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DEMOCRATIC LINKAGE IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MASS PUBLIC OPINION AND PUBLIC POLICY

by

Joel Elliott Brooks, B.A.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty
Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
Master of Arts -- Department
Political Science

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September 1976

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with the relationship between mass public opinion and national public policy in the United States and Canada -- from normative, theoretical, and empirical perspectives. The basic organizing concepts utilized throughout this work are Democratic Linkage -- i.e., political processes that allow governmental action to be consistent with mass preferences -- and Democratic Frustration -- i.e., governmental and non-governmental elite impediments to the achievement of Democratic Linkage. Four models of Democratic Linkage (Electoral Mandate, Party Government, Interest Group Politics, and Constituency Communication) are proposed and contrasted with four paradigms of Democratic Frustration (Trustee Role, Judicial Power, Bureaucratic Power, and Private Economic-Institutional Power). The relationship between public opinion and public policy in 237 cases from the United States and Canada is analyzed. The major findings are: (1) a general consistency between opinion and policy (the definition of democracy used in this thesis) exists in less than half the cases; (2) despite obvious structural differences, there is no meaningful distinction in the degree of consistency between opinion and policy for these two nations.

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PREFACE

A surprising and increasing number of students of government, in company with Walter Lippmann, question the wisdom of giving mass opinion any role in the determination of public policy. Democracy, in the sense of rule by public opinion, seems to be facing...threats to its self-confidence from various types of elitists.... Before popular government, government by public opinion, is allowed to go by default, it seems prudent to try and reassess the role of public opinion, both from the point of view of what it actually is today, what it should be in the light of its changed competence, and the kinds of issues it is capable of deciding.

Harwood Childs¹

It has been said (somewhat facetiously) that "the preface is always composed last of all, and is normally the place where the author, surveying the results of his labours, tells the reader about the volume he would have written if only he had been able to overcome the manifest inadequacies of the work now in front of him."² Rather than attempting to apologize in this manner for the possible shortcomings of this thesis, I shall try to steer a centre course between excessive humility and hubris.

The objective of this work is to confront democratic theory with political reality, to shed light on how, when, and to what extent mass public opinion should, can, and does

¹ Childs, Public Opinion: Nature, Formation, and Role, p. 309.

² Anthony Giddens, The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies, p. 9.

affect national government policy in the United States and Canada. In order to provide a common perspective and limitation to the analysis, the basic organizing concepts to be used in this thesis are Democratic Linkage and Democratic Frustration. Democratic Linkage is defined as: (1) processes or mechanisms (i.e., patterns of political interaction) that permit, persuade, or pressure governmental leaders to act in accordance with mass public opinion; (2) a situation in which national public policy is consistent with mass preferences.³ The counterpoint to Democratic Linkage is the concept of Democratic Frustration. It is defined as: (1) processes or patterns of political interaction that result in the thwarting of mass preferences, i.e., elite impediments to the attainment of Democratic Linkage; (2) a situation in which public policy is inconsistent with mass public opinion. Thus, democracy is viewed in this study as the correspondence between mass public opinion and government policy that results from possible pressures "from the bottom-up" (expressed through various Linkage mechanisms). The degree of democracy that occurs is measured by the extent of congruence between mass opinion and ultimate public policy on a broad spectrum of issues.

³ V.O. Key, Jr., in Public Opinion and American Democracy, was the first to use the concept of "linkage" in this sense. The definition utilized in this thesis is also somewhat similar to Norman Luttbeg's in Public Opinion and Public Policy. See Chapter II for a detailed analysis of the limited research in this area.

The basic theoretical premise of this work is that both democratic and elitist elements exist in North American society and, as a result, the public policy-making process is characterized by continual competition between Democratic Linkage and Frustration mechanisms. Unlike the "structural-functionalist" or "systems theory" view of society as a well-integrated, stable structure of elements each having consistent and complementary functions, this thesis contends (inter alia) that conflictive as well as integrative societal elements co-exist and interact. For example, as will be demonstrated, the supposedly complementary "conversion functions" of the democratic political system (postulated by Almond and others) may be exercised so as to conflict with each other -- the result being instability and disequilibrium. Dissensus and conflict as well as consensus and integration are dual strains of the twin faces of social structure, Dahrendorf has observed: "We cannot conceive of society unless we realize the dialectics of stability and change, integration and conflict, function and motive force, consensus and coercion." The statue of Janus, the two-faced god, is the true image of society.⁴ It is within this context that this study considers if, when, and to what degree the structural mechanisms for transmitting mass opinion tend

⁴ Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, p. 163; see Maurice Duverger, Idea of Politics, p. xiii.

to dominate over non-democratic processes in the determination of public policy.

This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter I explores normative democratic theory in regard to the role it postulates for the average citizen in the formulation of major governmental decisions and compares this to the participant political culture in North America. Of special concern are the revisionist forms of democratic thought, i.e., the various manifestations of "democratic elitism." Definitions of "democracy" and "elitism" to be utilized throughout the remainder of the thesis are provided.

Chapter II discusses the conceptual framework which holds the varied topics of analysis in this thesis together -- the Democratic Linkage-Frustration approach. The concept and formation of public opinion as well as previous research regarding the relationship between public opinion and public policy are examined.

Chapter III proposes four models of Democratic Linkage, indicating how elections, political parties, organized interest groups, and constituency communication (e.g., letters to legislators, public opinion polls, petitions) can perform the function of linking mass opinion and public policy to varying degrees of success in the U.S. and Canada.

Chapter IV suggests four models of possible Democratic Frustration to be considered along with the Democratic

Linkage models in Chapter III. The ramifications of widespread adoption of the "trustee" role of leadership are examined as well as judicial and bureaucratic power. The fourth model analyzes private economic and institutional power in North America from the perspective of its ability to thwart the successful linkage of mass preferences and governmental decisions.

Chapter V attempts to establish empirically the relative degree of Democratic Linkage in the United States and Canada, i.e., the extent to which public policy is consistent with mass public opinion on a large and varied number of issues. Such variables as issue salience, type of issue (e.g., foreign or domestic), type of government (e.g., minority or majority), type of decision-maker (e.g., legislative or judicial), and type of opinion distribution are tested to establish their relevance in better understanding linkage processes.

Chapter VI evaluates the heuristic utility of the Democratic Linkage-Frustration approach and the models proposed in Chapters III and IV. It concludes with an overall view of democracy and the opinion-policy nexus in North America based on the original findings in Chapter V.

The breadth of this thesis is immense and deserves to be justified. While the myriad topics considered in my analysis are, hopefully, conceptually tied together and limited by the Democratic Linkage perspective utilized, I

have, nonetheless, trespassed upon the "exclusive preserves" of a great many specialists in the quest for a complete picture — covering areas (e.g., normative theory) outside both my official major and allied fields. Yet, to neglect important aspects of the public opinion-public policy conundrum in order to stay within artificial boundaries of the discipline appeared to me to be an inexcusable alternative. While it might have been possible to study one salient characteristic of the opinion-policy connection, to the exclusion of the other topics covered in this thesis, it was my conscious decision to reject such a course. In keeping with the probably apocryphal story of the medical student who informed his perplexed professor that he planned to specialize in the left nostril, too many theses in political science fail to extend their examination beyond hyper-specialized areas of the body politic. Thus, their diagnosis often ignores (I apologize for this metaphorical flourish) the heart of the matter. To analyze only a part of the public opinion-public policy relationship is to invite misinterpretation of the entire process involved. To study parties but not groups, to examine only the positive processes for transmitting public opinion into policy while ignoring possible obstruction mechanisms (e.g., institutional elites), to measure empirically the consistency between opinion and policy without first establishing a theoretical foundation is to engage

"in a simplistic and counter-productive activity. Therefore, to the extent I have "sinned", it is in the direction of trying to be too comprehensive rather than too limited in my approach to the topic. But, I have opted for the proverbial "lesser of two evils."

John Sullivan, in stressing the importance of the relationship between public opinion and public policy, wrote (in 1974):

The problem of linkage between the general public and policy is crucial from the point of view of many different analytical frameworks. It is the essence of empirical democratic theory. Linkage is an essential element of any consideration of systemic stability regardless of the type of political system analyzed. Its presence or absence (or degree of presence) is the crux of many normative disagreements in and between political systems.... However, in spite of these and other important considerations, very little attention has been focused specifically on this question.⁵

This thesis is a modest attempt to explore and, if possible, to partially fill this void.

Finally, I wish to thank Professors Leo Panitch and John Sigler for their helpful comments and criticisms in revising this thesis.

⁵ Sullivan, "Linkage Models of the Political System", in Allen Wilcox (ed.), Public Opinion and Political Attitudes, p. 637.

CHAPTER I: DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT AND THE PARTICIPANT
POLITICAL CULTURE

The question is not how to control the elites,
but how to restrain the masses.... Arrangements
which make it difficult for majority preferences
to become public policy must be strengthened--
not modified, "reformed", or weakened.... Elites
must govern wisely if government "by the people"
is to survive.

Thomas Dye and Harmon Zeigler¹

War is Peace.
Freedom is Slavery.
Ignorance is Strength.

George Orwell²

A. Whither Democratic Thought?

A spectre is haunting the putative "century of the
common man"-- the spectre of elitism.³ From Plato to
Marcuse, students of politics have frequently disparaged
the ability of the masses to perceive political reality.
Whether citizens are beguiled by the shadows on the wall
of the cave or by the images on the television screen,
they are considered to be fundamentally unable or unwilling

¹ Dye and Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy
(second edition), pp. 366-67; (third edition), p. 2.

² Orwell, 1984, p. 7.

³ James Meisel, The Myth of the Ruling Class, p. v.

to effectively control political elites and to rationally direct public policy. ⁴ Armed with "iron laws" condemning the majority to "eternal tutelage" and theories confidently declaring that political power always has and always will reside in the hands of a few -- a ruling class, elitists dismiss democracy as being virtually impossible and/or undesirable.

Until fairly recently, such elitist beliefs were regarded as conflicting and distinct from basic democratic tenets. While in their pure form they are still perceived as contradictory, there has been a dominant trend in contemporary political theory toward incorporating major elitist principles within democratic thought. This democratic revisionism has been termed by some as "democratic elitism." ⁵ In phrases worthy of Orwellian "newspeak", some current political scientists have reversed the traditional democratic argument concerning what maintains and what threatens a democratic polity. They contend that the functioning of democracy depends on the ability of the elites to "protect the system" against the masses rather than accepting the traditional premise which identifies elite power as one of the main dangers to popular rule.

⁴ Gerald Pomper, "From Confusion to Clarity: Issues and American Voters, 1956-1968", in Norman Luttbeg (ed.), Public Opinion and Public Policy (revised edition), p.132.

⁵ Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism, pp. ix-xi.

The conventional meaning of democracy, the shorthand definition of which is "government by the people", is under siege -- attacked by neo-elitists disguised as "realistic democrats" as well as those who make little effort to hide their disdain for the masses. This first major section of Chapter I will focus on the formation, content, and implications of contemporary revisionist democratic theory and provide definitions of "democracy" and "elitism" to be utilized throughout the remainder of this thesis.

The Democratic Legacy.

From its inception, democracy has been conceived as an ongoing process in which political rights and the power to influence government decisions were to be progressively extended to groups in the population which had formerly been deprived of them. It was regarded as a movement towards an ideal condition of society: freedom of expression, political equality, majority rule, meaningful participation in important governmental decisions, elected political leaders responsible and responsive to an informed electorate, government policies substantially in agreement with the views or interests of the majority of citizens. This utopian vision, in which men ultimately would be fully self-governing, was a goal which might never be completely achieved, but one which democrats

thought they ought to strive for.⁶ As V.O. Key, Jr., relates:

The notion of government by public opinion, nourished on memories of government as exploitation of the mass of men by a few men, stirred millennial hopes of a lasting popular emancipation. By the enthronement of public opinion, governors could be brought to heel and the supposedly idealistic hopes of all men could be realized. Through the history...of political thought these ideas have flowed -- at times thinly, as disillusionment set in, at times in flood, as democratic idealism flourished.

In western history, the original impulse of democratic thought was a protest against aristocratic and autocratic societies which denied large segments of the population any formal right to political participation. The basic demand was for a transfer of political power vertically downwards from a landed aristocracy at least to the middle strata of society if not to the masses. The classical democratic theorists of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries proposed various justifications for this redistribution of power. It could be justified in terms of the individual's "natural right" to consent to the force by which he is governed (e.g., John Locke), or in the belief that by submitting to the "general will of all" the individual would enjoy a new and more perfect kind of freedom (Jean-Jacques Rousseau), or as the most direct method of ensuring that government

⁶ T. B. Bottomore, Elites and Society, p. 117.

⁷ Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, p. 4.

pursues the greatest happiness of the greatest number (e.g., Jeremy Bentham).⁸

The justification for a democratic system in the participatory theory of democracy rests to a large extent on the human results that are claimed to accrue from the participatory process. "One might characterise the participatory model as one where maximum input (participation) is required and where output includes not just policies (decisions) but also the development of the social and political capacities of each individual."⁹ This self-developmental objective of democracy has important implications for the interrelationship between individuals (their qualities and psychological characteristics) and the functioning of governmental institutions. Pateman claims that evidence supports the arguments of Rousseau and Mill that individuals do learn to participate by participating and that feelings of political efficacy are more likely to be developed in a participatory environment. Increase participation, one might argue, and efficacy and related democratic tendencies will also increase.¹⁰ The supposition, which is quite legitimate conceptually, is to regard participation as the in-

⁸ See Peter Russell, "A Democratic Approach to Civil Liberties", University of Toronto Law Journal, vol. 19 (1969), pp. 109-131.

⁹ Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, p. 43.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 104-5.

dependent variable of which the others are a function. To take the view of some democratic revisionists, that individuals should not participate until they have overcome their apathy or lack of expertise, is somewhat like suggesting one should not be allowed near the water until he has learned how to swim. ¹¹

A more limited justification for a degree of democratic responsiveness on the part of government can be termed the "appeasing the masses" school of thought. It contends that those in positions of power are always under some obligation to represent the masses if for no other reason than to maintain systemic stability. In societies with minimum democratic procedures (i.e., competing political parties and elections), political leaders cannot diverge too greatly from the wishes of the masses on highly salient issues without risking the loss of power. Put more cynically (with apologies to Abraham Lincoln): You have to please most of the people some of the time, in order to fool all the people most of the time.

One of the most prevalent justifications for the majoritarian principle in democratic thought is the Churchillian notion that democracy is the worst form of government except for all the other alternatives. In Lincoln's

¹¹ See Steven Brown, "Review of Carole Pateman's Participation and Democratic Theory", Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 3 (Fall 1971), pp. 512-13.

words: "Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that, rejecting the majority principle, anarchy or despotism in some form is all that is left."¹² The majoritarian concept could be said to follow from the principle of political equality which forms a basic tenet of democratic thought. If every person is to count equally, it follows that a numerical majority should count more. To let the minority of individuals govern would be to flout the concept of equality.¹³ While a majority may supposedly be convinced to agree to almost any absurdity (as in Kipling's story of "The Village that Voted the Earth Was Flat"), the crucial question arises: What is the alternative to the majority principle? The option of minority rule raises many insoluble problems: which minority? By what criteria should the "right" minority be chosen? Who is qualified (if not the majority) to select this ruling minority?¹⁴ As Robert Dahl notes:

If it is said that surely the wise and virtuous would have general consent for their rule, then why not adopt the democratic solution and allow the people to choose their leaders? If, on the other hand, one objects that people might not choose wisely... [must leaders] be imposed on the people? If so, would not the attempt... degenerate into a trial by battle in which the strongest, not the wisest and most virtuous would win?"¹⁵

¹² H.B. Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory, p. 179.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 174-82.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 187.

¹⁵ Dahl, Democracy in the United States (2nd. ed.), p.20.

To reject the majoritarian principle, in other words, is to be faced with a Hobbesian nightmare of political chaos.

The Undesirability of Democracy

By the mid-nineteenth century, the context and emphasis of democratic thought began to change. Democratic theorists were confronted with the reality (in comparative terms) of increasing democracy in Britain and North America -- especially with the "Jacksonian revolution" in the United States. The response of democratic theory was to recognize that the apparent shift of political authority to larger numbers of the population did not necessarily remove the ethical problems of power in society. The continued Madisonian fixation for checks and balances in the American government, Alexis de Tocqueville's poignant warning of the egalitarian "excesses of democracy" in the United States, and John Stuart Mill's analysis of "majority tyranny" (in On Liberty) all shared the conviction that the critical dilemma of the new era was not how to increase democratic tendencies but how to prevent them from going too far.¹⁶ The seeds of democratic revisionism had been planted.

In contemporary times, those wary of too much democracy have claimed support from selected and often ideologically-tainted conclusions of empirical voting and

¹⁶ Russell, pp. 109-131.

survey research studies.¹⁷ In one of the comparatively early comprehensive works on voting behaviour, Berelson and his colleagues found that, contrary to the assumptions of traditional democratic theory, large numbers of citizens were apparently lacking in motivation, interest, and knowledge concerning politics and political issues.¹⁸ Undaunted by these results, the team of social scientists contended in their concluding chapter not only that these political attributes of the voters failed to jeopardize the democratic system but that they were essential to it!¹⁹ The ideologically-based "fact" (assumed in studies of this ilk) that the "democratic" system in the United States was flourishing and functioning properly suggested that the defect lay not in the deficiencies of the average citizens who failed to measure up to an "unrealistic" ideal of participation but in the classical theory of democracy itself.²⁰

¹⁷ Some of the more important works of this genre are, chronologically: Lazarsfeld, et al., The People's Choice (2nd. ed.); Berelson, et al., Voting; Campbell, et al., The Voter Decides; Burdick and Brodbeck (eds.), American Voting Behavior; Campbell, et al., The American Voter; Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture; Campbell, et al., Elections and the Political Order.

¹⁸ See Chapter III (section A) of this thesis for reference to more recent studies questioning these earlier findings and their conclusions regarding the role of political issues and the voting public.

¹⁹ Berelson, final chapter.

²⁰ Bachrach, p. 33.

A similar rejection of the active participant concept of democracy, and the embracing of a milquetoast, closet participant as the ideal, is found in The Civic Culture. The view of democracy expounded by Almond and Verba (borrowing heavily from Kernhauser's notion of elite autonomy and limited mass participation) presumes that the finding of a lack of actual participation by the masses is beneficial to democratic government. This supposedly provides the ruling elite with maneuverability in order to formulate public policy without "interference" from the non-elites. However, to maintain a balance in the system, the potential for greater participation must be thought possible by both elites and non-elites alike. In describing their schizophrenic brand of democracy, Almond and Verba claim:

The comparative infrequency of participation, its relative lack of importance for the individual, and the objective weakness of the ordinary man allow government elites to act.... This maximizes only one of the contradictory goals of a democratic system.... The citizen's opposite role, as an active and influential enforcer of the responsiveness of elites is maintained by his strong commitment to the norm of active citizenship, as well as by his perception that he can be an influential citizen. This may be in part a myth.... Yet, the very fact that citizens hold to this myth -- that they see themselves as influential and as obligated to take an active role -- creates a potentiality of citizen influence and activity.

An additional argument of "democratic elitists" is that the masses exhibit anti-democratic tendencies and there-

²¹ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 346.

fore cannot be relied upon to govern democratically. "Despite a superficial commitment to the symbols of democracy, the people are not attached to the ideals of individual liberty, toleration of diversity, freedoms of expression and of dissent...."²² According to this view, the elites must save the masses from their own anti-civil-libertarian excesses. Democracy's worst enemy, as Sartori claims, is itself.²³ The fear of "massocracy", as expressed by Kornhauser and others, is that "mass man is vulnerable to the appeal of [undemocratic] mass movements which offer him a way of overcoming the pain of self-alienation...."²⁴ An atomized society can easily be mobilized and manipulated given the fragile respect of the masses for democratic values.

The rise of McCarthyism in America plus the findings of public opinion and personality research in the 1950s and 60s have supposedly documented the theorists' suspicion that the great majority of people have a surprisingly weak commitment to democratic values (e.g., freedom of speech) -- especially the "lower strata" of society.²⁵ Two of the most frequently misinterpreted studies of this genre are Stouffer's and McClosky's on American commitment to the democratic "rules

²² Dye and Zeigler, (2nd. edition) p. 365.

²³ Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory, pp. 18-21.

²⁴ William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society, p. 112.

²⁵ See Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, pp. 87-126.

of the game."²⁶ McClosky allegedly "proved" that approval of democratic values, in specific as well as abstract instances, was significantly stronger among "influentials" (delegates and alternates to the 1956 Democratic and Republican conventions) than the masses. What is usually omitted by "democratic elitists" in citing this study is the finding that a majority of the electorate supported the democratic "rules of the game" in both general and specific instances -- ranging from an average positive support for "specific applications of free speech and procedural rights" of 56% to 83% for "general statements of free speech."²⁷ To the extent there may be a greater degree of majority support for democratic values among "influentials", it may well be a result of their higher educational attainment and not, as McClosky and others hypothesize, "because they are unavoidably exposed to the liberal democratic values which form the main current of our political heritage. The net effect of these influences is to heighten their sensitivity to political ideas and to unite them more firmly behind the values of the American tradition."²⁸

Among those who have challenged this democratic re-

²⁶ Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics", in Fiszman (ed.), The American Political Arena (2nd. ed.), pp. 39-70; Samuel Steuffer, Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties.

²⁷ McClosky, pp. 45-48.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 60-61.

visionist premise, Robert Jackman (using Stouffer's data) investigated whether political leaders are in fact more tolerant than others who share their education, sex, and other distinguishing characteristics. He found that the mean "tolerance scores" within educational categories for the mass and elite samples (with region, sex, and city size controlled) showed no difference. In fact, college graduates who constituted part of the non-elite had a higher tolerance rating than members of the elite with no college education.²⁹ In addition, recent history demonstrates that political leaders are willing to abandon their often hypocritical support for democracy. Five of the most blatant violations of democratic civil liberties in recent North American annals -- the gathering of Canadian and U. S. citizens of Japanese ancestry into internment camps during World War II, the yielding to Joseph McCarthy's unsubstantiated charges of Communist infiltration, the illegal wholesale domestic spying by American federal agencies under six Presidents, the imposition of the War Measures Act in 1970, and the Watergate scandals -- were actions taken by government officials without prior overwhelming pressure from a blood-thirsty massocracy.³⁰

Despite such counter-arguments, the disenchantment

²⁹ Robert Jackman, "Political Elites, Mass Publics, and Support for Democratic Principles", Journal of Politics, vol. 34, no. 3 (August 1972), p. 765.

³⁰ See Robert Erikson and Norman Luttbegg, American Public Opinion, p. 104.

with the common man continues. As a result, the traditional view of the elite-mass relationship has been "turned on its head." It is the average citizen, not the elite, who is chiefly suspected of endangering liberty. It is the elite, not the common man, who is seen as the major guardian of the system. This revolt from the masses has resulted in a second alteration in theory. No longer is the focus upon extending or strengthening democracy, but upon stabilizing the status quo. The emphasis is on protecting liberalism from the "excesses" of mass democracy rather than on utilizing liberal means to strive toward the eventual realization of democratic ideals. Political equilibrium (e.g., as expressed in systems or functional approaches to comparative politics) is the fundamental value of the democratic revisionists. Therefore, the political passivity of the large majority of citizens is not regarded as a symptom of democratic malfunctioning but rather as a necessary condition for allowing the "creative governing" of the elite.³¹

At the heart of "democratic elitism" is a clear presumption of the average citizen's inadequacies and thus the undesirability of traditional concepts of democracy. While embracing liberalism (i.e., freedom of expression, etc.),

³¹ Bachrach, pp. 31-32.

revisionist thought rejects, in effect, the major tenet of classical democratic theory -- belief and confidence in the people.³² It was impossible to change a utopian theory into a "realistic" account of political behaviour without modifying significantly democracy's normative foundations. By reformulating democratic thought to bring it into closer correspondence with "reality", the revisionists have transformed it from a radical into a conservative political doctrine. The shortcomings of "democratic elitism" are not confined solely to its normative implications. Important questions also arise regarding its descriptive accuracy as well as its utility as a guide to empirical research.³³

The Virtual Impossibility of Democracy

While some democratic revisionists have uttered their protestations against the desirability of participative democracy, a number of other social scientists have claimed that despite the rhetoric and formal rules of democracy, a select group of individuals still retains the bulk of power. Democratic procedures cannot, according to this belief, overcome the inevitability of what Robert Michels called the "Iron Law of oligarchy":

The majority is thus permanently incapable of self-government.... The majority of human beings, in a condition of eternal tutelage, are predestined by tragic

³² Ibid., p. 94.

³³ Jack Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy", in Luttbegg (ed.), Public Opinion and Public Policy, pp. 457-59.

necessity to submit to the domination of a small minority, and must be content to constitute the pedestal of an oligarchy.³⁴

The central message of this body of thought is that the classical democratic ideals of political equality and majority rule, no matter how desirable, can never be realized.

A number of traditional elite theorists have suggested two major reasons for the inevitability of minority rule: (1) the psychological traits of leaders and followers, (2) organizational necessity.³⁵ Prominent among such writers was Michels, uttering the famous formulation: "Who says organization says oligarchy."³⁶ For bureaucratic and psychological reasons, democracy and large scale social organization are claimed to be incompatible. Presenting an argument rich with insight into mass organizations of any type, Michels noted that in the mass parties of European socialists the demands for specialization of function and expertise and the resulting division of labour and authority within the political party led inexorably to rule by the most skillful and interested minority. The masses have neither the ability nor the taste for a participative role. They supposedly have

³⁴ Michels, Political Parties, p. 354.

³⁵ Other than Michels, see: Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class; Vilfredo Pareto, The Rise and Fall of the Elites, Zetterberg (ed.); Max Weber, "Bureaucracy", in Gerth and Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, pp. 196-244.

³⁶ Michels, p. 15.

a psychological need for guidance and are glad to have others take on political responsibilities. The alleged traits of deference, apathy, and incompetence provide ideal conditions for the few with the inclination and the organizational ability to lead.³⁷ The consequences of the "oligarchic law", Michels believed, involved an ideological conservatism in which the oligarchy guarded its vested interests, developing a tendency to identify its interests as being synonymous with the organization's.³⁸

A further argument for the virtual impossibility of democracy (in a capitalist system) is the Marxist oriented economic critique. In its crudest form, this theory begins with the familiar assumption that the political is determined by the economic or is merely a part of the social superstructure erected upon the economic foundation. Applying this formula to capitalist democracies, it is suggested that being the political system of a class society, democracy must inevitably reflect the basic interests and preferences of the dominant economic class (i.e., the bourgeoisie). As long as class society (i.e., capitalism) endures, democracy cannot be transformed into an instrument of genuine majority rule by the proletariat because, by definition, the minority (the capitalist class)

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 85-91.

³⁸ See Frank Serauf, Political Parties in the American System, pp. 49-50.

makes all meaningful political decisions.³⁹ More refined forms of the economic power argument have been postulated. The most prevalent claims are, in brief, that inequality in economic resources and power yields political inequality. Such unequal competition in the political sphere makes majority rule exceedingly difficult to attain. As Ralph Miliband explains:

The control by business of large and crucially important areas of economic life makes it extremely difficult for government to impose upon it policies to which it is firmly opposed.... Business, in the very nature of a capitalist system of economic organisation, is immeasurably better placed than any other interest...to cause governments to pay greater attention to its wishes and susceptibilities than to anybody else.... The veto power of business...is not absolute. But it is very large, and certainly larger than that of any other interest in capitalist society.⁴⁰

The final argument for the "certainty" of minority rule is based on the institutional approach to elitism. Whereas Marxist oriented writers hold power in society to arise from the control of the means of production, Mills, for example, sees it as attached to a wider set of institutions comprised, in the U.S.A. (to which he confines his attention), of the military, the large corporations, and the political executive. The elite is the product of "the institutional landscape" of society; power is institutionalized. Certain

³⁹ Mayo, p. 280. For an attempted marriage between Marxist and elitist thought, see James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution.

⁴⁰ Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, pp. 132-34.

institutions occupy pivotal positions in the political system and the top ranks of the hierarchy in these institutions constitute the "strategic command posts of the social structure."⁴¹ The elite is thus composed of those who occupy the leading positions in the strategic hierarchies.⁴²

Because of the four main factors cited above (psychological, organizational, economic, and institutional), a minority of individuals is supposedly capable of exploiting its power and thus thwarting democratic rule.⁴³ A clear implication of this is that the putative elite constitutes a coherent, self-conscious, and united body. Meisel refers to the "three Cs -- group consciousness, coherence, and conspiracy" (the latter term indicating a "common will to action" rather than "secret machinations") -- as essential aspects of the elite concept which are usually assumed rather than proved. Unless the elite acts together as a group, with shared purposes on specific policy questions, its viability as a mechanism to frustrate democratic government is open to doubt.⁴⁴ While traditional democratic theory has been altered by elitist tendencies, classical elitism has been challenged from

⁴¹ See C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite.

⁴² Geraint Parry, Political Elites, pp. 52-3.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 35.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 31-2; Meisel, p. 4.

the quasi-democratic perspective by "plural elitists." Robert Dahl has hypothesized that in modern democracies different sets of individuals are prominently involved in particular areas of policy-making. Leaders are specialists in one issue-area. For example, the minority which is influential regarding housing policy will not necessarily be the same that decides military issues.⁴⁵ If this is the case, then the traditional elitist notion of power being cumulative in the hands of a consistent, all-embracing leadership core is incorrect. Furthermore, the greater the dispersion of power, the lesser the possibility of the "three Cs" being present.

Ersatz Democracy

Despite the fallibility of the two-schools of non-democratic thought discussed above, postulating the undesirability and/or virtual impossibility of democracy, they have had a profound impact on orthodox democratic theory. Modern democratic thought in the Anglo-American world has fallen heir to an elitist tradition. It accepts the "realistic" conclusion of Michels that the masses cannot truly rule. The complexity and range of decisions made by any large modern state, the supposed apathy, anti-democratic values, and ignorance of great numbers of the electorate, the control of major economic wealth by a few interests, and the "inevitable" hierarchies of power

⁴⁵ Parry, pp. 67, 120-21. For an application of this concept on the local level, see Robert Dahl, Who Governs?

concomitant with large bureaucratic structures apparently conspire to render unattainable and/or inadvisable the fulfillment of the democratic ideal of giving every citizen an equal amount of political power to influence government decisions. The modern breed of "democratic" theorist supposedly salvages the remnants of a tattered democratic tradition by postulating the distinctiveness of the elitist system produced by "democratic" rules and institutions -- the essence of that distinctiveness being the plural nature of the democratic elite. The chief goal of democratic institutions is to ensure that a number of possible rulers participate in popularity contests to determine who in fact will rule.⁴⁶ Joseph Schumpeter has provided the consummate definition of this revisionist view of democracy. Instead of the concept of "government by the people", he proposed "government approved by the people." Thus, the democratic method is defined as "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."⁴⁷ If elites are to exercise their "rightful power" effectively, the masses must understand that they cannot take political action between elections. "Bombarding" representatives with letters

⁴⁶ Russell, pp. 109-131.

⁴⁷ Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (3rd. ed.), p. 269.

and telegrams, Schumpeter argued, should not be allowed.⁴⁸

His concept of democracy was appropriately summarized in one sentence: "Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them."⁴⁹

According to democratic revisionists, the unique value of democratic institutions is not the attainment of the classical ideals of self-government, but the much more limited goal of the avoidance of a system which guarantees a monopoly of power to a single, unchallenged elite. The cassettes of mass society and "totalitarian democracy" have reversed democratic values and made a virtue out of the elitist manifestations of existing society. Thus, contemporary democratic thought has been bastardized and little resembles that of its traditional proponents. But then, claim the "democratic elitists", they were naive. There never can or should be more than "a little bit of democracy." With smug complacency, the democratic revisionists point with pride to the assumption that in western democracies governmental decisions are a little more responsive to public opinion, the composition of the governing elite is open to a greater upward mobility from the lower classes -- what more can reasonable men expect?⁵⁰ As Carole Pateman

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 295.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 285.

⁵⁰ See Russell, pp. 109-131.

laments:

No longer is democratic theory centred on the participation of "the people", on the participation of the ordinary man, or the prime virtue of a democratic political system seen as the development of politically relevant and necessary qualities of the ordinary individual. In the contemporary theory of democracy, it is the participation of the minority elite that is crucial and the non-participation of the apathetic, ordinary man lacking in the feeling of political efficacy, that is regarded as the main bulwark against instability.⁵¹

This genre of political thought is one embraced by an era disillusioned with the "common man." Its legacy is a democratic revisionist theory which spawns support for elitism and an ersatz democracy.

Democracy Redefined

The concept of democracy to be utilized in the remainder of this thesis will focus on an aspect all too often neglected by both traditional and revisionist democrats: the specific relationship between mass public opinion and ultimate public policy. This relationship, it is contended, is the true litmus test of a supposedly democratic state. Democracy is more than the procedural rights of freedom of expression and the franchise. It is more than competing political parties and participation. All of these ingredients can be viewed as important prerequisites for democracy but not as democracy itself -- as crucial means to an end yet not ends in themselves. For if despite procedural rights, elections, and active citizen involvement in politics, govern-

⁵¹ Pateman, p. 104.

mental policies are not reflective of mass preferences, then these democratic elements are only masking real power in society -- popular rule is a sham. What makes freedom of speech, election of political leaders, and participation meaningful and not merely symbolic in nature is some concrete evidence of the actual degree to which they bring policies into agreement with majority public opinion. The fixation of traditional (now sometimes called "radical") democrats for participation qua participation and the equal obsession against mass involvement by democratic revisionists cloud the essence of representative government. The elections of Schumpeter and group participation of pluralists are meaningless exercises in mass brainwashing and delusion if they do not allow the masses to have a perceptible impact on policy outcomes. Yet, democracy is usually seen in purely procedural terms by many theorists.

This thesis is hopefully a flight toward (and not from) reality. It is accepted that in any society of tens of millions of individuals the minority (in a technical sense) makes decisions and the majority obeys. However, this is an obvious truism with no ability to explain political relationships.

"That fewer people issue laws, orders and instructions than receive and obey them is a fact scarcely worth commenting upon. The elitist argument is a much stronger one. It is that the dominant minority cannot be controlled by the majority, what-

ever mechanisms are used."⁵² Unfortunately, this crucial contention is almost always assumed rather than proved by elite theorists. As Kornhauser (hardly one sympathetic to mass democracy) is forced to admit, Mills, for example, in postulating the American power elite "fails to put his argument to a decisive or meaningful test. He does not examine the patterns of decisions to show that foreign policy not only is made by a few people (this, after all, is a constitutional fact), but that it is made for their particular interests...." The degree of "autonomy of decision-makers cannot be inferred from the number of decision-makers, nor from the scope of their decisions. It is determined by the character of decision-making, especially the dependence of decision-makers on certain kinds of procedure and support."⁵³ David Spitz is even more direct:

It is not...the fact of leadership, the mere existence of elite, that is the crucial distinction between democracy and oligarchy. The central point at issue is the fact of responsibility: whether the leadership derives its power from the freely given assent of the people and whether the policies pursued by the leadership conform to the changing tides of public opinion.⁵⁴

Those such as Robert Dahl who attempt to formulate "realistic" definitions of democracy ("polyarchy") emphasize the wrong aspects. Procedural democratic rights are not the

⁵² Parry, p. 31.

⁵³ William Kornhauser, "Power Elite or Veto Groups", in Lindenfeld (ed.), Reader in Political Sociology, p. 292.

⁵⁴ Spitz, Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought, p. 104.

policies that result from these rights are analyzed.⁵⁵ Two of the few writers who provide an appropriate perspective (i.e., emphasizing ultimate policies) are Dye and Zeigler. They state that elitism can be summarized, in part, as follows: "Only a small number of persons allocate values for society; the masses do not decide public policy.... Public policy does not reflect demands of the masses but rather the prevailing values of the elite."⁵⁶ Democracy, accordingly, would be where public policy does mirror the preferences of the masses.

In essence, democracy in this work is perceived as the possible consequence of (primarily) elections, procedural rights, and various forms of political participation. These elements are seen in light of the possible pressures they can place upon decision-makers to increase responsiveness to the masses. To the extent that civil liberties are respected, elections are meaningful, and mass participation relatively widespread, the preconditions for democracy exist. Given such conditions, it is necessary to examine public policies that result in order to know the extent to which the potentiality for democracy has been realized. Only consideration of all factors can yield an accurate response to the question

⁵⁵ See Dahl, Democracy in the United States, pp. 39, 47; Dahl, Preface to Democratic Theory, p. 84.

⁵⁶ Dye and Zeigler, (3rd. ed.) p. 6.

of whether and to what degree democracy exists. To the extent the various Democratic Linkage mechanisms yield a public policy usually consistent with mass (i.e., majority) public opinion, democracy can be said to function. If the opposite is the case, if policy is consistently reflective of minority views, then an elite form of polity is operating. Such a redefinition of democracy and elitism -- emphasizing not just procedural elements but their impact on public policy -- is believed to be the most relevant and cogent approach. The representative nature of the policy outputs that result from the mix of democratic and elite tendencies in North America has been largely ignored in both normative and empirical democratic analysis. The reformulation of democracy and elitism in this thesis -- emphasizing the relationship between governmental policy and mass public opinion -- goes beyond the shadow boxing of past democratic debate and focuses on the results of the main political bout.

