THE INTERESTS THAT WERE PRESENT IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION. THE BROADER IMPLICATION OF THIS PAPER IS ITS ATTEMPT TO SUPPORT THE NOTION THAT CHANGES IN POLICY AND RELATIONS AMONG STATES DO NOT NORMALLY SHIFT DRAMATICALLY. INSTEAD, THE PROCESS IS SLOW, OFTEN UNEVEN, AND 'ZIG-ZAGGING.'

THE ARGUMENT THAT FOLLOWS WILL TRY TO SHOW THESE SHIFTS IN AMERICAN INTEREST AND CHANGES IN POLICY THAT TOOK PLACE IN THE 1960'S. THIS WILL BE DONE BY IDENTIFYING THE STIMULI AND SHOWING WHAT EFFECTS THESE STIMULI HAD. INDIA'S DEFEAT IN THE SINO-INDIAN WAR OF 1962, IT WILL BE ARGUED, LED TO A DECLINE IN INDIA'S PRESTIGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, AND THAT THIS LED TO A LOWERING OF THE ROLE AMERICAN OFFICIALS PERCEIVED THAT INDIA WOULD PLAY IN THE WORLD. THIS MARKED THE BEGINNING OF THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN INTERESTS IN INDIA. THE FAILURE OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TO BRING INDIA AND PAKISTAN TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DISPUTES WAS TO CAUSE AMERICAN POLICY-MAKERS TO RECOGNIZE THE FUTILITY OF THEIR EXERCISE, AND THUS LED TO REDUCED AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH ASIA. THE VIETNAM WAR, IT IS TO BE ARGUED, LED TO A BREAKDOWN OF A RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIA AND THE U.S., WHILE THE LACK OF TIME AMONGST POLICY-MAKERS TO DEAL WITH NON-VIETNAM RELATED ISSUES AS WELL AS THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS OF VIETNAM, LED TO A FURTHER LOWERING OF AMERICAN INTEREST. THE DISILLUSIONMENT WITH AID WAS TO LEAD TO A MOVEMENT AWAY FROM THE OLD EMPHASIS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE THIRD WORLD, AND WAS REFLECTED IN LESS AID TO INDIA. SINCE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WAS NO LONGER OF SUCH IMPORTANCE TO AMERICAN POLICY-MAKERS, INDIA WAS FURTHER REDUCED IN IMPORTANCE. THE NIXON DOCTRINE REFLECTED THIS LACK OF INTEREST IN THE SMALLER

26589

NATIONAL LIBRARY
OTTAWA

BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE
OTTAWA

NAME OF AUTHOR..... ISHWARI BAJPAI

TITLE OF THESIS..... "Declining American Interest in India"

UNIVERSITY..... Carleton University

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED..... M.A.

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED..... ..

Permission is hereby granted to THE NATIONAL LIBRARY
OF CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies
of the film.

The author reserves other publication rights, and
neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be
printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's
written permission.

(Signed) *J. P. Bajpai*

PERMANENT ADDRESS: *C/O Mr. U.S. BAJPAI*
MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
NEW DELHI
INDIA

DATED..... 5 February 1976 ..19

NL-91 (10-68)

Supervisor John H. Sigler

INFORMATION TO USERS

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN
MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

This copy was produced from a microfiche copy of the original document. The quality of the copy is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Canadian Theses Division
Cataloguing Branch
National Library of Canada
Ottawa, Canada K1A 0N4

AVIS AUX USAGERS

LA THESE A ETE MICROFILMEE
TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RECUE

Cette copie a été faite à partir d'une microfiche du document original. La qualité de la copie dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise pour le microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

NOTA BENE: La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer. Microfilmée telle que nous l'avons reçue.

Division des thèses canadiennes
Direction du catalogage
Bibliothèque nationale du Canada
Ottawa, Canada K1A 0N4

DECLINING AMERICAN INTEREST IN INDIA

BY

ISHWARI PRASAD BAJPAT, B.A.

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF
GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

CARLETON UNIVERSITY
OTTAWA, ONTARIO.

JANUARY 19, 1976.

7
© Bhawari Prasad Jappal 1970

The undersigned recommend to the Faculty
of Graduate Studies acceptance of the thesis
"Declining American Interest in India"
submitted by Ishwari Bajpai, B.A.,
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts.

.....*John H. Sigler*.....
Thesis Supervisor

.....*N. C.*.....
Chairman, Department of Political Science

Carleton University

February 1976

ABSTRACT

THE CONTENTION OF THIS THESIS IS THAT DURING THE 1960'S THERE WAS A DECLINE IN AMERICAN INTEREST IN INDIA, BOTH IN TERMS OF PARTICULAR INTERESTS AS WELL AS THE IMPORTANCE THE UNITED STATES ATTACHED TO INDIA. INTERESTS, IT IS MAINTAINED, ARE IMPORTANT DETERMINING FACTORS IN POLICY-MAKING, THOUGH OFTEN INTERESTS ARE CONTRADICTORY WHICH IS REFLECTED IN CONTRADICTORY POLICY. THIS LACK OF AGREEMENT ON INTERESTS IS REFLECTED IN THE POLICY-PROCESS WHICH IS INCREMENTAL, THOUGH INCREMENTALISM IS ALSO PARTLY DUE TO SUCH FACTORS AS LACK OF ADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE AND THE INABILITY TO PREDICT. SINCE THERE IS A TENDENCY TO AVOID CHANGING POLICY INHERENT IN THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS, A REVIEW OF POLICY IS ONLY BROUGHT ON BY STIMULI FROM THE ENVIRONMENT. THIS THESIS ATTEMPTS TO IDENTIFY AND DOCUMENT THE EFFECT OF THE STIMULI ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS INDIA. THE ARGUMENT IS THAT THESE STIMULI WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR INCREMENTAL SHIFTS IN THE AFOREMENTIONED POLICY WHICH CULMINATED IN THE LOW INTEREST ATTACHED TO INDIA BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BY THE EARLY 1970'S.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I WOULD LIKE TO THANK MY SUPERVISOR, PROF. D. LEYTON-BROWN AND
PROF. SIGLER FOR THEIR SUGGESTIONS AND CRITICISMS, AS WELL AS THEIR TIME.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO THANK PROF. N.M. CHI, JONATHAN WOUK AND MY FATHER.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
CHAPTER 1 - AN INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 2 - A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS	7
CHAPTER 3 - UNITED STATES, INDIA AND THE WORLD, 1945-60	19
CHAPTER 4 - INDIA'S CONFLICTS OF THE 1960's	36
CHAPTER 5 - AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM AND ITS EFFECTS ON U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS	53
CHAPTER 6 - DISILLUSIONMENT WITH AID	69
CHAPTER 7 - A NEW APPROACH AND CONFLICT ON THE SUBCONTINENT	89
CHAPTER 8 - THE SOVIET UNION'S GROWING INFLUENCE IN INDIA	105
CHAPTER 9 - CONCLUSION	124
APPENDIX A - FOREIGN AID VOTING PATTERNS	129
BIBLIOGRAPHY	139

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 5-1 - AID TO NESA AND INDIA	64
TABLE 6-1 - AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION HISTORY FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE UNDER F.A. ACT 1961 AND PREDECESSOR LEGISLATION 1948-1973	75
TABLE 6-2 - INDIA'S NATIONAL PRODUCT 1960-1968	85
TABLE 6-3 - INDIA'S NATIONAL INCOME 1960-1967	85
TABLE 6-4 - INDIA'S AGRICULTURE 1964-1968	85
TABLE 8-1 - COMPARISON OF SOVIET ARM SUPPLIES TO INDIA 1960-1969	116
TABLE 8-2 - INDO-SOVIET TRADE 1958-1973	117
TABLE A-1 - AN ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE	136
TABLE A-2 - SUPPORT FOR AID BY HOUSE	137
TABLE A-3 - COMPARISON OF RANK OF REGIONS ON SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN AID (90TH CONGRESS & O'LEARY'S STUDY)	138

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D)

<u>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
FIGURE 6-1 - TOTAL U.S. ECONOMIC LOANS AND GRANTS FY1946-1972	73
FIGURE 8-1 - SOVIET ARMS SUPPLIED TO INDIA 1955-1969	114
FIGURE A-1 - MEAN PERCENTAGE SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN AID BY PARTY, HOUSE AND REGION	134-135

CHAPTER 1

AN INTRODUCTION

THE SUB-CONTINENT OF SOUTH ASIA WITNESSED ANOTHER WAR IN 1971; UNLIKE PREVIOUS INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICTS IT WAS DECISIVE,¹ THOUGH A NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES STILL REMAIN.² WORLD REACTION TO THE INDIAN INVOLVEMENT IN PAKISTANI CIVIL WAR WAS MIXED. MOST OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE OLDER STATES (WESTERN AND COMMUNIST) WERE SYMPATHETIC AND/OR SUPPORTIVE OF THE INDIAN ACTION; THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, MANY WITH SECESSIONIST PROBLEMS THEMSELVES, WERE LESS PLEASED WITH THE TURN OF EVENTS. TO THIS PATTERN THERE WAS A NOTABLE EXCEPTION, THAT IS, THE VERY STRONG ANTI-INDIAN POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THIS WAS MANIFEST IN NIXON'S TILT TOWARDS PAKISTAN, WHICH INCLUDED THE DISPATCHING OF THE U.S.S. ENTERPRISE TO THE BAY OF BENGAL.

THE INDIAN PEOPLE AND THE GOVERNMENT REACTED WITH NOTICEABLE ANGER AND DISAPPOINTMENT. NORMAN PALMER NOTES, "THEIR (INDIAN) CRITICISM OF NIXON, KISSINGER AND U.S. POLICY ROSE TO A SHRILL CRESCENDO. INDIAN OFFICIALS WERE PARTICULARLY INCENSED BY THE ASSERTIONS OF HIGH AMERICAN OFFICIALS THAT INDIA MAINLY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GROWING TENSIONS AND THE WAR ..."³ EVEN THOSE ELEMENTS THAT WERE GENERALLY PRO-AMERICAN FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO VIEW AMERICAN POLICY AS ANYTHING BUT HOSTILE, AND THUS WERE UNUSUALLY CRITICAL OF THE UNITED STATES.⁴ AT FIRST GLANCE, IT SEEMS

1. THAT IS IF WE ACCEPT THE INDIAN ARGUMENT THAT THEY NEVER SOUGHT TO OVERRUN WEST PAKISTAN.

2. SUCH QUESTIONS AS RESERVES AND DEBTS OF PRE-WAR PAKISTAN.

3. NORMAN D. PALMER, "THE NEW ORDER IN SOUTH ASIA," ORIS, VOL. 17, NO. 4, P. 1115.

4. IBID., PP. 1115-1119.

QUITE PLAUSIBLE TO EXPLAIN U.S. POLICY IN TERMS OF ONE MAJOR VARIABLE - RICHARD NIXON. NOR IS SUCH AN ANALYSIS SO DIFFICULT TO DOCUMENT. EARLY IN THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION, NIXON HAD ADVOCATED AID TO PAKISTAN, AND FOLLOWED THE DULLES LINE THAT ALL NEUTRALS WERE BAD AND IMMORAL. WAS IT ALSO NOT NIXON WHO LIKED YAHYA KHAN BUT FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO COMMUNICATE WITH MRS. GANDHI? HAD NOT NIXON PERSONALLY REVERSED A DECISION THAT HAD WITHHELD ARMS FROM PAKISTAN? JACK ANDERSON'S REVELATIONS OF WSAG (WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTION GROUP) MEETINGS DURING THE WAR OF 1971 WOULD SEEM TO CONFIRM SUCH AN ANALYSIS. FOR ANDERSON PRESENTS SUCH DETAILS AS KISSINGER TELLING THE MEMBERS OF WSAG THAT,

"I AM GETTING HELL EVERY HALF HOUR FROM THE PRESIDENT THAT WE ARE NOT BEING TOUGH ENOUGH ON INDIA ... HE WANTS US TO TILT IN FAVOUR OF PAKISTAN."

YET IF THIS KIND OF ANALYSIS IS FOLLOWED TO ITS LOGICAL END, THEN WHY HAVE INDIO-U.S. RELATIONS NOT IMPROVED, IN THE POST-NIXON ERA, TO THE EXTENT THAT ONE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED. KISSINGER HAS CALLED THE PRESENT STATE OF RELATIONS AS 'MATURE' THOUGH PERHAPS "CORRECT AND LIMITED" WOULD BE A MORE REALISTIC, THOUGH LESS DIPLOMATIC WAY OF PUTTING IT. PATRICK MOYNIHAN, AS HE WAS ABOUT TO RELINQUISH THE AMBASSADORSHIP TO NEW DELHI, SEEMS TO AGREE WHEN HE CONDEMNES THE U.S. FOR A LACK OF INTEREST IN INDIA.⁶

LEAVING ASIDE MOYNIHAN'S POINT FOR THE MOMENT, THERE ARE TWO OTHER WEAKNESSES THAT ARISE IN PRESENTING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AS A RESULT OF A PRESIDENT HAVING A LONG-STANDING DISLIKE FOR A PARTICULAR

5. JACK ANDERSON WITH GEORGE CLIFFORDS, THE ANDERSON PAPERS, BALLANTINE BOOKS, NEW YORK 1973, P. 281.

6. NEW YORK TIMES, DECEMBER 13, 1974.

COUNTRY AND/OR LEADERS. THE FIRST RELATES TO RICHARD NIXON AS A PERSON, AND THE SECOND POINTS TOWARDS THE WHOLE CONCEPTION OF THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT IN CREATING AND IMPLEMENTING A POLICY THAT HE PERSONALLY ADVOCATES.

ANY ANALYSIS THAT ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THAT RICHARD NIXON COULD NOT OR WOULD NOT SEND HIS PERSONAL FEELINGS/OPINIONS IN ORDER TO MEET CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES CAN EASILY BE PROVEN TO BE FALSE.⁷ ONE ONLY HAS TO COMPARE THE RICHARD NIXON OF THE 1950'S TO THE NIXON AS PRESIDENT. IN THE FIFTIES RICHARD NIXON ACHIEVED FAME OR NOTOREITY WITH HIS UNBENDING AND UNFORGIVING ANTI-COMMUNISM WHICH TOOK THE FORM OF SUCH FAMOUS INCIDENTS AS THE ALGER HISS CASE, AND THE SO-CALLED KITCHEN DEBATE WITH PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV. YET IT WAS THIS SAME NIXON WHO, AS PRESIDENT, INITIATED DETENTE AND COULD BE SEEN IN CHINA - CHINA, AFTER ALL, WAS WHAT ALLOWED MCCARTHYISM TO SWEEP AMERICA. FROM THESE LIMITED EXAMPLES, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT RICHARD NIXON COULD CHANGE HIS IDEOLOGICAL AND/OR POLICY SHIRT WITH A CHANGED SITUATION.

WITH REGARD TO THE PROBLEM OF THE ROLE AND POSITION, AS WELL AS POWER OF THE PRESIDENCY IN GETTING WHAT HE DESIRES OR SEEKS, MOST ANALYSTS TEND TO AGREE THAT THIS IS LIMITED THOUGH NOT ABSENT. HILSMAN SEES THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS AS THAT OF THE "ULTIMATE DECIDER-COORDINATOR-PERSUADER"⁸ WITH EMPHASIS ON 'ULTIMATE'. HILSMAN POINTS OUT THAT,

7. THE ONLY UNBENDING DESIRE OF R. NIXON SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN THAT OF THE PRESIDENCY.

8. ROGER HILSMAN, THE POLITICS OF POLICY MAKING IN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HARPER & ROW, NEW YORK, 1971, P. 21.

"FOR ANY MAJOR DECISION, HE (THE PRESIDENT) MUST HAVE THE SUPPORT OR AT LEAST THE PASSIVE ACQUIESCENCE OF MOST AND SOMETIMES ALL THE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH."⁹

HALPERIN AGREES WITH HILSMAN IN THAT HE FEELS THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL OFTEN PREFER TO DELAY THAN PUT FORWARD A POLICY THAT IS OPPOSED.¹⁰ GIVEN THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE MORE POWER IN A CRISIS SITUATION, SUCH AS THE 1971 CONFLICT WAS, YET IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT HE DOES NOT NEED A CONSENSUS FOR AS ALLISON REMINDS US, KENNEDY WAITED A FULL DAY DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS IN ORDER TO GET A CONSENSUS ON POLICY EVEN THOUGH HE HAD ALREADY MADE UP HIS MIND.¹¹

IF THE ABOVE ARGUMENTS LEAD ONE AWAY FROM A SINGLE VARIABLE EXPLANATION OF AMERICAN BEHAVIOUR DURING THE 1971 WAR, THERE IS A NEED TO PRESENT AN ALTERNATIVE REASONING. IT IS TO THIS END THAT THE THESIS IS AIMED. IT IS THE CONTENTION OF THIS PAPER THAT AMERICAN INTERESTS IN INDIA DECLINED DURING THE 1960'S AND THE IMPORTANCE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ATTACHED TO INDIA HAD REACHED SUCH A LOW LEVEL BY 1971 THAT THE POLICIES OF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION WERE A LOGICAL CONCLUSION TO THIS PROCESS. IN OTHER WORDS, IT IS ARGUED THAT THE LOW LEVEL OF AMERICAN INTERESTS IN INDIA ALLOWED OTHER INTERESTS AND PREDILECTIONS TO DETERMINE THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION'S BEHAVIOUR. IT WILL BE ARGUED THAT THESE CHANGES WERE NOT SUDDEN DRAMATIC SHIFTS, BUT INCREMENTAL MOVES AWAY FROM

9. IBID., P. 27. PARENTHESES AND EMPHASIS MINE.

10. MORTON M. HALPERIN, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D.C., 1974, CHAPTER 4.

11. GRAHAM T. ALLISON, THE ESSENCE OF DECISION, LITTLE, BROWN & CO., BOSTON, 1971, PP. 203-210.

THE INTERESTS THAT WERE PRESENT IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION. THE BROADER IMPLICATION OF THIS PAPER IS ITS ATTEMPT TO SUPPORT THE NOTION THAT CHANGES IN POLICY AND RELATIONS AMONG STATES DO NOT NORMALLY SHIFT DRAMATICALLY. INSTEAD, THE PROCESS IS SLOW, OFTEN UNEVEN, AND 'ZIG-ZAGGING.'

THE ARGUMENT THAT FOLLOWS WILL TRY TO SHOW THESE SHIFTS IN AMERICAN INTEREST AND CHANGES IN POLICY THAT TOOK PLACE IN THE 1960'S. THIS WILL BE DONE BY IDENTIFYING THE STIMULI AND SHOWING WHAT EFFECTS THESE STIMULI HAD. INDIA'S DEFEAT IN THE SINO-INDIAN WAR OF 1962, IT WILL BE ARGUED, LED TO A DECLINE IN INDIA'S PRESTIGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, AND THAT THIS LED TO A LOWERING OF THE ROLE AMERICAN OFFICIALS PERCEIVED THAT INDIA WOULD PLAY IN THE WORLD. THIS MARKED THE BEGINNING OF THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN INTERESTS IN INDIA. THE FAILURE OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TO BRING INDIA AND PAKISTAN TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DISPUTES WAS TO CAUSE AMERICAN POLICY-MAKERS TO RECOGNIZE THE FUTILITY OF THEIR EXERCISE, AND THUS LED TO REDUCED AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH ASIA. THE VIETNAM WAR, IT IS TO BE ARGUED, LED TO A BREAKDOWN OF A RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIA AND THE U.S., WHILE THE LACK OF TIME AMONGST POLICY-MAKERS TO DEAL WITH NON-VIETNAM RELATED ISSUES AS WELL AS THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS OF VIETNAM, LED TO A FURTHER LOWERING OF AMERICAN INTEREST. THE DISILLUSIONMENT WITH AID WAS TO LEAD TO A MOVEMENT AWAY FROM THE OLD EMPHASIS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE THIRD WORLD, AND WAS REFLECTED IN LESS AID TO INDIA. SINCE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WAS NO LONGER OF SUCH IMPORTANCE TO AMERICAN POLICY-MAKERS, INDIA WAS FURTHER REDUCED IN IMPORTANCE. THE NIXON DOCTRINE REFLECTED THIS LACK OF INTEREST IN THE SMALLER

STATES OF THE WORLD, OF WHICH INDIA WAS PART OF, THEREBY SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE TO THE WAR ON THE SUB-CONTINENT.

BEFORE TRYING TO DOCUMENT THESE ARGUMENTS, IT IS NECESSARY TO TRY AND PRESENT THE INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN INTERESTS, INCREMENTALISM AND THESE REASONS FOR CHANGE IN INTERESTS. THE FOLLOWING CHAPTER WILL ATTEMPT TO DO THIS, WHILE CHAPTER 3 WILL TRY AND PUT THE EVENTS OF THE 1960'S INTO HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. CHAPTER 4 WILL DEAL WITH U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS IN THE FIRST PART OF THE 1960'S, CHAPTER 5 WITH THE EFFECT OF VIETNAM ON AMERICAN INTERESTS AND POLICY, WITH CHAPTER 6 DEALING WITH DIS-ILLUSIONMENT WITH AID, ITS CAUSES AND EFFECTS. IN CHAPTER 7, THE NIXON DOCTRINE WILL BE ANALYSED IN TERMS OF A RESPONSE TO A CHANGED INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT AS WELL AS THE EVENTS OF 1971, SOVIET-INDIAN RELATIONS AND ITS EFFECTS ON U.S. POLICY ARE DEALT WITH IN CHAPTER 8. AND FINALLY, CHAPTER 9 WILL TRY AND BRING ALL THESE TOGETHER IN A COHERENT CONCLUSION.

CHAPTER 2

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

IN THE INTRODUCTION IT WAS STATED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER WAS TO DOCUMENT A DECLINE OF AMERICAN INTEREST IN INDIA, AND BY DOING THIS HELP TO UNDERSTAND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR DURING THE 1971 BANGLADESH CRISIS. IT WAS FURTHER STATED THAT THIS CHANGE IN AMERICAN INTEREST WAS THE RESULT OF INCREMENTAL POLICY SHIFTS RATHER THAN A SUDDEN CHANGE. PRIOR TO MAKING AN ATTEMPT TO DOCUMENT THIS ARGUMENT, IT IS NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH A NUMBER OF POINTS. FIRSTLY, WHAT IS THE RELEVANCE OF THIS STUDY IN BROADER TERMS THAN U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS. SECONDLY, WHAT DO THE CONCEPTS 'AMERICAN INTEREST' AND 'INCREMENTALISM' MEAN? AND THIRDLY, WHAT IF ANY RELEVANCE DO THESE CONCEPTS HAVE IN HELPING TO UNDERSTAND AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS INDIA. AN ATTEMPT WILL BE UNDERTAKEN TO ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS IN THE FOLLOWING PAGES.

WHEN PURSUING A CASE-STUDY, AS IS BEING DONE HERE, THE IMMEDIATE QUESTION THAT ARISES IS WHETHER THE STUDY, HOWEVER WELL DOCUMENTED, HAS ANY BROADER SIGNIFICANCE. THIS SIMPLY IS WHETHER ONE CAN CLAIM ANY SIGNIFICANCE TO ONE'S FINDINGS WHEN ONE IS DEALING WITH ONE CASE OUT OF A HUNDRED AND FIFTY. THERE ARE TWO WAYS OF NEGATING THIS KIND OF CRITICISM. FIRSTLY, IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT SINCE THERE ARE CONSTRAINTS OF BOTH TIME AND FINANCE, WHATEVER LITTLE CAN BE ACHIEVED BY WAY OF SUPPORTING OR DIVINING NEW GENERALIZATIONS IS IMPORTANT. THE SECOND METHOD IS TO TAKE GENERALIZATIONS THAT ARE ALREADY IN USE AND TEST THEM ON A SPECIFIC CASE. BY DOING THIS, IT CAN PLAUSIBLY BE ARGUED THAT SUPPORT OR THE LACK OF IT IS FURTHERING, HOWEVER LITTLE, THE KNOWLEDGE

IN THE FIELD. AFTER ALL, THE MORE EVIDENCE THAT COMES FORTH IN SUPPORT OF ONE OR MORE GENERALIZATIONS, THE MORE ACCEPTABLE THE GENERALIZATION(S). IT IS THIS LATTER 'STRATEGY' THAT WILL BE FOLLOWED HERE.

EVEN IF IT IS RELEVANT TO UNDERTAKE A CASE-STUDY, HOW GOOD AN EXAMPLE OF CHANGING AMERICAN INTERESTS, THROUGH AN INCREMENTAL PROCESS, IS AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS INDIA. AFTER ALL, IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS VIETNAM PROVIDES A FAR BETTER EXAMPLE OF INCREMENTALISM THAN THE UNITED STATES' INDIA POLICY. THOUGH VIETNAM DOES, BY TAKING THE INCREMENTAL POLICY-MAKING TO ITS LOGICAL EXTREME, INTENSIFY "NORMALLY BLURRED FEATURES"¹ IT ALSO SUFFERS FROM THE FACT THAT MANY OF THE FEATURES OF VIETNAM MAY NOT BE PRESENT IN OTHER RELATIONS. IN FACT, IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE OF ANY OTHER AREA IN THE WORLD WHERE SUCH A STRANGE MIX OF CIRCUMSTANCES AND EVENTS COULD HAVE OCCURRED EXCEPT VIETNAM.² U.S. POLICY TOWARDS INDIA, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD SEEM TO FALL INTO THE MORE ROUTINE TYPE OF BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP; THEREFORE ITS EXAMINATION MAY BE OF GREATER SIGNIFICANCE.

THE FOREIGN POLICY INTEREST(S) OF NATIONS (IN THIS CASE THE U.S.) RAISE A HOST OF PROBLEMS, THE ROOTS OF WHICH LIE IN THE NEBULOUSNESS OF THE CONCEPT. IS (ARE) INTEREST(S) RELATED TO OR PART OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST - ITSELF A VAGUE AND ILL-DEFINED TERM - OR ARE THEY SEPARATE? WHAT, IF ANY, TYPES OF INTERESTS ARE THERE? AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, DO NATIONS AND/OR GOVERNMENTS HAVE INTERESTS? IF SO, ARE THERE CONTRADICTIONS AMONGST THE VARIOUS INTERESTS OR ARE THEY ON SUCH A HIGH RATIONAL

1. RICHARD M. PFEFFER (ED.), NO MORE VIETNAMS, HARPER & ROW, NEW YORK, 1968 P. 6.

2. IBID., P. 2.

LEVEL THAT THEY ARE WELL-INTEGRATED?

THE FIRST STEP IN ATTEMPTING TO DEFINE THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST, AS USED HERE, IS TO STATE THAT THERE ARE FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS, FOR AS FRANKEL NOTES IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DENY THE EXISTENCE OF A NATIONAL INTEREST,³ SIMILARLY IT IS HARD TO DO THE SAME WITH INTEREST. HOWEVER, THIS IS NOT MEANT TO INDICATE THAT NATIONAL INTEREST AND INTEREST(S) IN FOREIGN POLICY ARE ONE AND THE SAME. NATIONAL INTEREST, AS UNDERSTOOD HERE, RELATES TO GOALS THAT ARE HELD BY THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF A COUNTRY SUCH AS THE SURVIVAL OF THE NATION AS AN ENTITY. FOREIGN POLICY INTEREST(S), ON THE OTHER HAND, DO NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE SO BROAD BASED AND GENERALLY, THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY, ARE THE VIEWS OF THE DECISION-MAKERS. THESE INTERESTS MAY BE MEANS TO ACHIEVING OR MAINTAINING THE NATIONAL INTEREST OR THEY MAY BE NARROWER SECTIONAL AIMS. THUS, NATIONAL INTEREST IS DEFINED HERE AS APPROXIMATELY EQUIVALENT TO HOLSTI'S LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES/INTERESTS WHILE FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS ARE THOSE THAT AT A GIVEN TIME ARE HELD BY THE DECISION-MAKERS.⁴ HOWEVER, SINCE THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DOES NOT NECESSARILY LEAD TO RATIONAL DECISIONS, OFTEN THERE ARE CONFLICTING AND CONTRADICTORY INTERESTS SUCH AS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE THIRD WORLD, AND ACCESS TO CHEAP NEW MATERIALS, AS BETWEEN SUPPORTING A COLONIAL ALLY AND ADVOCATING SELF-DETERMINATION IN COLONIES. THIS TOOK PLACE WHEN INDIA ANNEXED GOA, AND THE UNITED STATES DECIDED TO SUPPORT HER ALLY PORTUGAL. CONTRADICTORY

3. JOSEPH FRANKEL, NATIONAL INTEREST. PALL MALL, LONDON, 1970, p. 43.

4. K.J. HOLSTI, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, 2ND ED. PRENTICE-HALL, ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, N.J., 1970, pp. 136-140. FOR VARYING VIEWS OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST SEE FRANKEL, OP. CIT., CHARLES A. BEARD & C.M.E. SMITH, THE IDEA OF NATIONAL INTEREST: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, MACMILLAN, NEW YORK, 1934, HANS J. MORGENTHAU, "ANOTHER 'GREAT DEBATE': THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES", IN STANLEY HOFFMAN (ED.) CONTEMPORARY THEORIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, PRENTICE-HALL, ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, N.J., 1960 AND M.D. PALMER (ED.), THE NATIONAL INTEREST: ALONE OR WITH OTHERS? AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, ANNALS, VOL. 282, PHILADELPHIA, 1962.

INTERESTS ALSO SHOWED UP IN THE AMERICAN DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN INDIA MILITARILY IN THE POST-1962 ERA, AS WELL AS AVOID ESTRANGING HER ALLY PAKISTAN. AS SHALL BE NOTED LATER, SUCH A POLICY WAS DOOMED TO FAIL SINCE IT FAILED TO SATISFY EITHER INDIA OR PAKISTAN.

ON THE QUESTION OF INCREMENTALISM, INCREMENTALISM IS THE PROCESS BY WHICH THE LEAST POSSIBLE DECISION IS TAKEN. THAT IS, GIVEN A STIMULUS FROM THE ENVIRONMENT, THE DECISION-MAKER(8) OR DECISION-MAKING UNIT RESPONDS IN A MANNER THAT INVOLVES THE MINIMUM OF CHANGE FROM THE COURSE OF A POLICY THAT WAS HITHERTO BEING FOLLOWED. AS HILSMAN STATES,

"RATHER THAN THROUGH GRAND DECISIONS ON GRAND ALTERNATIVES, POLICY CHANGES SEEM TO COME THROUGH A SERIES OF SLIGHT MODIFICATIONS OF EXISTING POLICY EMERGING SLOWLY AND HALTINGLY BY SMALL AND USUALLY TENTATIVE STEPS, A PROCESS OF TRIAL AND ERROR IN WHICH POLICY ZIGS AND ZAGS, REVERSES ITSELF, AND THEN MOVED FORWARD IN A SERIES OF INCREMENTAL STEPS."⁵

IT IS IN FACT WHAT LINDBLOM SO APTLY CALLED THE SCIENCE OF MUDDLING THROUGH.⁶ LINDBLOM AND BRAYBROOKE ARGUE THAT,

"... INCREMENTAL CHANGES INCLUDE ANY CHANGES PERMITTED WITHIN THE SMALLEST SET OF PATTERNS, AS WELL AS SOME OF THE SMALLER CHANGES WITHIN THE LARGER PATTERNS INCLUDING VERY SMALL CHANGES IN THE VERY LARGEST."⁷

FURTHER, THEY POINT OUT THAT IF INCREMENTAL CHANGE AND NON-INCREMENTAL CHANGE WERE PUT ON A CONTINUUM, AND UNDERSTANDING PUT ON ONE CROSS-OUTTING IT (HIGH AND LOW), THE FOLLOWING WOULD EMERGE:

5. ROGER HILSMAN, OP. CIT., P. 5.

6. CHARLES LINDBLOM, "THE SCIENCE OF MUDDLING THROUGH", PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW 19, No. 2.

7. CHARLES E. LINDBLOM AND DAVID BRAYBROOKE, "TYPES OF DECISION-MAKING" IN J.H. ROSENBAUM (ED.), INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY, (REVISED ED.), THE FREE PRESS, NEW YORK, 1969, P. 209.

ACCORDING TO THEM, INCREMENTAL POLITICS WOULD FALL INTO THE THIRD QUADRANT, THAT IS A COMBINATION OF LOW UNDERSTANDING AND INCREMENTAL CHANGE.⁸
 IT IS A POLICY OF MOVING AWAY FROM A GIVEN POLICY, RATHER THAN TOWARDS A SPECIFIC GOAL.⁹

FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS ONE AREA WHERE DECISION-MAKERS LACK ADEQUATE UNDERSTANDING. THIS IS MAINLY DUE TO A LACK OF INFORMATION, FOR IT IS OFTEN DIFFICULT TO DISCERN WITH CLARITY WHAT EXACTLY IS TAKING PLACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THIS IS PARTLY DUE TO THE PROBLEM OF BEING UNABLE TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN 'NOISE' AND ACTUAL INFORMATION. HILSMAN TAKES THIS A STEP FURTHER WHEN HE ARGUES THAT MUCH OF THE CONFUSION IN THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS IS DUE TO THE

"INADEQUACY OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF HOW AND WHY THINGS WORK IN THE SOCIAL AFFAIRS OF MEN, OUR LIMITED CAPACITY TO FORESEE DEVELOPMENTS THAT BRING PROBLEMS OR TO PREDICT THE CONSEQUENCES OF WHATEVER ACTION WE DO TAKE."¹⁰

THIS INABILITY TO PREDICT THE CONSEQUENCES IS CRUCIAL, IN THAT IT LEADS TO ACTION, LEFT THINGS DO NOT WORK OUT IN THE MANNER ENVISAGED. THUS, SMALL CHANGES IN POLICY DO NOT FIX THE DECISION-MAKERS ONTO AN IRRE-

8. IBID., PP. 209-211.

9. IBID., P. 213.

10. HILSMAN, OP. CIT., P. 12.

VERSIBLE COURSE OF ACTION. HENCE, INCREMENTALISM ALLOWS THE DECISION-MAKERS TO DO SOMETHING AND AT THE SAME TIME BUY TIME - THIS EXPLAINS MUCH OF THE ZIG-ZAGS IN POLICY.

EVEN WHEN INFORMATION IS NOT LACKING, AND EVEN WHEN IT IS POSSIBLE TO PREDICT THE OUTCOME OF A GIVEN NUMBER OF ALTERNATIVES, INCREMENTALISM IS FOLLOWED. THE PROBLEM OF THE CAUSE IS THE BUREAUCRACY ITSELF.¹¹ IT IS OFTEN THE CASE THAT THE BUREAUCRACY DOES NOT AGREE WITHIN ITSELF AS TO WHAT IS THE BEST POLICY TO FOLLOW UNDER A GIVEN CIRCUMSTANCE. THE CAUSE OF DISAGREEMENT CAN RANGE FROM 'IDEOLOGICAL' AND/OR RATIONAL OBJECTION TO A GIVEN ALTERNATIVE, TO A MORE NARROWLY BASED OBJECTION ON THE GROUNDS OF "ORGANIZATIONAL ESSENCE."¹² YET IN MOST GENERAL CASES, THE AMERICAN POLICY-MAKING SYSTEM WORKS ON CONSENSUS. CONSENSUS, IN FACT, IS THE HEART OF THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS, AND IS NECESSARY FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH IS TO IMPLEMENT A GIVEN POLICY. IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A CONSENSUS, IT IS OFTEN NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE A DECISION AT THE HIGHEST COMMON AGREEMENT LEVEL THAT CAN BE OBTAINED. THUS, ON MANY OCCASIONS THERE IS A VERY MINIMAL CHANGE IN POLICY - OFTEN IT MAY LEAD TO A STAND-OFF. FOR EXAMPLE, THE BUREAUCRACY MAY AGREE THAT THERE IS A NEED FOR CHANGE, BUT NOT ON WHAT THE CHANGE SHOULD BE; IN ORDER TO GET AROUND THIS STALEMATE, IT MAY BE DECIDED TO MAKE A SMALL CHANGE IN ONE DIRECTION, SMALL ENOUGH TO ALLOW FOR A REVERSAL IF NECESSARY.¹³

11. HERE THE TERM BUREAUCRACY IS DEFINED IN ITS BROADEST SENSE TO INCLUDE THE POLITICIANS IN THE ADMINISTRATION, AND INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT.

12. MORTON M. HALPERIN, OP. CIT., DEFINES "ORGANIZATIONAL ESSENCE" AS "THE VIEW HELD BY THE DOMINANT GROUP IN THE ORGANIZATION OF WHAT THE MISSIONS AND CAPABILITIES SHOULD BE" (P. 9), WHERE HALPERIN ALSO POINTS OUT THAT BUREAUCRATS OFTEN FIND IT DIFFICULT TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONAL INTEREST AND NATIONAL INTEREST.

13. FOR A DISCUSSION OF CONSENSUS BUILDING, BRAGAINING, ETC. SEE HILSMAN, OP. CIT., AND HALPERIN, OP. CIT., PART 2.

SO FAR, WHAT HAS BEEN STATED ATTEMPTS TO NOTE SOME OF THE CAUSES OF INCREMENTALISM. YET NOTHING HAS BEEN SAID ABOUT WHY THERE IS A NEED FOR CHANGE, I.E. WHY SHOULD NOT THE OLD POLICY CONTINUE? THIS IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT GIVEN THE TENDENCY OF GOVERNMENTS NOT TO CHANGE POLICY BECAUSE OF THE DESIRE TO AVOID BUREAUCRATIC STRUGGLES ON POLICY. THE ANSWER TO THIS LIES IN THE NATURE OF FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING, WHICH IS GENERALLY REACTIVE. FOR AS FRANKEL POINTS OUT,

"MOST POLICIES ARE REACTIVE, FOLLOWING REAL OR IMAGINED STIMULI FROM THE ENVIRONMENT."¹⁴

THUS, THE REASON FOR A CHANGE IN INTEREST AND POLICY LIES IN ENVIRONMENT FROM WHERE THE STIMULUS ARISES. HOWEVER, THE ENVIRONMENT REFERS TO BOTH WITHIN THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS AND OUTSIDE, AND THUS STIMULUS CAN BE BUREAUCRATIC, DOMESTIC POLITICAL (E.G. LEGISLATIVE), FOREIGN AND/OR TECHNOLOGICAL. THEREFORE, TO SUPPORT A THESIS OF A CHANGE IN INTEREST AND POLICY, IT IS NECESSARY TO IDENTIFY THE STIMULI, AND SHOW HOW THEY AFFECT THE INTEREST(S) AND POLICY. IN SOME CASES, HOWEVER, IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO SUGGEST A CHANGE IN INTEREST WHEN THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE IN POLICY, SINCE IT IS NOT ALWAYS POSSIBLE TO LOCATE MATERIAL INDICATING A CHANGE IN INTEREST. THIS IS A PROBLEM IN ANY FOREIGN-POLICY STUDY, SINCE THE LEVEL OF SECRECY IS VERY HIGH.

THE FOREIGN ENVIRONMENT (I.E. OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY) IS AN AREA THAT GIVES RISE TO A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT STIMULI DUE TO THE NEAR ALL-ENDCOMPASSING NATURE OF THE CATEGORY. IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE CATEGORY INCLUDES

14. FRANKEL, OP. CIT., P. 26.

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AS A WHOLE, AND THEREFORE SYSTEMIC CHANGES PROVIDE STIMULI TO NATIONAL DECISION-MAKERS. THE KINDS OF CHANGES CAN BE IN TERMS OF THE CHANGING STATUS AND/OR PRESTIGE OF ACTORS WITHIN THE SYSTEM, OR THE CHANGE FROM A BIPOLAR TO A TRIPOLAR OR MULTIPOLAR WORLD. THE REASON FOR A CHANGE IN THE SYSTEM PROVIDING A STIMULUS IS, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE BREAK-UP OF A BIPOLAR WORLD INTO A MULTIPOLAR ONE NECESSITATES NOT ONLY THE ACTING AND REACTING TO TWO MAJOR POWERS, BUT RESPONDING TO THE PULLS AND PUSHES OF VARIOUS POWERS. IN TERMS OF THIS PAPER, IT WILL BE ARGUED THAT INDIA'S DECLINE IN PRESTIGE AFTER HER 1962 CONFLICT WITH CHINA WAS REFLECTED IN THE CHANGED PERCEPTION OF AMERICAN POLICY-MAKERS OF THE ROLE THAT INDIA WOULD HOLD IN THE INTERNATIONAL FIELD. IT SHALL ALSO BE ARGUED THAT THE EMERGENCE OF A MORE MULTIPOLAR WORLD DURING THE LATE 1960'S WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NIXON DOCTRINE, A DOCTRINE THAT ADVOCATED A BALANCE OF POWER SYSTEM WITH LITTLE ROLE FOR SMALL OR MEDIUM POWERS.

THE SECOND SUB-CATEGORY WOULD BE TERMED AS "OTHERS' POLICIES." THIS SUB-CATEGORY INCLUDES SPECIFIC POLICIES OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS TOWARDS A GIVEN COUNTRY, AS WELL AS THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THESE OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND/OR OTHER ORGANIZATIONS. OBVIOUSLY, NOT ALL INTERACTIONS IN THE WORLD ARE GOING TO ACT AS A STIMULUS TO POLICY-MAKERS OF A GIVEN COUNTRY, YET THIS SUB-CATEGORY PROBABLY REMAINS THE LARGEST SINGLE SOURCE OF STIMULI. IN TERMS OF A BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, AS IS BEING STUDIED HERE, THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT ONLY HAVE REACTED TO INDIA'S POLICY TOWARDS HER, BUT ALSO TO INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH AMERICA'S ALLIES AND ANTAGONISTS. ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT HERE IS THE QUESTION OF POSITIVE VERSUS

NEGATIVE INTERACTIONS. THE FORMER CAN ONLY BE MAINTAINED WHEN THERE IS A MINIMUM LEVEL OF RECIPROCITY, WHETHER IN PLATITUDES OR MORE CONCRETE TERMS, SINCE NEGATIVE INTERACTIONS ARISE WHEN THERE IS AN UNEVEN RELATIONSHIP IN WHICH ONE OF THE ACTORS IS GAINING MORE THAN THE OTHER. WITH REGARD TO THIS SUB-CATEGORY, IT SHALL BE ARGUED THAT THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION FELT THAT INDIA WAS NOT PROVIDING THE LEVEL OF SUPPORT TO AMERICAN POLICY IN VIETNAM THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN JUSTIFIED UNDER A RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIP. THIS BREAKDOWN OF A RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIP PROVIDED ANOTHER STIMULUS FOR A LOWERING OF AMERICAN INTEREST. SIMILARLY, IN ANOTHER CHAPTER IT SHALL BE ARGUED THAT THE GROWING INDO-SOVIET TIES HAD A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON AMERICAN POLICY-MAKERS.

• THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IS THE SECOND BROAD CATEGORY THAT PROVIDES STIMULUS FOR POLICY AND POLICY CHANGE. IN THIS CATEGORY THERE IS THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, INTEREST GROUPS AND THE PUBLIC. THUS, THIS CATEGORY IS EQUIVALENT TO HILSMAN'S OUTERMOST CONCENTRIC CIRCLE,¹⁵ THAT OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT ACTOR IN THIS CATEGORY IN THE UNITED STATES IS THE CONGRESS. FOR CONGRESS NOT ONLY PROVIDES STIMULI BY CRITICIZING OR DEMANDING CHANGE, IT CAN IN CERTAIN AREAS ACTUALLY CAUSE POLICY CHANGES. GIVEN CONGRESS' POWER TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS AS WELL AS MAKE LAWS, IT CAN INFLUENCE AND MAKE OR UNMAKE CERTAIN PARTICULAR POLICIES SUCH AS DEFENCE, FOREIGN AID, IMMIGRATION AND TRADE. WHAT IS MORE IMPORTANT IS THAT BY ITS POWERS IN SUCH FIELDS, CONGRESS (OR AT LEAST INFLUENTIAL CONGRESSMEN) CAN BARGAIN

15. HILSMAN, OP. CIT., P. 120.

WITH THE EXECUTIVE, THEREBY INFLUENCING POLICIES BEYOND THEIR DIRECT CONTROL BY THREATENING TO OPPOSE THE EXECUTIVE IN THOSE AREAS WHERE CONGRESS DOES HAVE POWER. IN CHAPTERS 5 AND 6, ARGUMENTS WILL BE PUT FORWARD TO SHOW THAT, (1) CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL OVER THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY IN VIETNAM LED TO CUTBACKS IN THE FOREIGN AID BUDGET; (2) THAT WHILE VIETNAM MAY HAVE BEEN THE CATALYST IN AID CUTBACKS, THE GROUNDWORK FOR SUCH CUTBACKS WAS LAID BY THE GROWING DISILLUSIONMENT WITH AID IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. THESE CUTBACKS IN THE OVERALL AID BUDGET WERE REFLECTED IN A DECLINE IN AID TO INDIA. SINCE AID WAS AN IMPORTANT INGREDIENT OF U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS, ITS DECLINE REFLECTED A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS HER AND OTHER DEVELOPING STATES, TO SOME EXTENT LAYING THE FRAMEWORK FOR NIXON'S 'SELF-HELP' PROPOSAL TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES.

ALL THESE STIMULI FOR A REAPPRAISAL OF POLICY DEPEND ON ONE SINGLE FACTOR, AND THAT IS THEIR PERCEPTION BY THE BEHOLDER. TO PUT IT ANOTHER WAY, COUNTRY X'S STATUS MAY BE RISING (DECLINING), BUT IF THIS IS NOT PERCEIVED BY THE DECISION-MAKERS IN COUNTRY Y, THEN THERE IS NO STIMULUS FOR CHANGE. THIS HOLDS TRUE FOR ANY OTHER CATEGORY. PERCEPTION IS ALSO LINKED TO THE AMOUNT AND THE KIND OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE. SINCE INFORMATION IS OFTEN A PROBLEM, THERE IS A TENDENCY TO REACT IN TERMS OF PAST EXPERIENCE.¹⁶ FURTHERMORE, THE DECISION-MAKER'S PERCEPTION IS AFFECTED BY THE IMAGES HE HAS. JERVIS NOTES THAT,

16. JOSEPH DERIVERA, PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY, MERILL, COLUMBUS, OHIO, 1968, P. 51.

"... DECISION-MAKERS TEND TO FIT INCOMING INFORMATION INTO THEIR EXISTING THEORIES AND IMAGES. INDEED, THEIR IMAGES PLAY A LARGE PART IN DETERMINING WHAT THEY NOTICE."¹⁷

FURTHERMORE, HE POINTS OUT THAT DECISION-MAKERS ARE "TOO WEDDED" TO THEIR VIEWS AND "TOO CLOSED TO NEW INFORMATION."¹⁸ THUS, HE FEELS THAT THE TENDENCY TO INCREMENTALISM IS INCREASED.¹⁹ TO CONCLUDE THIS BRIEF DISCUSSION ON PERCEPTION, WE NOTICE TWO POINTS: (1) THAT DECISION-MAKERS MAY NOT PERCEIVE OR MAY MISPERCEIVE WHAT IS HAPPENING, AND (2) THAT UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES MISPERCEPTION MAY LEAD TO INCREMENTALISM.

THERE IS ONE FINAL ISSUE THAT MUST BE MENTIONED BEFORE TURNING TO THE RELEVANCE OF THIS FRAMEWORK TO THE CASE-STUDY OF U.S. POLICY TOWARDS INDIA, AND THAT IS THE QUESTION OF TIME. ALMOST ALL STUDIES THAT DEAL WITH DECISION-MAKING, ESPECIALLY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, POINT OUT THE IMPORTANCE OF TIME.²⁰ PERHAPS IT WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE TO SAY THE LACK OF TIME: THAT IS, THAT DECISION-MAKERS HAVE A LIMITED AMOUNT OF TIME (AND ENERGY) TO DEAL WITH MATTERS. THUS, NOT EVERYTHING GOES TO THE TOP. MORE IMPORTANTLY, SINCE FOREIGN OFFICES TEND TO BE DIVIDED INTO REGIONS WITH PYRAMIDICAL STRUCTURE, THE HIGHER ONE GOES, THE LESS TIME AVAILABLE FOR A PARTICULAR COUNTRY, EXCEPT DURING CRISES. FURTHERMORE, SINCE SOME ISSUES CONSUME MORE TIME, OTHERS GET LESS ATTENTION OF POLICY. THUS, AS VIETNAM BEGAN TO DOMINATE THE TIME OF AMERICAN POLICY-MAKERS, INDIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES WERE SUBJECT TO LESS ATTENTION BY THESE

17. ROBERT JERVIS, "HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION", IN ROSENAU, OP. CIT., P. 240.

18. IBID., P. 242.

19. IBID., FOOTNOTE 21.

20. HALPERIN, OP. CIT., P. 120 AND HILSMAN, OP. CIT., P. 125.

INDIVIDUALS, RESULTING IN A DECLINE IN INTEREST AS VIETNAM BECAME A DOMINATING INTEREST.

IN THIS CHAPTER THE ARGUMENT HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD THAT THE POLICIES OF NATIONS ARE GUIDED IN TERMS OF INTERESTS, WHICH ARE OFTEN CONTRADICTORY. BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THE POLICY PROCESS, WHICH IS INCREMENTAL, THERE IS A TENDENCY TO AVOID CHANGING POLICY UNLESS THERE IS A CHANGE IN INTEREST(S). THESE CHANGES IN INTEREST ARE THE RESULT OF STIMULI EITHER FROM WITHIN OR OUTSIDE THE POLICY-MAKING GROUP. IN TERMS OF U.S. POLICY TOWARDS INDIA, TWO CATEGORIES OF STIMULI ARE IDENTIFIED - FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC/POLITICAL. THE PURPOSE OF THE REMAINDER OF THIS PAPER IS TO TRY TO SHOW HOW THESE STIMULI AFFECTED AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS INDIA.

CHAPTER 3UNITED STATES, INDIA & THE WORLD 1945-60

IN UNDERTAKING A STUDY WITH A GIVEN OR POSITIVE TIME FRAME, THERE IS A PROBLEM OF OPERATING IN A VACUUM, FOR IT IGNORES WHAT HAPPENED BEFORE AND AFTER THAT PARTICULAR PERIOD. SUCH AN APPROACH CAN LEAD TO EITHER IGNORING OR NOT RECOGNIZING CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS; FOR INSTANCE, IF ONE ATTEMPTED TO EXPLAIN AMERICAN POLICY IN VIETNAM IN THE 1960'S WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECT OF THE 1950'S ON THE THINKING OF AMERICANS, THE RESULT WOULD BE MOST UNSATISFYING. IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO REACH THE SAME CONCLUSION, THAT IS THAT VIETNAM WAS THE RESULT OF BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS, BUT IT WOULD NOT EXPLAIN WHY THE ENVIRONMENT WITHIN WHICH THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS TOOK PLACE WAS WHAT IT WAS. SIMILARLY, TO UNDERSTAND AMERICAN-INDIAN RELATIONS IN THE 1960'S, IT IS NECESSARY TO EXAMINE BRIEFLY NOT ONLY THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS, BUT THE GENERAL CONTEXT IN WHICH IT TOOK PLACE. THUS, THIS CHAPTER BRIEFLY ATTEMPTS TO RECOUNT SOME OF THE MORE NOTEWORTHY EVENTS OF THE POST-WAR PERIOD BOTH IN THE WORLD AT LARGE AS WELL AS IN U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS. THERE WILL ALSO BE A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF INDO-SOVIET AND SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS, AND INDIA'S POSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM DURING THE 1950'S.

THE POST-WAR WORLD WAS A COMPLETE CHANGE FROM WHAT PRECEDED IT IN THE CENTURY AND A HALF SINCE THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA. IT MARKED THE END OF THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPE IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE WORLD. FAR MORE THAN THE PEACE OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR, WHICH RECOGNIZED NATIONALISM IN EUROPE, THE SECOND WORLD WAR ACTED AS A CATALYST TO NATIONALISM IN AFRICA AND

ASIA. THESE FORCES PITTED THEMSELVES AGAINST THE DEVASTATED POWER OF THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE TWO DOMINANT POWERS IN THE WORLD, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, DRIFTED INTO A STATE OF ANTAGONISM, WHICH AGAIN THREATENED THE PEACE OF THE WORLD. THIS STEADY WORSENING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION INSURED THAT AMERICA DID NOT RETREAT INTO ITS PRE-WAR ISOLATIONISM AS IT HAD DONE AFTER THE GREAT WAR. FINALLY, THE WORLD HAD MOVED INTO THE NUCLEAR AGE, THUS RAISING NEW HOPES AND FEARS.

IN THE EARLY POST-WAR YEARS, AMERICAN POLICY-MAKERS WERE DOMINATED BY ISSUES IN EUROPE, NAMELY THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF COMMUNISM WITH THE AID OF THE SOVIET UNION.¹ TO THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION HAD BETRAYED ITS WARTIME ALLIES BY FAILING TO ABIDE BY THE YALTA AGREEMENT. THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION BELIEVED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS OUT TO UNDERMINE THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES IN WHATEVER WAY IT COULD, SO THAT EVENTUALLY COMMUNISM WOULD DOMINATE THE WORLD. EVENTS IN POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GREECE, TURKEY, FRANCE AND ITALY, TO NAME A FEW, SEEMED TO LEND EVIDENCE TO SUCH A VIEW OF SOVIET POLICY. IT WAS AT THIS STAGE THAT THE "X" ARTICLE PUT FORWARD THE NOTION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS STILL BEING RULED BY REVOLUTIONARIES, AND THAT UNTIL THEY PASSED AWAY THERE WAS NO HOPE OF THE SOVIET UNION GIVING UP ITS EXPANSIONIST AIMS.

1. THIS PAPER DOES NOT INTEND TO GO INTO THE POLEMICS OF WHO STARTED THE COLD WAR, WHETHER OR NOT ANY AGREEMENTS WERE BROKEN, ETC. WHAT IS BEING NOTED HERE IS THE WAY IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES, OR FOR THAT MATTER, MOST WESTERN LEADERS INTERPRETED THE EVENTS THAT FOLLOWED THE SECOND WORLD WAR. FOR MORE INFORMATION ON THE COLD WAR, SEE WALTER LAFEVER, AMERICA, RUSSIA & THE COLD WAR, 1945-1966, WILEY, NEW YORK, 1967, STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, RISE TO GLOBALISM, PENGUIN, BALTIMORE, 1971, AND ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, "THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR", FOREIGN AFFAIRS, VOL. 46, NO. 1.

ARTICLE X CONTENDED THAT THE POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO FOLLOW WAS TO 'CONTAIN' THE SOVIETS UNTIL A MORE REALISTIC AND TECHNOCRATIC (I.E. LESS REVOLUTIONARY) LEADERSHIP REPLACED THE EXISTING ONE.²

IT WAS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THAT IT COULD NO LONGER MEET HER COMMITMENTS IN GREECE AND TURKEY. THIS ACTED AS A CATALYST TO THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION³ TO ACT IN SOME WAY TO STOP THE GROWING COMMUNIST POWER IN EUROPE AND TO TRY TO RECTIFY THE SITUATION AS FAR AS POSSIBLE. THIS FOLLOWED THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOON AFTER IT THE MARSHALL PLAN (MARCH AND JULY 1947). THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE ASSURED AMERICAN SUPPORT IN TERMS OF MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC TO ANY COUNTRY THREATENED BY COMMUNISM, AND THUS JUSTIFIED THE MARSHALL PLAN WHICH ENTAILED A HEAVY DOSE OF ECONOMIC AID TO A DEVASTATED EUROPE.

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND OF CONTAINING COMMUNISM IN EUROPE THROUGH RECONSTRUCTION, AMERICAN POLICY-MAKERS DID NOT HAVE MUCH TIME TO CONCERN THEMSELVES WITH ASIA IN GENERAL, AND THE NEWLY EMERGENT NATIONS OF SOUTH ASIA IN PARTICULAR, FURTHERMORE, AMERICAN POLICY-MAKERS DID NOT APPROVE OF INDIA'S NON-ALIGNED STAND. TO THEM,

"INDIA'S GOVERNMENT BETRAYED ITS DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL HERITAGE, REFUSED TO FACE THE CHALLENGES OF THE REAL WORLD OF POWER, AND KNOWINGLY INCREASED THE PRESTIGE OF 'INTER-

2. X, "THE SOURCES OF SOVIET CONDUCT", FOREIGN AFFAIRS, VOL. No. 4, PP. 566-82. THIS, AT LEAST WAS THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN TO THE ARTICLE. FOR KENNAN'S VIEW OF THE ARTICLE AND HIS ARGUMENT IT BEING MISINTERPRETED AND MISUSED BY U.S. POLICY-MAKERS SEE "IN WITH GEORGE KENNAN" IN ROBERT W. TUCKER & WILLIAM WATTS (ED.), CONTAINMENT, POTOMAC, WASHINGTON, D.C., 1973, PP. 3-16.

3. IT CAN BE ARGUED AND HAS BEEN, THAT GREECE AND T¹ EXCUSE THAT THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION HAD BEEN WAITING FOR A POLICY OF CONTAINMENT. SEE AMBROSE, OP. CIT., P. 145.

INT. SEC.
FOR THE
COUNCIL

NATIONAL COMMUNISM" BY REFUSING TO ALIGN ITSELF WITH WESTERN POLICIES AND BY FREQUENTLY CRITICIZING THE U.S."⁴

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA'S MOST ABHORRENT ACT, TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, WAS HER QUICK RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA.

YET, WHILE THIS MAY EXPLAIN SOME OF THE LACK OF A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THESE TWO COUNTRIES DURING THE PRE-KOREAN WAR DAYS, THERE WERE OTHERS. INDIA ITSELF WAS CAUGHT UP IN THE TURMOIL THAT FOLLOWED PARTITION; ON THE ONE HAND, THERE WERE THE PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES, ON THE OTHER OF CENTRIFUGAL FORCES WORKING FROM THE OUTSET TO UNDERMINE THE NEW NATION. CONFLICT WITH PAKISTAN OVER KASHMIR HEIGHTENED THE SITUATION IN THE REGION FOR INDIAN POLICY-MAKERS AND GAVE THEM LESS TIME TO PAY ATTENTION TO THE WORLD AT LARGE. THE LITTLE TIME THERE WAS, WAS SPENT MORE SATISFACTORILY ON COLONIAL ISSUES SUCH AS INDONESIA, THAN ON THE FARAWAY PROBLEMS OF EUROPE. THE COLD WAR WAS NOT SOMETHING THAT INDIANS COULD UNDERSTAND VERY WELL, OR CARED TO LEARN ABOUT. TO INDIANS, THE ONLY IMPLICATION OF THE COLD WAR WAS TO TRY TO KEEP OUT OF EITHER CAMP, SINCE JOINING A CAMP WOULD MEAN A LOSS OF INDEPENDENCE, AND THAT WAS AN UNWELCOME THOUGHT IN A NEWLY INDEPENDENT NATION.

THERE IS PERHAPS ANOTHER REASON FOR THE LACK OF BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND THIS IS IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION. DONALD SECREST ARGUES THAT THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE WAS NOT THE GUIDING LIGHT FOR THAT ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY, BUT THE "MISSING COMPONENT" DOCTRINE.⁵ THE "MISSING COMPONENT" DOCTRINE PROPOUNDED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD HELP

4. CHARLES H. HEIMBATH AND SUBJIT MANBINGH, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF MODERN INDIA, ALLIED PUBLISHERS, CALCUTTA, 1991, P. 351.

5. DONALD SECREST, AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD NEUTRALISM DURING THE TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN (UNPUBLISHED PH.D. DISSERTATION) 1967, PP. 19-23.

COUNTRIES WHERE IT COULD PROVIDE THE ONE COMPONENT THAT WAS MISSING IN MAKING THAT STATE STABLE. THUS, IN TERMS OF WESTERN EUROPE, THE COUNTRIES HAD DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOVERNMENTS HAD THE LOYALTY OF THE PEOPLE, THE PEOPLE HAD THE NECESSARY SKILLS, ALL THAT WAS NEEDED WAS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO REBUILD THE INDUSTRIES. HENCE, THE MARSHALL PLAN.

"BASED ON THE TYPE OF PRAGMATIC CALCULATIONS THAT WEIGH HEAVILY IN THE FORMULATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES, INDIA (EVEN AS AN ALLIED NATION) DID NOT QUALIFY ON ANY GROUNDS FOR FAVOURABLE AID POLICIES. IN TERMS OF THE CRITERIA OF RELATIVE POWER POTENTIAL AND COMMUNIST PRESSURES, INDIA'S IMMEDIATE NEEDS ... (WERE) ... MINOR COMPARED TO THOSE OF MANY OTHER NATIONS."⁶

IF ONE ADDS THE FACT THAT INDIA WAS NOT AN ALLY, AND WAS CRITICIZING THE WEST, IT PERHAPS BECOMES CLEARER WHY THERE WERE NO MAJOR AID FLOWS. SINCE AID WAS, AT THAT TIME, THE MAJOR INGREDIENT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, INDIA WAS NOT VERY IMPORTANT. NOT THAT INDIA WAS ALONE IN THIS POSITION OF NOT BEING VERY RELEVANT, MOST OF ASIA WAS IGNORED.

TWO EVENTS CHANGED THIS AMERICAN INDIFFERENCE TO THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN ASIA. THEY WERE THE "FALL OF CHINA", AND THE INVASION OF SOUTH KOREA FROM THE NORTH. IN FACT, THE FIRST MAY HAVE INFLUENCED THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE TO THE SECOND, IN THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD BEEN ACCUSED OF "LOSING" CHINA THROUGH A DELIBERATE POLICY OF NEGLECT, HOWEVER BENIGN IT MAY HAVE BEEN. THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL COSTS OF NOT SHORING UP THE NATIONALISTS WERE, FOR THE ADMINISTRATION, HEAVY, FOR CHINA HAD ALWAYS HELD A SPECIAL PLACE IN AMERICAN EMOTIONS - IT WAS

6. IBID., P. 35.

THE ORIENT, THE ONLY PART OF ASIA THAT AMERICANS HAD HAD REAL CONTACT WITH, EXCEPT THE PHILIPPINES. THE 'ASIA-FIRSTERS' OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND MILLIONS OF AMERICANS BELIEVED THAT CHINA COULD HAVE BEEN SAVED, BUT THAT THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION HAD REFUSED TO INVOLVE ITSELF IN THE CIVIL WAR SINCE "THIS WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE EUROPEAN ORIENTATION OF HIS ADMINISTRATION" ⁷ YET IT GAVE RISE TO MCCARTHYISM, AND HENCE, MAKING THE LOSS OF SOUTH KOREA A MAJOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL LIABILITY THAT THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION WAS UNWILLING TO ENTAIL. THE RESULTANT AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN KOREA BROUGHT THE COLD WAR TO ASIA.

THE KOREAN WAR WAS IMPORTANT FOR INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY, FOR IT ALLOWED HER TO ACTIVELY PURSUE NON-ALIGNMENT. (THIS IS IN SPITE OF HER INITIAL SUPPORT FOR U.N. ACTION.) UNTIL THE OUTBREAK OF THE KOREAN WAR, INDIA HAD BEEN UNABLE TO CONVINCE THE SOVIET UNION THAT IN SPITE OF HER ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LINK ⁸ WITH THE WEST, INDIA WAS NON-ALIGNED.

"MOSCOW HAD LITTLE REGARD FOR THE NEHRU GOVERNMENT WHICH HAD ALLEGEDLY PERMITTED INDIA TO BE DRAWN TOWARD THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SPHERE." ⁹

THIS COMES OUT EVEN MORE CLEARLY IN THE ACTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (CPI) IN GOING INTO OPEN INSURRECTION IN HYDERABAD. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA'S ACTIONS VIS-A-VIS CHINA (RECOGNIZING HER), AND CRITICISM AND LACK OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA'S SUPPORT FOR WESTERN

7. AMBROSE, OP. CIT., P. 193.

8. POLITICAL LINKS NOT IN TERMS OF ALLIANCES, BUT STRUCTURE AND FORM OF GOVERNMENT, IDEALS, ETC.

9. ARTHUR STEIN, INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, CHICAGO, 1969, P. 10. IT IS INTERESTING TO COMPARE AMERICAN AND SOVIET VIEWS OF INDIA IN PRE-KOREA DAYS IN THAT BOTH THOUGHT INDIA WAS AIDING THE OTHER.

POSITION ON KOREA, HELPED ALLAY SOVIET SUSPICIONS AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT BEGAN TO PAY MORE ATTENTION TO INDIA AND IN PARTICULAR INDIAN DIPLOMATS. IN FACT, RADHAKRISHNAN AS INDIA'S AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW, WAS ONE OF THE FEW NON-COMMUNIST AMBASSADORS TO MEET STALIN.¹⁰ NEEDLESS TO SAY, THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION DID NOT LIKE CRITICISM AND VIEWED NON-ALIGNMENT WITH HEIGHTENING REPUGNANCE.

THE REPERCUSSIONS OF KOREA ON U.S. POLICY IN ASIA WERE NOT LONG IN COMING. THE REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATION THAT TOOK OFFICE IN 1953, SUFFERED FROM "PACTOMANIA." THEY CARRIED CONTAINMENT TO ITS LOGICAL EXTREME BY TRYING TO ALLY EVERY COUNTRY ON THE PERIPHERY OF COMMUNIST STATES TO EACH OTHER AND TO HERSELF. IN ALL FAIRNESS TO THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION, THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION HAD PUT FEELERS OUT BEFORE LEAVING OFFICE, BOTH TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA.¹¹ IN SOUTH ASIA IN MID-1952 THERE WAS AN ATTEMPT TO GIVE ARMS AID TO PAKISTAN, HOWEVER OPPOSITION FROM U.S. AMBASSADOR BOWLES IN NEW DELHI AND KENNAN IN WASHINGTON MANAGED TO HALT THAT DEAL.¹² THE REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATION MADE UP FOR LOST TIME, AND TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS (U.S. AND PAKISTAN) ON ALLIANCE, INCLUDING ARMS AID, BEGAN. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA RESPONSE TO RUMORS ABOUT AN IMPENDING DEAL LED TO A GREAT DEAL OF ANNOYANCE, THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA JOINED IN, IN DERIDING AMERICAN INTERVENTION AND ALLIANCE BUILDING. THE SUPPORT OF COMMUNIST STATES DID NOT HELP INDIA'S POSITION,

10. IBID., PP. 27-31 FOR CHANGING SOVIET VIEW ON INDIA.

11. WILLIAM J. SARNOB, INDIA, PAKISTAN AND THE GREAT POWER, FALL HALL PRESS, 1972, PP. 86-87 AND 92.

12. IBID., P. 92.

SINCE IT GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT INDIAN NEUTRALITY WAS CLOSE TO COMMUNISM. HOWEVER, THERE WAS A DELAY BEFORE THE U.S. WENT AHEAD WITH THE DEAL. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS THE U.S. WENT FORWARD, SINCE IT FELT

"THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO BOW OUT OF THE PROGRAM WOULD STRENGTHEN DECENTRALISM THROUGHOUT. ASIA ... (AND) ... THAT ANY BACKING DOWN AT THIS POINT WOULD AMOUNT TO LETTING NEHRU CONTROL AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY."¹³

EISENHOWER DID TRY AND SWEETEN THE BLOW BY WRITING A LETTER TO NEHRU, THE LATTER, HOWEVER, REMAINED UNSOOTHED OVER THE FACT THAT THE COLD WAR HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO HIS DOORSTEP.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S REASONING BEHIND SUCH A MOVE BECOMES CLEARER BY THE EVENTS THAT FOLLOWS, I.E. THE BAGHDAD PACT AND SEATO. DULLES BELIEVED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO CONTAIN THE SOVIETS WAS TO BUILD A CHAIN OF ALLIED STATES AROUND IT. IN DULLESIAN THINKING, NEUTRALITY OR NON-ALIGNMENT DID NOT HAVE A ROLE, BOTH WERE "IMMORAL" AND "BAD."¹⁴ (PERHAPS THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM IN U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS IN THE MID-FIFTIES, LAY IN THE FACT THAT BOTH DULLES AND NEHRU APPROACHED INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WITH A VERY MORALISTIC APPROACH, EACH BEING CONVINCED OF THE RIGHTEOUSNESS OF HIS COURSE.) THUS, DULLES WAS QUITE WILLING TO SACRIFICE BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH INDIA FOR THE SAKE OF HIS GOAL.

FOR THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT, THE SPREAD OF A U.S. ALLIANCE SYSTEM

13. *IBID.*, P. 96. MOST OF THIS SECTION HAS BEEN TAKEN FROM BARROS, PP. 91-100.

14. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT NEUTRALITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT ARE TWO DIFFERENT THINGS. IN A STATE OF NEUTRALITY, ONE AVOIDS TAKING SIDES ON ANY ISSUE. IN NON-ALIGNMENT, ONE DOES NOT JOIN ANY GROUP, BUT KEEPS THE OPTIONS OPEN ON SPECIFIC QUESTIONS. THIS DISTINCTION SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN LOST ON U.S. POLICY-MAKERS.

TO HER OWN BORDERS WAS MOST DISHEARTENING. IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE INDIANS DID NOT TRUST THE PAKISTANIS, AND BELIEVED THAT THEY HAD DUPED THE WEST IN PROVIDING ARMS FOR HER (THE WEST'S) OWN INTEREST, WHERE THEY WERE ACTUALLY TO PAKISTAN'S. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA 'KNEW' THAT THE PAKISTANIS WOULD USE THESE ARMS AGAINST THEM. THUS, THE SECOND REASON WAS THAT INDIA WOULD HAVE TO INCREASE HER DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AT A TIME WHEN SHE NEEDED HER SCARCE RESOURCES FOR THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN. THIRDLY, NEHRU WAS NOT KEEN ON OUTSIDE POWERS INVOLVING THEMSELVES IN ASIA. THE HISTORY OF BRITISH CONQUEST OF INDIA PERHAPS HAS MUCH TO DO WITH THIS, SINCE THE EAST INDIA COMPANY'S INITIAL GAINS CAME AS ALLIES OF WARRING PARTIES. BE THAT AS IT MAY, NEHRU DID NOT LIKE, NOR THINK THAT THE COLD WAR WAS RELEVANT TO ASIA.

WHATEVER THE REASONS INVOLVED,¹⁵ THE QUESTION OF U.S.-PAKISTAN LINK HAS PROVED TO BE A STUMBLING BLOCK IN U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS UP TO THE PRESENT DAY. IN THE FIFTIES, THE SIGNING OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN ALLIANCE WAS THE LOW POINT IN INDO-U.S. RELATIONS; A NUMBER OF OTHER EVENTS HELPED KEEP RELATIONS AT THAT LEVEL. IN 1954, DULLES EFFECTIVELY STOPPED INDIA FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, WHICH THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT HAD DESIRED. THOUGH THIS DID NOT PRECLUDE KRISHNA MENON FROM BEING PRESENT IN BACKROOM NEGOTIATIONS. INDIA WAS ALSO TO GET THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE I.C.C. IN 1956, NEHRU'S MILD CRITICISM OF

15. IN RETROSPECT, PERHAPS HE WAS GLAD THAT THE U.S. ALLIANCE DID COME, SINCE IT DID MEAN SOME IMPROVEMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES AND CERTAINLY MORE AID AFTER THE SOVIETS BEGAN THEIR INITIATIVE. FOR A MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF INDIAN AND AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PAKISTAN ALLIANCE QUESTION, SEE PHILIP TALBOT AND S.L. POPLAI, INDIA AND AMERICA, HARPER & BROTHERS, NEW YORK 1956, PP. 86-94.

SOVIET POLICY IN HUNGARY, WHEN COMPARED TO HIS CRITICISM OF ANGLO-FRENCH ACTION OVER SUEZ, WAS NOT APPRECIATED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. IT ADDED TO THE IMPRESSION THAT INDIAN NON-ALIGNMENT WAS PRO-SOVIET.

WHILE INDIA WAS NOT PRO-SOVIET, IT IS HARD TO DENY THAT PERHAPS SOME OF THE SOVIET WORKING OF THE TWO YEARS PRECEDING THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION HAD PAID OFF. THE SOVIET 'OFFENSIVE' TOWARDS INDIA FOLLOWED A COUPLE OF YEARS OF IMPROVING RELATIONS. KOREA HAD PROVED INDIA'S NEUTRALITY, THE IMPROVING SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS HAD CULMINATED IN THE PANCH SHEEL, THE SOVIET UNION IN 1951 HAD GIVEN INDIA 50,000 TONS OF WHEAT. IN 1953, MALENKOV HAD SPOKEN OF IMPROVING SOVIET-INDIAN RELATIONS, AND IN 1954 HAD TRIED TO GET INDIA ON TO ALL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TABLES, INCLUDING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. (BOTH TIMES THE U.S. REJECTED INDIA'S PARTICIPATION.) IN LATE 1954, THE SOVIETS OFFERED TO BUILD A STEEL MILL IN INDIA; AN AGREEMENT TO SUCH AN EFFECT WAS SIGNED IN 1955. EVEN THE C.P.I. WAS MADE TO CHANGE ITS STAND ON THE CONGRESS AND NEHRU'S FOREIGN POLICY.

"THE GOAL OF THE SOVIETS IN THESE GESTURES SEEMINGLY WAS TO REINFORCE INDIAN NON-ALIGNMENT IN THE COLD WAR WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT IN THE FUTURE INDIAN SUPPORT MIGHT BE ENLISTED FOR SOVIET POLICY."¹⁶

THE AMERICAN-CREATED ALLIANCE SYSTEM ALL BUT SURROUNDED THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA. THERE WERE, HOWEVER, THREE CHINKS IN THIS WESTERN ARMOUR AND

16. STEIN, OP. CIT., P. 46. THIS SECTION OF SOVIET POLICY RELIES HEAVILY ON STEIN AND JARNDT, CHAPTER 6. FOR AN INTERESTING TREATMENT OF THE WAY THAT THE SOVIETS DEALT WITH PROBLEMS ARISING OUT OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA VIS A VIS MARXISM, SEE STEPHEN CLARKSON, "SOVIET THEORY AND INDIAN REALITY", IN PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, VOL. 16, NO. 1, PP. 11-12.

THE SOVIETS ATTEMPTED TO EXPLOIT EACH ONE. IN EGYPT THEY STEPPED IN TO BUILD THE ASWAN DAM, AND IN INDONESIA AND INDIA THE SOVIETS GAVE ECONOMIC AID AND POLITICAL SUPPORT. THE SOVIET "OFFENSIVE" COINCIDED WITH THE LACK OF WARMTH BETWEEN THESE THREE AFRO-ASIAN STATES AND THE U.S., THUS MAKING THE REALIZATION OF SOVIET POLICY THAT MUCH EASIER. IN INDIA, THE SOVIET UNION, BY PROVIDING A STEEL MILL AND BY HER GOVERNMENT CATEGORICALLY SUPPORTING INDIAN CLAIMS TO GOA AND KASHMIR, GAINED CONSIDERABLE PRESTIGE IN INDIA.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OBVIOUSLY FOUND A NEED TO RESPOND TO THE SOVIET INITIATIVES. FOR WHILE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MAY NOT HAVE PARTICULARLY CARED ABOUT INDIA, IT COULD HARDLY STAND AND WATCH THE COUNTRY COMING UNDER SOVIET INFLUENCE. THE RESPONSE OBVIOUSLY HAD TO BE IN KIND, I.E. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, SINCE THE NON-ALIGNED STATES WOULD NOT ACCEPT ALLIANCES. HOWEVER, THE NECESSITY FOR POLICY CHANGE WAS NOT ACCEPTED THAT EASILY, OR SO IT WOULD SEEM FROM THE MONTMOUTH OF CONFUSION THAT EXISTED ON THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION'S VIEW OF NEUTRALITY.¹⁷ IT BEGAN WITH EISENHOWER STATING THAT THERE WAS NOTHING WRONG WITH NEUTRALITY OR AIDING NEUTRALS. A FEW DAYS LATER, DULLES CAME OUT AND CONDEMNED NEUTRALITY AS IMMORAL. THIS WAS FOLLOWED UP BY DULLES ARGUING THAT THE AFRO-ASIAN STATES WERE NOT NEUTRALS, THEREFORE NOT IMMORAL. TO ADD TO THIS, NIXON TURNED AROUND AND STATED THAT COUNTRIES THAT CANNOT MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN FREE WORLD AND COMMUNIST STATES ARE IMMORAL. ALL THIS WOULD TEND TO SUGGEST THAT THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT AMONGST VARIOUS

17. THIS SECTION RELIES HEAVILY ON SECREST, OP. CIT., PP. 233-238.

BRANCHES OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND THAT THE SOVIET INITIATIVE HELPED CREATE A GREAT DEAL OF CONFUSION AMONGST A POLICY-MAKING GROUP THAT HAD TILL THEN VIEWED THE WORLD IN BLACK AND WHITE. THIS REFLECTS THE DIFFERING POSITIONS OF VARIOUS BUREAUCRATIC PLAYERS ON THIS ISSUE. NOR IS THIS KIND OF INSTANCE UNUSUAL IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. ULTIMATELY, A CONSENSUS SEEMS TO HAVE EMERGED WHICH LED TO LESS HOSTILITY TOWARDS NEUTRALS BY THE ADMINISTRATION.

IN 1956, OPPOSITION IN CONGRESS TO DULLES' POLICY ON NEUTRALITY WAS VOICED, ESPECIALLY BY THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATS WHO FELT THAT DULLES WAS

"INCAPABLE OF DEVISING NEW POLICIES WHICH COULD EFFECTIVELY COUNTER THE NEW SOVIET DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE IN ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST ... THOSE WHO ARGUED FOR NEW POLICIES FAVOURED ... POLICIES WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH GREATER RAPPORT WITH NEUTRAL-
IST GOVERNMENTS ... "18

THE RESULTS OF THIS INITIATIVE WERE POLICY REVIEWS ON AID CONDUCTED BY BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESS. THESE STUDIES LED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL LOAN FUND IN 1956 WHICH PROVIDED FOR MORE AID ON EASY TERMS TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. IT WAS HOPED THAT THIS PROGRAM WOULD BE EFFECTIVE IN MEETING THE SOVIET CHALLENGE. HOWEVER, CONGRESS DID ATTACH AMENDMENTS ON AID FOR PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND AGAINST PROVIDING AID FOR PUBLIC SECTOR ENTERPRISES IN THE THIRD WORLD. THE CHANGES IN AMERICAN PERCEPTION OF NON-ALIGNMENT, ESPECIALLY INDIAN, ARE REFLECTED IN THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE'S ATTEMPT TO ADD AN AMENDMENT TO THE MUTUAL

SECURITY ACT OF 1958 WHICH WOULD HAVE RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIAN DEMOCRACY AND INDIA'S DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, AND ENSURE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT PROVIDED SUFFICIENT AID. THIS ACTION WAS PARTLY IN RESPONSE TO THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE CRISIS THAT INDIA ENTERED IN 1957-58. WHILE THE AMENDMENT WAS DROPPED, BY 1959 INDIA WAS RECEIVING 28% OF ALL DLF FUNDS.¹⁹

AROUND THIS TIME SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS STARTED TO WORSEN, THE MAIN REASON BEING TIBET AND ITS BORDER WITH INDIA. SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS HAD BEEN A SOURCE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIA AND THE U.S. WHILE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAD CONSTANTLY WARNED ABOUT CHINESE AGGRESSIVENESS, THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAD, EARLY ON, DECIDED TO LIVE WITH CHINA. THUS, IT HAD BEEN AMONG THE FIRST TO RECOGNIZE THE COMMUNIST REGIME, AND IT HAD KEPT A LOW-KEY STAND ON CHINESE OCCUPATION OF TIBET IN 1950. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD IMPROVED DURING THE KOREAN WAR AND THE ERA THAT FOLLOWED IT WAS ONE OF GOOD RELATIONS SUPPOSEDLY GOVERNED BY PANCH SHEEL.²⁰ IN 1958 A NUMBER OF FACTORS STARTED TO COME TOGETHER WHICH AFFECTED SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS. THE FIRST WAS THE BEGINNING OF THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT, THOUGH THIS WAS NOT CLEAR AT THE TIME. THEN THERE WAS THE GROWING DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN DELHI AND PEKING AS TO WHERE THEIR BORDER WAS. FINALLY, THERE WAS TIBET, WHICH IN EARLY 1959 WAS UP IN REVOLT. ON THIS CHINA SUSPECTED SOME KIND OF INDIAN INVOLVEMENT; WHILE INDIA WAS CLEARLY SYMPATHETIC TO TIBETAN DESIRES, IT IS UNLIKELY

19. IBID., P. 251.

20. PANCH SHEEL IS THE 5 PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. THEY ARE: (1) RESPECT OF EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY, (2) NON-AGGRESSION, (3) NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, (4) EQUALITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT, (5) PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. BARNES, OP. CIT., P. 136.

THAT SHE WAS INVOLVED. FOLLOWING THE TIBETAN REVOLT, SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS QUICKLY BEGAN TO DETERIORATE, THE DISPUTE OVER THE BORDER BECAME PUBLIC.²¹ PERHAPS THE MOST INTERESTING ASPECT OF THIS GROWING CONFLICT WAS THE NEUTRALITY OF THE SOVIET UNION; IT WAS THE FIRST TIME THE SOVIET UNION HAD TAKEN SUCH A POSITION WHEN A COMMUNIST STATE WAS INVOLVED. THIS PERHAPS REFLECTED THE THEN INVISIBLE SPLIT BETWEEN THE USSR AND CHINA.

THERE WAS NO PUBLIC RESPONSE BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ON THE DEVELOPING FRICTION. YET U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS IMPROVED FROM A REALIZATION OF MUTUAL GROUND. EISENHOWER'S VISIT TO INDIA IN 1959 WAS WELL-GREETED IN INDIA AND SEEMED TO SET THE STAGE FOR GOOD RELATIONS IN THE COMING YEARS. UNOFFICIALLY, THE RESPONSE WAS DIFFERENT.

"... SOME AMERICANS WERE RUBBING THEIR HANDS WITH GLEE, AND ARE PROCLAIMING THAT SUDDENLY THE SCALES ARE FALLING FROM INDIANS' EYES ... NOW THEY REALIZE THAT ALL THAT WE SAID ABOUT THE DANGERS OF CHINA AND COMMUNISM ARE TRUE."²²

BUT THIS WAS NOT THE ONLY ASPECT OF CHINA AND INDIA THAT INTERESTED AMERICANS. KENNEDY BEST EXPRESSED THE PROBLEM WHEN HE STATED THAT CHINA AND INDIA WERE LOCKED IN A STRUGGLE "FOR THE LEADERSHIP OF THE EAST ... FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE WHOSE WAY OF LIFE IS BETTER," AND THAT WHOEVER WON THIS BATTLE WOULD DICTATE THE ROUTE WHICH THE REST OF THE THIRD WORLD WOULD FOLLOW.²³ CHINESE DEVELOPMENT DURING THE 1950'S

21. SEE BARNDT, OP. CIT., CHAPTER 7 AND HEINSATH AND MANSINGH, CHAPTERS VII AND VIII.

22. SELIG S. HARRISON (ED.) INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES, MC MILLAN, NEW YORK, 1961, P. 48.

23. KENNEDY'S SPEECH IN IBID., P. 63.

HAD SURPASSED THAT OF INDIA AND KENNEDY AND OTHERS WERE ADVOCATING A HEAVY INFUSION OF AMERICAN AID TO PUT INDIA OVER THE TOP.

