INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

**ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600**

UMI[®]

**Inclusive and exclusive spaces:
A look at ethnic television in Canada**

By

Sharon Mah, BA (Hons.)

**A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduated Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of**

Master of Arts

**Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
May, 2001**

**National Library
of Canada**

**Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services**

**395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada**

**Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada**

**Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques**

**395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada**

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-66835-5

Canada

**THESIS ACCEPTANCE FORM
M.A. CANDIDATE**

**The undersigned recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
and Research acceptance of the thesis**

**Inclusive and exclusive spaces:
A look at ethnic television in Canada**

**submitted by Sharon Mah, B.A.
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts**

Thesis Supervisor

Chair, School of Journalism and Communication

Carleton University

Abstract

This thesis argues that the limitations in the political economy of Canada's ethnic television broadcasting system hinder ethnic television services from reflecting the identity of Canada's ethnic minorities. Furthermore, the limitations in the political economy of ethnic television create inclusive and exclusive spaces. The examination of the limitations within the political economy of ethnic television broadcasting reveals three findings. First, ethnic television is moving towards larger corporations that increase the efficiency of content delivery. Secondly, the competition between specialty services for carriage and the de-coupling of content from identity creates inclusive and exclusive spaces in ethnic television broadcasting. Thirdly, the limitations in the political economy of ethnic television challenge the viability of the ethnospheres.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Karim H. Karim for making this project possible. His patience, comments, and his own commitment to expanding ethnic minority media studies have encouraged me.

I would also like to thank my colleagues Jeff Ashe, Nadine Kozak and Mariska teMeer for keeping me company. Thanks to Nadine for reading my thesis and for being there.

I am, as always, grateful to my family for their unconditional love and support. And thanks always to God for giving me the opportunity to learn.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Chapter 1 Theoretical foundation.....	5
1.1 Habermas' public sphere.....	5
1.2 Critiquing the Habermasian public sphere.....	7
A) <i>The degeneration of the public sphere</i>	12
B) <i>The transformation of the modern public sphere</i>	15
1.3) Television and the Canadian ethnospheres.....	20
Chapter 2 Ethnocultural communities evaluate television broadcasting: Feb. 1, 2 & 3 1999.....	23
2.1 Viewing ethnocultural television.....	25
2.2 A vision for the ethnic broadcasting system	
A) <i>Canadian Content</i>	30
B) <i>Foreign Programming</i>	33
2.3 Monitoring the system: Counting the players.....	37
2.4 The policy process.....	42
Chapter 3 Canadian broadcasting policies and Cancon.....	44
3.1 Contextualizing the state in television broadcasting.....	45
3.2) The Canadian content question.....	50
A) <i>Creating inclusive spaces</i>	51
B) <i>Creating exclusive spaces</i>	55
C) <i>Challenging the development of exclusive spaces</i>	59
D) <i>The future of Canadian content production</i>	61
3.3) Inclusive and exclusive spaces in Canada's television broadcasting industry.....	64
Chapter 4 Ethnic Television Broadcasting in Canada.....	66
4.1) Establishing the context: ethnic language market.....	67
4.2) Inclusive and exclusive spaces in Content	
A) <i>The need for more ethnic content</i>	69

B) <i>The political economy of ethnic television content</i>	72
C) <i>Incentives to increase ethnic television content</i>	74
D) <i>The technological drive for more content</i>	77
4.3 Limits in the broadcasting technology.....	81
4.4) Beyond policy: Maximizing corporate size.....	84
4.5 Exclusive and inclusive spaces.....	89
Chapter 5 The Chinese-Canadian television market	93
5.1 Recommendations to the CRTC on Feb. 1999	93
5.2 Reaching the Chinese language market	
A) <i>Background: The broadcasters</i>	96
B) <i>Market reach</i>	99
C) <i>The audience that Fairchild and CFMT-TV misses</i>	104
5.3) The implications of Chinese language television.....	106
Chapter 6 Concluding Remarks	111
References	118
APPENDIX A Public Notice CRTC 2000-42.....	127
APPENDIX B Fairchild Television corporate structure.....	132
APPENDIX C Shaw and Corus corporate structure.....	134
APPENDIX D Rogers Communication Ltd. corporate structure.....	136

Introduction to Inclusive and exclusive spaces, 1998-2000

Canada's ethnic minority broadcasting structure is emerging at a time when other nations are concerned with ethnicity and the clashes between cultures (Morley and Robins, 1996). Identity is not the dilemma of one nation; identity is the dilemma of many nations, individuals, and communities who desire to define themselves. The problem of defining "self" involves many actors with a variety of approaches towards identity. In many political and sociological circles, identity is a debate about recognizing or affirming cultural differences (Young, 1995; Taylor, 1994). The debates concern creating a harmonious society, to recognize and rectify the injustices committed by states and institutions on former colonies, immigrants, Native peoples, and women. In many ways, the solution to the injustices of nations depended on the "communication revolution" or the "technological revolution," the belief that communication technology can enable all communities to connect, obtain information, and culture based on interest and identity, but the faith in communication technology to obliterate the divisions between communities failed in the late 1970s (Mattelart, 1994). The political economy of communication systems divided along political and economic power, often perpetuating the same patterns that hampered communities from political and economic power. The identity of individuals, and communities challenges the development of communication systems that facilitate cultural and information flows for public discourse in western democracies.

The approach that some academics in ethnic minority media studies have focused on, to understand the role of communication systems and identity, is media usage within ethnic minority communities, communities established along cultural and linguistic

similarities (Kolar-Panov, 1997). Often, the ethnic minority communities' media usages are in relation to building new communities in their new country of residence.

Ethnographic studies such as Kolar-Panov's (1997) work provide important information on how ethnic minority identity influences media usage and how ethnic minorities adapt to changes in their new communities. Ethnographic studies, however, fail to situate the study of the media in relation to the larger hegemonic society and the political economy of the communication system in the nation. The flaw with not addressing the political economy of the communication systems is that ethnic minorities appear as active participants in media consumption without understanding the constraints in the political economy of the communication system that governs the choices available for consumption.

Other studies attempt to address the political economy of the communication system in the nation, but fail to examine the policies that create the communication system (Riggins, 1992; Husband, 1994). Studies on the political economy of the communication systems, usually television broadcasting, provide insightful analysis of the state's role in developing initiatives to include ethnic minorities within the broadcasting system. The studies often include the role that ethnic minority communities play in developing ethnic minority media. Studies on the political economy of ethnic minority media such as Riggins' (1992) and Husband's (1994) work, however, fail to examine ethnic minority media as a cultural industry with corporations, state agencies, and ethnic minority communities interacting with each other to develop ethnic minority media. In addition, the studies often fail to examine the transactions between corporations that limit the development of ethnic minority media and curb the information flows between ethnic minority communities. The transactions between

various actors in the political economy of the communication system reveal the obstacles and opportunities for the media structures to facilitate programming for ethnic minorities.

In an attempt to unravel all the nuances of identity, from gender to ethnicity, many academics have created an array of perspectives to understand identity. Ethnicity is an important element of an individual's identity. Although there are many different definitions of ethnicity in the sociological and political sciences, the understanding of ethnicity this thesis uses is the cultural and linguistic characteristics that individuals ascribe themselves to form communities. In a time of rapid information, cultural, and migratory flows between nations an individual's identity is not always transparent, though the individual may know his or her ethnicity. Ethnicity and all the variations of the term "ethnic", in terms of identity, is increasingly complex as many use the term "ethnic" to describe minority populations that have hybrid identities. Hybrid identities involve compounding two or more ethnicities, which may also include an individual's relocation from one place to another. What is important to understand is that majority populations also have ethnic identities.

The problem that faces the development of public policies is the nebulous understanding of ethnicity as an identity ascribed primarily to minority populations. Although Canada's ethnic minority television structure provides an opportunity for exploring the role that corporations, state agencies, and ethnic minority communities play in the development of ethnic minority media, ethnic minority media is imbued with a dubious understanding of ethnicity that defines ethnic minority media as something other than mainstream. The broadcasting policies governing Canadian ethnic minority broadcasting uses the terms "ethnic broadcasting", "ethnic content", and "ethnocultural

communities". This thesis will use the term "ethnic minority" to recognize that all Canadians possess an ethnicity.

Canada's multicultural society of diverse identities challenges the existing television system to provide programming for all the different ethnic minority communities. Most ethnic minorities in Canada, individuals of a cultural heritage in the minority population outside of French, English and Native Canadian, want to belong to their Canada. Mainstream media, however, fail to reflect the identity of ethnic minorities. Often ethnic minorities seek to understand the social, political, economic and cultural context of Canada, but the political economy of television broadcasting hampers the development of relevant television content for each ethnic minority community, communities other than those from France, the British Isles or Native Canadian.¹

The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) recognized the need for an ethnic minority broadcasting system that specifically addressed the ethnic minority communities. CFMT-TV (Canada's multilingual television station) was the first television service for ethnic minorities in Toronto. Since the licensing of CFMT-TV in 1978, the demand for ethnic minority television² has grown, culminating with an official broadcasting policy to specifically govern ethnic minority broadcasting services to the ethnic minority communities in *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139*. After fourteen years, however, of ethnic minority broadcasting regulation under *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139*, a review of ethnic minority broadcasting in 1999 revealed

¹ Ethnic minority communities are in reference to the communities across Canada that share linguistic and cultural similarity. In this discussion of the ethnic minority broadcasting system, Aboriginal Canadians are not included in the term "ethnic minority". The CRTC's separation of the broadcasting system creates a false division between the different types of audiences. Aboriginal Canadians are indeed ethnic minorities, but the policy does not govern Aboriginal television.

² Ethnic minority television is in reference to television for ethnic minorities based on language and cultural content governed by the *Ethnic broadcasting policy*.

the inadequacy in technological access to ethnic minority content and the low quality of ethnic minority programs on television.³ The CRTC responded to the 1999 review of *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139* by revamping the policy as the *Ethnic broadcasting policy*.⁴ In addition, the CRTC seized the opportunity to use digital and satellite technology to avail specialty television services for various ethnic minority communities. The television industry's renewed optimism in digital broadcasting technology and direct-to-home satellites seemed to make the possibility of cultural and linguistic representation for all Canadians a possibility.

With the development of new satellite and digital broadcasting technology, the Canadian broadcasting system could facilitate dialogue in the ethnospheres -- spheres of public discourse based on ethnic identity.⁵ For some, ethnic minority television may be on the cusp of fulfilling the CRTC's objective of linguistic and cultural representation for Canada's ethnic minority communities. This thesis, however, argues that the limitations in the political economy of Canada's ethnic minority television broadcasting system hinders ethnic minority television services from reflecting the identity of Canada's ethnic minorities. Furthermore, the limitations in the political economy of ethnic minority television create inclusive and exclusive spaces. The inclusive spaces in the broadcasting structure refer to the ability of the policies to support ethnic minority broadcasting to

³ The CRTC defines ethnic content as any program that is "one, in any language, that is specifically directed to any culturally or racially distinct group other than one that is Aboriginal Canadian or from France or the British Isles" CRTC, July 16, 1999). The definition excludes Aboriginal Canadian and those from France and the British Isles as individuals without ethnicity. The CRTC's definition of programming for ethnic minorities is incorrect since Aboriginal Canadians and French Canadians are also ethnic minorities within Canada. Consequently, the thesis will use the term ethnic minority content rather than ethnic content. If "ethnic content" is written, the thesis refers to the CRTC's category of programming in the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy*.

⁴ The CRTC's title "*Ethnic broadcasting policy*" fails to distinguish the difference between programming for ethnic minority communities and the dominant populations.

⁵ The usage of the term "ethnospheres" is different from Appadurai's ethnoscape (1996). Appadurai indicates that individuals moving from different locations into the nation constitute the ethnoscape (33).

perpetuate ethnic minority Canadian identity, while the exclusive spaces refer to the ability of policies to exclude or separate ethnic minority communities within the ethnic minority television broadcasting structure. The limitations in the political economy of Canada's ethnic minority television broadcasting structure create both inclusive and exclusive spaces that hinder television from reflecting the identity of ethnic minority Canadians. The purpose of this research is to contribute to a query of how ethnic minority television can facilitate the expansion of Canada's public sphere. The thesis takes the perspective that television facilitates public discourse between individuals within an ethnosphere, but the limitations in the political economy of ethnic minority television broadcasting hinder public discourse.

As such, a content analysis of the various programs and the debates between and within ethnic minority communities exceed the parameters of this thesis project. Instead, this thesis examines the current discussions on Canada's cultural industries and the hearings surrounding the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy* involving the CRTC, various ethnic minority organizations and television corporations.⁶ The policy analysis on Canada's ethnic minority television broadcasting structure focuses on the broadcasting policies and submissions made to the CRTC from 1998 to 2000 concerning ethnic minority television broadcasting.

Ethnospheres, however, are locations of public discourse within the nation. Ethnospheres are further examined on page 16.

⁶ Ethnic minority organizations are in reference to the groups advocating the interests of the ethnic minority communities before the CRTC during the 1999 review of *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139*.

Chapter 1

Theoretical Foundation

Habermas' *Structural transformation of the bourgeois public sphere* provides a theoretical starting point to understand the intersection between the media, the ethnic minority communities, and the state. Although his work did not consider the ethnic minority communities in contemporary Canada, his focus on debate as the key to emancipation against the possibilities of administrative domination in the eighteenth century provides this thesis an impetus to consider the limits in the political economy of television broadcasting that hinder public discourse in the ethnospheres. The ethnospheres, unlike Habermas' bourgeois public sphere, are circumscribed according to ethnicity rather than class. Habermas' work reveals three primary elements that transform an understanding of the single sphere of public discourse to multiple interconnected spheres: the capitalist economy, the media, and the identity of the participants. The Habermasian public sphere does not describe the discourse between ethnic minorities in the ethnic minority communities nor does the Habermasian public sphere offers an explanation for the association between ethnicity and information consumption.

This chapter examines three elements of Habermas' *Structural transformation* for an understanding of the ethnospheres as a means of conceiving the limitations within the political economy of ethnic minority television broadcasting. The objective is to establish an understanding of the difference between a vision of television providing information that facilitates public discourse and the reality of the obstacles in the political economy of ethnic minority television that restrict discourse. The discussion is divided into three sections: first, the chapter describes Habermas' bourgeois public sphere. Secondly, the chapter analyzes the Habermasian public sphere and directs the discussion

towards the ethnospheres. Thirdly, the chapter concludes with the importance of television broadcasting information that reflects the ethnospheres. The diagram below illustrates the process of examining Habermas public sphere and reconfiguring a single sphere of debate to multiple interconnected spheres of public discourse.

1.1 Habermas' public sphere

Habermas (1989) indicates that the public sphere of eighteenth century Europe was composed of private individuals gathered in various coffee houses in Britain, the salons in France, and the table societies in Germany to debate over rules governing commodity exchange and labour issues. The debate amongst the bourgeoisie prohibited the public authority from controlling the economy (27). The bourgeoisie's rational debates were more than a process of legitimating the ruler's authority. Instead, the bourgeoisie's principle objective was to change the domination of the ruler through public discourse (28). The public sphere was the meeting place of private concerns, commodity exchange, and the state's concern for a legitimate government (57). The separation of private and public concerns allows society to engage in critical debate. The distinction between public and private spheres encouraged citizens to develop opinions and reasons separate from the state -- in essence the freedom to cultivate life away from the scrutiny of government authorities. In bourgeois society, the family was the training ground for public debate where the private issues of individuals were publicly addressed in the realm

of the family. This familiar forum of open critique became an institution fostering critical debate outside the family in salons and coffeehouses. These two distinct spheres, public and private, formed a relationship where one could influence the function of the other. Habermas' public sphere reveals the intricate relationship between the various structures that influence the bourgeoisie's ability to receive information for public discourse.

Figure 1: Three concepts of the Habermasian public sphere

The three relevant concepts for this thesis discussion involve the capitalist economy, the media, and the identity of the participants. The three concepts illustrated in figure one provide a foundation for understanding the Habermasian public sphere. First, the bourgeois public sphere can only exist in a capitalist economy where the state and the economy operate separately from one another. The bourgeois public sphere has the power to change the state and the economy when the economy is free from the direct influence of the government. The economy reflects the interests of private citizens, but the law must protect the free market from the state (79). The separation between the economy and the state offers two routes of analysis: first, the analysis of state policies implemented to protect the economy from intrusive government action. Secondly, the analysis on the fluctuations in the market that reflect commodity exchange and industry expansion. Both routes of analysis are intertwined as economy affects the state and visa versa.

Secondly, the capitalists in eighteenth century Britain spurred the development of news pamphlets and journals through commerce and trade that provided information for public discourse. The capitalists depended on immediate information about the fluctuations in the markets, compelling merchants to exchange newsletters through newsdealers between cities (16). Later, political journals published by the same news bureaus gathered the academics' opinions of state policies. The state also used the journals to publish information for the reading public concerning taxes, foreign trade, and the prices of commodity goods (22). The development of journals was market driven and journals' continual success depended upon their relevance to various consumers. The movement of information from the realm of the government into the public sphere encouraged the transfer of political power from the state to the public. The public sphere represented the will of the people. When the public sphere was institutionalized "'they,' the subjects of public opinion, were no longer treated as people whom, like 'strangers,' one could exclude from deliberations. Step by step the absolutism of Parliament had to retreat before their sovereignty" (66). When the public sphere was institutionalized the bourgeoisie's opinions could challenge the state's power. The media facilitated public opinion by spreading information for debate in the public sphere. Consequently, the media are important actors in the relationship between the bourgeoisie and the state.

Thirdly, the Habermasian public sphere involved the men of nobility, merchant, and intellectual classes. Although Habermas distinguishes the difference between capitalists (merchants, bankers, entrepreneurs, and manufactures) and state administrators (doctors, pastors, professors, and scholars), these individuals were all men with a particular type of education and wealth. Habermas emphasizes that the real carriers of the public sphere were the capitalists who could not simply be integrated with the nobility

(23). Nevertheless, these two categories of men met each other on an equal footing, where "the mind was no longer in the service of a patron: 'opinion' became emancipated from the bonds of economic dependence" (33). Although each individual came from a different economic and social class, the individuals were valued for the reason they possessed and therefore, their opinions were vital to analyzing economic and political issues. Reason liberated individuals from the rigid class system, which had determined the right to rule based on lineage.⁷

The three concepts of the public sphere influence the current discussions on the state, private citizens and their identities; as well as the inclusive and exclusive nature of the public sphere. Although each of the three concepts facilitate the existence of the public sphere, each also hindered the public sphere from being an inclusive forum for all individuals. The exclusiveness of the bourgeois public sphere was one of the reasons it remained political. Habermas argues that the combination of the three concepts degenerated the public sphere. The degeneration of the public sphere arose from the commercialization of the media in a capitalist economy: the rules of the market are incorporated in the media and the media reflects the markets interests.⁸ Figure two, illustrates Habermas' commercial media and the possibilities of degenerating the public sphere. In figure two, the concept of the identity of the participants has not been incorporated into the commercial media. Habermas did not continue to discuss the affects of the participants' identity on commercial media.

⁷ Many, however, argue that reason liberated individuals from the social hierarchy and myths in the form of religion. Reason is liberating, but reason also leads to larger bureaucracies with greater administrative power that may dominate public opinion (Held, 1996: 174-177).

⁸ In the next section, the combination of the capitalist economy and the media is furthered examination in the next section.

Figure 2: Commercial media and the public sphere

Although Habermas recognizes astutely the bond between the capitalist economy and the media, he fails to address accurately the importance of the participants' identity in the public sphere. The eighteenth century public sphere was exclusive to men and to the bourgeois class. The participants' gender, class, and the unspoken ethnicity of the individuals' identities are paramount to their involvement in the public sphere (Ryan, 1991; Fraser, 1991).⁹ In addition, Habermas (1989) does not discuss the plebeian public sphere or any other public sphere in which different classes of individuals participated to influence the state and the hegemonic public sphere. Publicness can exist outside the bourgeois public sphere. The Jacobinian intelligentsia and peasants also engaged in rational debate outside the bourgeois public sphere (Eley, 1991: 304).¹⁰ The existence of alternative public spheres, in opposition to the hegemonic public sphere and the state, compels further analysis into how ethnospheres may occupy a similar position based on ethnicity rather than class. An examination into the ethnospheres, or alternative public spheres based on ethnicity, challenges Habermas' proposal that the public sphere degenerates as it become less exclusive to the rest of the population. He suggests that

⁹ In response to Ryan's (1991) and Fraser's (1991) comments on the exclusiveness of the bourgeois public sphere, Habermas agrees that the transformation of the public sphere remained patriarchal. He indicates that women, however, gained political rights, greater social benefits and consequently, they have modified their underprivileged status in contemporary society (1991: 428). Habermas makes a distinction between the bourgeois public sphere, which was exclusive, and the changing dynamics within society.

¹⁰ Although Habermas concedes that the plebeian public sphere existed, it was ultimately absorbed into the bourgeois public sphere (1991: 426). This is difficult to accept since the plebeian public sphere was based on class. Although rational debate is concerned only with the argument that individuals articulate, the plebeians' arguments are decisively marked by their class based arguments concerning their social, political, and economic needs.

pluralism is one of the signs of the degeneration in the public sphere, followed by the lost of rational debate against the state. According to Habermas, the commercialization of the media and the increasing number of participants in the public sphere led to the demise of the public sphere.

1.2 Critiquing the Habermasian public sphere

A) *The degeneration of the public sphere*

Figure 3: Degeneration or transformation?

The degeneration of the bourgeois public sphere involves the first two concepts of the bourgeois public sphere: the capitalist market and the media combine to form the commercial media. Habermas suggests that the commercial media contaminated the public sphere. The symptom of the degeneration of the public sphere was the media's changing role from facilitators of public discourse to objects of consumption. The market of commodity exchange, that was once the topic of public debate, commercialized the media, and expanded the boundaries of the market. The media's foundation on a capitalist ownership structure facilitated information dissemination in the market, increasing the size of their market reach; the media could become stronger, larger, and more influential. The media, as the children of the bourgeois class, were maturing into active market players who no longer depended on their connections to the bourgeois class. As mature players in the free market, the media created their own rules, explored new territories in entertainment, and left the bourgeois class and moved into the world of profits.

The bourgeois media, as facilitators of public discourse and consumer commodities, however, led to the demise of the bourgeois public sphere. The media, once favoring critical debates as information, were now craving for novels, public relations pieces, and advertisements to appeal to more consumers (175). The format of the journals and newsletters encouraged political institutions to treat individuals as consumers of information rather than as citizens. The press and the political parties, both desired to garner the favor of the reader: one in terms of sales and the other, for the reader's vote (176). The media could no longer act as forums for rational debate; rather, the media became manipulative instruments (178). The media contributed to de-politicizing the bourgeois public sphere as they matured into free market corporations that played and re-invented the rules of profit maximization.

The bourgeoisie allowed the market that encouraged public discourse and resistance against state domination to become the catalysis for the media to degenerate the public sphere through the commercialization of the media. Rather than acting as the channel for public debate, the media brought the citizens to the market -- challenging all media consumers to appeal to the common themes of profit, consumption, and information products. The public sphere was no longer the domain for public debate. Rather, the media propagated commodity consumption, reflecting the economy, and the state's agenda. Consequently, the public sphere changed from a place of rational debate against the state to a place reflecting the state and the economy. The media changed from non-partisan to partisan. The commercialization of the media, as information and cultural products and as the instruments of the market, leads not only to increasing the circulation velocity of commodity and money exchange, but to also increasing commodity consumption beyond national and geographic boundaries. The increase in circulation and

expansion of the market promotes the sale of more commodity goods (Marx, 1973). The media were the instruments that perpetuated their own growth.

