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THE MYTH OF THE MODERATE FACTION
IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN:
AN ANALYSIS WITH EMPHASIS ON THE
POST-KHOMEINI PERIOD

by

HOOMAN PEIMANI, B.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

(Master of Arts)

Department of Political Science

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

July 20, 1990

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Thesis Supervisor

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ABSTRACT

Peimani, Hooman. The Myth of the Moderate Faction in the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Analysis with Emphasis on the Post-Khomeini Period, (397 pages, 451 references, 843 endnotes, 2 tables, copyright).

The objective of this research is to evaluate the validity of the thesis: the Islamic Republic of Iran is incapable of adopting a moderate method of statecraft. Based on secondary sources, the research is structured to analyze the theory of the moderate faction in light of the significant events which have transpired since the death of Khomeini. Khomeini's rise to power was the result of a compromise among the nationalist groups, the clergy, some factions of the Shah's regime and Western countries like the USA and the UK. Ever since, the West has helped to prolong the demise of the Islamic regime for its own strategic interests. The desire for relations with Iran has taken the form of the theory of the moderate faction which has been formulated to justify the relations of Western countries with the Iranian regime. While this regime consists of several factions, they cannot be described in terms of "moderates" and "radicals". In conclusion, the continued hopes of some Western countries to resume relations with Iran will only prolong the Islamic regime.

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
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While the disclosure of USA-Iran clandestine relations caught a great many Westerners off guard, the existence of such relations did not surprise most Western governments. Having criticisms about issues such as its secrecy, timing, means and immediate expected outcomes, by and large Western governments did not question either the necessity or legitimacy of the pursuit of such a policy since Iran was too strategically important to be left isolated. In a sense, many Western countries had already established some economic, military or political ties with revolutionary Iran. Hence the main criticism of some Western governments was their dissatisfaction with the US policy which banned cooperations with Iran for Europeans while sanctioning American-Iranian cooperation. Generally speaking, following Irangate, the spread of the theory of a moderate faction offered a plausible reasoning to some Western countries for justification of their relations with a theocracy with a long record of human rights' abuse. Since then, attempts for resumption or initiation of diplomatic, political, economic and military relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) have been made under the pretext of strengthening the so-called moderates in order to secure their power. The death of Khomeini has given momentum to this theory according to which, now, the IRI has become inclined more than ever to adopt a moderate policy in domestic and foreign affairs. Major Western countries therefore still support the existence of a "moderate" faction and its likely future take-over of the system. In spite of this, the

"moderates'" continuation of a "radical" foreign policy has demonstrated that the IRI's innate characteristics undermine the adoption of a moderate method of statecraft.

Before proceeding, this research will present a brief general background to the contemporary political environment of Iran. The intention is to clarify the political situation in which the existing government functions. In addition, such an attempt will offer some historical and theoretical explanations about the reasons for the IRI's continuous fierce factionalism and its inconsistencies with democratic and non-radical type of statecraft.

Ever since the formation of the Khomeini regime in 1979, serious disagreements have existed on the factors which contributed to the collapse of the Imperial Government of Iran. Even though differences on its details exist, there are two general categories of explanations for the creation of the IRI.

One scenario stresses exogenous factors as the only factors responsible for the formation of the IRI. According to this scenario, the entire Islamic Revolution was an American, American-British or Soviet-British plan for the overthrow of the Shah who was seeking his own independent policies. By overthrowing the Shah these countries hoped that the regime succeeding the Monarchy would carry out their instructions and preserve their interests. Hence the Iranians did not have any specific reason for a revolution since the majority were satisfied with the Shah's regime. What made the people resort to

a variety of anti-Shah mass political activities were foreign agitations and so the entire Islamic Revolution was a well-organized conspiracy against the Shah, according to the scenario.

This scenario has been supported by the Royalists who have sought to explain the Islamic Revolution while keeping their legitimacy as an alternative to the IRI.¹ For that purpose, they need to deny any internal reason for the Revolution resulting from their management of the country otherwise they cannot present themselves as a viable alternative to the present Islamic government. Although certain Western countries directed the mass dissatisfaction towards the creation of an Islamic system², it is illogical to believe that a satisfied nation was easily provoked to participate in mass anti-government political activities. No foreign country could have stimulated a revolution if there had not been a suitable domestic situation. This explanation does not take into account participation of the majority of Iranians with different political orientations in the Revolution by exaggerating the role of foreign countries.³

Another scenario denies the importance of exogenous factors in the establishment of the Islamic government. Some influential Americans such as William Sullivan (last US Ambassador to Iran), General Robert Huyser (Deputy to the Commander-in-Chief of NATO in Europe, General Alexander Haig) and Gary Sick (who worked on the National Security staff during the Carter Administration) have subscribed to this explanation. Accordingly, the USA was caught off-guard when the revolution began. The American

government was simply not prepared to deal with the new situation.⁴ Lack of information about the new rising leadership, as a result of poor intelligence gathering on one hand and the quick development of the situation on the other gave the Americans practically no chance for influencing the situation.⁵

Whereas the USA tried to firmly support the Shah, the policy was not successful, the scenario continues. The Iranian government was disintegrating day by day, and so, US support could not be very constructive.⁶ General Huyser was sent to Iran to keep the Iranian Armed Forces united and convinced them to stand behind the Imperial government.⁷ Nevertheless, the Iranian Armed Forces were disintegrating due to massive desertion and their top militarists had already lost their morale and had serious disagreements on several matters.⁸ As a result, the Americans were unable to secure the support of the military for the moderate government of Dr. Shahpour Bakhtiar.⁹ In a few weeks, the Iranian military lost its control of the country which led to the collapse of the Shah's regime in February 1979.¹⁰

While acknowledging connections between the USA and certain influential Islamic leaders, this view denies any deliberate American effort for the creation of the IRI before and after the American realization of the bleak future of the Shah.¹¹ Briefly, the establishment of the present Iranian regime is said to be the result of American misjudgment and mishandling of the situation and its lack of information on Iranian realities.¹²

Yet evidence suggests that the US government was deeply involved in the procedure which led to the establishment of the Islamic government in Iran. The establishment of the IRI, therefore, seems to be the result of a compromise. It is true that the general dissatisfaction of the Iranian people with the Shah instigated the Revolution. However, certain evidence suggests that the normal pace of events could not have resulted in the formation of an undemocratic theocracy if the direction of the anti-Shah movement had not been deliberately diverted.

Beginning with intellectuals and secular elements¹³, the main goal of the Revolution was the formation of a democratic and progressive system which by no means could be envisaged within the framework of the present Islamic system.¹⁴ The Shah's regime became the target of antagonism of the overwhelming majority of Iranians for it was the symbol of dictatorship and repression. The Iranian people hoped that the Revolution would replace the authoritarian Monarchy by a liberal democratic polity which would present to the nation what the Shah's regime failed to. Hence the people's demand was the formation of a democratic and representative egalitarian political system which would observe democratic rights and freedoms of citizens and guarantee a representative, responsible and removable government through the recognition of independent political parties.¹⁵

Mass protest began at the time when the radical and non-religious political organizations were mushrooming.¹⁶ Having a degree of legitimacy and credibility because of their previous

struggles against the Shah, these organizations called for armed struggle as the only tactic to overthrow the Monarchy which now resorted to open violence against its people.¹⁷ Such a policy was welcomed by a growing number of protestors who had already found the gradual and peaceful policy of the clergy and their nationalist allies unsatisfactory.¹⁸

Hence a conservative coalition was the core of the leadership of the anti-Shah movement. This coalition consisted of two incompatible forces; the clergy and certain nationalist organizations. Being in favour of a constitutional monarchy and so a liberal-democratic type of government, the major nationalist organizations, i.e., the Liberation Movement and the National Front, lacked strong popular support.¹⁹ Because of this deficiency, they had to enter a coalition with the clergy although having totally different views on political and economic matters.²⁰

The prevailing radical sentiment dictated their entry into the coalition as there were only two main camps in the highly polarized Iran of 1979: the monarchist camp and the camp of opposition. For the nationalists, the first camp was out of the question since the great majority of Iranians had already expressed their desire for the overthrow of the Monarchy in massive street protests. Taking sides with the monarchists would have only discredited the nationalists among the population. Thus, the camp of the opposition was the only alternative.

Yet the latter camp was not monolithic as it encompassed two main ideologies. On one extreme, there were Marxist groups whose ideal of socialism was alien to the free-enterprise oriented nationalists. On the other extreme, there was the clergy under Khomeini whose ideal for creation of a theocracy was also unacceptable to the nationalists. However, they took sides with the clergy since the nationalists considered the latter incapable of running the country and so the establishment of a theocracy was not seen as a viable alternative for the future of Iran. This factor and the anti-Communist nature of the clergy further inclined the nationalists for making an alliance with the clergy as it would offer them an opportunity to influence the anti-Shah movement from the top and prevent a possible take-over of the Marxists.²¹ In short, the weakness as well as the opportunity for dominating the popular movement pushed the nationalists to form a coalition with Khomeini.

In the context of ever-expanding opposition to the Monarchy, there seemed only two alternatives before the Iranian elite. The core idea of one alternative was preservation of the system, with or without the Shah, through the exercise of harsh coercive measures in order to stifle the anti-monarchist movement.²² The second alternative was based on a compromise for creation of an acceptable political system with those segments of the anti-Shah coalition who were also fearful of a future radical take-over of Iran.²³

In retrospect, the former alternative could have prolonged the life of the Monarchy even for a few years, but it would probably have resulted in the strength of the left-of-centre forces. The unexpected growth of the radical organizations was largely due to the disillusionment of some segments of the population about the undemocratic nature of the clergy-nationalist coalition led by Khomeini.²⁴ The policy of compromise of this coalition was reflected in the leadership of Khomeini who was seeking a smooth transition of power with the consent of the Iranian ruling elite and their foreign supporters, especially the USA.²⁵ Implementation of this policy at the time when the clergy was requesting people to sacrifice their life in the streets for the cause of Revolution began to alienate the supporters of Khomeini.²⁶ However, it provided a suitable ground for the expansion of radical groups and an increase in their popularity and power.²⁷ Now, more than before, people were inclined to seek radical alternatives which had already been presented by the radical organizations. Hence persistence in keeping the Monarchy in power would have resulted in isolation of the conservative and anti-communist leadership of Khomeini.²⁸

The second alternative was, therefore, the only feasible and plausible option. It was feasible since Khomeini had already established contact with the Americans as well as certain other Western countries.²⁹ The reason was that neither he nor his nationalist allies believed in armed struggle for toppling the Shah; nor did they have the necessary organization.³⁰ Besides,

they were counting on the assistance of the USA as the overthrow of the Shah seemed impossible otherwise.²¹

Likewise, the alternative was plausible because the conservative and anti-Communist nature of the coalition fitted perfectly within the framework of the American scheme for the region.²² Consequently, the result was a compromise among the coalition represented by Khomeini, some powerful factions of the Imperial Government of Iran and the United States.²³ The goal was a prompt transfer of power before the time when the radical opposition would be strong enough to destabilize any undesirable political system.²⁴

It should be mentioned here that the strategic importance of Iran for the West has been one of the influential factors in shaping the pace of major political events in 20th century Iran. Because of Iran's large population, rich mineral resources and its shared border with the USSR and the oil-producing Persian Gulf region, major Western powers have been concerned with Iranian political movements which could develop to unfriendly regimes to the West. Likewise, Soviet behaviour towards Iran and its potential impact on influencing events in favour of the USSR has been one of the sources of tension between the West and the Soviet Union.

As a result, two major Western powers have masterminded schemes to keep Iran within the sphere of influence of the West during this century. Fear of the southward expansion of Bolshevism inclined the British government to provoke the 1920

coup d'etat of Reza Pahlavi (the Shah's father) to form a highly centralized government in order to withstand the Soviets.³⁵ The rapid expansion of the Communist Tudeh Party in the forties and early fifties added to the fear of the UK and the USA in particular of the rise of a nationalist movement led by the late Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh. Therefore, the military coup in 1953 which restored the power of the Shah was engineered by the USA and enjoyed the blessing of the UK.³⁶ In essence, the same consideration stimulated Western support for the creation of an Islamic republic as the only possible anti-Communist government which would not endanger the strategic interests of the West in the absence of the Shah.³⁷

In order to implement the policy, certain actions were made. Firstly, US envoys as well as that of some other Western countries negotiated with Khomeini and his allies in Iran and in Europe.³⁸ Secondly, the Iranian military which was a firm opponent to the compromise was neutralized. This was achieved by sending General Huyser to help abort possible attempts for a coup as a counter-measure to the US design.³⁹ Thirdly, the Western media prepared the atmosphere by exaggerating the personality of Khomeini and his revolution and creating an acceptable feature for Khomeini. To that end, Persian foreign broadcasts of the major Western countries, including the Voice of America and the BBC, covered the events in favour of Khomeini and tried to increase his popularity.⁴⁰ This policy helped Khomeini to expand his appeal as Iranian state-run media had already lost

their legitimacy among the people as a result of which the Iranians were mainly relying on foreign radios for news.

* * *

The new Islamic political system was an amalgam of incompatible forces. In a broad sense, it consisted of two distinctive forces: secular and religious. These forces which together toppled the Shah's regime later proved to be incompatible with each other. Having serious disagreements in terms of the objectives of the Revolution as well as the means to achieve them, the two founding members of the IRI could not work together for a long time. During the first three years of the Islamic regime, the clergy purged the secular forces from the system.

The secular forces embraced two types of political activists. The first type included a spectrum of intellectuals who subscribed to the broad idea of nationalism while identifying themselves with a variety of organizations with different interpretations of the form and content of the future political system.⁴¹ The most well-known nationalist organizations were the National Front, the Liberation Movement, the Lawyers' Guild, the Radical Movement of Iran and the Committee for Defence of Human Rights and Freedom.⁴² The prominent leaders and members of these organizations formed the first post-Shah government of Iran: the Provisional Government of Iran (PG).

Headed by Mr. Mehdi Bazargan, the PG was a forum for political participation of the nationalists whose main objective was to

liberalize the Imperial system totally.⁴³ As discussed earlier, for them the clergy was expected to control and direct the movement which was about to shift its direction towards other alternatives. In addition, the nationalists hoped that the clergy would compensate their lack of popular support by giving them the political leadership of the anti-monarchist movement; hopefully, this would pave their way to power.⁴⁴

Once in power, the clergy should have the role of the legitimizer of the new government and not its partner.⁴⁵ The essence of such a view was the assumption that the Khomeini-led clergy would not be able to run the country. The reason was that the clergy simply lacked the expertise and experience necessary for running a large and strategically important country like Iran with a huge and sophisticated bureaucratic system. Following this logic, the nationalists who possessed both requirements would assume the real power in the future Khomeini regime.

These elements formed the only moderate faction which was driven out from power shortly after the Revolution. Thus, the PG became the first victim of the clergy which was in search of the assumption of full power. In fact, the PG never acquired the full power and authority to implement its plans as the clergy's interference in the affairs of the government deprived the former of full control over its jurisdiction. This came about because of a number of factors. Firstly, massive clergy-instructed purges, arrests, executions and forced retirement of civil servants reduced the ability of the government to exercise its

authority.⁴⁶ Secondly, the parallel clergy-built organizations like the Revolutionary Guards Corps, the Committees, revolutionary and religious courts and several foundations expanded their jurisdictions wherever they viewed this as necessary.⁴⁷ This sharply undermined the power of the government and disrupted its daily function.

The clergy tolerated the PG until the time it felt strong enough to remove the nationalists from the scene. That scheme was put in practice in the form of gradually discrediting the PG. At the first stage, the Speaker of the Government, Abbas Amirentezam, was charged with conspiracy to dissolve "the Expert Assembly"⁴⁸ for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment.⁴⁹ At the second stage, the clergy initiated a campaign against the Government for what it referred to as the "liberal", "compromising" and "non-revolutionary" nature of the Government. The implication was that these characteristics resulted in the pro-American attitude of the PG which was against the revolutionary line of Khomeini. In addition to the acceptance of the Shah in the USA, the official meeting of Mr. Bazargan and Brzezinski in Algiers which surely had the sanction of Khomeini helped the clergy to press the charge of collaboration with the USA against the PG.⁵⁰ Hence the occupation of the US Embassy in Tehran, which was allegedly organized by a number of "students" who could no longer tolerate the counter-revolutionary behaviour of the Government, forced the latter to resign. The removal of

the nationalists from power was therefore one of the objectives of the occupation of the US Embassy in Tehran.²¹

* *

The second type of secular forces included a number of elements which did not identify themselves with the nationalist groups. While subscribing to the more or less same nationalist ideals, these people entered the political scene in the post-Revolutionary period as the disciples of Khomeini. Among them, two figures were of significant importance: Abolhassan Banisadr and Sadegh Gotbzadeh.

Due to his closeness to the clergy, Banisadr enjoyed a substantial share of power. Initiated as the PG Minister of Foreign Affairs and later the Minister of the Economy, Banisadr became the first IRI president. Upon his presidency, Khomeini delegated his authority as the Commander-in-Chief of the Military to Banisadr who became the Acting Commander-in-Chief of the Military.²²

However, the cooperation of Banisadr and the clergy could not last for a long time. The reason was a sharp ideological conflict between these two forces. The clergy was in favour of a theocracy whereas Banisadr supported a more or less secular and rational system of government.²³ He therefore tried to re-integrate technocrats and experts who had been purged by the clergy. The Iran-Iraq war offered him an opportunity to give prominence to the role of trained civil servants and experts at all levels of the state. This was in sharp contradiction to the

clergy's belief in the necessity for the clergy to fully control all branches of the government.²⁴

The clergy feared that Banisadr would take over the system and purged him. Banisadr's confrontation with the clergy began as he became strong enough to challenge the power of the clergy by leaning on the rehabilitated bureaucracy and the regular armed forces.²⁵ After several months of blatant hostility between the two forces, Khomeini stripped him of his position as the Acting Commander-in-Chief of the Military in June 1981 to be followed by his removal from the presidency.²⁶ The clergy in power used Banisadr's dismissal as the first stage for a military confrontation with the opposition which was gaining power and legitimacy at the expense of loss of face and support of the Khomeini system.²⁷

In the wake of his dismissal, a large number of his supporters, advisers and military officers was arrested, and most of whom were executed.²⁸ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander of the Air Force and the Minister of Defence, known to be supporters of Banisadr, were killed in an "air crash"; Banisadr himself managed to escape to France along with Mr. Rajavi (the leader of the Mojahedin) by an Air Forces plane.²⁹

Gotbzadeh survived the clergy's attack on its former secular allies in 1982 only to be physically eliminated a year after. Beginning his revolutionary career as the Director of the state radio and television organization, Gotbzadeh became the PG

Minister of Foreign Affairs.⁶⁰ In the aftermath of the PG resignation, he maintained his position as the interim Foreign Minister until the formation of the clergy-approved cabinet of Prime Minister Rajai in 1980.⁶¹ A year after the purge of Banisadr in 1982, Gotbzadeh was arrested and charged with preparation for a military coup.⁶² Following Gotbzadeh's arrest, a great number of military personnel and clergymen (including the late Ayatollah Shariatmadari) was arrested. Gotbzadeh and some of his alleged collaborators were executed in the same year.⁶³

While no firm evidence supported the accusation, it seems that the clergy pressed that charge in order to complete the purge of the system of incompatible forces. The traditional nationalist forces such as the National Front and the Liberation Movement were taken aside by the clergy fairly soon and easily. It was easy because they lacked strong popular support, and so the propaganda campaign of the clergy could neutralize the unaware. Yet the purge of the system from elements like Gotbzadeh and Banisadr was much harder because they entered the Revolution as the disciples of Khomeini. For that purpose and for their closeness to the clergy, they survived the initial purges.

Yet their purge was inevitable as their homage to the clergy could not hide their different political orientations. Under the broad and vague term of Islamic system, Gotbzadeh and Banisadr envisaged a somewhat more radical version of a liberal democracy with heavier weight for the public sector. As the main

characteristic of such a polity is its secular nature and its regulation by civilian laws, it cannot co-exist with a theocracy which is based on the subordination of all the temporal affairs including statecraft to the religious laws. Because of this inconsistency, Banisadr could not remain loyal to Khomeini and thus sought his own plan for the creation of a rational Islamic government. The purge of Banisadr demonstrated the rejection of that rationality by the clergy. Since then, the clergy had waited for an excuse to remove the last potentially powerful secular rival whose relatively moderate views appealed to the dissatisfied population. Thus, Gotbzadeh's connection with some military officers and a prominent source of imitation, the late Ayatollah Shariatmadari, offered an opportunity for the "purification" of the system.

* * *

The other founding member of the coalition was the clergy. While the establishment of the IRI granted preeminent status to the clergy in general, only one stream of the clergy acquired power. This was because the clergy accommodated a variety of tendencies (factions) with different and even opposite viewpoints and objectives. In short, these tendencies were (and still are) revolutionary, moderate and reactionary.

The revolutionary tendency embraced a tiny percentage of the young clerics who opposed the other two factions for their conservative or reactionary interpretation of Islam. Hence it

supported radical and anti-clerical organizations.⁶⁴ This is because they consider the entire religious institution as reactionary and outdated while they believe in Islam as the sole ideology for the salvation of people. What they are against is the clergy as an institution and its attempt for establishment of a theocracy.

Because of their radical approach towards the clergy, these young clergymen have been isolated by the high clergy. In cases, they have been dismissed from religious schools whereas in other cases they have chosen to quit the ranks of the clergy voluntarily. The third alternative has been their overt obedience to the clergy as a cover for their clandestine activities. Subscribers to this view either have taken sides with anti-clergy and/or left-of-centre political organizations or have created their own anti-clergy groups.⁶⁵

* *

The moderate tendency included prominent clergy who opposed the involvement of clerics in politics.⁶⁶ The logic is that the clergy is responsible for spiritual matters. Any involvement of the clergy in politics would only degrade its divine status to the low level of temporal affairs. This is especially dangerous since political affairs involve activities and behaviours which are banned or considered sinful by Islam. The consequence of clergy involvement in politics would be a disgrace for the clergy institution and the religion itself which is represented by clergymen. This would only weaken the religious faith of people

and incline them to seek alternatives such as atheistic ideologies. As a result, the clergy should abstain from becoming involved in political affairs for the sake of preserving the Islamic conviction.⁶⁷

Generally speaking, these clergymen have attempted to adapt religion to the realities of the twentieth century lest it loses its relevance. That is why they never called for the overthrow of the Shah and establishment of a clergy-dominated regime. Rather, these clergymen were supporting the implementation of the Iranian Constitution of 1906 which, by and large, was liberal democratic in form and content.⁶⁸ Consequently, they have supported nationalist and secular moderate organizations in their efforts for the conversion from autocracy to constitutional monarchy.⁶⁹ At the economic level, this faction of the clergy has supported free enterprise and liberalization of society to a certain extent.⁷⁰

* *

The reactionary tendency represented those clerics who were in favour of the leadership and full participation of the clergy in all social activities. The theory of velayat-e faqih (governance of jurisprudent) expresses the aspiration of this faction of the clergy. According to the theory, the divine characteristic of the faith overshadows and discredits everything else ranging from ideologies to sciences. Hence only the clergy who carry and preserve the Islamic conviction are competent and capable of running all the affairs of Muslim countries because of

their superiority, resulting from their mastering the religion. Non-religious politicians are therefore corrupt and are inclined towards anti-Islamic Western or Eastern ideologies. The rest of the population are subject to human weaknesses which make them negligible actors and undermine their capabilities for having any significant role in any aspect of social affairs. That is why the essence of velayat-e faqih is the assumption of absolute inferiority of people since they are unable to understand what is good for them economically, politically, socially and even personally.⁷¹

The consequence is a need for the leadership of a high clergyman who should determine what is good for his Islamic nation. This leadership should be exercised through the network of the clergy as the only capable force. Khomeini cleared the relationship between the jurisprudent and his ummah (Islamic nation) by making an analogy of the relationship between a shepherd and his flock.⁷² This makes clear the extent to which the role of the people in public and social affairs is permitted and the extent to which it is inconsistent with the assumptions of the liberal democratic system of government.

In general, the restoration of the medieval power of the clergy is the main objective of this faction.⁷³ As mentioned earlier, this means that only the clergy have the divine right and task to be the final decision-maker and executer in all aspects of an Islamic society. Secular institutions and the people who run them are respectively blasphemous and infidels.

To this end, destruction of all the modern institutions and repression of modern and democratic ideas and beliefs are indispensable.⁷⁴ Even prior to the Islamic Revolution, the reactionary nature of this type of mentality was reflected in the clergy opposition to Reza Shah's reforms. Those reforms included preventing the clergy from intervening in political and judicial affairs and unveiling women.⁷⁵ In the early 1960s, Khomeini's opposition to the Shah's extension of universal suffrage to women and their gaining equal opportunity to enter the civil service (which Khomeini named "prostitution" and "corruption") illustrated the regressive nature of this type of ideology.⁷⁶

The notion of velayat-e faqih is a medieval one. It emerged for the first time in the 10th century. However, it did not acquire its formulated form until the 16th century when the Safavid Dynasty was established in Iran.⁷⁷ That Dynasty made Iran a Shii country as its founders saw it a useful means for unifying the fragmented Iran. The expansion of the Sunni Ottoman Turk Empire made the choice plausible. As a result, the government became the defender and promoter of the faith. This resulted in the consolidation and expansion of the Shii clergy institution in Iran. Consequently, the situation became suitable for intervention of the clergy in affairs of the state. The subsequent gradual weakness of the Safavid Dynasty enabled the clergy to further extend its jurisdiction. The notion of velayat-e faqih was therefore formulated by some high clergy under that circumstance in the 16th century. The notion later

justified the clergy intervention in politics and judicial affairs until the early 20th century when the Pahlavi Dynasty was established.⁷⁶

Khomeini brought this reactionary and regressive faction of the clergy to power in order to materialize his ideal clergy-dominated political system: the Islamic Republic. The result of the implementation of velayat-e faqih in Iran as the guiding theory for building an Islamic system has been the restoration of a fragmented medieval society. Now, the clergymen have the power and right to rule the area under their control as they wish. Within that area, clergymen have their military forces which give them the means to intervene in all affairs, including personal affairs.⁷⁷

The result has been the formation of a chaotic medieval government. Under the rule of the clergy, laws (religious and civil) are interpreted according to the will of clerics.⁷⁸ As an example, punishment for a crime may range from lashing to execution. The same situation is true for virtually all other matters which has created a sentiment of uncertainty, unpredictability and lawlessness in the society.

The creation of parallel institutions for secular institutions has further deepened this anarchic situation. These military, judicial and executive organizations undermined the power of the secular ones. In order to expand its full control over society, the clergy has taken over secular institutions to "Islamize" them. Yet these two types of organizations have

become rivals. Although both are under the clergy, each is controlled by different political factions and lacks a clear jurisdiction. In any case, as the clergy is the ultimate interpreter of law, no written law can limit the jurisdiction of a clergy-dominated institution. This typically medieval sentiment undermines the power of any central government regardless of its nominal existence on paper. In short, the implementation of the notion of velayat-e faqih has resulted in the loss of political, economic, social and even personal freedoms and rights of the Iranian people; the lives of the people are at the mercy of the clergy in power.

This chaotic situation is not without precedent in Iranian history. With the important exception of the dominance of a secular Qa'ar Dynasty, it resembles somewhat the period prior to the 1906 Constitutional Revolution. At that time the weakness of the Iranian central government and its inability to run the country led to the strength of clergymen.²¹ They gathered paramilitary forces in every region and established religious courts which had unlimited power and were not accountable to the central government.²² Because of the consequent atmosphere of repression, fear, uncertainty and lawlessness, one of the major demands of the Constitutional Revolution was the separation of religion from state which was clearly reflected in the request for creation of a modern secular judicial system.²³

Contrary to this writer's view on the regressive nature of the notion of velayat-e faqih, some scholars consider it a modern phenomenon. William Shepard, for example, divides contemporary Islamic conviction into four large categories: Islamic modernism, radical Islamism, Islamic totalitarianism and neo-traditionalism.⁶⁴ The category of radical Islamism is relevant here. Rejecting the relevance and usefulness of terminologies such as fanaticism and fundamentalism for describing the rise of Islam in some Third World countries, Shepard denies the regressive and reactionary nature of Khomeini's version of Islam which he calls "radical Islamism". On the contrary, he describes it as a progressive ideology.⁶⁵

For Shepard, this version of Islam is progressive since it has no opposition to essential elements of modernity. He argues that radical Islamism such as that of Khomeini "borrows" some elements of modernity from the West. Acknowledging Khomeini's clear demand for return to sharia (religious law) and so his opposition to civil law, Shepard evaluates Khomeini's Islamic program as modern.⁶⁶ The author backs his claim by stating Khomeini's approval of Western technology, illustrated by the use of "cassette tape recorders in the Iranian revolution and the clash of modern weapons in the Iran-Iraq war".⁶⁷

In addition to acceptance of Western technology, Shepard believes that the Islam of Khomeini embodies some Western political elements as well. Therefore, he holds that radical Islamists in Iran:

accept and use effectively many modern methods of political and social organization that are of Western provenance and to adapt at least some Western political ideas and symbols. The Islamic Republic of Iran has political parties, elections, and a parliament and its "Crusade for Construction"...is at least distantly reminiscent of the U.S. Domestic Peace Corps.**

Consequently, Shepard rejects the idea that Khomeini and his followers are trying to return the "clock back to seventh century Arabia".** On the contrary, they are progressive forces and not reactionary and regressive since they:

not only want progress but insist that Islam is the way to get it. Khomeini, for example, describes Islam as "progressive,"In fact, far from reflecting a rejection of the idea of progress, their zeal reflects an acceptance of it, since the idea of progress cuts the ground from under one of the most common traditional justifications for inaction Radical Islamists undoubtedly want to undo many of the effects of Western-style "progress", but this is not the same as wanting to turn the clock back.**

This interpretation of reactionary and medieval ideology of Khomeini is based on a superficial definition of the notion of modernity. Hence it now equals the use of some modern technologies and the existence of some political institutions. To the best knowledge of this writer, modernity in the field of Political Science implies that type of ideology which argues for the government of people as the ideal system of government; its fundamental principle is the supremacy of people.** Majority rule is therefore a critical component to the ideology.**

What makes a modern system distinct from a medieval one is a clear reference to the source of power of the state which is the people and not the mystified divine power.** Modernity therefore rejects the delegation of political power from God to

the king and its consequent supra-human and unchallengeable authority of the sovereign. Modernity also rejects the assumption that the sovereign is not responsible to the people since his power stems from God while demands full submission of his nation.⁹⁴ Hence the emphasis of the temporal and not divine nature of the state and the sovereign is one of the distinctive characteristics of the modern political ideology. That is why separation of the state from religion is necessary since their integration only dilutes the boundary between the unquestionable submission of the believer to God with obedience to a political system which should be voluntary and conscious.

The modern system overcomes the deficiencies and uncertainty of the medieval system by de-personalizing the source of authority and the government. As a result, the will of one single person should not determine the fate of a nation.⁹⁵ What this system offers to its people is securing their safety and rights by accepting the principle of rule of law. It means that the government functions within a clear framework of law (constitution).⁹⁶ Its activities are also regulated by the law of the land. This law protects what is good for the majority and not what is good for a tyrant.⁹⁷ Hence arbitrary rule of the sovereign is no longer permissible. Moreover, the entire system is now predictable; the uncertainty of medieval times does not exist any longer.

By the same token, lives and property of citizens are protected by the law.⁹⁸ The will of a tyrant cannot restrict

their lawful rights.⁹⁹ Likewise, citizens are equal before the law regardless of their social status and treated by universal laws which are respected and observed in the entire country.¹⁰⁰ Hence preferential treatment for the powerful social strata, i.e., aristocracy and clergy, and their immunity from punishment is inconsistent with the system. The system does not accept the officially-recognized superiority of certain social groups. No one is above the law.¹⁰¹

This new type of government is accountable to the people. It implies that the activities of the government is under the constant scrutiny of the representatives of the people.¹⁰² Hence the government cannot go beyond its legally defined jurisdiction and cannot resort to unlawful means. Thus the law protects the rights of citizens against possible attempts of the government to undermine or restrict their rights.¹⁰³ It also provides people with a means to appeal for remedy should an injustice occur. For these purposes, an impartial, independent (from other government branches) and predictable secular judicial system is indispensable.¹⁰⁴

A modern polity is a representative system.¹⁰⁵ Representation is an essential component of the modern political system through which (ideally) the government of people exists. By electing representatives, people now can participate in the affairs of their country and govern. Beside delegating the people's demands and wills, representatives keep the government accountable for its activities through the parliament. In addition,

representation gives legitimacy to the government which now expresses the will of the majority.

Therefore, the modern system lays claims to a contract between the governed and the governor.¹⁰⁶ This deliberate contract is not the result of blind obedience of people from a miraculous and mystical leader, but the realization of their free choice. It is based on the consent of the governor and the governed in establishment of a political system which grants the latter rights and freedoms for his/her loyalty and responsibilities¹⁰⁷. These rights include political, economic, social and personal rights which are supplemented by essential freedoms. In return, citizens perform their social tasks which also include their active participation in the process of formation of representative government.

The modern political system has essential components although their existence in a society does not qualify it a modern system. While essential, elections, political parties and parliament are only means to achieve that type of polity. As a result, they may also exist in an undemocratic system without making that system a modern liberal democracy. Historically, modern technology has prepared and developed the situation for the existence of such a system. Yet the mere existence of technology in a society is not equal to the domination of a modern ideology either. Consequently, if all other above-mentioned principles exist in a society, elections, political parties and etc. are indicators of the domination of a modern ideology; the reverse is not true.

A simple comparison between the Khomeini-built system and a modern system discredits the claim of Shepard. Despite some reference to the role of people, the IRI Constitution recognizes God as the legitimizer of the Islamic system.¹⁰⁰ That is why the system is named the Islamic Republic since its guiding force is the Islamic religion. The Constitution specifies that the only legitimate governor is the twelfth Imam who disappeared about 14 centuries ago; the Shii have expected his reappearance ever since. In the absence of the Imam, the only acceptable government is that which is run by a jurisprudent.¹⁰¹

Hence the notion of velayat-e faqih which is an entrenched component of the Constitution is in sharp contrast to the principle of the government of people. Constitutionally, the Islamic regime does not derive its power from the Iranian people.¹¹⁰ Hence the legitimizer of the system is God whose Koranic instruction has to be observed at all times. The jurisprudent who is the leader of the republic must observe only religious laws.¹¹¹ Any law or regulation which is passed by the IRI Parliament is subject to the veto of the Guardian Council of the Islamic Constitution if it violates the religious laws.¹¹²

In contrast to the modern system, not everyone is equal under the IRI Constitution. The first exception is the IRI leader who must be a (selected and not elected) jurisprudent.¹¹³ The leader is constitutionally not responsible to any elected or appointed authority or institution while enjoys unlimited executive, judicial and legislative power.¹¹⁴ No section of the

Constitution restricts the power and authority of the leader in an implicit or explicit manner. In addition to his power to dissolve parliament, this unlimited power includes his right to dismiss popularly-elected figures such as the president.¹¹⁵ This prerogative was used by Khomeini.¹¹⁶ Nevertheless, the jurisprudent is not accountable for his actions and cannot be removed practically.¹¹⁷ Hence the principle of accountability is also absent in the case of the IRI.

The second exception is the clergy. As stipulated in the Constitution, the system must be supervised at all levels by the clergy because of its Islamic nature. The clergy is the only competent force for undertaking this task due to its religious knowledge. Not surprisingly, the Constitution recognizes special status for a tiny percentage of the population. Apart from general recognition of the clergy's superior rights, the existence of several clergy-dominated supervisory bodies (whose jurisdiction includes all the affairs in practice) such as the Assembly for the Determination of the Interests of the System¹¹⁸ and the Guardian Council give extraordinary power to the clergy.¹¹⁹ The occupation of the most sensitive positions at all levels by the clergy and its possession of political (Islamic assemblies of governmental departments) and military organs (Committees and the RG) with undefined or vaguely defined jurisdictions demonstrate the extraordinary status of the clergy.¹²⁰

The third exception is women, who are denied equal rights. Due to the domination of religious laws, equality of men and women does not exist any longer.¹²¹ Women have lost their very essential right to choose clothing and are compelled to wear the veil or similar clothing or can be punished for their disobedience.¹²² They are no longer permitted to judge and their bearing witness in the court is weighted as half of that of a man.¹²³ Officially, the enrolment of women in certain areas of study at the post-secondary level is restricted or banned.¹²⁴ Because of the restrictive measures, the percentage of women in the civil service has decreased from 13.5 percent in 1976 (under the Shah) to 8.5 percent in 1990.¹²⁵

The fourth exception is the rest of the population. The Islamic system does not consider any rights for its citizens in practice. Essential rights including human rights have been officially denied to citizens since especially the latter rights offer a pretext for interference of foreign powers in the affairs of Iran, as the regime argues. The recent mission of the UN special envoy to Iran made clear the alienation of the system of these rights. On that occasion the judicial authorities repeated the statement that torture of political prisoners was the observation of the religious law. This permits lashing, for instance.¹²⁶ Even personal rights of people such as clothing and eating whatever is preferred have been undermined.¹²⁷ In such a situation talks of political rights are irrelevant especially at

the time when any sign of opposition to a view of the leader can be responded to by execution.¹²⁰

Under these conditions, the rule of law is meaningless. In clear contrast to a modern system, the IRI Constitution recognizes the right of the clergy and the need for the preservation of Islam as the tasks of the regime.¹²¹ Therefore, the rule of law implies the preservation of the interests of the elite and not those of the majority of the people. Due to the religious rights of the clergy for interpretation of laws as it sees fit, the resulting arbitrary treatment of people and the inevitable chaos are the real meanings of the rule of law.¹²² In the best case, the rule of law implies the inferiority of the non-clergy which constitutes the overwhelming majority of the Iranians. Thus not everyone is equal before the law.

Hypothetically, the complete observation of the law would not guarantee the rights and freedoms of individuals. Beside the undemocratic nature of the Constitution whose full observation would be equal to the denial of the Iranians' rights, this is partially because of the fact that an entrenched part of the Constitution which determines the guiding judicial laws is the Retaliation Law (Qisas).¹²³ This Islamic law which is now part of the Constitution has replaced the civilian criminal laws. According to it, religious courts (which have unidentified power and jurisdiction) determine the punishment of criminal charges by ordering retaliation in kind to be executed by the victims or relatives of the victims in the case of murder. In addition,

religious courts have the power to sentence men and women to lashing and even stoning for adulatroy, incest, non-observation of religious instructions on clothing and drinking acholic beverages.¹³² In these courts defendants may not have any lawyer as the Islamic impartiality of the Judge is assumed.¹³³ Following the law, religious courts may order (and have ordered) punishments such as stoning women for adultery and cutting the fingers, hands or legs of thieves.¹³⁴ Consequently, the denial of essential rights such as having a lawyer and issuance of horrible punishments for charges which are in cases simply personal issues undermine the notion of the rule of law.

The independence of the judiciary is also meaningless. As the regime is said to be the protector of the faith, any act of opposition to the regime is equal to blasphemy.¹³⁵ The subscribers to blasphemous actions are infidels whose death is recommended by the faith. Therefore, the judiciary becomes the protector of the rights of the regime. In this situation, impartiality and independence of the judiciary is not acceptable especially since it is constitutionally compelled to observe the religious laws as a part of the system.¹³⁶ Summary executions of thousands of opponents as well as orders of confiscations and purges have shown the seriousness of the commitment of the judiciary to protect the people against injustice.

The principle of the rule of the law is also meaningless due to the multiplicity of decision-making organs. Lawfully, there are several military and non-military organs with similar

jurisdictions and tasks. These institutions have practically unlimited power which enables them to do whatever they want without any fear of prosecution. Hence the constitution lawfully recognizes lawlessness and anarchy. In such a situation, the Judiciary which should be the organ for redressing injustices functions as a force of injustice.

The notion of representation has also lost its meaning in the IRI case. Parliament which should be the forum for expression of differing and opposite views on all aspects of social affairs is legally instructed to do otherwise. As the Parliament of the Islamic regime, the IRI Parliament must preserve the Constitution which does not recognize the legitimacy of representation. Preserving Islam is the main constitutional task of everyone including members of parliament (MPs).¹²⁷ The unlimited power of dismissal of the leader, which extends to MPs, legally prevents them from expressing the problems of their constituency for the fear of punishment. Besides, only views which are seen as consistent with the faith are permitted. This automatically bans any discussion or expression of views which are (rightly or wrongly) seen as anti-Islamic.¹²⁸ In general, this constitutional restraint provides the elite a means to stifle any views other than their own.

Another factor undermines the resemblance of the IRI parliamentary system to the Western one. For instance, this is perhaps the only parliamentary system in which no party is permitted. Upon his ascension to power, Khomeini began

suppressing political parties. The first victims were nationalist parties such as the National Front and the Liberation Movement. Parties of national minorities were the second victim.¹³⁹ Radical secular Muslim parties such as the Mojahedin and Communist organizations were suppressed in 1981.¹⁴⁰ The cooperating Tudeh Party and the Fadaeyan (Majority) were outlawed in 1983.¹⁴¹ From that time until 1987, only two pro-government Islamic parties existed whose leaders were ruling the country: The Islamic Republic Party and the Organization of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution. In 1986, Khomeini disbanded the Organisation because of factional rivalry.¹⁴² In 1987, the last political party was dissolved by the order of Khomeini.¹⁴³ In short, the Parliament of the Islamic Republic has only functioned as a decorative institution of popular representation.

In spite of Shepard's claim, the existence of modern technology in Iran does not qualify Khomeini's notion of velayat-e faqih as a modern phenomenon. Khomeini and his followers came to power at the time when Iran had already experienced industrialization for at least a century. Because of that, the society could not (and still cannot) accept a retreat to the previous non-industrialized situation. Once the society is accustomed to modern inventions like radio, television and cassette tapes no regressive regime could consider promoting its views while banning the available means of communication. Hence

Khomeini's acceptance of some modern technology does not make him and his ideology modern.

Nor does the use of modern weaponry in the war qualify the prevailing ideology as a modern ideology. In the era of missiles, Khomeini could not continue his war with militarily-modern Iraq with a sword, for instance.

Contrary to Shepard's views, there are indications of hostility towards modern technology in general. While accepting some Western technologies, the prevailing ideology has created a situation where technology cannot grow. The clergy's hatred of well-educated people and its incompatibility with modern technology has been reflected in the deliberate plans for the destruction of the educational system.¹⁴⁴ Massive and continued purges of experts, managers and cadres of private and public institutions including universities have weakened the scientific and technological capabilities of Iran. The result has been a sharp decline in the country's scientific and managerial capabilities without which technology in general cannot flourish. In addition, disdain of educated people and the superiority of ideology to expertise have been salient components of the Islamic government which contributed to the massive emigration of cadres from Iran.¹⁴⁵

In conclusion, there is no firm evidence to prove Shepard's argument. The use of modern weapons is not a decisive indicator of modernity. Elections and a parliament do not make Khomeini's Islamic creed modern either. These are means for the achievement

of a modern society, not modernity itself. Hence if a democratic polity is in place they will provide avenues for expression and consolidation of modernity. In the absence of such a condition, these are only means for decoration of a non-modern polity. Finally, Khomeini's repeated interest in modernity does not offer any scientific ground for the validity of Shepard's theory.

* * *

The Islamic Revolution brought the reactionary faction of the clergy to power. Soon after, the suppression of the revolutionary clergy began as this group initiated its violent opposition to the IRI which was described as the "criminal theocracy".¹⁴⁶ Simultaneously, the moderate clergy, who refused to support Khomeini and/or criticized him, became the target of suppression. As a result, over time, not only have they been left out of the centre of power but their prominent leaders have been persecuted.¹⁴⁷ The survivors, who have no political and executive power, now are confined to their religious schools which are severely controlled by the state.¹⁴⁸

None of these factions is monolithic in nature. The salient characteristic of the clergy is factionalism as the medieval structure of their organization on one hand and the rivalry among them on the other hand promote and encourage multiplicity of centres of command.¹⁴⁹ This multiplicity has fostered a strong centrifugal tendency among the clergy which inclined them to be against a centralized type of institution whether religious or secular. The main factor which causes and contributes to the

persistence of this centrifugal tendency is the Shii faith itself which undermines the existence of one source of power and authority, in contrast to, for instance, Catholicism.

The reason for this is a Shii principle of imitation. This principle demands adoption and interpretation of religion with the realities of time by those limited number of high clergy who obtain particular characteristics, the "sources of imitation" (marajiaeh taghlead).¹⁸⁰ These sources are also called muitahid (jurisprudent) since they have already mastered the religious knowledge which enables them to reach the degree of itihad (practice of religious jurisprudence).¹⁸¹ Because of that level of knowledge, they can issue fetwa (religious decree on matters of controversy).¹⁸²

Sources of imitation should be more than one as the practising Shiite should have the freedom to choose the source of imitation. The recognition of this multiple leadership legalizes and reinforces the fragmentation within the clergy institution. This is because each source of imitation has his own organization which includes religious schools, sources of income and imitators. Their financial self-sufficiency makes them needless of the assistance of each other or the clergy institution. These financial sources include religious taxes (khums and zakat)¹⁸³ which are paid by their imitators as well as income-generating properties ranging from farms to small factories.¹⁸⁴ Having religious schools of their own, these sources of imitation train their own students who will become

their representatives all over the country. Through them, any source of imitation is able to maintain his ties with his followers and secure their support.

The self-sufficiency of sources of imitation perpetuates the centrifugal tendency of the clergy. Factionalism therefore does not endanger the lot of every high clergy. Nor does it disrupt the normal function of his affairs. That is why competition among the sources of imitation is the logical outcome of this state of affairs. This rivalry is not confined to the high clergy as their network of related clergy transmits this competition to the religious institutions under their control as well as their imitators. While there are disagreements over different matters among sources of imitation, they have no desire to overcome their disagreements. Among other reasons, high clergy prefer to keep these disagreements alive as their existence legitimizes the necessity of a multilateral-leadership system.

Beside this point, the subscription of any source of imitation to one of the two major streams within the institution (reactionary and moderate) is a major determinant of the fragmentation of the clergy organization. The result is the absence of a coherent religious organization capable of implementing a consistent general policy. After the 1979 Revolution, the clergy expanded this anarchic situation to the entire state machinery which now was much larger than before due to the creation of parallel religious organizations.

In the wake of the Islamic Revolution, Khomeini tried to overcome this chaotic system at the top level to some extent for two reasons. Firstly, he wanted to emerge not as the political leader, but as the sole preeminent religious leader of the country as well. Secondly, Khomeini realized that a scattered government would have no chance to remain in power for a long time. Hence one of the reasons for Khomeini's insistence on the imposition of velayat-e faqih was his desire to create a unilateral system of leadership since it demands the full submission of other high clergy to the jurisprudent.¹²⁸

In addition, there is rivalry within each faction of the clergy. Causes of this rivalry range from personal competition to disagreements over religious or secular matters. The clergy views itself capable of analyzing and interpreting issues. Hence acceptance of and implementation of the decisions of a central leadership do not appeal to it. This rivalry has been very clear in the era of the Islamic government. While the ruling clergy subscribes to the reactionary faction, the identification with one version of Islam has not prevented fragmentation among the ruling clerics. Hence fierce power struggle among rival factions has been a salient characteristic of the IRI.

However, it should be kept in mind that common interest keeps main factions of clergy together by and large. Being a distinct social strata increases the value at stake for the entire clergy to preserve the very existence of its institution. This implies that the clergy in general tends not to cause unsolvable

conflicts. That is why the institution has continued to exist since its formation. Following the tradition, the moderate faction of the clergy (which has not been a part of the IRI) has refused to openly challenge the reactionary faction in power for fear that the possible collapse of the system might be accompanied by the destruction of the religious institution in its totality.

Yet the experience of the Islamic government has shown that this tradition is no longer mutually accepted. This is evident in the practice of the reactionary faction in power which has not hesitated to persecute other factions. In cases such as that of the late Ayatollah Shariatmadari the reactionary faction even undermined the commonly observed sacredness and respect of the source of imitation. Khomeini ordered the arrest of Shariatmadari in 1982 for his alleged collaboration in a military coup sponsored by Sadegh Gotbzadeh.¹⁵⁶ As the jurisprudent, Khomeini also unprecedentedly stripped Shariatmadari of his religious status and kept him under house-arrest until 1987 when Shariatmadari died because Khomeini had refused him medical treatment.¹⁵⁷

In other cases, the religious status of some rival leaders within its own faction has not made the clergy in power behave more gently. Hence even Ayatollah Montazeri (who had been the chosen successor to Khomeini before his official removal from the position in 1989) was persecuted by Ayatollah Khomeini in the aftermath of the disclosure of Irangate.¹⁵⁸

In consequence, the ascension to power of the reactionary clergy has contributed to hastened rivalry. Factionalism is now stronger than ever since the value at stake (governing a rich country) is far greater than before.

* * *

The ascension of Khomeini to power initiated a period of demolition of Iranian society. The political honeymoon of the nationalists with Khomeini did not lead to their full control of the system nor to the departure of the clergy from the political scene. On the contrary, the reactionary faction of the clergy used the PG for its own purposes as the conversion of a twentieth century state apparatus into an outdated theocracy demanded a transitional government to prepare the situation.

While consolidating its power for future take-over, it was necessary for the rising clergy to minimize the negative reaction of the Iranians who had been exposed to modern and secular governments for a long time. For that purpose, the clergy's policy of appeasement of the people took the form of giving the nominal ruling power to a Westernized cabinet which had an acceptable feature, both for Iranians and foreigners. This started the gradual take-over of the state by the clergy. Once the clergy felt strong enough, the purge of the nationalists began. The American Embassy, therefore, was occupied to force the PG to resign.

Yet the full seizure of power by the clergy was not completed until June 1981 when Banisadr was removed from the presidency.

Ever since, the ruling reactionary faction of clergy has resorted to repressive measures in order to preserve its unstable system. Massive and bloody purges of the Armed Forces and governmental organizations have been supplemented with not only abuse of political rights but denial of individual rights of Iranians.¹⁸⁹ Mass arrests, torture and summary executions of political dissidents have been inseparable characteristics of the Islamic regime with and without Khomeini.¹⁹⁰

According to the Iranian opposition, about 90,000 dissidents have been executed since 1979.¹⁹¹ Of these, roughly, 70,000 were executed in the period of February 1979 to July 1988 when the Khomeini regime accepted the ceasefire.¹⁹² In the period July 1988 to June 1989 (when Khomeini died), over 12,000 political prisoners and ex-political prisoners were massacred as the weakened Islamic elite could not afford either potential of opposition or formation of the idea among the population that the end of the War is the beginning of an evaluation of the disappointing record of the regime.¹⁹³ Finally, on average, 50 dissidents have been executed weekly since the coming to power of the leader of the "moderates" and formation of his "moderate" cabinet in the aftermath of the death of Khomeini. The number of these victims, who have been killed as drug-smugglers, has already exceeded the figure of 1,300, according to the government's own statistics.¹⁹⁴

Through eleven years of theocracy, Iran has become exhausted. Financially, the country, which possessed at least \$30b in hard

currency¹⁶⁶ while receiving annually about \$22b in oil income¹⁶⁶, has spent almost its entire reserves and incomes including oil revenue on arms and a devastating scheme of "export of revolution". Thus, the elites are seeking foreign loans as the country's limited sources of income can hardly provide for essential imported food, medicine and arms.¹⁶⁷

The growing industrial sector, has been brought to its knees as a result of reckless measures. These measures include confiscations, massive purges of managerial and technical manpower, lack of investment, poor maintenance of facilities, interference of irrelevant organs in the economic policies, shortage of raw material and spare parts and uncertainty and absence of an economic plan for the entire country.¹⁶⁸ The devastating eight-year war further contributed to the destruction of a large number of industrial units by the Iraqis or total stoppage of production in some industries because of scarcity of resources and hard currencies, now dedicated to the war efforts.¹⁶⁹ Hence Iran has become dependent on imported manufactured goods as the remainder of the factories cannot meet ever-increasing demands.

The agrarian record is also negative. Iran which was close to or self-sufficient in the production of the most essential agricultural products and related products such as meat¹⁷⁰ before 1979, now has become one of the largest importers of grain, rice, vegetable oil, meat and dairy products.¹⁷¹ Not only have the area of grain-producing lands been reduced sharply, but the

drastic reduction in the size of lands under cultivation for industrial agricultural products such as cotton has dried up a substantial source of foreign currency.¹⁷² Iran now imports cotton.¹⁷³

The education and health sectors have also undergone damages. As a result of a series of measures including massive and repeated purges of primary and secondary school teachers, confiscation of private schools and abolition of the Literacy Corps, the educational system is simply unable to provide enough schools for the ever-increasing number of students.¹⁷⁴ It goes without saying that the quality of education has declined drastically. Likewise, due to purges, permanent interferences of a great number of non-academic organs in the affairs of post-secondary institutions and a generally intolerable situation, over 6,000 university professors have emigrated from Iran.¹⁷⁵

Similarly, the health system is incapable of meeting rising demand. Adding to problems such as purges and arrests, the destruction of the vocational and disciplinary medical organization has motivated over 7,000 medical doctors to leave Iran for Western countries.¹⁷⁶ This has taken place when the educational system has not been able to compensate the loss, as mentioned earlier.

* * *

This research is to prove the validity of the following thesis that the IRI is incapable of adopting a moderate method of statecraft. In order to prove the thesis, this research is

structured to analyze the theory of the moderate faction in the light of the significant events which have taken place since the death of Khomeini.

Chapter II will elaborate on major events and policies which have been initiated since 4 June 1989 to April 1990. The emphasis will be on the power struggle among rival factions of the IRI. Hence the attitudes of each faction towards the major policies and areas of agreement and disagreement will be dealt with.

Chapter III will analyze the theory of "moderate" faction and why some Western countries are spreading this notion. The influences contributing to a "radical" attitude towards the IRI on the part of some factions of Western governments will be discussed as well. Finally, the impact of Western policy on the continuation of the IRI will be addressed.

Chapter IV will focus on the foreign policy of the IRI in the post-Khomeini era. The reasons behind the different approaches of the "moderates" and "hardliners" towards the foreign policy will be analyzed. In particular, the continuation of the "radical" foreign policy by the "moderates" will be discussed. Issues such as the leadership role of the "moderates" in organized terrorism will be given special attention. Finally, IRI relations with some major Western and Third World countries will be evaluated.

Chapter V will elaborate on IRI-East relations. The main emphasis will be on the nature and extent of relations between

the IRI and especially the Soviet Union. This chapter will offer reasons why the East is not in a position to significantly expand its influence in Iran. The role of the IRI in the recent mass uprising in the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan and its possible impact on the future of Iran will be analyzed.

While providing a very short summary of influential factors, Chapter VI will analyze the influences which make the adoption of a moderate policy on the part of the IRI and its factions impossible. Finally, the negative effects of the West's foreign policy on future relations of succeeding governments will be analyzed.

ENDNOTES

1. For example, see: Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, The Shah's Story (London: Michael Joseph, 1980).

2. This point will be discussed shortly.

3. This chapter will provide a summary on the political orientations of major political groups which contributed to the collapse of the Shah's regime.

4. This is the central argument of Generals Huyser and Sullivan. For detail see: General Robert E. Huyser, Mission to Tehran (London: Andrew Deutsch, 1986). See also: William Sullivan, Mission to Iran (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981).

5. Nikki Keddie, Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 253.

For Gary Sick, US poor intelligence on Iran and American incapability to deal with an ideological revolution were major factors causing a series of wrong decisions by the Americans in the period of 1978-1981. The period began in 1978 which is an arbitrary date for the initiation of the Islamic Revolution and finished in 1981 which was the year the Hostage crisis ended. For more information, see: Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, 1985).

6. Sick, 43-130.

7. Edgar O'Ballance, The Gulf War (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1988), 17. See also: Sick, 136.

General Alexander Haig who was General Huyser's superior in 1979 believes that Huyser's mission to Iran had other objectives. That is why he was against that mission and was for firm support for the Shah. In an exclusive interview with Kayhan Newspaper, General Haig observes:

Right after Christmas in January 1979 when the situation was deteriorating in Iran, I received a note from Secretary of Defence Harold Brown through the Deputy Secretary of Defence according to which my Deputy, General Huyser, had been assigned to fly to Iran immediately. The objective of the Huyser mission was not clear to me and I wanted to know what the goal of his mission could be since I was suspicious about the situation and on-going events in Washington.... [In order to find the reasons behind the mission], I went to see Brzezinski at the White House. Question: And Brzezinski gave you the detail of the Huyser instructions? [Haig:] Brzezinski told me that he supposed that Huyser had been sent to Iran as a military liaison in order to assist the Iranian Armed

Forces to restore discipline and law. Question: Did you believe it? [Haig:] No. I even had another interpretation of the instructions given to Huyser which were contrary to that of Brzezinski. I told them [Secretaries of Defence and State and Brzezinski] that the Shah should be supported and the rule of law had to be preserved in Iran. Of course in the mean time, I kept my contacts with Huyser. Therefore, I realized that contradictory and ambiguous instructions had been given to him whose outcomes would surely be harmful.... [Question:] And the result was what you anticipated? Unfortunately, yes. My some-week-long nightmare came true and the Iranian Armed Forces collapsed because of the lack of commandership. This was a sad tragedy for the Iranian nation, free world and the government of the United States (General Alexander Haig, "The Rule of Law and democracy Will Soon Return to Iran," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 22 February 1990, 12).

8. Sick, 140-142, 146.

9. Ibid., 139.

10. Ibid., 150-156.

11. For American contacts with Khomeini, see: Ibid., 132-136.

12. Ibid., 168.

13. The revolution began in 1977 in the form of a number of anti-government activities which were initiated by secular groups and elements. In that year, an open letter addressed to the Shah was published in Iran and signed by three leaders of the outlawed National Front: Dr. Karim Sanjabi (leader of the Iran Party), Darioush Fourouhar (leader of the Society of the Socialists of the National Movement) and Dr. Shahpour Bakhtiar (leader of the Party of Iranian People). In that letter, repression and autocracy were condemned and the Shah was requested to implement the Constitution according to which he was almost a ceremonial constitutional monarch (Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions [Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982], 502; See also: Keddie, 233).

The National Front later received the support of the middle class including the technocrats and the Bazaris who went on strike upon the request of the Front several times. For detail on the National Front: see: John D. Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 50-52, 81-82, 84-85. See also: Abrahamian, 457-462, 504.

The Liberation Movement of Mr. Mehdi Bazargan sought the same goals and enjoyed the support of the intellectuals and Bazaris as well. Being formerly part of the National Front, the

Movement was working very closely with the latter. The Movement also distributed leaflets and open letters and used its influence to put the government under pressure by organizing strikes among the Bazaris and faculties of universities. For detail on the Liberation Movement, see: Stempel, 49-50, 84-85. See also: Abrahamian, 462-478, 504.

In the same year, a series of poem-reading nights was held in Tehran in which a large number of well-known and popular poets read their anti-Shah poetries. Sponsors were the members of the outlawed Writers' Guild which encompassed a spectrum of secular writers and poets ranging from nationalists to Marxists. In many cases, the ever-increasing audience of those poem-reading nights held anti-government demonstrations which led to clashes with security forces. For detail on the Guild of Writers, see: Abrahamian, 502-503, 505.

The outlawed Lawyers' Guild also initiated publication of a number of open letters written to Iranian authorities of that time in which the despotic regime was criticized. The demand was therefore the conversion of autocracy to democracy by implementation of the Iranian Constitution. For detail on the Lawyers Guild, see: Stempel, 82. See also, Abrahamian, 501-503. See also: Keddie, 233.

Other secular nationalist organizations such as the Radical Movement of Iran sought the same goal. Headed by Rahmatollah Mogahdam-Maraghei, the Movement demanded the end of dictatorship and its replacement by a rule-of-law system of government. For detail on the Radical Movement of Iran, see: Stempel, 55.

