

**What Does Our Country Mean to Us? Gender Justice and the Greek  
Nation-State**

by

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the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in Political Science

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### Abstract

Women have been ignored in studies of nations and nationalism and gender continues to be marginalized by mainstream theorists. Early Euro-American feminists did not account for the variability of women's relationships with nationalisms and assumed one universal relationship. I seek to explain the nature of the relationship between Greek women and Greek national movements and the results attained through women's interaction with national projects. The Greek case is marginal both to mainstream accounts of nationalism and mainstream feminist accounts; nationalism has not always affected women negatively.

I map the gender and nation relationship in Greece into three periods which represent greater or lesser *gender justice*. Each period is linked to specific national projects that result either in a substantive increase or decrease in *gender justice*. *Gender justice* involves achieving concrete conditions: physical security; economic security and access to the means to gain it, including property ownership and education; reproductive/sexual self-determination; and social adulthood or the right to be equal decision-makers politically and in civil society.

I hypothesize that the type of participation by Greek women and the degree of openness of national projects to their participation may restructure the *sex/gender regime* and so affect the extent to which women can achieve *gender justice*. I argue that Greek women's participation in nation-making and nationalism, as autonomous, self organized women's groups, often resulted in greater *gender justice* and joined national and feminist projects at times. Greek women have had the most affect on the *sex/gender regime* when they have participated in nationalism movements, both civic and ethnic, as *allies*.

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my great aunt, Ksiakousti Vouloukos, who as a young woman in early twentieth century rural Greece, was not afforded the right to determine her course in life.

### **Acknowledgements**

I am grateful to my supervisor Professor Jill Vickers who introduced me to the various dimensions of the gendered nature of nationalisms. I would also like to thank Professor Vickers for her encouragement, patience and unrelenting support without which, I could not have completed this thesis.

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**Key Dates**

- 1453 Ottoman domination of Greek world begins with the fall of Constantinople.
- 1814 Failed Greek uprising by the *Philiki Eteria* (Friendly Society).
- 1821 Outbreak of the War of Independence. Women participate.
- 1829 Treaty of Adrianople, declares peace between Russia and the Ottoman Empire and grants autonomy to Greece.
- 1830 Falmerayer's *Slavic Theory* emerges arguing that contemporary Greeks were descendants of Slavs.
- 1831 A new and independent Greek state is established.
- 1832 Convention of London confirms offer of 'hereditary sovereignty' of Greece to King Ludwig I of Bavaria, and the nation-state is placed under British, French and Russian guarantee.
- 1833 Church of Greece is declared independent from the Patriarchate of Constantinople.
- 1833 *Education Act gives women the right to enter designated schools.*
- 1840 *The first round of restructuring to the sex/gender regime is established and followed by the period 1840-1936.*
- 1840 *Women begin to write in their own journals and wage their own polemics.*
- 1844 Constitution of Greece is introduced.
- 1850 Emergence of romantic historiography and folklore in Greek intellectual currents who incorporate Byzantium into Greece's historical legacy.
- 1864 New Constitution declares Greece a 'democracy under a king'.
- 1870's *Greek women are incorporated into the pan-Hellenic national project and sent to Asian Minor as professional transmitters of Greek culture.*
- 1881 Thessaly and the Arta region of Epirus ceded to Greece by the Ottomans.

- 1890 *University of Athens admits first woman student.*
- 1896 *Siganou-Parren founds The Association of Greek Women and becomes leader of the first-wave Greek feminist movement and first woman reporter in Greece.*
- 1897 *The Ladies Newspaper is published promoting a feminist agenda.*
- 1897 Irredentist debacle in Asia Minor.
- 1910 Eleftherios Venizelos, founder of Liberal Party, becomes prime minister.
- 1911 *Autonomous women's groups begin to flourish and through an alliance with political parties, pursue a gender-specific agenda.*
- 1912 Second Balkan War in which Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro launch an attack against the Ottoman Empire leading to the Treaty of Bucharest, partitions Macedonia into three parts, allotting Greece the southern half.
- 1920's *Education of Slavo-Macedonian women pursued and their participation central in the ideological reproduction of the Greek collectivity as transmitters of the Greek culture in the private sphere.*
- 1921 Irredentist campaign, *Megali Idea*, launched to recapture land in Asia Minor.
- 1922 Greek armies driven out of Asia Minor.
- 1923 Treaty of Lausanne ends *Megali Idea* and stipulates a population exchange between Turks and Greeks and the protection of their respective rights.
- 1930 *Literate women over thirty are granted the vote in local council elections.*
- 1935 *Women's employment is reduced in both state and non-state public sectors.*
- 1936 *Establishment of Metaxas dictatorship and the second round of restructuring to the sex/gender regime followed by a stable period of decreased gender justice: 1936-1974. Right and freedoms are abrogated and mostly all women's groups are outlawed.*

- 1936 *Women incorporated as individuals into the fascist nationalist program; they are organized into mixed-sex Falange units called Metaxas Youth.*
- 1941 Germany invades and occupies Greece.  
Colonel Metaxas dies.  
The National Liberation Front (EAM) is formed in Athens and beyond, with the support of the Greek Communist Party (KKE), leading the Resistance against the Axis-led occupation. *Women participate.*
- 1942 *National People's Liberation Army (ELAS) is formed as a military wing of KKE who monopolized the resistance struggle in the mountains. Women participate.*
- 1943 *The United Panhellenic Organization of Youth (EPOY), the youth wing of EAM is formed and young women join.*
- 1943 *A large area of mountain central Greece no longer under the control of the Axis forces is declared Eleftheri Ellada or 'Free Greece' and introduces equal civil and political rights for both men and women. A backlash called the 'White Terror' (1943 – 1944), led by right-wing terrorist bands, is directed against communists and former partisan fighters*
- 1944 Defeat of Triple-Led Alliance and cabinet, with the support of the king, returned from exile with the intent of establishing a liberal democracy.  
Free Greece is being dismantled.
- 1946 The rule of the Right is re-legitimized and a Civil War ensues. *Women join the Marxist-Leninist Greek Democratic Army (GDA).*
- 1948 *The Panhellenic Democratic Union of Women (PDEG) is founded in GDA controlled areas and promote gender justice.*
- 1949 Civil War ends.  
*All Greek women were given the right to vote in local elections.*
- 1952 *Women obtain the right to vote in general elections.*
- 1967 New military dictatorship seizes power and all that was gained in the short quasi-democracy was again outlawed by the new junta.

- 1974 The Colonels stage an unsuccessful military coup in Cyprus leading to the Turkish invasion of the island.  
The military dictatorship resigns from power, the monarchy is abolished and the transition to democracy begins. Karamanlis' *New Democracy* secures a majority in parliament.  
*The third round of restructuring to the sex/gender regime begins which marks the period 1974-present.*  
*The women's movement re-emerges and women's groups begin to participate in the nation-state building project. Women begin to agitate for both social and women's liberation.*
- 1975 *The new Constitution declares men and women equal and the monarchy is officially dissolved.*
- 1981 Greece becomes the tenth member of the European Community.
- 1982 *Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) comes to power and promotes equality for women.*
- 1983 *Reforms to the Family Law now provide for 'joint responsibility' of the household.*  
*Greece ratifies the United Nations Convention for the Elimination of All Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).*
- 1984 *Legislation concerning rape and sexual violence was written to be gender neutral.*
- 1985 *Government created special machinery, the General Secretariat for Sex Equality, to channel women's representation was established with the goal of advancing the position of both urban and rural.*
- 1986 *Legislation to legalize abortion was passed permitting married women to abort within the first twelve weeks of pregnancy.*
- 1990's The 'Macedonian question', in which the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's* (FYROM) appropriated the name 'Macedonia', has leads to anxiety over national identity and the state/church re-politicizes reproduction.


Development of the Greek Kingdom: 1832-1947<sup>1</sup>



-Key-

-  Original Greek Kingdom
-  Ionian Islands ceded by Great Britain, 1864
-  Thessaly, added 1881
-  Macedonia, Crete and Islands added after the Balkan Wars, 1913
-  Ceded by Treaty of Sevres (not ratified) 1920
-  Ceded by Treaty of Lausanne, 1923
-  Dodecanese ceded by Italy, 1947

The Territorial Development of the Greek Kingdom 1832-1947



<sup>1</sup> Source: Mazower, Mark. Ed. (2000). *After the War Was Over: Reconstructing the Family, Nation and State in Greece*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. p.xi

## Introduction

If Hellenism was able to preserve its ethnicity and was not lost...fifty percent of the indebtedness for it is due to women. Nobody has dared so far to question this fact, and everybody, without exceptions, admits that it is Greek women who have kept and passed down from generation to generation our heritage of religion, language and customs, which are distinguishing characteristics of peoples.

Kallirrhoe Siganou-Parren (1903)<sup>1</sup>

Women have been ignored in studies of nations and nationalism and gender continues to be marginalized by mainstream theorists. But feminist scholars have also ignored nations and most have seen nationalism only in a negative light. In the introduction to *Feminist Nationalism* (1997), Lois West recounts Virginia Wolf's response to the dilemma of women who were asked to support nationalist projects in times of war by states which excluded women from full citizenship. Wolf asserted, "what does our country mean to me, an outsider... as a woman I have no country. As a woman my country is the whole world" (cited in West: 1997: xi). If nations and nation-states are gendered, however, can we ignore the role of women in theories of nationalism? Mainstream theorists of nations and nationalism like Anthony D. Smith suggest that "if the very nature of nations and nationalism (or national projects) is gendered, then a separate, or at least, a different kind of theory is required, one which takes this key attribute into account..." (1998: 205). Smith's proposal is to make gender

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<sup>1</sup> The quote is taken from the *Ladies Newspaper* in Maria Anastasopoulou, (1997). "Feminist Discourse and Literary Representation in Turn-of-the-Century Greece: Kalliroe Siganou-Parren's The Books of Dawn", *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*. 15: p. 6.

a ‘separate’ variable in the study of nationalism but this would perpetuate a male-centered analysis of nations and nationalism.

In the last two decades, literature exploring women’s relationships with nations and nationalism has emerged within feminist scholarship. Early feminist work assumed one universal relationship, but the variability of women’s relationships with nationalisms has become more evident as more case studies make gender visible. So, the task is explaining different patterns in relationships. My initial interest in exploring gender and nation relationships began with my contribution as a research assistant to Jill Vickers in her *Gender and Nation* project. The project maps intersections between gender and nation in thirty countries and how they change over time to identify factors correlated with women-friendly national projects in contrast to projects harmful to women. I develop the idea of “women-friendly” and “harmful” below.

### **Why Greece?**

I was assigned Greece as a case study for the *Gender and Nation* project and given my Greek heritage and knowledge of the Greek culture, became intrigued by my findings. I discovered women affected and were affected by the national project at different stages of the development of the Greek nation-state. The Greek nation’s trajectory includes its ancient glory, its role in the Byzantine Empire, domination by Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, its struggle for independence and to re-establish its ancient glory in a modern Greek nation-state. These phases of nation-state making involved the invention and re-invention of the modern Greek nation-state which encompassed ‘eastern’ elements of nationalism regardless of its ancient heritage as the

font of 'western' civilization. In each phase, Greek women were not passive observers but active participants in advancing national projects. I was also struck by the scarcity of feminist scholarship on Greek women's participation in national projects. As a member of the Greek diaspora, a narrative which resonates is the role of the 'heroic' Greek dictator, Colonel Metaxas, who defied the Nazi-fascists by not allowing them passage through Greece. His "OXI" or "NO" has been immortalized and celebrated annually. Nevertheless, Greek women combatants who participated in the Resistance, often losing their lives, were not valorized. It became clear that Greek women have assumed various roles from repositories of culture to combatants in national-liberation projects; roles which have had varying results in terms of women's achievement of full citizenship.

### **Statement of Thesis**

In this thesis, I seek to explain the nature of the relationships between Greek women and Greek national movements and the results attained through women's interaction with national projects. I hypothesize that the type of participation by Greek women, and the degree of openness of national projects to their participation, may restructure the *sex/gender regime* and so affect the extent to which women can achieve *gender justice*. I argue that Greek women have had the most effect on the *sex/gender regime* when they have participated in the national movement as *allies*. Being *allies* of national projects let women create political space in which to pursue *gender justice*. Moreover, in contrast to feminist beliefs (i.e. Walby, 1997), Greek women have been as prepared as Greek men to pursue nationalist goals including a willingness to fight. Moreover, they shared goals in common with men as well as seeing opportunity in

nationalism to pursue *gender justice*. Greece displays the variability of gender and nation relations, showing that women's relationships with nationalism always must be contextualized.

Once an understanding of nations and nationalisms is achieved and the characteristics relating to Greece determined, I explore the role of gender. I eschew mainstream Euro-American western, theories of nationalism to frame the Greek case. I see it as marginal, eastern, and ethnic in nature, an analysis I develop in detail in the next chapter. Moreover, unlike early Euro-American feminist scholarship which assumes one universal relationship and defines nationalism as bad or harmful for women, I conclude that in Greece, women's participation in nation-making and nationalism often resulted in greater *gender justice* and joined national and feminist projects at times.

### **Mapping Gender and Nation Relationships**

To determine the relationships between gender and nation, my thesis has three main components. First I map time periods; second I describe sex gender regimes; and third I map advances toward *gender justice*.

#### **Mapping Periods**

My analysis maps the participation of Greek women in national projects from 1840 to present which I divide into three periods, based on changes in the *sex/gender regime*. These changes are linked to specific national projects that result either in a substantive increase or decrease in *gender justice*. The first period, 1840-1936, is the period of nation-state founding in which women were incorporated into the Greek national project(s) I argue with the result of some gain in *gender justice*. The second

period, 1936-1974, reflects a shift in the relations between gender and nation which resulted in a more constrained *sex/gender regime* and substantive losses for women from the previous period in terms of *gender justice*. The third period, 1974 to the present, maps the gender/nation relationship through the transition to democracy. In the third period the *sex/gender regime* changes again as the public realm becomes more open to women's participation. The shift in the national project from authoritarianism to democracy helps women promote *gender justice* despite demographic panic over the 'Macedonian question' and a low birthrate among Greek women. Hence, each period involves changing relationships between *sex/gender regimes* and national projects. In the first and third periods, women could pursue goals of *gender justice* through their involvement in national projects.

In theorizing periods and the variability of gender and nation relations, I apply Vickers' interpretation of what constitutes changes in *sex/gender regimes*. Vickers<sup>2</sup> draws on Walby's idea that what she calls shifts in *gender order* are linked to *rounds of restructuring* of nation-states and nationalisms. The idea of *rounds of restructuring*, which I discuss in detail in the next chapter, links changes in gender/nation relationships to transitions such as democratization. I used Walby's idea of *rounds of restructuring* of the nation-state and Vickers' idea of the *sex/gender regime* to produce this periodization.

### **Mapping the Sex/Gender Regime**

My analysis maps the nature of the *sex/gender regime* which shifts with each period. Vickers' concept of the *sex/gender regime* (the social arrangements and

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<sup>2</sup> See Jill Vickers (2004). "Gendering the Hyphen: Gender Scripts and Women's Agency in the Making and Re-making of Nation-States". [www.cpsa-acsp/papers-2004/Vickers.pdf](http://www.cpsa-acsp/papers-2004/Vickers.pdf)

discourses) is derived from two sources: (1) Gayle Rubin's (1975) concept of *sex/gender* which joins both the material aspects determined by women's bodily life and gender which is composed of the socially constructed roles and behaviors imposed in each society; and (2) R.W. Connell's (1987) definition of a *gender regime* which he defines as gendered structures of power relations within institutions such as bureaucracies. Joining the two together in the concept of *sex/gender regimes* includes: a) material arrangements: bodily experiences and social practices through which both sex and gender are manifested, and b) gender scripts or discourses (i.e. ideology) via which arrangements are legitimized and naturalized thus capturing "symbolically the permissible relationships between women and authority" (Vickers: 2004: 9). Unlike Walby's "gender orders"<sup>3</sup> or Connell's "gender regimes", this envisions the possibility of non-patriarchal forms and captures both material and ideological dimensions. This is important in relation to demographic "crisis" and panics and state-responses of pro-natalism or anti-natalism. Vickers' conceptualization of *sex/gender regimes* encompassing both social and discursive practices will be used throughout my thesis so as not to marginalize reproduction in relation to nationalism.

### **Mapping Gender Justice**

I map the extent to which women advance *gender justice*, by exploring how *sex/gender regimes* change. *Gender justice* involves achieving concrete conditions: physical security; economic security and access to the means to gain it, including property ownership and education; reproductive/sexual self-determination; and social adulthood or the right to be equal decision-makers politically and in civil society. So, I

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<sup>3</sup> Walby in *Theorizing Patriarchy* (1991) assumes patriarchy explains all gender relations.

map the progress made in advancing *gender justice* as indicated by changes in the *sex/gender regime*<sup>4</sup>.

### **Women's Types of Relationships with Nationalist Movements**

My purpose in this thesis is to explore relationships between gender and nation in Greece and the extent to which women's involvement in the national project changed the *sex/gender regime* and so advanced or delayed *gender justice*. Four types of relationships characterize Greek women's involvement with nationalist movements/parties. Women participated:

- (1) As individual women, who may or may not be feminists, participate or are incorporated in nationalism movements. These individual women may or may not be organized into all women's groups, which may or may not be women-led, and may or may not be able to make their own collective decisions.
- (2) In previously organized women's groups, which may or may not have feminist goals, but which are co-opted and their actions controlled by nationalism movements/parties. Co-opted women's groups have little or no influence in nationalism movements or on political party decision-making, are usually directed from the top down, and may or may not be women-led organized groups.
- (3) In organized women's groups which emerged as part of nationalist movements/parties but which developed independent women-focused agendas. Women in this type of relationship were not self-organized but gained space while participating in a national project/party and so could advance feminist goals.

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<sup>4</sup> For the origins of these markers see Barbara Nelson and Najama Chowdhury. eds. (1994). *Women in Politics World-wide*. New Haven, London: Yale University Press.

- (4) In self-organized women's groups which are autonomous in that they can chose their own goals and strategies, which act to advance *gender justice* and which ally themselves with nationalist movement/parties in part to achieve feminist goals; and which have enough power to be treated as allies. Women's organizations may not have equal power and may be junior partners, but, they remain self-organized which involves the capacity to enter or exit an affiliation with a nationalist movement/party.

### **Approach and Method**

In this thesis, I place women at the center of the analysis. To give Greek women greater legitimacy, I explore how women were involved in national projects and explore how their experiences in nation-making changed from period to period. Mainstream approaches that only compare women's experiences with men's may fail to reveal how women interact to pursue both their own and their nation's objectives.

I first explore mainstream, male-focused Euro-American scholarship on nations and nationalism focused on the core nation-states (i.e. Britain, Holland, and France) which invented the nation-state form. These mainstream theorists see their nation as the norm against which all other nations and nationalisms must be understood. They often fail to realize the multiplicity of experiences and contrast theirs with everyone else's. Hence, they assume homogeneity of experiences to illustrate an ideal type of nationalism; a civic, western, secular and modern form is modeled as 'good'; anything which deviated is 'bad'. I also incorporate nations and nationalisms that are marginal to the experiences of the core nation-states and shaped by their ethnic, 'eastern', non-secular and non-

modern elements. I argue that the Greek case can best be understood within this marginal model of nationalism. I also note that the mainstream, “western”, civic norm involves the exclusion of women from citizenship for almost two centuries in the “ideal” countries.

I also explore women-centered literature on gender and nation. This includes mainstream, Euro-American feminist theories on gender and nation which until recently assumed that nationalism is always bad for women. Recently, however, this view has been challenged by those who believe gender and nation relations vary. I also explore anti/post colonial feminists who argue that feminist and nationalist movements often worked together. Finally, I survey the existing literature on Greek nationalism and scholarship on Greek women and their interaction with Greek national projects<sup>5</sup>. If relationships between gender and nation are not always ‘bad’, gendering nations and nationalisms can unveil the role of women in national projects.

### **Outline of Chapters**

The thesis develops in four chapters. In the first chapter, I undertake a review of the literature to develop a conceptual framework within which to understand the relationship among Greek women’s participation in national projects, the *sex/gender regime* and *gender justice*. I argue that the relationship of gender and nation in Greece represents a doubly marginal case which cannot be understood using mainstream accounts of nationalism or mainstream feminists accounts. The framework relies on accounts of marginalized nationalisms and feminist accounts which argue against a single universal approach to gender and nation. This insight that Greek nationalism is

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<sup>5</sup> Greek language sources are also used to explore the role of Greek women and the nation.

marginalized from the norm and that Greek women's experiences are doubly marginalized is the main insight of the chapter.

In the second chapter, I introduce the first period which is from 1840 to 1936 and show how Greek women initially were incorporated into the national project. I establish that the years following the founding of the Greek nation-state, establishes the initial national project and the *sex/gender regime* associated with it. During this period, nationalism fits the ethnic, 'eastern' model. This began to change during the turn-of-the-century Greece when a civic national project began to emerge. The *sex/gender regime* was maternalist and valorized women as citizen-mothers. Throughout this period women were gradually being incorporated as individuals into the national project. As citizen-mothers armed with an educational background that complemented their role as transmitters of Greek of culture both inside and outside the home, women began to agitate and mobilize for a liberal democratic project. Some women, organized and allied with the liberal national project, began to advance an agenda of equality between men and women. As a result of their participation, women gained more access to education, limited suffrage and greater access to economic security. These changes constituted a first round of restructuring in the *sex/gender regime*.

In the third chapter, I identify 1936 as the beginning of a second *round of restructuring* in which the establishment of an authoritarian government shifts the gender order. The period 1936 to 1974 was marked by military and civilian dictatorships, war and civil war. In this chapter, I show the variability in the relationship between gender and nation in Greece which involved significant reversals in the gains previously made

toward *gender justice*. The national project became increasingly ethnic with the installation of the dictatorship which constructed the *sex/gender regime*. Throughout this period, most women's associations were outlawed, women's roles were maternalist, but gender apartheid also was promoted. In this period, women did experience a brief period of renewed *gender justice* while participating in the left-wing led resistance movement (WWII). Long term restructuring did not occur. Although women's suffrage was achieved briefly once again, the post-war return to dictatorship delayed women's achievement of those rights enjoyed by their mothers and by women in democracies.

In the fourth chapter, I explore gender and nation in interactions during Greece's transition to democracy. I mark 1974 as the beginning of a third *round of restructuring* which is still underway. During this period, the national project became infused with a liberal democratic narrative advocating a civic nation-state. Nonetheless, ethnic elements of the Greek nation persist which re-politicize reproduction and express tension around women's roles. With the transition to democracy, the *sex/gender regime* became more open to women's participation in the public realm. Nevertheless, although organized women were allied with the nation-state building project, the women's movement was not afforded enough political space to restructure the *sex/gender regime* to respond to their grievances fully. The gender script did incorporate the notion of equality between men and women, making women more physically secure and more equal in the private sphere. Women's participation in the legislature, however, remained nearly the lowest in Europe. Social practices regarding women have not been aligned with discursive

practices and many demands made by women in their struggle for *gender justice* still have not been achieved.

Greek women's participation in national projects may have varying results regarding gains made in *gender justice*. Greek women were not granted full citizenship until the late twentieth century; nevertheless, they were not passive observers but active in national projects much earlier.

## Chapter One

### In Search of a Conceptual Framework

In this literature review I try to understand the participation of Greek women in national projects and how that participation related to changes in the sex/gender regime and advances or retreats of *gender justice*. I explore how mainstream and feminist theorists understand nations and nationalisms to derive a conceptual framework. Women belonging to core-nation states (i.e. France, UK Holland, and the US) may not share the same relationships with nationalisms as women in Southern Europe, especially in Greece. So, it is important not to conflate Greek women's experiences with those of women in other European countries. Nevertheless, similarities in women's relationships with nationalisms can be considered while recognizing differences resulting from location, race, language and ethnicity. Gender and nationalism in Greece need to be contextualized.

In this chapter, I devise a conceptual framework to advance a nuanced understanding of how and why Greek women's participation led to greater or lesser *gender justice*. How were women affected by and how did they affect nationalism? The framework illustrates the variability of gender and nation relations. Greek nationalism does not parallel mainstream, Euro-American modernist accounts; and women's experiences also differ from women's in mainstream Euro-American states. I argue that the Greek case deviates from these mainstream accounts both in general and in gender terms; and is more characteristic of marginal nations and nationalism – 'eastern' nations in Gellner's (1983) terms.

I begin by exploring mainstream theories of nationalism. Although they do not offer a gendered perspective of nationalism, their arguments are useful in unpacking certain dimensions, mainly the idea of civic versus ethnic notions of nationalism. Second, I explore feminist theories of nationalism divided in mainstream nations, and argue that we must go beyond this understanding of relationships between gender and nations to explain Greek women's experiences. I then explore anti-colonial theories to unpack relationships between colonial domination and women's participation in national projects. Most literature about anti-colonial nationalism deals with Euro-American colonizers, whereas in the Greece case the colonizer is Muslim – the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, anti/post colonial feminist scholarship provides useful insights regarding the role of religion thus explaining the ethnic, non-secular and 'eastern' characteristics of the Greek nation-state. Although the Greek Orthodox Church is subordinate to the state, its centrality has influenced women's lives and their role in nationalist projects.

