

Constructivist View of European Foreign Policy: A Spanish Case Study

by

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## **Abstract**

This study examines the role that socialization plays in shaping foreign policy of states. A focal question is how membership in an integrated international organization can shape the interests and perceptions of member states through sustained contact with other member states and institutions of the organization. Drawing on interviews with foreign affairs officials and policy documents, three Spanish policies are examined to determine how changes in perception can alter the foreign policy practices of a member state in the European Union. Additionally, this study uses these cases to draw conclusions about the existence of a European foreign policy and the various methods supranational policy formation. The analysis indicates socialization alters the perceptions of foreign policy objectives in member states, which leads to altered practices. Further, the analysis shows an emerging European foreign policy constructed by the member states and implemented at the supranational level.

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## **Introduction**

Recent years have seen the international arena marked by changes brought on by the rise of international organizations. This has caused a rethinking by those International Relations theorists who based their assumptions on state-centric, rationalist approaches, as more and more states become members of a variety of international organizations. The most prominent of these, and the organization that appears to go against rationalist conventions, is the European Union. The construction of a supranational institution that has projected stability and growth with the ongoing consent of its member states has called into question many of the basic tenets of the most prominent International Relations theories, particularly ideas of sovereignty and states' interests. In place of these theories, the study of the European Union has engendered new theories to explain the interactions amongst countries that have led to the formation of the European Union in its current iteration. These theories often focus on how the European Union continues to gather more competencies and expand its sphere of influence, despite constantly infringing on member states' sovereignty.

The research question of this study is to what degree membership in an international organization can change a state's perception of the international arena. The project uses Spain's membership in the European Union as an example of this process and explores the utility of a constructivist perspective to explain these changes. Specifically, foreign policy is examined to determine how institutional socialization has altered Spanish perceptions and practices. Three

cases are examined to determine how Spanish behavior in the international arena has altered. The analysis was informed by data from interviews with Spanish foreign affairs officials who contributed their understanding of the factors and perceptions that informed these policy decisions.

This study also examines how European policy is formed, and what factors lead to the emergence of a European policy. In each of the cases selected the Spanish behavior provides insight into the process of forming a European level international policy and how the socialization process can lead to the policies of the member being expressed through the European Union. Further, it highlights how the top-down and bottom-up approaches have different outcomes for policy creation in the European Union.

The hypothesis of this study there is socialization has a demonstrable effect on Spanish foreign policy. Membership in the European Union will have changed the way in which Spain generates interests and practices foreign policy, with a greater awareness of community objectives and stronger focus on normative ideals as a basis for interaction with other states. It is hypothesized that there will be a difference between Spanish policy prior to its accession and its current manifestations caused by immersion in the strong institutional context of the European Union. Further, it is expected that greater involvement from other member states will cause greater convergence of policies between Spain and the rest of the European Union. This convergence will reflect an emerging European foreign policy that is generated through member state initiatives and the

socialization of those states, rather than a top-down legal approach to foreign policy construction.

Whereas current theories of EU-member state relations, such as Neofunctionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism, concern themselves primarily with the causes of a member state's willingness to cede sovereignty to the EU, whether as a measure of negotiation or the result of spillover effects, the comparatively recent emergence of Institutional Socialization has focused on the processes that states undergo when they share the same institutional space. Institutional Socialization, based on constructivism, focuses on the alteration of interests and the understanding of roles inside the institution that states undergo once they become members. Further, Institutional Socialization examines which conditions are necessary for a state to undergo an effective socialization process. Institutional Socialization separates itself from Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism by emphasizing the impact socialization can have on institution, rather than the rationalist decision-making ascribed to actors by other theories. While examining the impact of Institutional Socialization as an explanatory theory, Checkel (2005) describes the ideal conditions for impactful socialization, including a close link between the members of the institution; a strong willingness on the member being admitted; and shared ideals between all members.

Following the issue of institutional influence over member states is the concern with the impact on policy. The different conceptions of the European Union, either as a supranational organization capable of behaving as an independent actor or as a intergovernmental institution which reflects the desires of its member

states, has raised questions about the nature of European foreign policy. Scholars such as Anderson and Seitz (2006) have questioned the validity of anything that could be unequivocally labeled as a “European” foreign policy despite the existence of programs such as the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), which lacks the firm purpose and material support to be an effective policy. Zwolski contends that the European Union should be considered an international actor in its own right capable of forming its own foreign policy (2012 Zwolski), while others, for example Devine (2011), believe the lack of overall institutional control prevents both a European foreign policy from being conceived, and also prevents the building of a consensus of member-state on foreign policy. These authors contend that any appearance of consensus is merely a coinciding of interests between member states. To understand what place European foreign policy has internationally, it is necessary to understand its place amongst the member states and if, and to what degree, a “European” foreign policy can exist. While it is widely agreed that when compared to a traditional nation-state, the European Union lacks a comprehensive foreign policy, there is debate about the possible emergence of what can be termed foreign policy and where such a foreign policy would come from.

Scholars recognize there are two methods through which the European Union could form a foreign policy: top-down and bottom-up. Those that subscribe to the top-down mechanism, such as Anderson and Seitz, maintain that European Union institutions, such as the EEAS or European Commission, conceive policy and project it onto its member states. In this case, the institutions that are mandated to represent the European Union are charged with deciding where policies are needed

and how they are to be formulated and enacted. Anderson and Seitz, for example, highlight the CSDP as a case of this type, where the policy is formulated at the EU level and its implementation is expected to be carried out by the EU institutions, such as the European Council. This requires the institutions of the European Union to work to achieve a consensus amongst the member states for its policy goals, as well as to achieve objectives on the international stage. This process is usually characterized by the supranational institution forming a policy and seeking the acceptance of the member states.

In contrast to the top-down approach, the bottom-up approach is characterized by member states interacting with each other when the need arises to develop a shared foreign policy. In these instances the need for a policy is recognized by member states which initiate a dialogue at the European level, using the EU as a space for interaction with other member states. This policy is then made into a European Union policy, which can be implemented from the institutions of the EU, while still giving the member states input into the direction of the policy. This allows member states to form a consensus on policy needs and strategy prior to moving it into the European sphere. This type of approach is characterized by member states forming a policy on their own, then moving into the European sphere.

Spain's membership in the European Union represents a prime opportunity to test the effectiveness of the Institutional Socialization theory as an explanatory tool to examine the degree to which socialization facilitates the emergence of a European foreign policy. If socialization encourages a shared understanding of the

international field, it may, in time, lead to a consensus of interests and objectives which results in the formation of a European Union foreign policy, one essentially created through a bottom-up process and implemented as top-down.

Spain became a member of the European Union in 1986 following years of international isolation under Franco's rule. Spain focused on joining the European Union with the aim of reestablishing itself as a viable actor in the international arena. This made Spain a willing member of the European Union, open to socialization. Additionally, Spain was joining an organization filled with neighboring states and states with which it had previously had relations, ensuring that it shared many of the values of the organization it was joining. Further, the European Union is a fully integrated international organization, with member states closely tied together by institutions and binding treaties, making it ideal to examine the effects of institutional socialization.

Spain also presents itself as an ideal state to examine compared to other European Union member states due to a number of additional factors: Spain was one of the first countries to join the European Union after the initial six, and therefore did not participate in the initial formation process, but was a member long enough to be fully subject to the socialization process. Spain is also a large and economically powerful country, with a strong international presence independent of its membership in international organizations. This makes Spain a more viable case study than smaller countries which may be subject to European Union directives due to economic or political needs. Additionally, Spain was already politically

engaged in areas of overlapping interests with the members of the European Union, making pre- and post-accessions comparisons more viable.

With regards to foreign policy Spain is an ideal candidate to examine the possible existence of a supranational foreign policy exerting influence on a member state. Spain's membership in the European Union has been marked both by its attempt to integrate itself into existing policies at the EU level while simultaneously bringing its own priorities and interests to the table. This has provided an opportunity for Spain to both adapt to European interests while at different times attempting to guide or initiate policies based on its own interests. Spain has been present and involved at many key times in European Union foreign policy development, including the Barcelona Process, making it a likely candidate to demonstrate the existence and influence of a European international policy.

While there has been some research in this area, this study fills a need in the current literature as it addresses the effect that institutional socialization has on foreign policy. Existing studies on interaction between European Union and member states focus on the relations built within the European Union and how member states work within the institutional framework. These studies are more concerned with the internal workings of the European Union and how its formation affects the dynamics between member states and the institutions (2005 Schmitter, 2005 Burca, 2010 Brummer, 2005 Risse). Additionally, other studies (1995 Barbe, 2000 Gillespie) have focused on the changes in foreign policy practice in new member states, but concentrated on the autonomous actions of that state rather than examining how perceptions have been altered by new contexts. This study, in

contrast, demonstrates how foreign policy can be altered by a state's membership in an international organization with regards to interest formation and perceptions of what constitutes effective practice.

In order to address the question of institutional socialization, I conducted a multi-layered study to understand changes in Spain's perception of the international arena and the effects it had on Spanish foreign policy. This will also inform the discussion on the existence of a European foreign policy and its formation. This process included a survey of primary sources, including European Union documents, Ministerio Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperacion (Spanish foreign service) documents, and official statements drawn from newspapers. This review is complemented by data from interviews with four Spanish diplomats in Spain. These interviews focused on Spain's perceptions of the international arena and of its relationship with the European Union. Three cases were selected based on information on the interviews. These cases are: the Barcelona Process, the Central and Eastern European Enlargement, and Cuba. These were examined to see if Spanish foreign policy practices had been altered by its interaction with other European Union member states or by the European Union offices. Official European and Spanish documents were analyzed to discover any alterations in processes of foreign policy implementation and the causes for those changes. The results were compared to public statements made by officials in newspapers and other official media to further understand what motivations existed for any changes in policy practice.

A review of secondary literature focused on European Union foreign policy and the construction of the European Union as an international actor, including studies that utilize socialization theories. These studies, many of which are concerned with the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), take a variety of approaches, from asserting that the value of the CSDP is greater to the European Union as a nation building tool (2006 Anderson and Seitz), to reconceptualizing the European Union's notion of security to include those beyond traditional definitions, such as climate change or global poverty (2012 Zwolski). These analyses understand the European Union as a separate actor attempting to construct a legally-constructed and unified foreign policy that the member states either conform to or are separated from regardless of the role they wish to play. However, there has not been sufficient attention paid to the role that socialization plays in the construction of European foreign policy. The role that socialization plays, between member states and the European Union is a focus of this study.

This study was limited by time and the availability of respondents for initial interviews. During the month available to conduct interviews, several possible respondents were reassigned, away from Madrid, or otherwise unavailable for interviews, limiting the possible number of viewpoints on particular policy issues under discussion. Further, those with highest authority who were most responsible for policy decisions were unavailable. Additionally, documents which provided insight into discussions which led to policy decisions were either unavailable or non-existent.

The three case studies of Spanish foreign policy allow for a broader examination of the effects of institutional socialization. Future studies could examine other countries with differing historical and political contexts from Spain's in order to provide a more thorough examination of the effects of institutional socialization on member countries.

This thesis is divided into four sections. The first chapter introduces the theoretical basis and methodology for the study. It explores Wendt's theory of constructivism as well as Checkel's theory of institutional socialization and applies these to the European Union and Spanish examples. This chapter also introduces the areas chosen for case studies and establishes their relationship to the research question. This chapter also explores Spain's perceptions of its own place in the European Union and the factors that lead to Spanish foreign policy decisions.

The second chapter examines the Barcelona Process, which provides insight into how Spain develops policy where multiple member states share a strong interest. The Barcelona Process represents Spain's first major area of policy decision-making within the European Union and an area in which interests and influence are equal with other member states.

Chapter 3 examines the EU enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe as an area in which Spain's interests were opposed to those of the larger EU institution and in which Spain did not have a great deal of influence. Spain's interests were not concentrated in the area previous to its accession and it found itself working in an unfamiliar area.

The final case study examines the relations between the EU and Cuba as Spain tried to reform the long-standing Common Position of the EU. Here Spanish interests and influence were strong, but Spain found itself opposed by other member states on normative grounds. This case study demonstrates Spain's attempt to bring its own interests into the European Union.

These case studies track the evolution of foreign policy from the Spanish accession to the European Union. The case studies are examined through a constructivist lens to determine if institution socialization is an optimal explanatory tool. The case studies not only demonstrate the functional changes in Spanish foreign policy but also the changes in perceptions and contexts that drive the changes within Spanish thinking.

## **Chapter 1: Theory and Methodology**

The evolution of Spanish foreign policy within the European Union is best understood through the institutional socialization theory of international relations. This perspective draws heavily on Wendt's (1992) constructivist theory of international relations and Checkel's institutional socialization theory, both of which provide the basis for examining the impact of the European Union on member states' foreign policy.

Before examining the interactions between the European Union and its member states, it is necessary to establish a number of underlying theoretical assumptions. The unit of analysis for international relations theory is, for most perspectives, the state. While some authors have argued that the definition of actors should be broadened to include non-state actors, such as non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations, the fact remains that states are the actors that generate foreign policy and act on these policies. While others may have an influence over the direction of these policies, international organizations and the treaties that shape interactions are conceived and implemented on the national level. Similarly, some argue for differing levels of analysis within the state itself, declaring that policy can only be understood through the study of elite decision-makers rather than attributing foreign policy to the state as a whole. While it is true that policy is often constructed by political elites, the views of elites are often shaped by the state to which they belong and their decisions are reflective of the circumstances within the state itself. Additionally, regardless of who makes the

decisions within a national government, or how those decisions are reached, the entire state is subject to the consequences. For example, if elites move a country into the European Union against the will of the majority, the country, its citizens, will still be in the European Union and be subject to all that it entails. Therefore this study, while examining the role of elites and outside influences in the decision-making process of a state, will focus on the state as the unit of analysis.

Another assumed condition present in international relations theory is the widely acknowledged presence of anarchy in the international relations arena. This is attributed to an absence of an overarching authority to govern the states that comprise the international arena. In this model the lack of structure or authority compels states to act on a strictly rational ground when pursuing their interests; the model dismisses other factors in the decision-making process, as there can be no higher appeal and no deference to institutions. This status compels the theoretical schools of Realism and Liberalism to assume a rational, competitive approach to international relations theory. Analysis from these theoretical perspectives often focuses on conflicts over economic or military advantages and states are valued by their ability to exert control over one another (2002 Nye and 1979 Waltz).

Both Liberalism and Realism, therefore, rely on the assumed anarchic nature of the international system and the rationalist, self-interested nature of the states that populate it. As demonstrated by Wendt, "...questions about identity- and interest-formation are therefore not important to students of international relations" (1992 Wendt 392). Rather, states' interests are exogenously given, that is, assigned interests that are based on the system in which they operate, rather than

other, contextual factors. This approach also demonstrates that both theories recognize that the anarchic system provides a permissive space for self-interested states to act in a competitive, rational manner (1992 Wendt).

Wendt chooses to argue that while the permissive structure of the anarchic system is evident, the interests of states are not necessarily exogenously given and the anarchic structure can be understood through a more sociological lens. Wendt observing that "...anarchy is what states make of it" argues that states do not have interests exogenously given but that interests are linked with identities (1992 Wendt 403). Drawing on sociological theory, Wendt's conception of states allows them to alter their identities based on the context in which they are acting. Therefore, if a state understands itself to be in a competitive, zero-sum, self-interested system, it must act on this identity. However, changes in the understanding of a state's identity, or in the context that a state determines itself to be in, can result in an alteration in the identity and therefore the interests of a state. Wendt's example examines the changes that the United States and the Soviet Union underwent during the Cold War period. The two states understood themselves to be in a Realist construction of the international arena, in which the gain of one state was at the cost of the other. To contrast this example to one in modern times Wendt might choose the "war on terror" as an example of states seeing value in cooperative partnerships where closer alliances can bring mutual benefit to all parties. Cooperation amongst states in the pursuit of global security has become more prevalent and the assumption that international relations have become a zero-sum equation is diminished in foreign affairs thinking. In both examples the anarchic

nature of the system remained in existence, but the understanding of the system and the context within which states operated changed (1992 Wendt).