Another active moderate organization was the Committee for Defence of Human Rights and Freedom. This organization was formed by a number of influential figures of the National Front (Karim Sanjabi), the Liberation Movement (Mehdi Bazargan), the Writers' Guild (Ali Asghar Haj-Seyed-Javadi) and the Lawyers' Guild (Rahmatollah Mogahdam-Maraghei). It was successful in stimulating middle class consciousness by focusing on the abuse of human rights and freedom and demanding a constitutional monarchy. For detail on the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedom, see: Stempel, 55-56.

In contrast to the latter groups and figures which supported a reformed monarchy, Several Marxist organizations also were fostering anti-Shah sentiment with the goal of toppling the Monarchy altogether and formation of a democratic people's republic in Iran. These groups organized several demonstrations and distributed anti-government leaflets in major Iranian cities. The most significant of them was the Organization of People's Fadaey Guerillas, the Pykar Organization, the Razmandeghan (Mililitants) of the Liberty of the Working Class, the Ranjbaran (Toilers), Navid (a branch of the Tudeh Party) and the Tudeh party. For detail on the Marxist groups, see: Stempel, 52-55. On the Tudeh Party, see: Abrahamian, 451-457, 480-489. See also: Keddie, 236-237.

To this list, the semi-religious, semi-Marxist Organization of the People's Mojahedin of Iran should be added. Like the

Marxists, the Mojahedin supported a violent overthrow of the Shah and establishment of a democratic people's republic in Iran. For detail on the Mojahedin, see: Ervand Abrahamian, Radical Islam: the Iranian Mojahedin (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989). See also: Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 489-495.

Finally, university students played a significant role in awakening the consciousness of Iranians and pushing for reforms as well as radical changes. By and large, these students subscribed to left-of-centre political orientations. As a result, in 1977, the streets of major cities including Tehran became the scene of anti-government student demonstrations which led to confrontations with the police in many cases. For detail on student protests, see: Stempel, 86-87. See also: Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 505. See: Keddie, 235-236.

14. The secular nationalist and Marxist organizations supported liberal democratic and democratic people's republic type of government respectively; these were qualitatively different from the IRI. While Khomeini himself never described the Islamic republic in detail, even what he mentioned as the components of the new system was more or less a liberal democracy in which even Marxists should have the rights for expression of their views and political activities. His criticism of the Shah and the SAVAK for arrest, imprisonment, torture and execution of political opponents and abuse of freedoms and rights of the people aligned Khomeini with moderate nationalists. Similarly, Khomeini's demands for a fair society and his opposition to the corrupt bureaucracy only gave him a more egalitarian and democratic feature than anything else. His emphasis on the implementation of Islamic rule, however, did not seem to be contradictory to his democratic promises as he equated an Islamic republic to a true liberal democratic society. Khomeini's stress on his reluctance for political power and that he would leave the political scene for the sanctuary of a religious school in the city of Qum were taken as sincere by Iranians at large. The appointment of a well-known moderate nationalist, Mehdi Bazargan, as the first Prime Minister of Khomeini's regime, about two weeks prior to the collapse of the Shah's regime, further assured the people of the secular and moderate nature of the new system. For detail on Khomeini's democratic views prior to his ascension to power, see: "Imam Khomeini: Dictatorship Does Not Exist in the Islamic Government," Kayhan (Tehran), 23 January 1979, 1; quoted in "The Radio-Television Message of the Head of the National Council of Resistance," The Organ of the League of Moslem Students' Abroad (hereafter Organ), 17 February 1989, 3. See also: Sick, 54-55.

15. Ibid.

16. Keddie, 251-252.

The largest radical organizations were "The Organization of People's Fadaey Guerillas of Iran", an underground Marxist organization founded in 1970, and "The Organization of People's Mojahedin of Iran", an underground non-Marxist organization founded in 1965 with a radical nationalist program influenced by certain Marxist notions and anti-fundamentalist religious tendencies. Both organizations were for a violent overthrow of the Shah's regime through armed struggle. For detail on their strength, political platforms and proposed means to achieve their goals, see: Hugo Gurdon, Iran - The Continuing Struggle for Power (Outwell: Menas Press Ltd., 1984), 56-58. See also: Stempel, 84-86.

17. Ibid.

18. For the radicalization of the population because of the Shah's use of force, see: Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 516-517. For the acceptability of the slogans of the radicals groups among people, see: Ibid., 522-523.

19. For detail on the nature and political objectives of these organizations and their numerical weakness, see: 10.

20. For detail on the program of the National Front, see: Stempel, 50-52, 81-82, 84-85. For detail on the program of the Liberation Movement, see: Ibid., 49-50, 84-85. See also: Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 462-478, 504.

21. Some scholars such as Fred Halliday question the possibility of a leftist take-over of Iran in the period of Revolution. While accepting the rapid growth of the Iranian left, Halliday argues that a number of factors such as the organizational weakness of the left, the subordination of some Marxist organization i.e., the Tudeh Party to the USSR, the strength of capitalism in Iran, the strength of the Shah's security forces and the would-be support of the conservative countries of the region like Saudi Arabia for the Shah in his possible confrontation with the Marxist undermined a Marxist take-over of Iran. While these points embody some truth about the situation, the sudden collapse of the Shah in a short time after the publication of Halliday's book and the rapid growth of the left and semi-Marxist groups i.e., the Mojahedin in the aftermath of the revolution seriously weaken Halliday's reasoning. For detail, see: Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, 2nd ed. (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1979), 306-309.

22. Gary Sick confirms this statement by saying:

[General Huyser] had spent endless hours in talks with each of the key [Iranian] military leaders, and he was not convinced that the Generals were prepared to throw their full support behind Bakhtiar when the Shah departed. They wanted to see Bakhtiar succeed, but if

he failed, they were preparing contingency plans for the military to take over essential functions and avoid a total breakdown of order (Sick, 139). (this writer's stress)

General Garebaghy, the last Chairman of the Supreme Command of the Imperial Armed Forces of Iran has published a book recently in which he denies his cooperation with Khomeini which led to the declaration of neutrality by the Armed Forces on the day of Revolution. In his first interview since leaving Iran, the General accepted the desire of certain Generals for a massive suppression of the Khomeini supporters, but he rejected the feasibility of such an operation. For detail, see: "Speaking with General Garebaghy," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 21 December 1989, 8.

To the best knowledge of this writer, those top military who were for a violent treatment of the opposition included: General Manucher Khosrodat (Commander of the Paratroops), General Bograt Gafarian (Military Governor of the Khuzestan Province), General Golam Reza Oveisea (ex-Commander of Gendarmerie) and General Rahime (Military Governor of Tehran) and General Ayat Mohageghy (Commander of the Gendarmerie). As claimed by the Minister of Health of the Bakhtiar Cabinet, the latter General explicitly demanded use of force for the destruction of the anti-monarchist movement in the meeting of high commanders of the Armed Forces which was held 12 days prior to the fall of the Shah's regime. For detail, see: Dr. Manucher Razmara, "Mr. General Garebaghy! "Impartiality" Did Not Mean Anything But Surrender," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 4 January 1990, 9.

23. Since 1979, several articles and books have been written about the covert negotiations and political deals which led to the establishment of the IRI in February 1979. All these sources, in one way or another, suggest that there were secret talks among high-ranking officials of the Imperial Government of Iran, Khomeini and his close advisers and some American top officials. These sources include books by Dr. Bakhtiar, Count Alexander DeMaranch, General Huyser, the late Shah, Gary Sick and Stempel.

While accepting the existence of serious social and economic disparities, Dr. Bakhtiar describes the collapse of the Monarchy as a result of the treason of some influential Generals of the Imperial Armed Forces. These Generals paved the way for a compromise between the clergy and the US government as a result of their secret negotiations with the opposition and the American authorities (Dr. Shahpour Bakhtiar, 37 Days After 37 Years [Paris: National Resistance Movement, 1980]; Dr. Shahpour Bakhtiar, Yekrangy [Paris: National Resistance Movement, 1986]).

Being the ex-Director of the French secret service, Count DeMaranch talks about an American plan for the removal of the Shah who was no longer desirable for the USA for a variety of reasons. The author believes that the American plan had the

blessing of major West European governments excluding the French government. The outcome of that plan was the IRI (Count Alexander DeMaranch, "The Shah and Ayatollah" in From the Secrets of Princes translated in "The Shah and Ayatollah," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 18 September 1986, 14, 25 September 1986, 5, 2 October 1986, 5).

General Huyser denies any involvement of the USA in the creation of the IRI even after it became clear to the Americans that the Shah could no longer control Iran. Nevertheless he confirms the American attempts for influencing the events through meeting with the leaders of the Revolution when there was no other choice (General Robert Huyser, Mission To Tehran (London: Andrew Deutsch, 1986)).

The late Shah believed in a deliberate conspiracy for his removal. According to him, the Americans were deeply involved in his overthrow as they preferred an Islamic regime in Iran for their strategic reasons. Therefore, General Huyser and William Sullivan, among other Americans, met with the opposition leaders several times. According to the Shah, the outcome of all those meetings was the enthusiasm of the latter two for the Shah's departure from Iran as a step towards the foundation of the IRI (Pahlavi, 178-190).

By and large, Sick shares the idea of General Huyser about the US role in the creation of the IRI. He also confirms the American connection with the Iranian opposition prior to the collapse of the Imperial regime with the purpose of influencing events as the last resort (Sick, 54-55, 111-112, 132-136, 140-143, 150).

Finally, Stempel denies any intentional US involvement in the creation of the IRI. However, Stempel elaborates on the "Americans' unsuccessful attempts" to influence the pace of events through establishing contacts with the opposition after the bleak future of the Shah's regime had become evident (Stempel, 104-164).

According to these sources, the following figures were actively involved in negotiations. The royalist negotiators included: General Nasser Moghaddam (Head of SAVAK), General Garebaghy (Chief of the Supreme Commander's Staff of the Imperial Armed Forces), General Hossein Fardoust (Head of the Imperial Inspection Organization) and even Dr. Shahpour Bakhtiar (last Prime Minister of the Shah) but through mediators.

The Americans involved in those negotiations included: William Sullivan (last US Ambassador to Iran), General Robert E. Huyser (Deputy Director of NATO), Ramsey Clark (ex-US Attorney General) and Andrew Young (ex-US Ambassador to the UN).

These people (royalists and Americans) were among those who negotiated with Khomeini himself or with his close advisers and allies such as Ayatollah Behesti (Head of the Revolutionary Council until its dissolution in 1980, then Speaker of the Expert Assembly and finally IRI Chief Justice, killed in an explosion in 1981), Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani (First Head of the Committees

until 1981, now Supervisor of Tehran mosques), Ayatollah Moussavi-Ardebilily (Chief Justice until 1989, now Friday Prayer Imam of Tehran), Hojatolislam Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani (Speaker of Parliament until 1989, now IRI President).

Among the non-clergy advisers of Khomeini, the following members of the "Liberation Movement" (LM) and the "National Front" (NF) were well-known figures who were involved in trilateral negotiations.

From the LM:

Mehdi Bazargan (First Prime Minister of Khomeini who formed the Provisional Government of Iran (PG) right after the collapse of the Imperial Government of Iran), Dr. Nasser Minachi (PG Minister of Information), Dr. Ezatollah Sahabi (Member of the Expert Assembly then IRI MP), Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi (PG Minister of Foreign Affairs), Abolhassan Banisadr (PG Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Economy then the First IRI President), Sadegh Gotbzadeh (Head of the IRI Radio and Television Organization and PG Minister of Foreign Affairs).

From the NF:

Dr. Karim Sanjabi (PG Minister of Foreign Affairs), Darioush Forouhar (PG Minister of Labour)
Ali Ardellan (PG Minister of Finance)

24. For the rapid expansion of radical groups which formerly had small memberships, see: Keddie, 251-252.

25. The desire for compromise was reflected in the peaceful tactics of the founding members of the coalition, the Liberation Movement, the National Front and the religious leaders, which were to challenge the government through demonstrations and strikes. See: Stempel, 143.

26. In many occasions, Khomeini requested the Iranians to show up in the streets to express their opposition to the system or to participate in mourning for the martyrs of previous demonstrations. In all these cases, the sheer presence of people in the streets could have provoked violence by the security forces. Confrontation of the unarmed people with heavily armed army and security forces whose result was clear to everyone including Khomeini was considered the proper tactic for the establishment of the Islamic regime as he:

exhorted the public to make more sacrifices until blood triumphed over the sword and Islam over the "pagan" Pahlavi (Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 507). (this writer's stress)

27. For the power of the radicals in the wake of the revolution, see: Stempel, 193-194.

Keddie signifies the military strength of the radical underground groups such as the Mojahedin and the Fadaeyan and

their key role in pushing back the Imperial Guard attack on the rebellious Air Force technicians on the day of the transfer of power by saying:

there seems no doubt...that the leftist guerilla groups were of major importance in the military victory, as were the homafars (Air Force technicians) themselves (Keddie, 257).

28. In their contacts with Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi (representative of Khomeini in his negotiations with the USA, later Minister of Foreign Affairs in the PG) prior to the formation of the IRI, the Americans expressed their concern about the proliferation of Communism in Iran and that the Communists might take over the country. Gary Sick gives the following account of a bilateral negotiation on 18 January 1979:

Yazdi was provided with a lengthy statement stressing the importance of contacts between the two sides and reliance on constitutional procedures. It warned of the dangers of the growing power of the Tudeh Party, and the risk that the left would be the only force to gain from a religious-military clash....

....Yazdi again took copious notes. He commented that the Tudeh Party threat was fully appreciated but the Islamic movement was too strong to be taken over by "Bolsheviks." He indicated that Khomeini had passed the word to his supporters in Tehran to get in touch with the army (Sick, 143). (this writer's stress)

29. For the nature of negotiations between Khomeini and his advisers with the American delegates and high-ranking officers of the Iranian Armed Forces, see: Stempel, 147-149, 180-181. See also: Sick: 54-55, 111-112, 132-136, 140-143, 150.

For negotiations between Sadegh Gotbzadeh on behalf of Khomeini with the representative of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see: Carole Jerome, The Man in the Mirror (Toronto: PaperJacks Ltd., 1988), 31-32.

30. To the knowledge of this author, the only published English book which elaborates on Khomeini's appeal for armed struggle is Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution. In that book, the author refers to Khomeini's appeal to his supporters to "arm and train themselves for possible confrontation" or the later Khomeini stand, urging "the overthrow of the Shah through civil war if necessary". In reality, Khomeini never took any serious step in this regard. As mentioned on page 143, the main tactics of the Liberation Movement, the National Front and the religious leaders were to challenge the government through demonstrations and strikes. In any case, the only available organization to Khomeini was the network of mosques and religious schools which could hardly be considered as proper institutions for waging armed struggle. Hence lack of military capabilities and organization would have hampered any effort for armed struggle

even if they there had been any will.

31. Stempel, 128. For the tendency of Khomeini in a non-violent transition of power through the assistance of the USA and his desire to deal with the Americans, see: Ibid., 160-161.

32. In the post-War period, one of the US strategies for containment of Communism was theorized in the form of the revised and up-dated Heartland Theory: Rimland Theory. Accordingly, in short, the control of the Rimland (neighbouring areas to the Soviet Union) could neutralize the power of the USSR and keep it in check. This was the theory which contributed to the creation of NATO, CENTO and SEATO. Sharing about 2,500 km. border with the USSR, Iran was (and still is) a very significant country for the containment of the Soviet Union. For detail on Heartland and Rimland Theories, see: Peter J. Taylor, Political Geography (New York: Longman Scientific & Technical, 1985), 37-43.

The clearance of the foreign policy of the future Islamic regime by Dr. Yazdi, made the Americans more sympathetic to the Islamic Revolution as it was definitely anti-communist with positive attitudes towards the USA. In a meeting with the Americans, Yazdi stressed the existence of:

deep popular resentment and hatred toward the United States for its unconditional support of the Shah since 1953, but he felt that friendly future relations were possible if America stopped interfering in Iranian affairs. He said Iran had "no better memories" of the Russians than of the Americans. They [Iranians] would seek friendly relations with the Soviet Union, but that process would be complicated by Soviet atheism and antireligious policies. At least Americans believe in God, "he noted", which made it easier to maintain a closer relationship (Sick, 134). (this writer's stress)

33. For detail on secret meetings among high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces, the leaders of the Revolution and American agents, which had taken place in 1978 and early 1979 and led to the "acceptance" of a non-confrontation policy and the publication of a communique regarding the neutrality of the military on the day of "revolution", see: Pahlavi, 168-188. See also: Stempel, 147-149, 180-181.

34. For detail on the change in US policy and taking sides with the "revolutionaries" for a peaceful transition and removal of the Shah, see: Stempel, 152-153, 159.

35. Halliday, 34.

36. Ibid.

37. For detail on the anti-communist and conservative nature of the new government, see: Ibid, 313-315.

38. The late Shah clearly mentions in his book the "strange mission" of General Huyser to neutralize the Iranian Armed Forces, the assurance of some prominent American politicians to a number of Iranian politicians that "there will be soon a new regime in Iran", the warning of the Soviet Union concerning the US "interference in Iran's internal affairs" and finally the Shah's visit of General Huyser and William Sullivan in which "neither of them was concerned with anything beyond the day and the hour of my departure". For detail, see: Pahlavi, 168-188. See also: Stempel, 147-149, 180-181.

39. Pahlavi, 168-188.

40. Stempel, 124. While acknowledging the role of the BBC in broadcasting anti-Shah and pro-Khomeini programs, Stempel denies any deliberate intention, on the part of the British government, behind such programs. He therefore puts the blame on "expatriate Iranians sympathetic to revolution [who] effectively 'captured' the Persian service of the BBC".

41. For the political viewpoints of the founding groups of the Provisional Government of Iran, i.e. the Liberation Movement, the National Front and the Lawyers Guild, see: # 10.

42. For detail on their nature and political agenda, see; 10.

43. Ibid.

44. The existence of such an idea among the nationalists provided some ground for the Sullivan plan for creation of a moderate alternative government to that of the Shah. For detail, see: Sick, 134-147.

45. Even Americans believed that Khomeini would not be able to run the country, therefore, the nationalists would assume the real power in the future Khomeini regime. Accordingly, Iran under Khomeini would be more stable and reliable than under the Shah or Bakhtiar since the ideological influence of Khomeini would keep the country together while the moderate nationalists would rule it. For detail, see: Sick, 138.

46. For detail on the negative role of the purges and the activities of the parallel administrative organs on the PG, see; Stempel, 198-200.

47. For detail on the effects of the Islamic Revolution on the regular Iranian Armed Forces and the role of the new parallel military institutions, see: Jack S. Levy and Mike Froelich, "Causes of the Iran-Iraq War," in The Regionalization of the

Warfare, ed. James Brown and William P. Snyder (New Brunswick, USA: Transaction Books, 1985), 137. See also: Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1988), 33-36. See also: O'Ballance, 20-24. For detail on the revolutionary courts, see: Stempel, 206-208.

48. In the place of the promised constitutional assembly, Khomeini ordered the creation of the Expert Assembly in the wake of the establishment of the IRI. He argued that the new system is an Islamic system for writing whose constitution no-one but religious experts (clergymen) is competent. With a few exceptions, the Expert Assembly included clergymen. For detail, see: Sepehr Zabihi, Iran Since the Revolution (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 33-35.

49. Nikki R. Keddie, "Islamic Revivalism Past and Present, With Emphasis on Iran," in Iran Since The Revolution, ed. Barry M. Rosen (New York: Social Science Monographs, Boulder, 1985), 12.

50. Stempel, 218-219.

51. Keddie, "Islamic Revivalism Past and Present, With Emphasis on Iran," 12.

52. O'Ballance, 23.

53. On the political orientation of Banisadr, see: Stempel, 198. See also: O'Ballance, 65.

54. For detail, see: Eric Hooglund, "Iran 1980-85: Political and Economic Trends," in The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic, ed. Nikki R. Keddie and Eric Hooglund (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 20-21.

55. For more information on Banisadr's attempts to secure the support of the regular military for himself through its rehabilitation, see: O'Ballance, 23, 50 and 58.

56. Ibid., 65.

57. For detail on the process of suppression of the opposition by the Khomeini in the wake of the dismissal of Banisadr, see: Zabihi, 133-151.

58. For detail on the process which led to Banisadr's dismissal from presidency and its subsequent massacre of his supporters, see: Gurdon, 58. See also: Keddie, "Islamic Revivalism Past and Present, With Emphasis on Iran," 13. See also: O'Ballance, 65-66. See also: Zabihi, 122-136.

59. Gurdon, 58. See also: Keddie, "Islamic Revivalism Past and Present, With Emphasis on Iran", 13.

60. O'Ballance, 88.

61. For detail on the Cabinet of Rajai, see: Zabihi, 72-74.

62. O'Ballance, 89-90.

63. "A Look at the Life of Ayatollah Shariatmadari," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 10 April 1986, 16.

64. During the last twenty five years, some of these young clergymen have supported the Organization of People's Mojahedin of Iran. For instance, Jalal Ghanjeei, has been a firm supporter and member of the National Council of Resistance (a coalition established by the Mojahedin) over the last eight years. His radically different viewpoints on issues was reflected in his condemnation of Khomeini's decree on Salman Rushdie during a press conference in London at the peak of the Rushdie affair. For detail, see: "The Press Conference of Jalal Ghanjeei," The Organ of the League Moslem Students' Association Abroad, (hereafter Organ), 24 February 1989, 17.

65. Among the radical organizations created by these clergy, the "Forghan" was (and still is) the most famous organization. The Forghan was founded by a young militant clergyman, Ahmad Godarzi, prior to Khomeini's ascension to power. Godarzi left the ranks of clergy as he had found them reactionary. This organization began armed struggle against the Khomeini regime which it called "the criminal mullahism", right after the Islamic Revolution in February 1979. The Forghan was responsible for assassination of a number of well-known figures of the Khomeini government in 1979. For more information, see: Stempel, 204-205.

66. The most prominent figures of this faction are late Ayatollah Shariatmadari, Ayatollah Golpaigani, Ayatollah Najafi-Marashie. For detail on their political viewpoints, see: Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 473.

67. For instance, Ayatollah Shariatmadari appealed to the clerics several times to "return to your mosques and seminaries and leave politics to professional statesmen". For detail, see: Zabihi, 77. For detail on the view of the moderate faction of the clergy, see: Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 473-475. While acknowledging the reluctance of these clergymen to politics, Abrahamian divides them into two groups. However, this division does not conflict the view of this writer on the same issue as Abrahamian offers more or less the same general orientation for both groups. See also: Nikki R. Keddie, "Religion, Society, and Revolution in Modern Iran," in Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and Change, ed. Michael E. Bonine and Nikki Keddie (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1981), 33.

68. For detail, see: Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 474. For their opposition to the notion of the "governance of jurisprudent" which was the core element of Khomeini's clergy-ruled Islamic regime, see: Shahrough Akhavi, "Clerics Politics in Iran Since 1979," in The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic, ed. Nikkie R. Keddie and Eric Hooglund (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 61.

69. The popular Ayatollahs of this faction contributed to the progression of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 which was an attempt to replace autocracy with constitutional monarchy. For detail, see: Ahmad Kasravi, The Eighteen-Year History of Azerbaijan (Tehran: Amirkabir Publication, 1979). See also: Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 474.

70. This is especially evident in their support of moderate nationalist organizations such as the National Front and their demand for separation of state and religion. See: Ibid., 473-474.

71. For detail, see: J. M. Abdulghani, Iran & Iraq: The Years of Crisis (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 178-181. See also: Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 475-478.

72. For full detail on Khomeini understanding of the notion of governance of jurisprudent, see: Ruhollah Khomeini, Islamic Government (Washington: U.S. Joint Publication Research Service, 1979).

73. Theocracy which was the ideal system of government for these clergymen is a medieval institution. For detail on the form and content of such a system, see: Ibid.

Since this objective had inevitably put reactionary clergy in opposition to the central government prior to the formation of the IRI, a number of colonial powers such as Britain and the Russian Empire had tried to use them in order to destabilize the Iranian central government. Hence the latter powers had manipulated these clergy in order to accomplish their economic and political goals in Iran in the second half of the 19th century and the early years of the 20th century. Even in the 1940s and early 1950s when anti-British sentiment was strong and the Iranian people were in the process of nationalization of their oil industry, led by late Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, these clergy, in one way or another, took sides with the British and tried to weaken Dr. Mossadegh. They also helped and cherished the military coup of 1953, engineered by the USA and the U.K.. For further detail, see: Bijan Jazani, The Thirty-Year History of Iran (Tehran: Sachafkha Publication, 1979).

74. For detail on their anti-Western orientation, see: Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 477. For detail on the destructive role of these clergy in the nationalist movement before and after the 1953 coup, see: Shahrough Akhavi, "The Role

of the clergy in Iranian Politics, 1949-1954," in Musaddeq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil, ed. James A. Bill and W M. Roger Louis (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1988).

75. Azar Tabari, "The Role of the Clergy in Modern Iranian Politics," in Religion and Politics in Iran, ed. Nikki Keddie (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 59-68.

76. Ibid.

77. For detail on the historical process of formulation of the notion and the role of the Safavid Dynasty in its formulation, see: Juan R. Cole, "Imami Jurisprudence and the Role of the Ulama: Mortaza Ansari on Emulating the Supreme Exemplar," in Religion and Politics in Iran ed. Nikki R. Keddie (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 33-46.

78. For detail, see: Tabari, 47-50.

79. For the power of the Committees (parallel force to the Police) and the Revolutionary Guards Corps (parallel force to the Armed Forces), see: 44.

80. This is because the Islamic judge is only responsible to God and not any temporal law or institution. The following text which is the explanation of an Iranian high clergy about the jurisdiction and power of an Islamic judge (a clergyman) backs this writer's claim.

The Independence of Judiciary

The judiciary branch of the state is completely independent and sovereign in Islam. It is not subject to the executive branch. It is a religious duty incumbent upon every judge to enforce divinely revealed laws. This duty is part of 'Amr-bil Maruf' and 'Nahl an al Mukar'. The judge is actually an agent of God, not of the government and is directly responsible to God. That is why, in his court, no partiality or special privilege may be allowed, not even to the head of state. Divine law must be enforced in its full strength, even against the ruler of the nation (Ayatollah Allama Yaha Noori, Islamic Government and the Revolution in Iran. [Glasgow: Royston Limited, 1985], 43). (this writer's stress)

81. For detail on the power of the clergy in the period beginning from the Safavid Dynasty which reached its peak under the Qajar Dynasty, see: Asaf Hussain, Islamic Iran: Revolution and Counter-Revolution (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), 22-26.

82. Tabari, 49.

83. For detail, see: Ibid., 50-59. For the role of the clergy in the Constitutional Revolution, see: Abdol Karim Lahidji, "In Between the Madrasa and the Marketplace: The Designation of Clerical Leadership in Modern Shi'ism," in Authority and Political Culture in Shi'ism, ed. Said Amir Arjomand (Albany: State University of New York, 1988), 133-158.

84. For detail, see: William Shepard, "Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology," International Journal of Middle East Studies 19 (August 1989): 307-336.

85. For detail on radical Islamism, see: Ibid., 314-317.

86. Ibid., 315.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid., 316.

90. Ibid.

91. For comprehensive explanations of two prominent thinkers on the issue of the modern political system and its differences with the tyrannical system of government, see: Jean Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, with Geneva Manuscript and political Economy, ed. Roger D. Masters, trans. Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978). See also: John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, ed. Thomas P. Peardon (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1985).

92. For detail on the notion of the majority rule, see: T.C. Pocklington, "Democracy," in Liberal Democracy in Canada and the United States: An Introduction to Political Government, ed. T.C. Pocklington (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada Limited, 1985), 3-6.

93. Locke, 84-85.

94. Ibid., 85.

95. Locke, for instance, rejects those types of governments in which the whole power is given either to "a few select men" (oligarchy) or to one man (monarchy). For detail, see: Locke, 73-74.

96. For detail on the notions of constitutionalism and the rule of law, see: F.C. Engelmann and T.C. Pocklington, "Constitutions and Courts," in Liberal Democracy in Canada and the United States: An Introduction to Political Government, ed. T.C. Pocklington (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada

Limited, 1985), 123-150.

97. For detail on the nature of a tyrannical system of government and how this system is to preserve the interests of the tyrant, see: Locke, 112-119.

98. Rousseau, 95-96.

99. Ibid., 62-64.

100. Ibid., 65-67.

101. Ibid., 66.

102. For detail, see: Pocklington, 10-13.

103. For detail, see: Engelmann and Pocklington, 140-141.

104. For detail, see: Ibid., 139-140

105. For detail on the notion of representation, see: J. Paul Johnston, "Representation," in Liberal Democracy in Canada and the United States: An Introduction to Political Government, ed. T.C. Pocklington (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada Limited, 1985), 94-123.

106. Rousseau, 54-65.

107. Ibid., 62-65.

108. This is evident in Article 2 of the IRI Constitution which stipulates:

The Islamic Republic is a system of government based on belief in:

a. the one God (as stated in the Islamic creed "There is no god but God"), His exclusive possession of sovereignty and the right to legislate, and the necessity of submission to His commands;

b. divine revelation and its fundamental role in the expounding of laws;

c. the return to God in the hereafter, and the constructive role of this belief in man's ascending progress toward God;

d. the justice of God in creation and legislation;
(Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1980), 26-27);
(this writer's stress)

109. Article 5 of the IRI Constitution observes:

During the Occultation of the Lord of the Age (may God hasten his renewed manifestation!), the governance and the leadership of the nation devolve upon the just

and pious faqih who is acquainted with the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability; and recognized and accepted as leader by the majority of the people. In the event that no faqih should be so recognized by the majority, the leader, or the Leadership Council, composed of fuqaha possessing the aforementioned qualifications, will assume these responsibilities in accordance with Article 107 (Algar, 29-30). (original italics)

110. See: 103.

111. This is because the IRI Constitution stipulates that all laws and all the articles of the Constitution must be in accordance with the Islamic creeds otherwise they are void. Hence the leader who is a jurisprudent must always consider religious laws as the norm for statecraft. As a result, he may legally override the Constitution whenever he sees this necessary for the preservation of the faith. Article 4 of the IRI Constitution gives this legal authority to the leader as it observes:

All civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle applies absolutely and generally to all articles of the Constitution as well as to all laws and regulations, and the fuqaha on the Council of Guardians have the duty of supervising its implementation (Algar, 29).

It should be pointed out here that "Council of Guardians" is a wrong translation of shouray-e negahban. The correct translation is the Guardian Council which will be used in the main text of this research hereafter.

112. Article 94 of the IRI Constitution legalizes this power as the follows:

All legislation passed by the National Consultative Assembly must be sent to the Council of Guardians. The Council of Guardians must review it within a maximum of ten days from its receipt with a view to ensuring its compatibility with the criteria of Islam and the Constitution. If it finds the legislation not so compatible, it will return it to the Assembly for review. If the Council fails to do the foregoing, legislation passed by the Assembly acquires the force of law (Algar, 61).

113. Article 107 of the Constitution stipulates the clergy qualification of the leader as the following:

Whenever one of the fuqaha possessing the qualifications specified in Article 5 of the

Constitution is recognized and accepted as *marja'* and leader by a decisive majority of the people - as has been the case with the exalted *marja'-i taqlid* and leader of the revolution, Ayatollah al-Uzma Imam Khomeini - he is to exercise governance and all the responsibilities arising therefrom. If such should not be the case, experts elected by the people will review and consult among themselves concerning all persons qualified to act as *marja'* and leader. If they discern outstanding capacity for leadership in a certain *marja'*, they will present him to the people as their leader; if not, they will appoint either three or five *marja'* possessing the necessary qualifications for leadership and present them as members of the Leadership Council (Algar, 66). (original italics)

114. Article 110 of the IRI Constitution specifies the jurisdiction of the leader as follows:

The leadership is to be assigned the following duties and powers:

- a. appointment of the *fugaha* on the Council of Guardians;
- b. appointment of the supreme judicial authority of the country;
- c. supreme command of the armed forces, exercised in the following manner:

- (i) appointment and dismissal of the chief of the general staff;

- (ii) appointment and dismissal of the commander-in-chief of the Corps of Guards of the Islamic Revolution;

- (iii) the formation of a Supreme National Defence Council, composed of the following seven members:

- the President
- the Prime Minister
- the Minister of defence
- the chief of the general staff
- the commander-in-chief of the Corps of Guards of the Islamic Revolution
- two advisers appointed by the leader

- (iv) appointment of the supreme commanders of the three branches of the armed forces, based upon the recommendation of the Supreme National Defence Council;

- (v) the declaration of war and peace, and the mobilization of the armed forces, based on the recommendation of the Supreme National Defence Council;

- d. signing the decree (formalizing the election) of the President of the Republic after his election by the people. The suitability of candidates for the presidency of the Republic, with respect to the

qualification specified in the Constitution, must be confirmed before elections take place by the Council of Guardians, and, in the case of the first term, by the leadership.

e. dismissal of the President of the Republic, with due regard for the interests of the country, after the issue of a judgement by the Supreme Court convicting him of failure to fulfil his legal duties, or a vote of the National Consultative assembly testifying to his political incompetence;

f. pardoning or reducing the sentences of convicts, within the bounds of Islamic criteria, after receiving a recommendation [to that effect] from the Supreme Court (Algar, 67-68).

115. See: Ibid.

116. Khomeini used his prerogative for the dismissal of Banisadr. For detail, see: Zabih, 130-133.

117. Article 111 of the Constitution determines the clergy-dominated Assembly of Experts as the only authorized organ for the dismissal of the leader. Since the conditions under which the leader can be dismissed are vague and the hand-picked members of the Assembly of Experts are so unlikely to have the will and power necessary for such a dismissal, the dismissal of the leader does not seem feasible. Article 111 specifies the conditions for a dismissal as incapability of the leader of "fulfilling the legal duties of leadership or [the leader's sudden loss of] one of the qualifications mentioned in Article 109" (Algar, 69). Article 109 describes the qualifications of the leader as the following:

a. suitability with respect to learning and piety, as required for the functions of mufti and marja';

b. political and social perspicacity, courage, strength, and the necessary administrative abilities for leadership (Ibid., 67). (original italics)

As a result, dissatisfaction of the Iranians with the leader is not a condition for his dismissal.

118. Because of the existence of serious disagreements among the Council of Guardians, the IRI Parliament and the IRI Cabinet over many bills, Khomeini ordered the creation of the Assembly For Determination of the Interests of the System in August 1987. This Assembly consisted of the heads of the three branches of the government, the PM, the General Prosecutor and the clergy members of the Guardian Council. Ahmad Khomeini was appointed as the liaison between the Assembly and Khomeini ("Formation of a New Assembly for Conflict Resolution Among the Leaders of the regime," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 11 February 1988, 1).

The main duty of the Assembly is to function as a mediator when the conflicts between the IRI Parliament and the Guardian

Council cannot be solved. At that time, the decree of the majority of members of the Assembly will be the final settlement (Ibid).

119. Although the Guardian Council consists of six clergymen and six non-clergy jurists, the Constitution gives the final power of decision-making to the clergy members of the Council. The following two articles of the IRI Constitution prove this claim.

Article 91

In order to protect the ordinances of Islam and the Constitution by assuring that legislation passed by the National Consultative Assembly does not conflict with them, a council to be known as the Council of Guardians is to be established with the following composition:

- a. six just *fugaha* [high clergymen who are expert in the religious laws.], conscious of current needs and the issues of the day, to be selected by the leader or the leadership Council; and
- b. six jurists, specializing in different areas of law, to be elected by the National Consultative Assembly from among the Muslim jurists presented to it by the Supreme Judicial Council (Algar, 60). (original italics)

Article 96

The determination of whether legislation passed by the National Consultative Assembly is compatible with the ordinances of Islam depends on a majority vote by the *fugaha* on the Council of Guardians; and the determination that it is compatible with the Constitution requires a majority vote by all members of the Council of Guardians (Ibid., 61). (original italics)

It should be mentioned here that the non-clergy members of the Council are hand-picked by the clergy as the clergy-headed Supreme Judicial Council must present them to Parliament.

120. According to the IRI Constitution, sensitive positions are the monopoly of the clergy. Beside Article 107 which determines that the leader must be a high clergy (see: 104), the following articles demonstrate this point with respect to other positions: Article 72 gives the power to the clergy-dominated Guardian Council the authority to control the legislative by giving it the power to revoke passed laws (see: 105).

Article 157 determines the Supreme Judicial Council as the highest judicial body which according to Article 158 consists of:

- a. the head of the Supreme Court

- b. the Prosecutor-General;
- c. three judges of proven justice and possessing the quality of mujtahid, to be chosen by all the judges of the country (Algar, 85).

Article 162 determines that:

The head of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor-General must be just mujtahid well versed in judicial matters. They will be nominated by the leadership for a period of five years, in consultation with the Supreme Judicial Council (Ibid., 86). (original italics)

As a result, the Constitution guarantees the clergy domination of the judiciary. All other important posts such as the presidency are occupied by clergymen.

121. Iranian women have lost their equal rights with men as the Islamic regime views equality of men and women as a Western notion which is not compatible with Islam. For detail, see: Azar Tabari, "Islam and the Struggle for Emancipation of Iranian Women," in In the Shadows of Islam: The Women's Movement in Iran, ed. Azar Tabari and Nahid Yegane (London: Zed Press, 1982), 14-15.

122. Ibid., 14-15.

123. Ibid., 15.

124. Ibid.

125. The Radio Program of the Muslim Students' Association in the USA and Canada (hereafter News), 25 May 1990.

126. During his stay in Tehran, Mr. Galindopole had a meeting with Dr. Mehrpour (a high-ranking representative of the judiciary) in which the abuse of human rights of political prisoners was discussed. In response to Mr. Galindopole, Dr. Mehrpour emphasized that "the laws of the country have been written based on Islam and the majority of the people support them. He stressed that those laws which are clearly stipulated in the Koran are unchangeable" ("The Text of the Report of the Human Rights Committee Envoy to Tehran," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 15 March 1990, 15).

127. Following the eleven-year attempts of the Islamic regime in restricting personal freedoms of people including their freedom of wearing clothes they want, the Islamic regime announced a new campaign against the people who did not observe Islamic instructions with respect to clothing in May 1990. As a result, government's armed patrols began stopping and or arresting men and women for their appearances. According to the official announcement, violators of the Islamic instructions are men who wear short-sleeved shirts and women who have make-ups; wearing shirts in light colours and fancy sun glasses are also

prohibited. This new harassment of the regime provoked resistance on the part of the people on its first day of its enforcement in Tehran. As a result, clashes took place between people and the government's agents which ended up in the arrest of 20 persons in Tehran, according to the regime's news release. For detail, see: "During a Clash between People and the Pasdaran in Ferdoosi Square, Tens Were Arrested or Wounded," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 17 May 1990, 1,2.

128. Late in April 1990, the Head of the Court of Administrative Justice (a clergy) announced in a religious ceremony that "Anyone who does not obey the Jurisprudent will facilitate his/her death." For detail, see: "Death Penalty for a Person Who Does not Obey the Jurisprudent," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 26 April 1990, 2.

129. The entrenched position of the clergy is reflected in a number of articles of the IRI Constitution. For instance, Article 2 stipulates the role of fugaha by saying:

The Islamic Republic is a system of government based on belief in:

a. the one God (as stated in the Islamic creed "There is no God but God"), His exclusive possession of sovereignty and the right to legislate, and the necessity of submission to His commands;...

which secures equity, justice, political, economic, social, and cultural independence, and national solidarity, by recourse to:

a. continuous *ijtihad* of the *fugaha* possessing the necessary qualifications, exercised on the basis of the Book of God and the Sunna of the Ma'sumin, upon all of whom be peace (Algar, 26-27); (original italics)

130. This arbitrary treatment now is constitutional as Article 167 holds:

The Judge must attempt to find a basis for judgement for every case in the codified laws of the land. If he is unable to do so, he will issue a verdict based on reference to reputable Islamic source or *fetvas* (Algar, 88). (original italics)

Fetva or *Fetwa* is a religious decree issued by a source of imitation on a matter of controversy.

131. For the full text of the Retaliation Law which is attached to the Constitution, see: "The Bill of Retribution," in In the Shadow of Islam, ed. Azar Tabari and Nahid Yeganeh (London: Zed Press, 1982), 94-97.

132. *Ibid.*

133. This is because the Islamic judge is considered to be "an agent of God" and not any government. Since his only concern is the preservation of the divine laws, the judge is impartial. Ayatollah Noori, for example, elaborates on this point. For detail, see: 75.

134. For detail, see: Tabari and Yeganeh, 94-97. Ayatollah Noori justifies these punishments by saying:

One may say that Islamic laws are harsh, even inhuman, and it is not possible to implement them at all. In answer, I would like to pose the counter question: can cutting off the hand, which is the Islamic penalty for theft only if twenty conditions stipulated by law are fulfilled, be considered inhuman while killing many thousands in Vietnam and Korea and maintaining dictators who massacre their own subjects are considered justified in the name of a military pact? A thief in unusual cases when there is no excuse to justify his theft, should be punished. A prison, a school for further criminality, is not the answer. He should be given proper moral training (Noori, 40).

135. Article 4 of the IRI Constitution emphasizes the ultimate task of the regime in protecting the Islamic faith. For detail see: 106

136. This point is expressed in Article 170 which observers:

Judges of courts are obliged to refrain from executing statutes and protocols of the government that are in conflict with the laws or the provisions of Islam, or lie outside the competence of the executive power. Anyone has the right to demand the voiding of any such regulation from the Court of Administrative Justice (Algar, 88).

Another article (Article 61) stresses the preservation of the Islamic conviction in the judiciary as it holds:

The exercise of the judiciary power is by means of course of justice, which are to be formed in accordance with the criteria of Islam and are to examine and settle cases, protect the rights of the public, dispense and enact justice, and establish the divine limits (Ibid., 50).

137. Article 72 of the Constitution confirms this point as it holds:

The National Consultative Assembly cannot enact laws contrary to the principles and ordinances of the official religion of the country or to the Constitution. It is the duty of the Council of Guardians to determine whether a violation has occurred, in accordance with article 96 (Algar, 55).

138. Article 67 embodies this notion clearly as it stipulates:

Members of the Assembly must swear the following oath at the first session of the Assembly and affix their signatures to its text:

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

In the presence of the Glorious Qur'an, I swear by God, the powerful and Almighty, and undertake, relying upon my honour as a human being, to protect the sanctity of Islam and guard the accomplishments of the Islamic Revolution of the Iranian people and the foundations of the Islamic Republic; to protect, as just trustee, the trust bestowed upon me by the people; to observe piety in fulfilling my duties as a member of the assembly (Algar, 53)...

139. For detail, see: Kiddie, Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran, 265. See also: Zabih, 76-79, 84-91.

140. O'Ballance, 65-66, 75-76.

141. Ibid., 130.

142. "The Organization of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Republic Was Dissolved," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 23 October 1986, 1, 14.

143. "Banisadr: the Islamic Republic Party Was dissolved Since Rafsanjani Has Been in Minority," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 18 June 1987, 2.

144. This point will be elaborated on shortly.

145. This point will also be discussed in detail in the same chapter.

146. Ibid., 205.

147. The most famous clergyman of this faction who has been brutally persecuted was late Ayatollah Shariatmadari. Being labelled "liberal" for his support for moderate political organizations and polices, he was forced to stay away from active political participation. Finally, in 1982, the alleged attempt of Gotbzadeh for a coup provided an excuse to arrest Shariatmadari for his collaboration in the coup. Following the arrest, his offices and religious classes were closed and his disciples arrested and executed. The Ayatollah himself was deprived of his religious privileges and put under house arrest although he was suffering from serious health problems and so needed special medical care. He finally died in 1986 since Khomeini had not allowed a doctor to visit him. This treatment of a high clergy was unprecedented in the contemporary history of

Iran as no secular government had ever dared to do what Khomeini did to a "source of imitation" like Ayatollah Shariatmadari. For detail see: "A Look at the Life of Ayatollah Shariatmadari," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 10 April 1986, 16. See also, "The Sin of Shariatmadari," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 10 April 1988, 2.

148. Akhavan, "Clerical Politics in Iran Since 1979", 61-63.

149. For the multi-polar system and lack of single authority within the clergy, see: Eric Hooglund, "Social Origins of the Revolutionary Clergy," in The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic, ed. Nikkie R. Keddie and Eric Hooglund (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 75-76.

150. Ibid., 75.

151. Haleh Afshar, "Khomeini's Teachings and their Implications for Iranian Women," in In the Shadow of Islam: The Women's Movement in Iran, ed. Azar Tabari and Nahid Yeganeh (London: Zed Press, 1982), 76.

152. For detail on the issue of source of imitation (mariaeh taglid), see: Keddie, "Religion, Society, and Revolution in Modern Iran," 21-28.

153. Khums is "paying one-fifth (20 percent of surplus income remaining at the end of the year after fulfilment of essential needs)" and zakat is "paying one-tenth (10 percent) of surplus income after fulfilling the needs". For detail, see: Noori, 52-53.

154. Tabari, "The Role of the Clergy in Modern Iranian Politics," 49.

155. Of course such would not eliminate the anarchy of the clergy organization as the full implementation of velayat-e faqih could not restrict the rights of lower-status clergymen to interpretation of matters as they wish. Through them, sources of imitation could covertly continue their rivalry while accepting the superiority of the leader overtly.

156. "A Look at the Life of Ayatollah Shariatmadari," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 10 April 1986, 16.

157. Ibid.

158. Late in October 1986, the Khomeini regime took advantage of the disclosure of Irangate by Mehdi Hashemi (brother of the son in-law of Montazeri) and launched a massive operation against the supporters of Montazeri. In protest, Montazeri resigned as the successor to Khomeini which was not accepted by Khomeini at that time ("The War of Succession Has Intensified in Iran,"

Kayhan Newspaper [London], 30 October 1986, 16). Among the arrested supporters there were relatives as well as friends of Montazeri. Some of his supporters were charged with kidnapping, espionage, murder, forging passports and government documents and taking advantage of the "Office For Assistance to Islamic Liberation Movements" for their own affairs ("Montazeri Resigned But Khomeini Did Not Accept His Resignation," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 30 October 1986, 1). Later in 1986, a large number of Revolutionary Guards commanders and businessmen, who were famous for their support for Montazeri, was arrested in Montazeri's province of birth, Isfahan ("MP from Isfahan and a Number of Commanders of the Guards Corps Were Arrested," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 13 November 1986, 3). Arrests of hundreds of Montazeri's supporters included two MPs and several commanders of the Revolutionary Guards all over the country ("Nine Commanders of the Guards Corps Escaped," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 18 December 1986, 1; see also: "Molavi, MP from Baluchestan, Confessed to Collaboration with Mehdi Hashemi on the Television," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 22 January 1987, 16).

159. For detail regarding purges of the military personnel, see: Chubin and Tripp, 33-36. See also: Levy and Froelich, 137. See also: Gurdon, 14.

160. For the continuation of repression and torture and summary execution of political prisoners after the acceptance of ceasefire by the IRI, see: "The Unprecedented Report of Amnesty International on the Massacre of Political Prisoners in Iran," Organ, 16 December 1988, 57. For the continuation of the same policy since the death of Khomeini, see: "The Text of the Report of the Special Envoy of the Human Rights Commission to Tehran," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 15 March 1990, 11,15; 22 March 1990, 12, 14; 29 March 1990, 12, 14 and 5 April 1990, 12.

161. "The Communique of the Director of the National Council of Resistance Regarding the Dirty Attempts of Bazargan to Whitewash the Direct Involvement of the Khomeini Government in the Murder of Dr. Sami," 16 December 1988.

162. Ibid.

163. Ibid.

164. During his mission to Tehran, Mr Galindopole, the Special Envoy of the UN Human Rights Commission, requested from the IRI judicial authorities an explanation on the reason for summary execution of 1,300 persons charged with drug-smuggling, as broadcast by the state-run Radio of Islamic Republic. He also expressed his concern about the fate of 900 prisoners who had been sentenced to death for the same charges, according to the published news in "Iran Times", an English organ of the "moderates". For detail, see: "The Text of the Report of the

Special Envoy of the Human Rights Commission to Tehran," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 22 March 1990, 12, 14.

165. Iranian reserves in 1979 were estimated to be more than \$30b since Iraq which did not have the variety of income-generating sources that Iran had, had \$30b in deposit in the same year. See: John Townsend, "Economic and Political Implications of the War: the Economic Consequences for the Participants," in The Iran-Iraq war, ed. M.S. El Azhary (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 54.

166. Iranian annual oil revenue (in US\$m) was:

<u>1977</u>	<u>1878</u>	<u>1979</u>
21,858	22,450	19,290

For detail see: Townsend, 56.

167. The English organ of the "radical" (Kayhan International) confirms the interest of the Islamic regime in receiving foreign financial assistance by saying:

There are no legal impediments in the way of foreign investment in Iran provided the shares of foreign partners do not exceed 49%, Deputy Minister of Economy and Finance Mahdi Navvab said Saturday ("Iran Open to Foreign Investment," Kayhan International, 28 January 1990, 8).

Since the amount of foreign loans (which is preferred to be hidden under the broad category of foreign investment for obvious political considerations) is expected to be substantial, the issue of foreign loans has provoked some opposition on the part of some "moderates" such as the ex-Minister of Commerce, Habibollah Assgharoladi who wrote in a "moderate" organ, Resalat, that:

Another point deserves some attention. If the [country's financial needs] exceed the [state's] present revenue in the Rial and foreign currency, it should not incline our mind towards the easiest way for [compensation] which is foreign or domestic loans (as some have assumed so). On the contrary, the most correct way which is generating revenue in the Rial and foreign currency must be our goal. Although it seems difficult to choose this way, we should take this program seriously ("Habibollah Assgharoladi, "All of Us Should take the Reconstruction Seriously," Resalat, 27 January 1990, 12).

Because of rumours of the Iranian appeal to the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the English organ of the "moderates" (Tehran Times) denied Iranian request for a loan from the World bank by saying:

The daily 'Nihon Keizai Shimbun' in its January 23 issue misquoted Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Hussein Adeli as saying to the Foreign Ministry Director general for Middle East and Africa Mitsuru

Watanabe that Iran intended to receive loans from the World Bank ("Japan Denies World Bank Credit to Iran," Tehran Times, 28 January 1990, 2).

However, the evidence suggests that Iran has applied to the WB and the IMF for financial assistance for building four dams. As a result, an IMF delegation visited Iran early this year in order to analyze the request. The IMF has begun studying the IRI request by assessing the report of its delegation to Iran. The exact detail of the request and the IMF conditions are not clear yet. It seems that Iran has also contacted the WB for financial and technical assistance ("For Building Four Dams, The Islamic Republic will receive Financial and Technical Assistance from the World Bank," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 29 March 1990, 4).

168. In an article in one of the organs of the "moderates", the devastation of the Iranian industries since the Revolution is described as follows:

From 1977 to 1980, the domestic gross production suffered gradual reduction which [dropped the value of the production] from rials 3,742.6b [US\$53.46b] to rials 2,568b [US\$36.68b]. From 1980 to 1984, the domestic gross production increased to the value of rials 3,421.1b [US\$48.87b]. Since 1984, the domestic gross production has had a decreasing trend.....[The gross domestic production] is estimated to be less than rials 3,000b [US\$42.85b] in 1988 (Kamal Athary, "Iranian Economy: Escaping from Constraints," E'telaat: Economic and Political, November-December 1989, 38).

The writer predicts dire results as the deteriorating economy will severely affect the labour market which is growing very fast as a result of a very high rate of population growth, estimated to be 3.9% annually (Ibid., 39). Massive unemployment is especially alarming as there is a dramatic decrease in industrial investment:

...the construction sector received about 80% of the constant investment of the country in 1986 which demonstrates the dependence of the economic life of the country to the construction sector during the recent years. However, the increase in [investment] in the construction sector was not due to the expansion of the activities of the public sector and an increase in development budget), but because of its decrease in investment [in general] and relative stability of the private sector's investment in construction on one hand and reduction in investment of both sectors [public and private] in machinery sector, [on the other hand] (Ibid., 39-46).

The author elaborates on the devastating economic problems. For example, he compares the sharp decrease in investment in vital sectors. Hence the amount of investment in the water and electricity sector in 1986 dropped to one-seventh of the amount invested in 1977 (Ibid., 39). Similarly, the investment in the

mine sector in 1986 reached one-fifth of that in 1977 (Ibid).

The author summarizes the reasons behind the economic chaos as follows:

In this period [1979-1989] beside the decrease in oil extraction, the reason for the reduction in domestic gross production has not been anything but decrease in generation of constant capital. In return, this reduction has stemmed from the war non-productive expenses and damages, reduction in foreign currency revenue, lack of attraction of foreign investment, reduction in development budget and the reluctance of the private sector to investment in industries and mines. Wrong economic policies should be added to these factors (Ibid., 38-39).

169. According to published statistics of the Ministry of Labour in 1985, out of 1,823,929 industrial units in the urban areas, 464,742 units were closed ("About One Third of the Urban Workshops Were Closed in 1985," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 2 April 1987, 8). In the war period, as a result of allocating limited available currency to military factories, the work hours of certain industries were reduced drastically. For instance, most of the textile factories were working with less than 50% of their productive capacity. In Isfahan province about four fifths of the textile factories reduced their production to the minimum; textile industries of Yazd, Azerbaijan and Tehran provinces were closed or forced to produce part time ("Several Productive Factories and Industrial Workshops Have Been Closed," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 19 May 1988, 4). The impact of a sharp reduction in the quota of hard currency allocated to industries other than the military was devastating since about 53% of industrial products in 1987 were somehow dependent on imported raw material, spare parts and machinery ("The Productive Power of the Agriculture Has Been Severely Reduced," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 23 June 1988, 1).

Since the financial problems of the IRI became even worse in 1986-88 because of the war and have continued since then, it is believed that the number of closed units has increased.

170. According to statistics, Iran imported 37,000 tons of meat in 1973 whereas it imported 225,000 tons in 1984 (Dr. Mohammad Satari, "Meat Famine," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 9 October 1986, 8). Since the imported meat increased by 600 percent while the population growth increased by 40%, from 35 m to 49m (Athary, 43), in the same period, and providing the formation of the IRI did not bring up the standard of living of the population at large, the drastic increase in the imported meat could be a strong indicator of deterioration of the livestock industry.

171. According to statistics provided in the publication of the Planning and Budget Organization, the annual rate of growth of major agricultural items were either negative or lower than the

annual population growth rate in the period of 1979 to 1987. Providing the birth rate was 3.9 in the period 1979 to 1987, the following table shows the depth of the problem:

Table No. 1- Changes in the production of major agricultural products in the period 1979-87

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kind of product	average growth rate per annum
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wheat	3.1
oat	10.3
rice	5.4
sugar beat	2.1
cotton	0.8
oil seeds	-2.4
provender	5.5
red meat	2.6
white meat	4.3
eggs	-1.0
milk	3.2

The rate of growth in production of products such as wheat, sugar beat, cotton, red meat and milk were lower than the rate of population growth in the past years. The rate of growth in production of oil seeds and eggs were negative (The Planning and Budget Organization, The Bill of the First Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan of the Islamic Republic of Iran [Tehran: The Planning and Budget Organization, 1989], quoted in Mogtadelnam Ravanbakhsh, "The Agricultural Industries and Their Role in Development," Ettelaat: Political-Economic, November-December 1989, 55).

The depth of agriculture bankruptcy is reflected in statistics of the US Department of Agriculture. These suggest that Iran spends US\$2.5b to 3b on importing foodstuffs which accounted for 35-40% of its needs for wheat, rice, sugar and sugar cubes, oil seeds, different kinds of meat, eggs and dairy products ("About 40% of the Required Iranian Foodstuffs Are Imported," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 28 May 1987, 8).

172. For instance only 120,000 acres of grain-cultivating land in the Syestan and Baluchistan Province has become useless due to the negligence of the authorities to decrease the percentage of its salt through development of irrigation networks ("One Hundred and Twenty Thousand Acres of Cultivating Lands of Syestan Is Deteriorating," Resalat, 27 January 1990, 5).

In comparison, land under cultivation of cotton in the northern part of Iran in 1986 was less than 10% of the area in 1979 (Dr. Mohammad Satari, "The Sad Story of the White Gold," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 3 July 1986, 8).

173. Whereas Iran was not only self-sufficient in cotton production but exported 163,000 tons of cotton in 1978, it has had to import cotton ever since. Iran imported 10,692 tons of cotton in 1981, for instance (Dr. Mohammad. Satari, "The Sad Story of the White Gold," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 3 July 1986, 8).

174. The Iranian Statistics Centre published the following statistics in 1989. Out of 13,000,000 eligible applicants in 1986, only 10,000,000 pupils in the age group of 5-14 years old entered primary and intermediary schools. In the same year, out of 5,249,417 students in the age group of 15-19 years old, only 1,076,762 studied at high schools ("The Educational System of the Country: Chaotic, Incapable and Underdeveloped," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 21 September 1989, 5).

175. "Universities Are Short of 6,000 Professors," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 29 January 1987, 15.

Due to the continuation of the emigration of university faculties, a number of measures has been implemented to keep the remaining professors. The following shows the disappointing situation and a proposed measure to cope with the problem.

In the meeting of the country's presidents of universities, the Minister of Culture and Higher Education demanded Parliament to pass the bill regarding the increase in the salary of professors and researchers and full-time status plan of university faculties as soon as possible. This means that the salaries of professors will be increased from the present rock bottom level to an acceptable level. If university professors who should be at the top of [the hierarchy of] experts face this situation, God helps other experts of the country whom are supposed to be trained by these professors. In this country, the expert does not even enjoy material benefits; forget about his intellectual and social respect ("Salary of University Professors," Aeyneh (Mirror), 27 January 1990, 2).

176. "The People Have Paid for the Anti-Doctors Policy of the Government," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 9 February 1989, 5.

CHAPTER II
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POST-KHOMEINI ERA
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The death of Khomeini initiated a new phase in the Islamic Revolution. What makes this period distinct from the previous one is the absence of a powerful leader who could keep the pieces of the fragile system together. Because of his role in the creation of the system, Khomeini was able to sustain a minimum degree of support among the lower-status urban population which was necessary for the continuation of the Islamic government. This crucial factor added to his system-legitimizing role, as the founder of the regime, and enabled him to keep the rival, and in cases hostile, factions whose legitimacy depended on Khomeini's blessing, together. This was achieved by maintenance of "impartiality" in the conflict of the contending factions over economic, political and social issues, although Khomeini himself was not neutral. Because of this, Khomeini was able to maintain equilibrium among rival factions by tilting or threatening to tilt to one faction in its dispute with another. This balancing policy enabled Khomeini to preserve a degree of consensus among the elite. The imposed consensus empowered the system to function more or less within a specific political framework.

The main characteristic of the post-Khomeini period is the absence of a charismatic leader. Because of his charisma, Khomeini was able to run the system, maintain a degree of popular support and keep rival factions together. The consequence was the continuation of the system despite the overall incompetence of the IRI elite. Even though Khomeini

officially presides over the leadership position, it is doubtful if he can fully replace Khomeini. At the time when the regime faces serious economic, political and social problems, Khamenei does not have the charisma to continue the function of the absent charismatic leader.

Before elaborating on the matter, a short review of the literature on charismatic leadership seems necessary. Max Weber defined charisma as:

certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader.¹

Weber therefore described a charismatic authority as a person who possesses a character which is different from every day routine structures.² This is not an exclusive definition since other scholars offer different definitions.³ What is in common in all these definitions is the emphasis on the personal capabilities of an individual which make him/her a charismatic leader. Hence a charismatic leader derives his/her charisma from his own record and character.⁴

Charismatic leaders usually enter the political arena in a crisis situation. In this case, these leaders appear to "save society from great distress".⁵ They may also emerge in a non-crisis situation when a society is ripe for certain changes, desired by the charismatic leader.⁶ In contrast to Weber's thesis that charismatic authority leads to routinization⁷, some

scholars suggest that charismatic leaders may also emerge from routinization. In this case, the office may make the leader.*

Charismatic leaders are actors who emerge in a specific period of time. During that period, these leaders have the charisma to the extent that: "they are able to inspire their followers with unshakable confidence in their ability to lead."⁹ Thus charisma is based on a relationship between the leader and his followers which is identified with a strong personal devotion of the followers to the charismatic leader. According to Weber, the main characteristic of this devotion is the followers' "psychological readiness to obey".¹⁰ What is crucial here is the source of charisma of charismatic leaders which "lies in their own personalities".¹¹ These leaders have a sense of mission for their missions' fulfilment; they demand obedience of their followers.¹²

The right of a charismatic leader to rule stems from the recognition of the leader's extraordinary qualities by the followers. These "God-like qualities" are either "imputed to him by followers in the heat of social change or bestowed on him through ascension to a charismatic office."¹³ Charisma is neither hereditary nor can be delegated. It must reside in an individual because of his/her personal extraordinary capabilities.

