

**ENEMY AT THE GATES: AN ANALYSIS OF CHANGES
AT THE GLOBE AND MAIL AFTER THE
LAUNCH OF THE NATIONAL POST, 1998-2003**

By

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and
Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts in Business Administration

Sprott School of Business
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario



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Your file *Votre référence*
ISBN: 978-0-494-27007-3
Our file *Notre référence*
ISBN: 978-0-494-27007-3

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Abstract

The Globe and Mail's monopolistic position as the only national newspaper in Canada was challenged in 1998 with the launch of the National Post. The Globe's leaders responded by launching a major change initiative aimed at updating the paper to the new competitive environment. The aim of this thesis was to extrapolate a model of best practice from the existing body of change management literature and use it to evaluate the change efforts at the Globe, while seeking to adapt theories of change for the media / newspapers. The thesis concludes that change management theories seem to, in general, apply to the newspaper context. A major discrepancy, however, appears to be empowerment and participative leadership, which apparently can be bypassed by newspaper leaders with no apparent ill effects on a change effort. The other principal conclusion is that a vision can be applied by more than one change leader.

Acknowledgements

Writing this MBA thesis proved to be a much longer and more complex process than I had originally envisioned. The topic that I chose – despite dealing with what I consider to be one of the most important events in Canadian media history – had not attracted any previous scholarly attention, nor had the broader theme of change management within the media. This put additional constraints on my work, but also allowed me to develop a number of ideas and approaches on my own. In this process of finding the best intellectual responses to the case, I was guided by Professor Linda Duxbury, to whom I am most grateful for her advice and vast knowledge, as well as her personal style of supervision. The latter gave me considerable personal freedom to explore the topic yet ensured that I stayed – relatively – focused on the topic at hand. I learned greatly from this experience and am very proud of this final product, and I feel must give much of the credit for this achievement to Professor Duxbury.

I would also like to extend my deepest thanks to the other two members of my committee – Prof. Ian Lee and Prof. Christopher Dornan - for their insightful remarks, creative criticism, and continuous support throughout the project. I would also like to thank Mr. Robert Sibley, my external examiner, for having been very meticulous in reading the thesis and giving me the best feedback I could have expected. Also, thanks to Prof. Roland Thomas for chairing the defense in such a way that it was an intellectually stimulating and memorable experience.

This work could not have been accomplished without many people who shared their time and insight with me by guiding me through the intricacies of the newspaper war and the changes at the Globe and Mail. These were key players in the Globe's change process. They were William Thorsell, Roger Parkinson, Richard Addis, Phillip Crawley, and Stuart Garner. I would especially like to thank Mr. Chris Cobb, author of *Ego and Ink*, the only book on this subject, who, besides granting me an interview, offered some invaluable early advice and guidance on the direction and context of this thesis.

The School's administrative staff deserves separate thanks for their efficiency and kindness in facilitating the formal aspects of this thesis and defense. I am also grateful to Ginette Lafleur for helping me with logistics and some aspects of the technical editing of the final draft of the thesis.

On a personal note, I would like to thank my parents, Ewa and Piotr, for their advice and support throughout this process. And my grandparents, Nina and Michal, for believing in my ability to accomplish my goals, no matter how bleak circumstances might seem at times.

Gratitude is also due to Niels and Olaf for equal measures of distraction and moral support. And finally, kudos to Kristian Roberts, who completely outside their intended context, yet somehow still in their entirety, commands a masterful grasp of the crucial concepts of portfolio management and buying low & selling high.

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1. Statement of Thesis

The purpose of my thesis was to undertake an in-depth study of the managerial decisions that guided the changes implemented at the Globe and Mail (also referred to throughout this thesis as “the Globe”) after its monopoly on the national newspaper market was disrupted by the creation of the National Post (also referred to in the thesis as “the Post”) in 1998. I specifically looked at the period between 1998 and 2003, when the most heated battles of the war had already been fought and the Globe had reemerged with an advantage in circulation and readership (Cobb, 2004).

I first evaluated the company in terms of its maturity and the types of changes it undertook; then, having placed it within this narrower framework, I diagnosed the Globe and Mail’s change initiative by focusing on the principal factors for change success identified in two widely recognized models of change (Jick, 1991, and Kotter, 1995 and 1999). Factors examined included leadership, vision, communication, and institutionalization of culture change. Qualitative research was undertaken within the organization in an attempt to compare and contrast its actions to those identified as best practice and develop a more profound understanding of change processes in a news media institution. It is hoped that such an analysis will help academics, journalists, and media managers by giving a clearer picture of what the Globe did right and wrong in waging Canada’s largest newspaper war.

This work will contribute to the existing body of literature about change management by providing in-depth analysis of a fascinating example of change. This is a case where a company with a virtual monopoly was challenged by a powerful newcomer and attempted to implement change not through one, but through a number of different

leaders (namely the CEO and the different publishers and editors-in-chief who held the paper's reins during the period of time in question). The advantage of such a case study is that it looks at a real-life situation where the effects of various inter-related aspects of change management - usually examined separately in the literature – can be examined simultaneously. This brings together the general (change management theory) with the specific (the details of the case of the Globe and Mail). Moreover, no study has looked at the changes at the Globe and Mail, a venerable media institution, from the perspective of change management. This makes my study beneficial to future leaders undertaking change efforts within the publication industry.

2. Background

The Globe and Mail, established in 1843, was a traditional, up-market paper. It dealt with national and international politics in great depth, and was respected for its analysis. It also had a large Arts section and appealed to Canada's intellectual classes. But its drab appearance and prolix content led to it being labeled the "Grey Lady on Front Street."

Starting in the 1960's, the Canadian newspaper market had undergone consolidation under a few large corporations that controlled the nation's daily newspapers. Because these corporations were publicly traded, they had to serve not only their readers, but also their shareholders' demands for profitability. These circumstances – aside from being heavily criticized by the journalistic community – led to 58.7 percent of Canada's newspapers being owned by the Southam (later bought by Hollinger and then CanWest) and Thomson (the owners of the Globe and Mail) groups (Edge, 2003).

As media baron Conrad Black gained power internationally, with the purchase of the London Daily Telegraph, Chicago Sun-Times, and Jerusalem Post, he turned his attention to the Canadian market. When his attempts to buy the Globe from the Thomson family in the mid- and late 1990's failed, he chose to launch a new national paper, one that would offer what the Globe didn't and for the first time challenge the Grey Lady's monopoly (Cobb, 2004).

The National Post, launched in 1998, aimed at being a modern, tongue-in-cheek daily that appealed to a wider audience than the Globe; it was graphic and photo-heavy, offered quirky stories and, as a first among Canadian papers, ran front-page editorials, wearing its – often controversial – politics on its sleeve. The paper's launch was bolstered by Black's ownership of the Southam publishing network that controlled many of the nation's metropolitan dailies and provided the new paper with a wealth of journalistic talent, distribution networks, and printing presses (Cobb, 2004).


The launch of the Post challenged the Globe on many fronts: distribution, where free copies of the Post inundated the streets of Canadian cities; advertising, with companies willing to give the upstart publication a chance; and content, where the Post offered a tongue-in-cheek, middle-of-the-road, sports- and entertainment-heavy alternative to the venerable Globe. Challenged for the first time, the Globe was not only blindsided by the Post's onslaught but faced what columnist Jan Wong referred to as an "identity crisis" (Cobb, 2004). It faced dropping circulation and wavering advertisers who were willing to give the new paper a try to reach a broader audience. In other words, the Globe realized it had grown old and, perhaps, out of touch.

The Globe finally introduced colour to its pages and tried updating itself, but it was not enough to hold off the Post's advance. Deciding that drastic measures were in order, the Globe's publisher and CEO, Englishman Phillip Crowley, reached to London's Fleet Street to find veterans of that country's constant, brutal daily newspaper competition. He drafted new editor-in-chief Richard Addis, and Addis in turn chose Canadian-born, London-based Cynthia Freeland as his second-in-command. The new crew, joined by a few other Britons, started a major overhaul of the Globe, making it more similar to British papers and, inadvertently, to the Post. But many of Addis' decisions, including a "dumbing-down" of the Globe's content, lowered morale at the paper, estranged long-term staffers, and angered some loyal readers who, in letters to the paper, accused the new Globe of lowering itself to the level of "news lite" (Bell, 2000).

In 2002, with the Post in retreat (Cobb, 2004), a Globe veteran, Ed Greenspon, took the helm from Addis and promised to lead the paper to greatness. But the current state of the Globe begs the question: in gaining the upper hand in the war (Mattos, 2003), did the Globe sacrifice the things that made it one of Canada's most respected papers?

The aim of this thesis is to examine in detail the changes undertaken by the Globe and Mail after the launch of the National Post, focusing on the managerial and editorial decisions of the different leaders at the paper. The literature review that follows will describe the framework for this examination and for the subsequent evaluation of the success of the change effort.

FIGURE 1 - PERTINENT DATES IN STAFFING AND CHANGE PROCESSES AT THE GLOBE AND THE POST



This thesis begins with an in-depth literature review of the existing change management literature in selected areas as well as a review of secondary sources pertaining to the newspaper war. This is followed by a discussion of the methodology which was applied in carrying out the study, including a discussion of the scope of the study and an introduction to the field study itself. This is followed by the analysis of the field study.

The literature review is divided into sections that create a framework for the thesis. The analysis will be split between the actions taken by two groups of individuals. The rationale for this division is explained in the Methodology section. The final

evaluation of the change at the Globe and Mail presented in the final section of the thesis will be an aggregate of these different areas of inquiry.

3. Literature review

The literature review will cover the aspects of the change management literature that were used to evaluate the changes at the Globe. Analysis of secondary sources as well as the formulation and analysis of the interview questions with the change leaders at the Globe are based upon the subsections that follow.

3.1. Putting the change into context:

Before undertaking an analysis of the specific aspects of the changes at the Globe and Mail, it is important to first broadly define the company at the time of the start of its change process by placing it within an appropriate theoretical framework of change management. The following literature will be used in this thesis to classify and analyze the organizational situation of the company, the types of changes it undertook, and the reasons for these changes. An understanding of this background information will permit the change effort to be evaluated more precisely through comparison with existing models. This, in turn, will help us put the change process into a context which should facilitate our ability to evaluate the change using the specific criteria outlined in the statement of thesis.

3.1.1. Types of organizations

An analysis of the Globe and Mail and its reasons for change should logically start from an assessment of the situation of the newspaper before it embarked on the road of change. Beatty and Ulrich (1991) suggest that as companies age, they progress through life-cycles. These start with the initial entrepreneurial phase of establishment, which is followed by an evolutionary growth phase, then slows down into a state of maturity, marked by stability. The change ends with the establishment of standard operating procedures that “become irrevocable patterns of behavior that eventually lead to structural inertia ... [and] an avoidance of challenges that can lead to success” (Beatty & Ulrich, 1991). This, in turn, if not checked, can lead to decline due to a loss of the ability to remain adaptable and competitive.

The goal of companies who become mature, claim the authors, is to renew themselves. They argue that the aim of such a process is to “learn how organizations and employees can change faster than changing business conditions to become more competitive ... to change faster on the inside than the organization is changing on the outside” (Beatty & Ulrich, 1991). This framework has been selected for use in this thesis because in the opinion of the author and others (Cobb, 2004, Chiu, 2005), the Globe and Mail was indeed a mature organization that, between 1998-2003, embarked on a major renewal initiative brought about by the launch of a competing national paper.

Beatty and Ulrich suggest that the greatest hindrance to a process of renewal is the shared mindset that arises within an organization, which is linked to all aspects of operations ranging from strategic focus to individual employee rewards and promotions. Furthermore, companies with established mores and methods of operating tend to draw

employees who self-select into the organization because of its particular set of norms.

This means that change is made even more difficult because mature companies are staffed by a particular “type” of person.

Beatty and Ulrich argue that for a company to renew, it must become more flexible and that “traditional control measures must be replaced with an empowered work force ... that acts out of commitment to purpose without the traditional boundaries and narrow mindsets of mature organizations” (Beatty & Ulrich, 1991). It must be noted that the authors are basing this statement on the assumption that employee empowerment and increased autonomy are preferable to a more hierarchical structure.

The authors present four “principles of renewal” that they state will increase the probability for successful renewal if “understood and practiced.” These are:

1. Instilling a customer perspective and focusing on customer demands in order to gain a sustained competitive advantage in the market. This means gauging whether current mindsets and practices have become incongruent with customer demands and expectations. This criterion implies that the company’s way of doing things should be evaluated from the customer’s perspective.
2. Increasing organizational capacity for change through alignment of activities toward common goals, removing internal and external “boundaries,” and developing the ability to learn from previous actions.
3. Altering both “hardware” (strategy, structure, and systems) and “software” (mindset and individual employee behaviours).

4. Creating empowered employees who act as leaders at all levels of the organization, giving individuals responsibility and making them accountable for activities within their specific domain.

Having established these criteria, the authors outline five stages of renewal. These are as follows:

1. Restructuring: downsizing and delayering occur as the organization becomes “lean and mean”; leaders require courage and conviction
2. Bureaucracy bashing: unnecessary meetings, reports, and policies are eliminated; employees become rewarded for adherence to new organizational norms; leaders need to embody the bureaucracy bashing they advocate
3. Employee empowerment stage: openness and dialogue between management and employees is facilitated, and employees are empowered to change and improve the organization; leaders need to act as facilitators and learn to share authority
4. Continuous improvements: new commitments need to become a sustainable long-term process; leader needs to espouse new approaches and philosophy
5. Cultural change: as an outgrowth of the other four factors, employee mindsets are changed and the company ceases to be “mature” in its operations and culture.

It is important to note that this article seems to be based on studies of large organizations. Assumptions such as the necessity for layoffs during a renewal process may not necessarily hold for smaller organizations that, although they might be considered “mature” according to the authors’ criteria, do not necessarily have a surplus

of employees (their “maturity” is caused by bureaucratic and cultural faults not necessarily related to overstaffing or directly to the staff themselves).

This article and the criteria presented in it will be used to determine whether or not the Globe and Mail was, in fact, a mature organization according to Beatty and Ulrich’s definition and, if so, how its change efforts compared to the renewal process outlined by the authors.

3.1.2. Types of Change

There are different kinds of changes that can be undertaken by organizations. These depend on a number of factors, including whether the changes are internally motivated or forced by external factors. The Globe and Mail undertook two phases of changes – one that began before the launch of the National Post (internally motivated) and one that followed it (externally motivated). While the main aim of the thesis is to examine the changes that were undertaken after the Post’s launch, these changes appear from preliminary readings to have been heavily influenced by earlier, rudimentary attempts at change (such as the introduction of colour to the Globe and Mail). In this thesis, models developed by Nadler and Tushman (1989) and Christensen and Overdorf (2000) will be used to classify the types of changes made at the Globe. Such a classification will again help us put the change efforts at the Globe and Mail in context with respect to the change management literature. Details on the models are provided below.

Nadler and Tushman (1989) present a matrix to identify four types of changes, each of which is defined by whether or not it is anticipatory or reactive, and strategic or

incremental. They dub changes that are incremental and anticipatory as tuning. These changes aim to increase efficiency but are not a response to an immediate problem. A change that is incremental and reactive is called an adaptation. This type of change is brought about by external events (environment, competition, etc.) but does not require fundamental, organization-wide change. A re-creation, on the other hand, is a change that is strategic and reactive, meaning that it is caused by external events that pose a critical threat to the organization. They require what the authors refer to as “frame-breaking” changes, ones that drastically alter the organization inside and out and can affect culture, strategy, and a number of other factors.

The authors’ focus, however, is on reorientation, strategic and anticipatory change made by an organization “with the luxury of time afforded by having anticipated the external events that may ultimately require change.” It appears from preliminary research that the Globe and Mail did have the luxury of time when it attempted slight incremental changes at first, but that these efforts were retarded and for the most part prevented by internal conflict (between various senior editors and the publishers) about the nature and purpose of the paper (Cobb, 2004). Reorientations are marked by making major changes without breaking the organizational “frame.”

Effective reorientations, the authors suggest, need to adhere to a number of principles, including the diagnosis principle, the vision principle, the energy principle, and the centrality principle. The “diagnosis principle” states that successful reorientations are based on careful preparation and planning including diagnostic thinking, identifying critical success factors, and analyzing organizational strengths and weaknesses. Managing reorientation is based on “managing the *what* as well as the *how*” of the

change – its content and the method for its implementation. The “vision principle” states that a clear vision must be formulated that captures the nature of the changes to be undertaken. The “energy principle” states that change implementers need to generate energy for the change to occur. This energy, in turn, is rooted in a sense of urgency or “pain” that makes members of the organization turn away from the status quo and embrace the change. This is particularly difficult in a reorientation because there is often no clearly visible reason to experience “pain.” The “centrality principle” states that all changes must be directly linked to an organization’s core strategic issues because, if they are not seen to be central to survival, they will not be engaging.

Disruptive change (a “re-creation” in Nadler and Tushman’s terminology), on the other hand, is reactive and strategic. It is caused by a dramatic shift in a company’s competitive environment, such as the entry into the market of a new competitor (Christensen & Overdorf, 2000). Christensen and Overdorf suggest that “it’s not that managers ... can’t see disruptive change coming. Usually they can. Nor do they lack the resources to confront them. ... What managers lack is a habit of thinking about their organization’s capabilities as carefully as they think about individual people’s capabilities” (Christensen & Overdorf, 2000).

They posit that in times of such change, drastic measures should not be taken and any actions should be based on a careful analysis of the organization’s capacity for change. The factors that influence this are a company’s resources, processes (patterns of interaction, coordination, and communication – both formal and informal), and values (defined by the authors as “standards by which employees set priorities that enable them to judge whether an order is attractive or unattractive”). Mature companies have the most

deeply embedded values and processes, ones that have been successful for so long as to appear flawless. Within these processes reside specific capabilities developed to deal with those exact processes. For this reason, “industry leaders never introduce – or cope well with – disruptive innovations” (Christensen & Overdorf, 2000).

The solution to coping with disruptive change is the creation and nurturing of new capabilities. This can be accomplished internally through teams and organizational learning or gotten from outside the organization through acquisitions.

The analysis contained in these articles will allow for the Globe and Mail to be situated within a specific context of organizational change. It is expected that its actions will be easier to evaluate when considered within the broader classification of the type of change the company was undergoing. It is hypothesized that the Globe and Mail’s changes can be classified and explained (based on Nadler and Tushman’s matrix) as first having been a reorientation and then, after the Post’s launch, a re-creation. As the sketch of changes at the Globe and Mail presented by Chris Cobb suggests (Cobb, 2004), the paper sensed impending turbulence in the market and attempted a recreation that lasted until just after the launch of the National Post. This was not enough and the company embarked on a process that appears more congruent with the definition of a disruptive change (re-creation) during the years focused on for the purpose of this thesis. Change is undeniably a difficult process, and these articles suggest how this difficulty can be minimized. The most important factor, it seems, is careful diagnosis of the organization, including its capabilities, which in turn allows for sound visioning and action.

3.1.3. Reasons for change

Organizations do not simply decide to undertake change overnight. Change processes are lengthy, costly, and by no means sure to succeed. Therefore, it is the opinion of the author that organizations need compelling reasons to alter or abandon current methods of operating and attempt to adopt new ones.

Spector (1989) states that business leaders have come to a two-fold consensus regarding the current demands for doing business: massive change is inevitable due to the nature of the competitive business landscape and adaptable organizations will have an advantage over static ones. He argued that in 1989 the greatest challenge facing companies was actually deciding to undertake the change effort. This statement seems equally true today.

In two influential papers, “Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail” and “Leading Change: The Eight Steps to Transformation,” Kotter ranks “not establishing a great enough sense of urgency” as the leading reason for the failure of change initiatives (Kotter, 1995 and 1999). A sense of urgency can be broadly defined as the organization-wide realization that business as usual is no longer competitively possible and that the status quo must be altered in the immediate future. Kotter refers to this as a “burning platform” that necessarily elicits a response and a need to engage in change.

Management needs to monitor a company’s performance and environment and react accordingly, meaning making changes where changes are necessary; “this step is essential because just getting the transformation program started requires the aggressive

cooperation of many individuals. Without motivation, people won't help and the effort goes nowhere" (Kotter, 1999).

In order for a sense of urgency to be created, the whole organization needs to be galvanized behind the change; it cannot be one person's initiative that is mandated down throughout the organization. Obviously, losing money or market share or other tangible signs of poor performance can help create this sense of urgency. A frank and open discussion throughout the company at all hierarchical levels of the competition and current organizational situation is necessary because it will "make the status quo seem more dangerous than launching into the unknown" (Spector, 1989).

Once this sense of urgency is accepted by the organization, powerful leaders (another reason for change effort success discussed later) committed to change are needed to drive the need for a change effort home; "transformations often begin, and begin *well*, when an organization has a new head who is a good leader and who sees the need for major change" (Kotter, 1999).

These articles establish that a necessary prerequisite for a successful change effort is a sense of dissatisfaction with the status quo combined with a sense of urgency to bring about change. The factors discussed will allow for an informed analysis of the reasons the Globe and Mail decided to undertake changes and whether or not management did enough to foster dissatisfaction with "business as usual" to create broad-based support for their initiatives.

3.2. Models used to evaluate change initiatives

Most literature regarding change focuses on one particular aspect of the change process, be it leadership, vision, resistance, or any one of a number of factors. It seems important, however, to find general, overarching models that present a more complete view of change to serve as a basis for the evaluation of the Globe and Mail. The two models selected for use in this thesis are Jick's "Ten Commandments" and Kotter's "Eight Steps". These models were chosen because they represent the prescriptions of two preeminent authors in the field of change management on how a successful change effort should progress from start to finish. They are both broad in that they do not focus on a particular industry or type of company, yet precise in that they are both step-by-step guidelines on how to confront and excel in organization-wide change. Once these two larger models for an "ideal" change are examined, common factors between them can be established to create a core group of requirements for successful change. These core factors can then be examined in-depth individually to determine a further consensus among change experts on how each factor should best be treated or implemented. This two-fold analysis will lead to the creation of a set of criteria by which the change effort at the Globe and Mail will then be judged.

3.2.1. Jick's Ten Commandments

In an influential article, Jick states that there are numerous pitfalls – many of them unforeseen - in change implementation. Among these is length of the process, lack of coordination or employee capabilities, lack of training and lack of support for the change (Jick, 1991). He notes that change is difficult and fraught with difficulties and unexpected

perils and there is no “silver bullet” approach to change. Jick goes on to identify what he dubs the “Ten Commandments of Change,” ten general principles that apply to most change processes that should be followed to achieve success. The following is an outline of these commandments and how the author suggests they be put into action:

- Analyze the organization and its need for change: Those planning a change need to first analyze the company’s capability for change and change history as well as perform a force field analysis. If the company is change-averse, the effort should be non-threatening and preferably use participative implementation, which includes these steps:
 - Presenting and explaining all change plans fully and skillfully,
 - Making information readily available,
 - Making sure the plans include benefits for end users (customers) and for the organization (including employees),
 - Spending extra time talking and communicating, as well as soliciting and welcoming feedback from the workforce,
 - Starting the change small and simple, and
 - Arranging (on the part of leadership/management) for quick, positive, visible payoffs, and publicizing all successes;
- Create a shared vision and common direction: The organization needs to be united behind a central vision, one that “implementers should ‘translate’ ... so that all employees will understand its implications for their jobs” (Jick, 1991);
- Separate from the past: Those leading the change need to isolate structures and routines that no longer work and vow to move past them, but Jick emphasizes that

it is “also important to hang onto and reinforce those aspects of the organization that bring value to the new vision” (Jick, 1991);

- Create a sense of urgency: The organization needs the sense of a “burning platform” to galvanize behind a change effort. This sense of urgency must be created without appearing to be fabricated in order to avoid it becoming a case of “crying wolf”;
- Create a strong leader role: Organizations undergoing change need a strong change advocate to lead them – someone to guide, drive, and inspire them;
- Line up political sponsorship: “To succeed, a change effort must have broad-based support throughout an organization” so strategists should seek the backing of informal leaders in the organization. Furthermore, they should craft a commitment plan by identifying target individuals whose commitment is needed, defining the critical mass needed to ensure success of change, developing a plan for getting this critical mass’ commitment, and creating monitoring system to assess progress;
- Craft an implementation plan: While those responsible for the change need to make an as-detailed-as-possible plan of everything from meetings to goal meeting, they should also remain flexible;
- Develop enabling structures: Those leading the change need to ensure that the organization’s internal structures are aligned with change goals, thereby eliminating possible hindrances;

- Communicate, involve people, and be honest: “Effective communication is critical from the start” and involves constructive change announcements that should:
 - Be brief and concise
 - Describe where the organization is now, where it needs to go, and how it will get there
 - Identify who will implement and who will be affected
 - Address timing and pacing issues
 - Explain the change’s success criteria and intended evaluation procedures, and related rewards
 - Identify key things that will not be changing
 - Predict some of the negative aspects that targets should anticipate
 - Convey the sponsor’s commitment to change
 - Explain how people will be kept informed throughout the change process
 - Be presented in such a manner that it capitalizes on the diversity of the communication styles of the audience

It should be noted that Jick feels that “real communication requires a dialogue” not a “unilateral directive” – in other words, implementers need to listen to gain broader understanding;

- Reinforce and institutionalize: The new culture must be reinforced, and its importance affirmed. Jick notes that some companies try to institutionalize the “journey” to keep themselves adaptive. He also warns that implementers cannot stick to one plan of action – they need to keep asking questions and assessing new

developments throughout the change process to ensure that desired results are achieved.

This point-by-point outline is useful in that it creates a tangible checklist of suggested steps that must be followed to achieve change success. Combined with the following checklist posited by Kotter, Jick's model will serve as a basis for a compilation of factors that can be deemed critical to change success.

3.2.2. Kotter's Eight-Step Program

Another prescribed framework for successful change is suggested by respected change theorist John Kotter in a set of two articles (1995 and 1999), the latter an expansion of the earlier one. The first seeks to address the reasons for failure of change while the second attempts to prescribe methods for avoiding these particular pitfalls. Kotter presents eight "critical mistakes" that prevent change efforts from succeeding and, by extension, eight steps to follow to increase the chance of change success. Kotter also notes that steps should ideally be followed sequentially because "skipping steps creates only the illusion of speed and never produces a satisfying result" (Kotter, 1999).

The following are the steps and their principal characteristics as well as Kotter's prescriptions for action that accompanies each one:

- Establish a sense of urgency: Managers tend to worry too much or assume they have done enough to motivate people. Their primary duty is to convince the majority of the organization that business as usual is no longer acceptable - they "need to make the status quo seem more dangerous than launching into the

unknown.” This step requires frank discussion about potentially unpleasant facts or what Kotter refers to as “real leadership”;

- Form a powerful guiding coalition: A group of five to ten top people committed to “excellent performance through renewal” are needed to form the backbone of support for the change; this group will then grow into a larger coalition that supports the change, whose principal purpose is to help avoid and/or overcome opposition;
- Create a vision: Leaders need to create a vision of the future that is easy to communicate, and which can be used as a focal point with which plans, directives, and programs can be aligned. Kotter suggests the following rule of thumb: a good vision can be communicated and clearly understood in under five minutes;
- Communicate the vision: The vision needs to be communicated repeatedly using all communication channels available. The goal of the communication effort is to convince people that change is possible. To support this conviction, senior management needs to act according to the vision;
- Empower others to act on the vision: Obstacles to change need to be removed, including changing the organizational structure, compensation system, and management behaviour that might undermine the vision (this includes removing people who may prove to be a hindrance). Once this is accomplished, leaders should encourage risk taking and non-traditional ideas and actions to foster a pro-change atmosphere;
- Plan for and create short-term wins: Leaders of change need to plan for visible recognition of accomplishments of provable goals and performance

improvements. The goal of such actions is to keep the level of urgency high and allow for analysis and revision of vision implementation strategies;

- Consolidate improvements and produce still more change: Because it takes a long time for processes to sink into company culture and there is the threat of regression to the previous (undesirable) state of affairs if change is stopped, Kotter states that it is important that victory is not declared too soon. He posits that a premature assumption of success can kill the momentum of the change;
- Institutionalize new approaches: New behaviours need to become rooted in the organization's norms and corporate culture. An important factor in accomplishing this goal is leaders communicating to employees the link between changes and improved results. If leadership or management changes before this has happened, the new leader must be a change champion and the next generation of management needs to personify the change approach.

Kotter's model is important because it is based on proscriptions rather than prescriptions (i.e.: his prescribed, suggested steps are the opposite of what he perceives to be the key reasons for the failure of change efforts). So while Jick's model can be said to be based on succeeding, Kotter's model is based on not failing. For this reason, the models vary slightly, but they also overlap a considerable amount.

Table 1 maps out the key steps suggested by each author and indicates the steps that parallel each other. In some cases, one step suggested by one author encompasses what the other author describes as two separate steps. The common points (where the two models converge) extrapolated from this comparison are then indicated. These main

points of agreement between the two authors will be used in this thesis as a base for a general model of “ideal” change.

TABLE 1 – A COMPARISON OF JICK’S TEN COMMANDMENTS AND KOTTER’S EIGHT STEPS

Jick’s Ten Commandments	Kotter’s Eight Steps	Common Points
Analyze the organization and its need for change	Establish a sense of urgency	Create a sense of urgency
Create a shared vision and common direction	Create a guiding coalition	
Separate from the past	Create a vision	Create a vision
Create a sense of urgency	Communicate the vision	Create a strong leader role backed by a guiding coalition
Support a strong leader role	Empower others to act on the vision	
Line up political sponsorship	Plan for and create short-term wins	Enable/empower others to act on the vision
Craft an implementation plan	Consolidate improvements	
Develop enabling structures	Institutionalize new approaches	Institutionalize changes and new approaches
Communicate, involve people, and be honest		
Reinforce and institutionalize change		

Given these two models, a few common points (where the two overlap) can be extracted that can be considered general prescriptions for success in change. The following table presents these common factors and their primary parts:

TABLE 2 – COMMON POINTS BETWEEN JICK’S AND KOTTER’S MODELS AND THEIR COMPONENT PARTS

Action	Aspects / Rationale
Create a vision	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.It is necessary to direct the change effort 2.Vision should be translated so that all employees will understand its implications for their jobs 3.Need to create strategies for achieving the vision 4.Use every vehicle possible for communicating the vision
Create a sense of urgency	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.Analyze the organization’s SWOT and its capacity for change 2.Need a “burning platform” 3.Need to openly discuss crises and opportunities 4.Describe where organization is now and how it will get to a preferable future state
Create a strong leadership role	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.A change advocate is needed to guide, drive, and inspire 2.The leader needs to be supported by a guiding coalition/political sponsorship to foster critical mass commitment and overcome resistance 3.Real communication requires a dialogue, not a one-way directive
Enable others to act on the vision	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.Get rid of obstacles to change 2.Encourage non-traditional ideas, activities, and values 3.Plan for short-term, visible, recognizable wins
Institutionalize the changes and new approaches	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.Articulate connection between new behaviour and organizational success 2.Continue reaffirming importance of change and new way of doing things 3.Develop means to ensure leadership development and succession 4.Do not declare victory too soon

The previous list is divided into general prescriptions. More useful for an analysis is a re-organization of the above into specific areas of the change literature that can then be examined in-depth. The following four areas emerge out of such an analysis:

- Vision
- Leadership
- Communication
- Institutionalization of the changes and new approaches

Key literature linking each of these four factors to successful change will be reviewed in the sections below. This review will help us understand how successful change is carved out and will therefore serve in the evaluation of the Globe and Mail's change efforts. The grouping of success factors into existing areas of change literature will allow for each area to be examined separately and then amalgamated according to the above models to create a detailed change success framework. This will allow a detailed evaluation of the Globe and Mail's change effort that is firmly rooted in the extant change literature.

It is important to note at this juncture that due to the number of major topics that need to be researched for this thesis, this review will not be exhaustive. Rather, each section will attempt to include key representative articles in each of the areas.

3.3. Vision and change

Numerous sources describe the importance of a clear vision to a successful change process (Jick, 1989, Nanus, 1996, Collins and Porras, 1996). In general, it is accepted that a good vision is short, creates an attractive picture of an organization's future state, and is able to unite and motivate all members of an organization behind the common goal of achieving this desired state. The sources included in this section will be

instrumental is gauging the validity of the visions of the Globe's various leaders (CEO, editors-in-chief) and whether or not these visions managed to permeate the organization and inspire staff. The aim of this section is examine the literature with a view to establishing the link between the effectiveness – and/or existence – of a vision to guide the change process and the efficacy of its dissemination throughout the company, and successful change.

The articles discussed in this chapter were chosen because they represent different leading authors' views about the nature, purpose, and process of change. These include the goals of the creation of a vision and prescriptions for how it should be created and disseminated.

One of the key authors in the area of vision is Jick. He defines a vision as “an attempt to articulate what a desired future for a company would look like ... ‘an organizational dream’ ” (Jick, 1989). According to Jick, a vision provides a big picture, a large, idyllic goal to which entire organizations and their employees should aspire. Visions during change serve a two-fold purpose: they provide a conceptual framework for understanding an organization's purpose and have an emotional appeal that has a motivational pull. To take, the vision must be consistent with an organization's mission, strategy, and philosophy.

The purpose of a vision is manifold. Most importantly, the vision serves to provide a focus, creating a source of both organizational and personal motivation. It also serves to differentiate the ideal future state from an imperfect present. In addition, it provides an “anchor” in an unstable business world, a point of balance around which companies can rally.

Jick suggests a number of defining characteristics for a good vision. First of all, he states that such a vision should be clear, concise, and easy to understand. Furthermore, it should be memorable, exciting, and inspiring for all members of the organization. From a performance point of view, it should be challenging and excellence-centered. As far as implementation is concerned, the vision should be stable yet flexible while remaining implementable and tangible.

Moreover, Jick states that a good vision should incorporate four particular elements. The first of these is customer orientation, whereby the authors of the vision specify key factors needed to satisfy an organization's customers. This needs to be matched with the second element, an employee focus, meaning that the vision should encapsulate a set of values and principles that an organization's employees stand for and support. The vision should also take into account organizational competencies, or the capabilities that have distinguished the organization from competitors in the past and will be the foundation for future actions. Finally, the vision should refer to an organization's standards of excellence, thereby appealing to the pride of those associated with the organization.

Jick describes three methods of vision creation: CEO-based, leader-senior team collaboration, and bottom-up visioning. Jick focuses on CEO visioning, stating that although the creation of a vision "is never purely a solo endeavor," classic leaders have all had compelling visions for their companies.

Jick states that successful visionary CEOs undertake a number of specific actions when formulating a vision that allow it to meet the standards outlined above. They search for ideas that will create a clear, easy-to-grasp vision that encapsulates the organization's

strategic direction and cultural values. Then, through copious communication, they motivate employees to embrace the vision, and seek their feedback and concerns. To achieve this goal, they link the vision to individual employee jobs and cares, making the vision a personal concern for those it seeks to motivate and unite. Finally, once the vision has been put in place, they remain committed to the vision and act “as the center of the action” as actions are taken to achieve the vision.