Having established that identities and interests are understood based on the contexts in which states exist, it is necessary to examine the methods with which identities evolve or change. State-to-state interactions can lead to the development of an identity in that context with both states gaining an understanding of how to interact with each other and what the interests are with regards to each state. However, recent developments have generated literature that focuses on the roles that International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) play in providing a space for multiple states to interact with one another. These studies examine what factors lead states to become socialized or fail to adhere to an organization's norms. Studies have predicted that level of integration, level of interaction, and previous beliefs prior to joining an organization are the strongest independent variables that explain the level of integration in an organization (2005 Checkel, 2007 Bearce and Bondanella).

Bearce and Bondanella's work attempts to provide a quantitative method for measuring the factors mentioned above. They bridge the theoretical gap between discussing states' interests and finding an effective quantitative method by utilizing United Nations General Assembly voting records as representative of states' interests. The basis of their work stems from the belief that the greater number of International Organizations states share membership in, the more likely they are to vote along lines similar to fellow members. Further, they distinguish between minimal, structured and interventionist IGOs. Minimal IGOs are organizations such

as the Commonwealth of Independent States that may possess a secretariat or similar body, but have little ability to guide state actions. Structured IGOs such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have guidelines dictating member policy and official institutions with some binding power. Interventionist organizations have strong binding powers and contain judicial organs along with access to credit or loans. The European Union and World Bank are often used as examples of Interventionist Organizations.

Bearce and Bondanella's work demonstrates a strong case for the argument that institutional socialization is prevalent in stronger, or interventionist, international organizations as closer contact provides more comprehensive state socialization for its members than weaker institutions. That is, the more closely the member states are tied together, the more likely socialization will occur. Whereas Bearce and Bondanella's study answers whether or not socialization occurs, the question it does not answer, and does not seek to answer, is one of the fundamental questions that Wendt raises in his work, namely how, and to what degree, the socialization process occurs within international organizations. To fully address these questions the mechanisms through which socialization occurs needs to be understood. Checkel seeks to address this question with his comprehensive study of EU institutions to determine if they are "promoters or sites of socialization" (2005 Checkel 806).

Checkel's objective is to establish the type of socialization that occurs in an institutional context and to the degree socialization is achieved. He posits that there are two types of socialization. Type 1 refers to an actor understanding new "rules to

the game” in which the actor is given a role, or set of rules, to follow. The actor will continue to perform the role based on the rationalist calculation that inclusion in the system is beneficial and that straying from the role will incur too many costs. However, an altering of identity and interests does not occur. Type 1, in which the actor follows the “logic of appropriateness” (2005 Checkel 804), subscribes to the rationalist theories of international relations for state interactions within an institution. Type 2 socialization is a deeper socialization in which an actor’s participation in a system can lead to the altering of identities and interests. It is known as “internalization/socialization” and is achieved when the actor begins to adopt the identity and the interests of the institution or to those of fellow members of the institution in which it now operates.

The different types describe the result of the process, but the mechanism through which socialization is achieved is just as important to the understanding of international institutions. Checkel identifies three mechanisms by which a state can be socialized into an institution, each with its own outcomes and conditions. The first is the strategic calculation process, which rewards socialization through material or political benefits. This type of socialization is often referred to in discussions of conditionality in international relations. The benefits of inclusion in an institution are sufficient for an actor to participate in the socialization process, and by doing so learn to participate within certain guidelines that govern the interactions of members. For this type of socialization to occur two conditions must be met. First, the perceived benefits for the new member must outweigh the costs of membership in the organization. Second, the authority in the organization must

be strong enough to impose the conditions of membership on the actor while it remains a member. In this way the authority is able to coerce the new member into accepting the rules of operation by providing a path of least resistance to the perceived benefits.

The second mechanism of socialization is identified as role-playing which also draws its foundation from rationalist thinking but accounts for the bounded nature of rationalism. It views the behavior of actors as guided by the limited amount of attention an actor can give to differing objectives; attention is a “scarce resource” (2005 Checkel 810). Actors use organizations as a way of utilizing this scarce resource more efficiently. The continued use of the opportunities provided by the organization develop a role for the actor within the structure, but unlike the previous mechanism this role is not dependent on a constant recalculation of interests, but rather actors “adopt certain roles because they are appropriate in the particular setting” (2005 Checkel 810). Actors will continue to fulfill their roles because deviation would require a new allocation of attention, with uncertain results. It is important to note that identity and interests do not change in this setting, rather only the role played by the actor changes, based on the context in which they are operating.

The final mechanism identified by Checkel is normative suasion. This mechanism draws heavily on the constructivist/sociological tradition. Checkel sums up the main tenet of normative suasion by observing “Normative suasion takes place [when] agents actively and reflectively internalize new understandings of appropriateness” (2005 Checkel 812). Reflecting the findings of Bearce and

Bondanella, normative suasion posits that constant contact with the institution or member states leads to an internalizing of new identities and a new understanding of interests. In Checkel's terms, normative suasion leads to Type 2 socialization. This mechanism is only effective when a number of conditions are met. First, the actor must find itself in a new environment, and thus be open to internalizing new information; the actor must not have vastly different beliefs than the members or institution it is joining; the actor must be motivated to join the "in-group" in which it seeks membership; finally, the actor is subjected to deliberative argument or discussion, not lecture or demands.

While Checkel and others have examined to what degree this socialization has occurred, finding that socialization does occur in the correct circumstances, less work has been done on exploring the way in which this socialization manifests itself, particularly in regards to foreign policy. On a state level foreign policy represents the most evident expression of identity and interests because the international arena is the area in which exposure to the socializing mechanisms first occurs, through initial contact and negotiations between states, and contact is maintained with other states. Given the correct contexts foreign policy practices can be used to demonstrate the manner and degree to which socialization can occur in a state within the institutional context.

To fully examine the institutional socialization process the correct conditions must be present. First, as established by Bearce and Bondanella, a high degree of integration is necessary to demonstrate any significant effect. As mentioned above, conditions would include some binding conditions for membership, a space for

continual contact between the members and a judicial system. The European Union meets these criteria and, with a majority of its members sharing a currency, participating in visa agreements through the Schengen zone and involving itself in a membership-wide parliament, is the most closely integrated international organization. In addition to the high level of integration, the European Union projects itself into the international arena with a focus on constructivist attitudes, such as human rights and international law, which is reflected in the conditions that are imposed on new members, who must participate in institutions such as the European Court of Justice. The European Union also provides space for contact between member states in a number of arenas. The Council of European Union, European Council, European Parliament and, most recently the External Action Service, allow institution socialization to occur at different levels of government.

Importantly, the European Union does not, with a few exceptions, have direct control, or even a great deal of influence, over the foreign policy of its member states. The lack of cohesive foreign policy with member states has been demonstrated and well documented in numerous cases, showing how such policy remains under the control of the member states. Examples of states expressing their independence in foreign policy include the decision by some countries to commit troops to the Iraq war and the lack of consensus over the right of Kosovo to assert its independence. However, while states may still choose their own paths, this does not preclude expressions of socialization by the member states. The manner of foreign policy practice, and the changes that occur after socialization, can

still be seen in the process and final manifestation of foreign policies (2011 Rynning, 2011 Devine).

Spain makes the ideal case study of institutional socialization of a state. The end result of the foreign policy formation is reflective of the formation of European Union foreign policy. The first step in understanding European Union foreign policy is to develop an understanding of the status the European Union has in the international arena. Some, such as Anderson and Seitz (2006 Anderson and Seitz), conceive of the European Union as a state, an independent actor in the global arena, separate from its member states. Their work, drawing on constructivist theories, focuses on whether the CSDP could have alternate value to the European Union, beyond military applications. Anderson and Seitz see the CSDP as a nation-building tool, serving to construct an European identity that can be constructed by building a "European" military, which acts with different criteria to the US-dominated NATO. Anderson and Seitz's view the CSDP as a means for member states' socialization through a top-down approach to foreign policy in which the members learn and adapt to a policy constructed at the level of European Union. In essence, the assembling of a European foreign policy is dependent on the European Union as an autonomous actor, not the member states. (2006 Anderson and Seitz).

Zwolski, on the other hand, sees the European Union as an emerging conduit for member states preferences. Zwolski attempts to provide a framework to study the European Union as an international actor through a security lens. Zwolski argues that only by reassessing traditional understandings of security to include those such as global warming, human security, poverty or global health, can a

comprehensive framework for studying European policy be established. Using this model, Zwolski also observes a slowly developing consensus amongst member states as they approve a variety of international policies at the supranational level. Zwolski concludes that with a shift in traditional understandings of security and an acknowledgment of the slow emergence of international policy, the European Union can be seen to have an independent policy, generated by the consensus of the member states (2012 Zwolski). Zwolski examined proposed policy documents from member states and locates how those documents were integrated into European Union foreign policy that were issued by the EEAS and the Commission. He looks for definitions of security that have been uploaded from member states to those the European Union uses in its own official documents.

Rieker sees foreign policy as being downloaded from the EU to the member states. However, unlike Anderson and Zeitz, he sees the European Union as evolving “towards a supranational state” (2006 Rieker). In Rieker’s view, the European Union is neither an independent actor, nor solely an intergovernmentalist institution for its member states. Using France, and separately the Nordic countries, as case studies, and using the socialization process as a lens, Rieker observes that states begin with an initial concept of security identity; that is how states conceive the necessary security practices they must pursue. Rieker then observes that European Union member states learn and adapt to new contexts once they become members of the European Union. Rieker attributes these changes to a process called the “spiral model,” defined as when

...the actor tries to find ‘new’ ways of preserving traditional interests. Even

though such a change cannot yet be characterized as socialization, it marks the first step in such a direction. In the end, the actor becomes convinced by the community's discourse, and the chances for socialization or learning increase. (2006 Rieker 4)

Rieker studies the shift in French policy by examining documents concerning both European and French defense policy. These documents show a shift in priorities for French national security policy and in the rhetoric of the preferred direction for European Union security, moving it closer to already existing EU policy prescriptions.

This thesis draws and builds on Rieker's theories for analyzing the creation of a European foreign policy. The European Union acts a means through which member states are able to "Europeanize" their policy aims on a supranational level. This means concerns raised at the national level are formed into policy concerns, and often solutions, at the national level and are then uploaded in the European Union via institutions such as the Council of Europe. This understanding of the process draws on Zwolski's work wherein members are in control of the initial processes of policy formation with the policy infused with the interests and perceptions of the member state. Once this policy is uploaded into the European sphere, and becomes a European policy, it comes under the purview of all member states who seek to alter or utilize the policy, using their own interests and understanding of the context in which they operate. This is the beginning of Rieker's "spiral process" in which the member states interact with one another and with the European Union with regards to the newly created policy. This results in a

socialization process, beginning with uploading of member states' interests and ending with European policy, constructed through the socialization of the member states in the European Union institutions.

This process can be observed through the evolution of cases studied in this thesis, where a member state brings its own concerns to the European Union, where a policy is further shaped by the European Union and the other member states, and then downloaded back onto the member states. This in turn shapes the interests and understanding of contexts that the member states operate in, leading to a convergence of interests and a "European" policy. Policy documents and public statements issued during the policy construction can be used to locate a converging of policy objectives.

To observe the effects of socialization it is useful to select one state to study. Spain's membership in the European Union fulfills the criteria laid out by Checkel for the most comprehensive socialization. Spain entered the European Union after years of international isolation. The aim of the Spanish government was to reengage on the international stage; the European Union provided the opportunity to do so both economically and politically, thus giving Spain a strong motivation to participate in the Union. This meant that Spain committed itself fully to the institutions of the European Union, engaging in the socialization process. Additionally, Spain, following its emergence from the Franco dictatorship, perceived the benefits of the European Union as greatly outweighing the cost. In interviews conducted for this study, respondents emphasized the importance of membership to Spain in the post-Franco years, in one instance by declaring that EU membership

was Spain's "only foreign policy objective"<sup>1</sup>. Further, most of respondents emphasized the cathartic nature that joining the EU had on Spain as it demonstrated a strong break from the Franco past. One respondent even went so far as to describe the EU as being like "AA [Alcoholics Anonymous]<sup>2</sup>" for countries with difficult histories, pointing to the Central and Eastern European countries which joined the EU to help break with their Communist pasts. Thus on a national, collective level joining of the EU provided Spain with an opportunity to reinvent its identity.

However, the perceived benefits went beyond a national identity perspective, extending into more pragmatic areas. Respondents highlighted the economic and political benefits for Spain when joining the EU. While the economic benefits are more accurately reported in other studies, respondents noted that membership in the EU gave Spain "access" to countries which had previously been distant or of relatively little importance<sup>3</sup>. Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia were areas that Spain had not enjoyed access to or influence over previous to its membership in the European Union. European Union membership has not only allowed Spain to participate politically in these areas of the world, but it has also increased its influence in areas where it already had a political presence. A respondent noted that while Spain always had a degree of influence in Northern and Western Africa, the closer partnership with other former colonial powers that still

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<sup>1</sup> Interview conducted by author, September 5<sup>th</sup> 2011 in Madrid with Pablo Ruperez, sub-director of foreign politics and common security

<sup>2</sup> Interview conducted by author, September 7<sup>th</sup> in Madrid with Pablo Ruiz, National contact point, office of the Director General of Intergration and Coordination

<sup>3</sup> Interview with Pablo Ruiz

exerted influence in these areas has allowed greater access and greater influence than was previously enjoyed by Spanish governments<sup>4</sup>.

Referring to Checkel's theories of institutional socialization, this thought process can be seen as Type 1 socialization achieved through a strategic calculation mechanism. Spain's interests aligned with EU membership and the benefits of integration outweighed any costs incurred. Over time Spain learned to adapt to the "rules of the game" by working within the institutions of the European Union to achieve its objectives, while still gaining the benefits of membership. Indeed, several respondents remarked upon the learning curve that Spain navigated during its first years of EU membership. One respondent, a veteran of EU foreign policy who worked during the first years of integration, noted that "In the 90s we were like a house guest [in the EU]<sup>5</sup>." The same official noted that during that time Spain often ceded to the wishes of the EU in order to appear as a willing member. Another official compared the experience of Spain in the 1990's to those of the new Central and Eastern European member states, particularly in reference to the similarities in behavior within the European Union institutions where adherence to the rules of the EU can override a stronger pursuit of national interests<sup>6</sup>. Both respondents noted that as Spain become more comfortable in its role in the EU, it began to take stronger stances and obtained a greater ability to achieve its objectives within the EU context. This type of response suggests that despite the costs of adapting to a

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<sup>4</sup> Interview with Pablo Ruiz

<sup>5</sup> Interviews conducted by author, September 2011 in Madrid with Pablo Ruiz and Ricardo Sanchez Blanco, Office of European Affairs

<sup>6</sup> Interview conducted by author September 14<sup>th</sup> 2011 in Madrid with Jose-Luis Pardo

new system that evidently reduces the ability of the state to act in an independent manner, the benefits outweigh the costs. This belief is clearly accepted within Spanish Foreign Affairs; when asked in what ways European Union membership has benefited Spain, respondents' answers varied along the theme of "In every way," "Completely," while questions about whether, overall, EU membership for Spain was positive or negative, all respondents answered overwhelmingly positive.

The above evidence would support the predominance of cost-benefit thinking demonstrating a Type 1/strategic calculation within Spanish foreign policy circles. However, this discounts the possibility of the internalization of EU membership and its values within Spanish foreign policy. When asked about the overlap of Spanish and European Union foreign policy, respondents emphasized the close alignment of EU and Spanish national interests. One respondent declared "Brussels is us", while others expressed similar views that emphasized not only a shared interest in foreign policy objectives but an internalization of European identity within Spanish foreign policy. Other responses about the way in which EU/Spanish interests were similar or different were, "They are the same," and "Not different at all." These comments highlighted that, in the view of the Spanish government, whatever was beneficial for the European Union was also beneficial for Spain. Further emphasis was provided when two of the respondents placed the importance of maintaining cohesiveness between the European Union members above pursuing their own national objectives. When pressed for an explanation of

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<sup>7</sup> Interview with Ricardo Sanchez Blanco

this apparent de-emphasis of national interests, respondents declared the value of the European Union as greater than the value of any individual Spanish objective.

