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**DEVELOPMENT AS CULTURAL CHANGE:
THE NEED FOR SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
IN DEVELOPMENT**

by

Allan G. Fuller, B.A.

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in International Affairs

**The Norman Paterson School of
International Affairs**

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

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The undersigned hereby recommend to the Faculty of
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Abstract

When modern development emerged in the early 1950s it was generally regarded as a subarea of macroeconomic theory. It is now generally recognized that applications of economic principles and theories or the technologies which they suggest, are not sufficient, in and of themselves, to provide the necessary knowledge and guidance to bring about development. Consequently, a need in the development field is for an alternative set of principles and theories -- ones which can subsume economics and technology -- to guide development practices and interventions. The central argument in this thesis is that the practice of development can be better understood if it is conceptualized and regarded as induced cultural change. Having argued this point, the paper goes on to suggest a series of social-psychology and psychology theories which can be usefully applied to conceptualize the cultural change process, and therefore, the development process.

Table of Contents

Abstract	iii
Table of Contents	iv
Preface	v
I. Introduction	1
Purpose of the thesis	1
Organization of the paper	8
Assumptions	11
II. Historical Overview of Development Approaches	29
Introduction	29
Modernization	33
The Basic Needs Approach	52
The Participation Approach - Bottom-up development	60
Summary of the changes in development	63
III. Development as induced cultural change	71
Implications and need for conceptualizing development as induced cultural change	71
Redefining Development as Cultural Change	77
IV. Relevant Social Science Theories	83
Introduction	83
The Theory of Mental Representations	84
The social construction of reality	102
Stress, uncertainty, and social change	125
Man undergoing cultural change	140
Faith in self and society in cultural change	150
V. Conclusion	155
Bibliography	160
Appendices	170
A critique of the planned project approach	171

Preface

The motivation for the paper stemmed from a year spent in Guadeloupe, F.W.I. During this period I met a number of the island's youth and was both astonished and appalled by the disparity between their conception of their future and the reality facing them. They held goals which, even to them, were clearly unobtainable, expectations which had no hope of being met, and dreams which could never be realized. In large part, this was the result of having based these goals, expectations and dreams on inputs from the First World. They wanted to live as they did on Dallas, fly jet fighters, and become very rich. Perhaps as a result of the discrepancy between dream and reality, they frequently seemed awash in their Third World environment, being tossed in ways determined by others or by chance rather than as a result of choosing their own direction. If they had been resigned to the constraints of their environment then perhaps my curiosity might not have been piqued. But they were not. Instead, their frustration frequently spawned a simmering bitterness and discontent. They had dreams but could not comprehend why there was no opportunity to realize them. When I returned to Canada I determined to return to university in order to understand what was happening to these youth and to find some way of ameliorating their condition.

The central ideas for the paper were formulated in early 1978 during a series of meditations. The basic purpose of these meditations was to identify areas of commonality which could be found in all peoples regardless of race, education, or culture and which were directly related to the development of society. For me, this common thread is the process by which people construct a view of their environment. In order to operate in any environment men must construct a series of images about that environment which can guide them in their minute-to-minute, day-to-day activities. If we expand this basic process to an aggregate level, we can say that the collection of images which members of an interacting group share with each other are both the product of their day-to-day interactions as well as the medium through which individual's images are created and conditioned.

Granting that these ideas are basically true, it seemed clear to me that they had important implications for development. Development could not be viewed as simply or even basically an economic process which used technological change as its methodology. Rather, development had to be viewed as a cultural change process with economic and technological aspects. At base, the process involved altering the set of images which the recipient peoples had evolved to allow their

collective interaction with their environment. In other words, their culture, was being fundamentally altered.

My concern with the way development work is carried out has increased as my investigations have expanded.

Currently, my conclusion is that the methodology of development may make development an extremely harmful experience for the recipient groups because it tears at the roots of social reality. However, while I feel quite certain of this conclusion in the short term, I am less certain about the outcome in the longer term.

There is a resiliency in human society due to the human life cycle and its systemic interactions which, over time, tend to isolate and correct the mistakes which a society may make from time to time.

The approach used in this paper has been revised several times. Its current focus is somewhat tangential to what is stated above in that it is more of an attempt to explain why the focus of development has been on economics and to argue for a shift in perspective to seeing development as cultural change. The reason for this is that once this central argument is accepted, there already exists a wide variety of social, social-psychological, and psychological theories which can be applied to development situations either directly or with slight modifications.

Over a decade has passed since I lived in Guadeloupe. This paper has slowly taken form over much of this period and, as with any endeavour of this nature, there are a number of persons who have paid a price in order that it be completed. Quite naturally, it has been my wife and children who have paid the highest price in terms of foregone time and finances. Financial assistance came at critical moments from my parents. In addition to a heartfelt thank you to these people, a special appreciation has to be expressed to the Baha'i Faith, my religion. The tone of this work, and its attempt to seek out and apply universal principles while respecting the particular characteristics of peoples is a reflection of my understanding of the Baha'i teachings.

I. Introduction

A. Purpose of the thesis

This paper is an attempt to argue for the need to view development as cultural change. Up until the early 1970's development was considered to be a process which could be best understood, controlled, and advanced through the application of economic theory and principles. There was no unanimous consent on this matter. In fact, since the mid-1960s there has been a growing general dissatisfaction with the use of economic theory in development and for a variety of reasons. However, it was not until the early 1970's and the general acceptance of program and project evaluation techniques by government and development agencies that a means appeared whereby this criticism could be successfully articulated. A number of studies appeared during the early to mid-1970s which indicated what development practitioners, those working in the field, had long suspected: most development projects fail, only partially achieve their stated objectives, and/or have multiple unforeseen consequences.

The gates were thus opened, not to new theories, but to alternative and pragmatic approaches to development. The field, perhaps fearing to find itself once again constrained to act in unproductive ways by either a non-

applicable or unworkable theory, appeared to avoid a search for any theory of development which might have been thought of as comprehensive. Instead, what were identified were various elements commonly found in successful projects. Approaches such as Participation and Bottom-up were constructed by pinning together these common elements and touted as the answer to the evident problems.

To this point in time there is still no general theory of development which can be regarded as both comprehensive and universally applicable. There is a very good reason for reluctance on the part of theorists to even try to put together a theory of development. The nature of development work ensures that there will be a tremendous range of variables and conditions under which development projects are undertaken and this fact alone suggests that a comprehensive theory of development would have to be either extremely complex or extremely simple in order to be accurate and applicable in particular situations while remaining general enough to enjoy usage in a wide variety of settings. Either of these options suggest that the product would be somewhat useless. If the theory were sufficiently complex, the cost in terms of time to learn and apply the theory would prove disheartening. If the theory were extremely simply then it is likely that those involved in the

practicalities of development will have already identified the concepts and, to the extent reasonable, are applying it.

The approach taken herein¹ is to suggest that no single theory can, in and of itself, explain the development process in an unlimited set of environments, contexts, and situations. Instead, what is needed is a flexible, common-sense employment of a set of mid-range theories. While the need for such theory will be discussed in some depth later on, the basic idea is that these theories are useful because they simplify complexity by focussing attention on a small set of key variables. Without such a means of focussing attention in a complex situation, one is likely to be confused or observe the wrong variables. The result is an inability to make sense of the environment or situation and the employment of inappropriate responses to the signals generated by various actors. Given a smaller set of variables to observe, there is a greater chance of learning their meaning and the appropriate responses to make. This is not meant to suggest that these theories will ever be applied in a rigid or mechanical fashion. There is

1. This is not the first time that such an approach has been suggested or used. Robert Merton suggested it in the 1950's as a means for Sociology to move forward in the face of seemingly overwhelming complexity. See for example Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1975).

likely too much variation in virtually every human context to allow for exactly the same application of any set of theories. Consequently, there will always be a need for someone to mentally select the more applicable aspects of these theories when given a particular context, to work out the options, and to forecast probable outcomes.

One of the major advantages in regarding development as induced cultural change is that it will allow the use of many existing mid-range theories. Much of the theoretical work available in the social sciences becomes relevant if developers can say that they are dealing with cultural change. These theories can be used to identify possible outcomes or ramifications of certain societal, interpersonal, or individual configurations given the proposed changes. Other social science theories deal with man's cognitive processes. Again, if development can be regarded as induced cultural change, the usefulness of such theories in development work is clear. Development would have to be regarded, at base, as an attempt to change the cognitive reality and thus the behaviors of the members of a recipient population. If this is the level being addressed by a theory then it should be of use to developers. The fact that these cognitive theories will be generally applicable to all people regardless of sex,

race, age, or culture is another important reason for using it in development efforts.

Stemming from its roots, development has tried to approach the development process as "augmentative change" (Hoogvelt, 1977) in an economic sense with an emphasis on the creation of more goods and services. Given that development's roots are in capitalism and that it was inspired, in part, by the successes of the Marshall Plan, the reason for the existence of this approach to development is understandable. However, the approach focusses mainly on what material goods or services a group or society produces. Consequently, it fails to take into account the fundamental nature of human beings as makers of mental models.² As a result, there have been and continue to be many attempts to graft the artifacts of one society onto that of another. The results, similar to those one would expect if one tried to graft apple snips on orange trees, have been disappointing. Development efforts over thirty-five years and the expenditure of hundreds of billions of

2. Section IV discussed man and his ability to create mental representations and models of entities and activities in his environment. In brief, it is generally accepted in social-psychology that people are enabled to operate in an environment because they can construct mental models of the objects and entities in that environment. These models allow them to anticipate actions and to respond appropriately.

dollars have not brought about the extent or types of transformations which the developers expected.

Beyond mere disappointment, however, are signs that other, more deadly consequences may result from the development practices currently being employed. There is increasing evidence that the societies in the recipient nations are collapsing. While at present the evidence for this is "soft" in that, to the author's knowledge, there have been no time series studies of social disorder in developing nations, this impression can be gleaned from a number of varying sources. These include news reports, journal articles, conversations with those who have spent some time travelling in the Less Developed Countries (LDC) and, perhaps most importantly, discussions with a number of people who have been working in the Third World for several decades. These sources almost consistently report increases in corruption, violence, theft, family breakdown, desertion of children, and government inefficiency. All of these are indicators of severe societal problems.³

3. Several of those reporting the increase of these problems also stated that the rate of increase is accelerating. It is not possible to verify such statements. However, this thesis suggests that an increasingly rapid expression of societal problems could be expected before a major collapse of a culture and subsequent cultural re-organization.

Such societal indicators are commonly considered to be beyond the scope of development interest despite the fact that they have an indirect but strong impact on the indicators of economic development which are more frequently used.⁴ Societal problems of this type are considered to be wholly within the purview of the national government of the Third World nation and therefore beyond the scope of development work. In this paper an attempt will be made to show that development efforts, as they are now being carried out, can be causally linked, at least in theory, to the observed societal decline.

Such a linkage is not meant to suggest that all development projects are socially de-stabilizing nor are development efforts the sole cause of the societal problems observed. However, the idea that the predominant development methodology, the planned project, may be contributing to societal decline should give pause to both project designers and implementors. It should also lead to questioning the depth of understanding which planners have of the nature of the recipients -- both individuals and their society.

⁴. These indicators include changes in economic productivity, either local or national, debt/asset ratios, and balance of trade figures.

B. Organization of the paper

This paper has five chapters including the introduction and conclusion. The introduction concludes with a section on the assumptions underlying this work. This section on assumptions is seen to be important because several of the assumptions made in this paper are not common to the development field. These assumptions are perhaps of special interest because they are based on models drawn from physics. The identification of similar relationships in different realms can only strengthen any arguments constructed around these assumptions.

The second chapter is an historical overview of the development field. The purpose of this section is to convey a general sense of how and why the development field has evolved since its inception in the early 1950s. In many ways the formal organization of development efforts today and its implementation techniques can be traced to early beliefs about the nature of development.

In order to follow this complex field through time only three of the many possible threads will be followed. These are measures of development, the unit of analysis used, and the general approach employed. Using these concepts, it is possible to indicate how the field has evolved from an almost purely macro-economic perspective

of development to one which has increasingly tried to blend in social, political, and cultural aspects. It will also be shown how the current institutional arrangement of the development field tends to thwart all but a planned project method of implementation.

The third chapter is central to the paper in that it is here that subjects of culture, cultural change, and the redefining of development as induced cultural change are discussed. Essentially, it is argued that given the definitions of culture and the intent of development efforts, it is clear that development should be redefined and treated as induced cultural change.

It follows that if development can be thought of as induced cultural change then there is a need in the development field for an understanding of the nature of culture and how a culture is created, maintained, altered, and transferred. It is here that theories and concepts developed in the social sciences can be called upon for conceptualizing and clarifying development situations and forecasting of possible outcomes of certain actions by the developer.

Chapter four suggests a series of social science theories which are linked together to give a holistic view of culture. The purpose behind this construction is to show that there are sufficient theoretical resources available in the social sciences to construct

a view of culture which can be used by those attempting to induce cultural change.

The initial mid-level theory which is drawn upon discusses mankind's inherent neurological makeup and the cognitive constructs which result. It is used to argue that a fundamental similarity exists amongst mankind -- an ability to make sense of, and therefore to operate within, an environment. It now seems clear from cross-cultural studies that the mental mechanisms through which perception and cognition occur are common to our species. From the perspective of development this is an essential fact because it allows the general application of much of cognitive theory developed in the First World to the realities of the Third.

This cognitive theory is used as a foundation upon which is successively overlaid theories of individual behavior, human society, and psycho-social stress. These theories are merged together and are applied in a final subsection which deals with the issue of man's need for faith in his society.

Other theories and concepts are mentioned throughout which may be of use to developers. It should be clear that the intention of this section is not to suggest that the theories discussed herein are the only or best theories available. Rather, the purpose of the section is to show that if development were regarded as cultural

change there is a sufficient body of theory available in the social sciences to make that redefinition useful to those working in the field and to begin the process of applying these theories and concepts.

The conclusion in chapter five summarizes the main ideas presented and reiterates the implications for development work. The paper is completed by an extensive bibliography of books and articles pertinent to the thesis.

C. Assumptions

This subsection discusses assumptions about man and society. It uses thermodynamics analogously to make overall sense of man, his society, and the general world that we live in. The concepts are presented pragmatically and succinctly and are treated, for the most part, as givens.

There are several reasons for presenting these assumptions. The main reason is to forestall criticism of this work because it is based on unstated assumptions. In addition, it is not only interesting but also reinforcing to the thesis that many of the patterns identified and described in this work on human social change are also observed in other scientific realms. A final reason for their presentation is that by laying out the assumptions the pattern of the thesis

arguments can be initialized for the reader. As a result, when these arguments are expanded on later, the reader will be better able to understand the linkages and implications of one idea for another.

As suggested above, an underpinning assumption of this paper is that the basic principles of thermodynamics can be applied analogously to man and his interactions with his environment. In this sense, energy can be considered the currency of life, change the basic fact, and stasis a primary goal of all the system's entities. Thermodynamics links these three concepts through the application of the entropy principle. This principle states that the complexity of an organization is positively correlated with the level of energy that organization is able to appropriate from its environment. Energy can be thought of as being either fully utilized in that it is incorporated into an existing form and the energy required to extract that utilized energy exceeds the return one would obtain or "free" in the sense that the return an appropriator would get will exceed the cost of its appropriation. In other words, free energy is energy which is not being utilized to its capacity in its current form. Free energy is of two types within any particular environment: renewable and non-renewable.

The complexity of an environment is ultimately limited by the amount of renewable free energy which is available in that environment. While an entity may appropriate non-renewable free energy in order to build complexity for a time, there is a finite limit to that energy and ultimately the complexity achieved will be lost because of this limit.

As the amount of renewable free energy in an environment is limited, so too is the level of complexity which can exist in that environment. Over long periods of time it is to be expected that organisms will move from states of greater or lesser complexity to some stasis which can be maintained.

Entities in all but a new environment must "work" in order to maintain their current level of complexity. As life forms use their store of energy to sustain their existence, more energy must be absorbed from their environment. The rate at which energy is drawn from the environment must remain relatively constant per period in order to maintain balance in the entities residing therein. The existence of multiple entities in an environment necessitates a system of constant changes in the environment which, overall, balance each other and do not exceed the total amount of renewable energy.

These changes can be thought of as a series of positive and negative feedback loops. The positive feedback

loops, in general, allow the expansion of the entity while negative feedback loops act to constrain this expansion. Taken together, these feedback loops control the energy intake and outflow of each of the entities in the environment. As a result, a system emerges from the total set of interactions. Within such a system, any alteration in the feedback loops of one entity must, at least indirectly, affect all of the entities in that environment. It is assumed that human society is a form of system as is the relationship between any particular group of humans and their environment.

All life forms can be seen as stores of energy and, for each entity, their current accumulation can be regarded as the net result of their form, their environment, and their effort over time. As energy is a flow, we can say that any particular store has neither existed in the past nor will exist in the future. Consequently every present form is contingent on previous events, is unique to the present, and will have an impact on subsequent or existing entities in the environment.

Given the above, life forms such as species or societies can be assumed to continue to exist in an environment over time because their form is specialized or adapted to that environment in a manner which ensures a continuation of the flow of energy from the environment to the entities composing that life form.

Ineffective integration of a life form into an environment must inevitably lead to either the death of the life form, an alteration of the life form, a restructuring of the environment, movement of the entity to a different environment, or some combination of these alternatives.

In the case of man as a life form, the adaption to the environment has included physical evolution of the hip joint, opposing thumbs, and the voice apparatus. However, without doubt, the most important adaptation has been the development of the human mind. Most of the social and environmental adaptations of man, including the development of families, groups, tribes, and nations, the construction of a language, the use of gestures and poses, and the development of technology can be traced to the evolution of the human brain. Through his brain man has been able to alter his environment so as to appropriate a higher level of energy.

It is assumed that man, because of his brain, lack of natural weapons or defenses, and an inherently dangerous environment, has evolved to be a rational creature. A pragmatic definition of "rational man" is any human capable of comparing and associating alternative wants (energy requirements), means (energy expenditures), and context of a situation (a particular environment at a

particular point in time, in a manner which leads to the identification of behaviors which can satisfy his wants. A more philosophical definition of rational man is that rational man is able to ascertain general abstract principles from several concrete experiences. Without this ability to generalize from the particular, each experience would be seen as unique. As stated above, the principle of thermodynamics states that no store or situation will ever be exactly the same. It follows that without an ability to generalize no automatic or consistent responses to similar situations could be learned, called upon, or applied. An individual would always be trying to learn how to respond to a new situation and so could not be thought of as rational. The abstraction from particular experiences into classifications allows for rationality.

To this assumption that man operates in his environment in a rational manner there is a need to add a postulate of general motivation. Motivation is seen, at base, to stem from the entropy principle. In order to maintain their existence, entities are motivated to access a relatively constant flow of energy. Entities are not regarded as maximizers. Rather they are viewed as "satisficers". In a sense, this is a protective stance. If an entity expanded to the environmental limits of free energy it would be vulnerable to any decrease in

that free energy. Satisficing allows an entity to survive periods of decreased free energy.

It will be assumed that man and society will be motivated to use their rational faculty to identify and satisfy a sufficiently large set of wants to maintain the current level of complexity. While the contents of "wants" will obviously vary from person to person, time to time, and culture to culture, we may still assume the existence of this motivation in all cultures because the entropy principle and the inherent requirement of all surviving life forms to continually draw from the renewable energy from their environment.