Hence the process of assuming power itself determines whether or not a leader has charisma. The charismatic authority is revolutionary which implies either his/her ascension to power

through a radical social change or his/her acquisition of a position which is meant to revolutionize the society. Hence charismatic domination means:

a rejection of all ties to any external order in favour of the exclusive glorification ... of the prophet and hero. Hence its attitude is revolutionary and transvalues everything; it makes a sovereign break with all traditional and rational norms...¹⁴

Charismatic leaders have certain characteristics. By and large, these are their "extraordinary expressiveness, self-confidence, self-determination, and freedom from internal conflict."¹⁵ Additionally, an important characteristic is their instability. As a revolutionary force, the charismatic leader aims at bridging the transition from one existing order to another one.¹⁶ Therefore, the role of such a leader is to create a new political system. Once this mission is accomplished, "charisma fades or ...[is] routinized".¹⁷ In the place of a personalized authority,:

[r]ules, traditions, and institutions grow up to stabilize and guide the new social arrangements and to replace the charismatic leader who either has departed through death or other circumstances or has given in to rule by tradition or bureaucracy.¹⁸

Hence the charismatic leader is unstable and transitory. What determines the longevity of this transitory period is the success or failure of a charismatic leader. If such a leader faces challenges or cannot accomplish what he has promised, the transitional period will be short as his/her failure discredits the divinity of his mission.¹⁹ Conversely, a charismatic leader will stay in power for a long time should his plans come true.²⁰

At the end, there are only two scenarios for a charismatic leader: disappearance or routinization. The first scenario is the fate of a leader whose mission has failed. The second takes place when a new political system has been successfully institutionalized.²¹

* *

The death of Khomeini removed the charismatic leader from the scene. What made Khomeini a charismatic leader for a large portion of the people was a number of factors which differentiated him from other IRI leader. Firstly, Khomeini entered the political scene at the time of crisis. While the Iranian Monarchy was unable to satisfy the demands of its people, Khomeini presented an alternative system of government which would allegedly meet the demands of the Iranians. He, therefore, emerged as the only leader who had the remedy for the prevailing problems.

Secondly, Khomeini's persistence in the termination of the Monarchy and the establishment of an Islamic Republic gave him a distinct character. While the secular radical groups were scattered and organizationally weak, Khomeini seemed as the sole powerful revolutionary leader. This became especially significant since the nationalist infamous leaders were not popular because of their compromising policy towards the Monarchy. The subsequent implicit or explicit acceptance of the leadership of Khomeini by the opposition groups (due to their weakness) reinforced the validity of this view among the

population that Khomeini emerged to save the country from tyranny and oppression and had the ability to unite all forces for that cause.

Thirdly, the process by which the Revolution succeeded increased the mystical character of Khomeini. In the eyes of some, Khomeini's promises for the Revolution's success made him a religious hero. What made that legend more convincing for certain underprivileged populations was Khomeini's insistence on demonstrations and strikes as the main means for the overthrow of the Monarchy. While the radical non-secular groups offered armed struggle as the only way for the overthrow of the Shah's regime, the establishment of the IRI without a civil war provided some ground for the inhuman and divine nature of Khomeini, who promised the victory of Islam over the militarily strong regime. The fact that certain compromise paved the way for a more or less peaceful transition of power was hidden from the majority.

Fourthly, Khomeini appeared as the leader of the movement which brought to an end 2,500 years of monarchy in Iran. No matter if the topple of the Shah was the consequence of the joint efforts of other religious and non-religious leaders, and regardless of the fact that certain powerful countries facilitated the collapse of the Monarchy, Khomeini gained an outstanding credit for the overthrow of the Shah's regime. Khomeini's overthrow of a 2,500-year old institution with "empty hands" gave him a legendary reputation among the poor.

Fifthly, Khomeini acquired a reputation for creating a revolutionary system of government. Khomeini's complete disapproval of the entire inherited political, economic and social systems and his determination in their destruction contributed to his special nature. This destruction of the old system was the consequence of his belief in having a divine mission to establish an Islamic system. On one hand, Khomeini's destruction of the old system satisfied the resentment of the oppressed strata which saw the Imperial government as the cause of their unfortunate status. On the other hand, his attempts to create a new political system which allegedly derived its legitimacy from God created an exceptional capability for Khomeini. This capability seemed even more unique as Khomeini's proposed model claimed to present an alternative to two known models: capitalist and communist models.

Sixthly, Khomeini's strong sense of mission made him distinct from other leaders. He viewed himself as the messiah of the twentieth century who had a mission to free the world from oppression. The oppressors were basically the West and the East under the leadership of the USA and the USSR respectively, however, the emphasis was on the USA.²² He also viewed all the governments of other countries as lackeys of the superpowers. Hence all should be overthrown. This view is clearly evident in Khomeini's book "Islamic Government" which was published prior to the Revolution.²³

Seventhly, the worldwide scope of the Islamic Revolution further contributed to the particularity of the Khomeini leadership. This global scope, which was shared by the elite, became evident in the conduct of IRI foreign policy. The most important element of this global view was his belief that the Islamic Revolution of Iran was only the starting point for further expansion of Islamic revolution into all Muslim countries and especially the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. Thus, Khomeini's pursuit of the policy of exporting revolution offered him a claim to the leadership of the Muslim world.²⁴

Another element of this global view was the principle of permanent revolution. The maintenance of a "revolutionary mood" in Iran could cover the inabilities of the Revolution in meeting the promises and satisfying the expectations and basic demands of the Iranians.²⁵ The preservation of revolutionary fervour in Iran could also stimulate revolution in other Muslim countries which in turn could guarantee the continuation of the IRI through establishment of friendly states.

Aversion to negotiation as a means of foreign policy was another component of the global view. Because the Khomeini system was a revolutionary and so hostile to existing notions and institutions, it should not accept the means in foreign policy which non-revolutionary countries adhere to. Therefore, negotiation with other countries to reduce tension was rejected since it was a sign of deviation from the revolutionary spirit and integration into the counterrevolutionary world order.²⁶

Disdain for all the international rules, regulations and organizations was another characteristic of the policy. This was due to three reasons. Firstly, Khomeini's anti-superpower attitude was incompatible with the acceptance of the norms, rules and organizations which had been initiated, established, supported or dominated by major powers in general and the superpowers in particular. Secondly, Khomeini viewed a revolutionary state as a state against all the formerly created institutions. Thirdly, the outdated nature of the Islamic system was in contrast to the realities of the twentieth century, economically, socially and politically. Acceptance of commonly respected international rules and organizations was equal to the denial of the very existence of the IRI.²⁷

Hence these characteristics were components of Khomeini's charisma. Due to his hostility to the international system and the old Imperial state apparatus in Iran and his call upon the "oppressed" to rise up and fight, Khomeini was successful in attracting a significant percentage of the Iranian urban poor. Because of their low standard of living, this group appreciated the message of Khomeini which promised a higher status for the "oppressed". For these people in particular, Khomeini seemed as the promised divine saviour who came to save the country and the world from oppression. Khomeini's emergence as the self-made leader of the entire nation, "independent" from any social group and political organization further contributed to the extraordinary nature of his character.

Nevertheless, that charisma did not remain strong for very long, for several reasons. Firstly, the resistance of a significant percentage of the population to his Islamic regime and the regime's use of coercive measures to preserve itself shattered the myth of the popularity of the leader among the majority. This also undermined the "divine" nature of the IRI and its leader and revealed their temporal nature which made them vulnerable to the opposition.

Secondly, the purge of leading IRI figures further disillusioned the population about the nature of the system and its leader. As Khomeini supported these figures before their removal, their dismissal for alleged charges (such as collaboration with foreign countries) drastically damaged the credibility of the leader. He was no longer a wise, prudent and perfect leader inspired with divinity.

Thirdly, Khomeini's brutal suppression of the opposing high clergy drastically reduced the sacredness of the clergy in general. In return, this decreased the holiness of Khomeini as a clergyman.

Fourthly, the failure of Khomeini to create a just and egalitarian regime sharply decreased the initial attractiveness of his message. The ever-increasing repression, inflation, unemployment and the incompetence of the regime in overcoming these problems and Iran's international isolation caused further disillusionment.

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
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STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 1010a
(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)

Finally, Khomeini's acceptance of the ceasefire had a devastating impact on his credibility. After eight years of war whose main goal was the overthrow of the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein according to Khomeini, not only did the IRI fail to stimulate Islamic revolution in the region, it was unable to push Iraqi forces back from its territory. A defeated Imam who accepted the ceasefire and resorted to the UN (which had been formerly criticized for its bias towards the global powers) for mediation could not remain a powerful charismatic leader.

Hence Khomeini had died as a strong charismatic leader prior to his actual death. This collapse of his authority became evident by the criticism of some relatively low-ranking clergyman on his fetwa on music and chess.^{2*} This showed his diminishing credibility among the elite. Logically, he would probably have lost his total charisma had he lived longer. The IRI's present outstanding problems would have further shattered his magical power.

* *

Khamenei assumed the leadership when the leadership institution had already lost its sacredness. The enormous number of social, political, economic and military problems on one hand and fierce factional rivalry, on the other, had weakened the momentum of the Revolution. Decrease in the prestige and credibility of the Revolution had reduced those of all its components including its leadership.

Unlike Khomeini, Khamenei assumed the leadership when he was deprived of charisma through the assumption of power. He was neither the leader of a strong revolutionary movement with an impressive agenda for the emancipation of the human being nor could the leadership institution compensate for his lack of charisma because it had already lost its prestige. By the same token, the troubled Islamic regime was unable to offer him credibility and prestige as the Revolution had failed to translate itself into an established and stable polity.

In contrast to Khomeini who achieved leadership himself, Khamenei has been given the title through compromise. This compromise, which will be discussed later, shatters the independence of the Khamenei leadership, in contrast to that of Khomeini. Being the selected leader, gives him very low status and makes him very vulnerable to any attempt on the part of dissatisfied factions whenever they decide to undermine the compromise.

Unlike Khomeini, Khamenei entered the scene while he could not fascinate people by calling for the destruction of the old system. An appeal for a revolutionary change was not possible as he inherited the Khomeini-built Islamic system. Hence he initiated his leadership not as a revolutionary, but as a conservative protector of the status-quo. His source of legitimacy was the IRI Constitution, not his personal acquisition of the post. Khamenei was there to continue the already defeated system.

Other factors hindered Khamenei's development of charisma. The founder of the IRI who had enthusiastically destroyed the old system failed to establish a new, stable and strong political system before his death. Once the promised alternative to capitalism and communism proved illusory, the validity of its guiding ideology was undoubtedly questionable. In the place of the initial Khomeini reference to his own personality to achieve the consensus of the Iranians for the continuation of the regime, now, the regime had to resort to its state machinery and coercive means to secure the obedience of the population.

In such a situation, no member of the elite could hope to lay claim to the same charisma that Khomeini possessed initially. By the virtue of his membership in the elite, any individual had to preserve the principles of the system whose results have been devastating. Any attempt for a substantial change with a possible disruption of the elite's prosperity, which could have generated popularity for an individual, was doomed to fail. Regardless of his personality, any individual needed the support of the elite at the time when the popular support of the regime was decreasing. Hence the prestige, authority and popularity of Khamenei were bound to be far less than those of Khomeini in 1979. Khamenei initiated his leadership under these circumstances.

* *

Despite the rhetoric, the ascension of Khamenei to the leadership has only filled the leadership gap in theory.

Khamenei has not and will not be able to perform the vital function of Khomeini because he simply lacks characteristics which gave Khomeini charismatic authority to run the system. As mentioned earlier, a number of general factors prevents the rise of a charismatic leader from within the system. In addition to these factors, the specific nature of the Islamic government, which deliberately prevented the rise of powerful and "popular" future leaders, as well as the personal incompetence of Khamenei are factors which eliminate the rise of Khamenei as a charismatic leader.

As the system was (and still is) based on (velayat-e faqih), the entire institution was established and expanded around the allegedly unique character of Khomeini. Therefore, one specific clergyman, Khomeini, and not the institution of the clerical leadership, was given legitimacy and power. To keep the legend alive, the power of Khomeini was legally unchallengeable as he was not accountable to any authority while he could override any decision, overrule any law and undermine the authority of any elected politician, including the President.²⁹ Hence lawlessness was institutionalized.

While being a necessary institution for running a despotic theocracy, this extraordinary leadership was the first and last source of legitimacy for all the components of the regime prior to Khomeini's death. Blessing, sanction and approval of Khomeini became indispensable for the creation, continuation and function of any institution or the "public" acceptance of the elite.³⁰ To

that end, everyone else and anything else had to be sacrificed for the divine leader: Khomeini. According to the ideology of the regime, there was only one competent person to run the system; the rest were his obedient disciples. In reality, the personality of Khomeini was the only source of legitimacy for the Islamic Republic as the disastrous record of the system left no other source of legitimacy.²¹

In addition, elite-purging has also contributed to the illegitimacy of the survivor elite.²² These purges have been carried out under the pretext of the victims' deviation from the "Imam Line" and that the Imam deposed them at his discretion. On one hand, such actions further strengthened the idea of indispensability and non-replaceable charisma of Khomeini which let the system survive the purges. On the other hand, such propaganda and reckless purges of extremely high officials (both clergy and non-clergy) have substantiated the belief that no one is trustworthy no matter how competent and how close to Khomeini he appeared. Again, the entire elite was reduced to one person: Khomeini.

In reality, Khomeini was the most significant figure. Not only was it due to his leadership title, but also to the fact that only because of him the Islamic elite came to power and might preserve their positions so long as the legitimacy of Khomeini compensated the fading legitimacy of the IRI and kept the outdated system on its feet. Only Khomeini could claim to that type of legitimacy since the movement which overthrew the

Shah has been, rightly or wrongly, attributed to the personal sacred leadership of Khomeini. That is why, in practice among other factors, it was this legend that hampered the creation of a united opposition in the first few months after the collapse of the Shah's regime and let Khomeini keep even dissatisfied people around him; otherwise the consolidation of his medieval system was not possible.³³

In addition, the personal incompetence of Khamenei prevents him from assuming fully the vacant leadership position. Firstly, as an eminent politician, his political record began after the overthrow of the Shah. This implies that Khamenei cannot build on his significant role in the collapse of the previous system which provided an undeniable degree of legitimacy for Khomeini. What he can refer to as his own outstanding record is his assumption of different positions in the Islamic era. Serving at the highest level of authority has created a black record for Khamenei because eleven years of the clergy role has brought only poverty, repression, war, ill-fame and isolation for Iran. Such a record has disillusioned the population at large about the real nature of the entire elite in general and those like Khamenei and Rafsanjani who have been the most visible and powerful politicians in particular.³⁴

In contrast to this writer's view, certain scholars underestimate the importance of these factors for the disenchantment of the Iranians with the regime. They argue that the emergence of the Islamic regime was a response of the people

to the total failure and shortcomings of the Western models of government. Following the logic, social and economic hardships cannot decisively weaken the support of the Iranians for the IRI because it represents their resentment to the Western models of government.³⁵

This view fails to stand the test of reality, for two reasons. Firstly, it is based on an assumption for which no strong evidence exists. As discussed in Chapter I, the objective of the Revolution was not the formation of a theocracy. On the contrary, the demands of the Iranians could have been fully materialized in the form of a Western type of government: the liberal democracy.³⁶ At that time, two factors helped Khomeini to seize the leadership. The first factor was the conclusion of a compromise at the leadership level which paved the way for the foundation of the IRI.³⁷ The second factor was the organizational weakness and fragmentation of the opposition. Under such a situation, the entrance of Khomeini (who had access to the nationwide network of the clergy) into the political scene offered him an extraordinary opportunity to become the leader. Khomeini was the only man in the right place, at the right time.

Secondly, IRI history discredits the validity of this view because the establishment of the IRI has not been cherished by the majority of the people. In its first year, the IRI provoked resistance of minorities in Kurdistan, Baluchistan, Turkamansahra and Khuzestan.³⁸ These movements were followed by a massive anti-Khomeini uprising in Azerbaijan under the leadership

of a moderate party which enjoyed the sanction of the late Ayatollah Shariatmadari.³⁹ In the same year, the regime's repressive measures faced the immediate opposition of women who opposed the compulsory veil⁴⁰, middle class who opposed censorship and closure of democratic newspapers⁴¹, and workers and the left who showed their strength in May First demonstration in Tehran as well as continued strikes.⁴²

In subsequent years, several events illustrated the break up of the Iranians with the Islamic Revolution. The rapid increase in the popularity of Banisadr, who was seeking a rational system of government, proved the alienation of ordinary people with the regime.⁴³ The Mojahedin's initiation of the armed struggle in 1981 illustrated the frustration of a significant portion of the population with the Khomeini regime, despite their own strong religious belief.⁴⁴ The IRI's resort to repression and massive suppression of its opponents have witnessed the elites' appreciation of their own fragility. Finally, the emigration of about 3,000,000 Iranians signifies the existence of a difficult situation in the country.⁴⁵

The participation of different social strata in anti-government activities have demonstrated the unpopularity of the Islamic regime among the Iranians. However, this does not mean the absolute isolation of the regime. A small percentage still supports the regime for a variety of reasons ranging from religious belief to opportunism. Thus, the ability of the regime in sponsoring some-hundred thousand strong demonstrations

in Tehran with 8,000,000 dwellers is not a decisive indicator of its popularity in spite of economic difficulties. No unpopular government can fail to mobilize a small percentage of the population around itself.

In addition to other personal factors, Khamenei lacks that essential positive reputation for consolidating the shaky system in contrast to Khomeini who possessed it when he seized power. What makes this negative point even worse is the fact that Khamenei and other present IRI leaders have been introduced to the Iranians as docile followers of the Imam who have always carried out the Khomeini decrees. This has reduced them to appendages of the Khomeini government. As successor to a charismatic leader who claims to the same charisma, Khamenei needs to refer to a strong political record which derives its strength from his own special personal capabilities in order to impress his followers. In the absence of such, the leadership of Khamenei lacks its fundamental pillar.

Factors such as age and low religious status also weaken the authority of Khamenei. Being in his late forties undermines his claim to religious leadership since now he must acquire the loyalty of high clergy who are not only much older than him but have higher religious positions. His original religious title, "Hojatolislam", designated him a very low religious authority. Yet this overnight promotion to Ayatollah has only caused anger among the high clergy.

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The appointment of Khamenei as the leader was a part of a compromise among the IRI founding factions.⁴⁶ Accordingly, the essential interests of each faction was accommodated by dividing power among the rivals. Hence in the absence of Khomeini an uncontrollable and dangerous scramble for power, which could have endangered the existence of the system, was avoided. Each faction received a share of power in return for support of other factions' claim to their shares. Thus, the system could safely pass the very sensitive period of transition from the Khomeini era to the new era without fearing the opposition's taking advantage of the rivalry among the contending factions.

The quick appointment of Khamenei demonstrated the realization of the sensitivity of the situation by the majority of the elite. Since the death of Khomeini could have provoked anti-government activities, the Revolutionary Guards (RGs) controlled vital areas of Tehran, Qum, Isfahan and Tabriz.⁴⁷ According to the official announcement, Khomeini died on 3 June 1989 and Khamenei was appointed to the position by the Experts Assembly the day after.⁴⁸ It is very likely that the general consensus over his leadership had been achieved prior to the death of Khomeini. Nevertheless, one third of the members of the Expert Assembly voted against him.⁴⁹ This indicated that his leadership could not be taken as seriously as that of Khomeini.

Khamenei could not have been the successor to Khomeini had the obstacles not been removed by the elite. The IRI Constitution stipulates that the leader must be the superior source of

imitation; otherwise a council of sources of imitation must be formed.⁵⁰ Since Khamenei did not meet the condition, a day before the death of Khomeini the Chairman of the Council for Revision of the Islamic Constitution announced the omission of that condition.⁵¹ Moreover, as the low religious title of Khamenei was not compatible with his new position, the Expert Assembly granted him the title of Ayatollah on 5 June.⁵²

In order to stifle any possible overt demonstration of opposition by dissatisfied factions, cooperation among leaders of the major factions was shown in different ways. Firstly, the news on the death of Khomeini was released in an official announcement signed by Khamenei (President), Rafsanjani (Speaker of Parliament), Moussavi (Prime Minister) and Moussavi-Ardebilily (Head of the Supreme Judicial Council).⁵³ Secondly, Rafsanjani deliberately rejected Western propaganda on his immediate takeover of the system by defending the leadership of Khamenei. Hence he dedicated the first Friday Prayer after the appointment to the issue of Khamenei's competence and why the political and economic knowledge of the leader compensated for his lower religious position.⁵⁴

Yet the Khamenei leadership has been challenged by different forces. Certain leaders of the so-called radical faction postponed their approval of the appointment for several days. While the media broadcasting the messages of solidarity of insignificant local authorities, Hojatolislam Karoubi (then Deputy Speaker of Parliament), Hojatolislam Moussavi-Khoeiniha

(Revolutionary Prosecutor) and Hojatolislam Mohtashemi (then Minister of Interior) delayed the announcement of their solidarity until 8 June.⁵⁶ Powerful elite groups such as the Hojatieh Society and the Velayatis (ultra right and for free enterprise religious factions) have as yet refused to announce their solidarity.⁵⁶ Nor have the major sources of imitation such as Golpaigani and Najafi-Marashi announced their approval.⁵⁷ Interestingly, even Ayatollah Araky (who has been supported as the highest source of imitation by the regime) accepted Khamenei as the leader while he disdained Khamenei by referring to him as Hojatolislam and not Ayatollah Khamenei".⁵⁸

In addition, there has been more severe and organized opposition to Khamenei. Firstly, certain influential groups like the Society of the Theology Teachers of Qum have refused to recognize Khamenei as the most knowledgeable source of imitation by nominating Ayatollah Golpayghani instead.⁵⁹ One of their most famous figures is Ayatollah Azari-Qumi who is the editor of the pro-free enterprise Resalat newspaper and member of the Expert Assembly.⁶⁰ Yet the most significant opposition appeared when 180 MPs opposed the law passed by the Council for Revision of the Constitution with respect to granting the leader the power of dissolution of Parliament.⁶¹

Perhaps the most powerful opponent has been Ayatollah Montazeri. Being forced to live in isolation as a result of his involvement in the disclosure of Irangate, Montazeri has reemerged as the death of Khomeini has seriously weakened the

ability of the regime to stop him. After a long period of silence, articles are being published in certain weekly publications such as "Rah-e Mojahed" in which Montazeri is introduced as the only competent clergy after Khomeini.⁶² It is of significant importance since he has refused to recognize the Khamenei leadership.⁶³ On one occasion, his refusal led to clashes between his supporters and the government agents in Isfahan three days after Khomeini's death.⁶⁴ The angry government agents disrupted his mourning ceremony for Khomeini in Qum on 9 June 1989 because of Montazeri's opposition to Khamenei's succession.⁶⁵

The Montazeri speeches on the incompetence of Khamenei, Rafsanjani and the inability of the government to run the country, led to a government-sponsored demonstration against him in Qum early in January.⁶⁶ That which especially irritates the regime is Montazeri's reasons for disqualifying Khamenei. These are the Khamenei's very poor religious degree and knowledge and rumours of his youthful homosexual affairs in the city of Mashad. The latter accusation, in particular, led to the temporary arrest of Montazeri.⁶⁷

The organized opposition also encompasses moderate secular opposition groups. Among them, the Liberation Movement⁶⁸ and the Society for Defence of Freedom and National Sovereignty⁶⁹ (both including the survivors of the Provisional Government) have demanded the abolition of velayat-e faqih altogether. However, their threat to the system is minor since they do not enjoy

strong popular support, and all they demand is to have legal political activities within the framework of the system.

* *

As a part of the succession deal, the way for the Rafsanjani presidency was paved too. Firstly, the Presidential election was rescheduled three weeks earlier lest the opposition take advantage of the power vacuum and destabilize the system.⁷⁰ Secondly, the competency of 78 candidates was rejected by the Guardian Council and as a result only two candidates remained, Rafsanjani and Shibani; the latter announced himself that his running was just symbolic.⁷¹ Thirdly, Khamenei clearly supported Rafsanjani.⁷² This approval guaranteed the likely outcome since it signalled to Khamenei agents that Rafsanjani should emerge from the balloting as president.⁷³

Finally, the presidential election also included approval of certain revised articles of the Constitution.⁷⁴ These issues included the elimination of the prime ministership and the transfer of power to the President who is now responsible to both parliament and the leader. The President has also the power to create the Supreme Security Council when necessary. Finally, the leader, while keeping all the power, does not have to be a source of imitation.

These arrangements do not reflect an intentional plan of the elite in the reduction of the spiritual role of the leader. This could not have been the aim of the elite for three reasons. Firstly, any intentional effort to reduce the religious aspect of

the IRI would weaken the regime altogether as it is the *raison d'etre* of the Islamic system. A political system whose constitution describes it as the government of God and the preserver of the Koranic laws cannot wilfully seek dilution of its religious and spiritual character; that would only question the very existence of the regime.

Secondly, the practice of the elite revealed its intention to keep the spiritual importance of the leader. The main point of the compromise which led to the selection of Khamenei as the leader was to rapidly fill the vacant position of the leadership which derived (and still derives) its legitimacy from strong religious prejudices. As discussed in Chapter I, the principal assumption of velayat-e faqih is the exclusive qualification of the clergy as the representatives of God and which reflects itself in the extraordinary and divine leadership of a high clergy. The appointment of Khamenei to that position showed the continuation of that belief.

Thirdly, the preservation of the spiritual aspect of the leadership was crucial for another reason. The elite was afraid of the eruption of mass protests when the vacant position of the leadership could equal the absence of any strong leadership and so the weakness of the system. In order to preserve the spiritual and mystical aspects of the regime, there was a need for a leader to demonstrate the continuity of the system; despite the death of Khomeini the leadership can be taken up by another.

Nevertheless, some actions seem to be indicators of an important change in the spiritual significance of the IRI. One was the appointment of Khamenei who was not a source of imitation and so necessitated the modification of the Constitution. Yet this had two reasons. One was the fact that there was no qualified source of imitation for that position. Being a source of imitation was stipulated in the Constitution since it was designed for Khomeini who was a source of imitation. Therefore, the Constitution adapted itself to what the leader was. Moreover, the reactionary faction of the clergy was confident in having its own alternative source of imitation to replace Khomeini. At that time, Ayatollah Montazeri was reliable, and so, became the official successor to Khomeini. Yet the factional rivalry led to his removal prior to the death of Khomeini.

The only remaining sources of imitation in Iran were moderate Ayatollahs Golpaigani and Najafi-Marashi whose political and religious beliefs were in sharp conflict with those of the ruling clergy.⁷⁵ Hence there was no eligible source of imitation to assume the leadership role. That is why the only reliable and influential clergyman who enjoyed the support of the elite was Khamenei who was not a source of imitation. In order to compensate this deficiency, Khamenei became an Ayatollah almost over night. This title can potentially provide a suitable situation for granting him a source-of-imitation status in the future.

Because Khamenei is unable to rule as Khomeini did, his leadership has decreased the prestige and authority of this position and the regime unintentionally. This is because no single clergyman could be as powerful as Khomeini as his power was a function of peculiar social, political and economic conditions which have sharply changed now. Having this point in mind, the clergy tried to minimize the weakness of the leadership by its refusal to form a council of fuqaha as the Constitution stipulates for the time when there is no single fagih to carry out the task. The reason was that type of council could become the centre of rivalry among the clergy whose consequences would be further weakness of the institution of the leadership and so the regime.

Similarly, the elimination of the Prime Minister ship is not a strong indicator of a significant change in the IRI. It is true that now the President has the authority and power of the prime minister as well. Yet this does not mean that he is the central political leader now. Prior to the amendment of the Constitution, the president was more or less a ceremonial figure as the main power of decision-making on executive affairs lay with the prime minister. As a result of the amendment, now the President has a greater part of the executive power, although not the entire executive power.

Several factors restrict the President now. Firstly, the leader who is the jurisprudent has an unlimited power which enables him to overrule, undermine, halt or change laws,

decisions and instructions issued by the three branches of the government. Secondly, the existence of councils and assemblies such as the Assembly For Determination of Interests of the System (AFDIS), which have undefined jurisdiction, reduce the full control of the President over the executive.⁷⁶ Thirdly, the President has lost his military role as the Acting Commander-in-Chief because the Leader now exercises that delegated power himself.⁷⁷ Finally, the President is now accountable not only to Parliament, but to the leader as well.

Consequently, recent arrangements indicate changes in the IRI power structure. It is true that a general decline in the spiritual aspect of the regime is visible. However, this is not intentional and the factors responsible for such a decline are simply beyond the control of the regime, as discussed earlier. What is certain is a re-division of power among different factions which necessitated changes in the power and authority of some positions as a result of the bargaining process. At the end, no single faction has gained that power which enables it to put aside other factions. The following analysis of the Rafsanjani cabinet will shed light on this point.

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The Rafsanjani cabinet and his appointments have become means to accommodate different interests of the IRI. Although it was widely assumed in the West, Rafsanjani's assumption of the Presidency has not been the beginning of a purge of the "radicals". On the contrary, his appointments have disproven the

theory of the moderate faction since all the so-called radicals have been given sensitive positions within the government or have kept their formerly vital ranks. In cases, some of the most savage "radical" elements have even been promoted. A look at his appointments will provide grounds for the claim.

Before proceeding, three points should be made clear. The first point is the meaning of purge within the context of the Islamic regime. This is because the conventional meaning of purge e.g., removal from positions, demotion or appointment to ceremonial posts does not apply to the IRI. What makes that irrelevant is the instability of and the specific nature of the regime. The continuation of resistance to the regime on the part of the Iranians and the incompetence of the regime in overcoming social and economic problems, which stimulates further political unrest, have caused a very fragile situation. This fragility makes the elite very intolerant to any sign of opposition. Since the IRI is based on the notion of velayat-e faqih which requires full submission to the jurisprudent, the system cannot let any sign of opposition, disobedience or disagreements unpunished lest such may encourage further dissatisfaction.

This intolerance applies to the people as well as to the elite. The reason is the elite may hope for the full submission of the population at large once no one doubts that the regime is determined to suppress any opposition. In addition to mass arrests, torture and summary executions of political opponents,

the harsh response of the regime towards a rebellious elite should convince the people not to dare to resist the regime; once the elite is not immune of repression, no one else is immune.

This claim is evident in the eleven-year history of the IRI. The Provisional Government was forced to resign. Ever since, no member of that government has served in a governmental position. Moreover, several members of that government have been imprisoned or beaten for their criticism of the system, although they have never demanded a radical overthrow of the regime.^{7*} Later, the bloody purge of Banisadr and his supporters demonstrated the resolution of the ruling elite in an indiscriminate suppression of any sign of opposition. This resolution appeared again in the suppression of Gotbzadeh and his "collaborators" which included a prestigious and prominent clergyman: the late Ayatollah Shariatmadari. Finally, the removal of Ayatollah Montazeri from the scene which included the execution of his close relatives suggested that this government does not have a non-violent conflict management procedure for the undesirable members of the elite.

The second point to be clarified is the irrelevancy between the loss of sensitive positions and loss of power. Since the regime consists of factions which possess their own economic, political and military institutions and the legitimacy of their rights to those institutions is also acknowledged by all the factions, members of each faction retain their power regardless of their official title. Unless a figure is arrested,

imprisoned, murdered or banned from having any contact with the state apparatus, having no official position or a ceremonial position does not prevent that person from exercising power as if he still possesses a sensitive job. That is why, for instance, no one questioned Mohtashemi about his personally-led military occupation of the Iranian Central Bank in Tehran when the Bank authority refused to cash a two-million dollar governmental cheque in foreign currency.⁷⁹ He did so at the time when he had no official position with the government. Nevertheless, the government did not arrest him for occupying the Bank nor for keeping a military unit.

Finally, the third point is the somewhat misleading titles of positions in the IRI. For example, the appointment of Ayatollah Moussavi-Ardebilily who was the Head of the Supreme Judicial Council to the position of the Friday Prayer Leader of Tehran may appear to be a clear demotion. However, this latter position is extremely important because the Friday Prayer leaders have unlimited political and military power. Since the Friday Prayer of Tehran is broadcast live by nationwide radio and television services, the Friday Prayer Leader of Tehran can (and does) influence events and policies for the following week. In reality, therefore, his new position is more influential than the previous one.

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The Rafsanjani Cabinet is the most clear indication of interdependence and compromise among factions. Rafsanjani

received the Presidential Decree from Khamenei on 8 August 1989.⁸⁰ At that time, the prevailing speculation among Westerners was that his most significant problem would be how to keep the well-known leaders of "radicals" such as Mohtashemi (Minister of Interior), Moussavi (Prime Minister) and Rayshahry (Head of the VAVAK) out of the power circle.⁸¹ Yet the Rafsanjani cabinet, to Western surprise, included most of the "radical" elements. The rest, however, have been given other positions within the system; no one has been deprived of power.

The Cabinet itself has accommodated some "radicals". Out of 24 ministers, 12 are ministers who had served under Moussavi for many years.⁸² Some of the new-comers have been closer to the "radicals" than to the "moderates" such as Nouri (Minister of Interior) who had been the sole representative of Khomeini in the Revolutionary Guards Corps (RGC).⁸³ The new Minister of Information (VAVAK) had been the Deputy to Rayshahry for a long time.⁸⁴

Other important governmental positions have been divided among the rest. The following only reflects the new positions of the most important figures. Mirhossein Moussavi has become the Presidential Adviser.⁸⁵ Reza Amroulahi (ex-Minister of Industry) has been appointed as the Director of the Nuclear Energy Organization.⁸⁶ Dr. Hadi Manafi (ex-Minister of Health) has become the Director of the Environmental Protection Organization.⁸⁷ Hassan Gafouri-fard (ex-Minister of Energy), Dr. Mohammad Farhady (ex-Minister of Science and Higher Education)

and Massoud Roushani-Zanjani (ex-Minister of Budget and Planning), now, are respectively the Deputy to Rafsanjani and the Director of the Physical Education Organization, the General Manager of the National UNESCO Commission and the Director of the Budget and Planning Organization.⁸⁰ Ali Shamkhani (ex-Minister of the Revolutionary Guards Corps) has become the Commander of the Navy (with joint support of Khamenei, Rafsanjani and Parliament).⁸¹ Behzad Nabavi (ex-Minister of Heavy Industry) is the Adviser to the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance.⁸²

Ayatollah Yazdi, the new "moderate" Head of the Supreme Court, has "rehabilitated" some "radicals". Hence Rayshahry has been appointed as the General Prosecutor.⁸³ Assadollah Lajevardi, the Director of the horrible Evin Prison whose appellation is "executer", has been promoted to the "Directorship of the Prisons and Responsible for the Country's Security and Educational affairs."⁸⁴

Other influential "radical" elements have received their shares too. Upon the election of Rafsanjani, Mousavi-Ardebili (Head of the Supreme Court) and Mousavi-Khoeiniha (General Prosecutor) resigned.⁸⁵ The former has become the Friday Prayer Leader of Tehran and the Director of an educational institution.⁸⁶ The latter along with Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani (a "moderate") has become the member of the Assembly For Determination of Interests of the System (AFDIS).⁸⁷ Mousavi-Khoeiniha has been also appointed to the position of the Centre for Strategic Studies by Rafsanjani as well.⁸⁸ Ahmad Khomeini

has become the member of the AFDIS⁹⁷ and the representative of Khamenei at the National Security Council (NSC).⁹⁸ Mohtashemi and Mehdi Karoubi (ex-Deputy Speaker of Parliament) have been elected an MP⁹⁹ and the Speaker of Parliament (with a weak majority)¹⁰⁰, respectively.

While becoming stronger in specific matters, Rafsanjani has had to give up a part of his power to satisfy other factions. As mentioned earlier he is now the head of the executive branch as his jurisdiction covers that of the Prime Minister. Likewise, it is within his authority to form the NSC and chair it. In return, however, he resigned from his position as the Acting Commander-in-chief of the military which had been delegated to him by Khomeini. The reason given by Rafsanjani for resigning was "shortage of time for good management of the Armed Forces".¹⁰¹ Now, Khamenei has restored the full power of the leadership. This is because Khomeini had delegated his power as the Commander-in-Chief of the military to Banisadr and then to Rafsanjani who functioned as the Acting Commander-in-Chief of the military. Khamenei's assumption of the military power restored the already divided power of the leader.

While losing some posts, the "radicals" have compensated their loss elsewhere. The IRI Parliament now is controlled by the "radicals" as Karoubi has become its Speaker. The control of Parliament has enabled them to retain a substantial amount of power in the elite bargaining over the re-division of power as they are now capable of keeping the "moderates" in-check by

obscuring bills. Moreover, Parliament can accommodate some "radicals" who have lost their positions as it was the case with Mohtashemi. Through this forum, they can exercise power under the pretext of their constitutional right of supervision of the executive. The appointments of "radicals" to highly sensitive positions, i.e., Rayshahry (General Prosecutor), Moussavi-Ardebilly (Friday Prayer Preacher of Tehran), Moussavi-Khoeiniha (member of the AFDIS), Ahmad Khomeini (Khamenei's representative in the NSC and member of the AFDIS) and Lajevardi (Director of Prisons), have secured their large share of power.

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While there are areas of serious dispute, there are agreements on certain security-oriented domestic policies in the post-Khomeini era.¹⁰² The realization of the weakness of the system due to its lack of a charismatic and powerful leader has made the rival factions agree on issues without which the very existence of the system would be at stake. Hence the consolidation of the fragile and vulnerable Islamic government has been given a priority by all the major rivals.

Since the continuation of the regime is impossible without minimum consensus and cooperation, rivalry in specific domestic matters has been minimized to the point of almost invisibility. This consensus has been achieved by the elite's recognition of the principle that power should be divided among the elite, and thus, the system should be run jointly. Therefore, no faction should be eliminated. This is evident in the fact that the

"legitimate" demands of all the factions have been met through division of all the important and vital positions among the elite regardless of their political orientation.

Hence no drastic change has happened to make the new era qualitatively different from the Khomeini period, as far as the accommodation of the essential interests of the factions is concerned. No faction of the regime has been able to dominate the system. What is new in this period is the absence of a charismatic leader like Khomeini to function as the ultimate arbiter. In spite of his position, Khamenei is not able to act as Khomeini did.

The area of agreement embraces the particular security-related issues. Firstly, the post-Khomeini era is characterized by more severe repression. It began by an undeclared martial law in major cities with the RGs stationed in important areas, as mentioned earlier. Since the absence of Khomeini might encourage anti-government activities, the main goal has been the intimidation of the population at large so that the dangerous period of transition can pass safely.

This policy of intimidation has been implemented by different measures. One of these measures has been massive executions of opponents, now mainly being executed as drug-smugglers. According to published government statistics, between 4 June 1989 to 12 February 1990, at least 2,000 people have been executed.¹⁰³ As a supplement, the harassment of women and men who do not observe the religious restrictions has been officially

encouraged. This is evident in the warning of the new Head of the Supreme Court (a "moderate") who expressed the intolerance of the system to any indication of non-observance.¹⁰⁴

Moreover, any sign of opposition has been brutally suppressed. The most recent case is the bloody suppression of massive anti-government demonstrations in Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, Shiraz and Hamadan which began on Friday 9 February 1990 and lasted until Wednesday the 14th.¹⁰⁵ The largest demonstration, which took several hours in Tehran on February 9, was dispersed by the RGs as they opened fire and killed an unknown number of demonstrators.¹⁰⁶ Massive arrests followed.¹⁰⁷ According to the regime, 20 demonstrators who had been called "mobs" were executed in the following few days.¹⁰⁸

Prior to the latest demonstrations, a number of anti-regime movements had been suppressed. On one occasion in November 1989, non-Tehran-resident university students stormed and occupied a building which was being used by the Bassigh units of the RGC. As a result, the RGC forces were dispatched to the site and arrested students in large numbers.¹⁰⁹ On another occasion, anti-government demonstrations which took place in two Tehran squares (Ghaleh and Molavi), located in deprived areas, were brutally suppressed. According to one report, at least five were killed and hundreds were arrested.¹¹⁰

A salient characteristic of the post-Khomeini period is the wave of assassination of opposition leaders abroad. Since the death of Khomeini, the fearful regime has assassinated

influential leaders of the opposition who subscribe to a variety of ideologies. The first victim was ex-Colonel Ataollah Biahmadi, one of the military commanders of a Royalist group (Derafsh-e Kaviani), who was murdered in Dubai on 5 June 1989.¹¹¹ Soon after on 13 July 1989, Dr. Abdolrahman Ghasemlou, the leader of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, was killed along with Abdoolah Garderi-Azad (representative of the Party in Europe) and an Iraqi Kurd (Dr. Fazel) in Vienna.¹¹² On 24 August 1989, Bahman Javadi, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Iran was shot to death in Cyprus.¹¹³ On 4 September 1989, Mohammad Sadigh Kamangar, a member of the Central Committee and the Director of the Radio of an Iranian Kurdish Organization: Komoleh, was gunned down in his office in Iraq.¹¹⁴ Finally, Dr. Kazm Rajavi (brother of Massoud Rajavi, leader of the Mojahedin) was murdered in Geneva on 24 April 1990.¹¹⁵

Parallel to the suppression of the civilian population, measures have been implemented to minimize the possible danger of the conventional military. The main thrust of recent policies is the gradual merger of the military and police, set up under the Shah and seen as unreliable, with the parallel Islamic military and police units. This scheme, however, has been reflected in a variety of measures in order to limit its foreseeable eruption of discontent among the military.

As a part of the policy, the process of removal of high-ranking officers has fiercely continued. Firstly, Dr. Hossein Firouzabadi, an RG, has been appointed to the High Command which

controls both the Armed Forces and the RGC.¹¹⁶ Another RG, Hassan Tullaei, has become the Managing Director of the Defence Industries Organization, a post which had always been given to a military.¹¹⁷ Similarly, a large number of RGs has replaced high-ranking Army officers at different levels of command.

In the Navy, the substitution of high-ranking officers with RGs has been widespread. As mentioned before, the ex-minister of the Revolutionary Guards Corps was appointed as the Commander of the Force who in return put several RG into sensitive naval positions.¹¹⁸

In the place of two ministries in charge of the Armed Forces and RGC, the Ministry of Defence and Support has been created. Asghar Turkan, an RG, is its minister whose Successor is also a RG, Mahmoud Pakravan, the ex-Successor to Ministers of the RGC.¹¹⁹ Other key positions of the Ministry has also been divided among the RGs.¹²⁰

The merger of the Police Department with the Committees is another aspect of the policy. After being passed by the Cabinet, a bill with respect to the merger was sent to Parliament by Rafsanjani in January 1990.¹²¹ Although not being ratified so far, there is no doubt that it will be passed soon and that the practical adjustments will be started at once. It goes without saying that the merger will be followed by massive purges in the Police Department in order to secure the superiority of the Committees.

Finally, executions of high-ranking officers have been accelerated since the death of Khomeini. The list of the officially announced executions includes the following. In July 1989, four Colonels, one Major, two Captains and two Lieutenants of the Army were executed.¹²² Three Army officers whose ranks are not known were executed in July 1989.¹²³ Later in the same month, ten more officers including two Colonels were executed in Isfahan.¹²⁴ In another case, the regime officially announced the execution of two high-ranking Navy officers (an Admiral and a Colonel) and an Army General in November.¹²⁵

Cooperation among the elite also expands to their unity against those who destabilize the regime from within. This is evident in joint efforts of the factions in their condemnation of Montazeri once the latter revealed his opposition to the ruling elite, especially Khamenei and Rafsanjani, as discussed earlier. Likewise, once an MP, Abdoolmajid Sharpassand, resigned after attacking Khamenei and Rafsanjani and the entire government for their incompetence and manipulation of the people, all the MPs who were connected to different factions united firmly against him. In his speech, Sharpassand condemned the lack of security in society and monopolization of power by the ruling factions.¹²⁶ As a result, the Parliamentary immunity of that MP was revoked. Charged as a counterrevolutionary and agent of infiltration, Sharpassand was arrested. MPs demanded his execution.¹²⁷

The consensus of the influential factions on sensitive matters is clearly reflected in the division of power right after the death of Khomeini. The leaders of different factions who had had other formulas finally accepted a compromise. This compromise was even elaborated on by Rafsanjani who said:

Previously, we had never come to the conclusion in the Expert Assembly or anywhere else that the leader be the present one In our previous talks, we had the idea of creating a council and then [would wait to] see what the outcome would be....However, certain [emerging problems] ... reinforced the prevailing mood of the meeting. The result was, therefore, what it is today.¹²⁸

Hence Rafsanjani accepted the leadership of Khamenei.

In return, Khamenei along with the Speaker of Parliament guaranteed the vote of confidence for the Rafsanjani Cabinet, as mentioned before. This arrangement also enabled Rafsanjani to have parliamentary sanction for his Five-Year Plan which would not be possible otherwise. This was evident in the passage of the Plan when Morteza Alviri, the Chairman of the Budget and Planning Commission of Parliament, elaborating on the depth of economic turmoil, disclosed that: "The present Islamic Republic managerial force is unable to implement the government plan for the next five years."¹²⁹

Despite the propaganda, the policy of the regime towards the political parties has not changed. After several months of deliberation, the government has only given permission to four pro-regime vocational and political groups which are clearly related to strong leaders.¹³⁰ No party so far has been given permission. Even groups such as the Liberation Movement (which

accepts the framework of the Islamic Republic for its activities) have not yet been given permission.¹³¹ There is no indication of dispute over this policy among the elite.

There are also common viewpoints on the Iran-Iraq war stalemate, at least among the major influential leaders. The common denominator seems to be the impossibility of continuing with the prevailing situation when about 3,600 sq. km. of Iranian territory is still under Iraqi occupation and 30,000 Iranian captives are being kept in Iraq.¹³² Hence a war for breaking the peace-negotiation stalemate has been hinted at by the elite.¹³³ Perhaps the eruption of dissatisfaction and the incompetence of the government to solve economic and social problems may be a strong incentive for a possible limited war with Iraq.

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While there is minimum consensus over specific security-oriented matters, there have been several sources of disagreement other than succession disputes. The first Five-Year Plan of Rafsanjani is one of them. In a sense, the Plan itself was accepted by the majority of MPs on 10 January 1990, although it was clear that it would not be practical.¹³⁴ As the shortage of hard currency is an obstacle to its implementation, it has been suggested that huge foreign investment be encouraged.¹³⁵ This has raised opposition by those factions which argue that it will be the beginning of foreign control of Iran.

Among them, the Guardian Council has been the most outspoken. This supervisory body has the mandate to determine the

consistency of laws with the Constitution. Hence it refused to sanction the approved Five-Year Plan, and so, sent it back to the IRI Parliament to be amended.¹³⁶ However, the joint pressure of Khamenei and Rafsanjani resulted in only minor changes in the Plan although it was finally approved by the Guardian Council.¹³⁷

Yet the strength of the challenge has forced Plan supporters to wage a campaign to justify the foreign role in the Plan. For instance, Resalat, the organ of a rightist faction run by Ayatollah Azeri-Qumi, has begun a series of articles on the role of foreign investment and that is why certain foreign loans will not bring foreign political domination.¹³⁸

More than genuine fear of foreign domination, the issue has offered some factions an excuse for attacking Rafsanjani. This is because the silence of the Speaker of Parliament over the dispute and the passage of the Plan by the IRI Parliament indicate that the "radical" Speaker of Parliament had no objection to the very notion of foreign loans. Similarly, the "radical" Khamenei has also given his blessing for them.¹³⁹ Thus, objection to this aspect of the Plan does not necessarily determine the political orientation of the critics since certain "radical" as well as "moderate" factions are firmly behind it.

It seems that the depth of destruction and the limitation of hard-currency generating exports have made it clear that without foreign investment the reconstruction of the country is almost impossible. According to Ezatollah Shabi, Minister of Budget and Planning in the Provisional Government, the deficit of the Plan

will be at least US\$ 70 b. which will have to be compensated for by foreign sources.¹⁴⁰ Nevertheless, as opposition continues, it is logical to argue that it should have reasons other than a simple calculation of political cost of the foreign assistance.

The attack on Rafsanjani has not been limited to his economic plan. Certain MPs have taken advantage of every matter to discredit Rafsanjani. One of the latest cases was the issue of publication of government-paid condolence and congratulation messages in newspapers. Hence 110 MPs demanded that Rafsanjani explain why government funds have been spent in this manner.¹⁴¹ On another occasion, the same group of MPs criticized Rafsanjani for tolerating skyrocketing prices while the people could no longer afford any further increase in prices.¹⁴²

Perhaps the invitation of the Romanian President Nicolai Ceausescu to Tehran has provided the rival factions a golden opportunity to disgrace Rafsanjani. Ceausescu was invited to Tehran in the aftermath of the massacre in Timoshora and was overthrown almost immediately after he returned home. Despite the instability in Romania, Rafsanjani invited him to Iran.¹⁴³ Upon his arrival in Tehran, Ceausescu negotiated only with Rafsanjani and Velayati, his Foreign Minister.¹⁴⁴ Once Ceausescu was overthrown, the opposition took the opportunity to criticize Rafsanjani and his government. Hence 45 MPs interpellated the Foreign Minister.¹⁴⁵

The President and Foreign Minister changed their defence of the policy as the opposition grew. Their reason for the

invitation was initially lack of knowledge about the Romanian internal problems due to the negligence of the IRI Ambassador to Rumania. Later, it was justified under the pretext of security issues which made the government negotiate with Romania.¹⁴⁶ Once the attack on Rafsanjani expanded, Khamenei came to his rescue by criticizing the news media by saying:

What is the matter with you? Why should some irresponsible people question the esteemed authorities of the Islamic Republic by resorting to negative aspects of issues?¹⁴⁷

As a result, the attack on Rafsanjani and his foreign minister stopped.

Yet Rafsanjani has not been the only victim of rivalry. Some "radicals" have received certain blows too. Interestingly, the "radical" leader has appointed Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani (a "moderate") to the position of the Director of the Centre for Supervision of the Tehran Mosques.¹⁴⁸ His foremost goal has been purging the mosques from the Bassighies who have turned the mosques to their military bases especially after the outbreak of the War. This has caused serious tensions between the clergy in charge of local mosques and the Bassighies. While admiring the Bassighies and their role in the War, Kani requested their withdrawal.¹⁴⁹ Of course, he has not achieved his objective so far as the ultimate conclusion of issues of this nature lies in elite compromise.

The Head of the Supreme Court, Yazdi, has also been challenged by his opponents. The occasion was given to his rivals when he met with the sister-in-law of Roger Cooper (a

British citizen imprisoned in Iran for his alleged espionage activities). In that meeting, Yazdi hoped that Cooper would be pardoned by Khamenei.¹⁸⁰ This was enough for 110 MPs to demand an explanation in the House. While stressing the intervention of the Judiciary in executive affairs, the protestors attacked the meeting as part of a deal for the release of Cooper in return for normalization of relations with Britain.¹⁸¹

* * *

The post-Khomeini era has not demonstrated a drastic shift in the internal and external policies of the Islamic regime. The system suffers from internal rivalry and power struggle as was the case before. Yet what makes this period distinct from the Khomeini era is the presence of a weak leader who is unable to continue the role of Khomeini. This weakness has provided a ground for his opponents to challenge his authority publicly. The Khamenei incompetence has been tacitly acknowledged as the regime has intensified repression and suppression of dissent. The system cannot afford any degree of openness as this will likely facilitate its collapse. The power struggle continues while the fragility of the Islamic government undermines the elimination of all the rival factions by one and its irreversible domination. Perhaps what will affect the elite competition and determine the fate of the Khomeini system is the outcome of the seemingly rising mass political protest.

ENDNOTES

1. Max Weber, The Interpretation of Social Reality, ed. J. E. T. Elderidge (London: Michael Joseph, 1971), 229.

2. Ibid., 234.

3. Some scholars like Zaleznik and Kets de Vries describe the charismatic leader as:

a man of tremendous self-confidence and conviction. People are drawn to his strength and vision. The influence process rests on his captivating style of presentation, the power of his own self-image, and the grandiosity of his dreams. For followers, the maximum man assumes the quality of an idealized parent (Jay A. Conger, "Theoretical Foundations of Charismatic Leadership," in Charismatic Leadership: The Elusive Factor in Organizational Effectiveness, ed. Jay A. Conger, Rabindra N. Kanungo and Associates (San Francisco: Jossey - Bass Publishers, 1988), 35).

For Bass charismatic leaders are leaders who:

often emerge in times of crisis as prospective saviours who by their magical endowments will fulfil the unmet emotional needs of their completely trusting, overtly dependent, and submissive followers. If successful, charismatic leaders bring about radical transformations in society (Bernard M. Bass, "Evolving Perspectives on Charismatic Leadership," in Charismatic Leadership: The Elusive Factor in Organizational Effectiveness, ed. Jay A. Conger, Rabindra N. Kanungo and Associates (San Francisco: Jossey - Bass Publishers, 1988), 40-41).

Finally, scholars like Conger describe the charismatic leaders as "change agents" because they:

see the shortcomings of any situation..... This sense of dissatisfaction with the status quo is a restless energy within the charismatic leader. Such leaders seem forever discontent and in search for new opportunities (Jay A. Conger, The Charismatic Leadership: Behind the Mystique of Exceptional Leadership, (San Francisco: Jossey - Bass Publishers, 1989), 4).

4. Ibid.

5. Bass, 55.

6. In this case, their emergence should be the outcome of: the ...charismatic vision and the articulation of that vision creating a sense of need for action by the followers. The "visionary charismatic" begins with ideological fervour and then moves on to action (Ibid.,

57)...

7. The notion of routinization will be discussed shortly.
8. This implies that: "the demands of the office - effectively met - may greatly elevate the esteem of the office holder.... In this case, charisma grew from administrative routine" (Bass, 59).
9. Marvin J. Folkertsma, Jr., Ideology and Leadership (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988), 4.
10. James V. Downton, Jr., Rebel Leadership: Commitment and Charisma in the Revolutionary Progress, (New York: The Free Press, 1973), 210.
11. Folkertsma, 4.
12. Downton, Jr., 210.
13. Ibid.
14. Conger, "Theoretical Foundations of Charismatic Leadership, 15.
15. Bass, 46.
16. Conger, "Theoretical Foundations of Charismatic Leadership," 15.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 15-16.
19. Ibid., 16.
20. Ibid.
21. The following factors are the necessary conditions of the second scenario:
 - (1) the development of an administrative apparatus apart from the charismatic leader that puts the leader's mission into practice; (2) the transfer of charisma through rites and ceremonies to other members of the organization; (3) the incorporation of the charismatic's message and mission into oral and written traditions; (4) the selection of a successor who resembles the charismatic founder and is committed to the founder's mission, and (5) a continued identification with and commitment to the charismatic's original mission (Ibid., 33).

22. Such a view was apparent in his message made on 11 February 1980 as he said:

From my hospital room I give a warning to the East and to Africa, and to all those countries under domination and oppression to unite to curtail the hands of the criminal American government. The hands of the U.S. government and other superpowers are stained with the blood of our youth and other oppressed and combatant people of the world (W. G. Millward, "The Principles of Foreign Policy and the Vision of World Order Expounded by Imam Khomeini and the Islamic Republic of Iran," in The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic: Proceedings of a Conference, ed. Nikki R. Keddie and Eric Hooglund [USA: Middle East Institute, 1982], 196).

23. Addressing the problems of Muslim countries, Khomeini observed in his book:

We have in reality no choice but to destroy those systems of government that are corrupt in themselves and also entail the corruption of others, and to overthrow all treacherous, corrupt, oppressive and criminal regimes. This is a duty that all Muslims must fulfil in every one of Muslim countries, in order to achieve the triumphant political revolution of Islam. We see, too [,] that together the imperialists and the tyrannical self-seeking rulers have divided the Islamic homeland. They have separated the various segments of the Islamic Ummat from each other and artificially created separate nations (Ibid., 193).

24. As a result, Khomeini and his following elite verbally attacked those countries for their "submission" to foreign powers, superpowers and especially the USA. These verbal attacks were followed by attempts on the part of the IRI to mobilize, organize, train, arm and lead fundamentalists in those countries in order to stimulate Islamic revolutions elsewhere. This policy included sending religious envoys to the Persian Gulf countries in order to provoke Islamic revolution; Kuwait was the first target. In early 1979, for instance, the Kuwaiti security forces uncovered an arms depot pertaining to a pro-Khomeini group (J. M. Abdulghani, Iran & Iraq: The Years of Crisis [London: Croom Helm, 1984], 196).

For Khomeini, this policy of exporting revolution was not only important for the purpose of creation of an Islamic empire, but he also considered it vital for the existence and continuation of the IRI itself.

25. To that end, the disdain of "consumption attitude", as a Western notion, and its negative effects on the revolutionary spirit of the people (who had a mission to liberate the entire world, and so, were indifferent to "shameful" temporal desires)

were employed.

26. Among other factors, this was a reason why Mr. Bazargan's initiatives for negotiations with Iraq in the aftermath of the Revolution for a peaceful settlement of conflicts were stopped by Khomeini. For detail, see: Jack S. Levy and Mike Froelich, "Causes of the Iran-Iraq War," in The Regionalization of Warfare, ed. James Brown and William P. Snyder (New Brunswick, USA: Transaction Books, 1985), 128-129.

27. Following the logic, Iran's representation in international organizations was sharply reduced. The IRI refused to attend certain organizations. In cases when it maintained its representation, the tribunes were used for humiliating that organization and attributing negative characteristics to them. The result was isolation of Iran in international organizations such as the UN and the Islamic Conference. For a typical IRI behaviour towards the UN and the Islamic Conference, see: Majid Khadduri, The Gulf War: The Origins and Implications of the Iran-Iraq Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 90-100.

28. In the aftermath of the acceptance of the ceasefire, Khomeini issued a fetwa on the religious legality of chess and music. After elaborating on how Khomeini's decision was against Islam in an open letter to Khomeini, a low-ranking religious scholar (Gardiri) advised Khomeini not to become involved in such issues any more ("One of the Religious Scholars of the Religious Centre of Qum Rejected Khomeini's Decisions on Music and Chess," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 20 October 1988, 16).

29. For specific sections of the IRI Constitution regarding the power of the leader, see: Algar, 66-69.

30. For more detail on the constitutionalized enormous power of Khomeini refer to: Gordon, 6.

31. For detail on the importance of the charismatic leadership of Khomeini for the continuation of the Islamic regime, see: Folkertsma Jr., 227-228.

32. For detail on these purges which included the qualitatively incompatible secular and clergy factions such the Provisional Government, Banisadr, Gotbzadeh and Ayatollah Shariatmadari as well as temporary troublesome clergyman i.e., Ayatollah Montazeri, see: Chapter I.

33. For detail on the medieval nature of the Islamic system based on the notion of the governance of jurisprudent, see: Chapter I. See also: R. K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 19-21. See also: Folkertsma Jr., 212-216.

34. Among other scholars, Shireen Hunter confirms this process of alienation of the Iranians from the Islamic regime. She describes it as "popular disenchantment with the Islamic alternative" for which she offers two general reasons: the regime's systematic campaign against the Iranian nationalism and the failure of the regime in satisfying the people's needs. For detail, see: Shireen T. Hunter, "Islam in Power: The Case of Iran," in The Politics of Islamic Revivalism, ed. Shireen T. Hunter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 270-274.

