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Canada, the Congo Crisis, and United Nations Peacekeeping
1960 – 1964

by

Kevin A. Spooner, B.A.(Hons), B.Ed., M.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of History
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario

March 1, 2002

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0-612-71949-9
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Kevin A. Spooner, B.A., B.Ed., M.A.

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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7 May 2002
ABSTRACT

The Belgian Congo, now the Democratic Republic of Congo, gained independence in June 1960. Within days, the new country’s armed forces mutinied. During the ensuing civil disorder, Belgium invaded to secure the safety of nationals who had decided to remain. Many in the international community condemned Belgium, and the Congolese leadership formally requested assistance from the United Nations. In response, the UN established the Opération des Nations Unies au Congo [ONUC or UNOC], initially to restore order and to supervise the withdrawal of all foreign nationals from Congolese territory.

This dissertation, the first thorough examination of Canada’s foreign policy during the Congo crisis and its participation in ONUC, uses primary sources to recount and assess significant issues and events. A number of themes are addressed: the politics of decolonisation in the Canadian and international responses to the collapse of ‘order’ within the Congo, and Canadian efforts to bridge political differences between developed and developing nations; the impact of the Cold War on Canadian and UN involvement in the Congo; the increasingly interventionist nature of ONUC’s mandate and official views on the use of force; the inter- and intra-departmental dynamics of Canada’s peacekeeping policy development; and the motivations and objectives behind Canadian participation in ONUC.

Canada’s Congo policy, under the Conservative government of John Diefenbaker and then Lester Pearson’s Liberal government, attempted to balance a number of, sometimes competing, considerations. As a NATO ally, Canada’s allegiance to the West
was clear; yet officials attempted to maintain an overall impression of objectivity. Canadian policy attempted to avoid any positions that could alienate the growing number of Afro-Asian members of the UN. The views of many of the non-aligned states differed from that of Canada on one significant issue: ONUC’s use of force. Ottawa consistently opposed any attempt by the UN to use ONUC to force a political settlement in the Congo. This opposition was voiced quietly to the Secretary-General and senior members of the Secretariat. Canadian policy with respect to ONUC and the Congo crisis was driven by a number of pragmatic factors, the paramount of which was support of the United Nations and its peacekeeping role.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Mostly, writing this dissertation seemed like a solitary exercise. Nothing could be further from the truth, however. I owe a debt of gratitude to many who, in one way or another, helped to make this dissertation possible.

Financial support was provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the Province of Ontario, and Carleton University.

I benefited from the experience and knowledge of archivists and curators at the National Archives of Canada, the Canadian Communications and Electronics Museum, and the Diefenbaker Centre for the Study of Canada. At the latter, Joan Champ must be singled out for the tremendous assistance she provided.

My colleagues at work, both at Julian Blackburn College and the Academic Skills Centre at Trent University, kindly agreed to take on more than their fair share in order to give me extra time for writing at critical points. My friends in the Canadian Studies Program, especially Jim Struthers, John Wadland, and Elsie Scott, have been consistently supportive.

Joëlle Favreau was kind enough to carefully translate some French primary sources to ensure I was understanding them correctly.

Professors John English, Fen Hampson, Blair Neatby, Stephen Harris, and Douglas Anglin, agreed to serve on the examining board for the dissertation. Their suggestions and comments were valuable and appreciated.

Ms. Joan White is an exceptional administrator. She is the unsung hero of all graduate students in History at Carleton. For nine years, Joan has been reminding me of impending deadlines, steering me through the bureaucracies of graduate study, and generally keeping me on track. Thank you, Joan.

I am grateful to the many professors I have been privileged to study and work with at Carleton. I learned a great deal about history and being an historian from Professor B. McKillop. Professor A. Bennett’s passion for history is exceeded only by her love of teaching. One could not ask for a better role model in academe. Above all, I must thank Professor N. Hillmer. First during my M.A. and then throughout my Ph.D., he has provided advice, support, and guidance in just the right measure. In every way, he has been the ideal thesis supervisor.

Finally, I must thank my family: Cecilia, Ken, Gloria, and Tracy Spooner; Ramesh, Hansa, and Krishan Mehta. I need especially to thank my partner Bina and son Nikesh. Too often I have spent time doing what was urgent and not what was important. Though I will never be able to repay Bina adequately for all the sacrifices and hardships she has endured so that I could complete this degree, I dedicate this work to her.
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Introduction

The Belgian Congo gained independence in June 1960. Within days, the new country's armed forces, the Force Publique, mutinied. During the ensuing civil disorder, Belgium invaded to secure the safety of nationals who had decided to remain. Many in the international community condemned Belgium, and the Congolese leadership formally requested assistance from the United Nations. In response, the UN established the Opération des Nations Unies au Congo [ONUC or UNOC], initially to restore order and to supervise the withdrawal of all foreign nationals from Congolese territory.

UN peacekeeping was not new in 1960. It emerged in the immediate post war period when it became apparent that the collective security provisions enshrined in the UN charter would not function as envisaged. With the unique exception of Korea, the Security Council was too often paralysed by rivalry amongst the permanent members and, consequently, the use of their right of veto. Provisions within the Charter for the development of an effective, international force to be used by the UN were never realized. Peacekeeping, then, developed as a de facto alternative to inaction: it served as a mechanism to diffuse and stabilise international situations, primarily in regions where the interests of the great powers were indirectly threatened. By the time of the Congo crisis, peacekeeping had already been used a number of times in the Middle East and along the border between India and Pakistan.

When the Congo crisis occurred, peacekeeping was becoming an increasingly important task of the UN. Because peacekeeping had not been anticipated when the organisation was formed, however, it was encumbered by constitutional and operational
ambiguity. The UN Charter, for instance, does not define peacekeeping. Its legal basis is found in Chapter 6 more often than Chapter 7, but it might be more accurate to say that it falls somewhere between the two.¹ Because of this ambiguity, the term 'peacekeeping' has been used to describe numerous activities, including peacemaking, peace enforcement, peace observation, and peace assistance. But Brian Urquhart, a long-standing, senior member of the UN Secretariat, has argued that true peacekeeping is characterised by its limited use of force and should be distinguished from actions taken to enforce peace.²

Written in the mid 1940s, the UN Charter embodied a number of assumptions later challenged by post war international relations. The authors expected the new institution, not to field peacekeeping operations, but to enforce measures for collective security. Peacekeeping expert Alan James suggests that the difference between collective security and peacekeeping lies in the principles of force and consent. Collective security relied “ultimately, on the mandatory use of force, while peace-keeping eschewed force, except in self-defence. and required the consent of the host state for the admission of UN

¹ Chapter 6: Pacific Settlement of Disputes; Chapter 7: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression
² Whether ONUC could be considered peacekeeping under this more limited definition is unclear. Jane Boulden recently contributed to the debate over peacekeeping terminology, suggesting that ONUC is best described as a “mandate enforcement operation.” The International Peace Academy defines peacekeeping as “the prevention, containment, moderation and cessation of hostilities between states or between the forces of a particular state, organized and led internationally by a multinational force, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.” This definition would certainly include ONUC, and is preferred by the author. Brian Urquhart, “Peacekeeping: A View From the Operational Center,” in Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals, Ed. Henry Wiseman (Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1983) 164; Jane Boulden, The United Nations and Mandate Enforcement: Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia (Kingston, Ont: Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University in cooperation with the Institut Québécois des
personnel."³ Although the Security Council was assigned primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace, particularly when collective action was required, attempts to fulfill Charter provisions that would furnish the Security Council with forces to be used in times of crisis were a "total failure."⁴ The Charter was ill-equipped to deal with intra-state conflicts because it focused on hostilities between nation states, all but ignoring civil wars.⁵ The UN Charter prohibits any involvement in the domestic affairs of a state, primarily by Article 2, paragraph 7 and by the emphasis placed on 'international' peace and security in Article 24.⁶ This prohibition can be circumvented only when the Security Council decides to take enforcement measures to ensure that a civil war will not constitute a threat to international peace.⁷

In spite of its limitations and silences, the Secretary-General was still compelled to rely upon the Charter as the legal basis for the principles of peacekeeping and the UN's response to the Congo's request for assistance. Articles 41 to 43 of the Charter clearly outline the means available to the Security Council to enforce its decisions. But, as has been seen, peacekeeping is often considered to be more passive and consensual than the methods implied by these Articles. At times, though, only a fine line separates those

⁷ See Appendix 1: Selected Articles of the United Nations Charter.
operations considered enforceable from those that are unenforceable; the Congo crisis would ultimately demonstrate this. For example, if a peacekeeping mission is approved under the 'provisional measures' clause of Article 40, it is considered mandatory but unenforceable. In other words, the Security Council can request that a peacekeeping force be allowed to enter the territory of a state, and it would be mandatory for a nation to comply with this request. But, if the state chose not to comply, entry could not be forced without an additional decision by the Security Council, taken under the authority of Article 42.8 By obtaining the consent of the host nation in advance, early peacekeeping operations circumvented such constitutional complexities altogether.9

The principle of consent is rooted in the institutional evolution of peacekeeping. When it proved impossible to resolve the Suez Crisis in the Security Council in 1956, discussion was transferred to the General Assembly using the Uniting for Peace Resolution. The General Assembly approved a peacekeeping force as part of the settlement, but because it lacked the constitutional authority, it could not impose the force on the disputants, nor could the peacekeepers be used to enforce a settlement. Instead, it relied on the disputants to consent to the force's presence, without powers of enforcement. When the Security Council approved later peacekeeping missions, the

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9 See Appendix 1: Selected Articles of the United Nations Charter.
pattern of a passive, consensual force had been established and the Security Council maintained this precedent.\textsuperscript{10}

By the time of the Congo Crisis, still other precedents had been established through the UN’s experience with its first major peacekeeping mission: the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). Neutrality was perhaps the most important of these. In practice, this required peacekeeping forces to operate with the consent of the parties to a dispute, not to intervene in the domestic affairs of disputants, not to use force except in self-defence, and finally, to recruit forces from nations other than the permanent members of the Security Council.\textsuperscript{11} This last point has clear significance for middle or non-aligned powers, such as Canada. Claude has suggested that while the great powers had to “permit” the UN to play this neutral role, it was the powers which were least aligned in the Cold War that would “enable” the UN to appear neutral.\textsuperscript{12}

Before turning to the UN’s response to the Congolese request for assistance, one final point should be made about the nature of UN peacekeeping missions. They are often burdened by equivocal mandates, usually the result of attempts to develop a consensus in the Security Council. Members of the Council may differ in their views of the purpose and rationale for a force and will consequently use vague language within enabling


resolutions to ensure that the overall goal, the creation of a peacekeeping mission, is met. This has serious implications for those left to oversee the conduct of an operation, often the Secretary-General and the Secretariat. It has been suggested that ambiguous mandates mean the Secretary-General, "is—legally—rather free to decide what mandate the forces shall have." In the initial weeks and months of the Congo crisis, Hammarskjöld used this freedom to propose and interpret ONUC's mandate but then faced strong criticism of his decisions. The Secretary-General and his staff would ultimately play a far greater role, from the beginning to end of ONUC, than had previously been the case in other peacekeeping or enforcement actions.  

Although ONUC was one of the earliest UN peacekeeping operations, it was significant primarily because it challenged the formative principles previous peacekeeping experiences had already established. ONUC broke all of these early 'rules'. The Congo crisis was essentially domestic, yet interference in the domestic affairs of a state was prohibited under the UN's charter. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld justified intervention on the grounds that a serious threat to international peace and security would be averted if the superpower rivalry of the Cold War was prevented from exploding in the Congo. With the establishment of ONUC, the UN entered uncharted territory. As the crisis wore on and it seemed as though the secessionist movement in the province of Katanga might jeopardise the territorial integrity and viability of the new country, the UN abandoned a passive approach to peacekeeping in favour of a more

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13 Asbjørn Eide, "UN Forces in Domestic Conflicts," 257.
forceful one. Through their efforts to expel foreign mercenaries from Katanga and prevent civil war, the peacekeepers became a party to the conflict. At its height, ONUC consisted of almost 20,000 personnel and eventually cost the UN $400 million dollars. In its size, cost, and mandate, ONUC was a precursor to the type of peacekeeping missions increasingly undertaken by the UN in the post Cold War period. Because of its tremendous political and financial stake in ONUC, the fate of the UN was perceived by many, at the time, to be inextricably linked to the outcome of the peacekeeping mission. ONUC stretched not only the definition of peacekeeping, but also the UN itself. Alan James, a leading scholar in this field, has described ONUC as "a watershed in the development of international peacekeeping."\textsuperscript{15}

A significant body of literature on the subject of peacekeeping has emerged in the past four decades, most particularly since the end of the Cold War and the deployment of several new peacekeeping operations. It is largely the work of political scientists and includes numerous articles and monographs that discuss and analyse the practice and utility of peacekeeping. Many of the monographs provide overviews of past operations and address common themes (e.g. legality and constitutional origins, characteristics and


definitions of peacekeeping, passivity and the use of force, financing, neutrality and objectivity, mandates).\textsuperscript{16}

A number of relevant studies were written during and just after the Congo crisis. Some are limited by a certain present-mindedness. Others provide a history of the colonial period that illuminates the crisis of the early 1960s. A number of authors specifically address the involvement of the UN and other members of the international community,\textsuperscript{17} while others focus primarily on the Congo itself.\textsuperscript{18} In the years since the crisis, a number of biographies and autobiographies have been written that shed light on the roles certain key individuals played.\textsuperscript{19} Belgium’s culpability, the role of the Secretary-


General, the evolution of ONUC’s mandate, the financial crisis caused by the refusal of
some members to pay their assigned share of peacekeeping costs, and ONUC’s use of
force in bringing Katanga’s secession to an end, are common themes. It is not possible to
deduce a predominant interpretation of ONUC from this scholarship, though a majority
would agree that the peacekeeping operation achieved what it set out to do – albeit at
great cost to the UN.

In the past two decades, a new generation of literature has emerged, as authors
reevaluate UN peacekeeping in the Congo. From an American perspective, this includes
the work of Stephen Weissman and Madeleine Kalb. Kalb’s work addresses the Cold
War context of superpower rivalry in the Congo. David Gibbs provides a critical analysis
of American policy from a political economy perspective, focusing on the role of US
financial interests. In a similar vein, Carole Collins provides a critical interpretation of
the actions of UN officials in the early months of the Congo crisis. Both Gibbs and
Collins argue that ONUC was neither neutral nor objective, characteristics seen as
essential to peacekeeping. Unlike Gibbs, Alan James is not starkly revisionist, but his
landmark study of Britain’s foreign policy during the Congo crisis ably demonstrates that

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and Dunlap, 1962); Indar Jit Rikhye, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General: U.N. Peacekeeping and

20 Stephen R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960-1964 (Ithaca: Cornell U P.,

21 David N. Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World Intervention (Chicago: U of Chicago P.,

of International Affairs 47.1 (1993): 243-269; Carole Collins, “Fatally Flawed Mediation: Cordier and the
peacekeeping does take place within a political context. Other studies have examined the participation of ONUC contingents from Ireland, Nigeria, and Austria.²³

By 1960, Canadians had already served in peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, the disputed Kashmir region between India and Pakistan, Lebanon, and the former French colonies in Indochina.²⁴ In addition to carrying out peacekeeping duties, Canada also made notable contributions to the diplomacy of peacekeeping. In 1956, Lester Pearson, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, urged the UN to despatch a large peacekeeping force to the Middle East to diffuse the Suez Crisis. Before this, peacekeeping typically involved a limited number of soldiers, used as observers to monitor peace agreements. UNEF was a significant development in the history of peacekeeping, for which Pearson was awarded the Nobel Prize. Historian Norman Hillmer has noted that this “contributed mightily to Ottawa’s and the public’s proprietary interest in peacekeeping.”²⁵ By the late 1950s, the government considered

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peacekeeping sufficiently important to warrant an Army battalion earmarked for standby service with the UN. 26

Although peacekeeping is often cited as a consistent, important Canadian contribution to the international community and a significant aspect of Canada's foreign policy, there are noticeable gaps in the scholarly literature on the subject. Written in 1968, Taylor, Cox, and Granatstein's *Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response*, remains the most complete and systematic treatment of Canadian peacekeeping. 27 Within this monograph, Granatstein's survey of Canada's participation in earlier peacekeeping missions is seminal because it stands alone as a scholarly history of Canada's contributions to the first UN operations. Canada's association with peacekeeping, and the prospects for its continued involvement, are assessed in a number of articles, chapters within books, and short monographs. 28 Particular issues related to

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26 The exact year when this occurred is unclear. For this study, it is sufficient to determine that a battalion was immediately available for UN service at the time of the Congo Crisis. Granatstein traces the earmarking of Canadian troops for UN service to 1950, when an Army brigade was recruited, trained, and equipped for UN service, as called for in the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Peter Calvocoressi states, "Canada kept an infantry battalion available for U.N. purposes after 1956." Paul Martin stated, "Since 1957 Canada has herself made arrangements for units of her armed forces to be on standby duty for possible service with the United Nations." Finally, R.B. Tackaberry suggests that a standby force was defence policy by about 1950, but that it was not until 1958 that it was available for despatch to a particular crisis. DHH: J.L. Granatstein, Historical Report #4: "Canada and Peace-keeping Operations," 11; Peter Calvocoressi, *World Order and New States* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1962) 96; Paul Martin, *Canada and the Quest for Peace* (New York: Columbia U P, 1967) 11; R.B. Tackaberry, *Keeping the Peace: a Canadian Military Viewpoint on Peace-Keeping Operations*, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1966) 7.


Canada and peacekeeping, the financing of operations or logistics for example, have received some attention.\(^{29}\)

From a strictly historical perspective, relatively little has been published about Canada and peacekeeping. Professors J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer are largely responsible for the existing literature.\(^{30}\) Biographies and autobiographies can sometimes provide historical insight into Canada’s involvement in peacekeeping and should not be overlooked. Professor John English’s fine biography of Lester Pearson, for example, includes a good account of Pearson’s diplomatic efforts to create UNEF, during the Suez

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crisis.\textsuperscript{31} Charles Ritchie's, \textit{Diplomatic Passport}, provides a first hand account of his tenure as Canada's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at the time of the Congo crisis.\textsuperscript{32} Fred Gaffen's \textit{In the Eye of the Storm: a History of Canadian Peacekeeping} and Col. John Gardam's \textit{The Canadian Peacekeeper} attempt to provide overviews and basic information about Canada's contributions to specific peacekeeping missions, in the absence of detailed histories of each of the Canadian peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{33}

Schools of thought or interpretation have yet to emerge from within this area of research, partly because of the relatively limited scholarship on the topic. It is possible, however, to discern a not uncommon theme or question: why has Canada, in the past and today, been relatively consistent in its support of UN peacekeeping? Writing in the early 1970s, Professor Granatstein questioned the value of peacekeeping and the motives of those responsible for making it a policy priority.\textsuperscript{34} He argued that there was more 'image' than 'reality' to Canadian perceptions of the importance of their peacekeeping record and that public pride virtually forced successive governments to take part in each and every


UN mission. This theme reappears in Granatstein’s more recent writings on the subject.35 Other scholars have repeated Granatstein’s argument in their own analysis of the relationship between public opinion and peacekeeping, and in brief references to Canada’s participation in ONUC.36

Two studies of Canadian peacekeeping policy, addressing Canada and the UN mission to the Congo, have raised doubts about the significance of self-image and opinion in the development of government policy.37 Livingstone argues that neither the public nor parliament were influential factors in the decision making of Liberal and Conservative governments with respect to peacekeeping in Egypt, the Congo, and Cyprus. In a M.A. thesis focused on the Diefenbaker government’s decision to send peacekeepers to the Congo, Spooner argues that opinion was not as important a factor as it was thought to be.

Two other studies of Canada, ONUC, and the Congo deserve mention. Nilufer Balsara has addressed Canadian policy on the financing of ONUC in a Ph.D. dissertation, “Paying for Peace: Canada, the United Nations and the financing of the Congo peacekeeping mission, 1960-1964.”38 Balsara has argued that Canada was vocal in its

attempts to convince member nations of the need for all to assume collective responsibility for the costs of peacekeeping but was largely ineffectual in resolving the UN’s economic woes. While Canadian diplomats may have been unsuccessful in negotiating long term solutions to the UN’s peacekeeping costs, this study did find that Canada played a credible role in ensuring that funds were found to at least maintain ONUC in the field until its withdrawal in 1964. A second study, by David Lenarcic, examined the inter-departmental dynamics of peacekeeping decision-making between the Departments of National Defence and External Affairs.\textsuperscript{39} Lenarcic found the relationship between the two ministries to be largely cooperative, with occasional – though sometimes fierce – episodes of friction. Readers will find this dissertation supports Lenarcic’s interpretation.

John Diefenbaker and the Conservative Party came to power as a minority government in the 1957 election. One year later, he consolidated this victory with a landslide majority. Preoccupied by the imperatives of domestic politics in his early years as Prime Minister, foreign affairs were often of secondary importance.\textsuperscript{40} Diefenbaker did, however, take a keen interest in international affairs and served as his own Secretary of State for External Affairs until the appointment of Sidney Smith to the Cabinet post in

\textsuperscript{39} David A. Lenarcic, “Meeting Each Other Halfway: The Departments of National Defence and External Affairs During the Congo Peacekeeping Mission, 1960-64.” YCISS Occasional Paper Number 37, CDISP Special Issue Number 1, August 1996.

\textsuperscript{40} Diefenbaker’s foreign policy adviser, H. Basil Robinson noted, “it was my experience that domestic policies and politics generally took precedence over foreign policy problems.” H. Basil Robinson, 
September 1957. Diefenbaker assumed this role again following the sudden death of
Smith in March 1959 and before the appointment of Howard Green in June of that year.
Green was a more vigorous Minister than Smith, but Diefenbaker maintained his interest
in Canada’s foreign policy.

It cannot be said that the Diefenbaker government significantly altered the course
of Canadian foreign policy. Commenting in 1959 on the previous session of Parliament,
one observer suggested there were “few differences over foreign policy between the two
main parties.”41 Foreign policy, it seems, was not a priority for many Canadians during
Diefenbaker’s early years in office. Historian Trevor Lloyd concluded,

Parliamentary debates did not show a higher level of informed interest in
foreign affairs than they had done before 1957, and public feeling on
matters of policy did not run very deep. Mr. Diefenbaker was probably
correct in thinking that people wanted a foreign policy that would make
Canada conspicuous in the world’s affairs and would oblige the United
States to pay attention to her problems, but it is unlikely that anything
more precise than this was expected by the public during the earlier years
of his premiership.42

Diefenbaker was Prime Minister at a critical time in the Cold War and when tremendous
change characterised the global community, primarily as a result of decolonisation. His
government did address a number of important international issues (e.g. continental
defence and nuclear weapons, South African membership in the Commonwealth, trade
with the United Kingdom), yet Diefenbaker’s foreign policy legacy is mostly
unremarkable. Basil Robinson argues, “It is perhaps not surprising that he left the foreign

41 Robert Duffy, “Canada’s Foreign Policy in Transition.” International Journal 14 (Autumn
1959) 303.
policy scene without having significantly altered the values, the priorities, or the continuing threads which he inherited from his predecessors.\footnote{Trevor Lloyd, \emph{Canada in World Affairs, 1957-1959} (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968) 20.}

The Congo crisis is a useful case study, not only because it was a noteworthy international event, but because the Diefenbaker government’s Congo policy exemplifies many of the issues associated with the study of Canadian foreign policy generally: peacekeeping, multilateralism, Canadian/American/British relations, midlepowership, quiet diplomacy. But if these speak to methodology, the evolution of Diefenbaker’s Congo policy was more reaction to foreign policy circumstance than to theories about what Canada was or would like to have been in international politics. The Conservative government carefully weighed its options when the UN formally requested Canadian participation in ONUC. Canadian officials were especially concerned for the safety of peacekeepers; there were fears French-speaking Canadian soldiers might be mistaken for Belgians. Nevertheless, the government gradually increased its support of ONUC. At first, aid and aerial support was provided. Once the UN was in a position to identify its particular needs, Canadian signals personnel were also sent. Canadian forces remained in the Congo until June 1964, when the mission ended. By then, Lester Pearson was Prime Minister and had sent forces to another UN peacekeeping commitment, this time in Cyprus.

This dissertation examines Canada’s foreign policy during the Congo crisis and its participation in ONUC, recounting and assessing significant issues and events between...
1960 and 1964. Within a chronological framework, a number of themes are addressed: the politics of decolonisation in the Canadian and international responses to the collapse of ‘order’ within the Congo, and Canadian efforts to bridge political differences between developed and developing nations in particular; the impact of the Cold War on Canadian and UN involvement in the Congo; the increasingly interventionist nature of ONUC’s mandate and official views on the use of force; the inter- and intra-departmental dynamics of Canada’s peacekeeping policy development; and the motivations and objectives behind Canadian participation in ONUC.

At the time of the Congolese request, relations between states at the United Nations were shaped by two significant political developments: decolonisation and the Cold War. As a result of decolonisation, the United Nations was at a critical turning point in its evolution. The membership of the UN surged. African and Asian states at the UN increased from 22 per cent in 1946 to 51 per cent by 1964. Although the Western states had enjoyed a strong position in the early years of the UN, by 1960 this position of strength was in decline.\(^{44}\) Beginning in the fifteenth General Assembly (1960), African and Asian states found it much easier to obtain a two-thirds majority, while the Western states found it increasingly difficult to garner sufficient support to block a vote.\(^{45}\)

At times, the Western states were themselves divided by the politics of decolonisation. Martelli argues that the United States was willing to sacrifice the interests

\(^{43}\) H. Basil Robinson, *Diefenbaker’s World*, 315.


of its European allies on colonial issues, in order to appeal to the majority of UN members. Unlike the US, Britain and even more so France, were reluctant to take positions during the Congo crisis which would limit freedom of action in their own African colonies. Martelli views the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples as a significant shift "in the centre of gravity," at the UN, "from the more to the less responsible, from the experienced to the immature, from those with a long tradition of diplomacy to those with no tradition at all." This opinion is perhaps a candid reflection of a certain eurocentric wistfulness that arose once the European powers had acknowledged that times were changing.46

While Western states may have been divided at the UN by decolonisation, the Cold War usually served to unify the West, especially when confronted by Soviet opposition. There was no mistaking that Cold War politics would play a role in the outcome of the crisis. To observers at the time, events in the Congo "seemed at one moment to pose the risk of a direct Soviet-American confrontation, initially in Africa but eventually elsewhere."47 Weissman reminds us of the many factors that contributed to increased Cold War tensions at the time of the Congo crisis:

In May the Paris summit conference blew up. In June anti-American riots forced President Eisenhower to cancel his trip to Japan. On July 1, a U.S. RB-47 reconnaissance plane was shot down over the Soviet Union. On the 3rd, the sugar quota for Castro's Cuba was cut from the American market.

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On the 9th, Premier Khrushchev warned that 'Soviet artillerymen can support Cuba with rocket fire.'

Initially, both superpowers had a common interest in using a UN peacekeeping mission to diffuse the potentially explosive situation in the Congo. Later, tensions would re-escalate after ONUC itself was exploited to maximise political gain.

John Holmes has argued that Canada "more assiduously" worked for compromise on colonial questions than on Cold War issues, but added, "Canada usually joined the Scandinavians in NATO to oppose the rigidities of the great powers in their attitudes both to the Communist states and the neutralists." Canadians, it seems, developed a "reputation for objectivity and independence, if not neutrality." While Canadian governments sometimes shared the political objectives of their cold war allies during the Congo crisis, they were content to allow others to shoulder the West's ideological burden in order to preserve this reputation for independence and objectivity.

Attempting to account for a certain style in Canadian diplomacy, Holmes suggested Canada's "reputation for independence and objectivity had to be reflected in endeavours to establish bridges between the blocs, to find compromise solutions." As will be seen, building bridges was a complex task for Canadian diplomats when it came to the Congo crisis: an international problem that divided both north from south, and east

48 Stephen Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960-1964, 27.
from west. Canada was keen to curry favour with the newly independent states. Geoffrey Pearson attributes Canada’s sympathy with developing nations to “the common experience of ‘colony to nation’ experience which includes the political economy of resource development and foreign ownership.”\(^5\) But faced with the constraint of being allied to colonial powers in NATO, quiet (at times silent), constructive diplomacy was often the order of the day for Canada.

The level of force ultimately used by ONUC challenged the notion that peacekeeping should be passive. In the post cold war period, muscular interventions in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia challenged the international community and scholars alike to redefine what was meant by ‘peacekeeping’. Terms such as peace enforcement, peacemaking, and mandate enforcement, were used to distinguish this ‘new’ kind of multinational military operation from the earlier forms of peacekeeping. This dissertation supports the view that ONUC was, in many ways, a precursor of the later form of active, interventionist, peacekeeping. While not entering into the debate surrounding definitions of peacekeeping or the legality of what ONUC did in the Congo, the study does document the Canadian government’s reaction to ONUC’s ‘creeping’ mandate that edged the mission ever closer to confrontation in Katanga. It is clear that the Diefenbaker government was not keen to see ONUC depart from the precedents of neutrality and passivity.

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The development of government policy is a primary focus of this study. Within the fields of Canadian political and diplomatic history, the decision-making role played by the political and bureaucratic élite has been emphasised. This is a logical starting point when studying the history of Canadian foreign policy. For decades, the planning and conduct of Canada’s international relations were in the hands of a small group of elected officials and civil servants. This was still true at the time (1960-1964) under examination in this study.

Kim Richard Nossal has suggested that, in spite of the growing literature on the domesticization of foreign policy, a modified statist approach remains the most relevant theoretical framework for understanding Canadian foreign policy. In other words, the élite are given considerable licence to conduct foreign relations, subject only to very wide parameters set by civil society.\(^{54}\) D.W. Middlemiss and J.J. Sokolsky have drawn strikingly similar conclusions about Canadian defence policy. They suggest, “on the whole, Canadian governments have not been greatly swayed by public opinion in formulating and implementing defence policy.”\(^{55}\)

External Affairs and National Defence were the key departments involved in the formulation of policy relating to ONUC and the Congo, though the views of Finance and Treasury Board were at times influential. Formal and informal requests for assistance from the United Nations were communicated to Canada’s Permanent Mission in New


York, which in turn forwarded the requests to External Affairs. DEA considered the political implications of requests and forwarded them to National Defence. It was not uncommon, however, for DND to have already been made aware of requests directly from liaison officers serving in New York and, later, from Canadian officers in the Congo.

At External Affairs, a number of divisions contributed to the development of Congo policy: the UN Division, the African & Middle Eastern Division, the European Division, and the Defence Liaison Division. Norman Robertson, the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, was ultimately responsible for communicating departmental views to other departments and to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, first Howard Green and then Paul Martin. During Diefenbaker’s time in office, it was not uncommon for Robertson to communicate directly with the Prime Minister’s Office, where Basil Robinson liaised for the department.56

At National Defence, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff was Robertson’s counterpart. From 1960 to 1964, this was Air Chief Marshal F.R. Miller. Miller was advised by the Chief of the General Staff (Lt. Gen. S.F. Clark, then Lt. Gen. G. Walsh), Chief of the Naval Staff (V. Adm. H.G. DeWolf, then V. Adm. H.S. Rayner), and the

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56 Basil Robinson was head of the Middle Eastern Division in 1957, but was assigned to work in the Prime Minister’s Office that year at the suggestion of R.B. Bryce, the Clerk of the Privy Council. The arrangement facilitated communication between the Department of External Affairs and the Prime Minister. It also helped to obviate Diefenbaker’s penchant for meeting foreign dignitaries alone and for improvising the delivery of some of his speeches. Robinson said, “The further away the Department is from the Prime Minister’s mouthpiece ... the less likely we are to be able to control what comes out.” As quoted in John Hilliker and Donald Barry, Canada’s Department of External Affairs, Volume II, Coming of Age, 1946-1968 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill – Queen’s U P, 1995) 143. See also: Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1989).
Chief of the Air Staff (A/M H.L. Campbell, then A/M C.R. Dunlap). Miller, in turn, advised the Minister of National Defence, first Pearkes, then Harkness, and finally Hellyer, after the Liberals returned to power in 1963. Whereas External Affairs considered politico-strategic implications, National Defence assessed the military's capability to meet each UN request.

The Prime Minister and Cabinet also shaped Congo policy. John Diefenbaker was Prime Minister for most of the time ONUC was in the Congo. Lester Pearson became Prime Minister only after the secession of Katanga was at an end, and the only important question remaining was when ONUC should be withdrawn. In the case of Diefenbaker, whenever a decision relating to the Congo or to ONUC could have serious political repercussions, it was considered in Cabinet.

In addition to addressing the themes so far discussed, determining the motivations and objectives of Canada's Congo policy was a key task of this dissertation. Canada's Congo policy differed little from foreign policy generally: it was motivated by self-interest. Support for the United Nations, an institutional cornerstone in Canada's multilateralist approach to foreign policy, was the foremost reason Canada became involved and maintained its commitment to ONUC. There was no shortage of additional concrete, though sometimes contradictory, considerations in Canada's Congo policy: preventing the Soviet Union from gaining a foothold in Africa, averting open conflict between the two superpowers within the Congo, reaffirming respect for the sovereignty and self-determination of nations, mitigating the friction between Belgium and the United Nations, and garnering influence amongst the Afro-Asian states.
A final objective of this dissertation was to provide a more detailed account of the experiences and challenges faced by Canadian peacekeepers serving in ONUC. While this study is not an exhaustive military history of the Canadian contingent in ONUC, it does discuss important incidents, issues, and events that affected the 57th Canadian Signal Unit and RCAF personnel stationed in the Congo.

This study is the first thorough account of Canadian Congo policy based on primary sources. The dissertation relied heavily upon documents obtained from the National Archives of Canada (NAC), the Diefenbaker Canada Centre (DCC), the Directorate of History and Heritage of the Department of National Defence (DHH), and the Canadian Communications and Electronics Museum at Canadian Forces Base Kingston (CCEM). Because the existing secondary literature was of limited use for this study — so little of it specifically addressed Canada’s role in this UN mission or its Congo policy — it was used mostly to provide context for events and issues, otherwise presented with Canadian primary sources. Wherever relevant, significant interpretative debates amongst scholars were identified.

The Government Archives Division at NAC holds thousands of documents, in hundreds of files, relating to ONUC. Indeed, the volume of material is overwhelming. The majority is held within the Foreign Affairs and National Defence record groups, though relevant documents were also found in the record groups of the Cabinet and Privy Council, Secretary of State, Justice, Finance, Trade and Commerce, and the Auditor General. The Foreign Affairs record group is especially strong for documents dated to
mid 1963, when a change in the system of filing appears to have resulted not only in a
revision of file names but also a significant reduction in the retention of material.
Documents within the National Defence record group, however, adequately cover the
final year of ONUC. It was not uncommon for one department to retain duplicates of the
other’s documents. Researchers should note that the war diaries for the 57th Signal
Squadron (later Unit) are available at the National Archives and not the Directorate of
History and Heritage, Department of National Defence. This is significant because, at the
time of writing, DHH was refusing access to all war diaries after the Korean War.

With the notable exception of the Diefenbaker papers, which were in fact
consulted through the DCC at the University of Saskatchewan and not through the
National Archives, the Manuscript Division at NAC yielded little of value for this study.
The Norman Robertson papers, for instance, were silent on the Congo; by comparison,
the King Gordon collection was rich with Congo material, but none was relevant to
Canadian government policy. And the Howard Green papers remain closed to public
access, pending review for sensitive material. The Diefenbaker papers contained many
letters sent by members of the public, the Prime Minister’s handwritten notes on meetings
and conferences, and copies of government documents, though the latter were often
duplicates of originals found elsewhere.

A number of useful documents were obtained at the Directorate of History and
Heritage at the Department of National Defence. Notably, it was possible to view a
number of interviews conducted with Canadians who served in senior positions within
ONUC. The Canadian Communications and Electronics Museum at CFB Kingston also
provided documents (often press releases and public relations stories) that provided glimpses into the day-to-day lives of Canadian peacekeepers in the Congo. Finally, eleven Canadians who served in various roles in the Congo (from Air Commander, to Quartermaster, to Postal Clerk) kindly corresponded with me and shared not only their recollections but also documents and photographs.
1
Prelude to Crisis

The Belgian connection with the Congo began in the late 1800s, when King Leopold II, the reigning monarch, hired the explorer Henry Stanley to establish trading posts in Central Africa. Stanley was successful in his mission, and a sphere of influence was established for Leopold. Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Portugal, and the Netherlands all competed for African territories, but Leopold shrewdly played each Power against the others and in the end retained control over the Congo. In view of his humanitarian pronouncements on the region’s economic development, Leopold’s claim was officially recognised during the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. More to the point, he was willing to maintain the Congo as an African zone for free trade and this appealed to the economic interests of each of the European states. After intense lobbying by two of Leopold’s aides, the Belgian parliament approved legislation that permitted Leopold to become sovereign of both Belgium and the Congo Independent State.

Under Leopold, the Congo Independent State quickly became a hotbed of commercial activity and colonial exploitation. Huge tracts of land were granted to private companies, as a means of raising money. Railroad development was also encouraged through a system of land grants. Private enterprise benefited from a state imposed labour tax that virtually forced the native Congolese to spend most of their time collecting

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1 On the curious role played by a Canadian from Halifax, who was commissioned by Leopold’s business interests to subdue the Congolese in Katanga and secure its resources. see Janina M. Konczacki “William G. Stairs and the Occupation of Katanga: A Forgotten Episode in the ‘Scramble’ for Africa.” Dalhousie Review 66.3 (1986): 243-55.

2 Sir Charles Tupper, the Canadian High Commissioner in London, advised the Secretary of State in Ottawa of the Berlin Convention of 1885 by forwarding copies of the agreement. NAC: RG6, A-1, v.59, #8025, 3 June 1885.

rubber and ivory. The Anglo-Belgian-Indian Rubber Company was one of the largest commercial enterprises in the Congo, but Leopold’s Domaine de la Couronne remained the largest concession. Covering an area the size of Poland, this region served only to enrich the Belgian royal family.⁴

The region of Katanga was left largely unexplored until Leopold began to fear its annexation by the British. To develop the province, he granted land and resource rights to private companies, as he had done in the rest of the colony, but in Katanga this reciprocal relationship of development and exploitation reached new heights. In the early twentieth century, a number of companies were created to develop Katangan resources. Copper and diamonds were mined by the Union Minière du Haut Katanga and La Société Internationale Forestière et Minière du Congo (FORMINIERE) respectively, and each of these major companies was owned in part by the Société Générale de Belgique, a company that was closely linked to the royal family.⁵ In Katanga, more than in any other Congolese region, private enterprise played a dominant economic and administrative role.⁶ This arrangement was a critical factor in the secession crisis that followed soon after independence.

By the turn of the twentieth century, there were growing international protests over the horrendous living conditions of the Congolese. In Canada, for instance, both the Ottawa and Victoria Ministerial Associations forwarded resolutions to Prime Minister Laurier that condemned the cruelties endured by the Congolese and urged British

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⁴ Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World Intervention, 43.
⁵ Wynfred Joshua suggests that the Société Générale de Belgique controlled, either indirectly or directly, some 70 per cent of the Congolese economy. Wynfred Joshua, “Belgium’s Role in the UN Peacekeeping Operation in the Congo,” Orbis 11.2 (1967): 415.
⁶ Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World Intervention, 44.
authorities to "secure to the people of the Congo Free State due protection and justice." Ultimately, Leopold relinquished control of the Congo to the Belgian government in 1908. It is difficult to assess Belgian colonial achievements. Michel Struelens suggests that there was a positive side to Belgium's rule:

At the time of independence, the per capita income in the Congo was $88. This gave the Congo one of the highest living standards in Black Africa. In 1959, the last full year for which detailed statistics are available, 40% of the annual production—amounting to $1.2 billion—was exported. The Congo could proudly lay claim to a balanced economy and, thanks to important investments from Europe (mostly Belgian), it enjoyed modern industries, an adequate transportation network and an advanced agricultural system.

George Martelli offers a similar, if more blunt, interpretation of Belgian colonialism, suggesting that the Belgians discovered the Congolese to be "the most primitive people in Africa living in a condition of utter savagery," and that the 'benefits' of Belgian rule left little doubt that the Congolese "had the best of the deal."

These assessments, however, must be balanced by Leopold's horrific legacy. A 1919 Belgian government report concluded that the "Congolese population had declined by half during colonial rule," and oral tradition in the Congo maintained that the rubber policy was "a greater cause of death and depopulation than either the scourge of sleeping sickness or the periodic ravages of smallpox." For the Congolese, Belgian rule, even when placed in the best possible light, was certainly seen as much less than a mixed blessing. In a speech delivered during the Congolese independence ceremonies, the new

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8 Struelens, The United Nations in the Congo or O.N.U.C. and International Politics, 36.
Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, denounced the colonial legacy of his new country as one “of ‘atrocious sufferings’ and ‘humiliating bondage,’ filled with ‘ironies, insults, blows which we had to endure morning, noon, and night because we were ‘Negroes.’”

Relative to the European colonial powers, Canada’s interest in Africa was modest at best. Both in terms of foreign and economic relations, Canada lagged behind most other developed nations in the establishment of links with the African continent and its newly independent states. In the early twentieth century, missionaries accounted for the earliest and most consistent Canadian presence in Africa. Notably, even at the time of the Congo crisis, the vast majority of Canadians living there were missionaries. In 1959, 49 Roman Catholic and 275 Protestant missionaries were living in Congo, Angola, and Mozambique. In the Congo, these were predominantly Mennonites.

Although the relationship between Africa and Canada was limited in scope, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and his Secretary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green, were well disposed to the idea that Canada might play a greater role in that part of the world. Green was partly responsible for External Affairs’ initial interest in Africa. Diefenbaker took the initiative at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference of May 1960 to expand development assistance to include, not only the Asian Commonwealth countries that had benefited from the Colombo Plan, but also African Commonwealth countries. By September of that year, Canada pledged to contribute $10.5 million to establish a Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan. To a

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degree, he was motivated to do this by his fear that developing nations might be susceptible to Soviet overtures if their needs for assistance were not met by the West. This concern ultimately became an important consideration in the Prime Minister’s foreign policy decisions relating to the Congo.

Early relations with African countries were usually with members of the Commonwealth. Canada’s membership in this organisation facilitated the development of these relations. African countries, however, often knew little of Canada except that it was not a great power and that it did not have colonies. Both of these considerations greatly enhanced its image, especially when compared with other Western countries. Canada’s importance and appeal as a potential ally stemmed principally from its access to the powerful democracies – particularly the United States. Diefenbaker perceived the opportunity for Canada to enhance its image abroad by taking the lead in the formulation of constructive policies towards Africa. In effect, this could have increased Canada’s influence with the developing and non-aligned nations, even though Canada was industrialised and Western-aligned. This goal was not easy to achieve and met with mixed results. In the UN General Assembly, Canada was sometimes reluctant to vote with African nations on issues significant to them. This did not go unnoticed. Canadians were sometimes perceived as “unsympathetic to African aspirations” and the Canadian delegation to the UN was known to many as the “total abstainers” because they often avoided taking a stand on significant votes.¹⁵

Although the government professed a concern and interest in Africa, in reality Canada was sorely under-represented by diplomatic missions there and few resources were devoted exclusively to Africa at External Affairs. The Commonwealth Division at

External was responsible for all of Africa south of the Sahara and it was not until 1956 that a single desk officer in that division was appointed to cover African affairs. By 1959, three officers staffed an African section and consideration was given to the establishment of a full-fledged African division. By comparison, the United States was far ahead of Canada in the development of a diplomatic corps specialising in Africa. While a single Canadian desk officer struggled to keep up with the frantic pace of events during the Congo crisis, and was still responsible for all of the rest of Africa south of the Sahara, there was in the U.S. a Bureau of African Affairs, with a staff of more than 70 that was headed by an Assistant Secretary of State. It should come as no surprise that the Americans, given their greater interests, would naturally have more diplomats and officials to serve and study Africa, but the vast difference between the two countries is even larger than one might expect.

Nevertheless, the Belgian Congo was served relatively well by Canadian officials. In 1960, at the time of the Congo crisis, there were only 5 Canadian diplomatic posts in all of Africa. The Congo was among the five, with a Consulate General, and was the only one of the five posts located in a country that was not a Commonwealth nation. Furthermore, before the Canadian Consulate General in Leopoldville was established, the Congo had been the location of one of only three Trade Commissions in Africa since 1946.

In spite of sustained interest and repeated attempts to develop trade between Canada and the Congo in the decades leading to the Congo Crisis, by 1960 Canadian exports had reached only $1.3 million. As early as the 1920s, the Canadian Trade Commissioner in South Africa, G.R. Stevens, had gathered information on opportunities

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for Canadian trade in the Congo. His travels revealed the central role of Katangan resources in the Congo’s economy but also limited prospects for Canada because traders relied heavily upon established sources of supplies in Britain and Belgium. While Canadian businesses managed to increase trade marginally during the twenties, in the thirties the great depression and increased competition by Belgium and Japan combined to virtually end this development. Little changed until 1939, when the outbreak of hostilities in Europe significantly affected Congolese trading patterns.¹⁷

Virtually cut off from Europe during World War II, Congolese trade shifted towards North America. The United States principally benefited from this, but Canada also temporarily experienced an increase in trade. In August of 1940, Max Horn, Counselor of the Belgian Government to the Belgian Ministry of Colonies, toured Canada and the United States to discuss Congo trade issues. The Belgian government had already concluded an agreement with Britain, by which the British agreed to “... grant the Belgian Colonies a fair share in its imports of colonial produce, the Belgian Colonies being treated in that respect on an equal footing with British possessions.”¹⁸ Horn was interested in a similar agreement with Canada and managed to negotiate a tentative agreement on trade concessions with Canadian authorities.

The agreement, in effect, placed the Congo on the same footing as parts of the British Empire, in terms of Imperial preferential rates of duty and the war exchange tax. Trade and Commerce officials believed that the Congo stood to gain more from the agreement than did Canada but felt justified in suggesting its approval because it enabled Canada to purchase Congolese goods in sterling and because the Congo was an active


¹⁸ NAC, RG20, vol. 60, file 19775 part 1, Desy to Skelton, 5 August 1940.
participant in the war. The Minister of Trade and Commerce, James MacKinnon, gave preliminary approval to the idea, which was then forwarded to External for consultation with the British. At this stage, however, problems were encountered. The British believed that the “extension to the Belgian Congo of Imperial Preference as such would raise very large and difficult issues in relation to both Empire and other foreign countries.” and hoped that Canada would be “willing to avoid any concession in the Belgian Congo which would affect the principle of Imperial Preference.”

Much to Horn’s disappointment, the Canadian government chose not to follow through on the tentative agreement. Nevertheless, by the end of the war, seventy per cent of Congo imports came from either the United States or Canada.

In hopes of retaining and enlarging their share of the Congolese market in the post-war period, Canadian officials opened a Trade Mission in October 1946. The following year the colony was visited by Trade and Commerce Minister MacKinnon. While it is difficult to precisely determine Canada’s position relative to other countries trading with the Congo, it seems that Canada remained a top twelve trading partner until the early fifties, when exports to the Congo fell because of competition and periodic downturns in the Congolese economy. Canadian efforts to retain the market share it achieved during the war were therefore only partially successful. Canadian exports never fell to prewar levels but could not be sustained at the heights they achieved during the early fifties. Overall, Canadian economic interest in Africa was limited – under one and a

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19 NAC, RG20, vol. 60, file 19775 part 1, Cranborne to Massey, 27 March 1941.
21 Comparative statistics from Congolese sources place Canada in the top 20 importing and exporting countries; however, these statistics did not take into account the relatively large number of Canadian goods reaching the Congo via other nations (i.e. Canadian goods shipped to the Congo through Belgium, the US, etc.). For this reason, Canadian statistics are a better indicator of the true level of trade.
half per cent of total Canadian exports and less than half of one per cent of imports. Only twenty Canadian companies operated in Africa, but most were quite small. Three companies accounted for two-thirds of total investment; the largest was Aluminum Limited with African holdings totaling $30 million.\textsuperscript{22}

During the mid-fifties, Aluminum Limited became involved in a hydroelectricity project that sought to harness the energy of the Congo River. A 200-mile stretch of river between Leopoldville and Matadi, the ‘Inga site,’ was considered a promising location for a massive power installation. In April of 1955, the Belgian Minister of Colonies announced that Canadian and American specialists had toured the area to evaluate its potential – much to the dismay of officials of Aluminum Limited who were “most anxious to keep out of the limelight its interest in the Congo.”\textsuperscript{23} Considerable secrecy surrounded the circumstances and negotiations of Aluminum Limited’s interest in Inga. The company wanted to keep as low a profile as possible so as not to arouse Belgian nationalist sentiments or antagonise Belgian business interests. It hoped to “secure control” over the project’s construction and the “future direction of the power site at least for a prescribed period.”\textsuperscript{24} and these objectives, it was felt, would run counter to the wishes of both the Belgian public and the Société Générale.

The Canadian Ambassador in Belgium discreetly met with Aluminum Limited’s representative, and in Ottawa his reports were forwarded to Canadian officials at the International Joint Commission and the Atomic Energy Control Board who had expressed “keen interest.” While information he obtained was useful to Ottawa, the Ambassador was nonetheless urged not to compromise relations between the Embassy

\textsuperscript{22} Anglin, “Towards a Canadian Policy on Africa.” 294-297.
\textsuperscript{23} NAC, RG25, vol. 3270, file 6386-40 part 1, Summary of Despatch No. 279, 6 June 1955.
\textsuperscript{24} NAC, RG25, vol. 3270, file 6386-40 part 1, Despatch No. 307, 8 June 1955.
and Belgian authorities. The Canadian government was interested by the possibility of Canadian investment in the Congo, but this was tempered by its desire not to offend or undermine Belgian colonial sentiments.²⁵

Proportionately, American trade and investment with Africa was far greater. The one instance of considerable Canadian involvement and investment in a venture in the Belgian Congo was met with interest, but circumspect caution. While it appears that Canadian trade with the Belgian Congo was at times substantial, it is unlikely that it was so significant as to later become a factor in the decisions to deploy Canadian armed forces with ONUC.

Canadian relations with the Belgian Congo were influenced first and foremost by relations with its mother country. Canada was reluctant to jeopardise its relations with Belgium, as evidenced by Canadian involvement in Inga; yet, Canadian officials in Ottawa and Leopoldville were sometimes critical of Belgium’s colonial policies. It was a balancing act. The Congo contributed greatly to Belgium’s economic well-being,²⁶ but was significant to Belgium for less tangible reasons as well – it was a source of pride. The Canadian Ambassador to Brussels in 1945 drew this to the attention of External Affairs. He noted that Belgium’s crushing defeat within days of the German thrust westward in May 1940 did nothing to foster the impression,

... that they have been able to play in this war a part corresponding to their influence and interests in Europe. Furthermore throughout the occupation

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²⁵ The Inga project, which relied heavily on American cooperation, failed to materialise when the Congo Crisis developed. According to Stephen Weissman, key investors such as the Rockefeller family and Chase Manhattan chose not to pursue the project. Stephen Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960-1964* (Ithaca: Cornell U P, 1974) 38.

all their resources, human and material were under the control of the Germans and they are aware that to a certain extent such resources have been used by the enemy against the Allies. These considerations are not expressed but they are deeply felt and they are source of humiliation.27

These humiliating events and circumstances were offset by Belgian pride in the valuable economic and strategic role played by the Congo during the war.28 For example, critical Congolese mineral resources, including uranium, were made available to the Allied war effort. The Belgians watched increased British and American war-time involvement with its colony with suspicion and the Canadian Ambassador warned that they would be uneasy about US and UK intentions when post-war colonial arrangements were addressed.

Belgian colonial policy was essentially paternalistic. Opinion at External on Belgium’s policy was divided, perhaps typical of a difference in views on decolonisation generally. The goal of Belgian policy was to attain a partnership between Europeans and Native Africans, but the time frame for achieving this goal was unclear. Other colonial powers concentrated on developing a general social awareness that would result in increased political responsibility. Belgium, on the other hand, placed emphasis on the economic well-being of the native Congolese and avoided measures which might lead to the development of a Native élite. For example, primary and secondary school education for Natives was far more common in the Congo than in other African colonies.29

University education was uncommon because Belgian authorities rarely permitted

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28 The Congo also proved to be valuable to Belgium’s economic recovery. Patrick O’Donovan notes that Belgium emerged from WWII as the only European country without a payments problem and attributes this to the Congo’s financial contributions during the war. Patrick O’Donovan, “The Precedent of the Congo,” *International Affairs* 37.2 (1961): 182.
29 Jacobson, however, questioned whether “many students stayed in the primary schools long enough for their education to have a lasting effect.” Harold K. Jacobson, “ONUC’s Civilian Operation: State Preserving and State Building,” *World Politics* 17.1 (1964): 78.
Congolese to study in Belgium and not at all in other countries. To the Belgians, it seemed that the approach taken by the other colonial powers too often developed an élite that lacked judgment and political maturity. They encouraged the development of a stable Congolese middle class and gradually dispensed limited political rights to vote in established urban areas when it was sensed that not to do so might result in Native demands for an even greater political role.\(^\text{30}\)

An interesting exchange of views in April of 1957 between Escott Reid, High Commissioner to India, and C.P. Hébert, Ambassador to Belgium, demonstrates the opposing views within External towards decolonisation and Belgian policy in the Congo. In preparation for a visit to Ottawa, by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Reid had written a memorandum on colonialism in which he suggested that the colonial powers in Africa should place their non-self-governing territories under the aegis of the UN and fix a date by which self-government for each territory should be achieved. He believed the African decolonisation process should take no longer than twenty years.

Hébert disagreed. He argued that the Congo was an "inchoate mass" that a century of Belgian administration had been unable to mould into a uniform society. Hébert was kind in his assessment of Belgian achievements and motives. He wrote,

The Congo ... is inhabited by very backward peoples few of whom can have any conception of government ... In the circumstances it is inconceivable that, twenty years from now, these peoples should be asked to assume the direction of their own affairs through a grant of self-government. ... Belgium's reluctance to make any such grant on her own initiative and her resistance to UN pressure cannot be said to stem entirely from imperial ambitions supported by vested economic interests.

... Belgium's achievements in the Congo do her credit. ... Despite this progress however it is perhaps asking a great deal to expect a transition in three generations (from 1890 to 1980) from tribal warfare and cannibalism to twentieth century standards of justice, political development, orderly and responsible government.

If, in spite of the existing situation, Belgium is forced to yield to UN pressures and grant to the Congolese self-determination in twenty years time, the consequences are not difficult to imagine. ... the resultant regime would be far from stable economically or politically and would soon be in the hands of semi-trained Congolese who would either exploit their fellows for their own benefit or for the benefit of some other foreign power, possibly the USSR. In either case UN help would probably be rejected on the grounds of infringement of sovereignty and interference in domestic affairs. 31

In some ways, Hébert's comments seem almost prophetic. He predicted some of the important issues associated with the Congo crisis, including fear of Soviet penetration and the legal difficulties that could arise should the UN consider involvement in a crisis that was essentially a matter of domestic jurisdiction.

Reid countered Hébert's remarks in a typically clear and effective manner. He conceded that it might take thirty years before independence could be granted, instead of the twenty years he had previously stated. 32 Using the example of India, he argued that it was not impossible for a diverse society to still achieve independence. Moreover, he noted that the Congolese were on average in a better economic position than were Indians at a similar stage in that country's development. Finally, he took issue with the idea that the Congolese could not meet twentieth century standards of justice, political

32 It seems peculiar that a mere three years before the Congo crisis it could be assumed that independence could be postponed for three decades. Relative calm and stability during most of the 1950s lulled people into a sense of false security and this perception was not uncommon. See: Struelens, The United Nations in the Congo or O.N.U.C. and International Politics, 18-19. He refers to a leading Leopoldville newspaper that suggested 1985, the centennial of the establishment of the Congo Free State, as a suitable date for independence.
development, and orderly and responsible government. He cited a long list of leading twentieth century political figures who failed to meet these same standards, including Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco.\(^{33}\)

In subsequent years, as we will see, most Canadian officials held the Belgians partially responsible for the Congo crisis for not having enough faith in the Congolese to assist them fully in preparing for independence. They questioned the Belgian wisdom that it was a favour to the Africans to withhold independence until such time as they had sufficiently developed a responsible political consciousness. In this sense, later views and attitudes had more in common with Reid than Hébert.

The slow pace of progress towards independence contributed to deteriorating race relations. By the 1950s, increased industrialisation caused Native Congolese to migrate from rural to urban areas. This concentration of people, combined with a cyclical economy that resulted in labour shortages and then unemployment, aggravated an already tense situation. Apartheid was not a legal fact in the Congo, but in economic and social terms its impact was every bit as real there as in South Africa. In April 1951, R.F. Douglas, an Air Attaché with the Royal Canadian Air Force, was sent to the Congo to report on conditions. He was received well by Belgian officials and submitted a detailed report, covering everything from the history of the colony, to its geography and military installations. On the issue of White/Native relations, he reported on the living and work conditions of the Congolese who served within the Force Publique. He said:

Training natives requires tremendous patience, and the officers of the Armed Forces in the Congo possess this to a very great degree. The result

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\(^{33}\) NAC, RG25, vol. 7033, file 6386-40 part 2.2, Reid to Hébert, 30 April 1957.
is a happy situation among the native soldiers, and I believe the same applies to most of the civilian organizations. In general, the native who goes to work for the white man immediately enjoys a far better life than he knows in his native village. The natives seem to realize this. There is a complete colour bar in the Congo, and the natives have nothing approaching the rights of white men. It is common practice in the cities to have the native quarter and to ensure that the natives are in there by 9 p.m. There are separate railway cars, waiting rooms, restaurants and sometimes stores, for the natives. The natives have no voice in the Government. At present and for a long time to come, this system seems to be the only practical one.\(^{34}\)

Douglas’ interpretation of relations between the Whites and the Congolese was simplistic in its optimism but does provide a good picture of the living conditions of the Natives. The situation Douglas described as ‘happy’ was perceived quite differently by the Congolese. The discriminatory working conditions and condescending attitudes of Belgian officers would ultimately lead to the revolt of Native soldiers in the *Force Publique* within days of Independence.

But Douglas was not alone in underestimating the deleterious effects of the persistent racism and discrimination that characterised society in the Congo. A.B. Brodie, the Canadian Trade Commissioner, held favourable views of the Belgian administration’s Native policies. He believed that the Belgians had no desire to suppress the Africans but rather were interested in elevating them to become “healthier and more useful citizen[s].”\(^{35}\) Official policy was meant to be benevolently paternalistic, and while it is possible that Belgian colonial administrators believed that they were sincerely assisting in the development of a new nation, the racist views and practices of the ‘non-official European’ were strengthened and given credence by this notion of the need to ‘civilise the savage.’ In their decision to focus on long term political goals for the colony, the

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\(^{34}\) *NAC, RG25, vol. 3270, file 6386-40 part 1, R.F. Douglas, 8 June 1951.*

\(^{35}\) *NAC, RG25, vol. 3270, file 6386-40 part 1, A.B. Brodie to D.W. Munro, 29 January 1952.*
Belgians failed to recognize that the seeds of discontent were being sowed in the segregated Native quarters of the cities.

When riots broke out with some frequency in 1959, it became apparent that relations between Natives and Whites were not as rosy as had been thought. European families resented the incorporation of native culture into the school curriculum, for both White and Black students. K. Nyenhuis, the Canadian Trade Commissioner at the time, concurred with the Europeans. In a report to External he suggested that “better subjects could be found since savagery is still very near the surface in most of the natives.” In addition, incidents between individual Natives and Whites assumed a new intensity of racial hatred and prominence. In late May, for example, two cars driven by Whites were demolished and the occupants seriously injured by Congolese in retribution for the death of a Native woman involved in a car accident earlier in the day.

Stories of racially motivated violence contributed to a growing sense of hysteria. In the fall, Nyenhuis toured the Eastern Congo and found tensions rising there too. He noted that most violence was between rival native tribes but that the rising level of violence left many Whites concerned:

Although no white people had suffered bodily or materially during the rioting, there was, nevertheless, the uneasy feeling that it would only take the slightest provocation, real or presumed, to unleash the latent hatred against the whites with the most abominable consequences. ... Therefore, the large majority of white citizens have heavily armed themselves. ...

The general behaviour of many blacks in Luluabourg was sufficient indication that the respect for the white man is disappearing. Whatever animosities the blacks may foster amongst themselves, they

would be united in taking bloody revenge for having been treated as inferiors, if not worse, for many years.38

In a report filed the previous month, Nyenhuis noted that many Native Congolese expected to take over the possessions of Europeans once independence was granted but that sentiments such as these were confined to urban dwelling Congolese. He believed that rural Natives had not changed their attitude towards Whites. Europeans believed that minor political concessions to the Congolese resulted in the racial difficulties and that everything could be solved by taking economic measures to relieve the unemployment problem.39 Even as the colony edged closer and closer to the breaking point, the European residents still failed to appreciate the root causes of Native discontent – paternalistic colonial policies and demeaning living conditions. Trade Commissioner Nyenhuis was equally late coming to this realisation and seemed to share the views of other Whites living in the Congo.

Indeed, the Belgian Congo was often seen as a model colony. The standard of living for Native Congolese was said to be among the highest of all colonised Africans. Improvements in economic well being, however, were not matched by increases in political rights or an amelioration in the social living conditions. The colony was ruled by a Governor-General and six provincial Governors, and each of these officials was responsible to the Colonial Ministry in Brussels. Political parties appeared for the first time in 1957, during the first elections ever held in the colony. Voting was permitted in Leopoldville, Elizabethville, and Jadotville to choose local officials. Membership in political parties was usually based upon tribal allegiances. In spite of local reforms, there were no plans for decolonisation as late as 1959.

Then, quite suddenly in 1959 and early 1960, a number of factors came together to ignite the Congolese independence movement. A.A.J. van Bilsen identifies three reasons for this development: in comparison with other African colonies, the Congo was economically advanced; because Belgium was not a Great Power it seemed less conscious of the growing global trend towards decolonisation; and, the Congo generally lacked an intellectual élite. ⁴⁰ Other scholars have emphasized international factors, including political developments in French and British colonies, and an American recession which made itself felt in the Congo through higher unemployment. ⁴¹ In January 1959, riots erupted in Leopoldville during a rally of the Association Culturelle des Ressortissants du Bas-Congo, (ABAKO) a political party headed by Joseph Kasavubu. At first the crowd was “small and orderly,” but soon there were shouts for immediate independence. The police began to panic and their Commissaire was knocked over while trying to arrest the party leaders. Police started to shoot in an effort to clear the crowd, and pandemonium resulted. The crowds rampaged, looting stores in both African and European neighbourhoods. Reinforcements from the Force Publique tried to cordon off the affected areas, but by nightfall disorder had spread throughout the Native quarter of the city. The Canadian Trade Commissioner in Leopoldville later reported that “all white people walking or driving through the native City and the outskirts of Leopoldville were attacked with stones, iron bars, and anything handy, their cars smashed and burnt, some women disrobed.” Police arrested over 200 people including Kasavubu, and some 50 Africans were killed. High unemployment was said to be one of the causes of the riot.

⁴¹ Martelli, Leopold to Lumumba, 221.
but dissatisfaction with the level of political independence from Belgium was also a crucial factor.\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 7033, file 6386-40 part 3, Brussels to External, 8 January 1959; NAC, RG25, vol. 7033, file 6386-40 part 3, K. Nyenhuis to USSEA, 8 January 1959; NAC, RG25, vol. 7033, file 6386-40 part 3, Glazebrook, 30 January 1959.}

After they were soundly criticised by the international community for their brutal suppression of the riots, the Belgian government finally unveiled its plan for self-determination in fall of 1959. The plan called for complete independence by 1964, with various stages of political development in the interim. The pace of the plan was unacceptable to the Congolese, and in fear of widespread riots, the Belgians agreed to hold a conference in February 1960 to discuss the issue further. The conference produced a much faster schedule of reform and drafted an interim constitution (the \textit{Loi Fondamentale}), which identified the political institutions of the new state. General elections were scheduled for May, and independence was to be granted on June 30, 1960. Belgian intransigence was replaced by a spectacular pace of political reform.

Yet, in their new found haste to concede independence, the Belgians failed to adequately prepare the colony. The Congo completely lacked a native, effective administrative and political structure because of the Belgian decision to limit the number of Congolese permitted to pursue post-secondary education. This was to have serious consequences for the first Congolese government, as they prepared to govern the vast territory they had regained.\footnote{In the year prior to independence, administration of the Congo was dependent on some 10,000 Belgians. Jacobson, “ONUC’s Civilian Operation: State Preserving and State Building,” 79. See also: Lefever, \textit{Crisis in the Congo}, 6-8; Gibbs, \textit{The Political Economy of Third World Intervention}, 73-76; Struelens, \textit{The United Nations in the Congo or O.N.U.C. and International Politics}, 18-19.} One explanation for this critical shortcoming may be that Belgium fully expected to continue to play a role in the administration of the Congo, even after independence. Jacobson suggests, “it was envisaged that a number of Belgians
would serve in the Congolese government," and that significantly "the extent to which these individuals would remain under the direct control of the Belgian government was somewhat ambiguous."

The two politicians who would ultimately be the central figures in the Congo crisis were already prominent by the late fifties. Joseph Kasavubu, arrested during the January riots, has already been mentioned as the President of ABAKO. He was educated in Catholic seminaries, and after working as a teacher and in administration, he was elected Mayor of Dendale (in the Native quarter of Leopoldville) in the local elections of 1958. Nyenhuis, the Canadian Trade Commissioner, reported that the most significant political event in May of 1959 was Kasavubu’s return from detention in Belgium. His political supporters heralded his return "as the beginning of the millennium" and gave him a new light blue Cadillac convertible to mark the occasion. During the early 1960 independence negotiations in Belgium, Kasavubu was the acknowledged head of the Congolese delegation and was seen as "the man whose stubborn demands had played a crucial part in convincing the Belgians to grant immediate independence." In these early months, he was not popular with the Belgian authorities, who regarded him as a

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44 Jacobson, “ONUC’s Civilian Operation: State Preserving and State Building,” 81. This view is echoed by O’Donovan, who suggests "They [the Belgian government] thought that the Government and people and industry in the Congo would remain totally dependent on Belgium, and they handed over fairly cheerfully..." O’Donovan, “The Precedent of the Congo,” 183.
"separatist and an intriguer."48 Above all, however, Kasavubu was a federalist whose support rested upon traditional, tribal loyalties.49

Patrice Lumumba was the other key figure. He was born in Kasai and educated in Stanleyville. After moving to Leopoldville, he became a sales manager for a brewery. He was prominent in the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC), the only political party that could ever truly claim to be national in membership in the early years of the Congo’s independence. The MNC sought to loosen ties with Belgium through a diversification of trade, investment, and aid.50 Lumumba’s nationalism was influenced by the independence movements in other African countries; unlike Kasavubu, he opposed tribalism and federalism, in favour of a centralised, socialist, and unitary state similar to Ghana.51 One journalist described him as “detribalized, and intensely intelligent, and ... perhaps the only real nationalist in the Congo, but a primitive one.”52 Although jailed for his political activities at one time, Lumumba was able to attend the Round Table Conference in Belgium, “from which he emerged as the acknowledged leader of the Congolese.”53 He was initially seen as a moderate, and “went out of his way to allay fears that once the Africans had obtained independence in the Congo they would repudiate the white man and confiscate his property.”54 His early pronouncements and actions earned him the trust

50 Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World Intervention, 80.
of the Belgians, who preferred him to Kasavubu at first. Following the May elections, he increasingly attacked Belgium and "Belgian political and public opinion began to regard him as unstable and inclined to accept support from communist countries."55

The Canadian Ambassador in Belgium did not wholeheartedly accept this Belgian view. He assessed Lumumba as,

... a born politician and the most astute of the Congolese political leaders. He has chameleon-like characteristics which enable him to change his position suddenly and without worrying too much about being consistent. Lumumba is energetic, self-centred and very ambitious. ... Lumumba's chief drawback is his apparent inability to get along with people who work with him. ... Another drawback is that he is disliked and distrusted by most of the other Congolese leaders ... they suspect him of dictatorial tendencies. ... In our view Lumumba is basically an opportunist and we doubt if he would let the fact that he got financial support from a certain quarter [Communists] influence his policy.56

The Belgian Government would, from time to time, raise the issue of Communist involvement to gain support for its policies in the Congo. At this early stage in his career, it is likely that they were overreacting and that the Canadian assessment of Lumumba is more accurate. Later, once the Congo began to descend into anarchy and Lumumba sought external support, his willingness to accept assistance from the Soviets needs to be more closely examined.

In December 1949, a news story appeared in the Paris edition of the New York Herald Tribune calling attention to the threat communism posed to the Belgian Congo.

55 Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967, 3:10. See also: Madeleine Kalb, The Congo Cables, xxiv; Colin Legum, Foreword and Notes, Congo My Country, by Patrice Lumumba (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962) xiii-xiv. Legum argues that Lumumba was not in favour of rejecting Belgian assistance outright; he wanted Belgian cooperation but only if they were prepared to recognise that the Congo was truly independent.
Because the story was riddled with inaccuracies, in and of itself it is relatively unimportant, but the reaction it received and the diplomatic correspondence it spawned is interesting as a demonstration of the views of Canadian diplomats regarding the seriousness of the threat of Soviet penetration in the Congo. The article, entitled “Red Danger Reported in Congo,” purported to be based on a “Belgian state security report” written by a “state security officer.” Among other things, the article suggested that the Soviets had sent sixty Native Congolese to Moscow in order to take a special course in modern witchcraft. Apparently, they then returned to rural areas of the Congo to inculcate witch doctors with the slogan “The Soviets are going to come and liberate Africa and return its old tribal chiefs and sorcerers. You have been elected. When, with your support we have ousted the white oppressors, your ancient powers will return.”

In conversation with British officials at their Belgian embassy, the Canadian Ambassador discovered that the report had been written by a certain Captain Freddy, an individual of questionable background. The British considered some parts of the story to be “utter nonsense” and discovered that it was not at all an official report of the Belgian government. L.H. Ausman, the Canadian Trade Commissioner in Leopoldville, also considered the news story “extremely inaccurate.” Ausman was very moderate in his views. He acknowledged that some communist ideology had penetrated into the Congo, but that activities along the lines reported in Freddy’s account simply did not happen. He noted that the local Belgian authorities took the communist threat seriously and had recently adopted measures to limit, as much as possible, the spread of communist ideals. A year later, W. Gibson-Smith, who succeeded Ausman as Trade Commissioner.

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59 NAC, RG25, vol. 3270, file 6386-40 part 1, Ausman to USSEA, 3 April 1950.
reported that the Commanding General of the Force Publique was unconcerned about the spread of communism amongst the Congolese because he considered the ideology to require more discipline than was to be found in the Natives. In the early fifties, when political conditions were relatively calm and stable, Canadian officials believed that there was little need to be worried about communism in the Congo. Belgium took the threat more seriously, but even its officials remained relatively unconcerned until it became obvious that independence would need to be granted much earlier than anticipated. By June 1960, Canadian officials also acknowledged that the Eastern European countries could pose a serious threat if they became involved in the political development of an independent Congo.

While the Congolese prepared for independence celebrations, the Canadian Cabinet discussed the possibility of upgrading Canadian representation in the Belgian Congo from a Trade Commission to a Consulate General. External Affairs regularly received copies of British Foreign Office reports on the Congo, and Canadian diplomats in Washington, the UK, and Brussels forwarded other relevant information when possible. The only first hand source of intelligence, however, was from the Canadian Trade Commissioner in Leopoldville. In February of 1959, Norman Robertson, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, had written to the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce to request that the Leopoldville Trade Commissioner be permitted to send occasional reports on the state of affairs in the Congo, when it would not interfere with his other Trade and Commerce activities. Prior to this, it was not uncommon for

60 NAC, RG25, vol. 3270, file 6386-40 part 1, Gibson-Smith to Director, TCS, 25 January 1951.
the Trade Commissioner to do this on his own initiative, but following Robertson's request such reports arrived in Ottawa more regularly.

In July 1959, the Canadian Embassy in Belgium put forward the suggestion that the Trade Commissioner in the Congo be given the title Consul-General, in light of the Belgian colony's political importance and the likelihood that it would soon be independent.\(^{63}\) This proposal initially received a cool reception at External. The Commonwealth Division stated its satisfaction with its current sources of intelligence on the Congo and felt that it might be unwise to "take an isolated plunge into the question in Black Africa."\(^{64}\) They pondered the implications of increasing representation in the Congo but not in French and Portuguese territories. The European Division also expressed the concern that an increase from Trade Commission to Consul-General might imply a tacit recognition of an independent Congo at a time when the Belgian government and Congolese leaders were still trying to negotiate the political future of the colony. They considered it better to let "sleeping dogs lie until a solution has been found to the political situation in the Congo."\(^{65}\) For the time being, the idea was shelved.

By March 1960, concerns that a change in diplomatic status might offend the Belgians were no longer applicable. The Belgian-Congolese Round Table Conference in January had settled on June of that year as an appropriate date for the Congo's independence. Norman Robertson put forward the idea once more. He argued that developments in the Congo would have "an important bearing" on the political evolution of surrounding African territories and noted the advantage of having first hand political

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\(^{63}\) NAC, RG 25, vol. 7034, file 6386-B-40 part 1, Can Amb Bru to USSEA, 31 July 1959.

\(^{64}\) NAC, RG 25, vol. 7034, file 6386-B-40 part 1, Commonwealth Div to Consular Div, 21 September 1959.

reports from the area.\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 7034, file 6386-B-40 part 1, Robertson to Green, 22 March 1960.} Concern for the safety of Canadians in the potentially unstable weeks that would follow independence was also an important factor.

Howard Green was unsure that Cabinet would approve the change, particularly if it was not clear that there would be trade advantages to doing so. The idea was set aside once again until June. At that time, Green agreed to take a joint proposal to Cabinet, together with Gordon Churchill, Minister of Trade and Commerce.\footnote{NAC, RG2, vol. 5937, Cabinet Documents 167/60 and 196/60.} The proposal met with some opposition, particularly once Treasury Board officials argued against it. They suggested that the cost was not warranted because Congolese officials had in the past recognised the Trade Commissioner as an official Canadian trade representative. Cabinet overruled these concerns, visions of greater wheat sales to a growing African market turning the decision-making tide.\footnote{NAC, RG2, vol. 2746, Cabinet Conclusions, 30 June 1960.}

In the weeks before independence, the Belgian Ambassador to Canada called upon Howard Green to see what, if any, assistance Canada could provide to a newly independent Congo. Prior to the meeting, officials at External prepared a memorandum, in which they surmised there would be a great need for material aid and technical guidance in the Congo. They argued, however, that Canada was not in a position to offer any assistance. Canada provided no direct capital aid to Africa and technical assistance and scholarships were given only to countries within the Commonwealth.\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5208, file 6386-40 part 4, Memo: The Belgian Congo, 10 March 1960.} Nevertheless, Green seems to have given the Belgian Ambassador the impression that some help might
be expected from Canada. The Ambassador was especially interested in contributions to the field of education or technical assistance by French-speaking Canadians.