THIS BRIEF SURVEY OF U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS IN THE FIRST DECADE AND A HALF AFTER THE WAR HAS SHOWN THAT THE RELATIONSHIP WAS BASICALLY ONE OF NON-AGREEMENT. THIS STEMMED FROM DIFFERING ASSUMPTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, COMMUNISM, AND WHAT WERE THE KEY ISSUES FOR THAT GENERATION. HOWEVER, THERE WERE AREA AGREEMENTS ON SUCH ISSUES AS SUEZ, COLONIALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS. BUT EVEN HERE THE TWO GOVERNMENTS DID NOT SEE EYE TO EYE ON THE TOOLS TO BE USED, AS WELL AS TIMING. UNTIL THE LAST FEW YEARS OF THE DECADE, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DID NOT LOOK FAVOURABLY UPON INDIAN POLICY AND MUCH OF HER INTERACTIONS WITH HER WERE NEGATIVE. THE SOVIET "OFFENSIVE", INDIA'S GROWING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, THE SINO-INDIAN RIFT AS WELL AS THE GROWING BELIEF THAT INDIA AND CHINA WERE THE KEY TO THE FUTURE OF ASIA, LED TO A CHANGING POLICY WHICH EVENTUALLY ACCORDED INDIA A MORE IMPORTANT PLACE IN THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE.

THIS CHANGE CAN BE SEEN IN THE FOLLOWING DISTRIBUTION:

AID TO INDIA
(IN DOLLARS MILLIONS)

1945-53 - \$253	1957 - \$187
1954 - 29	1958 - 243
1955 118	1959 - 320
1956 119	1960 - 521

THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ALSO FELT THAT INDIA WAS THE KEY TO SOUTH ASIA, WHEN IT STATED THAT:

"IN THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST WORLDS IN ITS ASIAN SETTING, INDIA PROVIDES ONE OF THE MORE CRITICAL AND SUBSTANTIAL CASES OF AN ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP ECONOMICALLY ... WITHIN ... A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER ... (ITS) ... FAILURE WOULD FACILITATE THE COLLAPSE OF OTHER NON-COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS IN ASIA ... "24

THE FINAL CONSIDERATION OF THIS CHAPTER IS WHAT WAS INDIA'S STATUS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM DURING THIS PERIOD. THIS IS A DIFFICULT QUESTION TO ANSWER SINCE THERE IS NO HARD AND FAST RULE TO JUDGE THIS BY. HOWEVER, A FEW POINTS SHOULD BE NOTED. FIRSTLY, INDIA PLAYED AN IMPORTANT PART IN THE U.N. THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD. IT WAS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE PROCEEDINGS OVER KOREA. IT WAS APPOINTED CHAIRMAN OF THE I.C.C. IN INDO-CHINA. DURING THIS PERIOD INDIA, ALONG WITH EGYPT AND YUGOSLAVIA, WERE THE LEADERS OF THE THIRD WORLD. THE SOVIET UNION, ALBEIT FOR ITS OWN REASONS, CONSIDERED IT VERY IMPORTANT. THE AMERICANS, BY ACTIVELY BLOCKING SOVIET AND COMMONWEALTH EFFORTS TO GET INDIA TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE TABLE MAY BE INTERPRETED AS A RECOGNITION OF ITS IMPORTANCE, EVEN THOUGH THE U.S. DID NOT APPRECIATE IT. HOWEVER, THIS CAN ALSO BE INTERPRETED AS AN ATTEMPT BY THE UNITED STATES TO KEEP OUT NATIONS THAT WERE UNIMPORTANT. INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION UNDOUBTEDLY HELPED RAISE HER PRESTIGE. THUS, IN CONCLUSION, WE CAN NOTE THAT OUTSIDE THE FOUR OR FIVE MAJOR POWERS, INDIA RANKED AS ONE OF THE MORE IMPORTANT COGS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.

24. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. SENATE, UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY. U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1961, P. 428.

THIS CHAPTER HAS PASSED OVER THE EVENTS OF THE POST-WAR PERIOD WITH A VERY BROAD BRUSH, THUS IGNORING MANY OCCURRENCES. IT IS, HOWEVER, HOPEFUL THAT THE CHAPTER HAS PROVIDED ENOUGH BACKGROUND AGAINST WHICH U.S. POLICY TOWARDS INDIA DURING THE POST-1960 PERIOD CAN BE DISCUSSED. IT IS TO THIS DISCUSSION THAT THE PAPER NOW TURNS, BEGINNING WITH INDIA'S CONFLICTS OF THE 1960's.

CHAPTER 4

INDIA'S CONFLICTS OF THE 1960's¹

THE NINETEEN SIXTIES SAW INDIA INVOLVED IN THREE CONFLICTS OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE, GOA, CHINA AND PAKISTAN BEING THE AREAS OF THIS CONFLICT. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES OF GOA AND WITH PAKISTAN ARE LEFT OVER FROM THE EARLY DAYS OF INDEPENDENCE. THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD ONLY ARISEN IN THE LATE FIFTIES, AND REACHED ITS PEAK IN THE AUTUMN OF 1962.² EACH OF THESE CONFLICTS WAS TO HAVE AN EFFECT ON U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS AND DOMINATED THEIR RELATIONS DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE SIXTIES. THE SINO-INDIAN AND INDO-PAK CONFLICTS CANNOT BE TOTALLY SEPARATED SINCE THE FORMER AFFECTED THE LATTER, ESPECIALLY IN TERMS OF THE WAY THE UNITED STATES ATTEMPTED TO DEAL WITH THE SOUTH ASIAN STATES. YET THE UNIQUE EFFECT OF EACH OF THESE CONFLICTS SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED. THIS CHAPTER INTENDS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT BOTH THE UNIQUE AND THE INTERRELATED CONSEQUENCES OF THESE CONFLICTS ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS INDIA. IN TERMS OF THEIR UNIQUENESS, THE INTENTION IS TO SHOW HOW INDIAN ACTION IN GOA DESTROYED ITS GANDHIAN IMAGE OF NON-VIOLENCE (TO AMERICANS) AND HIGHLIGHTED THE VICTORY OF "EUROPE-FIRSTERS" OVER "ASIAN-FIRSTERS" IN THE POLICY-MAKING STRUCTURE. THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT HELPED TO DESTROY INDIA'S IMAGE OF POWER, AND THUS LED TO A DECLINE IN THE STATUS OF INDIA, THUS CHANGING THE AMERICAN PERCEPTION OF INDIA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD. THE INDO-PAK CONFLICT BRINGS

1. THE TITLE OF THE CHAPTER IS NOT MEANT TO PASS JUDGEMENT ON WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONFLICTS.

2. THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT CAN ALSO BE SAID TO BE LEFT OVER FROM THE DAYS OF THE BRITISH RAJ SINCE THE CONFLICT INVOLVED THE INDO-TIBETAN BORDER WHICH HAD BEEN DEMARCATED DURING THE HEYDAY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE, BUT HAD NEVER BEEN RECOGNIZED BY GOVERNMENTS IN PEKING.

TO LIGHT SOME OF THE DIFFERING INTERESTS INVOLVED IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY-
MAKING, AS WELL AS THE GROWING DISSATISFACTION OF AMERICAN POLICY-MAKERS
WITH INDIA AND PAKISTAN'S FAILURE TO SETTLE THEIR DISPUTES.

OF THE THREE ~~DISPUTES~~/CONFLICTS THAT ARE BEING DISCUSSED, THE GOAN
CRISIS OF 1961 WAS THE LEAST SIGNIFICANT, AS WELL AS THE LEAST DESTRUCTIVE
IN TERMS OF HUMAN LIFE. GOA AND THE OTHER PORTUGUESE ENCLAVES IN INDIA
HAD BEEN THE SOURCE OF CONSTANT FRICTION BETWEEN INDIA AND PORTUGAL SINCE
INDIA'S INDEPENDENCE; THEY WERE ALSO A CAUSE OF FRICTION IN THE DOMESTIC
POLITICS OF INDIA WHERE THE CONGRESS PARTY WAS ACCUSED OF BEING TOO SOFT
ON THE ISSUE.³ BETWEEN 1955-61 ATTEMPTS AT SETTling THE DISPUTE PEACE-
FULLY ENDED AS NEITHER SIDE WAS WILLING TO COMPROMISE. THE PORTUGUESE
ARGUMENT THAT ALL HER FOREIGN TERRITORIES WERE AN INTEGRAL PART OF
PORTUGAL DOOMED ANY CHANCE OF COMPROMISE. MEANWHILE, THE INDIAN GOVERN-
MENT BEGAN FACING INCREASING DOMESTIC PRESSURE IN AN ELECTION YEAR.
THERE WAS ALSO CRITICISM FROM AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES WHICH BEGAN TO PORTRAY
INDIA AS A STATUS QUO POWER. IT WAS AGAINST THIS POTPOURRI OF PREASURE
THAT THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT DECIDED TO TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION TO
INTEGRATE THE PORTUGUESE ENCLAVES IN INDIA IN DECEMBER OF 1961.

"INDIA AND INDIA ALONE WAS IN A POSITION TO
FIND A VIRTUALLY BLOODLESS SOLUTION IN GOA
WHILE AT THE SAME TIME DIRECTLY AFFECTING THE
COURSE OF EVENTS IN ... AFRICA. UNDER THESE
VARIED COMPULSIONS, FOR INDIA TO FAIL TO ACT
COULD HAVE LED TO DEVELOPMENTS WHICH WOULD ...
DANGEROUSLY JEOPARDIZE INDIAN UNITY."⁴

THE RESPONSE OF THE WORLD TO INDIA'S ANNEXING THE PORTUGUESE

3. HEIMBATH AND MANSINGH, OP. CIT., P. 327. THEY GAVE A GOOD
DISCUSSION ON THE BACKGROUND OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THE INDIAN TAKEOVER OF
GOA IN 1961, PP. 324-333. ALSO SEE MARGARET H. FISHER, "GOA IN A WIDER
PERSPECTIVE", ASIAN SURVEY, 2, No. 2, PP. 3-10.

4. FISHER, OP. CIT., P. 10.

ENCLAVES WAS EXTREMELY DIVIDED, FROM VERY FAVOURABLE AMONGST AFRO-ASIAN AND COMMUNIST COUNTRIES (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CHINA AND PAKISTAN) TO SEVERE CRITICISM FROM THE WESTERN NATIONS. TO THE FORMER GROUP IT WAS A GREAT BLOW AGAINST COLONIALISM, AND THEREFORE AGAINST THE WEST. THE WEST FACED THE CRISIS WITH A DIFFERENT FORM OF REASONING, ARGUING THAT THE USE OF ARMED FORCE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A NATIONAL GOAL WAS AGAINST THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS. THE AMERICANS, THROUGH ADLAI STEVENSON, PUT FORWARD THEIR FEELINGS BY STATING THAT,

"WHEN ACTS OF VIOLENCE TAKE PLACE BETWEEN NATIONS IN THIS DANGEROUS WORLD ... THERE IS REASON FOR ALARM ... LET US BE PERFECTLY CLEAR WHAT IS AT STAKE HERE, GENTLEMEN. IT IS THE QUESTION OF THE USE OF ARMED FORCE BY ONE STATE AGAINST ANOTHER AND AGAINST ITS WILL, AN ACT CLEARLY FORBIDDEN BY THE CHARTER (U.N. CHARTER)."⁵

AND FURTHERMORE, THAT

"PRIME MINISTER NEHRU HIMSELF HAS OFTEN SAID THAT NO RIGHT END CAN BE SERVED BY A WRONG MEANS. THE INDIAN TRADITION OF NONVIOLENCE HAS INSPIRED THE WHOLE WORLD, BUT THIS ACT OF FORCE WITH WHICH WE ARE CONFRONTED TODAY MOCKS THE FAITH OF INDIA'S FREQUENT DECLARATIONS OF EXALTED PRINCIPLE."⁶

AND FINALLY, WHEN THE SOVIET UNION VETOED AN AMERICAN SPONSORED CONDEMNATION OF INDIA AND CALLING FOR HER WITHDRAWAL, STEVENSON COMPARED THIS ACTION TO THE FAILURE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO ACT ON THE ITALIAN INVASION OF ETHIOPIA, AND STATED THAT "TONIGHT WE ARE WITNESSING THE FIRST ACT IN DRAMA WHICH COULD END WITH ITS (U.N.'S) DEATH."⁷

5. UNITED STATES' VIEWS ON THE INVASION OF GOA BY INDIA: STATEMENT MADE BY U.S. REPRESENTATIVE (STEVENSON) IN THE U.S. SECURITY COUNCIL, DECEMBER 18, 1961, IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, CURRENT DOCUMENTS, 1961, DOCUMENT NO. 470, PP. 956-7.

6. IBID., P. 958.

7. IBID., P. 959. FOOTNOTE.

THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE INVASION OF GOA CAUGHT THE INDIANS BY SURPRISE. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAD EXPECTED AMERICAN SUPPORT, BUT THAT THE VEHEMENCE OF THE CRITICISM SEEMED EXTREME. TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THERE WERE FOUR FACTORS INVOLVED IN THEIR RESPONSE. THE FIRST TWO WERE NOTED BY ADLAI STEVENSON (1) THE UNITED STATES CONDEMNED THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND SPECIFICALLY IN MINOR DISPUTES,⁸ AND (2) THAT THE INDIAN INVASION HAD SHOCKED AMERICANS, BOTH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS; THE AMERICANS HAD EXPECTED A KIND OF HIGHER MORALITY FROM THE NATION OF GANDHI WHICH HAD SPENT THE DECADE OR SO OF HER INDEPENDENCE MORALISING TO THE WORLD ON THE HIGH VIRTUES OF NON-VIOLENCE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.⁹ THE THIRD FACTOR INVOLVED IS SOMETHING THAT ADLAI STEVENSON DOES NOT BRING UP EXPLICITLY, AND THAT IS THE DIFFERING INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. THE POINT IS THAT INTERNATIONAL LAW AS IT WAS UNDERSTOOD, PROTECTED THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS TO HAVE COLONIES, THUS UPHOLDING THE STATUS QUO. THE INDIAN ARGUMENT WAS THAT ANTI-COLONIALISM WAS A LAW UNTO ITSELF AND SUPERCEDED ANYTHING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT WENT AGAINST IT. THUS, THE AMERICAN POSITION THAT AGGRESSION VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDLESS OF THE REASONS BEHIND IT, WAS CLEARLY AGAINST THE INDIAN

8. THAT IS THAT THE UNITED STATES OBJECTED TO THE USE OF FORCE BY ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT - EXCEPT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT - OTHERWISE HOW COULD IT THEN HAVE JUSTIFIED LEBANON AND THE DAY OF PIGS.

9. IT MAY BE POSSIBLE THAT WHILE AMERICANS NEVER ACCEPTED INDIAN CRITICISM, AMERICANS MAY HAVE FELT THAT INDIA WAS PURSUING A COURSE OF ACTION (NON-VIOLENT) THAT THEY THEMSELVES WOULD HAVE PREFERRED HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES. THUS THE INDIAN APPROACH MAY HAVE REFLECTED THE 'ISOLATIONIST' IMPULSE OF AMERICANS. HEIMSATH AND MANSINGH, OP. CIT., P. 331 LEND SOME SUPPORT WHEN THEY POINT OUT THAT MANY WESTERNERS "RELIED TO A DEGREE THAT THEY MIGHT NOT HAVE ADMITTED ON INDIA'S ADHERENCE TO PRINCIPLES OF ORDER AND LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, WHILE MOST OF THE REST OF THE WORLD VIOLATED THOSE IDEALS."

CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

THE FINAL FACTOR INVOLVED, AND PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT, IS THAT OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE "EUROPE FIRSTERS" AND THE "ASIA FIRSTERS". ON THE QUESTION OF GOA, AMERICAN POLICY-MAKERS HAD TO CHOOSE BETWEEN A NATO ALLY AND THE LARGEST NON-COMMUNIST STATE. IN 1955 WHEN THE QUESTION OF GOA HAD FIRST RISEN, JULLES HAD SUPPORTED THE PORTUGUESE ARGUMENT THAT IT WAS AN INTEGRAL PART OF PORTUGAL. WHEN IN 1960 THE CRISIS ROSE AGAIN, A BATTLE SEEMS TO HAVE ENSUED BETWEEN THE WESTERN EUROPE AND SOUTH ASIAN DESKS - THAT IS IF ONE ASSUMES THAT THESE DESKS WERE SUPPORTING THEIR AMBASSADORS WHO ACCORDING TO GALBRAITH WERE EXCHANGING TELEGRAMS.¹⁰ THIS SEEMS TO BE SUPPORTED BY THE FACT THAT WASHINGTON HAD UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT, NO POLICY,¹¹ THOUGH GALBRAITH ARGUES THAT RUSK SEEMED TO HAVE TILTED IN FAVOUR OF PORTUGAL OR "WHAT THE LIBERALS IN THE DEPARTMENT ... CALLED THE 'IBERIA UBER ALLES' POLICY."¹² HOWEVER, IF THIS ANALYSIS IS CORRECT, AS THE EVIDENCE SEEMS TO SHOW, THEN THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS' 'BLAST' CAN BE ATTRIBUTED MORE TO THIS NEED TO SHOW HER NATO ALLY OF HER SUPPORT THAN ANYTHING AS MORAL AS OPPOSITION TO ARMED AGGRESSION. IT IS IN THIS BUREAUCRATIC PERSPECTIVE THAT THE GOAN ISSUE IS SIGNIFICANT, IN THAT IT DEMONSTRATED THE WEAKNESS OF AN "INDIA" LOBBY IN A CASE WHERE THE UNITED STATES COULD HAVE REMAINED NEUTRAL OR AT LEAST LESS CRITICAL.

10. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMBASSADOR'S JOURNAL, HAMISH HAMILTON, LONDON, 1969, REPORTS THAT "I SENT AN ELABORATELY ARGUED CABLE PROPOSING THAT WE DROP PORTUGAL, AS FAR AS HER COLONIES ARE CONCERNED. THIS HAS PRODUCED A WONDERFUL BLAST FROM OUR LISBON EMBASSY WHICH ASKS THAT WE STAND FOUR-SQUARE BY OUR PORTUGUESE ALLY. I HAVE WRITTEN A BRIEF BUT INFURIATING RESPONSE." P. 276.

11. IBID., P. 282.

12. IBID., P. 276, FOOTNOTE 12

THE SINO-INDIAN DISPUTE, AS WAS NOTED IN THE LAST CHAPTER, AROSE DURING THE LATE FIFTIES AND WAS OSTENSIBLY OVER THE DEMARCATION OF THE HIMALAYAN BORDER. COMPARED TO SOME OTHER CRISES, IT MAY BE SAID TO HAVE ESCALATED RATHER QUICKLY WITH BOTH COUNTRIES GETTING EMBROILED IN ARMED CLASHES THAT IN 1962 LED TO FULL SCALE MILITARY ACTION.¹³ THE RESULT OF THIS SHORT WAR IN THE AUTUMN OF 1962 WAS AN UNMITIGATED DISASTER FOR ALL INDIANS, ESPECIALLY NEHRU. IT WAS, AS SELIG HARRISON NOTES, "THE VIRTUAL DISTRUCTION OF THE UNPRECEDENTED SENSE OF NATIONAL CONFIDENCE" THAT NEHRU HAD NURTURED.¹⁴ WHILE DOMESTIC EFFECTS OF THIS DEFEAT WERE PROFOUND, WHEN COMPARED TO OTHER DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, THEY ARE LESS IMPORTANT.¹⁵ FAR MORE IMPORTANT, IN THIS DISCUSSION, ARE THE INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF INDIA'S DEFEAT, AND IN PARTICULAR HOW DID THEY AFFECT U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS.

IN THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER IT WAS CONTENDED THAT INDIA AT THE TURN OF THE DECADE ENJOYED A CONSIDERABLY IMPORTANT POSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. YET STATUS IS A RELATIVE CONCEPT AND INVOLVES SUCH AMBIGUOUS CONCEPTS SUCH AS POWER, WHERE THE LATTER AFFECTS THE FORMER. HOW DOES ONE JUDGE POWER? FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS PAPER, POWER SHALL BE DEFINED IN TERMS OF MILITARY-ECONOMIC VARIABLES AND THUS STATUS WILL BE ASSUMED TO BE A REFLECTION OF THESE PLUS OTHER INTANGIBLES SUCH AS THE

13. WHILE THIS PAPER DOES NOT INTEND TO INVOLVE ITSELF WITH THE QUESTION OF WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WAR TAKING PLACE, IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT AMERICAN AUTHORITIES AT THAT TIME ACCEPTED THAT CHINA WAS THE AGGRESSOR.

14. SELIG S. HARRISON, "TROUBLED INDIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS." FOREIGN AFFAIRS, VOL. 43, NO. 1 (1965), P. 312.

15. THE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS OF INDIA AND THEIR EFFECTS ON AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS AND RESPONSES WILL BE DISCUSSED IN A LATER CHAPTER.

POSITION ACCORDED TO A STATE BY THE SYSTEM.¹⁶ THUS REFERENCES TO PRESTIGE, POWER, POSITION, ETC. SHALL BE HELD TO INVOLVE THE QUESTION OF STATUS. SINCE STATUS IS RELATIVE, WHAT WAS INDIA'S STATUS BEFORE THE WAR COMPARED TO AFTER HER DEFEAT? CHINA IS GENERALLY HELD TO BE THE COUNTRY THAT INDIA WAS 'COMPETING AGAINST' BECAUSE OF THEIR SIMILARITY IN SIZE, POPULATION, PROBLEMS (I.E. UNDERDEVELOPMENT) AS WELL AS THEIR DIFFERING IDEOLOGICAL APPROACHES. A NUMBER OF SCHOLARS HAVE NOTED INDIA'S DECLINE IN PRESTIGE IN THE AFTERMATH OF HER POOR PERFORMANCE AGAINST THE CHINESE, FOR INSTANCE,

"INDIA STOOD AT THE PEAK OF ITS INFLUENCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS BETWEEN 1954-62. ITS SHOWING IN THE 1962- SINO-INDIAN WAR GREATLY REDUCED THE PERSONAL INFLUENCE OF NEHRU"17

"THE CHINA PROBLEM HIGHLIGHTED A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY IN INDIAN DIPLOMACY DURING 1963-64, AS INDIAN INFLUENCE DECLINED AMONG AFRO-ASIAN STATES, BURMA, INDONESIA AND EGYPT AMONG OTHERS DID NOT CONDEMN CHINA'S 1962 BORDER ATTACK"18

16. CHARLES HEIMSATH, "NON-ALIGNMENT RE-ASSESSED: THE EXPERIENCE OF INDIA" IN ROGER HILSMAN AND ROBERT C. GOOD (EDS.) FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SIXTIES, THE JOHN HOPKINS PRESS, BALTIMORE, 1965, PP. 44-66, ARGUES THAT INDIA HAD AN INTANGIBLE POWER DERIVED PARTLY FROM NON-ALIGNMENT AND WAS SIGNIFICANT ONLY IF THE BEHOLDER HELD IT TO BE AS THEY DID DURING THE COLD WAR. THIS KIND OF DESCRIPTION OF POWER IS EQUIVALENT TO THE TERM STATUS IN THIS PAPER. GALTUNG ARGUES THAT STATUS CONSISTS OF ASCRIBED (WHAT THE SYSTEM ACCORDS TO AN ACTOR) AND ACHIEVED (WHAT ATTRIBUTES THE ACTOR HAS, I.E. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC, ETC., STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES) STATUS. SEE JOHAN GALTUNG, "A STRUCTURAL THEORY OF AGGRESSION", JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, NO. 1, 1964, VOL. 1

17. R.L. SIEGAL, "EVALUATING THE RESULTS OF FOREIGN POLICY: SOVIET AND AMERICAN EFFORTS IN INDIA." MONOGRAPH SERIES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, VOL. 6, NO. 4, 1968-1969, UNIVERSITY OF DENVER, P. 29.

18. STEIN, OP. CIT., P. 196.

"INDIA'S INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE ... HAD DECLINED DURING THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, RAPIDLY AFTER THE CHINESE MILITARY ADVANCES OF AUTUMN 1962."¹⁹

WHILE THE ABOVE TENDS TO SUPPORT THE EARLIER ASSERTION THAT INDIA SUFFERED A DECLINE IN STATUS, HOW DOES ONE INFER THE EFFECTS OF THIS DECLINE ON U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS?

ONE WAY OF TRYING TO GAUGE THE EFFECT OF THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT ON AMERICAN-INDIAN RELATIONS IS TO COMPARE THE AMERICAN CONCEPTION OF INDIA'S ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA BEFORE AND AFTER 1962. IN THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION CONCEIVED OF INDIA AS THE KEY TO THE FUTURE OF ASIA. FURTHERMORE, IT RESPECTED THAT INDIA COULD ACT AS A 'BALANCER' TO CHINESE INFLUENCE IN ASIA. THE WAY IN WHICH AMERICA INVOLVED INDIA IN BOTH THE CONGO AND LAOS QUESTIONS, REFLECTS THIS ATTEMPT TO PLACE CONSIDERABLE EMPHASIS ON INDIA'S VOTE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. THE WAR CHANGED MUCH OF THIS.

"CHINA'S DRAMATIC TRIUMPH UNDERMINED THE IMAGE OF INDIA AS A POTENTIAL BALANCE AGAINST CHINA'S GROWING INFLUENCE IN THE REGION."²⁰

FURTHERMORE, SINCE AFRO-ASIAN STATES NO LONGER REGARDED INDIA WITH AS MUCH ESTEEM, IT WOULD SEEM LOGICAL TO CONCLUDE THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT EXPECT INDIA TO FULFILL AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. THIS SEEMS TO BE BORNE OUT BY GALBRAITH AND BOWLES IN THAT THEIR DISCUSSIONS AFTER 1962 SELDOM REFER TO QUESTIONS OUTSIDE THE BILATERAL

19. HILSMAN & GOOD, OP. CIT., P. 47.

20. MICHAEL BRECHER, "INDIA'S DECISION ON THE VOICE OF AMERICA: A STUDY IN IRRESOLUTION", ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. 20, NO. 7, P. 638.

QUESTIONS. WHEN BOWLES DOES REFER TO THEM, THEY ARE MORE IN TERMS OF AMERICAN PRESSURE BEING APPLIED TO GET INDIA'S SUPPORT THAN FOR SOME POSITIVE POLICY APPROACH BY INDIA.²¹ IN THE FIRST YEARS OF THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TRIED TO GET INDIA INVOLVED IN QUESTIONS SUCH AS THE CONGO AND LAOS. THIS CHANGE IN INDIA'S STATUS REFLECTS A SHIFT IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM WHICH AFFECTS THE INTERESTS OF GOVERNMENTS AS SEEN THROUGH POLICY CHANGES.

ONE OF THE MORE IMMEDIATE RESULTS OF THE SINO-INDIAN WAR WAS THE INDIAN REQUEST FOR ARMS AID FROM THE WEST, ESPECIALLY FROM THE UNITED STATES. THIS INDIAN REQUEST BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS, SINCE IT MEANT ARMING A NEUTRAL WHO WAS INVOLVED IN CONFLICTUAL RELATIONS WITH AN ALLY, PAKISTAN. THE INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICT HAD ARISEN OUT OF THE FORCES OF NATIONALISM AND RELIGION ON THE SUB-CONTINENT WHICH LED TO PARTITION FOR THE SAKE OF INDEPENDENCE. KASHMIR DEVELOPED INTO THE CRUX OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO NEW NATIONS, SINCE FOR INDIA IT SYMBOLIZED SECULARISM AND FOR PAKISTAN IT SYMBOLIZED THE COMPLETION OF THE MUSLIM STATE, AS WELL AS KASHMIR'S GEOGRAPHIC AND STRATEGIC LOCATION. AFTER THE FIGHTING IN 1948, THERE HAD BEEN NO ARMED CLASHES OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES, BUT THE DEEP HOSTILITY REMAINED. PAKISTAN'S SOLE REASON FOR JOINING SEATO AND CENTO HAD BEEN TO MAKE HERSELF MILITARILY STRONG ENOUGH TO DEFEND HERSELF. ON THE ISSUE OF KASHMIR, THE POSITION OF BOTH SIDES HARDENED DURING THE 1950'S, INDIA REJECTING ANY REFERENDUM UNTIL PAKISTAN REMOVED ITSELF FROM KASHMIR. IN THE CONSTANT

21. SEE GALBRAITH, OP. CIT., PP. 524-586 AND CHESTER BOWLES, PROVINCES TO KEEP, HARPER & ROW PUBLISHERS, NEW YORK, 1971, PP. 487-534. AS FAR AS AMERICAN PRESSURE GOES, THIS WILL BE DISCUSSED IN THE NEXT CHAPTER.

DEBATES IN THE U.N. THE UNITED STATES GENERALLY SUPPORTED HER ALLY WHILE INDIA BEGAN TO DEPEND MORE AND MORE ON SOVIET VETOES. THUS, INDO-U.S. RELATIONS WERE CONSTANTLY MARRED BY THE INTRUSION OF THE 'PROBLEM' OF PAKISTAN.

DURING THE ACTUAL FIGHTING ON THE HIMALAYAS THERE HAD BEEN AN ANGLO-AMERICAN AIRLIFT OF WEAPONS AND WHILE THIS HAD DISTURBED PAKISTAN OFFICIALS, THEY ACCEPTED THE AMERICAN ARGUMENT THAT IT WAS ONLY EMERGENCY SUPPLIES. HOWEVER, IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE FIGHTING HAD ENDED, INDIA REQUESTED THE UNITED STATES FOR ARMS AID WORTH \$500 MILLION.

"THE AMERICAN DECIDERS WERE FACING A DILEMMA AS TO THE TYPE AND VOLUME OF ARMS AID THEY SHOULD GIVE THE INDIANS (FOR THEIR PROTECTION), AND THE REACTIONS THAT IT WAS LIKELY TO PRODUCE IN PAKISTAN AND AS WELL AS AT HOME."²²

INDIRECT AMERICAN GOVERNMENTAL PRESSURE ON NEHRU TO NEGOTIATE WITH PAKISTAN HAD FOLLOWED THE END OF THE 1962 WAR. WHILE INDIA BOWED TO THIS PRESSURE, NEHRU WAS UNWILLING TO MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS IN THE HIGHLY EMOTIONAL STATE OF AFFAIRS THAT EXISTED IN INDIA AT THAT TIME.²³ HOWEVER, THIS AMERICAN PRESSURE IS NOT THAT SURPRISING CONSIDERING THAT BOTH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT THOUGHT THAT THE U.S. AIR BASE AT PESHAWAR WAS VERY IMPORTANT, AND THUS PAKISTAN WAS ABLE TO USE THE PESHAWAR

22. SHIVAJI GANGULY, "U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDIA 1962-63: A STUDY IN DECISION-MAKING". INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY, VOL. 28, NO. 3, PP. 220-21.

23. CHESTER JOWLES NOTES THAT "NEHRU ASKED WHY DID THE UNITED STATES ATTEMPT TO USE INDIA'S DIFFICULTIES WITH CHINA AS A LEVER TO FORCE HIM TO MAKE CONCESSIONS TO PAKISTAN AND KASHMIR? ... NEHRU REMINDED ONE ... (THAT) ... AT THE VERY MOMENT WHEN INDIAN EMOTION AGAINST PAKISTAN WERE HIGH, WE HAD ATTEMPTED TO FORCE HIM TO MAKE CONCESSIONS WHICH THE INDIAN PEOPLE AND THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT WOULD NOT POSSIBLY ACCEPT."

JOWLES, OP. CIT., P. 473.

LEASE AS A LEVEL TO PUT A "HAMMER LOCK" ON AMERICAN POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA.²⁴

IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THERE IS NOTHING UNUSUAL ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF PRESSURE AND LEVERAGE THAT PAKISTAN HAD ON THE UNITED STATES. ROBERT KEOHANE, IN ANALYSING THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HER SMALLER ALLIES, NOTES THAT,

"THESE (THE U.S. ALLIES) ARE THE BADGERS, MICE AND PIGEONS - IF NOT DOVES - OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, AND IN MANY CASES THEY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO LEAD THE ELEPHANT."²⁵

AND THAT FURTHERMORE, THE PROBLEM LIES IN "AMERICA'S CRUSADING SPIRIT" THAT HAS FORCED AMERICANS TO LISTEN AND BELIEVE THEIR DOMINOS SUCH THAT THESE ALLIES HAVE BEEN ABLE TO USE "AMERICAN IDEOLOGY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES ITSELF."²⁶ AMERICAN ALLIES HAVE USED DIFFERENT STRATEGIES IN ACHIEVING THEIR GOALS OF WHICH THE MOST COMMON HAS BEEN TO USE BUREAUCRATIC ALLIES. THESE ALLIES ARE NOT DIFFICULT TO ENLIST BECAUSE OF THE PLETHORA OF AMERICAN BASES AND INSTALLATIONS WHICH THE VARIOUS BUREAUCRACIES BELIEVE TO BE OF THE UTMOST NECESSITY TO NATIONAL SECURITY (EVEN THOUGH SOME OF THESE BASES/INSTALLATIONS ARE NO LONGER NECESSARY, THEY HAVE THEIR OWN BUREAUCRATIC RELEVANCE). THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE SPECTRE OF NATIONAL SECURITY IS OFTEN DIFFICULT TO FIGHT AGAINST BY GROUPS WHO DO NOT BELIEVE IN ITS IMPORTANCE. FURTHERMORE, THERE IS ALSO THE QUESTION OFTEN BOUND UP IN VAGUE EMOTIONALISM OF THE 'TRUE AND ONLY ALLY'. IN ANALYSING THE INFLUENCE OF PAKISTAN ON AMERICAN SOUTH ASIAN

24. IBID., P. 482.

25. ROBERT O. KEOHANE, "THE BIG INFLUENCE OF SMALL ALLIES", FOREIGN POLICY, No. 2, P. 161.

26. IBID., P. 163.

POLICY, BOTH THESE TOOLS WERE EFFECTIVELY USED, TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY KILLED THE INDIAN REQUEST AND THUS SENT INDIA TO MOSCOW FOR ARMS, THEREBY FULFILLING THEIR PROPHECY THAT INDIA WAS PRO-MOSCOW.²⁷

THE HARRIMAN MISSION, WHICH HAD GONE TO INDIA TO LOOK INTO HER NEEDS, REPORTED THAT WHILE INDIA'S NEED WAS ACUTE, THERE SHOULD BE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WITH PAKISTAN ALTHOUGH THAT SHOULD NOT BE A CONDITION FOR ARMS SUPPLIES; ARMS AID WITHOUT A SETTLEMENT WOULD DRIVE PAKISTAN INTO THE HANDS OF CHINA. THUS, IN ACTUAL FACT, THE HARRIMAN REPORT WAS A BRILLIANT BUREAUCRATIC COMPROMISE IN THAT IT ADVOCATED A POLICY THAT WAS PLAINLY IMPOSSIBLE TO CARRY OUT UNLESS THERE WAS A SETTLEMENT BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN WITH AMERICAN PRESSURE. SINCE THIS OBVIOUSLY WAS IMPOSSIBLE, THE UNITED STATES AS WE HAVE NOTED, DID ATTEMPT TO PRESSURE INDIA IN TALKS. THE TALKS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN BROKE DOWN IN MARCH 1963 AND ROSTOW WAS DISPATCHED TO THE SUB-CONTINENT. HIS ATTEMPT TO MEDIATE WAS A FAILURE, WHICH HE BLAMED ON NEHRU, ARGUING THAT SINCE INDIA WAS THE BIGGER STATE, SHE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE GENEROUS.²⁸

IN SPITE OF THIS BREAKDOWN IN COMMUNICATION BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN, KENNEDY ALLOWED NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ARMS DEAL TO CONTINUE. BOWLES NOTES THAT "KENNEDY ... SHARED MY CONCERN ABOUT OUR LOPSIDED POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN AND INDIA."²⁹ BOWLES ARGUES THAT HE THEN PROCEEDED TO WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT WITH INDIAN GOVERNMENT AND RETURNED TO WASHINGTON IN NOVEMBER. HE CLAIMS THAT KENNEDY SUPPORTED THE PROPOSALS,

27. THE FOLLOWING SECTION RELIES HEAVILY ON THE ACCOUNTS OF CHESTER BOWLES, SHIVAJI GANGULY AND WILLIAM J. BARNES, AND GALBRAITH, OP. CIT.

28. W.W. ROSTOW, THE DIFFUSION OF POWER, THE MACMILLAN CO., NEW YORK, 1972, PP. 205-6.

29. BOWLES, OP. CIT., P. 481.

BUT ASKED HIM "TO DEVELOP THE BROADEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN THE PENTAGON AND STATE DEPARTMENT."³⁰ THESE PROPOSALS WERE TO HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE 26TH NOVEMBER, BUT KENNEDY'S DEATH PUT AN END TO THAT. THE NEXT EIGHT MONTHS TO NEHRU'S DEATH IN MAY 1974 WAS A TIME OF CONSIDERABLE POLITICKING BETWEEN VARIOUS GROUPS, WITH THOSE OPPOSING ARMS AID TO INDIA SUCCESSFULLY HINDERING PROGRESS. BOWLES NOTES THAT,

"IT SOON BECAME APPARENT THAT, WHILE MCGEORGE BUNDY AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF HAD SECURED AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE, THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE PENTAGON WERE NOT YET PREPARED TO RISK OUR BASE IN PESHAWAR...."³¹

NEHRU'S DEATH PUT AN END TO THE WHOLE QUESTION, AS WASHINGTON WANTED TO WAIT FOR THE SITUATION TO CLARIFY ITSELF.

THE WHOLE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT TO PROVIDE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDIA REFLECTS THE DIFFERING AND CONTRADICTORY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. ON ONE HAND, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE LIKED TO ENSURE THAT INDIA'S ARMED FORCES WERE STRONG ENOUGH TO MEET ANY POSSIBLE THREAT FROM THE CHINESE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DID NOT WANT TO RUPTURE RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN, WHICH IS WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED IF THE U.S. DID PROVIDE ARMS TO INDIA WITH A SETTLEMENT OF INDO-PAK ISSUES. THUS, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTED TO SOLVE ITS DILEMMA BY ATTEMPTING TO PRESSURE INDIA INTO MAKING CONCESSIONS TO PAKISTAN ON KASHMIR. THE AMOUNT OF PRESSURE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT COULD

30. IBID., P. 481. IT IS NOT EASY TO SAY HOW FACTUAL EVERYTHING THAT BOWLES SAYS IS, THOUGH EVEN BARND'S NOTES THAT THE "PAKISTAN LOBBY" WAS SUCCESSFUL IN NEUTRALIZING ANY OPPOSITION. THE PROBLEM WITH BOWLES' ACCOUNT IS THAT HE IS TOO PRO-INDIAN AND THEREFORE IT IS NOT EASY TO ACCEPT EVERYTHING HE SAYS.

31. BOWLES, OP. CIT., P. 482.

APPLY WAS, HOWEVER, LIMITED BY ANOTHER INTEREST, THAT INDIA SHOULD NOT END UP IN THE SOVIET ORBIT OF INFLUENCE. THUS, WHAT FOLLOWED WAS A WEAK AND SOMEWHAT CONFUSED POLICY.

THE RESULT OF AMERICAN POLICY IN THE YEAR AND A HALF THAT FOLLOWED THE SINO-INDIAN WAR WAS TO DRIVE BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN AWAY FROM HER. BY BEING UNWILLING TO COMMIT HERSELF TO PROVIDING MILITARY HARDWARE TO INDIA WITHOUT INDIA REACHING A POLITICAL AGREEMENT WITH PAKISTAN, INDIA TURNED TO THE SOVIETS FOR MILITARY AID. THE SOVIETS HAD DECIDED THAT CHINA WAS LOST, AND THUS DECIDED TO MAKE THE MOST OF THE OPPORTUNITY IN INDIA. PAKISTAN, MEANWHILE, GREW WEARY OVER THE FAILURE OF THE U.S. TO FORCE INDIA INTO CONCESSIONS ON KASHMIR. FURTHERMORE, THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT BEGAN TO SUSPECT THAT GIVEN THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT, CHINA MAY BE A MORE USEFUL ALLY THAN THE UNITED STATES. EVEN IF THIS WERE NOT THE CASE, THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT MUST HAVE FELT THAT BY MOVING CLOSER TO PEKING, THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. MEANWHILE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT BEGAN TO GET DISENCHANTED WITH THE WHOLE REGION AND ITS DISPUTES. SEATO WAS NO LONGER THAT IMPORTANT, THOUGH SHE WAS UNWILLING TO SEE IT BREAK UP. INDIAN INTRANSIGENCE OVER KASHMIR DID NOT WIN ANY FRIENDS IN WASHINGTON. IT WAS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THAT JOHNSON CANCELLED BOTH AYUB'S AND SHASTRI'S VISITS TO WASHINGTON IN 1965.

"WASHINGTON WAS GETTING OUT OF TOUCH WITH THE LEADERS OF BOTH COUNTRIES AT A TIME WHEN THEIR MUTUAL HOSTILITY HAD REACHED A KINDLING POINT."³²

THIS MUTUAL HOSTILITY WAS TO BURST INTO OPEN WARFARE IN SEPTEMBER,³³ AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SUSPENDED ALL AID TO THE SUB-CONTINENT, ON THE BELIEF THAT THIS WOULD HELP ITS POSITION. HOWEVER, SUCH WAS NOT THE CASE, AS BITTER RECRIMINATIONS FOLLOWED. PAKISTAN FELT THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE SUPPORTED HER STAND, SINCE SHE WAS AN ALLY. (THE PROBLEM HERE LAY IN DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF U.S.-PAKISTAN AGREEMENTS.) INDIA, MEANWHILE, TURNED AROUND AND ACCUSED THE UNITED STATES OF NOT LIVING UP TO ITS ASSURANCES THAT PAKISTAN WOULD NOT USE AMERICAN SUPPLIED ARMAMENTS AGAINST INDIA. IT WAS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND OF EVENTS THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OPTED OUT OF TAKING AN ACTIVE ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT PEACE IN THE SUB-CONTINENT.