This prioritization of EU values and the subjugation of Spanish interests to the continuance of those of the EU exemplify Checkel's Type 2 socialization with a normative suasion mechanism. This corresponds with Spain's history prior to joining the EU and Checkel's requirements for normative suasions to take place, namely the emergence of an actor in a new circumstance, shared beliefs with the institution, constant contact within the new group, and that the actor must be motivated to join the new group and must not be subject to lecture or forced compliance.

In this case Spain's radical reemergence into the international arena after years of isolation under Franco placed it in a new circumstance and provided a strong motivation to join the EU. As a European nation Spain already shared many of the values of the EU member states and, as will be discussed later, had already been subjected to policies that brought it closer to European Union values. Finally, the nature of the EU structure provides constant contact without either lecturing or forcing changes upon a state.

Despite Spain's internalization of European interests, this has not resulted in agreement on all policies or objectives between these parties. A frequently cited example of disagreement between Spain and EU is the Kosovo conflict, where the EU and many of its member states wished to recognize Kosovo as an independent state, but Spain, due to domestic political considerations, has refused to acknowledge Kosovo's right to independence. The end result is that the EU has no official policy

on Kosovo. Despite this disagreement, Spain still shares values with the European Union and chooses to operate in a context in which the European Union is a dominant factor in rhetoric and policy-making.

The values shared between the EU and Spain are reflected in Spain's commitment to the European Union and the means by which policy is constructed, both domestically and internationally. The weight that the European Union carries in Spanish policy decision-making cannot be overstated. When asked directly about the importance of the European Union in Spanish foreign policy formation, respondents were quick to emphasize not just the importance of the EU but also its omnipresence in the process. One respondent claimed the EU was the "first thing you think of when thinking about foreign policy,"<sup>8</sup> while another claimed it was not only the first but was also "the second and third thing"<sup>9</sup> addressed. Another respondent, more familiar with large collaborations in EU foreign policy, noted that "You are always thinking about the European Union, at every stage [of foreign policy]."<sup>10</sup> This was followed by the observation that "The EU is present in everyday life. When you build a park [or other domestic project] you must first go to the EU."

While it is evident that there is a link between the European Union and member states' foreign policy, the expression of this relationship from a given member state's foreign policy is often overlooked. Studies have tended to concentrate on European Union foreign policy as an expression either of the institution or as a collective action by member states; or to examine a given member

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<sup>8</sup> Interview with Pablo Ruperez

<sup>9</sup> Interview with Ricardo Sanchez Blanco

<sup>10</sup> Interview with Jose Luis-Prado

state's foreign policy with regards to its membership in the EU, but few have examined how the socialization aspect of the European Union has altered the policies and practices of member states in policy directly relating to the European Union. Using three case studies, this thesis examines how Spanish foreign policy has been altered by its membership within the European Union. In particular it investigates how the goals, methods and contexts have evolved over time, beginning before Spanish membership in the European Union to the present.

The case studies were chosen based on two criteria: The degree of influence Spain had over the area, both in terms of direct influence and influence within the European Union (also related to the salience of the issue for other Member States) and the level of interest for Spain as a state. (See Table 1) The three cases were drawn from examples given by interview respondents as examples of areas where Spanish and European Union policy overlapped in some manner and where some interaction with the EU was required. Each case was chosen to represent a different level of interest and ability to influence policy both for Spain and the member states.

**Table 1**

**Relative Degree of Interest of Spain and of other EU Member States in Particular Foreign Policy Areas**

<b>Degree of interest of other Member States</b>	<b>Degree of Interest of Spain in the issue</b>		
	<b>Low</b>	<b>Medium</b>	<b>High</b>
<b>Low</b>			Relations with Cuba
<b>Medium</b>		Barcelona Agreement	
<b>High</b>	CEEC enlargement		

The cases chosen were the Barcelona process, which focused on the Mediterranean; and the Eastern expansion of the European Union to include Central and Eastern European countries; and the attempts by Spain to reopen contact with Cuba. In this instance, Cuba represents an area of great importance to Spain that placed it in conflict with a majority of the other member states. The Mediterranean represents an area where Spain had strong influence and historical ties, but shared interests and influence with other member states, while the Eastern Enlargement was an area where Spain had little influence but their interests were either indifferent or slightly against the Eastern expansion. Cases such as other Latin American countries were not chosen because Spain exercises dominant control both in Latin America itself and within the European Union when forming and shaping policy. Unlike the case of Cuba, in which there is conflict with other member states,

Spain's role in Latin America is uncontested and largely unaltered by other EU influences.

The case studies are informed by responses given in interviews to determine the full level internalization of the EU in Spanish foreign policy. While the interview responses established the identity that Spain has constructed for itself since joining the European Union, the cases studies establish how this has manifested itself in foreign policy practice and in what ways this internalization projects itself.

These cases are examined using Wendt's and Checkel's aforementioned theoretical models to view the degree of socialization that can be observed in these instances and how that socialization is expressed within Spanish thinking in the foreign policy arena. Extrapolations can be made about the influence of international institutions and their effect on foreign policy based on Spain's experience. However, it is difficult to measure how perceptions have changed over a given period given the inability to quantitatively measure perception. Additionally, there are many areas where perceptions can change, or the way in which these changes are manifested. Therefore this study focuses on changes in behavior as well as changes in the rhetoric used by Spanish officials as evidence of altered perceptions.

## **Chapter 2: The Barcelona Process**

The Barcelona Process demonstrates the evolution Spain's foreign policy has undergone since joining the European Union, highlighting the manner in which foreign policy practices have altered both toward fellow EU member states and non-member countries. The Barcelona Process, during which European Union member states set out establish a comprehensive treaty for all neighboring Mediterranean states, represents a convergence of Spain's own interests with a European Union imperative, allowing Spain to take the lead on an important, European-wide issue which already had a complex history both for Spain and the European Union. Since Spain and the European Union already had historical ties and a variety of priorities, from economic to political, with the Mediterranean region, the Barcelona process demonstrated the method with which Spain, member states and the European Union not only interacted amongst themselves, but also with third party countries. In this instance the negotiations were not only a dialogue with a partner but also an aspect of the socialization process that took place within the European Union itself.

Spain and the Mediterranean enjoyed historical ties long before Spain's entrance into the European Union. In particular, Spain's colonial history with Morocco and Algeria gave it a strong connection than many of Europe's southern countries. Economically, politically and culturally Spain's connections with the Mediterranean have been a focus of Spain's foreign policy since the time of the Ottoman Empire. This ongoing relationship between Spain and the Mediterranean countries, the Maghreb region in particular, has given Spain a deeper understanding

and a greater interest than many other EU member states. Even before its membership in the European Union, Spain focused on Morocco for a number of reasons ranging from trade and agricultural competition to responses to terrorism and illegal immigration. Regardless of its position within the European Union, the Mediterranean would be an area of focus for Spain

### **Spain and the Maghreb**

Spain's involvement with the Mediterranean, specifically Maghreb countries (Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria) has been based on bilateral relations and focused on smaller issues designed to keep relative peace between the countries. During Franco's rule several foreign ministers attempted to develop a greater Mediterranean policy, one that could be applied broadly to all of Spain's southern neighbors. However, a combination of internal party politics and disputes resulted in the removal of those supporting this approach. Instead Spain settled for a narrower, militaristic approach that focused on bilateral relations, security and the preservation of Franco's party (2000 Gillespie 46). After the removal of Franco and independence for countries like Morocco, Spain's approach remained focused on maintaining bilateral relations based on dealing with potential trouble areas and evolved from a colonial relationship to one based on geographical proximity. For example, Spain's relationship with Morocco became more complicated after Spanish and French Morocco were united and gained full independence in 1956, issues that had been of minor importance became major aspects of the two countries relationship. An example of this shift was the issue of fishing stocks, which had

previously existed in a state of semi-official regulation throughout the Franco years. After independence Morocco sought to establish more control over its fishing stocks, while Spain sought to do the same. The resulting dispute ended in a series of treaties and agreements governing fishing and territorial waters from the 1970s through to the 1980s (2000 Gillespie 47), but all the agreements remained bilateral and reactive, dealing with issues as they arose rather than as part of a longer-term strategy for an area of concern. Fishing agreements were the most prominent example of the Spanish-Moroccan relationship because, as Spanish official noted, of the “dialectical relationship between *pescas y politica* [fish and politics]” (2000 Gillespie 47). However, despite constant evolution of the agreements between the two countries and occasional disputes, agreements remained in place between Spain and Morocco until Spain’s membership in the European Union in 1986.

Similarly, trade issues demonstrate both the closeness of the Spanish-Moroccan relationship and its evolution between independence and Spanish membership in the EU. Until the late 1970’s there was little economic exchange between the two countries despite their geographical proximity. Gillespie notes that in the 1970s there were only roughly 100 Spanish companies doing business in Morocco despite the advantages of a growing market and lower wages. Additionally, a 1973 decree in Morocco that stripped Spanish companies of land, goods and other possessions caused a significant delay in the development of trade between the two countries. (2000 Gillespie 61). However, Morocco’s determination to move away from a reliance on France for international trade led to an opportunity for Spain to become a larger player in the Moroccan market. Spain

embraced this opportunity, which took its place in the hierarchy of clearly delineated objectives for Spain in Morocco, with fishing rights at the top and foreign aid near the bottom. Spanish foreign aid to Morocco in the 1970s and 1980s was split into 4 percent direct aid, with the majority of the remaining funds locked in as credit for the development of business overseas with the intention of increasing trade for Spanish businesses. These measures seemed to achieve their aims as trade with Morocco both increased, despite a minor setback in 1990, to 10 percent of Morocco's overall trade, and diversified from mostly arms and fishing to all types of food products, semi-manufactured products and textiles in exchange for boats, machinery and other fully manufactured products as exports (2000 Gillespie 63). However, fishing rights remained the area of greatest importance for Spain as evidenced by the decision to prioritize obtaining those fishing rights over development of trade. In 1991 Spain offered Morocco a \$550 million credit aimed at encouraging Spanish business to invest in Spain. However, the agreement was dependent on Morocco granted more fishing rights for Spain. In essence, Spain had an approach which carefully prioritized aspects of the Moroccan-Spanish relationship.

Even after Spain's full membership in the European Union, but prior to the Barcelona Agreement, Spain maintained a strong but narrow relationship with Morocco, focusing on individual issues with close relevance to Spanish interests without developing a broader set of policy goals or framework with which to address the Moroccan relationship. The concept of developing a greater foreign policy strategy was neither pursued nor of any interest to Spanish policy makers

who had achieved objectives across this narrow set of aims, even going so far as to “quarantine” (2000 Gillespie 68) certain political issues, such as the territorial disputes over Ceuta and Melilla, so as not to disrupt economic ones. By 1993 Spain was the largest foreign investor in Morocco and the second largest partner in terms of trade. Fishing agreements that had been signed did not need to be modified from year to year. Stability had largely been established as security, economic and trade interests had been fully secured.

Spain’s relationship with Algeria was similar to its relationship with Morocco. Like Spain and Morocco, Spain and Algeria shared a history and a standing at the time of Spain’s accession to the EU. Algeria is a country of close geographical proximity and represented a number of important interests to Spain. The relationship between the two countries had been focused on a small number of important and contentious issues without ever reaching a broader context. Spain’s approach to Algeria had been to try and address these issues on an individual basis rather than build a comprehensive relationship. As opposed to trade conflicts with Morocco, Spain’s ongoing concern with Algeria was more focused on security issues. In particular, Spain and Algeria repeatedly clashed over the concealment of and support of terrorist camps that were allegedly set up in Algeria. Of greatest concern to Spain was the sheltering of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) terrorists, the separatist group seeking independence for the Basque region, who had either fled or been banished from Spain. The tension between the two countries over this issue intensified when a former ETA leader died in Algeria. This incident was contentious because, first, agreements signed between the two countries stated that his

presence, known to Algeria officials, should have been relayed to the Spanish. Secondly, Spanish intelligence revealed that the leader, known as *Txomin*, had been killed in an accident at an ETA training camp, which were not supposed to be present in Algeria under the same agreements. This caused a determined effort, both by the Spanish Foreign Ministry and the Interior Ministry to improve relations with Algeria and obtain a firm commitment to be a partner in fighting domestic Spanish terrorism. While some ground was gained in these talks, the final breakthrough was achieved after ETA and the Spanish government agreed to a ceasefire. The end of hostilities and a significant push by the French brought Algeria closer to Spain and put an end to the harboring of ETA operatives in Algeria (2000 Gillespie 90).

Spain's economic interests further highlight the focus the Spanish government had on keeping issues separate when dealing with Algeria. Since independence Algeria has been the most important source of hydrocarbons for Spain while Spain is Algeria's largest customer. Despite the ongoing tensions regarding ETA and other conflicts, trade between the two countries remained open under constant scrutiny from both sides. Despite several agreements that were worded to emphasize general trade as areas of importance, all money and policies included in the agreement were aimed at continuing the flow of oil or gas from Algeria to Spain, both for the continued growth of Spanish industry and the expansion of the Algerian economy (2000 Gillespie 96). While several privately owned industries grew out of this hydrocarbon-focused relationship, including refineries and gas liquefaction plants in Spain, Algeria remained a country whose

economy was state-controlled and centralized. During the negotiations over oil, which included several visits by high-ranking and influential officials to the partner country, little attempt was made by Spain to encourage or impose a more open market on Algeria. With the supply of oil and gas secured, Spanish interests did not shift to making Algeria a more welcoming environment for Spanish businesses or attempting to move it into the global economy. Between the 1970's and late 1980s the Spanish government granted several large loans to Algeria, the highest reaching \$40million in 1972, the largest government-to-government loan at the time (2000 Gillespie 96). This loan was meant to help develop infrastructure for the development and transfer of oil rather than provide business and growth incentives. The relationship was maintained despite the constant political and security tension caused by of the harboring of ETA operatives because of the anticipated need for oil and gas. This demonstrates the separation of policies and the absence of any overriding, global policy agenda, or a focus on normative concerns, for Spain in the Mediterranean.

### **Initial Stages of European Union and the Mediterranean Negotiations**

The European Union's relationship with the Mediterranean area has developed over a much shorter period than Spain's, but has already gone through several incarnations. This process has involved several name changes, differing areas of focus and different priorities as the political realities of the both the EU and the Mediterranean have evolved. In general terms, the EU has shifted from regarding the Mediterranean as an area of secondary importance, behind issues

such as Eastern Enlargement, to one of greater concern, deserving of its own representation within the European Union structure. Further, the definition of “Mediterranean” has morphed over time as countries have risen and areas of concern have become more demanding of attention. The addition of new European Union countries in the area has helped reshape the relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean as states such as Spain, Portugal and Greece moved from being subject to EU-Mediterranean agreements to active members of the EU with a very strong interest in the geographical area they just departed politically.

The early years of EU-Mediterranean relations involved a constant process of repackaging and rebranding already existing agreements. Initially, as with many EU agreements, dialogue was opened between the two groups in an attempt to establish trade rules. Geographical proximity and colonial legacy meant that Western Europe contained most of the major trading partners for Mediterranean countries, particularly in the North Africa region. The formation of the European Union meant that many of these countries now faced imposing tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade that they were eager to address in negotiations with the member states. Initially, according to Joffe, the EU had its own pressing concerns to address with the Mediterranean countries, particularly the Maghreb region, namely security and trade. These concerns would mark an important jumping off point for the Mediterranean-EU relations as the agreements would grow to include more areas of concern and therefore provide a sterling example of how the methods of foreign policy practice by the European Union and its member states have changed (1997 Joffe 23).

The initial attempts to reach out to the Mediterranean countries, the Maghreb in particular, began in the 1960s after the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community. As Gomez observes,

“The Community was equipped with a limited range of explicit power, scattered throughout the founding treaties, to develop relations with the outside world...there were considerable uncertainties about the distribution of competencies between institutions and the member states.” (2003 Gomez 26).