Jick concludes by stating that the most important aspect of a vision is having it “take” - “It’s not just having a vision that counts, but also having one that is well accepted and can be translated into actual behaviour” (Jick, 1989).

This article is very useful in that it is both prescriptive and descriptive – it outlines a list of factors in the vision’s creation, purpose, and dissemination to which the actions at the Globe can be compared point by point. In this way, it will be possible to see where the Globe’s visioning process and the ideal described by Jick converge and diverge, why this is the case, and what effect the divergences may have had on the entire change process

Another key article on vision was written by Nanus (1996), who argues that a vision must – not may – come from an organization’s leader because it is he or she who “defines its reality” – the sum of factors affecting it. The leader must not only have, but also project, a sense of direction, and champion what is possible, desirable and intended for the future.

According to Nanus, a successful vision exhibits a few particular characteristics. It grabs attention and provides focus for an organization and its members. To do so, it creates meaning for all members of an organization by explaining the current situation,

why it must change within the context of a big picture, and how this can be achieved. In this way, it creates a common identity among the organization's members. The vision inspires new ways to think, act and learn and, in the process, Nanus theorizes that it energizes the organization. Moreover, the vision provides a challenge, thereby, Nanus argues, fostering higher levels of commitment and performance.

The article also includes a table that lists key characteristics of companies with and without a sound vision, one that could prove useful in evaluating both the Globe and Mail in general and its leaders' ability to craft a vision.

This article in large part reinforces Jick's work, but adds the contentious argument that a leader must be charged with visioning, even though it is meant to unite the entire organization. For this to hold true, the leader must indeed have a very profound understanding of all facets of the organization.

In an article that will be discussed in more detail in the following section, Gill (2003) provides an outline of the criteria for an effective vision. He states that it must define an appealing picture of the future. As such, it needs to be meaningful and ethical as well as inspiring, memorable, and quotable. The goal of a shared vision, according to Gill, is to clarify an organization's direction of change, motivate people, help align individuals and coordinate their actions, and builds trust between members of the organization.

Once again, these criteria align with those presented by Jick, further reinforcing the consensus in the literature on the qualities of a sound vision.

Collins and Porras argue that while a vision is certainly necessary for effective change, "truly great companies understand the difference between what should never

change and what should be open for change, between what is genuinely sacred and what is not” (Collins & Porras, 1996). As such, they suggest that there are two separate parts of a vision: a core ideology and an envisioned future.

The core ideology “defines the enduring character of the organization ... [it] acts as an enduring source of guidance and inspiration.” This is embodied in a company’s employees referring to certain actions, attitudes, or mores as “the way we do things around here” (Collins & Porras, 1996). A rule of thumb for identifying true core ideologies suggested by the author is that they are so deeply entrenched and important that an organization would hold on to them even if they became a competitive disadvantage.” Core ideologies are directly related to the company’s purpose – to its guiding star.

The envisioned future, on the other hand, should be personified by what the authors dub a BHAG (Big, Hairy, Audacious Goal) – one that is clear, compelling, challenging yet achievable and which is clearly understood by the leader. The aim of such a goal is to stimulate progress. A rule of thumb for the BHAG is that it should look 10 to 30 years forward and be based on thinking past an organization’s current capabilities and environment. Furthermore, the vision should not be a “sure bet.” Rather, its achievement should require considerable effort. Collins and Porras state that the BHAG should be vividly described by the leader who would paint a clear, appealing picture of what it would be like to achieve such a goal; “passion, emotion, and conviction” are required of the leader at this point.

The authors also stress the importance of aligning actions with the vision - “building a visionary company requires 1% vision and 99% alignment” (Collins & Porras, 1996).

In an industry as competitive and in such a state of flux as the newspaper industry, it would seem difficult to create such a long-term goal. For instance, newspapers are facing challenges not only from other media, but are themselves facing market pressures and instability in readership. This might make it difficult to create a vision that represents a vivid, appealing, and above all convincing picture of a future that members of the industry know first-hand be an uncertain one. It is also interesting that Collins and Porras note the need for a core ideology that encapsulates an organization’s “enduring character.”

Phelan also stresses the importance of vision, but he approaches it from the point of view of individual attitudes and actions of an organization’s employees. These actions are governed by mazeways, “an individual’s total complex of generalizations about the body and surroundings, similar to a map, which represents goals and difficulties, the self and other people and objects, and ways of attaining or avoiding values” (Phelan, 2005). Under stress such as changing conditions within an organization, “the mazeway may no longer adequately represent reality and therefore [become] dysfunctional.”

At this stage, it is the role of a visionary leader to step forward with a vision that presents culturally relevant information and galvanizes people to change. Phelan cites Kotter (1998) to support his position that for a vision to affect the entire organization, it must come from a leader. The aim of this new vision is what Phelan refers to as “mazeway resynthesis,” a process whereby the individual mazeways of different

members of the organization are reordered and made “more consistent with external reality by bringing individuals to attain new goals or find new ways of attaining existing ones.” As this vision – or “mazeway formulation” - wins “disciples” and overcomes resistance, it can - given that it avoids further stresses like the ones that necessitated it in the first place - create a new organizational cultural steady state.

The obvious hole in Phelan’s argument – although in large part it is congruent with the other literature reviewed in this section – is the idea that a new mazeway must avoid further stresses if it is to settle. Superficially, this is an obvious point, but in an industry in a state of flux like the media, it is difficult to imagine avoiding any stresses and settling into a new “total complex of generalization,” unless of course this mazeway is founded on the need for perpetual readiness for change.

The following table summarizes the key elements of vision posited by the aforementioned authors.

TABLE 3 – A SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE ON VISION

Author(s)	Jick	Nanus	Gill	Collins and Porras	Phelan
Definition of vision	“An attempt to articulate what a desired future for a company would look like... ‘an organizational dream’.”	“...Defines [the organization’s] reality.”	“ ‘Something seen vividly in the imagination, involving insight, foresight and wisdom’ ... a desired future state: this is the basis for directing the change effort.”	Two parts: core ideology (embodied in organizations as “the way we do things around here”) and the envisioned future (personified by a “Big, Hairy, Audacious Goal”)	No clear definition, but author notes that the “chief executive is often an established and charismatic business leader who has a plan for changing the corporation before accepting the position.”
Who should be responsible for its creation?	CEO / leader, leader in collaboration with a senior team, or bottom-up	CEO / leader	CEO / leader	CEO / leader	CEO / leader
Attributes of a successful vision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provides a conceptual framework for understanding an organization’s purpose and has an emotional, motivational appeal • Is consistent with an organization’s mission, strategy, and philosophy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Grabs attention and provides focus • Creates meaning for all members of an organization • Creates a common identity among the organization’s members • Inspires new ways to think, act and learn 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defines an appealing picture of the future • Is meaningful and ethical • Is inspiring, memorable, and quotable • Clarifies an organization’s direction of change and helps 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Core ideology is so deeply entrenched and important that an organization would hold on to it even if they became a competitive disadvantage. It is directly related to the company’s purpose • The envisioned future: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Is clear, compelling, challenging yet 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presents culturally relevant information and galvanizes people to change • Is crucial is attaining “mazeway resynthesis” • Ideally leads to the creation of a new organizational cultural steady state

<p>Attributes of a successful vision (cont.)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provides a focus, creating organizational and personal motivation • Differentiates ideal future from an imperfect present • Provides an “anchor” around which companies can rally • Is clear, concise, and easy to understand • Is memorable, exciting, and inspiring • Is challenging and excellence-centered • Is stable yet flexible, and implementable and tangible • Incorporates customer orientation, employee focus, organizational competencies, and the organization’s standards of excellence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Energizes the organization • Fosters high levels of commitment and performance by providing a challenge 	<p>align individuals and coordinate their actions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Motivates individuals and builds trust between members of the organization 	<p>achievable and clearly understood by the leader</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Stimulates progress. ○ Looks 10 to 30 years forward and is based on thinking past an organization’s current capabilities and environment. ○ Is not a “sure bet” and requires considerable effort. ○ Is vividly described by the leader who paints a clear, appealing picture of what it would be like to achieve such a goal 	
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As the summary in Table 3 shows, there appears to be a consensus in the literature examined that vision is central to the success of any change initiative. A vision is a change's guiding light, a method of ensuring that actions are aligned with a common goal that will ultimately improve the organization. In general, the literature suggests that a vision should be based on careful understanding of an organization's characteristics and competencies; it should provide an achievable yet challenging future goal that is compelling for all members of the organization and breeds improved performance; and it should foster both alignment of actions and organizational unity. Without a compelling, often-communicated vision, the literature suggests that change efforts are doomed to fail before they even begin, because they will be unable to gain support or institutionalize what successes they do achieve.

This would seem to apply especially to a media company like the Globe and Mail, whose journalistic staff would hold specific ideals not just for the operation of their company but for the way in which the news provided by their company affects the outside world. To change this type of person, it would appear that a particularly potent vision would need to be created and carefully applied to ensure all changes were understood and supported.

3.4. Leadership and change

Perhaps one of the most widely discussed issues in the field of organizational change is the role of leaders in its planning, implementation, and direction. Leaders must "change the mindset of employees" and facilitate employee empowerment (Beatty and Ulrich, 1991), provide a clear, pertinent vision (Jick, 1989), "oversee and orchestrate" the

process and share competitive information (Spector, 1989), champion communication and be the change they espouse (Young and Post, 1993, Mohrman, 1999), minimize employee uncertainty (Bordia, Hobman, Jones, Gallois, & Callan, 2004), master numerous and diverse skills (Kanter, 2002), be empathetic and aware of how rank-and-file employees are being treated (Mohrman, 1999) and overall be a “magic leader” (Nadler and Tushman, 1989). The task of leading a newspaper in a time of war could clearly be a daunting and difficult one. This wide array of sources will be employed in the thesis to judge the effectiveness of the Globe’s various leaders (CEO, publisher, editors-in-chief, deputy editors, etc.) in ushering in and managing change.

As part of the renewal process of a mature organization, Beatty and Ulrich stress the need for a leader committed to change who will guide the organization through the five “re-energizing” steps discussed previously (Beatty & Ulrich, 1991).

The first such requirement is the “courage to make difficult decisions fairly and boldly” as the organization restructures. This entails accepting that such decisions may not lead to personal popularity or the forming of close relationships with employees. In other words, the leader needs to put an emphasis on action rather than on personal popularity.

In the “bureaucracy bashing” phase, leaders must embody the actions they advocate by “letting go of work systems ... that have added little or no value to the processes’ next or ultimate customer” (Beatty & Ulrich, 1991). Leaders must also be able to pass up personal projects or goals to remove or reduce bureaucratic blockages. They ought to listen to requests and suggestions and encourage employees to take risks to

overcome roadblocks. Considering the uncertainty that accompanies this step, leaders should also strive to reduce the organizational fear of failure.

Moreover, a key task of leaders is the empowerment of employees, which involves relinquishing some of their own authority and diffusing it throughout the organization. The authors posit that “leaders must learn that sharing power builds capacity to change, commitment, and competitiveness” (Beatty & Ulrich, 1991). In order to make this empowerment sustainable, leaders should foster a philosophy of error detection and simplification of processes - “manag[ing] through principles” that can be “practiced according to the specific needs of the business.”

Throughout the process, the authors state that the leader should “constantly and demonstratively be a model and a cheerleader of the culture he hopes to implement.”

The importance of vision was covered in the previous section, but it is important reiterate here the points raised by Jick outlining the demands placed on a leader during the creation and dissemination of a new organizational vision (Jick, 1989). One of three methods described by the authors to create a vision – what they describe as “an attempt to articulate what a desired future for a company would look like” – is for the vision to be created by a leader or CEO.

While the author states that vision creation is frequently not a “solo endeavor,” he argues that leaders play a crucial role in the creation of a vision. The following are a few key characteristics of successful visionary leaders as identified by the authors who will be discussed in this chapter:

- Working out a clear vision and articulating it clearly and simply;
- Constantly communicating this vision and embodying it through hard work;

- Communicating with employees at all hierarchical levels regarding the vision, relating it to their work and discussing its implications for them;
- Fostering a sense of unity;
- Acting as a “prime shaper” of the vision.

The author also stresses that a successful leader of vision must sincerely believe in the vision if he/she is to be a true change champion.

According to Spector (1989), the key impetus for change is dissatisfaction with the status quo both among management and at the bottom of the hierarchy. He argues that “organizational leaders cannot change organizations” and that change cannot simply be mandated down from the top; rather, leaders need to “diffuse dissatisfaction” and facilitate change efforts throughout the organization. Indeed, “when leaders jump directly from being dissatisfied to imposing new operating models, they fail to generate any real commitment to change” (Spector, 1989).

Spector suggests a number of strategies for effectively diffusing dissatisfaction, thereby generating commitment to new change efforts. The first of these is sharing competitive information. Management should involve all levels of the hierarchy in their dissatisfaction by sharing details of the company’s competitive position as “information sharing of this kind is a symbolic way of equalizing power, overcoming conflict, and building trust” (Spector, 1989). According to Spector the data to be shared is not limited to financial data but also includes diagnoses and personal opinions. This sharing should, however, remain within the company and not be released to the press or to the general public. The second strategy involves creating behavioral dissatisfaction. According to Spector, behaviour and sentiment need to be changed not only at the company level, but

also at the individual level, as employee satisfaction is a critical factor in their willingness to participate in change programs. Therefore, he advocates attitude surveys to determine the level of satisfaction of employees throughout the organization. This is a fair measure because satisfaction cannot be mandated; it is dependent on the job and job environment. Next, Spector suggests that management should use models to promote dissatisfaction. By finding models of initiatives that are successful, managers can use them to prop up other changes they wish to initiate and involve employees. The final strategy is mandating dissatisfaction. This is a direct personal statement to critical people that things need to change and it's their job to do it. While this is a direct method of ensuring that it is understood the status quo is no longer acceptable, Spector notes that it can mean the mandate is not fully accepted because it violates the critical person's free choice of action.

This article will aid in the diagnosis of the Globe's change efforts by determining whether or not, and how, dissatisfaction was diffused, and if these methods adhered with the principles posited by Spector.

Another prescription for successful leadership is presented by Young and Post (1993), who cite a study that calls employee communication a "new top management priority." They present factors that contribute to successful employee communication. Chief among these is "the chief executive as communications champion." A changing company needs a leader who is committed to communication as an essential tool to achieving the company's goals and makes it a necessary part of company operations. This communication should include both strategic issues and routine activities. An emphasis on communication at the top of the hierarchy will prompt increased communication at all

levels of the company with the leader/CEO acting as an example to all other managers and employees.

Young and Post state that the leader/CEO who espouses a commitment to communication must also be a personally effective communicator who embodies his philosophy. This includes frequent communication through different media and in person and willingness to discuss all topics, even sensitive ones. Openness and willingness to communicate on the part of the leader can mitigate sub-par communication skills by showing employees that “at least he’s trying.”

Finally, the leader must be able and willing to present key messages themselves, rather than delegating them to others. This applies especially to the vision, which stems from the leader and needs to be accurately articulated by him.

Kanter (2002) begins her argument about the role and skills of change leaders with the truism that change is ubiquitous in modern business. She notes, however, that much attention is paid to bold, sweeping leadership actions, which she says are often “defensive, the result of a flawed strategy or failure to adapt to changing market conditions ... [or] mask the need for deeper change in strategy, structure, or operations, and they contribute to the anxiety that accompanies sudden change.” The “requirements of change can no longer be mandated” (Kanter, 2002). Instead, leaders need to focus on consistent changes undertaken not just at the top, but throughout the organization. This “long march” is in the long run more sustainable and more likely to bring about real change.

Kanter postulates that, to suit this “long march” approach, a certain type of leader is needed. She then goes on to outline three “keys to mastering change” and seven

“classic skills of leadership” that the change leader should embody. This article is especially significant because it lists a number of clearly defined aspects of leadership to which the actions of the Globe and Mail’s leaders can be compared.

Kanter identifies three key leadership dimensions needed to make change “a way of life.” The first is “the imagination to innovate,” meaning leaders need to encourage innovation by developing new ideas and models. The second is “the professionalism to perform” or the ability of leaders to provide personal and organizational competence to deliver value to customers. The third is “the openness to collaborate,” the leader’s ability to make connections with partners who can benefit the company.

Kanter also suggests seven skills required for leaders who wish to “take charge of change rather than simply react to it.” Leaders need to be tuned in to the environment by “looking, listening, seeing,” to determine what pieces of the business model fit and which don’t. They should also challenge the prevailing organizational wisdom by questioning assumptions, remembering there are many different solutions to problems, as well as observing patterns inside and outside the business and learning how to interpret them. They should also be able to communicate a compelling aspiration. This means that they should hold a genuine conviction that the change effort will create “something better” and be able to sell people on working to construct their own future. Kanter states that leaders must be able to build coalitions by identifying key supporters and including them in the change process. She notes that this step requires openness and honesty with all partners and employees. Leaders should also be able to let go of their projects and transfer ownership to a working team. While staying involved, they should let others implement some change and feel empowered by exploring solutions independently.

When faced with hurdles, successful leaders need to learn to persevere and buckle down for the “long march” toward achieving their goals. Finally, as goals are achieved, good leaders “make everyone a hero” by recognizing, rewarding, and celebrating organizational and individual accomplishments, thereby motivating employees and creating organizational unity by sharing credit for successes.

Gill (2003) steps back from the debate about the characteristics of successful change leadership to first clearly differentiate between the role of change management and change leaders by arguing that while management is necessary in change, it is effective leadership that often makes the difference between successful and unsuccessful change initiatives. Gill contends that the primary purpose of the leader is to envision the future state of the organization and ensure that employees are able to adapt to changes.

Gill outlines four “dimensions and requirements of leadership” that attempt to bring together different “tracks” of leadership theory. These are as follows:

- Intellectual/cognitive dimension: an effective leader needs to perceive and process information, imagine possibilities, make judgments, and adapt to changing circumstances;
- Spiritual dimension: the leader needs to create a vision and shared values to give people meaning and a sense of worth;
- Emotional dimension: the leader needs to understand himself or herself and other people, as well as display self-control and self-confidence. Emotionally intelligent leaders use personal power rather than positional power and authority to “win people’s hearts”;

- Behavioral dimension: the leader must be able to effectively communicate through writing, speaking, and listening and personal behaviour. He or she must also be adept at “using and responding to emotion.”

But while Gill postulates that the above qualities are necessary for a successful leader, he states that to actually achieve success they must be employed in conjunction with certain elements of “effective leadership practice.” Foremost among these is the ability to craft a vision. While this aspect was discussed in more detail in the section concerning Vision and Change, the two aspects that Gill suggests directly involve a leader’s actions should be mentioned as well. Gill notes that an effective leader needs to define and communicate an appealing vision for the future and build trust based on this shared vision by acting as a role model for corporate values. The leader should also be responsible for identifying and promoting shared organizational values that align with an organization’s strategy. Gill’s justification for this suggestion is his belief that employees can adapt to major strategic shifts as long as an organization’s mission and values remain constant. The leader must also be a source of empowerment for his employees. Gill argues that leaders should give people the knowledge, power, skills, resources, and self-confidence to enact change. He states that top-down leadership is no longer a valid form of implementing change in an increasingly complex business world and that, therefore, leaders should encourage “intrapreneurship” and attempt to flatten their organization’s hierarchical structures in an effort to promote participation in change efforts from all employees. Finally, Gill states that leaders should act as a source of motivation and inspiration. Leaders must be credible and credibility comes from perception of honesty

and competence (Kouzes and Posner, 2002). Moreover, they should set up short-term wins to promote visible improvements and build continued support for change

Gill's work is important because it underscores the value of change leadership, rather than management, and focuses on actions and qualities that he believes to be particular to true change champions. It also outlines particular qualities of leadership and suggests how these can be applied through the leadership practices he prescribes. This last part can be used to determine if the Globe and Mail's leadership engaged in these actions and, if so, if they adhered to the requirements and suggestions posited by Gill.

Nadler and Tushman (1990) go one step further and suggest that while leadership is important, a specific type of leadership is necessary to sustain change. They postulate that organizations undergoing change efforts need a "charismatic leader" to guide them. The authors do not use "charismatic" in the traditional sense, but rather as someone whose leadership is "observable, definable, and having clear behavioral characteristics." This leader is someone able to "mobilize and sustain activity within an organization through specific personal actions combined with perceived personal characteristics." These people "through personal effectiveness and attractiveness ... build a personal and intimate bond between themselves and the organization, thereby becoming a source of sustained energy and a source of high standards that others will emulate" (Nadler & Tushman, 1990).

The authors posit that there are three major types of behaviour practiced by charismatic leaders, each entailing specific actions that allow for success in bringing about and sustaining changes. The first is envisioning, which entails creating a picture of a desired future state with which people can identify and which can generate excitement

throughout an organization. The next is energizing, whereby a leader motivates people to act by using personal demonstrations of energy and excitement and leveraging this excitement with personal contact with members of the organization. This behaviour also includes recognizing successes to celebrate progress toward vision. Finally, Nadler and Tushman posit that leaders should engage in enabling behaviour. This involves demonstrating empathy, helping employees perform in the face of a challenge, and expressing support for and confidence in individuals.

Nadler and Tushman do not, however, believe that these three behaviours on their own are enough to successfully guide companies through change. Nadler and Tushman list a number of limitations to leaders who are simply charismatic, many of them based on the fact that the leadership of change is centered on a single individual. These include unrealistic expectations, dependency, reluctance to disagree or voice dissenting opinions, disenfranchisement of next levels of management, and personal limitations of the leader. Nadler and Tushman state that leaders need to be not only charismatic but also “instrumental” – able to not only motivate people but also ensure that proper actions are taken and behaviour adhered to that will allow a company to achieve its change goals. This kind of leadership is based on “managing environments to create conditions that motivate desired behavior (sic)” (Nadler & Tushman, 1990).

It is rooted in three further elements of behaviour. The first of these is structuring, or creating structures that make it clear what kind of behaviour is required for change success. The second is controlling, which involves measuring, monitoring, and assessing behaviour and results and administering corrective action. Closely linked to

controlling is rewarding, which entails meting out rewards and punishments in accordance with behaviour (based on consistency with the requirements of the change). The article states that a crucial aspect of instrumental leadership is shaping perceptions and culture through simple, detail-oriented, day-to-day actions. This “mundane behavior (sic)” such as time management, communication, shaping of physical settings, and so on “serves as a powerful determinant of organizational behaviour” (Nadler & Tushman, 1990).

The authors also state that not many people have all of the attributes necessary to be both an ideal charismatic leader and instrumental leader. Therefore, they suggest that, in terms of change, leaders need to create groups from managers and employees that will complement their leadership skills and style as well as pick up the slack from their weaknesses in pushing forward with change efforts. In the case of the Globe and Mail, for example, Richard Addis surrounded himself with a hand-picked group of senior editors. While this approach seems to support Nadler and Tushman’s theory, early research shows that it may, in fact, have had a negative impact on his relations with less senior employees.

Nadler and Tushman (1989) also suggest a number of principles that should be adhered to for successful change. These concern a reorientation type of change, so depending on analysis of the type of change undertaken at the Globe and Mail, this may prove to apply fully or only partially to this situation.

The “magic leader principle” states that leaders need to be the focal point of a change initiative and should display a number of particular characteristics. Nadler and Tushman state that leaders engage in three distinctive behaviours. These are envisioning

(creating an inspirational and engaging vision), energizing (creating an energy through personal demonstration, rewards, punishments, and setting high standards), and enabling (help employees do what it is they are being motivated to do). “Magic leaders” are also able to create a sense of urgency and be key players in the creation and management of organizational “pain” that spurs on the need for change. Once change is initiated, the authors suggest that ideal leaders act as guardians of the themes of the change by sticking to and continuing to articulate these themes throughout the change period. Simultaneously, they display a combination of autocratic and democratic management tactics in achieving the vision.

The “leadership-is-not-enough” principle holds that the base of leadership should involve more than just one of two individuals and that a team approach to the change is more beneficial to the organization than a strictly individualistic one.

While the above authors approached leadership of change from the leader’s perspective, Mohrman (1999) attempts to approach the issue from the perspective of employees affected by the changes. Large-scale change in any organization means that all of its members need to learn new ways of operating based on different values and goals than existed previously. Mohrman argues that these changes and the need to learn or re-learn many new things can prove overwhelming for rank-and-file employees. Learning cannot be mandated down from the top; instead, leaders need to establish processes and systems that allow for understanding and learning of the new values, goals, and operating methods to occur. In this context, the role of management is to stimulate and orchestrate organizational learning.

Leaders need to expose employees to as much information about the changes and methods of learning to adapt to them as possible, including being honest about risks of failure. They need to create systemic understanding of change throughout the organization so employees do not experience the change process as a set of seemingly unrelated projects and initiatives; alignment of projects and new organizational goals must be spelled out through communication. Otherwise, what may emerge is a “mechanical and superficial implementation of top-down dictated changes, with little learning about how to make them work effectively in the local setting because members continue to operate in ways they know have worked in the past” (Mohrman, 1999).

Mohrman posits that, in order to avoid such a shortfall and achieve their change goals, leaders need to strike a balance between prescription and self-direction (over- and under-commanding their staff at all levels of the organization’s hierarchy). This should be coupled with a consistency of actions with messages as well as a consistency between the messages of different members of management (otherwise, confusion can arise that challenges understanding of the change process). Moreover, management must be aware, through two-way communication, of how employees feel they are being treated and how this is affecting their learning. Continuity is also important in maintaining momentum in a change initiative and that changes in top management during the process can act as a deterrent to this continuity.

Spector’s article on inspiring organizational change is described in more detail in a previous chapter, but it is important in this section to stress a few key points made by him that pertain directly to the role of leadership in bringing about change (Spector, 1989).

Like Mohrman, Spector argues that a leader does not change an organization through individual initiatives, but rather oversees and orchestrates change processes at the level of individual work units. Moreover, leaders must work to spread dissatisfaction with the status quo throughout the organization, thereby creating support for change. This does not mean, however, that leaders can simply mandate down dissatisfaction; they must communicate and demonstrate that current operational procedures are detrimental to future goals and operations of the organization. Strategies for achieving these goals, as described above, include sharing competitive information, creating behavioral dissatisfaction, and using models to produce dissatisfaction.

Cummings goes even further and argues that while much of the change literature prescribes actions and characteristics for change leader, this attribution of success in change initiatives to the qualities and success of the change leader is flawed; these perceptions are wrong and the role of the leader is often romanticized or over-stated (Cummings, 1999). He presents the idea that the influence of a leader on a change depends on his/her "latitude of action." There are three determining factors of this: the task environment, the organization, and the leader himself/herself.

The task environment describes the latitude the leader has for affecting the day-to-day operations of an organization. In "environments where means-ends linkages are poorly understood or where competitive conditions are shifting rapidly" leaders have the greatest probability of personally contributing to change because "these external factors tend to lessen the inertial tendencies found in most organizations and can provide change leaders with considerable leeway to make strategic changes" (Cummings, 1999). In industries where a wide differentiation is possible between products or where standards

are lax, leaders can “make significant changes in how the organization markets, manufactures, and distributes products or services” (Cummings, 1999).

Cummings also argues that the organization itself has an effect on the leader’s potential for personally affecting the change. In general, companies that are larger, older, and control more resources tend to create a stronger culture that is more difficult to change, and vice versa. Cummings writes that leaders stand to have a greater effect especially in more inert organizations by forming leader teams made up of “younger, more educated members with relative short organization tenure, high team tenure, and heterogeneity in educational backgrounds” who are more willing to take risks (Cummings, 1999).

Finally, some characteristics of the leader himself can have a profound effect on his efficacy. Cummings argues that leaders with a moderate level of commitment provide the most freedom of change because they are neither so strict as to have the change follow a particular path nor so lax as to let the change happen haphazardly. The author also states that “to transform organizations successfully, change leaders need considerable power and political insight. They must be able to overcome entrenched interests and to gain the commitment of stakeholders with different values. Thus, top leaders with a broad power base and strong political skills are likely to have more freedom to change organizations than their less powerful counterparts” (Cummings, 1999). To strengthen a power base, CEOs should consider surrounding themselves with diverse, open working teams that would be able to arrive at a consensus for moving forward in a clear and committed direction.

Pascale applies complexity theory to change management and suggests that leaders emerge to champion ideas “whose time has come” (Pascale, 1999). He argues that traditional notions of an omnipotent and omniscient leader are anachronistic and that, instead, the role of the leader is to foster organizational learning. The key to this is self-organization – teaching people and letting them apply the lessons at the grassroots level.

This idea places three principal demands on leaders. The first is letting go of some of their sense of control and sharing power with others. This means spending as much time as possible communicating and working directly with employees at the lower rungs of the hierarchy. The second is creating an atmosphere that supports the development of formal and informal communication networks in the organization among people of different levels, tasks, and seniority. The third aspect is committing as much time as possible to the change initiative and, more precisely, to teaching and fostering a learning environment (this applies not only to the CEO but to all senior managers).

Complexity represents a shift from the traditional command-and-control style to cultivating emergent possibilities throughout the organization. This means that, during change, the leader’s job is to design and maintain a learning environment rather than leading authoritatively. Pascale offers the following quote from Shell’s Steve Miller to support his point:

“A successful company depends on leadership. But we need a different definition of leadership and a different approach to providing it. In the past, the leader was the guy with the answers. Today if you're going to have a successful company, you have to recognize that no leader can possibly have all the answers. The leader may have a vision. But the actual solutions about how best to meet the challenges of the moment have to be made by the people closest to the action” (Pascale, 1999).

Pascale also offers seven “keys to sustained complexity changes” which will be elaborated upon in the section on Institutionalizing Cultural Change.

Pascale hypothesizes that in addition to helping accomplish the immediate change initiative, tapping organizational intelligence creates a new generation of change-savvy leaders out of employees who were empowered during the change initiative. It will be interesting to compare the Globe and Mail leadership’s actions to those suggested by Pascale. This is because editors-in-chief, as the name of the position suggests, are the chief - they are the source of both managerial and creative authority at a publication and decide who does what and often how they should approach doing whatever it is that they do. Sharing authority and relinquishing personal influence on the part of the leaders might indeed prove to have been a major hindrance in the Globe’s change efforts.

Miller, on the other hand, argues that a key determinant of implementation success of change is the personal change adaptability of leaders, who are often respected for their “grace under pressure” or ability to appear nonplussed by events unfolding around them. These characteristics are representative of what he dubs “Stage 4” leaders (Miller, 2002). Leaders in organizations can progress – or perhaps mature is more apt – through four stages, each representing a different belief in the nature of change.

The following are the principal attributes of the most advanced leaders:

- They understand that successful change is contingent on commitment and that displays of power or the use of sanctions are unlikely to produce effects.
- They understand that people are not always willing or able to change and endeavor to create people change plans.

- They focus on particular changes by leading few initiatives and focusing on the cost of failure as much as on the benefits of realization of these goals.
- They delay implementation until the imperative for change is clearly understood and shared – to achieve this, they spend time studying the organization and understanding the impact of changes on the organization’s business model.
- They personally lead the implementation and “ruthlessly pursue” their objectives
- They embody the change in their day-to-day actions.
- They understand that change is “a contact sport” – they communicate through various means and strive to build support networks.
- They know implementation has to be systematic and relentless and follow through on initiatives until they are completed rather than assuming people “will get it.”

According to Miller, Stage 4 leaders are the most realistic about what is required of themselves and of the organization for change to occur and are willing to work diligently to make the change happen. So, while the importance of the leader in the grand scheme of change may be, to a degree, disputed, the characteristics outlined by Miller generally agree with those suggested by other leading authors in the field. They will therefore aid in the evaluation of the Globe’s leaders and their influence on the progress and success of the changes they attempted to implement.

Bordia et al add to the literature by stating that change efforts of any kind are bound to cause uncertainty throughout an organization (Bordia, Hobman, Jones, Gallois, & Callan, 2004). The three types of uncertainty are: strategic (which reflects the lack of a clear vision or strategic direction on the part of change leaders), structural (which results from changes to a company’s internal policies and practices), and job-related (pertaining

to job security, rewards, promotions, role within the organization). They postulate that this uncertainty leads to turnover, stress, job dissatisfaction, and lost productivity.

The article suggests that an important role of leadership during a change effort is to minimize uncertainty at all levels of the hierarchy. It is noted that due to the various reasons for and manifestations of uncertainty, this can be a difficult task. General solutions suggested include the need for timely and credible communication and the sharing of responsibilities between managers and subordinates, thereby including all employees to some extent in the decision-making process.

Table 4 outlines the principal dimensions of leadership during change as posited by the authors discussed above. Because many of these dimensions are touched upon by more than one author, the definitions are generalized and the authors who discuss the different dimensions are listed (in no order of priority).

TABLE 4 – KEY DIMENSIONS OF LEADERSHIP FOR EFFECTIVE CHANGE

Dimension	Definition	Authors identifying it
Spreading dissatisfaction with status quo / Creating a sense of urgency	Making members of the organization aware that the current way of doing things is not longer acceptable given the current environment / competitive conditions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Spector (1989) • Kotter (1989) • Nadler & Tushman (1989)
Creating and communicating a vision	Imagining a preferred future state for the organization and galvanizing the company behind this vision.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See section on “Vision and Change”, also: • Nadler & Tushman (1989)
Championing communication	To reduce ambiguity and build support for a vision / change initiative, leaders should engage in prolific communication with all of their employees and stakeholders. This communication should stress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pascale (1999) • Bordia et al (2004) • Young and Post (1993) • Mohrman (1999) • Spector (1989)

	honesty, clarity, and reinforcement of the leader's commitment to the effort.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kanter (2002) • Gill (2003) • See also section "Communication and Change"
Empowering employees / Sharing responsibility / Employing working teams	Leaders let go of some of their sense of control and teach/empower employees to have more responsibility for the implementation – and, by extension, success – of change initiatives.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bordia et al (2004) • Pascale (1999) • Cummings (1999) • Beatty and Ulrich (1991) • Kanter (2002) • Gill (2003) • Nadler & Tushman (1989)
Embodying change ideals	The leaders need to "walk the talk" by acting on the change ideals they espouse, placing an "emphasis on action" and being "able and willing to present key messages themselves."	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Beatty and Ulrich (1991) • Jick (1989) • Kanter (2002) • Young and Post (1993) • Nadler & Tushman (1989)
Motivating / rewarding employees	Galvanizing employees in support of the change effort and rewarding attainment of goals and change-specific achievements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jick (1989) • Kanter (2002) • Gill (2003) • Nadler & Tushman (1989)
Minimizing uncertainty	Reducing the uncertainty and ambiguity about the organization's future brought about by change efforts, thereby minimizing stress, job turnover, lost productivity, etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bordia et al (2004)
Personal adaptability	Displaying the characteristics of a "Stage 4" leader: being realistic about what is required of themselves and of their organization for change efforts to succeed, and being committed to this effort.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Miller (2002)
Committing large amount of personal time to effort	Instead of mandating down the change, leaders should be personally engaged in many of its aspects.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pascale (1999) • Kanter (2002)

The articles reviewed in this section and summarized in Table 4 cover a wide range of issues related to leadership during change and offer an even wider range of prescriptions for and factors that influence success. To list them all would be redundant, but it is important to note the broad topics that emerge in the arguments and suggestions of the authors mentioned above. Afterwards, a few issues will be discussed concerning the assumptions made by the authors in their analyses and how these will affect the application of these aspects to the Globe and Mail.

