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EUROPEANISM:
A STUDY OF PUBLIC OPINION AND
ATTITUDINAL INTEGRATION IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

by

Daniel Richard Mayhew, B.A.

(July, 1980) by Daniel R. Mayhew

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in International Affairs

The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
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(July 1980)

To Diane

The undersigned recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies acceptance of the thesis "Europeanism: A Study of Public Opinion and Attitudinal Integration in the European Community" submitted by Daniel Richard Mayhew, B.A. Hon., in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse "Europeanism" - a general term used to describe the mass publics' attitudinal orientation towards the European Communities (EC) and the idea of European Union. Using the data from public opinion surveys conducted in the nine Community countries during the period 1973 - 1979, it attempts to assess the extent to which the mass public of the EC has developed a sense of identification with and attachment to the principles, practices and institutions of European integration. The data analysis suggests that support for the EC polity has been building over a long period of time and it has reached a relatively stable and high positive level particularly in the six original member states. Furthermore, the use of multiple regression analysis on data for the EC in 1973 shows that length of membership in the Community is the best predictor of a European integration support dimension.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT	i1
ABSTRACT	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iv
LIST OF FIGURES	vi
LIST OF TABLES	vii
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
NOTES	12
II. PUBLIC OPINION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION	14
THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC TRADITION	18
The Rome Treaty	19
The Tradition of Parliamentarianism	21
Direct Elections to the European Parliament ...	23
The Nature of Legitimacy	24
The Salience of Politics	27
NOTES	30
III. REGIONAL INTEGRATION THEORY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION .	36
The Federalist Approach	39
The Pluralist Approach	45
The Functionalist Approach	49
The Neo-Functionalist Approach	52
NOTES	59
IV. THE NATURE AND GROWTH OF SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION .	63
Utilitarian Systemic Support	66
Affective Systemic Support	89
The Relationship Between the Support Dimensions .	109
NOTES	137

V. THE DETERMINANTS OF EUROPEANISM: INDIVIDUAL LEVEL DIFFERENCES IN SUPPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES	139
Changing Value Priorities	155
Cognitive Mobilization	159
The Relative Impact of Selected Variables	172
NOTES	182
VI. CONCLUSIÓN	185
NOTES	195
APPENDIX: A Note on Methodology	196
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	208

LIST OF FIGURES

2.1	Net Good Feelings Between Countries	15
3.1	Easton's political system	55
4.1	Public Appraisal of Membership in the EC (Fall 1973 - Spring 1979)	83
4.2	Long Term Evolution of Favourable Attitudes Towards the Unification of Western Europe (1952 - Spring 1979)	92
4.3	Speedup, Continue as at Present or Slow Down the Movement Towards European Unification (Fall 1973 - Spring 1979)	97
4.4	Long Term Trends in Favourable Attitudes Toward the Election of the European Parliament (Fall 1973 - Spring 1979)	105
4.5	Long Term Trends in Affective and Utilitarian Support for the EC (Fall 1973 - Spring 1979)	112
4.6	Long Term Trends in Affective and Utilitarian Support in Each of the Nine Nations (Fall 1973 - Spring 1979)	115
4.7	Linear Trends in Affective and Utilitarian Support (Fall 1973 - Spring 1979)	126

LIST OF TABLES

4.1	Evaluation of National Position in the Common Market (1963)	69
4.2	Public Appraisal of their Nation's Membership in the EC (Spring 1979)	71
4.3	National Versus Personal Position in the EC (Fall 1973)	74
4.4	Effects Attributed to the Common Market (Fall 1976)	76
4.5	Effects Attributed to the Common Market Related to Public Appraisal of Common Market Membership (Fall 1976)	78
4.6a	Public Appraisal of Common Market Membership	
b	Present and Future (1971 - Spring 1979)	86
4.7	General Attitudes Towards the Unification of Western Europe (Spring 1979)	90
4.8	Change in Favorable Attitudes Towards the Unification of Western Europe (1952-1973-1979) ..	95
4.9	Percentage For Three Views About the Movement Towards European Union (Fall 1978 - Spring 1979) ..	99
4.10	Percentage For the Evolution of the Common Market Towards European Political Union (Fall 1970 - Spring 1976)	101
4.11	Percentage for Principal Aspects of the European Political Union (Spring 1976)	103
4.12a	For or Against the Election of the European	
b	Parliament by Direct Universal Suffrage (Fall 1973 - Spring 1979)	108
4.13	For or Against the Election of the European Parliament Related to Opinions on the Common Market (Fall 1976)	113
4.14	Would Things Go Better or Worse if Your Country were not a Member of the EC (Fall 1976) ..	129
4.15	Willingness to Make Personal Sacrifices (Fall 1975)	133

4.16	Willingness to Make Personal Sacrifices Related to the Support Measures (Fall 1975).	134
5.1	Appraisal of EC Membership by Education and by Occupation (Fall 1976)	145
5.2	Appraisal of EC Membership by Age (Fall 1976)	148
5.3	European Integration Support Index (Fall 1973)	153
5.4	Value Priority Type by Nation (Fall 1973) .	158
5.5	Level of Cognitive Mobilization by Nation (Fall 1973)	163
5.6	Knowledge of EC Membership by Nation (Fall 1973)	167
5.7	Sense of Geo-Political Identity by Nation (Fall 1973)	168
5.8	The Relative Impact of Selected Variables on Support for European Integration (Fall 1973)	171
5.9	The Relative Impact of Five Predictor Variables on Support by Country	174
5.10	Relative Impact of Six Predictor Variables on Support in Community as a Whole	178
5.11	European Integration Support Index By Value Priority Type (Fall 1973)	180
6.1	Degree of Attachment to National Symbols (1970 - Fall 1976)	191

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is about public opinion and European integration. In particular, this is a study of the political culture of the European Communities (EC). Today, approximately 260 million people from nine nation-states live in a complex transnational collective decision-making system. It is natural to believe that the major transformations associated with the European integration process has had a significant effect in the way the average European thinks. In other words, the process of integration can be conceptualized to include: political, economic, social and attitudinal integration.¹ As Charles Pentland suggests:

If integration is taken to be a long, complex and dynamic process, it would seem important to examine the full cycle, including the ways in which the experience of political change itself affects individuals attitudes.²

This thesis, therefore, will examine the European political culture or "Europeanism" - a general term used to describe the mass public's attitudinal orientation towards the EC and the idea of European Unity. The rationale for the thesis originates from an interest in the changing state of regional integration studies.

The post-war movement in Western Europe toward economic and political integration brought about a vast outpouring of descriptions, interpretations, detailed case studies and empirical theories about regional integration. Social scientists engaged in the field of international integration began to focus on the EC and its forerunner, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)*, in the hope that the European experience might contribute to a general theory of integration applicable to understanding other integration experiments. Past theoretical research was revisited, in light of the new ongoing process of integration, and a multiplicity of revised and complex causal paradigms were formulated to describe and explain the European experience.

There is no shortage of pre-theories that seek to order the economic, political and social factors related to developments in the European Communities. What emerged was a profusion of empirical studies that contribute toward but fell short of providing a general theory about integration. By 1970 a group of scholars concerned with research problems in the field of regional integration had observed that "integration studies have clearly not yet passed beyond their 'Hundred Flowers' period."³

More recently scholars interested in European integration have not been looking for a general theory of international integration. Regional theorists have discovered that their

research approaches and methodological techniques used to study the European experience are not readily transferable to a study of integration elsewhere.⁴ Moreover, developments in the European Communities over the last two decades have convinced some regional integration scholars that the integrative process has come to a grinding halt or in stronger words "European integration is dead".⁵ The main result emerging from this realization has been a shift from studying 'change' or 'systemic transformation' to concerns with 'stability' and 'continuity'. Thus the primary focus of integration studies in recent years has been to study the EC system "in equilibrium" in order to develop an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the EC polity.

In contrast, during the decade that witnessed the formation of the ECSC and the launching of the EEC, regional integrationists raised questions about the evolution of the existing state systems toward a new form - a supranational government. What the early theorists wanted to know was "how and why do separate and different nations or states merge to form new, larger entities?"⁶ While the research approaches focussed on the international state system, the basic reason for the interest in European integration derived from the theorists' approval of the integration phenomenon. The overall academic feeling was that the European Communities were precursors of peaceful political community formation.

In summary on this point, theorists were intent on ascertaining whether European integration was progressing or not towards new and beneficial (in terms of peace and well-being) patterns of interactions among people. As E. Haas has pointed out, in retrospect, the main reason for studying integration in these early years was thus normative: "The units and actions studied provide a living laboratory for observing the peaceful creation of possible new types of human communities at a very high level of organization and of the processes which may lead to such conditions."⁷

So far the EC has not transformed itself into a true supranational system. The failure of the EC to live up to the regional theorists' prescriptions best explains the new directions in which research seems to be moving in the integration field. Contemporary integrationists are skeptical about the value of unity in Europe, especially regarding the goals and the impacts of the Common Market within national societies. Donald Puchala observes that academics are treating EC affairs as "politics as usual",⁸ whereas some scholars are asking new questions about European integration that include:

1. Questions concerning relationships between national problems, goals and aspirations, and the European institutions.
2. Questions concerning the structure of European-level politics.

3. Questions concerning the European Communities in World affairs. 9

It is important that a student of regional integration interested in addressing these questions not overlook the normative elements which are at the base of the European integration movement. It may be worthwhile digressing for a moment to consider some salient characteristics of the period preceding the formation of the Common Market. To anyone interested in twentieth century European history, the Europe that emerged from World War II is virtually inconceivable in comparison to the Europe of today. World War II was the last of a series of escalating tragedies, the result of the consolidation of nationalism and the extension of national policy by force of arms. The aftermath of each conflagration engendered feelings of hatred and animosity among the population of one nation to another. World War II was no exception. A UNESCO public opinion survey conducted in 1948 revealed that the French public felt the least friendly towards the German people (34%)¹⁰ and that this same negativism was witnessed in Italy and the Netherlands where the German people placed second (16% and 36% respectively),¹¹ after the Russian people, who were least liked (perhaps as an outgrowth of escalating cold war sentiment). These negative attitudes, however, were diffused as events in the post-war period served to ameliorate past hatreds and dislikes between Western European peoples. Financial assistance provided by the Marshall Plan facilitated

the economic reconstruction of Europe, while nationalism declined as the European idea began to materialize. Many of the leading Western European politicians, at the time, perceived that cooperative action on a European scale was a real option in rebuilding Europe and preserving a lasting peace. The result was the launching of the European Communities.