35. For instance, R. Hrair Dekmejian supports this view. For detail, see: R. Hrair Dekmejian, "Islamic Revival: Catalysts, Categories, and Consequences," in The Politics of Islamic Revivalism, ed. Shireen T. Hunter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 9-10.

36. For detail on the factors which instigated the Revolution and the nature and objectives of the forces which initiated it, see: Chapter I.

37. For detail on the compromise among the conservative segment of the anti-Shah movement, some factions of the Imperial Government and some Western countries, see: Chapter I.

38. Sepher Zabih, Iran Since the Revolution (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 84-90. See also: O, Ballance, 22.

39. During that uprising, the provincial radio and television station along with the bases of the Committees and the RG in the entire province were occupied by the opponents. This led to the ban of that party by the Islamic government. For detail, see: Zabih, 76-79.

40. Stempel, 196. For the strength, nature and activities of anti-regime's women organizations, see: Azar Tabari and Nahid Yeganeh, ed., In the Shadow of Islam: The Women's Movement in Iran (London: Zed Press, 1982).

41. For detail, see:

42. Stempel, 201-206.

43. People expressed their dissatisfaction with the system by participating in massive rallies and meetings in favours of Banisadr. For detail, see: Zabih, 121-136.

44. For detail on the reasons behind the initiation of armed struggle by the Mojahedin, see: Chapter I.

45. "The Number of Iranian Refugees Is Increasing Rapidly in Sweden," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 28 September 1989, 4.

46. The IRI elite consists of a number of factions whose number is far greater than two: "moderate" and "radical". Chapter III will elaborate on the factors which divide the elite into several factions. While this writer does not believe that moderation or extremism are the reasons for factionalism, this writer will use the titles of "moderate" and "radical" in his reference to certain factions. The main reason is to avoid any unnecessary confusion which might be generated by introducing new titles for specific factions.

47. "Khomeini Died," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 8 June 1989, 1.

48. "Khamenei Became the Successor to Khomeini," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 8 June 1989, 1.

49. Ibid.

50. Algar, 66.

51. "The Source of Imitation Condition Was Omitted," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 8 June 1989, 12.

52. "Khamenei Became the Successor to Khomeini," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 8 June 1989, 1.

53. "I Voted for a Council-Type of Leadership," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 15 June 1989, 12.

54. "The Major Sources of Imitation Have Not Approved Khamenei," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 15 June 1989, 2.

55. Ibid., 1.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid. For detail on the views of these two sources of imitation, see: Chapter I.

58. "The Regime's Internal Conflicts Began," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 15 June 1989, 1.

59. "Conflict Over Source of Imitation Position Continues," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 29 June 1989, 1.

60. "War On the Source of Imitation Goes on," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 20 July 1989, 2.

61. "Two Third of the of the MPs Opposed the Granting Khamenei the Power of Dissolution of the Parliament," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 29 June 1989, 1.

62. "Imam Khomeini from Ayatollah Montazeri's Viewpoint," Rah-e Mojahed 55 (September-October 1989): 21-25.
63. "The Major Sources of Imitation Have Not Approved Khamenei," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 15 June 1989, 1.
64. "I Voted to the Council-Style Leadership," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 15 June 1989, 12.
65. "The Supporters of Seyed Ahmad Khomeini Brought Montazeri Down From His Pulpit," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 22 June 1989, 12.
66. "Demonstration Against Montazeri in Qum," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 11 January 1990, 1, 2.
67. "Ayatollah Montazeri: Khamenei Lacks Necessary Knowledge and Good Reputation Necessary for Velayat-e Faqih," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 1 February 1990, 3.
68. "The Liberation Movement of Iran: Khamenei Lacks Characteristics of Leadership," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 1.
69. "The Society for Defence of Liberty and National Sovereignty Demanded the Elimination of Velayat-e Faqih and Dissolution of the "Guardian Council" and the "Assembly for Determination of Interest," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 20 July 1989, 1.
70. "Because of the Fear of Situation: The Presidential Election Was Scheduled Three Weeks Earlier," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 22 June 1989, 1.
71. "Rafsanjani and Shibani Are the Only Presidency Candidate," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 13 July 1989, 1.
72. For instance Khamenei explicitly denied the competence of any other possible candidate by saying: "Wherever I look, I cannot see any person better than Rafsanjani for the Presidency" (Ibid., 3).
73. Ibid., 1, 3.
74. "Five days Before the Imposed Referendum: People Do Not Know What They Are Supposed to Vote For," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 27 July 1989, 2.
75. For detail on the political and religious orientations of these Ayatollahs, see: Chapter I.
76. The nature and the reasons behind the creation of this Council was explained in Chapter I.

77. This point will be explained shortly.

78. In May 1990, for instance, 90 nationalist figures wrote an open letter to Rafsanjani in which the entire policy of the regime was criticized. Several signatories of that letter have been beaten up so far while there are rumours on the arrest and execution of a few other. For detail, see: "Some of the Members of the Liberation Movement Were Beaten Up in Tehran," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 24 May 1990, 1,8.

79. "Rafsanjani and Mohtashemi," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 7 September 1989, 1.

80. "The Cabinet-Making Crisis Continues," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 17 August 1989, 1.

81. Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Divided Iranians Seem Unable To Settle on Firm Policy Course," The New York Times, 10 October 1989, A14.

82. The complete list of the ministers is as follows:

Those who had served in previous cabinet are marked by "X".
 "Rafsanjani Will Face the Opposition of the Radicals," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 24 August 1989, 1.

- 1 - First Vice President: Hassan Habibi. X
- 2 - Parliamentary and Legal Deputy President: Ayatollah Mahagerani.
- 3 - Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Dr. Aliakabr Velayati. X
- 4 - Ministry of Defence and Support of the Armed Forces: Engineer Asghar Torkan.
- 5 - Ministry of Interior: Abdoolah Nouri (clergy)
- 6 - Ministry of Information: Ali Falahian (clergy)
- 7 - Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance: Dr. Mohsen Nourbakhsh. X
- 8 - Ministry of Justice: Ismail Shoushtary (clergy).
- 9 - Ministry of Health Treatment and Medical Education: Dr. Iraj Afzal.
- 10 - Ministry of Education: Dr. Mohammad Najafi. X
- 11 - Ministry of Commerce: Abdoolhossein Vahaji. X
- 12 - Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone: Engineer Seyed. Mohammad Gharazi. X
- 13 - Ministry of Construction Crusade: Engineer Gholamreza Fourozesh. X
- 14 - Ministry of Road and Transportation: Engineer Mohammad Said Kya. X
- 15 - Ministry of Industries: Engineer Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh. X
- 16 - Ministry of Heavy Industries: Dr. Mohammad Hadinejad-Hosseinian.
- 17 - Ministry of Culture and Higher Education: Dr. Mosstafa Moien.
- 18 - Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance: Dr. Seyed Mohammad

Khatemei (clergy). X

19 - Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare: Hossein Kamali

20 - Ministry of Agriculture: Dr. Essa Kalantari. X

21 - Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning: Engineer Sarajedien Kazerouni.

22 - Ministry of Mines and Metals: Engineer Hossein Mahlougy.

23 - Ministry of Oil: Gholamreza Agahzadeh. X

24 - Ministry of Energy: Engineer Bijan Namdar-Zangene. X

83. Ibid., 9.

84. Ibid.

85. "Moussavi Became the Rafsanjani Adviser," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 7 September 1989, 2.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. "Appointments of the Islamic Governments," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 21 September 1989, 3.

89. "Following the Removal of Admiral Malekzadeghan: A Large Number of Navy Officers Has Applied for Retirement," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 9 November 1989, 1, 2.

90. "Appointments in the Islamic Republic," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 25 January 1989, 3.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.

93. "Moussavi-Ardebilly Was Removed," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 24 August 1989, 3.

94. "The New Post of Moussavi-Ardebilly," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 19 October 1989, 2.

95. "The Members of the Assembly for Determination of the Interests of the System Were Chosen," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 12 October 1989, 1.

96. "Appointments of the Islamic Republics," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 19 October 1989, 11.

97. "The Members of the Assembly for Determination of the Interests of the System Were Chosen," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 12 October 1989, 1.

98. "Ahmad Khomeini Became the Representative of Khamenei," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 23 November 1989, 3.
99. "Following the Election of Aliakbar Mohtashemi: Parliament Will Become the Base of the Extremist Faction of the Regime," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 21 December 1989, 1.
100. "Upon the Election of Mehdi Karoubi to Succeed Rafsanjani: Seyed Ahmad Khomeini Has Remained Out of the Official Power Circle," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 24 August 1989, 1.
101. "Rafsanjani Resigned from the Acting Commandership of the Armed Forces," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 7 September 1989, 1.
102. The most visible source of disagreement is the issue of the conduct of foreign policy which will be dealt with in Chapter IV.
103. News Program of the Moslem Student Association, the USA and Canada, (Hereafter News), 12 February 1990.
104. Thus, he said:
It is somewhat felt and the reports confirm that the behaviour of some women and men endanger the security.... It is the duty of the executive authorities to stop it ("Ayatollah Yazdi Threatened Poorly-Covered Women and Ill-Dressed Men, the Radio and Television Authorities and...", Kayhan Newspaper (London), 21 September 1989, 1).
105. News 19 February 1990 and 24 February 1990.
106. News, 19 February 1990.
107. "The Large Anti-Regime Demonstration in Tehran," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 22 February 1990, 1.
108. News, 19 February 1990.
109. "Four Hours of Clashes Between Polytechnic Students and the Revolutionary Guards," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 23 November 1989, 1.
110. "Five Were Killed in Clashes in Southern Tehran," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 9 November 1989, 1.
111. "The Islamic Regime Terrorists Killed Colonel Biahmadi in Dubai," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 15 June 1989, 1.
112. They were deceived by Rafsanjani who sent his representatives to Vienna in order to settle the issue of Iranian Kurdistan through the mediation of the Dr. Fazel. However, the meeting was a trap for their assassination ("The Iranian

Democratic Party of Kurdistan: The Islamic Government Is Responsible for the Murder of Dr. Abdolrahman Ghasemlou," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 20 July 1989, 1).

113. "The Terrorists Killed Bahman Javadi in Cyprus," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 31 August 1989, 1.

114. "Mohammad Sadigh Kamangar, the Well-Known Komoleh Leader, Was Killed," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 21 September 1989, 3.

115. Dr. Rajavi had played an outstanding role in exposing the IRI abuse of human rights in international organizations such as the UN Human Rights Committee and the Amnesty International ("Foreign Minister of Regime, Velayati, Was Attacked in New York," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 3 May 1990, 1, 14).

116. "Appointments of the Islamic Republic," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 19 October 1989, 11.

117. Ibid.

118. Hence six RGs have been attending the Fifth Session of Headquarters Commandership to replace the same number of Navy high-ranking officers. Before, the training had been only for top military who were about to be appointed to sensitive command positions ("Tension in the Armed Forces and Revolutionary Guards Corps," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 30 November 1989, 1).

119. "Appointments in the Islamic Republic," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 4 July 1989, 2.

120. For example, the Minister's Budget and Industrial Management Deputy is also an RG, Abdoolrahman Boushehry ("New Appointments in the Islamic Republic Regime," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 26 October 1989, 2). So is the Adviser to the Minister, Alireza Yarmohammandi (Ibid.).

121. "The Bill of Merging the Police and the Committees Has Been Presented to the Islamic Parliament," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 11 January 1990, 1.

122. "Two Ex-Army Commanders and Five Revolutionary Guards Corps Commanders Were Executed," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 20 July 1989, 1.

The Following is the list of the executed officers:

A- Colonels:

- 1- Abass Naderian
- 2- Javad Kefael
- 3- Zabioolah Amir-Ebrahimi

4- Habiboolah Jalili

B- Major:

1- Alireza Yaghoubi

C- Captain:

1- Mohammadi

2- Ali Johnygadei-Kolahy

D- Lieutenant:

1- Mohammad Gafar Salehy

2- Mohammad Javad Ghoudarzi

123. "Three Army Officers and Three Ex-SAVAK Employees Were Executed," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 6 July 1989, 1.

124. "Ten Army Officers, Including Two Colonels Were Executed in Isfahan," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 13 July 1989, 1.

125. "Regime Confirmed the Execution of Four Generals and High-Ranking Officers of the Iranian Armed Forces," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 9 November 1989, 1.

126. He explained his resignation in terms of his fundamental doubts and questions about the future government (Rafsanjani government) and the suspension of the right of people to self-determination ("After Severe Attack of the Karaj MP Against the Clique of Rafsanjani-Khamenei: The Life of the Abdoolmajid Sharpassand Is in Danger," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 13 July 1989, 1).

127. Ibid.

128. "Hashemei-Rafsanjani: I Voted for a Council-Typed Leadership," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 15 June 1989, 12.

129. "The Country's Management Is Unable to Implement the Five-Year Plan," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 17 August 1989, 1.

130. "Groups and Political Parties Have Not Received Permission Yet," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 27 July 1989, 1, 11.

The four groups which have been issued permission are:

1- The Society of Muslim Women

2- The Society of Sacrificers for Islam

3- The Assembly of Militant Clerics

4- The Guild of Muslim Artists and Writers

131. Ibid., 11.

132. "Iraq Demands Direct Negotiations," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 31 August 1989, 1.

133. Addressing the Assembly of the RG commanders, Rafsanjani warned: "If the enemy does not have the intention of retreating, its withdrawal will surely be achieved by force" ("The Leaders of the Islamic Republics: If Iraq Do Not leave Iran, The War Will Be Resumed," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 28 September 1989, 1). The same stand was taken by Khamenei who sent a message to the Assembly, stressing that:

They [the Iraqis] will sooner or later be forced to withdraw from these areas. Everyone knows that the Revolutionary Iran will not tolerate the presence of an evil aggressor occupier for a long time (Ibid.).

Finally, the Speaker of Parliament, Karoubi, extended the same line of thought when he addressed the MPs. Thus, he said: "If the Islamic Republic becomes disappointed of political negotiations, it will have to find other alternatives for recovering the occupied areas" (Ibid.).

134. "Hashemi-Rafsanjani: We Have To Receive Loan From Abroad," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 18 January 1990, 1.

135. Ibid., 9.

136. "Le Monde: The Corruption Rules With Power in the Islamic Republic," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 22 February 1990, 12.

137. Ibid.

138. "The Five-Year Plan and Using Foreign Facilities," Resalat, 27 January 1990, 11.

139. "Le Monde: The Corruption Rules With Power in the Islamic Republic," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 22 February 1990, 12.

140. Ibid.

141. "Following the Increasing Internal Opposition, The Westerners Have Lost Their Confidence in Rafsanjani," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 19 October 1989, 1.

142. Ibid.

143. "Ceaurescu Went to Tehran," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 21 December 1989, 1.

144. Ibid.

145. "The Rumanian Events Shook Tehran," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 4 January 1990, 4.

146. Ibid.

147. Ibid.

148. "The Bassighies Will Be Thrown Out of Mosques," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 23 November 1989, 3.

149. Kani reasoned his request by saying:

The existence of Bassigh bases in the mosques played a sensitive role during the War. However, as we head towards a stabilized situation, the mosques should preserve their principal and normal features. From now on, therefore, it will not be in our interest to have the mosques as places for doing different affairs which are alien to their sacredness (Ibid.).

150. "For Meeting With a British Woman: The Head of the Judiciary Was Severely Criticized," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 12 October 1989, 1.

151. Ibid.

CHAPTER III
THE MODERATE FACTION
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The first public debate on the existence of a "moderate" faction began in late 1986. What instigated journalistic and academic debates on the existence and hoped-for takeover of the "moderates" was the revelation of US-IRI clandestine relations, known as Irangate. All of a sudden, the alleged analysis of a group of influential American policy makers became a fact taken for granted by some scholars and journalists. Since then, the Reagan Administration has been mainly criticized for conducting a covert operation which involved a number of illegal activities without the sanction and knowledge of Congress. What has been missing in these criticisms is any serious and continuous attempt to evaluate the validity of the theory of the moderate faction. This is rather surprising because the entire clandestine operation allegedly began as a result of a prevailing belief among top American policy makers in the division of the Khomeini government into "radicals" and "moderates". While belief in the existence of "moderates" may stem from poor access to the relevant information, incorrect assumptions and misperception, the preservation of American strategic interests, and not the consolidation of the "moderates", is the main reason behind the American administration's conviction in the theory of the "moderates".

Western policies towards Iran in general and those of the USA in particular are determined by the strategic importance of Iran for the security and stability of the West. In terms of non-political factors, Iran is extremely rich in minerals ranging

from oil and natural gas to iron and uranium. Having large known reserves of strategic raw material, Iran's shift to either global superpower may considerably endanger the position of the other side. In addition, Iran has a large and rapidly-growing population (52m.¹) which can afford to pay for its ever-increasing needs.

From a geo-political approach, Iran is doubtlessly significant for the West, in two ways. It shares about 2,500 km border with the USSR. This gives Iran a decisive role in checking the Soviet southward penetration towards the warm waters of the Persian Gulf. In return, that role gives Iran an outstanding weight in the maintenance of balance of power between two rival blocks. Besides, a friendly Iran can be a great asset for the security of certain NATO countries such as Turkey which otherwise has to bear the formidable task of balancing the USSR in the region all alone.

Likewise, Iran can be a strong and reliable help to pro-Western Pakistan which has been threatened by Indian might ever since its foundation. In a somewhat unexpected way, Iran has recently announced its possible direct military support of Pakistan should the recent Kashmir crisis lead to a war between India and Pakistan.²

Finally, Iran has the largest coast line with the Persian Gulf and the Oman Sea (2,500 km.). Because of that, as the largest and powerful country of the region, the country is able to significantly affect the stability of oil-producing countries of

the Persian Gulf e.g. Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman. Without any doubt, their stability and friendly relations with the West are of great importance to the latter.

Hence the political mode in Tehran determines the fate of Iran as well as that of the region to a great extent. It goes without saying that an Iranian anti-Western and pro-Eastern regime could upset the strategic balance against the West. In order to avoid such a bleak scenario the West, in general, and the USA in particular, have strong stakes in influencing the pace of events in their own favour. For this reason, the desire for having a friendly regime in Iran is quite understandable.

Yet it is wrong to think that the moderate theory has been formulated in order to construct a theory for the conversion of a so-called hostile government to a friendly one through the reinforcement of the power of one of its factions. As will be discussed, prior to the initiation of serious negotiations, it had been clear to the Americans that they were dealing with the entire Khomeini system and not with just one of its factions. Knowing that, the Americans went ahead to negotiate and arm the Islamic government. The reason was that the US analyzed the entire system as anti-communist and pro-West within certain ideological limits and thus chose to consolidate rather than to destabilize. After all, the very reasons which convinced the West, and the USA in particular, to stop supporting the Shah and

help Khomeini seize power existed in 1985-86.³ There are convincing indications that they are still in place.

Hence strategic considerations are the decisive factors for the formulation of the moderate-faction theory. What makes the theory more fascinating for the West is its strong belief in the strength of the IRI. This belief has fostered a tendency among Westerners to underestimate the incremental trend of opposition among the Iranians, stemming from a generally difficult social, political and economic environment.⁴

Instead of that, the focus of the West has been on the overall weakness of the anti-regime opposition. The opposition is divided along ideological, political and personal differences whose immediate result has been its inability to form a strong alternative to the Islamic regime. Those exceptional groups e.g., the Mojahedin which are relatively stronger than the others and may develop into a serious alternative government do not enjoy the support of the West because of their subscription to radical ideologies.⁵ In short, no single group is strong enough to topple the IRI without the assistance of the others or major powers while the creation of a strong united front of the pro-West opposition for the same cause does not seem likely in the near future.

Western belief in the durability of the Islamic regime has contributed to the plausibility of having closer ties with the non-friendly IRI. Since the IRI's negative reputation makes any direct expression of desire for closer relations highly

controversial for Western governments, there is a need for some argument to justify the West's need for closer ties with the Islamic regime. The theory of moderate faction offers a persuasive argument for the Western public as it covers the real incentive of relations under the convincing pretext of dealing with the moderates and not the entire regime. This chapter will present evidence to substantiate this claim.

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Before proceeding, a brief review of the announced objectives of US clandestine relations with Iran seems necessary. According to the Majority report of the Congressional Committee on the Iran-Contra affair, the covert operation which was initiated in the Summer of 1985 was simply an arms-for-hostages operation.⁶ Being proposed by the Israelis who had already been involved in arms deals with the IRI, the plan was accepted by the National Security Council (NSC) despite the firm opposition of the Defence and State Secretaries.⁷ The initiative then turned into a fund-raising operation for certain Latin American projects. An NSC employee, Lt. Colonel Oliver North, came up with the idea of overcharging the Iranian government in order to generate funds for the Contras.⁸

Although the arms sales did not lead to the release of all the hostages, the transfer of arms for the same purpose was continued in 1986 with the sanction of President Reagan, according to the report.⁹ Adding better relations with Iran to the agenda, the initiative was continued even when it was somewhat clear that

neither the latter objective nor the release of the hostages would be achieved.¹⁰ As the report argues, the reason was the lucrative arms deal with Iran which provided the NSC with a source of finance for the Contras.¹¹

The report stipulates the closure of the first channel of communication with the Iranians due to its unreliability.¹² That decision for the closure of the channel which had been opened by an Iranian businessman (Manucher Gorbaniyar) was made in May 1986 after a meeting between the NSC delegation, headed by Robert McFarlane, and the representative of the Islamic government in Tehran.¹³ The delegates which had been sent to finalize the release of all the US hostages in return for arms realized that their Iranian counterparts had no idea about that arrangement; hence a second channel was opened with the assistance of Albert Hakim, another Iranian businessman.¹⁴

Only two hostages were released through the first channel while the second channel facilitated the freedom of another hostage, the report concludes.¹⁵ The revelation of the secret relations between the Iranian elite and the Americans in November 1986 resulted in the termination of that operation.¹⁶

Whereas the report of the majority of the Congressional Committee pictures the operation as an arms-for-hostages deal, evidence suggests that the reality was totally different. Zbigniew Brzezinski, for instance, views the initiative as an attempt to establish relations with the IRI for the sake of preserving US strategic interest:

The effort to establish some links with some potential successors to Khomeini is justified by the geostrategic importance of Iran. I do not believe, however, that this need entails a continuing arms-supplying relationship.¹⁷

Similarly, scholars such as Barry Rubin evaluate the secret relations as an attempt to secure American strategic interests. He suggests that the initiative was consistent with a number of long-term American goals reflected in:

[d]emanding that Iran cease supporting terrorism and use its influence to release American hostages in Lebanon to signal its seriousness about improving relations; [c]onvincing Iran to seek a peaceful end to the Iran-Iraq war; [m]aking clear to Iranian leaders that the United States will act decisively against any attack on Gulf states friendly to Washington; [a]voiding any situation that would turn Iran into a Soviet client or lead to increased Soviet influence there.¹⁸

As the main focus of the media has been on issues like the arms-for-hostages deal and especially negotiations with the "moderates", it is necessary to analyze the opinion of influential American sources on the real objectives of the covert relations. To start with, two published secret documents which were signed by President Reagan and Admiral Pointdexter (National Security Adviser) shed some light on the American objectives.

The first document is the presidential authorization of the clandestine operation which determines its goals as:

- (1) establishing a more moderate government in Iran;
- (2) obtaining from them [Iranian sympathetic to the USA] significant intelligence not otherwise obtainable, to determine the current Iranian government's intentions with respect to its neighbours and with respect to terrorist acts;
- (3) furthering the release of the American hostages held in Beirut and preventing

additional terrorist acts by these groups; [and] [provide] funds, intelligence, training, guidance and communications and other necessary assistance to these elements, groups, individuals, liaison services and third countries in support of these activities.¹⁹

The document further stresses the intention of consolidating the position of the "moderates" by specifying the role of the US government which was to:

facilitate efforts by third parties and third countries to establish contact with moderate elements within and outside the Government of Iran by providing these elements with arms, equipment and related material in order to enhance the credibility of these elements in their efforts to achieve a more pro-U.S. government in Iran by demonstrating their ability to obtain requisite resources to defend their country against Iraq and intervention by the Soviet Union.²⁰

The second document, a "memorandum for the President", emphasizes the American potential role in creation of a moderate regime in Iran. According to the document, the Americans were persuaded by the Israeli belief in the potential of the "Western-oriented" elements or "moderates" for establishments of a moderate regime in Iran through American arms-sales. Hence it observes:

The Israeli plan is premised on the assumption that moderate elements in Iran can come to power if these factions demonstrates their credibility in defending Iran against Iraq and in deterring Soviet intervention.²¹

The document refers to the issue of releasing the hostages as a by-product of the initiative.²² Hence the initiative had a variety of objectives and was not meant to be reduced to an arms-for-hostages operation.

Yet these documents back the prevailing view of the American belief in the existence of "moderates" and their genuine efforts for negotiations with them. Before entering the debate on the very notion of moderate faction, it is essential to provide other documents in order to determine the real objectives of the initiative.

One source which clears up some of the ambiguity of the covert operation is the Minority Report of the Congressional Committee. Whereas the Majority Report gives a very limited scope to the initiative, the Minority Report suggests strategic considerations as the operation's central motivation. Elaborating on the strategic importance of Iran, the report stipulates:

The majority report systematically downplays the importance of strategic objectives in the Iran initiative. We believe, to the contrary, that the record is unambiguous on the following facts: (1) that strategic objective were important to the participants at all times; (2) that the objectives were credible; (3) that they were the driving force for the initiative at the outset, and (4) that without such a strategic concern, the initiative would never have been undertaken.²³

The Report, therefore, rejects arms deals, release of the hostages and generating money for the Contras as the basic aims of the initiative. It discloses the agenda of the initiative as the following:

- establish a new U.S. relationship with Iran, thus strengthening the U.S. strategic posture throughout the Persian Gulf region;
- counter Soviet influence in Iran;
- lessen Iran's dependence on the Soviet Union and other communist nations as arms supplies;
- open a channel to pragmatic Iranian officials;

- wean the Iranian regime away from terrorism;
- encourage a negotiated settlement of the Iran-Iraq war;
- protect the northern tier countries (Pakistan, India and their neighbours) and encourage their [Iranians] interest in supporting the Afghan resistance forces;
- protect the southern tier countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Israel and Egypt);
- improve U.S. intelligence capabilities in Iran; and
- discourage Iranian arms exports to Nicaragua.²⁴

Although the release of the hostages became one of the goals of the clandestine negotiations, the stimuli of the operation remained establishment of long-term relations. Within the latter context, the freedom of the hostages was considered as a stage for changing the circumstances in favour of a rapprochement. This notion was emphasized by the Americans involved in the operation during their meetings with the IRI authorities. Hence,:

at those meetings, U.S. officials sought a long-term strategic relationship with Iran to oppose Soviet expansionism. The hostages issue was presented as an obstacle to an enhanced relationship that would have to be overcome, not as the objective of the initiative. Colonel North made an extensive presentation to this effect in February 1986; former National Security adviser McFarlane made a similar presentation in Tehran in May 1986.²⁵ (this writer's emphasis)

The Minority Report idea on the status of the hostages issue in the whole operation has also been confirmed by an unidentified involved official who said:

This thing [covert relations] was undertaken with a worthy strategic objective,...When we undertook the project, the hostages were never discussed. They were never part of the planning. All of this grew out of our discussions with the Iranians.²⁶ (this writer's emphasis)

Even President Reagan who also tried to have the hostages released for personal reasons²⁷ never viewed the initiative as an arms-for-hostages operation. This claim was evident in the personal conversation of the President with a reporter in February 1986 who was given some information in return for his silence with respect to the initiative. Responding to his question on whether the initiative had anything to do with the hostages, Reagan said:

All right. The Iranian situation. We have to remember that we had a pretty solid relationship with Iran during the time of the Shah. We have to realize also that that was a very key ally in that particular area in preventing the Soviets from reaching their old goal of the warm water ports, and so forth. And now with the take-over by the present ruler, we have to believe that there must be elements present in Iran that -when nature takes its inevitable course- they want to oppose what they are doing. We at the same time must recognize we do not want to make enemies of those who today could be our friends.²⁸

Acknowledging the correctness of seeking US strategic interests, the Minority Report offers an explanation for the failure of the initiative. According to the Report, the employment of improper means led to the collapse of the efforts. Namely, heavy reliance of the Americans on Gorbanifar, who allegedly cheated both sides, created misunderstanding on both sides.²⁹ This was evident, as the Report points out, in the surprise of the Iranian negotiators once they heard from their American counterparts in Tehran that US interest in normalization of relations was the main item on the agenda of negotiations since they were only interested in arms for releasing the hostages.³⁰ Hence the improper channel of Gorbanifar, holds the

Report, caused the initiative to degenerate into a "series of 'arms-for-hostages' deals".²¹ Negotiations through the first channel, therefore, "never got off [the] arms-for-hostages track".²²

The Minority Report sees the disappointment of the Americans for achieving their strategic goals as the reason for the creation of the second channel.²³ Opened by Albert Hakim, its agenda was structured around strategic matters such as:

- U.S. and Soviet interests in Iran
 - U.S. and Iranian interests in Afghanistan;
 - Iran's objectives in the Iran-Iraq war;
 - Soviet objectives in the Iran-Iraq war;
 - intelligence information about deceased hostage William Buckley; and
 - establishing secure communication between the two governments to avoid compromise by hostile third governments.
- The negotiation also raised the possibility of an expanded military supply relationship, but the US participants made it clear that such a relationship presupposed resolution of the hostage situation, which was also discussed extensively.²⁴

Notwithstanding the rhetoric of the Report, consolidation of the "moderates" was not the objective of the initiative. It is true that "open[ing] a channel to Iranian pragmatic officials " was one of the items on the agenda, but there are some indications which downgrade its importance, on one hand, and American seriousness about it, on the other hand. To substantiate the claim, three issue areas will be discussed: the importance of the consolidation of the "moderates" for the initiative, the political orientation of the Iranian negotiators in practice, and the meaning of the terminology.

In contrast to the understanding prevalent among the Western public, no published document has provided firm ground to prove the sincere interests of the US administration in consolidation of the "moderates". The only available exceptions, which are two previously-mentioned documents signed by President Reagan and Admiral Poindexter, lose their significance once the contradictory practice of the Americans is taken into consideration.

As discussed earlier, being in touch with the pragmatics was one of the objectives. However, it seems to have been more a means to facilitate negotiations with the Khomeini government (and not one of its factions) rather than a goal in itself. That is why the main architects of the initiative did not give weight to the goal of being in touch with the pragmatics once dealing with the IRI. Nor did the initiative begin with that assumption in practice. The hearing of Robert McFarlane, for example, backs these arguments.

While stating the desire for influencing a change in the IRI initially, McFarlane elaborated on a type of agenda which could not be achieved through negotiation with only one IRI faction. In his hearing, McFarlane singled out Israel as the instigator of Irangate and for whose own strategic considerations was also interested in friendly ties with Iran. Because of their already-established secret relations with Iran, the Israelis hinted to the Americans at the possibility of negotiations with the Khomeini regime, through one of their officials, David Kimche.

Hence McFarlane referred to his conversation with Kimche as the stimuli of the US clandestine operation by stating:

He [Kimche] came to report the existence of contacts with Israeli officials and Iranian officials that had gone on for some time, and through these contacts the interest on the part of Iranian officials in establishing contact with the United States....[H]e went to some length to explain the basis to which he and his associates in Israel had concluded that these people were legitimate and sought over time to be able to influence change in Iran away from the rather extreme policies of the time to a more, a less violent coexistence with their neighbours.³⁵

McFarlane also expresses the approval of President Reagan in selling arms to Iran in order to increase the power of that IRI faction ("moderate") in its rivalry with the "radical" faction. Accordingly to McFarlane:

[t]he president points were foremostly that he could imagine that if these people in Iran were legitimate and their interest of changing Iranian policy, and were against terrorism, that to provide them arms would not be at variance with his policy since he wasn't providing arms to Khomeini, but to people opposed to Khomeini's policies.³⁶

While seeming to support the claim of backing "moderates", the previous expressions of assisting the "moderates" was contrary to the actual aims of the initiative. The following part of the McFarlane hearing (which disclosed certain main items of the initiative's agenda) supports the validity of the objectives of the initiative as stated in the Minority report. Reading from documents prepared by the NSC during the covert negotiations, Mr. Hatch, one of the questioners of the hearing, asked the following questions of McFarlane:

"Iran is the key to a region of vital importance to the West. It is increasingly threatened by a growing

Soviet and political influence." Would you agree with that statement? Mr. McFarlane: Yes, sir. ...Mr. Hatch. ...The document goes on to say that the Soviets believe that once the Ayatollah Khomeini dies, they will have an excellent opportunity to influence the formation of a government in Tehran which serves the Soviets's strategic interests. Do you agree with that? Mr. McFarlane. Yes, sir. Mr. Hatch. This leads to the conclusion in the report that the Soviets may well be pursuing their own revolution in Iran.... Do you agree with that appraisal? Mr. McFarlane. It is very possible. Mr. Hatch. Do you agree? Mr. McFarlane. Yes, sir. Mr. Hatch. Were these essentially the parameters you faced at the time that the White House developed its own 1985 Iran initiative? Mr. McFarlane. Yes, sir, they were.³⁷ (this writer's emphasis)

Without any doubt, fear of Soviet expansion in the region and so jeopardizing US interest in the region, was the incentive.

Nevertheless, one might argue that consolidation of the "moderates" could have been the means for coping with the Soviet threat. Although this sounds reasonable, such a statement could not have been true, for one reason. The entire agenda could not have been achieved with the support of only one faction. The nature of the undertaking leaves no doubt for the necessity of full cooperation of the entire Islamic government for its achievement. This is evident in the minutes of McFarlane hearings which reveal the dimensions of the American scheme. Supporting the correctness of the Minority Report on the initiative's agenda, McFarlane specifies some items of the agenda to be the following:

"wean[ing] the Iranian regime away from terrorism³⁸"
 "negotiat[ing] or find[ing] some reason or way to negotiate an end to the Iran-Iraq war³⁹", "protect[ing] the northern tier countries.. and to keep them [IRI authorities] interested in supporting Afghanistan ... and freedom fighters in Afghanistan⁴⁰", lessen[ing] "Iranian reliance on the Soviet Union as the arms

supplier⁴¹", getting "intelligence from Iran⁴²" and obtaining some captured Soviet modern weapons such a T-72 tank.⁴³

An alternative argument could be that the consolidation of the "moderates" was meant to empower the pro-West figures to eliminate their (pro-East) rivals in an anticipated war of succession after the death of Khomeini. Their subsequent seizure of power would secure the strategic interests of the USA in Iran. While persuasive, this scenario could not have come true no matter if it had been the intended result or not. The main assumption of the scenario is the possibility of destruction of one faction by another one which is unlikely at least for one reason. Because of the weakness of the regime at the time when ever-increasing popular dissatisfaction hints at future political unrest, no IRI faction could dare to further weaken the regime by the elimination of any number of rival factions. Any attempt of this nature would surely lead to a military confrontation since all the factions have their loyal units within the military. The likely result of such a confrontation would be unacceptable for the winning faction as an inter-faction war would divide military and security forces and create chaos. This anarchy would make the situation ripe for at least some radical opposition groups like the Mojahedin (which have military capabilities) to topple the divided and weakened regime altogether.

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While the goals sought in the initiative clearly needed the full cooperation of the regime, no firm conclusion could be made

unless the political orientations of the Iranian negotiators were specified. This research will demonstrate the participation and interest of all the major factions in the clandestine relations.

In contrast to the prevailing view as promoted by Western journalists, not only the "moderates" but all factions of the Khomeini regime were behind the secret relations. This implies that the Iranian side of the negotiations were the representatives of all the leading factions of the Islamic regime. At no stage did the representatives of one faction alone, "moderate" or "radical", negotiate with the Americans. Hence negotiations had the support of the entire elite including Khomeini. This claim has been proven by a variety of reliable sources.

The Minority report, for instance, specified the Iranian counterparts of the American negotiator as the following:

The "First Channel" talks between Iran and the United States, from late 1985 through the May 1986 Tehran trip, were arranged and principally conducted by representatives of the Iranian prime minister, who has ties to the more radical elements of the government. Representative of the so-called "middle of the road" Rafsanjani faction also appear to have attended some of these meetings.⁴⁴

The second channel which was opened after the failure of the Tehran negotiation (and allegedly closed when the initiative was disclosed⁴⁵) was arranged and conducted by representatives of Rafsanjani, the leader of the "moderates". However, Rafsanjani proposed that:

representative of other factions be included in the joint commission that was to be established to pursue the normalization of relations. These changes in the leadership of the negotiations appear to have corresponded with an increasingly serious willingness on the part of the Iranian leadership to consider renewed strategic cooperation with the United States, although the leadership did not abandon its interest in acquiring arms in return for hostages.⁴⁶ (this writer's emphasis)

This text clearly reveals the consensus among the elite on the necessity of negotiation with the USA. Therefore, it was not either the initiative of the "moderates" themselves or an attempt for consolidation of the "moderates".

Not only have other sources confirmed the same structure of negotiators but have provided interesting insight to the operation. For instance, Michael A. Ledeen (a liaison between the Israeli, American and some European governments and participants in some negotiations) rejects the claim of negotiation with only one faction by saying:

On the other hand, it was unrealistic to believe that a faction - especially a faction opposed to current policies - could bring about the release of American hostages in Lebanon. Nor could a faction receive and use TOW missiles; these would go to the government, and any military gain that Iran derived from the missiles would work to the government's advantage. Was the government - including the radicals - prepared to change its policies to achieve rapprochement with us? Or was this a clever deception, designed to get our weapons?⁴⁷

His statement not only refutes the cover of the initiative, i.e., consolidating the "moderates", but confirms the interests of the USA in preservation of the Islamic system. It also discredits the Reagan justification of arms sales to Iran which reasons:

if these people in Iran ["moderates"] were legitimate and their interest of changing Iranian policy and were against terrorism, that to provide them with arms would not be at variance with his policy since he wasn't providing arms to Khomeini, but to people opposed to Khomeini's policies.⁴⁸

Once rejecting the possibility of dealing with only one faction regardless of its political orientation, Ledeen specifies the Iranian participants in the negotiations. Talking about the first channel, he provides evidence for the connection of Gorbanifar with the Prime Minister (Mir Hossein Moussavi). For instance, when a party of delivered Hawk missiles to Iran proved to be too outdated to satisfy the needs of Iran, the IRI Prime Minister sent a message to President Reagan through Gorbanifar which was as follows: "We have fulfilled our every promise, and now you have cheated us. You must immediately remedy this terrible situation or else dire consequences will follow."⁴⁹

Even later when the US delegation arrived in Tehran to allegedly talk to the moderates, McFarlane:

was dismayed to discover that although Gorbanifar had earlier promised talks with the president, the prime minister, and Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani, none of these were present. The Australian [representative of the Prime Minister] was again the main interlocutor.⁵⁰

Hence the main connection was the "radical" Prime Minister. Yet this did not mean that others were not involved since later the representative of Rafsanjani (one of his advisers) entered the negotiation⁵¹ and Ahmad Khomeini (son of Khomeini) was kept up-to-date too.⁵² The involvement of Ahmad Khomeini in the negotiations shatters the validity of some journalistic claim that:

Rafsanjani and four other Iranian leaders had arranged Mr. McFarlane's visit in May without telling Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Iranian revolutionary leader....Only after Mr. McFarlane had landed in Tehran did Hojatolislam Rafsanjani tell Ayatollah Khomeini of his visit and sought permission to open negotiations with him to improve relations.⁵³

What further distracts from this claim is the Khomeini reaction. The "moderates" were not punished for the scandal although the opportunity for their purge could not have been better at any other time. In addition, Rafsanjani's public signals at the peak of Irangate leave no room to be sure that the initiative had the sanction of Khomeini himself. On 6 December 1986, Rafsanjani said in an interview with the Iranian official press agency that:

We have nothing against talking to them [Americans] through the same weapons purchase channels....We are ready to intercede to the extent that the Americans give us back our assets....There are no problems for us at this level and the Americans can make contact if they want to.⁵⁴

One could still argue that the absence of the Prime Minister, President and Rafsanjani in the Tehran negotiations proves their fear of a likely punishment by Khomeini. However, firstly, it is not certain if they really did not take part in the Tehran talks personally. Although the Americans, including McFarlane, have claimed so, the reality still could be the opposite. McFarlane's initial comments on the event have cast doubt on his future statements. During an interview with ABC television, he rejected the Iranian announcement of its refusal to negotiate with a group of Americans who went to Iran without the knowledge of the IRI by saying: "We came as properly clad representatives of the United

States Government and were treated as such....I carried my own passport. No one asked for it."⁵⁵

If it was the case at all, perhaps the reason for the indirect participation of the three IRI top figures could be their dissatisfaction with the arrangement. An American insider believes that the amount of weapons shipped to Iran by the delegate was less than the IRI expectation.⁵⁶ Top IRI officials lost their interest in negotiations since they interpreted the shortage of arms as another sign of American ill-will towards the IRI.⁵⁷ The source put the blame on Gorbanifar who lied to the Iranians about the amount of arms which the Americans accepted to deliver in order to keep them interested in continuation of relations through himself.⁵⁸ In addition, the lack of awareness of IRI leaders regarding the high political status of the delegates made them reluctant to negotiate directly.⁵⁹ They were not interested in talks with low-profile Americans whose promises could be ignored or overruled by top American officials.⁶⁰

Yet there is still doubt about the absence of IRI leaders, for two reasons. Firstly, the trip to Tehran was a planned trip and so it sounds illogical if the status of the American negotiators were unknown to the other side. McFarlane's acceptance of proper treatment of the delegation by the Iranians discredits that reasoning. Secondly, there is some evidence that the amount of US arms shipped to Iran in May 1986 was far greater than the

announced planeload of Hawk missiles.⁶¹ One source estimates it to be 20 planeloads of American weapons.⁶²

Ledeen believes that in practice all the factions of the Islamic government were involved in covert relations. This implies that both channels connected the Americans to the Khomeini government, of course through different mediators. The Prime Minister was the mediator of the first channel⁶³ while Rafsanjani had the same function for the second channel.⁶⁴ The involvement of the entire elite in the negotiations regardless of the mediator was acknowledged by Bakhramani, the representative of Rafsanjani through the second channel. Accordingly, it became clear that Bakhramani was:

a direct channel to Rafsanjani, which the Americans pronounced a distinct advantage over Gorbanifar, who was dealing with all three factions in the Iranian regime. But in reality, as Bakhramani constantly reminded the Americans in the discussions they held, Rafsanjani was doing precisely the same thing-coordinating each decision with all the factions.⁶⁵ (this writer's emphasis)

Nevertheless, the negotiators of the second channel were not only the representative of Rafsanjani, but of Moussavi as well. In reality, the second channel was essentially the outcome of the joint efforts of the latter two because its main negotiators were Ali Hashemi Bakhramani, an officer in the Revolutionary Guard Corps (RGC) and a nephew of Rafsanjani and Semail, an RGC intelligence officer in the Moussavi office.⁶⁶

Ledeen argues that the idea of consolidation of a faction was at best wishful thinking and at worst a serious misreading of Iran.⁶⁷ This was because the IRI power structure simply

undermines any attempt for increase or decrease of the power of one of its components. This view was confirmed in practice because:

{t}he model of internal conflict among three factions ...had been confirmed over and over again, most recently from Bakhramani himself. So Cave, Secord, and North should have realized that any effort to disrupt the internal balance, such as narrowing contacts and deals to a single faction during an attempt to come to terms with the Ayatollah's regime, was bound to fail. The others would do their best to sabotage everything.**

As a result, in all cases the Americans were dealing with the entire Khomeini government.** This notion was also confirmed by McFarlane in his hearing when he was elaborating on communication problems with the IRI government and his attempts to overcome it before sending a delegation to Iran as he said:

I spent quite a long time going over minimum conditions that would warrant sending a personal representative of the President to Iran and they included firm, credible guarantees on the pre-conditions, that is, setting behind us all of the arms traffic, and prisoner releases, and then agreement on the agenda - the four points that were acceptable to both sides, that the meetings would be with the Speaker, the Prime Minister and the President and so forth - and on each of these points we said, yes, all right, that is in place finally⁷⁰. (this writer's emphasis)

In a sense more than of being a single specific faction within the covert relations framework, the "moderate" faction seems to be a political coalition of the Islamic elite who have common understanding towards some aspects of IRI foreign policy. It implies that domestic problems had forced the leaders to realize the sensitivity of the situation. This appreciation of the problems has given them the flexibility to initiate a policy for

a period of time which seems necessary for the consolidation of the troubled political system. Hence factions with different political orientations agreed on negotiations with the USA to satisfy their immediate needs. It sounds logical to believe that each faction had (and perhaps still has) a particular interpretation of the joint policy which determines its level of commitment and longevity of support to the common cause.

Certain details on the nature of two channels may substantiate this view. Explaining the characteristics of the first channel, i.e., through the "radical" Prime Minister, Ledeen talks about the Iranian representative who was representing several Iranian officials:

whose positions in the government, the military, the clergy, and even such organizations as the Revolutionary Guards, were sufficiently impressive that they could make a credible claim of constituting an effective force for change. We understood that these were not people who were interested in sabotaging the Shiite revolution; none of them could be accurately termed "moderate" in the normal common sense meaning of the term.¹ (this writer's emphasis)

The latter statement clearly pictures the "moderates" as representatives of the entire range of elite interests having no serious dispute over major issues such as the very nature of the Khomeini-built system. Thus, moderation is a misleading nickname for the entire Khomeini regime, including the Ayatollah himself. Hypothetically, it could be argued that the talks of normalization of relation with the Islamic regime could hardly be sold to the Americans agitated by the events like the occupation of the US Embassy and hostages in Lebanon. To overcome that

problem, a more plausible title was designated for the Khomeini regime to increase the feasibility of future relations. After all, who could believe that:

Hojatolislam Rafsanjani, who has emerged as the regime's foreign policy spokesman since the arms deal revelation, could enunciate policy regarding the United States and the Soviet Union without at least the tacit approval of Ayatollah Khomeini. The Ayatollah first articulated the need for Iran to establish relations with the rest of the world in a speech in October 1984.⁷²

* * *

While it is clear that the USA had neither a desire nor had attempted to contact one specific faction despite the rhetoric, it is important to analyze the meaning of "moderation" as the Americans perceive it. This terminology has actually become vague and confusing, for two reasons. On one hand, different, opposite and contradictory meanings for the same notion have been offered by scholars as well as by the main protagonists of the clandestine relations. A variety of other terminologies have been used by the same group when referring to the same phenomenon, on the other hand.

A few examples illuminate the point. As an architect of the whole operation, McFarlane, for instance, accepted the objective of closer relations with the "moderates" who were different from "fanatics" when he was asked:

Mr. Courter. Do you think the United States has a legitimate goal in attempting to create relations with some elements ("moderates") in Iran? McFarlane. Yes, sir. Mr. Courter. That was indeed one of the pillars or reasons for the President's policy there, was it not? Mr. McFarlane. Yes, sir, it was.⁷³

Later, in the same hearing, McFarlane confirmed division of the Islamic Government to "radicals" and "pragmatics" when he was questioned:

Mr. Hyde. And, therefore, we relied, did we not, perhaps excessively, but of necessity, on Israeli intelligence for information as to who the pragmatics were, who the radicals were, who we could talk to and who we couldn't, because we didn't have that information. Isn't that true? Mr. McFarlane. Yes, I think it is.⁷⁴

Likewise, certain scholars use different terminologies while addressing the same group of people. Ramazani, for instance, had certain views on "moderates" who were logically different from "radicals" in the wake of Irangate.⁷⁵ The same scholar later divided the Islamic elites into "revolutionary realists" ("moderates") and "revolutionary idealists" ("radicals").⁷⁶

Some newspapers have contributed to this confusion too. For instance, The Times has designated two different titles to Rafsanjani which are "moderate" and "pragmatic".⁷⁷ Hazhir Teimourian who writes for the same newspaper has used three different names for the opponents to Rafsanjani, as follow: "hardliners"⁷⁸, "ultra-radicals"⁷⁹ and "militant wing of the state"⁸⁰.

Needless to say this change of terminology, while addressing the same group of Islamic elite, has further increased the ambiguity. Perhaps, journalistic and scholarly use of a variety of terminologies has stemmed from their reliance on contradictory official news releases or their analysis based on available information. However, the American contribution to this

vagueness could have its roots in their indifference to clear articulation of terminologies. Since the main thrust of the operation was to secure US strategic interests, what was of no importance to them was the real nature of the Iranian negotiators so long as US interests were not at stake. This apathy later translated itself into a number of different terminologies which the Americans used to make a credible story for the public. At different occasions, therefore, different terminologies were used to satisfy the immediate demands of that occasion.

Whereas the concept is confusing and unclear, it is clear what moderation does not stand for. The concept does not mean a conviction in a specific system of government, i.e., liberal democracy. Nor does it imply a belief in a version of free enterprise as the relevant and compatible economic system to that particular form of government. Consequently, the conviction in rule of law, recognition of essential rights and freedoms of citizens and respect for and compliance with internationally recognized laws are not the components of this terminology in our case.

An analysis of the Americans' understanding of moderation within the IRI framework will provide some arguments to support these claims. As an active-behind-the-scene participant of US-IRI covert relations, Ledeen stresses the desire of the "moderates" to continue the "Shiite revolution".²¹ He believes that they cannot be considered moderates in proper usage of the

term. Therefore, Ledeen describes the meaning of "moderates" within the context of the initiative as:

people who had many reasons for seeking out better relationship with the United States, and for changing the policies of their government. In addition to their religious convictions, they were anti-communist, and were united in their conviction that Iran could not long survive in total isolation from the West. They were therefore prepared to work for a moderation of national policies. In this sense, and in this sense only, the term "moderate" could accurately be applied to them. "Pro-western" is a more accurate description of their attitudes.*² (this writer's emphasis)

He then makes it clear that desire for relations with the USA was enough for calling them moderates, or, in his words:

When Shultz and Weinberger testified before the Select committees in the summer of 1987, both were quite confident in saying they believed there were no Iranian "moderates" with whom to deal. In one sense of the word moderate", they were clearly right. All important figures in Iran are loyal to the revolution and, on many issues, what we regard as fanatics. But in another sense- open to some shifts in foreign policy that would improve the chances for a better relationship with us- they were almost certainly too categorical.*³ (this writer's emphasis)

For the sake of clarity, Ledeen specifies who is included in his definition. Accordingly, these are also the characteristics of the well-known leader of the "moderates": Rafsanjani. Ledeen gives an example of a "radical" demand of Rafsanjani to support his view. Elaborating on the Tehran negotiations, the author says:

By the third day, the adviser [of Rafsanjani] was presenting outrageous demands from the Hezbollah, ranging from Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights to American promises that Kuwait would free the Da'wa prisoners. McFarlane said: "No deal."....Finally, on the evening of the third day, after hours of discussion about the nature of the Iranian Revolution and attitudes toward the United States, the adviser got

down to brass tacks: everything else could be resolved, if only the release of the Da'wa prisoners could be managed."⁴

Hence moderation equals anti-communism and interest in relations with the USA. Obviously, these characteristics could hardly qualify a person as moderate as far as the common understanding of moderation is concerned. Moreover, anti-communism is not the characteristic of one single IRI faction since the IRI in its totality is an anti-communist entity. This has been reflected in brutal suppression of the Iranian Communists since the creation of the Khomeini system.

Ledeen's meaning of moderation is not exclusive. Others have offered other meanings for the same concept. Scholars such as Barry Rubin believe in the existence of moderates in its conventional sense while they view them out of the power circle as they are identified by their severe numerical weakness and lack of power; hence figures such as Rafsanjani are excluded."⁵ In such a circumstance, "moderates" within the government are those:

whose interests and ambitions may lead them largely to set aside both the goal of region-wide Islamic revolution and the aggressive use of terrorism. In fact, the secret contacts between Washington and Tehran would probably not have been leaked if the people who favour a more extremist foreign policy had not lost a power struggle in Tehran."⁶

Hence "moderates" include all the ruling factions. This is because there is sufficient evidence to be sure that all the powerful factions of the Islamic regime approved of the covert relations and enjoyed the sanction and blessing of Khomeini, as

discussed earlier. Consequently, "extremists" are different from "radicals" as the latter were enthusiastic supporters of negotiations. The "extremists", therefore, were (and perhaps still are) accommodated in the faction of Ayatollah Montazeri whose relative (Mehdi Hashemi) leaked the news of the Tehran negotiations to the Lebanese newspaper Al-Sharrah.⁷ The continuation of IRI-backed terrorism in the post-Khomeini era prove that all the ruling factions are not prepared to "set aside ... region-wide Islamic revolution or ... terrorism".⁸

Hence complexity and confusion are salient characteristics of these terminologies within the context of the issue under study. There are neither generally-accepted criteria for distinction among "extremists", "hardliners", "radicals" and "revolutionary idealists", nor are there clear and consistent definitions for "moderates", "pragmatics" and "revolutionary realists". To make the situation yet more complicated, the term "fanatics" has been used to describe the entire Khomeini regime.

This discussion is not complete without a brief examination of the views which somehow question the validity of the theory of moderate faction from a Western viewpoint. As a matter of fact, a number of politicians as well as journalists and scholars reject or have strong doubt about the theory. Nevertheless, they are very few in number and their voices can hardly be heard. For instance, William Colby, ex-CIA Director, expressed his doubt about the theory when he said:

With the present Government, I have strong doubts. They have indicated total hostility. Their cause is

fundamentally an ideological cause against the "great Satan" - the United States - and against modern culture and society.⁸⁹

Another ex-CIA Director, Stansfield Turner shared the same viewpoint:

Nobody in the Khomeini Government is going to cosy up the United States. I think it is a very slim chance as long as Khomeini is in power, or even when Khomeini is gone.⁹⁰

At least since the death of Khomeini as a journalist, Amir Taheri has been one of the most outspoken opponents of the theory. Viewing Ayatollah Montazeri's ideas on the Iranian economy and politics far more moderate than those of Rafsanjani, Taheri implicitly titles Rafsanjani as "radical" when he says:

Montazeri's opponents, including the powerful Speaker of the Islamic parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani (at that time), on the other hand, favour a collective leadership and advocate more radical domestic and foreign policies. They want further nationalisation, including state control of foreign trade, and the distribution of land among the peasants. They also want to see Iran's recent tilt towards the Soviet Union become firm.⁹¹

Some other well-known journalists have also expressed their scepticism. In an article published in the post-Khomeini era, Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta disclosed the Bush administration's secret negotiations with the "moderates". Its immediate objective was said to be the release of American hostages.⁹² The authors believe that the harassment of a top official of the Mojahedin (an Iranian radical opposition organization), Aladdin Touran, who was arrested in Los Angeles and charged with possessing a fake passport, was part of the secret deal with the IRI.⁹³

With respect to Rafsanjani, Anderson and Van Atta rejected his so-called moderation by stipulating:

But Iranian-sponsored terrorism did not end when Khomeini died. Rafsanjani has continued its relentless, bloody tempo. Apologists for Rafsanjani say he has no choice because he must please the leftover Khomeini hardliners. But another possibility is that Rafsanjani is a terrorist because it suits his own purposes.*4

They even connect Rafsanjani to the hostage-takers by signifying his relative silence concerning the execution of Lt. Col. William R. Higgins as they said:

Not only did Rafsanjani fail to condemn the execution in the strongest terms, but Tehran radio, which is run by his brother, was downright exultant about the murder.*5

They conclude that Rafsanjani was behind the hostage takings and had tried to use that as leverage for forcing the Americans to negotiate with the IRI. They offer the following explanation to support their claim:

We have heard details of Higgins fate that point directly to Rafsanjani even when Khomeini was still alive. A confidential bulletin was circulated among Rafsanjani's clique in the Iranian parliament last December that called for the execution of "the most important Western hostage, namely Col. Higgins." The Bulletin implied that Higgins' death would put pressure on the incoming Bush administration to bargain for the remaining hostages and send Bush running into the arms of the "pragmatic" Rafsanjani to cut a deal. Behind the scenes, that is exactly what is happening.*6

Scholars like Rubin have also had doubt about the theory. This scepticism takes the form of rejection of the possibility of the takeover of the system by true moderates. Rubin has suggested a fierce power struggle in the wake of Khomeini's death. The likely outcome, as the author observes, would be:

(t)hose who ultimately triumph will probably share the Ayatollah's vicious dictatorial style and his strident rhetoric. But they may show greater restraint in seeking an end to the war and a measure of economic stability. The Iran of tomorrow will almost surely remain arrogant and radical, but it may not be expansionist or relentlessly subversive."

Consequently, the envisaged moderation would be a policy of following of a restrained and non-expansionist foreign policy with positive attitudes towards the USA.

* * *

Before proceeding to the remaining connected issues i.e., the rejuvenation of the moderate theory in the post-Khomeini era, nature of IRI factionalism, reasons behind policy change towards the IRI by some Western countries and the role of the West in the continuation of the IRI, a brief summary of the outcomes of IRI-USA clandestine relations is presented in this section. The most tangible consequence of relations were further consolidation of a highly unstable regime. On one hand, thanks to the influx of American and Israeli weaponry, the Khomeini government supplied certain needs of its forces which in return contributed to the prolongation of the Iran-Iraq war.** A war which undeniably was cherished by Khomeini and his "radical" and "moderate" disciples as it provided a justification for incompetence of the regime and brutal suppression of its opponents.

On the other hand, covert relations were de facto recognition of the Khomeini system which had also needed foreign psychological support for its consolidation. Ledeen believes that the negotiation strengthened the regime at the time when the

US aim should have been to destabilize it for the sake of establishing a democratic system.** However, the strength of the regime was parallel to the increase in power of the "radicals" and especially the RGC at the expense of the Armed Forces. This was because of two reasons.

Firstly, though other factions were not particularly against the war, the continuation of the war served the interests of the "radicals" whose viewpoints and rhetoric were more compatible with an abnormal war situation than any other situation. The war gave a golden opportunity to the RGC to expand from a poorly trained and numerically weak semi-military force¹⁰⁰ to an estimated 300,000 strong and relatively modern and trained conventional military force.¹⁰¹

Secondly, Western support of Rafsanjani, who was in charge of the war, further strengthened the power of the "radicals". The reason was Rafsanjani's process of becoming closer to a number of institutions including the RGC increased the political power of those "radical" organizations. As a result, two main negotiators of the second channel, through Rafsanjani, were Revolutionary Guards.¹⁰² Regardless of their political orientation, any increase in the power of the leaders of an institution like the RGC will surely lead to an increase in the prestige of that institution. The conduct of negotiations with two Revolutionary Guards proved this point.

The USA knowingly supported the entire Khomeini system. The fact that there was no moderate in the Islamic system and that

even Rafsanjani was not an exception was clear to the Americans, as mentioned before. Moreover, they even knew that their support of the "moderates" would only reinforce the power of the fanatic radicals including Rafsanjani. This is evident in Ledeen's assessment of the second channel through Rafsanjani as he clarifies:

... Cave and Secord knew - and Bakhramani [Rafsanjani representative] reiterated it to them during their conversations - that Rafsanjani was the man in charge of the war with Iraq, and he had become closely allied with the Revolutionary Guards,...the most radical organization in the country. The Revolutionary Guards were the mortal enemies of the regular army, and every serious analyst of Iran believed that one route to moderation of Iranian behaviour lay in strengthening the regular armed forces. It would seem, then, that the second channel, far from representing a way to moderate Iranian behaviour, was in fact the element of the Iranian regime most intensely opposed to moderation.¹⁰³

While there is no doubt about the clear understanding of the Americans about the nature of the Iranian government, the insistence on dealing with the "moderates" looks like nothing more than a cover up for the real objectives of the initiative. For instance George Bush, then Vice President, denied any knowledge of US connection with the "radicals". He denied that Israeli officials told him that: "we are dealing with the most radical elements" in Iran because dealings with moderates had proved unsuccessful."¹⁰⁴

Bush's aide reasoned that the Vice President had always thought of the negotiations to be with moderates despite the clear statement of the Israelis.¹⁰⁵ This is not very convincing as the Israelis even cleared why it was a matter of choice to

negotiate with the "radicals" because "we've learned they ["radicals"] can deliver and the moderates can't."¹⁰⁶. Notwithstanding the evidence, the aide to Bush stuck to the old story by saying:

...there appeared to be some ambiguity in Mr. Nir [Israeli official involved in the operation]'s reference to "we." Since it was the Vice President's view that United States negotiations were being conducted with moderates, Mr. Gregg said that Mr. Nir probably was referring to just the Israelis, and not to the Israelis and Americans who were talking to the Iranians.¹⁰⁷

* * *

It is no wonder that the moderate-faction theory has gained momentum since the death of Khomeini. Whereas many factors forced US policy makers to attribute certain divine characteristics to one specific faction last time, the death of Khomeini changed the political scene in a way that now the dominant factions, and so under it the entire system, can be called "moderate" or "pragmatic".

