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**POLITICAL ENCOUNTERS IN BENEVOLENCE: CANADA,
CONTRACEPTION, AND WOMEN HAVING BABIES ABROAD**

by

Kalapi Roy BA

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Institute of Political Economy

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

10 May 2002

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and Research acceptance of the thesis

Political Encounters in Benevolence:
Canada, Contraception, and Women Having Babies Abroad

submitted by Kalapi Roy
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

Thesis Supervisor

Director, Institute of Political Economy

Carleton University
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Abstract

This thesis illustrates the relations constituting Canada's benevolent identity in its development encounter with women for whom an official development assistance based contraceptive is being designed. Following William E Connolly, a modest genealogy highlights in this relation the existential resentment tingeing Canada's relations with an excessively fertile third world. In benevolent identity, existential resentment works to repel the threat of excessive demands posed by [over]population to Canada's standards of development. Identity\ difference is tracked in an exchange between the development agency sponsoring the contraceptive research project and an international campaign contesting Canada's involvement. The Bill of Rights that the campaign alternatively promotes is read through the "standpoint of the concrete other", as it is described by Seyla Benhabib. It is argued that the threat to Canada's identity posed by third world fertility might stymie Canada's commitment to securing for women reproductive choice.

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Introduction

A dollar love had good intentions, a clear conscience, and to Hell with everybody (Greene 1962:63).¹

Benevolent gestures are fettered with remnants. Dilemmas remaining, after action is taken, infiltrate benevolence's attempts at eliminating the suffering of others.² Canada's benevolent relations are the subject of this thesis.

This thesis examines Canada's official development assistance in the field of population. Canada's long standing commitment to lowering the world population growth rate is well documented in Canada's report to the Cairo Conference on Population and Development (1994UN ICPD) (Canada 1994).³ Canada pledges funds towards allaying the population problem as the pressure of numbers "delay or reverse social development ... [and] efforts to combat poverty" (Canada 1994:19). By tending to the satisfaction of human needs and the improvement of people's quality of life, Canada cements a public identity of benevolence.

The National Report on Population brandishes the hCG contraceptive research project sponsored by the Canadian crown corporation, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), as the Centre's most significant "population related project" (Canada 1994:22). As part of IDRC's "reproductive choice focus", the hCG contraceptive promises to improve women's reproductive well being (Canada 1994:19-22). However, a

¹ From Graham Greene's novel, The Quiet American.

² On the various approaches taken in political theory to "dilemmas", see Bonnie Honig (1996). Honig's approach is used here, where benevolence's dilemmas are placed at the study's centre.

³ The latest United Nations International Conference on Population and Development was held in 1994; ones before it were held in 1974 and 1984.

campaign mounted by women's organizations from around the world requests IDRC to suspend its funding of the hCG contraceptive research, and to agree to a meeting. At the meeting, the campaign inquires of IDRC whether the hCG contraceptive research project might interfere with the Centre's professed commitment to women's maternal health (Seabrooke to Bezanson 15 June 1995). The campaign presents to IDRC a bill of women's reproductive rights. The Bill of Rights: for contraceptive research, development and use (1996) is an articulation of economic, social and political needs requiring fulfillment in order for reproductive choice to be established. In dismissing the Bill of Rights, IDRC might be neglecting its commitment to improving women's lives. But in seriously considering the bill, IDRC would be compelled to question Canada's 20 year treatment of the population problem. Canada's benevolent identity, concomitantly, would be placed under examination. Undertaking an inquiry into IDRC's options, this thesis poses the question: in helping to solve the problem of world population, how might the dilemmas remaining in Canada's benevolent relations prevent it from committing to rights articulated in the name of the recipients of its assistance?

Towards answering this question, focus is placed on the cultural unconscious of Canada's benevolent identity. This thesis documents the practices and arrangements constituting Canada's benevolent identity in its development encounter with women for whom an assistance based contraceptive is being designed. While population assistance maintains Canada's identity of benevolence, it is shown that population assistance, at once, integrates into Canada's benevolent relations the very dilemmas working to perturb development's seamless ways. For, in benevolent identity, an existential resentment subsists, tingeing Canada's relations with a fertile third world. Tested by third world neediness,

Canada's existential resentment contends against the destabilization of Canada's self ascription as cooperative, charitable, generous and committed. Canada reinstates its benevolent identity against the excessive demands made of it with new approaches to curbing the birth rate abroad. Development's practices and arrangements, in this way, reconstitute an identity of benevolence in a succession of variations: as wealthy partner, humanitarian, steward of the environment, and custodian of women's health. It is in this last variation that Canada considers a request that it commit to upholding a bill of reproductive rights; but it may be impossible for Canada to commit to securing for women reproductive choice unless Canada tames its existential resentment. In other words, third world women's cultural constitution as excessively fertile would not shift simply with Canada's shedding of its benevolent identity. Even if women in the third world and women in Canada were entitled to the same economic, social and political conditions grounding reproductive rights, Canada may continue to discourage certain women from bearing children.

Forgoing an explanation of third world birth rates, this thesis examines the cultural logic in the faith displayed by purveyors of overseas assistance: that development must aid in lowering the world population growth rate. Developers' dedication to containing overpopulation is firm. Not surprisingly, international population assistance is riddled with dilemmas. Negotiated or political dimensions organizing Canada's benevolent encounters are tracked using William E Connolly's framework of identity\ difference (1995, 1991). "Identity involves naming cultural formations that have become naturalized and interiorized" (1991:175) in the course of an identity's relations with those different from itself. Revealing the cultural formations named by a collective identity is the task of genealogy. This study shows, using a genealogical methodology, that in the course of its 20

year effort to solve the population problem, Canada maintains, through its development assistance, an identity of benevolence. And though collective identity tends to present itself as smooth, it is not true, nor is it harmonious. (1991:204). Disruptions within an identity's boundaries are revealed through genealogical study, and the denaturalization of an identity's "truth" becomes evident in a democratic exchange. In democracy, a collective identity might attend to political contest with "critical responsiveness" (1995). Critical responsiveness is used in this thesis as a methodology to predict new relational arrangements of identity\ difference were Canada to commit to an international bill of reproductive rights. For a consideration of the implications new relations hold, the existential resentment fastening and unfastening Canada's benevolent identity is studied using genealogy and critical responsiveness. To this end, genealogy and critical responsiveness reveal the dilemmas invading the cultural unconscious governing Canada's benevolent identity.

Theories of democracy structure this thesis, since it studies relations of benevolence questioned, first, at meetings between a development agency and a campaign, and again, by the same campaign's claim for reproductive rights. Reproductive rights are claimed in the name of recipients of assistance, who expect, presumably, that development agencies will commit to upholding these rights. The Bill of Rights prompts IDRC to ask of itself, in terms of the relations its nurtures with women abroad, "what is expected of us in virtue of the kind of social bonds which tie us to one another?" (Benhabib 1992:10). Seyla Benhabib supplies this question as a guide to exchanges on self other relations based on bonds of care and sympathy. When expectations of one another held by a self and its other do not match, a reorientation in relations may prove challenging. Stressing in benevolence a predetermined care and sympathy suppresses, perhaps, the strength of conflicts structuring a self other

relation. Indeed, the campaign directed at IDRC seeks to transform the political, social and economic conditions in which reproductive choice is set. So William E Connolly's writing is pertinent, in that he states: "the key *ethical* question is what kinds of relations bearers of each contestable orientation strive to enter with their competitors" (1995:xxv). Benhabib and Connolly's theories of democracy are applied to assess the intermingling of care and conflict in Canada's development relations with third world women. Connolly's and Benhabib's writing contrast in point of origin, but both offer readings of how an exchange may proceed, and how it might be read. While Connolly can be described as a post Nietzschean, and Benhabib as a Habermasian, both highlight the potential for a self and other's transformation through the course of a democratic encounter. By reading as an exchange the campaign and IDRC's meetings and correspondences, this thesis uses democracy theory to explain the enabling of and possible change in a benevolent identity that seeks to be involved helpfully in women's reproductive well being.

This thesis draws from literature on world population growth and international population assistance that falls within the categories of political economy analysis, security studies, development studies on women's health, and writing on reproductive rights and health. Political economy analyses of international population activities explain that the amassing of capital requires a reduction in the world population growth rate (Akhter 1992, Sen and Grown 1987:46-49, Michaelson 1981, Davis 1981, Mass 1976), and concomitantly, a distraction from inequities and exploitation – the latter of which is accomplished by redirecting the solution for poverty to lowering world population growth (Bandarage 1997, Nair 1992, Bannerji 1981). This thesis follows political economy analysis by studying, rather

than the population growth rate itself, its alleviation through development assistance. While political economy literature is useful for examining Canada's case, the limits in this literature prevent its adoption for the study at hand. An examination of the cultural elements governing development assistance requires an interpretation of the popular applause in capitalism for lowering world population growth. The gap in this literature limits its usefulness here. Public endorsement of international population activities is better explained through security studies and development studies on women's health.⁴ Security studies writing by Thomas Homer-Dixon, for instance, requisitions development assistance for population growth and attendant third world phenomena that "create serious foreign policy difficulties for the United States and Canada" (1996:52). Canada's insecurities, defined in this literature, undergo scrutiny in this thesis by way of genealogical inquiry into Canada's benevolent identity.⁵

Like security studies, development studies on women's health tend to neglect analyses of global capitalism.⁶ Women's health studies concentrates on ways development assistance can help prevent maternal and infant death and illness. An efficient means to do so, according to this literature, is for development assistance to work on lowering birth rates. The appeal this method holds in Canada similarly undergoes examination in the genealogical inquiry this thesis makes into Canada's benevolent identity.⁷ In contrast to development studies in women's health, literature on reproductive health and rights seeks the

⁴ In an undergraduate research essay, I surveyed popular interpretations of world population growth and international population assistance in magazine articles in the era of the Cairo Conference on Population and Development (1994 UN ICPD).

⁵ See Chapters 2 and 3.

⁶ Sonalde Desai (2000, 1994) is one of the very few who integrates writing on women's health with political economy analysis.

⁷ See, again, Chapters 2 and 3.

establishment of socio economic conditions necessary for enabling women's reproductive sexual and sexual self determination. The bill of rights submitted by the campaign to IDRC is set in this literature. However, this literature is limited since it tends to ignore the import of cultural change on the part of the purveyors of assistance for the establishment of material change. So to consider the campaign's bill of rights, where the literature on reproductive health and rights is insufficient, this thesis relies on Connolly's identity\ difference framework. Critical responsiveness is used to assess the cultural change required of Canada for it to commit to third world women's reproductive rights.

This thesis attempts to contribute to reproductive rights literature an illustration of the import of culture and cultural unconscious analysis in evaluations of international population assistance. Democracy theory allows for such an illustration. Democracy theory allows showing that development's arrangements and practices constitute in Canada, through relations of conflict and care, an identity of benevolence. This thesis illustrates variations in Canada's benevolent identity, from the 1970s to the 1990s, beginning in the era of IDRC's first funding contribution to hCG contraceptive research. Canada's benevolent identity, in its 1990s variation, is described using, perhaps, the first academic reading of correspondence between IDRC and an international campaign on the subject of IDRC's hCG contraceptive research co sponsorship. Canada's identity is revealed, in the 1990s, as a custodian of third world women's health. In the 1970s, Canada's benevolent identity manifests, through its international population assistance, as a wealthy partner; in the 1980s, as a humanitarian; and later in the 1980s, as an environmental steward. With each variation, development's practices and arrangements conceal the threat the neediness of others' pose to the initiators of development. It is not Canada's fear of monetary depletion and material

denial that existential resentment appeases. In light of growing third world demands, which refute, perhaps, Canada's self ascription as cooperative, caring, generous and committed, existential resentment in benevolent identity protects benevolent identity against its own uncertainty. This thesis shows, that in this way, benevolence and existential resentment together comprise the culture and cultural unconscious of Canada's benevolent identity. Showing how care and conflict are integrated in Canada's benevolent identity permits an assessment of the culture and cultural unconscious that may prevent in Canada a commitment to reproductive rights asserted in the name of recipients of development assistance. In this sense, this thesis contributes to reproductive rights literature an illustration of the import of cultural change for the establishment of material change necessary for enabling reproductive choice.

Chapter outlines

The first chapter looks to writings on democracy elaborated by William E Connolly and Seyla Benhabib in order to select a set of theoretical tools. For examining the democratic encounter between IDRC and the campaign around IDRC's hCG contraceptive research co sponsorship, Chapter 1, first, compares relevant "private sphere" topics for inclusion in a public discussion on reproduction. Second, Chapter 1 evaluates various modes of exchange that may be applied to reading a cross cultural relation. Since Benhabib hesitates from drawing issues of religious and cultural conflict into public discussion, Connolly's identity\ difference framework is found to be better suited to an examination of cultural forces that may inform the international relations in which third world women's reproduction is set. To explore and contend with an identity's existential resentment, identity\ difference analysis offers genealogy and critical responsiveness as methodologies. Analysis of the exchange

should proceed, it is shown, not with a reversal of perspectives, as Benhabib might suggest, but with genealogy and critical responsiveness, which permit a sustained consideration of a collective benevolent identity. Genealogy and critical responsiveness are described in this chapter, and used to study the exchange in subsequent chapters.

Chapter 2 conducts a genealogy of Canada's benevolent identity, as it is constituted through population assistance. First, it is argued, for reading an exchange around development assistance, that an identity\ difference variant of genealogical methodology is more useful than Arturo Escobar's "discourse of development". Primary materials considered in this chapter's modest genealogy consist of IDRC and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) public documents. This chapter's genealogy shows that through the 1970s to the mid 1980s, an identity of benevolence emerges in Canada, first, as a "wealthy partner", then as a "humanitarian", and finally as a "steward of the environment". Existential resentment's preservation of development's standards of discipline and entitlement, it is demonstrated, is central in securing benevolent identity's relation with a needy third world.

Chapter 3 follows the previous chapter's presentation of Canada's benevolent identity. In the 1990s, Canada's benevolent identity manifests as a "custodian of third world women's health". This chapter, like the last, applies a genealogical methodology; this time, to read a correspondence between the campaign and IDRC on the Centre's research co sponsorship of the hCG contraceptive. First, Canada's involvement in the fertility of certain *domestic* populations is reviewed, using David Campbell's particular application of Connolly's identity\ difference analysis. In Campbell's application, the emphasis lies on difference *within* identity. Chapter 3 distinguishes itself from Campbell's endeavor, by featuring

difference within identity also as dissent. Contest against Canada's involvement in international population assistance, in the form of Canadian participants in the campaign, is difference from Canada's benevolent identity. The alternatives to Canada's development path proposed by "difference in identity" are assessed in this chapter.

Alternatives to Canada's benevolent relations are posited more comprehensively in the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights is explored in Chapter 4 using Benhabib's "lens of the standpoint of the concrete other" (1992). "Real reproductive choice", claimed in the Bill, is contrasted against the "choice" IDRC proffers through its population assistance. While the Bill details the substantive conditions necessary for enabling reproductive rights, it is argued that the Bill reinscribes the gender norm of women as fertile, potentially pregnant and reproducing. Rosalind Pollack Petchesky's writing around reproductive rights is read, specifically in terms of the assignment she places on women to make reproductive choices "responsibly". But the constitution of third world women as irresponsible clings to Canada's mutually constituted identity, making it unlikely that Canada would commit to the Bill of Rights. A possible shedding of Canada's benevolent identity is considered, consistent with stipulations in the Bill. Attention to cultural unconscious through critical responsiveness's cautions, even after changing its benevolent self ascription, that Canada's existential resentment may prevent it from extending reproductive choice to women in the third world.

Chapter 1

Considering Identity\ Difference in an Exchange on Reproduction

On 5 June 1995 the International Campaign against Population Control and Abusive, Hazardous Contraceptives met with officers from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) to discuss the funding of a female immunological contraceptive research project. Since 1975, IDRC, a Canadian crown corporation, had financed, along with the Indian government, the World Health Organization, and others, the engineering of the human Chorionic Gonadotropin (hCG) contraceptive for use in India and elsewhere. At the meeting, the Campaign asked IDRC to cease funding the research. A year later, the International Campaign presented IDRC with a Bill of Rights: for contraceptive research, development and use (1996). The requests made by the Campaign to IDRC propose an interesting reconfiguration of Canadian relations with the women for whom the contraceptive is intended. Two points in the Campaign's request are noteworthy: first, a development research funding agency must include in conversation those who are the objects of a development project; and second, in this conversation, IDRC must pledge to redress the unsatisfactory relationship it harbours with the subjects of the Bill of Rights. This chapter examines theories of democracy delineated by Seyla Benhabib and William E. Connolly, and assesses what these writings might offer to a reading of an exchange such as this one.

The exchange between the International Campaign and IDRC might be considered in light of writings concerned with the democratization of Canadian foreign policy. Certain authors conclude, for instance, that a pluralization of the consultative process, meaning a

greater diversity of entities participating in the discussion, does not in and of itself realise a substantive change in foreign policy (Neufeld 1999, Whitworth 1995). This is hardly surprising, as Neufeld notes, since questions concerning the kind of democracy being instituted, and the role democracy plays, are central in evaluating whether the democratization of foreign policy supports the perpetuation of unequal relationships (1999). Like Neufeld, this chapter does not probe the workings of an extant democratic encounter. Rather, a series of theoretical writings are examined here so as to consider what might be necessary in order for an exchange across nations on the subject of reproductive rights, between a Canadian development agency and an international campaign, to result in an actual change in Canada's overseas population policy. To this end, this chapter compares, using democracy theory, appropriate topics for inclusion in an exchange on reproduction, the various modes of exchange that may be applied to analyse the case at hand, and lastly, explanations of ways those usually excluded from exchange may gain entry. While the instance of democratic encounter itself is not placed under examination here, this chapter still refers to the exchange's particular case, in that the case guides a reading of the cultural and political relations in which the exchange is set. As such, the democratization of foreign policy is not what is addressed here. This chapter looks, instead, to a relevant theoretical literature in order to analyse, in later chapters, a democratic exchange on Canada's involvement in the reproductive matters of women living in the third world.

It will be argued, while Seyla Benhabib introduces women's reproductive experiences in the domestic-intimate sphere into public discourse, that her neglect of relevant topics of conversation, the emphasis she places on difference in distinction to sameness, and finally, her inattention to movements below the threshold of political membership suggest that the

model of deliberation she delineates could not well address the contested instance of Canadian involvement in the reproductive matters of women living in the third world. In contrast, William E Connolly calls for the politicization of identity in public dialogue. Connolly notes that identity\ difference, already present in politics, if addressed in dialogue, can bring attention to a collective's relation with difference. In particular, genealogical study, as described by Connolly, highlights Canadian identity in terms of its constitutive relations with women in the third world. Moreover, Connolly's notion of critical responsiveness predicts the shifts in identity\ difference that likely would accompany an affirmative response to a movement's demands, such as IDRC's commitment to the International Campaign's Bill of Rights. Critical responsiveness and genealogy are elaborated in the third section of this chapter. The second section studies the varying meanings of "difference" used by Benhabib and Connolly. The section immediately below compares the traditionally private topics of conversation that both Benhabib and Connolly argue should gain entry in public dialogue.

1 Bringing the Private into Public Discussion

While Benhabib seeks to open to scrutiny women's private sphere experiences, and bring these into public discussion, it will be argued that her inattention to cultural, national, religious and racial differences prevents the actual address of everyday reproductive experiences. More precisely, it will be argued that ignoring discussion of differences effectively stymies discussion of the state's involvement in reproduction. In contrast, Connolly describes difference as those whose " 'moral truths' " fall outside a hegemonic identity's range of tolerances (1991:161). To address identity's conflict with difference, Connolly makes a case for the politicization of identity. This allows for broaching in public

dialogue the cultural formations and social organizations that identity names, and correspondingly, the repression that difference endures. As such, compared to Benhabib's restrained integration of the private and public spheres, the politicization of identity argued for by Connolly permits the address of conflict between the state and women's reproductive experiences.

1.1 Reproduction in Private Sphere

According to Benhabib, by excluding from public discourse matters a theory predetermines to be private, that theory effectively "ignore[s] ... issues of 'difference' " (1992:109).¹ More specifically, by regarding sexuality and reproduction as private issues, and so excluding these from public discourse, a theory ignores the "difference in the experiences of male versus female subjects" (1992:109). Among the various meanings of the "private" in modern political thought, Benhabib is concerned specifically with the one that refers to the domestic-intimate sphere, and here she locates sexuality and reproduction. She describes the domestic-intimate sphere as "the domain of the household, of meeting the daily needs of life, of sexuality and reproduction, of care for the young, the sick and the elderly" (1992:108-109). Aside from being different from men's experiences, women's experiences in the domestic-intimate sphere are distinguished by a sexual division of labour, one qualified by "asymmetrical power relations" (1992:109). Consequently, when the domestic-intimate sphere is excluded from public discourse, the asymmetrical power relations undergirding the social reality experienced differently by women in the household remain at once

¹ Seyla Benhabib writes, specifically, with reference to the model of discourse ethics described by Habermas. Benhabib writes in a bid to ameliorate Habermas's model, which she finds to be structured by "overly rigid boundaries ... between matters of justice and those of the good life, public interests versus private needs, privately held values and publicly shared norms" (1992:111).

presumptively legitimate and uninterrogated (1992:109). Difference in the experiences of men and women are not the sole set of "asymmetrical power relations" informing women's reproductive experiences, however. Were a theory to comprehensively consider women's reproductive experiences, a redefinition of the boundary would better extend beyond the household, so that the involvement in reproduction of cultural, racial, national or religious conflict also may be interrogated.

To be fair, Benhabib notes that the domestic-intimate sphere is not contained, but that the state is involved in women's sexuality and reproduction (1992:113). She acknowledges that in welfare state societies " 'reproduction' has gone public" (1992:113). However, reproduction has gone public not only in welfare state societies; and it is not only the state that is involved in reproduction. Indeed, "[p]eople everywhere actively use their local cultural logics and social relations to incorporate, revise, or resist the influence of seemingly distant political and economic forces" (Ginsburg and Rapp 1995:1), and define their reproductive experiences accordingly.² That is, "everywhere", seemingly distant political and economic forces get negotiated into reproductive experiences locally.³ Indeed, this is a larger and messier public than Benhabib allows. Ginsburg and Rapp, for instance, theorize the conflict both local and global forces provoke in everyday reproductive experiences:

² For Ginsburg and Rapp, reproduction is not only "people imagin[ing] and enabl[ing] the creation of the next generation, most directly through the nurturance of children", but reproduction is also socially and culturally productive in that "children are born into complex social arrangements through which legacies of property, positions, rights, and values are negotiated over time" (1995:1-2).

³ Ginsburg and Rapp define "local" as the small scale arena in which negotiations are made through face to face interactions (1995:8). Processes are "glabal", on the other hand, when "knowledge and power escape the communities of their creation to be embraced or imposed on people beyond these communities" (Ginsburg and Rapp 1995:9).

It is our argument that, regardless of its popular associations with notions of continuity, reproduction also provides a terrain for imagining new cultural futures and transformations, through personal struggle, generational mobility, social movements, and the contested claims of powerful religious and political ideologies. These imaginings and actions are often the subject of conflict, for they engage the deepest aspirations and the sense of survival of groups divided by differences of generation, ethnicity, race, nationality, class, and of course, gender (1995:2).

In other words, everyday reproductive experiences can be mired in conflict that is hardly contained in the immediate domestic-intimate sphere. Most importantly, economic and political forces within a (welfare) state, and across states, work to encourage or discourage the regeneration of groups divided across differences of ethnicity, class, nationality and race. That is, conflict may permeate the reproduction of bodies and cultures as uneven relations empower some categories of people to reproduce, and disempower others from reproducing (Ginsburg and Rapp 1995:3). Then, as distant and local economic and political forces get negotiated, "the deepest aspirations and the sense of survival of groups" may not only be present but also contested in the everyday experiences of reproduction.

Reproduction might incorporate, with the greatest intricacy, the intersection of racial, religious, ethnic, national and sexual conflict. It is worth highlighting, as such, Angela Davis's promotion for making public the privatization of reproduction, so that the compromised condition of family determination among Black women might be addressed (1993). To attend to the historically compromised family determination among Black women, not only would the family be reconceptualized as a public matter, but so, too, would be racialized experiences. Angela Davis predicts Black women, Latina women, and other non white women increasingly will serve as surrogate mothers, at very low pay, to white women in the United States (1993:362-363). Black women have served as "surrogate mothers" from the era of slavery, producing babies as slave owners' property while nurturing

slave owners' children (1993:357-358). Into the present era, Black women, along with immigrant women, for low pay, perform domestic work in the household of others (1993:358-359). Yet the centrality of Black women's involvement in the determination of others' families, and Black women's concomitant economic exploitation, hardly are public topics, according to Davis's analysis. While the place of Black women's surrogacy in the determination of others' families has been central, but private, Black women's own determination of family has been defiled. First, abortion services are more difficult to find than sterilization services (1993:363). Second, "opportunities for self expression and development", distinct from pregnancy, are only limitedly available to young Black women (1993:362). And third, the denial of social services, "from the prenatal period to old age - child care, housing, education, jobs and all the basic services human beings require to lead decent lives", render decisions to bear children or not less than meaningful (1993:365-366). With public involvement in women's sexuality and reproduction firmly established, Davis calls for the reconceptualization of the family, from a private issue to a public one (1993:365-366). Family determination, reconceptualized as a public topic, then would consider women's experiences in the household as these intersect with political and economic forces structuring reproduction across differences of ethnicity, nation, race, class and religion.

With Davis, Benhabib advocates the inclusion in the public sphere of the commonly regarded private matter of reproduction. What is unclear, though, in Benhabib's redefinition of the private and public spheres, is how it may be conceived in public discussion that public involvement in reproduction makes the determination of the family less than meaningful for Black women. To evaluate the political and economic forces that encourage or discourage the birth of some, but not others, differences in racialized experiences necessarily would be

considered in the public sphere. Benhabib writes, “there can be no agenda to *predefine* the topic of public conversation. The struggle over what gets included in the public agenda is itself a struggle for justice and freedom” (1992:94). In Benhabib's model, then, it might be presumed, with regard to women's reproductive experiences, that racism also can be broached. Benhabib, more generally, seeks to redefine the boundary separating the private from the public sphere. Accordingly, it would be very interesting to read her argument on placing race on the public agenda. Benhabib addresses the inclusion of new topics on the public agenda when she distinguishes between the narrow renderings of the public sphere described by Hannah Arendt and her own, more expansive version. As an example, Benhabib notes Arendt's dismissal of school desegregation from worthiness of public discussion (1992:94). Referring to school desegregation in Little Rock, Arkansas, Benhabib writes, “This time around Arendt failed to make ‘the fine distinction’ and confused an issue of public justice - equality of educational access - with an issue of social preference - who my friends are or whom I invite to dinner” (1992:94). Extraneous, here, is Arendt's curious assessment of the American civil rights movement; what is relevant is Benhabib's spare description of southern segregation. She qualifies school desegregation as an issue of “equality of educational access”. In contradistinction, chroniclers of the era, writing contemporaneously with Benhabib, associate American civil rights with the dismantling of institutionalized anti black white racism (Williams et al 1997).⁴ By qualifying school desegregation as a matter of public justice, Benhabib clearly supports black and white

⁴ In the Introduction to *Eyes on the Prize*, Julian Bond writes, “After the Civil War, another protracted battle began against slavery's legacy - racism and segregation. But for most Americans, the civil rights movement began on May 17, 1954, when the Supreme Court handed down the *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* decision outlawing segregation in public schools” (Williams et al 1997:xi).

equality of educational access. But with regard to the Little Rock example, in her argument for making public matters otherwise privatized, when "phenotypic race is never sufficient yet never completely absent" (Alcoff 1996:14), anti black white racism is glaringly absent as a pertinent topic for public discussion.⁵ Benhabib makes an obvious opportunity for the mention, if not elaboration, of racism in the public discussion of school desegregation. In reducing the topic to "access to educational equality", Benhabib, though, fails to bring attention to the *ungovernability* of racism still informing topics striving to make the public agenda; reproduction is but one.⁶ Reproduction, publicly structured along lines of race, is but one of "the eventful eruptions of a turbulence that is always already there" (Honig 1996:259). In this sense, Benhabib does not alight upon how public discussion might better engage the ungovernability of racism - that is the remainders of racism, after legal "equality" is ruled.