The comparatively unstructured format of the EEC meant there was less demand for socialization occurring within the member states and more freedom to pursue country specific objectives without imposing a high cost on the other member states. The relative separation between member states meant the effects of a policy dictated by one country were less likely to be felt by another under the Treaty of Rome than they are in the current, more integrated, EU structure. Therefore only areas of common concern would be dealt with in a unified manner, and these areas were much fewer than they are today. One area of concern that was shared by members of the EEC was security in the Maghreb area. However, as Gomez observes, because security was not an area covered under the new Treaty, the member countries failed to reach comprehensive agreement on security issues.

Conversely, trade *was* the central piece of the Treaty of Rome and an area of common concern for all the member states. As a result it was also the focus of the initial dialogues with the non-member countries. Moreover, since Spain and Portugal were still non-members and trading partners with all the Community

members, Mediterranean trade was an important element to all of the EEC, unlike the case of security in the Maghreb where France had been the only party with strong interests. In 1960 Mediterranean countries, including Spain and Portugal, accounted for more than 15 percent of community exports and 60 percent of Mediterranean exports were being shipped to the EEC. The changing availability of European markets was the key concern for the Mediterranean countries and the focus of the initial dialogues. EEC countries sought to maintain some political contact with these countries in the interest of security, with specific concern over failed states and the harbouring of terrorists.

This initial manifestation of the Barcelona Agreement in 1969 was hindered, according to Gomez, by the failure of both sides to account for the multiple demands of all the parties involved (2003 Gomez 30). There was an assumption by the European Union that the Mediterranean could be convinced to accept one umbrella agreement that would be equally appropriate and acceptable to all members. However, the diverse nature of the countries involved combined with the varying degrees of importance to the European Union resulted in a series of separate agreements between the Mediterranean countries and the European Union. Some countries were given full Association Agreements that were, in theory, designed to progress to full membership in the EEC. Turkey, Greece and Malta were the fortunate recipients of these agreements. Former French colonial territories were given special trade agreements that mostly served to allow continued cheap imports to the Community from the former colonies. These agreements reflected France's interest in the region and its ability to steer the agenda both within the European

Union and within the Mediterranean region. The remainder non-member countries were granted lesser trade agreements.

This initial attempt to establish an overarching agreement between the Mediterranean and the European Community reflected both the prevailing aversion to communal foreign policy, as well as indications of the trend toward a greater emphasis on communal foreign policy for member-states. The catalyst for establishing a universal Euro-Med agreement was the very realist concern with security and trade. However, since member countries were unwilling to turn security policy over to the community in the Treaty of Rome, this left trade as the only aspect that the community could negotiate on as one unit. Further, even as the community was negotiating as a unified body, the interests and objectives of that body were still being discussed within the Community. Bicchi notes the lack of will by the Commission to take a leadership or enabling role in foreign policy was a prevailing trend at this time in Euro-Mediterranean relations. This reluctance resulted in a collection of separate policies, rather than a unified policy plan (2007 Bicchi 49). The resulting agreements were largely a reflection of separate aims of member states, in the case of the Mediterranean mostly French interests, rather than a reflection of a wider community set of objectives. For the French, the desire to maintain strong ties to their former colonies led to the favorable trading agreements. Conversely, Italian worries about the vulnerability of some of their local industries, such as fruit, meant that countries with similar goods for trade, such as Tunisia and Morocco, were only allowed to sign basic trade agreements after Italian growers had been appeased with subsidies and opt-outs. These events

demonstrate how the self-interested nature of the negotiations, both within the EEC and with non-member states, that prevailed over any valuing of the community itself.

### **Toward a Communal Approach**

Throughout the 1960s there were indications of a growing awareness of the need for a foreign policy that focused on the community rather than self-interested objectives. France provided such an example by shifting the costs of maintaining strong relationships with its former colonies to the EEC. The deteriorating relationship between France and its former colonies, particularly Algeria, following its independence in 1962, and the difficulty in financing continued development and favorable trade status with these countries forced France to find a new means to pursue these policies. The policies undertaken in the Mediterranean in 1970s allowed France to spread these costs across the six member-states and provided greater market accessibility without having to endure the higher price-tag by itself. In this way France "Europeanized" its foreign policy aims and costs. However, such a move meant that not only were costs spread across the Community, but now each member had an active concern with the shape and direction of any further policies. While the initial Mediterranean agreement failed to achieve an overarching framework for the area, it did establish initial agreements with the countries in the area and gave a direction for future negotiations to proceed, both with non-member countries and within the European Union.

The remainder of the 1970s and early 1980s saw little action on the Mediterranean front by the Community. However, the precedent had been set by the previous agreements and as non-member Mediterranean countries began to see the effects that the stronger free trade agreements had in neighboring countries; the demands for new negotiations grew stronger. Tunisia and Morocco in particular had been the strongest supporters of free trade agreements with the European Union, but because they lacked the presence or colonial ties of some of the other countries, they were forced to settle for the third-tier agreements. At the same time, according to Gomez, the Community felt an urge to assert itself as an international political actor and began to search for ways in which it could demonstrate its political relevance (2000 Gomez 30). In pursuit of this, summits were held in 1970 to attempt to reach some consensus on foreign policy objectives and practices for the Community as a whole. One of the results of this and several other summits was an agreement that the Community's

...long-term objectives [should be] the creation of a Mediterranean free-trade area...the commission argues that the free-circulation of goods alone would not promote development in the region, and that the GMP (Global Mediterranean Policy) should also include provisions on capital movements, technology transfers, technical cooperation, labour, environmental and financial cooperation" (2000 Gomez 30).

Further, the accession of the UK, Ireland and Denmark provided a new set of voices with new demands for foreign policy, while France's worsening relations with its former colonies prompted it to cede more of its influence on Mediterranean

policy to the European Commission in the hope of further defraying costs and using the political capital of other countries to continue their relationship with those former colonies.

The result of this was the growing role of the European Economic Community, as an institution, in directing foreign policy in the Mediterranean. The willingness, or necessity, of France to cede some of its influence over Mediterranean concerns to the supranational institutions helped empower the community to direct the progress of Mediterranean relations in a manner that was less focused on the desires of individual countries and more on the collective objectives of Community as a whole. The inclusion of Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland into the Community had very little effect on the direction of policy. The three new members expressed indifference at the ongoing Southern process with the exception of the UK, which sought to increase the free trade with any area that would be a viable market. This was in conflict with a number of countries within the Community which wished to maintain some type of economic protection, particularly in the agricultural sectors, for their own producers. In June 1973, in the best traditions of the European Union, a compromise was reached by agreeing to a 20%-80% reduction in the tariffs on agricultural products, depending on the time of year and “without endangering the legitimate interests of the member states” (1997 Regelsberger 174). While these types of agreements represented progress, they did not provide the overarching and comprehensive framework for relations with the Mediterranean that the Community envisioned. Thus, after two attempts at wide-ranging agreements, the EEC was left with several exceptions and general

guidelines, focused mostly on trade. The next decade, until the 1980s, would see similar attempts at further integrating Mediterranean policy in the European Community. However, Gomez refers to these attempts as “old wine in new bottles” (2000 Gomez 61) because despite multiple attempts to reach a conclusive, comprehensive policy, the dominant theme of these agreements was a series of treaties based on trade and full of exceptions for individual countries.

Despite the failures of these negotiations there continued to be a belief amongst member states that the Commission was the institution within the Community that should be leading the discussions. In all cases it was through the Commission that the agenda was set, meeting with the various member countries for input. This allowed a more communal process with all member states contributing. Member states with strong interests in the region continued to have influence, but all decisions and strategies were now channeled through the Commission. States with less direct knowledge and influence had some say over the direction of policy in the Mediterranean in a Community forum. While there were other foreign policy initiatives evolving in a similar manner at the same time as the Mediterranean initiative, this case describes an arena where state socialization could begin. The constant contact between states while trying to establish the comprehensive policy they all sought provided a space and a shared interest where, in the name of compromise, states could interact and establish a common manner of discourse through which agreements could be reached. In this way some of the practices that shape foreign policy in the EU began to emerge.

As the Commission began to take a more prominent role, it shaped the discourse within the Community and therefore the direction future policies would take. Since the Commission members were not passive actors in these conversations, they were able to bring about a change that emphasized the importance of the community aspect in the discussions and as a result stressed the overall communal aspect of the foreign policy. After the shift by member states to allow policy to be set in the Commission, the idea that the economic agreements were in fact “a natural extension of European integration” grew (2000 Gomez 31). This belief served to highlight several developing trends in Community and member-state foreign policy. First, one of the natural extensions of integration would be the continued leading role of the Commission whereby the objectives for the Community would already be established before engaging with non-member states, rather than participating in two simultaneous processes. This would lend a more Community oriented approach to foreign policy, emphasizing the interests of the community as a whole, rather than the collective interests of member states. Additionally, it would lend a community tone to the discussions with non-member countries. This was manifested by a greater emphasis on free trade in the 1970s than there had been before, when attempts were made to provide a Mediterranean-wide free trade agreement for all non-member partner states (1993 Grili 188). While this attempt to focus on free trade was not successful, it was an indication of the declining influence of national interests and lobbies on each agreement. Secondly, the Commission’s stance regarding the future of integration implied that closer ties with the Mediterranean neighbors were as important as internal

European Union integration. The veracity of this statement was underscored by the number of Community countries that had close ties with neighboring and former colonial states. To bring the European Community closer together would be to bring the issues that member states were focused on into the Community itself. This was demonstrated by France's willingness to cede its control over North African issues in part to the Commission. By relieving itself of some of the control over these areas France shifted this concerns to the Community. Therefore, any future integration would have to include these concerns as well.

Beginning in the late 1980s new areas of interest emerged within foreign policy. In the initial phases of the Mediterranean negotiations the main concern, both from member and non-member states, was trade. The versions constructed in the following years began to add other concerns to the treaties. Issues such as security, human rights, democracy and other normative concerns began to appear in the agreements. While few of the new treaties actually contained substantive agreements on any of these issues, they were officially referred to with increasing regularity. Several agreements included sections that promoted cultural and political development. Non-trade sections were included both in the Community's foreign policy aims for the area as well as in several agreements with non-member states, particularly Tunisia and Morocco. While these policies were still by no means the dominant aspect of the strategy the Community was pursuing, they showed a change from the original trade-based treaties.

After 1986 Spain became a full member of the European Union and the dynamics of the negotiations changed. Not only had Spain been part of the

Mediterranean negotiations for a number of years as a non-member state, but it was also heavily involved with the neighboring North African countries. Spain's involvement with the negotiations was similar to those of Greece and Portugal in that they all had at one time been non-member states subject to negotiations. Also, because of their projected membership in the Community, were able to have some influence over the direction of the agreements. In the initial stages of negotiations with these countries were able to use their influence to protect their domestic producers from intense competition from North African countries in areas they deemed too important to their own national economies, usually various agricultural industries (2000 Gomez). Even though these countries were considered to be outside the Community, they were seen as being on track for membership and therefore some concessions were made to their demands. This served the dual purpose of not only easing the transition from non-member to member status and integrating them into the European Community, but it also gave Spain, Portugal and Greece time interacting with member-states during the negotiations. This allowed the socialization process of the European Community to begin even before membership since the countries were not only negotiating with the intention of becoming members, but also were taking an active, if minor, part in the shaping of European Community foreign policy.

### **Toward a Global Mediterranean Policy**

The creation of the EU's Mediterranean policy, which was spearheaded by Spain, represented a departure from earlier policy. Whereas previously Spain had

dealt with each neighbor in separately, usually focusing on a few issues, the European Union was attempting to implement a comprehensive strategy both for the entire region and for all issues. In contrast to Spain, the EU had been attempting to formulate a strategy in which all areas of foreign policy could be addressed and where issues would not be separated from one another.

In the case of Spain, the Mediterranean aspect of EU foreign policy was unique because Spain was entering into a process of forming relationships with states that it already had long running interactions. Additionally, the Mediterranean was an area where Spain could be considered one of the leading members of the EU, both in terms of its experience and its existing contacts and connections. Spain was also one of a few countries, along with Portugal and Greece, which had gone from being the subject of Mediterranean policy to one of its drivers and facilitators. Indeed, Spain became the focal point, and often the driver, of Mediterranean policy within the EU and was often used as a point of reference for non-Southern countries who would approach Spain when they had interests in the North Africa region.

To become a leading figure in the Mediterranean served larger purposes for Spain and Europe. As leader of the Barcelona Process Spain directed the relationships between the Mediterranean countries, the Maghreb in particular, and the European Union which could provide greater markets and high foreign aid to developing countries in the region. Additionally, in terms of EU policy the Mediterranean was an opportunity for Spain to establish itself as relevant policy maker in the European Union. As Barbe (1995) and Gillespie (1995) have noted,

Mediterranean policy was an opportunity for Spain to transform itself from an isolated country to a fully participating member of the European Union. Therefore, despite already existing and fully functional relationships with several of the key states in the Mediterranean, Spain chose to take the lead on a policy that would largely reconfigure and broaden their own agendas.

The process through which the Barcelona agreement was reached encapsulates how a country can transform its foreign policy to satisfy the normative aspects the EU brings to international affairs. As Gomez notes “The decisions to hold the [initial Mediterranean] conference was the EU’s alone and was effectively presented to the [non-member] partners as a *fait accompli*” (2000 Gomez 72). The initial stages, particularly agenda setting, were dealt with largely by the Troika, consisting of the previous, current and next holders of the EU presidency. During this time the EU states emphasized that partner countries would be dealing with the European Union, rather than with individual nations. The process also provided a space for Spain to become further integrated into the foreign policy discussion about the Mediterranean. Barbe observed that some of the initial phases of developing Mediterranean policy in 1989 were made easier by the Mediterranean nature of the Troika: Greece, Spain and France (1995 Barbe).

In 1995 the Troika was represented by France, Spain and Italy, each also concerned with North African neighbors, and each willing to support the others in the desire to push the Mediterranean to the top of the EU agenda. It was France that made the initial efforts to start the Barcelona process, but the presidency belonged to Spain when the foreign ministers of all member states approved the agenda in

1995 at the Cannes Summit. In a stark difference from the first rounds of attempted Mediterranean agreements, the Cannes Summit resulted in agreements between all member states about the priorities of negotiations with the non-member states before beginning those negotiations. While there was disagreement between the various members about certain emphasis and areas of concerns within the agenda, the basic framework had been established with the European Union prior to contact with the non-member states, allowing there to be an expression of "EU" policy rather than a more loosely associated set of countries.

The tension between member states over a number issues served to emphasize the new method of foreign policy that the Barcelona Process exemplified. Before the finalization of the Barcelona agenda France expressed the desire to have the security aspect of the conference emphasized at the cost of other areas. Spain insisted that the whole agenda should be given equal weight, so that human rights and trade were given the same resources and time as security. In the various committees and groups that were charged with establishing the agenda Spain was able to use its representatives to lobby other member states to agree to maintain equal value for all parts of the agreement rather than picking one aspect over the others (1995 Gillespie). By settling issues in this manner the process was kept within the EU decision-making bodies and not moved into the global arena. It maintained the integrity of the European Union as a decision making body on foreign policy while giving voice and the ability to negotiate to the members.

The altering of perceptions of foreign policy in Spain can be most easily seen in final outcomes of the Barcelona process. Unlike previous approaches by Spain,

and unlike the initial offerings by the European Community, the Barcelona process embraces the entire Mediterranean under one policy initiative, specifically the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). All non-EU countries that signed on as partners agreed to one set of principles and directives that would govern their relationship with the European Union, and not with individual member states. While exact terms of agreements were different for each country, such as amounts given in loans and the exact direction of aid, the aim of providing both a framework for EU foreign policy and a basis for dealing with the Mediterranean as a whole was achieved.

Within these contexts it is also clearly evident where Spain had to adapt in order to achieve this type of global policy. Throughout the Spanish-Morocco relationship, labour issues, most particularly the rights of Morocco workers living in Spain, were kept out of any discussions between the two countries by Spain (1995 Gillespie). However, under the "EU/Morocco Action Plan" article 16 specifically identifies the issue of "living conditions of Moroccan workers and their families legally resident in the EU with a view to identifying ways and means of achieving progress on equal treatment and improving social integration" (European External Action Service Morocco Action Plan) as an aim of the current agreement. This aspect is of particular importance to Spain because the geographical proximity and a long shared history makes Spain a popular destination for Moroccans, who represent 12.7% of foreigners living in Spain; they comprised the largest group of foreigners in Spain until they were passed by Romanians in 2007 (2012 INE).