Canada was represented at the Congolese independence ceremonies by the Canadian Ambassador to Japan, who happened at the time to be visiting his son, the acting Canadian Trade Commissioner to the Belgian Congo. The ceremonies were held at the Palais de la Nation, the home of the Congo's first parliament, with representatives of 80 countries present. George Clay, a reporter for the London Observer, remarked,

Behind the long white building with its lofty lobbies and airy open stonework a green garden rolls down to the river's edge. But looked at closely, the noble palace is uncomfortably reminiscent of an insubstantial film set. Its drapes conceal gaps in the plasterwork, roughly breached walls and unfinished ceilings. Everywhere there is evidence of the haste with which the stage was set. 

The setting seemed to disclose the state of affairs in the Congo all too well, but with the exception of a few tense moments, which followed Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba's anti-Belgian speech, the day passed without incident.

Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN Secretary-General, had visited the Congo in January 1960. He believed that the Congolese would need considerable technical assistance following independence and was aware there may be political difficulties. Practising 'preventative diplomacy,' the Secretary-General hoped the UN might insulate a post-colonial Congo from the Cold War and provide additional stability. To this end, Ralph

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72 Lumumba became Prime Minister following the May elections, when his party (the MNC) won 35 of 137 seats in the Assembly, including seats from 5 of the 6 provinces. Madeleine Kalb, The Congo Cables, xxv.
J. Bunche, UN Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, was present at the independence ceremonies. Bunche was assigned the task of meeting with the new government to determine how the UN could be of assistance. Subsequent events, however, found the UN playing a far greater role than was initially anticipated.

Within a week, Patrice Lumumba’s government was on the verge of collapse, and the new country was descending into anarchy. The *Force Publique* mutinied on 5 July in Leopoldville.\(^{74}\) Mutineers attacked Belgians and other Europeans “and in some cases committed rape and other atrocities.”\(^{75}\) Congolese soldiers were upset by the continued presence of Belgians in the *Force*. Indeed, a Belgian, Lieutenant-General Emile Janssens, commanded the military, and the officer corps remained exclusively Belgian. Congolese soldiers wanted greater opportunity for promotion and advancement, but Janssens was unwilling to compromise on this issue. He believed little should change once the Congo achieved independence and was vocal about this.\(^{76}\)

On the day of the mutiny, Janssens wrote to the Prime Minister to admonish him for delivering “irresponsible speeches and announcements” that he believed had a demoralising effect upon the soldiers in the *Force*. He warned, “As I am not in the habit either of changing my mind or of repeating myself, I would be grateful if you would take this as a final and solemn warning.” Later in the day, Janssens met with *Force* officers

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\(^{74}\) The *Force Publique* was a 28,000 strong combined army and police force. I.J. Rikhye et. al., *The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and Its Future* (New Haven, Conn & London: Yale U P. 1974) 71.


\(^{76}\) Rikhye confirms that, “No Congolese held a rank higher than that of warrant officer, and prospects for him to be promoted to commissioned rank were nonexistent.” Rikhye et. al., *The Thin Blue Line*, 72. Martelli has suggested, however, that the grievances of the *Force* were simply exploited by external “agitators,” to cause “chaos.” Martelli, *Leopold to Lumumba*, 236.
and scrawled on the blackboard the words “before independence=after independence.” Janssens personified the disagreeable effects of Belgian colonialism, and it was his actions and words in the days that followed independence, far more than Lumumba’s, that propelled Congolese members of the Force towards mutiny. Janssens was typical of many Belgians who fully expected that little, if anything, would be changed by independence. In the days and weeks ahead, events demonstrated just cause for the new Congolese leaders to be suspicious of Belgian motives.

The mutiny quickly spread to other centres within the country and Europeans began to flee to neighbouring states. There was a mass exodus across the Congo River into Brazzaville. As the Europeans fled, the infrastructure and essential services fell into disarray. On 8 July, in consultation with the British Ambassador, the Acting Trade Commissioner, Roger Bull, decided to evacuate Canadian women and children associated with the Trade Commission to Brazzaville and Belgium. Approximately 240 to 260 Canadians were present in the Congo, but the majority were missionaries who chose to remain until the situation worsened during the second week of July. Bull found that the situation in Leopoldville, relative to other regions of the country, remained calm. He reported:

The Leopoldville mutineers were undoubtedly rough, but there was no evidence that they either shot or severely injured anybody. Indeed, by dawn, one of their main reasons for stopping people was to plead with them not to run away. . . . Driving around in Leopoldville during the morning the mere statement that one was Canadian or English or at least

78 For example, at independence 324 Belgians maintained the Congo’s telecommunications systems. By October 1960, only 24 were left. Jacobson, “ONUC’s Civilian Operation,” 82.
not Flemish, was usually sufficient to avoid anything more serious than a
cursory search of the car for arms at the road blocks.\textsuperscript{80}

In various locations outside the capital, as the mutiny widened, crises erupted. In the port
city of Matadi, Europeans were held hostage and looting was rampant. In Luluabourg and
the provincial capital of Katanga, Elisabethville, Europeans withdrew from rampaging
mutineers. Thousands of Belgians fled the Congo, and their stories of violence were
"considerably exaggerated" by the world press. Brian Urquhart noted that, from this
point, the crisis took on "strong racial overtones ... [and] no amount of idealism, sincerity.
or disinterestedness would keep the UN operation immune from them."\textsuperscript{81} Prime Minister
Lumumba and President Kasavubu flew from location to location trying to quell the riots,
but their absence from the capital made it more difficult to take concerted action.
Nonetheless, the Congolese Cabinet met with Bunche on the 10th and Hammarskjöld was
subsequently advised of a Congolese request for a team of technical assistance personnel
capable of providing military advice to the new government.

The following day Belgium ordered its forces to enter the Congo to protect its
civilians and interests. The Belgian paratroopers landed in Leopoldville, Matadi,
Luluabourg, and Elisabethville. This move by the Belgians aggravated an already
complicated situation. The Belgian aim may simply have been to provide protection for
Europeans living in the Congo.\textsuperscript{82} Certainly, many European residents hoped the Belgian

\textsuperscript{80} NAC, RG 25, vol. 5209, file 6386-40 part 9, Bull to USSEA, 4 August 1960.
\textsuperscript{81} Brian Urquhart and Ernest Lefever both suggest that the extent of violence in the Congo was
\textsuperscript{82} Ernest Lefever and Wynfred Joshua both cast Belgian intervention in a favourable light with a
generally pro-Belgian interpretation of the crisis. Lefever argues that the Belgians intervened only to
restore order and facilitate the departure of Europeans who wanted to leave. Joshua suggests that Belgium
had no intention of reimposing colonial rule. If this is the case, the Belgian government failed to appreciate
the negative impact of their actions on international and Congolese perceptions of their motives. Ernest
government would intervene, but to the Congolese the arrival of paratroopers was viewed as an attempt to reverse decolonisation. Belgian intervention resulted in a “deep suspicion and fear of whites in general on the part of the Congolese population.”\textsuperscript{83} Skirmishes between Belgian and Congolese forces occurred throughout the country. After the Belgians bombarded the port city of Matadi, killing 19 Congolese, the American ambassador reported that some Belgian forces “have become completely irrational and in many instances have behaved worse than the worst Congolese.”\textsuperscript{84}

Roger Bull was very critical of Belgium. He considered the invasion of Leopoldville “unnecessary” and suggested that Belgian policy was, “ill-conceived, ill-executed and, in the deepest sense, irresponsible. . . . Popular opinion among Europeans here is that the Belgian government has been cowardly, vacillating and stupid.” He also noted that Belgian military officers were inconsistent in their interpretation and application of the premise on which their intervention was based. Bull said of General Cumont, sent by Belgian authorities to take command of its military forces in the Congo, that he knew “little about the Congo and cares even less for the welfare of its citizens. He has behaved throughout in a childish and vindictive manner. . . . treating army intervention as an exercise.” He concluded that the Belgian invasion “completely obliterated any element of black/white cooperation or sympathy in the Congo. A most unpleasant xenophobia is now present.”\textsuperscript{85} Regardless of Bull’s private views, the Canadian government did not publicly criticise Belgium. But aside from Belgium’s

\textsuperscript{83} Brian Urquhart, \textit{Hammarskjold}, 404.
\textsuperscript{84} as quoted in Gibbs, \textit{The Political Economy of Third World Intervention}, 82.
NATO allies, the international community was virtually unanimous in condemning its actions in the Congo. The Soviet bloc was quick to exploit the situation, calling it an act of Western colonial imperialism.

This chaotic situation was only made worse on 11 July when the provincial president of Katanga, Moïse Tshombe, declared independence. The secession had serious implications. The viability of the entire country was placed in question once its richest province declared its intention to leave the federation. Katanga's many economic and political connections with Belgium also cast a larger shadow of doubt upon the motives behind its intervention. Some have said this doubt was warranted; in July, it appeared that Belgium had reversed its policy of fostering a united Congo in order to support breakaway provinces that chose not to stay within a Congo unified under the leadership of Lumumba.86

On 12 July, Lumumba and Kasavubu cabled the Secretary-General from Luluabourg requesting UN military assistance. They emphasised that this aid was "to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression which is a threat to international peace."87 It was now clear that the Congolese hoped not only for UN technical assistance to restore internal order, but also for a large-scale UN military intervention that would protect Congolese interests in the face of Belgian aggression. Earlier that day in Leopoldville, the vice-premier, Antoine Gizenga, had approached the American ambassador to ask for similar, bilateral military assistance. The

86 van Bilsen, "Some Aspects of the Congo Problem," 48. Michael Schatzberg is more blunt, suggesting that the Katangan secession "was a barely concealed attempt to dismember Zaire; Belgium accorded Tshombe every support except diplomatic recognition." Michael Schatzberg, Mobutu or Chaos? (New York: U P of America, 1991) 11.
Americans declined the request and suggested the Congolese redirect their inquiries to the UN.\textsuperscript{88} Partly to clarify the conflicting requests originating in Leopoldville and Luluabourg, Kasavubu and Lumumba cabled the Secretary-General again on 13 July. They stressed that the purpose of UN intervention would not be to “restore the internal situation in Congo but rather to protect the national territory against acts of aggression committed by Belgian metropolitan troops.” They also expected that the UN force would consist of military personnel from “neutral countries and not from the United States.”\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{88} Lefever argues that the US could have mounted an intervention, at this point, but decided against it because “the political cost of direct aid was overestimated in Washington,” as a result of the State Department’s, “oversensitivity to charges of ‘neo-colonialism.’” Lefever. “The Limits of UN Intervention in the Third World,” 13.

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Time of Decision

In Canada, the Congo crisis made headlines. *The Globe and Mail* followed the situation for weeks, usually printing front-page stories. The editorial pages were filled with commentaries calling for UN action. On 12 July, *The Globe* asked, “Where Are the UN Police?” in an editorial that was essentially pro-Belgian, yet called for the dispatch of a UN armed force. In the House of Commons, the issue was raised by the opposition. Liberal critic Paul Martin asked the Diefenbaker government if it intended, “to inform the Secretary General of the United Nations that if United Nations police forces are required and requested for the preservation of order in the new Congo state, a Canadian contingent is ready, trained and available to be moved by air transport immediately.”¹ Prime Minister Diefenbaker was evasive in his response, noting that the Secretary-General was consulting with the African nations and that he thought it was premature to offer assistance until these consultations were completed.

Meanwhile, officials in the Department of External Affairs met with J.W. MacNaughton of the Directorate of Military Operations and Plans (DMOP), Department of National Defence (DND). MacNaughton had been directed by the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff (CCOS) to “give preliminary thought to the implications of a possible request from the United Nations for Canadian military personnel.” If the UN decided to send peacekeepers to the Congo, DND assumed they might approach Canada for French speaking personnel. MacNaughton considered it unlikely that peacekeepers would be used “in any combat capacity,” and so expected that the UN would ask for military advisers, and not the stand-by battalion Canada had readily available for UN service (the

2nd battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment). Nevertheless, he believed the Canadian military could meet “most types of request which might be forthcoming,” noting that the Army maintained a stand-by list of 100 officers, including some who were bilingual and could be posted abroad on short notice. One of three French Canadian battalions could be made available but would take longer to prepare than the English speaking stand-by battalion. In the end, it was recognised that the Secretary-General would decide what was “feasible and appropriate.” The government would, in the meantime, continue to take the position that the matter was under study at the UN and that no requests had yet been made of UN members.²

In addition to their consultations with DND, External Affairs maintained close contact with diplomatic posts in Belgium, the United States, the United Kingdom, and also with the Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Charles Ritchie. At this early stage in the crisis, political differences between the US and the UK became evident. Fearing intervention by either the United Arab Republic or Guinea, and the spread of Pan Africanism, the UK hoped that any international intervention would be “on the broadest possible basis of white, brown, yellow and black, including the Belgians, but omitting the Permanent Security Council members.”³ In contrast, the Americans were concerned that the Belgians continued to send troops to the Congo. If outside help was required, they preferred non-African sources to be used only as a last resort. Accordingly, the State Department also considered, for the time being, that there was “no scope for an initiative on the part of Canada.”⁴

The secession of Katanga, led by premier Moïse Tshombé, complicated both an already tense political situation in the Congo and any plans for intervention in the crisis. Unlike the central government, Tshombé sought to maintain close ties with Belgium. He not only welcomed the intervention of Belgian forces, but also sought troops from Britain and neighbouring Rhodesia. Substantial British economic interests in Katanga, primarily in *Union Minière* and the Benguela Railroad, led one Canadian diplomat to conclude Britain “may have to make a hard decision on Katanga.” At External Affairs, Katangan secession was discussed and it was thought best to “do and say nothing to assist separatism in the Congo.” While the Commonwealth Division favoured a united Congo, it did not recommend condemning the separatists publicly. It did question whether restraint might privately be urged upon both Belgian and Rhodesian authorities; this was rejected by Norman Robertson, the Under-Secretary, who thought it unnecessary to take any position on the status of Katanga or to press what he considered to be a “pretty remote interest on the U.K.” It was, nonetheless, clear to Robertson that the “revolt” had created “a situation of civil war in which there will be strong pressures on European powers to take sides.”

Because Belgium was already open to charges of neo-colonialism, there was fear that any further intervention by European powers might leave the Congolese central authorities susceptible to communist influence. The Soviet leader, Khrushchev, in his first statement on the crisis, characterised NATO as having sent troops “to suppress the

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peoples of the Congo by force of arms.”10 The Canadian Embassy in Brussels reported that Prime Minister Lumumba was unlikely to “let Katanga go without a struggle and since he has no [repeat] no forces of his own effective against trained European troops, he may turn elsewhere.”11 Initial Canadian assessments of Congolese political attitudes had suggested that the Congolese were likely to pursue a policy of pan-Africanism and “positive neutrality.”12 In conversation with the acting Canadian Trade Commissioner, the Congolese Designate to the UN, Thomas Kanza, had even remarked favourably on Canada’s reputation for “objectivity” at the UN.13 Prior to independence, Canadian military intelligence suggested that there was “no indication of Sino-Soviet Bloc interference,” in spite of the presence in Leopoldville of a Czechoslovakian Consul-General considered to be a “most able and dangerous official.” The chaotic political situation and the “trend to secession” was worrisome as it presented “an ideal breeding ground for Communism.”14 Canadian analysts concluded that while either British or French forces could restore order in the Congo, the “only real solution to the problem is through assistance from the United Nations,” in the form of military advisors to the Force Publique, a UN military force, or a combination of the two.15

In New York, the UN Secretariat had to contend with the rapidly changing situation in the Congo, in their attempts to determine how best to respond to a number of

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Congolese requests for assistance. On 11 July, the Secretary-General was in Geneva when he was contacted by Ralph Bunche, the UN Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, with the first Congolese request for technical assistance in support of the Force Publique. Canadian diplomats in Geneva reported that Hammarskjöld seemed to have in mind "some fairly major operation which could help restore order and confidence." The Secretary-General immediately returned to New York and met with representatives of the African states on the morning of 12 July to discuss the matter. He suggested UN technical personnel be sent to the Congo to assist in restoring order and discipline within the armed forces; the African states accepted this in principle. Hans Wieschoff, of the UN Secretariat, later advised the Canadian representative that the UN hoped to use suitable officers from the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) for service in the Congo, with the approval of the contributing countries. Hammarskjöld expected to fund this operation from the UN technical assistance budget and his own contingency fund. He did not intend to ask the Security Council to endorse his programme; instead, he planned to explain his proposal to members of the Security Council at a luncheon the next day, and if there were no objections, simply put it into effect.  

It was at this point that the second Congolese request arrived, cabled directly to the Secretary-General by President Kasavubu and Lumumba. The Congolese leaders asked for UN military forces to counter the Belgian intervention. Canadian diplomats in New York reported that Hammarskjöld "would have liked to keep this additional (and of course highly embarrassing) request quiet until his programme to meet the first request

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for technical assistance had been developed and could be made public.” In fact, he hoped the second request would simply “fade quietly away,” once the technical assistance took effect. In conversation with the UK representative, Hammarskjöld revealed that he expected to select French-speaking officers for service in the Congo immediately after his luncheon meeting with the Security Council and specifically mentioned Canada as a potential contributor. Ritchie understood, on the basis of a phone conversation with officials at External, that “there is no [repeat] no question of making any prior offer of [Canadian] assistance,” but assured Ottawa that no one else had made such an offer either. Any request from the Secretariat would be relayed immediately for urgent consideration.

Events the next day forced Hammarskjöld to change his plans. On the morning of 13 July, yet another cable arrived from Kasavubu and Lumumba. In this telegram, the two Congolese leaders requested a UN force consisting of “military personnel of neutral countries and not [repeat] not of USA.” They also threatened to appeal to the Bandung Treaty powers for assistance, if the UN did not meet their request “without delay.”

From Leopoldville, Ralph Bunche grew increasingly concerned with events in the Congo. Belgian paratroops arrived in the capital and forcibly took control of both the European area of the city and the airport. In response, Lumumba threatened to call upon Ghana to provide military assistance until UN forces arrived. The American ambassador urged the French ambassador to have French troops in Brazzaville ready to intervene in the

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mounting crisis. Together, these events convinced Bunche to reverse his previous position against the dispatch of a UN force. In a cable to Hammarskjöld, he concluded, "I believe UN may be able to save this situation, chaotic as it is rapidly becoming, if some action is taken quickly enough. ... Only some manifestation of a 'third presence' which definitely should be international, military, but not indispensably fighting men, can save the situation." Hammarskjöld was persuaded by Bunche's assessment. He decided a larger UN military force should be sent, in addition to the technical assistance program he originally envisaged for the Congo. From informal discussions, Ritchie learned the Secretary-General expected the force to consist of 3 or 4 "fully equipped units ... which he hoped to obtain from several Asian and African countries and from 'a trans-Atlantic French-speaking country'." Ritchie noted that the later phrase could "conceivably" be a reference to Haiti. He was inclined to think that forces from NATO countries would not be asked to be a part of the larger force.

That afternoon, Hammarskjöld informally met with members of the Security Council and presented a three-pronged approach to deal with the Congo crisis. First, he maintained that Lumumba's initial request for military, technical assistance was a long term project that could be met by seconding officers from UNTSO in Palestine. He had in mind French-speaking officers from Canada and Scandinavia, though official requests had not yet been sent. Second, he proposed the UN send a military force sufficient in size

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to enable Belgian troops to withdraw. Finally, Hammarskjöld identified an urgent need for supplies and food aid.26

Once convinced of the need to send a peacekeeping force to the Congo, the Secretary-General demonstrated considerable initiative in putting his plans into effect. Bunche later noted that ONUC was “mainly Hammarskjöld’s in conception and reflected Hammarskjöld’s boldness.”27 While he did play a critical role in the development of UNEF, with ONUC Hammarskjöld was more involved at the earliest stages of planning and took the lead in defining the proposed mission’s mandate.28 One observer even commented that while it would be “misleading to imply that Hammarskjöld welcomed the crisis ... he did accept the challenge with enthusiasm. This was the opportunity he had been waiting for to expand the positive function of the United Nations as a force for progress beyond the wrath of the cold war.”29 Using Article 99 of the Charter for the first time, Hammarskjöld requested a meeting of the Security Council to formally consider the Congo situation and his proposed response.30

When the Council convened at 8:30 that evening, two issues became the focus of debate following Hammarskjöld’s opening statement and the introduction of a draft resolution by Mongi Slim, the Tunisian Representative. Hammarskjöld hoped to sidestep

30 Article 99 is reproduced in appendix 1. Most authors agree that this was the first time a Secretary-General used this Charter provision. See, for example, Andrew Cordier and Wilder Foote, Dag Hammarskjöld, 1960-1961 (New York: Columbia U P, 1969-1977) 20, vol. 5 of Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations (New York: Columbia U P, 1975-. J.W. Schneider suggests, however, that it had been “invoked for the first time with Korean aggression.” J.W. Schneider, “Congo Force and Standing UN Force: Legal Experience with ONUC,” The Indian Journal of International Law (1964) 275.
the Congolese charge of ‘aggression’ against Belgium by receiving assurances that the
‘Belgian government would see its way to a withdrawal,’ once the UN force was
dispatched. This was similar to the expectation that British and French forces were to be
withdrawn, once UNEF was deployed. The first operative clause of the Tunisian
resolution, however, clearly called upon Belgium to withdraw its forces from Congolese
territory. While the Western powers believed Belgium was justified in its intervention
and saw the clause as unnecessary, the African states insisted that this relatively mild
rebuke be retained. Indeed, the Soviets were upset that the clause was not more forceful
in condemning the actions of Belgium and suggested amendments to the resolution that
called for the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of Belgian forces. When these
amendments were voted down and Slim refused to make any changes to his resolution,
the Western nations and the Soviets finally agreed to accept the clause as originally
drafted.

The Council then debated the question of ONUC’s composition. Sobolev, the
Soviet representative, wanted the UN to use only African contingents. While acceptable
to the African states, such a limitation contradicted Hammarskjöld’s belief that, although
ONUC should consist mainly of African troops, it should also ‘include some contingents
from other parts of the world to reflect the universal character of the Organization.’

Given the colonial context of the crisis, the Secretary-General recognised the political

32 This parallel between ONUC and UNEF is noted by D.W. Bowett, who states, “it was never
contemplated that ONUC would use force to compel a Belgian withdrawal, a primary function of ONUC
was undoubtedly to enable such a withdrawal to take place.” D.W. Bowett, *United Nations Forces*
33 Cordier and Foote, *Dag Hammarskjöld, 1960-1961*, 25-26; Ernest Lefever, “U.S. Policy, the
UN and the Congo,” *Orbis* 11.2 (Summer 1967) 397.
the Secretary-General during the Congo crisis, confirms that Hammarskjöld believed “adequate regional
representation was required.” Indar Jit Rikhye, “United Nations Peacekeeping and India,” *India Quarterly*
41.3-4 (July-December 1985) 310.
necessity of a primarily African force, even though, as one scholar would later note, "it was impossible for a force so composed to be completely disinterested." Ultimately, Sobolev's amendment was narrowly defeated, 5 votes against to 4 in favour (Tunisia, Ceylon, Poland, Soviet Union), with 2 abstentions. For the moment, the issue of force composition was settled.

In the early hours of 14 July, the Tunisian resolution was approved (8 in favour, none against, 2 abstentions). In addition to calling upon Belgium to withdraw its forces from the Congo, the Security Council authorised the Secretary-General to:

- take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks.

The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as appropriate. This resolution, like many of the subsequent enabling resolutions related to ONUC, proved to be problematic. It was, for instance, deliberately vague on the question of Belgian withdrawal. In fact, when explaining their votes on this resolution, the Americans and Soviets maintained contradictory interpretations of the clause on Belgian withdrawal. The resolution failed to identify the Charter provisions upon which it was

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based. Because of these ambiguities, the Secretary-General exercised considerable latitude when translating the decisions of the Council into operating instructions for ONUC, filling in the "gap between resolution and action." To a degree, this followed the pattern established by UNEF. During that peacekeeping mission, the General Assembly was content to leave the daily operations in the hands of the Secretary-General: 'Leave it to Dag' was a common refrain. Initially, this approach provided the Secretariat with greater flexibility in the implementation of ONUC; but later, as Brian Urquhart noted, the rather "Delphic" instructions of the Security Council became a "political hazard."  

After Hammarskjöld's luncheon meeting with members of the Security Council earlier in the day, Canadian officials in Ottawa and New York began to assess the possibilities of Canadian participation in the UN efforts to deal with the Congo crisis.

The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Norman Robertson, prepared a

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38 This raised a significant legal question: was ONUC a Chapter 6 or Chapter 7 peacekeeping operation? Lefever suggests ONUC was "essentially a 'pacific settlement' mission under Chapter VI." Most other experts disagree and find the basis for ONUC within Chapter VII. Bowett states: "... the establishment of ONUC was by Resolution of the Security Council to achieve the general purpose of the Organisation set out in Article I (1), in fulfillment of the Council's 'primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,' conferred by Article 24; and that, having made an implicit finding under Article 39, the Council acted under Chapter VII of the Charter so as to establish a United Nations Force for the purpose of supervising and enforcing compliance with the provisional measures ordered under Article 40 and for other purposes which were consistent with the general powers of the Council under Article 39. In so acting the Council utilised its further powers under Article 98 to use the Secretary-General as its agent." See: Lefever, "The Limits of UN Intervention in the Third World," *The Review of Politics* 30.1 (1968) 5; D.W. Bowett, *United Nations Forces*, 180; G.I.A.D. Draper, "The Legal Limitations Upon the Empowerment of Weapons by the United Nations Force in Congo," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 12.2 (1963) 390; Thomas Franck, "United Nations Law in Africa: The Congo Operation as a Case Study," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 27 (Autumn 1962) 644; E.M Miller, "Legal Aspects of the U.N. Action in the Congo," *American Journal of International Law* 55.1 (1961) 4-7.


memorandum for the Minister that provided details on all three of Hammarskjöld’s proposed actions, in anticipation that a formal request from the UN could be forthcoming. J.W. MacNaughton, of the Department of National Defence, had already advised External officials that there was no military reason why Canada should not respond favourably if the Secretary-General requested the secondment of French-speaking Canadian officers serving in UNTSO. Nor did Robertson see any political reason to turn down a request, although there would be considerable personal risk for white officers serving in the Congo.42

Robertson was cautious on the question of Canadian participation in the Secretary-General’s proposed UN peace force for the Congo. Because the force would be assigned the task of restoring order, he assumed that it might become necessary for peacekeepers to fire upon Congolese mutineers or even rowdy civilians. He remarked, “It is difficult to see any United Nations force in this role because in effect the United Nations would have taken up arms against citizens of a state in what was essentially a domestic situation.”43 He sensed, however, that the Secretary-General’s reference to a ‘trans-Atlantic French-speaking’ country was intended to suggest Canada. He anticipated that Hammarskjöld would have a difficult time locating forces that were capable of providing logistic support to a mixed force, particularly given the problems posed by differences in language. He concluded,

I believe that any white troops involved in the proposed law enforcement role of the United Nations would be in a most difficult situation, since it would be difficult to persuade the Congolese masses that the United Nations force was not another form of white domination. The administrative units of the force might not be required to coerce the Congolese in any way but they might have to protect themselves and the

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42 NAC, RG25, vol. 5208, file 6386-40 part 6, Robertson to Green, 13 July 1960.
43 NAC, RG25, vol. 5208, file 6386-40 part 6, Robertson to Green, 13 July 1960.
supplies and equipment of the force against Congolese attack. On balance, therefore, we should have to look very carefully at any request involving a Canadian contingent for the force and the Secretary-General should be made aware of our hesitation to become involved in this way.  

Robertson's recommendation was a far cry from the Opposition's eager suggestion, put forward in parliament just the day before, that Canada should approach the UN to offer the services of its standby battalion. This was a moot point. In New York, Charles Ritchie was in a better position to appreciate the political debate surrounding ONUC's composition. He reported, "there had been no question of supplying a Canadian contingent to the proposed Force," and that "the Canadian standby battalion (second RCR's) would not be suitable in any event."

Robertson did recommend that the Cabinet consider the provision of foodstuffs or supplies, and the necessary air transportation to move these gifts to the Congo, to alleviate serious food shortages. He noted also that the UN had informally requested the use of two Canadian aircraft serving in UNEF, for the purpose of ferrying supplies and personnel to the Congo. The RCAF saw no objection to such service, and so Robertson suggested that Canada agree to provide the aircraft if the UN formally requested their use.

Because the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green, was away from Ottawa at a joint conference of US and Canadian Ministers on defence matters, the Prime Minister reviewed the Congo file himself. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's special assistant on foreign affairs, reported that the Prime Minister, "shot out of his chair and told me to see that Hammarskjöld was told right away not to proceed with the idea of

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44 NAC, RG25, vol. 5208, file 6386-40 part 6, Robertson to Green, 13 July 1960.
Robinson reported Diefenbaker’s views to the Under-Secretary at once, advising Robertson that the temporary secondment of Canadian officers in UNTSO would likely be approved by the Cabinet and that serious consideration would be given to any UN requests for foodstuffs. The question of a Canadian contribution to the large peace force, on the other hand, was a different matter. Robinson advised,

The Secretary-General should be told immediately not to make any mention to representatives of other countries of the possibility of a military contribution from ‘a trans-Atlantic French-speaking country’. The Prime Minister was emphatic that he did not wish any expectation to be aroused that military assistance from Canada would be forthcoming.\(^4^8\)

In Ottawa, discussion of a Canadian contribution to the larger peace force was focused on the prospect of Canada sending combat forces, the standby battalion in particular. In the press, the House of Commons, and at External Affairs, this idea was raised repeatedly, in spite of Charles Ritchie’s view that this was highly improbable.\(^4^9\)

Diefenbaker’s initial negative reaction also seems to have been based, in part, on this faulty assumption that the UN would want and request Canadian combat forces. Basil Robinson suggests that Hammarskjöld, “at first asked for a military unit from Canada,” but that upon hearing of Diefenbaker’s reaction, “settled for administrative and specialist personnel.”\(^5^0\) In fact, Hammarskjöld initially asked Canada only for a small number of technical personnel and had no intention of asking for combat forces. Diefenbaker’s approach was similarly reported to be to “avoid soliciting requests for help and to


\(^{4^9}\) At least one observer seemed to grasp the distinction between the appropriateness of Canadian combat and non-combat personnel. Spencer noted, “... it was sobering to be reminded that white troops, even those free of the taint of colonialism, were not wanted.” Robert Spencer, “Parliament and Foreign Policy, 1960,” *International Journal* 15 (Autumn 1960) 330.

\(^{5^0}\) Robinson, *Diefenbaker’s World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs*, 148.
respond favourably to anything short of combat troops."^{51} It would thus appear that a later request for non-combat, Signals personnel was in line with what Diefenbaker and Hammarskjöld both considered an appropriate Canadian contribution. Mistaken assumptions aside, there may have been political reasons why Diefenbaker reacted as he did. Robinson later recalled that the Prime Minister was upset that Canada might be asked to assist the UN on the basis of its bilingualism. Livingstone suggests, "He was not at all prepared for Canadian society to be viewed as divided into French-speaking and English-speaking segments. His 'one Canada' mindset determined that should requests be made for assistance, it would not be because Canada was bilingual."^{52}

In the House of Commons, Diefenbaker continued his evasive parliamentary tactics to avoid openly confronting the issue of Canadian participation in ONUC. In a question about Canada's role in the Congo crisis, Hazen Argue, M.P. for Assiniboia and leader of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, alluded to Canadian popular support for peacekeeping activities. He asked,

In view of the well known interest of Canadian citizens in our country being of every possible assistance in these difficult times, has the Canadian government given any consideration to making an offer of needed technical and professional personnel, preferably through the United Nations, for use in the Congo?^{53}

Diefenbaker somewhat muddled the issue when he suggested in his response that Argue was thinking of the Secretary-General's technical assistance program, and that Hammarskjöld was interested first in drawing personnel for this mission from the African

^{51} Robinson, Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs, 148.
^{52} G. Ann Livingstone, "Canada's Policy and Attitudes Towards United Nations Peacekeeping, 1956-1964, with Specific Reference to Participation in the Forces Sent to Egypt (1956), the Congo (1960) and Cyprus (1964)," Diss. (Keele University, 1995) 185.
states. The Prime Minister's response was inaccurate because Hammarskjöld planned to use African and Asian forces primarily for the larger peace force and fully expected that he would need to use personnel from non-African and non-Asian countries, who had some peacekeeping experience, for the smaller technical assistance program. Diefenbaker then confused matters further when he mentioned that officers might be seconded from UNTSO for this purpose, once permission from the Canadian government was granted. The Prime Minister's response did little to clarify Canada's role. The Globe and Mail could almost be excused for printing a story that in one paragraph made the sweeping statement that "Canada is prepared to fill any United Nations appeal for police troops for service in the Congo," but that two paragraphs later stated, "Canada hopes no request will come from UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold for the battalion of troops which this country maintains on a 24-hour alert for such international police action." It seemed to be a case of 'peacekeeping if necessary, but not necessarily peacekeeping'.

Before the Security Council meeting on the evening of 13 July, Charles Ritchie met with Hammarskjöld to discuss the Secretary-General's plans. Earlier, External Affairs contacted Ritchie and requested that he speak to Hammarskjöld and express clearly the Canadian government's reluctance to become involved in the larger peacekeeping force that was being contemplated. While mixed signals may have been given in Ottawa, the Canadian position was enunciated clearly and frequently in New York. Hammarskjöld assured Ritchie that "there was no [repeat] no question of making mention of a military contribution from [Canada]." The Secretary-General confirmed, however, that he intended to approach General von Horn (Chief of Staff in Jerusalem) to see if a number of French-speaking officers could be spared from UNTSO for the

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54 "Canada to Aid Congo Only if UN in charge," Globe and Mail [Toronto] 13 July 1960, 1.
technical assistance program. He expected that this would involve both Canadians and Scandinavians.

The larger peacekeeping force was to evolve in two stages. In the first stage, contingents from African states would be used to develop an atmosphere of confidence by demonstrating to the Congolese that the UN presence was designed to help maintain their independence. He suggested that it would be desirable to include non-African forces only after the first stage had been accomplished. The Secretary-General added, “at the present time, however, there was no question of any request for a Canadian contingent. Press reports suggesting that the Secretary-General was looking to Canada for a contingent were entirely inaccurate and misleading.”

On the morning of 14 July, Hammarskjöld and Ritchie spoke again. By this time, the Canadian Representative had received yet another telegram from External Affairs exhorting him to discourage further any request from the Secretariat for military assistance. Ritchie once again expressed the government’s concern. Hammarskjöld emphatically stated that the question did not even arise because offers of troops from African nations were more than sufficient to staff the force. He did take the opportunity to formally request the secondment of two Canadian officers from UNTSO for the technical assistance program.

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56 NAC, RG25, vol. 5208, file 6386-40 part 6, Robertson to Green, 14 July 1960. J.L. Granatstein in, “Canada: Peacekeeper,” Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response (Lindsay: Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 1968): 155-156. refers to Ottawa dispatches that reported Bunche in Leopoldville saying Canada would be expected to send paratroopers. He notes that the government doubted the accuracy of the reports, in response to calls for action in the conservative press. It turns out that the news stories were based on a ‘leaked’ private conversation between General Alexander and Bunche, in which they only theoretically discussed the possibility of using bilingual paratroopers for rescue operations. Thus, the reports were inaccurate. See: NAC, RG25, vol. 5219, file 6386-C-40 part 1, Memo for Minister: Congo: Canadian Contribution, 20 July 1960.

57 NAC, RG25, vol. 5208, file 6386-40 part 6, Robertson to Green, 14 July 1960.
The Canadian Cabinet addressed the Congo situation for the first time on 14 July. Diefenbaker explained that, in Green's absence, he had been asked by the Canadian delegation for instructions on how to respond to a UN request for "military units to be sent to the Congo." He noted his objections to Hammarskjöld's proposed announcement that troops for the Congo would be drawn from Africa, possibly Asia and "French-speaking units from a trans-Atlantic country." Presuming the latter was a definite reference to Canada, Diefenbaker advised Cabinet that he had told the delegation "he did not want the U.N. Secretary General to designate Canada in that fashion." Cabinet noted the Prime Minister's actions, and the fact that the Secretary-General had made no mention of Canadian units in his public statements, but no discussion of the matter seems to have taken place.\(^{58}\) It would seem that Cabinet came to share Diefenbaker's unwarranted concern that Canada might be asked to contribute combat forces.

Later that day, the Congo situation was raised in the House of Commons and Diefenbaker took the opportunity to outline the government's position. He argued that peacekeepers for a major UN force should be drawn primarily from neighbouring African states to avoid any misapprehension, on the part of the Congolese, that might otherwise result from the use of non-African forces. He stated that the government would look favourably upon requests for technical advisors, food, or transportation and concluded,

The government is responding favourably to requests of this kind because it believes that this is the most useful contribution which Canada can make in the current situation. If there are additional requests of the same nature they will be considered seriously.\(^{59}\)

\(^{58}\) NAC, RG2, vol. 2747, Cabinet Conclusions, 14 July 1960, paras. 4-5.

\(^{59}\) Canada, House of Commons Debates, 14 July 1960: 6273.
Lester Pearson, the Liberal Leader of the Opposition, agreed with the government's policy and actions but suggested that, if sufficient forces could not be mustered by the UN relying on African states alone, perhaps the government could "let the United Nations know that we have a battalion trained, equipped and available for that kind of service that could be made available if it were required by the United Nations."\(^{60}\)

In truth, the Secretary-General was not inclined to request such combat forces from Canada. Just in case, the government took every opportunity to remind the Canadian representative at the UN to limit or head off any such requests. As Ritchie was informed of the government's approval of the UN's secondment of Lt. Col. J. Berthiaume and Major H King from UNTSO to ONUC, he was again told, "We are aware that you have already informed the Secretary-General that the [Government] does not wish any expectation to be aroused that military assistance from Canada would be forthcoming. You should continue to discourage any such request from the Secretariat."\(^{61}\)

Nevertheless, the government *publicly* demonstrated that it was sensitive to expectations that Canada should play a peacekeeping role in the Congo. During debate in the House of Commons, Howard Green stated,

> We are continuing to be greatly interested in the peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations. Canada already plays as big a part as any other nation in the peace-keeping arrangements of the United Nations and the government is continuing that policy. It may be that some provision will have to be made for further support for the United Nations in this field. Certainly our minds are not closed and we are very much in favour of doing everything that Canada can do that is practical to help strengthen the peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations.\(^{62}\)


As a middle power, Canada had played an important role in previous peacekeeping missions, and this only encouraged many to expect similar involvement in the Congo. An editorial from the *Globe and Mail* amply demonstrates this:

Prime Minister Diefenbaker was asked in the Commons this week if he has offered this battalion to the UN for use in the Congo. He replied that the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, had the Congo crisis under advisement; the question of Canadian assistance, military or otherwise, would not arise until Mr. Hammarskjold made a specific request to Canada.

This is too passive, too negative, Canada should be playing an active, positive role on the side of peace. How better, at this time, could we play such a role than by helping to bring peace to the Congo? What greater contribution could we make to the world than by helping to put out flames which could spread through Africa? We have poured, still are pouring, billions of dollars into defense. This money would be more usefully spent on organizing a permanent Middle-Power police force than on maintaining our present subservient role in the North American Air Defense system.

With like-minded countries, we could build a force that would clear up trouble-spots, removing them from the area where they give the Great Powers an excuse to rattle rockets at one another.

In the Congo today, the blood of Africans and Europeans is being spilled. If Canada stands for peace, this is Canada’s business. As the darkness gathers in Africa, Canada should not be waiting to find out what, if anything, is expected of it by Mr. Hammarskjold. Canada should be stating clearly its will and wish to join other peaceful nations in going to Africa and restoring the peace.63

The Diefenbaker government did not want to answer this call to restore peace in Central Africa. Diefenbaker later wrote, “As Prime Minister, I believed that Canada should take an appropriate part in United Nations peacekeeping activities. But I never thought that this should be automatic; I think the idea ridiculous that Canada should perforce

participate in every United Nations peacekeeping activity." Nonetheless, he was certainly aware of the political importance of participation in UN peacekeeping. In all probability, this influenced Diefenbaker's Congo policy. The government felt compelled to support peacekeeping publicly, as it quietly limited the potential for future commitments in the Congo.

During the evening of 14 July, the NATO Council was called to a special meeting, at the request of the Belgian representative. Belgium attempted to rally support for its position in the Congo. Prior to independence, a treaty of friendship was negotiated between Belgium and the Congo which provided Belgium with two permanent military bases. The Belgians wanted to retain these installations, after their forces were withdrawn in compliance with the UN Security Council resolution. They appealed to their NATO allies to support them on this issue. Belgium reminded the Western powers of the Congo's strategic importance, in terms of both geography and mineral resources. The Canadian representative, Jules Léger, was surprised by the Belgian assessment of events in the Congo. Belgian officials thought that the actions of the Congolese authorities were being orchestrated by communist sources outside the Congo.65

Léger may have been surprised to hear that communists were behind the Congo crisis, but not officials at External. In Ottawa, the possible involvement of communist provocateurs had been a topic of recent interest. From Pretoria, the Department learned that the South African Consul-General in Leopoldville, Mr. Hewitson, saw little evidence that communists had helped to bring about the collapse of the Congolese authorities. He did, however, think it quite probable that some Belgian communists in the Congo would

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take advantage of the anarchy there. In Washington, the African Affairs Bureau was also studying the question of communist infiltration. Mr. Hennemeyer, of the West African Desk in the State Department, shared the American analysis with a number of diplomats, including staff from the Canadian Embassy. Hennemeyer said that American officials were puzzled by the nature of the operations of the Force Publique’s mutinous elements. They had expected the mutineers to participate in indiscriminate looting, other disorderly conduct and the selfish acquisition of food and other valuable commodities. Instead, they seized control of municipal offices, telegraphic services, and air strips. State Department officials discerned a pattern in these circumstances that implied either internal or external guidance of the mutiny “based on highly sophisticated ideas about guerrilla activities that could probably have been gained only through contact with communist organizations bent on fomenting trouble in the Congo.” In spite of this rather sinister appraisal of the mutiny, the State Department concluded that there was little likelihood of serious communist inspiration. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs argued that the Belgian military authorities were simply using the “spectre of communism” to rally support for their position.

Although little evidence emerged to either confirm or reject the possibility that communist agents may have played a role in the instigation of the Congo crisis, the Cold War implications of anarchy in the Congo were obvious to all and influenced both public perceptions of the crisis and policy making. For example, Canada was reluctant to

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publicly support Belgian claims to Congolese military bases because this might “give substance to charges of Western aggression . . . [and] would seem calculated to create the worst possible impression among African and anti-colonial powers generally.” On 14 July, Kasavubu and Lumumba severed diplomatic relations with Belgium and sent a telegram to Khrushchev asking him to monitor the situation carefully in the event they found it necessary to ask the Soviets to intervene. Khrushchev obliged with a threat to take “decisive measures to stop the aggression.” This was not well received in Canada. In an editorial entitled, ‘Mr. K. Brinksman,’ The Globe and Mail soundly criticised Khrushchev for making a bad situation worse by promising military support “to every country or faction which is involved in trouble with any of the Western Powers, however remote the scene of action may be from Russia and its normal concerns.” Editorial cartoons appearing in the Globe on 19 and 23 July clearly portrayed a sinister side to Soviet motives.

On 20 July, the Belgian Ambassador in Ottawa called on External Affairs. There, he met with the Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Marcel Cadieux. The two discussed various aspects of the situation in the Congo. In particular, the Ambassador was concerned the Soviets would attempt a “take-over unless the United States and other friendly countries adopt publicly a firm position.” Cadieux acknowledged his concerns and assured him that the Canadian government “was alive to the possibilities of a Soviet coup.” He added that it would be helpful for the Ambassador to forward any detailed information concerning communist infiltration in the Congo.

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Cadieux noted that he had witnessed a communist take-over in French Indochina and realised how upsetting this could be for the former colonial authorities. He stated he was sure that the Belgian government would take into account the psychological shock that often attended the transfer of authority, as they assessed communist threats.\textsuperscript{73}

The Ambassador also raised the issues of Katanga’s secession and the role of ONUC. He was adamant that the UN should not become involved in the internal affairs of the Congo and that ONUC should focus its deployment in areas where order had not yet been restored. He was unequivocally against sending ONUC to Katanga. Cadieux diplomatically suggested that, in his view, such matters were best left to the judgment of the Secretary-General. If the Belgian Ambassador had hoped to find a sympathetic ear, he must have left External Affairs somewhat disappointed. His government’s views were politely acknowledged but not wholeheartedly accepted. Cadieux, first and foremost, expressed faith in the UN and Hammarskjöld and, while accepting the possibility that communists might take advantage of anarchy in the Congo, did not uncritically subscribe to the idea that the Soviets were plotting a take-over. On the one hand, Ottawa had to respect its NATO ally; on the other, it could not ignore the realities of decolonisation and the impact of Belgian interests in the Congo on that country’s policies.\textsuperscript{74}

That same day, Norman Robertson was visited by Soviet Ambassador Aroutunian. Robertson noted that remarks made by the Ambassador demonstrated the wisdom of the Canadian government’s decision not to send combat forces to the Congo. Aroutunian “stated very firmly” his belief that combat troops from NATO countries

\textsuperscript{73} NAC, RG25, vol. 5219, file 6386-C-40 part 1, Memo for USSEA: Conversation with the Belgian Ambassador concerning Congo situation, 20 July 1960.

\textsuperscript{74} The Americans faced a similar challenge. Hamilton Armstrong suggests the US tried to balance a tradition that favoured independence movements with the interests of its NATO allies. He found they did so “without remarkable success.” Hamilton F. Armstrong, “U.N. on Trial,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 39.3 (1961): 397.
should not be used in ONUC. He argued that NATO allies of Belgium should refrain from playing any role in the UN’s military operations in the Congo. Robertson took issue with this latter point and by the end of their conversation had persuaded Aroutunian to accept the possibility that support units from some NATO countries might have to be incorporated “because of peculiar circumstances like the language problem.” The Ambassador also maintained that if the Congolese Government requested military assistance from the Soviet Union, “it would respond.”

Radio reports that day announced Lumumba’s intentions to turn to the Soviets for military assistance, should the upcoming session of the Security Council fail to deliver the complete withdrawal of the Belgian military from Congolese territory. Aroutunian’s comments, combined with these radio reports, must have made the possibility of communist intervention that much more real — except that it would not be so much a ‘take-over’ as suggested by the Belgian Ambassador, as a ‘welcome: please come in’. There may not have been a communist plot to infiltrate and influence the Congolese government, but in the early days of the crisis, circumstances certainly existed that would have made communist penetration quite conceivable.

Professor J.L. Granatstein has written that public pressure forced the Diefenbaker government to increase Canada’s contribution to the UN efforts in the Congo, and that this public pressure sprang from a desire to fulfill a national self-image. He states, “None of the usual triggers for public response were there” and suggests, as an example, that

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75 NAC, RG25, vol. 5219, file 6386-C-40 part 1, Robertson to Green, 20 July 1960.
76 Alan James suggests that there was little likelihood of “massive intervention” by the Soviets, given the very serious logistical limitations they would have faced in any attempt to intervene directly in the Congo and that this would have been viewed as “most unlikely” even in 1960. He adds, however, that without ONUC “there might well have been much greater pressure on the Soviet Union to intervene and she might have felt less well placed to resist it.” Alan James, The Politics of Peacekeeping (London: Chatto & Windus, 1969) 362-3; Alan James, “Peacekeeping and the Parties,” in The United Nations and Peacekeeping: Results, Limitations, and Prospects, Ed. Indar Jit Rikhye (Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with the International Peace Academy, 1990) 129.
“until a few months after the UN decision there were not even any Communists suspected of trying to usurp [sic] the government.”\textsuperscript{77} Public opinion did influence Diefenbaker’s Congo policy, as noted earlier, but public opinion was not fashioned by national self-image alone. Canadian officials, as well as the public, were concerned that communists might indeed capitalise on the chaotic situation in the Congo. Stephen Weissman examined American foreign policy in the Congo crisis and concluded,

Such uses of history [recalling Soviet exploitation of chaos in: Eastern Europe, Greece, etc.], supplemented by inexperience in Africa, could lead to the darkest imaginings. Some feared that instability in the Congo would spread beyond its borders, creating golden opportunities for the Soviet bloc. All were concerned that a Communist victory in this large, centrally located state could create a base for the subversion of Central Africa.\textsuperscript{78}

While one cannot always apply conclusions made about the attitudes of American officials to their Canadian counterparts, in the case of the Congo crisis it is possible to do so. On the issue of communist penetration, Canadian and American officials were clear-minded enough not to believe the almost paranoid ravings of the Belgians. They made an important distinction: the crisis was not perceived as communist hatched. They did see the potential for communists to exploit chaos in the Congo. It is significant that Diefenbaker provided an account of ONUC in his memoirs as an example of how his government “was concerned and did its part to ensure that the African continent should not become the focus of the East-West struggle.”\textsuperscript{79}


\textsuperscript{79} John G. Diefenbaker, \textit{One Canada}, 2: 126.
ONUC began to take shape quickly. By 18 July, the Secretary-General was in a position to submit to the Security Council his *First Report on Assistance to the Republic of the Congo*. The first half of the report enunciated the key principles by which ONUC was to operate. Hammarskjöld made it clear that, while the force was in the Congo to assist the government, ONUC was “under the exclusive command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General under the control of the Security Council.” It was not to take orders from the Congolese government, nor was it to become party to any internal conflicts. Hammarskjöld noted that it was “only on this basis that the United Nations can expect to be able to draw on Member countries for contributions in men and material.” The UN and the Congolese government were expected to cooperate to ensure that ONUC would have the freedom of movement and access to communications necessary to carry out operations. Authority to decide on the composition of the force rested with the UN alone, but it was expected that Hammarskjöld would take into consideration the views of the Congolese government. ONUC would be entitled to use force in self-defence but was strictly prohibited from taking “any initiative in the use of armed force.”

The *First Report* addressed the issue of force composition. Hammarskjöld reiterated his plans to launch ONUC with a core of African units. To demonstrate an “element of universality,” additional forces were to be drawn from three European, one Asian, and one Latin American country. Nonetheless, the Secretary-General stated:

> It would be wholly unjustified to interpret the United Nations action in the sense that nations from outside the region step into the Congo situation, using the United Nations as their instrumentality, because of the incapability of the Congo and of the African states themselves to make the basic contribution to the solution of the problem.\(^8^1\)

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\(^8^0\) Cordier and Foote, *Dag Hammarskjöld, 1960-1961*, 28-32. [italics in original]

Hammarskjöld clearly tried to preclude any charges that ONUC could become an instrument of neo-colonialism. In his selection of European countries, he avoided NATO and Warsaw Pact member nations. Only Ireland, Sweden, and Yugoslavia were asked to provide combat forces; Norway and Denmark, while members of NATO, were both asked to provide non-combat, specialised logistics personnel. While the African states were able to provide infantry in adequate numbers to enable the initial deployment of ONUC, there remained key shortages in “logistics, signals, material, aircraft, and specialised personnel.” and so Hammarskjöld addressed requests to “those countries which are most likely to provide them at very short notice, irrespective of their geographical position.” In particular, he noted, “as regards signals, a special difficulty has been created by the fact that the personnel should, if at all possible, be bilingual, having a knowledge of both French and English.” The politics of decolonisation and the Cold War ensured that infantry for ONUC would be drawn first from non-aligned, and primarily African states. By necessity, Hammarskjöld broadened the list of acceptable contributors in order to find the specialised, technical (non-combat) elements of the force.82

Although Charles Ritchie repeatedly advised UN officials that Canada did not want to be asked to contribute forces to the military operation in the Congo, the shortage of technical personnel prompted Hammarskjöld, on 15 July, to ask Canadian authorities if they would be prepared to send logistics and communications personnel as part of ONUC. The US was contributing equipment and the UN hoped to employ technical personnel, from the Scandinavian countries and Canada, to operate and service it. From Canada, the UN specifically needed signals personnel and additional equipment, in roughly the same proportion as had been provided for UNEF, as well as quartermaster

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82 Cordier and Foote, Dag Hammarskjöld, 1960-1961, 33-34.
and maintenance personnel. The request for Canadian assistance was exploratory.

Specific details and requirements were not expected to be available until after the new UN Commander of ONUC, General von Horn, had surveyed the situation in the Congo. Ritchie reminded the UN of the Canadian position with respect to the provision of military assistance and emphasised that the government did not consider it appropriate to contribute troops to the UN force. He offered, nonetheless, to transmit the Secretary-General’s appeal.

Basil Robinson was informed of the UN’s need for Canadian peacekeepers in the early afternoon. He sent a memorandum to Diefenbaker outlining the Secretary-General’s new requests. In addition to the potentially controversial logistics and signals units, the UN asked the government to approve the secondment of three more officers from UNTSO. The Secretariat also requested assistance in the form of foodstuffs – flour, canned pork, and dried milk, as well as the necessary air transportation to send the supplies to the Congo. Robinson penciled some notes on the bottom of the memorandum to emphasise that a contribution of logistics and signals personnel would be for the military force and not for the technical aid program. When he saw Diefenbaker later in the day, the Prime Minister approved the secondment of one of the three officers in question and indicated that the remaining requests would need to be raised in Cabinet the next day. Robinson orally reiterated the significance of the request for communication and logistics experts, and while Diefenbaker did not give a positive reaction, his assistant was left “with the impression that his inclination might be to respond favourably if a

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83 Although the UN does not seem to have said so in its communications with Ritchie at this point, Brian Urquhart maintains that Canada was the “sole available source of trained signalers and communications units which could work in both English and French,” and that “It was for this compelling reason that Canadian units had been included in the force.” Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972) 433.

specific request were received. Diefenbaker was reluctant to agree to the UN request in principle because he thought this might be perceived in New York as "a blanket commitment to supply technicians."

The Cabinet met on 16 July and considered the recent UN requests, just as the first peacekeepers began to arrive in the Congo. Secondment of two additional UNTSO officers to serve as technical advisors to the Congolese government was approved. The government also agreed to provide 20,000 pounds each of canned pork and whole milk powder, but only after considerable debate. Some Cabinet Ministers wondered if the aid might not be perceived by the public as a gift to "revolutionaries, rapists, looters, etc." Others expressed the view that surplus food supplies should be distributed as a priority to the Canadian unemployed rather than as international aid. In the end, the Cabinet decided to send the supplies. Given that India provided gifts of food, an act of charity it could barely afford, it would have subsequently proved embarrassing if the Canadian government had turned down this request. A decision regarding ONUC logistics and signals personnel was postponed, pending further examination by the Department of National Defence.

The following day, the Permanent Mission in New York reported on the Secretary-General’s requests to Sweden, Yugoslavia, and Ireland. Yugoslavia and Sweden both agreed to provide aircraft, pilots and maintenance personnel. Ireland agreed to provide a battalion, in spite of the strain it placed on its defence forces: the 1,400 strong battalion represented 20 per cent of the regular Irish forces. Hammarskjöld asked

Haiti and Burma for smaller infantry contingents. Canadian diplomats recognised that, with the use of non-African forces, Hammarskjöld had launched the second phase of ONUC. They were aware that the Secretary-General had opted for an exclusively Swedish battalion, instead of a combined Scandinavian contingent that would have included combat forces from Denmark and Norway. This decision seemed to confirm Ritchie’s original view that NATO countries would not be asked to contribute combat forces. The Secretariat, nevertheless, remained anxious for a reply to their appeal for Canadian peacekeepers, particularly French speaking signals personnel.  

In Ottawa, DMO&P at DND studied the implications of a Canadian contribution of signals and logistics personnel. With few details available, their planning proceeded on the assumption that ONUC would likely consist of 6000 peacekeepers, organised into 8 major units or battalions. Provision of a Brigade Signal Squadron, capable of supplying radio, line and dispatch rider communications for the command and control of a force this size was estimated to involve 5 officers, 183 men, and $794,000 in equipment. If the UN expected Canada to provide internal communications within battalions, a further 8 officers, 416 men, and $728,000 worth of equipment would be required. A long range circuit from the Congo to the UN in New York would need 2 officers, 50 men, and $200,000 in equipment. Provision of logistics involved considerably fewer resources. A Supply Organisation and Ordnance Railhead could be staffed with 19 officers, 199 men, and $342,000 in equipment. Finally, a further 25 officers, 125 men, and $125,000 would be required to establish a Canadian Headquarters in the field.

The UN request was a difficult one. Canada was short on both signalers and equipment. In order to provide the long range communications necessary within the

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90 DHH, file 112.1.003 (D9), Memo from DGPO: UN Forces in the Congo, 18 July 1960.
Congo, mobile radio teletype stations (AN/GRC-26) could be used, but they were all committed to the National Survival plan. The provision of personnel could be met only through significant disruption of regiments in Canada and a reduced capability to fulfill the Army’s national survival role. DMO&P concluded, “RC Sigs is less able to provide personnel than any other corps of the Canadian Army with the possible exception of the RCAMC. Some other form of support of the United Nations Force by the Canadian Army would be preferable.”

In the end, the Chief of the General Staff was reluctant to allow any sizable withdrawal of signalers for Congo service because of the difficulty involved in separating personnel without causing widespread disruption to other defence responsibilities. The army was in the process of training additional signals personnel. “but the demands of the National Survival plan, NATO, UNEF, and other regular commitments were outstripping the production of trained signallers.” Defence officials believed that the withdrawal of any more than 150 signalers would disrupt their ongoing operations.

When Cabinet met on the 19th, it learned that the Secretary-General had inquired urgently the day before to see if a decision regarding his request would be forthcoming. While awaiting a Canadian decision, the Secretary-General asked the Tunisian government to temporarily provide a small signals detachment. The Department of External Affairs had already asked Hammarskjöld for a more detailed assessment of the UN’s needs, and the Secretariat had urgently forwarded this task to General von Horn once he arrived in Leopoldville. Until the Cabinet received a specific list of von Horn’s needs, the Minister of National Defence, George Pearkes, thought that there was

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91 DHH, file 112.1.003 (D9), Memo from DGPO: UN Forces in the Congo, 18 July 1960.
insufficient information upon which to base a decision.\textsuperscript{94} Pearkes advised Cabinet of the need to inoculate personnel against tropical diseases, a process that would take three weeks. Canadian peacekeepers in UNEF had already been inoculated for tropical service, and the Cabinet wondered if they might be used to first establish communications, even temporarily.\textsuperscript{95}

The Cabinet was asked to consider what help, if any, Canada could provide to assist the UN in its airlift of supplies for the Force and other UN agencies operating in the Congo. Supplies were accumulating in a staging area established at Pisa, Italy and needed to be transported to Leopoldville.\textsuperscript{96} Four Canadian aircraft that were used to transport the Canadian gift of foodstuffs were in the area, and the Minister of National Defence had determined that the cost would be $9,000 per day, per aircraft. The Cabinet once again deferred a decision until more complete information could be obtained from the UN.\textsuperscript{97}

Over the next two days, officials from External Affairs communicated with the Secretariat, through the Permanent Mission in New York. Further details regarding the Pisa-Leopoldville airlift were obtained. The UN envisioned an airlift shared equally between Italy and Canada. The arrangement was for 30 days, and the cost of the

\textsuperscript{94} Because of mechanical difficulties with a number of planes sent to transport von Horn, the Commander’s arrival was significantly delayed until 18 July. This helps to explain the ambiguity in the UN requests of Canada. Even after his arrival, von Horn had difficulty determining requirements because a lack of communications made it difficult to contact his contingents. Carl von Horn, \textit{Soldiering for Peace} (London: Cassell, 1966) 131-136; Lincoln Bloomfield, “Headquarters Field Relations: Some Notes on the beginning and End of ONUC,” \textit{International Organization} 17 (1963) 379; David Wainhouse, \textit{International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads}, 289.

\textsuperscript{95} NAC, RG2, vol. 2747, Cabinet Conclusions, 19 July 1960; RG2, vol. 5937, Cabinet Document 228/60.

\textsuperscript{96} Pisa was the location of a special office of the UN Field Service, the agency responsible for the central procurement of supplies for UN activities. This location was meant to reduce administrative difficulties that resulted from the distance between New York and UN operations in the field. Arne Holm-Johansen and Odd Oeyen, “Experiences Related to Logistics in Gaza and the Congo,” in \textit{Peace-Keeping: Experience and Evaluation (The Oslo Papers)}, Ed. Per Frydenberg (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1964) 164.

\textsuperscript{97} NAC, RG2, vol. 2747, Cabinet Conclusions, 19 July 1960; NAC, RG2, vol. 5937, Cabinet Document 228/60.
operation was to be reimbursed by the UN. It was made clear that this airlift was to provide logistic support for ONUC, and was not at all related to the transport of gifts of supplies and foodstuffs. The Assistant Trade Commissioner in Leopoldville wired Ottawa requesting that the government consider authorising the aircraft to land at points within the Congo, in addition to Leopoldville.\textsuperscript{98}

The UN request for signals and logistics personnel was further clarified. External Affairs learned from the Permanent Mission in New York that the Secretariat were thinking of a Signals Squadron similar in size to that used in UNEF. The government’s concerns over committing signalers without a clear picture of the numbers required were allayed by UN assurances that,

\begin{quote}
the Canadian reply to the Secretary-General’s enquiry need not be regarded in any sense as a blank cheque since the Secretariat had throughout contemplated that the Canadian authorities would be the ones to provide specific figures for the size of any contribution made. It would be quite acceptable to the Secretariat, for example, to reply that the Government was prepared to provide a signals personnel with appropriate equipment up to a ceiling of say 150 all ranks, or less if this should be the wish of the Government.\textsuperscript{99}
\end{quote}

The UN was advised that it might take three weeks for Canadian soldiers to be immunised for service in the Congo and that this was true for both signals and logistics personnel. The idea of using an advance party of Canadian signalers from UNEF was raised with the UN, and the Secretariat indicated that it intended to consult with the UNEF commander to see if this was possible. The UN intimated that they required signals more than logistics personnel and so it was best to concentrate efforts there.

\textsuperscript{98} NAC, RG2, vol. 5937, Cabinet Documents 236/60, 238/60
At a special meeting of the Heads of Branches of the Armed Forces, it became clear that planning should proceed on the basis of a much smaller signals contribution than was initially proposed. Plans now envisioned a brigade signals squadron without an accompanying regimental signals organisation. 2 Brigade Signals Squadron was designated to provide a nucleus of personnel and the immunization of the first battalion of the Royal 22e Regiment (the Van Doos) was stepped up. Consideration was given to how the time required for immunisation might be shortened, particularly if the situation in the Congo became critical. It was noted, however, “any decision to dispatch personnel to the Congo without fulfillment of the orthodox medical requirements would, of course, be up to the Government.”¹⁰⁰ Plans to send a liaison officer to New York were cancelled when it was learned that General Alexander, of the Ghanaian Army who had been acting as interim commander of ONUC, was on his way to the UN. Instead, the Director-General of Plans and Operations, Brigadier R.M. Bishop, and the Director of Signals, Colonel J.B. Clement, were dispatched to meet with Alexander, “the only person who could give precision to and elaborate on the U.N. Forces’ signals needs.”¹⁰¹ Significantly, at this stage, the Army thought it “unlikely” that forces other than Signals would be required but still had not ruled out the possibility of providing “infantry and service elements.”¹⁰²

Bishop and Clement met with Alexander and Henry Labouisse, Under-Secretary to the Secretary General, on the evening of 20 July. They learned that ONUC Force and Divisional Headquarters would likely be located in Leopoldville. In addition, four

¹⁰² DHH, file 112.1.003 (D9), Memo: Possible Canadian Contribution to UN Forces in Congo Republic, Synopsis No. 3 Events up to 0900 Hrs 21 Jul 60, 21 July 1960. [italics my emphasis]
Brigade Headquarters were envisioned for Leopoldville, Luluabourg, Bukavu, and Stanleyville. The Canadians were needed to provide signals for the Divisional Headquarters (switchboard, signal office, wireless teleprinter network with cipher from Divisional HQ to each of the Brigade HQ), and for wireless/teleprinter links and ground/air links at each of the Brigade HQs. Communications within Brigades and the rear communication link to the UN were to be provided by other sources. Clement estimated that 8 officers and 100 other ranks would be needed, though the distances between headquarters required equipment larger than the AN/GRC 26, the sets DND initially expected would suffice. Clement’s request to consult with the US on the availability of equipment was turned down, however. The Chief of the General Staff noted, “I would not want this. It would look as if we wanted to take it on.”

In addition to the Signals contingent, the UN remained hopeful that Canada might still provide logistics support to organize and supervise supply depots at each of the Brigade HQs. The bilingual capability of Canadians forces was a key factor in the UN request. UN officials stressed, “Canada had been selected despite being a NATO power,” because of this. The UN did not expect an entire contingent of French-speaking peacekeepers but hoped as many as possible would be bilingual.

At the 21 July meeting of Cabinet, Howard Green recommended that Cabinet assign four North Star aircraft and their crews to the Pisa-Leopoldville airlift, to transport

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103 DHH, file 112.1.003 (D9), Memo: Telephone Conversation – CGS/DGPO/D Sigs 0900 Hrs 21 Jul 60, 21 July 1960.

ONUC supplies and equipment to and within the Congo. He further recommended that the Cabinet approve the provision of signals personnel and equipment once immunisation had been completed. George Pearkes reported that a liaison officer was present in New York to discuss the UN's needs with the Secretariat. He anticipated that equipment for ONUC would cost $1 million and was anxious to replace the equipment in Canada immediately. He believed that as many as 500 men would be needed to establish effective supply depots and communications. The Cabinet approved the proposed use of Canadian North Stars in the Pisa-Leopoldville airlift, and the immunisation of the necessary signal, logistic, and administrative personnel of the Canadian Army. Approval for actual participation in ONUC was withheld, but the Cabinet wanted Armed Forces personnel to be prepared in the event that it was subsequently granted.\textsuperscript{105}

Throughout the next week, consultations between External Affairs, DND, and the UN continued. Lt. Gen. Clark, Chief of the General Staff (CGS), asked the DGPO to work with External Affairs to prepare a joint submission to Cabinet. Anticipating that Cabinet would, in the end, decide to send signalers, Clark was anxious to have the authority to concentrate troops and equipment, and to send a reconnaissance team to the Congo.\textsuperscript{106} Von Horn, after finally arriving in Leopoldville, refined the UN request for assistance. A separate Divisional Headquarters seemed unlikely; instead, the Force Headquarters was expected to work directly with the brigades. The Force Commander hoped to use Canadians at the Force Headquarters to provide communications, including ground to air. Because von Horn had not received a firm commitment for signals from Canada, he had proceeded with the deployment of forces throughout the Congo, relying

\textsuperscript{105} NAC, RG2, vol. 2747, Cabinet Conclusions, 21 July 1960.
\textsuperscript{106} DHH, file 112.1.003 (D9), Memo DGPO: Joint Study – Army/External Affairs, 25 July 1960.
on civilian resources to provide the rear-link from brigade to division. Nonetheless, the UN still needed Canadians at Brigade Headquarters to provide ground to air communications and signals to the battalions. Von Horn thought an "independent signals company," similar to that deployed in UNEF, was an appropriate model. Signals became the clear priority over logistics. The Permanent Mission suggested, "we can stand down on logistic depots for now."\(^\text{108}\)

As the Army proceeded with its consultations, the North Stars assigned to UN duty became embroiled in controversy. The Cabinet understood that the planes were to be used exclusively to ferry supplies and equipment both to and within the Belgian Congo. Then the Secretary-General approached the Canadian Permanent Mission in New York to request that the North Stars be used for transporting Belgian troops from Leopoldville to Katanga, as part of the troop movements agreed to by Brussels and New York in preparation for the withdrawal of Belgian armed forces. Canada did not want to be seen as acting in concert with its NATO ally in the Congo, and therefore it did not want to be associated with the movement of Belgian forces anywhere in the Congo, especially near the secessionist province of Katanga.

Diefenbaker decided on 22 July that the planes could not be used for this purpose and notified Howard Green of his decision. Charles Ritchie was told to make this policy clear to the Secretariat. The dilemma was compounded by the discovery that the planes had been used to transport UN forces to numerous locations within the Congo, so that Belgian paratroopers could be withdrawn. Evidently, the Senior RCAF officer in the

\(^{107}\) Bloomfield describes the challenges faced by von Horn in the absence of trained signalers and equipment. The Commander had to rely upon amateur radio 'hams,' plantation nets, and Air Congo teletype circuits, and used native languages in place of encrypted text. Linco/n P. Bloomfield, "Headquarters-Field Relations: Some Notes on the Beginning and End of ONUC," 384.

Congo contacted Air Transport Command Headquarters in Trenton, at the suggestion of Ralph Bunche, and somehow obtained permission to use the RCAF aircraft for deploying Moroccan and Tunisian troops. Ritchie spoke to the Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General, Andrew Cordier, who assured the Canadian Representative that the whole incident had been a ‘crash operation’. Nevertheless, Ritchie emphasised that the planes could not be used for purposes other than those identified by the Canadian government and insisted that all future requests of a political nature be forwarded through the Permanent Mission.

Government officials could not have been comforted by consultations in New York between Air Commodore Carpenter of the RCAF and Maj. Gen. Alexander. Alexander believed the need for internal, as opposed to external, airlift would only increase in the weeks ahead, particularly with respect to the transport of troops throughout the Congo, including Katanga. Although concerned that Alexander’s views would influence UN officials, Norman Robertson advised Green, “It would seem doubtful that the placing of the four North Stars ‘at the disposal of the United Nations’ could be interpreted to include the significant change of role implied by General Alexander’s remarks.”

The Canadian position was made crystal clear following consultations between Green and Pearkes. Officials in External Affairs and DND were instructed as follows:

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109 Fred Gaffen suggests that Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. Berthiaume “managed with the connivance of some members of the RCAF to circumvent this restriction and airlift the Tunisian contingent to Kasai province and its capital Luluabourg.” Fred Gaffen, In the Eye of the Storm: a History of Canadian Peacekeeping (Toronto: Deneau and Wayne, 1987) 233-234.


From now on use of the R.C.A.F. North Stars is to be restricted to the transport of supplies and equipment for the UN force from Pisa to Leopoldville by shuttle service for a period of 30 days from July 21. The use of these aircraft for the transportation of troops is not authorized by Cabinet and is to cease forthwith.\textsuperscript{112}

Pearkes understood this policy to prohibit the transport of any passengers (aside from Canadian military personnel), the transport of supplies or equipment originating outside Pisa, carrying anything back to Pisa from Leopoldville, and the delivery of anything to any point inside or outside of the Congo aside from Leopoldville.\textsuperscript{113} Concerned this would seem unduly restrictive to the UN, especially given that it fully expected to reimburse Canada for the cost of the airlift, External Affairs subsequently lobbied to ease these conditions, once other nations came forward to provide internal airlift.\textsuperscript{114} The government was clearly determined to participate in ONUC only in a non-combat capacity; any use of the North Stars that compromised this principle was quickly curtailed.

In New York, the Security Council resumed consideration of the Congo situation from 20-22 July. Thomas Kanza, the newly appointed Congolese Minister at the UN, addressed the Council and downplayed the earlier Kasavubu-Lumumba ultimatum to turn to the Soviets for assistance. He called on the Council to end the Belgian aggression, evacuate Belgian forces, refuse recognition of an independent Katanga and facilitate the

\textsuperscript{112} NAC, RG25, vol. 5219, file 6386-C-40 part 1, Memo SSEA to USSEA: Congo – modification of the Use of the RCAF North Stars, 23 July 1960.
\textsuperscript{113} NAC, RG25, vol. 5219, file 6386-C-40 part 1, Letter Pearkes to Green, 25 July 1960; Wainhouse suggests that the US also limited, as much as possible, its ‘intra-Congo’ airlift. Wainhouse, \textit{International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads}, 291-292.
return of technicians to the Congo. The Belgian representative, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Pierre Wigny, argued that Belgium had only intervened for humanitarian reasons and recognised Congolese independence as an accomplished fact. A second resolution was passed, calling upon the Belgian government to “speedily” withdraw its forces, as it was already required to do by the first resolution.

During these meetings, Hammarskjöld raised two issues that would subsequently prove to be significant. In reference to the first Security Council resolution, he argued that it applied to the entire Congo as it existed when it was recommended for admission to the Organization on 7 July. This meant ONUC was entitled to freedom of movement throughout the country, including Katanga; but, it could not be party to any internal conflicts. No one on the Council questioned this interpretation. Resolution 145(1960) was, in many ways, a vote of confidence in Hammarskjöld’s handling of the crisis.

The debate preceding the adoption of the resolution foreshadowed the Cold War tensions soon to erupt. The Soviet and American Representatives exchanged barbs, Kuznetsov warning, “If the United States representative thinks that by speaking in this way he can influence the Soviet Union’s attitude, or possibly intimidate the Soviet Union, he is very gravely mistaken.” The Soviets again raised the issue of ONUC’s composition, protesting the use of American forces, if only in a logistics or transport role. The US had in fact played a key role in airlifting ONUC personnel and equipment to the Congo. By comparison, the Soviets did not object to Sweden’s role in the peace force but

116 Security Council resolution 145(1960) is reproduced in appendix 2.
did reiterate their view that ONUC should be comprised principally of Afro-Asian independent states.\(^{119}\)

In Canada, the military continued to plan for further Canadian participation in ONUC. The codeword ‘Mallard’ was assigned to cover “all phases of preparation and, if approved, subsequent dispatch of a Canadian Army force in support of the UN in the Congo Republic.”\(^{120}\) By 26 July, the government had permitted nine officers (five from UNTSO and four from UNEF) to be transferred to service in ONUC. In accordance with the Cabinet’s earlier decision, the Army began to select and immunise personnel, in advance of an actual decision to send peacekeepers. Headquarters, signals, and logistics establishments were expected to require 53 officers and 434 other ranks, drawn from various locations across the country.\(^{121}\) The CGS was anxious to concentrate personnel and equipment in Barriefield, Ontario (Royal Canadian School of Signals and RCEME School) as soon as possible. He warned the Minister of National Defence,

If we do not concentrate, the officers who would command detachments would not get to know their men and mould them into teams and our movement problem would be complicated by the fact that we would have to move personnel and equipment from widely dispersed parts of Canada, perhaps at the last moment.\(^{122}\)

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\(^{120}\) DHH, file 112.1.003 (D9), Memo: Possible Canadian Contribution to UN Forces in Congo Republic, Synopsis No. 7 Events up to 1400 Hrs, 26 July 1960; for original (more limited) definition of ‘Mallard’ also see: DHH, file 112.1.003 (D9), Memo: Possible Canadian Contribution to UN Forces in Congo Republic, Synopsis No. 5 Events up to 1400 Hrs, 22 July 1960.

\(^{121}\) DHH, file 112.1.003 (D9), Memo: Possible Canadian Contribution to UN Forces in Congo Republic, Synopsis No. 6 Events up to 1400 Hrs, 25 July 1960; DHH, file 112.1.003 (D9), Memo: Possible Canadian Contribution to UN Forces in Congo Republic, Synopsis No. 7 Events up to 1400 Hrs, 26 July 1960.

The Minister remained cautious and refused permission to concentrate the force until the government had given its approval. Plans to transport certain equipment to the Congo also proved troublesome because it was too heavy to be airlifted by the RCAF. The Chief of the Naval Staff, H. G. DeWolf, explored the possibility of using the aircraft carrier HMCS Bonaventure to transport 494 personnel and 199 vehicles but concluded it would not be feasible to disembark vehicles or troops in the Congo River or estuary. This particular difficulty would eventually be resolved with the assistance of the United States Air Force.