In the third section, I explore mainstream Greek nationalism and Greek feminist literature. Greek scholars do not see Greek nationalism as entirely modern but recognize ethnic and 'eastern' characteristics which differentiate the Greek case from original European nation-states. Finally, I introduce the framework I use to develop my analysis. My approach includes Euro-American feminists who focus on variability in gender, and nation relationships; and state and anti/post-colonial accounts which recognize the interplay between religion, gender and nationalism. The framework focuses on Greek women's incorporation into an ethnic, non-secular national project. I also use feminist literature about anti-colonial struggles for national liberation to frame women's participation in Greek national-liberation movements. Can women promote *gender*

*justice* by taking up arms for their country? Moreover, feminist scholarship on transitions to democracy helps analyze how women's roles change the most recent nation-state building project. The transition provides greater political space and opportunities for women to assert their grievances.

### **Mainstream Models of Nationalism**

Nationalism can be defined as “an ideological movement for the attainment of maintenance of self-government and independence<sup>1</sup> on behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential nation” (Smith: 1998: 188). Although Greek nationalists were influenced by the French Revolution and the Enlightenment, the Greek case cannot be explained by the classical modernist paradigm. Modernists date nationalism primarily to eighteenth century modern development of capitalism, bureaucracy and secular utilitarianism. Smith argues that the modernist paradigm is dominant within nationalist discourse which seeks “to derive both nations and nationalisms from the processes of modernization, and to show how states, nations and nationalisms, and notably their elites, have mobilized and united populations in novel ways to cope with modern conditions and model political imperatives” (1998: 224). The Greek case deviates from mainstream accounts of nationalism and so represents a marginal model encompassing an ethnic, perennialist, non-secular and ‘eastern’<sup>2</sup> model of nationalism. Ethnic nationalisms link citizenship to members in the ethnic community to which individuals have “ties and affinities based on history and vernacular culture and

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<sup>1</sup> The three basic elements of independence found in most nationalisms are “ideals of national autonomy, national unity and national identity (Smith: 1998: 188).

<sup>2</sup> See John Plamenatz. (1975). “Two Types of Nationalism”. In *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea*, edited by Eugene Kamenka. London: The Merlin Press; and Ernest Gellner. (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.

for that reason are accorded the rights of citizenship of the national state that represents, contains and protects the community” (Smith: 1995: 99). Civic nationalisms assume a universal citizenship through “membership of the people who constitute the citizens of the nation-state” which often results in embracing the dominant culture of the nation-state (Smith: 1995: 97). In fact, however, modern civic nations denied women citizenship until well into the twentieth century.

In the *Ethnic Origins of Nations* (1986), Anthony Smith argues, by contrast, that modern states appropriate pre-existing *ethnies*<sup>3</sup>. To Smith, nations include territorial ideas of an *ethnie* or a cultural community of people, primarily in the form of economic unity, common legal rights and a common polity whereas ‘nationality<sup>4</sup>’ is more a question of residence or belonging to a specific nation (1986: 135-136). Moreover, the concept of a nation-state<sup>5</sup> links the territorial ideas of an *ethnie* (nation) to the state which is a sovereign territorial entity with exclusive jurisdiction within its boundaries (Smith: 1986: 135-139). Smith’s *ethno-symbolist* approach is useful in unpacking Greek nationalism. He argues that modern nation-states and nationalisms do not constitute a complete break from the pre-modern era. Instead, ethno-symbolism: “aims to uncover the symbolic legacy of ethnic identities for particular nations, and to show how modern nationalisms and nations rediscover and reinterpret the symbols, myths, memories, values

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<sup>3</sup> *Ethnie* is described by Smith as both social and cultural with the following dimensions: a collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity (1986: 154).

<sup>4</sup> Yuval-Davis and Anthias argue that nationality can be synonymous with citizenship or “refer to an individual’s membership in a collectivity which is inherited from parents” (1989: 3).

<sup>5</sup> Smith argues that ‘national states’ unlike ‘nation-states’ are created when the “circle of the nation does not always correspond to the territorial state” in which ethnic minorities are often incorporated against their will (1986: 138-139).

and traditions of their ethno-histories as they face the problems of modernity” (Smith: 1998: 224).

Smith believes memory of one’s history is central to nationalisms; it is through memory that an *ethnie* can retain itself from the pre-modern into the modern era. Through historical memories of a unified ethnic community based not on primordial physical kinship ties but on cultural affinities, new national imaginings can form (Smith: 1998: 192). I explore the ethno-history of the Greek nation and nationalism used by the Greek intelligentsia and if drawing on a pre-modern *ethnie* impacts the gender and nation relationship.

### **Mainstream Modernist Nationalism**

Mainstream modernist theories of nationalisms are based on Euro-American and male-centered experiences. Modernist theorists assume a civic, modern and western model is the hegemonic experience. In *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (1991), Benedict Anderson uses a mainstream modernist account to define nations and nationalism. Viewing the nation as “both inherently limited and sovereign” (6), he argues;

It is imagined as *limited* because even the largest of them encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, that beyond which lie other nations... It is imagined *sovereign* because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm... Finally it is imagined as a *community*, because regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep comradeship (1991: 7).

For Anderson, nationalism arose in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century which he defines as belonging “with kinship and religion, rather than with liberalism and fascism” (1991: 5). Anderson believes nationalism was first invented during the eighteenth century in the American colonies by Creole elites influenced by the advent of capitalism and print technology. Nationalisms are understood not as “self-consciously held political ideologies but...with the large cultural systems that preceded it” mainly religious and dynastic ideas (Anderson: 1991: 12). So, after the French Revolution, religious authorities, the monarchy, and dynastic realms experienced a decline in their status.

For Anderson, the development and interplay between capitalism, print technology and the fatality of human linguistic diversity<sup>6</sup> encouraged national consciousness based on an imagined community (1991: 42-43). The rise of print-language allowed those who were literate “to visualize in a general way the existence of thousands and thousands like themselves...” (Anderson: 1991: 77). Readers were connected through print and formed the nationally imagined community through a stabilized printed language. Moreover, the development of the mass media supplied the intelligentsia with the tools needed to create an imagined community of people that were no longer imagined through the efforts of religious communities. Smith argues that the nation as a narrative, as presented by Anderson, is a limited definition since “other modes of cultural representation exist” (i.e. audio and visual) beyond print-language and print capitalism (1998: 138-140).

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<sup>6</sup> Anderson argues that with capitalism and the technology of communications, a linguistic unification could be achieved thus “assembling related vernaculars” (1991: 43-44).

Anderson's western model of nationalism does not explain the Greek case because the Orthodox Church and faith played a key role in imagining the Greek nation, particularly after Greek Independence from Muslim rule was attained. The Greek nation-state was inspired by the Enlightenment project and the French Revolution, but it cannot be explained within the modernist paradigm because the Greek nation-state is not part of a modernizing process (i.e. industrialization) for over a century. Moreover, the Greek nation-state was not secular since the Greek Orthodox Church was an integral part of Greek nationalism both under Ottoman rule and in the founding period of the Greek nation-state and subsequently. Although the Greek intelligentsia played a key role in 'imagining' the nation, the characteristics of a modern nation, as posited by Anderson, are not congruent with the Greek case. Therefore, we must turn to models of marginal nationalisms to contextualize the Greek case.

### **Models of Marginal Nationalisms: West versus East**

In contrast to the mainstream model, western theorists present a marginal model based on ethno-cultural, non-secular, eastern nationalisms. These are marginal nations who do not fit the norm of the modernist paradigm. Greece is an interesting case because there is an east/west (bad/good) tension that unfurls within its nationalisms during the founding nation-state period that has impacted on the relationship between gender and nation. To modernists like Gellner and Plamenatz, these are deviating cases.

John Plamenatz identifies two kinds of nationalisms that may be useful in situating the Greek case; 'western' nationalisms of Western Europe and 'eastern' nationalisms found in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. He describes nationalism which has been created by core western European cultures, the UK and

France specifically, as a cultural phenomenon that usually takes a political form.

Plamenatz defines this nationalism as “the desire to preserve or enhance a people’s national or cultural identity when that identity is threatened, or the desire to transform or even create it where it is felt to be inadequate or lacking” (1975: 23-24). To Plamenatz, the dominant western European nation-states are the apogee of world progress. These nations are culturally equipped to acquire nation-states with “universities and schools imparting the skills prized in that civilization...and well provided with the qualities and skills valued and admired by Western peoples generally” (Plamenatz: 1975: 29).

Plamenatz views ‘eastern’ cultures as ‘backward’ and not culturally equipped about the ideas of man, morals and society so as to transform and abandon archaic forms of authority, such as religious authority. He believes ‘backward’ and marginalized peoples are cognizant of their ‘backwardness’ and strive to imitate ‘the West’ by adopting the linguistic resources and other skills needed to progress. Greek nationalists accepted this idea of progress and strived to reform their inherited culture (i.e. the role of the Greek Orthodox Church within Greek society) in order to adapt to and imitate the modern world. Nevertheless, the Greek nation-state remained on the margins of Europe particularly since progress as understood by the standards of the core Western nations (i.e. modernization in the form of economic progress) was not attained until a century later. Moreover, the role of religious authority was not entirely abandoned. Ironically, the Greek nation deemed ‘backward’ by Plamenatz’s measurement was grounded in the ancient Greek Hellenistic culture deemed to be the origins of western civilizations.

In *Nations and Nationalism* (1983), Gellner rejects the perennialist<sup>7</sup> idea that nationalism is the awakening of an old force. Rather, he sees it as socially constructed and modern. To him, nationalism “is the consequence of a new form of social organization, based on deeply internalized, educated-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state” (Gellner: 1983: 48). He argues that nationalism produces nations and politically unites all those who share the same culture in which society is “no longer worshiped through religious symbols” (1983: 58). Unlike Smith, Gellner does not describe nationalisms or nations as rooted in pre-modern *ethnies*; rather he views “cultural threads and patches used by nationalisms [as] often arbitrary historical inventions” (cited in Smith: 1998: 34). In other words, Gellner claims that modern societies do not show an affinity for their culture of origin but with the invented culture that assumes some degree of authenticity. Gellner argues that men become nationalists “out of a genuine, practical necessity, however obscurely recognized, because it is the need for growth that generated nationalism” (cited in Smith: 1998: 28).

For Gellner, ‘high’ cultures are sustained through mass public education systems and exist only in modern, industrial societies which he considers superior to ‘low’ cultures, analogous to untamed gardens. Elites in agroliterate societies<sup>8</sup> have not become culturally sophisticated through modern processes (i.e. industrialism, education). For

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<sup>7</sup> Perennialist approaches to nations and nationalisms regard nations as “recurrent and/or persistent phenomena of all epochs and continents, but in no way part of a natural order” (Smith: 1998: 23).

<sup>8</sup> An agroliterate society is defined as a highly stratified society from elites to the masses - agricultural producers. “At the apex of societies are a series of small, but powerful elites, arranged in horizontal strata, including the military, bureaucratic, priestly, and aristocratic caste, who use culture – their culture – to separate themselves from society...with no desire to create a homogeneous culture for all members of society” (Smith: 1998: 39).

Gellner, nations can only function in modern societies<sup>9</sup>. But in Greece, an industrial revolution did not follow the creation of the Greek nation-state. More importantly, after Independence Greek nationalists looked towards the East – to Byzantine religious culture – for authenticity. Using Gellner’s conceptualization of nations and nationalisms, the Greek nation-state at its founding and after, can be contextualized as a backward, eastern and marginal form. Although it was inspired by the French Revolution, it deviated from the modern norm and so remained on the margins<sup>10</sup>. I apply an ‘eastern’ element in my analysis to link the marginal, ethnic and non-industrial Greek nation-state and gender relationships.

In *Nations and Nationalisms since 1780* (1990), Eric Hobsbawm distinguishes between civic and ethnic nationalisms which is useful in exploring the ethnic, marginal nature of the Greek nation-state and Greek nationalism. Hobsbawm borrows Gellner’s definition of nationalism to mean “primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” (Hobsbawm: 1990: 9). He also contends that the nation is a “historically recent” phenomena relating to a modern territorial state and, like Gellner, understand that nationalism “sometimes take[s] pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them and often obliterates pre-existing cultures” (Hobsbawm: 1990: 10). Hobsbawm sees the process as eventually linked to capitalist development.

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<sup>9</sup> Nations allow the modernizing process to function because “industrial growth requires both wide scale fluidity and patterned homogeneity, individual mobility combined with cultural standardization” (Smith: 1998: 35).

<sup>10</sup> Canovan (1996) argues that core Western nation-states already had a stable identity and did not need nationalism to create nation-states whereas countries that needed to build nationhood developed nationalist movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Hobsbawm describes civic nationalism as a model created by the French Revolution and developed in Europe from 1830-1870. He defines ethnic nationalism as an 'ethno-linguistic type' of nationalism which prevailed in Eastern Europe from 1870-1914 and resurfaced in the twentieth century with the advent of anti-colonial struggles. He argues that ethnic nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was a crucial turning point in nationalism. To him, countries without a stable nationality and nationhood tried to create one via ethnic nationalism. Hence, Hobsbawm believes nationalisms outside of Western Europe mostly were premised on ethnicity and language often combined with religion. They were not the civic nations associated with a modern, capitalist market economy. Hobsbawm argues that during this period the national question "became a significant issue in the domestic politics of virtually all European states...that stressed the linguistic and/or ethnic elements" (1990: 105-106). Greek nationalism, by contrast, incorporates Greek Orthodox religion and the Byzantine heritage, while trying to throw off non-western Muslim values and practices.

In my thesis, I will map out Greek ethno-linguistic nationalism and its intersection with gender after Greek independence was attained. None of the male-focused Euro-American theorists deal with women and how nationalist projects affect and are affected by women. Nonetheless, it is important to note that these modern, secular, civic nations excluded women from active citizenship, denying them civil and political rights.

### **Gender and Nationalism**

Mainstream literature on nations and nationalism rarely addresses women or gender and their relationship to nationalism. Nevertheless, like mainstream accounts of nationalism, mainstream feminist accounts are portrayed as universal, assuming a single

essential relationship between gender and nationalism. My thesis challenges mainstream Euro-American scholarship based only on the experiences of core nation-states. Therefore, in order to map the nature of women's participation in nationalism over time, the nature of the *sex/gender regime* and how women managed to advance *gender justice*, I go beyond mainstream assumptions. I assert that there is diversity in women's experiences with nations and nationalism which must be contextualized as such. In this section, I explore specific feminist theorists and how their work contributes to our understanding of gender/nation relationships in Greece. I argue that nationalism was not always bad for Greek women.

#### **Euro-American Feminist Accounts**

Vickers in "At His Mother's Knee: Sex/Gender and the Construction of National Identities" (1987) introduces two central elements of patriarchal national conflict; *battles of the cradle* reflecting what she then saw as a universal struggle by men to control women's power of biological reproduction; and *battles of the nursery* in which men sought to control social reproduction, the rearing of children, by reproducing specific group identities. Vickers conceptualized the *battles of the cradle* in the context of the struggle of French Canadians to out-reproduce English Canadians, building on Eisenstein's (1981) idea that women's ability to reproduce identity groups, including nations, gives them power which men seek to control, either in battles between nation-states or within states between competing national groups. I use the concept somewhat differently. First, I apply the concept to explore the Greek state's agenda to control women's reproductive power in order to combat demographic anxiety and safeguard the nation against perceived threats within the nation-state such as the Muslim minority in

Western Thrace. Second, I use *battles of the cradle* to explain tensions between nation-states as in the recent ‘Macedonian’ question. Both have led to the politicization of reproduction, even in demotic Greece. To Vickers *battles of the nursery* involved struggles to transmit the French language and culture to the next generation. I use this concept to explore the Greek national project of creating a homogeneous Greek society through language and transmitted through the family. The use of Greek inside and outside the home of Slavo-Macedonians was aggressively promoted, therefore, incorporating ethnic minority women into the national project.

Vickers' subsequent work argues that not all nationalisms are bad for women and that “feminisms and nationalisms can be mutually supportive” (2004: 1). She also argues that anti-colonial nationalisms may oppose Western modernity but still promote citizenship for women (Vickers: 2002:266). In “Feminists and Nationalism” in *Gender, Race and Nation* (2002), Vickers rejects the idea of one universal relationship between gender and nation. Instead she maps the diversity of experiences between, feminisms and nationalisms.

There are competing views on the intersection between feminism and nationalism. Bystydzienski identifies strategies for political change which favor women and “legitimize the female perspective” (1992: 5). Her focus is on what she refers to as non-traditional or alternative sources of strategies of women’s movements and not strictly in political institutions. Sources of strategy are aimed at empowerment which is:

a process by which oppressed persons gain some control over their lives by taking part with others in development of activities... power to or power as competence which is generated and shared by the disenfranchised as they begin to shape the content and structure of their

daily existence and to participate in a movement for social change (Bystydzienski: 1992: 3).

Bystydzienski also eschews a universal approach in understanding women's movements; although she sees all women as oppressed, she recognizes significant differences. She draws on the experiences of Third World women who struggle for equality by participating as combatants in national-liberationist struggles to illustrate changing gender and nation relationships. Bystydzienski does recognize nationalisms as potentially good for women but does not explore this relationship except in the Third World. My analysis assumes that nationalisms also could be 'good' for Greek women at some stages in their struggle for greater *gender justice*.

Nelson and Chowdury (1994) categorize modern secular nationalisms as good for women since they tend to produce greater *gender justice* such as political and legal rights, but both see ethnic and religious nationalisms as bad for women. Based on studies of women's political engagement in forty-three countries, they concluded that formal legal equality "was accompanied by secularism in government, which officially (but not always in practice) disentangled the power of the state from the power of religious denominations, most of which had a tradition of treating men and women unequally" (1994: 6). This sees religion and not nationalism as denying women rights. They see modern, civic nationalisms and secular nation-states as good for women while religious and ethnic-based models are deemed bad for women. Nevertheless, as Vickers asserts, modern nation-states are not always "as secular, universalist and civic as they seem on the surface" (2002: 266) nor as good for women. Feminism and nationalism can be both hostile and friendly towards each other regardless of the 'civic' or 'ethnic' characteristic

of nationalism. The founding Greek nation-state period was ethnic and religious yet women and nationalisms were not always alienated from one another.

Lois West in *Feminist Nationalism* (1997) argues that organized women can advance feminist goals particularly in alliance with the national projects. She first developed the idea of “feminist nationalisms”, understood as “social movements simultaneously seeking rights for women and rights for nationalists within a variety of social, economic and political contexts” (1997: xxx). West does not consider how women who participate in nationalist movements emerge as feminists as a result of their participation. Nevertheless, women can be incorporated as individuals into a national project and emerge with a feminist agenda.

West believes “women in feminist nationalist movements are struggling to define and reconceptualize their relationships to states, nations and social movements as activists central to the debate, not as passive recipients” (1997: xiii). She does not view nationalisms as a universal phenomenon but as differently gendered projects in which she identifies three ideal types of feminist nationalist movements derived from her earlier work: (1) historical national-liberation social movements<sup>11</sup>; (2) movements against neo-colonialism; (3) and identity-rights movements that wage struggles internal to their societies (1997: xxx)<sup>12</sup>. West tends to conflate feminism with any activism by women which limits the utility of her concept. I explore the emergence of feminist nationalism as a result of women’s participation in the Greek national-liberation movement. Women

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<sup>11</sup> This type of feminist nationalism arises during “colonial contexts when nationalist movements seek independence from external imperial control” (West: 1997: xxx).

<sup>12</sup> Vickers argues that the categories listed by West are incomplete and incorporates Pettman’s account of women gaining space within dominant state nationalisms as a necessary additional category of feminist nationalism (Vickers: 2002: 259).

can be active in nationalist movements and pursue *gender justice* as a result of their participation, including military participation. I argue that this was the case in women's participation particularly during the Greek Resistance to Axis occupation. Moreover, West's identity-rights movements and national-liberation social movements are useful concepts when mapping the relationships between women, not strictly feminists, and the nationalist project<sup>13</sup>. I argue that feminist nationalism in Greece prevailed and at times led to greater gender symmetry.

Yuval-Davis (1997) argues that women can affect nationalism and ethnic processes, but her post-modernist approach and the deconstruction of nationalist discourse, focuses on discourse and not on social practices<sup>14</sup>. She believes that all nations are gendered and that gender is always nationed; gender and nation are "informed and constructed by each other" and believes different nationalisms interact differently with gender (1997: 21). In other words, there are no patterns and each case is unique. To understand the Greek case I eschew a post-modernist approach focused on discourse alone since, as Vickers argues, "sex/gender is key to both the material and symbolic dimensions of nationalism" because of women's power to reproduce and transmit collective identities (2002:255). Nevertheless, Yuval-Davis' work is useful in deconstructing national discourse, albeit not sufficient in itself to understand *sex/gender regimes*.

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<sup>13</sup> Beckwith distinguishes women's movements from feminist movements. She argues "feminist movements share a gendered power analysis of women's subordination and contest political, social, and other power arrangements of domination and subordination on the basis of gender (2000: 431).

<sup>14</sup> Yuval-Davis focuses on the discursive intersection between gender and nation understanding gender as "a mode of discourse which relates to groups of subjects whose social roles are defined by their sexual/biological difference as opposed to their economic positions or their membership in ethnic and racial collectivities" (1997: 9).

One of the intersections between gender and nation outlined by Yuval-Davis is women's role as biological reproducers. This 'intersection' involves three categories; one is the 'people as power narrative'<sup>15</sup> which promotes enlarging the population of the national collectivity for the sake of the nation. This concept illuminates my discussion of the policies of the Greek Orthodox Church to out-produce the Muslim minority in Western Thrace during the third period. Yuval-Davis also theorizes three major discursive dimensions of nationalist projects<sup>16</sup> and argues that *Staatnation* or civic nationalism is understood as full membership in the community which encompasses civil, political and social rights. Nonetheless, even when they finally get included, Yuval-Davis sees women's citizenship in civic nation-states as having "a dual nature: on the one hand they are included in the general body of citizens; on the other hand there are always rules and regulations and policies which are specific to them" (1997: 24). Hence, although women eventually are given the status of equal citizen, because their lives remain regulated through marriage, they are still constructed as subordinate in marriage and this carries over into the public sphere. Her approach offers a useful perspective in understanding the intersection of gender and nation and how this subsequently impacts on women's struggle for *gender justice*<sup>17</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> The three discourses described as vital for national interest are; the people as power discourse concerned with enlarging the population of the collectivity, the Malthusian discourse which advocates reducing the number of children to prevent national disaster, and the eugenicist discourse that promotes the improvement of 'the national stock' (Yuval-Davis: 1997: 22).

<sup>16</sup> Yuval-Davis describes *Volknation* as constructed around the specific blood origin of the people; *Kulturnation* which focuses on the cultural dimension such as language; and *Staatnation* which represents a civic and presumably women-friendlier nationalism (Yuval-Davis: 1997: 21).

<sup>17</sup> My discussion of gender and citizenship incorporates both Yuval-Davis' and Walby's conception of citizenship which I discuss later in this chapter.

### **Nationalism as Bad for Women**

Most Euro-American feminists, who are part of a dominant culture within their nation-state, advance a universal picture based on their experiences in core nation-states. They assume there is only one gender and nation relationship. In the case of Greece, however, gender and nation relationships vary: although in some periods nationalism has had negative results for women, certain national projects also were positive for women although they remained ethnic in character. That is, civic nationalism as always good and ethnic nationalism as always bad, does not work for women.

Enloe argues that “nationalism has typically sprung from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope” (1989: 50). She believes women’s involvement with nations and nationalisms are different from men’s; that women and men do not share the same nationalist project because she believes women usually are oppressed and manipulated as symbols of the nation. For Enloe, nationalisms are always patriarchal in character and have not produced gains for women. In the Greek case, women have not always experienced one static negative relationship and often were able to advance elements of *gender justice* as a result of their participation in national projects. These are positive experiences which cannot be ignored.

McClintock (1993) also views nationalisms as hostile towards feminism and manipulative to women. She argues that “all nationalisms are gendered, all are invented, and all are dangerous” (1993: 61). McClintock also believes nationalism rarely empowers women because it produces “a nation state that will remain a repository of male hopes, male aspirations and male privileges” (1996: 281). McClintock examines the consequences of gendering national citizenship. She points out that in modern

Europe women were not incorporated into the nation as individuals but that their citizenship was mediated through the family. In other words, national projects in Europe resulted in *sex/gender regimes* which perpetuated gender asymmetry by making women legally subordinate to men in marriage and unequal in the public realm. McClintock argues that women were citizens indirectly, “through men, as dependent members of the family in private and public law” i.e marriage (1996: 262). Vickers describes this *sex/gender regime* as citizen-mothers. As in other European founding periods, Greek women were limited primarily to the role of citizen-mother but they did not always experience a negative relationship with national projects.