The literature suggests that among the most important requisites for a leader is the need for him or her to have a deep understanding of the organization, based on which a pertinent, powerful vision is crafted. The role of the leader is then to foster dissatisfaction with the status quo and overcome obstacles that stand in the path of the fulfillment of this vision. The two most important aspects of accomplishing this task appear to be an emphasis on constant communication through different media (including effective two-way communication where concerns of employees are effectively addressed) and in person. It seems to be particularly important for leaders to communicate with lower-ranking members of the organizational hierarchy, and personally act as a model of the changes he or she wants to implement (“walking the talk”). Once the change is underway, the literature suggests that leaders need to surround themselves with a leading coalition to push ahead with the change goals. They also need to create systems of organizational learning that will empower all employees to be effective change agents, as many of the authors note that mandating down dissatisfaction, learning, or support for change is not only ineffective, but can have detrimental effects. There are also compelling arguments presented for leaders to focus their energy on mundane, day-to-day tasks, thereby

cementing the new culture they hope to create (rather than aiming for sweeping, “silver bullet” changes). Finally, much of the literature praises leaders who reward actions consistent with the change values and who plan for and create short-term wins that link the changes with improved performance and build support for further changes.

It needs to be noted that much of the literature about change leadership is based on studies of large organizations. Numerous authors make reference to team structures and numbers of employees (for instance, 50 members of a leading coalition called for by Kotter; Beatty and Ulrich refer to actions taken by Hewlett-Packard, GE, Xerox, and IBM to illustrate their theories; Spector bases his study on US Financial, Scranton Steel, and Duluth Products; etc.) that seem consistent with a larger organization. In such organizations, there is also usually a fairly marked hierarchical structure with many levels separating the CEO and those at the lowest rungs. The Globe and Mail, despite being the largest national newspaper in Canada, is by no means on par with a large multi-national corporation in terms of staff or hierarchical structure. The bulk of the organization is housed in one building in downtown Toronto, which is also where the senior editors and almost all editors and reporters work daily. Therefore, there is much more immediate and frequent contact and communication between members of different departments and sections and between members of different levels of the chain of command. This may have an effect on how the changes at the Globe will compare to the criteria offered by the literature.

Another area where the Globe and Mail may differ from the models used in the bulk of the literature is in the person of the change leader. In most companies, the leader is the CEO. The Globe and Mail, on the other hand, while it has a CEO who makes the

major strategic and financial decisions at the organizational level, it also has a newsroom leader in the person of the editor-in-chief, who communicates both management decisions and day-to-day publishing directives to the newsroom staff. So, in effect, the Globe and Mail has two leaders at all times – a “back-room” leader and a news-room leader. Then, above these two, but not directly “in charge” of them per se is the publisher of the newspaper. This factor means that all three leaders should be evaluated for their leadership skill.

3.5. Communication and change

Almost all of the articles regarding leadership discussed previously mention, to some degree, the importance of communication on the part of the change leader to successfully implement changes. Leaders need to not only inform others about their vision, but they need to communicate about all aspects of the change, personally speak with and listen to members of the organization throughout the hierarchy. This section is, therefore, quite short to avoid repetition. However, the following articles make specific recommendations for communication during change. These will facilitate examination of communication efforts at the Globe and Mail both as part of the analysis of the leaders and of the communication effort itself.

In his aforementioned articles, Kotter emphasizes the need for communication in times of change (Kotter, 1999). First of all, he states that the vision needs to be communicated ceaselessly and tied into all organizational communication efforts, thereby permeating the organization with a consistent, committed message. He also explains that

communication throughout the change process is beneficial to winning support for the change. Among these process-related communication strategies is achieving short-term wins. Communicating such tangible achievements keeps the level of urgency high and allows for analysis and revision of vision and strategies. In the later stages of the change process, Kotter stresses that victory should not be declared too soon; for processes to sink into a company's culture and for that culture not to regress, a declaration of victory cannot be made and communication reinforcing the benefits of the change should not let up.

Young and Post concur that communication about all aspects of a change process throughout all of its phases is crucial for success. They present eight factors that determine the effectiveness of communication with employees during change (Young & Post, 1993). These present a very useful checklist for measuring the efficacy of communication efforts. They are as follows:

- The chief executive as communications champion: the “CEO must be philosophically committed to the notion that communication with employees is essential to the achievement of corporate goals” as “even a first-rate staff cannot compensate for a chief executive who is unwilling to provide visible leadership for the employee communications effort.”
- Matching actions to words: “formal communications are not how employees know their company ... they know it through their supervisors and through their management.”

- Commitment to two-way communication: successful change organizations seek employee opinion and feedback and have swift grievance procedures to address them.
- Emphasis on face-to-face communication: change needs solid, personal communication and straight talk to win support and build trust
- Shared responsibility for employee communications: people often hear pertinent news through the grapevine, not from supervisors; this needs to be changed so employees hear all news from supervisors, thereby building trust and togetherness
- Dealing with bad news: “when bad news is candidly reported, an environment is created in which good news is more believable.”
- Customers, clients, and audiences: identification of and focus on effectively communicating with all customers, be they internal or external
- Employee communications strategy: Management should communicate not only what is happening, but why and how it is happening because people want to know rationale for decisions. Communication should be timely, meaning that management should communicate what they know when they know it. Moreover, communication should be continuous. The authors suggest that in a company undergoing change, “you have to have a steady hum” of communication. This communication should link the “big picture” with the “little picture” (direct effects on employee’s jobs and lives). Finally, the authors postulate that communication should not seek to dictate the way people should feel about the news. Rather, employees should draw their own conclusions.

The above list offers some insightful prescriptions for how to properly communicate during change. In general, the message appears to be to communicate frequently and thoroughly. This emphasis on communication seems to be particularly important when dealing with journalists, people whose job it is to communicate. Since the product (the content of the paper) is closely linked to senior editorial decisions, the quality of the product is dependent on the quality of the editorial content, which in turn is dictated by directives sent down from the top editorial team. If investigative reporting is not on the agenda, for instance, it will not get done, which will have a certain impact on the leadership. So, from a product quality point of view, communication at a newspaper quite directly affects more than just employer-employee relations and employees' support for change.

Although his seminal work does not deal with change per se, D'Aprix offers a few important observations about corporate communication and some prescriptions for improved communication on the part of executives in his article "The oldest (and best) way of communicating with employees." He notes that in many companies communication is a sort of window-dressing: a topic everyone agrees is important but which is either not taken seriously or not acted upon. He states that "leaders must see and feel what their followers are experiencing; otherwise they become literally out of touch" (D'Aprix, 1982). He goes on to say that "executives ... should see face-to-face communication not as a burden ... but as a critical element of their jobs" (D'Aprix, 1982). He states that lack of personal communication exacerbates what in most environments is already a fairly substantial barrier between managers and rank-and-file

employees. This barrier, in turn, can lead to poor internal operations that translate into poor business results.

Communication is clearly indispensable to any change effort, and it must be handled carefully. Then again, simple common sense would seem to dictate that if one is making large change that involve others, those others should be told why those changes are happening and how they will be affected. Once again the point must be raised that in all of these works, the CEO is seen as the ideal “communications champion” while in a newsroom environment, communication is the domain of the editor-in-chief.

The following table (Table 5) summarizes the key literature reviewed in the preceding section with respect to dimensions of communication during change and identifies the authors who discuss each dimension.

TABLE 5 – SUMMARY OF CRITICAL ASPECTS OF COMMUNICATION DURING CHANGE

Dimension	Definition	Authors identifying it
Commitment to constant communication	The willingness on the part of leaders and executives to communicate throughout the change process – and in general - using a variety of media.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kotter (1989) • Young and Post (1993) • D’Aprix (1982)
Consistent message	Senior management presenting a common message about change issues to the organization. This should be matched with actions, as noted in the chapter on “Leadership and Change.”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kotter (1989)
Two-way communication / Face-to-face communication	Leaders and executives should frequently communicate in person with members of the organization at all levels of seniority. Management should solicit and be open to feedback from all employees.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Young and Post (1993) • D’Aprix (1982)
Leader as communication champion	The leader of the organization should spearhead communication efforts and be personally responsible for major announcements.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See “Leadership and Change”, also: • Young and Post (1993) • D’Aprix (1982)

3.6. Institutionalization of cultural change

Most societies and organizations have their own internal cultures that govern how they operate, how their members interact, and so on. Clichéd as it might be, the overarching definition of culture used for the purpose of this thesis comes from the

Oxford Dictionary. Culture is defined quite simply as “the customs, civilization, and achievements of a ... people.”¹ Other definitions are presented by the different authors whose works will be discussed in this chapter and, where they are offered, I have included them. But for introductory purposes, the very general definition above is sufficient. Just like different peoples, companies have their own cultures based around their internal, unique customs, ways of doing things, priorities, goals, and achievements. Culture is important because it not only differentiates companies from each other, it governs how each acts and, as the authors discussed in this chapter suggest, how they respond to change.

Even if a change effort succeeds at first, the challenge for its implementers is how to make the more profound cultural changes “stick”. The following articles describe how a culture of change (or simply a changed culture) can be made permanent. These approaches can be applied to the thesis because the goal of the changes at the Globe and Mail was to completely revamp what change leaders saw to be an outdated institution. For such sweeping changes to be sustained, a new culture would have to be put in place.

Schneider, Brief, and Guzzo delve into the issue of culture change by making a distinction between a company’s climate and its culture (Schneider, Brief & Guzzo, 1996). They explain an organization’s culture is what the organization as a whole, and by extension its members, believe and value or, symbolically, “what the people in the organization worship” (Schneider, Brief & Guzzo, 1996). An organization’s climate, on the other hand, is inferred by its members based on their perception of its daily routine and overall purposes. Based on these inferences, employees decide what behaviours are

¹ “Culture.” *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, eighth edition*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.

expected of them and what actions will be rewarded. They argue, therefore, that a climate change is a necessary precursor – the only possible precursor – to sustained culture change. They posit that a company’s “feel” depends on how it goes about its daily operations and what goals it pursues, and that out of these factors rise employees’ beliefs and values: their culture. And, conversely, the company’s climate (“feel”) stems from its culture, which in turn is based on actions and messages that come down from management.

The authors identify four dimensions of climate and hypothesize that certain factors of each dimension are necessary if cultural/climate change is to take root. While the authors argue that culture itself is well nigh impossible to directly alter or manipulate, it will change with the climate and, therefore, the key to cultural change is a change in basic, daily routines and actions – the tangibles that define culture. Moreover, a sound, sustainable change initiative should be broad and encompass all of the factors that affect climate, rather than a “silver bullet” approach that targets one specific aspect that is deemed needy of change. Like Bernick, the authors state that changes should be closely monitored for effectiveness and altered as needed. “What people in an organization experience as the climate and believe is the culture ultimately determines whether sustained change is accomplished” (Schneider, Brief & Guzzo, 1996).

This article presents a very plausible explanation for culture change. Rather than other articles that suggest that a culture can change and revert, this article suggests that as the climate changes and becomes sustained, culture follows. The idea that culture change is affected by daily actions supports the other literature and also adds depth by suggesting that behaviour affects climate, leading to the conclusion that sustained behaviour will, as

suggested by Pascale, alter culture. Moreover, the idea that changes should be monitored and altered as needed suggests that, if behaviours are altered during a change, so may the climate shift away from original goals but still lead to a cultural change – just not the one originally intended.

Phelan views the change of culture as a revitalization, a concept borrowed from anthropology and applied to an organizational setting. To begin his discussion of revitalization, the author quotes Wallace's (2003) definition of culture:

“Culture refers to a pattern of ideas, a cognitive system, consisting of a relatively small set of abstract propositions, of both descriptive and normative kinds, about the nature of the human self and society, and about how people should feel and behave. This ‘culture’ is shared, and shared uniquely, by the competent adult members of the community; it forms a template for all behavior. ... These high-order generalizations about how members of a community see themselves and each other help the anthropologist to understand the social structure and the economic system” (Phelan 2005).

The goal of this culture is “maintaining the psychological integrity of its members” (Phelan 2005). Revitalization, then, is the introduction of a new ideology into a society threatened by cultural crisis.

Phelan notes that there are set stages to cultural changes. The initial one is the “steady state period” when most members of a society (organization) cope with the status quo. Next comes increased individual stress created when, due to changes, conventional cultural norms no longer apply, which also makes efforts to deal with the stress increasingly ineffective. This anxiety leads to aberrant behaviour becoming

commonplace, which also leads to the creation of a sense of urgency. In such a situation, a visionary leader arises (as described above) who eventually brings the organization to the point of “routinization” when resistance to change plans is minimized and the revitalization movement becomes the norm. Thereafter, if no new major stress affects an organization, the values and norms that were introduced during the change will become the new steady state.

In other words, Phelan suggests that by engaging in change projects, members of an organization in effect learn by doing, and by acting institutionalize responsiveness to change as a new cultural norm.

This description is very general and, like much of the other literature, leans on the concept of a charismatic leader who will shepherd the company to greener pastures. But it does, on the other hand, concur with some of the leadership literature on the need to find followers who will help usher in the change and overcome resistance. The idea of adapting a culture through action also seems sound and seems to support the notion that cultural change cannot be mandate down or simply put into place – it must be established through routine action.

Pascale, on the other hand, argues that culture change comes not from a leader and his plan directly, but rather through organizational self-understanding and learning (Pascale 1999). He outlines seven keys to sustaining complex changes over time – ones that continue past the initial spurt of action as a change initiative is introduced.

The first is an “intricate understanding of the business.” This means an understanding by all employees of the link between their individual tasks and performance and the overall performance and strategic goals of the organization.

“Uncompromising straight talk” means that all members of the organization are encouraged to speak openly about all aspects of the organization’s performance and strategy without fear of reprisal and without holding back to show deference to superiors. The role of leaders during this process is to engage in “managing from the future,” meaning that they should envision a concrete future state and align organizational actions and strategy to achieve this “future as an inevitability.” The next of Pascale’s keys is “harnessing setbacks” which he defines as “recontextualizing failure [and] treating breakdowns as a source of future breakthroughs” (Pascale 1999). Organizations, he argues, should “continually emphasize the value of failure as a stimulus for learning” (Pascale 1999). Another key, one that is aimed at all members of the organization, is “inventive accountability.” This is the ability to improvise and innovate while on the proverbial field of battle, while still remaining committed to – and accountable for – performance benchmarks. Another important factor suggested by Pascale is “understanding the quid pro quo.” He argues that, considering the performance demands placed on employees, they should be rewarded. These rewards include not only recognition for tasks accomplished, but also training in new skills, being given a sense of meaning and satisfaction in their jobs, and being made to feel like they understand and are part of their organization’s strategy and destiny. Finally, Pascale posits that organizations should strive to experience a “relentless discomfort with the status quo.” This means that the company culture embraces a pursuit of excellence and, instead of becoming complacent with successes, strives to do even better and constantly seek out and attempt innovative solutions to problems.

In effect, the organization learns and progresses as a unit, under the guidance of a leader, but because of actions of all members of the organization. The key difference between this approach and Phelan's is that while Phelan describes the entire process, Pascale makes prescriptions for, supposedly, exclusively the leader's actions. That difference aside, Pascale's prescriptions call for a common understanding of all issues involved in the change while Phelan's theory seems to rely on a near-religious devotion to a vision and a single leader.

Bernick's theories support those presented by Pascale. Her first-person account of institutionalizing cultural change at Alberto-Culver, while it applies to a very different industry, holds some interesting insights into an effective cultural change (made even more pertinent by their real-life success over time in a major corporation). She states that a company's employees need to understand the company, what it does, and what role they play within a "big picture" (Bernick 2002). Employee involvement and feedback during change is also crucial – feedback that is visibly acted upon by management, as well as constant measurement of and alterations to the ongoing change process to measure effectiveness and tailor it to changing circumstances. Equally importantly, "cultural change, perhaps obviously, is not one change but numerous changes - some big, most little" (Berenick 2002). This also supports the leadership literature that emphasizes the importance of day-to-day actions in successful change.

Meyerson and Martin define culture as "the social or normative glue that holds together a potentially diverse group of organizational members" (Myerson & Martin 1987). They go even further in suggesting that, in the study of change, "organizations are culture" in that they encapsulate and espouse "patterns of meaning, values, and

behaviour” that they share to some degree (Myerson & Martin 1987). They state that there are many points of view on culture and culture change, including the integration paradigm (focus on leaders as sources of organizational culture), differentiation paradigm (focus on culture being an outgrowth of differentiation within an organization between subunits, groups, and individuals), and the ambiguity paradigm (which combines the other views and embraces the ambiguities and paradoxes inherent in this combination). The authors hold that to study cultural change, one must not subscribe solely to any of the individual paradigms so as not to risk overlooking the true nature of a culture change.

Kotter makes a claim relevant to this chapter when he states that a clear link must be drawn between organizational success and the effects of a change process and that future success must be portrayed in light of alignment with continuing changes (Kotter 1999). In this way, success and future success become seen as an outgrowth of sustained change, which in turn becomes embodied in the company’s culture.

Similarly, Jick’s “tenth commandment” states that once changes have been implemented and an organization’s culture has altered from its previous state, this change must be institutionalized and its importance must be affirmed (Jick 1991). He even suggests that the “journey” of change itself be institutionalized so that companies remain adaptive and ready to change at all times.

Organizations, especially mature ones, tend to have deeply entrenched cultural values. When these are challenged by a crisis and altered by change processes, they do not simply change and become new, desired ones. The literature points out that the process of making an organization’s values change is lengthy and dependent on numerous changes (large and small) and a long-term commitment by

management/leadership to foster sustainable change. Some authors suggest that the best way to institutionalize such permanent cultural change is simply by having members of an organization become accustomed to performing new tasks, which in turn will alter their attitudes and behaviours.

The following table (Table 6) summarizes the literature reviewed in the previous section. Included in the table are a set of definitions of the key dimensions of institutionalizing cultural change during and after organizational change. In each case the authors who has provided the main discussion of each of these dimensions is also identified.

TABLE 6 – SUMMARY OF CRITICAL ASPECTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZING CULTURAL CHANGE

Dimension	Definition	Authors identifying it
Broad / multi-faceted approach	Acting to alter many aspects of an organization’s climate/culture rather than relying on a “silver bullet” approach.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Schneider et al (1996) • Bernick (2002)
Change of daily activities / climate; Organizations learn by doing	Aside from grand schemes and strategies, concentrating on mundane, day-to-day activities that shape employees attitudes and, by extension, the organization’s climate.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Schneider et al (1996) • Phelan (2005) • Bernick (2002)
Culture change as “revitalization”	Viewing the process from an anthropological perspective of a new age coming to a society, with a leader guiding it through to “routinization” of new norms.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Phelan (2005)
Organizational self-understanding	All members of the organization should understand the purpose and effects of a change effort on the organization and their place/role in the organization; furthermore, they should understand how their individual actions affect / contribute to the change.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pascale (1999) • Bernick (2002)
Active employee involvement and feedback	As above, with employees being involved in major aspects of the change effort and asked for feedback (which is acted upon), thereby creating a sense of team accomplishment.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bernick (2002) • Pascale (1999)
Creation of direct link between changes and success	Linking organizational successes to actions undertaken during the change effort with the aim of establishing in the organizational mindset that change was necessary and fruitful.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kotter (1999)
Institutionalization of need for change	Imbuing the idea that future change is both necessary and inevitable in the organizational psyche to foster readiness and innovation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pascale (1999) • Jick (1991)

3.7. Critique of the Literature

While there appears to be a general consensus about many aspects of change among the various sources in the different areas of change management discussed above, there are a few notable gaps in the literature. This thesis, by dealing with the specific case of the Globe and Mail, seeks to add to the existing literature by addressing the following gaps.

The first, as mentioned in the section on Leadership and Change, is that many of the studies upon which the literature is based dealt with large organizations (as mentioned in the Leadership and Change chapter; also notable is Pascale's focus on the U.S. Army and Shell). While this does not necessarily make the theories gained from these studies invalid or inapplicable to smaller organizations, this applicability does not appear to have been widely tested. By employing these theories in the analysis of the case of a medium-sized organization like the Globe and Mail, this thesis may help in determining whether theories of change are equally applicable to organizations of different sizes.

Another notable gap is the lack of study of media organizations. Despite the fact that the media play a major role in the social, cultural, political, and economic development of the world, there appears to be a noteworthy dearth of academic studies about change – or even business process in general – in the media. In fact, the studies that do look at the media concentrate on classical business issues rather than delving into the particular nature of media companies. For example, the case “Creating Excellence out of Crisis: Organizational Transformation at the Chicago Tribune,” (Frame, Nielson, & Pate, 2000) while it deals with a major media company, is focused on labour relations with printer press operators (rather than reporters, editors, or other positions that are strictly

media-related). In other words, it could just as well have applied to heavy machine operators in any other industry and does not add to the body of understanding about the particulars of the mass media industry. The subject of this thesis, being a major national newspaper, allows for the application of change management theory to an actual newsroom. This will help determine whether theories developed based on other industries are equally applicable in the media field.

Third, in the sources discussed above, there appears to be little or no examination of the application of a vision (or visions) to an organization by a number of different leaders in a short span of time. While many of the sources of literature discuss issues pertaining to a single leader, they implicitly tie entire change initiatives to individual leaders. And, while some sources (Kanter, Gill, Pascale) discuss the need for the creation of a culture of change or change-savvy future leaders, there is a lack of discussion of tangible change initiatives led by more than one individual – or, perhaps more precisely, group of individuals. Mohrman does caution (as noted earlier) that changes in top management during the change process can act as a deterrent to its continuity, but he does not support this claim with concrete examples (Mohrman 1999). During the time span addressed by the thesis, three different editors-in-chief, two publishers cum CEOs, and a senior executive at the Thomson Corporation, each surrounded by a different cadre of decision makers, attempted to undertake changes for the same general reason: updating a venerable newspaper whose monopoly on the national market had been challenged. This study will be able to shed some light on whether or not (and how) different iterations of what is arguably the same change effort relate to each other.

As a general comment, much of the literature on change is composed of lists of prescriptions for success, often without a base of empirical proof or a discussion of the sample used to test the theories presented. This study seeks to circumvent these shortcomings by using a variety of prescriptive lists to find their common elements, and then test the validity of these common points against a concrete case. This, in turn, will be done with a clearly defined sample of respondents within one organization, allowing for in-depth, transparent analysis.

4. Methodology

The object of this thesis was to determine the success of the change at the Globe, not to evaluate the outcome or process of the newspaper war itself. That being said, success in the newspaper war, at least as perceived by the various interviewees, will factor into the evaluation of the change as a whole. The success of the change was measured according to two metrics: by asking the participants to evaluate its success in a number of areas (organizational, business / financial, editorial, overall) and objectively by examining the advertising and circulation/readership data for the period 1998-2003. The combined results of this analysis will be discussed based on the literature review, but the analysis will be divided into two blocks: the Globe under William Thorsell and Roger Parkinson and the Globe under Stuart Garner, Phillip Crawley, and Richard Addis. The reasons for this division will be discussed later.

The field work for this thesis included two aspects: secondary data research and interviews. The secondary data research was undertaken before the interviews and included qualitative sources (see below) as well as quantitative ones (like sales,

readership, circulation figures for both the Globe and Mail and the National Post). This secondary data served as a background for the formulation of interview questions and selection of interview candidates (besides the obvious selection of various senior editors and the publisher). The interviews sought to craft a “story” around the data gleaned from the secondary sources and served as a basis for the evaluation of the Globe and Mail based on the criteria included in Table 6 (above).

This section discusses aspects of the types of research that this thesis used as well as general approaches to qualitative research as described by Mintzberg (1979) and Eisenhardt (1989).

Primary sources for this thesis include in-person, e-mail, and telephone interviews with persons present at the Globe (in management and otherwise) during the 1998-2003 period during which the major battles of the newspaper war were fought. I must also note that I was an intern at the Globe between May and September of 2005 and have written freelance for the paper since then, and therefore have a familiarity with its protocol, culture, and personnel. This knowledge was useful in designing the research (i.e.: I knew whom to interview, who to contact, etc.).

4.1. Secondary data

Zikmund defines secondary data as “data gathered and recorded by someone else prior to (and for purposes other than) the current needs of the researcher. Secondary data are usually historical, already assembled, and do not require access to respondents or subjects” (Zikmund 2003). Other than the aforementioned sources taken from the change

management (and related) literature, this thesis will use a number of secondary data sources. These will include a number of articles and a book regarding the newspaper war (these sources will be described later in the section), transcripts of interviews undertaken by author Chris Cobb in his writing of the book *Ego and Ink*, as well as financial and circulation information regarding the Globe and Mail and the National Post during the period covered by this thesis.

Zikmund notes that the greatest advantage of basing research on secondary data is that “researchers are able to build on past research – a ‘body’ of ... knowledge” (Zikmund 2003). He goes on to note that “in some instances data cannot be obtained using primary data collection procedures” (Zikmund 2003). For example, the authors of “Shapes of Organizational Change: The Case of Heinenken Inc.” relied on sources including historical data, annual reports, articles in journals, books, and on the internet to perform their analysis of changes at the Dutch brewery (Beugelsdijk, Slangen, & van Herpen, 2002). Zikmund states that the purposes of secondary data research include fact finding (as the name suggests, looking for facts), model building (specifying relationships between two or more variables), and data mining (analyzing volumes of information to discover patterns of activities, purchases, etc.). In this thesis, the secondary data research will be used to find facts that will be analyzed using the literature and also to discover if relationships exist between the qualitative primary and secondary data and quantitative data (in the form of circulation and sales figures).

Zikmund also lists some limitations and disadvantages of secondary data research which bear mentioning here. He writes that “an inherent disadvantage of secondary data is that they were not designed specifically to meet the researcher’s needs” and that,

therefore, the researcher needs to evaluate secondary data to decide whether or not it should be used (Zikmund 2003). The questions used for this evaluation include: “Is the subject matter consistent with ... problem definition?”; “Is the time period consistent with [research] needs?”; and “Do they cover the subject in adequate detail?” The author also notes that the researcher has no control over the accuracy of secondary data – including bias and selective reporting in documents – and should address this issue by cross-checking as many secondary sources as possible against each other to determine their veracity (by noting similarity in independent sources).

4.1.1. Articles regarding the newspaper war

Chris Cobb’s book *Ego and Ink* (2004) as well as the articles by Chiu (2005), Bell (2000), and Mattos (2003) address either individual leaders or the entire change process at the Globe and Mail, but they do not draw on change management literature. Rather, they are journalistic pieces focusing on the people involved in the changes and on the effect the changes have had on the newspaper itself, on its reputation, on its readers, and on its staff. They provide not only a sound base of understanding of the subject, but also served as a guide to the formulation of interview questions.

Journalist Chris Cobb’s account of the newspaper war was an indispensable resource as it describes the events from an insider’s perspective and includes numerous interviews with managers and staff of both papers (Cobb, 2004). It also provides a detailed timeline of the actions undertaken by both papers and strategic decisions (both undertaken and suggested but rejected) at the Globe. Furthermore, it establishes the rivalry within the greater context of the Canadian media environment and of the

economic slowdown that struck Canada just as the war's most decisive battles were being waged.

Three articles that appeared in the Ryerson Review of Journalism proved to be very useful in preliminary research and as well as the writing of the thesis and formulation of questions:

- “Growing Old Disgracefully” (Chiu, 2005) discusses the changes in the Globe’s content and presentation and how they have affected its image and integrity;
- “The British are Coming, the British are Coming” (Bell, 2000) is a profile of the Globe under Richard Addis and addresses his ignorance of Canadian culture and history and the effects his managerial style, vision, and design ideas had on morale in the Globe’s newsroom. It also suggests that what emerged after Addis’ tenure was what one former columnist referred to as “un-Globe.”
- “The Scoop on Ed” (Mattos, 2003) is a profile on current editor-in-chief Ed Greenspon, a long-time rival and apparent opposite of his predecessor Richard Addis, including his vision for the Globe’s future and assessment of its current appeal, content, as well as Ed’s opinion of the state of the newspaper war.

The above sources were used for a number of purposes. They served as an introductory guide to the newspaper war and to its main players. As such, they were used as one of the bases for the formulation of interview questions. These sources were also used as a source of information to supplement the interview questions. Namely, they addressed related issues that were not covered by the questions (i.e.: morale problems, hiring decisions, interaction between key players, etc.). As such, they aided in the

evaluation of the change in the Globe and Mail by providing an outside view to supplement the responses of the interviewees and the objective numerical data (circulation and advertising).

4.2. Interviews

Zikmund extols the virtues of the interview as a research method. He notes that “the face-to-face interaction between interviewer and respondent has several characteristics that help researchers obtain complete and precise information” (Zikmund, 2003). The author lists a number of advantages to interviews. An important reason to conduct interviews, he posits, is that if a research objective calls for a number of lengthy questions, “personal interviews may be the only alternative” to ensure response (Zikmund, 2003). He notes that the opportunity for impromptu feedback and clarification during the actual interview may allow the interviewer to collect more and more detailed information. Zikmund also notes the importance of “probing” – the ability of the interviewer to delve into a respondent’s answers for more comprehensive explanations or elucidation of previous answers. This makes “the personal interview especially useful for obtaining unstructured information” (Zikmund, 2003). Moreover, item non-response is most likely to be minimized when a respondent deals with an interviewer personally (as opposed to impersonal methods like questionnaires or telephone interviews). Finally, Zikmund suggests that “people enjoy sharing information and insights with ... interviewers,” a fact that adds to the quantity and quality of data that can be obtained through this research method.

The author does, however, note two caveats to the interview method. The first is the possible reluctance of respondents to answer sensitive questions or provide confidential information due to the lack of a guarantee of anonymity. Second, he notes that the interviewer him- or herself may have an effect on the respondent's answers due to their interview techniques, phrasing of questions, tone of voice, or even personal appearance. This last point suggests that interviews with senior members of the media should be performed by someone with a professional appearance and a knowledge of both the formal and informal methods of communication present within the media environment.

Archer et al (1998) discuss an aspect of political science research that I believe fits well with the purposes of this thesis. They elaborate on the branch of interviewing called "elite interviewing," defined as an interview that seeks to answer "research questions that ... require specialized or 'inside' information" (Archer, Gibbins, & Youngman, 1998). In this context, elite is defined as "an individual or group with access to specialized information" (such as the senior editorial board of the Globe and Mail) (Archer, Gibbins, & Youngman, 1998).

The authors list a number of advantages to elite interviewing. Foremost among these is access to "detailed, directed, and often private, otherwise inaccessible information" including personal information. Moreover, this technique allows for more time to be devoted to the interview, which will ideally allow for more detailed data collection. The authors also note that for some respondents, an interview "presents a welcome opportunity to talk at length, explaining personal and political choices" (Archer, Gibbins, & Youngman, 1998). Another very interesting issue raised by Archer et al is the

possibility that the researcher will gain unexpected information or a new perspective from the elite interview. Unlike in other forms of research such as questionnaires or surveys, the elite interview is open-ended and may allow for the respondent to “suggest to the researcher a new way of approaching the research question or new avenues to be explored in the research” (Archer, Gibbins, & Youngman, 1998).

The authors do note a few disadvantages to interviews conducted with “insiders.” The first and most obvious is that these types of interviews are time-consuming, not only because of the physical length of the interview and subsequent transcription, but because members of the “elite” may have difficulty fitting the interview into their schedule, which can lead to delays. Another is that comparison of data gained from different elite interviews may be more difficult than comparing the formulaic answers gained from, for example, a questionnaire. So, while there will be “core” data that answers the base interview questions, “other data may not be amenable to comparisons.” The third potential disadvantage discussed by the authors is the most pertinent to this study. This is the problem of the reactive nature of the elite interview. In other words,

“the respondents are aware that their answers will be used in a research study, and this may lead them to alter the information given. ... People do not wish to look unknowledgeable and prefer to be seen in the best possible light. The desires for self-promotion and self-protection can lead people to embellish or downplay certain issues; the temptation to act as one’s own ‘spin doctor’ is great” (Archer, Gibbins, & Youngman, 1998).

This may prove to be particularly true considering that this thesis is based on the direct actions of a small group of people, some of whom still hold important decision-making positions at the Globe and Mail. The authors raise another, even more extreme possibility. They note that respondents may speak based on unfounded beliefs and perceptions or provide erroneous information that they believe is correct, or they may purposely seek to mislead or lie to the researcher. This means that data collected may be completely or to a certain extent false. As such, the authors underscore that researchers should “never treat what interviewees say as factual data, but rather treat *the fact that they said it as data*” (Archer, Gibbins, & Youngman, 1998).²

To facilitate the elite interview process, the authors suggest that the researcher be very clear on what data he or she is seeking. This calls for the creation of an interview framework that will ensure that core questions do not go unanswered and that there exists a base for comparison of answers given by different respondents. This also allows for flexibility as supplementary questions can be added based on the flow of the conversation without diverting the principal direction of the interview. Archer et al also state that before this type of interview, the researcher should familiarize him- or herself with the interviewee’s background to gain insights into his or her personality and allow for rapport to be more easily built. Furthermore, this might allow for the screening out of redundant questions the answers to which can be found elsewhere. A final suggestion offered by the authors is that the researcher both record and take notes during the interview. The aim of this is to be able to note nonverbal responses such as hesitation, nervousness, or body language to supplement verbal responses, allowing for a more thorough analysis of the interview.

² Italics used by authors.

Interview Design

All of the interviewees were asked 11 core questions based on the literature review and on the aforementioned secondary sources regarding the newspaper war. Each individual, with the exception of Chris Cobb, was asked questions regarding their personal actions (Mr. Cobb was asked to answer questions regarding the actions of the other respondents, both individually and as a group). Every respondent except Chris Cobb was also asked to answer several questions designed to gather specific information on their role in the changes.

4.3. A discussion about qualitative research

Qualitative research differs from quantitative research in that it strives to find answers to questions in attitudes and opinions rather than in hard numbers. The following articles offer suggestions on how and why qualitative research should be conducted.

The primary guide for the field research in this study was Henry Mintzberg's primer on effective qualitative studies entitled "An emerging strategy of 'direct' research" (Mintzberg, 1979). Due to the investigative nature of the study and the wide range of sources that were used for the evaluation of the Globe and Mail's change efforts, as well as the distinct quality of this particular case (see Critique of the Literature chapter), Mintzberg's prescriptions and emphasis on exploration align well with this study's aims.

Mintzberg, based on many years of personal experience engaging in large-scale research projects, argues that the purpose of qualitative research is not to prove or disprove ideas or theories but rather to learn as much as possible (Mintzberg, 1979). He

presents seven general themes on which qualitative research (both design and field work) should be based.

