placed on who can teach in certain circumstances. This manifestation can be identified in the VIP program as well. In the section of the guide dealing with the implementation of the VIP program, the need for those teachers who will be involved in the conducting of this program to attend an 'orientation seminar' is stressed. Among other reasons, this orientation seminar would be necessary to "clarify the methodology of Values, Influences and Peers" and would "provide helpful information concerning appropriate related audio-visual aids and reference materials." (p.37) This is clearly a manifestation of the need to ensure that the program is taught 'correctly', that is, in accord with the structured plan laid out in the guide. Once again an example of the need for control is found within the VIP program.

As a final point in the issue of control, it should be remembered that the exercise of control is inconsistent with the achievement of moral/practical insight but is characteristic of a techno/administratively rational process. What should be taken from this section is that the VIP program renders unlikely the thematization of moral/practical issues, at least partly because it is a process in which control plays a real role.

The third subcharacteristic that was described in the

previous chapter was the introduction of administrative knowledge. This was linked strongly with the issue of control and refers to knowledge which is 'useful' in controlling human interaction. The distinction has been drawn previously between practical knowledge (which truly implies and is implied in interaction) and administrative knowledge (which is an instrumentally rational substitute for practical knowledge). Some examples from the VIP program should make it clear that it is the latter form of knowledge which is consciously perpetuated through the VIP program.

In the previous chapter it was pointed out that a key element in the successful substitution of administrative knowledge for practical knowledge is the suggestion that certain 'skills' can be taught and applied to render interaction 'controllable'. These 'skills' are conceived to be similar in ultimate form to the 'skill' of addition or of reading. This is to say that they pre-exist and once 'learned' can be applied to the context for which they are useful. That this conception is adopted in the VIP program is clear in a statement made during the Rationale section of the guide. In this statement it is claimed that the VIP program 'helps' the students "by providing them with the skills...needed to examine the values issues inherent in particular circumstances." (p.6) The 'circumstances' referred to above are clearly connected to interaction and consequently the 'skills' address that interaction.

At this point the connection between the VIP program and administrative knowledge has been made. It remains to satisfactorily demonstrate that this connection is central to the message of the program (as is suggested by the assertion that the introduction of administrative knowledge is a subcharacteristic of the process). For this demonstration we must turn in the guide, to the 'Topic' entitled 'Authority and Authority Figures' (p.20) This 'topic' represents an introduction to administrative knowledge. In its introduction the suggestion is explicitly made that authority, which implies control and rule-bound organization, is essential to "the orderly functioning of society." (p.20) The emphasis on orderliness and, by implication, effective and efficient organization, is clearly consistent with the point previously made that technocratic rationality prevails even this level of social interaction. This is further supported in the statement that, "This unit has been designed to help students 'develop insights into the functioning of groups and the individuals role in them', while they 'learn the social skills and attitudes upon which effective and responsible co-operation and participation depend." (p.20 emphases added) With this given as the stated aim of this 'Topic', it should be clear that the suggestion that the indoctrination of administrative knowledge is a central element of the VIP program is quite supportable.

Once one delves deeper into the unit the nature of that 'administrative knowledge' becomes clearer. In an introductory activity the students are presented with a brief story. In this story a group of boys (already a stereotypical sex role presentation) were unable to continue their referee-less game of hockey because of arguments about rule infractions. Once one of the boys, who was unable to play, became a referee, the game was able to resume. The story seems simple enough but its messages are important. Clearly the intended message is that authority is a necessary element of interaction. The story is designed to demonstrate this 'fact' in a way that the students can quickly grasp; without the referee the game could not have been played. While not specifically mentioned in the story, it can be assumed that in the discussion that would take place around it, some other issues would arise. It might be suggested that because the boy was unable to play, he would be 'impartial' and that this impartiality is an important part of the effective administration of the rule-bound context of the hockey game. It might come out that even if some of the boys disagreed with the referee, his decisions must stand to ensure the maintenance of 'order' in the game. It might be argued that because everyone already knew the rules, the referees job is to ensure that all players abide by those rules and to penalize those who don't. It should be clear, at this point, that these messages are also desired results

of the introduction of this story.

By now the relevance of all of this to the point of the introduction of administrative knowledge should be evident. The story, as a metaphor for society in general, describes a rule-bound context in which competitive interests are controlled and organized through the acting of an administrative office. This is exactly the conception of the role of the State in contemporary society. Administrative knowledge is necessary for the hockey game and is just as necessary for the running of a country. The real message that is coming across through the VIP program, is that human social interaction, by definition, demands administrative knowledge. Insofar as this knowledge manifests itself, in the actual organization of a society, as authority, the VIP program supports it by demonstrating to, and convincing, the students of the need for it.