THE AMERICAN REACTION TO THE 1965 INDO-PAK CONFLICT SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED WITH TOO MUCH SURPRISE. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAD FOR THE THREE PREVIOUS YEARS ATTEMPTED TO BRING THE TWO BELLIGERENTS TOGETHER. AND WHILE THESE ATTEMPTS MAY NOT HAVE BEEN TOO SUBTLE OR WELL CARRIED OUT, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT HOWEVER BRILLIANTLY THEY MIGHT HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED, THAT THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL. DURING THIS SAME PERIOD OF TIME, THE UNITED STATES HAD BEEN POURING ECONOMIC AID INTO INDIA AND PAKISTAN. IN THE YEARS 1962-1965 (INCLUSIVE) INDIA HAD RECEIVED APPROXIMATELY \$1.5 BILLION. AND THE COMBINED FIGURES FOR THE TWO COUNTRIES AMOUNTED TO ONE-QUARTER OF ALL U.S. ECONOMIC AID AND OVER THREE-QUARTERS OF AMERICAN AID IN THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REGION DURING THAT TIME PERIOD.³⁴ IN THE LIGHT OF THIS, IT IS HARDLY SURPRISING THAT THERE WAS

33. EXACTLY WHEN HOSTILITIES BEGAN IS A MOOT QUESTION, AND DEPENDS ON WHETHER YOU ACCEPT THE INDIAN OR PAKISTANI ARGUMENT.

34. SEE JARNOS, OP. CIT., PP. 226-27 AND U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS AND ASSISTANCE, JULY 1, 1965 - JUNE 30 - 1972, PP. 1-16.

GROWING OPPOSITION IN CONGRESS OVER PROVIDING AID TO THESE COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY WHEN THIS WAS COMBINED WITH A GENERAL DISENCHANTMENT WITH AID AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.³⁵ IT WAS THUS THAT REPRESENTATIVE MORGAN OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REMARKED, "IF THEY DON'T GET DOWN TO BUSINESS AND SETTLE THEIR QUARREL WE SHOULD LESSEN THE RATE OR STOP AID ALTOGETHER."³⁶

THUS THE DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO STOP AID DURING THE CONFLICT REFLECTED A TURNING POINT IN AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS SOUTH ASIA. BROOKIN ARGUES THAT,

"WHAT WAS INVOLVED WAS THE FINAL DISMANTLING OF THE FOREIGN POLICY STRUCTURE BUILT BY EISENHOWER AND DULLES IN SOUTH ASIA."³⁷

AND WHILE THIS MAY BE AN EXAGGERATION, IT IS CERTAINLY TRUE THAT THIS CONFLICT MORE THAN THE PREVIOUS TWO ON THE SUBCONTINENT MARKED A CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN PERCEPTION OF THEIR ROLE IN ASIA. BARNOS STATES THAT THIS REALIZATION THAT THE MUTUAL HOSTILITY OF THE TWO COUNTRIES WAS NOT GOING TO ABATE WHEN COMBINED WITH LESS AMERICAN FEAR OF COMMUNISM OVER-RUNNING THE AREA, "LED THE UNITED STATES TO REDUCE SUBSTANTIALLY ITS INVOLVEMENT ... IN THE SUBCONTINENT."³⁸

IN THIS CHAPTER WHAT HAS BEEN ATTEMPTED IS TO SHOW THE EFFECTS OF THE VARIOUS CONFLICTS INVOLVING INDIA, DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE

35. FOR GREATER DISCUSSION OF THE LATTER TWO POINTS, SEE THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS.

36. NORMAN D. PALMER, SOUTH ASIA AND THE UNITED STATES, HAUGHTON MIFFIN, BOSTON (1966), P. 20, FOOTNOTE 9.

37. J.I. BROOKIN, "UNITED STATES AID TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN: THE ATTITUDE OF THE FIFTIES". INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, OCTOBER 1967, P. 664. VOL. 43, NO. 4.

38. BARNOS, OP. CIT., P. 224.

SIXTIES, ON AMERICAN INTERESTS, PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES. IT WAS ARGUED THAT THE GOAN CRISIS DESTROYED THE BELIEF IN INDIA'S NON-VIOLENCE, WHILE AMERICAN POLICY ON THAT ISSUE REFLECTED THE 'VICTORY' OF THE 'EUROPE-FIRSTERS' IN THE ADMINISTRATION. THE SINO-INDIAN WAR WAS ANALYSED IN TERMS OF THE EFFECTS OF THE DECLINE IN INDIA'S STATUS AS A "FOREIGN STIMULUS" TO POLICY-MAKERS AND THEIR RESULTANT CHANGE IN INTEREST IN INDIA REFLECT IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY OF CONCENTRATING ON SOUTH ASIAN ISSUES. THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT'S POLICY FOLLOWING THE SINO-INDIAN WAR SEEMS TO BRING OUT SOME OF THE KINDS OF CONTRADICTIONARY INTERESTS PRESENT WITH THE KENNEDY AND JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS. THE FAILURE OF THE AMERICAN ATTEMPT TO BRING THE TWO SOUTH ASIAN ADVERSARIES TOGETHER LED TO FRUSTRATION AND DISILLUSIONMENT, WHICH WAS HEIGHTENED BY THE FIGHTING IN 1965. THIS WAS TO MANIFEST ITSELF IN THE REDUCING INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH ASIA.

CHAPTER 5

AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM AND ITS EFFECTS ON U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS

THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION IS, TO A VERY LARGE EXTENT, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM AND THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THIS INVOLVEMENT. IT IS PERHAPS THE IRONY OF THE SITUATION THAT THE TWO AMERICAN POST-WAR PRESIDENTS (TRUMAN AND JOHNSON) WHO WERE DOMESTICALLY INCLINED, ENDED UP IN LAND WARBS IN ASIA. THESE WARBS WERE TO BE THEIR 'WATERLOO'. ON THE OTHER HAND, THESE EVENTS MAY BE INTERPRETED AS TESTAMENTS TO THE FACT THAT POST-WAR AMERICA CANNOT AFFORD TO HAVE PRESIDENTS THAT ARE UNFAMILIAR WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS. BE THAT AS IT MAY, IN THIS CHAPTER THE EFFECTS OF THE VIETNAM WAR ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN GENERAL AND TOWARDS INDIA, SHALL BE EXAMINED. AN ATTEMPT SHALL BE MADE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT VIETNAM DOMINATED ALL ISSUES IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THAT (1) IT KILLED NEW INITIATIVES IN OTHER AREAS (BESIDES VIETNAM); (2) SUPPORT FOR VIETNAM BECAME THE KEY IN RECIPROCAL RELATIONS; (3) VIETNAM LED TO AN INCREASE IN MILITARY AID AND A DECLINE IN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE; (4) VIETNAM CONSUMED LARGE AMOUNTS OF TIME OF DECISION-MAKERS, THEREBY A NEGLECT OF OTHER AREAS. BEFORE DOING THIS, HOWEVER, A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IS NECESSARY, IN ORDER TO PUT THE DISCUSSION INTO HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.

THE AMERICAN EFFORT TO STOP VIETNAM FROM BECOMING A COMMUNIST NATION BEGAN AFTER ROOSEVELT'S DEATH. IN THE BEGINNING, AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE FRENCH FORCES WAS MORE A REFLECTION OF THEIR EUROPEAN OUTLOOK THAN ANY REAL PERCEPTION OF THREAT FROM VIETNAM. IN OTHER WORDS,

AMERICA'S EARLY VIETNAM POLICY WAS MORE OUT OF THEIR PRIORITY OF KEEPING FRANCE SATISFIED THAN ANY REAL SELF-INTEREST.¹ THE 'FALL' OF CHINA AND THE KOREAN WAR WERE TO CHANGE THIS, AND THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO INSURING FRENCH CONTROL INCREASED TREMENDOUSLY.

"BY 1951 THE U.S. WAS PAYING ABOUT 40 PERCENT OF THE COSTS OF THE INDOCHINA WAR ... IN 1954 IT WAS ESTIMATED U.S. ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AMOUNTED TO \$703 MILLION AND MILITARY AID TOTALLED ALMOST \$2 BILLION ... ALMOST 80 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL FRENCH COSTS."²

FOLLOWING DIENBIENPHU, THE UNITED STATES ONLY MANAGED TO AVOID THE INVOLVEMENT OF HER FORCES IN VIETNAM BECAUSE OF THE OBJECTIONS OF THE BRITISH, CONGRESS AND GENERAL RIDGEWAY. NOT THAT THIS MEANT THAT THE U.S. WAS WAITING TO SEE THE DISAPPEARANCE OF A 'FREE VIETNAM'. INSTEAD, FOLLOWING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE IT INTERPRETED THE TWO 'ZONES' TO BE TWO COUNTRIES, AND EXTENDED AMERICAN GUARANTEES TO SOUTH VIETNAM. IT ALSO PROVIDED AID OF \$200 MILLION ANNUALLY BETWEEN 1954-61.³ DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION THERE WAS A BREAKING OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENT ON THE NUMBER OF FOREIGN ADVISERS ALLOWED TO BE PRESENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM. WHAT FOLLOWED WAS A STEADY INCREASE OF U.S. 'ADVISERS' EVENTUALLY REACHING 16,000. THE OVERTHROW OF DIEM, FOLLOWED BY KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION AND AN UPCOMING ELECTION DELAYED FURTHER AMERICAN EXPLOITS IN VIETNAM, UNTIL THE FAMOUS GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION. IN THE FEBRUARY FOLLOWING THE

1. DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST, FAWCETT CREST, CANADA, 1973, P. 105.

2. LESLIE H. GELS, "VIETNAM: THE SYSTEM WORKED", IN ROBERT W. TUCKER AND WILLIAM WATTS (ED.), BEYOND CONTAINMENT, POTOMAC ASSOCIATES, WASHINGTON, D.C., 1973, P. 31.

3. IBID., P. 32.

ELECTIONS, THE FIRST AMERICAN AIR RAIDS WERE CARRIED OUT. AT THE SAME TIME, AMERICAN GROUND FORCES CONTINUED TO INCREASE, EVENTUALLY TOTALLING MORE THAN HALF A MILLION. IN SPITE OF ALL, AMERICAN FORCES WERE NEVER ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY STOP VIETCONG AND NORTH VIETNAM FORCES, THE TET OFFENSIVE BEING THE PRIME EXAMPLE.

WHILE IT IS NOT THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER TO DELVE INTO THE CAUSES OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM, TWO POINTS ARE WORTH MENTIONING. THE FIRST IS, WHAT ROBERT PACKENHAM CALLS, THE LIBERAL IDEOLOGICAL BASE OF POST-WAR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. THIS IDEOLOGY, HE ARGUES, ABHORS REVOLUTION AND RADICALISM, SINCE LIBERALISM PROPOUNDS THAT CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT ARE EASY AND THEREFORE THE FORMER IS NOT NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THE LATTER.⁴ THE SECOND POINT IS THIS OPTIMISM OF LIBERALISM WHICH IS IMPORTANT SINCE ITS COMBINATION WITH THE THEORY OF LIMITED WAR (WHICH IS INHERENTLY INCREMENTAL)⁵ HELPED THE TWO TO REINFORCE EACH OTHER AND PROVIDE MUCH OF THE MOMENTUM FOR GREATER AND GREATER INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM. IT IS ALSO THIS OPTIMISM THAT GIVES BASIS TO THE AMERICAN BELIEF THAT BY POURING IN A FEW BILLION DOLLARS IN AID, DEVELOPMENT WOULD FOLLOW.⁶

WHAT DID AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM MEAN IN TERMS OF THE REST

4. ROBERT A. PACKENHAM, LIBERAL AMERICA AND THE THIRD WORLD, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, PRINCETON 1973. IN CHAPTER 3, HE EXPOUNDS "THE LIBERAL ROOTS OF THE DOCTRINES." AND WHILE THIS SECTION HAS BEEN LARGELY BASED ON PACKENHAM'S WORK, HE IS NOT THE ONLY ONE TO DISCUSS THE ROLE OF LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN IDEOLOGY IN INVOLVING AMERICA IN VIETNAM. FOR EXAMPLE, SEE PFEFFER, PP. 7-19 AND GEORGE ARMSTRONG KELLY, "A STRANGE DEATH OF LIBERAL AMERICA" IN TUCKER AND WATTS, OP. CIT., PP. 67-78. DAVID HALBERSTAM MAKES SIMILAR ARGUMENTS IN HIS BOOK.

5. THEODORE DRAPER ARGUES THAT IT IS THIS THEORY THAT MADE POLICY-MAKERS "CONSCIOUS OF HOW LITTLE FORCE" THEY MIGHT HAVE TO USE, AND THIS FORCE WOULD ALWAYS BE UPPED. SEE PFEFFER, OP. CIT., P. 34.

6. THE MILLIKAN-ROSTOW PROPOSAL DISCUSSED IN CHAPTER 6 EXEMPLIFIES THIS KIND OF OPTIMISM.

OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY? PERHAPS THE BEST WAY TO EXPLAIN THE INFLUENCE OF VIETNAM ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY WAS THAT IT DOMINATED EVERYTHING, AND CAN BEST BE COMPARED TO THE 1950'S WHERE EVERYTHING WAS DETERMINED BY RUSSIA. AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE WORLD WAS OFTEN COUNTED IN TERMS OF VIETNAM. JOHNSON HAD WANTED TO LIBERALIZE EAST-WEST TRADE, IMPROVE FOREIGN AID, REBUILD NATO AND DEVELOP A NEW POLICY TOWARDS ASIA. NONE OF THESE WERE TO TAKE PLACE.⁷ AS FAR AS IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WAS CONCERNED, VIETNAM WAS THE OBVIOUS STUMBLING BLOCK. IT WAS HARDLY POSSIBLE FOR JOHNSON TO BUILD DETENTE WHILE HE HAD HIS COUNTRY ENGAGED IN A WAR AGAINST ANOTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRY. EVEN IF HE HAD WANTED TO, THERE WAS LITTLE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIETS COULD HAVE RESPONDED GIVEN THEIR OWN CONFLICT WITH CHINA, AND THE RESULTANT COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE IN HANOI. SIMILARLY, HOW COULD HE HAVE A NEW NATO WHEN MOST AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE INVOLVED IN A WAR ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE WORLD. FURTHERMORE, VIETNAM WAS TO AROUSE CRITICISM IN WESTERN EUROPE, AND JOHNSON WHO BELIEVED IN RECIPROCITY, COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY CRITICISM WITHOUT REPLYING TO IT.

JOHNSON'S DESIRE FOR RECIPROCITY IS PERHAPS BEST REFLECTED IN HIS CONCEPTION OF FOREIGN AID. FOR WHAT JOHNSON DID WAS TO TRANSFER CONCEPTIONS FROM DOMESTIC POLITICS TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND SINCE THE POLITICS OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS INVOLVED WHEELING AND DEALING, TRADING SUPPORT

7. THE CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY REMARKS THAT "UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY UNDER JOHNSON WAS DOMINATED AND DIRECTED BY THE AGONY OF THE VIETNAM WAR. IT WAS A WAR THAT DEEPLY INFLUENCED ALL OF MR. JOHNSON'S POLICIES ..." IN CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, NATIONAL DIPLOMACY 1965-70, WASHINGTON, MAY 1970, P. 51. PHILIP L. GEVELIN, LYNDON B. JOHNSON AND THE WORLD, FREDRICK A. PRAEGER, NEW YORK, 1966, PP. 260-61.

ON ONE ISSUE FOR SUPPORT ON ANOTHER, JOHNSON FELT THAT WAS HOW FOREIGN POLICY SHOULD BE CONDUCTED. JOHNSON BELIEVED THAT THE "DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN AID FOR THE SAKE OF THEIR CHARITY ... WAS AN INVITATION TO BE TAKEN FOR A RIDE ..." AND FURTHERMORE,

"LYNDON JOHNSON WAS FOR DOING FAVOURS TO THOSE WHO SHOWED THEMSELVES TO BE APPRECIATIVE ... HE WAS TO ... SERVE NOTICE TO FOREIGN AID RECIPIENTS THAT ACTIONS DETRIMENTAL TO U.S. INTERESTS - AND DETRIMENTAL TO LYNDON JOHNSON'S POLITICAL INTERESTS - WOULD NOT BE COUNTENANCED."⁸

AND SINCE VIETNAM WAS THE MAJOR U.S. INTEREST DURING JOHNSON'S ADMINISTRATION, WHAT IT ALL BOILED DOWN TO WAS THAT JOHNSON WAS WILLING TO TRADE AID FOR POLITICAL SUPPORT OF AMERICAN ACTIONS. NOR WAS THE EFFECT OF VIETNAM ON AID LIMITED TO RECIPROCITY, IT ALSO CHANGED THE COMPOSITION OF AID, WHEREBY IMMEDIATE SECURITY AID MOVED UP FROM 15% PRE-1966 TO 40% IN THE LAST YEARS OF THE ADMINISTRATION.

CONGRESS WAS ALSO EFFECTED BY VIETNAM AND ITS EFFECT CAN BE SEEN MOST CLEARLY WITH REFERENCE TO FOREIGN AID, SINCE THAT WAS ONE OF THE FEW AREAS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON WHICH IT HAD ANY INFLUENCE.⁹ BEFORE DISCUSSING THE EFFECT OF VIETNAM, IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND WHICH SEGMENTS OF CONGRESS SUPPORTED THE AID PACKAGE. FOREIGN AID, AS IT DEVELOPED IN THE LATE FIFTIES AND SIXTIES, TENDED TO INVOLVE LARGE SUMS OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES THAT WERE NOT ALLIES. THUS, UNLIKE THE MUTUAL

8. IBID., P. 39.

9. ONE OF THE OTHER AREAS WOULD HAVE BEEN TO CUT FUNDS TO VIETNAM, BUT NO CONGRESSMAN COULD DO THAT WITH AMERICAN 'BOYS' FIGHTING THERE, AND STILL SURVIVE AN ELECTION.

SECURITY PROGRAM IN ITS EARLY DAYS, IT INVOLVED A COMBINATION OF HUMANITARIANISM, LONG-TERM AND SHORT-TERM INTEREST, THE LAST OF WHICH WAS GENERALLY PLAYED DOWN. THUS, THE SUPPORT FOR SUCH A PACKAGE SHIFTED ALMOST COMPLETELY ONTO THE SHOULDERS OF THE LIBERALS IN CONGRESS. BY AND LARGE, THESE LIBERALS TEND TO BE DEMOCRATS (EXCEPT SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS WHO VOCIFEROUSLY OPPOSED AID) WITH A SMATTERING OF REPUBLICANS, ESPECIALLY THOSE FROM NEW ENGLAND AND THE MID-ATLANTIC REGION.¹⁰ YET IT WAS THIS SAME GROUP OF PEOPLE THAT BECAME MORE AND MORE DISENCHANTED WITH THE AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM. THE CONSERVATIVES TENDED TO BE 'HAWKS' AND IN ANY CASE THEY OPPOSED FOREIGN AID.

"... THE VIETNAM WAR WAS BEGINNING TO MAKE SOME PEOPLE IN AND OUT OF CONGRESS WONDER WHETHER THE UNITED STATES MIGHT NOT HAVE COMMITTED ITSELF, THROUGH FOREIGN AID, TO A POLICY OF ARMED DEFENCE

OF ANY RECIPIENT NATION.¹¹ WITH THIS THERE WAS THE BELIEF THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD OVERCOMMITTED HERSELF AND THAT ONE OF THE AREAS IN WHICH CONGRESS BEGAN A RETRENCHMENT WAS IN FOREIGN AID. PERHAPS THE BEST EXAMPLE OF THE EFFECT OF VIETNAM ON LIBERAL CONGRESSMEN IS SENATOR FULBRIGHT (WHO WAS LIBERAL IN FOREIGN POLICY). FULBRIGHT HAD BEEN AMONGST THE EARLIEST ADVOCATES OF MULTI-YEAR AID COMMITMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES. HOWEVER, UNDER THE CLOUD OF VIETNAM, HE REVERSED HIS DECISION AND HELPED DEFEAT THE BILL IN THE SENATE. FULBRIGHT ALSO VOTED FOR CUTS IN FOREIGN AID IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT HE WAS FLOOR LEADER FOR THE BILL.¹² THIS

10. FOR A BREAKDOWN OF VOTING ON AID SEE APPENDIX A. THE WHOLE QUESTION OF FOREIGN AID WILL BE DISCUSSED AT GREAT LENGTH IN THE FOLLOWING CHAPTER.

11. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, OP. CIT., P. 53.

12. IBID., P. 70.

WAS PERHAPS BECAUSE OF THE DEEP DISTRUST OF THE EXECUTIVE GENERATED BY VIETNAM. FOR AS THE CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY NOTES,

"AS THE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM ESCALATED IN 1966, DISSATISFACTION OVER THE NATION'S FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ROSE."¹³

CUTS IN FOREIGN AID GREW, 1966 AID FELL TO BELOW \$3 BILLION, IN 1967 IT WAS LESS THAN IN 1956, AND IN 1968 AID FOR THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK WAS KILLED, FOLLOWED BY THE BIGGEST CUT IN THE DEVELOPMENT LOAN PROGRAM. ALL THE TIME, MORE AND MORE RESTRICTIVE RIDERS WERE ADDED TO THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT. MUCH OF THIS WAS DUE TO LIBERAL DEMOCRATS JOINING THE CONSERVATIVES IN CONGRESS.¹⁴ THIS DECLINE IN LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC APPROVAL OF FOREIGN AID IS REFLECTED IN THE MEAN PERCENTAGE SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN AID LEGISLATION AMONGST DEMOCRATS.

	<u>1961-1962</u> ¹⁵	<u>1967-1968</u> ¹⁶
HOUSE	78%	66%
SENATE	65%	53%

NOR CAN THIS BE PUT DOWN TO A DECLINE IN THE NUMBER OF LIBERAL DEMOCRATS SINCE THIS IS NOT TRUE.

THE FINAL INFLUENCE OF VIETNAM IS IN TERMS OF TIME - TIME AVAILABLE

13. IBID., P. 70.

14. IBID., PP. 70-72, 83-84, 106-7, 114.

15. MICHAEL K. O'LEARY, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN AID, ARTHURTON PRESS, NEW YORK, 1967, PP. 60-69.

16. FIGURES FOR 1967-68 FROM DATA COLLECTED FROM CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY OF 1967 AND 1968. THE DIFFERENCE OF MEANS TEST HAS $T = 7.43$ SIGNIFICANT AT 0.01 FOR THE HOUSE AND $T = 6.55$ SIGNIFICANT AT 0.01 FOR THE SENATE.

FOR TOP GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO DEAL WITH ISSUES OTHER THAN VIETNAM. THOMPSON POINTS OUT THAT EXECUTIVE FATIGUE IN STATE AND DEFENCE DEPARTMENTS, AS WELL AS IN THE WHITE HOUSE, BEGAN TO TAKE ITS EFFECT. AND BESIDES, WHATEVER EMOTIONAL AND PHYSICAL EFFECTS IT MAY HAVE HAD, IT ERODED "FRESHNESS OF THOUGHT, IMAGINATION, A SENSE OF PRIORITIES AND PERSPECTIVES."¹⁷ POLICY-MAKERS IN THIS CONDITION TEND TO GET BOGGED DOWN IN THEIR OWN RHETORIC AND NARROW-MINDEDNESS, AND END UP MAKING BAD POLICY. EVENTUALLY, A LACK OF TIME MEANS BEING UNABLE TO DEAL WITH OTHER ISSUES. THUS, IT IS PERHAPS APPROPRIATE TO CONCLUDE ON THE GENERAL EFFECTS OF VIETNAM, WITH A QUOTE FROM PHILIP GEVELIN.

"IF WE DIDN'T HAVE VIETNAM ..."
BY THE MIDDLE OF 1965, THIS BECAME A PREAMBLE TO A PARTIAL DISCUSSION OF ALMOST ANYTHING, AND CONTINUED TO BE WITH MOUNTING INTENSITY ... VIETNAM PRECEDED LYNDON JOHNSON'S RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS, WITH HIS OWN BUREAUCRACIES, WITH FOREIGN NATIONS LARGE AND SMALL."¹⁸

MOST OF WHAT VIETNAM DID TO AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS IN GENERAL IS PRESENT IN U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS. PERHAPS THE MOST INTERESTING CASE IS WHEN JOHNSON PUT HIS RECIPROCITY SYSTEM TO WORK. IT SEEMS THAT JOHNSON HAD DECIDED THAT HE WOULD MAKE INDIA AND PAKISTAN "OBJECT LESSONS" OF HIS POLICY OF TRADING AID FOR POLITICAL SUPPORT.¹⁹ IN MANY WAYS, THE CHOICE WAS A GOOD TEST OF HIS POLICY SINCE INDIA AND PAKISTAN WERE THE LARGEST RECIPIENTS OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. BOTH WERE

17. MORTON M. HALPERIN AND ARNOLD KANTER (ED.) READINGS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, LITTLE, BROWN AND CO., BOSTON 1973, P. 104.

18. GEVELIN, OP. CIT., P. 259.

19. PACKENHAM, OP. CIT., P. 89.

ALSO VERY DEPENDENT ON U.S. AID, INDIA ESPECIALLY ON PL480 SINCE SHE WAS GOING THROUGH ONE OF HER WORST DROUGHTS. FINALLY, THERE WAS SOMETHING TO EXCHANGE, THE UNITED STATES WANTED INDIA TO STOP CRITICIZING THE UNITED STATES ON VIETNAM, AND PAKISTAN FROM BECOMING OVERTLY FRIENDLY WITH CHINA. EARLY IN 1965, JOHNSON IS SUPPOSED TO HAVE REMARKED THAT HE WAS DISAPPOINTED OVER THE LACK OF INDIAN SUPPORT ON VIETNAM AND, THAT IF SHASTRI "GOT OFF HIS (EXPLETIVE DELETED) AND INDICATED, AT LEAST SOME MORAL JUDGEMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THE UNITED STATES" THEN SHASTRI COULD EXPECT AMERICAN SUPPORT AGAINST CHINA AND GET "SOME ARMS PRETTY CHEAP."²⁰

THIS EFFORT WAS OBVIOUSLY UNSUCCESSFUL, BECAUSE INDIA WAS ALSO UNDER SOVIET PRESSURE AND THE SOVIETS WERE HELPING INDIA RE-ARM AFTER THE 1965 CONFLICT. THE AMERICAN POLICY WOULD SEEM TO HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL SINCE DURING THIS PERIOD THE INDIAN STANCE ON VIETNAM WAS EVEN MORE PRO-SOVIET. IN A JOINT INDO-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE, THE PARTIES CALLED FOR AN IMMEDIATE BOMBING HALT, THE REMOVAL OF MILITARY BASES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES, AND AN END TO INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER NATIONS.²¹ THIS WAS A MARKED CHANGE FROM EARLIER POSITIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, WHICH HAD UP TILL THEN BEEN CALLING FOR A CEASE-FIRE. THE CHANGE IN THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT'S POSITION CAUSED QUITE A FUROR IN WASHINGTON.²² IT WAS SOON AFTER THIS THAT JOHNSON BEGAN A POLICY OF MANIPULATING THE WHEAT SHIPMENTS TO INDIA, IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT WAS OFTEN UNSURE TILL THE LAST MOMENT WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS

20. LA FEVER, OP. CIT., P. 267.

21. THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT APPEARS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, CURRENT DOCUMENTS, OP. CIT., DOCUMENT NO. IX-56.

22. BOWLES, OP. CIT., P. 515.

GOING TO BE ANY AMERICAN WHEAT FORTHCOMING. CHESTER BOWLES COMMENTS THAT,

"DURING INDIA'S FOOD CRISIS OF 1965-66, PRESIDENT JOHNSON RATHER OBVIOUSLY TRIED TO USE OUR WHEAT SHIPMENTS TO PERSUADE INDIA TO TAKE A MORE TOLERANT VIEW OF OUR MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM."²³

JOHNSON HAS ARGUED THAT HE FOLLOWED THIS POLICY BECAUSE HE WANTED TO FORCE INDIA INTO A NEW AGRICULTURAL POLICY - MAINLY SPENDING MORE ON AGRICULTURE - AND TO GET OTHER COUNTRIES SUCH AS CANADA, AUSTRALIA AND OTHERS INVOLVED IN GIVING INDIA FOOD. HIS ARGUMENT WAS THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NO LONGER THE GRAIN RESERVE OF THE WORLD - HER STOCKS HAD DEPLETED, AND THEREFORE IT WAS NECESSARY FOR INDIA TO DEVELOP HER AGRICULTURAL SECTOR.²⁴ WHILE THIS MAY BE TRUE, AND OTHER COUNTRIES DID JOIN IN, CHESTER BOWLES WHO WAS HIS AMBASSADOR IN INDIA, RESPONDS BY SAYING THAT INDIA HAD ALREADY AGREED TO A NEW AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN 1965, AND THUS THERE WAS NO REASON TO CONTINUE THIS PRESSURE IF THAT WAS THE OBJECTIVE.²⁵ AND IN THE LIGHT OF JOHNSON'S BELIEF IN RECIPROCITY, BOWLES CONTENTION SEEMS VERY PLAUSIBLE.

A SLIGHTLY MORE CONFUSING CASE IS WITH REGARD TO INDIA'S DEVALUATION IN 1966. IT SEEMS QUITE CLEAR THAT THE DEVALUATION ITSELF WAS THE RESULT OF PRESSURE FROM THE WORLD BANK AND THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT.²⁶ WHAT IS NOT SO CLEAR IS WHETHER OR NOT THE UNITED STATES HAD MADE A COMMITMENT OF LARGE AID AS WELL AS IMMEDIATE RELIEF IN ORDER TO TIE OVER

23. CHESTER BOWLES, "AMERICA AND RUSSIA IN INDIA", FOREIGN AFFAIRS, VOL. 49, NO. 4, P. 646. HEREFTER REFERRED TO AS BOWLES (ARTICLE).

24. JOHNSON, OP. CIT., PP. 225-31.

25. BOWLES, OP. CIT., P. 534. HEIMSATH, OP. CIT., P. 475 AND SIEGEL, OP. CIT., P. 30, AGREE WITH BOWLES THAT FOOD AID WAS USED AS A TOOL FOR COMPLIANCE.

26. BOWLES, OP. CIT., P. 515.

THE PROBLEM OF DEVALUATION. ACCORDING TO THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT WAS HOPING TO RECEIVE ABOUT \$8.5 BILLION DURING THE FOURTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN (1967-72).²⁷ THE SUBJECT BEYOND THIS IS UNCLEAR. IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE UNITED STATES DID MAKE SOME KIND OF AID COMMITMENT, THOUGH PERHAPS NOT AS MUCH AS \$8.5 BILLION. AS SHALL BE NOTED BELOW, HOWEVER, THE AMOUNT OF AID INDIA RECEIVED IN THE POST-DEVALUATION PERIOD WAS LESS THAN IN PRE-1966. THIS IS PERHAPS DUE TO THE LARGE CUTS IN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PACKAGES BY CONGRESS. SINCE THE AID CUTS SEEM TO HAVE BEEN PARTLY IN RESPONSE TO VIETNAM, THEN VIETNAM INDIRECTLY AFFECTED U.S. POLICY TOWARDS INDIA.

FOREIGN AID, AS HAS IMPLICITLY BEEN NOTED, HAS BEEN A VERY IMPORTANT PART OF THE RELATIONS OF INDIA WITH DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. WITH THE UNITED STATES THIS WAS EVEN MORE TRUE. AND THUS THE CHANGES IN PERCENTAGE OF AID TO INDIA AS WELL AS THE WHOLE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REGION ARE INTERESTING. TABLE 5-1 BELOW GIVES THE PERCENTAGES.

27. THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE IS QUOTED IN WARREN ILCHMAN, "A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREIGN AID", ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. 7, No. 10, P. 680.

TABLE 5-1

AID TO NESA AND INDIA

(IN PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL U.S. AID)

	<u>NESA</u>	<u>INDIA</u>
1949-52	36.4	4.34
1953-61	33.2	7.57
1962-65	36.02	12.13
1966	28.0	12.51
1967	24.7	7.98
1968	23.5	9.2
1969	18.2	6.68

SOURCE: AID, U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS.

WHAT THIS TABLE INDICATES IS THAT AID TO THE NESA AREA REMAINED VERY LARGE UNTIL 1965 AND THEN BEGAN TO DECLINE UNTIL IT WAS ONLY HALF AS LARGE (IN PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL U.S. AID) AS IT HAD BEEN IN 1965. WITH REGARD TO INDIA, HER PERCENTAGE OUT OF U.S. AID INCREASED STEADILY UNTIL IT PEAKED IN 1966. SINCE THEN, U.S. AID TO INDIA HAS FALLEN CONSIDERABLY. IT IS WORTH NOTHING THAT 1965-66 IS THE PERIOD WHEN AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM INCREASED CONSIDERABLY, AS DID OPPOSITION TO THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY. WHILE IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THERE IS ANY CORRELATION BETWEEN DECLINING AID AND DECLINING INTEREST, IT SEEMS PLAUSIBLE TO ARGUE THAT WHERE AID WAS SUCH AN IMPORTANT INGREDIENT IN THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF THE NESA AREA, THIS PERCENTAGE DECLINE REFLECTS

MORE THAN JUST CUTS ON THE WHOLE AID BUDGET, BUT SOME KIND OF LESSENING OF INTEREST AS WELL.²⁸

WITH REGARD TO THE FIGURES PRESENTED IN TABLE 5-1, IT CAN BE CONTENDED THAT THEY ARE MISLEADING, SINCE THEY ARE PERCENTAGES OF THE TOTAL AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE DURING ANY GIVEN YEAR. AND SINCE INDIA HAS NEVER BEEN A LARGE RECIPIENT OF U.S. MILITARY AID, THE PERCENTAGES SHOULD BE CALCULATED WITH REFERENCE ONLY TO ECONOMIC AID. HOWEVER, SUCH AN ARGUMENT IS SAYING THAT ONE SHOULD IGNORE THE ESSENTIAL POINT, I.E. THE SHIFT TOWARDS MILITARY AID DURING THE VIETNAM WAR. THIS IS CLEARLY THE CASE, AS MILITARY AID ROSE FROM \$2.21 BILLION IN 1966 TO \$3.1 BILLION IN 1969, WHILE TOTAL AID REMAINED STEADY AROUND \$7.25 BILLION. BUT EVEN IF WE ACCEPT THIS ARGUMENT, A COMPARISON OF THE AMOUNT OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE INDIA WAS GETTING FROM AID DECLINED FOR THE PERIOD 1962-1965, INDIA RECEIVED \$1.5 BILLION APPROXIMATELY; WHILE 1966-1969 IT WAS \$1.23 BILLION, WHICH WORKS OUT TO AN ANNUAL DIFFERENCE OF \$65 MILLION.²⁹

YET THE GENERAL CUT IN AID (THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT) BECAUSE OF CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION ALSO AFFECTED INDIA. THOUGH AID TO INDIA WAS CRITICIZED BY LIBERALS AS WELL AS CONSERVATIVES, IT WAS THE CONSERVATIVES THAT JUSTIFIED LESS AID TO INDIA IN TERMS OF VIETNAM. THESE CONSERVATIVES PERHAPS BETTER REFLECTED THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIEW OF AID TO INDIA.

28. OF COURSE IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT VIETNAM WAS NOT THE ONLY REASON FOR DECLINING U.S. AID TO INDIA. THE OTHER REASONS WILL BE DISCUSSED IN THE FOLLOWING CHAPTER.

29. U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS AND ASSISTANCE, LOANS AND OBLIGATIONS AND LOANS AUTHORIZATIONS JULY 1, 1945 - JUNE 30, 1972. (NO PUBLICATIONS N.O.)

THEIR ARGUMENT WAS THAT INDIA WAS CONSTANTLY CRITICIZING AMERICAN POLICY IN VIETNAM, AND YET GETTING A LARGE SHARE OF AMERICAN AID. THIS SEEMED TO THEM MOST ANNOYING, SINCE THEY, LIKE JOHNSON, SAW AID IN TERMS OF RECIPROCITY. PERHAPS THE BEST EXAMPLE OF THIS IS AN EXCERPT FROM HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON FOREIGN AID IN 1968.

REP. GROSS: "DOES INDIA HAVE COMBAT TROOPS IN VIETNAM?"
 MR. LEWIS: "THEY DO NOT SIR."
 REP. GROSS: "THEY DON'T HAVE ANY?"
 MR. LEWIS: "NO."
 REP. GROSS: "WELL WHAT IS THEIR DEMONSTRATION OF APPRECIATION FOR THE HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS WE HAVE PUMPED INTO INDIA... WE ARE NOT ONLY NOT GETTING ANY HELP FROM THE INDIANS, WITH ALL THEIR SURPLUS MANPOWER, BUT WE ARE BEING UNDERMINED BY INDIA, MR. LEWIS."³⁰

THUS, ANGER WITH INDIA WAS NOT ONLY OVER LACK OF SUPPORT, BUT LACK OF NEUTRALITY. THESE KINDS OF VIEWS WERE REFLECTED IN VOTES IN CONGRESS. FOR INSTANCE, REP. GROSS LED A MOVE TO MAKE IT MANDATORY FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO CUT AID TO COUNTRIES TRADING WITH NORTH VIETNAM. THIS AMENDMENT WAS ACCEPTED IN THE HOUSE, BUT WAS DROPPED IN CONFERENCE. REP. GROSS' ATTEMPT TO REINSTATE THE AMENDMENT LOST BY ONLY FOUR VOTES (196-200).³¹ THEREFORE, IT SEEMS THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT IN CONGRESS FOR VIEWS SIMILAR TO REP. GROSS.

FINALLY, THERE IS THE QUESTION OF TIME. CHESTER BOWLES HAD ACCUSED THE ADMINISTRATION POLICY-MAKERS OF "NOT PAYING SUFFICIENT

30. HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT, 1961, PP. 235-6.

31. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, CONGRESS AND THE NATION, VOL. II, 1965-1968, WASHINGTON, D.C. 1969, PP. 84-85.

ATTENTION TO INDIA BECAUSE OF THEIR PREOCCUPATION WITH VIETNAM."³² HE FURTHER ACCUSES THE ADMINISTRATION OF ALLOWING THE SOVIET UNION TO INCREASE ITS ROLE IN INDIA BECAUSE OF THIS PREOCCUPATION. PART OF THE PROBLEM, HE CLAIMS, LAY IN THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE AREA, AND THAT THE BUREAU OF NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS WAS LARGELY INVOLVED IN QUESTIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST. THUS, WITH TOP OFFICIALS CONCERNED WITH VIETNAM AND THE AREA BUREAU CONCERNED WITH THE MID EAST, THE ONLY THING THAT HAS BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN INDIA'S POSITION ON THE "BACK BURNERS" IN WASHINGTON HAS BEEN INDIA'S BEING A DEMOCRACY.³³

WHAT CONCLUSION CAN BE REACHED FROM THE PRECEDING DISCUSSION? OBVIOUSLY VIETNAM DETERMINED A GREAT DEAL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, AFFECTED HER FOREIGN AID PROGRAM, AND CONSUMED THE TIME OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO THE DETRIMENT OF OTHER AREAS. THE INFLUENCE OF VIETNAM ON U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS, IN TERMS OF ATTEMPTS TO PRESSURE, IS OBVIOUS, BUT WHETHER THIS INDICATES A DECLINE IN INTEREST IS NOT THAT CLEAR. FOR IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT BOTH THE PRESSURE ATTEMPTS AS WELL AS THE DECLINE IN AID ARE LINKED TO ONE ANOTHER, AND THAT THEY INDICATE THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIA'S SUPPORT TO THE UNITED STATES. WHILE THIS MIGHT BE THE CASE, ALL THE INDICATIONS WOULD SERVE TO POINT IN THE OTHER DIRECTION. FIRSTLY, AS WAS NOTED IN THE LAST CHAPTER, THERE WAS GENUINE AMERICAN DISENTHUSIASM FOLLOWING THE INDO-PAK CONFLICT. FURTHERMORE, THERE WERE VERY FEW HIGH LEVEL OFFICIALS WHO CAME TO INDIA IN THE LAST TWO YEARS OF THE

32. NEW YORK TIMES, 24TH JULY, 1961, P. 2.

33. BOWLER (ARTICLE), OP. CIT., PP. 638-645.

JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION. THIRDLY, THERE IS BOWLES' CRITICISM OF THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION'S SPENDING A LOT OF TIME ON VIETNAM AND IGNORING INDIA. FOURTHLY, THE AMERICAN PRESSURE ON INDIA SEEMS TO HAVE EASED OFF IN 1967-68, INDICATING PERHAPS THAT THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZED ITS FAILURE TO CHANGE INDIA'S VIEWS AND THAT THEY MIGHT JUST AS WELL IGNORE THEM. SINCE INDIAN VIEWS OFTEN TENDED TO REFLECT THE SOVIET LINE, THE UNITED STATES MIGHT HAVE DECIDED THAT INDIA WAS NOT WORTH THE TROUBLE. FINALLY, AS SHALL BE NOTED IN THE NEXT CHAPTER, INDIA'S DOMESTIC PROBLEMS COINCIDED WITH THIS PERIOD AND THUS MAY HAVE REINFORCED THESE VIEWS.

THE BREAKDOWN OF RECIPROCITY, AT LEAST IN THE EYES OF THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION, COMBINED WITH THE LACK OF TIME AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL EFFECTS OF VIETNAM, ESPECIALLY IN CONGRESS, WERE TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE BEARING ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS INDIA. THEY CAME TOGETHER IN SUCH A MANNER THAT THEY TENDED TO REINFORCE THE LOWERED AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT THAT HAD FOLLOWED THE INDO-PAK CONFLICT. IT SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE NOTED THAT THE PROCESS WAS GRADUAL IN THAT RECIPROCITY BROKE DOWN FIRST, AND THEN CAME THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO VIETNAM. AID WAS CUT SMALLER EACH YEAR, RATHER THAN IN A SUDDEN ACTION, ALL OF WHICH REFLECTS AN INCREMENTAL PROCESS.

