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Canada

THE CBC AND THE COLD WAR MENTALITY, 1946-1952

by

Philippe J. Baillargeon, B.A.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Institute of Canadian Studies

Carleton University

OTTAWA, Ontario

January 15, 1987

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programs. By focusing on certain expressed views while failing to report others, the reports gave the impression that the Corporation did not practice the doctrine of balanced representation which it preached.

Finally, chapter four discusses the so-called "anti-religion" controversy surrounding a series of public affairs programs aired in 1951. The incident erupted in the midst of a growing political debate over whether the government was failing to take the threat of communist subversion seriously. In the end, the controversy went beyond the issue of religion and became a centrepiece of cold war tensions in Canada.

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Abstract

This thesis examines "cold war" attacks on CBC public affairs programs from the end of World War II until 1952. The Corporation had laid the foundation for public affairs in 1939 with its policy on controversial broadcasting. Government interference during the war, however, had made it difficult for the CBC to build upon that foundation. The arrival of the cold war in 1946 seemed to threaten the development of public affairs even further. As East-West relations quickly deteriorated, attendant fears of communist subversion developed into morbid suspicion of unconventional views and beliefs. The CBC's inclusion of less orthodox opinion in its public affairs programs provoked reaction from some groups and individuals who either believed that the expression of unorthodox views served subversive ends or hoped to use the fear of subversion to silence such views.

Acknowledgements

A number of people deserve special thanks for their assistance and generosity while I wrote this thesis. Brigitte Grégoire and Victor Bradley kindly lent me their personal computer, making the horror of re-editing a thing of the past. Ross Eaman graciously took time off from his sabbatical year to supervise my work. His helpful comments on the manuscript were greatly appreciated. This study could not have been undertaken without the helpful recollections and insights of Dr. Davidson Dunton and Neil Morrison. Both made themselves freely available for interviews and provided useful comments on a number of incidents explored in this work. Finally, a special note of thanks goes to Susan Rowley for her constant encouragement and support.

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Guide to Abbreviations Used in Notes

While the first reference to each of these sources is given in complete form in the notes, the reader may wish to consult the following guide when later references are given in abbreviated form.

Bushnell	Ernest L. Bushnell Papers
CBC	Records of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
CC	Chronological Correspondence, (Neil M. Morrison Papers).
Claxton	Brooke Claxton Papers.
<u>Debates</u>	Canada, House of Commons, <u>Debates</u> .
McEnaney	Marjorie McEnaney Papers.
Morrison	Neil M. Morrison Papers.
PAC	Public Archives of Canada.
PC	Personal Correspondence, (Neil M. Morrison Papers).
<u>Proceedings</u>	Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting, <u>Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence</u> .
St. Laurent	Louis St. Laurent Papers

INTRODUCTION

The term "cold war" is generally used to describe the ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union from the end of the Second World War until the late 1950s. This conflict had domestic as well as military consequences for America, insofar as it provided the emotional context in which a number of groups and individuals were unjustly branded as communist. The climate of suspicion which gripped the United States for over a decade was perhaps America's greatest crisis in terms of her longstanding liberal values. In a headlong rush to defend democracy from an "enemy within," democratic principles sometimes fell by the wayside, and in some cases the fear of subversion developed into morbid paranoia of unorthodox ideas and beliefs.

Canada, too, seemed set for a communist witch-hunt following the defection of Soviet cipher clerk Igor Gouzenko in late 1945. Gouzenko had taken with him a number of documents which incriminated several Canadians for passing secret information to the Soviet embassy. Calls for a purge quickly followed the government's disclosure of the affair in February 1946. The leader of

the federal Social Credit, Solon Low, charged that the public service was "shot through and through with communist sympathisers and actual members of the communist party." The government, Low said, was responsible for the emergence of "vast spy rings" since there had been "little difficulty for communists and others of very doubtful loyalties to secure highly important and key positions in the government services." Low demanded that the government allow the RCMP to "take off their gloves" and that the Commons set up "a continuing watchdog committee on subversive activities" similar to the U.S. House Committee on Un-American Activities. (1)

Low was not alone in urging that strong action be taken against subversion. A number of newspapers apparently shared his concern. The Montreal Gazette, for example, called for a "thorough national house-cleaning" of disloyal individuals and ideas. Only a "persevering inquiry" could eradicate the "many roots and branches" of subversion which it said extended across the country. Similarly, the Financial Post argued that it was time for "pinks and leftists" who did "not accept the basic political ideology of the Canadian people" to be barred from the public service. (2)

Whether these calls for a purge remained relatively isolated or developed into an extensive witch-hunt was determined to a significant degree by the government's

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reaction to such demands. In the United States, the Truman administration, eager to placate and out-manoeuvre congressional opponents on the anti-communist issue, launched a loyalty-security program in late 1947 under which all federal employees were checked by loyalty boards. However, by dignifying the issue of subversion, the program merely whetted the appetite of witch-hunters and fanned the flames of McCarthyism.(3) By contrast, the Liberal government in Ottawa believed that it had nothing to gain by playing the game of anti-communist critics. While it was eager to prevent any further security breaches, it concluded that public investigations and restrictive legislation might ignite a bonfire of red-baiting on which it might burn. Soon after the Gouzenko affair, the federal government adopted a security clearance system for public employees, but made every effort to keep its operations as secret as possible. As Reg Whitaker has argued, the Canadian government's decision not to adopt American methods for investigating its employees helped to "diffuse rather than sharpen the Cold War imperative to delegitimize left-wing opinion" and minimized "the kind of politicization of security issues which led inevitably to the nightmare of McCarthyism in the United States."(4)

The response of the Truman administration was not the only factor which contributed to the more turbulent cold

war atmosphere in the United States. One factor was the U.S. Congress' considerable investigative authority which, by its indefinite nature, often deteriorated into personal or partisan unruliness. Congress has never attempted by resolution or statute to define the purpose, powers or procedures of its investigative committees. Congressional committees have, therefore, been able to wield an informal power of "prescriptive publicity," a disorderly form of governance designed to instruct and deter without legislative enactment or executive co-operation. (5)

Moreover, the American debate over communist subversion had much to do with the hostility of congressional conservatives toward the New Deal. Roosevelt's program of reform had not only challenged the conservative ideal of limited government but had been realized without traditional executive dependence on Congress. (6) Anti-New Dealers were thus eager to blur the distinction between liberals and communists and embarrass the administration by implying that subversion and social reform were one and the same. The 1948 presidential election made matters worse by failing to give a decisive mandate either for or against change. A Republican win had seemed assured and with it an end to the New Deal hegemony. Truman's narrow victory simply left congressional Republicans more determined than ever to use the sanction of "prescriptive publicity" in narrow

anti-communist terms in order to attack the administration.(7)

However, according to Canadian historian Michiel Horn, the absence of an overt witch-hunt in Canada may have led to a smug belief that this country displayed an unqualified tolerance for heterodoxy during the cold war.(8) To the extent that this is true, such a belief is probably both a cause and a consequence of the lack of scholarly literature on Canada's domestic cold war experience. To be sure, certain facets of the cold war in Canada have been examined in some detail, notably the Gouzenko affair, the development of an internal security system, the labour movement's purge of communist unions, and the plight of Canadian communists during the postwar dénouement.(9) Nevertheless, the question remains unanswered as to whether a cold war "mentality" developed in Canada through which a broad range of ideas were labelled as subversive or dangerous. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to help redress this situation by examining one area in which the expression of opinion was of particular importance. Specifically, it looks at the CBC's response to "cold war" attacks on its English-language public affairs programs during the early postwar period.

CBC public affairs programming was particularly susceptible to charges that undesirable views were being

aired or featured disproportionately. The CBC was committed to offering Canadians an opportunity to hear discussion on various public issues both national and international in scope. By presenting a wide variety of ideas and opinions in its public affairs programs, the Corporation hoped to create a more informed citizenry which was better able to make responsible decisions and intelligent choices. The inclusion of less orthodox viewpoints, however, made some Canadians uncomfortable with this open market approach to public discussion.

A leading Canadian daily, for example, described one CBC commentator's criticism of Winston Churchill as "pro-Soviet," equal in fury only to attacks made by Pravda and Izvestia. A secret "monitoring report" circulated among Canadian businessmen cited another commentator's critical views of European colonialism as proof of the "communist propaganda" carried by the CBC. A Social Credit Member of Parliament argued that a public affairs series on psychiatry was "softening up" the minds of Canadians so as to ready them "for the acceptance of what the communist policy holds forth," while the leader of the Opposition described the same series as "mental poison" which provided the "means by which [our] culture and . . . system can be undermined."

The operating principle of the CBC Talks and Public Affairs department was balanced representation of opinion.

Views which represented different ideological perspectives, as well as traditional and unconventional thought, were presented on its programs in such a manner that an overall balance was struck. In some cases, this was achieved within a program itself, as in the case of a forum or round table discussion. In others, balance was sought over the course of several weeks. This occurred either within a continuing series, such as a regular commentary, or between series themselves.

Inevitably, cold war attacks on public affairs programs came to focus on the theme of balance. In some cases, the principle was criticized as a ruse which allowed dangerous beliefs to pollute the airwaves and poison people's minds. In other cases, the doctrine of balance was not attacked as much as the CBC's alleged failure to implement it. In this regard, critics argued that the CBC was predominantly leftist in its choice of subjects and speakers and that it constantly ignored other ideological perspectives.

Although controversy over CBC public affairs programs has been the subject of discussion, (10) the period in question has been largely ignored. (11) This is unfortunate insofar as the cold war came at a critical period in the life of CBC public affairs. The Corporation did not introduce public affairs programming until the second half of World War II and was still stinging from

several incidents of government interference. The way in which the CBC responded to cold war pressures was thus of critical importance to the future development of public affairs broadcasting.

The CBC's response was especially significant given the contribution of its public affairs programming to national debate at the time. Until the creation of the CBC in 1936, major communications outlets in Canada were privately owned and reflected little but mainstream thought. The CBC's willingness to allow the expression of less orthodox ideas in talks, commentaries, and forums challenged traditional limits to public discourse in Canada. Cold war fears threatened to reverse this development by producing conformity of thought, prompting the association of unorthodoxy and dissent with disloyalty, and allowing the spectre of subversion to marginalize certain ideas.

To understand the impact of the cold war mentality on CBC public affairs programming, it is necessary to recall its troubled beginnings. Chapter one examines the origins of CBC public affairs programming during the wartime period. In 1939 the Corporation established a policy on controversial broadcasting which was intended to serve as an impetus and guide for public affairs programming. Government interference, however, effectively subverted initiatives in this area of broadcasting until the later

years of the war and remained a problem until the cessation of hostilities. Wartime efforts by Talks officials to secure public affairs programs thus amounted to a struggle for adherence to the CBC's established policy. In their view, the war to defend democracy abroad entailed a responsibility to practice its principles at home. It was thought that by providing programs which dealt effectively with public issues and presented a variety of viewpoints, radio could become both an example and an instrument of democracy.

Chapter two examines the growing debate over CBC commentaries in the press and in Parliament shortly after the Gouzenko affair. Some Canadians believed that the CBC had been in the forefront of a campaign of "Soviet-worship" since 1941. The Gouzenko affair and the breakup of the wartime alliance gave critics an opportunity to paint many of the CBC's past and present initiatives in shades of red. Critics did not simply disagree with the views of certain "leftist" commentators but demanded that they be barred from the air altogether.

Chapter three deals with the onslaught of monitoring reports and newsletters which sought to prove that the CBC was a vehicle of subversive propaganda. The "findings" of such reports were almost invariably inaccurate or out of context. Moreover, they relied on the concept of balance to draw a distorted picture of CBC public affairs

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programs. By focusing on certain expressed views while failing to report others, the reports gave the impression that the Corporation did not practice the doctrine of balanced representation which it preached.

Finally, chapter four discusses the so-called "anti-religion" controversy surrounding a series of public affairs programs aired in 1951. The incident erupted in the midst of a growing political debate over whether the government was failing to take the threat of communist subversion seriously. In the end, the controversy went beyond the issue of religion and became a centrepiece of cold war tensions in Canada.

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

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- 10 See Frank W. Peers, The Politics of Canadian Broadcasting 1920-1951 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), and Peers, The Public Eye: Television and the Politics of Canadian Broadcasting 1952-1968 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979).
- 11 A brief discussion of attacks made by so-called "monitoring reports"--a subject dealt with at some length in this thesis--can be found in Ron Faris, The Passionate Educators: Voluntary Associations and the Struggle for Control of Adult Educational Broadcasting in Canada 1919-52 (Peter Martin Associates Limited, 1975), pp. 126-30.

CHAPTER I

THE WARTIME BACKGROUND: GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE
AND THE WARTIME STRUGGLE TO ESTABLISH
CBC PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAMMING

To better understand cold war controversies surrounding CBC public affairs programs, the wartime struggle to secure such programming must first be considered. It was on the eve of World War II that the policy basis for public affairs was laid. Following a string of program controversies in the late 1930s, the Board of Governors developed a "White Paper" on political and controversial broadcasting in July 1939. It specified that the CBC would itself seek and present a variety of opinions on contentious issues and not sell network time to those wishing to broadcast personal views. This would "prevent the air from falling under the control of wealth or any other power." (1)

Yet the coming of war scuttled the White Paper's provisions only weeks after its announcement. Worried that certain issues and views could disrupt the war effort, the government overrode the Board of Governors' authority and directed CBC management to curtail

discussion on the air. Concern for the war effort, however, was not the only factor behind the suppression of open discussion. At another level, an unprecedented programming commitment which allowed less orthodox thought to be heard was also disturbing. Uneasiness with balanced representation of opinion thus existed from the time the principle was introduced.

The struggle of some Talks officials to develop public affairs programming during the war is also of significance. Their efforts to initiate forthright discussion on public issues reflected their belief that the war to defend democracy abroad meant practicing its principles at home. Diversity of opinion, in other words, could serve to contrast authoritarianism with the spirit of tolerance. Such a belief would be especially important in the post-war period when pressure mounted to curb the expression of unorthodox views.

Despite the war, Talks staff had every reason to believe that they could begin carrying out the White Paper's objectives. Press censorship by the government-appointed Censorship Committee was limited to information of military importance such as weather conditions or troop and ship movements. For instance, on September 11, one day after Canada's declaration of war on Germany, Talks Supervisor Donald Buchanan informed General Manager Gladstone Murray that the CBC would "be left with the same

freedom of discussion as will be retained by the Press." Buchanan, who had worked as Saturday Night's parliamentary correspondent before joining the CBC in 1936, insisted that "a great many subjects of purely domestic concern" existed which would "not infringe on military policy." (2) Buchanan, however, was probably also concerned with the direction in which Murray hoped to steer the CBC during the war. The government was then considering the abrogation of the Board of Governors--a step which would dismantle the White Paper's provisions. The General Manager's assistant, E. A. Pickering, suspected that Murray favoured such a move since it would release him from the Board's authority and permit him to work directly with the government on program policy. Pickering advised Murray that preserving the Board would quell fears that the government was organizing "organs of opinion" such as the CBC "into a powerful propaganda machine." His view, however, quickly won him Murray's disfavour, and the assistant promptly submitted his resignation on September 6. (3)

As it turned out, the government was able to curb discussion without abrogating the Board of Governors. The White Paper's architect, Leonard Brockington, vacated his position as Chairman in early November, leaving policy matters to less active, more conservative board members who did not question the working relationship between

Murray and the Minister of Transport, C. D. Howe.(4) General Victor Odlum, for example, assured the General Manager that he saw no subversion of authority in close government-management relations. "It is a great comfort to me," he wrote Murray, "to know that you are so close to Mr. Howe, whose judgement and courage are to be relied upon."(5) A few months later, Odlum's position had not altered. Murray reminded the Board's Finance Committee that Howe was still "very strongly opposed to any extension of controversy on the air," particularly the "discussion of war aims or peace aims by university professors or protagonists of particular controversial views."(6) Odlum replied reassuringly: "I share his [Howe's] views concerning any extension of controversy. We have enough fools in Canada without taking pains to create more."(7)

Ironically, Murray's advice in the early 1930s while public relations director for the BBC had been instrumental in securing the division between the CBC's policy and managerial functions. The Canadian Radio League had thus lobbied hard for his appointment as the CBC's first General Manager in 1936. Murray, however, was very much a manipulator whose public relations acumen served his driving ambition well. One politician described him as having "no principle other than to be successful in what he was doing."(8) While dedicated to

establishing a high quality broadcasting service, Murray was not above seeking personal political favour.

To Talks officials such as Donald Buchanan and Neil Morrison, both Murray and the Board were demonstrating insufficient confidence in the principle of free speech. Morrison, a young social activist and sociologist from McGill University's Extension Department, had first come to the CBC via the Canadian Association of Adult Education to conduct listening group research for radio. To these Talks producers, the war against fascism entailed a responsibility to embrace democratic principles at home, with radio playing an important role. By presenting a diversity of opinion through open discussion, the medium could serve as both an instrument and example of democracy. A desire therefore grew among this group to take up where the Board of Governors had left off in promoting the White Paper's objectives on controversial broadcasting. (9)

In the winter of 1939-40, proposals were made for a "Canadian Forum" and for the resumption of the "National Forum" series. (10) But Murray, ever ready to anticipate government requests to curtail discussion, quickly rejected the proposals. Regarding "National Forum," for instance, the General Manager cited "obvious official reluctance" at reinstating such a series which, in any event, did not "really represent [a] vital need" at the

time.(11) Undaunted, Buchanan submitted a plan in March for forum discussions on "War and Peace Aims." (12) This time Murray put the matter before the Board, but informed its members that the government's unofficial policy against free discussion could not be ignored.(13) Murray simply wanted the Board to rubber stamp his intended course of action. In a letter to Odum dated March 19, 1940, Murray explained why he had even bothered to seek the Board's approval:

Recently there has been a resurgence of a whispering campaign suggesting that Mr. Howe and I have exceeded authority by curtailing discussion of war and peace aims and of issues of Canada's external relations generally. The people who feel this way are the isolationists--Adult Educationists, W.E.A. [Workers Educational Association], Institute of International Affairs, League of Nations Society, etc. Recognizing the growth of the movement I decided it was imperative to have the whole matter threshed out by the Board so that both the Minister and I will know where we stand in the matter. I hope personally that the Board approves what is now being done and rejects the anti-war condition in this respect. Once we revert to open controversy we shall have advocacy of neutrality even now; on the lowest terms we shall have talk discouraging to morale.(14)

By September 1940, Murray's meddling had resulted in almost complete inaction by the CBC in public affairs. BBC rebroadcasts dominated the airwaves for 4 1/2 hours each week. Sporadic one-man "pep" talks by Canadian personalities, designed to be inspirational rather than probing, were arranged by Murray over the protests of program supervisors or without consulting them.(15) In some cases, Murray's eagerness to satisfy Howe actually

led to problems he sought to avoid. In May 1940, with the aid of an outside advisor, the General Manager unilaterally prepared the series "Over the Top," which featured anonymous guests speaking about the threat of espionage and fifth column activities. Two programs in particular contained expressions of fear regarding the menace of the foreign born in Canada. The government, which had only recently declared that such fear was unfounded, promptly ordered an end to the programs.(16) Ironically, this occurred at the same time that Murray forced Buchanan to cancel most of the programs in the series "Aspects of War," where leaders of non-English racial groups in Canada spoke on the subject of war participation.(17)

Eventually, Murray approved a series on citizenship-- "Citizens All"--to alleviate growing pressure for discussion programs. Problems soon arose, however, because of his demand for personal approval of subjects and speakers. Murray was especially concerned about CCF representatives appearing on the series.(18) For one broadcast, he refused to allow the participation of either the federal CCF leader, M. J. Coldwell, or the party's national secretary, David Lewis.(19) As Buchanan informed Talks producer Neil Morrison, it was not the first time the General Manager had barred CCF representatives from the air.(20) To make matters worse, an OPP officer

visited the Talks Department following the opening broadcast. The officer referred to reports that the series was "disloyal" and "instead of furthering democracy was really against democracy." (21) Murray took the occasion to argue how risky open discussion was and to remind programmers to think twice before demanding a more open approach. "It is only with the greatest difficulty," he warned Buchanan, "that I have secured permission to venture even so far as we are going, and I think excellent judgement is being shown in restraint." (22)

Buchanan was not impressed by Murray's supposed magnanimity and resigned soon after the Coldwell-Lewis incident. In his letter of resignation, he blamed Murray's "illiberal attitude towards broadcasting" for producing restrictions that exceeded "any reasonable limitations that could have been justified by war conditions." "Mere caprice" ruled the Programme department, he argued, destroying the "originality of expression" and the "free and balanced discussion of social, political and economic questions of national interest" which the White Paper had meant to foster. (23)

Inevitably, the "Citizens All" series did little to satisfy critics of the non-controversy policy. John Baldwin, national secretary of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, complained that speakers on "Citizens All" had been "afraid to express extreme,

clear disagreement over the air or to argue vigorously." He was particularly incensed that Murray had vetoed "completely harmless subjects" such as wartime finance and inflation or the significance of the Lend-Lease Bill to Canada.(24) Arthur Phelps, then a professor at the University of Manitoba, also criticized the series in a letter to Neil Morrison:

So many of such broadcasts tend to be mere shadow boxing. I don't think we Canadians have quite learned yet to differ freely, fully and emphatically on the public air. We are really afraid of free opinion. The CBC in my opinion could do no greater service to the National health of the effort against fascism than to "take risks" in opening discussions wide to serious and honest men.(25)

Morrison later told Phelps that he had been "saying very much the same thing, over and over again," but "with not a great deal of effect."(26) In his view, much was at stake if the CBC continued its present course. "Without the freedom to discuss and debate," he wrote Phelps, "democracy rapidly perishes." He added that "unless we encourage more thought and discussion, we are heading for serious trouble. The CBC undoubtedly has a leading role to play in this respect, if it will do so without fear or favour."(27) So firmly did Morrison agree with Phelps that he forwarded a copy of the professor's comments to Murray, adding that they were of "considerable importance."(28) A few months later, he again wrote to Murray, this time warning of the danger of emphasizing

"official" information which the General Manager so favoured at the expense of free discussion:

Neither workers nor farmers will listen to what they consider "hot-air" . . . They just get mad and turn off the radio when someone is making a speech which does not impress them with its realism. . . .