Within this context the 'skills' that have been previously mentioned can be unquestioningly passed on. In a later section of this 'Topic', the students are asked to formulate the rules for a game after being given only a vague title. Clearly they are being asked here to apply administrative knowledge. The formulation of rules implies the defining of a context and the controlling of the individuals within that context. The most interesting element of this exercise is that the success of the students is measured according to the usefulness and

efficacy of the rules. Students are expected to "try out the games...to see if the rules really work". (p.21) That the rules are applied in a context of human interaction and are directed toward the effective management of the humans in that interaction in order to achieve some pre-assigned goal, is a clear indication of the initial application of administrative knowledge. In this exercise the students are learning how to construct rules which can be imposed on others, they are learning 'skills' that can be applied in the manipulation of social interaction.

A second point regarding the inculcation of 'skills' brings in the rest of the 'Topics' in the VIP program. In this sense the 'skills' are really understandings of the ways in which obedience to rules can be carried out. This is undertaken in a peculiarly negative way. In the unit on authority, the students are provided with examples of rule following behaviour through the presentation of instances of rule breaking. Students are asked to consider the 'consequences' of such activities as "riding double on a bicycle...answering impolitely to a teacher in class...not doing homework...arguing with a referee". (p.21) Clearly, these consequences, as a result of the impending use of authority (punishment), would not be pleasant. A similar process occurs in the units that follow the 'Authority and Authority Figures' unit. In each of the units on "Being Truthful" (p.22), "The Dangers of Drugs" (p.24), "Vandalism and Destructive Behaviour" (p.27), "Shoplifting is

"Stealing" (p.30), and "Youth and the Law" (p.32), the students are asked to consider the 'consequences' of these behaviors. Accordingly, each of these units deals mostly with these consequences. The students are encouraged to discover the varieties of behaviour that fit into these categories and recognize the ways in which these behaviours come in conflict with the orderliness, and efficacy of a social organization. Because this orderliness and efficacy derives from the application of administrative knowledge, the students are really being taught 'skills' pertaining to the avoidance of conflict with the system of rules defined by that model of knowledge.

This peculiarly negative construction has a very important result, however. By demonstrating the 'obvious' irrationality of each of these behaviors through reference to their immediate, uncomfortable consequences for the individual, the program is able to disguise the fact that many of these behaviors are only irrational given a particular context. This point has been made already, and this is really an example of the way in which the presentation of administrative knowledge (and the rationality that supports it) as a necessary element of society, blocks thematization of the contextual nature of that knowledge (and rationality) and prevents discussion about that context.

The point that should be taken from all of this is that the VIP program serves as a forum through which the

principles of administrative knowledge are perpetuated and their use in society (indeed even the concept that administrative knowledge is a necessary element of society), is justified. It should be clear that this really means the perpetuation of the improper intrusion of instrumental rationality into the dimension of social integration. Insofar as this improper intrusion has been previously described to be the central element in the blocking of thematization of practical issues, its perpetuation through the VIP program can be understood to contribute to the reproduction of the contemporary social formation.

The fourth subcharacteristic of the process of education was described as the emphasis on 'level' of knowledge possession which is manifested through a 'grade' system. While this subcharacteristic presents some informative and interesting implications for the process of education at large, its application to the VIP program is limited. Because this program is conceived as a short term project (according to its own rules of implementation, it would last only about twelve weeks) the categorization of students according to knowledge possession is unlikely to occur in anything other than a very informal way. It may be important to point out, however, that the program itself is assigned a place in the educational structure which is clearly defined by the grade oriented structure of the process. It is stated at several points that this program

is aimed at students in 'grade six'. The reasons for this are many, but they revolve around the idea that the program contains knowledge that will be useful for students who will be moving into grade seven.