By assuming that man, in whatever culture and in almost every situation, will be motivated to think in a manner which will sufficiently satisfy his wants, it is also assumed that people will be able to conform their behaviors to their rational thoughts. It is on this assumption that a foundation for culture and society can be laid. Only in very unusual individuals or in unusual situations would we now expect to find a person either behaving in a culturally-defined "irrational" manner or intentionally decreasing their sufficient satisfaction from the expected.

The use of general abstract principles in order to obtain valued ends can be thought of as the employment of assumptions. Man, therefore, is capable of making

assumptions. Indeed, when one reflects on it, it is evident that all of man's many activities are based on some assumptions about some aspect of his environment. Whether these assumptions take the form of "beliefs"⁵ capable of motivating sacrificial behaviors, "knowledge" gained from past experiences that guides particular actions or that become habitual behaviors, or simply "thoughts" which, though having no substantive experiential basis, suggest novel ways of attaining some goal, these assumptions underlie man's interactions with his environment. Man does not simply react to environmental stimuli. Rather, he first imputes meaning to the stimuli through his assumptions about that entity and then reacts to the meaning.

By "environment" is meant the total combination of all those social, material, or spiritual aspects of existence which man can perceive.⁶ By "behavior" is meant a series of intentional, controlled body movements.⁷ Of man and his behavior in an environment

5. By "belief" is meant an assumption which cannot be demonstrated as true. This is in contrast with "knowledge" which is considered to be based on experiences which can be recreated for others and thus demonstrated.

6. Leff defines "environment" as "the total physical surroundings that impinge on an organism." (1978:10)

7. This definition of behavior is more restricted than most. It is common to define behavior in such a way as to include some of the mental or attitudinal characteristics of an entity. This narrower definition

it might be said that every behavior assumes its "likely" response because of the meanings man associates with the behavior. Knowledge of the meanings and assumptions on which behaviors are being made would obviously lead to a clearer understanding of human behavior.

The assumptions made by men can be classified into two types: implicit and explicit. People operate most of their lives on implicit rather than explicit assumptions. Implicit assumptions are those which the user has never investigated or considered alterable. In most circumstances people can rely on the continuation of certain forces, customs, behaviors, etc. The risk that their implicit assumptions will fail them is usually quite minute: gravity continues to allow men to walk; the sun does rise; people shake hands when greeting, the stores do open, and so on.

Explicit assumptions are found less frequently. They arise in situations where there is uncertainty about which assumption should be applied. Making the assumption explicit in such cases helps to identify the salient components of the situation and, thereby, to

excludes from behavior all non-observable and random movements as well as attitudinal expressions and characteristic positions or movements in order to expand the mental realm to its limit and thus indicate the capacity of the theory.

clarify it. After formulating explicit assumptions people generally try to test them by "experimenting" or, in other words, trying them out in the real world. This is provided, of course, that the risk involved (as discussed below) in experimenting is not too great. Making assumptions explicit in order to calculate the risks involved and then experimenting with the explicit assumptions can be seen as a major means of gaining experience with and knowledge about one's environment.

Risk is one of the outcomes of formulating explicit assumptions. It is a calculation of the perceived chances of a "win" or benefit over the sum of both the chances of a win and a "loss" or cost multiplied by the perceived net value of the benefit minus the loss or cost. Risk calculations are made by all men⁸ and, along with the making of explicit assumptions and experimentation, are a vital component in adapting to an environment.

It is evident that the more a person has experienced his environment, the more he can allow himself to make implicit assumptions about the reaction of other entities to his behaviors. Consequently, there will be less uncertainty and risk in his decision making. One

⁸. There are, for example, several studies showing that peasant farmers in the Third World make mental calculations of risk. See Peacock (1972), Jelicha (1969), or Todaro (1981:269-271)

could consider such a person to be "well-adapted" to his environment. The ultimate advantage to individuals of being "well-adapted" lies in life expectancy. Not only will such an individual be better able to gather the required energy from the environment but they will also experience less energy loss as a result of their environmental interactions. In addition, uncertainty has been shown to strain individuals (Leff, 1978:302) and strain has been linked to susceptibility to illness and disease (Leff, 1978:336-344). The well-adapted individual, by definition, has reduced much of his environmental uncertainty, the strain this uncertainty would otherwise produce, and thereby has increased his life expectancy.

The existence of human beings in a wide variety of physical settings suggests that the ability of human beings to adapt to their environment is a function of the mind rather than physiology. Otherwise we would see the human body taking on different forms as it adapted to each of the differing physical settings.

The human body has many inherent limitations which the mind must overcome. The most basic of these limitations are time and space because they, in turn, limit the mind. A person's body can sense only what is in his immediate environment (and this only partially) and one's time on earth is limited. A consequence of these

basic limitations is that a person's store of knowledge will always be constrained. It will also be selectively finite. Those environments in which the most time is spent will be better understood as a result of receiving more sensory impressions from and having more experiences with the entities within that environment. One outcome of these differences in understanding is that a person will generally be better adapted to those environments that are more frequently experienced. As a consequence, a person's more commonly experienced environments will become, over time, less stressful.

Environments can be subdivided into contexts and situations. A "context" will be defined as a specific, recurring sub-environment having a similar set of social, material, and spiritual aspects on each recurrence. In contrast, "situations" are defined as unique, non-recurring sets of environmental conditions. Over a lifetime, a person may commonly be expected to encounter a few environments, many contexts within any of these environments, and innumerable situations within any context.

That many situations arise from a single context can be attributed once again to the entropy principle. The principle states that there is constant tendency to shift from higher energy levels to lower. For an entity maintain its existence over time requires actions to

collect energy. These actions operate in a space occupied by other entities and this results in interactions between entities which, in turn, trigger a variety of positive and negative feedback loops within the context. Through these loops other entities in the environment are also affected. To the extent that these feedback loops operate on the entities in the environment they will be moved both in terms of space and activity. The overall result is that for each entity there is a range of activities and space positions. The combination of space, actions, and energy requirements for the collection of entities provides the complexity which is the basis for multiple, rarely recurring situations.

Where an organism is able to maintain a certain energy level over time it can be thought of as being effective in that environment relative to its inherent attributes including knowledge. The same principle can be applied to societies. Societies which maintain relatively constant levels of energy over time can be said to be effectively adapted to their environment relative to their inherent attributes. This is not to say that these entities and societies are maximizing their use of the energy, either renewable or non-renewable, in that environment. However, in order to obtain a higher level energy flow, the environment would have to be changed.

It is assumed that changes are neither random nor fixed but rather are temporally contingent on both the constant application of natural forces and the random or intentional actions of environmental entities.

Change is also assumed to be constant. There has always been change and change will continue to occur. Again, this is a result of the entropy principle. The existence of such change suggests the existence of positive feedback loops. Stability of an environment over time implies the existence of only negative feedback loops in the environment. Change requires the existence of at least one positive feedback loop.

Any change implicitly assumes the operation of both destructive and constructive processes. Given that both free energy and space are limited, then it is impossible to imagine construction without something being sacrificed in order to allow that construction to occur.

As part of man's rationality as discussed above, it is assumed that man is able to evaluate the various costs and benefits of construction against the various costs and benefits of destruction given a specific context. As with all rational decisions this implies the existence of some mental or physical standard against which the various options can be compared. This, again, suggests that man uses generalizations. A feasible standard becomes such only through the overlaying of

several particular experiences or objects. Otherwise a standard may be chosen which is unattainable or impractical.

Decisions and their subsequent actions are a contingent response to a set of physical, social, or spiritual manifestations which are themselves a contingent response to a set of contingent responses, ad infinitum. The origin of a response may be located in either an aspect of the environment or in individual entities. All of this suggests, as stated above, that man lives in a contingent world, one wherein the interaction of many individual decisions and behaviors leads to outcomes which form unique situations -- situations which cannot be wholly anticipated or predicted.⁹ What results are multiple, interactive, dialectic relationships between entities which, in sum, create a contingent (and even probabilistic) world wherein change is constant. However, through systemic feedback these changes tend to cancel each other out over time. This expresses itself as cycles of activity.

In the case of man, apparent consistency in an environment also requires that man create stability in

9. This is somewhat at variance with the current western view of reality which commonly assumes a stable reality based on law-like relationships. As will be discussed, the theory of Mental Representations suggests that these law-like relationships are man's perception of reality and not the reality itself.

the most encountered entity in that environment, his fellow man.

Human groups are assumed to exist as a result of and in order to facilitate the satisfaction of man's wants. The strength of the communal form of living is that it can satisfy more of the individual's total set of wants than can be satisfied by individuals living alone. The continued operation of a group implies that the collective actions are such as to satisfy a sufficient number of the wants of its individual members. It follows that a group must have a means at its disposal for identifying, measuring, and satisfying the wants of its membership. Social institutions and processes are assumed to have evolved in order to gather this information and to act upon it.

Equally important is the influence which institutions have on shaping the thoughts of its membership. Over time, given a constant spatial location, the wants of the individual, the individual's conception of how to satisfy his wants (means), and the group's institutions should become blended into a whole through which the wants are shaped in a manner which allows them to be channelled into means which are acceptable to the general group.

The complex, systematic whole which emerges as society can also be thought of as a human ecological system.

Within such a system, as in any environment, there will be a series of internal feedback loops which tend to stabilize the system and keep it in balance over time.

Similarly, human ecological systems share with all systems the existence of sub-systems. Individual members of the society will also be part of a number of smaller subsystems which likewise will tend to stabilize over time. As a result of these stabilizing factors, the society's members can become habituated to behavioral patterns which satisfy their wants. Stable systems and habitual individual behaviors increase predictability and thereby reduce both risk and stress.

In summary, many of the assumptions which will be made in this paper regarding man and his relationship to his environment and his society have analogies to relationships between entities as theoretically defined within thermodynamics. In thermodynamics these relationships are used to explain the existence of an ever changing environment in which entities operate. For the purposes of this paper, similar relationships are assumed to exist in man's social realm. Thus they can be used to explain why man must pit his rationality against a constant threat of change and must engineer an environment which is relatively stable over time.

For man, a stable environment is important not only because it reduces physical risks but also because it

reduces strain and uncertainty in interpersonal interactions. One result is an increased life span and this, at least from an evolutionary viewpoint, must be seen as an indicator of a successful species.

One of the methods whereby this stability is created is through the evolution of a human society with intrinsic systems for either reducing or encouraging certain behaviors amongst its membership. It should be kept in mind that it is this systemic, environmentally-specific, organically-interacting whole which development seeks to alter.

II. An Historical Overview of Development Approaches

A. Introduction

Perhaps the saving grace of development as a field of study is that it is not strictly theoretical. Rather its theories and approaches are applied in the field. As such it must be both open to trying new combinations of ideas put forth by the theoretical and applied sciences while pragmatically holding to whatever seems to really work. It is possible to note the effects of what should be two conflicting themes at the level of development practices in the field. Throughout the development world can be seen, firstly, a wide spectrum of approaches in use at any point in time, and, secondly, field workers open to trying new implementation techniques. Indeed, it appears that not only have these patterns both been in existence throughout the history of development, but have become increasingly evident over time. However, these practices make it difficult to lay out the macro-level changes in the field in a linear sequential fashion.

Another reason why it has been difficult to understand the changes in development is that development, as a field, has been evolving rapidly since its inception in the 1950s. When theories do not work in practice, there are tremendous pressures placed on those in the field to

find out what does work and to implement it. The observable result is a rapid change of practices. This rapid change creates conditions of diversity, breadth, and complexity within the field. Again this makes it difficult to achieve what this chapter has set out to do, that is, to provide an historical overview of the development field.

One way of simplifying this task is to note and follow only a few of the many possible threads in the development tapestry. This is the method used here. Two "threads" which are useful in providing a brief historical overview of the field are the measures used to assess the level of recipient development and, more importantly, the general approach used in development interventions.

There are several advantages of focussing on the approaches identified within the development field rather than the theories which spawned these approaches. Firstly, there are many theories existing in many fields of study which are applicable to development. In contrast, the number of identifiable approaches used in development are a manageable few. Secondly, some theories have been used to support several different approaches simply by emphasizing different aspects of the field or theory. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, approaches come closer to describing what

really does occur versus what should occur. The complexity of the situation in the field is such that it may not be possible to identify or isolate theoretical elements. In contrast, approaches suggest in more general terms those areas which are to be focussed on and how they are to be altered. In the same vein, theories tend to have a life of their own which frequently extends past their usefulness. Negative feedback loops on the theoretical level tend to be slow and are often ameliorated by polite rhetoric or narrow reading. In contrast, when the development practitioner uses the wrong tool the negative feedback is swift and harsh - a million dollar project fails, people starve, goods produced cannot be sold, disease increases, etc. As a result, the tools used by the practitioner are more likely to be up-to-date and truly useful.

Measurement of what is being accomplished is usually a central component of an approach. One has to be able to say whether or not there has been movement towards one's goals. Objective statements are frequently made in a way which allows measurement of their achievement. Therefore, when the measures used are examined in conjunction with the approach, a good indication of what was occurring in development at a particular point in time can be ascertained. Further, these aspects are commonly derived from theory and are used to provide a

means of linking theoretical concepts to empirical reality. They form part of the "tool kit" of the practitioner and so can also indicate something about what was occurring in the field rather than simply the mind of the theoretician.

It is interesting to note that though a potentially infinite number of approaches to development are possible there has tended to be only a few major "classes" or "types". The three types which are generally recognized are the Macro-Economic Approach or Modernization, Basic Needs, and Participation. As the following is intended to be only an overview it will therefore discuss only these approaches.¹⁰

¹⁰. The selection of these types of approach to development as opposed to others is open to criticism because of a lack of criteria used to determine what constitutes a development approach. However, this criticism underscores the reason for the section. The reason why there are no criteria available to define types of approaches to development is that the field has yet to agree on what development is. The three types of approach suggested here have been selected because they are commonly those discussed in the literature. Unfortunately, even though these terms are in wide use, it is also generally recognized that the breadth of each "type" leads to inter-type overlaps which tend to blur the boundaries between the approaches. One of the purposes of this paper is to begin the formulation of a definition of development by investigating a process believed to underlie all development efforts. Until such a general process is recognized by the field there can be no acceptable definition of approaches or types of approaches. Thus the means of either rigorously defining these three classes or types of approach or defending their selection over some other are not available. However, it should be pointed out that the intent of the section is to outline an evolution which

B. Modernization

Development as a field appears to have come into being as a result of the convergence of three events: World War II, Planned Economies, and Soviet-U.S. global confrontation. It was generally recognized by the 1930s that the Soviet Union had been able to make great strides forward in terms of its industrial modernization through its use of a centrally planned economy. WW II left the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as the strongest nations globally. Both Europe and East Asia were destroyed economically by the war and consequently were allowed little say in the running of world affairs. Each of the major victors attempted to expand their influence at the expense of the other and each attempted to construct a strong buffer zone. Two of the instruments chosen by the United States to achieve these ends were the Marshall Plan and the World Bank. It was in the Marshall Plan that we find a requirement for development plans and a budget before an international loan could be secured by the developing nation.

has taken place in the development field and to touch on the general nature of the changes which have occurred and the reasons for them. Therefore explicit terminology is not necessary at this point. General terms and meanings are sufficient to allow communication.

The success of development planning in Europe under the Marshall Plan set the pattern for what followed in the soon-to-be-released colonies of the Third World.

The 1950s and early 1960's saw the release of the European colonies. A considerable effort appears to have been spent by both the European states and the United States to form direct economic and political linkages with these weak new nations. As a result of such links the European states and the U.S. not only obtained easier access to raw materials but also to potential future markets for their finished goods. There was also an opportunity to influence the growth of Third World political institutions and, where considered necessary, election outcomes. It must not be forgotten in this connection that behind U.S. policies was the belief held by their Administration that the American way of life was the best alternative available to any peoples or nations. Communism, to them, was an aberration -- a mutant disease which could prey only upon backward nations where the democratic and capitalist systems had not yet developed. The apparent view prevailing at the time was that if the former colonies could be protected and their growth fostered through development assistance, then the natural outcome would be democratic, capitalist states. American military might was assigned the task of preventing

Soviet expansion while the World Bank was made a major channel through which development was to be fostered. To this end, the World Bank was assigned the role of providing Third World nations with cheap loans and sound economic counsel.

Given this historical environment, institutional arrangement, and lack of experience, it is not surprising that development was initially regarded as basically a macro economic process -- a simple extension of the existing (1950s) economic theory and systems into particular geographic areas. The economic bias was so strong that initially there was no perceived need for a special theory of development. Existing economic theory was thought to be sufficient. Perhaps some viewed the successful recovery of Europe as indicative of the usefulness and power of Neoclassical Economic Theory. In any case, throughout the 1950s up until Rostow's influential book, Stages of Economic Growth, we find that only the economic aspects of what today we would call a development theory.¹¹ These took the form of

¹¹. This may be overstating the point in that this period also saw the introduction of much of the Community Development work. The literature written about the decade suggests, however, that there was a large theoretical gap between what was considered Development and the work of Community Development. Though most people in the field today recognize the development of the community as a vital facet of Development this recognition came later, possibly as late as the 1970s.

macro economic models such as Lewis's, Harod-Domar's, etc., and macro economic approaches such as Balanced Growth (Nurkse, 1952; Hansen, 1981) and Unbalanced Growth (Hansen, 1981; Hirschman, 1958). With the latter approach can also be placed such conceptions of development as growth poles (Perroux, 1955) and circular causation (Myrdal, 1957). All of these approaches speak of development in almost purely economic terms. They could do so because one of the implicit assumptions being made in the 1950s was that the Third World peoples and institutions would easily and "correctly" adapt to the changes engendered by the transfers of capital, technology, and administrative techniques from the First World. No one had guided the European nations or the United States through their "successful" adaptation and it was assumed that the force of example would be sufficient to guide the Third World nations. As a result, the process of adaptation by local peoples from a "traditional" to a "modern" society and the means whereby this was to occur were never clearly spelled out. In part this lack of clarity may have been due to the fact that economists and not social scientists were generating the guiding theories and, in part, it was due to the fact that social and psychological theory had not developed to the point where their inclusion would have been obviously useful. Therefore, little was said about

culture, less about perceptions, and almost nothing about man-environment interactions.

Rostow's book marks the beginning of the change towards a distinct development theory. It was most notable in that it explicitly discussed the evolution of social and political institutions along with its discussion of economic arrangements. However, Rostow, still viewed the process of social and political evolution as a more or less natural consequence of economic growth. The stress on economics remained and was, in effect, legitimized. The inevitability of development along the capitalist route is another assumption which Rostow made.¹² Despite such assumptions, the book became the basis of the Modernization School's paradigm in large part because it was endorsed by the major U.S. development assistance agencies.

The goal, according to the Modernization School, was to increase the nation's productivity. The means included capital infusion and rapid industrialization. The unit of analysis was the national economy. The major indicator of development was Gross National Product per Capita (GNPPC). All of these concepts were ones which

¹². Naturally this evident bias drew substantial criticism from the left. For a succinct critique see Baran and Hobsbawm, 1981)

worked quite well in the First World. Therefore, they were simply transferred to the Third.

The validity of these transfers was not seriously questioned by the majority of practitioners at this time. Even the United Nations (U.N.) accepted and used growth in GNP as the indicator of development during the First Development Decade (1960-1969). However, in retrospect, the validity of making such transfers has been found to warrant investigation. Specifically, we are interested here in Modernization's measure of development using the economic indicators and its macro-economic approach.