This seems to me to indicate the necessity to have broadcasts dealing frankly and honestly with the problems which the common people face. In other words the best propaganda for democracy is an honest attempt to face the facts and to work out adequate solutions for the problems which the great majority of the people face. . . . A recognition of facts will do more to convince people of the sincerity of their leaders and of their ability to act decisively and constructively. (29)

Although Murray grew uneasy with mounting criticisms of the non-controversy policy, he showed little willingness to relax his position. In February 1941, he asked the Director General of Programmes, Ernest L. Bushnell, to formulate a "possible basis" for introducing a degree of debate while preserving the general intent of existing restrictions. (30) Bushnell realized that the General Manager could not have his proverbial cake and eat it too. Discussion of subjects "of vital national interest" would still not be permitted, he predicted, leaving only topics "of little or no consequence in light of the present day situation." Bushnell concluded that the CBC would do better not to have forums at all than to have to refuse topics for discussion. (31)

As the year progressed, Murray and the Board remained resolute in their opposition to public affairs

programming. In June, Clifford Sifton, writing on behalf of the League of Nations Society, proposed the establishment of a "Canadian People's Forum" to the Board of Governors. A special committee of business, labour, educational and religious leaders would select a subject and speaker for each broadcast. Murray, however, advised the Board to reject the plan. He argued that the CBC would have little control over what was said but would still be held liable, and that the program was not really a forum but a public lecture.⁽³²⁾ The same month, the Board assured the Canadian Association of Adult Education that forums would begin on "an experimental basis."⁽³³⁾ But by year's end, it had shown no sign of living up to its pledge. In December, the CAAE felt compelled to submit its own proposal for a "People's Forum" under a special committee of voluntary association leaders, namely, Bernard Sandwell, Sir Ellsworth Flavelle, Clifford Sifton and J. M. Macdonnell. The CAAE's Director, E. A. Corbett, suggested that the committee immediately seek an appointment with the Prime Minister or his secretary, Norman Robertson, to discuss "the question of the degree of freedom allowed in public debate."⁽³⁴⁾ Needless to say, the "People's Forum" proposal was also rejected. Not until Murray's replacement nine months later by board member J. S. Thomson did public affairs programming appear on the CBC.

Thomson, who was President of the University of Saskatchewan, strongly believed in radio's "democratic" role of promoting discussion on matters of public significance. He began his one-year term by giving the go-ahead to independent commentaries such as "Weekend Review" and to forums and discussion programs such as "National Labour Forum" and "CBC Discussion Club." Thomson was especially eager to develop a program devoted entirely to domestic and international post-war issues. The result was "Of Things to Come--An Inquiry into the Post-War World," which began in the spring of 1943. The sixteen programs, which featured author Morley Callaghan as chairman, were extremely popular. The demand for transcripts was so great that they were published in book form, and a follow-up series of the same name was planned with the CAAE for the fall, this time involving the preparation of study material and organized listening groups.

Thomson clearly hoped that the series would rectify previous "sins of omission" committed by the CBC. In a foreward to the book version of the scripts, the General Manager remarked:

The series of programmes is the best refutation of a criticism often made that a publicly-owned radio system cannot be free to present all points of view on subjects concerning which there are inevitable differences of opinion. . . . No restraint was put on the C.B.C. in the selection of speakers and, in turn,

we gave them complete liberty to express their minds.
 . . . as a public demonstration of free discussion
 . . . this experiment is a notable contribution to the
 democratic way of life.(35)

The Winnipeg Free Press agreed. It noted that the broadcasts had stimulated much-needed discussion and thinking on post-war problems. The newspaper was particularly pleased with the well-balanced presentation of divergent views:

. . . an extraordinarily diverse group of Canadians was brought to the microphone . . . Planners and socialists of different brands competed with experts who ardently believe that private enterprise still holds the big key to post-war solutions. Everybody had a chance to be heard, and care was taken to make sure that provocative statements could be provocatively answered on the same broadcast.(36)

Thomson's more liberal approach, however, did not sit well with some CBC Governors and those in government who feared the CCF's growing popularity.(37) They believed the new programs gave undue currency to positions in line with CCF policies. Governor R. Rowe Holland, for instance, informed Program Director E. L. Bushnell that he was "pretty well disgusted" that round-table discussions had gained in prominence at a time "when our 'way of living' is being so seriously challenged by the socialists." His criticism of one commentator on the newly inaugurated "Weekend Review" indicated that the government was equally uneasy:

Elmore Philpott who has had a long run as a commentator here in Vancouver is too obviously the reformer and too definitely tinges all his comments

with this characteristic to make him a stabilizing and useful wartime influence in the field. I think, definitely, that the somewhat general decision of the Government to replace him should be immediately implemented and carried out. (38)

Bushnell himself had "personal knowledge" that Prime Minister King, greatly concerned with CCF gains, was the source of many government criticisms reaching the Corporation's ears. (39) Eventually, King did make his displeasure felt, if only indirectly, during the planning of the second "Of Things to Come" series. At a meeting held on June 8, 1943, between CBC officials and the General Manager of the Wartime Information Board, John Grierson, the latter agreed to seek government financial aid via the Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship for organizing radio listening groups. (40) Ten days later, Grierson agreed at a CCEC executive meeting to set the figure at \$25,000. (41) On hearing of the proposal, however, King ordered Grierson to suspend the WIB's involvement in the project. Aware, no doubt, of the CCF's emphasis on post-war policy in contrast to his own silence on the matter, King was opposed to any such effort to promote discussion on reconstruction. (42)

The incident, in fact, was only a sign "of things to come." The change in programming philosophy initiated by Thomson soon encountered problems with the appointment of assistant General Manager Augustin Frigon as acting head of the Corporation. The former chief of French network

operations in Montreal, Frigon was used to programming far more conservative in content and approach. One observer described his arrival at his new post in these terms:

He apparently had surrounded himself in the French network with a group of "yes men"--and has not quite adjusted himself to dealing with the much more aggressive group in the Toronto office. He is apparently so careful that nothing controversial should go on the air--that as a result anything that sounds democratic is suspect and if possible suppressed. [sic](43)

Programmers soon discovered that ready acceptance of government interference lay behind Frigon's trepidation. Once again "Of Things to Come" became the cause for government concern. On November 3, 1943, Neil Morrison and Morley Callaghan, the series' producer and chairman respectively, arrived in Ottawa to consult with the national political parties on potential speakers. They first contacted Brooke Claxton, the Prime Minister's parliamentary secretary, but prior commitments on his part forced them to meet with Progressive Conservative and CCF party representatives first before returning to see Claxton later that afternoon. After listening to the CBC representatives explain the series' goals and ask for assistance in obtaining government spokesmen, Claxton suddenly accused them of having rigged the program to benefit the CCF.(44) He then contacted Frigon, suggesting that he withdraw all invitations to prospective speakers and that an advisory committee be appointed to prevent the

selection of "political figures and trouble makers."

Claxton also asked that Morrison and Callaghan be fired for incompetence.(45) The following evening, E. L. Bushnell arrived from Toronto, and during a meeting between himself, Morrison, Callaghan and Claxton, a heated exchange ensued in which the latter repeated his charges of political favouritism.(46)

On November 5, Claxton wrote the Prime Minister about the incident, insisting that the government had much to fear if the series went ahead unchanged:

Study groups are being arranged in conjunction with the programme. People's interest in post-war reconstruction, whetted by publicity, together with the technique of combining broadcasting with pamphlets, listening groups, discussion clubs and so on, will develop an enormous audience.

Consequently the programme is of the utmost political importance. It will be concerned with a field which the C.C.F. has made peculiarly its own and in which the Liberals have said little. Phrases in the titles like "new hopes", "longings for a better world" and "full employment" use the jargon which the C.C.F. has succeeded in appropriating.

Claxton largely justified his charges by claiming that "able" debaters of the left were invariably matched with ineffective speakers representing other positions, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had been suggested by the Progressive Conservatives, business concerns and such groups as the Canadian Manufacturers Association and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce. Claxton was particularly incensed that labour lawyer J. L. Cohen had been invited for the opening broadcast. His

inclusion, he informed King, "would prevent any Liberal or any respectable businessman from speaking on the programme" and was an "affront and an insult to the government." Morley Callaghan was himself described as "C.C.F. in sympathy," an "accomplished performer" who "by the shading of his voice can affect the whole atmosphere of any programme." (47)

Uncertain that his communication with Frigon would effect the necessary changes, Claxton asked the minister responsible for reporting on the CBC, Minister of War Services, Maj. Gen. Laflèche, to speak with the Acting General Manager. Claxton also added indirect pressure by asking John Grierson of the WIB "to keep in touch with the situation." (48) Grierson informed Frigon that he felt the broadcasts as planned would deteriorate into "an expression of vague hopes" unrelated to present wartime needs and conditions. (49) His criticism was strangely belated in view of his long-held interest in the project, and was indeed peculiar given that inspirational platitudes about a brave, new post-war world filled his own wartime films at the National Film Board. (50)

On November 9, Frigon travelled to Toronto to instruct Bushnell and Morrison of the changes to be made. (51) There he was met by fifteen CBC department heads who had drafted a statement for the Board's consideration. The officials called for "a clear and unequivocal

reaffirmation of the policy on controversial broadcasting already laid down." They argued that they could no longer carry on their work "conscientiously and with due consideration for safeguarding the public interest, without strong and dynamic leadership from the Management and Board of Governors." Their statement concluded:

If criticism from any powerful source--as for instance, any political Party in office--is to be regarded not merely as criticism but as instruction, then the Corporation becomes the instrument of that Party and the whole original purpose and integrity of the CBC is lost. (52)

Three days later, Bushnell himself asked Frigon to reconsider the White Paper's policy on controversy. He refuted claims made by the General Manager that the programs were too political in nature to be governed by the Paper's provisions on controversy:

. . . with the best will in the world I doubt if it is possible to remove entirely from debate on such highly controversial subjects all the elements that may be considered by some as contentious and even political (using the word in its broader sense) without nullifying to a considerable degree the purpose of the programmes. From the very beginning it was intended only to be provocative and to stimulate thinking on questions of the day and not to arrive at any final conclusions. (53)

Frigon stood his ground, however. Having already gained permission from the Board to appoint the selection committee, he proceeded to rescind earlier invitations made by Morrison to prospective speakers. With the order to delay the series until the committee made its first selections, (54) the acting General Manager considered the

matter closed.

Frigon was unaware, however, that the CAAE's director, E. A. Corbett, had informed the Winnipeg Free Press of the incident. Grant Dexter, the newspaper's Ottawa correspondent, was asked to investigate the matter and obtained details from Neil Morrison. (55) On November 16, the Free Press broke the story on the affair with an article by Dexter and a strongly worded lead editorial, "Free Discussion on the CBC." (56) The following day, Laflèche confirmed that the series would be set aside pending further study by "competent" CBC officials, but insisted that the decision had been Frigon's alone, based on the acting General Manager's dissatisfaction with the program's progress. (57)

The outcome of the episode was mixed. In the end, the public furor forced Frigon and the Board of Governors to allow the series to proceed on schedule. Yet the Assistant General Manager complied with Claxton's demand for a selection committee. Moreover, the first two broadcasts were in dramatic form, a ploy which granted the selection committee enough time to invite new guests while giving the appearance that the CBC had not yielded to political pressure. (58)

In fairness to Claxton, it must be acknowledged that as a member of the Canadian Radio League during the 1930s he was a key figure in the establishment of public

broadcasting in Canada. Moreover, a year before the "Of Things to Come" incident, he had been instrumental in the Commons Radio Committee in presenting a report critical of Murray and the Board. (59) Ironically, it was Claxton's progressive position within the Liberal caucus, combined with his strong partisanship, which probably fueled his fiery intervention. Claxton was clearly frustrated by the Prime Minister's reluctance to declare a post-war policy. A radio series on the subject prior to such a declaration could prove embarrassing and politically disastrous.

Claxton wrote to King:

This whole incident points to the necessity of reorganizing the C.B.C. and of the government coming out with a strong reconstruction policy. No Liberal speaker knows what line to take today because the government has not yet declared itself. The people are not interested in anything else and the people are not complacent about the war either. This is a subject of paramount importance and we are handing it to the C.C.F. (60)

Little more than a year after the "Of Things to Come" episode, the renamed Talks and Public Affairs department again became the target of government interference. (61) In March and April 1945, Talks officials were preparing coverage of the United Nations' founding conference in San Francisco which Prime Minister King was attending. Plans included on-site commentaries to highlight developments at the conference. Frigon, now General Manager, approved all the project's plans and arrangements, including the selection of commentators and

the decision to send Neil Morrison, now head of the department, as a supervisor. On the eve of the delegation's departure, however, General Laflèche called Frigon to his office. Laflèche strongly objected to the choice of two of the four commentators, Elmore Philpott and Willson Woodside, and of Morrison, whose competence was seriously questioned. After consulting with the Board's Chairman, Howard B. Chase, Frigon immediately ordered Bushnell to prevent the trio from proceeding to San Francisco. The Program Director appealed the decision to both Frigon and Chase, but to no avail. Eventually, British Columbia regional representative Ira Dilworth was sent in place of Morrison, though Woodside, who had already received partial payment for his services, was allowed to attend. Significantly, Philpott and Woodside generally represented left- and right-wing positions respectively. (62)

Frigon justified his action by claiming that he had not been properly posted on developments. (63) Bushnell, though, reminded the General Manager of the facts as they stood. Copies of all correspondence regarding the selection of commentators had been sent to Frigon for approval. Similarly, the proposal to send Morrison had also been referred and, again, no objection had been made. Indeed, as Bushnell remarked, Frigon had written to Norman Robertson, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,

informing him specifically who the CBC would send to San Francisco. (64) The General Manager's sudden reversal of plans, in other words, could not be considered as anything but a capitulation to government pressure.

The event fast became a show-down between Frigon and Morrison over the latter's efforts to maintain and develop programs of forthright discussion. (65) Signs of tension had emerged even before the Minister's intervention. Earlier, Frigon had been concerned with a proposal to broadcast introductory programs in the days leading up to the conference. Discussing problems which the conference would deal with, he felt, was too politically charged. Morrison reasoned that political overtones were unavoidable in dealing with such matters. He wrote to the General Manager:

. . . if we are going to be under the necessity of always attempting to avoid any political implications in broadcasts about public affairs subjects . . . we would be much better advised not to deal with them at all. When we ask speakers to take part in talks series, symposia or forums, we cannot very well warn them to stay away from any political implications on the subject they are asked to deal with, unless of course we wish to set up a fairly strict policy of censorship in this regard. (66)

With Laflèche's interference, more candid views emerged. No doubt stinging from the Minister's reproach, Frigon told Bushnell that the supervisory post at San Francisco required a "more mature person" than Morrison. (67) A few weeks later, the General Manager

reflected further on Morrison in a memorandum to Bushnell:

Neil Morrison has been the subject of frequent discussions amongst Members of the Board and outside of the Corporation. . . . It seems that because of his determined attitude he has a faculty of causing trouble to the General Manager and to the Corporation. He is much more the type of a propagandist than a level-headed administrator of the Talks Department. He seems to be always acting in good faith, his good intentions can never be challenged, but nonetheless he is determined that what he thinks is what the General Manager and the Corporation should think. (68)

Morrison, on the other hand, considered Frigon's actions in the affair to be "a clear challenge . . . to the competence and reliability of the whole Programme, Division or at least key officials in it." The General Manager's judgement had been made "not on the basis of their performance of duties and their knowledge of their specialized fields, but rather on the basis of whether or not they are considered to be politically reliable from the point of view of the government or the Management." Program officials, he felt, were thus "forced into a position of being constantly afraid of the possible political implications of their acts." (69)

By year's end, though, the Talks department had reason for hope. In November 1945, the policies and public relations of the CBC were placed in the hands of its first full-time, salaried Chairman, A. Davidson Dunton. Dunton, who had replaced John Grierson as General Manager of the WIB in early 1944, was no stranger to promoting the discussion of public affairs and was more inclined to

defend the department's actions from government intrusion. Morrison considered his appointment as welcome relief. It was "a new and refreshing experience," he wrote one friend, "to talk with a Chairman who knows the problems and understand [sic] what you are driving at." (70) He felt Dunton was "doing a first-class job" and, as a result, was more confident than ever about the CBC's future. (71)

Within a few short months, however, prospects for controversial public affairs programs would again be seriously tested. A new political climate descended in the aftermath of war which threatened to choke the operating principle of the department--forthright discussion through balanced representation of views--for which the Talks staff had struggled throughout the war. Having fought the battle to secure public affairs programming, it remained to be seen how well they would fare on another front to maintain it.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

- 1 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "Statement of Policy with Respect to Controversial Broadcasting," 8 July 1939, cited in Peers, Politics of Canadian Broadcasting, p. 279.
- 2 Public Archives of Canada (PAC), Records of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (hereafter cited as CBC), Vol. 186, File 11-18-4(5) memorandum, Donald Buchanan to Gladstone Murray, 11 September 1939.
- 3 Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting 1942, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (hereafter cited as 1942 Proceedings), pp. 926-31. Includes memorandum, E. A. Pickering to Murray, 3 September 1939. Pickering's resignation was not immediately accepted and did not take effect until October 2.
- 4 Murray later admitted that he visited Howe "four or five times a week." 1942 Proceedings, p. 962. Allan Plaunt, a more liberal-minded Governor and staunch defender of the White Paper, was by then too ill to take an active role in many of the Board's functions. Peers, Politics of Canadian Broadcasting, p. 305.
- 5 CBC, Vol. 408, File 23-3(7), letter, Victor Odlum to Murray, 12 December 1939.
- 6 Ibid., memorandum, Murray to members of the Finance Committee of the CBC Board of Governors, 30 March 1940.
- 7 Ibid., letter, Odlum to Murray, 2 April 1940.
- 8 David Lewis, The Good Fight: Political Memoirs 1909-1958 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1981), p. 272.
- 9 Interview of Neil Morrison by author, Ottawa, 12 February 1986.
- 10 PAC, Neil M. Morrison Papers (hereafter cited as Morrison), Vol. 1, File Chronological Correspondence

(hereafter cited as CC) January-May 1940, memorandum, Neil Morrison to Donald Buchanan, 18 April 1940; CBC, Vol. 186, File 11-18-4(5), telegram, Murray to Buchanan, 1 December 1939.