Students entering Grade 7 are at a particularly vulnerable age. A significant percentage of students suffer from the beginnings of mental or emotional problems at this age. For some this is a crucial time for deciding whether or not to smoke or to use chemicals (drugs). As well, involvement in school violence and vandalism tends to be fairly common among students of this age group. It is for these reasons that VIP is intended for use with students in Grade 6. (p.6)

The fact that the VIP program is locked into a particular level in the students development and for a particular reason (as a response to a perceived set of problems) betrays the workings of instrumental rationality. The program has been assigned a place in the structural hierarchy based on needs defined by the system and according to administratively rational rules. The danger exists where spontaneous practical learning which is connected to elements of the VIP program runs the risk of being discouraged because 'it will be covered in Grade Six'. This danger was described in the last chapter where it was pointed out that learning that was out of sync with the formalized conception of the hierarchical structure of the educational process would likely be systematically ignored. In this way this fourth subcharacteristic and its implications are to be found in the VIP program.

The fifth subcharacteristic follows closely from the fourth and suffers many of the same limitations of applicability. This subcharacteristic suggests that an emphasis on knowledge possession in an hierarchical structure demands a formalized system of evaluation. The analysis was extended in the previous chapter to demonstrate that once this occurs, a competitive environment is formed in which humans can be commoditized. It would seem that such an analysis would fit poorly with the VIP program, which has no formalized tests. In order to demonstrate that this subcharacteristic, in a modified form, is applicable to the program, some liberties must be taken. It is hoped that if these are not convincing in their own right they will at least not detract from the force of the argument in general.

Each of the 'Topics' in the VIP program is structured in a specific way. After a brief introduction to the concepts that will be presented in that unit, a section entitled 'Objectives' is presented. While the opening line in the 'Objectives' section is always; "Students should be given opportunities to;", it can be asserted that these represent the 'knowledge' that the students are required to have. Furthermore, it is expected that regular review sessions be held in order to "review, reinforce and consolidate" (p.37) what has been learned. Under these conditions it would seem not at all unreasonable to suggest that some evaluation must be going on. It might be further

suggested that, even if that evaluation remains informal and subjective (i.e. up to the teacher), it will produce a similar environment in the classroom as would be produced by a formal system of testing.

The nature of the program is such that the discussions, which form a large part of the time during the VIP program, obtain a particular role. Because the evaluation remains informal, the discussions present the major opportunity to demonstrate knowledge possession. Competition, in this forum, means competition for the opportunity (and time) to present this demonstration. The students are still competing, albeit in a less manifest and apparent manner. What this really means for the student is that competition, in one form or another, is central to human interaction. The realization that this is really only an effect of the context of the particular social formation, is rendered unlikely by the pervasiveness of that context.

Finally, because the program is short and can be considered to be 'successfully' completed, it reinforces the understanding that its subject matter is open to possession. In the section of the guide on the implementation of a VIP program, it is suggested that the successful completion of the program be recognized with the awarding of "a locally designed VIP certificate or T-shirt." (p.37) Such a formal acknowledgement of completion, including a symbol identifying a student as a

graduate, perpetuates the implication that these students possess knowledge that others do not.

These two points, that some form of evaluation must occur and that success is formally acknowledged, should support the contention that the subcharacteristic of evaluation does exist, even if in a modified form, in the VIP program.

The final subcharacteristic suggests that the process of education perpetuates the "illusion of choice". (Smollett, 1976, p.201) This perpetuation is also clearly evident in the VIP program. It should be clear by now that a major theme of this chapter is the point that the VIP program assumes a pre-given structural context and that this assumption arises from a particular rationality. More clearly put, it is assumed that social integration is pre-structured by external influences (in a way similar to system integration) and that humans must make 'choices' that are 'useful' in dealing with the effects of this externally imposed reality. It was then pointed out that, what this really means for individuals in society, is that they come to conceive of their role as one of 'fitting' into a social organization that has been presented as the most efficient way of ensuring collective survival in the face of an objective, external, imposed social reality. The implications of this were drawn out in the previous chapter. The aim here will be to demonstrate the workings of this understanding within the VIP program.

The first evidence for the demonstration can be found in the general introduction to the program. It is quite clear that the program begins with an assumption of an established social reality and that all individuals must act within that social reality. "In the process of developing a personal values system, a young person must be made aware of the set of values that Canadians regard as essential to the well-being of society." (p.4) The clarity of the assumption of universal consensus is profound. A little later in this introduction the guide provides a list of that set of values. The implication that these are the values that the student is expected to attain through exposure to programs like VIP, is also clear.