Gisela Kaplan in “Feminist and Nationalism: the European Case” (1997), argues that only two cases in which an alliance between feminism and nationalism in Europe exist; nineteenth century Northern Italy and early twentieth century Finland. She believes that “feminism and nationalism are almost always incompatible ideological positions within the European context” (1997: 4). Kaplan assumes the Euro-American model of the intersection between feminism and nationalism to be normative and asserts that it was and continues to be rare for European feminists to align themselves with groups or ideologies that are nationalistic for various reasons such as women being coerced by the state to reproduce. Relationships between feminisms and nationalisms change over time however, even in Europe, and it is this change that I trace. In my discussion, I map the relationships between the two ‘ism’s during the three periods I outline to examine any impact on *gender justice*.

### **Marginal Anti/Post-Colonial Feminist: Nationalism May Be Good for Women**

To advance my argument about how and why Greek women's experiences differ from the mainstream Western European model, I explore anti-colonial nationalisms and scholars who reject Euro-American feminist norms. Mainstream, modernist theorists of nationalism distinguished between 'eastern' and 'western' nationalisms, but failed to explore how the east/west dichotomy impacts women and the *sex/gender regime*. The Greeks were subject to colonial domination and, like others, used nationalism to fight against colonial rule. But although inspired by the French Revolution, the Greek nation-state was formed out of a resistance against Muslim Ottoman domination. Hence, it is an anti-colonial struggle, making it marginal to the core nation-states about which Euro-feminists write. What makes the Greek case different from other anti-colonial nationalisms, however, is the non-European 'colonizer'. This makes borrowing from the literature on anti-colonial national-liberationist movements regarding the role of women more complex, particularly concerning the period when Greek independence was under construction. It also makes the role of religion different from both 'western' European and other anti-colonial cases.

To mainstream theorists, modernization ends the sway of religion over politics. But in Greece, Eastern Orthodoxy retained great significance in the nationalist discourse which affected the social practices through which sex and gender are manifested and so women's lives. In my thesis, I use anti-colonial feminist scholarship to explore how the *sex/gender regime* was impacted by this unique status of Eastern Orthodox religion, including the impact on women of the privileged role given to the Greek Orthodox Church in re-constructing Greek identity against Ottoman rule. Although anti-colonial

theories about gender and nation deal with a model in which the colonizers are Christians and those colonized are non-Christian, what can be appropriated from their analysis is the role of religion in (re)constructing national identity after colonial rule is imposed.

Jayawardena in, *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World* (1986) explores the relationship between women and nationalism in the anti-colonialist struggles in Asia and the Middle East, focusing on the modernizing role appropriated by the colonized nationalists when shaking off Western imperialist domination. Jayawardena argues that feminist and nationalist movements in these regions at the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century were often hospitable to each other since “struggles for women’s emancipation were an essential and integral part of the national resistance movement” (1986: 8). In many Third World anti-colonial struggles in these regions, the vote was granted equally to both men and women once independence was attained. For her, feminism was not imposed on the Third World by the West, rather it must be understood within the context of the national-liberation struggles.

Jayawardena identifies three common elements in her study of various Middle Eastern and Asian countries where women won the vote in association with national-liberation movements: 1) a desire to carry out internal reforms (including regarding marriage) in order to modernize society and combat imperialism by justifying independence; 2) the dismantling of some pre-capitalist structures – ruling dynasties and religious orthodoxies that hindered internal reforms, but not the family; and 3) the assertion of a national identity on the basis of which men and women could be mobilized against imperialism (1986: 4). Hence, western models were adopted in part to gain

independence from Western dominance while reinforcing indigenous cultural identity<sup>18</sup>. Jayawardena argues that “third world” reformers had two specific objectives: “to establish in their countries stable nuclear families with educated and employable women...and to ensure that women would retain a position of subordination within the family” (Jayawardena: 1986: 15). In a similar vein, Frantz Fanon explored the interstices between women and nationalism. To him, the family was revolutionized by the national-liberation struggle in which the “heterosexual family is preserved as the truth of society-its organic, authentic form” (cited in McClintock: 1996: 271).

Greek nationalists believed that, as Europeans, they were superior to their Muslim rulers and had an ancient, rich Greek cultural heritage to draw upon. Yet they did not embrace ‘Western’ identity fully in part because of the centrality of their church. According to Plamenatz’s account, eastern cultures were “backward” because of their continued embrace of tradition or archaic forms of authority such as religious authority. ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ need to be contextualized within the Greek case to explore the implications of Eastern Byzantium influences (Orthodoxy) on women’s struggle for *gender justice*.

In *Gender and National Identity* (1994), Valentine Moghadam explores anti-modern national movements, Islamization and their impact on gender. She argues that “struggles around authenticity and cultural identity implicitly or explicitly delineate women’s roles and status” in national projects (1994:9). For example, in modernizing, anti-western national projects, the unveiled woman represents modernity “our women are

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<sup>18</sup> This was evident in Turkey under Ataturk. Reinforcing the indigenous identity was key in advancing his nationalist project by leaving the family unaffected by the modernizing process, although women received the right to vote before most women did in Europe.

as modern as yours so we deserve our freedom” and national progress, while the veiled woman represents cultural and economic backwardness. Anti-modern, anti-western projects have transformed the symbolism; veiled women now represent activist nationalists defending true religion and tradition against ‘Westoxification’. Moghadam posits that the recasting of both nationalism and of feminism in the late twentieth century “has distinct implications for the definition of gender, for the position of women and for feminism as an emancipatory project” (1994:4). Both nationalisms and feminisms have changed in the twentieth century and are less compatible, especially given western feminism’s emphasis since the 1970’s on sexual freedom, including lesbian rights. Ignoring the relationships between feminism and nationalism, or assuming nationalism is always bad for women, obscures women’s active involvement in national projects and the conditions that produce more women-friendly nations. I use these insights to explore how modern women’s roles in Greece were while religion continued to shape women’s roles within the community.

### **Greek Scholarship on Nations and Nationalisms**

Greek scholars do not define Greek nationalism as an entirely modern paradigm rather, like Smith, they emphasize its pre-modern *ethnie*. Veremis (1989) adopts Anderson’s modernist framework to illuminate the Greek case. He asserts that the Greek intelligentsia imported ideas of the Western Enlightenment and the French Revolution believing that “to secure legitimacy among European powers, Greece had to embark on a process of modernization” (1989: 9). Veremis argues, however, that the religious community that constituted ‘Greekness’ prior to the nation-state was never abandoned; indeed after independence the Church of Greece “became all the more associated with the

nation” (Veremis: 1989 10). For him, the “Hellenic Kingdom had little in common with industrialized Europe” implying that while the Greek nation-state attempted to imitate the modern core Western European nation-states, it didn’t succeed. He suggests that modern nation-states and nationalisms do not constitute a complete break from the past and that a strong commitment to collective interests was attained through the memory of one’s history (i.e. Ancient Greece). Once again, women were not considered.

Kitromilides (1990) defines nationalism as a “specifically political force linked to the creation of the modern state – phenomena that did not as a rule coincide with industrialization” (1990: 34). He reduces nationalism to a by-product of modernity, mostly the product of elites and educational systems<sup>19</sup>. Kitromilides describes the Greek national identity established through the educational systems of the Greek nation-state as based on a homogeneous language used to demarcate a distinct Greek ethnic identity. His argument follows Hobsbawm’s “ethnic” nationalism as an “ethno-linguistic type” in which language and ethnicity become a significant issue in nationalisms outside of Western Europe. But, Veremis argues that the process of nationalism is not essentially linked to capitalism. He does not minimize the role of the religious community however, and asserts that it “helped to cement new nations which states created” (Kitromilides: 1989: 59). Although the Greek intelligentsia was initially inspired to create a civic, secular and modern model, the nation-state created resembled a more non-secular and non-modern ethnic nation-state. As in Euro-American mainstream scholarship, neither gender nor women’s roles are considered.

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<sup>19</sup> Kitromilides argues that “state institutions would provide a normative discourse” once the Greek nation-state was founded thus emphasizing the role of the state and not the Greek Orthodox Church (1989: 36).

Greek theorists of nationalism Triandafyllidou and Paraskevopoulou in “When is the Greek Nation? The Role of Enemies and Minorities” (2002), examine the (re)construction of Greek national identity, its consolidation; and the role of ‘Others’, both outside and inside the Greek nation-state, including the question of *The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*<sup>20</sup>. The authors reject a modernist/perennialist dichotomy and argue against privileging one definition of nationalism over another, however, they do not see the Greek nation as “an artificial product of human will” (2002: 78) or an “imagined community”, following Gellner or Anderson. Triandafyllidou and Paraskevopoulou argue, “even though early Greek nationalism in the late eighteenth century was marked by the influence of the French Revolution and the Enlightenment, the nation was eventually defined with reference to common ancestry, culture and language” (2002: 79). Moreover, this collective identity was preserved as a religious community under Ottoman rule. These scholars of Greek nationalism, like Smith, believe pre-existing cultural forms characterize a given population and they see the nation as constantly evolving. They highlight the link between Hellenism and Orthodoxy, but they do not explore how this link impacted Greek women or women’s role in maintaining it<sup>21</sup>. Again, women’s interaction with the nation and nationalism are ignored, despite

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<sup>20</sup> *The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s* appropriation of what has been deemed as Greek national and cultural symbols by the Greek nation-state (i.e. the use of the name Macedonia).

<sup>21</sup> Triandafyllidou and Paraskevopoulou, like Kitromilides, stress the link between ‘Greekness’ and the role of the Greek Orthodox Church in defining a Greek national identity. The role is both symbolic since the revival of a Byzantine past becomes part of the collective memory, and material since the Greek Orthodox Church played a vital role during the founding nation-state period in mobilizing Greek consciousness. Therefore, Hellenism as part of a glorious ancient past representing a western tradition becomes linked to the eastern Greek Orthodox Church.

considerable evidence that women were assigned the role of repositories and mediators of Greek culture, through cultural reproduction as mothers, and as teachers.

In Triandafyllidou, Calloni, and Makris' "New Greek Nationalism" (1997), the focus is on the strategic manipulation by Greek politicians of nationalist sentiment and the restructuring of Greek national identity using cultural myths. Their argument advances Smith's model of ethno-symbolism which they use to grasp the dynamics of Greek national identity in the wake of the 'Macedonian' question. Greek national identity is described as having "ethno-cultural bonds and traditions on which Greek national identity is based" (Triadafyllidou et al: 1997: 2). Nevertheless, like mainstream Euro-American theorists, there is no mention of women and how the perceived demographic anxiety as a result of the 'Macedonian' question affects women and the *sex/gender regime* (i.e. the re-politicization of reproduction). They believe that ethnic model of nationalism still applies to twentieth century Greece. I find it a useful narrative when analyzing the relationship between gender and nation in the last period outlined in my thesis.

### **Gender and Greek Nationalism**

Greek feminist theorists do provide insights into the relationships among gender, nation, and state in post-independent Greece. Varikas in "Gender and National Identity in Fin de Siècle Greece" (1993) asserts that the Greek crisis of identity and the search for authenticity always interacts with gender. She posits that ethnic and cultural myths propagated by the male intelligentsia placed gender at the center of national self-definition by valorizing women as "bearers of an oral tradition uncontaminated by external influences" (1993: 256). She links nineteenth century and early twentieth

century Greek nationalism with the Greek feminist movement. First wave Greek feminists in turn-of-the-century Greece argued that women's self-emancipation was necessary for the fulfillment of a liberal Greek nation-state. Varikas asserts that in the late nineteenth century, the civic national project morphed into an 'ethnic' type aimed at protecting and enlarging the Greek community which marginalized it as 'eastern'. Like other European first wave feminists, Greek feminist nationalists agitated for a civic, liberal nation-state that would promote equality between men and women.

Karakasidou (1996) examines gender scripts and the sex/gender arrangements vis-à-vis the minority Slavo-Macedonian population in the Florina area of Macedonia. She argues that these women were incorporated into early twentieth century Greek nation-building as mediators of Greek culture. Slavo-Macedonian women became central agents in transmitting the Greek culture from generation to generation and active in the associations of the Greek Church. Karakasidou draws on the ethnic characteristics of Greek nationalism and identifies certain gains made by Slavo-Macedonian women through their participation in the Greek assimilationist nationalist project. Halkias (2003) explores the recent 'Macedonian question' which she describes as characteristic of a continuing ethnic national project that has politicized reproduction. Greek women are encouraged to increase their level of reproduction to preserve the national identity and be 'good' citizens. The perceived "demographic crisis" reveals the long-standing insecurity of a nation with a long memory of domination by Muslim rulers.

Stamiris (1986) provides a more detailed account on the Greek feminist movement from its origins to present day. She finds top-down efforts to alter women's legal and civil status have been problematic because institutions such as political parties

and governments have always marginalized women and women's agenda. Stamiris believes a mass feminist movement is needed to impact the public agenda, promote *gender justice* and make 'people matter' (1986: 112). Cacoullou (1996) offers a more critical interpretation. For her, women's *politicality*, or the ways in which women engage in political life, are defined by women's own special demands, controversies and strategies (1996: 2). She illustrates the complexities inherent in modern Greek political culture, especially during the transition to democracy when public decision-makers and the ruling party were hostile towards the opposition and often impervious to the demands of feminist activists. Her work illustrates how Greek feminists allied with political parties in the democratic Greek nation-state, but did not gain a significant increase in political space, as a result, limiting the impact of the transition on their struggle for *gender justice*.

### **Greek Women and the Resistance/Civil War**

Anagnostopoulou (2001), Hart (1996) and Verveniotis (2000) have written about Greek women's participation in both the Resistance and Civil War. They illustrate how left-wing women's struggles for national and social liberation through their participation in combat in nationalist projects of the Left, were part of the struggle for *gender justice*. Their accounts of Right-wing women's organized efforts to gain universal suffrage after the Civil War are also important when unpacking the efforts of Greek 'women' and exploring their impact on the *sex/gender regime*.

## Framework for Analysis

The framework developed from these sources incorporates two main components to understand the intricacies of the Greek case. The case is marginal both to mainstream theories of nationalism and to mainstream feminist accounts of gender/nation relationships. Therefore, I rely on Euro-American feminists who argue against a single universal approach to gender and nation, and on anti/post-colonial feminist theorists who often see feminism and nationalism as compatible, to frame my analysis. Their accounts also help me estimate the nature of the relationship between Greek women and Greek national movements, and the gains made toward *gender justice* as a result of their participation.

### A Functionalist Approach to Understanding Gender and the Greek Nation-State

Yuval-Davis and Anthias (1989) offer a functionalist account of women's involvement in ethnic and national processes. They see women as central to the creation and reproduction of ethnic and national projects although they do not develop the political and economic aspects of the gender/nation relationship. They identify five ways women participate in ethnic and national processes:

- a) as biological reproducers
- b) as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic/national groups
- c) by participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its culture
- d) as signifiers of ethnic/national differences where women symbolically constitute ethnic and national groups i.e. the nation as a loved woman
- e) as participants in national, economic, political and military struggles (Yuval Davis and Anthias: 1989: 7).

I show that during the founding nation-state period, Greek women participated in the ethnic and national project as 'transmitters of culture' which resulted in greater

*gender justice*. In the second period, however, the gender and nation relationship in Greece was restructured when women were promoted primarily as ‘biological reproducers’. This resulted in a decrease in *gender justice* following the first *round of (re)structuring*. Finally, women participated in national-liberationist struggles, which I discuss below, but with equivocal results. Although Yuval Davis and Anthias conceptualize how both social practices and discourses shape sex/gender relations, they do not consider how women shape nationalism. I adapt their functions to provide a more nuanced understanding of gender and nation.

#### The Variability of Gender Relations: Rounds of Restructuring

Walby argues against essentialist theorizations of gender which assert that diversity among women results only from class, ethnicity, and race. A modernist, she sees patriarchy as a distinct social system which causes the oppression, domination and exploitation of women. That is, she assumes patriarchy explains all gender relations<sup>22</sup> everywhere. In *Gender Transformations* (1997) Walby conceptualizes the gender regime (patriarchy) as either a domestic patriarchy or a public patriarchy. In the ‘domestic patriarchal gender regime’, women are confined to the household and excluded from the public domain; while in the ‘public patriarchal gender regime’ women are subordinated and segregated in the public domain (2000: 529)<sup>23</sup>. Vickers by contrast, conceptualizes the possibility of a gender regime which is not patriarchal and uses the concept of *gender*

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<sup>22</sup> Walby describes patriarchy as “a system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women” (1991: 20). Yuval-Davis finds the notion of patriarchy as a distinct social system constraining. Moreover, colonialism creates oppression as well. She argues “some women have power at least over some men as well as over other women” (1997: 7).

<sup>23</sup> In theory each domain can be egalitarian although the repeal of the Greek law making man ‘head of the household’ did not necessarily result in equality within the household. So patriarchal social practices may or may not exist in public and private spheres.

*justice* to estimate progress towards that goal. As mentioned earlier, the key idea I adopt from Walby is that gender/nation relations are not fixed for all times when the nation is founded, but can be restructured.

In theorizing the variability of gender and nation relationships in my thesis, I employ Walby's framework in which gender transformations are linked to *rounds of restructuring*. Rejecting the idea that there is one key period in nation-formation, Walby asserts that Mann (1987) and Turner (1990) "falsely universalize White men's citizenship experiences" as the key period of nation-formation (1997: 189). Turner suggests that the key definitive period in nation-making is related to the development of political democratic institutions when (White) men won the vote; for example in the US in 1840 (Walby: 1997: 169). Sluga argues that the gendered nature of nations and nationalisms was established in the French Revolution when citizenship was differentiated between masculine and feminine types (1998: 88). The French Revolution, which inspired many Enlightenment intellectuals, solidified gender boundaries and privilege by excluding women from citizenship thus promoting the nation as a union among men; Anderson's "horizontal comradeship".

Walby notes that the founding arrangements of nation-states could not be definitive since women now vote even in France. She advances a conceptual framework to understand shifts in gender regimes which are linked to the restructuring of nation-states. Walby defines changes in the nation-state including the *gender regime as rounds of restructuring*; "changes built upon foundations which remain, and that layer upon layer of change can take place, each of which leaves its sediment which significantly affects future practices" (1997: 190). So, *rounds of restructuring* involve relationships between

nation and states (i.e. the degree of democracy) and between nation-states and *sex/gender regimes*. Walby argues that during periods of restructuring of nation-states, the political process is likely to be more open to a shift in power relations. Women may find political space to pursue feminist goals which otherwise were elusive.

For Greek women the trajectory was not always better with each *round of restructuring* as Walby envisions. Walby uses the UK as a case study and universalizes the Euro-American model of patriarchy. She assumes modernity improves women's status so each *round of restructuring* also must improve women's situation. Nevertheless, *rounds of restructuring* do not consist always of "changes built upon foundations which remain". Instead, changes in the 'gender regime' may reveal different and less favorable results. For example, the Metaxas dictatorship abrogated many of the rights<sup>24</sup> won by Greek women in the previous period. It becomes clear that like other mainstream, modernists, Walby assumes the core nation-states are the norm and that modernity is the norm for liberating women. The Greek nation-state was not created because of modernization or industrialization, however, but was the result of liberation from Ottoman rule inspired by the French Revolution. Only long after its formation, did the Greek nation-state begin to modernize. Walby's argument that there is not one definitive period in a nation-state's formation is useful, but her thesis linking nation-state formation always to greater democracy and women's rights is misleading. The Greek case illustrates that *rounds of restructurings* may result in women losing rights and in that some national projects result in women's progress toward *gender justice* being started or reversed.

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<sup>24</sup> Access to employment was severely restricted and women's biological reproductive capabilities politicized.

Post-Colonial Approaches to Understanding Gender

In understanding the Greek case I apply post-colonial approaches, especially Chatterjee's ideas about women's relationship to religion in the founding nation-state period. In *The Nation and Its Fragments* (1993), Chatterjee argues that modernist anti-colonial nationalisms were inherently gendered. Colonizers (male) and colonized (male) were in conflict over how indigenous women were to be treated and both claims to rule and claims to independence revolved around gender. Chatterjee claims that "anti-colonial nationalism creates its own domain of sovereignty well before it begins its political battle with the imperial power" (1993: 6). He identifies two domains: the material and the spiritual. The material domain, the outside, involves "economy and statecraft...science and technology, a domain where the West had proved its superiority and the East has succumbed" (1993: 6). The spiritual or the inner domain, made Indian civilization superior to the West, however, and thus Indians could protect the heart of the nation from western influences. Hindu values (or Muslim) prevailed in the private sphere while women were expected to symbolize modernity in the public sphere to justify independence. Chatterjee argues that reformers in India were selective in accepting liberal ideas from Europe about the woman question (1993: 117). Colonizers had justified their conquest in part on how badly they considered Indian men treated 'their' women. Colonized men portrayed 'their' women as modern by imitating the West including women's active participation (i.e. education and political activism) while assigning "their" women the role of protectors of culture and spirituality in the inner domain.

A similar mediation is at the core of the situation in Greece, although the Ottoman rulers were Muslim. Women were assigned the role of repositories and transmitters of Greek culture; Greek morals were regarded superior to those promoted by the model promulgated by 'arrogant' Western Europeans. The new Greek nation-state was 'Western' because it incorporated European values from classical Greece and Europe had appropriated these to build the Enlightenment. Yet religion and the Orthodox Church played a role not sanctioned in the secular model. Ironically, Greece whose ancient heritage Western Europeans had appropriated to build their nation-states was classed as "backward". In Plamenatz's or Gellner's models, therefore, Greek nationhood represented an 'eastern' form of nationalism.

The mark of this backwardness was in part the role of religion. The Greek community had enjoyed a certain amount of autonomy under the Ottoman Empire through the *millet* system. *Millets* were communities within the Ottoman Empire organized by religion (i.e. Orthodox Christians were a *millet*) that retained control over local administration, trade and education. The Patriarch of Constantinople (leader of the Orthodox Christians during Ottoman rule) was empowered to control civil arrangements including, establishing tribunals that would decide matters of marriage, divorce and inheritance (Woodhouse: 1968: 103). This limited self-rule enjoyed by the Greek community, therefore, revolved around the Orthodox faith and gave the church special standing. After Independence, these civil powers were transferred to the Greek state but, although the Greek Orthodox Church's secular power was gone, it continued to control "personal status issues" and to control women because of its continuing centrality to Greek national discourse. I appropriate Chatterjee's idea of a division between material

and spiritual realms to unpack the *sex/gender regime* in the decades that followed the founding of the Greek nation-state.

### Gender, Militarism and Nationalism

To understand the Greek case, the relationship between gender and nation must also be examined through the prism of militarism<sup>25</sup>. Although Euro-American feminists often describe women as pacifist by nature, in Greece, women engaged in active resistance during both the resistance against the Axis-led Triple Alliance (WWII) and the Civil War (1946-1949). In this section I review some of the main theories about women's participation in informal militaries and national-liberation armies. I show how these theories may contribute to a greater understanding of Greek women's participation in national projects; and how that participation may relate to changes in the *sex/gender regime* and achievements of *gender justice*.

Working from the norm of the core Western nation-states, Walby suggests there is an empirical difference "in the extent to which men and women take up arms for nationalist projects, support peace movements and support politicians who have military build up (1997: 191). Her assessment is based on a few nation-states with secure nationhood prior to nation-state founding. Kaplan argues that European feminists ideologically are pacifist; and that feminism and nationalism are hostile towards each other (1997:8). For Kaplan, Western Europe's experience with fascism (i.e. Metaxas, Franco, and Mussolini) resulted in greater incompatibility between feminism and nationalism. Not all nationalisms are violent, but when militarism is involved, are

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<sup>25</sup> In this section I use militarism to mean women's active role, primarily taking up arms, in paramilitary organizations (i.e. left-organized resistance movements) and not in formal government organized militaries.

women less prepared than men to pursue nationalist goals? Walby argues that women are more likely to support nationalist projects which include their agenda and goals (1997: 188). Nevertheless, projects advanced by military action may or may not include women's agenda. For example, while Third World, anti-colonial nationalisms often included women's emancipation as a goal of the national-liberationist struggle; national-liberation struggles may place the nation above all else, including women's emancipation or may adopt an anti-western position against women's emancipation. Walby suggests that women who experience greater injustice as women may be more willing to share men's militarism and become combatants. Therefore, I examine the relationship between women's willingness to fight and the national-liberationist project and the effect, if any, on the *sex/gender regime* as a result of participation.

Yuval-Davis, whose scholarship incorporates both western and non-western women's experiences, argues "militaries and warfare have never been just a male zone" and looks at women's participation in both formal and informal modern militaries (1997: 93). In *Gender and Nation*, she describes men as discursively linked to warfare naturally while women have been linked to peace. Historically, women have been discursively constructed as passive, so it seems unnatural for women to participate directly in combat. Greek women<sup>26</sup> were active combatants during the Resistance to the Axis-led Triple Alliance and the Civil War. Were women combatants 'dishonored' i.e. 'nice' women did not fight, or did women gain credit and advance their goals? Yuval-Davis argues that a clear sexual division of labor between men and women in war usually disappears when

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<sup>26</sup> Greek women who were active in combat were urban, rural, single and married.

there is no clear differentiation between the 'battle front' and the 'home front'<sup>27</sup> (1997: 95). Moreover, internal differences like ethnicity, class and age become blurred for both men and women when the battle is on the 'home front'. During the Greek Resistance to the Axis-led Triple Alliance, many women shed the naturalized non-combatant passive role for that of combatant in this war waged on the 'home front'. Nevertheless, these women (left-wing) were projected as 'dishonored' after the Resistance and during the Civil War.