Similarly, the Barcelona Process focuses on several aspects that are new to Spanish foreign policy in Algeria. The European Neighborhood Policy Strategy

Paper for Algeria lays out a strategy focused on more normative areas for reform in Algeria than Spain previously focused on. Whereas in older iterations focused on security by attempting to track down and detain members of ETA, the current strategy focuses on improving Algeria's ability to combat terrorism by "modernization of the judiciary... [higher] qualifications of government employees... [which] will enable Algeria to focus future efforts on combating crime." (European External Action Service Morocco Action Plan) Previous interactions between the states were defined by their bilateral coercive nature wherein Spain would attempt to force an action on another state. This contrasts with the initial EU policy which sought to engage states through a variety of economic, cultural and political agreements prior to seeking reforms (2007 Dannreuther 47)

While these highlight some of the examples of Spanish foreign policy as a member of the EU, to fully understand the change that Spanish perception has undergone, it is best to examine the Barcelona Declaration. While the Barcelona Declaration contains no concrete policies, it is the basis for all other policies that came from the Barcelona conference, including the financial aid and restructuring packages that became part of EU policy for the Mediterranean. The first acknowledgement of the change in perception in the international arena is that the document is, as previously mentioned, an agreement between the European Union and the Mediterranean countries, rather than a series of individual, bilateral agreements. The first two names to appear on the document are Javier Solana, who represented both the Council of the European Union and Spain, and Manuel Marin, vice-president of the European Commission. This establishes that the agreement

represents a level of consensus amongst the member states and that all activities in this area are now directed through the EU. This is reinforced by the financial aid and restructuring agreements where “EU” is always listed as the donor, rather than any individual European countries. Moreover trade agreements, which differ between non-member countries, are still signed by the European Union and the partner, rather than between individual member states. This all serves to emphasize that, in theory, the European Union is the actor in this space, rather than by separate states.

Also demonstrative of change in the perception of the international arena is the move away from a realist perception toward more normative practices. Under the heading of “Political and Security Partnership: Establishing a common area of peace and stability” several areas of importance are mentioned as the basis for future relations, demonstrating a departure from and emphasis on coercion toward more normative values. This is laid out in several paragraphs where “the participants express their conviction that the peace, stability and security of the Mediterranean region are a common asset” (Barcelona Declaration). Here the emphasis is placed on the values that are being pursued for the common good of the signatories, as opposed to previous actions between states which were more combative in nature, such as battles over fishing rights between Morocco and Spain. The partners are acknowledging a shared geographical and political space in which responsibility can be shared for a greater good. Further, the declaration calls upon all the members to “Act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as other obligations under

international law, in particular those arising out of regional and international instruments to which they are party” (Barcelona Declaration). The acknowledgement of international norms as a guiding set of principles is a departure from previous agreements, both between Spain and the Maghreb countries as well as the EU and Mediterranean countries, where trade and security were the basis of all discussions. While trade and security are still important, indeed free-trade and economic cooperation are given more substantial attention later in the document, in the Barcelona discussions and any relations thereafter, all the parties committed to respect international law and United Nations conventions as a basis for these relations.

The methods for achieving change are also laid out in the declaration. A commitment to constant dialogue, a sharing of technical and political expertise, and ongoing cultural exchanges are the prescribed methods for achieving peace, stability and security. Moving countries toward democracy and open markets is also included in the document to promote a greater cooperation between the countries on a wide range of issues without the use of political tools such as trade and force. Not only does this prescribe the way the EU has committed to dealing with its southern neighbors, but it also treats the Mediterranean as a single space with interconnected issues, rather than as separate states to be dealt with on an individual basis. As highlighted in strategy papers and updates the EU assigned particular goals and objectives to each non-member state, based on their internal and international situations. The basis for each of these policies is the same and contains the same end objective: friendly and cooperative neighbors for the EU.

However, with greater emphasis placed on the Mediterranean as a whole there is the possibility for all the countries to be dealt with collectively, not on an individual basis, and issues of economic development dealt with comprehensively.

The link between issues in the Mediterranean states, such as understanding that investment, crime, and good governance are interrelated, formed the basis for much of the strategy behind the Barcelona Agreement and was understood by the members. When speaking about the effect the Barcelona Process could have on Spanish business in the Mediterranean, one Spanish official noted that “a large part of the problem [of encouraging investment in the Maghreb] is a problem of confidence in the social and political problems in the area”<sup>11</sup> (2005 Egurbide)

While it is difficult to measure to what degree a state would buy into the new Barcelona Agreement after it was signed, it is worth noting that with little variance the European signatories have stuck closely to the agreement. Despite some issues, such as refugees and immigrants, that have caused conflict between Spain and other member states, the parties seem committed to a European Union based foreign policy for the Mediterranean, in preference to falling back to state-oriented policy. Outward appearances suggest that governments are presenting themselves as full members of the Barcelona Process, as the Spanish government’s website link labeled “Mediterranean Policy” connects directly to the EEAS Barcelona Agreement page, suggesting that the Spanish Mediterranean policy and the Agreement are one in the same while at the same time stating “Spain’s foreign policy toward the

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<sup>11</sup> Author’s translation

Mediterranean in recent years has been tied to European regional policy<sup>12</sup> (2012 MAEC). The Spanish Foreign Service also highlights its own drive to move Maghreb issues into the EU agenda by stating “Since joining the EU, Spain has contributed to the integration of Maghreb issues to the EU agenda.<sup>13</sup>” (2012 MAEC) Further, during interviews with Spanish diplomats interviews were asked about the current state of Spanish-North African relations, the answer was that the Arab Spring had forced a new policy on the European Union, a policy not yet settled. The diplomat saw no separation between EU and Spanish foreign policy in this area.<sup>14</sup>

The Barcelona Process is illustrative of Checkel’s socialization process. Spain’s extensive foreign policy interest in the Maghreb region meant were established policies in the Mediterranean were in place well before Spain’s accession to the European Union. After its accession, Spain’s policy in the area evolved in two areas. First, it shifted interests from its control to channeling them through the European Union institutions, going so far as to become the leader in reforming the policy for the area and working with other member states who shared similar interests to develop a policy for the entire EU. This showed conformity to Checkel’s logic of appropriateness, as Spain’s decisions and actions were directed through the European Union institutions in a manner similar to other member states and within the normative understandings of these roles. Spain expressed its own interest through the EU and understood them as EU interests, not Spanish

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<sup>12</sup> Authors translation “La política exterior de España hacia el Mediterráneo ha estado identificada en los últimos años con la política regional europea.”

<sup>13</sup> Authors translation “Desde su adhesión a la UE, España ha contribuido a la incorporación de los temas magrebíes a la agenda comunitaria.”

<sup>14</sup> Interview with Pablo Ruperez September 5<sup>th</sup> 2011

interests channeled through a different medium.

Additionally, the Spanish-led reforms of the Mediterranean Policy shifted it from a narrow, security oriented understanding to a more normative understanding as mentioned above. This shift is clear evidence of Wendt's exogenous nature of interest generation. The Spanish willingness to adopt normative objectives in their policies was generated by contact with other member states and the European Union. Where Spanish policies previously contained no provision for democratic or societal reform, the Barcelona Process is built upon those ideas. As the policy area where Spain's interests most closely overlapped with those of other member states, the Mediterranean most clearly demonstrates the evolution of foreign policy understanding for a country entering the EU. Despite the previous experience and continuing strong interests, Spain's international policy evolution was evident through the process undertaken and the final result.

The Barcelona process also informs an understanding of European Union foreign policy by demonstrating both an uploading of interests to the supranational institution as well as a downloading of policy onto member states. It is accurate to label the Barcelona Process as a European policy because it was conducted through the European Union offices and was signed, and followed, by all the members. The initial stages of the Barcelona process in many ways represent the initial formation of what could be called a "European" foreign policy as states moved away from trying to implement their own interests through bilateral relations with the non-member states, to attempting to channel these interests through the European Union to construct a consensual foreign policy between the member states and the

EU. The Barcelona Agreement was the conclusion of a dialogue conducted in the space provided by the EU institutions and resulted in a growing consensus of the member states about the direction and nature of the Barcelona Agreements. In Spain's case the drive to bring the Mediterranean to the European Union allowed it to Europeanize its own wishes, but the method of practice was learned from the European Union members.

Additionally, the Barcelona Process shows a clear trend away from encoding a foreign policy practice in an overarching legal manner. The organic nature of Barcelona Process, where states saw a need for a more comprehensive policy and came together under the auspices of the European Union to develop that policy, superseded other approaches to policy creation. In this instance the member states' socialization process opened a space for the creation of a Mediterranean Policy, which was effectively pursued.

## **Chapter 3: The Eastern Enlargement**

The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union in many ways represents the greatest test of the power of international institutions to socialize member states. In particular, for Spain, the Eastern Enlargement embodied the positives, negatives and challenges that defined membership in the European Union. During the process of deciding to allow the enlargement and initiate negotiations with the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), known as the Eastern Enlargement, Spain found itself in unique situations, both in its official capacity as the holder of the EU presidency and unofficially as a powerful dissenting voice. The Eastern Enlargement occurred at a time when Spain had to balance its own interests with the normative pressures of operating within the European Union framework and thus demonstrates the degree to which socialization can alter a state's perceptions and behavior in the international arena.

The Spanish experience of entering the EU was reflective of the situation facing the CEECs as they prepared for accession negotiations. In both cases membership in the European Union represented a reemergence into the international arena following drastic regime changes. The chance to join the European Union did not just represent tangible political and economic benefits though those were welcome; they also represented a chance to establish a new identity both domestically and internationally. Questions over the more normative aspects of membership criteria, such as functioning democracy, human rights and

rule of law, were raised. As well, in both instances the soon-to-be members had been subject to a variety of “neighborhood” policies.

Viewed from a rationalist perspective, the entrance of the CEECs to the European Union was contrary to Spanish interests on a number of levels. In an economic sense, membership of the CEECs could reduce Spain’s competitive advantage as the new member states held a greater ability to attract the type of manufacturing and agricultural businesses that had sustained a large part of the Spanish economy since its entrance in the European Union. Additionally, the inclusion of the CEECs might reduce Spain’s ability to receive money from the European Union. Formulas that determined which members were entitled to funding from sources such as the Cohesion and Stability funds as well as the Common Agricultural Policy would be adjusted in light of the inclusion of the newer, less economically prosperous countries, meaning Spain would be re-categorized from “have-not” country to a “have” and would receive a great deal less money than before these countries had been admitted. This was publicly highlighted as a concern by think tanks and public reports released in the Spanish media in which it was noted that “Spain will suffer economically” (2002 Sosvilla and Herce).

Politically, Spain, among other countries, expressed concerns over the shift of balance based on the EU’s qualified majority voting system. Spain’s ability to influence votes had already been reduced when Austria, Finland and Sweden’s inclusion had been approved and with countries like Poland, with its large population base, poised to become members as well, Spain was concerned about its ability to direct EU policy in the future.

Viewed through this lens, there were still positives aspects to the CEECs membership for Spain. First, the new countries would provide large markets that would be open for all European businesses including Spain's. It was assumed that the larger markets that would be available once the CEECs joined the EU would bolster Europe's economy, which would directly or indirectly benefit Spain even as it competed in similar industries with the new member states. Additionally, the prospective new members of Romania and Bulgaria were potentially allies in Spain's attempt to focus EU interests on the Mediterranean. While it was generally viewed both by scholars and members of the Spanish foreign policy profession that the Eastern expansion was overall negative for Spain, Spain was also poised to benefit from the inclusion of these members in the EU.

The initial stage of the accession process for the CEECs demonstrates Spain's understanding of the system through a normative lens. It is important to note that while Spain still had its own interests and objectives during this process, the methods it chose to use, and the options it believed were available, demonstrated the socialization effect of the EU institutions on Spain. Also, despite the change in governing parties within Spain, its positions on Eastern Enlargement were not greatly altered. While it is possible that different political parties would have chosen to act differently at particular junctures in the negotiations, this is not possible to demonstrate with any degree of certainty and the official positions remained similar throughout this period.

In the broader context the factors that led to the European Union's decision to allow Eastern Enlargement shaped the discourse of negotiations both between

member states and with the CEECs. The European Union had long portrayed itself as the benefactor and protector of the former Soviet countries on its border and claimed it was supporting the transitional phase that the countries were going through (2007 Plumper 570). The founding documents of the European Union and its predecessors emphasize the “shared destiny,” “union of the people of Europe” and “the principles liberty, democracy...human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.” (2003 Schimmelfenning). Until the Kosovo War of 1998-1999 the European Union had been content to allow the CEECs to be subject to various neighborhood policies that provided technical and financial support without allowing them to become full members of the EU. The Kosovo War put pressure on the European Union to demonstrate its commitment to peace and stability in the CEECs by allowing the countries to press for membership and accelerate the application process as a way of increasing economic stability and preventing further conflicts. This pressure, exerted by the CEECs and by non-European countries such as the United States, forced the members of the European Union either to fully embrace its identity as a mechanism for preventing conflicts or to cast itself in a more rationalist, economic light as an area based on trade.

### **Brakemen and Drivers**

During this initial phase divisions within the EU began to emerge. Some countries, including Spain, advocated for a “deepening” of the EU where institutions and mechanisms would tie current member states more closely together while others championed a “widening” of the European Union by allowing the inclusion of

the CEECs. Those who supported widening included the more powerful economic countries, such as Germany and the United Kingdom. This strong lobby for the Eastern Expansion as well as the normative pressures resulted in the EU's choice to open discussions about the best method for admitting the applicant countries.

From the beginning the member states were divided into four distinct groups. Countries either subscribed to the "brakemen" or the "drivers" categories as well as championing an "inclusive" or "limited" enlargement strategy. (2003 Schimmelfenning) "Brakemen" were those who attempted to slow the decision-making process within the EU and advocated for further discussion and study while "drivers" favored a more immediate approach. Brakemen were often those who were seen as likely to suffer from the Eastern Enlargement while drivers were those who had the most to gain. Within each category those in favour of limited enlargement supported the membership of only those countries which already met EU standards economically, politically and culturally, while those who supported inclusive enlargement wished to admit all members of the CEE candidate countries. Schimmelfenning explains the divergence in opinions on inclusive or limited enlargement as based on geographical proximity to the candidate countries, where the countries closest to the CEECs favoured inclusive enlargement based on their strong economic and political ties to the area. The distribution of preferences is shown in Table 1. It should be noted that Britain's apparent strong support for the enlargement process despite a traditional euroskeptic stance is attributed to the belief that the Eastern Expansion would limit the deepening process, which Britain hoped to avoid.

Table 2	Limited Enlargement	Inclusive Enlargement
Brakemen	Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands	France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, <b>Spain</b>
Drivers	Austria, Finland, Germany	Britain, Denmark, Sweden

(2003 Schimmelfenning 166)

Spain, therefore, found itself both part of a group and in a unique position during the EU's internal negotiations over expansion. Spain was among several countries that were poised to suffer economically as described above. Along with France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Ireland, it constituted a group that sought to extend the process of integration for an indefinite period to delay the negative cost they would incur. However, and distinct from Schimmelfenning's conclusions, Spanish officials also expressed a preference for the inclusion because of the normative aspects that had initiated the process (2003 Pierdrafito). Spanish officials strongly supported the EU's promotion of peace and security internationally; this compelled them to support inclusion of the CEECs. There was a belief that admitting only the most suitable candidate countries would cause further divides between the EU and the other non-candidate countries. Additionally, with their closest trading partners now within the EU borders, the excluded members might regress financially. To the Spanish, and other inclusive process supporters, this was contrary to the stated purposes of the European Union.