The Aims of the program echo much of the rhetoric that is characteristic of the 'Formal Education' described earlier (and the 'Formal Democracy' that is connected with it). The first of these suggests that the program will help the students "become aware of some of the basic values of Canadian society". (p.7) The emphasis here is on an objective, pre-established set of values, and the program is set up based on this assumption. The second aim suggests that students should "learn to accept responsibility for their own actions" (p.7) It should be clear that the responsibility referred to here really means accepting the consequences of those actions. The point that is missed, and this will be returned to later, is that those consequences are only real insofar as a context

exists to support them. In this sense the 'accepting' of responsibility is a context bound concept that, by virtue of being stated without discussion in the aims of the program, is disguised as a universal one.

A third aim claims that the program should help students "gain a respect for the rights of others and for the rule of law" (p.7) The message here is quite clear. Both of these are fundamental elements of the presented illusion of a controllable and orderly organization of social integration. The implicit suggestion that the 'rule of law' exists as a self-evident and universal entity, is one of the most powerful legitimators of the State. Clearly, where a 'rule of law' exists the need for an administrative body to enforce it, also exists. The 'rights of others' are, by further implication, those rights that are given and supported by that administrative body. In both cases the assumption of the objectivity and self-evidence of a defining social reality are manifest.

A fourth aim suggests that the program will enable students to gain insights that will "assist them in making choices". This is a key point for this section of the chapter. In the last chapter, it was pointed out that the concept of 'choice' has replaced the concept of 'freedom' in contemporary society. The latter implies true political power, the former suggests that the individual is only free to make choices between a set of actions, the context of which is pre-given. Once the context is given, then

'effective', 'efficient' and 'appropriate' choices can be made according to it. It should be clear that the underlying purpose of the VIP program is to attempt to instill in the students the rationality that would lead to such choices. Indeed, the importance of the concept, 'choice', is made quite clear in the 'Rationale' section of the guide.

Through the program students become aware of;

- the personal and societal choices with which they will be confronted;
- the possible consequences of these choices;
- the relationship of these choices to personal and societal values systems. (p.6)

The most immediately obvious implication of the above is that the context is given. The suggestion that the program will identify a specific set of choices, clearly demonstrates the assumption that choices are given. Once this assumption is taken for granted, as it seems to be in this guide, then limits are placed on the potential for human action. In fact human action, in this model, comes to really only be reaction to an externally imposed reality. In the 'Topic' of the guide entitled "Decision-Making" (p.17) this process is made clear. It is stated that "Problems are basic to human existence and problem solving is a skill that everyone must acquire." Elements of this skill are described to be "not just feelings, preferences, and goals, but also feasibility, rights, and responsibilities." The important point here is that values

decisions are conceived to be not at all different from any other decisions. Hence the application of "feasibility" as a measure of the efficacy of a decision, or the demand that rights and responsibilities constitute a role in the appropriateness of a decision, betrays a contextualization of even (what should be) practical decisions.

It is in this context that the second statement of the above section gains meaningfulness. The consequences of choices come to define the criteria by which 'effective' or 'appropriate' choices can be made. This ~~is~~ formalized through what is referred to as "a simple method of decision-making". (p.18) The steps of this method are clearly spelled out;

- Define the problem.
- List the alternative solutions.
- List the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative.
- Decide on one alternative carefully considering whether the advantages sufficiently outweigh the disadvantages...
- Reconsider the consequences of each solution. Are there other alternatives? (p.19)

The process described above, and suggested in the guide as the method to resolve value decisions, is clearly an instrumentally rational one. If any choice implies positive and/or negative consequences a priori, and these can be quantified and measured, then the 'rational' choice would be the one that would have the fewest negative or the most positive consequences. This seems to be a self-evident truth. Indeed it is self-evident when the choice

is between poisoned or not poisoned food, but the whole construction misses the point that consequences in social interactions are themselves constructions of those interactions. These consequences have no objective, external existence. Further, the meaning of such social consequences as do seem to exist for a particular society are not necessarily uniform among its constituents. This all really means that instrumentally rational decision-making methods do not apply well to issues of social integration. They are, however, quite easily applied to issues of system integration.

This substitution of methods designed to maintain system integration into the dimension of social integration is secured according to the last part of the section above. By demonstrating a connection between the choices made according to the decision-making model and the values that are listed in the introduction, the program reinforces the illusion that the substitution is appropriate. The problem is that this set of values is simply assumed and is presented as though it is connected to fundamental human needs. The values are universalized by virtue of their being unquestioned. Once these universalized values are demonstrated to be connected to consequences, and these consequences used to support a set of 'rational' choices, system integrative needs can be met while being mistakenly justified as necessary elements of the dimension of social integration.