- 11 CBC, Vol. 186, File 11-18-4(5), telegram, Murray to Buchanan, 1 December 1939.
- 12 CBC, Vol. 408, File 23-3(7), memorandum, Buchanan to Murray, 18 March 1940.
- 13 Ibid., memorandum, Murray to Board of Governors, 18 March 1940.
- 14 Ibid., letter, Murray to Victor Odlum, 19 March 1940.
- 15 1942 Proceedings, p. 1006; Morrison, Vol. 1, File CC October-December 1940, notes by Buchanan on the "Lack of Co-ordination in War Programmes," n.d. (December 1940).
- 16 Donald Buchanan, "Handling of C.B.C. is Criticized by Former Official," Montreal Standard, 14 December 1940.
- 17 1942 Proceedings, p. 1007.
- 18 CBC, Vol. 188, File 11-18-9(1), memorandum, Morrison to Peter Aylen, 6 December 1940; Morrison, Vol. 1, File CC October-December 1940, letter, Buchanan to John Baldwin, 5 December 1940.
- 19 After much wrangling with the series co-organizers, the CAAE and the CIIA, Murray agreed to allow labour lawyer Andrew Brewin to take part. Morrison, Vol. 1, File CC October-December 1940, letter, Buchanan to John Baldwin, 5 December 1940.
- 20 Ibid., letter, Buchanan to Morrison, 6 December 1940.
 A few years later, Murray would publicly allege that wartime advocates of free speech were "in the left wing of politics" and were more interested in turning radio "into a vehicle of sectional propaganda." See "Anti-War Group Plot to Use CBC is Charged by Gladstone Murray," Montreal Gazette, 15 October 1943, and 1942 Proceedings, p. 175.
 After leaving the CBC in 1943, Murray became the key figure in a vicious smear campaign against the CCF. Backed by a \$100,000 annual budget from leading Canadian business interests, Murray launched his "Responsible Enterprise" public relations firm and his Outlook newsletter. The publication's main concern

during the war was to identify the CCF with Nazi totalitarianism. After the war, the theme of "Nazification" promptly changed to identification with Soviet Communism.

In 1945 it was also revealed that Murray had been receiving reports on CCF Members of the Ontario Legislature from the Ontario Provincial Police's "anti-sabotage" branch. Murray used the reports, which attempted to link the MPPs with Communist activities, in his public relations campaign against the party. See Walter D. Young, The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF 1932-61 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), p. 204; Gerald L. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism: The CCF in Ontario (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), pp. 122-24 and 168-90; and Lewis, The Good Fight, pp. 261-87 and 310-313.

- 21 CBC, Vol. 188, File 11-18-9(1), memorandum, Hugh. W. Morrison to Murray, 19 October 1940. Ironically, the constable was probably one of fourteen wartime operatives from the same OPP "anti-sabotage" branch with whom Murray later collaborated (see note 20 above).
- 22 Ibid., memorandum, Murray to Buchanan, 25 October 1940.
- 23 Letter, Buchanan to Murray, 23 November 1940, read into 1942 Proceedings, pp. 135-138.
- 24 Morrison, Vol. 1, File CC March-April 1941, letter, John Baldwin to E. L. Bushnell, 3 April 1941; PAC, Brooke Claxton Papers (hereafter cited as Claxton), Vol. 133, File CBC(1), letter, Baldwin to J. S. Thomson, 10 April 1941.
- 25 Morrison, Vol. 1, File CC January-February 1941, letter, Arthur Phelps to Morrison, 29 January 1941.
- 26 Morrison, Vol. 11, File "Citizens All," letter, Morrison to Phelps, 10 February 1941.
- 27 Ibid., and Morrison, Vol. 1, File CC January-February 1941, letter, Morrison to Phelps, 10 February 1941.
- 28 Morrison, Vol. 1, File CC January-February 1941, memorandum, Morrison to Murray, 6 February 1941.
- 29 Morrison, Vol. 11, File "Citizens All," memorandum, Morrison to Murray, 27 July 1941.

- 30 CBC, Vol. 186, File 11-18-4(8), memorandum, Murray to Bushnell, 12 February 1941.
- 31 Ibid., memorandum, Bushnell to Murray, 25 February 1941.
- 32 CBC, Vol. 623, agenda book for the 18th Meeting of the CBC Board of Governors, 9 June 1941.
- 33 CBC, Vol. 866, File PG4-3-6-2(1), letter, Rene Morin to E. A. Corbett, 19 June 1941.
- 34 CBC, Vol. 275, File 11-42-8(1), letter, E. A. Corbett to Hugh W. Morrison, 6 December 1941.
- 35 CBC, Vol. 186, File 11-18-5(1), copy of "Foreward" by J. S. Thomson for book version of "Of Things to Come," n.d.
- 36 "Of Things to Come," Winnipeg Free Press, 15 June 1943.
- 37 The August provincial election in Ontario saw the CCF skyrocket from no seats to 34, only four short of the new Conservative government. Caplan, Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, p. 105. Moreover, a September Gallup poll placed the party ahead of the Liberals and Conservatives in national popularity. Young, Anatomy of a Party, p. 320.
- 38 PAC, Ernest L. Bushnell Papers (hereafter cited as Bushnell), Vol. 1, File CBC Issues . . . 1943, letter, R. Rowe Holland to Bushnell, 6 October 1943,
- 39 Ibid., letter, Bushnell to Holland, 12 October 1943. King considered the CCF to be a greater threat than the Conservatives. J. W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, Vol. 1, 1939-1944 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), p. 466.
- 40 Claxton, Vol. 133, File CBC(2), excerpt from report of meeting between officials of the CBC and the Wartime Information Board, 8 June 1943.
- 41 CBC, Vol. 626, "Steps in the Development of Plans for Reconstruction Education Project," brief prepared for the 32nd Meeting of the CBC Board of Governors, 22 November 1943.

- 42 Gary Evans, John Grierson and the National Film Board: The Politics of Wartime Propaganda (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), p. 101; Faris, The Passionate Educators, p. 103.

One student of the Wartime Information Board believes the incident increased the Liberal government's suspicion of "progressive" civil servants. See Willian Robert Young, "Making the Truth Graphic: The Canadian Government's Home Front Information Structure and Programme During World War II" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of British Columbia, 1978), p. 98.

- 43 Morrison, Vol. 2, File CC 1943, letter, Alex Sim to Raleigh Parkin, 21 October 1943.
- 44 Morrison interview, 12 February 1986.
- 45 Claxton, Vol. 133, File CBC(2), memoranda, "Canadian Broadcasting Corporation of 'Things to Come'[sic] Programmes," Claxton to W. L. M. King, 5 November 1943 (hereafter cited as Claxton-King memoranda).
- 46 Morrison interview, 12 February 1986.
- 47 Claxton-King memoranda.
- 48 Ibid.
- 49 Claxton, Vol. 133, File CBC(2), letter, John Grierson to A. Frigon, 6 November 1943.
- 50 See Evans, John Grierson and the National Film Board.
At the time, Grierson was being touted as the eventual choice for the post of CBC General Manager. This fact may have influenced his actions on behalf of Claxton, for he "had made it very plain" to E. L. Bushnell--who was himself vying for the post--that he wanted the position. Bushnell, Vol. 1, File CBC Issues . . . 1943, letter, Bushnell to R. Rowe Holland, 12 October 1943.
- 51 Morrison had already met Frigon in Ottawa shortly after his visit with Claxton. According to Morrison, during the meeting Frigon, thinking the Talks producer had received a deferment from military service--he had failed to enter for medical reasons--suggested not too subtly that he might find himself in the army.
Morrison interview, 12 February 1986.

- 52 Bushnell, Vol. 2, File San Francisco Conference 1945, statement submitted by some of the principal officers of the CBC, n.d. [9 November 1943] (document erroneously placed).
- 53 CBC, Vol. 626, File Working Papers of the 32nd Meeting of the CBC Board of Governors, 22 November 1943, memorandum, Bushnell to Frigon, 12 November 1943.
- 54 CBC, Vol. 186, File 11-18-5(1), memorandum, Charles Jennings to Morrison, 10 November 1943.
- 55 Morrison interview, 12 February 1986.
- 56 "The Citizens' Forum," and "Free Discussion on the CBC," Winnipeg Free Press, 16 November 1943.
- 57 Statement made by the Minister of War Services, 17 November 1943, read into Canada, House of Commons, Debates (hereafter cited as Debates), 25 February 1943, p. 901.
- 58 Ironically, all but one of the speakers originally invited by Morrison and Callaghan (J. L. Cohen) appeared during the season. Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting 1944, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (hereafter cited as 1944 Proceedings), p. 172.
- 59 Peers, Politics of Canadian Broadcasting, pp. 320-21.
- 60 Claxton-King Memoranda.
- 61 Numerous incidents of political interference also occurred in the CBC News department. In August 1944, the Minister of Justice, Louis St. Laurent, asked the CBC not to report on prison disturbances, fearing this would precipitate further disorders. That same month, Minister of War Services Lafleche asked that no report be made on the enthusiastic welcome given to the former Montreal mayor, Camillien Houde, upon his return from internment. Houde had advised Montrealers not to register for limited conscription under the National Resources Mobilization Act. Bushnell, Vol. 2, File Correspondence and Memoranda relating to Programming 1944, letter, D. C. McArthur to Bushnell, 24 September 1944, and memorandum, McArthur to Bushnell, 21 August 1944.

- 62 Morrison, Vol. 2, File CC 1945, letter, Morrison to McArthur, 21 April 1945; Morrison, Vol. 10, File Special Programme Coverage of San Francisco Assembly 1945, memorandum, Frigon to Bushnell, 19 April 1945, and telegram, Frigon to Bushnell, 20 April 1945.
- 63 Bushnell, Vol. 2, File San Francisco Conference 1945, memorandum, Frigon to Bushnell, 20 April 1945.
- 64 Ibid., memorandum, Bushnell to Frigon, 28 April 1945. The file also contains copies of correspondence sent to Frigon regarding the selection of commentators, and a copy of Frigon's letter to Robertson, 6 April 1945.
- 65 Both Bushnell and his assistant, Charles Jennings, had offered to resign in support of Morrison if he chose to do the same. Morrison decided against the move. Morrison interview, 12 February 1986.
- 66 CBC, Vol. 254, File 11-39-14, memorandum, Morrison to Charles Jennings, 6 April 1945.
- 67 Bushnell, Vol. 2, File San Francisco Conference 1945, memorandum, Frigon to Bushnell, 20 April 1945.
- 68 Ibid., memorandum, Frigon to Bushnell, 7 May 1945.
- 69 Morrison, Vol. 10, File Special Programme Coverage of San Francisco Assembly 1945, memorandum, Morrison to Bushnell, 23 April 1945.
- 70 Morrison, Vol. 1, File Personal Correspondence (hereafter cited as PC) 1943-45, letter, Morrison to H. Gordon Skilling, 18 September 1945.
- 71 Morrison, Vol. 1, File PC 1946, letter, Morrison to R. T. McKenzie, 16 January 1946. Morrison admits that he tended to confer directly with Dunton on public affairs after the latter's appointment as Chairman, an association somewhat incorrect administratively since it by-passed the General Manager and the programming director. Interview of Neil Morrison by author, 29 May 1986.

CHAPTER II

FROM HOT WAR TO COLD WAR:

CBC COMMENTARIES AND THE SPECTRE OF SUBVERSION

In addition to government interference, public criticism, directed mainly at liberal and left-leaning commentators, also emerged with the introduction of public affairs programming in late 1942. Talks officials, though, were generally more successful in protecting their programming from this type of pressure. Such complaints were less threatening or immediate than ministers' rebukes, and did not compel the wary Frigon to redress "problems" with the same sense of urgency. Nevertheless, until Davidson Dunton's appointment as Chairman in November 1945, Frigon's incursions on behalf of critics remained a fixture in the department's operations. In February 1944, owing especially to complaints about Elmore Philpott, Frigon called for broader censorship of speakers' scripts above and beyond military screening. Morrison rejected this move, arguing that it implied that speakers' opinions were really those of the Corporation. Widespread suspicion already existed, he told B.C. regional representative Ira Dilworth, that the CBC

tailored commentators' remarks to suit "Government or business circles" rather than provide a true forum of varying opinions. "Once a suspicion of this kind becomes a conviction," he warned, "then the effectiveness of radio in all fields of information, education and morale is seriously limited." The CBC had to resist the reprimands of groups opposed to certain views, or else "accept the authoritarian philosophy of life, at least so far as radio in Canada is concerned." (1)

Another incident occurred a year later when a regular CBC commentator, Saturday Night's Willson Woodside, wrote an article in the magazine criticizing the CBC's use of George Ferguson and Elmore Philpott as commentators. Prompted by a January commentary by Philpott critical of British support for the re-invested Greek monarchy, Woodside wrote that both men sought "to arouse in Canadians suspicion of the good faith and statesmanship of the British Government and the man of unconquerable soul who heads it [Winston Churchill]." Their "malignant" attitude towards Britain, Woodside asserted, contrasted with their "reverence for the political wisdom of Russians and the exalted idealism of Americans." The article, left unsigned, and which only referred to Ferguson and Philpott indirectly as Winnipeg- and Vancouver-based journalists, added these observations:

For a long while German propaganda has aimed at creating suspicion of Russia and Great Britain in the United States. But in Canada we have a worse form of propaganda seemingly home-made. It seeks under guise of friendship for Russia to rouse suspicion of Great Britain just at a time when Britain's voice in the Councils of the "Big Three" should be potential. Canadian listeners need a rest from utterances of marplots [sic] who pollute the air with sinister suspicions against the motherland. (2)

The editorial prompted General Manager Frigon to inform the Board of other complaints regarding Philpott's commentaries. The Board, in turn, instructed Frigon to "remind" Dilworth of the criticisms, though the latter seems to have done nothing to check Philpott's views. Morrison, however, seeing how sensitive Frigon and the Board were to public reprimand, admitted to Dilworth that he feared the CBC might "lose its integrity and effectiveness as an instrument of public discussion simply by default." (3) His concern prompted him to write Saturday Night and remind it that suppressing critical discussion of British foreign policy was inconsistent not only with the British tradition of free speech and open criticism, but the magazine's own tradition of permitting varying opinion in its columns. Morrison described the repercussions for Woodside himself if the editorial's prescription were adopted:

It has been the policy of the CBC to select men with different points of view and to permit reasonable latitude to individual commentators in their interpretation of events. As an instance, another CBC commentator, Mr. Willson Woodside, has at times been quite forthright in his criticism of the foreign

policy of the British government, particularly in the cases of Poland and Yugoslavia, and he has occasionally questioned the wisdom and correctness of British and Allied military strategy. The only alternatives to our present policy would be to drop such commentators from the air entirely, to impose definite policy restrictions on what they might say, or to limit the interpretations entirely to those which take a completely uncritical attitude towards the actions and policies of the British government. (4)

Saturday Night never published Morrison's rejoinder, but it did print a letter from a long-time supporter of public broadcasting, professor G. G. Sedgewick of the University of British Columbia. Sedgewick, too, found it "surprising and discouraging" that Saturday Night had strayed from its "reputation for trying to be fair to its opponents." One could disagree with Philpott and Ferguson, he argued, without demanding their removal from the airwaves; their opinions were "honest, loyal, and well-informed," and were expressed "in good faith." (5)

Woodside's comments foreshadowed what lay ahead for the CBC. As relations between the Soviet Union and the West deteriorated, many Canadians sincerely believed that stifling the expression of unorthodox views was essential to security. Others were also eager to rouse and exploit the bogey of subversion to silence opinions with which they disagreed. For these Canadians, the CBC's principle of balanced representation was a major obstacle. Moreover, it was pressure from these interests, and not ministerial interference, that would pose the main challenge to the

CBC's commitment to diversity of opinion in the cold war era. (6)

Many Canadians believed that since the Soviet Union's entry into the war, Canada had been led to the altar of "Soviet-worship." With the government's blessing, Canadian-Soviet friendship societies had emerged across the country. Adoption of Soviet communities hit hard by the war became fashionable, and in every major city, aid projects and mass rallies were organized in support of the U.S.S.R.'s war effort. (7) By the war's end, however, such admiration was thought by many to have been dangerously naïve. Reasons were sought to explain (or explain away) why Canadians had been "led astray," and attention quickly focused on the alleged role played by "state" agencies of information. As Social Credit MP Norman Jaques charged in the Commons in July 1946, the National Film Board and the CBC had "for years been the means of spreading communism" in Canada. Both institutions, he said, had merely laid the groundwork for the spy ring whose disclosure shocked Canadians in February 1946. (8)

The Gouzenko affair, as the spy case came to be known, aroused a new sense of urgency among critics of balanced representation and seemed to vindicate their position. One such critic was Watson Kirkconnell, an English professor at McMaster University and a well-known anti-communist speaker and writer. Only eight days after the

government's disclosure of the affair, the Toronto Telegram ran an article by Kirkconnell accusing the CBC Talks department of having led a "long campaign on behalf of an alien tyranny." The charges centred on the employment of a known Communist, Raymond Arthur Davies, whom, Kirkconnell claimed, had provided "daily pro-Soviet news items" on the nightly "News Roundup" commentary. "No such privileges were accorded to any non-Communist journalist," the professor complained, adding that "in the meantime non-Communist commentators of unquestionable integrity (e.g., Mr. Willson Woodside) actually had their time reduced on the air." (9)

Kirkconnell's charges were a masterpiece of misrepresentation. In late 1943, Davies, an independent journalist and member of the Labour Progressive Party--the renamed Communist party of Canada--had prepared for a trip to the Soviet Union and had suggested to the CBC that he could supply material on events in that country. The Corporation realized that developments in the Soviet Union were closely linked to overall prospects for victory over the Axis and that public interest in these developments was growing. As Davies would be the only Canadian journalist in Moscow, the CBC agreed to have him cable background material for possible use in news, talks or farm programs. However, acceptance of the material, as well as how it was used, were entirely at the CBC's

discretion. Officials were instructed not to use material that might be remotely considered propaganda, and in the end, only a limited amount of copy was accepted. In addition, the CBC made certain that it featured comments by "non-Communist" visitors to the Soviet Union who were not Canadian, and consistently presented speakers critical of the country's political philosophy and actions. (10)

Ironically, the most prolific of these had been none other than Willson Woodside, who, as "News Roundup's" nightly commentator, enjoyed a privilege accorded to no other speaker. In July 1945, though, the program's commentary format was changed to straight news reporting. As a result, Woodside was confined to less frequent appearances on other commentary programs which featured contrasting opinions. (11) Woodside's airtime had been reduced, though Kirkconnell had not explained from what previous level. The CBC's actions had actually corrected a serious problem of imbalance which had long favoured the professor's political position.