Valentine Moghadam's categorization divides women's incorporation into revolutionary movements into two categories:

one which uses women as a symbol of liberation and modernization, in which case women would be encouraged to participate actively in the military; and one which uses women as a symbol of the national culture and tradition which is to be reclaimed, in which case women are virtually excluded from formal participation, and their supportive roles is highly controlled (cited in Yuval-Davis: 1997: 103).

Greek women were encouraged to participate actively in the Left-organized, paramilitary in large numbers during the Resistance to the Axis occupation. During the Civil War that followed, however, the right-wing government symbolically transformed these women after the Resistance accusing them of not embodying the ideals of the nation's constructed woman; pure and chaste. Greek women fit both categories put forth by Moghadam which illustrates the variability of gender and nation relationships. Although Left-wing women struggled to liberate the nation they became 'dishonored' women. It is worthwhile exploring if female combatants were considered 'dishonored' prior to joining the struggle or only projected as such after engaging in combat. I conjecture that only the

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<sup>27</sup> The 'battle front' is represented as wars waged on foreign land including neighboring villages while the 'home front' is within the boundaries of the specific collectivity that is being examined (Yuval-Davis: 1997: 95).

presence of women acknowledged as ‘honorable’ in national-liberation struggles, would change the *sex/gender regime* to promote greater *gender justice*.

Frantz Fanon argues that militarism strengthens paternal power. For Fanon, “the familial metaphor is not natural nor naturalized, it is a cultural project” and societal arrangements in anti-colonial nation-states take on characteristics of the family (cited in McClintock: 1996: 265). Moreover, he believes the militarization of women is “a passive offspring of male agency and the structural necessity of war” (cited in McClintock: 1996: 269). After the national-liberation struggle ends, the heterosexual family is re-naturalized as the norm of societal relations (McClintock: 1996: 271). The hierarchical structure of the family is projected onto national life thus strengthening paternal power. Hence, the state’s reassertion of a family metaphor is important in assessing the role of Greek women combatants in national-liberationist struggles. I explore if there was a heightened sense of family after the revolution/struggle which impacted the *sex/gender regime*.

### **Gender and the Transition to Democracy**

Feminist literature on the transition from fascist regimes to more democratic political systems, and its interplay with gender, is useful when analyzing progress toward *gender justice* in the most recent restructuring of the Greek nation-state. Specifically, I focus on the impact of women’s participation in the national project after the fall of the military junta in 1974, and its impact on *gender justice* and the *sex/gender regime*. Jacquette and Wolchick (1998), Waylan (1994) and Franceschet (2001) argue that transitions to democracy create new political space for women’s organized participation with the state. Although they focus on Latin America and Eastern Europe, there are insights especially in the Latin American cases, which show the possible effects of the

democratization process on the *sex/gender regime* and the role women's organizations play in attaining greater *gender justice*.

Jacquette and Wolchick argue that in Latin America "post-transitional identities are built in part on the rejection of the modes and policies of the prior regimes" (1998: 4). During transitions organized women who were part of a coalition aiming to topple the dictatorship often co-operated with political parties to form new agendas. This also happened in Greece. One of the challenges faced by women's organizations during transitions is "staying organized and sufficiently united to maintain and transform the political space they gained during the transition" (Jacquette and Wolchick: 1998: 6). They posit that in transitions to democracy in Latin America women used three main strategies to gain power: first, through the electoral process although low levels of female representation make this process slow; second, through state-feminism with ministries and offices established for women's issues working to increase *gender justice* providing the ruling party supports the implementation of new policies; and third, through affiliation with interest groups. In other words, the political space gained during the transition is a means to attaining greater power and space. Having 'women' incorporated into the constitution, however, is not necessarily indicative of greater power; nor is space occupied during a transition, space women can count on after.

### **Engaging with the Political System**

By engaging with the political system, women begin its transition. In the Greek case, the last military dictatorship (1967-1974) abrogated fundamental rights and freedoms including the freedom of assembly. During the transition to democracy in 1975, Greek women formed a united front *The Democratic Women's Movement* but which quickly

fragmented. Jacquette and Wolchick believe coalitions formed during transitions to democracy are fragile and need to be replaced by permanent women's organizations "capable of mobilizing political resources to maintain existing gains and push new agendas" (1998: 10). In chapter four, I examine what effect the lack of a united front had on the struggle for *gender justice* during the transition to democracy.

Waylen (1994) also explores the interplay between gender relations and democratization in post-dictatorship transitions in Latin America. She first looks at the space authoritarian regimes afforded women. Women used their traditional roles as Mothers when protesting making it more difficult for a regime to "persecute women who ...were fulfilling their maternal roles" (Waylen: 1994: 338). In Greece, the authoritarian regime provided some political space to both Right-wing women and 'mothers'. Waylen also notes the interaction between women's political activities and the process of transition, suggesting that once a transition has begun women's organizations are faced with a dilemma. They must either organize autonomously, outside of political parties and institutions; or risk being co-opted by them. I explore the political space afforded to women in Greece prior to and during the pre-transition and the transition to democracy and the affect of this political space on women's struggle for *gender justice*.

Based on the Chilean transition after the Pinochet regime, Franceschet (2001) argues for a gendered analysis of how and where women participate after transitions. What I learned from Franceschet's analysis of the Chilean transition is that where women participated, that is in the formal or informal political arena, can affect what shifts in the *sex/gender regime* are possible. Women in Latin America, acting mainly through political parties and bureaucracies, including women's policy machineries, used formal

political arenas to incorporate gender issues. But, Franceschet also notes the importance of the political arena as a space “where women’s organizations seek to build broader movements capable of developing and placing their political demands on the public agenda...organized around community and economic survival goals” (2001: 41). I consider Greek women’s interaction in both formal and informal political arenas, and the impact of that interaction, if any, on *gender justice*. I demonstrate that given the nature of the Greek political system, no actors in the informal political arena have access to the public agenda.

Greek women’s relationship with nationalisms has oscillated between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ and ethnic national projects have not always affected women negatively. Women have managed to advance *gender justice* to some degree through their involvement in national projects. In the chapters which follow, I explore the process in each of the three periods; the founding of the nation-state (1840-1936), fascism and ephemeral *gender justice* (1936-1974), transition to democracy and the women’s movement (1974-present).

## Chapter Two

### Gender Justice in a Post-Independent Greece (1840-1936)

In this chapter I examine women's participation in what I refer to as the Greek nation-founding period. I map 1840 - 1936 as a stable period following the first *round of restructuring* to the *sex/gender regime*. This period is characterized by a civic and liberal model of nationalism, an ethnic and eastern nationalism, an east/west tension, the incorporation of women into the national project as individuals and/or autonomous allies, and first wave feminism. I hypothesize that the type of participation of Greek women's groups in nationalism movements may have varying affects on gains made in *gender justice*. Moreover, the relative openness of the Greek national project to women's participation may also affect *gender justice* and must be considered; participation by women may take the form of citizen-mothers, women as transmitters of culture outside of the home, or autonomous feminist groups allied with a true liberal national project.

I begin by exploring the inception of the Greek nation-state first as a community under Ottoman rule during the pre-independence period, and its transformation to an independent Greek nation-state. I explore the role assigned to women as 'citizens-mothers' in the founding period. I then examine the Greek identity crisis in the 1950's leading to the irredentist campaign in which women were affected by and affected the nationalist project. I argue that women did achieve some minimal gains in *gender justice* mostly greater access to education although these gains were highly circumscribed to urban women. I then explore how women were made markers of history during turn-of-the-century Greece by exploring the colorful and poignant literary work of Kallirhoi

Siganou-Parren, who was the leader of the feminist movement. I focus particularly on her attempt to restructure a patriarchal *sex/gender regime* in which the maternalist gender script locks women out of 'equal' status with men. I then turn my discussion to women's participation in the battle over whether the demotic idiom associated with women or the purist Greek would dominate as the Greek language. I also examine the early twentieth century women's movement and how the efforts of organized autonomous women's groups resulted in greater access to economic security. In the last section, I examine the role of Slavo-Macedonian women in advancing an ethnic national project.

### **Founding the Nation-State: Restoring Greece**

During the initial years of the Greek nation-state, the intelligentsia's agenda imitated core Western nation-states and pursued a secular, liberal and civic model of nation-state building. Religion, more succinctly the Greek Orthodox Church, as the hegemonic power which governed Greek civil affairs under Ottoman domination, was no longer espoused. Ottoman domination of the Greek world began with the fall of Constantinople in 1453 and was ended by the Greek War of Independence from 1821 to 1829. Under Ottoman rule, the *millet* system afforded the Greek community a certain amount of autonomy. During pre-Independence Greece, the *sex/gender regime* which regulated gender discourse and the social arrangements of Greek subjects, predominantly emanated from the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The Patriarch was responsible for civil arrangements including marriage, divorce and inheritance in which women's autonomy was limited (Woodhouse: 1968: 103). In the early nineteenth century organizations of the Greek diaspora, particularly the *Philiki Eteria* (Friendly Society),

were significant in the struggle for independence<sup>1</sup>. The ‘imagined community’ of Greece drew on memories of a glorious past and this period of ‘becoming’ was shaped by various factors including: language, Christianity, irredentism<sup>2</sup>, and whether Greece was ‘eastern or ‘western’. In this nation-state founding period, organized women laid modest foundations for involvement in the nation.

A western, liberal and civic nationalism fused with a pre-modern *ethnie* to define an authentic Greek community, emerged before the modern Greek nation-state was created. Continuity with ancient Greece was highlighted by intellectuals determined to regain autonomy throughout the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Adamantios Korais, the intellectual leader of the Greek Enlightenment, a Phanariote<sup>3</sup>, asserted a historical continuity between ancient Hellas and the Greece of his day. Just as French philosophers were inspired by Ancient Greece, Korais<sup>4</sup> was profoundly influenced by the French Enlightenment and believed that the degradation of the Greek people was not indigenous but caused by Ottoman occupation (Chaconas: 1942). Korais believed Greeks should emulate the French, particularly in creating a western, liberal, and civic nation-state, and advocated reforms by which a restored autonomous nation would reflect a historical national continuity.

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<sup>1</sup> Throwing off the Ottoman yoke required the military efforts of the *klephts* (armed bandits of the southern Greek mainland) as well as Philhellene volunteers (Clogg: 1992).

<sup>2</sup> Smith describes irredentist movements as a “more philosophical idea: nations outside the homeland were deemed to be ‘lost’, and the lands they inhabited, especially those contiguous to the homeland, were ‘unredeemed’ (*irredenta*) and had to be recovered and ‘redeemed’ (1991: 75)

<sup>3</sup> A Phanariote refers to Greeks who resided in Constantinople under the Ottoman Empire, who held administrative posts and enjoyed an economically privileged status. Phanariotes held key positions of trust, such as the Patriarchate, who in return for guarantees of obedience and payment of taxes maintained a privileged post (Woodhouse: 1968: 103).

<sup>4</sup> Korais was born in Smyrna but embarked on a journey to Western Europe to escape Ottoman repression.

Anthony Smith argues that if a modern nationalism is not perceived as authentic, if it does not impart meaning and resonance to the people, then it cannot mobilize political action (1998: 198). Symbols and myths create that resonance with the people; symbols represent a group's distinctive shared experiences and values and myths, and bring meaning and illuminate the shared experiences and values. Hence, he believes modern nationalists rediscover the past to unite a group and distinguish them from 'others'. Korais portrayed a vivid identity by establishing continuity between the civilization of Ancient Greece and the nineteenth century Greek community under Ottoman rule<sup>5</sup>. The Greek nation did not stem from the process of modernization as modernists believe, but was restored as an ethno-cultural community, as perennialists suggest. Nevertheless, Korais' continuity with the past did not include Byzantium and he rejected the role of the Orthodox Church as a force to unite Greeks. His purely 'imagined' social constructionist approach precluded Eastern influences since he associated them with Ottoman 'Orientalism' and Ottoman 'backwardness' (Chaconas: 1942: 31). He did not credit the role of organizations under Ottoman rule for being repositories of Hellenic culture. The Greek nation was striving to reform their inherited culture (the Greek Orthodox Church) in order to imitate the secular, modern, and western world.

Women became symbols as Korais discursively constructed his new nation. Korais anonymously circulated pamphlets in 1801 such as "The Song of War" in which women were symbolically represented as disheveled, beautiful, defenseless and bloody

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<sup>5</sup> In 1805, he re-edited the works of ancient Greek writers, a part of the nation's authenticity, and inserted nationalistic prefaces using Modern Greek to inspire other Greek intellectuals (Chaconas: 1942).

from the wounds inflicted by the Ottoman ‘Other’ (Chaconas: 1942: 93). Women were ‘signifiers of ethnic and national differences’ and the Greek women’s vulnerability represented the usurpation of the land and its control by the Ottomans. In “The Song of War” the true Greek woman summons her sons to join the Greek army to fight for and defend Mother-Hellas. Greek women who are willing to lose their sons on the battlefield are true defenders of the Greek nation that has been occupied by the “Other”. Establishing a historic national continuity with Ancient Hellas evoked a consciousness of the ‘Other’ that has been reinterpreted through imagery and the written word. To Korais, women signified the ‘purity’ of his *imagined community* and the spirit of the collectivity. Although women symbolically were represented in the national discourse they soon would become active on the actual battlefield.

A Greek uprising was organized by the *Philiki Eteria* formed in 1814 composed mostly by Greek merchants from Odessa. Varikas argues that the *Philiki Eteria* prepared their patriotic rhetoric around: “a fundamental antithesis between the ‘obscurantism’ and ‘barbarity’ of Ottoman rule and the ideals of liberty, civilization and progress by the Greek people whose ancestors had ‘invented’ democracy”<sup>6</sup> (1993: 269). The uprising failed but the movement was reinvigorated by simultaneous events in several regions of occupied mainland Greece. The backbone of the struggle was Philhellenes like Lord Byron, who perished in the Enlightenment movement<sup>7</sup>. Moreover, the Greek people,

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<sup>6</sup> We know how limited this democracy was but the European Enlightenment had accorded Greece a golden halo. The West represented a civilized world while the East inculcated the ‘backwardness’ of the Ottoman Empire.

<sup>7</sup> Those actively involved in the struggle who played a leading role included: individuals from the Greek diaspora such as John Capodistria, the Russian Tsar’s joint Secretary of State and a member

including the peasantry and both men and women, fought for the liberation of the nation, although the participation of women is scarcely mentioned in most of the literature (Woodhouse: 1968; Varikas: 1993).

In this struggle for independence, women were not just symbols of honor but actively participated in the national-liberation movement. The women combatants<sup>8</sup> never ceased to be under male direction. Nor were they valorized immediately following the war for their roles in the Independence Movement. Women's involvement in the nationalist project can be categorized as incorporated; these individual women who participated in the nationalist project did not have feminist goals. Although women were involved in the national-liberation struggle<sup>9</sup>, a situation which could expand women's roles, women's agenda was an independent Greece and women did not achieve citizenship under the newly formed Greek nation-state<sup>10</sup>. This was not met with any resistance. The Napoleonic model of nation-state building favored by the leading intellectuals was based on a modern/traditional dichotomy which placed women at the center: markers of the Greek nation as citizen-mothers reproducing the nation at home (Varikas: 1993). This *sex/gender regime* based on a private/public split had both ancient practice and modern, especially French, practice and ideology on its side.

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of the *Philiki Eteria*, Phanariotes, and the native population including leaders such as the klepht Theodore Kolokotronis from the Peloponnese (Woodhouse: 1968: 133-156) .

<sup>8</sup> Lascarina Bouboulina, a wealthy widow, owned several vessels which she commanded during the War of Independence and has since been celebrated in romantic literature and iconography. Domna Visiviza, a wife of a naval officer, assumed her husband's position after he perished in battle (Malamas: 1998; Varikas: 1993).

<sup>9</sup> This is a departure from West's idea of feminist nationalism since in my definition women can participate in nationalist struggles and not be feminist activists (West: 1997). Moreover, feminism can come out of women's involvement in nationalisms.

<sup>10</sup> The 1844 Constitution provided universal manhood suffrage.

## The Citizen-Mother

A western model of nation-state building inspired by the French Republic was formed after Independence. A maternalist *sex/gender regime* that differentiated masculine from feminine forms of citizenship emerged in the newly formed Greek nation-state. Sluga argues that after the French Revolution, a patriarchal household was privileged in France and other Western European nation-states, in which the task of the women was to educate citizens (1998: 97). A gendered subjectivity was being formed as a result of women's exclusion from 'universal citizenship' which prompted feminists like Wollstonecraft and Adams to advocate women's right, as 'mothers', to education. Wollstonecraft argued, "if children are to be educated to understand the true principle of patriotism, their mother must be a patriot...but the education and situation of women, at present, shuts her out from such investigations" (cited in Sluga: 1998: 98-99). After the war, certain privileges arguably deriving from the Western enlightenment tradition were afforded to Greek women as citizen-mothers<sup>11</sup>. Although as citizen-mothers women had virtually no civil and political rights, they played a vital role in contributing to the national project as mediators of culture. Citizen-mothers created and reproduced the nation as mothers teaching their children Greek language and culture thus expanding their participation in the public sphere. To rear good citizens, women could not be enclosed in the private sphere but required access to education attained through the public sphere. The 1833 *Education Act* gave women the right to designated schools for the betterment of

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<sup>11</sup> A citizen-mother is a conduit for citizenship, a feminine form of national citizenship which is relegated to the private sphere, who reproduced the nation culturally by rearing good citizens. Citizen-mothers "participated by creating and reproducing these nations in the minds of their children, one family at a time" (Vickers: 2003: 4).

the nation and its collectivity<sup>12</sup>. In the 1840's, upper middle class women began to write for their own journals and waged their own polemics in print media. Hence, print technology was also used by women to imagine their trajectory in the newly created nation-state. A sense of agency among women to participate in the national project beyond the role of citizen-mother gained further impetus as a result of the panslavism narrative promulgated by the German historian Falmerayer. Falmerayer's *Slavic Theory*<sup>13</sup> argued that contemporary Greeks were descendants of Slavs leading to the 1850 emergence of romantic historiography and folklore within Greek intellectual currents<sup>14</sup>. A new strand of national identity emerged as Byzantium was resurrected as part of Greece's historical legacy, as a response to Falmerayer's thesis. This new strand also reinforced specific gender roles since women's role as repositories and transmitters of Greek culture in both the private and public sphere intensified. In the next section I will explore the nationalist project, the Byzantine heritage as part of the nationalist discourse, and its impact on women.

### **Identity Crisis**

With the emergence of Byzantium belonging to Greece's historical legacy, an eastern and non-secular model of the Greek nation-state was taking shape which diminished the magnitude of Korais' western and secular national project. Hence, the

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<sup>12</sup> Under the Education Act, schooling for both boys and girls was declared compulsory and female literacy flourished in the two decades that followed (Anastasopoulou: 1997:25).

<sup>13</sup> Falmerayer's thesis is presented in two volumes of *Geschichte der Halbinsel Morea Wahrend des Mittelalters* (1830, 1836).

<sup>14</sup> Falmerayer, in his previous work, described modern Greeks as descendents of Ancient Greeks who fought in Plataia and Salamina for the liberty of humanity. He was now arguing that this Greek race who drew its lineage to a glorious past have become "mere 'albanised' or 'slavified' tribes without a single drop of pure Greek blood, and therefore could not claim any continuity with Ancient Greeks" (Varikas: 1993: 270).

Greek nation-state can best be understood as marginal to core European nation-states.

Could the modern Greek national project still make claim to their *ethnie* in light of Falmerayer's thesis? If so, we also need to examine how this process affected women and which women were most affected. Varikas argues that Falmerayer was disillusioned with the apparent inability of the modern Greek people "to become really Western". She believes his theories created a sense of trauma by suggesting this inability to westernize as an opening which would allow Greece to be absorbed by the 'Slav-danger' (1993: 271). A distorted understanding of Falmerayer's thesis developed resulting in outrage and the reconstruction of national ideology. The Greek intelligentsia misinterpreted Falmerayer's concern – the inability to westernize – for advocating panslavism. As a result, Greek national ideologues included Byzantium in the historical account of the nation's origins. Hence, Greeks were not mere slavified tribes but part of a Hellenic culture that was not effaced over the centuries. A new symbolic order was emanating from the pre-modern era into the modern era.

In the mid nineteenth century, the eastern legacy, Byzantium, was infused into the new symbolic order and gender was placed at the center of national self-definition. The Byzantine Empire was now part of the nation's symbolic narrative with its glorious Eastern Orthodox tradition while Ancient Greece was reminiscent of a Western cultural legacy. The Greek historian Constantine Paparrigopoulos who was hailed a champion of national unity, incorporated Byzantium into Greek history during the mid nineteenth century suggesting Greeks inherited the region. In his historical narratives, Alexander the

Great was the hero who brought enlightenment to the “barbaric” Orient<sup>15</sup>. The new Greece linked the ancient cultural region to a modern state by resisting the hegemony of the West. After Independence from the Ottomans, Greece<sup>16</sup> was ruled by the Bavarian King Otto<sup>17</sup> and Western culture arguably was imposed by his court along with the bourgeoisie of the Diaspora<sup>18</sup>. In other words, domination by the non-Western Ottoman Empire ended by domination by a foreign ‘Western’ king and his court. Varikas argues,

in less than four decades, every aspect of traditional culture and institutions totally disappeared from Athens and the few big urban centers: traditional architecture gave way to German neo-classical style, monophonic music to military bands, the shadow theater to Italian operatta, and traditional costumes to European dress (1993: 282).

The newly formed political society was installed by the protecting powers who appointed King Ludwig I of Bavaria’s son, Otto, as King. In the early 1830’s, Greece was under the British, Russian and French protectorate during the war and its transition to independence. By the mid 1870’s, the upper middle class and lower working class in urban centers adopted a Western style of dress. Moreover, the influx of wealthy Greeks of the European diaspora to Greece “introduced the Western European model of woman as an object of conspicuous consumption” (Anastasopoulou: 1997: 2). These women lived an opulent lifestyle and were sharp contrasts to indigenous Greek women,

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<sup>15</sup> The boundaries of Greek culture have both expanded and receded over the course of history. Greece as a set of ancient city-states had no ‘state’ but a cultural region. Alexander the Great’s Empire (fourth century B.C.) represents Greek culture transcending the boundaries of Greek city-states hence a cultural empire. Nevertheless, Ottoman domination of Greece in 1453 led to the fall of Byzantium and the Helleno-Christian cultural region.

<sup>16</sup> In 1844 the newly formed Constitution established a bicameral parliamentary system ruled by a king (Woodhouse: 1968: 162).

<sup>17</sup> The 1864 Constitution declared Greece a ‘democracy under a king’ (*vaslilevomeni dimokratia*), an arrangement that was dissolved in 1968 (Woodhouse: 1968: 171).

<sup>18</sup> The first President of Greece was a Russian Greek Copadistrias who governed from 1827-1831.

especially rural women, who labored arduously on the land and had participated in the struggle for Independence. In other words, the emerging Greek spirit was being subsumed by Western Europeans who were suppressing the invention of 'Greekness'.

### **Greek Women and the Spiritual Domain**

The Greek nation became less imitative of core Western-European nations and its claim to authenticity, as separate from the 'Western' culture imposed by the Bavarian court, was transmitted through the 'spiritual' or inner domain. Chatterjee argued that anti-colonial Indian nationalists had created their own domain of sovereignty before combating imperialism with a material domain relating to the outside world where Indians emulated the West, and a spiritual domain of the family which extolled ancient culture and norms (1996:268). A similar division emerged during this period in Greece. Mediation between the spiritual and material realms is at the core of the Greece case, although the originating colonizing power was Muslim. Although the Greeks embraced certain Christian European values, they saw themselves superior to the 'arrogant' Western Europeans. Moreover, Varikas argues "traditional gender values offered a palliative for humiliating national dignity" (1993: 271). Local Greek morals were regarded by indigenous intellectuals as superior to those promulgated by the Bavarian court which promoted 'modern' Western culture, particularly regarding sexual morals. Greek women's role in the spiritual domain was to transmit, through formal instruction, the Greek language and culture to their children.

Moghadam argues that struggles around authenticity and cultural identity always implicitly or explicitly delineate women's roles and status (1994: 9). In Greece, the

modernity of women as 'modern' in the material domain was not part of the national self-definition since Greeks were 'Western' by opposition to the Ottoman Empire. By contrast, in early twentieth century Turkey women were the site of struggle between Kemalist secularism and Islamic activism; Turkish women were 'modern' in the material domain and represented 'Western' culture through their style of dress and access to education. In the spiritual domain, however, they were to remain repositories and transmitters of the national culture. In Greece women became markers of the spiritual frontier. The weaving of Byzantine culture into the Greek national narrative involved a shift in the role of women vis-à-vis the public realm. Women became professional educators sent to spread the Greek language and culture to ethnic Greeks subject to Ottoman rule.

Thus far we have seen Greek national identity in this period of 'becoming' shift from Ancient Hellas and Western enlightenment values to an identity crisis that incorporated eastern and religious elements; Byzantium and the Orthodox Church. Memories, values, and traditions of Eastern Orthodoxy became an active resource in the 'imagining' of the Greek nation. A desire to create a homogenous society that incorporated Greeks in the former territory of Byzantium spawned the *Megali Idea* (Great Idea), a national project intent on freeing the Hellenes from the 'backwardness' of the East. The *Megali Idea* did not seek territorial aggrandizement; it was a pan-Hellenic movement which directly impacted women.