Spain's position became more complex in 1995 when it took up the presidency during the first round of discussion between the European Union member states. The EU presidency carries with it an expectation of promoting the

causes of the EU, rather than the using it as an opportunity to advance to interests of the current holder. While this does not mean that the president cannot control the EU agenda and advance objectives that are relevant to the EU (see chapter 4), it does require the president to be beholden to the will of the other member states. In the case of the expansion it prevented Spain from using the presidency to kill the Eastern Expansion in its infancy and instead subjected Spain to the requirements of being the chief representative of the European Union during the negotiations. Therefore, Spain found itself essentially being forced to negotiate between two of its own interests, that of an autonomous country concerned about its economic competitiveness, and that as a Europhile country looking to advance the project of the European Union. Additionally, it had to stand both for its own interests within the European Union as well as *being* the European Union when it came to agenda setting and negotiations with the CEECs. Part of its role as holder of the EU presidency was to facilitate discussion between the parties seeking enlargement and those seeking to delay or stop the process. In this way Spain was presented with several conflicting objectives and identities which it had to navigate.

Several authors have noted (2000 Schimmelfenning, 2003 Pierdrafità) that the CEECs began their bids to join the EU by asserting their natural fit with Europe. They emphasized the cultural and political connections between themselves and their European neighbors, claiming that separation had only been caused by the “artificial barrier” of the Soviet Union, a barrier since removed, allowing them to find their natural place in Europe. The point was driven home by leaders of the CEECs, with Vaclav Havel declaring “Technical difficulties are ridiculous when

compared to the historical, social and cultural unification of Europe” while at the same time the Polish president stated, “We [the CEECs] are saddened by the selfishness of Western Countries” (Del Valle 2000). Regardless of the validity of these claims, this narrative established that a rejection of these countries was a rejection of European identity, which at that time was unlikely to come from any of the member states, and particularly not from Spain. Instead, Spain began its formal objections by raising questions about the suitability of some of the candidate countries.

The first stages of the accession discussion began in 1992 under the Portuguese presidency. While internally there was still divide between the various speeds of integration and the “inclusive” and “limited” camps, Spain raised objections along budgetary grounds and on the implications for the European Union. The previous year Spain used an intergovernmental conference to push for the united monetary policy, united security and foreign affairs, as well as cohesion policy. These objectives represented the policy manifestations of Spain’s preference for a “deepening” of the European Union and raised concerns that the expansion of Europe into the CEECs would be contrary to this aim. In this instance Spain, which did not hold the presidency at the time, focused on the impact on the European Union project. The rhetoric was constructed to show why each member of the EU, as well as the institutions of the EU itself, should be wary of the expansion, instead of raising concerns that Spain itself had with the process. This mindset was further demonstrated when Spain insisted that negotiations with EFTA only be initiated once the Treaty of Maastricht, the treaty responsible for some of the strongest

“deepening” at any stage of the European Union, had been signed by all member states.

Spain’s role during the Eastern Expansion changed as it approached its turn with the presidency. Spain stopped objecting to the Eastern Enlargement and instead took on the role of ‘honest broker’ between the member states. During this time the Spanish conservative party was elected, replacing the socialist party. However, prior to the election the socialist party had already dropped its objections to the Eastern Enlargement. Indeed, both parties used the Eastern Expansion as part of their platform in the general election, demonstrating a general shift in Spanish policy that was supported across party lines.

Internal discussion within the EU about the appropriate actions regarding the CEECs continued from 1991 through until the end of the Spanish presidency in 1995. By this time the Commission had established a set of criteria for candidate countries to join. There was general support from most member states for all of the eligible CEECs to begin proceedings to join the European Union. This prompted Germany to suggest opening negotiations only with Poland and Hungary, two of the more financially and politically suitable candidate countries. Spain, in its role as president, disagreed with this proposal, suggesting that inclusion of just two of the possible CEECs could cause further rifts between the member states and those who were excluded. This would be contrary to the original purpose of the Eastern expansion of promoting peace and stability. Spain was concerned that German’s proposal would encourage member states to lobby on behalf of preferred candidate countries, leading to a more divisive process.

Instead, Spain proposed a dual-process whereby all the candidate countries were granted the possibility of a rapid “political” integration but a slower “economic” integration with countries granted further integration in areas such as the Euro, cohesion funds and the CAP based on their progress in meeting the political criteria of EU membership. A condition of this proposal was that all the CEECs would be allowed to participate in negotiations for accession. This meant including Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania. Spain, along with Denmark, Sweden, Greece and Portugal, expressed support for this approach, labeled the “regatta principle” because of the belief that it supported the intent of the Eastern Expansion to support peace and stability while exclusion could lead to social unrest in those countries left out of the process as well as discouraging financial investment from abroad. The group defending the regatta principle also argued that including all the CEECs would cost the European Union less in administrative costs since the process would only have to be done once.

### **Acting as the Honest Broker**

The process of internal negotiation continued through 2000, with Spain attempting to mitigate the costs it would incur with the new member states while treading a fine line of maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the current member states. Spain held the presidency, and the ‘honest broker’ status it entailed, from January to June of 2002, which both diminished Spain’s ability to lobby on its own behalf while providing it with an opportunity to reverse some unpopular decisions made by the Spanish government (2007 Pierdrafito). Previous to 2002 Spain had proposed

several measures to alter the accession procedure that proved unpopular and politically damaging to Spain within the EU. This included demanding that those member countries most likely to benefit from the CEECs membership, such as Germany, make greater contributions to the EU to offset both the competitive advantage Spain would lose and the cohesion fund contributions that would no longer be received with the admission of the new member states. It also objected to a proposal by the German and Austrian governments that the candidate countries be given a seven year transitional phase of integration to counter a possible major influx of immigrants to those countries. Spain maintained that the seven year transition, which Spain itself had gone through, was unnecessarily long. However, when Spain requested promises from the other member governments that the issue of the immigration moratorium be finalized prior to accession agreements, the other member states interpreted this as political maneuvering by Spain. The states, led by Germany, understood the request by Spain to be a veiled declaration that it would hold up the accession process if the issue of cohesion funds and other financial considerations were not addressed to its satisfaction.

With a majority of the EU member countries now assuming that Spain was attempting to nullify or delay the accession process, Spain was forced to take steps to prove its support for the expansion. In official documents it emphasized its support both for the expansion and for the needs of the CEECs (2007 Pierdrafito 288). It also accepted the framework for the financial and institutional aspects of expansion during its presidency. This meant that Spain was not in a position to strongly object or alter these aspects because, based on its position at the time,

Spain would appear to be opposed to the entire expansion process and damage the legitimacy of its position as president of the EU. There were concerns that altering the agenda would be seen as using a minor point of procedure as a way to delay membership for the CEECs. Instead, the Spanish government demonstrated its willingness to embrace the role of the presidency and assist the expansion by accepting the agenda (2007 Pierdrafito 288).

The result of the EU-internal negotiations and the subsequent agreements with the CEECs resulted in Spain generally not receiving many of the concessions it sought. In particular, it demanded that the timeline for the countries joining the EU be contingent on their completion of the regulations and directives laid out in the *acquis communautaire*. While Spain presented this proposal as a method of controlling the changes that the EU would suffer with the influx of new members, it also would have helped level the loss of competitive advantage that Spain would have suffered. (2012 Herranz-Surrallés) The importance of this to Spain was highlighted in an incident when documents leaked to a Spanish newspaper revealed that an automotive company was planning to move from Martorell to Bratislava precisely because of the preferable business conditions Spain feared would attract Spanish companies. Spain attempted to raise the issue with the European Union by asking Slovakia to acknowledge and endorse European Union business practices regarding environmental regulation, tax exemptions and state aid. The EU responded with inactivity and Spain chose instead to endorse the position and allow the business to proceed, rather than upset the process of accession. (2012 Herranz-Surrallés)

## **Concluding the Enlargement**

In the end Spain did not receive a favorable outcome from the CEECs entrance in the European Union based on narrowly defined state interests. The inclusion of the CEECs meant that Spain was at a competitive disadvantage in a number of its key industries and its political power had been diminished within the European Union. Despite strong rationalist reasons to oppose the expansion to the CEECs, Spain never attempted to halt the process even when the opportunity was presented and at several key junctures highlighted its own support for the enlargement. Early attempts to steer the EU into further deepening instead of widening were never portrayed, or seriously interpreted, as an attempt to halt Eastern Enlargement, but rather an expression of a national preference that had existed largely since Spain entered the EU. Any attempts by Spain to alter the membership process for the CEECs were presented in terms of which direction was appropriate for the European Union rather than the positives or negatives for the Spanish state. An analysis of Spain's behavior during the expansion process shows how Spain has been socialized to act only within the institutional framework of the European Union and how the integrity of the European Union replace rationalist objects as a major state interest. Spain could pursue its objectives, as long as they did not hinder or damage the institution of the European Union.

To begin with, policy makers and those close to the process were always careful to emphasize the value of Europe to Spain when discussing the enlargement. Interviews conducted for this and other studies all received answers along the line that while the Eastern Enlargement was bad for Spain, it was good for the European

Union, which meant Spain was in favor of the decision. (2007 Pierdrafito) While this might be viewed as a simplistic view of a complex policy decision, it is important to note that this was a consistent message coming from the Spanish government, both within the European Union and to its own citizens. Spain at all times wished to be perceived as one of the supporters of the European Union. In fact, several respondents also noted the importance of not appearing to be “a bad house guest” when talking about the role Spain played in the membership of the CEECs<sup>15</sup>.

The actions of the Spanish government from 1999-2004 support this view. The most important decision Spain made on this matter during its first presidency in 1999 was to block the German proposal for opening discussions with only Poland and Hungary. Spain was concerned that this would emphasize the individual state’s interests over those of the Union, since Germany was the best positioned to benefit financially from the lowering of trade barriers with those two countries. Throughout the process Spain continued to favour the “regatta” approach in part because it would prevent any one current member state from benefitting too greatly from the expansion at the cost of other member states and other CEECs.

In conformity with to Checkel’s “logic of appropriateness”, Spain chose to act in the normative manner dictated by its role of president, even when holding the presidency placed it in position to direct policies more in its favor. In the first term of its presidency during of the enlargement negotiations, in 1995, Spain changed its position from one advocating for deepening to one that fulfilled the “honest broker” role that the president is expected to assume. Spanish actions in this time were

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<sup>15</sup> Interview with Jose-Luis Prado

consistent with moving the process forward and when forced to adjudicate decisions such as the German proposal, did so with the support of its fellow member states. The decision was not seen as an expression of realist decision-making, but as a decision made as leader of the European Union. This was followed by Spain's second term as president, in 2002, during which time it raised the objection to Germany and Austria's proposal of immigration limits at the same time it was attempting to alter the EU economic policies. Spain's backtracking on its objection to the German position was based largely on the perception that the objection was rooted in political maneuvering at the cost of the European Union. Once again Spain chose to accept the normative understanding of the presidency and not use its role to delay or hinder the process. Instead, it valued the perception as a good member state over its own financial gains.

Spain's action demonstrates the socialization effect that the high level of interaction and deep integration of the European Union has on its member states. Building on Checkel's theories of institutional socialization, Schimmelfenning notes that in the European Union business is conducted with a rhetorical emphasis on promoting the Union over national interests. That is, all arguments for or against a decision must be couched in terms of the European Union. The actions of Spain during the period of the Eastern Enlargement reflect this, as all of its arguments for or against policies needed to include not just the interests of Spain, but also of other member states. In its decisions to block the German's negotiations with Poland and Hungary, Spain was supported by a number of other countries. Countries such as Ireland, Portugal, and Greece shared Spain's concerns over the effect the CEECs

would have on Cohesion and Structural Fund disbursement. The only instance in which Spain was seen as promoting realist self-interest resulted in a loss of political credibility both with the Union and for the ruling political party. Spain was forced to appear supportive of the community at the cost of other actions which would have been more beneficial from a rationalist viewpoint. Even in this instance Spain was careful to portray itself as thinking along European Union lines. At a summit in 1997, then Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, backed by the Italian Prime Minister, demanded that the European Union work to establish policies to equalize currency and trade discrepancies between the EU and the candidate countries. The Prime Minister highlighted that such a solution would provide certainty for Europe and improve the prospects of the candidate countries (1997 Galan and Larraya)

It is necessary to note that while Spain may have portrayed itself as community-orientated member of the EU, it does not mean that Spain did not have its own interests. While it is impossible to derive true intent in actions, it is clear that Spain had its own agenda throughout the internal discussion about the Eastern Enlargement. Issues such as the inclusive versus limited enlargement were portrayed, by all parties, as a difference in ideological and technical opinions about the best method of bringing the new member states into the Union, but there is no doubt that the longer inclusive process favoured Spanish interests. Additionally, Spain made no secret of its hope to mitigate the costs it would incur with the inclusion of CEECs by altering the financial structure of EU and demanding that countries such as Slovakia meet European Union business and competition regulations as early as possible. It is important to recognize that while Spanish

decisions are often supportive of the EU, it does not mean that its interests are always aligned with those of the other member states or the EU institutions.

The entrance of the CEECs and the role Spain played in the process demonstrates the depth that institutional socialization can occur in a country as deeply embedded as Spain. In dialogues between Spain and the other member states, the European Union remained the central focus. Any member state straying from the central idea of improving the European Union or following the European Union's mission was subject to shaming and forced to alter its stance. Spain's adherence to the role of honest broker during its terms in the presidency also demonstrated the importance to Spain, and the expectations of the member states, to maintain the roles laid out in current European Union environment. The willingness of Spain to assume the costs of an Eastern Expansion demonstrated how Spain has internalized the norms of the European Union and all that comes with being a member.

In terms of European foreign policy, the case of the enlargement to include the CEECs represents a clear instance of organically developing foreign policy rather than an attempt at a structured approach. The push by the CEECs to be included in the EU eventually combined with external pressure on the member-states to provide action to back their normative rhetoric accelerated the process of accession. Each member state had its own idea about the exact nature of the process, such as which countries should be given preference and what rules should be adopted for the new members, but once again the dialogue conducted in the institutional space of the European Union resulted in a unified approach to the policy. Despite the

existence of rules and guidelines for membership, the ultimate decisions regarding the process were settled by the member-states negotiating with each other and settling differences amongst themselves, providing a solution that was presented internationally as the “European” solution for Eastern Enlargement. The policy decisions were made by the member states after an internal debate. While the final decisions were made at the EU, due to the nature of the policy in questions, the results had been determined by discussions between the member states. The preferences for the direction of the Eastern Enlargement were uploaded into the European Union, from the member states, prior to the final decisions.

For Spain, the policy was effectively downloaded onto the state, as final policy was contrary to the initial wishes of the Spanish government. Despite Spain’s initial attempts to redirect the policy in a direction they saw as more appropriate, Spain was first required to adapt to wishes of the other member states, then adopt the resulting policy as its own. As spokesperson for the EU during its terms as President, Spain projected the inclusive enlargement to both the CEECs and the rest of the world. Very clearly, Spain’s socializing had, in this case, forced it to adopt this European foreign policy.

## **Chapter 4: Cuba and the Cocktail Wars**

In the European Union context, Spain has been the leader in Central and South America policy since its accession. Spain's historical ties to the region combined with its ongoing interests in the area have made the country a leading member state, along with Portugal, in affairs involving Latin America. These strong links that Spain brought to the European Union when it became a member in 1986 represented a major increase in the degree of contact, interest and influence that the European Union had in Latin America. Spain and Portugal's colonial ties not only gave them a high degree of influence in those areas but also limited the ability of other European countries to exercise influence in the region. Therefore Latin America has not only been an area of Spanish influence but also an area where Spain demonstrated a greater interest than any other EU member state.

Spain has directed the Latin American foreign policy of the European Union from the time it became a full member. During the Spanish EU presidencies, Latin American policy was often on the agenda and with a focus on areas such as trade and immigration with South American countries. Policies such as EU-Latin American partnership, EU assistance programs and the EU investments programs were reflective of similar policies that focused on other geographic areas. These policies and programs were passed with little controversy and attracted little media attention.

The case of Cuba remains an outlier in this normal order of business. Despite remaining in the purview of Spain's Latin America focus, Cuba has been an area of

conflict, controversy and difficulty for Spanish initiatives in the European Union. Spain's experience of trying to achieve its own aims in Cuba in the EU context demonstrates how operating in an international organization can result in normative considerations overriding narrowly defined understandings of power and influence. Spain's ability to direct European Union policy came into conflict with the normative ideals of the European Union and the policies that other members believed were most effective at the time.