Equally fatuous was Kirkconnell's suggestion that Davies had benefited from the aid of a disloyal CBC official. (12) The charge rested on the fact that both individuals had been members of the Writers, Broadcasters, Artists and Musicians Council, an organization which Kirkconnell had frequently singled out as subversive in publications and speaking engagements during the war.

Despite the membership of such individuals as A. J. Casson and John Collingwood Reade (a director of research for the Progressive Conservative party and at one time a Chairman of the Council), Kirkconnell contended that the organization was "absolutely in Communist hands" and simply lulled "the non-Communist members into a false confidence in their blood-thirsty associates." (13)

Critics such as Kirkconnell did not stop at painting the Corporation's past actions in pink; they also attacked current commentaries on the CBC. Although balance was not achieved immediately as in a forum debate, commentaries were able to present varying opinions over the course of several weeks. Critics, though, were not content to disagree with certain views. Instead, they sought their wholesale removal from the air through the spectre of subversion.

A case in point was a talk given by Philpott on "Weekend Review" on March 10, 1946. The commentary came only days after Winston Churchill's famous "Iron Curtain" speech delivered in Fulton, Missouri at President Truman's invitation. Philpott found the address "shocking" and criticized the British statesman for being deliberately and irresponsibly provocative at a time of growing international tension. (14) Reaction to the commentary was swift. The following day, Senator Norman Patterson wrote to Dunton that Philpott's remarks had been "dangerous to

the extreme" and constituted "dangerous Communist propaganda." (15) Writing the Chairman that same day was S. Morgan-Powell, the editor of the Montreal Daily Star. "These Weekend Reviews," he told Dunton, "are accepted as Gospel for guidance by many Canadians who have not yet learned--or were never taught at their school, college or university--to think for themselves." (16) The Ottawa Journal was the commentary's loudest critic. It described Philpott as Churchill's regular "CBC assailant" who was permitted to attack the former Prime Minister "with almost equal fury" to that of "Pravda and Izvestia." The commentary, the Journal wrote, raised the question of why the CBC's facilities, "paid for by Canadian taxpayers," were "handed over to Mr. Philpott--or to anybody else--to attack Mr. Churchill, or to air his personal and clearly pro-Soviet sympathies."

The Journal anticipated that many would disagree with its observations on the basis of free speech. In its view, such arguments were simply "nonsense." "Free speech," it insisted, "does not mean, never has meant, and never will mean, that any man may have facilities provided for his speech at the expense of some other man." Regarding free speech, the Journal concluded, "there is too much muddled thinking." (17) But one reader wondered whether it was not the newspaper's thinking which was muddled:

Weren't these the same CBC network facilities which were afforded to Mr. Churchill as a private, even if prominent, citizen of Great Britain, voicing his opinions as such--opinions with which a great many people, including an overwhelming majority of his own countrymen, do not agree?

The reader contended that a great many people in Canada and the United States, including American newspaper editors "whom The Journal could not rightly dub 'Pro-Soviet,'" did not favourably regard the content, timing or occasion of Churchill's speech. "Mr. Philpott," he concluded, "had exactly the same right to criticize Mr. Churchill's speech as Mr. Churchill had to utter it." (18)

The Journal was now forced to reconsider its position. In response to the reader's letter, the newspaper took it upon itself to define what Canadians did and did not want to hear:

Everybody, or most everybody, wants to listen to Mr. Churchill. So when the CBC gives us Mr. Churchill, the CBC does appropriate business and good business. But our idea is that nobody, or hardly anybody, wants to listen to Mr. Philpott. So, in our opinion, the CBC was making both a business mistake and a public mistake in selling time to Mr. Philpott. (19)

Saturday Night, however, with B. K. Sandwell at the editorial helm, recognized what the Journal's real grievance was and defended the CBC for its actions:

[Mr. Philpott's views] are quite tenable . . . Indeed they have been expressed by a good many people in many parts of the British Commonwealth. It is entirely possible to differ from them, but that is another thing from saying that they should not be uttered on the C.B.C., which is what the Ottawa Journal has been saying, very angrily. . . .

. . . To us it seems desirable that quite a wide range of opinions . . . should go on the Canadian air on a nation-wide scale, whether the Journal agrees with all of them or not; and if Mr. Philpott has a substantial following, even though that following be wholly outside of the Journal office, we think it is all right for him to be put on the air by the C.B.C. (20)

A similar episode occurred on the same program on March 31 when Philpott drew parallels between Soviet delays in retreating from Iran and British and French tardiness in removing their troops from Syria and Lebanon. "The truth is," Philpott asserted, "that it is not just Russia that is stubbornly hanging on to the key strategic points. They are all doing it--that is France and Britain, as well as the United States." (21) Having earlier featured the Kirkconnell article, the Toronto Telegram re-entered the fray over CBC programming with an editorial on Philpott's latest commentary. The newspaper took issue with Philpott's position, arguing there was "no excuse for anyone cognizant of the facts" to make such a comparison. But the opportunity of going beyond legitimate criticism proved too tempting; as suggested by the editorial's title--"CBC Continues its Leftist Propaganda"--it again became a question of why such views were presented at all, owing to their supposedly subversive character:

Communists, who used by stealth to slip subversive literature into letter-boxes after dark must view with some envy the operations of Canada's national radio system which with impunity introduces leftist

propaganda into the sitting-rooms, kitchens and bedrooms of homes right across Canada on a Sunday night. Whereas the Communists' nocturnal operations brought them pursuit by the police, the national radio system legally collects an annual tax of \$2.50 from the victims of its country-wide hook-up.

Disregarding legislative strictures against government interference, the Telegram demanded that the government take action "to locate the person in the CBC organization who is responsible, and to determine whether leftist influence or soft-headedness is at the bottom of permitting the national system to be used in this way." (22)

Such beliefs that the CBC was a conduit for subversive ideas were hardly dispelled by the Royal Commission report on the Gouzenko affair a few weeks later. The Commission characterized many of the agents as having first had "a burning desire to reform and improve Canadian society." Their enthusiasm had led them to Communist study groups whose curriculum included "the study of political and philosophic works" as well as "discussions on current affairs designed to further a critical attitude toward the ideas of democratic society." (23) The Commission could just as easily have been describing members of a CBC discussion program or a listeners' study group than a meeting of enemy agents in the making. While not opposed to the promotion of social reform, the Commission tended to make it a dirty word. It made no attempt to

distinguish subversion from legitimate dissent or concern for social justice. The CBC's commitment to air certain views could therefore be seen as tantamount to aiding Communism.

The Commission also emphasized that operatives had kept their membership or adherence to the Communist party secret. The implication was that all levels of Canadian society were riddled with secret subversives and that anyone was potentially a spy. No group could be assumed to be free of subversives, especially if it held unconventional beliefs or permitted their expression. As one Social Credit member remarked in the House of Commons after quoting the report on this point, "does anyone suppose in the light of that that the communists forgot all about the C.B.C.?" (24)

It was to the Commons and parliamentary radio committees that the attack on CBC commentaries now shifted, with the Social Credit party taking the lead. The party's view of communist subversion employed a rather twisted logic. The most dangerous aspect of the domestic menace, it said, was its imperceptibility. Therefore, while it found no solid evidence indicating subversive activity, this in itself was said to be a measure of the threat. This left the party in a position to "colour in" the picture it had drawn and show Canadians just where subversion lurked. The argument was extended to radio.

Because of the medium's powerful influence, it was assumed to be high on subversives' list of priorities. How communist elements succeeded in using radio to their ends was unclear, but their ability to do so undetected was the insidious aspect of their operations. Indeed, subversive propaganda was effective because most Canadians were unable to detect the subtle way in which it manipulated their minds. As Social Credit leader Solon Low explained, the CBC presented speakers "posing as commentators . . . without the people knowing who they are, what they are, and what philosophy they follow." The effect of their daily barrage, Low contended, was "to mould the thinking of the people, and direct it into channels" which were "questionable and injurious." Consequently, commentators were "able to pour out uncalculated quantities" of the "poison" of "discordant loyalties." (25)

The party was not above identifying such commentators in disguise. One member who complained about commentators without labels proceeded to designate his own. European correspondent Matthew Halton, for instance, was said to be an outright "communist." One had "only to listen to him" and "need not be very acute to realize where his sympathies are, and for whom he is speaking." The member's biggest fear, however, was that most Canadians would not reach the same conclusion:

I have heard him on more than one occasion, and there is not much doubt about it. But the general public does not realize that. They hear a commentator over the radio and they take it for granted that he is absolutely unprejudiced. . . . Naturally they take it as authentic. A great deal of propaganda has been put over in that way. (26)

The same member later charged that both Halton and Elmore Philpott had "done their level best to wean away the loyalty of the Canadian people by selling communism to them." "Those who know [Halton]," he reiterated, "will admit he is a Communist." (27)

Guilt by association was another tool used by Social Credit members. In July 1947, the party resurrected Watson Kirkconnell's earlier attempts to link Raymond Arthur Davies with the CBC's Supervisor of Educational Broadcasting, R. S. Lambert. "The Lambert-cum-Davies alliance with the C.B.C. and the writers, artists, broadcasters war council [sic]," said Social Credit MP Norman Jaques, "plus the fact that Davies is featured as Moscow correspondent of the C.B.C. only after Lambert came on the staff of the C.B.C., shows that Lambert is a communist actively working for the communist party." (28)

In another instance, an article on Philpott in the communist Canadian Tribune became the basis for smearing the commentator:

Now here is a Communist party disloyal to Canada . . . and here is an official organ of the same party . . . advertising or propagandizing this man as a radio commentator. . . . I cannot imagine this paper

boosting a radio commentator who is not loyal to the same organization that is condemned in the Commission's report. (29)

The debate in Parliament and in the Press over CBC commentaries called into question the principle of balanced representation, implying that it allowed subversive thought to be heard across Canada. The Corporation recognized the challenge, but decided not to respond directly on the grounds that this would fuel the debate further and give undue attention to its detractors' charges. Instead, it chose to reiterate the importance for democracy of presenting diverse viewpoints. During the 1946 Radio Committee, Dunton underlined his belief that the CBC had to "foster and stimulate within the limitations of broadcasting the growth of a vigorous, healthy intellectual life in Canada." In achieving this end, he said, "the importance of frank and open discussion" could not "be over-emphasized." The CBC had a responsibility to encourage "the expression of a wide variety of ideas in all fields of human endeavour reflecting the strength and diversity of Canadian thought." Criticism of the CBC's approach, Dunton continued, had to be seen in a positive light:

This approach to the planning of programs may arouse criticism from time to time, but I am inclined to think such criticism is not undesirable. The alternative approach would inevitably lead to a sterility of thought on the air, to innocuous broadcasts on a dull level of mediocrity. . . .

I suspect that if we are not constantly being stimulated by a flow of critical comment about our programs, that we are not doing our job effectively or fulfilling our responsibility in terms of the national interest. (30)

Dunton also embarked on a major speaking campaign which, by 1947, focused almost exclusively on the relationship between radio and democracy. In his addresses, the issue of balanced provision of opinion was always a key note. "In a democracy," he told one gathering, "people not only want to know facts about things in making up their minds on various questions; they also want to know other peoples' opinions." As international, national and even community affairs became more complicated, Canadians wanted "the interpretations and opinions" of those who studied these fields. Dunton stressed, however, that the CBC could entertain no opinions of its own. Its task was "not to put forward or assist the putting forward of any one particular point of view," but "to see that different groups of opinions have a fair and balanced chance of being expressed. . . . It is by the varied expression of opinions that our democracy works." (31)

How the CBC achieved this, Dunton realized, was equally relevant. He pointed out that speakers were not selected "in any arbitrary or dictatorial way by officials of the CBC who might be affected by their personal preferences or prejudices." Instead, such different

groups as Canada's political parties, the Canadian Manufacturers Association and the Chamber of Commerce, farm and labour organizations and churches, were asked for suggestions and recommendations. (32) In another address, he emphasized the importance of at least one broadcasting organization in Canada adhering to the principle of balanced presentation of opinion. There would be "great dangers," he said, if broadcasters as a whole were permitted "just to put on the air what they like, or what they think people want to hear." No group, Dunton implied, should declare itself an arbiter of what Canadians should and should not hear:

Broadcasters are only a small group of people. If they put on the air only ideas which they liked there would be a grave danger that only some ideas would go over the air and others would never be heard. That would not be freedom of expression on which our democracy rests, no matter what the ideas were. Whether ideas are good or bad is for all the people to judge, each for himself, not any one little group of individuals. (33)

The CBC's Director General of Programmes, E. L. Bushnell, also noted the connection between radio and democratic principles in his statement to the 1946 Radio Committee. Bushnell felt that recent newspaper editorials had left an erroneous impression about the CBC's program policy in public affairs. The Department's "underlying philosophy," he stressed, was

completely democratic in character. We recognize that there are conservatives as well as liberals in Canada; there are socialists and adherents of other economic

and political theories; there are British imperialists and Canadian nationalists. We recognize that the interests and points of view of business men are sometimes different from those of trade unionists or farmers. Some people believe cooperation offers the solution to all social and economic ills whereas others see the only salvation in complete preservation of free enterprise.

Bushnell argued that, in effect, the CBC recognized that there was "a variety of major points of view about social, economic and political problems . . . represented among the CBC's shareholders--the license payers." As a result, the Corporation was "constantly aware of [its] responsibility to try to give reasonably fair representation to these different interests and opinions" in commentaries, talks and discussions. "Diversity of point of view and conflict of ideas," he concluded, were "of the essence [to] the democratic way of life." (34)

Such public statements and declarations were a reassuring sign that the CBC was not about to succumb to public pressure as it had to ministerial interference during the war. Equally encouraging was that by 1948, the clamour over commentaries in the Press and in Parliament subsided considerably. The idea of balanced representation of opinion seemed to be gaining wider acceptance among Canadians.

But such appearances were deceiving. Already the CBC was facing a new challenge to its public affairs programming which proved far more difficult to combat.

True to the spirit of cold-war smear tactics, a rash of newsletters and secret "monitoring" reports began to circulate which sought to prove that the CBC consistently and deliberately put out leftist propaganda. The campaign was especially disconcerting since it effectively used the "language" of balance to suit its own ends. As the Corporation discovered, attacks on this principle had still not disappeared; they had simply taken on the trappings of a clandestine operation.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

- 1 Morrison, Vol. 6, File Policy re Broadcasting Disputes of Elmore Philpott and Percy J. Phillips, memorandum, Morrison to Ira Dilworth, 3 March 1944.
- 2 [Willson Woodside], "Smearing Britain," Saturday Night, 10 February 1945.
- 3 Morrison, Vol. 6, File Policy re Broadcasting Disputes of Elmore Philpott and Percy J. Phillips, memorandum, Dilworth to Frigon, 20 February 1945, and memorandum, Morrison to Dilworth, 2 March 1945.
- 4 Ibid., letter, Morrison to the editor of Saturday Night, 16 February 1945.
- 5 G. G. Sedgewick, "A Matter of Smearing" (letter to the editor), Saturday Night, 10 March 1945.
- 6 The term "public" pressure, though used in contrast with ministerial or governmental interference, does not discount "political" criticisms levelled publicly in Parliament or in parliamentary committees.
- 7 Gary Marcuse, "The Cold War in Canada," pp. 5-6.
On the first anniversary of the U.S.S.R.'s entry in the war, Prime Minister King himself remarked that the Red army's "forcefulness and determination" in meeting "the common enemy" had "aroused the profound admiration of the civilized world." CBC, Vol. 746, File 18-16-1-49(1), "Message from the Prime Minister of Canada to the People of the U.S.S.R.," 16 June 1942.
- 8 Debates, 17 July 1946, p. 3552.
- 9 Watson Kirkconnell, "The Crucifixion of Poland," Toronto Telegram, 23 February 1946.
- 10 CBC, Vol. 291, File 14-1-16(1), notes prepared on "Raymond Arthur Davies" for possible use in 1946 Radio Committee, n.d.; CBC, Vol. 290, File 14-1-12(9), memorandum, D. C. McArthur to Charles Jennings,

7 March 1946; and Morrison, Vol. 1, File PC n.d., 1940-42, unsigned draft memorandum by Morrison for the General Supervisor of Programmes and the Chief News Editor, n.d. (document erroneously placed).

Davies also arranged contributions for such publications as Maclean's, Saturday Night, Chatelaine, the Montreal Standard and the Toronto Star Weekly. He also supplied items to the Religious News Service, and was the Mutual network's representative in Russia at the time. CBC, Vol. 290, File 14-1-12(9), memorandum, Morrison to unidentified individual, 27 April 1946.

- 11 CBC, Vol. 290, File 14-1-12(9), memorandum, McArthur to Jennigns, 7 March 1946; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Annual Report 1945-1946 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946), p. 6.
- 12 Kirkconnell, "Crucifixion of Poland."
- 13 Watson Kirkconnell, Seven Pillars of Freedom (London: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 72. For reference to the membership of Reade and Casson, see Writers, Artists and Broadcasters War Council of Toronto, Press and Radio: Allies or Rivals?, November 1942.
 Kirkconnell's charges regarding the alleged association between Davies and Lambert were reprinted in a pamphlet by a certain J. J. Fitzgerald of Blind River, Ontario. The pamphlet and the allegations became a topic of discussion in the 1944 Commons Radio Committee. Despite Social Credit attempts to hear testimony from Fitzgerald, the committee as a whole found the charges foundless and dropped the matter entirely. 1944 Proceedings, pp. 304-11 and 459-61.
 The professor may have also resented the fact that in February 1943, the CBC, on the advice of the Department of Justice, decided at the last minute not to carry his address on "Our Communists and the New Canadians" before the Canadian Club of Toronto. Certain passages were deemed defamatory or libelous. Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting 1946, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (hereafter cited as 1946 Proceedings), p. 102; CBC, Vol. 290, File 14-1-12(9), letters, J. S. Thomson to F. P. Varcoe, 3 February and 12 February 1943, and letter, F. P. Varcoe to J. S. Thomson, 15 February 1943.
- 14 CBC, Vol. 196, File 11-18-11-35(2), transcript of commentary given by Elmore Philpott on "Weekend Review," 10 March 1946.

- 15 Ibid., letter, N. M. Patterson to A. D. Dunton,
11 March 1946.
- 16 Ibid., letter, S. Morgan-Powell to Dunton, 11 March
1946.
- 17 "Over our Radio Too!," Ottawa Journal, 12 March 1946.
- 18 "Philpott's Criticism" (letter to the editor, signed
J.E.P.), Ottawa Journal, 15 March 1946.
- 19 "The CBC," Ottawa Journal, 16 March 1946.
- 20 "Radio Opinion," Saturday Night, 30 March 1946.
- 21 CBC, Vol. 196, File 11-18-11-35(2), transcript of
commentary given by Elmore Philpott on "Weekend
Review," 31 March 1946.
- 22 "CBC Continues its Leftist Propaganda," Toronto
Telegram, 2 April 1946.
- 23 Canada, Royal Commission to Investigate the Facts
Relating to and the Circumstances Surrounding the
Communication, by Public Officials and Other Persons
in Positions of Trust, of Secret and Confidential
Information to Agents of a Foreign Power, Report
(Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946), pp. 72-73.
- 24 Debates, 30 August 1946, p. 5643.
- 25 Debates, 24 August 1946, pp. 5337-38.
- 26 Debates, 24 August 1946, p. 5346.
- 27 Debates, 12 July 1947, p. 5546.
- 28 Debates, 12 July, p. 5547.
- 29 1946 Proceedings, p. 781.
- 30 1946 Proceedings, p. 26.
- 31 CBC, Vol. 466, File 31-2(1), "Radio and Education,"
talk given by A. D. Dunton at the Annual Meeting of
the Junior League of Montreal, 30 April 1946.
- 32 Ibid., talk given by A. D. Dunton to the Canadian
Women's Press Club Luncheon, Montreal, 1 June 1946.