### Women as Transmitters of Culture in the Public Sphere

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century an ethnic and not civic nationalism had intensified increasing women's access to the public sphere. Yuval-Davis and Anthias argue that women are central to the creation and reproduction of ethnic and national projects partly as participants in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its culture<sup>19</sup>. Greek intellectual leaders in the mid nineteenth century began to promote women as 'citizen-mothers'; agents for transmitting and preserving the Greek language in both the private and public sphere. The urban bourgeois woman became "an active and essential agent helping national regeneration" (Anastasopoulou: 1997: 4). Women were still considered subordinate to men, yet the new national project afforded certain women, urban petit bourgeoisie and the professional middle class, greater access to the public sphere through new educational and professional opportunities. Although the *sex/gender regime* remained patriarchal, and women were locked out of citizenship, they were given greater access (as citizen-mothers) to education as individual women incorporated into the nationalist project. Women represented the 'spiritual realm' and frontier in and through their education (i.e. trained as teachers) which also positioned them as professional repositories and transmitters of culture in the public sphere. Greek schools appeared throughout the Ottoman Empire "which channeled the normative discourse concerning the unity of Hellenism" (Kitromilides: 1989: 45). Irredentism would bring "Hellenism back to its geographical dimensions...and elevate ethnic truth" (Veremis: 1997: 40).

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<sup>19</sup> Yuval Davis and Anthias argue that women are designated the "cultural carriers...who transmit the rich heritage of ethnic symbols and ways of life to the other members of the ethnic group, especially the young" (1989: 9).

Hobsbawm refers to ethno-linguistic nationalism as promoting an ethnic type of nationalism that stresses linguistic and/or ethnic elements. Women teachers in the last quarter of the nineteenth century were sent to spread ethnic and linguistic 'Greek lights' in parts of the Ottoman Empire. Women continued to be incorporated as individuals into the national project. Women's education became intimately linked to the ethnic nationalist project which promoted a Greek/Orthodox identity. I conceptualize *battles of the nursery* in Asia Minor and the Balkans to be over which language would prevail; Greek or the language of the 'Others'. Women teachers, young and unwed, were sent by the Greek state to newly established schools in Balkans and Asia Minor, often working under precarious conditions, to diffuse the Greek culture, language and fuel pan-Hellenism (Varikas: 1993: 272). Although the patriarchal character of the *sex/gender regime* continued, Greek women who were incorporated into the national project attained greater access to education. Their education inevitably led them to agitate for greater *gender justice* during the turn-of-the-century Greece.

The Greek nation was defined by its ethnic and cultural components and romanticized by intellectuals and politicians like Dragoumis and Souliotes. To them, the Greek nation-state existed with specific boundaries but was incomplete since it did not incorporate the full nation which stretched into Asia Minor and the Balkans. The first attempt to unite the Hellenes of the East with the Greek nation-state culminated in the 1897 Thessaly irredentist debacle. Dragoumis placed blame on the state for the Ottoman military defeat and argued that the "Helladic state was too small to satisfy the needs of

the nation, too weak to pursue irredentist campaigns and corrupted by foreign mores” (Triandafyllidou et al: 2002: 82).

The Greek nation-state can be understood through a perennialist framework which “views nations over the *long durée* and attempts to grasp their role as long-term components of historical development – whether they are seen as continuous or recurrent in history” (Smith: 1998: 223). For Dragoumis and Souliotes a return to an authentic community of Hellenes stretched back to a pre-Christian era with little regard for the Church; and looked towards a secular version of the Ottoman Empire to unite the Hellenes of the East: a Greco-Ottomanism (Veremis: 1989: 16). It would be a multi-ethnic state, thus incorporating other nations as well. The idea was abandoned in 1909 as a result of the military insurgence. Moreover, the 1897 irredentist debacle<sup>20</sup> coupled with the frail economic condition of the Greek state, contributed to the attenuation of demands made by women’s groups although it did not suppress them entirely. Hence, women’s education provided a space women could use to build on their circumscribed role as repositories of culture and expand it to pursue a liberalist feminist agenda. Women were now incorporated into the nationalist projects as individuals and as allies.

### **Making Women Markers of History**

Although the *sex/gender regime* remained maternalist and patriarchal, women could no longer concede to their circumscribed roles as repositories and transmitters of Greek culture. Greek women at the end of the nineteenth century advocated a civic, liberal and secular nation-state, as initially envisioned by Korais, but one that recognized

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<sup>20</sup> The irredentist association, the National Society, was formed with the aim of annexing Macedonia and claiming the territory as part of the Greek nation-state (Koliopoulos: 1989: 83).

gender equality. Women were incorporated into the Greek national-liberationist struggle (1821-1829) and irredentist campaign (late 19<sup>th</sup> century), but shifted to autonomously organized women's groups; at the turn-of-the-century they chose their own goals and strategies to advance *gender justice*, were comprised with some measure of respect and self-determination, and allied themselves with nationalist movements/parties. The first wave of the Greek women's movement emerged after 1856 with the "initial flowering of capitalist development" which comprised petit bourgeoisie and professional middle class married and unmarried women (Stamiris: 1986: 99). Many of the women who participated as school teachers in Asia Minor and the Balkans now demanded the right to vote, equal education, the right to paid employment and the incorporation of Western European feminist ideas. Political rights, legal rights and social reforms were demanded; a *sex/gender regime* that recognized equal humanity and dignity of human beings.

In 1890, the University of Athens admitted its first woman student yet the struggle for equal access to higher education was at an early stage. Women's organizations argued that gender equality was an essential element of a liberal state and constitutive of Greece's national destiny. Women like Siganou-Parren, leader of the feminist movement in turn-of-the-century Greece, were struggling for *gender justice* by challenging sex/gender asymmetry and trying to dislodge the East/West dichotomy which supported the messianic role women were supposed to play. Siganou-Parren virulently attacked patriarchy promoting a 'New Woman' of equal status to Greek men both in the public and private realms. In this section, I map the first wave feminist movement and Siganou-

Parren's attempt to discursively restructure the *sex/gender regime* to produce greater material gains for women.

### **First Wave Feminists**

Restructuring the *sex/gender regime*, to women like Sigano-Parren, also entailed removing 'eastern' influences from the historical national continuity. Sigano-Parren<sup>21</sup> was the first woman reporter in Greece and published *The Ladies Newspaper* (1897-1917), a conscious-raising vehicle for Greek women denied their history. *The Ladies Newspaper* promoted a feminist agenda and was the primary forum for articulating political and social reforms. In 1896, Sigano-Parren founded *The Association of Greek Women* and became leader of the first-wave feminist movement. Women's associations were flourishing that addressed social issues including support for orphanages, poorhouses, soup kitchens, children's hospitals and daycare centers. What Lois West calls a feminist nationalist movement was emerging within a liberal national backdrop that promoted gender inequality. Feminist nationalism took the form of an 'identity rights movement' in which groups "struggle for a political voice...or a particular cultural and economic demand" (West: 1992: 568). The feminist standpoint adopted in turn-of-the-century Greece had the ambitious intent of changing human relationships. The women's movement was a modern, secularist, nationalist movement seeking to free the Greek nation from the Oriental mentality instilled by the Ottomans. Byzantium and Eastern Orthodoxy were part of the collective memory and women's participation in the nationalist project, as reproducers and transmitters of Greek culture, did not result in a

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<sup>21</sup> Sigano-Parren was born in Crete in 1861, received her teaching degree in 1878 from the Arsakion in Athens, and in the 1880's married French reporter Ioannis Parren who was the founder of the Athens News Agency.

substantive change in the *sex/gender regime*. Women gained greater access to education but their level of education remained limited with a few exceptions. As the leader of first-wave Greek feminism, Siganou-Parren wanted women included in the state (with suffrage) and challenged the claim “men were the sole makers of history” (Varikas: 1993: 273).

Siganou-Parren drew on a hypothetical age preceding patriarchal society; a Golden Age of equality on which women could draw to push for the regeneration of the ‘New Woman’ and humanity before men made women slaves. Siganou-Parren and other feminists of her day revised mythological interpretations through a gendered lens by creating a myth of women’s time. The myth of the struggle between Athena and Poseidon over the protection of Attica and the naming of Athens was used by men allegorically to illustrate women’s ‘historical defeat’ by men. Both Athena and Poseidon made territorial claims to Attica culminating in a contest in which the God with the most beneficial offering to Athenians would become the patron God of Attica. Poseidon, the God of the sea, offered a flowing salt spring whereas Athena, Goddess of wisdom and war, offered an olive tree. When the people drank from the spring they instantly spit it out and favored the olive tree which represented prosperity, industry and peace. Hence, Athens would become a prosperous territory ruled by reason.

Mary O’Brien argues that if we are to conceptualize history as a life-line, we not only have to challenge male power but to destroy the myth of men’s time and produce a regenerative time-consciousness (1989: 16). In both the Greek and Turkish cases, a Golden Age was envisioned in opposition to Orientalism and the trappings of Ottoman

society. In Turkey, intellectual leaders like Ziya Gokalp traced the origins of Turkish feminism and the *ethnie* of the collectivity back to an era in which sexes were ritualistically equal thus differentiating 'Turks' from 'Ottomans'. (Kandiyoti: 1991). Siganou-Parren referred to a pre-patriarchal Golden Age of *gender justice* in her plan to reformulate and reconstitute gender asymmetry. She intellectually synthesized a future in which *gender justice* would be promoted through the resurrection and reparation of the past. Notably, enlightened intellectuals in both Greek and Turkish circles discursively constructed the Ottoman Empire as the 'Other'.

Siganou-Parren's gendered reading of the myth credits Athenian women for the Goddess of Wisdom's victory since they represented more than half of the population (Varikas: 1993: 276). Poseidon's loss led him to punish women by depriving them of the vote, citizenship and the right to transmit their name to their children. Siganou-Parren used the myth allegorically to illustrate women's relegation to the private sphere and the forgotten tree of peace and prosperity. For Siganou-Parren, Athena was masculinized many centuries later as a warrior when Athens "was bathed in the blood of its children...and women were sent back home to their looms, for having dared to vote for a peaceful future...and gradually forgot their vocation" (Varikas: 1993: 276). Siganou-Parren represented the dispute as a conflict between 'feminine' and 'masculine' and argued Athena's true vocation was not the 'masculine' nature of war but the 'feminine' vocation of peace. Her reading demonstrated that women's exclusion from the public sphere was not natural but 'naturalized'.

Siganou-Parren also used literary discourse to argue for the freedom of the nation from a past of Oriental domination which had justified subordinating women, and challenged the ubiquitous late nineteenth century messianic image of Greek women; repositories of Greek traditional values and language. Her trilogy of novels, *The Books of Dawn*, challenged nineteenth century gender scripts by inventing characters that represent a new social discourse. Sigano-Parren illustrates that occupation by the Ottomans had instilled a 'degenerative' Oriental mentality, including male dominance, that can only be transformed by a developed iconoclastic society; a departure from the messianic image. In her novels, the East represented "prejudice governed by unnatural principles" and moral decay whereas her alternative the 'New World' represented by the United States, "subscribed to the principles of natural, truth, justice and social progress" (Anagnostopoulou: 1997: 9). The 'New Woman' was an individual engaged in relationships of mutual respect who was active in the public sphere, opposed to patriarchal structures and defiantly against convention. In her novel *The Emancipated*, Sigano-Parren illustrates the moral decay of the Orient by examining the lives of a Byzantine middle class family showing it as diametrically opposed to the ideals of the main character, Maria, who symbolizes truth and justice that will regenerate society. Falmerayer's thesis was nuanced in Sigano-Parren's interpretation of Greek society and in her juxtaposition of the Orient with the 'New Woman'. Greek upper-class women used the written word to critique the *sex/gender regime* and argue for an egalitarian society. In 1917, Sigano-Parren was exiled for her 'pacifist convictions' which is perhaps indicative of the 'degenerative' mentality that she was arguing against.

## Gender and the Demotic Movement

Smith argues that ethnic notions of nationalism “have ties and affinities based on history and vernacular culture” (1995: 99) but almost a century after Independence Korais’ purged Greek (*katharevousa*) continued to threaten the vernacular culture. The Demotic Movement reinforced the ethnic characteristic of the Greek nation-state and women’s support of an ethno-linguistic project. In turn-of-the-century Greece, *battles of the nursery* were over which idiom would be woven into the fabric of Greek society; the demotic idiom that can be understood by the masses or an elitist ‘purged’ Greek (*katharevousa*)<sup>22</sup>. Triandafyllidou and Paraskevopoulou argue that the Greek nation was eventually defined by common ancestry, culture and language, and is in a constant state of ‘becoming’. (2002: 79). The trajectory of the national project included: (1) formulating an ‘imagined community’ which represented a continuity with ancient Greece in the early nineteenth century; (2) the incorporation of Byzantine Greece that brought Greek Orthodox religion; (3) the campaign of Hellenism in the mid nineteenth century; and (4) the struggle over which language would prevail in the early twentieth century. *Diglossia*, the purist versus demotic idiom, also reflected the East/West tension inherent in the Greek nation-state building process; intellectuals depicted Greeks as culturally superior to their former Muslim dominators and showcased their authenticity through a purified idiom purged of all Turkish additions. Upper middle class women at the end of the century autonomously engaged in the nationalist movement by voicing their discontent with *katharevousa*. They advocated the demotic idiom as the national

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<sup>22</sup> Katharevousa was established in 1804 by the leader of the Greek Enlightenment, Admantios Korais, but it was a medium that was “too far removed from the capacity of the average reader or too remote from its classical prototype” (Chaconas: 1942: 57).

language that inevitably would contribute to a more egalitarian Greek nation-state. These women allied themselves with male intellectuals like Psiharis and formed the demotic movement in order to redirect the course of the nationalist project. *Katharevousa* was promoted by public officials and used by most male writers, but women wrote in “a prose noteworthy for its simplicity and clarity” (Cacoullou: 1994: 315).

Women were active in promoting the demotic idiom as a national language and opposed the unintelligible *katharevousa*. In the early twentieth century, Penelope Delta was an author from a wealthy family who wrote children’s books in the *demotic* language, to instill patriotism (Augustinos: 1997). A tacit understanding of how the purist idiom (*katharevousa*) segregated women who were not of a privileged class was developing. In his *Imagined Communities* (1991), Anderson argues that the nation is “imagined” through print artifacts like novels and newspapers. Greek women like Siganou-Parren mobilized the imagination of the political community through the demotic idiom to encourage the growth of a nationalist consciousness. The women’s circulation *The Newspaper*, with 5000 readers throughout Greece and the Diaspora communities, advocated a sense of gender belonging and a common project (Varikas: 1993: 278). Moreover, in 1896 Siganou-Parren appropriated history for women by writing a history for Greek women from 1530-1896 using the demotic idiom. In the early nineteenth century elite men “invented” Greece in a language most Greeks did not understand. Their insistence on purged Greek was in opposition to the language of their Ottoman Turkish rulers also considered their enemies. The demotic idiom was used

orally but the written language was primarily in *katharevousa*. Women actively and autonomously allied themselves with men in the demotic movement to create a more cohesive nation-state that did not further lock out of participation the predominantly illiterate masses, particularly women, who communicated using the demotic idiom. After all, the transition from an oral demotic idiom to a written one would be far easier to manipulate than purged Greek; more women would be able to learn to read which results in greater gains in *gender justice*.

### **Early Twentieth Century Women's Movement**

The *sex/gender regime* was undisturbed until the 1936 Metaxas dictatorship and elements of *gender justice*, mostly greater economic and social justice, were gained during this period. Women organized mostly in autonomous women's groups and renewed the struggle for women's rights which engaged with the state<sup>23</sup> "independent of party programs and ideology", in an effort to have social, economic and political justice materialize (Cacoullou: 1994: 315). In the early twentieth century gender relations were restructured through employment. Women's organizations promoted a liberal feminist agenda demanding an end to men's control of their biological reproduction and promoted abortion rights. Demands made by organized feminists also included equality in the family, protection for illegitimate children, and the eradication of brothels (Cacoullou: 1994: 315). This period began with women incorporated into the nationalist project although not necessarily with a feminist agenda. Nevertheless, during turn-of-the-century Greece, women were rallying for greater *gender justice* and were often allied with

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<sup>23</sup> Venizelos, came to power in 1910 after winning the elections with a substantive majority, supported a parliamentary form of government, irredentism (Megali Idea) and a modern bourgeois state (Woodhouse: 1968; Veremis: 1997).

political parties in support of a liberal state that would recognize women's equality. Feminists did not reject the state but advocated that it restructure the *sex/gender regime*. They often interacted with political parties and petitioned parliament for measures to achieve greater *gender justice*.

The political practices of first wave Greek feminism, led to the enactment of protective measures by the Venizelos government for both women and children working in factories. Between 1911 and 1912, protective legislation for women was passed including a maximum ten hour workday and maternity leave, and the first public high school for girls was established (Kyriakidou: 2002: 492). Nevertheless, not all women's organizations agreed on which type of protective legislation and gender specific agenda to promote. Certain women's groups that were influential in their pursuit of protective legislation included: *The National Council of Greek Women* (NCGW), *The Lyceum of Greek Women* (LGW), *The League for Women's Rights* (LWR) and *The Socialist Women's Group* (SWG) (Kyriakidou: 2002: 494-501). The nationalist projects of the nineteenth century served as a catalyst for women's struggle for *gender justice* in the form of economic, civil, and circumscribed political rights in the twentieth century. In other words, women who were incorporated into the nationalist project during the irredentist campaign as repositories and transmitters of the Greek culture (i.e. as teachers) or sent to Asia Minor and the Balkans to spread the Greek language, now rallied specifically for a restructuring of the patriarchal *sex/gender regime*. Many of the women active in the irredentist campaign had the advantage of an education in the demotic idiom and access to the public sphere. Many of these women waged their struggle for gender

symmetry using the print media and eventually through an organized women's movement.

The NCGW, founded in 1908, "sought to improve the position of women and children by seeking to promote gender consciousness, educational opportunities and, eventually, full civil and political rights"<sup>24</sup> (Kyriakidou: 2002: 494). The NCGW, through a charity embodied a maternal nationalism<sup>25</sup>; nevertheless, they did not engage in political activism. The LGW was founded in 1911 by Siganou-Parren and was of a pro-monarchist, anti-Venizelist persuasion with a nationalistic agenda of "reviving the glorious Greek past and working to rescue Greek tradition" (Vervenioti: 2002: 116). The LGW was concerned both with Greek folk culture and gender equality. Nevertheless, both the LWR and SWG were vociferous on the issue of protective legislation during a time when women and children were unprotected and at the mercy of their employers.

The LWR (founded in 1920) was a pro-Venizelist bourgeois feminist group arguing for suffrage and reforms through gender equality to eradicate prejudices faced daily by women workers (Kayriakidou: 2002: 495). These women were the few among Greek feminists who disapproved of protective legislation for women. They viewed protectionism as perpetuating women's subordination to men by placing them in the same category as children. Instead, they promoted equal status of men and women especially a minimum wage for both men and women. The LWR also attempted to change the 'masculine' and 'feminine' perceptions inherent in the social landscape and demanded

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<sup>24</sup> The illiteracy rate for Greek women in 1907 was 82% but decreased to 60% by 1921 (Hart: 1996: 112).

<sup>25</sup> Maternal nationalists "use their traditional female and maternal roles to protect the power such roles accorded them...maternal nationalists set out to use their maternal skills in the public sphere." (Wilton: 2000: 151).

universal suffrage. Hence, a substantive normative change in the relationship between gender and the nation was being pursued. In contrast, the SWG (founded in 1919) linked to *Socialist Women International*, advocated protective legislation for women and children in the labor force. They believed gendered work-related legislation would “decrease the number of accidents by reducing the number of work hours per day especially at dangerous and unhealthy work places” (Kayriakidou: 2002: 499). The SWG was influenced by international socialism and called for equality in the economic, civil, social and political spheres. This feminist organization argued for the improvement of the “female population’s standard of living as a whole” including the struggle against illiteracy (Kyriakidou: 2002: 499). The LGW, on the other hand, indirectly supported protective legislation by acknowledging the Soviet Union’s labor legislation which incorporated women. It is noteworthy to mention that the LGW did not have communist or socialist affiliations; however, they promoted measures taken for the progress of gender symmetry.

A liberal and civic model of democracy was pursued by autonomous feminist organizations affiliated with political parties to gain political citizenship and not remain within the limits of ‘citizen-mothers’. Autonomous women’s organizations like LWR, engaged with the state while successfully avoiding any form of co-optation. The organization diligently campaigned for women’s suffrage and sent representatives to lobby legislators for measures to promote greater *gender justice*. As a result, in 1920 MP Thanos Vasiaris during a parliamentary session proposed a law to recognize women’s right to vote (Ksiradaki: 1988: 114). LWR maintained links with Parliament so successfully

that in 1921 the Prime Minister promised to extend the vote to women. Women's agency and mobilization were magnified because Greece's political system was unstable at the time.

During the interwar period feminists such as Maria Giannou promoted women's direct participation in the legislature (Ksiradaki: 1988: 141). She wanted to transform Greek women of her day into women who could exercise their own reason and not float endlessly in man's shadow. For Giannou, like Wollstonecraft, women had the capacity for knowledge, reason and self-determination with the right to make their own life choices; their mobility would be facilitated and henceforth they would reject conformism. To gain their own time and break with masculinized history, Giannou pleaded for women to use their *psihiki dinami* or spiritual strength to understand the meaning of society, how it functions, how its laws are formed and so forth. For her, *alitheia* or truth was the tool women needed to transcend their subordinate position vis-à-vis men and reform female identity and social life (Ksiradaki: 1988: 141-143).

The nation-state in interwar Greece espoused a mainly civic agenda, as did many feminists, yet vestiges of an 'eastern' and ethnic national project remained. In interwar Greece, politics oscillated between right and left, from liberal Venizelists to anti-Venizelist royalists. Nationalist pride in the *Megali Idea* continued but the King's predilection for a civic concept based on a small and honorable Greece was increasingly favored. The 1921 irredentist campaign in Asia Minor was disastrous and expansionist ideology abandoned. The aggressive pursuit of the *Megali Idea* ended with the Treaty of Lausanne that stipulated a population exchange between Turks and Greeks and the

protection of rights (Clogg: 1992: 100-103). Recognition of the civic and religious character of the Muslim minority was also outlined in the Treaty. Hence, a “territorial and civic conception of nationalism was incorporated into the dominant discourses” although overall Greek nationalism remained ethnic (Triandafyllidou et al: 2002: 85). It is against this backdrop that women continued to lobby government and use available political opportunity structures. In 1930, literate women over thirty were granted the vote in local council elections. This had the potential for increasing *gender justice* in and through women’s participation.

### **Maternal Secularism**

Autonomously organized Greek women also promoted a civic and secular nation-state by attempting to transform the hold of Greek Orthodox religion over Greek culture through a *maternal secularist* narrative. While not unequivocally denouncing the maternalist gender script, they advocated legislation to protect them as ‘mothers’ against specific religious practices. The Church of Greece was declared independent from the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1833 and was brought under state control. Yet Orthodoxy was inextricably linked to Hellenism in the modern Greek nation-state.

The pillars of Greek modern identity have been the Greek Orthodox religion and Greek language. The role of the Church within the Greek society was as guardian of Greek culture and guarantor of national identity and was not modeled after the Eastern Orthodox Church under the Ottoman *millet* system. It is a separate modern entity from that of the pre-modern ecumenicity of the Patriarchate. The Church of Greece may have been subordinated to the state but was still influential within the domestic/spiritual realm.

Religion was strongly connected with cultural and political elements<sup>26</sup>. The melding of Hellenism with Orthodoxy also reinforced women's role as repositories and transmitters of the Greek Orthodox religion.

Greek women were arduously struggling bottom up for greater access to the public sphere. Part of the struggle in the early 1920's women's groups like League for Women's Rights was to engage in the ongoing debate over women's suffrage; they mobilized in solidarity and sent a memorandum to Parliament demanding women's right to vote. In 1928, the Foreign Minister under the Venizelos administration was diametrically opposed to women's suffrage and refused to participate in the discussions initiated by women's organizations who lobbied members of parliament. *The Socialist Women's Group* (SWG) made demands more succinct than those of the early 1920's (i.e. political, social and economic equality) and to them the personal increasingly had to be made political. A new *maternal secularism* was implicit in the demands forwarded by women's organizations and in 1929 in the journal *Socialist Life*, the SWG advocated a law that forbade young mothers who breast-fed to fast, both for their own and their child's self-preservation. Subsequently, they lobbied the health minister for its implementation (Ksiradaki: 1988: 120). Fasting was not subject to law; rather, it was understood as a religious practice woven into the Greek social and cultural tapestry. A maternalist frame was evident in an agenda which revealed the interplay among religion, government and the 'role' of mothers. The demand made by SWG also implicitly suggested a conflict between Orthodoxy and nationalism vis-à-vis the role of women.