Upon the quick selection of the successor to Khomeini a day after his death, the new leader, Khamenei, was called moderate since he was "[a leader] who ha[d] firmly allied himself with the wing of the clergy that favours less ideologically extreme policies."¹⁰⁸ All of a sudden, Khamenei became a true "moderate" as the former "archetype of the hard-line mullahs" was seen to be:

less radical, supporting efforts to renew Iran's ties with the West, because he wants to end Iran's isolation and attract foreign funds for reconstruction of the country after its eight-year war with Iraq.¹⁰⁹

Furthermore, the coalition of Khamenei, Rafsanjani and their allies that allegedly had full control over the system has also been called the moderate coalition. Thus, it was said:

Other experts on Iranian affairs said that after a time, elements in the regime like President Khamenei and the assembly of 83 experts that picked him, as well as his ally Hojatolislam Rafsanjani, may have to steer the country toward more mainstream policies again, if for no other reasons than dire economic need and the sheer exhaustion of the population from 10 years war, revolution and struggle.¹¹⁰

The excitement was not confined to the Americans. Certain Europeans have also evaluated the situation as being ripe for the development of moderation because the new leading coalition was perceived as being moderate and strong. Therefore, their ascension to power has been described in the following way:

The succession of the pragmatists to immediate power in Iran was reinforced yesterday at the first Friday prayer to take place in Tehran since Ayatollah Khomeini's death last week...

... The Speaker [Rafsanjani], who has taken over the temporal leadership while the President is in charge of spiritual matters, declared that President Khamenei was qualified to be Iran's supreme leader even if it meant bending the Constitution to give him the post.¹¹¹

Rafsanjani has now been given special attention in order to restore his eroded moderate image. Hence the unacceptable IRI behaviour has been attributed to the "radicals", as follows:

Hojatolislam Rafsanjani is being credited with Thursday's 48-hour postponement of the deadline for the execution of Mr Joseph Cicippio by a wing Hezbollah...the umbrella organization of extremist Shii in south Beirut. Although Hezbollah has in the past given every indication of being an Iranian proxy group, it is widely reported to be controlled by Hojatolislam Rafsanjani's more radical opponents.¹¹²

The author of this text failed to explain how Rafsanjani convinced an organization which was controlled by his opponents not to kill that hostage. The only logical answer could have been Rafsanjani's involvement in hostage-taking which gave him an authority over the hostage-holders. The recent revelation of his masterminding the kidnapping of Terry Waite strongly supports this view.¹¹³ In an article written in the Sunday Times, it was revealed that Rafsanjani ordered the kidnapping of Terry Waite after the disclosure of the IRI-US clandestine relations. Quoting some Lebanese sources, the article suggested that the kidnapping was a defensive tactic of Rafsanjani in order to re-stabilize his position within the Islamic government which had been allegedly damaged because of Irangate. The assertion of Anderson et al. on Rafsanjani's masterminding of hostage-takings and his role in the murder of Col. Higgins provide further evidence on Rafsanjani's involvement in hostage-takings.¹¹⁴

Further reports have sought to make Rafsanjani's moderation credible. An election speech, for instance, was given special weight since it:

lacked the revolutionary polemics of Ayatollah Khomeini. Instead, Hojatolislam Rafsanjani's unmistakable message was that the nation no longer has the time or the ability to chase after militant revolutionary ideals.¹¹⁵

At its peak, Rafsanjani's moderation has been given some substance by attempts to shatter his discredited image through aggrandizing certain ceremonial statements for whose

implementation no guarantee is available. For instance, it has been emphasized that:

the Soviet press agency said the President-elect, Hojatolislam Hashemi Rafsanjani, signed a statement with Mr. Shevardnadze "condemning all acts of a terroristic nature."¹¹⁶

Once "moderates" were specified, other factions became naturally "radical". Ahmad Khomeini has been identified as the chief architect of "radicals" who "has allied himself with elements in the political arena who are wedded to the ideal of pursuing the export and expansion of Iran's Islamic revolutionary creed."¹¹⁷ Ali Akbar Mohtashemi has been introduced as another Islamic "militant" ("radical") who "is the most prominent [opponent of Rafsanjani] who controls much of the state security apparatus."¹¹⁸ Finally, the ex-Prime Minister has been labelled a "prominent hard-liner" for whose non-pragmatic views:

was also left off the new Cabinet list...[and his] post [prime ministerial] was abolished under constitutional changes approved by referendum before the presidential elections.¹¹⁹

Having drawn the political environment like this, not surprisingly constructive results have been envisaged for the alleged moderate domination of the system. Since the Iranian political sentiment has been described as having a clear moderate trend by saying:

"The conventional wisdom a month ago was a definite trend toward pragmatism, with Rafsanjani on track to become a strong executive President," a Western diplomat said. "This scenario continues today."¹²⁰

Because of this optimism, drastic diplomatic change has been predicated. As an example, several diplomats have "suggested

that Iranian relations with the United States could be restored, and a Western envoy said he expected an American presence in Tehran in 18 months."¹²¹ Of course all these were because of rising strength of the "moderates" which helped, as the prevailing view anticipates, to establish a Western-oriented government in Tehran. The chief architect of the new policy was not surprisingly Rafsanjani who, now without any doubt, is thought:

by Western diplomats to favour an opening to the West designed to gain economic and technological help in rebuilding Iran's economy after its eight-year war with Iraq.¹²²

The optimism is not restricted to politicians and journalists, in the absence of Khomeini. Certain scholars have even viewed now that the power struggle has been essentially settled in favour of the "moderates". These premature unrealistic analyses of a very complicated political system in which, due to a variety of factors, no clear and permanent demarcation line can be drawn among factions has its roots in an assumption of division of the IRI into two factions. For some reason, this imaginary division for which no reliable academic proof exists has been found to be useful by a number of scholars who still base their analysis of the Iranian political future on it.

Shahrugh Akhavi is one of those scholars. In one of his recent articles, he specified two rival factions and their leaders in a comparative way. Accordingly, both Mohtashemi and Moussavi are:

known for their support of radical economic policies at home and hostility toward the United States. President Rafsanjani, by contrast, favours conservative domestic policies and is anxious to normalize Iran's relations with the West.¹²³

What Akhavi stressed was the absence of these two influential elements in the new cabinet which he assessed as a sign of a shift in the balance of power between the two factions.¹²⁴ While acknowledging the existence of support for the "radicals" and their possible attempt for a counter-attack, Rafsanjani's position as the Acting Commander-in-Chief of the military was taken as a factor which further secured the power of the "moderates".¹²⁵

However, it was too simplified an analysis of a complicated situation to withstand the cruel force of reality. In a few weeks, there was every indication of a consensus among all the main factions over their share of power at least for awhile. Accordingly, the elimination or weakening of one faction in favour of another was proven out of the question as all the prominent figures were back on the scene.

A brief analysis of the events may clarify the situation. The process of re-adjustment among the factions began fairly soon afterwards. A few weeks after Khomeini's death, Rafsanjani resigned from his supreme military position and relinquished his military authority to the leader.¹²⁶ Depriving Rafsanjani from a key position, Khomeini was no longer seen as very moderate as he also indirectly attacked Rafsanjani for his desire for negotiation with the USA when he said: "no one in the country

would negotiate with the United States unless Washington ended 'its deceitful policies and its support for Israel'.¹²⁷ On the other scene, Rafsanjani accommodated the interests of a great many of the "radicals" by granting them ministerial positions in his cabinet.¹²⁸ Others like Mohtashemi who were not given a cabinet position entered the race as MPs, as discussed in Chapter II in detail.

Having doubts if they ever disappeared, the so-called radicals re-emerged. Certain key positions, now, have been controlled by them. The Parliament is directed by a "radical", Karoubi.¹²⁹ Others have been appointed to sensitive positions, as discussed in Chapter II. In order to send signals to these who were counting on their fading power, the "radicals" did not hesitate to make their existence felt by provoking anti-American sentiment on the anniversary of the occupation of the US Embassy as they chanted loudly: "Death to America".¹³⁰

Yet it is wrong if the "fall" or "rise" of some elements are taken as indicators of the behaviour of the system. It should be reiterated here that, as evidence also suggests, the common interests of the elite determine the political direction of the system. There is no firm and cohesive faction with a permanent and consistent political, ideological and economic view. That is why to the surprise of some observers, Rafsanjani initiated the post-Khomeini foreign policy of Iran by improving relations with the USSR. Suddenly, some Westerners realized that:

in a significant switch from non-alignment which has dominated Iran's foreign policy for a decade, the

rulers of post-Khomeini Iran yesterday launched a campaign to forge closer links between Tehran and the Soviet Union. The change was announced in Tehran by Hojatolislam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani...who was giving the first important press conference since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini.¹²¹

Realities have proven the incorrectness of the prevailing Western view. Therefore, those who were supposed to be anti-communist, according to the Americans, has now emerged to see no ideological compromise in tightening economic and political relations with the USSR.

* * *

Rejection of the theory of a moderate faction raises question on the reasons behind IRI factionalism. This writer does not deny the existence of factions and their rivalry. What is denied here is the division of the Islamic elite into moderate and radical factions because the reason of factionalism is not the belief or disbelief in liberal democracy.

In spite of having opposite views on many issues, these rival factions have certain characteristics in common. All are fundamentalist and firm supporters of theocracy. Exercise of repressive measures and government-by-terror are not matters of disagreement among them. Brutal suppression of any social force which dares to challenge their legitimacy is a principle for these factions. All support crisis-making as a necessary principle for the continuation of the IRI. Finally, they are responsible to ..different extent for whatever has been done under the IRI banner.

The conflict among these factions can be attributed to a number of factors. Dissatisfaction over their shares of power is one. Fear of losing power to other factions and the desire to rule over the others are two other provoking matters. Concern about the very existence of the regime and fear of its collapse are the most important factors which have enhanced competition and hostility among the ruling factions. As a result, disagreements over the methods and extent of social, economic and political affairs are some other continuing elements. Disagreement over the short run foreign policy issues is another factor. Finally, economic matters and the limit of private ownership are two factors involved.

Three issues are of importance in analyzing the social make-up of these factions. Firstly, no firm ideological conflict exists among the factions. There are conflicts over economic and political issues but they do not necessarily fit in left/right or Marxist/capitalist categories as some scholars would argue. No IRI faction has ever proposed a clear and comprehensive political or economic platform in favour of either option. It seems that all the factions support a kind of mixed economy; the difference is essentially over the extent of emphasis on the private versus state sector of a mixed system.

Within the framework of Iran, support for the public sector of the economy is not necessarily equal to a left-of-centre orientation; the nature of the sector does not allow political forces to ignore or seriously limit it.¹²² Besides, the power

which ruling political forces receive from this sector functions as an incentive for its further expansion or at least preservation. Therefore, confiscations, which have been carried out since 1979, have been measures to eradicate the economic basis of the political power of the royalists in order to make the IRI an irrevocable political system. Any comparison between these confiscations and similar measures and those which have taken place in socialist countries for the purpose of calling one faction socialist or semi-socialist is overly simplistic.

Secondly, because the road to power was paved through a compromise for those social groups which normally would never had ascended to power and because of their fear of a dire fate in case of collapse, there is a strong tendency among the elite to remain in power at any price. The elite does not have any firm commitment to any principle except the continuation of theocracy. Therefore, slogans and political and economic stands may be changed several times for tactical purposes. This is true for the regime as well as every IRI faction. Similarly, any support rendered by a country is accepted regardless of its political consequences. The system tolerates sharp and contradictory attitudes towards foreign states. Therefore, one speech in favour of the USSR and state-planned economy or in favour of the USA and free enterprise should not be interpreted as a clear sign of political inclination.

Finally, many slogans, speeches or proposed plans have only "external" use. This means that a number of statements can be

made concerning, for instance, freedom of speech or economic policies only to present a justifiable pretext to some countries which are interested in relations with Iran. Thus, such "new policies" do not have "internal" application, and so, can be replaced by contradictory policies if some other countries are to be "impressed".

The IRI consists of at least nine major factions with different degrees of strength and cohesion. Despite their relatively clear political presence, they are not monolithic and there is permanent interaction among their members. For a number of short-term interests, some of these factions may form coalitions as has been the case over the last eleven years. As mentioned in Chapter I, several other factions have been purged over time whose destruction functioned as a uniting purpose for the others. When the "renegade" factions were destroyed the consensus among the elite disappeared and conflicts and rivalry emerged. The dissolution of the Islamic Republic Party in 1987 dramatized this point and revealed the already hidden rivalry among the fundamentalists; now they were free to continue their rivalry in the form of overt factionalism.¹³³ Since then, each faction has tried to expand its power which has led to inevitable clashes.

Since the revelation of Irangate, the most well-known faction has been that of Rafsanjani.¹³⁴ This faction has been in coalition with several others.¹³⁵ It has, therefore, represented the interests of a group of factions for hegemony

3

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over the others over time. In order to secure the support of some Western countries for its consolidation, the faction of Ratsanjani tends to take pro West (economic and political) stands in some cases. However, when the situation changes, it can become a severe anti-West and pro-Soviet force.¹³⁶ Despite its moderate reputation, the Rafsanjani faction has been a firm supporter of the state monopoly of foreign trade and extensive land reform.¹³⁷

Khamenei leads another IRI faction.¹³⁸ While viewing a role for the private sector in the economy, this faction has taken extreme left stands on many issues. For instance, Khamenei condemned the plan of Moussavi in 1987 for bringing back the Iranians abroad as "a big political mistake" and implicitly charged Moussavi (a "radical", then PM) with "liberalism" and surrendering to the counterrevolution.¹³⁹ In the capacity of the IRI leader, Khamenei has reiterated the necessity of the murder of Salman Rushdie as an unchangeable principle.¹⁴⁰ He has also firmly rejected any interest of the IRI in normalization of relations with a number of countries such as the UK and insisted on the necessity of the pursuit of the "Khomeini line" in internal and external affairs especially with respect to the USA.¹⁴¹

The faction of Ayatollah Azeri-Qumi is another influential faction.¹⁴² It is also known as the Resalat faction because of its newspaper "Resalat". This faction embraces former members of the "Hojatieh".¹⁴³ The Hojatieh is an anti-communist and

anti-Bahai group which is against velayat-e faqih. This group believes that the government should intentionally maximize oppression and inequality in order to speed up the promised appearance of the twelfth Shii Imam (Mehdi).¹⁴⁴ It also represents those clergy and non-clergy who support a larger share for the private sector in foreign trade.¹⁴⁵

The faction of Moussavi is one of the strong leading factions.¹⁴⁶ Directed by Moussavi himself, the Islamic Republic Newspaper is its organ. In spite of his support for a leading role of the state in the economy, Moussavi's faction has supported foreign investment in Iran and joint ventures between the Iranian and foreign private sectors.¹⁴⁷ This faction was also an active participant in the IRI-US clandestine relations. In addition, Moussavi initiated a plan in 1986 to bring back Iranians abroad who were clearly ideological opponents of the IRI. The objective of this plan was to decrease the dissatisfaction of the people through improvements in the functioning of private and state social and economic institutions by employing a large number of experts living abroad and encouraging their investment in Iran. Moussavi was hoping this would strengthen the pillars of his power and give him the higher hand in future rivalries. This initiative was ruined by Khamenei, as mentioned earlier.

The Guardian Council also functions as a faction although some of its members takes sides with other groups.¹⁴⁸ The Guardian Council essentially represents the interests of those clergy who

would like to secure the supremacy of the clergy in the state and society. This is evident in the power of the council in sending back to Parliament or calling void those bills which are perceived as unconstitutional or anti-Islamic. The Guardian Council's denial to grant sanction to several bills in 1986 and 1987 which were supported jointly by Rafsanjani, Moussavi and Khomeini forced Khomeini to order the creation of the Assembly For Determination of Interests of the System in 1987.¹⁴⁹

One of the controversial factions of the IRI is that of Ayatollah Montazeri. Montazeri, who was appointed as successor to Khomeini for his enthusiastic support of velayat-e faqih, lost his strong position in 1986 as a result of the joint-attack of the leading factions involved in Irangate on him.¹⁵⁰ While condemning the pro-West policy of the regime and that of Rafsanjani in particular, Montazeri has been an opponent of the extensive role of the state in a mixed economy.¹⁵¹ Following his plan for succession to Khomeini, Montazeri has taken sides in one way or another with factions such as the Guardian Council and the Resalat Faction as well that of Moussavi.¹⁵² In the post-Khomeini era, this faction has tried unsuccessfully so far to regain its power by challenging the leading figures including Khomeini and Rafsanjani, as discussed in Chapter II.

The Guards Corps (GC) has emerged as a faction since 1986 when it was given the authority to conduct the War.¹⁵³ Nevertheless, the GC does not represent a specific political inclination. Different GC leading figures are somehow related to

the major IRI factions. However, its role as the only reliable military force of the system has provided the institution a quasi-faction position. The power of GC as a demanding new faction has been evident in a number of cases. Since 1986, it has been able to nominate and support a few candidates and have them elected even by force.¹⁵⁴ The influence of the GC was also evident in the participation of Ahmad Rahimzadeh (GC Commander) in the delegation, led by Ahmad Khomeini, which negotiated with the Americans on arms purchases and normalization of relations in Geneva in August 1987.¹⁵⁵

There are still other factions which have lost their power to some extent or who have tried to remain above conflicts. The most well-known example of the former was the "Organization of Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution," (MIR) which was formed by the merger of a number of anti-communist fundamentalist sects right after the establishment of the IRI.¹⁵⁶ The organizational goal was to create an organized, fundamentalist alternative to the Mojahedin whose popularity among the Iranians was significant at that time. As a result of the intensification of its internal conflicts and extension of those conflicts to the cabinet and GC, Khomeini ordered its dissolution in October 1986.¹⁵⁷ Especially after its dissolution, rival sects of the organization joined either the Moussavi faction (Nabavi) or the Rafsanjani faction (Rezaei).¹⁵⁸ The continued presence of both figures in the political scene indicates their established power despite the MIR's dissolution.

The faction of Ayatollah Moussavi-Ardebilly has tried to remain "impartial". The strength of Moussavi-Ardebilly who was one of the founders of the Islamic Republic Party has been evident in his membership in the Assembly for Determination of Interests of the System. Now as the Friday Prayer Leader of Tehran, he enjoys enormous power. Nevertheless, his statements suggest that he has tried not to take stands against various factions, at least publicly. It seems that he has been worried about the collapse of the entire system because of internal competition.¹⁵⁹ Hence he has tried to decrease tension among factions. This faction supports velayat-e faqih, but has no known economic orientation.

* * *

While the prevailing Western attitude towards the IRI has been conciliatory in nature, there have been certain signs of policy change on the part of some Western countries since the death of Khomeini. Even though not irreversible and significant, these changes have been alarming for the IRI in some incidents. It should be pointed out that these unfriendly gestures may have stemmed from a variety of considerations which are not necessarily related to a complete revision of the foreign policy of the relevant countries. A few examples will be elaborated on to clarify the nature of the matter.

Late in September 1989, 209 members of the Italian Parliament including the leaders of parliamentary foreign committees and four ministers released a communique.¹⁶⁰ Addressing the

Italian Prime Minister, the signatories demanded a change of policy towards the Islamic regime. Stressing the continuation of repression in the post-Khomeini era, the policy of searching moderates within the Islamic regime was called futile.¹⁶¹ Hence they demanded: oil and military boycott of Iran, total termination of relations with the IRI, expulsion of IRI representatives from the UN and recognition of the National Council of Resistance (a coalition formed by the Mojahedin which seeks the overthrow of the regime).¹⁶²

Not surprisingly, the IRI responded severely. The Italian charge d'affaires was summoned to the foreign ministry where he was requested to ask his government to clarify its official stand towards Iran as the presence of four Italian cabinet ministers among the signatories created ambiguity about the official stand of the Italian government.¹⁶³

The same story was repeated in Canada. During the NDP conference in December 1989, 120 prominent NDP figures including its federal MPs and provincial MLAs signed a letter in which the Canadian Prime Minister was requested to cut Canada's relations with the IRI and recognize the National Council of Resistance.¹⁶⁴

In another incident, the majority of the European Parliament condemned the IRI in June 1989. Passing a resolution in which the Islamic government was criticized for its blatant abuse of human rights and repression, the MPs demanded the recognition of the National Council of Resistance and the expulsion of the IRI representative from the UN.¹⁶⁵

In Britain 240 MPs condemned the repressive regime of Iran.¹⁶⁶ Writing a letter to the UN Secretary General, these MPs requested an official condemnation of IRI for its continuous abuse of human rights. The signatories also demanded the expulsion of the IRI from the UN and recognition of the National Council of Resistance as the true representative of the Iranian people in the UN.¹⁶⁷

These cases have indicated opposition to the IRI in the West. However, in most cases, the condemnations were the initiative of a minority of MPs (with the exception of the European Parliament case) rather than the official stand of those governments. Hence such could be understood or interpreted in a number of ways. It could be a tactic of the opposition parties in order to disgrace the ruling parties for their relations with unpopular Islamic regimes only for electoral purposes.

It also could be a genuine attempt on the part of certain Western politicians who see that regime as a passing phenomenon, and so, do not want to compromise their countries' long-term interests in Iran with a short term and uncertain lucrative gain.

It could be a deliberate action by some Western countries. Following a policy of stick and carrot, that type of political manoeuvre could be used to change the undesirable behaviour of the IRI through intimidation of its reckless government by showing their interest in a definite alternative regime in Iran.

Finally, it could be attributed to a conservative and prudent policy which prescribes such occasional unfriendly gestures as a

good policy by which the Iranian opposition which would be successful in establishing a new political system in the future could be impressed. As a result, there would be a ground for relations with a would-be alternative Iranian government for some Western countries.

* * *

While it is not a determining factor, Western policy towards Iran has noticeable effects on the continuation of the contemporary regime. Especially after an eight-year war, the IRI is fragile and vulnerable. The regime is facing economic and political problems for which no immediate remedy is available. In the realm of economy, serious uncontrollable inflation, unemployment, shortage of hard currency, insufficient private investment (due to political uncertainty and instability), lack of spare parts and raw materials for factories, severe shortage of competent management due to massive purges and lack of a clear and feasible economic policy are just a few outstanding problems which the Islamic government is dealing with.

Politically, the IRI has internal and external problems. Domestically, economic hardships on one hand and continuous and severe repression and fanaticism on the other, have created an ever-expanding atmosphere of hostility and dissatisfaction among Iranians which have been manifested in recent popular street agitations in major Iranian cities. As no immediate solution to the enormous number of problems seems in sight, the future massive anti-government activities are not unlikely. The

appreciation of this point led to the recent sitting of the National Security Council which deliberated on the latest mass movements and decreed certain measures to retard and prevent the undesirable trend.¹⁶⁶

Internationally, the regime is practically isolated. This isolation is especially alarming for the elite since it drastically confines their abilities to overcome economic and domestic political problems. On one hand, the IRI isolation has provided Iraq with an extraordinary opportunity to refrain from abiding by the tenor of the ceasefire resolution. Because of unpopularity of the IRI, no powerful UN member and in particular no permanent member of the Security Council has exercised any pressure on Iraq to generate its compliance with the agreement. Hence the no-war no-peace state has been continuing which in itself has weakened the remaining credibility and prestige of the ruling clergy among the Iranians whose land is still in part under Iraqi occupation; its bleak consequences will be unacceptable for the regime.

On the other hand, IRI isolation has further increased the economic problems. This means that the regime now has to spend much more than the market price on purchasing foreign goods and services since it has to obtain them through international brokers. Yet not every demand can be satisfied in this way and certain strategic items including military hardware and high-technology devices need the sanction of the producing countries. Moreover, the financial problems of regime cannot be adequately

addressed as foreign governments and international financial institutions are reluctant to lend money to the Islamic government due to its isolation which is taken as a sign of instability.

Since the IRI is now unable to overcome its problems on its own, the Islamic regime needs substantial foreign assistance for its survival. In such a situation, the reconciliatory policy of the West can probably determine the fate of the political system. Western normalization of relations with Iran under the clergy, will only lead to consolidation of the badly fragmented system in its totality no matter if it is done under the pretext of dealing with the "moderates" or not. While this matter should be clear to the West, the adherence of a great many Western countries to the validity of the moderate-faction theory could only be interpreted as their desire to take advantage of the weakness of a regime which is prepared to sell its soul to the "satans" for its preservation no matter how "great" or "small" those "satans" used to be.

ENDNOTES

1. Dr. Nasser Khadem-Adam, "The Policy of Implementation of Technology in the Economy of Food Stuff," Ettelaat (Political and Economic) 2 (November-December 1989): 48.

2. Paying an official visit to Pakistan, General Shahbazi, the Iranian Chairman of the joint chiefs-of-staff of the armed forces, announced that Iran agreed with the plan of strategic cooperation among Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. He also mentioned that it would not be unlikely if the Iranian armed forces were sent to help Pakistan in the case of a confrontation between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. For detail, see: "Strategic Cooperation Among Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 29 March 1990, 1.

3. For detail on the considerations which inclined the USA to facilitate the transfer of power from the Shah to Khomeini, see: Chapter I.

4. Chapter II provides a comprehensive discussion on this view and the reasons behind the disenchantment of the Iranians with the regime.

5. For detail on the Mojahedin, see: Abrahamian, Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin.

6. The Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affairs, (Washington: The Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, 1987), 6.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., 7.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., 7-8.

12. Ibid., 8.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., 8.

15. Ibid., 7-9.

16. Ibid., 9-10.

17. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Dealing with Iran: How Experts See It," The New York Times, 16 November 1986, 14.
18. Barry Rubin, "The Shift on Iran: Sound, Courageous," The New York Times, 18 November 1986, A31.
19. "Texts of Order by Reagan and Memo," The New York Times, 10 January 1987, 5.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. The Committee of the Whole House, 523.
24. Ibid., 524.
25. Ibid., 520.
26. Stephen Engelberg, "Contacts with Teheran: Iranian Was Key Figure," The New York Times, 14 November 1986, A9.
27. The Committee of the Whole House, 528-529.
28. Ibid., 524.
29. Ibid., 520.
30. Ibid., 520.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 531.
33. Ibid., 531.
34. Ibid., 531.
35. Joint Hearings on the Iran-Contra Investigation: Testimony of Robert C. McFarlane, Garton J. Sigur, Jr., and Robert W. Owen, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 43.
36. Ibid., 47.
37. Ibid., 222-223.
38. Ibid., 223.
39. Ibid., 224.

40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., 225.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. The Committee of the whole House, 531.
45. Ibid., 520.
46. Ibid.
47. Michael A. Ledeen, Perilous Statecraft (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), 123.
48. Joint Hearings on the Iran-Contras Investigation, 47.
49. Ledeen, 162.
50. Ibid., 219.
51. Ibid., 220.
52. Ibid., 222.
53. "Iranian Says Iraq Got Foreign Help," The New York Times, 30 November 1986, 27.
54. John Kifner, "Key Iranian Calls for Hostage-Arms Deal," The New York Times, 7 December 1986, 24.
55. "Reagan Envoy Describes Trip," The New York Times, 14 November 1986, A9.
56. Ledeen, 219.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. The Committee of the Whole House, 530.
62. "Iranian Say Iraq Got Foreign Help," The New York Times, 30 November 1986, 27.
63. Ledeen, 156, 161-162.

64. Ibid., 234.
65. Ibid., 234.
66. Ibid., 234.
67. Ibid., 235.
68. Ibid., 235.
69. Ibid., 234.
70. Joint Hearings on the Iran-Contras Investigation, 252.
71. Ledeen, 139.
72. Elaine Sciolino, "Iran Seen Easing Hostility to U.S. in Shift of Policy on Superpowers," The New York Times, 8 January 1987, A11.
73. Joint Hearings on the Iran-Contras Investigation, 194.
74. Ibid., 229.
75. R. K. Ramazani, "Dealing With Iran: How Experts See It," The New York Times, 16 November 1986, 14. See also: R. K. Ramazani, "Iran's New Political Trends," The New York Times, 4 December 1986, A35.
76. R.K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: Contending Orientations," The Middle East Journal (Spring 1989), 210-211.
77. Nicholas Beeston, "Moderates Struggle to Consolidate Control," The Times, 9 June 1989, 9.
78. Hazhir Teimourian, "Rafsanjani Delay in Taking Helm," The Times, 16 August 1989, 6.
79. Hazhir Teimurian, "Rafsanjani Facing Crisis as New Leader of Iran," The Times, 4 August 1989, 6.
80. Hazhir Teimourian, "Leaders in Tehran Dig in for Long-Term Succession Struggle," The Times, 5 June 1989, 9.
81. Ledeen, 139.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., 143.
84. Ibid., 220.

85. Barry Rubin, "The Shift on Iran: Sound, Courageous," The New York Times, 18 November 1986, A31.

86. Ibid.

87. Shahrugh Akhavi, Elite Factionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran," The Middle East Journal (Winter 1987), 200-201. See also: Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: Contending Orientations," 213-214.

88. Chapter IV will provide a detailed discussion of IRI-backed terrorism in the post-Khomeini era.

89. William Colby, "Dealing with Iran: How Experts See It," The New York Times, 16 November 1986, 14.

90. Stansfield Turner, "Dealing With Iran: How Experts See It," The New York Times, 16 November 1986, 14.

91. Amir Taheri, "Now The Real Power Struggle," The Times, 5 June 1989, 16.

92. Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, "More Secret Dealings With Iran," The Washington Post, 8 October 1989, 1.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. Rubin, A31.

98. For instance, there are some indications that the receipt of American supplies was a factor which contributed to Operation Wal Fair-8 (10 February to 11 March 1986). As a result, the Fao Peninsula was captured by the Iranians. For detail on the operation, see: Edgar O'Ballance, The Gulf War, Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986), 173-175.

99. Ledeen, 222.

100. O'Ballance, 109.

101. "The Lost Golden Opportunities," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 2 August 1989, 12.

102. Ledeen, 235.

103. Ibid., 236.

104. Irvin Molotsky, "Israeli Told Bush Contacts in Iran Were "Radicals," Not Moderates," The New York Times, 8 February 1987, 1.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid., 15.
107. Ibid.
108. Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Iran Quickly Appoints Successor to Khomeini," The New York Times, 5 June 1989, 1.
109. Robert Pear, "Iran's New Supreme Leader," The New York Times, 5 June 1989, B10.
110. Ibrahim, B10.
111. Christopher Walker, "Moderates Adds to Iran Power Base," The Times, 10 June 1989, 9.
112. Teimourian, "Rafsanjani Facing First Crisis As New Leader of Iran," 6.
113. "The Direct Involvement of Rafsanjani in the Kidnapping of Terry waite Was Revealed," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 29 March 1990, 1.
114. See: 94.
115. Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Iranian Parliament Speaker Favoured in Presidential Vote," The New York Times, 29 July 1989, 3.
116. "Iranian Denies Link to Death of Hostages, the Soviets Report," The New York Times, 2 August 1989, A11.
117. Ibrahim, "Iranian Parliament Speaker Favoured in Presidential Vote," 3.
118. John Kifner, "Iran Now Free to Pursue a Less Militant Line, Diplomats Say," The New York Times, 13 June 1989, A6.
119. Alan Cowell, "Iran's Chief Seeks to Oust Hard-Liner From New Cabinet," The New York Times, 20 August 1989, 1.
120. Kifner, "Iran Now Free to Pursue a Less Militant Line, Diplomats Say," , A6.
121. Ibid.
122. Cowell, 15.

123. Shahrough Akhavi, "Iran Will Turn to the West, in Time," The New York Times, 22 August 1989, A23.

124. Ibid.

125. Ibid.

126. "Rafsanjani Resigned from the Acting Commandership of the Armed Forces," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 7 September 1989, 1.

127. Teimourian, "Rafsanjani Delay in Taking Helm," , 6.

128. Ibid. See also: Teimourian, "Rafsanjani first Crisis as New Leader of Iran," 6. A detailed analysis of the issue has been given in Chapter II.

129. Beeston, "Moderates Struggle to Consolidate Control," , 9.

130. "Iran Opens Former US Embassy on 10th Anniversary of its Seizure," The New York Times, 5 November 1989, 3.

131. Christopher Walker, "Iran Tilts to Moscow in Dramatic Policy Switch," The Times, 9 June 1989, 9.

132. One should always keep in mind that the Iranian government has been the largest entrepenuer in the country over the last 70 years. The state has also become the largest employer not only because of its huge bureaucratic and military apparatus but also because of its heavy investment in industries, banking, services and transportation. The public sector of the economy has become an acceptable, indispensable and necessary organ of the country. Consequently, no political force, regardless of its ideals, can ignore or seriously confine the public sector because such would create massive unemployment and unrest in urban areas. This would then result in weakening the pillars of support of the government in office.

133. As a result of the intensification of conflicts, the Islamic Republic Party, which had been the united front of all the fundamentalist factions, could no longer accommodate interests of its founders. The previous consensus among its leading members e.g., Rafsanjani, Moussavi, Khamenei and Moussavi-Ardebilly, disappeared. They could not preserve the party whose leaders were hostile to each other; Khomeini ordered its dissolution in order to ease the tension. In consequence, different factions which until that time had hidden themselves behind the party, emerged. These factions now identify themselves with different prominent IRI leaders.

134. The most famous members of this faction are: Mohammad Hashemi-Rafsanjani (Head of the Radio and Television Organization); Hojatolislam Mohammad-Yazdi (Chief Justice);

Aliakbar Velayati (Minister of Foreign Affairs); brother-in-law of Rafsanjani, Mohsen Rafiqdoost (ex-Minister of the Guards Corps; now Head of the Moustazafin Foundation) and Kamal Kharazi (IRI Ambassador to the UN).

135. This faction joined other leading factions in the anti-Montazeri coalition in the aftermath of the disclosure of Irangate (For detail, see: Chapter I). It also formed the anti-Guardian Council coalition with Khamenei and Moussavi which will be dealt with shortly. The Rafsanjani faction also entered a coalition with the faction of Khamenei in the wake of the Khomeini death (For detail, see: Chapter II).

136. For instance, after the scandal of Irangate and the US naval attacks against some Iranian targets in the Persian Gulf, Rafsanjani said:

Get ready to fight against the Americans too if a war breaks out in the south of the Persian Gulf....It is much better for us to fight against the USA instead of fighting against its lackeys in the region ("For a War Against the USA, Rafsanjani Called for Full Alert," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 11 June 1987, 14).

After the acceptance of the ceasefire, Rafsanjani expressed his interest in expansion of relations with the East since the country has been the victim of the West ("The Amount of Iranian Non-Oil Exports Have Decreased By 22 Percent," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 23 June 1988, 4). Finally, Rafsanjani began the post-Khomeini era by a clear tilt towards the USSR which was reflected in the conclusion of a series of economic and military agreements with the USSR. Chapter V will provide a comprehensive discussion on this issue.

137. See: 93.

138. The most famous members of this faction are: Hojatolislam Hojati-Kermani (ex-Special Adviser to the President) and Hojatolislam Moussavi-Khoeiniha.

139. "Bringing Back Iranians Is a Big Political Mistake," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 29 May 1986, 16.

140. Khamenei has emphasized the validity of the Khomeini Fetwa on Salman Rushdie several times since the death of Khomeini. He stressed this issue during his latest speech for the first anniversary of Khomeini's death in which he referred to Rushdie as "renegade" and announced that the IRI would follow Khomeini's line with respect to all matters. For detail, see: "The Important Message of the Great Leader of the Revolution on the Occasion of the First Anniversary of the Demise of Imam Khomeini," Kayhan Hava, 6 June 1990, 3, 4.

141. In his speech for the first anniversary of the death of Khomeini, Khamenei held:

We clearly announce to all the nations of the world that the belief in "the termination of the Imam Khomeini period", which the enemy tries to suggest, is nothing more than an arrogant trick. Despite the USA and its collaborators, Imam Khomeini is present among his nation and society and the period of Khomeini continues and will continue (Ibid., 4).

142. Other prominent figures of this faction are: Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, Hojatolislam Nategh-Noori (Ex-Minister of Interior, now an MP) and Ahmad Tavakoli (ex-Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, now Editor of Resalat Newspaper).

143. See: 137.

144. According to the faith, Mehdi will emerge when the world is totally corrupt and people are fed up with repression and despotism.

145. "Khamenei Becomes Close to Azeri-Qumi," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 7 November 1986, 2.

146. Other influential members of this faction are: Hojatolislam Mohtashemi, Hojatolislam Moussavi (Commander of the Committees) and Ayatollah Meshkini (Director of the Guardian Council).

147. For instance, Moussavi encouraged West German investment and joint venture with the IRI private sector by legalizing such activities prior to the termination of his prime ministership. This issue will be discussed in Chapter IV.

148. Famous members of this faction are: Ayatollah Meshkini, Hojatolislam Imami-Kashani (Speaker of the Council) and Ayatollahs Janati and Sanei (Members of the Council).

149. For detail on the conflicts between the Council and different IRI organs, see: "To Complain About the Guardian Council, MPs Went to Jamaran," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 11 June 1987, 2. See also: "It Is Possible That Whatever Action Which God Considers Prohibited, the Guardian Council Calls It Legitimate," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 2 July 1987, 16. See also: "The Guardian Council Rejected a Number of Passed Bill Regarding the Responsibility of the Judicial Power," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 30 July 1987, 15.

150. For detail, see: Chapter II.

151. Ledeen, 234.

152. In 1986, Montazeri severely criticized Moussavi's conduct of the economy and put the blame of all the economic problems on his excessive reliance on the state. At the same time, he firmly supported his plan on bringing back Iranians abroad ("Montazeri: They Ruined the Initiative Regarding Bringing Back Iranians Abroad," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 10 July 1986, 1).

153. Influential figure of the GC are: Mohsen Rezaei (Commander of the GC), Mohsen Rafiqdoost (ex-Minister of GC, now member of the GC Command Council, Director of the Mostazafin Foundation), Ali Shamkhani (member of the GC Command Council, Operational and Intelligence Deputy to the General Military Headquarters and Commander of the Navy) and Abbas Mohtaj (Chief of the Central GC Headquarters, Acting Commander of the Navy).

154. For example, in December 1988, the credentials of a GC-supported candidate was approved by Parliament although there was strong evidence to reject it. Alimohammad Ahmadi (MP), who was the Commander of Intelligence Department of the city of Khoramabad, had intimidated other candidates and their supporters by attacking their businesses and arresting some others ("The Clean-Record of MP of the Islamic Assembly," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 5 January 1989, 2).

155. "Ahmad Khomeini Arrived in Geneva with Several People for an Important Mission," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 20 August 1987, 2.

156. The important figures of this faction were Behzad Nabavi (ex-Minister of Heavy Industry, now Deputy Minister of Information and Islamic Guidance) Mohsen Rezaei (Commander-in-Chief of the GC since 1981), Rajaei (ex-PM, then President who was killed in an explosion in 1981) and Azam Talegani (MP).

157. "The Organization of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Republic Was Dissolved," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 23 October 1986, 1, 14.

158. Ibid, 14.

159. Such concern is reflected in some of his speeches like the following. In that speech, he referred to a religious war where the Prophet was defeated due to split within his camp. Thus, he said: "If the power struggle enhances and coordination disappear, the incident of Ohod will be repeated; and as happened at that time, faithful Muslims will be defeated" ("The Communique of Ayatollah Montazeri," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 8 December 1988, 12).

160. News, 27 September 1989.

161. Ibid.

162. Ibid.

163. News, 30 September 1989.

164. News, 7 December 1989.

165. MISS Bulletin, (October 1989), 2.

166. News, 16 February 1990.

167. Ibid.

168. The Council sat in the last week of February 1990. In that session, a secret twelve-article decree was issued to all the provincial governments regarding the rising mass movements. Accordingly, the security forces were ordered to remain on full alert. A number of instructions was also given to local clergy and authorities on coordination of their propaganda programs with the aim of appeasing the dissatisfied people. For detail, see: "The Secret Instruction of the National Security Council of the Islamic Republic to All the Local Governments," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 29 March 1990, 2.

CHAPTER IV
FOREIGN POLICY OF THE IRI
IRI-WEST RELATIONS
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IRI foreign policy in the post-Khomeini era has shown changes which make the new period somewhat distinct from the previous one. These changes, however, do not seem to be the results of a total revision of the principles and goals of the IRI foreign policy. Nor is it because of the irreversible domination of one faction over the others. It seems that the need for redressing a number of immediate and essential problems has imposed some flexibility and change on the regime's foreign policy. These problems include peace talks with Iraq, reconstruction of the devastated country and security-related issues. Evidence suggests that there is a consensus among the elite over the necessity of satisfying basic needs and achieving certain objectives in the pursuit of the foreign policy. As a result, factionalism cannot be seen in every area of the foreign policy. Needless to say there are differences among the elite on generally accepted issue-areas as each faction tends to propose its own interpretation and means to achieve the same goals. While power struggle is also reflected in the conduct of the foreign policy, there is ample evidence to prove that factional differences are limited to a few issue-areas.

This chapter will elaborate on a variety of topics concerning the foreign policy of the post-Khomeini era. Firstly, the main objectives and characteristics of the IRI foreign policy will be dealt with. Secondly, the importance of the peace talks and their status and prospect will be discussed. Thirdly, IRI-West relations will be analyzed.¹ Fourthly, IRI relations with some

third world countries will be assessed. Fifthly, the continuation of terrorism since the death of Khomeini will be discussed.

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The policy reflects the necessity of differentiation among foreign countries. Even under Khomeini, IRI efforts for normalization of relations or establishment of covert or overt economic ties with many Western and Eastern countries were the signs of the understanding of the inevitable interdependence of nations in the 20th century. In the absence of Khomeini, what has caused a more flexible foreign policy has been the increased awareness of the destructive nature of the political isolation of Iran which requires the assistance of other countries in at least three main areas.

Reconstruction is one area. The reconstruction of the country needs the technical as well as financial assistance of developed countries as Iran cannot carry out such an undertaking with its own resources and technical capabilities. The difficulties that Iran encountered during the war to supply its heavily Western-made industries and armed forces due to its non-friendly relations with the West have motivated the regime to convert its very one-sided industrial sector to a diversified one. Extension of relations with Third World (TW), Eastern and Western countries may assist Iran to reconstruct the country so as not to be dependent on the good will of one specific group of countries.

Another area is the peace talks. The termination of the prevailing no-war, no-peace state between Iran and Iraq can be hoped to end if the tenor of Resolution 598 is implemented. This demands the joint efforts of the permanent members of the UN Security Council (SC) which do not seem to be very enthusiastic about it, for the time being. Hence it is necessary to acquire the support or positive attitude of most of them.

The last area is state stability. The continuation of the former policy without showing flexibility could incline major powers to seek and support alternative regimes in Iran. Thus, it has become clear to the IRI elite that the pursuit of a policy of indiscriminate hostility towards all countries, at least verbally, will only put Iran in a weak position and increase its instability at a time when it needs the cooperation and support of others.

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The general motivating factor for the new foreign policy is the regime's growing internal isolation. This has alarmed the elite since now a growing number of Iranians has shown its interest in an alternative regime through mass protests. The IRI's fading popularity has sharply weakened its power at home and made it more vulnerable to foreign powers. Unable to solve problems by itself, the IRI cannot count on the strong financial power and expertise of Iranians abroad as a way out of the dangerous domestic situation either; the latter cannot tolerate the regime. Once the elite is not able to maintain the system

on its own, reliance on foreign assistance is its only way to survive.

While the full achievement of this goal is vital for the regime, the elite is incapable of following a consistent foreign policy. The new policy, therefore, has a temporary nature for a number of reasons. Firstly, the regime is unable to fully normalize its relations with especially Western countries since this would undermine its very existence. A regime, which is based on the claim to a divine mission to free the human being from "imperialism" and "arrogance", must continue a "non-compromising" and "revolutionary" policy towards major "oppressor" powers. Attempts to resume normal relations with these countries and acceptance of internationally-recognized diplomatic laws would be equal to the retreat from the IRI basic principles.

Secondly, the regime's need for crisis-making hinders complete normalization of relations with some countries. This tactic helps the IRI to divert the attention of dissatisfied Iranians from internal problems to external affairs through creating a foreign policy crisis. The Salman Rushdie affair is a very well-known example. As there is no immediate solution to ever-increasing problems, the regime will need to resort to this tactic more often in the future.

Thirdly, the elite's desire to create an Islamic empire contradicts the pursuit of a normal and consistent foreign policy since it demands active support of pro-IRI groups in especially

TW countries. This is essential for the regime as the creation of Islamic regimes can provide moral as well as material support to prolong the Islamic system in Iran.

Fourthly, the clergy's domination of the regime which perpetuates factionalism prevents the pursuit of a consistent policy in any field. Hence policies towards this or that country is subject to radical changes if these can help one faction to achieve certain goals at a specific period of time.

Finally, the regime is a coalition of a variety of factions which rule jointly for which a minimum degree of consensus over the conduct of policies is necessary. This demands the elite's abstention from those policies which could harm the coalition. Since for many reasons not all the factions are in favour of good relations with some countries, the regime must opt for a solution which satisfies all; that could be only a reversible policy towards certain countries.

For all these reasons, the new policy cannot be a long term one. Instead of following an indiscriminate hostile foreign policy, the IRI now should adopt a temporary differentiating approach which does not mean the full resumption of relations with its present foes. Rather the regime now hopes to achieve its three major goals through a reduction of tensions with some countries, continuation of existing relations with others, normalization of relations with some others, maintaining or establishing low-level diplomatic ties and/or just economic relations with others in order to satisfy its needs, keep its

factions united and avoid further degradation of its revolutionary appearance.

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Not surprisingly, the new policy is not qualitatively different from the previous one. It still seeks the "export of revolution" as it views Iran as the heart of the Muslim world. Being so, the Islamic regime should logically reserve the right to interfere in the internal affairs of other Muslim countries as it has done before. The emphasis on military defence of Muslim countries suggests the persistence of the old scheme for building an Islamic empire. The policy distinguishes among developed countries, but this is essentially a summary and an expression of the IRI foreign policy in practice in the recent few years which it now must follow more systematically.

What is new is the tacit expression of concern about Iran's isolation. This now dictates the necessity of a clear and explicit division of countries into a few categories and for each a specific approach is needed. Labelling all countries as "arrogant", "imperialist" and "reactionary" and identifying all with the "world-eater America" will only prolong the existing isolation. The new policy was presented in the last month of Khomeini's reign which indicated the approval of this so-called turn by Khomeini himself. An analysis of its major components will support the claim of this research.

A well-known "moderate", Dr. Mohammad Javad Larijani (ex-Deputy Foreign Minister, now adviser to the Foreign Minister),

specified the three basic determining factors of the IRI foreign policy in April 1989 as follows:

First, Iran should be the beating heart of the Muslim world. In other words, in Tehran not only Iran's interests should be taken into consideration, but the vista should also expand to include the adoption of decisions for the Muslim world as a whole...

Second, Islamic Iran should be strong. In other words, our military strength should be such that not only will the enemies of Islam not dare to undertake acts of aggression against us or to think of dominating us, but also if a country intends to commit acts of aggression against any part of the Islamic world or to intervene in its affairs, it will have our response to contend with....

Third, Islamic Iran should be flourishing and developed. In other words, it should possess an abundance of products that will not only feed the people of this country but will also feed millions throughout the world....²

These three major points were stressed again a week after the death of Khomeini when Larijani repeated the principles of the IRI foreign policy.³ Prior to the first articulation of principles, Larijani specified another principle which was the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Persian Gulf since the security of the Persian Gulf is only a "regional and collective issue...and no one is the regional gendarme".⁴

Larijani also specified the stance of the IRI towards the two superpowers. In spite of the "neither west, nor East" slogan, this time the regime distinguished between the two superpowers. Hence the USA was still an enemy as its policy in the Persian Gulf region was perceived to be based on the principle of divide and rule by creating fear of the IRI among the regional countries in order to justify its regional military presence.⁵ On the contrary, the USSR was considered more reliable than the

USA due to the initiation of a new phase in IRI-USSR relations. Therefore, a degree of consensus over the fate of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq peace talks as well as the recent changes in the USSR paved the way for better bilateral relations.⁶ While the new policy acknowledges the demise of Marxism, it rejects the idea of ignoring the USSR as a fading superpower with insignificant influence in international relations.⁷

If the USA is a foe in the new policy, Western Europe is not considered as an enemy. On the contrary, Larijani believed in a "bright future" for relations with Western Europe. The existence of "common interests" and "mutual logic" paved the way for good relations, in his view.⁸ However, Western Europe had made some mistakes which created problems one of which was their belief that:

with the help of these relations they could influence our situation and, for example, tell us to do this or to do that concerning the issue of human rights or ...concerning our domestic affairs....⁹

This notwithstanding, there was no obstacle to good relations as the Europeans, said Larijani, corrected the mistake. This happened when the IRI insistence on the murder of Salman Rushdie revealed the importance of the preservation of Islam for the IRI (which inclined it to undermine diplomatic behaviours) to the Europeans.¹⁰ The only obstacle to these relations seemed to be the USA which believed that it should represent Western Europe, and so, not all Western Europeans should have relations with Iran.¹¹ Relations with other Europeans should be subject to the establishment of relations of Iran with the USA.¹²

Whereas one aspect of the policy is normalization of relations with Western Europe, this does not necessarily imply the common meaning of the phrase. In other words, while having normal diplomatic relations, the IRI reserves the right to provoke anti-Western government street agitations if the situation demands. This is because the IRI in its totality cannot survive without crisis-making. Rafsanjani made this point clear four days before the death of Khomeini when he referred to an IRI-sponsored anti-Rushdie demonstration in London, as a sign of the determination of Muslims to stand against the West and support Khomeini's fetwa on Rushdie.¹³

A post-Khomeini article of the "moderate" organ Tehran Times is analyzed in order to make sure that the presence of Khomeini was not the reason for Rafsanjani's radical approach. Elaborating on Iran's steps towards reconciliation and their hopes for better relations with Europe, the author pointed out:

Europe in its turn should not ignore in their relations with Iran the inalienable principles of the revolution and foreign policy stances stemming from this. Iran will be alert and refuse to be perverted in any way by alien ideas and influences that any outside power may try to introduce along with or in the guise of trade....Our political and economic strategies can always be measured and adjusted against the responses of these European countries whether they blow hot or cold.¹⁴

Another focus of the policy is the non-aligned movement. Accordingly, Iran's relations with this movement should be kept to avoid isolation. This is especially important since Iraq is its member as well. Being a member state, Iran may use the non-aligned movement for putting pressure on Iraq to implement

Resolution 598. That is why the regime sent a high-level delegation to the 1989 summit in Belgrade.¹⁵ However, this policy does not imply the acceptance of the movement's policies. Referring to its summit conference, the IRI criticized its policy of only verbal fight against colonialism.¹⁶

Formation of a regional cooperation among three large countries is another objective of the IRI foreign policy. Hence there have been attempts to create a regional common market among Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. The result has been the creation of a tripartite economic cooperation.¹⁷ However, this organization has not been efficient. One reason for this, as the IRI stressed, has been the role of the USA which has tried to put obstacles in the way of regional cooperation. The new policy thus expects to activate the cooperation in two stages of revitalization of economic cooperation and then expansion of cooperation to include other significant regional issues.¹⁸

As a step towards revitalization, the establishment of a common chamber of commerce has been negotiated.¹⁹ Similarly, as a supplement to cooperation, Iran has expressed its interest in entering military strategic cooperation with Pakistan and Afghanistan.²⁰

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Although acceptable for awhile, the continuation of the no-war, no-peace situation has become troublesome for the Islamic government. Initially, the government found such a situation useful as it could justify the continuation of war measures,

militarization and economic and social problems under the pretext of the persistence of an emergency situation.

However, this situation has had negative impacts as well. As about 3,600 sq. km of Iranian territory are still under Iraqi occupation²¹, the prolongation of this state of emergency could have been interpreted by the Iranians as a sign of the incapability of the Islamic regime in preservation of the territorial integrity of Iran. In addition, the existence of about 30,000 Iranian captives in Iraq has further contributed to the popular dissatisfaction; the fact that Iran has taken about 60,000 Iraqis cannot be very persuasive for the families of Iranian captives.²²

In particular, the uncertainty arising from this situation has discouraged foreign as well as private domestic investment which now seems to be indispensable for the reconstruction of the country.

The peace talks, therefore, are of great importance for Iran. This is not the case for Iraq as the termination of this situation will inevitably result in its withdrawal from Iranian territories without compensation. Iran's insistence on the Algiers Agreement of 1975 as the basis for negotiations on the disputed territories and control over the border waterway Arvand-rud (Shatt-al Arab as Iraqis call it) has further discouraged Iraq to negotiate. The Iraqi recognition of the agreement would automatically leave no room for the Iraqi demand on its full sovereignty over the entire waterway.²³

Despite its special importance for Iran, peace negotiations have not been fruitful so far. The obstacle has been the Iraqi government which has refused to comply with the terms of Resolution 598 according to which both sides must return their forces to international borders and release all prisoners of war at once. Hence Iranian readiness to abide by the Resolution had not met with a positive response on the part of Iraq until the death of Khomeini in June 1989.

Late in April 1989, when the fourth round of negotiations began, its disappointing outcome was clear.²⁴ Since the round ended without achievement, Ali Akbar Velayati, Foreign Minister, blamed Iraq for its refusal for cooperation which was because of the indifference of three members of the UNSC in convincing Iraq to fulfil its obligations.²⁵ The Tehran Times specified the reason for their apathy by saying:

Some permanent members of the Security Council such as the U.S., U.K. and France are after achievement of their own political objectives, and do not have interest in implementation of justice.²⁶

As the deadlock continued because of the three non-Communist members of the UNSC, a tilt towards the USSR looked plausible. Being the main arms supplier to Iraq, the Soviet Union could exercise its influence in convincing Iraq to satisfy its obligations. This became necessary since the USA was coming closer to Iraq which would further increase Iraq's manoeuvring power in ignoring its obligations and insisting on its territorial claims to Iran. Thus, the "moderate" Ettelaat described US relations with Iraq as a reaction to its failure in

Iran because:

Washington, which after the ceasefire in the Persian Gulf war and the start of the era of reconstruction in Iran has been anticipating a normalization of relations with Tehran, is involved in a series of misgivings on the absence of balance and, what it calls, "the struggle between the extremists and the moderates" in Iran. This is at a time when, during recent times, the administration in Washington has become closer to the Baghdad regime...²⁷

Because of the change in the balance of power against Iran, "moderates" were particularly supporting Soviet exercise of power in favour of Iran. Sayeed Rajaei-Khorasani (Head of the Majlis Foreign Policy Committee) encouraged a Soviet move on behalf of Iran as he mentioned: "if the Soviets take effective steps it will be a political victory for the Kremlin leaders in the Security Council."²⁸ Elaborating on the significance of Iranian-Soviet relations and the IRI's indifference to the interpretation of the West, he called it "natural" and not "tactical".²⁹

The vitality of the break of the deadlock for the IRI was evident in its efforts to involve global powers in the resolution of the Iran-Iraq dispute. In itself, this illustrated a drastic change in IRI principles which had previously claimed to reject any interference of a global power in the affairs of "oppressed" countries. A comment of Larijani may support this assessment. Picturing the UNSC as an organ "which works on the chemistry of diplomacy" and has nothing to do with the "rights and truth", Larijani related the peace talks to the question of regional and global stability as he stipulated:

If you ask how I see the future of the peace talks regarding the implementation of Resolution 598, I will have to answer the question in connection with the future of peace in the region, because these talks are part of the process of peace and security in this region. I believe that the world will have to accept our logic and our just demands in the end. It is not worth it for the powers that exist in the region to have no peace in this area.³⁰

The same spirit existed in the Foreign Minister reiteration of Iran's readiness in negotiation under the auspices of the UN "at any place or time".³¹

In spite of this, the stalemate continued. Discouraged by the course of events, Velayati expressed his concern about any solution to change the status-quo.³² Such a disappointment, however, did not reduce IRI enthusiasm for a possible break in the deadlock when Elliason (UN special envoy) began his shuttle diplomacy between Tehran and Baghdad. Velayati availed himself for further negotiations as he repeated the IRI commitment for negotiations.³³ He later stressed that commitment by expressing Iran's demand for the implementation of Resolution 598 as the only criterion "for the establishment of respectable peace between the two countries."³⁴ Nevertheless, Velayati's optimism about the UN was not shared by the IRI First Deputy Foreign Minister, Ali Mohammad Besharati, who expressed his distrust towards the UNSC:

The Security Council members are responsible for continued Iraqi occupation of about 2,000 sq. km of Iranian territory even 430 days after Iran accepted the U.N. Resolution 598.³⁵

In January 1990, when the USSR offered to mediate, Iran accepted. While Iraq also demonstrated its interest, it was

clear that this would be more beneficial for Iran than Iraq, as discussed earlier. In a Tehran Times article, the "moderates" welcomed the offer because IRI relations with Moscow were friendly and expanding and the USSR was the main arms supplier to Iraq. In return for the Soviet friendly move, the "moderate" writer did not hesitate to criticize the West:

Although Iraq has heavily depended on the USSR for arms, this should not be unheeded that the West too has gained a considerable foothold in Iraq over the past decade. In other words, the West is not likely to allow the USSR to score a big diplomatic gain by solving [the] Iran-Iraq peace problem.³⁶

Being concerned about the increasing influence of the USSR in Iran, the author pointed out that Moscow's role as mediator should not be:

taken as a course of the Resolution 598. This should be explained to all international circles, prior to negotiations, that Moscow's presence in the talks is only to expedite the UN sponsored resolution. As such, the presence of the Secretary General...is a must in any negotiation that might be held between Iran and Iraq in Moscow.³⁷

Due to the failure of other attempts, IRI interest in conclusion of a peace treaty inclined it to accept the Secretary General's new proposal. Against the tenor of Resolution 598, the withdrawal of forces now has been postponed to the second stage which begins after the materialization of a new condition on free navigation in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormoz.³⁸ The acceptance of this plan which does not clearly specify the vital issue of the determination of the instigator of the war, demonstrates the weakness of the IRI which now has to give up its former claims.³⁹

As a part of the general policy, normalization of relations with the West is of significant importance for the IRI. This is because the regime needs Western technical and financial assistance for the future reconstruction of Iran. Moreover, the prolonged deadlock of the peace talks has made the Islamic government realize the necessity of the cooperation of the three Western permanent members of the SC for any progress in the talks. Of course, these two needs may be satisfied if the regime breaks its isolation. Hence efforts for normalization of relations or decrease of hostility between the IRI and some Western countries has some logic. Yet the durability of former policies with respect to the USA, Britain and France, for instance, demonstrates the necessity of continuation of a crisis-making policy for the preservation of the system. It seems that what the IRI aim to achieve is mainly economic objectives. That is why it has been successful in signing a number of large contracts with several Western countries, although such has not been parallel to a simultaneous diplomatic reconciliation.

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Without any doubt, IRI-USA relations have remained the most controversial. Certain factors have contributed to the prolongation of a mutual hostility. For the IRI, normalization of relations with the USA is achievable only if this does not imply its surrender to a superpower for one reason among others. Since its foundation, the regime has always stressed its firm anti-American position as a central and sacred principle for

whose preservation it has engaged in an eleven-year confrontation with the USA. In the absence of any persuasive justification e.g., substantial change in the nature of the USA or its defeat by the IRI, in order to keep its word and sustain the support of its follower, attempts for normalization of relations through a gradual policy of reducing tension would only further disgrace the elite and delegitimize the system. Hence resumption of relations with the USA would be more destructive than constructive for the IRI and any of its factions. This point seriously questions the existence of a strong interest among the elite for normalization of relations with the USA.