The market, however, does not adhere to political boundaries or the cultural divisions between societies. In contemporary democracy, national public spheres are difficult to conceptualize with increasing information, cultural, and human migratory flows. The diasporic movements have changed the demographics within the cities, while the media have disembedded cultures from the various locations in the world to diversify and challenge any notion of authentic identities (Lash and Urry, 1994). During the eighteenth century, at the time of the bourgeois public sphere, the media were still relatively confined to a single nation. Today, the speed of information transmission and the number of media outlets have expanded greatly. Various media organizations sell information about their clients, making the information on their clients commodities goods (Gandy, 1993). Thus, audiences can be delivered to various businesses, social and political organizations, regardless of national or cultural affiliation (Featherstone, 1995). It seems the cultural industries deceive more people than the media of the eighteenth century; the individuals themselves become the commodities they purchase as the cultural industries continue to produce cultural products (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1995). Commercialized media targets individuals as markets for information and cultural products for entertainment rather than information for critical debate. Habermas' concept of a degenerative public sphere where capital controls the organization's function and methods of operation, challenges individual emancipation through rational discourse. The domination of the base (economy) and superstructure (government) seem complete. If the superstructure constructs the public sphere or civil society, the discourse between citizens perpetuates the power of the superstructure and the state's legitimacy. If the

economy structures civil society and the public sphere, corporations control discourse. Neither possibility is desirable because both lead to domination. The dilemma that challenges Habermas' concept of human emancipation through rational debate in a degenerative public sphere is problematic.¹¹

The evidence for the complete degeneration of the public sphere arising from the commercial media, however, is inconclusive. Instead, Habermas' proposal that the public sphere degenerates when all players abide by the rules of the economy should be treated as a prophetic warning to nations that reject the opinion of their citizens and allow the media to become commercialized to the extent that public opinions are stifled. In the discussion below, the identity of the participants serves as a concept to reconfigure an understanding of the public sphere in Canada.

B) *The transformation of the modern public sphere*

Figure 4: Transforming the single sphere

Figure four illustrates the Habermasian public sphere, a single sphere based on the bourgeois class, being transformed into multiple ethnospheres that interact with each other and the hegemonic sphere. The commercial media provide information and cultural content for the various ethnospheres. The single sphere of public discourse is being reconfigured to include the identity of the participants based on ethnicity. The

¹¹ Habermas' (1987) work, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, attempts to resolve this dilemma.

ethnospheres provide a representative model of the spheres of public discourse.¹²

Rational discourse between the participants exists in the ethnospheres to resist the domination of the state. In the Canadian context, the participants in the ethnospheres dialogue with one another on issues arising from the hegemonic public sphere, the Canadian state, and other ethnospheres. The identity component of public participation also transforms the perception of public debate as an exclusive bourgeois activity to an activity for most individuals with different cultural and linguistic identities. The commercial media facilitates public discourse in the ethnospheres.

Some, however, may disagree that the media act as facilitators for public discourse. Husband (1994), Cunningham and Sinclair (2000) propose that rational debate is located within the ethnic minority media. According to Husband (1994), Cunningham and Sinclair (2000), ethnic minority media does not simply carry public opinion and the state's policy implementation, but the ethnic minority media are the public spheres or sphericules of public discourse. Although ethnic minority media may contain public discourse, ethnic minority media must not be embraced as the ethnospheres. The ethnospheres have three characteristics that make them distinct from ethnic minority media: first, the ethnospheres are *public places* of debate, discussion and organization rather than *the media being the space for public debate*. Secondly, the media provide information that facilitates public debate and carries contrasting public opinion. Thirdly, the ethnospheres are interconnected by flows of communication and mobile subjects to the dominant Canadian hegemonic public sphere (Lash and Urry, 1994; Giddens, 1990). Canada's ethnospheres reflect multiple spheres of dialogue that convene around concerns of ethnicity and community. The ethnospheres are places of debate against the state

¹² Other alternative spheres of public discourse can be based on gender, class, or political ideology (Lewis,

when the state denies or fails to recognize diasporic communities politically, economically, socially or culturally in the implementation of public policies. The ethnic minority groups debate against the state amongst themselves in their ethnospheres to change their political, social, and economic environment in Canada. Palmer (1991), Gibbins and Arrison (1995) reveal ethnic groups from Europe played a significant role in altering the dynamics of the politics in Western Canada. Germans, Poles, Italians, Ukrainians and many other groups were not considered significant to the largely British dominant Liberals or Progressive Conservatives parties until the populations reached a critical mass that can influence the outcome of an election.

The ethnospheres enabled ethnic minorities to change the dynamics between their communities and the government. During the eighteenth century, the bourgeoisie's resistance against the state began in the public sphere and the media spread information to facilitate public discourse. Today resistance against government policies may also begin in the ethnospheres, where organized individuals gather to influence the government and the economy. Historically, diasporic communities in Canada were denied political rights. Often the denial of political rights had tremendous affects on the social and economic status of the communities in Canada. For example, in World War Two many Japanese- Canadians were deported based on their ethnicity and many lost their property while they were imprisoned. Consequently, an examination of the ethnospheres must consider how immigrants constructed ethnospheres to resist the state's deployment of discriminatory policies based on their ethnicity. Conceiving of a single public sphere leaves no room for comprehending how each community developed, gained

economic, political, and social power to enter the Canadian public sphere.¹³ The hegemonic public sphere and the state constructed the initial narratives of each community within the nation (Said, 1979). The initial narratives constrict our understanding of different communities, subject communities to standards not of their own development and in the process whole communities become the "other" or the "exotic." Canada is still struggling to overcome the narratives of the "others." The narratives of the various ethnic minority communities do not exist in isolation: rather, the narratives of the "others" engage with the narratives from the ethnospheres.

The communication and migratory flows between diverse communities create hybrid identities from the various narratives (Bhabha, 1994). The identity component of the ethnospheres transforms the single sphere of debate into multiple ethnospheres that challenge the media to meet the diverse information and cultural content needs of ethnic minority Canadians. Ethnic minority Canadians possess hybrid identities, a composition of two or more cultural perspectives, that enables individuals to understand diverse information and cultural content. Consequently, a model for public discourse based on the ethnospheres must reflect the information and cultural content needs of ethnic minority Canadians. The model of the ethnospheres permits many questions on how the hegemonic sphere and the ethnospheres influence each other and the role the media play in facilitating the interaction between the various spheres of public discourse (Nancoo and Nancoo, 1996; Wilson, 1993). How do popular places of public debate and marginal places of debate affect each other? How do opinions arising from the hegemonic sphere

¹³ There is a difference between the Canadian hegemonic public sphere and the ethnospheres. The Canadian hegemonic public sphere is comparable to the exclusiveness of the bourgeois public sphere. Often there is more power in the hegemonic public sphere, distinguished according to ethnicity, class, and education. Some ethnic-Canadians may choose to enter the Canadian hegemonic public sphere to accomplish specific objectives.

and opinions from the ethnosphere influence each other? How are opinions from each place evaluated by the state and the economy? In addition, the model also challenges further considerations on the state's power to limit, enable, and influence the size of the ethnospheres (Valaskakis, 1992; Wilson, 1993; Con & Wickberg, 1982; Levine, 1997; Kobayashi, 1992). Lastly, using the ethnospheres as a model for approaching public discourse may reveal the power of the ethnic minority communities to resist, nurture, and radically alter the hegemonic sphere through their physical presence and communication.

The ethnic minority communities in Canada demonstrate the struggle to change government policies and the public opinion in the hegemonic public sphere. During the Second World War, the Canadian government nullified Japanese-Canadian citizenship. Before the imprisonment of Japanese-Canadians, Chinese-Canadians were subjected to discriminatory policies based on their ethnicity. These two historical examples reveal Canada's denial of the political, economic, social, and cultural aspects of ethnic minority Canadians. The opinions of many ethnic minority communities were ignored. Although ethnic minority Canadians resisted the Canadian state, their resistance, at the time, was considered inconsequential in the government's actions. From the periphery, ethnic minority communities established strong communities that fostered an atmosphere for the development of dialogues based on ethnicity. Later, ethnic minority communities learned the "language" or rules of the hegemonic sphere in order to interact effectively to change their political, social, and economic situations as they struggled to preserve their identity. Consequently, at any given time, there is an exchange of communication between the ethnospheres and the dominant public spheres. The spheres of interaction create hybrid identities that have historical roots that are unfolding and oscillate at the national and international level (Karim, 1998; Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1996; Braman, 1996). This

does not imply that the public sphere has degenerated, but rather it has radically transformed itself from the foundations of the old into the new (Touraine, 1997, 321).

1.3) Television and the Canadian ethnospheres

In Habermas' *Structural transformation*, the media facilitate public discourse by collecting the political opinions of the public and the state. Rational debate against the state could only occur when the information was available for examination. Western democracies depend on individuals to think critically about their society and act on their reasoning (Gitlin, 2000). The availability of information and culture contributes to the development of pluralistic societies. J.S. Mill wrote that society needs to maintain alternative ideas to enable individuals to be distinct from the majority:

[There is a need for protection] against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter development, and, if possible prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own (1859: 237).

In many ways, television reproduces a concept about a particular way of life, a particular culture, or ideology for seeing the world. The availability of cultural images, reaffirms an individual's identity; conversely the absence of cultural images can be a form of silencing dissenting voices or cultural hegemony (Mattelart, 1994). The television broadcasting structure not only influences ethnic minority communities' ability to participate in the ethnospheres and the hegemonic public sphere, but television also contributes to the development of cultural maintenance and social cohesion (Riggins, 1992: 3).

The CRTC must ensure that television broadcasters must increase the amount of ethnic minority content, not merely for economic reasons, but also for identity

development (Reeves, 1994).¹⁴ The identity of the participants in the ethnospheres is crucial to the transformation of a single sphere of public discourse into multiple interconnected spheres. Information transmission and production must be identity specific to support some of the discourse within the ethnospheres. Identity formation is a complex negotiation process that is political. Does the individual reader belong to the term "us" or does s/he belong in the group "other." If s/he identifies with either position or a negotiated position (Fiske, 1987), this negotiated position also needs affirmation. The identity of the individuals affects their participation in the public sphere because individuals bring private issues into the public realm. Television broadcasts and carries public opinion on identity issues in television programs (Entman, 1990; Armstrong, Neuendorf & Brentar, 1992). For example, if programs broadcast negative images of ethnic minorities, the programs contribute to stereotyping and oppression, leaving ethnic minorities with feelings of low self-esteem (Dates, 1980: 558, Armstrong et al, 1992: 156).¹⁵ The feelings of oppression affect how individuals may communicate with each other in the ethnospheres. Television images play a role in developing the beliefs of ethnic minority communities and the hegemonic populations concerning communities outside of themselves. The absence of ethnic minority images on television not only attest to the absence of the group's social and economic power, but also their political power in society (Gitlin, 1994).

The ethnospheres are characterized according to ethnicity. Ethnicity is political. Identity is political. Television is broadcasting more than information on the economy

¹⁴ Ethnic representation on television is increasing to appeal to the rising number of ethnocultural communities in the United States. Television profits by targeting their audiences with representatives from various ethnocultural communities (Atkin, 1992).

¹⁵ A person's identity effects his/her interpretation of the information or culture broadcasted on television (Morley, 1980; Dates, 1980; Brown and Schulze, 1990).

and the state. Television images also reflect, reaffirm, challenge, deconstruct and reconstruct the reality within ethnic minority Canadian communities (Karim, 1993). The confrontation between the state and the hegemonic public sphere is not only on commodity issues, but the confrontation is also on culture and language. The ethnospheres are places of debate on issues that extend beyond the economy into the realm of culture. The question for us to consider is, does Canada's existing ethnic minority broadcasting structure support the discourse in the ethnospheres.

Chapter 2
Identity and ethnic minority content:
Feb. 1, 2 & 3 1999

Habermas (1989) recognized the force of the state and the market on the ability of the media to act as facilitators for public discourse. The identity of the participants in the ethnospheres is the key for reconfiguring Habermas' single sphere of public discourse into multiple ethnospheres. Developing a television broadcasting system to incorporate the identity of the participants in the ethnospheres, however, is a difficult task. The political economy of Canada's television broadcasting system creates inclusive and exclusive spaces. The lack of finances, talent, and the small size of the ethnic market often hinder ethnic minority television from broadcasting information and culture relevant to the ethnic minority communities.

During the hearings across Canada for the *Review of the broadcasting policy reflecting Canada's linguistic and cultural diversity (Public Notice CRTC 1998-135)*, 111 presentations were made before the CRTC; out of the 111 presentations, 39 were from ethnic minority organizations.¹⁶ The policy review follows the success of *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139* to implement, at the policy level, a system governing ethnic broadcasting.¹⁷ The hearings brought suggestions from the industry and the ethnic minority communities on how to improve ethnic broadcasting in the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy*. Most of the ethnic minority organizations at the hearings petitioned the CRTC to change and reserve some of the features in *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139*.

¹⁶ The organizations are categorized according to economic or media affiliation. The organizations that had strong ties to broadcasters and distributors like SPTV were not counted as community organizations. Some of the ethnocultural organizations, such as the Arab Canadian Association of the Atlantic Provinces, are associated with other organizations; consequently, each association was counted separately from their affiliates. Aside from the broadcasters, distributors, and community organizations, a number of individuals who did not represent any organization made presentations to the CRTC.

The communities' perspectives involve the identity component of representing the participants in the ethnospheres on television.

The inability of Canada's ethnic minority television to reflect the identity of the participants in the ethnospheres is the strongest claim for improving television broadcasting. Most ethnic minority communities do not see themselves on Canada's television broadcasting system. Prior to the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy*, the content on ethnic minority television was not the right types nor the right amount of hybrid content that reflects the duality of most ethnic minorities in Canada. The ethnic minority communities wanted more television content that reflects their communities. Unfortunately, most ethnic minority organizations did not believe Canada's broadcasting system was reflecting them.

This chapter opens the discussion on the vision of ethnic minority television in Canada and introduces the political economy of ethnic minority television broadcasting. The chapter first examines the reasons behind the ethnic minority organizations' request for more ethnic minority. Secondly, the chapter examines the types of content that ethnic minority communities want supported in the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy*. The second section is divided into two parts on Canadian content and foreign content. Thirdly, the chapter examines the vision of the ethnic minority organizations' involvement in monitoring the broadcasting system. The chapter establishes the vision of ethnic minority television, but chapters 3, 4, and 5 indicate why the vision of ethnic minority television in Canada is difficult to achieve.

¹⁷ Chapter 4 discusses more policy issues.

2.1 Viewing ethnic minority television

Figure 5: Television and identity

The identity of the participants in the bourgeois public sphere of the eighteenth century was highly relevant to their ability to enter the public sphere and purchase journals and newsletters. Today, ethnic minority identity is also important for considering public participation. Figure five illustrates television broadcasting information for public discourse to the ethnospheres, but the ethnospheres are based on the ethnic identity of the participants. The media in the bourgeois public sphere catered to the bourgeoisie. Does the media in Canada appeal to the interests of the ethnic minority population? According to many ethnic minority organizations at the hearings from February 1 to 3 across Canada, the CRTC must change the broadcasting system to provide more adequate representation and service to the ethnic minority communities (The Latin American Community Council CRTC, Feb. 2, 1999, Vancouver: ref. 174; MOSAIC CRTC, Feb. 2, 1999, Vancouver: ref. 226). The communities were disappointed with Canada's broadcasting system because the system failed to reflect the diversity in the Canadian population, including the ranges of hybrid identities. The Ethnic Council of Arts commented that conventional broadcasters show a disdain and contempt towards ethnic programming, programs in any language including English and French targeted at ethnic minority communities (CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999, Toronto: ref.

139).¹⁸ The lack of third language programming,¹⁹ programming for ethnic minority communities across Canada in languages other than French, English or the Aboriginal languages, compelled many ethnic minority organizations to advocate for more ethnic minority television services (CRTC, July 16, 1999).

The ethnic minority communities cited several reasons why increasing the number of ethnic programs for some of the ethnic minority communities would be beneficial. The communities indicated that many of the ethnic broadcasting services were not connected to the communities they served. For example, the communities were not directly involved in the production and dissemination of ethnic minority, increasing the likelihood that the images would stereotype ethnic minorities. Some organizations also indicated that the high number of ethnic minority communities within the cities and the stereotypical images of ethnic minorities on mainstream television²⁰ could cause ethnic minorities to feel "a sense of embarrassment and shame [that] may become ingrained in the community" (CRTC, Feb. 2, 1999, Vancouver: ref: 226). Similarly, stereotypical images could create a sense of fear and resentment in the Canadian populace (Arab Canadian Association, CRTC, Feb. 1, Halifax: ref. 5). In addition, the existing ethnic specialty services are inadequately produced, funded and distributed, which exacerbates the condition of poor representation and the absence of representation (The Cambodian Community in Vancouver, CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999, Vancouver: ref. 50, 122). Consequently,

¹⁸ Ethnic programming is a term used in the 1999 Ethnic broadcasting policy. The term is used here to avoid mentioning all the different categories of ethnic content in the *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139*. Chapter 4 examines the different categories of ethnic programming.

¹⁹ Third language programming is a term used in the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy*. The term is used here to avoid mentioning all the different categories of ethnic content in the *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139*.

²⁰ The term "mainstream television" is used interchangeable with conventional television networks, such as Global and CTV, which reach over 70% of the audience in several regions. CFMT-TV and CJNT are not addressed as mainstream or conventional television to avoid confusion. The CRTC, however, categorizes CFMT-TV and CJNT as conventional broadcasters that reach less than 70% of the Canadian audience in a limited area.

the broadcasting system fails to serve the hegemonic population and the ethnic minority populations. The hegemonic population does not receive adequate representations of ethnic minorities and the ethnic minority communities do not receive enough television content that reflects their cultural identities. The limited number of television services that do target ethnic minority communities largely broadcast to the adult or elderly population rather than youths (Civic Youth Strategy, CRTC, Feb. 2, 1999, Vancouver: ref. 156).

If, however, a real attempt was made to provide space on the broadcasting spectrum for diverse programming in each ethnic minority community then ethnic minority communities can learn from one another (Fiji Muslim Association, CRTC, Feb. 2, 1999, Vancouver: ref. 235). The desire of the ethnic minority organizations for representation and affirmation is equal to their desire to dispel the media myths to create a more multicultural society, a society with a range of many different identities. Unfortunately, conventional broadcasters alone cannot create a circular flow of information and cultural understanding since it has a history of serving the largest and wealthiest segment of the Canadian population (The Cambodian Community in Vancouver, CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999, Vancouver: ref. 50). Ethnic minority organizations recognized that Canada's television broadcasting structure operates within a capitalist framework that inhibits the production of ethnic programming for small ethnic minority communities. Indeed, "conventional television has proven to be an inadequate response to the public's demand for multicultural programming" (Canadian Ethnocultural Council [CEC], CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999, Toronto: ref. 129).²¹ The ethnic minority communities themselves do not belong within Canada's dominant audiences, so an ethnic minority

broadcasting system must reflect the different reality of hybrid Canadians, individuals with a composition of two or more cultures and or languages. The ethnic minority organizations recognized that the failure of conventional television to serve Canada's ethnic minority populations means specialty television must bear the responsibility of broadcasting to ethnic minority communities in Canada.

Specialty television, television services broadcasted on pay-per-view or bundled with other television services in a package on cable or satellite, is limited by the political economy of television broadcasting. Most ethnic minority organizations, however, recognize specialty services are essential for meeting the needs of ethnic minority communities. In the hearings, most ethnic minority communities lamented the failure of conventional television to serve ethnic minority communities and petitioned the CRTC to refine the entire broadcasting system (public, specialty, and conventional television) to meet the needs of ethnic minority communities. The trend towards licensing specialty services for ethnic minority communities signifies the development of broadcasting space designated for ethnic broadcasting.²² The 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy* symbolically creates broadcasting space exclusively for ethnic minorities in Canada without regulations entangling conventional and public television. The identity component of reflecting ethnic minority communities is the impetus behind the expansion of ethnic broadcasting in specialty television.

What is uncertain is how reflecting ethnic minority identities can exist within the same broadcasting system that serves Anglophones, Francophones, and Native Canadians. The Center for Research Action on Race Relations (CRARR) affirms the

²¹ Multicultural programming is in reference to ethnic programming, programs in any language developed for the ethnic minorities in Canada.

²² Chapter 4 examines specialty television.

importance of creating a separate policy to address Canada's multicultural and multiracial population, but it challenges the policy title. CRARR believes the title distinguishes the broadcasting structure according to ethnicity, but Anglophones, Francophones, and Native Canadians also have ethnic identities. According to CRARR, the title alone suggests "ethnic" is an identity entirely separate from the rest of the population, an "other," that somehow does not belong. For CRARR, ethnic minority television must be seen as an integral part of the Canadian broadcasting structure rather than a communication enclave separate from the rest of the Canadian broadcasting system.

The distinction between ethnic broadcasting and broadcasting for the mainstream audiences began with *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139*, which governs ethnic minority television broadcasting. The policy creates spaces for the "others" without reforming conventional and public broadcasting. The solution for creating inclusive spaces according to identity, television services that reflect and contribute to the discourse in the ethnospheres, across the broadcasting system may become exclusive broadcasting spaces, television services that focus just on ethnic minority communities without connections to Canada. The ethnic minority communities desire, however, is to belong to Canada with a Canadian identity? The ethnic minority organizations desire to have a sense of Canadian identity compelled them to petition the CRTC to create a more inclusive broadcasting system that broadcasts Canadian ethnic and foreign produced content to reflect their hybrid identities (Canadian Ethnic Journalists' and Writers' Club, CRTC, Feb. 2, 1999, Toronto: ref. 264; CEC, CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999, Toronto: ref. 129).

2.2 A vision for the ethnic broadcasting system

Figure 6: Content reflecting identity

A) Canadian Content

Much of the ethnic minority organizations' comments stem from the failure of television to reflect the identity component of the participants in the ethnospheres.²³

Figure six illustrates the hypothetical model of television content that reflects the identity component of the ethnospheres. The identity of the participants must inform the content of television broadcasting just like identity played a large factor in the bourgeoisie's access to media. If content reflects the identity of the participants in the ethnospheres then television can facilitate public discourse in the ethnospheres. Preceding the hearings, the CRTC asked various parties how the broadcasting system could better serve the ethnic minority communities in Canada. For some ethnic minority organizations, the broadcasting system must reflect hybrid Canadian identity. Ethnic minority Canadian identity becomes synonymous with Canadian ethnic minority content, a composition of two or more cultural perspectives, reaffirming each other. Ethnic minority television content reaffirms ethnic minority Canadian identity and ethnic minority Canadians²⁴ are audiences for Canadian ethnic minority.

²³ Chapter 1 discusses the identity of the participants in the Habermasian public sphere as the factor that transforms the concept of a single sphere into multiple interconnected ethnospheres.

²⁴ The term "Canadian ethnic minority content" is not equivalent to the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy's* definition of ethnic content. The term distinguishes the "Canadian" aspect of cultural programming.

The Canadian Serbian Club believes the broadcasting system should contribute to Canada's multicultural society, where every ethnic minority community contributes to the "flavor" of the nation like a "beautiful Christmas cake" (CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999, Vol. 1: ref. 21). The metaphor of a beautiful Christmas cake in ethnic minority is a vision of what can occur in the broadcasting system, but first the television industry must recognize hybrid identities that connect ethnic minority roots and the everyday life of Canadians in Canada (Ukrainian National Federation of Canada, CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999, Toronto: ref. 13). Many of the organizations believe that the ethnic minority broadcasting system should reflect the Canadian population: the broadcasting system should have ethnic programming for the different generations of migrants and third language programming for recent migrants. Most organizations believe the system should make Canadian content (Cancon) a priority to facilitate hybrid identities without neglecting foreign productions (Center for Diverse Visible Cultures, CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999, Halifax: ref. 51). The CRTC must establish a balance between two types of programming to ensure that the broadcasting system acknowledges and affirms Canadian hybrid identities, while providing new migrants with third language programming.

At the time of the hearings, however, the Cancon regulations were counterproductive to the multicultural framework for ethnic minority television services because they did not increase the amount of content that reflects hybrid Canadian identities (Italian Canadians, Toronto District, CRTC, Feb. 2, 1999, Toronto: ref. 214). Canadian content must reflect the identity component of the ethnospheres. The identity component for information and cultural dissemination did not inform television content development. Figure six illustrates the ideal scenario of the identity component of the ethnospheres informing the production of television content, so that ethnic minority

communities can use the information in the ethnospheres. Canada's ethnic broadcasting regulations under *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139* and the Cancon regulations did not recognize the divorce between the identity component of ethnic minority communities and ethnic minority content. The type of Cancon the communities need, but *CRTC Public Notice 1985-139* and the *Cancon regulations* do not promote, are programs that reflect a Canadian perspective of the local ethnic minority communities, events in the nation, and providing information on Canada's democratic processes (The Cambodian community in Vancouver, CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999, Vancouver: ref. 50). The real value of Cancon is to create television programs that will "provide enough accurate information as fast as possible to the new landed immigrants to help them integrate" (Canadian Hispanic Congress, Vancouver, Feb. 1, 1999, Vancouver: ref. 51). Broadcasting television content that reflects the identity component of the ethnospheres creates opportunities for social cohesion, participation in Canadian society and intergenerational understanding within ethnic minority communities (CRARR, CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999, Montreal: ref. 126). Ethnic minority communities want to integrate, not assimilate, or separate from Canadian society; integration involves recognizing that ethnic minority communities belong within the mosaic. The mosaic of diversity often means including hybrid identities that are bicultural and bilingual -- if not trilingual and tri-cultural identities -- into television programming.