Mintzberg suggests that research be kept as purely descriptive as possible. Researchers, he writes, should not adhere to or base themselves on existing literature, but rather aim for description that might disprove existing theories. Moreover, they should rely on simple methodologies. He notes that if a small sample gives more in-depth or reliable data than a larger one, it should be used. Research should be as inductive as possible. Researchers should “do detective work” by tracking down patterns and consistencies. That being accomplished, Mintzberg writes that they should not be afraid of taking a “creative leap” - thinking beyond the data for new ideas and/or hypotheses. On the other hand, he is adamant that research should be systematic and that researchers need to have a well-defined focus that lets them get to the “hard” data for the research. Mintzberg suggests that once information is collected, researchers should “measure in real organizational terms.” In other words, they should not force the organization into abstract categories and avoid sterile description. As an aside to this, he notes that “questionnaires are not enough” and that researchers need to be creative about research and observation. Moreover, he suggests that systemic data be supported by anecdotal data. This has the dual aim of being able to be able to explain the hard data and uncovering relationships between qualitative and quantitative data. Finally, he states that researchers should strive to integrate diverse elements into their research. This is because in real research, some factors cannot be held constant so that others can be studied, so he suggests that researchers should seek to recognize patterns, not merely perform mechanical analysis

The points raised by the author appear to fit with the research model of this thesis. The Globe and Mail is a complex organization which may not neatly fit into the models described in the previous chapters and, as such, the goal of the research is to gain as profound an understanding as possible of the organization and its processes.

As discussed in the Critique of the Literature, this study will aim to fill certain gaps in the existing change literature – the same literature that the study is based upon. Due to this unique circumstance, the theories and prescriptions offered by the following article should prove most useful.

Eisenhardt's "Building theories from case study research," because it directly aims at creating theories based on case studies, is slightly stricter in its commandments than Mintzberg's article (Eisenhardt, 1989). The author states that for a qualitative study to be effective, it needs a well-defined focus and be based on pertinent constructs. It is important to carefully specify the population being studied. Eisenhardt advocates employing multiple data collection methods that combine qualitative and quantitative data; the two types should support each other and ensure that neither type, considered individually, provides misleading information. It is ideal to have more than one researcher perform a study to avoid biases and allow for different viewpoints or approaches.

More specifically, the author suggests that researchers take field notes – stream-of-consciousness notes describing how research is going, including observation and analysis. Researchers should not worry about adding or altering data collection methods during the study (but notes that this should not be treated as "a license to be unsystematic"). She also states that researchers should perform within-case analysis.

While the suggestions given by the author appear sound, they may not align with the research intents of this thesis. First of all, this is because the aim of this thesis is not to create a new theory but rather to explore an organization and compare it to existing models; so, while there is a well-defined focus, the goal is not necessarily to arrive at something completely new. A more particular detail is that research was conducted by one person, so the author's suggestion that there be more than one researcher, while seemingly valid, cannot be applied in this case.

Meyerson and Martin conclude their discussion of culture (as mentioned above) with pertinent advice for researchers delving into the nature of changes – especially those pertaining to culture – within an organization. They state that

“if researchers focus on ‘top-down’ organizational-level process, they will miss ‘bottom-up’ sources of change. If they attend only to locally based changes, they will miss global patterns and masked ambiguities. And, if ambiguities are ignored or hidden, experimentation ... may be inhibited” (Meyerson & Martin, 1987).

This advice supports Mintzberg's prescription that researchers should not adhere to one specific body of literature and, moreover, aim to be as explorative as possible. This, coupled with “experimentation” or, in Mintzberg's terms, a “creative leap” may lead to meaningful discoveries.

The majority of research performed was qualitative, as noted above, because the aim was to develop an understanding of the change processes that took place at the Globe and Mail, including the reasons why they were undertaken and why they might differ from the prescriptions in the literature. This was also done on the assumption that it was entirely possible that research would lead to the discovery of issues, events, of influential

factors that were not foreseen or initially researched. The research approach allows for further study and pursuit of such unforeseen issues with the aim of deepening knowledge about this unique case.

I also, however, sought out circulation and advertising data for both the Globe and the Post to examine the effects the competition and leadership decisions had on its readership and advertising customer base (the key determinants of a paper's success).

All of these sources allowed me to form a cohesive picture of the Globe and Mail's change efforts that I was then able to scrutinize through the lens of the previously discussed change management literature.

4.4. The Sample

The interviewees for this study were, as mentioned above, the key decision-makers at the Globe and Mail during the period covered by the study. These respondents were chosen because of their access to specific information regarding the subjects covered by the thesis which could not be obtained from other sources. Due to the scope of the study, certain people who it might have been helpful to interview were left off the interviewee list – for instance, the interviewee's counterparts at the National Post or a wider selection of Globe and Mail staff (see suggestions for further study). Original plans for the list of interviewees included the head of the paper's advertising and publication/distribution departments. When the Globe and Mail was contacted with a request to interview these people, I was told they were not the ones who had held the positions in question during the newspaper war period (their names were not given to me). Mr. Phillip Crawley, however, offered to answer the questions I would have asked

these two people as, he told me over the telephone and in person during the interview, he had been a hands-on manager of these issues during the period 1999 (when he was hired) to 2003. It was, therefore, Mr. Crawley who took responsibility for answering the questions that would have been asked of these individuals (which he did not actually answer in entirety – see subsection 4.7.) and provided me with necessary circulation data (see subsections 5.4.1. and 5.5.).

Only one of the planned interviewees refused to participate in the study. Despite numerous inquiries and attempts to get Mr. Ed Greenspon, the Globe and Mail's current editor-in-chief, to participate in the study, he has refused. An email from his personal assistant has been attached as an appendix. Also, repeated e-mails and telephone calls to associate editor Neil Campbell, who had previously agreed to assist with this thesis, were not answered. However, Mr. Greenspon's refusal to participate is not a serious hindrance to the project. He became editor-in-chief in mid-2002, after the major battles of the newspaper war had already been fought. Moreover, only six months of his tenure fall within the time span covered by this thesis. It would have been far more problematic had any of the other respondents refused to participate. As it stands, Mr. Greenspon's involvement in the changes cannot and will not be analyzed, but his actions will be noted where appropriate, relying on secondary sources and comments made by the other respondents.

4.4.1. The Field Study

The field work, in the form of interviews, was conducted between May 30 and June 15, 2006. Seven respondents were contacted for interviews, with six agreeing to participate.

As mentioned above, Ed Greenspon, the current editor-in-chief of the *Globe and Mail*, refused to take part in the study due to his “hectic schedule and severely limited time” (see e-mail attached as Appendix 2). William Thorsell (former editor-in-chief) was interviewed by telephone from his office in Toronto. Richard Addis (former editor-in-chief) was interviewed by telephone from his office in England. Stuart Garner (former publisher and CEO) was interviewed by telephone from the Bahamas. Chris Cobb (author of *Ego and Ink*) was interviewed in person at the offices of the *Ottawa Citizen* in Ottawa. Phillip Crawley (current publisher and CEO) was interviewed in person at the *Globe and Mail* offices in Toronto. Roger Parkinson (former publisher) was interviewed in person at his home in Toronto. All of the interviews were taped.

4.4.2. Non-response

The objective of the field study was to gather enough information to be able to evaluate the changes undertaken at the *Globe and Mail* in as much depth as possible by analyzing it based on the criteria from the existing change literature. However, not all respondents answered all of the questions they were asked. Table 7 shows the details of the interviews conducted, including which respondents did not answer certain questions.

TABLE 7 – SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED

Interviewee	When / how interview conducted	Duration of Interview	Data missing (which questions not answered?)
William Thorsell	May 30, 2006: Telephone	45 minutes	General # 13 Specific # 2
Richard Addis	June 1, 2006: Telephone	25 minutes	General #5
Stuart Garner	June 9, 2006: Telephone	45 minutes	General # 5,7,9,10,13 Specific # 1
Chris Cobb	June 12, 2006: In person (Ottawa)	45 minutes	General # 4,5
Phillip Crawley	June 15, 2006: In person (Toronto)	45 minutes	General # 6,9 Specific # 4,5,6,7,8
Roger Parkinson	June 15, 2006: In person (Toronto)	90 minutes	General # 5,9,11,12 Specific # 3

As evidenced by the data in Table 7, none of the interviewees answered all of the questions they were asked. There does not, however, appear to be a distinct pattern to which questions were not answered or a correlation between unanswered general questions on the part of the different respondents. The two reasons given for not answering questions were that the interviewee was not able to comment or could not recall the answer. Specific details with respect to non-response follow.

William Thorsell said he could not comment on the role the change in ownership played in the change process (General question 13) and could not recall outside consultants having suggested the Globe need an “overhaul” prior to the Post’s launch, as stated in *Ego and Ink* (Specific question 2).

Richard Addis said he did not “really remember” how much money was spent on implementing change at the Globe (General question 5).

Stuart Garner would not comment on how much money was spent implementing change (General question 5), stated that communication with staff was not his main role, so those questions that concerned it should be asked of Misters Crawley and Addis (General questions 7,9,10), and said he was unable to comment on the role ownership change played in the change process (General question 13). He also said he was unable to comment on the management decisions that had led to the refusal to sell the Globe to Conrad Black before the Post's launch (Specific question 1).

Chris Cobb did not answer General questions 4 or 5 (time committed to change and money spent on the change) on the grounds that he did not have access to the information required to give a correct answer.

Phillip Crawley chose not to describe his own leadership style (General question 6) and did not specify who made major announcements to staff (General question 9). Due to time constraints on our interview, Mr. Crawley was unable to answer Specific questions 4-8, those that were originally supposed to have been asked of the heads of advertising and distribution at the time of the newspaper war. I was told to email him these questions, but received no response. I was, however, provided with charts showing the Globe's circulation and readership compared to those of the National Post for the period 1999-2003 (which were compiled from third-party circulation data). These data are analyzed in this thesis.

Roger Parkinson did not recall how much was spent on the newspaper war (General question 5). Nor did he specify who made major announcements to staff (General question 9). He chose not to rate the change initiative numerically, instead commenting on the various aspects of the question. He also withheld comment on the

effect of the change in ownership of the paper (General question 12). He also did not answer Specific question 3 on the grounds that he was so removed from the Globe and Mail that he could not compare its culture now to when he ran the paper.

4.5. Scope of the Study

A few limitations to the scope of this study must be noted. First, this thesis is focused on the changes undertaken by the Globe and Mail immediately preceding and following the launch of the National Post. So, while the National Post will be mentioned during the analysis, it is not the focus of the thesis, nor will it be studied in-depth.

Second, the focus of this thesis is on senior managerial decisions. For this reason, lower-ranked members of the hierarchy were not interviewed. While some of their opinions and attitudes will be extrapolated from secondary sources and used during the analysis, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to delve more profoundly into how the changes at the Globe and Mail affected or were affected by its rank-and-file personnel.

Third, the timeline covered by this thesis ends in 2003. Because we are now three years removed from the events being studied, and many of the persons who were interviewed now work in different organizations, their responses may be clouded by time and new organizational affiliations.

Finally, it is important to clarify that this thesis does not seek to explain in full the reasons for the Globe and Mail's successes and failures during the newspaper war. There are a number of factors outside the scope of this thesis that certainly contributed to the competitive environment during the period being studied (i.e., changing national

economic conditions and the presence and actions of other competitors in the market, like the *Toronto Star*).

4.5.1. Access to data and timeline restrictions

All the information contained in this analysis, and all quotes from respondents, correspond to the period preceding 2003. Coincidentally, the *Globe and Mail* is currently being examined by the Competition Bureau in connection with commercial plans, so they cannot divulge (nor am I allowed to use), any data or information pertaining to the newspaper which concerns the period of January 1, 2003 until the present.

4.5.2. Access to financial data

Because the *Globe and Mail* was a privately held company until it was acquired in 2001, financial information prior to 2001 is unavailable. This includes figures concerning the costs of the changes and the personal investment made by Ken Thomson (see further chapters).

4.6. Objective measures of successful change

There are three measures of the success of newspapers, or at least of newspaper distribution: circulation, advertising, and readership. Although circulation and advertising are often used interchangeably, even in industry publications, they are in fact two distinct concepts. Circulation is simply a measure of how many copies of the paper are purchased

(or received for free) by readers – in other words, how many copies end up in readers' hands. Readership, on the other hand, is a measure of how many people actually read the paper. This differs from circulation because a single circulated copy of a paper can have more than one reader. For instance, it is assumed that a paper that ends up at a household will be read to some extent by all members of that household, or that a copy of a business section will circulate around an office and reach more than one reader. This distinction drives strategy for papers. Some seek circulation, others target their audience to maximize readership. Increased circulation is expensive; increased readership does not have to be. But the ideal is a balance that will ensure economic viability while letting the paper prove to advertisers – the source of papers' income - that their target audience is reading the paper.

The distinction explained above is important because this thesis refers to both circulation and readership and figures for both are presented.

4.6.1. The importance of advertising

Newspapers have one de facto source of income: advertising. Especially in North America, where cover prices for newspapers are relatively low, the income gathered from the physical sale of newspapers (be it through subscription, at the news stand, or through bulk sales), is not enough to even offset printing prices. So the aim of newspapers is to, besides delivering news and other content, acquire a readership that appeals to an advertising audience, which will then see the newspaper as a vehicle for selling their products or conveying their message. In any competitive situation, this becomes an issue of serious importance because advertisers must choose which of any number of

newspapers reaches the segment of the market they wish to sell to. In other words, battles between newspapers are battles for not only readership, but for a readership which is attractive to the advertising industry. So content is important, but aside from its journalistic value, it is a tool for attracting potential buyers of advertisers' products.

In the particular case of Canada, the largest single market for newspapers and, by extension, the single largest market for advertising – and, not coincidentally, the hub of advertising companies and corporate headquarters – is Toronto. Chris Cobb explains the relationship between newspapers and advertisers as follows:

“The media advertising pie is divided between newspapers, radio, TV, magazines, billboards, whatever, and it’s extremely difficult for a new entrant into a market to get access to that money. [That’s because] the advertising industry, for all its pretense of being hip, as any advertising executive will tell you, is one of the most conservative industries, and shifting their habits is extremely difficult. ... Just because there is a new player [in the market] does not mean that advertising budgets will grow” (Cobb, 2004).

This is an important fact because in this case, the National Post’s goal was to cut into the Globe’s advertising pie. So the Globe and Mail started from a naturally advantageous position of having a set base of advertisers, who would have to be convinced by the Post to abandon the Grey Lady. A future chapter will look at how advertising played into the newspaper war.

APPENDIX 1 - LIST OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND RESPONDENTS

Name	Position	Question	Justification
Every respondent (General questions)	All	<p>1. The change management literature offers a model that presents four kinds of change (Nadler and Tushman). Could you please tell me, in your opinion, which of these descriptors best describes the types of change that were undertaken at the Globe? Why do you say this?</p> <p>2. Why did the Globe need to change? In other words, what was the objective of the change initiative?</p> <p>3. What was your role in the change? In other words, how did you personally seek to bring about change at the Globe and Mail? What was your change strategy?</p> <p>3a. The change management literature identifies a number of strategies that have been associated with the management of change. I will list them and would ask you to comment, first of all, on whether or not this strategy was used at the Globe and Mail. If the strategy was used I will ask you to provide detail on how it was implemented? If the strategy was not followed at the Globe, I will ask you why not?</p> <p>a) Many organizations who are undertaking change start with a vision. Was / is there a vision for the Globe and Mail?.</p> <p>For those who say YES ask: What is it? Who created it? How was it created?</p>	<p>- Will help determine what kind of change the Globe and Mail underwent, thereby facilitating analysis. Will also determine if leaders understood their change.</p> <p>- Will provide a list of efforts that can be evaluated based on criteria.</p> <p>- See above.</p> <p>- See above.</p>

		<p>How often was it communicated? For those who say NO ask: Why do you think this was the case? b. Many organizations try and establish a sense of urgency within the organization with respect to the need to change. Did you attempt to create a sense of urgency? For those who say YES ask: How was this sense of urgency communicated? What messages were sent to employees? To what extent do you think that employees actually bought in to this message? For those who say NO ask: Why do you think this was the case? c. The research literature has also noted that many change leaders build coalitions to foster achievement of change. Was this the case at the Globe? For those who say YES ask: Who was included in this coalition? Why these individuals? For those who say NO ask: Why do you think this was the case? 4. About how much personal time did you / do you commit to change efforts (as opposed to normal daily activities)? 5. Approximately how much money was spent on trying to implement change on the Globe? (i.e. training and development, communication, etc.)? 6. How would you describe your leadership style? (4 words you would use to describe yourself, 4 words you think others would use to describe you)</p>	<p>- Will help determine level of leader's commitment to the change. - Will help determine the level of organizational commitment. - Will help in analysis of individual leaders' styles, which will be compared to criteria discussed in the literature review.</p>
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		<p>7. Communication in times of change is considered to be very important. How did you communicate with staff, stakeholders, and others involved in or affected by the change?</p> <p>8. Did you solicit input from staff regarding the changes? If yes, how did you act on staff input?</p> <p>9. Who made major announcements regarding change / victories / layoffs? Why this individual or group?</p> <p>10. Do you / did you seek to make every member of staff understand his/her role in the grand scheme of the change (including their contribution and responsibility)?</p> <p>11. On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being failure and 5 being complete success), how would you judge the change at the Globe from the following points of view:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • organizational • business / financial • editorial • overall <p>In each case, ask them why they awarded the score that they did.</p> <p>12. Has the editorial position of the Globe and Mail changed as a result of the newspaper war?</p> <p>- If yes, from what to what?</p> <p>- If no, why not? How would you describe it as it is?</p> <p>13. What was the role of the change in ownership (to Bell Globemedia) on the change process?</p>	<p>- Will help in the analysis of communication efforts during the change.</p> <p>- See above.</p> <p>- See above.</p> <p>- See above.</p> <p>- Will allow for comparison of the different leaders' assessment of the success of the change effort.</p>
Ed Greenspon	Editor-in-chief	REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE	

Richard Addis	Former E-in-C	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What do you think your reputation was coming to the Globe? What effect do you think this had on your role as a change leader? 2. Do you think coming in as an outsider (to the organization and to Canada as a whole) helped or hindered your efforts to change the Globe? Why do you say this? 3. You were known for your conflicts with the Globe's "old guard." Would you agree with this assessment? If yes, what do you think caused these conflicts and how did they affect your change efforts? If NO, why do you think that this impression was formed? 4. There was a documented morale problem among Globe staff during your editorship. Were you aware of the low morale? If yes, what did you do to counteract this? 5. Have the changes at the paper affected editorial decisions? (ex: the Globe not running the "Shawinigate" scandal stories) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Will help in analysis of specific personal leadership characteristics / competencies. - See above. - See above. - See above. - See above. Also will help in assessing overall level of change success.
William Thorsell	Former E-in-C	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Why were you initially opposed to the introduction of colour to the Globe and Mail despite the purchase of colour printing machines? 2. Outside consultants suggested that the Globe needed an "overhaul" prior to the Post's launch. How did you act on this advice? 3. What did you do to deter defection of staff to the Post? 4. There are instances where the message staff got from you differed from that given by other senior members of the hierarchy (ex: Wentz and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Will help in analysis of specific personal leadership characteristics / competencies. - See above. Will also help in assessment of organizational readiness for change. - See above. - See above. Will also help in evaluation of organizational communication during change.

		<p>Dellacourt). To what do you attribute these discrepancies?</p> <p>5. How would you describe the culture and business environment at the Globe before the launch of the Post? How would you describe it now?</p>	<p>- Will help in assessing overall level of change success.</p>
Phillip Crawley	Publisher	<p>1. Why did you choose to hire outsiders to the Globe's senior editorial positions?</p> <p>2. The Globe has a history of sharing competitive information with its staff. To what extent did you share such information during the change process?</p> <p>NOTE: The following questions were originally intended for the heads of advertising and distribution, but were to have been covered during the interview with Mr. Crawley.</p> <p>3. What did you do to deter defection to the Post?</p> <p>4. What were the greatest changes the Globe and Mail faced with regards to advertising after the launch of the National Post?</p> <p>5. How did advertising revenue change after the launch of the Post?</p> <p>6. What were the greatest changes the Globe and Mail faced with regards to circulation after the launch of the National Post?</p> <p>7. The Globe had begun removing newspaper boxes from the streets and re-launched them after the Post's launch, costing the company a significant amount of money? Was this a necessary step? If so, why?</p> <p>8. The Globe engaged in very competitive free giveaways and discounts to match the Post's free sample blitz and cheap subscriptions. Why was this done? Was</p>	<p>- Will help in analysis of specific personal leadership characteristics / competencies.</p> <p>- See above.</p>

		it, in retrospect, the right thing to do?	
Roger Parkinson	Former Publisher	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Outside consultants suggested that the Globe needed an “overhaul” prior to the Post’s launch. How did you act on this advice? 2. What did you do to deter defection of staff to the Post? 3. How would you describe the culture and business environment at the Globe before the launch of the Post? How would you describe it now? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Will help in analysis of specific personal leadership characteristics / competencies. - See above. - Will help in assessing overall level of change success.
Stuart Garner	Former CEO	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Why was the Globe not sold to Black when he sought to purchase it before launching the Post? 2. You brought in a group of outsiders to run the paper. Why did you make this decision? 2a. A number of articles on this topic have said this decision was unpopular. Do you agree with this assessment? If Yes, Then how did you react? If NO.. why not? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Will help in understanding of level of readiness for change. - Will help in analysis of specific personal leadership characteristics / competencies. - See above.
Chris Cobb	Author of <i>Ego and Ink</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. All general questions, but asked pertaining to the different leaders. 1. 2. Overall, what are your comments on changes at the Globe and Mail during the newspaper war? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Will help in understanding and analyzing various aspects of the change effort.

5. Field Study and Analysis

The analysis of the changes at the Globe and Mail will be divided into two parts. The first will look at the response to the launch of the National Post by the previous leaders of the Globe and Mail – editor-in-chief William Thorsell and publisher cum CEO Roger Parkinson.

This section will provide background on the state of the organization at the time of the launch of the National Post, as well as on the vision and strategy that were in effect previously. The latter will be important during further discussion of the application of different visions by different leaders within the same organization. Moreover, it will allow for the development of what I refer to as “vision interrupted” and its effects on leadership during this change. Thereafter, aspects of the change program instituted by Mr. Thorsell and Mr. Parkinson will be examined based on their congruence with or divergence from the models established earlier.

The second part will focus on the changes implemented by the so-called “British Invasion” of Thomson Corp. executive Stuart Garner, new publisher and CEO Phillip Crawley, and new editor-in-chief Richard Addis.

This section will examine the state of the Globe and Mail at the time of the first battles of the newspaper war as seen through the eyes of this new batch of leaders. The impact of their British approach to leadership and to the newspaper business, which I believe played a key role in how they aimed to change the Globe and Mail, will be outlined at this point. Then, just as in the first half of this two-part analysis, the changes implemented by these leaders will be examined based on the criteria contained in the models established earlier.

Analysis of both parts of the change will be aided by incorporating comments made by Chris Cobb, a journalist and author intimately acquainted with the newspaper war.

Dividing the analysis into these two groups will allow for more detailed examination of two different approaches to the change, to competition, and two very different approaches to newspaper management and journalism in general. Analyzing the change based on these two groups seems to make more sense than analyzing it based on changes implemented by individual leaders because there were two clear groups of individuals who acted in concert with each other (in terms of approach to change and objective managerial hierarchy within the Globe and Mail). Group one consists of Roger Parkinson and William Thorsell and Misters Addis, Crawley, and Garner form group two. Due to this pre-established alignment, as well as the fact that the two groups followed each other chronologically, with one picking up where the other left off, it seems most prudent to examine the potential differences between the individuals in each group and then examine the differences between the two groups rather than examine the differences and similarities between different individuals within the context of change at the Globe.

Once these two halves of the change have been analyzed individually, the entire change will be evaluated based on the “best practice” suggested in the literature. This, in turn, will allow the holes in the literature identified earlier to be addressed. Moreover, at this point I will be able to suggest instances where it is my belief that the generally established “best practice” does not necessarily apply to the particular nature of change in a daily newspaper.

Although, as noted in the section on Scope of the Study, this thesis does not seek to explain all the reasons for the outcome of the newspaper war, I feel it is important to discuss two aspects of the change which fall outside the scope of analysis in the thesis, but nonetheless are crucial to developing a more complete understanding of Canada's national newspaper war. These two factors are being included because they were mentioned by all the respondents who were interviewed as critical to the way the newspaper war played out. These are major strategic mistakes made by the National Post and Conrad Black – some of which were, in turn, exploited by the Globe and Mail's leaders, as will be discussed in the analysis – and the direct financial support for the newspaper war by one of the Globe's owners, Ken Thomson, son of Roy Thomson, founder of Thomson Corp.

Classification of Change at the Globe

An aim of this thesis was to classify the change at the Globe using the parameters laid out in the literature in order to facilitate the analysis of the change. However, the discrepancies between the interviewees' responses to the interview made it difficult to classify the changes undertaken at the Globe and Mail as strictly having "fit" into any the two main types of change outlined in the literature: incremental or disruptive.

Stuart Garner was the only interviewee who did not give a clear answer to this question, stating that he could only discuss the Globe when he took control of it in 1998, but not denying the possibility that some changes may have occurred before then that would make the overall change process incremental. Roger Parkinson states that, despite changes that had been instituted previous to the Post's launch, the changes undertaken

were “major changes because there was a major competitor coming.” William Thorsell, on the other hand, suggests that the changes were incremental and ongoing. In his interview he states that “most things haven’t changed... The Globe is still the Globe ... We undertook lots of changes including a complete redesign in 1990 that was followed by a major ad campaign. We aimed for upscale repositioning and attempted to reorient the journalism [even before the launch of the Post].” Phillip Crawley seems to concur. He acknowledges the changes undertaken by his predecessor, but also stresses that he undertook a number of major new initiatives. He explains his rationale as follows:

“Clearly what was driving the need for change was the knowledge that there was likely to be a new competitor. So it was a delicate balancing act. The Globe was a long-established newspaper with lots of tradition, lots of pride in the product, and lots of talent in the building, but it needed a different kind of leadership in a much more competitive environment that was going to be created with the advent of the Post.”

Conversely, Richard Addis describes the changes as having been “disruptive” and “major”. Chris Cobb explains in his interview that he sees the changes as having been “a sort of incremental transformation.” Clearly no consensus exists among the leaders of the changes as to what kind of changes they undertook.

What it appears to come down to is the individual respondents’ perspective on how major the new changes were and the extent to which the Globe had previously

changed. In general terms, it appears the Globe's old leadership seems to have undertaken a series of changes before the Post's launch, but these were not due to, as Nadler and Tushman suggest, "having anticipated the external events that may ultimately require change." Rather, they were updating the paper within a different context – that of monopoly. On the other hand these early changes at the Globe do appear to have been based on "diagnosis" and "vision".

The changes introduced by the Globe's British leaders do seem to have followed the model for disruptive change in that they were caused by the entry of a new competitor. The changes introduced do, in some cases, appear to have been drastic (for instance the editorial positioning of the paper), something which runs contrary to Christensen and Overdorf's prescriptions for effectively changing a mature organization. However, since there is no consensus on what type of change was undertaken, this may be a moot point.

In short, the analysis of the change at the Globe will not hinge on any specific definition of the type of change the Globe underwent. This will not affect the rest of the analysis – it is simply one factor which will remain undefined. In other words, the analysis will lack an evaluation of the change based on the principles contained in the parts of the literature that rely on the classification of a change into a given category, but this will not affect or alter any other aspect of the analysis.

It is interesting to note, however, that while the literature suggests clear-cut definitions of types of change, in this tangible case the delineation between types of change seems quite blurred. Moreover, it seems that classification of change may in large

part be in the proverbial eye of the beholder: For instance, Roger Parkinson and William Thorsell giving different answers to the question although both led the Globe at the same time. This classification also seems to hinge on what one considers to be the starting point of a change, which is not easy to pinpoint, even by those directly involved in carrying out the change.

The analysis follows a structure based on the separation of the two groups who governed the Globe and Mail: William Thorsell and Roger Parkinson, who were in charge of the Globe before and immediately following the launch of the National Post; Stuart Garner, Phillip Crawley, and Richard Addis, who took the reins to take on the new challenger. Each section will be introduced with pertinent background information, then each “team” of individuals will be discussed based on their vision, leadership, communication, and culture building. Each section will also include a section on strategy, which is the tangible application of vision within which the other aspects discussed were carried out. The Strategy sections will serve to provide a firmer context within which the specific aspects of change can be better analyzed.

The changes at the Globe and Mail will then be examined through a renewal lens. The literature (Beatty and Ulrich, 1991) suggests a successful change is an organizational renewal, therefore it is interesting to attempt to determine whether the change efforts of the various leaders indeed succeeded in renewing the Globe and Mail.

A discussion of other factors for the outcome of the newspaper war follows. This section is included because, as noted above, the newspaper war and its outcome was a key part of many respondents’ argument for the success of the change. This section seeks

to shed light on other reasons for why the war went as it did in an attempt to separate – at least partly – the concept of successful change from the idea of successfully waging the newspaper war. In other words, this section demonstrates what non-leadership factors contributed to the outcome of the newspaper war. It must be noted, however, that some of these factors did influence leadership decisions. This is followed by an answer to the question of whether the Globe and Mail won the newspaper war. This is useful because it will determine if the respondents' answers linking the newspaper war to change success are at least based on a correct notion of who was the victor.

A brief discussion of how else the Globe changed follows. This section seeks to examine what changes took place at the Globe peripherally to or at least as an indirect result of the leadership decisions taken.

This section concludes with an assessment of the changes and their success.

5.1. The old guard

Before the launch of the National Post, William Thorsell and Roger Parkinson were, respectively, the editor-in-chief and publisher of a monopolistic company: the only national newspaper in Canada. Their strategies were based on this non-competitive environment. The launch of the Post challenged this status quo.

5.1.1. The old Globe and Mail

Opinions regarding the state of the Globe at the start of the newspaper war vary widely and making a clear-cut statement about it being a “mature company” in the sense suggested by Beatty and Ulrich is difficult. First, it is very important to state that,

although it would be seriously challenged by the National Post, and while it did have a number of weaknesses which will be mentioned, the Globe and Mail was a very prestigious and high-profile newspaper that adhered to a high level of journalistic integrity. Even Richard Addis, who would challenge many of the editorial conventions of the Globe, stated during our interview that “the Globe under William Thorsell was a classic conservative, intellectual newspaper. It was very respected.”

The company certainly did hold a monopoly as the only national newspaper in Canada. While it shared key markets like the crucial Toronto market with other newspapers, notably the Toronto Star, Chris Cobb notes that it “coexisted as opposed to competed with the other newspapers, because they all have their own niches, and none of them overlap each other, so it was a comfortable arrangement.” For this reason, the Globe could allow itself certain liberties in terms of content, presentation, and business dealings. These, and the efforts of the new British leaders to combat them, will be addressed in the following section.

I speculate, however, that the more immediate effect of the Globe’s situation, was the fact that neither the paper nor its leadership appear, based on secondary readings or the interviews conducted, to have been prepared for competition, especially not the magnitude of competition they would face when Conrad Black threw down the gauntlet. Chris Cobb puts it rather bluntly in his interview when he says that the Globe “was not equipped for a tough competitive battle in the state that it was because it was atrophied by too many years of monopoly. ... [Especially] since the Post [would be] a direct threat to their circulation, advertising, and readership.”

The Globe and Mail was rooted in a tradition of commitment to quality and

upscale journalism, as evidenced by its focus on politics and international affairs. Although in itself this is commendable, the lack of competition meant that the Globe did not have to change its internal business procedures, the production of the paper, or even its content for any reason, be it internal or external. This led to the existence of what Beatty and Ulrich refer to as “standard operating procedures,” a hallmark of a mature company. Roger Parkinson admits in his interview that this was the case, (at least as applied to the Globe before he took power, at which point he put into effect some limited changes described below). Moreover, the shared mindset of the Globe’s employees (of making newspapers based solely on journalistic quality rather than competitive market strategy) left it seemingly incapable of foreseeing or adapting to the type of drastic changes that would occur with the launch of major competitor. In the words of Beatty and Ulrich, it would “hinder the ability to change” (Beatty & Ulrich, 1991).

5.1.2. Thorsell and Parkinson at the helm

While the Globe and Mail may have exhibited some of the traits of a mature organization in 1998, it had been undergoing steady changes since 1990. At that time, its owners and leaders deemed it – according to the interviews with Misters Thorsell and Parkinson - at that time to be mature and in need of change. However, as evaluated by Misters Cobb, Garner, Crawley, and Addis during their interviews, these changes were negligible in the face of what was required. So despite the concerted change effort that Misters Thorsell and Parkinson claim to have undertaken, the Globe appears to still have been a mature organization when the National Post was launched. The aim of this subsection is to establish the competitive and strategic context from which the Globe

would launch its change efforts. This is important because it allows us to understand the background from which the Globe's changes stemmed rather than beginning from the assumption that the paper started from a blank slate, ready for change and competition.

William Thorsell recalls that 1990 saw a "complete redesign ... that was followed by a major ad campaign" that saw the Globe aim for "upscale repositioning" and a "reorientation of its journalism." The vision he created was "To improve the editorial quality of the paper and make it appeal to a broader audience while maintaining and increasing value for our core readership." This core readership was defined by the Globe and Mail as an upscale group with the acronymic name MOPE (managers, owners, professionals, executives). Mr. Thorsell, later in collaboration with Mr. Parkinson, sought to increase the breadth and depth of "proprietary content" of the paper.³ This included expanding the Report on Business (ROB), which drew – and continues to draw - many of the Globe's readers. This vision, he says, was championed by him during staff meetings and disseminated throughout the editorial staff by the various section editors (this statement is corroborated by Mr. Parkinson during his interview).

Roger Parkinson stated during the interview that right after he became publisher and CEO of the Globe in 1994, he launched a three-part strategy based on his vision for the paper. The first aspect of this strategy was the selection of a specific target audience. He chose "what we called MOPEs, which is a top demographic." He says that the following strategy evolved out of this choice:

"To serve those MOPEs with information in whatever ways they wanted to receive it ... if they wanted their information daily on their doorstep, they had the Globe and

Mail, if they wanted it once a month in a magazine, they had ROB (we later started ROB TV), if they wanted it instantaneously, they had the website. We were segmenting the market and that was pretty well articulated and we were moving on that.”

The second segment of the strategy was an economic one, based in the Globe’s position as a monopoly as the country’s only national newspaper. Mr. Parkinson and his team had decided to shrink circulation by price.⁴ This process also included the reduction of costly distribution methods like newspaper boxes and a redirection of clients to newsstands or subscriptions.⁵ The Globe and Mail pioneered the now-common till-for-bid subscription method, which involved subscribers being billed automatically on their credit cards. “Every month we’ll just automatically deduct [the cost], as opposed to every month or every six month sending someone a bill, because it gives them the chance to cancel. So that contributed to much less churn,” explains Mr. Parkinson. This strategy succeeded, with the Globe passing the break-even point on both daily and Saturday papers, and on the newsstand, with only the newspaper boxes still losing money. This strategy overlapped with the first one, and also, in Mr. Parkinson’s opinion, benefited advertisers. He explains in our interview that:

³ Proprietary content is news special to the paper (created by the newspaper’s staff or specifically for the paper by an outside party / contributor), not just “hard news” that can be pulled from a newswire service.