The European statesmen who signed the Treaty of Rome, the founding document of the Communities, binding their countries to participate in a process of economic, political and social integration envisaged the eventual political unification of the member-states. Given these goals and aspirations, it is not surprising that the works of traditional integrationists are coloured by the view of a dynamic Europe with a vision. Indeed it is clear, in retrospect, that the Communities have contributed towards a lasting peace in Western Europe, and although difficult to establish a causal linkage, there is a certain parallelism between the development of the EC and the growth of economic prosperity among Western European nation-states. Thus, a pervasive academic feeling emerged in this period that the integrated EC set in motion a process that would lead to the abolishment of the independent nation-state. The EC's failure in recent years to attain these high expectations stimulated a shift away from the optimism of the sixties towards a more skeptical outlook. Yet, for three decades, the underlying aim of the EC has been

European political union. Moreover, Community member-states have been involved in a process which implies the notion of the "integration of people".

This thesis, therefore, is interested in the questions raised by both traditional and modern integrationists. "Attitudinal integration" will be examined in the hope of contributing to an understanding about first, the evolution of the Common Market towards European unity; and second, the strengths and weaknesses of the contemporary EC polity. The methodology used is to conduct, by means of a secondary analysis of the survey research data available,¹² a cross-temporal and cross-national study of public opinion and European integration. The time study is used to identify any changes or trends in the mass public attitudinal orientations towards the Community and the broader process of unification. Moreover, the typology of analysis will centre on the nation-state. A distinction will be made between the original members - France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, and the newcomers - Britain, Denmark and Ireland. A primary reason for this approach is that the European Community, albeit a dominant actor in Western politics for the last two decades, has not replaced the nation-state, nor is there immediate or substantive indications that the integrative process will inexorably lead to the demise of existing political structures. The nation-

state remains a dominant actor in an increasingly inter-dependent environment. As such, national variation will be an important factor in analysing Europeanism.

This thesis will focus in Chapter II on the relevance of survey research to the study of regional integration. According to M. Brouwer, in a study conducted in the mid-1950's, "the problem of European unification in the military, economic and political fields has always had, as one of its most important aspects, the question of how the peoples of Western Europe thought about each other and about plans for unification."¹³ Traditional integrationists, however, have focussed primarily on the national, political, economic and administrative elites, thereby formulating elite-centred pre-theories without major consideration of public attitudes. In recent years, modern integrationists have regarded survey research as an additional method to study salient aspects of European integration. Undoubtedly events, such as the direct elections to the European Parliament, stimulated a renewed interest in the degree of loyalty and identity among the mass public of the EC to the Community and the idea of European Union. Consequently, Chapter II will examine historical evidence and recent events that underscore the relevance of survey research to a study about the EC and moreover, support the claim that the Community is not an entirely elitist enterprise.

In Chapter III the thesis will review the regional integration literature. The approach that is taken is to categorize the regional integrationists into two broad approaches - elite institutional and the socio-psychological community approaches¹⁴ - and then further divide them into a fourfold typology - federalist, pluralist, functionalist and neo-functionalist.¹⁵ In this way it is possible to accommodate a broad range of writings on integration. The purpose of Chapter III is, first, to discuss past theorists' concerns about political attitudes; second, to examine theoretical concepts, variables and hypotheses that might be useful in studying public opinion and integration; and third, to raise some criticisms about their arguments. In particular, the theorists' concept of attitude changes or loyalty transfers will be focussed on. In each approach it is possible to find major theoretical assumptions or propositions about the timing of attitude changes and its importance in supranational community formation. Chapter III then is concerned with what has been achieved to date in understanding attitudinal integration.

On the basis of the theoretical models found in past research, Chapter IV will explore the effect that institutional development at the supranational level has had on the population in the nine Community countries. The European Communities have been part of Western Europe politics for over two decades, and the concept of European unity predates the second World War.

Community affairs are not new and, therefore, should not be unfamiliar to a majority of the public in the member-states. Indeed, in many policy areas, such as agriculture, decisions taken at the Community level have an impact on the everyday life of European citizens. For those who have not had first hand personal experience with the institutions or their output, many Community policy issues have received widespread and frequent media coverage. A case in point would be the campaign for the direct elections to the European Parliament, or an earlier issue involving the enlargement of the Community to include Britain. The general public has had ample opportunity to develop opinions about the Community in general, and specific segments of the public may have internalized a more complex network of attitudes concerning the Community and its performance. Chapter IV therefore, is concerned with the public's feelings about the EC and the idea of European Union. Our primary purpose is to examine the growth or evolution, and the direction, degree and stability of public support for the EC. Specifically, survey data will be used to determine the degree of public support commanded by the EC. In general, the main concern is with the extent to which a sense of community or, at least, a similarity in attitudes has emerged among the European citizens.

The thesis in Chapter V will focus on the determinants of "Europeanism". Primarily, we are interested only in those factors which from

prior theoretical and empirical knowledge are useful in explaining variations in public support for European integration. While background variables such as education, income and occupation are raised as possible avenues of explanation Chapter V concentrates on certain long term influences that have been shown to have positive correlations with support for the European Community. These long term factors are taken from an attractive hypothesis formulated by Ronald Inglehart to describe what he perceives as a "silent revolution", involving significant change of the political culture among Western publics.¹⁶ In Chapter V Inglehart's arguments will be outlined and then subjected to an empirical test.

In conclusion, we feel that support for integration in the Community is essential to the prospects for future European integration and therefore deserves serious investigation. The approach taken in this thesis will hopefully contribute to an understanding of the socio-political environment in which the European Communities operate.

Notes

1. J.S. Nye, Peace in Parts, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971).

Nye breaks apart the concept of integration to develop concrete measures. His typology of integration includes: social, political, economic, policy and attitudinal integration.

2. Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration, (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1973), p. 256.

* The European Community (EC) is made up of nine countries - Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. The forerunner of the EC was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which came into being in 1952 to create a common market between the first six countries in coal and steel. The success of this enterprise lead to the same six countries signing the Rome Treaties, March 1957, which were to establish the European Economic Community (Common Market) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Euratom exists for the joint development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses; the Common Market created a customs union with the broader objective of implementing common economic policies for the entire Community. In January, 1973, the EC was enlarged to include three new members - Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom.

3. L. Lindberg and S. Scheingold, eds., Regional Integration: Theory and Research, (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. xi.

4. D. Puchala, "New Trends in the Study of European Integration", in P. Soldatos, ed., Pour L'Etude de L'Integration Europeennes, (Montreal: C.E.D.F., 1977), p. 67.

5. P. Busch and D. Puchala, "Interests, Influence, and Integration: Political Structure in the European Communities", Comparative Political Studies, vol. 9, No. 3 (October 1976), p. 235.

6. D. Puchala, "New Trends in the Study of European Integration", p. 68.

7. E. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joys and Anguishes of Pretheorizing", in Lindberg and Scheingold, eds., Regional Integration, p. 4.

8. D. Puchala, "New Trends in the Study of European Integration", p. 68.

9. D. Puchala, "New Trends in the Study of European Integration", pp. 75-77.
10. W. Buchanan and H. Cantril, How Nations See Each Other: A Study in Public Opinion, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1953), p. 150.
11. Buchanan and Cantril, pp. 178-199.
12. The Euro-Barometer series, which is a bi-annual public opinion poll initiated by the Commission of the EC in 1973 in an effort to monitor the attitudes and aspirations of the European public, and early survey research studies (European Community Studies 1970, 1971 and 1973) provide the student of regional integration with valuable sets of data to study public attitudes. We use these data sets in later analysis.
13. M. Brouwer, "Some Data From a Six-Country Split Ballot Survey on European Military Cooperation anno 1951", Gazette, vol. 5 (1959), p. 49.
14. See P. Taylor, "The Concept of Community and the European Integration Process" in M. Hodges, ed., European Integration, (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1972).
15. The idea for this taxonomy is taken from C. Pentland, International Theory and European Integration.
16. This main theme is found in R. Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

CHAPTER II

PUBLIC OPINION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

In Chapter I we pointed out that one of the reasons for "relaunching Europe" in the form of a European Economic Community (EEC) was to introduce the means to achieve a lasting peace among the Western European nation-states. This goal was to be accomplished by the construction of supranational institutions that would bind member-states to common policies and a common purpose. The EC institutions thus provided for new joint decision-making centres, a forum for European debate and emergent Community law.¹ The European movement hoped that the formation of these institutions and procedures for integration at the European level would result in European unification.

The concept of European unity, although predating World War II reached its apex during the reconstruction of Western Europe in the establishment of the European Communities. The years after World War II have been a period in which supranational institutions and international organizations have flourished. These institutional changes have been accompanied by dramatic socio-psychological change at all levels of Western European societies. The change has been rapid and deep-rooted considering that in a period of two decades traditional

animosities between nation-states have been diffused and these states have witnessed the emergence of regional identification. Some evidence on the decline in cross-national animosities is provided in Figure 2.1 which graphically displays how feelings between Frenchmen and Germans improved dramatically between 1954 and 1963.

FIGURE 2.1

* The data are taken from a survey conducted by the United States Information Agency in which people were asked to indicate their feelings about other countries and given the choice of the following: very good, good, bad, very bad and neither good nor bad.

Net good feelings are determined by combining the very good and good responses and then subtracting the very bad and bad responses.

Source: R.L. Merritt and W.J. Puchala, eds., Western Perspectives on International Affairs: Public Opinion Studies and Evaluations, pp. 235, 237.