In a consideration of ethno nationalist strife, Benhabib may be making attempts to directly address the remainders of equality after equality is seemingly established. More precisely, when universal equal civil and political rights are constitutionally guaranteed, Benhabib directs inter group conflict of language, ethnicity, culture and religion to "find expression", not at the state level, but in the civic polity (1998:97). A group's claim might qualify as one that cannot be denied articulation, if the claim is based on a principle of "human freedom, justice, equality, solidarity [or] self expression", writes Benhabib (1998:96). However, she is troubled that the group making the claim may not be coherent. The group's

⁵ Benhabib is not exceptional in making this omission. In light of the "continuing inattention to race matters in philosophy and political theory", Linda Alcoff suggests, for remedying this crime of omission, the development of a phenomenology of racial identity (1996:10).

expression may be unified, but a group based on language, culture, religion, ethnicity, or nation is necessarily impure, historical and contingent (Benhabib 1998:95). Concluding that the "motivating closeness of ideologies" cohering a group cannot be accounted for (1998:95), Benhabib is sceptical of the very making of an "us". Concerned like this with the incoherence and possible internal oppression in an "us", Benhabib effectively displaces focus from the organizing, strife ridden relations differentiating "us" from "them" - that is, from the very differentiation drawing groups into conflict. It is the remainders of "equality" that seek expression in inter group conflict. And how to broach this conflict is what Benhabib does not alight upon. Interestingly, Benhabib's concern with remainders, specifically with households' sexual division of labour, indicates the direction a group differentiated claim may take in public discussion. The household is fundamental to a group's identity, and tends to be governed by religion, customs and culture (Benhabib 1997:108). Public discussion on the sexual division of labour, then, means discussion on religion, custom and culture, which would illuminate not only women's household experiences, but also women's relations with men in the house. Opening the private sphere of religion, custom and culture to public discussion permits, too, discussion on the making of group identity, or the making of an "us". More relevant, here, is that opening the private sphere permits discussion also on the authorization of relations between a self and its other through religion, faith and culture. Indeed, Benhabib argues for extending the public sphere so that "more matters of the 'good life' " can enter public discussion (1997:108). However, Benhabib's emphasis lies with guiding discussion on women's domestic experiences into the public sphere; and her

⁶ Bonnie Honig writes that there is "no place free of power, conflict, and struggle", and as such, resistance

attention to household conflict is not matched by the consideration she gives to conflicts between linguistically, religiously, nationally, culturally or ethnically differentiated groups. In order, though, not to conceal strife ridden self-other relations that remain despite legal equality, the line separating the private and public spheres might shift so to include culture, faith and custom into public discussion.

While Benhabib proposes that the line distinguishing the public and private sphere be redrawn so as to include in discussion difference in the domestic-intimate sphere, she fails to treat the household's intersection with conflicts based on cultural, religious, national or ethnic difference. Admittedly, she states that in the model of public discussion she proffers, "no conceptions of the good life are precluded from being voiced" (1992:97). However, Benhabib never explicitly offers religious, racial, or ethnic conflicts direction for address in public discussion. In fact, she proceeds with the greatest hesitation. Her caution seems to lie specifically with the potential maligning of an individual's moral conscience that might follow from the public discussion of "private" sphere issues. An individual's moral conscience concerns "matters of ultimate faith concerning the meaning of life, of the highest good, of the most binding principles in accordance with which we should conduct our lives" (1992:108). Benhabib's protection of individuals' moral conscience responds to criticism she suspects would be launched at a position advocating the redefinition of the private and public spheres. More precisely, she writes, "Habermas ... might respond that this position invites the corrosion of rights of privacy and the total intrusion of the state into the domain of the individual" (1992:111). Benhabib, as such, endorses forcefully, in the context of

defines the remainders of "rule-governance" as "ungovernability" (1996:258-260).

public discussion, the securing of autonomy for individuals' moral conscience. While she argues for redrawing the boundary separating the private and the public spheres, she writes that the boundary should not be redrawn "in ways which jeopardize the autonomy and insight of individuals" (1992:112). Habermas's probable criticism, and Benhabib's serious consideration of it, disappointingly ignore that "the right to privacy may be ... illusory, especially for women, the mentally or criminally 'deviant,' sexual minorities and other oppressed groups", despite liberal states' institutional commitment to a private sphere within which religious, political, racial and sexual opinions are meant to exist free of state control (Valverde and Weir 1988:32). The state's intrusion into the private sphere already is established, in other words, perhaps with minimal public discussion, and despite protest.

So that protest might be addressed, and discussion expanded, predictably Benhabib would be occupied with the ways hegemonic sexual, racial, political and religious opinion dominate and invade, perhaps through the state, the privacy or moral conscience of others. Indeed, while Benhabib explains that "the historical separation of church and state" relegates matters of ultimate faith to the private sphere, considering religion "as rationally 'irresolvable' " (1992:108), she does not hale for criticism the consequent removal of faith and religion from public discussion. That is, she does not insist, as she does with the household realm, that culture, sexuality, religion, nationalism and racism be drawn into public discussion. By ignoring the exclusion of religion from public discussion, "matters of ultimate faith" that may be authorizing aspects of social organization remain both uninvestigated and unchallengeable in the public sphere. The forces giving some the entitlement to birth and nurture, but not others, are political and economic forces (Ginsburg and Rapp 1995:2), but also may be, for instance, religious forces. It is not clear, actually,

whether religion, faith, nationalism, ethnicity, and racism are among the forces informing differentiated relations of reproduction. That Benhabib does not enhance the address in public discussion of the ways religion, nationalism, culture, nationalism or racism possibly enable a group's relations with others is surprising, considering she is interested in women's experiences in the household.

Regarding the inclusion of the private sphere in public dialogue, it might be asked how religious, cultural, and national conflict may be involved in "[t]he arrangements by which some reproductive futures are valued while others are despised" (Ginsburg and Rapp 1995:3). The central difficulty in answering this question, perhaps, is that among the distant and local forces involved in the structuring of reproduction, politics and economics may not be easily distinguished from culture or faith. Faith, and culture, in this sense, may be matters of material import. Conflict premised on different reproductive experiences across groups divided by religious and cultural differences cannot be addressed adequately in the public sphere when it is hazy how issues of conflicting cultures and faiths are rendered public. Though Seyla Benhabib's model prescribes how difference in the domestic-intimate sphere might be included in public discussion, women's reproductive experiences might be broached better were the public sphere to include, too, discussion on religion and culture and the authority with which these organize relations between a self and its other. Bonnie Honig writes, "To take difference - and not just identity - seriously in democratic theory is to affirm the inescapability of conflict and the ineradicability of resistance to the political and moral projects ordering subjects, institutions and values" (1996:259). Taking seriously conflicts premised on differences in religion, race, nationality, ethnicity and language requires a tack distinct from the one Benhabib offers. For relegating issues of culture and religion to

the private sphere bars from broaching in public discussion the possibility that culture or religion might be present, for instance, in the differentiated public structuring of reproduction within the state as well as across states.

1.2 Identity\ Difference

Sceptical of the exclusion of matters of " 'moral truth' " from public discussion, Connolly proposes, in contrast to Benhabib, that public dialogue permit the direct address of questions of difference. And in order to address difference, writes Connolly, identity must be considered. For Connolly, lived conceptions of collective identity "fix a range of tolerances for personal identities", and difference from identity, beyond this range, may suffer from repression as a dominant identity authorizes the structures of social organization (1991:161). More precisely, inattention to the repression of difference, especially at the hands of the state, seems consistent with the exclusion of differences in " 'moral truths' " from the public arena of discussion. That is, the segregation of differences in " 'moral truth' " in private realms assumes a state "that hardly touches the most intimate areas of life and identity" (1991:161). Or, this arrangement of the private and public problematically assumes that the state does not stand in relations of conflict with those whose moral truths fall outside the range of tolerances fixed by a collective identity. Moreover, assumptions like these do not reflect the difference in reproductive experiences within states and between states, across differences in race, religion, nations, class and cultures. As political and economic forces, and as enabling forces of " 'moral truths' " are involved in the public structuring of reproduction, it hardly can be assumed that neither the distant nor local state is minimally present in negotiated, everyday reproductive experiences. Rather, as reproduction has gone public, a political engagement concerned with the connections

between personal and collective identities must consider at least a collective politics that represses difference and maintains established identities (1991:161). Such a consideration, one that works against the effective dismissal of conflict from public discourse, might proceed by politicizing identity, or including questions of identity in public discussion.

The politicization of identity brings awareness to the way a collective identity represses differences as identity gets established, in this case, through the late modern state.⁷ Connolly explains that by way of "a common belief in the capacity of the state to promote publicly defined purposes", personal identifications with gender and race, for instance, and as consumer, worker, and lover, get bound with a collective identification with the state (1991:198).⁸ Considering the state as "the official center of self-conscious collective action", then identification with the state "symbolizes what we are ... [and] what we seek to be" (1991:201).⁹ Collective identity with the state also distinguishes "us" from "them". As such, difference from identity is foreignness, both internal and external. Moreover, difference from identity is potentially disruptive to the confirmation or security of an identity since difference stands as "a living contrast through which generally admired conventions of

⁷ Connolly, in writing this, criticizes theories that deny difference and assume neutrality in relations between a self and other (1991:160-161). Like Benhabib, he refers to the writing of Habermas. But unlike Benhabib, Connolly argues against Habermas's proceduralist accounts. According to Connolly, Habermas acknowledges the invasion of existential issues in collective life, but then he stops short: Habermas "appears to think that because no organization of public life can resolve or eliminate existential suffering, these issues can be excluded from public discourse" (1991:162).

⁸ The state, here, is defined as "the political dimension of the entire order - individuals as citizens and taxpayers, electoral campaigns and processes, public officials, lawmaking institutions, executive and enforcement agencies, rhetorical modes of consolidation and division, and so on" (Connolly 1991:206-207).

⁹ Certainly, identification with the state, as it mixes with other identifications, may be particular for every individual. Connolly explains the individuation of identification this way: "My identity is fixed within this [shared culture, social commonality], drawing some elements from it and reacting negatively to others. Who knows enough about these processes of selective osmosis to explain, let alone predict, any particular structure of self emerging out of them? But still, my identity is never neatly separable from the identifications and negations that constitute our way of life" (1991:199).

identity ... are tested, validated and vindicated" (1991:204). As an example, state sponsored force is distinguished from "terrorism" by the latter's use of unsanctioned violence. By constituting terrorists as difference or otherness, the state deflects attention not only from its inability to change the conditions that generate violence by non state agents, but also from the state's involvement, for instance, in capitalism that generates poverty and welfare, environmental degradation, and an unequal coexistence with people living in the third world (1991:207). To quell the disruption difference poses, the state, as the "pivotal embodiment of collective identity", defeats, conceals, converts, depoliticizes, stigmatizes, punishes, assimilates or simply tolerates otherness (1991:204). Rather than this active maintenance of identity's "established settlements below the threshold of public discourse", politicizing identity allows to surface questions concerning both the enduring repression of difference through identity, and an identity's very culture that constitutes identity in relation to difference (1991: 161).

In democracy, a focus on culture, and in particular, on existential suffering, advances an address of the repression with which difference exists. Interestingly, an investigation of instances of repression exposes the suffering sustained by both difference and its constitutive identity. Certainly those who are constituted as different from identity suffer under the repression of defeat, concealment, depoliticization, stigmatization, punishment or assimilation. However, in the most difficult cases in ethics, according to Connolly, those constituted in relation to a hegemonic identity as difference "are not entirely helpless but are defined as threatening, contagious, or dangerous to the self-assurance of those identities" (1999 a:129). AIDS patients, a man sentenced to death in the criminal justice system, a black or native pregnant teen, fertile women in the third world, a landless peasant activist, or

pavement dwellers soliciting money from passers-by, in this sense, are examples of otherness who might be suffering, but who challenge at once identity's standards of normalcy, charity, justice and equality. Challenged in this way, a collective identity's self assurance is destabilized. Consequently, the newly insecure identity now, itself, bears a suffering (Connolly 1999 a:129). Expressing its existential suffering, identity channels its suffering as resentment against the otherness whose suffering gets reread in competitive terms (Connolly 1999 a:129). That is, despite the asymmetrical power relations that separate them, identity expresses its resentment by repressing those who provoke its uncertainty; and in so doing, identity reinstates itself (Connolly 1991:209). While identity protects itself this way, the objects of resentment get represented as difference and otherness, and survive under the accompanying subjugation (1991:209). The politicization of identity, as such, addresses the existential suffering that fuels identity's resentment against difference, and results in the subjugation of otherness. In seeking to expose an identity's existential suffering, a focus on identity in public discussions means the inclusion of cultural unconscious in exchanges (1991:211) otherwise restricted to matters more commonly understood as political or economic.

Benhabib and Connolly, then, both criticise the exclusion of predeterminedly "private" subject matter from public discussion. But whereas Connolly opens for consideration the domestic-intimate sphere and its nexus with the state, Benhabib effectively closes such discussion by distancing the household from matters of cultural or religious difference. Specifically, Connolly contends with the implications of the particular "institutional interdependencies" of sexual (and reproductive) relations in the family and the state (Connolly 1991:160). That is, although Benhabib notes the state's involvement in

reproductive matters, she limits the scope of discussion in the public sphere, and consequently offers, at best, an abridged public discussion of women's experiences with sex, reproduction and nurturing in the household. Benhabib's writing, in short, by restricting the scope of public discussion ignores religion, nationalism, ethnicity or race embodied by the state. However, the household is not contained from the possibility of conflict borne from a clash of differences with the structures authorised by a dominant collective identity. With this in mind, Connolly's inquiry strives for the democratic address of "faiths that orient [the participants] and give them definition in relation to one another" (1991:211). As a result, Connolly politicizes issues traditionally deemed "private" in political theory: identity, its existential suffering, resentment and the subjugation of difference.

2 The Self and Other In Exchange

The previous section argues that Benhabib's evasion of differences in moral conscience might better be addressed in dialogue through Connolly's politicization of identity, which may bring to light the public and contested nature of women's reproductive experiences. The politicization of identity in conversation with an other, as such, brings attention to identity's existential resentment. In this section, the focus returns to women's reproductive experiences in the context of this conversation. Benhabib's discussion of the "standpoint of the concrete other" is, here, explicitly interrogated (1992). Benhabib proposes that the standpoint of the concrete other, by addressing the distinctions in women's household experiences, contributes to the reversing of perspectives in conversation. While the standpoint of the concrete other may illuminate a reading of the exchange at hand, it is argued that the standpoint's address of the relations in which reproduction is set is limited. Indeed, it is argued that the standpoint of the concrete-other limits the reversibility of

perspectives due to its neglect of relational differences, constitutional relations amid which conversation is set, and finally, the possible untranslatability of the other's concreteness. Forsaking the standpoint of the concrete other is not a favourable alternative, however. Perhaps, then, the standpoint of the concrete other might exist alongside a focus on identity, its constitutional relation with difference, its existential resentment and its concomitant repression of difference.

In moral conversation, prejudices, misunderstandings and hostilities between a self and other can be broached through a reversal of perspectives, according to Benhabib. In Benhabib's model of a procedurally based moral conversation, a reversal of perspectives seeks to generate universal agreement on norms that are to be used in the adjudication of justice, rights and perhaps, even the good life (1996, 1992).¹⁰ In order to enhance the reversal of perspectives, Benhabib introduces an additional procedural element to moral conversation: the standpoint of the concrete other. Specifically, the standpoint of the concrete other encourages in moral conversation broaching that which distinguishes the self from the other. By otherwise disregarding the distinctiveness of the other, moral conversation segregates matters of difference to the private sphere (1992:162). Benhabib's particular ambition is to proffer a procedure that dialogically would release from the private sphere the oppression with which women live in the household. More precisely, private relations of the household could be discussed in the public sphere, writes Benhabib, if "moral categories" customarily associated with household relations are admitted in moral conversation (1992:159). Through the standpoint of the concrete other, then, matters such

¹⁰ Benhabib defines "norms" as general rules of action and institutional arrangements (1996:70).

as needs, desires, motivations, and experiences can be articulated in the public sphere (1992:159).

Benhabib's addition of the standpoint of the concrete other to the public sphere supplements the usually singular presence of the standpoint of the generalized other. According to Benhabib, reversing perspectives through the standpoint of the generalized other alone means that "[d]ifferences are not denied; [rather] they become irrelevant" (1992:161). The standpoint of the generalized other, then, is an exchange based on the sameness between a self and other. In distinct contrast, through the standpoint of the concrete other, the other's point of view is articulated in terms of its otherness. The standpoint of the concrete other, in this way, brings to conversation (and conflict) that which Benhabib terms " 'the otherness of the other' " (1992:167). As such, a reversal of perspectives means that the self, first, adopts the other's perspective, and second, attempts to reason from the other's point of view (1992:8). When the self adopts the other's point of view, "what we know about others" is enhanced (1992:167). And through reasoning from the other's point of view, prejudices, misunderstandings and hostilities get "confronted, discussed, worked out and worked through in an open dialogue" (1992:167).

However, while the standpoint of the concrete other prompts an articulation of the other's distinctiveness, this standpoint does not necessarily lead to an articulation of the relations in which the other is set. Certainly, the inclusion in conversation of needs, desires, motivations and experiences elucidates what Benhabib terms the "differences in experiences of male versus female subject" (1992:109). More difficult, though, is the emphasis the standpoint of the concrete other places on individualized difference distinguished from sameness. That is, Benhabib's emphasis on the concreteness of the other is singularly "the

other as different from the self" (1992:161). More precisely, the standpoint of the concrete other does not encourage a discussion of concreteness in terms of the other's relational difference from the self. Accordingly, the standpoint of the concrete other does not well address the "asymmetrical power relations" which, according to Benhabib, distinguish women's experiences in the household (1992:109). For instance, Benhabib's reversal of perspectives might not be able to confront and work out hostilities, misunderstandings, and prejudices were the standpoint of the concrete other to present solely the distinctiveness of women's household experiences. That is, asymmetrical power relations in the household could be addressed in conversation only if gender relations also were confronted and worked through. What is needed, aside from the standpoint of the concrete other, is a detailed consideration of the more expansive relations in which reproduction is set.

Indeed, the very differences to be addressed in moral conversation between a self and other highlight the standpoint of the concrete other's limits. Addressing the relations in which a subject is set, Judith Butler writes that "the subject is constituted through an exclusion and differentiation, perhaps a repression" in relation to an other (1991:157). Describing the constitution of the subject, Butler writes that the subject is constructed through a set of relations, or "organizing principles of material practices and institutional arrangements" that work to constitute the self, and concomitantly differentiate or even repress the other (1991:155). A contrasting treatment of the subject would situate the subject in "an external web of cultural relations" (1991:157). Butler's point is that the subject is not simply situated: the subject, in this sense, does not stand somehow within its cultural relations. Rather, a subject who takes action is *constituted* through the effects of prior actions (1991:156). Most importantly, the very practices and arrangements constituting a self in

relation to an other hold implications for the reversal of perspectives, as advanced by Benhabib. Specifically, how could the self, first, understand the other's perspective, and second, reason from the other's point of view if the self cannot stand external from its constitutional relations? According to Butler, the material practices and institutional arrangements that constitute a self and other are likely to remain in place in a moral conversation. The cultural relations through whom a subject is differentiated, then, render problematic both understanding and reasoning. A subject cannot simply "disavow its constitutional relations" (1991:155) instantly in a bid to reverse perspectives. Effectively, the constitutional relations between a self and other make the reversal of perspectives, integral to reaching agreement in moral conversation, difficult, perhaps even unlikely.

Even when participants may be intent on coming to a mutual understanding, the differentiation through which a self and other are constituted complicates not only the understanding of the other's perspective, but also the translation of the other's perspective. That is, conversation is further disadvantaged by the likelihood that the other's concreteness cannot be translated for the purpose of reciprocity or dialogical exchange. Even if the motivation for solidarity exists, in the context of racism, imperialism, and class oppression, translation into the dominant language might be impossible, warns Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1993). Translation, or the grounds for exchange, is only likely when language is "earned", or learned as intimately as the speaker knows it (1993:183). Without this intimacy, the distinct nature of the oppression at hand, as well as the precise rendering of the political project the other envisions, both may get replaced by convenient meaning construction in the dominant language. As such, because imagining alterity is difficult, if not impossible, acknowledging the limits of understanding is advisable (1993:183). As the language of the

other's concreteness will not likely be understood, the adoption of the other's point of view, and hence reasoning from the other's perspective, too, will be hampered. As such, not only is the reversal of perspectives hindered by the difficulties of translation, but also the reversal of perspectives is limited by Benhabib's neglect of relational constitutionality. While the reversal of perspectives, as Benhabib directs it, should be rejected, the standpoint of the concrete might be recuperated. For the standpoint of the concrete other prompts conversation to include in exchange the discussion of needs, desires, motivations and experiences. The limitations found in the standpoint of the concrete other then suggest that a reading of contested reproductive relations requires supplementary theoretical tools.

Connolly acknowledges the possible impossibility of an exchange between a self and other. He concurs with Butler and Spivak, in effect, that the cultural constitution of identity and the conceivably untranslatable voice of the other mean that an exchange between a self and other is likely not to lead to mutual understanding. Imagining a self and other in encounter, Connolly describes the intransparency, unknown and estrangement characterizing an exchange:

It's text all the way down and all the way to the top. That means there is always more than any particular textualization encompasses, and that signs of this "more" will reside in subordinate dimensions of the particular text itself - in resistances it encounters, unexpected play in the metaphors it finds indispensable, unassimilated shifts in surface significations that reveal them to contain hidden depths (1991:38).

For the self, the enigma that is otherness (Connolly 1991:40) means that possibilities for exchange are bleak. While it might be difficult for the self to be in exchange with the other, for the self not to engage the enigma of otherness is equally troubling: such refusal maintains in place the subjugation identity enables as it retains its self certainty against an otherness that shakes it.

As such, Connolly promotes engagement with the enigma of otherness. He predicts that such engagement might create the possibility of alternative relations which, though still interdependent and strife ridden, nonetheless may relieve relations of conquest, conversion or even community and tolerance, of the taint of repression and/or discipline (1991:48). In contrast, a relation that denies the enigma of otherness, and treats the primitive, the terrorist, the oriental, the evil empire or the underdeveloped as intrinsically defective, holds that otherness merits defeat or correction (1991:40). In other words, denial of the enigma of otherness at once "erases the threat that difference presents to the surety of self identity", and conceals identity's response to the perceived threat that difference poses (1991:43). Engaging the enigma of otherness, rather than expunging the conflictual nature of its relation with difference, instead cultivates in identity an appreciation of the constitutive effects of the self\ other encounter (1991:37). A consideration of identity\ difference, as such, involves an examination of identity's existential suffering, expressed as resentment directed at otherness, and relatedly, allows for criticism of the modes of self reassurance identity mobilizes in the face of perceived derailments primed by difference (1991:33-34). With the exposure of identity\ difference that an engagement with the enigma of otherness permits, the development of alternative relations between a self and other becomes at least a possibility.

To explore this possibility, Connolly emphasizes in an exchange the space where the self can focus upon its constitution in relation to an other. In contrast, Benhabib's version of moral dialogue does not address the way the self's language dominates meaning in the voice of the other, as highlighted by Spivak. Nor does Benhabib's rendering of moral dialogue, according to Butler's writing, address how the reversing of perspectives between

the self and other might be impeded by the self's cultural relations with the other. It is precisely the constitution of the self in relation to the other, the relation of identity\ difference that Connolly centres in democratic exchange. More precisely, Connolly summons the politicization of identity, that is, a revealing of identity\ difference

by exploring the means by which one has become constituted as what one is, by probing the structures that maintain the plausibility of those configurations, and by analysing from a perspective that problematizes the certainty of one's self-identity the effects these structures and tactics have on others (1991:9-10).

The cultural constitution of identity\ difference can be probed, explored and analysed, according to Connolly, through genealogical study. A genealogy features the place of identity's existential suffering and resentment in its constitutional relationship with difference. A genealogy of the cultural constitution of the self is an initial intervention the self can make in its relations with otherness, when the self is faced with the seemingly impossible possibility of exchange.

The politicization of identity involves not only genealogical study, but a critical responsiveness, too. Critical responsiveness is the affirmative response of hegemonic identities "to struggles to modify or loosen closures in the order" (Connolly 1995:xviii). Responding to political movements striving to redress established relational identities and social injuries, a critical responsiveness inheres a spirit of generosity as identity considers redefinitions of itself, corresponding redefinitions of difference and otherness, and alternative relational possibilities (Connolly 1995:xviii). Towards this end, critical responsiveness works closely with genealogical study. By revealing the workings of existential resentment in the constitution of identity\ difference, genealogy exposes the historicity of identity's relations with otherness. This historicity shows that identity\

difference, while it affords the structures maintaining order, itself transforms relationally over time. Thus, genealogy prompts questions concerning how identity\ difference could transform again, particularly in the context of a critical responsiveness attentive to movements of resistance. While the standpoint of the concrete other might bring to an exchange the distinct needs, desires, experiences and motivations expressed in the Bill of Rights, the next section argues that in contrast to Connolly's notion of critical responsiveness, Benhabib's proffered model of democracy is not be able to explain the likely restriction of the Bill's subjects from political engagement with IDRC.

3 Agonistic Democracy

Informed by a theory of agonistic democracy, a reading of Canadian foreign relations would be attentive to conflict as that articulated by the subjects of the Bill of Rights. In the theory of agonistic democracy Connolly describes, critical responsiveness and genealogy feature centrally, as noted earlier. Critical responsiveness attends to a resistance movement whose otherness excludes it from the arena of political engagement, and stands in contrast to discursive validation, the procedure Benhabib offers for the (re)determination of the rules of discursive membership. While discursive validation ignores the cultural constitution of otherness, as will be argued below, a genealogy reveals the structuring of identity\ difference, and encourages inquiry into the constitution of Canada's identity in relation to the women for whose use the hCG contraceptive is intended. The key here is that familiarity with the contemporary and historical constitution of identity\ difference allows a critical responsiveness to greet social movements that otherwise would go unacknowledged.

In order to critically evaluate the criteria for membership in a public discussion, Benhabib recommends the procedure of discursive validation. Through discursive

validation, discussion participants evaluate and then (re)determine the rules governing membership in the decision making process (Benhabib 1996:79). More specifically, participants already accorded membership in the discussion evaluate and then determine, in effect, whether greater inclusion is warranted, or whether the exclusion of those contesting the rules of participatory entitlement still holds. If the discussion participants conclude that those excluded are not entitled to take part, only repeated contest around the rules of membership eventually might permit a more inclusive political participation. But under what conditions might inclusion be permitted? Referring to the entitlement to partake in public discussion as the "reciprocal recognition of one another's rights to moral personality", Benhabib writes "reciprocal recognition of one another's rights to moral personality is a result of world historical process that involves struggle, battle, and resistance, as well as defeat by social classes, genders, groups and nations" (1996:79). Compared to the prominence of struggle and defeat in determining conversational entitlement, discursive validation might actually contribute minimally to the expansion of membership in public debate. That is, in Benhabib's writing, a change in the rules of membership seems a formality, one that would follow more fundamental cultural, political and economic changes.

While the import of discursive validation for greater inclusion in public discussion may appear self evident, the promises guaranteed by this procedure suggest ways in which discursive validation actually might keep the rules for membership staid, and hence perpetuate the exclusion that political movements contest. To begin, it can be noted that social classes, genders, nations, etc get excluded from public discussion, despite their successes in the way of "world historical processes". Within the range of successes realized (and not realized) by a movement is the space where those excluded from public discussion

have struggled and been defeated. That is, amid encounters and exchange, a movement's successes are limited when discursive validation concludes that the rules still exclude that social class, gender, nation, etc from membership. However, it is unclear, within this range of unrealized and realized successes, the extent that struggle and defeat is required before inclusion can be, in Benhabib's words, the "result" of world historical processes. Thus, the observation of this "interval", that is, the period of limited successes still before discursive validation changes the rules of inclusion, prompts the following question: what is required by discursive validation for the rules of membership to change, so that participants on the verge of inclusion might be included in discussion?¹¹ Furthermore, this interval of pre inclusion draws attention, compared to movements on the verge of inclusion, to ones that are not even considered candidates for participatory membership. In other words, what of the movements whose struggles and defeats are not even acknowledged as resistance against the rules of membership by the procedure of discursive validation? In failing to consider a movement's struggles for participatory entitlement, that is, in failing to consider a movement as even a candidate for membership, Benhabib's concept of discursive validation renders the movement's resistance in apolitical terms, in terms apparently outside politics.