As the end of July approached, Prime Minister Lumumba visited the United States. The Americans gave Lumumba and his party a fine reception, although they did not agree to a program of bilateral assistance, the principal goal of the Congolese mission to North America. Instead, the US insisted the Congo receive American aid through the United Nations. Although this was not at all what Lumumba wanted, Canadian officials initially believed the Congolese "cheerfully accepted" this condition. While in Washington, Lumumba met with Canadian diplomats to make plans for a visit to Ottawa. The events of his official visit to Canada proved very frustrating for Canadian officials.

The saga began even before Lumumba's arrival, when Mr. Uyttenhove, the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires in Ottawa, visited Howard Green to express concerns about Lumumba and the impending visit. He emphatically labeled Lumumba a Communist,

123 Granatstein rightly identifies the dilemma that faced the government: "There was no single signals unit that could be sent in toto to ONUC service, but there seemed to be no effort underway to concentrate the troops selected for Congo duty in any one place." Granatstein, "Canada: Peacekeeper," 156.
125 Sohn suggests that the U.S. decision to provide aid only through the United Nations was contrary to prior decisions on aid and, thus, precedent setting. Louis B. Sohn, "The Role of the U.N. in Civil Wars," Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (1963) 584.
who had studied in both Prague and Moscow and was elected to office using money provided by the Eastern Bloc. The Secretary of State for External Affairs said there was little he could do about the visit, as it had already been announced in the press. Uyttenhove tried to rally support for Belgium's efforts to retain its military bases in the Congo and hoped the Canadian government would take a sympathetic view towards the Belgian position in the UN. For his part, Green avoided any commitment, and his comments reflected the government's attempt to remain friendly with both Belgium and the Congo. He concluded by saying that the Canadian Government "would do all they could to avoid making the situation more difficult for the Belgian Government." Out of respect for Belgium, Canadian officials did try to limit the fanfare associated with Lumumba's visit. Belgian authorities were incensed by the reception accorded the Congolese Prime Minister by the Americans. In addition, Lumumba had used the stage afforded by press conferences in the US to 'Belgium bash' — much to the chagrin of career diplomats that looked upon the Prime Minister with scorn for not observing diplomatic niceties.

Canadian officials were not convinced that Lumumba was the avowed Communist Uyttenhove suggested. Rather, he was seen as an inexperienced and untrained leader, eager to grasp at anything that might consolidate his political position. In Leopoldville, he had demonstrated a willingness to accept advice from every political vantage. They believed he played East and West against each other, politically and economically, and seemed to concur in Hammarskjöld's view that he was "very

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128 Kaplan suggests the Belgians believed Lumumba had been received in the U.S., "as if he had been the King of the Belgians himself," and that this considerably coloured Belgian views of US policy. Lawrence Kaplan, "The United States, Belgium, and the Congo Crisis of 1960," Review of Politics 29.2 (1967) 246.
responsive to friendship and to frankness, impressionable but apt to be swayed by changing influences ... ignorant, very suspicious, shrewd but immature in his ideas -- the smallest in scope of any of the African leaders.\textsuperscript{129}

Lumumba arrived in Ottawa on 29 July. The visit proved disappointing. In preliminary conversations, and in his meeting with Diefenbaker, Lumumba was somewhat curt in his replies to questions. Diefenbaker, in an attempt to understand the requirements of a newly independent African nation, asked his counterpart a series of questions designed to discover the specific needs of the Congolese, in spite of an earlier warning from the Washington embassy that discussions with the Congolese would likely be "rather general and not backed up with very much technical detail."\textsuperscript{130} Lumumba was either unable or refused to answer. The temperature began to rise, until Diefenbaker frankly asked Lumumba whether or not he expected Canada to pay for French-speaking technical experts the Congolese delegation hoped to recruit in Canada. By the time Lumumba met with the Prime Minister, he had already learned that Canada was not willing to provide bilateral assistance. He swiftly answered that he "did not expect another Government to pay for the services of Congolese civil servants." This seemed to mark a turning point in his meeting with Diefenbaker, because from then on the conversation became "cordial." Diefenbaker did offer administrative assistance to the Congolese, to facilitate recruitment of bilingual experts in various fields.\textsuperscript{131}


\textsuperscript{130} NAC, RG25, vol. 5225, file 6386-D-40 part 1, Telegram WASHDC to External: Visit of Congolese Prime Minister, 28 July 1960.

\textsuperscript{131} NAC, RG25, vol. 5225, file 6386-D-40 part 1, Memo for Minister: Conversations with Mr. Lumumba, 1 August 1960.
Officials at External were vexed by Lumumba’s approach. In his earlier discussions with them, he had expressed the hope that Canada would provide financial assistance and had became somewhat annoyed when he discovered that Canada was unable to give such assistance, except through already established UN channels. He changed his story for the afternoon meeting with Diefenbaker and blamed Canadian officials for any misunderstanding that may have led to the perception that he was hoping to have Canada pay a share of the planned technical assistance program. This left a very bad taste in the mouths of Ottawa diplomats. Following his departure, Robertson summed him up as “vain, petty, boorish, suspicious and perhaps unscrupulous.”

There was also the curious matter of a “secret” visit he had with the Soviet Ambassador to Canada, Aroutunian. Robertson later wrote that Lumumba greeted Aroutunian in a “very friendly and warm fashion” when he first arrived at the Ottawa airport. There was also at least one man from the Soviet Embassy “constantly on duty” at the Chateau Laurier, where the Congolese party was staying. While speaking with Bernard Salumu, Lumumba’s Private Secretary, one Canadian official was interrupted by someone from the Soviet Embassy who only reluctantly revealed his identity after asking for Salumu’s room number in French, with a Slavic accent. At the time, few details were known about the meeting between Aroutunian and Lumumba. An RCMP guard reported seeing the Soviet Ambassador with the Congolese Prime Minister on Saturday morning and that during the visit a phone call had been placed to Washington. Later, it was discovered that Aroutunian promised Lumumba a gift of transport vehicles.

132 NAC, RG25, vol. 5225, file 6386-D-40 part 1, Robertson to Green, 1 August 1960.
The cloak and dagger activities in the lobby of the Chateau Laurier and the rather blunt Canadian assessments of Lumumba and his entourage make for interesting reading.\(^{134}\) The visit was a significant event for Lumumba because his experiences in North America coloured his later actions and decisions. Diefenbaker said that Lumumba’s call on Ottawa did little to help his understanding of the Congo situation.\(^{135}\) By contrast, it was a formative experience for the Congolese leader. His mood changed during the visit, and his opinion of the UN was diminished. Both American and Canadian officials had couched their decisions not to give any bilateral assistance by reiterating commitments to provide aid through the UN. Lumumba came to perceive the UN as an “obstacle to quick action and to the kinds of aid he sought.”\(^{136}\) He realised that he was not going to get the help he desired from either the US or Canada and so turned to the Soviets, even before he had left Ottawa. In subsequent months, reports of Lumumba’s view of Canada filtered in to External. He thought he had been rebuffed by Ottawa. In October, at a dinner to celebrate the 2nd anniversary of Guinea’s independence, Lumumba delivered a speech in which he said that he had gone to Canada “to seek bilateral aid in belief that it was a truly democratic land but had been disappointed to find that although honest Canada was just another imperialist country.”\(^{137}\) Diefenbaker later added another reason for Lumumba’s poor opinion of Canada: “the failure of Howard

\(^{134}\) These blunt assessments were not reserved for Lumumba alone. A Congolese Ordnance Officer by the name of Captain Mawoso accompanied Lumumba on his visit to Ottawa. Cadieux described him as “a sincere, but somewhat inarticulate and limited individual. He spoke without resentment, but I have the impression that he would describe in the same smiling fashion a fire that destroyed his house or a flood that had eliminated a number of villages.” NAC, RG25, vol. 5225, file 6386-D-40 part 1: Memo for the USSEA, 30 July 1960.

\(^{135}\) John G. Diefenbaker, One Canada, 2:128.


Green and the officials at the Department of External Affairs to provide him with female companions during his visit.\footnote{138}

The day before Lumumba arrived in Ottawa, the Canadian Cabinet decided to provide the logistics and signals personnel the UN had requested. From discussions with the Secretariat, the precise needs of ONUC finally emerged. The Minister of Defence noted the crisis was moving swiftly and changing constantly; this had made it difficult to determine ONUC requirements. He recommended that Canada provide a signals detachment for ONUC headquarters, including signal office, message centre, a 100-line switch-board, linemen and dispatch riders; five ground to air communication links, and possibly two more at a later date; twelve mobile wireless detachments; eight cypher detachments; and four composite logistic depots. To meet these needs, Cabinet agreed to the dispatch and maintenance of up to 500 officers and men, 200 of which were to be provided as soon as possible for signals and communications. None of the Canadian peacekeepers were to be attached to units below Brigade Headquarters level.\footnote{139} That same day, External Affairs contacted the Permanent Mission in New York to request that they inform the Secretariat of Canada’s willingness to provide signalers and a small Canadian

\footnote{138} Diefenbaker, One Canada, 2:128. Charles Lynch spins a rather apocryphal tale of Green’s reaction to the Congolese request for women. Lynch suggests, “Green, a prim and proper man with a minimal knowledge of the world outside Canada and no knowledge at all of Africa, sent back word that the Canadian government did not deal in such matters. One of Green’s aides, in delivering the reply, let slip on the sly that maybe the distinguished guests could try the By Ward Market, the hangout for hookers, just two blocks down the street.” The veracity of this particular account is questionable given Lynch’s patently false report of Lumumba’s later death, which he suggests happened at the hands of an angry Leopoldville mob that tore him limb from limb. A more reliable source, diplomat George Ignatieff, suggests that Green misunderstood Lumumba’s request for ‘girls’ and sent stenographers; when it became clear that Lumumba actually wanted prostitutes, “arrangements were made to meet the wishes of the Congolese prime minister the following night.” Accountants at External Affairs reportedly charged the expense as “flowers”. Charles Lynch, You Can’t Print THAT! (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers Ltd., 1983) 188-90; George Ignatieff, The Making of a Peacemaker (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1985) 191.

\footnote{139} NAC, RG2, vol. 2747, Cabinet Conclusions, 28 July 1960.
headquarters detachment. This was to be kept in confidence until after Parliament was notified. The UN gratefully welcomed the news.\textsuperscript{140}

In support of Canadian participation, Howard Green argued, "Much had been made of Canada's support of the United Nations. Not to do what the Minister of National Defence had suggested would be a mistake."\textsuperscript{141} The importance of public opinion and Canada's self-image did enter into the decision, but other considerations were also taken into account. At the time when the government made its decision, the situation in the Congo had improved somewhat. General Alexander, the British Commander of the Ghanian forces in the Congo, "foresaw no danger to white personnel serving the United Nations, so that non-combatant Canadian support troops need to be supplied with personal weapons only."\textsuperscript{142} In a memorandum to Cabinet, Peake and Green further argued that initial political objections to the addition of white personnel to the Force, even if these forces were drawn from NATO countries, were no longer valid because ONUC contained both African and non-African combat contingents. The fact that Canadian peacekeepers would provide technical support and avoid a combat role, unlike some of their non-African and most of their African counterparts, certainly made the proposition more palatable. The government was consistently concerned to limit the risk to Canadian lives. Because some peacekeepers were bilingual, the Cabinet also recognised that they were uniquely suited to UN service in the Congo.

An overriding concern for the success of ONUC, and indeed the United Nations itself, was expressed by Norman Robertson:

\textsuperscript{140} DHH, file 112.1.003 (D9), Telegram PERMISNY to External: Congo: UN Force, 28 July 1960.

\textsuperscript{141} NAC, RG2, vol. 2747, Cabinet Conclusions, 28 July 1960.

\textsuperscript{142} NAC, RG2, vol. 5937, Cabinet Document 243/60.
The significance of the United Nations role in the Congo cannot be fully measured at this time but there is no doubt that it has far-reaching implications for the Congo, for Africa and for the United Nations itself. Success in the Congo may lay the groundwork for many other operations of the United Nations in Africa, especially as regards the peaceful parts of the programme. Success for the United Nations in the Congo and in Africa might establish the Organization firmly as the strongest influence for peace in the world. Undoubtedly, success in the Congo will rally public support but with that public support must come the material support, as distinct from lip service from member states. Failure, on the other hand, in the Congo might mean the final failure of the United Nations.\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5209, file 6386-40 part 8, Robertson to Green, 27 July 1960.}

The success of the United Nations in Africa meant the failure of communist penetration. The Cold War implications of the crisis were taken into consideration. Clearly, the government supported ONUC, not simply from a single-minded fear of public reaction to a limited Canadian response, but for a number of reasons.

There remained the question of how best to involve Parliament in the decision to send peacekeepers. Following a review of precedents set in the dispatch of Canadian forces to Korea, in the service of NATO and UNEF, the Judge Advocate General suggested an order in council should be passed, then tabled in the House of Commons. The Prime Minister or Minister of National Defence could then table a motion asking the House to approve the action taken by the government.\footnote{DCC, file MG1/XII/C/114, Memo from Office of the Judge Advocate General: Dispatch of Canadian Forces to Congo, 25 July 1960.} On 28 July, Cabinet seems to have rejected this approach in favour of placing a $1 supplementary estimate before Parliament for its approval. Two days later, they reconsidered and decided to introduce a resolution in the House of Commons to permit all parties to indicate a stand by means of a vote. Only after a resolution had been passed would the Cabinet issue the appropriate
order in council. The Diefenbaker government was keen to have the positions of all parties on the record before it took the final step of issuing an order in council.

The decision to provide personnel and equipment was announced in the House of Commons on 30 July. The resolution in support of participation in ONUC was debated on August 1st. In his address to the House, Diefenbaker recalled the history of Canadian participation and support of United Nations forces. He paid particular tribute to the Canadian officers currently serving in the Congo, organising the air lift, and serving at Force Headquarters. He noted that a meeting with Canadian missionaries recently returned from the Congo had confirmed for him “that wherever there is anarchy, chaos or economic dislocation there is a field for communist operations.” The actions of the Soviet Union during the crisis were seen to be “a continuance of the belligerent and even blatant attitude now being taken in many parts of the world by that country.” The Prime Minister even drew attention to the Soviet Ambassador’s recent meeting with Lumumba in Ottawa. He concluded,

I trust that the house will give unanimous acceptance to the course we have followed, for it represents a major step forward to that day when, wherever difficulties may arise anywhere in the world, as I stated in March, 1945, the nations comprising the United Nations will all make available to an international force whatever is requisite to assure peace.

Both opposition parties supported the resolution. Perhaps fearing the Canadian public might not share their enthusiasm, CCF M.P. H. W. Herridge went so far as to suggest parliament, “arouse public interest and pride in our participation in this very important work which I am quite sure many people do not fully appreciate at the present time.” The

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resolution was approved unanimously, and an order-in-council was subsequently approved by the Cabinet on 5 August, giving “authority for the maintenance on active service of up to 500 officers and men of the Canadian Armed Forces as part of or in support of the United Nations operations in the Congo.”

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3
Deployment

Within hours of the Security Council’s decision to create ONUC, the first international contingents arrived in the Congo. The acting Canadian Trade Commissioner, Roger Bull, was disappointed in the United Nations’ initial response to the crisis. He found Ralph Bunche, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, to be a “quiet self-effacing man” who did not want to “expose himself to criticism” by doing too much before it was clear that the UN was willing to assume a role in resolving the crisis. Then, on 14 July, Major-General Alexander arrived with the Ghanaian contingent. Bull suggested this “immediately stiffened the U.N.’s backbone.”1 Because von Horn was unable to get to the Congo until 18 July, Alexander assumed a prominent role in directing the early activities of UN peacekeepers. During this initial period of deployment, Alexander ordered peacekeepers to disarm the Force Publique. This may have seemed a reasonable course of action to him at the time, but it was clearly outside of ONUC’s mandate and so Bunche disagreed with his decision. Much to Lumumba’s dismay, the Ghanaian troops did start to disarm the Force. While these attempts met with initial success, disarmed Congolese troops took up arms once again by 23 July. The whole affair did much to colour Lumumba’s early perceptions of ONUC.2

The arrival of von Horn and his “triumvirate of Canadian staff officers” infused the mission with an “an air of decision and activity.”3 The sheer size of the Congo operation meant that the initial chaos and confusion inherent in any multinational military

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operation was multiplied. Within days, five to six thousand peacekeepers were deployed over a vast area, without adequate transportation. Some had only four days of hard rations.\(^5\) In addition, von Horn had insufficient notice of when reinforcements were expected to arrive. He knew little about the equipment they intended to bring or how their units were organized. The Irish, for example, arrived in winter uniforms.\(^6\)

The European exodus continued, but by 18 July Roger Bull believed conditions were sufficiently safe to recall the families and office staff evacuated to Brazzaville in the early days of the crisis. The appearance of UN peacekeepers in Leopoldville provided an initial sense of safety and comfort. Bull wrote,

> We have Swedes practically next door to us in the office building, Ghanaians across the street from the Residence and blue armbands lurking behind every bush to protect us. Miss Morel, in fact, has found the excitement so invigorating that her health is almost restored to normal.\(^7\)

Regular office work, much like the rest of Leopoldville, came to a standstill. The staff was, nonetheless, kept busy. The first of the Canadian North Stars arrived in Leopoldville with their cargo of food aid on 21 July. The Trade Commission staff fed and housed the twenty-four crew members and subsequently arranged for them to stay in the guest house of a local company. By 24 July, another thirty-nine RCAF personnel had arrived and the seven available beds in the official residence, as well as the entire guest house, were filled.

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\(^5\) Bowman and Fanning observe that contingents had to bring sufficient equipment and supplies for their first few days in the Congo, as they were expected to “operate autonomously for a short time.” Edward H. Bowman and James E Fanning, “The Logistics of a UN Military Force,” *International Organization* 17 (1963) 357.


\(^7\) NAC, RG25, vol. 5209, file 6386-40 part 9, Bull to Hughes, 1 August 1960.
In addition to food aid, Canada provided medical assistance through the Red Cross. Dr. Phil Edwards, a black Canadian doctor serving with one of two Canadian Red Cross medical teams, was received very well by the Congolese. Roger Bull reported that Edwards made "a most favourable impression here." These two teams stayed temporarily with Bull until they flew on to Coquilhatville to reopen the hospital and Institute of Tropical Medicine. After the majority of Europeans fled the Congo, medical personnel were in short supply. This is one example of how Canada contributed to UN sponsored or initiated technical assistance programs, in addition to the provision of peacekeepers for ONUC. The Canadian Red Cross recruited the personnel for these medical teams, and the Cabinet agreed to fund the mission with $44,000 from the International Relief Fund.9

Once Cabinet decided to send signalers, the Army moved quickly to complete the necessary arrangements for their departure. Two units were formed: Canadian Headquarters, United Nations Force in the Congo (CDN HQ UNFC) and No 57 Canadian Signal Squadron (57 CDN Sig Sqn).10 The UN withdrew its request for logistics assistance, "presumably because it could not wait the time necessary to immunize, equip and despatch these forces." Sudan and the United Arab Republic agreed to provide logistics, but the Army continued to immunize those earmarked for service in case staff from either country were unable to carry out these duties.11 As equipment and personnel arrived in Barriefield, pressure mounted in New York; the Canadian liaison officer, Lt-

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9 NAC, RG2, vol. 2747, Cabinet Conclusions, 4-5 August 1960.
11 DHH, file 112.1.003 (D9) vol. 2, Telegram CANARMY to CENCOM: Canadian Soldiers Congo, 4 August 1960.
Col Johnson, reported that the UN was “extremely anxious to know when the first load of operating personnel will leave Canada. The urgency of getting ‘working personnel’ on the ground as soon as possible cannot be over-emphasized.” Full immunization and the acquisition of the necessary equipment were taking time. Treasury Board approved the purchase of 13 tropicalised AN/GRC 26D heavy wireless sets from the United States, on the understanding that the UN would eventually reimburse this cost. Johnson noted the UN was eager to have the personnel, with or without their equipment, and believed “it was going to be extremely difficult to explain our delays in terms of the need to immunize personnel when so many other nations had ‘taken a chance’ on this.”

Colonel Albert Mendelsohn, an officer with a military engineering background and experience in the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), led a reconnaissance party of six officers to the Congo on 30 July. He was instructed to determine personnel and equipment requirements, assess organisational requirements of the Canadian Headquarters unit and justify its necessity, and resolve the conflict between the UN’s request to deploy Canadians below brigade headquarters and the Minister of National Defence’s directive against this. His initial reports were generally favourable. He found that Leopoldville was gradually returning to normal. Some of the basic utilities were restored and the “white area” of the city appeared to be quite modern, with buildings “equal to the best in Ottawa.” He noted that ONUC

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12 This was a newer version of the AN/GRC 26 sets used and available in Canada. See John S. Moir, Ed. History of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, 1903-1961 (Ottawa: Corps Committee, Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, 1962) 315; DHH, file 112.1.003 (D9) vol. 2, Telegram CANARMY to CENCOM: Canadian Soldiers Congo, 4 August 1960; NAC, RG58, vol. 278, file 1750-64-6, “Extract from the minutes of a meeting of the Treasury Board [T.B. 568585], 5 August 1960.

13 DHH, file 112.1.003 (D9), Transcript of Telephone Conversation, 29 July 1960.

14 DHH, file 112.1.003 (D9), Memo to Col. A. Mendelsohn, 29 July 1960; DHH, file 112.1.003 (D9), Memo: Possible Canadian Contribution to UN Forces in Congo Republic Synopsis No. 9 Events up to 1400 hrs, 29 July 1960.
headquarters personnel did not carry personal weapons and were able to move about freely without any trouble. The local Congolese seemed “quite unconcerned and happy.” He acknowledged that his observations were based principally upon Leopoldville but expected other major cities, where Canadian personnel might be deployed, to be comparable with respect to accommodation and utilities.¹⁵

The presence of the reconnaissance party in the Congo permitted further clarification of UN requirements. Consultations with von Horn revealed ONUC required the Signals Squadron to provide communications between ten, mostly stationary positions throughout the Congo, instead of the eight cypher detachments and twelve mobile wireless detachments initially approved by Cabinet.¹⁶ It appeared that ground to air communication links were also no longer required, as the Canadians could not discover who had made the initial request; those concerned disclaimed any knowledge of it. This pointed to the level of disorganisation at ONUC headquarters. The Canadians reported, “we are working in a vacuum here. Info very difficult to obtain and when obtained is almost invariably conflicting. No coordination anywhere. In summary can only say that pers should be sent over ASP as they can certainly be used in many capacities.”¹⁷

During the first two weeks in August, the concentration and preparation of personnel and equipment continued apace in Barriefield. Lt Col B. J. Guimond was

¹⁶ The proposed communications net covered: Leopoldville (HQ ONUC), Libenge (HQ Liberian Task Force), Goma (HQ Irish Sector), Stanleyville (HQ Ethiopian Brigade), Luluabourg (HQ Tunisian Brigade), Matadi (HQ Moroccan Brigade), Coquilhatville (HQ Independent Moroccan Coy), Inongo (HQ Guinea Brigade) and eventually two stations in Katanga.
appointed acting Commander of the Canadian Headquarters Unit and Maj R. C. Bindoff commanded 57 Signals Squadron. With personnel arriving from across Canada, measures were taken to ensure swift processing and immunisation, especially since the latter would determine dates for departure to the Congo. Peacekeepers were given training in small arms, attended lectures on tropical disease, and were briefed on conditions in the Congo by Air Commodore F. S. Carpenter, recently returned from assisting the UN with its initial airlift. By 8 August, the Headquarters Unit had reached its authorised strength of 52 all ranks and the 57th had actually exceeded its establishment of 193 by 11. Army Headquarters agreed to increase the establishment accordingly, presumably working within the Minister’s limit of 200 personnel from the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals [RCCS]. At noon the next day, the first group of ten peacekeepers left for Trenton, where they embarked on a 40 hour, 6,320 mile trip to the Congo, with stops in Gander, Lajes, Dakar, and Accra.18 Throughout the next weeks, the RCAF reassigned the North Stars used in the original UN airlift to transport the remaining men and equipment.19 They were assisted by the United States Air Force, which used C124 Globemasters to transport vehicles and equipment too heavy for RCAF aircraft; in addition, the USAF flew 117 peacekeepers to the Congo.20 As Professor J.L. Granatstein has observed, the Canadian

19 March notes that ONUC “involved almost every long-range transport aircraft that the RCAF had available at the time. Only essential transport runs were maintained throughout North-America and Europe.” William March, “The Royal Canadian Air Force and Peacekeeping,” in Peacekeeping 1815 to Today, Ed. Serge Bernier (Ottawa: International Commission of Military History, 1995) 471.
military’s reliance on US planes, in this instance, serves as a stark reminder that peacekeeping is not as “independent” as it is often assumed to be.21

As the first peacekeepers arrived in the Congo, the government sent its formal reply to the Secretary-General’s request for peacekeepers and, in so doing, outlined a number of conditions and understandings. The Army asked for it to be made clear that the UN withdrew its request for logistics personnel not “at the instigation of Canadian Army authorities,” but because this support had been sought from other nations. Although the Army faced a limit of 200 signallers, references to this were deleted in the final text of the reply, on the assumption that the Ministers of National Defence and External Affairs could work within the framework of the original Cabinet decision to meet additional requests, from either the Canadian Commander or the UN, for extra personnel. Because the reconnaissance party had reported that ONUC was “not exercising its command through traditional field brigade headquarters, ... but through territorial commands,” Pearkes agreed to amend the original restriction against the deployment of peacekeepers below the level of brigade headquarters. The UN was advised that the Canadians should be “concentrated as much as possible,” and not, “deployed below ‘subordinate territorial commands’ which it is understood are being set up in established centres.” Canada agreed to provide pay and allowances to its peacekeepers on a basis similar to UNEF and assumed that other financial arrangements with the UN, especially as regards foreign allowances and the depreciation costs of equipment, would also be the same as in UNEF. Officials at DND and DEA interpreted Pearkes’ earlier warning to his Cabinet colleagues, that equipment might have to be purchased, “not as an implication that the United Nations might be requested to procure some of the equipment in question.” Aside

from depreciation costs, the Canadian reply made no mention of the UN reimbursing Canada for the acquisition of equipment. This directly contradicts the basis upon which Treasury Board approved the purchase of signals equipment from the United States. Finally, the reply asserted the right of the Canadian Commander to communicate directly with the CGS on purely administrative matters; later, this provision would prove important when ONUC was forced to confront the problem of inappropriate communications between its contingents and their home governments.\footnote{NAC, RG24, vol. 21484, file 2137.3 part 1, Telegram External to PERMISNY: Text of Proposed Reply to SECGENS note 15/7 concerning Sigs and Log Support, 12 August 1960; DHH, file 112.1.003 (D9) vol. 2, Letter CGS to MDND: Employment – 57 Signal Squadron – Congo, 5 August 1960 NAC, RG25, file 6386-C-40 part 2, Memo DL(1) to UN Div: Congo – Formal Reply to the UN regarding Canadian Contribution to the UN Forces, 11 August 1960.}

In the initial weeks following ONUC’s deployment, the political situation in the Congo was tense. Three political demonstrations in Leopoldville were described by Bull as relatively orderly; he noted that a Canadian reporter who got too close to one of the demonstrations had his foot stepped on and received an immediate apology. Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba was not so lucky. When he appeared at one of the demonstrations, he was stoned, and his car was smashed by a hostile crowd.\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5209, file 6386-40 part 10, Bull to USSEA, 19 August 1960.} The acting Canadian Trade Commissioner was equally unimpressed, not only by Lumumba, but by most ministers in the Congolese government. He wrote, “If the ministers as a group were considerably more intelligent, they would rise to the spectacularly incompetent. The majority appear to be too stupid to make mistakes.” Many UN officials came to share this harsh assessment. Only the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Justin Bomboko, was singled out.
as "intelligent, energetic and courageous." To many, the Congolese seemed naive and ignorant. Bunche would later write, "There was not at this time very much understanding on the part of any Congolese official about the nature of the United Nations, or about what it could or could not do, its functioning and structure, and particularly about the meaning and status of the United Nations Secretariat."25

Conflicting views as to the purpose of ONUC contributed to a deterioration in relations between the UN and the Congolese, and between Hammarskjöld and Lumumba in particular. Legum suggests. "Lumumba's loss of faith in the United Nations started the moment he discovered he would not be allowed to determine how its forces should be used" and that the Prime Minister "had little or no idea of how the United Nations worked, or of the conventions that applied to the U.N. Emergency Forces."26 Although Belgian forces withdrew as ONUC deployed throughout most of the Congo, they remained at military bases in Kitona and Kamina, and in the province of Katanga. Lumumba believed that ONUC was empowered by the Security Council "to help his Government put down the secession of Katanga by force."27 The Secretary-General, however, disagreed with Lumumba's interpretation of Resolutions 143(1960) and 145(1960). He argued that ONUC could not use force, except in self-defence, and was clearly prohibited from intervention in any internal Congolese conflict.28 The Secretary-

28 Jones suggests these two principles were "basic to Hammarskjold's concept of how the peacekeeping operation should be conducted." Coronwy Jones, The United Nations and the Domestic Jurisdiction of States (Cardiff: U of Wales P and Welsh Centre for International Affairs, 1979) 128.
General refused to allow ONUC to become the “secular arm” of the Congolese government, as Lumumba seemed to expect.\(^{29}\)

Hammarskjöld also disagreed with the Katangese and Belgian authorities’ views on the implementation of the UN resolutions. Belgium gave essential support to Moïse Tshombé’s separatist régime “contrary to the intention of the July and August 1960 resolutions.”\(^{30}\) Financially, the Belgian mining conglomerate, *Union Minière du Haut Katanga*, provided 80% of the régime’s revenue.\(^{31}\) It is not surprising that the Belgians perceived no need for the UN to enter Katanga. They argued the Belgian military, together with forces loyal to the secessionist government, had already restored law and order. The Secretary-General believed that ONUC’s mandate required the force to be deployed throughout the Congo, including Katanga. The Canadian Mission learned from Andrew Cordier that Hammarskjöld had privately convinced the Belgians to withdraw their troops and was encouraging them to “make a public declaration to this effect.” Negotiations were complicated “by the erratic attitude of members of the Congolese Government,” who not only pressed for the complete withdrawal of the Belgians, but also expected to travel to Elisabethville with the Secretary-General.\(^{32}\)

Instead, Hammarskjöld sent Bunche to Katanga on 4 August to negotiate the entry of UN forces. Tshombé had warned Hammarskjöld that the “entry of UN troops into


Katanga would be resisted and that their arrival would be the signal for a general uprising in Katanga.” In turn, through Bunche, the Secretary-General explained that, under Articles 25 and 49 of the Charter, the Security Council had the authority to implement its decisions throughout the entire Congo; any resistance would have “legal consequences.” Hammarskjöld reassured Tshombé that the arrival of UN forces would not “represent interference in the internal affairs of the Congo or influence in favour of any particular constitutional solution.” When the Katangese Interior Minister later threatened to shoot down the plane dispatched to return Bunche to Leopoldville, the Secretary-General’s representative decided it was unlikely that ONUC could enter Katanga “without bloodshed.” He believed the “political realities of the United Nations ... would not long permit a peace force to be in the posture of an army of occupation.” Hammarskjöld resolved to consult with the Security Council before pressing forward. He was of the view that “he had been instructed by the Security Council to get the Belgian forces out of the Congo but had not been instructed to use the U.N. force to subject Katanga.” Nations contributing contingents did so on the basis that the troops would be used in a peacekeeping mission, not an enforcement action. Hammarskjöld was of the view that any significant change in the legal basis of ONUC would require “re-negotiation and, indeed, a new consent by the contributing State to the use of its contingent.”

33 NAC, RG24, vol. 21484, file 2137.3 part 1, Telegram PERMISNY to External: Congo, 4 August 1960.
Canada continued to observe a policy of not publicly taking sides on the Katanga issue, and the role of Belgium in particular. The Belgian Ambassador in Canada was concerned that Diefenbaker's remarks to the House of Commons on 1 August had "left the impression that the withdrawal of the Belgians [immediately after independence and during the mutiny] had been calculated." Officials at External Affairs believed the Ambassador was "unduly worried," noting that the Prime Minister had clearly stated, "he implied 'no criticism whatever of the action taken by the Belgian Government or by Belgian nationalists.'" The Ambassador was anxious to have Canadian views on the withdrawal of Belgian forces from Katanga and its military bases in the Congo.

Robertson thought it "not unreasonable" for Belgian troops to leave Katanga "only when United Nations troops are in a position to maintain law and order," and suggested this point might be raised with Hammarskjöld in the Elisabethville negotiations. The Under-Secretary was less supportive of Belgian ambitions to retain their presence at Kamina and Kitona, even if this was of significance to NATO. He argued, "the strategic advantage of maintaining Belgian troops in the Congo has to be balanced against the very serious political difficulties which will result both in the Congo and in neighbouring territories if the Belgian government will not withdraw their forces."

In the end, Howard Green thought it best not to give any advice to the Belgians. He believed they were looking "for a scapegoat in Nato itself." Publicly, Green simply advised the House of Commons of Hammarskjöld's decision to consult with the Security

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Council and added, “The secretary general has made clear that the difficulty which the
council faces in Katanga does not have its root in the attitude of the Belgian government,
which acquiesced in the security council decisions.” He was critical of countries who
demanded “direct action,” and “whose interest in the Congo may not coincide with the
aims of the United Nations.”

On 9 August, the Security Council passed Resolution 146(1960). It confirmed
the authority vested by the Council in the Secretary-General and called upon Belgium to
immediately withdraw its forces from Katanga. It also asserted the necessity of ONUC’s
entry into the breakaway province but required that ONUC not become a party to, or
influence the outcome of, any internal conflict. Because the UN force was now clearly
obliged to prevent civil war in the Congo, Hammarskjöld could condone neither the
Lumumba government’s “forcible occupation of Katanga” nor “Katanga’s forcible
secession.” Boulden suggests that Resolution 146 did not really change ONUC’s
mandate; it did make “explicit aspects of the mandate previously thought to be implicit,
... stopping short of any authorization to use force.” In effect, the Council declared it
“necessary” for UN forces to enter Katanga, without yet authorizing “the use of force to
accomplish that result.” The Security Council’s latest pronouncement on the Congo
situation was the first to explicitly cite Articles 25 and 49; in doing so, all member states
were reminded of their Charter obligation to “accept and carry out Security Council

41 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 8 August 1960: 7747.
42 Security Council Resolution 146(1960) is reproduced in appendix 2.
43 Herbert Nicholas, “UN Peace Forces and the Changing Globe: the Lessons of Suez and Congo,”
International Organization 17 (1963) 331-332.
44 Boulden, The United Nations and Mandate Enforcement: Congo, Somalia and Bosnia
(Kingston, Ontario: Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University in cooperation with the Institut
Québécois des Hautes Etudes Internationales, Université Laval, 1999) 29-30.
45 Mona Gagnon, “Peace Forces and the Veto: The Relevance of Consent,” International
decisions and to afford mutual assistance for such measures.”

Once the Security Council endorsed his actions, the Secretary-General was in a much stronger position to return to Katanga to negotiate the peaceful entry of UN forces.

Along the way, Hammarskjöld drafted a memorandum that outlined his interpretation of ONUC’s role. It emphasised the UN force’s obligation not to intervene in the conflict. This memorandum, along with Hammarskjöld’s decision to fly directly to Elizabethville for negotiations with Tshombé, infuriated Lumumba. He wanted the Secretary-General to consult the central government before taking any action to resolve the Katanga issue and expected to accompany him on this trip to Elizabethville.

Hammarskjöld’s decision to take along Swedish peacekeepers, as the first of the ONUC forces to be deployed in Katanga, further annoyed Lumumba. The Congolese Prime Minister suspected Hammarskjöld was conspiring with the Belgians and perceived the Secretary-General’s decision to be accompanied by Swedes as proof of such a conspiracy.

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47 Citrin sees this resolution as yet another vote of confidence in “Hammarskjöld’s approach.” Jack Citrin, *UN Peacekeeping Activities: A Case Study in Organizational Task Expansion*, 40.


49 Hoffman argues that ONUC’s mandate, as defined by the Security Council, both required entry of UN forces into Katanga and “meant that the central government’s authorities could not accompany or follow the UN forces, given Katanga’s opposition to them.” Stanley Hoffman, “In Search of a Thread: The United Nations in the Congo Labyrinth,” 335.

These differences of opinion over ONUC’s role in Katanga resulted in a marked shift in Lumumba’s views.\textsuperscript{51} Bunche later wrote, “from that time on Mr. Lumumba rejected all normal relations with the United Nations.”\textsuperscript{52} He became increasingly hostile to Hammarskjöld, the West, and white UN forces. His press attaché, Serge Michel, recounted Lumumba’s belief that “all Westerners in the Congo were racists.” He said of white UN forces:

“They’re afraid. How can you imagine that, just like that, a hat painted blue is enough to eliminate the complexes of conservative officers from Sweden or Canada or Great Britain?” Their vision of Africa ... was one of lion hunts, slave markets, and colonial conquests, and they sympathized with the Belgians because they had “the same past, the same history, the same taste for our riches.”\textsuperscript{53}

Lumumba began to call for the withdrawal of white peacekeepers, but Hammarskjöld strenuously rejected this on the grounds that the UN alone had the authority to determine the composition of its peacekeeping forces.

To Lumumba, it must have seemed as though the UN increasingly dictated the means by which the stand-off with Katanga would be settled. The Security Council, in its most recent resolution, affirmed that its decisions were mandatory; as a result, “the territorial government could not by unilateral action decide that the threat was over or that measures taken by the Council should be terminated.”\textsuperscript{54} As one expert has noted, the


\textsuperscript{52} Ralph Bunche, “The United Nations Operation in the Congo,” 417.

\textsuperscript{53} as quoted in Madeleine G. Kalb, \textit{The Congo Cables}, 49-50.

very presence of peacekeeping forces "is an indication that the host state has in some
important way been unable to cope on its own." For Lumumba, steeped as he was in the
ideology of anti-colonialism, these developments must have been bitter pills to swallow.
The Canadian Trade Commissioner reported that, as a result of the disagreement between
Hammarskjöld and Lumumba, the Prime Minister attempted to "reassert the
Government's authority" by announcing over the radio that "Belgian spys [sic] and
saboteurs were masquerading in UN uniform." A "witch hunt" ensued.56

Hammarskjöld arrived in Elisabethville on 12 August, after a brief stop in
Leopoldville. Bunche remained in the capital to explain the Secretary-General's
interpretation of Resolution 146 to the central government, but Hammarskjöld
deliberately avoided meeting with Lumumba. There were a few tense moments when
Katangese authorities threatened to refuse landing to the four aircraft carrying troops,
which accompanied Hammarskjöld's plane. Tshombé, however, intervened directly and
suggested there had been a "misunderstanding" once Hammarskjöld made it clear that,
unless all five planes landed, he would return to Leopoldville. While Hammarskjöld met
with Tshombé, his representatives met with Belgian military representatives to discuss
arrangements for the withdrawal of Belgian troops. A press communiqué announced the
successful conclusion of negotiations: "the relief of the Belgian troops in the Katanga by
United Nations troops will begin today Saturday August 13, 1960 at 5 p.m. local time."
At the designated hour, the Swedish peacekeepers that accompanied the Secretary-

55 Alan James, "Peacekeeping and the Parties," Ed. Indar Jit Rikhye. The United Nations and
peacekeeping: results, limitations, and prospects (Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with the
International Peace Academy, 1990) 133.
56 NAC, RG25, vol. 5219, file 6386-C-40 part 3, Letter Wood to USSEA: Congo – UN Relations,
18 August 1960.
General took over guard duties at the Elisabethville airport. More Swedish and Moroccan troops arrived in the following days. Ultimately, ONUC headquarters planned to deploy 4,000 peacekeepers throughout the province.

The UN deployment in Katanga resulted in the urgent need for a signals team in Elisabethville, but instructions for the Canadian reconnaissance team dispatched to the Congo in July included a restriction against the presence of any Canadian personnel in Katanga. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff brought this to the attention of External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence, who finally lifted this restriction to allow Canadian peacekeepers to “be employed in Katanga under UN command in accordance with same arrangements as applies remainder of the Congo,” on 19 August.

It was becoming increasingly clear that Lumumba was simply not prepared to accept the status quo implied by the UN’s policy of non-intervention in Katanga. He turned to the Soviets for assistance to end the secession. During the Congo crisis, the Soviet Union publicly supported the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a state; however, it was prepared to assist Lumumba because it viewed the conflict between the central government and the Katangan authorities as not exclusively internal, but rather inspired and sustained by Belgium. In the final two weeks of August,

60 In support of Lumumba’s position, Pradhan argues “the non-interventionist attitude of the UN amounted to freezing the situation in favour of Tshombe.” Ram Chandra Pradhan, *The United Nations and the Congo Crisis* (New Delhi: MANAS Publications, 1975) 219.
Lumumba used Soviet aircraft and trucks to transport ANC forces into Luluabourg, in preparation for an attack on Katanga. Earlier in the month, hostilities between the Lulua and Baluba peoples in this city resulted in the latter retreating south to Bakwanga. Once there, their leader Albert Kalonji declared the secession of South Kasai. Faced with yet another separatist movement, Lumumba ordered the ANC into South Kasai en route to Katanga. Inadequate supplies and planning left the Congolese army to live off the land. When the Baluba resisted, the army massacred many.\textsuperscript{62}

The events in South Kasai, and Lumumba’s reliance on Soviet assistance in particular, hardened the views of many in the West against the Congolese Prime Minister. From Washington, External Affairs learned the Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs viewed Lumumba as “unpredictable” and questioned, “whether the position of the UN in the Congo and the internal stability of the country could be maintained so long as Lumumba continues on his present course.”\textsuperscript{63} Gibbs argues that the United States was definitely and actively opposed to Lumumba and his policies. He writes, “US officials detested Lumumba” and that overthrowing the Congolese leader was the “principal” objective of early American policy in the Congo.\textsuperscript{64} He suggests “the U.S. embassy in Leopoldville openly supported the secession [of Katanga],” and the C.I.A. “delivered Fouga Magisters, French-built jet fighters, to the Katangese military.”\textsuperscript{65}

The Belgians became even more convinced that communists were infiltrating the Congo and shared various reports to support this view with Canadian diplomats. From

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{62} Hoskyns, \textit{The Congo Since Independence}, 193-195; United Nations, \textit{The Blue Helmets}, 227.
\item \textsuperscript{63} NAC, RG25, vol. 5209, file 6386-40 part 10.2, Telegram WASHDC to External: Congo, 30 August 1960.
\item \textsuperscript{64} David Gibbs, “Secrecy and International Relations,” \textit{Journal of Peace Research} 32 (May 1995) 220.
\end{itemize}
Brazzaville, they learned Lumumba wanted to accept a Russian offer of 100 doctors in spite of his health minister’s objections. Belgian officials in Elisabethville suggested the Soviet plane given to Lumumba for his personal use was “equipped with an unusual powerful broadcasting station which operates from Ndjili airport.” Equally ominous was a warning that “28 Russians including three women carrying with them very heavy material of an unknown nature landed in Luluabourg.” Lumumba was said to be considering the despatch of cadet officers to Moscow for military training and the acceptance of Soviet technical and financial aid for the construction of the Inga dam.66

And, the Belgian Secret Police had identified Serge Michel, Lumumba’s information officer, as a “staunch communist.”67 By comparison, the Canadian Trade Commissioner reported on similar ‘offers’ of Russian assistance and questionable Lumumba colleagues, but concluded, “I do not think many Congolese have the foggiest idea of what communism is.” He did warn, “Communist methods and psychology may serve as a stick to beat the Belgians or belabour unkind fate. They will not hesitate to use it.”68

In the midst of this political turmoil, Canadian peacekeepers continued to arrive on regular flights from Trenton. There was, initially, some concern at DND over the quartering of Canadians serving in the Congo. Air Commodore Carpenter warned that outside Leopoldville Canadians might face living with “the native troops serving under United Nations.” The Army was keen to avoid being “accused of refusing to quarter Canadian soldiers with coloured soldiers.” It argued, “it would not be a matter of a colour

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bar so much as not wishing to quarter our troops with foreign troops who speak a different language whose customs may be widely different from our own.” Col Mendelsohn was asked to make “cautious” inquiries about separate accommodations for the Canadians. “This matter,” he was warned, “would have to be handled delicately because Mr. Ralph Bunche, the senior UN official in the Congo, is coloured.” The entire issue was recognised as so sensitive that Mendelsohn was asked to wait to report his findings until he had returned to Canada himself so that no United Nations officials would “know about this subject.”

Mendelsohn was successful with this delicate mission. After their short stay in the Otraco company guest house, arranged by Roger Bull, the earliest arrivals of the 57th Signal Squadron and the Canadian Headquarters took up residence in the Athenee Royal, a two story cement structure that previously was the main boarding and day school for white children. The 57th occupied the girls’ dormitory, while the Headquarters was located in the nearby boys’ dormitory. Ghanaian troops “illegally” occupied the kitchen of this building, so the Canadian peacekeepers continued to take their meals at the Otraco house until the Ghanaians vacated the kitchen on 21 August. Peacekeepers stationed at territorial detachments in the Congolese interior also appeared to have been quartered separately, usually in private residences. Messing often proved particularly difficult for these personnel. One commanding officer observed,

Differences between the Canadian diet and that of the contingent with which a detachment may be serving makes it impossible to mess with the contingent with which they work; a meal of hot curried rice is very

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enjoyable once in a while, but having it served twice a day does not appeal to all Canadians.\textsuperscript{71}

The problem was usually solved through separate acquisition of rations, either locally or through the accompanying contingent. Local Congolese were then hired to prepare the food. In some locations, the UN contracted local guest houses to provide the Canadians with their meals.

On 23 August, Army Headquarters recalled all but two members of the original reconnaissance party. Col Mendelsohn and Maj R.C. Daigle remained, as Contingent Commander and Medical Officer respectively. By the end of August, the 57th had dispatched detachments to Luluabourg, Stanleyville, Coquilhatville, and Elisabethville. Each detachment consisted of one officer and nine men and provided radio-teletype communications 24 hours a day.\textsuperscript{72} Commanding officers were usually drawn from outside the Signals service but “proved to be invaluable, particularly in times of trouble” and acquired sufficient knowledge of signals to administer their detachments.\textsuperscript{73} Often, the officers were drawn from the Royal 22e Régiment and became important links “between district Congolese commanders, UN troops and ONUC headquarters.”\textsuperscript{74}

The 57th used the ANG/RC 26D radio sets purchased especially for the Unit for use in the Congo. While this set was supposed to have a range of only 250 miles when used for radio-teletype, the shortest circuit serviced by the Unit was actually a distance of 500 miles (Leopoldville to Luluabourg). The sets were even used to communicate with

\textsuperscript{71} CCEM, Box 137, Article: The Royal Canadian Signals in the Congo by Col. H.W.C. Stethem and Capt. R. Fournier, undated.
\textsuperscript{72} See appendix 3 for an organisational chart that outlines the elements of the 57th and identifies tasks undertaken by personnel within the Communications Squadron.
\textsuperscript{73} CCEM, Box 137, Article: The Royal Canadian Signals in the Congo by Col. H.W.C. Stethem and Capt. R. Fournier, undated.
\textsuperscript{74} Gaffen, \textit{In the Eye of the Storm: a History of Canadian Peacekeeping} (Toronto: Deneau & Wayne, 1987) 235.
Nairobi, Kenya at a distance of 1,650 miles. In order to exceed their normal range, the transmitters were used at maximum power at all times. This led to frequent breakdowns, as did the heat. In Leopoldville, the average temperature in the transmitter room at the Athenée Royal was 95°, while the tape relay centre averaged 90°, even with three air conditioners. Repairs at outlying detachments were often complicated by a lack of spare parts and because aircraft schedules delayed the arrival of replacement parts or senior technicians from Leopoldville. Until such repairs could be made, detachments sometimes reverted to the use of Morse code.\textsuperscript{75}

At ONUC Headquarters, the Canadian signalers provided a number of important services. They operated a tape relay centre, a message centre, a crypto center, a transmitter station, the UN HQ automatic phone system and provided despatch rider services between all units in Leopoldville. The message centre handled, "from 400 to 500 messages a day in several different languages." While most radio circuits were within the Congo, the link to Nairobi connected with the Commonwealth Communication System so that messages could be sent to and from Canada, as well as the home countries of other Commonwealth contingents. The signalers both maintained and operated the phone system. Some bilingual personnel operated the switchboard 24 hours a day, while others worked and cooperated with the local phone company to ensure that services needed by the UN would be "installed within a reasonable time." The 57th also established a repair shop in ONUC HQ and was often called upon to repair equipment belonging to the UN civilian communication system, other contingents, the Nigerian police, UN Military

\textsuperscript{75} CCEM, Box 137, Article: The Royal Canadian Signals in the Congo by Col. H.W.C. Stethem and Capt. R. Fournier, undated; Fred Gaffen, \textit{In the Eye of the Storm}, 221.
Police, the UN Field Security section, and the International Telecommunication and International Civil Aviation Organisation. 76

In addition to the signals personnel, Canadians served within most branches of ONUC Headquarters. At various times, Canadians served as Chief Operations Officer, Chief Signals Officer, and Chief Air Officer. 77 Wainhouse observes,

At almost any date during the four-year operation, there were more Canadian officers in the Force headquarters than any other single nationality. This was specially so during 1960. Through General von Horn's tenure, a Canadian was either Chief of Staff at the headquarters or von Horn's Chief Military Adviser. With their language capability, peacekeeping experience, generally good political acceptability, professionalism, and familiarity with both Commonwealth and U.S. military procedures the Canadians were ideally suited for ONUC. 78

By mid August, twelve Canadian officers served at ONUC HQ. Most had been transferred either from UNTSO or UNEF. 79 In addition, Canada provided a Food Services section and a Canadian Provost Corps detachment. The latter, under the command of the Force Deputy Provost Marshal, worked and lived with Danish military police. Because many were bilingual, the Canadians were made chiefly responsible for investigations that involved the local Congolese. 80 Rikhye notes English was used as the common working language at ONUC headquarters because "it was easier to obtain personnel whose second

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76 CCEM, Box 137, Article: The Royal Canadian Signals in the Congo by Col. H.W.C. Stethem and Capt. R. Fournier, undated.
78 Wainhouse, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 308.
80 CCEM, Box 137, Article: The Royal Canadian Signals in the Congo by Col. H.W.C. Stethem and Capt. R. Fournier, undated.
language was English." Yet, the C Pro C detachment is just one example of how Canadians were able to play an important role at ONUC headquarters because of their ability to communicate with the Congolese in French. For the duration of ONUC, an average of ten Canadian officers served at the Leopoldville headquarters, more than from any other single nationality.  

Although the Canadian peacekeepers did not serve in a combat role in the Congo, they still regularly came into contact with both the Congolese and Lumumba's Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC). Soon after their arrival, an incident occurred that foreshadowed the serious difficulties Canadian peacekeepers would encounter in the coming weeks. On 15 August, a crowd of two hundred Congolese surrounded a jeep containing two Canadian members of ONUC. The crowd shouted "Flamand, Belgium," believing the peacekeepers to be Belgian. One of the peacekeepers tried to calm the crowd; as this was accomplished on one side of the jeep, people on the other side were rallied by three or four agitators. The incident was diffused when a Congolese police patrol arrived on the scene, confirmed the identity of the peacekeepers, and dispersed the crowd.  

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82 The Canadian average was 10.25; India was a close second, at 9.5. Brookings Institution Study; Rikhye provides a critical assessment of ONUC headquarters, in its early days: "... owing to a lack of standard operating procedures and an uneven level of professionalism in method and experience among the staff members, even here coordination and general efficiency left much to be desired." He mostly credits the Indian officers serving at ONUC HQ with rectifying this situation. He writes, "India held many key related staff positions at Headquarters. It was thanks to their ability and to the goodwill they established with their working partners from other nations that an almost impossible task of administering and logistic support of ONUC was done as well as it could be." Indar Jit Rikhye, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and India," India Quarterly 41.3-4 (July-December, 1985) 311; Indar Jit Rikhye, The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future (New Haven, Conn & London: Yale U P, 1974) 85.  
Three days later, the first incident of serious violence between the Congolese and Canadians occurred at N’djili airport, just outside Leopoldville, and demonstrated how vulnerable the Canadians could be. Two groups of peacekeepers were waiting to depart on reconnaissance missions to Coquihatville and Luluabourg, to plan and prepare for the arrival of signals detachments. Those destined for Luluabourg were delayed on the tarmac. A patrol of about ten to twelve Congolese soldiers suddenly rushed towards them. The peacekeepers presented their UN identity cards and tried to identify themselves as Canadian. The Congolese were unimpressed and forced them face down onto the tarmac, arms extended. They then kicked the peacekeepers, focusing their efforts particularly on the commanding officer, Captain J.C.A.A. Taschereau. The peacekeepers destined for Coquihatville, along with the Indian aircrew and some Moroccan passengers, were removed from their aircraft and together with the first group of Canadians, were herded into an awaiting truck. Their wallets and valuables were stolen and blue UN berets removed. At this point, Taschereau was hit in the face with the butt of a rifle and knocked unconscious. Another Canadian was struck in the back with such force that the rifle butt broke. Others suffered cuts and bruises. After about twelve minutes, a Danish officer accompanied by Ghanaian troops rescued the Canadians.84

Hammarskjöld, once informed of the incident, promptly drafted a letter to the Congolese Ambassador to the UN. He stressed the “extreme gravity” of the incident, drawing attention to the unacceptable conditions faced by peacekeepers in ONUC. The Secretary-General threatened the Lumumba government with the withdrawal of UN support and assistance with a warning that “further activities may be rendered

impossible” if the peacekeepers’ working conditions did not improve. This letter was followed by an official note of protest to the Congolese government, which repeated his threat by suggesting that all UN activities in the Congo might have to be submitted to the Security Council for reconsideration. The Secretary-General made it clear that he expected the government to immediately take “all measures necessary to forestall the recurrence of any such incidents.”

After consulting with Howard Green, Diefenbaker summoned Norman Robertson to his office and set to work drafting a Canadian letter of protest. Diefenbaker was “obviously annoyed.” In a note “as strong as any employed by a Canadian head of government to a foreign leader,” he stated,

Such totally unwarranted and unjustified attacks on Canadian Service personnel are of a most serious character. I expect an immediate assurance that effective measures will be taken to ensure that the forces under your control will refrain from threatening the security of Canadian personnel who proceed to your country on friendly and peaceful missions in the performance of tasks determined by the United Nations.

Reporters were called to the Prime Minister’s office and shown the contents of the letter sent to Lumumba. With “rumpled” hair and in a harsh tone, Diefenbaker warned that

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87 DCC, file MG1/XII/C/114, Memo for Prime Minister by USSEA, 18 August 1960.
the Canadian Government took a “serious view of the totally unwarranted and unjustifiable conduct of the Congolese soldiers.” He had considered the implications of possible Canadian casualties weeks before Cabinet finally decided to participate in ONUC. Once injuries actually occurred, he dealt with them forcefully and quickly. Doubtless he anticipated that Canadians would be indignant over the treatment of their peacekeepers, and he cannot have expected the editorial that appeared in the Globe and Mail the following day. It seriously questioned the wisdom of Diefenbaker’s letter of protest and argued only the UN had a right to condemn the Congolese government because Canadian soldiers were serving as peacekeepers, under the auspices of the international organisation. The editorial concluded by exhorting the Canadian Government to display the same “conspicuous self-control and patience in the face of all provocations and dangers” displayed by the UN personnel involved in the incident.  

The principal UN officials paid tribute to the conduct of the Canadian peacekeepers. Brigadier Indar Jit Rikhye, Military Advisor to Hammarskjöld, contacted External Affairs and said Taschereau and his men “behaved admirably throughout the incident under the most severe provocation.” They would have been justified in using their arms in self-defence; instead, they demonstrated “extreme restraint” in their attempts to reason with their attackers. Von Horn sent a message to the Canadian Chief of General Staff, S.F. Clark, expressing his “admiration for the very high standard of

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32 “A Time for Coolness,” Globe and Mail [Toronto] 19 August 1960: 6. The Globe and Mail raised a valid point. Bowett suggests that occasionally states protested the treatment of their personnel serving in ONUC, but these protests “were in the nature of an association of the State with the formal United Nations protests and did not attempt to press a separate claim on the basis of a breach of the Congo’s duties towards aliens.” In fact, Diefenbaker’s protest was not so clearly associated with the UN’s: in tone, it appeared to emphasise Canadian-Congolese, bilateral relations. Bowett, United Nations Forces, 243.

discipline and for the courage and forbearance shown by your troops.” He added, “I thank them, congratulate them on their splendid conduct in the face of needless and senseless provocation and I am proud and honoured at having them under my command.” In his memoirs, von Horn recalled that the N’djili incident had a “profound impact on everyone” in ONUC. From this point on, very few members of the force disguised “their hostility towards the Congolese.” He remembered strapping on his own pistol before heading to the airport to see the remaining Canadians flown in. In a radio broadcast to all the military and civilian staff of ONUC, Bunche paid “high tribute,” to the Canadians. He noted, “They might, so easily and effectively, have dealt with the situation in their own way. Instead, in the interest of the UN, they exercised patience and restraint of the most commendable nature.”

On 19 August, Lumumba held a press conference in Leopoldville to address Hammarskjöld’s note of protest. The Congolese Prime Minister considered the N’djili incident “commonplace” and suggested it had been blown out of proportion by the Secretary-General as a diplomatic manoeuvre. He made reference to an identity control system recently implemented by the government as a means to discover the “many persons of foreign nationality” infiltrating the Congo. He maintained the Congolese soldiers at N’djili airport on 18 August were simply trying to verify the identity of the Canadian soldiers, who had in turn “categorically refused to show their papers and behaved rudely.” To counter Hammarskjöld’s charges, he argued the Congolese army was subjected daily to “uncalled-for affronts and humiliation by the UN European

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troops.” He concluded his press conference with a demand for the withdrawal of the white UN troops who had “provoked the latest incidents.”

Howard Green declined to comment on Lumumba’s allegations against the Canadian peacekeepers before the Security Council could meet to consider the situation, but a UN spokesman “curtly” denied the charges, asserting that identification badges were shown and that the peacekeepers had not “behaved badly.”

In conversation with the Secretary of State at the Congolese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Canadian Trade Commissioner learned that Lumumba’s call for withdrawal of non-African forces was directed primarily at Swedish peacekeepers. Wood reported,

The [Congolese] Government have clearly developed a prejudice against the Swedish troops in the UN. This is partly a corollary of Lumumba’s quarrel with Hammarskjöld [sic], but is also due to the presence of Swedish troops in Katanga and the fact that there has been one or two cases of Swedish troops intervening to prevent the arrest of Belgians by the Force Publique.

To Wood, it seemed as though the difficulties between the UN and the Congolese forces were increasingly of a “racial character.” He worried particularly for the position of the Canadian peacekeepers in Leopoldville, especially if the Swedes were withdrawn and the Canadians were left as the only remaining white troops. This may have been a moot point. Hammarskjöld is said to have confided in the Americans that he would recommend the full withdrawal of ONUC if Lumumba pressed his demand for the withdrawal of white contingents. In his view, the UN could not “adopt a policy of ‘inverted racism’.”

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100 Madeleine Kalb, The Congo Cables, 51.
Lumumba's account of the N'djili incident was soon undermined by the Chief of Staff of the Congolese National Army. As the Prime Minister held his press conference, Colonel Mobutu delivered an official apology to Ralph Bunche. It stated, "We are extremely sorry that precise instructions had not been given in time to the company on duty at the airport, as that might have prevented the shameful occurrence at Ndjili." Bunche was assured that strong measures had been taken against the soldiers responsible for the incident. 101 In the days that followed, Lumumba himself somewhat softened his stand by apologising for the "minor" N'djili incident and for his soldiers' excessive zeal in carrying out their orders to check all identification. He ordered the army to act "with tact and dignity in future." 102

Within two weeks there was another serious and violent incident between Congolese forces and Canadian peacekeepers. Six members of the Signals Squadron left Trenton on 27 August aboard two United States Air Force Globemaster aircraft. The US had agreed to transport heavy equipment required by the signalers that could not otherwise be transported by RCAF planes. The Canadian officer in charge, Capt. J.J.B.L. Marois, was accompanied by three other peacekeepers in the first plane. He assigned two others, Cpl. Gavel and Signaler Bone, to accompany the remainder of the squadron's equipment in the second plane. One hour and fifteen minutes after the first plane left, the second also departed. Marois and his group left first, so that they would be able to organise equipment and arrange to meet the second plane when it landed.

101 NAC, RG25, vol. 5209, file 6386-40 part 10, PERMISNY to External, 21 August 1960. Kalb suggests that Mobutu often took it upon himself to "patch things up with the United Nations after Lumumba had made a particularly outrageous statement," and cites this apology for the N'djili incident as a "notable" example. Madeleine Kalb, The Congo Cables, 93.
The first plane reached Stanleyville at 8:30 am. The four Canadians noticed what looked like three companies of the Congolese army, as well as a company of Ethiopian peacekeepers, on the tarmac. They disembarked, unloaded the aircraft, and assisted in the departure of the airplane. A UN officer then escorted them to the UN headquarters at the Hotel Wagenia. Moments later, Congolese soldiers looking for Belgian paratroops rushed into the Stanleyville Headquarters and demanded to see the recently arrived Canadians so that their identification could be established. They were loaded into jeeps at gun point, along with three UN civilians and three other Canadian peacekeepers, including Captain J.J.B. Pariseau, who had already been detained the previous week for the same purpose. The Congolese commander assured Pariseau that no one would be killed and explained that the whole affair was only for "political appeasement." Still, they were beaten, searched, stripped, and placed in cells where they were kept for forty-five minutes until an Ethiopian Brigade Commander arrived to rescue them.

In the meantime, Cpl. Gavel and Signaler Bone arrived in the second American plane. A crowd formed on the airfield and was stirred into a frenzy by reports the plane contained Belgian paratroopers. Patrice Lumumba was expected to arrive shortly in another airplane and rumours quickly spread that the 'paratroopers' had been sent to assassinate the Congolese leader. Gavel, Bone, and the American air crew were pulled from the plane and severely beaten by Congolese soldiers. The two Canadians were flown to Leopoldville to be hospitalised for a week. General von Horn deployed three hundred peacekeepers around the plane bearing the wounded soldiers when it landed at N'djili airport and threatened to fire the first shot if there was any interference.103 Later, in

a statement to a senior officer, one Canadian peacekeeper declared, "I couldn’t help thinking that our Canadian responsible heads, political or otherwise had not thought too much when they sent us in such an area without adequate protection. In fact as soon as I can, I’ll ask for my release from the army, that is how much I feel about it." 104

Canadian reaction to the Stanleyville attack was swift. The Acting Consul General in Leopoldville, Mackenzie Wood, made a verbal protest to Congolese Foreign Minister Bomoko. In Ottawa, Diefenbaker once again spoke out against this new assault on Canadians. In a press release, more subdued in tone than that which followed the N’djili incident, he said he was “naturally gravely concerned that Canadian personnel are again encountering difficulties.” He expressed the hope that the Congolese authorities would cooperate with the UN to ensure that there would be no further incidents. 105 This second occurrence of serious violence did not shake the Globe and Mail’s support for ONUC. For the Globe, the latest attack simply demonstrated the need for the UN to carry on its activities “for a long time to come.” 106

Privately, Canadian officials were stern. External Affairs suggested an urgent meeting of the Secretary-General’s Advisory Committee to consider the situation. They warned, “If it should transpire that UN forces cannot be allowed to operate by the Congolese authorities in such a way that minimum security is provided to UN personnel the whole problem of continued UN operations in the Congo will have to be considered by the Security Council.” 107 The Canadians sought assurances from the UN that, in future, adequate security would be in place at Congolese airports. The Canadian commander in

104 DHH, file 144.9.009 (D30), Memo: Incident Involving Canadian Personnel, 29 August 1960.
Stanleyville took a more direct approach. Captain Pariseau invited the local ANC Commandant to dinner, assured him there were no hard feelings but “warned that in the future his troops would fight and the Congolese would be answerable to the Canadian Army.”  

Ireland closely watched reactions to the N'djili and Stanleyville incidents. There were two Irish battalions, totaling almost 1,400 officers and men, stationed in the Congo and, unlike the Canadians, Irish peacekeepers were there in a combat capacity. Sweden, Denmark, and Norway also had white forces serving in ONUC. After N’djili, the UN representatives of Canada and these other countries began to meet informally to share confidential personal views of Congolese developments. They recognised that the reaction of any one government to incidents in the Congo could affect the position of the others, especially if withdrawal of an entire national contingent was contemplated. They each assured the other that their governments were not considering this option and noted Hammarskjöld’s decision to stand firm against Lumumba’s demand for the withdrawal of white forces. Charles Ritchie explained that Canadian opinion was in “complete support” of participation in ONUC but that the recent ill treatment of Canadian peacekeepers “had caused indignation.”  

From the earliest days of ONUC, common concerns and a sense that the fates of ‘white’ contributing nations were linked, brought this group of representatives together. Yet, these countries remained willing to criticize one another privately. The UN Desk Officer in Dublin, for instance, expressed “apprehension” to a

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108 Fred Gaffen, *In the Eye of the Storm*, 226.
Canadian diplomat about "Swedish antipathy to blacks," and suggested the "attitude of Swedish forces might eventually create serious friction with Congolese."\textsuperscript{110}

Members of this group were anxious to understand the causes and implications of the violent actions of the soldiers in Lumumba's ANC. The Congolese government suggested the attacks were simply a case of mistaken identity: white peacekeepers were confused with Belgian paratroopers. Publicly, Ralph Bunche issued statements supporting this interpretation of events. He characterised the Congo as a society "in which suspicion leads to fear and fear easily leads to panic."\textsuperscript{111} He pointed to the mob that had mauled the Canadians in Stanleyville as an example of how the mere mention of paratroopers could set off a crowd that would not otherwise be concerned with white peacekeepers. The Congolese were not generally 'anti-white'. They were 'anti-Belgian' and there was always the danger that one could be mistaken for the other.

Similarly, Consul General Wood acknowledged that it was difficult to know to what degree mistaken identity had contributed to the earlier N'djili incident. He recalled at least one account that placed a suspicious man near the Congolese troops just prior to their attack on the Canadians and who seemed to be "either directing or inciting them, presumably by saying that the Canadians were Belgians in disguise."\textsuperscript{112} Brigadier Rikhye cited additional factors that contributed to an atmosphere of paranoia amongst the Congolese. In conversation with Bunche, and in the presence of Congolese General Lundula, a Belgian paratroop Major mischievously implied that twelve Belgian soldiers were unaccounted for and left behind after their final withdrawal. Lundula initiated a

\textsuperscript{111} NAC, RG25, vol. 5209, file 6386-40 part 11, PERMISNY to External, 2 September 1960.
search for the soldiers, which was inflamed by Belgian nationals wearing Sabena airline caps similar in colour to UN berets and rumours that UN armbands were for sale on the Congolese black market for 1,000 Congolese francs.113

In private, Bunch considered another plausible explanation. In a confidential report to New York, he said the incidents directed against white peacekeepers were “not accidental but were part of a pattern which might possibly be inspired deliberately by the Congolese government.”114 The Secretary-General concurred in this view. While unwilling to say so publicly, Hammarskjöld was in fact convinced the Stanleyville incident “came as a result of direct orders from Lumumba.”115 Given the deteriorating relationship between the Secretary-General and the Prime Minister, this interpretation is plausible. By early September, Consul General Wood was less convinced “the attacks on Canadians have all been made in the genuine belief that they were Belgian paratroops, and without the knowledge of the Prime Minister.” He surmised, “Mr. Lumumba has on several occasions shown that he would prefer to see the United Nations operation in the Congo africanised as much as possible. He may therefore, at the suggestion of some of his advisers, have felt that by creating difficulties for the Canadians, he would be furthering this end.”116

The Soviet Union was quick to make good use of the N’djili and Stanleyville incidents. Soon after the Canadian Parliament approved participation in ONUC, Soviet officials delivered a démarche to the Secretary-General. They objected to the use of

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115 NAC, RG25, vol. 5219, file 6386-C-40 part 4, Cadieux, 27 August 1960; [332]
Canadian peacekeepers because Canada was one of Belgium's NATO allies. The Soviets argued Canadian participation in ONUC was contrary to the Security Council's decision to "take all necessary resolution toward the speediest cessation of aggression, the immediate withdrawal of troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo and respect for its territorial integrity and political independence." They called upon the Canadian government to "display due objectivity" by not sending forces to the Congo.\(^{117}\) The Secretary-General decided not to take the memorandum too seriously. He noted that Kuznetsov, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, seemed to "make light of it."\(^{118}\) In his formal response to the Soviets, Hammarskjöld outlined the serious communications difficulties ONUC faced, particularly given the many languages used by the various contingents. He maintained that Canada "was in a unique position among the nations in having available an adequate trained communications personnel with a facility in both French and English and in also having available the necessary equipment."\(^{119}\)

As relations between Lumumba and Hammarskjöld deteriorated during the remainder of August, the Soviets began to attack the Secretary-General's actions. Canadian officials in New York noticed, "at times Soviet public criticism of Hammarskjöld appears to follow closely the pattern of alternating praise and blame that Lumumba gives him."\(^{120}\) As countries in the West became increasingly suspicious of Lumumba, the Soviets provided him with bilateral assistance and moral support. On the basis of a number of articles in the Soviet press, which vigorously criticised Hammarskjöld's handling of the Congo crisis, the Canadian Ambassador in Moscow

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\(^{117}\) NAC, RG25, vol. 5219, file 6386-C-40 part 2, PERMISNY to External, 8 August 1960.

\(^{118}\) NAC, RG25, vol. 5219, file 6386-C-40 part 2, Robertson to Green, 8 August 1960.

\(^{119}\) NAC, RG24, vol. 21484, file 2137.3 part 1, Telegram PERMISNY to External: Congo, 8 August 1960.

\(^{120}\) NAC, RG25, vol. 5209, file 6386-40 part 10, PERMISNY to External, 15 August 1960.
concluded, “the Soviet Government is encouraging Mr. Lumumba to bypass the United Nations and take direct action against Katanga with the military forces of Guinea and Ghana.” This view was confirmed by the Canadian Representative in Yugoslavia, who reported a conversation in which the Acting Head of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry deplored the withdrawal of Lumumba’s confidence from Hammarskjöld and placed blame for the crisis on past Belgian policies and the Russians “in equal measure.”

Following the N’djili incident, the Soviets returned to the issue of Canadian participation in ONUC with a vengeance. The following passage appeared in Pravda on 21 August:

Contrary to the assurances given by the United Nations Secretary General Hammarskjöeld [sic], a detachment of the armed forces of Canada — Belgium’s ally in NATO — landed in Leopoldville a few days ago, which aroused the fully justified indignation of the Congolese people and led to further aggravation of the tension in the country.

The day before, Kuznetsov held a press conference in New York and demanded the withdrawal of “armed groups from Canada.” The Soviet official no longer made light of Moscow’s protests over Canadian participation. Instead, the inclusion of Canadians in ONUC turned into ammunition in what became, as the month wore on, a concerted Soviet attempt to discredit and undermine Hammarskjöld. The Secretary-General told Charles Ritchie that Kuznetsov “had taken the line that ‘now you realize how unwise it was to send Canadian troops to the Congo’”.

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121 NAC, RG25, vol. 5209, file 6386-40 part 10, Despatc; Moscow to SSEA: Congo, 16 August 1960.
During the Security Council session on 21 August, Kuznetsov once again raised the issue when he "vigorously attacked the inclusion of Canadians in the force" and demanded they be withdrawn. He did not take issue with Swedish participation, or the inclusion of troops from Denmark and Norway, even though the latter two countries were also members of NATO. Hammarskjöld defended his decision to enlist the help of Canada and showed "no sign of regretting or changing his position."\textsuperscript{125} He argued that of the 127 civilian experts in the Congo, 87 were from countries that, "by no stretch of the imagination," were connected with NATO, and only 500 of the 18,000 ONUC peacekeepers were from NATO countries. Half of these would not have been required if Poland had been able to contribute the forces the UN had requested.\textsuperscript{126} The Secretary-General believed that membership in either NATO or the Warsaw Pact did not necessarily preclude participation in ONUC. Hammarskjöld argued the N'djili incident should not be seen as directed against Canadians in particular because both Indian and Moroccan personnel were also involved.\textsuperscript{127} In his address to the Council, the Congolese representative raised neither the issue of white forces generally, or Canadian participation in particular. Many other countries came to Canada’s defence. Argentina, for example, considered the Soviet allegations against Canadian peacekeepers an insult to a country "whose international conduct had been universally recognised as serious, responsible and worthy of respect."\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{125} NAC, RG25, vol. 5219, file 6386-C-40 part 3, Robertson to Diefenbaker, 22 August 1960.
\textsuperscript{128} NAC, RG25, vol. 5219, file 6386-C-40 part 3, Robertson to Diefenbaker, 25 August 1960.
Less than a week later, Kuznetsov “upbraided” Hammarskjöld again for continuing to use Canadian troops. In addition to their opposition to the presence of Canadian signalers, the Soviets were upset that so many officials at ONUC Headquarters had been drawn from “NATO countries.” This, combined with Soviet opposition to the decision to temporarily replace Ralph Bunche with another American, Andrew Cordier, raised tensions to yet a higher pitch. These criticisms persisted well into September, when the Soviets continued their campaign against Hammarskjöld in the General Assembly. Charles Ritchie reported widespread concern at the UN for the Secretary-General’s future with the organisation, given the strength and severity of the USSR’s criticism. Diplomats wondered if the Soviets were “out for his scalp.” Ritchie thought it premature to conclude that the USSR was aiming for Hammarskjöld’s resignation but was concerned the Congo crisis had become an issue in the Cold War.

The potential for intervention by one of the Great Powers in the internal affairs of the Congo seemed all the more likely, and this posed a far greater threat than the initial mutiny by the Force Publique and the subsequent Belgian intervention. In this context. Lumumba’s threats to expel UN forces, if he carried through on them, would have presented a new dilemma. Because the departure of ONUC would have constituted a potential threat to international peace and security, the decision to withdraw UN forces could no longer be made “on a unilateral and arbitrary basis by the Congo

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129 Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 436-437.
130 Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 434; Soviet concerns on this point were perhaps understandable, as Madeleine Kalb notes, “The original staff officers who accompanied von Horn to the Congo were from Canada, Sweden, New Zealand, and Italy, and they were later joined by officers from Denmark, Great Britain, and Ghana. Not one of the military advisers came from Eastern Europe.” Madeleine Kalb, The Congo Cables, 20-21.
government."^132 Such a decision would have to be deliberated in the Security Council. As early as 17 August, the Canadian Cabinet was aware that a day might come when a decision on the withdrawal of the Canadian ONUC contingent would mean choosing between either the Congo Government's demands or the UN's wishes.\(^133\)

By the middle of August, and on into September, the Diefenbaker government found itself in a difficult position because of a commitment it had made to send four Caribou aircraft to support Canadian peacekeepers serving with ONUC. On 1 August, the government announced in the House of Commons its intention to purchase these planes from the de Havilland Aircraft Company. Because of their ability to take off and land within short distances, they were considered ideally suited to conditions in the Congo. Arrangements to purchase the aircraft were quickly completed, with delivery of the first operational aircraft by 15 August. Air and ground crews were expected to be trained by the time the aircraft arrived.\(^134\)

Initially, the RCAF used North Stars to transport the gift of Canadian food aid. The Cabinet subsequently approved a plan to use these aircraft in an airlift of UN supplies and equipment from Pisa, Italy to Leopoldville, for a period of thirty days. It will be recalled that a controversy developed when it was discovered that the North Stars were used for internal transport of UN forces. The Cabinet opposed the use of the planes for this purpose. In any event, the North Stars were recalled to Canada, with the agreement of UN officials, to transport the Canadian signalers to the Congo. Once all Canadian forces were airlifted, the North Stars were expected to return to duties on the Pisa-Leopoldville

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external airlift, leaving the new Caribou to primarily provide internal air support for Canadian forces in ONUC. When the needs of Canadian forces were met, the planes were then to be available for other UN duties.