The Modernization approach was based on a number of assumptions about the nature of development. A first assumption was that development could be defined in economic terms. It was assumed that the needs and wants of human beings were satisfied by goods and services which could be measured in economic terms. Therefore the goal was to increase a nation's average level of productivity -- to produce more quantitatively measurable goods and services.

A second assumption was that of trickle-down or spread effects. Modernization embraced the idea that increased productivity in one area or sector would lead to increased productivity in others. Likewise, the benefits of development were assumed to naturally spread

from one area to another. If an industry were set up in one area, its demand for inputs of raw materials, labor, etc., would bring increased productivity locally and thus wealth to the shops, industries, and peoples in the vicinity.

Another assumption of Modernization was that there would be a natural process of social change as a result of the growth in the economy and, more particularly, the increase in industry. The basic channel through which the process of change would be expressed was the newly created political forms. These forms were to be democratic and based on either the English Westminster model of government or the U.S. model. The power expressing itself through the political system was to be the new middle class and interest groups which the middle class established to represent their interests. Initially, it was expected that a large number of groups would appear but these were expected to coalesce into a small number of political parties and associations as a result of spread effects. These groups, operating through their democratic institutions, were expected to generate their own cultural and social transformation.

The transformation process itself was assumed to be linear in nature. Nations were assumed to be a single society and every society was thought to evolve step by step from primitive to modern. It was also assumed that

this progression was natural and that if there were no blocks a modern, industrial, and democratic state would be the natural outcome.

Two of the acknowledged potential blocks to modernization were the existing social values and institutions. Traditional cultures were viewed as containing "economic, social, cultural, political and institutional barriers which might hinder the transmission effects." (Stahn, 1981:41). To overcome this potential block, the developers had the mass media and educational systems. These systems were made the vehicles for propagating a new national culture.

It is quite easy to see how these assumptions lead to the building of a few large, urban, industrial centers, and why it was regarded as correct to use the natural resources available in the Third World nations to attract capital and technical expertise from the developed nations. It also followed that the developers should try to coordinate and control the spread effects by using national-level planning and that little should be done in terms of society or culture as the general belief was that any and all local cultures would be

melded into a variation of western culture and society.¹³

In terms of measurement, as stated above, the primary indicator of development was GNPPC. GNP is defined as:

The sum of all factor incomes earned in the process of producing the nation's output, including capital consumptive allowances. (Lipsey, 1978:494)

It is a summary figure arrived at by adding several indices within the national accounts. These indices include: 1. wages and other labor income, 2. the incomes of proprietors, 3. interest and miscellaneous investment income, 4. capital consumption allowance, 5. indirect business taxes, 6. corporate valuation adjustment, and 7. the residual error of estimate. Thus the unit of analysis is the national economy and GNP is the indicator found by using the instrument of the national accounts. The GNPPC value is found by dividing GNP by the size of the population.

The advantages¹⁴ of GNP as an indicator of development were seen to be the following:

13. It is perhaps questionable whether the culture of the recipient group was considered at all. Few people involved in development had heard the word "ethnocentrism" and fewer still understood its implications for cross-cultural contacts.

14. It must be remembered that indicators are embedded in theories. Some of the "advantages" mentioned here would obviously be rejected by those espousing a different theory of Development.

1. It was available at a time when many other economic (or social) indicators were not.
2. It was macro and summed up the condition of an entire nation.
3. It was economic and, as societal growth was assumed to be a result of economic growth, GNP was viewed as measuring the dynamic core of the development process.
4. GNP was quantitative and thus amenable to statistical techniques and econometric analysis. For example, it could be standardized in U.S. dollars and used for international comparisons and in comparisons over time. Annual growth rates could thus be calculated. It could also be aggregated into geo-political regions.
5. GNP was not felt to be culturally biased or subjective. Rather, it was viewed as an objective indicator which could be calculated by any economist with the appropriate training.
6. GNP was relatively cheap to calculate. It required only a few good economists in the national capital in order to make the necessary calculations.

It must be kept in mind that most of those involved in Modernization were economists and that they were working at the national level. Also, it must be remembered that their assumptions allowed them to ignore such things as social adaptation on the micro level. To quote the Report of the Director of the Development Advisory Committee of the OECD:

We took it for granted that GNP growth, largely concentrated in the industrial sector, would bring with it automatically full employment and the eradication of poverty as it had seemed to do for us. (OECD, 1973:31)

Similar comments can be found in the works of many developers.¹⁵

¹⁵. See for example Seers "The New Meaning of Development", in International Development Review, 1977:3 or Hicks and Streeten, "Indicators of Development

General disenchantment with the Modernization approach began in the mid-sixties. As hard data about the social conditions in the Less Developed Countries (LDC) became more available it was evident that though there had been a rapid increase in GNP, the development of societies was not occurring as anticipated. Societies were increasingly becoming bi-polar with the very rich and the very poor. Power was also being concentrated in the hands of the rich. The traditional Third World social structures and institutions were not evolving to the benefit of society but, instead, were being entrenched as a defence of those in power. It appeared that those with power, the landlords, money lenders, and industrialists, were not only against the institutional reforms which would spread the benefits of development but were also capable of preventing the changes from occurring.

While the propensity of the governors to block any threat to their power might have been predicted by political philosophers such as Machiavelli and Pareto, what was more unusual and unexpected was that so many of the changes introduced to assist the poor also appeared to be rejected. As will be shown in this paper, the reasons for the recipients' rejection of the changes

- The Search for a Basic Needs Yardstick" in Development Digest, Vol.16 no. 2, 1980.

were quite rational. However, to many of the development practitioners they did not appear to be so at the time. In addition many of the technologies introduced were found to exacerbate existing problems or to create new ones. The Green Revolution with its introduction of high-yield varieties of seed can be regarded as a classical example of the benefits and costs of change under the Modernization approach. It is unlikely that nations like India would have survived the 1970s without a major famine had the high-yield varieties not been adopted. However, the distribution of benefits was not even. Many peasants were evicted from land which their families had tilled for generations by landlords who, because of the new varieties, realized that they could make more from the land by mechanizing than by collecting rents (Cleaver, 1972; Goody, 1980). The Green Revolution has also been linked to the increase in malaria in the Third World (Science News, October 3, 1981:213).

There were also the additional problems of maintaining new industries. The imported technology required expatriates to operate and maintain the equipment and the costly import of parts and spares (Cooper, 1975). Further, Third World industries were often under-utilized because of world market conditions (Lim, 1977).

National-level Planning similarly was found to be less useful than anticipated. To quote Waterston:

After about two decades during which planning gained virtually worldwide acceptance, questions are being asked about its usefulness....even the less naive are disappointed with the results of planned development....For despite reservations about the statistical reliability of the data in the poor countries, what is available indicates that, despite steadily increased reliance on planning since the War, the annual rate at which real domestic product (GDP) has grown in all less developed countries has shown virtually no improvement since the 1950s. (1972:81)

There are several reasons for this lack of effectiveness. Waterston points out that conventional planning makes use of a set of tools largely devised in and for the more advanced countries (1972:86), and that these tools may be inappropriate for the Third World environment and thus "may produce misleading and inaccurate conclusions" (1972:86). A number of environmental differences are noted such as political stability, economic attitude, political will, and administrative capacity (1972:88-90). As well, Waterston notes the lack of data and simplistic planning models with assumed linear relationships, stable parameters, over-aggregation -- sometimes to only two sectors, and a failure to include political, social, and institutional factors (1972:85-87). Finally, Waterston notes that:

... in the prevailing circumstances ... medium term national development plans ... are, ... in varying degrees, facades which are ignored or circumvented by

the technical ministries, departments and agencies charged with the implementing of plans. In practice, these organizations generally pursue a project-by-project approach (1972:91).

Thus the national planning aspect of Modernization may never have existed except in theory.¹⁶

However, there were changes in the Third World during the 1950s and 1960s. Many of these changes were subtle and were not those reported in development journals. In discussions with several individuals who were in the Third World during this period¹⁷ one of the changes noted was in the attitudes and the character of the people. Where once people laughed freely, cooperated within the village, respected and trusted each other, cared for one another, and shared the joys and sorrows of life, there was an increase in a sense of bitterness, disrespect, selfishness, and conflict. There has also been noticeable increases in the general level of marital conflict, family disruption, alcohol

¹⁶. Though Waterston makes no reference to it, one of the problems of such national planning lies in the nature of the organization which does the planning, i.e. bureaucracies. Down's work (1965) on the bureaucratic form suggests that many of the problems with top-down or centrally-planned development may have originated in the form of organization rather than in the theory or conceptions of the Development process.

¹⁷. These reports were generally in the form of personal communications. The individuals and their locations include: Dr. Glen Eyford (India), W. Lemmon (India), Clara Christoffe (Guadeloupe, F.W.I.), and Z. Meghir (Tanzania).

consumption, and an increase in corruption amongst the officials.

In sum, it seems clear that Modernization, while creating change, may not have achieved its overall goal of development and its more limited goal of increased productivity. Some of the apparent reasons have been noted. More recent authors (See for example; Bopp, 1980, 1986) have tended to focus on the basic assumption of Modernization - that development is economic - and are asking how valid this assumption is. It will be shown in this paper that, in fact, this was perhaps the fundamental flaw of the Modernization approach as it was practiced. As for the social forces set in motion during the 1950s and 1960s, unlike Modernization theory, these are still existent today and can be shown to underlie much of the instability seen in the Third World.

Not surprisingly, disenchantment with the national economy as the unit of analysis seems to have paralleled the decline of the Modernization approach. Throughout the 1960s the feeling grew that GNP and its derivative GNPPC were not only missing vital aspects of the development process but were also flawed methodologically. The criticisms made of GNP methodology can be divided between the two sources of measurement error; reliability and validity. In both

cases there have been substantial criticism of GNP as an indicator of development.¹⁸

In 1965 the first major institution openly acknowledged the seriousness of the problems with the Modernization approach to development and, implicitly, the national economy as the unit of analysis, and GNPPC as the indicator of development. The specific document which broached the subject was the U.N. 1965 Report on the World Social Situations. To quote the Report:

A picture of painfully slow progress in the developing countries emerges at the mid-point of the Development Decade. While some sectors of development (especially education) have continued to fare better than others, and some countries (and parts of countries) have advanced faster than others, it seems clear that for the most part, the recent effort at development has fallen far short of hopes and expectations. Possibly some of these expectations were undoubtedly optimistic; a more pertinent question is whether the development efforts both national and international, have been sufficient -- and in the right direction.

Progress has been limited both by external constraints and by internal political and social realities. Unfavorable trends in trade and problems of external financing have sharply limited the material resources for development in many of the poorer countries, while the implementation of development goals has been hampered in a number of these countries by political instability and dissensions, with frequent overthrow of governments amid charges of corruption; sometimes also by lack of the necessary political will for development, and frequently by persistence of administrative and social structures that fail to provide an organizational basis for change and development or to enlist popular

¹⁸. For a more thorough discussion of the problems of using GNP as an indicator of development see Thirlwall, 1978; Sinha, 1977; Kravis et al, 1975; Hicks and Streeten, 1980; and Todaro, 1980.

motivation and participation. (page vii as quoted in UNRISD Report #80.3:p.68-9)

It was obvious that an economically propelled social, cultural, and political transformation along lines broadly similar to that which occurred in the First World was not occurring or, at least, was not occurring as quickly as anticipated. The assumption of a linear and common development process was not proving true. The question was: Why? The answer, in part, was seen to lie in the fact that development was neither a simple nor linear process. Rather, the process was very complex and unique to each nation. The U.N. document marks the beginning of the open recognition of this fact. As Wolfe states regarding this U.N. document and the times in general:

... the proponents of social development were beginning to envisage development as a complex process of societal change and modernization, in which the "economic" and the "social" were separable only artificially and for the purposes of analysis. (UNRISD, 1980:69)

By 1969 the development field was sufficiently sensitized to the need for social analysis and inputs that it was possible to "officially" put away Modernization Theory with its overemphasis on economic growth.¹⁹ The instrument of this purge was a U.N.

¹⁹. In regard to this sensitization one could quote several writers. Perhaps the most insightful would be Dudley Seers' (1977) retrospective comments on his earlier (1969) work on "The meaning of Development":

called Meeting of Experts on Social Policy and Planning which met in Stockholm.²⁰ "The purpose of the meeting was to clarify further the role of social factors in development with a view to ensuring their adequate inclusion in development plans and programmes." (U.N., 1971:4). The meeting laid much of the blame for the failure of development during the sixties on the relative ease of obtaining and using economic indicators. This can be seen as an implicit criticism of the assumption that economic growth was sufficient to bring about development.

... over-emphasis on economic growth rates of production has been based on the apparent ease of quantification in the concept of the national income or gross national product of developing countries.... The dominance of economists among the social scientists and the earlier development and easier

The common basis of development studies and policy making was still very simple in 1969: in order to solve social problems, such as unemployment, and achieve respectable status as modern nations, poor countries needed "development" which could be measured in GNP. In fact economic growth was development.

(IDR, 1977/3:1)

Seers goes on to state that the intent of the 1969 article was to redefine the term development:

...growth was in itself insufficient, indeed perhaps socially damaging: a country was not enjoying "development" unless in addition inequality, unemployment and poverty were declining. Not really very original. The paper should be seen as just one articulation in a period of drastic change in professional attitudes. (IDR, 1977/3:3-4)

²⁰. The full report of this meeting was published in the U.N.'s International Social Development Review, no. 3 1971, pp.4-14.

quantification of their concepts, has meant that certain non-market aspects - those inappropriately labelled "social" - have been neglected in approaches to development. (UNRISD, 1980:75-76)

The report explicitly expanded the meaning of the development process to include other societal subsystems besides the national economy.

... it is most necessary to view the development process as a complex whole, comprising economic elements sensu stricto, but also other social, as well as political and administrative elements. Any design for a development strategy, national or international, must cover all the above mentioned fields if it is to be meaningful, internally consistent and capable of effective implementation. (UNRISD, 1980:75)

This report should not be seen as simply drawing out the implications of a set of well-known criticisms of a theory. Rather, it should be viewed as marking the formal and public recognition of the failure of an approach and perhaps even a paradigm. One of the consequent outcomes of the above statements was a quick proliferation of development theories, approaches and forms of measurement - none of these necessarily connected with each other. As well, there was a vast increase in the number of different definitions of development, each of which emphasized a different aspect of the complex that development was now recognized to be.²¹

²¹. In order to follow our threads through this period of fragmentation we must choose between different actors and their various theories, approaches, and measures. For the purposes of this thesis, the work of

C. The Basic Needs Approach.

While developer-academics tried to construct new and more viable Macro-economic theories²², the development organizations generally became more pragmatic. For example, it is the development organizations who appear to have financed much of the subsequent work on social indicators, the generation of more socioeconomic data, and procedures for evaluating development projects. In sum, the organizational response might be thought of as following a grounded theory approach in that they tried to carry on their development work inductively rather than from theoretical deductions, that is, from the basis of their experience as to what really worked.

Armed with evidence that the rich and powerful in the Third World were siphoning off large portions of the national capital, that the poor were getting relatively poorer, and that structural changes were required, these

the major development institutions, including the U.N., UNRISD, World Bank, AID, CIDA, etc. will be followed. These organizations have generally been able to employ the best minds in solving their problems yet, due to bureaucratic drag, tend to be somewhat conservative in their practices. These two factors suggest that if a progressive orthodoxy exists in development then it probably resides in these organizations.

²². See UNRISD (1980:92-107) for an outline of eight proposed development theories which emerged after 1969.

bilateral and multilateral organizations were faced with a major problem. How, as outsiders, were they to change the socio-political structure of a sovereign state?

This question arose because the powerful and influential of the Third World were commonly either members of government or had close associations with the government. Therefore the issue of creating a more equitable distribution of Gross National Product within the Third World Nations could not be dealt with openly. To have done so may have precipitated an international incident.

The solution seized upon was to refocus development efforts on those programs and projects which could directly benefit the world's poorest, and, hopefully, thereby keep money from those who already had sufficient. This approach has been dubbed the Basic Needs Approach because of its avowed goal of providing for the poor's basic needs. This approach has an interesting and important contradiction - one which reflects its origins. All nations, regardless of GNPPC have poorer segments. In terms of providing basic needs, work could in fact be done in any nation. Yet, it was necessary to designate certain nations as worthy of aid and not others. In order to appear fair, a method was needed which would be capable of making this distinction on the basis of national indicators.

Unfortunately, the information needed was based not on national averages but on specific intra-national (often geographical) pockets. The existence of absolute poverty in a remote region of a nation, for example, might be lost in averaging the annual income figures from a nation with a very skewed income distribution. A considerable amount of work has gone into trying to find a solution to both this problem of intra-national differences and its "parent" problem of identifying national level indicators capable of expressing the "true" condition of an independent national state.

Once having identified a recipient nation as needing development assistance, the approach attempted to work at the sub-national level in those geographical areas where basic needs are not being met. These areas have tended to be rural and the type of project has tended to have as its goal either the improvement of agricultural yields or the provision of health and education needs, i.e. introducing new varieties of seed, local irrigation projects, building sanitation facilities, running water, elementary schools, etc.

On the level of actual practice, the effect of the shift towards providing basic needs rather than major capital items has had a relatively small impact on the actual design or methods of projects. Projects are still selected by external expertise based on their

assessment of need, the economic return on the investment, and the funds available from some outside source. Outside experts still decide on the design of the project and the idea is still to implement the change as quickly and as economically efficiently as possible. The major difference is that development projects are now allowed to openly append a social component.

Some may feel that this characterization is too harsh; that it does not give sufficient weight to the increasing consciousness of those working in the field with respect to the need to work with the local people rather than regarding the nation as a unitary whole. This may be true, but the fact remains that by the time the Basic Needs Approach was generally accepted, the organizations implementing development had been established, the bureaucratic rules to be followed were in place, and the employees indoctrinated. Under such conditions, it is hard to imagine how a truly major shift could be effected.

An example of how the Basic Needs Approach was subverted by the existing order can be seen in the way projects were selected. The selection process was initiated, not by the local leadership or the community at large, but by the national government of the Third World nation. The government, usually without

consultation with local peoples, would draft a list of development wants. It would then circulate this list amongst the potential donor nations and organizations. The donors would select those projects which they thought they could best or should, for political reasons, assist with. Commonly, planning and budget control were in the hands of representatives of the international organization coordinating or implementing the overall program. Individual projects were usually components of a national program and were controlled from a national office in the capital city. With such a selection process and organizational structure, it is obvious that the nature of the projects would continue to be oriented towards the introduction of capital equipment as this was the general orientation of all of the major decision-makers.

In terms of the local culture, the growing awareness of intra-national cultural differences was beginning to be felt. One result was that it became more common for field workers to make cursory studies of the local culture in the project areas before a project was initiated.²³ It seems that there was still a belief in

²³. Gittinger, in private conversation while at Carleton University, March 1982, stated that the World Bank had hired two anthropologists but found them hard to work with in that the anthropologists required a considerable amount of time to make their societal studies. As a result funding would be tied up and thus

the idea of a national culture. However, achieving this goal was shifted to the indefinite future.

In terms of indicators, the Basic Needs Approach can be seen as an attempt to move closer to and to measure aspects vital to what is perhaps the single goal of development which could be universally accepted -- that of sustaining human life.