The ethnic minority organizations' presentations reveal that the ethnic minority content prior to the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy* did not reflect the identity component of the ethnospheres, specifically the hybrid identities of Canadians. According to the ethnic minority organizations, the lack of television content that reflects the identity component of the ethnospheres produces a gap in the Canadian population,

between those marginalised and those reflected in television content. The ethnic minority organizations' demands for more ethnic minority content that builds intergenerational relationships and develops social cohesion within and between ethnic minority communities are extravagant compared to the disparity in which their vision of the ethnic broadcasting system arises. The progress in establishing a foundation for ethnic broadcasting in *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139* must continue to support Canadian ethnic minority content, content that specifically addresses the reality of the hybrid Canadian identities, while broadcasting third language programming for new migrants still strongly connected to their country of origin. An inclusive broadcasting system for a range of Canadian identities is extravagant economically.

B) Foreign Programming²⁵

Most ethnic minority communities at the hearings strongly advocated for foreign specialty channels, third language services produced outside of Canada and Canadian ethnic minority television services. Some organizations believe that foreign specialty services, important as they are for connecting immigrants with their homelands, must not take priority over Canadian ethnic minority content since foreign language programming relayed from the homeland does not serve Canada's multicultural perspective (Italian Canadians, Toronto District, CRTC, Feb. 2, 1999, Toronto: ref. 214; Progressive Intercultural Community services Society, CRTC, Feb. 2, 1999, Vancouver: ref. 199). According to this opinion, foreign specialty services reaffirm an identity that no longer represents the communities here in Canada; the concerns of the homeland, although interesting, do not possess a Canadian perspective nor do foreign services provide

intergenerational connections. The Indo-Canadian Association articulated strongly to the CRTC that their community was not interested in foreign programs:

You see if we really want to see programs made in our country it is really not at all a problem. We can import them and obtain movies. There is no need for any television station here and they can play those movies 24 hours, but that is not what we want. Our children have to learn something. Our children have to participate. They have to perform and that is more important to us (Federation of Indo-Canadian Association, CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999, Toronto: ref. 66).

Perhaps, the ethnic minority organizations' concern for developing programs that reflect their hybrid identities are the strongest in this perspective. The nostalgic longing for the homeland is not as strong as the desire to teach the second generation more about being Canadians with hybrid identities. Organizations supporting this position do not discount the importance of foreign specialty services as an option within the broadcasting system, but if the choice excludes Canadian ethnic minority content then the option is undesirable to them. In any case, foreign language programming is secondary to Canadian ethnic minority content (The Canadian Ukrainian Immigrant Aid Society, CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999, Toronto: ref. 51).

Despite the desire to have Canadian ethnic minority programming, some organizations believe that foreign specialty services play a vital role in propagating a multicultural society (Arab Canadian Association of the Atlantic Provinces, CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999, Halifax: ref. 39). Whereas the first perspective advocated for foreign programming as a part of Canada's broadcasting system to offer choice, the latter position advocates for foreign programming as an extension of Canada's multicultural society -- that is foreign television services teach Canadians about other cultures to quell the stereotypical images. Those organizations that support foreign programming for this

²⁵ Foreign programming is any program re-broadcasted from outside of North America, which can be used to fill the third language content requirement under the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy*.

reason often believe that accurate reflections of some cultures can only be achieved with foreign specialty services (German Society of Manitoba, CRTC, Feb. 3, 1999, Winnipeg: ref. 12). Other organizations believe that Canada's broadcasting system does not provide enough coverage on international news that are vital to those migrants with strong connections, usually family ties, that bind migrants to the aspirations and struggles of their native land (Winnipeg Chinese Cultural Center, CRTC, Feb. 3, 1999, Winnipeg: ref. 21). Foreign services then play an important role, not only to inform migrants of international news, but also to assist them in feeling at "home" in Canada away from "home." The migrants can negotiate the flows of culture, language, and religion in Canada, while other Canadian viewers can obtain a better understanding of different cultures through television programming to dispel their preconceived ideas of Canadians with hybrid identities.

Still other ethnic minority organizations recognized the practical need for foreign specialty services since Canada's small population and the lack of resources hindered Canadian ethnic minority productions. As such, foreign language programming imported from other countries fills the demand for ethnic minority content, any content that reflects ethnic minorities in any language, without expending non-existent funds (Ethnic Council of Arts, CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999, Toronto: ref. 139). At the hearings, the ethnic minority organizations were split over whether to license foreign broadcasters to reflect the diversity in the Canadian population or develop Canadian owned ethnic minority television services to reflect the hybrid identities of Canadians. Many of the commissioners at the large hearings in Toronto and Vancouver did not give their opinion on what direction the CRTC should take. Commissioner Wilson at the Toronto hearing, however, responded to the proposal to license foreign broadcasters carriage on Canada's

broadcasting system. He told the ethnic minority organizations that licensing foreign broadcasters would be incompatible with licensing Canadian owned ethnic minority television services:

It has been argued at various proceedings before us that as soon as you authorize a foreign service to be carried you preclude the ability of a Canadian to start such a service because that service comes in and gets launched and attracts an audience and the market is so small in Canada that it can only support one channel in any particular niche (CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999, Toronto: ref. 139).

Any ethnic minority television service, foreign or Canadian owned, has a small market that can only support one or the other. The advantage of licensing foreign specialty services is that they offer a connection to the homeland for new immigrants who may strongly be attached to the events at home, while ensuring there is diversity within the system without the high cost of productions (Canadian Immigrant Aid Society, CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999, Toronto: ref. 52; Metropolitan Immigrant Settlement Association, CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999: ref. 23). Although foreign specialty services prevent Canadian operated ethnic minority television services from entering the market, the CRTC can mandate distributors and broadcasters to contribute funds towards Canadian content production.

2.3 Monitoring the system: Counting the players

Figure 7: Regulating ethnic minority television

Figure seven illustrates the identity component of the ethnospheres informing the production of television content is crucial to television reflecting the ethnospheres. Television broadcasters, however, do not simply produce content that reflects the ethnospheres. The question that some ethnic minority organizations wrestle with is how to create a system that reflects the ethnic minorities and their discourse in Canada. How does the television broadcasting system balance the need for foreign and Canadian ethnic programs, programs that are broadcasted from outside of Canada and programs that are produced in Canada? How can the system create an inclusive broadcasting system without creating exclusive communication spaces, spaces of culture and language that focus on one community without significant connections to Canada (Polish Canadian Women's Federation, CRTC, Feb. 2, 1999, Toronto: ref. 193)? The communication ghettos, though acting as inclusive spaces for communities based on language, culture, and religion, may conversely isolate those communities based on the same qualities, hindering individuals from obtaining hybrid Canadian identities.

One of the arguments for licensing foreign broadcasters is that each broadcaster must carry a specific percentage of Canadian content that facilitates the development of hybrid Canadian identities. Consequently, none of the foreign television services would

be complete communication enclaves that isolate ethnic minorities within cultural content from the homeland. At the time of the hearings, the ethnic minority communities did not agree with the level of Cancon in foreign specialty services: the Cancon requirements for foreign specialty services were lower than Canadian owned ethnic minority television services (Arab Canadian Association, CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999, Halifax: ref. 5). The distributors in the television industry, on the other hand, argued the Cancon quotas were sufficient if not too high, while Canadian owned broadcasters brought other issues forward (Specialty Premium Television Association, CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999, Toronto: ref. 6).

Nevertheless, community organizations believed strongly that the responsibility for creating an inclusive broadcasting environment belonged with the CRTC to use its regulatory power in the broadcasters' license renewals. Unlike most distributors and broadcasters who reaffirmed their important role in facilitating ethnic minority community integration and the desire for the CRTC to provide additional leverage to make the industry more viable through funding and technological development, these organizations argued that the CRTC was responsible for the failure of the broadcasting system to provide the ethnic minority communities with quality programming at an affordable price. The CEC indicated that the CRTC failed to provide multicultural programming that reflects the diversity in the Canadian population:

The CRTC has been negligent in ensuring that public broadcasting fully reflect the multicultural, multilingual and diversity of Canada's demographic reality ... Visible minorities and linguistic minorities are among many groups that will be faced with marginalization as Canadians with access to new technology work to improve their skills (CEC, CRTC, Feb. 2, 1999: ref. 129).

The CEC argues that the technological disparity between ethnic minorities²⁶ and the rest of Canadian society is associated with a lack of information attainment, linked to economic, social, and political marginalization. The CEC's criticism specifically addresses the CRTC's failure to create inclusive spaces in the broadcasting system. inclusive spaces created through ethnic programs for ethnic minority communities. Consequently, the exclusive access to information distinguishes those that are "Canadians" (information rich) and the "others" (information poor) who cannot attain information.

Hierarchies of information rich and poor are not in accordance with the vision of Canadian identity, an identity based on a multicultural concept of inclusiveness, where individuals receive information and acknowledgement as citizens regardless of whether they belong to the hegemonic population or to the minority populations. However, if the CRTC recognizes that some citizens have a greater advantage of receiving information, the CRTC becomes responsible for ensuring that ethnic minority communities, disadvantaged in information sources, obtain access to information based on their identity (Italian Canadians, Toronto District, CRTC, Feb. 2, 1999, Toronto: ref. 214). The issue of access is not confined to making ethnic and third language programming available, but also decreasing the cost of television specialty services for access to all income levels (Hellenic-Canadian Federation, CRTC, Feb. 2, 1999, Toronto: ref. 187). Some organizations suggest that licensing independent networks that cater to ethnic minority programming across Canada can resolve access problems (Ethnic Council of Arts, CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999, Toronto: ref. 139). Organizations advocating for independent networks that increase access believe more networks will increase access without the

²⁶ The term ethnic minority was used instead of the CEC's terms "visible and linguistic minorities"; this

reliance on satellite and digital technology for distribution. Other organizations advocate for the production of more Canadian ethnic programs, but more programs that are Canadian do not equal lower fees for access since the problem is technological. Independent networks would increase the number of broadcasting channels as a common broadcaster without all the fees associated with digital, satellite, and cable packages. The option of increasing the number of independent networks is highly unlikely as Canada's broadcasting system is accelerating towards larger conglomerates of information distributors and producers. Instead, conglomerates will likely use more digital and satellite technology to distribute their cultural products.

In any given scenario, the dilemma of monitoring the broadcasting system to increase the amount of programming targeted at ethnic minority communities and decrease the amount of the stereotypical images will remain consistent if the CRTC continues to separate television for ethnic minorities and television for mainstream audiences. At the hearings, ethnic minority organizations urged the CRTC to monitor the entire broadcasting system much more closely to ensure broadcasters and distributors not only provide adequate services, but also accurate representation of each ethnic minority community (Affiliation of Multicultural Societies, CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999, Vancouver: ref. 31). Furthermore, the Federation of Indo-Canadian Associations urged the CRTC to "watch out against unfettered free market forces. Culture is an area which is prone to commercial exploitation" (CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999, Toronto: ref. 66). Although the communities were grateful for Canadian owned ethnic minority television services, such as Asian Television Network and Fairchild Television, they did not trust the broadcasters to continue providing quality services without the CRTC's intervention. The ethnic

thesis considers visible and linguistic minorities as ethnic minorities. Chapter 1 examines ethnicity further.

minority organizations believed the ethnic minority television industry would pursue profits and neglect to produce Canadian ethnic programming that reflects the ethnic minority communities. The high cost of television production is a disincentive to produce Canadian ethnic minority content. For broadcasters, importing foreign content and using token representations to fill the "diversity" aspect of Cancon regulations is less expensive than producing ethnic and third language programming in Canada.²⁷ Some organizations requested the CRTC include ethnic minority communities in the monitoring process to hold broadcasters accountable for broadcasting quality ethnic programming (Chinese Canadian National Council, CRTC, Feb. 2, 1999, Toronto: ref. 113).

The ethnic minority organizations' desire to be involved in the monitoring process arises from the belief that their standards are higher than the television industry's standards for cultural representations. The ethnic minority organizations' concerns emphasize creating a stronger community with television broadcasting as an integral part of community building. Unfortunately, the ethnic minority organizations' desire for more CRTC intervention is contrary to the progress the CRTC is making towards greater industry responsibility and control. The CRTC informed community organizations that they are caught between those that want more and those that want less intervention (Commissioner Langford, CRTC, Feb. 2, 1999, Toronto: ref. 126). Although the CRTC appears to be walking a fine line between the interests of the commercial sector and the ethnic minority organizations' demands, the CRTC has leaned clearly towards profit maximization to address some of the ethnic minority organizations' demands in the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy* and the Cancon regulations of 2000 (*Public Notice CRTC 2000-42*). This leaves a nagging question of how the ethnic minority organizations'

²⁷ The terms "ethnic and third language programming" are from the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy*.

presence affected the policy development process in reassessing ethnic broadcasting in Canada.

2.4 The policy process

Although the vision of an inclusive broadcasting system that recognizes hybrid Canadian identities involves ethnic minority organizations, the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy* does not mandate broadcasters to establish advisory councils. Consequently, the ethnic minority organizations are not institutionalized in the regulation process. In the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy*, however, some of the proposals the ethnic minority organizations presented to the CRTC were accepted. Firstly, the ethnic minority organizations recommended the CRTC increase the amount of Cancon requirements for foreign specialty services. In the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy*, all foreign specialty services must broadcast 15% Canadian content. Secondly, the CRTC recommends broadcasters establish advisory councils to monitor ethnic broadcasting, increase ethnic minority communities' participation in ethnic broadcasting, and ensure broadcasters meet the required amount of third language programs (CRTC, July 16: ref. 66). Implementing the second recommendation for advisory councils to oversee the performance of the ethnic stations, the CRTC can allow the ethnic broadcasting industry to self-regulate. Industry self-regulation integrated with ethnic minority organization involvement would decrease the CRTC's direct involvement in the operation of the broadcasting system.

Although the ethnic minority organizations' concerns are given adequate acknowledgement in the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy*, the political economy of the emerging ethnic broadcasting system still limits the amount of Canadian ethnic minority content and access to cultural content. What the consultation process across Canada has

accomplished is inject the ethnic minority organizations into the policy process, enabling Canada's governing structures to respond to some of the ethnic minority communities' needs. The ethnic minority organizations' participation in the policy process, however, does not guarantee that all of their demands are met. Canada has the potential to meet the needs of the ethnic minority communities with digital and satellite technology, but the political economy of ethnic broadcasting limits the production of Canadian ethnic minority content and technological access for all ethnic minority communities in any location in Canada.

Chapter 3

Canadian broadcasting policies and Cancon

Figure 8: Governing Canadian content

The preceding chapter examined the ethnic minority organizations' request for more Canadian ethnic minority content and stringent regulations on the representation of ethnic minorities. Figure eight illustrates the identity component of the ethnospheres informing the production of Canadian ethnic minority content to reflect hybrid identities. Ideally, the ethnic minority organizations' request for Canadian ethnic minority content and stringent regulations on the representation of ethnic minorities would offer information and cultural products for public discourse in the ethnospheres. The CRTC, however, has not become more involved in the direct regulation of the Canadian broadcasting system. Instead, the CRTC is leaning towards more industry control of the system. The current Cancon regulations in *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42* hamper the ethnic minority organizations' request for more Canadian ethnic minority content.

This chapter examines the reorientation of Canadian content regulations and the difficulties of fulfilling the ethnic minority organizations' recommendation for more Canadian ethnic minority content. This chapter serves two purposes; first, to move the discussion from chapter two on the vision of an ethnic minority television broadcasting system to the realities the CRTC is implementing in Canadian broadcasting. Secondly, the chapter draws attention to the role of the state's influence on the media. According to

Habermas, the state's usage of the media for its own purpose, the commercialization of the media, and the increase in the number of participants outside the bourgeoisie all contributed to the demise of the public sphere. In Canada, the state, or a state organization -- the CRTC -- implements policies that influence the economy of the television industry and Canadians' cultural and information reception. Television content influences the information and culture that individual participants receive, which eventually affects the ethnospheres and the discourse of the participants. This chapter examines how policies may hinder content production that contributes to the discourses in the ethnospheres.

Chapter 3 has three sections. The first section briefly contextualizes the role of the state in the policy discussions on Canadian content regulations. A discussion on the policies of Canadian content requires an understanding of the Canadian state and the historical approach to Canadian cultural policies. Although this section may appear inconsequential to the political economy hindering the production Canadian ethnic minority content, the discussion demonstrates that the CRTC is redefining its policy approach towards Canadian broadcasting. Secondly, the chapter discusses Canadian content and the reasons behind the restraint on Canadian ethnic minority television content. Thirdly, the chapter discusses the relation between the meaning of the Canadian content issues and the development of inclusive and exclusive spaces in Canada's broadcasting system.

3.1 Contextualizing the state in television broadcasting

Throughout most of Canada's history, the state has played an active role in stimulating the growth of Canada's economy and uniting its vast geography through the cultural industries. Canada's close proximity to the United States, combined with Quebec's tenuous relationship with the federal government, has produced an obsession over Canada's communication infrastructure and culture industries to secure Canada's nationhood. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) and the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) are some of the most well discussed organizations in Canada.²⁸ These organizations have been the focus of numerous public and academic critiques because, together, they provide some of the most contentious discussions on Canadian identity and culture. From a nationalist perspective, cultural dissemination, industry structure and regulation act as Canada's barriers to the United States' cultural domination (Dowler, 1996: 338). The state's intensive participation in the cultural industries is evident in the numerous initiatives that ensure that Canada is in control of its information and cultural production. For example, the Information Highway Advisory Council (IHAC), established in 1994, composed of members reflecting Canada's information and cultural producers and distributors, is structuring Canada's Information Highway.²⁹ The government established three objectives for the IHAC to explore: "creating jobs through innovation and investment in Canada; reinforcing Canadian sovereignty and cultural identity; ensuring universal access at a

²⁸ Broadcasting in Canada, however, preceded the CBC and the CRTC (Vipond, 1992).

²⁹ The Information High Way embodies "interconnected and interoperable networks of networks" between the private and public sector (Industry Canada, 1996). The term "Information Highway" describes the

reasonable cost" (Industry Canada, 1997). The state has always used its political power, whether as a "carrot" (directing funding) or a "stick" (the CRTC's regulatory power), to ensure the cultural industries develop and promote national unity. Consequently, Canada's nationalistic tendency is to use technology to ensure its social, political and economic survival. The emerging ethnic minority television broadcasting structure is an instrument of this technological infrastructure. The limitations in Canada's ethnic minority television broadcasting infrastructure exist within the CRTC's historical approach to the Canadian broadcasting system.³⁰

The degeneration of the bourgeois public sphere occurred as the state increasingly became more interventionist in the media's operations. Has the Canadian state, through the CRTC and other state organizations, intervened in the media to such an extent as to push the Canadian ethnospheres into degeneration? In Canada, the state's involvement in broadcasting is very significant: from implementing policies through the CRTC to the funding of the CBC and various organizations such as Telefilm Canada, the state's imprint in Canada's television broadcasting industry is undeniable. Despite the state's involvement in the Canadian broadcasting system, the CRTC has moved towards less intervention and greater industry control. The state's high level of intervention arose from its nationalist approach to policy making that focused on protecting Canada from the flow of culture in United States. In the nationalist approach to policy making, policy makers believed the involvement of the state in cultural productions was necessary for the survival of the nation. In 1983, Paul Audley's analysis of Canada's cultural industries advocates strong government intervention. After nearly two decades, Audley's

communication infrastructure that will provide the new economy based on transporting data on a new type of "Highway."

³⁰ Chapter 4 discusses the limitations in the technological infrastructure.

perspective on the cultural industries remain popular in the magazine industry (Magder, 1998). His analysis of Canada's cultural industries reveal that there are significant levels of foreign investment in Canada's cultural productions, which decreases the amount of Canadian involvement in content production (1983: 320-321). Consequently, the Canadian government must increase its expenditures in the film and television industry to ensure that French and English language content are produced (331). His recommendations focus on the CBC, technology, and increasing the revenues of private broadcasters. Over the years, however, cultural policies, cloaked in a nationalist or cultural sovereignty agenda, have hindered the broadcasting industry from expanding in alternative directions (Dorland, 1996).

According to Collins, Canada's political institutions perpetuate Canadian identity and producing Canadian cultural commodities to act as barriers against American hegemony are not necessary (1990: 329). Although Canadians consume American culture, Canadian identity is separate from cultural commodities. In addition, the industries' attempt to create a symbolic "Canadian" culture is an illusion since the reality of Canada is that the nation does not have a unitary symbolic culture. Canada, however, is not a deficient nation for this "insufficiency." Rather, Canada's strength lies in recognizing that all cultures are important threads within a multicultural tapestry. The broadcasting system may potentially serve Canada's pluralistic society rather than a unitary concept of Canadian identity (334). Nationalism, in reality, cloaks the inherent tensions within the broadcasting system and perpetuates the existing problems. Under a nationalist agenda, the government uses the broadcasting system as its own instrument rather than as a tool to reflect Canadian communities (Raboy, 1990: 335). In order for Canada's broadcasting system to serve the public, several changes need to occur. The

most pertinent changes concern the involvement of the public in defining policies, the re-evaluation of the broadcasting system's objectives to serve the public rather than the private sector, and the entrance of more autonomous broadcasters (355-356).

Dorland calls this new perspective surrounding Canada's broadcasting policies "post-nationalist." Indeed, broadcasting policies need to go beyond the rhetoric of government and nationhood because "nationalism is no longer the principal analytical framework through which to think about the problems of Canada's cultural industries" (1996: 361). Dorland suggests that if analysts and policy makers leave behind a nationalist perspective, they will recognize the paradoxical nature of Canada's cultural industries that will challenge them to ask more questions about the development of Canadian content regulations rather than seeking to remedy the small size and quantity of Canada's cultural productions (361). The Canadian content regulations existed in the shadows of the nationalist agenda, attempting to define Canadian identity within cultural industries largely dominated by the United States. Although the Canadian content regulations contributed to expanding Canada's cultural industries, the policy failed to define the meaning of Canadian cultural identity. What has become more evident in the last twenty years is the dominance of the market to establish standards that prevail against a definition of Canadian cultural identity. In other words, the production of mass culture appeals to audiences regardless of the origin of production. Under a post-nationalist perspective (Dorland, 1996) Canada must reconsider Canadian content regulations as a policy other than one protecting or promoting cultural identity and national sovereignty. The post-nationalist perspective would entail either separating the meaning of Canadian identity from cultural content or compelling the CRTC to evaluate the real meaning of Canadian content productions outside the standards of the market. The trend in Canadian

content regulations is clearly moving towards the former rather than the latter: the separation of the meaning of Canadian identity from cultural content and the acceptance of an industry standard for cultural productions. An industry standard for cultural productions would promote the growth of the cultural industries in Canada, including the television industry, but the growth of the cultural industries is not equivalent to an increase in the awareness of Canadian identity. Perhaps Canada no longer needs to promote a sense of Canadian identity.

3.2) The Canadian content question

Re-evaluating Canada's content regulations in relation to ethnic minority television poses three dilemmas in regards to the post-nationalist perspective of cultural productions. First, if a post-nationalist perspective of policy making embraces the separation of Canadian identity from cultural content, how does ethnic minority television in Canada fit into an industry standard of cultural content? Secondly, if the post-nationalist (Dorland, 1996) perspective involves merely an industry standard of cultural content, what is the purpose of Canadian content regulations for ethnic minority television? Thirdly, how does the production of Canadian ethnic minority content receive support without a nationalist agenda? What is the purpose of developing Canadian ethnic minority content, if not for a nationalist agenda that promotes national unity and social cohesion? Central to understanding the meaning behind these questions is discerning whether cultural identity is important to Canada's definition of Canadian content. If an industry standard is the post-nationalist (Dorland, 1996) perspective on cultural content then perhaps the identity of the audience is inconsequential to the production of culture. The ethnic minority organizations, however, clearly expressed to

the CRTC that the communities need more Canadian ethnic minority content. The gap between Canadian content regulations that follow the trend towards market standards and the demand from the ethnic minority organizations for more Canadian ethnic productions are contradictory to each other. Corporations abiding by market standards seek cultural content that will expand their operations, while the ethnic minority organizations seek more cultural content that reflects their communities regardless of the cultural industries need for growth.