This inquiry into the exclusion of movements contesting the rules of membership would be incomplete were this inquiry contained to a critique of discursive validation. For instance, Connolly notes that "a recourse to the dialectic" obscures the codes governing the

¹¹ Judith Butler calls this "interval", more elaborately, an "ontologically suspended zone". She does so in reference to the exclusionary nature of universality as it fails to include " 'subjects' ... to the extent that they lack authorization as human by the conventions of universality that set limits on the term" (Butler and Connolly 2000:15).

rules for political inclusion (1995:185).¹² In this sense, Benhabib's categorization of politics in terms only of world historical processes allows politics to remain concealed. That is, the contradiction at the center of a world historical process might not be revealed as such until the movement making the claim is granted political membership (Connolly 1995:184-185). Until then, the contradiction might stay concealed, as might the movement's struggles, resistances, and defeats. This can be the case when discursive validation does not consider movements resisting the rules of membership even as candidates for inclusion in discussion. Effectively, then, discursive validation qualifies only the appeals it adjudicates as struggles for membership. Indeed, Connolly describes the very codes governing the rules of membership as restrictive (Connolly 1995:xv-xix, 178-188). In contrast to discursive validation, critical responsiveness attends to movements existing under the threshold of candidacy.

To attend to struggles existing under the threshold of candidacy, Connolly encourages the "cultivation of an ethos of critical responsiveness to social movements seeking to redefine their relational identities" (1995:xvi). Like discursive validation, critical responsiveness acts as a rejoinder to the appeals of political movements. But while discursive validation considers only those political movements at the threshold for candidacy, critical responsiveness more fundamentally notes the interdependencies in which relations are set. Compared to discursive validation, critical responsiveness is a "political

¹² Connolly does not consider the procedure of discursive validation when he criticizes Benhabib's reliance on "dialectical progression" to explain the process of inclusion into the universal (1995:184). Rather, Connolly's criticism suggests that an explanation reliant on contradictions to describe the process of inclusion into the universal can be used only retroactively; and that an explanation relying on contradictions cannot describe the process of inclusion into the universal of movements "now poised on that precarious threshold of enactment" (1995:186). However, I argue earlier that discursive validation at least considers movements now poised on the threshold of candidacy, but that Benhabib's explanations of discursive validation does not do this well.

response to the politics of identity\ difference that always precedes its intervention" (Connolly 1995:xvi). That is, critical responsiveness replies politically to a resistance movement by studying the cultural constitution of identity\ difference in which the claims of a resistance are set. For critical responsiveness, the study of identity\ difference is key, as identity\ difference constitutes and is constituted through the cultural codes that govern politics of identity\ difference under interrogation by resistance movements seeking redress.¹³ While its very otherness might conceal a movement's political ambitions, critical responsiveness inquires into the cultural constitution of identity\ difference and not only reveals the movement's struggle, but also reveals the cultural codes, or operational beliefs and judgments governing the politics of engagement.

Connolly writes, "to redefine its relation to others a constituency must also modify the shape of its own identity" (1995:xvi). As such, critical responsiveness operates on two registers: as identity responds to a resistance movement, the movement shifts from otherness to political legitimacy; and identity\ difference must shift concurrently. More precisely, while a political movement rests under the threshold for candidacy, its injuries, like its bid for participatory entitlement, remain concealed. As its struggles are revealed, a movement gains legitimacy and its political exclusion earns the marker of "unjust" (1995:184). Importantly, transition to a point where a movement's injuries are seen as unjust corresponds with a transition in the constitution of difference, or more precisely, of identity\ difference. The relational nature of identity\ difference extends the transition to the very

Moreover, my argument emphasizes discursive validation's neglect, hence Benhabib's neglect, of certain movement's candidacy for inclusion, despite the agitations these movements make.

constitution of identity. In this way, a redress of relational injuries necessitates a corresponding modification of identity. Connolly writes that critical responsiveness "arises in settings where the end in question is often not yet clearly in view, either to the initiators or to the respondents" (1995:184). The present, it can be added, is also hazy. That is, while identity\ difference, as it shifts, is not clearly in view, nor necessarily is the cultural constitution of identity\ difference as it stands now. So to address this problematic, genealogical research can be pursued as a mode of cultural study by respondents to resistance movements. Genealogical study reveals not only identity\ difference as it stands in the present, but also the trajectory that has shaped identity\ difference. The transition identity\ difference takes, in line with critical responsiveness, then, surprisingly might imitate variations on identity\ difference revealed in a genealogical study.

That genealogy is so central is evident: it demonstrates how, in critical responsiveness, the focus is on identity, or more specifically, on the cultural constitution of identity in relation to otherness. Were a resistance movement to request a redress of its relational injuries, then a genealogy would attempt to reveal the cultural constitution of identity\ difference and track identity's existential resentment organizing the relation. As such, a genealogy would expose identity's suffering expressed as the subjugation of difference. Specifically, the course by which existential resentment comes to read, define, judge and remedy difference gets exposed through genealogical study. Difference, that is, the other perceived as posing excessive demands on an identity, or threatening the rules

¹³ Connolly writes that "identity involves naming cultural formations that have become naturalized and interiorized, and naturalized dispositions always contain a set of operational beliefs and judgments that help to constitute them" (1991:175).

through which an identity programs its life, is "a requirement built into the logic of identity" (Connolly 1991:9-10). Difference, it might be shown, is defined as variants of abnormality, irresponsibility, dependency or security risk, and as such "license bureaucratic correction, discipline and regulation" (1991:21). At once, as identity and difference stand in a mutually constitutive relation, a genealogy probes the frames of thinking which, while constructing otherness, also maintains an identity's legitimacy (1991:181). Accordingly, a genealogy discerns the expressions of resentment that consolidate the otherness at which political tactics are directed, and in turn, distinguishes difference from identity, through whom these tactics are issued (1991:23). Political tactics and institutional structures, or the very expressions of resentment securing identity\ difference, are analysed in the process (1991:191).

However, genealogy does not end with a simple disclosure. In genealogy,

The task is to identify those patterns of insistence in a society that idealize its own formations and then to project counter-strategies by which to expose multiple points of discrepancy between institutional idealizations and that which they contain or subjugate (Connolly 1991:163).

While a genealogical study focuses upon the problematizing of particular frames of thinking and their institutional expressions of containment, a genealogy does not dwell equally upon the effects these structures, strategies and tactics have on difference. Still, when political movements struggle against the effects of particular disciplinary and normalizing measures, a culture of genealogy enables "some beneficiaries to respond affirmatively to struggles to modify or loosen closures in the order" (1991:184). Closures in the order that correspond with the cultural constitution of identity\ difference are challenged by a genealogy that refuses an exhibition of identity as the ideal that has congealed. Accordingly, a genealogy

denaturalizes identity\ difference and so confounds its self certainty (1991:171-181). In place, genealogy offers a conception of identity that takes itself as uncertain. By unsettling identity\ difference, genealogy challenges identity's dogmatism (1991:159). In this way, identity\ difference, studied through genealogy, suffers a disruption, one that concomitantly may enable identity's political exchange with movements seeking the redress of relational injuries.

Together, critical responsiveness and genealogical study form a variant of the theory of agonistic democracy Connolly expounds.¹⁴ Despite Connolly's, like Benhabib's, interest in the politics of movements on the margins, neither Benhabib's model of democracy, nor critical responsiveness (and genealogy) lend acute insight into the politics of resistance. Similar in this way, critical responsiveness, though, stands distinct from moral conversation since critical responsiveness dwells on "the barriers to [the] rectification of [political resistance] posed by cultural codes" (Connolly 1995:xvi). More precisely, critical responsiveness uses the politics of resistance as a point of departure from which identity addresses, through genealogy, the constitutional relations of identity\ difference that impede possible responses to movements' agitations. Political riposte, according to Connolly, requires not simply a critical responsiveness, but also the cultivation of an ethos of critical responsiveness. Critical responsiveness, he explains, "draws sustenance from ... an attachment to life as a protean set of energies and possibilities exceeding the terms of any identity or cultural horizon in which it is set" (1995:28).¹⁵ A generous spirit imbues an ethos

¹⁴ Connolly writes also on agonistic democracy as studied indifference and agonistic respect (1995, 1991).

¹⁵ More precisely, an ethos of critical responsiveness is not founded upon the fixing of a common theistic faith, a deep, universal identity, nor a rational consensus (Connolly 1995:27-29). Rather, an ethos of critical responsiveness stands alongside those other ethical imperatives without jockeying to supplant them.

of critical responsiveness, but the generosity permeating critical responsiveness is a guarded one, as it is coupled with an agonistic appreciation of ambiguity and contestability in the very structure of strife and interdependence that is identity\ difference (1995:27-30). So Connolly tempers the optimism that may miscolour political projects broached by an agonistic democracy: he writes that "[e]very revealing conceals" (1991:34). Accordingly, critical responsiveness attends, at best, incompletely to the appeals a resistance movement might make. Genealogy, as it probes the cultural constitution of identity\ difference, reveals only partly the otherness of the other that identity names, but a fraction of identity's existential resentment that subjugates otherness, and just something of the operational beliefs and judgment that maintain the constitutional relations of identity\ difference. That is, while a movement may make the transition to political candidate in the forum of political engagement, critical responsiveness and genealogy can never clear the opacity that obscures the relations of identity\ difference. Nor can critical responsiveness promise to redress even one of the many injuries of otherness, and transform, as it would be required, the cultural constitution of identity\ difference. This thesis proceeds heeding Connolly's warning.

Conclusion

Bringing the standpoint of the concrete other to the public sphere allows the framing of the Bill of Rights: for contraceptive, research, development and use in terms of women's reproductive experiences, desires, motivations and needs. However, the constraint on discussion of issues of culture and religion in the public sphere restricts the address of states' involvement, within and across nations, in women's entitlement to give birth, or to abstain from birth and nurture. Further, the reversal of perspectives, which the standpoint of the concrete is meant to enhance, fails to engage the constitutional relations that warrant address

if there was an affirmative response to the Bill of Rights. In turn, agonistic democracy encourages broaching such matters: that is, genealogy shows, first, how a collective identity embodied by the state enables the public structuring of reproduction; and second, how the constitutional relations in which identity\ difference is set render an identity that seeks to hinder and help a perceived difference. If it were adopted, then, agonistic democracy might track the material and concomitantly the cultural injuries endured by the women whose fertility concerns Canadian assistance agencies. Accordingly, through agonistic democracy, a critical responsiveness to resistance movements could contemplate, first, the possible inclusion of women in the third world in public dialogue concerning Canadian foreign policy formation, and second, the regeneration of identity\ difference entailed by the redress of social and material injuries endured by the objects of Canada's foreign policy.¹⁶ A possible critical responsiveness to the Bill of Rights is the topic in Chapter 4, the final chapter.

The next two chapters, through genealogical study, engage in the politicization of identity. Politicizing collective identity in public dialogue permits the discussion of conflicts that arise when a state is involved in the reproductive experiences of foreign women. The politicization of identity thus commits a democratic exchange to a genealogical study of the strife and interdependence in which relations of identity\ difference are set. An instance that might be named the democratization of foreign policy is found actually to be an exercise

¹⁶ In this way, the case concerning the International Campaign differs from the writing on the democratization of Canadian foreign policy cited earlier. A failed instance of democratization in Mark Neufeld's writing sees foreign policy attending to the protests of a counter consensus. The counter consensus to which Neufeld refers is a coalition of groups based in Canada (1999:116, fn 19). Similarly, Sandra Whitworth assesses the participation of groups making recommendations for foreign policy as it may impact the lives of women abroad (1995). In the instance of failed democratization Whitworth notes, the women's groups participating in the "making" of foreign policy are based in Canada. In comparison, the International Campaign is a coalition of women's organizations from 26 countries.

in the perpetuation of unequal relations (Neufeld 1999). This project, in comparison, features genealogy as a means of tracking foreign relations as a set of constitutional relations and cultural codes that differentiate identity from otherness, and sustain identity's tendency to assert its self certainty.¹⁷ So in promoting public discussions in which identity and existential resentment are central, it has been argued that "democratic politics can be a medium through which to expose and redress the politics of resentment" (Connolly 1991:192). The next two chapters shall chronicle through a modest genealogy Canada's constitution of its identity in terms of an otherness that is (fertile) women in the third world.

¹⁷ Consistent with Connolly's proposal, that a distinction between material and cultural theories cannot necessarily be supported (1999 b), I hold, too, that a study of identity\ difference does not argue against a study of hegemony on the perpetuation of unequal relations. Elaboration might show, for instance, how the constitution of "Canada" is central in the state's response to native land claims; how the constitution of "woman" is central in the level of social assistance granted to single mothers, etc. Elaborations such as these can make more evident "how significantly cultural self-interpretation helps to constitute macro-institutional practices" (Connolly 1999 b:51).

Chapter 2

An Identity of Benevolence

According to the same learned white man, the concept that is currently termed "development" has gone through six stages of metamorphosis since late antiquity.¹ The perception of the outsider as the one who needs help has taken on the successive forms of the barbarian, the pagan, the infidel, the wild man, the "native," and the underdeveloped. Needless to say, these forms whose meanings helplessly keep on decomposing can only exist in relation to their opposites. "The barbarian is, in the first place, the man who believes in barbarism"² (Trinh 1989:54).

Assessing the history of Canadian relations with the third world, Laura Macdonald finds that in its state and non state variations, Canadian foreign relations have been qualified by attitudes of northern cultural and political superiority (1995).³ Macdonald examines, specifically, how "Canada's privileged position within the British empire fundamentally shapes the country's discursive practices toward the South" (1995:112). But in circumscribing her study to an examination of Canadian discursive practises, Macdonald keeps the southern component in north south relations analytically undynamic. The singular focus on dominant Canadian ideas, institutions and values underlying Canada's "unequal" relations brings attention to the identities Canada harbours in its relations with the third world. But questions concerning how these identities, self definitions and attitudes either restrict or ease in alternative relations to unequal ones is left unaddressed. All the same, the conclusions Macdonald draws from considering Canada's forays in British empire building, missionary work, Cold War politics, trade, and contemporary development efforts contribute

¹ Ivan Illich (1980:27).

² Claude Lévi-Strauss (1961:22), translated by Trinh.

to the problematization of present day self conceptions of Canadian identity.

Macdonald's rendering of "Canadian 'civilization' " certainly provokes thought (1995:115). Idealized conceptions of the self in Canadian foreign relations, perhaps, deserve (re)consideration. As do the arrangements and practices actualizing Canada's identity in these instances: has Canada, in north south encounters, simply brandished attitudes of northern superiority, as Macdonald suggests, or has fear or uncertainty tinged such northern attitudes with grief? Democratic exchange, William E Connolly suggests, precipitates a more complex examination of identity, when the soundings of contest might instigate, in a cultural unconscious, the denaturalization of idealized conceptions of relational identity (1991:211). However, Macdonald's passive rendering of the south leaves her study neglecting vital questions on the north south relationship. For example, what have third world movements said, regarding Canada's relations with the third world? And, if Canada were to respond to these movements, how alternatively could Canadian foreign relations be conceived, and how concomitantly might Canada's sense of self have to transform? Despite Macdonald's shortcomings, this chapter follows her lead and approaches Canadian relations with the third world by focusing upon Canada's cultural practises. This chapter draws its case from an alert an international campaign has signalled in response to a project funded in part by official Canadian development assistance. Using a genealogical epistemology (Connolly 1991:158-197) this chapter provides an account of Canada's benevolent identity through the course of its involvement in international population activities.

This chapter, more precisely, illustrates that in the 1970s, Canada's benevolent

³ While she firmly situates Canadian relations with the third world within a "subordination and exploitation of the periphery", Macdonald veers away from a purely economic interpretation of Canadian foreign relations and

identity emerges as a wealthy partner, donating money through international population organizations to national family programs in the third world. In the 1980s, Canadian identity appears as a humanitarian deliverer of basic needs, giving funds now also to third world community organizations in a bid to provide personalized contraceptive solutions. Later in the 1980s, benevolent identity surfaces as a steward of the global environment, organizing a reduction in third world sustenance production and proffering as its replacement an invitation to third world women to join international market production. In this sense, a Canadian identity of benevolence is constituted through a variety of particular and constructed relations with a difference that is an overpopulated third world. Institutional arrangements and material practises constitute benevolent identity in relation to a difference that is needy and dependent on Canada's development assistance. But tracking identity's existential resentment shows that development's arrangements and practises also constitute difference as being hazardous to identity's stability. Thus, the politics of benevolent identity demonstrates that while Canada operates as a cooperative, caring and generous entity, Canada also administers correction to a difference that destabilises benevolent identity's self certainty. Accordingly, a genealogical inquiry into Canada's development assistance problematizes Canada's naturalized identity of benevolence. The arrangements and practises that constitute through development assistance Canada's identity of benevolence are addressed in the second section. The third section examines the competitive nature of identity's relations, and inquires, relatedly, into the workings of existential resentment in identity's relations with difference. The section that follows immediately below compares the genealogical epistemologies used by Arturo Escobar and William E Connolly, and

selects, ultimately, the latter's approach to pursue a study of Canada's benevolent identity.

1 A Genealogical Epistemology

William E Connolly and Arturo Escobar both draw upon a tradition of genealogy in the study of everyday practices, but between them, Connolly uniquely grants genealogical analysis a place in political exchange. For Connolly, genealogical inquiry reveals the historically contingent character of identity, while it probes the attendant structures that retain an identity's plausibility over time. Connolly writes:

Identity involves naming cultural formations that have become naturalized and interiorized, and naturalized dispositions always contain a set of operational beliefs and judgments that help to constitute them (1991:175).

But revealing the cultural formations named by identity is not the end of Connolly's project. Connolly centres genealogy in a larger project of democratic politics that concern contestatory claims made against dominant identities. Unlike Connolly, Escobar does not address an identity's genealogy, but instead details the substantive minutiae in the workings of a discourse. Specifically, Escobar researches the making of the third world and the discourse of development that makes it so. Escobar's examination, then, assesses the "historical event" which destines "That the essential trait of the third world was its poverty and that the solution was economic growth and development became self evident, necessary, and universal truths" (1995:24). In this sense, Escobar and Connolly both study culturally produced truths, or naturalizations of identity, and the attendant practises that keep these truths and naturalizations in place. Connolly and Escobar, as such, offer comparable epistemological approaches to the study of Canada's official involvement in developing the third world.

Escobar seems the obvious choice, given the ready framework he provides for

studying the discourse of development. He asks what it means to say: "development started to function as a discourse, that is, that it created a space in which only certain things could be said and even imagined" (1995:39). He responds by writing:

To understand development as a discourse, one must look not at the elements themselves but at the system of relations established among them. It is this system [of relations] that allows the systemic creation of objects, concepts and strategies; it determines what can be thought and said. The relations - established between institutions, socioeconomic processes, forms of knowledge, technological factors, and so on - define the conditions under which objects, concepts, theories, and strategies can be incorporated into the discourse (1995:40).

Among the concepts incorporated into the discourse of development is "rapid population growth" (1995:41). Indeed, Escobar's framework can be used to extend the study others have made of the place of "population" in the project of third world development. Jaquette and Staudt, for example, demonstrate that biological models of medicine, demography, and bureaucratic decision making together determine that population growth in the third world is a problem, one that gets fixed through technological solutions; that is, primarily by contraceptive administration (1985). Analysing, specifically, the "single mindedness" of population programs implemented by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) from 1965 to 1984, Jaquette and Staudt caution that these programs are "derived from approaches, habits of thought, and patterns of decision making that are deeply embedded in our society, and that will consequently be difficult to change" (1985:235). Similarly, Barbara Duden writes that "population", as a popular concept, evokes all too predictable images and analyses (1992). Duden describes transformations in the term's use in development discourse since the mid 1950s. She writes that in the mid 1970s, "population" changes from being treated as "one of the external factors in the development calculus, a given like a country's rivers or subsoil" to "an endogenous factor of the

developing 'system' " (1992:149). That is, population variables (ie fertility rates, infant mortality rates, etc) interacting with health care, education, rural development, and industrial development are established now as objects of development. Duden aggregates statistics and demography, "effective private philanthropy", and the popularity of books, like Paul Ehrlich's The Population Bomb (1968), as she trails "population's" entry into development discourse (1992).

Rather than promoting this sort of discursive analysis, Connolly suggests pursuing a genealogical epistemology. Genealogy reveals the constitutional relations of identity\ difference. More precisely, genealogy reveals the relations through which identity is constituted, or the "organizing principles of material practices and institutional arrangements" that work to constitute the self, and concomitantly differentiate or even repress the other (Butler 1991:155). Whereas, then, a genealogy centres the interdependent, strife ridden relations constituting a self and other, discursive analysis focuses upon the relations between institutions, socio economics, knowledge, technology, etc. Furthermore, unlike discursive analysis, genealogy does not simply end with identity's disclosure. That is, in genealogy,

The task is to identify those patterns of insistence in a society that idealize its own formations and then to project counter strategies by which to expose multiple points of discrepancy between institutional idealizations and that which they contain or subjugate (Connolly 1991:163).

Thus, while a genealogy focuses upon problematizing particular frames of thinking and their institutional expressions of containment, a genealogy does not dwell upon the effects of these structures, strategies and tactics on otherness. Rather, a genealogy exposes the competitive edge that corresponds with an identity's institutional expression, making

genealogy, therefore, sensitive to the politics of identity\ difference (Connolly 1999 a:129). Unlike Connolly, Escobar does not connect in his framework the discourse of development with the politics of development. Certainly, Escobar emphasises development's effects on those in the third world: for instance, the consignment of people to fields of vision, the mapping of people under coordinates of control, the transformation of conditions in which people live into a "productive, normalized, socialized environment", etc (1995:156). Also, Escobar is attuned to Latin American politics of resistance.⁴ But the politics of development receive minimal treatment in Escobar's framework. Largely unexamined is the question of how the discourse of development actually constitutes the relations between those who provide development and those who supposedly need it. In comparison, the genealogy prescribed by Connolly attends to the constitution of an interdependent, strife ridden relation of identity\ difference. As such, Connolly turns his attention to the politics of dominant identities, and particularly those contested by oppositional movements.

When global conditions of interdependence prove to be unmasterable, Connolly writes that "[p]olitics becomes ... less attentive to the claims of the suffering and more willing to discipline those whose suffering cannot be ignored" (1991:25). This suffering might be similar to the injuries Escobar describes: ones borne from discursive practises tied to development.⁵ However, suffering might concern, alternatively, the drive for mastery, conditioning, for example, development based solutions to third world poverty. And Connolly's writing provides grounds for siring inquiry into the drive to master globalized

⁴ Indeed, Escobar co edits with Sonia Alvarez The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy (1992).

⁵ The case, upon which this chapter is based, gives evidence to contestation against such injuries, as will be shown in Chapter 4.

interdependence (1991:23-25). Several questions follow from this rendering of suffering. If a drive to mastery constitutes a benevolent identity, then what might be the effects on this identity of a resistance to its mastery? Challenged in this way, what might be identity's institutional expression of its suffering? More precisely, what might be the effects of the development encounter "upon the self identities of the initiating power" (Connolly 1991:37)? To respond to these queries, a genealogy can be pursued, as it focuses on probing the naturalization of identity's claims made in the drive for mastery. Genealogy, as such, can be used to examine the naturalization of Canada's benevolent identity in terms of its involvement in international population activities.

Distinct from discourse analysis, then, genealogy details in an identity's drive for mastery the identity's existential suffering. Moreover, in contrast to discourse analysis, Connolly grants genealogical analysis a place in political exchange. A genealogical study of Canada's benevolent identity is especially pertinent in light of contest directed against it. A Bill of Rights (1996) responds to Canada's development efforts, and was issued in 1996 to an agency channelling Canadian official development assistance (Seabrooke to de Savigny, 18 April 1996). The Bill of Rights raises concerns not so much around the intent behind Canada's development assistance as much as the Bill provokes thought about the nature of Canada's benevolent relations. As the Bill of Rights requests a relational redress between Canada and the objects of its benevolence, a genealogy can reveal the cultural constitution of Canada's benevolent identity, and track in its relation with difference an existential resentment. That is, a genealogy exposes identity's suffering expressed as the subjugation of difference. Specifically, the course through which existential resentment comes to read, define, judge and remedy difference gets exposed through genealogical study. Genealogy, in

this sense, exposes, at least partially, the politics of identity\ difference.

When democracy operates so as to air contest against claims made by a dominant identity, and when democracy operates to denaturalize settled identities, and reconsider relations in which an identity is set, then democracy is robust, according to Connolly (1991:193). But before an identity's relations can be redressed through democratic exchange, a genealogical inquiry into identity's naturalized status is required. Thus, as a response to the Bill of Rights, this chapter makes a genealogically inspired study into Canada's benevolent identity in the development encounter, specifically in terms of Canada's involvement in international population activities. Before this genealogy begins, Canada's involvement in international population activities is contextualized within a history of Canada's relations with the third world. But first, briefly considered is "Canada", as a collective identity.

2 The Many Manifestations of Benevolent Identity

A reciprocal flow runs between the state and collective identification with the state.⁶ William E Connolly explains that state action is premised on a social commonality, one that shares a culture and a set of institutionalized roles, as well as the common understandings, proclivities and repugnancies that the culture and roles inhere, and in turn, through which perception, judgment and decision making get structured (1991:199). Collective expectation then holds that the state "symbolizes what *we* are ... [and] enacts what we seek to be through its institutions of accountability and effectivity" (Connolly 1991:199). In this sense, identification with the state nurtures "a common belief in the capacity of the state to promote publicly defined purposes" (1991:198). While common expectations make the state

"the official center of self conscious collective action", reciprocally, "the state constantly draws upon these investments in its definitions and resolutions of public issues" (1991:201, 199). The state and collective identity coexist symbiotically, such that each embraces and braces the other. Thus, while the late modern state is preoccupied with the mastery of global interdependencies, collective identification with the state is preoccupied, similarly. The state, then, with the collective that identifies with it, together partake in a public securing of a sense of self, amidst interdependencies fostering, for instance, greenhouse gases, the drug trade, illegal migration, interstate terrorism and third world poverty. This chapter proceeds, accordingly, by questioning the way Canada's identity of benevolence gets secured through Canada's involvement in population activities in the third world.

Canada's participation in third world development comprises only one set of relations discussed by Laura Macdonald in a history of Canada's unequal relations with the third world (1995). Macdonald considers a broad range of practices, such as trade, 19th century immigration, official development aid, state foreign policy, church affairs and non governmental relations as she defines the "attitudes" and "self definitions" Canada establishes through its relations with the third world. In this sense, the relations with the third world the Canadian state affects are not distinct, but rather typical of the attitudes and self definitions Canada harbours. Thus, it would not be exceptional for Canada's identity of benevolence to be constituted through the practices and arrangements that comprise the Canadian state's sponsorship of population activities in the third world. However, while Macdonald's account comments on "attitudes" and "self definitions" emerging in the course

⁶ Here, the state is defined as "the political dimensions of the entire order - individuals as citizens and taxpayers, electoral campaigns and processes, public officials, lawmaking institutions, executive and

of Canadian relations with the third world, she does not explicitly discuss Canada's "identity" nor this identity's relation with difference. Rather, Macdonald traces the discursive practises, or "organized sets of signifying practices" that order Canada's foreign relations (1995:114). Accordingly, Macdonald refers to "Canada's 'civilization' " when she finds that as a "junior partner" in the British empire, dominant Canadian values, ideas and institutions originate in British culture, but become distinct through the course of Canada's external relations by virtue of a national struggles for autonomy in foreign policy. Canada's culture also stands distinct from Britain's due to the "centrality of racial oppression of Natives and immigrant minorities" that Canada, as a white settler colony, extends to non whites " 'outside' the territorial borders of the state" (Macdonald 1995:115-116).