B. The North American Participant Political Culture

Besides the minimum formal institutions of democracy (e.g., competing political parties and elected legislatures), a participatory form of democratic political system requires as well (as a necessary though not sufficient condition) a political culture conducive to it.⁵⁷ The term "political

⁵⁷ Almond and Verba, p. 3.

culture" has been defined as "a set of learned attitudes and behaviour patterns with which members of society approach the allocation of resources."⁵⁸ It consists of "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation to politics."⁵⁹ From the crude Marxist perspective, there are no strictly cultural factors in political phenomena. Ideologies, beliefs, collective images, institutions, and culture are seen as only reflecting the class system and belonging to the superstructure of society. Given the Marxist concept of economic determinism, i.e., the notion that economic realities shape society, the values and beliefs of that society are viewed as dependent variables. For many western writers, however, cultural factors are of prime importance. Politics is conceived as ideas, and controversies are primarily conflicts of doctrine. Both extremes are too drastic. While the "bourgeois" approach is often only a thin screen for camouflaging the defence of particular material interests, "institutions, cultures, ideologies, and value-systems are not simply the by-products of socio-economic conditions. Rather, not only do they determine the

⁵⁸ Richard Van Leen and Michael Whittington, The Canadian Political System (1st. ed.), p. 92.

⁵⁹ Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development, p. 513.

form and context of the political struggle, but also they help to bring these conflicts into being, to aggravate and to attenuate them."⁶⁰ This section of Chapter I will focus on the participative aspects of American and Canadian political culture.

Participative Myth and Reality

From the effusive tone of Lipset's contentions concerning the positions of the U.S. and Canada on the "revolutionary-counterrevolutionary" continuum, to the restrained verbiage of Presthus, the distinctions between American and Canadian political culture are presumed to be of great significance.⁶¹ In their 1976 edition of The Canadian Political System, Van Leon and Whittington embrace a similar conclusion while ignoring evidence which clearly contradicts Lipset in regard to the participative dimension.⁶² The essence of this prevailing view is that the United States is dedicated to egalitarianism and democratic participation while Canada stresses order, loyalty, and deference to government. Canadians are said to be generally quite willing to leave actual

⁶⁰ Maurice Duverger, The Idea of Politics, p. 68.

⁶¹ See S. M. Lipset, "Revolution and Counterrevolution: The United States and Canada", in Kruhlak, et al. (eds.), The Canadian Political Process (revised ed.), pp. 3-29; Robert Presthus, Elites in the Policy Process, pp. 3-39.

⁶² Cf. Van Leon and Whittington, (2nd. ed.) pp. 79-83; Tom Truman, "A Critique of Seymour M. Lipset's Article, 'Value Differences, Absolute or Relative: The English Speaking Democracies'", in Kruhlak, et al. (eds.), pp. 30-60.

political decision-making to "the authorities." Jon Pannett hypothesizes that "politics has less salience for...Canadians than it does for citizens of many other countries."⁶³

However, an analysis of the most recent data concerning political participation indicates greater opportunity for and actual involvement by Canadians in some electoral and non-electoral areas than Americans -- especially when focusing on the national level. Thus, while a superficially impressive number of offices in the United States are filled by the electoral process (over 530,000), only 0.1% of these are on the national scene -- less proportionately than in Canada.⁶⁴ The huge size of U.S. House of Representative districts (encompassing six times the number of citizens as Canadian constituencies) makes constituent-representative communication less personal and more difficult in America. While the national volume of electoral policy referenda in the U.S. totals between 10,000 and 15,000 annually, none are on the federal level.⁶⁵ Average national voter turnout in the United States for the last ten federal elections has been less than 52% (the 1974 election had a 38% participation rate)

⁶³ Van Loon and Whittington, (2nd. ed.) pp. 80-81.

⁶⁴ Robert Ross, American National Government, p. 59.

⁶⁵ Howard Hamilton, "Direct Legislation: Some Implications of Open Housing Referenda", in Wilcox (ed.), Public Opinion and Political Attitudes, p. 521.

compared to an average of 70-75% for Canada.⁶⁶ Moreover, interest group membership is slightly higher in Canada than the United States: 64% of Canadians versus 53-62% of Americans report being members of organizations. Those with multiple association affiliations include 36% of Canadians and 32% of Americans.⁶⁷ In commenting on the relevance of group membership for democracy, Almond and Verba claim:

The individual who belongs to an organization, compared with one who does not, is more likely to feel competent to influence the government.... Membership in an organization, political or not, appears...to be related to any increase in the political competence and activity of the individual. The member, in contrast with the nonmember, appears to approximate more closely what we have called the democratic citizen.... Democracy depends upon citizen participation and it is clear that organizational membership is directly related to such participation.⁶⁸

Milbrath has suggested a hierarchy of political involvement: spectator activities (e.g., voting, political discussion), transitional activities (e.g., attending a political meeting), gladiatorial activities (e.g., becoming an active member in a political party).⁶⁹ The higher up the hierarchy (which includes only electoral participation), the fewer participants there are. Using Milbrath's typology, little

⁶⁶ Dye and Zeigler, (3rd. ed.) p. 217; Van Loon and Whittington, (1st. ed.) p. 80.

⁶⁷ James Curtis, "Voluntary Association Joining: A Cross-National Comparative Note", American Sociological Review, vol. 36 (October 1971), pp. 873-77; Erikson and Luttbeg, p. 305.

⁶⁸ Almond and Verba, pp. 254-56, 262-65.

⁶⁹ Lester Milbrath, Political Participation, p. 18.

difference is found between participation in the U.S. and Canada. At most, 4% of Canadians are estimated to participate at the "gladiatorial" level while another 10 to 20% are involved in "transitional" level activities. Participation at the "spectator" status is higher; about 22% of Canadians, for example, tried to convince other people how to vote in the 1965 federal election campaign.⁷⁰ In the United States, regular voting in Presidential elections is the only major political activity that a majority of American citizens report performing. Less than 20% have attended at least one political meeting or rally (i.e., "transitional" activity) in the last three years. Approximately 8% are members of a political club or organization.⁷¹

In a 1968 national survey of Canadians, the general level of "political efficacy" was measured. It was defined as believing that "one is able to influence Parliament, the civil service, and government." Approximately 45% of all respondents fell into the "high" or "fairly high" categories compared to less than 9% in the "low" classification.⁷² In the Civic Culture study, 40% of American respondents said there was "some likelihood" that an attempt of theirs to in-

⁷⁰ Van Loon and Whittington, (2nd. ed.) pp. 108-9.

⁷¹ Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality, pp. 30-1, 79.

⁷² Robert Presthus, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics, pp. 39-41.

fluence the national legislature would be successful.⁷³
 Using a different criteria of efficacy, Meisel et al. discovered in their national survey that 29% fell into the "high" category. Utilizing the same items to measure efficacy in an American city, Form and Huber found that 32% ranked "high."⁷⁴

Contrary to what many analysts have proclaimed, the bulk of the evidence indicates that the participative aspect of Canadian and American political culture is similar (with Canada surpassing the United States in some important categories). By comparative standards, a high degree of participation exists. As Jackson and Atkinson note:

The models of governing which Canada inherited from the United States and Britain have fostered certain types of attitudes and behaviour and discouraged others. The most important of these are democratic attitudes toward political participation and governmental authority.... By comparison with many countries, Canada may be considered to have a "participant" political culture.⁷⁵

Participation and Mass Public Opinion

The "public opinion" which is measured in opinion polls is an essentially passive input into the political system; it must be sought out. The active opinion that is

⁷³ Almond and Verba, p. 345.

⁷⁴ Presthus, Elite Accommodation..., pp. 39-41; W. Form and J. Huber, "Income, Race, and the Ideology of Political Efficacy", The Journal of Politics, vol. 33, no. 3 (August 1971), p. 669.

⁷⁵ Robert Jackson and Michael Atkinson, The Canadian Legislative System, pp. 27-28.

the basis of elections, pressure groups, parties, and the many forms of constituency communication constitutes the kinetic input in the political process. "Interest groups and political parties act to sort and rank the various attitudes and interests in such a way as to make the task of the decision-makers a little easier. The extent to which they reflect the actual forces present within the society is an important factor in determining how responsive the political system will be."⁷⁶ Yet, the two major processes of political communication -- polling and participation -- convey a different aspect of reality. As has been noted, not all citizens are participants. This would not be a problem of great concern if the factors that cause citizens to participate operated on a random basis. Unfortunately, such is not the case. The preferences of citizens that are communicated through the various modes of political participation do not necessarily reflect on a proportional basis the desires of all groups or individuals in society.⁷⁷

Most available evidence indicates that various demo-

⁷⁶ Rais Khan, Stuart MacKown, James McNiven, An Introduction to Political Science, p. 77.

⁷⁷ See, for example, Sidney Verba and Richard Brody, "Participation, Policy Preferences, and the War in Vietnam", Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 3 (Fall 1970), pp. 325-332. In their survey, Vietnam "hawks" constituted 18% of the respondents but 30% of those who had written letters to governmental officials expressing their opinion on the war.

graphic characteristics, especially socio-economic status, are closely associated with participation. It is those with higher income, higher education, and higher status occupations who participate most. In addition, the close relationship between such characteristics and participation is paralleled by a link between political preferences and participation.⁷⁸ The nonrandom nature of political involvement can be seen, for example, in regard to feelings of political efficacy. In a Canadian study, only 8% of "lower class" respondents indicated a high level of efficacy as compared with 49% of those in the "upper-middle class." Thus, an extremely large proportion of those who have most justification for discontent do not feel that they can have any meaningful influence over political decisions. Such an attitude, in addition to a dearth of resources, leads them to abstain from participation and their very abstention makes their low sense of political efficacy a self-fulfilling prophecy.⁷⁹ An individual's socio-economic class is also related with his degree of activity in a political campaign. For example, using data from the 1965 Meisel et al. survey of Canadians, 58% of the "upper-middle class" respondents

⁷⁸ Verba and Nie, pp. 12-13, 284-85.

⁷⁹ Van Leen and Whittington, (1st ed.) pp. 90-91; similar results were found in the U.S., see Form and Huber, pp. 659-688.

indicated "low" campaign activity versus 84% for "lower class" respondents. However, in regard to the highest degree of campaign involvement (probably the more relevant factor), the differences were not great -- ranging from 5.9% for "upper-middle", 5.3% for "middle", 3.5% for "working", and 4.2% for "lower class" respondents.⁸⁰ Data from the Survey Research Center's studies of the American electorate indicate that self-identified "upper-middle class" individuals were four times as likely to engage in at least one "gladiatorial" activity as members of the "working class" sample.⁸¹

The examples cited above illustrate the skewed nature of political participation in North America. Therefore, reliance upon only active manifestations of public opinion can result in a distorted view of the mass opinion landscape. (The degree to which passive opinion is considered by decision-makers is discussed in Chapter III, section D): On the other hand, to the extent that intensity of opinion is an important and relevant factor, some justification can be given for granting greater consideration to those motivated to participate than those passive or apathetic individuals who are not "turned-on" politically.⁸²

⁸⁰ Van Loen and Whittington, (1st. ed.) pp. 83-4.

⁸¹ Milbrath, p. 117.

⁸² See Khan, et al., pp. 76-77; Robert Lane and David Sears, Public Opinion, p. 9.

The Democratic Participatory Evolution

There is substantial evidence to indicate that individuals with higher educational attainment are more likely to participate (and on an informed basis) in politics.⁸³ To the extent that the number of citizens with post-secondary educational backgrounds has been growing rapidly, the potential for greater political participation exists. In fact, such has been the case in North America. Canada now ranks second to the United States (but far ahead of other industrialized Western nations) in the proportion of students enrolled in post-secondary education. If percentage of national income spent on education (whether public expenditures or private and public funds) is considered, then Canada ranks ahead of the United States.⁸⁴ The electorate is becoming increasingly educated and, therefore (in theory), more likely to engage in greater political involvement.

The extension of advanced educational opportunity has been accompanied by the expansion of the franchise. Once voting was initiated, it was an extremely troublesome problem to justify the suffrage for one class or group and not another. The doctrine of "popular government" contains an inner logic -- an almost inevitable momentum. As a result, the history of North America shows a continuing growth in

⁸³ Milbrath, p. 122.

⁸⁴ Truman, pp. 31-34.

the electorate. Beginning with the repeal of property and tax-paying requirements, including attempts to extend the vote to nonwhites and women, the inexorable tide has flowed -- though at times rather weakly.⁸⁵ It was only within this past decade that the last major extension of the franchise was realized: the lowering of the voting age in North America to eighteen and, in the United States, the removal of remaining barriers to black electoral participation. Combined with the increased educational attainment of a growing body of the citizenry, the democratic participatory evolution has reached its highest plateau to date. As a consequence, two prerequisites to democratic government, universal suffrage and an electorate growing in educational qualification, have recently been achieved. This warrants no conclusion as to whether democracy actually exists -- only whether the minimum preconditions are present to justify further exploration. Is the degree and kind of political participation now taking place in North America sufficient to make effective use of the various potential Democratic Linkage mechanisms? This crucial aspect of democracy is the conundrum which future chapters of this thesis will attempt to unravel.

⁸⁵ Seven of the last thirteen amendments to the U.S. constitution, covering a span of over 100 years, have extended the suffrage in some manner.

CHAPTER II: PUBLIC OPINION AND THE DEMOCRATIC LINKAGE

FRAMEWORK

Like fog or smoke, public opinion is obvious in its larger manifestations, but intangible at closer view.... Public opinion has vital importance as a symbol that need stand for no value other than directing human affairs through the consensus that emerges from discussion and persuasion. The validity of government by public opinion lies in the kind of social milieu it helps to establish and the attitude of mind that it encourages....

Pendleton Herring¹

In a democratic society, it is taken for granted that public opinion will have an important influence on the policies of governments.

Alex Murray and Lawrence Leduc²

A. The Concept of Public Opinion

"Public opinion" has come to refer to a kind of secular idol -- a "god-term" -- to which many citizens, political scientists, and office-seekers alike pay homage: partly as an act of faith, partly as a matter of necessity, partly as a condition of habit.³ Yet, like the Deity, its

¹ Herring, "The Value of Public Opinion as a Social Myth", in Christenson and McWilliams (eds.), Voice of the People, pp. 47-49.

² Murray and Leduc, "Public Support for Controls Rises, Government Action Gains Backing", (Toronto) Globe and Mail, October 10, 1975, p. B1.

³ See Avery Leiserson, "Notes on the Theory of Opinion Formation", American Political Science Review, vol. 47 (1953), p. 171.

name is often taken in vain.

The modern study of public opinion dates from A. Lawrence Lowell's Public Opinion and Popular Government (published in 1913) and Walter Lippmann's Public Opinion (published in 1922). Although a great number of social scientists have dealt with the concept of public opinion since then, there has been remarkably little consensus as to definition or approach. Public opinion has been defined, inter alia, as: (1) "an aggregate of individual views, attitudes, or beliefs shared by a significant portion of the community";⁴ (2) consisting of the opinions of the group of individuals "making up the public under discussion" and including only those views "relevant to the issue or situation that defines them as a public";⁵ (3) "a multi-individual situation in which individuals are expressing themselves as favoring or disfavoring some definite condition, person, or proposal of widespread importance in such a proportion of number, intensity, and constancy as to give rise to the probability of affecting action, directly or indirectly, toward the subject concerned";⁶ (4) "those opinions held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed."⁷

⁴ Jack Plano and Milton Greenberg, The American Political Dictionary (2nd. ed.), p. 116.

⁵ David Truman, The Governmental Process, p. 220.

⁶ Gordon Allport, "Toward a Science of Public Opinion", Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 1 (1937), p. 23.

⁷ V.O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy, p. 14.

In this thesis, unless otherwise specified, the term "public opinion" will refer to mass opinion, i.e., those political preferences held by all adult citizens regarding desired national public policy (as expressed through both active and passive Democratic Linkage mechanisms).⁸

Approaches to Public Opinion

There are three main dimensions to the study of public opinion: (1) the distribution and quality of opinion, involving analysis of direction, saliency, intensity, and the attributes of individuals holding different positions on the same issue; (2) the processes of opinion formation, examining the formative agents of public opinion (e.g., the media, opinion leaders, political parties); (3) the impact of opinion upon governmental decisions (the main emphasis of this work).⁹ An analysis (by this researcher) of the contents of the Public Opinion Quarterly from its inception in 1937 through 1975 indicates that the subject matters considered fell, primarily, into the following major categories: (1) public opinion polls (techniques and evaluations); (2) public opinion of selected groups on specific

⁸ See the discussion regarding participation and mass public opinion in Chapter I (section B) plus the four linkage models in Chapter III for an examination of active and passive opinion processes.

⁹ See Lee Benson, "An Approach to the Scientific Study of Past Public Opinion", Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 4 (Winter 1967-68), pp. 522-67.

issues; (3) the influence of selected factors in the formation of public opinion; (4) voting behaviour; (5) communication theory and the media; (6) political participation. Conceptual studies and empirical research on the specific relationship between public opinion and public policy are extremely rare in this journal.¹⁰ They consist, mainly, of a few case studies. Indeed, this dimension of public opinion research has been plagued by a plethora of speculation and unsubstantiated "verdicts" and a dearth of empirical testing (and meaningful theorizing. For example, the argument is often made by opinion analysts that it is not public opinion in general which is significant in affecting government policy, but only a segment of opinion -- that which originates from informed elites. Almond views public opinion as divided into three major categories: mass, attentive, and elite. He proclaims: "In the democratic policy-making process the general mass of the population is neither interested nor informed, and is unable continuously to be active in policy-making."¹¹ Rosenau, "borrowing" this trichotomous analysis of Almond, cavalierly dismisses the relevance of mass opinion by declaring: "...The mass public lies virtually outside the opinion-policy relationship."¹² However,

¹⁰ See Harwood Childs, Public Opinion: Nature, Formation, and Role, pp. 49-50, 62.

¹¹ Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, p. 138.

¹² James Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, p. 36.

neither Almond nor Rosenau provide operational definitions of "attentive" or "elite" opinion or attempt to empirically test their metaphysical "conclusions." In addition to neglecting to give any convincing evidence for their sweeping generalizations about the opinion-policy nexus, they make no attempt to explain how such elite policy-making processes can still be termed "democratic" if the masses are virtually excluded. Thus, they fall victim to the same criticisms leveled against democratic revisionists in Chapter I. This is not to suggest that Almond and Rosenau are necessarily incorrect in postulating the importance of "attentive" or "elite" opinion compared to mass opinion. However, there is a vital difference between assuming this distinction as an established "fact" so obvious that it does not need to be proved and the empirical testing of hypotheses to determine the validity of such claims. The latter procedure is one of the major aims of this study.

One solution to understanding some of the differing definitions and emphases of opinion research is to recognize that public opinion has conceptual significance at two levels -- micro and macro. Public opinion is both an individual and mass phenomenon. By focusing on public opinion as the outcome of the individual interacting with his political and social environment (i.e., the micro level) and as the "aggregation and articulation" of individual opinions within a given functional unit (i.e., the macro level) it

is possible to make sense of sometimes discrepant emphases of the various definitions.¹³ In conceptualizing public opinion in this manner, many differences in approach can be viewed as differences in analytic level. Analysis of micro level public opinion emphasizes the individual and forces one to inquire into how his values, beliefs, and attitudes are interrelated, how they are formed and under what circumstances they change. (While these questions are not the focal point of this thesis, previous research in this area will be summarized below). The macro level examination of public opinion begins where the micro definition ends. It "asks what is the distribution of public opinion toward a given set of political objects in the environment and how and under what circumstances does public opinion play a role in the policy-making process."¹⁴ It is this macro level of opinion analysis that is the focus of the Democratic Linkage approach.

Formation of Public Opinion

The boundaries within which public opinion evolves are determined by a variety of formative agents. A review of the public opinion literature shows great emphasis on the formation of opinion, revealing over a dozen possible factors involved. Many of these are capable of working at

¹³ James Best, Public Opinion, pp. 2-3.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 4.

cross-purposes. Thus, to the extent these agents are operating as hypothesized, the mass opinion that finally crystallizes on a particular issue is not likely to be the result of one determinative factor, but the consequence of the interaction of a number of conflicting forces. The remainder of this section of Chapter II will outline those factors which supposedly play an important role in the formation of public opinion.

The connection between the government and public opinion is a two-way relationship. Public opinion is capable of influencing the government and the government can have an important impact on public preferences. The statements, acts, and even the behaviour of the Prime Minister or the President can have a profound influence on mass opinion. Through the use of press conferences, radio and television appearances, and speeches, the government (and opposition leaders) can reach the public directly. Through conferences, interviews, correspondence, dinners, and phone calls, high government officials can influence nongovernmental leaders in society (and vice versa).¹⁵ The government can affect public opinion both positively and negatively by giving and by withholding information (e.g., the attempt to prevent disclosure of the Pentagon Papers). In almost every "democratic" society, complaints have been raised accusing government officials of

¹⁵ Childs, pp. 291-2.

"managing" the news in one way or another so as to create favourable impressions of their actions. However, such machinations can often backfire. The widespread acknowledgement of the "credibility gap" between what governments often say and what is perceived to be the truth is evidence of the limits and counter-productivity of obvious attempts to misinform the public.¹⁶

The political party and electoral system constitutes another formative agent of mass opinion. Duverger observes that it is necessary to distinguish between formulated and raw public opinion. He notes:

The first is the product of the kneading of the latter by party propaganda and of its moulding by the party system and the electoral system. Parties create public opinion as much as they express it.... Parties tend to crystallize opinion; they give skeletal articulation to a shapeless and jelly-like mass.... The Marxist theory itself which treats opinion as a reflection of social class holds that all classes are class-conscious; but class-consciousness does not exist unless a party exists to awaken and develop it.¹⁷

Propaganda by organized interest groups is an additional source of influence on mass opinion (i.e., the opinion of non-group members). Vast sums of money are often spent by groups in an attempt to sway the general public. For example, in the two months preceding the July 1974

¹⁶ See Rais Khan, et al., An Introduction to Political Science, pp. 69-70; David Wise, The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy, and Power.

¹⁷ Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (2nd. ed.), p. 378.

Canadian federal election, The National Citizens' Coalition (a right-wing mass membership pressure group which operates primarily through use of the printed media) spent over \$140,000 on newspaper advertisements.¹⁸ An important way in which a pressure group can enlarge its impact on public opinion formation is to exploit the "multiplier effect" of informal alliance with a political party. In the massive campaign conducted in the 1950s by the American Medical Association against "socialized medicine", the adoption by the Republican party of the AMA scare tactic of "creeping socialism" significantly aided the success of the propaganda effort.¹⁹

The mass media constitute a crucial factor in opinion formation. Since it is impossible for the media to provide all available information, they must decide which news stories to cover. They must make judgments as to what it is that the public should hear, see, and read. By engaging in this process, the media perform an "agenda setting" function for the mass public. By defining a particular event as newsworthy, and others as not, the media also confer salience, i.e., the object of the news story is one that should be the object of an opinion. A review of mass communication re-

¹⁸ From personal correspondence with director of organization (Sarah Band), letter dated June 30, 1975.

¹⁹ See Key, p. 156.

search indicates that the mass media are most influential in reinforcing existing opinions or in creating new opinions where none had previously existed, rather than in converting opinions from one side of an issue to another.²⁰ There also is evidence to indicate that in North America, reporters have, at times, gone beyond the parameters of objective reportage and have engaged in expressing either their own or the management's views on particular subjects. In addition, there is the demonstrated danger in private broadcasting that pressure from sponsors may alter the content of certain programmes.²¹ Where electronic media are under regulation and/or ownership by the government, there is the ever-present possibility that the incumbent administration will exploit this control to its own advantage. For example, French television was regularly accused of this during the De Gaulle years. However, government regulation of the electronic media also can be of positive benefit. The "fairness doctrine" in the United States requires that the television and radio industry give equal time not only to candidates for public office, but also, in some instances, to interest groups holding opposing views to those discussed on the airwaves.²²

²⁰ Best, pp. 131-135; also see Joseph Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communication.

²¹ See Khan, p. 69; F. Engelmann and M. Schwartz, Canadian Political Parties, chap. 6. The implications of the "class bias" of private mass media are considered in Chapter IV, section D.

²² Best, p. 135.

Many political pundits and a number of politicians have suggested that polling activity itself exercises a potentially powerful influence on the mass opinion it seeks to measure. It is believed by some that during election campaigns, for example, the publication of potential voter sentiment tends to interfere with what ought to be the autonomous decision-making function of the electorate. The general claim is that publication of opinion poll results during the pre-election period fosters a "band wagon" effect in favour of the leading party or candidate.²³ However, it can also cause overconfidence on the part of the side that is the projected winner and thus, ironically, aid the underdog party.

The authors of The People's Choice were the first among survey researchers to "discover" that some people are, in Orwell's celebrated phrase, "more equal than others" when it comes to influencing voter decisions.²⁴ There are some people who exert a disproportionate personal influence on the voting intentions of other individuals. It is contended that these "opinion leaders" are not at all identical with those who are traditionally thought of as wielding great influence. Studies indicate that "opinion leaders" seem to be distributed among all occupational groups and on every social and

²³ See Hugh Whalen, "The Perils of Polling", in Paul Fox (ed.), Politics:Canada (3rd. ed.), p. 161.

²⁴ Paul Lazarsfeld, et al., The People's Choice (2nd. ed.), pp. 150-51; also see Bernard Hennessey, Public Opinion (2nd. ed.), pp. 301-2.

economic level. They report much more than non-opinion leaders being influenced by the mass media. This suggests a "two-step flow of communication"; ideas often seem to flow from the mass media to "opinion leaders" and from them to the less active sections of the population.²⁵ It is important to stress that "opinion leaders" are not a group set apart and opinion leadership is not an inherent trait which some individuals have and others do not. Rather, as Katz and Lazarsfeld see it:

Opinion leadership is an integral part of the give-and-take of everyday personal relationships. It is being suggested, in other words, that all interpersonal relations are potential networks of communication and that an opinion leader can best be thought of as a group member playing a key communications role.²⁶

In a similar analysis, Rosenau contends that two basic elements of the opinion formation process are "opinion holders" and "opinion makers." Those individuals in society who, on a given issue or in general, cannot transmit opinions to persons with whom they are not acquainted are referred to as "opinion holders." They are capable of disseminating opinions on a face-to-face basis, but have no access to "the impersonal channels" of the communications system. These individuals are quite similar to the "opinion leaders" discussed above. "Opinion makers", on the other hand, are those

²⁵ E. Katz and P. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications, pp. 32-33.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 33.

who, by virtue of their leadership positions in society, have direct access to the mass media.²⁷

Besides the efforts (referred to earlier) of organized pressure groups to sway the opinions of nonmembers who constitute the mass public, the influence of group membership in modifying a member's own opinions may occur in several ways. The most prevalent are: (1) direct personal communication and influence by the members of a group; (2) mass persuasion by a member of a group (e.g., a union leader addressing a union meeting); (3) providing "reference points" which help an individual form his own opinion, i.e., cues which serve as guides in opinion formation even in the absence of overt attempts at persuasion. (An individual does not necessarily have to be a member of a group for it to serve a "reference" function for him).²⁸ In its attempts to mold opinion, therefore, the leadership of a pressure group has at least two major targets -- the general public and its own membership. Leaders must devote a great deal of effort to the "indoctrination of their own members. Attitudes of group members are not always a product of objective circumstances. Group leaders...take a hand in molding the attitudes of the rank and file."²⁹

²⁷ Rosenau, pp. 28-29.

²⁸ Robert Lane and David Sears, Public Opinion, pp. 33-4.

²⁹ Key, pp. 508 and 515.

The literature regarding group influence on its own membership suggests a three-fold typology: (1) primary groups, i.e., groups which rely upon face-to-face personal influence (e.g., peer groups of friends and working associates); (2) secondary groups, i.e., associations where the relationship between individual and group is rarely personal and intimate (e.g., the AFL-CIO, cadre style political parties); (3) tertiary groups, i.e., those groups which have no specific organization, but are broad societal categories with supposedly similar perspectives on political issues (e.g., age cohorts, regions, social classes, racial, religious, or ethnic groups).³⁰ Virtually all individuals are associated with a wide spectrum of either primary, secondary, or tertiary groups. While most groups have no direct political origin or intentions, individuals are likely to develop or accept the basic norms of the groups to which they belong. These norms often have political implications. Especially among peer groups, the fear of peer disapproval may result in attitudes and behaviour the individual might not otherwise exhibit if he were not a member of the group. For example, attitudes regarding racial or ethnic prejudice may be created, reinforced, or diminished depending upon the circles in which the individual moves.³¹

³⁰ Lane and Sears, p. 34.

³¹ Khan, p. 67.

The impact of the work group on a person's opinions is a function of the importance of the job to the worker and the extent to which his occupation permeates his daily existence. If, as is often the case in North America, the job is perceived as nothing more than a place to spend eight hours a day with people one doesn't see again or care to see again, then the work place is of marginal importance in influencing opinion. Contrary to what Marxists contend, the social milieu of the work situation may not be the key determinant of how individuals respond to their political world.³² Lipsitz argues, however, that men who are dissatisfied with industrial work requiring only low skill levels and in which the work pace is determined by machines, not the worker, also are displeased with other dimensions of their life. Alienation from work is often generalized to alienation from society and politics by the industrial worker.³³ Thus, an apolitical working class and not a class conscious politicized proletariat can develop.

In considering the importance of economic factors in determining public opinion, certain key points emerge from the relevant literature. First, economic interests do not "dictate" a given viewpoint for all members of a

³² Best, p. 124.

³³ See Lewis Lipsitz, "Work Life and Political Attitudes: A Study of Manual Workers", American Political Science Review, vol. 58 (December 1964), pp. 951-62.

particular economic group. Second, the impact of economic interests is strongest in those cases where "class" interests are clearly involved in a given issue. Frequently, opinions are expressed which may be interpreted as contrary to the objective economic interests of those concerned -- often because the interest at stake is not clearly perceived or differences exist regarding how best to promote it. Other contradictory factors may be present to act as "cross-pressures" (e.g., ethnic or racial antagonisms splitting groups with common economic interests). Third, views on issues which are not blatantly economic in their implications appear to be essentially unrelated to the individual's economic situation (e.g., capital punishment).³⁴ Whereas Marx believed that men would form their opinions on society on the basis of their economic class, once they learned how to locate themselves within this perspective, the bulk of opinion research in North America indicates that Marx's view was much too narrow. Individuals tend to take their broader perspective on political subjects from a host of factors outlined in this section. While one's "class" position (defined objectively in occupational terms or more importantly by subjective self-identification) can be a major formative

³⁴ See Robert Erikson and Nerman Luttbeg, American Public Opinion, pp. 166-185; Richard Dawson, Public Opinion and Contemporary Disarray, pp. 78-107; Robert Alford, Party and Society; Khan, p. 67.

agent in regard to many issues, it is rarely the determinative factor in the crude Marxist sense.³⁵

Other important factors in the opinion-making process include the nuclear family and the educational system. Family influence has been noted in numerous studies of opinion formation and political party preferences. This research has indicated, *inter alia*, that the majority of voters follow the same partisan lines as their parents.³⁶

The educational system often acts to reinforce certain basic cultural values.³⁷ Higher education generally appears to create somewhat more "liberal" attitudes (e.g., on issues involving civil liberties). Surveys have also shown over the years that the higher one rises on the educational ladder, the greater the level of political knowledge and opinion holding.³⁸

In multicultural societies such as Canada and the United States, the multiplicity of religious values have a complicating influence on the formation of public opinion.

³⁵ See *Ibid.*; Lane and Sears, p. 41.

³⁶ Erikson and Luttbeg, pp. 130-34.

³⁷ This raises the broader issue (beyond the purview of this thesis) of political socialization, i.e., the process by which the more general attitudes about politics constituting the political culture of a system are inculcated from one generation to the next. Many of the agents of political socialization also function on a more specific opinion-formation level.

³⁸ Lane and Sears, pp. 17-27; Khan, pp. 65-67.

There is a tendency for certain religious groups to share opinions en bloc, in some instances out of a special feeling of group solidarity (e.g., the views of North American Jews regarding formal recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization), in other cases out of a sense of direct religious interest in a particular issue (e.g., Catholic opposition to abortion-on-demand). Though the separation of church and state has been accepted for many years in North America (with the exception, until recently, of Quebec), this separation tends to be ignored when the state becomes involved in matters traditionally considered to be within the religious realm of moral concern.³⁹

A final factor to consider in the formation of public opinion is the concept of age cohorts. The "experiential theory of generational opinion differences" holds that a generation is produced by a shared historical experience at a formative time in its development (i.e., the late teens or early twenties). This shapes its political outlook and distinguishes it from earlier and later age cohorts whose views are the product of different traumatic experiences. For example, according to this belief, Munich and Pearl Harbor shaped the perspectives of one American generation on foreign policy which remained dominant until another equally momentous event, Vietnam, generated a different out-

³⁹ Khan, pp. 65-66.

look in a new generation.⁴⁰

B. Previous Research Regarding the Opinion-Policy Nexus

As was noted earlier in this chapter, there has been a disproportionately small amount of research on the specific relationship between mass opinion and public policy. This section will examine the major theoretical works and empirical studies which do exist on the opinion-policy nexus, indicating their major failings and the gaps that remain in comprehending this essential relationship.

Theoretical Works

The first individual to consider the connection between mass opinion and governmental policy on a systematic basis was V. O. Key, Jr., in Public Opinion and American Democracy. Though never specifically defining the concept, he was the first to utilize the term "linkage" in referring to the opinion-policy relationship. The various mechanisms of linkage Key described were the familiar ones of elections, political parties, and interest groups. Though his analysis of these structures was quite traditional, his perspective was distinct. His main contribution was to focus specifically on the ways in which these elements were thought to "link" public opinion and public policy in the United States.

⁴⁰ See Samuel Huntington, "Paradigms of American Politics: Beyond the One, the Two, and the Many", Political Science Quarterly, vol. 89 (March 1974), p. 23.

While adding no original empirical data on this relationship, Key speculated on the "interaction between the mass of citizens and "democratic leadership echelons." He concluded that public opinion should be conceived as a "system of dikes" which channel public action or which determine a "range of discretion" within which the government acts. According to this conception, the relationship between policy and opinion is not precise in matters of detail but rather is expressed in regard to broad preferences. Key also suggested the existence of "time lags" occurring between the "crystallization of a sense of mass purpose and its fulfillment in public action." However, despite these qualifications and the lack of any specific data upon which to base his conclusion, he confidently believed that "in the long run majority purpose and public action tend to be brought into harmony."⁴¹

Building upon Key's analysis (though failing to acknowledge this fact), Norman Luttbeg has claimed authorship of the concept of "political linkage." He defines it as "any means by which political leaders act in accordance with the wants, needs, and demands of the public in making government policy."⁴² Along with his colleague Robert Erik-

⁴¹ See Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, final chapter.

⁴² Luttbeg (ed.), Public Opinion and Public Policy (2nd. ed.), p. 3.

son, Luttbeg has suggested five "linkage models."⁴³ The "rational-activist model" begins with the assumption that the average citizen is politically informed, rational, and active. Since candidates for public office supposedly make their issue positions known, it is possible for the voter to select the candidate closest to his own preferences. Thus, the winning candidates are those who best reflect the aggregate preferences of the public at election time. Parties are non-existent under this conception.

The "political parties model" proposed by Luttbeg also assumes a rational, informed, and active electorate. However, rather than choosing between individual candidates, the voter selects between the issue positions of the political parties as expressed in their platforms. The party best reflecting the preferences of the public wins the election, and gains control of the government. It proceeds to enact its platform via its control of the elected leaders. As with the previous model, if the party in power makes decisions that are at odds with mass preferences, it loses the next election.

The "pressure group model" is based on the assumption that various groups in society actually reflect the views of those they claim to represent. At one extreme, "such

⁴³ See Luttbeg (ed.), Public Opinion and Public Policy (1st. ed.), pp. 1-9; Robert Erikson and Norman Luttbeg, American Public Opinion, pp. 15-20.

groups could be so inclusive of all individuals in our society, and could so accurately represent their members' opinions that representatives could achieve accountability merely by recording the choice of each group, weighing them by the numbers of voters they represent, and voting with the strongest pressure."⁴⁴

Luttbeg's "sharing model" assumes that all segments of society share the same values and preferences because of a commonality of interest and similar patterns of political socialization. Since many attitudes are thought to be held throughout the society, elected leaders, by following their own preferences, will also satisfy the majority sentiment in the polity. This model is based upon the integrative view of politics as consensus and derives from the outmoded and sterile precepts of the "end of ideology" ideology.

The fifth paradigm, the "role playing model", relies upon elected officials perceiving their role as that of a reflector of the policy preferences of their constituents -- despite possible personal views to the contrary. "Because of this orientation, representatives will anticipate public opinion and respond quickly to public protest."⁴⁵

While political models necessarily simplify and distort reality to some degree, the simplistic fantasizing of

⁴⁴ Erikson and Luttbeg, p. 17.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 19-20.

Luttbeg and Erikson bears little resemblance to constructive model-building. The chasm between the real and artificial world they create is so large that the heuristic utility of such an effort is minimal. In speaking of the activity of model formulation, William Riker explains: "The essential feature of this method is the creation of a theoretical construct that is a somewhat simplified version of what the real world to be described is believed to be like."⁴⁶ The distortion and oversimplification of political processes involved in Erikson and Luttbeg's "linkage models" go beyond what is legitimate or useful in the construction of paradigms.

In a similar vein, John Sullivan postulates four models that he admits are derived from Luttbeg: the rational man, responsible parties, consensus, and instructed delegate models of linkage. After comparing each model to relevant research, he concludes that they all contain assumptions and predictions that appear to be erroneous. In their place, he constructs a new paradigm that is essentially a selective cannibalization of parts of each of the previously mentioned models. The result is greater confusion instead of enhanced clarity.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions, p. 7.

⁴⁷ See John Sullivan, "Linkage Models of the Political System", in Allen Wilcox (ed.), Public Opinion and Political Attitudes, pp. 637-59.