Whether market standards or the ethnic minority organizations' standard of cultural content is used, cultural content is never neutral. A policy that supports an industry standard for Canadian content based on market forces may neglect to reflect ethnic minorities in Canada. The question of whether cultural content includes or excludes individuals based on ethnicity is strongly contentious (Hall, 1979; Morley, 1980; Fiske, 1987; Condit, 1994). Many argue that images do not simply include or exclude audiences; rather there are many negotiated positions that audiences can take depending on their social, political, and economic place in society (Hall, 1979; Morley, 1980). Although the images and words may not act as a master narrative that operates in a hegemonic manner, "it is in the meaning of words used to describe Canada and its population that we see how symbolic constructions, deconstructions, and reconstructions serve to include or exclude specific types of people" (Karim, 1993: 198). Cultural content is never neutral, but the Canadian content regulations are moving towards industry standards that purport to serve the expansion of the cultural industries. Do Canadian content regulations that support the expansion of the cultural industries reflect the ethnic minorities in Canada? Who is included and excluded in Canadian content regulations and broadcasting policies?

A) Creating inclusive spaces

Canada's broadcasting system creates inclusive and exclusive spaces. In 1985, the CRTC passed the *Broadcasting policy reflecting Canada's linguistic and cultural diversity (CRTC Public Notice 198-139)*,³¹ the initial broadcasting policy that recognizes Canadian ethnic minority content. In 1988, the *Multiculturalism Act* became the impetus for fragmenting or reconstructing the broadcasting system by introducing new voices and practices into the state, the public sphere and civil society.³² With the passage of the *Multiculturalism Act*, Canada's broadcasting system came under its influence to "promote policies, programs and practices that enhance the understanding of and respect for the diversity of the members in Canadian society" (Canadian Heritage, 1997-1998: 7).³³ The 1991 *Broadcasting Act* reflects the principles of the 1985 broadcasting policy on diversity and the *Multiculturalism Act*; these policies attempt to create an inclusive symbolic order within the broadcasting system that reflects multiple discourses and identities. Promoting multiculturalism, however, within the broadcasting system means reflecting Canada's

³¹ Although the CRTC licensed CFMT-TV and CITY TV before the 1985 broadcasting policy. Public Notice CRTC 1985-139 was the first policy framework towards establishing an ethnic television broadcasting structure.

³² The argument that the Multiculturalism Act reconstructed Canada's policies ignores the vibrant discourse between the ethnospheres and the government. The *Multiculturalism Act* (1988) can be considered the child of a long historical debate between the various ethnospheres to claim identity in the public sphere. Once ethnicity was coupled with citizenship (*The Citizenship Act* in 1947), all proceeding policies from the *Citizenship Act* are policy moves that are combinations and recombinations of different values for achieving a pluralistic society. The *Multiculturalism Act* is then another move towards that objective. The 1996 *Strategic evaluation of multiculturalism programs* was an attempt to measure and reassess the former policies' accomplishments, perhaps even with the *Citizenship Act* in mind. In any case, the birth of the *Multiculturalism Act* is not the primary consideration for this discussion. Rather the focus is on how the policy re-orient the meaning of Canadian content.

³³ However, it would be idealistic to assume that the changing practices of multiculturalism benefits everyone or that Canada has achieved its social goals through the multiculturalism policies (Canadian Heritage, 1996). The critique may well be that the multiculturalism policies are attempts of "the state to 'rewrite' the nature of Canadian civil society to reduce risk, still within the context of the culture of alienation" (Hamilton, 1995: 8). In other words, the state is legitimating its intrusive actions in the private and public sphere with the multiculturalism policies.

diversity, which potentially fragments and challenges the appeal for Canadian content that reinforces a singular nationalistic ideal of Canadian identity. The three policies that compel the television industry to recognize diversity within the Canadian population and the need to re-evaluate the meaning of Canadian content in the realm of cultural production are *CRTC Public Notice 1985-139*, the *Multiculturalism Act*, and the 1991 *Broadcasting Act*.

The 1991 *Broadcasting Act* embodies two multicultural principles that recognize diversity in the Canadian broadcasting system, which promotes inclusive "Canadian" cultural symbols. The first mandate for the Canadian broadcasting system to "safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada." [1991: ref. 3d (i)] may contradict the multiple identities and narratives within the Canadian population. How does a broadcasting system *safeguard* the development of multiple narratives that require production in other nations? In other words, the development of cultural content outside of Canada introduces other cultures within the nation, creating a fragmentary effect on the notion of a singular identity embodied within a nation. Canada's perspective of nationhood, however, embodies many cultures and identities. If the broadcasting system is used to safeguard or perpetuate a sense of Canadian identity then the broadcasting system must be expanded to meet the diverse needs of the Canadian population. In order for the first mandate to be effective, it must provide concrete results or the mandate is merely a visionary statement without weight.

The second mandate for the broadcasting system encourages the development of ethnic minority television broadcasting in Canada. The *Broadcasting Act*

[encourages] the development of *Canadian expression* by providing a wide range of programming that reflects *Canadian attitudes, opinions, ideas, values and artistic creativity*, by displaying Canadian talent in entertainment programming

and by offering information and analysis concerning Canada and other countries from a Canadian point of view [*italics mine*, 1991: ref. 3d (ii)].

The "*Canadian attitudes, perspectives, values, ideas and opinions*" refers to all Canadian expressions that are diverse, multicultural, and multilingual. Ethnic minority television can support the diverse, multicultural and multilingual aspects of the Canadian broadcasting system. The second mandate does not give any preference to one ethnic minority community or to the hegemonic population. Again, the second mandate is insignificant without concrete results. The CRTC recognizes that television broadcasting corporations must decrease costs of production, distribution, and broadcasting and increase the maximum number of consumers for advertisers. The multiple voices and opinions that need expression are contained in corporate structures.

The third mandate attempts to infuse corporate structures with Canadian perspectives.

The Canadian broadcasting system should encourage through its programming and the employment opportunities arising out of its operations, serve the needs and interests, and reflect the circumstances and aspirations, of Canadian men, women and children, including equal rights, the linguistic duality and multicultural and multiracial nature of Canadian society and the special place of aboriginal peoples within that society [1991: ref. 3d (iii)].

Clearly, the 1991 *Broadcasting Act* reflects an ideal of nationhood based on diversity rather than singularity. The problem, of course, is achieving the vision of multiple perspectives within a nation that embodies multiple identities with broadcasting technology that enables free flowing information and cultural content from the United States.³⁴ The task of reflecting multiple identities challenges the CRTC and the television industry to allocate funds to programs that may not be as profitable as other Canadian programs that reach a larger audience. The television industry is still struggling to reflect

the diversity in the Canadian population. What the *Broadcasting Act* has accomplished is to establish a structure to govern information and cultural flows; as well as set precedence for subsequent broadcasting policies with similar goals that involve other institutional actors in the process of restructuring Canada's symbolic order (Breton, 1987; Fleras, 1989) such as Telefilm Canada, the Canadian Television Fund (CTF), the CBC, and the CRTC.

B) *Creating exclusive spaces*

Despite the 1991 *Broadcasting Act*, the CRTC's desire to diversify the television broadcasting system is not an easy task to accomplish because what is considered Canadian content may not necessarily reflect diverse identities. Conventional television has yet to embrace cultural content that couples diverse identities. In other words, conventional television does not distinguish cultural content that reflects diverse identities and cultural content that follows the television industry's standards of Canadian content. The CRTC has made this distinction even wider with the current Canadian content regulations in *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42*. Although *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42* enables conventional broadcasters to produce more Cancon that uses the industry standards, while neglecting the reflection of the diverse identities in Canada, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) broadcasts programs that reflect the Canadian population. The CBC still embraces its vision as "the major broadcast contributor to shared national consciousness and identity through cross-cultural, multiracial and interregional programming" (Canadian Heritage, 1994/1995: 62). Conventional and specialty broadcasters, on the other hand, do not have the same vision statement. If

³⁴ Often Canadians evade the Canadian broadcasting system by using satellite technology to receive

anything, the vision statement for conventional and specialty broadcasters has always been to satisfy the Cancon regulations with the lowest cost and the highest investment returns. The chasm between the 1991 *Broadcasting Act's* recognition for diverse identities and the CRTC's acknowledgement of the market forces and the underlying vision for multicultural content has, in the last two years, favored the market rather than Canada's multicultural population. Indeed, the actions of the CRTC reject coupling diverse identities with cultural content in Cancon regulations. *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42* is a policy that upholds industry expansion, leaving cultural identity on the other side of broadcasting ideals that sound good but fail to be profitable for the television industry.

The CRTC's belief that they are fulfilling the 1991 *Broadcasting Act's* vision for reflecting Canada's diversity, through "separate classes of ethnic licenses and the recent licensing of the Aboriginal Peoples Television Network" (CRTC, June 11, 1999b: ref. 116), is misguided. The distinction between mainstream and Canadian ethnic minority audiences creates two separate broadcasting systems and two exclusive spaces. First, the CRTC may reaffirm the difference between ethnic minority communities in ethnic minority television while creating exclusive spaces for the mainstream audiences by branding specific broadcasters as "ethnic." Secondly, the CRTC creates exclusive spaces in conventional television for Canadians with hybrid identities by branding conventional broadcasters as "Canadian" without ethnic minority community representation. The latter is a case where the universal "Canadian" content fails to acknowledge the differences within Canada's multicultural population. Although the definition of "Canadian" in *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42* refers to the *Citizenship Act's* definition and includes immigrants who possess their "Record of Landing" Certificate (CRTC, March 12, 2000:

television services from the United States.

13). *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42* fails to recognize hybrid Canadians within Cancon requirements. Although Cancon requirements fail to incorporate identity within the policy framework, the CRTC expects to increase multicultural representation at the broadcasters' time of licensing or license renewal. The CRTC expects broadcasters to "make specific commitments to initiatives designed to ensure that they contribute to a system that reflects accurately the presence of cultural and racial minorities and Aboriginal peoples in the communities they serve" (CRTC, June 11, 1999b: ref 114). The problem, however, is with the definition of Canadian content.

The CRTC's emphasis on addressing individual broadcasters and their commitment to reflect Canada's multicultural society does not address the coupling of cultural content with diverse identities. Broadcasters may fund television production, but broadcasters and producers use *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42* as the guide for Canadian content requirements. Consequently, the CRTC's attempt to induce conventional broadcasters to reflect diverse identities occurs too late in the chain of Canadian content productions. In other words, the broadcasters will likely meet the Cancon requirements in *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42* with the lowest cost as the necessary content for operations before considering ethnic minority representation. The conventional broadcasters' licenses to operate entail fulfilling particular obligations according to the capabilities of the broadcaster, while the Cancon requirements entail that all broadcasters must commit to creating programs that reflect the diversity in the Canadian population. The real emphasis is on Cancon requirements rather than on the license conditions of the broadcasters to provide Canadian programming. Consequently, the CRTC's request for more ethnic minority representation on conventional television will not likely produce many Canadian ethnic programs.

The obstacle against programs that reflect the diversity within the Canadian population lies with *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42*. *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42* fails to re-emphasize the 1991 *Broadcasting Act's* vision for coupling cultural content with diverse identities, particularly hybrid Canadian identities within the definition of Cancon. What the CRTC does emphasize strongly is that the CRTC

aims to strengthen the programming industry, increase the visibility of our local talent, both in Canada and beyond our borders, and promote the growth of our broadcasters in an increasingly competitive global market (CRTC, June 11, 1999a: 1).

The CRTC's objective is to expand the broadcasting industries without using the Cancon regulations to increase the amount of Canadian ethnic programs. The distinction between an industry objective without a cultural component is evident in the new Cancon regulations.

Thus far, the Canadian broadcasting system's progress in reflecting Canada's hybrid Canadians has been achieved through the CRTC's regulations and their ambitious vision for a broadcasting system that is multicultural and multiracial (CFTP, 1999). With the passage of *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42*, the argument for de-coupling Canadian identity from the television industry seems more likely than cultural content coupled with ethnic identity. Third language broadcasters are the enclave markets that acknowledge ethnicity, where specialty licenses are based on fulfilling the ethnic content quotas that the CRTC establishes.³⁵ The space created for "third language" content is an exclusive space that affirms ethnic identity, while possibly isolating individuals within the same space. The consequence of de-coupling identity from cultural content in the television broadcasting industry, however, may encourage the continual conglomeration of private

³⁵ "Ethnic content" is the term the CRTC uses to distinguish the various types of programming. As such, the term "ethnic content" is used in reference to the ethnic content category.

broadcasters at the cost of declining Cancon productions that fail to reflect the identity component of the ethnospheres. On the other hand, de-coupling identity from cultural content in the Cancon regulations may also contribute to the conglomeration of private broadcasters and the rise of more Canadian content. The rise of more Cancon does not necessarily mean more hybrid Canadian identities are represented within conventional television since hybrid Canadian identities are not coupled with cultural content in the Cancon regulations. The CRTC's trust that the market dictates the private broadcasters' action towards their audiences leaves Canada's broadcasting system predominantly in the hands of private broadcasters to determine the amount of hybrid Canadian representation (CRTC, June 11, 1999 a & b).

C) Challenging the development of exclusive spaces

Some players, however, strongly disagree with the direction the television industry is rolling towards: less quality Canadian content, more profits for broadcasters, and a clear separation between ethnic minority television and television for the mainstream audience. Cancon regulations in 2000 not only marked the separation between industry standards for cultural content and Canadian cultural content based on identity, but the policy inadvertently failed to define or embrace the multicultural identity of television viewers. The assumption that Canadian content appeals to all Canadians is false. Again, cultural content is never neutral. The failure to couple identity with cultural content in the Cancon regulations, is also a failure to acknowledge the diversity within the Canadian population. Consequently, cultural content that is "Canadian" may only be Canadian for some viewers, while others remain underrepresented.

Prior to *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42*, during the CRTC's request for comments on Canadian content in 1999, the Canadian Film and Television Production Association (CFTPA) strongly urged the CRTC to reconsider the proposal for the new Canadian content regulations, which became effective September 1, 2000. The CFTPA, which represents 300 Canadian cultural producers, argues that the CRTC's Cancon proposals in *Public Notice CRTC 1999-135* **do not** meet the 1991 *Broadcasting Act's* goal for diverse representation nor does the regulation promote more quality Canadian content (1999: 1). The proposal for Canadian content considers the broadcasting system more as an industry rather than as a culture producer who influences identity. The CRTC decreased the demands of the preceding Canadian content criteria and appeased broadcasters with the new Cancon regulations (Kari, 1999; Vardy and Shecter, 1999). The CFTPA warned the CRTC that if the new Cancon regulations came into force, "there will be little or no distinctive Canadian programming in the highest audience periods of 8 to 11 PM" (1999: 1). The Alliance for Children and Television (ACT), a non-profit organization dedicated to children's programming, also cautioned the CRTC to "adequately weigh the *absolute impact* on all players and on the interest of the audience they serve" (1999: 2). Obviously, the weight of hybrid Canadian representation did not play a significant role in defining Cancon regulations. Instead, the new Cancon regulations maintain the 60% and 50% day and evening quota respectively, while increasing the number hours for Canadian content. Prime time hours for Canadian programming can be broadcasted from 7 PM to 11 PM rather than from 8 PM to 11 PM during the weekdays for WIC, CTV, Global, and TVA. The new Cancon regulations target broadcasters (WIC, CTV, Global, and TVA) that reach 70% of the audience in either French or English in several provinces. The new Cancon regulations encourage broadcasting more under-represented programs such as

documentaries, entertainment magazine shows and regional programs between 7 PM and 11 PM. In addition, the Cancon definition certifies a program as Cancon using three categories: producer, the point system, and expenditures in Canada without addressing the value of identity or the issues of multicultural or multiracial representation (see Appendix A).

D) The future of Canadian content production

In an attempt to level the playing field between conventional and specialty / pay broadcasters, *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42* applies the same Cancon requirements on conventional and specialty / pay television. The Cancon requirements are not enforced on ethnic minority television broadcasters. Instead, ethnic minority television stations must devote 60% of their monthly schedule to ethnic programming, which may or may not contain Canadian ethnic minority content. The level playing field that the CRTC desires to create is for television broadcasters broadcasting to the mainstream audiences since these broadcasting organizations are competing for similar language audiences. The competition in this field is rigorous with the profit before interest and taxes for conventional and specialty / pay television broadcasters at 15.6% and 17.4% respectively (CRTC, June 11, 1999b). In 1998, the profits before interest and taxes for conventional broadcasters' was 11.1% -- a drop of 4.5% from 1997 (CRTC, June 11, 1999b). In an article called, *Broadcasters cut some slack*, The Guardian reported that between 1993 and 1997, conventional broadcasters increased their expenditures on Canadian programming by 1% (June 12: B10). Although the CRTC is concerned about the growing size of conventional broadcasters and their effect on local communities (CRTC, Feb. 5, 20001), the trend is towards oligopolies that compete globally. The new Cancon regulations and

the disincentive of high cost Canadian cultural production places Cancon producers in a precarious position since Cancon can no longer be used for a nationalist sovereignty agenda, nor is Cancon rigorously regulated by the CRTC. The structure of the broadcasting system is changing in more ways than one, from a nationalist perspective to a post-nationalist framework (Dorland, 1996), from the dominance of conventional broadcasters to the fragmentation of the Canadian audience in specialty television, from a rigorous cultural definition of Cancon to an industrial definition of Cancon for market competition.

The future of coupling or de-coupling Canadian identity with cultural content is presumably in the hands of all broadcasters, but this does not resolve the role that Canadian cultural producers will play in the prolific broadcasting system. Generally, the cost of producing Canadian programs tends to exceed the return on investments and U.S. programs tend to have a greater return on investment than Canadian programs. Broadcasters often broadcast U.S. programs to cover the cost of Canadian programs. *Public CRTC 2000-42* lessens the pressure for rigorous Cancon levels and in the process may be one of the first policies to begin de-coupling identity from cultural content. Producers in the business of developing Cancon, however, have not made decisive steps towards de-coupling identity from cultural content. The Canadian Television Fund (CTF) acknowledges the economics of Canadian program productions. The *Report of the Review of the Canadian Television Fund* recommends that "the CTF be clearly established as a cultural fund rather than an industry fund or a combination of the two. A policy statement enunciating this cultural mandate should be issued" (Canadian Heritage, March 2000: 3). Furthermore, if funds were allocated according to equity investments and return on investments, important Canadian programs would not be funded (10). Of

course, the fund is only relevant if the broadcasting system and other institutional actors such as the CBC, the NFB, and Canadian Heritage continue to see the relevance of Canadian content (11). The structure of the CTF is undergoing changes to meet the competitive and flexible policy framework in Canada's broadcasting system. The changes, however, do not include embracing the industrial definition of Cancon; rather CTF is adhering to the 1991 *Broadcasting Act's* mandate for cultural production.³⁶

Clearly, the changes in Canadian content regulations and the increase in the broadcasting capacity will favor conventional broadcasters. They will have more broadcast windows for featuring Canadian productions that may not reflect the diversity in the Canadian population. Producers such as Alliance Atlantis that have specialty licenses can take advantage of flexible Cancon regulations and their own broadcasting abilities, integrating their companies into broadcasting and production. The future belongs to larger, more integrated, corporations that use their production and broadcasting capabilities to leverage their competitive advantages in the entertainment industry. The restructuring of Canada's broadcasting system compels producers to make strategic acquisitions and mergers vertically and horizontally to strengthen their marketing appeal (CFTPA, 1998: ref. 75). The ramifications for a vertically integrated system is that there are few players in the television industry as the cost of entry rises. In addition, cultural producers and broadcasters become specialized information producers or providers of niche markets.

³⁶ At the same time, the federal and provincial expenditures on film, video and television production are declining, which forces organizations, such as the National Film Board (NFB), to concentrate on documentaries and animation. The market for Canadian cultural content seems to be increasing despite the decline in federal and provincial expenditures. Between 1994 and 1995, productions for the television market accounted for 70% of all productions and 40% of the total cultural productions revenue (Statistic Canada, 1996). As well, Canadian productions are gaining a larger market outside of Canada, reaching \$163 million at the end of 1995, and productions with foreign film producers increased from five in 1980 to thirty-two in 1996. The value of these co-productions is \$241 million (Statistics Canada, 1996).

3.3) Inclusive and exclusive spaces in Canada's television broadcasting industry

Public Notice CRTC 2000-42 moved cultural content away from a nationalist objective to an industry objective, expanding Canada's cultural industries. Is this a sign of a post-nationalist framework (Dorland, 1996) for analyzing and creating cultural policies? If the movement towards a post-nationalist framework involves placing the cultural industries' expansion above the identity component in cultural productions, Canada may fail to acknowledge its multicultural population. *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42* does not ignore the cultural industries, it continues to promote the growth of the cultural industries. Specialty channels will fuel the expansion of the television broadcasting industry and compel cultural producers and broadcasters to become larger and more integrated. Unfortunately, the CRTC's focus on expanding the television broadcasting industry in *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42* has begun the process of decoupling cultural content from identity and accelerating the system towards niche marketing. Although reaffirming identity in cultural content and niche markets are not antithetical, creating exclusive spaces may hinder the development of hybrid Canadian identities. *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42* is contrary to the ethnic minority organizations' desire for more ethnic minority content. The lack of emphasis on redefining Canadian content and the broadening of the definition opens the door for more industry flexibility that may decrease the amount of quality Canadian ethnic minority content. The ethnic minority organizations had advocated for more regulations on content.

The CRTC, however, has decreased intervention and increased greater industry responsibility. The emerging ethnic minority television broadcasting system rests on the CRTC's policy moves that expand Canada's broadcasting system, while also fragmenting the system into niche markets that have the potential for being exclusive spaces

designated as cultural enclaves. *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42* failed to acknowledge diverse identities and instead embraced an industry standard of Canadian content, creating television for two types of populations, television for the ethnic minorities and television for the hegemonic populations. Clearly, *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42* favors an industrial definition of Canadian content at the expense of reflecting the identity of the audiences. Ethnic minority television broadcasting, although established to serve the ethnic minority communities in Canada, also favors a business approach to broadcasting. The limitations within the political economy of ethnic minority television broadcasting create cultural enclaves in ethnic broadcasting that ignore the identity component of the ethnospheres. The following chapter examines the failure of ethnic broadcasting to reflect the ethnic minority communities in Canada. Where this chapter's discussion focused on the division in Canon regulations, the following chapter will examine the technological and content limitations within the political economy of ethnic broadcasting. Using the model of the ethnospheres, ethnic minority television broadcasting can serve a legitimate role in facilitating the discourses in the ethnospheres without becoming the ethnospheres. The antithetical relationship between public service and commercial profits, the entrance of the private sphere (identity) into the public sphere, the commodification of information, and the monetary value of technology ownership all influence the type of information and culture available for public discourse.

Chapter 4

Ethnic Minority Television Broadcasting in Canada

The previous chapter examined the industry trend towards separating content from identity in *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42* that hinders the production of Cancon to reflect the diversity in the Canadian population. Although *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42* may expand Canada's cultural industries, the policy may be detrimental to representing the ethnic minority communities in Canada. Despite the fact that *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139* and the subsequent 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy* recognizes the diversity within the Canadian population and the need to reflect the ethnic minority communities, a stronger industry definition of Cancon undermines the progress the CRTC is making towards hybrid Canadian representation. A rigorous policy change towards expanding the television industry that affects conventional broadcasters may appear inconsequential to ethnic broadcasting in Canada, but vertical and horizontal integration, de-coupling content from identity, and redirecting Canadian television producers towards an industrial standard of Cancon all have ramifications on ethnic minority television and the creation of exclusive spaces.