Officials at External expected it to be difficult to persuade the UN to accept the Caribous if they were to be “used in direct support of the Canadian Army, and were not to be placed generally at the disposal of the U.N. Commander or under his full operational control.” This interpretation of the Caribous’ role would have required the Canadian government to negotiate a direct bilateral agreement with the Congo government, an arrangement not considered “practical to contemplate.” Pearkes believed it was best to adhere to the Cabinet’s position. He noted that restrictions had been placed on the UN’s use of the Canadian signalers (i.e. they were not to be used in advance of brigade headquarters, subsequently modified to sub-territorial commands) and felt that the best policy would be to suggest a compromise: the RCAF Caribou unit would be “employed under the operational control of the United Nations Commander with priority being given to Canadian force requirements.”

By mid-September, the Caribou problem was still not resolved. Rather, it became more complicated. When Canadian officials offered the Caribou to the UN, the Secretary-General was neither in New York nor Leopoldville. Bunche reacted favourably “on practical grounds of need for air transport.” Subsequently, Hammarskjöld made it clear that he considered it politically inadvisable “to add, at this time, a hundred air and ground crew from Canada to the UN force.” In Leopoldville, Bunche was contacted by the Secretariat to clarify this difference in opinion. He confirmed the practical advantages of

the Canadian offer but added that von Horn rejected the Canadian proposal that the Caribou be used primarily to support the Canadian Signals Unit or that priority should be given to their requirements. The Force Commander wanted the Caribou to be "assigned as part of the ONUC Air Transport Unit," under his command. In the end, Bunche said he "understood" Hammarskjöld's view of the political implications of accepting the Caribou. In effect, the UN had decided not to accept Canada's offer and the Permanent Mission concluded only a direct approach to the Secretary-General might reverse this position.\(^{138}\)

Such an approach seems not to have taken place because within a week External Affairs had further learned that Hammarskjöld "responded negatively in very firm terms" to the compromise proposal suggested by the government. Given the criticism he had faced from the Soviets over his decision to include Canadian signalers in ONUC, he believed a proposal to send a Canadian air unit would leave him in an "untenable position."\(^{139}\) Hammarskjöld suggested that the Caribou might still be used if Canada was prepared to make them available on a 'lend-lease' basis, so that they could be staffed by aircrews from other UN units.\(^{140}\) Col. Mendelsohn returned to Ottawa in September to give a preliminary report to the Department of National Defence. He argued that, in spite of the Secretary-General's concerns, there was an urgent need for the Caribou and that

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\(^{138}\) NAC, RG24, vol. 21484, file 2137.3 part 1, Telegram PERMISNY to External: Congo – UN Use of Caribou Aircraft, 18 August 1960. The Canadian government was guilty of 'placing the diplomatic cart before the horse.' Precedent established that no nation had the right to insist on the inclusion of its forces in a peacekeeping mission. While the Canadian government did not quite go this far, it was certainly premature to announce the acquisition of the Caribou for service in ONUC prior to consultations with the UN Secretariat on the appropriateness and suitability of such a contribution. On the development of this precedent, see: Wainhouse, *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads*, 558.


this need was fully recognised by von Horn. The only thing standing in the way was Hammarskjöld’s desire not “to upset the Russians.”

These difficulties aside, the RCAF was of considerable assistance to the UN, especially in the early days of ONUC. The UN was impressed with the services of Air Commodore F. S. Carpenter, who was present in the Congo when the first ONUC peacekeepers arrived. Following Carpenter’s return to Canada, the Secretary-General asked if the Canadian officer could be sent back to Leopoldville, accompanied by five RCAF staff officers, to form an air staff at von Horn’s headquarters. Group Captain W.K. Carr was dispatched in Carpenter’s place, along with ten other personnel to serve at Force Headquarters and as RCAF communications technicians and operators.

The RCAF initially envisaged their contribution to ONUC as an Air Transport Unit (ATU) consisting of two key elements: four Caribou aircraft to be employed in support of Canadian forces and the routine North Star airlift between Pisa and Leopoldville. The latter was considered a temporary commitment, initially undertaken for 30 days, while the Caribou were seen as the key long term commitment. Ironically, as we have seen, the Caribou portion of the ATU never materialised for political reasons, but arrangements governing the ‘temporary’ North Star airlift were repeatedly renewed every 90 days.

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In late August, von Horn advised New York of his proposed establishment for the United Nations Air Transport Force (UNATF). He expected Canadians to fill many key roles. He argued that the position of Air Commander should be filled by a Canadian because "of the familiarity of Canadians with Air transportation principles, ICAO standards, and requirements." He warned, "if for some unforeseen reason it would not be desirable to have a Canadian as the Air Commander, then it is absolutely essential that an appropriate RCAF officer fill the SASO [Senior Air Staff Officer] establishment."

Because of their experience and familiarity with procedures to be followed and equipment to be used, he maintained that the Chief Operations Officer, Engineering Officer, and Supply Officer should all be Canadians; but, perhaps anticipating Hammarskjöld's concerns that he might be seen as relying too heavily upon Canadians, von Horn planned to reduce the number of Canadians at UNATF headquarters by a third, over a period of three months.144 Overall, RCAF strength fell from 58 personnel in August to 15 by December.145

Together with technicians from the Canadian Department of Transport, the RCAF played an important role in directing air traffic, a task previously performed by Belgian technicians who had left the Congo with the wave of European evacuees in the days following the mutiny of the Force Publique. A mere two hours before ONUC forces were scheduled to arrive at a rate of one troop transport every half hour, the only person in the

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144 In August 1960, Canadians occupied all of the positions at UNATF. By November, von Horn anticipated Canadians would still hold 4 of 13 positions. Coughlin underlines the RCAF's experience as the UN's only airlift in the Middle East as the reason why Canadians were asked to play such a key role in UNATF. T.G. Coughlin, "The UN and the RCAF," Roundel 16.10 (December, 1964) 6; NAC, RG24, vol. 3022, file 895-8/115, Letter and Attached Charts Von Horn to UN HQ (New York), 23 August 1960.
145 Fred Gaffen, In the Eye of the Storm, 222-223.
control tower at N’djili airport was a “very drunk Belgian who was discovered collapsed over his instruments.”146

On 2 August, a special request for technical assistance arrived from an unexpected quarter. Ghana was planning a bilateral training program with the Congo to train Congolese cadets as Force Publique officers at the Ghana Military Academy. The Ghanaian President, Dr. Nkrumah, hoped Canada would cooperate in this venture by providing approximately twenty French-speaking members of the Armed Forces to assist in the training. The Canadian High Commissioner in Ghana confirmed that General Alexander supported the Ghanaian proposal and would “not want other than [Canadian] service personnel to assist.”147

Canadian officials considered the request with caution and questioned the Ghanaian motives for the proposal. Ghana and Guinea had recently made known their interest in establishing a federation with the Congo. One member of the Prime Minister’s Office observed. “In free Africa, as in free Asia, power politics are regarded as the monopoly of the West—or, at least, of East and West,” but added, “Can it be, nevertheless, that a game of African power-politics, with strictly African goals and within African regional confines, is also emerging?”148 Officials at External preferred to coordinate Congolese assistance through the UN. They suggested Britain, the US. and the UN all be consulted to ascertain their views on such a proposal.149 The Minister of National Defence, George Pearkes, was even more reluctant. He wrote to Prime Minister

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148 DCC, file MG1/XII/C/114, Memo for Prime Minister: Crisis in Congo and the Role of Ghana, 1 August 1960.
149 NAC, RG25, vol. 5219, file 6386-C-40 part 2, Robertson to Green, 4 August 1960.
Diefenbaker to encourage him to reply negatively to the request citing a shortage of highly trained French-speaking personnel. Yet, Pearkes added that a UN sponsored initiative would be preferable to a bilateral agreement. This would seem to imply that he actually opposed the Ghanian plan not because of the stated shortage of personnel, but on the grounds of the bilateral nature of the arrangement.  

The Cabinet considered the request on 12 August, and their deliberations were greatly simplified when Hammarskjöld cabled Canadian authorities to request a similar training program under UN auspices. The timely arrival of the UN request provided the government with a diplomatic reason to reject participation in Ghana’s training scheme. A later suggestion by Nkrumah to channel Congolese aid through independent African states was also rebuffed. While Diefenbaker appeared to adopt a position that was sympathetic to the Ghanian view that all aid need not necessarily be delivered through the UN, he ultimately asserted that there was not “a real alternative at the present time to the United Nations presence in and assistance to the Congo.”

The government was clearly of the view that the Congo crisis would be best addressed through multilateral, not bilateral, solutions. On 26 August, the government officially declined involvement in Nkrumah’s plans. He was told Canadian participation in efforts to “re-establish order in the Congo” were being carried out “through the United Nations.”

Two weeks earlier, External Affairs had advised the Permanent Mission in New York that the government was willing to consider Hammarskjöld’s training scheme

and might supply “up to 100 personnel but is thinking in terms of about 50.” In addition, throughout August, External Affairs and DND continued their joint efforts to respond to the UN’s increasing number of requests to second and transfer Canadian personnel from UNTSO to ONUC headquarters, although the CGS, S.F. Clark, continued to express concern that the UN not transfer officers without first consulting Canadian authorities. By month’s end, the first Canadian casualties in ONUC justified Clark’s cautious approach and Cabinet halted plans to send any more Canadians to the Congo, including those considered for the UN’s training scheme.

The isolated incidents of violence encountered by Canadian peacekeepers shortly after their arrival were soon followed by a significant deterioration in the internal Congolese political situation. Two events were crucial: Lumumba’s abortive attack on Katanga through South Kasai in late August and the subsequent coup by President Kasavubu. The ANC massacre of some 200 Baluba tribespeople, in South Kasai, has already been mentioned. While Lumumba’s reliance on Soviet transport planes to move his troops into Kasai further alienated him from the West, the massacre itself greatly affected Hammarskjöld. The Secretary-General believed the massacre was not only a “flagrant violation of elementary human rights,” but also “had characteristics of the crime of genocide.” The barbarity prompted the UN to act, in spite of legal stipulations within its Charter against intervention within a state. A neutral, de-militarized zone was

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established between tribal groups. President Kasavubu used the events in Kasai as a pretext to dismiss Lumumba because his actions as Prime Minister “were becoming increasingly arbitrary and were involving the country in civil war.” Kasavubu announced his decision in a radio broadcast from Leopoldville on the evening of 5 September. Lumumba, in turn, took to the airwaves, denounced Kasavubu’s actions as inspired by imperialists, and dismissed the President.

Andrew Cordier, who had recently replaced Ralph Bunche as the Secretary-General’s Representative, feared the situation would deteriorate into a state of civil war and ordered UN forces to take control of airports throughout the Congo to prevent the movement of troops. The next day, following a number of pro-Lumumba radio broadcasts which Cordier feared would incite civil war, he ordered ONUC to take control of the Leopoldville radio station. These actions proved very controversial because, while they stabilised the conflict, they also worked to Kasavubu’s advantage. Without access to airports, Lumumba was unable to transport the ANC forces that remained loyal to him from their positions in Kasai to Leopoldville, and Kasavubu’s allies across the river in Brazzaville were willing to continue broadcasting his political announcements. Carole Collins offers the most damning interpretation of Cordier’s actions, suggesting that his decisions “effectively threw U.N. support behind Kasavubu and reinforced US and Belgian efforts to oust Lumumba — seriously compromising the United Nations’ impartiality.” Other scholars are more forgiving. McVitty, for example, succinctly

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identifies the difficult position Cordier faced: ‘‘At times inaction was as capable of affecting the volatile internal situation as action would have been.’’

Ironically, just two weeks earlier, Hammarskjöld had responded to criticism that ONUC’s administration was too Western and American in particular, by announcing that Ralph Bunche would be replaced as head of ONUC by an Indian diplomat, Rajeshwar Dayal. His choice of Cordier, another American, to serve temporarily between Bunche and Dayal was, with the benefit of hindsight, unfortunate.

The establishment of an Advisory Committee was one step Hammarskjöld took to insulate himself against criticism of his direction of ONUC. During the August 1st debate in the House of Commons on Canadian participation in ONUC, Lester Pearson raised the question of whether or not the Secretary-General intended to strike an Advisory Committee, following the precedent set by UNEF. Initially, External Affairs did not perceive the need or desirability for such an Advisory Committee. Norman Robertson observed that ONUC, unlike UNEF, was established by the Security Council.

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and Hammarskjöld could simply turn to it for advice instead of a separate Advisory Committee. Robertson believed the question of composition would be so controversial that Hammarskjöld “would be better advised to rely on the Security Council, the military staffs, including General Von Horn’s headquarters staff, and on normal diplomatic arrangements for obtaining and receiving advice from member governments.”

It would appear that Hammarskjöld initially shared Robertson’s views because the Secretary-General’s initial plans for ONUC did not include an Advisory Committee. Pradhan argues that had one been established at the outset of the crisis, “much of the misunderstanding which developed between the Lumumba Government and ONUC could have been avoided.” Once the Soviets raised the possibility of an Afro-Asian commission to “assist the Secretary-General in his activities in the Congo,” and pressed their proposals for a troika to replace Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General seriously considered the establishment of an Advisory Committee as an acceptable alternative to these suggestions. On 23 August, the Canadian Government received an invitation to join fifteen other countries in membership on the committee. The turbulent events of August had clearly influenced Canadian policy; in a complete reversal of its earlier position, External Affairs now argued.

Because of the complexity of the United Nations operations in the Congo, there is all the more reason for having an advisory committee. While the Secretary-General has received and will no doubt continue to receive, broad policy direction from the Security Council, he would find it useful to

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165 NAC, RG25, vol. 5219, file 6386-C-40 part 2, Memo for Minister: Congo: Advisory Committee for Secretary-General, 4 August 1960.
166 Ram Chandra Pradhan, The United Nations and the Congo Crisis, 226.
share some of the day to day problems with representatives of
governments directly involved in the United Nations operations.\textsuperscript{168}

The Secretary-General was informed the next day that Canada was willing to serve as a
member of the Advisory Committee.\textsuperscript{169}

Ottawa was quick to provide the Permanent Mission in New York with advice on
how best to participate in these meetings. The politics of race were an immediate
concern. External Affairs anticipated that the meetings would inform all members and
provide “a common basis for consultation” but considered it quite likely that
representatives of governments “providing white troops will be consulting more closely
with one another than with some of the other reps on the [committee].” This assumption
was based upon previous experience with UNEF. External Affairs further cautioned:

In the proceedings of the newly established advisory [committee] it will
be very desirable to avoid any impression that opinions are divided on
racial lines about the operation of the force in Congo. You will readily
appreciate why, in a UN context, the [governments] providing white
troops should not [repeat] not appear to be banded together either in
favour or against suggestions made by the [Secretary-General]. As a
general approach to the [committee] we would suggest that African
members be allowed to make the running on most questions raised.
Certainly, it would appear wise for the reps of non-African [governments]
to withhold their advice to the [Secretary-General] until after Africans
have had an opportunity to express theirs.\textsuperscript{170}

Canadian representatives were, evidently, successful at carrying out these instructions.

One British diplomat remarked, “the Canadians on the Committee ‘make a practice of not

\textsuperscript{168} NAC, RG25, vol. 5219, file 6386-C-40 part 3, Memo for Prime Minister: Advisory Committee
\textsuperscript{169} NAC, RG24, vol. 21485, file 2137.3 part 2, Telegram External to PERMISNY: Congo
\textsuperscript{170} NAC, RG24, vol. 21485, file 2137.3 part 2, Telegram External to PERMISNY: UN Force in
Congo, 26 August 1960.
throwing their weight about among all these black faces." 171 Although the United Kingdom was not permitted to attend the committee's confidential meetings, Canada followed the precedent of the UNEF Advisory Committee, where it was common practice for members to filter information to other member states on a confidential basis and regularly advised Britain on the discussions that had taken place. 172

Some Canadians were so disturbed by events in the Congo they wrote to either Diefenbaker or Green to express their views on the developing crisis, either as concerned individuals or as members of organizations. On the issue of Katanga and Belgian intervention, for example, the Delta Committee of the Communist Party of Canada urged Diefenbaker "to use [his] good office to the end that all Belgian troops be immediately removed from that country, including the Province of Katanga." 173 Whereas, the Canadian Council of Churches was sympathetic to the position of the Belgians and suggested that their post-independence military intervention could not be "fairly regarded as "aggression."" 174 V. McFaul wrote, "We are very sorry for Belgium, who gave Congo its [sic] freedom, now under U.N. pressure must also vacate Katanga. U.N. will go into Katanga against the will of that government. Rather points up and makes a FARCE U.N. democratic objectives doesn't it." 175 The Victoria Branch of the Communist Party of Canada urged the Prime Minister "to press for the speedy removal of Belgian troops from

173 DCC, file MG1/VI/(845 Congo), Letter Delta Committee Communist Party of Canada to Diefenbaker, 6 August 1960.
174 DCC, file MG1/VI/(845 Congo), Letter Gallagher (Canadian Council of Churches) to Diefenbaker, 7 August 1960.
175 NAC, RG25, vol. 5209, file 6386-40 part 10, Letter V.M. McFaul to Diefenbaker, 11 August 1960 [emphasis and underlining as per original].
every foot of Congo territory.”  

Finally, Bronson McNair questioned, “Should Dag H. and Bunche be given the awesome power to bludgeon Katanga and deny it the Self Determination of Nations right?”

One common trend in the tone of correspondence was discernible following the two incidents in August when Canadian peacekeepers were beaten by Congolese forces: the number of letters expressing extreme views increased. Many were blatantly racist and viewed Diefenbaker’s protests against the ill treatment as inadequate. Robert Blair wired, “What good protests to apes who cannot read or comprehend [sic] if they could stop Suggest only recourse to show minimum dignity is recall Canadians immediately stop Let blacks stew in own mess.” ‘Citizen Jones’ scolded Diefenbaker: “As a Canadian tax payer I demand that you cease forwarding these ‘stern letters of protest’ to the Congolese Govt. I say let this chap Lumumba buy his own toilet paper.” Yet another wire arrived from John Madden in Newfoundland, “I am ashamed to belong to the Canadian federation when the citizens of a country can be beaten up by savages in a country to which we have to help with taxes either get all people out of there immediately and let them eat one another or do not sent any more help to Lumumba [sic].” Mrs. C. Critchell, 1st Vice President of the Sechelt Conservative Association wrote to Howard Green: “I used to feel very sorry for those poor natives, for there is no doubt they have been abused, but it is no doubt now they are more animal than man. From now on I shall only think of them as smelly dirty niggers. ... Tell them to shoot and not to wait until they

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178 DCC, file MG1/V1(845 Congo), Telegram Blair to Diefenbaker, 29 August 1960.
179 DCC, file MG1/V1(845 Congo), Letter Jones to Diefenbaker, 29 August 1960.
180 DCC, file MG1/V1(845 Congo), Telegram Madden to Diefenbaker, 30 August 1960.
'see the whites of their eyes'.”181 And, perhaps most direct, "Who was the Big Dumb Nut, who sent French-speaking Canadians to the Congo?"182

Yet, even after these incidents, some letters were much less strident and did remain supportive of Canadian participation in ONUC. Someone from Edmonton wrote, “This was to be a protest on your handling of the treatment of our soldiers in the Congo. But I must say I am pleased with your handling of the situation. ... Please keep in mind you have the Canadian people behind you.”183 Professor Maxwell Cohen, of McGill University, advised the Prime Minister: “It is imperative that despite all the embarrassment and provocation Canada remains part of the United Nations force in the Congo. ... A withdrawal by Canada now would encourage a future pattern of discrimination in any future United Nations force.”184 In spite of the harsh criticism the government received from some citizens, Howard Green, in a response to Mrs. Critchell’s letter, echoed Professor Cohen’s views: “I continue to believe, and I am sure that the majority of my fellow citizens must share my view, that the best hope for re-

181 NAC, RG25, vol. 5209, file 6386-40 part 11, Letter Critchell to Green, 29 August 1960 [underlining as per original].
182 DCC, file MG1/VI/(845 Congo), Letter Barker to Diefenbaker, 5 September 1960.
183 DCC, file MG1/VI/(845 Congo), Letter Riaskowsky to Diefenbaker, 30 August 1960.
184 DCC, file MG1/XII/C/114, Memo to Prime Minister from Professor Maxwell Cohen, 30 August 1960.
establishment of law and order in the Congo is through the efforts of the United Nations and that Canada is right to back up that endeavour to the utmost."\textsuperscript{185}
Rajeshwar Dayal arrived in the Congo on September 8th, to replace Andrew Cordier as head of ONUC. Political confusion reigned. President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba had each dismissed the other, and attempts within the Congolese parliament to legitimise either leader’s actions, or reach a compromise solution, proved futile. Dayal was faced with increasing accusations that the UN, because it closed the Leopoldville radio station and all airports, was biased in favour of Kasavubu. ONUC was in a difficult position. It was assumed that the UN mission would work in cooperation with the Congolese government; but, as one scholar notes, such a government ceased to exist on 5 September and the UN was then faced with a “governmental interregnum.”

Perhaps in an attempt to improve the UN’s relations with the Congolese, Dayal took action soon after his arrival to reopen the radio station and the airports to civilian traffic. These efforts were soon overtaken, however, by a coup orchestrated by the Chief of Staff of the ANC, Colonel Joseph Mobutu. On the evening of 14 September, Mobutu announced by radio that the army was temporarily taking power. Both rival governments and parliament were effectively neutralised and replaced by a College of Commissioners, consisting mostly of students and recent graduates appointed by Mobutu.

In reports of these events, the Canadian Consul General said Dayal dealt firmly with Mobutu. In the days following the coup, the army harassed many of Lumumba’s supporters in the African quarter of Leopoldville, until Dayal was said to have strongly protested, telling Mobutu “to control the Army or else.” In addition, Dayal intervened to

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prevent Lumumba’s arrest and resisted Mobutu’s attempts to cloak his coup with the College of Commissioners. The Colonel reportedly asked if the UN would recognize a government established and led by himself. Dayal refused, unwilling “to let the UN act as midwife at the birth of a military dictatorship,” but was left with little choice but to deal with the College of Commissioners on a “de facto basis”. It was made clear that this was not tantamount to official recognition. Dayal’s position strained relations between the UN and the US and with the American Ambassador to the Congo, Claire Timberlake, in particular. Although some in the State Department had misgivings about contradicting the UN position, US policy generally supported the Mobutu régime from the outset. Schatzberg goes so far as to suggest that the “CIA bore much of the responsibility for Mobutu’s coup.” This divergence in US and UN policy toward Mobutu was significant. In the months ahead, it seriously affected Dayal in his position as head of ONUC.

During the first week of September, the Secretary-General’s Advisory Committee considered an important question of principle facing ONUC, arising out of the massacres in South Kasai and Hammarskjöld’s response. The Secretary-General planned to send a letter to the Congolese authorities suggesting that he was sure the government would support the UN in any efforts to prevent such arbitrary acts of violence against civilians. Unless he heard otherwise from the Congolese, he would issue instructions to UN forces to take action to prevent such atrocities in future. While the white members of the committee remained silent, Guinea, Liberia, and Morocco were vocal in their opposition to Hammarskjöld’s plans. They suggested the unfortunate events in Kasai were a result of

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the civil war. They expected that the Secretary-General’s proposed instructions to ONUC would be “extremely unpalatable” to the Congolese government. Instead, it was decided that Cordier would approach the Congolese authorities and discuss the matter informally. If their response was “not helpful,” the issue was to be raised again in the Advisory Committee.

Although he remained silent at the meeting, it is clear the Canadian Representative, Charles Ritchie, also had serious reservations about Hammarskjöld’s plan to revise ONUC’s instructions. He wondered,

whether orders of the kind envisaged could be implemented without placing an impossible burden of judgment on the individual commander. What criteria should be used to differentiate between action taken in pursuit of the civil war and those which are merely abhorrent on grounds of human rights and civilized conduct? What are the specific grounds on which a UN commander would be entitled to take such action which would involve the shooting of Congolese troops, from either side?

Ritchie was anxious for advice from Ottawa. Along with the other white representatives, he had remained silent during this meeting but speculated, “continued abstention on our part, particularly in the type of debate which is expected at the next meeting, might well be questioned.” He added, “issues of principle and of wide implications for the future of UN operations in the Congo and elsewhere are now coming to the center of the debate.” The Legal Division at External Affairs shared Ritchie’s concerns. After reviewing the relevant UN resolutions, they maintained ONUC could not take “any forceful action which is in direct contravention of the express instructions of the recognized Congolese Government, nor [could] they take any steps to interfere in conflicts, armed or otherwise.

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between organized bodies." And, although they acknowledged the Balubas' human rights had been violated, they did not believe this alone "could extend the mandate of the U.N. Forces in the Congo without further authority from the Security Council." Canada may not have shared the political objections of the African members of the Committee, but clearly Hammarskjöld's views raised legal and practical concerns in both Ottawa and New York.

Initially, the Canadian government did not enthusiastically respond to the possibility of involvement in UN efforts to address the Congo crisis. However, once UN requirements were clarified and the government decided to participate in ONUC, National Defence and External Affairs recognised the significance of the peacekeeping mission and worked together to meet the UN's requests for assistance. Then, in mid-September, it seemed that DND began to have second thoughts. The deteriorating political conditions in the Congo raised concerns, but negative reports from Colonel Mendelsohn and the trying experience with the Caribou aircraft also may have curtailed their willingness to either increase or maintain the Canadian presence in ONUC.

Geoffrey Murray, of the UN Division at External, attended one of Mendelsohn's briefings and cautioned, "If Col. Mendelsohn has reported to his superiors in the same pessimistic and critical vein, we can expect the Canadian Army to be rather cool to additional requests from the United Nations for military assistance in the Congo.” Mendelsohn warned that the Communist bloc nations were poised to assist Lumumba in seizing control of the Congo and cited the presence of Soviet aircraft in particular as evidence of this. His most venomous criticism was saved for the UN and ONUC itself. While he complained about Von Horn's "lack of firmness," this was scathingly attributed

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to political interference by authorities in New York. The Commander’s staff was deemed “woefully inefficient,” and the Colonel questioned their ability to conduct ONUC “even in the best of conditions.” He complained “bitterly about the preference which was given to African members of the Force,” even suggesting that Hammarskjöld “was not really happy about the inclusion of Canadians.” Consequently, the Canadians, according to Mendelsohn, “had no part in the planning of operations in the Congo even those concerning the use of the signals detachment.”

Murray noted there were tensions over the role of the Canadian Headquarters Unit in the Congo; its anomalous position meant that it was often overlooked by ONUC headquarters, and this, Murray speculated, may have prejudiced Mendelsohn’s views. Concerned this report would prompt DND to expect External to protest at the UN, Murray wrote to Charles Ritchie. He described Mendelsohn as a “highly emotional type who would make a better back room planner than a field commander,” but warned, “the Canadian Army may be disposed to pay heed to Col. Mendelsohn’s pessimistic report because there seems to be considerable disappointment at NDHQ that Canada has not been given a more prominent part in the Congo operation.” This latter statement is difficult to reconcile with the Army’s initial reluctance to part with Canadian service personnel but may also explain why Murray added, “this is not altogether the fault of the United Nations.”

Evidently, DND chose to raise its concerns in Cabinet rather than at the UN. When Cabinet considered the question of Canadians serving in ONUC on 14 September, the Minister of National Defence said, “the condition of the Canadian troops in the

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Congo was far from satisfactory because they were apparently unwelcome both to the Congolese and to the personnel of the United Nations military organization there.”

Pearkes went so far as to suggest that Howard Green, while in New York at the upcoming session of the General Assembly, should raise with Hammarskjöld the possibility that the Canadians be “relieved by Asian or African signallers.” Then, as the issue was discussed, Pearkes’ concerns were set aside. Cabinet recalled the Secretary-General’s intent to assemble ONUC from a variety of nations so as not to “imply that the U.N. was making a discrimination based on colour,” and was anxious not “to give the impression of being reluctant to carry through its undertaking to the U.N.” In spite of the Minister’s misgivings, they were unwilling to preemptively end Canada’s contribution to ONUC. Pearkes was offered some consolation: Green was instructed to raise once again the issue of the Caribou aircraft with Hammarskjöld.10

The Security Council resumed consideration of the Congo Crisis on 9 September, to review the fourth report of the Secretary-General and to consider how best to respond to the latest Congolese political turmoil. Hammarskjöld’s report urged the Council to issue a request for funds, and in statements to the Council he defended Cordier’s decision to close both the radio station and airports. As telegrams arrived from the competing Congolese political factions, each announcing the dispatch of rival delegations to the UN, the Council decided to adjourn until 14 September but not before seating the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Valerian Zorin, who had arrived to replace Kuznetsov.

When the Council met on the 14th, Ritchie reported that Zorin delivered a “harsh, vituperative” attack on Hammarskjöld’s conduct of ONUC. He suggested “UN command

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10 NAC, RG2, vol. 2747, Cabinet Conclusions, 14 September 1960; Ultimately, the UN Secretariat agreed to make use of at least two of the Caribou in UNEF, as replacements for two Dakotas serving there. NAC, RG25, vol. 5220, file 6386-C-40 part 5, Letter Barton to Campbell, 23 September 1960.
and the [Secretary-General] personally from the very beginning had pursued a policy of interference," and was especially critical of Hammarskjöld's decision to recruit "so-called experts" from countries in the "western camp," including the Canadian signals company.\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5220, file 6386-C-40 part 5, Telegram 1457 PERMISNY to External: Congo – Security Council, 15 September, 1960.} The Soviets had already raised this issue with Hammarskjöld in August but had done so only half-heartedly. Now their tone changed. When Ritchie spoke with Zorin following the meeting to point out "the absurdity of stating that this small group of non-combatant troops could be described as a 'colonialist plot' of NATO," the Soviet Representative "replied simply by criticizing [the Canadian] decision to send any troops to the Congo."\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5220, file 6386-C-40 part 5, Telegram 1459 PERMISNY to External: Congo – Security Council, 15 September 1960.} The next day the American representative came to Canada's defence, arguing,

I cannot believe that any member of this Council will be impressed by the charge that the inclusion in a UN force totaling some 18,000 of personnel from [Canada] and Norway of a total of less than 300 men performing specialised technical functions, constitutes an instrument of imperialist designs by the NATO powers in Africa. I believe rather that when African states recall the honourable and consistent attitude of [Canada] and Norway towards African problems they will prefer to draw other conclusions.\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5220, file 6386-C-40 part 5, Telegram 1459 PERMISNY to External: Congo – Security Council, 15 September 1960.}

Cold war politics were clearly at play. Both the Soviet and American delegations introduced draft resolutions. Ceylon and Tunisia responded with an Afro-Asian resolution that generally supported Hammarskjöld, his conduct of ONUC, and the recommendations contained within his fourth report. It did, however, encourage closer coordination between ONUC and the Congolese authorities. The resolution obtained
eight affirmative votes but was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The United States then proposed, and the Council concurred over Soviet objections, to convene an emergency session of the General Assembly using the Uniting for Peace Resolution.¹⁴

On 17 September, the General Assembly was convened. The Soviet Union introduced a draft resolution embodying much of its criticism of ONUC and the Secretary-General. Seventeen of the Afro-Asian nations also introduced a resolution based primarily upon the vetoed version Ceylon and Tunisia had co-sponsored in the Security Council. This, Cordier and Foote suggest, "cut the ground right out from under the Soviet's tactical position."¹⁵ The Soviets did not press for a vote on their resolution, and the Afro-Asian resolution was adopted by a vote of 70 in favour, none against, and 11 abstentions (Soviet bloc, France, and South Africa).¹⁶ Most scholars agree this was a victory for Hammarskjöld and a vote of confidence in his handling of ONUC.¹⁷

Ottawa's instructions to vote in favour of the 17 power resolution contained the first clear and succinct statement of Canadian policy on the Congo crisis:

The [Canadian Government] has throughout the Congo crisis taken the view that the UN's presence represents the best hope of preserving stability and of preventing the Congo from becoming a cold war arena.

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¹⁶ The text of Resolution 1474 (ES-IV) is reproduced in Appendix 2.
We think the internal constitutional difficulties are a matter for the Congolese people to work out for themselves but they may need the help of the UN in doing so. Interference outside the framework of the UN is clearly to be deplored. In the prevailing confusion moreover there is every justification for the UN taking the measures necessary to keep the peace.

These principles governed Canadian policy in the years ahead, but the government was reluctant to advocate its views vigorously. Ottawa thought it best if the Afro-Asian nations made “most of the running in the debate” and saw no reason why Canada would intervene, “unless it seemed desirable to give the [Secretary-General] fullest possible support or unless our silence in the debate would be conspicuous.” External added, “The fact that we are participating in the UN force and that our participation has been under attack might be reason for not intervening and for letting others defend the [Secretary-General’s] decision to select [Canadians] for the force.”18 The presence of Canadian forces in ONUC came to be a frequently cited justification for not overtly and openly advocating Canadian policy objectives. During this emergency session, however, Charles Ritchie felt compelled to speak. Aside from a veiled reference to the Soviets, who he suggested had dangerously and selfishly interfered in the Congo, the statement was positive in tone and supported the 17 power resolution.19

The emergency session of the General Assembly was immediately followed by the fifteenth regular session. Cabinet issued instructions for the Canadian delegation,

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urging them to be "alert to seize every opportunity that may be presented to encourage an improvement in the conduct of relations between Eastern and Western countries and to promote understanding between the latter and the countries of Asia and Africa."\textsuperscript{20} Although the Congo situation was not originally on the agenda of this session, Cabinet suggested the issues of financing ONUC and material support for the Congo should be raised, if the opportunity presented itself. These instructions demonstrate an inconsistency or contradiction in the Canadian position. On the one hand, Canada was clearly a member of NATO and a developed nation; yet, the government perceived a role for Canada as a bridge between East and West, North and South. Through quiet diplomacy, it seems, Canada hoped to rise above its geopolitical position to facilitate communication between blocs of nations.

Unfortunately for Canada, the fifteenth session proved an unlikely stage on which to play the role of conciliator. Urquhart has said it was "by any standard an extraordinary gathering."\textsuperscript{21} Attended by 32 heads of government, including Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and Diefenbaker, it quickly degenerated into a bitter exchange of cold war accusations. Khrushchev was particularly vitriolic in his denunciations of Hammarskjöld and his conduct of ONUC. The Secretary-General's spirited defence of his actions and his office brought most delegations to their feet in a standing ovation but also lead to the now infamous scene of Khrushchev pounding his desk with his fists. Diefenbaker's speech demonstrated the contradiction of presenting Canada as moderate and detached but also

aligned with the West. By calling upon the Soviets to abandon their “colonies” in Eastern Europe, the Prime Minister left little doubt in the minds of delegates as to Canada’s position in the cold war. In a subsequent meeting with Eisenhower and State Department officials who expressed “in very warm terms their appreciation of the Prime Minister’s speech,” Diefenbaker noted that Krishna Menon, the Indian Representative, was said to have called the speech “a continuation of the cold war.” For the moment, Canada’s position as ally took precedence over its aspiration to be a mediator.

In the Congo, a diplomatic episode of a different sort was taking place. Canadian ONUC officers and the Consul General were anxious to explain to Ottawa their presence, and the events they witnessed, at a reception in honour of the second anniversary of the independence of Guinea, hosted by the commander of ONUC’s Guinean contingent. Lt. Col. Berthiaume and Group Captain Carr were seated at the head table and were surprised when, part way through lunch, Patrice Lumumba arrived. Following their host’s speech, the two officers left, fearing Lumumba “might have made an address of his own and that their presence would have been a source of embarrassment to the United

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22 Raymond Rodgers, “The PM at the UN: An Assessment,” *Saturday Night* v. 75 (October 29, 1960) 23.
Nations.”24 Lumumba did address the luncheon and, according to the Canadian journalist Peter Worthington, said, “he [Lumumba] had gone to [Canada] to seek bilateral aid in belief that it was a truly democratic land but had been disappointed to find that although honest [Canada] was just another imperialist country.”25 The Consul General, who was dining with the UK Consul just outside the restaurant where the reception was held, denied Worthington’s suggestion that he had “gate crashed” the reception. He first speculated that Lumumba’s critical remarks about Canada might have been prompted by the departure of the two Canadian officers but later reported that the “walk out” failed to evoke “any comment.”26 While the incident itself was minor, it was significant because it suggests that Lumumba, by October, had come to view Canada as simply another Western nation.

The Canadian contingent was busy throughout September and October establishing new detachments, consolidating the Signals Squadron and Headquarters Unit, and addressing questions related to their command instructions, as originally issued by DND. In addition to continued support for Leopoldville and the four outlying detachments already established, signals personnel were now sent to Kamina, Gemena and Matadi.27 Because of the continued tense political situation facing the Stanleyville detachment, and especially after the ill treatment accorded the peacekeepers upon their

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arrival, the Signals commanding officer considered their withdrawal. In the end, Capt. J.J.B. Pariseau, the detachment commander, persuaded Maj. Bindoff that conditions had "completely changed," due mostly to the departure of the ANC, the "stabilizing influence of Mobutu," and "the enforced departure of the Russians and the consequential cessation of rumour-mongering."\(^{28}\) For the time being, the detachment stayed in the field.

Acting on Col. Mendelsohn's recommendation, DND decided to amalgamate Canadian Headquarters, ONUC with the 57\(^{th}\) Canadian Signal Squadron. The existing arrangement had two weaknesses: the HQ unit had not been requested by the UN and, in Mendelsohn's view, was "not the best organization to look after Canadian interests"; the commanding officer of the HQ unit was isolated from ONUC HQ, with "little or no access to staff planning likely to affect [Canadian] troops."\(^{29}\) The new unit was re-designated 57\(^{th}\) Canadian Signal Unit and was commanded by a Lt. Col. in the Royal Canadian Signals. Col. P.D. Smith arrived in the Congo on 24 October to assume command from Col. Mendelsohn, and the two units were officially amalgamated three days later.

Prior to Smith's appointment as commanding officer, questions arose over two related aspects of his command instructions. The controversy was prompted by the possibility the UN might ask for Canadian peacekeepers to be dispatched to Kamina, to

\(^{27}\) See appendix 4 for a map of the Congo illustrating locations of Canadian deployment.


serve as Provost personnel. Col. Mendelsohn was reluctant to agree to this request because the Canadian Units were, in so far as possible, to be kept together.30

Mendelsohn’s view was based on the following two paragraphs of his command instructions:

In principle all detachments of this Unit will be commanded by Canadian officers. While the deployment of the Unit, within the terms agreed to by the Canadian Government is a matter for the Commander UNOC to decide, it is anticipated that, in the normal course of operations, tasks will be allotted so that Canadian sub-units or detachments will be commanded by Canadian officers.

If, at any time, other than when required temporarily by urgent operational necessity, it appears that the principle of maintaining the separate entity of the Canadian Unit is likely to be violated, you will state your views to the Supreme Commander, United Nations Force, and immediately report the matter to the Chief of the General Staff.31

If posted to Kamina, the peacekeepers may have been asked to serve under a non-Canadian officer and would have been separated from the rest of their unit at ONUC HQ.

By comparison, detachments of the 57th, although posted throughout the Congo, were always commanded by a Canadian officer. In the end, DND advised Mendelsohn that he could agree to this use of Canadian personnel if they were posted to a location where there was also a 57th signals detachment, so that they could be placed under the immediate command of that detachment’s commanding officer.32 Ironically, the controversy proved moot when the Secretariat, likely still bruised from Soviet attacks

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31 DHH, file 112.1.003 (D9) vol. 2, Command Instructions for the Commander, Canadian Army Forces, UNOC, 17 October 1960.
against it for using Canadians in ONUC, advised ONUC HQ that it would approach
Norway and Denmark for the additional Provost Corps personnel, but "did not wish to
approach Canada at this time." 33

The second controversy concerning the Canadian command instructions related to
their provisions for communication between the 57th Signals Unit and Canadian Army
Headquarters. In mid October, the Permanent Mission in New York received a letter
Hammarskjöld wrote to each nation contributing forces to ONUC. He was concerned
senior officers of military contingents in ONUC were communicating with their national
governments prior to carrying out instructions from ONUC HQ. While this admonition
might seem related to Mendelsohn's recent objections, Ritchie was assured by Cordier
that it was directed towards the African governments who had "taken a very forward
position in relation to the activities of their contingents." 34 Nevertheless, the Canadian
command instructions clearly stipulated, "no limitation is placed on your [CO] direct
channel of communication on any matter with the Chief of the General Staff." 35
External Affairs recognized this contradiction. After consultations with DND, it was decided to
respond to Hammarskjöld as follows:

As in the case of Canadian participation in the UNEF, the command
instructions for the commanders of Canadian units serving with the United
Nations Force in the Congo have been made available to you and to the

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32 DHH, file 144.9.009 (D30), Telegrams CDN HQ ONUC to CANARMY and CANARMY to
CDN HQ ONUC LEO, 6 October 1960.
33 NAC, RG25, vol. 5220, file 6386-C-40 part 5, Note for File: Congo - Canadian Army
34 NAC, RG25, vol. 5220, file 6386-C-40 part 5, Telegram CANDELNY to External: UN Forces
in Congo, 18 October 1960.
35 DHH, file 112.1.003 (D9) vol. 2, Command Instructions for the Commander, Canadian Army
Supreme Commander of the Force. The Canadian military authorities have noted the remarks contained in your letter and have stated that the appropriate chain of command between Canadian forces in the Congo and the Canadian government will continue to be observed.\textsuperscript{36}

In light of the Secretary-General's concerns, instructions to Colonel Smith were clarified. He was explicitly told, "provided an order is within the general conditions under which the force was assigned, and even though you may have appealed the order to the Supreme Commander, you should obey the order but you have the right of appealing direct and immediately to me for corrective action."\textsuperscript{37} The Army was determined to retain the right of their commanders to communicate with Canadian HQ regarding ONUC orders but acknowledged the need to first obey the orders.

The question of communication between the 57\textsuperscript{th} HQ and Army HQ on matters other than questionable orders or routine administration remained ambiguous. ONUC operation directive No. 5, for instance, prohibited the transmission to national governments of any ONUC documents (such as situation reports) or information "acquired in the course of their [peacekeepers'] duties."\textsuperscript{38} Yet, the Canadian command instructions continued to state there were no limitations on communication between the commanding officer and the Chief of the General Staff. The presence of detailed and abundant military intelligence on ONUC and the political situation in the Congo, within


\textsuperscript{37} DHH, file 112.1.009 (D21) vol. 4, Letter CGS to Smith, CO 57\textsuperscript{th}, 31 October 1960.
the files of DND and External Affairs, suggests that Canadian commanders, when communicating with Army HQ, more often followed their command instructions than ONUC directives.\textsuperscript{39}

The possibility of Canadian involvement in the training of ANC officers arose again in early October. Mobutu approached a number of Western embassies to see if they would provide officer training, and Consul General Wood received phone calls seeking advice about military studies in Canada. The United Kingdom planned to take 60, but the UN prevented the first group of 36 from leaving because New York had not waived General Assembly Resolution 1474's prohibition against the provision of military assistance by parties other than the UN. The officers concerned were "bitterly disappointed," and Mobutu reacted "vigorously" to reports that the UN was considering the establishment of an officers' training school at Kamina because he favoured sending the Congolese to foreign countries for training. Ottawa decided against bilateral involvement in Mobutu's ANC training scheme but remained open to the prospect of providing assistance if requested by the UN. Mobutu eventually circumvented UN opposition and sent this particular group of officers to Belgium.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{38} NAC, RG24, vol. 18482, War Diary – No. 57 Canadian Signal Squadron, October, Unit Orders, 12 October 1960.


Relations between Mobutu and Dayal continued to deteriorate throughout the month. Wood’s reports to Ottawa portray the Secretary-General’s new Special Representative as generally critical of the Congolese and biased in favour of Lumumba. According to Wood, Dayal “deplored criticism of UN by all factions and said he had never found it necessary to speak so bluntly as to Congo politicians.” In addition, he was annoyed with the Congolese habit of describing people “as black or white.” Orders were issued to all ONUC contingents to “identify people according to the continent or country of their origin,” rather than their colour. Dayal was said to have also antagonized the Western embassies with his “pro-Lumumba” and “anti-Mobutu” attitudes. In Wood’s view, both Dayal and the Secretary-General’s Military Advisor, Indar Jit Rikhye, had not been “very neutral in their dealings with Mobutu.” This, it seemed to Wood, was attributable to the position of the Indian government, which favoured Lumumba. Wood reported, “from here looks as though Nkrumah and Nehru may have made a deal in [New York].” The impact of the cold war was clearly felt in Leopoldville; the East increasingly supported Lumumba, while those in the West supported Kasavubu and Mobutu. Perhaps it was not a coincidence that, aside from

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42 NAC, RG24, vol. 18842, War Diary – No. 57 Canadian Signal Squadron, October, Unit Orders, 4 October 1960.
Wood, no NATO ambassadors and very few Congolese attended Dayal’s UN day parade that October.\textsuperscript{44}

On 21 September, the Permanent Mission in New York received an urgent request from the Secretary-General for contributions to a UN fund for the Congo, established in accordance with the General Assembly’s recent resolution. Hammarskjöld hoped the government would “decide to make a substantial contribution.”\textsuperscript{45} While in New York for the 15\textsuperscript{th} regular session of the General Assembly, Green and Diefenbaker discussed aid for the Congo. The Prime Minister later indicated, in his address to the Assembly, that Canada would provide financial assistance but did not specify an amount.\textsuperscript{46} In Ottawa, Norman Robertson, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, prepared a submission to Cabinet proposing a contribution of $4 million arguing, “Unless those countries with relatively strong economies are prepared to contribute an amount more than the equivalent of their share of the regular budget of the Organization, there is no hope of attaining the targets fixed for the programmes in question.” Nevertheless, Green reduced the request to $1 million and raised the possibility of further contributions at a later date.\textsuperscript{47} This revision addressed the concerns of Donald Fleming, the Minister of Finance. Fleming was anxious for the contribution to be seen as equitable by the Commonwealth African states, which shared $3.5 million in Canadian aid. He was also concerned that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} NAC, RG25, vol. 5210, file 6386-40 part 13, Telegram Leopoldville to External: UN Day Parade, 25 October 1960.
\item \textsuperscript{45} NAC, RG25, vol. 5225, file 6386-H-40 part 1, Telegram PERMISNY to External: Congo and General Assembly Appeal for Funds, 21 September 1960.
\item \textsuperscript{46} NAC, RG25, vol. 5225, file 6386-H-40 part 1, Memo for the Prime Minister: Congo – General Assembly Appeal for Funds, 22 September 1960.
\end{itemize}
Hammarskjöld’s objectives for the fund went “well beyond the purview of normal responsibilities assumed in U.N. programmes.” Cabinet approved a $1 million contribution in time to make an announcement at the General Assembly and agreed to keep “under active review” the option of an additional contribution, depending on “the manner in which the Fund was applied in the Congo, and the response of other states to the Secretary-General’s appeal.”

In New York, Canada’s awkward diplomatic position became increasingly apparent during the meetings of the Secretary-General’s Advisory Committee. Resolution 1474, approved by the emergency session of the General Assembly, appealed to the Congolese to settle their political differences with the assistance of a conciliation commission consisting of Afro-Asian nations on the Advisory Committee. External Affairs acknowledged the dire implications of continued turmoil in the Congo but wondered if UN intervention was wise given the “sharp criticism in recent weeks of the UN role in the Congo and of the Secretary-General.” In keeping with their earlier position, Ottawa suggested, “there is much to be said for as far as possible leaving the Congolese to sort out their own difficulties.” Canadian authorities favoured less formal mechanisms of intervention, such as fact-finding missions and roundtables. Ritchie was

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cautioned, “You no doubt agree that Canada should not take a very active part in the discussion of these delicate questions.\textsuperscript{50}

It was early November before the Advisory Committee decided to proceed with the appointment of a formal conciliation commission and reached agreement on its composition: the African states contributing forces to ONUC, as well as four Asian nations that contributed sizeable infantry or administrative contingents.\textsuperscript{51} Canada’s reluctance to encourage UN intervention in Congolese affairs soon seemed justified. When Dayal advised Kasavubu of the Commission’s appointment, the President refused to recognize it on the grounds that he had not been previously consulted as to its composition or terms of reference. In reality, Kasavubu disagreed with the primary purpose of the Commission: to create conditions that would permit parliament to be reconvened. Kasavubu’s negative reaction divided the Advisory Committee. Some members, India for instance, argued for the immediate dispatch of the Commission regardless of Kasavubu’s objections. Others, including Nigeria, favoured delay pending clarification of Kasavubu’s position. Canada favoured this more moderate position, but Ritchie thought it inadvisable “to enter into the discussion on these issues because support from the only NATO country on the [committee] might only embarrass the moderates.” The Canadian representative worried that Hammarskjöld’s insistence that this decision rested entirely with the Advisory Committee would ultimately require Canada to put its views on record. He warned,

\textsuperscript{50} NAC, RG25, vol. 5220, file 6386-C-40 part 5, Outgoing Message External to CANDELNY: Advisory Committee on Congo, 12 October 1960.
If Kasavubus [sic] opposition becomes clear, and there is an attempt to
despach the commission in spite of this opposition, we should have to
consider the resultant situation very carefully. To impose a body of this
sort on the only legally-constituted authority with the right to speak for the
Congo would create a questionable precedent.

This view, subsequently endorsed by Ottawa, is revealing because it acknowledges
Kasavubu as the legitimate authority in the Congo. This interpretation was shared by
many Western nations and, without doubt, set Canada apart from the Eastern bloc and
Afro-Asian nations that favoured Lumumba.\textsuperscript{52}

Douglas Harkness, who had replaced Pearkes as Minister of National Defence
after Diefenbaker appointed the latter to the position of Lt. Governor of British
Columbia, was anxious to review the RCAF commitment to the UN. In the early days of
ONUC, the government approved RCAF participation in the Pisa-Leopoldville airlift and
in the transport of Canadian forces to the Congo. Following the initial deployment of
ONUC and the signals personnel, the government agreed to an additional request from
the Secretary-General to continue RCAF participation in the airlift for 90 days. Flights
specifically in support of the Canadian contingent were simply integrated into this airlift.
The agreement with the UN was scheduled to expire on 9 December. Green, who
favoured continued involvement, wrote to Harkness:

\ldots we should perhaps bear in mind that in addition to providing useful
support to our own forces in the Congo, this external airlift represents one
way in which we can contribute to the United Nations activities in the

\textsuperscript{52} NAC, RG25, vol. 5220, file 6386-C-40 part 6, Telegram CANDELNY to External: Advisory
Committee on Congo – Conciliation Commission, 15 November 1960; NAC, RG25, vol. 5220,
file 6386-C-40 part 6, Outgoing Message External to CANDELNY: Advisory Committee on Congo –
Conciliation Commission, 16 November 1960.
Congo without an additional commitment of Canadian personnel and equipment in the Congo itself, and that we should be in no undue hast to terminate or substantially curtail the operation.\(^{53}\)

Harkness was not entirely convinced. He advised Green that he had instructed the Chief of the Air Staff to make inquiries at the UN to determine if it was possible to reduce the airlift by transporting more ONUC supplies by sea.\(^{54}\) National Defence’s inquiries in New York simply resulted in an urgent request from the Secretariat to continue the airlift on its “present basis” with the added assurance “that a constant check will be maintained on the cargo carried and the continuing need, and you will be immediately notified if it is possible to reduce or discontinue these flights.”\(^{55}\) In October, ONUC supplies were arriving in equal measure by air and sea, approximately 40 tons a day. Air support was considered especially critical, given the limited transportation infrastructure throughout the Congo.\(^{56}\) In late November, Green reminded Harkness that a decision was required, and the airlift agreement was extended for another 90 days.

Meanwhile, incidents in the Congo continued to demonstrate the dangerous and precarious position of the Canadians serving there. On 8 November, a patrol of Irish peacekeepers was inspecting a damaged bridge in northern Katanga when it was ambushed by 200 Baluba tribesmen. Only two peacekeepers survived the hail of


arrows. In his apology to the UN, the Baluba leader explained that his followers mistook the Irish for Belgians. This was little comfort to Canadian authorities. In Cabinet, the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs called for a review of the “terms and conditions governing the placing of Canadian troops at the disposal of the United Nations.” He argued, “The government of Canada was deprived of control of its own forces when so assigned, but the people of Canada would hold the government responsible if any ill should befall them.” With the Irish peacekeepers in mind, Diefenbaker assured his colleagues that the government had taken steps to ensure Canadians serving in ONUC could not be dispatched to isolated areas.

Two weeks later an incident in Leopoldville demonstrated that a posting to a headquarters location was not a guarantee of safety. In October, Kasavubu and Foreign Minister Bomboko declared Nathaniel Welbeck, a Ghanaian diplomat in Leopoldville, persona non grata. In part, this was done to retaliate against Ghana’s support, at the United Nations, of policies that favoured Lumumba. When Welbeck refused to leave, the Congolese decided to forcibly remove him. On 21 November, anticipating trouble, Rikhye deployed 215 Tunisian peacekeepers to protect the Ghanaian embassy, and a Canadian, Maj. Bouillard, was sent by the ONUC Operations Section to investigate.

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59 NAC, RG25, vol. 5220, file 6386-C-40 part 6, Telegram Leopoldville to External: Ambush of Irish Patrol, 12 November 1960. The UN Secretariat was not convinced by this explanation. The Irish report of the incident asserted that the UN peacekeepers were not mistaken for “Katangan gendarmerie”. NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 7, Memo UN Div to USSEA: Congo, 29 November 1960.
Bouffard met with the Congolese outside the embassy and returned to ONUC HQ to report he was convinced the Congolese would resort to force if Welbeck did not leave. Within hours of Bouffard’s visit, an ANC battalion surrounded the embassy, but ONUC HQ failed to take any additional action.

That evening, violence erupted when the ANC confronted the Tunisians, who refused to hand over Welbeck. There was an exchange of fire between ONUC and ANC troops; a Tunisian lieutenant was injured, and an ANC colonel was killed. The ANC, using armoured cars with 37mm guns, opened fire and hit the neighbouring Canadian officers’ mess. The ANC were eventually persuaded to permit the Canadian officers to leave their mess for the Athenée Royal, where the other Canadian peacekeepers were quartered. In the confusion of night, it seemed to the Canadian Consul as though even his residence was under fire. He reported that one ANC soldier, not far from the residence garden, “kept letting off a few rounds every five minutes for no apparent reason.”

In addition to the ANC colonel, one Tunisian peacekeeper was killed and six were wounded. While there were no Canadian casualties, Lt. Col. Berthiaume was detained by the ANC as he made his way to the embassy to investigate. He later said he entertained his captors, who at first threatened to shoot him, with stories of winter and

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snow in Canada until Mobutu arrived and ordered his release.62 The 57th Unit was not the
direct target of these attacks, but this incident illustrated the volatility of conditions, even
in urban centres, and the danger this posed to the Canadians. One group of concerned
citizens was prompted to write to Diefenbaker to “insist that our loved ones be returned
to us before they needlessly forfeit their lives in the Congo.”63

In spite of these concerns and incidents, the government agreed to increase the
size of the Canadian contingent by 50 peacekeepers. At 13 December, there were 239
Army officers and other ranks and 22 RCAF personnel stationed in the Congo.64
Amalgamation of the Headquarters Unit with the Signals Squadron resulted in the need
for an additional 34 personnel. Then, in mid November, the UN requested an additional
16 personnel.65 The CGS consulted with Col. Smith and it was “determined that the
alternatives, if Canada does not supply the additional personnel, are not desirable.”66
Green, although in agreement with Harkness’ recommendation, recalled that Cabinet had
rejected the last request for additional personnel and was of the view that this new request
should be put to Cabinet for a decision.67 Because Green left Ottawa without attending
Cabinet, this was left for Harkness to do. The Minister of Defence, however, appears to

62 DHH, file 90/336, box 1, Dumont-Bayliss interview with J. Berthiaume.
63 DCC, file MG1/VI/(845 Congo). Letter from Unknown Authors in 3 Communities to
Diefenbaker, 23 November 1960 [underlining as per original].
64 NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 7, Notes on United Nations Military Operations in
the Congo. 28 November 1960; NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 7. Memo DL(1) to File: Congo
65 NAC, RG25, vol. 5220, file 6386-C-40 part 6, Telegram PERMISNY to External: Congo: UN
Request for Assistance, 17 November 1960.
have approved this request on his own, as there is no record of Cabinet discussing the matter.

Canadian authorities were united in their opposition to the use of Canadian peacekeepers for espionage. In December, Brig. Rikhye asked Col. Smith for permission to send a Canadian Provost NCO to Brazzaville to undertake an intelligence operation. ONUC was keen to investigate questionable shipments entering the Congo from Brazzaville. They planned to assign the peacekeeper to work with the World Health Organization, “ostensibly as the UN movement control representative.” The officer would be in a position to report on all movement of arms and ammunition through the airport. Smith, suggesting the assignment “amounted to espionage,” raised a number of concerns with the plan and told Rikhye it would require government approval. Notably, when asked by Smith, Rikhye admitted the operation had not been discussed with Gen. Kettani, the acting Supreme Commander. At DND, Lt. Gen. Clark was against Canadian involvement. He argued, “This is a form of espionage which could make Canadian relations with the de facto [government] of the Congo Republic difficult. ... Canadians could be accused of spying for NATO, USA.”68 External Affairs took the matter one step further. Ritchie was instructed to bring Rikhye’s plan to the attention of either Hammarskjöld or Bunch and to confirm that Canadian peacekeepers could not be used for spying. Moreover, the “propriety” of Brig. Rikhye’s approach was called into question. It is quite difficult to reconcile the proposed Brazzaville mission with

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Hammarskjöld’s early pronouncements, in the Advisory Committee, against the
"secretive practices habitually associated with intelligence services." In any event, once
Canada refused to cooperate, the mission was canceled for lack of “suitable personnel.”

ONUC HQ was in a difficult position vis-à-vis leadership. Von Horn was ill and
on leave in Sweden. Col. Smith reported that the Supreme Commander had been “at odds
with the UN civilian heads and is not anxious to return to the Congo.” New York was
searching for a replacement, likely from Ireland or Ethiopia. Von Horn’s departure,
according to Smith, raised questions about Lt. Col. Berthiaume’s future at ONUC HQ.
Berthiaume first served as the Supreme Commander’s Chief of Staff, and later as his
Military Attaché. Smith observed, “he [Berthiaume] is one of the few people in the UN
whom the Congolese trust and he exerts an influence out of proportion to his
appointment. It is unlikely that Berthiaume will be able to continue to function in the
same manner under a new commander.” It is clear that Berthiaume found it difficult to
work with Rikhye and many of the other Indian officers who served at ONUC HQ. As
early as September, Rikhye suggested to Col. Speedie, DND’s liaison officer in New
York, that it might be necessary to replace Berthiaume. When asked why, Rikhye said

69 Walter Dorn and David Bell, “Intelligence and Peacekeeping: The UN Operation in the Congo
1960-1964,” in Peacekeeping 1815 to Today. Ed. Serge Bernier (Ottawa: International Commission of
70 Dorn and Bell, 587.
71 NAC, RG25, vol. 5210, file 6386-40 part 14, Summary of a Letter Written to CGS by CO 57
Independent Signal Squadron, 8 December 1960.
Berthiaume was not bilingual. Rikhye "professed surprise and had no further comments," once Speedie pointed out Berthiaume was French Canadian and completely bilingual.\(^{72}\)

As Col. Smith predicted, tensions surrounding the Canadian peacekeeper resurfaced in December and January, as the UN prepared to replace von Horn with General MacEoin, the new Commander of ONUC. DND agreed to second Berthiaume to UNTSO for a period of two weeks so he could assist von Horn with the preparation of the Commander's final report. They then expected Berthiaume to return to the Congo to complete his tour and perhaps take up a position on the new Commander's staff.\(^{73}\) At first, MacEoin seems to have favoured retaining Berthiaume. In a cable to Bunche, albeit written by Berthiaume, the Commander asked, "would appreciate your reconsideration decision so as to allow me to benefit from services Berthiaume can render due to his considerable experience and intimate knowledge of Congo operations."\(^{74}\) Perhaps sensing the UN might be unwilling to retain Berthiaume, External advised New York to make representations in the Secretariat to at least replace the officer with another Canadian. Ottawa considered it "important to maintain both Canadian and Western influence at ONUC headquarters."\(^{75}\) Cordier was approached and reassured Ritchie that ONUC HQ had been contacted about this; he was awaiting a reply. By February, the situation was not resolved. It was worse: Ritchie advised, "the Secretariat was taking it for granted that


\(^{74}\) DHH, file 90/336, box 3, part 46, Telegram MacEoin to Bunche, undated.

Col. Berthiaume would not return to ONUC." Col. Smith reported that MacEoin had decided to use an Irish officer as his Military Assistant. He no longer intended to ask for a replacement for Berthiaume. Smith warned that this would "seriously weaken" the Canadian position at ONUC HQ, as there would no longer be an officer present who could influence policy.

It is difficult to know, with certainty, why the UN appeared so keen to get Berthiaume out of the Congo. Tension with his fellow officers may have been one significant factor. An official at External noted, "It is quite possible that Berthiaume is not popular with the Indians, who hold most of the positions on the staff of the Supreme Commander, and with a number of the African-Asian participants in ONUC." In recognition of this, Canadian diplomats in New York were directed not to discuss the matter with Rikhye. Berthiaume was very critical of the conduct of his Indian colleagues, Rikhye in particular:

From shortly after the arrival of Brigadier Rikhye to the Congo in August 1960, there was a systematic policy on the part of ONUC officials to ignore the military and not to seek the advice of the Supreme Commander and his Senior Staff Officers. Military matters were being run by Brigadier Rikhye who dealt only with Indian officers and in many occasions usurped the authority of the Supreme Commander. From that time on, the undersigned had to devise his own ways and means of finding out ONUC civilian policy. ...

In the same manner, Brigadier Rikhye would take it upon himself to issue direct orders to the troops without previous reference to the

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Supreme Commander, his Deputy or the Chief of Staff. The feelings amongst ONUC personnel, military and civilians alike, were that the Indian coterie were running the whole show and had no intention of allowing other nationals to interfere.\textsuperscript{79}

Berthiaume was convinced that Dayal and Rikhye were behind the decision to deny his reappointment at ONUC HQ. Dayal, in classified messages to New York, was said to have expressed a "firm desire" to get "rid of someone who was but too familiar with unethical activities on the part of certain UN officials, including himself and Brigadier Rikhye."\textsuperscript{80} Although he did not cite specific incidents, Berthiaume accused Dayal and Rikhye of attempting to discredit Kasavubu, Mobutu, and any other Congolese leader who leaned towards the West, while favouring Lumumba, Gizenga, and others who opposed Kasavubu.

Berthiaume's close relationship with Mobutu may have been a factor in New York's decision not to reappoint him as MacEoin's Military Assistant. While working at ONUC HQ, Berthiaume fostered relationships with many Congolese. He later wrote, "Through meetings and discussions, contacts and relations were established with Congolese leaders, civilians and military alike. As time went on, these relations changed from a business to a friendly and personal basis."\textsuperscript{81} Berthiaume cultivated a strong relationship with Mobutu, and this left him open to charges of being biased, not unlike those he directed towards Rikhye and Dayal. External Affairs was aware that Berthiaume

\textsuperscript{79} DHH, file 90/336, box 1, part 3, Memo J.A. Berthiaume to DMI: HQ ONUC: Status of Canadian Officers, 1 August 1961.

\textsuperscript{80} DHH, file 90/336, box 1, part 3, Memo J.A. Berthiaume to DMI: HQ ONUC: Status of Canadian Officers, 1 August 1961.
was "sympathetic to the aims, if not always the methods, of the Kasavubu-Mobutu elements in the Congo."82 At times, the relationship proved useful. Following the Welbeck incident, for example, Berthiaume was able to use his influence with Mobutu to smooth the very strained relations between ONUC and the ANC.83 There is evidence, however, that Berthiaume gravely crossed the line of impartiality and neutrality expected of all peacekeepers. In an interview with Pauline Dumont-Bayliss, of the Directorate of History and Heritage at National Defence, Berthiaume admitted to playing a role in Mobutu's capture of Patrice Lumumba. Berthiaume tracked the Prime Minister as he fled Leopoldville for Orientale province and then informed Mobutu of Lumumba's whereabouts.84 If Rikhye or Dayal were aware of Berthiaume's participation in this plot, they seem not to have said anything to the Canadian authorities, but it would explain their reticence to agree to the reappointment. In March 1961, reports questioning Berthiaume's role in ONUC arrived in Ottawa from Ghana. Officials at External Affairs concluded,

Whatever may be the rights or wrongs of this case, it seems to me that it would be very difficult to establish with certainty to what extent Col. Berthiaume gave advice to Mobutu and whether, in doing so, he went beyond his U.N. mandate. If he did in fact overplay his hand, it was the responsibility of the Commander of the Force to restrain him. In the absence of any adverse reports from either the former or the present U.N. Commander, we can only assume that he acted in accordance with his instructions ... I would suggest that we let the matter rest.85

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81 DHH, file 90/336, box 1, part 3, Memo J.A. Berthiaume to DMI: HQ ONUC: Status of Canadian Officers, 1 August 1961.
84 DHH, file 90/336, box 1, Dumont-Bayliss interview with J. Berthiaume, 12 September 1990.
Even if Berthiaume cooperated with Mobutu out of frustration, to counter the political bias of Dayal and Rikhye, the implications of Lumumba’s arrest hardly justified his actions.

As 1960 drew to a close, it was increasingly apparent that the Congo was a divided country. Apart from the obvious separation caused by the Katangan secession, there were significant political divisions within and between the remaining provinces. Three figures remained central to the national political crisis: Lumumba, Kasavubu, and Mobutu. Although Mobutu, by establishing the College of Commissioners, professed to neutralize both politicians, in reality he maintained a working relationship with Kasavubu. The President, for instance, was willing to recognize the College as the provisional government of the Congo.\(^{86}\) Kasavubu had the geographic advantage of Leopoldville province as his political stronghold. As President, and consequently head of state, Kasavubu also had the advantage of title. He could, with some credibility, justify his decision to attend the upcoming session of the General Assembly as the Congo’s rightful representative. His colleague, Justin Bomboko, argued, “[the] President has as much right to attend assembly as Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Nasser and other African heads of state.”\(^{87}\) Wood, the Canadian Consul, provided External with the following assessment: “Kasavubu’s position has improved, thanks to the prestige attached to the chief of state and he probably now has more following outside [Leopoldville] than at

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independence. But he is still far from being a traditional ‘strong man’ (and he does not seem to have the personality or inclination to become one).”

By the time the General Assembly met for its regular session, Kasavubu was clearly the political candidate favoured by the West.

Wood had the opportunity to meet with Mobutu in November. Presumably for his safety, the ANC Commander had moved to the outskirts of Leopoldville. Wood had to pass two barbed wire road blocks, armoured cars, and was subjected to a search before he was escorted to Mobutu’s house. Once inside, Mobutu greeted Wood as he concluded negotiations with a “well-nourished European woman” for newer, larger accommodations. Mobutu denied accusations that he was pro-Belgian, but Wood deduced from the presence of a number of Belgian publications present in the waiting room that he was not anti-Belgian. The Colonel maintained that “foreign interference should stop and that the Congolese should be left alone to settle their own problems.” The Canadian Consul was “generally impressed” by Mobutu. He perceived him to be a “man of intelligence and some sophistication.” As with Kasavubu, he concluded that Mobutu was not a “strong man,” nor a “military man,” and he speculated the Colonel might have “difficulty in maintaining the support of the army against stronger rivals, either military or political.”

Mobutu also faced a significant obstacle: the United Nations, while

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prepared to work with him because he exercised *de facto* control, was unwilling to recognise either the Colonel or his appointees as a legitimate government.⁹⁰

For both Kasavubu and Mobutu, Patrice Lumumba remained a political force to be reckoned with. Wood noted that only Lumumba could lay claim to being a “national leader.” Favoured by the East and a number of the Afro-Asian nations (notably Ghana and Guinea), Lumumba retained Orientale province as a political stronghold. As earlier noted, his actions soon after ONUC’s arrival, particularly his acceptance of bilateral Soviet aid, alienated him from both UN officials and the West.⁹¹ Wood acknowledged that Lumumba had been labeled “a Communist, a mad man, a dope addict and a drunkard,” but stated, “I do not believe he is any of these things (although there may be a grain of truth in each of them.” The Canadian Consul General captured, quite succinctly and in a balanced, realistic manner atypical of many Western diplomats, the fundamental problem the Congo faced:

... Lumumba, in my view, is still a major force despite the humiliations he has suffered and it is unlikely that a permanent political settlement can be effected without his participation. Basically, therefore, the dilemma facing the Congo is that the one man most qualified to be Prime Minister is unacceptable to the two most important areas of the country, Léopoldville and the mining region of Katanga.⁹²

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⁹² NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 8, Despatch Leopoldville to SSA: the Political Situation in the Congo, 22 November 1960.
The political instability, compounded by Mobutu’s ensuing coup, ultimately hurt Lumumba the most. It also led Rikhye to conclude, “despite efforts to avoid it cold war was actually operating in Congo.”

It was operating in New York too, as the United Nations considered which Congolese delegation, Lumumba’s or Kasavubu’s, should be seated as the ‘legitimate’ representatives of that country. The United States led efforts to seat Kasavubu. In Ottawa, the American embassy lobbied External to support their position in the General Assembly. In New York, Ritchie met with representatives of Australia, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Norway, the UK and the US to discuss “tactics for dealing with the Kasavubu credentials.” The Americans had every reason to believe Canada would support their view. In his meeting with Eisenhower, just one month earlier, Diefenbaker had expressed the view that “Kasavubu, as President, had a prior claim [for recognition] to that of Lumumba.”

Although Canada willingly revealed its preference for Kasavubu in private, Howard Green instructed Ritchie “not to become involved in the move to seat Mr. Kasavubu’s delegation.” The UN Division outlined the Canadian position:

Especially if the African-Asians, as a group, should be ranged against the West in this matter, Canada should abstain. Our position on the United Nations Force in the Congo made this desirable and also our general position in relation to the African and Asian countries. If it turned out that

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the Africans were divided on the issue, there might be some reason for altering the Canadian stand but for the time being the Canadian delegation should not be drawn into partisan discussions about tactics and should be prepared to abstain in any voting on the credentials. ⁹⁶

As was the case in the Advisory Committee, Canada considered that its presence in ONUC made it “desirable” to refrain from active participation in the debate. The rationale was, in this instance, expanded further to include the preservation of good relations with the Afro-Asian nations. Canada intended to maintain a public image as a more moderate state, while others fought to seat the Kasavubu delegation, an outcome it privately favoured.

The US began its efforts to accredit the Kasavubu delegation in the credentials committee, but procedural wrangling kept the committee from considering the issue. Then, in the General Assembly, the Afro-Asian nations moved to adjourn the debate, fearing an eventual decision in the credentials committee might require the Assembly to approve the recognition of Kasavubu’s delegation. Many did not support Kasavubu, but they were equally reluctant to vote against him openly. Over American objections, and in spite of their attempts to forestall it, the Assembly was adjourned. ⁹⁷ Publicly, Canada did not support the United States; the delegation abstained in the vote to adjourn so that it

⁹⁶ NAC, RG25, vol. 5220, file 6386-C-40 part 6, Memo UN Div to USSEA: Congo: Credentials of Kasavubu’s Delegation, 8 November 1960.
⁹⁷ NAC, RG25, vol. 5220, file 6386-C-40 part 6, Memo UN Div to USSEA: Recent Developments at the General Assembly, 15 November 1960.
would not appear as though Canada was taking sides.\textsuperscript{98} The matter then returned to the credentials committee, which finally decided to accredit Kasavubu's delegation.

Bolstered by French and British attempts to lobby their former colonies, the Americans became convinced they could obtain a majority in favour of accepting the committee's report if only there were no further attempts to adjourn debate in the Assembly. In Washington, State Department officials called on the Canadian Embassy and expressed "the hope" that Canada would "support continuation of the Congo debate."\textsuperscript{99} In Ottawa, the American ambassador delivered a démarche to Green. The US aide-memoire hoped that "the Government of Canada shares [the American] view of the gravity and urgency of the issue and will see its way clear to instruct its delegation to vote against any postponement of consideration of the matter and to support the seating of the Kasavubu delegation."\textsuperscript{100} Similar representations were made by the UK.\textsuperscript{101} The UN Division identified the fundamental dilemma Canada faced:

As for any vote on the report of the Credentials Committee, presumably we would not wish to vote against Mr. Kasavubu's delegation but a vote in favour of seating them could be interpreted as choosing sides in the internal Congo dispute. If among the members of the Advisory Committee Canada was the only one voting in favour of the Credentials Committee's report, our position would probably be interpreted as support for our NATO ally Belgium and for the Western position generally. However, if the Advisory Committee members were divided in the voting, and

\textsuperscript{98} NAC, RG25, vol. 5220, file 6383-C-40 part 6, Memo UN Div to USSEA: Congo: Credentials of Kasavubu's Delegation, 16 November 1960.
especially if African-Asians like Tunisia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Ireland and Sweden voted in favour of the report, we could probably join them. In the whole manoeuvre what we should try to avoid, however, is lining up with pro-Western elements only, and especially if they are in danger of being defeated.\textsuperscript{102}

The delegation in New York favoured accepting Kasavubu’s credentials but only if it appeared as though the recommendation would be adopted anyway.\textsuperscript{103} Canadian policy attempted to strike a balance: there was a need to appear neutral or detached and, at the same time, not jeopardize Western interests in the Congo.

During the evening of 17 November, Green instructed Ritchie to abstain on the adjournment issue. The Minister continued to weigh the option of abstaining on the vote to accept Kasavubu’s credentials. On the latter issue, he planned to consider the positions adopted by Ireland and Sweden, the other two nations with white contingents in the Congo.\textsuperscript{104} The next day, both issues came to a vote in the General Assembly and, after last minute consultations with Ritchie, Green instructed the delegation to abstain on both the motions to adjourn the debate and seat Kasavubu. Ross Campbell explained Green’s decision to Robertson:

In the circumstances, the Minister considered that Canada’s vote was not needed for the success of the Western move and that it would be illogical for us to do other than abstain, despite our desire to see the Kasavubu delegation seated. The determining factors in this decision were (a) the need to avoid taking sides in the interests of the welfare of our troops in the Congo; (b) a desire to avoid isolation in the Advisory Committee; (c)

\textsuperscript{102} NAC, RG25, vol. 5220, file 6386-C-40 part 6, Memo UN Division to USSEA: Congo: Credentials of Kasavubu’s Delegation, 16 November 1960.

\textsuperscript{103} NAC, RG25, vol. 5220, file 6386-C-40 part 6, Telegram CANDELNY to External: 15th UNGA: Congolese Credentials, 17 November 1960.