### **Establishing the Common Position**

From the time that Spain joined the European Union, known then as the European Economic Community, all member states had the same concerns about Cuba, namely its repeated violations of human rights, lack of democracy and repression of the media. Member states shared the objective of attempting to move Cuba toward a more open and democratic society. The exact method for achieving this aim has evolved since the initial policy of 1996, with Spain often being the outlier in terms of policy preference. The internal debate in the EU about the best direction for Cuban policy has also been dictated by events within Cuba itself. Cuban domestic politics have sometimes been the driving force behind EU policy and at other times have interrupted or influenced the creation of policy that was being put forward. In each instance, the wishes of the Spanish government were central to the direction of the policy and were also subject to the desires of the other member states.

It is also worth noting that on traditional levels of analysis, such as economic or immigration, no European Union member state has had a greater interest in Cuba than Spain. Further, unlike other policies mentioned in this study, there has been a strong influence by states outside of the European Union, such as the United States. In particular, the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom has often resulted in the UK siding with American views on foreign policy related to Cuba. Additionally, while most countries have little interest in doing business in Cuba, Cuba has shown the ability to suddenly attract attention from otherwise disinterested states. Often this sudden interest was driven by human rights issues in Cuba and would bring a stronger normative component to foreign policy discussions than otherwise would have existed. Therefore, while Spain was often the leader in foreign policy and the member state with the greatest interest, it had to contend with fluctuating interests from a variety of member states, all of which were expressed through the institution of the European Union.

The initial European Union-wide policy on Cuba was formulated in 1996, ten years after Spain's accession to the European Union. The policy was called the Common Position on Cuba and fell under the Common Foreign Security Policy pillar of the Maastricht Treaty. It is important to note that at the time any European Union policy, such as the one adopted on Cuba, required the unanimous support of all the member states. This has proven to be a stumbling block for common positions in European Union foreign policy and explains the lack of a position on Kosovo. Spain, among other countries, refused to acknowledge Kosovo's right to independence and prevented an EU position from being established. It is also important to emphasize

that a common position within the EU does not dictate the foreign policy of all member states, nor does a lack of common policy preclude member states from having their agendas. Common positions rarely include binding policies that require the members to act in a particular manner but rather express a common intent or belief amongst the member states. The EU-Cuba relationship centers on the Common Position of 1996, which served as the basis for all policies. While the lack of data regarding the process that led to the Position being signed makes it difficult to understand the dynamics of policy formation for the Common Position, later policy decisions are more available.

The 1996 Common Position on Cuba emphasized human rights, democracy and other normative aspects as areas of importance for the European Union. Opening lines of the Common Position states that “the objective of the European Union in its relations with Cuba is to encourage a process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable recovery and improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people.” (1996 Common Position) However, the Position is careful to stress that “it is not European Union policy to try to bring about change by coercive measures with the effect of increasing the economic hardship of the Cuban people.” In this, the EU clearly distanced itself from the economic isolation policies of the United States. Further, the EU laid out a conditional approach to bring about the changes it wishes to see in Cuba declaring “as the Cuban authorities make progress towards democracy, the European Union will lend its support to that process and examine the appropriate use of the means at its disposal.” (1996 Common Position) These

measures include economic agreements should the Cuban economy open up, political dialogue between Cuba and the EU as well as other possible interactions and increased cooperation agreements between the two actors.

The Common Position contained several sections that came into prominence during later EU-Cuban relations and would serve as the basis for areas of dispute between Cuba, member states and Spain. The first, section 3-c, summed up the main concerns that the EU had with Cuba and the necessity in having a Common Position for Cuba, separate from other Latin American policies. The section declared that in order to achieve a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba the EU:

Will encourage the reform of internal legislation concerning political and civil rights, including the Cuban criminal code, and, consequently, the abolition of all political offences, the release of all political prisoners and the ending of the harassment and punishment of dissidents. (1996 Common Position)

The EU's emphasis on the release of all political prisoners would be the cause of many future disputes between the two actors. It would prove to be an area of the greatest interest for a number of member states.

Section 3-e also proved to be one of the more influential areas of the Common Position. The section expresses the willingness of the EU to provide "ad hoc humanitarian aid" on an ongoing basis but expressly mentions that this aid will be distributed through third party sources such as "non-governmental organizations, churches and international organizations." (1996 Common Position) Many of the organizations obliquely referred to in this section have the same objective as the EU in terms of reforming Cuba. Therefore, the Common Position and in particular section 3-e, expressed the EU's tacit backing of other agencies that

could be viewed as in conflict or subversive to the Cuban government. This framed the interactions in a combative and prescriptive way that influenced future interactions. Finally, and importantly for Spanish interests, the Common Position was set to be reviewed on a periodic basis to see if it was achieving its goals and if changes should be made.

### **The Cocktail Wars**

The first disagreement between Cuba, the European Union and its member states occurred in 2003, following notable actions by the Cuban government. Initially, 2003 appeared to be a promising year for Cuban-EU relations. In March, the European Union opened a permanent embassy in Havana for the first time. However, in the same month, the Cuban government arrested a group of citizens on charges ranging from subverting the “integrity and sovereignty of the state” to being under the influence of US diplomats. The group consisted of librarians, journalists, and human rights activists, all of whom were given one day trials and sentenced to time in prison. Books such as *Animal Farm* and *1984* were used in the trials as evidence that the accused were “demonstrably not independent thinkers...but persons directly in the pay of the US government” (2005 *The Independent*)

Relatives of the accused were blacklisted from working for the Cuban government and therefore were unemployed.

The events in March were emphasized in April when a Cuban ferry was hijacked and ordered to sail to the United States. After a standoff in which the ferry was returned to Cuban waters, the hostages were released and the hijackers

arrested. The seven hijackers were given swift trials, which resulted in four being given life sentences and three being executed by firing squad. These two events galvanized international human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International, into claiming that conditions in Cuba had deteriorated to levels to seen since 1960s. (2010 BBC News)

The imprisonment and execution of dissidents in Cuba clearly contravened the objects and guidelines of the Common Position. The hope of rewarding political progress in Cuba with greater interaction with the EU had instead resulted in a regression of human rights in Cuba. The European Union consequently decided that action was needed to demonstrate the disapproval of the European Union and its member states. The implications for Spain's plans for Cuba and the European Union were immediately apparent, as a Spanish diplomat was quoted as stating "This incident will make it more difficult to get Cuba in the Cotonou Agreement." (2003 Vicent) <sup>16</sup> The concern for getting Cuba into the Cotonou Agreement, an economic development agreement for Caribbean, Africa and Pacific, outweighed other considerations on Spanish thinking about foreign policy. It was immediately clear to the Spanish government that human rights issues would trump other considerations in the eyes of other member states and attract the attention of the rest of the European Union.

Immediately following the detention of the political activists, the European Union imposed high-level sanctions on Cuba, eliminating state visits from prominent members of the European Union, such as the President, or formal state

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<sup>16</sup> Translation by author

visits. This was viewed as a largely symbolic gesture on the part of the European Union but remained in line with the intent of the Common Position, which was careful to highlight the desire to change the political structure in Cuba but not “to try to bring about change by coercive measures with the effect of increasing the economic hardship of the Cuban people” (1996 Common Position). While not a binding resolution, this section of the Common Position essentially prevented the European Union from bringing harsh economic sanctions to bear on Cuba, resulting in the high-level diplomatic sanctions. While this decision had little impact in Cuba or internationally, it did signal the European Union’s distress at the events in Cuba.

The member states also took individual actions, which had a greater resonance in Cuba and internationally than the European Union’s decision. Several countries chose to invite prominent dissidents in Cuba to a variety of national celebration days. France invited several political activists to Bastille Day at the French Embassy and Britain invited another group to the Queen’s Birthday as a demonstration of their support for the activists. Joining them were Germany, Italy, Austria, Greece, Portugal and Sweden, all of whom invited activists to varying diplomatic functions as a show of support. Cuba publicly expressed anger at this move, which was seen as supporting activities that subverted government authority. In response, Cuba banned contact with officials from the European Union and member states until political activists were no longer invited to foreign embassies (2008 The Guardian).

The dispute began to gain international attention as it moved into a year of formal sanctions and became known colloquially as the Cocktail Wars. The EU

maintained its demand that the political prisoners be released while Cuba maintained that it was not the concern of the European Union and that such actions were attempts to meddle in Cuban affairs. The standoff prevented high-level talks between the parties and remained stalemated for a year while discussions took place between the EU, member states, and Cuba (2005 The Independent).

The end of 2004 showed movement between the parties. In response to Cuba releasing 14 of the political prisoners, the European Union began to hold internal discussions on the value of the sanctions. Following the tenet of the Common Position of rewarding positive behavior, the EU established a working group to examine current and future relations with Cuba. In February of 2005, the working group recommended that the high-level diplomatic sanctions be suspended but that no Cuban nationals of any rank or designation be invited to diplomatic functions in the future (The Independent 2005). In essence, embassies would never host dissidents or government officials at receptions or other similar events. Additionally, the European Union would seek to open more dialogue with the Cuban government with a particular emphasis on the release of political prisoners. Spain was the first country to embrace this new approach and began meeting with Cuban officials immediately following this decision. However, other countries, including new member states, expressed disappointment and frustration with the new policy. In particular, the Czech Republic and Poland, both former communist countries, publicly communicated their resistance to the new policy, with the Czech Foreign Minister claiming: "We are on our territory and we can invite whomever we want." Additionally, the Polish State Secretary added that if there were dissidents at

Poland's national day reception, "we [would] not throw them out." (2005 The Independent).

The decision to suspend the Cocktail Wars rather than remove the sanctions entirely was presented as an incentive for the Cuban government to release the last of its political prisoners. It also opened the opportunity for dialogue and negotiations at higher levels and negotiations, with Spain pushing for the removal of all restrictions on interactions with Cuba, with the claim that further dialogue would promote greater reform in Cuba. Nevertheless, a disconnect existed in Cuban-European relations between the EU and its members states in terms of the best method of dealing with Cuba's human rights violations. While the EU did have an official policy, which could be summarized as encouraging dialogue without strongly endorsing actions, it was practiced differently by member states, from Spain's enthusiastic engagement to the Czech Republic and Poland publically demonstrating their disapproval of this policy. In essence, the original Common Position remained very much in effect, but the context surrounding it had been altered both by events in Cuba and by the change in membership of the European Union.

### **In Modern Times**

The relationship among all the parties remained in stasis until 2008 when the Spanish government, more particularly the Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, began to push for a more open approach to Cuba. The Spanish government wanted to formally end the sanctions that had been suspended in 2005 based on the change of regime from Fidel to Raul Castro and the increase in freedom

granted to the Cuban people since his move into the Cuban presidency. From 2005 to 2008, Cubans had been granted the ability to own more personal items, such as computers and cell phones, restrictions on the economy had been eased, including the freeing up of agricultural land for farmers to privately manage, and some political freedoms had been granted, such as a greater ability for opposition parties to operate and some political prisoners being released. The Spanish government claimed that these reforms should be enough to cause the European Union to revisit the sanctions that had been in place, but not in effect, since 2003 (2010 Euractiv.com).

This interaction was reflective of the same debate held in 2005 that preceded the end of the cocktail wars. Several member states claimed that removing the sanctions would legitimize the actions of the Cuban government, which still held over 200 political prisoners. Poland, the Czech Republic and Sweden were amongst the most vocal of the countries opposing any lifting of sanctions, citing the number of political prisoners and the conditions of prisons as their reasons for opposing the policy. On June 19<sup>th</sup>, the EU officially ended the sanctions of 2005 but formally requested that Raul Castro work to improve his human rights record and release the remaining political prisoners (2008 The Guardian). While it was never publically stated, the move followed the direction laid out in the 1996 Common Position of rewarding positive behavior in Cuba. The small steps that the Cuban government had taken towards becoming a more democratic and open society encouraged those in favor of greater contact with Cuba to remove the remaining restrictions while doing nothing to encourage states that demanded more progress and the release of

prisoners. Following the same path as the 2003 decision, the intent and direction of the Common Position was followed, with individual member states attempting to interpret or act upon it in their own way.

The decision of 2008 was driven by Spain, who was the most vocal in its support of changing the policy towards Cuba, and was able to make its position the one expressed by the European Union, even while dissenting member states were vocal in their disapproval. The distinction between the Common Position, which still held unanimity in the EU and the practice toward Cuba allowed for the diverging opinions to be expressed through the same policy. The objective remained the same, while the practice was altered.

In 2010, Spain took over the EU presidency and laid out a number of objectives for the term, one of which was to establish a new bilateral agreement with Cuba on behalf of the European Union. The Spanish government stated that they wanted to remove the Common Position of 1996 and replace it with a bilateral cooperation framework that would cover a number of areas including a strong chapter on human rights (2010 European Commission). The Common Position, which at the time was the only unilateral position in the European Union, would require commitment by a number of member states to the new policy, a state of affairs that the Cuban foreign minister at the time said he believed was a possibility.

Initially, Spain began by setting up meetings between officials from Spain, the European External Actions Service and Cuba. These talks included meetings between the high level representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, and Cuban Foreign Affairs minister, Bruno Rodríguez (2010

EUBusiness.com). The talks were to focus on increasing the connection between the EU and Cuba, with a focus on human rights. At the time, Spain had been able to increase the level of dialogue between the parties and seemed likely to bring suggested policy reforms to the European Union, marking a departure from the Common Position and from the overall approach of the EU toward Cuba.

However, early in the presidency, Spain faced difficulties in developing a constructive dialogue with Cuba. In January 2010, a member of the Spanish Parliament was denied entry to Cuba after it was claimed that the intention of his trip was to visit political dissidents in the country. Cuban authorities forced the MP to immediately return to Spain without letting him leave the airport. The member of Parliament admitted that one of the purposes of his trip had been to visit with some members of the political opposition in Cuba but that the trip was a personal one and he was not representing the EU or Spain. The refusal of the Cuban authorities to allow the Spanish MP in the country was seen by some as sign of Cuba's continuing refusal to be open to greater dialogue and its commitment to political repression within its borders. The Spanish foreign minister, who supported Spain's attempts to encourage greater dialogue, summoned the Cuban ambassador in Spain and demanded an explanation while at the same time calling the ejection of the MP a "mistake." (2010 euobserver.com)

Further hindering Spain's effort was the incident on February 24<sup>th</sup> 2010 when political prisoner, Orlando Zapata Tamayo, died while on a hunger strike in prison.. He had been amongst the 75 arrested during the initial crackdown in 2003 and had been protesting the conditions in the prison. The European Parliament

responded by passing a resolution, by 509 votes to 30, to condemn the actions of the Cuban government, demand the release of all political prisoners, call for moves toward democracy, and demand that Catherine Ashton pressure Cuba to follow these demands. The meetings that had been scheduled between the EU Foreign Service, the Spanish foreign minister and Cuba were cancelled, though no official explanation was given. Cuba claimed that the European Parliament's actions were offensive due to their prescriptive nature (2010 BBC news).

The death of a political activist and the ongoing hunger strike of another shifted the focus to the remaining political prisoners in Cuba. Spain, as the member state most closely connected with Cuba, began discussions with the Cuban authorities for the release of the remaining prisoners, using the Catholic Church as an intermediary. Through negotiations that lasted from February until early July 2010, the Spanish government secured the release of all of the remaining political prisoners from the original 75 that had been arrested in 2003. Most of those released were flown to Spain and given residency, though some chose to remain in Cuba. The timing of the releases coincided with the end of the Spanish presidency of the EU and the continuing refusal of the hardline member-states to reform the Common Position (2010 BBC news). As a result, Spain's objective was not completed by the termination of its presidency, and as Cuba was not a priority for Belgium, the next country to occupy the presidency, the situation remained unchanged. Spanish officials were able to claim some success, arguing that the release of the prisoners demonstrated the Cuba's willingness to engage in a

dialogue. Nevertheless, despite Spanish efforts the Common Position remained the foundation for EU interaction with Cuba.