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<sup>26</sup> Civil marriage was only introduced in 1983. Moreover, the Church's political convictions were often articulated i.e. Venizelos was "excommunicated and anathematized" by the Archbishop in 1916 (Stavrakakis: 2003: 164).

The Church's influence over women's right to self-determination, breastfeeding while fasting, suggested that the influence of religion blurred the church and state divide. Importantly, the Church also continued to govern the lives of women in key areas like marriage and divorce. The separation between church and state was not absolute yet the ultimate right to intervene and enact legislation to protect women remained with the state.

### **Minority Women**

The marginal ethnic model of the nation persisted as the Greek nation-state continued its process of 'becoming'. The Greek national project aimed at creating a homogeneous Greek society by incorporating ethnic minority women into the national project. Slavo-Macedonian women, who were part of the ethnic minority population in Greece, were incorporated as individuals into the ethnic national project by transmitting the Greek language and culture to their children. Although Nelson and Chowdury (1994) argue that ethnic and religious nationalisms are bad for women, Slavo-Macedonians were afforded greater material gains as a result.

Slavo-Macedonian identity had been a point of contention for the Greek government from the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913 which partitioned Macedonia into three parts, allotting Greece the southern half<sup>27</sup>. Karakasidou illustrates how Slavo-Macedonian women in the Florina district of Macedonia played a key role as reproducers and transmitters of Greek culture thus contributing to the creation of a secular national identity. Slavo-Macedonians were not part of the pre-modern Greek *ethnie*. Yet under the *millet* system they were exposed to the Greek language used in liturgy, higher

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<sup>27</sup> The Ottoman Empire controlled the region of Macedonia which consisted of Muslim and Orthodox Christians who for centuries spoke mainly Slavic, Greek, Vlach and Albanian.

education and the market place<sup>28</sup>. When the territory was ceded to the Greek government the women's condition of life slightly differed from Greek women's. In the Florina area, unlike most Greek social arrangements, there were large extended family households in which brothers and their families all shared the same home.

Slavo-Macedonians did not have a 'Macedonian' consciousness but did have their *slava* which was an annual celebration symbolizing the family's patron saint (Karakasidou: 1996: 103). Karakasidou argues that enculturation<sup>29</sup> does not obliterate sub-national cultures and identities, although through 'subtle symbolic manipulation' alternative cultural symbols are suppressed. According to ethno-symbolists, modern nationalisms reinterpret symbols, myths and memories and in the case of Slavo-Macedonians 'subtle symbolic manipulation' led to cultural and identity transformations<sup>30</sup>. The Slavo-Macedonian *ethnie* was transformed into a Greek national and ethnic consciousness through the reinterpretation and imposition of Greek ethnic and cultural symbols. In the Florina area, women's education would promote change and subtle manipulation. The education of women in the 1920's became "a key dimension of national enculturation and an important step in producing loyal citizens in the Florina

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<sup>28</sup> In the Florina area during 1911 and 1916, there were no monolingual Greek speakers, rather, half of the Greek speakers also spoke Slavic and identified as Bulgarians (Karakasidou: 1996: 107). Macedonian consciousness of Greek national culture (enculturation and not acculturation) was acquired in the aftermath of the Treaty of Bucharest through the "administrative affiliation with the new modern Greek nation-state" (Karakasidou: 1996: 100). For example, daycare and kindergarten programs in the region were tuition free with Greek administered as the language of instruction.

<sup>29</sup> Enculturation refers to the "learning and internalizing of culture for the first time" and in the Slavo-Macedonian case there was an ethnic culture during the Ottoman era but no sense of national culture until the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913. Slavo-Macedonians came to identify with the Greek national culture.

<sup>30</sup> Karakasidou argues that the symbols of Greek nationhood were 'ambiguous' enough to allow for the enculturation of Slavo-Macedonians.

area of Greek Macedonia” (Karakasidou: 1996: 102). Slavo-Macedonian women who were incorporated into the national project as individuals became central agents in the inculcation of Greek culture and its transmittance from generation to generation that would efface their own Slavo-Macedonian identity. They too, like Greek women in the nineteenth century, gained access to education.

*A battle of the nursery* was being played out mainly over which language would prevail in the household. Slavic speaking women and mothers were aggressively pursued and taught Greek; moreover, the Slavic language was forbidden in the household. These women, as part of their assimilation, were also encouraged to become active in the social events of the Greek Orthodox Church in which they spearheaded activities and rituals of the church. By observing and performing rituals, cultural symbols of Greek national identity were intensified within the Slavo-Macedonian collective memory. Hence, the relationship between gender and nation resulted in Slavo-Macedonian women participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of the Greek collectivity and as transmitters of the Greek culture. As a result, *gender justice* in the form of access to education and civil society was provided to these women.

### **Conclusion**

In this chapter I explained how women became incorporated first as individuals and then as autonomously organized and allied with ethnic and civic national projects. The relationship between women and nationalism was not always hostile towards each other. Women’s participation in national projects often contributed to the restructuring of the *sex/gender regime*. I also explored how a national project’s relative openness to

women affected the *sex/gender regime* and women's struggle for *gender justice*. In the period between 1840 and 1936, women gained greater access to education, social adulthood (right to be equal politically and in civil society), and economic security and access to the means to gain it. Women's access to post-secondary education, the first evening school of commercial studies for working women and the founding of schools to fight female illiteracy were all achieved. Law for the protection and recognition of children born out of wedlock and partial equality at work were afforded to women. Moreover, literate women over thirty gained the right to vote in municipal elections.

Women's incorporation as individuals into the irredentist national project led primarily to their greater access to education in order to fulfill their roles as repositories and transmitters of the Greek culture. Rural women were little mobilized however and for them *gender justice* was little enhanced. Education was particularly difficult to access for rural women. One exception was of the minority Slavo-Macedonians who became central agents in the inculcation of Greek culture which culminated in their access to education and civil society.

Organized women who became allies with the national project(s) yet independent from political parties, managed to garner greater material gains. In the latter part of this period, the national project was more open to organized women's groups. The *sex/gender regime* however, changed little and maintained a maternalist script. Women's suffrage was not universal, and not at the nation-state level. *Gender justice* in terms of women's economic and physical security, property ownership, and reproductive/sexual determination remained beyond Greek women's reach. Greek women's participation in

the public sphere increased but the persistent economic crisis limited the state's willingness to support women's social adulthood. In 1935, women's employment was reduced in both state and non-state public sectors in "an attempt to reduce male unemployment" during the world-wide depression thus reinforcing the norm of a male led public sphere (Kiriakidou: 2002: 504). The first wave women's movement's flourishing progress under a liberal/monarchist regime was abruptly interrupted with the 1936 Metaxas dictatorship.

### Chapter Three Fascism and Ephemeral Gender Justice (1936-1974)

To assess the quality of participation in national projects and how that participation related to changes in the *sex/gender regime* and *gender justice*, I identified 1936 to 1974 as another period in which a *round of restructuring* took place. Although this period has often been divided to account for the rhythm of change in governmental regimes<sup>1</sup>, it remained a period of a more constrained *sex/gender regime* and less *gender justice*. Fascist regimes were interspersed with periods in which gender symmetry was promoted, but these were brief moments of restructuring. In the previous *round of restructuring* relations among women, the nation and the state, resulted in greater material gains such as education for women, especially in the early twentieth century. By contrast, fascist regimes led to the suppression of social movements and resulted in a reversal of gains previously made.

This chapter is divided into three phases in which the *sex/gender regime* was reshaped. First, I explore the Metaxas dictatorship (Phase I) and the shifts and the substantive decrease in *gender justice* from the previous period (1840-1936). Second, I explore the period of Resistance and the Civil War (Phase II) and the effects on the *sex/gender regime* and *gender justice*, especially of the right/left divide. Third, I examine the pseudo-democratic period and the final military dictatorship (Phase III) which led women to prioritize the liberation of Greece from authoritarianism over a gender-specific

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<sup>1</sup> See Yota Papageorge-Limberis. (1988). "Conventional Political Involvement of Greek Women". *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*. 16 (Spring): 31-41; C.M. Woodhouse. (1968). *Modern Greece: A Short History*. London: Faber and Faber.

agenda. I do not treat the pseudo-democratic period as a new *sex/gender regime* for two specific reasons; first, only marginal gains in *gender justice* were made, primarily political equality, which did not significantly alter the relationship between gender and nation; second, gains made in *gender justice* were brief and were not part of the *sex/gender regime's* long-term restructuring.

## **Phase I**

### **Metaxas Dictatorship**

A governmental regime change can quickly undo what women's movements gained, like economic security and access to the means to gain it, and social adulthood, and eliminate discursive space gained locking out all or most women from any sphere of influence<sup>2</sup>. In the previous period, both civic and ethnic nationalisms were not always inimical to women's participation in the national project. Nevertheless, in this period, a fascist regime<sup>3</sup> governed the Greek nation-state denying all or most forms of political association and mobilization. In Greece, the fascist government was militaristic and based on state terrorism. As Kaplan asserts "it is important to realize that the new nationalist right-wing movements were instrumental in abolishing every freedom women had just gained in the brief spells of democracy" using violence and intimidation (1997: 20). With the installation of Metaxas' fascist regime, with the King's blessing, a transformation annihilated the Left, removing anyone with leftist sympathies. Of importance to women, it reconstituted the private realm. Metaxas' agenda of "restoring"

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<sup>2</sup> See Karen Beckwith. (2000). "Beyond Compare? Women's Movement in Comparative Perspective". *European Journal of Political Research*. 37: 431-468.

<sup>3</sup> Fascism as an ideology replaces "democratic and parliamentary institutions by a dictatorial one-party state and the free economy of liberal competition by one organized and planned on corporative lines..." (Weber: 1971: 883).

traditional familial relations led to greater gender discrimination and abrogated most of the rights women had attained in the previous period. The *sex/gender regime* was restructured to return women to the home eliminating provisions concerning women's employment, women's albeit circumscribed vote, and denying freedom of assembly.

Social practices and discourse reinforced gender asymmetry and reintroduced gender apartheid. The gender script under Metaxas was maternalist as in the previous period; but now participation by women in the public sphere was not sanctioned. Women's primary national contribution was to be through their maternal activities; in the family women would rear good citizens and their public acts would reproduce their roles as transmitters of Greek culture. Moreover, the fascist regime enacted the *Family Law* in 1940, declaring men 'heads of the household' (Lambiri-Dimaki: 1986: 99). This legalization remained throughout the period until the law was struck down in the 1980's.

The state envisioned an ethnic and politically homogeneous nation and the dictator promoted a redefined gender script. Education rights for women remained but were made compulsory for Slavo-Macedonian women between the ages of 15 to 40, in an effort to assimilate them (Karakasidou: 1996: 105). Education also became a medium for reinforcing the maternalist gender script of the state which limited tolerance for diversity. Women's power of social reproduction was used as a tool by the regime, to maintain and secure group identity by placing limitations on the group's physical and social reproducers. Patriarchal sex/gender relations were diffused within a wider cultural realm. The Church and nation were allied with one another with a "strong religious element or sacredness present in commemorative rituals" in Greece (Karakasidou: 2000: 235). In

the political sphere, patron-client networks prevailed in which political exchange was contingent upon those who could grant or seek favors.

Like fascist dictatorships elsewhere, the Metaxas regime promoted a *sex/gender regime* with no active political role for women's movements in civil society or vis-à-vis the state. Kaplan remarking on fascism in Europe in the 1920's and onwards asserts, "in all dictatorships, fascist and totalitarian regimes, women were the producers of children, be this to provide cannon fodder (Mussolini), to help invigorate the race (Hitler) or to work as servants of men (Salazar/Franco)" (1997: 20-21). Alliances developed previously between women's organizations and political parties were now forbidden in a polity marked by a right/left divide; communists and suspected communists were persecuted. Metaxas established a 'modern' and efficient state, dissolving free trade unions and arresting labor leaders which produced rippling effects on the lives of workers in both urban cities and rural towns.

Waylen posits that authoritarian regimes afford women who use their traditional maternal roles a certain degree of political space. Women were not completely locked out of the public sphere and some were co-opted into the national project although their autonomy was ended and they acted under male rule. The only activism women were allowed was charitable work by women who acquiesced to fascism. Their charitable work included offering shelter to poor working girls, and providing clothes and footwear to students. *The Lyceum of Greek Women* was co-opted by the Metaxas dictatorship because their agenda related to cultural matters like folk festivals. *The Lyceum of Greek Women*, founded in 1911, was one of the few organizations not abolished and it was not

considered a 'feminist union' and existed to safeguard the glorious past and Greek traditions. By contrast, the League of Women's Rights which advocated greater *gender justice* with emphasis on women's suffrage, was abolished.

Women were also incorporated as individuals into the fascist nationalist program. Falange units called *Metaxas Youth* were created and modeled after Hitler's youth organizations that served as a network of terror. Some young women were active in these units albeit they often did not understand the magnitude of their involvement as certain biographies explicitly reveal (Hart: 1996: 89-93). These women claimed to have been unaware of the acts of torture committed by Metaxas' police force, often for spurious political crimes. Members of the *Metaxas Youth Group* were often mobilized through high schools and one young woman member claims not to have been "politicized correctly" and so was unaware of the brutality of fascism against innocent victims (Hart: 1996: 93). Only when the Left-led resistance to Nazi-fascist occupation began in 1941, did many members of the *Youth Group* interpret fascism as patriarchal and soon discovered the crimes committed against humanity. The invasion of Greece by the Nazi-led Triple Alliance, and the failure of the Metaxas regime to militarily defend the nation, led women country-wide to join the Left-wing paramilitary resistance. Moreover, with the death of Metaxas in 1941 and a new right-wing government in exile, the Left flourished

## Phase II

### Greek Resistance to the Triple-led Alliance

In this phase of the period an increase in gains made in *gender justice* was achieved as a result of women's direct participation in the national-liberation project. West (1997) argues that women can advance feminist goals in alliance with national projects. In a similar vein, I argue that women can be incorporated as individuals in national-liberation projects and desire *gender justice* as a result of their participation. The *sex/gender regime* in this period was disrupted and temporarily restructured by the Resistance movement in which the traditional roles are eschewed. Women were encouraged to transcend their roles as biological and ideological reproducers of the collectivity and transmitters of culture. Women were incorporated into the left-wing movement not as organized women's groups but as individual women allied with the national-liberationist project<sup>4</sup>.

This is not a *round of restructuring* but an interruption in the fascist regime which did little to disturb gender asymmetry over the long haul. The Resistance movement challenged the masculine/feminine divide but changes were equivocal. The *Communist Party of Greece* (KKE) formed the resistance organization and *gender justice* in which greater access (rural women) to education and social adulthood (equality in political and civil society) was temporarily forged through left-wing party affiliations. These changes

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<sup>4</sup> A biographical account of a female resistance fighter captures the politicized role of women as a result of the crisis. The young combatant Tasia's recalls, "...the woman began to understand that she also needed to participate in politics to follow what was going on politically" (Hart: 1996: 93).

were reversed again when a dictatorship was re-established, but the ideal of gender equality promoted by the left remained for future action under a democracy.

The gender script promoted participation by women in the Resistance project and women leaders emerged both in the project and the polity. Before the war, the gender script constructed women's morality and honor on their virginity as women whose destiny was to marry, raise children and be good Greek women. Now women as participants in the nation found their traditional role of 'mother' muted; the sex/gender script promoted women's participation in politics and combat which ultimately affected the social practices of a 'Free Greece'. The patriarchal structures in place before the Resistance against the Metaxas regime were suspended. The 'Free Greece' area was both freed from Axis occupation and from rule by the dictatorship, and de-facto governed by the Left. It is noteworthy to mention that the Resistance movement was an informal military organized to liberate the nation and was not part of the exiled government's army.

Women and the Left-led national-liberation project, which promoted a civic and inclusive nation once liberation was achieved, were no longer incompatible. To understand how and if women's participation in the Resistance movement affected any permanent changes in the *sex/gender regime* and *gender justice* once the war was over, I examine how women were organized and their participation as combatants. Were Greek women less prepared than men to use force to pursue the same goals? What kinds of women were recruited? In 1941 *The National Liberation Front* (EAM) was formed with the support of the *Greek Communist Party* (KKE). It became the leading resistance

movement against the Axis led occupation in Athens and beyond. Yet in the more remote mountain areas the *National People's Liberation Army* (ELAS) would take up the struggle. In 1942, ELAS was formed as a military wing of KKE who monopolized the resistance struggle in the mountains. Hence, EAM organized resistance military operations in urban centers, while ELAS recruited individuals from remote rural towns resulting in a hyphenated EAM-ELAS. National Solidarity (EA) was EAM's relief organization which distributed food, medical supplies and the like, to the left-wing resistance fighters. *The United Panhellenic Organization of Youth* (EPON) was the youth wing of EAM, created in 1943, who informed towns and villages of the political strides made by EAM-ELAS. The *National Republican Greek League* (EDES) formed under the auspices of British officers in Greece also organized an armed resistance movement in the countryside. The leaders of EDES favored a republic but were persuaded by the British to support the monarchy. Anti-communist organizations like *The National Agrarian Federation of Anticommunist Action* (EASAD) often collaborated with the Germans. The right/left divide that marked the Greek political landscape before the Nazi-led Triple Alliance occupied Greece shaped the resistance from 1943 onward.

Yuval-Davis argues that militaries and warfare have always been gendered and feminists have historically linked women to peace. In the Greek case, however, the battle was on the 'home front' which blurred any preconceived 'natural' sexual division of labor in war. Women who joined national-liberation armies often seek to empower themselves by establishing new identities, skills and respectable social positions as well as participating in a struggle for a cause they believe in (Yuval-Davis:1997: 102).

Joining the resistance allowed women access to education/literacy through the KKE along with leadership roles (i.e. leading the youth division of the KKE). Greek women in rural areas willingly mobilized to escape oppressive gender relations manifested in virginity exams, honor killings or the inability to walk freely in the streets unchaperoned<sup>5</sup>. Resistance roles for women also included traditional activities of cooking, cleaning and providing shelter to the men fighting in the war. But some became women-combatants.

Yuval-Davis argues that although armed struggle might sometimes be the only way to fight against oppression and occupation, how the struggle is organized, its targets and social organization, are crucial regarding its impact on women. (1997: 113) Walby theorizes that women will take up arms for national struggles when their agenda and goals are included, especially if women can hope to experience greater *gender justice*. Fanon by contrast believes the militarization of women during national-liberation struggles is an 'offspring of male agency' and a necessity of war (cited in McClintock: 1996: 269). Greek women reacted with intense nationalism and patriotism to invasion and occupation. They also welcomed an apparent opportunity to escape circumscribed domestic roles. The national-liberation struggle cut across social cleavages<sup>6</sup> and apparently transformed familial relations. Brothers, sisters, husbands and wives (some with children) fought in the Resistance. Although traditional roles were still assigned to women some managed to evade those roles and actively engage in combat. On occasion

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<sup>5</sup> In the countryside, whole villages were often recruited by EAM-ELAS in which women who were married, widowed and elderly joined in different capacities from cooking and cleaning to direct military participation (Hart: 1996: 29).

<sup>6</sup> Women in the Resistance ranged from rural peasants to upper class urban elite.

women left their children with their father and without trepidation joined the Left (Hart: 1997: 179). Moreover, the patron-client system in which the head of the family represented it in politics was disrupted particularly during the period of 'Free Greece'.

Yuval-Davis suggests that a strong ideological stance, within formal and informal militaries, might help to transcend some of the tensions inherent in a mixed sex military resulting from women's formal incorporation as military soldiers thus transcending traditional roles (1997: 101). This can be threatening unless women combatants are distinguished from male soldiers by emphasizing women's 'femininity'<sup>7</sup>. In the Left-organized Greek Resistance movement there was a strong ideological stance imbued with liberty of both the nation and the people who would be free from fascism. The narrative EAM-ELAS promoted was "Greece for Greeks" signifying national autonomy from Nazi occupation. But it also promoted a new political infrastructure; full citizenship rights for women, the dismantling of clientelism and the empowerment of women and marginalized groups. Loyalty was to the organization and its ideology and in EAM-ELAS strict sexual chastity was demanded (Vervenioti: 2000: 109). EAM had a male-dominated hierarchy therefore, while women's rights were advanced, leadership roles were limited to men. In other words, women in EAM-ELAS were combatants in addition to performing traditional roles such as nurses within a rigid, hierarchical, male-dominated leadership structure. In EPON, the youth wing of EAM, women were on a more equal footing with men and were assigned leadership roles alongside men. The youth organization did not engage in combat, which may partly explain gender equality in leadership roles (Hart:

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<sup>7</sup> Yuval-Davis draws on the name of the women's corps in Israel, 'Charm', to illustrate the feminization of women soldiers who have been formally incorporated into the military (1997: 101).

1996: 167). The leftist organized Resistance dominated but the Right had small pockets of operations that promoted women's participation as nurses (Hart: 1996: 197). In this period, women shared the same goals as men; the liberation of Greece from the Nazi-led Triple Alliance. Although women did not organize around gender-specific issues, second wave feminism in Greece begins with women in the Resistance and intensifies during the Civil War within the Left.

Both the *sex/gender regime* and gender scripts seemed changed during the Resistance, but the change was strictly controlled by the Left. Women made strides within the movement in ways which promoted *gender justice*. Women who fought in the Resistance, for example, learned to read and write in the demotic idiom, which was the official language of the EAM (Hart: 1996: 150). The goal of the resistance was to liberate the countryside which also meant liberating women. Neither the KKE or EAM operated under the auspices of the Soviet Communist party and although certain ideas may have emanated from the Bolsheviks, they did not congeal within the Greek leftist movement<sup>8</sup>. Defensive nationalism<sup>9</sup> aggressively incorporated women into the public sphere disrupting traditional patriarchal norms of the Metaxas era. This included rural areas that had not been affected by the changes achieved in the first period. In 1943, a large area of mountain central Greece was no longer under the control of the Axis forces

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<sup>8</sup> Hart argues that there was no concrete support for 'red narratives' and the communist leaders who were predominantly from the middle-class and upper middle-class did not have a blueprint for Greek social revolutionary change. Rather their polemics were contextualized and focused on liberty of the nation from fascist ideology and populist rhetoric was used to support the reconstruction of the political element of Greek society (Hart: 1996: 85-86).

<sup>9</sup> Defensive nationalism within a Greek context refers to defending the nation from the external evil Nazi-fascists whose ideology is linked (not synonymous) with the Metaxas dictatorship – harsh and gruesome conditions were perpetrated by both fascist regimes.

and declared *Eleftheri Ellada* or 'Free Greece' and administered by the *Political Committee for National Liberation* (PEEA). The provisional government PEEA was established in 1944 to govern until their promised free elections could take place. Moreover, an equal rights clause was passed declaring political and civil equality for all Greek men and women. A quasi-legal infrastructure was created in rural areas of 'Free Greece' to adjudicate local cases and some women were appointed as judges (Hart: 1996: 203).

In 'Free Greece' women gained the right to vote<sup>10</sup> and women deputies were elected to the assembly. Women's involvement in the national-liberation movement had reshaped their consciousness and an enhanced women's agency emerged during the Civil War. Tension between conflicting ideologies mounted and between 1943 and 1944 a backlash called the 'White Terror', led by right-wing terrorist bands, was directed against communists and former partisan fighters. 'Free Greece' was on the verge of being dismantled<sup>11</sup> and after 1945, EAM-ELAS was demobilized followed by mass arrests. The cabinet<sup>12</sup>, with the support of the king, returned to Greece in 1944 under the leadership of George Papandreou with the intent of establishing the rule of law along the lines of a liberal democracy. In 1946, free elections were held in Greece and observers were sent by the French, British and US governments to monitor and supervise the electoral process. The *Populist Party* produced a majority government<sup>13</sup> and King

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<sup>10</sup> PEEA introduced equal civil and political rights under Article 5 of its Constitution (Hart: 1996: 31).

<sup>11</sup> People's Courts under the purview of EAM-ELAS were still operating by late 1944

<sup>12</sup> The cabinet was a Venizelist-liberal cabinet who approved the British suppression of the Communists and the PEEA.

<sup>13</sup> The KKE boycotted the elections.

George was officially returned to his throne (Woodhouse: 1968: 257). Despite attempts for peace<sup>14</sup> between the two ideological streams (the Varkiza Agreement of 1945), the elections in 1946 re-legitimized the rule of the Right and a Civil War ensued.<sup>15</sup>

### **Civil War (1946-1949)**

This period explores gender apartheid and although women under ‘Free Greece’ made substantive gains in *gender justice*, they were removed once the mountain government collapsed. The new right-wing Tsaldaris government was not open to women’s organized groups, particularly those of the Left. The nation-state building project focused on eliminating communist ‘threats’ while women, especially left-wing women, were forcibly domesticated and their traditional roles as ‘mothers’ promoted. The *Greek Democratic Army* (GDA) was an organized group of communist guerillas who initially formed and mobilized in northern Greece. The Greek government sought external support and was financially supported by the British and American governments to quell the insurgence<sup>16</sup>. Greece was considered the “first battleground of the Cold War” (Woodhouse: 1968: 258).

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<sup>14</sup> The *Dhekemvriana* (December Events in 1944) represents several armed clashes in the streets of Athens between EAM-ELAS, and the British supported Athens police (Hart: 1996: 32). This led to the Varkiza Agreement in which EAM-ELAS exchanged weapons to the Athenian government in return for free elections.