According to Macdonald, racism travels beyond the territory by extending a northern "universalism" through the development enterprise, in response to a suspicion that the third world is unable to govern itself (1995:136). In an era when most members of society are active church goers, knowledge about the colonized in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean is produced primarily through missionary work (1995:120). The secularization of uplift, or development, is introduced in the 1950s, as a rejoinder to the internationalization of communism (1995:126-132). Canada's vocation for the diffusion of its knowledge, responsibilities and culture get asserted as a national mission when former prime minister Lester B Pearson announces in 1950 that " 'we of the free democratic world ... must demonstrate that it is we and not the Russians who stand for national liberation and economic and social progress' " (1995:127). As such, anti communist Cold War objectives combine with Christian proselytizing to explain Canada's initial foray into economic

assistance through the Commonwealth Colombo Plan (1995:127). Following the demise of the British Empire, Canada maintains relations with third world countries in the Commonwealth, and later La Francophonie, through the professionalization and institutionalization of development (1995:128). The discourse of development is firmly set, effectively "creat[ing] a space in which only certain things c[an] be said and even imagined" (Escobar 1995:39, Macdonald 1995:128). It is under auspices of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) that official Canadian development assistance begins to support the remedy for (over)population in the third world.

2.1 The Wealthy Partner

Addressing the third world population growth rate Canada manifests an identity of benevolence. Compared to the genealogy William E Connolly proposes, the chronicle in this chapter is very modest. In the 1970s, Canada's benevolent identity emerges as a wealthy partner, working in cooperation with an independent, developing third world on third world national family planning programs, one of which includes research in new contraceptives. In the 1980s, Canadian identity appears as a humanitarian deliverer of basic needs, sending abroad contraceptives, among other vital goods, for third worlders' use. Later in the 1980s, benevolent identity surfaces as a steward of the global environment, balancing the demands of a surging third world population with the earth's limited resources.

A reading of official development documents on international population activities finds that in the 1970s, Canada establishes an identity of benevolence. The first of a series of variations on this identity can be termed as "wealthy partner". Emerging in a period of "world economic turmoil", the wealthy partner seeks to appease the economic imbalances

that lie behind a sudden rise in OPEC oil prices (Canada 1975:14). The wealthy partner offers development assistance to the third world, and qualifies Canada's unique generosity in terms of its "lack of imperial or colonial ambitions", historical or present (Canada 1975:15).⁷ Indeed, development expects that its help will herald in a beneficial relationship between Canada and the third world: one in which Canadian assistance is understood in the third world as "cooperation" (Canada 1975:15-16). Extending help in the form of financial support and influence, the wealthy partner contributes to the apparently inevitable sublimation of third world economic growth (Canada 1975:14-17). However, economic growth in the third world means accompanying changes in the first world, Canada cautions:

From industrialized countries, the Third World is seeking additional transfers of concessional flows and more fundamentally, significant changes in the patterns of international trade, technology transfer, finance, resource ownership and development (Canada 1975:17).

The wealthy partner pledges help to the third world as Canada braces for demands made by the third world. Indeed, benevolence expects its help will work to amend "its vulnerability over the longer term to demands upon its resources by the Third World" (Canada 1975:15). Curiously, third world economic growth disturbs the certainty of Canada's generosity by pressing against the wealth upon which benevolence is based. At once, third world economic growth sanctions the establishment of a benevolent identity, evident in the efforts at "cooperation" the wealthy partner extends.

In a bid to encourage development abroad, the wealthy partner provides financial

⁷ See Laura Macdonald (1995) and those cited by Macdonald who name Canada a "white settler colony". That is, in contrast to claims made in official documents, Canada is conceived by these authors as a territory colonized by a second set of settlers who stand in distinction from the original inhabitants. Indeed, many descendants of the original inhabitants are fighting for the return of land appropriated by white settlers and presently colonized by *their* descendants, as well as by others.

support to the family planning program in India. India's family planning program is instated in 1952 as a means through which socio economic conditions and women's health both can be improved (Nair 1992:239). The relationship between development and family planning is theoretical: a smaller family size is said to permit a family to accumulate savings, while a decrease in the national birth rate is said likewise to permit a state to accumulate savings.⁸ By the 1960s, mediated by the leverage of the United Nations and the United State's "food for family planning" exchange, the Indian family program institutes demographic targets so to ascertain more timely results (Bannerji 1980:86). The Indian family planning program, while steered by foreign interveners, remains self financed through federal and state revenues, to a total of 90% (World Bank/ OEB 1992:35). Of the money the national government marks for family planning, a portion is directed into new research in the area of female contraceptives. Important here is that as a wealthy partner, Canada, in 1975, through IDRC, contributes the first of a series of grants to an Indian research team developing the original immunologically based female birth control: the hCG contraceptive.⁹ Canada's funding of this research project is explained by the "potential demographic impact" the hCG contraceptive promises (CIDA 1974:42). At once, benevolence contends with its "concern to avoid charges that a rich country like Canada is imposing population 'solutions' on developing countries" (CIDA 1974:38). Canada's concern might be appeased, however. Canada's foray into international population activities is based upon an *invitation* from

⁸ According to Mass, this theory, in demographic circles, is referred to as " 'dependency theory' " (1976:72). This theory attributes poverty to over consumption by supposedly non productive and thus dependent youth of scarce family and national resources.

⁹ At that time, like now, female contraceptives are exclusively either barrier methods, spermicidally based, hormonally based, or consist of sterilization (Women's Health Interaction and Inter Pares 1995). In this sense, immunologically based contraceptives use a completely new technology.

developing countries to help improve upon "inadequate methods of fertility control", ones especially for use in "large scale family planning programs" (CIDA 1974:40-41), such as India's. Canada's involvement in efforts to stymie the "population explosion" (CIDA 1974:3), in this respect, is only a wealthy partner's affirmative response to a third world country's request. As such, heeding India's autonomy, Canada as a partner joins India's initiative to solve what Canada, like India, terms a "population problem" (CIDA 1974:3). In common, then, third world plans for increased economic growth through lower birth rates match benevolent identity's designs for third world development. Certainly, in this case, Canada's sponsorship of the hCG contraceptive research project qualifies as an instance of development cooperation.

Canadian benevolence spreads its help to state run family planning programs abroad by also contributing money to multilateral funders of international population activities.¹⁰ In the 1970s, bilateral assistance for family planning, such as IDRC's contribution to the Indian hCG contraceptive research team, is an exception. Usually, Canadian official development assistance for family planning is channelled through multilateral organizations, and in particular through the International Planned Parenthood Federation and the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) (Canada 1994:22). Though it is channelling funds through multilateral organizations, Canada can still be certain it is respecting India's autonomy, as in the mid 1970s, India names rapid population growth the major stumbling block to the country's development (Nair 1992:243). From the late 1960s to 1977, assistance to India through UNFPA sponsors the administration of family planning at vasectomy camps. At these camps, Indian state officials offer men incentives in exchange for surgery,

so that quotas for sterilization set nationally are met (Bannerji 1980, Karkal and Pandey 1989, Nair 1992). Between April 1976 and January 1977, state workers coerce or forcibly sterilize 7 635 396 men, mostly from "the weaker sections of society" (Bannerji 1980:83). Among the men sterilized are those who are old (Karkal and Pandey 1989:77). Not surprisingly, the "population explosion" does not get quelled, and the Indian family planning program perseveres. As a wealthy partner, Canada increases its funding to UNFPA in the 1980s, and IDRC follows its initial grant to the Indian hCG contraceptive research team with successive grants in the next two decades.¹¹ In this way, that is, by participating in the development ambitions of a third world country, the difference upon which identity depends, Canada secures its identity of benevolence.

2.2 Humanitarian Deliverer of Basic Needs

Canada, in the 1980s, maintains an identity of benevolence, with variations on its manifestations from the 1970s. In the 1970s, Canada sends assistance to family planning programs instituted by third world governments. In the 1980s, in distinction, Canada sends "help" to the world's poorest people (CIDA 1986:44-45). As such, in the 1980s, benevolent identity manifests as a "humanitarian deliverer of basic needs". Among the "basic needs" benevolence delivers to the world's poorest is family planning (CIDA 1986:43). The turn in the assignment of assistance is a subtle one. Benevolence reassigns its designs from the governments in the third world to those in the third world who are governed. The turn in assignment assistance takes is to one that more directly delivers benevolence to those who are deemed needy. After all, third world governments are found by Canada to have been

¹⁰ In 1975, among donors of official development assistance, Canada ranks 6th in the world (Canada 1975:15).

¹¹ IDRC's research sponsorship of the hCG contraceptive is explored further in Chapter 3.

unsuccessful in quelling the population explosion. Indeed, IDRC finds that

family planning programs [have] not all met with the hoped for success. One of the reasons is that continuation rates for contraceptive users remains low. Fears about the safety of some contraceptive methods, or the inconvenience of use, lead many to abandon them (1983:18).

Like IDRC, CIDA, too, resignedly finds, with some exceptions, that national family planning programs in the third world intended to manage rapid population growth have not been sufficiently successful (CIDA 1986:43). Placed under questioning, then, is whether or not IDRC and CIDA's apportioning of assistance to state run family planning programs has stymied Canada from being effective in its benevolent endeavours. Moreover, Canada's efforts seem pressed by the poor's abject participation in national family planning programs. Interestingly, the uncooperative conduct of the poor, and the ineptly managed programs of the state work together to aggravate the assuredness with which Canada expends its benevolence. But not only does a resistant underdevelopment destabilize the assuredness of Canada's benevolent identity. The diffidence of poverty abroad also authorizes benevolence's reinstatement.

Rating its development ventures as mediocre, Canada reestablishes its benevolent identity through a redirection of its efforts. While IDRC maintains an identity of wealthy partner with the Indian state based hCG contraceptive research project, on other counts, benevolent identity's attention turns from third world governments to the world's poorest people. Among the basic needs Canada sends to the third world poor is family planning. Canada does this by contributing money to many and varied organizations. Compared to the 1970s, when benevolence responds to third world governments' national initiatives by contributing money through international family planning organizations, in the 1980s, CIDA

and IDRC contribute money to "international organizations, voluntary movements, and grass roots community groups" (CIDA 1987:50). In effect, Canada's sponsorship of voluntary and grass roots groups supplementing or operationalising state run family planning programs means that Canada no longer directs its attention to national family planning programs alone. IDRC writes with regret that "most developing countries have launched active family planning programs ... but not all have met with the hoped for success" (1983:18). However, success might be better assured when development assistance is not only increased, but also when assistance is allocated through a greater variety of channels. In the 1980s, Canada becomes the world's fourth largest donor in the field of international population activities.¹² Funding grass roots community groups encourages the distribution of birth control fashioned on the particular needs of families and individuals of a community. Family planning efforts, as such, can focus on individuals' hesitancy to adopt select birth control methods. The solution to rapid population growth gets personalized in this way. Benevolence's endeavours, funded through bilateral and multilateral fora, and now also through grass roots groups, destine ever widening opportunities for development's success.

Through the Indian family planning program, population growth gets personalized, as birth control choices and monetary incentives work together so as to reach every (fertile) woman's body. In this way, India arranges to remedy excessive fertility. In the 1980s, Canada funds the World Bank's financial support for the Indian family planning program

¹² IDRC's bilateral research sponsorship of the hCG contraceptive does not change significantly between the 1970s and the 1980s (de Savigny to Seabrooke, 14 July 1995:3). At CIDA, in contrast, funds allocated for "international population cooperation" surges in this time period, from \$12 million in 1980-81 to \$50 million in 1988-89 (Canada 1994:21).

(Canada 1994:22; World Bank/ OEB 1992:35). In certain Indian states, the preferred contraceptive method is laparoscopic sterilization, performed in camps by doctors.¹³ In exchange for selecting laparoscopic sterilization, the state pays a woman Rs 100, compared to a payment of Rs 10 for IUD insertions, or nothing for other methods (World Bank/ OEB 1992:32).¹⁴ By offering an exchange to every woman, the program seeks to reach every fertile body, and effectively individualizes the correction of population growth. Through its support for the Indian family planning program, Canada manoeuvres to more successfully attain its development ambitions, and in turn, ascertain its benevolent identity. Debilitating though the poor's conduct may be to the efforts benevolence expends, Canada finds the poor remediable, and development assistance names contraceptives among the basic needs the third world poor require. In this way, Canada secures more successful solutions for third world poverty, the difference upon which benevolent identity depends.

2.3 Steward of the Global Environment

Another manifestation of Canada's benevolent identity emerges a few years later. In the late 1980s, benevolent identity manifests as a "steward of the global environment", and through this identity Canada newly responds to third world underdevelopment. Now benevolence's

¹³ The camp approach "involves taking a particular contraception facility out of clinics or hospitals to the rural areas or slums for a short duration ... The underlying assumption in the camp approach is that poor, rural and uneducated masses do not require personal counselling and can be treated 'en masse' " (Singh 1998:174, fn 25). More specifically, laparoscopic sterilization in camps forgoes pelvic and other examinations before surgery (Singh 1998:185, fn 56). Vasectomies, in the 1970s, are also performed in camps.

¹⁴ Though the policy is unofficial, in the 1980s, the Indian family planning program no longer seeks male candidates for the administration of birth control (Singh 1998:183; Nair 1992:244; Karkal and Pandey 1989:68). Indeed, the lawlessness of the vasectomy camps, especially in the period of Emergency (1975- 1977), and publication bans in the same era, together catalyse the dislodging of the ruling party in the 1977 elections (Bannerji 1980:94).

concern turns to the ominous relationship between an increasing population abroad and the limited capacity of the environment to provide the resources required to meet the needs of the world's poorest people (Canada 1987:50). As environmental steward, Canada assesses the causes of environmental degradation and finds that rapid population growth detrimentally "exerts pressure on the biophysical environment", and in turn "puts pressure on the economic infrastructures, employment generating capacities and efforts to combat poverty" with which Canadian benevolence assists (CIDA 1994:19). Canada's generous development efforts, in this way, get set back or reversed by the third world poor's reproductive habits. Moreover, rapid population growth challenges Canada's generosity by simultaneously destabilising Canada's own economic development. Canada describes overpopulation and environmental degradation as issues that "transcend borders" (Canada 1995:ii). That is, rapid population growth not only overtaxes the limited water and energy supplies abroad, but overpopulation in the third world also encroaches into the global supply of natural resources on which Canada may lay claim. Against transnational encroachments such as these, Canada procures official development assistance so as to secure its national stability and economic well being (Canada 1995:ii). As such, by protecting Canada's economic well being, official development assistance also consolidates Canada's benevolent identity. Paradoxically, while the perpetuation of underdevelopment disturbs the certainty of Canada's benevolent identity, poverty abroad at once legitimises benevolent identity's reinstatement.

After gauging the causes of worldwide resource depletion, benevolent identity, as steward of the global environmental, sets out to resolve the very causes of resource scarcity. In essence, Canada seeks to balance the demands placed on the environment and the

environment's capacity to meet these demands. In so doing, Canada adopts a "one world perspective" (King 1997:S30). The one world perspective is evident in Canada's affirmation of its benevolent efforts, for instance in a document that suggests a north-south sharing of the planet:

Canada's position is that we all share a collective responsibility in protecting the global environment ... [and] Canada for its part, will continue to support population activities through all assistance channels (CIDA 1987:50).

In other words, Canada explains that in renewing its sponsorship of population activities in the third world, Canadian benevolence expresses a commitment to the preservation of the earth's resources required for the development of current and future generations, globally. Canada's commitment, moreover, is expressed in dollars. Referring to the scarce resources overpopulation further strains, CIDA prioritises funding for international population activities, describing the management of births abroad as "a major element of its [development assistance] programs" (CIDA 1987:50).¹⁵

Benevolence selects a specific focus in its quest to regulate the relationship between an ever increasing population abroad and the limited capacity of the environment. In the mid 1980s, CIDA's focus rests upon sequestering women away from reproductive labour and in place organizing the "full participation of women in all aspects of society" (CIDA 1987:50). The link CIDA makes between women's work and natural resources reflects a timely trend in third world development assistance. When the World Bank advises states to mobilize human resources to work, and inanimate resources to production, the natural resources on which sustenance is based, as well as the labour used to produce this

sustenance, get requisitioned to the market, and directed into growth founded on export production (Sen 1994:64-66). Canadian benevolence answers the World Bank's appeal with development dollars. At once, Canada asserts its identity as steward of the global environment when it pronounces that

More efficient production reduces the drain on scarce resources such as raw materials and energy, and limits the demands placed on the regenerative capacity of the environment. Efficient use of land, labour and capital is also at the heart of development efforts to satisfy human needs (Canada 1995:37).

Centering its definition of sustainable development in the efficient use of land and labour, Canadian benevolence seems to agree that "[n]ature's transformation into natural resources need[s] to go hand in hand with the transformation of culturally diverse people into 'skilled human resources' " (Shiva 1992:206-207). In this sense, benevolence proffers that the full participation of women in the international market ensures an environmentally sustainable use of labour and land. To this end, that is a balanced environment, Canada discourages women in the third world from bearing children, and alternatively, encourages women to join the international market economy. Whether (greater) participation in the market economy actually meets poor women's needs is a question that remains unanswered, however.¹⁶ All the same, it is especially poor women whom the steward of the global environment addresses, as it finds that "[much] of the environmental degradation is the

¹⁵ IDRC's support for international population activities declines in the mid 1980s (Canada 1994:21-22). Meanwhile, in this era, when CIDA links third world population growth with environmental scarcity, the Agency's funding of international population activities is at a peak (Canada 1994:21-22).

¹⁶ Gita Sen writes cogently on the absence of research evaluating the impact of women's wage-labour on women's overall well being (1996:825). Sen defines women's well being by listing, among other features, the ease with which women can perform reproductive tasks in the household, the availability of inputs for domestic work, the consumption of public services and goods, the household division of labour and resources, the structures of authority and control within the household and community, vulnerability to the threat of violence, the status of women's health, nutritional intake, access to basic needs such as food, water, fuel, child care, sanitation, housing, and education, etc (1996:823). Of course, then, the links between earning an income and well being are highly complex.

result of the desperate search of the poor and the landless for such needs as fuel, food and water" (CIDA 1987:50). Counteracting the reproduction of the poor, Canada works to preserve the natural resources required for economic growth in the south and north by organizing the greater participation of women in the international market economy. As Canada extends its reach to the environment, benevolence, in this way, finds new methods through which to assist those who are poor, that is, the difference upon which identity depends.

In sum, the politics of identity congeals Canada's self ascription of benevolence, one that emerges in a succession of variations. Corresponding with these variations, three approaches to development make discernible the debates permeating benevolent identity's legitimation. In the 1970s, as the third world's wealthy partner, Canada allays underdevelopment by directing funds to third world government programs, engineering with newly independent governments third world economic growth. In the 1980s, as humanitarian deliverer of basic needs, Canada now also funds community organizations' programs that can personalize better than state implementation prompt, simple responses to individuals' impoverishment. Later in the 1980s, as steward of the global environment, Canada extends development to the third world by proffering market solutions to poor women, especially. Through these variations in benevolent identity, consistently evinced is Canada's efforts at taming the excessively high third world population growth rate development apparently requires. By tracking development's involvement in international population activities as such, this genealogically inspired study of Canada's benevolent identity exhibits the fundamentals that transexist the debates in an identity's establishment (Connolly 1991:181). To be sure, the debates moderating benevolent identity's

establishment do not illustrate this identity's fundamental shifts. Rather, the debates negotiating identity's establishment reflect the confirmation of identity's benevolence, and in particular, the successive methods through which Canada's endeavours most soundly ground benevolent identity's legitimacy.

That is, the debates in Canadian benevolence, while sustaining Canada's identity, deliberate the most persuasive ways development can affirm its efforts. For instance, through the 1970s and 1980s, debates in the approach to development exhibit Canadian benevolence's pursuit of the most credible way Canada can be involved in international efforts to correct reproductive behaviour abroad. In the 1970s, so as to quell the spectre of overpopulation, Canada funds national family planning programs in compact with governments in the third world. In the early 1980s, as Canada finds that third world family planning programs have not adequately stymied the population explosion, Canadian development installs through donations a more personalized approach to the prescription of birth control. Again, later in the 1980s, as Canada detects that rapid population growth in the third world still defies containment, Canadian development expends efforts to remedy third world reproductive behaviour by strategizing to replace reproductive labour with the benefits market labour reputedly offers. Not only does this modest genealogy observe that Canada's approach to development is multiple, but this genealogy also shows that these approaches supplant one another as defeat and self doubt trail the benevolent encounter. Indeed, the variations in identity exhibit the ambiguity in benevolent identity, and intimate the resistance interrupting the cohesion of Canada's identity as charitable. Canada confronts benevolent identity's uncertainty, paradoxically, by focusing on the unruly, persistent growth of the third world's poor. Benevolent identity then gets consolidated by overhauling

Canada's development strategy, and by renewing the vigour with which Canada extends its assistance abroad. In this way, "the very terms of contestation over sources and remedies" organizing third world development in fact secure an identity of benevolence (Connolly 1991:181).

3 The Cultural Constitution of Benevolent Identity

The nature of identity revealed through genealogically inspired study exposes the constitution of identity in relation to difference. Specifically, the cultural constitution of identity\ difference is the "organizing principles of material practices and institutional arrangements" that work to constitute the self, and simultaneously, differentiate or even repress the other (Butler 1991:155). Next, it will be illustrated that an identity of benevolence, through Canada's development efforts, casts third world reproductive behaviour as being in need of Canada's helpful involvement, but, too, that benevolent identity, through institutional development, fashions third world fertility as posing to Canada a hazard or a threat. In this sense, genealogically inspired study, as will be shown, also exposes the place of identity's existential resentment in identity's constitutional relations with difference.

"[N]o identity is the true identity", William E Connolly notes (1991:46). Yet a Canadian identity of benevolence is sustained over the course of two decades. In the 1970s, benevolent identity emerges as a wealthy partner, working in cooperation with an independent, developing third world; in the 1980s, Canadian identity appears as a humanitarian deliverer of basic needs to the world's poorest people; and later in the 1980s, benevolent identity surfaces as a steward of the global environment, balancing the demands of a surging third world with the earth's limited natural resources. That benevolent identity

modulates in this way demonstrates identity's particular and constructed nature (1991:46). Identity's condition through time, in other words, is historically contingent (1992:46). In addition, identity's variations illustrate that identity's contingency, particularity and constructedness correspond relationally with difference. Connolly writes that "[t]he definition of difference is a requirement built into the logic of identity" (1991:9-10). Indeed, in each of identity's successive manifestations, benevolent identity depends relationally on a wanting, growing, underdeveloped third world. Identity, in this way, is constituted through development's practices and arrangements that together work to establish Canada's benevolent relations with a needy third world.

Faithfully, benevolent identity spends and invests in a bid to quell the pressure rapid population growth asserts on development. As a sponsor of development projects abroad, benevolent identity distinguishes itself from, yet is dependent upon, those at whom benevolence is directed. In this sense, benevolence is directed at difference: here, an "excessively fertile third world". An overpopulated third world, then, stands consistent with the nature of *différance*: that which is non full, non simple and structured in a relation of otherness with benevolent identity (Derrida in Connolly 1991:13).¹⁷ *Différance*, also, is the "differentiating origin of differences" (Derrida in Connolly 1991:13, emphasis added). Identity, in this sense, gets constituted through the material practises and institutional arrangements that render as difference a series of objects of benevolence. These objects are, in the 1970s, a third world population *growth rate* that is to be reduced, with contributions from Canada, through third world national family planning programs. In the 1980s, difference, more precisely, is the *poorest people* in the third world, to whom Canada donates basic needs, like

contraceptives. More precisely still, in the mid 1980s, difference exists as the *poorest women* in the third world, whose reproductive labour Canada offers to replace with a more efficient, market based labour. However, while Canada establishes its benevolent identity by organizing the reform of reproductive behaviour in the third world, it is not necessarily the case that reduced fertility rewards development's discipline. Indeed, in India, in the 1980s, "by and large, couples adopt family planning only after achieving their family size and desired sex composition" (Karkal and Pandey 1989:91). Monetary incentives, ultimately, make the family planning program a "one shot mini anti poverty program", especially during periods of dry employment and in lean agricultural seasons (1989:74-75). Not surprisingly, then, in the 1980s, the Indian birth rate is unchanged, despite development's concerted efforts (Nair 1992:84). Apparently, difference is elusive, and resistant to identity's ordering. Regardless, Canada's benevolent identity reinstates its legitimacy by continuing its sponsorship of international population activities into the end of the 1980s, perhaps due to, as well as in spite of, the elusiveness and resistance that is *différance*.

While Canada persistently sends funds to the third world for development projects, a genealogy of benevolent identity exposes that difference not only elicits charity, but that difference, too, is hazardous to identity's stability. In relations of identity\ difference, when "those who suffer are not entirely helpless but are defined as threatening, contagious, or dangerous to the self-assurance of these identities", benevolent relations are revealed to be deeply complex (Connolly 1999 a:129). Benevolent identity is culturally constituted not only through practises and arrangements that define difference as needy, but benevolent identity is constituted, too, through practises and arrangements that define difference as a threat. In

¹⁷ Jacques Derrida (1982:11).

relation to Canadian benevolence, difference is the stubborn unfurling of third world births. Difference gets defined as threat, more precisely, due to the perpetuation of overpopulation the third world begets against Canada's development efforts. In the 1970s, for instance, the "population explosion" presses against third world economic growth, which gets wrested instead by third world demands for more beneficial terms of trade. Canada's economic well being then gets unsettled. In the 1980s, poor third worlders' reproductive unruliness jeopardizes national family programs when the poor in question reject the contraceptives international funders' favour. Accordingly, the investment in contraceptive administration benevolent identity makes might not prove to be a successful enterprise in Canadian development's delivery of basic needs. Later in the 1980s, the population problem in the third world puts at risk the earth's limited supply of fuel and water, not only for its own use, but for the first world's use, too. In other words, Canada assesses the risk and finds that the third world endangers its own development, and, endangers, too, the wealth first world benevolence taps so as to source solutions to the third world's problems. As such, excessive fertility in the third world produces overpopulation that resists Canada's benevolent efforts, and concomitantly destabilises Canada's benevolent identity.

Canada's benevolent identity is fearful of the challenges difference poses to the institutional standards through which identity is legitimated. Canada, apparently, is benevolent in its relations with the third world. Canada is cooperative with the third world in the shared project of third world development; charitable, as development assistance makes efforts to meet the third world's basic needs; and generous, in welcoming third world workers into the international economy. Under institutionalized standards of entitlement and discipline, underdevelopment is met, in this way, by benevolent interventions that

arrange for the third world's development. Development means, in this sense, third worlders' compliance with national family planning programs that intend to generate savings and growth; third worlders' consumption of basic needs, in particular, of those contraceptives favoured by national family programs; and third worlders' reduced sustenance production that gets off set by increased participation in the international market economy. If the third world abides by these institutional standards of discipline and entitlement, development is meant to extend from benevolence's interventions. However, as benevolence makes efforts to combat poverty abroad, the poor respond by reproducing, effectively delaying or reversing Canada's development endeavours. Canada might ask, What gives these others the right to complain when many struggling to measure up to the demands of life as a project already face as much self discipline, dependency, and uncertainty as they can handle (Connolly 1991:23)?

The question centres on asking whether the third world, dependent on first world benevolence, is responding correctly to Canada's development efforts. Or is it the case, that while Canada reinforces the benevolent nature of its relations with the third world, the overpopulating poor show that development's designs might not be appropriate, and that the institutional standards of discipline and entitlement extended by development might not be suitable? Whichever the case, when those in the third world are found not to be conforming with the interventions development extends, the standards maintaining Canada's benevolent identity are challenged.