The connection of all of this to the subcharacteristic of the perpetuation of the 'illusion of choice', is actually quite simple. The VIP program attempts to convince students that the 'usefulness' of values lies in their connection to making 'choices'. Because individuals "are constantly confronted by choice in our rapidly changing society..." (p.17) they require a firm set of values that will enable them to make 'good' choices. Once the students are armed with these values and have, through the VIP program as one example, practiced their application, they will be prepared to deal with the 'multiple-choice world' with which they are confronted. They will not be prepared, however, to understand the social world, this understanding can only be gained through practical knowledge. Instead, students of the VIP program, just like students in the educational process in general, are forced to substitute reaction to a perceived social world for understanding of that world. Because the VIP program seems to provide tactics for the former and remains silent on the latter, the thematization of practical insight remains unlikely.

The section of this chapter that has been presented above has attempted to demonstrate that the six subcharacteristics of the process of education also can be found in the VIP program. This demonstration should lend support for the contention, running through this paper, that the process of education and the system of schooling

that contains it, serve to reproduce the existing social formation by rendering unlikely the thematization of the practical insights that can be the only source of change. There are, however, elements that are unique to the VIP program which contribute to this process. The following section of this chapter will briefly discuss one of these.

It has already been mentioned that one of the rules of the VIP program is a 'no-name' rule. Indeed there is a great emphasis on anonymity throughout the program. For example, in the Rationale section, it is pointed out that "anonymity is important..." (p.6) and in the 'Topic' on values and standards it is emphasised that the teacher should explain that "no one will see how any individual student responds." (p.9) This emphasis on anonymity has implications for communication. Insofar as the distortion of communication has been previously identified as a major contributor to the inappropriate intrusion of instrumental rationality into social integration, these implications are potentially important.

It should be clear that certain elements of communication are central to the movement toward intersubjective understanding. There are actually four of these "validity claims" (CES, p.2) which, Habermas suggests, are implied in every communication and I understand at least one of these to be directly applicable to the analysis of the emphasis on anonymity. Held identifies the four claims as "comprehensibility,....

truth,...., correctness,...., and truthfulness/sincerity". (1980, p.333) It is the last which we will consider here. Regarding it, Habermas suggests that, in the process of communicating, an individual claims to be "making himself thereby understandable;". (CES, p.2) This validity claim applies to the desire of the speaker to express her intentions in a way that will make what she has said believable. To this apply the trustworthiness of the speaker and the evidence of her genuineness in the particular interaction in question, in short, her sincerity. Habermas claims that all four validity claims must be present if understanding is to be attained.

Given this, it should be clear that an emphasis on anonymity contains an ominous implication. If the hearer is not able to identify the speaker, then she will certainly not be able to assess the genuineness of the speakers intent. Further, if the speaker is able to systematically alter elements of her communication (as she would be required to according to the 'no-name' rule) then the truthfulness of the information presented therein might suffer question. Once anonymity is ensured and the 'no-name' rule applied, then the participants in discussion are able to remove themselves from the meaning and implications of their statements, they are allowed to make statements experimentally. This is to say that they can assess the reaction of others to their statements before they decide whether to actually believe them themselves. When this has

occurred, then the possibility of a consensus is removed.

This occurrence is quite valuable for the educational system, and in the specific case of the VIP program. Because a specific set of values are assumed by the program, and the teacher has the role of inculcating these, she needs the situation where practical inquiry can be distorted into an experimental process. Once the students can gain 'appropriate' values and that appropriateness is reinforced by positive reactions from the teacher (who, after all, knows the answers) then the needs of system integration are met and the potential thematization of practical insight is removed. The very clear contradiction between the stated intention that students "learn to accept responsibility for their own actions" (p.7) and the systematic denial of responsibility implicit in enforced anonymity, seems to be unaddressed.

The above discussion was intended to demonstrate that even the most innocuous seeming elements of the VIP program actually betray the workings of a specific rationality. This lends support to the major point of this chapter, that the VIP program in particular is just as affected by the technocratic ideology as the process of education in general. The implications of this point are made more important as a result of the fact that the VIP program is actually an official substitute for moral education. As a conclusion to this chapter, a brief summary of the points we have undertaken to discuss here, will be useful.