- 33 CBC, Vol. 467, File 31-2(2), "Radio and Democracy," talk given by A. D. Dunton to the Annual Meeting of the Radio Manufacturers Association, Niagara Falls, 30 May 1947.

It should be noted, however, that Dunton was concerned that commentators were becoming too forthright in expressing their opinions. In March 1948, he told Neil Morrison that he thought some commentators tended "to preach" their "own particular pet ideas" or "doctrines." Such "strongly opinionated broadcasting," Dunton felt, was better handled through forums where balance was achieved immediately. Morrison, on the other hand, was convinced that limiting forthright opinion to forums would "seriously restrict the area of freedom on the air and at the same time put a premium on innocuousness and sterility of thought in broadcasting." Despite his reservations, Dunton's preference remained just that. CBC, Vol. 164, File 11-2(1), memorandum, Dunton to Morrison, 16 March 1948, and memorandum, Morrison to McArthur, date unrecognizable.

- 34 1946 Proceedings, p. 77.

CHAPTER III

COVERT THREATS: NEWSLETTERS, CIRCULARS AND MONITORING REPORTS

The smear campaign to which the CBC was subjected between 1946 and 1950 was not altogether surprising considering other such attacks at the time. Since 1943, for example, the CCF had been the victim of scurrilous newsletters and pamphlets funded by Canadian business interests. The most prominent figure in the anti-CCF campaign was Gladstone Murray, whose business-funded newsletter Outlook constantly attempted to link the CCF with communism.(1) What was perhaps surprising to the CBC, however, was that it did not have to espouse unorthodox ideas to occasion similar attacks. For some Canadians, the CBC's existence as a "public" enterprise and its provision of airtime for varied opinions were a sufficient justification for instituting cold war smear tactics.

The first salvos in this anti-CBC campaign were fired by the Toronto and Montreal-based public relations firm Johnston, Everson and Charlesworth through its Letter-Review and The Printed Word newsletters. Boasting the

absence of any "Ph.D in the lot" or of "socialists in the outfit,"(2) the firm used the publications to advertise its public relations skills to prospective clients. The newsletters were generally concerned with voicing business opposition to "the threat of national wellbeing in baby bonuses, old-age pensions without means test, and similar other proposals."(3) Both the Letter-Review and The Printed Word were sent to approximately 2,000 business subscribers and, more importantly, about 1,000 newspapers,(4) mostly weeklies, which often reprinted columns as editorial supplements.

Public ownership and regulation in broadcasting were two of the "other proposals" which the firm opposed. Its initial attacks on the CBC reflected the ideological belief that broadcasting should be a private enterprise. In 1946, for example, an issue arose over the re-allocation of "clear channel" frequencies from private stations to the CBC. In its regulatory capacity, the Corporation had allowed three private stations--CFRB Toronto; CFCN Calgary; and CKY Winnipeg--to occupy the frequencies in 1941 until it could make use of them itself. The stations' licences clearly stated that the channel allocation did not confer a monopoly on their use.(5) But when the CBC announced its intention to occupy the frequencies in March 1946, CFRB and CFCN reacted as if the channel allotment represented a vested

interest. Harry Sedgwick, president of the Canadian Association of Broadcasters and CFRB's managing director, described the CBC's actions as "tantamount to confiscation of private property." (6) In support of the private stations, a Printed Word editorial warned what the frequency transfer could mean for Canadian listeners:

Already the CBC is sufficiently powerful as a propaganda agency for government and for the crowd of adolescent producers of plays and talks who use the so-called people's system to promulgate their own ideas for a better world. It is not a fact, as was said before a parliamentary committee the other day, that the points of view of all groups in the community are expressed. The cards usually are stacked against the more conservative (small C) elements. . . . for the CBC is a socialist enterprise and naturally attracts to its staff those who think that way. Yet both the election returns and the Gallup poll show that the CBC over-emphasizes the leftist point of view.

If, as is believed, this is the present situation, what can be expected when the monopoly is complete? (7)

The article signalled the intention of Johnston, Everson and Charlesworth to devote more attention to the Corporation in conjunction with private broadcasters' growing aggressiveness against CBC regulation. Unfortunately, the firm showed little interest in discussing the legitimate issues underlying the debate over public vs. private broadcasting. Instead, it chose to argue that as a "socialist" institution, the CBC was predisposed to attack private enterprise in its programming. The Corporation's regulation of private broadcasters was considered to be unjust a priori.

Just how the CBC mistreated the private stations was never explained; its alleged leftist bias was offered as explanation enough.

The firm's account of why and how public affairs programs became so leftist was intriguing. According to The Printed Word, the CBC was doing an end-run around the rules governing political party broadcasts by injecting leftist positions in non-political "educational" fare. As to how this was achieved, the newsletter pointed to the possibility of subversive infiltration. A case made in Britain regarding the BBC, it suggested, showed how "a few determined political partisans inside the organization can easily change the policy [regarding political broadcasts]":

Lord Craigavon, president of the Listeners' Association of England, in a recent letter to the Recorder has complained about the B.B.C.'s "sustained policy of presenting Russia, Communism and revolution in a sympathetic light." He cites various programmes that have been broadcast, such as a dramatic reconstruction, inaccurate in parts, of the Russian Revolution, talks on the lives of Russian revolutionists, etc., and concludes that "only the existence of a strong Communist element in the B.B.C. would make possible this constant harping on Russia and revolution." (8)

The Printed Word portrayed the CBC as the CCF's darling, arguing that this was yet another factor affecting the interests of private broadcasters. The CCF was said to be "very fond indeed of the CBC," readily defending the Corporation for "even its most outrageous

and arbitrary regulations" against private stations. "No other party," it insisted, "not even the Commies, has so large a stable of radio speakers ready and eager to go on the talks programs so generously provided by the CBC for the listening public." (9) The difference between communists and the CCF, though, was not always so distinct. In one article, The Printed Word argued that the CBC ought to bar communists from its programs. It implied, however, that such a ban would necessarily extend to the CCF since it claimed that the party "ably represented" Communist economic views and "would not be at all backward in setting them forth." (10)

The May, 1947, issue of The Printed Word contained one of its most serious attacks on CBC public affairs programs. It alleged that a Saskatchewan housewife named "Mary" had visited an Ontario Farm Forum listening group and had been invited to compare it with prairie groups. "What surprised her," the article reported, ". . . was the readiness of the groups, both east and west, to accept opinions expressed in the broadcasts and make no careful examination of them." She surmised that this fact was readily known by broadcasters, given that they seldom advanced convincing arguments to support their opinions. On one point, however, Mary seemed quite pleased with the listening groups:

"But there is one thing I like about the listening groups" Mary concluded. "That is that after the broadcast is over, we get right down to the important business of spending a social evening with the neighbors and leave the secretary to make up any report she feels like sending to the National Farm Forum headquarters.(11)

Inquiries made by Fergus Mutrie, the CBC's Supervisor of Farm Broadcasts, revealed just how solidly the story was based and how credible were its facts and quotations. When Mutrie sought "Mary's" full name and address in order "to check on the way listening groups may be operating in her district," he was informed by J. L. Charlesworth that no further information could be provided. The story had actually been given to the consultants second-hand "by a friend" on "the condition that names and places be altered." Charlesworth had forgotten Mary's real name and told Mutrie he was "not even sure that she came from Saskatchewan." (12)

In December 1946, Johnston, Everson and Charlesworth stepped up its campaign against the CBC by inaugurating a weekly "Report on Programs Monitored" which it distributed to a special mailing list. The Report, however, was no doubt launched for reasons other than simply promoting the interests of private broadcasters. The firm recognized that the CBC consistently tackled public issues and provided opportunities for the expression of opinions that challenged the status quo. In 1943, for instance, the Letter-Review had remarked that the "Of Things to Come"

series had been developed "to incense business men, both participants and listeners, and to suggest to ignorant listeners that the world's troubles were because of business planning or stupidity." In this instance, government interference had been justified in order to deal with the "Pinkness" of this "Socialist institution." (13) Undoubtedly, Johnston, Everson and Charlesworth perceived the situation as having grown much worse since 1943. If the firm's stated purpose was to tell business' "story," (14) a publication devoted entirely to uncovering leftist propaganda in public affairs programs was necessary.

Most of the Report's "findings" were clearly false or misleading. For example, it reported that a "Farm Forum" broadcast in February 1947 on "What Makes Prices?" had not included a speaker to support the free market principle. In fact, this position had been represented by an economics professor from the University of Alberta who had been suggested to the CBC by the Winnipeg Grain Exchange. (15) In another case, remarks made in a "Capital Report" commentary were lifted from the talk's full context in order to distort their meaning. The monitor's description of the talk in question is as follows:

From Ottawa, Robert McKeown, of the Montreal Standard, speculated on the course of events in the next Parliamentary session. He felt that the hottest

debate would be in connection with housing, and expressed the personal opinion that subsidized housing was the only answer.

McKeown had actually said that many issues had to be settled in the coming session, such as immigration, ~~the~~ future of government controls, the question of a bill of rights and Canada's foreign relations. The commentator had then mentioned the issue of housing, about which he had this to say:

I think a lot of good can come of talking plainly about housing. The fact is that the homes now being built are far beyond the means of those who need them most. . . . that is, for the people who earn one hundred and fifty dollars a month or less. Yet nothing is being done about subsidized housing, and this is the only means that has ever been successful in providing housing for low income families. (16)

Nowhere did McKeown suggest that subsidized housing was a universal panacea, only that it best suited the housing needs of low-income earners who most desperately needed new homes.

Direct quotations used by the Report to add weight to its arguments ~~were~~ almost invariably inaccurate and deliberately misleading. From the myriad of erroneous quotations documented by the CBC, a few examples suffice to illustrate how the report crafted comments to draw a distorted picture of what was said. For example, the Report had this to say with regard to a "Midweek Review" program in February, 1947:

Speaking from Paris, Glen Shortliffe discussed the French plan for control of the Ruhr by an Allied commission. He described the German industrialists as democracy's greatest enemy, which is fair enough, but then went on to add, "as they are in any country", which is far too sweeping a statement for any commentator to make.

Shortliffe's actual words were:

. . . to keep this war potential out of the hands of the German industrialists who have traditionally been democracy's worst enemy, not only in Germany but in the rest of Europe as well. (17)

Another case which did not involve a public affairs program illustrated the same technique. At the war's end, the commentary program "News Roundup" was changed to a news digest of daily events. Emphasis was no longer placed on personal analysis or interpretation but rather on objective reporting. The Report claimed, however, that one speaker on the program had injected personal opinions while speaking of the effects of the British power crisis on Britain's press:

Again dealing with the power crisis, Andrew Cowan remarked that some of the British weekly papers, notably "The New Statesman", had suspended two issues. "This," he remarked, "is a serious loss at a time when enlightened political comment is so vital."

— This is, of course, not propaganda to anyone who does not know that "The New Statesman" is a socialist journal, but it does indicate which way Cowan's sympathies lie.

In reality, Cowan had mentioned not only The New Statesman but also The Economist. (18) The latter, generally recognized as a more conservative review of economic and political matters, was often critical of the Labour

government's policies. As these papers represented divergent viewpoints, there was no basis to the charge that Cowan had voiced a personal bias in his report.

Less blatantly fraudulent tactics sometimes left more damning impressions of CBC programs. The Report frequently distorted what was said on the CBC by simply detailing comments it considered leftist while ignoring those of different perspectives. Two examples of this "distortion by omission" concerned the "Truman Doctrine" speech of March 1947. On March 16, Elmore Philpott appeared on "Weekend Review" criticizing the President's aid proposal for Greece and Turkey. The plan, Philpott argued, subverted international agencies like the United Nations and the World Bank for channelling assistance. He also questioned Truman's assertion that the plan would prevent the overthrow of democracy, recalling the position of the Greek royalist government during the war. The President's overture, Philpott maintained, could only be seen as an American attempt to establish a "permanent military overlordship . . . without the slightest pretence at consultation with the United Nations." (19)

The Report did not even bother relating Philpott's points. Instead, it satisfied itself by describing the talk as "full of a mighty wrath against President Truman" which, because of the commentator's "pronounced pro-Russian tendencies, . . . was without visible (or audible)

means of support." It concluded that the broadcast was "the most blatant example of left-wing propaganda" on the CBC during the week.(20) Aside from unfairly labelling Philpott's comments as pro-Russian and propagandistic, the Report made no mention of a talk on the same series two weeks later by J. B. McGeachy of the Globe and Mail in defence of Truman's proposal. McGeachy claimed that it was not necessarily "to uphold Democracy and fight Communism" that the President proposed to help the Greek and Turkish governments. "It is to prevent the Soviet Union from becoming dominant over these two countries."(21)

Much the same occurred two weeks later when British Labour MP William Warby criticized the President's plan on "International Commentary." The Report discussed Warby's remarks but neglected to mention that another British speaker, Brigadier A.R.W. Low, had expressed dissimilar views on the same program three days later. It was better, Low contended, "for the United States to declare its unmistakeable intention to help independent nations to retain their freedom now, than to wait until that freedom has been destroyed."(22) In essence, Johnston, Everson and Charlesworth were calling into question the CBC's dedication to its own principle of balanced representation, though it did so by drawing a picture that was meaningless. Using the Report's method of omission,

it was just as easy to show that the CBC displayed a conservative bias.(23)

In effect, the weekly report did little more than exhibit its authors' personal views and reactions to certain ideas. As explained in a CBC briefing paper prepared for the 1947 Radio Committee, the Report's use of the term "leftist" included any view favouring price and export controls, marketing boards, co-operative organizations, or public ownership in any field. At one time or another, the brief noted, varying degrees of support for such measures had been given by both the Liberal or Progressive Conservative parties, as well as the Canadian Federation of Agriculture and labour organizations, making all of these groups "leftist" using the Report's criteria. The brief added:

This monitor also picks out any statement which advocates international co-operation at the expense of some sacrifice of national sovereignty as though it were "Leftist" and probably subversive. For instance, [the Report] considered it worthwhile quoting this comment by Robert McKeown of the Montreal Standard: "The war has at least taught our politicians that this is one world"--a sentiment which has been expressed by many world leaders, regardless of their political ideology.(24)

Eventually, CBC officials considered how and whether to contest the Report's charges. Talks and Public Affairs Supervisor Neil Morrison believed that the firm should be asked to comment on its errors and retract accusations in future issues.(25) The General Supervisor of Programming,

E. L. Bushnell, saw little advantage to this scheme, but suggested that the CBC keep a record of the Report's erroneous statements as well as more "rightists"

broadcasts it did not mention. Bushnell was clearly eager to slug it out with the firm. He looked to the 1947 Radio Committee as the chance to present this evidence in order to "clear ourselves of the stigma Mr. Johnston is trying to fasten upon us" and to "completely discredit him and his organization." (26)

CBC Chairman Davidson Dunton, however, was wary of drawing undue attention to the whole matter. Dan McArthur, the Chief News Editor, told Dunton that he knew Johnston personally and had already approached him with the idea of including CBC rebuttals to the report's mailing list. (27) The Chairman replied that such an arrangement would only dignify the sheet and that paying too much attention to its charges would serve the firm's ends. Dunton also saw no benefit in raising the subject of the Report before the parliamentary committee. It was not a public periodical and was only available on a limited, confidential basis. He did not fancy giving it undeserved, country-wide attention if he could help it. He believed, however, that preparations as suggested by Bushnell were not unwise in the event that the matter was brought up and, indeed, foresaw a time when it might be propitious "to hit out at Johnston" in a future

parliamentary committee.(28)

The firm's assault, however, combined with public criticism, was probably a factor which led officials to consider a degree of "official" self-censorship in early 1948. At a March 23rd meeting, Dunton, Bushnell and Morrison agreed that "Communists or persons regularly following the Communist party line" would not be used "on isolated talks, or in discussion programs." "Doubtful cases," they also decided, would "need careful advance consideration." Exceptions were possible "in the interests of furthering the understanding of listeners," but only for "carefully considered and well understood reasons." (29)

Talks producers were quick to oppose the proposal, arguing in a signed statement that such "positive restraints" on freedom of expression were no way to "answer . . . critics of western liberalism." The statement pointed out that it was "the function of government, backed by parliament," to decide whether Canada's affairs had reached a point where it was "dangerous to allow the usual free expression." Producers feared that the policy would simply give communists the chance "to announce themselves as martyrs" and would trigger criticism from "genuine liberals."

The biggest problem, however, was how to apply such a policy. On this point, Talks officials argued that:

While it is our job to be informed of the political views of the speakers (insofar as this is possible), there are many cases where the judgements of different people will not be the same. The program planner will keep wondering whether so-and-so would be regarded by someone in the Corporation, or by a section of the population, as a fellow traveller, even though the program planner has reason for believing otherwise. The easiest way out will be to choose someone who is unquestionably "safe". We cannot believe that this will make for stimulating talks programmes.

If problems of imbalance arose, the statement concluded, corrections could be effected, including dismissals for persistent error, "without departing from our former liberal policy." (30)

Morrison was impressed enough with his staff's concerns to ask Dunton to reconsider "the implications involved in such [a] fundamental and important" decision. (31) At a meeting held with Talks officials on April 7, Dunton agreed that the policy should be "scrapped." Both sides agreed, however, that the CBC should "more than ever . . . be careful not to give the communist point of view any disproportionate amount of air time." (32)

Within months, the resolve to resist clandestine attacks was put to an even greater test. The CBC was soon faced with two other monitoring reports: a bulletin put out by the Vancouver-based "Western Monitoring Service"; and the Radio Listening Post, a circular issued by the British Columbia Federation of Trade and Industry. An introductory note in the latter, which began distribution

in mid-1948, clearly indicated that it was intended to serve the same group addressed by the "Report on Programs Monitored" and for largely the same reasons:

In an effort to acquaint business men with the use being made of radio time by labour unions and left-wing groups in Canada, the B. C. Federation of Trade and Industry distributes each week extracts from broadcasts heard by the "listening post". Knowing that most executives are too occupied to listen themselves, it is felt that you will welcome this information, which shows how far such forces are spreading their opinions on controversial issues.(33)

The Federation also seemed eager that readers make use of the information it provided. For instance, one issue of the report highlighted remarks made by an official of the Saskatchewan government's insurance office during a Farm Forum debate on the relative merits of government and privately-owned insurance. The Listening Post warned its readers, however, that its spelling of the official's name was strictly phonetic and advised them that "for purposes of quotation, it would be well to refer to him as 'a representative of the Saskatchewan government' on words to that effect."(34)

The Listening Post produced the first and only casualty of the anti-CBC smear campaign. In early 1949, Glen Shortliffe, a Queen's University professor, informed the Talks and Public Affairs Department that he could no longer appear as a commentator on "Weekend Review."(35) Several "prominent" and "influential" men close to the university had received the Radio Listening Post,

which described Shortliffe's talks as "communist" or "pro-communist," and had voiced their displeasure and concern over his statements to the university's Principal, R. C. Wallace.(36) Shortliffe feared his continued presence on the air would place Queen's "in an almost impossible position." He informed Wallace that he could not continue broadcasting freely "in the light of these tactics of character-assassination, without very rapidly destroying a large part of my usefulness to Queen's as an institute of higher learning."(37) The professor's departure was unfortunate for the CBC, as he had evoked an unusually appreciative response from listeners for the manner in which he analysed difficult and controversial subjects.(38) Many listeners believed the CBC had forced Shortliffe's withdrawal and wrote the Corporation asking that he be re-instated.(39)

Shortliffe, however, felt that the CBC should not leave the matter of monitoring reports unattended. The professor wrote to Talks producer Marjorie McEnaney:

I suggest to you that this whole question of libellous publications about CBC commentators might well be considered by the Corporation. Individuals can hardly expose themselves to this sort of thing, which involves real damage, unprotected. If some formula cannot be found--I don't know what: counter-publicity, perhaps, or even legal action if all else fails--to protect commentators from this kind of character-assassination, then I'm afraid Mr. Brockington's famous remark about the danger of 'free air' being confined to the service stations, is going to become very pertinent indeed.(40)

Shortliffe's commentaries continued to plague him even after his departure from "Weekend Review." A few months after the incident, the professor was to take up a teaching position at George Washington University in St. Louis. The American consul in Toronto, however, was aware of his radio broadcasts and referred specifically to them during a visa-application interview with Shortliffe. The professor was subsequently denied entry into the United States. (41)

As with the "Report on Programs Monitored," the Radio Listening Post not only neglected to describe or assess comments with which it agreed but made extensive use of false quotations. Its treatment of Shortliffe's own commentaries provides a good example. In one talk the professor discussed the civil strife between Nationalist and Communist forces in China. The report described it in this manner:

The situation in China was summed up by Dr. Glen Shortliffe of Queen's U.