\textsuperscript{104} NAC, RG25, vol. 5220, file 6386-C-40 part 6, Memo for Minister: Congo: Kasavubu Credentials, 17 November 1960.
the desirability of avoiding accusations of going along with a manoeuvre initiated by the United States and Belgium. 105

All members of the Advisory Committee were expected to vote for adjournment, with the exception of Pakistan, which planned to abstain. Had Canada voted against adjournment, it would have been the only member of the Advisory Committee to do so. Sweden and Ireland both abstained on the question of Kasavubu’s credentials.

The Congolese President’s delegation was seated by a vote of 53 in favour, to 24 against, and 9 abstentions. Without doubt, Canada preferred this outcome; it was simply not prepared to sacrifice the appearance of neutrality to achieve it. Persistent pressure by the West swayed a sufficient number of countries to vote for Kasavubu so that Canada’s vote was not critical. Still, the Canadian Consul in Leopoldville was left in the awkward position of explaining the Canadian vote to the Congolese Foreign Office. They seemed satisfied with Wood’s explanation and assurances that “we were well aware in any case that [Kasavubu’s delegation] would be seated without our vote.” He later reported being seated ahead of other members of the consular corps at a dinner hosted by the President. This was interpreted to mean Canada was “not in dog house yet.” 106

From the earliest days of ONUC, Canadian officials were determined to see the mission’s financing established on a sound footing. They did not want the UN to resort to a “succession of ad hoc measures,” as had been the case with UNEF financing. Bishop identifies three principles that guided Canadian financial policy with regard to

106 NAC, RG 25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 7, Telegram Leopoldville to External.
peacekeeping: frugality, fair share, and universal/compulsory payment for all operations. Because a number of nations, notably those from the Soviet bloc and France, subsequently refused, for political reasons, to pay their share of UNEF’s expenses, Canada considered it vital for the General Assembly to “put itself on record as affirming the collective responsibility of the membership for the Congo operation.”

The Canadian principle of frugality, Bishop notes, was more “elastic” than that of compulsory payment; even when they threatened to dwarf the entire UN regular budget, peacekeeping costs were seen as a necessary, reasonable price to pay for the preservation of peace. And ONUC was expected to be expensive: the Secretariat estimated the total costs for the first 6 months of ONUC could reach $66,625,000 million, and this sum was distinct from the $100,000,000 voluntary fund established by Hammarskjöld to restore the economic life of the Congo.

In contrast with its timid manner on the Advisory Committee, Canada was quite vocal on the issue of financing, using its presence on the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee (Budgetary) to stress not only the financial but also the political significance of peacekeeping activities. In a statement to the committee, the Canadian delegation argued adequate financial support for ONUC was a political question that transcended “differences of national interest,” and struck at “the heart of the reason for the existence

29 November 1960.

of the UN.” Highlighting the inability of the Great Powers to fulfill their peace and security responsibilities as originally envisaged in the UN Charter, the Canadians suggested these responsibilities had shifted to the “middle and small powers,” to whom the “burden of providing personnel, equipment and facilities,” had fallen. The delegation was critical of those who refused to pay their share of peacekeeping costs but, in an effort to meet the concerns of poorer nations, acknowledged the need to reduce expected contributions from states that simply could not afford to pay. “A sharp distinction,” they said, “must be drawn between those who can support these peace-keeping operations fully but who will not; and those who wish to support them fully but cannot.” Canada recognised the need to compromise with the lesser developed UN members in order to gain support for efforts to normalise the procurement of funds to cover peacekeeping expenses.\textsuperscript{111}

Canada’s arguments became all the more credible when the government backed its pronouncements with additional funds. The initial transport of contingents and equipment to the Congo cost $14 million.\textsuperscript{112} The vast majority of this, $12 million, was initially borne by the United States. In response to a request from the Secretary-General, the Americans subsequently agreed to waive these costs. The airlift of Canadian forces cost $600,000. Diefenbaker, Green, and Harkness recommended to Cabinet that Canada

\textsuperscript{110} NAC, RG25, vol. 5225, file 6386-C-40 part 1, Memo for Minister: Costs of UN Activities in the Congo – July to December 1960.
\textsuperscript{111} NAC, RG25, vol. 5210, file 6386-40 part 14, Outgoing Message External to CANDELNY: Fifth Committee Congo Financing, 29 November 1960.
do likewise and absorb these costs instead of passing them on to the UN. “This year,” it was argued, “when the Organization is facing its severest test since the Korean War, it is particularly necessary that those countries who are in a position to do so, to assist the United Nations in every way possible so that lack of the means does not become an impediment to the discharge of the essential peace-keeping functions of the Organization.”  

Although the Minister of Finance had “some reservations,” Diefenbaker was “now satisfied with the fairness and necessity of this operation.” Cabinet agreed to absorb the costs of the initial airlift and the delegation in New York was so informed. The UK also agreed to absorb $500,000 in transportation costs but awaited Canada’s decision so as not to be the only country, apart from the United States, to make such a gesture.

Events in the Congo took a serious turn for the worse, just as President Kasavubu returned triumphant from New York. Patrice Lumumba remained in Leopoldville, his residence surrounded by a guard of UN peacekeepers who prevented his arrest by ANC forces that, in turn, had surrounded the peacekeepers. On the evening of 27 November, Lumumba and some of his supporters left his residence and managed to sneak through the ring of ANC soldiers. They headed for Stanleyville, the capital of Orientale province, Lumumba’s political stronghold.

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When the Leopoldville authorities discovered he was missing, they began to search for him with the “help of a low-flying aeroplane, said to have been supplied from Brazzaville.” Hoskyns reports ONUC peacekeepers “all over the Congo were given orders ‘to refrain from any interference in regard to Mr Lumumba’s movements or those of his official pursuers’.” As revealed earlier, however, von Horn’s Military Attaché, Canadian Col. Berthiaume, has said he assisted Mobutu in the efforts to locate Lumumba. In a September 1990 interview Berthiaume stated,

Alors, de toute façon là j’ai le choix. Qu’est-ce que je fait. Puis là j’ai appelé Mobutu. J’ai dit: Mon colonel, vous avez un problème quoi, vous cherchez à récupérer votre prisonnier, Monsieur Lumumba. Je sais où il est et je sais où il sera demain. Mais il dit qu’est-ce que je peux faire. Mais c’est bien simple, mon colonel, vous venez avec l’aide des Nations-Unies de créer l’ambrión de vos para-commandos on venait de qualifier une trentaine de ces gars, triés sur le volet des marocains entraînés comme parachutiste là puis qui ont sauté puis il n’y en a pas un qui a refusé. Puis pour être bien sûr de mon affaire j’avais même mis notre capitaine Mario Côté dans l’avion, pour être bien sûr qu’il n’y avait pas de tripotage. En tout cas, mais c’est bien simple vous prenez un Dakota vous envoyez vos parachutistes puis vous allez cueillir Monsieur Lumumba dans le petit village là, il ya une piste puis tout le bazar. C’est tout ce que vous avez à faire mon colonel. Il l’a récupéré comme cela puis je l’ai jamais regretté moi.  

Berthiaume considered this intervention justified, believing it prevented Lumumba from rallying political and military support in Orientale and a full-scale civil war. The

116 DHH, file 90/336, box 1, Dumont-Bayliss interview with J. Berthiaume, 12 September 1990.
The immediate results of Lumumba’s arrest were, however, a dangerous deterioration in the political conditions in Orientale and renewed diplomatic hostilities in New York.\textsuperscript{117}

Ghanian peacekeepers, stationed in Kasai near where Lumumba was arrested, requested permission to intervene and to place the Prime Minister under UN protection. The Secretariat denied this request.\textsuperscript{118} Hammarskjöld subsequently argued against similar Soviet and Afro-Asian demands for UN action to obtain Lumumba’s release on the grounds this would “constitute a measure of internal intervention unauthorized by the existing U.N. resolutions.” In the Secretary-General’s view, ONUC’s enabling resolutions did not authorise enforcement action under Chapter 7 of the Charter, so the UN had no legal authority to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Congo.\textsuperscript{119}

In Stanleyville, Lumumba’s supporters threatened to arrest and kill all Belgians if Lumumba was not released in 48 hours. Officials at External Affairs feared Lumumba’s forces would not distinguish between Belgians and other Europeans. In addition to the nine Canadian peacekeepers stationed in Stanleyville, some 20 Canadian missionaries were thought to be living throughout Orientale.\textsuperscript{120} The Canadian detachment in Stanleyville warned that the provincial authorities intended to force all “white personnel.

\textsuperscript{117} A recent account of Lumumba’s assassination discusses Lumumba’s capture by Mobutu’s forces but makes no mention of the part played by Berthiaume. It focuses, instead, on a decision by von Horn and Dayal, confirmed by UNHQ, to stop Ghanian peacekeepers, who were near to where Lumumba was arrested, from intervening to prevent the arrest. Ludo de Witte, \textit{The Assassination of Lumumba}, Trans. Ann Wright and Renée Fenby (London and New York: Verso, 2001) 51-57.

\textsuperscript{118} Hoskyns, \textit{The Congo Since Independence}, 267.

Canadians included" to leave the Congo. ONUC personnel were also told not to interfere with any arrests of Europeans. Together, this was sufficient cause for concern in Ottawa. Howard Green instructed Charles Ritchie to speak with the Secretariat to seek assurances "that adequate transportation will be available in order to evacuate any UN units which might find themselves heavily outnumbered by opposing forces." Green added a notable caution: he asked Ritchie to ensure that this "démarche" would not "leave any impression that [Canada] is contemplating withdrawal of [Canadian] units or would advocate any general withdrawal of UN forces." While Canada was not in favour of a general withdrawal of ONUC, Cordier secretly told Ritchie the UN was in fact "giving preliminary consideration to [the] necessity for evacuating UN forces from [the] Congo." Cordier was deeply pessimistic.

Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba's Deputy Prime Minister, had just declared the provisional installation of the Central Government in Stanleyville, in opposition to the College of Commissioners in Leopoldville. It seemed possible that ONUC contingents from nations aligned with Lumumba might rally to the side of Stanleyville, and this could prompt the Indonesians and Ethiopians to withdrawal their troops all together. Cordier

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121 NAC, RG24, vol. 18482, War Diary - No. 57 Canadian Signal Squadron, December, Telegram Stanleyville Detachment to 57th Leopoldville, 1 December 1960.


123 Canada received a telegram, dated December 13 and signed by Gizenga, informing the government of the installation of the Stanleyville government. Robertson advised Diefenbaker, "We do not
was concerned for the impact this would have on the "UN as a whole." The Secretariat planned to tentatively approach the US to ask for planes to be placed on stand-by in case it became necessary to evacuate UN peacekeepers. Ritchie was warned that Canada might also be approached with a similar request.124

Lumumba’s arrest prompted some Canadians to write to Diefenbaker, and to the UN, to express their concern. One resident of North Bay was less concerned for Lumumba’s personal safety, than the potential repercussions if the Congolese Prime Minister died: “Lumumba’s death in prison will make him a martyr of African nationalism and rallying point of all anti Western feelings on that continent please try to intervene and save his life. Alive Lumumba might be difficult, but a dead Lumumba will be impossible.”125 Others, including the Congress of Canadian Women, supported the imprisoned leader, arguing “the only way to bring peace to the Congo is to give support to the elected representatives of the people.”126 Finally, Alicia Humphries was very critical of Diefenbaker for not doing more to help Lumumba. She wrote, “This time the U.S.A. has gone just too far. She has placed upon herself a stain of blood that Time can never erase and Lumumba will be remembered in history, a hero and a martyr, as great as

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125 DCC, file MG1/VI/(845 Congo), Telegram King to JGD, 6 December 1960.
126 DCC, file MG1/VI/(845 Congo), Letter Congress of Canadian Women to Diefenbaker, 29 December 1960.
any of our Canadian martyrs. And YOU did not say one word in protest. Coward, sneak, slave of corruption, stooge of the U.S.A."

In early November, a number of ANC officers visited the United States and expressed their intent to proceed on to Canada. American authorities treated the visit entirely as a military matter and Canadian officials proposed to do the same, once they received confirmation from the Consul General in Leopoldville that Mobutu did in fact expect the group to spend time in Canada. External Affairs was of the view that the officers should be received officially but were anxious not to give the visit "any embarrassing political significance." Ritchie, noting the General Assembly was about to resume debate on the Congo, urged that the visit "be handled as quietly as possible and that Ottawa not be included on the itinerary." The visit was much less eventful than Lumumba’s had been earlier in the year. The group was ushered to Quebec, where they made a good impression on their Canadian counterparts. The officer in Quebec Command responsible for organising the visit said the Congolese were "in general well behaved and presentable. They showed a certain maturity and were interesting to talk to." Canada, it seemed, also left a good impression. The ANC officers "were reportedly more impressed with what they saw in Canada than what they saw in the United States."

Their presence in Quebec, and the ability to communicate in French, undoubtedly eased the visit.

Against the backdrop of the increased political tension resulting from Lumumba’s arrest, discussion of the Congo crisis resumed in New York, first in the Security Council and then in the General Assembly. The seriousness of the situation, combined with the possibility Canada might need to declare its position during the forthcoming debate, prompted External Affairs to review its Congo policy. Despite recent events, Ottawa perceived, and welcomed, a general trend towards stability in the Congo “occasioned by the ascendancy of Kasavubu and Mobutu,” but was concerned that the Congolese authorities had “fallen out” with the UN. The preference for Mobutu and Kasavubu was a subtle indication of Canada’s political position; the Western bloc tended to favour both these leaders.

Conflict between the UN on the one hand, and Mobutu and Kasavubu on the other, was problematic for Canada because it became increasingly difficult to balance support for the United Nations with tacit support for the de facto Leopoldville government. Officials noted, “While we are concerned to maintain UN prestige, it is also recalled that we supported the UN action with the object of maintaining peace and security and, by the same token, forestalling communist intervention.” Canada was committed to the United Nations and multilateral diplomacy but also hoped for an outcome to the crisis favourable to Western interests. Ottawa was even critical of Belgian policy, when it was seen to threaten larger Western objectives. For example, Robertson stated,
It would also seem that Belgium’s insistence on its right to aid the Congo unilaterally, by private arrangement with any Congolese authority it chooses to recognize, and its continued support of a secessionist regime, constitute an open invitation to the Communist powers to intervene whenever they may wish to do so.\textsuperscript{130}

Canadian policy became increasingly complex as it attempted to reconcile these varied, and sometimes contradictory, objectives.

One concern remained foremost in the minds of Canadian officials: the safety of Canadian peacekeepers serving in ONUC. As the Lumubists became entrenched at Stanleyville, Charles Ritchie warned,

There will be anxious months ahead in the Congo. I feel I should draw your attention in particular to the problem of the security of the UN forces and of the Canadian contingent. Unless relations can be improved between the Congolese [government] and the UN forces, there is a continuing danger that UN forces including the [Canadians] may be exposed to physical danger, and if control of the airports is lost, to the possibility of being trapped in different areas of the Congo.\textsuperscript{131}

Ritchie was more explicit and pragmatic in his telephone conversations with department officials. The Canadian representative was anxious to do something “for the record,” in case “everything went wrong in the Congo, and there was a massacre which included Canadians.” He added, “the Government and the Department would be called upon to say what if anything they had done to ensure the safety of our troops.” Ritchie suggested raising the matter either directly with the Secretariat or in the Advisory Committee so that Canadian concerns “would be on the record and could be cited if someone asked why

\textsuperscript{130} NAC, RG25, vol. 5210, file 6386-40 part 14, Outgoing Message External to PERMISNY: Congo Trends, 5 December 1960.
\textsuperscript{131} NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 7, Telegram PERMISNY to External: Congo Trends, 9 December 1960.
Canada was not speaking up, or if it became necessary after a catastrophe to say what we had done.\textsuperscript{132}

Within the week, Ritchie had an opportunity to speak with Hammarskjöld to express the government's concern for the security of UN forces and the Canadian contingent in particular. He found the Secretary-General to be less pessimistic than his Assistant, Cordier. Hammarskjöld did not consider it necessary to evacuate ONUC yet but was concerned for the long term prospects of a political solution to the Congo crisis.\textsuperscript{133}

From 7 to 13 December, the Security Council once again addressed the Congo situation. Two draft resolutions were introduced: a Soviet sponsored resolution called for Lumumba's release, disarming Mobutu's forces, and the expulsion of all Belgians; the second, sponsored by the US, the UK, Italy, and Argentina, called for the fair treatment of political prisoners but not the release of Lumumba. Ceylon and Tunisia attempted to draft a compromise resolution to bridge the differences between the East and West, but they were unsuccessful. When the Soviets vetoed the West's resolution and the Soviet resolution failed to receive the minimum number of votes, the debate was transferred to the General Assembly.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{132} NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 7, Memo African Div to Ignatieff: Situation in the Congo, 9 December 1960.
\textsuperscript{133} NAC, RG25, vol. 5210, file 6386-40 part 15, Telegram PERMISNY to External: Congo, 14 December 1960.
\textsuperscript{134} NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 7, Memo UN Div to USSEA: Congo at the UN, 14 December 1960.
Murray, in the UN Division, hoped the West would take a constructive and conciliatory tone in the resumed debate in the General Assembly.

I believe that the Western Powers should be trying very hard to evolve a position which would give the maximum support to the United Nations and which, at the same time, would seek to reassure the African-Asians that the main Western interest in the Congo was to bring about stability. If the debate should be a confused combination of cold war propaganda and a sharp argument between the extreme African-Asian nationalists and the ‘imperialists’ of the West, the Western Powers are likely to suffer heavily and, conceivably, the United Nations operation in the Congo could collapse under the strain. This might happen in any event but a vigorous move to turn the Assembly proceedings in the direction of conciliation and constructive effort could help to save the situation.  

This was not to be. Eight Afro-Asian states took the initiative and introduced a draft resolution that called for the UN to be more forceful in its implementation of previous resolutions, the release of political prisoners, the reconvening of the Congolese parliament, disarmament of Congolese armed factions, and the immediate withdrawal of all Belgian military and civilian advisers. The Americans interpreted this resolution as an attempt to create conditions that would facilitate a return to power by Patrice Lumumba. The United States lobbied Canada, both in Washington and Ottawa, to oppose the eight-power resolution. American diplomats suggested the proposal was “a very serious threat to Western interests not only in the Congo but in the whole of Africa.” In their view, it was “imperative to defeat the resolution.”

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135 NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 7, Memo UN Div to USSEA: Congo at the UN, 14 December 1960.
any propositions that would undermine Kasavubu and to support efforts to postpone the
debate all together.\textsuperscript{138}

The UN Division, Charles Ritchie, and Norman Robertson were agreed in their
opposition to the American idea to delay the debate. “The present drift in the Congo
situation,” it was argued, “could hardly be allowed to continue for three months without
some United Nations action, unless we were prepared to contemplate a complete erosion
of the United Nations position there.” At a minimum, they hoped for a resolution that
would call upon all political and military forces in the Congo to cooperate with the UN;
authorise steps to restore law, order, and constitutional authority, including the recall of
parliament; and renew the injunction against bilateral intervention by the Soviets,
Belgium, or any neighbouring African state.\textsuperscript{139} Canada continued to be less strident than
its ally in advocating a wholly Western Congo policy. In fact, Charles Ritchie believed it
would be very difficult for Canada, given its participation in the Advisory Committee and
ONUC, to follow “the straight NATO line.”\textsuperscript{140}

The Western view was embodied in a resolution sponsored by the United States
and the United Kingdom. External Affairs considered the text to be “unexceptionable,”
but did not expect it to receive the required two-thirds support from the Assembly
because it did not include a call to release Lumumba, a provision Canadian officials

\textsuperscript{138} NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 8, United States Aide-Memoire, 16 December
1960.

\textsuperscript{139} NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 8, Memo: UN Div to USSEA: Congo at the United
Nations, 16 December 1960.

\textsuperscript{140} NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 8, Memo: UN Div to USSEA: Congo at the United
Nations, 16 December 1960.
assumed was the "main objective" of the eight-power resolution. Diefenbaker instructed the Canadian delegation to vote in favour of the Western resolution, but in order to compromise with the Afro-Asians, the delegation was also advised not to oppose any "African-Asian move to have the text amended to call for the freeing of political prisoners." This was an important departure with American policy, which was clearly against any proposition to release Lumumba. Canada distanced itself from the firm Western position when it declined American and British requests to co-sponsor the Western resolution, ostensibly because of Canadian participation in ONUC. Further evidence of Canada's effort to distance itself from a perceived 'NATO' line can be found in the weight given by Ottawa to the positions taken by Ireland and Sweden, when it ultimately decided to vote in favour of the Western resolution and against the eight-power resolution.

The Canadian statement in the Congo debate justified the votes in favour of the Western resolution and against the eight-power resolution on the grounds that the former was constructive and clarified the role of ONUC, while the latter was ambiguous and likely to result in further confusion. Although the speech conceded that Canada might have had political aspirations for the Congo, it stressed the neutrality and objectivity of Canadian actions. The Canadian delegate stated,

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My [government] could have wished at different times that different courses of action had been pursued in the Congo. It could have sought to influence the UN operations to serve particular purposes which [Canada] believed should be served. But we have considered that it was important to resist these temptations and to exercise a degree of restraint even when events were taking place, the immediate results of which were not to our liking. 143

The intervention during the debate was also used as an opportunity to chastise the Soviet bloc and ridicule their attempts to draw attention to Canada’s membership in NATO.

The violence of the attacks spearheaded by the Soviet bloc, built on a tissue of mendacious invective, has only served to demonstrate their real motive. Superficially these attacks have been directed at the [Secretary-General] and at alleged imperialist intrigues of NATO allies. This must, incidentally, include my country, but who, I wonder, could honestly believe that [Canada] has imperialist or aggressive designs against the Congo? The real objectives of these propagandistic attacks by the Soviet bloc must surely be clear to four-score-and-ten states represented here. 144

This speech revealed the twofold nature of Canadian policy: it professed Canadian neutrality and objectivity and, at the same time, attempted to score political points by criticizing the Soviets. In the end, neither resolution received the required number of votes and the debate closed with a procedural motion, by which the Assembly decided to retain the Congo as an agenda item and simply noted that the previous General Assembly and Security Council resolutions remained in force. 145

145 NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 8, Memo for Minister: Congo Debate, December 1960; One scholar observed that this debate was an example of how difficult it could be to formulate a positive policy for ONUC when there was no clear majority consensus. Herbert Nicholas, “An Appraisal,” International Military Forces: The Question of Peacekeeping in an Armed and Disarming World. Ed. Lincoln Bloomfield (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1964) 116.
As 1960 drew to a close, political conditions in the Congo were fragile, and relations between Congolese and ONUC officials remained tense. Nonetheless, when the Acting Canadian Consul General, George Hampson, met with Kasavubu he found the President to be optimistic about the prospect of holding a conference of Congolese leaders in order to resolve the governmental and political crisis. Kasavubu told the Consul General that Joseph Ileo would be charged with forming a new government "to represent different provincial interests in the Congo," early in the new year. Hampson found that Ileo spoke in the same general terms about the need for discussion and negotiation but was unsure of how much significance to attach to these comments. Ileo, he noted, "seemed to be having a quiet afternoon in a back office without many visitors."¹⁴⁶

Dayal, according to Hampson, was much less optimistic about the ability of the Congolese to negotiate a solution to their difficulties. Hammarskjöld’s Special Representative was of the view that the Congolese leaders should "first accept the idea of working under the 'constitution'.” While Dayal was critical of the Congolese, Hampson noted the American and British ambassadors were critical of Dayal and his management of ONUC. He was said to have "poor personal relations with the Congolese leaders in Leopoldville whom he treats with reserve and disdain,” and to have been “interpreting his instructions from the Security Council in a negative way.” From his interviews, Hampson concluded, “one of the primary difficulties between the UN and the Congolese is lack of

understanding of each other’s positions compounded by superior attitude on the part of Dayal.”\textsuperscript{147}

In an attempt to improve UN-Congolese relations, the Secretary-General considered using three officers of the Advisory Committee’s Conciliation Commission, who had finally arrived in the Congo in early December, as a consultative body to assist Dayal and “smooth” relations with the \textit{de facto} Congolese authorities.\textsuperscript{148} Kasavubu’s cool reception of the Commission scuttled this plan. The President refused to allow the Commission to interview any of the Congolese leaders he held under arrest and issued orders to Leopoldville hotels prohibiting the provision of accommodations to any member of the Commission.\textsuperscript{149} Wainhouse suggests the already poor relations between Kasavubu and ONUC likely “rubbed off on the Conciliation Commission.”\textsuperscript{150} Alan James provides an additional explanation as to why efforts at mediation, such as the Conciliation Commission, proved futile: “the various groups and factions within the Congo were interested not so much in mediation as in victory or survival, according to their situation.”\textsuperscript{151} The Commission remained in the Congo until February, attempting to carry out its mandate. The poor relationship between Dayal and the Leopoldville authorities was, however, beyond improvement or redemption.

On 31 December, the Canadian Cabinet considered how much Canadian peacekeepers serving in the Congo should receive as a special overseas allowance. It was customary for nations to continue to cover the costs of their soldiers’ regular pay while they served on peacekeeping missions, but the UN usually reimbursed the costs of any overseas allowances. In mid December, the Treasury Board reviewed a request from the Minister of National Defence to establish the rate of the overseas allowance at $150 per month. The Minister, in his submission, noted that other nations had granted allowances that ranged from $90 to $570 per month (at the rank of private). Treasury Board questioned the usefulness of these figures, noting they were based on the assumption that they were reimbursable by the UN, when this had not yet been “firmly established.” The Board recalled that peacekeepers received $30 per month if they served in UNEF, “where conditions although markedly different in some respects, might, in sum, be considered an almost equally difficult area in which to serve.” Peacekeepers living in the Congo would have readily challenged that assumption. Treasury Board recommended that Cabinet, if it chose to exceed the $30 allowance, use the Post-differential allowances paid to diplomatic personnel in Leopoldville as a model ($500 per year, increased to $750 or $1,000 for personnel serving outside Leopoldville).\(^{152}\) Cabinet settled on a figure of $100 per month, effective 1 December 1960.\(^{153}\)


Officials at External Affairs made discreet inquiries at the UN as to the allowances requested by other nations, in order to reply to a Member of Parliament's question about "out-of-proportion" claims by some countries.\textsuperscript{154} They learned that some countries had requested allowances "on the high side," but the Secretariat was negotiating more reasonable rates. More troubling was news that UN HQ was expecting the Canadian claims for reimbursement "to be at the same rate as for UNEF (about $33)."\textsuperscript{155} Cabinet was unaware of this at the time it made its decision. In a memo to Howard Green, Robertson warned, "we can anticipate that the Secretariat will raise objections when asked to reimburse Canada at the rate of $100 per man per month." Robertson provided both "political and practical" reasons why Canada should not press its claim on the UN for the full $100 allowance. In particular, he was concerned that it might weaken the Secretariat's position in its negotiations with nations providing contingents larger than Canada's. Robertson suggested a solution: Canada would request the "highest possible percentage, consistent with other claims being paid," and the Department of National Defence could absorb the remaining balance.\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{154} The M.P. was particularly concerned about Swedish allowances. This was a special circumstance, though. The Swedish constitution did not permit armed units to serve outside the country. As a result, Swedish peacekeepers were volunteers, and the UN was required to pay their regular salary, in addition to an overseas allowance. See: D. Colwyn Williams, "The Political Problem of Peace-keeping," 15.
The long overdue announcement of the allowances was greeted in the Congo with little enthusiasm or fanfare. Anticipating disappointment, the notification by Canadian Army HQ was practically apologetic in tone:

Notwithstanding strong efforts made here to have allowance approved effective date members [Canadian] forces first arrived Congo unlikely that approved date of 1 Dec 60 will be changed. Moreover original intention was that 100.00 dollars be approved as interim measure subject to review following on the spot investigation to be made by fact finding team from Ottawa. Decision now taken that rate of allowance as approved following review by Cabinet is firm and investigating team will not be despatched.\textsuperscript{157}

Anticipating outright dissension, the Commanding Officer of the 57\textsuperscript{th} issued orders to “insure that all ranks are aware of the proper method of registering complaints. They are NOT to write letters to newspapers on this subject.”\textsuperscript{158} At least one peacekeeper did attempt to contact the press. In a letter appended to the War Diary and signed simply “A disheartened Canadian,” the soldier outlined his grievances and asked, “Are we here some sort of super-citizen that the Canadian people should expect us not only to suffer the temporary loss of wives and families, to suffer the hardships this country offers and then also tell us that we must suffer our families and selves to financial loss.”\textsuperscript{159} The peacekeepers had a legitimate grievance, especially with respect to the date upon which the allowances were made effective. Paradoxically, those who served in the difficult and dangerous period of July to December were to receive no special allowance for these


\textsuperscript{158} NAC, RG24, vol. 18483, War Diary – No. 57 Canadian Signal Squadron, February, Minutes of 57\textsuperscript{th} Canadian Signal Unit Staff Meeting, 10 February 1961 [emphasis and underlining as per original].
initial months. This grievance was addressed, and in February the allowance was made
retroactive to August.\textsuperscript{160}

In late December, Belgium found itself embroiled in a diplomatic incident and
looked to its NATO allies for support. As 1960 drew to a close, the Stanleyville
‘government’ moved to strengthen its hold in Eastern Congo. ANC troops loyal to
Lumumba were sent to neighbouring Kivu province, where they arrested local military
and political leaders and reinforced a military garrison in the capital, Bukavu. Hundreds
of Stanleyville soldiers then moved through Kasai into Northern Katanga. In response to
these attacks, Mobutu and 100 soldiers flew to the nearest available airport to Bukavu,
located at Usumbura in the neighbouring Belgian Trust-Territory of Ruanda-Urundi.
They boarded trucks, drove to the Congolese border, and crossed into Kivu. The
campaign quickly disintegrated when the Stanleyville ANC failed to rally to Mobutu’s
side, as the Colonel had expected them to do.\textsuperscript{161}

Belgium immediately came under fire for assisting Mobutu in his transit through
Ruanda-Urundi. Explaining the events to their NATO partners, Belgium claimed not to
have received Mobutu’s request for transit until just before the planes landed at
Usumbura. Given the circumstances, they “decided to allow the troops to land and to
transport them to the Congolese frontier by truck.” They argued, “Belgium and the West
have both an interest and a moral responsibility in the Congo,” and that, “it was necessary

\textsuperscript{159} NAC, RG24, vol. 18483, War Diary – No. 57 Canadian Signal Squadron, February, Letter by
anonymous Canadian Peacekeeper in ONUC, 8 February 1961.

\textsuperscript{160} John S. Moir, Ed., History of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, 1903-1961 (Ottawa: Corps
Committee, Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, 1962) 318.
to face Communist-Afro-Asian unity with Western unity.” The African and Middle Eastern Division were skeptical of the Belgian claims to have had little or no warning of Mobutu’s arrival; they asserted, “it was no secret that some sort of expedition was planned.” They questioned whether the Belgian account was the “full story” but acknowledged it might be wise not to admit this publicly. It was best, in the view of this Division, not to respond to Belgium’s “appeal for NATO solidarity,” especially given that Hammarskjöld and Belgium were “directly opposed to each other on this issue.”\footnote{Hoskyns, \textit{The Congo Since Independence}, 301-4.}

The European and Defence Liaison Divisions, by comparison, were more sympathetic towards Belgium in their assessments of the Usumbura incident.\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5211, file 6386-40 parts 16 and 16.2, Memo for the Minister: Request for NATO support of Belgium’s Congo Activities, 12 January 1961.} Ottawa decided not to support their NATO ally openly. Canada had to maintain a “reputation for disinterestedness.”\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 9, Memo European Div to USSEA: Request for NATO Support of Belgium’s Congo Activities, 18 January 1961; NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 9, Memo DL (1) to USSEA: Request for NATO Support for Belgium’s Congo Activities, 16 January 1961.}

Before long, the Belgians grew tired of Canada’s ‘lukewarm’ support. The Canadian Ambassador came to believe he exercised very little influence in Brussels. He reported, “I have whenever I could pressed the point with Wigny [Belgian Foreign Minister] and others that Belgian cooperation with UN seemed wisest policy and best tactics but I didn’t make any impression. I could hardly get a word in edgewise.”\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5211, file 6386-40 parts 16 and 16.2, Outgoing Message External to NATOPARIS: Belgian Policy in the Congo, 20 January 1961.}

\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 9, Telegram Brussels to External: Congo, 12 January 1961.}
effort to once again influence the views of its allies, Belgium dispatched an Ambassador to the NATO Political Advisers Committee. Initially, Canada and Britain were both reluctant to discuss Congo policy within this committee. Ottawa told its NATO representative, “We fully share U.K. assessment of the danger of possible leaks of the fact that NATO is discussing the Congo and the consequent interpretation that a ‘NATO line’ on Africa was being developed. Such an interpretation could not fail to arouse apprehension and resentment in a number of African and other countries.”¹⁶⁶ In spite of these misgivings, Canada agreed to a discussion of the Congo crisis in hopes that Belgium might be helped to see the advantages of “fuller cooperation with the UN Secretariat.”¹⁶⁷

The Belgians were unimpressed. In a later meeting with the Canadian ambassador, Wigny expressed concern that Canada was not more supportive of Belgium in the UN. The ambassador replied, “As Belgium’s ally and friend [Canada] felt that given the present political balance in the world and in UN and given [Canada’s] membership on UN Advisory [Committee] on Congo and [Canadian] troops in Congo, the best way for [Canada] to help was to avoid taking sides too openly.”¹⁶⁸ Wigny was unconvinced; he hoped that Canada “would reexamine the position and reconsider her attitude, and would come to the conclusion that our common interests would best be

served by supporting Belgium more openly and fully in UN and elsewhere. In Belgium’s view, the private assurances and subtle suggestions of Canadian ‘quiet’ diplomacy amounted to poor support from one of its NATO allies.

The consolidation of Lumumbist support in Orientale and the military incursions into Kivu and Northern Katanga, by ANC forces loyal to Stanleyville, caused concern in Leopoldville. Then, elements of the ANC mutinied at Thysville, where Patrice Lumumba was being held. Taken together, these events indicated a resurgence in Lumumba’s support that Leopoldville authorities decided to counter by transferring Lumumba from Thysville to Katanga. Hoskins has concluded that it was “by no means clear” who planned and carried out the transfer, but both Kasavubu and Bomboko, but not necessarily Mobutu, appear to have been involved.

The Secretary General’s Advisory Committee met to consider the situation. Hammarskjöld explained that it had not been possible for ONUC to intervene to prevent the transfer of Lumumba because the Congolese leader had been detained in an ANC camp not under UN control. When the plane carrying Lumumba arrived at the Elizabethville airport, it was met by jeeps, armoured cars, and 130 gendarmerie. Six peacekeepers were able to view the scene from a distance and watched as the “severely beaten” Lumumba was thrown to the floor of a jeep, which then drove through an opening specially cut in the fence so that the usual control centres could by bypassed.

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Hammarskjöld immediately sent a message to Tshombé "urging humane treatment and Lumumba's right to a fair and speedy trial," outside Katanga.\textsuperscript{171}

Members of the committee generally approved of Hammarskjöld's actions, but many, lead by India, were keen to see Lumumba released so that he could fully participate in any political negotiations or attempts at conciliation. Although Charles Ritchie expressed Canada's "shock and disgust at the brutal treatment" of Lumumba, he did not go so far as to suggest Lumumba be released. In his statement to the Committee, he simply agreed "Mr. Lumumba should be brought to a fair and speedy trial in accordance with the guarantees which are normally given to accused persons."\textsuperscript{172}

Canada's awkward position in the Committee was then highlighted when Morocco made "an oblique and rather caustic" remark concerning a statement made by Howard Green, which was seen to be insufficiently supportive of Lumumba.\textsuperscript{173} In response to a question in the House of Commons as to whether the government had protested the beating of Lumumba, Green had remarked, "No, Mr. Speaker, there has been no protest launched. It would keep us very busy if we were to protests all the beatings which take place in the Congo. I agree ... that it was an unfortunate incident."\textsuperscript{174} The Advisory Committee "agreed" that Hammarskjöld should send a further message to Kasavubu "pointing out that negotiations for a political settlement could not be effectively pursued if Lumumba


\textsuperscript{172} NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 9, Minutes of UN Advisory Committee on Congo, 20 January 1961.

continued to be incarcerated under conditions where he could not be regarded as a free agent.”

In his report to Ottawa, Ritchie was critical of the “rather peculiar way” the Advisory Committee functioned. He noted that during the discussion a number of representatives, including himself, had gone no further than to suggest Lumumba be brought to a speedy trial. Yet, when Hammarskjöld summed up “the consensus” reached by the Committee, provision for Lumumba’s release “for the purpose of participating in negotiations” had been incorporated. Short of expressing an explicit reservation, there was little Ritchie could do but go along with Hammarskjöld’s interpretation. He noted, “In any case it would be difficult to oppose such a principle in the Advisory [Committee] given its strongly Afro-Asian complexion.”

Eyebrows were raised in Ottawa. Norman Robertson noted. “This is the first time that the Secretary-General has recommended that Lumumba be released from custody to engage in political negotiations and he has thus raised an issue of considerable importance.” Previously, Canada had been willing to go along with UN resolutions that called for the release of Lumumba. Now, Ottawa seemed more concerned at the prospect of Lumumba’s return. The following views, though subsequently edited from the final draft of instructions to Ritchie, are revealing: “For your own info and as background for

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any talks you may have with the [Secretary-General] privately, we have some concern as to the effect which the return of Lumumba to active political life may have, both on the possibility of creating stable political institutions in the Congo and on the international posture the Congo might adopt.” Ottawa hoped Lumumba’s release, if it was to occur, would be at a time decided by the “Central Congolese Government rather than the Advisory Committee.” Ottawa was safe in assuming the Leopoldville authorities would never release Lumumba at a time when he might easily return to power. Although there was a clear policy preference in Ottawa to limit the impact of any move to release Lumumba, Ritchie was told to maintain a “restrained and impartial” attitude in the Advisory Committee. Private views were not for public consumption.

When it raised concerns about ONUC’s chain of command and leadership, Canada was somewhat more direct in its diplomatic interventions with the Secretary-General. Canadian officers serving with ONUC reported serious shortcomings with the organisation and operation of ONUC HQ. General von Horn, the Supreme Commander, was variously described as ill, ineffective, indecisive and weak. The UN Division noted von Horn had no experience commanding a formation in the field and, in Sweden, was “critically referred to as ‘general transport’.” Group Captain Carr found that von Horn

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was contumacious of civilians; this, he stated, spoiled relations with the civilian side of ONUC.  

It should be remembered that Rajeshwar Dayal, a civilian, was the highest-ranking UN official in the Congo and was ultimately responsible for both the military and civilian operations of ONUC. For a short time in the fall, while Dayal was in New York, General Indar Jit Rikhye, Hammarskjöld's Military Adviser, stood in as Acting Representative of the Secretary-General. The majority of the officers on von Horn's staff were Indian. Group Captain Carr reported that frequently these officers followed instructions received directly from Rikhye or Dayal, without any reference to von Horn. The degree to which relations between von Horn and Dayal had deteriorated is evident in the following memo from the Force Commander to the Special Representative:

Reference your unexpected midnight request for my deferring the departure, the necessity of which I reported to Secretary-General almost three weeks ago, I feel entitled to be given all facts. Will you therefore please advise me of communications between yourself and Secretary-General concerning me. In view of so much action that has taken place over my head since you left for New York on 2 November 1960, I feel slightly puzzled that my physical presence should be of any particular importance when I have two very senior officers to deputize for me.

If Secretary-General were unable to find anyone willing to take on this most thankless task and therefore, as indicated in his first signal to me, would ask me to return. I must emphasize the necessity of satisfactory terms of reference between Supreme Commander and the Civil Administration.

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183 DHH, file 90/336, Box 3, part 48, Memo Supreme Commander to Ambassador Dayal, 10 December 1960.
Once it was clear to Ottawa that von Horn was leaving his post, External Affairs thought it an opportune time for Ritchie to raise Canadian views with Hammarskjöld, prior to the Secretary-General's appointment of the next Force Commander.

Ritchie was apprehensive about raising the topic with Hammarskjöld. The Secretary-General completely relied on Dayal and Rikhye and was said to be in a "state of extreme tension and sensitivity."\(^{184}\) Ritchie planned first to meet with other Secretariat officials, while Ottawa considered how to present Canadian concerns so that they would not be interpreted as yet another complaint about Hammarskjöld's direction of the UN's efforts in the Congo. Although a lengthy list of concerns was drafted, following consultations with DND, External Affairs decided to concentrate particularly on issues related to ONUC's chain of command.\(^ {185}\)

By end of December, Ottawa had learned from the Canadian contingent in the Congo that Rikhye had been asked to return to New York. Robertson wrote to Green, suggesting "our worries about Brigadier Rikhye may be approaching an end and that our approach to the Secretary-General need not be too pointed as regards Rikhye's activities in the Congo."\(^ {186}\) Dayal, however, remained problematic. There was increasing pressure, in the press and from the Leopoldville authorities, to recall Dayal. The UN Division cautioned, "If our intention is to support the United Nations position rather than to press


for a Western position, which may be divided in any case, I can see little advantage in adding to the Secretary-General’s worries by joining the chorus of demand for withdrawal of Mr. Dayal.” The African and Middle Eastern Division departed from this view somewhat. They agreed that Canada should not publicly press for Dayal’s withdrawal, but because they believed he was an impediment to the eventual resolution of the crisis, they argued against “joining any counter-chorus in defence of Mr. Dayal.” More significantly, they took the opportunity for intra-departmental discussion to elaborate more fully upon the political position Canada should pursue:

I am rather doubtful, too, about the suggestion that our intention is to support a ‘United Nations position’ – which means, as I understand it, the Secretary-General’s position – rather than to ‘press for a Western position’. I don’t really see the alternatives posed in quite this way. I am sure we should not (not yet, at any rate) espouse the proposal for a solid NATO front on the Congo, premised entirely on the analysis of the Congo situation as part of the East-West struggle. This is not yet an agreed Western position and I should think there is an opportunity for us to avoid this and to help elaborate a general Western position which is consonant with or at least not irreconcilable with the Hammarskjold approach. At the same time I would hope that the Secretary-General’s present position is not unalterable and that he would continue to be open to friendly counsel, particularly about the directives to be given the U.N. forces in the Congo and the directives to his Special Representative on his proper relationship with the U.N. military command and with the Congolese authorities. The instructions to Charles Ritchie ... provided a useful beginning of an exercise in quiet persuasion which needs to be renewed and reinforced from time to time.  

188 NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 9, Memo African and Middle Eastern Div to USSEA: Congo and UN Officials, 20 January 1961; The Defence Liaison division subsequently supported the African and Middle Eastern Division’s view that Canada should not publicly support or criticize Dayal, but should privately give advice to Hammarskjold on the “proper role of his representative in the Congo.” NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 9, Memo DL (1) to USSEA: Congo and UN Officials,
This argument is very indicative of the tactics Canadian diplomats often used during the Congo crisis. They avoided hard and fast political positions, sought out room for constructive compromise, and quietly persuaded others to see the sensibility of Canadian views.

In this instance, it fell upon Charles Ritchie to employ his powers of quiet, tactful persuasion with Hammarskjöld. Ottawa instructed its representative in New York to raise numerous issues with the Secretary General: reconciling the factions within the United Nations which favoured the various Congolese leaders, the lack of cooperation between the Congolese and ONUC, the threatened withdrawal of certain ONUC contingents, and chain of command. The last point was considered the “most important.” The Canadian government was of the view that the Force Commander “should have full control of all military matters and should be fully responsible for giving military advice to the [Secretary-General’s] Rep.” Put bluntly, Ottawa wanted Rikhye to return to, and remain in, New York. Ritchie was advised, “It is the firm opinion of the [Canadian] military authorities that the confusion in the directives given to the force will not be removed unless and until the role and function of the Commander is clarified in this way.” External Affairs hoped Ritchie could discuss the matter “in a friendly and frank way,” without reference to specific personalities.¹⁸⁹

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Ritchie found Hammarskjöld in a “relaxed and almost buoyant mood.” The Secretary-General acknowledged there had been difficulties at ONUC headquarters and that the chain of command needed to be clarified. Hammarskjöld justified Rikhye’s presence in the Congo on the grounds that he needed “a senior military officer who was capable of conducting delicate and difficult negotiations with various Congolese military and para-military elements.” It was implied that von Horn was “too poor in health or lacking in sufficient vigour to undertake this function.” The situation was expected to improve with the appointment of MacEoin, and this would permit Rikhye’s return to New York. Hammarskjöld still anticipated the need for a senior officer who could be dispatched throughout the Congo when emergencies arose and expected one might be found from among the Commander-in-Chief’s staff. It may be recalled that MacEoin had initially urged the Secretariat to retain Col. Berthiaume for this purpose, but Hammarskjöld now told Ritchie that von Horn “had attempted to use Col Berthiaume in this way on one or two occasions but that Berthiaume had not shown the qualities needed for political appreciation.” This issue appears not to have been pursued; one is left to speculate on what was meant by ‘the qualities needed for political appreciation’. While it appeared as though Ritchie was persuasive on the issue of Rikhye’s role at ONUC HQ, the Secretary-General was “immediate and categorical” in his defence of Dayal. At this point, there was little prospect of Hammarskjöld replacing his Special Representative.190

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In mid January, Canada refused to provide the UN with 27 RCAF technical personnel, some three months after the UN asked. This was the first significant ONUC request the government chose to decline. Initially, details from the UN were unclear, and when DND prompted External Affairs for clarification of the UN’s precise needs, the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff advised the Under-Secretary, “The organization of the RCAF is such that they are much more able to contribute a complete unit such as a squadron, rather than to weaken several units by supplying a piecemeal group as requested by the United Nations.”

By mid November, details had been obtained, planning was undertaken, and the RCAF approved a plan to provide the necessary personnel to operate a telecommunications network for ONUC’s three main air transport bases in Leopoldville, Stanleyville, and Kamina. The Chief of the Air Staff abandoned his earlier reservations because Canada had since been asked to fill the position of Air Commander in ONUC, and he did not want either the flexibility or safety of the air operations to be compromised because of inadequate communications.

Cabinet, however, postponed a decision on the request because of the “disturbed” political situation in the Congo. Following discussions with Group Captain Carr, the Chief of the Air Staff asked Harkness to raise the matter in Cabinet again. The Minister suggested a further delay of two weeks. When that interval passed, and political conditions in the Congo had still not

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improved, DND finally asked External Affairs to advise the Secretary-General that it would not be possible to meet his request.

The continued deterioration of political conditions eventually led to a famine in South Kasai. An earlier group of 80,000 Baluba, who fled to the region, were joined by an additional 150,000 refugees as conflicts worsened. Mortality was said to be high, estimated at 200 famine related deaths daily, due primarily to diseases related to protein deficiency. From time to time, Canadians had written Diefenbaker and Green to offer their views on events in the Congo, but nothing compared with the outpouring of letters the government received urging it to act to relieve suffering in Kasai. The words and sentiments of Florence Waterworth were typical of dozens of letters the Prime Minister received: “You are our Prime Minister and your influence and power are great. You and your government must act immediately and be assured you are expressing the will of the hearts of the Canadian people.” Many were dismayed by the government’s lack of immediate action: “Make national call for substantial aid (cash and food) plus government help for starving Congo and China. Have we no conscience? Why are we always lagging in humanitarian effort?” An entire elementary school class from Richmond Hill wrote letters; one student said, “All the class at school were talking it over and we thought that we wanted to send some food to the people in the Congo, and we want to ask you to. We have to [sic] much food here and we don’t need it all. We want

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196 DCC, file MG1/VI/(802/C749), Telegram to Diefenbaker, 16 January 1961.
very much to send some.” While two letters retained in the Diefenbaker papers did
urge the government to assist the Canadian unemployed as well as the starving
Congolese, all others exclusively addressed the urgent need to send aid to the Congo.

In spite of this public outcry, the government prevaricated. Canada was asked
particularly for dried fish. Aid agencies required 3,250 tons, and while the government
did not maintain stocks of this commodity, Canadian industry did. Moreover, the
Department of Fisheries “welcomed” a government purchase of the commodity.¹⁹⁸

Howard Green, in a submission to Cabinet supported by the Ministers of Agriculture and
Fisheries, suggested a gift of 100 tons of dried fish and 100 tons of dried skim milk, at a
cost of $50,000. Consideration was also given to covering the cost of transporting the
food, if this could not be borne by aid agencies. Green noted, “the FAO appeal has
evoked considerable sympathy in Canada, as evidenced by letters urging a Canadian
contribution.”¹⁹⁹ Cabinet considered the matter on 26 January 1961 and seems to have
been convinced by Diefenbaker to delay any decision on aid until the Minister of
Agriculture could study and propose “a possible programme of distribution of surplus
foodstuffs to needy persons within Canada.” Diefenbaker said he had received
“numerous” letters objecting to plans to provide aid to the Congo when there were needy
unemployed in Canada.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁷ DCC, file MG1/VI/(802/C749), Class set of 31 Letters to Diefenbaker, 1 February 1961.
¹⁹⁸ NAC, RG25, vol. 5211, file 6386-40 parts 16 and 16.2, Memo to the Minister: Famine in the
¹⁹⁹ NAC, RG2, vol. 6178, Cabinet Document 22.61, Memo to Cabinet: Famine in the Congo,
If this was the case, many of these letters appear not to have been retained in his personal files. The vast majority of the letters present in the Diefenbaker papers are united in their call for immediate aid for the Baluba. Howard Green seems to have been aware of this discrepancy. The very next day he wrote to the Prime Minister, requesting that Cabinet immediately reconsider the issue, "particularly in the light of the mounting public interest in this question." Green argued that dried fish and skim milk powder were not suitable for relief distribution in Canada. He added, "I am aware of numerous letters from the general public asking what the Government will be doing to help." He drew the Prime Minister's attention to a letter that was concurrently published in the *Montreal Gazette*. The matter was raised in Cabinet again on 31 January, but Diefenbaker stood his ground. He said he had been approached by "representatives of several groups of unemployed persons," and that "surplus foodstuffs should be distributed to unemployed persons in Canada before any announcement was made about donations to other countries."²⁰¹ Cabinet reaffirmed its earlier decision to delay any decision. In the end, Canada appears to have given little if any aid. There was some effort at External Affairs to locate funds within existing budgets to circumvent the need for a supplementary estimate, but it is not clear whether any aid was eventually provided this way.²⁰²

This episode is interesting for what it tells us about the role of public opinion in shaping the Conservative government's foreign policy. In this instance, Diefenbaker

clearly paid little heed to the volume of letters he received; and, it is worth noting that many of the authors of these letters learned of the famine by watching television and reading newspapers or magazines. If Diefenbaker did truly consider public opinion, he appears to have dismissed the letters and contemporary media as unrepresentative of most Canadians’ views. This is significant because for the entire time Canadians were present in the Congo, no other issue caused as great a public reaction as did the famine. Either public opinion played a limited role in shaping this aspect of Canada’s Congo policy, or it must have been deduced from sources other than letters from the public and media coverage.

In the Congo, a number of states with ONUC contingents became increasingly bitter as Kasavubu continued to consolidate power and undermine Lumumba. In protest, Guinea, the United Arab Republic, Morocco, and Indonesia formally asked the Secretary-General to withdrawal their forces from the operation, a total of approximately 6,150 peacekeepers. Hammarskjöld turned to Ethiopia, Iraq, Sudan, India, Mexico, and Senegal for replacements. Concerned about the public’s perception of this withdrawal, Norman Robertson suggested that Howard Green take advantage of any questions raised in the House of Commons to point out that the situation was not as “bad” as had been, for instance, reported in the Globe and Mail.²⁰³ Indeed, Ottawa seemed to take this news in stride. Hammarskjöld was seen to be “acting energetically to counteract the situation,” and the withdrawal of troops from Guinea and the UAR was seen as a positive

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development for ONUC that could "result in improvement in the operations of the Force."\textsuperscript{204} As a parting shot, the United Kingdom suggested to Canada that the Security Council be apprised of the United Arab Republic's "mischievous activity" in the Congo. Canada was keen to ensure the UAR contingent did not remain in the Congo once its status with ONUC was terminated but thought it best to let sleeping dogs lie. Unlike the UK, Canada favoured raising concerns about the conduct of UAR peacekeepers in private with the Secretary-General.\textsuperscript{205} Once again, quiet diplomacy was the order of the day.

While some nations withdrew their contingents from ONUC, Canada was increasing its representation at ONUC HQ. On 5 January, the UN asked Canada to provide four bilingual Army staff officers: one major for movement control duties, one major for information duties, one major for operations staff duties, and one captain for logistics staff duties. At the time, there were 280 Army officers and men serving with ONUC, including nine officers and two other ranks with ONUC HQ. In addition, the RCAF had a total of 12 officers and men in the Congo. This was well within the ceiling of 500 personnel set by Cabinet when Canadian participation was originally approved.\textsuperscript{206} Both Harkness and Green agreed to the UN's request, but Green wanted the role of the information officer to be clarified before the matter was brought to Cabinet. Recalling Rikhye's earlier attempt to use a Canadian peacekeeper as a spy in Brazzaville, External


Affairs sought assurances that this officer would not be used to gather intelligence. After consulting with the commanding officer of the 57th, Col. Smith, it became clear that the primary responsibility of this officer would be the preparation of situation reports and other documents on developments in the Congo. Smith was very much in favour of accepting the additional commitment. He wired Army HQ, “Need for bilingual [officers] is urgent and need for [officers] who know something about what they are doing is even more so. Errors have been made in [movement control] for example that cost millions.” The UN’s decision to request Canadians for ONUC HQ appeared to be a turning point, perhaps prompted by the sudden withdrawals of the contingents from nations that staunchly supported Lumumba. According to Col. Smith, up to this point in time, Hammarskjöld had resisted the appointment of any additional Canadians.

Cabinet agreed to the request on 31 January. The Minister of National Defence argued that the provision of these officers “would enable the Canadian government to obtain more complete information on developments in the Congo, and would enable

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207 NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 9, Memo for Minister: Congo – Request for Assistance, 19 January 1961; Green’s concerns were reasonable, not only because of the prior incident with Gen. Rikhye, but also because the meanings of the terms ‘intelligence’ and ‘information’ were used somewhat ambiguously within ONUC. According to Lincoln Bloomfield, the civilian side of ONUC insisted on the use of the word ‘information’ instead of ‘intelligence’. Lincoln Bloomfield, “Headquarters Field Relations: Some Notes on the Beginning and End of ONUC,” International Organization 17 (1963) 381. See also: Michael Harbottle, “Peacekeeping and Peacemaking,” Military Review 49.9 (September 1969) 49.
Canada to exert a greater influence upon U.N. affairs in that area.”

It is difficult to reconcile the Minister’s expectation that provision of these officers would provide Canada with information on Congo developments with National Defence’s earlier assurances to the UN that Canadian forces would respect UN expectations that peacekeepers would not communicate such information to their governments. In meeting this request, a degree of self-interestedness was a factor in the Cabinet’s decision.

The arrival of the Kennedy administration invigorated attempts to address the Congo crisis. Madeleine Kalb notes, “The mood in Washington shifted significantly.” Kennedy was committed to supporting the UN and Hammarskjöld. He recognised that Lumumba might have to be included in any Congolese government that hoped to enjoy broad-based public support. Early in February, the American embassy in Ottawa delivered an aide-memoire identifying three policy objectives: the establishment of a broadly-based government; a new mandate for ONUC that would allow it to “establish control over all principal military elements in the Congo, thus neutralizing the role of the Congolese forces in the country’s political affairs”; and an increased, improved effort by the civilian side of ONUC to provide aid so as to eliminate the likelihood of outside assistance.

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The Canadian government was pleased with the new American approach, which was deemed "reasonable and constructive." While it had usually shared the objectives of the Eisenhower administration, Ottawa was not always willing to openly cooperate with some of its divisive tactics in the UN: the maneuvering to seat Kasavubu's delegation, for example. Kennedy's productive approach was more compatible with Canada's key policy objective of helping the UN to succeed in its efforts in the Congo. Robertson wrote to Green,

The general U.S. intention of backing the United Nations effort and allowing the Secretary-General to take the public lead is identical with the expressed views of the Canadian Government. The views of Canada and the United States coincide exactly on the need to stop further outside interventions in the Congo, to reorganize the Congolese forces, to effect political conciliation and to revive the economic life of the Congo.213

Canadian diplomats were instructed to give support to the US initiative, but External Affairs recognized that some American aims would be difficult to achieve. While Ottawa appeared to be supportive of suggestions to neutralise and control armed elements in the Congo, it did not "underestimate the difficulties in doing so." The proposed timing of Lumumba's release was also questioned. US policy favoured his release only after armed elements had been neutralised and conciliation towards a new government was well under way. Ottawa noted, "[I]t may have to be faced that the immediate release of Lumumba may be a condition set by some of the Asian and African powers for their cooperation in achieving any of the general objectives now set forth."214 By accepting the

214 NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 10, Outgoing Message External to PERMISNY,
necessity of Lumumba's release and by considering the need for a strengthened ONUC mandate that would require the neutralization of the ANC, Canadian policy appeared to be emboldened by the American initiative to shift slightly towards a more activist, moderate, stance.

The American initiative caused an open rift within NATO, and with the exception of the United Kingdom, Canada found itself increasingly at odds with its European allies. At a NATO Council meeting of 9 February, Belgium was especially virulent in its criticism of the US for its failure to consult with NATO allies prior to acting on a new policy they considered "could only give comfort to the Russians." In the face of opposition from virtually all other members, Norway, Canada, and to a lesser degree Britain, tried to support the United States. Canada, it was said, "generally welcomed the line taken," in Washington. In a statement that was directed towards Belgium as much as it was the United States, Leger, the Canadian representative, remarked, "It would be in the interests of those who are involved more than we, that they should consult their allies early in the game and not after matters are raised at the UN. The proper time for discussion of a number of these matters was not two weeks or two months ago, but two or three years ago."215

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Belgium, and others on the Council, reiterated the view that NATO should
consider its policy on the Congo and present a united front. In his instructions to Leger,

Howard Green strenuously resisted this proposition:

I strongly disagree with the view that the object of NATO consultation on
UN questions should be to arrive at a common, coordinated NATO stand.
For one thing, the interests of individual NATO members in the Congo
situation are diverse and I would seriously doubt that any real meeting of
minds could be achieved except as a lowest common denominator. Even if
general agreement were possible, to attempt to adopt a NATO front in the
UN would be counter-productive ... Apart from diminishing the
possibility of gaining wider support in the UN for any positive move, it
would probably serve to discredit NATO’s own reputation in the UN.
Even if we could achieve agreement in NATO on such issues as the
Congo, it would seem much more desirable that attempts to gain support
for the policies we advocate should be put forward by individual members
of NATO in New York rather than as a concerted NATO action.\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5211, files 6386-40 parts 17 and 17.2, Outgoing Message External to
NATOPARIS: Congo, 14 February 1961.}

Canada was convinced of the need to look somewhat independent of its NATO allies at
the UN. The appearance of involvement in a united, western front would serve only to
undermine its efforts to play a constructive role in the resolution of the Congo crisis – a
role that required it to support, first and foremost, the Secretary-General and the
institution of the United Nations itself.
5
Continued Chaos: the Ileo Government

Late in January 1961, President Kasavubu followed through with his plans, earlier discussed with the Canadian Consul General, to deal with the ongoing political instability in the Congo. Working with Joseph Ileo, who was briefly Prime Minister before Mobutu’s coup, Kasavubu called for a roundtable conference of all the Congolese political leaders to take immediate steps to replace the College of Commissioners with a more representative interim authority, prior to the reconvening of parliament. According to van Bilsen, it was Kasavubu who convinced Mobutu to give up the College of Commissioners in favour of a government lead by Ileo, a move intended to create a more ‘legal’ government. Without the concurrence of parliament, the legality of Ileo’s government was dubious, and it never managed to exercise effective control over more than half of the Congolese provinces. ¹ Key leaders from Kivu, Orientale, and Katanga never attended the roundtable conference. In part, the Congolese central authorities took this step to forestall any further intervention by either neighbouring African states or the United Nations. Kasavubu warned the Congolese would “not tolerate any attempt whatever to put them under trusteeship. The Congo is an independent country and has the sovereign right to decide its own future.”²

As the Ileo government assumed power in Leopoldville, Canada prepared to send a new Acting Consul General, Michel Gauvin, to the Congolese capital. In advance of his


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departure, representatives from External Affairs and National Defence briefed Gauvin on Canadian policy and the situation in the Congo. The Canadian position on the Congo, Gauvin was told, was one of "impartiality." The primary objective of Canadian policy was to support the Secretary-General and the United Nations. The impact of the cold war was acknowledged, however, one official said, "It is a fair assumption that all Western countries feel we should prevent Soviet domination of or infiltration into the area." Significantly, it was suggested that Canada was "prepared to accept a neutralist Congolese state."\(^3\)

In this respect, Canadian policy continued to differ from its European counterparts. For example, through its staunch support of Kasavubu and Mobutu, Belgium clearly favoured the establishment of a solid, Western oriented government in the Congo. And the United Kingdom, which had earlier half-heartedly defended the US in NATO meetings, became openly critical of provisions within the new American plans for the disarmament and reorganization of the ANC. Ottawa learned that the British government had instructed its delegation in New York to discourage Hammarskjöld from pursuing a policy of disarmament. If these attempts failed and the matter was brought before the Security Council, Britain planned to oppose such a policy there.\(^4\) While the Canadian government had expressed practical concerns about how the ANC and other


armed elements in the Congo could be disarmed, they did not oppose the policy in principle.

Since December, when both the Security Council and the General Assembly failed to adopt a positive policy for UN action in the Congo, ONUC was adrift. Guinea and Mali withdrew their contingents, and other contributing nations keen to see a more forceful implementation of existing resolutions reiterated their threats to leave as well. Hammarskjöld visited the Congo early in 1961 and came away convinced that a more active approach was needed. Support from the new American administration for a more interventionist policy strengthened the Secretary-General’s hand. In a statement to the Security Council, when it reconvened on 1 February, Hammarskjöld said,

[T]he Organization could well be blamed if, at the present juncture, it did not reassess its policy in the light of experience and consider whether, in the interest of peace and security, for which it carries primary responsibility, more far-reaching measures are not now called for in order to overcome this continued and increasing lack of cohesion, even if such measures by some might be felt as coming close to a kind of interference. ... I would welcome a decision by the Council requesting the Secretary-General to take urgently appropriate measures for assistance in the reorganization of the national army, preventing it, or units thereof, from intervening in the present political conflicts in the Congo.5

Hammarskjöld was clearly advocating disarmament of the ANC, a controversial step that both Britain and the Congolese government opposed. As was often the case during the Congo crisis, events in the Congo soon overtook debate in the Security Council.

On 13 February, Katangese authorities announced that Patrice Lumumba, the deposed Congolese Prime Minister, and two of his colleagues had been killed following
their ‘escape’ from prison. In the House of Commons, the opposition asked if the government had any information on Lumumba’s demise. Secretary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green, deplored “this act of violence.” He said, “While Mr. Lumumba has been a controversial figure, the fact remains that he was a duly elected member of parliament and formed the first government of the newly independent republic of the Congo. His death, if it has taken place, is unlikely to settle anything.”

In New York, Canada’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Charles Ritchie, met with his colleagues from Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. He reported their “general assessment of the situation was in terms which could scarcely have been darker.” Lumumba’s death was a blow to recent American diplomacy, some elements of which were now seen as “hollow or impractical.” However, Ritchie did hold out hope that something could still be done to prevent external intervention in the Congo or to achieve the neutralization of Congolese armed forces. Upon learning of Lumumba’s death, the Soviet Union was vehement in its condemnation of Hammarskjöld. It called for his removal, the withdrawal of ONUC within a month, and the immediate recognition of Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba loyalist and provincial leader of Orientale, as the head of the Congolese government. In spite of the severity of this attack on the UN, Ritchie perceived an additional reason to be guardedly optimistic: most Afro-Asian nations

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appeared to favour a moderate, compromise position instead of this extreme Soviet stance.⁷

News of Lumumba’s death prompted another series of letters written by concerned Canadian citizens. Various branches of the Communist Party of Canada sent half. Regardless of author, though, the letters were almost unanimous in the outrage they expressed at Lumumba’s fate. One Canadian living in the Congo wrote to Diefenbaker, “Lumumba is dead. We are all guilty. ... I long for the day when Canada stands up and denounces America for what it is. I am not Communist.”⁸ From Alberta, one woman wrote, “It’s shameful! To me and I’m sure to people all over the world Lumumba’s murder could have been prevented if United Nations forces were doing their duties.”⁹ The B.C. Young Communist League was more blunt: “Patrice Lumumba [sic] was elected and supported by the majority of Congolese people. His murder by Belgian running dogs makes it imperative that the Canadian government presses in the United Nations for the immediate convening of the rightfully elected Congolese parliament.”¹⁰ Although the government did publicly deplore Lumumba’s fate, it did not follow through on the many, often repeated, suggestions raised by the authors of these letters: to recognize the Gizenga government, to call for Hammarskjöld’s resignation, to denounce the Belgians and

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⁹ DCC, file MG1/VI/(845 Congo), Letter Miskew to Diefenbaker, 14 February 1961.

Americans, and to withdraw UN peacekeepers. As was the case with the letters
addressing the Kasai famine, the Lumumba letters did not influence government policy.

Canada never recognized Gizenga’s regime in Orientale as the legitimate
government in the Congo, though the matter was discussed in Cabinet. In Howard
Green’s absence, Prime Minister Diefenbaker noted the USSR, Ghana, Guinea, and the
United Arab Republic had all recognized Gizenga as Lumumba’s successor and his
government as the rightful authority in the Congo. The Prime Minister was concerned
that Gizenga would attempt to establish control over other parts of the Congo; 2,000
soldiers loyal to Gizenga were thought ready to attack Stanleyville.\textsuperscript{11} The Soviets
threatened to intervene on behalf of Gizenga, and a report by Charles Ritchie in New
York would only have served to confirm the view that this threat was not an idle one. In a
conversation with Ambassador Morozov, number two at the Soviet mission, Ritchie
attempted to seek out areas of compromise and middle ground. Morozov rejected all of
Ritchie’s arguments. The Soviet Ambassador simply countered, “There is no middle
ground.” Ritchie ominously concluded, “Morozov’s attitude revealed complete lack of
interest in any attempt to reach a peaceable solution in Congo and moreover lack of any
recognition that such a solution was even remotely attainable or indeed desirable.”\textsuperscript{12} The
Canadian Cabinet was certainly aware of the continuing and escalating Cold War
implications of events in the Congo, even as Ritchie attempted, in vain, to seek out room
for compromise.

\textsuperscript{11} NAC, RG2, vol. 6176, Cabinet Conclusions, 16 February 1961.
\textsuperscript{12} NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 10, Telegram PERMISNY to External: Congo,
When news of Lumumba's death arrived in New York, the Security Council was adjourned. The Soviet reaction was immediate and vituperative. They repudiated Hammarskjöld as Secretary-General, demanded an end to ONUC within one month, called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops in the Congo, and wanted both Mobutu and Tshombé arrested. Howard Green, in answer to a question posed by Lester Pearson in the House, dismissed the Soviet attitude and fulminations as a "culmination of the bitter but unfounded attack launched by the Soviet union against the secretary general late last summer and all during the autumn session of the general assembly." Green was effusive in his praise for the Secretary-General: "For its part the Canadian government will continue its firm support for the United Nations effort in the Congo and for Mr. Hammarskjold, who in the face of the greatest difficulty has served the high principles and purposes of the charter with courage, determination and endless patience."

The severity of the Russian response prompted the government to vigorously defend not only Hammarskjöld but also the United Nations as an institution. One Canadian official bemoaned, "the Soviet Union seems determined to wreck the contribution to stability which the United Nations is making in the Congo." Concerned that the neutral and independent countries seemed either to be siding with the Soviet Union or passively allowing the situation to deteriorate, Marcel Cadieux identified a particular question for Canada: what could be done "to induce these uncommitted states

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to do anything to prevent what would in fact be a major Soviet victory." Once again a Canadian diplomat patently cast the Congo Crisis in Cold War terms but also sought out a constructive role for Canada as interpreter of Western views to the neutral states and guardian of the United Nations.

When the Security Council resumed consideration of the Congo situation on 15 February, the Soviet Union introduced a draft resolution calling for both the dismissal of Hammarskjöld and the withdrawal of ONUC. It was defeated by a vote of one in favour, eight against, and two abstentions. A second resolution, sponsored by Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab Republic passed with nine affirmative votes, none against, and two abstentions. The three-power resolution, presented in two parts, brought about a significant shift in the role of ONUC. The UN was urged to take measures to prevent civil war in the Congo, even by the use of force “if necessary, in the last resort.” All foreign military personnel, mercenaries and even political advisers were required to leave the Congo. All states were asked to take measures to prevent the departure of such personnel for the Congo. An investigation into Lumumba’s death was ordered, and the perpetrators of the murder were to be punished. Adequate protection was to be provided to facilitate the recall of the Congolese parliament. Finally, armed units in the Congo were to be brought under control, reorganized, and removed from any involvement in the political affairs of the country. Charles Ritchie cited a number of key factors that

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{15}}\] NAC, RG25, vol. 5221, file 6386-C-40 part 10, Memo for USSEA: The Situation in the Congo, 16 February 1961.

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{16}}\] The full text of this resolution is found in appendix 2.

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{17}}\] Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence, 328-331.
accounted for the Council’s success in passing this resolution: firm American support of UN involvement in the Congo; a united effort by the Afro-Asian states to “preserve the United Nations approach,” once they realised both the US and USSR “meant business” in the Congo; a significant shift in Indian policy away from staunch support of the Lumumbists and an immediate recall of parliament towards the prevention of civil war and strengthened military support for the UN; and the United Arab Republic loosened “the Soviet embrace” because it was not prepared to risk an open conflict between Gizenga and Kasavubu, in which each side would by supported by rival superpowers.  

External Affairs was guardedly optimistic in its assessment of the resolution. They expected that Belgian and French reactions would be critical and that Belgian policy would depend on the degree of pressure applied to its allies, especially the US and UK. Perceptively, Canadian officials recognized that the 21 February resolution would refocus attention on Tshombé and Katanga. They noted, “if the United Nations presence in Katanga can be reinforced and if the external props are removed, his [Tshombé’s] position will be less tenable and he will be better disposed to reach accommodation with the other political leaders in the Congo.” The implications of the Security Council’s decision to use force in the last resort to prevent civil war were not lost on the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Norman Robertson, who concluded, “While there is cause for mild optimism about the fact that the Security Council has been able to reach a decision in favour of further action by the United Nations in the Congo, it would be a

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mistake not to be cautious about the difficulties. In trying to prevent civil war, for example, the United Nations could become involved in heavy fighting.”

The 21 February resolution had far-reaching, though uncertain, implications for the question of the use of force by ONUC. The legal basis for the resolution’s authorization of the use of force to prevent civil war was not explicit. This subsequently lead to conflicting interpretations, by diplomats and scholars alike. Uncertainty surrounding the meaning of this operative clause was immediately evident at External Affairs, where it was vaguely noted, “The Security Council resolution apparently gives the force somewhat broader scope for action than previously, when its military function has been largely limited to self-defence.” Publicly, in the House of Commons, Howard Green appeared to acknowledge that the repercussions of the resolution were not yet fully

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20 A number of scholars maintain that this resolution did not change ONUC into an enforcement action, in spite of its authorization to use force. For example, Boulden argues the Security Council resolutions “avoided using language or references that could invoke article 42-type enforcement.” Bowett suggests ONUC’s mandate was simply clarified, “without providing a wider legal basis.” Others highlight ways in which the mandate was expanded, bringing it ever closer to an enforcement action. Paul Diehl, for instance, suggests the resolution embodied “far more authority than had previously been granted peacekeeping operations and probably violated some basic principles of peacekeeping.” Likewise, Citrin states, “the emphasis on the undesirability of non-UN foreign advisers left no doubt that the reintegration of Katanga with the rest of the Congo was becoming an operational goal of ONUC,” and James identifies this resolution as “the first time the UN departed from the convention that its peace-keeping activities were to involve the use of force only in self-defence.” Some observers, however, do interpret the resolution as authorising enforcement action. Goronwy suggests “the Force was urged to use enforcement action if circumstances warranted it.” Parsons shares this view. See: Jane Boulden, The United Nations and Mandate Enforcement: Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia (Kingston, Ontario: Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University in cooperation with the Institut Québécois des Hautes Études Internationales, Université Laval, 1999) 33; D.W. Bowett, United Nations Forces (London: Stevens & Sons, 1964) 163-5; Paul Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins U P, 1994) 51. Jack Citrin, UN Peacekeeping Activities: A Case Study in Organizational Task Expansion Monograph Series in World Affairs 3.1 (Denver, Colorado: U of Denver, 1965-66) 40-1; Alan James, The Politics of Peacekeeping (London: Chatto & Windus, 1969) 414; Goronwy Jones, The United Nations and the Domestic Jurisdiction of States
understood, although he expressed confidence in the ability of the UN to exercise its mandate responsibly:

It is too early yet to have arrived at a precise assessment or interpretation of all the implications of the security council resolution of February 21. Various measures calling for procedures of implementation have been included in the resolution. These measures are broad in scope, and it has not yet been established in what way the United Nations will carry them out. ... I suggest that at this date we should not be concentrating our attention on this question of the possible use of force. The resolution states clearly that force would be used only if necessary and in the last resort. I am sure that we can rely on the good judgment of the Irish commander of the U.N. forces in the Congo, General McKeown, [sic] to act responsibly. 22

In contrast, days before this most recent resolution, the British were explicit in their views on the likelihood of the UN using force in the Congo. In a message to Green, the British Commonwealth Secretary stated, “it is no good looking to the United Nations force to do more than it is physically capable of doing. Nor is it possible or desirable for the United Nations to take over the job of governing the country and to assume a colonial function there. These two considerations seem to rule out imposing any political solution on the Congolese by force.” 23 These early views on ONUC and its use of force are significant because by the end of 1961 the peacekeeping mission would find itself actively involved in hostilities with the Katangese gendarmerie.

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Responsibility for the implementation of the 21 February resolution fell once again to the Secretary-General. In a clever move, Hammarskjöld began to use the Advisory Committee to shield himself from future criticism. Charles Ritchie noticed the change in tactics at once. Previously, communications were simply shared with the committee before being issued by the Secretariat. Now, Hammarskjöld involved the committee in the actual drafting of these communications.24 In a conversation with Ritchie, the Secretary-General revealed that he was “following a deliberate policy of facing the sponsors of the resolution … and other Afro-Asian members with their responsibilities.” All members of the committee came to be associated with his decisions, including Canada. This entailed certain risks, especially because it was not always possible for Ritchie to obtain advance instructions from Ottawa on proposals raised in the committee. Overall, Ritchie favoured continued participation because Canadian membership provided an important link with the Afro-Asians, helped the UN operation as a whole, and safeguarded the interests of Canadian peacekeepers serving with ONUC.25

In a break with its usual cautious and quiet approach, External Affairs advised Ritchie to “exercise a restraining influence whenever it should appear that the African-Asians might be pushing the UN into extreme positions.” Ottawa suggested it was “desirable from time to time in the advisory [committee] to remind the African-Asians, ...

especially the extremists, about the financial requirements and the need for collective responsibility in meeting them.” This rather pointed remark was meant to draw attention to the fact that the West paid the vast majority of ONUC's expenses. Despite these instructions, Ritchie was not “too vocal,” fearing any attempt to mitigate the more extreme interpretations of the 21 February resolution would lead to accusations that he was “furthering ‘unafrian’ designs.”