⁴ As explained by Mr. Parkinson during the interview, “in North America the prices of papers are relatively much smaller than they are in Europe. In Europe, they make money off circulation. In North America, most papers, for every additional paper they sell, they lose more money. This is because the incremental revenue you get back doesn’t cover your direct variable cost. We had six categories – we had Saturday and we had daily, and we sold by subscription, we sold on newsstand, and we sold in boxes. On the Saturday we were already having a positive contribution on subscriptions (in other words, we were making money off them) – if we sold another paper on Saturday on subscription, we’d come out with more money on the bottom line. On the others we did not. The boxes are the most expensive. We were eliminating boxes and saying ‘go to the news stand’.”

“I wanted to get the price up for economic reasons, and in addition because finally we articulated this target [market], which is not only a high economic demographic, but also a high intellectual demographic. The people that are dropping for price – we were selling access to this market, we had others in there, but... – those were the people that the advertisers who were buying us weren’t after anyway. So as a matter of fact they’d have a purer buy so it would be even better for them. So by raising price, which was good for economics, we were also dropping circulation, which is also good for economics.”

The third goal, closely related to the other two, was to increase profitability. Mr. Parkinson is quick to point out that increases in profits were helped by a growing economy and a lack of “any real national competition.” That notwithstanding, the Globe managed to surpass his target of a 15% profit margin and was as high as 18% before the introduction of the Post. This, in turn, translated into increased investment in the paper. Mr. Parkinson states that he believed that “15% is all you need in a paper – spend the rest on quality.” For every year of his tenure, Mr. Parkinson invested \$5-million in editorial quality and quantity – more reporters with more resources, more pages in the newspaper, etc. He notes that, by contrast, when “Conrad Black bought the Ottawa Citizen, everybody was talking about ‘My God, Conrad Black put in \$2 million to improve the quality one time’.”

⁵ Newspaper boxes are generally seen to lose money because they can hold only a few copies (which can all be taken for the price of one by unscrupulous buyers), rarely sell out, need to be stocked and emptied of coins, which necessitates a maintenance staff, and are often targets of vandalism.

However, despite all this investment, the Globe and Mail in early 1998 was still a national newspaper of a G7 nation that was entirely black-and-white and lacked, among other things, a sports section.

William Thorsell opposes claims by members of the media community that he was opposed to the introduction of colour. For him, the choice to not go to colour after the earlier purchase of new printing presses that had the capacity for colour printing was a case of a cost-benefit analysis. “We had \$2-million for colour. I was of the opinion, and the managers agreed with me, that the money could be better used if invested in the quality of the Report on Business. We hired more journalists and aimed to improve it. I think, in retrospect, that that brought better value for the money.” Roger Parkinson echoes this sentiment. “Basically we said the Wall Street Journal still isn’t colour, colour is very expensive to do, and we didn’t need it. Someday we wanted to do it, but I would have rather added more news, more international, more reporters.” Then he adds, expressing a sentiment that seems representative of the leeway afforded a monopolistic organization, “And it didn’t matter because we didn’t have competition.”

5.1.3. Changing directions

The Globe and Mail was not, of course, entirely broadsided by the launch of the National Post. In other words, the paper’s staff did not just wake up one day to find a competing newspaper sticking out of their mailboxes. After Conrad Black’s attempts to purchase the Globe failed, he bought the Financial Post, and rumours began swirling in the Toronto media community that he was planning to use the business paper as the centerpiece for a new national newspaper (Cobb, 2004). As these rumours grew more

definite, the staff of the Globe and Mail moved to change to address this imminent threat. The problem, however, was that the strategies that the people I interviewed stated were needed to be implemented in order to combat the new competitor (increased distribution, more targeted content, etc.) were, in some instances, diametrically opposite to the strategies championed by Misters Thorsell and Parkinson.

Mr. Thorsell claims that “the Globe was already changing, and the launch of the Post may have made it clearer that we needed to continue to change, but the changes started long before the Post was launched.” He goes on to say that “it is important to note that the Globe did have a national competitor in the Financial Post, which it led. So the competition was not complete news.” While these statements may be based on his perception of the state of the paper at the time, they do appear to be exaggerations when compared with the responses of the other interviewees and the descriptions of the Globe at that time contained in *Ego and Ink* as well as “Growing Old Disgracefully.” Roger Parkinson offers a view that seems more congruent with the other descriptions. Namely, that although the Globe had been implementing some changes, “there were major changes [needed] because there was a major competitor coming.” It would appear that the executives at Thomson did not share Mr. Thorsell’s confidence in the Globe’s ability to adapt because they assigned Stuart Garner, a man with experience in competitive newspaper markets, to take charge of planning the Globe’s defense against the incoming siege by Conrad Black’s new paper. Based on the interviews conducted, it would appear that what Mr. Garner brought to the paper was, in effect, a market-oriented approach that countervailed the journalism-oriented approach that dominated the Globe’s actions at the time.

Roger Parkinson explains this as a differing view of quality. “[Mr. Garner] - his number one paper is the Daily Mail in London [a right-wing, middle-market tabloid (in the British sense)], that’s what he thinks is good – he came from regional publishing, he liked short stories, he used to talk about ‘I don’t want these long stories for professors.’ Basically, he didn’t want intellectual writing. He wanted short and retail-oriented.”

5.1.4. The new vision

The approaching newspaper war, and the fact that it interrupted their ongoing vision and strategy, meant that Misters Thorsell and Parkinson seemed unable to – and, perhaps, were not afforded time to (see next chapter) – formulate a new vision to suit the new needs of the Globe and Mail.

Instead, they adopted what seems to be a reactive strategy. Mr. Parkinson employs a sailing analogy to explain the Globe’s actions at the time: “If a guy goes to pass you, all you have to do is move over and cut off his wind.” So instead of formulating a new vision, the Globe’s leadership aimed to cut off – preemptively before the Post’s launch and reactively thereafter – the Post’s possible advances.

The Globe did, under Stuart Garner’s influence, introduce colour. Knowing, as stated in *Ego and Ink*, that the National Post would be a colour paper, the Globe and Mail made the move to colour, accompanied by a lengthy introduction by William Thorsell headlined “No longer black-and-white, still read all over.” This was undeniably a crucial decision because, when the National Post did launch in colour, it did not have that obvious visual advantage over – or the obvious visual differentiation from - the Globe.

The National Post proved to be a formidable opponent for the Globe and Mail. Its British editors brought an irreverence and design savvy that had not previously been seen in Canadian newspapers. Chris Cobb states bluntly that “The National Post was a very good newspaper. It was significantly better, more interesting, brighter, than the Globe and Mail.” Caught off-guard, the Globe’s leaders sought to fight the Post on its terms. “Any time we went to match them, they changed dramatically,” says Mr. Parkinson. “We were responding to what they were going to do, but they kept changing boats.” In many instances, the Globe ended up copying design or editorial decisions made by the Post.

In *Ego and Ink*, Chris Cobb describes the situation as follows:

“Perhaps the Globe lost its nerve, and its faith in itself, too soon, or maybe it was institutionally ill equipped to face the bright, brash, and sexy package [that was the National Post] every morning. The venerable daily was obviously trying hard, but it seemed spooked, and in often clever but revealing ways began mimicking some of the Post’s design techniques and taking uncharacteristic Post-like approaches to news stories and feature articles. Its mix of page-one stories became noticeably lighter and story selection ... changed significantly” (Cobb, 2004).

Roger Parkinson states that if he had a vision after the Post’s launch, it was simply to cover the Globe’s weaknesses and not leave openings that the enemy could exploit – not a sound basis for change when compared to the change literature. Chris Cobb defends these actions to an extent, stating that

“They [the Globe] tried and I think Parkinson actually, in his own way, had a fairly good idea of what was going to happen and what the problems were, but I think that they were ... so atrophied by their own monopoly... their

attitude was so, I would guess, stubborn, to the point where they didn't actually believe that Post will act as competition [even as they were competing with it].”

On the other hand, he explains that, in his opinion, “the Globe could not compete against the National Post because it didn't know how to. Thorsell did not know how to compete against [Post editor] Ken Whyte. It didn't have the tools. And so you found things [in the Globe] on a daily basis that were blatant copies – kind of pathetic copies – of what the Post was doing.”

Reactionary tactics do not appear to be an adequate replacement for a vision because they do not seem, by their nature, to be capable of uniting an organization behind a common purpose – I do not believe that an organization that is visionary can or should be defined by its relationship with a competitor. According to Kotter's definition, a vision needs to be a focal point for plans and directives. If this vision is merely to head off a competitor, it will continue changing with every new strategy implemented by said competitor, an by extension will remain in constant flux. An extension of this is that a lack of vision means that change cannot be communicated in such a way that, as Jick puts it, “employees will understand its implications for their jobs” (Jick, 1991).

So, as there was no vision, it cannot be evaluated. However, the very fact that there was no vision can be. It would appear that this lack of vision is what doomed the post-Post change efforts of Misters Thorsell and Parkinson. Without an “organizational dream” as per Jick or a BHAG as per Collins and Porras, the Globe could have become mired in a reactionary quagmire. This is especially true considering that if the leaders – who are accepted in the literature as bearing responsibility for the creation of the vision – had no vision, it is not probable that a sense of direction for the Globe would have come

out of the rank and file employees. Perhaps most importantly, the lack of vision means that these two leaders would not have been able to alter individual employees' "mazeways" as defined by Phelan. This, in turn, would mean that, by not giving staff an alternative to the then-current mazeway which "no longer adequately represented reality" (Phelan, 2005) in a competitive environment, the leaders would have further impeded the causes of change and culture change.

In short, if it is accepted that a clear vision is central to successful change, the old leadership at the Globe lacked the proper foundation to affect change and were, therefore, unprepared to take on the National Post.

5.1.5. Strategy

The Globe's strategy at the time was a reflection of their lack of vision – they were, in effect, concentrating on defending rather than counterattacking. This defensive, reactive strategy involved a commercial and an editorial aspect. Due to what William Thorsell describes as the Post's "huge distribution power" based on its link with the Southam newspaper chain, the new paper was able to distribute a large number of copies throughout the country for free or at discounted prices. The leaders of the Globe chose to engage in a circulation war with the aim of, as Mr. Thorsell puts it, "[being] seen as the country's biggest paper." This led to a costly war of attrition whereby both papers inundated Canada's major cities with free copies of their papers. To paraphrase Chris Cobb's comment regarding this issue in *Ego and Ink*, someone living in Toronto during the newspaper war would have to go out of his way to pay for a newspaper. This also

meant that newspaper boxes were brought back by the Globe to combat the eye-catching gold boxes the Post had set up in profusion in major cities. In general, the distribution war would undo Roger Parkinson's profitable strategy of reducing circulation and re-organizing distribution to lower-cost channels.

The other strategy was to attempt to reach a broader audience – primarily women and the younger generation – without losing the core MOPE audience. This was a direct response to the National Post's broader appeal. Roger Parkinson explains that the Globe and Mail invested considerable time and effort researching its own weaknesses because they knew that the management of the National Post would have done the same. Therefore, he suggests that all the changes that were hurriedly put into effect upon the Post's launch were not entirely unplanned. He notes, however, that the biggest competitive change instituted during his tenure was the aforementioned introduction of colour. "You can make all the change you want inside and people may or may not notice, but colour is the trumpet. When we went to colour, that trumpet sounded and made people look at us and all the new things we were doing," he says. So just as on the distribution side, the launch of the Post caused the Globe's leadership – note that I use the word "caused" rather than "forced" because there is no proof that the actions that were taken were the only option available – to very rapidly reverse the strategies that they had been successfully executing during the early- and mid-1990's.

5.1.6. Leadership

The analysis of the change leadership qualities of Misters Thorsell and Parkinson based on the criteria outlined in the literature review applies only to the period

immediately prior to the launch of the National Post through to both of their departures from the paper in 1999. It is outside the scope of this thesis to examine their leadership qualities during the round of changes they implemented through the 1990's.

Sense of Urgency

If nothing else, it would appear that the “old guard” at the Globe were indeed aware of a need to change due to the introduction of the Post. William Thorsell states that

“In the case of the newspaper war I don't believe we needed to create a sense of urgency. When Conrad [Black] launched the Post it was made clear that he was coming after us. He marched an army to the top of the hill and it was obvious we were at war. There was no ambush or maneuvering. It was all done out in the open. So we knew that we had to act quickly because he was coming after us. There was no need to spread a sense of urgency because everyone saw it right in front of them.”

So although a sense of urgency was felt, at least by Mr. Thorsell, proactive efforts were not made to generate a widespread sense of urgency. Roger Parkinson echoes the above sentiment when he states that “we felt the urgency and we were acting on it. People felt it. Everybody was going to feel urgency. The question was ‘What are we going to do about it?’.” He cites the example of the preemptive launch of colour to support this assertion.

There is no proof contained in any of the interviews or any of the secondary sources consulted, however, that the sense of urgency was, in fact, widespread or felt by the wider body of staff. Rationally, the leaders may have been acting on an understanding that a competitor was coming, but the actions they took were major, top-down, leader-driven decisions, not ones which involved all staff or attempted to galvanize the staff in favour of the change. The exact degree to which the sense of urgency was felt – or not – by the staff would require further study, but Chris Cobb goes so far as to suggest that it did not exist.

“I don’t think they had a sense of urgency at all. I don’t think they had a sense of urgency even when the Post arrived on the scene. I think on October 27, 1998, when the Post first appeared, I don’t think they really considered it to be a threat or anything more, in fact, than a rich man’s folly. It wasn’t until the Post started making rapid strides in a very short period of time that they realized they were in trouble,” he says.

The lack of action taken – due to their assumption a sense of urgency was felt throughout the organization - by Misters Thorsell and Parkinson fit Spector’s proscription for diffusing dissatisfaction. Rather than communicating dissatisfaction with the status quo and working to spread a sense of urgency, both men assumed that it was felt and set to devising and implementing a strategy to challenge the Post. So instead of “diffusing dissatisfaction” they “jump[ed] directly from being dissatisfied to imposing new operating models,” (Spector, 1989) in the process failing to win wide-spread commitment to change. On a positive note, they continued to share competitive information, but this may have inadvertently hurt the Globe by allowing sensitive information to be leaked to

the competition. While this cannot be established with certainty without further study, it appears that there was no attempt to create behavioural dissatisfaction – rather it appears to have been assumed that the very presence of the National Post would galvanize the staff in commitment to change. So, in the terms defined by Nadler and Tushman, neither Mr. Thorsell nor Mr. Parkinson sought to create an organization “pain” to build support for their planned changes. To put it simply, it would appear that the “old guard” of leaders at the Globe failed to generate a sense of urgency among their staff. Considering that the two men also lacked a vision for the new competitive environment, they do seem to have been unfit to continue to lead the Globe. This judgment seems to have been shared by Bell Globemedia management, who removed both men from their posts.

Building teams / empowering employees

Both Mr. Thorsell and Mr. Parkinson state in their interviews that they are firm believers in the importance of teams in bringing about change, and both claim in their interviews that they strove to assemble teams to implement the rapid changes they sought to push through to defend against the Post. “I had a strong group of senior editors under me,” says Mr. Thorsell. “You can’t achieve a change all by yourself, so we had a team who supported the change and could communicate [it] to members of the company, to their individual sections.” He also notes, as is suggested by the literature (Kotter) that a leading coalition is beneficial to neutralizing the opposition of those people within an organization who are opposed to change. He goes on to say that “it was important to have that strong core of people who supported the changes and were willing to implement them.”

Mr. Thorsell was also a supporter of empowering employees, especially in terms of editorial content and design. He says that while there was an official suggestion system in place and good suggestions were rewarded, he trusted his employees to push through individual ideas.

Despite this understanding of the need for teams and employee empowerment, however, Mr. Thorsell's efforts were deemed insufficient by Bell Globemedia management. For this or other reasons, he, as well as many senior editors and staff, were replaced (see next chapter).

Although the interviews would suggest that Mr. Thorsell's team-building and employee empowerment efforts seem to have been undermined by his and Mr. Parkinson's lack of a clear vision or an established sense of urgency, they were certainly commendable and in line with the prescriptions of the literature. Mr. Thorsell, as prescribed by Beatty and Ulrich, relinquished his own authority and encouraged staff to take actions in line with organizational principles of their own accord. Or, to use the term coined by Kanter, Mr. Thorsell exhibited "openness to collaborate". The individual changes he saw were caused by his ability to give his staff the skills, resources, and confidence to innovate of their own accord – a requirement of leadership noted by Gill. In his interview he states that:

“the thing I appreciated most was when I picked up the paper in the morning and saw a change in say Report on Business that I knew nothing about. That is what we were after – that good creativity that people would engage in of their own initiative. An editor-in-chief can't make decisions on every little change and approve everything, so I was

glad to see people initiating changes by themselves in their own sections.”

As far as team building, Mr. Thorsell was in line with the prescriptions in the literature in that he surrounded himself with a team that favoured change – whether or not this team did enough to change the Globe or understood the competitive demands for change is another question.

Minimizing Uncertainty

Misters Thorsell and Parkinson also grasped the need to minimize uncertainty during a period of change, but their efforts to do so proved, by their own admission, to not be entirely successful. William Thorsell was committed to discussing all the strategies being put into place at meetings, including discussing how they applied to all the departments and, where possible, to individual employees. He also says that he feels he spent as much time on communication as he did on supporting and spearheading the changes themselves.

Mr. Parkinson agrees that efforts were made to minimize uncertainty among staff, but he concedes that the constant questions of how to combat the Globe and the drastic changes in strategy led to confusion among staff at all levels of the hierarchy. He adds that this may have been exacerbated by the amount of time – relatively speaking, as the changes were implemented quite quickly – it took to run the changes through all levels of management and consult with executives at Thomson Corp. He also says that due to constant research and ever-shifting plans intended to “cut off the Post’s wind,” he feels “some people may not have known what was going on.” He is also slightly more negative

in his assessment of the communication efforts aimed at minimizing uncertainty. “There was no clear communication because we were always shifting. And I understand people thought that was confusing.” This problem was, in turn, probably exacerbated by the fact that during the early stages of the newspaper war, the Globe and Mail’s newsroom was being revamped and renovated as part of his earlier strategy of “investing in quality.” So, Mr. Parkinson says, “there was constant chaos, with departments always moving around, people shifting around the newsroom and the building, noise from the workers.” So not only was the competitive situation chaotic, even the Globe staff’s workplace was in a state of flux. This, although it is outside the scope of this thesis to examine in detail, does not seem like a factor that would mitigate the sense of uncertainty that accompanied the escalating competition with the National Post.

In the spirit of maintaining a competitive and united newsroom – likely with more emphasis on the former than the latter – William Thorsell acted early in an effort to deter defection of staff to the National Post (which was actively headhunting journalists from across Canada). “We employed a preemptive strategy,” he explains. “We brought in valuable people who we thought the Post might go after and told them how much we valued their work and offered them some extra incentives and bonuses. I think this was wiser than waiting for the Post to woo them and then trying to win them back by saying how valuable they were to us.” This approach proved largely successful as only a minimal number of staff abandoned ship to join the new national paper and, as he notes in his interview, even fewer did so preemptively out of uncertainty over their own professional future or the organizational future of the organization.

Using the criteria presented by Bordia et al to judge the data obtained from interviews and secondary sources, Mistert Thorsell and Parkinson failed at reducing structural uncertainty. This conclusion can be supported by the fact that the Globe was constantly changing, competitively, content-wise, and even in its physical environment. They did, however, seem to have succeeded largely at reducing job-related uncertainty in that they kept key staff, communicated with all staff regarding how the changes would affect individuals. And they appear to have partially succeeded at reducing strategic uncertainty. They lacked a vision and, due to the shifting nature of their plans to oppose the Post, could not clearly communicate with staff. On the other hand they communicated often, showing their commitment to staff, and shared all competitive information in keeping with the “democratic” system they had established. The result is that the employees, even if they felt confused, likely felt that they were to some degree involved in the decision-making process.

Committing personal time to change

William Thorsell says he spent approximately half of his time on change initiatives. This included introducing new ones and continuing the ones that had been underway before the threat of the Post and were not interrupted by its launch (like investment in editorial quality). Roger Parkinson says that while he is unsure of an exact percentage, “my guess is not every waking second but pretty close.” It would appear, therefore, that both of the “old guard” leaders seem to have committed, as per the prescription in the literature, a large portion of their personal time to directly being involved in the changes they were implementing. This would suggest a personal

investment and commitment to the changes being implemented and is in line with the prescriptions for effective change leadership in the literature.

Description of leadership style

When asked to describe their leadership styles, both men offered descriptions that seem congruent with the actions they took in terms of implementing the first round of changes to fight the Post.

William Thorsell describes himself as the following:

- “Not an administrator – someone who leads from the future, a change agent, someone who says ‘we will be different’.”
- “Someone who relies on communication.”
- “A ‘leading on the floor’ type of person – working down in the trenches.”

By contrast, Chris Cobb describes him in our interview as “stubborn” in terms of not doing enough to update the paper and make it competitive.

Mr. Thorsell’s description of himself seems to fit the descriptions of / prescriptions for effective change leadership contained in the literature. Saying “we will be different” can be construed as spreading dissatisfaction with the status quo as suggested by Spector (1989), Kotter (1989), and Nadler and Tushman (1989). Championing communication also follows Nadler and Tushman’s prescriptions. And “working in the trenches” seems synonymous with embodying change ideals, as prescribed by Beatty and Ulrich (1991), Jick (1989), and others.

Unfortunately, these self-descriptions do not seem congruent with the analysis contained above, nor with Mr. Cobb’s outsiders’ view. Therefore, it would appear that

Mr. Thorsell was not able to see that his actions did not match his self-image in terms of change leadership.

Roger Parkinson describes himself as “someone with a bright sense of what I wanted the paper to be in terms of quality and values ... someone who got people on the job and trusted them.” He does note the caveat that “how well executed and communicated that was, I’m not sure ... [and] results didn’t always happen.”

Chris Cobb describes him as “the person who started the [change process] but was ill-prepared to see it through.”

Roger Parkinson’s self-description suggests an ability to empower employees and share responsibility as per the prescriptions of Bordia et al (2004), Pascale (1999), Cummings (1999), and others. This appears to have indeed been the case. The second part of his self-description also unfortunately appears to be true, as supported by interviews with Chris Cobb and Stuart Garner. It can therefore be surmised that, as Mr. Cobb’s quote above suggests, while Mr. Parkinson had an understanding of what was required of a change leader, he lacked the capacity or tools to carry this out.

5.1.7. Communication

William Thorsell states that “communication is crucial. Nothing will change if you don’t communicate, communicate, communicate.” He says he tended to communicate with staff through frequent group meetings. During the change process, he says in his interview, he held group meetings almost daily with groups of 15 to 20 staff

(until he had gone through the entire 300-strong newsroom) to discuss goals and strategies. He also used this time to get personal feedback and suggestions.

Mr. Parkinson said his communication with staff was based on town-hall type meetings (where all members of the newsroom would gather around a central location so announcements could be made on major issues) and then talking one-on-one with newsroom staff. He also had a policy of sharing competitive information with employees and trusting them not to leak it – this custom was later discontinued by Phillip Crawley. He concedes that “maybe in a knock-down, drag-out type of situation you [cannot] act like this, but I felt you should work with employees, trust them. I believed the newsroom should be run like a democracy.”

However, commitment to communication is one thing and consistency of message is another. As noted earlier, the Globe’s actions were geared at reacting to the Post’s actions and, therefore, tended to fluctuate and alter rapidly. This led to confusion for the reasons mentioned previously and was exacerbated, according to the interviews with Chris Cobb and Roger Parkinson, by the fact that despite a profusion of communication there was no consistent message from the leaders regarding the change.

Not enough information is available to compare the communication policy of Mr. Thorsell and Parkinson to Young and Post’s eight factors which determine effectiveness of communication with employees, but it appears from interviews that the two men had a sound understanding of the principles of communication.

The chief executive, Mr. Parkinson, was indeed a communication champion, as was Mr. Thorsell, the newsroom leader. They both state in their interviews that they were

open to staff feedback and two-way communication, emphasized face-to-face, personal contact, and took responsibility for employee communications. These facts are corroborated by Mr. Cobb in his interview. Also, they both claim to have communicated with employees in a timely and continuous manner and, although they had no clear strategy, they kept staff apprised of both “big picture” and “small picture” aspects of the change process. In D’Aprix’s terms, they treated “face to face communication ... as a critical element of their jobs.” On the other hand, they had no vision to communicate so, as previously mentioned, they lacked a consistent committed message that would, if the theories contained in the literature hold, galvanize the staff behind a single purpose.

Both of the Globe’s old leaders were committed to communication throughout their tenures and during the change period. Although, as noted above, it was in some instances difficult to dispel confusion regarding the change, both Mr. Thorsell and Mr. Parkinson were dedicated to communicating with their staff.

5.1.8. Culture building

It is difficult to gauge the success of Mr. Thorsell and Mr. Parkinson’s success at culture building for three reasons. First, their initial strategies and accompanying attempts to change culture were interrupted by the launch of the National Post, which, while it allowed for some of the strategies they had implemented to continue, it ceased or reversed others. Second, after the launch of the National Post, the men, as has been shown, lacked a vision for the future of the company. Third, both left their posts soon after the launch of the Post and as such did not have the time needed to change a culture. It is impossible at this juncture to ascertain which actions – if any - undertaken by these

leaders led to any permanent culture change at the Globe. It must be noted here, however, that Mr. Thorsell's ultimate goals of "constant change and emphasis on people engaging in independent creative action" form an integral part of the goals of the Globe's current leaders (see next chapter). Whether or not this is due to Mr. Thorsell's influence or independent creation of the same ideals cannot be determined, but at least that aspect of Mr. Thorsell's vision for the Globe's culture continued to be a driving factor behind the changes that followed his departure from the organization.

In general, based on the criteria for sustained culture change discussed in the literature, the changes implemented by the Globe's old guard of leaders seemed to be unfit to bring about culture change. While they were broad and multi-faceted, as is prescribed by Schneider et al, they were not based on a vision and therefore lacked a basis of organizational self-understanding as prescribed by Pascale and Bernick. So while behaviours were, to a point, being changed, they were not kept constant, therefore making long-term culture change impossible.

SUMMARY

Overall, it would appear from the above analysis that Misters Thorsell and Parkinson were unfit to lead a major change or face up to a major competitor. This is not to say they were incompetent leaders or make a similarly dismissive statement. However, their strategies and approach to the Globe and Mail and its management were founded on a monopolistic environment which did not necessitate major strategic change. So the men's actions – reducing circulation, streamlining distribution – were tactical decisions

aimed at increasing profits. On the other hand, their investment in journalistic quality is commendable and was part of the reason the Globe was such a respected institution.

After the launch of the Post, the two leaders continued to react tactically rather than forming a cohesive vision for the Globe within the context of the competitive environment. This seems to have invalidated their overall approach to the competition. While some of the initiatives they undertook are aligned with the prescriptions in the change literature, they do not seem to have amounted to effective change management as a whole. That being said, they may have laid the groundwork for some of the similar strategies followed by their successors (what I have dubbed in the next section the British Invasion), although definite proof of this supposition would require further study.

5.2. The British Invasion

After being given responsibility for the Globe and Mail in 1997, Stuart Garner found a paper he says he felt to be substandard. He therefore acted quickly to change it. To achieve this end, he states in his interview that he assembled a team that would not only defeat the National Post but also reshape the Globe and Mail. In the interview, he sums up the Globe and Mail as he found it in 1997:

“I felt during that period when I didn’t have responsibility for it that the Globe and Mail was under-performing for a variety of reasons. Basically, it was complacent. I felt I had to make changes to the paper not for personal reasons, but because it seemed to me that the commercial franchise was under threat. ... In any organization that is

underperforming, that lowers barriers to entry into that industry and I felt it was vulnerable. And apart from that I am also impatient with businesses that under-perform. I believe that it is the responsibility of a business to do the best it can and deliver the best possible outcome for its stakeholders. Definitely with the Globe and Mail, and its position at the time as the only national newspaper in Canada, I think Canada had the right to a better national newspaper. It was probably one of the last major newspapers without colour. [It was] years behind the curve in newspaper publishing around the world. I instantly made that change. So there was change going to happen from well prior to Conrad Black definitely deciding to launch the National Post.”

To address this perceived lack in design and presentation, he brought in Jim Jennings, a world-renowned expert on newspaper colour, and pushed forward the introduction of colour contrary to the original strategy of William Thorsell and Roger Parkinson.

Ideologically, Stuart Garner represented a different school of thought than Misters Parkinson and Thorsell. With experience in competitive markets (see next section), Mr. Garner held a view of the newspaper as a commodity or a product rather than simply a source of news. “I found that [at the Globe and Mail] serving the reader was not the important thing, it was the essential purity of the art. I came from a background where serving the reader was the only thing that mattered,” he says. Roger Parkinson concurs with this statement, but finds the sentiment problematic.

“I cared most of all about newspaper quality. This is where Stuart Garner and I would be just diametrically opposed.

[He] and I have different views on quality journalism. He went for circulation and readership wherever he could get it, and so he changed the paper's focus and its target audience."

In other words, the arrival of Stuart Garner would run counter to plans Masters Thorsell and Parkinson had had for the paper. It was also a portent of the end of both men's tenures at the paper, says Mr. Parkinson.

"Stuart [Garner] was brought in to be head of the Globe – we had to start reporting to Stuart – even though I had been told that I would never have to report to him. They were just trying to assuage me. That was a big deal because Stuart had ideas and he wanted to exercise them."

Among these ideas, he says in his interview, was bringing in experienced newspaperman Phillip Crawley in 1998, who soon thereafter took over the position of publisher and CEO. Almost immediately afterwards, he replaced William Thorsell with British editor Richard Addis. Both new recruits were veterans of competitive environments, according to their interviews and that with Chris Cobb, and both came in with an approach to journalism congruent with the one held by Stuart Garner.

Mr. Crawley, who would take direct responsibility for the implementation of the changes at the Globe, was an outsider to Canada and Canadian affairs, but had a wealth of newspaper experience and had a clear picture of the shortcomings of the paper he was taking over. His assessment of Canada's national newspaper was as follows:

"The Globe was a long-established newspaper with lots of tradition, lots of pride in the product, and lots of talent in the building, but it needed a different kind of leadership in a much more competitive environment that was going to be

created with the advent of the Post. ... [But] the Globe was in a state of evolution when I joined in the sense that in the summer of 1998 they went with editorial colour for the first time.”

Misters Crawley and Garner also saw what they perceived to be a major hole in the Globe’s news coverage: a well nigh non-existent sports section.

“In some areas we were conspicuously weak,” says Crawley. “We didn’t have a sports section, for instance. Very simple thing – we didn’t have a sports section. Sports had been consigned to the back of a section. My expectation was that the Post would come out with a strong, colourful sports section, which they did, because that’s what the *Daily Telegraph* [also owned by Conrad Black] does in London. They have a very good sports section. That’s something that very often appeals to an audience that has a heavy business bias, a heavy male bias, and that was lacking in our range of offerings. So the first thing I did was launch a sports section. We did that within a couple of weeks of me getting here.”

Chris Cobb echoes this sentiment.

“[The Globe’s] sports section was pitiful when Garner first came in - Thorsell didn’t like sports - which was a real blind spot because everybody knows that businessmen and sports goes together. And the business community was obviously very important to the Globe and Mail because the Report on Business is its economic driver. It makes the money for the paper. So that was a real blind spot and ... it made them extremely vulnerable because the sports section of the Post was a dynamite sports section.”

Richard Addis, the new editor-in-chief who would be responsible for changes to the Globe's content and design, says bluntly that the changes he planned to undertake would be disruptive. "It was a major change as far as content," he says.

5.2.1. Discussion of the British newspaper and editorial system

As a prelude to a discussion of the leadership qualities and decisions of Misters Garner, Crawley, and Addis, it is important to make some general observations regarding the British editorial style and the power afforded to British editors. These observations are important because they will help shed light not only on these men's leadership styles, but also on the reason why they were chosen to, as it were, man the battle stations at the Globe. Stuart Garner describes the difference as follows:

"In Britain the newspaper scene is starkly different. When I was a reporter - which was 20-odd years ago - in Britain wherever you were, on that day there were 14 national newspapers, and there might also be more regional newspapers operating in the same city. So *that* is competition, and if you are brought up in that environment you are much more used to the ... gutter-level, the street-fighting. So if you have someone who launches against you with the stated objective to basically destroy you, that there's only going to be one winner, you need to ensure that you're tooled up to deal with that threat. And that involves people as much as anything else."

Richard Addis explains the position of senior editors in Britain – as contrasted to the Canadian convention – as follows: "In Britain editors of newspapers, they're not called 'editor-in-chief', they're called 'managing editor'. They deal with ads, opinion and

editorial, strategy of the newspaper, hiring and firing of the columnists, and basically everything that goes into the newspaper.” Stuart Garner expands on this by stating that

“if you’re brought up in the UK newspaper industry, you have a rather more hands-on approach to editorial. If you’re the editor of a tabloid newspaper in Britain, you are the total boss. If it doesn’t work and circulation falls, you get fired, but you’re the total boss in the sense that no one is going to get in your way on a day-to-day basis. It’s a ruthless environment within which to work. Anyone, for instance, in the editorial department of a London tabloid who decided that his views were more important than the editor’s about an issue would be looking for a job that afternoon.”

Chris Cobb notes simply that “[Phillip] Crawley made the point that this was not a democracy.”

What is important here is not only that these three leaders subscribed to the system described above, but that they would be introducing the methods they learned in that system to a slightly mature, monopolistic Globe and Mail that Roger Parkinson had purposely been molding to function like a democracy based on participation and trust.

5.2.2. Vision

Roger Parkinson, while admitting that he and William Thorsell lacked vision for the Globe and Mail in a competitive environment, makes one bold statement in praise of those who would take the Globe’s reins: “Stuart and Phillip had a vision.”

What follows are the descriptions of their individual visions given by each of the three new leaders, which will be analyzed individually and then considered for their congruency with each other.

Stuart Garner says of his vision:

“The vision for the Globe and Mail, prior to the announcement of the National Post, from my perspective, was for it to be undoubtedly the best newspaper in Canada, and for it to be operating with financial characteristics which were best in the business, best in the industry. The first part of that of course is subjective in how you measure it and the second part is objective. From my perspective the Globe and Mail should have been growing faster and making more money each year. And as for it being the best in country, it wasn’t editorially. ... So yes, there was a vision prior to the Post’s launch. After the launch, the vision remained the same, but added to it was seeing off the predator.”