The development of European policy towards Cuba demonstrates the limits a member state may face in attempting to direct policy within the EU while also showing flexibility in the supranational system. Spain's interests in Cuba were not matched by other member states, nor were Spain's knowledge and expertise in that area. As a result, Spain was in a position to drive Cuban policy from the beginning of its initial inclusion in the European Union and did so with the 1996 Common Position. However, the Common Position was endorsed by the other member states at the time and was passed with consensus. Changes in Spanish thinking about foreign policy encouraged Spain to attempt to reform the Common Position on a number of occasions, to promote more dialogue and engage Cuba more directly to encourage reforms. It is necessary to emphasize that Spain was pursuing greater openness between the EU and Cuba, as the Common Position did nothing to restrict Spanish interactions or trade with Cuba. In essence Spain was trying to Europeanize its own foreign policy, making Spanish and European policy congruent.

The interactions within the EU can be understood in light of theories of logic of appropriateness and institutional socialization. Spain's attempts to change the EU policy toward Cuba were restricted by the prevailing attitudes of other member states. While Spain may have believed in the correctness of its own position, it was forced to work with member states' perceptions of and EU policy toward Cuba. Thus, when the initial sanctions were put in place in 2003, Spain acted accordingly but was one of the first to normalize relations with Cuba when the policy was

revoked. Similarly, when Spain held the presidency, the events in Cuba caused Spain to backtrack on its ambitions. Bowing to the logic of appropriateness, the Spanish government acted within the bounds of EU institutions and of the will of other member states.

The case of Cuba demonstrates the ongoing process of institutional socialization and effect it has on policy actions. Spain's focus on Cuba, from the time of Spanish accession, has made Cuba a matter for EU policy rather than an area of focus for a single member state. While there is no unanimity on policy decisions, there is agreement on the normative aspects of Cuban policy, and it has become a matter for all member states, and therefore a European concern.

Spain's control of Cuban issues within the EU allowed it to guide policy decisions for much of its membership in the EU. The primacy of Spain's position allowed it to dictate much of the policy with respect to Cuban trade, aid and other day-to-day issues. In these areas, Spain was effectively uploading its own interests into European Union policy, due to its own strong position and the lack of interest from other states. However, interest generated from the human rights violations in Cuba suddenly brought about an attempt by the other member states to reverse this trend and attempt to download their own normative objectives onto European, and therefore Spanish, foreign policy. Whereas Spain's focus on Cuba is generated by its wide-ranging interest, member states which are otherwise unengaged have narrowly focused on the human rights issue.

The case of Cuba differs from the other examples in this study because the issue has not been fully resolved. Current European affairs and a changing domestic

situation in Cuba have removed some of the urgency from the discussion about how best to address Cuba's human rights violations. However, the fact remains that the debate over the best approach took place in the European space and was manifested both through member states' individual actions and the European Union offices. As the dialogue between the member states has not resulted in a consensus on the best position for the European Union to take, the EU or its member states have not been able to construct a policy that satisfies all members. In each case, the action fell within the guidelines of whichever policy was being enacted, even as states chose to interpret and act on the European-wide policy in their own manner. This resulted in the expression of something that could reasonably be called a "European" foreign policy, as it was expressed both by the institution as well as the member states. However, it should be noted that the policy that was put forth by the European External Action Service did not result in a converging of interests between the member states, as it was manifested as a solely top-down approach. The European policy remains codified in the Common Position on Cuba. The desired direction of these policies in the future remains a contested issue between the member states, as evidenced by the actions and recommendations the member states undertook during the incidents in Cuba. As a result, while there is an official policy document at the European Union level, it would be more accurate to say that currently there is no European foreign policy for Cuba, but that the process, or the dialogue, is ongoing.

## **Chapter 5: Conclusion**

Spain's membership in the European Union has altered the manner in which it has conducted foreign policy. Following its determination to join the European Union at the end of the Franco regime, the Spanish government embraced its role as an active member of the EU and the new contexts in which its foreign policy objectives would be achieved. Further, it began to understand its objectives and the methods of achieving those objectives in a new way. The Spanish case demonstrates that when a state becomes fully integrated into an institutional space in which socialization can occur, of which the European Union is a prime example, socialization can act on the state to alter its interests and policy practices. Following Wendt and Checkel's theories of state socialization, this thesis finds that interests and practice can be exogenously given.

Perhaps most fundamental to understanding Spain's foreign policy evolution is comprehending the perceptions that Spain holds of its place in the European Union and its own methods of policy practice. When interviewed Spanish officials were consistent in not only placing the European Union as an omnipresent consideration in their foreign policy deliberations but also in linking their own identities to the European Union. Responses such as "Brussels is us" served to emphasize how fully Spain's conception of itself internationally revolves around Spanish interests being in line with European Union interests. This is not to say that Spain does not have preferred directions towards which it wishes the EU to go nor that Spain is subservient to the demands of other member states, but instead that it

chooses to abide by the process and respect the outcomes, regardless of their effect on Spain. Spain sees itself as a fully committed member of the European Union and draws many of its foreign policy aims from that context.

The social institutionalization of Spanish foreign policy can manifest itself in a variety of ways. Just as in other foreign policy issues, context dictates the manner in which a state will conduct itself. In the case of Spain and its relationship with the European Union, the method of practice depends both on the factors external to the European Union as well as the interests and policies of the member states. The example of the Barcelona Process is demonstrative of new methods of approaching geographical areas and the approaches that are taken by the European Union member states. Spain's interest in the Mediterranean area was present before its membership in the European Union and therefore relevant policies already existed. In essence, the objectives remained the same and the methods similar, both temporally and across state boundaries. Bringing the Mediterranean states closer to the European Union states by trade, political, and cultural agreements while pursuing security issues was an aim of Spain, France and Italy from before the European Union. Since Spain's membership and the initiation of the Barcelona Process, policy evolved from bilateral agreements and a narrow focus on issues to a multinational, all-encompassing framework in which the relationship between all participating countries was promoted and no issue, such as fishing rights, security, or political reform, was seen as isolated from the other. The Barcelona Process was reflective of the manner in which the European Union itself operated and demonstrated a policy shift toward more interlinked approaches.

The enlargement of the EU into Central and Eastern European demonstrated the primacy of the European Union in Spanish thinking. Spain's refusal to use its position as president of the European Union to block or filibuster any such enlargement combined with the unwillingness to pursue any action that might be perceived as impeding the process clearly revealed Spain's preference to follow the normative prescriptions for its position with the European Union rather than treating it as a vehicle for more realist approaches toward foreign policy. Spain's attempts to alter the enlargement process were carefully couched in terms of what was best for the European Union or the candidate countries, despite the obvious concerns Spain had about its own standing. Further, the expansion reaffirmed the EU's contention that it stood for normative considerations, arguing that rebuffing the CEECs would be contrary to the values of the EU and make it more of an economic union rather than the ongoing unifying project it claimed to be. The series of actions Spain undertook during the Central and Eastern Expansion followed with the statements made by Foreign Service officials in that the decisions and identity of the European Union fully permeated Spain's decision-making and resulted in the member states supporting the expansion rather than contentiously opposing it.

Spain's attempts to reform the Common Position on Cuba resulted in a strong pushback from the other member states who opposed moving closer to Cuba because of Cuba's human rights record. Despite Spain's repeated attempts to reform the policy that isolated Cuba from the EU, the pressure from other member states prevented efforts to remove the sanctions on Cuba. Despite the constant tinkering of policies to fit the evolving circumstances of Cuba's political situation, the Common

Position remained the policy that directed the EU's practices. The basic principal of Cuba being rewarded for political reform and punished for regression was the main driver of policy through the hostage crisis, the Cocktail Wars, and the release of political prisoners. All the member states, despite their disagreements on practice, obeyed this principle when discussing Cuba-European relations, honouring the consensus that was reached during the normal dealings of the EU. This case highlights the difficulty in transitioning a state's interests into the greater EU context. It instead drove Spain to concede to the human rights oriented demands of the remaining member states of the EU.

An analysis of all three cases illustrates an emergence of a new understanding of the international arena within Spain. The most prominent of these changes is the primacy of the European Union in all foreign policy decisions. In line with the statements made by respondents, how any decisions will effect or will be received by the European Union and its member states is carefully considered as one of the strongest factors during policy decision-making. Whether it is to bring a policy in line with EU preferences or bowing to the demands of the majority of other member states, awareness of the EU occupies Spanish foreign policy across all areas and interests. This is a move away from previous foreign policy considerations wherein Spanish interests were held as the main motivating factor for Spanish policy, and any outside factors were treated as factors of implementation rather than as guiding principles.

Secondly, Spanish foreign policy has taken on a more normative approach in its dealings with other countries. This is most evident in the example of the

Barcelona Process where a previous framework of narrowly defined objectives was pursued without regard for how they affected other concerns. Since joining the European Union, Spain has made comprehensive policy strategies a part of its foreign policy, where broader objectives are pursued through more wide-ranging policies. This type of approach can also be seen in the endorsement and attempted reform of the Common Position and to a lesser degree in the decision to stand behind the Eastern Expansion of the EU.

Finally, Spain, through its foreign policy, has demonstrated a willingness to redirect itself through European Union institutions. While the line between Spanish objectives and European Union is becoming less defined, Spanish objectives do differ from those of the other member states, and Spain has shown a preference for using European Union institutions and the decision making process as a means to pursue those objectives. The cases examined in this study demonstrate Spain's willingness to conform to the normative roles set out in the European Union and its attempt to shift Spanish interests into the European Union.

In broader terms, the case of Spanish foreign policy demonstrates the effectiveness of institutional socialization theory as an explanatory method. The cases in this study repeatedly show Spain's conformity to the normative roles ascribed to each member and the positions within the EU institution. In the three case studies, Spain obeyed the role normatively assigned to it, regardless of the issue or context at hand. The role of president of the European Union is understood to carry obligation of representing the interests of the entire European Union and to not pursue national interests while holding that position. Instead, Checkel's logic of

appropriateness dominates Spanish behavior when it conducts foreign policy outside of the European Union. Additionally, Wendt's theories of exogenously given interests are borne out in this study as Spain's interests have shifted to encompass its new context. Spanish foreign policy during the Franco era was isolationist, but shifted to a preference for bilateral relationships focused on security and economics. Membership in the European Union encouraged Spain to not only embrace the community approach to international relations but also to draw its interests from the other member states and the institutions of the EU itself. The Central and Eastern Expansion is such an example where the former Soviet countries were considered largely unimportant in Spanish foreign policy but became a major concern. Not only was Spain drawn to consider these countries where previously it had not, it also was forced to consider them under a normative lens, based on the mission of European Union and above any security or economic considerations.

The cases presented strongly support the case for institutional socialization as an explanatory theory. However, there are several instances in the cases that differ from the predicted behavior that Checkel describes. In the case of the Common Position on Cuba, Spain's interests were not radically altered by its accession; the drive to increase connections with Cuba was present before Spain's membership and remained so despite the protestations of other member states. Additionally, the belief in greater dialogue and stronger linkages between the two countries as a method of promoting reform in Cuba was always a tenet of Spanish foreign policy toward Cuba. Instead, Cuban case demonstrated the way in which normative aspects from one area of the institution can prevent the

“Europeanization” of a state’s policy or interfere with a state’s ability to direct an area of its own interest in the EU context.

The case of the CEECs also provides a variation on the theory. While Spain followed the prescribed roles and expressed support for the process, it was reluctant to embrace the inclusion of the CEECs. This shows that interests and understandings of the international system have not been completely adopted into Spanish thinking. The Spanish belief in the European project and the embracing of the normative thinking show that socialization is occurring but the stance by Spain during the process shows that socialization has not completely erased state-centric thinking from Spanish foreign policy.

The strength of institutional socialization is clearly demonstrated in the case of Spain where a strong desire to become a member of the European Union preceded a complete commitment to the ideals and practices of the European Union. However, not only did Spain embrace its role in the EU as prescribed by the normative understandings of the member states, Spain’s understanding of foreign policy practice outside of the EU was also altered as demonstrated by its interaction with non-member states. The changes in Spain’s contexts resulted in the understanding of how to practice foreign policy and an evolved understanding of the international system.

In each case, Spanish involvement was part of a larger discussion of foreign policy within the European Union. The Spanish experience is reflective of how the European Union can lay claim to something that can be called a “European” foreign policy. While there exist offices within the European Union framework itself, such

as the Council of Europe or the Commission, that have been conduits through which the member states express their collective foreign policy, these have generally failed to generate effective European Policy. Instead, a European foreign policy has come about as the result of dialogue between the member states on variety of issues, driven by forces both within the EU and outside.

It is clear that only when member states internally settle on a foreign policy that it can be called European. The Barcelona Agreement demonstrates this best, when failure to agree on the basic framework for negotiations led to fractured and ineffective treaties. After an effort by the member states to settle issues amongst themselves, a more effective policy was generated. Similarly, in the case the CEECs and Cuba, the process was to establish a position internally before interacting with outside countries. When member states tried to deviate from the resulting policies, the EU was forced to correct internally before again engaging.

In the end, it is reasonable to talk of a European Union foreign policy, but only as an expression of the consensus of the member states, and only after a dialogue, or other type of socialization, has taken place between the member states to settle on exactly what policy will be expressed to the outside world. While some policies are generally questioned for their effectiveness, such as the CSDP, it may be that these policies will become more effective once their role has been thoroughly established by the member states. What is clear is that socialization, not top-down approaches, are most likely to produce something referred to European Union foreign policy.

All three cases studies examined demonstrate both the top-down and bottom-up processes that result in European policy. The Barcelona Process is the clearest example of how both of these processes can be involved in the formation of a European policy. The beginning of the Process was driven by the desire on the part of member states to form a comprehensive policy with their southern neighbors. This began as a trade agreement, the exact terms of which could not be agreed upon by the member states prior to approaching the Mediterranean countries. This was followed by a period of dialogue, negotiations, and debate amongst the member states with terms reworked to further accommodate the competing demands of the parties involved. This is easily identified as the beginning of the “spiral process” that Rieker refers to, where member states attempted to obtain their own goals by adapting to the context of the European Union. The spiral process was marked by countries, such as France allowing their concerns to be addressed in the European sphere, thereby relinquishing some control over their own foreign policy. In the final stage policy was largely formed at the European Union level and member states were adapting to the input, leading to new understandings of relations with the Mediterranean area.

The Central and Eastern European Enlargement represents a different manifestation of the two approaches, as the expansion was largely driven by the desires of the applicant countries. Additionally, for the Central and Eastern Enlargement there was also a precedent for outside states joining the European Union, reducing some of the need for internal discussion. However, because of the unique factors surrounding the CEECs enlargement, such as the large number of

countries seeking to join, there was still internal discussion with the EU about how best to accommodate the new countries. While the bottom-up aspect was less prominent in this case, it still existed where countries attempted to express their own interests, such as Germany seeking to admit particular countries first, or Spain trying to stall the process entirely. The top-down aspect is more obvious when countries, Spain in particular, adopted the final process and participated in its ascribed roles when called upon. Once the policy had been settled at the European level, states followed it with minimal dissention.

The Cuba incident is more demonstrative of the ongoing process than the other cases. Since the position of the states involved has largely remained unchanged, it is reasonable to assume the spiral process is still ongoing. When the initial Common Position was agreed upon early in Spain's membership to the EU, the understanding of the policy was not tested until human rights violations were committed in Cuba and the divergent opinions of the member states became apparent. The manifestation of the top-down approach was evident when the embargo was imposed by the European, though each member state lobbied for its own interests, in some cases for the removal of the embargo, others for stronger measures. The eventual removal of the embargo left only the initial Common Position, which had been demonstrated to lack a clear direction to guide member states policies. Instead the ongoing debate between member states demonstrates that the bottom-up process is still ongoing and will need to be resolved before a firm, and unanimous, policy on Cuba can be formed.

The cases above show the ways in which the bottom-up and top-down processes lead to the formation of a European foreign policy. Dialogue between member states is a necessary aspect of the creating a sustainable and effective European Foreign policy, which can then be implemented at the EU level. As member states adapt to the new policies they are beginning on the spiral process, wherein adapting to the new contexts to pursue their interests leads to a new understanding of the system and alteration of interests for the state. In the broader picture, this can be as part of the evolving “toward a supranational state” that Rieker describes. The continued dialogue between the member states leads to converging of interests and perceptions, which fosters a consensus on foreign policy, which is expressed through the EU.

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## **Interviews**

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