"It's very clear," he said, "that when Chiang [Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek] chose to fight it out with the forces of the north five years ago, he sealed his own fate. The Chinese people, as with the Russians of 1917, are voting for peace. They are voting for it with their guns. . . ." (42)

Shortliffe's script actually read as follows:

The wholesale desertions and surrenders of entire Nationalists armies can mean only one thing,--and that is that the Chinese, as was said of the Russians in 1917, are voting for peace--voting for it with their feet. (43)

At this stage in the war, it was generally recognized that the Chinese Communist forces were certain of victory. Without mentioning Shortliffe's reference to Nationalist desertions, the word change of "feet" to "guns" suggested that the professor saw the inevitable outcome as justification for armed conflict in settling political differences in China.

The monitor also attributed the following quotation to the professor:

Shortliffe said that "if we hope to repair the obvious damage our championship of Chiang has done", we must adopt a reasonable attitude towards the Chinese communists and the government which they will form.

"If we support the liberal elements of China, even if they don't believe in private enterprise", he said, we will be showing our belief in democracy and our dislike of dictatorship, even though dictatorship in China "has proved profitable for some of us in the past." (44)

Not surprisingly, Shortliffe's observations differed significantly from the Listening Post's account:

General Marshall says "there is a definite liberal group among the Chinese communists." Well, it seems to me that by supporting and encouraging such liberal elements--even if they don't believe in free enterprise--we can prove to millions of Asiatics that our real concern is democracy and human freedom, and not just the preservation of a particular economic arrangement that some of us have found profitable. (45)

The report had not alluded to General Marshall's remarks as the source of Shortliffe's comments. More importantly, nowhere had the commentator suggested that "dictatorship in China" had proved profitable for some Westerners. What Shortliffe did say was that "a particular economic

arrangement," namely, free enterprise, had been profitable for "some of us," but that this should not be the paramount consideration in dealing with the Chinese situation.

Not to be outdone by this new wave of circulars, Johnston, Everson and Charlesworth launched a special "Confidential Report" on the Farm and Citizens Forums sponsored by the Canadian Association of Adult Education. The "Confidential Report," distributed to about 200 businessmen in the spring of 1950, (46) was another assortment of carefully selected "quotations" indicating that the forums attacked free enterprise and were stacked with Communists or left-wing sympathisers. (47) Some recipients, including the Montreal philanthropist, J. W. McConnell, and Hugh Crombie, an executive with Dominion Engineering Limited and second Vice-President of the Canadian Manufacturers Association, sent copies to the CAAE's Associate Director, J. R. Kidd. Kidd promptly informed the CBC of the report's circulation (48) and personally responded to the attack by issuing an eleven-page "Memorandum on National Farm Radio Forum and National Citizens' Forum" to all CAAE Council members, the CBC, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, and "those who had given it circulation." (49) In it he commented on the now-familiar tactic of omission used by the confidential report:

If one wishes to play a shabby game one can accuse those responsible of any form of bias and then, by carefully selecting some facts to be presented while at the same time rigidly excluding others, one can give, without any difficulty at all, an air of plausability to the charge. This is the method adopted by the writer of the "confidential report."

The CAAE Associate Director added that if the circular's author could "prove his case," he had "a duty as a citizen to do so--before the Royal Commission on the National Development of the Arts, Letters and Sciences, or the Parliamentary Committee on Radio." Otherwise, he had "the responsibility of making a public apology." Kidd himself tackled the issue of biased speaker selection in the memorandum, noting, for instance, that:

From more than 150 speakers on forty-four broadcasts . . . the author of the "report" was apparently only able to muster seven speakers who made critical or slighting references to business men or business organizations. . . . Of course no mention was made of the speakers (or quotations given of their statements) who presented the view points of business and industry very ably, as was done on many occasions.

Kidd pointed out that specific complaints raised by the secret report were meaningless. For example, it had complained that a Farm Forum broadcast on "Farm and Labour--Friend or Foe" had not included a business representative. While true, Kidd argued that the speakers chosen--Prince Edward Island's Deputy Minister of Agriculture, the past President of the Nova Scotia Farmers Association and the Secretary of the Saskatchewan Federation of Labour--provided an adequate balance for the

topic under discussion. It was "also likely," he said, "that if the topic had been 'Agriculture and Business--Friend or Foe' that no labour speaker would have been invited." In another case, the report had criticized a "Citizens' Forum" broadcast on the subject "What is the Best Approach to World Peace?" because it had only included "one rightist." It was "just as fair," Kidd noted, "to say that the panel only included one 'leftist.'" (50)

The growing anti-CBC smear campaign eventually led to uneasiness about the Corporation within the government. In December 1949, National Revenue Minister J. J. McCann referred a "Western Monitoring Service" bulletin to CBC Chairman Davidson Dunton. The bulletin stated that:

A new series on the CBC, International Commentary, heard here each evening over CBR, appears to have been arranged to coincide with the election campaign in Britain. At a glance, the speakers seem to have been selected so as to put the Labor government in the best possible light. Matthew Halton, for one, is beating the drum for Labor once more, after a period of comparative neutrality, all of which seems to add up to a pro-Labor campaign on the part of the CBC. (51)

Dunton replied that Halton was then working on special assignment for the BBC and had not even appeared on the series. Such a misrepresentation, he pointed out, was undoubtedly an indication of the bulletin's unreliability. (52)

The same month, however, Postmaster General G. Edouard Rinfret, having received numerous complaints about "the socialistic tendencies of the CBC," sent McCann and

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Prime Minister St. Laurent a "Western Monitoring Service" bulletin attacking a "Cross-Section" program. Rinfret had received the bulletin from a highly placed Liberal who felt that the CBC's English network had become a tax-supported mouthpiece for CCF, and at times, communist propaganda. (53) The broadcast in question, "What Does Labour Want," had partly dramatized workers' objectives as spelled out that year by labour organizations. For this the Western Monitoring Service had called it "one of the slickest pieces of propaganda the CBC has managed to put out." (54) McCann contacted Dunton over the matter, but as the Chairman later explained to the Minister, the program had been one of a pair. The second, "What Does Business Want," had similarly dramatized the objectives of organized business as expressed in the policy declarations of the Canadian Manufacturers Association and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, a fact the Western Monitoring Service had not bothered to mention. (55)

In effect, the monitors had touched a sensitive political nerve in the government. In recent months, a new political climate had descended on the capital in which the issue of subversion began to assume dramatic proportions. The Conservative opposition, under its new leader George Drew, called on the government to take legislative action against potentially subversive forces. Drew took his lead from the United States, where a

campaign to root out alleged treasonable activity had reached hysterical proportions. Unfortunately for the CBC, the debate was also fueled by the enticing theory of media infiltration. An incident involving the National Film Board erupted in December 1949 and became the focus of opposition charges that the government was not safeguarding the country from communist subversion. It was only a matter of time before Canada's other public agency of information became embroiled in a similar controversy.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

- 1 See Chapter 1, Note 20.

Another figure in this anti-CCF campaign was B. A. Trestrail, whose pamphlet, Social Suicide, was mailed to every postal address in Canada between 1943 and 1945. The pamphlet displayed thinly disguised anti-intellectualism and anti-semitism. F. R. Scott was a professor with "no practical business experience," and David Lewis, whose name was printed in quotation marks to denote surreptitiousness, "a Russian-Polish-Jew," the son of "Mowcha Losz." In 1948 Trestrail distributed a book of anti-CCF cartoons prepared by Globe and Mail cartoonist, Jack Boothe, and mailed out a second pamphlet the following year entitled Is Democracy Doomed?. The latter was financed by payments of \$200.00 by businesses wishing to "employ" his public relations firm for counselling services. Young, Anatomy of a Party, p. 203.

- 2 The Printed Word, no. 208, January 1952.

- 3 Ibid.

- 4 Faris, The Passionate Educators, p. 187, n. 61.

- 5 Peers, Politics of Canadian Broadcasting, pp. 378-81.

- 6 Harry Sedgwick, "Freedom of Choice," The Globe and Mail, 28 May 1946. The article was one of two written by Sedgwick for the Globe and Mail's editorial page.

The newspaper itself argued that the issue represented "no less than the final suppression of the right of freedom of the air . . . another of the long sequence of brutally arbitrary developments in the corporation's campaign of suppression." The CBC, it asserted, had "encroached more and more upon the rights of the private operators until all independence has been denied them. Even their properties may now be expropriated for no better reason than to feed the insatiable appetite of the Government-controlled octopus." "It's the People's Fight," The Globe and Mail, 24 May 1946.

- 7 The Printed Word; no. 140, July 1946.
- 8 Ibid., no. 165, August 1948.
- 9 Ibid., no. 151, June 1947.
- 10 Ibid., no. 165, August 1948.
- 11 Ibid., no. 150, May 1947.
- 12 CBC, Vol. 290, File 14-1-14(4), letter, Fergus Mutrie to J. G. Johnston, 5 May 1947, and letter, J. L. Charlesworth to Mutrie, 6 May 1947.
- 13 Letter-Review, no. 131, 13 December 1943.
 Ironically, Neil Morrison had contacted Johnston, Everson and Charlesworth in the summer of 1943 for advice on participants and topics for the upcoming "Of Things to Come" series. CBC, Vol. 186, File 11-18-5(1), letter, J. G. Johnston to Morrison, 25 August 1943, and letter, Morrison to Johnston, 8 September 1943.
 The firm, or Johnston at least, continued to make suggestions for the program the following year. Morrison, Vol. 11, File Citizens Forum - "Of Things to Come," letter, Bushnell to Johnston, 5 June 1944.
- 14 The Printed Word, no. 208, January 1952.
- 15 CBC, Vol. 291, File 14-1-16(1), "Comment on 'Report on Programs Monitored,'" brief prepared for 1947 parliamentary Radio Committee.
- 16 CBC, Vol. 290, File 14-1-14(4), comments prepared by Marjorie McEnaney regarding "Report on Programs Monitored" for week of 24-31 January 1947.
- 17 Ibid., comments prepared by Marjorie McEnaney regarding "Report on Programs Monitored" for week of 31 January to February 1947.
 At first, CBC officials were themselves prone to believing the "documented" evidence. E. L. Bushnell informed Neil Morrison that he had to "agree with the views expressed by the monitor" regarding Shortliffe's talk on control of the Ruhr. Morrison, too, confessed he could not help but think that the commentator's remarks had been too sweeping, but upon investigation discovered the report's deception. CBC, Vol. 990, File 16, memorandum, Bushnell to Morrison, 10 February 1947, and memorandum, Morrison to Bushnell, 3 March 1947.

- 18 Morrison, Vol. 6, File CBC, Censorship in general 1944-1952, memorandum, McArthur to Bushnell, 16 March 1947, including excerpt of "Report on Programs Monitored" for week of 7-14 February 1947.
- 19 CBC, Vol. 196, File 11-18-11-35-1(2), transcript of commentary given by Elmore Philpott on "Weekend Review," 16 March 1947.
- 20 Morrison, Vol. 24, File Talks Department Programmes 1939-1946, comments prepared by Marjorie McEnaney regarding "Report on Programs Monitored" for week of 14-20 March 1947 (erroneously placed in file).
- 21 Ibid., comments prepared by Marjorie McEnaney regarding "Report on Programs Monitored" for 28 March-2 April 1947.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 At times the Report did mention speakers with whom it agreed, but always described their comments as "non-political" or "unbiased". The intent of such a ploy was simple. Denying that none but liberal or left-leaning speakers subjectively slanted their remarks, the monitor could handily dispose of the notion that the CBC's present efforts achieved balance.
- 24 CBC, Vol. 291, File 14-1-16(1), "Comment on 'Report on Programs Monitored,'" brief prepared for 1947 parliamentary Radio Committee.
- 25 CBC, Vol. 990, File 16, memorandum, Morrison to Bushnell, 3 March 1947.
- 26 Ibid., memorandum, Bushnell to Morrison, 14 March 1947.
- 27 Ibid., note, McArthur to Dunton, n.d.
- 28 Ibid., memorandum, Dunton to McArthur, 22 April 1947.
- 29 Morrison, Vol. 2, File CC 1948, "Meeting of the Chairman, Director General of Programs and Supervisor of Talks in Ottawa, March 23, 1948 re: Commentaries."
- 30 Ibid., statement signed by F. W. Peers, Charles Harris, Elizabeth Long, Marjorie McEnaney and James R. Scott to the Director General of Programmes, 31 March 1948.

- 31 Ibid., memorandum, Morrison to Bushnell, 1 April 1948.
- 32 PAC, Marjorie McEnaney Papers (hereafter cited as McEnaney), Vol. 1, File Communists on Talks Programs, minutes of meeting held on 7 April 1948 between Dunton, Bushnell, Morrison, Charles Harris, James Scott, Marjorie McEnaney, Elizabeth Long and Frank Peers.
- 33 CBC, Vol. 196, File 11-18-11-35(6), Radio Listening Post, introductory note. The note does not appear on early issues of the newsletter.
The Listening Post devoted most of its attention to CBC programs, but also commented on labour-related broadcasts heard on Vancouver-area stations.
- 34 Ibid., Radio Listening Post for week of 7-13 January 1949.
The report did not go unnoticed in the press. Jack Scott of the Vancouver Sun wrote in his "Our Town" column that he had received copies of the Listening Post from a "more broad-minded" business man. According to Scott, the report displayed no real analysis of radio programs, and satisfied itself by simply labelling speakers with party or ideological affiliations as it saw fit. Jack Scott, "Our Town," Vancouver Sun, 16 October 1948.
- 35 Morrison, Vol. 6, File CBC, Censorship in general 1944-1952, letter, Glen Shortliffe to Marjorie McEnaney, 16 February 1949.
- 36 Ibid., letter, Shortliffe to McEnaney, 1 March 1949.
- 37 Ibid., letter, Shortliffe to R. C. Wallace, 23 February 1949.
- 38 From only five "Weekend Review" broadcasts in 1948, Shortliffe elicited the greatest listener response--101 letters, of which only two were unfavourable. The other eight commentators on the series, two of whom had appeared 17 and 11 times, together accounted for 150 letters, nine of which were unfavourable. CBC, Vol. 196, File 11-18-11-35(6), "Weekend Review: Audience Mail Survey for 1948," and telegram, Neil Morrison to Hugh Palmer, 16 March 1949.
- 39 Ibid., memorandum, Morrison to Bushnell, 12 April 1949.
- 40 See note 35 above.

- 41 Letter, Mrs. Margaret Shortliffe to author, 29 October 1986.
- 42 CBC, Vol. 196, File 11-18-11-35(6), Radio Listening Post for week of 30 December 1948 to 6 January 1949.
- 43 Morrison, Vol. 6, File CBC, Censorship in general 1944-1952, "Sample Mis-Quotations from 'Radio Broadcasting Report,'" notes prepared by Glen Shortliffe, n.d.
- 44 See note 42 above.
- 45 See note 43 above.
- 46 Faris, The Passionate Educators, p. 128.
- 47 Morrison, Vol. 11, File Citizens' Forum - Programming 1944-55, J. R. Kidd, "Memorandum on National Farm Radio Forum and National Citizens' Forum," 26 June 1950.
- 48 CBC, Vol. 200, File 11-18-11-41(3), letter, Jean Heath to Orville Shugg, 9 June 1950.
In discussing the "Confidential Report," Public Affairs officials felt the CBC should acquire counsel "to assist in breaking open such under-cover conspiracies." CBC, Vol. 177, File 11-18(1), minutes of Talks and Public Affairs departmental meeting, 12 June 1950.
- 49 CBC, Vol. 200, File 11-18-11-41(3), letter, J. R. Kidd to Dunton, 15 September 1950.
- 50 See note 47 above.
- 51 CBC, Vol. 990, File 16, bulletin of the "Western Monitoring Service," n.d.
- 52 Ibid., letter, Dunton to J. J. McCann, 30 December 1949.
- 53 Ibid., letter, G. Edouard Rinfret to McCann, 16 December 1949, and letter, unidentified individual to Rinfret, n.d.; PAC, Louis Stephen St. Laurent Papers, (hereafter cited as St. Laurent), Vol. 151, File R-90(1), letter, Rinfret to Louis St. Laurent, 16 December 1949.
- 54 CBC, Vol. 990, File 16, bulletin of the "Western Monitoring Service," n.d.

55 Ibid., letter, Dunton to McCann, 30 December 1949.

CHAPTER IV

THE COLD WAR TURNS HOT:

THE CBC AND THE "ANTI-RELIGION" CONTROVERSY

International and domestic cold war tensions had heightened significantly by the end of 1949. The previous year had seen the communist coup in Czechoslovakia as well as the combined American and British airlift of supplies to Soviet-blockaded Berlin. In 1949, The U.S.S.R. successfully tested its first atomic bomb, signaling the end of America's atomic monopoly. Later that year, the Chinese civil war between the forces of Communist leader Mao Tse-tung and the American-backed Chiang Kai-shek ended in Chiang's defeat and eventual retreat to the island of Formosa.

In the United States, the Truman administration fell victim to its own foreign policy rhetoric stressing American leadership in blocking the spread of Communism. Given this portrayal of the United States, international events seemed to suggest that America's resolve to defeat Communism was being undermined from within. The result was an obsessive fear of subversion, a mania for absolute security, and excessive suspicion of "un-American" ideas

and activities. Truman himself was forced to prove his purity as an anti-communist ideologue by instituting a loyalty check program for federal employees and the Attorney-General's list of subversive organizations.

In Canada, the threat of subversion also became an issue. During the federal election campaign in the spring of 1949, the new leader of the federal Progressive Conservatives, George Drew, raised the spectre of communist subversion before a national audience. Drew, as one colleague observed, "was never happier than when exposing and attacking communism." (1) Taking his lead from the American situation, the former Ontario Premier partially styled his entry into federal politics as a crusade to purge the country of "anti-Canadian" elements. During the election campaign, he told crowds that they were in danger of losing their personal and economic freedom "to the bureacrats who accept the basic philosophy of Karl Marx, no matter what political name they may adopt." (2)

Drew lost the 1949 election and Canada was spared an American-styled communist witch-hunt led by its prime minister. But the issue of subversion refused to go away. This was due, at least in part, to the seductive theory of media infiltration.