Firstly it must be stated that it is not the intention of this chapter to demonstrate that the VIP program is unable to fulfill its own aims, that it is not effective. That would involve quite a different analysis. The point is that the VIP program suffers from limitations that prevent it from being connected to practical issues. The mistaken claim of the program is that it has anything to do with moral/practical inquiry. This point was exhaustively made in the first section of this chapter.

In the second section of this chapter, the six subcharacteristics of the process of education were applied to an analysis of the VIP program. It was demonstrated that this program contains some elements of each of these subcharacteristics. Insofar as these subcharacteristics have been previously identified with the reproduction of the existing social formation, their presence in the VIP program would suggest that it is also supportive of the movement to reproduction.

Finally, the issue of anonymity, which is a formal element of the VIP program, was demonstrated to actually serve to distort communication. Because this distortion of communication has also been tied with the reproduction of this social formation, evidence of its existence in the VIP program would lend support to the suggestion that the VIP program is actually an effective player in that reproduction.

The tie-in for all of this with the previous chapters

and the theme of this paper is quite simple. According to the demonstrations undertaken above, the VIP program represents a concrete example of the process described in Chapter Three. It is hoped that the demonstration of the real day to day workings of this process, will lend credibility to the suggestion that the process and its effects are real. Once this claim can be taken seriously, then the seeds of a critique of the process at large are sown. This point will now be taken up in the conclusion to this paper.

Conclusion

The aim of this conclusion is to very briefly tie together the diverse points made in this paper and to then demonstrate their connection to a movement towards emancipation. Because this movement towards emancipation (or at least the provision of a catalyst for it) is the central concern for Critical theory and this paper has attempted to remain faithful to a Critical analysis, it is implied in the analysis itself. Firstly, a brief summary of the points of the paper is necessary.

The first chapter of the paper described the need for a better world understanding to be applied to an analysis of education in contemporary society. The conventional theories of education were quickly dismissed as uninformative and context bound. It was then pointed out that the interesting insights of various radical theories of education were systematically limited by the theoretical framework within which they were constructed. At the end of the chapter some of these limitations were discussed and it was suggested that the work of Jurgen Habermas could be useful in removing these limitations. Habermas' theoretical framework could provide that 'better world understanding'.

The second chapter picked up from the first and briefly presented some of the elements of Habermas' work that could be applied to an analysis of the working of education in contemporary society. From this presentation were drawn the important points that State intervention, supported by

a domination of scientific/instrumental rationality over moral/practical rationality, has led to a situation where the existing social system has great power for identity maintenance. This power, it was then argued, manifests itself as a reproduction of the social formation.

The third chapter then demonstrates that this reproduction is made possible, at least partially, through the workings of the schools which are really institutional examples of State intervention. The connection between schooling, education and a Life-world constructed according to techno/administrative (instrumental) rationality was then made. The effects of this rationality impact on the individual in the educational subsystem through six subcharacteristics. These subcharacteristics were then described and some of the implications of each were discussed. The major theme of this chapter was that, because the educational subsystem subscribes to a particular view of the world (one that is constructed according to techno/administratively rational rules), it systematically removes from possible thematization moral/practical insights. Further, because these insights have been demonstrated to be the motor behind social evolution, it can be suggested that the subsystem of education serves to aid reproduction.

In the fourth chapter, the model for analysis that was developed in Chapter Three was applied to the concrete historical situation of the VIP program. It was also

demonstrated that the six subcharacteristics of the process of education can be found in the VIP program. The implications of this were suggested. The VIP program is actually a techno/administratively rational substitution for true moral/practical inquiry. Thus the final point of the paper should be understood to be that even programs in the educational subsystem which are represented to address moral/practical issues, actually render the thematization of these issues impossible.

The pessimism of this point seems oppressive. What, one might ask, is the sense of education at all if it is systematically prevented from being an agent of true social change? Obviously it would be impossible to answer this question adequately in the few pages remaining in this paper. What will be attempted here is to demonstrate some implications of the general analysis that might lend hope for the future. These may be unsatisfactory in their brevity, but it is hoped that they can serve as the genesis for more creative analyses which might bring about the sort of understanding that would be necessary to start the evolutionary ball rolling again.

This hope can find support in the concept of an erosion of legitimacy. In order to understand this we must briefly return to Habermas' theory of social evolution. It was pointed out in the second chapter that the enlightenment 'freed' the State from the need for legitimation by eliminating the 'myths' that were the previous source of

legitimation and replacing them with a self-legitimizing set of 'natural laws'. With the downfall of liberal capitalism, the State once again required legitimation. Habermas contends, however, that moral/practical insight have advanced to the point where this legitimation is based in the "formal conditions of possible consensus formation." (CES, p.184) In this sense, the 'ideal speech community' which, by its very nature, describes the conditions necessary for rational consensus formation, has been used to ground legitimacy in organized capitalism.