Rather than focusing upon the relationship between mass opinion and policy, Almond (as briefly noted earlier) emphasizes "elite" or "attentive" opinion in relation to foreign policy determination. The mass public, which Almond arbitrarily proclaims to be 80% of the population, is supposedly not interested in foreign affairs. While the "attentive public" (representing by Almond's mystical calculation 15% of the populace) is relatively well-informed and concerned about political issues, it supposedly lacks access to the policy-making process. Therefore, Almond concludes, foreign policy is made by the top 5% of the population.⁴⁸

Rosenau, though writing eleven years later, fails to acknowledge his intellectual debt to Almond's prior analysis. Likewise concentrating on foreign policy and formulating a trichotomous typology of opinion, Rosenau generously "borrows" concepts which he portrays as his own. Using his apparently metaphysical power, he reveals (without the bothersome necessity of empirical verification) that "the attentive public is probably no larger than 10% of the population and possibly much smaller." He then suggests that this unrepresentative segment of the population introduces an "effective measure of democratic control into

⁴⁸ See Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, concluding chapter.

the opinion-policy relationship...."⁴⁹ The best indication of the severe limitations of Rosenau's approach comes from the author's own words:

The foregoing analysis does not contain the linkages between the various publics, opinion-makers, and communications media. It notes how and where the decision-making, opinion-submitting, and opinion-making processes overlap, but it does not include any estimates of when and why these interrelations occur in one form rather than another.... The concept of influence was purposely avoided.... From the outset, it was recognized that... our conceptual framework... would not in itself reveal the causal factors through which the opinion-policy process is consummated.⁵⁰

Empirical Studies: United States

In the United States, only about one dozen cases involving the specific relationship between mass public opinion and public policy (on the national level) have been studied. Six of these case studies were done by graduate students at Princeton University in collaboration with Professor Harwood Childs. The issues considered were: (1) nuclear testing policy (from 1954-62), (2) the Kennedy-steel industry price controversy (April 1962), (3) federal aid to education (from 1949-61), (4) U.S. relations with Cuba (from 1959-62), (5) Medicare (from 1957-62), (6) military expenditures (from 1935-64). Among the conclusions that Childs draws from an analysis of these six cases are: first, that the relation-

⁴⁹ Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, pp. 40-41.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 98.

ship between public opinion and public policy varies greatly from issue to issue; second, that the government is often able to influence public opinion but it cannot press it into a "rubber-stamp" or feedback of official opinion management; third, public opinion appears to set limits to government decisions because public officials are generally reluctant to take a stand in the face of probable widespread disapproval.⁵¹ Childs concludes: "Public opinion seldom acts positively to promote a new policy, but it often acts negatively to demonstrate its dissatisfaction with existing policies. It may be a powerful instrument of control after, rather than before, the fact."⁵²

Hazel Erskine, writing in the Public Opinion Quarterly, has examined several national issues in the United States. In regard to the significant majority of public opinion which she found favouring gun control legislation, Erskine notes: "It is difficult to imagine any other issue on which Congress has been less responsive to public sentiment for a longer period of time."⁵³ She has also observed that official U.S. opposition to the admission of the People's Republic of China into the United Nations was uniformly in accord with American opinion. In regard to capital punish-

⁵¹ Childs, Public Opinion, pp. 318-19.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Erskine, "The Polls: Gun Control", Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 36 (Fall 1972), pp. 455-56.

ment, Erskine found the mass public opinion to be inconsistent, sometimes favouring the death penalty and at other times (mid-1960s) opposed to it.⁵⁴ Given such ambivalent results from the limited number of case studies of the opinion-policy connection, it is not possible to formulate meaningful conclusions.

On the sub-national level, controversial attempts have been made to determine the relationship between public opinion in American states and the policies adopted by state governments.⁵⁵ To obtain an assessment of public opinion in all 50 states with any confidence that the sample is representative of actual opinion would be extremely expensive. Therefore, one group of researchers has attempted to estimate state opinion without these costs. The procedure is based on noting differences in opinion among various types of people (e.g., blacks, Catholics) in available national studies and then imputing these opinions to the states from the estimated percentage of these different categories of persons within each state. By comparing the simulated state mass opinions with state policy, it is thought possible to designate when and if Democratic Linkage

⁵⁴ Erskine, "The Polls: Red China and the U.N.", Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 35 (Spring 1971), pp. 123-25; "The Polls: Capital Punishment", Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 34 (Summer 1970), pp. 291-99.

⁵⁵ See Erikson and Luttbeg, pp. 313-14.

occurs.⁵⁶

Sutton uses this procedure to assess the representativeness of each state's policies on eleven issues. In approximately half the American states, there was moderate consistency between imputed opinion and policy for at least seven of the eleven issues. Yet, there appeared to be little similarity between states with comparable degrees of Democratic Linkage (e.g., New York and Nevada ranked highest).⁵⁷ Weber and Shaffer utilized similar methods of simulating state opinion to measure opinion-policy congruency in regard to five issues (public accommodation, parochial school aid, right-to-work, teacher unionization, firearms control laws). They found that public opinion was moderately correlated with policy in two of these areas: public accommodation and gun control.⁵⁸ None of these researchers, however, have provided any rationale for their somewhat discrepant findings (i.e., why opinion and policy appear related in some areas but not others). In addition, all findings using data based on the imputation of state opinion must be viewed with suspicion until there is as-

⁵⁶ This technique is explained in detail in: Weber, Hopkins, Mezey, and Munger, "Computer Simulation of State Electorates", Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 36 (Winter 1972-73), pp. 549-65.

⁵⁷ Richard Sutton, "The States and the People: Measuring and Accounting for 'State Representativeness'", Politics, vol. 5 (Summer 1973), pp. 451-76.

⁵⁸ Weber and Shaffer, "Public Opinion and American State Policy-Making", Midwest Journal of Political Science, vol. 16 (1972), pp. 683-99.

surance that the guestimate of a state's mass opinion validly portrays actual public preferences.⁵⁹

Instead of focusing on mass opinion, one attempt has been made to empirically test the "attentive public" concept and consider the possible relationship between this segment of public opinion and public policy. Donald Devine operationally defined the "attentive public" as consisting of those individuals who in national surveys ranked in the highest quartile of "attentiveness scores" based upon indicators such as attention devoted to campaign issues, reading newspapers and magazines, and political knowledge. He found the "attentive public" to be over-representative of the "upper class" (defined in terms of occupation, income, and education).⁶⁰ The hypothesis proposed was that public policy would tend to be consistent with the attitudes of the "attentive public" (as operationally defined) in regard to seven specific issues considered. Devine discovered the opposite to be the case. For example, despite 57% support among the "attentive public", in 1964, for continued levels of foreign aid expenditures, actual governmental assistance decreased for the first time in four years.⁶¹ Early in 1964,

⁵⁹ For a critique of this method of imputing state public opinion, see David Seidman, "Simulation of Public Opinion: A Caveat", Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 39 (Fall 1975), pp. 331-342.

⁶⁰ Devine, The Attentive Public, pp. 64, 77.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 78-79.

prior to the passage of the important public accommodations civil rights act of that year, only 18% of the "attentive public" were found to support such legislation.⁶² As Medicare was about to be passed in 1965, the "attentive public" indicated only 38% support for the measure.⁶³ As Devine was forced to admit: "Obviously, the analysis in this chapter has not shown that policy outputs are necessarily the results of attitudes held by the Attentive Public."⁶⁴

Rosenau relates the details of a fascinating case study involving the potential influence of mass versus elite opinion in the United States.⁶⁵ The results are not supportive of his claim (cited earlier) that elite opinion is the major factor in foreign policy. This case involved the issue of American foreign aid in the late 1950s. Convinced that the foreign assistance programme would meet stronger resistance than usual in the recession year of 1958, President Eisenhower sought to build public support by exposing a special gathering of national elites to a series of bipartisan speeches extolling the virtues of the foreign aid programme. It was presumed that an enthusiastic and informed group of national, nongovernmental leaders would transmit a

⁶² Ibid., p. 87.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 80.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 91.

⁶⁵ James Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, pp. 446-61.

flow of opinion favourable to foreign aid that would eventually filter back to Congress and diminish hostility to the programme. This reasoning resulted in the calling of a "Conference on Foreign Aspects of U.S. National Security" (in February of 1958). Included among the conferees were approximately 250 leading corporation executives, 100 university presidents, 400 officers of large voluntary associations, 20 labour leaders, 10 Admirals and generals, 100 publishers and important journalists, 135 senior members of Congress, and 75 top officials of the executive branch -- in short, a sample of national elites. Three months following the conference, the approximately 1,000 conferees (who were not congressmen or officials of the Eisenhower administration) were mailed an eight-page, 71-item questionnaire -- over 61% responded. One of the most important questions asked in this survey involved the post-conference activity engaged in by the conferees. The results indicated that since the conference, 87% had discussed foreign aid with their colleagues, 45% had talked or written to Congressmen about foreign aid, 27% had tried to affect the position of an organization regarding this issue, and 25% had written an article, report, etc. on foreign aid which had appeared in some publication. 66.

In regard to policy preference, over 82% of the elite respondents indicated they wanted foreign aid to be kept at current levels or increased. A poll of mass opinion taken a number of months earlier indicated only 28% sharing the elite preference. A staggering 61% of mass opinion expressed a desire for decreased expenditures in this area.⁶⁷ Thus, on this issue of foreign assistance there existed a wide disparity between the mass and elite publics. In late 1958, despite the activity precipitated by the conference, the Congress approved a foreign aid appropriation almost \$650 million less than President Eisenhower had requested. As Rosenau observes: "Since Congress's final disposition of the President's request was more in line with the public's attitudes than with those of its leaders [i.e., the nongovernmental elites], this disparity raises a number of questions about the structure of national leadership...."⁶⁸ Unfortunately, Rosenau does not supply any answers to these queries.

Some opinion researchers have attempted to examine the opinion-policy relationship indirectly, i.e., studying aspects other than the consistency (or inconsistency) between mass opinion and policy. For example, Verba and Nie,

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 455.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

employing highly questionable reasoning, measure the degree of congruence between local government leaders and participative citizens on local issue priorities (e.g., ranking crime above snow removal among issues of concern) and infer from this that policy congruence will follow.⁶⁹ No attempt to determine consistency between opinion and policy is made. Instead, Verba and Nie proceed on the dubious assumption that agreement on priorities will yield agreement on policies finally enacted. In addition, reference to issue priorities on the local level and policy preferences of the public on the national level are often used interchangeably. Considering the tautological reasoning also sometimes employed by these authors (e.g., it is contended that members of groups and parties participate more than nonmembers, with participation defined operationally, mainly, as group and party membership), this study ranks as a prime example of mindless empiricism.

John Kingdon has attempted to determine the relative importance of six actors (constituency, fellow congressmen, party leadership, interest groups, the executive branch, and legislative staff) regarding the voting decisions of U.S. congressmen.⁷⁰ However, there are severe

⁶⁹ See Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in America.

⁷⁰ Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions.

methodological problems with this study. Kingdon relies upon subjective guesstimates by his sample of congressmen in order to determine the positions of most of the actors involved. Thus, he does not check with the interest groups concerned to discover their position on the issues considered but depends instead upon the perception of his congressional respondents. The same is true regarding the distribution of mass opinion in the congressman's home district -- no attempt is made to verify objectively the accuracy of the politicians' subjective perceptions of public opinion. Nevertheless, Kingdon proceeds to measure whether a congressman's vote agrees with the guesstimate of a certain actor's position on the same issue (referring to this approach as "objective" in nature). He concludes that fellow congressmen appear to be the most important influence on voting decisions of other congressmen, with the congressman's own constituency ranking second in importance.⁷¹

Kingdon also uses what he terms a "subjective" perspective -- directly asking congressmen to state which of the six actors considered, if any, were of major importance in their voting decisions. Again, fellow congressmen ranked first with the constituency close behind. Party leadership (reflecting the lack of party discipline in the American

⁷¹ Ibid., pp. 22-23.

system) had the lowest ranking of the six actors;⁷² they were considered less important than the congressman's own staff. When members of the House of Representatives referred to "constituency opinion" during their interviews, Kingdon found that in most instances "they judged district opinion either by referring to the mass public alone or by citing a simple, undifferentiated view of the district...." In a quarter of the cases congressmen were making generalizations about their constituencies on the basis of elite judgments only.⁷³

About the only published data from which it is possible to objectively assess the correspondence between the policy views of the American public and its elected leaders is a CBS television survey of Congress and public opinion in 1970. The results are presented below in Table 2.1:

TABLE 2.1
Comparison of Public and Congressional Opinion on Key Issues⁷⁴

Issue	Mass Opinion	House Members	Senators
<u>Vietnam</u> : % supporting faster withdrawal	27	30	45
<u>Defence</u> : % supporting reduced spending	30	37	45
<u>Guaranteed Income</u> : % approving	48	65	76
<u>Civil Rights</u> : % supporting further action to help blacks	53	58	76
<u>Supreme Court</u> : % denying it tends to favour criminals	29	36	56

⁷² Ibid., p. 19.

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 33, 56.

⁷⁴ Erikson and Luttbeg, pp. 257-58.

In all instances, Senators were less representative of mass opinion than members of the House of Representatives (who must run for reelection every two years -- three times as often as Senators). It is important, however, not to conclude that because on some issues Congress and the public may be in general agreement that policy is also congruent with public opinion. As Chapter IV will indicate, there are forces that can prevent even a representative Congress from ultimately achieving what it and the public seem to want.

For Democratic Linkage to occur, an essential prerequisite must be the ability of political leaders to correctly estimate constituency opinion from the operation of the various linkage mechanisms. Two studies on the American state level have specifically tested for this element. Hedlund and Friesema quizzed Iowa state legislators about their constituencies' majority preferences on four statewide referendum questions that were about to be voted on by the electorate. On the four issues, the accuracy of the legislators' predictions ranged from 64 to 92%.⁷⁵ Erikson and Luttbeg asked Florida legislators to predict the percentage point breakdown in their district (and the state) of three referendum issues. The state legislative members erred by an average of 10% in predicting their district's vote, but they were

⁷⁵ R. Hedlund and H. Friesema, "Representatives' Perceptions of Constituency Opinion", in Norman Luttbeg (ed.), Public Opinion and Public Policy (2nd. ed.), pp. 396-412.

able to predict accurately, in most instances, on which side of the issue majority sentiment rested.⁷⁶

Probably the most widely cited empirical study in the linkage field is that by Miller and Stokes.⁷⁷ However, in addition to the fact that it focuses only on House of Representative voting records and not ultimate policy (e.g., ignoring the possibility of lack of Senate approval, a Presidential veto, or adverse ruling by the Supreme Court), and that it considers only three issue areas, there are major methodological problems that make this eighteen year old study of dubious value.

Miller and Stokes rely upon a University of Michigan Survey Research Center poll of 116 congressmen, their opponents, and a sample of constituents in these districts. However, the inadequacies with this approach can be found by closely examining the 700 word footnote which attempts to justify the questionable technique employed. For example, Miller and Stokes acknowledge "the districts in our sample had unequal probabilities of selection and unequal weights in the analysis, making the sample somewhat less efficient than an equal-probability sample of equivalent size."⁷⁸ They also admit, buried in the second paragraph

⁷⁶ Erikson and Luttbeg, p. 278.

⁷⁷ Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress", in Luttbeg (ed.), Public Opinion and Public Policy (1st.ed.), pp. 405-418.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 406.

of their exculpatory footnote, that they have "estimated" characteristics of whole constituencies from their sample of constituents⁷⁹ living in particular districts. In light of the fact that their total nation-wide sample of less than 2,000 respondents was "divided among 116 districts", this means their imputation of congressional district mass opinion was based upon an average of less than 17 constituents per district. In what amounts to a classic understatement, they concede that "the reader may wonder about the reliability of these estimates".⁷⁹ The degree of error that is possible with such procedures is immense. Miller and Stokes attempt, in part, to justify such empirical promiscuity by hyperbolically claiming that to obtain the necessary interviews per congressional district so as to be certain about the specific opinion distributions concerned would be as expensive "as several nuclear reactors."⁸⁰

Relying heavily upon their own past work, this immodest duo claim in their introductory remarks to their article that "no one familiar with the findings of research on mass electorates could accept..." any other conclusion than that set forth in their own study, The American Voter.⁸¹ The fact that the findings of what has become a semi-sacred

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 407.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 408.

document of empirical research were based upon just two case studies (the 1952 and 1956 U.S. Presidential elections) is overlooked. The usually accepted premise that one should not over-generalize from only two cases is ignored. Despite all these problems, Miller and Stokes proceed to measure the correlation between congressional voting records and the imputed constituency opinion. On questions of social and economic welfare, the agreement between representatives' votes and guestimated district opinion is nearly .40. For the issues of foreign involvement, they find no discernible agreement between legislator and constituency. Regarding civil rights, the correlation figure was .57.⁸²

Based upon the work of Miller and Stokes, Cnudde and McCrone have attempted to empirically formulate simplistic models to determine the causal link between constituency opinion and congressional vote.⁸³ They utilize procedures adapted from Simon and Blalock to establish what are euphemistically called "causal inferences."⁸⁴ Unfortunately, Cnudde and McCrone rely upon additional data supplied to them by the Miller-Stokes team. Thus, many of the

⁸² Ibid., pp. 408-14.

⁸³ Charles Cnudde and Donald McCrone, "The Linkage Between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Analysis", American Political Science Review, vol. 60 (March 1966), pp. 66-72.

⁸⁴ See Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research; Herbert Simon, "Spurious Correlations: A Causal Interpretation", Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 49 (1954), pp. 467-79.

same methodological criticisms apply to this study as well. In addition, since the procedures used by Cnudde and McCrone assume the opinion-policy relationship to be unidirectional, their "causal inferences" ignore the degree to which public opinion is influenced by the various elements in the linkage process.

Empirical Studies: Britain and Canada

The one common factor regarding all the theoretical and empirical works cited in this section is that they concentrate solely on the linkage process in the United States. Only one non-American oriented study has been published concerning the specific relationship between opinion and public policy -- Hewitt's analysis of policy-making in Britain.⁸⁵ He attempts to compare mass and elite opinion with the ultimate policy of the British government on 20 national issues. However, Hewitt's determination of what constitutes "elite opinion" on these issues is questionable. He utilizes letters published in the "quality" British press plus editorials in these newspapers as an indicator of "elite opinion." In reality, Hewitt may actually be measuring what has been referred to earlier as "attentive" (and not elite) opinion, i.e., the alleged views of

⁸⁵ Christopher Hewitt, "Policy-Making in Postwar Britain: a Nation-Level Test of Elitist and Pluralist Hypotheses", British Journal of Political Science, vol. 4 (April 1974), pp. 187-216.

educated, concerned citizens who constitute the politically active non-elite. It can be argued that those who constitute the elite positions of societal leadership (economic, political, institutional) have more direct and meaningful forms of communication than writing letters to newspapers. Nevertheless, from the results of his research, Hewitt concluded that "elitist theories" were not supported. As he stated:

Neither the business group nor any other type of organized interest was consistently successful in realizing its policy goals. In fact the power structure appears to be quite democratic in the sense that issues tended to be resolved in a fashion that was generally compatible with the preferences of the majority of the public. The study of policy issues suggests a rather "pluralist" interpretation of the British political system. ⁸⁶

In Canada, the only study of direct relevance is an unpublished Master's essay by Westland.⁸⁷ He is concerned primarily with opinion formation via the concept of "images" on the part of the mass public and governmental elites. As he contends, "Public opinion and government position reflect the ideas of the public and governmental elites respectively. Insofar as public and elite minds are composed of different images, the hypotheses hold that

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 214.

⁸⁷ Remmelt Westland, "The People and Foreign Policy: Towards a Theory of Public Opinion", unpublished Master's Research Essay, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, 1975. Mildred Schwartz, in Public Opinion and Canadian Identity, does not specifically measure congruence between opinion and policy (although inferences can be drawn from data she presents); see pp. 233-58.

public opinion and government policy will diverge on foreign policy issues to the extent that issue types draw out image differences."⁸⁸ Thus, Westland is not directly concerned with the influence of mass opinion on public policy but rather the degree to which differences in elite and mass "images" will result in different views on foreign affairs. As he makes clear, "One assumption, often made with respect to public opinion and foreign policy, will not apply in this study. This is that a causal relationship exists between the two."⁸⁹ Nevertheless, to analyze the impact of "images" on opinion formation, Westland does compare foreign policy preferences of the mass public with governmental policy in Canada on foreign affairs and defence issues from 1961-1973. Using a "public-government accord" scale ranging in value from "1" (highest government-opinion congruence) to "5" (highest policy-opinion inconsistency), the average score for all issues considered was 2.3, indicating a moderate consistency between public opinion and policy.⁹⁰

In addition to Westland's failure to consider the processes of interaction between mass opinion and governmental decision-makers -- postulating instead an isolated policy-making atmosphere devoid of mass input, there are

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 65.

⁸⁹ Ibid., pp. 4-5

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 58-9.

some important methodological problems with this study. First, Westland fails to take into account, in interpreting the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion survey results he utilizes, that all such surveys are subject to sampling error -- i.e., the extent to which results may differ from what would be obtained if the whole population had been interviewed. Thus, he incorrectly considers differences in majority versus minority opinion distribution of only one or two percent as meaningful. Second, in assessing the Canadian government's position on an issue, Westland adopted no formal standards as to time-lag considerations in comparing opinion-policy congruency. The result, is that inconsistent time periods are considered when evaluating public-government accord on various issues. Third, his characterization of government policy is, by his own admission, highly subjective. In attempting to measure such nuances in public policy as the government, "tending to favour an issue but taking no action" versus the government "taking action supporting an issue", Westland resorts too often to speculative and sketchy evaluations of government policy.

C. The Democratic Linkage-Frustration Perspective

What is an "approach" or "perspective" to the study of political science? Isaak responds to this question by suggesting:

An approach may involve the attempt to locate an or-

ganizing concept or set of concepts that can orient research and coordinate empirical data from several sources. We might say that an approach is designed to include as wide a range of political phenomena as possible within a single set of concepts.... This activity involves both conceptual analysis and empirical research.... On the face of it, no approach is right or wrong; but some may be more useful than others. Because we do not have a finely honed knife available, there is some overlap between the approaches. But there are differences to be drawn which are meaningful for the political scientist. 91

The Democratic Linkage-Frustration framework outlined briefly in the Preface of this thesis is presented as a distinct "approach" within the context expressed by Isaac. The organizing concepts of Democratic Linkage and Democratic Frustration serve as a basic orientation for the conceptual analysis and empirical research in this work. This section will proceed to examine the distinctions between the approach proposed in this thesis and those utilized in previous studies of the opinion-policy relationship.

According to the Democratic Linkage-Frustration approach, elite manifestations are viewed as conflictive and not harmonious elements within a potentially democratic society. Unlike the democratic revisionist bias shared by many opinion researchers, elitism is perceived in this study as antithetical instead of complementary to democratic government. Rather than accepting the structural-functional or systems approaches slavishly followed, implicitly or ex-

⁹¹ Alan Isaak, Scope and Methods of Political Science, pp. 158-59.

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plicitly, by virtually all the major U.S. studies on public opinion, the approach suggested in this thesis departs from the premises involved in previous research on the opinion-policy nexus. Most past works in this field have accepted the supposition that the political system exhibits an orderly, if not rational, pattern. Systems proponents often speak of "pattern maintenance" and "equilibrium", while functionalists espouse the litany of basic "conversion" functions that they all too readily assume are being met and complement one another.⁹² The integration theory of society, as proposed by Parsons and other structural-functionalists, is based upon assumptions of the political system as a relatively persistent, stable, well-integrated structure of elements. Every element in a society has a function which renders a consistent contribution to its maintenance as a system, and society is based on a consensus of values among its members.⁹³

Those, such as this researcher, who cannot accept the assumptions of the systems and structural-functional schools or the theosophical and rigidly deterministic aspects of crude Marxism, are drawn to a third alternative: it emphasizes the significance of oppositions of interest

⁹² See Peter Merkl, Modern Comparative Politics, pp. 18-19; Khan, An Introduction to Political Science, pp. 33-34.

⁹³ Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, pp. 161-62.

generated by economic and other power-oriented inequalities in society. It assumes that the consensus aspects of traditional approaches need to be supplemented and interlaced with a concept of conflict.⁹⁴ As Duverger observes:

According to one [interpretation], politics is conflict, a struggle in which power allows those who possess it to ensure their hold on society and to profit by it. According to the other view, politics is an effort to bring about the rule of order and justice, in which power guarantees the general interest and the common good against the pressures of private interests. In the first case, politics serves to maintain the privileges of a minority against the majority. In the second, it is a means of realizing the integration of all citizens into the community.... The essence of politics, its real nature and true significance, is to be found in the fact that it is always and at all times ambivalent.... The two elements always co-exist, though the importance of each varies with the period, the circumstances, and the country concerned. ⁹⁵

In an attempt to apply the theoretical premise of this thesis, an examination is made of the dual aspects of power in North American society -- mass power as expressed through Democratic Linkage processes and elite power as manifested through Democratic Frustration mechanisms. It is through consideration of conflictive as well as integrative elements, within the context of the relationship between mass opinion and public policy, that this thesis diverges from past work in the field of opinion-policy research. As a result, in

⁹⁴ See Anthony Giddens, The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies, p. 14.

⁹⁵ Maurice Duverger, The Idea of Politics, pp. xii-xiii.

addition to attempting to formulate more sophisticated and realistic models of Democratic Linkage than those previously suggested, conflicting models of Democratic Frustration are postulated to conceptually analyze the elitist processes for obstructing the attainment of mass preferences.

Unlike all previous research in this field, this thesis is comparative in nature -- both conceptually and empirically. The application of models and analysis of empirical data for more than one country allows for comparison as to relative degrees of Democratic Linkage. This provides a superior basis for understanding the opinion-policy nexus. Furthermore, in order to allow for more meaningful conclusions, the approach utilized in this work rejects the case study method (as interesting and useful as it can often be) and substitutes use of aggregate data compiled by this researcher on a large number of cases (237) involving the relationship between opinion and policy in the United States and Canada.

In applying the Democratic Linkage-Frustration approach in the remainder of this thesis, eight models regarding the relationship between mass opinion and government policy will be proposed. The purpose of establishing the Electoral Mandate, Party Government, Interest Group Politics, and Constituency Communication models of Democratic Linkage in Chapter I.I is to analyze in a different conceptual framework commonly discussed institutions and pro-

cesses in light of their role as a set of potential mechanisms that explain how governmental leaders can act consistently with their constituents. In regard to the Trustee Role, Judicial Power, Bureaucratic Power, and Private Economic-Institutional Power models of Democratic Frustration in Chapter IV, an attempt is made to construct paradigms of elite rule based upon both governmental and non-governmental processes.

After the major elements of each model are outlined, use will be made of pertinent existing data and studies to allow assessment of the "fit" between the assumptions of the models and political reality in North America. The paradigms which will be presented are not mutually exclusive. The processes described in all models interact and operate in both Canada and the United States -- though with varying degrees of effectiveness. They are treated separately so as to focus analysis on the main differentiating components and their supposed operation within a simplified perspective. In order for democracy to prevail in the policy-making process, it is assumed that not only must the requirements of at least one of the Democratic Linkage models be attained, but also that the obstacles to popular rule analyzed in the Democratic Frustration paradigms be surmounted. After establishing a conceptual basis of analysis through the eight models proposed in Chapters III and IV, Chapter V reports the frequency with which government policies

are in accord with mass opinion in Canada and the United States across a broad range of issues. On the basis of these comparative empirical results, an attempt will be made to assess the viability of each model and to discuss the implications of linkage failure in the supposedly democratic societies of North America.

CHAPTER III: MODELS OF DEMOCRATIC LINKAGE

In most democratic polities, political parties have come to play important roles in the formation of political opinions and interests, in the structuring and expression of political conflict, and in the transmission of political demands and concerns into public policy.... The institutions that play the most important part in linking the interests, demands, and preferences of the mass citizenry with the government policy-making apparatus are political parties and elections.

Richard Dawson¹

Political theory usually assumes that interest groups play an essential role in democratic polities, providing an instrument through which the individual may participate to some extent in the making of public policy.... Regardless of variations in political culture and political structure and despite variations in group legitimacy and the intensity of lobbying, groups play a critical linkage role...in North American society.

Robert Presthus²

A. Electoral Mandate Model

Lyndon Johnson declared in 1964: "I ask the American people for a mandate, not to preside over a finished program, not just to keep things going. I ask the American people for a mandate to begin."³ Under the mandate concept, issue conflicts or broad public policy innovations are decided by

¹ Dawson, Public Opinion and Contemporary Disarray p. 156.

² Presthus, "Interest Group Lobbying: Canada and the United States", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 413 (May 1974), pp. 44-45.

³ Quoted in Gerald Pomper, Elections in America, p. 253.

"going to the country" for a final decision. According to this principle, even a political party's legislative majority does not necessarily entitle it to introduce a major alteration of existing government policy, of a kind likely to arouse intense citizen controversy, if the electorate have not had the chance to express their views on the subject.⁴ As Wheare notes: "Legislators may begin life in a newly elected parliament under the influence of pledges which have been given to the electors either by themselves individually or by their party leaders on their behalf. Their freedom of action may appear to be restricted by this legacy of the election campaign. They may have obtained what is sometimes called a 'mandate' from the electors for a particular course of action."⁵ Opposition parties will often criticize measures presented by a government on the ground that the voters have given no mandate for such proposals. Although the electorate have mixed motives for their voting behaviour (see below), many candidates for public office perceive the election returns in terms of a clear-cut expression of public opinion, with the winners seeing the results as a mandate from the voters who have supposedly endorsed their campaign proposals.⁶ In addition, a by-election is often per-

⁴ Ibid., pp. 246-47; A. H. Birch, Representative and Responsible Government, p. 117.

⁵ K. C. Wheare, Legislatures (2nd. ed.), pp. 43-44.

⁶ See James Best, Public Opinion, p. 183; John Kingdon, Candidates for Office.

ceived as a referendum on the policies of the present government.

According to the Electoral Mandate Model of Democratic Linkage, elections serve a two-fold purpose: (1) to establish voter preferences regarding particular policies, (2) to act as a potential or actual sanction to enforce the previous electoral decision, i.e., to perform the function of maintaining accountability by elected officials to the electorate. The first purpose can be achieved directly through the use of plebiscites or referenda. While the American sub-national governmental units make frequent use of the referendum (averaging over 12,000 per year), there is no constitutional provision for staging national referenda in the United States.⁷ In Canada, the last national plebiscite was in 1942, regarding the issue of conscription for overseas service during World War II.⁸ Thus, in North America, the most direct linkage between public opinion and public policy -- the plebiscite -- is almost nonexistent on the federal level. In the absence of referenda, for elections to serve as mandates, i.e., for the voters to exercise influence over public policy through the electoral process, at least four basic conditions must exist: (1) competing parties or candidates have to offer clear policy alternatives on major issues;

⁷ Howard Hamilton, "Direct Legislation: Some Implications of Open House Referenda", in Allen Wilcox (ed.), Public Opinion and Political Attitudes, pp. 519-21.

⁸ See Donald Creighton, Canada's First Century, p. 256.

(2) voters have to be issue-oriented and vote accordingly; (3) the electoral system must permit majority preferences to prevail; (4) elected officials have to perceive themselves bound by the positions they espoused during the campaign and act accordingly. It should be noted that under this model of Democratic Linkage, political parties play a subservient role -- they are viewed as tools for implementing an electoral mandate; the electorate vote on the basis of issues and not parties, per se.⁹

Issue-Oriented Voting

In their study of the 1952-56 period, the authors of The American Voter found that issues played a tertiary role in voting decisions and were generally less influential than the primary and secondary components of party identification and candidate image.¹⁰ Other early studies on voting behavior (as noted in Chapter I) portray the voter as ignorant, apathetic, and non-issue-oriented. However, a number of more recent studies have challenged this interpretation. Key was one of the first to present the "perverse and unorthodox argument" that the "voters are not fools." He stressed that "the electorate behaves about as rationally and respon-

⁹ See Dye and Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy (3rd. ed.), p. 191.

¹⁰ See Campbell, Converse, Miller, Stokes, The American Voter.

sibly as we should expect, given the clarity [or lack thereof] of the alternatives presented to it and the character of the information available to it."¹¹

Of course, issue voting requires candidates who emphasize divergent views on major policy questions. In the 1968 U.S. Presidential election, for example, it was quite difficult for even the most careful observer to detect what Hubert Humphrey or Richard Nixon said they would do differently about Vietnam -- especially given Nixon's "secret" plan to end the war. Only careful scrutiny of the campaign statements would support the belief of the plurality of the public that Humphrey's stand was slightly less "hawkish" than Nixon's. Because the major candidates' stances on the Vietnam war were far from being "perfectly clear", the Presidential decisions of 1968 voters were only slightly related to their policy views on this issue.¹² One might wonder if opinions on the Vietnam war would have been more highly related to voter decisions if the major party candidates had taken distinctly opposite viewpoints. If Ronald Reagan (a vocal "super hawk") and Eugene McCarthy (an outspoken "dove") had faced the voters, polls indicate that given such a hypo-

¹¹ V.O. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate, pp. 7-8.

¹² Robert Erikson and Norman Luttberg, American Public Opinion, pp. 227-30.

thetical election, McCarthy would have received the votes of 80% of the "doves" in the electorate and Reagan two-thirds of the self-identified "hawks." The American people's Vietnam positions could have had considerable influence on their election choices if the major candidates in 1968 had offered clearly divergent policy stances on the war.¹³

Gerald Pomper, in his study of the 1964 and 1968 U.S. elections, concluded that there was "increased voter consciousness of policy questions... While the voters did not respond ideologically in the full sense of the term, they did respond to the specific issues presented to them, and they did align their partisan loyalties far closer to their policy preferences."¹⁴ Walter Burnham, in his analysis of the 1972 and 1974 congressional elections, suggests significant evidence of policy voting among the electorate.¹⁵ Kirkpatrick and Jones, in their study, were able to isolate five "issue publics" (i.e., groups of individuals for whom specific issues are highly salient, and therefore, motivating forces) during the late 1960s.¹⁶ From the more recent

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Pomper, "From Confusion to Clarity: Issues and American Voters, 1956-1968", in Norman Luttbeg (ed.), Public Opinion and Public Policy (2nd. ed.), p. 146.

¹⁵ Burnham, "Insulation and Responsiveness in Congressional Elections", Political Science Quarterly, vol. 90 (Fall 1975), pp. 417-18.

¹⁶ S. Kirkpatrick and M. Jones, "Issue Publics and the Electoral System: The Role of Issues in Electoral Change", in Allen Wilcox (ed.), Public Opinion and Political Attitudes, pp. 537-555.

studies, Erikson and Luttbeg conclude: "On balance, it appears that measures of voters' policy stances summed over several issues perform about as well as predictors of how people vote as do party identification and measures that tap voters' evaluations of the candidates' personalities."¹⁷

In criticizing the earlier studies on voting behaviour which tended to denigrate the voter and the possibility of issue-oriented elections, it is important to note that these findings are time-bound and based upon atypical cases. For example, in The American Voter, the two elections analyzed (1952 and 1956) were the only two American Presidential elections this century between the same major party opponents. This helps to explain, in part, the degree of stability found in the electorate. While a low degree of ideology was detected among voters in 1956, it may well be a reflection of the environmental circumstances during that campaign which failed to stimulate ideological feeling. Replicating the University of Michigan study for the contrasting 1964 election, in which ideology (within the narrow American context) was emphasized, Field and Anderson found a substantial increase in ideological awareness.¹⁸ This

¹⁷ Erikson and Luttbeg, p. 233.

¹⁸ J.O. Field and R.E. Anderson, "Ideology in the Public's Conceptualization of the 1964 Election", Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 33 (Fall 1969), pp. 380-398.

was also true of the 1972 Nixon-McGovern contest.

Because voters of the Eisenhower period did not respond to elections in ideological or issue-oriented terms, it has often been concluded that they could not respond in such a manner. Yet, Key reminds us that "The voice of the people is but an echo.... The people's verdict can be no more than a selective reflection from among the alternatives and outlooks presented to them."¹⁹ If the candidates or parties fail to emphasize issues or to present distinct and clear positions, the voters cannot be expected to invent them. The earlier findings on the electorate are a reminder of the dangers of overgeneralization from data derived from a limited spatial or temporal context. The most balanced view of the role of issues in elections is that the candidate's policy stances can constitute an important, but not necessarily determinative, factor in election outcomes.²⁰

Majority Preference and the Electoral System

One of the basic principles of a democratic system is political equality, which in turn is often expressed in the electoral formula "one man-one vote." Unfortunately, this essential requirement is grossly violated in both the United States and Canada. It was not until 1964, as a result of the

¹⁹ Key, p. 2.

²⁰ See Erikson and Luttbeg, pp. 223-26; Gerald Pomper, Voters' Choice: Varieties of American Electoral Behavior.

Westberry v. Sanders decision of the United States Supreme Court, that the principle of each voter having an equal weight (i.e., counting equally in electing representatives) was enforced for the House of Representatives. The American Senate, one of the most powerful upper houses in the world, is extremely undemocratic -- based upon the criterion of "one man-one vote." Two senators from sparsely populated states have equal voting power as two from populous states. "The result is a representative system which makes it very difficult indeed for the national majority to prevail, if the national minority concerned can command a number of Senate seats, as it often can.... Upper houses, even if elected, as long as they are not elected on a strict population basis, do violate the democratic principle of equal voting."²¹ Using 1970 census figures, calculations reveal that (at its greatest extreme) a majority of U.S. senators from the 26 smallest states, with only 16% of the eligible voters, could prevent enactment of legislation supported by senators from the 24 largest states, representing 84% of the population.²² (Such a coalition of small versus large states occurs on issues such as aid to major urban areas). This minority veto power is totally inconsistent with an attempt to implement majority

²¹ H.B. Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory, p. 158.

²² Calculated from census data in Britannica Book of the Year-1974, p. 773.

preferences via the Electoral Mandate Model.