Mr. Garner also displays an understanding of the need for a vision:

“I believe all commercial activity and some non-commercial activities as well – like life – require a vision in order to actualize what you’re trying to do or live life to the full. Of course you’ve got to have a vision, and in that case being able to say what the mission is going to be and how to achieve it and what the characteristics that identify your activity that distinguish it.”

This vision meets many of the criteria for successful vision outlined in the literature. It was created by a leader with knowledge of the organization, it is brief, yet

provides a clear ideal and focus for the newspaper which based on an achievable yet challenging future goal. In terms of Jick's "organizational dream," Mr. Garner's vision is crystal-clear: "to be undoubtedly the best newspaper in Canada." This is definitely a challenging and excellence-centered goal which can act as an "anchor" for all change strategies.

While this vision does not directly incorporate the four elements for successful vision outlined by Jick (it does not make reference to organizational competencies per se), it does have customer orientation in terms of excellence of product, which is also a reference to "organizational standards of excellence." Moreover, it clearly touches on commercial priorities, which would be central to the carrying out of the costly newspaper war and were in line with the British commodity approach to newspaper publishing. And finally, it makes clear reference to the need to defeat the competitor. This, in turn, adheres to the characteristics of a successful vision listed suggested by Nanus – it is situated within a macro context (in this case the Canadian newspaper market and the competition with the Post), unifies members of the organization (under the banner of excellence, prosperity, and victory over "the predator"), and it certainly provides a challenge.

This vision also aligns with Gill's criteria of being inspiring, meaningful, and quotable. "Undoubtedly the best" and "seeing off the predator" are certainly quotable and inspiring.

It must be noted that this vision was communicated primarily to senior leaders and executives. These individuals, in turn, communicated this to staff, although Mr. Garner did meet with staff on certain occasions, he primarily dealt with senior staff. But

this does not diminish the strength of his vision. In fact, it is a testament to its merits that he was able to sell it to that many senior members of the organization and win their support for it.

Mr. Garner says that, over the course of his numerous, intimate conversations about the change and his vision with Phillip Crawley, he became convinced that “he being the kind of guy he is, with similar background to me, would have had exactly the same vision anyway, so it wasn’t as if there was a need particularly to communicate with him.” Mr. Crawley agrees, and adds that the vision for the Globe and Mail came from different sources, including the owners of the Thomson Corporation, who “had a clear sense of what they thought the values of the Globe and Mail should be,” the experienced managers at Thomson who were based in the United States, who “had strong ideas about how newspapers should be marketed, how they should be presented,” and himself and Mr. Garner. For his part, he agreed with the principles of the Globe and Mail upon which he feels the vision was based: “quality journalism, principles, integrity, good writing, and good business.” Based on this, he saw it as his job to communicate the vision internally by “preaching the gospel ... of the need for rapid change, the need to evolve the product quickly, to move fast on design change, to hire in areas where we were weak.”

Mr. Crawley notes that a central purpose of the communication of the vision was to convince the Globe’s staff of the need for the change to ensure an aspect of the vision he dubs “quality of content, quality of presentation”. He remembers that when he first addressed the issue of the Post’s launch, some staff at the Globe said, in effect, that “we don’t need to do anything. We’re strong enough to withstand whatever the Post throws at us. We’ve got 150 years of history, we’ve got the brand.” Considering the fact that

Conrad Black had the benefit of launching the Post off the Southam newspaper chain, Mr. Crawley did not consider this to be a valid point of view. Moreover, he thought that in some instances, the Globe and Mail was overconfident in what it perceived to be its strengths. “The brand promise wasn’t being completely fulfilled. ... Some of its alleged strong points weren’t as strong as they should be. Business coverage wasn’t as good as it should be, we needed to sharpen up our coverage in various areas” he says. He also felt that the paper needed a makeover in terms of presentation and design, including bolder and more prolific use of pictures and graphics, and more creative freedom from the “design straitjacket” that was being applied to layout. He also felt that in terms of content, while the paper was strong, it needed to “lighten up and reach out to its audience.” For him, the motivation for communication was to improve these weaknesses with a view to defeating the National Post but also improving the paper irrespective of the competitive environment.

Considering that Mr. Crawley’s vision incorporates Mr. Garner’s vision, the analysis of one applies to the other. What follows is an analysis of Mr. Crawley’s expansion of the vision – his addendum to the “core” vision he shared with Mr. Garner - based on the change management literature.

The first point on which this vision varies from Mr. Crawley’s is its collaborative creation – Mr. Crawley explains in his interview that he worked with his team and solicited input into his vision while Mr. Garner explains in his interview that his vision was a personal one. This matches Jick’s criteria of vision creation by a leader in association with a senior team. In this case, this is a benefit in that it combines the interests of the newspaper with the interests of its owners and the general values (not

specific to the Globe and Mail) of experienced newspaper managers familiar with the paper itself and with the industry as a whole. This also allowed it to be based around a central core of organizational values (“principles, integrity, etc.”), which lend it an employee focus as defined by Jick.

Mr. Crawley’s expansion of the vision incorporates a clear customer orientation. His stated goals include “fulfilling the brand promise”, improving business coverage for the core MOPE audience, and making the product more attractive in terms of presentation and design as well as editorial content. This clearly differentiates the desired future state from an imperfect current state. Moreover, this expanded vision suits the criteria for a BHAG outlined by Collins and Porras. It focuses on the core aspects of the organization that “should never change” while making specific references to necessary changes. The BHAG of defeating the Post en route to being the best paper in the country (as per Mr. Garner’s vision) is combined with clear objectives which must be accomplished so this state can be achieved. On the other hand, it is not so specific that it would be impossible to stick to considering the rapidly changing media environment.

Finally, this vision lends itself to communication, which Mr. Crawley states in his interview was among his priorities during the change. The literature holds that having a vision is futile if it is not communicated and used to focus the efforts of all staff. While Mr. Crawley’s vision may not have appealed to all staff (see later section) and may have led to changes in the paper that some judged negatively (see later chapter), it was used by him as the centerpiece for his strategy and his messages to his staff. In that, it is consistent with the literature.

Richard Addis says that he had his own vision for the paper (“I made it. I didn’t even talk to anyone else about it.”). This vision was as follows:

“As far as I remember it was to do three things. One was to restore or firm up the credibility of the Globe and Mail because I always wanted to show that it was the most credible newspaper – and news source – in Canada. Authority goes with that. The second thing was to keep the circulation rising, not falling, to the point where it was significantly higher than the National Post. The third was to achieve a reputation for journalistic excellence, and that involved winning more recognition, winning more awards, and generally establishing a ... preeminent, quality newspaper.”

And, in the fashion of a British editor – he admits in his interview to having been granted the leeway to flex his authoritative muscle in the style of a British editor by his superiors – Mr. Addis implemented his vision rapidly and forcefully. “It was [communicated], well, very erratically. Basically by telling people what to do,” he says.

Mr. Addis’ vision fits many of the criteria for a successful vision – it was created by him, clearly defines a purpose and end goal, fits the competitive strategy of the paper as well as its values (see above), is clear, and is certainly excellence-centered. It is also particular to the newsroom and specifically addresses editorial issues. While this vision might not be particularly compelling for an advertising representative, it is one that would resonate with a reporter or designer. As such, it is employee-oriented, customer-oriented in terms of quality and credibility of the final product, and concentrates not only on organization-specific, but newsroom-specific competencies. This vision also presents an appealing picture of the future for the entire organization (winning the circulation battle,

overall quality) and for the newsroom (having a reputation for credibility, winning awards).

The problem appears to be that this very solid vision was not communicated enough. Rather, it seems to have been used as a base for Mr. Addis' self-admittedly individual, authoritative change mandate based on, as quoted above, "telling people what to do." As will be discussed later, this had some merits of its own, but the lack of communication certainly did little to garner support or unite the newsroom staff behind the vision. While changes were still implemented, and they were aligned with the vision, this was in large part because of the power given Mr. Addis rather than recognition on the part of the staff of the strength of his vision. In other words, as he himself states in his interview, he had the authority to push through changes without first winning broad support for them. It is important to note, however, that regardless of communication, Mr. Addis' changes might not have been welcomed by some newsroom staff regardless of his vision. This is because while the vision itself appears to be sound, some of Mr. Addis' plans and his approach to news might have clashed against older Globe sensibilities (as they ended up doing) regardless of whether he had communicated the vision or not.

What is unique about this case is that the "second phase" of the changes to address the challenge posed by the Post was led by three different men, each with different responsibilities, who had individual visions. This is not that surprising considering that they came from a similar background and were hired for a specific job. What is unique, however, is that the visions they had were so similar and each of the three leaders involved applied it to a different aspect of the change – Mr. Garner to

crafting a macro-level strategy and winning support from senior executives, Mr. Crawley to changing the organization internally and on a business level, and Mr. Addis to altering the paper's editorial and design practices.

All three visions can be considered successful based on the criteria outlined in the literature. Mr. Addis did succeed in making broad changes, but would, when compared to the prescriptions in the literature, have done well to have communicated much more.

What is more, they represented a departure from the reactive policies of Misters Thorsell and Parkinson while not straying far from the values espoused by the Globe's owners and managers or departing from what would be expected of the Globe by its core readership and core advertisers. Finally, all of the visions presented clear yet flexible views of the future, which seems to have facilitated the capacity for continuous changes throughout the newspaper war in all aspects of the organization (see next section).

5.2.3. Strategy

Stuart Garner states in his interview that he saw the launch of colour as the start of a new era at the Globe and Mail: one where it was a competitive paper in line with his view and crafted under his supervision. "I have to say it was one of the most professional launches of colour in a newspaper in the history of the newspaper industry. And that was substantially because I had put in as a consultant one of the world experts on the subject, a guy called Jim Jennings," he says. That being said, Mr. Garner's primary task was to get the ball rolling in terms of change at the Globe. Once he had created his vision, he could not put it into effect himself. Therefore, he brought in Misters Crawley and Addis to implement changes "on the ground". He puts it as follows:

“The changes I made basically related to personnel. Because what was going to be happening was that Canada was going to see its first ever tooth and claw newspaper war. ... And the problem with the Globe was that during this period they were complacent and underperforming. At the end of the day that has to be put down to management. Basically they were peace-time soldiers. They didn’t have any experience of competition, let alone a life or death battle.”

However, Mr. Garner is quick to point out that, having made appointments to senior positions, he played a hands-off role in the changes. “When you make appointments at a certain level, you have to provide the guy with maneuvering room so he can show what he can do rather than have someone repressing him from above.” So, after filling in key positions with people he saw as fitting his image of the new Globe and having ideas for the paper’s future congruent with his own vision, he says he constrained his role to “ensuring that whatever was needed within the limitations of the company would be made available and that includes money, outside help where needed, ... resources needed to do the job.”

The next aspect of the strategy was to prepare, establish, and pay attention to internal and external monitoring systems that would allow the Globe’s leaders to “know exactly where they [the Post] were and exactly where we were in this battle.” This information – regarding readership, circulation, what stories were run and why, design, use of images, advertising, and a slew of other key factors – were examined, compared, and discussed on a daily basis. The goal of this analysis, he says in his interview, was to change without losing ground to the Post or losing touch with existing clientele: “We spent a fortune on research and every week we tried to see the latest figures which related

to readership. The Globe targets business people, professional people, senior managers, and so on, and that was the ground we needed to hold,” says Mr. Garner.

Phillip Crawley, when he was brought in to the Globe and Mail – even before he officially replaced Roger Parkinson as publisher and CEO – was, according to *Ego and Ink*, de facto the person charged with bringing change to the Globe and Mail and implementing strategies to bring these changes to fruition. Mr. Crawley and Mr. Cobb state that the Englishman, in sharp contrast to Mr. Parkinson, was – and is – very commercially-minded about the news industry. As such, his concern is not “the purity of the art” but rather delivering a product that is attractive to a target audience and to advertisers. This is not to say that high quality news coverage is not a major part of this package, but in this view, it is not the sole driver of the news enterprise. Considering that Mr. Parkinson, as noted earlier, also paid attention to targeting the product to a certain audience, this distinction may seem superficial or semantic in nature, but it is in fact quite important. This is because, in simplest terms, Mr. Parkinson’s approach was based on providing quality content to a given audience while Mr. Crawley’s approach was based on gearing a product to a target audience, with quality and content being contingent on audience appeal. So Mr. Crawley’s changes hinged, as he explains in his interview, on major changes throughout the organization, including an expansion of the target audience, a general “re-packaging” of the venerable newspaper, and commercial competitive considerations like circulation, distribution, and pricing strategies.

One of the centerpieces of Mr. Crawley’s approach to the changes and the rapidly-shifting competitive environment was to “deliver to the readers and advertisers something that they would see very clearly ... [and] change without frightening them.”

The following quote from the interview with Mr. Crawley suggests that he knew what he wanted to do with the paper, but he also understood that he could not alienate the Globe's traditional audience.

“The Globe audience is a very mature, sophisticated, educated, high-end audience. When you make changes with an audience like that, you expect to get some very articulate feedback, so it was, again, a balancing act in a certain sense. [Because] you need to do this, some people aren't necessarily going to like it, but overall you take most of the people with you and they like it,” he explains.

The change was made even more difficult by the fact that, unlike in other businesses where strategic offerings can be carefully planned, the Globe had to deal with the fact that its daily offering was compared by millions of readers to the competing offering of the National Post which, during the early parts of the war at least, was being offered free or for massively discounted prices. This daily competition also meant, however, that strategic actions and responses to the competitor's actions could be considered and re-considered day-to-day, giving the Globe greater flexibility than would be possible under other circumstances or in other industries. As Mr. Crawley puts it, “you're looking at what you're doing every day against the competition and saying ‘They did that better than we did, we did this better than they did, we have this story, they have that story.’ [So] it's very focused but the timelines really sharpen.”

This competitive reality is the reason why he was instrumental in the choice of Richard Addis as the new editor-in-chief. Due to the need for rapid, intuitive change, Mr. Crawley says in his interview he wanted to bring in someone experienced in competitive environments who was ready to make swift changes without being restrained by what he

calls “loyalties to any individuals or any sort of history or tradition” or the internal, interpersonal politics of the paper. Richard Addis, Mr. Crawley says, “was brought in very much as a change agent. [He] was not tied to the previous Globe mindset, could take a look from the outside and say ‘this is what we need to do’.” To support Mr. Addis, Mr. Crawley brought in another outsider, but one familiar with Canada, in the person of former Financial Times Russia bureau chief Chrystia Freeland to support Mr. Addis. The two “complemented each other well,” he says.

With the editorial content in good hands, Mr. Crawley turned his attention inward and strove to renew some of the company’s hierarchical and business-process shortcomings. He says of his approach to changing the organization that “it’s not all just about journalism – it’s about how good your production people are, how good your ad sales people are.” For instance, the Globe and Mail had never had a VP of production – one person who would bear responsibility for production quality – so he created the position in an aim to establish and maintain higher quality standards. Mr. Crawley also says in his interview that he was instrumental in the purchase and introduction of a new editorial computer system, followed shortly thereafter by a new advertising/business system.

At the same time as they were overhauling the physical paper’s content and design, the company was working on launching a series of online ventures. The company was expanding its Workopolis.com job-search site, developing Globeinvestor, a subscription product for investors and executives, and in 2001, they launched globeandmail.com, an initiative spearheaded by current editor-in-chief Ed Greenspon.

Mr. Crawley likens these changes to an iceberg – the Globe was making visible changes that were gaining public attention, but at the same time the paper was changing “invisibly” internally.

Mr. Crawley credits the management at Thomson with giving him the funds, support, and “firepower” to accomplish these changes.

“Thomson Corp.,” he says, “was saying ‘If you think this is the right strategy to develop, to move into new areas where we hadn’t previously been present, to develop a breaking-news website, to hire the people, do it.’ They’re good business people, they want their business case made, but then they empower you to get on with it. So they gave me a lot of autonomy to do that, and then Bell GlobeMedia came along with the support of both Bell and Woodbrige [the Thomson family’s holding firm]. So you had two very well-funded owners who were prepared to invest in the long term. For them, it’s not all about instant coffee, it’s not all about results next week. That’s a big difference.”

He says he was aware that the changes would be expensive, but considering the profits that had been amassed during Mr. Parkinson’s tenure, he felt it was safe to dig deep to ensure future profitability.

Costs in general played a major role in the newspaper war (as discussed in a later section) and in crafting the competing papers’ strategies. One of the effects of the changes undertaken on the editorial side was that the average size of a normal issue of the Globe and Mail increased by up to 20 pages. With both sunk costs and incremental costs for daily printing rising, the management of the Globe and Mail faced an important

choice: they could keep their prices as they were or they could mimic the National Post and discount their cover prices and advertising rates in an effort to boost circulation. Mr. Crawley felt that for the Globe and Mail to win the war, it had to maintain an image as the premier paper in Canada, and that meant keeping premium prices and ensuring that the product was strong enough to keep drawing readers and advertisers. Mr. Crawley says that this price-level placement proved fortuitous.

“Most of our life alongside each other, the Globe and the Post, the Globe was always more expensive to buy at the newsstand than the Post was, so the Post was offering itself as a cheaper alternative. And ultimately that has ended up tarnishing its image because it’s always now identified in the market as a paper that is prepared to sell itself cheap.”

The above strategy notwithstanding, the Globe and Mail did spend considerable amounts of money on a circulation battle. Free issues of the paper were distributed in metropolitan centres – primarily in the crucial Toronto market – to combat the deluge of free National Posts. Also, newspaper boxes which had been in the process of being phased out in the 90’s were brought back en masse to maintain an appearance of strong market presence.

Richard Addis’ role in the strategic scheme was ostensibly to have responsibility for the content and presentation of the paper – the outward changes that would be seen by consumers and advertisers and that would physically challenge the National Post on newsstands on a daily basis. He came to the Globe with the stipulation, as noted above, that he would be given a broader ability to implement changes as he saw fit.

This is important because it would give him the ability to mandate change down through the newsroom. It must be noted, and this will be discussed in more detail later, that this is in direct contradiction to the change literature which suggests that change cannot be mandated. It was also seen as necessary by the Globe's new leaders, as explained by Misters Addis and Cobb in their interviews - to be able to effectively counteract the National Post at the newsstands day-in and day-out. It is important to mention here that Richard Addis, in keeping with the commodified view of the news media shared by his British compatriots, saw his role from a more macro vantage point. Rather than describing his strategy in our interview as being to renew the Globe from an editorial and presentation perspective, he positions it within the broader competitive context. His change strategy, he says, was "essentially to re-establish the Globe's commercial dominance" in the Canadian market. Among the major new initiatives launched by Mr. Addis – aside from changes to the paper's presentation and choice of stories and photography – was the launch of a separate Saturday Books section and the repackaging of Arts & Entertainment into an arts and popular culture section called Review.

It is also important to stress the fact that, like Mr. Crawley, Mr. Addis was an outsider not just to the Globe and Mail but also to Canada – Chris Cobb describes him as "the antithesis of a 'Globe person'." Mr. Addis is honest about the drawbacks and benefits of this situation (and his infamy for callousness gained after he fired eighty newsroom staff in one day as editor of London's Daily Express – and was quoted out of context as having referred to the incident as being "just like cleaning out an old sock drawer").

“Coming there I think my reputation would have been as an absolutely ghastly barbarian from British tabloid newspapers. I think the effect this had on my behaviour was a healthy one meaning that I would try not to be a barbarian and to keep the civilized values of the Globe and Mail alive. The more people said I was a barbarian, the harder I tried to be civilized. It helped me to be an outsider just because I had no vested interest, allegiances, and no history. It meant I could take the paper and do something with it. It was an amazing advantage I think, for me. Now, detractors would say you can’t really run a national newspaper if you don’t know the country very well. That would be true if you were trying to run a national agenda, become a major voice in national issues and politics – that would be foolish if you were an outsider. I didn’t try to do that – I let the big name columnists do that. I just tried to make a better paper.”

In summary, the overall purpose of the strategy undertaken by Misters Garner, Crawley, and Addis was to make the Globe a more competitive newspaper which would be more efficient externally and internally. The primary aspects of this strategy were staffing changes at upper levels to ensure that key personnel were aligned with the vision of the top leaders (including Misters Crawley and Addis being in line with Mr. Garner’s overall strategic scheme), maintaining the Globe’s leadership with its target MOPE audience while broadening its appeal, improving internal systems in terms of customer orientation, expanding the range of products and services offered to clients, and concentrating on winning the circulation battle against the Post.

5.2.4. Leadership

Phillip Crawley stresses that the threat of the Post was not underestimated by the Globe, but that it did create three different mindsets within the organization. This description seems a fitting introduction to the analysis of the leadership decisions undertaken by the British trio of change agents.

“There were also a lot of people within the Globe who were conscious that Conrad Black had an enormous amount of power in Canada because of his ownership of the Southam chain of newspapers. He had, therefore, a huge opportunity to market the National Post on the back of those other newspapers and that was a pretty formidable weapon in terms of establishing the identity of the Post straight out of the gate. So I think that there was one school of thought within the Globe that ‘the Globe should stick to what it was doing and needn’t change very much at all,’ there was another school of thought that ‘Conrad Black is more powerful and is going to win because he usually gets what he wants, particularly in Canada, and we’re in danger of being swept aside by the Conrad Black tidal wave,’ and then there were the people on the middle ground who just wanted some leadership in terms of moving on to produce something better than what we were then producing.”

So the challenge faced by the new group of leaders was to unite all three groups behind their change vision, including guiding the third group, motivating the second, and overcome resistance from the third, all the while adhering to their strategy and battling the Post at the newsstand each morning.

Sense of urgency / Dissatisfaction with the status quo

Mr. Garner alludes to the work of psychologist and consultant Edward de Bono and his theory that for an organization to function on a “higher plane of performance” it needs a so-called “provocation.” For Mr. Garner, this theory parallels the idea of a sense of urgency, and he sees the launch of the Post as having been a “provocation” for the Globe and Mail. He feels that the appearance of a competitor not only allowed for culture change to happen at the Globe, but also hastened it by instilling the organization with a “fear factor”. He draws the following analogy: “Like the Second World War in London. If someone’s about to drop bombs on you, you get frightened, don’t you? Life changes. And you have to put up with hardships and privations which you would not have tolerated before.” In other words, the launch of the National Post forced the Globe and Mail to accept the need for change. Mr. Garner saw this sense of urgency as an opportunity to enact his various strategies and spoke of the subject with executives, and trusted Misters Crawley and Addis to spread the message throughout the organization.

Phillip Crawley states that when he arrived at the Globe just prior to the Post’s arrival, “the driving need for change was the knowledge that there was likely to be a new competitor.” He cites the launch of colour as a sign that a sense of urgency had already started to take hold and that an understanding that the status quo would be insufficient to battle the Post had started to form within the paper. That being said, he says that one of the reasons he was brought in to be publisher and CEO was that he understood how newspaper competition worked, and therefore had to bring a greater sense of urgency to the Globe to allow for rapid change. He notes that the visibility and tangibility of the Post

made this goal easier to achieve. He describes using the Post's presence as a basis for his leadership as follows:

“I think it was a big help to me to have an immediate threat on the doorstep. If I had just come to preach change with no looming competitor, it would have been much harder to do it. Once the Post launched, the people could see that it was going to be a serious player in the market, because they did make a big splash right out of the gate. They spent a lot of money on marketing and visibility and it was obvious they were around. It made it much easier for me to talk, as I did on a frequent basis, to the staff to say ‘Here’s what we have to do, here’s the things that are right for the Globe to do, here’s what our values are and what we stand for, and here’s the differences between us and them’.”

Mr. Crawley says in his interview that he strove to make the need to change understood by all members of the organization – because the changes he put into effect involved content, design, bureaucracy, and many other aspects of the newspaper, he had to ensure that all employees understood the threat posed by the new competitor.

Mr. Addis, unlike Mr. Crawley, says he did not feel that a sense of urgency existed at the Globe and Mail – at least not in the newsroom of which he took charge. Therefore, he attempted to create one, but primarily through actions rather than words. The need to change, he says, was demonstrated “mainly by doing things very very quickly. ... [Those] that normally would have taken six months, I would try to do them in usually about six days. So a lot of change happened very quickly. I think that automatically conveyed a sense of urgency and speed to the organization.”

All three leaders acted in accordance with Spector's prescription in that they sought to "diffuse dissatisfaction" – Mr. Garner among senior executives and staff, Mr. Crawley throughout the organization, and Mr. Addis in the newsroom. While they all mandated change to some extent, they all also sought to communicate the need to change rapidly due to the encroachment of the Post.

Mr. Crawley engaged in an interesting mix of sharing and withholding competitive information from staff. On one hand, the interview data indicates he frequently spoke with staff regarding necessary changes, his vision, and his change strategy. But on the other hand he stopped sharing financial and other sensitive information. While he states in his interview that this was motivated by the need to prevent leaks to the Post, it can be surmised that it could have been perceived by employees as a lack of trust, something his predecessor is very vocal in his interview as having valued highly.

Mr. Crawley also created behavioural dissatisfaction on the business side of the organization. He did this by appointing a VP of production and, as he explains in his interview, and as is noted by Chris Cobb in *Ego and Ink*, confronting his lackadaisical advertising force to urge them to be more proactive in finding advertising while also treating their existing clients with more professionalism. Mr. Addis also aimed to create behavioural dissatisfaction in the newsroom, but he did it by setting new standards and introducing new behaviours. In a sense, he led by example – he did what he expected to be done, and contrasted it to the old way of doing things by bringing in the changes rapidly. In this manner, he showed that old behaviours would no longer be acceptable. So in effect he used his power to mandate change to attempt to prove that previously

accepted behaviours would no longer be acceptable. Both leaders can be said to have made the organization feel the “pain” necessary to foster change, even if this was done in a top-down manner.

The British leadership’s efforts to spread dissatisfaction can be deemed a success. Despite the fact that communication may have been a bit of a problem (see further section), they, in the words of Kotter, actively sought to prove to the Globe and Mail that “the status quo [was] more dangerous than launching into the unknown,” thereby allowing their changes to be put into effect. It must be noted that these efforts would suggest that the secondary data and interviews with Misters Addis and Garner, were not accepted wholesale by staff, leading to morale problems and certain staff members being let go.

One of the principal differences between the leadership approaches of the two groups of leaders was an understanding of and communication of a sense of urgency on the part of the British triumvirate. This was also helped by circumstances. Misters Thorsell and Parkinson faced a sort of phantom enemy, one to which they had to start reacting before it was launched and which was entirely new and always changing once it had been launched. Misters Garner, Crawley, and Addis, on the other hand, were able to watch the Post’s development and were able to confront a tangible enemy.

Teams / Leading coalitions / Empowering staff

Stuart Garner stated that he was a firm believer in the need for a guiding coalition to implement a change. The data from this study indicated that this belief did not translate to a democratic style of management. Rather it was implemented through the use of a

small, like-minded cadre of senior members of an organization pursuing a common goal.

He also noted that he is a supporter of “organizational SWAT teams.” He explains the rationale for this approach in times of change in the following terms:

“I think if one guy tries to go into a major situation like the Globe and change things, I don’t think one person’s got a hope in hell, particularly if you have this culture issue where you’ve got to break some moulds in order to make any progress. One person cannot do this because the organization will swamp him – the dynamics are such that the forces of reaction and conservatism in the organization will find ways of snuffing him out or ducking what he wants to do or submerging him in minutiae of details instead of letting him get in a helicopter above the battlefield and really direct operations.”

He also notes in the interview that small specialized teams are important in that leaders can surround themselves with people who will make up for their weaknesses or execute strategies in areas where the leaders does not have the time to implement them personally. This observation is interesting as it reflects the reason for the implementation of employee and management teams given by Nadler and Tushman. Moreover, on a personal note, he sees leadership coalitions as important because they allow leaders a sounding board for ideas and also “someone to talk to.” He explains that “leadership is a very lonely business. Leaders don’t have anyone to talk to typically unless they have or make arrangements to have someone to talk to.”

Mr. Garner’s requirements for his SWAT team were for two people with competitive experience – one to run the business and the other to run the editorial department. Phillip Crawley was an old friend and Richard Addis was brought in

because, as Mr. Garner put it in our interview, he “had been tempered in the fires of Fleet Street in London. ... Although he has an elegant tone of voice, when it came down to it he was a street-fighter.”

When he was charged with ushering in change at the Globe and Mail, Stuart Garner was de facto mandated to assemble and empower a senior group of leaders to carry out the change. Of his efforts to empower employees, he says that “having made the right appointments of people, I would give them all they needed to do the job and then give them the space to do it ... and give them time.” Indeed, after an initial period heavy of involvement in the operations of the Globe in terms of formulating a strategy and bringing in key staff and consultants, Mr. Garner stepped back to a secondary position, acting as a liaison between the Globe and Thomson management and acting as a sounding-board and advisor to senior Globe staff, primarily Phillip Crawley.

For his part, Mr. Crawley says in his interview that he sought to win over key leaders on the business and editorial side to help push through changes. He admits that he realized that he could not accomplish changes alone, so he sought to build support. However, as noted by Chris Cobb in his interview, he at times did this by appointing friendly staff to key positions rather than attempting to win over the people who had held these positions previously.

Richard Addis, on the other hand, felt no need to build or develop teams. Other than his strategic meetings with Chrystia Freeland, he effectively ran a one-man show in the newsroom, keeping two-way communication to a minimum and shunning any kind of team-building altogether. As explained by Richard Addis, Chris Cobb, and Stuart Garner in their interviews, it was not Richard Addis’ role when he was brought in to be an

empowering leader. This is why he was hired on the agreement that he “would be regarded as if I were in Britain,” meaning he had more autonomy to implement the changes he saw fit without necessarily being required or expected to delegate or share responsibility with others. The one exception to this rule was his second-in-command Cynthia Freeland, with whom he consulted on numerous decisions. Mr. Addis explains this as follows: “really one of the essential things if you’re editor and you want to make a lot of changes is to have one other person you can 100,000% rely on.”

Considering it was his goal to find efficient, like-minded leaders for the Globe and Mail, Stuart Garner succeeded insofar as his relationship with Misters Crawley and Addis is concerned. Having chosen the two men for their posts, he says in his interview that he gave them the resources and authority they needed to enact changes, relegating his own role to that of advisor and helper. He allowed them to, in the words of Beatty and Ulrich, “manage through principles” and, having chosen them for this exact reason, act “according to the specific needs of the business.” Or, to use the concept presented by Kanter, having started the change going, he transferred ownership of this project to his working team and allowed them to independently explore solutions to the problems and challenges that would arise.

Mr. Crawley’s actions were an extension of those undertaken by Mr. Garner in that, as he explains in his interview, he found key people throughout the organization and worked closely with them to implement his change strategies. As noted by Nadler and Tushman – the “leadership-is-not-enough” principle – it is preferable to have a leadership base greater than simply one or two individuals. So Mr. Crawley’s decision was

rightfully based on spreading his influence by gaining buy-in from key players in different departments.

But while Mr. Crawley sought to expand his leadership base, Mr. Addis, according to Chris Cobb and by his own admission during his interview, kept the newsroom as a dictatorship, with only one de facto “team member” in the person of Cynthia Freeland. While introducing changes to a newsroom environment would seem like the ideal setting for uniting employees and then letting them implement changes of their own accord, Mr. Addis explains in his interview that he led by example and with no buy-in, a fact acknowledged by Chris Cobb. This was an approach that clearly violated the prescriptions in the literature and, while it was to an extent effective, could arguably have been far more effective had a team-based system been used.

Description of leadership style

When asked to describe their leadership styles, Misters Garner and Addis gave answers that seem to fit with their actions and with the opinion of Mr. Cobb.

Stuart Garner describes himself as a “catalyst”, “enabler”, and “lubricant”. He believes other would say of him that he “led from the front with my chin, and got it hit a few times.” Chris Cobb describes him as having been “ruthless”.

Richard Addis describes himself as “impetuous”, “obsessive”, “autocratic”, and “overconfident”. He believes others would describe him as having been “autocratic”, “brave”, “overcritical”, and “successful”. Mr. Cobb agrees with Mr. Addis’ opinion and describes the former editor-in-chief as “autocratic”.

Mr. Crawley did not answer this question. However, Mr. Cobb describes him as “determined” and both Misters Garner and Addis shower praise on him for his commitment to the changes and efficaciousness in implementing them. Mr. Addis states that

“I would say that none of those things [changes] could have been done, none of the things could have been done that I feel proud of or was allowed to do without an amazingly skilful and courageous publisher. You had to have a team, you had to have support. So one of the best things that happened was that Phillip Crawley was there and he is absolutely a great publisher and somebody who very deeply wanted things to be done, very supportive, very strong when times got difficult in backing editorial change. He saw the importance of editorial journalism and its quality. He’s an amazing colleague and boss.”

Reducing uncertainty / Addressing morale issues

The new group of leaders at the Globe came to their positions as the paper was assuming battle stations against the Post. The urgency of the situation coupled with their competitive approach led to a strategy based on defeating the Post and strengthening the Globe rather than making friends and appeasing the staff. The evidence would suggest that morale issues were not always adequately addressed and efforts at reducing uncertainty during the change were not a priority. Justification for this conclusion is given below.

Stuart Garner’s view of human resources during change is best encapsulated by his statement that “I took the view that what was important here was the future of the

Globe and Mail and not the sensibilities of people.” He felt that while people might be upset with rapid change and the brusque manner in which it was sometimes applied, they would be even more upset if the newspaper folded and they were forced to find a new job. This approach, according to interviews with Misters Cobb and Garner, exacerbated existing morale issues at the Globe and led to much grumbling in the organization. Mr. Garner, while not dismissing these concerns, defends his heavy-handed approach and criticizes some of the Globe staff’s commitment.

“Clearly in a change management process you always wish to have the troops go with you and to be total believers, 100% gung-ho,” he says, “but life’s imperfect and remember that the Globe had a substantial number of people who’d had a very cozy, comfortable life doing things their own way – the place was run a bit like a democracy rather than a conventional business.”

He feels that the shock of the changes snapped many staffers out of a complacent state that had arisen when they could carry on comfortably without any threat to the Globe. He adds that the Globe was “not a totally happy ship anyway. I think there was a lot of internal bickering and infighting cause it was run a bit like a democracy and I think some people would have seen the launch of the National Post as an opportunity rather than an issue they had to confront – in other words, a better job somewhere else, as they perceived it.” Mr. Garner did not seek to address these morale issues because he felt it more important to enact immediate changes. He also takes the view that during a change process the ends justify the means.

“Leaders sometimes have to make unpopular decisions, and therefore people can be upset. At the time I felt that what happened was absolutely necessary. With the benefit of one

year's hindsight when it was becoming clear that the Globe was winning, I was convinced that I was right," he explains.

Richard Addis did communicate with staff regarding his plans for change, but because the editorial department was essentially a one-man show (with Cynthia Freeland playing the part of the faithful assistant), the frequent fluctuations in his message may have added to, rather than diminished, uncertainty. "They knew exactly what was going on, even if I changed my mind from one day to the next, I would tell them," says Addis of his communication strategy. But if he was maladroit in reducing uncertainty, Mr. Addis was a – self-admittedly – abject failure at handling morale problems. He experienced personal conflicts with certain staff members, most notably renowned columnist Jeffrey Simpson, and says in his interview that he was aware of the many morale problems in the Globe's newsroom. But he states that he did nothing to counteract them.