~~It~~ has been pointed out that this use of the 'ideal speech community' as the grounding device for legitimacy in contemporary society is counterfactual. This is to say that, while the 'ideal speech community' is represented to exist in contemporary society, it does not. Its substitute, previously described as 'Formal Democracy', is really only a codification of a set of rules which are claimed to represent the procedures of substantive democracy but which do not retain its substance. Habermas formalizes this statement: "The idea of an agreement that comes to pass among all parties, as free and equal, determines the procedural type of legitimacy of modern times." (CES, p.185) The legitimacy of the State in contemporary society is grounded in the ~~institution~~ of a system through which the illusion of full political participation is perpetuated while actual political participation is realized only in an extremely limited

sense. This is the 'counterfactual' use of the 'free speech community'.

It should be clear by now that this counterfactual use of the 'free speech community' really describes the central element in the distortion of communication which allows for the reproduction of the social formation. The actual relations of force that are facts in a capitalist social formation and that distort communication remain hidden behind the presentation of a (counterfactual) claim of universally attained consensus. By definition these relations of force are incompatible with the concept of an 'ideal speech community' which demands an "intersubjectivity of understanding achieved without force". (CES p.120)

However, social systems remain human systems. The moral/practical dimension cannot be absent. As was suggested, individuals within society continue to learn in the dimension of moral/practical knowledge but the insights gained from this learning are blocked from articulation by social processes that discourage their thematization. It is this blocking that creates the context within which reproduction is possible. The fact that moral/practical learning continues is meaningful, however. Habermas has pointed out that learning in the moral/practical dimensions of a social system involves the development of potentials for the rationalization of communicative action. Rationalization, in this sense, means "extirpating those

relations of force that are inconspicuously set in the very structures of communication". (CES, p.119) It should be clear that, under this meaning of rationalization, moral/practical thought must first be turned toward the conditions that place limitations on it. This is further supported in the following statement: "Rationalization means overcoming each systematically distorted communication in which the action-supporting consensus concerning the reciprocally raised validity claims...can be sustained in appearance only, that is, counterfactually." (CES, p.120) It seems only reasonable that, despite the power of the system to distort communication and prevent thematization, some of these potentials will be actualized. This actualization represents the beginning of an erosion of the counterfactual basis of contemporary society.

Critical theory finds its aim in the movement towards this actualization. The program involves making apparent the manifestations of domination implicit in contemporary society and demonstrating the dangers this domination holds for the potential of human emancipation.

The irrationality of domination, which today has become a collective peril to life, could be mastered only by the development of a political decision-making process tied to the principle of general discussion free from domination. (TARS, p.61)

Most important to this movement is the exposing of the inappropriate intrusion of scientific/technical rationality

and knowledge into the dimension of social integration. This should not be seen as an attempt to rid the world of an 'evil' monster named 'Technology'. Indeed,

it is impossible to envisage how, as long as the organization of human nature does not change and as long, therefore, as we have to achieve self-preservation through social labour and with the aid of means that substitute for work, we could renounce technology, more particularly our technology, in favour of a qualitatively different one. (TARS, p.87)

This relatively brief and vague description of the potential for the dissolution of the elements of contemporary society that are leading to reproduction and of the connection of a Critical analysis to it, may seem somewhat unsatisfactory. However, it should be clear from the preceding page that it would be inconsistent for a Critical theorist to suggest that she 'knows' the identity of the form of social organization that 'should' replace organized capitalism. The concern with "setting into motion a politically effective discussion", must, by definition, become part of that discussion. Its results cannot, therefore, be decided beforehand and given. While this position may initially appear to be weak when compared to those points of view which claim to conceive of a desired end-state, and work dedicatedly towards it, it has the great strength of opening the emancipatory potential of a truly human society. That is, a society, the form of which is completely decided by all its human citizens.

Accordingly, the role of the Critical theorist is to demonstrate the weaknesses of the present form of social organization, the contradictions that plague it, and to unblock the channels of communication that have been blocked by it. All of this while keeping in mind the rationality of her own position.