In Canada, the situation is also bleak. The "fathers of confederation", like the American "founding fathers", harboured deep suspicions of the values implicit in democracy and were anxious to establish what Cartier referred to as "a power of resistance to oppose the democratic element."²³ The result, inter alia, was an unelected upper house. While the Canadian Senate is clearly inferior to the House of Commons, this appointed body of octogenarians still amends approximately 10% of the government's legislation²⁴ (most recently, the bill regarding tax privileges for foreign magazines). Of greater concern is the absence of the "one man-one vote" rule in determining electoral boundaries for the House of Commons. In 1968, following the redistribution two years earlier by an independent commission, 60% of the Canadian adult population was represented by less than one-half of the number of seats in Parliament. This distortion is further enhanced in an electoral system with more than two parties. Thus, winning candidates often represent less than 50% of the voters in their riding.²⁵ The absence of some form of proportional representation adds to the distortion

²³ Quoted in Jackson and Atkinson, Legislative System, p. 96.

The Canadian

²⁴ Ibid., p. 97.

²⁵ T. Qualter, The Election Process in Canada, pp. 90-93. See Alan Cairns, "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965", Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 1 (March 1968), pp. 55-80.

resulting from inequitable riding boundaries.

An additional blow to the principle of majority rule occurs from the use of the "electoral college" in determining American Presidents. Under this mechanism, a Presidential candidate may obtain a majority of the national popular vote, but lose in the "electoral college." This occurred in 1888,²⁶ with the defeat of Cleveland despite his winning the largest share of the popular vote. A further insult to the principle of democratic rule is the provision in the U.S. Constitution allowing for unelected Presidents. The recent bizarre spectacle of an appointed President, who was a previously appointed Vice-President, presiding over the bicentennial of the "American experiment in democracy" is highly ironic. But even more disturbing is the realization that the source of this President's appointment was a former President whose first Vice-President had resigned in disgrace as a confessed felon and who himself resigned in the face of the virtual certainty that he would be impeached and removed from office. As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has observed: "For the first time in the history of the United States, the President and Vice-President are both appointed -- not elected by the people and not responsive to any mandate from the citizens."²⁷ While

²⁶ David Saffell, The Politics of American National Government, p. 118.

²⁷ Schlesinger, "On the Presidential Succession", Political Science Quarterly, vol. 89 (Fall 1974), pp. 475-76.

this situation may seem unique, it should be remembered that for almost one-quarter of the period from the end of World War II through the end of 1976, the American Presidency will have been occupied by men who were not elected to that office.²⁸

The Accountability Function

It has been said that "Politics is the ability to get money from the rich and votes from the poor while convincing both you are protecting each from the other."²⁹ While campaign promises are often "a dime a dozen", elections can serve the purpose of punishing those officials who blatantly violate their pledges to the electorate. The possibility of retrospective disapproval of past performance or policies provides a potential check on elected leaders. To the extent they desire to be reelected, politicians can be held accountable, in theory, by the ability of the electorate to defeat those who renege on previous election commitments. The belief that his reelection chances hinge on how well he represents his constituency's opinion will not influence the officeholder unless he cares about getting reelected. Most politicians do care! For example, of the 35 U.S. senators up for reelection in 1970, only two did not seek re-

²⁸ Presidents Truman (1945-48), Johnson (1963-64), and Ford (1974-76).

²⁹ "Kenneth Keating", Time, vol. 105 (May 19, 1975), p. 65.

election. The same year, only five U.S. House members voluntarily retired from public life.³⁰ As David Mayhew contends: "Reelection underlies everything else, as indeed it should, if we are to expect that the relation between politicians and public will be one of accountability."³¹

One study has attempted to determine whether candidates perceive themselves to be bound by the positions they espoused during the election campaign. Sullivan and O'Connor considered whether "pre-election differences between candidates for the U.S. House are the basis of post-election roll-call votes. Generally, the winners voted as the pre-election interview scores indicated they would. However, among incumbents, 88 had more liberal voting records than would have been anticipated based upon pre-election statements. "The shift was strong enough to cause slippage between the representation some voters might be expected to believe they would get and what they actually received...."³²

It should be noted that the sanction available to the voters against public officials for failing to carry out their mandate is dependent, to a large extent, on the frequency of elections. In this respect, the electors of members of the

³⁰ Erikson and Luttbeg, p. 265.

³¹ David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, pp. 13-16.

³² John Sullivan and Robert O'Connor, "Electoral Choice and Popular Control of Public Policy: The Case of the 1966 House Elections" in Luttbeg (ed.), Public Opinion and Public Policy (2nd. ed.), pp. 181-82.

House of Representatives might be expected to exercise greater control over congressmen (since elections occur every two years) than electors of members of the House of Commons (where elections need occur only every five years). The "recall" mechanism which can be found in some American states, allowing for the removal of officials through a special election, is the ultimate tool of electoral accountability.³³ However, this procedure is not available on the federal level in the United States.

Evaluation of the Electoral Mandate Model

In 1974, Prime Minister Trudeau and the Liberal Party campaigned against wage and price controls. It could be reasonably construed that the election results indicated a mandate opposed to such economic policies.³⁴ Yet, the following year, controls were imposed. In 1964, President Johnson, as noted earlier, asked for a mandate from the U.S. electorate. He pledged in that election not to send American troops to fight in Southeast Asia. However, by the time of his inauguration, U.S. soldiers were being sent to slaughter and be slaughtered in the institutionalized atrocity called the Vietnam war. Recent history in both Canada and the United States calls into question the applicability of the Electoral

³³ Wheare, pp. 44-45.

³⁴ See Howard Penniman (ed.), Canada at the Polls: The General Election of 1974.

Mandate Model. While voters have indicated a degree of issue-oriented voting, there is often little discernible difference between candidates or parties on major issues. The difficulty in assuring that majority preferences prevail, given the inequities of the electoral system discussed above, makes successful linkage between mass opinion and policy even less likely through the mandate vehicle. Even if these obstacles could be overcome, the mandate concept (other than through frequent referenda) is an inherently inferior mechanism for attaining Democratic Linkage. Election results can often be ambiguous (e.g., a minority government), preventing a clear mandate. In addition, the terms for elective offices at the national level in Canada and the United States range from two to six years. During such a long inter-election period, a number of unforeseen issues or events can arise that will not be covered by the previous electoral mandate or that cannot wait until an election to be resolved. Without some other mechanism for determining mass sentiment, the elected representative, even if he wishes to represent public opinion, would be unable to effectively do so.

B. Party Government Model

"The political party, or party system," claims Avery Leiserson, "provides the major connective linkage between people and government.... The growth and evolution of democracy and rule by public opinion have been uniquely connected

with the rise of party government...."³⁵ In modern, large-scale democracies, public opinion is considered by many to be too varied and dispersed to be effective unless it is organized. It must be mobilized along the broad lines of some major division of views. As Disraeli once proclaimed: "Party is organized opinion."³⁶ In the Party Government Model of Democratic Linkage, the role of political parties is considered central to the formulation of issues of public policy and to the ultimate choices that are made by government. At every stage of the political process, parties are perceived as the key components: shaping issues for presentation to the electorate, selecting candidates to compete for public office, and seeing to it that the electoral decision is given meaning through legislative and executive action. According to this model of policy-making, parties are the essential bridges between citizens and governments, the channels through which voters transmit their preferences to government, and the mechanisms by which policy is made responsive to the popular sentiment expressed at the ballot box.³⁷

The extensive literature on political parties sug-

³⁵ Leiserson, "The Place of Parties in the Study of Politics", in Roy Macridis (ed.), Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas, pp. 31, 34.

³⁶ Quoted in Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (2nd. ed.), p. v.

³⁷ Peter Woll, Public Policy, pp. 89-90.

gests numerous functions which they supposedly perform:

(1) Interest Articulation -- the presentation of demands upon the political decision-makers;³⁸ (2) Regulation of Demand Stress -- the limitation of any indiscriminate input of demands to prevent demand overload;³⁹ (3) Interest Aggregation -- the conversion of unstructured demands into general policy alternatives;⁴⁰ (4) Brokerage -- where parties are seen to function primarily as conciliating intermediaries between opposing interests;⁴¹ (5) Representation -- where parties function as an expression of a particular interest, class, or social grouping;⁴² (6) Integration -- to attempt compromise among conflicting interests in society through a policy "in the national interest";⁴³ (7) Structuring the Vote -- enabling voters to choose candidates according to their party labels, party designation therefore

³⁸ See Gabriel Almond and G.B. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, pp. 73-97.

³⁹ See David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, pp. 122-23.

⁴⁰ Almond and Powell, pp. 98-127.

⁴¹ See Pendleton Herring, The Politics of Democracy.

⁴² Roy Macridis, "The History, Functions, and Typology of Parties" in Macridis (ed.), Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas, p. 17.

⁴³ Leo Panitch, "Ideology and Integration: The Case of the British Labour Party", Political Studies, vol. 19 (1971), p. 185.

serving as a cue to simplify and guide the decision of the voter;⁴⁴ (8) Political Recruitment and Patronage -- the selection of leadership personnel to contest and/or fill various political offices;⁴⁵ (9) Campaign Financing -- the gathering of funds for electoral contests;⁴⁶ (10) Political Socialization -- process by which a set of norms concerning the political system is transmitted between generations, and individuals are integrated into the social structure;⁴⁷ (11) Opinion Transformation -- use of mass media and other techniques to actively mold or change public opinion;⁴⁸ (12) Mobilization of the Electorate -- where "those within the physical boundaries of a social system become active participants in the political process";⁴⁹ (13) Programmatic role-- support of some fundamental political perspective (e.g., socialism);⁵⁰ (14) Loyal Opposition -- formulation of alternative policies to the existing government, and legiti-

⁴⁴ Leon Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 77.

⁴⁵ Almond and Powell, pp. 47-8.

⁴⁶ See Engelmann and Schwartz, Canadian Political Parties: Origin, Character, Impact, pp. 276-81.

⁴⁷ See Macridis, p. 18.

⁴⁸ Duverger, pp. 372-92.

⁴⁹ Engelmann and Schwartz, pp. 263-82.

⁵⁰ Epstein, pp. 261-62.

zation of the political power struggle and societal conflict within specific "rules of the game";⁵¹ (15) Control and Coordination of Government -- running the public policy-making machinery of the political system;⁵² (16) System Maintenance and National Unity -- supportive contribution to the basic social, economic, and political values of the society, creating conditions for the party's survival and for the survival of the political and economic system within which it operates;⁵³ (17) Symbolic Reassurance -- serving to reaffirm the image and belief (though not necessarily the reality) of parties as effective instruments in the "democratic political system";⁵⁴ (18) Vehicle for the Legitimate Expression of Extreme Dissent -- provision of a legitimate channel for expressing unpopular, "extreme", or divisive views (e.g., Communist party or Parti Quebecois);⁵⁵ (19) Conversion -- transforming political demands and support into specific governmental policies;⁵⁶ (20) Linkage -- the

⁵¹ See Robert Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies.

⁵² See Epstein, pp. 315-50.

⁵³ See Macridis, p. 19.

⁵⁴ Murray Edelman, "The Symbolic Nature of Politics", in Abbott and Riccards (eds.), Reflections in American Political Thought, pp. 272-78.

⁵⁵ Richard Van Loon and Michael Whittington, The Canadian Political System (1st. ed.), p. 237.

⁵⁶ Macridis, p. 17.

establishment of a close relationship between mass opinion and public policy.⁵⁷ It should be noted that these potential functions of North American political parties are not always exercised, nor are they mutually exclusive, compartmentalized activities. There are numerous instances where these functions can overlap or else be contradictory in nature. In addition, parties do not always enjoy a monopoly on their performance.

A number of the above-mentioned putative functions are encompassed within the Party Government Model. In essence, it consists of three stages: first, the internal democratic aspects of the party system, i.e., the process whereby distinctive policy platforms and candidates to represent the party are selected; second, the electoral stage, i.e., the point of interaction between the competing political parties and the mass electorate; third, the implementation of the party platform by the winning party upon the formation of a government. Each of these stages will be examined, in detail, below.

Intra-Party Democracy

According to Duverger's widely accepted typology, two broad types of party organization predominate: the cadre and mass parties.⁵⁸ With cadre parties, voters have no formal

⁵⁷ See V.O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy.

⁵⁸ Duverger, pp. 63-71.

affiliation; the party is run by a small group of activists -- a self-appointed party elite that is the party. These activists make its decisions, raise its funds, pick its candidates, shape its policies and ideology, and chart its strategies. To a significant extent, they run an "entrepreneurial party", selling their candidates and platforms to "political consumers."⁵⁹ Above all, the cadre party rests upon a concept of the political party as an electoral organization in which the electorate and party are sharply differentiated. The cadre party involves, in Duverger's words, "the grouping of notabilities for the preparation of elections, conducting campaigns, and maintaining contact with the candidates.... If we define a member as one who signs an undertaking to the party and thereafter regularly pays his subscription, then cadre parties have no members."⁶⁰

Mass parties, on the other hand, attempt to enlist significant numbers of voters into the party apparatus. From the financial point of view, the party is essentially based upon the subscriptions paid by its members rather than a select group of wealthy contributors. The outstanding characteristic of the mass party is its openness and mystique of participation (e. ., the belief that the national party exerts control over its legislative representatives).

⁵⁹ Frank Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System, p. 44.

⁶⁰ Duverger, p. 64.

In Canada, both the Liberal and Conservative parties have been categorized as cadre-organized, though there are elements of mass-style participation in regard to candidate and leadership selection (see below). The New Democratic Party has been classified as having a mass-type orientation.⁶¹

In the United States, what were initially cadre parties have become, by Duverger's own admission; "semi-mass parties." Taking the example of American parties in states which operate under the system of "closed primaries" (the predominant form of primary found in 43 states requiring registration of potential voters by party designation), Duverger recognizes the resemblance to mass parties: "Participation in the primary, with the registration and pledges it involves, may be considered as an act of membership. Moreover, activity connected with the nomination of candidates presented at elections by a party constitutes one of the activities typical of party membership."⁶² Through elevating a large portion of the electorate into a quasi-membership status within the party for the purpose of selecting party candidates, the United States has created a hybrid, quasi-mass party system.

In regard to the selection of national party candidates, the direct primary is now used in every American state to nominate congressmen to represent the party in the general

⁶¹ Engelmann and Schwartz, pp. 310-11.

⁶² Duverger, p. 65. For a discussion of the various degrees of party participation, see Duverger, pp. 90-116.

election. Typically, however, there are competing candidates in less than 40% of congressional primary elections, in large part because the advantage of incumbency discourages competition.⁶³ In Canada, where party standard-bearers are chosen in nomination meetings of the particular riding association, 37% of the MPs interviewed by Kornberg indicated they had obtained the nomination of their parties only after they had defeated one or more opponents in an intra-party contest.⁶⁴ Since the decision to select national party candidates is made at the local (or state) level in North America, the national party apparatus rarely has a determinative influence in the process. Realizing that nominating decisions are actually made at the district or riding level, candidates may tend to have a local as opposed to a national orientation. Especially in the United States, without the counterbalance of a parliamentary form of government to enforce party unity, the result is reduced national party solidarity in legislative voting (discussed later in this section).

In regard to national party leadership selection, Canada is the only country in the British parliamentary tradition whose parties use national conventions similar to the United States (though the British Liberal Party recently ex-

⁶³ Saffell, pp. 106-7.

⁶⁴ Allan Kornberg, Canadian Legislative Behavior: A Study of the 25th. Parliament, p. 64.

experimented with a non-parliamentary caucus method of leadership selection).⁶⁵ It has been argued that selection of a party leader by a national convention is incompatible with parliamentary government. Yet, in North America, the use of national conventions arose, in part, as a result of the inability of intragovernmental party apparatus (i.e., the congressional or parliamentary caucus) to reflect the variety of interests within large and diverse federal polities. In both the United States and Canada, national conventions developed as extragovernmental institutions for leadership selection when the earlier methods no longer reflected the political base necessary for a successful national party.⁶⁶ To the extent political parties in North America use national conventions to broaden participation in the leadership selection process, they go beyond the boundaries of traditional cadre party orientation. In Canada, minimum representation of youth and women in conventions has recently been assured through quota systems. In the United States, "affirmative action" has been taken (by the Democratic party) to ensure a somewhat representative cross-section of delegates.⁶⁷ While major North American parties "operate as cadre parties in

⁶⁵ Important differences include the "low-man-out" rule plus voting by individual secret ballot in Canadian conventions versus bloc (i.e., state) open balloting in the U.S.

⁶⁶ Carl and Ellen Baar, "Party and Convention Organization and Leadership Selection in Canada and the United States", in Matthews (ed.), Perspectives on Presidential Selection, pp. 49-52.

⁶⁷ In the 1966 Democratic convention, 11% of the delegates were Black, over 34% were women, 20% labour union-members.

much of their activity, the party convention provides an opportunity to develop a mass base, activate the party branches, and strengthen articulation of the diverse elements of the national party."⁶⁸

An analysis of two Canadian leadership conventions,^o however, calls into question the representativeness of delegates who participate. In an examination of the 1967 Conservative and the 1968 Liberal leadership conventions, three conclusions were reached:

First, delegates to the two conventions were predominantly representative of the most privileged groups in Canadian society; second, convention rules continued to afford a position of advantage to the elite within the parties; and third, up to the actual act of balloting, opportunities for widespread manipulation existed and were availed of.... In short, if the openness of these conventions is to be judged by their effectiveness in providing proximate representation to the main body of interests reflected in Canadian society, they must be appraised as having failed. ⁶⁹

While most Canadian delegates are chosen either through riding association meetings or automatically appointed as ex officio delegates because of party or government positions they hold, all U.S. convention delegates are selected either through the primary process (about 75% of all delegates) or district and state party conventions. There are no ex officio delegate positions. As a result of these differences in delegate selection, Canadian leadership conventions show a closer

⁶⁸ Baar, p. 63.

⁶⁹ J. Lele, C. Perlin, H.G. Thorburn, "The National Party Convention", in Thorburn (ed.), Party Politics in Canada (3rd. ed.), pp. 106-109.

relationship with elected officials than do party conventions in the U.S. For example, while all members of Parliament are designated ex officio delegates by their respective parties, only 31% of Democratic and 49% of Republican senators and 14% of Democratic and 28% of Republican congressmen served as delegates to the 1972 American conventions.⁷⁰ With tens of millions of citizens participating in the selection of party leaders via the primary machinery (which for the Democratic party is based upon a system of proportional representation), the process in the United States appears more open and representative than that utilized in Canada. In both countries, however, the leadership selection process extends beyond a simplistic cadre designation.

In regard to the possible loci of policy-making in a party, there are at least two possibilities: the public office-holders and the organized membership. The public officials are likely to view themselves as representing a broad electorate of which their party's organized members constitute only a small, though active, minority. On the other hand, the thousands of delegates to a party convention are impressively numerous, more so than any party's public office-holders as a group.⁷¹ In considering this tension between what could be termed macro and micro democracy, Ostrogorski

⁷⁰ Baar, pp. 55-58.

⁷¹ See Epstein, pp. 290-93.

found much to criticize in the late nineteenth-century efforts of organized American and British parties to determine policies for their elected representatives.⁷² Michels, conversely, was critical of the tendency of parliamentary representatives of the early twentieth-century labour and social democratic parties to free themselves from the influence of their highly organized memberships.⁷³ In this regard, Duverger has commented: "Democracy requires that parliamentary representatives should take precedence over party leaders and the members of the electorate over the members of the party, since the electors constitute a larger group than party members, who are moreover included in it."⁷⁴

In North America, most parties have been experimenting with periodic policy conventions in recent years: the American Democratic party beginning in 1974, the NDP bi-annually, and the Conservatives and Liberals every two to four years. However, their impact on the elected party leadership is uncertain. The relatively high degree of intra-party democracy which these conventions superficially portray cannot necessarily be equated with significant policy input. As Jackson and Atkinson observe: "There is an unmistakable feeling on the part of rank and file members in

⁷² M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, pp. 90-117.

⁷³ Robert Michels, Political Parties, pp. 172-187.

⁷⁴ Duverger, p. 182.

the governing party that the cabinet politely entertains the policy ideas of the party organization, but expends most of its energy attempting to avoid embarrassing inconsistencies in party and government policy."⁷⁵

In regard to the relationship between a party's electorate and its stated policy positions, the 1972 Democratic party's platform, for example, included a number of important issues in which official party policy was at variance with the views of typical Democratic voters. On the issue of Vietnam amnesty, for instance, there was little agreement between the views of voters who identified with the Democratic party and the position adopted at the party's convention. This was also the case with the issues of busing to achieve school integration and abortion.⁷⁶

In order for Democratic Linkage to be achieved, the party leadership must support policies consistent with those voters who elected them rather than the party membership -- if and when these two "publics" are in conflict. To do otherwise, while fulfilling the rhetoric of internal (micro) democracy, is to court electoral disaster (when the party must depend on other than just members for success) and to violate the more compelling democratic obligation to the major-

⁷⁵ Robert Jackson and Michael Atkinson, The Canadian Legislative System, pp. 44-45.

⁷⁶ See Halifax Opinion Index, report #85 (July 1972), pp. 6-9.

ity in the electorate as opposed to the much smaller majority in the party. Unfortunately, in addition to the potential conflict between party members and party electorate, there is a second level of conflict between voters of a party on one hand and a government supposedly dedicated to representing the "whole nation" on the other. The integrative tendency of many western democratic governments necessitates a broadening of political appeal and support on the part of elected leaders beyond party members and, often, electoral supporters in an attempt to reflect the elusive chimera of the "national interest." Support of an "integrative ideology" by elected party representatives conflicts with the "representation" function of the party. The resulting strain influences both the party's self-perception and policies as well as the systemic role it can perform as a mechanism of Democratic Linkage.⁷⁷

Parties and the Electorate

According to the Party Government Model, it is assumed that at election time the citizenry chooses between competing policies and candidates for office on the basis of party designation. The party label, and the concomitant ideology, policies, and candidates for which it stands, serves as a cue to simplify and guide the decision of the voter. James Wilson claims: "Parties are more important as labels

⁷⁷ See Panitch, pp. 185-86.

than as organizations. Their chief effect on election outcomes is as an organizing principle to enable voters to identify with various candidates."⁷⁸ Once the party label has been affixed, the electorate can attribute to the candidate a whole series of qualities.⁷⁹

Depending upon the orientation of the voter, the party label can serve two purposes. For the policy-oriented citizen, instead of monitoring each candidate's specific campaign statements and hoping that these pronouncements indicate what the office-seeker would do if elected, the voter needs only to learn the distinctions between each party's programme and then use party labels as cues to rational voting.⁸⁰

For other voters, the party label acts as an unsophisticated, though useful, method for determining broad ideological commitment. Individuals often link themselves to the governing process through their images and impressions of group sympathies and alliances of political parties. They carry crude diagrams in their heads that identify the group affiliates and allies of the major parties. They may regard one party as the friend of the workingman and another party as the advocate of the cause of big business. These

⁷⁸ James Wilson, Political Organizations, p. 95.

⁷⁹ See James Post, Public Opinion, pp. 184-86.

⁸⁰ See Erikson and Luttbeg, American Public Opinion, p. 289.

images can reflect some of the basic rivalries and conflicts existing in the political order. In this context, their importance is that they may serve as a handy shortcut to more or less rational action by the voter. While the average citizen's information about the issues that plague those with responsibility for decision-making may be limited and his grasp of the nuances involved in the debate of public policy may be slight, he may have an image of one of the parties as dedicated generally to the interests of "his kind of people." To the extent that these perceptions correspond with reality, the individual can, as he acts in terms of these broad images, respond rationally to a series of specific issues.⁸¹

Numerous voting studies refer to the concept of party identification: "a psychological attachment to a political party held by the voter. Its import is found in the effect it has on structuring attitudes to the elements of politics, especially parties, leaders, and issues. Party identification is the perceptual screen, the filter, through which opinions pass.... This affective tie is learned early, usually in the family, and it is retained by most voters throughout their adult years...."⁸² The stronger the party identification, the greater the likelihood that an individual will

⁸¹ Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, pp. 433-34.

⁸² Jane Jenso, "Party Strategy and Party Identification: Some Patterns of Partisan Allegiance", Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 9 (March 1976), p. 24.

vote in an election for his party's candidate. The strongest party identifiers constitute what Shadegg has called "yellow dog" partisans -- they would vote for a yellow dog if it were their party's nominee for public office.⁸³ It is these fervent party identifiers who constitute the hard-core of the "party in the electorate", almost always supporting their party's candidates. In North America, however, where political parties make broad appeals to the electorate as a whole, election results often depart considerably from the voter division that would be expected with a strict "party-line" vote.⁸⁴

Are there meaningful distinctions between the major political parties in Canada and the United States? Without such differences, the voters would not be able to successfully indicate their preferences on controversial issues through the Party Government process. Given the fact that the United States is the only major democracy which lacks both a significant social-democratic party competing for votes and a parliamentary system conducive to party solidarity, it is usually assumed that the American voter, more than any other, is not provided with a meaningful choice between political party ideology. However, if one examines

⁸³ See Stephen Shadegg, How to Win an Election.

⁸⁴ See Erikson and Luttbeg, p. 214; Best, p. 180; Philip Converse, "The Concept of the Normal Vote", in Angus Campbell, et al. (eds.), Elections and the Political Order, pp. 7-39; Jenson, "Party Strategy and Party Identification: Some Patterns of Partisan Allegiance", Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 9 (March 1976), pp. 27-48.

domestic partisan differences between Democrats and Republicans, within the confines of the narrow political spectrum represented by American public opinion, one can find indications of meaningful differences based on party label. On a subjective level, results from election polls of the Survey Research Center indicate that, during the 1960s, over half of the respondents perceived a difference between the national Republican and Democratic parties on domestic policy. The direction of the perception was almost always that the Democrats were more "liberal" than the Republicans.⁸⁵ Approximately 40% of respondents to a Gallup poll suggested there was a "great deal of difference" between the two major parties.⁸⁶

On a more objective basis, in an analysis of the 1966 congressional candidates, it was found that the Democratic office-seekers were almost invariably more "liberal" than their intradistrict Republican opponents. Out of 435 contests, the Republican candidate had a more "liberal" rating on the issues considered in only 19 of the races. It was concluded that if a voter during that election wanted to vote conservatively, for example, "he only had to know that the Republican party is generally more conservative

⁸⁵ Erikson and Luttbeg, p. 87.

⁸⁶ George Gallup and the American Institute of Public Opinion (eds.), The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971 (vol. 3), May 26, 1965.

than the Democratic party in order to cast his ballot correctly in light of his values."⁸⁷

In Canada, voters do not perceive a major difference between the federal Liberal and Conservative parties. For example, a 1969 Gallup poll indicated that 71% of the respondents felt that the two parties were "much the same."⁸⁸ The survey, however, did not include consideration of the New Democratic Party. With the quasi-socialist ideology of that party, the Canadian voter is provided with an electoral option. Given the solidarity required by parliamentary government, the use of the party label as a reasonable voting cue is enhanced.

Party Policy Implementation

In order for the Party Government Model to be applicable, party members in the legislature must vote together as a cohesive unit. It is in this area that the United States deviates to a great extent from what would be required -- optimum linkage through the party system. Defining "party unity votes" as those where a majority of voting Republicans and Democrats follow party lines, these parties acted in a relatively cohesive fashion (in both houses of Congress) in only 34% of all roll calls during the years

⁸⁷ John Sullivan and Robert O'Connor, "Electoral Choice and Popular Control of Public Policy: The Case of the 1966 House Elections", in Luttbeg (ed.), Public Opinion and Public Policy (2nd. ed.), p. 184.

⁸⁸ Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (ed.), The Gallup Poll of Canada, January 8, 1969.

1968-1972.⁸⁹ The American Congress operates to a great extent by a series of coalitions; on most votes there is not a clear division between the parties. For decades, the Congress has been controlled by an "inverted coalition" of conservative southern Democrats and Republicans. This coalition has been "inverted" because the party that has normally organized each house did not dominate the coalition that set its substantive record. Therefore, while the more liberal Democratic party has organized Congress for almost all of the past 45 years, its policy-making often has reflected the conservative bias of a separate de facto "inverted" voting pattern.⁹⁰

In an analysis of 1400 relatively specific Democratic and Republican party national platform pledges between 1944 and 1964, Pomper found there was only minimal conflict in the planks, while there was greater, but still only moderate, bipartisan agreement. "The parties do not duplicate one another, but appeal to distinct groups of voters. On rare occasions, their varying appeals bring them into direct opposition." Approximately 10% of all platform pledges involve party conflict.⁹¹ Regarding these conflicting pledges, if the platforms have any signif-

⁸⁹ Woll, pp. 82-83.

⁹⁰ Saffell, pp. 171-72; see Stephen Bailey, Congress in the Seventies, pp. 39-40.

⁹¹ Pomper, Elections in America, pp. 193-94.

licance in Congress, it would be expected that the parties would differ on these issues. This expectation is largely met. Of the relevant "conflict" roll calls, there was party-unity voting (i.e., a majority of Democrats in opposition to a majority of Republicans) in an average of 88% of the votes during the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations.⁹² Pomper's analysis of the fairly detailed policy positions in the major party platforms reveals that only 10% of these positions are completely ignored in the parties' subsequent actions in Congress. Not unexpectedly, the party controlling the Presidency achieved greater success in implementing its platform promises, succeeding in 80% of the cases versus 50% success for the "out" party. However, Pomper's data is open to various interpretations. Specific policy pledges constitute only 27% of all statements in the platforms analyzed and the major parties take alternative positions on only 10% of these commitments. The result is that fewer than 3% of all platform statements afforded the voter a clear choice of distinct partisan positions.⁹³ It was only within this small range of issues that party unity was achieved in congressional voting.

In the Canadian political system, party government

⁹² Ibid., pp. 195-96.

⁹³ Ibid., pp. 187, 194; Erikson and Luttbeg, p. 301.

is a central concept. Kornberg observes that the Canadian MP "stands at the most responsible end" of a responsible party continuum; he does campaign on a national party platform and he is pledged to support the policies and leaders of his party."⁹⁴ The Prime Minister is both party and government leader in respect to policy formation. Elected cabinet members steer the course of legislation through Parliament and act as heads of the various administrative departments. There is unified in the hands of the cabinet the three elements of party, legislative, and executive power. On all major issues (except during a rare "free vote") party members in the House of Commons are expected to vote on the basis of party lines. While it is possible to express divergent views in caucus, a high degree of consensus is usually displayed in public. Theoretically, there should be no doubt as to where a party stands, particularly regarding an issue that has been brought to a vote.⁹⁵

The American system, on the other hand, is based upon three independent centres of party and governmental power: the House, Senate, and the Presidency. The relations between these elements is often characterized by conflict and not cooperation.⁹⁶ An American President, for example,

⁹⁴ Kornberg, p. 108.

⁹⁵ Mildred Schwartz, Public Opinion and Canadian Identity, pp. 205-6.

⁹⁶ See Harvey Mansfield (ed.), Congress Against the President.

is faced with two legislative houses, each of which regards itself as more than the equal of the other and not subservient to the man in the White House. Nevertheless, for American government to function, the constitutional and political obstacles of separation of power must be overcome. It is the party that casts a web, at times extremely weak, at times rather strong, over these dispersed organs of government and that gives them a semblance of unified action.⁹⁷

Evaluation of the Party Government Model

In regard to the internal structure of North American parties, they are not a perfect fit for Michels' oligarchic theories or Duverger's dichotomous typology. Party "members" are not as passive, homogeneous, or as numerically small as these writers expected. In relation to party activists, the most appropriate theoretical construct appears to be the one employed by Samuel Eldersveld -- the "stratarchy." Eldersveld claims:

The very heterogeneity of party membership, and the sub-coalitional system, make centralized control not only difficult but unwise.... Further, the party must cope with widely varying local milieus of opinion, tradition, and social structure, and this encourages the recognition and acceptance of local leaders, local strategy, local power.... While admittedly party systems in different countries will vary in degree of stratarchy, exploratory research suggests the real probability that there is a stratarchical element in all such systems. ⁹⁸

⁹⁷ See V.O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (5th. ed.), pp. 654-65.

⁹⁸ Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis, p. 9.

Stressing that the general characteristics of "stratarchy" are the proliferation of the ruling group and the diffusion of power prerogatives and power exercise, Eldersveld concludes: "It is our position...that the theory of elite control of the organization [i.e., the party], which the oligarchic model assumes, is empirically incorrect.... Although authority to speak for the organization may remain in the hands of the top elite nucleus, there is a great autonomy in operations at the lower 'strata' or echelons of the hierarchy, and that control from the top is minimal and formal."⁹⁹

Given the recent propensity for minority governments in Canada (five of the last eight), Democratic Linkage would have to result from a situation which is less than ideal for the functioning of the Party Government Model. The necessity for compromise of party positions and de facto coalitions in a minority government can sometimes blur the supposed distinctions between the parties as well as possibly afford disproportionate influence to a third party.

While in the United States and Canada the national parties seek public support on the basis of mild ideological or policy differences, the legislative events that follow (assuming a majority government) the elections diverge widely from each other. As noted earlier, the Canadian

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 99.

system is predicated, to a large extent, upon the "responsible party" concept. In the American milieu, candidates who have campaigned under the party umbrella almost invariably break rank once elected. The legislative "parties" speak not as two voices but as a cacophony of coalitions and individuals. Party cohesion does not vanish, but it is severely eroded. The result is that few judgments of legislative performance are associated with the political parties per se. The absence of significant party discipline makes it difficult or unlikely that electoral sanctions can be imposed on the unresponsive party.¹⁰⁰ Thus, while the Party Government Model appears quite weak as an explanation of Democratic Linkage in the United States, it is of much later relevance in understanding democratic input processes in the Canadian political system.

C. Interest Group Politics Model

The so-called "group theory" of politics has been in existence for approximately 70 years. Beginning with its founder, Arthur Bentley, exaggerated claims have been made for the theory which have reduced its credibility and heuristic utility as a tool for explaining the operation of democratic government. For Bentley, it is not an overstatement to assert that he believed the group was everything and

¹⁰⁰ See Donald Stokes and Warren Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress", in Luttbeg (ed.), Public Opinion and Public Policy (1st. ed.), pp. 84-95.

everything was a group.¹⁰¹ According to proponents of group theory, political parties are only one variety of the far more inclusive social species of groups.¹⁰² Writing four decades after Bentley, David Truman was not prepared to go quite as far when he acknowledged that the American political system "is not accounted for by the sum of the organized interest groups in the society." Yet, he saw the entire polity as composed of either actual or "potential" groups (i.e., latent interests capable of being articulated).¹⁰³

The pervasive concept of "pluralism" derives from group theory. It portrays the political process as competitive, involving bargaining and compromise among a numerous assortment of pressure groups. The multiplicity of such groups and the assumption that their memberships are overlapping supposedly prevent the possibility of any one group emerging as the dominant elite.¹⁰⁴ In addition, interest groups are thought to be omnifarious. As Presthus claims: "Canadian society has a rich and varied group life in which, it seems, very few interests remain unorganized.... One is hard pressed indeed to think of any social interest that is not represented by one or another organized group."¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government, p. 222.

¹⁰² Peter Merkl, Modern Comparative Politics, pp. 305-6.

¹⁰³ Truman, The Governmental Process, p. 51.

¹⁰⁴ Dye and Ze'ler, The Irony of Democracy (3rd. ed.), pp. xi-xii, 10; see Arnold Rose, The Power Structure.

¹⁰⁵ Robert Presthus, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics, pp. 64-65.

Lowi observes:

An obvious feature of pluralist reasoning is that with pluralism society remains automatic. Pluralism is just as mechanistic as orthodox Smithian economics, and since the mechanism is political it reinforces acceptance of government. Pluralists believe that pluralist competition tends toward an equilibrium.... Pluralist equilibrium is really the public interest. 106

Interest groups are alleged to perform numerous functions. Almond and Verba suggest that voluntary associations are "the prime means by which the function of mediating between the individual and the state is performed. Through them the individual is able to relate himself effectively and meaningfully to the political system. These associations help him avoid the dilemma of being either a parochial, cut off from political influence, or an isolated and powerless individual...."¹⁰⁷ Interest groups are supposed to "articulate political demands in the society, seek support for these demands among other groups...and attempt to transform these demands into authoritative public policy by influencing the choice of political personnel, and the various processes of public policy-making and enforcement."¹⁰⁸ Some major interest groups aggregate as well as articulate political interests (e.g., the Canadian Labour Congress).

¹⁰⁶ Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism, p. 47.

¹⁰⁷ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 245.

¹⁰⁸ Gabriel Almond, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process", in Eckstein and Apter (eds.), Comparative Politics, p. 401.

These associations combine some and reject other demands articulated by the organized groups in their field.¹⁰⁹ As proposed by group theorists, interest groups are also thought to channel communications to governmental decision-makers, aid in structuring policy choices, act as buffers between the government and the masses, help check demands made by others, provide functional representation, compartmentalize access to decision-makers, lead to a political system characterized by "minorities rule", and provide people with an emotional outlet.¹¹⁰ As is the case with political parties, these alleged functions are not necessarily performed, nor are they always complementary or unique.

The Interest Group Politics Model of Democratic Linkage is based upon a somewhat less exalted, though important, view of the role of interest groups in a democratic polity. Voluntary associations are seen as essential supplements to the electoral and political party linkage processes. First, by being independent of the electoral process, interest groups are not limited to infrequent representations of public opinion. Second, by being independent of geographically-based representative districts, they can better represent national economic, social, and political

¹⁰⁹ F.C. Engelmann and M.A. Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure, p. 94.