At the most, the IRI may hope for some temporary rapprochement on specific issues. As mentioned earlier, better relations with some Western countries are to help the regime to meet its needs with respect to three major issues. Once these needs are met, there will not be any immediate reason for the maintenance of less troubled relations, further development of relations or establishment of full diplomatic relations. As discussed before, Iran cannot count on a positive American attitude in the UNSC regarding the peace talks. Better relations with some European countries should break the almost absolute isolation of the regime among the Westerners and increase their stake in the preservation of the IRI. Under these circumstances, it seems that what IRI hopes to gain from the USA is its softness on some financial issues such as the release of the \$12b. of frozen Iranian assets in the USA along with more reconciliatory approach

of the IMF and the World Bank.

Certain issues also put obstacles in the way of immediate American reconciliation with the IRI. Eleven years of anti-IRI propaganda makes reconciliation with Iran rather difficult because the Americans also need to save face in the conclusion of any rapprochement lest they be blamed for surrender to an anti-American regime. The issue of the American hostages in Lebanon makes the Americans cautious in their relations with Iran.

Hence both sides have reasons not to seek a quick normalization of relations. Yet this is more important for the IRI as a wrong move might irreversibly decrease its legitimacy among remaining followers and so further destabilize it. IRI-USA relations in the post-Khomeini era will be analyzed with these considerations in mind.

A new wave of hostility towards the USA began a month prior to the death of Khomeini and has continued since then. The instigator of this campaign was Rafsanjani. Commenting on the intifadah on the occasion of the Quds day (Jerusalem Day), he recommended the killing of certain Westerners in retaliation for the Israeli murder of Palestinians:

if in retaliation for every Palestinian martyred in Palestine they [Palestinians] kill and execute, not inside Palestine, five Americans or Britons or Frenchmen, they (Zionists) would not continue these wrongs....It is not hard to kill Americans or Frenchmen. It is a bit difficult to (kill) Israelis. But there are so many (American and Frenchmen) everywhere in the world.⁴⁰

Rafsanjani also proposed hijacking "planes to swap prisoners in

Israeli hands" and blowing up "factories in Western countries".⁴¹

Aware of likely criticism, he added:

Now they will start saying that so and so, as a man in charge, and as the speaker of parliament has officially called for acts of terror...But let them say it...aren't they saying it now?⁴²

Added to the global resentment, PLO rejection of the recommendation⁴³ made Rafsanjani deny his statement. The denial however did not go far enough as he maintained: "They [Westerners] have quoted me, in their words, innocent civilians should be killed. I don't know. Perhaps this could be derived from my statement."⁴⁴ The unconventional denial was further diluted as he cleared his stand on the inevitability of tit-for-tat attacks.⁴⁵ Later, Rafsanjani implicitly repeated his previous recommendations by clarifying aspects of that controversial speech.⁴⁶

While some Westerners tried to attribute Rafsanjani's recommendation to a shrewd tactic to appease the "radicals", the pace of events proved otherwise. Evidence suggests that the entire elite were agreed on an anti-American campaign, perhaps, as a sign of appreciation for the Soviet friendly policy. A few days before the speech, the Prime Minister, Moussavi, charged the West German Embassy with espionage for the USA.⁴⁷ A day before Rafsanjani's speech, IRI state Television (which is run by Rafsanjani's brother) broadcast the first episode of a series of "confessions" of some Iranian "CIA spies" on their "subversive" activities.⁴⁸ The broadcast "disclosed" US designs on Iran as attempts for "disintegration from within".⁴⁹

The anti-American campaign continued in June 1989. In this month, the "moderate" organ, Resalat, attacked the American administration. Referring to Secretary James Baker's concern about the expansion of Iranian-Soviet relations in the wake of new treaties⁵⁰, Resalat condemned the "US imperialist designs" on Iran:

It seems the Soviets would be wise to respond to the reaction of the Americans and disclose to the world the self-declared right of the White House for having the world under the U.S. mandate.⁵¹

The daily analyzed cooperation between Iran and the USSR in the region as opening a "new chapter in the diminishing influence of the United States probably with adverse impacts to Washington".⁵² The hostile attitude was further stressed as the IRI state-run radio rejected the possibility of any compromise with the USA by broadcasting a Kahan International article which described IRI-USA relations as "irreparable".⁵³

Even though the entire elite opted for a common anti-American campaign, they did not leave the door completely closed for some sort of dialogue. Apart from the need for access to the financial market controlled partially by the USA, it seems that IRI frustration with the impasse of the peace talks forced the Islamic elite to realize the necessity of having some kind of dialogue with the SC permanent member: the USA.

Having eleven-year-old, anti-American slogans on the background, the entire media initiated a series of articles in which conditions for the resumption of relations with the USA were discussed. On 26 July 1989, Iranian radio broadcast the

views of an MP, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, who denied any secret on-going negotiations with the USA, even though he emphasized that it:

does not mean that there is no possibility for resumption of Iran-U.S. ties at all but it will not be the same as it used to be in the previous regime in Iran.⁵⁴

That statement was followed by a commentary in the Tehran Times on the exact conditions for the resumption of relations. The author specified "three strategic steps" that the USA should take for the normalization of relations which were: US acceptance of its diminishing power, stability of the IRI and mutual respect and non-interference principle in its relations with Iran.⁵⁵ That view was confirmed as an editorial article of the Tehran Times specified obstacles to relations.⁵⁶

In order to remove any doubt about the approval of all the factions, the "radical" Kayhan International elaborated on the issue as well. The Bush administration was implicitly praised for its "cautious line" towards Iran and for "learning a lesson" from his predecessor's mistakes.⁵⁷ The article therefore proceeded by saying:

It is time the U.S. ceases from behaving arrogantly....Instead it can demonstrate its wisdom, farsightedness and pragmatic approach just by taking two simple actions: (1) Condemn Israel for its acts of terrorism and (2) release Iranian assets.⁵⁸

While everything showed an open-door policy, the sudden change of tone of Tehran proved the inability of the regime to pursue a consistent foreign policy. The request of a number of US Congressmen for recognition and support of the National Council

of resistance as an alternative government for Iran was the instigator. However, that request did not go very far as US officials rejected the idea immediately. Hence the change of mode could not be only because of that action. Perhaps, this was a good indication of the non-ideological nature of factionalism and that in cases internal conflicts over certain issues can hamper the implementation of a policy on which major factions have agreed.

For whatever reason, the organs of both "moderates" and "radicals" condemned any attempt for normalization of relations with the USA. On August 16 when the "radical" newspaper Kayhan International specified its conditions for the resumption of relations, an article in Ettelaat, a "moderate" organ, severely denied any interest in relations by describing the USA a "terrorist supporter" for its backing Israel.⁵⁹ A TV broadcast ruled out the American hope for better relations in the absence of Khomeini as the commentator emphasized the depth of IRI hostility towards the USA.⁶⁰ At last, Larijani joined the others in opposing any rapprochement since:

The Hizbollah nation will transform Islamic Iran into a blossoming garden, a strong bastion for the defence of the sanctity of Islam and the Muslims, and there is no need for assistance from or ties with the United States to achieve this.⁶¹

Once again a new period of overt hostility began. Speaking after Rafsanjani indicated the possibility of negotiations, Khamenei ruled out any chance for negotiation.⁶² The Rafsanjani offer of talks was probably an expression of what he personally

saw as proper because the admiration of Resalat of Khamenei's speech demonstrated the consensus of even "moderates" on the necessity of showing unity against the action of some US Congressmen. While the USA had reasons and means to establish its espionage network in Iran, the resumption of the confessions of some Iranian "spies of the USA" on nation-wide TV at that time could have been well-orchestrated anti-American propaganda as a reaction to the American Congressmen's initiative."³

Certain other American actions provoked a hostile sentiment in Tehran. The US President's authorization to Congress to "issue orders for the arrest and kidnapping of 'suspect terrorists' regardless of their nationalities and without the permission of the country of their residence" was one of them."⁴ This law which seemed to be targeting IRI-sponsored terrorist groups was perceived as outrageous by the entire elite. That is why the pro-Rafsanjani newspaper, Ettelaat, praised the counter law of the Islamic Parliament according to which the IRI President now was authorized to carry out reciprocal actions against US citizens who "somehow harmed Iranians or put Iran's interests at stake"⁵.⁶

Hence American action stimulated an anti-American mode in Tehran. Such an atmosphere radicalized the "moderates" and "radicals" alike. However, it especially gave the "radicals" an opportunity to hear their anti-American campaign. This revived campaign was reflected in the anniversary of the occupation of the US Embassy when several thousands gathered at the former US

Embassy and chanted "Death to the USA".⁶⁷ Yet that symbolic gesture was followed by articles and radio broadcasts in which the continuation of belief in the "anti-arrogant" and "anti-American" "imam line" was emphasized by the "radicals" and the "moderates" alike.⁶⁸

The second provocative action was the US invasion of Panama. The operation in itself alarmed the elite on a possibility of some sort of US punitive military action against Iran. Needless to say the geo-political situation of Iran as well as its size and strength make a massive American military operation for the purpose of occupation or changing the regime very unlikely. Especially, the history of the eight-year war has proven that a foreign invasion will most probably release patriotism behind which any undemocratic and unstable regime may survive. Moreover, the outcome of such an operation could not be as clear as that of Panama. The well-trained and well-equipped one million strong Iraqi armed forces failed to penetrate Iran; Iraqi massive use of missiles and air strikes against large cities including Tehran did not compensate for this.

Notwithstanding the facts, the US invasion of Panama could have been a prelude to a new aggressive policy. The presence of the American fleet in the Persian Gulf increased the anxiety of the Islamic elite of a possible attack or invasion. Consequently, both "moderates" and "radicals" found themselves in the same trench for the condemnation of the action.⁶⁹

Despite all these, the entire post-Khomeini period has not

been the era of confrontation. There are indications that some sort of contact has been maintained behind the scene. Perhaps, the release of \$570m of Iranian frozen assets in the USA in November 1989 was an indication of covert negotiations although US authorities considered that a simple release of assets according to the verdicts of the International Court.⁷⁰ It is said that covert negotiations, presumably on the fate of the hostages, was undertaken in Geneva in February 1990 in which the USA linked further release of Iranian frozen assets to the release of the hostages.⁷¹ The announcement of the settlement of claims in the amount of \$105m by Iran to US claimants in May 1990 and US agreement to talk about the release of the \$11b in Iranian assets held by the USA proved the convention of talks between the two sides.⁷²

One could argue that the inflexibility of the IRI on certain matters including the hostages led to two actions by the USA. Firstly, in February, the US Secretary of Defence, Dick Cheney, announced an American decision to take no action in the case of a Soviet invasion of Iran.⁷³ Secondly, the US State Department annual report on human rights, condemned the IRI for severe abuse of human rights.⁷⁴ These could have been measures for making the Islamic government cooperate with the USA.

These actions, among other factors, contributed to the IRI desire for negotiations. Rumours speak of continued contacts and the IRI giving up its pre-conditions for negotiation on the hostages.⁷⁵ Those conditions include the release of Iranian

frozen assets in the USA, receipt of arms paid for by the Shah, release of Annis Naqqash⁷⁶, and Sheikh Obeid⁷⁷, and information on the fate of four Iranians kidnapped in Beirut in 1980.⁷⁸ The recent release of American hostages, Robert Polhill and Frank Reed, has provided some ground for the validity of these rumours.⁷⁹

* * *

The relations of the Islamic government with some strong members of the European Economic Community (EEC) and Japan has been of special significance in the post-Khomeini era. Having unfriendly relations with the USA, the IRI has been inclined to more friendly relations with Western European nations and Japan as they can supply Iran's demands as well. This policy has been both more feasible and plausible than approaching the USA since establishment of relations with European countries provokes less internal opposition. It is also relatively easier because the European side, by far, and Japan have not experienced diplomatic crises with Iran which may severely hinder any overt attempt for resumption of relations.

In addition to Japan, IRI relations with four major European countries namely Britain, France, West Germany and Italy will be studied. Besides their importance due to their economic and political powers, these countries have been chosen since they are main Western trading partners of the IRI.

* *

Among these four European countries, the UK has been the most

unfortunate country in its relations with the IRI. While bilateral relations have had their own sources of tension, the Thatcher government's firm and constant support of American actions, especially its active support of the US-orchestrated Western naval presence in the Persian Gulf, and its own naval build-up in the Persian Gulf have contributed significantly to the prolongation of unfriendly relations. This British over-identification with the USA has provoked the IRI elite to overreact to certain British moves. In return, this has complicated the settlement of conflicts between the two countries. Apart from the IRI need for crisis-making, the persistence of the regime in keeping the Rushdie affair on the agenda may have some roots in this issue.

Whereas Britain overcame the diplomatic obstacles in 1989 which led to re-opening of both embassies and certain arrangement for exchange of ambassadors¹⁰, the Rushdie affair complicated the situation. This inevitably hampered the expansion of relations. Nevertheless, the British government has tried to reduce tension and normalize relations. As a positive gesture, the Thatcher government strictly played down:

a call from the European Parliament to impose an economic boycott on Iran and support the outlawed Mojahedin-e Khalq terrorist group (MKO) to replace the present Islamic leadership.¹¹

Though appreciated, that sign of good will was not persuasive enough. The IRI apparently had two demands which were: banning the Rushdie book and a full report on the whereabouts of four Iranians who were kidnapped in Beirut in 1980.¹² Rafsanjani,

therefore, subjected full resumption of relations to British acts on these demands, as he pointed out in June 1989: "the ball was firmly in the hands of the British Government if it wanted to resolve the mutual differences."³ Hence British explanations that the banning of the book was not possible and those four Iranians had already been killed did not convince the Islamic elite, including Rafsanjani.⁴

The return of the EEC-recalled ambassadors to Tehran after their short stay in Europe in protest to the Rushdie affair, further put the British in an unpleasant situation. As EEC governments summoned their ambassadors to Europe to show their unity in support of the British demand on the renunciation of the Khomeini fetwa, the return of those ambassadors to Tehran in the absence of any IRI renunciation revealed that the EEC members did not wish to jeopardize their own strategic interests by remaining on the British side. At the end, the UK found itself left alone. An Iranian Radio broadcast referred to this point as an indication of the isolation of Britain, but it left the door open for reconciliation because of a recent British sign of softness.⁵

In spite of the IRI's realization of the British efforts, the Rushdie case has still prevented the normalization of relations. In an interview, Mahmud Vaezi (Deputy Foreign Minister for America and Europe) set forward the criterion for resumption of relations with the UK. Accordingly, the respect for "Islamic values and principles" was crucial for relations with any foreign

country."⁶ Hence he reiterated the ban on Rushdie's book as the condition."⁷ Vaezi further hinted at the willingness of Iran in diplomatic ties with the UK, but it was subject to the UK's show of its genuine intention of respecting "Islamic principles and values" which implied its acceptance of the IRI demands."⁸

The interest of the British in their relations in Iran became evident when they released an IRI terrorist in October."⁹ As the release of that terrorist, Kurosh Fuladi, was one of the requests of Mr. Vaezi¹⁰, that action was a clear concession by the British to pave the way for a rapprochement. Nevertheless, the IRI complicated the situation by aligning the UK with the USA and accusing the former of collaboration with Israel for ignoring the Israeli treatment of the Palestinian in the occupied areas. Ironically, this charge was laid by the "moderate" Ettelaat.¹¹

Perhaps one of the factors which complicates the situation is the behaviour of the "radicals". In an attempt to remove the main obstacle, Rafsanjani tried to downgrade Khomeini's death penalty for Salman Rushdie by denying its status as a religious decree and calling it an "expert view" on the issue."¹² Consequently, there was no religious obligation on practising Muslims to carry out the order. With the sanction of Khamenei, Mohammad Yazdi, the Chief Justice, however, ruled out Rafsanjani's interpretation by renouncing his categorization of the death penalty as a "view" or "fatwa" since it was a strict decree to be carried out and no one else could revoke it."¹³

As attempts for reconciliation failed, the sentiment of overt

hostility prevailed. In February 1990, the British Home Office ordered the representative of the IRI Radio and Television Organization to leave Britain along with eight other Iranians before 20 November.⁹⁴ Not unexpectedly, Iran retaliated by banning the BBC reporter in Tehran.⁹⁵ As a result, IRI-UK relations are still unfriendly and no drastic change seems likely in the near future.

* *

The relations of two continental European countries, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), have reflected their desire for keeping good economic relations with the IRI regardless of resulting controversy. This has illustrated their intention to differentiate between their own long term interests and those of other Western countries e.g., the USA and the UK in their relations with Iran. FRG, for example, has become a major industrial goods supplier to Iran at the time when the USA has tried to impose economic restrictions on Iran in order to extract its cooperation.

Mild reactions of FRG and France have encouraged the IRI in its pursuit of crisis-making policy. Their non-punitive and symbolic diplomatic reactions to such a policy have convinced the IRI of their high stake in maintaining relations with Iran regardless of its behaviour. Hence these countries have encouraged the regime to resort to this policy, as a means for its continuation. In a recent case, both countries sent back their ambassadors to Iran after four months in Europe in protest

to the Rushdie affair despite IRI persistence on its stand.¹⁰⁰ No wonder if the IRI Foreign Ministry took the ambassadors' return as an indication of strength and stability of the regime.¹⁰¹ This view was shared by the "moderate" Tehran Times¹⁰² as well as the "radical" Abrar.¹⁰³

* *

Although welcomed in Tehran, these two countries have gone through two different routes in relations with Iran in the post-Khomeini era. FRG has sought not to get itself involved in diplomatic and political wars of other EEC members, e.g., the UK. As a result, it has enjoyed very stable and lucrative economic relations with Iran. These relations have become more extended as the regime is interested in German investment and technology in reconstructing the country.

Late in January 1990, a high-ranking German delegation which represented over 60 German firms entered Iran.¹⁰⁴ In their negotiations with the "radical" Nabavi¹⁰⁵, he explained the IRI Five-Year Plan and requested German assistance for its fulfilment.¹⁰⁶ Nabavi also announced the legality of the purchase of shares of Iranian firms by German companies.¹⁰⁷ Additionally, the IRI guaranteed the reimbursement of future German loans with interests through the Iranian Central Bank.¹⁰⁸ The Germans, in return, increased the ceiling of their export credits for Iran from DM20m to DM500m.¹⁰⁹

IRI-FRG relations have taken on another dimension since the death of Khomeini. Evidence suggests that the FRG has been

assisting Iran in the production of chemical weapons. In June 1989, it was revealed that an FRG firm arranged the sale of "significant amount of chemicals" to Iran which was suspected to be used for the production of chemical weapons.¹⁰⁶ Even though Iran denied the news and called it a US falsification¹⁰⁷, the seizure of "six containers packed with chemicals used in producing mustard gas aboard an FRG ship bound for Iran", in Dubai (UAE), proved the clandestine military cooperation between the two countries.¹⁰⁸

* *

In contrast to the FRG, France's relations with Iran have been very troublesome so far. Over time, several factors have been responsible for a prevailing sentiment of hostility and distrust towards France among IRI leaders. The French acceptance of opposition leaders i.e., Shahpour Bakhtiar and the Mojahedin leader Mssoud Rajavi, on its soil has been a factor. The refusal of France to release pro-IRI terrorist Anis Naqqash¹⁰⁹ has been another factor. The participation of France in the UN peace-keeping forces in Lebanon in 1983, its naval presence in the Persian Gulf in 1987 and its role as the second largest arms supplier to Iraq have been other factors.

Although these factors seem strong enough to explain the toughness of the IRI, the continuation of troubled relations with France is a sign of the regime's need for crisis-making in its conduct of foreign policy for internal considerations. This is because most of these problems have already been solved.¹¹⁰

The only remaining obstacles in the way of solid bilateral relations are now: the fate of Naqqash, conflict of interest in Lebanon and outstanding financial disputes. With the exception of the last one, the other two factors are blatant examples of the IRI resolution in support of terrorism and following its export-of-revolution policy.

Instead of removing these items from the agenda (which do not serve the long-term interests of Iran), focusing on the solution of the financial dispute and improving relations with an SC permanent member whose support of Iran is crucial for breaking the stalemate of the peace talks, the regime has deliberately given heavy weight to the release of Naqqash and its adventurism in Lebanon in its relations with France.¹¹¹ That is why it has ruined the French reconciliatory gesture in the wake of the Rushdie affair. At the beginning, the IRI responded to the French ambassador's return to Tehran by an equal action in kind; the Iranian Ambassador to France, Ali Ahani, returned to Paris in July.¹¹² However, the mentioned issues have prevented the development of normal economic and diplomatic relations with France.

Defending two opposite Lebanese forces have undermined a rapid and durable rapprochement between the two countries. The emergence of General Michel Aoun in Lebanon which has enjoyed the military assistance of Iraq and France (as it is believed despite the French denial) has seriously endangered the interests of the IRI-backed Hizbollah. What especially lit the fire of hostility

was the French decision on dispatching its navy to Lebanon to back the military efforts of General Aoun.¹¹³ Even though that French military operation was not fully materialized, Velayati immediately cabled to the UN Secretary General to demand the withdrawal of the French fleet from the region.¹¹⁴ The cable was followed by the warning of the "Lebanese National Army " and Hizbollah that they would fire on the French fleet.¹¹⁵

Concerned about the escalation of tension, France pull out most of its ships from the vicinity of the Lebanese Mediterranean zone.¹¹⁶ In spite of the refusal of France to support Aoun militarily, the French venture in Lebanon damaged its relations with Iran to a great extent. As usual, the IRI threatened the West over the fate of the hostages as a means to achieve their compliance with IRI's demands.¹¹⁷

Although unhappy about the Lebanon affair, the IRI accepted the reconciliatory gesture of France. The pull out of the French ships from the vicinity of Lebanon and its non-involvement in military operations reduced the prevailing tension between the two countries. Elaborating on the dangerous nature of any foreign military intervention in Lebanon, a radio broadcast commentary hinted at a possible future rapprochement:

Once again the Government of France implicitly admitted to the mistaken nature of its new policies in the Lebanon. According to experts, the new adjustment to the number and class of the French warships on the Lebanese coastline is interpreted as that country's political retreat from its former positions.¹¹⁸

However, this semi-conciliatory approach was not shared by all factions, at least initially. Certain factions viewed the

Velayati's cable to the UN Secretary General as the first step. That is why Jomhuri-ye Eslami called upon the "Muslims of the world" to unite over the following points for the purpose of forming a credible threat in order to make the French withdraw totally from the region:

1. The Islamic countries inflict coordinated military pressure on the French Government; 2. More modern and more effective weapons are placed at the disposal of the joint Islamic-national front in Lebanon by the Muslims of the world so that this front can confront the aggressors more strongly; 3. The jihad forces throughout the world of Islam attack French interests in their countries; 4. France [should] not feel safe from attacks by Muslim jihad forces inside French territory and in other countries.¹¹⁹

Nevertheless the Lebanon affair did not last long enough to irreversibly damage mutual relations. The impasse of the peace talks and need for reconstruction convinced the entire IRI elite of the necessity of cordial relations with France. That is why the IRI Foreign Ministry welcomed the visit of Francois Sheer (Director General of the French Foreign Minister) to Tehran in September 1989 in order to seek a solution to their financial dispute.¹²⁰ Iranian authorities mentioned the logic of the mutual relations, the scientific and technical capabilities of France and Iran's need to deprive Iraq from having a strong ally: France.¹²¹ The eagerness of the IRI resulted in an agreement over the "improvement of their relations in political, cultural and economic fields".¹²²

Despite the announcement of general agreement on issues, the relations have not materialized according to French expectations. Iran's need of the French support in the UNSC for the

implementation of Resolution 598 was a major factor which inclined it to negotiate with France just after the Lebanon affair. As mentioned by Vaezi, France expressed its support of Iran's demand on the resolution.¹²³ Yet the IRI remained sceptical about France because of its "previous bitter experiences". Viewing a wide range of issues for cooperation, Vaezi expressed his doubts on the future of relations for:

these relations can be expanded if we conclude that France wants healthy and stable relations with us....We should wait to see the good will of France in action so that we can then announce our serious decision.¹²⁴

It seems that two issues created problems in general. One was the outstanding debt of France to Iran. In the 1970s, the Shah lent \$1b in loan to Eurodif, the French nuclear organization. Reimbursement of the original amount and its interest (which Iran also believes to be \$1b) to Iran has become a chronic matter for disagreement between the two countries since 1979. One of the reasons for the visit of Francois Sheer to Tehran was this issue.¹²⁵ The negotiation was continued when Vaezi paid a visit to Paris in October 1989.¹²⁶ Yet that visit did not solve the problems including a related issue of the fate of a promised nuclear power plant in Iran.¹²⁷

Apparently, another controversial issue has been the case of Annis Naqqash. Evidence suggests that, in his negotiations in Tehran, Sheer promised the release of Naqqash. Since it did not happen, two articles in Kayhan and Kayhan International accused the French of breaching their promises.¹²⁸

After a year since the death of Khomeini, relations are not

stable yet. While certain economic deals have been signed including a 100-million-dollar repair contract of the off-shore oil wells of Nassr¹²⁹, mutual relations are remote from normal ones. In an interview in early April 1990, Vaezi announced some progress on both sides' financial disputes in the latest round of negotiations.¹³⁰

Yet financial dispute is one problem among others. During the public trial of a Tunisian member of the IRI terrorist group in France, he revealed the direct involvement of Rafsanjani, Khamenei, Rafighdost (ex-Minister of the Guards Corps) and Rayshahry (ex-Minister of Information) as the masterminds behind the 1986 bombings in Paris.¹³¹

Despite all these, it seems that the isolated IRI has tried to maintain some relations. Beside some economic considerations, the likely reason is its fear of further isolation at the time when Iran needs France for its peace talks with Iraq. This is evident in the statement of Besharati, a Foreign Ministry official, who expressed:

satisfaction over the current upward trends and hoped that these ties will improve further...He recalled that "French President Francois Mitterrand was the second leader of the European Community who sent a congratulatory message to President Hashemi-Rafsanjani after his election to the post and French companies are buying Iranian oil at a satisfactory level."¹³²

* * *

Like West Germany, Italy has been successful in avoiding any durable problems in its relation with the IRI. Perhaps, what has contributed to this is the Italian attempt not to get

involved, at least directly, in the American diplomatic and military campaigns against the IRI. Hence the absence of proactive behaviour and Italy's following of a more or less independent policy towards Iran have provided a suitable atmosphere for expanding bilateral relations.

As mentioned in Chapter III, the appeal of several Italian MPs, senators and two cabinet ministers to the Italian Prime Minister for supporting the National Council of Resistance created a short term tension between the two countries. While linking the Italian case to a previous US Congressman's identical initiative, Ettelaat demonstrated the anger of the Islamic elite of such an action in a reasonably mild phrasing. Hence it demanded an official Italian condemnation while it indicated IRI willingness for the continuation of relations.¹³³

In the absence of any Italian official condemnation, it seems that the economic importance of Italy for Iran led to the pursuit of a compromising policy by Iran lest it would lose Italian cooperation. In 1989, Italy was assisting Iran in completion of vital industries such as the steel complex of Mobarake, the petro-chemical section of the Arak oil refinery and construction of power transmission centres.¹³⁴ Because Italy was one of the major buyers of Iranian oil whose revenue was vital for Iran, Iran had every reason to act more cautiously not to lose a major oil-purchaser.¹³⁵

Even though Italy has been one of Iran's economic partners, its becoming a major trading partner in 1990 illustrates Italy's

importance for Iran. In February 1990, the Iranian Oil Minister announced the conclusion of a one-billion-dollar contract for the construction of an oil refinery in Bandar Abbas with two Italian and Japanese companies.¹³⁶ A separate 13-billion-dollar agreement was reached in April 1990.¹³⁷ During the IRI Five-Year Plan, Italy will assist Iran in construction or development of metal mills, petro-chemical industries, production of automobile and agricultural and industrial machinery and extraction and enrichment of lead.¹³⁸ In return, the IRI has obtained the support of Italy, as a major power, for the implementation of Resolution 598.¹³⁹

* *

Perhaps Japan has been the only Western country which has not experienced political or diplomatic crisis with Iran. A number of factors has been responsible for these peaceful relations. One is Japanese "impartiality". More than any other Western country, Japan has sought to remain away from any Western-sponsored plan against the IRI. It has also followed a policy of not becoming involved in political and diplomatic disputes with Iran by abstaining from criticizing IRI elites for their domestic or foreign policies. As a result, IRI-Japan bilateral relations have taken the form of economic relations which have been of special importance for both sides for different reasons. For Japan, the troublesome relations of Iran with some Western countries have offered an opportunity to gain a big part of the large and expanding Iranian market. For Iran, Japan has become a

reliable supplier of industrial goods which the country badly needs especially at the time when its hostile relations with certain highly industrialized countries have limited its sources of supply.

The absence of bitter memories have made the expanding relations with Japan more plausible for Iran. There is no history of hostility between these two countries. Japan's emergence as an Asian challenger of European and American economic power and its falling victim to American nuclear bombs have further inclined the IRI to expand these relations. Moreover, relations with Japan cannot damage the IRI revolutionary prestige. For all these reasons, and because of Japan's highly developed industrial capabilities, mutual relations have flourished.

While two countries have not experienced any political and diplomatic crisis, the only source of tension in IRI-Japan relations has been the fate of the unfinished petro-chemical complex of the port of Khomeini (Shahpour). The construction of that huge complex began in the Shah's time, but the outbreak of the revolution and then the Iran-Iraq war damaged it to the extent which made the Japanese reluctant to complete the project. As the complex is expected to not only meet domestic demand, but produce surplus goods for export in return for hard currency, the IRI has tried to compromise with the Japanese for its completion. After a long period of negotiations, the acceptance of the Japanese contractor of the project (Mitsui) for paying

compensation solved the only significant problem in their bilateral relations.¹⁴⁰

Without any doubt, Japan has been the most successful Western country in its relations with the IRI. Economically, it has stood second to West Germany which has been the largest trading partner of Iran. This has been the consequence of its cautious policy towards Iran which has inclined the IRI to hope for stronger ties as expressed by Tehran Times at the eve of Japanese election.¹⁴¹

Seemingly, Iran's desire for extension of economic relations will surely put Japan in a co-equal status with West Germany if not in a higher position. This is because, in 1988 Iran imported \$808m in goods from Japan and exported \$1.163b worth of goods to Japan.¹⁴² Up to September 1989, the value of Iranian imports from Japan was \$664m while the value of its exports was \$1.312b.¹⁴³ While statistics for the complete annual exchange of 1989 are not yet available, the Japanese receipt of a number of huge contracts will surely guarantee their preeminent status in Iran. Early in February 1990, the Iranian Oil Minister, Aghazadeh, announced the conclusion of a contract for building a large oil refinery in Bandar Abbas with two Japanese and Italian companies; the expected expense was said to be \$1b.¹⁴⁴ Similarly, Japan signed a 300 million-dollar contract for the repair of two off-shore oil wells.¹⁴⁵ An outstanding contract may be signed in 1990 according to which Japan will provide Ira with \$27b in credit to repair, complete and develop its oil, gas

and petro-chemical installations.¹⁴⁶ In the second half of March 1990, a Japanese delegation representing fifty firms was expected to visit Iran in order to negotiate the deal.¹⁴⁷ The final outcome of the deal is yet to be released.

* * *

The IRI has attached special importance to its relations with certain Third World (TW) countries. Partly, this is because some TW countries are technologically advanced enough to fill the place of some Western countries which are no longer in good terms with Iran. The necessity of diversification of sources of goods and technology has also increased the attraction of relations with such countries. Some other TW countries can act as brokers between the IRI and unfriendly Western countries. In cases, certain regional and security-related considerations have dictated or encouraged closer relations with specific TW countries.

In general, the less controversial nature of these relations has inclined the IRI to expand these relations. Despite the closeness of TW countries to major powers, relations with TW countries cannot be interpreted as the IRI surrender to foreign powers. Because of their overall economic, military and political weakness, these countries are unable to seek domination over Iran via economic or military relations. Hence the south-south nature of relations has increased their plausibility for Iran.

In the absence of Khomeini, the IRI has given a heavier weight

to its relations with certain TW countries. The persistence of several obstacles to normalization of its relations with certain Western countries has reinforced the necessity of the pursuit of its TW policy more seriously than before. To assess the validity of this statement, the relations of the IRI with three groups of TW countries will be briefly analyzed. These are: regional countries, non-regional Arab countries and newly industrialized countries (NIC).

Among regional countries, the Islamic regime has sought consolidation of relations with Pakistan and Turkey in the post-Khomeini era. In addition to the long history of cooperation among these three countries, the eight-year war further consolidated ties especially economic ones as Iran was no longer able to purchase certain goods from some countries directly or found cheaper identical items in these regional countries. More important than that in a sense, the global diplomatic isolation of Iran has forced closer political and diplomatic ties with these two countries.

IRI post-Khomeini foreign policy has made a number of efforts to further tighten these regional ties although this does not mean the IRI dispensing with its designs on these Muslim countries. The continued interference of the regime in the internal affairs of Turkey under the excuse of "preserving Islam" has shown the vitality of the export-of-revolution policy for the continuation of the IRI.

Being at least nominally an Islamic Republic, Pakistan has become the closest "strategic" ally of the IRI. An additional contributing factor has been their common interest in Afghanistan due to the existence of millions of Afghan refugees in their territories and their common fear of Soviet penetration into the region. Their mutual interest in the maintenance of cordial relations was reflected in the presence of the Pakistani President, Ishaq Khan, in the funeral of Khomeini as the only head of states who participated in the ceremony.¹⁴⁸ This was highly appreciated by Velayati who described it as the indication of "the brotherly closeness between the two countries".¹⁴⁹ The recent official visit of the Pakistani Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, to Tehran signified the importance of the bilateral relations for Pakistan.¹⁵⁰ Especially because of the escalation of tension between Pakistan and India over Kashmir and the possibility of a war between the two countries, Pakistan also needs to secure the support of the IRI as a means to deter India.

In the absence of Khomeini, resolution of the Afghan problem has become a pivotal issue of IRI relations with Pakistan. High-ranking authorities of both sides have visited each other's capitals in order to pursue a common strategy with respect to the issue. In an interview prior to his travel to Pakistan, Velayati specified his visit's goals as being bilateral relations and the issue of Afghanistan which is:

a source of intensive concern to Iran and Pakistan [which] are neighbours of Afghanistan. The two

countries do not desire anything except an independent Afghanistan with a government based on the wishes of the Muslim people of that country. The constant advisory role of Iran and Pakistan regarding assistance to the Afghan people for the attainment of their objectives can prove to be decisive and fundamental.¹⁵¹

The result of the trip was the acceptance of a number of principles for the resolution of the Afghan problem.¹⁵²

Apart from Afghanistan, other issues have also been given importance. Security-related issues is one of them. Since June 1989, Iran has tried to satisfy some of its military needs from Pakistan. In July, the Pakistani Defence Minister visited Iran.¹⁵³ During his visit he negotiated with the Minister of Defence, RG Commander in Chief and other RG figures.¹⁵⁴ An agreement was reached at the end of negotiations whose nature is, as yet, unknown. However, Pakistani delegates expressed their satisfaction for having "good and effective results in bilateral military cooperation".¹⁵⁵ On another occasion, the Pakistani Defence Minister made an arrangement with the IRI for providing the Iranian navy with spare parts.¹⁵⁶

Besides military contracts, Iran has achieved broader accords. Upon the November 1989 visit of the IRI Minister of Interior, Nouri, a comprehensive contract was concluded which encompassed areas such as security, economic and political as well as anti-drug campaign.¹⁵⁷ The first and last issue-areas are usually codes for common operation against Iranian opposition groups in Pakistan and Iranian Baluchi groups which have waged an armed struggle against the IRI since its foundation.¹⁵⁸

The relations of two countries seems stable and reliable

especially for Iran. The continuation of negotiations at the ministerial level on political and economic issues during in the post-Khomeini era has shown the strength of their ties. For example, the visit of the Pakistani Foreign Minister in July¹⁵⁹, Energy Minister in November 1989¹⁶⁰, the Pakistani Speaker of Parliament in January 1989¹⁶¹, and the Prime Minister in May 1990 may substantiate the claim.

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Compared to relations with certain Western countries, IRI-Turkish relations have been relatively peaceful. While issues such as the ban of the scarf at universities and anti-fundamentalist policies of the Turkish government have stimulated the clergy's harsh rhetoric¹⁶², the necessity of the preservation of relations with Turkey has restricted IRI reactions to these events. Turkey has been especially important for Iran as it connects Iran to Europe (in addition to the USSR) through roads and railways. The insecurity of navigation in the Persian Gulf in war time and uncertainty about its future situation due to the no-peace, no-war situation, have motivated IRI authorities to maintain a level of normal relations lest Turkey may deprive Iran of receiving European supplies in an emergency. Furthermore, the IRI's concern about the eleven-year long armed struggle of the Iranian Kurds has functioned as another incentive for closer relations with Turkey which is also preoccupied with its own Kurds.

A policy of reconciliation has prevailed over bilateral

relations, despite the rhetoric. Because the Turkish crack down on Muslim fundamentalists had created some tension between the two countries, Besharati was sent to Turkey to ease the situation in May 1989.¹⁶³ The results were the return of ambassadors to their posts and a border economic pact.¹⁶⁴ Turkey for its part sent a minister as its representative to the funeral of Khomeini which showed its general dissatisfaction of IRI interference in its affairs while satisfying the minimum diplomatic convention.¹⁶⁵ Although the participation of a minister in the funeral of a head of state was an insult in itself, the IRI reconciliatory policy was reflected in the speech of Nabavi, then the Minister of Heavy Industries, which clearly showed Iran's need for good relations with Turkey:

Relations between Iran and Turkey are at a level that does not allow the emergence of any serious problem. If any differences arise, they will be solved through mutual efforts.¹⁶⁶

Despite diplomatic fluctuations, economic ties between IRI and Turkey have remained strong. In the period under study, a number of economic agreements was concluded including a joint venture for construction of a railway which connects Iran to Syria via Turkey¹⁶⁷, a 700-million-dollar Turkish package of loan and credit for the IRI reconstruction programs,¹⁶⁸ and Turkish investment in certain Iranian industries, such as automobiles.¹⁶⁹; the two countries agreed to increase the value of their economic exchange to \$2b in 1990.¹⁷⁰

Nevertheless, even strategic considerations have not prevented the IRI from interfering in Turkey. Parallel to reconciliatory

polices, Rafsanjani denied the Turkish accusation of IRI's interference in Turkish internal affairs by supporting and agitating Turkish Muslim fundamentalists. Hence he justified IRI actions by saying "we protect Islam" for what the Turkish saw as interference.¹⁷¹ The practical implication of such statement could only mean further agitation of Turkish anti-government fundamentalists. The continuation of this policy led to the expulsion of an Iranian clergy for his anti-Turkish government agitations.¹⁷² This action led to the expulsion of the Turkish Political Attache at its Orumieh Consulate for the charge of "opening brothel".¹⁷³

While having sound economic relations, the "moderates" did not hesitate to attack the Turkish governments for its harsh measures against IRI-supported groups in Turkey. Hence, according to the Tehran Times:

...in recent years, the militarist wing led by Kenan Evren, who planned the 1980 coup in Turkey, has been behind the opposition against Iran sponsored no doubt by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and spurred on by Evren's personal antipathies towards Iran as diehard secularist [sic].¹⁷⁴

Ironically, such an statement did not prevent the regime from receiving the Turkish Foreign Minister in Tehran and emphasizing "the need to broaden and strengthen the political, economic, trade, and cultural relations between the two countries".¹⁷⁵

* *

The IRI has also given special attention to the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. That region is of great importance for Iran especially due to the presence of a strong Iraq whose rising

power has to be checked by achieving a balance of power in favour of Iran or at least not against it. The fear of a strong hostile and non-reliable neighbour has alarmed the entire Islamic elite to seek a remedy before it is too late. Thus reduction of tension between the IRI and some Persian Gulf Arab states have seemed necessary as a means to prevent the influence of Iraq in the region. In addition, these countries' fears of the IRI have offered a convincing excuse to the USA and other global powers to increase their military and so political presence in the region. For this reason also, a somewhat different approach has seemed necessary. The death of Khomeini provided a situation which inclined the regional countries to be more positive about any Iranian signal for better relations.

The new IRI regional policy has a temporary nature since the IRI has sought the establishment of Islamic regimes in the region since 1979. This goal has not been strategically abandoned because the creation of friendly Islamic regimes can provide psychological and material support for the regime and prolong its life. While the IRI still insists on its support of "Islamic movements" in the region¹⁷⁶, the pace of its support in some regional countries has been reduced for awhile.

A new regional policy has been initiated with the consent of the entire elite. Rafsanjani expressed his view on the necessity of new relations in the area by stressing:

the need for expansion of Iran's political, economic and cultural ties with regional countries. Stability and security in the region would be possible only through mutual cooperation.¹⁷⁷

This led to the announcement of the policy of "equality and balance" by Velayati. Accordingly, the regional countries should respect the sovereignty and security of each other and not let foreign powers have excuses for entering the region under the pretext of defending one against the other.¹⁷⁰ The "radical" Speaker of Parliament (Karoubi) shared the same view.¹⁷¹

However, these expression of "moderation" should not be taken as genuine. This is not to say that the regime does not want normalization of relations with the regional Arabs who have been called "US puppets" since 1979. Rather, this is to say that the pursuit of such a policy does not necessary mean a drastic break with the former policies as the system cannot continue if it does so. That is why the "moderate" Velayati who had already announced his policy of non-interference reiterated the regime's commitment to the policy of "export of revolution", by saying: "Regarding our relations with the Islamic liberation movements, we support Islamic movements in principle. We fully support some of the Islamic movements."¹⁷² As the small regional Arab countries have been the first target of the "export of revolution" policy¹⁷³, the revitalized commitment of Velayati to that policy should create suspicion and distrust which can hardly be useful for the new IRI regional policy.

While the necessity of a new policy has been acknowledged by the elite, there has not been any consensus on Saudi Arabia. Maintaining already reasonably stable relations with the UAE and Oman, relations with countries such as Kuwait and Bahrain have

been normalized, by and large.¹⁰²

On the contrary, relations with the most significant regional country have not been normalized yet.¹⁰³ Saudi Arabia was about to establish normal relations with Iran in May 1989 at the time when even the "radical" Kayhan hinted at its approval by demanding the Saudis to only accept their mistake of "massacring Iranian pilgrims in Mecca" in 1987.¹⁰⁴ However, the execution of 16 pro-IRI Kuwaiti pilgrims in Mecca in September 1989 provoked the entire elite.¹⁰⁵ As a result, both "moderates" and "radicals" have rejected any possibility for good relations between the two countries.¹⁰⁶ Reviving proactive demands like creation of an international Muslim committee for the management of the affairs of sacred places of Saudi Arabia by certain "radicals" has further complicated the possibility of a rapprochement in the near foreseeable future.¹⁰⁷

* *

Relations with two non-regional Arab countries have tremendous significant for the Islamic regime. As the only Arab supporter of the IRI in the war, Syria has had a special place in Iranian foreign policy. In order to preserve those relations, the Syrian government has been paid in free oil and/or discounted oil whose price has never been paid; as a result, Syria owes Iran about \$5b. This outstanding delinquent account has not been perceived as a serious problem for Syria as the cooperation of the latter has been essential on two matters for Iran: checking Iraqi power and protecting IRI interests in Lebanon.

That is why several meetings at the ministerial level have taken place in Tehran and Damascus since the death of Khomeini. Late in May 1989, Velayati paid a visit to Damascus and talked with President Assad, Hizbollah leaders and some Palestinian extremists such as Ahmad Jibril.¹⁸⁸ On the occasion of the 40th day memorial ceremony for Khomeini, Syrian Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs and Minister for Cabinet Affairs went to Tehran.¹⁸⁹

While the isolation of Iraq is still an important objective, it seems that the main theme of bilateral negotiations has been the Lebanese issue. Iran needs the assistance of Syria for supplying and protecting its Hizbollahi forces who now hold several hostages. In August, thus, an important joint meeting among the extremist Palestinians, Hizbollah and Amal forces (backed by Syria), Iran and Syria was convened for finding a common strategy in Lebanon.¹⁹⁰ In the wake of the conference, Velayati had talks with President Assad over "bilateral relations and regional issues".¹⁹¹ The result of all these has been the creation of a "popular Lebanese government" in the areas under the control of the participants to withstand the forces of Iraqi-backed General Aoun.¹⁹²

Despite the absence of overt confrontation between the two countries, the future of IRI-Syria relations is not very promising for Iran. President Assad's refusal to head the Syrian delegation to Khomeini's funeral showed Syria's losing interest in its relations with Iran. This is because Syria's

support of the IRI has contributed to its isolation among Arab countries which it needs for a variety of reasons ranging from military to financial. These countries have put Syria under pressure to improve its relations with Iraq and stop supporting the IRI in order to reunite the Arab camp against Israel. The influx of Soviet Jewish immigrants to Israel and the Israeli plan for their settlement in the occupied areas have created a sense of urgency among Arab leaders since this might further encourage Israel not to comply with a peace plan and so plant the seeds of another military confrontation.

In addition, fear of Israel demands closer ties with Arab countries on which Syria can count for deterring Israel or withstanding its possible invasion. For that purpose, for instance, Iraq is more reliable than the IRI. The recent news on a possible future meeting of Assad with Saddam Hossein¹⁹³, President of Iraq, and his readiness for negotiations with Israel¹⁹⁴ seems to bring about a serious tension in IRI-Syria relations.

In addition, Syria's desire to break its isolation in the West demands its separation from terrorism. Recent Syrian attempts to play an active role in the release of hostages and its efforts to get rid of troublesome elements such as Ahmad Jibril all are to pave its way for rehabilitation as a non-terrorist country. For that purpose, standing away from the IRI is of great importance.

Finally, the contradiction between the goals of Syria and the

IRI in Lebanon has further contributed to the formation a schism between the two. In order to fulfil its dream of the creation of the "Great Syria" and to compensate for its loss of the Golan Heights to Israel, Syria has had designs to annex Lebanon or at least a great part of. This policy sharply contradicts the IRI hope for creation of an Islamic regime in Lebanon. The bloody confrontation between the Hizbollah and the Amal forces in Lebanon partially reflect the incompatibility of these two goals in Lebanon.

* *

IRI relations with Lebanon have been closely related to its Syrian ties. While seeking its "export of revolution policy", the IRI presence in Lebanon has inevitably forced Iran to maintain close ties with Syria. The presence of hostile Israeli or Israeli-backed forces on one hand and Phalange and other Maronite forces on the other have necessitated the protective umbrella of the Syrian Army for the IRI-backed coalition group: the Hizbollah. Moreover, the closeness of the Shi'i Amal group to Syria has further necessitated the preservation of good relations with Syria as the Amal has followed other goals which are different than those of the Hizbolah.

This pursuit of different objectives has resulted in bloody confrontations between the two Shi'i groups in many cases. The IRI has attempted unsuccessfully to decrease the hostility between the two and make them enter a united front. For that purpose, the representatives of the latter two were invited to

Tehran in July and signed an agreement for cooperation.¹⁹⁶ The IRI efforts further provided a degree of cooperation among the later two and the Hizbollah with the extremist Abu-Nidal group.¹⁹⁶

Because of its support of the Syrian presence in Lebanon¹⁹⁷, the IRI policy in Lebanon has provoked hostility of the Lebanese government. The IRI-backed forces' scramble for weakening the Beirut government has only increased that hostility. That is why the Lebanese Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry described:

Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani position on Lebanon as very serious and irresponsible and as representing Persian interference in the Lebanese and Arab people.¹⁹⁸

In spite of expectations, the IRI has failed to forge a union between two rival Shia groups. Since the death of Khomeini, they have fought against each other several times. In itself, this has been a significant indication of diminishing power of the IRI in Lebanon. It has also demonstrated the sharpening of contradictions between Syria and the IRI due to their pursuit of two incompatible goals.

* * *

As an NIC, South Korea has become one of the main trading partners of the IRI. Its advanced technology, lower prices and its interests in preservation of good political and economic relations with Iran have created a suitable situation for the growth of economic ties with Iran. In addition the South Korean policy of avoiding political confrontation with the IRI has convinced all especially the "radical" on the necessity of such

relations. This has been evident in the friendly meeting of Karoubi with the Korean Ambassador in Tehran in which the former confirmed the Iranian interest in expansion of relations in all fields including the politics. As a result, he officially invited the Korean Speaker of Parliament to Iran.¹⁹⁹

In the post-Khomeini era, a major economic deal was made. Signed in March 1990, the contract embraced a package of industrial, commercial and oil cooperations. On one hand, Korea agreed to increase its oil imports from Iran which was 100,000 barrels per day at that time to an unknown volume.²⁰⁰ On the other hand, South Korea will finish the 4.5-billion-dollar unfinished petro-chemical complex of the port of Khomeini.²⁰¹ Furthermore, it will be assisting Iran in building or expanding petro-chemical and automobile industries as well as building ports, power stations, communication networks, and a fishery port in the Persian Gulf.²⁰² While the exact value of the contract is unknown, it is logical to estimate it a contract of several billion-dollars.

* * *

Contrary to what was expected, the Post-Khomeini era has not reduced IRI-sponsored terrorism. Not only have the "moderates" in power not disengaged the regime from organized terrorism, but they have clearly become the masterminds of such activities. The regime's and Rafsanjani's support of well-known terrorists and Rafsanjani's approval of terrorism have shattered the validity of his moderation. The continuation of IRI-sponsored terrorism

in the post-Khomeini era has proven that the system in its totality and regardless of the figure at its top cannot survive in an internationally-recognized diplomatic world. Nor is it capable of following a non-violent foreign policy. The following facts should substantiate the claim.

To the surprise of some observers, IRI relations with terrorist organizations has now become closer and overt. In the post-Khomeini era, Ahmad Jibril and Abu-Nidal have become the "popular" figures of the Islamic elite. In return, they have become the admirers of the Islamic government and its leadership. After Rafsanjani's call on the Palestinians for killing Westerners, Jibril condemned Arab countries for their indifference and praised the IRI "pro-Palestinian" line because: "... the Muslim Iranian national [sic] continue to support the liberation of the holy Qods. That's why Iran has a basic role to play in the Palestine issue."²⁰³

The occasion of Khomeini's mourning brought Jibril and Abu-Musa to Tehran as the official guest of the regime. During their stay in Tehran, Rafsanjani had meetings with them in which he reiterated his support for their "anti-Zionist cause".²⁰⁴

Intimate relations continued after the election of Rafsanjani as president. Not surprisingly, Jibril sent a message of congratulations to Rafsanjani.²⁰⁵ Just to make sure that it was not only a message among many others, the "moderate" Ettelaat published a long interview with Jibril in July 1989 in which he expressed his:

great faith in the leadership of Ayatollah Khamenei and we know that he was a good student of the imam and will remain so. We have great confidence in the new leader.²⁰⁶

Velayati, in his turn, had a meeting with Jibril and Abu-Musa on the situation in Lebanon and the Palestinian issues in July.²⁰⁷

Other actions of Rafsanjani have cleared his approval of terrorism. For instance, it is interesting to know that the released Iranian terrorist, Kouroush Fuladi, (who had spent ten years in a British prison for his role in an unsuccessful bombing in London) was received by Rafsanjani upon his return to Tehran. Hence Rafsanjani "praised Fuladi's potent and resistant spirit and described him as a model of courage and resistance to the Muslim youth of the country."²⁰⁸ (this writer's emphasis)

Yet the relations with terrorists has not been confined to public receptions. There is evidence to back the continuation of an active terrorist-support policy by the IRI. In the aftermath of Rafsanjani's call for reprisal upon westerners, for instance, the PLO warned Westerners not to visit Lebanon for the:

fear that Hizbollah or its Palestinian allies will act on the call by Iranian Parliamentary Speaker, Hashemi-Rafsanjani.....[The PLO claimed that] Iran is gearing up for a campaign of vigorous anti-Zionism, part of which includes attempting to halt the new trend of moderation inside the PLO. The Iranian government is also channelling funds to Islamic extremists inside the occupied territories.²⁰⁹

If the previous case was more a warning for the future operations, the Egyptian case was different. In August 1989, Egyptian authorities announced the arrest of a terrorist fundamentalist network.²¹⁰ The members of the network had been

funded and trained by the IRI in order to carry out sabotage acts against "U.S., Israeli, Iraqi and Kuwaiti interests as well as against some other Arab states".²¹¹ The leader of the network, Dr. Sayyid Fahmi al-Shinnawi, had been one of the doctors of Khomeini who had meetings with IRI leaders such Moussavi ("radical") and Velayati ("moderate") before he left for Egypt.²¹²

The last known case of IRI terrorism is the Congo air crash. The IRI has been charged with masterminding the explosion of a French civilian plane. Accordingly, two pro-IRI Hizbollahis placed a bomb on the French DC-10 plane which was crashed in Niger in August 1989.²¹³

* * *

The new foreign policy of the Islamic government has been affected by factional rivalry. This rivalry has been salient in a few cases while cooperation has been reflected in the majority of foreign policy decisions. This does not imply the essential elimination of power struggle. Nor is it an indication of full domination of a faction over the others. Cooperation, therefore, has reflected the concern of the elite about the continuation of the political system. Although better relations with other countries may noticeably reduce the acuteness of some problems, no cordial and reliable relations can possibly assure the stability of the IRI unless the regime secures the sincere support of the majority of the Iranians.

ENDNOTES

1. Chapter V will be dedicated to IRI-East relations.
2. Dr. Mohammad Javad Larijani, "Larijani's Article Reviews Foreign" (text). Tehran Ettelaat in Persian (27 April 1989, 20). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 12 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-091; p.40).
3. Like his April 1989 articulation of principles, they were:
One: Consolidation and further opening of the prestigious position which Iran enjoys within and across the Islamic world; Two: Building effective and reliable defence, based on philosophy of deterrence and popular participation; Three: A general mobilization of the nation for comprehensive and all pervasive programs for total restructuring of the economy, social well-being and education (Dr. Javad Larijani, "Larijani Comments on Post-Khomeini Priorities" [text]. Tehran Tehran Times in English (12 June 1989, 3). Re-printed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 23 June 1989 [PrEx 7.10: FBIS-NES-89-120; p.38]).
4. Dr. Mohammad Javad Larijani, "Ex-Deputy Foreign Minister Larijani Interviewed" (text). Tehran Ettelaat in Persian (19 April 1989, 14). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 9 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-NES-89-088; p.45).
5. According to Larijani, the US policy in the region is:
based on the fact that there should be a lack of security and trust in the relations among the regional countries and on the fact that ... every one should fear Iran. The tension between the regional countries and Iran gives the United States an opportunity to increase its influence and presence in the region on the pretext that it is protecting countries. Therefore, one should assume that the United States is a country that does not wish for good relations between regional countries and Iran (Ibid., 46).
6. Ibid., 46-47.
7. That is why, Larijani, on another occasion, maintained:
On the contrary, the Soviet Union has taken the initiative on the international scene and especially in Europe. Europe is moving toward becoming a single house, and the Soviet Union is a part of this house. If there is a room in this house, then something should

be done. This is actually the meaning of all these developments (Dr. Mohammad Javad Larijani, "Larijani on East Europe, Soviet Developments" [text]. Tehran Television Service in Persian [1505 GMT, 24 November 1989]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 27 November 1989 [PrEx 7.10: FBIS-Nes-89-226; p.62]).

8. Larijani, "Ex-Deputy Foreign Minister Larijani Interviewed", 47.

9. Ibid.

10. Larijani elaborated on the issue by saying that: the Salman Rushdie affair and the imam's historic decree showed that Iran opted for safeguarding Islam and the revolution over safeguarding relations with West Europe....I think that with the existing common grounds, their logic should be based on non-intervention. In other word, they have realized that Iran should never be given options, and that when it comes to choosing between its revolution and interests and its relations with one country or another, Iran will undoubtedly choose the revolution and Islam....a readjustment of logic and the existence of common grounds in relations manifest the fact that the future of just and logical relations between Iran and West[ern] European countries is bright (Ibid).

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. On that occasion, Rafsanjani maintained:
[I]f the West attempts to stand against the Muslims' recent move, [the Muslims] may start a new one. [That demonstration was held when], on the one hand, a poisonous propaganda had started against Iran to provoke the public opinion against us, and on the other, implicit and explicit threats had been made by various British officials. But the Muslims, in support of the Imam's fetwa, embraced danger and made such a presence in the scene which was unprecedented in recent decades (Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, "Hashemi-Rafsanjani Warns West Against 'Mischief'" [text]. Tehran IRNA in English [30 May 1989]. Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 30 May 1989 [PrEx 7.10: FBIS-NES-89-102; p. 64]).

14. Editorial, "Editorial Views Economic Relations With West" (text). Tehran Tehran Times in English (17 September 1989, 2). Re-printed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 27 September 1989 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-NES-89-186; p. 57).

15. [Ali Mohammad] Besharati, "Besharati on Nonaligned Movement" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (25 July 1989). Re-printed by the Foreign Information Broadcast Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 26 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-NES-89-142; p. 61).

16. That criticism was reflected in the following statement:
In order for that movement to have meaningful content it must follow its lofty objectives. The highest objective which the member-states of the movement can choose is planing against colonialism and exploitation: otherwise, mere slogan will not be efficient (Emami-Kashani, "Emami-Kashani Urges Action, Not 'Sloganeering'" [text]. Tehran Domestic Service in Persian [030 GMT, 8 September 1989]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 8 September 1989 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-NES-89-173; p. 48)).

17. Dr. Mohammad Javad Larijani, "Larijani Comments on Ties With Turkey, Pakistan" (text). IRNA in English (1714 GMT, 9 November 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 14 November 1989 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-NES-89-218; 81).

18. Ibid.

19. "The Opening of the Chamber of Commerce of Iran, Turkey and Pakistan," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 15 March 1990, 8.

20. "Strategic Cooperation Among Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 29 March 1990, 1.

21. Ali Mohammad Besharati, "Besharati on Elliason Mission, Al-Tai'if Accord" (text). IRNA in English (0740 GMT, 30 October 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 31 October 1989 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-NES-89-209; p. 61).

22. "The Lost Golden Opportunities," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 2 August 1989, 12.

23. The 1975 Agreement recognized the talweg principle for the determination of the control of either country over the waterway. The Iraqi dissatisfaction of the arrangement, which was imposed on it due to its weakness and frustration with the Iranian-backed Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, was one the contributing

factors to the Iraqi invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980. Prior to that on 17 September 1980, Iraq officially abrogated the Algiers Agreement. For detail, see: Peter Hunseler, "The Historical Antecedents of the Shatt-al-Arab," in The Iran-Iraq War, ed. M.S. El-Azhary (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 18-19. See also: Levy and Froelich, 129.

24. Tehran Times predicted its fruitlessness by saying that it was:

off to a bad start already as no agreement has been reached yet on what should be on the agenda. More than a pinch of salt would be needed for us to believe in the success of the negotiations and that it can break ground in the execution of the stalemated Security Council Resolution 598 (Editorial, "Editorial Comments on Peace Talks with Iraq" [text]. Tehran Tehran Times in English [22 April 1989, 2]. Re-printed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 2 May 1989, [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-083; p. 47]).

25. Ali Akbar Velayati, "Foreign Minister Interviewed on Geneva Talks" (text). Tehran Kayhan in Persian (24 April 1989, 2). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 10 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-089; p.49).

26. Editorial, "Tehran Times Criticizes Peace Talks" (text). Tehran Tehran Times in English (26 April 1989, 2). Re-printed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 4 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-085;p. 52).

27. Marvi, "Commentary Criticizes Superpower Support for Iraq" (excerpts). Tehran Ettela'at in Persian (25 April 1989, 13). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 11 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-090; p. 51).