This paper has been an attempt to do this and has focussed on one element of the social system, the subsystem of education. In it I have attempted to demonstrate some of the contradictions of this subsystem. The reasons that I have chosen to examine the subsystem of education can be summed up in ~~one~~ statement. It is my belief that the educational subsystem of contemporary society is a human process. It ought to involve, at a fundamental level, groups of individuals coming together to gain mutual understanding. This means that the educational subsystem can be understood (at least potentially) as a moral/practical experience. It is my disenchantment, inspired by the complete lack of the moral/practical dimension in it, that has provided the inspiration for this paper. However, because I believe the potential exists for a practically relevant education, some indications of the direction that must be pursued can be suggested. It should be clear that these suggestions derive from the identified weaknesses of the subsystem.

What is needed, at least initially, is the recognition that, insofar as language plays a key role in both

education and human society, these connections might be more fully explored. The consensus implied in language must be identified and nurtured in a truly human education. Education must, following the pattern of this process, come to mean 'the coming to mutually understand'. In this sense education may be the key to the reintroduction of the evolutionary movement.

The directions that should be taken can, at this point and for necessary reasons, only be hinted at. However, it is clear that a human pedagogy should be initially conducted with conscious effort according to insights in the dimension of moral/practical knowledge. Education should be a process initiated by, and shared with, each individual in society. We must re-humanize education. Not in the sense of an instrumentally rational organization or re-organization of existing resources, but rather in the sense of a practically rational construction of an enterprise designed to address issues fundamental to the human condition. We must construct a developmental understanding of our own needs that can lead to education with practical goals, unconstrained by the limits or demands of scientific-technical possibility. This education must enable us to harness the potential implicit in technical knowledge and use it when our desired (that is, consensually decided) end-state, requires it.

To place this in a simple analogy, it is as if we have lost the reins of a stage-coach and are forced to go in the

direction dictated by the horses. An education which could provide us with the insights necessary to regain the reins and turn the stagecoach, means an education that addresses emancipatory rationality. This emancipatory rationality is the first step on the road of the 'free-speech community'. It implies understanding of and therefore freedom from, the blocking effects of ideology.

Education free from ideology, in as much as ideology implies control, domination and power, must be the starting point for the 'free-speech community'. Practical issues must be allowed to be articulated and open to discussion, freed from the masking influences of the pervasive domination of scientism which seeks to redefine them as technical problems and must, thereby, misunderstand them.

It is hoped that this paper will be regarded as an initial step in this unmasking. Certainly it has demonstrated some of the ways in which the enterprise of education is connected to the reproduction of an organized capitalist social formation, and that many of these connections imply contradictions. The implications of these contradictions must be drawn out and brought into consciousness in order to bring an end to the unnecessary domination of humans and to open the way to a better society.

Notes

Chapter Two

1. Habermas mentions a third type of social system environment. This is formed by "the other social systems with which the society is in contact." (LC p.9) He quickly dismisses the importance of this in the context of the present argument, when he suggests that it is "the processes with outer and inner nature that are decisive for the specific form in which socio-cultural life reproduces itself." (LC, p.9) Consequently, no further mention will be made of this in this paper.

2. A discussion of this can be found in Communication and the Evolution of Society in Chapters 2 and 3.

3. The suggestion might be made that it is not the case that the application of productive forces is connected so simply to the external environment. Indeed, one might conceive of the situation, described through concerns of the impact of technology on the world ecology, where the application of productive forces actually renders more complicated the external environment. This point presents some interesting possibilities for further study, but will remain unaddressed here.

4. A simple example of this might be useful in clarifying what is meant here. The development of communications technology, which can be understood to have lessened the impact of time and distance (both elements of outer nature) on society, meant also that new networks of interaction were opened up between individuals and groups in that society; that new customs were required and problems of national language were rendered more immediate (all of these are elements of inner nature). Clearly, advantages of the technical innovation for System Integration were somewhat cancelled out by increased complexity in the dimension of Social Integration.

5. This argument is fully developed on p. 19 of Legitimation Crisis

Chapter Three

1. I have worked for several years as a Teaching assistant for two local boards of education.

2. The work of Schecter (quoted at several points in this paper), Katz (for example, "From Voluntarism to Bureaucracy" in Karabel, J. and Halsey, A.H. Power and Ideology in Education Oxford University Press, New York, 1977), and Selby fall into this category.

Chapter Four

1. Project VIP

2. In a 'card sort', a series of cards with statements or questions printed on them is placed in a pattern (usually piles of 'yes' and 'no' or 'good' and 'bad').

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