¹¹⁰ See Harmon Zeigler, "The Effects of Lobbying: A Comparative Assessment", in Luttberg (ed.), Public Opinion and Public Policy (1st. ed.), p. 185.

interests. Robert Lane has referred to interest groups as forming a de facto third legislative chamber.¹¹¹ The lobbyist is seen as performing the role of functional national representation while Congress and Parliament are restricted to the role of local, geographical representatives -- what some believe is an increasingly anachronistic orientation. As Jackson and Atkinson note:

According to this perspective, interest groups constitute a major legitimate form of political representation. It is argued, implicitly, that groups are perhaps the most important interests deserving of representation and that the constituency form of representation is unable to meet the demands of groups in the political system.... The proliferation of advisory councils attached to government departments, such as the Canadian Welfare Council and the Canadian Consumer Council, is one indication of the appeal of this type of representation.¹¹²

Functional representation is often regarded as a meaningful concept because geographically oriented parliaments and parties are not sufficiently representative of economic interests.¹¹³ The result of the integrative approach often practiced by western political parties (noted earlier in this chapter) means that parties cannot rival trade associations, unions, or other specialized organizations in representing specific viewpoints. The perceived or actual necessity for parties to make broad-based appeals

¹¹¹ Robert Lane, "Notes on the Theory of the Lobby", Western Political Quarterly, vol. 2 (1949), pp. 154-62.

¹¹² R. Jackson and M. Atkinson, The Canadian Legislative System, pp. 39-40.

¹¹³ See Michael Curtis, Comparative Government and Politics, p. 114.

often prevents consistent representation of special interests. In addition, without a party's need to attract as many voters as possible, a pressure group can afford to limit its appeal to those individuals who support a specific, interest-oriented programme. It is hard to deny that, in theory, specialized pressure groups can provide a highly suitable mechanism for representing policy preferences in complex, industrial societies. As Leon Epstein explains:

How else are individual citizens -- with desires, economic or otherwise, for governmental policies favorable to them or to some cause with which they are identified -- going to communicate those desires? It is really no answer to say that they can do so through political parties. They would have to find a way to influence the party, and even for this task an organized group is essential. More important, a major party cannot manage a clear-cut identification with a single set of interests if it is successfully to fulfill its electoral [and governing] function. 114

While the characterization of organized interest groups as the "third house" puts the matter vividly, if somewhat exuberantly, they can perform an important function of representation in the political system. In summary, the explanation of this development of organized spokesmen for specialized segments of society, rests upon at least three factors: (1) the aforementioned shortcomings of an integrative ideology on the part of political parties, (2) the need for more frequent modes of expressing mass opinion

¹¹⁴ Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, pp. 278-79.

than afforded through the electoral system, and (3) the disadvantages of geographical representation in a highly differentiated society. Organized groups, according to this view, supplement the system of "arithmetical democracy."¹¹⁵ In its more formalized format, a system of functional representation can lead to a form of corporatism, where members of a central governing body directly represent specific functional groups in the policy-making process. The most common broad divisions in modern politics consist of an institutionalized triad composed of organized labour, big business (capital), and the state. The recent Canadian Labour Congress' manifesto is a clear invitation for a formalized, quasi-corporatist state.

In analyzing the putative role of political representation performed by interest groups in North America, three major elements will be considered: first, the extent of group micro-democracy (i.e., whether positions espoused by groups are reflective of interests they claim to represent, and the internal democratic aspects of groups), second, the extent of group macro-democracy (i.e., whether all major interests in society are represented in the group process, and whether power is proportionate to the number of citizens each group claims to represent), third, the effect

¹¹⁵ See Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (5th. ed.), pp. 143-44; Samuel Beer, British Politics in the Collectivist Age, pp. 71-75.

of group interaction with governmental institutions.

Interest Groups and Micro-Democracy

Individuals join interest groups for a variety of reasons -- power, status, financial, philanthropic, ideological, psychological. The economist Mancur Olson has suggested that a common element of large economic pressure groups who lobby for some "collective goal" is that they also are organized for some other purpose -- usually a personal, instrumental incentive. These "selective inducements", Olson claims, constitute the major reason why most members remain in large associations. This, in turn, enables the group leaders to seek the collective objectives which normally activate the group. "The lobby is then a by-product of whatever function the organization performs that enables it to have a captive membership."¹¹⁶ For unions, Olson believes that "their political power is a by-product of their non-political activities." Members are mainly concerned about the bread-and-butter issues such as wages and paid vacations, not the larger political interests of their union which may encompass a broad range of economic and social issues. Professional lobbies and farm organizations supposedly exhibit similar patterns of "selective inducements."¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, p. 136; see Presthus, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics, pp. 73-74.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

Robert Salisbury expands upon Olson's theory by suggesting that in large-scale interest groups, the division of labour (between most members who are concerned with the nonpolitical advantages of group membership and the leaders who provide the membership with political and non-political benefits) allows the activist-leadership core a flexibility to pursue the association's political policies.¹¹⁸

"As long as the organization provides benefits for their members, the leadership can do other things; they exchange group benefits for policy freedom."¹¹⁹

From Olson, Salisbury, and others, it is possible to deduce that individuals join most interest groups not because of the political positions they take but because of the services which they perform for their members -- services difficult or expensive to obtain from alternative sources. In return for these benefits, the members acquiesce in the political activities of the organization's leaders. Therefore, while the group provides both political and non-political outlets for the membership, most members are deemed to be more interested in the nonpolitical and the leaders in the political benefits to be derived from the organization. The result is that lobbying activities of large-

¹¹⁸ See Robert Salisbury, "An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups", in Interest Group Politics in America, pp. 32-68.

¹¹⁹ James Best, Public Opinion, p. 200.

scale associations can often be viewed as failing to articulate the opinions of the mass membership. James Best suggests:

As vehicles for the articulation and aggregation of public opinion, interest groups may not very well fulfill the role which we have automatically assigned to them. Instead, interest groups may be expressions of the opinions of their leaders, arguing they speak for the membership. To the extent that public officials believe them, then interest groups do aggregate and articulate opinion -- of the leaders, not the members.¹²⁰

Studies such as those done by Presthus concentrate on interest group leaders to the almost total exclusion of the rank and file membership. As a consequence, an elite form of pluralism is postulated where group elites and not members are the important elements in the "democracy." Yet, such studies beg the question of who interest group leaders represent other than themselves.¹²¹ Key observes that "while the available information does not go deeply into the subtleties of the attitudes of members and comparable non-members, it generally supports the observation that a gap exists between the attitudes of the leadership of mass-membership organizations and those of the rank and file."¹²² This can be viewed as a result of undemocratic aspects involved in the internal governing of most interest groups. Consistent with what Michels found, Truman has noted the

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 203.

¹²¹ See Robert Presthus, Elites in the Policy Process.

¹²² Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, pp. 509-10.

prevalence of the "active minority" controlling the political interest group despite outward pretensions toward internal democracy.¹²³ For example, between 1949 and 1966, 41% of the 51 largest American unions did not have contested elections for either the top or the second-ranking offices.¹²⁴ Lipset acknowledges that "the functional requirements for democracy cannot be met most of the time in most unions." Yet, he contends that internal democracy is not essential for the attainment of a democratic polity: "The general proposition that trade-unions, like many other internally oligarchic organizations, help sustain political democracy in the larger body politic still holds.... Many internally dictatorial associations operate to protect the interests of their members by checking the encroachment of other groups.... An organization under direct membership control may become irresponsible from either the vantage point of its needs or those of the society."¹²⁵

One hopeful sign regarding interest group micro-democracy is the apparent increase in issue-oriented groups in North America. Single issue, ad hoc groups may provide one of the best mechanisms for the expression of public opinion. Unlike the "institutional interest groups" (e.g.,

¹²³ Truman, pp. 139-155.

¹²⁴ James Wilson, Political Organizations, p. 245.

¹²⁵ S.M. Lipset, Political Man, pp. 430-32.

labour unions) discussed by Olson, these organizations arise because of a common concern about one issue (e.g., the addition of a second major airport in Toronto) or a range of related issues (e.g., the anti-big government crusade of the National Citizens' Coalition). These groups seek to mobilize public opinion quickly and, because of their narrow, issue-oriented focus, they are able to articulate and aggregate relevant opinions around the political goal to which they address themselves. The group's preoccupation with specific issues prohibits it from developing "selective inducements" in the sense expressed by Olson.¹²⁶ With these organizations, their success often depends upon how many individuals they can attract to their banner since they lack the traditional points of political access jealously guarded by institutionalized organizations. Thus, they tend to be media-oriented and rely upon an open display of rank and file support from a large, homogeneous membership to provide the impetus for their actions.

Interest Groups and Macro-Democracy

More than one-third of all Americans and Canadians do not belong to any organized interest group.¹²⁷ In addition, of those who are members of voluntary associations, many are involved in organizations which have little direct

¹²⁶ See Fross (ed.), Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics, pp. 10-15.

¹²⁷ See page 31 of thesis.

political relevance. Furthermore, the higher an individual's social class (as defined by occupation, income, or education), the more likely he is to join an interest group. Social stratification greatly influences the types of citizens who can be mobilized and thus the types of organizations that exist.¹²⁸ Therefore, it is difficult to ignore the evidence that the extravagant claim of universality of interest representation postulated by group theorists is far from accurate.

A second factor to consider is whether, as group theory proponents imply, there is fairly equal competition among those interests in society which are formally organized and represented. In this respect as well, there is a significant gap between theory and reality. As Ralph Miliband explains:

Pluralist theory could not have gained the degree of ascendancy which it enjoys in advanced capitalist societies if it had not at least been based on one plainly accurate observation about them, namely that they permit and even encourage a multitude of groups and associations to organise openly and freely and to compete with each other for the advancement of such purposes as their members may wish.... What is wrong with pluralist-democratic theory is not its insistence on the fact of competition but its claim (very often its implicit assumption) that the major organised interests in these societies, and notably capital and labour, compete on more or less equal terms, and that none of them is therefore able to achieve a decisive and permanent advantage in the process of competition. This is where ideology enters, and turns observation into myth.¹²⁹

¹²⁸ See Wilson, p. 56 and pages 35-36 of thesis.

¹²⁹ Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, p. 131.

Presthus found that in Canada and the United States, business and professional groups rank higher than organized labour on measures of "political effectiveness."¹³⁰ In the U.S., of the 676 federal lobbies that listed their spending in 1970, 405 were related to business interests. Robert Ross concludes that the groups best able to express their opinion in Washington, "represent those that already have secured most of the benefits of American society."¹³¹ Dye and Zeigler contend that not only is the interest group system unrepresentative of the entire community, but "there is a great deal of inequality among organized interest groups. Business and producer groups with narrow membership but cohesive organization are able to achieve their tangible goals at the expense of broad, unorganized groups seeking less tangible goals."¹³² In essence there is what Miliband, terms, in an understatement, "imperfect competition" among existing organized societal interests. This is not to suggest that capitalistic interests automatically prevail or necessarily impose their views upon the government in relation to their every demand. "Had business predominance been absolute, it would be absurd to speak of competition at all. There is competition, and defeats for powerful

¹³⁰ Presthus, Elites in the Policy Process, pp. 206-7.

¹³¹ Ross, American National Government, p. 166.

¹³² Dye and Zeigler, (3rd. ed.) pp. 281-82.

capitalist interests as well as victories. After all, David did overcome Goliath. But the point of the story is that David was smaller than Goliath and that the odds were heavily against him."¹³³

Group Interaction with Governmental Institutions

Presthus discovered that from one-quarter to one-third of all categories of groups in North America are "highly active" politically as defined by two criteria: the proportion that employ lobbyists for political liaison, and the proportion that rank in the upper-third of a scale of "political activism" based upon the percentage of directors who interact frequently with bureaucrats and legislators.¹³⁴ The primary general targets of Canadian interest groups (i.e., the proportion of groups ranking each target first) are: the civil service -- 40%, Parliament and committees -- 28%, cabinet -- 19%.¹³⁵ In a sample of American interest groups, the proportion ranking each target first was: the civil service -- 23%, legislature and committees -- 59%, cabinet -- 4%.¹³⁶ As can be seen, the focus of group access varies directly with constitutional and structural differences in the allocation of formal political power within

¹³³ Milliband, p. 148. See Chapter IV, section D for a detailed analysis of private economic power and its ability to thwart the attainment of Democratic Linkage.

¹³⁴ Presthus, Elites in the Policy Process, p. 118.

¹³⁵ Presthus, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics, p. 153.

¹³⁶ Presthus, Elites in the Policy Process, p. 80.

the Canadian and American polities. Given the increased policy-making role of legislators in the United States as opposed to back-benchers in Canada, the emphasis is logically on the legislature and the powerful American committee system. With the comparatively greater power of the bureaucracy in the Canadian system, the result is a greater intensity of group interaction with the civil service than is found in the United States. Despite the differences that result from the distinctions between parliamentary and presidential systems, Presthus concludes that interest groups seem to play a similar role in both systems.¹³⁷

It can be useful to distinguish between two polar extremes in group interaction with government: consultations and negotiations. "Negotiations take place when a governmental body makes a decision hinge upon the actual approval of organizations interested in it, giving the organizations a veto over the decision; consultations occur when the views of the organizations are solicited and taken into account but not considered to be in any sense decisive."¹³⁸ Organized groups play a role of representation in relationships with administrative agencies by advocating the cause of their members and providing information. One

¹³⁷ Ibid., pp. 460-62.

¹³⁸ Harry Eckstein, Pressure Group Politics, pp. 23-4.

of the main reasons for the well-worn path between interest groups and the bureaucracy is their similar functional structures. This condition means that agency-clientele relationships can flourish between governmental elites and the substantively-relevant groups. These administrative arrangements may create a relationship between agency and clientele in which the groups involved, in the reality of politics, come to control agency policy or at least to have a near veto over it. "Formalized advisory and consultative relations between government agencies and those affected by its action provide a linkage that may closely approach group management of the agency."¹³⁹ The legitimacy ascribed to the existing system can be witnessed by observing that not only do 37% of Canadian senior civil servants maintain that interest groups perform a "useful and necessary role", but 80% of them agree with the following rationale for a functional system of representation: "Government departments are usually organized to represent discrete interests in society (e.g., business, agriculture, labour). It is therefore reasonable that such departments should be mainly concerned with the social and economic interests in their special area."¹⁴⁰

The nexus between interest groups and the bureaucracy

¹³⁹ Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (5th. ed.), pp. 148-49.

¹⁴⁰ Presthus, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics, p. 224.

is so close, that at times it has resembled a politically incestuous relationship. Indeed, Presthus found that virtually half of the departments in his sample have created interest groups in order to facilitate the expression of relevant claims.¹⁴¹ An example of such a "reverse pressure group" is the Consumers' Association of Canada which has received government grants to continue expressing the viewpoint of the consumer.¹⁴² This raises serious questions about the use of groups as agencies of social control and co-optation by the state. Even without being fathered by the state, organizations can be utilized as tools of social management by the government. The most blatant example in recent years is the "social contract" in Britain between the so-called Labour government and major British unions.

A number of theorists have viewed interest group interaction as an essentially negative process consisting of "veto groups" -- each of which is concerned primarily with protecting its jurisdiction by blocking efforts of other groups that seem to threaten that jurisdiction. As Riesman expresses it: "There is a plethora of organized groups, each of which has struggled for and finally attained a power to stop things conceivably inimical to its inter-

¹⁴¹ Ibid. p. 235.

¹⁴² Van Loon and Whittington, The Canadian Political System (2nd. ed.), p. 290.

ests."¹⁴³ Having achieved the twin goals of "legitimacy" and "mandate",¹⁴⁴ they seek to maintain their access to the key points of decision-making in government -- with a bias in favour of the status quo. To the extent power becomes too fragmented among a host of competing "veto groups"; each protective of its own small enclave of power, effective majority rule is extremely difficult to achieve. The result is a form of "minorities rule." As Robert Dahl explains:

The making of governmental decisions is not a majestic march of great majorities united upon certain matters of basic policy. It is the steady appeasement of relatively small groups. Even when these groups add up to a numerical majority at election time it is usually not useful to construe that majority as more than an arithmetic expression. For to an extent that would have pleased Madison enormously, the numerical majority is incapable of undertaking any coordinated action. It is the various components of the numerical majority that have the means for action. ¹⁴⁵

Evaluation of the Interest Group Politics Model

What has been termed "interest-group liberalism" seeks to parcel out to private entities the power to make public policy. It perceives as both beneficial and necessary that the "public interest" be defined in terms of the formally organized interests in society. To some extent, the often outrageous demands of pressure groups are checked by the demands of other organizations in a dialectical group

¹⁴³ David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd; p. 247; see Kornhauser, "Power Elite or Veto Groups", in Lindenfeld (ed.), Reader in Political Sociology, pp. 277-96.

¹⁴⁴ David Kwavnick, Organized Labour and Pressure Politics, p. 3.

¹⁴⁵ Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, pp. 146.

process of mutual antagonism.¹⁴⁶ Yet, as previously indicated, it is not at all clear who the spokesmen of these groups represent other than themselves and a small band of activists within the particular association. Many groups are countered by no competing organization of equal strength -- the opposing interest may, in fact, be completely unorganized. "In short, while group pressures can often cancel each other out, this process restrains particularism erratically and uncertainly.... Another restraint built into the group system lies in the limitations on group action from overlapping or multiple membership. Private groups rarely encompass all the interests or command the complete loyalty of their members."¹⁴⁷

An important implicit premise of group theory is that organizations displeased with the performance of public officials will respond through the electoral process by punishing their enemies and rewarding their friends at the polls. This is the sanction available to groups in order to enforce compliance from recalcitrant government officials and to alter, if necessary, the political environment in which they operate. Yet, in their electoral activity, many mass membership groups operate under the restric-

¹⁴⁶ See Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism, pp. 58, 70-71.

¹⁴⁷ Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (5th. ed.), p. 150.

tion that a number of their members do not regard it as legitimate for the organization to attempt to control their vote. This is where the gap between the leaders and the mass membership comes to the surface. This attitude may stem from the fact (noted earlier) that political activity ~~is~~ regarded as secondary to other group functions. Beyond this, people often resent attempts to influence their vote or the imputation that they belong to a voting bloc that can be manipulated. "Electoral activity by pressure groups is nearly always a two-edged sword. Group support of a candidate or party may repel as well as attract voters."¹⁴⁸

In conclusion, while elements of political representation do result from the interest group process in the United States and Canada, it is a highly imperfect method of attaining Democratic Linkage. While the Interest Group Politics Model is not restricted to the electoral process, and therefore is capable of continuously transmitting mass preferences to public officials, the views that are presented are usually not a truly representative reflection of mass opinion.

D. Constituency Communication Model

Interest groups, by definition, are composed of the more vocal citizens in a polity. The election process does not operate continually and usually confronts the electorate

¹⁴⁸ Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, pp. 518-21.

with the selection of one candidate or party out of two or three choices, whereas the problems and issues facing the public are far more complex and numerous. The result is that political leadership, assuming it wishes to be responsive to mass public opinion, needs to know a great deal more regarding specific mass preferences on particular issues than can be provided by election results, parties, or interest groups.¹⁴⁹

The Constituency Communication Model of Democratic Linkage is based upon a conception of popular rule as continual interaction between citizens and leaders -- a two-way flow of communications between public opinion and government. Emanating from the government itself, communications may move to the public to maintain or obtain consent for policies by persuasion or by conveying needed information. From sources independent of the government, information about governmental actions is transmitted to the citizenry. Public opinion having been activated, a feedback of mass opinion to centres of authority transpires. Responses of approbation or disapproval for past or projected courses of action may be evoked. This allows public policy to be brought into apparent harmony with public opinion.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ See Nais Khan et al., An Introduction to Political Science, p. 63.

¹⁵⁰ Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, p. 413.

Like the Functional Representation paradigm, this model of Constituency Communication is not dependent upon the electoral process. However, unlike all previously analyzed models, it is capable of conveying passive as well as active opinion and thus, in theory, is the most representative process considered.¹⁵¹

Methods of Constituency Communication

One of the most important mechanisms of Constituency Communication is the public opinion poll. While elections measure aggregates, an indication of the summary conclusions of voters across a broad spectrum of issues, they are not an adequate tool for discerning public preferences in regard to a specific issue. Public opinion polls, however, constitute one channel for accurately aggregating and articulating mass public opinion. They provide a representative countervailing mechanism to the formal institutional processes that are dominated by entrenched interests of the highly active minority in society. Their utilization provides an effective passive opinion counterbalance to the participatory means of expressing political views.

A study of the use of opinion polls by United States senators reveals that they viewed public opinion surveys as important for determining electoral strength and areas

¹⁵¹ See discussion in Chapter I, section B.

of possible voter dissatisfaction as well as the general public's preferences on specific issues.¹⁵² In addition to reliance upon professional, nation-wide polling results, the number of American House members who take their own constituency surveys has steadily risen -- from 11% in the early 1950s to 74% by 1970. One study of opinion on the fallout shelter controversy in the early 1960s compared the results of congressional surveys with professionally obtained polls and found a high correspondence between them. It was also discovered that congressmen often altered their votes on the fallout shelter issue on the basis of the declining public support for a shelter programme manifested in their own surveys.¹⁵³

In addition to public opinion polls, elected politicians keep in touch with the citizenry through personal contacts and meetings. Members of Congress and Parliament often spend weekends in their home districts attempting to gauge public sentiment. For example, in their study of the 26th Canadian Parliament, Hoffman and Ward found that "conversations with constituents" was the most frequently cited method used by MPs to obtain information about the feelings of the public on political issues. Many MPs

¹⁵² Best, Public Opinion, pp. 207-8; see Mendelsohn and Crespi, Polls, Television, and the New Politics, for consideration of the benefits and problems of reliance upon polls.

¹⁵³ See Erikson and Luttbeg, American Public Opinion, p. 268; Brody and Tufte, "Constituent-Congressional Communication on Fallout Shelters: The Congressional Polls", Journal of Communication, vol. 14 (1964), pp. 34-49.

mentioned maintaining a constituency office mainly for this purpose.¹⁵⁴

The flow of mail or telegrams from citizens to elected representatives as well as administrative officials constitutes another link between the public and government. However, this method of communication is limited in its ability to accurately represent mass opinion. In the United States, only about 15% of the adult population reports ever having written a letter to a public official, and two-thirds of these are sent by approximately 3% of the population. When considering letters to newspapers or magazines, the constituency is even more restrictive -- only about 3% of Americans claim to have written such a letter, with two-thirds of these communications issued by only .5% of the population. Furthermore, studies indicate that the views expressed by this small minority are not typical of mass opinion, though they can be an effective index of issue salience.¹⁵⁵ While it is clear from research that mail to public officials is generally read and taken seriously, not all letters or telegrams are considered equally. Organized mail campaigns, once they are recognized as such by the intended target, are usually discounted.

¹⁵⁴ Hoffman and Ward, Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian House of Commons, pp. 99, 111-115.

¹⁵⁵ Converse, Clausen, Miller, "Campaign Strategy: The South as Republican Target", in Luttbeg (ed.), Public Opinion and Public Policy (1st. ed.), pp. 426-27.

Analysis of letters sent to legislators reveals that they, like direct constituency contacts, are often more concerned with requests for personal constituent service than with expressions of opinion on public issues.¹⁵⁶

Other means of communicating public opinion include mass demonstrations and petitions. Petitioning one's government is a time-honoured practice in the United States and Canada. Two dramatic examples are the anti-abortion and capital punishment petitions presented to Parliament with over 500,000 signatures.¹⁵⁷ Mass marches and demonstrations were important tools used in the 1960s by civil rights and anti-Vietnam war protesters in the United States. However, mechanisms such as protest marches and petitions are usually a better illustration of intensity of opinion of an aroused minority than an accurate reflection of mass sentiment. In some instances, such activity can influence mass opinion (though not always in the direction which the protesters desire). If faced with an intensely motivated minority and an apathetic or permissive majority regarding a particular issue, the government may be obliged to respond to the minority viewpoint.

As noted earlier, Constituency Communication is a

¹⁵⁶ See Best, pp. 211-12.

¹⁵⁷ Lester Sobel (ed.), News Dictionary-1973, p. 2; "Death Penalty Will Be Abolished", Ottawa Journal (May 3, 1975), p. 1.

two-way process. It includes mechanisms by which opinion flows from the public to the government and techniques for government officials to communicate with their constituents. In this latter area, a number of mechanisms are utilized: regular newsletters from congressmen or MPs, columns in local newspapers, use of radio or television, public speaking engagements, and press conferences. In the United States, use of the franking privilege has mushroomed in recent years. During 1974, it was estimated that House and Senate members sent out 476 million pieces of mail to their constituents.¹⁵⁸ Another popular technique of policy-makers in their attempt to "lobby the public" is the "trial balloon", which is floated to ascertain the reactions of the public to a proposed course of action.

Evaluation of the Constituency Communication Model

Because of the more important role of the party in the Canadian system and the constraints on individual initiative imposed upon MPs by the parliamentary process, American legislators are freer to respond to the policy wishes of their constituents than Canadian legislators. Yet, the Canadian cabinet is in a position, if it wishes, to rely upon Constituency (defined nationally) Communication as a means of Democratic Linkage.

While many of the mechanisms utilized in Constituency

¹⁵⁸ David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, pp. 50-54; Hoffman and Ward, p. 116.

Communication are far from perfect in their representation of mass preferences, the use of public opinion surveys comes closest to the optimum tool of Democratic Linkage. Given their availability, there is no excuse for public officials claiming ignorance of mass opinion on major issues. The inequities and distortions of participatory modes of opinion expression can be overcome by increased reliance upon public opinion polls.

However, the attainment of Democratic Linkage is not simply a technical problem of establishing the fairest or most accurate technique for expressing mass preferences. Powerful governmental and nongovernmental elites must be confronted. There is the further necessity of a willingness on the part of public officials to represent the masses. For example, there was little doubt in the recent controversy regarding capital punishment in Canada about where the mass public stood on the issue. Yet, the desire to respond to clear expressions of public opinion was absent. During a meeting with high school students, an angry teenager complained to Prime Minister Trudeau that Parliament should reflect the views of a majority of Canadians on capital punishment, citing an opinion poll indicating 79% of Canadians support hanging of murderers. Trudeau replied that "responsible government doesn't work by public opinion polls or referendums."

159 "No More Hangings Until Issue Debated, Trudeau Indicates", (Toronto) Globe and Mail (May 24, 1975), p. 1.

The achievement of a significant relationship between public opinion and public policy is not only hindered by the shortcomings of various modes of expressing mass opinion, but also by attitudes and institutions which act to frustrate the linkage process even when clear and accurate representations of mass preferences can be articulated. This thesis now turns to an examination of the four major forms of Democratic Frustration,

CHAPTER IV: MODELS OF DEMOCRATIC FRUSTRATION

Je participe.
Tu participes.
Il participe.
Nous participons.
Vous participez.
Ils profitent.

From a wall in Paris¹

A crucial point in Marxian theory is that classes are conflict groups and that their conflict makes for social change.... We are almost at the point of substituting power for property, that is, of constructing a twofold class system of those who have the power to make the major decisions for the society, that is elites, and those who do not have such power, non-elites.

John Porter²

A. Trustee Role Model

For nearly every situation in which one human being interacts with another, whether asking a question in a seminar, interviewing for a job, or serving as a representative in the government, individuals hold perceptions as to what the proper behaviour should be in these circumstances. These sets of beliefs prescribing behaviour for each "social position" are normally termed "roles." Of specific concern

¹ See Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality, p. xxv.

² John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, p. 25.

in this thesis is the role orientation of the public official as it relates to the frustration of Democratic Linkage.³

Three major representational roles seem to be characteristic of elected politicians: "trustee", "delegate", or "politico". A "trustee" perceives himself as a free agent making public policy decisions on the basis of his own convictions. Although he may not totally ignore public sentiment, he regards it as only a minor element and not the determining factor in his deliberations. This resembles the theory of representation espoused by Edmund Burke. On the other hand, an elected official who sees himself as a "delegate" believes that regardless of personal convictions, his primary obligation is to mirror his constituency's opinion and voice its views.⁴

In the Canadian context, given the predominance of party influence on legislators, there are two different types of "delegates." The first is the MP who acts on the basis of perceived "instructions" from his constituents. If interests conflict, this individual is willing to vote

³ Erikson and Luttbeg, American Public Opinion, p. 260.

⁴ See John Wahlke, et al., The Legislative System, pp. 285-86. Quite another matter is the "focus" of representation, i.e., the particular "constituency" being referred to (either national or local). Approximately one-third of U.S. and Canadian legislators indicate a purely local (i.e., electoral district) focus of representation as opposed to a national perspective. See Roger Davidson, "Congress and the Executive: The Race for Representation", in Alfred Grazia (ed.), Congress: The First Branch of Government, p. 394; Kornberg, Canadian Legislative Behaviour, p. 108.

as his constituents wish -- even against his party or his own personal inclinations. This "constituency delegate" attempts to faithfully express the opinions of the voters. The other type of "delegate", the "party delegate", is equally "other-directed": in this instance his "commands" come from his own party. When the party determines its position, he follows that line. There is no overt exercise of independent judgment (except possibly in the original formulation of the party position). From this perspective, one can view the "trustee" orientation as the other end of the spectrum -- at the extreme of "inner-directedness." When interests conflict, the "trustee" is prepared to act contrary to the wishes of his party and/or constituency. Between the two extremes is a third role orientation -- the "politico." This individual is not easily categorized as bound to constituents, party, or personal views; his role varies depending upon a number of factors to be considered later in this section.⁵

According to the concept of democracy proposed in this thesis, representational role orientations other than "delegate" are considered to be prima facie undemocratic in nature since they reject the primacy of public opinion as a determiner of public policy. Of course, this presumption might be invalid if elected leaders were highly representa-

⁵ See David Hoffman and Norman Ward, Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian House of Commons, pp. 66-7; Dale Vinyard, Congress, pp. 23-4.

tive of the general population in regard to age, sex, income, occupation, education, and other relevant factors. In such a situation, even if officials voted as "trustees", they would be likely to mirror the opinions of the public-at-large -- just as a representative sample of survey respondents is reflective of the general population (within a certain acceptable margin of error). However, the greater the lack of congruence between the socio-economic traits of policy-makers and the electorate, the greater the likelihood of wide divergence in policy preferences.⁶ With role orientations other than "delegate", these unrepresentative views can be enacted into public policy. Thus, two conditions must exist for democracy to be frustrated in this manner:

- (1) elected leaders must not be significantly representative of the general electorate (in socio-economic terms);
- (2) the "delegate" role orientation must be accepted by only a minority of national political leaders.

The Unrepresentative Nature of Political Leaders

Because the most wealthy and best educated individuals are more likely to be politically active, it should not be surprising that these people are the ones most represented among public office-holders. For example, the vast majority of American legislators have professional or managerial occupations in a society where only 19% of

⁶ See Erikson and Luttbeg, pp. 253-56.

the work force are engaged in such jobs. Lawyers and businessmen are notably over-represented (they composed over 42% of congressmen in 1965), as are whites, males, Protestants, and older people. The U.S. Senate presently contains 22 millionaires and a majority of members have assets in excess of \$250,000.⁷ In Canada, aggregate data comparisons indicate significant differences between elected officials and the general public on the basis of occupation, education, income, and age. Thus, while (in 1961) only 6% of Canadians had achieved a college education, 72% of MPs in the 25th Parliament and 67% in the 26th Parliament had attended university. Occupational differences constitute a stark division between legislators and the electorate. Data from the 25th Parliament indicate that 76% of MPs were classified as "professionals" or "proprietor-managers."⁸ As Kornberg concluded in his study of Parliament: "The members of this Canadian House of Commons were, like other democratic legislative bodies, very much an elite group."⁹

Role Orientation and Determination

In regard to specific role orientations, an interesting comparison can be made between the United States and

⁷ Ibid.; Davidson, p. 389; Nicholas Horrocks, "Mondale Among Least Wealthy in Senate", (Toronto) Globe and Mail (July 26, 1976), p. 10.

⁸ See Jackson and Atkinson, The Canadian Legislative System, pp. 137-39.

⁹ Kornberg, p. 55; see Hoffman and Ward, pp. 24-28.

Canada. In a study of the U.S. House of Representatives, only 20% indicated a "delegate" role orientation, while 28% articulated a "trustee" preference. Approximately one-half of the representatives claimed a "politico" orientation.¹⁰ Averaging the results of Kornberg's and Hoffman and Ward's studies on the Canadian Parliament, one finds 40% of MPs indicating a "delegate" role, 24% proclaiming a "trustee" preference, and 36% articulating a "politico" orientation.¹¹ While those MPs preferring the "delegate" role was twice the percentage found among American representatives, in neither instance did a majority of elected officials opt for the democratically-oriented posture.

What factors noticeably affect role determination? Much of the difference in the behaviour of elected leaders and their perceptions of their appropriate representational role can be traced to the competitive nature of their electoral district. The Platonic elitism of the Burkean "trustee" position is easily available only to those who, in a "safe seat", can afford the luxury of virtual independence from their constituents. It is usually forgotten that Burke, after his eloquent oration on the superiority of the "trustee" orientation, lost his seat in Parliament.¹² The electorate's only sanction on the "trustee" is its retro-

¹⁰ Davidson, pp. 393-4.

¹¹ Computed from data in Kornberg, p. 108, and Hoffman and Ward, p. 68.

¹² Michael Curtis, Comparative Government and Politics, p. 102.

spective judgment at the polls regarding his previous decisions. In Davidson's study of the House of Representatives, "delegates" were found disproportionately from competitive or "marginal" districts.¹³ In the Canadian context, Kornberg has measured the relationship between representational roles and political competition (evaluated subjectively by the Parliamentary candidates and objectively by voting data). As can be seen in Table 4.1, the more competitive the riding, the greater the tendency to adopt a "delegate" orientation.

TABLE 4.1 Relationship Between Representational Role and Political Competition (source: Kornberg) ¹⁴			
<u>Subjective Competitive Evaluations</u>			
Representational Role	Noncompetitive Riding	Moderately Competitive	Very Competitive
Trustee	41%	15%	11%
Delegate	27%	47%	53%
Politico	32%	38%	36%
<u>Objective Competitive Evaluations</u>			
Trustee	22%	13%	11%
Delegate	44%	54%	49%
Politico	34%	33%	40%

Kornberg also discovered that socio-economic traits constitute a second factor affecting role determination. Specifically, he found that education and occupation were related to the propensity to select one role orientation

¹³ Davidson, pp. 393-4.

¹⁴ Kornberg, p. 111.

as opposed to another. Those who were college graduates, professionals or businessmen tended to assume the "trustee" role more frequently.¹⁵ Thus, the elected officials who least resemble the general public on socio-economic terms are the very ones most likely to adopt a role orientation which will reflect their unrepresentative views in the policy-making process. Additional relevant factors in determining role preference include the type of issue under consideration and the ideological commitment of the elected official to a populist as opposed to elitist concept of democracy.

A final factor to consider is the political party. Especially in the Canadian context, it can have a powerful influence on role orientation. Hoffman and Ward discovered that if the personal views of MPs were in conflict with either their own political party or their constituents, they were clearly more inclined to follow their parties than they were to acquiesce to their constituents' views. In other words, the "trustee" content of their role orientation was indicated more clearly vis-a-vis constituents than vis-a-vis parties. However, in a situation where the constituents' wishes were known to be conflictive with the party position, the MPs were not so readily prepared to go along with their

¹⁵ See Ibid., p. 109; Jackson, p. 147.

parties. In this instance, 31% said they would be more likely to follow their constituents, 28% said they would definitely go along with their party's position, and 41% indicated they would use their own judgment depending on the issues involved.¹⁶ Table 4.2 indicates the relationship found between party membership and representational role.

TABLE 4.2
Relationship Between Representational Role and Political Party (source: 17)

Party	Role Orientation			
	Constituency Delegate	Party Delegate	Trustee	Politico
Liberal	10%	24%	25%	41%
Conservative	13%	12%	34%	41%
N.D.P.	0%	11%	78%	11%
Social Credit	20%	20%	40%	20%

It is interesting to note that the New Democratic Party MPs have a significantly higher penchant for the least democratic role orientations. The populist strain of Social Credit philosophy is reflected by the finding that it ranks highest in the percentage of MPs opting for the "delegate" role.

Evaluation of the Trustee Role Model

A fiery, French-Canadian intellectual wrote almost twenty years ago: "L'homme d'Etat pourra bien penser autrement que ses concitoyens sur certains sujets, il pourra tenter de leur communiquer sa sagesse particulière; mais en dernière

¹⁶ See Hoffman and Ward, pp. 74-75.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 68-70.

analyse, c'est la volonté générale qui doit prévaloir et non sa volonté propre."¹⁸ To adopt the "trustee" role -- the posture of Platonic guardian -- is to place one's individual convictions ahead of mass preferences. This orientation is a complex role which cannot be fully explained in simplistic Marxist terms as a mode for representing "class interests." No doubt, given the upper-class bias (in socio-economic terms) of political leaders, the passage of redistributive economic legislation, for example, would be contrary to their self-interest. Thus, the adoption of the "trustee" role can be a method of legitimizing and rationalizing the rejection of mass opinion in this area. But this is not a sufficient explanation. Psychological and normative factors must also be considered as well. Candidates who have worshiped at the altar of majority rule and who have uttered the ritualistic incantations of democratic theology often suffer a strange transformation upon acquiring a position of leadership and power. Once in office, their perspectives are altered and, in addition to the integrative tendencies cited earlier, they

¹⁸ Pierre Trudeau, Les Cheminements de la Politique, p. 94. The English version of Trudeau's passage, as translated by this haltingly bilingual researcher, reads as follows: The statesman may well think differently from his fellow-citizens on certain subjects, he can try to convey his special wisdom to them; but in the final analysis it is the general will that must prevail, not his own will.

soon perceive themselves as the font of all wisdom and morality. As Shakespeare wrote, "each loves his brief moment of authority."