Significantly, the trend towards reciprocal good feelings began about the same time as the ECSC and became strikingly positive with the development of the EEC. The same trend in favorable appraisals of other nation-states was extended to the joint activities taking place on a European scale. Post-war survey studies conducted in West Germany have shown people to be generally favorable to the effort of rapprochement with the other countries of Europe, and in France, as early as 1947, two Frenchmen out of three pronounced themselves in favor of European unification.² Indeed, since 1957, as Donald Puchala has noted "there has been a secular trend toward greater and greater elite and mass legitimacy accorded to integrative institutions and regional political processes."³

However, despite the success of the European movement and the signatories of the Rome Treaty in providing the means to maintain a "no-war community", the "Common Market" has remained predominately a "common market", albeit achieving substantive success in economic sectors,⁴ such as agriculture. While the integrative process has been progressive in the economic field, increasing levels of integration have not been straightforward, rather undergoing a series of crises - the consequence of both internal and external factors. In the mid-1960's President de Gaulle's boycott of the Community institutions, emerging from a disagreement with the Commission over the nature and direction of supranationality among the

six original members,⁵ was one of the more devastating internally generated crises. More recently, in the fall of 1973, the selective oil embargo of the Arab oil-producing countries dealt a severe blow to the solidarity of the EC. The ramifications of this external threat were widespread; presently, they are being felt in the domestic economies of the nine who are suffering from the economic misfortunes of high inflation rates and spiralling unemployment statistics. Events such as the energy crisis, the rampant inflation of the late sixties and seventies and chronic monetary disorders led James Caporaso to describe Europe in the late seventies as "economically troubled and uncertain, institutionally incomplete, and confused over ideals."⁶

The primary obstacle to achieving success in integration and/or harmonization has been the obstructionism of national interests. The inception of the EEC was coordinated by a small number of prominent individuals and the integrative process has been elite-dominated. The people now involved in Community policy making derive their mandate from the national governments that they represent and, as such, many owe their primary allegiance to the nation-state. Furthermore, in the past, European mandarins have depoliticized Community affairs so the mass public has not had an opportunity to become involved in the day-to-day decision-making activities of the Community institutions. In summary on this point the politics

of the EC are elitist.

Taking this view, it seems that the EEC is dominated by an elite that tends towards a national bias and that the European idea is monopolized and bound by the pragmatism of Community policy-makers. If this is the case why bother studying public opinion and European integration? Does it matter whether the public of the member-states support the EC and European unification? In our opinion the answer is a resounding "yes". The reasons for this focus on public opinion and European integration will now be examined. The emphasis on attitudinal research in the context of the EC derives, in particular, from the liberal democratic traditions of the nine Community member-states.

The Liberal Democratic Tradition

The discussion on the democratic traditions of the Western European nation-states will make reference to the following interrelated factors: The Rome Treaty and the goal of political sovereignty; the tradition of parliamentarianism; the direct elections to the European Parliament and the implications of an emerging European constituency; the nature of legitimacy in the form of mediated support for the EC; and finally the salience of politics resulting in the politicization of Community affairs. The first four factors relate directly to the provisions of the Rome Treaty, the founding document of the EEC. The last factor refers to events that have occurred

in recent years. These events have mobilized public opinion to such an extent that the mass public has had a decisive impact on European issues.

The Rome Treaty

The political elite of "the Six" embarked on an experiment to achieve European unity by means of a "common market". The approach that was to be taken is clearly outlined in the Messina Resolution⁷ (June 1955).

"The Governments", it declared:

...believe that the time has come to make a fresh advance towards the building of Europe. They are of the opinion that this must be achieved, first of all, in the economic field.

They believe that it is necessary to work for the establishment of a united Europe by the development of common institutions, the progressive fusion of national economies, the creation of a common market and the progressive harmonization of their social policies.

8

Although established as a "common market" the EC have a highly political purpose; the aim is not merely to reduce tariff barriers between member states and erect a Common external tariff, but to begin a process whereby a whole range of vital decisions is taken at Community level. This purpose is entrenched in the Rome Treaty, a document scholars interpret as being primarily political.

The Treaty of Rome, "the traite cadre"⁹ of the EC initially committed six countries (since 1973 nine countries) to establish "the foundations of an ever closer union among the European peoples" in the form of "a Common Market" and

"progressively approximate the economic policies of the member states, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and a closer relation between its member states."¹⁰ The articles of the Treaty, although specifying substantive obligations binding the member states with regards to the customs union, amount to a general statement of goals and the procedure for their attainment. Significantly, one of the primary goals as written into the preamble of the Treaty was to establish "the foundations of an ever closer union among the European peoples". This purpose was to be accomplished by the setting up of a complex central decision-making machinery that has the capacity to provide for political integration. Lindberg suggests the Treaty, although providing for the institutions "formally dependent on the will of the member-states, does provide for an independent source of initiative and impulsion towards the Treaty's goals."¹¹

The Treaty envisaged the EEC system to consist of the following four main institutions: The Council of Ministers, the Commission, the Court of Justice and the Assembly. Although the effective powers of the Community are concentrated in the Council of Ministers and the Commission, the founders of the EEC did provide for some semblance of democratic control in a European Assembly. An interest in international parliamentary

assemblies is a characteristic of the postwar period.

The Tradition of Parliamentaryism

As a part of the new institutions established in Western Europe after World War II, the liberal democratic principles of these states, particularly their concern with questions of democratic control and legitimacy, have resulted in the development of transnational parliaments. Although these transnational institutions were affected by the controversies between the supranationalists (advocates of extending substantive powers to the new institutions) and the intergovernmentalists (advocates of limited powers) one of the principal manifestations in all the arguments was a commitment to some type of parliamentaryism. The result has been the proliferation of parliamentary assemblies in Western Europe.

Thus, in the negotiations which resulted in the establishment of the EEC, the decision was made to form a European Parliamentary Assembly as a successor to the Common Assembly of the ECSC. The provisions of the Rome Treaty did not make the European Parliament a legislature, but rather a deliberative body which is severely limited in its ability to make authoritative decisions. The name "Parliament" itself is a rather presumptuous title. The Rome Treaty refers to the institution as an "assembly" and it was not until 1962 that the delegates decided to change

the name, which according to some would underline the significance of its so-called "powers".¹²

By the terms of the EEC Treaty, the assembly consists of delegates who are designated by the Parliaments of the member governments in accordance with the procedures laid down by each member-state (Article 38).¹³ Significantly, the Treaty declares that the Assembly's members are representatives not of the member-states but of the people of the member states (Article 137). The European Parliament, therefore, was to be the institution of the EC that would be the most representative of the European public. In Robert Schuman's words:

At the institutional level, it is the duty of the Parliament to interpret the views of the general public whose participation is becoming more and more necessary. The Parliament must make the governments and executives grasp the fact that the European idea is a living reality. ¹⁴

Though chosen by the national parliaments, prior to the direct elections held in June 1979, the delegates were not bound by any instructions from their home parliament or government. From the inception of the EEC and the Parliament the members have been given the opportunity to consider themselves as representatives of the people of the Community. The Parliament's primary function then, according to Leon Lindberg, is "to change the attitudes, the expectations and the focus of more and more people."¹⁵ As such the European

Parliament has been recognized as the most pro-European of the EC's three institutions.

For federalists, the absence of direct democratic supervision of the Council and the Commission may be ameliorated by the strengthening of the powers of the European Parliament.¹⁶ Although the Rome Treaty does not provide for an increase in the powers of the Assembly, provisions were made to assure democratic control of the institution.

Direct Elections to the European Parliament

The Rome Treaty empowered the Assembly to draw up proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all member-states (Article 138.3). Hence, the Parliament made numerous unsuccessful attempts to obtain a Council decision in favor of direct elections during the sixties and early seventies. It was not until after the enlargement of the Community in 1973 that the nine member governments agreed to provide for direct elections, which were held in June 1979.¹⁷

Direct elections may have a significant impact on the integrative process in Western Europe. Clearly, a directly elected Parliament ~~provides~~ democratic control over those aspects of government which have been transferred from the competence of nation-states to supranational institutions. Since national parliaments have played a very minor role in European Community development direct elections establish a

highly visible linkage between the "European citizen" and the EC. As one scholar suggests "the exercise of suffrage as a European civil right would help give ordinary people the sense of belonging to a European political whole:"¹⁸

It has been noted that the movement toward European integration has been elitist with only marginal involvement of the mass public. This may have largely been true in the past, but the election itself and the prior European campaign conducted by transnational party groups helped mobilize public opinion towards European issues.¹⁹ Furthermore, for the first time the European Parliamentarian directly represents a European constituency. Accordingly, EC Commissioner Giolitti has pointed out that the members of the European Parliament could "become a sort of pressure group for the people" (towards increased unification), and suggested that the direct election would not be a panacea but a "turning point" in the building of a European Community.²⁰

The Nature of Legitimacy and the EC

Prior to the direct election there was no structural base, in terms of a formalized institutional link,²¹ between the European public and the EC. It may be worthwhile noting again that the EC was initiated and continues to function under the control of political and economic elite. Moreover, the Community clientele has tended to be restricted to elites. The mass public does not participate in the day-to-day

activities of the Community although, as citizens of the member-states, they are affected by Community outputs. However, the European citizen does have certain direct representation in that Community decision-makers are national elite who are at some time accountable to a national electorate.

Where there is limited accountability to the national government or the national electorate, as in the case with members of the Commission,²² these Eurocrats are sensitive to trends in public opinion. To cite but one voice, Mr. Roy Jenkins, President of the Commission expressed the hope in the Commission's policy for 1977 that "in their concern with the great issues of economic and industrial policy they must never forget the need to carry the people of Europe with them."²³

The acceptance of this form of representation on the part of the mass membership extends a modicum of support to the system as a whole - the nation state as a member of the EC - and to the elite who do participate in Community affairs. The willingness of the public to accept the political system (the EEC) and thus abide by the allocative decisions of national authorities functioning as Community policy-makers transfers legitimacy to the supranational structures.

In the past any support extended by the mass member-

ship to the EC has been termed mediated support. The concept is derived from Easton's systems approach to the political system.

As far as the individual himself is concerned, he may be quite indifferent to the political object. Yet his adherence to a group would mean that to the extent that he was persuaded to go along with attitudes and behaviour of the group or that his presence contributed to its perceived strength, he would thereby be contributing some part of his own support or opposition as it is mediated through the group.

24

The same grounds for compliance apply to the decisions of the authorities as national leaders and as Community decision-makers. As long as the mass membership identify closely with their national elite they are provided with an indirect representation, and they extend a mediated support to the EEC.

Lindberg has pointed out "for most members of the mass public support is and will long continue to be mediated through the national authorities and elites. Hence continued support for and participation in the systems structures on the part of national authorities and elites is important!"²⁵ The favourable predispositions of national authorities and elite to the EEC means the diffuse support they receive assures public acquiescence toward their actions at the European level. However, this form of support may prove fragile. The elite's ability to generate a sense

of legitimacy is dependent upon the absence of political controversy about Community affairs.

The Salience of Politics

During the first decade of Community development the mass public was neither a participant, nor particularly cognizant of the events occurring at the European level. The reasons for this derive from the depoliticization and predominately bureaucratic nature of Community decision-making. However, as Community policy-makers move from negative integration, with the successful completion of the customs union, towards positive integration²⁶ there is opportunity for more and more people to feel the direct effects of Community outputs. Lindberg in a mid-term report on European integration published as early as 1970 finds "virtually no economic sector which is independent of the authority of the EEC."²⁷ Building on this factor, we suggest that the mass membership, although not participating directly in the system, other than in exercising their franchise are bound to feel, in time, the effects of Community output and thus become increasingly aware of the decisions made by the EEC institutions. Any increase in exposure to the EEC may affect the public's relative indifference toward European affairs.