28. Sayeed Rajaie Khorasani, "USSR Could Play 'Major Role' in Iraq Dispute" (text). IRNA in English (0600 GMT, 6 July 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 6 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-128; p.38).

29. Ibid.

30. Dr. Mohammad Javad Larijani, "Larijani Interviewed on Gulf, Ties with West" (text). Tehran Resalat in Persian (7 August 1989, pp. 2,10, 12). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 25 August 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-164;p. 48).

31. Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, "Velayati Interviewed on Foreign Policy" (text). Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (1630 GMT, 7 September 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 8 September 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-173; p.48).

32. He observed:

We have had no substantive progress regarding the implementation of Resolution 598 since then, and if the conditions remain unchanged, it is not clear whether we will be able to achieve any tangible progress in the near future either (Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, "Jomhuri-ye Eslami Interviews Velayati" [text]. Tehran Jomhuri-ye Eslami in Persian [2 November 1989, p. 12]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 2 November 1989 [PrEx 7.10: FBIS-NES-89-211;p. 48]).

33. "Elliason, Velayati Discuss Resolution 598" (text). Tehran domestic Service in Persian (1600 GMT, 14 November 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 14 November 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-211;p. 44).

34. "Velayati Comments on Peace" (text). Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (0430 GMT, 17 November 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 17 November 1989 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-NES-89-221;p. 44).

35. Besharati, "Besharati on Elliason Mission, al-Tai'if Accord", 61.

36. Editorial, "Tehran Times on Moscow's Mediation" (text). Tehran Tehran Times in English (13 January 1990, 2). Re-printed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 19 January 1990 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-NES-90-013).

37. Ibid.

38. "The Islamic republic Accepted the New Plan of the Secretary General for Peace with Iraq," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 15 March 1990, 1.

39. Ibid.

The articles of the plan are as follows:

- 1- Preparation for subsequent arrangements of the ceasefire, free navigation in international waters and the Strait of Hormoz.
- 2- Withdrawal of forces to the internationally recognized borders without any delay and its confirmation by the UN.
- 3- Release and return of the prisoners of war to their countries without any delay and according to the Geneva Convention approved

on 12 August 1949.

4- Cooperation with the General Secretary in his efforts for mediation in order to achieve a comprehensive, fair and acceptable agreement for both sides which includes all the unresolved issues according to the written principles of the UN, dredging the Shatt-al Arab for navigation for the benefit of both countries.

5- The Secretary General's following up through consultation with Iran and Iraq for the sake of a just investigation regarding the issue of the determination of the instigator of the confrontation.

6- Creation of an expert team for the study of the issue of the reconstruction by the Secretary General.

7- The Secretary General's consultation with Iran and Iraq and other regional countries for the assessment of the measures for the consolidation of security and stability in the region.

8- Mutual guarantee for the implementation of the resolution in its totality for the purpose of creation of peace and good neighbourliness.

40. "Majlis Speaker Urges Attacks on U.S. Citizens" (text). IRNA in English (1000 GMT, 5 May 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 5 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-086;p. 45).

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. "PLO Leaders Reject Rafsanjani Reprisals Call" (excerpts). London Al-Shargh Al-Awsat in Arabic (10 May 1989, pp.1-2). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 11 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-090;p. 2).

44. "Majlis Speaker Says Remarks 'Misinterpreted'" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1005 GMT, 10 May 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 11 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-090;p. 44).

45. Ibid.

46. Rafsanjani said:

I expressed my own view, this was my analysis and its was nothing new. For years, even in my interviews with Western correspondents, I have said that such pressures exerted on popular and Islamic movements cannot be one sided and will evoke similar responses. I still hold the same view. My opinions might be shared by other officials or might not ("Interviewed on Manoeuvres, PLO" [text]. Tehran Domestic Service in Persian [1630 GMT, 10 May 1989]. Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast

Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 11 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-090;p. 45).

47. "Editorial on U.S. 'Non-Stop' Espionage" (text). Tehran Times in English (29 April 1989, p.2). Re-printed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 9 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-088;p. 49).

48. "Tehran TV Details 'Covert Operations' of Spies" (excerpts). Tehran Television Service in Persian (1740 GMT, 4 May 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 8 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-087;p. 55).

49. The broadcast held:

The Intelligence experts of the big powers, especially the U.S. CIA, have now come to believe that a change in the policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran is not possible through violent military means or through a coup d'etat. The only way recommended by American theoreticians -drawing on past experiences in other countries of the world- to defeat the Islamic revolution is to make society disintegrate from within by distorting genuine values, controlling economic channels, as well as destroying the younger generation (Ibid.).

50. This will be discussed in full in the next chapter.

51. "U.S. Reaction to the Iran-USSR Ties Viewed" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1740 GMT, 25 June 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 27 June 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-122;p. 38).

52. Ibid., 39.

53. The daily observed:

Tehran's relations with Washington are irreparable and those who feel the situation may change in the near future are advised to go through the pictures of mutilated bodies of Iranians on board the Airbus who could never think of becoming targets of American missiles ("Daily Says Relations With U.S. 'Irreparable'" [text]. Tehran IRNA in English [0625 GMT, 3 July 1989]. Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 21 July 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-139;p. 53].

54. "Deputy Sets Out Conditions for Resumed U.S. Ties" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (0645 GMT, 26 July 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 26 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-142;p. 55).

55. The following is an excerpt of the original text:

The first step: As a matter of historical fact, the United States must eventually adapt to the reality that the present situation of the world, particularly since the 1980s has significantly changed. Strictly speaking, nations of the Third World, especially Muslims, no longer tolerate suppression and hegemonic policies by great powers....

The second step: The United States must recognize the reality of the Islamic Revolution which has been created by millions of people in Iran and is growing profoundly in momentum and stature. [The USA should compensate its wrong-doings by] stopping... her hostility against Iranian people and their revolution by putting an end to her help to the enemies of the [IRI] and by releasing Iran's property...

The third step: For the resumption of reciprocal relations with Islamic Iran, as the Iranian Government agrees, the United States must theoretically and practically accept these two fundamental factors:

1. Non-interference into Iran['s] internal affairs,
2. Respect for mutual interests. See: Seyed Ali Mahmudi, "Commentary on Steps Needed for Relations with U.S." (text). Tehran Tehran Times in English (3 August 1989). Re-printed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 9 August 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-152;p. 60).

56. Tehran Times specified the obstacles as follows:

The major obstacle is U.S. itself [which] since severance of relations [with Iran] has not proposed any practical sincere approach, required to resolve the difficulties. The other important problem is the harsh stance of the U.S. Government with regard to the Islamic Revolution. In case of Iranian assets for example, it has blocked their release without any legitimate reason and has not shown any sincere intentions in this regard ("Tehran Times on Iran-U.S. Relations" [text]. Tehran. Tehran Times in English [8 August 1989]. Re-printed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 14 August 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-155;p. 53]).

57. "U.S. Must Condemn Israel, Release Assets" (text). Tehran Kayhan International in English (16 August). Re-printed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 16 August 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-157;p. 51).

58. Ibid.

59. The article reasoned as follows:

The U.S. had frozen Iranian assets in American banks for the past 10 years, regularly condoned kidnapping and other acts of terrorism by Israel, and always vetoed U.N. resolutions against Tel Aviv ("Ettelaat: Relations with U.S. Unwanted" [text]. Tehran IRNA in English [1425 GMT, 16 August 1989]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 17 August 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-158;p. 48]).

60. The commentator stressed that:

domestic conditions in Iran, the views of various officials, and the hatred for the past that remains in the people's hearts will not give the United States this opportunity. If the Americans smile at Iran, no will [sic] in Iran will smile back. If they offer their hand, no one in Tehran will shake it ("Tehran TV Reviews Relations with United States" [text]. Tehran Television Service in Persian [1615 GMT, 26 August 1989]. Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 7 September 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-172;p. 45]).

61. "Larijani Opposes Relations with U.S." (text). Tehran Resalat in Persian (12 September 1989). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 19 September 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-180;p.49).

62. "Resalat Views Friendship with United States" (text). Tehran Resalat in Persian (14 September 1989). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 29 September 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-188;p. 33).

63. " 'Spy' Outline Recruitment, Training, U.S. Plans" (text). Tehran Tehran Times in English (14 September 1989). Re-printed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 21 September 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-182;p. 65). See also: "Program on 'U.S.' Spies" (excerpt). Tehran Television Service in Persian (1614 GMT, 2 November 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 6 November 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-213;p. 62).

64. "Khoiniha Praises Majlis Law on U.S. Citizens" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1610 GMT, 3 November 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 6 November 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-213;p. 65).

65. Ibid.

66. An editorial in this newspaper assessed the bill:
The historic and brave efforts by the Majlis in approving a bill on confronting the U.S. Government's terrorist acts added yet another glorious document to the list of those on the future of the independence and freedom of the Iranian Majlis, nation, and government (Editorial, "Ettelaat Editorial Lauds Majlis Bill" [text]. Tehran Ettelaat in Persian [2 November 1989]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 14 November 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-218;p. 74]).
67. "Mohatshemi Appeared in the Anniversary of the Occupation of the US Embassy," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 9 November 1989, 1.
68. An editorial of the daily, Jomhuri-ye Eslami, pointed out that:
The confrontation with arrogance and with the pro-Westerners is an inheritance left in the heart of the Iranian nation by the imam. Whoever moves contrary to this will be crushed by the huge wheels of the revolution (Editorial, "Editorial on 'Continued Struggle' Against U.S." [excerpts]. Tehran Jomhuri-ye Eslami in Persian [4 November 1989]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 14 November 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-218;p. 75]).
- In their turn, the "moderates" expressed their anti-American feelings by broadcasting a radio commentary which held:
Today, 10 years from the capture of the den of spies, one can say, with due attention to the events which have taken place and the nature of the Islamic revolution, that the Islamic republic will never lay down the flag of campaign against global arrogance. This stems from the fact that global arrogance, headed by the United States, has proved during the past years that it never abandons plotting against the Islamic revolution ("Commentary on Capture of Embassy" [excerpts]. Tehran Domestic Service in Persian [1110 GMT, 4 November 1989]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 6 November 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-213;p. 64]). (this writer's stress)
69. Tehran Times viewed the US invasion of Panama as a proof that:
the imperialist powers can go to any lengths to keep their interests intact. In a clear and calculated violation of international norms, the U.S. President George Bush has once again shown how debased U.S. political behaviour can get by sending in thousands of troops to arrest the Panamanian President (as

published] Manuel Antoinio Noriega on charges that still need to be proven (Editorial, "Tehran Times Condemns U.S. Action in Panama" [text]. Tehran Tehran Times in English [23 December 1989]. Re-printed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 3 January 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-90- 002;p. 68]).

Similarly, Jomhuri-ye Eslami condemned the invasion by saying: The savage U.S. military expedition against Panama and the bloodbath the United States unleashed in this small [Panama] country speak of the biggest defeat of the Great Satan in the current year (Editorial, "Editorial Decries 'Savage' U.S. Action in Panama" [text]. Tehran Jomhuri-ye Eslami in Persian [23 December 1989]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 17 January 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-90-011;p. 48]).

70. "President's Legal Adviser on Frozen Assets" (text). Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (0430 GMT. 10 November 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 14 November 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-218;p.73).

71. "Secret Negotiations of the Islamic Republic and the USA," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 8 February 1990, 1.

72. "According to the Verdict of the [International Court] in the Hague: Iran Will Pay \$600m to 'Amoco'," Kayhan Havai, 20 June 1990, 2.

73. "US Defence Secretary: In the Case of Soviet Attack on, The Unites States Will Not Defend Iran," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 15 February 1990, 1.

74. "US State Department: Abuse of Human Rights Continues in the Islamic Republic," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 1 March 1990, 1.

75. "For the Release of the Hostages: The Islamic Republic Gives Up All Its Claims," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 8 March 1990, 1.

76. This issue will be explained in the following section on IRI-France relations.

77. One of the local leaders of the Hizbollah in Lebanon who was abducted by the Israelis in the late 1989 and has been taking in Israel ever since.

78. Ibid.

79. Robert Polhill was released on 22 April 1990. For detail, see: "Free At Last!," The Ottawa Citizen, 23 April 1990, A1-A2.

80. "Ambassadors Will Be Exchanged Between the Islamic Republic and Britain," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 17 November 1988, 1,5.

81. "UK said to Play Down Call for Economic Boycott" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (0445 GMT, 26 May). Re-printed the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 16 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-101;p. 37).

82. "UK Foreign Office Spokesman Cited on Ties" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (9 June 1989). Re-printed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-112;p. 52).

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

85. Addressing the appeal of the British Muslims to the High Court for the expansion of the anti-blasphemy law to Islam as well, the broadcast gave credit to the Britons as it stipulated: perhaps one can consider the British High Court announcement allowing the extension of the anti-blasphemy law as a step aimed at correcting previous stances -a step in the direction of respecting the sacred feelings of Muslims ("Possible 'Revision' of UK Policy on Rushdie" [excerpts]. Tehran Domestic Service in Persian [1058 GMT 22 June 1989]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 19 July 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-137; p.45]).

86. "Deputy Foreign Minister on British Relations" (text). Tehran Tehran Times in English (22 August 1989). Re-printed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 29 August 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-166; p.44).

87. This was a condition since:
relations with Britain could have been maintained "on a healthy footing and at more than superficial levels," if only Britain had not committed the unpardonable mistake of supporting Salman Rushdie and the publication of his diabolical work giving offense to Islamic sentiments throughout the world (Ibid).

88. Ibid.

89. "President Meets with Former UK Prisoner Fuladi" (text). Tehran Television Service in Persian (1600 GMT, 1 November 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 3 November 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-212;p. 3).

90. "Deputy Foreign Minister on British Relations", 44.

91. The daily laid the charge by raising a question:

If superpowers and impudent and haughty governments like the U.S. and British Governments have truly accepted the fact that terrorism is a crime that is overtly contrary to international norms and regulations, then why do they support a government like Israel's which is the founder, fomenter, and standard-bearer of state terrorism in the Middle East (Editorial, "Editorial on Prospects for U.S. Relations" [text]. Tehran Ettelaat in Persian [16 August 1989, 1,3]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 16 August 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-166; p.44])?

92. "Hashemi-Rafsanjani: 'Imam's' View on Salman Rushdie Is an 'Expert View'", Kayhan Newspaper (London), 22 February 1989, 1.

93. Hashemi-Rafsanjani: 'Imam's' View on Salman Rushdie Is an 'Expert View ', 1.

94. The eight included an IRI Air employee and seven government-bursary students. These nine people were proclaimed harmful for the welfare and security of Britain ("The Representative of the Islamic Republic Radio and Television Service in London and Eight Others Were Deported from Britain," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 8 February 1990, 1).

95. "The BBC Activities in Iran Were Prevented," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 1 March 1990, 2.

96. "Papers on 'Positive' Decision by France, FRG" (text\). Tehran IRNA in English (0703 GMT, 14 June 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 14 June 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-113;p. 64).

97. This was evident in the IRI Foreign Ministry statement which observed:

those countries which want to have relations with Iran have no other option but to recognize the reality of the Islamic Republic of Iran and respect the Iranian People's wishes ("Foreign Ministry on French, FRG Envoys' Return" [text]. Tehran IRNA in English [1420 GMT, 15 June 1989]. Re-printed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 16 June 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-115;p.42]).

98. Tehran Times interpreted the return as a clear sign of the Europeans' understanding of the necessity of relations with the IRI. That is why the Europeans have:

already taken steps for improving political relations with the Islamic Iran during the second decade. The revolution, they have rightfully recognized, is

politically and economically stable and strong (Papers on 'Positive' Decision by France, FRG, 64).

99. Abrar, welcomed the move while interpreting it as a victory for Iran's foreign policy (Ibid.).

100. "German Firms Can Purchase the Shares of Iranian Firms," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 1 February 1990, 3.

101. Behzad Nabavi is the ex-Minister of Heavy Industries, present Deputy Minister of Economy and Finance and the Director of the Organization for Investment and Technical Assistance of Iran.

102. "German Firms Can Purchase the Shares of Iranian Firms", 3.

103. Ibid.

104. "FRG Increased its Export Credits to DM500 Million," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 8 February 1990, 4.

105. Ibid.

106. "FRG Aided Sale of Chemicals for Weapons" (excerpt). Hamburg DPA in German (1238 GMT, 27 June 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 30 June 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-125;p. 39).

107. "Manufacturing Plans Denied" (Text). Tehran IRNA in English (0905 GMT, 30 June 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 30 June 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-125;p. 39).

108. "Dubay Authorities Seize Mustard Gas Bound for Iran" (text). Jerusalem Radio in Arabic (1430 GMT, 2 July 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 3 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-126;p.20).

109. Being a Shi' Lebanese, Naqqash was assigned by the IRI to assassinate Dr. Shahpour Bakhtiar in 1980. Although he failed to kill Bakhtiar, he killed two French citizens. Since then, he has been serving a life sentence in France. His release has been one of the demands of Lebanese hostage-takers and the IRI alike ("Annis Naqqash Is About to Die," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 11 January 1990, 2).

110. Because of its long term considerations and as a result of a series of IRI-sponsored bombing in France in 1986, France restricted the activities of Iranian opposition groups and deported Rajavi from France.(a) It also withdrew its forces from Lebanon in 1983 after an IRI-sponsored attack on American and

French forces. The regime itself has shown its understanding of its inability in forcing France not to arm Iraq due to its lucrative nature as it has not included the termination of arms sale to Iraq as condition. Finally, the French naval presence in the Persian Gulf in 1987 was insignificant compared to that of the USA. Nevertheless, France has essentially withdrawn its forces from the region. The remaining ships are not that significant to provoke the IRI ("Masoud Rajavi Settled Down in Iraq," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 12 June 1986, 1.9).

111. The IRI presence in Lebanon is a part of its export-of-revolution policy. Therefore, it is clear that it has every reason to be sensitive to any threat posed by a power to its well-nourished Hizbollahi forces in Lebanon. Lebanon is the only country in which the regime has been successful to establish a relatively strong pro-IRI force. However, it is not very wise to exaggerate the role of France in Lebanon which was more symbolic than military. France was not in the position of irreversibly change the status-quo in favour of Auon, for example. Therefore, the insistence of the regime on creating an uproar about the French designs on Lebanon at the time when Iran needed the French support for its far more important issue of the peace talks showed the desire of the regime in creating crisis.

112. "Ambassador Ali Ahani Returns to France" (Text). Tehran IRNA in English (1658 GMT, 18 July 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 19 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-137;p. 44).

113. "French Ships' Arrival 'Proactive'" (Text). Tehran IRNA in English (1656 GMT, 24 August 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 24 August 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-164;p. 44).

114. Ibid.

115. "French Warships in 'Retreat' from Lebanon" (excerpts). Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (1030 GMT, 25 August 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 28 August 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-165;p. 47).

116. Ibid.

117. For instance, Tehran Times stipulated:
The West of course should pursue efforts and use all diplomatic means to contain the Lebanese crisis and should avoid resort to arms. It is only in this way that humanitarian moves to resolve the hostage crisis can be taken, particularly in Lebanon (Editorial, "Editorial Warns West to Stay Out of Lebanon" [Text]. Tehran Tehran Times in English [22 August 1989]. Re-

printed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 28 August 1989 (PrEx
 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-165;p. 47)).

118. "Commentaries View French Action on Lebanon 'Military Interference' Seen" (excerpts). Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (1700 GMT, 26 August 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 29 August 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-166;p. 45).

119. Editorial, "Editorial on Muslims' Duty Against French" (Text). Tehran Jomhuri-ye Esjami in Persian (26 August 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 14 September 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-177,p.48).

120. Editorial, "Editorial on 'Rationalism' in Ties with France" (Text) Tehran Tehran Times in English (19 September 1989). Re-printed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 16 June 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-186;p. 53).

121. Ibid.

122. "Visit by France's Scheer Reportedly Promotes Ties" (excerpts). Tehran Tehran Times in English (19 September 1989). Re-printed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 27 September 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-186;p.53).

123. "Deputy Foreign Minister on Relations with France" (Text) Tehran Resalat in Persian (20 September 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 4 October 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-191;p.56).

124. Ibid.

125. "French Official to Visit Over Loan Dispute" (Text) Tehran IRNA in English (1825 GMT, 13 September 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 14 September 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-177;p. 48).

126. "Loan Dispute Talks to Resume" (Text). Tehran IRNA in English (1340 GMT, 24 October 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 25 October 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-205;p. 52).

127. "Mahmud Vaezi Comments on Relations with France" (Text) Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (0430 GMT, 10 November 1989). Translation the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 16 June 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-218;p.72-73).

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128. The articles held:

The French, who have grossly breached earlier promises and agreement with regard to Annis Naqqash, will not hesitate to repeat it in future as has been witnessed with other issues ("Paper Condemns French Breach of Promises" [Text] Tehran IRNA in English [0759 GMT, 25 October 1989]. Re-printed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 25 October 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-205;p. 52]; see also: Sayed Masud Jazayeri, "Kayhan Comments on Relations with France" [Text]. Tehran Kayhan in Persian [21 October 1989]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 28 November 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-227;p. 76]).

129. "The Repair of the Off-Shore Oil Deposits of Nassr Was Given to the French," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 22 February 1990, 4.

130. "In the Fifth Round of Negotiations, Some Part of the Financial Disputes Was Settled," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 12 April 1990, 1.

131. "The Secrets of the Terrorist War of the Islamic Republic in France Was Revealed," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 8 February 1990, 1.

132. "Besharati on Gorbachev Visit, Improving Ties " (Text). Tehran IRNA in English (1018 GMT, 5 September 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 6 September 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-171;p.61).

133. The article approached the issue as follows:

The Italian Government and Parliament are like a seething cauldron, the contents of which are constantly on the move; even so, the signatures of two cabinet ministers is a point worth noting. Unless the Italian Government condemns these measures, a downgrading of diplomatic ties would be an answer which the Italian Government and Parliament might well take note of. They would then see that our government, Majlis, and revolution are not be held hostage by the lonely sons of Mussolini (Editorial, "Ettelaat Comments on Relations with Italy" [text]. Tehran Ettelaat in Persian [30 September 1989]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 18 October 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-200;p.50]).

134. "Signing an Unprecedented 13-Billion-Dollar Agreement with Italy," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 12 April 1990, 4.

135. Italy increased its oil imports from Iran from 3.8m barrel in the first eleven months of 1988 to 5.1m barrel in the same period of 1989 ("Increase in the Iranian Oil Export to Italy," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 29 March 1990, 4).

136. "Two Italian and Japanese Firms will Construct an Oil Refinery for Bandar Abbass," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 8 February 1990, 3.

137. "Signing an Unprecedented 13-Billion-Dollar Agreement with Italy", 1.

138. Ibid.

139. Ibid.

140. In the end of a long period of negotiation, the President of Mitsui announced its company's desire for withdrawal from the project ("Petrochemical Dispute with Japanese Firm Resolved" [text]. Tehran IRNA in English (9 October 1989). Re-printed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 10 October 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-1946; p.61]). Hence it was agreed in October that the Japanese side would pay one billion dollars in compensation to Iran; this solved the outstanding problem between the two countries (Ibid.).

141. The daily maintained:

Japan's new government when it is set in place, it is hoped will review its entire position in relations with Iran and forge a closer and highly beneficial movement in mutual relations with this country (Editorial, "Editorial Comments on Relations with Japan" [excerpts]. Tehran Tehran Times in English (26 July 1989, 1,3). Re-printed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 3 August 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-148; p.49]).

142. "Japanese Envoy Interviewed on Commercial Ties" (text). Tehran Tehran Times in English (20 November 1989, 1,4). Re-printed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 28 November 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-227; p.79).

143. Ibid.

144. "Two Japanese and Italian Companies Will Build an Oil Refinery for Bandar Abbas," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 8 February 1990, 3.

145. "The Contract of Repair of Salman' and 'Nassar' Wells Were Given to the Japanese and French," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 1 March 1990, 4.

146. "The Islamic Republic Has Applied for a 27 Billion Dollar Credit to Japan," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 1 March 1990, 4.

147. Ibid.

148. "President Ishaq Khan Leaves for Khomeini Funeral" (text). Islamabad Domestic Service in Urdu (5 June 1989). Translation by Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 6 June 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-107;p.53).

149. "Velayati Departs for Pakistan, Comments on Trip" (text) Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (0430 GMT, 19 June 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 19 June 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-116;p.51).

150. Bhutto paid an official visit to Tehran on 16 May 1990 during which she received the support of Rafsanjani on a number of issues including the Pakistani stand on Kashmir. For detail see: "Further Expansion of Iran-Pakistan Relations," Kayhan Havai, 23 May 1990, 5.

151. "Velayati Departs for Pakistan, Comments on Trip", 51.

152. The mutually agreed points are as follows:

We welcome the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. We are opposed to any attempts to replace the forces which have retreated. [The Afghan people] must show the same patience and tolerance on the political scene as well. They must show a unified effort with the unity of Muslim forces....They must know that while military success is achieved through unity, success on the political scene needs more unity and solidarity. We believe all the mujahedin, including the seven-party group and the eight-party group as well as those independent from the mujahedin groups and independent Muslim groups...all must make efforts side by side for a guaranteed future for Afghanistan, without foreign interference. It must be independent, nonaligned and Muslim ("Velayati Returns from Talks in Pakistan" [excerpts]. Tehran Domestic Service in Persian [1030 GMT, 21 July 1989]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 24 July 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-140;p.50]0.

153. "Pakistani Defence Minister Arrives on Visit, Received by IRGC Commander" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1245 GMT, 21 July 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 24 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-140;p.50).

154. Ibid.

155. "Tours Southwest Border Areas" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (9715 GMT, 23 July 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 24 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-140;p.50).

156. "The Islamic Republic Becomes Closer to Pakistan," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 25 January 1990, 3.

157. " 'Mutual Cooperation' Pact with Pakistan Signed" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1853, 21 November 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 22 November 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-224;p.49).

158. Some of these groups are said to be royalist. Since the death of Khomeini, there has been a noticeable increase in the activities of armed militant Baluchis. The IRI and representatives of those militants abroad have both confirmed bloody armed clashes in the Iranian province of Seystan and Baluchistan ("During the Unrest and Clashes in Tehran: Tens of People Were Arrested or Wounded," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 19 April 1990, 9; see also: "Haji Rasoul Shahbakhsh Was Assassinated in Pakistan By IRI Terrorists," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 1 March 1990, 3).

159. "Pakistani Foreign Ministers Ends Visit" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (3 July 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 19 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-137;p.49).

160. "Aghazadeh Receives Pakistani Energy Minister" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1747 GMT, 21 November 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 24 September 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-225;p.70).

161. "Pakistani National Assembly Speaker Meets Karoubi" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (0826 GMT, 18 January 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 24 January 1990 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-90-016;p.50).

162. "Trade, Relations Viewed" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (0615 GMT, 29 May). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 30 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-102;p. 69).

163. Ibid.

164. Ibid.

165. "Turkish Official Meets with Moussavi in Tehran" (text). Ankara Anatoli in Turkish (1637 GMT, 7 June 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 9 June 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-110;p.42).
166. Ibid.
167. "In Six Months, Tehran Will be Connected to Damascus by Railway," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 1 February 1990, 4.
168. "The Egsim Bank of Turkey Will Provide Iran with \$700 Million Industrial Credit," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 22 March 1990, 4.
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid.
171. "Interference in Turkish Affairs Denied" (text). Ankara Anatoli in English (1450 GMT, 8 June 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 13 June 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-112;p.55).
172. Editorial, "Deterioration of Ties with Turkey" (text). Tehran Tehran Times in English (17 October 1989, p.2). Reprinted by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 25 October 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-205;p.51).
173. "The Turkish Political Attache in Rezaeieh Was Deported," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 8 February 1990, 1.
174. Editorial, "Deterioration of Ties with Turkey," 51.
175. "Turkish Official's Contacts in Tehran Noted" (text). Tehran International Service in Turkish (1700 GMT, 28 December 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 3 January 1990 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-90-002;p.69).
176. This point will be discussed shortly.
177. "President Calls for Expanded Political Ties" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1430 GMT, 19 November 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 21 November 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-223;p.58).
178. "Velayati on the Policy of Equality, Balance" (text). Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (1030 GMT, 20 November 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 21 November 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-223;p.58).

179. He observed:

The Islamic Republic of Iran has always been willing to expand relations with Persian Gulf countries. The improvement of relations ...should be base on mutual respect to each other's security and sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of others, safeguarding basic principles of international norms and securing the rights of world Muslims ("Karoubi Urges Closer Ties with Gulf Nations" [text]. Tehran IRNA in English [1242 GMT, 20 september 1989]. Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 21 September 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-182;p.66]).

180. "Velayati Interviewed on Iranian-Arab Ties" (text). Dubai Al-Bayan in Arabic (22 January 1989. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 27 June 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-12;p.34).

181. For example, this policy included sending religious envoys to the Persian Gulf countries in order to provoke Islamic revolution; Kuwait was the first target. In early 1979, the Kuwaiti security forces uncovered an arms depot pertaining to a pro-Khomeini group. The IRI also created and supported "The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain" and "The Islamic Revolution Organization of the Arabian Peninsula" (Saudi Arabia). These organizations were responsible for a variety of subversive activities in the mentioned countries in 1979 and 1980. For detail, see: Abdulghani, 196-197.

182. In July 1989, Kuwait accepted a proposed Iranian ambassador, and so, relations were fully restored ("New Envoy Appointed to Kuwait in Upgrade of Ties" [text]. Tehran IRNA in Persian (18 July 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 19 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-137;p.44)). Similarly, the already reasonably good diplomatic relations with Bahrain were supplemented by some talks on expansion of economic ties between the two countries in July 1989 ("Expansion of Economic Ties with Bahrain Was Discussed" [text]. Tehran IRNA in English [1027 GMT, 26 July 1989]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 1 August 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-146;p.55)).

183. These relations have been troublesome since the formation of the IRI. The regime has always referred to the Saudis as the promoters of "Americanized Islam" which is a reference both to their close relations to the USA and their attempt to keep religion separate from politics. Saudis financial support of Iraq during the war has also contributed to the hostilities. Yet their harsh suppression of an IRI-sponsored demonstration in Mecca during the annual pilgrim in 1987 led to the complete cut-

off of diplomatic relations. On that occasion, the Saudis deliberately resorted to arms since they were afraid of an IRI-sponsored attempt for a coup in Saudi Arabia. Ever since, the IRI has overtly expressed its interest in the toppling of the Saudi regime.

184. "Kayhan On Relations with Saudi Arabia" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1658 GMT, 27 May 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 30 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-102;p.68).

185. "Supporters of Saudi Ties Criticized" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (0845 GMT, 24 September 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 25 September 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-184;p.60).

186. The "radical" organ, Abrar, rejected any possibility for normal relations so long as the Saudi regime is in power (Ibid.). Similarly, the "moderate" Ettelaat criticized the Head of the Foreign Policy Commission of the Parliament for proposing normal relations with a regime with "bloodstained hands" ("Reestablishment of Ties with Saudi Arabia Viewed" [text]. Tehran Ettelaat in Persian [11 September 1989,2]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 25 September 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-184;p.60]).

187. See: "Tehran Clergy on Ending Saudi Regime's Crimes" (text). Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (1030 GMT, 26 September 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 27 September 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-186;p.47).

188. "Returns From 'Constructive' Visit" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (0650 GMT, 22 May 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 22 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-097;p.59).

189. "Syrian Deputy Prime Minister Arrives" (text). Damascus Domestic service in Arabic (2015 GMT, 12 July 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 14 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-134;p.50).

190. "Al-Shar', Iran's Velayati Meet Lebanese Groups" (text). Tehran Television Service in Persian (1700 GMT, 15 August 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 16 August 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-157;p.41).

191. "Velayati Returns from Syria, Comments on Talks" (text). Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (0430 GMT, 17 August 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS

Daily Report-South Asia, 17 August 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-158;p.46).

192. "Syria-Iran Role in Lebanon Criticized" (text). Baghdad Al-Thawarah in Arabic (23 July 1989, 2). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 28 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-144;p.13).

193. "Ghadafi Will Mediate Between Assad and Saddam in Baghdad," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 12 April 1990, 3.

194. "Syria will Reconcile with Israel," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 22 March 1990, 1.

195. "Further on Shiite Leaders' Visit to Tehran" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (9830 GMT, 24 July 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 28 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-144;p.51).

196. "Hizbollah, Abu-Nidal Group on Consolidation" (text). Clandestine Voice of the Oppressed in Arabic (0530 GMT, 9 August 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 9 August 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-152;p.43).

197. "Velayati Supports Syrian Presence in Lebanon" (text). Tehran Television Service in Persian (1600 GMT, 31 October 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 1 November 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-210;p.50).

198. "Abu-al-Lam Says Rafsanjani Stand Irresponsible" (text). Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic (1415 GMT, 6 October 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 10 October 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-194;p.48).

199. "Karoubi Discusses Relations with ROK Envoy" (text). Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (1030 GMT, 6 November 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 9 November 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-216;p.49).

200. "The Islamic Republic Expands its Economic Cooperations with South Korea," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 29 March 1990, 4.

201. Ibid.

202. Ibid.

203. "Ahmad Jibril Statement on Jerusalem Day Noted" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1515 GMT, 5 May 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 8 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-087;p.64).

204. "Hashemi-Rafsanjani Supports Palestinian Struggle" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1628 GMT, 12 July 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 14 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-134;p.55).

205. "Jibril Congratulates Iran's Hashemi-Rafsanjani" (text). clandestine Al-Quds in Arabic (9 August 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 9 August 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-152;p.4).

206. "Interview by Tehran Paper" (text). Tehran: Ettelaat in Persian (16 July 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 9 August 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-152;p.8).

207. "Velayati Meets Jibril, Hizbollah Leaders" (text). Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (23 September 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 25 September 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-184;p.61).

208. "President Meets with Former UK Prisoner Fuladi" (text). Tehran Television Service in Persian (1600 GMT, 1 November 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 3 November 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-212;p.39).

209. "Radicals 'Could Heed' Hashemi-Rafsanjani" (text). London The Daily Telegraph in English (10 May 1989, 12). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 10 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-089;p.7).

210. "Iran Reportedly Linked to 'Sabotage' Plans" (text). London Al-Sharq Al-Awsat in Arabic (23 August 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 25 August 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-164;p.9-9).

211. Ibid, 9.

212. Ibid, 8.

213. "Involvement in Congo Plane Crash Denied" (text). London BBC World Service in English (1615 GMT, 17 January 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 18 January 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-012;p.51).

CHAPTER V
IRI-EAST RELATIONS
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The post-Khomeini era has witnessed a drastic expansion of relations with the East. Having long, stable and non-controversial relations with Eastern countries, the IRI's policy towards Eastern Europe in this era has signified a clear tendency among the elite in general and the "moderates" in particular for stronger ties with the socialist bloc. Hence mutual economic, political and military ties have started to grow rapidly. IRI objectives in the pursuit of its Eastern policy have been the satisfaction of its needs regarding three areas i.e., reconstruction, peace talks and state stability. An additional goal has been the fear of escalation of hostility with some Western countries which might take dangerous forms. In particular, the presence of the US fleet in the vicinity of Iran has increased the threat of a full-fledged military confrontation. Having sound relations with the East may decrease the plausibility of an American military operation against Iran.

In a sense, the existence of already satisfactory diplomatic relations and the absence of controversial unresolved problems have eased further expansion of relations with the East. By far, the entire elite have agreed on mutual ties. Notwithstanding the expanding ties with the East, the latter is unable to fill the vacant position of some Western countries especially the USA in Iran. Whereas the attempts for better relations with the West have increased the hope for a political shift of the Islamic regime among some Westerners, the parallel and seemingly more reliable and uncontroversial ties with the

East have undermined the validity of the assumptions of a Western-oriented moderate faction.

In order to test the correctness of the claim, this chapter will analyze Iran-East relations with a focus on certain Eastern countries. These are the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the PRC and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Mutual relations will be studied in the light of three issue-areas which are: economic relations, military relations and the implementation of Resolution 598.

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With the exception of a short period of time, post-Khomeini IRI-USSR relations have been peaceful. The only source of tension which could have damaged bilateral relations disappeared as the hope among the Islamic elite for influencing the Azeri movement, for several reasons, faded rather quickly.¹ Apart from that, bilateral relations have reflected both side's desire for normal and reliable relations. This has been reflected in the conclusion of many short-term as well as long-term mutual accords. While the nature and extent of these agreements demonstrate the eminent position of the Soviet Union in Iran, the presence of the USSR in Iran is still weaker with respect to that of Western or Western-oriented countries.

Before examining different components of bilateral relations, the factors which paved the way for closer relations should be specified. As far as the Islamic regime is concerned, three major factors have created a suitable situation for the

expansion of relations: the "de-Stalinization" policy of Gorbachev, the new Soviet policy towards Afghanistan and the friendly Soviet approach to the Islamic government.

In the aftermath of Rafsanjani's visit to Moscow in June 1989, an editorial article in Ettelaat stressed the first point. According to the article, the IRI would never have sought closer ties if Gorbachev had not changed the dictatorial Stalinist system; the liberalization of the Soviet system removed this obstacle to bilateral relations.² Presumably, this means that the Gorbachev reforms and criticisms of the Soviet system and its subsequent degradation of socialism as a vanguard ideology have provided an opportunity for the regime to establish more intimate relations with a superpower without losing its faces among its remaining followers. Now the regime can receive Soviet assistance and support which it needs badly without being accused of compromising the principle of "Neither East, Nor West". Otherwise, a regime which is known for its repression should not be concerned about the abuse of human rights in the USSR.

The second point followed the first one. The article continued: "The withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan and other military reforms showed the Soviet goodwill."³ This show of goodwill was highlighted in the joint communique which was released after the completion of Rafsanjani's visit to Moscow in June 1989. Hence it stipulated:

Emphasizing the legitimate rights of the Afghan nation and that country's Islamic identity and history, the two sides agreed on safeguarding the territorial integrity and rights of the people of that country to

determine their fate without foreign interference. The two sides also announced their support for an independent, nonaligned, and Islamic Afghanistan which has friendly relations with its neighbours.⁴

A radio commentary, later, admired the Soviet view on Afghanistan because of the Soviet Union having prepared the situation for reconciliation by negotiating with the representatives of the Afghan Mujahedin stationed in Iran and Pakistan.⁵ Once it was clear to the regime that the Afghan Mujahedin could not overwhelm the Kabul regime militarily and a would-be Mujahedin government would not be a desired one (as the IRI influence was only limited to Iran-based Afghan groups), the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, its acceptance of negotiation with the Mujahedin and its support of a future coalition government in Afghanistan offered an honourable excuse to the IRI to separate itself from a losing movement without disgrace.

The third point was emphasized by Larijani. In the wake of the conclusion of a six-billion-dollar contract, Larijani gave credit to the friendly policy of the USSR towards Iran as he said:

Under Marxism,...the Soviet foreign policy was mainly devoted to remote areas, ignoring the issues relevant to neighbouring countries. But with the "new thinking" in Gorbachev's foreign policy "definitely the Americans are behind."⁶

The latter point has been significant since it is believed that this friendly Soviet approach has continued despite the objection of the USA. Hence the Tehran Times admired the friendly Soviet approach to Iran which was reflected in its agreement to boost Iranian military capability under a very

preferential treatment while disregarding the American warning.⁷

The importance of friendly Soviet policy towards the IRI which is a clear recognition of the Islamic system has been the most important contributing factor to the new phase of bilateral relations. That is why Rafsanjani gave it as the reason behind rapid expansion of relations. Elaborating on his experience with the Soviets during his visit to Moscow, he stated that the Soviets:

have comprehended the reality of the revolution and the nature and essence of our revolution and have adjusted themselves accordingly.... For the first time in the history of Iran, they had fully prepared themselves to encounter an Iran which is 100 percent independent and will not accept anything except what is in the interests of its ideology and people and of the country. This was the attitude with which they entered into dialogue with us, and whatever we had planned was approved and signed there.⁸

This policy of cooperation with the USSR has enjoyed the support of the entire elite. This is because the elite knows the fragility of the system and that its last hope for survival is foreign assistance now offered by the USSR.⁹ Hence the "radicals" have welcomed the relationship. In the course of Rafsanjani's visit to the USSR, Jomhuri-ye Eslami predicted strategic benefits from such relations, thus:

if the Soviet leadership's commitment in practice remain stable and unchangeable (as the Islamic Republic) in the long run, there should be no doubt that fundamental changes in the right directions will take shape and the Middle East would witness U.S. interests and those of its followers threatened more than in the past.¹⁰

Another "radical" newspaper, Kayhan International, sanctioned the policy by describing the relations as: "Presently the superpower

in the East has extended the hand of friendship and Iran has received it warmly in the extent of its independent Islamic policy."¹¹ However, this does not mean lack of interest on the part of the IRI for relations with the West as it continued: "The Majlis Speaker's trip to Moscow also challenge the West to rethink its Iran policy."¹²

This positive approach to the Soviet Union was shared by the "moderates" as well. Elaborating on Iran's flexibility and its desire to establish relations with countries regardless of their ideologies, Tehran Times specified the reason for the Soviet success:

The West wants to, and hopes to mould this country in its own fashion, but the Soviets who have always sought to preserve their own ideological integrity are better equipped to understand the Iranian psyche.¹³

Another "moderate" daily, Ettelaat, hailed the relations while expressing concern about "Western plots". The article lightened the importance of IRI-USSR relations for the regime and its fear of losing those relations as a result of an American scheme.¹⁴

* *

One important aspect of bilateral relations has been economic ties. Both countries need to extend their mutual economic relations for different reasons. The IRI needs to rely on the USSR in order to diversify its sources of supply and to acquire certain types of goods or services which the West denies to Iran. In some cases, Soviet acceptance of barter agreements is another incentive for the regime which is short of foreign exchange. The closeness of the USSR to Iran is a contributing

factor as it makes the economic relations free from reliance on uncertain third countries as a transit route.

For the USSR, these relations should consolidate its position in the large and rich market of Iran. Especially now as a result of the introduction of market economy to the USSR, Soviet industries need to have access to foreign market for their survival and expansion. In addition, these economic relations should discourage the IRI of agitating the Muslim population of the USSR while enabling the Soviets to increase their political influence in Iran. Hence strategic considerations are main factors behind the Soviet interest in the expansion of economic relations.

The expansion of these relations is evident in the conclusion of recent agreements. In June 1989, a package of \$6b. agreements was signed.¹⁵ The month before, a high-ranking Soviet delegation led by the Soviet Minister of Roads (Nikolay S. Konarev) arrived in Tehran to finalize different aspects of the agreements to be signed in Moscow by Rafsanjani.¹⁶ Those agreements included a wide range of economic activities from scientific treaties on satellite technology to construction of heavy industries in Iran.¹⁷ In completion of the contracts, a detailed accord on the use of telemetry and satellites was discussed in Tehran in August 1989.¹⁸ In November 1989, a note of understanding was signed between the two countries in Tehran according to which the signatories would cooperate in production of capital goods.¹⁹

One of the outcomes of the new closeness for Iran has been Soviet military assistance. Although the major arms supplier to Iraq, the USSR has extended its military cooperation with Iran significantly. It seems that the Soviet Union does not want to jeopardize its long-run relations with Iran (which is undeniably important for it) by keeping them at a very low level for the sake of loyalty to Iraq. Closer military cooperation will also increase the IRI's stake in preserving good relations with the USSR and increase the Soviet influence in Iran. Prior to the Rafsanjani visit to Moscow, agreements were reached between two sides for purchasing weaponry from the USSR.²⁰ The logic behind the IRI decision was Iran's aim to diversify its sources of military supply in order to minimize its political vulnerabilities for the sake of purchasing certain weapons.²¹

During the Rafsanjani visit, the USSR officially announced its readiness to "bolster the military capacity of the Islamic Republic".²² Presumably, this should include both arms sales and transfer of technology for arms production in Iran. The announcement of the Soviet Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of meeting Iran's military needs and its extended scope provoked the criticism of Iraq.²³

Military cooperation between the two countries is not confined to arms sales and production of military hardware. Some agreements have been reached on cooperation with respect to the latest advanced military technology. For instance, in August 1989, a satellite cooperation accord was signed between the IRI

Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics and the USSR Satellite Organization. Accordingly, both countries would cooperate in the field of survey and geography.²⁴

* *

The necessity of the implementation of Resolution 598 has been one of the major components of the IRI reactivation of relations with the USSR. Being a permanent member of the UNSC, the Soviet Union is essential to Iran for any progress in the deadlocked resolution. The USSR has become especially important for Iran since it lacks the sympathy of at least two UNSC members, namely the USA and the UK. The third non-Communist UNSC member, France, cannot be counted upon, from Iran's point of view, because it is the second arms supplier to Iraq while its relations with Iran are not yet very friendly. Hence isolation of the IRI has further increased the necessity of acquiring the positive Soviet view.

Beside its economic aspect, one of the main features of the 1989 Iran-Soviet agreement for Iran was expression of a common view on Resolution 598. At the time when Iraq was not interested in compliance with the resolution, this expression of common view demonstrated a Soviet concession to Iran which lacked the support of other UNSC members for the same cause. According to the text of the Joint Communiqué, two sides discussed the problem and agreed on the important role of the UN and its Secretary General in the peace talks and called:

for the implementation of the resolution. In this connection, both sides expressed their support for the

four-point plan of the UN [Secretary General, dated 1 October 1988, for speeding up the implementation of resolution 598.²⁵

In an interview upon his return to Tehran, Rafsanjani stressed the Soviet support of Resolution 598 by saying: "The Soviet Union...is very serious concerning implementation of a just and durable peace and supports our stands in this regard."²⁶

Of course, Soviet support has gone beyond talks to some extent. Prior to Rafsanjani's visit to Moscow, Gerasimov (Soviet Foreign Affairs' Speaker) announced in an unprecedented move that: "Iraqi troops should evacuate occupied territory and return to the borders defined in the 1975 Algiers Accord."²⁷

Of course that statement was later called the personal view of Gerasimov.²⁸ Yet its timing and the delayed Soviet reaction to it suggest that Iran's strategic importance to the USSR requires friendly and close relations with Iran; pressing for its demands regarding resolution is essential. At the same time, the USSR does not want to lose one of its remaining allies in the Middle East: Iraq. Presumably, that manoeuvre was to satisfy both sides for awhile.

The IRI's hope for Soviet support in the progression of the resolution was evident in a Tehran Times editorial. Referring to the USSR's close relations with Iraq and the "natural" expectation of Iran for the Soviet support of its stands after the conclusion of large agreements, the article stipulated that: "Moscow can greatly help peace talks by pressing Baghdad to end its adventurous activities especially along the border line."²⁹

Broadcast by nationwide radio, another Tehran Times article praised the Sheverdnadze visit in August 1989 by saying: "indications are that Moscow will surely pave the way towards the establishment of a lasting peace emerging from a settlement of the Iran-Iraq dispute."²⁰

* *

Two issues have caused tension in bilateral relations. The first one was events in Soviet Azerbaijan. In the course of rising Azeri nationalism, some expression of desire for stronger ties with Iran on the part of some Azeris was reflected in a number of events.²¹ These events made the clergy optimistic about a possibility of expansion in Soviet Azerbaijan. The IRI, therefore, initially supported the movement. Its fervour for the rise of "a true Islamic movement" in Azerbaijan led to strong verbal support of almost all the Islamic elite who warned Gorbachev of intervening in Azeri affairs and then condemned his military intervention when it happened.²² The distribution of Khomeini's pictures and books in Baku is an indicator of certain connections between two sides.²³ Soviet authorities claimed on one occasion that Iran had transferred a substantial quantity of arms to the region which were used by Azeri militants against Armenians and Soviet troops.²⁴

However, the Islamic government of Iran became very cautious towards the issue shortly afterwards. This was because of three factors. Firstly, the Azeri movement was essentially a nationalist movement and the Muslim fundamentalists within that

movement were not strong enough to convert it into a pro-IRI Islamic movement in spite of the expectation of the IRI elite.³⁵ On the contrary, the rise of Azeri nationalism and the influx of Soviet Azeris to Iran brought ideas as well as Baku-printed pan-Turkist literature³⁶ to Iranian Azerbaijan which could provoke Iranian Azeri nationalism and a possible demand for independence especially when the Iranian government was unpopular, repressive and weak. The news on limited activities among some Iranian Azeri intellectuals in Iran and abroad alarmed the regime.³⁷

Secondly, the harsh warning of the Soviet Foreign Minister who expressed the Moscow's intolerance towards Iranian interference in Soviet Azerbaijan, made the Islamic regime become more realistic.³⁸ The desire for breaking isolation through improvement of relations with the East was an incentive for restraint too. Among other things, they could not afford to lose the assistance of the USSR or to have a hostile neighbour in the north. For these reasons, the Iranian media suddenly stopped publishing or broadcasting comments and provocative news on the Azeri movement in February 1990.³⁹ The message of Velayati to the Soviet Foreign Minister in late January 1990 cleared the IRI's shift of policy:

the Islamic Republic is concerned about the well-being of all Muslims throughout the world, but emphasized that Tehran is firmly committed to the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.⁴⁰

Thirdly, the would-be status of an independent Azerbaijan discouraged further capitalization on the movement by Iran. This

was because the return of Azerbaijan to Iran seemed impossible. In spite of historical, cultural and religious commonalities, a tendency towards re-incorporation into Iran had not been observed. It is not to say that this idea does not exist at all, rather to say that perhaps a variety of reasons has eliminated such an option, at least for the time being. The existence of a repressive government in Iran has probably eliminated from the agenda of the Azeri nationalist movement the plausibility of secession from a totalitarian system for the sake of integration into an undemocratic theocracy. An analysis of the Azeri movement will substantiate the claim that the movement was a coalition of several political forces in which the pro-IRI Muslims were in minority.

Within the movement, five clear tendencies are noticeable. The first is Pan-Islamism whose roots can be traced back to a few hundred years ago when the Ottoman sultans were dreaming of creating a world Islamic government through incorporation of Muslim countries.⁴¹ This tendency has gained some ground since the Khomeini revolution in Iran, but it does not have strong popular support yet. On some occasions, the pictures of Khomeini and other Iranian leading clergy have been carried in demonstrations.⁴²

The second tendency is Pan-Azerism whose goal is the unification of Iranian Azerbaijan with Soviet Azerbaijan and establishment of an independent state: the Great Republic of Azerbaijan.⁴³ According to some rumours, this tendency is

supported by the government of Soviet Azerbaijan and receives indirect support from the Turkish government as well.⁴⁴ This tendency is supported by several forces which seek different objectives. One of the forces involved represents an anti-Perestroika faction of the local party and KGB which are said to be supported by the anti-Gorbachev forces of the Soviet leadership. For these pro-Stalin forces, weakening Gorbachev is the main goal.⁴⁵

The second tendency also includes another force which calls itself, the Motherland Front. The Motherland Front has based its program on the unification of Turkish-speaking populations of the Caucasus with the Iranian Azeris for the purpose of annexation of Iranian Azerbaijan to the Soviet Union. This political force publishes an organ (Odlar Yurdi) and has begun its propaganda among the Iranian Azeri abroad.⁴⁶

The second tendency embraces another force which represents the survivors of the Democratic Sect. It was a Soviet-created party which declared the occupied Iranian Azerbaijan under the Red Army in 1945, the Republic of Azerbaijan. That republic lasted until 1946 when as a result of the allied ultimatum to the USSR and shrewd tactics of the Iranian Prime Minister, the Soviet troops withdrew from Iran and the Iranian Army therefore managed to push the Democratic Sect's forces out of Iran into Soviet Azerbaijan.⁴⁷ Due to the weakness and unpopularity of the Iranian government and the ever-rising nationalist mode in Soviet Azerbaijan, the survivors of the Sect have found the situation

ripe for another attempt for secession of Azerbaijan from Iran.⁴⁰

The third tendency is Pan-Turkism whose main objective is to restore the Ottoman Empire in the name of the Great Turanistan.⁴¹ To meet that end, the annexation of the Turkish-speaking regions seems necessary. Pan-Turkism is supported by certain factions of the Turkish government.⁴² However, because of its weakness, it supports Pan-Azerism as the secession of Iranian Azerbaijan is the essential stage for creation of the Great Turanistan. Pan-Turkism attempts to expand its public support by reference to the 1918 Azerbaijan Republic which was created by the support of the Turks. The flag of moon and stars which has been seen in demonstrations in Azerbaijan was the flag of that Republic.⁴³

The fourth tendency includes those who resent the Soviet government and wish to secede from the USSR in order to join Iran. Their active political presence has not been evident so far.⁴⁴

The last tendency includes those foreign elements who are dissatisfied with the Soviet government. The Khomeini repression forced a relatively large number of Iranian Communists to escape to the USSR. Among them, the members of the Tudeh Party and the Organization of the Fadais of the People (the Majority) are of special significance.⁴⁵ Being ill-treated by the Soviets, those individuals who had connections in the West left the USSR while the rest have had to continue a very desperate life in the Soviet Union. Joining the Azeri movement, which weakens the Soviet government, has become a means for expression of their

hatred towards the Soviet system. Interestingly, some of these elements have acquired high positions in the movement. For instance, one of the advisers to a leader of the Popular Front, Nemat Panaov, is an Iranian. Some of these elements have been arrested by the Soviets.⁵⁴

The strength of each tendency is not clear but it seems that there is a consensus among factions over general issues.⁵⁵ That is why the Popular Front or the National Front of Azerbaijan has been able to lead the population under its banner. While the incorporation of Soviet Azerbaijan into Iran seemed unlikely, the creation of an independent Azerbaijan as the only possible scenario would be very dangerous both for Iran and the USSR. Even if it did not lead to separation of Iranian Azerbaijan and secession of other Soviet republics, the very existence of such a state would only reinforce the power of Turkey in the region. An independent Azeri state could not count on the assistance of Iran or the USSR since both would have every reason to isolate and weaken such a destabilizing centre. In this case, Turkey would be the only possible source of support for an Azeri state since, beside other benefits, it would create a buffer zone between Turkey and the USSR and also could be annexed in future. The strong existence of pan-Turkism in Turkey would legitimize and encourage this scenario.⁵⁶ In any case, the result would be an increase in the influence of Turkey in the region and consequently an increase in the power of NATO.

Because of these three factors, the IRI stopped its

activities and propaganda concerning the Azeri nationalist movement. Fear of its possible destructive outcome encouraged the clergy to cooperate with the Soviets. Hence that source of tension was removed.

* *

The second source of tension in bilateral relations was the problem of Afghanistan. Ever since the Communist take-over in Afghanistan in 1978, Iran has opposed the pro-Soviet regime of Kabul. Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan pushed Iran further to support the Afghan mujahedin. Since then, the IRI has given refuge to a large number of Afghans and supported the military efforts of Iran-based militant Muslim groups. Parallel to this, the IRI has been among those countries which demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. This demand until recently along with Iran's support of the mujahedin, had created an obstacle in the way of expansion of Iran-Soviet relations.

Three factors contributed to the resolution of this problem. These were Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan, the IRI's needs for the USSR in the reconstruction of the country, and implementation of Resolution 598. The prolongation of rivalry which even led to intra-mujahedin fighting and persistence of conflict between the Iran-based Shia mujahedin (Eight-Party-Coalition, hereafter EPC) and the Pakistan-based Sunni mujahedin (Seven-Party-Alliance, hereafter SPA) revealed the inability of the mujahedin to overthrow the Kabul regime.

Having no well-founded prospect for a pro-IRI regime in Kabul, the last two vital points inclined the IRI to follow a more reconciliatory policy towards the Afghan question.⁵⁷

The symptoms of a shift in IRI policy appeared in May 1989. Early in May, the entire elite seemed to be united in their defence of the Afghan mujahedin. On May 11, Khamenei received the leaders of the EPA. On that occasion, he repeated the IRI's commitment to the mujahedin by stressing: "For us the Afghanistan issue is an ideological standpoint, it is our duty to assist the Muslim people of Afghanistan who are under pressure."⁵⁸ The "radical" Mohtashemi shared this view when he met with the same representative of the Afghans on May 18. Similarly, the "moderate" Velayati supported the Afghan militants in his meeting with the Iran-based Afghan coalition when he emphasized "the need for the solidarity of Muslim mujahedin and expressed pleasure with efforts for the unity of various Muslim groups in Afghanistan."⁵⁹

Despite the announced support, the shift towards seeking an acceptable non-military solution for all the involved parties began. This is not to deny Iran's support of the mujahedin, but to imply that the goal of such a backing now seemed different. As will be discussed shortly, perhaps the reiteration of Iran's approval of armed struggle in Afghanistan and its interest in the creation of an Islamic republic there was to not deprive itself of leverage Iran enjoyed in its negotiations with the USSR. Otherwise it is quite clear now that the Islamic regime

has practically given up its plan for an Islamic regime in Afghanistan.

This shift was evident in a number of public speeches. On May 1, Besharati commented on the creation of a Mujahedin interim government in Pakistan by the Pakistani-based coalition, SPA. He disclosed Iran's dissatisfaction with the absence of the Iran-based mujahedin in the interim government by postponing its recognition:

if it represents all Afghan mujahedin groups....If the interim government embodies all mujahedin groups, not only Iran but many other countries will immediately recognize it.⁶⁰

Even Khamenei hinted at the possibility of a change of policy while receiving Afghan leaders in Tehran. Referring to Iran's lengthy border with Afghanistan, he gave more priority to the future security of Iran than to any other consideration in drawing Iran's policy towards Afghanistan:

The issue of the Islamic Republic of Iran's national security is linked to Afghanistan's security and we cannot, on any account, be indifferent to the future government of Afghanistan.⁶¹

The conclusion of a series of agreements in Moscow finalized the IRI's shift. According to the Joint Communique released at the end of the Rafsanjani visit to the USSR in June 1989, the two sides reached a common understanding which preserved the interests of both. In order to meet that end, the future government of Afghanistan should not be a mujahedin-dominated and anti-Soviet government, but a coalition of the representative of all interests involved. Hence the Communique stated:

Emphasizing the legitimate rights of the Afghan nation and that country's Islamic identity and history, the two sides agreed on safeguarding the territorial integrity and rights of the people of that country to determine their fate without foreign interference. The two sides also announced their support for an independent, nonaligned and Islamic Afghanistan which has friendly relations with its neighbours.⁶² (this writer's stress)

This reconciliation received the blessing of Pakistan. In the aftermath of Rafsanjani's visit to Moscow, the Pakistani Foreign Minister (Sahahzadeh Yaqub Khan) went to Iran to be briefed on the visit.⁶³ Afterwards, he expressed his belief that the joint Iran-Soviet agreement on Afghanistan would "lead to peace and security in the region".⁶⁴ As the representative of a party to the conflict, Pakistan, Yaqub Khan accepted the Iran-Soviet approach by saying:

Any solution to the issue...must guarantee independence, territorial integrity and the Islamic nature of the country far from any foreign intervention. ...Afghanistan should enjoy good relations with all its neighbouring countries including the Soviet Union, Pakistan and Iran.⁶⁵ (this writer's stress)

The word of Velayati further revealed the compromise reached among the three neighbours. After having discussions with his Pakistani counterpart, he declared that both Iran and Pakistan:

are of the opinion that the future government in the country must be non-aligned, acceptable to the majority of its Muslim population and establish good relations with its neighbours.⁶⁶

The consequence was that neither Iran nor Pakistan sought any longer the formation of an Islamic republic in Afghanistan. That form of government which had been envisaged as the ultimate goal of the mujahedin by especially the IRI was replaced by a

broad reference to a regime "acceptable to the majority of its Muslim population". It is now clear for both countries that no government can be established in Kabul without the consent of the USSR when the mujahedin are simply unable to overthrow the Kabul regime. Having internal problems themselves, the existence of a large number of armed Afghans in Pakistan and Iran contributes to the instability of these countries.