Ottawa worried that ‘extreme’ Afro-Asian opinion might pressure the Secretary-General into using ONUC to force a political solution in the Congo. The UN Division was in favour of intensifying efforts to establish neutral zones and cease-fires, but was against any suggestion that the 21 February resolution authorised enforcement action. Murray wrote,

We should agree, too, to the interpretation that the new resolution does not go beyond Article 40. ... It is unlikely that many member states would agree that the United Nations could use more than “preventive force”. which would be an extension of the concept of self-defence. It will be very important to block attempts on the part of some members to have United Nations force in order to impose any particular solution, for example. an attack on Katanga to coerce Tshombe.”

The Advisory Committee did take up the question of how best to interpret the reference to the use of force in the resolution’s first operative paragraph. Hammarskjöld was of the view that the new resolution entitled ONUC to “occupy territory to prevent civil war and

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take defensive action for all positions held." This, the Secretary-General felt, "gave the UN command in the Congo new and significant military strength." 29 Not satisfied with this interpretation, the Indian Ambassador was reported to have launched into a "series of almost metaphysical statements on 'defensive-offensive' force coupled with suggestions that the UN forces in the Congo should be more 'pushful' but at the same time apparently should keep out of trouble." 30 The Canadian view coincided with Hammarskjöld's: ONUC "should be used 'in the protection of agreed peaceful solutions'." Ottawa favoured negotiation and conciliation, thinking it doubtful the UN could force solutions on any Congolese faction and that the organisation would find itself in great difficulty "if it succumbed to the pressure from some member [governments] for the use of force as a sanction against unco-operative elements in the Congo." 31

By mid February 1961, there were 28 officers and 186 other ranks serving in the 57th Signal Unit. Twenty-one of the officers and 132 of the other ranks were stationed in Leopoldville. The remaining personnel were assigned to seven detachments of one officer and seven to nine men, throughout the Congo. 32 In addition, seven officers and two men served with ONUC HQ, along with a provost detachment of eleven men and a food services section of one officer and four men. Twelve RCAF personnel were located in Leopoldville, either on staff with ONUC or in connection with the RCAF external

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32 See appendix 4 for a map and table of 57th Signal Unit detachment locations.
airlift.\textsuperscript{33} The arrangement with the UN for the airlift had been extended in December for another 90 days and was set to expire on 9 March. External Affairs and National Defence agreed that the airlift should be continued for a further ninety-day period. Norman Robertson noted, "it would seem more than ever essential that the U.N. presence there be maintained and adequately supported logistically, and that Canada should not take any action which might suggest a declining interest in the ONUC, or which might imply that we intend to scale down Canadian participation in the Force."\textsuperscript{34} National Defence did plan to replace the North Stars with CC-106s and asked External Affairs to consult with the United Nations on changes in the flight schedule that would result from use of the larger planes and a switch in the European stopover to Marville, France.\textsuperscript{35} By maintaining the 57\textsuperscript{th} at strength and extending the airlift, the government demonstrated its willingness to support its commitment to the UN even at a time when Congolese political conditions continued to be unsettled.

Canadian authorities expected any outbreak of violence to occur in eastern Congo, in either Kivu or Orientale provinces.\textsuperscript{36} In truth, Leopoldville proved to be as dangerous. On 26 February, in the north-west part of the city, four Canadian peacekeepers were stopped by ANC para-commandos at a roadblock. They were disarmed, marched barefoot

\textsuperscript{35} NAC, RG25, vol. 5222, file 6386-C-40 part 11, Despatch SSEA to PERMISNY: UN Airlift-Replacement of North Star Aircraft, 23 February 1961.
half a mile to an ANC camp, and beaten with rifle butts along the way. Personal weapons and possessions were stolen. Questioned in the House of Commons on the right of the Canadian peacekeepers to defend themselves, the Minister of Defence answered, “If there is a concerted attack on a body of Canadian or other troops, they fire to defend themselves. However, if it is a matter of two or four soldiers, something like that, going along the street and being stopped by a patrol of Congolese soldiers, they do not start a fight.” The Force Commander, General McEoin, vigorously protested to the ANC command, warning that in future ONUC would “oppose such acts with the maximum of force, and that responsibility for the consequences will fall squarely on the ANC and on the authorities concerned.” The Canadian Consul General protested at the Congolese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He stressed the “damaging effect such incidents had for Congo not only in [Canada] but all over the world.” In reports to Ottawa, Gauvin attributed this incident to ANC nervousness arising from poor relations between ONUC and the Congolese and the implicit threat of the 21 February resolution to disarm the ANC.

The extent to which relations between ONUC and the ANC had deteriorated became patently clear within a week, in a far more serious incident at Matadi. Some

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eighty miles upriver from the mouth of the Congo, Matadi was a key port at which
ONUC supplies arrived by sea and were stored. Since the previous September, Canadian
peacekeepers had been stationed there providing communications for ONUC forces. On
March 3rd, Capt. G.E. Belanger, commanding officer of the 57th's Matadi detachment,
dined with the ONUC Sudanese contingent and discovered they were wearing pistols as
though they were "fully equipped for battle." When asked why, the Sudanese commander
was not entirely forthcoming, but Belanger suspected this had something to do with
fighting in nearby Kitona and Banana, so he asked the Sudanese to "send some guards" to
the Canadian detachment in case of hostilities between ONUC and the ANC.⁴²

The next day, while Belanger was away from the detachment, a fully armed and
equipped Sudanese section took up defensive positions at the Canadian detachment,
including a light machine gun pointed directly at a nearby ANC guardhouse. Belanger
expected his request to be met with one or two guards and was surprised, on his return, to
find so many Sudanese. He discovered that the ANC had countered the deployment of the
Sudanese with a light machine gun of their own, not far from the detachment's front
door. Belanger tried to speak with the ANC Sergeant commanding the machine gun but
found him to be "very excited"; the Sergeant simply screamed at him to get the Sudanese
out of the building.⁴³ At that point Belanger returned inside, and moments later firing

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⁴¹ NAC, RG25, vol. 5222, file 6386-C-40 part 11, Telegram Leopoldville to External: Incident
between ANC and ONUC, 28 February 1961.
⁴² NAC, RG24, vol. 18483, War Diary - No. 57 Canadian Signal Squadron, Statement of Captain
Belanger, 8 March 1961.
⁴³ NAC, RG24, vol. 18483, War Diary - No. 57 Canadian Signal Squadron, Statement of Captain
Belanger, 8 March 1961.
started and continued for about two hours. It is not clear who fired first, but Col. Smith later reported that the Canadians and Sudanese were outranged and outgunned. The ANC fired at the building with 37mm anti-tank rounds. According to two Canadian peacekeepers, the defence of the building was largely left to the Canadians after the initial exchange of fire. One said of the Sudanese, "... they were not very effective. They hid under a table or stood in corners."\textsuperscript{44}

Following numerous failed attempts to arrange and sustain a cease-fire, and after one attempt resulted in Belanger’s separation from the detachment, the decision was made to surrender to the ANC. Before doing so, the Cryptographer burned the codes and sabotaged the communication equipment. By all accounts, the ANC officers ensured the captured Canadians were well treated and intervened when other ranks of the ANC were threatening. While awaiting their evacuation to Leopoldville, they were provided with food, drink, and even beer. Some Canadians suffered minor injuries, primarily from shell fragments and masonry chips. The Sudanese casualties included one dead and four wounded. Belanger was evacuated to Leopoldville a day after others in the detachment, escorted by an ANC officer and Congolese government official.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{44} NAC, RG24, vol. 18483, War Diary – No. 57 Canadian Signal Squadron, Statement of Signaler Bates, 8 March 1961.
In the meantime, Col. Smith, the 57th's Commanding Officer, had left Leopoldville for Matadi to search for Belanger. The Canadian peacekeeper was in fact safe, but Smith used his time in Matadi to assess the situation first hand. He was unable to determine who fired first and in the end concluded, "In any case I don't see it matters much when 2 groups excited and jittery Africans facing each other at short range with weapons loaded and cocked someone is certain to open fire." He found the ANC officers to be quite amicable. Several said they regretted the involvement of the Canadians, as they considered the peacekeepers friends. The ANC Commander was said to have asked Smith, "Why do you send us soldiers the same colour as we are (pointing to his skin). They are no better than we are. What can we learn from them." The officer asked Smith to send the Canadians back and noted he had guards at the Canadian detachment to ensure no one could damage the signals equipment. All other UN equipment and vehicles, aside from that belonging to the Canadian detachment, was seized by the ANC. While the ANC officers were generally kind, Smith found the rank and file "surly" and the civilian police and population hostile. He considered it unlikely that armed peacekeepers could return to Matadi or that the port could be retaken by force. The UN, he said, "has clearly suffered major defeat and it will take a lot of talking our way out."46

In the days following the Matadi confrontation, both Acting Consul General Gauvin and Col. Smith met separately with Foreign Minister Bomboko and General

McEoin. Gauvin also met with Dayal. In his conversation with Col. Smith, Bomboko apologized for the Matadi and Leopoldville incidents. He said he had “great respect” for Canadians and was assured by his people that everywhere Canadians were located they were “liked and respected.” He was “anxious” for the Canadians to return to Matadi and had issued orders to protect Canadian equipment and to allow the return of the 57th detachment whenever they “wished.” Bomboko was highly critical of Dayal. He assured Smith that he wanted to cooperate with the UN, but said that Dayal made this “impossible.” In this context, Bomboko mentioned Col. Berthiaume, whom he held in “high regard,” and “implied that Dayal had dismissed him.” Smith was generally impressed with Bomboko. He thought the Foreign Minister was “genuinely anxious to reestablish some kind of contact with UN.” Bomboko’s criticism of Dayal was given credence when, in a subsequent conversation with General MacEoin, Smith learned even the Force Commander was considering submitting his resignation if Dayal continued in the role of Hammarskjöld’s Special Representative.\(^47\)

Gauvin visited Bomboko to express “serious concern and indignation” at the treatment of the Canadian peacekeepers in Matadi, as instructed by Ottawa.\(^48\) Again, Bomboko apologized, cited the previously good relations between the Canadian peacekeepers and the ANC in Matadi, and assured Gauvin that any involvement of


Canadians was “purely accidental.” He also repeated his criticism of Dayal.\textsuperscript{49} Then, in a subsequent conversation with the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Dayal suggested to Gauvin that the Matadi incident was part of a “scheme” to force ONUC out of the port. The Consul General reported, “Both sides act as if there existed a cold war with threats and counter threats without any attempt at conciliation.” Dayal was said to have no contact with the Congolese, as he did not invite them to his home and was openly contemptuous and disdainful of Congolese soldiers. In contrast to Dayal, Gauvin perceived MacEoin to be quite balanced. MacEoin was not convinced that the ANC should entirely be blamed for Matadi. The Force Commander questioned the conduct of the Sudanese officer in charge, describing him as “well intentioned but inexperienced.”\textsuperscript{50} Canadian diplomats and military officers generally found the central Congolese authorities to be reasonable but identified the growing rift between Leopoldville and the civilian leadership in ONUC as a cause for concern.

The events in Leopoldville and Matadi once again raised questions about the level of force ONUC was entitled to use in order to fulfill its mandate. Previously, in the House of Commons, Harkness suggested Canadian peacekeepers were authorised to use force only in self-defence against a concerted attack. The Judge Advocate General, in a letter to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, questioned this interpretation: “This appears to me to put a


\textsuperscript{50} NAC, RG25, vol. 5222, file 6386-C-40 part 12, Telegram Leopoldville to External: Congo – Matadi Incident, 8 March 1961.
very severe restriction on the right of Canadian soldiers to defend themselves." He noted UNEF peacekeepers were given greater latitude in their use of force. Nonetheless, Harkness was correct in his characterization of the way in which peacekeepers had, so far, responded to ANC harassment. While soldiers in ONUC may have been legally entitled to resist being disarmed, in practice peacekeepers normally complied with the demands of the ANC, in order to deescalate tense situations. On a number of occasions, the military and civilian leadership of ONUC commended peacekeepers for their demonstration of restraint in response to such direct provocation.

This changed on 1 March, when General McEoin ordered all ONUC troops not to surrender their arms under any circumstances and authorized them to "open fire" to prevent being disarmed. It would be difficult to surpass the entry provided by the 57th Signal Unit's war diarist, where he described the peacekeepers' reaction upon hearing this new order:

At 2115 hrs tonight Col Smith spoke to his assembled unit. This talk and its results will remain as one of the most memorable occasions of this unit in the CONGO.

All troops were confined to unit lines and the majority of them not on guard or signals duties were assembled and watching a movie. All personnel realized the tense situation existing in LEOPOLDVILLE. The incident of Feb 27 was still quite fresh on their minds and the tenseness in the unit was noticeable.

The film was cut and in the semi-darkness Col Smith stood before the men. He told them that a new order had been issued to UN forces whereby

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51 DHH, file 73/1223 part 461, Memo and Related Correspondence, JAG to CCOS, 28 February 1961.
52 NAC, RG24, vol. 18483, War Diary – No. 57 Canadian Signal Squadron, Telegram 57th Leo to CANARMY, 2 March 1961.
it was now compulsory for them to fire in protection of their weapons. It stated, he said, that UN troops would not in future be disarmed.

The unit’s reaction to this announcement was an immediate outburst of clapping and shouting which lasted a full ninety seconds. For some psychological or other reason, it lifted the tension somewhat. When the noise died down Col Smith concluded by saying he was proud of his men and their attitude. This in turn was the signal for another outburst which only calmed down five minutes later when the film was continued.53

The Permanent Mission in New York took note of this significant change in policy. It confirmed that MacEoin had indeed issued the order and that he had notified the Secretary-General. Ottawa was advised, “It would appear that the order was issued under authority already existing within UN policy.”54

A parallel discussion took place in the Advisory Committee on the question of when it was appropriate for ONUC to employ force to achieve its mandate. As Hammarskjöld prepared to approach 21 African governments for additional troops, he consulted with the Committee in order to “spell out the circumstances in which UN troops might use force.” He resisted an Indian suggestion to be vague, arguing “We have been living on obscure mandates for seven months. This has harmed UN prestige, and must not be repeated.” Although the Secretary-General drafted the following passage on the use of force, all members of the Committee reviewed it, and no objections were raised:

The latest resolution adopted by the Security Council does not seem to derogate from the position that UN troops should not become parties to

armed conflict in the Congo. The basic intention of the resolution is, in my opinion, the taking of all appropriate measures for the purposes mentioned, resort being had to force only when all other efforts such as negotiation, persuasion or conciliation were to fail. If following such efforts, or measures taken in support of their result, UN troops engage in defensive action when attacked while holding positions occupied in prevention of a civil war risk, this would not, in my opinion, mean that they become a party to a conflict, while the possibility of becoming such a party would be open were the troops to take the initiative in an armed attack on an organized army group in the Congo.  

Ottawa did not want Ritchie to take a “leading part” in Advisory Committee discussions on this issue but largely shared Hammarskjöld’s interpretation. External Affairs stressed the need for the UN to “rely mainly on processes of consultation persuasion and conciliation,” yet acknowledged additional circumstances when the use of force could be justified. For instance, use of force was acceptable to defend positions held by ONUC that were critical either for the prevention of civil war or the establishment of stability. With Matadi clearly in mind, ONUC was also seen to have a “right and obligation to reoccupy positions important to UN operations from which UN troops had been ejected by force.” Ottawa was unequivocal, however, in its insistence that ONUC not use force on behalf of any of the political factions in the Congo.  

Following the 21 February resolution, Canada continued to strike a balance between supporting the United Nations and its NATO ally, Belgium. Because the resolution required all foreign advisers (political and military) to leave the Congo, Canadian officials considered Belgium’s “immediate acquiescence” to be “a good deal to

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expect.” External Affairs acknowledged that relations between Canada and Belgium were already strained and was concerned about the wider implications of further Belgian disillusionment with, and resentment of, its NATO allies. “Continued efforts,” it was thought, “may be required to convince Belgium of our sympathy with its distress and our sincerity in wishing to help it find a reasonably satisfactory way out of the present situation.” 57 Nonetheless, Norman Robertson maintained that in taking an attitude of “sympathetic encouragement” towards Belgium, Canada should not deviate from its “insistence on the paramount importance of implementing the Security Council resolution.” 58 Guilt and obligation were factors to consider, but the success of the United Nations in the Congo remained the paramount objective.

Canada’s awkward position was made all the more obvious when the Belgian Chargé d’Affaires approached External Affairs with an “embarrassing request.” The Belgian government was hopeful that Canada would provide them with information about the Secretary-General’s Advisory Committee. The Chargé was told the question was of “considerable delicacy,” as Canada could do nothing that would jeopardise its position on the Advisory Committee or its relations with Hammarskjöld. 59 The African and Middle Eastern Division succinctly identified the difficulty posed by this request:

In addition to the general impropriety of revealing the details of these confidential proceedings, any such information which could be of real value to the Belgians presumably would have some influence on their subsequent dealings with the United Nations; and there would thus be a substantial likelihood that Belgian possession of special knowledge about Advisory Committee proceedings would come to light in one way or another. In view of the NATO relationship, suspicion in such circumstances would most probably fasten upon Canada as the source of the leak.\(^{60}\)

The Belgians were keen for Canadian cooperation. The Canadian Ambassador in Belgium was lobbied and asked to emphasise "the importance Belgians attached to a favourable response."\(^{61}\) Rothschild, the Director of the Congo section in the Belgian Foreign Office, "in good humour," observed, "that it was possible at times to be 'too objective'."\(^{62}\)

Although Charles Ritchie was "a little worried" that leaks might be traced back to him, he went along with, and Howard Green approved, a plan to provide the Belgians with broad, general information on the proceedings of the Advisory Committee, provided the passing of information was used as an opportunity to influence the Belgian government to cooperate with UN objectives in the Congo.\(^{63}\) Canadian officials had particular confidence and trust in Rothschild, and this also appears to have been an

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\(^{61}\) NAC, RG25, vol. 5222, file 6386-C-40 part 12, Telegram Bru to External: Congo.

10 March 1961.

\(^{62}\) NAC, RG25, vol. 5222, file 6386-C-40 part 12, Telegram Bru to External: Congo.

13 March 1961.

important factor in their decision. After agreeing to share information, Ottawa wasted no
time dipping into its reserve of 'diplomatic credit' with Belgium. External Affairs
instructed the Canadian Ambassador to use his influence with Belgian officials to
convince them of the need to persuade Mobutu and Kasavubu to adopt a "conciliatory
attitude" on the UN's plans to return to Matadi.\textsuperscript{64} The Ambassador was assured that
Belgium was already working on Kasavubu and that the UN "sooner or later" would be
able to return to Matadi in a "satisfactory" manner.\textsuperscript{65}

In mid-March, Diefenbaker attended the Commonwealth Prime Ministers'
Conference in London. This was an opportunity to discuss the Congo situation with other
heads of government. Early versions of the notes for Diefenbaker's statement on the
Congo stressed Canada's detachment:

\begin{quote}
I venture to make a plea for mutual understanding because I think Canada
-- through no particular virtue of its own -- is rather more impartial in its
approach to the problems of the Congo than some others. Canada is not an
African power. It is not a colonial or ex-colonial power. It has no
territories in Africa and no territorial ambitions. It has no financial or
commercial interests in the Congo sufficient to influence its judgment.
Canada -- as anyone may verify by examining our record on this issue in
the United Nations -- has been and remains, relatively speaking, impartial.\textsuperscript{66}
\end{quote}

Given the direct and partial involvement in the Congo of many other members of the
Commonwealth, it is perhaps not surprising that this passage did not survive successive

\textsuperscript{64} NAC, RG25, vol. 5212, file 6386-40 part 20, DEA Outgoing Message External to Bru:

\textsuperscript{65} NAC, RG25, vol. 5212, file 6386-40 part 20, Telegram Bru to External: Matadi, 30 March
1961.

\textsuperscript{66} NAC, RG25, vol. 5211, file 6386-40 part 18, Notes for Possible Statement by Prime Minister at
drafts of the speech. Yet, these views provide a revealing glimpse into the thinking of officials at External Affairs – or at least the ideas they hoped to impart on others.

Diefenbaker maintained that Canada held “no brief for any of the contenders for power in the Congo,” but also said that Canada considered the “regime in Leopoldville” to have the “greatest claim to constitutional legitimacy.”\textsuperscript{67} Although Kasavubu had been recognized by the General Assembly, Diefenbaker’s statement would have been unpopular with those present who supported the Orientale regime. Additionally, the Prime Minister argued against the notion that ONUC should consist entirely of non-white troops, a proposition favoured by Ghana at the time.\textsuperscript{68}

On the whole, the Conference was not an important event in the shaping or implementation of Canada’s Congo policy for a number of reasons: the South African issue dominated the agenda, in one session on the Congo Diefenbaker did not participate because he could not “get a word in edgewise,” and the issue was barely discussed when he privately met with British Prime Minister Macmillan.\textsuperscript{69} Diefenbaker did find it “stimulating” to hear the views of other leaders who had more direct experience with the Congo and was pleased that the final communiqué stressed the importance of ONUC.\textsuperscript{70} And, in something of a fluke in circumstance, the Prime Minister met with Rajeshwar Dayal who also happened to be in London, though the majority of the meeting appears to

\textsuperscript{67} DCC, file MG1/XII/C/110.3, Notes for a Statement by PM: Congo, 14 March 1961.
\textsuperscript{68} DCC, file MG1/XII/C/110.2, Press Conference Transcript Bryce and Murray, 8 March 1961.
\textsuperscript{69} DCC, file MG1/XII/C/110.4, Press Conference Transcript: Bryce, 15 March 1961; DCC, file MG1/XII/C/110.3, Notes on Conversation with Macmillan at Chequers, 10 March 1961.
\textsuperscript{70} DCC, file MG1/XII/C/114, Typewritten Notes, 16 March 1961.
have been used by Dayal to present a spirited defence of his role in ONUC and a critique of both the Belgians and the American diplomats present in Leopoldville.\textsuperscript{71}

In New York, the Congo situation was again the subject of debate in the General Assembly and the root cause of bitter exchanges in the Advisory Committee. As the Conciliation Commission prepared to release its full report, the Nigerian head of the Commission, Jaja Wachuku, spoke critically of African leaders who professed to speak on behalf of all African nations. Although Wachuku "named no names," Ritchie noted President Kwame Nkrumah, who was serving as the Ghanaian representative in the Committee that day, "was visibly angered." Then, in an "impressive" and critical retort to a remark from the Indian representative, Wachuku "emphasized the prime necessity for the Advisory Committee to 'get off the fence' and make up its mind as to the identity of a central Congo government since it was essential for the United Nations to have one government with which it would work and cooperate."\textsuperscript{72} In making this statement, Wachuku specifically recalled the General Assembly's decision to seat Kasavubu. The Commission recognized the Iléo government as an "encouraging step," though not legal till approved by parliament.\textsuperscript{73} Ghana and many others, however, recognized the Stanleyville regime. In the end, the Afro-Asian members of the Committee remained


divided on the question of which authorities were the legal representatives of the
Congolese people.

Canada consistently espoused the view that the Congolese should sort out their
political and constitutional difficulties by themselves, without outside interference. From
time to time, though, a subtle Canadian preference for Kasavubu surfaced. For example,
External Affairs was pleased with "moderate and conciliatory" proposals for the
reorganization of the ANC that Kasavubu suggested to Hammarskjöld. Ottawa suggested
the Secretary-General "send without delay an appreciative and cordial reply which would
indicate that the proposals were receiving sympathetic consideration." 74 When Ritchie
went to speak with Hammarskjöld on 13 March, he found the Secretary-General in "a
somewhat tense state." Hammarskjöld was "indignant" with the Congolese authorities
over the Matadi hostilities and a recent incident in which Swedish personnel captured by
the ANC were made to walk naked in the street. 75

Hammarskjöld was especially critical of Kasavubu's participation in the
Tananarive Conference, at which a number of Congolese leaders (except for Gizenga)
agreed to a confederation of separate Congolese states. In Hammarskjöld's view,
Kasavubu had abandoned the loi fondamentale and the "validity of his position as head of
the Congolese state." Instead of working with Kasavubu, as Ottawa hoped, Ritchie
learned that Hammarskjöld planned to raise the question of the legitimacy of Kasavubu's

74 NAC, RG25, vol. 5212, file 6386-40 parts 19 & 19.2, Outgoing Message External to
PERMISNY: Kasavubu's Position, 10 March 1961.
75 NAC, RG25, vol. 5222, file 6386-C-40 part 12, Telegram PERM/SNY to External: Congo
Advisory Committee Meeting – Mar 13, 14 March 1961.
presidency in the next Advisory Committee. Ritchie unsuccessfully tried to talk the Secretary-General out of doing this. Hammarskjöld’s intervention, Ritchie surmised, would “make working relations with Congolese authorities more difficult.” Above all, the Canadian Representative wanted the UN to “improve working relations with the existing Congolese authorities by a mixture of firmness and active conciliation.” Continuing instability in the Congo was expected to lead to “grave difficulties,” especially for those states with peacekeepers in ONUC. Ritchie went so far as to suggest that Canada “assimilate” its position to certain members of the Afro-Asian bloc, including Tunisia, Sudan, Nigeria, Liberia, and Pakistan. Even India, Ghana, Indonesia, and the UAR were cited as having points of common interest. Ritchie observed, “We are certainly not the only ones to wish to avoid an impossible dilemma in Congo.”

Canada’s effort to further develop its relationship with the Afro-Asian bloc was evident when the General Assembly considered three new resolutions on the Congo in mid-April. India was the driving force behind two of the resolutions, Pakistan the third. During the debate, Canada delivered a lengthy speech in which the violent incidents against Canadian and other members of ONUC were condemned. The Canadian Representative said, “[Canada’s] contribution to UN forces in Congo is small in terms of total numbers, but this fact does not make the life or the welfare of any one of these men a matter of any less concern,” to the Canadian government and Canadian people. In what was to become a common Canadian refrain, the delegation warned that if the UN failed in

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the Congo the organisation’s continued ability to take effective action in cases of threats to peace and security would be jeopardised.\textsuperscript{77} The first Indian resolution was directed entirely at Belgium; initially, it contained a definite deadline for the withdrawal of Belgian personnel and an implied threat of sanctions if this was not met. Canada planned to abstain on this resolution if these particular provisions were not removed. External Affairs was hopeful that “reasoning and influence” could be brought to bear on Ireland, Sweden, and the moderate Afro-Asians to secure a “constructive amendment of the more unrealistic portions of [the] Indian draft.”\textsuperscript{78} When the offending elements were in fact dropped, Canada voted in favour of the resolution along with Ireland and Sweden, even though both the UK and the US abstained, and Belgium voted against it. In addition, Canada voted in favour of the second Indian resolution that established a Commission of Investigation into Lumumba’s death. Again, Canada voted with Ireland and Sweden but this time against the Congo. Once more, the UK and the US abstained. In this round of Assembly diplomacy, Canada openly supported resolutions sponsored by the Afro-Asians, even though this contradicted its NATO allies.

Relations with Belgium continued to be something of a balancing act throughout the spring of 1961, as the Belgian government faced increased pressure from the UN to comply with the 21 February resolution. At External Affairs, the European Division prepared a memorandum presenting a spirited defence of Belgium; it suggested

\textsuperscript{77} NAC, RG25, vol. 5222, file 6386-C-40 part 13, Telegram CANDELNY to External: Congo. 4 April 1961
Belgium's sixty-year record in the Congo had "much on the credit side of the balance sheet which the judgment of history is likely to confirm." In contrast, Patrice Lumumba and UN officials were blamed for the poor state of relations between the Congo and Belgium. The Division concluded, "There are indications that Belgium considers that Canada has not been as helpful as it could have been over the Congo issue and our silence in PAC and elsewhere seems to have been misinterpreted." They suggested Canada intervene in the Advisory Committee to urge its members not to interpret the 21 February resolution "too restrictively" and to be more empathetic towards the Belgians. They suggested Canada intervene in the Advisory Committee to urge its members not to interpret the 21 February resolution "too restrictively" and to be more empathetic towards the Belgians. These suggestions appear to have been rejected outright because the memo was filed without ever being circulated to other divisions.

Abstract discussions on how best to preserve relations with Belgium were superseded by yet another request from Rothschild for additional information on the proceedings of the Advisory Committee. When the UN sent a representative to Brussels to discuss arrangements for the withdrawal of Belgian nationals in the Congo, in accordance with the 21 February resolution, the Belgian government insisted on tripartite discussions with the Congolese. An official of the UN told Brussels that the Advisory Committee opposed such talks, so Rothschild turned to Canada for confirmation that this was the case. Ritchie could not recall any recent discussion in the Advisory Committee

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of tripartite consultations, although the general issue of Belgian withdrawal had been addressed often.

Ritchie recalled that Canada's "principal objective" in passing information to the Belgians was to "facilitate or induce more forthcoming and active Belgian cooperation with UN on implementation of [the] withdrawal provision." so he suggested the Belgians be told "the crux of the issue is not so much whether discussions should be three-sided as what these discussions are about." He added, "The principle of speedy and complete withdrawal is not considered by the Advisory Committee members as being negotiable, but they recognize that the means for achieving this are open for discussion, both with the Belgians and with the Congolese." Ritchie cautioned against providing Belgium with any information that could by used by Brussels to undermine the UN and rejected as "entirely inappropriate" any disclosure to the Belgians of views attributed to specific nations.\(^81\)

External Affairs followed this recommended course of action. The Canadian Ambassador in Brussels was told to advise Rothschild on the overall tone in the Advisory Committee, without divulging specific details of its deliberations, in hopes this would dispel the Belgian inclination "to underestimate the intensity of Afro-Asian suspicion of and impatience with what is regarded as Belgian procrastination."\(^82\) Once again, Canada prioritized its position with the United Nations above its relations with Belgium, but the

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\(^82\) NAC, RG25, vol. 5222, file 6386-C-40 part 13, Memo for Minister: Belgian Request for Information on Advisory Committee Discussion, 12 April 1961.
decision to provide some information can be seen as an attempt to reach out to Brussels, albeit on Canadian terms.

Officials from the departments of Finance, External Affairs, and National Defence met in early April 1961 to discuss Canadian policy on the financing of ONUC. To this point, Hammarskjöld and the General Assembly met ONUC’s substantial financial commitments through a series of interim resolutions and ad hoc measures that, at times, resorted to loans from other UN accounts. The need for a more systematic and positive approach to ONUC financing was underlined when the UN’s Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions estimated Congo costs in 1961 would reach $120 million. A number of measures were considered: Canada could decline any rebates offered on its 1961 Congo assessment; costs already incurred for airlifts, allowances, and equipment could be waived; and the Canadian delegation in New York could make a concerted effort to “bring home to potential defaulters the inevitable consequences not only for the peacekeeping operations but for all United Nations programmes of large-scale defaulting.”

Howard Green rejected these suggestions. He thought it best not to raise proposals regarding ONUC financing with Cabinet until a payment or pledge was required in New York and believed it should be left to the Americans “to make the running in rounding up support for payment by others of their assessed shares of the $120 million Congo cost.” Instead, Canada continued its ‘behind the scenes’ efforts to regularise ONUC financing.

\footnote{NAC, RG24, vol. 7169, file 2-5081-7 part I, 6 April 1961.}
The previous December, the delegation worked to ensure that a resolution on ONUC financing contained a perambulatory paragraph that deemed ONUC expenses to be binding, mandatory costs of the UN.\(^{85}\) Now, the delegation took the lead in the Fifth Committee by tabling a draft proposal that eventually became the basis for a General Assembly resolution on ONUC financing.\(^{86}\) The resolution called for the 16th session of the General Assembly to reconsider urgently the administrative and budgetary procedures related to the costs of peacekeeping operations. It also established a working group to consider principles applicable to the development of a special scale of assessments, a provision designed to appeal to Afro-Asian and Latin American states concerned about the additional financial burden peacekeeping might impose upon them.

From the Congo, Gauvin sent External Affairs reports praising the efforts of the Acting Special Representative, Mekki Abbas, to normalize relations with the Congolese authorities and warning of the potential consequences if Dayal returned from New York to resume his position in ONUC. Dayal was at UN headquarters consulting with Hammarskjöld. Gauvin wrote, “Dayal’s return would provoke Congolese to point where open conflict between Congolese and ONUC might well be expected and all opportunity for cooperation and understanding lost.” He urged External Affairs to make representations to Hammarskjöld, to ensure the Secretary-General appreciated the “great


risks” involved in returning Dayal to the Congo.\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5222, file 6386-C-40 part 12, Telegram Leo to External: Dayal’s Return to Congo, 22 March 1961.} Ottawa advised Ritchie to speak with Hammarskjöld and proposed a number of “face-saving” scenarios that might be employed to obviate Dayal’s return; they considered it “desirable to find some satisfactory formula for averting the return of Dayal to Leopoldville, … or at least for mitigating the adverse impact of his return.”\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5222, file 6386-C-40 part 12, Telegram External to PERMISNY: Proposed Return of Dayal to Congo, 23 March 1961.}

Murray, in the UN Division, believed Hammarskjöld’s steadfast support of Dayal could not be dismissed simply as “blind loyalty” or worries about the loss of prestige. In his view, Hammarskjöld and Dayal’s shared ideological objective of establishing the Congo as a neutralist state and the Secretary-General’s increased dependence on India for political support were important factors.\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5222, file 6386-C-40 part 12, Memo UN Div to USSEA: Dayal’s Return to the Congo, 24 March 1961.} By the end of April, it still seemed possible that Dayal would return to Leopoldville, perhaps for a brief period or with additional deputies. In a conversation with Murray, Dayal suggested the key was removing “the unhelpful Belgian influence.” Hammarskjöld concurred. The Secretary-General was reported to have said, “the Belgians have acted ‘like the Israelis at their very worst’ but with the difference that, while the Israelis were clever, the Belgians were ‘stupid’ in their dealings with the United Nations.”\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5222, file 6386-C-40 part 13, Telegram PERMISNY to External: Return of Dayal to Congo, 28 March 1961; NAC, RG25, vol. 5223, file 6386-C-40 part 14, Memo UN Div to African and Middle East Div: Congo: Appointment of Mr. Dayal, 24 April 1961.} For the time being, Dayal’s future remained unclear.
Conditions throughout the various Congolese provinces remained tense, and on 2 April the 57th Signals Unit received orders to restrict movement to safe areas within Leopoldville. Still unaware of the new orders the next day, a group of five Canadian peacekeepers left Leopoldville on a recreational trip to Zongo Falls. All were unarmed and in civilian clothes. They were stopped 25 kilometres from Leopoldville by an ANC roadblock, ordered out of their jeep, and forced to kneel in a ditch at gunpoint. One ANC soldier, thought to be intoxicated, kicked and slapped the Canadians, all the time shouting "Indians." The peacekeepers were then taken to Thysville but were released after the local ANC Commandant contacted Mobutu. ANC soldiers escorted the Canadians back to Leopoldville, to protect them from a "hostile" crowd gathered at the camp. Both Col. Smith and Gauvin contacted Ottawa to suggest the incident be minimized. They noted the Canadians should not have been in the area where they were found, and Smith acknowledged that, aside from the behaviour of the one ANC soldier, the remaining Congolese soldiers "went out of their way to protect, buy food, point out places of interest, etc." for the Canadians. Initially, Col. Smith ordered a Canadian Press correspondent accredited to the 57th to postpone filing his story on the incident. The next day, after ONUC HQ released information to other newsmen, the reporter was allowed to

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submit his story. According to the war diarist, this was much to “his relief, and relief of others who watched him fret for fourteen hours.”

The 57th's Commanding Officer took measures to reduce the likelihood of incidents between Canadian peacekeepers and the local Congolese. In addition to the areas in Leopoldville declared unsafe or dangerous by ONUC HQ, Smith identified other locations as “out of bounds” to members of the 57th in particular. As well, an order was posted on a recurring basis in an attempt to discourage the “habit,” acquired by some personnel, of calling the Congolese, “Blacks, Black Bastards, Jigaboos, and Coloured.”

In spite of Smith’s efforts, “a long expected event” happened on 15 April. While AWOL, one of the Canadians “got into trouble with local Congolese civilians in the red-light district,” and when found by the ONUC Provost claimed he had been captured and manhandled by the ANC. The next evening, two other peacekeepers were arrested by the ANC when they attempted to cut their vehicle through an ANC barbed-wire roadblock. Because the peacekeepers had been in Leopoldville for eight months and the Afro-Negro nightclub was “in line with their travel at the time they were taken prisoner,” their account of the events was met with skepticism. Later, when this same nightclub was placed out of bounds because a number of senior Canadian NCOs were involved in several riots and incidents there, the decision prompted much discontent. The war diarist

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noted, "For some reason it was the proverbial straw on the camel’s back. Despite the fact that several other nightclubs in town are similar, if not more typical, the exclusion of this particular one was the cause of much grumbling.” These restrictions did have a cumulative impact on morale; limited recreation opportunities were recognised as a factor to be taken into account in any decision to post peacekeepers for longer than six months. In spite of these many restrictions, however, the Senior Medical Officer still observed, “our troops apparently have quite an active sexual life.” Indeed, the limited number of cases of venereal disease amongst the peacekeepers led him to question rumours that 90% of Congolese women were infected with the disease.  

A far more serious incident occurred in Stanleyville on 8 April. Captain Stubbs, the commanding officer of the detachment, thought the peacekeepers “clung to the security of the UN building far too much,” and so he set out to establish contacts with civilians who could help to relieve the peacekeepers’ boredom. Unfortunately, ANC soldiers interrupted a supper party and film night arranged with local European civilians. Aside from two signalers quietly dispatched by Stubbs to find UN assistance, the Congolese soldiers arrested everyone, peacekeepers and civilians alike. The detainees were beaten, threatened, and generally maltreated. Members of the Ethiopian battalion arrived three hours later and secured the release of ONUC personnel, but “implied that it was hard luck on the civilians.” When he arrived back at the Stanleyville HQ, Stubbs

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96 NAC, RG24, vol. 18483, War Diary – No. 57 Canadian Signal Squadron, Diary Entry, April 1961
unsuccessfully tried to convince ONUC officials of the need to rescue the civilians. He then took matters into his own hands. After a failed attempt to bribe the guards where the prisoners were being held, he went to see General Lundula, head of the Stanleyville faction of the ANC. "Very tired and irritable," Stubbs roused Lundula and "ordered him to the phone at gun point." Lundula immediately arranged for the release of the civilians.

Col. Smith noted that UN reports of the incident made no mention of Stubbs threatening Lundula, and he proposed to suppress this information.98 In his report to Abbas, the local head of ONUC in Stanleyville briefly noted, "Captain Stubbs of the Canadian Signals made an attempt to get the other men released at 0600 hours by going alone to the camp."99 And in a later official statement by Stubbs, the Captain simply said, "The General spoke to me, he was cool but formerly correct. I asked him for the release of the prisoners, he phoned the Etheopians [sic], who arrived at the house and neogations [sic] then commenced to effect the release of all civilians."100 In what was clearly a very serious incident, the record has almost erased the remarkable exchange between Lundula and Stubbs.

Between April and June 1961, the UN made five additional requests of Canada. The first was for assistance in airlifting Indian troops from Dar-es-Salaam to Kamina. The United States transported 2300 Indian peacekeepers by sea to Tanganyika, but

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98 NAC, RG24, vol. 18483, War Diary - No. 57 Canadian Signal Squadron, Telegram 57th to CANARMY, 10 April 1961.
backed out of an earlier commitment to airlift half these troops onwards to Katanga. Rikhye then turned to Canada with an informal "enquiry" for assistance, as he did not want to place the Canadian government in the awkward position of having to turn down an official request. External Affairs identified a number of political difficulties posed by the request, so DND was asked only to give it sympathetic consideration. In Leopoldville, Gauvin urged Ottawa to decline the request in light of Congolese opposition to the arrival of additional Indian peacekeepers. The US, he noted, was criticised for airlifting the first thousand Indians. He advised, "If without letting down UN too badly and if it is possible to discourage their request I would think it wise to do so especially since nature of [Canadian] contribution to ONUC has been such up to now that we have been able to avoid being involved in controversial issues between Congolese and ONUC." The UN made other arrangements to transport the troops before a final decision could be reached, and the enquiry was suspended. The UN also withdrew an additional request for four bilingual staff officers to serve on cease-fire teams when General McEoin decided the risk of immediate hostilities between Ginzenga and Mobutu forces had diminished to the point where there were sufficient officers available from other countries.

The RCAF received two requests from the UN. Air Commodore Chapman’s tour in the Congo was set to finish on 14 July, and at the end of May the UN asked Canada to name a replacement. The RCAF chose Air Commodore H.A. Morrison, who was considered to be one of the air force’s “most experienced officers in the air transport field.” The second request for three teams of one officer and one non-commissioned officer each to assist in air transport work at various airfields throughout the Congo was rejected. The Acting Chief of the Air Staff acknowledged that ONUC’s need was “very real” but cited “an overriding objection to having small increments of one or two individuals operating on their own out in the field as it has always been the RCAF policy in the Congo to only provide complete units and not to have isolated detachments.” The RCAF was willing to consider providing replacements for staff at ONUC HQ, if this would enable peacekeepers from other nations to “undertake the required tasks in the field.”

The Army also turned down a request by the UN for three officers to oversee a transit camp ONUC planned to establish in Leopoldville to care for troops as they were rotated in and out of service. The UN envisioned a Canadian Captain or Lieutenant Quartermaster in charge of the camp, with one Warrant Officer and one Sergeant to assist in the running of the camp and to perform clerical duties. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

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advised Robertson that the camp would be under an Indian Headquarters and would have to provide for “various nationalities with diverse habits and diets unfamiliar to Canadians.” Canadians would not use the camp, and the 57th Signal Unit could not spare any personnel for this employment. For all these reasons, DND asked External Affairs to tell the UN that Canada was “unable to provide the personnel requested.”

National Defence continued to be judicious in its consideration of each UN request. Of the five requests during this time period, only one was approved. Two were rejected outright, and the UN withdrew the others. And in the case of the latter requests, it seems unlikely that DND would have agreed to these had the UN persisted.

In early May, questions arose in the House of Commons concerning the safety and defence of Canadian peacekeepers in the Congo. These were prompted by an incident in Port-Francqui, Kasai, where ANC troops overpowered and “ruthlessly massacred” a detachment of 44 Ghanian peacekeepers. One Member of Parliament asked, “What are the orders to our Canadian forces, who are there on the authority of the government and the House of Commons, as to what they should do under such circumstances, and what equipment do they have for their own defence?” In his response, Diefenbaker noted the Canadians were “still under basically the same orders as those issued by the first United Nations commander,” but these orders had been “reinforced and given more detailed

interpretation by the current commander.” The Prime Minister said, “In essence the orders to Canadian troops provide that they may use their weapons for defence in certain clearly defined circumstances. Resort to force is, of course, to be used only if normal discussion or negotiation has proved impossible or unavailing.”

Pressed to clarify what was meant by ‘clearly defined circumstances,’ Diefenbaker responded, “they have the right to resist attempts to disarm them; to resist attempts to arrest or abduct any United Nations personnel, military or civilian; to resist attempts to prevent them by force from carrying out their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders; and, in addition, to use weapons in defence of positions they have been ordered to hold.” He added that in addition to the pistols and sub-machine guns originally sent with the Canadian contingent, the peacekeepers now had a quantity of semi-automatic rifles, six light machine guns, and two 3.5 inch rocket launchers.

Diefenbaker’s explanation was a sound interpretation of the 21 February resolution, and his confirmation that peacekeepers had been provided with additional weaponry suggests the government recognized that ONUC could become more forceful in the implementation of its mandate.

Within a week of this statement in the House, the Commanding Officer of the 57th found himself in a difficult position. Abbas wanted a Canadian signals detachment to return to Matadi with two ANC officers, in advance of a party of 100 unarmed Nigerian police who were expected to reoccupy UN positions. The CO spoke with MacEoin and expressed concerns about the temper of the civilian population in Matadi and the

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discipline and capability of the ANC to protect the signals personnel. MacEoin agreed with this assessment and delayed the order pending consultation with Abbas and New York. In the meantime, the Canadian commander wired Army HQ: “If ordered to proceed to Matadi without arms or in advance of Nigerian police propose to comply and to info you by immediate message particularly in view of recent statement in [Canadian] parliament on protection as I do not consider risk justifiable in view temper [local] populace and lack of control by ANC.”

Ottawa contacted the Permanent Mission in New York at once and instructed Ritchie to tell Hammarskjöld “the Canadian government does not wish members of Canadian Signal Unit to go to Matadi unless armed and accompanied by properly armed Nigerian provost detachment.” Having in mind the Secretariat’s earlier objections to direct communications between contingents and their governments, Robertson acknowledged “there may be some delicacy in raising this matter with the Secretary General because of the channel through which we have received our information.” but maintained the Commander of the 57th was clearly within his rights and acting in accordance with his command instructions when he reported his concerns to the Chief of the General Staff. Ritchie spoke with both Bunche and Rikhye and found that each had a different understanding of what the UN was planning to do in Matadi. Nonetheless, he

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pressed Bunche for an “explicit” assurance that Canadians would only be sent back to Matadi if they were armed and accompanied by armed Nigerians.\textsuperscript{114}

The entire operation was called into question when the Nigerian government also expressed concerns, but these were resolved when it was agreed the Nigerians would return unarmed, a solution thought to be safer because the peacekeepers would pose less of a threat.\textsuperscript{115} This was not acceptable to the Canadian government. When the United Nations announced that the Nigerians would be accompanied by Canadian Signals personnel, Ottawa once again reiterated to the Secretariat its unwillingness to send unarmed Canadians to Matadi, even if they were accompanied by unarmed Nigerian troops. To ease a difficult situation for Hammarskjöld, Ottawa agreed not “to announce publicly that the Canadian Government had not been consulted before the UN Command concluded this agreement with the Congolese authorities.” External Affairs further advised Diefenbaker: “it might be preferable not to indicate that a final decision has been taken not to despatch Canadian signalmen to Matadi.”\textsuperscript{116} The Commander of the 57\textsuperscript{th} was pleased with the decision not to send Canadians. He observed, “Consider UN is merely providing hostages free of charge and if a scrap develops anywhere in Lower Congo police will probably reap any revenge that is taken. Am of the opinion now that to put


\textsuperscript{116} NAC, RG25, vol. 5223, file 6386-C-40 part 15, Memo to Prime Minister: Answer to Possible Question in the House – Return of UN Troops to Matadi, 14 June 1961.
any force less than 1 battalion there is gambling."¹¹⁷ ONUC HQ announced that Canadian Signals personnel were not sent to Matadi for "technical reasons," and UN civilian field personnel provided communications for the Nigerians.¹¹⁸

On 13 May, Colonel H.W.C. Stetham replaced Colonel Smith as Commanding Officer of the 57th Signal Unit because Smith was promoted to Director of Signals. Smith returned to Ottawa and met with officials at External Affairs to share his impressions of ONUC and peacekeeping in the Congo. Smith saw the Welbeck incident as the beginning of the deterioration in relations between the Kasavubu government and ONUC. The fracas over Welbeck was then compounded by the removal of Berthiaume, which caused a further "loss of confidence." Smith said that Berthiaume "had been friendly with Congolese leaders, particularly Bomboko and Mobutu, and when he was removed, the Congolese had come to the conclusion that he had been fired because he was their friend." It seemed to Smith as though ONUC relations with Kasavubu were improving, but at the same time they were worsening with Tshombé.

Smith provided a frank assessment of ONUC contingents. The reputation of the Canadians was said to be excellent because officers at ONUC HQ were bilingual and the Canadian Army, relative to other contingents, was highly professional. He praised the Malayans and Indonesians. Troops from the UAR were dismissed as "rabble," although their officers were considered good. Tunisians and Moroccan peacekeepers were rated as

¹¹⁸ NAC, RG24, vol. 18483, War Diary – No. 57 Canadian Signal Squadron, Minutes of No. 57 Canadian Signal Unit Staff Meeting, 16 June 1961.
fair, and the Liberians were seen as the worst. Indian peacekeepers were said to be the most disliked, but Smith attributed this to a “general African attitude towards Indians” and Dayal’s bad reputation. Although Smith did express some concerns during his debriefing, his overall impressions were much less pessimistic than Colonel Mendelsohn’s had been upon the latter’s return to Ottawa, after serving as the first Canadian Commander in the Congo.

In fact, there was evidence that relations between ONUC and Kasavubu were improving. Hammarskjöld sent Robert Gardiner of Ghana and Francis Nwokedi of Nigeria to negotiate with the Congolese authorities on the implementation of the 21 Feburary resolution, and by mid April they had reached an agreement. This was a significant step forward, as both Tshombé and Ileo were reported to have regarded the resolution as a “declaration of war by the United Nations.” Ottawa welcomed this development as the “beginning of practical cooperation between [Leopoldville] authorities and the UN.” Ritchie was instructed to intervene in the Advisory Committee, though not to take “a leading role in the discussions,” in order to express Canada’s satisfaction with the terms of the agreement. Ottawa believed that while the terms fell short in some respects, they were at least not in conflict with the “spirit and intention” of the UN resolution.″

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119 NAC, RG25, vol. 5223, file 6386-C-40 part 14, Note for File, 26 April 1961 (approx.).
In addition to the amelioration of ONUC-Congolese relations, positive movement towards a settlement of the constitutional crisis was discernible. Following a conference of political leaders in Coquilhatville at the end of April, where Kasavubu announced his intention to reconvene parliament, there was a limited rapprochement between the Stanleyville and Leopoldville authorities. ONUC was not involved in the discussions between the leaders, but it facilitated meetings through the provision of transportation and security. Acting Consul General Gauvin’s account of his first meeting with President Kasavubu revealed a definite shift in hostility towards Katanga, as opposed to Orientale. While there was no love lost between Kasavubu and Gizenga (the President referred to the leader of the Stanleyville faction as un homme fini un homme mort), his invective was saved primarily for the Katangese leader. Kasavubu said, “Tshombe can yell as much as he likes I will never agree to anything that would amount to recognition of separate Katanga state.”

Ottawa studiously avoided wading into the waters of Congolese internal politics. In May, Ottawa received a number of telegrams from various Katangese political and tribal elements, but these were deliberately left unanswered so as not to imply that Canada ascribed any legitimacy or recognition to the separatist regime. Likewise. External Affairs never approached the Leopoldville government to request Exequatur for

Gauvin, in fear this could alienate one, or all, of the other various provincial factions.\textsuperscript{124}

The implications for ONUC of the shift against Tshombé were not lost on External Affairs. Under-Secretary Norman Robertson noted,

\begin{quote}
It is difficult to see how, under existing UN directives, the UN operation could be directed to active support of military action against Katanga. On the other hand, despite the Security Council injunction of February 21 to prevent the occurrence of civil war and armed clashes, it would evidently be very awkward politically for the United Nations Command to attempt to obstruct action against Katanga by a central Congolese government invested by Parliament.\textsuperscript{125}
\end{quote}

The Under-Secretary hit the nail on the head. Once the constitutional crisis was settled, this was the precise challenge ONUC was required to face.

Just as relations between ONUC and Leopoldville appeared to be on the mend, news of Dayal’s return to Leopoldville threatened to undo the improved state of affairs. From his perspective in Leopoldville, Gauvin first said it was difficult to anticipate how the Congolese would react to Dayal’s return. The central government appeared preoccupied with Katanga, and he thought Dayal might be accepted without too much “fuss”.\textsuperscript{126} Abbas informed Kasavubu and Mobutu that Dayal was expected to return on 16 June. Dayal later wrote that Kasavubu’s reaction was “very negative,” while Mobutu’s was actually “violent”.\textsuperscript{127} Rikhye was dispatched to the Congo to calm the situation, and

\textsuperscript{125} NAC, RG25, vol. 5213, file 6386-40 part 24, Memo for Minister: Recent Developments in the Congo, 28 July 1961.
\textsuperscript{126} NAC, RG25, vol. 5223, file 6386-C-40 part 14, Telegram Leopoldville to External: Dayal’s Return, 18 May 1961.
he subsequently downplayed the Congolese reaction in reports to New York. As a result, Dayal continued to plan for his return.

Rikhye was mistaken. The Congolese Foreign Ministry called together all heads of embassies and legations. The diplomats were told their respective governments should speak to Hammarskjöld and advise him against sending back Dayal. Gauvin, though not present at this meeting, advised Ottawa: “Probabilities are that they are not bluffing and therefore it might be advisable to consult with UK and USA to add our weight to any representation they may make to [Secretary-General].” 128 When Abbas visited Kasavubu and Mobutu to confirm Dayal’s expected date of arrival, both leaders remained vehemently opposed to Dayal. In his memoirs, Dayal stated, “Kasavubu said he would abrogate every single agreement with the United Nations and would turn his soldiers on all United Nations personnel and there would be a state of war with the Organization. Both uttered threats and imprecations and said they would stop at nothing to prevent my setting foot in the Congo, Mobutu even threatening assassination.” 129 Under these circumstances, Dayal submitted his resignation, and Hammarskjöld reluctantly accepted it. The Congolese had won. but Gauvin told Ottawa the UK Charge d’Affaires was instructed to see the Congolese authorities to ask them to avoid any statements presenting the Secretary-General’s decision as a “Congolese victory.” 130 Dayal’s resignation would

129 Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjöld, 261.
130 NAC, RG25, vol. 5223, file 6386-C-40 part 14, Telegram Leopoldville to External: Dayal Return, 24 May 1961; A number of scholars suggest Dayal’s resignation was part of a larger deal that involved the transfer of both the British and American ambassadors in Leopoldville. See: Ernest Lefever, “US Policy, the UN and the Congo,” Orbis 11.2 (Summer 1967) 398-99; Alan James, Peacekeeping in
have been a relief to Canadian diplomats and peacekeepers in ONUC. They saw the Special Representative as a hindrance to relations with the Congolese and had made this clear to Hammarskjöld.

One provision of the 21 February resolution required the reorganization of the ANC, and in the new spirit of cooperation between the UN and Leopoldville, Mobutu and Abbas reached an agreement that would see ONUC organise the training of ANC officers. Mobutu stipulated that the instructors would have to speak French and be either French or Canadian. Gauvin learned of the agreement from a reliable source at ONUC and without delay contacted Ottawa. He presumed that Canada would be "forced" to seriously consider the request if Hammarskjöld raised it in the Advisory Committee and if the plan was agreed to by the "more extreme Afro-Asian members." France, he assumed, would be unacceptable to the Advisory Committee. Neither Kasavubu nor Mobutu had approached Gauvin directly about this, so the Consul General said he would take no immediate action.131

At External Affairs, Howard Green was "prepared to give full backing" to the use of Canadian officers as instructors for the ANC.132 And National Defence engaged in preliminary planning for a retraining scheme after Lt. Col. Speedie, in New York, warned DND that "the Military Advisory staff [at the UN] ... is quite incapable of producing a

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coordinated plan for the retraining of the ANC and that decisions are being made now on
a haphazard basis which may well involve Canada in a badly planned operation.\textsuperscript{133} External Affairs and National Defence were both agreeable to Canadian participation, but
the UN did not immediately follow through with any plan to retrain the ANC. Almost
two months later, Gauvin met with Mobutu. The colonel said he was still awaiting a
response to his request of the UN to arrange for Canadian or French instructors. Canada,
he said, was welcome in the Congo. He wondered why Ottawa was so careful no to
offend the Afro-Asians. Gauvin reassured Mobutu that there could be any number of
reasons why Canada had not provided officers.\textsuperscript{134} External Affairs later told Gauvin the
government was still waiting for an official request from the UN because all military
assistance had to be channeled through the organisation, in compliance with existing UN
resolutions.\textsuperscript{135} The matter was dropped and not raised again until September.

As the internal Congolese political situation and ONUC were about to enter a new
stage in the Congo crisis, Canadian officials paused to reflect on both the nature of the
peacekeeping operation and the major considerations that shaped Canadian policy. The
UN division, for instance, was critical of a report that assessed the peacekeeping
operation from a strictly military perspective. Murray viewed peacekeeping as both a
military and political instrument. It was necessary, he argued, to measure ONUC

\textsuperscript{133} NAC, RG24, vol. 5086, file 3445-34/73, Memo: Telephone Conversation – Colonel Parker –
\textsuperscript{134} NAC, RG25, vol. 5223, file 6386-C-40 part 15, Telegram Leopoldville to External: Follow up
on visit to General Mobutu, 19 June 1961.
\textsuperscript{135} NAC, RG25, vol. 5223, file 6386-C-40 part 15, Letter USSEA to CCOS and attached
operations with regard to "their political impacts and in an international context of great complexity." He added, "While national soldiers may have seen ready solutions on the basis of their national training and experience, those solutions may well have been impracticable because of their international implications and particularly because of the United Nations role and interest in such situations."\(^\text{136}\)

One document described Canadian policy, particularly as a result of membership in the Congo Advisory Committee, as governed by a need to "preserve an entirely impartial attitude on controversial Congolese issues."\(^\text{137}\) While this may have been a guiding principle for policy development and implementation, there were many additional, pragmatic factors to take into account. Another, more complete, assessment identified no less than ten "major considerations" that shaped Canadian decisions on Congo questions:

(a) our recognition of the fundamental importance of forestalling the establishment of a predominant Soviet influence in the Congo, as a Soviet bridgehead in the heart of Africa;
(b) in view of the evident inability of the West, and especially the United States, to accept such a course of developments, our concern at the prospect of a great-power clash over the Congo;
(c) our view that this and other aspects of the Congo situation constituted a menace to international peace and security, and that therefore the UN appropriately could, and indeed should, intervene.
(d) the Canadian attitude that the limitations placed by the UN charter on the scope of UN action on the territory of a member state should be scrupulously observed, having in mind particularly respect for Congolese sovereignty;

(e) our concern that the UN operation should not fail, since failure in the Congo might seriously impair the organization’s capacity for peace-keeping activities elsewhere in the world;

(f) the desire to avoid alienating the support of Afro-Asian countries on other issues (at the United Nations and in other international bodies) in which we were more directly interested, and reducing whatever general influence we might enjoy with these countries, by appearing to associate ourselves with western positions which they regarded as “colonial” in character. Several of our abstentions on resolutions which included elements quite objectionable to us can be thus interpreted.

(g) our wish to avoid irritating our Belgian allies by our stand on Congo questions, to indicate our sympathy with Belgium’s difficulties over the Congo, and to mitigate friction between Belgium and the United Nations.

(h) Canada’s adherence to the principle of self-determination, which in terms of Congo affairs has impelled us to stress the Congo’s political problems should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the Congolese people themselves;

(i) our recognition of the need for economic and technical aid to the Congo on a large scale, for many years to come, and our view that this must be channelled [sic] through the United Nations if the Congo’s independent status is to be adequately safeguarded;

(j) Canadian government concern for the welfare of Canadian personnel in the UN force.\(^{138}\)

This lengthy list underscores the complexity faced by Canadian diplomats and the government as they formulated Congo policy. Factors relating to the Cold War, multilateralism and colonialism, all had to be weighed, at times against one another. In the months ahead, this would only get more difficult.

6

Adoula and the Challenge of Katanga

On 2 August 1961 the Congolese parliament reconvened at Lovanium University near Leopoldville and almost unanimously voted confidence in a new government of national unity, headed by Cyrille Adoula, bringing to an end the months long constitutional crisis.1 Gizenga nervously remained in Stanleyville, but parliamentarians loyal to the Orientale faction did participate and assumed at least nine posts in the new Cabinet. Members of the Leopoldville faction retained eleven posts, including Justin Bomboko who continued in his position as Foreign Minister and Joseph Ileo who became Minister of Information. Tshombé’s Katanga group did not attend.

Adoula faced two immediate obstacles: convincing Gizenga to fully participate in the new government and resolving differences with the regime in Katanga. External Affairs predicted the stability and effectiveness of the new government would be “determined largely by the ability of a small number of key personalities to achieve a workable relationship.” And on this point, Under-Secretary Norman Robertson pessimistically observed, “The record of their past performances is by no means entirely reassuring as to the degree of compromise and accommodation which may be expected of

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1 According to Bowett, this resolved a key dilemma for the UN as the organization now had a “legal” government with which it could work. D.W. Bowett, United Nations Forces (London: Stevens & Sons, 1964) 169.
these personalities. ¹² Nevertheless, Prime Minister Diefenbaker sent Prime Minister Adoula congratulations on the formation of the new government. ³

In the weeks immediately following the formation of the new government, Gizenga’s position was unclear. He remained in Stanleyville instead of taking up his position as first Deputy Prime Minister in Leopoldville. Col. Stetham reported that Gizenga refused to allow a provincial minister to travel to Leopoldville on the grounds that “le gouvernement central reste en place a Stanleyville.” ⁴ When Acting Consul General Gauvin met with Adoula for the first time on 22 August and inquired about the situation in Orientale, he was assured by the Congolese Prime Minister that Gizenga did intend to come to the capital and that the diplomatic missions in Stanleyville had been advised to recognize Leopoldville as the one and only government in the Congo. In Gauvin’s words, “Although Mr. Adoula did not give impression that difficulties with Stanleyville were over he appeared determined and confident to overcome conditions one way or another.” ⁵ Adoula’s confidence seems to have been derived from a meeting with Gizenga in mid-August; External Affairs, however, noted that there were conflicting reports as to the agreement reached between the two leaders at this meeting. ⁶ Hoskyn’s suggests Gizenga demanded Adoula take action against Katanga as quid pro quo for participation in the

⁴ DCC, file MGI/VI/8858.A (845 Congo), Telegram 57th to CANARMY, 16 August 1961.
central government. Ottawa considered it unlikely that Adoula would be able to consolidate his control over the rebellious Congolese provinces until the difficulties with Gizenga were resolved. In reality, the opposite was true: for Adoula, action against Katanga was the key to integrating the Gizengist faction.8

On 24 August the Adoula government issued an ordinance requiring the expulsion of all separatist foreign officers and mercenaries in Katanga, and OUNC was asked to assist in their detention and repatriation. In a move that caught the Katangese authorities by surprise, OUNC initiated Operation Rum Punch on 28 August: 338 of the 442 European officers in the gendarmerie were rounded up and detained for repatriation.9 Considerable tension in Elisabethville was the result. A Canadian peacekeeper serving at OUNC HQ, Captain Mario Côté, was sent to the Katangan capital to serve as a liaison officer between OUNC and the Katangan armed forces. Soon after his arrival, he was surrounded by demonstrators and “briefly menaced but subjected to no violence.” The group was content with shouting and booing at the Canadian officer.10 Tension eased somewhat when OUNC agreed that the Katangan authorities, in cooperation with the Elisabethville consulates of Western nations, could take the lead in arranging the repatriation of the captured officers.

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Not only did Côté have difficulty with the Katangese, he also found ONUC’s actions problematic. He discreetly complained to Col. Stetham about an incident in which he was required to have a Belgian woman who was eight months pregnant submit to a medical examination against her wishes. Conor Cruise O’Brien, Hammarskjöld’s Special Representative in Elisabethville, insisted on documentation from a non-Belgian doctor in order to permit the husband, a Belgian officer, to remain in the Congo until after the baby was born. Stetham complained to McEoin and insisted that Côté’s employment would have to be changed if the Canadian officer was being asked to “perform tasks in a manner liable to reflect badly on the Canadian Army.”\textsuperscript{11} The Chief of the General Staff concurred with Stetham. The Colonel was told, “Feel sure if you explain situation to General McEoin he will understand that we expect all ranks to carry out their duties in an effective manner and that we know he would not wish any of our soldiers to be given tasks which would reflect adversely on Canada.”\textsuperscript{12} When informed of the “harsh and almost ruthless character” of ONUC’s actions against the Belgian advisers, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green, went one step further, instructing Norman Robertson, “If any further of this type of action please protest to Secy. Gen.”\textsuperscript{13}


\textsuperscript{11} NAC, RG25, vol. 5223, file 6386-C-40 part 15, Telegram 57th Canadian Signal Unit to CANARMY, 1 September 1961.

\textsuperscript{12} NAC, RG25, vol. 5223, file 6386-C-40 part 15, Telegram CANARMY to 57th Canadian Signal Unit: For Stetham from CGS, 19 September 1961.

\textsuperscript{13} NAC, RG25, vol. 5223, file 6386-C-40 part 15, Memo for Minister: Canadian Participation in UN Congo Operations, 13 September 1961; Gaffen, in his account of this incident, suggests “Côté had followed the dictates of his conscience rather than those of his superiors in the UN force. Officials at External Affairs believed he should have acted as instructed. Colleagues in the force there were more understanding.” The evidence does not support this view. The highest ranking officials at both External
In New York, the Secretary-General was in fact consulting with Canada’s Permanent Representative, Charles Ritchie, as well as the Permanent Representatives of the United Arab Republic, Nigeria, and Sweden, on developments in Katanga. Given the “delicate” nature of the situation in the breakaway province, Hammarskjöld was reluctant to discuss matters with the entire Advisory Committee. He called together this select group of diplomats to explain the situation and hear their comments. Hammarskjöld was pleased with the UN’s new relationship with the Adoula government, which he described as “an enormous improvement on anything they had ever experienced in dealing with Congolese authorities in the past.” “It was,” he continued, “a prime objective of UN policy that [Adoula’s government] should survive and that the new and better prospects in Congo should not be wrecked.”

Hammarskjöld considered it was time for Katanga to “take its rightful place in a unified Congo.” While Tshombé was seen as obstinate on this point, the Secretary-General was more concerned with the Katangan Minister of the Interior, Godefroid Munongo, who was reported to be inciting intertribal hatred. When Hammarskjöld raised the possibility of ONUC arresting Munongo, Ritchie expressed concern for the precedent this would set. Howard Green later confirmed Ritchie’s view. The Minister advised New York, “The possible future implications of establishing such a precedent are

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sufficiently disturbing that I consider every effort should be made to avoid having to resort to this move." 16 The Canadian government was pleased with the prospects for newfound political stability in the Congo, made possible by the Adoula government, but believed there were limits to the measures that should be taken in its support.

Nevertheless, according to Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld came away from this meeting, and others with Belgium, Tunisia, the United States, and Britain, with the impression that "most of the governments concerned would now be prepared to assist in putting all possible pressure on Tshombe to negotiate and that they now also realized that more drastic measures could be expected if these efforts did not produce the desired effect." 17

Operation Morthor (Hindi for 'smash'), initiated by UN peacekeepers in Katanga on 13 September, was undoubtedly a muscular response to Tshombe's dithering on the removal of the last of the European volunteers and mercenaries. One hundred and four were known to be in Katanga "reinfiltrating into the gendarmerie, distributing arms to groups of soldiers over whom they could assert control, and getting ready for violent resistance." 18 In addition to rounding up these remaining foreigners, Col Stetham advised Army HQ that Morthor was intended to establish UN control of the Elisabethville airport, radio station, post and telegraph offices, and capture key political agitators, including Munongo. 19 Hammarskjöld's cautious consultations in New York, especially on the

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question of arresting Munongo, lend credence to the possibility that Morthor was initiated on orders from New York. Most accounts of ONUC are unequivocal in their assertion that the operation was strictly a local initiative. Resistance by the Katangese gendarmerie was unexpectedly strong and resulted in eight days of pitched battles, not only in Elisabethville, but also in Kamina, Jadotville, and Albertville. There were 50 Katangese and 11 ONUC deaths. The UN Secretariat maintained, “Belgian and white-led forces,” and not the Congolese in Katanga, were responsible for the extended hostilities.

The Commanding Officer of the 57th’s Elisabethville detachment was “disgusted” by the lack of cooperation from ONUC Brigade Headquarters, as the Canadian peacekeepers were “neither briefed or consulted” about the operation and found out about it only “by chance” from the Indian Signals. The eleven peacekeepers barely had time to evacuate their equipment to the new Brigade HQ outside the centre of the city. The Logistics Officer at Brigade HQ refused to provide soldiers to assist with the move, so the Canadians dismantled a generator, lifted it into a truck, and departed with a stockpile of water and rations. Their belated preparations paid off because in the days ahead there

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20 Dutsch states, “Hammarskjöld did not authorize Morthor, and neither did ONUC’s top civilian or military leadership.” Meisler does not suggest that Hammarskjöld knew of plans to undertake the operation, but differs from Dutsch in that he implicates both Khiary and O’Brien. According to Meisler, Khiary told O’Brien, “Above all, no half measures,” and so the Elisabethville Representative simply assumed Hammarskjöld had approved the plans. Rikhye’s account supports Meisler’s version, suggesting that O’Brien and Khiary were responsible for the operation and that the initiative was not Hammarskjöld’s. See: William J. Dutsch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin’s P., 1993) 341; Stanley Meisler, “Crisis in Katanga,” Soldiers for Peace, Ed. Barbara Benton (New York: Facts on File Inc., 1996) 110; Rikhye, The Thin Blue Line, 79-80.

were shortages of both food and water at the new HQ and the electricity was severed.\textsuperscript{23} A mercenary, flying in a Fouga Magister jet trainer, bombed ONUC positions in Elisabethville three times.\textsuperscript{24} Capt Rich, the officer in charge of this 57\textsuperscript{th} detachment, reported that one signaler continued to operate the teletype “in total blackout with amazing calm and dexterity,” even though bombs landed within 25 feet of the transmitter room causing shrapnel to break the windows. Two other signalers volunteered to retrieve wounded under fire.\textsuperscript{25}

Two of the ten Canadian peacekeepers in the Albertville detachment had an especially harrowing experience when hostilities broke out there on 17 September. They remained at the mess following the evening meal and came under attack when three Katangese fired into the building. By phone, Capt Bussieres, the officer in charge at Albertville, ordered both to take cover, not to return fire unless the building was invaded or their lives were threatened, and not to do anything that would draw attention to themselves. Cut off from other ONUC forces, they could do little but wait. Firing continued late into the night but eventually trailed away, and the Katangese simply left at daybreak. At that time, the Indian troops retook the airports, railway, and secured the


\textsuperscript{24} DHH, file 144.9.009 (D43) vol. 1, Memo: Report on the Operation Undertaken to Capture the Katangese Ministers of State, 15 September 1961.

\textsuperscript{25} This single jet menaced ONUC forces and gave the Katangese gendarmerie air superiority because, at this point, ONUC had no offensive aircraft at all. The CIA front company Seven Seas Airlines had delivered three Fouga Magisters to Katanga early in 1961, even though this was not consistent with official US policy. See: Michael Schatzberg, Mobutu or Chaos? (New York: U P of Amercia, 1991) 12; Wainhouse, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: National Support – Experience and Prospects (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins P, 1973) 297.

\textsuperscript{26} DHH, file 144.9.009 (D43) vol. 1, Memo: Report on the Situation in Elisabethville.
ONUC brigade area "systematically" wiping out all opposition. The Canadians never had
to fire a single shot, none were wounded, and their equipment was undamaged.26 At
Kamina, the seven Canadian peacekeepers were protected by an ONUC battalion and
suffered no casualties in spite of a series of attacks by the Katangese. Shelling did destroy
their wireless set.27

From Leopoldville, Gauvin told External Affairs that ONUC authorities were
"unprepared" for the strength of the reaction in Katanga. Morthor was expected to
proceed as "smoothly" as the round of arrests in late August. At Adoula's invitation,
Hammarskjöld arrived in Leopoldville expecting to negotiate a settlement of the
differences between Tshombé and the Congolese government. Confronted by the
outbreak of serious hostilities, he thought it best to first discuss cease-fire arrangements
with Tshombé. Certain political "extremists" opposed any negotiations with Tshombé,
but the Secretary-General persuaded the Congolese parliament of the necessity for a
cease-fire. Hammarskjöld also met with the British Ambassador who expressed concern
that the UN was using force "to effect [a] political settlement." The Secretary-General
rejected this view and "held firm" to the position that ONUC had acted within the terms
of the 21 February resolution. Late on 17 September, Hammarskjöld flew out of
Leopoldville to meet Tshombé at Ndola, in Northern Rhodesia. His plane never arrived.

22 September 1961.
26 NAC, RG24, vol. 18483, War Diary – No. 57 Canadian Signal Squadron, Report on the
27 NAC, RG25, vol. 5213, file 6386-40 part 25, Memo for Minister: Telephone Conversation –
Colonel Stetham, Congo, 18 September 1961.
Its wreckage was found the next day west of the Ndola airport. All sixteen persons on board died, including Hammarskjöld.

External Affairs viewed the hostilities in Katanga, compounded by the death of the Secretary-General, as a serious threat to Congolese stability. Both Adoula’s government and Tshumbé’s regime were fragile coalitions dependent upon the support of extremists who threatened to pull the two leaders further apart and, therefore, lessened the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. In meeting Adoula’s request to assist the Central Government with the expulsion of foreign officers and mercenaries, Ottawa believed the UN could “claim to have acted within a legal framework and have probably stayed within the letter of their mandate,” but that the organisation “left themselves open to criticism by appearing to use force to bring about a political settlement in favour of the Central Government.”

External Affairs questioned the prudence, not the legality, of UN actions in Katanga yet viewed with concern the growing divide between the majority of Afro-Asians and the Europeans, especially Britain and France. The press in both India and Ghana implicated the United Kingdom in Hammarskjöld’s death. A despatch from Gauvin, based on reports from the French Consul in Elisabethville, confirmed that the successful defence of Katanga was “due to the mercenaries, backed by a European population acting out of fear of reprisals by the Baluba should the UN operation

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succeed.” In a message to Howard Green, the British Commonwealth Secretary, Duncan Sandys, rejected the “malicious” charges leveled against Britain with respect to Hammarskjöld’s death but admitted Britain was “distressed that some of the most virulent comment has come from our African and Asian Commonwealth partners.” Sandys maintained that Britain never supported Tshombé in his “secessionist ambitions” and implied the UN, or at least its local Congo officials, had made “errors” that contributed to the events in Katanga.

Half-hearted apologetics did not play well in Leopoldville, where anti-Western demonstrations were on the rise. Outside the American and Canadian consulates, Congolese carried banners declaring, “Western imperialists have killed Hammerskjold,” “Western imperialists are killing our brothers in Katanga,” and “Death to Western imperialists.” In the midst of this anti-colonial tension, Ottawa hoped cool heads would prevail and urged a return to constructive, impartial diplomacy. External Affairs viewed the facilitation of negotiations between Tshombé and Adoula as the most urgent task facing the UN but was also keen to see the organisation “return to its impartial role of preventing civil war.” In preparation for a meeting of the Congo Advisory Committee, Green advised Ritchie, “It would be our hope that the UN would not contemplate any

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new hostilities in Katanga likely to lead to a renewal of hostilities. We would certainly expect to be consulted before any new decisions are taken which might have serious consequences.\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5214, file 6386-40 part 26, Outgoing Message External to PERMISNY: Congo Advisory Committee, 11 October 1961.} Canadian authorities were not critical of the UN in its first round of hostilities with Katanga, but they were certainly uncomfortable with the direction of events.