Hicks and Streeten note that indicators of development can be roughly classified as indicators of inputs or outputs. Regarding this, they write:

For performance testing there is something to be said for choosing indices that measure results, impacts, or outputs, since these are closer to what we are trying to achieve. Furthermore, measures of inputs can introduce biases toward certain patterns of meeting needs which may not be universal. (1980:84)

Thus, this shift towards output indicators would be considered a positive step. However, the indicator problems associated with the basic needs approach are still many, some of which are virtually identical to those mentioned earlier in connection with GNPPC (These problems are discussed below.). The reason for this lies in the fact that while the Basic Needs approach was attempting to operate at the local and regional level, the measurement was still being made at the national

increase the cost of the project. Consequently, the approach which he advocated was to train economists to make the necessary pre-project social evaluations, perhaps using a checklist.

level in an attempt to either supplement, complement, or replace GNPPC (Hicks and Streeten, 1981:83). The methodological need perceived by the international development organizations was for a means of making comparisons and for quantifying advances in the provision of basic needs at the national level when the work was being done at the local level.

Instead of using the national economy as the unit of analysis as had been done in Modernization, those using the Basic Needs approach tried to identify and use some concept of the "national society." This unit of analysis is similar to the national economy in that it is still a national unit and its indicator is still calculated as a composite of a number of sub-indices. Naturally enough developers encountered basically the same type of problems as when using the national economy. In fact, they encountered more of them because of the lack of an accepted definition of basic needs.

In our examination of national economy as the unit of analysis for development we noted that the indicator was neither reliable nor valid. The problems with the reliability of indicators used with the Basic Needs approach can be summarized as:

1. Non-monetary sectors which had to be estimated.
2. The inability to select prices to be used as weights.
3. The inability to create functions which would allow international comparisons.

The problems associated with validity can be cited as:

1. No consensus about the definition of the concept to be measured.
2. The concept is a multidimensional one consisting of several sub-concepts.
3. The measure is lengthy and complex.

The contention here is that the use of the national society as the unit of analysis encounters these same measurement problems as the use of the national economy. While a number of attempts were made to define a valid and reliable measure of basic needs²⁴ none was considered successful.

Historically speaking, this marks the state of affairs up to the end of the 1970s. In terms of the Basic Needs Approach to development, by this time the initial enthusiasm for approach had waned considerably. In part, this loss of enthusiasm was due to the problems encountered in defining the basic needs indicator but it was also due to the difficulty in meaningfully applying an approach which demanded so much more fieldwork when the organizational structures were set up to support either a macro approach or a hit and run style of project implementation. Expatriate experts are

²⁴. There is an extensive literature documenting this search. See, for example UNRISD, 1974; Pausewang, 1973; UNRISD, 1968; UNRISD, 1969; Drewnowski, 1966a and 1966b; McGranahan et. al., 1972; and Hicks and Streeten, 1980. One attempt which received widespread interest was the physical quality of life index (PQLI). For a succinct critique of the PQLI see Morris, 1980.

expensive, powerful, and hard to fire. The organizations may also have lacked vision. For whatever reason, it seems fair to say in retrospect that a general malaise had settled on the field.

D. The Participation Approach - Bottom-up development

Even if there were no advances in the evolution of either a guiding theory of development or implementation techniques in the late 1960s and early 1970s, there were considerable advances in the social sciences generally and more specifically in management science. One of the techniques developed by these fields was project evaluation. Beginning in the late 1960s and taking off in the early 1970s, program and project evaluation became more and more extensively used. By 1975, this grounded theory or action theory approach was beginning to identify what actually worked in development. A consistent finding was that project success could be predicted by the amount of participation that the local people had in both the project planning and its implementation. Perhaps the best known of these studies was that performed by Morss et. al. (1975) in their study of thirty-six development projects located in

Africa, Asia, South America, and Latin America.²⁵ It is largely as a result of these findings that a new approach to development emerged -- the Participation Approach.

A hallmark of the participation approach to development²⁶ is the assumption that peoples in the Third World know what they want and need. They may even know how to get it but lack the resources necessary to do so. As a result of this assumption the Approach attempts to place enough resources at the disposal of a chosen community to enable it to achieve its wants and needs. In effect, the locus of control of the development project is placed in the hands of the local population. The results have been both a greater number of successful development projects along with more variety and flexibility.

25. Two other studies which reached this same general conclusion regarding the need for participation were those of Lele (1975) and Lance and McKenna (1975). In the Lance and McKenna study, their examination of 50 programmes for the introduction of technological changes they found that the only effective strategy was popular participation. Lele writes that the element of popular participation was found to be consistently important in her experiences in Kenya with the Special Rural Development Projects.

26. For an overview of the history of this approach and a framework for analyzing Participation projects see Cohen and Uphoff, "Participation's Place in Rural Development: Seeking Clarity Through Specificity" in World Development, Vol. 8 no. 3, (March, 1980) pp. 213-236.

Projects may take the form of co-operatives, small industries, agricultural projects, health projects, etc. - almost whatever the local people and the development institution can agree on. Often they take on the same "basic needs" goals as stressed by the preceding approach. Both economic and social development can occur. Projects may take place in either urban or rural settings but have tended to be rural because the need is greater. In part this greater need is a result of Third World governments' bias towards urban populations (Lipton, 1977:44-86, Van Arkadie, 1977) and in part because national governments are more likely to intervene in urban areas and to dictate what will be done. The participation approach also tends to function at the level of communities such as villages and barrios instead of at the national or regional levels. This stems from the fact that villages and barrios are communities and, as such, are more homogeneous and have usually established their own means of gaining and articulating community consensus in decisions.

It would appear that the key ingredients responsible for the success of the approach lie in local control of decision making and local motivation to change. As the choice of project lies with the local people, it is less likely that there will be major disruptions of the local culture because those who are most sensitive to and

impacted by such changes are directing them. Finally, the motivation for change is located within Third World communities and not in external groups and forces.

The participation approach is not without its failures. In Ethiopia, for example, a sum of \$1,000 per year was allotted to each of the camps for persons displaced by the drought. It was reported in one case²⁷ that the local council of a camp decided to use its money to purchase sewing machines. Six months after the machines arrived an inspection showed that the machines were not being used because no one knew how to use them. One of the goals of the remaining chapters is to explain why this type of behavior occurs.

E: Summary of the changes in development

Having now made a brief and selective historical overview of the changes in the development field, it now remains to draw out and clarify the trends and problems which we can see with respect to the general approach to development and its measurement indicators.

The major trend in the measurement of development has been from economic to socioeconomic indicators. However, as we noted, neither of these have been found

²⁷. Reported in a series of articles on Ethiopia in the Ottawa Citizen, March 1986.

to be either reliable or valid when aggregated to the national level. The problems encountered include:

1. The lack of an accepted definition of what was being measured. This includes both the participation and the basic needs approaches. This critique does not include macro-economic approach to development. Here the indicator was known and accepted but shown to be unreliable.
2. An inability to aggregate various sub-indices because of an inability to construct an appropriate weighting system.
3. A lack of data about sectors or geographical areas within nations.²⁸

²⁸. UNRISD in 1972 launched a project called "Measurement and Analysis of Progress at the Local Level." The defined purpose of this project is to find a way to make accurate measurements of development and to collect the needed data. To quote the project proposal:

The purpose of this project is to try to build up an approach to development indicators - a way of collecting, analyzing and presenting data - that will provide a basis for a better picture of social progress as it is actually taking place in developing countries. The hypothesis is that by systematic examination and mapping of real progress at the local level (i.e. in specific villages, small towns, city districts, etc.) not only can certain aspect of change, particularly social aspects, be more accurately assessed and portrayed than by national aggregates or averages - which may conceal as much as they reveal - but also the nature of change, including the interrelations between economic and social factors, can be better observed. (UNRISD Research Notes #4, Geneva, 1974)

It can be argued that all three of these problems stem from a single fact: that within nations, especially Third World nations, there are a number of distinct environments and societies. The degree of this particularity which exists at the sub-national level makes it virtually impossible to make valid and reliable cross-group generalizations or comparisons beyond the obvious. It is this plurality which blocks the generation of acceptable definitions, valid weighting systems and the collection of standardized information from all areas of most Third World nations. In contrast, most First World nations had their boundaries defined on the basis of its cultural characteristics and they have actively worked to create a single cultural system through the use of education and media. Therefore the various constituent sub-cultures have a much smaller differential impact on the socioeconomic indicators. Generalizations within the developed nations are thus made possible where they would not be possible in most Third World countries.

As regards the possibility of being able to develop an indicator of development which might be used to make inter-project comparisons, an examination of the conclusions of a pilot study of two Cretean villages

As of 1980 this project had been established in villages in at least seven countries. (Mathew, 1980:3)

made by UNRISD as part of their Measure of Real Progress at the Local Level project (1974:99-101) suggests that this will never be possible. The conclusions included the following points:

1. "The nature of the overall change that may be taking place can give a sense of growth or a sense of decline, which may affect the significance of particular indicators." (UNRISD, 1974:99) Local people do sense when growth or decline is occurring.
2. "A number of proposed typical national and international indicators were too crude to deal with local realities and required refinement." (UNRISD, 1974:99) This appears to refer to both problems of aggregation and quality of what is indicated (for example, years of education versus quality of education received).
3. "There is no simple thing that can be called progress (development) as defined by the local population, 'by the people themselves'." (UNRISD, 1974:100) Divisions were noted between old and young and between villagers and administrative and technical authorities.
4. "The same indicator may have different degrees of relevance or different meaning in different local conditions." (UNRISD, 1974:100)
5. There were "various particularistic aspects which would be difficult to generalize to regions or the country as a whole." (UNRISD, 1974:100)
6. "With the process of change, some indicators lose significance locally and new indicators or new variations of an older indicator came in." (UNRISD, 1974:100) The example given of this phenomenon is that of potable water. After all houses had an adequate supply of potable water, it lost its relevance as a significant variable. Indoor toilets became the relevant indicator.
7. "While indicators of progress tend to be reported separately....Villagers appeared to view significant progress not as isolated changes in education, health, the environment, etc., but as a bundle of simultaneous changes in these and other aspects. It would follow that a reporting system should make it possible, as by tagging items, to describe joint changes as they affect specified localities or population groups." (UNRISD, 1974:100)

These points would appear to support not only the views expressed above regarding the inability to use a common set of indicators but also point out that there may be significant societal differences even within villages; i.e. between young and old or between progressive and traditional. The results of this study would seem to rule out both standard indicators and the nation as the unit of analysis and to suggest caution when aggregating even to the village level.

A second consideration which must be addressed here is why there have been almost continual efforts to find indicators of development at the national level. Why was the national level of such great importance to the developers despite the evident problems? As suggested earlier, the reasons may have less to do with development and more to do with the nature of the organizations providing the funding and the way in which the developers have been trained to see the world and especially the nation state. In the 1950s the developers were taught to see the Third World in economic terms and through the capitalist paradigm. The development agencies were national governments. Consequently the need was to find a national level economic instrument. The experience of the 1950s and 1960s has tempered this view. Now there is a move towards funding Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and

allowing them to implement the development projects in their own way using their own expertise. In order to remain informed of the project's advancement a project evaluation is usually mandatory. The indicators in the situation are almost always local in character and have social as well as economic components.

The other thread that followed in this historical overview of development has been the nature of the general approach to development as advocated by the different schools. It was noted how there has been an evolution on a number of dimensions. First there has been a movement away from top-down development where the type of development project was dictated by the funding agency or national government to a bottom-up development where local peoples are included in the project selection process. The initial focus at the national level has been shifted to the local level. The emphasis on the economy in general and on industrialization in particular has been tempered somewhat because of the current requirement that local peoples be allowed to participate in the choice of development project. Not all recipients want industry.

A point which needs to be emphasized is that the first two approaches, Macro-economic and Basic Needs, are so closely related in terms of their approach to development that in many respects they can be considered

equivalent. While this may not be evident at first glance, it becomes clear when one notes that the organizational structures and supports, the approach, as well as the educational level and specializations of the personnel employed are generally the same. The major difference is that one suggests the import of capital equipment while the other, seeds, medicine, and tube wells. Therefore, in the following discussion, these two approaches will be indicated when the term Modernization is used.

The need which has been evident in development since the loss of the adjective "economic" is for a theoretical framework which can both explain past successes and failures and can incorporate the more recently identified understandings arrived at through the grounded theory approaches. The field needs such a theoretical base in order to unify it, and to identify shortcuts and pitfalls before they are encountered. To date development is bereft of such a theory and therefore must rely on the recipes arduously worked out by experienced practitioners. These recipes still fail from time to time as environments and contexts change but without theory to conceptualize the development process, the reasons for failure can only be surmised.

There is a great deal of social science theory available at this time. However, these are not

generally regarded as applicable to development because, for the historical reasons shown above, development is viewed as an economic and technological activity. In order to legitimately access these theories the first requirement is to show that development truly falls within the purview of the social sciences. Then, there must be some indication that social science theory is capable of providing sufficient insight into the development process that its use is warranted. Finally, there must be a winnowing of the various social science theories in order to match theory to what exists in the environment. Development, because it is applied in the real world, offers an excellent opportunity for attempting this matching. The end result will likely be a set of mid-range theories which are sufficiently general to suggest approaches to development in various environments and contexts though no one theory will be dominant overall.

In the next chapter an attempt will be made to redefine development as induced cultural change and thereby to allow many of the theories currently existent in the social sciences to have a direct application to the work being performed in the development field. The section following will outline a series of social science theories which appear to be of use to development.

III. Development as induced cultural change

A. Implications and need for conceptualizing development as induced cultural change

The central idea of this section is that development is induced cultural change. Making this point is relatively trivial in that it requires only an examination of definitions of culture and the subsequent comparison of these definitions to the activities of development. This will be done in the next sub-section. In this sub-section the need for conceptualizing development as induced cultural change and some of the implications of doing so will be examined. While showing that development is cultural change is a trivial activity, neither the need to do so nor the implications which emerge are.

As the previous section has shown, up to the present the development field has generally viewed the development process as an economic and/or technological activity and, as a result, has tended to approach development on a project by project basis using a project management approach. Each project has, to a large extent, been organized and implemented autonomously with the majority of care being given to the technical feasibility of the effort and its economic spinoffs rather than its impact on the recipient group's

social or cultural makeup. It has also been shown that attempts to define development in terms of either economic or technological variables have not proven successful. Further, a number of writers in development have been quoted in the previous section as saying that the projects, in general, have not achieved the anticipated and planned for results. Finally, where development work has achieved notable success it has usually been organized by or operated through organizations composed of members of the recipient group itself.²⁹ In other words, development successes are more likely to occur when there is a strong input from those living in the environment rather than by reference to any body of technical knowledge. This pattern of success and failure has resulted in the construction of a number of pragmatic approaches to development, each of which has been specific to its area and environment. While the relative success of these projects is to be lauded, such specificity and resulting variation does not easily allow for the induction of general principles by which to guide development interventions. Having

29. See for example; Macy(1983) on the Sarvodaya Shramadada Movement in Sri Lanka which is regarded by many as one of the most successful ongoing development organizations and de Silva et al. (1979) on the Bhoomi Sena movement in Maharashtra, India. In both of these cases, a large degree of the success achieved is attributed to the virtually exclusive use of local individuals.

general principles of development is important for several reasons. Perhaps the most important of these is that without these principles a significant gap can emerge between those who are working in the field and those who are financing the field operations.

Development funding organizations such as the World Bank and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) have ultimate control over most of the work being performed. These organizations exercise their control through establishing project identification and reporting criteria and project selection guidelines which must be met by those who wish to be financed. If these criteria and guidelines are not valid then the projects which they fund are less likely to be effective. In fact, these criteria and guidelines may even preclude projects which those in the field believe have the greatest chance for success.³⁰ This problem occurs because there are no general principles or overall theories which guide the development process.

30. M. Miloff of the South Asia Partnership amongst others has stated that one of the needs in many NGOs at this time is for a specialist in project writing who can describe a project in terms which allows it to fit within the funder's guidelines and criteria regardless of what the project will actually be like. Otherwise many of the types of projects which have usually proven successful in the past would not qualify to receive funding.

A related problem, and one which is emerging more frequently over time, is conflict between development agencies in the field. Certain type of project are more valued by any given development agency than others. In many cases this value is a result of their having expertise or domestic over-production in that area. For example, Canada has been quite happy to send powdered milk to any and all disaster areas because the political environment in Canada guarantees a surplus of powdered milk. Similar statements can be made for any number of items and for virtually all funding agencies. The conflict occurs when there is pressure from the funder to "dump" a particular technology or expertise wherever it seems plausible. This situation manifests itself in the field as a number of agencies converging on an area and attempting to introduce similar or, worse, conflicting technologies. Such circumstances create conflict between agencies or their supported NGOs.³¹ Without a commonly accepted theory which can be used by all concerned to arbitrate their differences the inevitable result is conflict.

³¹. This problem was first flagged for me by the UNDP country representative in Timbucto during 1981-82. He described a meeting at which he obtained agreement from all agencies as to what they would contribute to the development effort only to have the actors renege on their agreement, apparently after consultations with their home office. A very recent (July, 1988) trip to Ethiopia by a colleague identified this same type of problem.

The above problems suggest a need in development, not for another type of approach to the development process, but rather, a need for a body of theory which is general enough to allow application in a variety of situations and environments.

It is the thesis of this paper that one way in which the above needs can be met is to view development as a process of cultural rather than economic, sectoral or technological change. It is also held that sufficient theory on cultural change currently exists within sociology, psychology, and anthropology to meet this need. Development can be seen as a special case of cultural change.

When development is viewed as cultural change there are several implications. Fundamental amongst these is that it will legitimize and perhaps even necessitate the application of social, psychological, and anthropological theories in the development environment. From this implication arise the opening of development to the theories, concepts, and ideas of these social sciences, a clarification of both the purpose of development and its goals, the identification of new and more effective approaches to development interventions, and the identification of better organizational structures for development organizations. Aspects of

these resulting changes are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Viewing development as cultural change can be expected to bring about substantial changes in the methods of development. For example, the cultural view of development will likely urge developers to see the holistic nature of the recipient group and the systemic interactions which bind that group together. If the whole of a group is taken into consideration instead of only a small part, then the way in which development efforts are focussed, the approaches used, the goals established, the time scale for development changes, and, perhaps equally importantly, the way in which development organizations are structured to implement development would be altered to reflect this consideration.

In the longer run, a more important benefit from this shift in perspective could be the identification and application of a set of theories which are capable of conceptualizing the development process. There are a number of theoretical perspectives within the social sciences which can be usefully applied to the development situation and process. If development is regarded as an economic and technological process there is no need to access the knowledge which lies therein. As stated in a footnote above, the argument used by the

funding agencies for ignoring the social sciences has been as follows:

The services of sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists will cost and will take time which also has cost implications. If the development process is considered to be economic and technological then the expertise which these individuals have is not required. Therefore there is no reason to incur the cost of such individuals.

However, if development is redefined as a process of cultural change then this expertise would not only be of interest but would, almost by definition, be required as would the theory and conceptions evolved by these fields.³²

B. Redefining Development as Cultural Change

Definitionally, development becomes cultural change when it can be shown that development efforts change the

³². This is not meant to suggest that there is complete agreement within the social sciences as to the validity or usefulness of particular theories or conceptions. However, full agreement is not an absolute requirement at this point in time. What is required is agreement that development is a process of cultural change. With the establishment of this agreement any one of a number of theories can be used as an initial start position. From this position movement can be made towards more effective theory as results of field applications are studied.

culture of the recipient group. Therefore, in order to meaningfully redefine development as cultural change it is necessary, firstly, to examine how culture is defined and, secondly, whether or not development will alter culture. If development efforts alter recipient cultures then it has the effect of inducing cultural change.