In turn, Canada's institutionalized identity of benevolence contains the threat to identity posed by the objects of benevolence. More specifically, identity's existential suffering struggles with an uncertainty the objects of benevolence lend to development's standards of entitlement and discipline. Canada, for its part, conforms evidently with these

institutional standards: for example, Canada is cooperative, as it shares with the third world the project of third world development; Canada is charitable, as it makes efforts to meet specific third world basic needs; and Canada is generous, as it welcomes third world workers into the international market economy. But the poor give benevolent identity's resentment strength, as third worlders undermine the institutional standards of entitlement and discipline upon which benevolent relations are meant to depend. Instead, the third world endows underdevelopment with an overpopulation that demands from Canada greater compensation through improved terms of trade; an overpopulated third world demands from Canada different basic needs than the ones Canada provides; and overpopulation in the third world demands use of more of the earth's natural resources than Canada deems fit. Difference, in effect, destabilises Canada's benevolent identity; that is, difference disputes Canada's ascription as cooperative, charitable and generous. Canada's disappointment with poor people's disruption of development's benevolent efforts then gets expressed as existential resentment. In other words, identity's existential suffering turns to resentment against these others whose poverty, supposedly, is tinged with a competitive edge (Connolly 1999 a:129). Development, as such, is not only benevolence's efforts to quell a persistent overpopulation, but too, benevolence's self defence in the face of poor people's reproductive excess. Despite the asymmetrical power relations that separate them, then, identity's expression of existential resentment gets directed at those in a condition of official dependence (Connolly 1991:23). Identity expresses its resentment by repressing through development's institutionalized correction those who provoke benevolent identity's uncertainty, and like this, Canada maintains the standards of discipline and entitlement which legitimate its self ascription as benevolent (1991:209). In this sense, identity's existential

suffering and resentment are central to identity's constitutional relations with difference.

Genealogical analysis shows that identity's constitution is not only interdependent with difference, but that identity exists constitutionally in a relation of strife with difference (Connolly 1991:48). As such, through identity's variations, identity's many manifestations illustrate that it is competitive, and also that it is constructed and historically contingent (1999 a:129, 1991:48). In this sense, identity's cultural constitution proves to be agile, especially when identity senses it is threatened; and this agility, reflected in identity's contingency, lends support to the notion that a settled identity might shift were it confronted in democratic politics by movements seeking relational redress. As such, democratic exchange is the venue where identity's constitutional relations with difference can be confronted (1991:192-193). Indeed, democratic politics, Connolly writes, "can be a medium through which to expose and redress the politics of resentment" (1991:192). As illustrated, then, as a component of democracy, a genealogy of identity permits the criticism of modes of self reassurance identity mobilizes in face of difference's derailments (1991:33-34).

Conclusion

This chapter uses a genealogical epistemology to provide an account of Canada's benevolent identity through the course of its involvement in international population activities. From the mid 1970s to the end of the 1980s, a benevolent Canadian identity determinedly funds and furnishes development projects aimed to reduce the birth rate abroad. Benevolent identity emerges in a series of manifestations during this time: as a wealthy partner, a humanitarian deliverer of basic needs, and as a steward of the global environment. Through each of these manifestations, by fashioning third world fertility as needing development's assistance, institutionalized development constitutes Canada's identity in relation to a

difference that affirms Canadian benevolence. At once, with each one of identity's manifestations, arrangements and practises of development cast fertility in the third world as posing a threat to Canada's self ascribed benevolence. As such, genealogy addresses the existential suffering that fuels identity's resentment, which in turn gets expressed as the subjugation of difference. It is through a genealogy, then, that an inquiry is made into the naturalized status of Canada's benevolent identity. This modest genealogy continues in the next chapter, where another manifestation of benevolent identity is revealed as Canada, in the 1990s, explains its involvement with the hCG contraceptive research project.

The final chapter contemplates a constitutional change in identity\ difference, one that would accompany a redress of social and material injuries, as is requested in the Bill of Rights: for contraceptive research, development and use (1996). Displaying that such a change in identity is not impossible, this chapter, through genealogical study, denaturalizes the cultural constitution of identity\ difference, and accordingly attempts to confound benevolent identity's self certainty (Connolly 1991:171-181). In doing so, this chapter follows Laura Macdonald's analysis of cultural practises in Canada's relations with the third world (1995). An examination of Canada's involvement in international population activities demonstrates, consistent with Macdonald's findings, that a northern attitude of superiority is evident in Canada's relations with the third world (1995:136). That is, in benevolence, a sense of political and cultural superiority is present as Canada corrects an excessively fertile third world poor, one that supposedly is unable to regulate its reproduction, especially in terms of the standards development defends. Consistent though Canada's identity of benevolence is with Macdonald's inquiry, this chapter demonstrates, distinct from Macdonald's study, that benevolent identity dispenses correction through institutional

development, specifically as an expression of existential resentment. Development contends with excessive third world births again in the 1990s, as Canada extends a new manifestation of benevolence. This one emerges as a "custodian of third world women's health", as the next the chapter illustrates.

Chapter 3

The hCG Contraceptive, an International Campaign and Benevolent Identity's Entry into Democratic Exchange

David Campbell describes US foreign policy as "a practice constitutive" of American identity (1990:271). Similarly, this thesis seeks to illustrate that Canada's official development assistance constitutes Canada's identity of benevolence. Tracking Canada's involvement in the field of third world population assistance, this thesis observes a peripheral instance in Canada's external relations. In contrast, Campbell surveys American security during the Cold War, when the whole world was watching (1992, 1990). In this era, American foreign policy seems to be responding to a diverse set of historical circumstances, with support from its strong, constant and certain national identity. But neither then, nor now, is American identity fixed. Identity, instead, constituted by American foreign policy, is "always in a process of becoming" (1992:11). Cardinal in identity, as such, is foreign policy's continuous constitution of an internal (American) realm in relation to an external (communist) one, or the constitution of a self in relation to an other (1990:273). Campbell reads William E Connolly and explains that identity is constituted in relation to difference (1992:8). Difference is an externalized, foreign-inscribed threat, and foreign policy is the "system through which ... exclusion and controls [of difference] [a]re effected" (1992:7). In this sense, foreign policy is entrusted with disciplining uncertainties testing identity - uncertainties propelled by external threats of danger (1990:272). This thesis, with subtle contrast, draws from Connolly and seeks to show that identity's uncertainty, in the face of foreign threat, catalyses identity's existential resentment. Existential resentment can be expressed through

external relations of development assistance, in turn, which might be met by political movements' contest. Distinguishing Connolly and Campbell's writing fundamentally, then, is Connolly's centering of the identity\ difference analysis in democratic contest. For instance, Campbell describes American foreign policy's constitution of American identity in relation to Soviet threats of imperialism, if not in terms of the USSR's mere existence.¹ But with the end of the Cold War, though external threats are of a "constantly shifting characterization", how the "opportunity ... [for] the emergence of new and less violent forms of identity and difference" might be conceived remains unexplored in Campbell's schemata (1990:268, 282).

Dissent articulates modes of being and forms of life contending with extant relations of identity\ difference, and these articulations of dissent may be sounded in democratic exchange. Unlike William E Connolly's writing, David Campbell's schema does not examine dissent from identity's relation with identity\ difference. Certainly, Campbell acknowledges the continuous presence of dissent in identity's play. He notes "the on-going agonism between ... practises and the freedom they seek to contain means that individuals have articulated a series of counter-demands" (1992:258). But Campbell refrains from detailing these counter demands, so he is left wondering "what modes of being and forms of life could we or should we adopt" (1992:257)? It is democracy that allows for contest against settled identities, according to Connolly (1991:200). Concomitantly, democracy allows an address of identity's existential resentment directed at difference (1991:192-193). However, a

¹ Campbell paraphrases Connolly and writes that "[t]he mere existence of an alternative mode of being, the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible and thus denaturalizes the claim of a particular identity to be the true identity, is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat" (1992:3).

study of exclusion and repression endured by difference is limited, as difference, save for its story of defeat, is rendered, then, undynamic, as in Campbell's account. Only when "space [is created] for the Other *not to be spoken of but to speak*", writes E Fuat Keyman, might the denaturalization of settled identities proceed (1997:195). In democratic exchange, difference may articulate dissent by proposing alternative relations of identity\ difference, and difference within identity may do the same. An example of the articulations of difference, elaborated in the next chapter, is the Bill of Rights (1996), proposed by and representing women in the third world for whose use a Canadian Crown Corporation is funding research into a new contraceptive. An example of the articulations of difference within identity is elaborated in this chapter, in which difference in identity is shown to be women in Canada contending against this instance of overseas reproductive assistance. An examination of difference within identity, such as this one, does not chronicle difference's defeat, and instead attends to the democratic contest dissent sounds against identity's relations with difference. Anna Yeatman writes that contest involves an evaluation of the procedures that determine who is included in and excluded from decision making (1993:234). Contesting the procedures through which decisions are made implies a concern with the very decisions being made, and implies, as well, the imagining by dissent of alternative decisions.

Before elaborating upon the possible alternatives dissent from identity might offer, first this thesis continues to probe Canada's identity of benevolence. Like the last chapter, this chapter uses a genealogical epistemology to provide an account of Canada's benevolent identity in the course of Canada's involvement in international population activities. This chapter, more precisely, illustrates that in the 1990s Canada's benevolent identity emerges as a custodian of third world women's health. This benevolent identity promotes for third

world women's use the selection of the hCG contraceptive so that third world fertility can be better controlled and, concurrently, rapid population growth remedied. In this sense, Canada's identity in the 1990s stands consistent with benevolent identity's earlier manifestations. Likewise, this chapter demonstrates, like the last, that Canada's benevolent identity, through institutional arrangements and material practices of development, constitutes difference as being needy and dependent on Canada's assistance. But tracking identity's existential resentment shows that benevolent identity also constitutes difference as being hazardous to identity's stability. Thus, the politics of benevolent identity exhibit that while Canada operates as an entity committed to third world women's health, Canada also administers correction to a difference that destabilizes identity's self certainty. Challenging Canada's identity of benevolence, difference in identity directs dissent at Canada's administration of correction through development assistance. Difference in identity, in this case, is the International Campaign against Population Control and Abusive, Hazardous Contraceptives, in negotiations with the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) concerning the Centre's suspension of funding for an hCG contraceptive research project. The International Campaign, through its negotiations, proposes to IDRC that it consider alternative relations with the women for whom the hCG contraceptive is being designed. The International Campaign's proposal that IDRC exchange its pursuit of a development *malfait* for a development *bienfait* is introduced in the final section. The arrangements and practises that currently constitute a benevolent identity's relations with difference are featured in the second section, while the third section looks specifically at those arrangements and practices that protect identity from difference's persistent threat. Such a threat to an identity's stability is not only posed from without, but also circulates

within the identity's self defined boundaries. Correspondingly, the section that immediately follows displays difference within identity not as dissent, but rather as outsiders existing on the inside whose reproduction Canada fears, and whose reproduction Canada accordingly arranges to defeat.

1 Muting the Reproduction of Difference within Identity

In the face of uncertainty, the repression of difference in identity works to ascertain identity\ difference. David Campbell more precisely explains difference in identity's play in the establishment of identity\ difference:

The demarcation of self and other is, however, not a simple process that establishes a dividing line between the inside and the outside. It is a process that involves the grey area of liminal groups in a society, those who can be simultaneously self and other - outsiders who exist on the inside. In the constitution of US society, women, American Indians, workers, Chinese, Japanese, and others have, at various historical junctures, been liminal and thus central to the creation of US political identity (1990:275).

Constituting identity\ difference then means the exclusion or repression of outsiders who exist on the inside (Butler 1991:155). During the Cold War, as Campbell notes, the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) conducted "loyalty tests" on a fifth of the American labour force, marking certain Americans as " 'subversive' " or Un-American (1990:276). Liminality threatens identity by destabilizing, for example, identity's constitutive sense of superiority, singularity, and truth. Labour politics during the Cold War, as such, threatened "the subjectivities and social relations of production associated with liberal capitalism: family, property, and hence national identity" (1990:277). Suppressing threats to identity involves linking liminality with a foreign source; in this case, labour politics is associated with Cold War communism, or Soviet imperialism (1990:278). The state is central to the suppression of difference in identity, as the state is central to identity's constitution.

However, in constituting identity, the state is not distinct from identity: William E Connolly argues, "the state is the official center of self-conscious collective action" (1991:201). As such, collective identity is bound to the state while the state, in turn, protects identity by repressing with it treacherous otherness. When identity\ difference is disturbed, "the state disciplinary-police-punitive apparatus is marshalled to constitute and stabilize constituencies whose terms of existence might otherwise provide signs of defeat, injury, and sacrifice (Connolly 1991:206). Hence, with the execution of state discipline, "internal objects of externality" (Connolly 1991:208) get constituted as difference. In the era when IDRC funds research into the hCG contraceptive, reproductive policies and practises in Canada render particular Canadian residents "internal objects of externality". That is, in 1975-1995, Canada, considering the reproduction of some within its boundaries undesirable, limits fertility among select human samples. When "defects in the established identity" are suspected, the state, in other words, exacts a discipline, defending identity by defeating the defects infecting it (1991:209).

In the last quarter century, Aboriginal women and men, those diagnosed as intellectually disabled, new immigrants and the poor are "primary targets of state negation" (Connolly 1991:207), and are disproportionately sterilized in Canada. Both Alberta and British Columbia repeal provincial sterilization acts only in 1972. Before this, between 1929 and 1972, nearly consistently, the number of Eastern Europeans sterilized under the Alberta Act is disproportionately high in comparison to the proportion of Eastern Europeans in the provincial population (Lewis 1995:78). Alberta's attempts to limit Eastern Europeans through fertility control conforms with Canada's efforts to limit Eastern European

immigration in this period.² Under the Alberta Act, in the last years of its existence, 25.7% of people sterilized are Indian and Métis, while the proportion of Indians and Métis in Alberta at this time is only 3.4% (Lewis 1995:78). A survey conducted at a British Columbia mental health hospital finds a typical patient of sterilization there might be described as a young, unwed mother diagnosed as mentally retarded (McLaren 1990:160). The famous case of Lelani Muir shows that some sterilized in Alberta mental institutions are not "mentally defective", as diagnosed, but simply poor and unwanted (Whiting 1996). "Defects", while presumed to be intergenerationally transmitted, figure as both biologically fixed and as culturally embedded, released, then, only with the greatest difficulty (MacLaren 1990:48). Ontario, though without legal means to sterilize those thought likely to pass to the next generation a hereditary taint, in 1978, after the repeal of the Alberta and British Columbia sterilization acts, conducts hundreds of therapeutic sterilizations, as the province has annually for decades (McLaren 1990:169). The "neediness" of Aboriginal, immigrant and disabled peoples; the taxation required to meet these needs; and the social ills thought to transpire should "treatment" not be forthcoming: these are an historically harboured Canadian fear (McLaren 1990). Currently, popular fears abound when the birth rates of Métis, Inuit, and Indians are announced.³ Accordingly, it is not surprising that Aboriginal women, as well as non white women, immigrant women, women with disabilities, and

² Immigration law in the 1920s excludes from entry into Canada "illiterates", and draws categories of " 'non preferred' " southern and eastern Europeans and " 'preferred' " northern Europeans, though this last category limits British subjects in the Commonwealth to ones in predominantly white countries (McLaren 1990:58).

³ As recently as 1998, in the *Globe and Mail*, Jeffrey Simpson devotes an editorial piece on the birth rate among Aboriginal people, drawing particular attention to the fact that the birth rates of Inuit, Métis and Indians exceeds the birth rate of the overall population. Simpson predicts an increase in demand, on and off reserves, for education, training, employment, child services, day care and counselling, and warns that unless these demands are met, "Canada will have even more social problems than it does now" (1998:A23).

adolescent women, too are more likely to be sterilized or administered long term contraceptives than other women (Lewis 1995:76-77, 91-93; Canadian Women's Committee 1994:9).⁴ By disciplining the uncertainty the internal other poses, Canada tames its fears, which often remain imprecise, while the identity that is to be stabilized also remains vague. More certain is that this identity, perhaps defined only by its national contours, ie "Canada", senses danger, and accordingly extends existential resentment against the threatening difference (Connolly 1991:207).⁵ The state "proceeds by making 'foreign' ... [these] 'internal' developments that would otherwise constitute signs of disruption within the collective identity" (1991:207).⁶ Collective identity, never separable from the state, but rather sharing with it "understandings, proclivities, and repugnancies that infiltrate the structure of

⁴ Lewis, writing a Master's thesis, finds evidence of present day coercive sterilization in phone conversations with activists in northern Canada, in a footnote relating medically unconfirmed stories in a provincial Law Reform Commission Report, in a grassroots activists' flyer, and in a report written by a local women's group (1995). That the sources announcing contemporary coercive sterilization in Canada might be considered academically " 'unreliable' ", according to Lewis, is consistent with the very silencing of women with disabilities, Aboriginal women, women who are poor, and non white women (1995:3-4).

⁵ Angela Davis documents the disproportionately high sterilization of [poor] Black women and [poor] Native women in the United States (1981:202-221). Poor Black adolescents, illiterate Black women, and Black and Native women deemed to have already a sufficient number of children are sterilized with federal government funding at the behest, for instance, of "Community Action Committees", physicians' judgments, and Indian Health Services Hospitals (Davis 1981: 202-221). As in Alberta and British Columbia, women are sterilized in America under state laws intending to prevent the reproduction of " 'mentally deficient persons' " (Davis 1981:217). Indeed, by 1932, 26 American states have instituted compulsory sterilization legislation (Davis 1981:214). In Europe, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland pass sterilization laws between 1929 and 1938 (McLaren 1990:212, fn 17). Starting in 1934, Germany sterilizes non institutionalized " 'feeble minded' " persons and inmates in mental institutions; and later, along with Jews, homosexuals and gypsies, the state also confines in Concentration Camps, and murders, psychiatric patients (Whiting 1996, Bock 1983:412-415).

⁶ Similarly, David Campbell writes, "resistant elements to a secure identity on the inside are linked through a discourse of *danger* with threats identified and located on the outside" (1990:266). But Campbell differs from Connolly by stressing the discourse *linking* threats within with threats without. An aforementioned example is the link between American labour politics and Soviet imperialism (Campbell 1990:278). Linking internal threats to identity with external threats to identity effectively transforms differences within "into differences between", according to Campbell (1990:266). Thus, in the breadth of HUAC's trials, when homosexuals also are tried for treason (Kushner 1993), homosexuality effectively is made foreign in America. How internal threats to identity are linked with external threats to identity, with regard to Canada's domestic and foreign reproductive politics, is not the subject of this chapter, however.

perception, judgment, and decision" (Connolly 1991:199), engages in practices and arrangements that limit the reproduction of differences while identity, at once, assuages its fear of internal otherness.

2 Benevolent Identity in the 1990s

A genealogical analysis of Canada's involvement in international population activities finds that Canada's identity in the 1990s stands consistent with earlier manifestations of Canada's benevolent identity. In the 1970s, benevolent identity emerges as a wealthy partner funding national family planning programs in compact with third world governments. In the 1980s, benevolent identity appears as a humanitarian deliverer of basic needs, funding now, also, community organizations that can dispense basic needs like birth control. Later in the 1980s, Canada's benevolent identity surfaces as a steward of the global environment, quelling third world fertility's detrimental effects on the environment by conferring to replace reproductive labour with the benefits market labour reputedly offers. In the 1990s, Canada's benevolent identity manifests as a custodian of third world women's health. Canada's identity of benevolence promotes for third world women's use the hCG contraceptive so that third world fertility can be better controlled. The hCG contraceptive, by the mid 1990s, enters the human trial phase after 20 years of research co sponsorship from the Canadian Crown Corporation, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC).

In the 1990s, Canada's identity of benevolence manifests as a custodian of third world women's health. IDRC qualifies its research funding of the hCG contraceptive as a

part of "the Centre's thrust ... on maternal and child health research" (IDRC nd a:1).⁷

Indeed, as a custodian of third world women's health, IDRC explains the reproductive benefits the hCG contraceptive holds. Specifically, IDRC recognises "the need for alternatives in reproductive choices with the aim of enabling women to have greater control over fertility and health" (IDRC nd a:2). The hCG contraceptive, in this sense, offers women improved fertility control through a greater choice in pregnancy prevention methods. Provision of the hCG contraceptive meets an additional concern IDRC harbours in relation to third world women's fertility: overpopulation in the developing world. IDRC states:

The Centre approaches contraception from the standpoint of maternal and child health. While issues of population are not the driving force of our research, we are of course very aware of population issues and the need for alternatives in reproductive choices with the aim of enabling women to have greater control over their fertility and their health (nd a:2).

Certainly, IDRC makes a distinction between its benevolent involvement in the health of

⁷ The hCG contraceptive is an injectable birth control method based on the immunological principle of bodily rejection: when there is conception, the contraceptive triggers antibodies against the hCG hormone (human chorionic gonadotrophin hormone), which, when suppressed, terminates pregnancy (Richter 1993:9-12). The immunological approach to birth control is new. Immunological contraceptives have yet to reach the market in the era when the International Campaign and IDRC are engaged in an exchange over the Centre's research funding of the hCG contraceptive. In this era, for example, the hCG contraceptive research co sponsored by IDRC is assessing only its first set of human trials (Pestieau to Seabrooke 24 January 1997, National Institute of Immunology nd). Five major centres are conducting research on immunological contraceptives at the time of IDRC's exchange with the International Campaign. Among these research centres are the World Health Organization; the Population Council in New York; and the National Institute of Immunology (NII) in New Delhi, where IDRC sends its funds (Richter 1993:14-15). The five centres are researching immunological contraceptives that interfere, varyingly, with egg maturation and production of sperm, fertilization, and like the hCG contraceptive, the implantation, or development, of early embryos (Richter 1993:11). NII's development of immunological contraceptives is funded, along with IDRC, by the Indian government, the Rockefeller Foundation, USAID, and the Family Planning Foundation of India (*Resistance on the Rise* 1996:47, Richter 1993:14). Since 1974, IDRC has been funding hCG contraceptive research in India through five consecutive grants, first to the All India Institute for Medical Research, and then to NII (de Savigny to Seabrooke 14 July 1995:3). IDRC also has supported hCG contraceptive research conducted by the International Committee for Contraception Research of the Population Council, issuing its last grant in 1985 (de Savigny to Seabrooke 14 July 1995:3). From 1974 to 1995, IDRC funds hCG contraceptive research to a total of \$4.5 million (de Savigny to Seabrooke 14 July 1995:3).

third world women from its concern with third world overpopulation. But a solution for curbing overpopulation, as it is expressed by IDRC, coincides with its solution for women's health needs by way of women's fertility reduction. Women's reproductive good health, and a reduction in third world births, both can be confronted, then, through greater contraceptive choice - that is, through women's selection of the hCG contraceptive. IDRC's allusion to the dangers of overpopulation is evinced in Canada's submission to the 1994 United Nations International Conference on Population and Development. Canada names these dangers more explicitly in this submission: only a year before IDRC's exchange with the International Campaign, apparently for the first time in an official position, Canada connects fertility in the third world with an apprehension over third world immigration to Canada (Canada 1994:15). In distinction, IDRC does not articulate its concerns with overpopulation so precisely. Rather, as custodian of third world women's health, IDRC instead focuses on rendering greater control of women's fertility to individual women. Women's use of the hCG contraceptive quells, then, the vague third world dangers discerned by IDRC that pose to Canada a threat. In endangering Canada, third world women's fertility undermines Canada's benevolent identity as custodian of third world women's health. That is, women in the third world test benevolent identity's singular focus on care by prompting, also, Canada's self defence against unrestrained third world fertility. Third world women's reproductive health, accordingly, beckons Canada to press ahead in its development endeavours and entrench its identity of benevolence.

As custodian of third world women's health, Canada extends its benevolence by sponsoring research into the hCG contraceptive - an alternative contraceptive choice, according to IDRC, that women can select in a bid to prevent pregnancy (IDRC nd a:1).

For married third world women, half of whom "do not want any more children", the hCG contraceptive is "a simpler, cheaper, safe, more easily accessible, confidential and reversible means for women to avoid unwanted pregnancy" (IDRC nd a:1-2). Achieving good health, then, depends on women selecting, among varied birth control methods, the hCG contraceptive. Similarly, achieving "development" might depend on the Indian family planning program dispensing the hCG contraceptive. Indeed, the prevention of pregnancies is an Indian "development problem" that IDRC's research sponsorship contributes to solving.⁸ More precisely, in India's VIIIth 5 Year Plan (1992-1997), lowering an excessive national fertility rate is one of the Plan's six priorities (Singh 1998:189). In the 1990s, the Indian national family planning program replaces its birth control method of choice, female sterilization, with "spacing methods", such as the IUD, pills, condoms, implants and injectables (Nair 1992:246).⁹ The hCG contraceptive is one such injectable. As an injectable, the contraceptive requires a health service provider for its administration. Secured against user failure, provider administered contraceptives are considered more effective than user controlled contraceptives by anti natalist family planning programs (Parikh 1994).¹⁰ While provider controlled contraceptives are costly to administer, compared with surgical implants (such as Norplant), or vaginal insertions (like the IUD), an injectable method like the hCG contraceptive is a relatively inexpensive alternative in the context of

⁸ By funding NII's research into the hCG contraceptive, IDRC is clearly fulfilling its mission "to help developing countries find their own solutions to development problems through research" (IDRC nd a: no page number).

⁹ Whereas female sterilization terminates all possibility of pregnancy, spacing methods, like the IUD, pills, condoms, and injectables (eg Depo Provera, NET-EN and the hCG contraceptive) do not discourage young couples from using birth control if fewer or spaced births is preferred to no births at all (WB/ OED 1992:34).

¹⁰ User failure is defined as pregnancy arising from the user's incorrect contraceptive administration - be it accidental or purposeful (Richter 1994:63).

spartan health services (Richter 1994:214). Predictably, then, the Indian national family planning program, in its mission to discourage births, might encourage use of the hCG contraceptive, once it is marketable, much as IDRC, as custodian of third world women's health, promotes use of the contraceptive as a superior choice for third world women's pregnancy prevention.

But as custodian of third world women's health, IDRC pledges that its research sponsorship of the hCG contraceptive will let fertility control better rest with the individual. More specifically, IDRC is alert that Canada's research sponsorship might propagate a birth control method that the Indian national family planning program next selects as the institutional choice for meeting the country's anti natalist designs. IDRC writes: "Contraceptive use is not an institutional decision. It is an individual decision. It is an individual decision to be made by the woman concerned. IDRC is trying to widen the options for contraceptive choice for women to consider (nd a:1)". Writing this, IDRC affirms its identity as custodian of third world women's health despite the fact that contraceptive choice for Indian women tends to rest with the national family planning program. More specifically, given the high likelihood that the hCG contraceptive wins favour with the Indian national family planning program, health workers in this target based program might prescribe the contraceptive regardless of users' concerns. Health workers, in other words, regularly view women's concerns with contraceptives as psychologically based, while "clinic staff is known to push its own decision in what the women should accept" (Karkal and Pandey 1989:88). The hCG contraceptive, in particular, is likely to win institutional favour since reduction of the birth rate stands as a national priority and the hCG contraceptive promises a low rate of user failure; also because the contraceptive is

inexpensively administered through hypodermic injection; and because the contraceptive is being developed as a long acting method.¹¹ Indeed, that contraceptive choice with the Indian national family planning program tends to be an institutional decision is hardly unknown. Between April 1976 and January 1977, state workers coerce or forcibly sterilize 7 635 396 men, mostly from "the weaker section of society" (Bannerji 1980:83).¹² In the 1980s, the state pays a woman Rs 100 in exchange for selecting laparoscopic sterilization, compared to a payment of Rs 10 for an IUD insertion, or nothing for other methods (World Bank/ OEB 1992:32).¹³ In the 1990s, an expectation that women's informed consent always prefigures human contraceptive trials gets undermined by allegations that trials for the hCG contraceptive are conducted deceptively on Indian trial subjects.¹⁴ Whether the trial subjects are aware that the trials are meant to determine the "unknown efficacy and potential adverse effects" of the experimental contraceptive remains debatable (Richter 1994:219, Schaz and Schneider 1991).¹⁵ Also uncertain, or rather unlikely, once the contraceptive is developed, is

¹¹ In its most developed form, that is, in the hCG contraceptive's last human trials, the contraceptive's efficacy lasts only 3 months (NII nd:3). But the intention behind the contraceptive's ongoing development is that the contraceptive last in duration, at minimum, six months to a year (NII nd:5).

¹² Following this period of Emergency, when the Indian government legislates publication bans and the suspension of civil rights, in 1980, IDRC issues a second phase of funding for hCG contraceptive research in India (IDRC 2001 b).

¹³ In 1983, IDRC issues a third phase of funding into hCG contraceptive research, specifically to test the contraceptive's safety (IDRC 2001 c).