Some may argue that the ethnic minority television policies protect the niche market and ensure ethnic minority communities receive adequate representation. Vertical and horizontal integration and de-coupling content from identity, however, all culminate in slowly making ethnic minority television an ethnic communication enclave that does not reflect hybrid Canadian identities. Ethnic minority television policies do not ensure ethnic minority communities are represented in Canada's broadcasting system. The same industry standard that applies to *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42* applies to ethnic minority television broadcasting. In the 1999 review of *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139*, the ethnic

minority organizations indicated that the technological and cultural content limitations in *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139* hampered ethnic minority communities from receiving adequate ethnic minority television services. The lack of technological access and quality in ethnic minority television broadcasting increases the development of exclusive spaces. This chapter examines the limitations in the political economy of technology access and content availability that contribute to the development of exclusive spaces. The limitations in the political economy of ethnic minority television broadcasting hamper the ability of ethnic minority television from reflecting the identity component of the ethnospheres.

4.1) *Establishing the context: ethnic language market*

One of the challenges the CRTC faces in developing television broadcasting policies is trying to balance the needs of Canadians and the needs of the television industry. Canada's heterogeneous population makes fulfilling the *1991 Broadcasting Act* a difficult goal to accomplish. The first mandate in the *1991 Broadcasting Act* specifies strengthening Canada's cultural, political, social, and economic fabric. The second mandate qualifies Canadian expression in the broadcasting system and the third mandate stipulates implementing the mandates in corporate structures (CRTC, 1999). All the mandates involve recognizing the cultural and linguistic diversity within Canada's population. The CRTC has taken steps towards achieving the mandates; however, increasing the number of television services does not accomplish the goal of reflecting the ethnic minority communities in Canada. Instead, the CRTC has acknowledged the diversity within the Canadian population, but it failed to reflect the diversity in Canadian ethnic programming and technological access to ethnic minority television services.

Since licensing CHIN in 1966 (owned by Radio 1540 Ltd.) and CFMT-TV in 1978 (Canada's multilingual television station owned by Rogers Broadcasting Limited), the number of multilingual ethnic stations in radio, television, and specialty television services have increased dramatically. Increasing the number of radio and television services does not mean that all of Canada's ethnic minority communities are represented in the media.

The 1996 Census indicated that 16.1% of the population's mother tongue was neither English nor French.³⁷ The number of immigrants whose mother tongue is neither English nor French further compounds the diversity of Canada's population. A high percentage of Canada's new immigrants between 1991 and 1996 did not speak either English or French. In 1996, 80% of the 1,039,000 new Canadian immigrants did not speak either of the two official languages (Statistics Canada, Dec. 2, 1997). If the number of English and French speakers also grew, the growth in the number of third languages would not make a dramatic difference in the Canadian population. The 1996 Census, however, revealed that although Anglophones accounted for 60% of the population, the number of Anglophones were less than the 1991 Census. In 1996, the number of Francophones declined to less than 24% of Canada's population (Statistics Canada, Dec. 2, 1997). The cultural and linguistic diversity in Canada's population is growing and the population can provide adequate markets for ethnic minority television services. Existing television services, however, do not reflect the cultural and linguistic diversity in Canada's population.

³⁷ Statistics Canada defines "mother tongue" as "the first language learned at home in childhood and still understood by the individual at the time of the census" (Statistics Canada, Dec. 2, 1997). The mother tongue assessment, however, does not measure whether the individuals still use their language in their own homes.

4.2) Inclusive and exclusive spaces in Content

A) The need for more ethnic minority content

Clearly, the cultural and linguistic diversity within the Canadian population warrants more television programming that reflects the ethnic minority population. The statistics on the number of migrants that do not speak English or French reveal the linguistic diversity in the Canadian population. The statistics, however, do not reveal the hybrid language capabilities of Canada's ethnic minority population. Before the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy*, television content attempted to fulfill the language needs of ethnic minorities who still spoke their mother tongue, but ethnic minority television did not regard the development of hybrid identities.

Table 1: Ethnic Programming by Category during Broadcast Year 1997-1998³⁸

Category Type	Total Hours per Category	% Per Category
Type A	6,277	86.05%
Type B ³⁹	399	6.25%
Type C ⁴⁰	274	3.12%
Type D ⁴¹	197	1.46%
Type E ⁴²	171	3.12%

Source: CAB, 1998: 20.

During the 1997 broadcast year, the ethnic broadcasting industry was primarily concerned with Type A programming, services in a language other than French, English or an Aboriginal language, to fulfill the requirements specified in *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139*. Type A programming comprised 86.05% of the total number of programs

³⁸ In table one, ethnic and conventional television broadcasting are combined together: specialty services are not included.

³⁹ Type B is a program in French or English that is directed to a racially or culturally distinct group whose common bond language is French or English (CRTC, July 16, 1999).

⁴⁰ Type C is a program in French or English directed to a racially or culturally specific group who has lost their mother tongue (CRTC, July 16, 1999).

⁴¹ Type D is a program containing a bilingual mix of languages (French, English or a third language) directed to any racially or culturally distinct group (CRTC, July 16, 1999).

targeted at the ethnic minority communities. The emphasis on Type A and the minimal interest in developing all the other categories of ethnic programming reveals that the industry is more interested in providing audiences with information and entertainment in their mother tongue; rather than developing Type C, D and E programs for hybrid Canadians. Developing more Type A programs challenges people who did not retain their mother tongue, but who have attachments to the culture associated with the language, to find culture and information reflective of their hybrid interests. Given the emphasis on Type A programming, some may conclude that third language viewers, viewers with a language other than French, English or Aboriginal Canadian, with ties to their homeland would be satisfied with the quantity of foreign language programming.

A study, however, presented to the CRTC in September of 1998 revealed that the ethnic minority communities were generally not satisfied with the amount of foreign language programming. Fifty-six percent of those who spoke an unofficial language at home were dissatisfied with the amount of foreign language programming. The percentage of the people dissatisfied with the foreign language programs, who spoke an unofficial language, is the highest disapproval percentage of those surveyed in Canada. The study is in accordance with the dissatisfaction heard at the 1999 review of *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139*. During the public hearings on ethnic broadcasting, the CRTC, ethnic minority organizations, individuals and corporations heard the need for more third language programming both in the form of Canadian content and foreign programs. The ethnic minority organizations indicated their communities were willing to consume more third language programming, but the question of whether the market could bear the developmental cost was open for debate. At the hearings, two areas of programming

⁴² Type E is a program in French or English that is directed to any ethnic group or mainstream audience.

concerns were heard. First, the ethnic minority organizations presented to the CRTC their need for more Canadian ethnic minority content that was developed in Canada with a unique Canadian perspective. Secondly, the ethnic minority organizations indicated that the communities also needed more foreign language programming from other nations outside of North America. The mixture of ethnic and third language programming that a broadcaster selects for broadcasting influences the development of inclusive or exclusive spaces.

In fact, the type of programming available challenges our understanding of identity coupled with cultural content. The Chinese Canadian National Council indicated that Type A programs predominantly focus on providing viewers with a connection to their homeland. In addition, Type A programs could facilitate social and political participation in Canada. Types C and D programs, however, are "important as they foster cultural heritage and provide a sense of community and identity, especially among those who are second, third or fourth generation Chinese Canadians, those who have not fully retained the use of the Chinese language" (CRTC, Feb. 2, 1999: ref. 113).⁴³ Language alone does not determine the value of cultural content. The CCNC recognizes that identity is complex and that cultural content itself must not be static in depicting an "authentic" ideal of "Chineseness." Their argument for diversifying programming targeted at the Chinese population in Canada is an attempt to include more of the Chinese community rather than exclude Chinese-Canadians based on language. Clearly, the ethnic minority organizations were unhappy with the ability of *Public Notice CRTC*

depicting Canada's cultural diversity (CRTC, July 16, 1999).

⁴³ The CCNC does not use the hyphen, but this document uses the hyphen to denote a combination of two identities as one.

1985-139 to fulfill their vision of Canadian ethnic minority content and third language programming in the broadcasting system.

In *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139*, cultural content is associated with identity.

Despite the coupling of cultural content with identity, broadcasters failed to meet the needs of Canada's ethnic minority communities. The reason broadcasters failed to reflect the linguistic and cultural diversity in the population was not associated with the definition of the categories outlined in *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139*. Rather, the central barrier to reflecting the ethnic minority communities lay within the political economy of ethnic minority television broadcasting. The limitations in content availability create exclusive spaces in ethnic minority television broadcasting.

B) *The political economy of ethnic minority television content*

The political economy of ethnic minority television hinders broadcasters and the CRTC from meeting the demands for more Canadian ethnic minority content and third language content. All the categories of ethnic programming outlined in *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139* are associated with a cost; some programs cost more than others. The programs with the highest cost may not obtain the most profits; sometimes, broadcasters and producers do not even achieve a break-even point broadcasting their programs. In other words, the revenues do not cover the cost of production and distribution.

Advertisements must offset the cost of developing the programs to reach ethnic minority communities in English and French. In Canada, the cost of a typical English prime time drama series is about \$1 million per hour and for a French prime time drama series the cost is about \$500,000 per hour (Coopers & Lybrand, June 30, 1998: 15). This illustrates the high cost of production in conventional television and the likelihood that the break-

even point for ethnic drama production is also high in relation to the number of viewers in Canada's ethnic minority communities. The broadcasters and the CRTC heed the political economy of television broadcasting, to increase profits, create a viable industry, and attempt to meet the information and cultural needs of some ethnic minorities. Consequently, some ethnic minority communities and some ethnic minorities within a community may be excluded in ethnic minority television.

Before the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy*, broadcasters may have ignored Types C and D programs because the market was too small, too ambiguous to ascertain, or too economically unprofitable. The other more subtle reason for ignoring Type C and D programs was that it was probably not easy to convince advertisers of the exact profile of the targeted ethnic minority communities. Canadians with hybrid identities who have lost their mother tongue may no longer adhere to their cultural practices; Type C programs are directed at Canadians with hybrid identities and who may have lost their mother tongue. Type D programs are for Canadians with hybrid identities and who understand a bilingual mix program. Canadians with hybrid identities are able to understand Type C and D programs, but they may not be easily targeted. In addition, developing Type C and D programs may cross advertise audiences that are bilingual or trilingual individuals who may well be considered a part of the French or English language audience -- especially if their only identifiable characteristic is their physical appearance. For example, English language programming can reach English speaking Caribbeans through language. Language can be used, not only to categorize programming, but to develop advertisements for each ethnic minority community. Programs that do not greatly expand the corporate revenues can be seen as a waste of valuable resources. The ethnic minority communities' demand for programming

reflective of hybrid identities, however, is not necessarily an economic argument based on profitability ratios nor should cultural content simply be based on language alone.

C) Incentives to increase ethnic minority television content

The cost of ethnic programs influences the selection of content available for viewing on television. The television industry, however, must also meet some of the consumers' expectations or the corporations will fail to expand their market. Cost alone does not justify the lack of Canadian ethnic programs and third language programming. The industry must balance the profitability ratios with the needs of the ethnic minority communities. In a climate where technology drives the production of content, broadcasters, distributors, and producers of content are becoming competitors, often for the same audiences. Although some companies like Alliance Atlantis are moving towards vertical and horizontal integration, others are still very small players with limited resources. Canada's technological infrastructure is expanding to the extent that more content is needed to fill the broadcasting system. Consequently, the demands of the ethnic minority communities and the technological expansion also influence the production of ethnic programming.

In the 1999 hearings, the ethnic minority organizations indicated they needed a larger quantity of Canadian ethnic programs and third language programming. The CRTC and broadcasters appear to be complying with their demands, but the technological drive towards content and the political economy of ethnic broadcasting may continue to hamper efforts of meeting the ethnic minority organizations' demands. Technology drives the need for content. The Specialty and Premium Television Association (SPTV), an association of specialty broadcasters, however, asserts that

Canada's market is very small and the market can only sustain existing ethnic minority television broadcasting services. The market cannot support competing narrow-niche specialty services (CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999: ref. 6). The size of Canada's niche market is already quite small; thus, to expend resources on developing programs within the same language or cultural may not be feasible. On January, 2000, the CRTC confirmed niche broadcasting by granting foreign language broadcasters carriage on Canada's revamped digital distribution system without adhering to the Canadian content regulations (CRTC, Jan. 13, 2000b). This is a bonus for distributors since it does not directly cost the corporation to develop Canadian programs. The smaller ethnic minority communities will receive third language programming, but they may not receive much Canadian ethnic minority content since the foreign broadcasters do not need to adhere to the Cancon regulations. Increasing the number of foreign television services will satisfy the large technological capacity for content distribution, but the increase may not reflect the hybrid identities or the discourse in ethnospheres.

The larger ethnic minority communities may receive more Canadian ethnic programming when the industry recognizes the profitability of producing more Canadian ethnic minority content. Currently, distributors are contributing towards Canadian content development under the Canadian Television Fund (CTF), which is also supported by Canadian Heritage and Telefilm Canada. The industry is also rigorously contributing funds to the development of Cancon. In 1998, the cable industry contributed \$56.3 million and the Canadian Heritage and Telefilm Canada contributed \$232.7 million (CAB, 1998-1999: 7). Other industry initiatives to support Canadian program development include the Rogers Telefund, the Rogers Documentary Fund, the Shaw Children's Programming Initiative, and the Cogeco Program Development Fund. In

addition, in the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy*, the CRTC advised distributors to contribute 20% of their total contributions to the development of Canadian content to ethnic content (ref. 32). These funds assist the industry to meet the Cancon requirements.

Although the initiatives towards developing Canadian content sounds promising, the funds do not indicate the percentage of the dollar amounts allocated towards Canadian ethnic minority content. Consequently, what appears to be the fulfillment of the demands of the ethnic minority organizations for more third language programming may in fact be the expansion of the market. What appears to be the recognition of the identity component of the ethnospheres may in fact be the technological need for more content -- any content regardless of the language of the programs. The 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy* reflects the move towards the expansion of the television industry. The CRTC abolished the different categories of ethnic cultural content in the *Ethnic broadcasting policy* and replaced the categories with two different definitions of content: ethnic content and third language programming. As well, the *Ethnic broadcasting policy* voided all stipulations on the categories of ethnic programming. The CRTC indicates that all licensed ethnic stations must broadcast 60% ethnic content during each broadcast month and 40% non-ethnic programs. The CRTC requires that ethnic minority television services broadcast 60% Cancon during the broadcast month and 50% Cancon during the evening broadcasts. The 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy* leaves broadcasters with greater flexibility over the different ranges of programming.

Consequently, the television industry's initiative towards the development of Canadian ethnic minority content, content associated with the identity component of the ethnospheres, are offset by the *Ethnic broadcasting policy*. The *Ethnic broadcasting policy* no longer associates cultural content with identity. Instead, the *Ethnic*

broadcasting policy has moved towards entrusting the television industry with the responsibility of meeting the demands of the consumers, all consumers regardless of their identity.

D) The technological drive for more content

The television industry is not driven by the need to meet the identity component of the ethnospheres. Rather the television industry is driven by the technological capacity for more content and the refinement of content for niche markets. The ethnic minority communities without television services are niche markets that may benefit from the competition between distributors, but Canadians with hybrid identities may not be reflected in the packages of ethnic minority television services. The competition for consumers between cable companies, Satellite Relay Distribution Units (SRDU) and Direct-to-Home satellite technology (DTH) companies are opening the door to a plethora of foreign third language programming, more flexible program packages, and lower subscriber fees that could mean more choices for consumers. With cable bundles of programs, consumers were restricted to the cable companies' packages. Some cable companies, however, can offer similar flexible options, even pay-per-view options, as the industry changes from analog to DTH and SRDU digital technology.⁴⁴ The ability to provide more choice and flexibility to the ethnic minority communities will depend on the competition between various service providers and the willingness of cable companies to carry ethnic broadcasting.

⁴⁴ The primary difference between SRDU and DTH technologies is that the former may relay signals to terrestrial broadcasting distributors, which then relays the signal to their subscribers. DTH, on the other hand, directly send signals to satellite owners.

As of January 2000, there were five specialty services catering to Canada's ethnic minority communities. The expansion of the broadcasting system with digital technology will allow these ethnic services national broadcasting privileges. The five ethnic specialty services all have agreements with DTH, SRDU, cable providers, or a combination of all three distributors. Similarly, licensed multi-ethnic stations such as CFMT-TV are making use of digital technology to reach audiences outside of Ontario. The chart below illustrates the old category of ethnic minority television services that are available in Canada and some of the companies that distribute these services. The only ethnic specialty services that had guaranteed delivery were Fairchild Television's Regional (Talent Vision) and National services and Telelatino since their language market was over 10% of the Canadian population. As of 1998 foreign specialty services such as TV Japan, The Filipino Channel, TV Polonia, WMNB-TV: Russian American Broadcasting Company, Odyssey, South Asian Television (ATN), Black Entertainment Television (BET), and Deutsche Welle were on the list of available services for broadcasting, but only BET and Deutsche Welle were being distributed. In 2000, ATN and Odyssey both received carriage on satellite. The licensing of new digital pay and specialty services will change the number of ethnic minority television services in 2001 as well as increase the competition between services for carriage on digital, satellite and cable technology.

Table 2: Ethnic Minority Television Services in Canada (Before Dec. 14, 2000)

	Type of Service	Niche Market	Coverage	Access
CFMT-TV	Ethnic Service (60%)	Multilingual	National	ExpressVu, Star Choice, Look TV
CJNT-TV (CTEQ)	Ethnic Service (100%)	Multilingual	Montreal	Star Choice
City-TV	Conventional Television	* Carries multilingual service	Toronto, Ottawa	ExpressVu, Star Choice, Look TV
CHCH-TV	Conventional Television	* Carries multilingual service	Hamilton	Star Choice
Fairchild-TV (regional)	Specialty	Chinese	B.C	Star Choice, Rogers Cable
Fairchild-TV (national)	Specialty	Chinese	National	Rogers Cable, Star Choice,
Odyssey	Specialty	Greek	National	Star Choice
Teletatino	Specialty	Latino	National	Star Choice
ATN	Specialty	South Asian	National	ExpressVu, Star Choice, Look TV

* Note: These stations are not licensed multilingual stations, but they carry some ethnic minority television programming.

The technological dilemma the CRTC and the private sector are encountering concerns the lack of frequencies and the outdated analog technology that compels a new "solution" to delivering ethnic minority television content and conventional programming. The CRTC and the private sector see digital technology as the "solution" to the technological bottleneck to information and cultural delivery, while advocating convenience for consumers.

Although the CRTC considers the size of the ethnic minority community before specialty licenses are granted, the CRTC and the distributors are eager to fill the technological capacity with more specialty services. The CRTC has categorized specialty

television according to distribution: specialty services licensed under Category 1 will have guaranteed distribution by distributors who employ digital technology. Specialty services licensed under Category 2 must negotiate with distributors for access (CRTC, Nov. 24, 2000). As of December 14, 2000, digital TV was confirmed for 2001 with an addition of thirty-three new ethnic minority television services and two hundred twenty nine mainstream services being offered in Category 2. The CRTC's commitment to increasing the number of specialty services is a response to the demands of the television industry for more content. Shaw is one company that has established a framework for digital distribution:

Shaw has kept our commitment to build a fully capable and complete digital distribution system. We have built the infrastructure to deliver digital services, we have acquired the digital decoders, and we have launched an initial package of digital services. Our digital rollout is missing only one essential element – a full range of attractive new programming services that will convince our customers of the tremendous value of digital broadcasting (Shaw, 1999).

Shaw's comment on technological acceleration exceeding content availability reveals how content must sell technology.

The need for content compels the CRTC, the broadcasters and the distributors to continue pursuing three "solutions" to disparity in content availability: first, to increase the number of specialty licenses for conventional and ethnic minority television broadcasting. Secondly, the CRTC increased the number of foreign specialty services for ethnic minority communities with a substantial population - but a population that the CRTC and the television industry deemed too small for Canadian ownership and Canadian content regulations. For example, Rogers' move towards offering digital cable services allows the company to carry foreign broadcasters, such as TV Japan and other third language programming, without all the regulations normally afforded to Canadian

specialty services. Thirdly, licensed ethnic radio broadcasters are airing their signals on television through satellite and cable technology to increase the amount of ethnic minority content on television. CHIN Radio/ TV International both broadcast its radio signals over cable and it broadcasts ten hours per week of television programming on CITY-TV. CHIN Radio / TV International is using a brokering system of "renting" television time without actually purchasing its own television broadcasting equipment. Broadcasters that use the brokering system to reduce their operating cost, allowing the companies to focus on developing ethnic programming content.

The first and the third solution must abide by the Cancon regulations. The second solution to increase the number of foreign specialty services or Category 2 specialty services in the 2001 licenses, however, ***do not*** dramatically increase the amount of Canadian ethnic minority content. The rules for the 2001 Category 2 ethnic minority television licenses require only 15% Canadian content under *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42* compared with French and English language specialty services that require 35% Cancon (CRTC, Jan. 13, 2000: ref. 32). The absence of Cancon requirements in third language programming lessens the likelihood of developing Canadian ethnic minority content. As such, the propensity to create ethnic minority television enclaves is much stronger than if the services abide by the Cancon quotas or stipulations established in the *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139*.

4.3 Limits in the broadcasting technology

Although the technological infrastructure is capable of distributing all the new specialty television services, the political economy of technological access hinders some ethnic minority communities from receiving ethnic minority television services. Shaw's

comment above that the company has established a digital system and it is waiting for the CRTC to license more specialty services to fill the technological capacity ignores the lack of capacity for ethnic minority television services. In other words, Shaw ignores the fact that there are ethnic specialty services without carriage. Instead, Shaw's comment reveals two limitations concerning technology. First, the limits found in the hardware and software restricts the actual data carriage on the system. Corporations developing hardware and software technology incur high costs that distributors must cover. The cost of technology may be passed on to the consumers. The second limitation concerning technology is found in the political economy of distribution. The distributors select profitable ethnic minority television services to carry on their system. The hardware and software capacity forces distributors to restrict carriage only to profitable ethnic minority television services. Ethnic minority television services are competing against specialty services targeted at the hegemonic population. Consequently, the ethnic minority television services must be more profitable than other specialty services. In an atmosphere of optimism surrounding the capabilities of satellite and digital technology, the limits of hardware / software capacity and the limits in the political economy of ethnic minority television broadcasting are often irritating reminders of the division between those with access and those without access to information or cultural content.

The limits of the hardware and software hinder the television industry from growing and limit the ability of consumers to receive television services. The CRTC believes the broadcasting infrastructure has a limited number of radio and television frequencies available, which makes it impossible to license separate over-the-air stations for each language community (July 16, 1999). Appearing before the CRTC on February 2, 1999, Sundar Raj drew the attention of the Commission to the limited amount of ethnic

programming access on analog technology frustrating most ethnic minorities before the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy*. The inability to purchase cable packages with ethnic specialty services such as ATN or install satellite dishes on multiple unit dwellings makes implementing the CRTC's policies irrelevant in some areas (CRTC, Toronto: ref. 98).⁴⁵ Many participants at the hearings voiced similar complaints as Mr. Raj on the accessibility and the cost of broadcasting technology. The CRTC's response to the high cost of technological access is to provide digital technology and more competition for content delivery.

In the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy*, the CRTC responded to the ethnic minority organizations' demand for lower costs to technological access. The CRTC responded to the ethnic minority organizations demands by saying, "the primary goal of the policy is to ensure access to ethnic programming to the extent practicable given resource limitations" (CRTC, July 16, 1999). Since the comment and the implementation of the *Ethnic broadcasting policy*, the CRTC has created other policies that increase competition between cable distributors, such as Rogers and Shaw who have the highest number of subscribers in the industry (CAB, 1998), to compete with Star Choice and ExpressVu. Star Choice and Express Vu use DTH and Satellite Relay Distribution Undertakings (SRDU) technologies to deliver ethnic minority content to the ethnic minority communities nationally. Consequently, the CRTC believes that increasing the competition between distributors will lower the cost of technological access for consumers. In January 2000, the CRTC increased its effort to provide digital services with the framework for Direct-to-Home (DTH) satellite undertakings (CRTC, Jan. 13, 2000; *Broadcasting Act*, 2000) and digital broadcasting (CRTC, Feb. 4, 2000).