Culture has been defined in several different ways by various writers. The following collection of definitions has been taken from Keesing (1976).

That complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society. (Taylor, 1871)

The sum total of knowledge, attitudes and habitual behavior patterns shared and transmitted by the members of a particular society. (Linton, 1940)

[All the] historically created designs for living, explicit and implicit, rational, irrational, and nonrational, which exist at any given time as potential guides for the behavior of man. (Kluckhohn and Kelly, 1945)

The mass or learned and transmitted motor reactions, habits, techniques, ideas, and values -- and the behavior they induce. (Kroeber, 1948)

Patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts. (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952)

Culture is all those means whose forms are not under genetic control which serve to adjust

individuals and groups within their ecological communities. (Binford, 1968:323)

From these definitions Keesing synthesizes his own and the one which will be used herein:

"[C]ulture" [refers] to systems of shared ideas, to the conceptual designs, the shared systems of meaning, that underlie the ways in which a people live. Culture, so defined, refers to what humans learn, not what they do and make. (Keesing, 1976:139)

In reading through these definitions it seems clear that the consensus amongst social scientists is that culture is what an individual learns from and shares with members of a group. In other words, culture is that part of an individual's view of reality which similarly resides in the minds of the other members of his group. Culture is a group's shared world view. The expression of culture, in contrast to its reality, is the prescribed behaviors, technology, artifacts, social organizations, etc. which the members produce or evince. While these tangibles reflect a culture and may even be essential to its continuation, they are not, in and of themselves, the culture. The core of a culture lies in the shared view of the world which a group of people have learned.

Given this definition and the historical evolution of development it seems clear that every development

effort, wittingly or not, is intended to affect the recipient group's world view. The justification for developers introducing new grains, sanitation techniques, electrification, and so on is to bring about changes in the recipient group. The introductions are made with the idea in mind that the recipient group will adopt the new ideas, technologies, tools, methods, organizations, institutions, and behaviors and leave behind the old. Therefore, development, used as a transitive verb describing procedures carried out by development agencies, is an attempt to induce cultural change.

While cultural change is the effect of development efforts, not all cultural change can be equated with development. A key connotation of the term "development" when used as an intransitive verb is that there is a positive, augmentative change in the object in question. As remarked upon several times above, this is not necessarily the case in the development field. While development will almost certainly bring about cultural change it does not necessarily follow that the resulting cultural change will be positive and augmentative -- that is, development. It is primarily for this reason that it is important to regard development work as inducing cultural change and not, as

has been the case to this point, as bringing about positive, augmentative change.

In order for this new view of development to be of use, it is not sufficient to simply show that development efforts induce cultural change. It is also necessary to indicate that there is sufficient applicable theory about culture and cultural change to make such a shift in perspective a practicable alternative. The need, therefore, is to show that there exists a sufficient body of theory which can conceptualize how individuals acquire and change their particular cultural understanding, how individuals come to share their understanding of a particular culture, how a group persists in maintaining their culture over time, and how changes in a culture are possible.

In the following sections are presented a range of concepts and theories drawn from the social sciences which together appear capable of achieving these requirements. In presenting them, the intention is not to suggest that these particular theories are either the best or the only ones available. Rather, it is to indicate, firstly, that sufficient theory does already exist in the social sciences to enable the meaningful redefinition of development as cultural change and, secondly, to begin the process of assembling and integrating a set of social and social-psychological

theories appropriate to development. As stated at the beginning of this section, the requirement at this time is to identify initial starting places. The development field offers more than ample opportunity to prove or disprove the usefulness of the various theories selected for application.

IV. Relevant Social Science Theories

A. Introduction

The purpose of this section is two-fold. Firstly, this section attempts to demonstrate that there is a sufficient body of theory existent in the social sciences to make useful the conceptualization of development as cultural change. In so doing it also further develops the ideas introduced above. The second purpose is to begin a formulation or combination of these theories in a manner which will find a practical application amongst those involved in development work.

In general it can be said that the theories related herein indicate how an individual's world views are created and how these world views are shared and thereby become the mechanism underlying social institutions, technologies, and social interactions.

It is not the intention of this section to prove that any of the theories discussed are the best available within the social sciences. Rather the intention is, first, to show that the existing theory is sufficient to justify the shift in the way in which we view development and, second, to begin the process of evolving a more valid approach to development.

As was stated at the beginning of the second chapter, the saving grace of development is that it is

applied in the real world. Therefore, any theory being used to guide an intervention or approach can be assessed in terms of how well it forecast the observed outcomes. What is required now is an initial starting place -- a social science theory or set of theories which can be used as an initial starting point for the study of development as cultural change.

Undoubtedly there are many theories which could be used as an initial start point for the study of development as induced cultural change. Until these theories are actually applied in the field there is no way of truly knowing which ones will be best. The intention here is only to suggest social and psychological theories which can be used as a start point. Those who will be responsible for the results will have to decide which theories they will use.

B. The Theory of Mental Representations

The following paragraphs present a theory which would appear to provide a good initial start place for someone wanting to understand development as induce cultural change. As will be seen, it has the potential to suggest both a general philosophy and an approach to induced cultural change. It is generally applicable despite environmental and situational variations because its focus is on one of man's basic abilities -- his

ability to construct mental models of his world. The theory which describes this process is referred to below as the Theory of Mental Representations (TMR). As presented here, it is a composite of work done by several different social scientists. Included are ideas drawn from Leff (1978), Bandura (1977), Norman (1983), Gentner and Stevens (1983), Lewin (De Rivera, 1976) and, in general, the Symbolic Interactionism of Mead and Blumer.

Historically, many of the ideas applied in TMR were developed during the 1930's and 1940's. In Germany, Lewin was evolving his Field Theory while in Chicago Mead and Blumer were working on Symbolic Interactionism. Perhaps Lewin's greatest lasting contribution was the development of an approach to experimental psychology which regarded the individual as an entity-within-an-environment-that-affects-the-behavior-of-that-individual. Field Theory states that an individual does not simply react to environmental stimuli. Rather, he takes to the situation a particular subset of meanings and understandings which are based on the individuals needs of the moment. These needs operating through the meanings and understandings create a "valance" between objects and the individual. The concept of valance is used to indicate the existence of a force of attraction or repulsion. At any moment a number of forces will be

operating and thus setting up a field of forces, all of which are operating on the individual and jointly work to create behavior.

Some fields are said to be situational, that is, a "life-setting" in that they are a result of the individual operating in a particular physical setting while other fields are said to exist within the mind of an individual. For example, a hungry person's behavior in a kitchen setting is likely to include a search for food. That same person in the same environment will exhibit different behavior if their hunger has been satisfied. The stimuli of an environment where there is food, by itself, is not sufficient to trigger a search for food. Further, even if a person is hungry, the search behavior may not be initiated because of internal mental forces. For example, if the kitchen is that of a new acquaintance or a boss then it is unlikely that the individual would allow himself to begin his foraging behavior.

Lewin (1922) also demonstrated that a subject's behavior is, in part, determined by perceptions which, in turn, are influenced by intentions. Thus one can intentionally sensitize oneself to see a certain type or subset of objects in the environment which others may not notice. For example, if one is looking for a place to sit, then they will be more likely to see objects

such as pails, which have the potential to be used as chairs. This concept has importance in terms of the paper in that development efforts often have the effect of sensitizing individuals to new ideas or uses of known objects.

While Lewin's theory has lost favor with most psychologists³³ over the last decade, yet many of the concepts such as the need for seeing the world from the perspective of the individual being studied and the existence of the individual within a set of interacting relationships have been carried into other theories.

Similar comments can be made about Symbolic Interactionism. Some of the central concepts identified by Mead and Blumer have been drawn upon by others. These include man's being able to create mental images symbolizing environmental entities, the use of these symbols in making sense of the environment, and the

³³. Perhaps the most important critique of Field Theory is that it is very difficult to move past a detailed description of what occurred to predicting what will occur. This results because, as field theory recognizes, the person involved in an act projects meaning into that situation. This meaning, in part, determines the behaviors which, in turn, alter the organization of the environment and, by doing so the behaviors which occur in that environment. It is the person as actor who has created the situation in that environment and not the environment itself. Consequently, the ability to predict activities in any predetermined environment is severely limited. It is for this reason that phenomenologist such as Schutz and Merleau-Ponty have placed such emphasis on an integration of the individual and his environment.

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ability of humans to mentally manipulate symbols are concepts which are both central to the Symbolic Interactionism and fully employed herein.

In many respects, since the end of the 1940's there has been a convergence of the concepts evolved in various psychological theories and approaches. In the area of prime interest to a discussion of culture, the key has been the increasing recognition of man having an ability to create and manipulate mental representation of environmental entities and behaviors. Within social-psychology this conception of man is becoming so accepted generally that, to quote Norman,:

In interacting with the environment, with others, and with the artifacts of technology, people form internal, mental models of themselves and of the things with which they are interacting. These models provide predictive and explanatory power for understanding the interaction. (1983,7)

Norman then goes on to say:

These statements hardly need be said, for they are consistent with all that we have learned about cognitive processes... (1983:7)

The concepts presented herein, while specifically related to culture and development, are those which, though coming from various historical roots, can be thought of as generally accepted in psychology today.

As its name suggests and the quote from Norman outlines, the basic idea behind TMR is that individuals construct mental representations of the entities,

activities, and situations found in their environment. These mental representations are, for the individual, equivalent to the real entity, activity, or situation and may be manipulated, added to, or subtracted from as a result of new experiences with that reality, whether the experience is actual, vicarious, or imagined.

The primary mental mechanism considered in the theory is the cognitive loop. The cognitive loop is considered to be a chain of neurons each of which encodes data. As the term suggests, this chain is formed into a loop and is, therefore, self-firing once stimulated³⁴. The principle on which such loops are constructed is called contiguity. The term refers to the propensity of the mind to link together two things which occur closely in time. Initially, cognitive loops are very simple. It would take only two nodes linked to each other to form a loop. Over time loops are enlarged by the association of additional nodes, each encoding different information about the same entity as the first two nodes. Again, the principle of contiguity is called upon to explain both this enlargement and its organization. It is generally recognized that not all of the loops possible are created. This may be due to

³⁴. Due to depletion of the neurochemicals used in the firing process continuous firing does not occur. After reaching a certain level of depletion, the chemical balance is such that further firing must be spaced over longer time periods.

the need to reinforce a node over time in order for it to remain accessible or viable. It has been determined that the dendrites of neurons, the long hair-like filaments which connect one neuron to another, grow over time and as a result of stimulation. The more a neuron is stimulated the more growth occurs. A single stimulation of a neuron, or, equivalently, the identification of a new facet of an entity may not result in sufficient growth to add a new node to an existing loop.

Cognitive loops are fired as a result of the person perceiving an entity in the environment which shares characteristics with a cognitive loop existing in the brain. It is hypothesized that the perception of the environmental entity produces a cognitive loop in short-term memory. If there is a similar loop in long-term memory then a resonance is set up between the two which causes the loop in long-term memory to be fired. Stronger inter-nodal connections will be easier to excite. Cognitive loops are generally considered to encode characteristics of particular entities. However, much of human thought is general and abstract. It is hypothesized that these abstractions are created from a number of particular experiences by a process of overlaying several particular loops. Loops encoding similar data are likely to be connected to each other

through their sharing of common nodes. As these common nodes are used when each of the particular entities they represent are noticed in the environment these nodes become stronger than the nodes encoding data about any one of the particular entities. For example, a person may learn what a chair is through an experience with a kitchen chair. A particular cognitive loop will be established as a result of this initial experience. Over time the person will be introduced to other chairs. The mental representations of these other chairs will share some but not all of these characteristics of the first chair. The nodes encoding these common characteristics and the connections between them will become strengthened by more frequent use. One result is that when one of the chair loops is excited, the common and more strongly connected nodes will be fired but not necessarily the rest. Thus the common characteristics of these entities will be recalled but not the particulars. By definition these common characteristics are an abstraction because they do not refer to a particular entity. The loop containing this abbreviated or common set of strongly-connected nodes is referred to as a generic loop.

The concept of generic loops is important because they encode several key aspects of human behavior. Included here are values, normative behaviors, and

mental models. Thus much of human thought is in terms of generic loops.

A potential problem with generic loops is that after they are formed they come to have the same properties as cognitive loops. Important here is the idea that they can be expanded by the addition of other nodes. This may result in an abstraction with characteristics that rightfully belong to particular entities or do not exist in the environment. For example, a generic loop representing green men may be constructed as a result of the person having several experiences with individuals so labeled. Certain common characteristics will be associated on this generic loop. Once it is created, however, it is relatively easy to add other nodes. Repeated comments to the effect that green men are jealous or unhealthy would create such a node. The point is that these characteristics may not have existed in any of the initial cognitive loops and therefore would not exist on the initial generic loop. However, once the generic loop was formed these new nodes can be added through the same process as with cognitive loops.

Removing erroneous data from generic loops is especially difficult because frequent firing of the loop makes the connections between the composing nodes very strong.

As the example of green men suggests, generic loops can be used as models of environmental entities. Using such models allows the individual to quickly grasp the nature of an entity or environment without observing it in detail.

The actual success of these mental models is dependent on the accuracy of their representations. The more experience which a person has with an entity, the more likely the mental representation of that entity will be valid and the modelling of behaviors will be correct.

It is very likely that there are links between every cognitive loop one has in his brain. In fact, it would seem that the whole brain is one large interlocking network of loops.³⁵ The totality of these interconnections provides individuals with their world view. A world view is the sum of all possible cognitive loops which can be normally accessed. It will naturally occur that most of these cognitive loops will be generic loops.

In most cases, the cognitive or generic loops associated with environmental entities will have associated behavioral patterns. These associated

³⁵. This fact again echoes an idea first mentioned in the introduction: that organic entities are frequently networked into holistic system through a series of feedback loops. No doubt the reader will note other similarities as well.

behaviors form the repertoire of actions that are used in the majority of cases involving these entities. Again, the principle allowing the association of these behaviors is contiguity. The person has used the same pattern of behavior in response to that entity so frequently that the behavior has become habitual. Habitual behavior allows the individual the opportunity to use his higher consciousness to consider other things. In addition, these behaviors are usually not stress-producing. They have been performed so frequently that the results are predictable. The person performing habitual behaviors has at least the sense of being in control of the situation.

There are a number of higher-level cognitive processes. These are focussing, scanning, and model manipulation. As a rule they require more energy and usually produce more stress than habitual behaviors.

Focussing is the process of consciously examining the contents of one's cognitive loops. The process can be initiated by external stimuli creating a loop in short-term memory or by the individual consciously constructing such a loop in short-term memory. In either case the successful result is the identification of an existing loop in long-term memory. Once the loop is identified the person focusses on it by examining each of its associations and data points.

Scanning is the process of following the linkages between the various cognitive loops. This allows the person to switch from one area of thought to others. It is like following a thread through a tangled ball except that at each crossing the individual can consciously choose to switch to the cross thread. Daydreaming is an example of this same process except that the extent of conscious control is questionable.

Model manipulation uses both focussing and scanning to identify aspects of experiences and entities in order to construct new cognitive loops. The new loops are often intended to model the actions or behavior of environmental entities in response to actions by other entities. Using this technique the individual can rehearse his behaviors and identify possible outcomes of his actions before making them. This reduces the possibility of making errors, allows him to build up a repertoire of behaviors contingent on what other entities do, and also gives the individual confidence that he will be able to respond appropriately to the other entity's behavior.

Model construction is an important ability possessed by human beings not only because it allows for the selection of what appears to be the optimal solution before acting but it also can be used to bring to bear a wide variety of experience and knowledge which is not

necessarily closely associated with the problem at hand and thus allows creativity. Model manipulation can also construct entities which are fictitious and non-existent.

When environmental stimuli produce loops in short-term memory which cannot be matched to anything in long-term memory then the individual's higher-level cognitive processes are activated. The person may try to construct a model of the novel set of stimuli and try to match the model with memories by adding, rearranging, or deleting aspects of what is perceived. They may even intentionally and consciously conclude that the stimulation must have been caused by "X" even though the patterns of stimuli are not the same as those in memory.

That people will go to this extent in order to identify what they have experienced with what they know occurs because of what appears to be an inherent need for closure in the cognitive process. It is the lack of cognitive closure which results in people taking a second look, moving obstructions out of the way, and asking questions. When a person cannot figure something out stress is experienced. This reaction, while experienced as a negative to the person having the experience, is clearly positive in terms of the species and some might even suggest that it is a result of natural selection. Obviously, those individuals who do

not seek to identify sources of unusual stimulation (like a hungry lion crouching in the bushes) in their environment are the ones who will not take notice of dangers in time to protect themselves.

Cognitive closure has been related to the inherent need for people to learn. In situations which are non-stressful over time, individuals will seek out the novel and new. In other words, they will seek out learning situations. This observation can be explained by the concept of the individual seeking cognitive closure of loops created by environmental stimulations. One implication of this explanation is that perception is not a random process. Instead, it is the result of a series of interactions between the cognitive loops in short-term memory and the corresponding loops in long-term memory.³⁶ A loop in short-term memory will fire or sensitize a loop in long-term memory. The sensitizing or firing of this loop will create a propensity to have the same loop fired when the next loop is created in short-term memory. The overall result is a propensity to link what is perceived in the environment with existing cognitive loops. In high stress or dangerous

³⁶. Support for this view can also be found in the work of Glenberg, Bradley, Kraus, and Renzaglia (1983). Their studies of the Long-Term Recency Effect provide support for the hypothesis of a contextually guided retrieval process which can be interpreted within TMR as an interplay between perception and long-term memory.

situations individuals have no time to check the details of what they perceive. When an association is made, the individual simply accesses the associated behavior patterns and acts. In a safe environment the individual is able to note the variance between what is in memory and what is perceived. At this point cognitive closure take over and the individual seeks to comprehend or explain away the newly noted differences.

There are two more concepts which need to be linked to the ideas outlined above. These are the "I" and "self". The "self" is considered to be a subset of the world view which contains the complete repertoire of social roles and behaviors which an individual can play. The "I" is the social role which is currently being accessed or stimulated. A person may have a large number of social roles, each with its own repertoire of behaviors. These roles are selected sequentially. The current role is considered to be the "I". Thus a person, as the "I", can take on the appearance (role) of many different people while the self is more stable over time.

Closely associated with each role will be a set of cognitive loops containing the information most frequently used in that role. Selection of a role can result from either the perception of some environmental entity or the conscious thought processes.

Given the above brief outline of how the theory of mental representations hypothesizes the process whereby individuals come to understand their reality, it is now possible to see how culture resides in the minds of individuals. Basically, culture takes the form of generic loops. The transfer of culture is also quite clear. It is the sum result of individuals creating cognitive and generic loops on the basis of their experiences with their environment. These created loops carry the associated behaviors and knowledge required to act in a manner appropriate to common situations. The various social roles, normative behaviors, and values are encoded in the same manner.

From the above, it would seem clear that normal cultural activity will be relatively non-stressful. Most behaviors will be performed in an habitual manner. Those which are new to a particular individual can be modelled on the behaviors of others. Often these others are one's significant others and will not only provide the novice with a pattern for the behaviors but also with support and assistance. An environment of this nature, being non-stressful, is very conducive to learning. In sum, the individuals raised in such an environment will come to know it intimately and in depth. The people will be well-matched cognitively to the experiences in that environment.