In recent times Community issues have become particularly salient and in a few cases the mass public

have been given the opportunity to have a decisive input into the Community debate. In 1972 the question of joining the EEC was open to public referenda in four nation-states.²⁸ The Irish and the Danes voted "yes" when asked whether their country should join the European Community or not. In Norway the public voted "no" to membership and in Switzerland, where the vote concerned association, the Swiss voted "yes". In all four cases the national governments complied with the decision of their electorate - Ireland and Denmark joined the European Community as members and Switzerland became associated with the EEC, while Norway stayed out. The referenda results indicate that a mobilized public opinion has a decisive impact in the decisions made by political authorities. As N. Peterson suggests in the Danish case, "the Danish referendum represents one of those rare occasions when public opinion quite literally exerts a decisive influence on the outcome of a major foreign policy issue."²⁹

Public opinion also became an important factor to Great Britain's membership in the EC. Although Britain did not hold a referendum in 1972, opinion remained so volatile that the Labour Government upon taking office in 1974, broke with tradition, and decided to hold a referendum on whether Britain should remain in the EC. The issue was so politically controversial that during the referendum campaign both the

Labour and Conservative parties split between "Marketeers" and "anti-Marketeers". The British public voted in favor of the EEC and Britain has remained a member.³⁰

In the final analysis, public attitudes are becoming important to a study of EC development. From the inception of the EC, in the provisions of the Rome Treaty for a directly elected European Parliament, visible steps have been taken to establish an institutional link between the EC and the European public. The Treaty of Rome is not exclusively an economic document. In a broader sense the Treaty commits the governments of the member-states towards the "integration of people". Or as one scholar has suggested "regional integration among modern nation-states whose populations are aware of and participate in politics is as much a merging of peoples as it is a merging of governments and territories."³¹ Certainly, recent European experience has shown that the European public can have a decisive impact on foreign policy issues. This last point, in particular, suggests the usefulness of attitudinal research in the study of regional integration.

In Chapter III we will discuss the regional integration literature to evaluate the past theorists' concerns with political attitudes, in the hope that their theoretical paradigms include concepts, variables and hypotheses that might be useful in studying public opinion and integration.

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Notes

1. The Rome Treaties made provisions for four main institutions:

1. the Commission - a bureaucratic organ independent of member governments principally concerned with ensuring the application of the Treaties and initiating Community action.
2. the Council of Ministers - the principal authoritative decision-making organ on which representatives of the member governments sit.
3. the European Parliament - responsible for scrutinizing Community policies.
4. the Court of Justice - responsible for ensuring that the treaties are respected.

An excellent introductory study to the Community institutions and the Community decision-making process is the work of Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963).

Lindberg studies the EEC in its first few years of operation, August 1959 - January 1961.

2. Gallup International, "Public Opinion in the European Community", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 2 No. 2 (1963).

3. Donald Puchala, "The Pattern of Contemporary Regional Integration", International Studies Quarterly, vol. 12, No. 1, (March, 1968), p. 63.

4. John Pinder lists five great policy achievements of the European Community:

- a) the establishment of the customs union,
- b) the creation of the agricultural common market,
- c) the successful negotiation of the Kennedy round,
- d) the cartel policy, and
- e) the agreement to adopt a uniform system of tax on value added (TVA).

John Pinder, "Positive Integration and Negative Integration: Some Problems of Economic Union in the EEC", in M. Hodges, ed., European Integration, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1972), pp. 137-142.

Dennis Swann also provides an illuminating study of some of the economic principles underlying the decision to create the Common Market and the policies the Common Market has been following.

Dennis Swann, The Economics of the Common Market, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Modern Economic Texts, 1972).

For a more intensive study of the economic dynamics behind a Common Market see:

B. Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration, (Allen and Unwin, 1962).

5. Richard Mayne provides an excellent historical survey of the post-war period 1945-1973 in Western Europe.

Richard Mayne, The Recovery of Europe, (New York: Anchor Press, 1973).

Also Miriam Camp provides a very good study of the unification movement during the 1960's with a detailed description of deGaulle's boycott.

Miriam Camp, European Unification in the Sixties, (New York, 1966).

6. James A. Caporaso, "The European Community in the World System", Journal of European Integration, Vol. 2, No. 3 (May, 1979), p. 419.

7. The Messina Resolution was the outcome of a conference held in Messina in June 1955 when the Six decided to extend European Integration to cover the entire economy. Two years later the Rome Treaties were signed establishing the EEC.

8. Richard Mayne, The Recovery of Europe, (New York: Anchor Books, 1973), p. 292.

9. The term "traite cadre" or framework treaty is used by L. Lindberg to describe the immense scope of the Treaties in his pioneering study of the first four years of the EEC.

10. Treaties Establishing the European Communities, (Office for Official Publication of the European Communities, 1973), p. 173.

11. Lindberg, p. 45.

12. There have been very few books written about the European Parliament. The more informative include:

J. Fitzmaurice, The Party Groups in the European Parliament, (Westmead England: Saxon House, D.C. Heath Ltd., 1975).

G.V. Oudenhove, The Political Parties in the European Parliament: The First Ten Years, (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1965).

The Treaty does not establish the Parliament as a legislature, rather legislative powers are granted to the Community as a whole and not to any one institution.

Lindberg explicates how the decision-making machinery functions.

Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Integration.

13. Treaties Establishing the European Communities, (Office for Official Publication of the European Community, 1973).

14. The Economist, April 3, 1976, p. 57.

15. L. Lindberg, "The Role of the European Parliament in an Emerging European Community", in E. Frank, ed., Lawmakers in a Changing World, p. 46.

16. In the past the national parliaments of member-states have not played a significant role in Community development. The absence of a strong linkage between the national parliaments and the EEC institutions is studied in:

M. Niblock, The EEC: National Parliaments in Community Decision-Making, (London: Chatham House: PEP, 1971).

Since the enlargement of the Community to include Great Britain, the British anti-market~~eer~~ parliamentarians have attempted to strengthen the British parliaments control over EEC secondary legislation. They are well aware of the limited powers of the European Parliament and rather than advocating a strengthening of that Parliament they have attempted to device procedures in their home parliament that will exert democratic control at the Community level. Their endeavours are outlined in:

M. Ryan and P. Isaacson, "Parliament and the Communities", Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 18, (1975), pp. 199-215.

17. The Nine signed the Act on the Election in May-June 1978 of the European Parliament by Direct Universal Suffrage, in Brussels on 20 September, 1976.

Reference to the pertinent documents are found in:

Elections to the European Parliament by Direct Universal Suffrage (Secretariat: Directorate-General for Research and Documentation, July, 1977).

18. Ben Patterson, "Direct Elections", European Studies, (European Community Information Service, 1974).

19. Transnational political parties were established at the European level and they contested the elections on a European platform. For example, an EEC wide centre right party called the European People's Party was formed in May, 1976. The party's long term objective as found in Article 3(c) of their constitution states "the party shall participate in the transformation of Europe into a European union with a view to achieving a federal union." Press reports indicate the People's party represents 35 million voters or 25% of the whole EEC (the Socialists would represent 44 million voters or 31% of the electorate).

The Economist, 8 - 14 May, 1976, p. 71.

20. European Community, Jan/Feb. 1978, No. 201, p. 46.

21. This is not entirely true; individuals, represented by lawyers entitled to practice before a court of a member state, may appear before the Court of Justice.

The Court of Justice of the European Community, (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the EC, 1975).

22. The members of the Commission are chosen for their general competence by the governments of the member-states. They are "not to seek or accept instructions from any government, being charged with representing the general interest of the Community."

L. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Integration, p. 30.

23. Programme of the Commission of the European Community for 1977, Address by Mr. Roy Jenkins, President of the Commission to the European Parliament, (Luxembourg: Office of Official Publications of the EEC, Feb. 1977), p. 14.

24. David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, (London: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 225-6.

25. L. Lindberg, "Political Integration as a Multi-dimensional Phenomenon" in L. Lindberg and S. Scheingold, eds., Regional Integration: Theory and Research, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 86.

26. Pinder defines negative integration as that part of economic integration that consists of the removal of discrimination and positive integration as the formation and application

of coordinated and common policies in order to fulfill economic and welfare objectives other than the removal of discrimination.

J. Pinder, "Positive Integration and Negative Integration", p. 126.

27. L. Lindberg and S.A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1970), p. 27.

Lindberg in attempting to study the nature of EC as a political system uses decision areas grouped into external relations, political-constitutional, social-cultural and economic functions to determine the scope of the EC system between 1950 and 1970. In all four categories of subject matter there has been progress toward joint decision-making (the economic functions predominate), pp. 68-75.

28. A referendum was also held in France where the French electorate was invited to simultaneously express their support for:

- a) the policy of expanding the EC, and
- b) the Government of Georges Pompidou.

In this matter Pompidou was able to reverse a policy of de Gaulle's which had effectively prevented Great Britain from joining the EEC on two occasions during the 1960's.

R. Inglehart, The Silent Revolution, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 326.

29. N. Petersen, "Europeanism and its Foreign Policy Attitude Correlates: A Political Belief System?", Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 10 (1975), p. 141.

Peter Hansen is concerned with the linkage between public preferences and official policy-making. He provides another informative study of the Danish referendum campaign.

Peter Hansen, Melvin Small, and Karen Siune, "The Structure of the Debate in the Danish EC Campaign: A Study of an Opinion-Policy Relationship", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2, (Dec. 1976), pp. 94-129.

For information concerning the Norwegian referendum see:

J. Holst, "Norway's EEC Referendum: Lessons and Implications", The World Today, (March, 1975), Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 114-120.

30. Uwe Kitzinger has provided a study of the British and French negotiations and the final British entry into the Common

Market. The study refers to numerous opinion polls taken in Britain during the 1970's which show the shifts in opinion on the question of joining and then remaining in the EEC.

Uwe Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain Joined the Common Market, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973).