Unease with the events in Katanga curtailed Canada’s enthusiasm for UN requests, though not usually its willingness to continue to meet UN needs. On 20 September, the Secretariat urgently requested transport aircraft, aircrews, maintenance personnel, and spare parts for airlifts within the Congo for three to five weeks. ONUC relied, to a considerable extent, on charter airlines for internal transport of supplies and personnel. During Operation Morthor, Katangese jet fighters damaged or destroyed a number of these charter planes so most airlines withdrew their services, reducing available charter aircraft from thirty to three. The aircraft requested were to re-supply forces stationed throughout the Congo. Sweden and Ethiopia had already offered jet fighters to escort the transport aircraft. By the end of five weeks, ONUC expected the threat from the Katangese jets to be “resolved” and planned to revert to chartered transport. Officials warned Howard Green that there could be “armed resistance and renewed hostilities” if the UN tried again to arrest mercenaries in Katanga.\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5214, file 6386-40 part 26, Outgoing Message External to PERMISNY: Congo Advisory Committee, 11 October 1961.} Cabinet considered the request, and Green acknowledged it was a “difficult decision.” Although
the aircraft would be at risk of attack, especially if the cease-fire ended, Cabinet agreed to send two C119s for one month, together with the necessary crews to permit their operation 24 hours a day. In acceding to the request, Cabinet identified a number of important factors: the need to support Canadian and other peacekeepers deployed throughout the Congo, the significance of UN success in Katanga for the organisation’s future effectiveness, and public opinion. Harkness thought the government would be “criticized by the Canadian public if it refused the request.” This was one instance when public opinion was explicitly acknowledged to be a factor in the government’s decision-making. Cabinet made its decision on 23 September, and the planes and personnel left the next day.  

Two weeks later, a second request arrived from the Secretariat. ONUC required eight control tower officers and two maintenance ground communication technicians to aid in the operation of the Swedish and Ethiopian jet fighters and Indian light bombers now assigned to ONUC. Because of the policy implications of this request, further information was sought from New York. Ottawa learned that ONUC intended to use the fighters and bombers in the event hostilities were resumed, both to defend its transport aircraft and to “render unuseable” the runway available to Katanga’s jets. Should the cease-fire be breached, McEoin planned to move all jets to Kamina to operate from

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within Katanga.\textsuperscript{36} External Affairs was very concerned about the implications of Canadian involvement in this aspect of ONUC's operations. Robertson wrote.

There is, of course, a possibility that if we agree to the present U.N. request, we could be placed later on in an awkward position if the U.N. engages in warlike operations in the Congo, and particularly in Katanga. The situation would be especially delicate if these operations were undertaken in circumstances about which we may have some reservations.\textsuperscript{37}

Howard Green asked the Minister of National Defence, Douglas Harkness, to give "sympathetic consideration" to the request because the personnel involved would still be considered "non-combatant" and the aircraft involved would provide protection for both RCAF and 57th Signals Unit stationed in the Congo.\textsuperscript{38}

Harkness advised Green on 25 October that there was "an acute shortage" of suitable personnel required to meet the UN's request, so it could be met only by sacrificing the operational efficiency of RCAF units in Canada. He asked External Affairs to inform the Secretariat that "Canada would prefer not to accept this commitment."\textsuperscript{39} Disappointed and deeply concerned by the negative reply, Ralph Bunche personally approached Ritchie and asked if Canada would reconsider its decision. The American and Ethiopian missions also expressed concern. The United States was


unwilling to provide the necessary communications equipment unless Canadians agreed
to operate it.

The need for this equipment became acute when Katangese planes carried out
bombing raids in Kasai. In an Advisory Committee meeting, Bunche revealed that ONUC
had warned the Katangan authorities that any further offensive action would be countered
with the destruction of "all planes involved either in air or on ground." But, the UN
would not be able to carry out this threat without the American equipment and Canadian
personnel. Green wrote Harkness asking him to reconsider his decision. The Minister
observed, "[I]t would appear that Canada would be the object of widespread criticisms by
Afro-Asian countries, particularly those who are members of the Congo Advisory
Committee, if it is felt during the forthcoming developments that the capacity of the U.N.
to resist aggression is seriously impaired because of our inability to provide the
communications personnel needed for the servicing of the U.N. aircraft." Before
Harkness received Green's appeal, the Minister of Defence raised the matter in Cabinet
on his own initiative, and the earlier decision was reversed. Yet again, Canada set aside
political reservations and competing operational requirements to meet the UN's needs.
Cabinet also granted a thirty-day extension on the loan of the two C119s but cautioned
"there was no intention of continuing this arrangement indefinitely." ¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ NAC, RG25, vol. 5223, file 6386-C-40 part 16: Memo Ross Campbell to DL (1): Congo: UN
to Green, 6 November 1961.
Both Cabinet and National Defence were displeased when, on 20 November, a Yukon turbo-prop on a trial flight was seized by Congolese forces when it landed in Leopoldville. The plane was released only after Air Commodore Morrison appealed directly to Adoula and Mobutu. Worried additional aircraft might be detained, National Defence suspended all Yukon flights to the Congo, a decision that was subsequently endorsed by Cabinet.\textsuperscript{43} It was late December before the matter was reviewed. At that time, the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff asked Norman Robertson to seek assurances from the UN that any RCAF aircraft flying within or into the Congo in support of ONUC would not “be subject to seizure or impoundment.”\textsuperscript{44} External Affairs learned from Leopoldville and New York that the Yukon incident was an “isolated case” of mistaken identity. The Congolese were confused by the unfamiliar design of the plane and because it bore only RCAF insignia, not UN markings. To reassure Ottawa, the UN put in place measures to prevent a recurrence of this incident: Congolese authorities were to be given adequate notice prior to the arrival of each flight. UN officials were, in fact, keen to use the Yukons because one flight with this larger aircraft could replace two troop rotation flights on North Stars.\textsuperscript{45}

It has been suggested that incidents, such as that with the Yukon, happened “frequently enough” to cause Ottawa to become “less eager” to provide ONUC with


\textsuperscript{44} NAC, RG25, vol. 5223, file 6386-C-40 part 17, Letter CCOS to USSEA, 18 December 1961.

assistance generally and to meet a particular request in November 1961 for help in establishing a security service.\(^{46}\) While the threat of violence towards Canadian peacekeepers was always a concern and a factor weighed by the Government when it assessed UN requests, political and even administrative concerns were often the more significant factors when it was decided to turn down or scale back Canadian involvement in ONUC. The security and intelligence service request, cited by Professors J.L. Granatstein and David Bercuson, is one such example. This request was turned down for two reasons: Canada could not spare forty bilingual officers qualified to do intelligence and security work; and, as was the case in Rikhye’s earlier request for a peacekeeper to gather intelligence in Brazzaville, both External Affairs and National Defence questioned the wisdom of Canadian involvement in a service that had “the greatest possibility of embarrassment to any nation involved.”\(^{47}\)

Similarly, in late October, the Chief of the Air Staff issued instructions to develop a case to get the RCAF out of providing an officer to serve as ONUC Air Commander.\(^{48}\) The timing of this decision, coinciding as it does with the addition of jet fighters and light bombers to ONUC’s air services, suggests National Defence was uncomfortable having a Canadian oversee operations that went beyond transportation of supplies and personnel. Political considerations, and not just concern for casualties, were always evaluated and

\(^{46}\) J.L. Granatstein and David Bercuson. War and Peacekeeping (Toronto: Key Porter Books Limited, 1991) 221.


\(^{48}\) NAC, RG24, vol. 3022, file 895-8/115, Memo Chief of Air Staff to Vice Chief of Air Staff, 24 October 1961.
weighed heavily in the decision to either approve or reject any given UN request for assistance.

Following Operation Morthor, External Affairs contemplated whether or not it should continue to obtain situation reports from Col. Stetham. ONUC directives strictly prohibited the communication to home governments of any information peacekeepers learned during the course of their duties. This, it will be recalled, was the subject of an earlier exchange between UN headquarters and troop contributing states, Canada included. Command instructions permitted direct communication with Ottawa on purely administrative matters and questionable orders, but the commanding officers of the 57th also sent detailed situation reports.

In the wake of the first round of Katangan hostilities, Canadian officials became concerned that other countries, “in particular the Afro-Asians,” would learn that Ottawa received “regular reports from the Canadian contingent on the situation in the Congo.” The benefits of continuing to receive the reports were seen to outweigh the risks. One official noted, “[I]t is clear that our Consulate General alone could not provide all the information that we need. Neither could the U.N. nor our friends from other countries.” The reports, he said, “provided invaluable background information on Congo crises, such as the Matadi affair and the U.N. action in Katanga.” To minimize the chance of a leak revealing the transmission of these reports to Ottawa, it was suggested “the smallest possible number of members of the Canadian contingent” be made aware of the existence of the reports and that they not be circulated outside Ottawa, unless warranted in an urgent situation. Perhaps to ease guilty consciences or to offer further justification, an
official noted, "we know that the Indians themselves are reporting to their Government the information made available to them through their participation in the U.N. contingent." 49

In late August, the 57th was notified by ONUC HQ that the Unit would have to vacate the Athenée Royale, the premises it had occupied since shortly after its arrival in the Congo. The Congolese Ministry of Education planned to reopen the school for Congolese students: sixteen students actually arrived in Leopoldville earlier than expected, showed up at the school, and demanded overnight accommodation. By 9 September, the Unit had completed its move to the seven story, twenty-eight apartment block Leie Building, across the street from ONUC HQ. The first three floors were taken up with offices and other ranks messes. The remaining floors were used as sleeping quarters, with up to ten peacekeepers per three bedroom apartment. Officers of the 57th lived in a separate residence, two kilometers from the Leie Building. 50

Sgt. R.H. Moore became the first Canadian casualty in ONUC, when he died at Albertville on 6 October from a coronary thrombosis. The 57th found it difficult to arrange the peacekeeper's burial because there were "unusual regulations and obstacles to surmount," which were further complicated by the persistent absence of the responsible authorities. A funeral service was held and attended by all of the 57th officers, 108 off-duty other ranks, representatives of all ONUC contingents, Consul General Gauvin and

his Vice Consul. The Nigerian police kindly provided a choir. A second, and final, Canadian casualty was Staff Sgt. J.P.C. Marquis who died the following February, also of natural causes.  

The question of providing Canadian officers for training and advising duties was raised again on 12 September, when the UN asked if Canada could provide a number of qualified French speaking personnel to fill some of the eighteen officer and eleven NCO positions required as part of their plans to reorganize the ANC. On instructions from Washington, the American embassy in Ottawa asked External Affairs to give this request their “most sympathetic consideration.” But when National Defence studied the availability of bilingual officers, it concluded it was inadvisable to draw any officers from headquarters or units in Quebec Command or from corps schools. A limited number of the personnel requested could be provided “but only at the expense of reduced efficiency elsewhere.” Seven officers already serving in the Congo at ONUC HQ were considered the only viable candidates, and their release from current duties for employment with the ANC would be required. But before these conclusions were shared with External Affairs, the hostilities in Katanga and Hammarskjöld’s death pushed the training and

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reorganization plans into the background, particularly because the training school was to be located at Kamina.\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5223, file 6386-C-40 part 16, Memo DL (1) to USSEA: Request for Military Advisers and Instructors for the Congo, 5 October 1961.}

Then, in November, the Senior Military Adviser to the Congolese Government, General Iyassu, spoke with Gauvin and asked Canada to provide eleven officers: nine staff for the training school and two advisers for the ANC. Iyassu threatened to resign if the UN did not take action to establish the training school. He believed neither the situation in Katanga nor the need to integrate the Stanleyville ANC should further delay the school’s opening.\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5214, file 6386-40 part 27, Telegram Leopoldville to External: UN Request for Military Advisers and Instructors for Congo, 7 November 1961.} “If Canada replied affirmatively and quickly,” Iyassu thought, “the U.N. would be willing to fill the most important positions by Canadian officers, leaving other appointments to other nationalities.”\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5214, file 6386-40 part 27, Memo for Minister: Congo – Request for Military Training Assistance, 9 November 1961.} Because of Gauvin’s reported conversation with Iyassu, External Affairs contacted New York and asked the Permanent Mission to obtain the Secretariat’s views and intentions. At the same time, the Chief of the General Staff advised the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff and Harkness that he was “most reluctant to accept this commitment,” because of the impact on efficiency within French-speaking units.\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5223, file 6386-C-40 part 16, Memo DL (1) to USSEA: Request for Military Advisers and Instructors for the Congo, 5 October 1961.} When National Defence advised External Affairs on 21 November that it was “doubtful of its ability to meet any requests for further French-speaking officers for the Congo,” the Mission in New York was immediately advised not to approach the Secretariat after all, or if it already had, to inform them that “it is unlikely that Canada
could provide the assistance requested. With this, the question of ANC training and organisation was once again set aside.

The sixteenth session of the General Assembly was expected to consider and resolve the question of ONUC’s financial woes. At the time of Hammarskjöld’s death, the United Nations was $100,000,000 in debt. By mid October, it was clear that a solution would not be found by the end of the month, when the authority to incur ONUC expenses to a maximum of $10 million per month would expire. Eleven members of the Advisory Committee, including Canada, co-sponsored a resolution in the Fifth Committee to extend this authority to the end of 1961, to permit ONUC to continue. The Department of Finance expressed reservations about this resolution because it failed to include a provision for the apportionment of expenses; in their view, “the Canadian Delegation should have pressed for some provision concerning the obligation of members to meet any expenditures incurred under this resolution.” External Affairs disagreed, considering there would be ample opportunity later in the sixteenth session to discuss financing “at length and without pressure,” so long as this technical resolution was not jeopardised by a general debate on the principle of assessment, which would be open to

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exploitation by the Soviet bloc. The resolution passed by a vote of 55 in favour, 9 against and 15 abstentions.\(^6\)

The troubling state of ONUC’s finances, temporarily allayed by this interim authorization to incur $10 million for each of the last two months of 1961, was resolved to mid 1962 with an additional Fifth Committee resolution approved by the General Assembly in December. Resolution 1732 (xvi) continued the \textit{ad hoc} Congo account, authorised average monthly expenditures of $10 million each month from January to June, confirmed the October measures that had provided $20 million for November and December 1961, and called for the apportionment of these expenses in accordance with the scale of assessment for the regular budget. Provisions were made to reduce or rebate the assessment for members who could not afford to pay, while permanent members of the Security Council and Belgium were urged to make additional contributions to offset these rebates.

In its final report on the Fifth Committee’s activities during the 16\(^{th}\) session, the Canadian delegation said it had played a “significant part in the behind-the-scenes negotiations leading to the adoption of the resolution.” They had reservations concerning the size of the rebate offered and the fact that financing was arranged for only the first six months of 1962 but supported it because of the UN’s poor financial position and because a UN bond issue was expected to raise enough funds to meet the additional costs for the remainder of 1962. Above all, Canada hoped that continued political conciliation in the

Congo might limit the scope of ONUC’s operations, and consequently its expenses, throughout the coming year.  

Despite a 13 October cease-fire negotiated with Tshombé by the civilian head of ONUC, Mahmoud Khiari, the situation in northern Katanga worsened. Katanga launched “offensive air action” along its border with Kasai, and ANC forces from Leopoldville and Stanleyville were only partly successful in their attempts to take control of towns just south of the Katanga/Kivu border because of stiff resistance from European mercenaries. Concerned by the situation in Katanga and the “lawless acts of mercenaries,” Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Sudan requested a meeting of the Security Council. In considering ONUC’s mandate and the issue of the mercenaries, External Affairs identified three potential choices facing the UN: ONUC could actively assist Leopoldville in a conquest of Katanga, ONUC could stand aside while Leopoldville renewed military operations against Katanga, and ONUC could interpose itself between the two rival forces.

Because the United Kingdom insisted on a peaceful, negotiated settlement with Katanga, chiefly “to avoid disruption of the mining operations in Katanga,” the first option was considered a non-starter. So long as the ANC continued to lack air support and the mercenaries remained in Katanga, the second scenario also seemed out of the
question. As for the third option, External Affairs was of the view that the UN was obliged, under the terms of the 21 February resolution, to intervene to prevent any further fighting between the ANC and Katanga's gendarmerie, but recognized this would require "a change of attitude on the part of the Secretariat who have tended to take the position in the Advisory Committee that Central Government operations against Katanga were essentially a police action."65

The essential question underlying all of this was "whether and to what extent, the UN should side with the Central Government in its quarrel with Katanga." Howard Green agreed with Robertson's proposition that Canada and the UN should give moral and political support to the Central Government on the issue of secession, but not cooperate militarily in any operation against Katangan forces.66 In his first meeting with the new Secretary-General, Howard Green advised U Thant of the Canadian government's view: ONUC was in the Congo to preserve order, not to support an ANC attack on Katanga.67

The Security Council adopted its fifth and final ONUC resolution on 24 November 1961. Sponsored by Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab Republic, it was "silent" on the question of whether ONUC should actively support the Central Government "in a military operation to reduce Katanga." In order to garner the widest possible support for the resolution, this issue had to be avoided because, in addition to

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Canada, most other Western countries, India, and the Secretary-General, opposed any suggestion that ONUC undertake offensive operations against Katanga. The resolution is seen by many as an incremental step in the application of force to the Congo situation.\footnote{Bowett argues this resolution authorised U Thant “to use a degree of force which surpassed the limits of self-defence and involved positive action.” Citrin writes, “The use of force against foreign personnel, if necessary, was now authorized, and it was implied that such action could be used to bring Katanga to heel.” Comparing this resolution with previous ones, Hoffman concludes, “This time, the UN redefined its mission in such a way that preventive diplomacy included both what can be called a preventive use of force and a clear-cut intervention in domestic disputes.” Rikhye states, “[A] hesitant Security Council authorized ONUC to use force in the last resort in order to reunify the country and restore law and order in Katanga.” See: Bowett, United Nations Forces, 170-1 and 201-3; Jack Citrin, UN Peacekeeping Activities: A Case Study in Organizational Task Expansion, Monograph Series in World Affairs 3.1 (Denver, Colorado: U of Denver, 1966-66) 41; Stanley Hoffman, “In Search of a Thread: The United Nations in the Congo Labyrinth,” International Organization 16.2 (1962) 348; Indar Jit Rikhye, “Peacekeeping and Peacemaking,” Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals. Ed. Henry Wiseman (Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1983) 15.}

U Thant was authorised to take “vigorous action, including the requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation” of all foreign officers and advisers not under UN command.\footnote{The full text of the 24 November resolution is found in appendix 2.}

This provision was cause for some concern in Ottawa, where it was thought that U Thant’s “ideas about settling the mercenary problem could lead to a renewal of fighting or at least a number of unsavory incidents.” External Affairs hoped “that it could be recognized that the primary responsibility for getting rid of mercenaries should rest with the Katanga authorities.”\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5214, file 6386-40 part 28, Outgoing Message External to CANDEL: Congo, 22 November 1961.} The government’s reluctance to see ONUC employ military force did not apply to the mission’s right to reply with force in self-defence. The rationale for this distinction was underscored following the massacre of thirteen Italians serving
with ONUC, in Kindu, on 11 November. Robertson noted, "[T]here is little doubt that a Canadian aircrew in the same circumstances could well have met with a similar fate."  

Discussions on the principles governing the use of force were soon overshadowed by a second round of fighting between ONUC and Katanga. Tshombé condemned the Security Council's 24 November resolution "and called upon the population to be prepared to defend their homeland." In the following weeks, a number of incidents were directed against the UN. Brian Urquhart, sent to Elisabethville to replace Connor Cruise O’Brien, and his deputy were seized and beaten by the Katangese gendarmerie. They were released only after ONUC threatened to storm the presidential palace and Tshombé intervened. Urquhart is said to have told reporters, "Better beaten than eaten." In addition, one Indian peacekeeper was murdered and an Indian officer and eleven Swedish peacekeepers were captured. Events culminated on 5 December, when the gendarmerie set up a roadblock between Elisabethville and the local airport, and local ONUC authorities decided to take military action to clear it.

Once fighting between ONUC and the gendarmerie erupted, U Thant authorised ONUC to take "all necessary action to ensure freedom of movement including the occupation of key points," a sound decision justified by the Security Council’s resolutions. Additional peacekeepers were flown from elsewhere in the Congo to Katanga, and ONUC jets destroyed four Katanga aircraft on the ground in Kolwezi.

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External Affairs recognised a key difference between this round of hostilities and those that occurred in September:

It seems clear that the current military action is related essentially to the protection of UN personnel and the UN Command in Katanga; in this respect, it is quite different from the action initiated by the UN last September which was connected with removing mercenaries. It is also clear that the UN action was taken only after every attempt had been made to reach agreement with the authorities in Katanga and after the situation regarding the security of UN personnel had become quite intolerable with individuals being picked off, held as hostages or killed.

Charles Ritchie was confident both the Secretary-General and Brian Urquhart would act with restraint but firmness. Urquhart, in particular, was seen to be "far less emotional and prejudiced than his predecessor [O'Brien]." 74 External Affairs appeared satisfied that the UN was acting reasonably to safeguard ONUC peacekeepers.

This resumption of hostilities in Katanga brought to the fore differences of opinion within the West on how best to resolve the Congo crisis. Both Britain and France abstained on the 24 November resolution, whereas the United States voted for it – as did the U.S.S.R. The UK government was thought to have been pressured by financial interests and the press into adopting a policy against the use of force in dealing with the mercenaries. In what one Canadian official observed was tantamount to a "pro-Tshombe policy," Britain insisted that the UN role should be confined to the conciliation and pacification of differences between Tshombe and Adoula. "In short," he concluded, "it would seem that the United Kingdom in the past few months has tended to adopt a more

73 Meisler, "Crisis in Katanga," 114.
'European' policy towards the Congo." Britain wanted a formal cease-fire and asked the United States to consider a joint appeal to U Thant. In discussion with his Danish colleague in Leopoldville, Gauvin learned that Washington rejected this suggestion: for good measure, the Danish Consul General also criticized British policy and suggested the UK "would meet another Suez." The split between the United States and Britain placed Canada in the awkward position of having to choose between opposing policy options favoured by its two most important allies. The US considered a cease-fire unacceptable until after ONUC achieved certain minimum objectives, "namely the protection of its personnel and the assurance of its freedom of movement." The distinction between military and political objectives was somewhat blurred. A memo prepared by the United Nations Division argued, "There is more than a suggestion, however, that in the armed conflict the Katangese forces will be shattered and that Mr. Tshombe will be obliged to enter into negotiations with the United Nations and with the Central Government of the Congo." In other words, it was possible that in the forceful exercise of its right to freedom of movement throughout Katanga, ONUC could overpower the gendarmerie and the mercenaries. effectively

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ending the secession. Such a political settlement, achieved through force, was unacceptable to Britain. Macmillan wrote to Diefenbaker, explaining the British position: “it is the duty of the United Nations to bring about at the earliest possible moment an end to hostilities and a return to the path of conciliation and negotiation.”

In Ottawa, there seems to have been a difference of opinion as to which side to support. While Diefenbaker appears to have favored the British view, officials at External Affairs preferred the American position. They argued,

The presence of Canadian communications troops with the UN forces in Katanga gives Canada a direct interest in supporting UN action designed to protect its personnel and freedom of movement and communications. Moreover, a premature cease fire would not be conducive to early negotiations between Tshombe and the Central Government. If a cease fire is ordered in a situation where Tshombe can claim a victory as he did in September, the chances of fruitful negotiations between the Congolese themselves which we are all seeking, will be that much less likely. Finally, Canada has supported the UN operation in the Congo from the beginning and it would look ill if she were now, at this crucial time, to appear to be withdrawing support for an action which the UN leaders on the spot have taken only after serious provocation.

Evidently, External Affairs’ rationale was sufficiently persuasive because in the 16 December meeting of the Advisory Committee everyone, including Canada, praised the United States position, while Britain and France were criticized. By way of compromise, it was suggested that Canadian influence within the Advisory Committee be used to urge restraint and a halt to the fighting as soon as ONUC positions were secure.

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81 NAC, RG25, vol. 5214, file 6386-40 part 29, Memo for Minister: Situation in Katanga,
Even this, though, would have to be done tactfully. The UN Division warned, "the Western powers will be closely watched by the African-Asians for any sign that they are weakening in their resolve to ensure that the Congo is reintegrated with United Nations assistance. Sharp criticism could be expected if Canada appeared to equivocate in the current situation."\(^2\)

During an inconclusive discussion in Cabinet, Green was more blunt: "Canada had troops in Katanga and must either back the U.N. or let it down." Britain's attitude against the military action taken by ONUC was attributed to "her other African interests, particularly Rhodesia." Some Ministers considered it time to withdraw Canadian peacekeepers from the Congo, while others argued this would leave ONUC without communications and in a "hopeless" state.\(^3\) Ultimately, Canadian policy was more akin to that of the United States than Britain, but the British could still expect a watchful, though not dutiful, presence in the Advisory Committee.

Canada advocated a "speedy and effective" end to hostilities as soon as practicable, not only with an eye to Britain but also to public opinion. The government was concerned that continued reports of civilian casualties and confusion as to the UN's objectives in Katanga would eventually undermine public support of ONUC.\(^4\) In the battle of public relations, the UN appeared "to be losing some ground ... as a result of the

\(^{16}\) December 1961.


\(^{3}\) NAC, RG2, vol. 6177, Cabinet Conclusions, 7 December 1961.

emphasis which is being placed on the anti-Communist and self-determination aspects of the Katanga case."\(^{85}\) These were common themes in about two dozen letters sent to the government, protesting UN action in Katanga. W.J.W. Bullock wrote, "In order to be consistent I suggest it is your bounden duty to appeal to the United Nations to send an Army into the Prov. of Quebec to suppress the Secessionist Movement there before it attains greater proportions If slaughter & terror, initiated by U.N. Forces, are in order in suppressing secession in a Prov. of the Congo it surely is equally applicable to Quebec."\(^{86}\) Another letter exclaimed, "How glad I am to see the British are not afraid to stand up for Katanga! Surely any red blooded government with the smallest sense of fair play would do so. ... The United Nations couldn't intervene in Hungary, etc but they, the cowards they are, can pick on a little province like Katanga. This U Thant? Is he a communist? I wonder."\(^{87}\) Letters supporting the UN were uncommon, but not altogether absent. One Canadian wrote, "It is tragic that the British government should take this stand. It also adds to the suspicion that directly or indirectly Britain, Welensky & Co. were responsible for the death of the great Secretary-General. If we have to choose between membership in the U.N. or in the British Commonwealth I would choose the former."\(^{88}\)

By 19 December, ONUC had consolidated positions in Katanga required for its security, and peacekeepers were ordered to "hold fire unless fired upon."\(^{89}\) Writing in

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\(^{87}\) DCC, file MG1/VI/(845 Congo), Letter E. Tate to Diefenbaker, 15 December 1961.

\(^{88}\) DCC, file MG1/VI/(845 Congo), Letter M. Brown to Diefenbaker, 15 December 1961.

1965, Ralph Bunche asserted that the UN did not take offensive action in this round of fighting, that ONUC’s actions were entirely consistent with the Security Council’s resolutions, and that hostilities stopped “the moment the security and freedom of movement of the United Nations Force had been restored.”

Nevertheless, the fighting resulted in the deaths of 206 Katangan soldiers and six non-Congolese soldiers, and a further 50 civilians were either wounded or killed.

A report from Gauvin implied that it was just as well the fighting ended when it did. The Consul General learned from Air Commodore Morrison that the UN had almost bombed a building where women and children were taking shelter; only “poor aiming” prevented the building’s destruction. Morrison also revealed that he intervened at the last moment to prevent the bombing of Tshombé’s residence by two Canberras. The fighting took a toll on the ONUC’s civilian leadership in Elisabethville. According to Morrison, Urquhart was shaken, not from being attacked personally or from the pressure of work, but from the confusion of battle and “the fact that he never knew what the UN troops would do next.” Gauvin, Morrison, and Urquhart were all critical of ONUC’s military commander in Katanga, Brigadier Raja. Gauvin said he had a “pleasant personality,” but not the “qualities necessary to lead a delicate and intricate military operation with political considerations.” To illustrate this point, the Consul General recalled a social occasion at Raja’s home when the Brigadier pointed into the darkness and assured his guests, “I have organized an all-round defence and if these Congolese bastards ever try to

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come in, we will shoot them like flies.” Morrison and Gauvin’s observations suggest it was for the best that ONUC consolidated its position and halted hostilities as expeditiously as it did.

The latest round of hostilities in Katanga convinced National Defence to follow through with its plan to vacate the position of Air Commander at ONUC HQ. Harkness wrote to Green on 7 December to say that, once Air Commodore Morrison completed his tour in the Congo at month’s end, he would not be replaced. Harkness justified his decision on the grounds that, to this point, the Air Commander principally coordinated transport. ONUC’s military involvement in Katanga was expected to result in increased responsibilities, including both “defensive and offensive military operations.” Because the enlarged staff required to meet these new responsibilities was expected to come from countries other than Canada, Harkness believed “the accepted international principle of the country supplying the largest force also provides the Commander should be adopted by the United Nations.”

The UN Division at External Affairs expressed concern at this decision. Murray stressed the political reasons why Canada should continue to provide an officer to fill this role. Senior officials in the Secretariat were said to have high regard for the RCAF contribution in the Congo. In the past, Murray said, the military had complained they were not given an adequate role in ONUC, yet the position of Air Commander provided

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an opportunity to “continue a contribution which is recognized as effective and for which we are well qualified.” The safety and welfare of Canadian peacekeepers located in detachments throughout the Congo could be protected if a Canadian continued in this role. Murray cited General E.L.M. Burns’ command of UNEF as a ready example of how the United Nations did not consistently follow the principle of appointing commanders from the largest troop contributing states. Above all, the political implications of not replacing Morrison were noted: “We should not wish to expose ourselves to a charge of backing away from the United Nations operation at a time when our support was needed most. There is no doubt in my mind that if we do not replace Morrison the news about our refusal will spread.”\textsuperscript{94} It was not until 18 December, when he returned from a NATO Ministerial meeting in Paris, that Green wrote Harkness asking that the decision be reconsidered.\textsuperscript{95}

The Minister of Defence was unmoved and asked Green to “inform the UN authorities promptly of our desire to withdraw A/C Morrison by the end of this year.” Because of the lateness in responding to the UN request, Harkness was willing to provide an additional two weeks of service in order to give the UN time to find a replacement. Green decided not to press National Defence any further and issued instructions to inform New York.\textsuperscript{96} The Secretariat was disinclined to accept ‘no’ for an answer, however. Rikhye contacted Murray by phone to emphasise that the UN command “had become

\textsuperscript{93} NAC, RG25, vol. 5223, file 6386-C-40 part 17, Letter Harkness to Green, 7 December 1961.
\textsuperscript{94} NAC, RG25, vol. 5223, file 6386-C-40 part 17, Memo UN Div to USSEA: Congo Replacement for A/C Morrison, 13 December 1961.
accustomed to dealing with RCAF officers on air matters and that the smoothest co-
operation had been possible because the RCAF officers ‘understood the United
Nations’. They were “disturbed” by the negative reply to their request; U Thant, the
Acting Secretary-General, was considering a direct appeal to Diefenbaker. The next day
a telegram for Diefenbaker arrived from the Secretary-General: “I most earnestly appeal
to you, therefore, to find it possible to replace Air Commander Morrison, who has
rendered outstanding service in that position, with an RCAF officer of similar
qualities.” After further consultations with External Affairs and Harkness, the decision
was made to extend Morrison’s term by an additional three months, after which time
National Defence would neither renew Morrison’s term nor provide a substitute.

The RCAF became entangled in another diplomatic tussle when France, on 15
December, closed its airspace to any UN traffic carrying munitions, reinforcements, and
spare parts, to protest ONUC’s activities in Katanga. The ONUC airlift operated by the
RCAF used Marville, France as a staging airport. In June, the French government had
granted Canada permission to use Marville, so External Affairs proposed to simply
continue the flights through France until they were “notified officially” of the French

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97 NAC, RG25, vol. 5214, file 6386-40 part 29, Memo UN Div to USSEA: Canadian Military
Assistance to the UN in the Congo, 3 January 1962.
98 NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 18, Memo SSEA to Ignatieff, Campbell DL (1),
Euro Div & attached telegram, 5 January 1962.
99 NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 18, Memo Robinson to USSEA: Replacement for
Air Commodore Morrison, 11 January 1962; NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 18, Memo for
Prime Minister: Congo – Replacement for A/C Morrison as UN Air Commander, 8 January 1962; NAC,
RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 18, Memo from Prime Minister to Robinson, 10 January 1962.
decision. Then, early in January, the Canadian Embassy in Paris received notice that permission for the RCAF overflights scheduled for January was suspended. While the Canadian Ambassador headed for the Quai d'Orsay to convince French authorities to permit the overflights, at least temporarily, the RCAF made contingency plans. One option called for a link between Baden-Solingen, Germany, and Pisa, Italy. Personnel and equipment bound for the Congo would continue to land in Marvile and would then be carried by road to Germany. The Defence Liaison Division noted, “this information, of course, need not be supplied to the French.” The inconvenience and uncertainty surrounding this issue was not easily resolved – it dragged on for months.

Another ongoing issue was revived on 23 December when U Thant directly asked Diefenbaker for fifteen French-speaking officers to assist in the training of the Congolese Army. General Iyassu last raised this matter in a similar request made urgently through Gauvin in November. At that time, National Defence concluded there were too few suitable officers available. Events in Katanga had preoccupied the Secretariat, and Canada did not send a negative reply because a formal request never arrived. It was not clear to National Defence whether this request bore any relation to the earlier one from Iyassu, but the shortage of officers identified then still applied. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff advised the Prime Minister that 38, mostly French-speaking, officers were already provided for the Congo. Living conditions required frequent rotation, so four to five

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101 NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 18, Memo DL (1) to USSEA: RCAF Overflights of France in support of UN Congo Operations, 8 January 1962.
officers were required as back-up for each officer assigned there and National Defence expected any commitment to train the ANC would continue "for a very long time." The request was not rejected outright and further information was requested, but it was clear the military was not keen to stretch its French-speaking officer corps any further than it already was.

External Affairs, on the other hand, drew attention to the advantages of the request: retraining the Congolese Army would eventually permit the withdrawal of ONUC, which U Thant hoped to achieve by the end of 1962; a positive response would be consistent with Canada's support of ONUC and its policy of helping the Congolese to help themselves; helping the Congo would demonstrate that Canadian assistance in Africa was not exclusively for English-speaking countries; and Canada was one of very few acceptable sources of French-speaking instructors who would still be a Western influence on the Congolese Army. Cabinet reviewed these arguments on 28 December but postponed a final decision until Harkness, who was in the West, could be present.

Pressure to arrive at a decision was applied early in January, when Rikhye contacted External Affairs to follow up on the request. Prime Minister Adoula had set a deadline of 15 January for the United Nations to establish the school, or he intended to look elsewhere to provide the training. To facilitate a positive response, Rikhye was willing to employ recently retired officers and provided assurances that they would

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102 DCC, file MG1/XII/F/215, Memo to Prime Minister from CCOS: Canadian Assistance to establish an Officers' Training School in Congo, 27 December 1961.
receive satisfactory compensation. The reason for Rikhye's persistence was made clear in the Advisory Committee. Bunche revealed that both Canada and Switzerland had been approached for officers, but Switzerland had already turned down the request.

"Everything now depended on Canada," Bunche said. Cabinet debated the merits of providing assistance on 26 January. Howard Green argued in favour of providing officer instructors, and Harkness opposed the plan. The position of the Minister of National Defence prevailed, primarily because the recent fighting in Katanga highlighted the Congo's political instability and consequently raised doubts as to the wisdom of sending more Canadians there. Information obtained from Air Commodore Morrison that the training was not for officers but for NCOs and that "it would be at least ten years before the U.N. could divest itself of its military commitment in the Congo," was also a decisive factor. The Acting Secretary-General, U Thant, was told his request was given careful consideration, but no French-speaking officers with the required qualifications were available.

U Thant, the Permanent Representative of Burma, was chosen to complete Hammarskjöld's term in office after the tragic plane crash near N'dola. Urquhart has

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105 NAC, RG25, vol. 5214, file 6386-40 part 29, Memo UN Div to USSEA: Canadian Military Assistant to the UN in the Congo, 3 January 1962.
written that U Thant “was in almost every way the opposite of Hammarskjöld.” In comparison with Hammarskjöld, U Thant was calm, simple, direct, and more apt to listen and take advice from others. By early 1962, Canadian diplomats and officials had worked with and observed the Acting Secretary-General enough to form general impressions of his abilities and handling of the Congo crisis. Charles Ritchie found him to be “in good form unruffled by his responsibilities firm and clear in his opinions and frank in his discussion.” U Thant trusted Ritchie enough to share quite critical views of Soviet policy towards the Congo. The Canadian Ambassador observed, “U Thant who is a patient and sympathetic listener may let more ambitious and voluble members of his staff talk themselves out and then pursue his own course. I suspect that this technique which I have seen him employ in Advisory [Committee] may be one which he will follow in dealing with senior advisors who surround him.” The Acting Secretary-General was more likely to delegate, particularly to Bunche and Rikhye, than was his predecessor, but still approved all major decisions.

The way in which U Thant employed the Advisory Committee was notably different than Hammarskjöld. As has been seen, Hammarskjöld consulted the Committee often, as a forum for testing ideas and assuring adequate support for his policies. Additionally, associating all members of the Committee with his Congo decisions provided some protection from Soviet criticism. U Thant was less likely to consult with

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the Committee before taking action and used it more as a forum for communicating information about the Congo and UN actions. In sum, the African and Middle Eastern Division concluded, "U Thant’s handling of Congo affairs so far has been effective and not basically inimical to Western interests."\(^{111}\)

Political conditions in the Congo were relatively stable during the first few months of 1962, due largely to an agreement reached by Adoula and Tshombé in the days following the fighting in Katanga the previous December. The Kitona Declaration provided a basis for settling the constitutional impasse on terms that generally favoured Adoula’s Government. Tshombé accepted the *loi fondamentale*, recognised the authority of the Central Government over all Congolese provinces, agreed to end the secession, and said he would uphold the UN resolutions.\(^{112}\) In this spirit of conciliation, Tshombé also agreed to the deployment of peacekeepers in Jadotville, Kolwezi, and Kipushi – towns known for the presence of mercenaries.

This plan to station ONUC forces in the outlying areas of Katanga concerned Charles Ritchie and prompted him to question U Thant on the wisdom of carrying out what could appear, to either the *gendarmerie* or local inhabitants, to be an ONUC occupation.\(^{113}\) Ottawa was less concerned. Howard Green agreed that the arrival of ONUC in these towns could lead to friction but believed the UN was "basically right in wanting to put troops into these places." In the Minister’s view, the deployments would

\(^{113}\) NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 18, Telegram PERMISNY to External: Congo,
need to be carried out tactfully "and only after adequate preparation to avoid giving impression the move is a resumption of military operation." External Affairs was more concerned with reports from London that the arrival of ONUC in these towns might be followed with ANC troops; this, they thought, would be premature and could "upset the apple cart." 114

In any event, Tshombé subsequently on the agreement to station ONUC troops in Southern Katanga, as part and parcel of his failure to implement the measures called for in the Kitona Declaration. The Katanga provincial assembly refused to ratify the Declaration and suggested it be used simply as a basis for continued negotiation with Leopoldville. Norman Robertson surmised, "Tshombe may try to turn the clock back by again taking the attitude that he is negotiating with the Central Government as an equal and demanding a confederal solution." Adoula's position, as Prime Minister, was seen as tenuous; if he failed to resolve the Katanga issue, it was thought that his political support would shift to another leader "prepared to take more extreme measures." 115 The result of this impasse was yet another extended round of negotiations between the two leaders.

While these negotiations were taking place, Ottawa learned the UN might occupy Kolwezi, Jadotville, and Kipushi, without Tshombé's cooperation, if the talks broke down. Howard Green had previously supported this idea, but only if it could be done "in such a way as not to appear as a resumption of military operations against the Katanga

14 February 1962.


115 NAC, RG25, vol. 5215, file 6386-40 part 30, Memo for Minister: The Situation in the Congo,
This new plan, implying occupation without any cooperation or consent, was an entirely different matter. However, the African and Middle Eastern Division thought there was no need “for Canada to express alarm in New York.” If the UN attempted to carry out the plan, Britain could be counted on to protest.  

Against this backdrop of Congolese political strife, February 1962 provided an unprecedented period of comic relief at the Canadian Consulate. Gauvin received instructions from External Affairs to investigate and report on the “scope and activities of communist block diplomatic missions in Leopoldville.” One can only imagine the reaction in Ottawa when they received the Consul General’s first report, entitled “Lunch with Soviet Colleagues.” Hosted by the French Ambassador, Gauvin attended a luncheon with the Russian Chargé d’Affaires, a second Russian introduced as the First Secretary but who remained nameless, and the Chargé d’Affaires of Dahomey. Aside from brief, innocuous comments about Robert Gardiner replacing Sture Linner as ONUC’s Officer in Charge, political topics were studiously avoided during lunch and in Gauvin’s report. Instead, Ottawa was treated to an account of Russian perspectives on European literature, albeit a colourful account no doubt inspired by the menu of Amer Picon, whiskey, white champagne, red wine, red champagne, Armagnac, and cognac. Consumption of this much alcohol left the Russian Chargé quite “loquacious,” though the First Secretary was noted

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2 March 1962.


to have held "his liquor much better."\textsuperscript{118} Ottawa did eventually receive a more ‘traditional’ and far less entertaining report on the presence of communist missions in Leopoldville and their relations with the Adoula government. The U.S.S.R., Poland, East Germany, and Yugoslavia maintained diplomatic posts in the capital, but their relations with Adoula were described as "non-existent."\textsuperscript{119}

This same month, Ottawa received an account of a ‘diplomatic’ incident between Justin Bomboko and a staff member from the Canadian Consulate bordering on the theatre of the absurd. Hearing the continuous honking of a car horn and the rattling of a tin, Mr. Weidman went out onto his balcony and asked a man in the street to stop honking the horn. This turned out to be Bomboko, who screamed, "You don’t know who your [sic] dealing with. I am going to take away your visa. I am coming up to take down the number of your apartment. What do you mean by throwing a tin at me!" Weidman denied throwing a tin and went back inside his apartment. Moments later, Bomboko and another man burst into his apartment. Bomboko yelled, "People do this sort of stupid thing and then they call the Congolese ‘savages’." Weidman managed to convince Bomboko he had not thrown the can, and the Foreign Minister left "muttering dire threats.

\textsuperscript{118} NAC, RG25, vol. 5226, file 6386-O-40 part 1, Numbered Letter Leopoldville to USSEA: Lunch with Soviet Colleagues, 1 February 1962.

\textsuperscript{119} NAC, RG25, vol. 5226, file 6386-O-40 part 1, Numbered Letter Leopoldville to USSEA: Communist Block Embassies in Leopoldville, 23 February 1962; The two shortest telegrams in the Congo files demonstrated a rare example of Ottawa reciprocating humour. When asked if an official from External Affairs could visit Leopoldville, Gauvin replied "No objections. Mr. Cousineau very welcome. Even more welcome if he could manage to bring two fresh salmon packed in dry ice." When Ottawa asked the UN for permission and the Secretariat nixed the idea, External Affairs wired back, "No Cousineau No Salmon"; NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 19, Telegram Leopoldville to External: Visit of Departmental Officer, 15 March 1962; NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 19, Outgoing Message External to Leopoldville: Visit of Departmental Officer, 15 March 1962.
against the person who had thrown the tin.” The account concluded, “I am informed that Mr. Bomboko’s white secretary who is rumoured to double as his mistress, lives in the same building as I.” The Acting Consul General said, “The only explanation I can find for such behaviour was that Mr. Bomboko had had too much to drink.”  

February was a very odd month.

In February and March, the United Nations made three additional requests of Canada. The most remarkable of the three was a direct appeal from Ralph Bunche to General E.L.M. Burns, asking the General to take over from General McEoin as the next ONUC Force Commander. At the time, Burns was serving as the Chief Adviser to the Canadian Government on Disarmament. Burns referred the request to Howard Green, who decided that Burns’ services could not be offered. The Minister noted that it would be “impossible” to replace Burns as Canada’s Chief Delegate to the upcoming Disarmament Conference. The politics of colonialism and the Cold War also influenced the decision. Green said,

We are of the opinion that in the present circumstances the appointment of a general officer of a NATO country to command the UN Force in the Congo, with additional responsibilities as the Chief Political Representative of the Secretary-General, would involve grave possibilities of friction with African and Asian states participating, and of difficulties arising with some of our NATO partners and inevitably hostility on the part of the Soviet bloc which could be detrimental to the brightening prospects for success in the whole UN Congo operation.

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121 NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 18, Outgoing Message External to PERMISNY: Possible Appointment of General Burns as Commander in Chief of ONUC, 5 February 1962.
Ritchie broke the news to Bunche, emphasizing the significance of Burns’ role as Disarmament Adviser. Bunche was understanding, acknowledged the importance of Burns’ duties with respect to disarmament, praised the General’s outstanding qualifications, and agreed that he would not press the suggestion further.\textsuperscript{122}

The 57\textsuperscript{th} opened a new detachment at Kindu, in the province of Kivu province, in February. This fully committed the Signals Unit, so ONUC HQ became concerned by the possibility it might need to deploy forces into additional areas on short notice and would need additional signals personnel. To meet this shortfall, U Thant asked if the Signal Unit could be increased by two additional detachments of one officer and ten men each.\textsuperscript{123} The Defence Liaison Division recalled that this was “the first request for additional signalers to be received for a long time.” They hoped National Defence would agree to meet the request “since the need is evident and the personnel should not be too difficult to find.”\textsuperscript{124} National Defence, however, cited a “shortage of certain technical tradesmen” and said it could not provide the additional detachments without jeopardizing other commitments. Following consultation with the Canadian contingent in the Congo, Harkness offered a compromise: Canada would maintain a standby detachment of one officer and nine men that could be quickly sent to the Congo and that would be replaced by a second standby

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{122} NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 18, Telegram PERMISNY to External: Following for Minister from Ritchie, 13 February 1962.
\item \textsuperscript{123} NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 18, Telegram PERMISNY to External: Congo – UN Request for Assistance, 16 February 1962.
\item \textsuperscript{124} NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 18, Memo DL (1) to USSEA: Congo – UN Request for 2 additional Signal Detachments, 19 February 1962.
\end{itemize}
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detachment, if and when the first was dispatched.\textsuperscript{125} The Secretary-General was informed of the arrangement, following its approval by Cabinet on 3 April 1962.\textsuperscript{126}

The third UN request resulted in a peculiar reversal of roles: External Affairs expressed caution and reservations, but National Defence readily agreed to it. The UN sought an additional three peacekeepers for ONUC HQ. External Affairs was fine with the provision of a Major to serve as Deputy Chief of Military Personnel and a Corporal for clerical duties in the Provost Section; they had doubts “about the desirability of providing a Canadian NCO for military information activity, especially since it is specified in the U.N. request that experience in intelligence activity would be useful in this case.” Previously, Canada had advised the UN that it did not want its peacekeepers to be involved in intelligence activities in the Congo.\textsuperscript{127}

This request occurred just as ONUC was strengthening its intelligence resources. According to Dorn and Bell, the first two rounds of hostilities in Katanga demonstrated the need to improve ONUC’s intelligence gathering activities. Rikhye responded with the establishment of a radio monitoring organisation and other enhancements to the Military Information Branch.\textsuperscript{128} Another plan to send a Canadian peacekeeper to Brazzaville to


confirm information on the arrival of six Fouga jets destined for Katanga was evidence of this reinvigorated attempt to gather intelligence. In this instance, Stetham would not permit the officer to be sent outside the Congo without first obtaining government approval, and this, he told the Chief of Military Information, was unlikely to be given.\textsuperscript{129}

Discounting External Affairs' misgivings, National Defence said it was prepared to supply a Sergeant, whom they assumed would be employed "on minor staff duties, ... for example the marking and maintenance of operational maps." The officer concerned would not be permitted to do field intelligence work.\textsuperscript{130} External Affairs advised New York that the required officers would be provided but also asked National Defence to confirm with Col. Stetham "our understanding that no Canadian officers or men are involved in field intelligence activities in the Congo." External was keen to know more about the "nature of the work" done by officers assigned to military intelligence at ONUC HQ.\textsuperscript{131} It was not uncommon for National Defence to be guarded when asked to meet UN requirements from its stretched resources; yet, External Affairs could also be cautious in its attitude towards UN requests, especially when potential risks to Canada's reputation or policy interests were involved.

The thorny issue of contingents communicating directly to their governments from the Congo was raised once again by the United Nations in April. Gen. Rikhye, in a

\textsuperscript{129} NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 19, Outgoing Message External to PERMSINY: Congo, 8 March 1962.
meeting with the various military advisers from troop contributing states, asked that all
direct links be eliminated. Use of unauthorized radio frequencies was said to be causing
confusion and jamming the signal of the Leopoldville radio station. The need to
communicate with home governments on administrative matters was acknowledged and
Rikhye offered to provide communication facilities through UN channels. RCAF single
side band voice communication, direct between Trenton and Leopoldville, was
excepted.\textsuperscript{132}

This caused something of a stir in Ottawa, as External Affairs and National
Defence conferred on how best to respond to Rikhye’s statement. As when this issue was
previously addressed, the command instructions and conditions set by Cabinet when it
approved the despatch of Signals personnel were reviewed. These clearly stipulated that
the senior officer of the Canadian contingent had the right to direct communication with
Army HQ.\textsuperscript{133} Earlier, the UN was concerned mostly with contingents that sought
confirmation of the Force Commander’s orders before following them. This time, the UN
was worried about security leaks. Coming so soon after External Affairs had reviewed the
question of whether or not they should continue to receive situation reports from the 57\textsuperscript{th}
Unit’s Commanding Officer, Rikhye’s comments appear to have struck a nerve. National
Defence maintained that the Canadian communications station in Leopoldville was set up
on the “express instructions” of the Chief of the General Staff and was “operated by

\textsuperscript{132} NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 19, Telegram PERMISNY to External: Congo:
ONUC Forces Direct External Communications, 5 April 1962.

\textsuperscript{133} NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 19, Notes for Mr. A.R. Menzies: ONUC – Direct
External Communications, 10 April 1962.
expert signalers on a wave-length quite distinct from that of the Leopoldville [radio] station." For this reason, Rikhye's comments were assumed not to have been directed at Canada in particular. Because the Secretary-General's Military Adviser had raised the issue only verbally, National Defence considered a formal, written response unwarranted. As there is no record of a response, External Affairs seems to have agreed.

A similar 'let sleeping dogs lie' approach taken on another issue, the use of Marville airport in France after the French government decided to ban overflights destined for ONUC, came back to haunt Canada in late January 1962. External Affairs believed the French decision was made at the "highest level" and directed "primarily against the USA," so Canadian diplomats worked with the Quai d'Orsay to develop a practical, though tortuous, arrangement that would be compatible with the French directive and allow for continued use of Marville by Canadian aircraft carrying personnel and supplies for ONUC. No munitions of war destined for ONUC were allowed over or into France, but the agreement permitted the transport of personnel and innocuous supplies so long as passenger and cargo lists were provided to French authorities 24 hours prior to their departure from Marville. The RCAF agreed to station a Squadron Leader in Paris to take the required documentation to the French authorities in order to obtain

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clearances for each individual flight. In addition, passengers and cargo were swapped into a different plane at Pisa before proceeding on to the Congo.\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 18, Memo for Minister: Use of Marville Airport for UN Flights, 6 February 1962.}

Less than a month after this agreement was arranged, the French revoked it because of differences in the interpretation of ‘non-combat’. While Canada considered 57th personnel to be non-combat, the French saw the communications unit as serving a function that was "plainly military." The Embassy in Paris advised Ottawa, "We are inclined to believe that the RCAF would be wise seriously to consider an alternative means of handling passengers and even cargo via Pisa for Congo ... In our view prolongation of the present uneasy arrangement is likely to give rise to frictions and difficulties which it would be better from the political point of view to avoid."\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 18, Telegram EMBPARIS to External: RCAF Overflights of France for UN Operations, 19 February 1962.} This episode highlights the growing rift in Congo policies between Canada and one of its NATO allies. The politics of colonialism and the Cold War were not necessarily congruent.

Although Cabinet decided on 26 January not to provide instructors for a Congolese Army officers’ training school, a new round of discussions resumed throughout February and March after U Thant made a direct, anxious appeal to Diefenbaker for Canada's participation. The Acting Secretary-General pleaded, "We are so desperately in need of French-speaking officers for this purpose that I feel that I must renew my appeal to you in a modified form as sole means of avoiding necessity of..."
abandoning training project altogether and informing Congolese [Government] of our inability to assist them in this training." While the UN had earlier requested fifteen officers to form a homogeneous group to take charge of the school, they were now willing to take any officers Canada could spare, even those who were retired, on the inactive list, or in the reserves.\textsuperscript{137} Ralph Bunche further lobbied William Barton, a diplomat at Canada’s Permanent Mission. Barton learned that Greece, Argentina, and Finland were willing to provide French-speaking officers, but Bunche stressed that he and the Secretary-General were still hopeful that Canada would come through with the required officers to form the “nucleus” of the school. Bunche was certain the UN would agree to any “reasonable conditions of service” Canada stipulated and even to the recall of the Canadian officers on short notice if an emergency required their recall to Canada. Of all the UN requests related to the Congo, this effort to convince and pressure Ottawa to reverse its decision was unprecedented.

Pressure to meet this request was increasing not only from the UN but also from the Congolese themselves. At the UN General Assembly, Prime Minister Adoula appealed publicly for assistance in training the ANC one week after Harkness admitted, in answer to a question raised in the House of Commons, that Canada did not have the required number of French-speaking officers needed to operate the school.\textsuperscript{138} Because the UN, in its revised request, was willing to use retired or reserve officers and was no longer

\textsuperscript{137} NAC, RG24, vol. 7169, file 2-5081-6 part 15, Telegram PERMISNY to External: Provision of Instructors for Congolese Army, 2 February 1962.
expecting Canada to assume sole responsibility for the school, officials speculated the previous negative response was “more difficult to justify publicly.” When Ross Campbell spoke with Diefenbaker about the UN’s latest inquiry, he found the Prime Minister “not himself unsympathetic” but unwilling to press the issue with Harkness if the Minister felt unable to make any officers available. During further discussion in Cabinet, the original decision not to provide any officers from the active list was confirmed, but the Secretary-General was informed that the government was looking into the possibility of making available six or seven officers from the retired list. Robertson subsequently advised Green, “the problem of recruiting suitably qualified French-speaking officers may be in the process of finding a solution.” National Defence was mostly concerned with the administrative details of incorporating retired officers into the army establishment for service in the Congo.

Both Mobutu and Adoula were growing impatient with the UN, and Mobutu, in particular, was opposed to the idea of a school operated by a mixed group of officers from various nations. Adoula wrote to ONUC HQ, “It appears to me that [Canada] which has never been a colonial power which has no political or economic interests in Africa

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139 NAC, RG25, vol. 5226, file 6386-M-40 part 1, Memo: UN Request for 15 French-speaking Officers to Train Congolese Army, 5 February 1962
and which possesses good military schools could furnish these few instructors who are needed.¹⁴³ Mobutu spoke directly to Gauvin, asking that the Consul General make one last appeal to the government.¹⁴⁴ At this point, the African and Middle Eastern and Defence Liaison Divisions at External Affairs began to question the wisdom of providing only a few officers for a school operated by a number of nations, especially if Mobutu opposed such a plan. They argued that Canada should either provide the entire complement of officers, or none at all.¹⁴⁵ This view was rejected, and the Permanent Mission in New York was asked to find out the specific appointments, ranks, and qualifications for the six or seven officers Canada could provide.¹⁴⁶ It remained to be seen whether the Congolese government and Mobutu would agree to UN plans for a school operated by officers of various nationalities.

In addition to the help sought in establishing an officers’ training school, the UN continued to make additional requests in direct support of ONUC throughout the summer of 1962. Generally, National Defence acceded to fewer of these requests, usually citing a shortage of qualified personnel or a need to reduce departmental expenses. Still, in a review of the requests that arrived during the summer months, Norman Robertson concluded, “There has been no indication that the Army or the Air Force are less willing

to be forthcoming in their responses to U.N. requests for assistance to ONUC since the commencement of the Government’s austerity programme. Each request is carefully examined on its merits and with regard to the availability of the services to meet them.”

External Affairs recognised that they sometimes were at a disadvantage in assessing the utility and significance of UN requests, relative to National Defence. To correct this, the Consul General in Leopoldville was directed to gather information so that the Department could more independently evaluate National Defence’s decisions, which were often based on consultations with the Commanding Officer of the 57th. Gauvin was told, “We have no reason to doubt the accuracy of the information received through that channel [CO 57th] but we are uncertain whether in the end the political factors are weighed as carefully as the military ones.” In a response to External, the Consul General confessed that he also relied on the views of senior Canadian officers to assess the necessity of UN requests; he found them to be “always cooperative,” and “anxious to stop any unjustified request from UN for further personnel.” Ottawa was assured that Canadian military and diplomatic personnel were “keeping an eye” especially on senior Indian officers who were said to have a “propensity to create staff jobs.”

Even as ONUC began its third year, requests for assistance that were seen to have merit, and

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especially those that could be met from within existing establishments, could still expect to receive a fair hearing by the government.

National Defence continued to provide replacements for all personnel in the Congo during this period, including a new Commanding Officer for the 57th; Col. Hamilton replaced Col. Stetham on 13 May. Requests for additional commitments to ONUC were approved and rejected in almost equal measure. When the UN asked for further flying control personnel to serve at UN posts in Katanga, External Affairs identified a number of political disadvantages and recalled the difficulties National Defence faced in their earlier effort to provide such personnel.\(^\text{150}\) Although they passed along the request with the mild observation that it appeared “reasonable in the circumstances,” they did not press the matter with National Defence, and the request was turned down.\(^\text{151}\) Likewise, requests for eight additional military police at the rank of private and a mobile photo-developing unit, with personnel, were declined.

Four other routine requests were granted: four French-speaking switchboard operators, two officers and one NCO for service at ONUC HQ, a military auditor, and a projector technician.\(^\text{152}\) National Defence and External Affairs also concurred in the appointment of Maj Normandin, a Canadian serving as Liaison Officer to the ANC, to the


Military Committee of the Joint Reconciliation Commission, which was working toward
the peaceful reestablishment of Congolese unity.\textsuperscript{153} Finally, the government agreed to
provide a Military Assistant to the ONUC Chief of Staff and the Chief Logistics Officer
for Katanga and appeared willing to meet an anticipated, future request to provide two
officers for ONUC HQ: the Deputy Chief of Staff and Chief of Logistics for all of
ONUC.\textsuperscript{154} Gauvin expected the latter request because the Force Commander was “intent”
on reducing the number of Indians in senior staff positions, “to avoid criticism of
predominant Indians in key jobs.”\textsuperscript{155} According the Consul General, the Indians were not
keen to see their presence at ONUC HQ diluted. Following a meeting with Indar Jit
Rikhye, he reported, “I gained the impression that Indians seemed to be reluctant to
abandon key positions and, to be frank, suspect they badly need [Canadians] but do not
want them to fill positions where they could interfere with their own plans.”\textsuperscript{156} Overall,
the evidence suggests that the government’s support of ONUC was relatively stable
throughout this period, in spite of personnel shortages and increasing financial pressures
at National Defence, with one notable exception: the Pisa-Leopoldville airlift.

\textsuperscript{153} NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 19, Memo DL (1) to USSEA: Congo – Canadian
Participation in Joint Reconciliation Commission, 6 June 1962.
\textsuperscript{154} NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 20, Memo for Minister: Congo – UN Requests for
Div: Canadian Role in UN Operations in the Congo, 18 July 1962.
\textsuperscript{155} NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 20, Telegram Leopoldville to External: UN
Request for Assistance, 5 July 1962.
\textsuperscript{156} NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 20, Telegram Leopoldville to External: UN
Request for Assistance, 7 July 1962.
In June 1962, the government agreed to a further ninety day extension of the RCAF Pisa – Leopoldville airlift, in operation almost from the outset of ONUC. As had become customary, the UN was warned that the commitment would be kept “under active review,” to ensure more economical modes of transportation were also used to supply the peacekeeping forces.\textsuperscript{157} The following month, National Defence informed External Affairs that it would not be possible to renew this agreement after 9 September because the government’s austerity measures required the review of “all extraneous commitments in order to effect every economy possible.” The airlift would be replaced with bimonthly, non-stop Yukon flights in direct support of Canadian peacekeepers in the Congo. The controversy over French airspace would also be resolved, as the planes would be rerouted to avoid over-flying France.\textsuperscript{158} A significant Canadian contribution to the UN operation was about to come to an end.

The implications of this decision were not lost on External Affairs, where officials immediately took action to get the decision reversed. They questioned National Defence’s argument that canceling the airlift would result in financial savings. The vast majority of the expenses involved were recoverable from the UN, although National Defence’s budget was negatively impacted if expenses were recovered in a year subsequent to when they were incurred and, thus, credited only to the Receiver General. External Affairs countered, “there will be little saving for the Canadian Government as a whole,” and that “the announcement that Canada is curtailing its assistance to ONUC at

such a critical juncture in the Congo would throw unfavourable light on the Canadian attitude toward the U.N. without bringing us any substantial advantage in terms of the austerity programme.” Rather than raising the issue either in Cabinet or at the ministerial level, Howard Green instructed Robertson first to discuss the matter with the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 20, Letter CCOS to USSEA, 13 July 1962.}

The Under-Secretary wrote to the Chairman presenting External’s financial and political arguments. Robertson wondered if some change could be made in accounting practices in order to resolve National Defence’s budgetary dilemma and not deprive the UN “of a support which they consider necessary and which the Organization is prepared to pay for in its entirety.” To the dismay of National Defence, who expected to end the airlift as an administrative decision, External Affairs expressed their intention to raise “any important new decision affecting this airlift,” in Cabinet.\footnote{NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 20, Memo for Minister: Canadian Airlift to the Congo, 17 July 1962.} The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff wrote to the Chief of the Air Staff noting, “It is apparent that if we are to get approval on this we will be up against Ex. Affairs in Cabinet.” He asked, “Have we get enough ammunition to win? Can we get credit in our estimates for the UN payments – if we do not now do so.”\footnote{DHH, file 73/1223, part 463, Letter USSEA to CCOS, 20 July 1962.}

National Defence attempted to resolve the matter at the administrative level. In mid August, Air Commodore Birchall told the Defence Liaison Division that, because 426 Transport Squadron had been disbanded as part of the government’s austerity...
program, the RCAF simply did not have the aircraft to continue the Congo airlift. In the interests of time, the deadline of 9 September was quickly approaching, he suggested the UN be notified of the decision so that they would have time to make alternate arrangements. Even if considered by Cabinet, he said, “there would not now be time to arrange to resume the flights.” In a subsequent discussion with Ross Campbell, the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff suggested there could still be some flexibility with the 9 September date but that it would be best to “notify the UN as requested and reconsider the matter when the inevitable ‘protest’ follows.”

Howard Green made one last appeal to the Prime Minister to see if Diefenbaker would ask Harkness to reconsider the matter. Diefenbaker said he would not object if Green asked Harkness to review the decision, but he would not “direct” the Minister of National Defence to alter it. Green chose not to make any further representations to Harkness but was told if the UN “pressed strongly” for reconsideration of the decision, National Defence would review its decision.

External Affairs did decide to establish formal, diplomatic relations with Leopoldville in June 1962. The Canadian Consulate became an Embassy, and Michel Gauvin, the Acting Consul General, became Canada’s first Chargé d’Affaires in the Congo. Letters of introduction were prepared for Gauvin and presented to Foreign Minister Bomboko on 13 July. Bomboko said he “was touched by the sign of confidence

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81 DHH, file 73/1223, part 463. Note CCOS to CAS, July 1962.
83 NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 20, Memo for Prime Minister: Canadian Airlift to Congo, 16 August 1962.
Canada showed towards the Republic of the Congo,” and spoke warmly about Canada’s contribution to ONUC and the other forms of assistance that had been provided. Canada he said, was in a “special position to help the Congo because they shared a common language, ... there were other countries which were willing to help the Congo, but because of cultural difficulties, were not in the same position as Canada to do so.”

Congolese political developments in the remaining months of 1962 would test Canada’s commitment to ONUC, the UN, and Adoula’s government.

This change in diplomatic status coincided with a reinvigorated attempt by U Thant to address the political impasse between Tshombé and the central government. The Acting Secretary-General faced both financial and political pressures to resolve the Congo crisis: the UN had enough funds to finance ONUC, at its current level, only until January 1963; and he was anxious to achieve progress before his interim term in office ended and he had to stand for election to the post. Supported by the United States, the Secretary-General engaged in a round of diplomacy to convince the British and Belgians to apply financial pressure on Tshombé’s regime. He was less successful with the British, than the Belgians. Robertson wrote,

The British want the U.N. to tackle the constitutional side of the problem by helping the Congolese to draft a new constitution which would guarantee Katanga the autonomy it wants and preserve Tshombe’s prestige. They are anxious at all costs to avoid ‘a third round’ in Katanga.

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It seems unlikely, therefore, that the British will agree to the use of major economic sanctions against Katanga or any move to use U.N. troops to protect the mines.

In New York, Congolese officials attempted to rally Afro-Asian support for renewed UN action against the Katangese mercenaries, the very option Britain opposed. Howard Green was clearly against "any use of force in Katanga," but Norman Robertson concluded, "Unless the British, Belgian and French are prepared to threaten Tshombe with real sanctions it seems unlikely that he will make the necessary concessions." Once again, ONUC approached a crossroads on the question of using force.

The Congo Advisory Committee met on 31 July to discuss options after U Thant failed to reach a consensus with the European states on how best to apply economic pressure on Katanga. The Secretary-General was weighing the possibility of summoning the Security Council in order to revise or clarify ONUC's mandate, conceivably to authorise greater use of force. The Canadian government opposed this for a number of reasons: uncertainty as to the likely outcome of a third round of fighting; concern that fighting by ONUC peacekeepers would weaken public support and the UN's image, limiting effectiveness in future emergencies; and, it was believed not to be in the long term interests of the Congo for Katanga to be subjugated using outside forces – a lasting solution, it was thought, required the Congolese to settle their own constitutional issues.

On the surface, this policy appears to support Britain's position, but there was a difference. External Affairs accepted that Tshombé's "delaying tactics" had to be ended soon and supported the Secretary-General's efforts to convince Britain, France, and
Belgium to apply financial pressure. The Under-Secretary observed, "Adoula's prestige has suffered to the point where unless progress is made soon his government may fall ... The U.N.'s prestige is also involved and so is the personal position of U Thant especially in relation to his chances of being elected Secretary-General." In the Advisory Committee, Canada's new Ambassador to the United Nations, Paul Tremblay, cautioned against both the use of force to settle Katangan secession and public debate of the issue in the Security Council. Rather, he suggested a moderate, constructive approach: support for U Thant's efforts to reach a negotiated settlement.

Together with representatives of the United States, Belgium, Britain, and France, the Acting Secretary-General drafted a framework for national reconciliation in the Congo intended to compel a negotiated settlement between Katanga and the Central Government. This plan consisted of a set of concrete steps to be implemented by both Tshombé and Adoula and four phases of action to be followed if Katanga proved uncooperative, culminating in a voluntary ban on mineral imports from the secessionist province. Britain objected to this latter provision for an embargo, out of fear it would lead to fighting or would set a precedent for future UN sanctions against the Rhodesias and South West Africa. The UK was said to have expressed reservations about UN demands for ONUC's freedom of movement, fearing Tshombé would interpret this as a threat of

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UN military action. While not in support of sanctions, Britain did intend to warn Tshombe that it would be unable to oppose or prevent their application.\(^\text{170}\) External Affairs appears to have had little faith in the efficacy of such warnings. One assessment of British policy in the Congo noted, "They have on several occasions used their influence to persuade Tshombe to negotiate with the Central Government but they do not seem to have exerted much pressure on him to make the concessions necessary for a solution. By advocating negotiations in which Tshombe would hold most of the cards they are in effect encouraging a Tshombe-dictated solution."\(^\text{171}\) By comparison, the United States favoured the plan. American diplomats lobbied Canada to endorse it and to consult with the Secretary-General to encourage him to present it without delay.\(^\text{172}\)

The Canadian attitude towards the Plan for National Reconciliation fell somewhere between America's ardent support and Britain's reluctant cooperation. While most features of the plan were acceptable, there were concerns about sanctions. Ross Campbell said, "our object should be to devise for use in New York a form of words which would support the purposes of the proposals and the positive features of the four-

\(^{170}\) NAC, RG25, vol. 5215, file 6386-40 part 32, Memo for Minister: Plan for National Reconciliation in the Congo, 15 August 1962; Joshua notes that Belgium shared Britain's skepticism on the question of sanctions, in contrast with American policy. Britain, however, was more strident in its opposition to such punitive, economic measures. Joshua also suggests that the U Thant plan represented the first instance of cooperation between ONUC and Brussels since Dayal and Hammarskjöld worked to strictly limit the Belgian presence in the Congo. Joshua, "Belgium's Role in the UN Peace-keeping Operation in the Congo," 433-4.


stage programme ... while avoiding any language which would appear to endorse as well the embargo clauses about which we have reservations." Ambassador Tremblay rose to the occasion and met this call for ambiguity in subsequent discussions with Ralph Bunche, who was simply told that Howard Green "was aware of necessity of maintaining united front with regard to both ‘reconciliation proposals’ and various ‘courses of action’ that were being contemplated." This statement was hardly a ringing endorsement, but it achieved an important goal: Canada remained uncommitted on the question of sanctions.

Though not nearly to the same degree as the British, the Canadian government was somewhat concerned for the precedent that might be set should sanctions be applied to Katanga. It was, however, more appreciative of the need to have "some effective pressure in reserve to avoid another endless round of negotiations." This accounts for Howard Green’s expression of support for economic sanctions, in discussions with Lord Home during the 1962 Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting. Green was reported to have "scolded the British for their unco-operative attitude towards ONUC," a stand that was probably "warmly appreciated ... by most of the delegations other than the

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175 NAC, RG25, vol. 5215, file 6386-40 part 32, Memo: The Congo, 24 August 1962; NAC, RG25, vol. 5216, file 6386-40 part 34, Memo for Minister: Possible Question in the House on the Congo, 8 November 1962; Alan James, discussing British policy on sanctions, suggests, “Coming out against the United States’ anti-Katangan line would also have deeply offended the Commonwealth’s Afro-Asian members, and of the older, white, members, Canada would certainly have been upset.” As seen here, evidence suggests Canada initially shared some of the British concerns about sanctions but support for the United Nations was a paramount consideration. See: Alan James, Britain and the Congo Crisis, 1960-1963 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996) 171.
Canadian concerns regarding sanctions were largely motivated by fear the Central Government would not be able to enforce sanctions and the UN might be asked for assistance, increasing the risk of renewed hostilities between Katanga and ONUC. Canada opposed a military offensive against Katanga. Green said, “We’re on a peace-keeping operation, not a war-making operation.” Overall, the Canadian position on the Plan for National Reconciliation managed to be similar to certain aspects of each of the somewhat contradictory policies of both the United States and Britain.

When efforts to implement U Thant’s plan once again stalled because of disagreements between Adoula and Tshombé, many had a sense that the crisis was coming to a head. Gauvin thought both leaders were “equally obstructive,” but the Chargé d’Affaires was cognizant of Adoula’s tenuous position in parliament. Extremists accused the Prime Minister of “being used by the colonialist interests to balkanize the Congo.” Gauvin ominously reported, “Though I have been one to preach patience in the past, I now feel that the brink may have been reached here; that Western interest and influence in this part of Africa does rest on the success of the present UN proposals.” Gauvin was not alone in recognizing that a turning point had been reached. In an August report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General warned, if a solution was not found to the Congo stalemate soon, the UN’s financial position and further deterioration in the

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Congolese political situation would require, once and for all, a decision on whether ONUC should be withdrawn or authorised to “seek by all necessary measures” an end to Katangese secession.\(^{180}\)

Canada was forced to reexamine its Congo policy in mid-October, when U Thant asked members of the Advisory Committee for guidance. Both the UN and the Congolese government were concerned that Tshombé was delaying implementation of the Reconciliation Plan in order to build up his military forces and in hopes that Adoula’s government would eventually fall. Adoula, therefore, decided to cut off Tshombé’s revenue: Union Minière was ordered to stop paying any taxes or fees to the Katangese authorities. The Secretary-General believed this might lead to a request from the company that ONUC protect its mining installations and transport routes against Katangese retaliation. Because deployment of ONUC on such a task could lead to another round of fighting, U Thant sought assurances from troop contributing states that they were “prepared to accept the possible consequences.” Citing the UN’s financial predicament and the serious implications for future peacekeeping if ONUC failed, External Affairs argued the government should indicate, in the Advisory Committee, its approval of the Adoula government’s actions, with respect to Union Minière, and its acceptance of increased risk to Canadian peacekeepers should ONUC be asked to protect the company’s installations.\(^{181}\)


Given the political significance of these issues, a memorandum was prepared for Diefenbaker requesting his views. The Prime Minister considered the matter to be of sufficient importance to require discussion in Cabinet, before instructions could be issued to the Mission in New York. In a submission to Cabinet, Green contended,

Because of their [Canadian peacekeepers'] key role in the field of communications, administration, air control and logistics and the fact that it would be very difficult for the UN to replace them from politically acceptable countries, a decision to restrict their use in Katanga could jeopardize the whole UN operation at a crucial moment. Also any weakening of support from Canada and the other Western countries at this time would make it more difficult for the Acting Secretary-General to resist the offer of troops from certain countries who are prepared to use force against Katanga.

Green added that Canada “could hardly refuse to support the U.N. attempt to control Tshombe,” but Cabinet was not persuaded. Some ministers regretted ever having sent peacekeepers to the Congo and suggested that if they were used this way in Katanga it would be viewed “with horror in the United Kingdom.” Others felt that ONUC was simply not up to the task. In the end, Cabinet agreed that the delegation “should not indicate in the Congo Advisory Committee that Canada in any way approves of the proposed new approach to the Union Miniere, or accepts any increased risks to Canadian personnel in the protection of Union Miniere’s interests.” Cabinet was also against any attempt by U Thant to obtain a new mandate for ONUC from the Security Council. In spite of External Affairs’ arguments, there were limits to Canada’s support of the UN.