CHAPTER 6DISILLUSIONMENT WITH AID

THE REALIZATION THAT INDIA IN THE MID-1950'S WAS IN THE MIDDLE OF A FOREIGN EXCHANGE CRISIS BEGAN ONE OF THE BIGGEST ECONOMIC AID PROGRAMS TO THE THIRD WORLD. IN THE DECADE OR SO THAT FOLLOWED, INDIA BECAME THE LARGEST RECIPIENT OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. THIS AID, WHILE NOT NECESSARILY LEADING TO DEVELOPMENT, MANAGED TO FORESTALL ANY GRAVE ECONOMIC CRISIS THAT MAY HAVE DESTROYED THE VERY FABRIC OF INDIAN SOCIETY. THUS, AID HAS BEEN A VERY IMPORTANT PART OF AMERICAN-INDIAN TIES. THE AMOUNT OF AID INDIA HAS RECEIVED FROM THE UNITED STATES, OVER \$10 BILLION, HAS IN PART REFLECTED AN AMERICAN DESIRE NOT TO ALLOW INDIA TO GO OVER THE 'BRINK'. WHILE THIS AID MAY HAVE BEEN USED BY THE UNITED STATES TO GAIN POLITICAL SUPPORT, IT WAS NOT ONLY FOR THAT PURPOSE THAT INDIA WAS A RECIPIENT. ANY CUTBACKS IN AID WERE BOUND TO AFFECT INDIA AND HER RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. IN THE LAST CHAPTER, IT WAS NOTED THAT VIETNAM HAD BEGUN TO GNAW AWAY AT SUPPORT WITHIN CONGRESS FOR FOREIGN AID. IN THIS CHAPTER THE DECLINING SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC AID AND ITS REDUCED SIZE ARE GOING TO BE EXAMINED IN TERMS OF OTHER THAN VIETNAM. FOR IT IS PROBABLE THAT VIETNAM WAS JUST A CATALYST AND THAT THERE ARE MORE DEEP-SEATED REASONS FOR THE GRADUAL DISILLUSIONMENT THAT TOOK PLACE IN THE U.S. AFTER THE MID-SIXTIES AND STILL EXISTS. THE DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWS WILL BE AT BOTH THE GENERAL LEVEL AS WELL AS IN TERMS OF THE U.S. AND INDIA. THE DISILLUSIONMENT OVER AID WAS BROUGHT ON BY BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL STIMULI. THE FORMER WAS IN TERMS OF THE FAILURE OF AID TO MEET ITS STATED OBJECTIVES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRACY AND

PRO-AMERICANISM; THE LATTER, BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE TO FIND AN ADEQUATE RATIONALE FOR AID, THE DECLINE IN PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT FOR THE AID PROGRAM AND THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC PROBLEMS (AS WELL AS THE DOMESTIC EFFECTS OF VIETNAM WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED).

IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND THE DISILLUSIONMENT THAT DEVELOPED DURING THE LATE SIXTIES, IT IS IMPORTANT TO REVIEW THE ORIGINAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC AID THAT HAD DEVELOPED IN THE PREVIOUS DECADE. MILLIKAN AND ROSTOW PROBABLY PRESENTED THE DOCTRINE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE MOST COHERENT FORM. WHAT FOLLOWS IS A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THEIR PROPOSAL.

THEY ARGUED THAT IF THE ENDS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY WERE TO STOP COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND CREATE A WORLD IN WHICH "THREATS TO OUR SECURITY AND WAY OF LIFE ARE LESS LIKELY TO ARISE",² THEN ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT REASONS FOR FURTHERING THIS END WAS AN AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE THIRD WORLD. AMERICA, THE PROPOSAL READ, HAD DEVOTED TOO MUCH TIME TO TREATIES AND TOO LITTLE TIME TO CREATING DEMOCRACIES, WHICH WOULD NOT CREATE "CONFLICT BECAUSE THEIR NATIONAL INTERESTS PARALLEL OURS"³ SINCE CHANGE IN TRADITIONAL SOCIETY LED TO FLUIDITY AND RISING EXPECTATIONS, THERE WAS A DANGER THAT THESE SOCIETIES WOULD END UP COMMUNIST. IN ORDER TO STOP THIS FROM TAKING PLACE, IT WAS THE DUTY OF THE UNITED STATES TO KEEP DEVELOPMENT HAND IN HAND WITH THE RISE IN EXPECTATIONS. FOR AMERICANS,

"ALONE ... HAVE THE RESERVES TO MAKE STEADY AND SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC GROWTH AN ACTIVE POSSIBILITY."⁴

1. MAX P. MILLIKAN AND W.W. ROSTOW, A PROPOSAL, KEY TO AN EFFECTIVE FOREIGN POLICY, HARPER & BROTHERS, NEW YORK, 1957.

2. IBID., PP. 2-3.

3. IBID., P. 5.

4. IBID., PP. 39-40.

A DEEP ASSUMPTION IN THIS THEORY WAS THAT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LEADS TO POLITICAL MATURITY, AND THAT IN TURN LEADS TO DEMOCRACY; AMTOUGH THIS IS SOMEWHAT HEDGED, IT IS UNDOUBTEOLY A VERY KEY FACTOR.⁵

MILLIKAN-ROSTOW CONTENDED THAT THERE ARE THREE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND COUNTRIES IN EACH STAGE HAD TO BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY.⁶ THE FIRST STAGE IS ONE IN WHICH THE PRECONDITIONS FOR ECONOMIC PROGRESS ARE ESTABLISHED, SUCH AS EDUCATION, COMMUNICATIONS, INSTITUTIONS TO MOBILIZE CAPITAL, ETC. THE SECOND STAGE IS THE "TAKE-OFF" ONE, WHEN THE SOCIETY "BURSTS FORTH" WHERE SAVINGS RISE FROM 5 TO 10 PERCENT OF THE NATIONAL INCOME, 25-50% OF INCREASED OUTPUT IS PLOWED BACK INTO THE ECONOMY. THIS PHASE IS FOLLOWED BY THE THIRD STAGE, THAT OF SELF-SUSTAINED GROWTH OVER A LONG PERIOD, WITH REGULAR IF FLUCTUATING PROGRESS. DURING THE FIRST STAGE, AID REQUIREMENTS ARE MAINLY IN THE FORM OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, WITH LITTLE CAPITAL ASSISTANCE. THE TAKE-OFF STAGE INVOLVES A MUCH HEAVIER DOBAGE OF CAPITAL ASSISTANCE, AND THEREFORE THIS IS THE KEY STAGE IN TERMS OF A FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, SINCE IN THE THIRD STAGE IT IS PRESUMED THAT CAPITAL IS AVAILABLE FROM THE REGULAR INTERNATIONAL MONE-TARY MARKET. THE KEY TO THE AMOUNT OF AID TO BE GIVEN TO A PARTICULAR COUNTRY DEPENDS ON THAT COUNTRY'S ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY, THAT IS WHY STAGE 1 REQUIRES LITTLE CAPITAL AID AND STAGE 2 A GREAT DEAL OF IT. THUS, THE PROGRAM SHOULD NOT CONCERN ITSELF WITH SUBSIDIZING (DEFENCE SUPPORT AID FOR INSTANCE) BUT WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR EFFECTIVE USE OF AID. THE PROPOSAL ENVISAGED INCREASING THE AID PROGRAM BY ABOUT \$1 TO \$1.5 BILLION

5. ROBERT PACKENHAM, OP. CIT., MAKES THE SAME POINTS AND IT IS ONE OF HIS THREE DOCTRINES OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. (P. 4)

6. MILLIKAN & ROSTOW, OP. CIT., CHAPTER 5.

ANNUALLY. THEIR PROPOSAL CONCLUDES IN THE RHETORIC OF THE FIFTIES, THAT THIS KIND OF PROGRAM WOULD CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH,

"OUR FORM OF SOCIETY CAN DEVELOP WITH (ITS) HUMANISTIC PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE ITS FOUNDATIONIT IS DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE THE SURVIVAL OF A DEMOCRATIC AMERICAN SOCIETY AS AN ISLAND IN A TOTALITARIAN SEA."⁷

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS FEAR OF AMERICA IN A "TOTALITARIAN SEA" WAS QUITE GENUINE.

IT WAS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND AS WELL AS CRITICISM FROM DEMOCRATIC SENATORS THAT PUSHED THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION INTO CREATING THE DEVELOPMENT LOAN FUND (DLF) WHICH GAVE CAPITAL LOANS OF LOW INTEREST FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME. INDIA WAS ONE OF THE MOST IMMEDIATE BENEFICIARIES OF THIS ACTION. THIS DID NOT, HOWEVER, SATISFY THE DEMOCRATS WHO PRESSED FOR EVEN GREATER AMOUNTS OF AID, AS WELL AS A NEW AGENCY TO DEAL WITH THEM. THIS WAS LARGELY MET BY THE INCOMING KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, WHICH CREATED THE AGENCY OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID).

WHAT HAPPENED TO AID DURING THE MID-SIXTIES ONWARDS? ¹⁴FIGURE 6-1 WE SEE THAT THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF U.S. ASSISTANCE (INCLUDING MILITARY AND ECONOMIC) ACTUALLY REMAINED STEADY TILL 1969, AND THEN ROSE. HOWEVER, A CLOSER LOOK INDICATES THAT IN ACTUAL FACT THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND OTHER OFFICIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE* WERE THE ONLY TWO CATEGORIES TO REGISTER ANY UPWARD MOVEMENT. AT THE SAME TIME THE AID BUDGET, AS WELL AS OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL AID (PL480, ETC.) ACTUALLY DECLINED IN TOTAL DOLLAR VALUE, AS WELL AS IN PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF ASSISTANCE.

7. IBID., PP. 130 AND 132.

* THIS INCLUDES THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LOANS AND OTHER LOANS.

FIGURE-6-1
TOTAL U.S. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL LOANS AND GRANTS FY1946-72
(IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

SOURCE:
U.S.A.I.D., OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS, OP.CIT.p5.

THIS IS IN SPITE OF INFLATION THAT ACTUALLY CUT INTO THE DOLLAR VALUE OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, AND THE DEVALUATION OF 1971. IN FACT, WHILE BOTH MILITARY AID AND OTHER OFFICIAL AID REGISTER A STEEP RISE IN THE POST-DEVALUATION YEAR, THERE IS NO SIMILAR INCREASE IN THE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE. THUS, FIGURE 6-1 REFLECTS A DECREASE IN DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE, A RETURN TO THE 1950'S EMPHASIS ON LARGE AMOUNTS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE,⁸ AND AN INCREASE OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE BY SUCH AGENCIES AS THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK. THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK HAS ALWAYS HAD HIGH STANDING IN THE EXECUTIVE AS WELL AS CONGRESSIONAL BRANCHES, SINCE IT HAS BEEN A CONSERVATIVE INSTITUTION WHICH GAVE LOANS AT QUITE A HIGH INTEREST RATE, AND THUS TENDED TO BE 'COMMERCIAL.'

YET TO A LARGE PART THE REASONS FOR THE DECLINE OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WAS DUE TO CUTS BY CONGRESS. WHILE CUTS BY CONGRESS WERE NOTHING NEW, AND HAD IN FACT BEEN PART AND PARCEL OF THE AID BUDGET, THE INFLUENCE OF CONGRESS BEGAN TO RISE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 1960'S. TABLE 6-1 GIVES THE ADMINISTRATION REQUESTS FOR THIS TIME PERIOD. FROM THIS TABLE IT IS CLEAR THAT WHILE ADMINISTRATION REQUESTS WERE CONTINUALLY ABOVE \$2.5 BILLION, CONGRESS INCREASED THE AMOUNT IT CUT, EVENTUALLY DROPPING THE AID APPROPRIATIONS TO BELOW \$2 BILLION IN 1968. THE AID BUDGET NEVER CROSSED THE TWO BILLION MARK AGAIN. SECONDLY, THE TABLE ALSO SHOWS A DECLINE IN THE SIZE OF ADMINISTRATION REQUEST FOR AID. THIS REFLECTS TWO THINGS: THE REALIZATION THAT CONGRESS WAS NO LONGER GOING TO APPROPRIATE LARGE SUMS AND THUS THEY MAY AS WELL GIVE A REALISTIC BUDGET;

8. THIS LARGE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, ESPECIALLY DURING THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION MAY REFLECT IN PART THE VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM.

TABLE 6-1

AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION HISTORY FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE UNDER
I.F.A. ACT 1961 AND PREDECESSOR LEGISLATION (INCLUDING SUPPLEMENTALS)
1948-1973 (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

YEAR	AUTHORIZATION REQUEST A	AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS A	APPROPRIATION REQUEST A	APPROPRIATED BY CONGRESS
1948-49	7,370.0	6,913.0	7,370.0	6,446.3
1950	4,280.0	4,280.0	4,280.0	3,728.4
1951	2,950.0	2,762.5	2,950.0	2,262.5
1952	2,197.0	1,585.7	2,499.0	1,540.4
1953	2,475.0	1,894.3	1,543.2	1,782.1
1954	1,563.2	1,475.7	1,788.5	1,301.5
1955	1,798.1	1,581.9	1,812.8	1,528.8
1956	1,812.8	1,851.8	1,860.0	1,681.1
1957	1,660.0	1,815.1	1,964.4	1,749.1
1958	1,964.4	1,786.9	2,141.1	1,418.9
1959	2,142.1	1,070.6	2,330.0	1,933.1
1960	2,330.0	2,176.8	2,875.0	1,925.8
1961	2,875.0	1,786.3	2,883.5	2,631.4
1962	2,883.5	2,559.5	3,124.6	2,314.6
1963	3,281.3	3,074.8	2,461.7	2,573.0
1964	3,124.6	2,602.1	3,124.6	2,000.0
1965	2,461.7	2,452.0	2,461.7	2,195.0
1966	2,704.5	2,605.0	2,704.5	2,463.0
1967	3,443.4	2,628.0	2,469.0	2,143.5
1968	2,785.6	2,165.0	2,630.8	1,895.6
1969	2,554.2	1,609.8	2,498.5	1,280.6
1970	2,210.0	1,624.2	2,210.0	1,424.9
1971	2,093.7	2,093.7	2,008.0	1,733.9
1972	2,335.2	1,868.6	2,355.2	1,718.2
1973	1,970.5 D	1,206.5 D/E	2,256.6	1,664.2 F

A - ADJUSTED TO FISCAL YEAR BARS AND IND. EXEC. BRANCH ADJUSTMENTS

B - ADJUSTED TO FISCAL YEAR BARS AND IND. EXEC. BRANCH ADJUSTMENTS

C - INCL. BORROWING AUTHORITY DURING MARSHALL PLAN PERIOD 1948-1952.

D - INC. \$984,000,000 IN FY 1972 FOR DIV. ASSISTANCE IN FY 1973.

E - EXCL. SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE AND RUPEE RELIEF ASSISTANCE (BANGLADESH)
WHICH WERE NOT AUTHORIZED FY 1973.

F - REPRESENTS ANNUAL RATE CONTAINED IN COUNTERING RESOLUTION
(PL93-9 MARCH 1973)

SOURCE: A.I.D., OP. CIT., P. 12.

THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION DID NOT HAVE THE SAME COMMITMENT TO ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AS THE PREVIOUS TWO ADMINISTRATIONS. THE BEATING THAT AID TOOK IN THE LATE 1960'S IS REFLECTED IN THE FACT THAT WHILE THE TOTAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OFFY 1962 AND FY 1970 REFLECT A DECREASE OF 8.5%, THE AID BUDGET DROPS BY 33%.⁹

IF IT IS AGREED THAT ECONOMIC AID CONTINUED TO DECLINE FROM THE MID-SIXTIES ONWARDS, THEN THE QUESTION ARISES AS TO WHY THIS TOOK PLACE. IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE HAS ALWAYS BEEN A LARGE ANTI-AID BODY IN AMERICA. THIS GROUP HAS GENERALLY CONSISTED OF SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS AND THE MORE CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY. THEIR OPPOSITION TO AID, ESPECIALLY ECONOMIC AID, IS A REFLECTION OF NEO-ISOLATIONISM AND FISCAL CONSERVATISM. SPECIFICALLY, THEY CONSIDER AID TO BE THE GIVING AWAY OF AMERICAN RESOURCES. WHAT IS EVEN MORE INTERESTING IS THAT STATES WITH THE LOWEST POPULAR APPROVAL OF FOREIGN AID SEND 57% OF THE REPRESENTATIVES AND 52% OF THE SENATORS.¹⁰

AND WHILE NOT ALL THESE CONGRESSMEN REFLECT THE ATTITUDES OF THEIR STATES, A LARGE PROPORTION OF THEM DO AND THUS CREATE CONSIDERABLE OPPOSITION TO THE AID PROGRAM. WITH THIS NUCLEUS OF OPPOSITION TO AID CONSTANTLY BEING PRESENT, IT IS ONLY NECESSARY TO GAIN THE SUPPORT OF A REASONABLY SMALL SEGMENT OF OTHER CONGRESSMEN TO EFFECTIVELY REDUCE THE AID PROGRAM.

THE SECOND MAJOR PROBLEM THAT DEVELOPED FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE LAY IN THE TWO BASIC ASSUMPTIONS IN THE MILLIKAN-ROSTOW TREATISE, THAT

9. SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, "FOREIGN AID: FOR WHAT AND FOR WHOM?" IN R.F. HUNTER AND J.E. REILLY (ED.), DEVELOPMENT TODAY, PRAEGER, NEW YORK, 1972, P. 46.

10. Op. Cit., P. 32.

ECONOMIC AID LEADS TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LEADS TO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. THE PROBLEM IS NOT THAT THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC AID LEADING TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IS ALWAYS WRONG, BUT THAT IT IS NOT ALWAYS RIGHT. THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE VARIES FROM TIME AND PLACE, AND IN FACT "... THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE AMOUNTS OF AID RECEIVED ... AND THE GROWTH PERFORMANCE IS WEAK."¹¹ MAINLY BECAUSE FOREIGN AID IS ONLY ONE COMPONENT, AND THERE HAVE TO BE OTHERS SUCH AS PRIVATE INVESTMENT, BETTER ALLOCATION OF AID AND MORE EXPERIENCE, ETC.¹² IN THE LIGHT OF THE LACK OF PROGRESS AMONGST MANY OF THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES, IT IS HARDLY SURPRISING THAT ECONOMIC AID HAS LOST MUCH OF ITS SUPPORT. FOR AS SENATOR CHURCH NOTES, "AS FAR AS THE 'DECADE OF DEVELOPMENT', TEN YEARS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN AID ... HAVE FAILED TO NARROW THE GAP."¹³

EVEN IN CASES WHERE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (KOREA, TAIWAN AND IRAN ARE CITED AS EXAMPLES OF PROGRESS), THIS HAS NOT LED TO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN TERMS OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES. IF ANYTHING THERE HAS BEEN A DECLINE IN THE NUMBER OF STATES THAT PROFESSED TO BE DEMOCRACIES. NOR WAS THERE STABILITY; COUPS IN 17 OUT OF 20 LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 6 IN AFRICA AND 7 IN ASIA. DURING THE PERIOD 1962-65 THERE WERE 219 MILITARY CONFLICTS COMPARED TO 135 IN 1958-61 PERIOD.¹⁴ WITH REGARD TO STOPPING COMMUNISM,

11. L.B. PEARSON, "TWO DECADES OF DEVELOPMENT" IN GUSTAV RAVIS (ED.) THE UNITED STATES AND DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, W.W. NORTON & CO., NEW YORK, 1973, P. 51.

12. IBID., P. 52.

13. FRANK CHURCH, "FAREWELL TO FOREIGN AID", IN HUNTER & RIELLY, OP. CIT., P. 250.

14. PAACKENHAM, OP. CIT., PP. 9-10.

THE RATIONALE PRESENTED IN THE MILLIKAN-ROSTOW THESIS WAS NO LONGER ACCEPTED, FOR IF COUNTRIES DID NOT GO COMMUNIST IT WAS BECAUSE OF REASONS OTHER THAN ECONOMIC AID, SUCH AS THE STRENGTH OF THE CONSERVATIVE CLASS, ANTI-COMMUNISM IN THE PUBLIC IN THE THIRD WORLD AND NATIONALISM. WHILE MILITARY AID MAY HAVE HELPED COUNTER INSURGENCY, ECONOMIC AID HAD NO INFLUENCE ON WHAT HAPPENED, WITNESS CUBA AND CHILE.¹⁵

THE WHOLE CONCEPT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS A PRIME CONCERN FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY HAS NEVER BEEN ACCEPTED IN ITS TOTALITY.

"AID WAS PRIMARILY CONCEIVED AS AN INSTRUMENT OF CONTAINMENT, A WEAPON OF THE COLD WAR; AND IF SOME AMERICANS FAVORED MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND OTHERS ECONOMIC THAT TOO WAS A MATTER OF TACTICS."¹⁶

THEREFORE, THE INABILITY OF FOREIGN AID TO DETERMINE WHETHER COUNTRIES WERE GOING TO GO COMMUNIST, SOCIALIST OR DEMOCRATIC UNDERCUT THE RATIONALE FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT AMERICAN CONGRESSMEN OFTEN DO NOT DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN COMMUNISM AND SOCIALISM, ESPECIALLY AS THEY SEE THE GROWTH OF LARGE PUBLIC SECTORS IN UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND AN IMPRESSIVE ARRAY OF RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT. THE WEAKENING OF SUPPORT REFLECTS, IN PART, THAT THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF POOR COUNTRIES IS IN ITSELF AND BY ITSELF NOT A HIGH PRIORITY FOR THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE WHEN THE RATIONALE IS THAT,

"ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SHOULD ITSELF BE A HIGH PRIORITY GOAL OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY BUT THAT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE SHOULD NOT REFLECT UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY."¹⁷

15. HUNTER & RIELLY, OP. CIT., P. 252.

16. IBID., P. 251.

17. HUNTER & RIELLY, OP. CIT., P. 26.

THE POINT IS THAT THE UNITED STATES IS WILLING TO PROVIDE AID ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS, TO PROVIDE A MINIMUM WELL-BEING AND NOT "TO PROMOTE OPTIMAL ECONOMIC GROWTH OF SOCIETIES." THUS, THE ARGUMENT FOR 1% OF THE GNP BEING DEVOTED TO ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IS WEAK, SINCE A PERCENTAGE CAN ONLY BE A GOAL NOT AN END IN ITSELF.¹⁸ IN OTHER WORDS, A PERCENTAGE POINT CANNOT BE A JUSTIFICATION IN ITSELF, THERE HAS TO BE SOMETHING MORE.

THE PROBLEM OF A RATIONALE FOR AID IS IMPORTANT, ESPECIALLY IN THE WAKE OF THE MYRDAL THESIS THAT ECONOMIC AID IS JUST A SIDE-SHOW. SUCH CRITICISM ADDED TO THE GROWING FEELING THAT NO AMOUNT OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WAS GOING TO LEAD TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THERE WAS A GROWING CONVICTION THAT UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES WERE BEYOND ANY HELP; THAT THE PROBLEMS IN THESE COUNTRIES WERE DUE TO POOR LEADERSHIP AND A LACK OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THEIR GOVERNMENTS; RAMPANT CORRUPTION AND MALADMINISTRATION;¹⁹ AND A REAL LACK OF WILL TO IMPROVE, BOTH AMONGST THE LEADERS AND THE GENERAL POPULACE OF THESE COUNTRIES. THUS,

"ON THE BASIS OF ALL THE NOTED EVIDENCE BEFORE US, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE RECEIVING COUNTRIES WILL STILL 20, 30, 40 YEARS HENCE, BE COMING FORWARD FOR SUBSIDIES AND HELP OF ONE SORT OR ANOTHER."²⁰

THE TIME FACTOR WAS ANOTHER WEIGHT AGAINST ECONOMIC AID, FOR WHILE MILLIKAN-ROSTOW HAD ENVISAGED A QUICK "TAKE-OFF" TO SELF-SUSTAINED GROWTH, A DECADE LATER NOTHING MUCH HAD HAPPENED. AMERICAN POLITICIANS SAW THIS AS A PROGRAM WITHOUT AN END, AND PROGRAMS WITH NO END TEND TO LOSE

18. IBID., PP. 31-33.

19. CORRUPTION, OF COURSE, NOT ONLY EXISTS IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES BUT IN DEVELOPED SOCIETIES. HOWEVER, DEVELOPED SOCIETIES CAN ABSORB IT WITHOUT GREAT ECONOMIC HARDSHIP; THIS IS NOT TRUE OF STATES WHERE RESOURCES ARE VERY SCARCE.

20. HERBERT FELDMAN, "AID AS IMPERIALISM? IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, VOL. 43, NO. 2, P. 231.

SUPPORT SINCE POLITICIANS ARE CONCERNED WITH SHORT-TERM GAINS AND NOT THE LONG HAUL.²¹ THIS IS ONE REASON WHY THE MARSHALL PLAN HAD SUPPORT; IT FORESAW A TIME LIMIT TO ITS OPERATIONS. THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID PROGRAM SEEMED MORE LIKE DROPPING PENNIES INTO A WELL WITHOUT A BOTTOM, AND NO MATTER HOW MUCH YOU PUT IN, YOU HAD NO IDEA WHEN IT WOULD FILL UP.

BESIDES THE LACK OF A RATIONALE OF WHY AMERICA SHOULD HAVE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF UDC'S AS ITS PRIORITY PROGRAM, AID HAS ALSO SUFFERED IN THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, EVEN THOUGH TIED TO PURCHASES IN THE U.S., FOR THE MOST PART IS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE A JOB CREATING AND/OR ECONOMIC WELL-BEING INDUSTRY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE DEFENCE BUDGET GETS CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT BY TRADING THE LOCATION OF DEFENCE CONTRACTS AND BASES FOR POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE REST OF ITS PROGRAM. SINCE CONGRESSMEN ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE WELL-BEING OF THEIR CONSTITUENCIES, EVEN IF FOR SELFISH REASONS, THE PROMISE OF OR THE THREAT TO STOP EXPENDITURES IN THEIR PART OF THE COUNTRY IS A VERY USEFUL TOOL. AID DOES NOT HAVE THIS INFLUENCE, NOR DOES IT HAVE EFFECTIVE PRIVATE LOBBIES WORKING FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF ITS REQUESTS. THOSE LOBBIES THAT DO EXIST HAVE A MINIMUM OF INFLUENCE ON THE OUTCOME OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS. NOR IS PUBLIC OPINION PARTICULARLY FAVOURABLE ON THE QUESTION OF "GIVING AWAY" MONEY. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THOSE THAT ARE IN FAVOUR OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TEND TO BE LESS FORCEFUL AND DEMANDING THAN THOSE OPPOSED TO AID. FURTHERMORE, THESE PRESSURE GROUPS, SUCH AS THEY ARE, SUFFER FROM PROBLEMS SUCH AS:

21. HUNTER & RIELLY, Op. Cit., p. 25.

(1) NOT NARROW ENOUGH SO AS NOT TO INVOLVE PARTISAN POLITICS,
 (2) SUFFICIENT KNOWLEDGE, (3) OFTEN LACK A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN LOBBY-
 ING, (4) THE GROUPS TEND TO CONTRADIOT ONE ANOTHER, (5) OFTEN SPEND A
 GREAT DEAL OF TIME TRYING TO CONVINCE THEIR RANK AND FILE.²²

THE FOREIGN AID PROGRAM HAS BEEN A CREATION OF THE EXECUTIVE AND
 THAT IS ITS MAIN SOURCE OF POLITICAL SUPPORT AND STRENGTH. O'LEARY HAS
 NOTED THAT SUPPORT IN CONGRESS ON FOREIGN AID IS GENERALLY RELATED TO
 SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT FROM HIS OWN PARTY.²³ THIS IN PART REFLECTS THE
 POST-WAR CONSENSUS ON FOREIGN POLICY. A HISTORY OF FOREIGN AID WILL
 SHOW THAT IT WAS BEEN A PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAM. TRUMAN LAUNCHED BOTH THE
 MARSHALL PLAN AND THE POINT FOUR PROGRAMME, THE DLF WAS CREATED BY
 EISENHOWER (WITH CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE), AID AND THE PEACE CORPS WERE
 BOTH THE RESULTS OF KENNEDY'S HANDIWORK, JOHNSON, WHILE FAILING TO GET
 HIS MULTI-YEAR AID PROGRAM THROUGH, WAS A CONSISTENT SUPPORTER OF AID.
 THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION WAS RATHER QUIET ON THE WHOLE QUESTION OF
 ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. PRESIDENT NIXON REFUSED TO GO EITHER ONE WAY OR
 THE OTHER WHEN THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACTS BILLS CAME BEFORE CONGRESS,
 GENERALLY LEAVING IT TO THE AGENCIES INVOLVED TO DEAL WITH CONGRESS AS
 BEST THEY COULD. IN PART, THIS REFLECTED THE "LOW PROFILE AND SELF-
 HELP" ATTITUDE OF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION TOWARDS UNDERDEVELOPED
 COUNTRIES.²⁴ IT ALSO REFLECTED THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE NIXON ADMINI-

22. O'LEARY, OP. CIT., PP. 33-34, 46-52.

23. IBID., P. 46-52. HOWEVER, THIS IS NOT ENTIRELY TRUE, AS WAS
 NOTED EARLIER. SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS AND CONSERVATIVE REPUBLICANS HAVE
 CONSISTENTLY BEEN AID-AID WHILE LIBERAL DEMOCRATS HAVE FAVOURED AID.

24. R.E. HUNTER, "THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD" IN HUNTER AND
 REILLY, OP. CIT., P. 17.

STRATION TO WASTE POLITICAL CREDIT ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE THUS PROVING THE POINT THAT ECONOMIC AID WAS NOT THAT IMPORTANT TO AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. CONGRESSMAN FRASER, A LONGTIME SUPPORTER OF AID, NOTES SOMEWHAT BITTERLY, "WE HAVE NOT HAD A MAJOR EFFORT BY A PRESIDENT IN AID FOR THE PAST HALF-DOZEN YEARS."²⁵

THE GROWING DOMESTIC AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ARE ALSO IMPORTANT FACTORS IN THE DECLINE OF THE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. THE REALIZATION OF THE STATE OF AMERICA'S POOR, THE CONDITION OF AMERICAN CITIES, AND THE 'LONG HOT SUMMERS' OF RACIAL VIOLENCE HAD CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE ON THE LIBERALS IN CONGRESS WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY SUPPORTED AID. TO THEM, THE TIME HAD COME TO PAY MORE ATTENTION AND SPEND GREATER RESOURCES IN ALLEVIATING THESE PROBLEMS AT HOME THAN ABROAD. NOR HAS THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES HELPED. AMERICA HAS HAD A CONTINUED AND GROWING BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM AND AN INCREASING NATIONAL DEBT. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, A NUMBER OF AID CRITICS QUESTIONED THE NEED TO SEND MONEY OUT OF THE COUNTRY WHEN THE UNITED STATES FINDS ITSELF IN FINANCIAL STRAITS. THE BEST EXAMPLE OF THIS IS CONGRESSMAN WOLFF WHO CRITICIZED THE INDO-U.S. RUPEE SETTLEMENT AS A WASTE OF U.S. RESOURCES, "ESPECIALLY AT A TIME WHEN THERE ARE GREAT NEEDS IN THIS NATION ..."²⁶ (EVEN THOUGH THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT TOUCH THOSE 'RESOURCES'.)

IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID ABOVE, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE

25. DONALD M. FRASER, "THE POLITICS OF AID LEGISLATION" IN IBID., PP. 244-45.

26. HEARINGS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA, OF HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, THE INDIAN RUPEE SETTLEMENT, 93RD CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION, CPO WASHINGTON 1974, P. 16.

AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS LIKELY TO TAKE AN UPWARD TURN. THE AMERICAN ECONOMY HAS STILL NOT RECOVERED; THE HIGH OIL PRICES ARE MAKING BALANCE OF PAYMENT DIFFICULTIES EVEN GREATER, THERE IS HIGH DEFICIT BUDGETING AND THE ADMINISTRATION IS NOT ATTEMPTING TO CHANGE THE CONGRESSIONAL MOOD ON FOREIGN AID. IF ANYTHING, THE POOR COUNTRIES ARE LOWER ON THE AMERICAN LIST OF PRIORITIES, AND NO NEW RATIONALE FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IS ABOUT TO EMERGE. WITH THIS, IT IS TIME TO BRIEFLY REVIEW INDIA'S DOMESTIC PROBLEMS AND HOW THEY RELATE TO THIS DISILLUSIONMENT AND OUTBACK IN AID.

WHAT HAPPENED IN INDIA IS IMPORTANT FOR TWO REASONS: (1) INDIA WAS SEEN IN THE EARLY SIXTIES AS A COUNTRY THAT WAS READY FOR THE 'TAKE-OFF' STAGE AND (2) THIS PAPER CONCERNS ITSELF WITH AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS INDIA AND THEREFORE IT IS IMPORTANT TO SEE HOW THE REACTION TO INDIA'S FAILURE TO ENTER THE SELF-GROWTH PHASE IN SPITE OF HEAVY INFUSION OF AID. DURING THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT PERIOD, INDIA HAS RECEIVED 13% OF TOTAL AMERICAN ECONOMIC AID, AND 44% OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC AID IN THE NESA AREA THUS BECOMING THE LARGEST RECIPIENT OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. FURTHERMORE, INDIA HAS RECEIVED LARGE SUMS OF AID FROM OTHER MEMBERS OF THE AID INDIA CONSORTIUM - THE AVERAGE AID TO INDIA DURING THE 1960'S FROM THE CONSORTIUM COUNTRIES AND THE EASTERN BLOC IS AROUND \$1 BILLION ANNUALLY. YET, IN SPITE OF ALL THIS, INDIA HAS NOT SHOWN A GREAT DEAL OF PROGRESS, THE GNP HAS SHOWN AN AVERAGE GROWTH RATE OF 4.2% DURING THE 1960'S WHICH IS EXACTLY THE SAME AS IT WAS DURING THE 1950'S.²⁷ THUS,

27. "RICHARD J. WARD, "LONG THINK ON DEVELOPMENT" IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, - VOL. 46, No. 1, P. 16.

INDIA'S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE BEARS CLOSER LOOKING INTO.

TABLE 6-2 NOTES THE CHANGE IN NATIONAL PRODUCT DURING THE PERIOD 1960-61 TO 1967-68, AND CLEARLY INDICATES THE PROBLEM OF STATISTICS. WHEN ONE LOOKS AT THE NATIONAL PRODUCT AND THE NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA AT CURRENT PRICES, THE PICTURE SEEMS QUITE BRIGHT, THE FORMER HAVING DOUBLED AND THE LATTER HAVING INCREASED BY 77 POINTS. HOWEVER, WHEN BOTH THESE ITEMS ARE VIEWED IN TERMS OF 1960-61 PRICES, THE PICTURE IS CONSIDERABLY LESS FAVOURABLE. AFTER A SLOW RISE IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 1960'S, THERE IS A SHARP DECLINE IN 1965-67 WITH THE GNP PER CAPITA ACTUALLY DROPPING BELOW THE 1960 BASE IN 1967. OF COURSE, THE IMMEDIATE EXCUSE TO THIS IS THAT INDIA SUFFERED ITS WORST DROUGHT DURING THIS PERIOD, AND THIS SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS AN INDICATION OF INDIA'S LACK OF PROGRESS. THIS ARGUMENT IS FALLACIOUS SINCE IT IGNORES THE IMPORTANT POINT THAT BY 1964-65 THE NATIONAL INCOME HAD ONLY GROWN BY 75 POINTS AT 1948-49 PRICES, AS TABLE 6-3 INDICATES. AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE INCREASE IN THE PER CAPITA INCOME WAS ONLY 25 POINTS, WHICH, IF AVERAGED OUT IS 1.6 PER YEAR, HARDLY CONSTITUTING A GREAT ECONOMIC GROWTH AND CERTAINLY NOWHERE NEAR WHAT MILLIKAN-ROSTOW EXPECTED. TABLE 6-4 SHOWS THE FLIGHT OF AGRICULTURE, AND WHILE THE DROUGHT YEARS 1965-67 ARE PARTLY RESPONSIBLE, THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR HAS BEEN UNABLE TO KEEP UP WITH THE RISE IN POPULATION. THIS, IN TURN, REFLECTS BAD PLANNING BY THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH UNTIL THE DROUGHTS WAS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT HEAVY INDUSTRY AND IMPORT SUBSTITUTION THAN THE MORE PRIMARY SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY. THE FAILURE TO BRING IN EFFECTIVE LAND REFORM IS JUST ANOTHER EXAMPLE

TABLE 6-2

INDIA'S NATIONAL PRODUCT 1960-1968

(BASE 1960-61 = 100)

	<u>60-61</u>	<u>61-62</u>	<u>62-63</u>	<u>63-64</u>	<u>64-65</u>	<u>65-66</u>	<u>66-67</u>	<u>67-68</u>
NAT. PROD. (CURRENT PRICE)	100.0	105.7	111.9	128.6	150.9	154.7	177.7	209.8
NAT. PROD. (1960-61 PRICES)	100.0	103.7	105.7	111.9	119.8	113.1	114.9	124.2
NAT. PROD./CAPITA (CURRENT PRICE)	100.0	103.3	106.6	119.7	137.1	153.6	153.6	177.0
NAT. PROD./CAPITA (1960-61 PRICES)	100.0	101.3	100.7	104.1	108.8	100.2	98.6	104.8

SOURCE: ANNUAL INDIA YEAR BOOK, 1960-1969, BY MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING, NEW DELHI.

TABLE 6-3

INDIA'S NATIONAL INCOME 1960-1967

(BASE 1948-49 = 100)

NAT. INCOME								
CURRENT PR.	163.5	171.1	178.0	199.0	236.2	235.1	287.3	N.A.
1960-61 PR.	147.2	151.0	153.9	161.5	173.4	169.5	172.8	N.A.
NAT. INCOME PER CAPITA								
CURRENT PR.	130.5	133.6	136.0	148.6	172.4	167.7	185.4	N.A.
1960-61 PR.	117.5	117.8	116.9	119.9	125.7	120.9	120.5	N.A.

SOURCE: ANNUAL INDIA YEAR BOOK, 1960-1969, BY MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING, NEW DELHI.

TABLE 6-4

INDIA'S AGRICULTURE 1964-1968

(BASE 1949-50 = 100)

	<u>64-65</u>	<u>65-66</u>	<u>66-67</u>	<u>67-68</u>
FOOD GRAINS	149.1	129.9	123.8	159.9
OTHER CROPS	174.9	156.4	148.5	165.7
ALL	157.6	132.7	132.0	161.8

SOURCE: ANNUAL INDIA YEAR BOOK, 1960-1969, BY MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING, NEW DELHI.

28

OF THE MISMANAGEMENT AND LACK OF POLITICAL STRENGTH.

DURING THIS SAME PERIOD OF TIME THAT THE INDIAN ECONOMY WAS STAGNATING, THERE WAS INCREASING DOMESTIC INSTABILITY. THE CONGRESS PARTY HAD LOST NEHRU IN 1964, AND IT WITH INDIA SEEMED TO BE "PUTTERING ALONG WITH NO CLEAR DESTINATION IN MIND."²⁹ THE FOOD SHORTAGES ILLUMINATED THE WEAKNESS OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN BEING ABLE TO PERSUADE SURPLUS STATES TO SUPPLY ENOUGH FOODGRAINS TO DEFICIT STATES. THIS, IN PART, REFLECTED THE CENTRIFUGAL TENDENCIES THAT HAD BEEN GROWING IN INDIA. IN THE NORTH-EASTERN STATE OF ASSAM, THE ARMY WAS INVOLVED IN TRYING TO PUT DOWN NAGA AND MIZO TRIBESMEN WHO WERE DEMANDING AUTONOMY IF NOT INDEPENDENCE. THE 1967 GENERAL ELECTION DID LITTLE TO CLEAR THE AIR; THE CONGRESS PARTY MAINTAINED ITSELF IN THE CENTRE WITH A REDUCED MAJORITY, BUT LOST MANY OF THE STATES. HOWEVER, BECAUSE MANY OF THESE STATES HAD NO PARTY IN THE MAJORITY, THERE WAS A PERIOD OF SHIFTING COALITIONS WITH GOVERNMENTS COMING AND GOING WITH A REGULARITY SIMILAR TO THAT IN ITALY. THE AMOUNT OF VIOLENCE IN THE SOCIETY AS A WHOLE INCREASED, ESPECIALLY THE GROWING NUMBER OF RIOTS THAT ENDED UP WITH POLICE USING ARMS TO QUELL THE RIOTS. IN BENGAL, RIVAL COMMUNISTS AND SOCIALISTS BEGAN A THREE-YEAR PERIOD OF POLITICAL MURDERS. WRITING IN 1967, FELDMAN CONCLUDED,

"... THE FOOD SHORTAGE APPEARS TO BE ENDEMIC, THAT SOCIAL UNREST AND VIOLENCE ARE WIDESPREAD, AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT HAS SUFFERED A LOSS OF AUTHORITY THAT MAY PROVE DESTRUCTIVE TO THE REPUBLIC."³⁰

28. WHILE ALL STATES HAVE SOME KIND OF LAND REFORM LEGISLATION ON THEIR STATUTES BOOKS, THEY ARE OFTEN FILLED WITH LOOPHOLES. FURTHERMORE, UNTIL OF LATE THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE WILL TO IMPLEMENT THESE LAND REFORMS ESPECIALLY IN CONGRESS HELD STATES, SINCE A LARGE PART OF THE CONGRESS PARTY'S SUPPORT ORIGINATES FROM THE LANDLORDS.

29. SELIE HARRISON, "TROUBLED INDIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS" IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, VOL. 43, NO. 1, P. 314.

30. FELDMAN, OP. CIT., P. 221.

THUS, NOT ONLY HAD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FAILED, BUT THE EFFECT ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT WAS SEEMINGLY IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. INSTEAD OF DEMOCRACY BECOMING MORE DEEP-ROOTED, THE ROOTS SEEMED TO HAVE BEGUN TO ROT.

THE RELEVANCE OF ALL THIS WAS NOT LOST TO THE AMERICAN CONGRESS WHICH WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO INDIA, BEGAN TO QUESTION THE VIABILITY OF AID AS A TOOL FOR SOLVING THESE PROBLEMS. REPRESENTATIVE BROOMFIELD QUESTIONED WHETHER AID COULD COMBAT ALL THESE PROBLEMS AS AID OFFICIALS CLAIMED. HE NOTED THAT,

"DURING THE PERIOD OF FOREIGN AID, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS HAVE INCREASED RATHER THAN DECREASED.

... LANGUAGE DIVISIONS HAVE ALSO SHARPENED, THE CONGRESS PARTY HAS LOST GROUND POLITICALLY AND ITS LEADERSHIP IS DIVIDED.

THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT HAS HAD TO ASSUME THE ADMINISTRATION OF STATE GOVERNMENTS. THESE PROBLEMS ARE BEYOND THE REACH, IN ANY JUDGMENT, OF FOREIGN AID. YET THEIR PERSISTENCE MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR SUCH AID TO BE EFFECTIVE ..."³¹

THERE WAS ALSO A CALL FOR LOWERING THE PRIORITY OF INDIA IN THE AID PROGRAM. CONGRESS ALSO REFLECTED THOSE FEELINGS MENTIONED EARLIER ABOUT WASTING OF RESOURCES IN INDIA RATHER THAN USING THEM AT HOME. AID OFFICIALS CAME INTO CONSIDERABLE CRITICISM FOR TRYING TO PAINT 'ROSY PICTURES' AND GENERALLY THE HEARINGS ON FOREIGN AID TO INDIA WERE MARKED WITH CONSIDERABLE DISILLUSIONMENT OVER THE WHOLE PROGRAM.³²

31. HEARINGS OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1969, GPO, WASHINGTON 1969, PP. 75-78.

32. FOR EXAMPLES OF THIS SEE IBID., PP. 74-79, AND HEARINGS OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT 1968, GPO, WASHINGTON 1968, PP. 213-246.

IN THIS CHAPTER AN ATTEMPT HAS BEEN MADE TO SHOW THE DISILLUSIONMENT THAT TOOK PLACE WITH AID, ESPECIALLY ECONOMIC AID, DURING THE LATE SIXTIES. IN ORDER TO PRESENT A CLEAR PICTURE, THE BACKGROUND AS WELL AS THE CAUSES OF THIS DISILLUSIONMENT HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED. THE LAST PART OF THIS CHAPTER HAS TRIED TO SHOW THAT SOME OF THE CAUSES WERE REFLECTED IN WHAT HAPPENED IN INDIA AND UNDOUBTEDLY INFLUENCED DECISION-MAKERS IN THE UNITED STATES. THE WHOLE PURPOSE OF ALL THIS HAS BEEN TO SUPPORT THE ARGUMENT THAT A DECLINE IN AID, MAINLY ECONOMIC, IMPLICITLY INDICATES A DOWNGRADING OF THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIA TO THE UNITED STATES, AND THUS REFLECTS A DECLINE IN INTEREST. THIS IS A DECLINE IN INTEREST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIA, FOR THAT IS NO LONGER A PRIORITY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. THIS DOWNGRADING OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POOR COUNTRIES IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES REFLECTS A CONSIDERABLE CHANGE SINCE THE EARLY SIXTIES. THIS LOWERING OF PRIORITIES WAS NOT SOMETHING THAT HAPPENED SUDDENLY, BUT DEVELOPED DURING THE MIDDLE AND LATE SIXTIES; THIS IN PART REFLECTS AN INCREMENTAL MOVEMENT - ONE THAT MOVED AWAY FROM ECONOMIC AID AS AN IMPORTANT TOOL FOR AMERICAN POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT PER SE AS A GOAL. SINCE THE AID LINK WAS A VERY IMPORTANT FACET OF AMERICAN-INDIAN RELATIONS, AS ECONOMIC AID WENT, SO WENT INDIA IN TERMS OF PRIORITIES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.

2 2

OF/DE

CHAPTER 7A NEW APPROACH AND CONFLICT ON THE SUBCONTINENT

THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION CAME INTO POWER WITH THE LEGACY OF THE COLD WAR EXEMPLIFIED IN VIETNAM. THE WORLD, HOWEVER, HAD PASSED OUT OF THE PERIOD OF AMERICAN SUPREMACY AND TOWARDS A MORE DISTRIBUTED POWER ERA. THE SOVIET UNION WAS COMPARABLE TO THE UNITED STATES IN STRATEGIC ARMS, EUROPE AND JAPAN HAD BECOME ECONOMIC GIANTS, WHILE CHINA HAD EMERGED AS A NUCLEAR POWER. VIETNAM HAD DESTROYED THE CONSENSUS ON FOREIGN POLICY IN AMERICA, WHICH HAD DOMINATED THE TWO PREVIOUS DECADES. THERE WAS A GROWING CONVICTION IN AMERICA THAT SHE HAD PAID TOO MUCH ATTENTION TO THE WORLD AND HAD IGNORED DOMESTIC ISSUES, SUCH AS POVERTY AND RACIAL CONFLICT. AMERICAN SOCIETY WAS BITTERLY DIVIDED BY THE WAR, AS WELL AS BEING DISILLUSIONED. AMERICA HAD GONE FORTH INTO THE WORLD IN THE 1960'S WITH HER SENSE OF MISSION, TO MAKE THE WORLD A BETTER, MORE PEACEFUL AND MORE AMERICAN WORLD TO LIVE IN. INSTEAD, SHE HAD FOUND THAT THE WORLD WAS NOT SO KEEN ON BEING AMERICAN, AND INSTEAD OF PEACE SHE WAS INVOLVED IN WARS THAT SHE COULD NOT WIN. IN SPITE OF ALL THIS, THERE WERE A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF AMERICANS WHO DID NOT WANT TO 'LOSE' THE WAR. IT WAS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THAT THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION HAD TO FORMULATE A FOREIGN POLICY, ONE THAT WOULD HOPEFULLY REBUILD THE CONSENSUS.

THE MOST IMMEDIATE AREA OF CONCERN WAS VIETNAM, AS IT HAD BEEN FOR MUCH OF THE SIXTIES. THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION HAD TO COME OUT WITH A VIABLE PLAN THAT WOULD DIFFUSE THE OPPOSITION AT HOME, YET EXTRACT AMERICA FROM VIETNAM "WITH HONOUR", AND A REDEFINING OF AMERICA'S ROLE, BOTH IN ASIA AND THE WORLD AT LARGE. YET INVOLVED IN THIS WAS THE INHERENT

CONTRADICTION BETWEEN NOT LOSING A WAR AND NORMALIZING RELATIONS.¹ FOR WHAT NIXON WANTED IN VIETNAM WAS A KOREAN TYPE OF STALEMATE. THAT IS, HE WANTED TO DEVELOP THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES TO A LEVEL WHERE THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE OVER ALL THE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE DEFENCE OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND THEN HOPE THAT THE SITUATION WOULD STALEMATE INTO A WEARY NORTH VIETNAM ACCEPTING THE DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY.² BUT IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THIS, THE UNITED STATES HAD TO BUY TIME BY ACTUALLY ESCALATING THE CONFLICT AND TO MAKE IT EFFECTIVE WITHOUT CONFRONTATION WITH EITHER THE SOVIET UNION OR CHINA. THIS BECAME THE EARLIEST MOTIVATING FACTOR IN DETENTE, AND THE REOPENING OF 'RELATIONS' WITH CHINA.

"THE COUP DE GRACE ... WAS TO BE THE SKILLFUL MANIPULATION OF THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT TO OPEN THE DOOR WIDER FOR THE EVENTUAL OPTION OF SATURATION BOMBING AND MINING OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PORTS."³

WHILE DETENTE'S INITIAL IMPETUS MAY HAVE COME FROM THE VIETNAM CRISIS, THE ACTUAL GUAM (LATER NIXON) DOCTRINE CERTAINLY ORIGINATED FROM AN EFFORT TO RESPOND TO A CHANGED WORLD, BOTH INTERNATIONALLY AND DOMESTICALLY.

THIS CHANGED WORLD, AS THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION SAW IT, HAD FIVE BASIC POINTS. FIRSTLY, THAT THERE HAD BEEN A RECOVERY OF EUROPE AND JAPAN, "WITH THE RESULT THAT BOTH THEIR ROLES AND OURS ... MUST BE ADJUSTED TO

1. RAYMOND ARON, "RICHARD NIXON AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY", DAEDALUS, VOL. 101, NO. 4, P. 4.

2. THE OTHER ARGUMENT THAT CAN BE PUT FORWARD IS THAT THE UNITED STATES WANTED TO LEAVE VIETNAM WITH A FACADE OF HAVING ACCOMPLISHED WHAT IT SET OUT TO DO, AND THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE COULD WAIT JUST LONG ENOUGH FOR AMERICA TO SAVE HER 'HONOUR' BEFORE BRINGING DOWN THE ROTTEN EDIFICE.

3. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, "THE UNITED STATES IN THE NIXON ERA." DAEDALUS, VOL. 101, NO. 4, P. 30.

REFLECT THEIR VIGOR AND SELF-ASSURANCE."⁴ SECONDLY, THAT THERE WAS A SELF-RELIANCE AMONG NEW STATES THAT COULD LOOK AFTER THEIR OWN WELL-BEING AND THUS DID NOT NEED TO BE BACKED UP. THIRDLY, THAT THERE HAD BEEN A BREAK-UP OF THE COMMUNIST MONOLITH, AND THAT THESE COMMUNIST STATES RESPONDED MORE TO NATIONAL INTEREST THAN IDEOLOGICAL FERVOR. FOURTHLY, INSTEAD OF A STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY, THERE WAS A STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND U.S.S.R. AND FINALLY, THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FELT THAT OTHER NATIONS MUST CARRY A GREATER "BURDEN OF WORLD LEADERSHIP" WHILE THE AMERICAN ROLE BECAME MORE RESTRAINED.⁵ IN RESPONSE TO THESE, THE NIXON DOCTRINE ADVOCATED "A NEW GLOBAL STRUCTURE BASED UPON A DYNAMIC BUT HOPEFULLY STABLE MULTI-BALANCE OF POWER",⁶ WHICH HAD AS ITS THREE PILLARS STRENGTH, PARTNERSHIP AND NEGOTIATIONS.

IN THIS NEW WORLD ORDER, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES ARE THE HEAVYWEIGHTS WHO WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE CONFRONTATION, BUT THEY MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THEIR GLOBAL TRUSTEESHIP. AND THUS THE DOCTRINE ADVOCATES THE PURSUIT AS WELL AS THE RESTRAINING OF NATIONAL INTEREST, IN THE LATTER CASE FOR THE GREATER GOOD. IN DOING THIS IT ARGUES FOR A REAL-POLITIK APPROACH, WHICH "APPEARS TO BE THE REGULATING MECHANISM OF THE MULTIPOLAR BALANCE",⁷ SO THAT THE BIG POWERS WILL NOT ALLOW SELFISHNESS TO LEAD TO A STATE OF WAR. FOR THE TWO SUPERPOWERS IT COULD MEAN AVOIDING THE DESIRE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SITUATIONS. A SIMILAR, THOUGH LESSER,

4. RICHARD NIXON, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S: THE EMERGING STRUCTURE OF PEACE, A REPORT TO CONGRESS, FEB. 9, 1972, P. 7.

5. IBID., P. 7.

6. W.F. HAHN, "THE NIXON DOCTRINE: DESIGN AND DILEMMAS", ORIS, VOL. 12, (SUMMER 1972,) P. 363.

7. IBID., P. 365.

ROLE IS SEEN FOR CHINA. CHINA IS IMPORTANT TO THE SYSTEM BECAUSE OF HER POWER POTENTIAL AND SIZE, AND SOVIET CONCERN OVER HER. SHE IS TO FUNCTION AS A BLOCK AGAINST SOVIET DESIGNS IN ASIA, AND WHILE THE UNITED STATES CONCEDES TO CHINA SOME GROWING INFLUENCE IN ASIA, IT HOPES TO KEEP THAT IN CHECK. THIS IT IS HOPED WOULD BE DONE BY JAPAN, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND U.S. NAVAL AND AIRPOWER. JAPAN, ALONG WITH EUROPE, ARE "ANCHORS OF REGIONAL BALANCE ON OPPOSITE SIDES OF THE EURASIAN LAND MASS",⁸ AND WHILE BOTH STILL NEED THE PROTECTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AT THE MOMENT, IT IS HOPED THAT THEY WILL EVENTUALLY SHARE THE BURDEN. HOWEVER, THE NIXON DOCTRINE SEES THE POSSIBILITY OF TWO PROBLEMS HINDERING THIS: THE FAILURE OF EUROPE TO UNITE; THE INABILITY OF JAPAN TO OVERCOME ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIER AGAINST PLAYING THE ROLE OF A GREAT POWER. AS FAR AS THE REST OF THE WORLD WAS CONCERNED, THE NIXON DOCTRINE DID NOT SAY VERY MUCH. ASIAN STATES WERE EXPECTED TO ADJUST TO THE AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL THE BEST THEY COULD, AND EMPHASIS WAS PLACED ON SELF-HELP. TOWARDS AFRICA THERE WAS NO REAL POLICY, AND SOUTH AMERICA CONTINUED TO BE TREATED BY THAT MYOPIO VIEW THAT HAD DOMINATED PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS.⁹

MORE FUNDAMENTAL TO THE DOCTRINE ARE ITS ASSUMPTIONS WHICH ARE: NATIONAL INTEREST RATHER THAN IDEOLOGY DETERMINES BEHAVIOUR OF STATES; THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA ACCEPT INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY AS OPPOSED TO

8. *IBID.*, P. 366.

9. PIERRE HASSNER, "PRAGMATIC CONSERVATION IN THE WHITE HOUSE", IN TUCKER AND WATTS, *OP. CIT.*, PP. 100-102. HASSNER ARGUES THAT NIXON, WHILE PAYING "LIP SERVICE TO THE GROWTH OF NATIONALISM AND TO THE NEED FOR A TRANSFORMED RELATIONSHIP" WITH LATIN AMERICA, DISCUSSES THE LATIN AMERICAN INTERACTION WITH SUCH BLANDNESS, AMBIGUITY AND CONTRADICTION THAT "CAN ANY LATIN AMERICAN BE EXPECTED TO FIND IT RESPONSIVE TO HIS OWN PERCEPTIONS OF THE HEMISPHERE?" (P.100)

REVOLUTION; THAT THE PRESENT SYSTEM IS SIMILAR TO THE CLASSICAL BALANCE OF POWER OF THE 19TH CENTURY EUROPE. IT IS OVER THESE ASSUMPTIONS THAT CRITICISM HAS BEEN DIRECTED - AS WELL AS A FEW OTHER POINTS. THE ASSUMPTION OF NATIONAL INTEREST DETERMINING BEHAVIOUR IS NOT THAT CONTENTIOUS UNLESS A VERY HARD LINE RIGHT-WING APPROACH IS TAKEN. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER EITHER OR BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA HAVE ACCEPTED INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY IS PROBLEMATIC. KISSINGER BELIEVES THAT THE TWO ARE IRRECONCILABLE SINCE INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY "INVOLVES AN ACCEPTED BALANCE OF THE LIMITED POWERS POSSESSED BY A PLURALITY OF INDEPENDENT CENTRES."¹⁰ AND SINCE THE QUESTION OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF THIS KIND OF LEGITIMACY IS NECESSARY TO MAKE THE SYSTEM WORK, THE QUESTION IS VERY PERTINENT. HERE AGAIN THERE IS NO STRAIGHT ANSWER; IT DOES NOT FOLLOW AS NIXON AND KISSINGER WOULD HAVE ONE BELIEVE THAT JUST BECAUSE EITHER OR BOTH THE COMMUNIST POWERS ARE LESS REVOLUTIONARY THAT THEY ARE STATUS QUO. FURTHERMORE, WHAT IS THE BASIS OF THIS LEGITIMACY? IS IT FEAR OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT? IF SO, THEN SHOULD THE POWERS MOVE TO LESSEN THE FEAR, SINCE THAT MAY ERODE THE BASE?"¹¹

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY BALANCE OF POWER INVOLVED FIVE POWERS OF REASONABLY EQUAL POWER. FURTHERMORE, BRITAIN PLAYED THE ROLE OF A BALANCER IN THE SYSTEM, WHILE AUSTRIA DURING METTERNICH'S ERA PLAYED THE 'ROLE OF ARBITRATOR.' THE FIRST POINT IS THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EQUALITY AMONGST THE POWERS EXCEPT THE TWO SUPER POWERS. WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN

10. EDITORIAL "MR. NIXON'S PHILOSOPHY OF FOREIGN POLICY" IN THE ROUND TABLE, VOL. 62, NO. 248, P. 405.

11. SEE HAHN, OP. CIT., PP. 370-373 AND EDITORIAL, PP. 405-409.

ARE NOT NEARLY EQUAL AND ARE DEPENDENT ON THE UNITED STATES. SECONDLY, WHO IS GOING TO PLAY THE ROLE OF BALANCER?

"THE TRUTH IS THAT AMERICAN POLICY ASSUMED A SPURIOUS EQUALITY IN ITS APPROACH TO OTHER POWERS, CONFIDENT IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF ACTUAL PRESENT SUPERIORITY BUT FEARFUL OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF A CONTINUED DECLINE IN THE FUTURE."¹²

FURTHERMORE, THE KIND OF BALANCE OF POWER CONCEIVED OF BY NIXON-KISSINGER REQUIRES THAT CONFLICTS BETWEEN SMALL POWERS BE LIMITED AND IF POSSIBLE THE SUPER POWERS SHOULD NOT ALLOW THEM TO HAVE CONFLICTS. THIS INVOLVES THE POWERS CONTROLLING THEIR ALLIES. UNFORTUNATELY, IT ASSUMES THAT THE MAJOR POWERS, ESPECIALLY THE SOVIET UNION, HAVE GREATER CONTROL OVER HER ALLIES THAN THE UNITED STATES HAS HAD. IN SOME WAYS THIS IS A THROW-BACK TO THE DAYS OF THE COLD WAR WHERE THE SOVIET UNION SUPPOSEDLY CONTROLLED ALL HER ALLIES; IT IS ASSUMPTIONS LIKE THAT WHICH CONFOUNDED THE AMERICANS IN VIETNAM. FINALLY, CAN THE UNITED STATES PLAY THE ROLE IT HAS SET FOR ITSELF - OF RESTRAINT AND CONSULTATION? THE DOLLAR DEVALUATION, ACTION IN CAMBODIA AND JORDAN TO TAKE A FEW EXAMPLES, DOES NOT SEEM TO SHOW THAT THIS IS GOING TO TAKE PLACE.

"THIS WAVERING BETWEEN UNILATERAL ACTION AND THE URGE TO ASSERT AND IMPOSE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LEGALITY IS A DISPOSITION WHICH ARISES FROM THE DEEP FAULT IN THE PRESIDENT'S STRUCTURE OF PEACE."¹³

THE 'DEEP FAULT' IS THE CONCEPT OF A 'BALANCE OF POWER SYSTEM WHEN IT IS NOT THERE.

IN THIS NEW INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION SAW NO

12. EDITORIAL, OP. CIT., P. 409.

13. IBID., P. 410.

REAL ROLE FOR SMALL POWERS. THE SYSTEM ENVISAGED BIG POWER POLITICS WITH EACH POWER RESPONSIBLE FOR HER SPHERE OF INFLUENCE. THOSE AREAS THAT WERE NOT IN ANY PARTICULAR SPHERE OF INFLUENCE WOULD BE THE AREAS WHERE THERE WOULD BE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE BIG POWERS, BUT EVEN THIS WAS TO BE KEPT AT A BARE MINIMUM. THE ONLY PROBLEM THAT THE NIXON DOCTRINE ENVISAGED WITH REGARD TO SMALL POWERS WAS THEIR POTENTIAL TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN CONFLICT. THIS CONFLICT WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE SYSTEM AT LARGE IF IT WERE TO INVOLVE THE BIG POWERS. THUS, THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION PERCEIVED THE ROLE OF SMALL POWERS TO BE BASICALLY NEGATIVE.

SOUTH ASIA WAS ONE OF THE AREAS WHICH HAD SMALL POWER WHICH WERE CAPABLE OF CREATING CONFLICT AND PERHAPS INVOLVING OUTSIDE POWERS. YET WHEN THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION TOOK OVER, THIS HARDLY SEEMED LIKELY. IT WAS A TIME WHEN BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN WERE INVOLVED IN DOMESTIC UPHEAVAL AND NEITHER STATE WAS IN ANY POSITION TO GET INVOLVED IN A CONFLICT. IN INDIA, THE CONGRESS PARTY HAD SUFFERED DEFEATS IN ELECTIONS FROM 1967 ONWARDS, IN BENGAL THE GOVERNMENT HAD COME TO A STANDSTILL, THE ECONOMY HAD ONLY JUST BEGUN TO RECOVER FROM THE FAMINES AND FINALLY IN THE MIDDLE OF 1969 THE CONGRESS SPLIT. FOR THE NEXT YEAR INDIA WAS TO FUNCTION WITH A MINORITY GOVERNMENT, WHICH WAS MORE CONCERNED IN PREPARING FOR AN ELECTION THAN GOING TO WAR. PAKISTAN'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS HAD BEGUN SOON AFTER THE TASHKET AGREEMENT OF 1966. THE EASTERN WING HAD BECOME MORE AND MORE DISENCHANTED WITH THEIR DOMINATION BY THE WEST. THE ANTI-AYUB FEELING FINALLY TOPPLED THE REGIME IN 1968, WHEN AYUB WAS FORCED TO RESIGN. THE NEW GOVERNMENT PROMISED ELECTIONS AND A RETURN TO DEMOCRACY. PAKISTAN THUS SPENT THE NEXT TWO YEARS PREPARING FOR THESE

96.

ELECTIONS. THUS THERE WAS LITTLE INDICATION THAT WAR WOULD ENGULF THE SUBCONTINENT, AS THERE HAD BEEN PRIOR TO 1965. HENCE IT IS HARDLY SURPRISING THAT THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION DID NOT CONCERN HERSELF WITH THE SUBCONTINENT.

THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION JUST CONTINUED THE TREND THAT HAD DEVELOPED IN THE LATTER PART OF THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION, "THE TREND TOWARDS REDUCED INVOLVEMENT."¹⁴ AID, WHICH HAD BEEN A KEY COMPONENT OF AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND PAKISTAN, CONTINUED TO DECLINE DUE TO LACK OF PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT.¹⁵ AND WHILE NIXON REVERSED AN EARLIER DECISION NOT TO PROVIDE ARMS TO PAKISTAN, THIS HARDLY CONSTITUTED A MAJOR POLICY SHIFT, ESPECIALLY IF ONE COMPARES THIS TO THE HEAVY INVOLVEMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION IN BOTH COUNTRIES. NOT ONLY WAS THE SOVIET UNION PROVIDING MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID, BUT IN INDIA THE USSR WAS SUPPORTING MRS. GANDHI'S WING OF THE CONGRESS PARTY BOTH VOCALLY AND THROUGH THE C.P.I. THIS LACK OF AMERICAN INTEREST IN THE SUBCONTINENT IS BORNE OUT BY THE LACK OF EXPERTISE IN THE AREA IN ANY MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY AGENCY. WAYNE WILCOX NOTES THAT,

"OFFICIAL WASHINGTON FAITHFULLY REFLECTED SOUTH ASIA'S MODEST POSITION IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN ITS STAFFING PATTERNS ... NO PRINCIPAL OFFICER IN THE WHITE HOUSE, TREASURY OR DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENCE HAD ANY DEEP EXPERIENCE IN THE REGION ..."¹⁶

THUS THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION WAS SEEMINGLY KEEPING TO ITS CONVICTIONS OF NOT INVOLVING HERSELF IN ASIA.

14. BARNDT, OP. CIT., P. 233.

15. SEE PREVIOUS CHAPTER.

16. WAYNE WILCOX, "AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH ASIA" IN ASIAN AFFAIRS, VOL. 59, NO. 4, P. 134.

PRESIDENT NIXON IN HIS FOREIGN POLICY ADDRESS OF 1971, GAVE THE SOUTH ASIAN REGION LOW IMPORTANCE WHEN COMPARED TO SOUTH EAST AND EAST ASIA. HE SAW THREE REASONS FOR AMERICAN INTEREST IN THE REGION: (1) HUMANITARIAN; (2) FEAR THAT LACK OF GROWTH WOULD LEAD TO CONFLICT BETWEEN 'HAVE AND HAVE NOTS'; (3) REGIONAL CONFLICTS WOULD INCREASE FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN THE AREA. HE RECOGNIZED THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF OTHER POWERS IN THE REGION, AND REFRAINED FROM ALLUDING TO "THE COMPETITION BETWEEN CHINA AND INDIA AND THE EFFECT OF INDIA'S POSSIBLE FAILURE ON THE REST OF THE WORLD."¹⁷ THE REASON FOR THE FAILURE TO ALLUDE TO THE SINO-INDIAN COMPETITION IS PERHAPS THAT THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION RECOGNIZED THAT CHINA HAD WON THAT 'COMPETITION' AND THE POSSIBILITY OF INDIA'S FAILURE NO LONGER EVOKED THAT MUCH CONCERN. IN ANY CASE, THE UNITED STATES PROBABLY CONCLUDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS A BETTER PROTECTOR OF INDIA'S INTERESTS GIVEN THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT. AS HAS BEEN NOTED, CONFLICT DID SEEM UNLIKELY, AND WITH THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION FACING GROWING DOMESTIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS DURING 1970-71; THE ADMINISTRATION WAS NOT THAT DEEPLY CONCERNED, WITH THE CHASM BETWEEN THE 'HAVES' AND 'HAVE NOTS'. THIS WOULD SEEM TO LEAVE ONLY HUMANITARIANISM AS A REASON FOR AMERICAN INTEREST IN SOUTH ASIA, AND THAT IN ITSELF INDICATES HOW LITTLE AMERICAN INTEREST THERE WAS.

IT IS NOW PERTINENT TO RETURN TO DECEMBER OF 1970 AND GIVE A HISTORY OF WHAT TOOK PLACE BETWEEN THEN AND THE END OF THE WAR IN 1971, BEFORE TRYING TO ANALYZE THE 'WHY'S' WITH REGARD TO AMERICAN POLICY DURING

17. B.K. SHRIVASTAVA, "INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT" IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, VOL. 14, NO. 1, P. 30.

THE CRISIS AND THE WAR. THE ELECTIONS THAT YAHYA KHAN HAD PROMISED FINALLY TOOK PLACE IN DECEMBER OF 1970. THE CAMPAIGN HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT EAST AND WEST PAKISTAN WERE GOING SEPARATE WAYS. IN THE EAST, THE AWAMI LEAGUE DEMAND ALMOST COMPLETE AUTONOMY EXCEPT IN DEFENCE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND COMMUNICATIONS. IN THE WEST, THE PEOPLE'S PARTY WAS DETERMINED NOT TO SURRENDER ANY PREROGATIVES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. THE ELECTION RESULTS HIGHLIGHTED THE POLITICAL AND PHYSICAL DIVISION OF PAKISTAN BY GIVING ALMOST ALL THE SEATS IN THE EAST TO THE AWAMI LEAGUE AND A COMFORTABLE MAJORITY OF WESTERN SEATS TO THE PEOPLE'S PARTY. MORE PERTINENT IS THAT THE AWAMI LEAGUE HAD EMERGED WITH AN ABSOLUTE MAJORITY. WHAT FOLLOWED WAS A SERIES OF ATTEMPTS BY THE MILITARY AND WEST PAKISTANI POLITICIANS TO GET THE AWAMI LEAGUE TO SOFTEN ITS DEMANDS. WHEN THESE ATTEMPTS FAILED TO YIELD SATISFACTORY RESULTS, THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT DECIDED TO REVERSE THE ELECTION RESULTS BY FORCE OF ARMS, BEGINNING THE BLOODBATH IN EAST PAKISTAN.

AS PAKISTAN WAS HEADING FOR CIVIL WAR, INDIA SEEMED TO BE MORE UNIFIED THAN IT HAD BEEN IN A LONG WHILE. THE CONGRESS PARTY, ON A PLATFORM OF REMOVING POVERTY, HAD SWEEPED BOTH CENTRAL AND PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS. INDIA WAS READY TO FACE THE SITUATION DEVELOPING IN PAKISTAN WITH CONSIDERABLE SELF-ASSURANCE. INDIA'S IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO THE MILITARY ACTION IN EAST PAKISTAN WAS OF CONSIDERABLE DISMAY AND ANGUISH. THIS WAS REFLECTED IN MRS. GANDHI'S REMARKS TO PARLIAMENT, WHEN SHE SAID,

"THE TRAGEDY WHICH HAS OVERTAKEN OUR VALIANT NEIGHBOURS IN EAST BENGAL SO SOON AFTER THEIR REJOICING OVER THEIR ELECTORAL VICTORY HAS

UNITED US IN GRIEF FOR THEIR SUFFERING, CONCERN FOR THE WANTON DESTRUCTION OF THEIR BEAUTIFUL LAND, AND ANXIETY FOR THEIR FUTURE."¹⁸

NOT ONLY WAS DEMOCRACY BEING SCUTTLED, BUT THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN LOOKING FORWARD TO A PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT LED BY THE AWAMI LEAGUE. DISMAY AND ANGUISH QUICKLY TURNED INTO ANGER AND FRUSTRATION AS A FLOOD OF REFUGEES (A LARGE PART OF WHOM WERE HINDUS) POURED INTO INDIA FROM EAST BENGAL. HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE REFUGEES, INDIA MAY HAVE IGNORED THE EVENTS, BUT AS REFUGEES POURED IN DOMESTIC PRESSURE AS WELL AS ECONOMIC NECESSITY TO DO SOMETHING ROSE.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE EVENTS WAS MIXED. MOST WESTERN GOVERNMENTS, WHILE CONDEMNING THE ACTION, PREFERRED TO REMAIN QUIET HOPING THAT IT WOULD GO AWAY. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS FORCED TO CANCEL THE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO PAKISTAN UNDER CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC AND MEDIA PRESSURE. IT, HOWEVER, CONTINUED THE SHIPMENT OF THOSE ARMS THAT WERE IN THE PIPELINE. THE SOVIETS REACTED IN PODGORNYY'S LETTER TO YAHYA OF APRIL 3, CALLING ON HIM TO STOP THE REPRESSION AND SETTLE THE ISSUE BY NEGOTIATION, THE SOVIETS FEARED, AT THAT TIME, AN INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT. CHINA FOUND HERSELF IN THE UNFAMILIAR ROLE OF HAVING TO SUPPORT A CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT AGAINST A "NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT." THE CHINESE ACCUSED INDIA, THE SOVIET UNION AND U.S. OF INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF PAKISTAN AND PROMISED SUPPORT AGAINST INDIAN EXPANSIONISM.¹⁹

18. MRS. GANDHI IS QUOTED IN D.R. MANKEKAR, PAKISTAN CUT TO SIZE, INDIA BOOK COMPANY, NEW DELHI, 1972, P. 23. FOR MORE ON THE INDIAN RESPONSE BETWEEN MARCH AND DECEMBER, SEE MANKEKAR, PP. 23-50 AND ROBERT PAYNE, MASSACRE, MACMILLAN, NEW YORK, 1973, PP. 100-112.

19. BARND, OP. CIT., P. 262.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S UPCOMING VISIT AND THE ROLE THAT PAKISTAN HAD PLAYED IN KISSINGER'S SECRET VISITS TO CHINA HELPED CHANGE THE SITUATION IN SOUTH ASIA. THE INDIANS FEARED THAT RAPPROACHMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA COULD LEAD INDIA INTO A TWO-FRONT WAR. NOR DID KISSINGER DO ANYTHING TO COOL INDIA'S APPREHENSIONS WHEN HE TOLD MRS. GANDHI THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT COME TO INDIA'S AID IF AN INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICT DREW IN CHINA.²⁰ THE SOVIET UNION ALSO REACTED SHARPLY TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF NIXON'S PLANNED VISIT TO CHINA; UNTIL THEN IT HAD NOT BEEN VERY SUPPORTIVE OF THE INDIAN POSITION. HOWEVER, IT COULD NOT IGNORE THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SCENE, AND ITS PARANOIA OVER CHINA ALSO INCREASED. THUS, IT TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF INDIA'S FEARS TO MAKE HER A LINK IN HER (SOVIET) ASIAN SECURITY CONCEPT WHEN THE TWO COUNTRIES SIGNED THE INDO-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP TREATY IN AUGUST.

THE UNITED STATES HAD BEEN TRYING TO PROD YAHYA KHAN INTO REACHING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE. HOWEVER, BEFORE OCTOBER THIS EFFORT WAS AT BEST HALF-HEARTED FOR BY KISSINGER'S OWN ADMISSION IT WAS NOT TILL LATE OCTOBER THAT HE DEVOTED MUCH ATTENTION TO THE SUBCONTINENT. WHEN MRS. GANDHI ARRIVED IN WASHINGTON AT THE END OF HER WORLD TOUR, NIXON AND KISSINGER TRIED TO PERSUADE HER TO AVOID WAR, WITHOUT OFFERING ANY SOLUTION, AT LEAST AS INDIA SAW. WHEN WAR BROKE OUT, THE UNITED STATES REACTED SHARPLY BY ACCUSING INDIA OF BEING THE AGGRESSOR JUST WHEN THE UNITED STATES HAD GOT PAKISTAN TO AGREE TO POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS. THE UNITED STATES CUT ALL FORMS OF AID TO INDIA, INCLUDING THAT WHICH WAS

20. BIMAL PRASAD, "THE SUPER POWERS AND THE SUBCONTINENT" IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, VOL. 13, NO. 4, P. 736.

IN THE PIPELINE. ACCORDING TO JOHN LEWIS, THE "HOOPING OF THE PIPELINE WAS A VERY UNUSUAL FORM OF AID ACTION. WE HAVE SELDOM DONE THAT KIND OF THING."²¹ THE ADMINISTRATION ALSO FEARED THAT INDIA WOULD OVERRUN WEST PAKISTAN, AND THUS DECIDED TO TAKE A VERY TOUGH STAND. THIS INCLUDED WARNING THE SOVIETS THAT THE SUMMER SUMMIT MAY BE CANCELLED AND THE SENDING OF THE U.S.S. ENTERPRISE TO THE BAY OF BENGAL. WHEN THE CONFLICT ENDED, THE UNITED STATES CLAIMED THAT HER PRESSURE HAD CONTAINED THE CONFLICT TO THE EASTERN FRONT.²² WHILE THIS WAS THE POSITION OF NIXON-KISSINGER, THE STATE DEPARTMENT DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE AGREED WITH THIS POLICY, BUT WAS OVERRIDDEN.²³

A NUMBER OF REASONS HAVE BEEN GIVEN FOR AMERICAN BEHAVIOR DURING THE 1971 WAR. THE ADMINISTRATION'S ARGUMENT HAS A NUMBER OF POINTS. FIRSTLY, THAT IT COULD NOT STAND BY AND WITNESS THE 'COMPLETE DISINTEGRATION BY FORCE OF A MEMBER STATE OF THE U.N. "SINCE IT WOULD CREATE AN UNHEALTHY PRECEDENT, INCREASING THE TENDENCY TO RESORT TO FORCE TO SETTLE DISPUTES."²⁴ SECONDLY, THAT THE LACK OF AMERICAN ACTION MAY HAVE ALLOWED THE SOVIET UNION TO INTERPRET DETENTE AS "AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE STRATEGIC

21. U.S. INTEREST IN INDIA, HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA, MARCH 1973 (GPO) P. 138, HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS HOUSE HEARING 1973.

22. ACCORDING TO MARVIN AND BERNARD KALB, KISSINGER ACCEPTED A CIA REPORT FROM DELHI THAT INDIA WAS GOING TO ATTACK AND DESTROY WEST PAKISTAN AS SOON AS INDIA HAD DEALT WITH EAST PAKISTAN. SEE THEIR BOOK, KISSINGER, LITTLE, BROWN AND CO., BOSTON, 1974, PP. 260-62. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE BESIDES THE CIA REPORT TO SUGGEST THAT THIS WAS GOING TO TAKE PLACE. FROM INDIA'S POINT OF VIEW, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF INHIBITING FACTORS: (1) INTERNATIONAL REACTION ESPECIALLY SOVIET, (2) THE FACT THAT THE BULK OF PAKISTAN'S ARMY WAS IN THE WEST, (3) IN ORDER TO OVERCOME THE PARITY IN THE WEST, INDIA WOULD NEED TO MOVE TROOPS FROM BANGLADESH WHICH IS AN ENORMOUS TASK, (4) THE QUESTION OF WHETHER SHE COULD FINANCIALLY AFFORD A WAR LONGER THAN TWO WEEKS.

23. IBID., P. 259.

24. NIXON, OP. CIT., P. 50.

EXPANSION OF SOVIET POWER." AND FINALLY, THAT CHINA WAS JUST COMING INTO THE WORLD, AND IT WOULD BE INFLUENCED "BY ITS ASSESSMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES BY WHICH THIS SYSTEM WAS GOVERNED"²⁵

A SECOND ARGUMENT THAT CAN BE PUT FORWARD IS THAT THE UNITED STATES DID NOT WANT THE BALANCE OF POWER IN SOUTH ASIA TO SHIFT. SIBOO PUT FORWARD THIS POINT WHEN HE STATED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A "STABLE BALANCE NOT ONLY BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES IN THE AREA ITSELF, BUT BALANCE IN TERMS OF OVERALL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MAJOR POWERS"²⁶ THE POINT IS THAT AN INDIAN VICTORY WOULD MAKE INDIA THE DOMINANT POWER ON THE SUBCONTINENT, AS WELL AS THE SOVIETS THE DOMINANT MAJOR POWER IN THAT AREA. BOTH OF THESE WERE AGAINST THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND AMERICAN INTERESTS. THIS ARGUMENT ALSO CARRIED CREDENCE AMONGST INDIANS WHO TEND TO FEEL THAT AMERICA HAS SINCE 1947 PURSUED A POLICY OF PREVENTING INDIA FROM ACHIEVING ITS RIGHTFUL PLACE IN THE WORLD.

OUTSIDERS HAVE ARGUED DIFFERENTLY; THE MOST COMMON ARGUMENT IS THAT THIS POLICY WAS PART AND PARCEL OF THE AMERICAN POLICY OF RAPPROACHMENT WITH CHINA.²⁷ THE ARGUMENT IS THAT THE UNITED STATES IN THE CRISIS FOUND AN AREA UPON WHICH SHE AND CHINA COULD AGREE. FURTHERMORE, SINCE CHINA WAS CONCERNED OVER THE INDO-SOVIET TIE, AND FEARED THAT THE BREAK-UP OF PAKISTAN WOULD EFFECT HER STRATEGIC POSITION, THE U.S., BY SUPPORTING PAKISTAN, COULD DEMONSTRATE HER UNDERSTANDING FOR CHINA'S POSITION WHICH IN THE LONG RUN WOULD MAKE CHINA MORE AMENABLE TO ACCEPTING THE

25. IBID., P. 51.

26. SEE JADISH BHAGWATI, OP. CIT., PP. 32-34, BIMAL PRASAD, OP. CIT., P. 345.

27. HOUSE HEARINGS 1973, OP. CIT., P. 2.

NIXON INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. THIS ARGUMENT USES AS ONE OF ITS BASES THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE WHEREIN THE AFFAIRS OF THE SUBCONTINENT WERE THE MOST COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE TWO POWERS.

LEWIS AND BARNOS²⁸ DISAGREE WITH THE ARGUMENT THAT CHINA WAS THE CAUSE OF AMERICAN POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA. LEWIS CONTENTS THAT,

"ANY INTERPRETATION OF THAT EPISODE THAT EXPLAINS OUR BEHAVIOUR AS A STALWART IMPLEMENTATION OF SOME LARGER OR LONGER STRATEGY STRIKES ME AS SPECIOUS ... LARGER THEORIES AND BOGIES WERE INVENTED TO RATIONALIZE THE EARLY MISTAKES AND INCREASINGLY OUR POLICY-MAKERS CAME TO BELIEVE THEIR OWN INVENTIONS."²⁹

BARNOS DOES NOT GO THAT FAR, BUT CONTENTS THAT THE CHINA POLICY ONLY STOPPED THE U.S. FROM SUPPORTING INDIA, AND DID NOT NECESSITATE THE ANTI-INDIAN STAND. BARNOS INSTEAD CONTENTS THAT IT WAS PERSONAL ANIMOSITIES THAT EVENTUALLY CAUSED THE 'TILT'.³⁰ LEWIS ARGUES THAT THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM LAY IN THE LOW PRIORITY THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION GAVE TO INDIA, AND THEREFORE

"... THERE WAS LITTLE COST IN GIVING WAY TO BUREAUCRATIC ERROR, COVERED TRACKS, GENERAL PEEVISHNESS AND EVENTUALLY A MILD NEUROSIS."³¹

WHILE IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO AGREE WITH LEWIS' ARGUMENT OF BUREAUCRATIC BUNGLING, THE POINT OF LOW PRIORITY REMAINS. IN FACT, WHATEVER EXPLANATION IS OFFERED FOR THE ACTUAL BEHAVIOUR, BE IT PRESERVATION OF A MEMBER STATE, BALANCE OF POWER OR CHINA, THE QUESTION IS WHETHER ANY OF THESE FACTORS WOULD HAVE MATTERED IF THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERED INDIA

28. IBID., PP. 121-129.

29. IBID., P. 121.

30. IBID., P. 142.

31. IBID., P. 121.

IMPORTANT. THE ANSWER SEEMS TO BE NO. IF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION HAD CONSIDERED INDIA'S SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AS THEY SAW IT TO BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR, THEN THE ADMINISTRATION COULD NOT HAVE FOLLOWED POLICIES THAT WOULD ALIENATE INDIA. BUT THE ADMINISTRATION DID FOLLOW THESE POLICIES; IT WAS WILLING TO SACRIFICE ANY GOODWILL IT HAD IN INDIA FOR OTHER ENDS. THE QUESTION OF REASONS THUS BECOMES SECONDARY TO THE POINT OF IMPORTANCE. THE NIXON-KISSINGER APPROACH DID NOT FEEL THAT INDIA WAS AN IMPORTANT OOG AND THUS ALLOWED OTHER PREDILECTIONS TO DOMINATE HER POLICY DURING THE 1971 CRISIS.