Those who adopt the "trustee" role paternalistically substitute their views -- the opinions of an unrepresentative elite -- for the supposedly inferior wishes of those who elected them. This concept of representation is a reflection of the democratic revisionism discussed in Chapter I. It is a response to the belief of "democratic elitism" that the mass of individuals cannot be trusted to know what is in their own (or society's) best interests. While in highly technical areas of decision-making there may be some justification for claiming superior knowledge as opposed to the average citizen, on issues involving basic moral or social policy the argument of expertise does not suffice. To attempt to establish that Parliament or Congress is an institution of such superior moral leadership -- a political College of Cardinals -- that it should override the overwhelming desires of the mass public on issues such as capital punishment or abortion is preposterous. Mark Twain might be justifiably accused of hyperbole when he claimed that "it could probably be shown by facts and figures that there is no distinctly American criminal class except Congress."¹⁹ Nevertheless, recent disclosures in Washington

¹⁹ Quoted in Green, et al., Ralph Nader Congress Project: Who Runs Congress?, p. 131.

and Ottawa (e.g., Watergate and the "judges affair") refute implicit claims to moral or ethical leadership on the part of politicians.

Hoffman and Ward found that two-thirds of the MPs they surveyed were prepared to stick to their own views even if they knew that their constituents would want them to take another position.²⁰ In the recent free vote on capital punishment in Canada, neither response to party discipline, economic or "class interest", or constituency opinion can be considered relevant factors. Only the Trustee Role Model can explain the outcome. Despite opinion polls indicating up to 80% opposition to total abolition of the death penalty, MPs rejected the clear mass preference on this issue and substituted their own view. Democratic Linkage in the United States and Canada is frequently frustrated by this perverted concept of "representation" which contends that the elected office-holder is under no obligation to actually represent the views of his constituency. Supported by a widely accepted theory of ersatz democracy that fears and denigrates the masses, the Trustee Role process of governing is a powerful tool of Democratic Frustration.

B. Judicial Power Model

It has been said that "Judges deal today with the

²⁰ Hoffman and Ward, pp. 68-70. Presently, 58% of Canadians believe that MPs should vote according to the desires of their constituents (i.e., adopt the delegate role) rather than following their own views (Gallup Opinion Index, July 1976, p.28).

problems of tomorrow by applying the solutions of yesterday."²¹ Regarding the inherently conservative concept of stare decisis which supposedly guides judicial decision-making, Justice Cardozo observed:

Judges march at times to pitiless conclusions under the prod of a remorseless logic which is supposed to leave them no alternative. They deplore the sacrificial rite. They perform it, none the less, with averted gaze, convinced as they plunge the knife that they obey the bidding of their office. The victim is offered up to the gods of jurisprudence on the altar of regularity.²²

It is part of legal mythology to suggest that the judiciary performs a unique function which differs significantly from that of elected officials. It is often claimed that judges "are not representative agents who...are expected to reflect some interest or opinion.... The judge's opinion is not to be founded on what people want, but rather on what is the law, and the decision emerges from these principles when applied to the facts before him."²³ Yet, to contend that federal judicial decisions in the United States and Canada are not policy choices but rather the largely automatic result of technical legal procedures and constitutional knowledge is to foster a myth that is highly inaccurate, though extremely useful in inducing acceptance of the court's decisions.²⁴ This mechanistic

²¹ Paul Weiler, In the Last Resort: A Critical Study of the Supreme Court of Canada, p. 18.

²² Quoted in Weiler, p. 91.

²³ Dawson and Ward, The Government of Canada (5th. ed.), p. 395.

²⁴ See David Truman, The Governmental Process, p. 481.

theory of judicial objectivity is acknowledged as a myth by many judges themselves. For example, Felix Frankfurter has admitted:

The meaning of "due process" and the content of terms like "liberty" are not revealed by the Constitution. It is the Justices who make the meaning. They read into the neutral language of the Constitution their own social and economic views.... Let us face the fact that five Justices of the Supreme Court [i.e., a bare majority out of nine sitting judges] are the molders of policy rather than the impersonal vehicles of Revealed Truth. 25

In terms of the United States Supreme Court, it is generally accepted that it is a political as well as a legal body. The search for neutral principles of constitutional law is recognized by many as both fruitless and itself a product of a particular ideological bias.²⁶ Many Canadians, however, hold to the traditional concept of the law controlling the courts rather than the courts shaping the law. They perceive the American example as an exotic case -- one that is not applicable to Canada. Yet, most Canadian legal academics regard this belief as naive. In Weiler's words:

The Court is an important part of the governmental structure in Canada. It exercises substantial, independent power in laying down the general legal standards by which our lives are regulated. In some areas -- the administration of the British North America Act and the Bill of Rights -- the judges tell the elected legislators what they can and cannot do. Their judgments about important issues of public policy are not readily reversible by the representative institutions

²⁵ Quoted in Dye and Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy (3rd. ed.), p. 374.

²⁶ See Jay Sigler, An Introduction to the Legal System, pp. 107-8.

of our government, especially in the constitutional area. 27

The recent Supreme Court decision regarding the constitutionality of wage and price controls and the landmark decision of Regina v. Drybones (the first case where a provision in a federal statute was held inoperative because it was construed to conflict with the Canadian Bill of Rights) attest to the potential power of the judiciary in Canada.²⁸ In the United States, many of the most important domestic policy decisions have been made by the Supreme Court rather than the President or Congress. Within the last 15 years, the American Supreme Court has provided policy pronouncements on such diverse issues as racial segregation, public school prayers, government assistance to church-supported schools, abortion, capital punishment, regulation of police tactics in law enforcement, pornography, freedom of the press, limitations on the military draft, malapportionment of state and federal representative districts, Presidential claims to executive privilege, election financing reform, and school busing. As De Tocqueville observed, "Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into

²⁷ Weiler, pp. 3-4, 30.

²⁸ For an analysis of recent cases involving the Canadian Bill of Rights, see Tarnopolsky, "The Canadian Bill of Rights and the Supreme Court Decisions in Lavell and Burnshine: A Retreat from Drybones to Dicey?", Ottawa Law Review, vol. 7 (Winter 1975), pp. 1-33.

a judicial question."²⁹

Given the reality that the federal judiciary in North America is involved to a significant extent in the policy-making process and judges are not "law-vending machines" or helpless prisoners of a set legal framework,³⁰ the issue of the democratic accountability of this power must be raised. According to the Judicial Power Model of Democratic Frustration, it is suggested that "judicial policy-making is largely independent of democratic input or sanctions and functions as a mechanism to obstruct the attainment of Democratic Linkage. A simple majority of appointed Supreme Court Justices is capable of vetoing the actions of elected officials. In addition to this negative activity, courts engage in positive policy-making, such as the issuing of reapportionment or school busing plans. Since federal judges are not elected, and they are not supposed to attempt to reflect mass sentiment in their decisions (i.e., they are not perceived by the public nor do they perceive themselves as "delegates"), only if they constitute a highly representative body, in socio-economic terms, could mass preferences be indirectly represented. While the Trustee Role Model is based upon the behavioural orientation of elected leaders,

²⁹ De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 73.

³⁰ See Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, p. 125.

and thus is theoretically subject to modification through a change in attitudes of the electoral sanction, the Judicial Power Model postulates the deliberate institutionalization of a mechanism designed to be independent of the popular will -- a government elite in long, black robes.³¹

The Undemocratic Nature of Judicial Policy-Making

While many judges in American states are elected, no federal justices in Canada or the United States are subject to direct control at the ballot box. Federal judges in the United States are appointed to office for life and, in Canada, until age 75. Thus, they are ensconced in their positions -- insulated from the electorate -- until the first signs of senility, and sometimes well beyond that stage. As Dye and Zeigler note:

The Supreme Court of the United States...is the most elitist institution in American government. Nine men -- none of whom are elected and all of whom serve for life -- possess ultimate authority over all the other institutions of American government. These men have the power to void the acts of popularly elected Presidents, Congresses, governors, state legislatures, school boards, and city councils. There is no appeal from their decisions about what is the "supreme law of the land", except perhaps to undertake the difficult task of amending the Constitution itself. ³²

The elitist character and function of the judiciary has been clear from its inception. In discussing the role of

³¹ See Dye and Zeigler, (3rd. ed.) chap. 11.

³² Ibid., pp. 367-9.

American judges, Gouverneur Morris was asked, in 1801, "Why are we here?" He responded, "To save the people from their most dangerous enemy: to save them from themselves."³³

In North America, the federal judiciary is independent of most of the restraints and checks which are usually called into play against other public officials. Judges are protected against the operation of some of the most potent weapons which a democracy has at its command. Like dictators from a "banana republic", judges receive almost complete immunity against criticism (as the recent contempt of court case involving former Consumer Affairs Minister Andre Ouellet illustrates). A judge cannot be removed from office for any ordinary offence, but only for misdeeds of a flagrant kind (e.g., bribery or treason). He cannot be removed from office even if his decisions consistently run counter to the express wishes of the cabinet, the Prime Minister or President who appointed him, the legislative branch, or the mass public.³⁴

The perpetuation of the legal mythology surrounding judicial decision-making -- portraying it as an objective, intellectual process rather than a subject, ideological endeavour -- provides support for the view that judges should be free from political influence or public accountability.

³³ Quoted in Cohen, Democracy, p. 212.

³⁴ Dawson and Ward, p. 409.

Yet, when a judge must express himself on matters of value (e.g., abortion, capital punishment, or what degree of inflation constitutes a legitimate emergency), he is clearly beyond the realm of statutory interpretation and in a position of substituting his view for that of an elected legislature or the public-at-large. In areas involving social, economic, or civil libertarian issues, the judge must inevitably commit himself on values and specific policy preferences. As Weiler contends:

In the flow of decisions over the long run, an elected legislature is much more likely to be responsive to the majority than a tenured judiciary. To allow a court the power to override a legislative judgment about fundamental issues of civil libertarian policy is, *prima facie*, a deviation from democratic values. ³⁵

As was the case with the Trustee Role Model, if judges were highly representative of the general population in relevant socio-economic characteristics, then the policies they pursued might not be too different from what the mass public preferred. However, judges are grossly unrepresentative of the general public. Detailed analysis of backgrounds of Supreme Court members discloses a definite upper-middle-class bias. Furthermore, it is now generally accepted that a judge's behaviour pattern is not unlike that of other political actors and is subject to the influence of his social and personal background.³⁶ Weiler has found that, in

³⁵ Weiler, pp. 208-9.

³⁶ See Sigler, p. 105; John Schmidhauser, "The Justices of the Supreme Court: A Collective Portrait", Midwest Journal of Political Science, vol. 3 (1959), pp. 1-12.

Canada, not only is there an ethnic bias in the Supreme Court's membership, but there is also a "class bias."

Judges are selected from a very narrow stratum in Canadian society -- ageing, male lawyers.³⁷ As Miliband states:

"Judicial elites...are mainly drawn from the upper and middle layers of society; and those judges who are not have clearly come to belong to these layers by the time they reach the bench.... Judges...cannot be independent of the multitude of influences, notably class origin, education, class situation and professional tendency, which contribute as much to the formation of their view of the world as they do in the case of other men."³⁸ Only by chance, does this elite group of elderly lawyers come to share the changing values and aspirations of the mass public.³⁹

The consequence of the lack of democratic control over and the unrepresentativeness of Supreme Court Justices has been that judicial policy often runs counter to mass sentiment. For example, The American Supreme Court has been able to act as one of the prime instruments of economic reaction (especially prior to 1937). Its defence of "economic liberty" aided many a businessman and caused the working class to suffer more than would otherwise have been the case.

³⁷ Weller, pp. 19-21.

³⁸ Miliband, p. 124.

³⁹ Weller, pp. 45-6.

An illustration of the judicial veto in this area is its decision regarding child labour legislation in the United States. Twenty-six years intervened between the legislative passage of the first law on this matter and the final consent by the Supreme Court. National legislation on workmen's compensation for longshoremen and harbour workers required a quarter-century, three different laws, and a new generation of justices before the Court finally reversed itself and ruled such laws constitutional.⁴⁰ In more recent years, The American Supreme Court has become an active agency in the promotion of civil rights for minorities -- often in the face of a hostile majority.

Over its whole history, the U.S. Supreme Court has held congressional legislation unconstitutional in approximately 100 cases. More than 800 state statutes have been voided.⁴¹ In slightly less than one-third of the instances where federal legislation was vetoed by the Court, the aims of the original congressional enactment were eventually achieved -- although, as indicated above, it sometimes required a quarter century to do so. In the remaining 70% of the cases, the ends were not subsequently attained by other means, i.e., the judicial veto of the federal legislative majority prevailed.⁴²

⁴⁰ Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, pp. 109-110; Sigler, p. 210.

⁴¹ Jay Sigler, pp. 170-71.

⁴² Ibid.; Dahl, pp. 109-110.

Limitations on Judicial Power

While the federal judiciary in North America has significant power, (it is not without important restraints. First, the judiciary cannot act on an issue until it has been presented with a relevant case from some outside party. The courts cannot initiate policy until the proper question has been presented to them. Unlike other important institutions, courts are in a dependent position regarding their policy-making agenda.⁴³

A second limiting factor is that, in Canada, the Bill of Rights is not constitutionally entrenched. Therefore, Parliament can legally reverse a judicial decision in this area by re-enacting the challenged statute with a provision excluding application of the Bill of Rights. The option of constitutional amendment is available in both the United States and Canada to override a judicial policy dealing with a constitutional issue. However, the political difficulties in following these routes to by-pass a judicial decision are substantial.⁴⁴

An additional factor to consider is the method of judicial selection. The requirement, in the United States, of Senate confirmation of Presidential nominees to the federal judiciary allows democratic input through the activity of

⁴³ See Saffell, p. 281.

⁴⁴ See Weller, p. 221.

organized interest groups and the possibility of rejection of the nominees by an elected body. David Truman points out that "The successful effort, in 1930, to prevent confirmation of President Hoover's nominee to the Supreme Court, led by the A.F. of L. and the N.A.A.C.P., exhibited overt group activity on as complete a scale as a conflict over major legislation would have."⁴⁵ Approximately one-fifth of all Presidential appointees to the Supreme Court have been rejected by the Senate.⁴⁶ The most recent examples include the Senate's refusal to confirm two legal "neanderthals" nominated by President Nixon. In Canada, the selection of judges is made by the Prime Minister and his Minister of Justice after a quiet investigation. The decision is then announced as a fait accompli to Parliament and the public. As Weiler complains: "The fact that this decision, which is of vital importance to the future quality of Canadian law, is made at such low visibility and with only the most informal consultation, should be a cause for disquiet in a democracy."⁴⁷

Finally, it is sometimes claimed that Supreme Court Justices "follow the election returns" -- even if they may not do so very promptly. The federal courts are subject to being "packed" with additional justices if they remain

⁴⁵ David Truman, pp. 489-92.

⁴⁶ Sigler, p. 100.

⁴⁷ Weiler, p. 21.

totally unresponsive to changing societal attitudes. While Roosevelt's "court-packing" scheme failed, the sitting Supreme Court Justices performed a sudden turnabout and did not void a subsequent piece of New Deal legislation thereafter. Thus, it could be contended that judges are not totally oblivious to the political and social milieu in which they operate.

Evaluation of the Judicial Power Model

In order to protect economic vested interests and because of a desire to have a society devoid of the crass "excesses" of mass politics, American elites have long sought a form of "human-less", automatic government beyond the reach of the electorate. This was thought possible, in part, by providing for the "objective" interpretation of a semi-sacred document -- the American Constitution -- by nine Platonic guardians known as Supreme Court Justices. In North American political culture, there has been a tendency to apotheosize judges and the role they perform. There has been a willingness to accept the false dichotomy between politics and judicial decision-making and the myth that judges are interpreting rather than making law.⁴⁸ Yet, as former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Jackson has admitted: "For the Court to be supreme over the elected branches of government is a doctrine wholly incompatible with faith in

⁴⁸ See Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice, p. 315.

alia, systemic and political support (e.g., the treatment meted out by bureaucrats influences a citizen's perception of the government and political officials in general), environmental transformation, cultural maintenance, scientific experimentation, and applied technology.⁵⁶

The Undemocratic Potential of Bureaucratic Policy-Making

The real issue in considering the role of the senior-level bureaucracy is not whether these officials have impressive powers, but whether they have far too much authority in a supposedly democratic polity. The Bureaucratic Power Model of Democratic Frustration is based upon the assumption that bureaucratic policy-making is not only significant in scope and influence, but also that it is largely independent of democratic input or sanctions. In short, it is a mechanism of obstructing the attainment of Democratic Linkage. Bureaucrats are not elected to office and, therefore, are not directly accountable to the people. Given the generally accepted notion of administrative independence from direct political influence by elected leaders, the reflection of mass opinion depends upon the unlikely possibility that bureaucrats constitute a highly representative body, in socio-economic terms, or that there is interaction with and influence by nongovernmental sources of popular representation (e.g., interest groups). Each possibility is examined below.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

democracy.... In case after case the issue has been the extent to which the majority principle will be set aside."⁴⁹

While American political analysts recently have been obsessed with the so-called Imperial Presidency, a more ominous development has transpired -- the establishment of an Imperial Judiciary. Isolated from the electoral accountability and frequent criticism which even a President must face, U. S. Supreme Court Justices have made momentous decisions in many volatile areas. Either because of the "benign neglect" or timidity of the elected branches of government, the American judiciary has expanded its purview and confronted basic social issues (e.g., race relations, abortion, and capital punishment), political questions (e.g., electoral district malapportionment), and matters of economic and legal justice (e.g., the mandating of free legal services to indigent criminal defendants). Issues that are decided in virtually all other democracies by elected officials have been dealt with by the appointed judiciary in the United States.

Thus, while the Judicial Power Model of Democratic Frustration is applicable to both Canada and the United States, it is of far greater importance in the American context. This results, inter alia, from the entrenched nature of the U. S. Bill of Rights, the long history and

⁴⁹ Quoted in Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory, p. 198.

greater acceptance of judicial activism, and the abdication of political responsibility by other governmental entities. As Justice Frankfurter acknowledged: "Constitutional adjudication has always been statecraft.... No other country in the world leaves to the judiciary the power which it exercises over Americans."⁵⁰

C. Bureaucratic Power Model

Many of the early writers in the field of public administration attempted to make a distinction between policy and administrative decisions. In the United States, the Pendleton Act of 1883 (institutionalizing the merit concept in the American civil service) became the symbol of those who took a stand against the "spoils system" and party bosses. Since then, "reform" movements have firmly supported the concept of depoliticization. The goal of a neutral, nonpolicy-making bureaucracy, isolated from direct political control, has persisted. The politics-administration dichotomy denies any political role to civil servants.⁵¹ It assumes that there is an identifiable distinction between policy or value and execution or fact, and that individuals will consciously act according to the supposed differences. These are convenient assumptions which many people find acceptable; they fit well into a value-free "science" of

⁵⁰ Quoted in Frank, pp. 310-11.

⁵¹ See Galden, The Dynamics of Public Administration, pp. 88-93.

administration. Politicians like to believe that they are the ones who rule and that civil servants are meek ciphers. This outlook has been instrumental in devising organizational forms of public administration such as the city-manager concept in local government and the crown corporation in public enterprise.⁵²

As with the false perceptions of judicial decision-making discussed above, this view of administrative decision-making is also a myth. As Felix and Lloyd Nigro claim: "The policy-administration dichotomy was always fiction, but not an outright absurdity in the period when legislatures still retained strong initiatives in policy-making and the executive branch, while growing, was much smaller than it is today."⁵³

Execution of the law has always required some discretion. In recent times, legislatures have found it necessary to enact statutes in highly complex areas where expert knowledge of the programmes concerned is essential. This expertise usually is best supplied by the administrative officials who specialize in such fields. Regulatory commissions are frequently cited as examples of the necessity and opportunity for wide-ranging administrative power and discretion. The vast area for administrative policy-making and its impact on individual citizens can be seen in the

⁵² Ibid., pp. 99-100.

⁵³ Nigro, Modern Public Administration (3rd. ed.), p. 9.

decisions of the wage and price control tribunals operating in the United States in the early 1970s, and in the edicts of the present Canadian board. In addition, higher civil servants are active in the original formulation of legislation which often grants to other civil servants the power of implementation. The reality of modern political activity is that most laws are drafted by bureaucrats, that many laws originate with civil servants and allow them great discretion in making delegated legislation. Van Loon and Whittington contend that "The public service is a vital link in the policy-making process in Canada. Together with the cabinet and the various constellations of interest groups which revolve around any given issue, Canada's senior bureaucrats must be viewed as largely responsible for the shape of public policy in Canada."⁵⁴

The bases of bureaucratic power, other than the weaknesses -- structural or personal -- of competing entities, include the following factors: (1) Resources -- the priority that is given to the public bureaucracy in resource allocation allows it to lord over dependent institutions and to provide strong competition to rivals. It commands an appreciable proportion of the society's wealth and talent and has a legitimate monopoly of the instruments of coercive power; (2) Expertise -- many of the functions performed by

⁵⁴ Van Loon and Whittington, The Canadian Political System (2nd. ed.), p. 324.

the public bureaucracy are monopolistic. It employs most functional experts in many fields who cannot be easily replaced from outside the system; (3) Confidential information -- the bureaucracy is an informational storehouse, providing a veritable smorgasbord of government "secrets." Access to this data can be denied to both outsiders and selected political leaders or conveniently leaked to suit personal or political purposes; (4) Discretionary powers -- as noted earlier, the exercise of discretionary authority, the making of value choices, is an inherent characteristic and increasing function of the bureaucracy; (5) Strategic position -- as the intermediary between elected leaders and the mass public, the bureaucracy is responsible for the way in which political orders are executed and for the conformity of end results with expectations. It is in a position to negate political intentions and distort feedback. The elected leaders can be misled or deceived by suppression of citizen complaints, appeals, or problems. Politicians are dependent, to a large extent, on the candor and honesty of the bureaucracy; (6) Status -- despite adverse images of bureaucrats, the standing of top officials in the civil service is high in the social structure. The prestige that results confers an aura of authority.⁵⁵ From these bases, the public bureaucracy derives further power over, inter

⁵⁵ See Caiden, pp. 103-4.

alia, systemic and political support (e.g., the treatment meted out by bureaucrats influences a citizen's perception of the government and political officials in general), environmental transformation, cultural maintenance, scientific experimentation, and applied technology.⁵⁶

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⁵⁶ Ibid.

John Porter has written:

To be representative, "a bureaucracy must contain a reasonable cross-section of the population in terms of occupations, social class, ethnic groups, and so forth, and those working in it must share the values and attitudes of the society as a whole. When bureaucracies are representative of the various social groups composing the society, they presumably have a sufficient feel for the social fabric to be able to give socially significant or "effective" advice...[in decision-making]. 57

In reality, the North American public bureaucracy falls far short of the standards suggested by Porter. In addition, representativeness in regard to education or class origin may not be relevant or desirable. Weber argued that one result of increasing bureaucratization was the "levelling" of social classes "in the interest of the broadest possible basis of recruitment in terms of technical competence."⁵⁸ However, the bureaucracy can have this "levelling" impact regarding social class origins of its members only if the educational system through which the necessary technical competence is obtained is equally available for members of all social classes. Yet, there are still sociological and economic restraints in North America to the attainment of equal opportunity in this area. As a result, the social class or ethnic origins of higher level bureaucratic members is not representative of the larger society.⁵⁹

In addition to the six factors indicated earlier (resources, expertise, confidential information, discretionary

⁵⁷ John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, p. 449.

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 433, 444.

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 444-446; see Dye and Zeigler (3rd. ed.), pp. 105-9.

power, strategic position, and status), the bureaucracy's strength and anti-democratic potential result from its semi-permanent character, free from the periodic sanctions of the voters, its freedom from direct political party control as well as interference from either the legislative or executive branches, and its unmanageability deriving from its sheer size. (In 1971, there were over 2,600,000 full-time civilian employees working in executive departments in the American federal government.)⁶⁰ Some administrative agencies use these elements to establish a distinct power-base devoid from outside control. They try to become virtually independent entities which have a source of power rivaling that of -- and in some cases superior to -- elected governmental bodies (e.g., the F.B.I. under J. Edgar Hoover or the R.C.M.P.). On occasion, governmental economic policy has been contradicted and severely hindered by high-level bureaucrats who insisted on substituting their policy for that of elected leaders. The Coyne affair is a prime example of the power of an individual, such as the Governor of the Bank of Canada, to challenge and obstruct the policies of a majority government elected in a record landslide victory. Less dramatic examples exist in the United States in regard to the independence of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System.

⁶⁰ See Saffell, pp. 248-49.

Some agencies perceive themselves as guardians of the "national interest" -- a concept which they attempt to interpret for themselves. The result is that they often act as if they are above the legal restraints imposed upon the rest of society (e.g., the C.I.A.). Other agencies actively lobby for public and congressional support with a fervour that exceeds many organized pressure groups (e.g., the Pentagon employs 2,800 public relations and "information" officials).⁶¹ More often, the bureaucracy is able to build political strength through establishing a firm alliance with the same interests it is supposed to regulate. As noted in Chapter III (section C), Presthus found that in measuring the proportion of interest groups ranking various institutional targets, 23% cited the civil service as their prime access point in the United States and over 40% in Canada ranked the bureaucracy as their primary target.⁶² Therefore, there is substantial interest group interaction with the bureaucracy. However, given the inadequacies of interest groups as instruments of Democratic Linkage, their often incestuous political intercourse with bureaucrats does not assure that policies which are spawned will be representative of mass preferences.

In Max Weber's view, the power of the public bureau-

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 252-53.

⁶² Presthus, Elites in the Policy Process, p. 80; Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics, p. 153.

cracy cannot be checked by political authorities -- even in a supposedly democratic system:

Under normal conditions the power position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always overwhelming. The "political master" finds himself in the position of the "dilettante" who stands opposite the "expert", facing the trained official who stands within the management of administration. This holds whether the "master" whom the bureaucracy serves is a "people", equipped with the weapons of "legislative initiative", the referendum, and the right to remove officials, or a parliament, elected on a more aristocratic or more democratic basis and equipped with the right to vote a lack of confidence....⁶³

Evaluation of the Bureaucratic Power Model

Although the federal bureaucracies in North America are huge, and individual agencies have developed independent sources of political strength, some visible checks on their power do exist. First, the bureaucracy must share political authority with elected institutions which may partially restrain bureaucratic excesses through surveillance and investigation. Second, appointment of ombudsmen (who are functioning at sub-national levels in North America) can pose an additional barrier to administrative abuses or at least provide a mechanism for their eventual correction. Third, to a greater extent than most other sources of political power, bureaucratic power is fragmented -- rarely is it united on most issues. More often, the bureaucracy is fractured by intense rivalry between competing agencies, prior-

⁶³ Max Weber, "Bureaucracy", in Gerth and Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, pp. 196-244.

ities, and programmes. In-fighting among members of the same agency adds another dimension to the divisions already noted. The splintering of bureaucratic power -- its lack of cohesiveness -- makes outside control by elected officials much easier than contended by cassetras such as Burnham or Weber.⁶⁴

An important difference exists between Canada and the United States regarding the degree of political control over top bureaucratic officials. The very highest offices in many American governmental departments tend to be filled with political appointees -- most of whom require Senatorial confirmation. An American President has the opportunity of making over 2,000 key appointments, including 300 sub-cabinet officials and federal agency heads.⁶⁵ This provides a politically responsive element in the American bureaucracy. Career civil servants, though forming a higher proportion of officials than in years past, have a lower status than in most other countries, including Canada.⁶⁶ In addition, the American legislative system is more independent of the bureaucracy. Many bills originate in Congress since it is a creative legislative body and not an organ for the pro forma registration of approval of measures originating elsewhere. Thus, it would appear that the Bureaucratic Power

⁶⁴ See Calden, p. 104.

⁶⁵ Saffell, p. 249.

⁶⁶ See Geraint Parry, Political Elites, pp. 82-3.

Model of Democratic Frustration is more applicable to Canada than the United States.

Nevertheless, in both countries, the public bureaucracy is not simply a subservient mechanism that meekly translates the will of the legislative majority into action. On some occasions, bureaucrats may obstruct governmental policies with which they disagree (as happened in Saskatchewan when the C.C.F. first took office).⁶⁷ The various administrative agencies of the state are a significant force, though not as important as might be inferred from the more extravagant diatribes against the bureaucracy..

The increasing volume and complexity of public affairs have reduced to a myth the doctrine of separation of policy and administration. The authority to decide many issues has, of necessity, been delegated to the bureaucratic element of government. A significant danger appears to be that of drifting into a condition in which bureaucrats serve as a purely negative force. An entrenched bureaucracy, without heroic efforts to the contrary, tends to become enamoured with the traditional methods and policies of governing. It can constitute a highly-placed element which is hostile to innovation, lacking in initiative, and unresponsive to changing public sentiment -- a strong conservative force in society.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Caiden, pp. 102-3; see Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, pp. 307-331.

⁶⁸ Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, (5th. ed.), pp. 709-11.

Considering the additional danger -- and reality in some instances -- of the bureaucracy aggressively grasping for unwarranted independence and authority, Bureaucratic Power constitutes an important tool of Democratic Frustration.

D. Private Economic-Institutional Power Model

In the "crude" Marxist tradition of social theory, it is the economic rather than the political system which is "master." Those who control the economic sphere of life, it is argued, totally dominate the rest of society. Though focusing on an essential aspect of power in capitalist politics, this simplistic analysis overstates the case. As John Porter contends: "It is more useful to regard power as a generic term rather than a term applied to one particular kind of behaviour, and thus to consider the political, economic, bureaucratic or administrative, military, and ideological as various species of power in the complex social structure. People in power roles belong to an elite."⁶⁹ In the words of C. Wright Mills, "Elites occupy the strategic command posts of the social structure."⁷⁰

The previous three models of Democratic Frustration focused on governmental elites. This model concentrates on the loci of nongovernmental power capable of obstructing

⁶⁹ Porter, pp. 206-98.

⁷⁰ Mills, The Power Elite, p. 4.

the attainment of Democratic Linkage. The point to be made is that:

The sovereignty allocated by traditional political science to the political system is subject to compromises with the other power systems with which it is interrelated in the society. Even when it appears that political power-holders make the ultimate decisions in some situations the power may be more apparent than real. The decisions of governments to intervene or not to intervene can be as much a reflection of power outside the political system as they are of political power *per se*. 71

It is suggested in this fourth model of Democratic Frustration, that the potent minority forces which challenge and, at times, control the political realm are based upon economic and/or strategic, private institutional positions of power.

Great potential for power is lodged in the giant nongovernmental institutions of North America. High positions -- in finance, industry, the media -- and great wealth provide the opportunity for significant influence in the political as well as the economic system. The institutional structure of American society concentrates great authority in a relatively few positions. Approximately 3,500 presidents and directors of the United States' largest corporations control about half of all assets in the communications, utilities, transportation, banking, insurance, and industrial sectors. This elite is recruited disproportionately from the white, Anglo-Saxon, upper-middle class, male population

⁷¹ Porter, p. 206.

of the nation.

Wealth in North America is also unequally distributed. For example, in the United States, the top one-fifth of income recipients receive over 41% of all income in the country, while the bottom fifth obtains only 5.5%.⁷² As Ralph Miliband explains:

The most important political fact about advanced capitalist societies...is the continued existence in them of private and ever more concentrated economic power. As a result of that power, the men -- owners and controllers -- in whose hands it lies enjoy a massive preponderance in society, in the political system, and in the determination of the state's policies and actions. Economic life cannot be separated from political life. Unequal economic power, on the scale and of the kind encountered in advanced capitalist societies, inherently produces political inequality, on a more or less commensurate scale, whatever the constitution may say.⁷³

The question to be considered is not whether the economic and private institutional elites in North America have an important amount of political power and influence. No one can seriously deny that they do. The real issue is whether these forces exercise a significantly greater degree of political influence than the mass public can command through the various mechanisms of Democratic Linkage. Does control and/or ownership of vitally important areas of institutional and economic life also assure "control of the means of political decision-making in the particular political environment of advanced capitalism"?⁷⁴ Can this unelected,

⁷² Dye and Zeigler, (3rd ed.) pp. 141-42.

⁷³ Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, p. 237.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 45.

unrepresentative, nongovernmental elite -- holding power unaccountable to the mass citizenry -- veto government policy inimical to its interests? Can these forces of privilege in society maintain their positions through more subtle means by controlling the ideological foundation of the polity? Consideration of such questions follows below.

Direct Interaction Between Private Elites and Government

In any capitalist society, since the health of the economy is heavily dependent upon the health and vitality of the corporate sector, public policy will tend to be oriented in general terms, over the long-run, in the direction which is fundamentally consistent with the welfare and interests of the giant economic enterprises.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, to make sure of this outcome on specific matters, private economic and institutional power is expressed through various modes of interaction with and influence on political officials. For example, approximately 800 of America's 1000 largest corporations have representatives stationed in Washington, D.C.⁷⁶ These lobbies derive their strategic advantage by controlling the flow of information and propaganda in and out of Congress. An additional factor to consider is that top governmental executives (e.g., cabinet members, Presidential advisors, senior civil servants, am-

⁷⁵ See James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State.

⁷⁶ Mark Green, et al., Ralph Nader Congress Project: Who Runs Congress?, pp. 30-31.

bassadors) are frequently individuals who have occupied key posts in private industry, finance, law, or education. These men shuttle in and out of government posts from their positions of power or influence in the corporate, financial, legal, and educational world. The close relationship between the military establishment and former officers now working for defence contractors is well-documented. In the United States, 261 retired generals are presently employed as "consultants" and lobbyists by weapons producers or other merchants of death.⁷⁷ In Canada, the recent establishment of a "consulting firm" by former deputy ministers Reisman and Grandy, and the plethora of corporate directorships garnered by John Turner upon his departure from government illustrate the interpenetration between corporate and governmental elites and the ease with which individuals shift from one to the other.⁷⁸

Political campaign financing provides another important connection between corporate power and personal wealth and the political system.⁷⁹ "Quite apart from all other sources of influence, business is assured of a most attentive hearing on the part of the leaders of conservative parties because it constitutes an important, even an

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 35.

⁷⁸ "The Best of Both Worlds", Maclean's, vol. 89 (May 3, 1976), pp. 21-22; see Clement, The Canadian Corporate Elite, p. 346.

⁷⁹ Dye and Zeigler, (3rd. ed.) p. 142.

essential source of financial support."⁸⁰ Even for the party closely identified with organized labour in the United States (the Democrats), approximately half its funds come from corporate contributions. At the congressional level, it is estimated that as much as 95% of campaign funds for both parties combined are derived from business sources.⁸¹ For the 1972 Canadian federal election, half of the money raised in Ontario by the Liberal party came from 90 large corporations. In fact, 90% of the funds raised by the Liberals and Conservatives come from business donations.⁸²

The close relationship between private economic and institutional elites and governmental leaders has led many to question the pluralist concept of policy-making (referred to in Chapter III-section C). Miliband suggests there is "imperfect competition" resulting from the "pervasive and permanent pressure upon government and the state generated by the private control of concentrated industrial, commercial, and financial resources."⁸³ One study done in the United States attempted to test this assertion of business dominance in the policy-making process.⁸⁴ An exami-

⁸⁰ Miliband, p. 119.

⁸¹ Green, et al., p. 12.

⁸² Paltiel, "Campaign Financing in Canada and Its Reform", in Penniman (ed.), Canada at the Polls: The General Election of 1974, p. 182.

⁸³ Miliband, p. 132.

⁸⁴ See Wilson, Political Organizations, pp. 310-11.

nation of the congressional testimony of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers (between 1961 and 1968) revealed that the two organizations together presented formal positions on an average of 50 bills in each session. There were 79 instances when the Chamber or the N.A.M. testified on a matter in opposition to another significant group. The business-oriented position prevailed in approximately two-thirds of these cases. However, the proportion of successes declined to 50% when these business groups were faced with a combined opposition from the Democratic President and the A.F.L.-C.I.O. Regarding the type of controversial issues on which the Chamber of Commerce and the N.A.M. publicly expressed themselves, in general, they tended to be proposed legislation that either affected business interests specifically (e.g., minimum wage, tax, right-to-work, antitrust bills) or involved broader issues such as women's rights and foreign aid. While the Chamber and/or N.A.M. were normally victorious on matters of direct impact on the business community, they did not generally triumph on matters of broad social or foreign policy.

Control of the Means of Mental Production

The structure of the mass media is such that it is a powerful tool for projecting general ideologies and support for or opposition to specific public policy. As Clement claims:

Those who control these means of mental production control, in large part, the ideological predisposition of the population. For this reason it is important to analyse who controls the mass media and with that, who acts as gatekeepers to that media. The evidence presented illustrates that the mass media in Canada are highly concentrated and becoming more so.... They are instruments of the corporate elite because the media elite and the economic elite turn out to be the same people occupying the uppermost positions in two functionally defined domains of life in Canada. ⁸⁵

Clement found that 49% of the media elite are members of the executive or hold directorships in one of the 113 dominant corporations in the economic sector while, at the same time, holding one of these positions in one of the dominant media complexes. ⁸⁶

In the United States, Kevin Phillips, lamenting the power of those who control the mass media, has characterized American society as a "mediacracy." He suggests that U.S. politics has entered the Post-Industrial Age, an era dominated by a new economic sector -- the mass media industry -- which is engaged in the less than objective production, dissemination, and consumption of information. Those working in this sector, he contends, constitute a "class" which is "displacing" the business-industrial power elites of the previous era in regard to influence on public policy. ⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Clement, pp. 340-41.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 325.

⁸⁷ See Phillips, Mediacracy.

The awesome power in the hands of the elite that controls the mass media results in a disproportionate ability to influence and mold mass attitudes and governmental policy to suit certain economic interests. The media can control the values and norms of society as well as the information upon which policy decisions are based. Whether the mass media actually exercise their potential power in a conscious and consistent pattern is debatable. Important elements of the media establishment (e.g., the Washington Post or New York Times) have often been correctly characterized as "liberal" -- within the American context. The varying positions of the media in regard to issues such as the Vietnam war or Richard Nixon's impeachment demonstrate a lack of cohesiveness. The mass media industry does not speak in one unified, loud voice on many matters. However, as a result of the individual and ideological interconnection between the mass media and the corporate world, the virtual unanimity on the part of the media in opposing policies which threaten economic wealth and privilege (e.g., the virulent reaction to George McGovern's modest proposals for income redistribution) indicates a basic commitment to the so-called free enterprise economic system and an ability of united action in areas of direct threat to vested economic interests.