¹⁴ See Schaz and Schneider (1991). Also, at its meeting with IDRC on 5 June 1995, the International Campaign sounds this same allegation (*Resistance on the Rise* 1996:20-21).

¹⁵ IDRC replies to allegations that hCG contraceptive trials are conducted deceptively on trial subjects by requesting to the National Institute of Immunology that it employ an independent survey to determine the adequacy of the informed consent procedure (de Savigny to Seabrooke 14 July 1995). A year and a half later, IDRC expresses its approval of the informed consent procedure NII uses in the trial. "When literacy was an issue," IDRC writes, "a tape of the consent form was played or it was read aloud to the potential participant" (Pestieau to Seabrooke 24 January 1997). After the International Campaign makes an inquiry specifically about the independent survey of the informed consent procedure IDRC has requested from NII, IDRC responds that "it is made clear to [our grant recipients] that they must conduct [research] in conformity with national laws and standards and, where applicable, recognize international standards. However, as a granting institution,

whether then the worsening of existing immuno suppressive diseases, like HIV or hepatitis B, will be prevented through screening patients for diseases before the contraceptive is prescribed (Richter 1993:39-40). Like it waives time consuming and expense incurring pelvic examinations before laporoscopic sterilizations in the 1980s, the Indian national family planning program may waive disease screenings before administering the hCG contraceptive, waive users' concerns with side effects, and waive the periodic monitoring of the contraceptive's effectiveness, especially were malnutrition to set in.¹⁶ Disseminating information on the risks associated with a contraceptive better lets fertility control rest with the individual. But misinformation contributes to institutional contraceptive selection, and even to coercive contraceptive administration, in a family planning program governed under a national priority to reduce births.¹⁷ As custodian of third world women's health, IDRC, by sponsoring research into the hCG contraceptive, effectively contributes to development's control of third world women's fertility - the difference upon which Canada's benevolent identity depends.

In sum, custodian of third world women's health is a variation of Canada's benevolent identity surfacing in the course of Canada's involvement with fertility abroad, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. These variations in Canada's benevolent identity illustrate debates in Canada's approaches to third world development, and illustrate,

IDRC cannot accept responsibility for every aspect of the conduct of the hundreds of projects which it funds annually, and which are legally under the control of grant recipients" (O'Neil to Seabrooke 16 June 1998).

¹⁶ Malnutrition, a pervasive condition with which women in India live, lowers the body's immune response (Rao 1996:39, Richter 1993:33).

¹⁷ Julie Delahanty shows that the "discourse of population control" significantly influences, not only contraceptive delivery, but also contraceptive technology research (1995). Using feminist critiques of technology and critical literature on population control, she develops her case around the hCG contraceptive (1995).

moreover, that development, regardless of the specific approach, requires taming what development names as an excessively high population growth rate. In the 1990s, by focusing on third world women's health, Canada takes an approach to development which permits benevolent identity to promote the hCG contraceptive's selection among other birth control methods, so that third world women's fertility can be better controlled and, concomitantly, rapid population growth remedied. Canada's manifestation of benevolent identity in the 1990s, as such, does not indicate a fundamental shift in identity but indicates, rather, a confirmation of identity's benevolence. The variations in identity, then, according to this genealogy, portray not only that Canada's approach to development is multiple, but that these approaches to development supplant one another as defeat and self doubt trail the benevolent encounter. Paradoxically, Canada confronts benevolent identity's uncertainty by focusing on the unruly persistent growth of the third world's poor. That is, benevolent identity gets consolidated by overhauling Canada's approach to development, and establishing a new tack as development again attempts to suppress the spectre of third world population growth. In this way, "the very terms of contestation over sources and remedies" organizing third world development in fact secure an identity of benevolence (Connolly 1991:181).

3 The Constitution of Benevolent Identity as Custodian of Third World Women's Health

A genealogical study of Canada's benevolent identity exposes identity's constitutional relations with difference. Identity is constituted through "organizing principles of material practices and institutional arrangements" that concurrently differentiate or even repress the other (Butler 1991:155). It will be illustrated next that institutional development's practices

and arrangements constitute Canada's identity as benevolent, while concomitantly differentiating third world fertility as being in need of Canada's helpful intervention. However, not only does institutional development constitute third world fertility as needing Canada's benevolence, but development's arrangements and practices also constitute third world fertility as posing to Canada a hazard or threat. It is through studying identity's existential resentment, as it will be shown, that genealogy illustrates, in constitutional relations of identity\ difference, the fear otherness instills in Canada's benevolent identity.

Over the course of two decades, institutional arrangements and material practices of international development constitute a Canadian identity of benevolence. More precisely, through development's practices and arrangements, Canada's benevolent identity is constituted in relation to a needy third world. William E Connolly writes that "[t]he definition of difference is a requirement built into the logic of identity" (1991:9-10). As a sponsor of development projects abroad, Canada's benevolent identity distinguishes itself from, yet is dependent upon, those at whom benevolence is directed. Identity, in this sense gets constituted through material practices and institutional arrangements that render as difference a series of objects of benevolence. These objects are, in the 1970s, a third world population *growth rate* that is to be reduced, with contributions from Canada, through third world national family planning programs. In the 1980s, difference, more precisely, is the *poorest people* in the third world, to whom Canada donates basic needs, like contraceptives. Later in the 1980s, difference exists, more precisely, again, as the *poorest women* in the third world, whose reproductive labour Canada proffers to replace with a more efficient, market based labour. In the 1990s, difference is *third world women's uncontrolled fertility*, which requires for its containment the hCG contraceptive - a contraceptive being developed, in part, with

Canadian assistance. Indeed, in each of benevolent identity's successive manifestations, the constitution of identity depends on a wanting, growing, underdeveloped third world.

While Canada persistently sends funds to the third world for development projects, a genealogy of benevolent identity exposes that difference not only elicits charity, but that difference, too, is hazardous to identity's stability. In relations of identity\ difference, when "those who suffer are not entirely helpless but are defined as threatening, contagious, or dangerous to the self-assurance of these identities", benevolent relations are revealed to be deeply complex (Connolly 1999 a:129). That is, benevolent identity is culturally constituted not only through practises and arrangements that define difference as needy, but also through practises and arrangements that define difference as a threat. In relation to Canadian benevolence, difference is the stubborn unfurling of third world births. Difference gets defined as threat, more accurately, due to the perpetuation of overpopulation the third world begets against Canada's development efforts. In the 1990s, Canada's benevolent identity as custodian of third world women's health is undermined by Canada's fear of third world women's fertility. That is, third world women test benevolent identity's singular focus on care by also prompting Canada's self defence against an unchecked increase in third world birth rates. Canada's fear of foreign overpopulation is displayed, not so subtly, in the IDRC Ottawa headquarter lobby. Here one finds a "clock" counting on one pixel board the world's net increase in population each second; and below this, on a second pixel board, a "clock" counting the world's net decrease in arable land each second.

These clocks, of course, resound with Thomas Malthus's 18th century pronouncement on the scourge that is poor people's overpopulation. Malthus predicts, given that the increase in human population is geometric, and the increase in food

production in arithmetic, that unproductive poor people's excessive fertility requires the implementation of controls (Bandarage 1995:27-28, Mass 1976:16-17).¹⁸ In its leaflet on the clock, which IDRC distributes in the era of the Centre's negotiations with the International Campaign, IDRC writes that "[t]he next millennium should see efforts to control our numbers take hold" (nd b). The pamphlet refers, in addition to IDRC's research sponsorship of new farming methods and education initiatives, to IDRC's efforts to control numbers through new "birth control methods" (nd b). "[E]fforts to control *our* numbers", more precisely, allude to efforts to control *their* numbers, as IDRC writes in its pamphlet that "[t]he countries of sub-Saharan Africa and south Asia will tilt the scales, accounting for one-half of the world's population compared with their current one-third share" (nd b, italics added). IDRC's fear of the increasing numbers of poor, who allegedly jeopardize Canada's access to productive land, undermines IDRC's reiteration of its "commit[ment] to ... improving the lives of women and children in the South" (Philips to Seabrooke 14 April 1998). Limited by the fear against which it competes, IDRC's commitment manifests as a suspended benevolence. IDRC's identity as custodian of third world women's health, in this sense, gets destabilized by an excessive third world fertility, the difference upon which benevolent identity depends.

As Canada's fear of foreign fertility conflicts with its commitment to third world women's health, benevolence gets translated through institutional development into an existential resentment against difference. Unfixed by difference, benevolent identity reestablishes its relations with third world women. Relations of benevolence get

¹⁸ See also Peter Gillespie's account of the Malthusian overtones evident in IDRC's "clock" (1994).

(re)constituted in terms of development's standards of discipline and entitlement, whereby Canada, in the 1970s, is cooperative, as it shares with the third world the project of third world development. In the 1980s, Canada is charitable, as it makes efforts to meet specific third world basic needs. Later in the 1980s, Canada is generous, as it welcomes third world workers into the international market economy. In the 1990s, Canada is committed to third world women's individual control over fertility and health. However, the poor in the third world respond to Canada's benevolent attention by reproducing, effectively demanding from Canada, in the 1970s, greater compensation through improved terms of trade; in the 1980s, different basic needs than the ones Canada provides; later in the 1980s, use of more of the earth's natural resources than Canada deems fit; and in the 1990s, Canada's reconsideration of its commitment to third world women in the face of the offences of an excessive fertility. Difference, in this way, destabilizes Canada's benevolent identity: that is, difference disputes Canada's self ascription as cooperative, charitable, generous and committed. Relatedly, difference refutes Canada's standards of discipline and entitlement. Moreover, difference refuses to conform to these. An identity's existential suffering, or disappointment with difference's refusals, becomes resentment against these others whose poverty, supposedly, is tinged with a competitive edge (Connolly 1999 a:129). In other words, by complaining, difference seems to provoke identity's resentment, and also identity's uncertainty. Identity's expression of its existential resentment, in turn, corrects with benevolence those who complain against institutional development's standards of entitlement and discipline. In this way, Canada allays its uncertainty, while it legitimates the arrangements and institutions constituting its identity of benevolence (1991:209). Central in identity's constitutional relations with difference, then, is identity's existential resentment.

4 Dissidence

A benevolent identity, charitable towards yet fearful of third world fertility, marks Canada as it addresses population issues abroad. Difference in identity, also addressing Canada's third world relations, deviates from Canada's identity of benevolence. Here, difference in identity is not the liminality threatening identity's assuredness (Campbell 1992, Campbell 1990), nor, relatedly, is difference in identity the difference simply disciplined by identity's existential resentment (Connolly 1991). Here, difference in identity is dissent present in collective identity. Bonnie Honig, like David Campbell, reads William E Connolly as she considers difference in identity (1996). Distinct from Campbell, Honig studies campaigns conducted by difference in identity that advocate a change in identity's rules and cultural constructs (1996:260). Next, there follows an elaboration, through Connolly and Honig, of difference in identity's meaning, a discussion of difference in identity's place in the debate around IDRC's research funding of the hCG contraceptive, and finally, an examination of the possibilities difference in identity hold for a change in relations Canada might contemplate or cultivate with the women for whose use the hCG contraceptive is being designed. Here, difference in identity is the International Campaign against Population Control and Abusive, Hazardous Contraceptives, as it engages IDRC in an exchange, and proposes that Canada adopt for its benevolent identity a constitutively changed relation with women in the third world.

While an identity is pressed from without, as Canada's fear of foreign overpopulation suggests it is, identity, too, is pressed from "withi*n* its would-be economy of the same" (Honig 1996:258). That is, not only difference, but difference "withi*n*" identity, too, plagues

identity. The International Campaign against Population Control and Abusive, Hazardous Contraceptives is a manifestation of difference in identity. The International Campaign is a coalition of activists who exchange correspondence and meet with IDRC over its research funding of the hCG contraceptive. The International Campaign asks IDRC, among other requests, to cease funding the hCG contraceptive research project (Seabrooke to Bezanson 14 November 1996, Seabrooke to de Savigny, 18 April 1996, Seabrooke to Bezanson 15 June 1995). Composed, in part, of Canada's National Action Committee on the Status of Women, the International Campaign is a transnational entity, which cannot be categorized as foreign from Canada. Composed, also, of another 25 Canada based and non Canadian organizations, the International Campaign cannot be categorized, either, as "third world".¹⁹ Affiliated with Canada and at the same time with women in the third world, the International Campaign challenges Canada's relations of identity\ difference.²⁰ Whereas

¹⁹ At its 5 June 1995 meeting with IDRC, the International Campaign consists of organizations based in Australia, Brazil, Canada, the Dominican Republic, Germany, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, the US, and Zimbabwe (*Resistance on the Rise* 1996:49-50). Only the afternoon preceding the 5 June 1995 meeting does the International Campaign adopt its name (International Campaign against Population Control and Abusive, Hazardous Contraceptives) (*Resistance on the Rise* 1996:15). However, a campaign directed at funding institutions sponsoring immunological contraceptive research is launched two years before (*Resistance on the Rise* 1996). Participant organizations contribute to the campaign from the varied fields in which these organizations are involved, namely women's health law, reproductive issues, health and education, women's issues, Aboriginal women's issues, disabled women's issues, women and the environment, AIDS and HIV, and violence against women (*Resistance on the Rise* 1996:49-50).

²⁰ Uniting the International Campaign, seemingly, first, is its identification as potential users of newly developed contraceptives, and second, its affiliation with potential users of these contraceptives (Women's Health Interaction 1995:2). A series of authors caution feminist campaigns and the women's movement against assuming a unity not fraught within its ranks (Honig 1996, Jhappan 1996, Spivak 1993, Spivak 1987, Lorde 1984). Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, for example, criticizes a feminism that ignores its race and class privilege within an international political economy, and so fails to ask of the women with whom this feminism affiliates, "But who is this other woman? How am I naming her? How does she name me?" (1987:150). In light of feminist movements and campaigns actually fraught in this way, Rey Chow warns that withdrawing from the tasks of third world feminism is for third world feminism in the west "a complete surrender to the enemy" (1992:13). Chow advises western third world feminism, instead, to distinguish between support for the struggle and the struggle itself (1992:111). That is, according to Chow, third world feminism might leave the struggle's initiative to those whose life is constituted by it (1992:112). Western third world feminism's paradoxical

Canada cultivates a relationship of benevolence with women in the third world, the International Campaign seeks for Canada an alternative. William E Connolly writes that difference in identity's compulsion to seek an alternative relationship is based on identity's true nature, which difference in identity puts into doubt:

[The] bearers [of difference in identity] may acknowledge a drive within themselves and their culture to naturalize the identity given to them ... But they also struggle to ambiguate or overcome this drive because they find it ethically compelling to revise their relation to difference in the absence of ... proof (1991:46).

An absence of proof that fails to establish identity's self conception as a true and singular self prompts difference in identity to propose to Canada that it revise its relations with difference. In effect, the International Campaign places Canada's benevolent identity into question.²¹ An absence of proof, contrary to benevolent identity's judgment, also may disqualify the constitution of women in the third world as foreign, fertile, threatening, and needing development's mode of assistance. As such, development's arrangements and practises constituting Canada's benevolent identity are put into doubt by difference in identity.

Identity, ultimately, is variable (Connolly 1991:28, 171-181). Difference in identity is one example of identity's vicissitudes: the International Campaign, while not foreign from Canada transcends, at once, the distinction Canada places between itself and women in the third world. Another example of an identity's irregular and changeable nature is the multiple forms benevolence takes in relation to [over]population abroad. Through Canada's

advantage is that it meets at the juncture of multiple oppressions, for instance, of sexism and racism/ imperialism (Chow 1992:113). As such, in its politics of the self ie its "local politics", there exists for western third world feminism grounds for strategic alliances with third world women's struggles (Chow 1992:113).

involvement in population control, benevolent identity's ambivalence over its mission is never comprehensively concealed, however. While perceived population problems elicit charitable concern, the threat overpopulation in the third world poses to Canada is never entirely dismissed. Identity, in this sense, constitutes third world women's fertility as an otherness "licens[ing] bureaucratic correction, discipline and regulation" (Connolly 1991:21). But third world poor people's rebellion against development's discipline, and dismissal of development's standards of entitlement, taint benevolence with fear. Indeed, an existential resentment, directed at a feared other, organizes Canada's relations with women in the third world. Difference in identity, then, challenges the naturalization of identity's constitutive relations of identity\ difference.

Difference in identity ushers in alternative possibilities for identity\ difference. In particular, the International Campaign alerts Canada's benevolent identity to a development bienfait it can exchange for its development malfait. In the course of its exchange with IDRC, the International Campaign requests, most emphatically, that IDRC suspend its financial support for hCG contraceptive research at the National Institute of Immunology (Seabrooke to Bezanson 14 November 1996, Seabrooke to de Savigny 18 April 1996, Seabrooke to Bezanson 15 June 1995).²² However, the International Campaign does not request of IDRC that it discontinue funding contraceptive research altogether. Rather, the International Campaign advises IDRC that:

[Contraceptive r]esearch should be redirected towards methods that enable people -

²¹ See also Neufeld and Whitworth (1997), Neufeld (1995), Macdonald (1995) and Gabriel and Macdonald (1994) on domestic movements' criticism of the Canadian state's foreign policy orientation.

²² Also of grave importance in the International Campaign's exchange with IDRC is the allegation that IDRC turns a blind eye to the violation of informed consent procedures permitted by NII in its human trials on the hCG contraceptive (Seabrooke to Bezanson 1995:2).

particularly women - to exert greater control over their fertility without sacrificing their integrity, health and well being. It will only enhance your reputation as a conscientious funding institution to adopt a people-centred approach even at this stage (Seabrooke to Bezanson 15 June 1995:4).

As such, the International Campaign does not attempt to persuade IDRC to abandon its involvement in the health of women in the third world. Rather, the International Campaign recommends to IDRC that it fund the development of alternative methods of birth control, specifically physiologically non interfering, user controlled methods like barrier techniques or ovulation prediction (Resistance on the Rise 1996:30-31). According to the International Campaign, were IDRC to heed the Campaign's advise, Canada's benevolent identity, in its variant as custodian of third world women's health, effectively could be "enhance[d]".

More precisely, benevolent identity could be further "enhance[d]" were IDRC to extract contraceptive research funding from its interest in reducing population growth abroad. The International Campaign states: "If IDRC's objectives were to promote good science, values, ethics and women's health, then IDRC should reflect as to whether it wants to fund research into contraceptive methods that could easily end up as population control tools" (Resistance on the Rise 1996:22). The International Campaign claims, in other words, that the hCG contraceptive is a tool likely to be used in population control programs. More specifically, in the context of a population program determined to lower the birth rate, the hCG contraceptive can be administered deceptively. An expectation that women's informed consent always prefigures contraceptive trials is undermined by allegations in the early 1990s that the hCG contraceptive trials in India are conducted on unknowing patients (Seabrooke to Bezanson 15 June 1995:2, Schatz and Schneider 1991). Indeed, the hCG contraceptive is likely to win family planning programs' favour since the contraceptive promises a low rate of

user failure, because the contraceptive is inexpensively administered through hypodermic injection, and because the contraceptive is being developed as a long acting method. In the era of the International Campaign's exchanges with IDRC, the family planning program in India is governed under a national mandate to lower the birth rate.²³ As such, the International Campaign requests from IDRC that it terminate its support for research into a contraceptive synchronous with an antinatalist population program (Seabrooke to Bezanson 14 November 1996, Seabrooke to de Savigny 18 April 1996, Seabrooke to Bezanson 15 June 1995). Related to IDRC's support for India's family planning program, the Campaign requests, too, that IDRC explain its lapsed supervision of the informed consent procedure in the hCG contraceptive's human trials (Seabrooke, Mulay and Stemerding to O'Neil 21 May 1998, Seabrooke to Bezanson 14 November 1996, Seabrooke to de Savigny 18 April 1996, Seabrooke to Bezanson 15 June 1995:2-3). The International Campaign, in effect, discredits Canada's benevolent identity as the Campaign refutes IDRC's commitment to third world women's health. However, the threat to Canada posed by third world women's fertility is not a subject the International Campaign pursues when it recommends to IDRC an alternative to its development *malfait*.

The alternative relations IDRC might cultivate with women in the third world, as proposed by the International Campaign, seems conservative, perhaps, in terms of the constitutive change required for a development *bienfait*. However, developing a user controlled method of birth control, one administered by the user and operative when the user decides is development research based in a "people centered" model (Seabrooke to

²³ In India's VIIIth 5 Year Plan (1992-1997), lowering the national fertility rate is one of the Plan's six priorities

Bezanson 15 June 1995:4), and grounded in a constitutively alternative relation of identity\ difference. The International Campaign informs IDRC:

We were disappointed that despite your professed commitment to women's health as opposed to population control, you continue to believe that population growth is a fundamental problem and have not really changed your framework. We would like to remind you that good science ... is only possible in an ethical context (Seabrooke to Bezanson 15 June 1995:3).

The existing context to which the International Campaign refers is one wherein IDRC pronounces population growth in the third world as undesirably high. The births and bearers of births in the third world, more specifically, are constituted as a "problem" that benevolent identity needs to solve. IDRC casts third world behaviour as being in need of Canada's assistance; but IDRC, too, fashions third world fertility as posing to Canada a hazard or a threat. When IDRC attempts to solve this problem by disciplining difference, and so assuaging the threat that the other poses, then the development invoked by IDRC is not one based on a "people centered" model. The meaning of a "people centred approach" to development remains unclear, though, when a reconstitution of identity\ difference is not concomitantly affected. That is, it is not immediately conceivable how institutional development can revoke its benevolent interest in reducing birth rates abroad, nor is it apparent how Canada can refute its attendant fears. The International Campaign, in effect, does not name Canada's existential resentment, central to its constitutive relations with difference, an emission IDRC might address. The International Campaign's omission could be strategic, however. Of difference in identity Connolly writes, "if one transcends the domestic field of identities through which the other is constituted, one loses the identity and

standing needed to communicate with those one sought to inform” (1991:44). Contest expressed by difference in identity, in other words, runs the high risk of defeat, specifically when requests made by difference in identity sound dissonance. Like the liminal within identity subjected to birth limits, difference in identity, as dissent, too, might suffer defeat, and the alternative relations of identity \ difference dissent suggests get rejected.

Conclusion

Applying a genealogical epistemology, this chapter finds that in the 1990s Canada's benevolent identity manifests as custodian of third world women's health. By fashioning third world women as needing development's assistance, institutionalized development constitutes Canada's identity in relation to a difference that affirms Canadian benevolence. At once, through development's arrangements and practices, benevolent identity casts third world women's fertility as posing to Canada a threat. As such, genealogy addresses the existential suffering that fuels identity's resentment, or subjugation of difference and its dangers. It is through genealogy, then, that an inquiry is made into the naturalized status of Canada's benevolent identity. Identity is not uniform, however. For example, through its membership, the International Campaign, as difference in identity, is part of, yet at once distinct from Canada. The International Campaign, furthermore, is dissent from identity, as it questions benevolent identity's establishment. Indeed, the International Campaign questions Canada's constitutional relations with difference as the Campaign reproves benevolent identity's institutional devotion to decreasing the number of third world births. Notably, reproductive excess supersedes third world confines, not only through difference's interdependence with benevolent identity, but also by being present within Canada. That is, difference within identity is present in Canada as the liminality marking Aboriginal people's,

non white women's, poor women's, disabled women's and adolescents' fertility. Concerned with the excessive births difference bears upon it, Canada strikes to defeat difference in identity. Canada's identity, in this sense, is constituted not only by its practises and arrangements to lessen an undesirably high fertility through development in the distance; but Canada's fear of reproductive excess extends to difference within identity, and as such, Canada's identity, too, is constituted by its subjugation of internal outsiders' threat.

Perhaps a constitutional change in the relations of identity\ difference is unlikely. For, how might a constitutional change in identity be conceived? The next chapter probes the answer in a democratic setting, positioning Canada's benevolent identity against the requests made of it, more comprehensively than by the International Campaign, by the Bill of Rights: for Contraceptive Research, Development and Use (1996). The International Campaign's combined self definition as, and affiliation with, potential users of newly developed contraceptives promotes the involvement of contraceptive users in decisions about contraceptive research (Women's Health Interaction 1995:2). The Bill of Rights extends the articulations of contraceptive users into a democratic exchange, not only on the topic of the context in which contraceptives are researched, but also, very importantly, on the context in which contraceptives are prescribed and used (1996). The Bill of Rights (1996), in effect, is a guide the International Campaign presents to IDRC (Seabrooke to Bezanson, 14 November 1996) directing funding agencies' future relations with women in the third world, and perhaps the first world, too. Canada's benevolent identity may respond to the Bill of Rights (1996) with an assortment of rejoinders. Canada might respond to the Bill of Rights (1996), for instance, with "critical responsiveness" (Connolly 1995). Inhering a spirit of generosity, a critical responsiveness to the articulations of difference may

contemplate the reconstitution of identity, corresponding differences and otherness, as well as alternative relational possibilities of identity\ difference (Connolly 1995:xviii). Central to a new constitution in relations of identity\ difference is an address of benevolent identity's existential resentment, or "attempts to erase the threat that difference presents to the surety of self identity" (Connolly 1991:43). While the International Campaign does not name Canada's existential resentment when the Campaign proposes to IDRC that it pursue alternative relations with women in the third world, critical responsiveness addresses identity's expressions of resentment. That is, through critical responsiveness, Canada might confront the politics of benevolence. An occasion for critical responsiveness, such as this, is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 4

Reproductive Rights

What would it mean for women in the third world and poor women "to envision and demand democratic space where their histories, agency, autonomy, and self-determination would be at the centre" (Alexander and Mohanty 1997:xi)? The Bill of Rights: for contraceptive research, development and use (1996) reflects the envisioning and demanding of such a space. But what it is that might be required for the making of this space is the focus of this chapter. Chapter 4 responds to a thought posed by Patricia Williams: that writings on democracy, predisposed with rights assertions, have not similarly explored rights commitment (Alexander and Mohanty 1997:xxxvi).¹ Newly committing to a set of rights is not a simple matter. For such a commitment incorporates, in an exchange, attending to the voices of those who have been newly included; and attending, also, to the changes an affirmative response to these voices might engender. Newly committing to a set of rights, as this chapter illustrates, implies a change in the relations between those upholding the rights and those making the claim.

The Bill of Rights: for contraceptive research, development and use is published by a set of women in Canada in consultation with women's groups around the world (1996).²

The Bill is a rejoinder to a contraceptive research project funded in part by Canadian official

¹ Williams refers to white and black politics in the US (1991). She writes, "This country's worst historical moments have not been attributable to rights assertion but to a failure of rights commitment" (1991:159).

² Developed by women in the North and the South, the Bill of Rights builds on feminist work produced around the 1994 United Nations International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, and the 1995 United Nations World Conference on Women in Beijing (1996:1).

development assistance. The assistance organization funding the project, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), since 1975 has been co sponsoring research into the development of an immunological contraceptive for women: the hCG contraceptive. Concerned with the Centre's financial contributions to the hCG contraceptive research project, an international campaign presses IDRC in 1995 to agree to a meeting. In the meeting's aftermath, a selection of campaign participants publishes the Bill of Rights, which articulates a precise set of conditions under which contraceptive research should proceed. While the conditions stipulated in the Bill are not being met in the hCG contraceptive research project, upon receiving the Bill, IDRC acknowledges its merit.³ The Centre confirms a year later that it is no longer funding the hCG contraceptive research project (Pestieu for Bezanson to Seabrooke 24 January 1997).⁴ IDRC and other research funders may apply the Bill, all the same, to development research projects in the future.⁵ The Bill of Rights, admittedly, holds no legal might. At this time, the Bill is a set of guidelines development research funding organizations like IDRC can choose to follow voluntarily. But before, IDRC, for instance, could commit to the Bill, this chapter illustrates that Canada

³ IDRC's president writes, "The Bill of Rights is particularly impressive ... [it could] be an extremely useful guide" (Bezanson to Seabrooke 19 December 1996:1).