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External Affairs remained hopeful events in the Congo would outpace discussion in the Advisory Committee and advised the delegation to remain silent, unless doing so would be construed as tacit approval for a course of action not in line with the Cabinet decision. ¹⁸⁵

The Secretariat did not immediately press the issue. The possibilities of sanctions, boycotts, and pressure on Katangan companies dragged on for another month. Some progress was made when the Americans, British, and Belgians agreed to press Union Miniere to pay its taxes to the Monetary Council in Leopoldville. ¹⁸⁶ But, the threat of sanctions and embargoes lingered. In mid December, the Liberal Leader of the Opposition, Lester Pearson, asked Diefenbaker, in the House of Commons, what Canada’s policy was with respect to the imposition of sanctions on Katanga. The Prime Minister evaded the question. He simply outlined the more innocuous provisions of the U Thant plan and then concluded, “So far as the particular question [of sanctions] is concerned, I think until further discussions have taken place with the secretary general and member nations it would be better that I do not go further than I have gone at this point.”¹⁸⁷ Canadian policy, it seemed, was to avoid the issue unless it became impossible not to take a stand. Semantics facilitated such a policy. When Adoula and U Thant wrote to seventeen governments asking them not to import Katangan ores, the Secretary-General said this did not amount to sanctions because the Congolese government was

only asking other governments to respect its laws and not import ores on which “legal
taxes and duties” were not paid. Canada was not expected to receive such a letter because
it did not import mineral ores from Katanga.\textsuperscript{188}

As 1962 drew to a close, a number of high-level talks, including a meeting of the
NATO Ministers and discussions held in the Bahamas between Diefenbaker and both
Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy, offered an opportunity to share views
on the Congo situation just as events there were about to render discussion of sanctions
moot. In contrast with Diefenbaker’s evasive remarks in the House of Commons, notes
prepared by External Affairs for the NATO meeting revealed that Canada was “prepared
to support ‘severe economic measures’ against Katanga.” The strength of this position
was weakened by the rather implausible condition that such measures not lead to
“widespread fighting.” In his talks with Diefenbaker, Macmillan justified the United
Kingdom’s opposition to sanctions on the grounds that “this would involve an
intervention in the domestic affairs of a country.”\textsuperscript{189} The Foreign Office, though, had
already said the UK would not prevent any UN effort to end the Katangan secession
through the application of economic sanctions. During the Bahamas talks, the British
Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, did tell Canadian diplomat Marcel Cadieux that Britain
would veto any Security Council measure to end secession by force. U Thant had
previously intimated he might return to the Security Council to obtain a revised mandate;

\textsuperscript{187} House of Commons, \textit{Debates}, 12 December 1962, 2580–2581.
\textsuperscript{188} NAC, RG25, vol. 5216, file 6386-40 part 35, Memo for Minister: The Congo, 17 December
1962.
as it stood, ONUC was permitted to use force only to retaliate in self-defence, to prevent
civil war, and to expel mercenaries. But, in a rather prescient conversation with Ross
Campbell, Howard Green acknowledged that the time for forestalling the use of force
was nearing an end. The point had nearly arrived, he thought, when the UN would have
no alternative but to end Katangan secession by force.\textsuperscript{190}

The United Nations continued to request various forms of assistance from
Canada, but in November the tenor of these requests implied the UN was taking measures
to strengthen ONUC's strategic position in the Congo. ONUC HQ was intercepting a
"considerable volume" of encoded, tactical operational messages in Katanga, dealing
primarily with troop movements, but was having difficulty decoding the messages.
Although the Secretariat was "reluctant" to make a formal request, they wondered if
Canada could provide an officer able to advise ONUC HQ on how to break the code.\textsuperscript{191}

Ottawa was also asked to place the two standby signals detachments, earlier agreed to by
Cabinet, at a state of readiness for despatch to the Congo on short notice.\textsuperscript{192} A most
unexpected enquiry arrived from New York: the UN asked if Canada could supply
NAPALM bombs. External Affairs was "surprised" the UN was contemplating the use of
NAPALM in the Congo, speculated as to the possible rationale for equipping ONUC with
such weapons, and ultimately expressed reservations about responding in positive terms.

\textsuperscript{189} DCC, file MG1/XII/C/291, Notes: Bahamas Meetings – December 21-22, 1962: Specific
Points Discussed with President Kennedy at Luncheon Meeting, 21 December 1962.
\textsuperscript{190} NAC, RG25, vol. 5216, file 6386-40 part 35, Memo for Minister: British Policy on the Congo,
28 December 1962.
\textsuperscript{191} NAC, RG24, vol. 7169, file 2-5081-6 part 17, Telegram PERMISNY to External: CONGO
Though willing to reconsider the matter if it came to light that Katangese forces had NAPALM and intended to use it against Canadian personnel, External Affairs thought it best to forestall an official request with a reply from National Defence that the bombs were not available "at the moment." Together, these requests indicate the UN was taking definite measures to consolidate and support its position in Katanga.

A less controversial request, for a Canadian to serve as Liaison and Training Officer with a battalion of ANC soldiers recently incorporated into ONUC and serving in Katanga, also arrived in late 1962 just as National Defence undertook a review of the Canadian officer establishment serving with ONUC HQ. External Affairs had some reservations about the wisdom of attaching a Canadian officer to this battalion but agreed to it on the condition the ONUC HQ was advised that the officer should not "assume any command functions with the ANC battalion and that, in the event of hostilities, he would perform only liaison duties." It was conceded that it was within the ONUC Commander's authority to assign the officer to such duties and that "specific reasons" would have to be provided if Canada was to press any objections.

The addition of this officer increased the number of Canadians serving (or proposed to serve) at ONUC HQ from 14 to 15. In its overall review of ONUC HQ, National Defence found the UN valued the Canadians because those who were bilingual

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were “almost the only staff capable of communicating with the Congolese effectively.”

ONUC’s Chief of Staff, Brigadier Guha of the Indian Army, acknowledged that the
Canadians “shouldered far more than their fair share of the work.” The Canadians were
considered to be at a standard “at least equivalent to one rank higher in the best of the
other contingents;” and for this reason it was decided to gradually raise the rank structure
during rotations so that it would be “commensurate” with overall Canadian representation
at ONUC HQ. In spite of the large number of Canadians serving at HQ, practically all
served beneath the rank of Lt. Col. By comparison, almost half of the Indian officers at
HQ served at the rank of Lt. Col. or higher. Thus, Canadians performed an amount of
work out of proportion to their numbers but enjoyed few senior, prestige appointments.196

Partly for this reason, National Defence decided in December not to follow
through with its earlier commitment to the UN to provide a Military Assistant to the
Chief of Staff of ONUC. At first, National Defence suggested the offer be rescinded “in
view of the shortage of bilingual officers.” When External Affairs pointed out that the
position did not require someone who was bilingual, National Defence admitted that this
was “not a valid reason” to revoke the earlier commitment. The real reason could hardly
be used in a reply to the UN: the Indian Chief of Staff was believed to have “little work
to do himself,” so National Defence expected the Canadian would be used only as an

195 NAC, RG25, vol. 5216, file 6386-40 part 34, Memo DL (1) Div to A&ME Div: Congo:
Employment of Canadian Contingent, 16 October 1962.
196 DHH, file 112.3M2.003 (D15), Report P.S. Cooper to VCGS: Congo – Canadian Officers at
HQ ONUC, 23 October 1962; NAC, RG24, vol. 21487, file 2137.3 part 9, Letter Raymont to SO/Admin:
UN Requests and Review of Congo Establishment Canadian Officers, HQ ONUC, 7 December 1962;
NAC, RG24, vol. 21487, file 2137.3 part 9, Numbered Letter USSEA to PERMISNY: Canadian
“office boy.” The Chief of the General Staff felt “Canadian officers, because of their training and experience, can and should be used to greater advantage in more responsible positions.” External Affairs suggested more “cogent” reasons to decline the request be found and, if possible, another peacekeeper be provided for an alternative, more acceptable assignment. To placate New York, the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff did subsequently agree to provide an officer at the rank of Lt. Col. or Major as Chief Instructor for movement control courses in the Congo.

As Howard Green anticipated, events in the Congo finally came to a head during the last week of December 1962. The Katangese gendarmerie opened fire on ONUC positions, established roadblocks in and around Elisabethville, and shot down a United Nations helicopter. When Tshombé proved unwilling or unable to restrain his forces, and after waiting a number of days for the gendarmerie to cease fire on their own, on 28 December U Thant ordered ONUC to remove the soldiers and mercenaries from Elisabethville and to restore its freedom of movement throughout Katanga. The American Ambassador in Leopoldville told Gauvin that the Katangese defences fell like “card castles.” Gauvin dismissed suggestions that the attacks on ONUC were part of a

“well prepared attack”; he attributed the outbreak of a third round of hostilities to the increased tension in Elisabethville, brought about by ONUC’s increased presence there. With a certain sense of inevitability, he observed, “It is also evident that with Indian contingent (which represents largest unit of 5,000 men) due to leave at the end of Feb, some action had to be taken soon if UN was ever going to make use of its strength to settle Katanga secession. What it found in firing of gendarmerie was desired occasion to get at Tshombe once and for all.” By 30 December, this was practically achieved; ONUC secured Elisabethville and Kipushi, neutralised a number of Katangese aircraft on the ground, and a column of peacekeepers had almost reached Jadotville.

Tshombé, who fled first to Rhodesia and then to Kolwezi, made one last diplomatic effort to prevent ONUC’s consolidation of its position throughout Katanga. He threatened a scorched-earth policy and, specifically, to destroy mining facilities in Jadotville and Kolwezi if the UN entered these towns. According to Urquhart, Bunche and U Thant were “sufficiently impressed” with arguments made by the Belgian and British ambassadors, keen to protect their respective mining interests, that orders were issued to ONUC’s Officer-in-Charge, Robert Gardiner, to stop ONUC from crossing the Lufira River into Jadotville.²⁰³

²⁰² NAC, RG24, vol. 7169, file 2-5081-6 part 17, Telegram Leopoldville to External: The Third Round Has Started, 29 December 1962; The repatriation of Indian troops became necessary when hostilities broke out on the Chinese-Indian border. Gauvin’s impression that this was a significant factor in the UN’s decision to engage the gendarmerie is shared by a number of scholars. See: Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, 344; Alan James, The Politics of Peacekeeping (London: Chatto & Windus, 1969) 420; Francis Parakatili, India and United Nations Peacekeeping (New Delhi: S. Chand, 1975) 124.
²⁰³ Urquhart, Ralph Bunche: An American Odyssey, 357.
In an attempt to rally support for Britain’s position, the British Foreign Secretary sent Howard Green a message asking the Canadian government to use its status and influence at the UN to encourage the Secretariat to be “magnanimous and imaginative.” Green instructed Ambassador Tremblay to speak with U Thant to express the government’s “hope that the U.N. would find a moderate solution to the current difficulties in the Congo.” Tremblay met with the Secretary-General on 2 January and found U Thant “relaxed and satisfied with the way things were going in Katanga.” The Secretary-General was reported to have agreed with Tremblay’s suggestions that a moderate solution be found and restraint exercised. U Thant, it was said, “confirmed that he was determined that the eventual solution should be found in political negotiations rather than in military action.”

Notwithstanding U Thant’s assurances, ONUC arrived in Jadotville on 3 January, causing considerable controversy as to whether or not the peacekeeping operation’s military leadership had overstepped, or even disobeysed, the Secretary-General’s orders. Major General Dewan Prem Chand and his deputy, Brigadier Reggie Noronha, talked their way into Jadotville without firing a shot. The mayor, it seems, favoured ONUC over threats by the gendarmerie and mercenaries to destroy local industries. The local populace cheered the arrival of the peacekeepers, and the manager and staff at Union

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204 DCC, file MG1/VI/8858.A (845 Congo), Memo for Mr. Dier & Attached Letters Amory to Robertson and Home to Green, 2 January 1963.


Miniere were also said to have warmly welcomed the UN's arrival. From Leopoldville, Gauvin reported that U Thant's decision to halt ONUC's advance on Jadotville had caused a "real commotion." Robert Gardiner was said to have threatened to resign if the Secretary-General did not rescind this order and permit ONUC to exercise complete freedom of movement throughout the Congo. It is debatable whether local officials deliberately ignored U Thant's orders or simply did not receive them in time to prevent the unexpectedly swift advance, but there is no doubt that this final thrust brought Katanga's secession to an end: a result that very much worked to the UN's advantage. Sent to the Congo to investigate the breakdown in communications, Ralph Bunche acknowledged the seriousness of the incident but also reported, "there is unabashed elation, which I share, at the entry, at long last, of the UN into Jadotville and relief that this was accomplished with a minimum of fighting and of damage to the installations." There were sixty Canadian peacekeepers in Katanga at the time of the third round of hostilities, at detachments in Elisabethville, Kamina, Albertville, and Kongolo. They played an important role that brought praise from Lt. Gen. Kebede Guebre, ONUC's Commander. Addressing members of the 57th, he later said.

208 Urquhart, Ralph Bunche: An American Odyssey, 357.
211 as quoted in Urquhart, Ralph Bunche: An American Odyssey, 359.
I recall with special pride and pleasure the truly magnificent performance of the 57 Canadian Signal Unit during the fighting in Katanga. During those eventful days you handled a volume of traffic which was so far above the peak load that up to then it was considered an impossibility. But you withstood the strain, achieved the impossible and completed a task which might have daunted lesser men than Canadians. 213

At External Affairs, officials debated the implications and legitimacy of ONUC’s actions in Katanga. The Defence Liaison Division was concerned with the “precedent which may have been established,” when military conditions appeared to have been prioritised ahead of political considerations. “Such a move,” one official wrote, “in our estimation, endangers the whole concept of peace-keeping operations as they have been supported consistently by Canada since 1956.” 214 But neither the United Nations Division nor the African and Middle Eastern Division were keen to investigate or press the issue. Murray wrote, “We shall not remedy the ills of this situation by holding inquests and assigning blame. We can only hope to improve peace-keeping operations in the future by learning the lessons of the past and by strengthening the machinery (our own included) available to the United Nations.” 215 This view appears to have prevailed in the department. Ross Campbell provided the definitive assessment:

It is reasonably apparent that the Sec-Gen has been saying one thing in N.Y. (to UK, Belg, Fr) while at the same time tacitly condoning what was

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212 NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 21, Memo DL (1) to Bow: Canadian Armed Forces in Katanga, 10 January 1963.
being done in the field by the U.N. [Commander]. Given the imperatives of the Congo situation – the imminent exhaustion of UN funds & withdrawal of Indian troops, Tshombe’s record of deception, etc. U Thant has had no option but to allow events to run their course, including the present military offensive. I do not think we should inject ourselves into this very delicate situation by a premature inquisition.216

Significantly, Campbell uses the word “offensive” to describe the UN’s actions in pressing onwards to Jadotville. Although concerns regarding the UN’s use of force had been expressed previously at the highest political levels and in direct relation to the situation in Katanga, in the end Canada accepted this fait accompli. Katanga’s secession was at an end.

Preparing for Withdrawal

Once the secession in Katanga was finally brought to an end and the territorial integrity of the Congo ensured, attention shifted towards preparations for the eventual withdrawal of ONUC. Training and reorganization of the ANC was seen as a necessary prerequisite. As has been seen, Canadian involvement in schemes to retrain or reorganize the ANC were proposed and considered at various times since ONUC arrived in the Congo, but no definite decisions or actions were ever taken. Then, in early 1963, the question of military assistance for the ANC was revived by a US initiative, the Greene plan.

Based on a proposal formulated by an American Colonel sent to the Congo to assess the ANC's requirements, the plan called for a series of bilateral aid programmes to train the various services within the Congolese military, coordinated under the aegis of the United Nations. Canada, Belgium, Italy, Norway, and Israel were asked to participate.1 In the ensuing months, Canada was asked to provide training for both officers and communications units, and the senior officer to oversee the entire training mission. Washington, Brussels, and Leopoldville pressed Ottawa to agree to a Canadian contribution. Gauvin reported that Mobutu appeared unwilling to take 'no' for an answer: "Where there is a will there is a way," the Congolese general insisted. This, the Consul General maintained, demonstrated the "esteem and confidence" with which Canada was

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1 Ernest Lefever, "US Policy, the UN and the Congo," Orbis 11.2 (1967) 407; Weissman bluntly suggests the Greene plan was UN "cover" for "Western military aid." Stephen Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960-1964 (Ithaca: Cornell U P, 1974) 213.
regarded. Nevertheless, both External Affairs and National Defence were only willing to consider Canadian involvement if the military assistance was “directed by and through the U.N.”\(^3\) In fact, National Defence was unwilling to take the tentative step of preliminary discussions between military officials in Washington until they knew more about the Greene plan and, particularly, the role it envisaged for the UN.\(^4\)

U Thant’s view of the Greene plan was not immediately clear to Canadian officials. Ambassador Tremblay believed support for the plan in New York to be strongest amongst General Rikhye and his staff but doubted U Thant would back a training scheme carried out primarily by NATO countries. Tremblay thought the “NATO label would be embarrassing, not only for the Secretary-General but for the United Nations as a whole and for the individual NATO countries participating in the scheme.” The UN Division concurred with Tremblay and suggested the basis for participation be broadened (i.e. to include non NATO nations) and assurances be sought from the Secretary General that he was “100% behind the scheme.”\(^5\) Tremblay was instructed to speak to U Thant personally, to express Canada’s concerns, and to suggest the participation in the training schemes of African countries such as Nigeria and Tunisia.

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\(^1\) NAC, RG24, vol. 21487, file 21373 part 9, Telegram Leopoldville to External: Mobutu’s visit and Request, 23 November 1962.


Any request for assistance, U Thant was told, would receive official consideration only if it came from the Secretary-General and was supported by the Congolese government.\textsuperscript{6}

Canadian officials were astute in their anticipation of the political difficulties the Greene plan would face. On 20 March, the Secretary-General asked the Congo Advisory Committee whether or not the United Nations should act as an umbrella for the bilateral assistance envisaged. To make the proposal more attractive, the Secretariat suggested the addition of a coordinating group of African states, including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Tunisia. During the meeting, Tremblay welcomed this initiative, though he did raise a number of logistical and organisational issues as to the role and function of the group. The plan, however, ran into serious opposition. The African and Middle Eastern states “found it psychologically and politically difficult” to approve the plan.\textsuperscript{7} Perhaps for this reason, the Canadian Ambassador later went to great lengths to assure members of the Committee that, despite the inclusion of Canada in circulated correspondence relating to the Greene plan, no bilateral negotiations had taken place between Canada and the Congo. Tremblay stated, “we have always assumed that any contribution that we would make to the ANC training scheme would be under the aegis of the United Nations.”\textsuperscript{8} The African states were clear: either they should be included in the actual training or the programme should be arranged entirely on a bilateral basis without UN involvement.\textsuperscript{9}

\textsuperscript{6} NAC, RG24, vol. 7169, file 2-5081-6 part 18, Telegram External to PERMISNY: Congo: ANC Retraining and Reorganization Scheme, 1 February 1963.

\textsuperscript{7} NAC, RG24, vol. 7169, file 2-5081-6 part 18, Telegram PERMISNY to External: Congo Advisory Ctee 73rd Meeting March 20, 21 March 1963.

\textsuperscript{8} NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 22, Minutes Congo Advisory Ctee, 1 March 1963.

\textsuperscript{9} NAC, RG25, vol. 5217, file 6386-40 part 37, Memo for Minister: Training the Congolese Armed Forces, 8 April 1963.
When Tremblay met with U Thant on 28 March, it was evident the Secretary General was questioning the wisdom of the Greene plan. The previous day, the Soviets had warned him they planned to request a meeting of the Security Council if the UN became involved in the training plan, and he expected to hear shortly from a group of Afro-Asian states that had decided to advise him “strongly against” any UN involvement in ANC retraining. U Thant told Tremblay the problem of military assistance for the Congo could no longer be treated as a technical one; it had become primarily a political problem to be dealt with as such.10 The Ambassador left the meeting with the impression the Secretary-General would have to “wash his hands of the present training programme.”11

A subsequent discussion with Ralph Bunche confirmed this impression. Tremblay asked if there was a position Canada could take at the next Advisory Committee meeting that would support the Secretary-General but was told U Thant intended simply to listen to the African representatives without advancing any position of his own. According to Bunche, it was no longer a matter of the degree to which the UN should be involved but whether it should be involved at all. He revealed that the UN legal department was trying to find a way for the Secretary-General to by-pass Resolution 1474, which prohibited the provision of military assistance to the Congo except at the request of the Secretary-

General. The UN was faced with a significant dilemma: the ANC needed to be retrained and reorganized in order for ONUC to be able to complete its withdrawal, but political realities ruled out both direct, bilateral military aid and aid provided under the umbrella of the United Nations.

Once it became clear the UN would not oversee the retraining scheme, debate in the Advisory Committee focused entirely on the question of the Congo’s right to obtain bilateral assistance. African members of the committee were divided: some argued the Congolese government could not solicit bilateral assistance so long as ONUC was present in the Congo, while others shared the Canadian view that the Congolese should be allowed to make their own arrangements, if the UN was unable or unwilling to meet their needs.

In advance of the 23 April meeting of the Advisory Committee, Prime Minister Adoula wrote to U Thant and argued that any attempt by the UN to invoke the provisions of Resolution 1474 to prevent the Congolese government from securing bilateral assistance would “constitute an unjustifiable and intolerable restriction on its freedom of action.” Because Resolution 1474 was passed so early in the crisis and at a time when political conditions were vastly different, the Congolese Prime Minister reasoned that it

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was no longer valid. In a statement delivered in the Advisory Committee, Ambassador Tremblay concurred with Adoula’s interpretation:

The situation which UNGA [Resolution] 1474 was intended to prevent no longer exits. In these changed circumstances for this [Committee] to object to [the Secretary-General] recognizing that Congolese [Government] is free to make its own arrangements for military assistance would amount to placing a limitation on Congolese sovereignty. My [government] considers that the UN should be extremely careful to avoid putting itself in the position of limiting the sovereignty of any state to whose appeal it responds. The result of such a restriction on the sovereignty of the Congolese [government] might be the development of a feeling of resentment on the part of the Congolese people and [government].

While this statement would have alienated the more radical African states on the Committee, its emphasis on the implications for the general principle of sovereignty would have appealed to the interests of most states. The statement was appreciated in Leopoldville, where Foreign Minister Bomombo expressed his gratitude to Gauvin for the Canadian stand in the Advisory Committee.

Noting the lack of unanimity in the Committee, Canadian officials expected that U Thant would not “object directly” to a Congolese effort to obtain bilateral military training assistance. Publicly, the Secretary General turned a blind eye to the training programs soon after established by the Congolese, with the notable assistance of Belgium. In a report to the Security Council, U Thant simply said, “I have no official

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knowledge of subsequent developments.”\textsuperscript{18} While this diplomatic manoeuvre enabled the Congo to enlist the help it needed to retrain its army, it also closed the door to any possibility that Canada could provide assistance to the Congo, on a multilateral basis, through the United Nations.

Once the UN decided against associating itself with the Greene plan, the Congolese government took immediate steps to secure bilateral military assistance. As expected, Canada received a request from Prime Minister Adoula. The Congolese were keen to secure Canadian participation because Canada was considered “a non-colonial country politically acceptable to most African opinion” and to prevent the complete domination of the training programme by Belgium.\textsuperscript{19} Following the 8 April election in Canada, the Liberal party came to power led by Prime Minister Lester Pearson. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, concurred with Under-Secretary Norman Robertson’s recommendation against Canadian involvement in ANC training, citing practical considerations – the shortage of suitable personnel. Although he clearly harboured “doubts regarding the political advisability” of Canadian participation, the door was not closed to this possibility entirely. Martin wrote to Paul Hellyer, the new Minister of National Defence, to see if personnel would in fact be available to serve either as signals instructors or as the senior officer coordinating the programme, in the


\textsuperscript{19} NAC, RG25, vol. 5217, file 6386-40 part 38, Memo for Minister: Request for Canadian Assistance in Training the Congolese Army, 8 May 1963; NAC, RG25, vol. 5217, file 6386-40 part 38,
event "impressive political arguments are advanced by the Americans and Belgians in favour of some Canadian participation." The shortage of bilingual signalers ruled out meeting this aspect of the request, but with respect to the position of a coordinating officer, the Chief of the General Staff did recommend "the nettle ... be grasped and the commitment accepted, as an indication of Canada's practical concern for the future of the Congo in particular and black Africa in general." Consequently, the merits of Canadian involvement continued to be discussed.

International pressure on Canada to participate mounted. In Washington, the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs approached the Canadian Ambassador, Charles Ritchie, and intimated that both Italy and Norway were awaiting a Canadian decision before making a final determination as to their own participation. The Americans hoped "personnel limitations" would not prevent Canada from making a "most important and valuable contribution" to the training scheme. In Brussels, the Canadian Ambassador reported that Foreign Ministry officials "never failed to tackle us ... and ... continued to show the keenest interest in our possible participation." The implications of the lengthy Canadian delay in responding to the Congolese request were not lost on the Belgian Foreign Minister, who eventually met with the Canadian Ambassador and "put the whole

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Memo SSEA to A&ME Div: Training the Congolese Army Request for Canadian Assistance, 10 May 1963.


matter ... quietly without insistence or pressure and, indeed, without marshalling the arguments at his disposal." The Ambassador speculated, "It may be that Spaak [the Belgian Foreign Minister] has assessed the chances of our accepting as poor and put the request to me as a matter of form."24 In the Congo, General Joseph Mobutu, Chief of Staff of the ANC, was growing impatient. In an interview with the Congolese press, he stated, "Italy, Canada and Norway seem to be hesitating. And I have [the] impression that these countries will not do anything as long as UN does not confer its patronage on this organisation."25

Still, in the face of this pressure from various quarters, the government continued to weigh its options. The military was not keen to sacrifice its capability to meet other defence requirements in order to provide officers for the communications training. And though the Chief of the General Staff was willing to contribute a coordinating officer, External Affairs foresaw political difficulties in doing so: the Congo Advisory Committee, to which Canada belonged, had taken a strong stand against the Greene plan; and any cooperation with Israel, a partner nation in the training scheme, could complicate Canada's participation with UN peacekeeping in the Middle East.26

A further urgent enquiry from American officials, indicating that the point had been reached when knowledge of Canada's intentions "was becoming necessary,"

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19 June 1963.
prompted yet another round of interdepartmental discussions. Officials at External Affairs attributed the delay in making a decision to National Defence: Paul Hellyer was said to be reluctant to consider the request until a budgetary review was concluded and prioritized National Defence commitments. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff did not concur with the Chief of the General Staff's offer to provide a coordinating officer. He was said to be "against the idea completely," and was quoted as saying the position would be "the graveyard for a Canadian Officer and his inevitable successors." In order to avoid a flat refusal of the Congolese request, officials in both departments contemplated the dispatch of a fact-finding mission to the Congo, but Paul Martin considered this a "misleading course" and thought it better to "frankly say that our difficulty is due to scarcity of personnel because of the review now taking place."

A definite decision not to participate in the training of the ANC was finally taken in the fall of 1963. By this time, the UN had decided to extend ONUC's stay in the Congo through to mid 1964. Canadian peacekeepers, because of the tasks they performed within the peacekeeping mission, were expected to stay till the end. This extended commitment, in addition to an affirmative response to an ONUC request to provide an officer to serve as Chief of Staff, were cited as the reasons why Canada could not commit.

further military resources for service in the Congo.30 Gauvin was instructed to express the government’s regret at being unable to meet the Congolese request but, in doing so, also to make reference to the “considerable amount of time, manpower and money which [Canada] has expended in Congo to date as evidence of our continuing concern for future stability of country.”31 The Belgians and Americans were disappointed but not surprised. They had already interpreted the lengthy delay in responding to the request as a bad sign.32 For Norway, on the other hand, this was good news. Officials from the Norwegian Embassy in Ottawa had previously expressed their concern at possibly being the only country to refuse the Congolese request.33 Both military and political factors proved decisive in determining the Canadian response to this request for bilateral military assistance.

By early 1963, UN requests for various, additional personnel for ONUC itself were increasingly scrutinized, especially by National Defence. The Secretariat asked Canada to provide four training and administrative officers for service with two ANC

30 July 1963.
battalions, helicopter pilots and ground crew, and movement control personnel.\textsuperscript{34}

Following consultation with the Navy and Air Force, the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff
turned down the request for helicopter personnel because it would “seriously prejudice”
other commitments.\textsuperscript{35} External Affairs was not surprised by this and had decided it was
“preferable not to exert any strong pressure to provide this particular assistance and to
reserve our best ammunitions for military training assistance.”\textsuperscript{36}

The Chief of the General Staff was frustrated by these “piecemeal” requests
which were said to be making it “almost impossible to do any career planning for the
officers concerned,” and because they were having “an adverse effect on the proper
general administration of the Army.”\textsuperscript{37} As a result, National Defence rejected not only the
most recent request for movement control personnel but also decided not to proceed with
an earlier commitment to provide an officer to serve as Chief Instructor for movement
control courses.\textsuperscript{38} One request was approved: for signals personnel to be assigned to serve
at a message centre in Katanga. National Defence expressed concern that this positive
response would result in further requests for communications assistance “at levels below


\textsuperscript{36} NAC, RG25, vol. 5224, file 6386-C-40 part 21, Memo DL(1) Div to Ross Campbell: Congo: UN Request for Assistance, 6 February 1963.


that included in our present commitment.” To prevent this, it was decided at an interdepartmental meeting of officials from National Defence and External Affairs to advise the UN that Canada was “reviewing its present commitments to the Congo operations and that we would not wish to provide additional personnel to ONUC for the time being,” and that “only specific and well substantiated requests for reassignments of [Canadian] officers already serving at ONUC HQ can be considered.”

In mid January, the Secretariat anticipated that ONUC might be brought to an end by August or September. When the Canadian military liaison officer in New York suggested to the military staff that it would soon be possible to do without the services of the 57th, the UN officials were said to have reacted with “horror.” The Chief of the Field Operations service was of the view that it was too early to consider the withdrawal of the 57th and that the unit would be required “for some considerable time.” Brigadier Rikhye described the Canadian unit as the “backbone of the ONUC Force,” and further stated, “he would rather see any unit other than the 57 Signals Squadron repatriated.” Within weeks of these conversations, it was clear that ONUC was not likely to leave the Congo altogether until 1964. But National Defence was keen to reduce its commitment of Signals personnel in ONUC, who were “acutely needed in Canada.” The Director of

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Signals was sent to the Congo to report on the possibility of personnel reductions. Given their earlier panicked reaction in New York, UN officials were reassured the Director's visit was not an indication that Canada was contemplating an "immediate withdrawal" of its peacekeepers. As the Secretary General planned to reduce ONUC to 7800 all ranks by July 1963, detailed discussions with the Force Commander resulted in a decision to reduce the establishment of the 57th to approximately 200 personnel. A reduction in the number of signals detachments, from eight to four, was expected. Consequently, the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff suggested to Paul Hellyer that the standby signal detachment maintained in Canada be canceled. The Minister concurred and External Affairs was asked to advise the UN that the detachment would no longer be available. Some reductions in personnel were achieved throughout 1963, but it also became clear that it was unlikely a complete withdrawal could be achieved by the end of that year.

When U Thant indicated his intention to recommend to the Security Council that ONUC be withdrawn at the end of 1963, the United States anxiously asked Canada to voice support in the General Assembly for an authorization of funds that would enable

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ONUC to continue till June 1964. External Affairs found it "difficult to disagree" with the American view that peacekeepers should remain in the Congo until the ANC were better able to assume complete responsibility for internal security but was concerned that any effort to extend ONUC's presence be supported by both U Thant and the African and Asian members of the Security Council. Ottawa thought it was "undesirable for Western countries as a group to appear to be pressing for retention of ONUC." Officials feared the Afro-Asian members would "be suspicious that Western countries wanted ONUC to stay on in the Congo in order to give the Belgians more time to establish their influence." If these states supported a continuation of ONUC, External Affairs saw no political difficulty in supporting a General Assembly resolution to extend ONUC's financing. Encouraged by the United States, Prime Minister Adoula appealed to the Secretary General to leave 3,000 peacekeepers in the Congo until mid 1964. Adoula said, "Our concern ... derives from the concern which we feel that this work, which has cost so much effort and sacrifice, should bear fruit and achieve the objectives which UN and Congo set themselves." U Thant and senior members of the Secretariat remained unconvinced. The Secretary-General had detected little support from members of the Advisory Committee or the Fifth Committee for maintaining ONUC beyond the end of

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1963 and was skeptical of the chances of the General Assembly authorising continued financial support.50 The UN’s perilous financial position was a paramount consideration.

Following a round of inconclusive consultations between U Thant and members of the Advisory Committee, the matter was finally addressed definitively in the General Assembly.51 Resolution 1885 (XVIII) noted the support given to Adoula’s request by other independent African states and authorised the Secretary General to spend an additional $18.2 million to cover ONUC expenses to June 1964. The resolution passed by a vote of 76 to 11, with 20 abstentions. Canada voted in favour of the resolution; the Communist bloc cast the negative votes.52 One month prior to the debate on Resolution 1885, Prime Minister Pearson had addressed the Assembly and made public Canada’s willingness to maintain the Signal Unit in the Congo.53 Both National Defence and External Affairs supported the continuation of ONUC, though the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff doubted the ANC would be “very much better in six months’ time.” when it would need to take complete responsibility for the maintenance of law and order.54 Paul Hellyer echoed this concern but assured Martin that National Defence was “willing to co-operate in any course which you are convinced would be wise in the national interest.”55 An establishment of 31 officers and 217 other ranks was approved for the first six months of

54 DHH, file 73/1223 part 1081, Letter CCOS to MDND, 29 August 1963.
1964, and Hellyer even intimated he was prepared to maintain the 57th Signal Unit beyond June if it was "inopportune, and perhaps even difficult, for the United Nations to disengage." Thus, continued support for the core Canadian contribution to ONUC survived both the transition in government from the Conservatives to the Liberals and three years of trials and tribulations in the Congo.

With a more definite end for ONUC in sight, National Defence appeared more willing to accept senior military positions within ONUC. Earlier, they had successfully resisted pressure from the UN to provide a replacement for the position of ONUC Air Commander. In November 1963, however, they responded favourably to a renewed effort by New York to once again appoint a Canadian to this position. A Canadian already serving in the Congo was promoted to the rank of Group Captain in order to serve as both Air Commander and Coordinator Air Transport Operations.\textsuperscript{56}

National Defence also agreed to the appointment of Brigadier J.A. Dextraze to the position of Chief of Staff – the most senior appointment ever held by a Canadian within ONUC.\textsuperscript{57} External Affairs believed Dextraze’s appointment would send an important political message: Canada was prepared to have senior Canadian officers serve under

\textsuperscript{56} NAC, RG25, vol. 10648, file 21-14-6-ONUC-5 part 1, Telegram PERMISNY to External: ONUC – Request for Assistance Air Commander, 6 November 1963; NAC, RG25, vol. 10648, file 21-14-6-ONUC-5 part 1, Letter CCOS to USSEA: ONUC – Air Commander, 6 December 1963.
Africans. Dextraze assumed his position just as command of ONUC was transferred from Major-General Kaldager to Major-General Aguiyu Ironsi, of Nigeria. Officials at External Affairs were impressed by a meeting with Dextraze, held in advance of his departure for the Congo, at which he assured those present he “intended to honour his position as Chief of Staff to Major-General Ironsi … [and] did not intend to bypass him.” With the appointment of Canadians to two senior posts in ONUC, it was clear that Canada supported the UN’s efforts to bring the mission to a successful close.

In spite of Brigadier Dextraze’s best intentions, relations with Ironsi ultimately proved tense at times. Shortly after the new Force Commander’s arrival in Leopoldville, the Canadian Chargé d’Affaires noted Ironsi had “given the impression in Military and High UN civilian circles of being very much of a play-boy.” “His professional competence,” the Chargé continued, “would also appear to be in doubt.” First impressions were subsequently confirmed in a later report to External Affairs:

The difference between the previous Force Commander and the present one is that the former, who was well trained, had every intention of doing nothing, and the latter, who has little military ability, insists on doing something. … In addition to his other duties, the Brigadier [Dextraze] often has to kick out the drunks from the Commander’s house at 2, 3 or 4 o’clock in the morning, stick the Commander in bed, and make sure he is dragged out and at his desk the next morning. That next morning will start with abuses, and abuse, often of an arrogantly personal nature, often continues all day. These are trials which Dextraze is accepting, (1)

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because he is a good professional soldier, (2) because he is a Canadian, and, I suppose, there are other reasons but God knows what they are.\textsuperscript{61}

The difficulties with Ironsi came to a head in early June, when Dextraze reported directly to the Chief of the General Staff on an incident involving the Force Commander. The Officer-in-Charge of ONUC, Bibiano Osorio-Tafall, called a meeting at 9:45 pm on 1 June to discuss an urgent message received from U Thant. Dextraze was instructed to notify Ironsi, but the Force Commander was reported to have said, “If Tafall wants me at any meeting tell him that he can telephone me personally. That’s all I’ve got to tell you.” When Ironsi arrived at 11:00, Dextraze noted “it was evident that he was under the influence of liquor”; the Force Commander was further described him as “belligerent.” The incident was diffused the next day when the Nigerian Ambassador suggested Ironsi apologise to Osario-Tafall, who in turn suggested that apologies be extended to Dextraze and others present at the meeting. Though Dextraze contemplated a request to be recalled to Canada, he reconsidered and decided to stay for the remaining four weeks in June.\textsuperscript{62}

Once the crisis of Katangan secession was resolved, life for most members of the 57\textsuperscript{th} became routine. They maintained communications between various ONUC detachments and Leopoldville 24 hours a day, though atmospheric conditions in the evening often interfered with the teletype signal. As a result, communications could be guaranteed for only 70 percent of the day.\textsuperscript{63} While living conditions could vary markedly

\textsuperscript{61} NAC, RG24, vol. 7169, file 2-5081-6 part 19, Numbered Letter Leopoldville to USSEA: Staff Relations – ONUC, 21 February 1964.

\textsuperscript{62} DHH, file 112.1.003 (D21) vol. 3, Letter Dextraze to CGS, 2 June 1964; DHH, file 112.1.003 (D21) vol. 3, Telegram Osorio Tafall to Secretary General and Ralph Bunche, 2 June 1964.

\textsuperscript{63} DHH, file 144.9.009 (D43) vol. 1, Memo: Communications in the Congo, 12 June 1963.
between the unit's outlying detachments, the commanding officer in Albertville described a tranquil setting: "Across the rippled emerald surface of Lake Tanganyika, one can discern the pale outline of Mount Kungwe rising into the clouds and the rolling hills of western Tanganyika fading away, in myriad shades of purple and blue, as far as the eye can see. For those who would commune with nature, it is an idyllic location." When not on duty, peacekeepers enjoyed sightseeing – often guided by local civilians the Canadians had come to know. Given the scenery, photography became a popular hobby. In addition, the peacekeepers enjoyed dances, bingos, fishing, and crocodile hunting. The hectic pace of life in North America contrasted with the "relaxed way of living" in the Congo. "No doubt," one officer said, "there will be fond memories of the very practical custom of siesta every afternoon after lunch until three o'clock." It is perhaps not surprising that 25 percent of the Canadians applied for an extended tour of duty.

The routine of the remaining months in the Congo was interrupted by two events. On 10 April 1963, command of the 57th Signal Unit changed hands for the final time. At a ceremony attended by the ONUC Force Commander, Col. D.G. Green accepted the command from Col. Hamilton. Addressing the Unit, and Col. Hamilton in particular, General Kebbede said, "Your performance has been second to none. You are a credit to your Army and your country and you have more than upheld the long and splendid tradition of Canadian Signals in the Congo." Col. Green was transferred to the Congo

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64 DHH, file 144.9.009 (D57), Cover Letter and Report/Story: Albertville CO to CO 57th, 29 April 1963.
65 DHH, file 144.9.009 (D57), PRO: United Nations Force Commander Honours Canadian Signal Unit in Congo, 10 April 1963.
from Edmonton where he had previously been the command Signal Officer at Headquarters Western Command.  

In early 1964, ONUC engaged in a series of rescue operations that foreshadowed some of the political difficulties the Congo would face once the UN peacekeeping mission had departed. Canadian personnel played key roles in the rescue of missionaries from Kwilu district who were under attack by members of the Congolese Jeunesse movement. For their participation and acts of "gallantry," Col. Green recommended military awards for Sgt. J.A. Lessard, Lt. Col. P.A. Mayer, and Brigadier Dextraze. Dextraze both planned the rescues and participated in their implementation; Mayer was principally charged with carrying them out and succeeded, in one instance, in rescuing a number of missionaries after he was knocked unconscious and threatened with death; and Lessard saved two nuns by single-handedly assisting both into an awaiting helicopter while fighting off four Jeunesse, in spite of a "shower of arrows." The Secretary-General commended the peacekeepers: "the success of the entire operation is attributable to splendid co-operation among troops under the fine leadership of General Ironsi and his Chief of Staff, Brigadier Dextraze. In completing this mercy mission ONUC has won not only the gratitude of Member States whose nationals were saved but of the world at large."  

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66 DHF, file 144.9.009 (D57), PRO: United Nations Force Commander Honours Canadian Signal Unit in Congo, 10 April 1963.  
67 NAC, RG25, vol. 10646, file 21-14-6-ONUC-2, Letter and attached from Secretary General, 12 February 1964; DHF, file 144.9.009 (D65), Recommendation for Award in Peacetime: Joseph Lessard, 27 February 1964; DHF, file 144.9.009 (D65), Recommendation for Award in Peacetime: Paul Mayer, 27 February 1964; DHF, file 144.9.009 (D65), Recommendation for Award in Peacetime: J. Dextraze,
By January 1964, it was increasingly apparent that ONUC would not be extended beyond the end of June. From Leopoldville, Col. Green reported that senior controllers and auditors had arrived from New York to make arrangements for the final disposition of equipment and supplies. And the American Ambassador in Leopoldville confirmed the United States was no longer willing to continue its financial support because other requests for assistance were being received from other African nations.\(^68\)

The Permanent Mission in New York subsequently confirmed Green’s appreciation of the situation. For a number of reasons, they also did not expect ONUC to continue beyond June: U Thant was said to be adamant that the mission be withdrawn and was supported in this view by his principal advisers, there was no mandate for ONUC funding beyond June, continuation would require a special session of the General Assembly and this seemed unlikely for extraneous political reasons, they perceived little support amongst “the vital African membership” or the western bloc, and logistical planning was already in place based on the assumption contingents would be withdrawn.\(^69\) External Affairs advised the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, “We see no objection, therefore, to the development of plans for the withdrawal of the Canadian contingent by the end of June. … There remains the possibility of some development

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27 February 1964; For a complete, detailed account of the rescue operations see: DHH, file 144.9.009 (D38), Operation Jadex One, A Chronological Account of the Rescue Operations in Kwilu Province (24 January to 3 February 1964), 25 February 1964.

\(^68\) DHH, file 144.9.009 (D49), Telegram 57th to CANARY, 1 January 1964.

\(^69\) NAC, RG24, vol. 21487, file 21373 part 12, Telegram PERMISNY to External: Congo – Continuation of UNOC, 6 February 1964.
which might lead to a decision to reconsider the matter, but we do not at present foresee any such development.”

In subsequent months, it became clear Canada would not permit its forces to remain in the Congo after ONUC was withdrawn. When Nigeria expressed concern for the safety of 400 of their police officers expected to remain till the end of 1964, External Affairs noted it would not be possible for Canadian peacekeepers to remain under the terms of the government’s original decision to send forces. Plans were finalized to transport the remaining Canadians from Leopoldville in four Yukon airlifts, approximately 60 personnel at a time, throughout June. UN requests for three NCO storekeepers to assist in the preparation of UN stores for shipment and the retention of Lt. Col. Mayer to serve as a UN liaison officer with the ANC were turned down. The Chief of the General Staff argued, “It is not considered desirable to leave any personnel in Congo after the general UN withdrawal.”

As the Canadians prepared to leave, a bureaucratic disagreement developed. The Secretary-General asked Canada to donate the communications equipment of the 57th Signal Unit to develop a civilian telecommunications network, estimating the original value of the equipment at $300,000. Col. Green had already started to return the

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73 NAC, RG24, vol. 21487, file 2137.3 part 12, Telegram PERMISNY to External: Canadian Signals Equipment in Congo, 31 March 1964.
equipment to Canada but was asked by the Secretary General's Representative in the Congo to halt further shipments pending a decision by Ottawa. Discussion within External Affairs clearly favoured donating the equipment, as did the Canadian Chargé d'Affaires in Leopoldville and the External Aid Office. National Defence, however, was keen to have the equipment returned so that it could be put to use "to meet other essential Canadian Army requirements." The Army estimated the original cost of the equipment at $216,000 and expected $125,000 would be needed to recondition it once it was returned. The latter sum and return transportation costs were considered "recoverable" from the UN, while the cost of replacing the equipment was estimated at $600,000. External Affairs was asked to have the Secretary General lift the suspension of the equipment's shipment back to Canada.

Once aware National Defence definitely wanted the equipment back, External Affairs became concerned when they learned from the Permanent Mission in New York that the Chargé d'Affaires in Leopoldville, Arthur Hicks, might have made an offer to sell the equipment to officials of the World Meteorological Organisation in the Congo. Hicks later assured Ottawa that the furthest he had ever went in any discussion of the

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74 NAC, RG24, vol. 21487, file 2137.3 part 12, Telegram PERMISNY to External: Canadian Signals Equipment in Congo, 1 April 1964.
equipment was to suggest, as a private opinion, that it might be purchased at a nominal price. He noted the equipment “was bought second-hand in the United States expressly for use in the Congo. It has been extremely over used and only strenuous daily maintenance work by Canadian Signals personnel has kept it from falling apart at the seams. In the words of those who ought to know it is classed as being used-junk in terms of its subsequent use in Canada.”

Nevertheless, National Defence wanted it back, and the UN was informed that it should be returned to Canada. It was not until October 1964 that officials with the Auditor General discovered that the original Treasury Board authorization for the purchase of the equipment was granted on the understanding the purchase cost would be recovered from the UN. In fact, the only costs recovered were for lost or stolen equipment, as a result of the hostilities in Katanga, in the amount of $15,705.97. The initial cost of the equipment became an added peacekeeping expense, though National Defence was able to use the equipment for other defence commitments.

On 30 June, the War Diarist for the 57th Signal Unit minuted, “Reveille came early this morning but nobody seemed to mind.” In the end, the Canadians were among the very last of the peacekeepers to leave the Congo; the final Yukon arrived back in
Canada on Dominion Day (1 July), 1964. In four years, over 1,800 officers and men served in the Congo. The Secretary General thanked Canada for its contribution:

It is my earnest hope that the great efforts and sacrifices of the officers and men of the UN Force in the Congo which has provided a four-year respite for the [Government] and people of that country from the worst results of anarchy disorder and civil war will also prove to have made a lasting contribution to its future peace and prosperity. May I once again express to your [government] my appreciation for their contribution to the success of the UN Force in the Congo.

By order of the Vice Chief of the General Staff, the 57th Canadian Signal Unit was reduced to nil strength. ceased to be allocated for duty with the United Nations Organization in the Congo, and was made dormant.

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82 CCEM, box 137, DPR Press Release, 30 June 1964.
Conclusion

In the foreign policies of democracies, ... there is always an element of calculation as well as conscience, and neither the cynic nor the idealist is ever right in an absolute judgement on motives.¹

John Holmes

In 1993, reporting on the possibilities for renewed interest in peacekeeping in the post Cold War era, the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs concluded. “Canada has had an exemplary record in peacekeeping. In fact, it is the sole military activity which Canadians fully support.”² For many, peacekeeping has become a symbol of the Canadian national identity. But why has Canada so consistently contributed to United Nations peacekeeping forces? What lies behind a consensus successively formed by generations of Canadians and their political representatives? Is there more image than reality to the history of Canadian peacekeeping?

According to Hillmer and Granatstein, “Moralism is one unifying thread running through the history of Canadian foreign policy.” Support of peacekeeping, then, could be interpreted simply as one manifestation of this moralistic streak. To the larger Canadian public, “Canada was the real inventor of peacekeeping and its practitioner par excellence. Even our armed forces, in other words, were not the traditional ‘brutal licentious soldiery’ but arbiters in blue helmets, umpires enforcing the world’s rules on the unruly.” Yet, the two historians challenge us to question this stereotype: “Canada has never been a

choirboy in the concert of nations; it has fought wars and bargained for advantage like all the rest.” In other words, foreign policy is ultimately driven by concrete, realistic objectives and considerations. Throughout the Congo crisis, those responsible for shaping Canadian policy were certainly aware of the public's penchant for Canada's image as a 'moral superpower', but their decisions were, in fact, driven by more pragmatic factors. While the archetypal image of 'Canada the peacekeeper' may have served the role of conscience, Canada's Congo policy was still quite calculated.

It is important to remember that the Congo Crisis occurred at a time when Cold War tensions were at their highest. Canada's membership in NATO left little room to doubt where Canada stood in the battle between East and West. Nevertheless, Canadian diplomats studiously worked to maintain an image of a nation that was objective, if not neutral. Hammarskjöld's decision to include Canadians in ONUC, in spite of membership in NATO, suggests a degree of success in achieving this image. Even Soviet diplomats downplayed protests from Moscow over Canada's participation in the peacekeeping mission, until Russian policy hardened against the Secretary-General. In addition, Canada's voting pattern in the General Assembly on Congo resolutions was more akin to that of Ireland and the Scandinavian countries than its NATO allies. Furthermore, Canada resisted frequent Belgian attempts to develop a concerted NATO policy on the Congo — so much so, in fact, that Belgian officials eventually accused their Canadian counterparts of being 'too objective.' Similarly, Ottawa refused to allow the RCAF to participate in

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the transport of Belgian forces within the Congo, though they were requested to do so by the UN, out of fear Canada would be associated with its NATO ally.

At other times, it was evident that Canada was solidly within the Western bloc. In statements delivered in both the House of Commons and the General Assembly. Prime Minister Diefenbaker was often strident in his criticism of the Soviet Union. In turn, the Soviet attack on Hammarskjöld left the Secretary-General less willing to use Canadians. as was seen when he declined Ottawa's offer of Caribou aircraft and accompanying aircrews. Limited Canadian representation in the senior levels of ONUC HQ, with one or two notable exceptions, was further evidence of this. More often than not, Canada's allegiance to the West was more obvious in the exercise of behind-the-scenes, quiet diplomacy. For example, Ottawa agreed to Brussels' request to be kept informed of the confidential discussions of the Secretary-General's Advisory Committee. Publicly, Ottawa never declared a preference for any particular Congolese political faction and consistently stressed the need for the Congolese to be allowed to sort out their political and constitutional difficulties for themselves. Privately, however, Canada favoured the more western oriented Kasavubu. Congolese officials were assured Canada had not voted to seat Kasavubu's delegation at the UN only because it was confident this outcome could be achieved without its affirmative vote. Though it was eventually decided not to participate in any of the retraining and reorganization schemes for the ANC, the most consistent argument in favour of Canada's involvement, advanced by officials at both External Affairs and National Defence, was that it would be a good 'western' influence on the Congolese military. Finally, Col. Berthiaume's involvement in Mobutu's arrest of
Lumumba definitely contributed to the solidification of a western oriented government in the Congo – though there is no evidence to suggest that Ottawa approved of, or was aware of, the Colonel’s actions.

Thus, in a number of ways, Canada’s allegiance to the West was clear; yet officials still attempted to maintain an overall impression of objectivity. To be fair, this effort was not simply window dressing. Canadian policy and officials were more constructive than some of their western counterparts. Though it hoped for a western-oriented government in the Congo, Ottawa was genuinely willing to accept a neutral one; this is a significant departure from the policies of most members of NATO. In addition, Patrice Lumumba was more often perceived in less threatening terms by Canadian officials. While there was evidence to indicate senior Canadian officers in the Congo had a definite sense the Cold War was operating there, all of the ‘rank and file’ peacekeepers with whom I corresponded rarely had anything more than a vague awareness of this, suggesting the politics of the Cold War were not a significant factor in how they carried out their routine duties as peacekeepers.

Decolonisation was the other significant international aspect of the Congo crisis. Again, Canadian policy studiously avoided any positions that would alienate the growing number of Afro-Asian members of the United Nations. This was most evident with Canadian tactics in the Advisory Committee, where the majority of members were either Asian or African. The Canadian representative was often instructed to remain silent during discussions of controversial issues whenever it was thought the Canadian view might be different than that of the majority; divergent views were saved for private
discussions with the Secretary-General. Occasionally, members of Diefenbaker’s Conservative Cabinet would express sentimental concern for Britain as a colonial power. but officials at External Affairs rarely sympathized with Britain, and even less so with Belgium, when these states were perceived to be acting to defend their colonial positions in Africa.

Canadian policy, at these times, was more likely to follow the lead of the United States. This was seen in votes on General Assembly resolutions that were critical of Belgium. Ottawa also refused to support Brussels in their attempts to preserve the right to occupy military bases in the Congo. Katanga’s secession was a lightening rod for charges of neo-colonialism against both Belgium and Britain. Canadian officials recognised this and consistently expressed support for the Congo’s territorial integrity, even in the face of a vocal segment of the Canadian public that favoured Katanga’s right to secede.

Ottawa was clearly successful in portraying Canada as sympathetic to the concerns of the newly independent states: Congolese officials often made reference, in warm terms, to Canada’s lack of a colonial past. In the case of Patrice Lumumba, Canada’s image did suffer following his visit to Canada. Once the Congolese Prime Minister learned aid would be provided only through the United Nations, he viewed Canada as just another “imperial” power. For the most part, however, Canada was sympathetic to the Congo’s position as a new state and was disinclined to support its European, NATO allies when they were perceived to be pursuing neo-colonial policies.

There was one facet of the Katanga issue on which both Ottawa and London agreed: neither thought ONUC should be authorised to use force in order to achieve a
political settlement. From the earliest days of Canadian participation in ONUC, it was clear Ottawa expected the UN’s peacekeeping efforts in the Congo to follow earlier precedents of ‘passive’ peacekeeping, for practical and theoretical reasons. The government was keen to limit the possibility of Canadian casualties. This explains Diefenbaker’s initial reticence; he mistakenly assumed the UN would ask Canada for combat forces. His change in attitude is largely attributable to the subsequent clarification of the UN’s request: Canada was asked to contribute only non-combat personnel. The government also placed restrictions on where both Army and Air Force personnel could serve within the Congo, to further reduce the chance of casualties.

At first, the idea that a peacekeeping mission would use force, especially when dispatched to an intra-state conflict such as the Congo, was almost inconceivable to Canadian diplomats. For example, when Hammarskjöld raised the prospect of more forceful ONUC intervention on behalf of Baluba refugees, Charles Ritchie expressed reservations as to the appropriateness and legality of such an initiative, a position that was subsequently supported by the Legal Division at External Affairs. When ONUC ultimately did use force, Ottawa was noticeably uncomfortable. Ambassadors Ritchie and Tremblay consistently counseled both Hammarskjöld and U Thant to exercise restraint, as successive enabling resolutions passed by the Security Council increased the prospect that ONUC would be involved in fighting. Though in the third round of hostilities Howard Green eventually became reconciled to what seemed an inevitable confrontation between ONUC and the Katanga gendarmerie, Canadian diplomats in New York continued to press for a peaceful resolution to the Katangan secession. They had little
choice once the Cabinet refused to authorise an intervention in the Advisory Committee that would have approved a UN plan entailing increased risk for confrontation with Katangese forces. National Defence was no less concerned about the use of force. Significantly, when ONUC’s air unit was supplemented with fighter and light bomber aircraft in advance of the third round in Katanga, the military was no longer willing to provide an Air Commander – a position consistently filled by a Canadian officer since ONUC’s inception. While Canada publicly supported the Secretary-General following the final round of fighting in Katanga, some at External Affairs privately expressed concerns, especially regarding ONUC’s ‘offensive’ thrust to Jadotville. This muscular version of peacekeeping was not hailed as a welcome innovation.

The differing views, within Ottawa, on the use of force highlight the various bureaucratic and administrative components involved in the decision making process on questions related to peacekeeping and Canada’s Congo policy. As this study demonstrated, there were often conflicting views between divisions at External Affairs on a proposed course of action. The European Division, for example, was generally more sympathetic to Belgian views on colonial questions than the other divisions.

The relationship between External Affairs and National Defence was generally cooperative. Joint submissions to Cabinet, on significant issues related to ONUC, were not uncommon, though most questions related to the peacekeeping mission were settled at the ministerial level, after the initial decision to participate was taken. Occasionally, there were differences between the two departments. In ONUC’s last two years, National Defence was forced to stretch military resources to their limits in order to meet financial
objectives of the Diefenbaker government’s austerity program. In addition, ONUC
drained the military of the very type of soldier it could least afford to provide: those who
were bilingual, and those who had specialised training in military communications. As a
result, National Defence was less able to meet requests forwarded by External Affairs.
Recognising this trend, officials at External began an internal process of prioritization
pressing National Defence only on the requests they considered most worthy. Yet, as was
seen in the cases of the continued renewal of the Pisa-Leopoldville air lift, DND’s
decision not to reappoint an Air Commander, and the final effort to arrange military
training for the Congolese forces, National Defence sometimes refused to meet a request
even when pressed to do so by External Affairs. In these instances, Green turned to
Diefenbaker. The Prime Minister encouraged Harkness to reexamine decisions but never
to reverse them. Thus, on these relatively rare occasions, National Defence’s position
prevailed.

The Prime Minister and Cabinet also shaped Congo policy. John Diefenbaker was
Prime Minister for the majority of ONUC’s duration. Lester Pearson became Prime
Minister only after the secession of Katanga was at end, and the only important question
remaining was when ONUC should be withdrawn. In the case of Diefenbaker, whenever
a decision relating to the Congo or to ONUC could have serious political repercussions, it
was considered in Cabinet. Diefenbaker’s views were critical here; he often swayed the
final decision. Decisions to contribute forces to ONUC in the first place, to halt the
dispatch of troops when political conditions in the Congo became too unstable, to restrict
the area of operations for both RCAF and Army personnel, to provide contributions to the
Secretary-General’s Congo fund, to not provide food aid during the Kasai famine, and to oppose UN strategies that could lead to hostilities in Katanga, were all taken at the Cabinet level. Notably, there were times when officials at External Affairs cleverly attempted to work around Cabinet decisions that rejected a departmental submission. In the case of food aid, funds were sought from within departmental sources so as not to require an additional estimate. And, as has already been noted, on the question of UN policy in Katanga, instructions were issued to the Canadian ambassador to simply remain silent in the Advisory Committee meeting when this issue was raised. The Prime Minister also discussed the Congo situation with various world leaders: in bilateral summits with American Presidents Kennedy and Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Macmillan, and during meetings of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. Such occasions were never used to set Canadian Congo policy, but they did provide Diefenbaker with an opportunity to hear the views of other heads of government.

As might have been expected, public opinion was most often a consideration when the Congo was discussed in Cabinet, rather than at the departmental level. It is not, however, entirely clear how Diefenbaker and his colleagues determined what public opinion was. Letters from concerned citizens and interest groups, newspaper articles (including editorials), and interventions in the House of Commons were all present in the archival and documentary collections. But, Diefenbaker did not necessarily use these ‘sources’ of public opinion, so readily available to himself and later for the historian, as indicators of ‘true’ public opinion. On the question of whether or not to provide food aid during the Kasai famine, we saw that Diefenbaker simply ignored the large number of
letters he received imploring him to send food to the Congo. In any case, it is clear that even in Cabinet public opinion was only one of many factors taken into account when decisions relating to the Congo were made. At the departmental level, public opinion rarely seems to have been a concern. One External Affairs departmental memo enumerated no less than ten major considerations in Canada’s Congo policy – public opinion did not make the list. Moreover, Cabinet documents prepared by External Affairs and National Defence never emphasised public opinion as a significant matter.

There is no doubt as to the most important determinant in Canada’s Congo policy: support for the United Nations and peacekeeping. Within the first month of the crisis, officials at External Affairs came to believe that the future of both peacekeeping and the institution itself would be at risk if the UN failed disastrously in the Congo. This view was only reaffirmed as the crisis wore on and was increasingly shaped by the politics of the Cold War. In his final speech to Parliament as Secretary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green said, “We have tried to keep tempers cool. We have tried to urge moderation, and I think we have been able to do quite a lot in that regard. Our policy in regard to the Congo has been throughout, and is today, to support the United Nations.”

For a middle power, whose foreign policy rested on a tradition of multilateralism, the United Nations was an important institution to preserve. As Tom Keating has observed, “Canadian support for multilateralism has not been an altruistic commitment to

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international order but a means of meeting vitally important national objectives.” In its support of the United Nations and the practice of peacekeeping, Canada was serving its own self-interests. There is, therefore, a danger in over emphasizing the significance of altruism or public opinion as determinants in Canadian peacekeeping policy; doing so, implies Canada peacekeeps primarily to reinforce our own self-image and to preserve a national symbol. James Earys’ satirical portrait of the Canadian peacekeeper as a “Sir Galahad, sword gleaming, white horse prancing, knight-errantry shining, rushing in to save lesser breeds from the consequences of their own miscalculations, greed, and stupidity,” is, in some ways, still an apt critique of Canadian peacekeeping. To understand fully the reasons why Canada was so committed to ONUC, Eayr’s altruistic image should be balanced by John Holmes’ admonition to search out the element of calculation in the motivations for Canadian foreign policy. Canada’s Congo policy was shaped by self-interest and pragmatism.

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7 James Eayrs, “Military Policy and Middle-Power,” in *Canada’s Role as a Middle Power*, Ed. J King Gordon (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1966) 81.
Appendix 1

Selected Articles of the United Nations Charter

Article 2, paragraph 7

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

Article 24, paragraph 1

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.
Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 99

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.
Appendix 2

Selected United Nations Resolutions Pertaining to the Congo

Security Council Resolution, 14 July 1960 [S/4387]

The Security Council,

Considering the report of the Secretary-General on a request for United Nations action in relation to the Republic of the Congo,
Considering the request for military assistance addressed to the Secretary-General by the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo (document S/4382),
1. Calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw their troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo;
2. Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance, as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government, with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as appropriate.

adopted 8 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions [China, France, United Kingdom]

Security Council Resolution, 22 July 1960 [S4405]

The Security Council,

Having considered the first report by the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution S/4387 of 14 July 1960 (document S/4389),
Appreciating the work of the Secretary-General and the support so readily and so speedily given to him by all Member States invited by him to give assistance,
Noting that as stated by the Secretary-General the arrival of the troops of the United Nations Force in Leopoldville has already had a salutary effect,
Recognizing that an urgent need still exists to continue and to increase such efforts,
Considering that the complete restoration of law and order in the Republic of the Congo would effectively contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security,
Recognizing that the Security Council recommended the admission of the Republic of the Congo to membership in the United Nations as a unit,
1. *Calls upon* the government of Belgium to implement speedily the Security Council resolution of 14 July 1960, on the withdrawal of their troops and authorizes the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to this effect;

2. *Requests* all States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of Congo of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo;

3. *Commends* the Secretary-General for the prompt action he has taken to carry out resolution S/4387 of the Security Council and his first report;

4. *Invites* the specialized agencies of the United Nations to render to the Secretary-General such assistance as he may require;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to report further to the Security Council as appropriate.

adopted unanimously

Security Council Resolution, 9 August 1960 [S4426]

*The Security Council.*

Recalling its resolution of 22 July (S/4405), *inter alia*, calling upon the Government of Belgium to implement speedily the Security Council resolution of 14 July (S/4387) on the withdrawal of their troops and authorizing the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to this effect,

*Having noted* the second report by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the aforesaid two resolutions and his statements before the Council.

*Having considered* the statements made by the representatives of Belgium and the Republic of the Congo this Council at this meeting,

*Noting with satisfaction* the progress made by the United Nations in carrying out the Security Council resolutions in respect of the territory of the Republic of the Congo other than the Province of Katanga,

*Noting* however that the United Nations had been prevented from implementing the aforesaid resolutions in the Province of Katanga although it was ready, and in fact attempted, to do so,

*Recognizing* that the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Province of Katanga will be a positive contribution to and essential for the proper implementation of the Security Council resolutions,

1. *Confirms* the authority given to the Secretary-General by the Security Council resolutions of 14 July and 22 July 1960 and requests him to continue to carry out the responsibility placed on him thereby;
2. *Calls upon* the Government of Belgium to withdraw immediately its troops from the Province of Katanga under speedy modalities determined by the Secretary-General and to assist in every possible way the implementation of the Council's resolutions;

3. *Declares* that the entry of the United Nations Force into the Province of Katanga is necessary for the full implementation of this resolution;

4. *Reaffirms* that the United Nations Force in the Congo will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise;

5. *Calls upon* all Member States, in accordance with Articles 25 and 49 of the Charter, to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council and to afford mutual assistance in carrying out measures decided upon by the Security Council;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to implement this resolution and to report further to the Security Council as appropriate.

adopted 9 votes to 0, with 2 abstentions [France, Italy]

*General Assembly Resolution, 20 September 1960 [1474 (ES-IV)]*

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the situation in the Republic of the Congo,

*Taking note* of the resolutions of 14 July, 22 July and 9 August 1960 of the Security Council,

*Taking into account* the unsatisfactory economic and political conditions that continue in the Republic of the Congo,

*Considering* that, with a view to preserving the unity, territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, to protecting and advancing the welfare of its people, and to safeguarding international peace, it is essential for the United Nations to continue to assist the Central Government of the Congo,

1. *Fully supports* the resolutions of 14 and 22 July and 9 August 1960 of the Security Council;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to take vigorous action in accordance with the terms of the aforesaid resolutions and to assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order throughout the territory of the Republic of the Congo and to safeguard its unity, territorial integrity and political independence in the interests of international peace and security;

3. *Appeals* to all Congolese within the Republic of the Congo to seek a speedy solution by peaceful means of all their internal conflicts for the unity and integrity of the Congo, with the assistance, as appropriate, of Asian and African representatives appointed by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, in consultation with the Secretary-General, for the purpose of conciliation;
4. *Appeals* to all Member Governments for urgent voluntary contributions to a United Nations Fund for the Congo to be used under United Nations control and in consultation with the Central Government for the purpose of rendering the fullest possible assistance to achieve the objective mentioned in the preamble;

5. *Requests:*
   (a) All States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Republic of the Congo of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the unity, territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo;
   (b) All Member States in accordance with Articles 25 and 49 of the Charter of the United Nations, to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council and to afford mutual assistance in carrying out measures decided upon by the Security Council;

6. Without prejudice to the sovereign rights of the Republic of the Congo, call upon all States to refrain from the direct and indirect provision of arms or other materials of war and military personnel and other assistance for military purposes in the Congo during the temporary period of military assistance through the United Nations, except upon the request of the United Nations through the Secretary-General for carrying out the purposes of this resolution and of the resolutions of 14 and 22 July and 9 August 1960 of the Security Council.

adopted 70 votes to 0, with 11 abstentions [Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian SSR, Union of South Africa, USSR]

**Security Council Resolution, 20-21 February 1961 [S4741]**

A

*The Security Council.*

*Having considered* the situation in the Congo,

*Having learnt with deep regret* the announcement of the killing of the Congolese leaders, Mr. Patrice Lumumba, Mr. Maurice Mpolo and Mr. Joseph Okito.

*Deeply concerned* at the grave repercussions of these crimes and the danger of widespread civil war and bloodshed in the Congo and the threat to international peace and security,

*Noting* the Report of the Secretary-General's Special Representative (S/4691) dated 12 February 1961 bringing to light the development of a serious civil war situation and preparations therefore.

1. Urges that the United Nations take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the
halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort;

2. Urges that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries;

3. Calls upon all States to take immediate and energetic measures to prevent the departure of such personnel for the Congo from their territories, and for the denial of transit and other facilities to them;

4. Decides that an immediate and impartial investigation be held in order to ascertain the circumstances of the death of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues and that the perpetrators of these crimes be punished;


B

The Security Council.

Gravely concerned at the continuing deterioration in the Congo, and the prevalence of conditions which seriously imperil peace and order, and the unity and territorial integrity of the Congo, and threaten international peace and security,

Noting with deep regret and concern the systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the general absence of rule of law in the Congo,

Recognizing the imperative necessity of the restoration of parliamentary institutions in the Congo in accordance with the fundamental law of the country, so that the will of the people should be reflected through the freely elected Parliament,

Convinced that the solution of the problem of the Congo lies in the hands of the Congolese people themselves without any interference from outside and that there can be no solution with conciliation.

Convinced further that the imposition of any solution, including the formation of any government not based on genuine conciliation would, far from settling any issues, greatly enhance the dangers of conflict within the Congo and threat to international peace and security,

1. Urges the convening of the Parliament and the taking of the necessary protective measures in that connexion;

2. Urges that Congolese armed units and personnel should be re-organized and brought under discipline and control, and arrangements be made on impartial and equitable bases to that end and with a view to the elimination of any possibility of interference by such units and personnel in the political life of the Congo;

3. Calls upon all States to extend their full cooperation and assistance and take such measures as may be necessary on their part, for the implementation of this resolution.

adopted 9 votes to 0, with 2 abstentions [France, USSR]
General Assembly Resolution, 15 April 1961 [1599 (XV)]

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 1474 (ES-IV) of 20 September 1960 and the Security Council resolutions of 14 July, 22 July and 9 August 1960 and, more particularly, that of 21 February 1961, urging the immediate withdrawal and evacuation of all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries,

Deploring that despite all these requests the Government of Belgium has not yet complied with the resolutions and that such non-compliance has mainly contributed to the further deterioration of the situation in the Congo.

Convinced that the central factor in the present grave situation in the Congo is the continued presence of Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers, and mercenaries, in total disregard of repeated resolutions of the United Nations.

1. Calls upon the Government of Belgium to accepts its responsibilities as a Member of the United Nations and to comply fully and promptly with the will of the Security Council and of the General Assembly;

2. Decides that all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries, shall be completely withdrawn and evacuated;

3. Calls upon all States to exert their influence and extend their co-operation to effect the implementation of the present resolution.

adopted 61 to 5, with 33 abstentions [Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Laos, Luxembourq, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States]

General Assembly Resolution, 15 April 1961 [1600 (XV)]

The General Assembly,

Having considered the situation in the Republic of the Congo,

Gravely concerned at the danger of civil war and foreign intervention and at the threat to international peace and security,

Taking note of the report of the Conciliation commission appointed in pursuance of paragraph 3 of its resolution 1474 (ES-IV) of 20 September 1960,

Mindful of the desire of the Congolese people for a solution of the crisis in the Congo through national reconciliation and return to constitutionality without delay,
Noting with concern the many difficulties that have arisen in the way of effective functioning of the United Nations operation in the Congo,

1. Reaffirms its resolution 1474 (ES-IV) and the Security Council resolutions on the situation in the Congo, more particularly the Council resolution of 21 February 1961;
2. Calls upon the Congolese authorities concerned to desist from attempting a military solution to their problems and resolve them by peaceful means;
3. Considers it essential that necessary and effective measures be taken by the Secretary-General immediately to prevent the introduction of arms, military equipment and supplies into the Congo, except in conformity with the resolutions of the United Nations;
4. Urges the immediate release of all members of Parliament and members of provincial assemblies and all other political leaders now under detention;
5. Urges the convening of Parliament without delay, with safe conduct and security extended to the members of Parliament by the United Nations, so that Parliament may take the necessary decisions concerning the formation of a national government and the future constitutional structure of the Republic of the Congo in accordance with the constitutional processes laid down in the Loi fondamentale;
6. Decides to appoint a Commission of Conciliation of seven members to be designated by the President of the General Assembly to assist the Congolese leaders to achieve reconciliation and to end the political crisis;
7. Urges the Congolese authorities to co-operate fully in the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly and to accord all facilities essential to the performance by the United Nations of functions envisaged in those resolutions.

adopted 60 to 16, with 23 abstentions [Afghanistan, Belgium, Cambodia, Ceylon, Colombia, Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, France, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Laos, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Union of South Africa, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia]

Security Council Resolution, 24 November 1961 [S5002]

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions S/4387, S/4405, S/4426 and S/4741,
Recalling further General Assembly resolutions 1474 (ES-IV), 1592 (XV), 1599 (XV), 1600 (XV) and 1601 (XV),
Reaffirming the policies and purposes of the United Nations with respect to the Congo (Leopoldville) as set out in the aforesaid resolutions, namely:
(a) To maintain the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo;
(b) To assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order;
(c) To prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo;
(d) To secure the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all foreign military, para-military and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries; and
(e) To render technical assistance,

Welcoming the restoration of the national Parliament of the Congo in accordance with the Loi fondamentale and the consequent formation of a Central Government on 2 August 1961,

Deploiring all armed action in opposition to the authority of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, specifically secessionist activities and armed action now being carried on by the Provincial Administration of Katanga with the aid of external resources and foreign mercenaries, and completely rejecting the claim that Katanga is a 'sovereign independent nation',

Noting with deep regret the recent and past actions of violence against United Nations personnel,

Recognizing the Government of the Republic of the Congo as exclusively responsible for the conduct of the external affairs of the Congo,

Bearing in mind the imperative necessity of speedy and effective action to implement fully the policies and purposes of the United Nations in the Congo to end the unfortunate plight of the Congolese people, necessary both in the interests of world peace and international cooperation, and stability and progress of Africa as a whole,

1. Strongly deprecates the secessionist activities illegally carried out by the provincial administration of Katanga, with the aid of external resources and manned by foreign mercenaries;
2. Further deprecates the armed action against United Nations forces and personnel in the pursuit of such activities;
3. Insists that such activities shall cease forthwith, and calls upon all concerned to desist therefrom;
4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to take vigorous action, including the use of requisite measures of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries as laid down in paragraph A-2 of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961;
5. Further requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary measures to prevent the entry or return of such elements under whatever guise and also of arms, equipment or other material in support of such activities;
6. Requests all States to refrain from the supply of arms, equipment or other material which could be used for warlike purposes, and to take the necessary measures to prevent their nationals from doing the same, and also to deny transportation and transit facilities for such supplies across their territories, except in accordance with the decisions, policies and purposes of the United Nations;
7. Calls upon all Member States to refrain from promoting, condoning, or giving support by acts of omission or commission, directly or indirectly, to activities against
the United Nations often resulting in armed hostilities against the United Nations forces and personnel;

8. **Declares** that all secessionist activities against the Republic of the Congo are contrary to the *Loi fondamentale* and Security Council decisions and specifically **demands** that such activities which are now taking place in Katanga shall cease forthwith;

9. **Declares** full and firm support for the Central Government of the Congo, and the determination to assist that Government in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations to maintain law and order and national integrity, to provide technical assistance and to implement those decisions;

10. **URGES** all Member States to lend their support, according to their national procedures, to the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo, in conformity with the Charter and the decisions of the United Nations;

11. **REQUESTS** all Member States to refrain from any action which may directly or indirectly impede the policies and purposes of the United Nations in the Congo and is contrary to its decisions and the general purpose of the Charter.

adopted 9 votes to 0, with 2 abstentions [France, United Kingdom]
Appendix 3

57th Canadian Signal Unit

**Headquarters**
- Commanding Officer
- Adjutant
- Orderly Room Clerks
- Public Relations

**ONUC HQ Detachment**
- 12 man C Pro C section
- numerous Officers and NCOs on staff in branches of ONUC HQ

**Administrative Squadron**
- Pay
- Medical
- Quartermaster
- Transport
- Food Services
- Movement Control
- Pioneer
- Chaplain
- General Duty

**Communications Squadron**

**Leopoldville**
- Tape Relay Centre
- Message Centre
- Crypto Centre
- Transmitter Station
- Despatch Rider Service (within Leopoldville)
- ONUC HQ Telephone System (Operation/Maint.)
- UN Switchboard at HQ Katanga (Elisabethville)

**Local Detachments (Territorial Commands)**
- 1 Commanding Officer
- 3 Radio/Telegraph Operators
- 2 Teletype Operators
- 2 Cryptographers
- 1 Radio Equipment Technician
- 1 Teletype & Cypher Equipment Technician

* number and location variable (according to ONUC requirements)
Appendix 4

The Congo Republic
Deployment of Canadian Signals Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leopoldville</td>
<td>August 1960 – June 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coquilhatville</td>
<td>August 1960 – August 1961</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luluabourg</td>
<td>August 1960 – May 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabethville</td>
<td>August 1960 – June 1964</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stanleyville</td>
<td>August 1960 – January 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamina</td>
<td>September 1960 – February 1964</td>
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<td>Gemena</td>
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<td>Albertville</td>
<td>March 1961 – June 1963</td>
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<td>Bukavu</td>
<td>August 1961 – April 1963</td>
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<td>Kindu</td>
<td>February 1962 – June 1962</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kongolo</td>
<td>December 1962 – March 1963</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goma, Kolwezi, Kikwit</td>
<td>detachments maintained for relatively brief durations</td>
</tr>
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