<sup>15</sup> The Civil War in Greece (1946-1949) was a struggle between the left Democratic Army (EAM-ELAS members referred to as the GDA) and the right-wing National Army which was supported by both the British and American governments.

<sup>16</sup> The British government, which had 16,000 British troops stationed in Greece, intervened in 1946 and supplied the right-wing government with rifles, clothing and other supplies (Woodhouse: 1968: 258). Moreover, the US under Truman’s presidency and with the support of Congress, sent financial aid to fight the communist threat and maintain an ‘independent’ Greece (O’Balance: 1966: 137).

Although *The Greek Democratic Army* announced a ceasefire in 1949, the exogenous factor of the Cold War and the dominance of the US/British supported right-wing government, delegitimized changes to the *sex/gender regime* by the Left during the Resistance. Women and men were imprisoned equally for their participation in EAM-ELAS; participation was represented as allegiance to communism. In defense of their vision for a progressive country, many left-wing women joined the Partisans during the Civil War. Left-wing women were outraged “at the right-wing backlash against ideals and practices which had transformed their communities” and many began to participate in the battle alongside men (Anagnostopoulou: 2000: 422). A national-liberation movement was shared by both men and women - their ambitions to liberate Greece from the yoke of authoritarianism.

A maternalist agenda by the Right refocused on women’s role as reproducers of the collectivity’s ideology and transmitters of Greek culture. The *sex/gender regime* administered under PEEA granting political and civil equality was rejected. *The Communist Party* (KKE) was castigated by the Right for ‘rejecting’ the nation, family and religion. Those who had fought in the Resistance were accused of having ‘Moscow-Sofia’ as a dream and depicted as the unpatriotic ‘other’. The Right deepened the ideological divide by accusing the Left of harboring designs to have Greece join the Communist Bloc; covering Greece with the iron curtain, which the Right considered inimical to the fabric of the Greek nation, although it was never the goal of the Left to join the Communist Bloc (Hart: 1996: 85-86).

The destiny of Greece as promulgated by the new Right-led government involved strengthening the family and depicting the female combatants as women of 'loose morals', discrediting equality. There were no romantic images of heroic women who fought in the Resistance for the freedom of the nation. Rather many of these women were rounded up and sent to island prisons; tortured and raped there for having leftist affiliations (Vervenioti: 2000: 113). The attempt to restructure the *sex/gender regime* failed. The good Greek woman was again the mother.

Feminism and nationalism were not always incompatible and Left-wing women's active roles in the Resistance led to the emergence of a feminist nationalism during the Civil War. Women who joined the Marxist-Leninist *Greek Democratic Army* (GDA) during the Civil War, however, wanted change. Some women did occupy leadership positions within the KKE/GDA hierarchy although the organization remained male dominated. Most women in the GDA were peasants from rural Greece and given the shortage of manpower due to the aggressive 'mopping up' campaign by the Right aided by the Americans and the British, women often were forcibly recruited<sup>17</sup>. Their experiences led them to want social justice for women and marginalized groups (Anagnostopoulou: 2001: 492). Kaplan believes women's experiences of dictatorships like Metaxas' and their misogynist laws influenced them to affiliate with the Left (1997: 22). Greek women made up 20-30% of the GDA, joining the partisans in self-defense or for political and ideological reasons (Anagnostopoulou: 2001: 482). Women were not

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<sup>17</sup> Women were often reluctant in joining yet were in constant threat of the 'backlash' by the Right leading many leftists and former partisan women fighters to seek refuge in the mountains by participating in the GDA (Anagnostopoulou: 2001: 488).

'passive recipients' during the Civil War but were organized women's groups allied not just incorporated into the national-liberation project.

Women who had been involved in the Resistance began to agitate for greater *gender justice* during the Civil War as organized feminist nationalists. *The Panhellenic Democratic Union of Women* (PDEG), founded in 1948 in GDA controlled areas, mobilized women into the GDA and promoted *gender justice* after the war in recognition of women's armed participation in the struggles for national self-determination. Anagnostopoulou argues, however, that "the PDEG should not be mistaken for an explicitly feminist enterprise; at no point did it offer a substantial critique of Greek sexual politics" (2001: 495). Although the PDEG was not an "explicitly feminist enterprise", it did have a gender-oriented agenda that agitated for greater gender symmetry<sup>18</sup> along with their initial campaign of liberating Greece from monarcho-fascism. The PDEG rallied for social, economic and political justice, cross-cultural unity of women<sup>19</sup>, and the protection of mothers and children. A liberal narrative was used by the PDEG which portrayed women warriors as equal to men. By contrast, the Right depicted the 'women warriors' as 'blood thirsty hyenas'<sup>20</sup> and reinforced that their rightful place was in the household. The Left's ambitious designs for *gender justice* were not attained. The Monarcho-fascists continued to propagate the institution of the family, the importance of

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<sup>18</sup> The PDEG was associated with the branch of the communist oriented Women's International Democratic Federation who agitated for 'peace as women and women's arguments' (Anagnostopoulou: 2001: 492).

<sup>19</sup> The objectives laid out by the PDEG include "unity of all women in our country, Greek, Slavo-Macedonian, Turkish, Vlach, and Albanian women who collectively and wholeheartedly gave themselves to the struggle" (Anagnostopoulou: 2001: 493).

<sup>20</sup> Women combatants in the GDA were constructed by the Right in opposition to the valorized 1821 uprising naval woman officer Bouboulina.

motherhood and women's naturalized pacifism. But the combination of nationalism and women's roles as 'mothers' was used by Right-wing women as a powerful tool to persuade the government to allow them some political space as an organized group.

### **Phase III**

#### **Pseudo-Democracy**

The years after the Civil War were unpropitious for women, especially 'dishonorable' women with a history of Left-wing affiliations, with a rigid *sex/gender regime*. In the late 1940's however some women also used the maternal narrative to protest against the state's repression of the Left. Mothers, sisters and wives dressed in black, intervened in trials and kept a vigil outside parliament – precursors of women in Black. *The Pan-Hellenic Movement of Families* (PEOPEF) used the ascribed role of 'mothers' to defend imprisoned partisan fighters. Their organizational work was termed by the court martial that tried the PEOPEF leadership as "sacred, national, patriotic and Christian" before acquitting the defendants (Vervenioti: 2000: 111).

Queen Fredericka established the Queen's Fund with the purported goal of repatriating Greek children (pedofilagma) supposedly taken to communist bloc countries during the Civil War. The Queen's Fund volunteers referred to as *The Commissioned Ladies* used the image of Fredericka as "mother of the people and army" to continue their struggle internationally for the repatriation of the children (Vervenioti: 2002: 120). Under authoritarian governments women have gained 'political space' when women used their traditional role of 'mother' in the public sphere which governments failed to see as threatening (Waylen: 1994: 338). *The Commissioned Ladies* were instrumental in

influencing public opinion and eventually gaining women's suffrage. In 1948, the United Nations requested a delegate be sent to the *Commission on the Status of Women* and the *Coordination Committee of Seven Cooperating Unions* was established to represent the status of Greek women at the UN. *The Commissioned Ladies* were right-wing women using the role of 'mother', and "their own connections with men in power" exploited the political space provided by the government by becoming delegates to the UN (Vervenioti: 2002: 116). They also rallied for women's suffrage. Nevertheless, these women defended their rights as 'right-wing' women and did not articulate rights for all women, particularly left-wing women.

In April 1949, all Greek women were again given the right to vote in local elections and in 1952 in general elections<sup>21</sup>, paradoxically, by the activism of right-wing women allied to a right-wing nationalist dictatorship. Although the *sex/gender regime* in Greece was not immutable, the relationship among gender, the nation and the state did not change substantively with women gaining the vote. Importantly, women's suffrage was not a reward granted by the government but an unforeseen consequence of women using their traditional role in the public sphere as sanctioned by the Right. In Italy, for example, shame regarding a fascist past under Mussolini resulted in a more inclusive state, making women the markers of modernity and democracy thus extending political citizenship<sup>22</sup>. In Greece, however, the dictator Metaxas has been immortalized for

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<sup>21</sup> The first female Member of Parliament was elected in a by-election in 1953.

<sup>22</sup> See Jomarie Alano. (2003). "Armed with a Yellow Mimosa: Women's Defense and Assistance Groups in Italy, 1943-45". *Journal of Contemporary History*. 38(4): 615-631; Victoria De Grazia. (1992). *How Fascism Ruled Women Italy 1922-1945*. Berkley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press.

denying Italians passage through Greece while women's struggle to free Greece from occupation was forgotten.

### **The Military Dictatorship (1967-1974)**

This period is characterized, for the most part, by an ethnic national project and a rigid *sex/gender regime*. Women's struggle for gains in *gender justice* made previously were removed and the relationship between gender and nation inhospitable. In the late 1950's and early 1960's there was a fledgling attempt at democracy. Elections were held with women voting yet the political instability, chronically weak economy, invoking of the 'communist threat' and King Constantine's relentless meddling in politics, made democracy difficult to establish. Throughout this period women never ceased to organize and participate in competing national projects, clandestinely or openly allied with or incorporated by either the Right or Left. In the early 1960's militant women's movements re-emerged including the autonomously organized *Pan-Hellenic Union of Greek Women*, which advocated "radical social change" vis-à-vis the position of women (Stamiris: 1986: 105).

In 1967, all that was gained in the short quasi-democracy was again outlawed by a new junta. The foundation remained, however, and resurfaced after the defeat of the dictatorship. The Colonels' dictatorship, headed by Papadopoulos, promulgated the eradication of communism altogether and promoted the union of Cyprus with Greece (*enosis*) despite the 1959 agreement to Cypriot independence among Britain, Greece and Turkey. The ethnic nationalism promoted by the junta was joined to a modern administrative apparatus and economic development. The goal was a harmonious society

without difference or imbalances, a healthier political life and a more ethically oriented educational system (Danopoulos: 1984: 65-66).

Women active in progressive anti-dictatorship organizations were arrested, tortured and exiled while civil and political rights for both men and women were suspended (Stamiris: 1986: 105). Meetings of more than five people required authorization by the dictatorship; elections were suspended; censorship and control of the media ensued; and civil war era concentration camps were reopened (McDonald: 1990: 265). Once again this involved deterioration of *gender justice* and a reversal of even the small strides made by right-wing women. The narrative of the family again was strongly reinforced as the dictatorship was based on “the cult of family” (Stamiris: 1986: 105). Women were relegated again to the private sphere by the state but became active in the struggle against the Colonels. In this resistance they temporarily suspended pursuit of feminist goals and focused all their attention on liberating Greece from authoritarianism.

Waylen argues that in Latin America, “frequently women’s protests formed the first organized and open opposition to authoritarian governments, helping to bring about the end of fear” using their maternal roles (1994: 339). Nevertheless, in the Greek case, the feminism that had grown out of women’s involvement during the Resistance had resulted in a form of feminist nationalism during the Civil War. It was temporarily suspended but re-emerged once the dictatorship was overthrown. Struggles against the oppression of women were no longer prioritized. Women were incorporated as individuals into this Resistance and were active in organized, clandestine activities to gain freedom and democracy for the nation of Greece with no emphasis upon their own

status. In this struggle for democracy, women took part in student movement uprisings often resulting in imprisonment and abuse at the hands of their captors. The “national rebirth” the Colonels promoted came to an end after the union with Cyprus debacle in 1974<sup>23</sup> and the military’s decision to withdraw from power. After the demise of the junta, re-establishing democracy including the civil, political, and economic equality of men and women was the central task of Greek women’s movement. The eventual change in regime led to an aggressive pursuit of social justice, of the kind that women could rely on, democratic principles, in their future pursuits of gender democracy.

### **Conclusion**

Walby argues that shifts in gender regimes build on *rounds of restructuring*. This is not the case for Greek women. Gains made in the previous restructurings were removed by the Metaxas dictatorship leaving Greek women struggling to recapture what was reversed. Did women’s participation in the national projects and agendas during this period restructure the *sex/gender regime* at all? Were any gains in *gender justice* made in this period?

Under the Metaxas dictatorship left-wing women’s groups were outlawed; and right-wing women’s organizations (mostly charitable) were co-opted since they had little autonomy and no influence on the nationalism movement/party. No substantive change resulted from their participation. By contrast, the education of Slavo-Macedonian women in Greece conformed to Metaxas’ project to create a homogenous society. Ironically they enjoyed greater access to Greek education than in the previous period.

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<sup>23</sup> In 1974 the Colonels staged an unsuccessful military coup in Cyprus, an island populated by mainly two ethnic groups, Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, leading to Turkey’s invasion of the island (Woodhouse: 1968: 304).

The left-organized resistance temporarily empowered women within 'Free Greece' suggesting that nationalism is not always bad for women. Incorporated as individuals into the national-liberation project, women were given civil and political equality by the PEEA constitution. Moreover, the women who joined, mostly rural women, gained access to education and learned to read and write in the demotic idiom. With the advent of the Civil War, these women who had selflessly participated in the liberation of Greece were demonized and dishonored by the Right. Ideological conflict circumvented any strides in *gender justice* women might have gained from their role in the Resistance which was never rewarded as it was in Italy and France. Women who were co-opted by the Right, paradoxically, achieved suffrage basing their claim on their traditional role as 'mothers'. Nevertheless, despite suffrage, progress toward *gender justice* did not materialize. Third level education of Greek women in 1951 was 32% and in 1971 was 31%; and literacy increased from 61.4% in 1951 to 76.3% in 1971<sup>24</sup>. Both improved significantly in the next period. The right/left divide and authoritarian currents marked this period and it is only against this backdrop that the failure to change the *sex/gender regime* can be understood. Only when the transition to democracy let women reconstitute the relationship among gender, nation and state, would *gender justice* as a goal become part of the democratic national project both in terms of changes in discourse and in social practices.

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<sup>24</sup> Source: Unesco (1963). *Unesco Statistical Yearbook*. Paris: The Unesco Press; Unesco (1974). *Unesco Statistical Yearbook*. Paris: The Unesco Press; Unesco (1983). *Unesco Statistical Yearbook*. Paris: The Unesco Press.

## Chapter Four

### Transition to Democracy and the Women's Movement (1974-Present)

The period 1974 to the present introduced by the third *round of restructuring* maps the gender and nation relationship through the transition to democracy. In this chapter, I explain how women's participation in the democratic national project related to changes in the *sex/gender regime* and *gender justice*. I explore the transition to democracy and locate the political space afforded to women as a result of the transition. In the previous period, right-wing, often authoritarian, regimes reversed the gains previously made toward *gender justice*. The opportunity provided by the transition to democracy was seized on by the women's movement to restructure the *sex/gender regime*. Nevertheless, Greece's corporatist system with its top-down, patron-client, political structure has made it difficult for women to engage in politics without being allied with a political party. Indigenous theorists of feminism like Cacoullos (1996) see the transition to democracy as a marker of change for women and their relationship with the state; however, she believes clientelism impedes progress. Cacoullos argues that the configuration of a state determines whether women's organizations will be "in or out" and believes clientelism continues to lock out women's organizations which choose not to ally with political parties (1996: 52-53).

In this chapter, I argue that the women's movement did not gain enough political space in the transition to democracy to restructure the *sex/gender regime*. Political parties have appropriated gender issues presented by feminists allied with the parties in the nation-state building project and have locked out autonomous women's organizations.

First, I explore the transition to democracy and revisions to the gender script. Second, I examine the various women's organizations allied with political parties and argue that the corporatist structure led to their subtle co-optation resulting in women not gaining sufficient political space to pursue all their gender-specific goals. Third, I assess autonomous women's organizations and explain how and why they are now detached from the national project. Fourth, I address *Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party's* (PASOK) role in achieving gender equality. Fifth, I argue that a new *battle of the cradle* has been provoked by the Greek Orthodox Church by a perceived demographic anxiety; as a result, the *sex/gender regime* involved a re-politicization of reproduction hampering progress toward *gender justice*. I conclude that women's struggle toward greater *gender justice* resulted in watered-down legislation. Moreover, clientelism remained thus making it difficult for women to carve out space to pursue their grievances.

### **Transition to Democracy**

Often transitions to democracy opens up political space in which women can also pursue greater *gender justice*. Jacquette and Wolchik argue that transition politics develop at times of crisis which can spawn new ideas and institutions in political life partly due to the rejection of the previous regime (1998: 4). During such transitions, women may have the opportunity of placing gender-specific issues on the political agenda. Walby (1997) in a similar vein argues that during periods of restructuring, including transitions to democracy, the political process is likely to be more open to a shift in power relations in which the state may become allied with the women's movement and provide women greater opportunity to pursue feminist goals.

Nevertheless, during these transitions political tasks are often centered on building democratic infrastructure and not gender-specific agendas. Waylen argues that women's organizations are faced with the dilemma of organizing autonomously with no alliance, with political parties or working alongside political parties and institutions with the risk of being co-opted (1994: 339-340). This was one of the main dilemmas of the Greek women's movement. Can Greek feminists be part of the nation-state building project during the transition to democracy without forming an alliance with a political party?

In July of 1974, the junta collapsed and the road to democracy was established in Greece. In Latin America, a coalition of progressive forces which included women's groups caused the collapse of most military dictatorships in the region (Waylen: 1994). In Greece, democratization was initiated by the military dictatorship's decision to withdraw from power partly caused by their failed attempt to unite Cyprus with Greece (Veremis: 1997). Progressive conservative leader Karamanlis returned from self-imposed exile and was elected Prime Minister (1974-1981) in the 1974 elections (Woodhouse: 1968). The Communist Party (KKE) was legalized, but the once sharply polarized women's groups were not as alienated from each other in their respective platforms. Reforms were slow to materialize in the transition period; the new constitution did not fully adopt western liberal principles of equality although women's right to vote was immediately reinstated.

### **Revisions to the Gender Script**

*Gender justice* in terms of physical security, access to economic security and the means to gain it, right to property ownership, education, reproductive/sexual self

determination and social adulthood were being renegotiated. In this *round of restructuring*, new systems of gender relations were being written into a revised national script. Yet in Walby's terms (1997) the "layers of foundation which remain", included anti-democratic elements as under Metaxas when organized movements were mostly forbidden and left-wing women punished.

In June of 1975, the monarchy was officially dissolved, and a new republican constitution was passed establishing gender equality in the national script. Men and women were declared equals but any laws which limited equality would persist until December 31, 1982 when they would be nullified. In this transition to democracy, the initial changes to the gender script were initiated from the top unlike other transitions<sup>1</sup> where people-power removed dictators and organized women co-operated across party and class lines to develop new gender friendly agendas. It was not until the election of a Socialist PASOK government in the early 1980's that substantive patriarchal barriers were brought down.

Certain changes were made in the initial transition to democracy. In 1976, International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention no.100 was ratified which stipulates equal pay for work of equal value. (Yotopoulos-Marangopoulos: 1986: 90). A series of laws were passed in the 1970's promoting social and political changes in the *sex/gender regime*. Article 16 established free education for both males and females and in 1979, women were granted the right to cover their children using their own insurance plan (Yotopoulos-Marangopoulos: 1986: 90-92).

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<sup>1</sup> See Jane Jacquette and Sharon Wolchik eds. (1998). *Women and Democracy*. Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Prior to reforms made to the *Family Law* in 1983, men were legally heads of households with the right to make all decisions relating to conjugal life and to children providing fathers authority over every aspect of a child's life. The *Family Law* was in theory amended to provide for 'joint responsibility'; the dowry system abolished; and women were given responsibility equal with men concerning the economics of the home according to their capacity. The patriarchal family in theory has no more clout although social practices tell a different story. Civil weddings were introduced in 1982; women could keep their family surname; children born out of wedlock were not legally disadvantaged; and divorce by mutual consent was permitted (Kyriazis: 1995: 281). The legal age for marriage, for both men and women, was fixed at 18 years of age and the system of separate property which stipulated that each spouse retains and administers his/her property at the time of marriage, remained intact (Yotopoulos-Marangopoulos: 1986: 92).

Not all of women's demands articulated by autonomous feminists or those allied with political parties were achieved in this period of transition to democracy. It has been argued that progressive demands advanced by feminist groups are molded into watered-down workable legislation when women's groups are allied with political parties (Jacquette & Wolchik: 1998). Were Greek feminists who engaged with a political party in the nation-state building project really allies or co-opted by the political party they affiliated with?

### **The Re-establishment of the Women's Movement in Greece**

Although in theory the Greek political system is democratic, the political culture is based on a corporatist political system in which the locus of power is centralized and those seeking to participate can only do so through state-approved political parties. The political system of patron-client networks continued to prevail (as in the previous period) in which political exchange was contingent upon those who could honor or seek favors. Hart posits that “the primacy of political clientelism in Greece meant that certain groups were excluded from participation. This method of political exchange excluded those not in a position to seek favors or accrue the political currency necessary to make their voices heard” (1996: 81-82). She includes peasants, the elderly, refugees from Asia Minor, young adults and women as belonging to those excluded and so unable to permeate the clientelist political structure. Clientelism makes the prospect of grassroots movements’, particularly feminist organizations’ influence on the public agenda bleak. The top-down system in Greece makes it difficult for feminist groups to articulate their demands if they are not allied with political parties; however, as allies, women’s organizations are in danger of being co-opted by political parties. Autonomous women’s organizations which participated in the nation-state building project as allies to promote a gender-specific agenda were more likely to influence the political agenda but remained weak.

Greek women mobilized for specific demands during the transition to democracy, yet, they were divided over the issue of alliance versus autonomy from political parties. Walyen argues that when the transition has begun political parties are focused on building their agendas and institutional politics leading to the attenuation of the demands

of women's organizations (1994: 339). Women's organizations find their demands muted and must either ally with political parties risking co-optation or remain autonomously organized and risk marginalization. Prior to transitions to democracy, as in Argentina, women's issues are often placed on the agendas of political parties, usually left-wing parties, to gain women's electoral support once free elections are held. But once civilian politics is re-established, clientelism locks women out of institutional politics and their issues are subordinated whether or not feminists are allied with political parties (Waylen: 1994: 341-343).

Under the military junta (1967-1974) Greek women's organizations were illegal and second wave Greek feminism during and after the Resistance was abruptly outlawed. Prior to the transition to democracy, women organized and participated as incorporated individuals in the national-liberationist movement against authoritarianism, supporting the freedom of the nation and specifically women's emancipation. Nevertheless, the transition saw political space reclaimed by political parties mostly leaving women on the fringes with small opportunities to voice their grievances, unless they were allied with mainstream political parties.

Walby believes women relate differently to national projects than men and are more likely to support national projects when their goals are included (1997: 188). The slogan widely used by Greek women's groups in the transition to democracy was, "there can be no women's liberation without social liberation, no social liberation without women's liberation" (Stamiris: 1986: 105). For Greek feminists, the liberated nation had to include liberated women but the clientelist system would prove difficult to surmount.

A liberal feminist discourse promoting equality, autonomy, and other democratic virtues prevailed among feminists in the mid 1970's, tying them to *gender justice*. In the mid to late 1970's, allied autonomous women's groups rallied for legislation that would reduce women's duties in the home through shared domestic responsibilities between men and women. Moreover, a welfare state was advocated to provide services such as daycare, paid parental leave, affordable public cafeterias for working women. Women offered a competing national vision by gendering issues such as social liberation. In this section, I examine those organizations allied with political parties and their clout, if any, in advancing their agenda.

### **Women Allied with Political Parties**

#### **Movement of Democratic Women**

In 1975, the *Movement of Democratic Women* (KDG) was formed and allied with the *Communist Party* (KKE Interior). Some women who belonged had been part of the second wave women's movement in the 1960's and served as parliamentarians, were part of the 1945 *Panhellenic Congress of Women* and were politically active during the Civil War (Cacoullous: 1994; Varikas: 1985). Their aim was to participate in the new democratic national project by promoting a women-friendly society and making women's equality a fundamental component of the democratic process. The KDG was the most exposed to feminist ideas during the transition but the least powerful and least hierarchical of leftist women's organizations allied to the KKE<sup>2</sup>. They rallied for new provisions to the Constitution to be written in demotic Greek so it can be understood by

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<sup>2</sup> They predominantly engaged in conferences, seminars and banquets (Varikas: 1985: 922).

the general public. Nevertheless, the KDG quickly shrank as women formed and strengthened other organizations once parliament was restored.

### **The Federation of Greek Women**

*The Federation of Greek Women* (OGE) was allied with the Communist Party of Greece (KKE)<sup>3</sup> and its activism and promotion of gender issues reflected the strategies and ideology of the leftist party (Cacoulios: 1994: 316). The issues advanced by the OGE were centered on the rights of working women yet opposed to women's protests. Women were workers and were to be treated as such.

### **The Women's Movement of Greece**

The career of Margaret Papandreou, the U.S. wife of Andreas Papandreou, leader of PASOK and Prime Minister of Greece in the 1980's, shows how the interplay between alliance with political parties and women's rights can produce legislative changes. In 1975, she founded *The Women's Movement of Greece* (EGE) which was ideologically allied with PASOK. She gave speeches, interviews and press conferences; and mobilized Greek women by traveling from town to town<sup>4</sup>. EGE has been referred to as a 'state feminist' group whose projects were often circumscribed by PASOK, culminating in watered-down demands and concessions that reflected the interests of PASOK. Nevertheless, Margaret Papandreou working within a closed political structure, managed to gain direct access to decision makers and influence the rewrite of the nation's official

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<sup>3</sup> Note the KKE and KKEs were two separate leftist parties with the latter aligned to Eurocommunism.