The Kabul government also took part in the process of reconciliation. After a long period of hostility in bilateral relations, President Najibullah sent a congratulatory message to Khamenei upon his leadership selection in which he wished that:

under your efficient leadership and guidance of Iran's revolution, dear brother, who enjoys high credibility among the brother people of Iran, the relations between our two Muslim and neighbouring countries which have deep Islamic, historic, and cultural roots can develop on mutual respect and good neighbourliness in the interests of our peoples and regional peace and security in the region.⁶⁷

By starting his message with "In the name of God", Najibullah's clergy-styled phrasing of the message and his stress on Islamic relations between the two countries all demonstrated a clear reconciliatory attitude of the head of the Marxist government of Kabul.⁶⁸

This attitude was positively received by Iran. In November 1989 the "moderate" Resalat published an interview with Najibullah which was a de facto recognition of the Kabul regime as an essential party to the conflict. In that interview, the Afghan President appreciated the softness of the IRI's new policy by referring to the IRI's approach to Afghanistan as "realistic"

and hoping for expansion of relations in all fields.** Consequently, the temporary reconciliation over the fate of Afghanistan removed the second obstacle in the way to closer relations with the USSR.

In spite of a clear expansion of relations, the presence of the USSR in Iran is far weaker than the West. In absolute economic terms, the conclusion of a six-billion-dollar contract has put the USSR in a relatively low position vis-a-vis Italy with a 17-billion-dollar agreement and Japan with a possible 27-billion-dollar deal, for example. Adding together the combined volume of economic exchange of the West and some TW countries with Iran, Iran-Soviet economic relations (if it is being fulfilled in reality) will still be somewhat insignificant. As will be discussed shortly, the USSR is remote from gaining a preeminent position in Iran.

* * *

In the post-Khomeini era, IRI relations with other Eastern countries have not shown a very drastic change. As far as relations with these countries are concerned, the focus has been mainly on economic and military relations. It should be pointed out that the existence of friendly relations with these countries has simply removed any need for a parallel diplomatic effort for establishment or resumption of relations. Moreover, these countries have kept themselves away from any political controversy since the foundation of the Islamic system. Perhaps because of this factor, their maintenance of political, economic

and military ties with Iraq before and after the eight-year war has been ignored by the IRI. In general, these countries have compensated the shortage (or lack) of those types of goods which Iran can no longer receive from the West or prefer to buy them from the East due to their lower prices or acceptance of barter deals. The additional factor has been the regime's strategy of diversification of sources of supply.

With the exception of the DPRK and the PRC to some extent, Iranian relations with the following four Eastern countries have remained at the economic and military levels. It seems that the death of Khomeini has not added reliable and strong political and diplomatic dimensions to the relations.

Although massive economic and military contracts were signed prior to the collapse of Communist governments in Eastern Europe, there is no indication that these governments were reluctant to honour their obligations. It seems that the lucrative nature of relations with a rich oil-producing country has convinced the reform-oriented Communist leaders of Bulgaria and the non-Communist leaders of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania to continue their economic and diplomatic relations with Iran. Their immediate need for hard currency for the period of transition from highly planned economies to more market-oriented ones and modernization of industries has made relations with Iran indispensable. The introduction of market economy to these countries has additionally motivated the new Eastern European leadership to maintain good relations with the

large and expanding Iranian market.

In its turn the Islamic regime has no reason for reducing the level of relations with these countries. Despite its fear of the implications of the expansion of democratic governments for the IRI, the demise of the atheistic Marxist ideology has given an opportunity to the regime for propaganda. A short analysis of bilateral relations will provide some ground for the claim.

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Iran-Bulgaria relations have continued as before. In May 1989, prior to the death of Khomeini, a huge contract was signed which included mutual cooperation in fields such as construction of roads and railways as well as Iran's purchase of ships from Bulgaria.⁷⁰ The total value of the contract has not been released. In the same month, the conclusion of a range of agreements was announced. Among them was a 200-million-dollar contract, the details of which have not been revealed.⁷¹ Other deals whose values were not mentioned embraced the economic, technical and cultural fields.⁷² It was also announced that "grounds for a ten-year cooperation agreement" had also been laid.⁷³

Again in May, Bulgaria announced its readiness for modernization of the Iranian military. Iran accepted the offer in principle. Yet there is no evidence to prove any further development.⁷⁴

In the absence of Khomeini, economic relations have continued

as usual. Perhaps the IRI's need for supplying some of its needs through Bulgaria have contributed to its policy of avoiding any political confrontation with Bulgaria. Even events such as the persecution of the Bulgarian Turkish minority did not cause any deterioration of relations. The Turkish authorities took the opportunity to blame the IRI for not condemning the persecution of Muslims in Bulgaria. In reaction to that, Iran's protest was confined to Velayati's call on the Bulgarian Deputy Foreign Minister (Lubomir Popov) to:

make utmost efforts not to let the rights of Muslims in that country be trampled upon...[However, he] stressed that Tehran attached importance to its ties with Sofia and that "there are no impediments in the way of expanding mutual ties."⁷⁵

The mild IRI expression of concern was later responded to by a friendly gesture on the part of the Bulgarians. It took place when Lukanov, the visiting Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Economic Relations, "briefed" Rafsanjani on the situation of Muslim Bulgarians and asked:

the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a strong country in the world of Islam and as Bulgaria's friend, for the necessary cooperation in paying attention to the Bulgarian Muslims' problems."⁷⁶

Iran has signed a number of agreements with Bulgaria in the post-Khomeini era. Upon the arrival of a Bulgarian high delegation led by Lukanov, it was announced that Iran would export 1 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Bulgaria."⁷⁷

The news on possible long-term sale of gas to Bulgaria was also released."⁷⁸ Another accord was signed in October 1989 according to which Iran would export 50-million dollar worth of goods to

Bulgaria.⁷⁹ In its turn, Bulgaria would sell \$100 million in machinery, tools, accessories and equipment.⁸⁰

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IRI-Czechoslovakia relations have not shown a radical change in the post-Khomeini era as they have kept their economic nature as well its limited scope. In the last month of Khomeini, the two countries signed an economic agreement. Accordingly, Czechoslovakia would help Iran to establish or modernize certain industrial units.⁸¹ Beside exportation of gas, Iran would export to Czechoslovakia mineral and industrial goods.⁸² The two countries also agreed to cooperate in uranium industries, air research, designing of nuclear reactors, nuclear generators and other peaceful aspects of atomic energy.⁸³

Good economic relations continued in the post-Khomeini era. The Czech Foreign Trade Minister was sent to Tehran for the ceremony of the 40th day after the demise of Khomeini.⁸⁴ On that occasion, Czechoslovakia expressed its interest in buying one million tons of crude oil annually from Iran.⁸⁵ In September 1989, the Czech Deputy Foreign Minister in Charge of International and Economic Affairs arrived in Tehran.⁸⁶ Apart from discussions over regional and international issues, the content of their economic talks was not announced.⁸⁷

* *

As an exception, Iran-Hungary relations have faced some tensions in the post-Khomeini era. Prior to September 1989, bilateral relations continued as usual. In July two high-

ranking IRI officials¹⁰ visited the Hungarian Embassy in Tehran in order to offer their condolences upon the death of the Hungarian leader, Janos Kadar.¹¹ Yet the recognition of Israel by Hungary in September led to the postponement of the visit to Tehran of the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and cancellation of the visit of the Hungarian Minister of Industry.¹² Presumably, the IRI needed to take a somewhat radical stance in order to improve its anti-Israeli appearance which had been damaged by Irangate. However, the IRI did not go beyond to cut its diplomatic relations with Hungary perhaps because of the fear of further isolation.

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Iran-Romania relations have not been very successful either. However, the instigators of problems were not political conflicts in bilateral relations, but the Romanian economic problems in the first case and elite rivalry in the second case.

Hence a decline in relations between these countries began prior to the death of Khomeini. In May 1989, the Iranian Head of the Central Bank was sent to Bucharest to determine the reasons for the decline of mutual economic exchanges which had amounted to \$300m in 1988, less than the expected target.¹³ Despite economic decline, relations remained politically active. In the following September a special envoy of Ceausescu delivered a message to Rafsanjani in which further expansion of political, cultural, technical, scientific and economic relations were demanded.¹⁴

However, the Ceausescu visit to Tehran in December 1989

created an internal uproar. Touring Iran in the middle of the Romanian uprising and a few days before being toppled further disgraced the Islamic Regime internationally. Upon Ceausescu's overthrow as discussed in Chapter II, the "radicals" took the opportunity and criticized the "moderates" for discrediting Iran by inviting and hosting a falling dictator. Kayhan elaborated on this point and blamed Velayati for providing an excuse for Western media to attack the IRI.⁹³ Resalat, in response, reminded the critics of their own censor of the Romanian uprising news during the visit of Ceause3cu and charge the "radicals" with taking advantage of situation to weaken the Foreign Ministry.⁹⁴

Interestingly, another "moderate" newspaper, Ettelaat, also criticized Velayati by comparing Noriega and Ceausescu. As the article described Noriega a patriot and anti-American who bravely withstood the US invasion of Panama, it referred to the negative character of Ceausescu and concluded: "we would like to imagine that we would have been better off if we had invited Noriega instead of Ceausescu, even though both were overthrown!"⁹⁵

At the end, the elite decided to sacrifice the IRI ambassador for the sake of reconciliation among the factions. The Ambassador was accused of misleading the government about the internal affairs of Romania, was summoned from Bucharest and dismissed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁹⁶ A new ambassador was sent to Romania after four months.⁹⁷ Normalization of relations are expected to follow.

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Relations with two Asian Communist countries have kept its active pace in the Post-Khomeini era. In contrast to the Eastern European countries, the PRC and the DPRK still follow the Stalinist version of socialism. Because of their intolerance to dissent, denial of individual rights and freedoms and their ideological type of government, these two countries are ideologically closer to the IRI. For that reason and because of their firm support of Iran during the eight-year war, their relations with the IRI have gone far beyond economic relations.

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In contrast to other Eastern countries, Iran-DPRK relations in the post-Khomeini era have illustrated a political closeness as well. However, this does not imply the initiation of a new phase in their relations since the DPRK has kept very good political and economic relations with Iran since the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. Yet this implies the North Korean support for Iran's demands for implementation of Resolution 598 and the withdrawal of foreign fleet from the Persian Gulf. For instance in July 1989, the visiting Chairman of the National Assembly of the DPRK firmly backed those Iranian's demands in Tehran.**

Similarly, constant visit of top-ranking politicians of both sides of each other's capital has manifested the existence of firm political ties between the two countries. In May 1989, for example, Khamenei (then President) paid an official visit to DPRK.** In July 1989, the Speaker of the DPRK National Assembly

attended the 40th day ceremony of Khomeini.¹⁰⁰

The preservation of close relations with DPRK has been supported by "radicals" as well as "moderates". For instance, Moussavi (then Prime Minister) replied to the DPRK delegate's praise for the IRI and Khomeini by saying: "the people and government of the Islamic Republic of Iran will never forget sincere cooperation of the two countries during the (Iran-Iraq) war time."¹⁰¹ Likewise, Rafsanjani responded to his Korean counterpart when he expressed his country's full support for Iran's anti-American campaign by lauding:

Kim Il-song for encouraging existing friendly ties between the two countries and said "your country is among those states with which we want to have outstanding relations. In practice... Tehran-Pyongyang ties are at an outstanding level."¹⁰²

In terms of economic relations, a large agreement was signed in May 1989. As a result, the volume of trade between the two countries would be expected to increase to \$500m which is double that of the previous year.¹⁰³ This accord embraced a wide range of economic cooperation.¹⁰⁴

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The interest of the entire elite has resulted in the continuation of Iran-PRC relations in the Post-Khomeini era. China can supply some of the economic and military demands of Iran. Being a permanent member of UNSC, it can be counted on for supporting Iranian interests especially with respect to the peace talks. Moreover, China's conflict with the USA and especially the USSR have given a particular plausibility to the

consolidation of relations with the PRC.

Hence Khamenei (then President) paid an official visit to the PRC in May 1989.¹⁰⁵ The occasion provided a ground for the expression of will for strengthening ties with the PRC. Elaborating on the economic importance of China for Iran, Kayhan wondered while:

China and Iran share "primary objectives" as both are opposed to imperialism....Why the authorities of a revolutionary regime in Iran had overlooked the importance, rather the need, to improve relations between two countries....China's stance in the eight years of the imposed war and its attitude towards Iran after it accepted the Security Council Resolution 598 must have been effective in making the Iranian officials rectify their outlook.¹⁰⁶

Likewise, Resalat signified the importance of bilateral relations by publishing an interview with the Chinese Ambassador to Iran.¹⁰⁷

The preservation of ties have also been taken seriously by the PRC. In order to generate enough hard currency to continue its huge modernization plans, the PRC needs to secure markets for its low-quality goods. The isolation of Iran and its financial constraints have made its leaders interested in cheap and low-quality Chinese goods. An additional factor has been the decline of both superpowers in the Persian Gulf region which has inclined the regional countries to extend their relations with other global power e.g., the PRC. Through its relations with Iran, among other regional countries, China hopes to increase its political influence in the Persian Gulf region as well.

This seriousness has been reflected in a number of official

Chinese visits to Iran. In October 1989, Chinese Foreign Minister (Qian Qichen) paid an official visit to Tehran. During his stay, he met with IRI leaders namely Velayati¹¹⁰, Karrubi¹⁰⁹ and Rafsanjani.¹¹⁰ That trip was called constructive by both sides.¹¹¹ In particular, China's expression of its will for the full implementation of the resolution was highly appreciated by Iran.¹¹² At the end of the visit, the IRI's satisfaction with the trip was stated by Velayati who described the foreign policy of the two countries as very close to each other enabling them to cooperate in many issues; he also drew a positive picture for their future economic and political cooperation.¹¹³

Economic ties have continued in the new era. In November 1989 a 600-million-dollar economic deal was signed in Tehran.¹¹⁴ The accord encompassed a range of cooperations in heavy industries.¹¹⁵

Mutual military cooperation has been expanded in the post-Khomeini era. In January 1990, a 10-year agreement between the two countries on "scientific cooperation and military technology exchange" was signed.¹¹⁶ The exact detail of the agreement has not been published yet.

* * *

Despite its uncontroversial nature, the future of IRI-East relations is not very clear. Besides some general problems which are also applicable to its relations with the West¹¹⁷, there is some well-founded doubt about the practical capability of the East to fulfil its undertakings. On one hand, the Eastern

European countries are in a transitional period, the final outcome of which is still unknown. What is known, however, is a prevailing state of uncertainty and chaos in its economy. A clear economic model has neither been developed nor accepted. If there were one, it could not rapidly substitute the old system. Attacks on the strategies and objectives of the planned economy have noticeably reduced production in the East. Adding to that, rising political dissatisfaction has taken the form of strikes in factories and mines or other types of interruption which have surely decreased the industrial production of Eastern European countries. The result is the inability of especially the USSR to meet its economic commitment to Iran.

Although the PRC and the DPRK do not face the same problem, their ability to meet the needs of the IRI is also doubtful. To start with, China is in the process of modernizing its industries with the assistance of the West. Hence even its compliance with the agreements may lead to supplying Iran outdated technology and factories which will unlikely to satisfy Iran's need for high-quality goods, technology and factories (the types which it had access to prior to deterioration of relations with the West). Similarly, the DPRK should be expected to provide Iran with more or less low-quality goods and technology.

It is true that they may and will provide Iran with certain military items. However, the poor quality of their products could hardly meet the ever-rising military demands of Iran which is now involved in an arms race with Iraq. Experiencing the

unpredictable no-war, no-peace situation, the Iranian military badly needs to recover its losses and catch up with the Iraqi massive scramble for making Iraq self-sufficient in producing highly sophisticated weaponry which might sharply increase the capability of its highly modern armed forces. The Iraqi efforts for production of nuclear weapons must have alarmed the Iranian military about the necessity of a quick catch-up with Iraq which now produces both short-range and long-range missiles and stockpiles chemical and presumably biological bombs.^{11*} Under such circumstances, the Chinese and North Korean third-class versions of Soviet weapons may only help Iran in maintaining a numerical military hardware equilibrium with Iraq.

As a consequence, the ability of the East in general and the USSR in particular to fill the vacant position of the USA seems unlikely. In addition to all these general obstacles, a reason behind this inability should be found elsewhere than in those countries. This is to say that the decline of the United States as an unchallengeable economic and military power has been at least partially a function of the increase in economic and military capabilities of other countries including certain TW countries.

In the Persian Gulf region, for instance, the sharp increase in the income of its oil-producing countries has weakened or eliminated in cases the dependence of some of the Persian Gulf countries on foreign financial assistance.

Parallel to that, the rise of semi-industrialized regional

powers such as Iran and Iraq with formidable military forces has sharply increased the power of these countries to influence the life of the region.

As a result, the decline of the USA is not equal to the rise of the USSR in the region. Taking into account the existence of relatively strong ties between Iran and some Western countries on one hand and its incremental cooperation with some NICs among other TW countries, perhaps the observation of one scholar with respect to the situation in the Persian Gulf may well be relevant to the Iranian case:

The vision of a predominant United States presence in the regions of the Third world dies hard, however, and it will take some time to learn the lessons that the decline of United States influence may not be followed...by a corresponding increase in Soviet influence but in a loss of influence of all outside powers.¹¹⁹

* * *

ENDNOTES

1. This event will be explained later in this chapter.
2. The daily explained this point by saying:
The Islamic Republic of Iran has never compromised with a communist regime in the Soviet Union that was dictatorial and oppressive, and that supported Stalinism. The Islamic Republic stood firm on its principles until, fortunately, a fundamental and significant change occurred in the Soviet Union, when Gorbachev took charge of the situation with admirable understanding (Editorial, "Editorial Views Rafsanjani Visit to USSR" [text]. Tehran Ettelaat in Persian [26 June 1989]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 14 July 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-134;p.58]).
3. Ibid.
4. "Text of Joint Communique" (text). Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (1030 GMT, 23 June 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 26 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-121;p.31).
5. The broadcast observed:
The common views between the two countries and talks between the Eight-Party Coalition of Afghan mujahedin in Tehran and the Seven-Party Alliance in Pakistan and their talks with the Soviet representatives in Tehran and Islamabad indicates a better outlook for resolving the situation in Afghanistan on the basis of the right of the Afghans for self-determination ("IRNA on Communique" [text]. Tehran IRNA in English [1502 GMT, 25 June 1989]. Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 26 July 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-121;p.32]).
6. "Larijani Praises Soviets" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (0720 GMT, 26 June 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 29 June 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-124;p.49).
7. The daily elaborated on the point as follows:
a White House spokesman has expressed what it called "displeasure" with Soviet efforts to improve ties with Iran culminating in an agreement this week for economic and military cooperation. Then again the U.S. took it upon itself to warn Moscow against Soviet arms sales to Iran. But the Soviets went ahead nevertheless offering to boost Iran's military potential under a friendly cooperation agreement of a type reserved normally for

its closest allies. A joint declaration called for both countries to expand cooperation in defence and other fields and not to interfere in each other's affairs (Editorial, "Paper Views Contacts, Ties with West, USSR" [text]. Tehran Tehran Times in English [25 June 1989]. Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 25 July 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-141;p.58]).

8. "Hashemi-Rafsanjani Returns from USSR 23 June" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (23 June 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 26 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-121;p.28).

9. Chapter IV provides an explanation to illuminate this point.

10. "Newspapers Comment on Visit" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (0710 GMT, 24 June 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 26 June 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-121;p.34).

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. The daily therefore warned:

From now on we must be more aware than ever of the conspirators of the CIA, other internal espionage organizations of the United States, Britain and their like, who have all kinds of leverage, infiltrators, and elements to cause problems and obstacles in relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and its great northern neighbour (Editorial, "27 June Ettelaat Editorial" [text]. Tehran Ettelaat in Persian [27 June 1989, p.1,18]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 14 July 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-134;p.59]).

15. Larijani Praises Soviets, 49.

16. "Official on Hashemi-Rafsanjani's USSR Visit" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (0816 GMT, 10 May 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 10 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-089;p.48).

17. "Economic Agreements Outlined" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1815 GMT, 24 June 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 26 June 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-121;p.33).

The following is the list of agreements:

Development of two power stations, construction of seven joint dams, attainment of 1.9m tones capacity of the Isfahan steel mill and its further increase to 4m tons a year, modernization of the Arak machine building complex, transfer of technological know-how for die casting, construction of iron and moulding industries, production of construction material and coloured metal; construction of the Tajan-Sarakhs Railways and its further extension to Mashhad, electrification of the Tehran-Qum, Bafq-Bandar Abbass, and Tabriz-Tehran railways; agreements on shipping in the Caspian Sea, increasing the number of Iranian ships and the travel of passenger and cargo ships to Europe via Soviet rives; exchange of data on nuclear energy, exchange of university professors and students; use of satellites for telecommunications technical and scientific cooperation); Iran annual export of three billion cubic meters of gas to the USSR beginning 1990, Soviet permission for transfer of Iranian gas to Europe through Soviet pipelines; agricultural agreements including transfer of Soviet technology to Iran for cultivation of wheat and cotton, modernization of agro-industrial plants in Iran; oil exploitation in the Caspian Sea, geophysical cooperation and exchange of meteorological and ecological data; giving permission to the Caspian provinces of Gilan and Mazandaran to export non-oil goods each worth of \$15m a year to the USSR.

18. "Satellite Cooperation with USSR Discussed" (text). Tehran Ettelaat in English (1500 GMT, 14 August 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 15 August 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-156;p.54).

19. The note determined that the signatories would cooperate in different fields i.e., production of heavy machinery, implementation of projects for the construction of water and steam turbines, cooperation in the production of various types of freight cars and their export to the USSR and development of the Arak machinery plant ("Trade Documents Signed with Soviet Union" [text]. Tehran Domestic Service in Persian [1630 GMT, 22 November 1989]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 27 November 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-226;p.64)).

20. "Arms Purchase Agreement with USSR Signed" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (0612 GMT, 1 May 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 1 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-082;p.46).

21. The logic is: "if w- depend on one particular country or bloc, then they [will] take advantage from the situation... [and] they want to impose their own ideology on us" (Ibid.).

22. "IRNA on Communique" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1502 GMT, 25 Jun 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 16 June 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-121;p.31).

23. "Ettelaat Views Defence Ties with USSR" (excerpts). Tehran Ettelaat in Persian (28 June 1989, p.24). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 25 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-141;p.56).

24. "Satellite Cooperation Accord Was Signed with USSR" (text). Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (31 August 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 1 September 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-169;p.50).

25. "Text of Joint Communique" (text). Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (23 June 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 26 June 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-121;p.30).

26. "Hashemi-Rafsanjani Returns from USSR" (text). Tehran IRNA in Persian (1710 GMT, 23 June 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 23 June 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-121;p.28).

27. "Ettelaat Views Defence Ties with Moscow", 56.

28. Ibid.

29. Editorial, "Tehran Times on Moscow's Role in Peace Talks" (text). Tehran Tehran Times in English (2 July 1989, p.2). Reprinted by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 25 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-141;p.60).

30. "Daily Sees 'Hope' in Sheverdnadze Visit" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (0815 GMT, 2 August 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 2 August 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-147;p.49).

31. On one occasion, kilometres of Soviet border fences and posts between the Nakhichevan SSR and Iranian Azerbaijan were destroyed by some Azeri protestors ("The Iranian Forces Are on Alert on the Azerbaijan Border," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 18 January 1990, 1). Prior to that, thousands of people had demonstrated along the border demanding the lifting of travel restrictions to Iran (Ibid.). In a four-day period from the removal of border obstacles to the closure of the border by the Soviet Army, over 20,000 Azeris entered Iran most of whom returned to the USSR gradually ("The Iranian-Soviet Borders were closed," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 25 January 1990, 1).

32. "The Soviet Government Warned The Islamic Republic Against Intervention in Azerbaijan," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 11 January 1990, 1-2. See also: "Tehran Ceremony Mourners Dead" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1807 GMT, 23 January 1990). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 24 January 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-90-016;p.47-48). See also: "Red Army in Baku Deplored" (text). Tehran International Service in English (1730 GMT, 23 January 1990). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 24 January 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-90-016;p.48).

33. "The Iranian-Soviet Borders Were Closed," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 25 January 1990, 9.

34. Ibid.

35. This claim will be substantiated shortly by an analysis of the leadership forces of the movement.

36. Katane Sultani, "Do the Azeris Want to Join Us? Or Do We Want to Join Them?," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 3 February 1990, 9.

37. Ibid.

38. "The Soviet Government Warned The Islamic Republic Against Intervening in Azerbaijan," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 11 January 1990, 1.

39. "Following the Soviet Warning: The Islamic Republic Stopped Agitation in Azerbaijan," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 1 February 1990, 1.

40. "Velayati Urges Peaceful Solution in Azerbaijan" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1908 GMT, 24 January 1990). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 25 January 1990 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-90-010;p.46).

41. Garib Azar, Hossien Ahary, Mohammad Arassy, Firouz Bagerzadeh, Ali Parasto, Dariush Shaighan, Davoud Shikhavandi, Alireza Minaei and Hossein Malek, "A Communique on the Recent Events on the Iranian-Soviet Border from the Viewpoint of Azeri-Speaking Iranians," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 18 January 1990, 13.

42. "The Soviet Government Warned the Islamic Republic against Intervening in Azerbaijan," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 11 January 1990, 9.

43. Azer et al., 13.

44. Azer et al., 13.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran: A Study in Big-Power Rivalry (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1949.), 23.

48. Azar et al., 13.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Mehrdad Arfazadeh, "Arass Is Not the Line of Separation." Kayhan Newspaper (London), 1 February 1990, 11.

53. M. Sarabi, "The Soviet Azerbaijan: The Struggle for National Identity," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 18 January 1990, 13.

54. Ibid.

55. Besides demanding more autonomy and settlement of territorial dispute with Armenia, the Front has also demanded the change of the Cyrillic script to the Latin alphabets and recognition of the Mussavat* flag as the official flag of Soviet Azerbaijan (Sarabi, 13). The former demand may strengthen the influence of Turkey in the movement as it will remove the obstacles to the distribution of Turkey's literature. In cases, some Azerbaijani newspapers have begun teaching the Persian and Arabic scripts to their readers which will potentially increase Iranian cultural presence in the region. This action is accompanied by a debate on changing all the Soviet-imposed names to their Iranian original forms (Ibid.).

* The Mussavat Republic was the Ottoman-supported independent Menshevik republic of Azerbaijan which was established in the wake of the October Revolution. It lasted until 1920 when it was overthrown by the Red Army. For detail, see: Lenczowski, 24-25.

56. This emerging Pan-Turkism has been evident in the speeches of some influential Turkish politicians. For instance, Arjomand Konokeman, a Minister without portfolio, said in one his speeches in January 1990 that: "In the next ten years, new states with the flags of moon and stars will be established in China and the Soviet Union". The moon and stars flag was the flag of the Mussavtist Republic which enjoyed the support of the Turkey in 1918. Likewise, Khalil Ozusouei, Deputy to the General Secretary of the Motherland Party, condemned the passive attitudes of the

Turkish government towards the Soviet Azerbaijan. The USSR officially protested against their intervention in the Soviet affairs. For detail, see: "The Soviet Union Strongly Protested Turkey," Kayhan New Paper (London), 25 January 1990, 1.

57. The disappointment of the IRI of a future mujahedin government in Afghanistan is evident in a Tehran Times article. Referring to the rivalry and disagreement within the interim government in Pakistan and its wrong policies, the editorial article condemned the Iran-based mujahedin and anticipated a bleak future for the Islamic movement in Afghanistan by saying:

However, it was sheer narrow-mindedness and selfishness which led the Tehran-based Eight-Party Alliance and some other groups not to join hands with the interim government. Moreover, the hidden tussle within the interim government for key-posts and their apathy and passive roles just now with the ulterior motive of making effective use of their military forces during a future rival power struggle are the main causes for total failure of an interim government (Editorial, "Editorial Views Afghan Mujahedin Leadership" [text]. Tehran Tehran Times in English [2 September 1989, p.2]. Reprinted by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 14 September 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-177;p.49]).

58. "Khamenei Receives Afghan Alliance Leaders" (text). Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (1630 GMT, 7 May 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 11 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-090;p.50).

59. "Velayati Receives Afghan Islamic Unity Leader" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1254 GMT, 29 May 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 30 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-102;p.65).

60. "Besharati on Afghan Interim Government, UK Ties" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (0608 GMT, 2 May 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 2 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-083;p.49).

61. Khamenei Receives Afghan Alliance Leaders, 50.

62. Text of Joint Communique, 31.

63. "Pakistani Foreign Minister Ends Visit" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1018 GMT, 3 July 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 19 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-137;p.49).

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. "Najibullah Sends Congratulation to Khamenei" (text). Kabul Domestic Service in Dari (1600 GMT, 5 June 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 7 June 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-108;p.42).

68. For detail, see: Ibid.

69. In his interview, the President of Afghanistan said:
In our opinion, there are broad areas for economic, social, commercial, cultural, and etc. cooperation between our countries that we can use in the interests of both countries' people and in the interests of peace and security in the region. In our view, the recent realistic approach by the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran vis-a-vis the issue of Afghanistan is a positive step that our people have welcomed. We hope that it will not be long before friendly and good neighbourly relations in all fields are being consolidated and broadened between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran ("Iranian Newspaper Interviews President Najibullah" [text]. Kabul Bakhtar in Pashto [1130 GMT, 16 November 1989]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 17 November 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-221;p.36]).

70. This included cooperation in:
laying the Bulgaria-USSR line and [cooperation] concerning roads, ports, railways, and the dredging of the Arvand-Rud...[In addition,] Iran will be buying two ships from Bulgaria and Bulgaria agreed to train the manpower needed by the ships and repair Iran's ships ("Transportation Agreement Signed" [text]. Tehran Domestic Service in Persian [2030 GMT, 28 May 1989]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 2 June 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-108;p.64]).

71. "Bulgarian Delegation Departs" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (0836 GMT, 31 May 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 2 June 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-105;p.64).

72. Some specific fields were agriculture, forestry, food industry, research, education, irrigation and studies for construction of small dams (Ibid).

73. Ibid.

74. "Defence Modernization Proposed" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1335 GMT, 29 May 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 2 June 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-105;p.64).

75. "Velayati, Bulgarian Official on Muslim Concerns" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1400 GMT, 15 July 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 25 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-141;p.59).

76. "Meets with Rafsanjani" (text). Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (0430 GMT, 21 September 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 26 September 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-185;p.50).

77. "Bulgaria to Import Iranian Gas" (text). Tehran Tehran Television in Persian (1700 GMT, 21 September 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 22 September 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-185;p.51).

78. "Meets Press on Outcome of Talks" (text). Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (0430 GMT, 21 September 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 26 September 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-185;p.50).

79. They included cars, minibuses, ambulances, railway passenger cars and wagons for transporting gas to Bulgaria ("Economic Agreement Signed with Bulgaria" [text]. Tehran Ettelaat in Persian [0430 GMT, 1 October 1989]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 4 October 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-191;p.55)).

80. Ibid.

81. Czechoslovakia would help Iran in establishing six petrochemical plants and two rubber factories and modernizing several sugar factories. It would also cooperate in two cement projects and sell textile machinery to Iran ("Trade Protocol Signed" [text]. Tehran IRNA in English [1900 GMT, 21 May 1989]. Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 23 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-098;p.65)).

82. These goods included shoes, ambulances, colour televisions, cars and minerals (Ibid.).

83. Ibid.

84. "Agazadeh, CSSR's Sterba Discuss Trade" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1700 GMT, 14 July 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 14

July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-134;p.62).

85. Ibid.

86. "Besharati Meets CSSR Deputy Foreign Minister" (text). Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (1630 GMT, 13 September 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 14 September 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-177;p.47).

87. Ibid.

88. They were: Alireza Moayeri (Deputy Premier) and Ali Mohammad Besharati (Deputy Foreign Minister).

89. "Leaders Sign Condolences for Hungary" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1530 GMT, 16 July 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 25 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-141;p.59).

90. "Hungarian's Visit Cancelled Due to Israel Ties" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1025 GMT, 21 September 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 22 September 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-183;p.51).

91. "Bank Governor Leads Delegation to Bucharest" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (8 May 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 11 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-090;p.50).

92. "Romanian Presidential Envoy Makes 2-Day Visit" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1758 GMT, 20 September 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 26 September 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-185;p.49).

93. Jamileh Keshavarz, "Kayhan on Ceausescu Visit" (text). Tehran Kayhan in Persian (25 December 1989, p.20). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 9 January 1990 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-006;p.65).

94. Editorial, "Resalat on Ceausescu Visit, Unity" (text). Tehran Resalat in Persian (28 December 1989, pp.1,12). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 9 January 1990 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-90-006;p.65).

95. Editorial. "Ettelaat Editorial Compares Noriega and Ceausescu" (excerpts). Tehran Ettelaat in Persian (26 December 1989, pp.1,3). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 17 January 1990 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-011;p.47).

96. "The New Regime's Ambassador to Romania," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 19 April 1990, 3.

97. Ibid.

98. He therefore supported:

Iran's stand on the precise implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 598 calling for an end to Iraq-Iran hostilities. He also called for immediate withdrawal of foreign forces, especially the U.S. fleet, from the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean ("DPRK Official Meets Musavi, Discusses Ties" [text]. Tehran IRNA in English [1817 GMT, 17 July 1989]. Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 19 July 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-137;p.49]).

99. "Khamenei to Visit DPRK After PRC Tour" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (0710 GMT, 30 April 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 1 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-082;p.47).

100. "Hashemi-Rafsanjani Sees off DPRK Envoy" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1353 GMT, 19 July 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 21 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-139;p.55).

101. DPRK Official Meets Musavi, Discusses Ties, 49.

102. "Hashemi-Rafsanjani Supports Korean Unification" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (2020 GMT, 15 July 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 24 July 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-140;p.51).

103. "Trade with DPRK to Double in Year" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1235 GMT, 21 May 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 23 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-098;p.65).

104. This included the export of Korean steel and machine tool factories to Iran, construction of a power station, dredging of the Arvand-Rud, setting up a shipyard in the Caspian port of Anzali and construction of a fishing port in Bandar-Abbass (Ibid.).

105. "Kayhan Urges Development of Ties with PRC" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1045 GMT, 11 May 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 11 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-090;p.47).

106. "Kayhan Urges Development of Ties with PRC" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1045 GMT, 11 May 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 11 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-089;p.47).

107. "Resalat Interviews PRC Ambassador to Tehran" (excerpts). Tehran Resalat in Persian (3 May 1989, p.3). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 11 May 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-090;p.47).

108. "Holds Talks with Velayati 7 October" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1240 GMT, 7 October 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 10 October 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-194;p.59).

109. "Discusses Relations with Karrubi" (text). Tehran Television Service in Persian (1600 GMT, 7 October 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 10 October 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-194;p.59).

110. "Received by Hashemi-Rafsanjani" (text). Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (1030 GMT, 8 October 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 10 October 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-194;p.59).

111. "Concludes Visit, Departs 8 October" (text). Tehran IRNA in English (1710 GMT, 8 October 1989). Monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 10 October 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-194;p.60).

112. Ibid.

113. Velayati held:

Bearing in mind that the sessions of the joint commission of the two countries will take place in Tehran in the near future, it can be said that in the fields of economics, industry, and commerce, and also in the political field, the two side have decided to increase expansion and interaction in their relations.China's foreign policy positions are similar on many accounts. We have cooperated substantially in the international arena up to now, and we will continue to do so in the future ("Velayati on 'Positive' Visit" [text]. Tehran Domestic Service in Persian [2030 GMT, 8 October 1989]. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 10 October 1989 [PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-194;p.61]).

114. "PRC Trade Minister Signs Memorandum, Departs" (text). Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (0430 GMT, 29 November 1989). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS

Daily Report-South Asia, 30 November 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-229;p.47).

115. Ibid.

116. "Scientific, Military Agreement Signed with PRC" (text). Tehran Domestic Service in Persian (1030 GMT, 21 January 1990). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-South Asia, 25 January 1989 (PrEx 7.10:FBIS-NES-89-010;p.48).

117. These problems, which are shortage of hard currency to meet its financial obligations, persistence of a chaotic situation especially in the field of economy, rivalry among factions and internal instability and international isolation, will be discussed in detail in the last chapter.

118. "The Iraqi Surprising Attempts to Have Access to Advanced Military Technology," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 12 April 1990, 12.

119. John Sigler, "The Gulf War: United States Interests and Policies," in Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War, ed. Robert Spencer (Toronto: Centre For International Studies, University of Toronto, 1982), 95.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
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The Khomeini version of Shi'i which is formulated in velayat-e faqih is inconsistent with the formation of a coherent, stable and predictable political system. Hence this ideology is incapable of fostering a rational or moderate system of government. The characteristics of the Khomeini-constructed polity are therefore: anarchy, resentment towards centralism and factionalism. The most important factors which contribute to these deficiencies are indigenous¹ to the system; the nature of the clergy is the most salient factor.

Instead of a singular leader in the Shi'i faith, there are several sources of imitation. This first legitimization of fragmentation at the leadership level paves the way for an institutionalized anarchy within the clergy organization. It is because any source of imitation may and has his own schools, religious students, source of income and imitators. Consequently, any source of imitation does not need and does not enjoy the support of other sources. On the contrary, there is an undeclared rivalry and perhaps hostility among the sources of imitation. This rivalry is transmitted from the top to the bottom of each related organization as a result of which a planned anarchy prevails. The consequence is a strong sense of resentment to a centralized authority within the clergy organization.

The ascension of the clergy to power has reinforced this anarchic characteristic. The clergy, which had been deprived of a role in the judicial and political arenas in the previous

secular government, was given full power over the destiny of a nation of fifty million in 1979. As discussed before, the seizure of power by the reactionary faction of the clergy, which believes in inseparability of religion and politics and the right of the clerics to govern, has radically consolidated the centrifugal characteristic of the clergy.

The result has been manifest in the formation of many new organizations parallel to the previous secular ones. Beside the distrust of the elite towards the old Imperial institutions, the creation of multiple identical organs with the same tasks has been a clear reflection of the anarchic nature of the clergy. This is especially evident in the formation of judicial bodies which are related to different power circles among the reactionary faction of the clergy such as revolutionary courts and religious courts.

In turn, the creation of several institutions with the same functions has perpetuated and strengthened the clergy-generated chaos. In addition to the regular armed forces and police force, there are the RGC, the Committees and military units under the command of different prisons, revolutionary courts, religious courts, revolutionary prosecutor's office and Friday prayer leaders. As no written law specifies the jurisdiction of these forces, they enjoy an unlimited power which gives them the authority to do practically whatever pleases them. Hence a legal state of lawlessness prevails.

What further strengthens this anarchy is fierce factionalism.

There are several rival factions which aim at their own factional goals. Being evident in their approaches to different policies, this factionalism has additionally complicated the prevailing chaotic situation.

As a result, no decision can be expected to be simultaneously in effect all over the country. Decisions of the central government may or may not be implemented everywhere according to the positive or negative affiliation of local authorities with the centre and/or their temporary or long-term alignment with the faction behind a specific decision.

As another indigenous factor, stress on ideology has contributed to the inability of the system to function adequately. Following the policy of preference of ideology over expertise, a large number of well-educated cadres has been purged. While a reason behind the initial purges was the elites' fear of the non-cooperation of the inherited system, the continuation of this policy has revealed the hatred of the clergy and their non-clergy supporters of the educated strata.

Very close to the latter is the elites' enthusiasm for exercising religious law. Since religious law gives the clergy full power and authority to intervene in all the economic, political, judicial, social and even personal affairs, there is a tendency to undermine even the written laws of the Islamic regime. This is equal to a "legal" division of the central authority into an unknown units as now every clergy reserves the right to be the final authority over any issue in any region.

What further complicates this system is the Shi'i right of every clergy to interpret laws according to his understanding and needs at the time. As there are several sources of imitation, there is no way to expect a universal implementation of religious laws all over the country even if any clergyman does not decide to add his own personal interpretations to the recognized verdicts of the sources of imitation.

Finally, the irrelevancy of a clerical system to the realities of the time demands the adoption of a crisis-making policy. The entire regime which has shown its incompetence in providing the needs of the nation has no choice but to resort to the policy of crisis-making in order to hide its inborn deficiencies behind the uproar of a foreign policy crisis. All the internal problems therefore could be attributed to the permanent attacks of foreign powers which do not let the system focus its resources on resolving domestic problems.

In sum, these indigenous factors have shattered the potential and desire of the elite in the voluntary selection of a moderate system of government. Hypothetically, they could still adopt this type of statecraft if they changed their system which justifies anarchy and lawlessness overnight. As this would imply a denial of themselves and their organization as well as their belief system, this scenario would be very unlikely.

* *

The collapse of the Shah's regime brought a coalition of anti-Monarchist forces to power. While united under the

charismatic leadership of Khomeini, these forces proved to be incompatible and so a schism became inevitable. These inconsistent forces were a spectrum of nationalist figures and the reactionary faction of the clergy. In search of full control over the country, the clergy in power purged its former nationalist allies and began suppressing other challenging forces to its despotic rule, outside and inside the regime. Now the clergy was able to fully implement its ideology (formulated in the theory of velayat-e faqih) in order to establish its desired Islamic system. Using his charisma, Khomeini functioned as the final arbiter with the authority to enforce his verdicts upon competing factions. He therefore kept the anarchic clergy together and continued the system despite factionalism.

* *

Selection of Khamenei as the successor to Khomeini has only nominally filled the vacant leadership. Because of age, low religious status and his insignificant role prior to the formation of the IRI, Khamenei cannot simply claim to or exercise the same power which he has allegedly inherited from Khomeini. Exaggeration of the religious, spiritual and political role of Khomeini in the pace of events before and after the Islamic Revolution has put other IRI leaders in the shadow. Moreover, Khamenei lacks the so-called impartial status of Khomeini which had helped him function as an arbiter among competing factions whenever the continuation of a factional disagreement could have endangered the existence of the system. These factors have

contributed to Khamenei's weakness as a leader co-equal to Khomeini. Hence absence of a strong and unchallengeable leader is the salient characteristic of the post-Khomeini era. In the absence of such a leader, the unity among the factions which was forged by Khomeini has disappeared while Khamenei does not have the prestige and power to function as the final arbiter.

* *

For the sake of their strategic interests, the USA and other Western countries have contributed to the creation and continuation of the IRI. Fierce rivalry on one hand and social, economic and political problems on the other could have led to the fall of the regime if some Western countries had not provided the regime with its requirements. In the absence of a desirable alternative government, these countries have opted for the one which can satisfy their needs in spite of its anti-West rhetoric. In return, their assistance, which has taken the forms of overt or covert economic or military relations, has enabled the fragile Islamic system to continue.

* *

While the nature of the system is the main obstacle to a rational system of government, some Westerners believed that the death of Khomeini would pave the way for the moderation of the regime. Accordingly, the domination of the "moderates" would end the factionalism and prepare the situation for radical changes in the system. In contrast, the death of Khomeini did not bring a new era in internal and external affairs. The

"moderates" have not gained full power and have remained as one faction among others. The recent eruption of mass protest in several major Iranian cities has additionally inclined the entire elite to the pursuit of previous old repressive measures at home. Their consent and persistence in the continuation of "radical" policies both at home and abroad have shattered the validity of the existence of a moderate faction with qualitatively different characteristics.

Whereas there is ample evidence to reject the existence of a moderate faction, the durability of the moderate-faction theory suggests the interest of some Western countries in maintaining ties with the Islamic government. Evidence shows that even the Americans knew that they were dealing with the entire Khomeini system in the course of their clandestine relations with the IRI and that there was no moderate faction, in the conventional sense. The persistence of this theory despite the facts, is perhaps due to its practical utility for justification of relations with the undemocratic Islamic regime. Because Western governments count on the survivability of IRI, their justification for close relations with such a repressive regime (in order to secure their strategic interests) has been translated into the theory of moderate faction.

* *

While the IRI consists of several factions, there is no moderate faction within the Islamic regime. The roots of rivalry are not the inconsistency between moderate and radical

ideologies, rather they are a great number of other factors. The system is simply incapable of nourishing moderation as a full-fledged ideology. In addition to the IRI's intrinsic characteristics which prevent moderation, several exogenous factors make the adoption of a moderate policy also impossible. Since a number of economic and political needs are unlikely to be met by the regime, the following incremental economic and political dissatisfaction among the people will have to be met by coercive measures in order to preserve the system.

Economically, the major factor is the IRI's inability to implement necessary reconstruction plans because of a shortage of funds and skilled manpower. While the IRI needs \$455b. for the implementation of its first Five-Year Plan, it is estimated that Iran needs at least \$200b. for the reconstruction of the country alone.² Although recent contracts with the East and the West are essential for Iran's recovery, it is not clear how the government will generate sufficient revenue in hard currency to pay its bills. For the time being, its major source of foreign currency is oil exports. As the price of oil has been decreasing due to overproduction³, the amount of Iran's oil revenue cannot be predicted. It is important to know that Iran's inability to produce its designated OPEC quota has further decreased Iranian oil income.⁴ Even if they were not problems and even if the expectation of some experts on the temporary nature of a decline in oil price and its eventual increase came true, oil income could hardly provide Iran with enough financial

means to meet all its commitments to Western and Eastern as well as TW economic partners.

Knowing that, attempts have been made to create other sources of income. As mentioned earlier, export of natural gas to the USSR and some other Eastern European countries seems to be a partial solution. Yet this cannot markedly change the situation because Iran has just started selling gas to the USSR and it will be some time before it is possible to increase gas export to meet the needs of other customers.⁵ Additionally, current gas contracts including an important one with the USSR are mainly barter agreements which will not generate any income in hard currency.⁶ Therefore, the solution seems to be the export of Iranian industrial products to other countries. Even if it faces no technical problem, the consequence of this policy will not be other than further shortage of those goods on the Iranian market. The political price of such a solution will be likely high for the Islamic regime at the time when it needs to decrease internal dissidence.

Beside financial restrictions, the regime does not possess necessary skilled manpower to implement its reconstruction plans. Continued purges of technocrats, managers and well-educated cadres have created a shortage of expertise at the time when the Iranian educational system is not capable of fulfilling needs. The regime's pursuit of totalitarian policies and continuation of lawlessness have discouraged Iranian experts living abroad from returning home. While especially the "radicals" have realized

the need for this expertise and tried to encourage their return', the continuation of disagreements among the elite and its resulting atmosphere of uncertainty have weakened the possibility of voluntary return.

The complete implementation of reconstruction plans is also doubtful due to the continuation of chaos in Iranian economy. After eleven years, there is no consensus among the elite over the universal implementation of even constitutional laws with respect to economy. While the IRI Constitution clearly sanctions three sectors of the economy i.e., public, private and cooperative, there are still sharp disagreements over the jurisdiction of each sector since no law clearly defines their jurisdictions. These disagreements have created a sentiment of economic uncertainty which has resulted in a sharp decrease in private sector investment in the productive fields of the economy.*

While conflict over the jurisdiction of each sector may be observed in any other political system, the peculiar forms which these conflicts take in the context of the IRI have retarded economic activities. Within the IRI framework, they take the form of the refusal of some ministries and governmental organs to provide goods or services like raw material, spare parts and electricity for factories, for the private sector for instance, while other institutions and ministries issue licences and permits and provide some other materials or facilities for their activities. In other cases when there is no objection to the

production of certain goods, the total product of an industrial or agro-industrial unit can be confiscated by some governmental organ if that organ arbitrarily sees its distribution as its right.

Moreover, the persistence of several decision-making organs and the prolongation of factional rivalry have simply undermined the feasibility of the implementation of a unified economic policy even if there was one. Now, any governmental organ, institution and military or para-military force has the power and right to intervene in the conduct of the economy since it wants to satisfy certain needs, has the right to control certain section or specific production or view the implementation of this or that policy against its economic and/or political powers.

Likewise, the continuation of factionalism will be another probable hindering factor. On one hand, rivalry among the elite will prevent the implementation of economic and military programs as the intervention of each faction in the process may cause sequential interruptions. On the other, competition might force some compromises over the cancellation of some plans since the political situation demands a radical response to the behaviour of certain countries for which a united action of the elite is necessary.

Politically, two series of factors may hinder the adoption of a moderate policy. The first series includes those political factors which may cause negative economic outcomes that may increase domestic dissatisfaction. One factor is the

unpredictability of the regime. The IRI might need to become temporarily closer to a country or to take a stand on an issue in order to achieve some political or economic goals to solve one of its problems. That could potentially provoke a negative response by other countries in the form of defiance of carrying out their economic and military undertakings. For instance, the IRI's persistence on the Salman Rushdie death penalty (which it needs to maintain for its internal considerations*) has created an obstacle for further development of its relations with the EEC.¹⁰ The other factor is the instability of the regime. At the domestic level, the continuation of recent anti-government activities may further damage the stability of the regime, and so, provide a situation in which the completion of certain plans may not be possible.

The second series of factors reflects the potential of public dissent in destabilizing the system. The Islamic government has every reason to suppress these types of activities and further tighten security measures. The result could not be anything but further restriction of freedoms and expansion of repression.

* *

Since the regime is unable to overcome its enormous domestic problems, the IRI needs to seek help abroad. In search of support, the regime has introduced its new foreign policy. However, its inability to develop a more or less (internally and internationally) acceptable political system has become evident in its conduct of foreign policy. With three major objectives

i.e., reconstruction, peace talks and the regime's stability, the IRI has made certain efforts to break its isolation.

With respect to the West, the outstanding problems have not been resolved yet. IRI relations with the three non-Communist UNSC permanent members are still not promising. There is no indication of a rapprochement with the USA in the near future. Relations with the UK which had been close to normalization were severed due to the Rushdie affair in the Khomeini era. As bilateral relations have undergone extra tensions since the demise of Khomeini, resumption of normal relations seems very remote. Diplomatic relations have been restored between Iran and France, but a range of financial and political disagreements has prevented the establishment of close and reliable relations between the two countries.

Whereas the conclusion of economic accords with Western countries like Japan and Italy have given an eminent status to the West in Iran, the prolongation of unfriendly relations with the major Western powers have illustrated the innate inability of the regime to implement a normal foreign policy.

Although less controversial, the IRI tilt towards the East has not been very promising either. IRI relations with the East have remained mainly economic. It is not even certain whether Eastern European countries and especially the USSR will be able to fulfil their economic undertakings, due to the unpredictable situation prevailing there. The absence of that type of problem in countries like the DPRK and the PRC will perhaps assure the

supply of Iran with low-quality goods and arms which will not be sufficient to secure the prompt recovery that Iran needs now.

* *

The post-Khomeini era has not been successful in overcoming the outstanding problems of the Islamic system. While there is a consensus over essential security-related matters, rivalry among contending factions persists. The destabilizing impact of factionalism has been even more significant since the system lacks a charismatic leader like Khomeini to keep the factions together.

Beside repression of views, torture, summary executions and lack of personal as well as collective rights, the inability of the regime to curb unemployment, reduce inflation and prevent rising prices has increased popular dissatisfaction. The failure of the regime to recover from the destruction of war at the time when there is no indication of economic improvement in sight has further stimulated public protest. Recent anti-government demonstrations have indicated the susceptibility of society to sudden eruption of political dissent. As repression continues and no rapid economic recovery is imaginable in the near future, the regime should expect more mass protest.¹¹

In such a situation adoption of a moderate policy looks practically impossible. The reason is that such a policy (which would require political openness and dissolution of present repressive forces such as the Revolutionary Guards and the Committees) would only deprive the regime of coercive means by

which it has more or less contained popular dissatisfaction. Such would only pave the way for the eruption of popular discontent and massive anti-government activities whose consequences would be unbearable for the regime.

While some degree of political openness could have prolonged the life of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, this would not be a remedy for the IRI. This is because those regimes had achieved progress in certain sectors such as heavy industries and provided a minimum degree of prosperity for the population at large. Hence their use of coercive measures was to compensate their deficiencies in other fields such as individual rights and shortage of consumer goods; coercion was a supplementary measure of statecraft. In contrast, the disappointing record of the IRI in practically all fields i.e., economic, political, social, individual and international, has made the elite employ coercion as the only means for the continuation of the system. In such a case when the majority of the people seek other forces as alternative rulers, any degree of relaxation of repression would only encourage and facilitate the political groups to mobilise the population for the overthrow of the regime.

Having explained the sensitivity of the situation, two things are essential for the survival of the regime. Firstly, repression must be continued lest any sign of leniency on the part of the regime in coping with opposition might be interpreted as weakness.¹² Such could encourage broader expression of opposition whose political outcomes would not be very promising

for the regime. Secondly, the attention of Iranians must be diverted from the ever-increasing domestic problems including elite rivalry. For that purpose, it is necessary to create crises in the conduct of foreign policy or maintain tension with some countries. Accordingly, internal build-up on these matters on one hand and the reaction of target countries on the other may provide enough input to keep the propaganda machine of the regime busy.

This need for crisis-making was the reason behind the Rushdie affair. The regime initiated its anti-Rushdie campaign when it felt very vulnerable to the internal dissent because of the ceasefire. Although the war began in the form of the Iranians' defence of their motherland against the Iraqi invaders, Khomeini continued it even when Iran re-captured its territories as he determined the topple of the Iraqi regime and "Arab reaction", as the conditions for the termination of the war. However, the real reason for the prolongation of the war was its providing an emergency atmosphere which could justify the incompetency of the elite under the pretext of problems generated by the war. It also legitimized the regime's repressive measures as necessary to ensure the continuation of war efforts. However, the regime could not continue the war after eight years due to several reasons ranging from incremental popular opposition to the war to social, political, economic and military considerations. Accepting the ceasefire sharply decreased the legitimacy of the elite among its followers who were told to stop fighting while

the Khomeini-set objectives had not been achieved and some Iranian territories were still under the Iraqi occupation.

The sudden acceptance of the ceasefire created a serious stability threat for the IRI. Now it had to face two formidable issues: solving social and economic problems and containing political dissent now also among its own followers. Once there was no immediate solution to these problems and no excuse for evasion, there was a need to divert the attention of the people from domestic problems. The most plausible excuse was an event which could imply the continuation of the emergency situation through foreign threat which prevented the regime from addressing internal problems. Therefore, Khomeini created a crisis by issuing a fetwa on Salman Rushdie. This not only provoked the harsh response of the British government and public, but stimulated antipathy towards the regime in many other countries. As a result, the rising wave of condemnation of the regime provided enough material to feed the IRI propaganda machine in order to prove an international conspiracy against Iran which necessitated the continuation of the emergency situation and public tolerance of hardship.

* *

In spite of expectations, the pursuit of an implicit or explicit conciliatory policy towards the IRI by countries such as the USA and FRG will probably weaken Iran's ties with the West. The essence of present Western policy towards the Islamic regime is implicit support of a political system which has been losing

its domestic basis of support ever since its establishment in 1979. The IRI's move towards the use of repressive measures for which it has been criticized by various governments along with international organizations reveal the IRI's realization of the existence of a situation suitable for rapid expansion of dissent. Having realized that, the IRI's resort to suppression discloses its fear of a bleak future if it does otherwise.

Under these circumstances, the Western policy of cooperation has only prolonged the life of an undemocratic polity. This cooperation which has taken many forms ranging from overt diplomatic and economic relations to covert arms deals has assisted the regime in different periods of time to satisfy its essential needs. Beside short-term profits, Western purchase of Iranian oil and recent contracts for providing the IRI with credit, loans and/or investment have been aimed at easing the IRI's financial and economic difficulties. These difficulties can paralyse the system and facilitate the collapse of a regime which has been responsible for not only repression at home but terrorism and crisis-making abroad.

In particular, the continuation of the regime means agony and repression for Iranians. As the system is losing its support because of its incompetence to sustain even the unsatisfactory standard of living under the Shah, its incapability to defend Iran's territorial integrity and its systematic and brutal repression, any foreign country which comes to the rescue of the Islamic government will lose its prestige and credibility among

Iranians. As the exercise of a long term policy needs the consensus or at least indifference of the population, the rising resentment to some Western countries among Iranians due to their support of the regime, will likely provide a situation which will not let any future government of Iran establish close and extended relations with at least certain Western countries.

* *

The inability of this system to overcome its problems, its unpopularity within Iran, and its probable collapse have recently been acknowledged by certain influential American politicians¹³, who argue that the continued hopes of some Western countries to resume relations with the Islamic government will only prolong the suffering of Iranians. Today more than ever, it is clear that there is neither a moderate faction in the Islamic regime nor does the situation allow the formation of a moderate faction. In addition to certain intrinsic deficiencies of the elite, adoption of a moderate system of government at the time of existence of tremendous economic, social and political problems would be equal to the facilitation of the collapse of the system. The Islamic elite is not capable of overthrowing itself.

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ENDNOTES

1. "Indigenous" means those beliefs, behaviours and methods which form the inseparable characteristics of the founding factions of the IRI.

2. "During the Current Year, The Islamic Republic Will Have \$15.6b Income in Currency By Selling Oil and Gas," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 5 April 1990, 4.

3. "The Emergency Session of OPEC Will Be Held Next Week," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 26 April 1990, 1.

4. It is believed that the average oil production of Iran in February 1990 was 300,000 to 340,000 barrels per day less than its approved quota. For detail, see: "Following the Global Fall of the Oil Price, Currency Constraints of the Islamic Government Will Be Worsen," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 19 April 1990, 1. See also: "The Price of Crude Oil Has Decreased," Kayhan Newspaper (London), 12 April 1990, 4.

5. Iran Officially Began Selling Natural Gas to the USSR on 8 April 1990 ("During the Interview of the Oil Minister, It was Mentioned: Iranian Readiness for Selling Gas to European Countries," Kayhan Havai, 18 April 1990, 10).

6. According to the Iranian Oil Minister, Golam Reza Aghazadeh, Iran will annually export 3b cubic meters of natural gas to the USSR for the next 15 years. This will generate an annual income of \$300m. However, the amount will be deposited in a special account by the Soviet Union in order to be spent on future Iranian-Soviet plans for expansion of Iranian gas-export facilities. Hence the expected revenue cannot be spent on whatever Iran decides (Ibid.).

7. In addition to the previous requests of ex-Prime Minister, Mir Hossein Moussavi, the overseas organ of the radicals "Kayhan Havai" has recently begun publishing articles with the purpose of encouraging Iranian experts residents of Western countries to return home. These articles have tried to give some guarantees to these people by rejecting "rumours" of the government's disdain of intellectuals and the inability of the regime to provide essential needs of the people. For detail, see: "The Iranian Californians Desire to Return to the Motherland," Kayhan Havai, 18 April 1990, 14,9.

8. This point was elaborated on in Chapter I.

9. This issue will be discussed shortly.

10. Now the EEC countries have postponed further development of their economic relations with the regime to the resolution of the IRI's conflict with the U.K. ("Relations with Western Europe Lies in Improvement of Relations with Britain," Kayhan Newspaper [London], 14 June 1990, 1, 9).

11. Different Iranian opposition groups have published news on anti-government demonstrations on 15 April 1990 in a park located in the north of Tehran during which several people were arrested or wounded by the security forces. While confirming the arrest of 65 people on the same day and in the same place, the overseas organ of the "radicals", Kayhan Havai, attributed the arrests to non-political reasons. It also criticized the daily organ of the Revolutionary Guards Corps "Abrar" for publishing such a "baseless" news which only fed the propaganda machinery of the anti-government groups. Kayhan Havai specified "Abrar" as an "unreliable source". See: "Unreliable Sources and the Uproar of the West and Its Connected [Iranian] Groups," Kayhan Havai, 25 April 1990, 8.

12. The government has recently severed its security measures especially after the outbreak of a number of anti-government demonstrations in Tehran and other major cities. The following is the latest announced measure. With the excuse of controlling the observation of religious laws on men's and women's clothing, the government announced early in May 1990 that special patrol teams would be dispatched to the streets in order to arrest non-observant men and women (News, 6 May 1990).

13. Late in April 1990, one hundred members of the International Security Council including General Alexander Haig published an article on the last page of The Washington Times in which the alienation of the Iranians from the Islamic government was stressed. Elaborating on the ever-increasing dissatisfaction of the people, the signatories predicted the inevitable collapse of the regime. They also rejected the moderation of Rafsanjani. For detail, see: "Security of America and Iran," The Washington Times, 21 April 1990, ; quoted in "The Washington Use of Retired American Generals for Interference in the Internal affairs of Iran," Kayhan Havai, 25 April 1990, 2.

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