⁴ The institute conducting the research, the National Institute of Immunology (NII) in New Delhi, has not applied to IDRC for subsequent funding following the Centre's 1989-1995 grant (Pestieu for Bezanson to Seabrooke 24 January 1997). It is not clear whether the campaign's meetings with IDRC, and the campaign's publicity around the contraceptive, influence the Centre to retract its interest from the research project. IDRC's disinterest, alternatively, might be influenced by the Indian government's reduced enthusiasm for the project. In 1997, the Indian government halves its annual grant to the hCG contraceptive research project as part of the government's larger withdrawal from funding contraceptive research in India (Jayaraman 1997:478). See also (Phillips to Seabrooke 14 April 1998).

⁵ IDRC's suspended funding of the hCG contraceptive research project is not matched by the Centre's, nor CIDA's, elimination of support for other contraceptive research projects, family planning, nor for reducing third world women's fertility rates, more broadly. In the 1990s, IDRC continues to fund research on contraceptives, family planning and fertility (IDRC nd c). Concurrently, CIDA continues to fund projects in Bangladesh that explicitly "aim to reduce the fertility rate" (CIDA 1994:5).

would be required to revise its sense of benevolent self, that is, its self ascribed identity of benevolence.

Like Patricia Williams, democracy theorists Seyla Benhabib and William E Connolly seek to include in exchange the voices of those on the political margins. This chapter illustrates that Benhabib's standpoint of the concrete other permits a reading in the Bill of Rights of the substantive conditions necessary for enabling women the choice to bear or to refrain from bearing children. An exploration of the possibility of an affirmative response to the Bill is directed by Connolly's writing on critical responsiveness. It is argued that an affirmative response to the Bill might propel Canada to shift its identity to "co entitled" with women in the third world to conditions enabling reproductive rights. Integral to a commitment to reproductive rights, then, is Canada's shedding of its benevolent identity, the expulsion of its existential resentment, and a concomitant change in the cultural constitution of difference as "disorder". In the sections that follow, this chapter shows, first, the insight provided by the standpoint of the concrete other into the violation of women's reproductive rights, and the call in the Bill for altered political and economic conditions necessary for upholding these rights. Next, an evaluation is made of the stipulations in the Bill compared to the poverty of Canada's benevolent gestures, the potential institution of reproductive rights if there were a shift in Canada's benevolent identity, and the incongruity between the reproductive right to birth and nurture and the assignment to women of "responsible" choice.

1 The Bill of Rights

The procedural element of the "lens of the concrete other", offered by Seyla Benhabib, permits reading in the Bill of Rights the substantive conditions necessary for enabling

women the choice to bear children or not. The conditions the Bill lists are the establishment of a specific set of political and economic conditions, the institution of comprehensive health services beyond contraceptive delivery, funding for the development of user controlled contraceptives, and finally, the involvement of women's health activists and contraceptive users in decision making processes around health services. Denial of these conditions amounts to a violation of reproductive rights. However this claim to reproductive rights, it is argued, reinscribes the gender norm of women as biological reproducers.

The Bill of Rights can be read through the lens of the "standpoint of the concrete other", a procedural intervention Seyla Benhabib introduces to moral conversation (1992). "In assuming this standpoint", she writes, "... We seek to comprehend the needs of the other, his or her motivations, what she searches for, and what s/he desires" (1992:159). In a moral conversation on rights, the standpoint of the concrete other, in this sense, preserves the particular identity of the other in a way that the singular presence of a generalized other as a "right-bearing individual" does not (1992:163-164). The standpoint of the concrete other does not replace the standpoint of the generalized other, however. Rather, the standpoint of the concrete other supplements the usually singular presence of the generalized other in moral conversation. Benhabib promotes the standpoint of the concrete other specifically because the singular presence of the generalized other renders the social reality lived by women in the domestic sphere privatized (1992:152). It is experiences of identity organized by the "gender-sex system" with which Benhabib is concerned (1992:109). In order to bring to moral conversation, not only the experiences lived differently by women, but too, the oppression with which women live in the household, Benhabib argues

for the use of the standpoint of the concrete other in rights deliberation.

In the Bill of Rights, the standpoint of the concrete other brings to moral conversation an articulation of women's reproductive needs, motivations, experiences and desires. Benhabib's intent is to bring to the public sphere women's needs, desires, motivations and experiences as these are found in the domestic-intimate sphere (1992:159). Such articulations of concreteness tend to correspond with moral categories associated with the private sphere. More precisely, conversation around needs, motivations, experiences and desires tends to correspond with moral categories such as sympathy, solidarity, responsibility and care (Benhabib 1992:159). Interestingly, a " 'reproduction [that] has gone public' (Benhabib 1992:113) is set among those very moral categories usually associated with the private sphere. These moral categories, in other words, are present in the public sphere, as well. IDRC, for instance, consistently professes that it is "*cares* about the health and safety of women and children in developing countries" when the funding agency refers to its research sponsorship of the hCG contraceptive (IDRC nd a:3, emphasis added). The Bill of Rights presented by the International Campaign to IDRC articulates women's reproductive experiences and motivations, and needs and desires for good health and well being. In bringing concreteness to the public sphere, the Bill of Rights matches remarkably well with the moral categories expressed in IDRC's approach to development assistance. However, IDRC's benevolence does not correspond well with the concreteness of women's reproductive needs and desires, as these are enunciated in the Bill of Rights.

The Bill compares the state of women's health against women's contrasting reproductive needs. As such, the standpoint of the concrete other brings three themes to notice in the Bill. These are, first, contraceptive users' exclusion from decision making

processes involving contraceptive development; the regular medical mistreatment women endure; and last, the poor state of health in which contraceptive users' experiences are embedded. Indeed, experiences with "the harmful effects of many pharmaceutical products on women's bodies and lives, the increased medical control and manipulation of women's fertility, and the overall poor state of women's health worldwide" (Bill 1996:1-2) serve as the point of departure, or the "motivation" (Benhabib 1992:159) for the Bill of Rights. Like many statements emerging from the worldwide women's health movement, the Bill of Rights denounces women's experiences with contraceptive promotion, especially for the purpose of reducing fertility. In particular, the Bill criticizes family planning programs' promotion of contraceptives, funded at the expense of more comprehensive health services provision.⁶ The hCG contraceptive, once fully developed, predictably will be a method favoured for administration amid scant health services, since the contraceptive is delivered by injection.⁷ In this sense, IDRC's co sponsorship of the hCG contraceptive's development contributes, potentially, to the birth control offered by anti natalist family planning programs operating where health services are minimal. In counterpoint to women's experiences with health services predisposed with pregnancy prevention, the Bill expresses women's alternative needs and desires for good health and well being. Directing researchers and research granting agencies to meet women's self made criteria for accessing and maintaining good health, the Bill acts as a set of guidelines. Criteria listed in the Bill, like altered socio economics, a new approach to health services, and contraceptive users' inclusion in decision

⁶ See García-Moreno and Claro (1994); The Committee on Women, Population and the Environment's 1992 document Women, Population and the Environment: Call for a New Approach in Asoka Bandarage (1997:345); and DAWN's reproductive health and rights framework in Sônia Correa with Rebecca Reichmann (1994:58).

making around women's reproductive health, will be featured in the explication of the Bill that follows.

The socio economic context necessary for women's well being is wanting currently, according to the Bill of Rights. The Bill explains that women's reproductive health is dependent on the socio economic context in which women's lives are set. On this count, the Bill of Rights states: "Real reproductive choice is possible only when women are guaranteed food, health care, education, employment, and shelter, and have full and equal access to economic and political power" (1996:4). The Bill of Rights lists the goods and services necessary for establishing "real reproductive choice". The provision of a greater selection of contraceptives, contrary to Canada's claims, hardly can be equated with greater reproductive choice, as such.⁸ Reproductive choice, rather, permits women in a state of good health and well being to make the decision to have, or not have children. Unless access to safe water, food, shelter, nutrition, jobs and enhanced political power are included in health strategies, reproductive well being is not guaranteed (1996:2). However, the Bill refrains from stipulating the specific socio economic reconfiguration required for establishing "real reproductive choice". In this way, the Bill is consistent with many statements formulated by the women's movement concerned with reproductive health.⁹ Still

⁷ See Chapter 3 for an elaboration of this argument.

⁸ In the mid 1990s, IDRC houses the hCG contraceptive research project in its Health Sciences Division, as part of the Division's "reproductive choice" focus (Canada 1994:23).

⁹ See, for instance, DAWN's reproductive health and rights framework, which does not describe alternative socio economic relations necessary for establishing "food security, employment and income opportunities and basic services" (Correa with Reichmann 1994:58). Still, DAWN seeks the dissolution of national and international socio economic contexts obstructing reproductive and health rights (Correa with Reichmann 1994:109). See, similarly, Women, Population and the Environment: A Call for a New Approach (Bandarage 1997:345).

Alternative development strategies may not be detailed in the Bill of Rights because the alternatives are not obvious. To be sure, Gita Sen points to the absence of research examining the relationships between

the Bill stresses the impossible separation of reproduction "from the whole person, or from the political, economic and social context within which people live" (1996:4). This emphasis in the Bill may explain its criticism of reductive understandings of reproductive choice, wherein choice is conflated with a greater array of contraceptives.

Other focuses in the Bill of Rights are improved health services, health service promotion of user controlled contraceptives, and users' inclusion in contraceptive research processes. Like other women's health agendas from around the world, the Bill of Rights seeks to the establishment of health services that are universally accessible, and makes special mention of "removing systemic barriers which discriminate against women marginalized by race, class, disability, poverty, sexual preference, or age" (1996:12). Poor experiences of women treated by anti natalist family planning programs should be allayed, the Bill explains, while contraceptive delivery should be overhauled. The Bill states that "Provision of contraceptive and safe abortion services are essential health services and must always be offered as part of broader health programs" (1996:12). As such, while it prioritizes a high level of birth control service delivery, the Bill stipulates that birth control should be delivered

markets, states and gender (1996). Sen delineates a research agenda that "look[s] beyond market activity per se to non market activity and to women's well being more generally" (1996). Considering the current vacuum, DAWN, itself, does not present possible alternatives, but encourages grassroots women's groups to do so (Correa 1994:109).

The Bill of Rights does condemn the existing relationships between macro economic policies and the funding of reproductive health services. The Bill states that "Official Development Assistance (ODA) for health programs must not be tied to the provision of Canadian goods and services and ODA must not undermine such programs through, for example, support to programs of structural adjustment" (1996:16). The Bill's criticisms are limited, though. Inequitable international nor national patterns of resource transfers, environmentally unsustainable growth, export led development models extending from debt servicing and neo liberal trade regimes, etc, named by commentators, activists and academics writing on reproductive health (Petchesky 1995, Correa and Petchesky 1994, Hong 1994) get only minimal mention in the Bill of Rights. Criticism of reproductive rights agendas, from the earliest years of the 1990s women's health movement, in this sense, is worth noting. Farida Akhter, for example, writes of the inutility of reproductive rights for addressing the social relations of reproduction - the larger conflict within which reproductive rights agendas are set (1992).

within a broader range of reproductive health care (1996:2).¹⁰ The experiences of women in India illustrate the hazards associated with contraception administration in the absence of comprehensive health evaluations.¹¹ Evaluations verify whether a contraceptive is actually the medically appropriate one for the woman to whom the contraceptive is prescribed. If birth control is to be used safely, it is imperative to offer each contraceptive user information on the contraceptive's side effects, disadvantages, efficacy and reversibility; as it is imperative to offer each user follow up treatment (1996:12-14).

The Bill emphasises the development of user controlled birth control so that these methods may replace the provider controlled birth control usually offered (1996:6). The hCG contraceptive is an example of a provider controlled contraceptive. Like others of its sort, the hCG contraceptive depends on a health care provider to insert and remove it. As such, provider controlled birth control compromises the ability of the user to reverse the contraceptive's function (Parikh 1994). Reversibility is further compromised in the context of scant health or family planning services. Reversibility is especially compromised when minimal services exist within a national family planning program that is anti natalist.¹² While reduced user failure suits anti natalist family planning programs, the Bill of Rights criticizes provider controlled contraceptives and, in turn, advocates the development of safe, effective

¹⁰ The 1992 Women's Declaration on Population Policies, for instance, describes a broader approach to reproductive health that includes services directed at pregnancy, birth delivery and post partum care, prevention and treatment of HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases, infertility, etc (Germain et al 1994:31). See, similarly Women, Population and the Environment: A Call for a New Approach (Bandarage 1997:345). DAWN's reproductive health and rights framework addresses health services broader even than general reproductive care. The framework lists, additionally, cancer prevention and mental health services, for example, as mandatory for women's reproductive well being (Correa 1994:58).

¹¹ See Chapters 2 and 3.

¹² In Indonesia, the removal of Norplant, a set of rods implanted subdermally in the arm, is difficult (Boland et al 1994:99). See also Farida Akhter's commentary on the experiences of women in Bangladesh with Norplant

and reversible user controlled contraceptives (1996:6). To this end, The Bill also recommends the reconfiguration of the process wherein decisions are made with regard to contraceptive research. The Bill states:

As a part of formal research processes, mechanisms must be introduced which would facilitate the full and equal participation of women's health activists and potential contraceptive users in decision making bodies involved in setting research priorities; monitoring ongoing research; guiding the research process; defining the criteria for safety, etc (1996:7-8).

With the involvement of women's health activists and potential contraceptive users in decision making processes around women's health, health projects may be prioritized "based on the values, needs and desires of women, in all their diversity, as defined by women themselves" (1996:17). In the absence of broader participation, health services concentrate on the administration of provider controlled birth control, indicating in decision making bodies a narrow perspective on women's health - one concerned inexorably with restricting women's pregnancy.

The standpoint of the concrete other permits in the Bill of Rights "assumptions about needs and interests sustaining rights claims [to] become visible" (Benhabib 1992:170). But the Bill expresses more than women's reproductive experiences and contrasting needs. In one sense, the Bill advocates the establishment of women's reproductive well being under a favourable set of conditions compared to the ones, which IDRC, for instance, contributes through its research sponsorship of the hCG contraceptive. Indeed, in the context of anti natalist family planning programs, IDRC's contraceptive research funding contributes to a further restriction of reproductive choice. The Bill, in another sense, though it is related to

the first, names a violation and calls for its end. The Bill of Rights, more precisely, condemns the compulsion under which women's reproductive decisions are made, and condemns, also, the desperate conditions under which women must make these decisions (Correa and Petchesky 1994:112). A commentary on women's poor experiences with anti natalism in the Bill expresses the violation of women's choice to bear or not to bear children. The Bill, as a requisition for correction, presents a new set of conditions under which women's reproductive rights might be set. Emphasised in the Bill is the indivisibility of reproductive rights and political and economic rights (Correa and Petchesky 1994:117). In articulating women's reproductive needs, the Bill posits that without the satisfaction of political and economic rights, reproductive rights do not exist for "majority of the world's women, who are poor" (Correa and Petchesky 1994:109). An end to the violation of reproductive choice is what the Bill of Rights seeks. The substantive basis deemed necessary in the Bill for permitting "real reproductive choice" means establishing the political and economic conditions required for the exercise of reproductive choice, instituting comprehensive health services beyond contraceptive delivery, funding the development of user controlled contraceptives, and finally, reconfiguring the relationship research funding agencies hold with women's health activists and contraceptive users so that the latter get included in the funders' decision making processes. These are the articulations of concreteness undergirding the Bill's claims for reproductive rights.

Wendy Brown confirms, in order for rights to reveal and redress women's subordination, that rights "must be specific and concrete". But enunciating this very

contraceptive entails similar compromises in users' ability to reverse the contraceptive's function (1994:44-45).

concreteness, she writes, "potentially entrench[es] our subordination through that specificity" (2000:238). The absence of specificity and concreteness "render gender so abstractly that the particulars of what constitutes women's ... violation remain unarticulated and unaddressed" (Brown 2000:233).¹³ Alternatively, the inscription in rights of the experiences of "*some* women" is held to represent *all* women (Brown 2000:232-233), like in the Bill discussed here. Reproductive rights, or specifically, the American advocacy around the right to abortion, through its association with unwanted pregnancy, reinscribe heterosexually defined gender (Brown 2000:234). Brown notes that struggles around laws pertaining to childbearing, adoption, and custody by homosexual parents, in this sense, remain distinct from reproductive rights (2000:234). The Bill of Rights referred to here consonantly ignores the right to childbearing and childrearing for lesbians. However, the Bill endorses the right to non procreative sexuality, regardless of its orientation, and in this way, contrary to Brown's assessment, joins gender based and sex based rights, rather than keeping the two sets of rights distinct (1996:5).¹⁴ To be sure, sexual regulation and reproductive regulation are intimately linked.¹⁵ While the Bill of Rights marginally strains against heterosexual norms that are reinscribed with reproductive claims, the Bill fully reinscribes the norm of women as biological reproducers. The Bill reinscribes the gender norm of women as biological reproducers by advocating, alongside the right not to bear children, the right to bear children

¹³ Brown concurs with Benhabib on this point. However, Benhabib advises, for interpreting concreteness, the application of the lens on the concrete other to existing rights. Brown refers to new rights, like the Bill of Rights: for contraceptive research, development and use (1996).

¹⁴ Specifically, the Bill states, "Women have the right to express themselves sexually and to be free to decide whether to have sex, with whom, when and how. Human sexuality must cease to be male-defined and heterosexual sex must no longer be considered the only acceptable form of sexual expression" (1996:5).

¹⁵ See Davis (1980) and Perchesky (1990), for example, on the intrinsic links between (hetero)sexual, gender and racial regulation in the United States.

(Akhter 1992:3-4). The Bill of Rights calls for political and economic rights necessary for enabling women the choice to bear children, or not. In doing so, the Bill calls for the establishment of substantive conditions necessary for heterosexual and lesbian women to exercise rights *through the gender norm of women as biological reproducers*. It is concluded next, following Brown (2000) and Akhter (1992), that in entrenching women's biological, reproductive capacity, the Bill's claim to reproductive rights, perhaps, prevents putting an end to the violation of the right to choice.

2 A Critical Responsiveness to the Bill of Rights

Like Seyla Benhabib, William E Connolly addresses democratic exchange between a self and other. Whereas Benhabib works towards the reversal of perspectives, and hence the consideration of the other's point of view, Connolly emphasises consideration of, and revision to the self. Central to Connolly's prescription is the politicization of identity\ difference. Were IDRC to respond affirmatively to the Bill of Rights, the politicization of benevolent identity would be integral. The politicization of identity entails the genealogical consideration of, then possible revision to, an identity through critical responsiveness. A critical responsiveness to resistance movements contemplates an affirmative response to a movement's press for a redress of social injuries, and a change in established relational identities (Connolly 1995:xv-xix). Connolly writes, "Identity and difference are bound together. It may be impossible to reconstitute the relation to the second without confounding the experience of the first" (1991:44). Were Canada to consider responding affirmatively to the Bill of Rights, a critical responsiveness would assess a possible revision to Canada's benevolent identity. With self revision, an identity's constitutive relations with difference shift in tandem. Central, then, in critical responsiveness, are two features in

identity's relation with difference. First, is identity's evaluation of third world women's right to reproductive choice; and second, is identity's inclusion in decision making of those constituted as threatening. It is argued, due to the cultural constitution of third world women's fertility as excessive, that Canada's benevolent identity is unlikely to commit to the right to reproductive choice, substantive rights enabling choice, or to third world women's membership in decision making processes. It is argued next, if Canada were to consider a revision to its fraught relations with (fertile) women in the third world, that a critical responsiveness to the Bill of Rights might guide Canada to shed its identity as benevolent, and take in place an identity as co entitled with third world women to conditions enabling reproductive choice. However, Canada's fear of excessive third world births may not be abated, even with a change in identity, for third world women, it is shown, can never exercise reproductive choice that is "responsible". Canada's critical responsiveness to the Bill of Rights might be limited, as such, for the Bill consolidates third world women as reproductive, thereby sustaining Canada's existential resentment.

2.1 Critical Responsiveness to Difference

Critical responsiveness attends to political contest with a spirit of generosity (Connolly 1995:xviii). Political contest involves an evaluation of the procedures that determine who is included in and excluded from decision making (Yeatman 1993:234). Related to its concern with decision making, political contest involves, also, the imaginings of different decisions compared to ones made in the past. The Bill of Rights, for example, originates in the experiences of women with family planning programs promoting contraceptive use so as to reduce the birth rate (1996:12). The Bill, in turn, presents women's needs and desires in the realm of reproductive health and well being. These needs and desires include the

establishment of substantive conditions deemed necessary in the Bill for enabling women the reproductive choice to have, or not have, children. Among the substantive conditions listed in the Bill is the inclusion of women's health activists and contraceptive users in funding agencies' decision making processes (1996:7-8). If a political movement like the one issuing the Bill of Rights were "to succeed[, this movement] must extend *from* those who initiate cultural experiments *to* others who respond sensitively to those experiments even while they disturb their own sense of identity" (Connolly 1999 a:130). In this way, revising an identity, so that it is receptive to appeals made by resistance movements, proves to be central to critical responsiveness. Accordingly, how could identity\ difference shift if Canada were, first, to reject the notion that reproductive choice means, primarily, the provision of an increased selection of contraceptives, and adopt instead the notion that reproductive choice means, more comprehensively, the choice and means not to have children or, alternatively, to have children? Second, how could identity\ difference shift were Canada to include contraceptive users and international women's health activists in decision making with regard to women's reproductive well being? An affirmative response to the Bill of Rights would prompt Canada to contemplate with generosity redefinitions of Canada's benevolent identity, corresponding redefinitions of difference, and alternative relations (Connolly 1995:xvii) that would establish both third world women's political involvement, as well as reproductive choice to bear children or not.

As such, a critical responsiveness to the Bill of Rights assesses ways Canada's identity of benevolence contributes to or denies from women reproductive choice. Reproductive choice in the Bill requires women's entitlement to those substantive conditions that would permit women and their children, if women choose to bear children, to live in well being

(1996:4). Relatedly, IDRC funds research on a range of "poverty reduction projects" that advance women's well being (IDRC nd a:1). These projects include research on land ownership rights, water, occupational diseases, economic policies, etc (IDRC nd a:1). More relevant to the Bill of Rights is the question of how IDRC's research funding contributes to women's reproductive choice, especially considering the Centre's perspective on the third world population growth rates. IDRC writes that it "realizes that contraception is not the key or a sole solution to world population growth. Poverty is the problem and IDRC, in general, funds research primarily aimed at finding solutions to problems of poverty" (nd a:1). IDRC's research into poverty reduction contributes not only to women's well being, as such; IDRC's research into poverty reduction contributes also to solving the problem of third world population growth. Considering this computation of problems and solutions, IDRC's projects appear to instrumentalize poverty reduction as a means to reduce the birth rate abroad. Likewise, IDRC's concern with maternal health appears to instrumentalize the reduction of maternal deaths as a means to lower the birth rate abroad. In a position paper on its hCG contraceptive research funding, IDRC cites the matter of "500 000 women d[ying] annually due to complications of pregnancy, delivery and induced abortion" (1995 nd a:1). Contraceptive use, though, is a highly circuitous method of preventing maternal deaths.¹⁶ Contraceptive use is, evidently, an immediate method applied by anti natalist family planning programs for lowering the birth rate. Whether targeted directly through the development of the hCG contraceptive, or whether targeted indirectly through poverty

¹⁶ Women's overall good health is important in disabling causes of maternal mortality, while abortion services, emergency obstetrics facilities and quick and free access to these prevent maternal mortalities most effectively in times of crisis (Desai 2000:436; Freedman and Maine 1993:155-157).

reduction projects, women's reproductive choice to have children is discouraged through the standards of discipline and entitlement constituting IDRC's benevolence. Indeed, a decline in fertility rates as a requisite for third world development clings to benevolent identity with an unshakable faith. Canada, in this sense, is unlikely in its critical response to the Bill, to establish conditions expressly enabling third world women to choose, especially when institutional development regards third world women's reproduction a disorder to correct.

Also, a critical responsiveness to the Bill might dispute the inclusion of third world women in Canada's decision making arena. Among the social conditions stipulated in the Bill of Rights is the inclusion of third world women in decision making involving third world women's health and well being (1996:4-5). Canada could ascertain, through an exchange with the women in question, whether various Canadian sponsored assistance programs are based on the needs, values and desires these women name. However, Canada might be vexed were third world women included in decision making processes, for benevolent identity's self certainty gets threatened by excessive demands on it the third world makes. Chapters 2 and 3 illustrate that the poor in the third world continue to reproduce, despite Canada's benevolent attention. Excessive reproduction effectively demands from Canada, in the 1970s, greater compensation through improved terms of trade; in the 1980s, different basic needs than the ones Canada provides; later in the 1980s, use of more of the earth's natural resources than Canada deems fit; and in the 1990s, Canada's reconsideration of its commitment to third world women in the face of the third world's fertility offences. With the inclusion of third world women in Canada's decision making arena, perhaps Canada would find demands made on it consistent with conditions named in the Bill of Rights. Third world women's reproductive choice to have children, in this sense, demands more

from benevolent identity than, perhaps, it would be willing to concede. Indeed, to Canada's benevolent identity, third world women's participatory entitlement in decision making around Canada's assistance projects may "sound inside the culture either like noise or like collaboration with the enemy" (Connolly 1991:46). But if difference comes to doubt Canada's self ascription as cooperative, charitable, generous and committed, the stability of Canada's benevolent identity may be threatened. That is, as Canada refutes third world women's demands, Canada's benevolent identity may find itself revealed, instead, as being unjust, exclusionary, or dominant. With its demands and its potential to destabilize the certainty of Canada's benevolent identity, difference in this way is disorderly. As such, a relational change, which brings to women in the third world the substantive basis for reproductive rights, including political membership, undeniably, is unlikely.

Alternatively, were there a shift in an identity's constitutive relations with difference, then the cultural constitution of difference would shift correspondingly. For example, lesbians and gays must escape a particular cultural constitution before the advocacy of rights for homosexuals is considered legitimate by heterosexuals (Connolly 1995:185). Connolly writes that for rights for gays and lesbians to be legitimate, homosexuality must break from its cultural constitution as an "'objective disorder'" (1995:185). Only after a movement "migrates from an abject, abnormal, subordinate, or obscure Other *subsisting* in a nether world *under* the register of justice" can the movement's "injuries acquire the standing of injustice or illegitimacy" (1995:184). In effect, it is not with *what homosexuality truly is* that non homosexuals must be concerned when responding affirmatively to lesbian and gay rights movements. Critical responsiveness concerns, rather, identity's constitutional relations with difference. More precisely, were rights for lesbians and gays to enter political exchange,

identity's relations with difference would cease to be constituted by practices and arrangements securing identity's heterosexuality against a (homo)sexual disorder - one that requisitely gets corrected. Only when the cultural constitution of homosexuality stops impelling the sexual "aspect of [women and men's] lives under the threshold of candidacy for inclusion" in political exchange do the injuries sustained by lesbians and gays gain legitimacy (1995:184-185). For political inclusion means finally legitimacy, a turn away from otherness, and dissolution in the cultural constitution of an abject difference. When a movement's injuries are qualified as unjust, or as legitimate, the relation of identity\ difference changes concomitantly. Chapters 2 and 3 illustrate difference constituted as women in the third world marked by an excessively high birth rate. Constituted both as in need of Canada's benevolent attention, as well as hazardous to the stability of Canada's benevolent identity, women in the third world as difference correspond with Canada's identity as charitable and endangered. The practices and arrangements constituting this relation of identity\ difference see Canada destining money abroad so as to ascertain a reduction in the third world population growth rate by funding the administration of contraceptives through national family planning programs; organizing the placement of women's labour in the market economy so as to redeploy women's reproductive household labour; and donating money to contraceptive research projects. Relations of identity\ difference, in this sense, constitute third world women's fertility as excessive, and as such "licens[ing] bureaucratic correction, discipline and regulation" (Connolly 1991:21). Were Canada to respond affirmatively to the Bill of Rights, identity as benevolent and endangered would change with the Bill's definitions of women's experiences, needs and desires, since with critical responsiveness, "every effective movement of difference moves the identities

through which it has been differentiated" (Connolly 1999:142-143).