On a more subtle level, the institutional structure of society exercises power when it attempts to limit the scope of public decision-making to issues that are

relatively innocuous to the elite. This idea has been expressed in the "nondecision-making" argument proposed by Bachrach and Baratz. According to these authors, this concept constitutes the "practice of limiting the scope of actual decision-making to 'safe' issues by manipulating the dominant community values, myths, and political institutions and procedures."⁸⁸ As a result, it is claimed that almost all political issues are trivial in the sense that they do not threaten the essential interests of the economic and institutional elites.

According to the Marxist contention, the class which has control over the material means of production also controls the means of mental production: "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas."⁸⁹ As Frank Parkin suggests:

This proposition rests on the plausible assumption that those groups in society which occupy positions of the greatest power and privilege will also tend to have the greatest access to the means of legitimation. That is to say, the social and political definitions of those in dominant positions tend to be objectified and enshrined in the major institutional orders, so providing the moral framework of the entire social system. ⁹⁰

This "dominant value system" is a product of the process of political socialization -- a process intended,

⁸⁸ Bachrach and Baratz, "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework", in American Political Science Review, vol. 57 (September 1963), pp. 632, 641.

⁸⁹ Marx, quoted in Miliband, pp. 162-63.

⁹⁰ Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order, pp. 82-83.

in part, "to foster acceptance of a capitalist social order and of its values, an adaptation to its requirements, a rejection of alternatives to it; in short,...what is involved here is very largely a process of massive indoctrination."⁹¹ For the "indoctrination" to occur, it is not necessary to ban opposing views. Miliband contends: "It is only necessary that ideological competition should be so unequal as to give a crushing advantage to one side against the other. And this is precisely the position which obtains in advanced capitalist societies."⁹² As Dye and Zeigler suggest: "Elites, by controlling the values and norms of society, can thereby also control the issues upon which governmental decision-makers act. Control of this type is subtle and effective."⁹³

Evaluation of the Private Economic-Institutional Power Model

In considering the role of economic elites in North America, it is important to note an outstanding feature of the Canadian economic structure -- foreign ownership and control of a large number of "Canadian" corporations. This foreign "control":

Implies that important decisions about the Canadian economic system are made outside the country. Rather

⁹¹ Miliband, p. 164.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Dye and Zeigler, (3rd.ed.) p. 174.

than a Canadian elite we should perhaps be searching for a foreign or international elite.... No other nation as highly industrialized as Canada has such a large proportion of its industry owned by non-residents.... Foreign ownership of such dimensions creates difficulties in studying elites. It suggests that a substantial amount of decision-making takes place outside the country. 94

While detailed consideration of the exogenous nature of the Canadian economic elite is beyond the purview of this thesis, it can be argued that even if Canadian capitalists were substituted for the foreign industrialists and international cartels that now predominate, corporate behaviour would remain essentially the same. As John Porter contends:

Corporations...are governed by human beings who behave in accordance with a set of institutional norms -- those of corporate capitalism. To argue that national sentiments and the "national interest" would supplant the historical and inexorable norms of capitalist enterprise is to reveal an ignorance of the capitalist economy.... Capital responds to the international language of the bourse. Because the nationalities of the actors in the system have no place in the instrumental norms of capitalism, it is difficult to see how nationality affects the behaviour of those who govern a capitalist economy. 95

While the power of the economic and institutional elites in North America is substantial, it is subject to some important restraints. Recent changes in campaign financing laws in the United States and Canada have reduced the possible influence of corporate interests in this area. As part of the post-Watergate fallout, the U.S. Election

94 Porter, pp. 266-69.

95 Ibid., pp. 269-70.

Campaign Act of 1974 established limits on contributions and spending. Disclosure requirements were also strengthened. The most important innovation was the provision for public financing for all phases of the Presidential campaign. In the upcoming general election, the Republican and Democratic candidates will each receive approximately \$22 million in government funds obtained from the tax dollar check-off system. No direct private contributions are permitted. Thus, in regard to Presidential election campaign financing, the direct influence of big money and special interests has been negated.⁹⁶

In Canada, the Election Expenses Act of 1974 attempts to reduce spending by parties and candidates through imposing overall expenditure ceilings. A tax credit system is established to encourage donations from a wider number and range of citizens. There are also provisions for full disclosure of donors. In addition, a public subsidy is provided in the form of a reimbursement of a portion of the costs of candidates who gain at least 15% of the votes cast in a constituency. For example, in an electoral district of 80,000 voters, a candidate with permissible expenditures of approximately \$34,000 would be entitled to a subsidy of about \$12,000.⁹⁷ While not going as far as the American

⁹⁶ See King and Peabody, "Control of Presidential Campaign Financing", in Mansfield (ed.), Congress Against the President, pp. 180-95. While the Supreme Court has ruled part of this act unconstitutional, the provisions cited above were upheld.

⁹⁷ See Paltiel, pp. 201-208.

legislation, this new Canadian law may reduce the degree of corporate influence in this area.

As noted in Chapter I, for the concept of elite rule to be meaningful, the "three C's" must be present: group consciousness, coherence, and conspiracy.⁹⁸ While Porter was able to indicate that various Canadian elites share common backgrounds, he could not conclusively demonstrate (although it was implied) that such common backgrounds led automatically to common attitudes and values which would be reflected in similar policy preferences.⁹⁹ Bottomore contends that there is a lack of cohesion in many instances among both industrial and intellectual elites.¹⁰⁰ As indicated earlier, the mass media is often split on many issues. In addition, there are countervailing forces which, if united, can offer significant opposition to a divided economic and institutional elite (e.g., organized labour and a sympathetic President or Prime Minister). To the extent that the nongovernmental "power structure" is highly complex and diversified rather than unitary and monolithic, the political system is less subject to domination by the economic sphere.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ See James Meisel, The Myth of the Ruling Class.

⁹⁹ See Van Loon and Whittington, (2nd. ed.) p. 333.

¹⁰⁰ Bottomore, Elites and Society, p. 89.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Domhoff, The Higher Circles; Arnold Rose, The Power Structure.

The veto power postulated in the Private Economic-Institutional Power Model of Democratic Frustration is not absolute. Examples such as the introduction of a capital gains tax by the Liberals in Canada or the rejection of the SST programme in the United States are evidence of the ability of entrenched economic interests to lose individual political battles -- though not necessarily the more important economic and ideological "war." The existence of this major area of independent economic and institutional power is a crucial factor which no government, whatever its political inclinations, can ignore in the determination of public policy. The former chairman of the editorial board of the modern capitalist bible -- Fortune magazine -- has claimed that "Any President who wants to seek a prosperous country depends on the corporations at least as much -- probably more than -- the corporations depend on him. His dependence is not unlike that of King John on the landed barons at Runnymede, where Magna Carta was born."¹⁰² While the analogy may suffer from a degree of hyperbole, nevertheless, "The stress on the independent power of business, and on the dependence of government upon it, is altogether justified, not only for the United States but for all other advanced capitalist countries."¹⁰³

¹⁰² Quoted in Miliband, p. 132.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

CHAPTER V: EMPIRICAL TESTING-OF DEMOCRATIC LINKAGE AND FRUSTRATION

It is recognized that public opinion may in a few instances function in such a way as to direct the behavior of government officials in paths they otherwise would not have chosen -- the retirement of Lyndon B. Johnson in 1968 suggests the power of public opinion to alter behavior of a President who might otherwise have run for reelection. Yet in most instances it seems more likely that public opinion creates a general mood which is supportive or nonsupportive of decisions already made, or which will permit innovation within some broadly defined limits.

David Saffell¹

A. General Methodology

As indicated in the first chapter, "democracy" is defined in this thesis as the attainment of a general consistency between mass public opinion and public policy. The purpose of this section is to explain the procedure utilized in this study to empirically determine the degree of Democratic Linkage in the United States and Canada. Nine hypotheses will be proposed (in the following section) to consider factors possibly influencing the extent of consistency between mass opinion and government action.

As was seen in Chapter II, little concrete, reliable data exist (other than a handful of case studies) on the

¹ Saffell, The Politics of American National Government, p. 54.

specific relationship between public opinion and public policy on the federal level in North America. Thus, it was necessary for this researcher to create a moderately large body of aggregate data which allows the systematic empirical analysis of the opinion-policy nexus. In this chapter, the basic concepts are operationally defined as follows: (1) "public opinion" -- the distribution of national mass sentiment on selected "political linkage cases" (to be defined below) as determined by Gallup surveys; (2) "public policy" -- federal government actions or positions regarding selected "potential linkage cases" as indicated by legislative enactment or inaction, executive pronouncement or prerogative, major administrative decisions, and/or judicial review; (3) "Democratic Linkage scores" -- the frequency (converted to a percentage) with which government policies are consistent with public opinion on the "potential linkage cases" considered; (4) "Democratic Frustration scores" -- the frequency of cases indicating inconsistency between opinion and policy (reciprocal of Linkage score).

The appropriate cases for analysis -- termed "potential linkage cases" -- were chosen in the following manner. In determining which issues to select for the study of opinion-policy congruence, it was necessary that public opinion polls already be in existence regarding mass preferences on such issues. Therefore, the cases to be analyzed depended upon the scope of opinion surveys readily avail-

able to this researcher, i.e., only surveyed issues could be considered. To establish reasonable limitations to the number and range of cases examined, it was decided to restrict consideration to the latest ten-year period for which data was available (1965-1974). This researcher started with an initial survey base of all American and Canadian Gallup polls published during the decade chosen. Since this amounted to over 2,000 polls, some further legitimate means of narrowing the number of issues was necessary. Of course, not all matters on which Gallup surveys are taken concern politically relevant events (e.g., an opinion poll regarding views on the revealing, though non-political, topic of topless bathing suits). Thus, the logical criterion of political relevance was applied to all Gallup surveys in order to choose appropriate issues. Having narrowed the field of cases to politically relevant polls for the 1965-1974 period, a further "winnowing-out" process was applied on the basis of the following criteria: (1) since the concern of this thesis is linkage at the national level, the subject matter of the survey had to be within generally recognized federal government jurisdiction (e.g., this would exclude polls on the question of fluoridation of local water supplies); (2) the subject matter of the survey had to be specifically policy-oriented (e.g., this would exclude questions on party identification or pre-election polls); (3) events-prediction issues were excluded (e.g., questions asking whether unemployment

will get worse over the next year); (4) general attitudinal or evaluational issues were excluded (e.g., questions asking whether the United Nation is doing an effective job); (5) retrospective opinion questions regarding ex post facto approval or disapproval of previously made governmental decisions were excluded, since they may not be an accurate reflection of opinion on the issue concerned prior to the announcement of the government's policy. This is meant to prevent measuring what Hewitt refers to as a "phoney consensus", i.e., where the majority of the public approves the policy ~~option~~ only after it is announced.²

The surveys which remained following this process of elimination constituted the data base for the empirical testing of Democratic Linkage. By analyzing all relevant surveyed issues during the time span selected (as determined by the logical and relatively objective criteria outlined above), the possibility of bias in issue selection on the part of this researcher was significantly reduced. Each separate survey from the American and Canadian Institutes of Public Opinion (the Gallup organizations' official titles) which survived the aforementioned selection requirements is treated as a separate instance of public opinion-public policy congruence or deviation (i.e., a "potential linkage case") -- with two exceptions.

² See Christopher Hewitt, "Policy-Making in Postwar Britain: a Nation-Level Test of Elitist and Pluralist Hypotheses", British Journal of Political Science, vol. 4 (April 1974), pp. 194-95.

First, surveys on the same specific issue (e.g., support for or opposition to Chinese admission to the United Nations) within the same calendar year are averaged and treated as one survey result. This prevents more than one case of potential linkage on any one issue per calendar year. At the same time, highly salient issues which appear over a long time span (e.g., the Vietnam war), are considered as separate cases of potential linkage for each year they are polled. Thus, a built-in weighting system -- dependent upon the frequency and duration with which the Gallup organization surveys respondents on particular issues -- is established. This weighting is independent of the subjective judgments by this researcher as to the importance of one issue versus another. Reliance is placed upon professional polling organizations who presumably do not want to waste their time, money, and effort on irrelevant or non-salient issues. Thus, the questions asked most frequently, and over a long time period, are a reasonable reflection of expert opinion on the most relevant issues on which to check for public preferences.

Second, all sample surveys are subject to a degree of "sampling error", i.e., "the extent to which the results may differ from what would be obtained if the whole population has been interviewed." Samples of the size used by the Gallup organizations have a tolerance within 3% points

95% of the time.³ Therefore, all polls indicating 3% or less difference between majority and minority opinion were excluded from the sample of cases considered.

As a result of the previously mentioned "winnowing-out" criteria plus the application of the two exceptions noted above, 237 "potential linkage cases" (143 American and 94 Canadian) remained. Each of these "potential linkage cases" consists of the Gallup organization's finding of public opinion on a relevant political issue (over a calendar year) meeting all criteria and conditions already noted. For each case, the reported majority public opinion is compared with a characterization of ultimate public policy. If there is general congruence between opinion and policy in a "potential linkage case", it is classified as an instance of Democratic Linkage. If there is a basic inconsistency between mass preferences and government action, the case is designated as an example of Democratic Frustration. Thus, a nominal scale is established -- i.e., "a set of categories that is exhaustive (includes all cases) and mutually exclusive (no cases in more than one category)."⁴ Every "potential linkage case" is categorized as either an instance of general opinion-policy congruence or incongruence. The percentage of cases falling within these

³ See American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Political Index, reports # 79-117 (January 1972-March 1975).

⁴ Ted Gurr, Politemetrics, p. 60.

two categories yields the "Democratic Linkage and Frustration scores" referred to earlier.

In regard to the characterization of public policy for the cases considered, this process is not totally objective. Admittedly, the rating of government policy is an interpretive process -- though establishing a dichotomous designation of governmental action as tending toward either general consistency or inconsistency with public opinion is broad enough so as to allow agreement among most observers. A more refined scale for characterizing public policy, while allowing for consideration of nuances in various actions, also permits greater latitude for subjective and highly speculative interpretations. For this reason, the latter approach was rejected.

A second matter to consider in relation to policy characterization is the possibility of using "expert judges." In light of the number of cases involved in this study, it was considered unrealistic to expect even "experts" to have sufficient knowledge "off the top of their heads" to judge year-by-year changes in policy on over 200 specific issues. In-depth research regarding these issues is required in order to be confident of policy designations applied. This is the duty of the researcher who should not attempt to "pass the buck" to outside "experts." In addition, with the use of a panel of judges, Gurr notes:

The researcher seldom knows to what extent the judgments reflect biases and misinformation. The use of a number of judges is only a partial control for this factor. The judges may all share common biases.... Many, probably most, area and country experts intellectually resist making summary quantitative judgments because they think their subjects have subtleties that no set of scales could take into account. 5

A third matter to consider in public policy designation and its relationship to public opinion is the time-lag factor. When analyzing the impact of opinion on government action in this thesis, (as noted earlier) only opinion surveys taken prior to the policy decision are considered. But how long a period after the expression of public opinion manifested in a Gallup poll should one allow before making a final determination on the policy outcome? There is no obviously right or wrong answer to this perplexing question. Thus, this researcher has arbitrarily (though he hopes reasonably) adopted a maximum six month time-lag factor. This means that in determining the opinion-policy nexus on an issue, the government's actions up to one-half year following the date of the publication of the relevant Gallup survey will be considered -- allowing sufficient time for policy-makers to respond to explicit expressions of public opinion!

As indicated above, both the characterization of public opinion and public policy in this chapter is on a

⁵ Ibid., p. 83.

dichotomous basis. Majority opinion and public policy are designated as either supporting or opposing a particular issue. While some might object to this relatively simple division, Hennessey reminds us that "When public policy has to be made (when the issue has to be 'acted on' officially), a dichotomous voting situation is structured."⁶ The problems associated with further measurement "refinements" in the policy area have already been noted. In regard to more complex distinctions regarding public opinion, one of the nine hypotheses in this chapter considers the relevance of the degree of majority support or opposition on an issue.

Of methodological importance is the fact that the opinion-policy divisions utilized result in a nominal scale. Therefore, if one wishes to compare Democratic Linkage scores between the United States and Canada, or determine whether a minority versus a majority government yields a higher frequency of opinion-policy consistency, the level of measurement involves two nominal scales. This limits the procedures of data analysis that are available. As Blalock contends:

The use of a particular mathematical model presupposes that a certain level of measurement has been attained.... The common arithmetic operations, for example, can ordinarily be used only with interval and ratio scales....

⁶ Bernard Hennessey, Public Opinion (2nd. ed.), p. 27.

It is not legitimate to use a mathematical system involving the operations of addition or subtraction when this is not warranted by the method of measurement.... Ideally, one should make use of a data-gathering technique that permits the lowest levels of measurement, if these are all the data will yield, rather than using techniques which force a scale on the data. ⁷

This researcher accepts the "conservative" advice of Blalock and rejects the more exotic trends toward methodological permissiveness and empirical promiscuity euphemistically referred to by supporters as "empirical sophistication." The use of nominal variables and the resulting limitation on measurement techniques is considered acceptable in order to obtain results which -- though statistically "primitive" -- can be utilized with some degree of confidence. The advantages in measurement procedures gained by establishing interval scales to determine policy and opinion designations are outweighed, in this researcher's view, by the disadvantages that result from falsely assuming the existence of objective, easily identifiable, commonly accepted, equal interval data when in actuality the opposite is more likely the situation in this subject area.

A final conundrum to consider is the issue of causality. Rosenau suggests:

Regardless of the researcher's purpose, whether it be to improve the operation of democratic theory or

⁷ Hubert Blalock, Social Statistics. (2nd. ed.), pp. 21, 24.

the predictiveness of scientific theory, ultimately his attention will turn to questions of causality. He will want to know why opinions circulate as they do, or why public policy is responsive to public opinion in the way that it is. And in considering these "whys", the researcher unavoidably confronts the problem of charting the flow of influence, since this is the concept used to describe causality in social interaction.... One cannot manipulate the variables that would reveal which groups or persons...exercise influence over the formulation of...policy. Rather, the most one can do is to examine the behavior which appears to be a function of the opinion-policy relationship, and then deduce from that behavior those factors which seem to have been responsible for the influence in question.... In other words,...we can only observe behavior and infer therefrom which influences are operative. 8

The finding of a high degree of consistency between public opinion and public policy for the cases considered in this study would not necessarily establish a causal relationship between mass preferences and governmental action. An alternative explanation could be that elites are extraordinarily successful in molding mass opinion to agree with their values and policy predilections. As noted in Chapter II, however, mass opinion is influenced by a number of often conflicting forces in the formation process, precluding any one factor from dominating to an overwhelming extent. In addition, it has been recognized throughout this work that the opinion-policy relationship is not uni-directional and any simplistic notion of causality is unrealistic. Nevertheless, it is contended that when

⁸ Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, pp. 10-11.

considerable agreement between opinion and policy exists on an issue, it is reasonable to raise the inference that actual Democratic Linkage processes are functioning as indicated in the four proposed models. Whether congruence between public preferences and governmental action is also partially a result of the ability of governmental and/or nongovernmental elites to manipulate public opinion is an intriguing, though largely unmeasurable, possibility. As

V.O. Key explains:

Government...attempts to mold public opinion toward support of the programs and policies it espouses. Given that endeavor, a perfect congruence between public policy and public opinion could be government of public opinion rather than government by public opinion. One can never be certain of the extent to which the parallelism of government action and public preferences results from governmental influence on opinion and to what extent it results from the adjustment of public policy to bring it into accord with public opinion. 9

Since (as noted before) this study precludes the use of ex post facto surveys (e.g., a poll taken in early 1971 regarding the wisdom of the imposition of the War Measures Act a few months earlier), the possibility of measuring a "phoney consensus" is reduced. Thus, when congruence between opinion and policy is found in a particular case, the possibility that it is a consequence of Democratic Linkage processes is enhanced. Assuming that cause and effect are time-dependent, it is reasonable to suppose

⁹ Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, pp. 422-23.

that if condition "x" (manifestation of majority opinion on an issue) regularly precedes "y" (government adoption of a policy consistent with majority opinion on that same issue), it is a likely cause of "y."¹⁰

B. Democratic Linkage-Frustration Hypotheses

The prime issue to be considered in an empirical analysis of democracy in North America is the extent to which the majority preferences on political issues are faithfully reflected in the policies adopted by the governments concerned. On the basis of the models of powerful elite influence examined in Chapter IV, it is hypothesized that (HYPOTHESIS #1): A SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE OF DEMOCRATIC FRUSTRATION OCCURS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA. "Substantial degree of Democratic Frustration" is operationally defined as a finding of inconsistency between mass opinion and government policy in at least 40% of all cases. If such a result is found, it would not be subject to the causality problems noted above. Inconsistency between opinion and policy can only be interpreted as a breakdown of the democratic processes -- through the inadequacies of the various Democratic Linkage procedures and/or the successes of the Frustration mechanisms of elite rule. To the extent this democratic failure occurs for over 40% of all

¹⁰ See Gurr, p. 161. This does not, of course, exclude the possibility of a third intervening factor being a causative agent.

issues analyzed, this researcher feels it is reasonable to characterize such thwarting of democracy as "substantial."

The second issue of importance is the comparative degree of Democratic Linkage found in the United States versus Canada, i.e., which country is more democratic. It is contended that (HYPOTHESIS #2): DEMOCRATIC LINKAGE SCORES WILL BE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA. The term "substantially the same" is operationally defined as the lack of a statistically significant difference at the .05 level. This hypothesis is based on the detailed evaluation of the models of Democratic Linkage and Frustration discussed in the previous chapters. In brief, it was determined that the Electoral Mandate and Interest Group Politics models apply, to an approximately equal extent, in both Canada and the United States. There is clearly a much greater opportunity for Linkage to result in Canada from the Party Government Model, while the Constituency Communication paradigm appears more applicable in the American context. Considering the modes of Frustration, both the Trustee Role and Private Economic-Institutional Power Models apply to a significant extent throughout North America. The Judicial Power Model has greater explanatory utility in regard to the United States, while the Bureaucratic Power Model has more relevance to the Canadian scene. Thus, though different models of Democratic Linkage and Frustration have varying degrees of

applicability in the United States and Canada, it is postulated by this researcher that the overall impact of these processes of fulfilling and denying democracy is relatively the same. There is no reason, based on the analysis in the preceding chapters, to expect a wide variance in the degree of consistency between opinion and policy for the two countries concerned. However, it should be stressed, the specific processes yielding these anticipated comparable results would differ to the extent examined in earlier chapters.

The remaining hypotheses consider various factors which could be of importance in affecting the degree of Democratic Linkage that is attainable. HYPOTHESIS #3: DEMOCRATIC LINKAGE SCORES WILL BE HIGHER FOR ISSUES OF HIGH SALIENCE THAN FOR LOW SALIENCE ISSUES. Two rough indicators for the independent variable of issue salience are utilized: (1) the percentage of survey respondents who were unable to give a reply to a question because they had no opinion or did not know enough about the issue to offer a view; (2) polls specifically indicating whether particular issues were seen as critical or major problems in the country. This more direct measure, unfortunately, was not as readily available and only a few of the surveys used asked for such specific responses.¹¹ As a consequence,

¹¹ Mildred Schwartz uses similar indicators of salience in her study; see Public Opinion and Canadian Identity, p. 218.

in the absence of direct measures of saliency on an issue, the term "high salience issue" is operationally defined as one with less than 10% of respondents giving "no opinion" and/or "don't know" responses in a particular poll. Issues of "low salience", therefore, constitute those cases with 10% or more of the public unable or unwilling to express an opinion. It is assumed in this hypothesis that as an issue becomes more salient for more individuals, opinions begin to form and people tend to become committed to taking a position on the issue. As Best claims, "At its height, the issue will find everyone holding some opinions on it with some intensity."¹² If this is true, then the mass public would be more likely to utilize Democratic Linkage mechanisms to express their views on issues of great importance or salience to them. The perceived meaningfulness of an issue may force otherwise reluctant public officials to yield to public pressure in such instances for fear of electoral retribution or because expressions of mass opinion are more demonstrative on issues of high salience.

HYPOTHESIS #4: DEMOCRATIC LINKAGE SCORES WILL BE HIGHER FOR CASES OF LANDSLIDE MAJORITY THAN FOR CASES OF SIMPLE MAJORITY OPINION. The concept "landslide majority"

¹² James Best, Public Opinion, p. 161.

is operationally defined as "potential linkage cases" involving over 60% majority opinion regarding an issue. "Simple majority", therefore, constitutes mass support or opposition on an issue of 60% or less. The rationale behind this hypothesis is that to the extent public opinion has relevance in the policy-making process, an overwhelming degree of majority opinion regarding an issue ought to carry greater weight and thus be more effective in influencing public policy.

HYPOTHESIS #5: DEMOCRATIC LINKAGE SCORES WILL BE HIGHER FOR DOMESTIC THAN FOR FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. For the purposes of this hypothesis, Rosenau's definition of "foreign policy" as an issue area will be used: "We mean all the controversies within a society that, at any moment in time, are being waged over the way in which the society is attempting to maintain or alter its external environment."¹³ The rationale for this hypothesis is based upon the frequently espoused, though largely unproven, assumption in the international relations, ~~public opinion~~, and elite literature that foreign policy is less susceptible to the pressures of public opinion.¹⁴ For example, Domhoff contends: "None of the factors often of importance in domestic

¹³ Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, p. 412.

¹⁴ See Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy; Erikson and Luttbeg, American Public Opinion, pp. 50-54.

issues -- Congress, labor, public opinion -- has anything but an occasional and minor effect on foreign policy. If there is one issue-area truly and solely the domain of the power elite, it is foreign policy."¹⁵ This hypothesis is meant to test if such assumptions are empirically valid.

HYPOTHESIS #6: DEMOCRATIC FRUSTRATION SCORES WILL BE HIGHER FOR DOMESTIC REDISTRIBUTIVE THAN FOR NON-REDISTRIBUTIVE ISSUES. The term "domestic redistributive issues" designates those non-foreign policy issues involving a potential redistribution of economic or political advantage or power in society (e.g., issues concerning nationalization of energy resources, a guaranteed annual income, wage-price controls, income tax reform, a national Presidential primary). Such issues challenge those forces, outlined in Chapter IV, which benefit from existing inequalities in political and economic power. Since "redistributive" issues strike at the heart of elitism, it can be expected that on these types of issues, more than any others, economic and political elites will attempt to frustrate the popular will.

HYPOTHESIS #7: DEMOCRATIC LINKAGE SCORES WILL BE HIGHER IN CANADA UNDER A MINORITY THAN UNDER A MAJORITY GOVERNMENT. For the purposes of this hypothesis, all Canadian

¹⁵ Domhoff, The Higher Circles: The Governing Class in America, pp. 111-112.

"potential linkage cases" are divided into two categories: (1) minority government period (January 1965-June 1968, November 1972-July 1974) and (2) majority government period (July 1968- October 1972, August-December 1974). It is suggested that in a minority government situation, the constant threat of electoral sanction will yield a higher degree of responsiveness on the part of elected officials and therefore greater opinion-policy consistency.

HYPOTHESIS #8: DEMOCRATIC LINKAGE SCORES WILL BE HIGHER IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER SAME-PARTY THAN SPLIT-PARTY CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT. The term "same-party control" refers to the situation in which both houses of Congress and the Presidency are controlled by the same political party (1965-68). Therefore, "split-party control" refers to instances where one party occupies the White House but the other party has a majority of seats in Congress (1969-74). It is postulated that "split-party" control of legislative and executive branches in the United States further weakens the ability of the Party Government process to function. The well-known concept of "checks and balances" reaches its apex in such instances and thus, it is suggested, affords a greater likelihood of stalemate and frustration of democracy.

HYPOTHESIS #9: DEMOCRATIC FRUSTRATION SCORES WILL BE HIGHER FOR JUDICIALLY THAN FOR NON-JUDICIALLY DECIDED CASES. The rationale for this hypothesis rests upon the Judicial

Power Model examined in Chapter IV.

The data created and utilized in testing these hypotheses can be found in the Appendix.

C. Results and Discussion

To determine whether the distributions considered below are statistically significant (at .05 level), the chi-square test of significance was utilized.¹⁶ However, while conforming to standard politimetric procedure in this regard, this researcher wishes to stress the major limitations of significance testing. First, data in political science rarely fully satisfy the requirements of such tests. Significance testing is usually appropriate "only when applied to information derived from random samples, and many tests further require that the measured properties of those samples be normally distributed. Since these requirements are seldom met by macropolitical data, the interpretation of significance levels is problematic."¹⁷

A second noticeable failing of significance tests is that "They are not as important for the kinds of research that interest us as we are usually led to believe by the texts or the published literature."¹⁸ As Tufte

¹⁶ See Blalock, chap. 15.

¹⁷ Gurr, p. 129.

¹⁸ Ibid.

explains: "Probability levels and test statistics tell us very little about the strength and nothing about the substantive significance of a relationship. The important question is 'Does the result show a relationship which is of substantive interest because of its nature and magnitude?' Significance tests are silent on this matter."¹⁹ It is with this caveat in mind that the analysis of the nine hypotheses under consideration now begins.

Hypotheses #1 and 2: Comparison and Degree of Democracy

Table 5.1 (below) shows the relevant results for the first two hypotheses. As predicted in Hypothesis #1, a "substantial degree" of Democratic Frustration does occur in the United States and Canada. In fact, for both countries, in an absolute majority of cases mass opinion and public policy were found to be inconsistent. As sug-

TABLE 5.1 Democratic Linkage and Frustration in the United States and Canada						
Country	Dem. Link. cases		Dem. Frus. cases		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
U. S. A.	67	47	76	53	143	100
Canada	42	45	52	55	94	100
Total	109	46	128	54	237	100

gested earlier, the explanation for such a result lies in the modes of elite power analyzed in Chapter IV as

¹⁹ Quoted in Gurr, p. 129.

well as the inadequacies of present Democratic Linkage mechanisms already examined in Chapter III. In interpreting this finding, one is faced with the question: If mass opinion is not shaping public policy in a majority of instances in North America, what factors are? The most reasonable alternatives are suggested in the political and economic elite paradigms of Democratic Frustration. Analysis of subsequent hypotheses may allow determination of which Frustration mechanisms are most prominent.

From the perspective of democratic theory, the finding of a substantial degree of Democratic Frustration is, ironically, both encouraging as well as discouraging. As previously discussed, a high degree of consistency between mass opinion and government action could be caused by an extremely successful effort on the part of elites to structure mass opinion to agree with their preferences -- a false consistency between opinion and policy being the result. By the same token, the very fact that mass opinion differs from ultimate policy in a majority of the cases analyzed is dramatic evidence of the failure of elites in a significant number of cases to mold public opinion to share the elites' values. The positive sign in the otherwise generally depressing finding of a significant lack of Democratic Linkage is the apparent inability of elites to successfully manipulate mass preferences so as to create

a docile, malleable, mass public which is supportive of elite policy preferences. While elites appear successful in determining policy formation in a majority of cases, they are not as successful in controlling opinion formation. As long as views independent of and contrary to elite preferences can prevail among the masses, the conflictive nature of politics (referred to in Chapter II); and not the integrative, consensual view, appears more applicable.

As predicted in Hypothesis #2, Democratic Linkage scores are substantially the same in the United States (47%) and Canada (45%). The small difference between them is not statistically significant (at the .05 level). Thus, despite structural differences between the American and Canadian political systems, the degree of democracy in both countries is essentially the same. The expectation based on the comparative analysis of the various Democratic Linkage and Frustration models has been confirmed.

The large minority of cases indicating congruence between opinion and policy allows an inference of the successful operation of democratic processes for these issues. Yet, for majority opinion to prevail in only a minority of instances in so-called "democracies" raises severe problems to be discussed in the final chapter. Of importance at this point is to note that previous published assumptions regarding the comparative responsiveness of American and Canadian political systems to public opinion

are not validated. Thus Van Loon and Whittington's untested contention that there is even less correspondence between public opinion and policy in Canada than the United States is not supported by the findings in this thesis.²⁰ The same is true of Tom Truman's undocumented assertion: "American political institutions are clearly much more sensitive to public opinion in the constituencies and in the nation than their...Canadian counterparts."²¹ These authors, like too many political scientists, stress the obvious, though often superficial, differences in "democratic" political institutions between the United States and Canada while virtually ignoring the more important similarities in economic and political mechanisms for frustrating democracy. It is these similarities, this researcher suggests, that explain, in large part, the comparable degree of Democratic Linkage in the American and Canadian polities.

Hypothesis #3: Issue Saliency

Tables 5.2 and 5.3 (next page) show the results for the third hypothesis. For the United States, as expected, the Democratic Linkage scores are indeed much higher for issues of high saliency (56%) than for low saliency issues (34%). The results are statistically significant.

²⁰ See Van Loon and Whittington, The Canadian Political System (1st. ed.), p. 73.

²¹ Tom Truman, "A Critique of Seymour M. Lipset's Article, 'Value Differences, Absolute or Relative: The English-Speaking Democracies'", in Kruhlak, et al. (eds.), The Canadian Political Process (rev. ed.), p. 46.

icant. For the Canadian cases considered, the results are not in the same direction as the American findings (i.e., high salience issues have a lower Democratic Linkage score). These contradictory results are not easily explicable.

TABLE 5.2

Democratic Linkage and Degree of Issue Salience--U.S.A.

Degree of Salience	Dem.Link.cases		Dem.Frus.cases		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
High	46	56	36	44	82	100
Low	21	34	40	66	61	100
Total	67	47.	76	53.	143	100

TABLE 5.3

Democratic Linkage and Degree of Issue Salience--Canada

Degree of Salience	Dem.Link.cases		Dem.Frus.cases		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
High	14	32	30	68	44	100
Low	28	56	22	44	50	100
Total	42	49	52	55	94	100

As noted earlier, the increased meaningfulness and visibility of highly salient issues (in the U.S.) results in increased utilization of and responsiveness to Democratic Linkage mechanisms. In Kingdon's study of the relationship between congressional voting and constituency opinion²² (see pp. 71-3 of thesis), he found that high-

²² Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions, pp. 43-4.

salience issues occupied a special place -- namely, that the probability of a congressman voting consistently with his constituency is significantly greater with high salience issues than with issues of medium or low salience. The results of this hypothesis (at least for the American cases) are consistent with this previous finding. However, it should be stressed that even for highly salient issues, a substantial degree of Democratic Frustration (44% in the United States and 68% in Canada) exists.

Hypothesis #4: Degree of Majority Opinion

Tables 5.4 and 5.5 indicate the results for Hypothesis #4.

TABLE 5.4						
<u>Democratic Linkage and Degree of Majority Opinion--U.S.A.</u>						
Degree of	Dem.Link.cases		Dem.Frus.cases		Total	
<u>Maj. Opin.</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Landslide majority	27	43	36	57	63	100
Simple majority	40	50.	40	50.	80	100
Total	67	47.	76	53.	143	100

TABLE 5.5						
<u>Democratic Linkage and Degree of Majority Opinion--Can.</u>						
Degree of	Dem.Link.cases		Dem.Frus.cases		Total	
<u>Maj. Opin.</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Landslide majority	15	40.	23	60.	38	100
Simple majority	27	48	29	52	56	100
Total	42	45	52	55	94	100

Contrary to what was predicted, Democratic Linkage scores are not higher for cases of "landslide majority" (i.e., over 60%) than for cases of "simple majority" opinion. In fact, for the United States and Canada, cases reflecting less than a "landslide majority" indicate a marginally greater degree of Linkage. In both countries, the differences between "simple" and "landslide majority" opinion are not statistically significant. Therefore, it appears that the degree of majority opinion expressed in opposition to or in support of a particular issue is not a relevant independent variable in the decision-making process. This provides a further indication of the gap between democratic myth and reality. It is further proof of the inability of even an overwhelming proportion of the mass population to implement its wishes over the apparent objection of elite forces in society.

Hypothesis #5: Foreign Policy vs. Domestic Issues

The results for the fifth hypothesis are shown in tables 5.6 and 5.7 (next page). As with the previous hypothesis, the results are not as anticipated. Democratic Linkage scores in both Canada and the United States are actually higher (though not to a statistically significant extent) for foreign policy than domestic issues. Thus, those writers who have proclaimed that foreign policy is outside the domain of public opinion influence (as com-

TABLE 5.6
Democratic Linkage and Foreign Policy vs. Domestic Issues
U.S.A.

type of issue	Dem.Link.cases		Dem.Frus.cases		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Foreign pol.	26	54	22	46	48	100
Domestic	41	43	54	57	95	100
Total	67	47	76	53	143	100

TABLE 5.7
Democratic Linkage and Foreign Policy vs. Domestic Issues
Canada

type of issue	Dem.Link.cases		Dem.Frus.cases		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Foreign pol.	13	59	9	41	22	100
Domestic	29	40	43	60	72	100
Total	42	49	52	55	94	100

pared to domestic issues) are not supported by the findings of this hypothesis.²³ In fact, since the Judicial Power Model virtually ceases to operate in regard to foreign policy matters (1 case), the chance of greater Democratic Linkage in this area seems possible. Though the number of cases is small, it appears that Peyton Lyon is correct (in regard to the Canadian results) in observing that Canadian politicians do pay considerable attention to public opinion in the formulation of defence and foreign policy.²⁴ Still, it

²³ See Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy; Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy.

²⁴ See Lyon, The Policy Question, p. x.

must be stressed that 42% of the Canadian foreign policy cases resulted in a policy inconsistent with mass opinion.