Being well-adjusted cognitively to an environment does not imply that the environment is one which is easy to live in or that the individuals are materially affluent. Rather, the individual's sense of comfort comes from low psychosocial stress. For example, in a particular culture children may die frequently because of environmental conditions. Yet these deaths may not be terribly stressful to the members of the culture because it is expected and the culture will have adapted itself to this reality. This adaptation may take many forms but is likely to include aspects of the culture's myths, religious beliefs, and family organization. Through these adaptations, events which would be traumatic from the perspective of another culture are ameliorated and made relatively easy for individuals to sustain and overcome.

Examples of this are so common as to be trivial. One example of a recent event demonstrating this difference is the reaction of a group to their losing a job. In September, 1987, 20,000 black miners in South Africa were summarily dismissed during a strike. If 20,000 workers in North America were to suddenly lose their jobs, one would expect violence, depression, and even a number of suicides to result. For South African blacks, their losing their job was accepted as simply part of life. These two cultures reflect the

differences in their attitude towards their job in numerous ways.

In North America, the worker is likely to be allowed a line of credit and will likely have a house mortgage, his children will be in a local school where they are expected to stay for at least 5 years, and the worker's wife is probably also working in the same locality. All of these reflect both the need for and expectation of job stability in North America. The loss of a job in North America is therefore a very stressful life experience. In contrast, in the South African case, the man will likely be several hundred miles from his home and family, his possessions can be carried on his back, he has no line of credit, is not in debt, and is not expected to remain on the job for more than a year at a time. The loss of a job is not a stressful disruption in such a case because changes in work are expected to occur relatively frequently and the society socializes all concerned to this reality. Why would one even think of committing suicide in such a situation?

These examples not only show the internal integration of a culture and the absolute importance of culture in providing a pool of possible or acceptable behaviors but they also highlight the nature of psychosocial stress and its intimate relationship to a particular culture. As the example suggests, and the

next section goes on to discuss, psychosocial stress is not generated by negative occurrences in and of themselves. Rather it is a joint product of the event and the culture of the individual undergoing the experience. The point being made here is that psychosocial stress is, in large part, cognitively based and that this cognitive base both reflects and creates the person's culture.

C. The social construction of reality

As stated above, the theory of mental representations has the potential to provide a good initial starting point for conceptualizing development efforts as induced cultural change because it is focussed at a basic level of human activity. As a result the concepts should have application everywhere. While this theory, in itself, does tell us much about culture, in itself, it can underpin what other theories say. In this section will be presented a theory of society which easily meshes with the concepts of the theory of Mental Representations -- Berger and Luckman's Social Construction of Reality. In the initial stages reference will also be made to Leff(1978).³⁷

37. Of necessity, this section does not examine the complete range of theoretical works available. One area of particular importance which is only alluded to herein is speech. Many theorists including Vygotsky (Wertsch, 1985), McQuown (Dil, 1982), and Wallace (in

Culture has been defined earlier as basically a group's shared understanding of their world. At the level of the individual, culture is the set of aspects of the individual's learned world view which are held in common with others. Every individual will have their own unique world view, but they will share most of the elements of that world view with others. The commonly shared elements constitute the group's culture.

This sharing is important because it constitutes the basis for human society. While the topic of society is a subject within itself, certain key points can be made by reference to the work of Berger and Luckman (1966). This work provides a model of society. It is perhaps especially useful in the current discussion because of its emphasis on the dynamics of society and not the content. This emphasis encourages a universal application of the concepts. In itself, this model can be seen as axiomatic heuristic device. This will be its function in the next section.

The Berger and Luckman model of society begins where TMR leaves off -- with the notion of man having an intentional consciousness which can be directed towards objects in his environment (1966:20). Different objects present themselves to consciousness as different

Casson, 1981) have expressed the idea that the members of a culture are constrained in what they can think by the vocabulary and grammar of their language.

entities having different meanings or associations (1966:21). These meanings are part of the knowledge base which has been learned from others, have been incorporated into generic loops, and are commonly shared with others. Such sharing allows for inter-subjectivity -- a sharing of a common view of the world with shared knowledge about and attitudes towards objects. A society's sum of knowledge can be subdivided socially according to a number of criteria including means of production, secret organizations, position in social structures, sex, age, etc. Uniting the various enclaves of specialized knowledge is what is called "common sense knowledge" (Leff, 1978:23).

"Temporality is an intrinsic property of consciousness" (Leff, 1978:25) which must be reckoned with. Projects must be synchronized to the behaviors of others. Proper sequencing of events is also required in order to reach objectives by stages.

"The most important experience of others takes place in the face-to-face situations, which is the prototypical case of social interaction." (Berger and Luckman, 1966:28) In such encounters the other person is fully real and thus allows the actors to enrich their cognitive loops regarding each other by typing each other on a multitude of possible dimensions (1966:31). This is a reciprocal process as people also present

themselves as types. The richer the set of cognitive loops, the more intersecting typifications which can be associated with an individual and the less anonymity that person has. Thus a continuum can be constructed, one pole of which consists of an "inner circle" of people with whom one shares frequent face-to face situations while at the other pole are "highly anonymous abstractions which by their very nature can never be available for face-to-face interactions" (i.e. stereotypical or generic creations) (1966:33). "Social structure is the sum total of these typifications and of the recurrent patterns of interaction established by means of them" (1966:33).

"Human expressivity is capable of objectivation, that is, it manifests itself in products of human activity that are available both to their producers and to other men as elements of a common world" (1966:34). "The reality of everyday life is not only filled with objectivations, it is only possible because of them" (1966:35). Objects in our environment "proclaim" the subjective intention of people in that environment. "A special case of objectivation is signification, that is, the human production of signs" (1966:35).

Signs can be clustered in a number of systems, the most important of which is vocal signs or language. (1966:36-7) Language is not only the vehicle of

everyday face-to-face interaction, it also is "capable of becoming the objective repository of vast accumulations of meaning and experience, which it can then preserve over time and transmit to following generations" (1966:37). This accumulation can be referred to as the social stock of knowledge.

"As a sign system, language has the quality of objectivity." One "encounters language as a facticity external to" oneself and it has a coercive effect on the individual in that it forces him into its patterns of syntax and constrains one to a certain vocabulary with which to typify experiences. (1966:38-9) In this way one's culture shapes one's processes of thought and informs one as to what can be thought about.³⁸

Language also can be used to bridge different dimensions of reality such as spatial, temporal, and social, and integrate them into a meaningful whole. (1966:39) It can also transcend the reality of everyday life constructing ideal images and goals as well as

³⁸. Wertsch (1985:161-166) using Vygotsky's initial concepts, sees this process whereby children are enabled to act as their adult models would as the transition from interpsychological to intrapsychological functioning. A role model works with the child taking him through similar situations repeatedly, each time with different particulars, until the child evolves a sufficiently robust generic model to be able to handle, in a culturally appropriate fashion, novel but similar situations. Wertsch (1985) provides a number of insights on the detailed process whereby children acquire their parent's culture.

"edifices of symbolic representations that appear to tower over the reality of everyday" (1966:40).

Religious, national, and political ideologies fall into this category.

The ability of people to successfully interact with each other is based on their participation in a common and available social stock of knowledge, a common shared set of cognitive loops. Such participation also allows individuals to locate themselves and others in their society and also to handle them in the appropriate manner. (1966:41-42) Included in the stock of knowledge is "recipe knowledge", "knowledge limited to pragmatic competence in routine performances" (1966:42) such as making phone calls and having a car repaired.³⁹ "The social stock of knowledge differentiates reality by degrees of familiarity" (1966:93) or experiences with that aspect of reality. It provides rich and specific knowledge about things with which one has had the opportunity of multiple experiences or is intimately familiar while only general and imprecise knowledge about things which are less familiar. The validity of knowledge about everyday life is taken for granted until a problem arises and cannot be solved in terms of that

³⁹. This concept is similar to Leff's "common sense knowledge".

knowledge. (1966:44) This is the basis for the faith one commonly has in one's society and culture.

There is always a background area of the unknown but this area is not relevant to the carrying out of everyday activities. In carrying out the everyday activities everything necessary must be known and explained. Otherwise a person could not have faith in his ability to meet the daily challenges.

The knowledge which a person has of the world can be "structured in terms of relevances" (1966:45). While some knowledge is imperative to some individuals it may be only of passing interest to others. Thus relevance structures vary. When the relevance structures of different people intersect at different points they will have interesting things to share with each other. Therefore knowing the relevance structures of other is an important aspect of a person's stock of knowledge as it can guide him to others who have knowledge relevant to him. Knowledge, therefore, is both "socially distributed, that is, as possessed differentially by different individuals and types of individuals" (1966:46) as well as geographically distributed.

A major issue addressed by Berger and Luckman is how knowledge was initially acquired by a society. Though man is acknowledged as having instinctive drives, these drives are highly unspecialized and undirected.

As a result, man is less constrained than other animals in his use of the environment and in the form of social organization. There is no inherently fixed "human nature in the sense of determining the variability of socio-cultural formations" (1966:49). As a result man can be molded by the socio-cultural milieu in which he is immersed by chance of birth. The primary influences in this socialization process are one's significant others⁴⁰ and the physical environment. Both of these influences must be taken into consideration in order to gain an adequate understanding of the human phenomenon. (1966:51) The emphasis, however, must be on the social or inter-human dimension. As Berger and Luckman note:

Man's self-production is always, and of necessity, a social enterprise. Men together produce a human environment, with the totality of its socio-cultural and psychological foundations. (1966:51)

Thus it is possible to have two groups living side by side in the same overall physical environment who have radically different cultural forms.

The need for social forms stems from the lack of biological means for providing stability in human conduct. As we noted above, the creation of such an order provides individual members with the day-to-day

⁴⁰. This term is used in the sense proposed by G.H. Mead and Symbolic Interactionists generally: That is parents or associates who provide models and who are able to reward or punish the developing individual. See, for example, Charon (1979).

constancy necessary to reduce individual levels of stress to optimal levels.

An important point is that no human social order is fixed. Rather it is an ongoing human production.

(1966:52) Social orders evolve constantly as the actors and the environment change. As a result, what stability exists does so because the social organization and the institutions which exist are evolving at a slower rate than any of its supporting participants. The reasons for this are habituation and aggregation.

According to Berger and Luckman (1966) the process of habituation is said to precede that of institutionalization. Habituation can be shown to be beneficial in several ways: it reduces inter-personal strains by narrowing the number of choices available to an individual; it provides a person with "what works" and, as a result, it frees up energy for deliberation, innovation, and for dealing with uncommon situations. "Institutionalization occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors" or, "put differently, any such typification is an institution" (1966:54). The key to Berger and Luckman's definition of an institution is typification. Institutionalization requires that those associated with an institution perceive the types both of actions and actors in that institution. Both of these typifications

are dependent on habitual behavior or, alternatively, the existence of generic loops which contain them.

"Institutions imply historicity and control. The reciprocal typifications of action are built up in the course of a shared history. They cannot be created instantaneously" (1966:54). Neither can they be deleted or destroyed instantaneously. Patterns of behavior are learned over time and are extinguished over time. Further, the role played by institutions can be shown to have evolved over time in interaction with the environment and the changing population in which it exists.⁴¹ The control exercised by an institution consists of setting up predefined patterns of conduct which channel the behavior of its constituents. Predictability is one of the most important gains of institutionalization. (1966:57) Such predictability not only reduces strains but also allows individuals to cooperate and compete with each other in a manner which does not threaten the society. The intention of the behavior can be judged relatively easily and appropriate responses rendered.

A division of labour is possible (1966:57) within the institution because of the habituation and typification. Roles within a society and especially

⁴¹. The growth of present day banking institutions from blacksmith shops of the 17th Century provides a good example of this point.

institutions are a form of typification. An individual identifies with the socially objectified typifications of conduct and takes them on. These typifications are truly an individual's "social self" (1966:73). To make these typifications roles requires that others in the collectivity share with the actor knowledge of the meaning of the typification.

It can readily be seen that the construction of role typologies is a necessary correlate of the institutionalization of conduct. Institutions are embodied in individual experience by means of roles.... By playing roles, the individual participates in a social world. By internalizing these roles, the same world becomes subjectively real to him. (1966:74)

The fact that roles are objectively identifiable makes them amenable to linguistic appellation, standards of performance, and role specialization. It also suggests a distribution of social knowledge along the lines of roles.

Sanctions form a secondary mechanism which is used to control deviant behavior. Deviant behavior can be thought of as behaviors which are either not part of a typification or are performed out of context. Such behavior can be seen as stress-causing to other members of the society as it reduces predictability and hence mutual understanding.

The historical evolution of institutions is also explored by Berger and Luckman. These authors note that

an habitual arrangement made by two individuals is subjective in the sense that they have originated the habit. They know why the typification exists and how it came into existence. A third person arriving and viewing the behavior of the twosome would see it objectively, as something "out there," equivalent to a cloud, river, or any other object. As such it must be presumed by the third party to be natural or correct.

Children, as third parties, must learn how to mix their patterns of behavior with those of the adults around them and thus learn the same patterns which the adults exhibit. They must also attempt to learn why those patterns are important. Adult responses initially may be "Because that's the way it is done" but sooner or later imagination, story telling, and other related experiences will work to evolve or produce the reasons. These reasons will legitimize the behavior by explaining and justifying it.

Legitimation provides the basis not only for learning certain behaviors but also for developing and using institutional authority and coercive mechanisms of social control. One of the most pervasive means of social control is language. Language provides the fundamental superimposition of logic on the objectified social world. The edifice of legitimation is built upon language and uses language as its principal

instrumentality. Since the well-socialized individual "knows" that his social world is a consistent whole, he will be constrained to explain both its functioning and malfunctioning in terms of what he knows or the set of knowledge he has been provided with by his society (1966:64). It is very easy, as a result, for the insider unexposed to alternatives, to assume that his society's institutions are and do function as they are supposed to. As a result, if a society's institutions are maladaptive - causing environmental damage, for example - then one of the last to understand the underlying nature of the problem may be the members of the society which causes the problem.

In part, this "blindness" stems from the likelihood, especially within demographically small communities, for individuals to have fitted the various aspects of his society into a single consistent mental framework. The world which is subjective, apparent, and linguistically identified ideally should form a complete, legitimated, integrated, meaningful whole. (1966:80) There are no contrasts available by which the failures of the society could be identified. In such cases individuals would have perfect faith in their world view and in their way of life.

Related to this lack of recognition of the nature of one's own society is the concept of legitimation.

Berger and Luckman point out that roles which exist and are accepted by a group have a tacit legitimation in the very fact of their existence. These roles may be further supported and buttressed by stories, myths, theologies, and other abstract legitimizers. However, "the more abstract the legitimation is, the less likely they are to be modified in accordance with changing pragmatic exigencies" (1966:118). Therefore institutions may still exist after their useful functions have been taken over by other institutions. What keeps such useless institutions operational is the psychological residue left in the group's social stock of knowledge.

A similar argument can be made for fully socialized individuals with their habituations. Long after the need for certain habitual behaviors has disappeared an individual may still exhibit such behaviors.

As a consequence, there may be a need for radical divergence from the norm before the dialectic between an individual, his society, and his environment is strained to the point where corrective adaptive changes are made. Generally, it follows that the more integrated and institutionalized the society, the more inertia it is likely to demonstrate in terms of making needed adjustments to environmental or social changes.

The decisive question according to Berger and Luckman with reference to the socialized individual, is whether or not the individual retains the awareness that, however objectified, the social world was made by men, and, therefore, can be remade by them. (1966:89) This is a central issue in development because development is an attempt to change a culture. If those undergoing cultural change are unaware of the nature of socialization then they may not be able to retain a vision of themselves as being separate from their culture. Their subjective experience of their culture will lead them to either resist change because the change is perceived as a change in themselves or to disparage themselves as obviously flawed when their culture is compared to that of another group. In other words, instead of seeing their culture as a coat which can be changed for a newer style, their culture is seen as their skin and can be altered only with a great deal of pain.

There is another level at which change can occur -- at the time of transmitting the cognitive and behavioral universe from one generation to the next. "Socialization is never completely successful" (1966:106). There will always be idiosyncratic variations in conceptions of the universe and behavior is always to some degree the result of personal

experiences with the environment, social or physical. Adaptively positive idiosyncratic changes are likely to be self-perpetuating while maladaptive ones die out with the individual. In this sense, cultural change occurs naturally and on an individual basis.

As well, change may be forced upon a group by the environment. This may take one of several different forms. In a cultural contact situation the more powerful group may impose its definition of reality and its terms upon another group. A prolonged environmental deterioration, either natural or man-made, can cause the breakdown in institutions or make it impossible to transmit aspects of the culture between generations.⁴² Disease, pestilence, etc. can attack key individuals during a transition period and prevent the old order from being transferred to a new generation. Cultures may cease to exist if any of these changes cannot be accommodated by the existing cultural order.

A distinction must be made between cultural extinction and cultural change. Cultural change occurs constantly in the sense that the variables which constitute social, technological, linguistic, and institutional forms evolve and, by the very fact of their evolution, alter the patterns constituting the whole that forms a culture. Cultural change is an on-

⁴². See, for example, Turnbull (1972)

going process which usually takes the form of adding on to the existing stock of knowledge in a manner that integrates it into the existing conceptual, structural, and linguistic forms. Berger and Luckman note that where a cultural "merger" is possible, both groups' stock of knowledge is enriched and differentiated. (1966:121)

In this regard, it is interesting to note that most modern societies are pluralistic meaning that they have a "shared core universe" and "different partial universes coexisting in a state of mutual accommodation" (1966:125). Such pluralism "goes with conditions of rapid social change" and "indeed pluralism itself is an accelerating factor precisely because it helps to undermine the change-resistant efficacy of the traditional definitions of reality" (1966:125). Pluralism does so because it offers alternative ways of viewing reality and thereby encourages both skepticism and innovation.

In contrast, cultural extinction results from a change process so rapid and sweeping in its implications that the existing patterns of society either are not taught to the young or are regarded by the young as irrelevant. In either case there is only a very incomplete transfer of culture between generations and consequently the culture ceases to exist with the

passing of the adult population. From the perspective of the people involved, there are several negative side effects which result from cultural extinction. These will be discussed in detail later.

The socialization process is generally viewed as one which is ongoing and dialectical. There are, however, three distinguishable movements: externalization, objectivation, and internalization. "To be in society is to participate in its dialectic" (1966:129). "No individual is born a member of a society. Rather he is born with a disposition towards sociability, and he becomes a member of society" (1966:129). The first stage of this process is internalization; "the immediate apprehension or interpretation of an objective event as expressing meaning,..." (1966:129). Through the experiential process of learning, individuals acquire the cognitive loops associating objective behaviors or objects and past, present, or future events. Internalization or the construction of these loops, is the basis for both understanding the surrounding environment (including local culture) and for the apprehension of the environment as a meaningful reality. (1966:130) One "takes over" the world in which one's significant others live. As a result, there can be mutual sharing of

thought and understanding. This provides the basis for identification with a group.

The Berger and Luckman treatise identifies three types of socialization. The initial or primary socialization takes place in childhood. Secondary socialization "is any subsequent process that inducts an already socialized individual into new sectors of the objective world of his society" (1966:130). Secondary socialization includes the induction of a youth into a sub-group as an apprentice or into a secret society as a candidate for a future position of leadership. While primary socialization is virtually assured in all cases, it is this secondary socialization which is lost when there is a cultural extinction. Transitional socialization is any post-primary socialization in which the individual is inducted into a different culture.