"I just kind of ignored them or tried to make them worse in a way because I did not have any patience for them. There were people at the Globe who got away with murder as far as being allowed to go around morosely complaining about the situation when there wasn't anything to complain about. In a way it made me angry when people were negative."

It comes as little surprise then, that while Mr. Addis was praised by Misterns Garner and Crawley for his success in instituting changes and revamping the image and editorial approach of the Globe, he was widely disdained by his newsroom staff (Cobb, 2004).

Phillip Crawley takes a slightly more diplomatic stance on the treatment of employees, one which may be explained by his position as CEO. Stuart Garner was a

kind of special agent charged with starting major changes and had free reign to do so. Richard Addis had a similar mandate in the editorial department. Mr. Crawley, on the other hand, could not risk alienating the organization he had just taken over. In terms of reducing uncertainty, especially considering the fact that the National Post was using its pages to make declarations warning of the Globe's impending demise, Mr. Crawley says he "did do a lot of talking to staff ... to basically sort of fly the Globe banner and make people believe that the Globe wasn't just a sitting duck waiting to be overtaken by Conrad Black." On the other hand, he made the strategic decision to discontinue the practice begun by Roger Parkinson of sharing competitive information with staff. He says in the interview that he felt that there was a risk of financial or otherwise sensitive information being leaked to the Post, which would use it as a weapon. Moreover, since the Post was owned by a publicly traded company, its financial information – namely its large early losses – were in the public domain and could be exploited by the Globe, while the Globe, being privately owned, could keep its financial doings secret. While this may have been a sound financial decision which agrees with Mr. Crawley's belief that a newspaper should not be run like a democracy, it runs contrary to the best practice prescription of sharing as much information as possible with staff during change.

Chris Cobb recounts in *Ego and Ink* that when Mr. Crawley announced that the newspaper was at war, he threatened to deal harshly with anyone caught leaking information, using the analogy for executing traitors in times of war. When columnist Jan Wong asked how he proposed to execute staff, Mr. Crawley infamously responded "hanging." While this attitude won him enemies, it also won him respect. Reporter Susan Delacourt is quoted by Chris Cobb as saying of the incident that "he scared the bejesus

out of all of us big brave reporters. ... It was something we had been waiting to hear, and wished someone had said it months before” (Cobb, 2004).

As for morale issues, Mr. Crawley took a two-pronged approach. Knowing that the Post was after marquee names and talent, he strove to ensure that the Globe would retain “key people” by preemptively offering royalties and bonuses. This was a continuation of the policy implemented earlier by Misters Thorsell and Parkinson. Although some staff did defect, Mr. Crawley states confidently that “we [lost] a lot less than what had originally been feared.” He did not, however, go out of his way to retain disaffected staff who opposed the changes and did not qualify as “key” to the organization. He felt that if staff would not change themselves to fit the change, the change would not be altered to accommodate them. Of these people, he says the following:

“Obviously there were people who were resisting [the change], and you have to decide at that point whether they’re going to ever learn to sing from the same hymn sheet or will they not. There’s been a fair amount of turnover at both the executive level and the staff level because change means you’ve got to bring in new blood. Some people will feel disaffected, they will feel ‘Hey, this isn’t the place that I used to work for,’ and for those people you say ‘Okay, thanks very much’.”

The new leadership at the Globe failed to live up to two of the three uncertainty reduction criteria posited by Bordia et al. They definitely had a clear vision and goals which they communicated, but they did not reduce structural uncertainty (they changed people’s positions, implemented new policies, practices, and standards and, in the case of

Mr. Addis, very rapidly introduced a plethora of changes that varied greatly from previously accepted methods). It would not be a stretch to state that they actually increased job-related uncertainty by not respecting morale concerns, letting non-crucial employees go, not reaching out to resisters and employing a “with us or against” us approach. While their position of instituting major changes for strategic competitive reasons is valid in general, it does not, if evaluated using the prescriptions in the change management literature, justify the British leaders’ disdain for any opposition from employees. Nor does it validate their purposeful ignorance of major morale problems – as documented in the secondary sources and acknowledged by Misters Addis and Cobb, among the staff upon whom they should have been depending to implement and sustain their change strategies.

SUMMARY

With a sound vision and a strategy based on applying this vision, the British crop of leaders appear to have also fit the general prescriptions of successful change leadership contained in the literature better than their predecessors. However, there are also a few key points where their actions diverged – or directly opposed – the best practice suggested by the literature.

Misters Garner, Crawley, and Addis all followed – for the most part – the literature’s prescriptions for spreading dissatisfaction throughout the organization, thereby facilitating the implementation of their change strategies. Their descriptions (self-descriptions also in the cases of Misters Garner and Addis) also seem to match the qualities of successful change leaders as described in the literature. They were also

believers in the importance of teams. However, on this last point, they seemed to prefer high-level, like-minded cadres rather than wholesale participation from all levels of the organization.

A major flaw in the three men's – and particularly Misters Garner and Addis' – leadership that can be seen regardless of the leadership dimensions being discussed is the relatively minor emphasis they seem to have placed on employees' morale and involvement in the changes. For instance, in otherwise "correct" efforts at spreading dissatisfaction, Misters Addis and Garner were willing to overlook – or dismiss – the staff members who did not buy into their vision, rather than working harder to convince them or bring them into the fold. Also, the British Invasion did not succeed at reducing uncertainty – they neither reduced structural uncertainty nor job-related uncertainty. Overall, they also appear to have been generally apathetic to morale problems they admit they knew existed. And, finally and perhaps most importantly, they seemed to take the view that they were generals in a war rather than managers, and so appear to have been content in many instances to mandate down change and adherence to their strategies, even when opposition existed to these initiatives. This last point will be discussed more fully later and the point will be made that while such an approach runs counter to the literature it may have been appropriate in this situation.

5.2.5. Communication

Because his position did not require him to speak to the staff as a whole, Stuart Garner's communication efforts were primarily centered around one-on-one discussion with senior staff members. At the beginning of his tenure, this meant letting it be known

that he was dissatisfied with the state of the paper as he found it. He recalls during his interview speaking at length and on numerous occasions with Misters Parkinson and Thorsell and various other staff members and explaining why he was “less than happy” with the Globe’s performance in general and editorial performance in particular. He made certain judgments based on his own editorial experience and shared them with the staff responsible for these areas. “I had several delightful dinners with William Thorsell in which it was interesting to hear his views and he was interested in hearing mine [although] he might not have wanted to hear them,” he recalls.

Mr. Garner was, however, brought in on occasion to address mass gatherings of the staff and make major announcements. For instance, at the launch of the Globe’s inaugural colour issue, he “addressed the assembled multitude,” as he puts it, to share his enthusiasm about what he saw as “one of the most professional launches of colour in a newspaper in the history of the newspaper industry ... [and] I would take an opportunity like that to reinforce the [change] message and stay on the message.”

Mr. Garner states in his interview that he communicated often and with a consistent message, sharing his vision for the future of the paper and his dissatisfaction with its then-current state. In this he is consistent with Kotter’s prescription for communication in times of change. This view of Mr. Garner’s communication style is corroborated by Mr. Cobb in his interview.

His actions also match many of the factors of success outlined by Young and Post: he was a communication-champion leader (though not the CEO) and acted (according to his interview) on his words. He says he was committed to two-way communication (with senior staff) as well as face-to-face meetings (as stated by him, Mr.

Addis, and Mr. Crawley in their interviews). He states he shared responsibility for communication with the greater body of staff with the other leaders (as he explains in his interview), shared bad news and dissatisfaction, communicated with a broad range of stakeholders at the Globe and in Thomson management, and he says in his interview that he made use of an “employee communication strategy” (communicated what was happening and why, in a timely manner, often, and linked his idea to the big picture of the new competitive landscape). Finally, he communicated short-term wins (at least in the case of the introduction of colour) and used this achievement to reiterate his strategy. Overall, he meets all of the criteria discussed in the literature for successful change communication.

Phillip Crawley states in his interview that his mass communication with staff included numerous town hall meetings and other public staff gatherings in which he would explain the Globe’s goals, current strategies, progress, and what he saw as accomplishments and shortcomings. He explains that, other than communicating strategies and accomplishments, his aim was to “fly the Globe banner and make people believe that the Globe wasn’t just a sitting duck waiting to be overtaken by Conrad Black ... because the message from the Post all the time was ‘It’s only a matter of time. We’re catching up fast. The Globe is on the ropes’.”

But outside of these large, broad meetings aimed at “hitting the largest groups” of staff, Mr. Crawley was committed to a high volume of one-on-one communications, focusing on key executives and managers. These e-mails, conversations, and strategy sessions with small numbers of senior staff were, in his opinion, central to what he perceives as his success in carrying out his vision. But while he was generally open about

decisions and goals, he was not prepared – as mentioned earlier – to disclose financial and other sensitive information to the entire staff, or even to the more limited, 80- to 100-member management council. “I said ‘Sorry, we’re not going to do that anymore. The shutters are going to come down’,” he explains.

Mr. Crawley, like Mr. Garner, seems to have displayed acumen when it came to communication of change. He states in his interview that he communicated frequently using a variety of media as well as face-to-face communication both with large groups and one-on-one. As per Kotter’s prescription, Mr. Crawley continued to communicate about various issues throughout the change process, and aimed to reassure staff in times of distress about the Globe’s competitive position. He did however discontinue some information sharing, which may have had negative consequences on morale (see earlier section). Mr. Crawley says in his interview – a statement corroborated by Mr. Garner – that he spent a substantial amount of his time communicating with various executives and managers in various departments of the organization. In this, his actions were congruent with D’Aprix’s suggestion that leaders should communicate frequently in person. Moreover, he dealt frequently with staff and, according to his self-evaluation during his interview, was open to their feedback – he aimed to “see and feel what [his] followers are experiencing.” This is not to say he was always empathetic. As the section on Reducing Uncertainty showed, he was dismissive of those who opposed his changes. But at least he listened to them.

To apply Young and Post’s criteria, based on the interview and comments from Chris Cobb, including those mentioned above, Mr. Crawley was a CEO who championed communication, matched actions to words, was committed to face-to-face and two-way

communication (the latter especially with other managers, however), shared responsibility for employee communications, dealt with bad news like the Post's gains by aiming to bolster morale, and communicated frequently with a variety of interlocutors including advertisers and Thomson executives.

Richard Addis admits freely that "I should have done more communicating ... I obviously didn't do enough." He did hold frequent meetings with staff, especially the various section editors, during which he would explain his strategies, plans, and concerns. He also strove to ensure that they were kept up to speed on more macro-level managerial plans and decisions to which they might not have had access otherwise. "I did have a policy of being extremely open – in my own mind anyway – with people on my team," he says. On the other hand, he pushed through many editorial and design changes very quickly and unilaterally. This communication through action was what a senior editor would do in England, but it was a departure from the policies of William Thorsell, so it led, by Mr. Addis' own admission during his interview, to an increase in the aforementioned morale problems. Moreover, while he informed his staff of his plans and strategies, Mr. Addis made it clear that he was not keen on receiving input into his strategies or having them evaluated on a democratic basis. "As far as input into changes, I said 'no'. I drew the line at that," he says.

Unlike the other two British leaders, Mr. Addis was not adept at the sort of communication suggested in the change management literature. He communicated, but was by no means a "communication champion". Even when it came to his vision, he explains in his interview that he implemented the strategies it entailed rather than expanding on it verbally or through other means of communication. He did match actions

to words, but he did so in terms of explaining what he was doing once it was done. He did emphasize face-to-face communication with staff and kept them apprised of the link between the “big picture” of management decisions and the competitive environment and the “little picture” of changes affecting the newsroom, but, as noted in the previous paragraph, he shunned two-way communication. In other words, he transmitted messages, but left no option of a reply. In some cases, this may have amounted to the equivalent of telling someone you are going to step on their toes and doing it anyway despite their protests. And for this reason, despite his frequent communication, he may have – as D’Aprix warns - widened the gap between himself and his rank-and-file staff.

5.2.6. Culture Change

Stuart Garner offers an anecdote from a change initiative he led earlier in his career to demonstrate the difficulty of changing organizational culture.

“After some weeks of not feeling like we were making a lot of progress, I asked someone who wasn’t actually in the business but was familiar with the area, ‘What the hell do you do to lead people here?’ He said, ‘You don’t lead them I’m afraid. You just find out which direction they’re walking and get in the front, walk in front of them, then you’ll then be leading but you’ll end up going where they’re going.’ It was a cynic who was speaking, but there’s some truth in that.”

Mr. Garner, when he took charge of the changes at the Globe, knew that the ultimate goal would be to change not only the product but the organization's culture. He again demonstrated a firm understanding of change management in that he understood that changing a company's culture would be both a difficult and time-consuming task. "If someone were to come up and tell me you can go into a business and announce six months later he has affected a culture change, I will point to him and say he is a liar. It can't be done. People aren't like that. What produces culture is a deep-seeded insidious process over time," he says. He based the speed and authoritativeness of his actions on the premise that "newcomers to an organization get sucked into that culture and imbued with its values over time, by osmosis," a fate he wished to avoid if he were to implement his vision.

He defends the mandating down of change as a way of creating a system that would effectuate culture change using the example of William Thorsell. Richard Addis, he says, was brought in to introduce change because "Thorsell ... didn't seem fully able to implement [it], and I think this was partly because of the rather convoluted system in the editorial department of the Globe – the kind of democracy that I have already referred to which existed." So by bringing in an authoritative change agent, he changed an aspect of culture that was a hindrance to change and set a precedent for a culture where change is easier to institute, even though in doing so he made the newsroom more rather than less democratic.

Mr. Garner's assessment of the difficulty of changing culture matches Shneider et al's assertion that culture cannot be simply changed, but rather that it must be altered slowly as a result of climate change. An extension of this understanding is Mr. Garner's

aim to alter the inner workings of the Globe and Mail by starting at the top and introducing two outsiders as leaders, thereby bringing a new approach to competition and the newspaper business to the organization. This was intended to diffuse the new attitudes, including a firm customer focus, throughout the Globe. Such a change of attitudes would be manifested in a fundamental change in the Globe staff's daily approach to their workplace – from advertising through editorial content, design, production quality, and even distribution methods. That this broad range of changes was introduced rapidly by Mr. Garner and by the CEO and editor-in-chief he brought in is a testament to a number of factors – among them the need, in their opinion, to change rapidly to combat the Post, and also the general belief that the Globe as a whole needed an overhaul. The fact that these changes have stuck – based on the evaluations of the Globe expressed in the various interviews conducted - speaks to the success of their implementation and Mr. Garner's culture change plan. On the other hand, Chris Cobb's description of Mr. Garner as "ruthless" and Mr. Parkinson's assertion that he lacked "a good bedside manner", coupled with the morale problems (documented in *Ego and Ink*, other secondary sources and the interviews) that plagued the new group of leaders, show that perhaps while Mr. Garner had hoped others might learn by doing once their behaviour were altered, as suggested by Pascale, he should have taken more time and engaged more staff in participating in change.

Mr. Garner does fit the model of a visionary leader striving to bring about a cultural revitalization posited by Phelan. If the Globe at the time when he took control of it can be seen as having been, for the most part, a culture existing in a steady state, then the imminent launch of the National Post would have changed the norms and increased

stress among the organization's members (threat of competition, leaders changing vision and spreading dissatisfaction, lure of new jobs/headhunting). In other words, the Globe was threatened by a cultural crisis. Mr. Garner, for his part, saw this and added to it by communicating his dissatisfaction with the status quo to senior staff at the Globe and executives at Thomson. In the new competitive environment, Mr. Garner developed a vision for defeating the Post and renewing the Globe and Mail, implementing policies which he believed would see new norms and a new climate become the routine. Within this context, his rapid actions can be explained by his understanding of – and the Globe staff's inexperience with – competition and the demands it would place not just on the newsroom but on the whole organization. In this sense, the changes he instituted would see the Globe's staff forced to act and think in a certain way (for instance, working with colour on a daily basis) or simply acknowledge the need to consider the need for change in daily action. This, in turn, would over time alter the Globe's culture.

Phillip Crawley explains that the basis for his approach to the change was that they would not be short- or long-term, but rather that they were “the start of a period in the Globe where change would be a constant.” He explains that he sought to avoid a rapid burst of activity that would stop and be followed by what he calls a collective “Okay, phew, we're glad that's over,” which in turn would lead to reversion to the old, complacent corporate culture. Moreover, he felt that the Globe would have to be ready to face not only the immediate threat from the Post, but other competition from different quarters in the future. A concrete example of editorial policy necessitated by the competitive environment will be used to demonstrate Mr. Crawley's approach to cultural change.

“You know, if you’re the only national newspaper, a mindset develops whereby you say ‘Well, we’re working on this story, it might not be ready for another week, but we’ll publish it in a week’s time and it will be the definitive piece because this is the Globe and if the Globe says so, then it’s the definitive piece.’ When you’ve got another national newspaper competitor on your heels, you actually have to get it in the following day. The speed of delivery counts. You haven’t got time to write 50 inches, you need to get something in the paper, because otherwise the other guys are going to do it before you do. I mean, it’s not rocket science, but it is a change of attitude, and expectations change. So my job was making clear to people that expectations were different,” he explains.

He hoped that this change in expectations would then change the staff’s attitude toward how they should conduct their jobs, which in turn would alter their daily activities, which would eventually help establish a new organizational culture.

He recognizes that, coming in as an outsider, he was not very familiar with Canada or Canadian politics. Nor was he familiar with the Globe’s culture. However, he says that this was offset by his experience of leading cultural change in various publications around the world and of being adept at “changing an organization from within to reflect in the product in a way to which readers would react positively.”

Mr. Crawley’s approach to change matches Shneider et al’s theory of altering culture by changing routine actions and beliefs. The changes he implemented were not aimed at a one-shot culture change, but rather at changing aspects of the Globe’s operations he saw as deficient – presentation, appeal, treatment of advertisers,

distribution. By instituting changes in all of these cases, making new expectations clear, and monitoring internal performance as well as market performance compared to the competition (see earlier section), he sought to ensure that the daily operations of the Globe changed to suit his vision and strategy. Throughout this process he communicated with his staff efficiently and effectively (see previous section). He states in his interview that he sought to ensure through constant communication that the changes he instituted were adhered to and reached the point of “routinization” (Phelan, 2005), meaning that they became the norm and also that their benefits were understood within the competitive context.

Considering Mr. Crawley’s goal of achieving a sustainable, perpetual culture of change, it is fitting to compare his culture change efforts to Pascale’s keys to sustaining complex change over time. While Mr. Crawley may not have been intimately familiar with the Globe and Mail, he was familiar with the requirements of a competitive, efficient newspaper, and he conveyed these requirements to the staff. As mentioned earlier, he encouraged communication, although he was not entirely receptive to criticism. He certainly “managed from the future”, basing his changes on his vision for the Globe. While it is unclear whether or not he “harnessed setbacks” (Pascale, 1999), he did strive to encourage staff in times when it seemed the Post was gaining (see earlier section). There is not enough information to judge whether or not he “emphasize[d] the value of failure as a stimulus for learning.” However, he states in his interview that he studied the Globe and the Post closely and was ready to tweak strategies to match changes in the environment (for instance, knowing when to cut back on mass distribution to save money). There is not enough information available about his dealings with individual

staff members to determine to what extent he engaged in “understanding the quid pro quo,” but he claims in his interview that he did strive for continuous change and constant discomfort with the status quo. So while some information is lacking, it would seem that Mr. Crawley’s actions are for the most part in line with Pascale’s system of achieving sustainable change.

Richard Addis differed from Mr. Crawley, as evidenced by his actions. Although he did not directly refer to attempts at culture change, it can be surmised from his actions that he sought to drastically alter the Globe’s approach to design and editorial content, in effect creating a new framework within which the newsroom staff would work. This change would be such a departure from the past that old standards and approaches would simply not fit the new, “pop” Globe. Therefore, editorial culture would be changed through the establishment of new standards which the newsroom staff would have no choice but to adhere to.

Mr. Addis’s mandate was not so much to change the newsroom culture as to quickly change the way the newsroom worked. These two are not the same thing. So while Mr. Addis may have forced new behaviour on his staff, he says that he did not necessarily tie this to explanations of the necessity for particular changes. This opinion was corroborated by Mr. Crawley and Chris Cobb in their interviews. Nor did he welcome criticism or input. In fact, his attempts to change the newsroom and its behaviour, and by extension its culture, were based on mandating change. This directly contradicts the prescriptions of the change management literature. It is interesting to note, however, that since the newsroom changes were backed by change messages from Mr. Crawley and competitive success, the spirit of tabloid-inspired, graphic-heavy design and

editorial risk-taking remained after Mr. Addis' departure and were adopted by Ed Greenspon. So Mr. Addis does appear to have succeeded in altering the newsroom culture, despite having made enemies and stepped on many toes, not to mention having fallen short in his communication efforts. This discrepancy between theory and fact is intriguing, especially considering that the other two British leaders adhered much more closely to the literature's prescriptions but did not necessarily achieve much greater success at the organizational level than Mr. Addis did at the newsroom level. The caveat there, however, is that Mr. Addis had a non-renewable three-year contract and a specific job to do, so he could afford to make enemies as long as he achieved his goal. Mr. Crawley did not have the same leeway as he had to lead, and continue leading, a united organization.

5.3. Other reasons for the outcome of the newspaper war

The stated aim of this thesis is to determine how the actions of the various leaders at the Globe and Mail contributed to its success in the change process. It is outside the scope of this thesis to examine the totality of the reasons for the Globe's successes or to examine the actions taken by the National Post. However, considering that this thesis is also, in some respects, a business-level account of the newspaper war as a whole, it seems necessary to briefly discuss some reasons for the outcome of the newspaper war that were mentioned by the respondents. The reason for the inclusion of this brief section is that all of the respondents mentioned, to a lesser or greater extent, the effects of the circulation battle and its costs, and of what is referred to in the Toronto media community as Conrad

Black's "big blink." They also talked about the impact some strategic mistakes on the part of the Post had on the outcome of the newspaper war. While some aspects of these mistakes are tied to the strategies of the Globe, others are completely independent of it. The aim of this section, therefore, is not to analyze this "big blink", but rather to mention its aspects in an attempt to provide more detail on the newspaper war and place the analysis contained in this thesis within the greater context of the newspaper battles waged outside the Globe and Mail's offices.

The following subsections discuss the newspaper war itself and the reasons for what I suggest, based on interviews and review of secondary sources, was its final outcome. This includes a subsection on the importance of advertising and circulation in the strategies employed by both the Globe and the Post during the newspaper war. A brief discussion of changes at the Globe and Mail which resulted from the newspaper war follows. These are changes that can be seen in the Globe and Mail that may not have been the primary aim of the various leaders' change strategies, but which remain tangible proof of these strategies. The section ends in the answer to the question of whether or not the changes at the Globe and Mail were ultimately successful.

The National Post, when it was launched, proved a formidable opponent for the Globe and Mail. Conrad Black and his team effectively analyzed the Globe's weaknesses and entered the Canadian market offering a package that addressed the gaps in the market. The new paper provided a right-wing political voice, was irreverently written, and yet concentrated heavily on both sports and women's issues. However, the Post made a number of mistakes on the content and business level that, according to all those

interviewed, hurt it quite badly. On the editorial side, Roger Parkinson notes that the Post had a very one-sided editorial approach. While this appealed to its target audience, it did little to appeal to other readers and hurt the paper's journalistic integrity because it did not represent a broad spectrum of ideas. "You show you tolerate different points of view and recognize them. ... Conrad [Black] didn't do that," says Mr. Parkinson. This, in turn, allowed the Globe to move more to the left to both a "small l" and "big L" liberal stance, appealing to an audience alienated by the Post. This was done because Mr. Addis could now position the Globe toward an expanded audience. "Addis went left for marketing reasons," explains Mr. Parkinson. Journalistic ideals aside, it was a sound business decision because it allowed the Globe and Mail to access readers who were turned off by the competition.

One of the commercial decisions that ended up hurting both papers – but which took more of a toll on the Post - was the heated distribution battle. Both papers (and to a certain extent the Toronto Star) inundated the market with copies of their papers in a battle for market presence and circulation. For the Post, this was important because it needed the figures to prove to advertisers that it was a worthwhile investment and would give them value for their money. The distribution battle, and the associated discounts, proved very costly for both papers. However, where the Globe pulled back and maintained premium pricing, the Post carried on with its discounting strategy. This had a two-fold effect. The first was the creation of the aforementioned image of the Post as a paper "willing to sell itself short." The second was simply that the paper continued to swallow heavy losses on discounted circulation. Phillip Crawley describes this situation as follows:

“For hotels and airlines, traditionally you sell in bulk every day (like Air Canada and hotel groups), and they lock into a certain number of thousands copies a day and they get a bulk rate. We [the Globe] do that because it’s a valuable audience and you just swallow the loss on those. But if you do that with your subscription products like the Post did, relying on bulk and discount sales to prop up your circulation, [that] is a bad proposition. ... When you’re selling papers at less than printing price on a regular basis, you’re going to lose money.”

The continued losses also played into another of Mr. Crawley’s strategies. When he discontinued sharing financial information with his staff, he effectively cut off access for the Post to the Globe’s “numbers” (by sealing off potential for gossip and file leaking). The Post’s losses, on the other hand, had to be released. This exacerbated the Post’s business image problems by painting a picture of what Mr. Crawley describes as “the loss-making National Post ... a paper that’s wallowing in red ink.” Among the business community, he says, it was this and not the quality of content that became the defining description of the new paper.

All of the respondents interviewed for this thesis mentioned the impact of the costs of the newspaper war, and especially of the demands for investment these costs placed on both papers’ owners. What this led to was a spending contest between Conrad Black and Ken Thomson, the two preeminent Canadian newspaper moguls. William Thorsell estimates that during the first years of the war the papers’ costs were “definitely in the 10s of millions of dollars per year” each. The mounting costs had the effect of turning the war into a war of attrition, with each side waiting for the other to run out of money and have to withdraw. Chris Cobb chalks this escalation of spending up to Conrad

Black underestimating Ken Thomson's commitment to the Globe and Mail. Mr. Black had originally wanted to buy the Globe and Mail, and even the purchase of the Financial Post was seen by some as a provocation for the Globe's owners to sell rather than risk a newspaper war. Mr. Cobb explains that this – and even the subsequent launch of the Post – was a calculated gamble. The Thomson family had been following a strategy of divesting their newspaper holdings, so it was a fairly safe bet that sooner or later they would let the Globe go as well. Then, with the Post's early success, the possibility of the Globe being overwhelmed and folding became more than idle talk among Post staff, says Mr. Cobb. As a response, Mr. Thomson began pumping money into the Globe and Mail. The exact amount he spent cannot be disclosed by the paper, but Mr. Cobb states that it was "certainly in excess of his ownership commitment." We cannot be certain of the motivation behind this level of investment, but Mr. Cobb offers two possible reasons. The first is that Mr. Thomson was ideologically opposed to Mr. Black's views and wished to protect the Globe on those grounds. The second is ego.

"What a person very close to him told me was that he did not want Conrad Black to own the Globe and Mail ... there was no way that Thomson was going to let Black take over the newspaper" says Mr. Cobb. "He was, by all accounts, a very nice man, but you're not the country's wealthiest person and one of the world's wealthiest individuals without an ego."

And, being richer than Mr. Black, Mr. Thomson won out. "My view is that he miscalculated the strength of Ken [Thomson]'s conviction behind the Globe and Mail," says Phillip Crawley. Mr. Cobb suggests that the entire newspaper war could be summarized as follows:

“It cost millions and millions of dollars. It cost the Star millions, the Post millions, and the Globe millions. Really it was a fight to see who would run out of money first, and then [Conrad] Black did. If you wanted to, you could bring it down to simple terms like that, because in the end it was all about money.”

This led to the aforementioned “big blink”. Phillip Crawley theorizes that coupled with the growing costs was disappointment on Conrad Black’s part with the Post’s inability to affect Canadian politics.

“I think he also felt the Post was going to make a political difference in Canada, there was undoubtedly a political motive in terms of providing a stronger voice of opposition to the Liberal government. ‘Unite the right’ was the big thing. That didn’t come off either, so I think he was disappointed with the lack of impact from a political point of view,” he says.

Regardless of whether or not it was caused by one reason or a combination of them, in 2001 Conrad Black decided to sell the National Post to the Asper family, owners of the Canwest media company. The Aspers, receiving a money-losing newspaper, made financially driven changes – they reduced the size of the paper, cut back entire sections, and reduced circulation (Cobb, 2004). This, in turn, led to a decrease in readership. “This was the turning point,” says William Thorsell, “Suddenly the advertisers who were torn on where to put their money stayed with or returned to the Globe. ... It was clear that the war was over.”

This is not to say that the changes undertaken by the Globe’s leaders can be ignored – because they were in fact major changes which had a considerable effect on the organization – but rather that they were part of a greater power struggle between media

barons. Many of the change efforts undertaken by the Globe and Mail, it can be assumed, were funded not only based on their validity, but on Ken Thomson's commitment to defending the Globe and Mail from Conrad Black and his vast fortune and distribution network. Finally, it must be noted that both the interviews and *Ego and Ink* seem to suggest that it was as much mistakes made by the Post as fortuitous decisions made by the Globe which led to the ultimate outcome of the war.

5.3.1. The Globe and Mail, circulation, and advertisers

As a monopoly in its niche as national paper, the Globe and Mail enjoyed the benefit of not having to compete for advertisers. The companies who advertised with the Globe had only one option of paper to reach a national audience and the key readers of the Report on Business. This fostered what Chris Cobb describes in *Ego and Ink* and what Misters Cobb, Crawley, and Garner describe in their interviews as a complacent and at times unprofessional attitude at the Globe toward its advertisers. Misters Garner and Crawley note in their interviews - and Mr. Cobb in both his interview and in *Ego and Ink* - that the advertising sales force merely acted as caretakers for the advertising accounts and did not actively pursue new ones. Also, there were instances of ads being run on the wrong dates or the wrong pages. But advertisers had no alternative to the Globe. The launch of the Post was by no means welcomed with open arms, but it did prompt, as noted by Mr. Garner and Mr. Cobb in their interviews, some advertisers to risk investing some of their money – their “advertising pie” – in the new paper.

As the newcomer into the market, the National Post's strategy was to build a circulation that would rival the Globe's, and do it as soon as possible (Cobb 2004). As

Chris Cobb explains it, “they did that by giving papers away either for nothing or for cut prices. That started sort of the spending war.” This presented the Globe and Mail with two options: to stay the course and keep circulation relatively low or to compete for circulation – and by extension advertisers’ attention – with the Post.

“The Post started with huge distribution power and it was able to get a large number of papers out there, throughout the country, for free or at a very low cost. ... Ultimately we decided, correctly I believe, that the Globe needs to be seen as the country’s biggest paper. This was punishing in the short term, but we knew that the war would be judged by circulation figures,” explains William Thorsell.

This strategy would cost the Globe a vast amount of money and would alter its strategy both in terms of distribution and content. For instance, newspaper boxes, which had been on the verge of extinction, were brought back.

“We also spent a lot of money putting boxes back in the street to fight the Post for presence, met the Post in building dealer networks. In that Garner and his people did what I would have done. But then Garner and Crawley spent money on discounting, fighting for circulation, which is wrong: you should fight for leadership in readership,” says Roger Parkinson.

He also criticizes the British leaders’ approach to target audience selection by saying that “[Garner and the others] went for circulation and readership wherever they could get it, and so they changed the paper’s focus and its target audience.” Phillip Crawley disagrees, stating that he spent money on quality. Stuart Garner supports this claim and justifies the expenditures made as follows: “I knew Black and Radler well enough to know that they weren’t going to put \$200-million Canadian or whatever it was

going to cost them out there without a fight. And the problem with the Globe was that during this period during which they were complacent and underperforming.” The investments he made, Mr. Crawley says, were needed to turn around the Globe and Mail internally and externally. “That of course would have a bearing on the margins. You’ve got to spend money doing things you might otherwise not do, which is going to depress the financial performance,” he explains.


The investment – buoyed by competition for advertising – did have an effect internally on the Globe’s advertising department and its relationship with customers. Phillip Crawley says that he made a point of ensuring that his advertising staff would actively seek new advertisers and treat all existing advertisers professionally. While readers are a gateway to advertisers, both are the newspaper’s customers, and both must be treated with care and focused upon in a newspaper’s strategies if a newspaper is to follow the prescription of adhering to a strategy of customer orientation.

5.4. Did the Globe win the war?

While it is not the direct purpose of this thesis to answer the question of whether or not the Globe and Mail won the newspaper war, this is, as mentioned earlier, an important factor in the interviewees’ evaluation of the success of the change process as a whole. A brief discussion regarding this question is necessary within the context of the thesis and the analysis of the success of the Globe’s change efforts.


Declaration of victory in any competition is based on the criteria used to judge victory. So, since the National Post is still in existence and continues to operate and draw readers, it cannot be said that the Globe and Mail won a complete victory – they did not annihilate their opponent, nor did they repel it from key markets. That being said, circulation figures (Graphs 1 and 2) show that the Post’s circulation and readership dropped considerably from a position that briefly challenged the Globe and that this discrepancy is even greater today.

GRAPH 1 - TOTAL WEEKLY CIRCULATION PAID 50% OR MORE OF COVER PRICE⁶



⁶ ABC Publishers Statistics. March 2006.


GRAPH 2 - TOTAL SATURDAY CIRCULATION PAID AT 50% OR MORE⁷



Financial data for the Globe and Mail is unavailable but it is the consensus of all those interviewed that its advertising revenue, after dipping slightly at the very beginning of the newspaper war, has rebounded and surpassed previous levels. The Post, meanwhile, according to Misters Crawley and Cobb, continues to operate at a loss. It also continues, as demonstrated in Graph 3, to offer a large number of copies at a discount price to sustain circulation, while the Globe has been able to reduce its discounting while remaining the leader in readership.

⁷ ABC Publishers Statistics. March 2006.

GRAPH 3 - WEEKDAY DISCOUNT (LESS THAN 50% COVER PRICE) AND BULK CIRCULATION TREND⁸



Moreover, all of the respondents interviewed for this thesis stated that the Globe had won the war despite there being no question on the questionnaire asking if this had been the case. Granted, all except Chris Cobb were involved in fighting the war, but all are experienced newspaper experts and all deemed the war to have been a victory.

5.5. Assessing the change

The previous parts of this section were an evaluation of various parts of the changes based on secondary sources and on the responses of the interviewees. But the interviewees themselves were also asked to evaluate the change as they saw it. This section demonstrates the interviewees' ratings of the change and the rationale they gave for these evaluations.

⁸ ABC Publishers Statistics. March 2006.

Did the changes succeed?

The following table is an aggregate of the answers to Question 11 by all of the interviewees, including their numerical ratings and qualitative descriptions of the various aspects of the change and their overall rating. It is interesting to note that many of them equate winning the newspaper war with succeeding at change.