31. Donald Puchala, "The Patterns of Contemporary Regional Integration", p. 41.

CHAPTER III

REGIONAL INTEGRATION THEORY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The European Community has provided scholars with an operational laboratory by which to describe the ongoing process, derive the background variables and prescribe strategies for the successful completion of the integration phenomenon. Throughout the literature there appears a basic theme - the question of whether integration is progressing or not. Although there is a difference of opinion on this point in the studies of regional integration, there are certain similarities involving assumptions that have been expressed both explicitly and implicitly in the literature. Scholars of regional (and international)¹ integration have suggested that individuals who participate in cooperative activities may experience both cognitive and affective attitudinal changes which are favourable for subsequent integrative processes. As H. Kerr states "central to this theoretical work is the notion that integration implies changes in the attitudes and expectations of the participants in the direction of an increased commitment to regional cooperation."² In the studies of the European Community the analysis of attitudes and attitude change have focussed primarily on the national

authorities and elite who are the Community policy-makers.

Past regional integration scholars have not devoted much time or energy to the investigation of mass attitudes toward political issues. This is surprising as "one of the fundamental concerns of national integration is the attitude of the populace toward the government."³ National integration theorists have asked the following type of questions: Do people conceive of themselves as members of the state?; Do they identify with the government? Almond and Verba, for example, in their pioneering study of five contemporary democracies analyse the political culture, which refers "to the specifically political orientations - attitudes toward the political system and its various parts and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system."⁴ The past studies of regional integration seem to neglect this research approach, rather concentrating on the relevant actors - the trans-national institutions and the political and economic authorities who are participants in the cooperative activities. E. Haas explains the reason for this focus in the following passage:

The emphasis on elites in the study of integration derives its justification from the bureaucratized nature of European organizations of long standing, in which basic decisions are made by the leadership over the indifference of the general membership. This gives the relevant elite a manipulative role which is of course used to place the organization in question on record for or against a proposed measure of integration.⁵

Although the regional integrationists primary concern was on analysing elite socialization and elite identification with the new central structure, attitude change takes on some of the characteristics of a diffusion process. If an overview of the numerous paradigms is taken the movement towards European political integration may be plotted as a three step process: elite stage, informed public opinion and mass acceptance. Where the theorists differ is on the role and importance of the attitudes of the mass membership in the formation of a political community. The theorists diverge on the extent to which the integrative process affects the average individual and in turn, the extent to which the mass membership can affect the process of integration.

The fundamental difference between the numerous paradigms derives from the theorists' views on the nature of sovereignty.⁶ Some theorists believe that institutional change is the most important aspect of integration. They take a legalistic perspective, thus viewing the transfer of formal powers from the national to the supranational authorities as the prerequisite for successful integration. Other theorists attach conditions to the transfer of sovereignty. In their view, power must be based on a popular consensus, derived from the development of communal feelings which extend strong identification and attachment to the new institutions and authorities. The transfer of sovereignty

depends upon the growth, by a learning process, of a socio-psychological community.

These schools of thought serve to bifurcate the theorists into two groups according to their characteristic elite-institutional approach or the socio-psychological community approach. The literature on regional integration suggests it is possible to further divide the theorists into a four-fold classification. The taxonomy refers to the federalist, functionalist, pluralist (or transactionalist) and neo-functionalist approaches. These approaches will be discussed individually to determine the theorists' views on attitude change and the importance of public opinion to European integration.

The Federalist Approach

The federalists view integration as a political phenomenon that encompasses matters of high politics and results from the foreign policy decisions of political leaders. At the first glance, the federalist approach may be associated with the legalistic perspective on sovereignty since they emphasize the central role of the national elite in manipulating national powers to develop new institutions. The primary criterion for initiating integrative action is the diffusion of a popular consensus among the political leaders of several nation-states. The political elite must be convinced that the problems that each of their states faces

are so severe to warrant cooperative activities. Political change will first be accepted by the leaders who have come to believe in the value of integration. The motivational forces that compel the political leaders to adopt cooperative policies derive from a variety of sources. As Pentland states:

It could be the rational economic judgement that economic welfare or viability requires larger units, it could be a perceived threat from an outside power; it could be a mystical belief in some inexorable historical process, or in some mythological unity; it could be a calculation about personal, group, or national political advantages in the larger political unit. 7

In postwar European politics the first two factors were particularly dominant. The political authorities of these states faced the similar problems of reconstruction, the means to prevent France and Germany from fighting each other again, and the emergence of a perceived threat from the Soviet Union. Among the various prescriptions to solve European problems, federalists advocated the construction of a United States of Europe. These federalist ideas for dramatic structural change had some impact on the decision-makers who were directly involved in the negotiations for the establishment of the ECSC and later the EEC. During this period European unity was not a mass issue and therefore did not depend upon whether the several units were similar in cultural tradition, religion or language. The important factor was whether the elite in power were homogeneous. Indeed Etzioni has pointed out

"the Treaty of Rome was signed at a time when the internationalist and bourgeois Catholic parties of Europe were simultaneously in power ⁸ In retrospect, the history of the Community suggests that the similarities or dissimilarities in elite perceptions towards unification has had a significant effect on Community development.

Although the federalists stress elite orientations, they do not ignore the importance of popular identification. Etzioni defines a political community as a community that possesses three kinds of integration:

- a) it has an effective control over the use of the means of violence;
- b) it has a centre of decision-making that is able to affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community; and
- c) it is the dominant focus of political identification for the large majority ⁹ of politically aware citizens.

Thus the federalist concept of Community includes a notion of public identification to that community. The success of integration, therefore, depends on the system elites' ability to use their power to create a supporting popular will. As Etzioni states:

...the more identitive power the elites initiating and guiding unification command or the more the union-system generates, the more successful unification will be. ... when identitive power is lacking member units are likely to become alienated from the union and/or its elites. ¹⁰

The elite creates popular support by exercising identitive

power through education, religion, the media, propaganda or symbols. The political elite's capacity to manipulate the resources on hand should provide "a justifying ideology or degree of legitimacy for integration."¹¹ However, the view that public loyalties may be shifted to new institutions and political roles does not imply that individuals cannot internalize non-conflicting multiple loyalties to different levels of political institutions. Thus an individual may have sympathetic attitudes on three levels: to the local community, to the province or state, and to the new central structures.¹²

The focus on multiple loyalties is related to the federalist ideas about the end-product of integration. In the federalist view integrative actions are not taken to supplant the nation state by a new supranational structure. In the last analysis, the political changes involved in bargaining on a transnational level are intended to benefit the nation-state.

The federalist approach is too elite-centered for our purposes in this study. Clearly, federalism does provide an attractive interpretation of the sequence of events that led to the establishment of the EEC and the first decade of Community development. The stress on the political will of the elite is particularly salient if one considers that the impetus for the ECSC and the EEC came from a small group of

highly motivated elite. During this period the mass public had very little to say about European affairs, and the majority were unaware of the moves that were being taken toward European unity. Moreover, as Pentland has remarked, the federalist emphasis on the central role of the elite "leads to a great man theory of integration, where the requisite political will is seen as residing in the person of a great leader or group of leaders."¹³ This view may explain the impact that a political leader such as President Charles de Gaulle has had on the European movement. Among the many factors that have caused crises in European unity de Gaulle stands as a central figure. During the 1960's de Gaulle was the principal obstacle to an expansion of the Commission's authority and he led the forces that vetoed Britain's attempts to join the six Community member-states. Not surprisingly, the great man theory of integration has been used by other regional integration theorists when they talk about dramatic-political actors.¹⁴ The regional integration theorists have tended to use aspects of the "great man" theory to explain why the integration process in the EC has not measured up to the prescriptions given in their own theoretical paradigms.

Although federalist ideas may be useful in studying the inception of the EC and the first decade of its operations they seem inappropriate in a discussion of mass

political attitudes in integration. One difficulty with the federalist reliance on the manipulative notion in the relation between popular attitudes and political change is that identification is viewed as flowing in only one direction. Etzioni has stated that "in elite-centred unions the identification is of followers with member-elites."¹⁵ This view seems to discount the importance of the elite's capacity to receive information about satisfactions or alienation among the population, and the elite's responsiveness to the information that they receive. The linkage between public attitudes and elite policy preferences should include both upward and downward channels of communication as the elite may manipulate public identification through propaganda or symbols, while being responsive to political attitudes that indicate a strengthening or weakening of identifications.

A study of Community development suggests that although the elite have the capacity to use identitive power to shift loyalties from the nation-state to the supranational institutions they have not tended to do so. The reason for this is straightforward, as "the educational systems and other identitive mechanisms, from mass media to religious organizations are still largely national, not supranational."¹⁶ Many of the resources needed to manipulate attitudes remain in the hands of national decision-makers who are more apt to use them to create national identification than supranational

ones.

The Pluralist Approach

A socio-psychological community is defined as a "sense of a community of beliefs, values, attitudes and loyalties".¹⁷ David Easton describes a sense of community "as a we-feeling among a group of people - they are a political entity that works together and will likely share a common political fate and destiny."¹⁸ A research interest in a sense of community is a strong concern in the pluralist (transactionalist) approach to integration. In the literature terms such as sense of community, mutual responsiveness or/and identification and we-feeling are commonplace.

Pluralist scholars make a clear distinction between the political community and the attachment of the membership to the community. For example, D. Puchala suggests the movement towards contemporary regional integration results from: 1) processes of international social assimilation, and 2) processes of international political development. The first concept is defined as both a state of mutual understanding and mutual confidence among peoples and the social psychological processes contributing to this state.¹⁹ The pluralist writers then view a community as separate from the new institutions and more in terms of the relationship between groups of people. Individuals who possess or have developed a sense of community are able to identify with one

another and distinguish between themselves and those that are external to the community.