⁴⁵ In September 1999, ExpressVu made an application to the CRTC to serve multiple unit dwellings

The CRTC's attempt to expand the technological infrastructure enticed cable companies to apply for DTH distribution and authorization centers to deliver pay-per-view, pay-TV, and other programming services. Shaw, Astral, Rogers, and others, however, withdrew their applications for DTH distribution licenses. DTH technology elevates the pressure from cable companies to carry all the specialty and pay-per-view programs on analog technology, but it does not lower the cost of technological access. Rather the CRTC has inadvertently raised the threshold for information and culture access, initiating a greater disparity between information / culture rich and information / culture poor. The CRTC expects the cost of television access to decline as competition between distributors increase. Before competition lowers the price of access, however, consumers are expected to pay the price for technological access. Although there are more distributors for ethnic specialty services, the cost is *not* likely to decrease as cable companies slowly switch from analog to digital TV, while DTH and SRDU servers will need to recover the cost of establishing their technological distribution systems.

4.4) *Beyond policy: Maximizing corporate size*

The high cost of content and technological development and the changes in the television industry are producing integrated corporate structures. The limitations in ethnic minority television access can be attributed to the vertical and horizontal integration of television corporations. Ethnic minority television services compete for carriage against distributor owned specialty services. Although integrating corporate structures may seem to provide more television services to the population, the intense commercialization of the media may lead to the degeneration of the ethnospheres. The

(MUDs) with its then current DTH license (CRTC, Dec. 21, 1999).

commercialization of the media in Canada's television industry is clearly accelerating towards larger corporate sizes that may challenge the viability of the ethnospheres.

Although integrated corporate structures enable broadcasters, distributors and producers to decrease cost and increase efficiency, the CRTC is ignoring the negative consequences of large integrated corporations. The report on the *Competition and culture on the information highway* indicated that distributors should not be "permitted to acquire ownership or control of programming undertakings other than over-the-air radio and television services" (CRTC, Dec. 8, 2000). On December 14, 2000, however, the CRTC indicated the distribution of the new digital specialty licenses could be enhanced by distributors (cable and satellite) joining in the role of ownership with broadcasters.⁴⁶ Some corporations, like Shaw, take full advantage of the integrated structure to control the cost of content and technological developments. From Appendix C on Shaw Communications and Corus Entertainment, the combination of distribution and broadcasting ownership is evident: Corus Entertainment owns 20% of Telelatino and numerous other specialty channels. Shaw owns Cancom and Star Choice; Shaw's ownership of Cancom and Star Choice are incentives for delivering Telelatino since Shaw has shares in Corus Entertainment. For those new specialty services without a distributor investor, content delivery may be much more difficult to attain.

Rogers Cable system argues that the old analog technology hinders the capacity of cable companies to provide more diverse programming (Rogers, March 4, 1999). This argument fails to acknowledge that broadcasters and distributors often own specialty licenses, which decreases the amount of carriage capacity for ethnic minority television

⁴⁶ In October 2000, the CRTC expressed its concern over cross media ownership indicating it was exploring whether journalistic creativity was threaten in the market (Marotte, 2000, Oct. 5). The CRTC.

services. With the promise of more digital broadcasting, the flexible broadcasting structure will play a more prominent role in determining how content is packaged and delivered. The flexible framework provides avenues for producers to be broadcasters and distributors. The trend towards integrating companies ensures content for distribution. Alliance Atlantis (a production and broadcasting company) owns twenty-four new specialty licenses,⁴⁷ more than any organization. Canadian satellite Communications (now a broadcaster and distributor) owns one specialty license and Rogers (a distributor and broadcaster) owns four new specialty licenses. The chart below illustrates the distributors' ownership of specialty licenses before December 14, 2000.

however, has not acknowledged whether the integrated media corporations affect the ethnocultural communities.

⁴⁷ On February 12 2001, Alliance Atlantis purchased Salter Street Films, a production company with 21 new Category 2 specialty licenses. Alliance Atlantis now has forty-five specialty licenses available for broadcasting in 2001.

**Table 3: Ownership of pay & specialty services by top six distributors
(As of Nov. 2000)**

Control of specialty services		
Corporation	Service	Percentage
Rogers Communications	CTV SportsNet	29.99%
	Outdoor Life	33.30%
	Viewer's Choice	24.95%
Vidéotron Ltée	Le Canal Nouvelles (LCN)	100%
	Canal Évasion	10%
	Canal Indigo	20%
Corus (Shaw)	CMT (Country)	90%
	MovieMax!	100%
	SuperChannel	100%
	Telelatino	20%
	TELETOON ⁴⁸	20%
	The Comedy Network	95%
	TreeHouse	100%
	YTV Canada	100%
	Family Channel (In-trust) ⁴⁹	50%
	Food Network	10%
	Home Theatre	100%
COGECO	Canal Indigo	20%
Moffat Communications Ltd	Lifestyle (WTN)	100%
BCE Media	Canal Évasion	50.1%
	Télé des Arts	16%

Source: CRTC, Dec. 11, 2000b.

The chart above illustrates that all distributors are significantly involved in specialty services, which ensures the advent of digital television will contain content. Rogers Communications owns significant shares in CTV SportsNet, Outdoor Life, and Viewer's Choice. Corus (Shaw) owns five specialty services, making Corus (Shaw) a broadcaster and distributor. In addition, distributors may own shares of the ethnic specialty services through subsidiaries in another country, such as Shaw's ownership of Fairchild Television through a Dutch company (CRTC, March 10, 2000: ref. 9). The integration between

⁴⁸ Corus owns 20% of TELETOON through YTV Inc.

⁴⁹ Currently, 50% of the Family Channel held by Corus Premium Corporation is in trust with Keith Campbell. The CRTC requires the separation as a condition of approval for Corus to acquire the remaining assets of WIC Radio.

distribution and broadcasting hinders specialty services without integrative structures from being broadcasted.

The largest distributors are now the biggest players in specialty broadcasting.

Table 4 illustrates the top six distributors in Canada and the size of their subscription list.

Table 4: Top six distributors by total basic subscribers

Top six by total basic subscribers		
Corporations: by rank	1999 subscribers	1999 national share
Rogers Communications Inc.	2,213,855	26%
Vidéotron Ltée.	1,549,731	18%
Shaw Cablesystems Ltd. – cable only	1,532,877	18%
COGECO Inc.	765,155	9%
Moffat Communications	322,607	4%
Bell ExpressVu	277,938	3%
Star Choice (Shaw) – DTH only	241,438	3%

Source: CRTC, Dec. 11, 2000b.

Shaw, Rogers, Cogeco, and Moffat Communications are Canada's top content distributors who also own shares in specialty services. Canada's television broadcasting is competitive because of the integration between production, distribution and broadcasting. Profitability and global competition are indeed a sign of success; however, the access dilemmas for ethnic minority television services arise from the same competitive structures. The lack of carriage capacity contributes to the problem of ethnic minority television access.

Ethnic broadcasters are also integrating. The thirty-three new ethnic specialty services in Category 2 are owned by a limited number of specialty broadcasters. For example, Asian Television Network (ATN) controls all eight specialty services targeted at the South Asian community. The only other new players involved in third language programming are broadcasters without specialty channels such as The Sports Network, I.T. Productions Ltd., TV ITALY, and Video Italia. Ethnic minority communities will

receive more third language programming and some Canadian ethnic minority content, but one broadcaster owns the services targeted to the largest ethnic minority communities in Canada.

The integration between broadcasters, distributors, and producers may hamper those ethnic minority television services without distributor ownership from broadcasting in Canada. Specialty services with distributor ownership are more likely to receive broadcasting privileges than those services without distributor ownership. The trend towards vertically and horizontally integrated structures is also occurring in ethnic minority television broadcasting. The consequences of increased commercialization in the television industry are larger corporate sizes, fewer players, and larger obstacles for television services without distributor ownership.

4.5 Exclusive and inclusive spaces

The growing size of the corporations in the television industry challenges the availability of diverse opinions on television for Canada's ethnic minority communities. Although there are more specialty services, there may not be more opinions arising from Canada's ethnospheres. The same structure that facilitates public discourse can also hamper it. The trend in the television industry is towards larger corporations that influence the production and distribution of ethnic minority television. The same broadcasting structure also limits ethnic minority television services.

Despite the growing technological capacity for more content, the broadcasting structure still has limits. Although there are thirty-three Category 2 third language services for 2001, there is often only one corporation controlling all the broadcasting licenses for each ethnic minority community. One corporation owning all the television

services to one community challenges the ability of television to facilitate diverse opinions and cultural content for public discourse. According to Lacroix and Tremblay (1997), the shift from different technologies for information dissemination allows businesses to develop more offensive strategies in the cultural industries that change the ground rules of competition and "the appearance or ascension of new actors, the presence of which modifies prevailing power relations" (67). The changing power relations in the television industry affect the type of information and culture available for Canada's ethnic minority communities.

The growing size and power of television corporations is in tandem with the CRTC's decreasing involvement in the direct governance of the broadcasting system. The CRTC's desire for flexible broadcasting policies and the technological change enables distributors more power in the television industry, since the implementation of technological innovation and content delivery revolves around the ability of distributors to meet the demands of their consumers. Distributors are not oblivious to the niche markets in the ethnic minority communities. Shaw and the rest of the television industry are poised to take advantage of the niche markets that the broadcasting technology creates. The flexibility in the broadcasting policies allows broadcasters to adapt to the changes in the ethnic broadcasting market. Shaw indicates that "ethnic broadcasters know their business and their respective local markets and, as in the past, will continue to adjust their programming approaches accordingly" (1999). Shaws' statement reflects the technological and marketing expertise the distributors have developed in assessing the needs of their market. Furthermore, the expertise of distributors and broadcasters diminishes the CRTC's need to be highly involved in regulating the industry. According

to CAB, the broadcasters are capable of managing ethnic broadcasting without the CRTC's intervention:

Ethnic broadcasters are committed to ensuring access for ethnic Canadians. It is not the role of the CRTC to establish some body to superimpose its judgement on broadcasters in terms of *how* they fulfill program needs within their market (CAB, 1998: 14).

CAB insists that the CRTC limit the role it plays in regulating the ethnic minority television industry. Obviously, cable distributors believe the CRTC's role in the broadcasting system is to be a mediator between various interests rather than as a governor that directs the system. Consequently, the CRTC's stance on its own role within the industry is as follows:

The Commission has designed the policy to increase flexibility for ethnic stations, to reduce regulation where possible, and to respond to the evolution within ethnic groups and in Canadian society at large (CRTC, July 16, 1999).

The flexible framework for broadcasting means letting broadcasters establish advisory councils separate from the CRTC to self-regulate the industry. In the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy*, the CRTC advises the ethnic broadcasters to incorporate ethnic minority communities in these advisory councils so that the decisions the councils make will be reflective of Canada's multicultural society.

The beginning of self-regulation and the decreasing intrusion of the government in broadcasting may mean that the CRTC is retreating away from the market, but self-regulation may also mean the market has more power to dictate the availability of programs for their consumers. In a time of digital transition, the distributors hold the keys to access (Folb, Dec. 14, 1998). The amount of control that distributors hold challenges ethnic minority television from being facilitators of public discourse within the ethnospheres.

Ethnic minority television can serve a legitimate role in facilitating public debate in the ethnospheres, but ethnic minority television exists in a capitalist economy that restricts the availability of ethnic minority television. Unfortunately, Canada's broadcasting system exists in a capitalist system, which functions best in disparity (McChesney, 1999). The CRTC has created a flexible governing system for broadcasters and distributors. The flexible governing system creates exclusive spaces through the high cost of technological access and niche markets in specialty services that limit content within a specific language. Currently, specialty services in ethnic minority television cater to the niche markets (third language programming) and multilingual television services attempt to bridge diverse communities.⁵⁰ Digital and satellite technology is indeed expanding the television industry, making the large number of specialty services available in 2001, but the limitations in the political economy of content availability and technological access hampers some communities from receiving ethnic minority television.

⁵⁰ An attempt to create a definite inclusive multilingual broadcasting network for the ethnocultural organizations was proposed by Rogers Broadcasting Limited in 1997, but the proposal did not find serious consideration until the 1999 hearings on the *Ethnic broadcasting policy*.

Chapter 5

The Chinese-Canadian television market

The political economy of content availability and technological access hampers some ethnic minorities from gaining access to television services. Canada's Chinese-Canadian communities, the largest visible minority community, are fortunate to have several specialty television services available.⁵¹ In addition, CFMT-TV broadcasts some programs in Cantonese and Mandarin. The existing Chinese television services, however, do not reflect the identity of Chinese-Canadians. Rather the existing Chinese television services reflect the trend in the television industry towards larger television corporations that are integrated vertically and horizontally. Although integrating television corporations is not contrary to reflecting the identity of Chinese-Canadian audiences, the broadcasting policies support increasing content without increasing cultural content that reflects the identity of hybrid Canadians.

This chapter examines the Chinese language television market. Although the competition between Chinese language services involve primarily CFMT-TV and Fairchild Television, programs on CFMT-TV and Fairchild Television are insufficient to reflect the identity of the Chinese-Canadian audiences. Instead, Chinese language television services are means of reaching niche markets based on language.

5.1 Recommendations to the CRTC on Feb. 1999

The existing Chinese-Canadian television services have not fulfilled the Chinese-Canadian ethnic minority organizations' recommendations for content that reflects the

⁵¹ According to the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy*, the Chinese-Canadian community is the largest audience receiving third language programming. However, the community is not the largest ethnic community since the British and French are also considered ethnic.

identity of Chinese-Canadian audiences. During the hearings on the review of *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139*, the Chinese Canadian National Council (CCNC) and the United Chinese Community Enrichment Services Society (SUCCESS) recommended that the CRTC take action to increase the amount of diverse programming to reflect the identity of Chinese-Canadian ethnic minority communities.⁵² The CCNC made eight recommendations to the CRTC for the 1999 *Ethnic broadcasting policy*. Of the CCNC's eight recommendations to the CRTC, two concerned identity, while the other recommendations concerned access, establishing an advisory council to the broadcasters, establishing a national network, training journalists and establishing a minimum amount of ethnic minority content in conventional and ethnic minority television services (CRTC, Feb. 2, 1999: ref, 113).

The CCNC petitioned the CRTC to change the existing television services to reflect the reality of Chinese-Canadian identities. The CCNC presented eight recommendations to the CRTC that were community oriented rather than industrially oriented to expand the broadcasting system within a capitalist framework. The CRTC's and the broadcasters' vision for the emerging ethnic minority television broadcasting system is contrary to the CCNC's vision of the Canadian broadcasting system. The CCNC seeks more intervention, the CRTC and broadcasters seek less regulation; the CCNC seeks more responsibility and easier access, the CRTC and broadcasters seek profits obtainable in a narrow niche, segregated, broadcasting system. In the words of the CCNC, the existing ethnic representation smacks of tokenism:

⁵² The CCNC represents twenty-nine chapters across Canada. Although it was formed in 1979, relatively new compared to the Chinese Benevolent Association established in the early 1900s, its objectives encompass a variety of educational endeavors to encourage cultural awareness as well as integration into Canada's multicultural society.

The lack of diversity in mainstream broadcasters is not resolved by specialty stations, as these too do not reflect the population of Canada ... Neither will the problem be solved by licensing token 'ethnic' broadcasters, especially as they may not be Canadian (e.g., Black Entertainment Television) or provide English or French language programming (Oct. 5, 1998: 4).

According to the CCNC, foreign television specialty services such as BET do not adequately reflect the diversity in Canada's ethnic minority communities. What is striking about the CCNC's comment is their reference to a sense of Canadian identity that is more diverse, more Canadian than what ethnic minority television broadcasting was prior to the *Ethnic broadcasting policy*.

In addition, the CCNC challenged the television industry to consider that visible representation of an ethnic minority community is not equal to reflecting hybrid Canadian identity. The SUCCESS indicates there is a need for cultural content that reflects the reality of hybrid Canadians. At the time of the hearings, existing television services did not provide a sufficient quantity of content that reflected Chinese-Canadian identity. In the CCNC's opinion, any non-Canadian ethnic broadcaster, such as BET, is a broadcaster that offers token representation. Although foreign broadcasters offer a variety of diverse cultural and linguistic programming, the CCNC believes the broadcasters have failed to play a vital role in social cohesion. In the CCNC's opinion, television can play an important role in integrating different ethnic minority communities (CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999: ref. 72). The Chinese-Canadian organizations view the television broadcasting system as an instrument for creating social cohesion rather than an instrument of assimilation in Canadian society. The niche market approach of targeting communities, however, does not prepare the hegemonic communities to accept the ethnic minority communities (CRTC, Feb. 1, 1999: ref. 72). The ethnic minority television structure does not offer a communication flow between the hegemonic communities and the ethnic minority

communities. Ethnic broadcasting continues to create exclusive spaces by isolating ethnic minority communities linguistically and culturally within the television broadcast.

The Chinese-Canadian organizations' perspective on developing community is contrary to the industrial model for increasing specialty services that act as niche markets. Community organizations such as SUCCESS and the CCNC argued for an increase in the quantity of cultural content that reflects the reality of hybrid Canadians. At the hearings, SUCCESS and the CCNC wanted television services that would overcome the language and cultural barriers between the ethnic minority communities and the hegemonic population. The ethnic minority organizations' recommendation for a broadcasting structure without divisions between mainstream television and ethnic minority television is contrary to the trend in the television industry.

5.2 Reaching the Chinese language market

A) *Background: The broadcasters*

SUCCESS and the CCNC failed to realize that the trend towards vertical and horizontal integration in the television industry was also occurring in ethnic minority television. The need for more Chinese-Canadian cultural content, produced in Canada is connected to the larger television industry. The trend in the television industry influences the corporate structure of ethnic minority television services. Often distributors have shares in specialty services, regardless of whether the services are directed at the mainstream or ethnic minority audiences. In the Chinese language market, the most successful players are indeed the players with the most integrated structures. Although there are several conventional television services for the Chinese language market, only CFMT-TV is a successful broadcaster with the potential of expanding its market reach to

Vancouver. The other multilingual station that offers twenty-five or more language services is CJNT-TV. CTEQ Television, the owner of CJNT-TV, however, filed for bankruptcy on April 11, 2000, after CanWest ceased to fund its operations. Without additional funding or an alliance with any of the large distributors or broadcasters, CJNT-TV's future operation is questionable. Although it may be premature to exclude CJNT-TV in this discussion on conventional multilingual broadcasters, CFMT-TV is the only viable station still in the process of expanding its audience reach.

CFMT-TV has the corporate structure to expand outside of the Toronto market. Rogers Communication, the largest cable distributor in Canada with 26% of the national basic cable subscription, owns CFMT-TV (CRTC, Dec. 11, 2000b) (see Appendix D). Rogers ensures that CFMT-TV will have distribution whereas the other broadcasters must negotiate carriage with a distributor. CFMT-TV offers some Chinese language programming, regularly broadcasting the *Chinese Newslines*, which has some local, national, and international news. CFMT-TV also broadcasts *The Chinese Business Hour*, *Gwai Lo Cooking* (a Cantonese language show on Western cooking) once a week and the *Mandarin Wide Angle Lens Show* developed for the local Mandarin community on fashion, finance, and entertainment twice a week. The only other Chinese language competitor in Southern Ontario is CHIN-TV and CJNT-TV, but these broadcasters do not offer the same quantity of Chinese language programming.

Fairchild Television, however, is the only Chinese language specialty service that provides an entire day of Chinese language programming. The policy restriction on ethnic specialty services allows only Fairchild to service the Chinese language market in Mandarin and Cantonese. Under Fairchild Holdings, the Fairchild television group has eight Category 2 specialty licenses, newspapers, and radio outlets. Fairchild Holdings

Ltd. owns Fairchild Television, Talent Vision, Fairchild radio, and the new Category 2 Chinese language specialty television services.⁵³ The new Category 2 Chinese language services include Fairchild Body and Soul Channel, Fairchild Children's Channel, Fairchild Movie Channel, Fairchild Music Channel, Fairchild Spiritual Channel, and the Fairchild Technology Channel (see Appendix B). According to the CRTC, the new Category 2 digital services will likely begin broadcasting in September of 2001. As Fairchild increases the number of specialty services, the corporation follows the rest of the television industry towards vertical and horizontal integration; it gains multimedia ownership with an increasing capacity to compete in more than one environment. Fairchild's corporate structure is not complicated: Thomas Fung owns 80% of Fairchild Television through Fairchild Holdings Ltd. and Condor Entertainment, a Dutch company, owns 20% of Fairchild Television. Shaw, however, owns 27.8% of Television Broadcasts Ltd., which owns 100% of Condor Entertainment (see Appendix C). Thomas Fung is connected to Shaw through Condor Entertainment who owns shares of Fairchild Television.

Although the Chinese language market is small compared to conventional television that reaches over 70% of the mainstream audiences, CFMT-TV and Fairchild Television compete for advertising dollars. Fairchild Television would appear to have a greater advantage over CFMT-TV since advertisers could obtain contracts for Fairchild's other television and media services to reach the Chinese language market according to interest. The corporate structure of the broadcasters influence their ability to garner advertising dollars and their distribution.

⁵³ The Fairchild Media Group also has owns the *Popular lifestyle and Entertainment magazine*. This

B) Market reach

Both CFMT-TV and Fairchild Television are successful at reaching their audiences. Despite CFMT-TV's limited number of programs catering to the Chinese language market, a study conducted by LLS Market Research indicates that CFMT-TV reaches 93% of its audience, which is about 326,000 Chinese language viewers in Southern Ontario.

Table 5: Average Daily Reach of Various Media (Mon to Sun)

Company	Total Chinese Audience Reach
Fairchild TV	58%
Ming Pao	32%
Fairchild Radio	28%
CFMT-TV	21%
Sing Tao	19%
Toronto Star	17%
CHIN Radio	14%
CFTO	7%
World Journal	4%
City TV	5%

Source: ACNielsen, 1999a.

* DJC Research Toronto Chinese Media Index 1999

* Base: 223,000 Chinese Adults 18+ in Toronto CMA who speak Cantonese at home

According to ACNielsen's 1999 research, however, Fairchild Television boasts the highest percentage of daily audience viewing in Toronto.⁵⁴ ACNielsen's 1999 research in Toronto, the largest Chinese language market, reveals that Fairchild on average reaches more of the Chinese language audience than any medium. The ACNielsen research indicates that Fairchild dominates the Chinese language market at 58% of the 223,000 Chinese adults who speak Cantonese in Toronto. The next

covers an entire range of media, making it the most integrated ethnic media service in Canada.

⁵⁴ The LLS and the ACNielsen studies reveal different sample populations. In addition, the AC Nielsen study measures only the Cantonese language population rather than combining the Mandarin, Cantonese and English speakers together. Thus, the ACNielsen study is much more specific compared with the LLS study.

significant player competing for the Cantonese market is *Ming Pao*, a national paper with an average of 32% of Toronto's Cantonese speaking adults. When ACNielsen conducted a survey on the Mandarin market, the figures were slightly different.

Table 6: Average Daily Reach of Various Media (Mon to Sun)

Company	Total Chinese Audience Reach
Fairchild TV	33%
World Journal	25%
CFMT-TV	15%
Sing Tao	15%
Toronto Star	14%
City TV	13%
Fairchild Radio	8%
CFTO	8%
Ming Pao	7%
CHIN Radio	3%

Source: ACNielsen, 1999b.

* DJC Research Toronto Chinese Media Index 1999

* Base: 44,000 Chinese Adults 18+ in Toronto CMA who speak Mandarin at home

Fairchild reaches 33% of the Mandarin language market: the percentage is slightly higher than the Fairchild's next competitor, the *World Journal*. The *World Journal*, a newspaper targeted at immigrants from Taiwan, China, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia, which boasts about 25% of the average Mandarin language market. CFMT-TV is at a distant third place with 15% of the average daily reach. ACNielsen's study also reveals the significant number of Cantonese and Mandarin speakers that use non-ethnic media such as the *Toronto Star*, which has a significant reach of 17% and 14% respectively.

The Vancouver market is more competitive than the Toronto market. ACNielsen indicates that Fairchild's average share of the daily Chinese language market out of 211,000 Chinese adults, eighteen years and older is about 39% or 82,900 Chinese speakers. The restriction on competition between specialty services has enabled Fairchild

Television to corner the national market on Chinese television broadcasting. Although CFMT-TV is Fairchild's obvious television broadcasting competitor, the gap between Fairchild and CFMT-TV has widened from 1996 to 1999. When ACNielsen compared the market between Fairchild Television and CFMT-TV, Fairchild's quarter rating was significantly higher in 1999. Fairchild's rating increased 8% from 24% to 32% in 1999. CFMT-TV's rating fell from 20% in 1996 to 15% in 1999. Overall, Fairchild Television has more viewers than CFMT-TV on its Chinese language programming.