Primary socialization is never pure in terms of the surrounding society. Society is always filtered to the child through significant others and within a particular ecological and sub-societal milieu. Significant others and each milieu, are to some extent, idiosyncratic. Still, a society's core values will almost always penetrate through these filters. Thus the child is able to identify and take on the ideas, attitudes, norms, and roles of particular sub-groups and still be able to operate effectively in the society-at-large. "Society,

identity, and reality are subjectively crystallized in the same process of internalization. This crystallization is concurrent with the internalization of language.... Language constitutes but the most important content and the most important instrument of socialization" (1966:133)

A final point made by Berger and Luckman regarding primary socialization is that the internalized mental representations which result from primary socialization is reality for the child.

The child does not internalize the world of his significant others as one of many possible worlds. He internalizes it as *the* world, the only existent and only conceivable world, the world tout court. (1966:134)

Secondary socialization is viewed as the natural outcome of societal differentiation and specialization. Varying and overlapping sub-groups exist which have a need for specialized knowledge, language, techniques, etc. in order to permit their functioning. Commonly such specialized knowledge is complementary rather than conflicting with common knowledge and thus presents neither a threat to the society nor cognitive dissonance for the individual. Such secondary socialization is likely to be context specific in that it is used only in certain settings.

Transitional socialization varies from secondary socialization in that the common knowledge is brought

into question by the existence of cultural contrasts. Consequently the subjective understanding of the mother culture is jeopardized. Initially an individual will be either intrigued or threatened by the concepts composing the world view of the alternate culture. Some aspects of the alternate culture will be perceived as jokes⁴³ while other will be construed as norm violations.

As the introduction continues individual recipients will likely experience greater anxiety because of an increasing amount of cognitive dissonance. Their habitual responses will have to be rejected and the higher cognitive processes invoked in order to alter the habitual patterns. Culturally correct behaviors will have to be rejected while unusual or culturally reprovved behaviors encouraged.

In a very real sense this is a threshold condition. The individual can, at this point, still reject the alternate culture and return to the comfort of his own. Alternatively he can continue on and try to absorb even

43. TMR explains a joke as follows. There are two phases, commonly referred to as the lead up and the punch line. In the initial phase of the joke a number of clues are provided which cause a certain set of cognitive loops to be sensitized but not fired. There is a lack of closure because a key element is missing. This results in the creation of stress. The second phase causes the firing of a loop which is only remotely related to those sensitized. The sudden solution causes the firing of both sets of loops and a quick release of the tensions built up during the initial phase. The result is laughter or, when the link between the two areas is very remote, groans.

more of the alternate culture and thereby make it his own.

It is an unfortunate fact, however, that in almost all cases, individuals cannot make a full cultural transition. The degree, of course, varies, but what commonly occurs is that an individual experiencing transitional socialization will have an opportunity to absorb only part of the other culture. There will not be a sufficient opportunity for the individual to partake in the breadth and depth of experience required to allow him to create the integrated holistic framework of the alternate culture. While pieces of the alternate culture will be learned the overall framework which locates these aspects into a coherent logical whole will not. As a result, people will find themselves in a state of limbo. They have consciously rejected aspects of their own culture but have only a few aspects, often only external behaviors, of the alternate culture to cling to. Many of the values and norms which were just accepted as valid now become questionable but if the mother culture is being rejected and only fragments of the alternate culture are known then there is no inherently logical standard available to the individual against which the various values and norms can be compared. There is no way of knowing whether a particular norm or value is good.

The condition just described will obviously be stressful. But it is potentially much more than that. As suggested by Berger and Luckman and explained by TMR, an individual comes to see his culture as his self. He is the set of activities which he performs. If he does not understand the coat-like nature of culture then he is likely to see what happens to his culture as happening to his self. If such an individual is told either directly or indirectly that something is wrong with his culture it may be interpreted as meaning something is wrong with him. If this occurs consistently over time or it comes from a person or group to which he has granted power over himself, then, as a consequence, the individual may begin to lose his sense of faith in himself.

In this section the concepts of TMR have been augmented by those of Berger and Luckman's Social Creation of Reality. This augmentation allows for an expansion of several of the TMR concepts to the level of society and culture. It should be stressed that this combination of theory is not the only one possible. However, it has not been the intention of this paper to identify either the set of theories which are capable of this or to prove that those theories presented are the best. Rather, the intention has been to show that there are, indeed, social science theories which can be

applied in the discussion of cultural change and that as a result there is an opportunity for developers to gain insight in the development situation.

The latter part of this section in particular has dealt with cultural change. It suggests that through taking into consideration the way in which individuals construct their view of reality, it may be possible to more readily introduce cultural changes or at least to identify some of the reasons for the difficulties experienced in inducing cultural change.

The next section continues to build on the ideas expressed above. The focus will be on stress, uncertainty, and social change.

D. Stress, uncertainty, and social change

One area of the social sciences which has been researched at length is the area of stress and strain. However, despite this effort, there are still many variables and relationships which are still not totally understood. This area is one of importance to development because cultural change, through modification of the norms and roles, can place a great deal of strain on individuals and societies. Therefore, it was thought to be worthwhile to present some of the theories and concepts to show how they too mesh with TMR and the Social Construction of Reality.

Once again, these are not the only theories of stress and strain. The ideas presented below tend to be mainstream thought but are certainly not the views of the entire field. Our purpose here is not to identify the best theories or those which should be used in development. Rather, the purpose is to show that the social sciences do have theories which can be applied to the cultural change situation.

In both the introduction and the section above, it was suggested that man is constantly attempting to construct a context in which he encounters few strains and from which he can move into a wide variety of more exciting and straining situations. Research indicates that if individuals are strained too much they will become distressed and dysfunctional. They will become physically sick, psychotic, or neurotic. However, some strain adds zest to life and overcoming the obstacles causing strain is usually rewarding.

Psychological stress occurs when there is mismatch between a person's conception of their environment and the reality of that environment. This mismatch may be real or perceived but in either case the individual feels that "environmental demands tax or exceed the adaptive capacities or resources of the person, and/or environmental opportunities constrain the satisfaction

of individual needs." (Menaghan, 1983:158)⁴⁴ The cognitive component is a strong factor in determining whether or not an event is stressful. Research has shown that events which are considered stressful for some individuals are not for others and that the differences, to a large extent, have to do with how the event is perceived (Vinokur and Selzer, 1975; Ross and Mirowsky, 1979; Meuller et al., 1977; and Gersten et al., 1974). Stress, therefore, appears to be related to mental representations which, as shown earlier, are central to the perceptive and cognitive processes.

One of the methods of studying stress and its effects is through the examination of changes in social roles. This approach is used here for several reasons. Firstly, it allows generalization. All human groups develop some social roles for their individual members. These social roles tend to sensitize individuals differentially to changes. Thus it is likely that one of the main reasons for the different responses individuals have to the same change is the varying effect that the change has on the more enduring aspects of key social roles of the individuals involved.

A second reason for focussing on social roles is that development is frequently focussed directly on the

⁴⁴. See also Pearlin and Lieberman, 1979; Fletcher and Payne, 1980; Lazarus, 1981; and Stagner, 1981.

roles being played by members of the recipient group. For example, the national government may institute a new system of community leadership wherein a government appointee is given the authority which has been held by village elders or, alternatively, a local co-op may be set up by middle aged peasants with the same usurping of effective power from the elders. In both cases it is to be expected that the change would place more strain on those playing those roles affected. In this case the elders and the older men would be more affected than the children, women, or young men.

A third reason for focussing on social roles is that social roles are generally potent sources of stress (Pearlin, 1983). People usually attach considerable importance to their role activities as these commonly occur within institutions vital to the society. These institutions include the family, work organization, the political apparatus, etc. Everyone in the society is socialized to operate in or interact with those playing these institutional roles.

A final reason for focussing on social roles is that there is commonly an overlap of other social factors such as status, values, and norms with roles. These social factors systematically interact. Social roles guide individuals to certain life experiences and not others.

In sum, if we examine stress by focussing on social roles we have the advantage of being able to gain a perspective on both the larger social order as well as obtaining insight into individual behaviors. Social roles are one of the simpler means through which a culture can be mapped.

Before going further, it is necessary to define the terminology used. The first of these terms is stress. The concept underlying stress as it was originally developed by Selye (1956) was that the individual sought a position of homeostasis wherein the established order was maintained. Events or circumstances which threatened this homeostasis were considered to be stressors. The successful individual was the one who was able to neutralize these stressors and, by so doing, was able to preserve their homeostatic position. Those who were unable to preserve their homeostasis were said to be dis-stressed. While the term distress has remained relatively the same over time, more recent research has shown, however, that individuals are not seeking homeostasis. Rather, there is a tendency for individuals to reach out and grasp new experiences. Currently, a key concept is that individuals will want to grasp only those experiences which they can cope with.

By "coping" is meant that the individual is able to reduce the perceived stress to a level they feel comfortable with. Thus we see some individuals willingly going on roller coasters, speeding down highways, accepting a new and challenging job, and taking on new roles while others will not. As a result of this change in understanding, the term stress, with its connotation of negative consequences has been replaced by the term "strain". Strain is defined more broadly than stress as perceived psychological pressure. One of the implications of this broader definition is that a stressor which is causing strain may have either positive or negative consequences. Both types of stressors create a strain which the individual must cope with. If the individual cannot cope with the strain then they are said to be distressed.

Distress manifests itself physiologically as well as psychologically. Physiological symptoms of distress can include high blood pressure, sore or tightened musculature, a tendency towards an acid imbalance in the body, nervousness, dry mouth, headaches, and sweaty palms. The psychological symptoms may include a constant feeling of tiredness, lethargy, non-specific pain, irascibility, aimlessness, or apathy.

Strain is often labeled as indirect or direct. Direct strain results from stressors which directly

impinge on the individual in question. Direct stressors include such events as the loss of gainful employment, the death of a child, divorce, a new job, etc. Indirect strain results from the strain and distress of others.

This brings us back to roles. One of the major vehicles through which indirect strain operates is through social roles. This occurs because social roles are never performed in isolation. Roles are embedded in role sets (Merton, 1957). These are clusters of related roles within which interactions between role occupants takes place. Clearly, if one of the role occupants is distressed, it is likely that all of the individuals in associated social roles will also be somewhat affected.

Pearlin (1983) notes six types of role strains which may create distress in the individual. The first of these are role strains involving problems between the individual and the nature of the tasks she or he is expected to perform. This type of strain occurs as a result of the actual work which an individual must perform as a consequence of the role that he occupies. Pearlin notes that, generally, there is a weak association between distress and the role that the individual plays. It appears that the evolution of a role ensures that it is possible for a role holder to handle the requisite behaviors. This is providing, of

course, that there are no extraordinary factors impinging on the role.

The second type of role strain involves interpersonal problems within the role sets. Social roles are embedded in role sets and are the result of the development of mental representations. The abstract nature of these representations makes it virtually assured that there will be variances in conception between individuals. One of the most common examples of this type of strain is that which occurs between parents and their children. In part, this strain is the result of the changes which children undergo in a relatively short time. Parents must continually alter their role in the face of the child's changing capacity. Another aspect of this same type of strain results from the different views of the world developed by the young compared to their parents during times of rapid change.

Distress is also caused by intra-personal problems which occur as a result of individuals participating in multiple roles. Individuals commonly take on multiple roles in any society. At times these roles may conflict with each other. The intra-personal conflicts which result can be a source of confusion and strain. That intra-personal role conflict is usually not stressful is the result of two coping mechanisms. Firstly, roles are commonly mutually exclusive. They occur in different

contexts. Secondly, there is a tendency to develop hierarchies of roles. Thus when faced with a potential role conflict, individuals can resort to their internal hierarchies in order to establish for themselves which social role has priority (Pearlin and Schooler, 1978).

A fourth type of role strain is due to role captivity. It results from a person being constrained to play one role though they wish to play another. Examples include housewives who want to work and retirees who want to return to the job situation.

Strain can also result from the gain and loss of roles. As the individual moves through life there is a frequent gain and loss of roles. This is sometimes referred to as scheduled role changes. These include the taking up of adult responsibilities, marriage, having children, etc. As mentioned above, while these changes should be stressful, research has shown that scheduled role changes are not particularly so. The reason for this lack of distress is that the individual receives anticipatory socialization to the role. Further, many of these role changes are tied to the life cycle. Therefore, the individual's entry into the role can be anticipated and the basic patterns of behavior associated with the role are known (Pearlin, 1983; 1980).

In contrast, there are unscheduled role changes where shifts in roles and status, particularly those involving loss, are the source of considerable distress. Examples of unscheduled role changes include the loss of a job, the death of a child, the loss of a hereditary position, etc. Pearlin et al. (1981) notes that it is not necessarily the unscheduled loss of a role in itself that causes distress. Distress is more likely to appear when, as a result of the unscheduled loss, there are also other roles and expectations that cannot be met. In terms of our conceptualization of mental representations this fact is explained by reference to the integration of the individual's mental representations into a holistic self image and the impact of the loss on this self image.

A sixth types of role strain result from the restructuring and change of roles within role sets. As noted above, roles commonly exist within role sets. Where there is a change in one role, there is likely to be a need for corresponding changes in other roles within the role set. This is likely to create strain and distress because the process of change involves several individuals and will require negotiations and give and take. Consequently the mental representations of a role will have to altered several times. As well, it is common for social roles to be used frequently, if

not daily. Thus changes in a social role will affect interactions which occur daily or so frequently as to give the impression of a tenacious problem.

Usually, distress does not result from strain over a short duration no matter which type of role strain is involved. Instead distress emerges in situations where the stressor(s) are tenacious and persist over time. Tenacity and persistence are required characteristics of the strains before they become stressors because there are usually many coping mechanisms available to the person being strained. Coping mechanisms act to defray or dissipate the impact of the stressor. These can be deployed quickly to alleviate new or sudden strain before it becomes distressful. Only if the strain persists over time will it become distressing to the point where there will be a mental breakdown and/or cognitive reorganization within the individual.

Pearlin (1983) observes that role strains produce far more stress than one would initially expect. After all, role strains are not life threatening. They usually do not involve new or unknown demands. And they typically do not create confrontations on which an individual's entire future depends. Yet they tend to be more stressful than major life events.

This fact can be explained by reference to the theory of mental representations. Social roles are

clearly generic mental representations. The severe psychosocial strain which occurs as a result of role conflicts can therefore be explained because, first, generic representations cannot be reconstructed easily or quickly. They are the end result of a multitude of experiences which have laid down a deep pattern of stimulus-response. This pattern will be largely habitual and not consciously determined. Consequently, to change the pattern will require moving from performing behaviors in a relatively easy manner, that is, habitually, to conscious control, which is relatively difficult. Further, any reconstruction of one person's mental representation of his or her role must necessarily involve the other individuals in the role set. Unless the group had a clear understanding of what was occurring, it is to be expected that the cooperation needed to change roles would not be forthcoming. It would likely be easier for an individual to change his group than to change his role within a group.⁴⁵ Where leaving the group is not feasible, then one would expect to see either considerable psychosocial stress and role strain or stubborn resistance to the changes in social roles.

45. A common example of this is seen in children growing up. Often they feel "forced" to leave home in order to truly express the person they feel that they have become.

Again, this pattern suggests that the role strain will be tenacious.

Role strains, in particular, diminish the individual's mastery and self-esteem. By mastery is meant the extent to which people feel that they are able to manage and control the forces that importantly affect their lives (Pearlin and Schooler, 1978). A situation which is stressful is, by definition, noxious to the individual involved. The tenaciousness of the stressor must reflect to the individual his inability to control the circumstances of his life. While a sudden death through accident can be blamed on the contingent nature of the world and even prepared for through preparatory socialization, the tenacity and persistence of a noxious social role has fewer escapes and, as a result, the individual is less able to cope with it. In particular, the mental representation of the self suffers. From the perspective of the individual, one's self appears to be dis-empowered and incompetent. As a result, it becomes even more vulnerable to stressors (Pearlin and Radabaugh, 1976).

There are a number of coping resources, styles, mechanisms, and techniques available to individuals under strain. The concept of coping is an umbrella term encompassing a wide range of variables and subtopics. Within this range of variables and subtopics there are

three major categories which need to be distinguished for our purposes: coping resources, coping styles, and coping efforts.⁴⁶ Coping resources are generalized attitudes and skills that can be used in many situations. They include attitudes about self (esteem, ego strength), attitudes about the world (sense of coherence, belief in mastery), intellectual skills (cognitive flexibility and complexity, analytic abilities, knowledge), and interpersonal skills (communication skills, competence, and ease in interpersonal interactions). Coping styles are generalized coping strategies, defined as typical, habitual preferences for ways of approaching problems. They are used in a variety of situations by the individual. Coping efforts are specific actions (covert or overt) taken in specific situations that are intended to reduce a given problem or stress. It should be noted that most of these coping mechanisms and techniques are cognitive and therefore at the focus of strains caused by role conflict. This suggests another reason why role strain is so likely to cause distress.

Three major styles of coping with or of reducing strain are the avoidance or correction of situations seen as causing the strain, the modification of the

⁴⁶. This nomenclature and definition set are taken from Menaghan (1983).

meaning of the situation in a manner that neutralizes threats, and the management of stress symptoms so that they do not overwhelm the individual (Pearlin, 1983).

One of the coping styles noted by Kaplan et. al. (1982) and Pearlin (1983) which is especially noteworthy here is the arrangement of roles in a way that devalues those that are a source of pain, and values more highly those that promise to be a source of reward. Essentially, the self image is less at risk when threats are diverted to components of life that are of peripheral importance. This means that people may demean the importance of roles in which they experience distress while at the same time they are seeking to create or move other more rewarding roles to positions of central importance. In effect, what the individual is doing is reorganizing his hierarchies according to the associated strain. The roles that become prioritized under these conditions may be those recognized and applauded by a special subgroup but which may lack broad social approval. In this sense these roles may be deviant and even socially destructive. Deviance has been recognized as an effort to avoid self-denigration and to win self-esteem (Kaplan et al., 1982). Thus a negative self-concept can be a precondition of emotional distress in the short run and, in the long run, a

condition contributing to socially deviant behavior (Pearlin, 1983).

The above has covered a range of topics under the heading of stress and strain. Again, these theories should not be considered as the only ones available to the developer. There are others. The point being made is that given acceptance of the argument that development is induced cultural change, then it follows that there is a need to attempt to apply relevant theory from the social sciences. As stated earlier, the purpose behind the presentation of these theories is not to prove that one is more valid. Rather, the intention is to show that a sufficiently large body of social science theory applicable to broad cultural change does exist and to demonstrate the general direction that this approach could take and, in the process, to expand upon and reinforce the concept that development is cultural change.

E. Man undergoing cultural change

The above material suggests a number of things about mankind which any group should take into consideration before embarking on cultural change and especially if this group intends to bring about cultural change in another culture.

The first point to be made is that the above theory indicates that what makes man an adaptive survivor is his ability to create his reality. The fuzzy genetic definition of reality which man is provided with through highly unspecialized and undirected instinctual drives must be supplemented by sharper images provided by the mind. These images are constructed out of a wide variety of experiences which the individual has with his environment. Initial cognitive loops representing an experience are laid down in a series of linked nodes according to the principle of contiguity. Additional experiences which have some of these nodes in common will, by the stimulation of these nodes, cause them to be strengthened. Over time the subset of nodes which are most frequently stimulated emerge as the generic representative of that type of experience. These generic loops become the means whereby individuals come to understand and react to their environment.