TABLE 8 - RATINGS OF SUCCESS OF THE CHANGE (OUT OF A POSSIBLE 5 POINTS)

	Organizational	Business / Financial	Editorial Content	Overall
William Thorsell	No rating	4	4	3
Roger Parkinson	No rating	No rating	No rating	No rating
Stuart Garner	4	5	4	5
Richard Addis	4	4	4	4
Phillip Crawley	3	4	5	5
Chris Cobb	4	No rating	4	3

TABLE 9 - RATINGS OF SUCCESS OF THE CHANGE WITH COMMENTS⁹

Respondent	Aspect of Change	Organizational	Business / Financial	Editorial Content	Overall
William Thorsell	Rating:	No rating	4 / 5	4 / 5	3 / 5
	Comment:	No comment because "I left too early on."	"They spent a lot of money, but they won the war."	"They have popularized the Globe and reached a broader audience."	"It's not over yet and they have gone a bit too far toward the [Post], so they need to pull back a bit."
Roger Parkinson	Rating:	No rating	No rating	No rating	No rating
	Comment:	No comment	No comment	"Richard Addis was good at running with big stories, giving them lots of room and lots of coverage."	No comment
Stuart Garner	Rating:	4 / 5	5 / 5	4 / 5	5 / 5
	Comment:	"The only reason I wouldn't give it a 5 is because I am sure we could have done some things better in some cases had we been more effective, but it's a starred 4. You could argue that it is a 5 because the Globe won."	"Given that we had to put resources into this battle which we would perhaps not have given otherwise, and it would've held down the financial performance, but I think under those circumstances that we did as well as we did."	"I'd like to think that the editorial people had intense pride in what they achieved. You can't ignore the outcome."	"Not just because it won the war, but because things were done which brought about the realization of the vision that I had in 1997. And the people just got the job done. It was an excellent outcome."

⁹ All quotes are from the interviews conducted during the field study.

Richard Addis	Rating:	4 / 5	4 / 5	4 / 5	4 / 5
	Comment:	“Basically because of the effectiveness of the changes. I’m not saying people were overjoyed or very happy about them internally, but I’m giving it a 4 because they really worked and I think people still benefit from those changes.”	No comment.	No comment.	“A very high rating. I believe the change to have been successful.”
Phillip Crawley	Rating:	3 / 5	4 / 5	5 / 5	5 / 5
	Comment:	“There’s still lots more work to do.”	“We made a very strong comeback and we planned a certain course and we’ve managed to follow it from a budget-planning point of view.”	“That’s really what I’ve been most happy with. We’ve seen the very clear, visible benefits of the money we’ve spent, the people we’ve hired. The feedback I get ... is that people are generally very much happier with the paper than previously. It’s a better paper to read, there’s lot more in it, it’s a lot more varied in its approach.”	“Well, if you go back to 1998, the fear was the National Post might overtake the Globe and Mail. ... [Now] nobody believes the National Post now can possibly threaten the Globe and Mail. And the Globe is in a better position than it was 7 years ago. ... We’ve won the war.”

Chris Cobb	Rating:	4 / 5	No rating	4 / 5	3 / 5
	Comment:	<p>“They got their act together eventually. When Addis came in, he was from the same newspaper culture Martin Newland was from. He didn’t need to copy the Post in order to compete with it. He knew what to do as a competitor without any reference to the competition.”</p>	<p>“They managed to keep the advertisers happy enough that they didn’t go flitting over to the Post, so that’s a success. Crawley went in there, and he had irritated advertisers, a lethargic advertising sales force, and this very attractive competitor came on the market, so you have to assume he did something quite dynamic with that problem in order to prevent a bleed-away from the Globe to the Post.”</p>	<p>“Night and day. The Globe and Mail, in my view, was boring, tedious to the point of being unreadable on many days, and what the Post brought to the Globe was some spark, some humour, ... willingness to take a few journalistic chances. I think, in a phrase, the National Post experience wrenched the Globe and Mail out of its own self-indulgence.”</p>	<p>“The first phase was inadequate, but an incremental improvement, the second phase was built on that, and I think together they were successful. They won the newspaper war. The thing though, is it’s complex. ... It would be wrong to say that it was 100% the Globe’s reaction that brought the Conrad Black National Post to its knees. I think that conservatively speaking they were able to resist the Post’s attack to the point where the Post ran out of resources.”</p>

5.6. Changes to Editorial Content

The change process and the newspaper war also undeniably altered the Globe and Mail's editorial content. Considering its position as the preeminent national newspaper in Canada (having established its readership and circulation advantage over the National Post after the newspaper war), the Globe and Mail is by its nature an influential source of information and opinion. So while the changes that the paper undertook were necessary and the change effort is recognized as being successful, the changes this entailed to the editorial content of the paper are not as widely praised. It is not the role of this thesis to comment either positively or negatively on the content of the paper outside its place as a factor in strategic change decisions, however it seems important to include comments made by the various respondents regarding editorial changes at the Globe and their perceived effect of the paper, its image, and its place in the Canadian political and intellectual landscape.

Roger Parkinson believes that the "news as a commodity" approach has hurt the newspaper's content. He describes the changes as follows:

"What the 'new' Globe could never have is William [Thorsell]: he was way ahead of the pack politically and ahead of trends. He was an idea guy. People at that time read the Globe to see what's new. No one reads it for that anymore. It has lost that. It misses William's idea generation and far-sightedness. I think that delineation between news, opinion, and editorial is key. What competition means in Britain is segmenting the market and pandering and targeting stories to your audience. So editors

are marketers - they are 'marketing editors'. They muck up the distinction between news, analysis, and opinion. And that's what happened to the Globe. Richard [Addis] brought that over. The argument for it is that it is interesting, people like it, but it *is* marketing. Addis at least had some 'pop' ... but the paper now [under Ed Greenspon] is dull and low-energy."

While Mr. Parkinson criticizes the marketing approach to editorial content, Phillip Crawley praises it. He argues that the targeting of a broader audience has succeeded – the breadth of the Globe's audience has changed, it reaches a wider demographic in more parts of the country ("we've pushed into the BC market in a much more aggressive manner"), and it has won over more female readers. And, in general, he argues that "it's a better paper to read, there's a lot more in it, it's a lot more varied in its approach." He opposes criticism that the paper's political stance had been altered by the changes. He notes that the Globe's politics have never been a "fixed thing" and tended to vary depending on who was editor-in-chief and what various political parties offered. As an example, he cites the Globe's support for the Liberal Party during the first half of the decade, which was followed by support for Stephen Harper's Conservatives "because the Liberals have made a total mess of it."

Stuart Garner agrees with this statement. He says that "an awful lot of thought – more so than before – went into what the positioning of the newspaper should be." This, coupled with constant research into readership, meant that the Globe knew who was reading its paper and could alter strategic decisions based on this information. He states that despite broadening its target audience, the Globe remained committed to serving its core business readers while diversifying content. "So did it change its positioning?" asks

Mr. Garner. “No, I don’t think so. I think – I hope, anyway – it became more sure about what its positioning should be.”

William Thorsell says, not negatively, that “they have popularized the Globe and reached a broader audience.” Considering that he gives the Globe’s editorial changes a 4 out of 5 rating, this means that within the context of the change, he sees this as a success, even if the editorial policies diverge quite markedly from those he followed.

Richard Addis, for his part, states that the editorial changes he instituted were intended to veer away from the previous agenda and popularize the paper without trivializing or diluting the strength of its content. “I think it became more of a liberal, arts newspaper - that was my influence. [It became] less political, more interested in culture and ideas, and probably more in tune with the liberal intelligentsia in Canada as opposed to the politics of the right.”

Chris Cobb argues that the differences between the editorial package offered by the Globe after the change (production, layout, presentation, and content) as opposed to before it is “night and day”. He says that “The Globe and Mail, in my view, was boring, tedious to the point of being unreadable on many days, and what the Post brought to the Globe was some spark, some humour, ... a willingness to take a few journalistic chances.”

6. Discussion

6.1. Overall Assessment of changes based on best practice

Having completed an analysis of the individual aspects of the changes implemented by the Globe’s two groups of leaders, it seems fitting to compare the totality

of the change to both models of “best practice” identified in the literature review.

Following this, some other key points from the literature will be applied to the whole of the change process and linked to its success. This, in turn, will lead into the next chapter which will address the holes in the literature mentioned earlier and introduce some theories about the nature of change in the media.

The model presented by Jick offers prescriptions for successful change. For the most part, the change effort at the Globe adhered to these. Both sets of leaders analyzed the organization and understood its need for change. Both groups communicated frequently, made information available (with the notable exception of Mr. Crawley’s decision to discontinue sharing sensitive financial information), and ensured that the change would benefit the organization and its customers. Short-term wins (such as the introduction of colour and gains in circulation over the Post) were celebrated and used to propagate the change objectives.

On the other hand, and this applies primarily to the members of the British Invasion, the change was sweeping (despite the fact that the Globe was a fairly change-averse organization) and did not rely on participative implementation (other than at the upper levels of the hierarchy). Also, although this was not intentional, the change did start comparatively “small and simple” under Misters Thorsell and Parkinson before it was accelerated and enlarged by the British leaders. Where the old leaders floundered when it came to creating a vision, the new leaders created a shared vision upon which all of their strategies for change were based. Through communication, this was translated into employee understanding of their roles within the change (although at times this was done in a heavy-handed manner). Both groups of change leaders sought to separate from

the past. They looked to update the paper while holding onto the key principles that made it what it was. This is exemplified by the British leaders continuing some of the strategies begun by Misters Thorsell and Parkinson (investing in key sections aimed at the core audience – namely the Report on Business for MOPE readers) but abandoning others (like reducing circulation and streamlining distribution), all the while ensuring that their actions agreed with the Globe’s ownership. The issue of editorial content arises here. Namely the fact that some consider the editorial changes to have weakened the Globe from a perspective of influence and respect while – or because of - expanding its audience.

While both groups felt a sense of urgency, it was the new batch of leaders who actively sought to communicate a sense of urgency (through words and actions) in an effort to galvanize change, although it should be mentioned that, contrary to the claims of the leaders themselves, Chris Cobb suggests they did not strive to communicate this urgency until the Post began making major gains in circulation. In terms of being able to guide and drive change, the presence of the British leaders certainly created a strong leader role at different levels of the hierarchy, although whether or not they inspired the staff – rather than forcing them to change – is debatable. Led by Stuart Garner, the British leaders did line up political sponsorship, especially among senior staff members and executives. In the way that they engaged in change, the critical mass they needed was not among the rank-and-file of the Globe, but among the executives who governed how much money would be invested in the change effort. In that sense, they succeeded. They also effectively monitored and assessed their progress. Misters Garner and Crawley also had a detailed plan of changes they thought were necessary. These were bolstered by their

frequent meetings with each other and key stakeholders and executives. They also created enabling structures with the organization (from new positions to new computer systems) that would facilitate the achievement of their change goals. The basis for this had been set by the old leaders, who had already invested in, for example, colour-capable printing presses.

Both sets of leaders were also committed to communication, communicating frequently with staff regarding the change process throughout. The old leaders did this despite the fact that they lacked a vision, but the very fact that they communicated certainly worked to offset confusion more than if they had not communicated at all. An interesting fact is that Richard Addis adhered to most of the prescriptions for effective communication, but refused to communicate in a two-way manner or use communication to involve staff in changes which he preferred to implement by himself. In this, Mr. Addis directly defies Jick's prescription that communication should be based on dialogue rather than "unilateral directive[s]". So rather than gaining broader understanding, as Jick suggests, Mr. Addis appears to have had the single-minded aim of forcing his understanding upon the Globe's newsroom. The scope of this thesis ends in 2003, so long-term changes to culture as far as it being "reinforce[d] and institutionalize[d]" cannot be examined, but Mr. Crawley, the sole remaining member of the British Invasion, notes in his interview his commitment to ongoing change.

Similarly, the change effort at the Globe for the most part adhered to the suggestions given by Kotter for avoiding problems with the implementation of change. The British leaders worked to establish a sense of urgency throughout the organization and, by openly declaring war and frankly discussing the Globe's shortcomings, they

showed the paper's staff that the status quo was more dangerous than undertaking change – and unfortunately it seems they did in such a way as to win themselves as many enemies as supporters. Stuart Garner can be credited with forming a powerful guiding coalition committed to “excellent performance through renewal.” While Mr. Crawley also strove to win broad-based support for changes, it was Mr. Garner who crafted the team of executives and leaders, and recruited the new CEO and editor-in-chief, uniting them behind his vision for the renewal of the newspaper. This in turn helped Misters Crawley and Addis develop and implement their own visions, which were congruent with his. These two men, in turn, sought to communicate their vision to staff, and both acted according to the vision. The difference is that while Mr. Crawley was heavy-handed with his changes, Mr. Addis acted as a sort of change bulldozer, pushing through any and all changes he saw fit regardless of reaction. This approach translates directly into the leaders' empowerment of staff. While Misters Garner and Crawley seem to have effectively empowered staff and removed obstacles to their implementation of change, Mr. Addis changed few systems and used his staff as tools to accomplish his own goals. But, as mentioned previously, all three leaders succeeded in accomplishing the changes they hoped for, having them “stick”, and creating a pro-change atmosphere.

While they may not have done enough of it, all the leaders throughout the change used short-term wins to strengthen the change message. There is not enough information available without further study to determine more precisely under exactly what circumstances this was done. Nor did the leaders declare victory too soon. Phillip Crawley is especially adamant on this point. While the Post has, in his opinion, lost the war, he stresses in his interview that the Globe must commit to constant change and a

culture of adaptability. As noted above, the time span of this thesis does not allow for an in-depth study of the efforts made to institutionalize changes, but the British leaders did implement many changes at the organizational and editorial level which continue to be applied.

Ed Greenspon's refusal to participate in this study makes it impossible to determine exactly to what extent he is continuing the changes implemented by his predecessor and to what extent he is pursuing his own strategies. But based on comments made by the respondents, it would seem that he has not worked to undo any of the major changes introduced by Richard Addis. Furthermore, he is known for experimenting with design and presentation, aspects of the paper that appear to have been relatively stagnant before the arrival of Mr. Addis.

Two general conclusions can be drawn regarding change leadership as well. The first is that, considering the information discussed above, it would appear that, as suggested by Pascale, vision seems to be best implemented by a new, visionary leader, "whose time has come." This is evidenced by the British Invasion's ability to make a new vision for the organization rather than attempt to redirect an already existing vision to deal with a new situation as did Misters Thorsell and Parkinson. The second is that, as evidenced by the British Invasion – and above all by Mr. Addis – successful change leaders need to be able to, as suggested by Beatty and Ulrich, make unpopular decisions. All three men made major decisions which would move the Globe in new directions and were met with resistance and morale issues, but all stuck to their proverbial guns and brought their envisioned changes to fruition. Mr. Addis especially accepted his role of making drastic editorial changes by turning a deaf ear to opposition and pushing through

his changes which, despite the fact that the manner in which they were introduced violated a number of change prescriptions from the literature, ended up sticking and complemented the overall change vision and strategy of the British Invasion.

Another general statement regarding the change which should be made is one iterated by Chris Cobb during his interview: that, in his words, “in fairness, it may have been impossible to [change] in one swoop of transformation.” In other words, that the changes made by both groups of leaders contributed to the final outcome of the changes. While, as noted above, it is unclear what type of change the Globe underwent in terms of the change being proactive or reactive and to what extent the change leaned toward either definition. And, although this is impossible to ascertain because it is impossible to consider a “complete” set of changes introduced by either group separately of that introduced by the other, it appears that it is the totality of the two sets of change that made the Globe what it is. Or, to put it differently, the change is not the direct result of the change efforts of either of the groups, but rather of a combination of both (including the advantages and drawbacks of each as described earlier in the analysis).

6.2. Changes at the Globe as a renewal process

Starting with the basic supposition, as established earlier, that the Globe and Mail in 1998 was a mature organization, albeit one already involved in a process of renewal (which was in some instances discontinued and in some cases continued after the launch of the National Post), it is important to evaluate the efforts of its leaders in terms of a renewal process as outlined by Beatty and Ulrich. The qualification of the Globe and Mail as still being a mature organization is based primarily on the fact that the changes

being implemented were not meant to break out of the paper's monopolistic paradigm, but to improve its operations within that framework. Therefore, while improvements may have been made to design and content, these did not spread to business-level development or even major production changes like the move to colour. This analysis pertains to the Globe's three British leaders – Misters Thorsell and Parkinson, who may have started some of the renewal processes, lacked a vision for the new Globe and left the organization before they could make a tangible impact of the new round of renewal activities.

The Globe's new leaders for the most part adhered to Beatty and Ulrich's "principles of renewal". Their visions and general approach to the newspaper business is based on a customer perspective of newspapers – as described earlier, the view that a newspaper is a product rather than simply a source of information. They felt that the practices and mindsets at the Globe were indeed incongruent with the demands and expectations of customers (both readers and advertisers). Having chosen a target audience, they altered the paper to appeal to said audience (more content aimed at women and young readers, as well as the introduction of more extensive sports coverage and an improved, more graphic-heavy Report on Business to appeal to the core business audience). They also sought to improve their relationship with advertisers by being - as explained by Misters Garner, Crawley, and Cobb in their interviews - more professional with ad placement and actively soliciting new clients.

They also appear to have increased the Globe's capacity for change. In large part this was based on their direct involvement in the paper's actions. The three of them were accustomed to change while the Globe was not, so they had to make sweeping changes

internally and to the paper's content immediately. That being done, they created frameworks within which change was easier, and they aligned these frameworks with the goal of customer orientation and product excellence in terms of content and production (as judged by customer appeal). According to interviews with all three, they removed the "boundaries" to these changes by removing those staff who most opposed the changes, appointing pro-change staff to key positions, and changing the editorial policies of the paper, thereby making it easier to make changes to content and production that would suit the target audience.

"Software" and "hardware" at the Globe were also significantly altered. The paper's strategy was drastically changed and embodied in its actions and changes. The structure of the Globe and Mail's organization, while it was not dramatically altered, was changed (i.e.: the introduction of a VP of production). The internal systems of the paper were changed as well, although in this instance, as will be discussed under "bureaucracy bashing" slightly later on, they were made less democratic. These changes, according to various interviews, also led to a change in the company's mindset. Whether or not full-scale culture change was achieved remains uncertain barring further research (see Section 8), but the Globe and Mail does appear to have become more of a competitive, market-driven paper, with visible improvements in its dealings with advertisers and production quality. If this is the case, it would follow that a new organizational mindset was instilled. This, in turn, would mean that individual employee behaviours were altered in such a way that they fit into the new corporate mindset.

Employee empowerment is a more contentious issue. As evidence by the above analysis, the Globe's new leaders tended to act in an authoritarian manner, often

mandating change rather than implementing it in a participative manner. On the other hand, once major changes were made and employees knew what was expected of them, they were expected to perform to new company-wide standards without having their hands held. In areas like design, for example, this naturally entails a certain level of creativity and autonomy. The “British Invasion” certainly did not create an entirely empowered culture, but perhaps doing so would have been at odds with implementing rapid change and would have hindered rather than bolstered this particular renewal initiative.

The new leaders also appear to have progressed through the stages of renewal outlined by Beatty and Ulrich. While restructuring at the Globe was not major, staff who strongly resisted the change were removed and pro-change staff were brought in and promoted, including people with competitive experience such as Misters Crawley and Addis. This step is described by the Beatty and Ulrich as requiring courage and conviction on the part of the leaders implementing it. And, in fact, since it was Mr. Crawley who pushed through most of the major initiatives, he is praised for exactly these traits by both Mr. Garner and Mr. Addis.

A very interesting aspect of this renewal process was the stage described by Beatty and Ulrich as “bureaucracy bashing”. In the case of the Globe and Mail before the era of the National Post, it was not necessarily an excess of bureaucracy that caused “unnecessary ... approvals, meetings, measures, policies, procedures, or other work activities that create backlogs” (Beatty & Ulrich, 1991). Rather it was the “democratic” operation of the newspaper that had existed previously and that was strengthened by Mr. Parkinson. In a culture of information sharing and quasi-autonomous employees trusted

to perform certain tasks with little oversight – in a monopolistic company without a customer-oriented mindset – it was difficult to push through changes because of all the steps and people whose buy-in was needed. The new leaders overcame this obstacle by trying to reduce the influence of non-senior staff and autocratically pushing through changes they believed were necessary. In other words, they eliminated unnecessary steps that slowed changes by engaging in a process of democracy bashing. Change efforts were expedited because they could bypass any steps the leaders saw as hindrances. This is exemplified by Mr. Parkinson's gripe, noted above, that many of the changes he wished to institute were slowed by the need to communicate them throughout various levels of the hierarchy. Under Mr. Garner, changes undertaken by Mr. Crawley and Mr. Addis, although they had to be approved and funded by Thomson – and later Bell Globemedia – executives, could bypass virtually all other steps and head straight into the implementation phase. This would seem to be the reason why the new leaders were able to make such sweeping changes in such a short time.

As mentioned earlier and evidenced by the interviews with the new group of leaders, organization-wide employee empowerment was not a priority. Rather, empowerment of very senior staff who would act swiftly and decisively to accomplish major changes in a short period of time was undertaken.

What they lacked in employee empowerment, the new leaders made up for in commitment to continuous improvements. They introduced new strategies and an entirely new philosophy to the Globe and Mail which would henceforth be used as a baseline for future commercial and journalistic activities. They also introduced new approaches – for better or worse – by pushing through numerous changes at the editorial and institutional

level. Moreover, Misters Garner and Crawley were committed to continuous change. Mr. Addis, on the other hand, was hired for a three-year contract, so his commitment was more to enacting major change that could be continued after his departure. Mr. Crawley especially, as proven by his comments mentioned above, sought to make the Globe an organization that was perpetually changing and adapting, a goal that was in large part accomplished through the policies he adopted.

Finally, the changes the new leaders implemented in large part contributed to the process of culture change (as mentioned earlier, it is outside the scope of this thesis to determine exactly to what extent the culture has actually changed). However, it is safe to say that mindsets within the organizations have been changed, at least in some areas, and the need for competitive action seems to have been instilled in the paper's staff, based on the author's personal experiences at the paper as well as interviews with Mr. Cobb and Mr. Garner. Basically, the Globe and Mail can no longer be considered "mature", meaning that the renewal process has been a success. It should be noted here that it is the author's belief that, with the Globe and Mail having regained a considerable lead in the newspaper war (see earlier chapters), the risk exists that complacency may again set in as the Globe establishes itself as *the* – if not the only – national paper. This does not mean that the paper will regress to a previous state, but that it may lose the drive to continue to change considering it does not currently face any major threats.

SUMMARY

The above evaluation of the outcome of the change effort at the Globe and Mail based on the best practice models established in the literature review shows that the

change efforts at the Globe and Mail were, despite obvious discrepancies, a success. This supports and is in turn supported by the evaluation of the change efforts given by the various respondents.

7. Conclusions / Contribution of the Thesis

This section addresses the earlier Critique of the Literature section by discussing the theories and conclusions this thesis contributes to the existing body of change management literature. This section also addresses the limitations of the thesis (in terms of the model and limitations encountered during the research process) and makes suggestions for further study of change management aspects of the Globe – Post war.

7.1. Change in medium-sized organization

The change management literature seems to apply just as much to a medium-sized company like the Globe and Mail as it does to the larger companies upon which it is – for the most part – based. The need for a clear vision which is communicated by a strong, visionary leader certainly applies. The literature suggests that without a vision, a company cannot move forward strategically and achieve change goals. This is clearly demonstrated in the difference between the Misters Thorsell and Parkinson's reactive response to the imminent launch of the National Post and the visionary approach of the British Invasion.

Similarly, the literature's suggestions of the need for communication in achieving successful change seem to apply to a medium-sized organization – constant, committed two-way communication seems to be important to achieving buy-in from staff. The notable exceptions in this case are Mr. Crawley's discontinuation of sharing of financial information (which can be justified as being part of his strategy of hiding sensitive information from the National Post during wartime) and Mr. Addis' inconsistent and authoritative communication with his newsroom staff (this will be addressed in the next section).

The need for strong leadership (including its component parts of spreading dissatisfaction with the status quo/creating a sense of urgency, creating and disseminating a vision, embodying change ideals, minimizing uncertainty, and committing large amounts of personal time to the change) also seems to apply just as much to a medium sized organization as it would to a large one – prepared, strong, visionary leaders do appear to be central to the success of a change initiative. The glaring discrepancy in this case is the frequent mandating down of change on the part of Misters Garner, Crawley, and Addis which seems to have helped rather than hindered changes at the Globe. This, however, will be discussed in the next section as an aspect specific to the media – and specifically newspaper – environment, and likely not representative of medium-sized organizations.

Overall, the prescriptions and guidelines for change outlined in the literature appear to be equally pertinent to medium-sized organizations as to larger ones – successful change management, it can be surmised, is based on certain fundamental practices which are equally important and effective in organizations of different sizes.

7.2. Change leadership in a newspaper environment

Almost all of the factors from the change management literature discussed above as being pertinent to medium-sized organization appear to apply equally to a newspaper. A vision, solid communication, and constant efforts to affect culture change are all key to creating sustainable change. A conclusion that can be drawn from this study, however, is that the role of leadership in change at a newspaper differs from the best practice suggested in the literature. While aspects of effective leadership like spreading dissatisfaction, creating, communicating, and embodying a vision, minimizing uncertainty, and committing large amounts of personal time to the change are as applicable to newspapers as to other organizations, the reality of a newspaper diverges drastically from the literature when it comes to mandating change and winning broad-based support from staff. This section will seek to explain why this may be the case and why, in the case of change at newspapers, autocracy may be superior to democracy, especially in times of war.

The primary reason for this discrepancy may be the nature of the product created by newspaper companies. Newspapers are created and released daily. This means that they release a new product every day – albeit with the same brand name and format – which is then evaluated and compared by consumers and advertisers to the competition. In this environment, time is of the absolute essence. All changes made need to be planned quickly and implemented into this ongoing product cycle. Unlike in other organizations when changes can be planned long in advance and launched based on product life-cycle or other schedules, newspaper have to be released every single day. Therefore, even outside newspaper wars and major change initiatives, leaders at newspapers tend to have

a considerable amount of authority regarding content and planning. Chris Cobb notes that newspapers in general are based around authoritative systems of command. In times of newspaper war and major change, the already tight deadlines on which newspapers operate are protracted. In some cases, changes need to be made instantly, and bureaucracy, democracy, and the process of seeking buy-in from staff may simply take too long. So sometimes visionary leaders (or groups of leaders when they lead with a single vision – see next section) need to act unilaterally and implement the changes they see fit, and deal accordingly with the consequences. This is not to say that leaders in newspapers should ignore the opinions and suggestions of staff altogether, but that they can supercede the participative decision-making process when timeliness is more important than consensus. If we look at a newspaper war in terms of an actual military conflict, generals confer with their more senior troops on strategic decisions, but in the heat of battle, it is their duty and responsibility to make decisive decisions and react decisively to the enemy's actions. And it is then the troops' responsibility to obey these orders, regardless of how they feel about them or whether or not they agree with them.

By extension, this means that within the newspaper context, a small group, or cadre, is able to make rapid, lasting change without necessarily having broad-based support from throughout the organization. As evidenced by the triumvirate of Mistern Garner, Crawley, and Addis, a small group sharing a common purpose can surround itself with a senior leading coalition and dramatically change an organization despite being perceived as outsiders and clashing with staff. Moreover, these changes can be lasting and effective and, overall, successful within the framework presented in the literature. So a successful change in a newspaper can be brought about – perhaps even has to brought

about – by leadership practices which are opposed to the consensus of the literature. This may be regarded as a practical case of the ends justifying the means.

Such autocratic actions fall in line with the suggestion by Beatty and Ulrich that leaders need the “courage to make difficult decisions fairly and boldly” and risk sacrificing personal popularity by placing an emphasis on action. The downside of such an approach is that it can ultimately lead to the type of environment that exists in British newspapers, where constant competition breeds virtually omnipotent editors. This, when combined with a commodity approach to the newspaper business, can hurt content as it is increasingly targeted to the tastes of a given audience. An ideal situation would be to run a newspaper on a democratic basis like Roger Parkinson attempted to do, but make it understood that in times of change, the leader will make decisions that may prove unpopular. Striking such a balance may, however, be far more difficult in practice than in theory.

7.3. Vision applied by different leaders

It appears from this study that different leaders can indeed implement the same change – or perhaps more precisely, participate in the same change - but this is contingent on them sharing a vision for that change. In this case, the three different leaders with a shared vision that made up what I refer to as the British Invasion, were able to implement a set of changes based upon a shared set of ideas. On the other hand, the Globe’s old guard lacked a vision for competition with the Post. Or, rather, their original vision was interrupted, and they were unable to formulate a new one. The three new British leaders,

on the other hand, shared a common vision and were each able to implement it successfully.

While judging the continuity of vision is impossible in this case because the new set of leaders devised a vision divergent from the one applied by their predecessors, it seems that unity of vision is key to the creation of a unified change strategy. In other words, as long as a set of leaders all buy into a single vision, they will be able to apply it individually and successfully, even if their means differ (for instance Mr. Addis' implementation of design and editorial changes).

An interesting theory which this case suggests, however, is the idea of a "vision interrupted". It seems that if a leader or leaders have a vision that they are in the process of implementing (as did Misters Thorsell and Parkinson), they will find it difficult if not impossible to craft a new vision to suit a dramatically altered competitive environment. Having a vision be interrupted and made obsolete, such as was the Globe's old strategy crafted to suit a monopolistic environment, can cause tension and make it difficult for the leaders who created it to regroup and create a new, updated vision. In such cases, it may be best for leaders "whose time has come" – as suggested by Pascale - to step forward and take over. Or, viewed from the other side, having implemented or introduced one vision, leaders whose time is up should step down rather than struggle to reformulate a vision.

7.4. Limitations

Due to the nature of the interview process, it was not possible to receive clear answers from all respondents regarding all aspects of the change. For this reason, it is not

possible to neatly compare each change leader's actions to those of the others. Moreover, certain respondents did not answer certain questions at all, leaving some aspects of the analysis impossible to complete. And, of course, there is the issue, discussed in detail earlier, of Ed Greenspon refusing to participate in the study.

I do not believe that a significant bias exists in the answers to the questions because the questions various interviewees did not answer do not overlap significantly. The only question which the majority of respondents did not answer was General question 5: "Approximately how much money was spent on trying to implement change on the Globe?" Although different reasons were given, it seems plausible that they simply do not wish to reveal sensitive information. While this data would have been useful, it does not significantly effect the evaluation of change at the Globe.

An important omission is a lack of answers to Specific questions 4 through 8 on the part of Phillip Crawley. These questions were specifically included to determine the effects the change had on the paper's approach to advertising and distribution, which have been established to be key to a newspaper's success. Although Mr. Crawley did provide me with numerical data regarding circulation and readership, it would have been preferable to have received subjective answers to these questions to support the objective data.

Moreover to the previous point, data regarding these aspects of the Globe's operations (financial data, circulation / readership figures prior to 2000, and data regarding advertising such as income, number of advertisers, internal statistics, etc.) were unavailable to the researcher when writing this thesis. Because business-level changes appear to have been an important aspect of the changes at the Globe and Mail, access to

this objective data would have been beneficial in order to evaluate the strategies behind the purportedly major “back-room” changes undertaken at the Globe and their effects on the change initiative as a whole. Furthermore, circulation and readership data for a longer period of time would have allowed for a more detailed break-down of changes in these numbers throughout the changes at the Globe (for instance before the launch of the Post, immediately afterwards, upon the start of the British Invasion’s round of changes). As it stands, the available data only covers the period post-2000 and, as such, does not accurately convey the fluctuations in both the Globe and Post’s circulation and readership and the relationship between the two, which was such a crucial aspect of the newspaper war and of change strategies at the Globe. This data would act as concrete, objective evidence of the immediate impact of the change initiatives and actions of the various leaders on the paper’s financial and sales performance.

Finally, due to the complex nature of this case, the analysis cannot simply be a case of checking off “good” or “bad” actions on a checklist of best practice. This is especially true considering the incompleteness of information regarding the case and of the responses given by certain interviewees. That being said, a wealth of information was obtained that allowed in-depth analysis of many parts of the change process and an interesting discussion of the nature and outcomes of the newspaper war itself. The aim of this note is to make clear that when discussing certain topics, this thesis leans toward qualitative description rather than forcing analysis where information is lacking to avoid proverbially trying to fit a square peg into a round hole.

7.5. Suggestions for future research

While this thesis has accomplished the goals it was set, a number of aspects of the newspaper war remain which could be analyzed from a change management perspective in order to develop a more complete picture of these fascinating years in Canadian media history.

The first such suggestions would be for an analysis similar to this one to be performed on the National Post. This would be interesting because the Post was a new organization that changed frequently and dramatically and was certainly guided by the compelling vision of overthrowing the Globe and Mail. Such a study of leadership decisions at the Post would complement this study and paint a clearer picture of the competitive chess match played between Canada's two major media empires. This could be further continued by studying the changes at the Post in the wake of its transfer of ownership to the Asper family, owners of CanWest.

The second continuation of this study would be to study the changes at the Globe and Mail from the perspective of its rank-and-file staff. This would allow for a clearer understanding of personnel morale issues, buy-in to the leaders' vision, and open up the possibility for study of aspects of change management outside the scope of this thesis, such as resistance to change. This could also expand on this thesis' content by providing even more insight into the actions taken by the Globe's various leaders. The obvious difficulties in such a study would be gaining access to the Globe's current staff and tracking the various staff members who have departed since – or because of – the changes examined in this thesis.

Finally, once the current limits on divulging information are lifted, it would be fascinating to extend this study to include the current set of leaders at the Globe and Mail. This would allow for an analysis of changes implemented by leaders in a “post-war” environment in an organization that has re-established dominance in the market after a successful, major change effort. It would also allow for further analysis of the idea of the continuity of vision between generations of leaders (most notable would be a study of the differences between Richard Addis and Ed Greenspon).

Research which was attempted but not completed on this thesis is the aforementioned lack of discussion of distribution and advertising. A sound expansion of this thesis would include seeking out this data (the answers to Specific question 4 through 8 for Phillip Crawley). This would aid in understanding more fully the role advertising and circulation (and discounting) played in the newspaper war and how it affected or was affected by the competitive environment and leadership decisions. This, in turn, could then be compared to the best practice and used to expand the conclusions of this thesis.

All of the above suggestions are feasible and would further add to the change management literature by delving deeper into a fascinating, tangible, current, and Canadian-based example of change.

Jan,

More than many, you are likely aware of Ed's hectic schedule and severely limited time to devote to requests of this nature. He would love to help, but as a policy we have developed in fairness to all, I must advise he simply can not assist you with your thesis study.

It's good to hear from you and we do, of course, wish you well in pursuing your MBA.

Sincerely,

Judith McGill
Executive Assistant to the Editor-in-chief

NOTE: Further attempts to contact Mr. Greenspon personally, through Associate Editor Neil Campbell, and through his secretary were ignored.

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