CHAPTER 8THE SOVIET UNION'S GROWING INFLUENCE IN INDIA

AMONG THE LARGE AND VARIED NUMBER OF DETERMINANTS OF A NATION'S FOREIGN POLICY IS THE INFLUENCE AND INTERESTS OF OTHER NATIONS. IN BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS, THE ROLE OF THIRD PARTIES CAN BE, AND OFTEN IS, THE KEY INGREDIENT IN THE MIX. DURING THE POST-WAR ERA, AMERICAN PERCEPTION OF SOVIET INTERESTS AND POLICY HAVE TO A LARGE EXTENT DETERMINED UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY, AND VICE VERSA. THE COLD WAR IS A PERFECT EXAMPLE OF THE ROLE OF THIRD PARTIES IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONS; BOTH AMERICAN AND SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES WERE LARGELY THE RESULT OF THE OTHER'S POLICY. THAT IS, THE RELATIONSHIP US - X IS INFLUENCED BY SU - X. IN SPITE OF THE BREAK-UP OF THE 'COMMUNIST MONOLITH' AND GROWING DETENTE, SOVIET POLICY HAS REMAINED AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN AMERICAN POLICY.

THERE CAN, HOWEVER, BE MORE THAN ONE THIRD PARTY THAT INFLUENCES A BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. IN THE CASE OF U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS, THERE WERE MANY IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION, PAKISTAN AND CHINA STAND OUT. THE LATTER TWO HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED EARLIER, WHEN DISCUSSING INDIA'S 'WARS'. AND WHILE MENTION HAS BEEN MADE OF THE SOVIET UNION, IT IS IMPORTANT TO BRING OUT THE SOVIET ROLE MORE CLEARLY FOR IT IS TO BE ARGUED THAT BY THE LATE SIXTIES AND EARLY SEVENTIES, THE UNITED STATES WAS TO CONSIDER INDIA TO BE MORE OR LESS A SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY. IN ORDER TO ACCOUNT FOR THIS, IT IS NECESSARY TO DOCUMENT SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS THE SUBCONTINENT IN GENERAL, AND INDIA SPECIFICALLY. WE HAVE ALREADY NOTED SOVIET POLICY

TOWARDS INDIA DURING THE LATE FIFTIES ENTAILED CONSIDERABLE ECONOMIC AID AND POLITICAL SUPPORT TO INDIA, AND THUS THE PRESENT ACCOUNT WILL BEGIN WITH THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT.

IN RETROSPECT IT IS APPARENT THAT THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT BEGAN AROUND 1957-58. ONE OF THE EARLIEST INDICATIONS OF THIS WAS THE SOVIET NEUTRALITY ON SINO-INDIAN FIGHTING IN 1959. THE SOVIET UNION FOUND ITSELF IN A DILEMMA OVER THE SITUATION, SINCE IT INVOLVED A CONFLICT BETWEEN A 'BROTHER' COMMUNIST STATE AND A NON-ALIGNED STATE THAT IT HAD BEEN WOOLING FOR A CONSIDERABLE WHILE, AT SOME FINANCIAL COST. THE SOVIET FEAR WAS THAT BY SUPPORTING CHINA AND THUS PRESENTING A UNITED COMMUNIST FRONT, IT WOULD FORCE INDIA INTO GIVING UP HER NON-ALIGNMENT FOR A WESTERN ALLIANCE. INDIA SEEMS TO HAVE FEARED THAT THIS IS WHAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN FORCED TO DO.¹ THUS, THE SOVIET UNION DECIDED TO PUBLICLY STATE HER NEUTRALITY, MUCH TO NEW DELHI'S JOY. YET THE SOVIETS DID NOT VIEW THE IDEA OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO ASIAN POWERS WITH ANY SATISFACTION. MOSCOW ASKED INDIA AND CHINA TO REACH SOME KIND OF AGREEMENT PEACEFULLY. IN 1960 KHRUSHCHEV USED HIS INFLUENCE TO GET CHOU AND NEHRU TOGETHER, AND THOUGH THE MEETING TOOK PLACE IT WAS A FAILURE, SINCE NEITHER OF THEM WERE WILLING TO COMPROMISE.

THE SINO-INDIAN WAR CAUGHT THE SOVIETS IN THE MIDST OF THE CUBAN CRISIS; EVEN IF IT HAD NOT, IT IS QUESTIONABLE AS TO HOW MUCH INFLUENCE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE HAD IN TERMS OF STOPPING THE CONFLICT. HOWEVER, WHAT DID RESULT WAS THE NECESSITY FOR THE SOVIETS TO SUPPORT

1. BARNES, Op. Cit., PP. 155-156.

CHINESE CLAIMS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE IMAGE OF COMMUNIST SOLIDARITY. THIS WAS A SURPRISE FOR THE INDIANS WHO HAD EXPECTED NEUTRALITY, AT A VERY MINIMUM. AS SOON AS THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS WAS OVER THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT BEGAN TO SHIFT AWAY FROM SUPPORTING THE CHINESE. IT BEGAN BY DENYING FORE-KNOWLEDGE OF THE ATTACK AND BY NOT CRITICISING THE ANGLO-AMERICAN AIRLIFT OF ARMS TO INDIA. THESE ACTIONS WERE FOLLOWED BY THE SOVIET SUSPENSION OF ARMS AID, SPARE PARTS AND FUEL TO CHINA WHILE MAINTAINING AID LINKS WITH INDIA.² SUCH SOVIET ACTIONS BEGAN TO CONFIRM THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT, WHICH BECAME PUBLIC WITH ATTACKS ON THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS FIRST BY KOZLOV OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, AND THEN BY KHRUSHCHEV IN DECEMBER 1962. KHRUSHCHEV ATTACKED CHINESE REVISIONISM AND ACCUSED CHINA OF DRIVING INDIA INTO THE "IMPERIALIST" CAMP.³ THIS SOVIET BEHAVIOR HELPED THE SOVIET UNION TO MAINTAIN REMARKABLY GOOD RELATIONS WITH INDIA IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR, THOUGH INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS HAD NOT RETURNED TO PRE-WAR CONDITIONS. ALL THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS WERE AS ROSY AS IN DECEMBER 1961 WHEN THE SOVIETS HAD VOCIFEROUSLY SUPPORTED INDIAN SEIZURE OF GOA, BUT THAT GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES THE SOVIETS HAD MANAGED TO MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION IN INDIA.

2. STEIN, OP. CIT., PP. 154-157.

3. HARISH KAPUR, "INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION", SURVEY, VOL. 16, NO. 4, (WINTER 1971), P. 205. IT SHOULD BE NOTED HERE THAT POLICY TOWARDS INDIA WAS A CATALYST IN THAT IT MADE THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT PUBLIC. THE BASIC CONFLICT BEGAN AFTER THE 20TH PARTY CONGRESS OF THE SOVIET COMMUNISTS WHERE THEY ANNOUNCED THE POLICY OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE. THUS, THE IDEOLOGICAL AND POLICY CONFLICT, AS WELL AS LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD, CAME TO THE FORE WHEN CHINA CHALLENGED THE POLICY OF "PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE". ONE OF THE KINDS OF THINGS THAT ANNOYED THE CHINESE WAS THE LACK OF SOVIET CRITICISM OF NEHRU WHEN HE DISBANDED THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN KERALA.

THE FAILURE OF THE AMERICAN INITIATIVE IN THE POST-1962 PERIOD TO BRING INDIA AND PAKISTAN TOGETHER HELPED SOVIET AMBITIONS IN THE AREA. THE AMERICANS HAD TRIED TO USE ARMS AID AS A LEVER TO BRING NEHRU TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE SINCE THEY WERE UNDER CONSIDERABLE PAKISTANI PRESSURE THEMSELVES NOT TO AID INDIA. IN ATTEMPTING TO PLEASE BOTH THE BELLIGERENTS, THE UNITED STATES PLEASED NEITHER, INDIA TURNED TO THE SOVIET UNION, WHILE PAKISTAN TURNED TOWARDS CHINA. SINCE INDIA WAS GOING THROUGH A PERIOD OF IMPROVING HER DEFENCE IN THE LIGHT OF THE DISASTER, THE SOVIETS BECAME THE ONLY SUPPLIER. THE NET RESULT OF A RELATIONSHIP IN WHICH THE BUYER NEEDS THE ITEMS MORE THAN THE SELLER IS THAT THE LATTER GAINS CONSIDERABLE LEVERAGE OVER THE FORMER. THIS HAPPENED IN INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS.

THE CLEARER INDICATION OF THIS CAME IN 1964 WHEN THE SOVIETS BEGAN THEIR POLICY SHIFT TOWARDS PAKISTAN. THE NEW LEADERSHIP IN MOSCOW WAS CLEARLY APPREHENSIVE OVER THE GROWING RELATIONS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND CHINA, AND HAD NO WISH TO SEE THE FORMER UNDER THE LATTER'S WING. THE PAKISTANI ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CHINA RESULTED FROM A DISAPPOINTMENT WITH U.S. POLICY DURING 1962 AND THE REALIZATION THAT CHINA WOULD BE A BETTER COUNTER-WEIGHT TO INDIA THAN THE U.S. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO WEAN PAKISTAN AWAY FROM CHINA, AND IF IT COULD BE DONE WITHOUT DAMAGING INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS, SO MUCH THE BETTER.⁴ EVEN IF THERE WAS SOME DAMAGE, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP FELT THAT THEY COULD NOT AFFORD TO PUT TOO MUCH IN INDIA'S BASKET. THIS SWITCH

4. ARTHUR STEIN, "INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION: THE POST-NEHRU PERIOD." ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. 7, NO. 3, P. 171. HEREINAFTER THIS ARTICLE IS REFERRED TO AS STEIN (2).

BECAME APPARENT WHEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION IN 1964, FOR THE FIRST TIME, DID NOT REFER TO KASHMIR AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF INDIA. SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WERE ALSO IN A SIMILAR FORM. HOWEVER, THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO THESE, AT LEAST PUBLICLY, REMAINED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS A GOOD FRIEND. IF ONE COMPARES THIS WITH THE BARRAGE OF CRITICISM THE UNITED STATES HAS RECEIVED FROM INDIA ON KASHMIR, IT HIGHLIGHTS THE POINT. THERE ARE TWO OTHER IMPORTANT PIECES OF EVIDENCE THAT SHOW THE EXTENT OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN INDIA. THE FIRST IS WITH REGARD TO INDIA ALLOWING THE VOICE OF AMERICA (VOA) TO HAVE A RELAY STATION IN INDIA. THE SECOND IS THE OFFER OF MEDIUM-WAVE TRANSMITTERS BY THE U.S. TO INDIA FOR INDIAN USE. IN BOTH THESE CASES, THE SOVIET UNION OBJECTED STRENUOUSLY AND INDIA WAS INFLUENCED INTO REFUSING THE OFFER OF THE UNITED STATES.⁵ WHILE IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT THE VOA QUESTION WAS INFRINGING ON INDIA'S NEUTRALITY, THIS CANNOT BE THE CASE WITH THE TRANSMITTERS. IN FACT, WITH THE TRANSMITTERS INDIA WOULD HAVE SAVED ITSELF LARGE AMOUNTS OF EXPENDITURE. UNFORTUNATELY, SHE CHOSE TO BOW TO SOVIET POLITICAL PRESSURE AT HER OWN FINANCIAL COST.

AS HAS BEEN NOTED, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD MOVED AWAY FROM A POSITION OF BEING PRO-INDIAN TO NEUTRALITY. THIS BECAME OBVIOUS IN 1965, DURING THE INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT, WHERE THE SOVIETS DECLARED NEUTRALITY AND THEN SET ABOUT SEEKING TO END THE CONFLICT. THE SOVIET UNION FELT THAT A PROLONGED CONFLICT AND THE INSTABILITY ON THE SUBCONTINENT WOULD ONLY ENHANCE THE POSITION OF THE CHINESE.⁶ THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ALSO

5. IBID., P. 168.

6. SHeldon W. SIMON, "KASHMIR DISPUTE IN SINO-SOVIET PERSPECTIVE", ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. 7, NO. 3, P. 180.

FEARED THAT CHINA MAY INVOLVE ITSELF IF A PROLONGED CONFLICT TOOK PLACE. FURTHERMORE, THE SOVIET UNION'S GOVERNMENT DID NOT REGARD THE CONFLICT AS BENEFICIAL TO ITSELF, GIVEN THE FACT THAT SHE HAD INVESTED CONSIDERABLE RESOURCES IN BOTH COUNTRIES. ANYHOW, THE SOVIET OFFER OF MEDIATION WAS ACCEPTED BY BOTH PARTIES, WHICH AGAIN SHOWS HOW EASILY THE SOVIETS HAD MANAGED TO WOO PAKISTAN WITHOUT LOSING HER GRIP ON INDIA. AT TASHKENT THE SOVIETS MANAGED TO GET AN AGREEMENT FOR BOTH SIDES TO WITHDRAW TO POSITIONS HELD BEFORE THE CONFLICT. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS THAT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS HAD GROUND TO A HALT ON JANUARY 9, 1966. IT WAS ONLY THE INTERVENTION OF KOSYGIN WHICH ALLOWED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL. BRINES POINTS OUT THAT,

"THE STAKES WERE VITAL FOR HIM (KOSYGIN). THE FAILURE OF THE CONFERENCE AT THAT POINT WOULD HAVE MEANT A SEVERE LOSS OF PRESTIGE FOR THE SOVIETS, IN THEIR FIRST PEACE-MAKING ENDEAVOUR OF THIS SORT. PEKING'S REPUTATION ACCORDINGLY WOULD HAVE BEEN ENHANCED"7

THE SOVIETS EMPLOYED ENOUGH PRESSURE TO FORCE SHASTRI TO GIVE UP THE HAJI PIR AND TITHVAL POSITIONS IN KASHMIR, WHICH THE INDIANS BELIEVED VITAL TO PREVENT FURTHER INFILTRATIONS.⁸

WHAT IS SURPRISING IS THAT IN THE YEARS THAT FOLLOWED TASHKENT, THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT REFRAINED FROM CRITICIZING THE SOVIET UNION OR ATTEMPT-

7. RUSSELL BRINES, THE INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT, PALL MALL PRESS, LONDON, 1968, P. 409.

8. IBID., P. 405. ONE MUST REMEMBER THAT INDIA HAD ARGUED THAT THE 1965 CONFLICT WAS THE RESULT OF INFILTRATION OF PERSONNEL FROM PAKISTAN HELD KASHMIR, WITH PAKISTANI SUPPORT. WHEN THIS INFILTRATION DID NOT PROVIDE THE NECESSARY RESULTS, PAKISTAN MOVED HER ARMED FORCES INTO THE CONFLICT. FURTHERMORE, BRINES POINTS OUT THAT INDIA FEARED A GUERRILLA WAR IN KASHMIR FAR MORE THAN A CONVENTIONAL WAR WITH PAKISTAN.

ING TO MOVE OUT OF SOVIET INFLUENCE. THIS IS IN SPITE OF NUMEROUS EVENTS WHICH ONE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED INDIA TO REACT TO. IT IS WORTH LISTING A FEW OF THE CASES WHERE INDIA EITHER KEPT QUIET OR FOLLOWED THE SOVIET LINE.

(1) THE SOVIETS BEGAN GIVING ARMS AID TO PAKISTAN IN 1966 (PERHAPS THIS WAS ONE OF THE 'CARROTS' USED BY KOSYGIN TO GET THE TASHKENT AGREEMENT). AT FIRST IT WAS JUST TRUCKS AND JEEPS, BUT LATER ON CAME TO INCLUDE TANKS.

(2)⁹ DURING THE PERIOD 1966-69 BROADCASTS FROM RADIO PEACE AND PROGRESS⁹ BECAME INCREASINGLY CRITICAL OF INDIA'S DOMESTIC SITUATION INCLUDING CRITICISM OF THE CONGRESS PARTY.

(3) THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT FORCED THE CLOSURE OF USIS MISSIONS WHICH IT CLAIMED HAD OPENED UP WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION, BUT TURNED A BLIND EYE TO INDO-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP CENTRES, WHICH HAD ALSO ARISEN.

(4) AND PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT WAS WITH REGARD TO INDIAN VIEWS ON U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM. THROUGH SOVIET PRESSURE, MRS. GANDHI WAS, WITHIN A FEW DAYS, TO CHANGE FROM DEMANDING A COMPLETE CEASEFIRE IN VIETNAM TO A BOMBING HALT. THE REASON FOR ASSUMING SOVIET PRESSURE IS THAT MRS. GANDHI CALLED FOR A COMPLETE CEASEFIRE, WHILE IN CAIRO IN 1966, BUT TWO WEEKS LATER A JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY MRS. GANDHI AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP CALLED A BOMBING HALT AND WAS GENERALLY ANTI-U.S.¹⁰

(5) CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE PERVASIVE SOVIET

9. RADIO PEACE AND PROGRESS BEAMS SPECIAL BROADCASTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION TOWARDS INDIA.

10. STEIN (2), P. 168.

INFLUENCE. WHILE COMMUNISTS IN ITALY WERE CRITICIZING THE SOVIET INVASION, INDIANS AGAIN KEPT THEIR REMARKS MILD.

THE QUESTION THAT OBVIOUSLY ARISES IS WHY DOES INDIA ALLOW THE SOVIET UNION TO INFLUENCE HER POLICY AS MUCH AS SHE DOES? IN THE LAST TWENTY YEARS, COUNTRIES THAT WERE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF GREAT POWERS HAVE OFTEN TURNED AROUND AND THROWN THEM OUT; INDONESIA AND EGYPT ARE TWO SUCH CASES. IF THEY COULD, WHY WOULD NOT INDIA DO SO? WHAT IS SO IMPORTANT FOR INDIA THAT SHE MUST MAINTAIN THE SOVIET LINK? THERE ARE THREE BASIC REASONS THAT FORCE INDIA TO ACCEPT SOVIET POLICY, AND THEY ARE: (1) POLITICAL SUPPORT, (2) AID, ESPECIALLY MILITARY, (3) TRADE. EACH OF THESE WILL BE DISCUSSED IN TURN.

IN ANY DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL SUPPORT, THE FIRST POINT IS WHY IS THIS SUPPORT NECESSARY? FOR INDIA, THERE ARE TWO VERY SIMPLE REASONS - PAKISTAN AND CHINA. THIS SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT PAKISTAN AND CHINA ARE AGGRESSIVE, BUT THAT INDIANS PERCEIVE THEM TO BE SUCH. INHERENT IN THIS PARANOID APPROACH IS THE FEAR OF A TWO-FRONT WAR, AND THUS NEED FOR POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM ANY OUTSIDE PARTY THAT WOULD COUNTER-ACT THIS. THE REASON FOR DEPENDING ON THE SOVIET UNION BECOMES CLEAR WHEN ONE VIEWS INDO-U.S. RELATIONS. AS HAS BEEN NOTED EARLIER, THE U.S. HAS BEEN CONSTRAINED BY HER RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN FROM PROVIDING THE NECESSARY SUPPORT INDIA NEEDED. GIVEN THIS, THE ONLY OPTION IS TO TURN TO THE SOVIETS. THE SOVIETS HAD SUPPORTED INDIA ON MANY ISSUES SINCE 1955, AND WERE INVOLVED IN THEIR OWN QUARREL WITH CHINA. AND THOUGH IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT BOTH SIDES NEEDED THE SUPPORT OF THE OTHER, INDIA'S POSITION WAS, VIS-A-VIS CHINA, FAR WEAKER THAN THE SOVIETS.

LINKED TO THE NEED FOR POLITICAL SUPPORT IS INDIA'S HEAVY DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIETS FOR ARMS. THE NEED FOR ARMS DEVELOPED PRIMARILY OUT OF THE CONFLICT WITH CHINA WHICH BROUGHT TO LIGHT THE WEAKNESS OF THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES. ATTEMPTS TO GET ARMS FROM THE U.S. FAILED, AND OTHER ARMS SUPPLIERS WOULD ONLY TRADE IN HARD CURRENCY. THE SOVIETS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WERE WILLING TO PROVIDE ARMS ON BARTER AND/OR RUPEE EXCHANGE. FURTHERMORE, THE SOVIETS ALLOWED THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MIG21 PLANT WHICH WHILE GIVING INDIA THE FEELING OF INDEPENDENCE, ACTUALLY KEPT INDIA FIRMLY TIED TO THE SOVIET APRON. THIS IS BECAUSE THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT ALLOWED THE PRODUCTION OF CERTAIN KEY COMPONENTS TO TAKE PLACE IN INDIA AND ENSURE THEIR CONTROL BY BEING THE SOLE SUPPLIERS. IN THIS IT IS SOMEWHAT SIMILAR TO THE U.S. POLICY OF SUPPLYING ALLIES (ESPECIALLY PAKISTAN) ONLY ENOUGH AMMUNITION AND SPARE PARTS FOR A LIMITED CONFLICT.¹¹

SOVIET MILITARY SALES AND AID TO INDIA BY 1969 HAD AMOUNTED TO AROUND \$710.0 MILLION WHICH IS APPROXIMATELY 16% OF ALL SOVIET WEAPONS EXPORTS SINCE 1950 OUTSIDE EASTERN EUROPE AND CHINA.¹² FIGURE 8-1 SHOWS THE PATTERN OF SOVIET MILITARY AID TO INDIA. BETWEEN 1955 AND 1965, SOVIET AID ROSE FROM \$2 MILLION TO OVER \$40 MILLION, WITH A SHARP RISE IN 1960, AND VERY LOW FIGURES FOR 1964 (ABOUT \$6 MILLION). IN 1966 MILITARY AID RISES TO ALMOST \$170 MILLION AND THIS IS PROBABLY EXPLAINED BY SOVIET REPLACEMENTS OF ARMS USED IN THE 1965 CONFLICT. SOVIET ARMS AID FALLS FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS (\$130 AND \$112 MILLION), BUT IN 1969 RISES TO A

11. STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI), ARMS TRADE WITH THE THIRD WORLD, P. 486, FOOTNOTE 10.

12. CALCULATED FROM VARIOUS SIPRI TABLES. THIS WAS DONE BY TAKING THE OVERALL FIGURE OF SOVIET SALES TO THE SUBCONTINENT AND SUBTRACTING WHAT PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN RECEIVED.

SOVIET ARMS SUPPLIES TO INDIA

(SOURCE: SIPRI ARMS TRADE WITH THE THIRD WORLD)

NEW HIGH OF \$178 MILLION. TABLE 8-1 GIVES A BREAKDOWN OF SOME OF THE ARMAMENTS RECEIVED FROM THE SOVIET UNION, AND COMPARES THEM TO WESTERN MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SALES. THE TABLE INDICATES THE INDIAN AIR FORCE DEPENDS HEAVILY ON BOTH SIDES FOR ITS AIRCRAFT, THOUGH SOVIET AIRCRAFT ARE MORE SOPHISTICATED THAN THE WESTERN ONES. SIMILARLY WITH NAVAL SUPPLIES; EXCEPT FOR THE FRENCH SUBMARINES THE SOVIET EQUIPMENT IS FEWER AND MORE SOPHISTICATED. FINALLY, THE SOVIET UNION IS THE ONLY SUPPLIER OF TANKS TO INDIA, THOUGH THIS IS PARTLY DUE TO THE FACT THAT INDIA PRODUCES HER OWN TANKS.

SIMILARLY, WITH ECONOMIC AID INDIA HAS BEEN THE MAJOR RECIPIENT OF SOVIET LARGESSE. MOST OF THE ECONOMIC AID BY THE SOVIET UNION TO INDIA HAS BEEN IN THE FORM OF PROJECT AID, ESPECIALLY HEAVY INDUSTRIES. IN THE AREA OF THAT, THE USSR HAS CONSTRUCTED THE BHILLAI AND KOKAN STEEL MILLS. IT IS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MACHINE TOOLS PLANT AT RANCHI. PROJECT AID HAS FITTED IN WELL WITH INDIA'S CONCEPTION OF HER DEVELOPMENTAL STRATEGY, I.E. SOME KIND OF SOCIALISM BASED ON A LARGE PUBLIC SECTOR PRODUCING HEAVY INDUSTRIAL GOODS WHILE THE PRIVATE SECTOR CONCERNS ITSELF WITH MORE CONSUMER GOODS. THE SOVIETS ALSO HELPED IN INDIA'S SEARCH FOR OIL, AS WELL AS UNDERCUTTING WESTERN OIL COMPANIES' PRICES DURING 1960, THUS HELPING TO FORCE OIL PRICES IN INDIA DOWN BY 25 CENTS A BARREL. THEY ALSO HELPED CONSTRUCT OIL REFINERIES AND THUS BREAK THE STRANGLEHOLD OF WESTERN OIL COMPANIES WHO WERE REFUSING TO PROCESS INDIAN OIL. SOVIET ECONOMIC AID IN TOTAL HAS PASSED OVER THE \$1 BILLION

TABLE 8-1

COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND WESTERN ARM SUPPLIES TO INDIA
1960-1969

AIRCRAFT¹

	<u>SOVIET</u>	<u>WEST</u>
FIGHTER BOMBERS	200	221 (125)
FIGHTER INTERCEPTORS	167 (87) ²	8
TRANSPORTS	51	148 (14)
HELICOPTERS	68	100 (80)
OTHERS	-	18
	486 (87)	575 (229)

NAVAL

FRIGATES	2	4 (UK)
CARRIERS	-	1 (UK)
LANDING CRAFTS	4	-
PATROL BOATS	2	-
SUBMARINES	4	3 (FR)
TORPEDO BOATS	6	-

OTHER WEAPONS

MISSILES	1102 ³	100 (FR)
TANKS	110 ⁴	-

SOURCE: SIPRI, ARMS TRADE WITH THE THIRD WORLD, PP. 833-836.

1. FIGURES IN PARENTHESES INDICATE PRODUCTION IN INDIA UNDER LICENSE.
2. ALL MIG-21s.
3. 1000 OF THEM ARE ATOLL AIR-TO-AIR FOR MIG-21s, THE REMAINDER ARE GUIDELINE 102 SURFACE-TO-AIR WHICH COST APPROXIMATELY \$112
4. 70 PT-76s, 40 T-54s.

MARK, THOUGH EXACT FIGURES ARE NOT AVAILABLE.¹³

SOVIET AID IS, AND HAS BEEN, CLOSELY LINKED TO SOVIET TRADE POLICIES. A GREAT AMOUNT OF SOVIET AID IS REPAID IN THE FORM OF RAW MATERIALS (SUCH AS TEA, AND JUTE) AND MANUFACTURED GOODS (SUCH AS SHOES) AND THUS IT IS DIFFICULT TO STATE EXACTLY HOW MUCH OF THE TRADE IS AID RELATED OR NOT. HOWEVER, WHAT IS CLEAR IS THAT INDO-SOVIET TRADE HAS EXPANDED QUICKER THAN INDIAN TRADE WITH ANY OTHER COUNTRY. THE SOVIET UNION IS NOW INDIA'S SECOND BIGGEST TRADING PARTNER AFTER THE U.S. TABLE 8-2 SHOWS THE RISE IN INDO-SOVIET TRADE.

TABLE 8-2

	1958	1959	1960	1961	63-64	64-65	65-66	66-67	67-68	68-69
% IMPORTS FROM USSR	2.5	1.9	1.3	2.5	5.7	5.9	5.8	5.5	5.5	10.0
% EXPORTS TO USSR	4.0	4.9	4.8	4.7	6.6	9.6	11.5	10.6	10.6	10.9
% INDO-USSR TRADE/ TOTAL INDIAN TRADE	3.1	3.1	2.6	3.3	6.0	7.3	7.9	7.3	7.3	10.4
				1969-70	70-71	71-72	72-73			
% IMPORTS FROM USSR				10.8	6.5	4.8	6.1			
% EXPORTS TO USSR				12.5	13.7	13.0	15.5			
% INDO-USSR TRADE/ TOTAL INDIAN TRADE				11.6	10.0	8.6	8.5			

SOURCE: INDIA YEAR BOOKS 1960-1974, OP. CIT.

13. FOR A DISCUSSION OF SOVIET AID TO INDIA, SEE MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN, SOVIET FOREIGN AID, FREDRIK A. PRAEGER, NEW YORK, 1967, PP. 189-215. OTHER WORKS TEND TO BE COMPARISONS OF U.S. AND USSR AID EFFORTS. FOR EXAMPLES, SEE: LED TANSKY, U.S. AND USSR AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, PRAEGER, NEW YORK, 1967 AND KAREL HOLBK, THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE THIRD WORLD, VERLAG WELTARCHIV GMBH, HAMBURG, 1968.

TABLE 8-2 INDICATES THAT INDO-SOVIET PEAKED IN 1969-70 WHEN IT ACCOUNTED FOR 11.6% OF INDIA'S TOTAL TRADE. HOWEVER, INDIAN EXPORTS TO THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CONTINUED TO GROW WHILE IMPORTS HAVE FALLEN OFF. THIS IS IMPORTANT SINCE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES ARE SEEKING MARKETS FOR THEIR EXPORTS WHILE TRYING TO LIMIT IMPORTS. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TRADE LINK FOR INDIA IS THAT THE SOVIETS OFTEN TAKE PRODUCTS THAT ARE NOT IN GREAT DEMAND ON THE WORLD MARKET. FURTHERMORE, THE AMOUNT INVOLVED NOW IS SO LARGE THAT INDIA CANNOT AFFORD TO LOSE THAT MARKET. SINCE SOVIET TRADE POLICIES ARE CLOSELY TIED WITH THEIR POLITICAL RELATIONS, IT IS DIFFICULT FOR INDIA TO HAVE ONE WITHOUT THE OTHER. THIS PROBLEM DOES NOT ARISE TO THE SAME EXTENT WHEN TRADING WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES, THOUGH SOME DO HAVE QUOTAS.

IT WAS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THAT INDIANS RECEIVED THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND BREZHNEV'S IDEAS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY. THE CONTENTS OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE HAVE ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED;¹⁴ THE ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM SEEMS TO BE A SOVIET SCHEME TO LINK TOGETHER ASIAN STATES IN SOME FORM OF ALLIANCE THAT WOULD CONTAIN THE CHINESE.¹⁵

"THE BREZHNEV PROPOSAL FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN ASIA APPEARED BY IMPLICATION TO REJECT THE NIXON VIEW ... INDIAN EXPERTS FOUND THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO BE MORE FAITHFUL TO THE CONCEPT AND THE NEED FOR A BALANCE OF POWER IN ASIA"¹⁶

HOWEVER, DELHI REMAINED CAUTIOUS ABOUT BOTH PLANS. IN ANY CASE, 1969-70 WAS A TIME WHEN INDIA TURNED INWARDS WHAT WITH THE CONGRESS PARTY SPLIT.

14. SEE CHAPTER 7.

15. R.M. DONALDSON, "INDIA: THE SOVIET STAKE IN STABILITY" IN ASIAN SURVEY, 12 (JUNE 1972), PP. 479-482, VOL. 12, NO. 6.

16. ASHOK KAPUR, "INDO-SOVIET TREATY AND THE EMERGING ASIAN BALANCE", IN ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. 12, NO. 6, P. 467.

BY THE TIME INDIA WAS READY TO FACE THE WORLD, THE BANGLADESH CRISIS BROKE OUT. IT IS IN THE BACKGROUND OF THIS CRISIS THAT THE IDEA OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY RE-EMERGED. FOR INDIA NEEDED A GUARANTEE FROM THE SOVIETS THAT CHINA WOULD NOT INTERFERE IF WAR BROKE OUT ON THE SUB-CONTINENT. WITH NIXON'S ANNOUNCED TRIP TO PEKING, INDIA'S NEED FOR ASSURANCE ROSE.

"AS INDIA FACED THE PROSPECT OF ANOTHER ROUND WITH PAKISTAN - SUPPORTED BY CHINA - IN 1971, COULD SHE COUNT AGAIN EVEN ON AMERICAN NEUTRALITY?"¹⁷

THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT ENTHRALLED BY THE PROSPECTS OF SINO-U.S. RAPPROACHMENT, GIVEN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE CHINESE. NOR DID THE SOVIETS FIND THE PROSPECT OF CONFLICT IN THE SUBCONTINENT IN THEIR INTERESTS. THE SOVIETS HAD INVESTED IN THE AREA AND THE ONLY GAINS WOULD BE FORCES OUTSIDE THE AREA.¹⁸ ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY COULD NOT AFFORD TO LOSE THEIR STAKE IN INDIA, WHICH WOULD HAVE RESULTED IF THEY HAD NOT COME THROUGH WITH THE REQUISITE SUPPORT. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHAT BETTER WAY THAN TO TIE INDIA TO A TREATY WITH THE USSR. THE SOVIETS HAD HOPED THAT THE TREATY WOULD HELP AVERT A CRISIS, AND IF THAT WAS NOT POSSIBLE, AT LEAST THE SOVIETS COULD BE ON THE WINNING SIDE.

"IN SHORT, THE TREATY'S MAIN PURPOSE, FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW, WAS TO FORMALIZE AND EXTEND RUSSIAN INFLUENCE FOR THE IMMEDIATE END OF STABILIZING THE SITUATION IN SOUTH ASIA, BOTH BY DETERRING THE PAKISTANIS AND THEIR CHINESE PATRONS, AND BY PROVIDING A PSYCHOLOGICAL CRUTCH TO THE INDIANS DESIGNED TO FORESTALL AN EMOTIONAL DRIFT TOWARD WAR ON THE PART OF NEW DELHI."¹⁹

17. DONALDSON, *OP. CIT.*, pp. 481-482.

18. *IBID.*, p. 483.

19. *IBID.*, pp. 483-4.

WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR DURING NOVEMBER THAT CONFLICT WAS NOT GOING TO BE AVOIDED THE SOVIETS PROVIDED CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL SUPPORT AS WELL AS MILITARY SUPPLIES. THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE IN THE U.N. VETOED RESOLUTIONS CALLING FOR A CEASEFIRE UNTIL INDIA HAD COMPLETED HER OPERATIONS IN BANGLADESH. MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF THE TREATY IS WHETHER THE TREATY WILL CAUSE FUNDAMENTAL LONG-TERM CHANGES IN INDO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIPS.

IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY JUST FORMALIZED A RELATIONSHIP THAT HAD BEEN DEVELOPING OVER THE YEARS, AND WHILE ITS TIMING MAY HAVE BEEN FORCED, IT WAS BOUND TO HAVE COME OUT IN SOME FORM OR OTHER. IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE TREATY HAS UNDOUBTEDLY CHANGED THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. IN A SENSE, IT HAS COMMITTED INDIA TO THE SOVIET VIEW ON CHINA, AND THAT THE POSSIBILITIES OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS IMPROVING HAS BEEN DIMMED. FOR AS LONG AS THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE LASTS, THE CHINESE ARE NOT GOING TO ANSWER ANY INDIAN FEELERS OF GOODWILL, SINCE THE CHINESE WILL MAKE THE REJECTION OF THE TREATY A FUNDAMENTAL PRECONDITION. FROM INDIA'S POINT OF VIEW, IT IS WELL NIGH IMPOSSIBLE TO ABROGATE THE TREATY GIVEN THEIR DEPENDENCY ON THE SOVIET UNION. IN ANY CASE, IT IS HARD TO JUSTIFY RUINING ONE RELATIONSHIP FOR THE SAKE OF ANOTHER. THE CHANGE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE TREATY IS MORE CLEARLY REFLECTED IN THE ECONOMIC RELATIONS THAT HAVE DEVELOPED IN THE POST-1971 PERIOD. THESE CHANGES INCLUDE THE SETTING UP OF A JOINT COMMISSION WHOSE MAIN FUNCTION IS TO "DOVETAIL" THE FIVE-YEAR PLANS OF THE COUNTRIES.²⁰ WITH THIS IS THE QUESTION OF INDIA JOINING COMECON. "DOVETAILING AND INTEGRATION ... IS IN PRINCIPLE NOT FAR AWAY FROM COMECON

20. R.V.R. CHANDRASEKHAR RAO, "INDO-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS" IN STRATEGIC DIGEST, VOL. 4, NO. 3, P. 41.

NORMS.²¹ AND EVEN IF FULL MEMBERSHIP WERE NOT TO ARISE, A STATUS SIMILAR TO THAT OF YUGOSLAVIA MAY BE GIVEN TO INDIA IN COMECON. THIS CHANGE REFLECTS "THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC REALITIES ON ECONOMIC RELATIONS."²²

SO FAR IN THIS CHAPTER, THE DISCUSSION HAS CENTRED AROUND THE GROWTH OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN INDIA HIGHLIGHTING SOME OF THE MAJOR TURNING POINTS AS WELL AS SOME OF THE REASONS BEHIND THIS GROWTH. THE DISCUSSION, HOWEVER, HAS NOT DEALT IN ANY LARGE DEGREE ON HOW THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT VIEWED THIS GROWTH OF SOVIET INFLUENCE. PART OF THE PROBLEM HERE LIES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION, SINCE MANY OF THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS REMAIN CLOSED. IT IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, TO PRESENT SOME EVIDENCE OF THE KIND OF REACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AT DIFFERENT TIMES DURING THE DECADE OR SO AFTER 1962.

WHEN INDIA WAS ABOUT TO SIGN THE MIG-21 DEAL WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHICH WOULD SET UP A MIG-21 PRODUCTION PLANT IN INDIA, THERE WAS AN ANGLO-AMERICAN EFFORT TO PERSUADE INDIA TO BUY WESTERN AIRCRAFT INSTEAD. THE PROBLEM IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN EFFORT WAS THAT THE OFFER WAS NOT IN TERMS THAT INDIA WAS WILLING TO ACCEPT. THIS WAS PARTLY DUE TO THE CONSTRAINTS ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT BECAUSE OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN. FROM THIS IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT DID NOT WANT TO SEE INDIA BECOME DEPENDENT ON SOVIET ARMS, BUT WAS UNABLE TO PRESENT A LUCRATIVE COUNTER-PROPOSAL. SIMILARLY, THE VOA INCIDENT IN WHICH INDIA, AFTER ACCEPTING THE U.S. OFFER TO SET UP A TRANSMITTER, THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

21. IBID., P. 44.

22. IBID., P. 42.

BACKED AWAY UNDER SOVIET PRESSURE, COULD HARDLY HAVE PLEASED DECISION-MAKERS IN WASHINGTON. FOR IT SEEMS PLAUSIBLE THAT DURING A TIME WHEN THE COLD WAR WAS STILL ON, THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT COULD HAVE ACCEPTED SUCH A TURN AROUND WITHOUT SOME SERIOUS MISGIVINGS; MISGIVINGS BECAUSE (1) IT SHOWED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WAS UNWILLING TO PURSUE POLICIES THAT WERE OPPOSED BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT U.S.-INDIAN RELATIONS WERE AT THEIR HIGHEST POINT EVER, AND (2) THAT THE AMERICANS HAD LOST AN OPPORTUNITY TO BROADCAST WITHIN INDIA WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT.

MORE THAN THESE TWO INCIDENTS, THE QUESTION OF INDIAN BEHAVIOR ON VIETNAM WOULD SEEM TO SHOW THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DID NOT LIKE THE INFLUENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION. IT HAS ALREADY BEEN NOTED THAT THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION ATTEMPTED TO 'PERSUADE' INDIA WITH VARIOUS MEANS TO EITHER SUPPORT THE AMERICAN POSITION IN VIETNAM OR AT LEAST MAINTAIN NEUTRALITY. IT HAS ALSO BEEN SHOWN THAT THE FIRST INDIAN SHIFT FROM NEUTRALITY ON THE ISSUE OF VIETNAM CAME IN MOSCOW IN 1966. THEREFORE, AN ARGUMENT CAN BE MADE THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT DID ATTEMPT TO TRY AND GET INDIA TO TAKE A NEUTRAL POSITION ON VIETNAM DURING 1966-67 BY USING FOOD AID AS A LEVER TO COUNTERACT THE SOVIET INSTRUMENT OF ARMS AID. IT WOULD SEEM, HOWEVER, THAT THE FAILURE OF THIS AMERICAN ATTEMPT LED TO THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE SOVIET POSITION IN INDIA. IF THIS IS SO, THEN IT REFLECTS A FURTHER DECLINE IN AMERICAN INTEREST. FOR IN A SYSTEM WHERE THERE IS COMPETITION BETWEEN DIFFERENT POWERS FOR INFLUENCE, AND ONE POWER GAINS THAT IN A PARTICULAR AREA, THE OTHER(S) HAS THE OPTIONS OF (A) ATTEMPTING TO PUSH BACK THE GAINER'S INFLUENCE, (B) ATTEMPTING TO STOP IT FROM GROWING,

(c) ALLOWING IT TO CONTINUE GAINING. SINCE THE NIXON DOCTRINE CONSIDERS INDIA TO BE OF PERIPHERAL INTEREST AND RICHARD NIXON STATED THAT "INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION ALREADY HAD A POLITICAL TIE OF A KIND THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO MATCH", IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE FIRST OPTION IS OUT. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE U.S. HAS DECIDED WHICH OF THE OTHER TWO IT SEEKS TO FOLLOW.

IN CONCLUSION, THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE SOME EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT VIEWED, DURING THE LARGE PART OF THE 1960'S, THE GROWTH OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN INDIA WITH SOME DISPLEASURE. THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DID TRY AND COUNTERACT THIS GROWTH IN SOVIET INFLUENCE, THOUGH IT CAN ALSO BE ARGUED THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT WAS UNWILLING TO MAKE THE LARGE ENOUGH EFFORT TO DO THIS, THEREBY PERHAPS INDICATING A LOW PRIORITY FOR INDIA AMONGST AMERICAN DECISION-MAKERS. THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION HAD CLEARLY INDICATED THAT IT WOULD NOT MAKE THE EFFORT TO 'OUST' THE SOVIET UNION FROM HER PREDOMINANT POSITION IN INDIA, NOR HAS THE FORD ADMINISTRATION INDICATED ANY CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLICY.