<sup>4</sup> In 1996, Margaret Papandreou founded WINPEACE, a collaborative project between Greek and Turkish women's organizations with the aim of opening dialogue between the two nations, and to promote gender-specific goals including a greater presence of women in formal politics economic independence.

gender script. Political parties make it difficult for feminists who do not have party alignments to penetrate mainstream politics. EGE was the largest organized women's group during the transition to democracy with more than 15,000<sup>5</sup> members.

In 1983, EGE promoted a decentralized monitoring of gender related issues and was successful in obtaining certain promises, primarily to supervise reforms made to the *Family Law*. Within a few months the PASOK government established a nine member *Council for Equality of the Sexes* that was transformed into the *General Secretariat of the Equality of the Sexes*, which was made up of women from various feminist organizations. One of the objectives of the newly formed, state-run office was to inform the public about the changes made to the *Family Law*. In 1984, EGE only joined the protest movement to legalize abortion late and well after autonomous women's organizations who began agitating for women's right to abortion in the 1970's. EGE also pressured the PASOK government for improved working conditions for agricultural women, social policy advancements including access to health insurance, proper education, training and career development. It is the consensus that EGE's ability to direct the political agenda of PASOK has been minimal<sup>6</sup>. Nonetheless, the political space that was afforded to EGE was an improvement over what the *New Democratic Party* (ND) conceded in the 1970's. Unlike transitions to democracy in Argentina and Chile where women's organizations initially gained political space by co-operating with political parties to promote their

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<sup>5</sup> See Eleni Stamiris. (1986). "The Women's Movement in Greece". *The New Left Review*. 158: 98-112.

<sup>6</sup> See Ann Cacoullou. (1994). "Women Confronting Party Politics in Greece". In *Women and Politics Worldwide*, edited by Barbara J. Nelson, and Najma Chowdhury. New Haven: Yale University Press; Eleni Stamiris. (1986). "The Women's Movement in Greece". *The New Left Review*. 158: 98-112.

agenda, Greek women's organizations did not gain substantial space to restructure gender relations. The difference is likely the top-down nature of the transition with its deeply embedded clientelist political structure. Women were not needed as allies to get democracy and as a result, nothing was owed to them.

### **Autonomous Women Not Allied with Political Parties**

In the late 1970's a second camp of women organized autonomously and renounced any affiliation with political parties. Nevertheless, all bottom-up mobilization attempts faced obstacles and women's voices expressed outside of parties were rarely heard by decision-makers in state institutions.

### **Autonomous Women's Movement**

In the late 1970's, a loose network formed under the rubric of *Autonomous Women's Movement* mostly in urban centers like Athens and Thessaloniki to influence the nation-state building agenda. The network advanced demands about female sexuality and family relations, and insisted they be put at the forefront of the legislative agenda. The *Autonomous Women's Movement* worked on the basis of the idea that the 'personal is political' and was concerned with the hierarchical structure of family and employment (Cowan: 1996: 69). These radical feminists rejected the existing social, economic and state structures and argued that they needed to be transformed so a new society could be built. But, marginalized feminist groups were unable to have their demands expressed within the impervious Greek political system (Cacoullos: 1996).

### Coordinating Committee of Representatives of Women's Organizations

The *Coordinating Committee of Representatives of Women's Organizations* (SEGES), a collaborative effort formed in 1976, was very prominent in the struggle to change the *Family Law* and challenged the paternal Greek nuclear family. Their goal was to “remedy institutional inequalities” and believed that a common front “would afford the political parties no alternatives to the women’s demands but to go along with them” (Papageorgiou-Limberes: 1992:74). SEGES was composed of twelve women’s organizations of various political leanings, some allied with political parties, others were not like the *Movement of Women in the Resistance*<sup>7</sup>, the *Federation of Greek Women*, the *Union of Greek Women*, the *Union of Greek Women Lawyers* and the *Association of Greek Secretaries*. SEGES disbanded in 1983, when reforms to the *Family Law* were codified, but it managed to draw support from an unprecedented coalition of women from a wide political spectrum. Between 1976 and 1982, three government appointed committees were established that funneled the demands proposed by these women’s organizations. Nevertheless, Cacoulios argues that the committee was a way of undermining women’s claims particularly since the claims were represented by a male-led committee; there were more men than women on two out of the three committees with the third committee outnumbered by one (1994: 69-70). SEGES re-emerged in 1990 to pressure the government and political parties to implement a thirty-five percent minimum quota applied to women party candidates but was unsuccessful (Papageorgiou-

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<sup>7</sup> The *Women in the Resistance* organized around the struggle to acknowledge women’s participation as combatants in the resistance against the Nazi-led Triple Alliance. They also promoted solidarity among all women who were living under authoritarian and fascist regimes.

Limberes: 1992: 74). Certain changes made<sup>8</sup> to the *Family Law*, documents advancements in the struggle toward *gender justice*, however, feminist organizations were unable to set the agenda.

### **Movement for the Liberation of Women**

Autonomous women's groups who were not allied with a political party, but organized as a united front, attempted to shape women's citizenship and the right to reproductive self-determination. In 1976 the autonomous *Movement for the Liberation of Women* (MLW) began to organize around family issues. They argued for the redefinition of the family and the pressure young women have to marry that inevitably encroaches on their professional aspirations and their ability to pursue an education and not marriage. The Greek family ideal and social practices still understood women's rightful place as in the home and men as the decision makers in all aspects of life concerning their wives and children. Wives and daughters were to be subordinate to the man in the household and faced with strong social pressures to be 'good' girls who married and had children.

MLW spearheaded the abortion campaign in 1976 and launched an exhibition to inform Greek women about contraception and the different methods available (Cacoulios: 1994: 318). Abortion in Greece was illegal yet neither the state nor the Church had openly supported the law prohibiting abortions. In 1985, a petition signed by 500 women disclosed that they had an abortion. They presented it to Parliament and eventually it went to a committee. The Church and the Right adopted a pro-natalist position arguing that legalizing abortion would devastate efforts to increase the nation's birthrate thus making abortion a national matter not just of gender equality. Reproduction was viewed

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<sup>8</sup> See earlier discussion on *Family Law*.

by the Church in terms of woman's obligation and role in society. The *New Democratic Party's* opposition in Parliament to the proposed abortion reform was based on its idea that the state had the right to control women's reproductive power. In 1986, legislation to legalize abortion was passed permitting married women to abort within the first twelve weeks of pregnancy but was convoluted and ambiguous regarding unwed mothers (Cacoulios: 1994: 318). Women's claim to the right to reproductive self-determination proved a struggle.

### **Other Campaigns by Autonomous Women's Organizations**

Autonomous women's organizations<sup>9</sup> conducted a campaign to repeal provisions of the penal code that exonerated rapists from being prosecuted and serving a sentence when prosecution would lead to a victim's psychological and public damage. Women's shame and family honor were implicit in the existing legislation especially when the rape was by a relative or immediate family member. Rape was classified as a crime against morals and women wanted rape recognized as a criminal act. Although the autonomous women's movement generally acted against the results of male violence (i.e. organized shelters), attempts to get state actors to legislate against violence and repeal laws which condoned it, failed. Legislation concerning rape and sexual violence was written to be gender neutral declaring the act as "alienating the sexual freedom of both men and women" (Cacoulios: 1994: 319). Control over women's sexuality shifted from control by a woman's husband to that of the state. Women's struggle for self-determination has not succeeded. The balance of authority between men and women in sexual and reproductive

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<sup>9</sup> This campaign was conducted by autonomous women's organizations in Athens and Thessaloniki. Legislation was passed in 1984 and did not meet many of the demands made by women's organizations.

matters continues to favor men. Although changes in the gender and nation relationship resulted in greater material gains than those previously made, autonomous women's organizations affiliating briefly with political parties, were unable to significantly penetrate the decision-making process.

### **Quiet Revolution and Autonomous Women's Organizations**

Unlike mainstream feminists, autonomous women's organizations often remained 'quiet' as a form of political participation. By silently not conforming to government norms during the key period when sex/gender relations were being reconstructed in Greece, primarily through reforms to the *Family Law*, feminist organizations participated politically. Cacoullos argues that "women became quiet observers who refused the invitation to debate and make recommendations because they had no say in the design" (1996: 74). Although autonomous women were able to form broad coalitions among their groups, they were less often able to influence or access policy decision-makers. In the Greek corporatist political structure grass roots movements not allied with mainstream political parties rarely gain political space. Moreover, their grievances are perceived as lacking any political merit by the political class. They remain on the outside in their self-imposed silence.

### **PASOK and Gender-Related Policies**

Beckwith argues that when feminist movements are organized in advance with left-wing opposition parties "large-scale policy changes" may result if these parties are in power (2000: 441). In this period of transition to democracy, women's issues scarcely

were addressed until the early 1980's when Greece entered the European Union<sup>10</sup> (EU) leading to the adoption of EU gender equality<sup>11</sup> policy. In the same year, the *Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party* (PASOK) came to power and its position on gender issues was promoted through the party slogan 'Equality for Women'. The European Union required that areas of policy be reassessed by the Greek government using a gendered lens (Walby: 2002). Discriminatory laws were changed to accord with EU guidelines. The *sex/gender regime* was being transformed. The transformation of discourse about the Greek family by revising the gender script (i.e. *Family Law* making men and women equal in the household) did not end patriarchy in Greek society. Moreover, EU directives regarding family and gender equality focus on reconciling the two in ways that rarely challenge traditional gender relations. They are reconciliatory because they legitimate "more flexible working conditions [to accommodate women workers] rather than changing gender relations within the family" (Stratigaki: 2004: 32).

PASOK was allied with EGE and received suggestions forwarded by EGE and other women's organizations. Autonomous women's organizations did not get all that they wanted especially with the abortion and rape legislation. EU accession made Greece's status as a democracy more stable yet the patriarchal structures embedded in the social fabric and a debt-ridden economy, blunted progress towards more equal social relations. Women's groups allied with PASOK ultimately gave the government control over the *gender justice* agenda. The male-dominated Parliament amended laws to accord with party ideology ignoring the legitimacy of the demand. This resulted in the gender

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<sup>10</sup> In 1981 Greece became a member of the European Union.

<sup>11</sup> In 1983, Greece also ratified the United Nations *Convention for the Elimination of All Discrimination Against Women* (CEDAW).

neutral sexual assault legislation which pretended both sexes are equally subject to rape (Cacoullos: 1994: 321).

Nevertheless, the past has impacted the present and under the PASOK government the principle of equality in both public and private spheres has led to a shift in the *sex/gender regime* albeit often ‘reconciliatory’ as EU policy requires (Stratigaki: 2004). Hundreds of new day-care centers have been created, programs targeting the employment of women implemented, and affirmative action has blurred traditional, gendered employment stereotypes such as the accustomed male bus driver (Stamiris: 1986: 109-110). This has led to greater *gender justice* with regard to economic security. Moreover, in 1985, the government created special machinery to channel women’s representation. The *General Secretariat for Sex Equality*, made up of representatives from various women’s organizations was established, with the goal of advancing the position of both urban and rural<sup>12</sup> women. Nevertheless, the number of women in the national legislature<sup>13</sup> remains one of the lowest in the European Community.

### **A New “Battle of the Cradle”**

An ethnic national project promoted by the state/church resurfaced and once again sought to control women’s right to reproductive self-determination. Greece’s establishment of a secularized state and its “effort to achieve both structural and cultural alignment with the European Union, have pushed [ethnic and gendered] sentiments concerning an essentialized notion of Greekness underground” (Halkias: 2003: 213). The

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<sup>12</sup> In the mid 1980’s the position of rural women improved with a new law allowing their participation in agricultural cooperatives, improved maternity allowances and health care benefits (Stamiris: 1986: 109-109).

<sup>13</sup> The percentage of women in politics suggests ‘token’ representation. See discussion on page 132 for a comparison with other EU member states.

nation with its glorification of the Byzantine period and claims to Cyprus, was being transformed both by its position within the European Union and by the actions of the third wave women's movement. Nevertheless, the national project of joining Orthodoxy to Hellenism in framing the modern Greek nation-state produces moments of demographic anxiety when 'Greece' seems threatened. Once again, a *battle of the cradle* has surfaced and women's reproductive power in Greece is again at the center of the national project; put there by the state and the Greek Orthodox Church to distill the 'threat' underlying demographic anxiety. Intellectuals like Korais who had articulated the need for a liberal, civic oriented nation were disenchanted with the persistent 'eastern' influence embedded in Greek culture. Article 3 of the 1975 Constitution states that "the prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ" (Anderson: 2002: 10). The Greek Orthodox religion is hegemonic and other 'known'<sup>14</sup> religions are subordinate to Greek Orthodoxy. Although not a state religion, it occupies a privileged place concerning the nation

The Muslim minority in Western Thrace, which in fact is a majority in the northern region, has been at odds with the state over being denied the right to elect their own spiritual leader or mufti. In 1990, a law was passed giving the state the right to appoint muftis whereas previously they were elected by Muslim community leaders. The Greek state has taken legal action<sup>15</sup> by prosecuting any mufti who has assumed the title without being appointed by the state. The European Court of Justice condemned this

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<sup>14</sup> 'Known' religions include the Muslim religion as outlined by the Treaty of Lausanne.

<sup>15</sup> The state sentenced illegally elected spiritual leaders to prison terms of up to seven months to enforce state control.

treatment arguing that any religious community should be able to elect its religious representatives.

Concern about growing Muslim numbers has led the Greek Orthodox Church in Western Thrace to promote a natalist policy offering monetary incentives to Greek families to have a third child. The Greek Orthodox Church once again promoted nationalism by advancing the 'people as power' narrative with the intent of harnessing women's reproductive power in the name of the Greek nation. The battle between the Muslim and Orthodox populations launched by the Greek Church to enlarge the Greek population in Western Thrace placed women's reproductive powers at the center of the project. Greek women should make babies. Although the Greek Church is subordinate to the state it uses its hegemonic status to influence and promote its ethnic national project. Consequently, the politicization of women's reproductive rights has also been perpetuated by the Greek state.

The 'Macedonian question', in which the *Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's* (FYROM) appropriated the name 'Macedonia', has also led anxiety over national identity. The struggle over the name 'Macedonia' is one of culture, symbols, tradition and a glorious past that embodies the Greek nation-state. The Greek nation's *ethnie*, sense of history and perception of cultural uniqueness that differentiates Greece from the 'other', has been threatened in the eyes of the Greek state, many people and the Orthodox Church. The United Nations recognized the name *The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* and negotiations over political identity continue to be waged despite the Bush administration's recognition of 'Macedonia'. Against this backdrop, a

renewed Greek nationalism has emerged based on a reinvigorated ‘us’ versus ‘them’ discourse focused on women. This new national project led to attempts to roll back changes in the *sex/gender regime* to restore church/state control, however subtle, over the reproductive rights of women. How can we speak of *gender justice* and democracy in which moral autonomy has been articulated (Dahl:1989) as involving the freedom to govern oneself and to live under laws we help make, when reproductive self-determination is denied to one sex?

Demographic anxiety due to a recent influx of Eastern European and Asian immigrants, and the ‘Macedonian’ question, re-politicized reproduction. In the 1990’s, compulsory heterosexuality as part of the *sex/gender regime* through the state established family planning and *demografiko* (demographic) research centers. Halkias argues that a low ‘Greek’ birth rate and a high abortion rate exacerbated the *demografiko* issue<sup>16</sup>. Greek women are encouraged to increase their level of reproduction to preserve Greek national identity and be ‘good’ citizens. As Greece tilts towards the West, its interpretation of the norms of democracy and the rights of citizenship will either include a more pluralistic national identity or perpetuate the classical ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy. In 1995, education reforms were introduced for the minority which included training teachers for minority and the improvement of the presence of Muslim minorities in Greek Universities<sup>17</sup>. Although the minority populations are guaranteed fundamental rights such

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<sup>16</sup> Annual birth rates are approximately 100,000 and abortion rates estimated at 150,000-250,000 in 2001 (Halkias: 2003: 211).

<sup>17</sup> For additional information see the Ministry of Press. (1999). “A Global View on Foreign and Security Policy”. 25 July, 2004. [www.minpress.gr](http://www.minpress.gr)

as freedom of religion, an assimilationist ethos prevails and Greek nationalism remains ethnic.

### **Conclusion**

Transitions to democracy can help women gain power through newly created political space and institutions. Women's incorporation into the Greek Constitution, however, did not produce a substantive shift in their position. Greek women were citizens but their status was mediated through laws that still gave men authority over many aspects of their life in both the private and public spheres, although certain revisions made to the *Family Law* resulted in greater self-determination. Through women's engagement with the political system a shift in the *sex/gender regime* towards greater equality began. The openness of movements, ideologies, institutions and processes to women's participation and goals is an important factor in evaluating the degree of *gender justice* achieved. In this period initiated by a transition to democracy, there were disparate views over the kind of participation women should undertake to improve their status. Whether autonomous women's groups remained allied with the risk of co-optation, or not allied with political parties, they had a difficult time penetrating the corporatist Greek political system to advance their agenda. There was no lively debate and women did not get what they wanted. The Greek political system was not open to women's participation and goals until PASOK attained power and offered concessions mostly circumscribed like the sexual assault legislation. The corporatist structure contributed in part to the current hostility between feminists and the national democratic nation-state building project. Women did manage to funnel certain demands like those

concerning revisions to the *Family Law* but their claims were often undermined when parties appropriated and distorted their demands.

Women's engagement with the state did result in a shift in the *sex/gender regime* when Greece entered the European Union. The *Family Law* revisions secured married women the right to administer and own property during marriage. Nevertheless, legislation on sexual violence used gender neutral language hence fell short of what was anticipated. Women's education especially improved and illiteracy was practically eliminated; from 86.2% in 1980 to 95.9% in 2000<sup>18</sup>. Greek women participated in the construction of a civil society but political parties often reject views not aligned with their principles. Women's employment also increased, however, it remained below the EU average: 35.4% in 1991 (EU average = 50.2%), to 40.9% in 2001 (EU average = 54.9%)<sup>19</sup>. Moreover, the number of women in the Greek legislature ranked among the lowest in the EU. Greek women in decision making positions in government ministries was 4.2% in 1987 and 4.0% in 1994 and was on of the lowest in comparison to other EU members; in Denmark 13.6% of seats in 1984 belonged to women and 29.2% in 1994; in Italy 4.5% in 1984 and 12.0% in 1994<sup>20</sup>. Although certain gains have been advanced by women in their struggle for *gender justice*, the elite decision making arena still does not accommodate pluralism and women's demands have often been construed as having no political merit.

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<sup>18</sup>Source: The World Bank Group. <http://devdata.worldbank.org/genderstats/genderRpt.asp?rpt=profile&city=GRC,Greece&hm=home4>

<sup>19</sup> Source: *European Union. (2003) Eurostat Yearbook 2003: The Statistical Guide to Europe 1991-2001*. France: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. p.114

<sup>20</sup> Source: United Nations. (1995). *The World's Women 1995 Trends and Statistics*. New York: United Nations. p.171

## Conclusion

In this thesis, I attempted to map the various ways Greek women participated in national projects, to show how that participation related to changes in the *sex/gender regime*. I suggested the openness of a national project to women's participation may also affect the degree of *gender justice* attained. The gender script promoted in a national project may not always result in improved gender arrangements in social practices. Women have affected national projects and Greek women's participation in nationalist movements/parties has contributed to the restructuring of the *sex/gender regime* thus producing greater *gender justice*. There are three main conclusions that I draw from the interaction among gender and nation and state in Greece. First, feminisms and nationalisms can be compatible; autonomous Greek women's groups have allied themselves with national movements/parties open to women's participation, with their participation resulting in the restructuring of the *sex/gender regime* and greater gains toward *gender justice*. Second, despite Walby's thesis, women in Greece were as prepared as men to pursue similar nationalist goals including willingness to fight. Third, while the transition to democracy opened up some political space for women, the national project did not end the traditional system of clientelism which plagues Greek democracy and circumscribes women's ability to achieve *gender justice*.

### **The Results of Being Allies**

Greek women who organized as allies with the national project opened up space through their activism and pursued an emancipatory framework which emerged. In the first period 1840-1936, the gender script remained maternal yet certain core elements of

*gender justice* were attained mostly by autonomous women's groups allied with a liberal national project. Women were initially incorporated as individuals into the national project as tools of ethnic and religious nationalism without the ability to procure substantive changes to the *sex/gender regime*. Women, including minority Slavo-Macedonian women, attained certain privileges as citizen-mothers. During the first wave feminist movement in Greece, women who allied with the civic national project gained some political space to pursue a gender-specific agenda. As a result, certain elements of *gender justice* were made more tenable like access to education, women's suffrage (limited), and economic security and access to the means to gain it. Nevertheless, the gains advanced by women in their struggle for *gender justice* had less of an impact on rural women since they did not have the same opportunity to access these gains.

During the period 1936-1974, the advent of an authoritarian regime and its ethnic and politically homogenous national project revised the maternalist script and promoted gender apartheid. The *sex/gender regime* was restructured, the ideal of a naturalized family advanced, and hostility towards organized women was mounted through the enactment of laws that stifled their mobility and reversed gains previously made in *gender justice*. Nevertheless, right-wing women allied with the national project used the client-patron network available to them to gain some political space yet the *sex/gender regime* remained very hierarchical. The national project throughout this period was premised on the sanctity of the family, was hostile towards the Left, and hardly open to women's participation. Unlike Walby's thesis, strides made in *gender justice* were not embedded into the nation-state's foundation with each *round of restructuring*.

During the period 1974-present, autonomous women's organizations allied with the nation-state building project and political parties were given some space through which to present their grievances. Although in this type of relationship women can choose their own goals and strategies to advance *gender justice*, their capacity to exact women-friendly legislation was taxing. The Greek women's agenda was often appropriated by political parties through subtle co-optation and women did not get all of what they wanted. The gender script incorporated the notion of equality between men and women in 1983, and the support of women leaders advanced; yet social practices tell us a different story. Greek women were unable to effectively penetrate the corporate system and to influence decision-makers often resulting in legislation that was not very women-friendly, like the gender-neutral sexual assault legislation. Conversely, Greek rural women have been systematically excluded from decision-making power.

### **Women and the Resistance**

Greek women, of various classes, were as willing as men to take up arms for a nationalist movement. Greek women were incorporated as individuals into the national-liberation struggle and emerged as organized women's groups with a gender-specific agenda. These left-wing women were afforded social adulthood, physical security and access to education, yet gains made in *gender justice* were reversed due to the right/left tension. Moreover, during the quasi-democratic period and the transition to democracy, women who fought in the Resistance were never valorized. Women's participation in the national-liberation movement during the Resistance was ultimately destructive for left-wing women.

### **Transition to Democracy**

The transition to democracy in Greece afforded women some political space in which to wage their discontent but it was not until the leadership of PASOK and Greece's accession to the European Union, when autonomous women allied with the nation-state building project/party, were able to advance a gender-specific agenda. Moreover, the tradition of clientelism which remained intact during the transition, continued to lock women out of the decision-making process or circumscribe their gender-specific agenda. Moreover, ethnic nationalism resurfaced and the re-politicization of reproduction promoted by both the state and the Greek Orthodox Church, reinforced a patriarchal structure. The sway of the church over politics remained and continued to influence the national discourse and social practices through which sex and gender are manifested. Greek women have been tenacious in their quest for *gender justice*; although decision-making powers are overwhelmingly in the hands of men, women, nevertheless, silently continue to struggle for both their ideological and material predilections.

### **My Contribution**

I believe my thesis may contribute to the literature gender and nationalism in several ways. First, it may contribute to the Gender and Nation project, my initial source of inspiration, when identifying threads of commonalities in the intersection between gender and nation around the world and the conditions that promote women-friendly national projects given the framework and operationalization of various concepts used. Second, it may contribute to the literature on gender and Greece, since there has not been a systematic study of Greek women and how their participation in national projects

restructures the *sex/gender regime*. What exists are specific moments in time such as first wave feminists and their contribution in shaping nationalism or mapping out feminism from nineteenth century Greece to present. Moreover, the literature on gender and Greece is not examined using recent feminist frameworks that theorize relations between gender and nation, as I do in my thesis. Third, mainstream nationalist theorists have been used in the past to explicate the east/west dichotomy inherent in the Greek nationalist project(s). I take a different approach in order to understand the intersection between gender and the east/west dichotomy. I apply the literature on feminism and anti-colonial nationalism to develop the argument, while accounting for differences; mainly that Greeks were colonized by a Muslim and not Christian empire, an important distinction when contextualizing 'Western' in order to analyze the *sex/gender regime*. In the future, I hope to contribute to the field of gender and nation by comparing women's participation in the Resistance during the Second World War in France, Italy and Greece to uncover if women's participation in national-liberation movements in these countries resulted in the restructuring of the *sex/gender regime* and greater *gender justice*. By comparing the threads of commonality and differences we may be able to gain a broader understanding of how women affect and are affected by nationalism and not assume women take on a hue of pacifism during military struggles.

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