In pluralist literature the development of a popular consensus towards the new institutions is a necessary condition of integration. This view is particularly salient in the works of K. Deutsch. Deutsch finds that one of the most effective methods to promote political amalgamation was the enlistment of broad popular participation and support.²⁰ Furthermore, changes in the political attitudes and behaviour of individuals are viewed as a precondition to the successful creation of a community of states. Indeed in Deutsch's paradigm the growth of mutual identification among people is a defining characteristic of integration.²¹

Individuals become mutually responsive and develop a we-feeling through a process of social learning. The formation of a community requires individuals to learn to communicate and to understand each other. Once they are able to identify with each other there is an increased opportunity for an extension of identification and support to new institutions. The development of identification has been described as a learned drive that follows shifts in the social reward pattern. Teune illustrates how learning theory may be applied to a study of the European Community. He states:

the benefits of the Common Market, plus the possibilities of future economic gains, make the stimuli of Common Market institutions part of the political world of many Europeans. In

time, this change in the world of political stimuli may lead to identification with Europe. ²²

Changes in identification from a national to a supra-national setting may derive from some anticipation of the benefits or rewards to be gained from the new setting. As such Deutsch lists among his background conditions that are necessary if a community is to succeed "the expectations of stronger and rewarding economic ties or joint rewards."²³

Deutsch and others have used behavioural and attitudinal indicators to study European integration (elite interviews, public opinion polls, systematic content analysis, and transaction analysis). In Deutsch's earlier research he speculated that "since the mid-1950's European integration had slowed and it had stopped or reached a plateau since 1957-58."²⁴ Furthermore, mass opinion research suggested that there was "between 1957 and 1962 some evidence of ~~an increase~~ in the importance of the image of a united Europe in France and Germany, but there was no decrease in the dissimilarities of French and German political preferences and values."²⁵ Similarly, in the analysis of elite interviews Deutsch found there was persistently greater concern for national interests than for European ones. The data led him to conclude that "Europe in 1970 and 1975 seems likely to remain predominantly a Europe of nation-states."²⁶

For the purpose of this study the pluralists main contribution to the study of integration is the stress on the

social-psychological dimension, and the importance of changing political attitudes in the creation of a community of states. However, the pluralist writers concentrate too heavily on the emergence of a we-feeling or mutual identification among peoples. Deutsch may be correct in his view that present-day Europe remains a Europe of nation-states. Certainly the growth of community through social learning - "which is a long and gradual process occurring over several generations" ²⁷ has not yet been achieved. But the dissimilarities in preferences and values among the mass public of the Community member-states should not cancel the importance of a growth in the image of European unity. Mutual identification can stretch both across national boundaries and upwards toward supranational institutions. The federalist concept of multiple loyalties may be more appropriate in this context. It is doubtful whether the European Communities will ever achieve the degree of integration that is inherent to the pluralist view of a "community of states"; however, the present day symbiotic relations that have emerged between the Community institutions and the member nation-states may have engendered among the public, dual non-conflicting loyalties to both the national and supranational levels.

Following from this a more general view of what constitutes a political community may be warranted. Teune's definition is suggestive and attractive since it includes the

pluralist notion of social learning. Teune states:

If a substantial portion of the population living within a political boundary has learned that political identification is rewarding or has a learned pattern to be politically identified with a specific set of political stimuli, then this collectivity of people could be called a political community. 28

Certainly, the European Communities political boundaries are well defined in the Rome Treaties so that, in time, Community output may serve as the political stimuli to change mass political attitudes to identify with Europe. If this is the case political loyalties can be fractionated: loyalty to the Community will derive from the learned perceptions of rewards resulting from Community output; and loyalties to the nation-state will be retained in those areas where national authorities are perceived as the distributive agents.

Functionalist Approach

Functionalist writers, as do the pluralists, stress the development of a socio-psychological community as a precondition for integration. A sense of community, a feeling of mutual affection, identification and loyalty result from an individual's participation in cooperative actions that fulfill expectations of material satisfaction. Political attitudes may change during experienced joint problem solving where these activities are perceived as mutually rewarding. The functionalist approach is therefore based on the pro-

position that "once a task oriented cooperative atmosphere has been established, joint actions around the common problem will result in further shared goals and the perception of joint benefits."²⁹

The functionalist notion of attitude change is taken from a doctrine of attitudinal reorientation on the basis of learning. Ernst Haas has asked "Do people learn to think in non-national terms merely because of a pattern of technical cooperation? And he states that:

...at first it seems to be only the experts and managers who learn. They become habituated to consulting with their opposite members from other nations about technical problems, and eventually they come to see all problems from the perspective of mankind as a whole. Thus the answer to maximizing the learning process lies in extending the range of participation in practical problem solving. In the end others besides experts, managers and civil servants will participate and undergo the same process...

30

The process of attitude change is thus viewed as operating in two phases, first, through direct experience of co-operation by people involved in specific functions, and second, affecting the mass public as experience becomes more diffuse and the scope of functional areas has increased.

Functionalism describes integration, or the growth of community as primarily a rational, incremental process of learning by association. "As their functional needs are met, people discover the source of their welfare and direct their expectations and loyalties to the international agencies

rather than their states."³¹ This is based on the utilitarian assumption that an individual will seek his rational advantage in maximizing his physical welfare by cooperating with other men when necessary,³² and that the public will gradually turn its loyalties to the institutions that are perceived as satisfying their needs.

The core of the functionalist argument seems to be based on the assumption that political attitudes are almost entirely cognitive. They view attitude change as a rational, incremental response of technocrats, involved in functional activities, to perceptions of utilitarian gains. As the scope of functional cooperation increases the public has a greater opportunity to feel the effects of cooperation on their daily lives. Public loyalties shift to the new organizations as each functional activity is perceived as a source of material satisfaction. The functionalists do not take into account the nonpolitical and irrational aspects of political attitudes. The emotive or affective responses of political elite and the mass public are viewed as secondary.

If political attitudes are primarily cognitive, any shifts in mass loyalties to Community structures may prove fragile. Community outputs that are not perceived as beneficial would result in a subtraction of a certain sum of loyalty. Support based exclusively on cognitive perceptions may be short-lived as a sequence of output failures

would generate alienation among both the political elite and mass publics.

Taking this view, we suggest that the functionalist notion of attitude change should be broadened to include both cognitive and affective components of men's attitudes. A popular consensus may well be explained by reference to cognitive perceptions of utilitarian gains. However, a student of regional integration should not discount the effect of an emotive attachment to the European idea in a study of public opinion and regional integration. As Etzioni has remarked:

When the EEC went into effect early in 1958, identitive power was small and the main integrating power was utilitarian. By the end of 1963, the Community had a significant identitive power; the utilitarian power was still the larger, but by then it shared the integrating task with a strong identitive one.³³

If the EC has been able to strike a balance in the growth of utilitarian and affective identification among the European public, popular consensus toward integration may prove stable. However, it is not clear what effect a time lag between utilitarian and affective attitude change will have on the EC development.

Neo-Functionalist Approach

Many of the tenets of functionalism have been taken up by the early neo-functionalist writers. Like the other regional integration scholars, the neo-functionalists

approach to the study of integration has a highly normative dimension. Haas has pointed out that his main reason for studying integration is normative: "The units and actors studied provide a living laboratory for observing the peaceful creation of possible new types of human communities."³⁴ The interrelationship between the theorists is outlined by J. Nye who states, "basically the neo-functionalists were federalists in functionalist clothing, pursuing federal ends through what appeared to be functionalist means."³⁵ Furthermore, Nye has suggested four basic similarities between neo-functionalists and functionalists:

- 1) both stress welfare
- 2) both tend to downgrade the role of symbols and identity and to emphasize utilitarian factors in Community formation
- 3) both tend to rely on pluralistic societies in which individuals and groups are free to shift their activities and loyalties
- 4) both tend to emphasize the role of the technocrat.

Among the contributions of the neo-functionalists to the study of regional integration is the analytical rigour in their approach to the phenomenon. Political integration is viewed as "a multidimensional phenomenon requiring multivariate measurement."³⁶ Neo-functionalists have been determined to find the background variables in integration and the process mechanisms that describe the ongoing operations.³⁷ Furthermore, their approach to the study of integration is based on a utilitarian perspective, similar to the functionalists, and the concept of the cumulative

logic of integration. "Economic and political elites can initiate plans for integration in one sector of the economy which inevitably leads to integration in all sectors of the economy and ultimately to a full-blooded political unification."³⁸

The neo-functionalist's definitions of integration include references to the shifts in political loyalties and expectations to the new decision-making centres.³⁹ In the earlier neo-functionalist writings these shifts in loyalties and expectations involved a change in political attitudes on the part of the national political, administrative and economic elite. As in the older functionalism, political attitude change is a two step process effecting firstly elite who experience utilitarian gains and secondly the mass public through a process of diffusion. In the final analysis, the early neo-functionalist approach was elite centred and therefore, it tended to disregard the problem of general public attitudes.

However, the neo-functionalists have been the least reluctant of the regional integration theorists to change their attitudes about integration because of the evolving European situation. The re-examination of their theoretical notions concerning the process of integration has resulted in a research interest in the role of mass political attitudes in European integration. The initial theoretical justification for focussing on public attitudes derives from the use of

David Easton's systems model⁴⁰ to describe the EC in terms of a political system. When Easton refers to a political system the nation-state is used as his model; but Easton has clearly indicated that the model is applicable to a study of any type of system. For example, he states:

an international system is just another system at a different level of organization. But in all other respects it is amenable to investigation through the same conceptual apparatus that is being developed in this volume with respect to what we normally call domestic political systems. 41

The political system is viewed as a responding and self-regulating system that contains a feedback mechanism. Easton was concerned in answering the question of how political systems manage to persist in the face of inevitable support and demand stress. Below is a basic diagram of the political system based on Easton's work.⁴²

FIGURE 3.1

Easton's systems concepts have been used by Leon Lindberg to develop a system's orientation to the analysis of regional integration. One of the major contributions of Lindberg's systems model has been the application of

Easton's notion of support to a study of the European Community. Lindberg provides both a systematic and comprehensive investigation of support in terms of utilitarian and affective public attitudes and he draws a distinction between identitive support (the horizontal interactions among European peoples) and systemic support (the vertical links between the public and the Community). One of the major advantages of Lindberg's dimensions of support is that it enables students of integration to systematically approach the study of mass political attitudes and European integration. Chapter IV will explore the full meaning of the supportive dimensions and evaluate Lindberg's arguments. Suffice it here to note that Lindberg's schema will provide a useful approach to an analysis of "Europeanism".

Thus, in recent neo-functionalist writing there has emerged a growing concern with the study of mass political attitudes. This research focus is particularly dominant in the works of R. Inglehart. Much of this new interest was sparked by the debate between Deutsch and Inglehart⁴³ about the state of European integration. Inglehart took issue with Deutsch's view that Europe in the 1970's would remain a Europe of nation-states.⁴⁴ Rather Inglehart has argued that "far from finding a stagnation of integrative processes since 1958 in some respects European integration may have moved into full gear since 1958."⁴⁵

The basic question that Inglehart has asked is:

"To what extent do public preferences constitute an effective influence on a given set of national decision-makers, encouraging them to make decisions which increase (or diminish) regional integration?"⁴⁶ Like Lindberg he takes a systems approach to examine the nature of the elite-mass linkage and, thus, sees the relationship between public preferences and political decision-makers in terms of a feedback model. But Inglehart finds "the relative importance of the societal input is conditioned by at least three main factors":

- 1) The structure of the national decision-making institutions.
- 2) The distribution of political skills within the society
- 3) The degree to which the given decision relates to deep-seated values among the public or evokes only relatively superficial feelings.