**Table 7: Average Quarter-Hour Rating
Comparison (Monday; 9 PM-10 PM)**

Company	1996	1999
Fairchild Television	24%	32%
CFMT-TV	20%	15%

Source: ACNielsen, 1999c.

DJC Research Toronto Chinese Media Index 1999 & ACNielsen and
DJC Research Toronto Chinese Media Index 1996

With the advent of an increasing number of Chinese language television services scheduled for broadcasting in September of 2001, Fairchild will most likely dominate the Chinese language television market. In the chart below, the Canadian Cable Television Association (CCTA) indicates that the number of people subscribing to Fairchild Television increased from 132,200 in 1995 to 286,600 in 1999; this is an increase of approximately 46%. Talent Vision, on the other hand, declined from 18,600 in 1995 to 13,000 in 1999; the decline is approximately 43% over four years. Although these figures do not correspond to the number of Chinese speakers in Canada, they do prompt the question of why one service declined and the other increased. Below is a chart of the subscription figures for Talent Vision and Fairchild Television between 1995 and 1999.

Table 8: Monthly Cable Subscribers (000)

Service	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Talent Vision	18.6	18.9	17.7	13.3	13.0
Fairchild	132.2	131.4	144.3	309.2	286.6

Source: Canadian Cable Television Association 1998, 1999.

The decline in Talent Vision's subscription may reveal the over saturation of the Mandarin language market, which produces a cannibalistic effect on Fairchild's affiliate. The cannibalistic effect of one service by another is obviously not a deciding factor for determining Fairchild Holdings' future specialty services to the Chinese language market since the corporation has expanded the number of services to the Chinese-Canadian audience. In addition, the new Category 2 Chinese language services may refine the niche market according to interest. What will be interesting to note is the cost of these services to Fairchild's subscribers. Currently, the cost of receiving Fairchild Television per month is approximately \$20 on ExpressVu, Star Choice, and Rogers Cable. The cost of receiving CFMT-TV in a package of basic cable services with many other Canadian and American networks is about \$19. A home receiving Talent Vision on a stand-alone basis is about \$10 on Rogers Cable. Fairchild Television is obviously much more costly to receive per month than the two other services. If individuals purchase a service based on the cost, hierarchies of information consumption and exclusive access based on income level arises in the Chinese-Canadian communities. Although cost alone does not determine subscription, income level influences who has the economic means to purchase television services.

The cost of television services is one deciding factor for purchasing Chinese television services. People with different social, economic and gender differences, however, use television for different purposes or a combination of purposes (Morley,

1986: 33-34). Audiences are fragmented along the lines of social, economic, gender and political differences (Ang, 1996). In ACNielsen's studies, Cantonese and Mandarin speakers use a variety of media that consists of both Chinese language media and the *Toronto Star*, an English language newspaper. Although the studies do not convey the percentage of Chinese speakers that use conventional television, newspapers, radio or the Internet, the significance of including the *Toronto Star* indicates the multilingual capabilities of Chinese-Canadians to receive information from various media outlets and their ability to use the information for participation in both the hegemonic public sphere and in the Chinese-Canadian ethnosphere.

The *Toronto Star's* inclusion in ACNielsen's studies hints at the variety of media that Chinese-Canadians use as information sources and as avenues of cultural negotiation. This demonstrates the mobility of Chinese-Canadians and the negotiation process that occurs between different spheres of interaction. In addition, the inclusion of the *Toronto Star* in the studies compel a more extensive examination of the increasing number of Chinese-Canadians who use conventional media to participate in Canada's public sphere and negotiate their identity as English or French speakers with some Chinese cultural practices. The previous chapter also indicated the lack of content focused on this portion of the Chinese-Canadian population and the need for increasing the number of television programs that reflect the hybrid identities that many possess. Chinese-Canadians are selecting their own information sources to facilitate their hybrid interests outside of Fairchild Television and CFMT-TV.

C) The audience that Fairchild and CFMT-TV misses

Chinese-Canadians select media outside of Fairchild Television and CFMT-TV to meet the needs of their hybrid interests. The Chinese-Canadian audiences have hybrid identities; each wave of migration brings individuals from different political, social, economic and geographical locations. The earliest group of Chinese migrants came in 1858 as coolie laborers to mine the gold in the Simon Fraser River. From 1858 to 1947, the majority of Chinese migrants came from southern China under different political, economic, and social conditions than those migrants after the 1950s and on wards. The Chinese migrants to Canada, not under the family unification category between the 1950s and the 1980s, however, did not face the same economic, social, or political conditions as the previous generations. The Canadian government recognized progressively over the years that the Chinese were unfairly treated; the government eliminated the head taxes, sought to reunite families separated through the head taxes, and granted the Chinese the right to vote in 1947 (Con & Wickberg, 1982). Consequently, the Chinese after the 1950s arrived in Canada with different economic, social, and political conditions. In addition, the Chinese migrants from the last twenty years are not from the same regions, they do not have the same dialect, and they do not have the same economic status as the earlier migrants. The migrants from the last twenty years are a heterogeneous population, who may have had hybrid identities before their arrival in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, May 2000). Consequently, these individuals may speak more than one Chinese dialect; Cantonese and Mandarin are the most popular.

The diversity of the Chinese population extends beyond language capacity. There is also a significant education difference in the Chinese-Canadian population. In the 1996 Census, the number of Chinese migrants with university education was 29%,

43.7%, 45.1% from Hong Kong, China, and Taiwan respectively. On the other hand, the percentage of Canadian born university graduates was only 19.3%. The chart below reveals that almost every immigrant group between the ages of 25 and 44 are more educated than the Canadian born population. With a higher percentage of university education than the Canadian born population, the Chinese migrants offer a vast array of skills to the Canadian labor force.

Table 9: Recent Immigrants aged 25 to 44 from selected countries by highest level of schooling, Canada, 1996.

	Total # of immigrants	% Less than high school	% University graduates
Total population	9 324 345	20.6	20.7
Canadian born	7 589 550	20.7	19.3
Recent immigrants	471 820	18.8	33.7
Hong Kong	47 415	18.9	29.0
Philippines	38 885	5.0	48.0
Peoples Republic of China	32 625	26.2	43.7
India	29 615	26.2	41.2
Sri Lanka	21 915	38.9	11.6
Poland	18 060	10.4	22.2
Vietnam	14 655	58.4	6.3
United Kingdom	1 240	7.4	27.8
Taiwan ⁵⁵	10 500	7.5	45.1
United States	10 375	5.0	55.1

Source: Statistics Canada, April 14, 1998.

The Chinese migrants with a university education are likely to be more mobile and technologically well equipped to compete in the Canadian economy than the previous waves of Chinese migrants (Qui, 1999). Hong Kong migrants are associated with being capital oriented and with different family structures, such as astronaut families, where children may not live with their parents but with other relatives (Ho et al, Nov. 2000).

⁵⁵ Statistics Canada does not indicate whether some of the migrants from Taiwan are of Chinese ancestry.

The Chinese Canadians are a heterogeneous population. Ethnic minority television, however, continues to target Chinese-Canadians as a homogenous population.

The political, economic, and educational differences of each Chinese migrant group challenges the ability of existing Chinese language television services to meet the needs of the Chinese-Canadian population. Fairchild Television's niche market approach, important as Fairchild is in facilitating information and cultural consumption, lends itself to the possibility of isolating individuals within the language service. Some, however, may argue that the Chinese-Canadian population has numerous opportunities to select Canadian programming from the vast array of specialty / pay and large conventional network television like Global. Although the selection of specialty and conventional television is available, the selection process involves neglecting the cultural and language aspect of television consumption or at least assuming ethnic minority communities enjoy the same cultural content as the dominant populations. In addition, Canadian content on conventional television for the mainstream audiences does not necessarily contain ethnic minority content.

The ethnic minority television services that specifically target the Chinese-Canadian audiences do not reflect the diversity in the Chinese-Canadian population. The diversity in the Chinese-Canadian population warrants more programs that reflect hybrid identities, rather than programs from the homeland.

5.3) The implications of Chinese language television

The existing Chinese language services do not reflect the heterogeneity of the Chinese-Canadian population. Although Fairchild television has eight new Category 2 specialty services for their Chinese-Canadian audiences in 2001, the specialty channels

will not likely offer more cultural content that reflects the Chinese-Canadian audience.

The specialty services in Category 2 will contain 15% Canadian content, but the remaining 85% will consist of programming from the homeland. Fairchild is developing a horizontally and vertically integrated media structure.

The market is increasingly dictating that larger corporations will profit much more than smaller, less integrated corporations. Ethnic minority television is following the rest of the television industry towards integration. The large number of specialty services for the mainstream audience reflects the trend towards vertical and horizontal integration. On December 14, 2000, sixteen English new digital pay and specialty services were licensed in Category 1 that involved distributors and broadcasters. Of the sixteen channels, four clearly have distributors as its owners. 13th Street is owned by Global, TVA, and Rogers; the Biography Channel is owned by Rogers, Shaw and A&E; Issues Channel is owned by Cogeco and Stornoway; and TechTV is owned by Rogers, Shaw and TechTV.

The CRTC's approval of the integration of distributors and broadcasters increases the efficiency for delivering content, but the CRTC may inadvertently be limiting the number of dissenting voices within the broadcasting system. The CRTC limits the number of broadcasters by raising the threshold for market entrance against small, less financially capable and less vertically integrated corporations; corporations must have financial capital, human resources, and technical knowledge to enter the market. The integration of television corporate structures and the increase in the number of specialty television services, however, do not equal more cultural content that reflects the identity of ethnic minority communities.

The lack of representation and the increase in the number of specialty television services may signal the increasing commercialization of the media. The increasing commercialization of television may allow advertisers to refine their advertising campaigns for each niche market based on language. The television broadcasting system offers advertisers niche markets based on interest and language, but the specialty television services may not contribute to the development of discourse within the ethnospheres since content reflects the homeland more than Canada. Consequently, Chinese television services are not examples of ethnic minority television meeting the needs of Canada's diverse population. Rather the integrated structures of television corporations and the increase in the number of specialty services are means of reaching the pockets of ethnic minority communities outside the hegemonic population. One can argue that the programs on ethnic minority television services can socialize the ethnic minority communities for higher sales in the marketplace. All the products can be advertised in Cantonese, Mandarin, Punjabi, Croatian, Spanish, and other languages as a means of teaching the ethnic minority population to be a common consumer within a capitalist society. Television technology, although fragmenting the mass audience, is conversely homogenizing the ethnic minority audiences for commodity consumption under specific language categories.

The specialty television services offer advertisers niche markets for their products. In 1997, television advertising revenues reached \$2.1 billion with a 2.1% growth annually from 1987. The greatest growth rate in advertising revenue was from specialty television, which yielded \$183 million in 1997 with a 26% growth rate net of inflation from 1987. Conventional broadcasters' advertising revenue, on the other hand, only grew by 1.4% annually with \$1.6 billion advertising dollars (Coopers & Lybrand,

June 30, 1998: 6). The chart below clearly reveals the growth in advertising dollars is in the specialty television market.

Table 10: Average Advertising Annual Growth Over Last 4 Years (1993-1997)

Program	English
YTV	22.3%
MuchMusic	5.7%
TSN	4.3%
Total Specialty	17.1%
Conventional	5.0%

Source: Coopers & Lybrand, June 30, 1998: 6.

YTV's, MuchMusic's and TSN's advertising revenues all grew between 1993 to 1997.

Television is indeed a profitable business that reaps rewards for targeting the interests of their consumers. Chinese television services will also gain advertising dollars for targeting the Chinese-Canadian community, but the content will likely not be associated with the identity of the Chinese-Canadian population.

The larger dilemma aside from the ethnic minority organizations' concern with whether content reflects the identity of the Chinese-Canadian community is, does television hinder or contribute to the development of discourse in the Chinese-Canadian ethnosphere. What is evident in Chinese-Canadian television is that a very small number of corporations have licenses to broadcast information to the Chinese-Canadian community in Chinese and only Fairchild holds the specialty licenses that cater to Chinese language television. The limited number of broadcasters, the high cost of access, the politics of cable carriage, and the profit margins for a successful operation in the television industry must be seen as a caution light in the celebration of public debate both on the national and international stage. The larger question, however, is more difficult to

answer without further studies on how Chinese-Canadians use television for public discourse.

What is evident is that the recommendations from the CCNC and SUCCESS for more cultural content that reflects the Chinese-Canadian communities will likely remain unfulfilled with the eight new Category 2 Chinese language services. The CRTC and the television industry must create lower access cost to quality Chinese-Canadian content that reflects the interest and dreams of those that call both Canada and their other residence (Taiwan, China, Hong Kong and other countries) home. Future generations of Chinese-Canadians cannot depend upon a few content producers who relay information and cultural production from the homeland that do not delve into the hybrid interests and the duality that comprises "Chinese-Canadianess." Fairchild Holdings is a case example where the development of new technology expands the number of television services for Chinese-Canadians. Increasing the number of services without diversifying away from third language programming, however, means that there is less opportunity for hybrid narratives to reflect the discourse in the Chinese-Canadian ethnosphere. With the limited number of television programs and services that reflect the identity of Chinese-Canadians, Chinese-Canadians must be keen to take advantage of all forms of media (newspapers, radio, television, and the Internet) available to them.

Chapter 6

Concluding Remarks

Ethnic minorities in Canada will likely need to expand their information sources to include newspapers and radio rather than depend on ethnic minority television to provide the type of information and cultural content that reflect their identity. Despite the large number of ethnic minority television services that will be available in September 2001, the political economy of ethnic minority television broadcasting hinders the structure from reflecting the identity of hybrid Canadians. Although the larger question of whether ethnic minority television reflects the ethnospheres requires further study, this thesis argues that the political economy of technological access and content availability reveals the inability of the ethnic minority television structure to provide content that reflects the identity of hybrid Canadians.

The political economy of ethnic minority television reveals the growing number of ethnic minority television services, but an increase in the quantity of television services and content does not equal an increase in content that reflects the hybrid identities of Canadians. The gap between the ethnic minority organizations' demand for content that reflects the hybrid identities in Canada and the television industry's supply of foreign television services is large. Foreign broadcasters must broadcast 15% Cancon, but the remaining 85% of third language programming is not Canadian content. Foreign broadcasters fill the technological capacity for more content, but they do not support the development of a high percentage of Canadian content. If Canadian content regulations associated content with identity, the 15% of Cancon on foreign television services would be a step towards increasing Canadian ethnic minority content. The Canadian content regulations in *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42*, however, is a policy that de-couples cultural

content from identity and moves the television industry towards an industry standard of Canadian content. Consequently, increasing the number of foreign television broadcasters with 15% Cancon will not significantly reflect the ethnic minority population with hybrid Canadian identities. The Cancon regulations permit an expansion of the number of programs that can qualify as Canadian content without reflecting the diversity within the Canadian population. Ethnic minority television is following the trend towards de-coupling content and identity, since ethnic minority television does not have separate Cancon criteria that would couple identity and cultural content. Ethnic minority television services that fail to reflect the identity of hybrid Canadians in the ethnic minority population create exclusive spaces based on language and culture.

The development of communication enclaves based on language and interest permit corporations to tailor their advertisements to the viewing audience. Although niche marketing may not be antithetical to supporting content that reflects the identity component of the ethnospheres, the conditions in *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42* do not favor content for the ethnospheres. Consequently, the transactions between broadcasters and distributors can be seen as attempts to expand their market share of the fragmenting Canadian audience. Habermas' proposal of degeneration in the public sphere as the media became increasingly commercialized, challenges the CRTC and those concerned with public discourse to consider the obstacles raised against public discourse in the ethnospheres. What has become evident in this discussion on the political economy of ethnic minority television is that there is a possibility for degeneration as the market determines content availability and technological access. In ethnic minority television, ethnicity is not the discriminating factor against content and technological access; rather capital is the critical determinant. The size of the audience matters to the television

industry. Can corporations make a profit offering television services to an ethnic minority community? Unfortunately, capital may be associated with ethnicity since new migrants or generations of ethnic minorities may still be struggling to overcome the crippling results of policies enacted in previous years. The CRTC has welcomed market standards and industry responsibility in ethnic minority television broadcasting without considering the divisions that capital raises. For those who see the proliferation of specialty services and the increase capacity for content in broadcasting technology, the policies that direct the production of content and technology determine how they will be used and who consumes the products.

Although digital and satellite technology opens the door to hundreds of specialty channels and numerous foreign specialty services, the technology may not necessarily contribute to more inclusive spaces for ethnic minority communities on the broadcasting spectrum as the number of players decrease and the cost of access increases. As distributors gain more control over content dissemination, competition between specialty services vies for the limited carriage capacity on cable and satellite. For ethnic minority communities waiting for foreign specialty services, the policy structure alone limits technological access, restricting the foreign specialty services in Category 2 from digital broadcasting. Each ethnic minority community has one broadcaster, but each community may have several specialty services. The CRTC and the television industry have chosen to protect niche market competition, while increasing the number of licenses one Canadian operator may own. For example, Fairchild Television owns all the specialty licenses catering to the Chinese-Canadian audiences. The ramification of conglomerating licenses is that, despite the availability of satellite technology and digital technology in 2001, there is a limited carriage capacity for all the available specialty services. Those

specialty services with distributor ownership are far more likely to be distributed, while those specialty services without Canadian ownership will find it difficult to obtain distribution. As such, ethnic minorities may still find it difficult to obtain third language programming in the next few years while the industry is adjusting to the content and technological changes.

Those ethnic minority communities without access to ethnic minority television services will be excluded from being represented in Canada's broadcasting system. The vision of an inclusive broadcasting system that ethnic minority communities imagined may take much more time to evolve, while the CRTC implements successive policies to restructure Canada's broadcasting system technologically, economically and politically as it pushes the Canadian television broadcasting system towards greater industry responsibility. The initial policy framework on satellite and digital technology, however, limits the carriage of foreign specialty services. The ethnic minority communities counting on the new foreign services to reaffirm and develop their hybrid identities will discover the hurdles are still there, in both technological access and content. The ethnic broadcasting structure has expanded the number of services without addressing hybrid Canadian identity in the ethnic minority population at the policy level that governs access and content production.

Limitations

The CRTC and the television industry have chosen to use the specialty services as a way of meeting the information and cultural needs of the Canadian audience, but the quantity of services do not equal quality Canadian ethnic programming that will expand the industry and address issues of cultural identity. Defining identity within public policy

is difficult because the institutionalization of the discourse on ethnic media separates ethnic media as an other within the broadcasting system. What is particularly troubling is the CRTC's, broadcasters', distributors' and the ethnic minority communities' usage of the term "ethnic" in all its variations from "ethnic minority" to "ethnic content". The problem with using an institutionalized discourse on "ethnic media" is that the process of describing or enacting policies for communities outside of the mainstream becomes a process of separating or distinguishing communities by distinguishing characteristics according to language and culture when identities are hybrids. Consequently, television policies become focused on maintaining a certain type of an idealized concept of ethnicity that is constantly defined against television for mainstream audiences and television for audiences in the homeland. Although the minimum quota of Canadian content is necessary for broadcasting and offers an element of Canadian information and cultural presence, the ethnic terminology constricts future policies from moving beyond the idea that "ethnic" is content other than mainstream.

Aside from the institutional discourse on ethnic media, the limitations of this study exclude any discussion of how ethnic minority television influences debate in and between the ethnospheres. The discussion on Habermas' public sphere offers a theoretical discussion on the importance of the media facilitating the opinions of the public and the state. In Canadian society, however, there is more than one medium of information. Some may argue that the failure of television to provide information and cultural content reflective of hybrid Canadian identities is not detrimental to the democratic process since other media are available. What the political economy of the emerging ethnic minority television broadcasting system does reveal is the influence of

the state, the economy, and the ethnic minority organizations on ethnic minority television.

This study focuses primarily on the political economy of the emerging ethnic minority television broadcasting system with some comments from the ethnic minority communities in Canada. Although this examination does attempt to examine the inclusive and exclusive spaces within the ethnic broadcasting policies, its confinement to specialty services and conventional television stations such as CFMT-TV, *does not* portray a complete picture of Canada's broadcasting system. As such, future studies on the entire Canadian broadcasting system's contribution to creating inclusive spaces must include a lengthy discussion of the CBC's programming and hiring practices that facilitate multiculturalism. The CBC broadcasts more Canadian programming than any other broadcaster. Future studies may investigate whether the CBC's funding situation still encourages ethnic minority programming and whether the programs serve the diverse populations of Canada. The CBC remains the primary broadcaster of Canadian programming.

Future studies may also examine the inclusive and exclusive spaces in the subsequent policies on Cancon productions that require distributors to contribute a greater percentage of their profits to the development of Cancon. Do the policies facilitate a greater contribution to more hybrid Canadian content for the ethnic minority population? This study captures the initial stages of ethnic minority television in digital and satellite carriage without possessing a broad spectrum of evidence that captures the efficiency and effectiveness of the policies implemented in 2000. In addition, the study may also examine other broadcasting systems in the world that are using satellite and digital technology; comparing Canada's implementation of ethnic minority television

with the broadcasting systems of other nations. The study may examine the obstacles and success stories that can contribute to developing policies for Canada's ethnic minority television structure.

For an understanding of the relationship between television and public discourse, however, future studies must develop a comprehensive random survey of several communities to determine ethnic minority viewing practices, including other technological access to information, and their perspectives on ethnic broadcasting. The importance of conducting an audience study in families would greatly enhance the understanding between the structure of the emerging ethnic broadcasting system and the audiences' perspective, providing a better understanding of how ethnic minority television informs individuals' actions in the ethnospheres and the public sphere. How does an individual's understanding of his / her culture and Canadian society influence his / her participation in the democratic process? In this study the opinions of the ethnic minority organizations offer one perspective, but this perspective only skims the surface level and the ethnic minority organizations do not answer questions of how ethnic minorities use television in their everyday life in conjunction with other technologies and family activities. Indeed, the analysis of the political economy of the emerging ethnic minority television broadcasting system only examines the inclusive and exclusive spaces that policies create for programming without undertaking a content analysis or an examination of the individuals' interpretations of the various programs. The ethnic minority organizations' perspectives do contribute to an understanding of the policy process between government agencies and the industry players, but they cannot reflect the inner life of the members within the organization. Future studies may make a stronger connection between ethnic minority television broadcasting and the development

of ethnospheres by undertaking quantitative and qualitative audience studies to measure and assess the success or failure of the ethnic minority television services to the various communities.

References

- ACNielsen. (1999a). *Average Daily Reach of Various Media (Mon to Sun)*.
<http://www.fairchildtv.com/english/fairchildtv.html>
- (1999b). *Average Daily Reach of Various Media (Mon to Sun)*.
<http://www.fairchildtv.com/english/fairchildtv.html>
- (1999c). *Average Quarter-Hour Rating*.
<http://www.fairchildtv.com/english/fairchildtv.html>
- Alliance for Children and Television (ACT). (September 20, 1999). *Re: Public Notice 1999-135*. http://www.crtc.gc.ca/PROC_BR/NOTICES/1999/1999-135e/co012.doc
- Ang, I. (1996). *Living room wars: Rethinking media audiences for a postmodern world*. London: Routledge.
- Appadurai, A. (1996). *Modernity at large: Cultural dimensions of globalization*. Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Armstrong, B., Neuendorf, K.A., & Brentar, J.E. (1992). Entertainment, news, and racial perceptions of college students. *Journal of Communication*, 42 (3), 153-174.
- Atkin, D. (1992). An analysis of television series with minority-lead characters. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, 9, 337-349.
- Audley, P. (1983). *Canada's cultural industries: Broadcasting, publishing, records and film*. Toronto: James Lorimer & Company.
- Breton, R. (1987). Symbolic dimensions of linguistic and ethnic minority realities. In L. Driedger (Ed.), *Ethnic Canada: Identities and inequalities* (pp. 44-64). Toronto: Longman Group.
- Broadcasters cut some slack: CRTC makes it easier for Canadian TV networks to meet homegrown content requirements and maintain quality. (1999, June 12). *The Guardian (Charlottetown)*, B10.
- Brown, J. & Schulze, L. (1990). The effects of race, gender, and fandom on audience interpretations of Madonna's music videos. *Journal of communication*, 40 (2), 88-102.
- Canadian Association of Broadcasters (CAB). (1999, May 14). Ensuring pride of place for Canadian services, Appendix A. <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/>.
- Canada. (1951). *A selection of essays prepared for the Royal Commission on national development in the arts, letters, and sciences*. Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier.