2.2 An Evasive Choice

Were there, then, a critical responsiveness to the Bill, Sônia Correa and Rosalind Pollack Petchesky's version of reproductive rights could steer the course Canada's identity might take towards changing: changing, that is, from an identity of benevolence to an identity as "co entitled". Correa and Petchesky contemplate scenarios around the world as they describe reproductive rights as women's entitlement to conditions enabling reproductive choice (1994). For reproductive decisions to be made " ' free[ly] ' ", rather than made under conditions "that may force women 'to choose' one course over another", decisions would be made amid "enabling conditions" (Correa and Petchesky 1994:112). Enabling conditions are the "material and infrastructural factors" (1994:112), or the "*substantive* basis of rights in human needs and a redistribution of resources" (1994:110) that appear, for instance, in the Bill of Rights. Correa and Petchesky write, "Rights involve not only *personal liberties* (domains where governments should leave people alone), but also *social entitlements* (domains where affirmative public action is required to ensure that rights are attainable by everyone)" (1994:112). Correa and Petchesky stress that reproductive rights, like the entitlement to enabling conditions, are universally applicable. The Bill of Rights originates in the experiences of women subjected to anti natalist population programs. However, the Bill, like Correa and Petchesky's framework, seeks the extension of reproductive rights not only to these women, but to all women without discrimination (Bill 1996:12).

In the era when IDRC funds research into the hCG contraceptive, reproductive regulations in Canada render particular Canadian residents "internal objects of externality" (Connolly 1991:X). That is, in 1975-1995, Canada, considering the reproduction of some

within its boundaries undesirable, limits fertility among select human samples. State anti natalism directed at Aboriginal people, immigrants and disabled people disqualify some in Canada from exercising the choice to have children.¹⁷ The extension to Canada of the Bill of Rights, or the extension to women in Canada of reproductive choice, would ensure that "[reproductive] rights are attainable by everyone" - in Canada and in the third world. From benevolently regulating third world women's fertility, Canada as "co entitled" now would commit to upholding the Bill of Rights, in the third world *and* in Canada. "[W]ho is normatively entitled to refuse childbearing [or] to be a parent" (Ginsburg and Rapp 1995:3) would extend to "everyone", and would be consonant with the entitlement of "everyone" to enabling conditions permitting reproductive choice. In this sense, identity shifts. Wherein, earlier, difference was dependent on the standards of development's discipline and entitlement, now, women in the third would be co entitled with women in Canada to enabling conditions permitting reproductive choice. Canada's identity would change concomitantly, from being benevolent to being co entitled with women in third world to enabling conditions permitting women's reproductive choice.

Were Canada to respond affirmatively to the Bill of Rights, and establish for women reproductive choice, then Canada would shift its relations with difference in accordance with its changed identity as co entitled; that is, unless Canada's identity as benevolent and endangered were obdurate. Considering the incredulity an affirmative response to the Bill of Rights inspires, it is essential to describe obduracy in identity. While identity is constructed, particular and variable, alternately, identity can be obdurate, or still (Connolly 1991:176).

¹⁷ See Chapter 3 for an elaboration.

Regardless of identity's shift from benevolent to co entitled, Canada's identity would be obdurate if it continues to be endangered. Canada's identity, in other words, would be obdurate if difference is constituted still as third world women marked by an excessively high birth rate. Third world women pose to Canada's benevolent identity a threat in the era of IDRC's research sponsorship of the hCG contraceptive. More specifically, in the 1970s to the 1990s, Canada fears the threat to its benevolent identity third world women's fertility instils. Difference seemingly refutes development's standards of discipline and entitlement by demanding, with its unchecked births, qualitatively and quantitatively more than development's standards permit. Third world women, in other words, test Canada's self ascription as cooperative, charitable, generous and committed by prompting Canada's self defence against an unchecked rise in third world births. Whatever, then, could expel the threat women in the third world pose? To (fertile) women Rosalind Pollack Petchesky assigns two sets of responsibilities: "a commitment to the legitimacy of social regulation of those areas of human activity [involving reproduction] but also a rejection of the idea that there is a 'natural right' to procreate indefinitely or to procreate at all" (1990:400). Canada's involvement in third world fertility is reflected in Petchesky's description of reproduction as a social relationship. With Canada's new identity, difference's new constitution as co entitled to conditions enabling reproductive choice requires third world women to choose "responsibly" (Correa and Petchesky 1994:118).¹⁸ Canada, in this case, might shed its identity as endangered were women in the third world to choose "responsibly", and

¹⁸ Responsible" choice is assigned to women also in the World Population Plan of Action from the 1974 and 1984 United Nations International Conferences on Population and Development (UN ICPD), and in the Program of Action from the 1994 UN ICPD (Petchesky 1995; Boland, Rao and Zeidenstein 1994).

accordingly restrict third world fertility in adherence with "social regulations" governing reproduction.

Social regulations governing reproduction eliminate the possibility of responsible reproductive choice, however. The import of identity\ difference analysis for reproductive rights emphasises exclusion and repression in social regulations governing reproduction. Arrangements and practices constituting Canada's benevolent identity operate along development's standards of discipline and entitlement, which work, effectively, to repress third world women's fertility. On the basis of disciplining abnormality, irresponsibility or dependency, certain women's choice to bear children gets discouraged. Thus, women marked by an excessive fertility, or other irresponsibility can never choose responsibly. Further, when identity and difference are co entitled, as in Canada, where Aboriginal and non Aboriginal women, and disabled and able bodied women purportedly are, the conditions enabling choice might be withheld from *some*. Aboriginal women, non white women, immigrant women, women with disabilities, and adolescent women are more likely to be sterilized or administered long term contraceptives compared to other women (Lewis 1995:76-77, Canadian Women's Committee 1994:9). Certain women in Canada are discouraged from giving birth and nurture. Under current social regulations around reproduction, certain women's right to reproduction is restricted. Petchesky's prescription to women to choose "responsibly", in accordance with current social regulations, for certain women means accepting exclusion or selective repression - not rejecting " 'natural right' to procreate" (1990:400). When choosing responsibly is an impossibility, abandoning the " 'natural right' to procreate" means abandoning the choice to bear children. Petchesky mentions the tension that exists between abandoning the " 'natural right' to procreate" and

"committ[ing] to the legitimacy of social regulations" around reproduction (1990:400). She writes, "In any society, there will remain a *level of individual desire that can never be totally reconciled with social need* without destroying the individual personalities whose 'self realization' is the ultimate object of social life" (1990:400). While unmet individual desire, doubtless, is worth noting, because, forever, perhaps, it is restrained, this identity\ difference analysis stresses a hegemonic identity's repression and exclusion of difference from the choice to bear children through social regulations consistent with "legitimate" social needs. It is precisely this legitimacy that the Bill of Rights challenges. For development's skewed standards of discipline and entitlement attempt to restrict from third world women the reproductive choice to bear children.

It is the case, if only third world women were to choose "responsibly", that Canada would no longer be endangered by excessive third world fertility. Canada may mute, then, the existential resentment it directs at women abroad. Regardless, though, as to whether or not the irresponsible or abnormal reject the "legitimacy of social regulations" around reproduction, Petchesky insists that institutional non intervention in women's bodies is essential to reproductive rights (1990:400).¹⁹ Yet, when women refrain from choosing "responsibly", Canada's identity successively gets reconstituted through arrangements and practices that discourage a threatening difference from giving birth. "[D]ifference is a requirement built into the logic of identity", William E Connolly writes, and "the

¹⁹ Petchesky writes that "[e]ven in the context of revolutionary social relations of reproduction, it will never be legitimate to compel a person to have sex or to bear a child, to have an abortion or be sterilized, to express or repress sexuality in some prescribed way, or to undergo surgical or chemical or other bodily intervention for reproductive or contraceptive purposes. A sense of being a person, with personal bodily integrity will remain essential to the definition of social participation and responsibility under any historical circumstances I can imagine" (1990:400).

construction of otherness is a temptation that readily insinuates itself into that logic" (1991:9). Specifically, when "one" seemingly refuses the standards of discipline and entitlement constituting identity\ difference, "one runs a high risk of entrapment in one of the categories of otherness derived from it ... of delinquency, irresponsibility, dependency" etc (Connolly 1991:21). Concomitant with one's entrapment in a category of otherness is the correction, discipline, regulation or exclusion otherness legitimately licenses (Connolly 1991:21). Benevolent identity's perpetual correction of third world women's fertility ranks among the arrangements and practices around the world that encourage the birth of some, and discourage the birth of others (Ginsburg and Rapp 1995:3). The logic of identity holds that existential resentment will direct correction at the other's otherness by way of institutionalized restrictions.

Critical responsiveness to the Bill of Rights would be minimal, then, unless the cultural constitution of difference shifts with Canada's new identity as co entitled. Were women in Canada and the third world similarly co entitled to conditions enabling reproductive choice, as under the Bill of Rights, Canada's identity might be constituted *still* through arrangements and practices discouraging a threatening difference from giving birth. If difference ostensibly threatens identity's stability, and difference reveals, in place of a benevolent or co entitled identity, an identity perhaps less proper, then otherness gets tacitly oppressed by way of identity's reinstatement. Identity, in this sense, channels its uncertainty into an existential resentment that reads in difference a danger (Connolly 1999 a:129). If difference, or the irresponsible, abnormal and dependent cannot exercise reproductive choice that is ever "responsible", any claim difference makes on rights, enabling conditions, or choice to have a child, perhaps, is too great a demand on identity. This is likely the case,

unless the very otherness of the other escapes its cultural constitution as objective disorder (Connolly 1991:185). The establishment of conditions enabling reproductive choice, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, though, cannot expel the danger third world women's fertility is suspected of posing. The normative entitlement to refuse childbearing or to be a parent (Ginsburg and Rapp 1995:5) consists of more than the entitlement to substantive conditions enabling reproductive choice. In this sense, to critically respond to the Bill of Rights, benevolent identity would be compelled to challenge its existential resentment.

In contrast to Petchesky's writing, an identity\ difference analysis demonstrates here that reproductive choice depends on an end to the uncertainty propelling identity's existential resentment. Petchesky promotes the substantive basis of reproductive choice, like the Bill of Rights, but neither Petchesky nor the Bill broach the dangers associated with third world women's right to bear children. The Bill, as "rights procured specifically for women ... reinscribe[s] heterosexuality both as defining what women are, and defining what constitutes women's vulnerability and viability" (Brown 2000:233). Reproductive rights, as such, consolidate third world women as fertile, pregnable and reproductive (Akhter 1992:3-4). Third world women, as the biological reproducers of excess, are the very threat from which existential resentment protects identity, and against which a critical responsiveness must contend. For identity's difference from itself sustains identity's existential resentment. Were Canada's identity to shift from benevolent to co entitled with third world women to reproductive rights, Canada's identity might be reconstituted *recurringly* in relation to an otherness that is excluded or repressed. A critical responsiveness to the Bill of Rights seems limited by identity\ difference's properties. Concerned with the shift in Canada's identity\ difference, from benevolent to co entitled, democratic exchange, at best, "exposes the

cruelties ... concealed by the previous terms of comparison" (Connolly 1991:179). The study, here, attempts to assess, in the previous terms of comparison, the workings of fear in Canada's benevolent identity that keep its existential resentment from preventing these cruelties.

Conclusion

That an identity might retain its constitutive relations is a risk in democratic exchange (Connolly 1991:193). Canada, indeed, may bristle at stipulations in the Bill of Rights that extend to women conditions enabling the reproductive choice to have children. Predictably, if a critical responsiveness to the Bill of Rights finds that Canada's identity as endangered is obdurate, then Canada might not extend to women in the third world reproductive rights. Instead, practices and arrangements constituting Canada's relational identity would continue to emphasize, in third world women's reproductive choice, increased choice in contraceptive methods. The arrangements and practices constituting Canada might continue to discourage the irresponsible, dependent and abnormal from bearing children. The conflict between births in the third world and the possible obduracy of endangerment in Canada's identity prompts contemplation of the following:

No order can enable everything to flower in the same garden: this is a 'necessary injustice,' as Nietzsche would put it, within the practices of justice. The point is not to deny this ambiguity but to struggle against the denials and simplifications it tends to engender (Connolly 1991:159-160).

A necessary injustice may mark identity\ difference and its possible range of relationships (Connolly 1991:47). However, to deny or simplify the repression inherent in identity's constitutive relations is to neglect the tension existential resentment lends to interdependent relations of identity\ difference. Certainly, the Bill of Rights acknowledges the relations of

interdependence between development funding agencies and women in third world. Interestingly, the Bill does not request from development funding agencies a complete retraction from this strife ridden relationship. Nor does the Bill advise women to observe development's standards of entitlement and discipline, and accordingly to choose "responsibly". The Bill, instead, solicits a reconsideration of the interdependent, strained relations in which reproduction is set.

Some structures are the products of unconscious social forces fixed in resisting self consciousness (Williams 1991:158-159). A focus on identity ushers into exchange the play of identity's cultural unconscious in relations regarded otherwise as simply benevolent. Politicizing identity\ difference in the arrangements and practices constituting Canada's benevolent identity illuminates the unconscious dogmatism with which third world women's reproductive rights are restricted. Were Canada, rather, to commit to the rights in the Bill, Canada would place third world women in its "referential range" (Williams 1991:153) of self other relations. But as it stands, an antagonism currently excludes third world women even from Canada's referential range with its others. For at this antagonism's behest, identity\ difference renders third world women's reproductive choice "shuffled to the margins of legitimate political discourse through the ruse of self referential delegitimization" (Connolly 1991:179). Were women in the third world indeed within Canada's range of referential relations, the relation would be bereft of antagonism, and instead be constituted in terms of agonism. Herein, "each treats the other as crucial to itself in the strife and interdependence of identity\ difference" (Connolly 1991:178). Whatever an identity might be in relations of agonism, might that identity be, while dependent and self serving, at once independent of fear? Faithfully optimistic, William E Connolly draws attention to "diferance". Diferance

always exceeds the claims of identity\ difference. That is, "diferance", or "the noise, energies, and remainders that circulate through every cultural configuration are not captured by their self identifications" (Connolly 1995:99). In the very same diferance that limits identity with difference, an identity might find in diferance a generosity that provides it the drive to revise its self ascription, and concurrently its relations with difference - responsive to difference's resistance, while shorn of antagonism for it.

Conclusion

This thesis documents an identity\ difference made manifest: one of Canada's benevolent identity in relation to a needy, excessively fertile third world. International development constitutes for the initiators of assistance a negotiated, political identity that is simultaneously benevolent towards and competitive against development assistance's recipients. The case is made by examining Canada's international population activities, and in particular, development agency IDRC's research co sponsorship of the hCG contraceptive. In arriving at its finding, this thesis required answering the question: in helping to solve the problem of world population growth, how might Canada respond to the claim to third world women's reproductive right to bear children?

Theories of democracy were used to analyse a conflict around reproduction. William E Connolly's variant of "agonistic democracy" solicits the inclusion of identity\ difference in a public discussion on a development agency's involvement in the reproductive matters of women living in third world. Genealogy is described in Chapter 1 as a mode of study that examines the constitution of collective identity and an identity's existential resentment directed against its relational difference. Next, critical responsiveness is described as a collective identity's contemplation of a regeneration of relational identities, in response to resistance movements' claims. In an exchange on reproduction, understood, otherwise, as strictly political or economic, the "politicization" of identity\ difference means the inclusion in discussion of elements governing an identity's cultural unconscious. In the following chapters, genealogy and critical responsiveness are applied to a reading of Canada's

international population assistance so to highlight the strife conditioning the benevolent encounter.

A modest genealogy exposes that development's practices and arrangements constitute through population assistance a collective identity of benevolence. In Chapter 2, it is illustrated, in the 1970s, that Canada's benevolent identity emerges as a "wealthy partner", working in co operation with an independent, developing third world. In the 1980s, Canada's identity appears as a "humanitarian" deliverer of basic needs, sending abroad contraceptives, among other vital goods. Later in the 1980s, benevolent identity surfaces as a "steward of the global environment", balancing the demands of a surging third world against the earth's limited resources. Canada's self ascription as benevolent is shown to be dependent upon a needy, excessively fertile third world. But Canada is also fearful, in the face of difference's unmanageable demands, of the uncertainty threatening benevolent identity's sense of self. Genealogical study reveals the course by which existential resentment, through population assistance, reads, defines, judges and remedies difference as Canada reaffirms its identity of benevolence. Genealogy permits, in this way, an explanation of the effects of the development encounter on the initiators of development.

The genealogical inquiry continues in Chapter 3, showing that a new variation of benevolent identity appears in the 1990s. As "custodian of third world women's health", Canada takes another approach to development: now benevolent identity promotes the hCG contraceptive as the favourable choice among birth control methods, so that third world women's fertility can be better controlled, and concomitantly, rapid population growth remedied. Existential resentment corrects [over]population's threat to the self certainty of benevolent identity by affirming again, with international assistance, a needy third world

dependent on Canada's charity. "Difference in identity", part of Canada's collective identity, acts as dissent against Canada's administration of correction through population assistance. In so doing, "difference in identity" puts the "true" nature of Canada's identity of benevolence into doubt.

Alternative relations for identity\ difference are contemplated after reading a bill on reproductive rights. Seyla Benhabib's "lens of the concrete other" provides insight into reproductive rights claimed, in an exchange, on behalf of recipients of Canada's population assistance. Through critical responsiveness, Chapter 4 demonstrates the implausibility of, first, the inclusion of women living in the third world in public discussion on Canadian foreign policy formation, and second, the regeneration of identity\ difference concomitant with Canada's commitment to third world women's choice to bear children or not. An affirmative response to the Bill of Rights might require from Canada that its identity shift from benevolent to *co entitled* with women in the third world to conditions enabling reproductive choice. The assignment to women to make reproductive choices "responsibly", it is argued, renders *certain* women's choice to bear children never responsible. For, perpetually, through correction, an identity's existential resentment secures identity's self certainty from the fertility of women constituted as threatening.

Population assistance entails the protection of the poor from poverty, and protection of Canada's sense of benevolent self from the poor's accusations against it of wrongdoing. Following William E Connolly, it has been illustrated that the negotiated, political nature of a benevolent identity works to preserve, in its relation with recipients of its assistance, a neediness or dependency that keeps identity's relational difference from being read as a threat. An identity's existential resentment works with institutional arrangements and

material practices so as to defend a sense of self. The import of this thesis's findings lies with its petition to prevent identity's possible mistreatment of those constituted as difference. So that the fear organizing a public identity's repression or exclusion may be addressed, and contested against, this thesis could be used towards the study of Canada's constitutive identity with those "different" from it, with whom relations of benevolence, solidarity, and even "co entitlement" are sought.

The findings made here, regarding the establishment through international population assistance of Canada's benevolent identity, may be confirmed or contradicted by two new trends in the field of development assistance. These trends are, first, the apportionment of funds for the education for girls, and second, the institution in Canada of private organizations concerned with population and development. While hardly unimportant, education for girls may be established as a means to reduce the birth rate abroad (Barroso and Jacobson 2000), perhaps in a way similar to the case of contraceptive promotion.¹ As with contraceptive promotion, the type of education established by development assistance, and the context within which education is offered both affect the

¹ In its 1998 Discussion Paper on Canadian objectives for the United Nations Five Year Review of the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development, Canada lists education as a "key factor in sustainable development" (Federal Government Inter-Departmental Committee on ICPD +5 1998:13). Canada's approach through education to lowering birth rates abroad correlates with international efforts aimed at "empowering" women. Girls' education, reproductive health services and access to micro credit comprise the main elements in the "policy agenda for empowerment" (Barroso and Jacobson 2000:352). The empowerment agenda is buttressed, in the mid 1990s, by an increasing collection of data arguing "that invest[ments] in human capital [are] as important to achieving population stabilization as investments in family planning programmes, if not more" (Barroso and Jacobson 2000:351). Note Sonalde Desai's criticism of the transfer of investments from expensive infrastructure projects, like clean water supplies, to small projects, like young women's education (2000:431-434). Desai makes the link between investing in young women's reproductive education and holding already overburdened mothers "responsible", for instance, for preventing infant death from dehydration (2000:431-434). Dehydration tends to originate with diarrheal disease, due to a baby's ingestion of *dirty water*, while women's training in oral rehydration therapy is shown to be irrelevant to the baby's recovery (Desai 2000:431-434).

workings of a benevolent identity. A new variation of benevolent identity possibly surfaces with development's new focus on girls' education. And through Canada's practices and arrangements of development, third world fertility may or, less likely, may no longer be constituted as a threat. Concerning the second trend, Action Canada for Population and Development (ACPD), a charitable, private organization, has been active since 1999 as a CIDA watchdog.² Lobbying CIDA to fulfill its pledge to the Cairo Conference's Programme of Action (1994 UN ICPD), ACPD's involvement in third world women's fertility reflects Mariana Valverde's depiction of the "symbiotic – though sometimes conflicting – relationship between philanthropy and the state" (Valverde 1991:165).³ ACPD's non governmental and charitable efforts may constitute third world women as difference in relation to a benevolent identity, but in relation to a benevolent "self" distinct from that of "Canada". If population and development NGOs and development's "investment" in girls' education have inspired the ire of resistance movements, then the corresponding conflicts may be studied by applying democracy theory to the emergent benevolent identities.

² Michael Shenstone, a former employee at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, is a co founder and chair of ACPD. In various instances, Shenstone has emphasized the importance of development for securing Canada's borders against third world [over]population's threat of migration (2002, 1998).

³ The Cairo Programme of Action is inadequate on many fronts. Fertility reduction in third world countries is the Conference's focus, and reproductive health and rights, in the Programme of Action, are as a means to this end (Women's Global Network on Reproductive Rights (WGNRRR) nd:1, Hong 1994:18). While the Programme of Action stipulates for national budgets an increase in funds for reproductive health services, funds for basic health services are not emphasised in the Programme, nor are funds for securing other basic necessities like food, shelter, and political participation (WGNRR nd:1-2). Change to northern patterns of consumption and environmental degradation goes unaddressed in the Programme of Action, while the inequities of the "global economic system" receive no attention, either (Hong 1994:17-18, WGNRR nd:2-3). Before the Conference started, the US Women of Color Delegation predicted the Programme of Action's faults, writing, "We don't want to wait until the 'unmet need' for contraceptives has been satisfied before realizing that we have utterly neglected to boost social and economic progress, and failed to alleviate poverty, again" (1994:30).

It is doubtful that development's new emphasis on girls' education, or new private organizations' concerns with population and development work to establish the substantive conditions enabling women in the third world the choice to bear children, or not. The establishment of political and economic change requires from a benevolent identity a shift in its constitutive relations with difference. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak writes,

The struggle subsists in the arena of cultural difference, but cultural identity is not [third world 'globe girdling' movements'] specific program. Instead, [the movements'] focus is hard-core economic resistance, which repeatedly undoes the polarity between culture and economics (1994:10-11).

The link between culture and economics would be maintained in an identity\difference analysis of first world identities constituted through the WTO, World Bank or transnational corporations' institutional arrangements and material practices. Identity\ difference analysis might feature, in a genealogy of first world identities, the existential resentment present in first world-third world relations of trade, finance and labour. "Globe girdling" movements' economic resistance operates with the "goal of redistributing generated capital, reallocating the uses of capital ... [and focuses, as such, on the] wrench between capitalism and socialism, the self and the other ... appropriation and giving up" (Spivak 1994:8). The wrench between capitalism and socialism, the self and other, and appropriation and giving up are addressed in a question posed at the teach in, "Transforming the Global Financial System".⁴ There, a young man asked: if third world debt were cancelled and structural adjustment eliminated, in the first world, what would be "our" loss? With awkward glances all around, his question went unanswered. The question is potent because it places at center

⁴ The Halifax Initiative hosted the teach in in Montréal on 21 October 2000, coinciding with a G20 meeting of G7 finance ministers, finance ministers of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey, as well as a European Union representative, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, and the president of the World Bank.

the threat catalyzing northern existential resentment in light of southern demands – material demands inextricably linked with cultural ones. Southern “hard core economic resistance” demands a change in the north’s sense of its “first world” self. Accordingly, a study of resistance movements advocating a “pro poor, pro environment development” (Halifax Initiative 2000: np) would feature an examination of the requisite shift in the constitution of first world identities, as well as the workings of first world identities’ existential resentment directed at difference.⁵

Political analysis of existential resentment may be applied to studies both of discrimination *within* Canada, as well as to the difficulties of solidarity under current conditions of international capitalism. Christina Gabriel and Laura Macdonald consider “the potential for cross-cultural and cross-national feminist solidarity” in Canada-Mexico organizing around the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). One of the areas of difference “largely avoid[ed]” in trans continental coalition building has been “ethnocentric reactions to the threat to Canadian jobs” under free trade (Gabriel and Macdonald 1994:553). Canadian organizers striving for solidarity with Mexican counterparts may have avoided ethnocentric reactions within their ranks, but Mexican organizers still were concerned, in the early years of NAFTA, with racist reactions within the larger labour movement (Gabriel and Macdonald 1994:558). Within labour, continental free trade may threaten the certainty of an identity as “worker”; or perhaps an identity as “consumer”; or

⁵ “[P]ro poor, pro environment development” was the subject of a work shop entitled “Making Finance Work for Development” at the “Transforming the Global Financial System” teach in (Halifax Initiative 2000:np).

“first world” or Canadian. It is not clear.⁶ Concomitantly, it is not clear how the threat of job loss to Mexican workers might provoke ethnocentrism or racism in Canada and the United States.⁷ Genealogical study into the workings of an existential resentment may prove insightful to this end. Within Canada, inquiry into discrimination against poor people is already underway at the National Anti Poverty Organization (NAPO), for example.⁸ “‘Poor bashing’” in Canada “‘happens when poor people are stereotyped as lazy, and when they are scapegoated for society’s social and economic problems’” (Biddle in NAPO 1997:6).⁹

Anti panhandling laws in Canadian cities are described by NAPO as legislated poor bashing: poor people are perceived to be more of a threat simply because they may not look like or act the same as people who are not poor. The wording of the by-laws make it clear that it is the very presence of poor people on the streets asking for money that people are objecting to (NAPO 1999: np).

Despite the establishment of a (degrading) socialized system of wealth redistribution, in Canada, a collective politics “defin[es] ulterior dispositions operating below the threshold [of “true” identity] as intrinsically abnormal” (Connolly 1995:91). “Poor” is the relational difference from an identity constituted by the “criminaliz[ation of] begging ... [and the] enact[ment] of legislation that is creating more poverty” (NAPO 1999:np). However, it is not simply governments and laws, as NAPO seems to suggest, that criminalize and further impoverish poor people. The identity against which difference is constituted relationally is a public and collective hegemonic identity. The workings in Canada of an existential

⁶ Wendy Larner shows, in New Zealand, under “‘market governance’”, that “The consumer has become the hegemonic political-economic identity, and the social dimensions of the identity worker have become attenuated” (1997:iii-iv).

⁷ For an account of the mutually supportive ideologies of nationalism and left anti globalization activism, especially in western Europe, see the letters from Krebbers and Schoenmaker, of De Fabel van de illegaal (1999) to the magazine *Hier List*.

⁸ NAPO named “poor bashing” one of its “key issues” in 1999-2000 (NAPO nd:np).

⁹ Tony Biddle, Perfect World Productions (1996).

resentment directed against poor people seemingly is alighted upon in NAPO's documents and activities, but whether this existential resentment works in a nationally based, or tax payer based, or other composition of the "self" requires study.

This thesis illustrates the practices and arrangements through which a collective identity is made manifest. When resistance movements contend against repression or exclusion, constitutive relations of identity\ difference may be exposed using genealogy. An identity's existential resentment can be traced through genealogy, permitting an unraveling of, and perhaps challenge to, the protection identity organizes of its sense of true self in defence against a perceived, external threat. Revealing the negotiated, political dimensions of Canada's foreign and domestic affairs checks against concealing, in a collective identity, the self's dilemmas that otherwise disappear.

Postscript

Overpopulation

... let's consider these poor, third world mothers who cant afford their children. Why are we shown pictures of starving children in Sub-Saharan Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia when we hear about overpopulation? ... In comparison to these people, US citizens use up resources in numbers incredibly disproportionate to the rest of the world. According to research available from the group Zero Population Growth, the per person use of energy in the US is twice as high as any other country in the world. The average US citizen uses as much energy as 13 people in China, 372 Ethiopians, and two people in Japan. Along with this massive use of world resources, the United States has the highest birth rate of industrialized nations.

From The D[o]I[t]Y[ourself] Files - How to Get a Vasectomy, or how to be a good boy and have yourself neutered, by John Gerkin (1999:102).

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