47

- In Inglehart's research of these factors he develops concepts and hypotheses about political attitudes and European integration.

One of the major arguments of Inglehart's work has been that processes of affective (shifts in the values of Western publics from an overwhelming emphasis on material-well being and physical security toward greater emphasis on the quality of life) and cognitive (a shift in the distribution of political skills) change have transformed the political culture of Western publics. These two processes of change are viewed as explaining attitudes towards Europe.

In the final analysis, the recent neo-functionalist writers provide the most useful approach to the study of public attitudes. Neo-functionalist thinking has evolved with the changing European situation. European Community development is no longer, exclusively, within the jurisdiction of the national political, economic and administrative elite. In the recent past controversies such as the enlargement of the EC has placed Community issues before public scrutiny and the subsequent referenda results have shown that the elite-mass linkage is susceptible to upward flowing influence. Furthermore, the direct elections to the European Parliament guarantees the direct participation of the European public in Community affairs. Students of regional integration would be remiss in taking for granted a popular consensus or apathy in Europe.

Notes

1. See H. Kelman, "Changing Attitudes Through International Activities", Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 18, (1962).
2. H. Kerr, "Changing Attitudes Through International Participation: European Parliamentarians and Integration", International Organization, Vol. 27, (Winter, 1973), p. 46.
3. Hayward, "Continuities and Discontinuities between Studies of National and International Political Integration", p. 46.

also see P. Hansen, "The Structure of the Debate in the Danish EC Campaign".

Hansen has pointed out that "during the past few decades, social scientists have devoted much energy to the investigation of mass attitudes toward political issues." Further, he refers to the ideological and technical factors that have reinforced an interest in this field of research.

4. G.A. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), p. 12.
 5. E. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 12.
 6. P. Taylor, "The Concept of Community and the European Integration Process", in M. Hodges, ed., European Integration, pp. 203-224.
- Taylor distinguishes between two views on the nature of sovereignty: 1) primary stress of the legal aspects; that power is sovereign that has the legal right to act; and 2) as a condition of sovereignty power must be based on a popular consensus, upon a community or nation. pp. 204-5.
7. C. Pentland, International Theory and European Integration, (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1973), p. 172.
 8. A. Etzioni, Political Unification, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), p. 26.
 9. Etzioni, Political Unification, p. 4.
 10. Etzioni, Political Unification, pp. 71-2.

11. Pentland, International Theory and European Integration, p. 172.

12. see H. Guetzkow, Multiple Loyalties, (Princeton: Princeton University, 1955).

Guetzkow has suggested that "loyalty is not a single entity once used up, then exhausted. It is, rather, an expandable quantity which can be generated in increasing amounts towards a variety of objects. Thus there is no need to think that an increase in loyalty to supranational groups necessarily means decrease in loyalty to the nation-state..." p. 67.

13. Pentland, International Theory and European Integration, p. 173.

14. Lindberg has pointed out that Haas distinguishes between elites with "dramatic-political aims and incremental-economic aims." Dramatic-political actors are those who are concerned with "high politics" while the latter are those who have devoted themselves to their daily welfare concerns and who have abandoned an interest in high politics.

Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity, p. 123.

Haas, Lindberg and Inglehart in their research work's have viewed the intervention of a dramatic political actor as crucial in the formation of the ECSC and EEC.

see Lindberg and Scheingold, p. 243, and

Inglehart, "Public Opinion and Regional Integration", in Lindberg and Scheingold, eds., Regional Integration, pp. 197-8.

15. Etzioni, Political Unification, p. 78.

16. Etzioni, Political Unification, p. 254.

17. Taylor, "The Concept of Community and the European Integration Process", p. 205.

18. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, p. 332.

19. Puchala, "Patterns of Contemporary Regional Integration", p. 30.

20. K. Deutsch, "Attaining and Maintaining Integration", in M. Hodges, ed., European Integration, p. 119.

21. Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity, p. 39.
22. H. Teune, "The Learning of Integrative Habits", in P.E. Jacob and J. Toscano, eds., The Integration of Political Communities, (Philadelphia: J.P. Lippincott Co., 1964), p. 280.
23. Deutsch, "Attaining and Maintaining Integration", p. 112.
24. K. Deutsch, Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance, (New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 20.
25. K. Deutsch and others, France, Germany and the Western Alliance, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 219.
26. K. Deutsch, France, Germany..., p. 245.
27. C. Pentland, International Theory and European Integration, p. 50.
28. Teune, "The Learning of Integration Habits", p. 271.
29. Kelman, "Changing Attitudes through International Activities", p. 86.
30. E. Haas, Beyond the Nation State, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 13.
31. Pentland, International Theory and European Integration, p. 87.
32. Haas, Beyond the Nation State, p. 20.
33. Etzioni, Political Unification, p. 247.
34. E. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration", in Lindberg and Scheingold, eds., Regional Integration, p. 4.
35. J. Nye, Peace in Parts, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), p. 51.
36. L. Lindberg, "Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement", in Lindberg and Scheingold, eds., Regional Integration, pp. 45-127.
37. E. Haas and P. Schmitter, "Economics and the Differential Patterns of Political Integration", International Organization, (1964), Vol. 18, No. 4.

The variables consist of background variables (size of member-units, rates of interunit transactions, extent of

social pluralism within the units, and elite complementarity); variables at the moment of economic union (degree of shared government purposes, and powers delegated to the union); and process variables (decision-making style, post-integration rates of transactions, and the adaptability of governments in situations of disappointment and crisis).

38. R. Shepherd, Public Opinion and European Integration, (England: Saxon House D.C. Heath Ltd., 1975), p. 41.

39. For example, E. Haas defines political integration as "the process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing society."

E. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, p. 16.

40. D. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life.

41. Easton, p. 173.

42. Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity, p. 111.

43. Pentland, International Theory and European Integration, p. 129.

44. Deutsch, France, Germany..., p. 245.

45. R. Inglehart, "An End to European Integration", American Political Science Review, (1967), p. 91.

46. R. Inglehart, "Public Opinion and Regional Integration", in Lindberg and Scheingold, eds., Regional Integration, p. 160.

47. Inglehart, "Public Opinion and Regional Integration", pp. 161-3.

CHAPTER IV

THE EVOLUTION AND THE NATURE OF MASS SUPPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Chapter I pointed out that a primary interest of this study is to examine the degree of public support commanded by the EC. The notion of support is taken from David Easton's systems theory.¹ Easton's work focusses primarily on the conditions of survival of a political system, which is described in terms of an input-output mechanism incorporating a feedback process.² Input consists of demands made upon the system by its environment, and support that may or may not be directed towards the system. Furthermore, Easton distinguishes between the "political community" - an object toward which support may or may not flow - and "a sense of community".³ In the final analysis, the survival of a political community depends on some support. Moreover, the failure of a sense of community to develop overtime as a source of support leaves a system vulnerable to stress.⁴

Easton suggests that a systems approach is applicable to the study of systems in general, at different levels of organization.⁵ Some modern integrationists also conceive of the EC as a system. Donald Puchala introduces the concepts of international political development (political community) and international social assimilation (sense of community)

in a discussion of the process of international integration. In particular, Functionalists and Neofunctionalists perceive a separability between the development of apolitical, supranational, functionally specific authorities and attitude change in terms of the transfer of elite and public loyalties away from nation-states. The success or failure of regional, functionally specific organizations, therefore, depends on a shift in citizens' loyalties away from national governments towards the new supranational authorities.

This chapter explores the question of public support for the EC. In particular, it is interested in the effect that political institutional development at the supranational level has had on the population of the nine Community countries. The chapter will, therefore, examine the growth or evolution and the direction, degree and stability of public support for the EC. We begin by defining a support model that is found in Lindberg and Scheingold's Europe's Would-Be Polity.

Whereas Easton's concepts were elaborated to study stress in a political system, Lindberg and Scheingold adapt the basic model to gain an understanding of system growth or system change in the EC. As part of their system's based model of integration they introduce a matrix of support. The matrix consists of four dimensions of support divided into two levels of interaction:

1. systemic support probes vertical relationships between the system and these publics (support for the European Community), and

2. identitive support is a gauge of the horizontal interaction among the broader publics of the system (how the public feels toward each other).

and two bases of response:

1. utilitarian support based on some perceived or relatively concrete interest,
2. affective support which seems to indicate a diffuse and perhaps emotional response to some of the vague ideals embodied in the notion of European unity.⁶

Since the present study focusses on the EC as the "political community" the analysis concerns primarily the systemic level of interaction. Some evidence has already been provided in Chapter II, page 15 to suggest that identitive support, measured in terms of net good feelings, has been increasing to positive levels in EC member-states. Although, this dimension of support is important, this chapter is confined to a study of affective and utilitarian systemic support for the EC.

Lindberg and Scheingold describe two kinds of supportive responses - those of an affective nature and those which are utilitarian. According to Wildgen "the idea that support for political institutions can be thought of as coming from two sources is a commonly accepted notion in current political science."⁷ Other regional integrationists also conceptualized support or loyalty as having two main dimensions. E. Haas, to cite one theorist, defines political integration as the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings

are persuaded to shift their loyalties (affective), expectations (utilitarian) and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.⁸ Put quite simply, the literature suggests two sources of support. The first is affect which is something related to loyalty or perhaps legitimacy and popularity, thus, referring to a more diffuse, non-rational, emotional sentiment. The second is utility which is cognitive in nature and based on an individual's perception of the benefits that result from successful performance. Accordingly, in the sections that follow the affective and utilitarian indicators of support will be considered separately. The selection of appropriate indicators was facilitated by reference to studies where data reduction techniques, such as factor analysis, were employed to distinguish between the support dimensions.⁹ Moreover, a review of the codebooks available led to the selection of individual questions that seem to tap at an intuitively obvious sense of utilitarian or affect support.

Utilitarian Systemic Support

The first task is to examine the growth and nature of support resulting from the perceived utility of the Common Market. As the term "utility" implies, utilitarian systemic support derives from an individual's perception of satisfaction that accrues from a political object. According to Easton,

support of this type for any political object will depend upon the members being persuaded that outputs are in fact meeting their demands, or that they can be expected to do so within some reasonable time.¹⁰ This input of support, therefore, flows as a consequence from some specific satisfactions obtained from the system. As the members of a political community perceive advantages from the ongoing relationship they develop a vested interest which may be expressed in favorable attitudes and predisposition.