In November 1949, the Financial Post disclosed that the Department of National Defence had stopped using the NFB for "classified" work until the RCMP screened the

Board's staff.(3) Coming only two years after the infamous Hollywood trials, the revelation sparked opposition charges that the government did not take the threat of communist subversion seriously. "The intellectual high command of communism knows the value of propaganda," one Social Credit Member insisted. Film was not the only medium he had in mind. "There are two institutions in Canada that are the most powerful media of propaganda we have," he declared. "I refer to the motion picture screen and the medium of radio. . . . they are the first fields that what I call the intellectual high command will seek to influence."(4)

Shortly before its NFB article, the Financial Post had also called the CBC into question in a feature written by the anti-communist crusader, Watson Kirkconnell, now President of Acadia University. "Russia bulks large on CBC broadcasts," Kirkconnell wrote, "even though the CBC no longer has a top-flight Canadian Communist broadcasting from Moscow at the expense of the Canadian taxpayer." The Talks Department, the professor claimed, "still insists on giving pro-Moscow news commentators as much importance from week to week as the point of view of the 99% of our people who do not see eye-to-eye with the CBC string of leftists."(5)

It was not the Talks and Public Affairs department, however, that bore the immediate brunt of the growing

anti-communist campaign. During the NFB controversy, George Drew asked whether the RCMP was also screening the CBC's International Service, which the Corporation operated on the government's behalf. Screenings had in fact occurred since 1945 in order to safeguard the confidentiality of dispatches and analyses sent by the department of External Affairs for script development. (6) The process was a precautionary measure and did not by itself prove that subversion existed within the International Service. Drew, however, argued that screenings were taking place because "certain broadcasting" had perhaps been "conveyed to European countries, which was not in accordance with the purpose of setting up this station." Drew deftly sketched a picture of the possible to suggest what was probable:

. . . there is a particular group being screened. It consists of those who are making broadcasts by voice, and who are in a position to convey information to countries beyond the iron curtain. . . . [They] are being screened because of the fact they are in a position to communicate messages to areas that are not regarded as areas to which we would want certain messages to go. . . . By the very nature of the activities [the International Service] carries out, it could be a vehicle for the communication of messages which might be dangerous to the security of the state.

Drew reasoned that since the government had concealed the fact of screenings, the IS had become "an agency of highly improper activity." (7) His concern, however, lay with the Service's broadcasts, not, as with External Affairs, the handling of sensitive information for script

development. In Drew's view, the danger was that infiltrators might present programs serving enemy ends, a position which reflected the popular notion that channels of communication were vital to subversive schemes. In effect, the CBC was paying the price for External Affairs' ambivalence between using the IS as an overt psychological weapon and creating as few "international" waves as possible. The result was not criticism of External Affairs' program policy, but of the International Service's allegedly "neutral" broadcasts. This, in turn, raised questions regarding the CBC's trustworthiness in the wake of a growing communist threat.

The outbreak of the Korean War, the rise of Senator Joe McCarthy in the United States, the conviction of Alger Hiss and the arrest of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, all served to further heighten cold war tensions by 1951. Within this worsening climate, suspicion arose in Canada over the CBC's public affairs broadcasts. In particular, a debate emerged over supposed "anti-religious" programs reflecting "Godless Communism." In June 1951, the Corporation re-broadcast a BBC talks series entitled "The Nature of the Universe," prepared by Cambridge astronomer Fred Hoyle. The series was devoted to contemporary developments in astrophysics, including Hoyle's own theory of continuous creation. The final program included a ten-minute segment by the scientist on how his hypothesis had

affected his personal religious beliefs. In Hoyle's view, science had supplanted the religious interpretation of the physical world, leaving religion to occupy "some other world whose nature" he could not "even begin to imagine." (8)

Although Hoyle's brief remarks on religion were overwhelmingly counterbalanced by CBC religious programs, (9) the Corporation provided formal rejoinders to his theological as well as astronomical opinions. A University of Toronto astronomer, Dr. Ralph Williamson, criticized the lecturer for making little distinction between astronomical facts and working hypotheses. He argued that for one who believed so strongly in science's power of revelation, Hoyle exaggerated the scientific merits of his continuous creation theory insofar as science could not properly test it. (10) A theologian from the same institution, Rev. J. M. Kelly, focused on Hoyle's admission that science left many unanswered questions. That scientific inquiry could not deal with such questions, Kelly argued, did not make them any less important in people's lives. (11)

Despite these rebuttals, there was a strong public backlash to the series. It was largely orchestrated, however, by one man. Robert Keyserlingk, publisher of the anti-communist Catholic weekly The Ensign, almost single-handedly whipped up public indignation against the CBC for

airing the programs. In his newspaper and through his contacts with a number of religious organizations, Keyserlingk created the impression that the entire series was an assault on religion. He also charged that the rejoinders were only planned after strong public protest, and without the benefit of "C.B.C 'booster' aids" enjoyed by "Hoyle's attack." (12) The CBC's program guide CBC Times had in fact mentioned the rejoinders when it first announced the series. Introductory statements to Hoyle's last three talks had also advertised the rebuttals. (13) Nevertheless, Members of Parliament were deluged with letters and telegrams from Roman Catholic organizations and other religious groups protesting the CBC's actions. 4

Keyserlingk's efforts also included a letter to Prime Minister St. Laurent, (14) who subsequently suggested to Davidson Dunton that the CBC not broadcast the last of Hoyle's talks. (15) St. Laurent was unable to hear the segment when it was presented, but was concerned enough to ask his principal secretary J. W. Pickersgill to listen in for him. Pickersgill reported that while the CBC was "stupid" to carry the program and thus create unnecessary trouble for itself, the broadcast was not the kind one would want to suppress. His only objection was that Hoyle too narrowly defined "Christian" in literalist-fundamentalist terms. In Pickersgill's view, the astronomer's opinions were essentially religious and were

similar to those of most liberal Protestants. (16)

A few weeks after the Hoyle incident, The Ensign claimed that the CBC was continuing its attack on Christianity with a second series called "Man's Last Enemy--Himself," which featured leading psychiatrists discussing the human condition. (17) However, it was a third set of programs on "Living in the Atomic Age" by Bertrand Russell that brought the "anti-religious" issue to a head. The series displayed Russell's frustration with the mania for orthodoxy in a world divided into camps. He lamented the stale rigidity of ideas that became "straight-jackets" of interpretation hindering human creativity. Neither Marxism nor economic liberalism, for instance, were thought to provide an adequate interpretation of human affairs when adopted as political or economic creeds. According to Russell, vested interests simply used doctrinaire beliefs to manipulate or mould thought and behavior to suit their ends. (18)

Russell's refusal to embrace any credo left him wary of other institutionalized ideologies such as Christianity. In the series, for example, he argued that the Christian concept of sin unduly emphasized avoiding evil rather than doing good. With cold war developments no doubt in mind, Russell noted that such a view fostered moral crusades which attempted to root out individuals who

did not uphold arbitrary ethical standards.(19) Such remarks were not lost on Russell's critics. One Catholic Monsignor described the talks as "deadly pus oozing from hell," nearly all of them having a "Communistic bias." (20) The Ensign regarded Russell as an enemy "of all Christian thinking" and of "all morality in the name of an attractive pagan ideal." His appearance on the CBC was taken as an indication that the Corporation had "not exhausted its audacity" to pollute the airwaves.(21) The paper refused to be placated by the CBC's arrangement of a panel discussion on Russell's views by a philosopher, theologian and anthropologist.

It was soon clear that growing debate over the three series was not only about supposedly "anti-religious" programming. A Member of Parliament described one of the broadcasts as "anti-religious and therefore pro-Soviet." It was high time, he said, that such "pro-communist programs" were "cleaned out of the air." (22) George Drew, remarking on the "mental poison being carried over the airwaves of Canada," saw the issue in much the same way:

I think we should examine what is involved in this discussion. Over and over again it has been said that the underlying distinction between our democracy and the communist system is that our democracy is based on religion . . . The most powerful influence opposed to the spread of communism is religion itself. At a time when we are putting so much effort and so much of our wealth into the defence of our system, it seems utterly inconsistent that we should . . . provide a means by which that culture and that system can be undermined. (23)

The Ensign was particularly eager to portray the controversy in cold war terms. In one column, it likened the programs in question to totalitarian religious persecution:

The question facing us is whether Christian culture is the accepted basis of our society or whether it is merely an "authoritarian prejudice", declared free game by a group of "enlightened" program directors of the CBC. . . .

Is Christianity to be under constant and insidious attacks at home while it is under persecution abroad?(24)

In another article, the newspaper noted that a guest in the psychiatry series, Dr. Carl Binger, had been a defence witness for Alger Hiss, the State Department official accused of communist espionage and later convicted for perjury.(25)

Defenders of the CBC also spoke in cold war terms. "The world today is engaged in an ideological struggle for the minds of men," declared the Association of Civil Liberties in an open statement to the government. The strength of western democracy, the Association explained, lay in its "tradition of freedom of speech and liberty of thought. To depart from that tradition by imposing a form of censorship such as has been proposed would be to deny the strength of our own faith as a democratic people and to destroy one of our strongest weapons against totalitarianism."(26)

Trumped-up accusations by Keyserlingk against the

International Service fanned the flames of suspicion about the CBC. Speaking over Montreal radio station CJAD in January 1951, the publisher accused the Service of taking a "kid glove" approach to Communism. This, he said, was a result of the Service having hired "left-wingers" and "Marxists" when "Soviet glorification" was part of the war effort. Its unwillingness to adopt an anti-communist position, Keyserlingk contended, represented a sin of omission as dangerous and fatal as Communist aggression itself.(27) At no time, though, did Keyserlingk mention that the International Service's broadcasts conformed to External Affairs' guidelines. The issue was thought to be the CBC's trustworthiness, not External Affairs' programming policy.

Keyserlingk's allegations reached the floor of the House of Commons. Calling the publisher's radio talk "a very comprehensive summary of this subject," George Drew criticized the "noticeable absence of anything that would indicate the 'Voice of Canada' is being used for positive anti-communist propaganda." Drew said he was concerned about the degree of supervision exercised by External Affairs, given allegations "made by responsible people" that IS broadcasts were "rather sympathetic to the communist point of view, and that men of known communist associations" were still involved in broadcasting activities.(28)

Inevitably, Keyserlingk linked his charges against the International Service with the "religion and Communism" controversy. The Ensign claimed there was "a clearly traceable pattern of anti-Christian propaganda over both the English section of the CBC as well as the CBC International Service." Both "variants" of this "stream of well-planned godless propaganda," the newspaper concluded, owed their origin to "a group of men in the CBC [who] were able to take over the CBC programs." (29) Other publications repeated Keyserlingk's charges and made a similar case against the Corporation as a whole. For example, an article in the Jesuit periodical Relations, translated and reprinted in the Montreal Gazette, added these observations:

The same things can happen here as happened in the U.S.A. On March 26, 1947, J. Edgar Hoover, head of the American secret police, testified before a Congressional committee that "the party (Communist) is no longer content with the printed word for its propaganda, but is availing itself of the radio. Members and sympathisers have not only infiltrated on [sic] the air waves, but are energetically seeking radio channels."

There has already been a purge of C.B.C. But it would be a naive person indeed who believed that propaganda today is always positive, direct and violent; it knows how to cover itself up, to be subtle, hypocritical: it often contents itself with the negative approach. (30)

The controversy over religion and Communism led some to conclude that balanced discussion was untenable since it allowed dangerous views to be heard. "We are fighting communism, materialism," one Member of Parliament

explained before the Commons Radio Committee. "If it is that kind of philosophy that we are going to present to our people in Canada, I do not see how we can advocate freedom of speech and just let them go on." Another member of the committee declared himself to be a "democrat," but said a line had to be drawn when "democratic institutions are being undermined and the CBC used for that purpose." On one occasion, the Radio Committee's Social Credit member, Ernest Hansell, asked the CBC's Chairman if he had read the script of Dr. Ewen Cameron, a Montreal psychiatrist. "Does he twig [sic] anything in that broadcast that plays into the hands of communist philosophy?" Hansell inquired. "I am saying it does. . . . He is propounding of a philosophy of man's dependence upon himself to a place where God is ruled out, and that is communism." (31) In the Commons, another member went so far as to say that the psychiatry series had advocated that "children should have no control placed over their sexual appetites." He added that by listening to ideas such as Freud's, young people might become "sex maniacs." (32)

For his part, Dunton asked the members of the Radio Committee if they understood the implications of banning particular programs. Parliament, he reminded them, had not assigned the CBC the role of deciding between right or wrong opinions, but of providing Canadians with a chance

to hear different views on an fair basis. If the Corporation were to deliberately suppress certain views, Parliament had a responsibility to re-assess its position on freedom of speech:

We have tried to carry out the task of seeing that different viewpoints do get on the air. Parliament may wish, after consideration, to change the nature of the principles which have applied. Parliament may wish possibly to say that certain opinions should not go on the air in Canada. If it does that, I hope that parliament will speak distinctly and will say clearly what the opinions are that may go on the air and what opinions may not go on the air; what opinions are to be held back from those Canadians who do want to hear them. In that way the corporation will know where it stands; the people of Canada would know what opinions can be heard and what opinions cannot be heard; and the people would know just where the limitations on the circulation of opinions in Canada lie. As I understand it, unless and until parliament changes these principles, the corporation must continue to try to apply them, and to try to see that all viewpoints which a reasonable number of Canadians wish to hear have an opportunity on the air. (33)

What Dunton suggested, essentially, was that any adjustment to balanced representation was a form of censorship. One committee member, John Diefenbaker, concurred with Dunton that neither Parliament nor the CBC could act as an arbiter of opinion. An ardent civil libertarian, Diefenbaker stood apart from most of his Conservative colleagues on the anti-religious issue:

I agree that free speech, freedom of speech, dare not be allowed to degenerate into licence, but what concerns me is this: however much I am in disagreement with what is being said so long as what is being said does not contravene the laws respecting sedition, libel or blasphemy - who am I to judge what shall be said? If we ever arrive at a position whereby the right to think and to express oneself under the law is

going to be in the custody of the C.B.C. or any other group, then once and for all we have denied freedom. Certainly, truth is relative and if we are going to take the position of being censors over what shall be said, so long as it is not blasphemous or libelous, we actually place ourselves in a position where the majority will do the thinking for the minority in the country and where truth will have been established, finalized, once and for all.(34)

The Press, too, entered the debate over the censorship of certain views. The Ottawa Citizen argued that the issue did not concern the right for spokesmen to speak, but the right of Canadians to hear different opinions and, in effect, "to search for the truth." On many occasions in the past, individuals and organizations had "tried to impose their views of truth on others." Yet it was "the search for truth rather than the dictation of particular convictions," the Citizen wrote, which had "inspired human progress through the centuries." (35) Maclean's adopted a similar historically-inspired perspective. The debate, it said, proved that "the ancient struggle to root out heresy" lived on despite such "well-meaning blunders" as the Inquisition and the witch burnings. It commended Dunton for correctly focusing on two essential questions in his remarks to the Radio Committee. Who can define heresy to everyone's satisfaction in a society which believes in freedom of thought? And who can set down rules for suppressing it once it has been defined?(36)

The Peterborough Examiner provided one of the most strongly-worded defences of the CBC. It noted that

Parliamentary critics outraged with the programs made

. . . the great mistake of assuming that religion thrives on inactivity of the mind, and that religion is going to be discredited or unseated if any opinion is expressed about it which is not utterly orthodox. This attitude does religion more harm than all the psychologists and all the philosophers in the world.

As for the association between psychology, atheism and Communism, the connection merely payed "religion a poor compliment." It was "no service to religion," the Examiner stressed, "to cloud it with such sentimental and irrational twaddle." (37)

Yet as long as broadcasts were described in such explosive terms as "atheistic" and "communistic," balanced representation remained an unacceptable principle for some segments of the press. The rhetoric of "us" versus "them" contributed to the view that limitations had to be placed on the the concept of balance. Responding to Dunton's statement that the CBC could not judge between good or bad opinions, the Montreal Gazette countered that:

According to this principle, it does not matter that Canadians are generally speaking religious. They must have their public dose of atheism. Nor does it matter that they have shown a strong repugnance for leftist views. They must have really considerable doses of leftism. And it has seemed particularly important that their overseas interpretation of British news should have the advantage of a somewhat leftist analysis.

What interests and intrigues many listeners to the CBC is not only that the public air is free to some very strange opinions: even more interesting and intriguing is the basis upon which the CBC divides up its time between the different points of view. . . .

Is it considered as evident that there must be one part atheism to so many parts belief? How can the CBC

be sure that Canadians are really getting enough of the atheistic point of view? Are they getting enough of the leftist point of view?(38)

Underlying this argument, of course, were the Gazette's conception of Canadian society and its idea of what Canadians should and should not hear. Similarly, the French-language weekly Action Catholique assumed an unusual ability to separate truth from falsehood. This led it to try to defend freedom by attacking one of its precepts:

Or le président du bureau des Gouverneurs de la Société Radio-Canada soutient qu'au nom de la liberté, on doit laissez dire ces messieurs.

Nous vivons en pays chrétien, dans un pays où l'erreur évidente, celle qui contredit les vérités fondamentales du régime, il a pas les mêmes droits que la vérité. . . .

Que des Canadiens rejettent l'Être suprême et sa morale, . . . on ne les emprisonnera pas . . . Tolérer les athées et les amoraux qui ne troublent pas l'existence des autres, c'est chrétien; mais leur fournir les moyens d'exprimer publiquement leurs erreurs par le truchement de la radio OFFICIELLE, c'est illogique, c'est criminel, c'est antidémocratique.(39)

Other critics actually criticized the CBC for not attempting to achieve balanced representation. "If the directors responsible for this outrage . . . merely wish to be 'broad-minded,'" said one newspaper editorial, "then they are grossly incompetent, for they have made no effort to present the other side of the picture. . . . If intellectual freedom be to ignore the opposing viewpoint, then this is intellectual freedom."(40) This ignored the fact that rejoinders had been provided and that other

broadcasts regularly presented orthodox religious views. It also overlooked the way in which the programs in question had achieved a degree of balance with each other. Russell, for example, had decried the view that science was man's great emancipator; on the contrary, its "intoxication" was said to be leading us dangerously into believing ourselves omnipotent. Russell had thus implicitly criticised the scientific arrogance that some critics had found in the Hoyle and psychiatry broadcasts. (41)

Still other critics claimed that balance had not been properly secured. The programs had so "challenged accepted standards of right and wrong," wrote the United Church Observer in a highly publicized article, that quick rebuttal through a forum debate was necessary to check "the propaganda effects of such lectures." (42) The CBC responded to the Observer article by saying that forum or round-table broadcasts were not always possible or even desirable in presenting controversial views. What was important was that the CBC had "always recognized its basic responsibility for maintaining a fair balance in the presentation of such [views] over a period of time" and that it would "continue to do so" in the future. (43)

The parliamentary Radio Committee remained unconvinced that this was a proper approach to the question of balance. The committee admitted that it was unable to

"express an opinion" on the broadcasts since it recognized "the right of every Canadian . . . to adhere to his own beliefs, religious or otherwise." Nevertheless, it advised the CBC that "where views on any subject are going to be expressed which are known to be controversial, care be taken to ensure that full effect is given" to the "right to answer." (44) Maclean's called this proposal at best impractical and at worst unfair. It doubted that "even the most unreasonable supporter of Lord Russell or Dr. Hoyle would claim for his man the right to interrupt every orthodox sermon heard over the CBC or follow it with an immediate postscript." (45)

Eventually, the government itself voiced its disapproval of the CBC's actions. To the surprise of many, J. J. McCann, the minister through whom the CBC reported to Parliament, told the Commons that speakers on such programs ought

to say nothing that would be either insulting or offensive to the Christian beliefs and sensibilities prevalent in this country. I think censorship to that extent might very well be employed. . . . I am bound to admit that in this particular instance probably something got over the air which would have been better for the great majority of our people not to have permitted. (46)

McCann seemed to concur with critics' views on what the programs represented and implied that government interference might be justified in the future. No doubt his remarks reflected the Prime Minister's personal

displeasure with these and other CBC programs. Before the controversy, St. Laurent had considered certain CBC commentaries to be communist in tone and had wondered whether something should be done to limit them to an "educational" role "along desirable lines . . . not too far from the middle of the road." (47) According to one CBC Governor, the Prime Minister had also been "extremely unhappy" that the last of Hoyle's talks had gone ahead. (48) While his displeasure did not result in direct interference, it prevented him from giving any show of support for the Corporations's policy of balanced representation.