As they are a composite, generic loops encode abstractions. But these abstractions are usually representations of elements of the environment which are important to the survival of the individual involved. Included here are also those elements which are essential to society's functioning; norms, values, language, gestures, and social roles. Collectively these generic loops provide the individual with his "I",

self, world view, and culture. Their abstract nature has the additional advantage of allowing their employment through adaptation to the particular in a wide variety of situations and circumstances.

As a result of their regular use, generic loops become very strong over time. Subjectively, they become the reality which the person "knows". In many cases the successful use of the pattern and its strength allows the individual to operate on almost a strictly habitual basis.

For the individual, operating in the world through habits has the major advantage of reducing strains. It does so in several ways. Habitual behaviors are usually successful in obtaining the desired result. They are also performed almost mechanically and thereby reduce the requirement for focussed higher cognitive functioning. By avoiding this level of thought, strain is reduced.

In inter-personal interactions, habitual behaviors are strain reducing because they allow greater predictability of the behavior of others. A person generally knows how others will react when both are performing in an habitual manner. These inter-personal habits are the basic ingredient of society and culture.

At the societal level, habitualized behavior allows interpersonal cooperation and the formation of roles and

role types. The primary socialization process by which the individual acquires his social view of reality is absorbed throughout childhood. Parents and other significant others as they live their daily lives provide the experiences and knowledge which constitutes the primary socialization. Language is of special importance to socialization because it can be used to store knowledge as well as to communicate it. It can also transcend the present, outline goals and build nonexistent abstractions.

One of the major benefits of culture is that it reduces environmental danger and thereby uncertainty and psychosocial stress. This effect is obtained in a number of ways. Perhaps the most important way is by allowing the group to perform collective actions which alter the environment so as to either remove the potential dangers or enhance the growth of beneficial goods. Collective actions require that the members of a group are able to communicate and interact with each other in a manner which allows them to construct shared models of what they intend to do. From these shared models they can then determine individual roles and actions. Culture provides both the means whereby such interpersonal interactions can occur and models of more ideal environments towards which the group should work. The technology to be used, the model for the

environment, as well as the patterns of behavior for social interaction have been learned by the group's membership as they grew up. They are part of their culture.

The very existence of these patterns and technologies reduce uncertainty and stress by limiting the technological options available to the individuals. In a world where there are few natural limits to what can be done, having such limits helps to reduce uncertainty. An ideal towards which one should work also assists in reducing uncertainty because it produces a standard against which one can compare the results, both real and potential, of a given set of actions.

In a similar manner, the knowledge of how to socially interact in order to obtain desired ends also reduces uncertainty. A culture teaches its members how to interact with each other. This allows for only a certain subset of possible behaviors and these have a known meaning. Often, culturally determined behaviors also have predictable responses. Once again this reduces uncertainty and psychosocial stress. One could well imagine the stress which might be produced if a respondent could react in any way he thought fit.⁴⁷

⁴⁷. In this regard, it was reported by Dr. Lewis of the University of Alberta that a colleague of his in need of a machete was pointed to an elderly individual by several members of the tribe he was studying. They all had assured him that this individual always shared

Culture also acts to assist learning and to perpetuate itself by providing to the learner, especially young children, with multiple experiences of a similar nature. Thus the lesson of one experience is consistently reinforced by those that follow. For example, if children are expected to show respect for adults by being quiet, the child will learn this not only at home but through observing other children and being made to be quiet by adults who are not significant others. The end result is greater predictability. The child can guess how even adults who have never been seen before will react when noises are made. Being able to predict the actions of others and the environment gives the individual the ability to control his situations.

As stated several times above, a culture is an integrated, holistic system. The members know how to interact with each other despite differences in

his machete. However, in response to the request for the machete, the individual began to yell and wave his machete in the air. There followed a swift chase through the village with the anthropologist barely managing to stay several yards ahead. At that point the machete-wielding native stopped and regarded the anthropologist's receding form with a somewhat quizzical expression. When the anthropologist had sufficiently recovered his composure he confronted his advisers, demanding to know why they had sent him to the old man. He was told in a matter-of-fact manner that, of course, the old man chased him with the machete. He always chased the person asking for his machete. But, that after awhile, the old man always stopped and then gave it to the person asking. At that point the anthropologist was asked why he had not stopped when the old man did.

knowledge and experience. This allows a number of results. The group, as a whole, can predict the outcomes of their collective behaviors and therefore is in control of their collective environment. Stresses which arise periodically from natural events such as death, marriage, and childbirth can be relieved through interpersonal interactions and community-wide, perhaps ritualistic, support. The technology used is common to the specific sub-groups who use it. This allows a sharing within such sub-groups which gives those involved a feeling of belonging and personal involvement. The channel through which the various sub-groups and areas of activity are meshed is language. Through language the group constructs shared definitions of the meaning of events or experiences.

As culture is learned, the emphasis in any discussion of culture must be on what is being learned and how what is learned is organized in the mind. A culture does not reside in the environment but in the minds of each of the culture's members. The interactions played out by individuals are a result of what they have learned from their interactions with their environment. It is from their experiences, direct, vicarious, or through written text, that they have been able to create mental representations of

entities, behaviors, and values in the environment, a self, and an overall world view.

Altering generic loops is a difficult, stress-producing, and frequently painful process. It requires the use of higher cognitive functions to monitor what normally would be habitual behaviors in order to inhibit and alter them. The individual will experience cognitive dissonance because what he is saying or doing will be at variance with what he wants to say or do. Further, there will likely be intra-personal role conflicts as the changes in one area or role impact on the others.

These role conflicts will occur externally as well as internally. Individuals who play complementary roles with the person changing will find that the responses they expect are no longer being made. This will result in their experiencing greater anxiety and strain when they are interacting with the person who is changing his generic loops. In the end, these others may find it easier and more pleasant to avoid the changing person than to continue their interactions. Certainly, social sanctions will be applied in an attempt to motivate the person changing to return to social normality. These sanctions will also increase the strains felt by the person making the changes.

As a result of the negative feedback which a person undergoing change is experiencing it is not surprising that there will be a corresponding loss of faith in themselves and their society. Beyond the more obvious negative sanctions and altering of habitual behaviors, there is a sense of self loss in that the self is composed of the very generic loops which are being effaced ignored, or changed. This may be particularly true because there is a tendency to denigrate the existing generic loops in order to segregate them.

These social, psychological, and physiological block to changing generic loops make it unlikely that a complete cultural change will really occur, especially in the case of older, more habituated individuals. If change does occur it will likely be only partial, probably occur amongst the young, and involve relocating to an environment where those desiring the change are surrounded by the culture they want to be part of.

The basic physiological reason for these conditions is that it is usually much easier to create new generic loops than to efface existing ones. In order to create the new generic loops when the person already has ones which are similar in terms of content, it is necessary for the person to create, at least in his mind, new rules or contexts which segregate the old cognitive loops from the new. Without such a separation, the old

loops, instead of the new ones, will be triggered by the environmental stimuli and the person will end up reinforcing the very world view or behaviors that he is trying to remove.

In a discussion of cultural change, then, one level of interest must be that of generic loops. The questions asked must include issues such as how the individuals involved can be expected to make a sufficient separation between the existing generic loops and those which are to be introduced in order to prevent cognitive confusion, and how the change will be incorporated into the existing world view. The contexts used by those involved must be understood in order to suggest how a new idea can best be instituted.

As children grow they are socialized into the existing social reality and come to accept it as their own reality. A key to socialization is the repetition of sequences of behaviors or events. Such sequences construct the generic loops out of which habits emerge.

In sum, the Berger and Luckman conception of society as a self-perpetuating, yet evolving organism is in accord with the Theory of Mental Representations and the idea that culture takes the form of mental representations in the minds of its adherents. It also suggests why an approach focussed on a single sector such as that commonly used in development efforts may

not be optimal. The various elements of a society are so inter-twined that a change in one sector must necessarily impact on many, if not all, others. If this likelihood is not taken into account then it is only to be expected that there will be both surprising and unacceptable reactions.

F. Faith in self and society in cultural change

The concept of faith, defined as "a belief in things unseen", has been alluded to several times in the above discussions on mental representations and society. The human condition is such that little is certain except for the fact of our existence. Those things which are certain are things such as the physical laws - - gravity, electromagnetism, and the like -- which govern realms so large that we cannot begin to affect them. Equally, there are areas where chaos (a war zone) or probability (gambling) operate and therefore it is impossible to know what will occur next. Between is a zone where humans have tried to establish or impose their set of rules in order to create predictability where none naturally exists. Society, as discussed above, is an example of this as is organizing one's desk or cleaning one's house. All of these acts operate to increase the likelihood of correctly predicting outcomes before activities are initiated. In most societies, the

predictions of outcomes are accurate so often that the members develop what amounts to faith in their society. Though a certain transaction or interaction may not be scheduled to occur for years, all of the parties involved may know what the outcome of that event will be. Faith in one's society is one of the cornerstones of human existence.

The basis for faith in one's society rests on two points. Firstly, the individual must be capable of accurately modelling the patterns of his society as he experiences it. If the modelling mechanism is faulty then clearly the models produced will be biased or in some other way unrepresentative of the social reality which exists. Secondly, the society itself must share a common set of rules. This shared set of common rules is almost a definition of society.

It should be noted that in normal human development many of the models created are, in fact, wrong. Children initially develop very egocentric models which fail to take into consideration the realities facing others in their environment. If mother does not come when called then something is wrong with mother not with the call. Over time the child comes to learn that their mental models are incomplete and adjustments, usually additions, are made. In doing so a higher level of generic loop is created which, in effect, says that if

there is a conflict between the environment and the way the environment is modelled then the environment is right and the individual is wrong. Consequently, there is a disposition on the part of the individual to seeing himself as wrong in these situations. Normally, this is a healthy pattern. Individual's adjust to society and not vice versa. However, in times of rapid change it may lead the individual to lose faith in himself and in his ability to model reality in general and his society in particular. A person may make inaccurate predictions so frequently that they lose all confidence in their ability to interact with others. More likely, they will lose confidence in interacting with some subset of others or of interacting in certain situations or contexts.

In a cultural transition period, individuals will frequently act in inappropriate ways. This is due to the very nature of the cultural transition. Many of the person's existing cognitive and generic loops will contain information which is regarded as invalid or as incorrectly organized by the alternate culture. As a result, ideas, concepts, models, and behaviors will not bring about the reactions or results anticipated by the person in transition. The individual will be ineffective in achieving his goals and feel somewhat out of control. Under such conditions it would be difficult

for a person who does not understand the process he is engaged in to maintain his faith in himself.

Further, the actions and ideas of a person involved in integrating himself into a different culture are likely to cause disruption amongst his friends and associates. They will come to lose faith in him as a person who is known and predictable and may avoid his company. Behind this "shunning" is a loss of trust. Trust is a basic requirement of social interactions. It is based on the belief that others share the same set of meanings and behaviors as oneself. Having similar sets of meanings allows individuals to predict the reactions of others even when they are complete strangers. Man must have faith in his fellow's behaviors before placing himself at risk. Where people are well-acquainted with each other then there can be a relaxing of tensions in each other's presence. Responses can be made in an habitual manner. If, in this condition of trust, a person suddenly begins to behave in an aberrant manner, then it is to be expected that their fellows will quickly lose faith in them and will avoid their company.

Without faith in the individuals composing a society and culture, the society and culture can not stand for long. The strains will be too great. Any process which intentionally or unintentionally destroys the faith an individual has in his society is, in

effect, contributing to the long term suffering of individuals no matter how noble the goals behind the process or intervention may seem. It follows that developers must come to understand the influence which they can potentially have in a development project. In order for this to occur, the developer must first come to see development as induced cultural change rather than just a shifting of economic incentives or the introduction of new technologies. With this understanding will come a desire to learn about the nature of society and culture and hopefully development methods which help to preserve the faith of individuals in their society rather than tearing it away.

This subsection concludes the discussion of social science theories relevant to development redefined as induced cultural change. It is hoped that the reader finds, as does the author, that there is clearly sufficient social science theory available to make the redefinition of development a worthwhile shift in perspective.

V. Conclusion

The main thesis of the paper is that development is can be better understood when viewed as cultural change. Concomitantly, the purpose of development agencies is better identified as inducing cultural change while the effect of the development process can be better understood when regarded as induced cultural change.

As the introduction attempts to indicate, this thesis is not unique to the development field. Rather it is only another expression of a general and pervasive pattern. Perhaps the strongest formulation of this pattern is found in the theories of thermodynamics. The basic idea is that entities operating within any environment are interconnected through a complex web of positive and negative feedback loops. Within this environment, particular entities effect each other and the environment through the transfer of energy. Given this general pattern, it follows that the implementation of a change in the environment will affect in some way or another most of the entities therein. As the culture of a group takes in the whole of a group's relationships amongst its members and to its environment, it seems clear that any outside agency which attempts to alter these relationships is, in effect, changing the group's culture.

Development's roots in economics initially constrained the field to regarding development as a purely economic and technical activity. Social changes were expected to naturally and gradually occur over time as a result of introducing various technologies. The role of economics was to suggest which type of technologies to introduce and the timing for these introductions.

As shown in the historical overview, throughout the 1960s there was increasing dissatisfaction with the economic/technical approach. All too frequently problems were encountered which were neither predicted nor could be dealt with through economic or technical means. Development workers therefore began to approach their work on a basis of what actually worked in the field rather than what economic theory or technological knowledge suggested. The 1970s saw even greater diversity in development as more and more actors sought to apply their own conceptions of development. The decade also witnessed the introduction of widespread project and program evaluation and a resulting increase in control over projects by bureaucrats and accountants. At the present time, the field is without general theory to guide it and moves ahead more as a result of bureaucratic constraints and requirements than in accordance with any inherent purpose or logic. There is

a vital need at this time for developers to understand what they are doing and how to do it better.

It has been generally acknowledged that much of the effort performed in the name of development has not been successful. Instead of ameliorating the conditions of the recipient groups, it has all too frequently lead to social dislocation, an increase in socially destructive behaviors and, in some cases, even economic ruin. None of these ends were intended. But they have occurred and are still occurring. While a variety of development theories and techniques of development have emerged over the past fifteen years, these are generally regarded as ineffective. The bottom line is that where development projects have been operating there has frequently been suffering on the part of the recipient because of the cultural dislocations which these projects have caused. Consequently, a need in development at this time is for a body of theory which can guide the developers in their development efforts. As discussed above, neither economics nor the various sectoral technologies appear able to provide the required theory because they are too narrowly focussed. What is being changed is not technological or social sectors but the recipient group's interactions both amongst its members and with its environment.

What has been suggested herein is that developers come to regard development, not as a strictly technological or economic activity, but rather as a more encompassing activity -- cultural change. By taking a broader perspective of the development process a number of benefits will result. One of the first benefits is that developers will be able to access a large amount of knowledge which has been accumulated over time by social scientists studying culture and cultural change. To demonstrate this possibility, a number of theories which appear applicable to development were presented in a rough fashion. Beyond the mere presentation of these theories and concepts is the possible application of these ideas and concepts in a manner which will enable developers to identify which of the various theories have true value for development. By selectively applying the various concepts it may be possible to evolve a body of theory which can generally guide development work.

The secondary spinoffs from having such theory are significant. Firstly, it will allow those working in the field to better interact with the recipient groups and with each other. Secondly, it will assist both funders and developers to select between development projects. Thirdly, it will enable developers to identify both potential and emerging problems before

they prevent the project from accomplishing its stated goals. Finally, it can aid in the identification of approaches to development which are more conducive to lasting benefits for the recipient group.

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Appendices

Appendix A: A critique of the planned project approach

The basic criticism of the planned project approach to development may appear to be focussed on its methodology but it would seem that the approach as a whole should be criticized because it does not adequately consider the nature of man and culture and, in particular, the way man creates his reality.

It takes years for individuals to adequately conceptualize their world, that is, to construct the cognitive and generic loops needed to link together the multitudinous aspects of human life into a coherent model of reality.

Every culture's model of reality will be different. It will use different mechanisms to explain the same occurrences, different classification methods and organizations of environmental objects, and will define different goals and values as important. Different groups' conceptions of what is right and good may vary radically. By failing to adequately deal with these aspects of human existence and assuming that the recipient group will simply change, the developers may be doing the recipient group a tremendous disservice. The induced changes may prevent several generations of the recipients from achieving ends that have been valued

for generations and may so alter roles that interpersonal interactions are abortive. More importantly, it may be destroying the faith which individuals have in themselves and in their society.

One of the reasons why the development project can be so devastating rests in the disparate powers of the two cultures involved in the development effort. The local culture is at a distinct disadvantage for several reasons. Firstly, at the national level, the local culture has already been compromised by the granting of nation state status to a group of people said to represent the whole of some externally defined geographical area within which they reside. This appellation is not simply words but carries with it certain rights and prerogatives including the right to borrow money on behalf of the local people, to make and impose laws on the local people, to tax the local people, to expropriate their land, and to impose on them a world view foreign to their culture and way of life. The outsider comes to the local population with the blessings and endorsement of this national government.

Secondly, the outsider has access to wealth far in excess of that found locally. This allows the outsider to achieve ends not possible for local people.

Thirdly, the outsider has access to technology not available locally. As with funding, this allows the

outsider to achieve objectives beyond the scope of the local people.

Fourthly, the outsider has a world view which is supported by outside forces and to which he can return from time to time in order to maintain his "vision". Thus, even when the outsider is working in the Third World, he is acting in a manner which is consistent with his cultural world view and not that of the local people. Therefore he is able to contravene local mores and norms and to get away with what no local would even consider doing.

Finally, the outsider, because of the nature of First World society and culture (and the variety of experiences to which he is exposed in that society) is assured of having a richer world view than the local person. This world view gives him greater flexibility in seeing how ends might be reached. A richer world view thus gives him additional personal power but it may also lead him to question the intelligence of the local people and to become disenchanted when the local people appear to be inflexible in their approach to the world.

This richer world view may cause the outsider to see the locals as inferior, as needing what his culture has to offer. If the outsider does not understand the basis for this difference, it may cause him to perceive

that the locals are somehow less than people in his own culture.⁴⁸

Using the power available to him, the developer, as already expressed, can alter the existing society by introducing any of a number of new elements from seeds to medical care. It should be stressed once again that the introduction itself is not the problem. Rather, it is the method of introduction. The project methodology as currently practiced commonly requires that milestones be established and that specific goods or services be provided by that point. In return for achieving the milestone, the project receives another budgetary allocation. As these introductions are quantifiable there is an ability to measure and compare the visible progress which one development organization is making versus another. However, these measures are of the external manifestations and frequently cannot take into account the internal cultural changes which the project is creating. Yet it is exactly here that either the most damage or benefit is occurring.

In sum, in development it is not the outsider who has to adjust culturally. It is the recipient who, though living in his own environment, is made to believe

⁴⁸. Outsiders are not the only group to suffer from this misperception. The local elites, having had the advantages of a better education, may also look upon the local residents as inferior.

that he should change his culture. The relative power of the outsider to the local recipients ensures that the change can be pushed through if the local recipients balk. That the developer would force a project onto the local group may not sound realistic. Yet, in so many of the descriptions of development efforts there are references to the developer sitting down and persuading the locals to join the project or of the locals reverting to their old ways after the developer leaves. One interpretation or explanation for this observation is that, the developer appears to be using intentional or unintentional coercive means. Further, from the developer's perspective, given his need to fulfill his contract with the funder and to show that the project has been a success, soft forms of coercion may be very appealing.

As stated elsewhere, whether or not the project is successful may not be the issue. The changes brought in by the developer will almost certainly have an impact on the local culture and thereby on the way the recipients see themselves and their society.

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