Hypothesis #6: Redistributive Issues

The sixth hypothesis suggested that Democratic Frustration would be higher for domestic "redistributive" issues (i.e., cases involving the likely alteration, to some extent, of economic wealth or political power in society) than for non-redistributive issues (e.g., the establishment of lower speed limits or mandatory seat belt laws, gun control, capital punishment). The results attained for both the United States and Canada support this hypothesis (see Tables 5.8 and 5.9 on next page). To an extent that is statistically significant, cases involving "redistributive" matters indicate a substantially higher degree of Democratic Frustration.

These results illustrate the success of the elite forces in North American society in maintaining their disproportionate share of power. These findings appear to verify the processes outlined in Chapter IV, particularly the Private Economic-Institutional Power Model of Democratic Frustration. If the failure of Democratic Linkage is simply a random event, one would not expect such dramatic results regarding the types of issues subject to overwhelming degrees of Democratic Frustration. On issues which could potentially alter existing income or power inequality,

TABLE 5.8

Democratic Frustration and Redistributive Issues--U.S.A.

type of issue	Dem.Link.cases		Dem.Frus.cases		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Redistrib.	20	40	30	60	50	100
Non-redist.	47	51	46	49	93	100
Total	67	47	76	53	143	100

TABLE 5.9

Democratic Frustration and Redistributive Issues--Canada

type of issue	Dem.Link.cases		Dem.Frus.cases		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Redistrib.	12	27	32	73	44	100
Non-redist.	30	60	20	40	50	100
Total	42	45	52	55	94	100

mass preferences are thwarted in 60% of the cases in the United States and 73% in Canada. Theodore Lowi, in suggesting his three-fold typology of policy outputs (distribution, regulation, and redistribution), claims that the political activity involved in economic "redistributive" matters results in a conflictual political environment. As he explains: "The participants in this arena are in conflict over major group -- or class -- interests. This conflict is between the 'elite', representing the 'ruling class', and the... 'outsiders'.... The welfare state battle of the 1930s in the United States illustrates this type of policy, the actors confronting one another with entirely

different value premises."²⁵ Thus, it is contended that the results obtained in this hypothesis substantiate the view of elite versus mass confrontation in policy-making outlined in the Preface and Chapter II of this thesis.

Hypothesis #7: Minority vs. Majority Government

The seventh hypothesis suggested that Democratic Linkage scores would be higher in Canada in a minority than a majority government situation. In fact, the actual results (see Table 5.10 below) indicate there is no difference between Democratic Linkage scores during a minority as opposed to a majority government tenure. Contrary

TABLE 5.10						
<u>Democratic Linkage and Minority vs. Majority Government</u>						
type of	Dem.Link.cases		Dem.Frus.cases		Total	
government	N	%	N	%	N	%
Majority	26	43	32	55	58	100
Minority	16	44	20	56	36	100
Total	42	43	52	55	94	100

to what is often contended, the type of government in power appears to be irrelevant regarding the consistency achieved between mass opinion and public policy. These results raise questions as to the viability of the fear of immediate electoral sanction (which supposedly exists in minority

²⁵ Levi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory", World Politics, vol. 16 (July 1964), p. 695.

governments) as a motivating force to increase political responsiveness.

Hypothesis #8: Same-Party vs. Split-Party Government

It was suggested in Hypothesis #8 that Democratic Linkage scores would be higher in the United States during "same-party" as opposed to "split-party" control of government. The results (shown in Table 5.11) run counter to what was anticipated. There is actually a greater degree of Democratic Linkage during divided control of American government (though the difference is not statistically significant).

TABLE 5.11						
<u>Democratic Linkage and Same-Party vs. Split-Party Gov.</u>						
type of	Dem.Link.cases		Dem.Prus.cases		Total	
government	N	%	N	%	N	%
Same-party	223	43	30	57	53	100
Split-party	444	49	46	51	90	100
Total	667	47.5	76	53.5	143	100

Observers of the American political system have long concluded that instances of divided government lead to stagnation and the inability of either party to fulfill its policy goals. However, these results provide the impetus for speculation on the conditions under which divided government may result in more responsive governmental action. One such condition could be the case in

which the policy under consideration is perceived to be popular among the mass public -- especially in an election year. In such a situation, rather than producing stagnation, "split-party" government may encourage each party to "beat the other to the punch" and take credit for the enactment of proposed legislation. A common example is a proposal for a token reduction in income taxes around election time.²⁶

Hypothesis #9: Judicially Decided Issues

The ninth hypothesis contended that Democratic Frustration would be higher for judicially than for non-judicially decided issues. The results obtained substantiate this hypothesis (see Table 5.12). To a statistically

TABLE 5.12
Democratic Frustration and Judicially Decided Issues--U.S.A.

type of issue	Dem.Link.cases		Dem.Frus.cases		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Judicial	7	35	13	68	20	100
Non-jud.	60	59	69	59	129	100
Total	67	47.2	76	53.5	143	100

significant extent, cases decided by the United States Supreme Court indicate substantially lower responsiveness to mass preferences than non-Supreme Court related issues. Thus, the Judicial Power Model is supported (for the United States) by these findings.

²⁶ Kingdon, p. 175.

For Canada, only three cases were found which involved judicially-decided issues (see Appendix, section B, cases# 15, 55, 75). Therefore, the lack of sufficient data precludes any generalizations based upon hypothesis #9.

Application of Linkage-Frustration Models

While this chapter has focused on stark, aggregate data and generalizations regarding the degree (or lack thereof) of democracy in North America, it is appropriate to briefly examine how the models proposed in Chapters III and IV can be applied to individual cases of Democratic Linkage and Frustration.

In Canada, an issue of consistently high salience and Democratic Frustration is the abolition of the death penalty (see Appendix, section B, cases# 23-26). During both minority and majority governments, and despite the degree of majority support for capital punishment, the majority will did not prevail for the decade under consideration in this study. During this period, all major party leaders supported abolition. Together with the provision of a "free vote" in Parliament on the issue, the public was prevented from using the Party Model of Linkage (probably the most important in the Canadian context). While some interest groups (notably police associations) have campaigned against abolition of the death penalty, mass sentiment has been expressed most clearly through the mechanisms outlined in the Constituency Communication Model: a petition with over half a million signatures

(see p. 152 of thesis) and numerous public opinion polls indicating up to 80% support for capital punishment. Despite the fact that Parliament rejected an all-party private members' resolution for outright abolition in April of 1966, and never voted total abolition during the time period covered by this thesis, no executions occurred. Given the nonredistributive nature of this case, and the lack of judicial or bureaucratic determination, this policy outcome is a clear example of the Trustee Model of Democratic Frustration.

In the United States, the issue of school busing has fostered a significant lack of democratic responsiveness (see Appendix, section A, cases #9,10). Despite clear majority opposition to forced busing to achieve racial integration, the policy persists. Mass sentiment has been expressed through the electoral, party, and group processes as well as various means of Constituency Communication. The mode of Frustration is not bureaucratic or economic elites but the power of the judiciary to impose its view of public policy in spite of elected officials and public sentiment. For the issues of capital punishment and busing in Canada and the United States, respectively, Democratic Linkage mechanisms have clearly portrayed mass preferences. The failure to attain a representative policy resulted from the application of the Trustee and Judicial Power Models and not the inadequacies of Linkage processes, per se.

A second Canadian example is that of nationalization of energy resources. Mass sentiment, as expressed in 1973,

was in favour of such a policy. However, with no political party taking a clear, forthright position in support of such a socialist stance (plus the obvious opposition of private economic elites to this kind of proposal), it is not surprising that such a redistributive issue should reflect the denial of majority opinion.

Two examples of Democratic Linkage can be found in the passage, in the U.S., of Medicare and voting rights legislation of 1965. Both issues were part of the 1964 Presidential campaign -- a relatively ideological election by American standards. The electoral and party processes plus the use of marches and demonstrations (i.e., forms of Constituency Communication) in the civil rights field apparently were successful in implementing mass preferences for these two cases.

In conclusion, it should be stressed that the data gathered and created for this thesis emphasized overall relationships between opinion and policy rather than case studies of the specific application of the eight-fold matrix of Linkage and Frustration processes. Therefore, any attempt to apply specific cases to these models (given the lack of existing data and case studies) can only be speculative. In addition, since the models of Linkage and Frustration are not totally independent (i.e., they interact), attempts to locate a sole process as being determinative can be misleading and counterproductive.

CHAPTER VI: DENOUEMENT

I have written, and then thrown away, several endings to this book. Over all of them there hung that fatality of last chapters, in which every idea seems to find its place, and all the mysteries, that the writer has not forgotten, are unravelled. In politics the hero does not live happily ever after, or end his life perfectly. There is no concluding chapter, because the hero in politics has more future before him than there is recorded history behind him. The last chapter is merely a place where the writer imagines that the polite reader has begun to look furtively at his watch.

Walter Lippmann¹

The elusive spectre of elitism achieves chilling concreteness when one ponders the findings outlined in the previous chapter. The attainment of Democratic Linkage -- a general consistency between mass opinion and public policy -- occurs in less than half the cases for the United States and Canada. In relation to "redistributive" issues, majority opinion is thwarted in almost two-thirds of all instances examined. It is time to recognize the fraudulent nature of "democracy" in North America. In addition to unmasking closet elitists and democratic revisionists who either desire or are resigned to elite rule, this thesis challenges the all too prevalent facile assumptions of

¹ Lippmann, Public Opinion, p. 411.

simple-minded democrats who presume democracy functions because of the existence of the pre-conditions (e.g., political parties, elections).

Treated frankly as a social myth, rule by public opinion holds implications of great significance for the political system. The belief in the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is no less important in so-called "communist" nations than "government by public opinion" is for so-called "democratic" countries. Yet, it has been easier for North American political scientists and laymen alike to see through this former phrase as an inadequate description of fact than to note the comparable limitations in the theory of popular government. In neither instance does the present significance of the concept rest in its accurate description of governmental behaviour. Rather, it lies in the realm of ideology, where it exerts its influence on the minds of men. In regard to the value of public opinion as a social myth, Pendleton Herring has observed: "As with all symbols, meaning is not to be found in the thing itself as a logical concept but rather in its effectiveness for evoking loyalties and sanctioning rule."²

² Herring, "The Value of Public Opinion As a Social Myth", in Christenson and McWilliams (eds.), Voice of the People, pp. 47-49.

One of the main purposes of the Democratic Linkage-Frustration approach utilized in this work is to defoliate the mythological and ideological underbrush obscuring the reality of "democratic rule" in North America. By utilizing a redefinition of democracy which stresses policy outcomes, it is possible to travel, analytically and empirically, behind the facade of democratic institutions. It was contended in Chapter I that the existence of civil liberties, competing political parties, and honest elections were not enough to justify a state being termed "democratic." The four models of Democratic Linkage, illustrating the potential modes of transmitting mass opinion into consistent public policy, demonstrate the gap between democratic possibility and reality on an analytical plane. But the heuristic utility of this perspective lies in the fact that unlike previous studies in this field, it goes beyond the mere consideration of the mechanisms capable of achieving a close relationship between mass preferences and government action. In suggesting the four paradigms of elite rule -- Democratic Frustration -- it is recognized that the failure of democracy does not result simply from the inadequacies in the processes of Democratic Linkage. As previously indicated, public opinion polls provide an excellent means for policy-makers to achieve a high rate of consistency between opinion and government action. The crucial point

is that because of the acceptance of the "trustee" role concept by many decision-makers, the excessive power of unelected and unrepresentative governmental institutions -- the judiciary and the bureaucracy, and the inevitable inequalities of private wealth and power which accrue in a capitalist system, even if the mechanisms of Democratic Linkage functioned to their optimum extent there is no guarantee that democracy will succeed.

This view is enhanced, in this researcher's opinion, by the findings of the last chapter, especially in regard to the apparent irrelevance of the degree of majority opinion on an issue, the manifestation of elite blockage of majority opinion in "redistributive" cases, and the support for the Judicial Power model. It is the empirical aspect of the approach used in this thesis that allows one to go beyond mere speculation and attempt to explain and quantify the actual degree of democracy on a comparative basis. One does not have to rely upon simplistic, impressionistic, and often false assumptions about the role of public opinion in the policy-making process. As indicated by the results reported in Chapter V, many of the cherished, untested presumptions in this area (e.g., that foreign policy is less susceptible to the influence of public opinion, or that the existence of a minority government will affect the degree of responsiveness to

public opinion) are not supported. While this does not mean that these suppositions are totally false, it does force a healthy skepticism regarding the automatic acceptance of political "folk wisdom."

The findings in the last chapter also appear to confirm the contention that the policy-making process is not one of consensus. Conflictual as well as integrative social forces interact. The mass public does not mechanistically reflect elite preferences. As a result, the long-term implications of the Linkage failure which is occurring are significant. As Easton speculates:

If the authorities in the system are unable or unwilling to meet the demands of the members in some determinable proportions..., ultimately we could expect that this situation would breed a high and ever-increasing state of discontent. In due course, if the demands continued to be thwarted or denied, the disaffection of the members who count might also spill over to the regime.... "Output failure", as we might call the result of the unwillingness or inability to meet demands, would tend in the direction of undermining support for the system, a characteristic kind of stress for a system.... To the extent that demands are unfilled, they would have important consequences for the input of support. ³

In quantifying the extent of the denial of democracy in the supposedly "democratic" societies of North America, and in proposing models for assessing the modes of interaction that cause the Linkage and Frustration of mass opinion, this thesis takes important steps in analyzing

³ David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, pp. 119-120.

ISSUE	YEAR	OPIN.	POLICY	CODING
67. Inauguration/election dates changed (Nov./Sept., respectively)	73	S	O	DF,LS,LM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
68. Income tax surcharge	67	O	S	DF,LS,LM,D,R,SAP,NJ
69. Marijuana, legalization of	69	O	O	DL,HS,LM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
70. Marijuana, legalized	72	O	O	DL,HS,LM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
71. Marijuana, legalized	73	O	O	DL,HS,LM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
72. Marijuana, legalized	74	O	O	DL,HS,LM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
73. Medicare	65	S	S	DL,HS,LM,D,R,SAP,NJ
74. Mercy killing	73	S	O	DF,HS,SM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
75. Middle East policy, aid for Arabs	74	O	S	DF,LS,LM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
76. Middle East policy, non-intervention	69	S	O	DF,LS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
77. Middle East policy, non-intervention	70	S	O	DF,LS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
78. Middle East, supply arms to Israel	67	S	S	DL,LS,SM,F,NR,SAP,NJ
79. Middle East, supply arms to Israel	74	O	S	DF,LS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
80. Minimum wage raised	65	S	S	DL,HS,SM,D,R,SAP,NJ
81. Miscegenation, laws forbidding	67	O	O	DL,HS,SM,D,NR,SAP,J
82. Nationalization of railroads	73	O	O	DL,LS,SM,D,R,SPP,NJ
83. NATO troop reduction	73	S	O	DF,LS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
84. Nixon, impeachment of	74	S	S	DL,LS,SM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
85. Nixon, resignation of	73	O	O	DL,LS,SM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
86. Nixon, resignation of	74	S	S	DL,HS,SM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
87. Obscenity, community setting own standards	73	S	S	DL,HS,SM,D,NR,SPP,J

APPENDIX

This Appendix contains the data utilized to test the hypotheses in Chapter V. Each issue is listed alphabetically together with the year, designation of majority public opinion and public policy, and the coding of each case as done by this researcher. In order to conserve space, the following abbreviations are used:

Support for an issue= S
Opposition toward an issue= O
Democratic Linkage= DL
Democratic Frustration= DF
High Degree of Salience= HS
Low Degree of Salience= LS
Landslide Majority Opinion= LM
Simple Majority Opinion= SM
Defence and Foreign Policy Issues= F
Domestic Issues= D
Redistributive Issues= R
Non-Redistributive Issues= NR
Majority Government Cases= MJ
Minority Government Cases= MN
Same-Party Cases= SAP
Split-Party Cases= SPP
Judicially-Decided Cases= J
Non-Judicially-Decided Cases= NJ

Section A. 143 American Cases

ISSUE	Year	Opin.	Policy	Coding
1. Abortion, on demand	1966	O	O	DL,LS,LM,D,NR,SAP,NJ
2. Abortion, on demand	69	O	O	DL,LS,SM,D,NR,SPP,J
3. Abortion, on demand	72	S	S	DL,HS,LM,D,NR,SPP,J
4. Amnesty, unconditional	72	O	O	DL,HS,SM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
5. Amnesty, unconditional	73	O	O	DL,HS,LM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
6. Amnesty, unconditional	74	O	O	DL,HS,SM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
7. Antiballistic missile programme	69	S	S	DL,LS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
8. Birth control, free dissemination of information	65	S	S	DL,HS,LM,D,NR,SAP,J
9. Busing	71	O	S	DF,HS,LM,D,NR,SPP,J
10. Busing	74	O	S	DF,HS,LM,D,NR,SPP,J
11. Cambodia and Laos, bombing of	72	O	S	DF,LS,SM,F,NR,SPP,J
12. Cambodia bombing, congressional deadline	73	S	S	DL,LS,LM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
13. Capital punishment	66	O	S	DF,LS,SM,D,NR,SAP,NJ.
14. Capital punishment	72	S	O	DF,LS,SM,D,NR,SPP,J
15. Capital punishment	73	S	O	DF,LS,SM,D,NR,SPP,J
16. Capital punishment	74	S	O	DF,LS,LM,D,NR,SPP,J
17. Communist China, admission into U.N.	65	O	O	DL,LS,LM,F,NR,SAP,NJ
18. China in U.N.	66	O	O	DL,LS,SM,F,NR,SAP,NJ.
19. China in U.N.	69	O	O	DL,LS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
20. China in U.N.	70	O	O	DL,LS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
21. China in U.N.	71	S	O	DF,LS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
22. Communist registration	65	S	O	DF,LS,SM,D,NR,SAP,J

ISSUE	YEAR	OPIN.	POLICY	CODING
23. Compulsory arbitration	66	S	O	DF,LS,SM,D,R,SAP,NJ
24. Confessions, restrictions on admissibility	66	O	S	DF,LS,SM,D,NR,SAP,J
25. Confidentiality of news sources	72	S	O	DF,LS,SM,L,NR,SPP,J
26. Cuba, recognition of	74	S	O	DF,LS,LM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
27. Defence spending, reduction of	69	S	S	DL,HS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
28. Defence spending cut	70	S	S	DL,HS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
29. Defence spending cut	71	S	O	DF,HS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
30. Defence spending cut	72	S	O	DF,HS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
31. Defence spending cut	73	S	O	DF,LS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
32. Defence spending cut	74	S	O	DF,LS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
33. Dominican Republic, sending of troops	65	S	S	DL,HS,LM,F,NR,SAP,NJ
34. Draft, lottery system	66	O	O	DL,LS,SM,F,NR,SAP,NJ
35. Draft, continuation of	69	S	S	DL,HS,LM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
36. Economy, Ford's programmes	74	O	S	DF,LS,SM,D,R,SPP,NJ
37. Eighteen year old vote	65	S	O	DF,HS,SM,D,R,SAP,NJ
38. Eighteen year old vote	67	S	O	DF,HS,LM,D,R,SAP,NJ
39. Eighteen year old vote	68	S	O	DF,HS,LM,D,R,SAP,NJ
40. Eighteen year old vote	70	S	S	DL,HS,SM,D,R,SPP,J
41. Election campaigns, government funding	73	S	O	DF,LS,LM,D,R,SPP,NJ
42. Election campaigns, government funding	74	S	S	DL,HS,LM,D,R,SPP,NJ
43. Election campaigns, spending limitations	67	S	O	DF,LS,LM,D,R,SAP,NJ
44. Election campaigns, spending limitations	68	S	O	DF,HS,LM,D,R,SAP,NJ

ISSUE	YEAR	OPIN.	POLICY CODING
45. Election campaigns, spending limitations	70	S	0 \ DF,HS,LM,D,R,SPP,NJ
46. Election campaigns, spending limitations	72	S	0 DF,LS,LM,D,R,SPP,NJ
47. Electoral College, abolition of	66	S	0 DF,LS,LM,D,R,SAP,NJ
48. Electoral College, abolition of	67	S	0 DF,LS,LM,D,R,SAP,NJ
49. Electoral College, abolition of	68	S	0 DF,LS,LM,D,R,SAP,NJ
50. Equal rights amendment	74	S	S DL,HS,LM,D,R,SPP,NJ
51. Federal aid to education	65	S	S DL,HS,SM,D,NR,SAP,NJ
52. Federal judges, mandatory retirement age	66	S	0 DF,HS,LM,D,NR,SAP,NJ
53. Foreign aid increased	65	0	S DF,LS,SM,F,R,SAP,NJ
54. Gas rationing	74	0	0 0 DL,LS,SM,D,R,SPP,NJ
55. Guaranteed annual income	65	0	0 DL,LS,LM,D,R,SAP,NJ
56. Guaranteed income	68	0	0 DL,HS,SM,D,R,SAP,NJ
57. Guaranteed income	69	0	0 DL,HS,LM,D,R,SPP,NJ
58. Guaranteed job	68	S	0 DF,HS,LM,D,R,SAP,NJ
59. Guaranteed job	69	S	0 DF,HS,LM,D,R,SPP,NJ
60. Gun control	65	S	0 DF,HS,LM,D,NR,SAP,NJ
61. Gun control	66	S	0 DF,HS,LM,D,NR,SAP,NJ
62. Gun control	67	S	0 DF,HS,LM,D,NR,SAP,NJ
63. Gun control	72	S	0 DF,HS,LM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
64. Gun control	74	S	0 DF,HS,LM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
65. House of Representatives, four-year term	66	S	0 DF,LS,LM,D,NR,SAP,NJ
66. Immigration, end of quotas	65	S	S DL,LS,SM,F,NR,SAP,NJ

ISSUE	YEAR	OPIN.	POLICY	CODING
67. Inauguration/election dates changed (Nov./Sept., respectively)	73	S	O	DF,LS,LM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
68. Income tax surcharge	67	O	S	DF,LS,LM,D,R,SAP,NJ
69. Marijuana, legalization of	69	O	O	DL,HS,LM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
70. Marijuana, legalized	72	O	O	DL,HS,LM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
71. Marijuana, legalized	73	O	O	DL,HS,LM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
72. Marijuana, legalized	74	O	O	DL,HS,LM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
73. Medicare	65	S	S	DL,HS,LM,D,R,SAP,NJ
74. Mercy killing	73	S	O	DF,HS,SM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
75. Middle East policy, aid for Arabs	74	O	S	DF,LS,LM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
76. Middle East policy, non-intervention	69	S	O	DF,LS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
77. Middle East policy, non-intervention	70	S	O	DF,LS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
78. Middle East, supply arms to Israel	67	S	S	DL,LS,SM,F,NR,SAP,NJ
79. Middle East, supply arms to Israel	74	O	S	DF,LS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
80. Minimum wage raised	65	S	S	DL,HS,SM,D,R,SAP,NJ
81. Miscegenation, laws forbidding	67	O	O	DL,HS,SM,D,NR,SAP,J
82. Nationalization of railroads	73	O	O	DL,LS,SM,D,R,SPP,NJ
83. NATO troop reduction	73	S	O	DF,LS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
84. Nixon, impeachment of	74	S	S	DL,LS,SM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
85. Nixon, resignation of	73	O	O	DL,LS,SM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
86. Nixon, resignation of	74	S	S	DL,HS,SM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
87. Obscenity, community setting own standards	73	S	S	DL,HS,SM,D,NR,SPP,J

ISSUE	YEAR	OPIN.	POLICY	CODING
88. Ombudsman	65	S	O	DF,LS,SM, D,NR,SAP,NJ
89. Open housing	67	O	S	DF,LS,SM,D,NR,SAP,J
90. Pardon of Nixon	74	O	S	DF,HS,SM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
91. Parochial school aid	65	S	O	DF,HS,SM,D,R,SAP,J
92. Parochial school aid	73	S	O	DF,HS,SM,D,R,SPP,J
93. Parochial school aid	74	S	O	DF,HS,SM,D,R,SPP,J
94. Presidency, one six-year term	73	O	O	DL,LS,LM,D,R,SPP,NJ
95. Presidential nation-wide primary	68	S	O	DF,LS,LM,D,R,SAP,NJ
96. Presidential nation-wide primary	72	S	O	DF,LS,LM,D,R,SPP,NJ
97. Pueblo incident, use of force	68	S	O	DF,LS,SM,F,NR,SAP,NJ
98. Revenue sharing	67	S	O	DF,LS,LM,D,R,SAP,NJ
99. Revenue sharing	71	S	S	DL,HS,LM,D,R,SPP,NJ
100. Seat belts, mandatory auto equipment	65	S	S	DL,LS,SM,D,NR,SAP,NJ
101. Senators, two term limit	66	S	O	DF,LS,SM,D,R,SAP,NJ
102. Social programmes, spending reduced	74	O	O	DL,HS,LM,D,R,SPP,NJ
103. Space spending cut	65	O	O	DL,HS,SM,F,NR,SAP,NJ
104. Space spending cut	69	O	S	DF,HS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
105. Speed limits, cut to 55 mph	73	S	S	DL,LS,SM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
106. Speed limits, to remain at lower rate	74	S	S	DL,HS,LM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
107. Surtax extension	69	O	S	DF,LS,SM,D,R,SPP,NJ
108. Universal military training	66	S	O	DF,HS,LM,F,NR,SAP,NJ

ISSUE	YEAR	OPIN.	POLICY	CODING
109. Universal national service	69	S	O	DF,HS,LM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
110. Universal national service	70	S	O	DF,HS,LM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
111. Universal national service	72	S	O	DF,HS,LM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
112. Universal national service	74	S	O	DF,HS,LM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
113. Universal national service (women)	69	O	O	DL,HS,SM,D,NR,SPP,NJ
114. Vietnam, bombing North	65	S	S	DL,HS,SM,F,NR,SAP,NJ
115. Vietnam, bombing North	67	S	S	DL,HS,SM,F,NR,SAP,NJ
116. Vietnam, bombing North	68	S	O	DF,HS,SM,F,NR,SAP,NJ
117. Vietnam, bombing North	72	O	S	DF,HS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
118. Vietnam, bombing North	73	O	O	DL,HS,LM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
119. Vietnam, military aid	72	O	S	DF,HS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
120. Vietnam, military aid	73	O	S	DF,HS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
121. Vietnam, troop withdrawal	65	O	O	DL,HS,SM,F,NR,SAP,NJ
122. Vietnam, troop withdrawal	66	O	O	DL,HS,SM,F,NR,SAP,NJ
123. Vietnam, send more troops	67	O	S	DF,HS,SM,F,NR,SAP,NJ
124. Vietnam, gradual withdrawal	68	S	S	DL,HS,SM,F,NR,SAP,NJ
125. Vietnam, gradual withdrawal	69	S	S	DL,HS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
126. Vietnam, gradual withdrawal	70	S	S	DL,HS,SM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
127. Vietnam, complete withdrawal by year's end	71	S	O	DF,HS,LM,F,NR,SPP,NJ

ISSUE	YEAR	OPIN.	POLICY	CODING
128. Vietnam, complete withdrawal by end of year	72	S	S	DL,HS,LM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
129. Vietnam, re-introduction of troops	73	O	O	DL,HS,LM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
130. Voting rights bill	65	S	S	DL,HS,LM,D,R,SAP,NJ
131. Wage-price controls	71	S	S	DL,HS,SM,D,R,SPP,NJ
132. Wage-price controls, more strict	72	S	O	DF,HS,SM,D,R,SPP,NJ
133. Wage-price controls, more strict	73	S	S	DL,HS,SM,D,R,SPP,NJ
134. Wage-price controls, re-introduced	74	S	O	DF,HS,SM,D,R,SPP,NJ
135. Wage-price freeze	65	O	O	DL,LS,SM,D,R,SAP,NJ
136. Wage-price freeze	69	S	O	DF,LS,SM,D,R,SPP,NJ
137. Wage-price freeze	70	S	O	DF,LS,SM,D,R,SPP,NJ
138. Wage-price freeze	71	S	S	DL,LS,SM,D,R,SPP,NJ
139. War referendum required for declaration of war	73	O	O	DL,HS,SM,F,R,SPP,NJ
140. War powers bill	73	S	S	DL,HS,LM,F,NR,SPP,NJ
141. Watergate tapes released	73	S	S	DL,HS,LM,D,NR,SPP,J
142. Welfare, Nixon plan	69	S	O	DF,LS,LM,D,R,SPP,NJ
143. Welfare, surtax to pay for increased benefits	74	O	O	DL,HS,SM,D,R,SPP,NJ

Section B. 94 Canadian Cases

ISSUE	YEAR	OPIN.	POLICY	CODING
1. Abortion, legalized for physical/mental health reasons	65	S	O	DF,LS,LM,D,NR,MN,NJ
2. Abortion, legalized for physical/mental health reasons	69	S	S	DL,HS,LM,D,NR,MJ,NJ
3. Abortion, on demand	70	O	O	DL,HS,SM,D,NR,MJ,NJ
4. Abortion, on demand	73	S	O	DF,HS,LM,D,NR,MN,NJ
5. Abortion, on demand	74	S	O	DF,HS,LM,D,NR,MJ,NJ
6. American investment, desire for more	67	O	S	DL,LS,SM,F,R,MN,NJ
7. American investment, encourage more	68	S	S	DL,LS,SM,F,R,MN,NJ
8. American investment, desire for more	70	O	S	DF,LS,LM,F,R,MJ,NJ
9. American investment, desire for more	71	O	S	DF,LS,SM,F,R,MJ,NJ
10. American investment, screening agency	72	S	S	DL,LS,LM,F,R,MJ,NJ
11. Baby bonus, elimination for wealthier/increase for poorer families	69	S	O	DF,LS,SM,D,R,MJ,NJ
12. Baby bonus, elimination for wealthier/increase for poorer families	71	S	O	DF,HS,LM,D,R,MJ,NJ
13. Bilingualism, Official Languages Act	69	S	S	DL,HS,SM,D,NR,MJ,NJ
14. Bilingualism, implementation of	72	S	S	DL,LS,SM,D,NR,MJ,NJ
15. Breathalyzer tests	70	S	S	DL,HS,LM,D,NR,MJ,J
16. Buying majority Canadian interest in foreign subsidiaries	70	S	O	DF,LS,SM,F,R,MJ,NJ

ISSUE	YEAR	OPIN.	POLICY	CODING
17. Campaign funds, financial disclosure	72	S	O	DF,HS,LM,D,NR,MJ,NJ
18. Campaign funds, prohibition of private contributions	74	S	O	DF,LS,LM,D,R,MN,NJ
19. Campaign spending, limitations on	68	S	O	DF,HS,LM,D,R,MJ,NJ
20. Campaign spending, limitations on	72	S	O	DF,HS,LM,D,R,MJ,NJ
21. Canada Pension Plan, universality	65	O	O	DL,LS,SM,D,R,MN,NJ
22. Canadian tv/radio content quotas	70	S	S	DL,LS,SM,D,NR,MJ,NJ
23. Capital punishment	65	S	O	DF,HS,SM,D,NR,MN,NJ
24. Capital punishment	66	S	O	DF,HS,SM,D,NR,MN,NJ
25. Capital punishment	71	S	O	DF,HS,LM,D,NR,MJ,NJ
26. Capital punishment	72	S	O	DF,HS,LM,D,NR,MJ,NJ
27. Cigarette advertising, ban on	71	S	O	DF,HS,SM,D,NR,MJ,NJ
28. Communist China, admission to U.N.	66	S	O	DF,LS,SM,F,NR,MN,NJ
29. Communist China, recognition of	66	S	O	DF,LS,SM,F,NR,MN,NJ
30. Communist China, recognition of	70	S	S	DL,LS,SM,F,NR,MJ,NJ
31. Compulsory arbitration	66	S	O	DF,HS,LM,D,R,MN,NJ
32. Divorce, liberalisation of grounds for	65	S	O	DF,HS,LM,D,NR,MN,NJ
33. Eighteen year old vote	66	S	O	DF,HS,SM,D,R,MN,NJ
34. Eighteen year old vote	68	S	O	DF,HS,SM,D,R,MJ,NJ
35. Eighteen year old vote	70	S	O	DL,HS,SM,D,R,MJ,NJ

ISSUE	YEAR	OPIN.	POLICY	CODING
36. Energy, export re- strictions	73	S	S	DL,LS,SM,F,NR,MN,NJ
37. Energy, price rises	73	O	S	DF,LS,SM,D,R,MN,NJ
38. Equalization payments to provinces	72	S	S	DL,LS,LM,D,R,MJ,NJ
39. Five-province Canada	69	O	O	DL,LS,SM,D,NR,MJ,NJ
40. Foreign aid, increase taxes to supply more	68	O	O	DL,LS,LM,F,R,MJ,NJ
41. Four-year term for Parliament	66	S	O	DF,LS,SM,D,NR,MN,NJ
42. Free trade with U.S.A.	68	S	O	DF,LS,SM,F,R,MJ,NJ
43. Gas/oil temporary price freeze	74	S	S	DL,HS,LM,D,R,MN,NJ
44. Guaranteed annual in- come	72	S	O	DF,LS,SM,D,R,MJ,NJ
45. Guaranteed annual in- come	74	S	O	DF,HS,SM,D,R,MN,NJ
46. Gun control	67	S	O	DF,HS,LM,D,NR,MN,NJ
47. Immigration, increase	71	O	S	DF,HS,LM,F,NR,MJ,NJ
48. Immigration, tied to jobs	74	S	S	DL,LS,LM,F,NR,MJ,NJ
49. Income tax, implementa- tion of White Paper	70	O	S	DF,LS,SM,D,R,MJ,NJ
50. Lottery, for health/ welfare needs	67	S	O	DF,HS,LM,D,R,MN,NJ
51. Lottery	69	S	O	DF,HS,LM,D,R,MJ,NJ
52. Mandatory prison terms (10 years) for drug trafficking/armed robb- bery	69	O	O	DL,LS,SM,D,NR,MJ,NJ
53. Marijuana, fines only	70	O	O	DL,LS,SM,D,NR,MJ,NJ
54. Marijuana, legaliza- tion of	71	O	O	DL,HS,LM,D,NR,MJ,NJ

ISSUE	YEAR	OPIN.	POLICY	CODING
55. Mass picketing, restriction on	66	S	S	DL,LS,SM,D,NR,MN,J
56. Maternity payments	71	S	O	DF,LS,SM,D,R,MJ,NJ
57. Medicare	68	S	S	DL,HS,SM,D,R,MN,NJ
58. Metric conversion	74	S	S	DL,HS,LM,D,NR,MJ,NJ
59. National Anthem, "O Canada"	65	S	S	DL,HS,LM,D,NR,MN,NJ
60. National petroleum corporation	74	S	S	DL,LS,LM,D,R,MN,NJ
61. Nationalization of energy resources	73	S	O	DF,LS,SM,D,R,MN,NJ
62. NATO, continuation of troops in Europe	68	S	S	DL,LS,LM,F,NR,MJ,NJ
63. NATO, troop reduction	69	S	S	DL,LS,SM,F,NR,MJ,NJ
64. Natural gas, sale to U.S.A.	70	S	S	DL,LS,SM,F,NR,MJ,NJ
65. North, Canadian claim of jurisdiction over	70	S	S	DL,LS,SM,F,NR,MJ,NJ
66. Oil pipeline extension	74	S	S	DL,LS,LM,D,NR,MN,NJ
67. Old age pension, rein- stitution of means test	66	O	O	DL,HS,SM,D,R,MN,NJ
68. Old age pensions, in- creased to over \$300 per month	74	S	O	DF,HS,SM,D,R,MJ,NJ
69. Parliament, limitation on debate	69	S	S	DL,LS,SM,D,NR,MJ,NJ
70. Parliamentary pay increase	70	O	S	DF,HS,LM,D,NR,MJ,NJ
71. Parliamentary reform, Trudeau's proposals for	69	S	S	DL,LS,SM,D,NR,MJ,NJ
72. Public Order Act, continu- ation of	71	S	O	DF,LS,SM,D,NR,MJ,NJ
73. Queen's picture, re- moval from some stamps	70	S	S	DL,LS,SM,D,NR,MJ,NJ

ISSUE	YEAR	OPIN.	POLICY	CODING
74. Railroads, assistance to improve passenger service	66	O	O	DL,LS,SM,D,NR,MN,NJ
75. Religion as citizenship requirement	65	O	S	DF,HS,LM,D,NR,MN,J
76. Republic, as preferable form of government	68	O	O	DL,LS,SM,D,NR,MJ,NJ
77. Strikes in essential industries forbidden	69	S	O	DF,HS,SM,D,R,MJ,NJ
78. Strikes in public service forbidden	66	O	O	DL,LS,SM,D,R,MN,NJ
79. Strikes in public service forbidden	72	S	O	DF,LS,SM,D,R,MJ,NJ
80. Tight money policies to fight inflation	70	O	S	DF,LS,SM,D,R,MJ,NJ
81. Unemployment benefits increased	72	S	S	DL,LS,SM,D,R,MN,NJ
82. Unification of armed forces	67	S	S	DL,LS,SM,F,NR,MN,NJ
83. Vietnam, acceptance of American draft dodgers	68	O	S	DF,LS,SM,F,NR,MJ,NJ
84. Vietnam, acceptance of "peace observer" role	73	S	S	DL,HS,SM,F,NR,MN,NJ
85. Vietnam, "peace force" withdrawn	73	S	S	DL,HS,LM,F,NR,MN,NJ
86. Wage-price controls	65	S	O	DF,HS,SM,D,R,MN,NJ
87. Wage-price controls	73	S	O	DF,LS,LM,D,R,MN,NJ
88. Wage-price controls	74	S	O	DF,HS,SM,D,R,MJ,NJ
89. Wage-price freeze	70	S	O	DF,HS,SM,D,R,MJ,NJ
90. Wage-price freeze	71	S	O	DF,LS,SM,D,R,MJ,NJ
91. Wage guidelines	70	S	O	DF,HS,LM,D,R,MJ,NJ
92. War Measures Act, application to FLQ crisis	70	S	S	DL,HS,LM,D,NR,MJ,NJ

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