CHAPTER 9CONCLUSION

THE STATED OBJECTIVE OF THIS THESIS WAS TO TRY TO SHOW THAT THE KEY TO UNDERSTANDING THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT'S BEHAVIOR DURING THE 1971 INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICT LAY IN THE DECLINE IN AMERICAN INTEREST IN INDIA DURING THE 1960'S. IN ORDER TO DO THIS, IT WAS ARGUED AN ATTEMPT WOULD BE MADE TO DOCUMENT THIS DECLINE IN AMERICAN INTEREST. THE ASSUMPTION OF THIS PAPER IS THAT THE IMMEDIATE REASON AS TO WHY THE UNITED STATES ACTED IN THE WAY IT DID IS UNIMPORTANT WHEN COMPARED TO THE QUESTION WHY IT WAS ABLE TO TAKE SUCH AN ANTI-INDIAN STANCE. THIS, IT WAS STATED, COULD ONLY BE FATHOMED BY UNDERSTANDING THAT INDIA WAS OF PERIPHERAL INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AND THEREFORE IT WAS EASY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO IGNORE THE INDIAN JUSTIFICATIONS FOR HER POLICY AND ALLOW OTHER CONSIDERATIONS TO DETERMINE THE AMERICAN RESPONSE. THIS PAPER HAS, THEREFORE, TRIED TO SHOW THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION WERE THE LOGICAL CONCLUSION OF A DECADE OF CHANGING AMERICAN INTEREST(S) IN INDIA.

THE POINT OF VIEW PRESENTED IN THIS PAPER IS THAT GOVERNMENTS OF COUNTRIES DO HAVE INTERESTS. THAT THESE INTERESTS ARE NOT NECESSARILY RELATED TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST, WHICH IN TERMS OF THIS PAPER IS DEFINED AS INTERESTS SHARED BY THE BULK OF THE POPULATION OF A GIVEN COUNTRY. THESE INTERESTS ARE OFTEN CONTRADICTORY, SOMETIMES LEADING TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF ONE OVER THE OTHER, AND SOMETIMES TO A STALEMATE. THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO GOA REPRESENTS THE FORMER, WHILE AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS INDIA AND PAKISTAN BETWEEN 1962-1965 IS A REFLECTION OF A STALEMATE.

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS, AS RECOGNIZED HERE, WAS SAID TO BE INCREMENTAL, BECAUSE OF A NUMBER OF FACTORS SUCH AS VARYING INTERESTS AND KNOWLEDGE. THUS, IT WAS ARGUED THAT INTERESTS AND POLICY (THE LATTER BEING A REFLECTION OF THE FORMER) SELDOM CHANGE DRAMATICALLY, NORMAL PROCESS BEING ONE OF THE SMALL SHIFTS IN DIRECTION. HOWEVER, THESE CHANGES, THE ARGUMENT RAN, TAKE PLACE ONLY IN RESPONSE TO A STIMULUS (OR TO STIMULI) EITHER FROM WITHIN THE BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE OR OUTSIDE. THE ASSUMPTION HERE IS THAT THERE IS AN IN-BUILT BIAS AGAINST CHANGING POLICY UNLESS THERE IS AN IMPORTANT REASON TO REVIEW IT, SINCE DECISION-MAKERS PREFER TO STEER CLEAR OF POLITICS THAT WOULD BE INVOLVED IN CHANGING POLICY.

HAVING BRIEFLY REVIEWED WHAT THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER WAS, IT IS NOW TIME TO REVIEW HOW FAR THESE CONTENTIONS HAVE BEEN SUPPORTED. THIS WILL BE DONE BY STARTING WITH THE QUESTION OF THE ROLE STIMULI PLAYS AND MOVING BACKWARD THROUGH THE OTHER ONES.

IN GENERAL, THE STIMULUS-RESPONSE ARGUMENT SEEMS TO BE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, WITHOUT, HOWEVER, SHOWING THE CAUSAL LINK OF PERCEPTION IN MOST CASES. IN FACT, IT WOULD SEEM THAT WHERE THE STIMULI HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AND A CHANGE IN INTEREST AND/OR POLICY NOTED, THE PERCEPTUAL LINK HAS BEEN ASSUMED. THIS, OF COURSE, IS A WEAKNESS, BUT IT IS A WEAKNESS INHERENT IN ANY POLICY-MAKING ANALYSIS SINCE IT IS VERY OFTEN IMPOSSIBLE TO LOCATE THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS THAT WOULD SHOW WHETHER OR NOT CERTAIN STIMULUS(STIMULI) WAS (WERE) PERCEIVED. UNTIL IT IS POSSIBLE TO OPEN THE POLICY-MAKING SYSTEM IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO ASSUME PERCEPTION FOR OTHERWISE IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO PROCEED WITH ANY POLICY ANALYSIS.

AT THE SPECIFIC LEVEL OF EACH STIMULUS THAT HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED, THIS PROBLEM OF PERCEPTION IS CONSIDERABLY MORE ACUTE. FOR INSTANCE, WHILE THE DECLINE IN INDIA'S STATUS/PRESTIGE HAS BEEN NOTED BY ACADEMICS, DOES IT NECESSARILY FOLLOW THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT INTERPRETED THE SINO-INDIAN WAR IN THAT MANNER? UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS NO WAY OF ANSWERING THAT EXCEPT NOTING THAT AMERICAN POLICY THAT FOLLOWED WOULD SEEM TO LEAD ONE TO BELIEVE THAT THAT WAS THE CASE. THE PROBLEM IS SLIGHTLY MORE DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH WHEN THE GROWTH OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IS BEING CONSIDERED AS A STIMULUS TO AMERICAN DECISION-MAKERS. FOR WHILE THERE ARE EXAMPLES OF AMERICAN REACTION TO A COUPLE OF SPECIFIC SOVIET ACTIONS (SUCH AS THE MIG DEAL AND VIETNAM), IT IS HARD TO DOCUMENT AMERICAN DECISION-MAKER'S REACTIONS TO THE WHOLE IDEA OF GROWTH OF SOVIET INFLUENCE.

WAS THE PROCESS OF INTEREST AND/OR POLICY CHANGE INCREMENTAL?

THERE WAS NO SUDDEN CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLICY OR INTERESTS DURING THE DECADE UNDER ANALYSIS. THERE WERE, HOWEVER, SLIGHT SHIFTS AT DIFFERENT TIMES DURING THE COURSE OF THE 1960'S. THE SINO-INDIAN WAR WOULD SEEM TO MARK THE FIRST CHANGE, THE FAILURE TO BRING INDIA AND PAKISTAN TOGETHER RESULTS IN A GREATER CHANGE. THE VIETNAM WAR AND ITS RELATED ISSUES SEEM TO HAVE RESULTED IN SLOW CHANGES IN THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS INDIA. THE RECOGNITION THAT THE WORLD HAD CHANGED, BY THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION, AND ITS POLICY OF BIG POWER RELATIONS REFLECTS ANOTHER CHANGE. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS, IT WOULD SEEM TO BE LOGICAL TO ARGUE THAT THE CHANGE WAS INCREMENTAL. FURTHER SUPPORT CAN BE FOUND IN THAT AT NO TIME DOES THE AMERICAN POLICY SEEM TO BE HEADING TOWARDS ANY PARTICULAR GOAL, AND THIS IS A TRADE-MARK OF INCREMENTALISM.

THIS PAPER WOULD APPEAR TO SUPPORT THE CONTENTION THAT DECISION-MAKERS DO HAVE FOREIGN POLICY INTEREST, ALBEIT AT TIMES CONTRADICTORY. WHILE THESE INTERESTS ARE THERE, THE INTERESTS SEEM TO BE ON TWO LEVELS. THE FIRST IS IN TERMS OF SPECIFICS, I.E. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAD AN INTEREST IN MAINTAINING ITS BASE IN PESHAWAR. IN THE SECOND, INTEREST SEEMS TO BE SYNONYMOUS WITH IMPORTANCE. THOUGH THE TWO ARE PROBABLY RELATED IN THAT THE KINDS OF SPECIFIC INTERESTS DETERMINE THE INTEREST (DEFINED AS IMPORTANCE) IN THAT IF THE SPECIFIC INTERESTS OF STATE A IN STATE B ARE OF A LOWER PRIORITY THAN THOSE OF A TOWARDS X, THEN THIS WOULD BE REFLECTED IN LOWER INTEREST (DEFINED AS IMPORTANCE) IN STATE B. WHILE ON THE POINT OF INTEREST (SPECIFIC, AS WELL AS IN TERMS OF IMPORTANCE) IT IS SOMETIMES NECESSARY TO TRY AND UNCOVER AN INTEREST BY LOOKING FOR POLICY. THIS CAN SOMETIMES LEAD TO THE PROBLEM OF ARGUING RATIONAL INTEREST(S) WHERE THERE MAY HAVE BEEN NONE, AND POLICY MAY ACTUALLY REFLECT MANY INTERESTS.

THE EVIDENCE PUT FORWARD IN THIS THESIS DOES, TO A LARGE EXTENT, SUPPORT THE ARGUMENT THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT'S INTERESTS (BOTH SPECIFIC AND IN TERMS OF IMPORTANCE) DID DECLINE DURING THE 1960'S. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1960'S, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED INDIA TO BE THE COUNTRY THAT COULD ACT AS A BULWARK TO CHINESE COMMUNISM; INDIA WAS TO SHOW THAT DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT WAS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE COMMUNIST MODEL. TO THIS END THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS TO POUR LARGE AMOUNTS OF AID INTO INDIA. BY THE END OF THE DECADE, THE UNITED STATES NO LONGER LOOKED UPON INDIA AS A COMPETITOR TO CHINA - CHINA HAD FAR SURPASSED INDIA. AMERICAN AID TO INDIA HAD FALLEN OFF; INDIA SEEMED TO HAVE LITTLE

OR NO ROLE TO PLAY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AS CONCEIVED BY THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION. THUS, IT WOULD SEEM FAIR TO CONCLUDE THAT AMERICAN INTEREST IN INDIA WAS NO MORE THAN THAT INDIA MANAGED TO REMAIN ONE ENTITY; SINCE A BREAK-UP OF INDIA WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE CONSIDERABLE INSTABILITY IN ASIA AND PERHAPS FORCE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO COMPETE WITH THE SOVIETS AND THE CHINESE IN THE AREA FOR INFLUENCE. AT THE MOMENT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE INDIAN UNION GIVING WAY TO SMALLER STATES DOES NOT SEEM VERY PROBABLE; AMERICAN INTEREST(S) IN INDIA REMAIN LOW. THE POLICY OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION WOULD SEEM TO REFLECT THIS IN THAT NO SERIOUS AND PROLONGED EFFORT HAS BEEN UNDERTAKEN TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH INDIA.

APPENDIX AFOREIGN AID VOTING PATTERNS IN CONGRESS

FOREIGN AID IS ONE OF THE FEW AREAS IN FOREIGN POLICY WHERE CONGRESS HAS ALWAYS PLAYED A LARGE ROLE, AND THEREFORE IT IS WORTHWHILE TO SEE WHAT FACTORS INFLUENCE FOREIGN AID VOTING OF CONGRESSMEN. O'LEARY, IN A STUDY OF THE 86TH AND 87TH CONGRESS, CONCLUDED THAT THE FOUR FACTORS INFLUENCING THE WAY CONGRESSMEN VOTED WERE: (1) WHETHER THE PRESIDENT WAS OF THE SAME PARTY; (2) PARTY; (3) REGION; (4) WHETHER THE CONGRESSMAN WAS IN THE HOUSE OR THE SENATE.¹ UNFORTUNATELY, O'LEARY USED STRAIGHT PERCENTAGES TO REACH HIS CONCLUSION WITHOUT ANY TESTS ON THE STRENGTH OF THE RELATIONSHIPS. FURTHERMORE, HIS RESULTS WERE OBTAINED WHEN FOREIGN AID WAS AT ITS HIGHEST POPULARITY.

BEFORE PUTTING FORWARD ANY HYPOTHESIS, IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT A TEST OF THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT HAD TO BE ABANDONED WHEN IT WAS FOUND THAT PRESIDENT NIXON WAS NEUTRAL ON THE FOREIGN AID PROGRAM. THE REASONING BEHIND THIS IS THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO JUDGE THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRESIDENT ON HIS PARTY WHEN HE TAKES NO STAND ON AN ISSUE, AS WAS THE CASE WITH PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE FOREIGN AID BILLS. THUS, IT WAS DECIDED ONLY TO USE DATA FROM THE 89TH CONGRESS (1967-68). ON THE BASIS OF O'LEARY'S FINDINGS, THE FOLLOWING HYPOTHESES WERE PUT FORWARD:

1. THAT PARTY IDENTIFICATION IS RELATED TO FOREIGN AID VOTING PATTERNS OF CONGRESSMEN.

1. O'LEARY, OP. CIT., CHAPTERS 5 AND 6.

2. THAT THE REGIONS THAT CONGRESSMEN COME FROM IS RELATED TO THEIR FOREIGN AID VOTING BEHAVIOUR.

3. THAT THERE ARE DIFFERENCES IN VOTING PATTERNS BETWEEN THE TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS.

IN OPERATIONALIZING, IT WAS DECIDED THAT UNLESS A CONGRESSMAN HAD VOTED AT LEAST ON HALF THE FOREIGN AID MEASURES, HE/SHE WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE STUDY. IT WAS ALSO DECIDED THAT CONGRESSMEN WHO HAD NOT ACTUALLY VOTED, BUT THAT HAD EITHER INDICATED FOR THE RECORD THAT THEY WOULD HAVE VOTED FOR OR AGAINST THE MEASURE WERE INCLUDED. SIMILARLY, THOSE CONGRESSMEN THAT HAD BEEN 'PAIRED OFF' WOULD ALSO BE INCLUDED. THE REASON FOR DOING THIS WAS TO GET AS LARGE A NUMBER OF CONGRESSMEN'S VIEWS AS POSSIBLE, THEREBY INCREASING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESULTS. PARTY AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE HOUSE WERE EASY TO OPERATIONALIZE. FOR OPERATION-ALIZING THE VARIABLE REGION IT WAS DECIDED THAT IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO MAKE SOME COMPARISON WITH O'LEARY'S RESULTS, 7 REGIONS WERE TO BE USED. THEY ARE: (1) NEW ENGLAND (N.E.); (2) MID-ATLANTIC (M.A.), WHICH INCLUDES NEW YORK, PENNSYLVANIA, THE BORDER STATES OF MARYLAND AND WEST VIRGINIA; (3) THE SOUTH (SO.), WHICH INCLUDES THE OLD CONFEDERATE STATES, LOUISIANA AND OKLAHOMA; (4) EAST CENTRAL (E.C.), WHICH INCLUDES THE STATES BETWEEN OHIO AND ILLINOIS (INCLUSIVE); (5) WEST CENTRAL (W.C.), INCLUDING THE STATES BETWEEN ILLINOIS (EXCLUDED) AND COLORADO (INCLUSIVE); (6) ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION (R.M.), WHICH INCLUDES A BELT OF STATES LYING BETWEEN THE WEST CENTRAL AND PACIFIC REGIONS; (7) PACIFIC (PA.) WHICH INCLUDES ALL THE STATES ON THE PACIFIC SHORE INCLUDING HAWAII AND ALASKA.

THE DATA WERE COLLECTED FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY. IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE VOTES TO BE INCLUDED SHOULD BE ONES WITH REGARD TO THE

FOREIGN AID BILL, I.E. THE AUTHORIZATION, APPROPRIATIONS AND AMENDMENTS. HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO CUT DOWN IN NUMBER OF VOTES, AMENDMENTS THAT WERE WITH REGARD TO SPECIFIC COUNTRIES WERE ELIMINATED. FURTHERMORE, IN ORDER TO FACILITATE SCALING ONLY 3 AMENDMENTS WERE INCLUDED FOR EACH OF THE TWO YEARS, THUS BRINGING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VOTES INCLUDED TO TEN. IN ORDER TO DO THIS, THE AMENDMENTS THAT WERE THE MOST BROAD RANGED WERE INCLUDED. FOR EXAMPLE, AMENDMENTS SUCH AS ONE IN THE SENATE THAT WOULD HAVE INCREASED FOREIGN AID TO THE HOUSE LEVEL WERE INCLUDED. A TOTAL OF TEN VOTES WERE RECORDED, THUS A SCALE OF 0 TO 10 WAS USED. IN THE CASE OF CONGRESSMEN WHO HAD VOTED (OR INDICATED) MORE THAN 5 OF THE VOTES INCLUDED, BUT NOT ON THE FULL QUOTA, AN AVERAGE SCORE WAS CALCULATED AND THEN RAISED TO WHAT IT WOULD BE ON A 0-10 SCALE. IN COMPUTING INDIVIDUAL SCORES, CONGRESSMEN HAD EITHER A ZERO OR ONE (1) PLACED AGAINST THEIR NAMES FOR EACH VOTE, AT THE END OF TEN A TOTAL SCORE WAS THEN ADDED UP. A ZERO WAS GIVEN WHEN THE VOTE WAS AGAINST FOREIGN AID (EITHER THE WHOLE PACKAGE OR SPECIFIC INCREASES) WHILE A ONE (1) WAS GIVEN FOR VOTES FAVOURABLE ON AID. THUS THE 0-10 SCALE INDICATES IN ASCENDING ORDER THE SUPPORT FOR AID.

THE RESULTS

THE MEAN SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN AID BY PARTY, HOUSE AND REGION ARE GIVEN IN FIGURE A-1. FROM THIS IT SEEMS THAT DEMOCRATS ARE MORE SUPPORTIVE OF AID THAN REPUBLICANS; THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE HOUSES OF CONGRESS IN TERMS OF SUPPORT; THAT CONGRESSMEN FROM THE REGIONS OF NEW ENGLAND, THE MID-ATLANTIC AND THE PACIFIC ARE MOST SUPPORTIVE OF AID, WHILE THOSE FROM THE SOUTHERN, THE WEST CENTRAL AND ROCKY-MOUNTAIN REGIONS

ARE LEAST SUPPORTIVE, WITH THOSE FROM THE EAST CENTRAL LYING SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN. THAT PARTY IDENTIFICATION IS IMPORTANT IN DETERMINING VOTING PATTERNS IS SUPPORTED BY THREE OTHER RESULTS:

(1) THAT WHEN A CROSS-TABULATION WAS CONDUCTED BETWEEN SCORE AND PARTY, THE RESULTS WERE NOT ONLY SIGNIFICANT, THE RELATIONSHIP WAS STRONG (CRAMER'S $V = 0.493$);

(2) TABLE A-1 GIVES THE RESULT OF AN ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE WHICH INDICATES THAT PARTY HAS BOTH A SIGNIFICANT AND STRONG RELATIONSHIP TO VOTING PATTERNS ON AID;

(3) THAT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MEAN SUPPORT OF THE DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS HAS $T = 11.3$ SIGNIFICANT 0.01 (ONE-TAILED).

SIMILARLY THE RESULTS SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS THAT THE REGION THAT CONGRESSMEN COME FROM IS RELATED TO THEIR VOTING PATTERNS. BESIDES THE MEAN SUPPORT OF VARIOUS REGIONS WHICH INDICATES REGIONAL DIFFERENCES, THERE ARE OTHER INDICATIONS. A CROSS-TABULATION BETWEEN SCORE AND REGION NOT ONLY GAVE A SIGNIFICANT RESULT BUT ALSO A STRONG RELATIONSHIP (CRAMER'S $V = 0.255$). FURTHERMORE, THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SHOW THAT REGION IS A SIGNIFICANT EXPLANATORY FACTOR IN FOREIGN AID VOTING WITH A STRONG RELATIONSHIP ($\eta^2 = 0.466$) (SEE TABLE A-1) FINALLY, WHEN CROSS-TABULATIONS BETWEEN SCORE AND REGION CONTROLLING FOR PARTY WERE CONDUCTED, IN ALL BUT ONE CASE THE RESULTS WERE BOTH SIGNIFICANT AND HAD A STRONG RELATIONSHIP. THE EXCEPTION WAS THE SOUTH, AND THE EXPLANATION FOR THIS LIES IN THE FACT THAT SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS ARE VERY ANTI-AID. IN FACT, OUT OF THE 81 DEMOCRATS WITH SCORES OF 0-2 (INCLUSIVE) 52 OF THEM WERE SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS.

UNLIKE THE OTHER TWO HYPOTHESES, THE ONE ON THE ROLE OF THE HOUSE SEEMS TO HAVE LITTLE SUPPORT. NOT ONLY IS THERE NO MARKED DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MEAN SUPPORT SCORES OF THE TWO HOUSES, BUT THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SHOWS THAT DIFFERENT HOUSE MEMBERSHIP IS NOT A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN AID VOTING BEHAVIOUR. TABLE A-2 SHOWS THAT THE ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF CONGRESSMEN ON THE SCORE SCALES ARE DIFFERENT IN THE TWO HOUSES, AND THAT WHEN A CROSS-TABULATION BETWEEN SCORE AND HOUSE THE RESULTS WERE SIGNIFICANT AND STRONG (CRAMER'S $V = 0.3$). HOWEVER, WHEN A CONTROL FOR PARTY WAS ADDED, THE CHI SQUARE = 12.81 WITH 10 DEGREES OF FREEDOM AT A SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL = 0.23. THUS, THE REASON FOR THE RESULT WHEN NO CONTROL WAS USED MAY BE DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HAS A MUCH LARGER DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY.

HOW DO THESE RESULTS COMPARE WITH O'LEARY'S FINDINGS? IT WOULD SEEM THAT THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE EFFECT OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND REGIONAL IDENTIFICATIONS. THE ROLE HOUSE, HOWEVER, DOES NOT SEEM TO BE THAT IMPORTANT IN DETERMINING FOREIGN AID SUPPORT. ON THE QUESTION OF REGIONAL SUPPORT, IT SEEMS THAT THE RESULTS ARE THE SAME AS O'LEARY'S. (SEE TABLE A-3) IN CONCLUSION, IT WOULD SEEM THAT CONGRESSMEN WHO ARE DEMOCRATS AND ARE OF THE NORTH-EAST (NEW ENGLAND AND MID-ATLANTIC REGIONS) ARE MOST SUPPORTIVE OF FOREIGN AID LEGISLATION. SOUTHERNERS, BOTH REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS, ARE LEAST SUPPORTIVE. REPUBLICANS ARE ALSO GENERALLY OPPOSED TO FOREIGN AID, WHILE DEMOCRATS (EXCEPT SOUTHERN ONES) ARE GENERALLY IN FAVOUR.

FIGURE A-1

MEAN PERCENTAGE SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN AID

FIGURE A-1 (CONT'D)

(III)

BY REGION

TABLE A-1

AN ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

<u>SOURCE OF VARIATION</u>	<u>SUM OF SQUARES</u>	<u>DF</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>SIGNIF. OF F.</u>
<u>MAIN EFFECTS</u>	3564.96	8	60.07	0.00001
PARTY	1839.2	1	247.88	.00001
REGION	2105.16	6	47.29	.00001
HOUSE	5.59	1	0.75	.3857
<u>2-WAY INTERACTION</u>	604.41	13	6.27	.00001
PARTY-REGION	207.41	6	4.66	.00013
PARTY-HOUSE	318.66	1	42.95	.00001
REGION-HOUSE	183.9	6	4.13	.00046
<u>3-WAY INTERACTION</u>	90.16	6	2.025	.06077
PARTY-REGION-HOUSE	90.16	6	2.025	.06077
<u>RESIDUAL</u>	3694.97	498		
<u>TOTAL</u>	7955.52	525		

PARTY $\text{ETA} = 0.428$ REGION $\text{ETA} = 0.466$ HOUSE $\text{ETA} = 0.01$

TABLE A-2

SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN AID BY HOUSE

	<u>% OF SENATE</u>	<u>% OF HOUSE</u>
0	8.0	10.7
1	15.0	12.4
2	7.0	6.8
3	6.0	5.9
4	3.0	2.8
5	13.0	4.5
6	7.0	4.5
7	15.0	3.1
8	7.0	6.6
9	9.0	8.9
10	10.0	23.9
	(N = 100)	(N = 425)

S
C
O
R
E

TABLE A-3COMPARISON OF RANK OF REGIONS ON SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN AID

(90TH CONGRESS + O'LEARY'S STUDY)

	<u>90TH CONGRESS RANK</u>	<u>O'LEARY'S RANKING</u>
NEW ENGLAND	1	1
MID-ATLANTIC	2	2
SOUTH	7	7
EAST CENTRAL	4	4-5
WEST CENTRAL	5	4-5
ROCKY MOUNTAINS	6	6
PACIFIC	3	3

RANKING IS ON 1 = HIGHEST AND 7 = LOWEST

BIBLIOGRAPHYBOOKS

- ALLISON, GRAHAM T. THE ESSENCE OF DECISION, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY, BOSTON, 1971.
- AMBROSE, STEPHEN E. RISE TO GLOBALISM, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 1939-1971. PENGUIN, BALTIMORE, 1971.
- ANDERSON, JACK WITH GEORGE CLIFFORD. THE ANDERSON PAPERS. BALANTINE BOOKS, NEW YORK, 1973.
- BALDWIN, DAVID A. FOREIGN AID AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. FREDRICK A. PRAEGER, NEW YORK, 1966.
- BARNES, WILLIAM J. INDIA, PAKISTAN AND THE GREAT POWERS. PALL MALL, LONDON, 1972.
- BLUE, RICHARD N. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO INDIA: THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT. UNPUBLISHED PH.D. DISSERTATION, CLAREMONT GRADUATE SCHOOL, 1967.
- BOWLES, CHESTER. PROMISES TO KEEP. HARPER AND ROW, NEW YORK, 1971.
- BRINES, RUSSELL. THE INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT. PALL MALL PRESS, LONDON, 1968.
- CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY. NATIONAL DIPLOMACY 1965-1970. WASHINGTON, 1970.
- FRANKEL, JOSEPH. NATIONAL INTEREST. PALL MALL, LONDON, 1970.
- GALBRAITH, JOHN K. AMBASSADOR'S JOURNAL. HAMISH HAMILTON, LONDON, 1969.
- GEYELIN, PHILIP L. LYNDON B. JOHNSON AND THE WORLD. FREDRICK A. PRAEGER, NEW YORK, 1966.
- GOLDMAN, MARSHALL I. SOVIET FOREIGN AID. FREDRICK A. PRAEGER, NEW YORK, 1967.
- GURTOV, MELVIN. THE UNITED STATES AGAINST THE THIRD WORLD. PRAEGER, NEW YORK, 1974.
- HALBERSTAM, DAVID. THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST. FAWCETT CREST, CANADA, 1973.
- HALPERIN, MORTON H. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY. BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, 1974.

HALPERIN, MORTON H. AND ARNOLD KANTER (ED.). READINGS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY, BOSTON, 1973.

HARRISON, SELIG (ED.). INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES. MACMILLAN, NEW YORK, 1961.

HEIMBATH, CHARLES H. AND SURJIT MANSINGH. A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF MODERN INDIA. ALLIED PUBLISHERS, CALCUTTA, 1971.

HILBMAN, ROGER. TO MOVE A NATION: THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY. DOUBLEDAY AND COMPANY, NEW YORK, 1967.

_____. THE POLITICS OF POLICY-MAKING IN DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HARPER AND ROW, NEW YORK, 1971.

_____. AND ROBERT C. GOOD (ED.). FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SIXTIES: THE ISSUES AND THE INSTRUMENTS. THE JOHN HOPKINS PRESS, BALTIMORE, 1965.

HOFFMAN, STANLEY (ED.). CONTEMPORARY THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. PRENTICE-HALL, ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, N.J., 1960.

_____. GULLIVER'S TROUBLES OR THE SETTING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. MCGRAW-HILL, NEW YORK, 1968.

HOLBIK, KAREL. THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE THIRD WORLD. VERLAG WELTARCHIV GMBH, HAMBURG, 1968.

HOLSTI, K.J. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. (SECOND EDITION) PRENTICE-HALL, ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, N.J., 1972.

HOUGHTON, NEAL W.A. (ED.). STRUGGLE AGAINST HISTORY: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTION. WASHINGTON, SQUARE PRESS, NEW YORK, 1968.

HUNTER, R.E. AND J.E. REILLY (ED.). DEVELOPMENT TODAY. PRAEGER, NEW YORK, 1972.

IMAM, ZAFAR. WORLD POWERS IN SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA. STERLING PUBLISHERS, NEW DELHI, 1972.

JOHNSON, LYNDON BAINES. THE VANTAGE POINT, PERSPECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENCY 1963-1969. HOLT, RINEHART AND WINSTON, NEW YORK, 1971.

KALB, MARIAN AND BERNARD KALB. KISSINGER. LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY, BOSTON, 1974.

KISSINGER, HENRY. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. (EXPANDED EDITION), W.W. MORTON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK, 1974.

LAFFER, WALTER. AMERICA, RUSSIA AND THE COLD WAR: 1945-1966. WILEY, NEW YORK, 1967.

LOOMBA, JOANNE F.K. A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKERS' IMAGES AND POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS, AND THEIR ORIENTATIONS TOWARDS FOREIGN AID FOR INDIA, 1951-1967. UNPUBLISHED PH.D. DISSERTATION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, 1971.

LOVELL, JOHN P. FOREIGN POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE. THE DRYDEN PRESS, HINSDALE, ILLINOIS, 1970.

MAGDOFF, HARRY. THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM: THE ECONOMICS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. MONTHLY REVIEW PRESS, NEW YORK, 1969.

MAHESHWARI, B. FOREIGN AID AND THE POLICY PROCESS: A STUDY OF THE STRUGGLE OVER FOREIGN AID IN CONGRESS. UNPUBLISHED PH.D. DISSERTATION, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1965.

MANKEKAR, D.R. PAKISTAN CUT TO SIZE. INDIAN BOOK CO., NEW DELHI, 1972.

MILLIKAN, MAX F. AND W.W. ROSTOW. A PROPOSAL: KEY TO AN EFFECTIVE FOREIGN POLICY. HARPER AND BROTHERS, NEW YORK, 1957.

MONTGOMERY, JOHN D. FOREIGN AID IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. PRENTICE-HALL, NEW YORK, 1967.

MORGENTHAU, HANS. POLITICS AMONG NATIONS, 3RD ED. ALFRED A. KNOPF, NEW YORK, 1965.

NEVINS, ALLAN (ED.). THE STRATEGY OF PEACE BY JOHN F. KENNEDY. HARPER AND ROW, NEW YORK, 1960.

NIXON, RICHARD M. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S, BUILDING FOR PEACE. A REPORT BY PRESIDENT TO CONGRESS, FEBRUARY 15TH, 1971, HARPER AND ROW, NEW YORK, 1971.

_____. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S: THE EMERGING STRUCTURE OF PEACE. A REPORT TO CONGRESS, FEBRUARY 9TH, 1972.

O'LEARY, MICHAEL K. THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN AID. ATHERTON PRESS, NEW YORK, 1967.

PALMER, NORMAN D. SOUTH ASIA AND THE UNITED STATES. HOUGHTON MIFFIN, BOSTON, 1966.

PACKENHAM, ROBERT A. LIBERAL AMERICA AND THE THIRD WORLD. PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, PRINCETON, 1973.

PAYNE, ROBERT. MASSACRE. MACMILLAN, NEW YORK, 1973.

PFEFFER, RICHARD M. (ED.) NO MORE VIETNAM? THE WAR AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. HARPER AND ROW, NEW YORK, 1968.

RAMIS, GUSTAV. THE UNITED STATES AND DEVELOPING ECONOMIES. W.W. MORTON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK, 1973.

DE RIVERA, JOSEPH H. PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY. MERRILL, COLUMBUS, OHIO, 1968.

ROBINSON, JAMES A. CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING. (REVISED ED.) DORSEY, HOMewood, ILLINOIS, 1967.

ROSENau, JAMES M. NATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND FOREIGN POLICY. PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, PRINCETON, 1972.

_____. (ED.) INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY. (REVISED ED.) FREE PRESS, NEW YORK, 1969.

ROSTOW, W.W. THE DIFFUSION OF POWER. MACMILLAN, NEW YORK, 1972.

SPANIER, JOHN W. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE WAR. PRAEGER, NEW YORK, 1971.

SECRET, DONALD E. AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD NEUTRALISM DURING THE TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATIONS. UNPUBLISHED PH.D. DISSERTATION, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, 1967.

STEIN, ARTHUR. INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION: THE NEHRU ERA. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, CHICAGO, 1969.

SHAH, RAMESH. THE VALUES IN STATEMENTS OF AMERICAN DECISION-MAKERS CONCERNING INDIA 1947-1962, AS REVEALED THROUGH CONTENT ANALYSIS. UNPUBLISHED PH.D. DISSERTATION, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, 1967.

STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI). ARMS TRADE WITH THE THIRD WORLD. HUMANITIES PRESS, NEW YORK, 1971.

SYNDER, R.C., H.W. BRUCK AND BURTON SAPIN (ED.) FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING. FREE PRESS, NEW YORK, 1962.

TALBOT, PHILIP AND S.F. POPLAI. INDIA AND AMERICA. HARPER AND BROTHERS, NEW YORK, 1956.

TANSKY, LEO. U.S. AND U.S.S.R. AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. PRAEGER, NEW YORK, 1967.

TUCKER, ROBERT W. THE RADICAL LEFT AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. THE JOHN HOPKINS PRESS, BALTIMORE, 1971.

TUCKER, ROBERT N. AND WILLIAM WATTS (ED.) BEYOND CONTAINMENT: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. POTOMAC, WASHINGTON, 1977.

WALTERS, ROBERT S. AMERICAN AND SOVIET AID TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS. UNPUBLISHED PH.D. DISSERTATION, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, 1967.

WARD, BARBARA, J.K. RUNNALS AND LENORE D'ANNOU (ED.) THE WIDENING GAP. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS, NEW YORK, 1971.

WEAVER, DAVID R. PUBLIC LAW 480, INDIA AND THE OBJECTIVES OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN AID, 1954-1966. UNPUBLISHED PH.D. DISSERTATION, UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI, 1971.

ARTICLES

ARON, RAYMOND. "RICHARD NIXON AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY", IN DAEDALUS 101, FALL 1972.

AYOUB, MOHAMMED. "U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN 1954-1965. A CASE STUDY IN THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN AID", IN INDIA QUARTERLY, VOL. 23, No. 2.

BACCHUS, W.I. "DIPLOMACY FOR THE 70'S", IN AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 68, JUNE 1974.

BALDWIN, D.A. "FOREIGN AID, INTERVENTION AND INFLUENCE", IN WORLD POLITICS, 21, APRIL 1969.

BARNES, WILLIAM J. "MOSCOW AND SOUTH ASIA", IN PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, 21, MAY 1972.

_____. "INDIA AND AMERICA AT ODDS", INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 49, JULY 1973.

BHAGWATI, J. "U.S. IN THE NIXON ERA ..." IN DAEDALUS, 191, FALL 1972.

BOWLES, CHESTER. "AMERICA AND RUSSIA IN INDIA." IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 49, JULY 1971.

BRECHER, MICHAEL. "INDIA'S DECISION ON THE VOICE OF AMERICA: A STUDY IN IRRESOLUTION." IN ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XIV, No. 7.

BROOKIN, E.T. "U.S. AID TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN." IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 43, OCTOBER 1967.

BURKE, S.M. "THE POST-WAR DIPLOMACY OF INDO-PAKISTANI WAR OF 1971." IN ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XIII, No. 11.

CHOUHURY, G.W. "MOSCOW'S INFLUENCE IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT." IN WORLD TODAY, 28, JULY 1972.

_____. "MOSCOW'S INFLUENCE IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT." IN WORLD TODAY, Vol. 28, AUGUST 1972.

CLARK, I. "COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN ASIA." IN ROUND TABLE, No. 252, OCTOBER 1973.

CLARKSON, S. "SOVIET THEORY AND INDIAN REALITY." IN PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, 16, JANUARY 1967.

_____. "LOW IMPACT OF SOVIET AIDING AND AID ON INDIAN THINKING AND POLICY." IN SURVEY, 20, WINTER 1974.

DONALDSON, R.M. "INDIA: THE SOVIET STAKE IN STABILITY." IN ASIAN SURVEY, 12, JUNE 1972.

EDITORIAL, "MR. NIXON'S PHILOSOPHY OF FOREIGN POLICY." IN ROUND TABLE, 248, OCTOBER 1972.

FELDMAN, HERBERT. "AID AS IMPERIALISM." IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Vol. 43, No. 2.

FISHER, MARGARET W. "GOA IN A WIDER PERSPECTIVE." IN ASIAN SURVEY, 2, No. 2.

FRIEDMAN, I.S. "IN DEFENSE OF DEVELOPMENT." IN WORLD TODAY, 22, APRIL 1966.

GALTUNG, JOHAN. "A STRUCTURAL THEORY OF AGGRESSION." IN JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, 1 (1964).

_____. "INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH." IN TRANSACTIONS OF THE SIXTY WORLD CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY, 1966.

GANGULY, SHIVAJI. "U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDIA 1962-63: A STUDY IN DECISION-MAKING." IN INDIA QUARTERLY, Vol. 28, No. 3.

GARVEY, G. "FOREIGN AID THEORY: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?" IN WORLD POLITICS, 18, JULY 1966.

GILBERT, S.P. "SOVIET-AMERICAN MILITARY COMPETITION IN THE THIRD WORLD." IN ORBIS, 13, WINTER 1973.

GOLDMAN, M.I. "A BALANCE SHEET OF SOVIET FOREIGN AID." IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 53, JANUARY 1975.

GUPTA, S. "POWER STRUCTURE IN SOUTH ASIA." IN ROUND TABLE, 60, APRIL 1970.

HAHN, W.F. "THE NIXON DOCTRINE: DESIGN AND DILEMMAS." IN ORBIS, 12,
- SUMMER 1972.

HARRISON, SELIG. "TROUBLED INDIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS." IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
VOL. 43, OCTOBER 1965.

HEIMBATH, CHARLES H. "UNITED STATES-INDIAN RELATIONS: A GENERATION OF
UNFULFILLMENT." IN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, 28, SUMMER 1973.

ILOHMAN, W.F. "POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREIGN AID: THE CASE OF INDIA." IN
ASIAN SURVEY, 7, OCTOBER 1967.

KAPUR, ASHOK. "INDO-SOVIET TREATY AND THE EMERGING ASIAN BALANCE." IN
ASIAN SURVEY, 12, JUNE 1972.

_____. "STRATEGIC CHOICES IN INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY." IN INTER-
NATIONAL JOURNAL, 28, SUMMER 1973.

KAPUR, HARISH. "INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION." IN SURVEY 16, WINTER 1971.

KEEP, JOHN. "THE SOVIET UNION AND THE THIRD WORLD." IN SURVEY, SUMMER 1969.

KEOHANE, ROBERT O. "THE BIG INFLUENCE OF SMALL ALLIES." IN FOREIGN
POLICY, 2, 1970-71.

LINDBLOM, CHARLES E. "THE SCIENCE OF MUDDLING THROUGH." IN PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, 19, 2, 1959.

MOYNIHAN, DANIEL P. "INDO-U.S. RELATIONS." IN INDIA QUARTERLY, 30, NO. 1.

NAYAR, BALDEV RAJ. "TREAT INDIA SERIOUSLY." FOREIGN POLICY, VOL. , NO. .

NICHOLS, J.P. "U.S. AID TO SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA." IN PACIFIC HISTORY
REVIEW, 32, MAY 1963.

PALMER, NORMAN D. "INDIA'S POSITION IN ASIA." IN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, 17, NO. 2.

_____. "UNITED STATES-SOUTH ASIAN RELATIONS IN THE 1970'S."
IN ORBIS, 17, WINTER 1974.

POWER, P. "INDIA AND VIETNAM." ASIAN SURVEY, 7, NO. 10.

PRASAD, BINAL. "THE SUPER POWERS AND THE SUBCONTINENT." IN INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES, 13, NO. 4.

REID, E. "CRISIS IN FOREIGN AID." IN WORLD TODAY, 22, AUGUST 1966.

- RAO, R.V.R.C. "INDO-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS." IN ASIAN SURVEY, 13, AUGUST 1973.
- RUBISTEIN, A.Z. "SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE THIRD WORLD." IN ORBIS, 15, SPRING 1971.
- STEIN, ARTHUR. "INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION: THE POST-NEHRU PERIOD." IN ASIAN SURVEY, 7, MARCH 1967.
- SETHI, J.D. "INDIA, CHINA AND THE VIETNAM WAR." IN INDIA QUARTERLY, 22, No. 2.
- SHRIVASTAVA, B.K. "INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT." IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 14, No. 1.
- SIEGEL, R.L. "EVALUATING THE RESULTS OF FOREIGN POLICY: SOVIET AND AMERICAN EFFORTS IN INDIA." MONOGRAPH SERIES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 6, No. 4, 1968-69, UNIVERSITY OF DENVER.
- SIMON, SHELDON W. "KASHMIR DISPUTE IN SINO-SOVIET PERSPECTIVE." IN ASIAN SURVEY, 7, MARCH 1967.
- VENKATARAMANI, M.S. "THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INDIA 1958-1959." IN INDIA QUARTERLY, 16, JANUARY-MARCH 1959.
- WARD, B. "AID IN DISTRESS." IN ROUND TABLE, 56, JULY 1968.
- WARD, RICHARD J. "LONG THINK ON DEVELOPMENT." IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 46, JANUARY 1970.
- WATT, D.C. "AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER VIETNAM." IN POLITICAL QUARTERLY, 44, JULY 1973.
- WILCOX, WAYNE. "AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH ASIA." IN ASIAN AFFAIRS, WINTER, 1972.
- _____. "UNITED STATES: THE FINAL RECESSIONAL." IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 43, OCTOBER 1973.
- _____. "THE SOURCES OF SOVIET CONDUCT." IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JULY 1947.

DOCUMENTS

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (A.I.D.), U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS AND ASSISTANCE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. LOANS AND AUTHORIZATIONS, JULY 1, 1945 - JUNE 30TH, 1972.

_____. FY 1974 PROGRAM PRESENTATION TO CONGRESS.

U.S. CONGRESS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HEARINGS, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1968.

_____, THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1969.

_____, U.S. INTERESTS IN AND POLICIES TOWARD SOUTH ASIA, 1973.

_____, THE INDIAN RUPEE SETTLEMENT 1974.

U.S. CONGRESS, SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1961.

U.S. INFORMATION SERVICE (OTTAWA), WHY VIETNAM?

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DEAN RUBK, "YOUR STAKE IN FOREIGN AID."
BULLETIN 23, MARCH 1964, P. 435.

_____, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY CURRENT DOCUMENTS, 1961.

_____, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY CURRENT DOCUMENTS, _____.

END

9 0 3 7 7

FIN