This lack of official support left the impression that programs offering counter-perspectives, some of which had been in progress long before the debate, were corrective measures for alleged CBC misdeeds. For instance, in February 1952, "CBC Wednesday Night" introduced a series on philosophical and religious themes entitled "Christianity in a Scientific Age." Although the program had been in development for over a year, The Ensign boasted that its campaign had led directly to McCann's "censure," and had thus forced the CBC to start "the 'Wednesday Night' program . . . with a very different series." (49)

Government efforts to disarm criticism of the International Service further tarnished the CBC's image.

During the religious controversy, the government announced the appointment of a senior External Affairs official, ambassador Jean Dsy, as Supervisor of the Service. The appointment, the first to come from outside the CBC's ranks, gave the impression that the Department was taking charge of a bad situation left by the Corporation. Dsy's ideological outlook and political connections were especially important for soothing IS detractors. "He has good contacts in the Province of Quebec," Dana Wilgress informed External Affairs Minister Lester Pearson, "and he enjoys a favourable reputation among those circles (which find a voice in the The Ensign among others) which have been particularly critical in the past." (50) Dsy did not let the Department or the CBC's critics down; he soon began a one-man "get tough" publicity campaign based on the allegation of subversive-led neutrality.

Like the Service's critics, Dsy ignored the fact that IS broadcasts had conformed to External Affairs' program policy. Instead, he believed that less restrictive hiring practices had led "many politically unreliable persons" to be employed and that lax controls had "allowed their leftist tendencies" to "surface in unchecked broadcasts destined for Iron Curtain countries." (51) Pressure was thus brought to bear on several "questionable" employees, most of whom resigned. As one such employee explained, there was "no point in undergoing the stress of an attack

by [Désy] and emerging covered with pink paint." (52)

Once changes were effected, Désy boasted to the press that IS operations were in order. The Service's reorganization, Désy told The Ensign, ensured that it would be "engaged to the hilt in the battle for men's minds." Programs were now "frank and critical of the evils of communism to the point of combativeness," with "moral issues" having "a dominant emphasis in all broadcasts." (53) A Time magazine article on Désy proved to be especially embarrassing to the Corporation. Until recent stirrings, Time noted, few Canadians had noticed the Service's "pinko tone." To avert a scandal, the government had appointed Désy, "one of External Affairs' most dextrous hot-potato jugglers." The diplomat's assignment had been "trying," but had reached its mark:

His objective, as he announced, was to make the Service "frank and critical of the evils of Communism to the point of combativeness." Last week even the once-critical Ensign agreed that Désy had achieved his goal; the pale pinko tone no longer infiltrates the voice of International Service.

The article then added:

Unofficially, some staffers resent the new order. Sneered one, who does not like Désy or the Désy line: "Before, we were not pro-Communist . . . not anti-Communist . . . Now, we handle news stories about Communism in cowboys & Indians fashion--with the Indians always the villains."

Diplomat Désy does not mind such mutterings so long as International Service makes the sort of external noises that most Canadians like. He, like most of his countrymen, knows the difference between Redskins and Reds. (54)

Ira Dilworth, the Service's former Director, was infuriated with Dēsy's posture. He pointed out to Davidson Dunton that Dēsy's "manoeuvre" not only cast serious doubts on himself and the IS, but took "into its scope and its effects the whole of the Corporation's activities." If his regime were to fall increasingly under unanswered criticism, Dilworth could "not see how the C.B.C. as a whole, at any rate its Management," could "escape being 'smeared.'" (55)

As it turned out, however, the religion and Communism debate was the last major "cold war" controversy to beset the CBC. While government interference became a problem for the rest of the decade--particularly during the remaining years of the Liberal dynasty--it was a result of clearly partisan reasons rather than any fear of potential subversion. (56) In the House of Commons, the issue of subversion within the CBC continued to be raised, but became increasingly isolated, reduced to virtually a one-man campaign led by a Social Credit Member of Parliament. A thaw in cold war international relations, as well as America's growing weariness with the climate of suspicion and intimidation at home, caused Canadian fears of the Red boggy to die down proportionately. A development in broadcasting itself helped diffuse the issue of subversion within the CBC. Disputes over allegedly subversive programs were obscured by a new set of issues raised by

the introduction of television in September 1952.

Questions regarding the priority of its availability, whether it would be funded and developed under private or public auspices, and the type of fare which it would carry, seemed far more relevant to a country eagerly seeking a new diversion from existing international tensions.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

- 1 Donald Fleming, So Very Near: The Political Memoirs of the Honourable Donald M. Fleming, vol. 1, The Rising Years (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985), p. 186.
- 2 Cited in Dale C. Thomson, Louis St. Laurent: Canadian (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1967), p. 260.
- 3 Kenneth R. Wilson and Cyril Bassett, "Film Board Monopoly Facing Major Test?," Financial Post, 19 November 1949. The charge that the Board was perhaps a "leftist propaganda machine" seems to have been a smear tactic to benefit private film companies, since the article was mostly concerned with the NFB's alleged encroachment on their work. For discussion of the NFB controversy, see the various articles in Cinema-Canada, no. 56, June-July 1979.
- 4 Debates, 7 December 1949, p. 2863.
- 5 Watson Kirkconnell, "How Much do the Russians Know of Us," Financial Post, 10 September 1949. The "top-flight Canadian Communist" was Raymond Arthur Davies, the central figure in Kirkconnell's 1946 attack on the CBC. See Chapter II, pp. 50-52.
- 6 The process led to a handful of dismissals and transfers in 1948 and 1949 when, following the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, External Affairs provided more sensitive information on new East Bloc targets.
- 7 Debates, 6 December 1949, pp. 2825-27.
- 8 CBC, Vol. 293, File 14-1-23(4), transcript of "A Personal View," final broadcast by Fred Hoyle in series "The Nature of the Universe," 20 June 1951. The BBC originally added the segment after receiving numerous requests to hear Hoyle's religious beliefs in view of his cosmological theory. Morrison, Vol. 6, File Censorship Attempts by Pressure Groups, memorandum, E. S. Hallman to Morrison, 12 November 1951.

- 9 For instance, network religious broadcasts totalled 214 hours for the year ending in April 1951. This did not include local religious programs which the CBC also presented. Morrison, Vol. 6, File Censorship Attempts by Pressure Groups, memorandum, McEnaney to Morrison, 23 October 1951.
- 10 CBC Vol. 293, File 14-1-23(4), transcript of talk given by Dr. Ralph Williamson in series "The Nature of the Universe," 27 June 1951.
- 11 Ibid., transcript of talk given by the Rev. J. M. Kelly in series "The Nature of the Universe," 27 June 1951.
- 12 CBC, Vol. 293, File 14-1-24(1), clipping, "Not According to Hoyle," The Ensign, 30 June 1951.
- 13 Ibid., notes on the series "The Nature of the Universe" prepared for the 1951 parliamentary Radio Committee.
- 14 St. Laurent, Vol. 151, File R-90 "Duplicate," letter, R. W. Keyserlingk to St. Laurent, 14 June 1951.
- 15 CBC, Vol. 617, microfilm T-3041, Minutes of the 76th Meeting of the CBC Board of Governors, 21 and 22 June 1951, p. 469.
- 16 St. Laurent, Vol. 151, File R-90 "Duplicates," memorandum, J. W. Pickersgill to St. Laurent, 21 June 1951.
- 17 CBC, Vol. 293, File 14-1-23(4), clipping, "Dr. Chisholm Again," The Ensign, 8 September 1951.
- 18 CBC, Vol. 293, File 14-1-23(4), transcripts of six broadcasts given by Bertrand Russell in the series "Living in the Atomic Age," 21 June to 26 July 1951.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 "Urges Protest Here against CBC Programs," The Brantford Expositor, 20 October 1951.
- 21 CBC, Vol. 293, File 14-1-23(1), clipping, "Guest Opinion," The Ensign, 6 October 1951.
- 22 Debates, 19 October 1951, p. 229.
- 23 Ibid., 9 November 1951, pp. 894-95.

- 24 CBC, Vol. 293, File 14-1-24(1), clipping, "No Whitewash, Please," The Ensign, 1 December 1951.
- 25 Ibid., clipping, "A Psychiatrist Cross-Examined," The Ensign, 19 June 1952. The article was a reprint of a feature which first appeared in Life magazine, 23 January 1950).
- 26 Morrison, Vol. 6, File Censorship Attempts by Pressure Groups, public statement to the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Revenue and members of the parliamentary Radio Committee by the Association for Civil Liberties, n.d. [November 1951].
- 27 CBC, Vol. 438, file 27-9-3, transcript of talk given by Robert W. Keyserlingk over radio station CJAD Montreal, 14 January 1951.
- 28 Debates, 14 May 1951, pp. 2993-94.
- 29 CBC, vol. 293, file 14-1-24, pt. 1, clipping, "We Rest our Case," The Ensign, 13 October 1951.
- 30 "C.B.C's European Service," the Montreal Gazette, 14 March 1951. The reprint was a translation of a March editorial in Relations entitled "Service européen de Radio-Canada."
- 31 Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Radio Broadcasting 1951, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (hereafter 1951 Proceedings), pp. 33, 28, and 42.
- 32 Debates, 13 December 1951, p. 1888.
- 33 1951 Proceedings, pp. 13-14.
- 34 Ibid., p. 28.
 Diefenbaker later wrote Neil Morrison, to say he was "sorry that there should have been any criticism but that is to be expected." The CBC, he said, "is and always will be suspect by super-critical and self-appointed guardians of their own narrow prejudices who regard its every commentator as a dangerous person if he takes a view contrary to theirs." Morrison, Vol. 1, file PC 1952, letter, John Diefenbaker to Morrison, 14 January 1952.
- 35 "The Freedom to Listen," Ottawa Citizen, 27 November 1951.

- 36 "Religious Censorship and the CBC," Maclean's, 1 January 1952.
- 37 "The CBC Committee Shows its Quality," Peterborough Examiner, 22 November 1951.
- 38 "What is CBC Formula of Freedom?," Montreal Gazette, 19 November 1951.
- 39 Louis-Philippe Roy, "La vérité et l'erreur a Radio-Canada," L'Action Catholique, 26 November 1951. The quotation reads roughly as follows in English:
The Chairman of the CBC Board of Governors maintains that in the name of freedom, we must let these gentlemen speak.
We live in a Christian country, in a country where obvious error, that which contradicts the fundamental truths of our system, has not the same rights as truth. . . .
Though some Canadians reject the Supreme Being and his morality, . . . we shall not imprison them . . . To tolerate atheists and the amoral who do not trouble the lives of others is Christian; but to provide them the means to publicly express their errors by way of official radio is illogical, criminal and antidemocratic.
- 40 "The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and Scientism," Nelson Prospector, 12 October 1951.
- 41 See note 18 above.
- 42 "Propaganda or Discussion," United Church Observer, 1 October 1951. Most Canadian dailies gave the article advance coverage on 27 September.
- 43 "Church Paper Attacks CBC Medical Series," Globe and Mail, 27 September 1951.
- 44 1951 Proceedings, p. 474.
- 45 "Religious Censorship and the CBC," Maclean's, 1 January 1952.
- 46 Debates, 13 December 1951, p. 1896.
- 47 St. Laurent, Vol. 151, R-90, File 22, "Weekend Review" - Confidential 1950, note, St. Laurent to Pickersgill, n.d. [November 1950].

- 48 CBC, Vol. 607, microfilm T-3041, Minutes of the 76th Meeting of the CBC Board of Governors, 21 and 22 June 1951, p. 469.
- 49 CBC, Vol. 293, File 14-1-24(1), clipping, "A Great Improvement," The Ensign, 9 February 1952.
Morrison had predicted that the series would be seen "as a sop" to critics. Morrison, Vol. 1, file PC 1952, letter, Morrison to Barry MacDonald, 8 February 1952.
- 50 Memorandum, D. Wilgress to Minister (Lester Pearson), 2 May 1953, cited in Bernard J. Hibbitts, "The CBC International Service as a Psychological Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy in the Cold War, 1948-1963" (M.A. thesis, Carleton University, 1981), p. 95.
- 51 Draft memorandum, Jean Dsy for Lester Pearson, 26 May 1953, cited in Hibbitts, "The CBC International Service."
- 52 Morrison, Vol. 1, File PC 1952, letter, Elspeth Chisholm to Morrison, 22 July 1952.
- 53 PAC, Jean Dsy Papers, Vol. 3, clipping, "Impetus Sparks CBC," The Ensign, 21 June 1952.
- 54 "A Change of Voice," Time (Canadian edition), 21 July 1952.
- 55 CBC, Vol. 988, File 11, memorandum, Ira Dilworth to Dunton, 1 August 1952.
- 56 For an account of government interference for the remainder of the 1950s, see Peers, The Public Eye, pp. 115-123 and 193-202.

CONCLUSION

The arrival of the cold war in 1946 came at a critical period in the development of CBC public affairs. Such programming had been a cause for concern since the Corporation had established its policy on controversial broadcasting in 1939. The government had suppressed open and frank discussion until the later war years, and even then interfered with programs which began to develop. By the advent of the cold war, the principle of balanced representation was still not firmly secured. The CBC's response to cold war demands for conformity was thus a critical factor in the future development of public affairs programming.

During the cold war period, the CBC did not, by and large, succumb to either public or ministerial pressure. This does not rule out the possibility that there was a certain amount of self-censorship, an "indefinable process" where "cumulative experience teaches you where your borders are and how far you can go." (1) Nevertheless, the fact that many public affairs programs continued to draw criticism is a strong indication that Talks officials were not overtly intimidated into "playing

it safe." On the contrary, they showed on a number of occasions their determination to preserve and protect the integrity of their programs.

Our study shows how fervidly some groups and individuals sought to preserve orthodoxy in the way Canadians thought at the time. They believed that if radio was to be at all educational, it should be confined to reinforcing solid principles and upholding established truths. It could be constructive, but only in an auxiliary fashion. Airing views critical of certain aspects of society or favourable to its reconstruction was a disconcerting prospect.

In some cases, the fear of subversion was a genuine, albeit mistaken, inspiration for stifling the expression of certain views over the airwaves. Some Canadians believed that unorthodox opinion was a slow poison for Canadian society; airing this opinion could only serve subversive ends. Such a belief displayed not only intolerance toward heterodoxy, but contempt for the general population's ability to make sound decisions based on the testimony of divergent opinion. Based on the subtle manner in which "dangerous" ideas were said to manipulate people's minds, a number of groups and individuals seemed prepared to decide what Canadians should and should not hear on the CBC.

In other cases, however, the bogey of subversion was

roused and exploited to protect vested interests and positions of power. To some extent, this occurred with respect to broadcasting itself. The attacks made by one monitoring report were launched, in part, to further the interests of private broadcasters. But such assaults usually stemmed from the belief that certain public affairs broadcasts threatened the status quo. In this respect, critics imitated certain American conservatives who tried to limit reform by linking it to communist subversion and, conversely, associating conservatism with loyalty, religion, and vigilance against evil. Attacks often had as much to do with exposing the alleged transformation of Canadian society through "alien" ideals as with uncovering communist subversion.

In either instance, the CBC's principle of balanced representation of opinion became a focus of debate. At times criticism centred on whether the principle was appropriate in supposedly dangerous times. More frequently, questions arose as to whether balanced representation was enforced or properly attained. In the latter case, many critics underhandedly used the concept of balance for their own ends by focusing on certain expressed views while ignoring others. In so doing, they drew a deliberately distorted picture of what was said over the air and claimed that the CBC was an agency of leftist propaganda.

Certain methods of achieving balance left some public affairs programs more open to criticism. In the case of commentaries, for example, balance was to be attained over a period of weeks. Listeners who disagreed with one commentator's views did not always hear the opinions of another in later broadcasts and sometimes concluded the CBC was biased. Yet, despite this possibility, officials in Talks and Public Affairs resisted "ghettoizing" forthright opinion to forum discussions. While the method of quick rebuttal afforded unique insights on public issues, Talks producers knew that less confrontational programs yielded equally important perspectives which forums only provided with difficulty. Reliance on safer formats, they realized, would only serve to arrest the imaginative and creative possibilities of exploring public issues.

As the religious controversy showed, however, the public's perception of whether balance was maintained or not could not be overlooked. Thinkers like Freud and Russell were still the focus of many a church sermon on the alleged evils of modern thought. Moreover, the fluidity of the term "communist" made such figures and their ideas easy targets. While balance had been sought in a number of ways, the Talks department probably exercised poor judgement in scheduling the broadcasts in question so closely in succession.

The absence of an overt cold war witch-hunt in Canada has often been taken to represent an unqualified Canadian tolerance towards heterodoxy. Our study has shown that such a belief is less than completely justified; when the opportunity was provided for others to "prod," reaction did surface. To be sure, the reaction elicited by the CBC was perhaps exceptional. Yet one wonders whether an inability to challenge centres of power through other media channels was also responsible for the general appearance of non-controversy in Canada. The absence of a witch-hunt, in other words, should not be automatically taken as proof of greater tolerance; so-called "witches" were perhaps given few other opportunities to speak out, making a counter-assault unnecessary.

The existence of public broadcasting may itself have been an important institutional difference with the United States which helped cultivate sobriety and restraint. Popular mass media drew considerable attention because, rightly or wrongly, they were seen as powerful influences on public opinion. In the United States, however, their corporate nature made them especially susceptible to red-baiting. At the risk of losing advertising dollars or box office receipts, American media industries purged themselves of "potential subversives" and accepted the vetting services of enterprising investigators who otherwise withheld their "protection" by naming names. (2)

The CBC, though, was accountable to the Canadian people through Parliament, not to the corporate dictates of profit-making. Prior considerations of what sold best and least offended a lowest-common-denominator audience were not paramount, making boycotts by sponsors and ad agencies academic. Though indirect political pressure could be considerable, the issue of what would or would not go on the air was at least openly debated in public.

The critical reaction provoked by CBC public affairs during the cold war may indicate that the Corporation was one of Canada's foremost institutions which consistently tackled public issues and included unorthodox opinions in their discussion. Its efforts in public affairs at the time stand out as one of the few positive strikes against the emergence of a cold war mentality in Canada which went beyond the simple decision not to ride the crest of an anti-communist wave. Talks programming familiarized Canadians with a variety of issues and ideas and asked them to form responsible opinions based on given testimony, not on what was alleged to be disloyal or dangerous. In so doing, the CBC probably helped foster a degree of fair judgement which kept certain ideas "afloat" as legitimate options rather than drown in distrust and misunderstanding. In all, that the CBC continued to present programs fielding a variety of opinions cannot be taken as evidence that a cold war "mentality" did not

exist in Canada; what is remarkable is the perseverance to do so in spite of such a mentality.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

- 1 Piers Handling, "Censorship and Scares," Cinema Canada, No. 56 (June-July 1979), p. 28.
- 2 Eric Barnouw, A History of Broadcasting in the United States, Vol. 2, The Golden Web 1933-1953 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 256-73; Cate, The Great Fear, pp. 522-32.

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