- Canadian Heritage. (March, 2000a). *Report of the review of the Canadian Television Fund: Executive summary*. Ottawa: Corporate Review Branch.
- Canadian Heritage. (March, 2000b). *Report of the review of the Canadian Television Fund*. Ottawa: Corporate Review Branch.
- Canadian Heritage. (1997 -1998). *10th Annual report on the operation of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.
- Canadian Heritage. (1996). *Strategic evaluation of multiculturalism programs: Final report*. Ottawa: Corporate Review Branch.
- Canadian Heritage. (1994 -1995). *Annual report on the operation of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.
- CRTC. (December 11, 2000a). *Broadcasting policy monitoring report - part 2*. <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/publication/reports/PolicyMonitoring/BPMR2-e.htm>.
- CRTC. (December 11, 2000b). *Broadcasting policy monitoring report - part 3*. <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/publication/reports/PolicyMonitoring/BPMR3-e.htm>.
- CRTC. (December 8, 2000). *Public Notice CRTC 2000-165*. <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/Notices/2000/PB2000-165.htm>.
- CRTC. (March 17, 2000). *Public Notice CRTC 2000-42*. <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/Notices/2000/PB2000-42.htm>.
- CRTC. (March 10, 2000). *Public Notice CRTC 2000-38*. <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/Notices/2000/PB2000-38.html>.
- CRTC. (February 4, 2000). *Public Notice CRTC 2000-22*. <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/Notices/2000/PB2000-22.htm>.
- CRTC. (January 13, 2000a). *Public Notice CRTC 2000-6*. <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/Notices/2000/PB2000-6.html>.
- CRTC. (January 13, 2000b). *New CRTC licensing framework for digital pay and specialty television services will bridge changeover from analog to digital distribution*. <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/ENG/NEWS/RELEASES/2000/R000113e.htm>.
- CRTC. (January 6, 2000). *Public Notice CRTC 2000-1*. <http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/Notices/2000/PB2000-1.html>.
- CRTC. (December 21, 1999). *Public Notice CRTC 1999-199*. http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/BCASTING/NOTICE/1999/P99199_0.txt.

- CRTC. (July 16, 1999). *Public Notice CRTC 1999-117*.
<http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/Notice/1999/PB99-117.html>.
- CRTC. (June 11, 1999a). *The new policy on Canadian television: More flexibility, diversity and programming choice*.
<http://www.crtc.gc.ca/ENG/NEWS/RELEASES/1999/R990611e.htm>.
- CRTC. (June 11, 1999b). *Public Notice CRTC 1999-97*.
<http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/Notices/1999/PB99-97.htm>.
- CRTC. (March 10, 2000). *Public Notice CRTC 2000-38*.
<http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/Notices/2000/PB2000-38.htm>.
- CRTC. (February 1, 1999). *Public hearing on third language and ethnic programming*. Halifax:
[http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/PROC_BR/Transcripts/1999/c012999\(halifax.html\)](http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/PROC_BR/Transcripts/1999/c012999(halifax.html)).
- CRTC. (February 1, 1999). *Public hearing on third language and ethnic programming*. Montreal:
[http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/PROC_BR/Transcripts/1999/c012999\(montreal.html\)](http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/PROC_BR/Transcripts/1999/c012999(montreal.html)).
- CRTC. (February 1, 1999). *Public hearing on third language and ethnic programming*. Toronto:
[http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/PROC_BR/Transcripts/1999/c012999\(toronto.html\)](http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/PROC_BR/Transcripts/1999/c012999(toronto.html)).
- CRTC. (February 2, 1999). *Public hearing on third language and ethnic programming*. Toronto:
[http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/PROC_BR/Transcripts/1999/c2012999\(toronto.html\)](http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/PROC_BR/Transcripts/1999/c2012999(toronto.html)).
- CRTC. (February 1, 1999). *Public hearing on third language and ethnic programming*. Winnipeg:
[http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/PROC_BR/Transcripts/1999/c012999\(winnipeg.html\)](http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/PROC_BR/Transcripts/1999/c012999(winnipeg.html)).
- CRTC. (February 2, 1999). *Public hearing on third language and ethnic programming*. Vancouver:
[http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/PROC_BR/Transcripts/1999/c2012999\(vancouver.html\)](http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/PROC_BR/Transcripts/1999/c2012999(vancouver.html)).
- CRTC. (February 1, 1999). *Public hearing on third language and ethnic programming*. Vancouver:
[http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/PROC_BR/Transcripts/1999/c012999\(vancouver.html\)](http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/PROC_BR/Transcripts/1999/c012999(vancouver.html)).
- CRTC. (December 22, 1998). *Public Notice CRTC 1998-135*.
<http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/Notices/1998/PB1998-135.html>.
- CRTC. (September 28, 1998). *Audience viewing habits and attitudes with respect to programming and Canadian content*.
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/PROC_BR/Crp9809e.html.

- CRTC. (June 23, 1998). *Public Notice CRTC 1998-60*.
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/BCASTING/NOTICE/1998/P9860_0.text.
- CRTC. (May 6, 1998). *Public Notice CRTC 1998-44*.
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/bcasting/Notice/1998/p9844_0.txt.
- CRTC. (1998). *List of ethnic broadcasting services by type*.
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/PROC_BR/NOTICES/1998/Pn98-135/Back9901e.htm.
- CRTC. (1991). *Broadcasting Act*.
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/ENG/LEGAL/BROAD_E.HTM.
- CRTC. (July 4, 1985). *Public Notice CRTC 1985-139*.
- CRTC. (October 1, 1984). *Public Notice CRTC 1984-237*.
<http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/Notices/Notices/1984/PB1984-237.html>.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (May, 2000). *Recent immigrants in the Toronto metropolitan area*. Ottawa: Strategic Policy, Planning and Research.
- Industry Canada. (1997). *Information highway*.
<http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ih01649e.html>.
- Statistics Canada. (1998). *1996 Census: Education, mobility and migration*.
<http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/9804141/d9804141.htm>.
- Statistics Canada. (1997). *1996 Census: Mother tongue, home language and knowledge of languages*.
<http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/971020/d971202.htm>.
- Statistics Canada. *Population by mother tongue, 1996 Census*.
<http://www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/People/Population/demo/8f.htm>.
- Canadian Association of Broadcasters (CAB). (1998). *CAB submission: Ethnic broadcasting policy review*. http://www.crtc.gc.ca/FRN/Proc_br/Avis/1998/Pn98-135/col11.doc.
- Canadian Cable Television Association (CCTA). (1998-1999). *1998-1999 Annual report*. Ottawa: CCTA.
- (1999-2000). *1999-2000 Annual report*. Ottawa: CCTA.
- Canadian Film and Television Production Association (The) (CFTPA). (1999). *Comments on proposed revisions to the definition of television content categories & proposed definitions of Canadian dramatic programs that will qualify for time*

credits. http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/PROC_BR/NOTICES/1999/1999-120e/co013.doc.

Chinese Canadian National Council. (February 5, 1999). *Submission to the CRTC on the review of the broadcasting policy reflecting Canada's linguistic and cultural diversity*. <http://www.ccnc.ca/issues/crtcsb%2099.htm>.

—— (October 5, 1998). *Submission to CRTC Canadian television review*. Canada: CRTC.

Con, H. & Wickberb, E. (1982). *From China to Canada*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.

Condit, C. M. (1994). The rhetorical limits of polysemy. In H. Newcomb (Ed.), *Television: The critical view (5th ed.)* (pp. 426-447). New York: Oxford University Press.

Coopers & Lybrand's Nordicity Team. (June 30, 1998). *Environmental scan: Canadian television and programming industry*. [http://www.crtc.gc.ca/FRN/Proc_br/Avis/1998/Pn98-82-2/c1060-11\[app5-6\].doc](http://www.crtc.gc.ca/FRN/Proc_br/Avis/1998/Pn98-82-2/c1060-11[app5-6].doc).

Cunningham, S. & Sinclair, J. (Eds.). (2000). *Floating lives: The media and Asian diasporas*. Queensland: University of Queensland Press.

Dahlgren, P. (1995). *Television and the public sphere*. London: Sage Publications.

Dates, J. (1980). Race, racial attitudes and adolescent perceptions of Black television characters. *Journal of Broadcasting*, 24 (4), 549-560.

Dorland, M. (1996). Cultural industries and the Canadian experience: Reflections on the emergence of a field. In M. Dorland (Ed.), *The cultural industries in Canada* (pp. 347-365). Toronto: James Lorimer & Company.

Dowler, K. (1996). The Cultural Industries Policy Apparatus. In M. Dorland (Ed.), *The cultural industries in Canada: Problems, policies, and prospects* (pp. 328-346). Toronto: James Lorimer & Company.

Eley, G. (1991). Nations, publics, and political cultures: Placing Habermas in the nineteenth Century. In C. Calhoun (Ed.), *Habermas and the public sphere* (pp. 289-339). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Entman, R. T. (1990). Modern racism and the images of blacks in local television news. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, 7, 332-345.

Featherstone, M. (1995). Global cultures. In M. Featherstone (Ed.), *Undoing culture: Globalization, postmodernism and identity* (pp. 86-101). London: Sage.

- Fiske, J. (1987). *Television culture*. London: Methuen.
- Fleras, A. (1989). Toward a multicultural reconstructing of Canadian society. *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 21 (3), 307-321.
- Folb, M. (December 14, 1998). Stranded outside the cable club. *Marketing*, 24.
- Fraser, N. (1991). Rethinking the public sphere: A critique of actually existing democracy. In C. Calhoun (Ed.), *Habermas and the public sphere* (pp. 109-142). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Gandy, O.H. (1993). *The panoptic sort: A political economy of personal information*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Giddens, A. (1990). *The consequences of modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Gibbins, R. & Arrison, S. (1995). *Western visions: Perspectives on the West in Canada*. Peterborough: Broadview Press.
- Gitlin, T. (March 13, 2000). Dying for attention. *Globe & Mail*, A11.
- (1994). Prime time ideology: The hegemonic process in television entertainment. In H. Newcomb (Ed.), *Television: The critical view (5th ed.)* (pp. 516-536). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Habermas, J. (1991). Further Reflections on the Public Sphere. (T. Burger Tans.). In C. Calhoun (Ed.), *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (pp. 421-461). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- (1989). *The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society* (T. McCarthy & F. Lawrence, Trans.). Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hall, S. (1979). Encoding / decoding. *Culture, media, language: Working papers in cultural studies, 1972-1979* (pp. 128-138). London: Hutchinson.
- Held, D. (1996). *Models of democracy (2nd ed.)*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Ho, E., Beford, R., & Bedford, C. (November, 2000). *Migrants in their family context: Application of a methodology*. Hamilton, New Zealand: University of Waikato, Department of Geography.
- Horkheimer, M. & Adorno, T.W. (1995). *Dialectic of enlightenment* (J.Cumming, Trans.). New York: Continuum.

- Husband, C. (1998). Differentiated citizenship and the multi-ethnic public sphere. *The Journal of International Communication*, 5 (1&2), 134-148.
- (Ed.). (1994). *A richer vision: The development of ethnic minority media in western democracies*. London: UNESCO.
- Kari, S. (February 17, 1999). The Cancon shuffle: Critics of private broadcasters say the money made from rebroadcasting U.S. shows -- money that was supposed to subsidize Canadian programs -- has gone missing. *National Post*, National Edition, D3.
- Karim, K. (1998). From ethnic media to global media: Transnational communication networks among diasporic communities. Glasgow: *International Association for Mass Communication Research: Political Economy section*.
- (1993). Constructions, deconstructions, and reconstructions: Competing Canadian discourses on ethnic minority terminology. *Canadian Journal of Communication*, 18, 197-218.
- Kobayashi, A. (1992). The Japanese-Canadian redress settlement and its implications for 'race relations'. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, XXIV (1), 1-19.
- Kolar-Panov, D. (1997). *Video, war and the diasporic imagination*. London: Routledge.
- Lacroix, J. & Tremblay, G. (1997). The information society and cultural industries theory. *Current Sociology*, 45 (4), 1-155.
- Lash, S. & Urry, J. (1994). *Economies of signs and space*. London, England: Sage Publications.
- Latour, B. (1990). Drawing things together. In M. Lynch and S. Woolgar (Eds.). *Representations in scientific practice* (pp. 19-68). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Levine, M.V. (1997). Canada and the challenge of the Quebec independent movement. In W.A. Van Horne (Ed.), *Global convulsions: race, ethnicity, and nationalism at the end of the twentieth century* (pp. 315-338). New York: State University of New York Press.
- Lewis, Peter (Ed.). (1993). *Alternative media: Linking global and local*. Paris: Unesco.
- LLS Market Research. (1998). *The most highly view Chinese television station in Southern Ontario*. <http://www.cfmt.com>
- Magder, T. (1998, April). Franchising the Candy Store: Split-run magazines and a new international regime for trade in culture. *Canadian -American Public Policy* (34).

- Marotte, B. (October 5, 2000). CRTC concerned by news media mergers. *The Globe and Mail*, B9.
- Marx, Karl. (1973). *The Grundrisse: Foundations of the critique of political economy* (M. Nicholas, Trans.). Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Mattelart, A. (1994). *Mapping world communication: War, progress, culture* (S. Emanuel & J.A. Curran, Trans.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- McChesney, R.W. (1999). Graham Spry and the future of public broadcasting. *Canadian Journal of Communication*, 24 (1), 25-47.
- Mill, J.S. (1859) On liberty. In D. Dyzenhaus and A. Ripstein (Eds.), *Law and morality: Readings in legal philosophy* (pp. 234-253). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Morley, D. (1986). *Family television: Cultural power and domestic leisure*. London: Comedia publications.
- ____ (1980). *The nationwide audience*. London: British Film Institute.
- Morley, D. & Robins, K. (1995). *Spaces of identity: Global media, electronic landscapes and cultural boundaries*. London: Routledge.
- Nancoo, S.E. and Nancoo, R.S. (Eds.). (1996). *The mass media and Canadian diversity*. Mississauga: Canadian Educators' Press.
- Palmer, H. (1991). *Ethnicity and politics in Canada since confederation*. Ottawa: Keystone Printing.
- Qui, H. (1999). *From five lakes and four seas: Online expatriate Chinese student magazines and community mobilization*. Ottawa: Carleton University.
- Raboy, M. (1996). *Missed opportunities: The story of Canada's broadcasting policy*. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Reeves, J.L. (1994). Rewriting culture: A dialogic view of television authorship. In H. Newcomb (Ed.), *Television: The critical view* (5th ed.) (pp. 188-201). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Riggins, S.H. (1992). The media imperative: Ethnic minority survival in the age of mass communication. In S. Riggins (Ed.), *Ethnic minority media: An international perspective* (pp. 1-22). Newbury Park: CA, Sage.
- Rogers Cablesystems. (1998). *Executive summary: Review of the broadcasting policy reflecting Canada's linguistic and cultural diversity, Public Notice CRTC 1998-*

135. [http://www.crtc.gc.ca/FRN/Proc_br/Avis/1998/Pn98-135/co103-1\[Executive%20Summary\].doc](http://www.crtc.gc.ca/FRN/Proc_br/Avis/1998/Pn98-135/co103-1[Executive%20Summary].doc).
- Ryan, M. (1991). Gender and public access: Women's politics in nineteenth-Century America. In C. Calhoun (Ed.), *Habermas and the public sphere* (pp. 259-287). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Said, E.W. (1979). *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Shaw Communications. (1999). *Digital licensing framework proceeding Public Notice CRTC 1999-19*. http://www.crtc.gc.ca/FRN/Proc_br/Avis/1999/1999-19f/co040.doc.
- SPTV. (September 20, 1999). *Re: Public Notice CRTC 1999-135, The definition of a Canadian program -- clarifications & proposed revisions*. http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/PROC_BR/NOTICES/1999/1999-135e/co015.doc.
- Sreberny-Mohammadi, A. (1996). Introduction. In S. Bramen and A. Sreberny-Mohammadi (Eds.) *Globalization, communication and transnational civil society* (pp. 1-20). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. Inc.
- Taylor, C. (1994). The politics of recognition. In A. Gutmann (Ed.), *Multiculturalism* (pp. 25-73). New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Tomlinson, J. (1996). Global experience as a consequence of modernity. In S. Braman and A. Sreberny-Mohammadi (Ed.), *Globalization communication and transnational civil society* (63-88). Cresskill: Hampton Press.
- Touraine, A. (1997). *Critique of modernity* (D. Macey, Trans.). Oxford UK: Blackwell.
- Valaskakis, G.G. (1992). Rights and warriors: First nations, media and identity. In S. Nancoo and R. Nancoo (Eds.), *The mass media and Canadian diversity* (pp. 110-123). Mississauga: Canadian Educators' Press.
- Vardy, J. & Shecter, B. (June 12, 1999). CRTC eases content rules for TV: Prime time extended an hour, more shows count as Canadian. *National Post*, National Edition, D1.
- Vipond, M. (1992). *Listening in; the first decade of Canadian broadcasting, 1922-1932*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Wilson, V.S. (1993). The tapestry vision of Canadian multiculturalism. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 26 (4), 645-669.
- Young, I. M. (1995). Social movements and the politics of difference. In J. Arthur and A. Shapiro (Eds.), *Campus wars: Multiculturalism and the politics of difference* (pp. 199-225). Boulder: Westview Press.

— (1994). Comments on Seyla Benhabib, *Situating the self*. *New German Critique*, 62, Spring-Summer, 165-172.

Appendix A

(Public Notice CRTC 2000-42, March 17, 2000: 4-7)

Criteria: certification for Canadian programs

Basic definition of a Canadian program

The Commission will certify a Canadian program, a live, videotape or film production, that meets the requirements listed in sections A, B and C, set out below:

A. Producer

Must be Canadian, must control and be the central decision-maker of a production from beginning to end. The producer must be prepared to demonstrate full decision-making power by submitting, upon request, ownership documents, contracts or affidavits. The producer must also submit, upon request, an independent legal opinion confirming that financial and creative control of the production is Canadian. Any person fulfilling a producer-related function must be Canadian.

By exception to this rule, non-Canadians may receive courtesy or vanity credits for producer-related functions as described in the current CAVCO guidelines, providing:

- the remuneration to the Canadian producer must exceed the aggregate remuneration to foreign executive producers, and
- foreign executive producers must limit their time on the set to 25% of principal photography, and their role solely to that of observers.

The duties of foreign executive producers shall be limited to non-creative, non production-related functions. Such functions could include arranging financing and foreign distribution. The CAVCO guidelines provide a fuller description of the "individual production-related positions and screen credits". The Commission will not, however, adopt CAVCO's exemption for the writer credit.

B. The point system

A live action production or continuous-action animated production must earn a minimum of six points based on the key creative functions below being performed by Canadians. (A separate point system for other forms of animation is set out in Appendix II.)

Director - 2 points

Screenwriter - 2 points

Lead Performer

(or **first voice**) - 1 point

Second Lead Performer

(or **second voice**) - 1 point

Production Designer - 1 point

Director of Photography - 1 point

Music Composer - 1 point

Picture Editor - 1 point

Notwithstanding the above, at least one of the director or screenwriter positions

and at least one of the two lead performers must be Canadian.

Determination of lead performers will take into account billing, screen-time and remuneration. In non-dramatic productions, the second lead must have at least 50% of the on-screen time (or off-screen time where narrators or interviewers are involved) and 50% of the remuneration of the first lead, plus billing appropriate for a second lead. Individuals not meeting these criteria will be considered as filling minor roles.

A production in which non-Canadians are the only lead performers will not be certified as Canadian. The addition of Canadians in minor roles will not be sufficient for a production to qualify.

In category 7, 8, and 9 programs (Drama & Comedy, Music & Dance, Variety) the leads will be the performers, i.e. actors, singers, dancers, etc. In other program types, the leads will usually be the host, narrator, commentator, moderator, interviewer, quizmaster, etc.

The host of a documentary is normally compensated; the subject is not. In a documentary series, the same subject is not usually prominent in every episode: the host is.

Upon application, where an applicant has provided compelling reasons why a production should receive certification as an exception, the Commission may certify as a Canadian program, a production in which the positions of either:

- a) director and writer are non-Canadian, or
 - b) both lead performers are non-Canadians,
- as long as Canadians fill all other key creative functions.
Interpretation notes may be found in section X below.

C. Expenditures

Services Costs represent the total cost of a production, minus the costs listed below. At least 75% of services costs must be paid to Canadians.

- Remuneration for producer(s) and co-producer(s) (except for producer-related positions),
- Remuneration for key creative personnel eligible for points,
- Post-production/lab costs,
- Accounting and legal fees,
- Insurance brokerage and financing costs,
- Indirect expenses,
- Contingency costs,
- Goods purchased, such as film/videotape supplies, and
- Other costs not directly related to production.

Post-Production/Lab Costs. At least 75% of such expenses must be paid for services provided in Canada by Canadians or Canadian companies. This does not include costs attributed to the picture editor.

The Commission may require audited statements and affidavits in support of an application. Where the Commission has not detailed specific descriptions or interpretations, those set out in the CAVCO certification guidelines may be used.

Fairchild Radio
see / voir 802

The percentages refer to voting rights only / Les pourcentages font référence aux droits de vote seulement.

Holding / Propriétaire
 Licensee / Titulaire
 Usage CRTC use

UPDATE

CRTC 2001-270 - approved application by Fairchild Television Ltd. to distribute Television across Canada (National)

Fairchild Radio ownership percentage updated on May 17, 2000.

MISE À JOUR

CRTC 2001-270 - a approuvé la demande de Fairchild Television Ltd. pour distribuer Télévision partout au Canada (national)

Pourcentage propriété Fairchild Radio corrigé le 17 mai 2000

802a
 ownership / propriété
 BROADCASTING / RADIODIFFUSION
CRTC
 2001-05-19

The percentages refer to voting rights only / Les pourcentages font référence aux droits de vote seulement.

Holding / Propriétaire
 Licensee / Titulaire
 Usage CRTC use

(M) originating station with R / station source avec R
(O) originating station without R / station source sans R
(R) re-broadcasting station / station réémettrice

MAJE A JOUR

Correction: re: CRTC 96-728
La titulaire de CHKF-FM est Fairchild Radio (Calgary FM) Ltd.
CRTC 2001-136 - a approuvé a new Punjabi-language SCMO service

UPDATE

Modification: re: CRTC 96-728
The licensee of CHKF-FM is Fairchild Radio (Calgary FM) Ltd.
CRTC 2001-136 - a approuvé une nouveau service EMCS en langue pendjabi

#92
ownership / propriété
BROADCASTING / RADIODIFFUSION

CRTC

2001-05-25

Shaw portfolio

SHAW & CORUS Corporate STRUCTURE comparative

The percentages refer to voting rights only / Les pourcentages font référence aux droits de vote seulement.

Holding / Propriétaire
Licensee / Titulaire
Usage CRTC use

#32
ownership / propriété
BROADCASTING / RADIO-DIFFUSION
CRTC
2001-07-01

**Specialty Services /
services spécialisés**

Holding / Propriétaire
Licences / Titulaire
	usage CRTC use

The percentages refer to voting rights only / Les pourcentages font référence aux droits de vote seulement.

Holding / Propriétaire
 Licensee / Titulaire
 Usage CRTC use

#27
 ownership / propriété
BROADCASTING / RADIO-DIFFUSION
CRTC
 2001-04-30

The percentages refer to voting rights only / Les pourcentages font référence aux droits de vote seulement.

Holding / Propriétaire
 Licensee / Titulaire
 Usage CRTC use

subjected to transition for a transition period of three months following implementation. / autorisées à diffuser pendant une période de trois mois à compter de la date de mise en œuvre de la nouvelle station.

subjected to transition for a transition period of three months following implementation. / autorisées à diffuser pendant une période de trois mois à compter de la date de mise en œuvre de la nouvelle station.

(M) originating station with R / station source avec R
(O) originating station without R / station source sans R
(R) rebroadcasting station / station reémettrice

#27b
ownership / propriété
BROADCASTING / RADIODIFFUSION
CRTC
2001-04-30