In the case of the EC, utilitarian systemic support may arise from an individual's satisfaction with the past performance and future expectations of benefits he perceives originating from Community institutions and actions. According to Functionalists, this support dimension is believed "to depend upon an instrumental, stimulus response relationship between the governed and government."¹¹ Thus, it was argued, that utilitarian support depended on a modicum of cognitive awareness engendered by a learning process and perceptions of material gains. A citizen must be knowledgeable of past performance and cognizant of the functionally specific organizations charged with maximizing his socio-economic welfare interests. As noted in Chapter III, page 52, Functionalists and early NeoFunctionalists focussed primarily on this rationale, incremental, largely utilitarian aspect of an individual's attitudes. Both approaches draw heavily from learning theory

in arguing that changes in political identification result from some anticipation that other political or functional stimuli may prove more rewarding.

Although regional integrationists tend to differ in analytic approaches they do concur that support of a utilitarian nature should be present and perhaps increasing among the mass public of the EC. This view is based on the implicit assumption that the performance of the Community has been or will be effective in satisfying the concrete socio-economic welfare interests of its members. Consequently, the Common Market should be capable of generating increasingly high levels of utilitarian support. The capacity of the EC in engendering support of a utilitarian nature will now be examined.

In Lindberg and Scheingold's study the utilitarian side of their support matrix describes "strong support for economic and cultural goals and positive reactions to supranational institutions."¹² As the data for their attitudinal indicators were taken from surveys conducted in the early 1960's, it can be surmised that utilitarian support did emerge in the first decade of Community development. Further evidence on this point is offered in Table 4.1. It is clear that the general public in the six member states believed that their country benefited from Common Market membership. In particular, the difference column shows the preponderance of

TABLE 4.1

Evaluation of National Position in
Common Market* (percentage)

1963

	<u>A</u> Think their Country will gain	<u>B</u> Think their Country will lose	Difference A - B
Netherlands	70	7	+63
Italy	55	3	+52
Belgium	55	9	+46
France	39	16	+23
Luxembourg	23	11	+12
Germany	21	15	+6

Source: Gallup International "Public Opinion and the European Community", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1963, p. 109.

Note: This table does not include the neutral response (Think there will be no difference).

* The word format of the question was not provided in the source material.

favorable opinion. But there is a significant difference in the relative support levels in the given nations. While there is a consensus in each of the six countries that the advantages of the Common Market outweigh the disadvantages, the public in Luxembourg and Germany are far more cautious. The majority by either failing to answer, or thinking "that there will be no difference", must feel the Common Market is irrelevant, at least in terms of its effects on their country. Nevertheless, these data sources tentatively suggest that the EC has been capable of generating some utilitarian support. In the paragraphs that follow more recent data are introduced to examine the overall level of utilitarian support. Moreover, the section will explore the trends and the direction of change in the support dimension through time.

In recent years the general public of the nine nations (excluding the British public) support the status quo by an impressive majority. This statement becomes clear after examining Table 4.2 which displays the results of a utilitarian measure for the Spring 1979. The question asked:

Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership in the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?

In particular, this question is a sensitive indicator of utilitarian support. Earlier survey studies have found that the question is phrased "in a way that makes it easy for

TABLE 4.2

Public Appraisal of Their Nation's Membership
in the European Community

Spring 1979
(percentage)

	Good Thing	Bad Thing	Neither	Difference (Good-Bad)
Netherlands	84	2	10	+82
Luxembourg	83	3	12	+80
Italy	78	2	14	+76
Belgium	65	2	20	+63
Germany	66	5	20	+61
France	56	8	28	+48
Ireland	54	14	24	+40
Denmark	37	25	26	+12
United Kingdom	33	34	26	-1
EC*	59	12	21	+47

Source: Public Opinion in the European Community on the Eve
of the Elections to the European Parliament, Euro-
barometer, No. 11, May 1979, p. 44.

Note: "Don't knows" are not shown.

Question Wording: "Generally speaking do you think that (your
country's) membership of the Common Market
is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good
or bad?"

* Each national sample weighted in proportion to that nation's
population.

those who have no clear opinion to select the neutral option."¹³ Thus the respondent's choice of either "a good thing" or "a bad thing" indicates a firm and perhaps salient attitude concerning support for, or opposition to, European integration. Also a negative (bad thing) or positive (good thing) response denotes the respondents' feelings about whether their country has benefited or not from the existing Common Market relationship. In a sense, the general public is being asked to rate the Common Market's performance and in so doing to reveal their level of satisfaction with the status quo. In other words, a predisposition to favour (or oppose) Common Market membership underlines a basic orientation towards the existing European Community framework.

Table 4.2 shows that in the Community as a whole, six out of ten people felt that their country's membership was a good thing, whereas only one out of ten (12%) expressed a negative opinion. The most supportive countries prove to be the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy with positive assessments outweighing negative ones by as high as a forty-two to one ratio (Netherlands). In the six original member-states the difference scores are positive, exceeding +48%, thus reflecting the preponderance of favourable opinion. But the same level of positive appraisal is absent in those countries which entered the union in 1973. In Denmark and the United Kingdom the gap between positive and negative evaluation is minimal

with the difference scores actually taking a negative value in the latter country. The Irish public fall into a different category. If the nine nations were rank ordered on a support-nonsupport scale, Ireland would rank 7th, just after the original six member-states. That the Irish manifest a more favorable attitude (54%) toward Common Market membership than the other two new member countries suggests a level of utilitarian support akin to the Six. However, Irish support is somewhat diminished by a significant percentage of respondents (14%) who feel that membership is "a bad thing". In summary, Ireland remains somewhere in the middle of the support scale, neither belonging to the countries characterized by high positive evaluation nor to those countries, like the United Kingdom and Denmark, where the majority opinion is much more skeptical about the benefits of Common Market membership.

In the European Community as a whole, a clear majority is convinced that their country does benefit from membership in the Common Market. However, the positive assessment about the Common Market is reduced when membership is viewed on a personal level. In the Fall 1973, the public in the nine nations were asked:

And for you personally, do you think that
(your country's) membership is a good
thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?

Table 4.3 shows the percentage of respondents in each nation

TABLE 4.3

Public Appraisal of Membership in the European
Community (Percentage saying that Membership is
"a Good Thing")

NATIONAL VERSUS PERSONAL Position

Fall 1973

	A Personal Benefits	B Country Benefits
France	50	61
Belgium	46	57
Netherlands	48	63
Germany	47	63
Italy	54	69
Luxembourg	42	67
Denmark	32	42
Ireland	41	56
United Kingdom	22	31
EC*	42	56

Question Wording: A - "And for you personally, do you think
that (your country's) membership is a
good thing, a bad thing, or neither good
nor bad?"

B - see Table 4.2

* weighted average

that felt that membership was "a good thing" for themselves personally (column A) and also for their country (column B). At first glance the Table reveals widespread positive appraisals, particularly in the six founder states, on both attitude indicators, suggesting that utilitarian support stems from individual self-interest and nationalistic feeling. As noted earlier there is a difference in support levels between the six original member-states and the three new member-states. The pattern of divergence in supportive attitudes between old and new member-states may be related primarily to length of time of membership in the European Community. It is worth noting that early versus late membership will be viewed in Chapter V as an important factor in the growth of supportive attitudes. What is of interest here is the difference in the support levels between the two indicators. Clearly, in each of the nine countries the percentage of respondents who feel their nation has benefited outweighs the percentage that feel that they personally have benefited. There is a perception therefore held by a majority of the European people that Common Market membership is more advantageous for the nation-state than it is for the individual.

A reason for the difference in support levels is offered in Table 4.4. In the Fall 1976 the general public in each of the nine countries were asked what kind of effect the Common Market had on their job or profession, their

TABLE 4.4

Effects Attributed to the "Common Market"

For the Community as a Whole*

Fall 1976

(percentage)

	Job or Profession	Country's Economy	Consumer Prices	Underdeveloped Areas
Good Effect	17	40	22	22
Bad Effect	7	29	50	20
No Effect at All	63	12	12	28
Don't Know	13	19	16	30

* Weighted average

Question Wording: "In a little more detail, can you tell me, in each of the following cases, whether the Common Market has had a good effect, a bad effect, or no effect at all on your job or profession (or that of your wife or husband), (your country's) economy, consumer prices (in your country), underdeveloped areas (in your country)?"

country's economy, consumer prices and underdeveloped areas. In the Community as a whole, a clear majority felt that the Common Market had no effect at all on their job or profession. Similarly, on the subject of underdeveloped areas, a vast majority had either noticed no effect or failed to reply. The Common Market was viewed as having a good effect only on their country's economy and conversely, a bad effect on consumer prices. It is significant that the European Community is not seen as a major factor on a personal level, but, rather the general public tend to formulate attitudes based on the effects on their economy in general. The data suggests that supportive attitudes are perhaps rooted in a generalized awareness of the Community's effect on the national economy and not on personal experience. Further evidence on this point will now be examined.

In Table 4.5 public appraisal is related to the effects attributed to the Common Market. As a detailed inspection of these results shows, support orientation stems primarily from the public's perception of the Common Market's effect on their country's economy. Clearly 61 out of every 100 who are in favour of the Common Market also view it as having a good effect on their country's economy and conversely, 81 in every 100 non-supporters see it as having a bad effect. In addition, negative attitudes are related to the notion that the Common Market has had a bad effect on consumer prices

TABLE 4.5

Effects Attributed to the Common Market
Related to Public Appraisal of Common
Market Membership (European Community as a Whole)*

Fall 1976
(percentage)

Job or Profession	Country's Economy		Consumer Prices		Under-developed Areas	
	Good	Bad	Good	Bad	Good	Bad
25	3	61	15	34	32	15
2	23	5	81	2	8	44

Public Appraisal of
Their Nation's
Membership in the
European Community

Good Thing

Bad Thing

* Weighted average

Question Wording: "In a little more detail, can you tell me, in each of the following cases, whether the Common Market has had a good effect, a bad effect, or no effect at all on your job or profession, country's economy, consumer prices and underdeveloped areas?"

Note: Significance at .001 level

(90 in every 100). A further inspection of Table 4.5 does not reveal any other significant relationship between public appraisal and awareness of the effects attributed to the Common Market. In summary, the predispositions to favour the Common Market are related primarily to perceptions about the Common Market's effects on the economy. These findings point out a serious weakness of the Functionalists' and Neo-functionalists' argument. Underlying the "concept of learning process" is the assumption that support is transferred away from the nation-state to the supranational community as individuals identify the new source satisfying their welfare need. It is interesting to note that in the EC supportive attitudes are not necessarily based on personal experience, but rather, emerge from the perception that the nation-state itself benefits.

Public support of the EC for the sake of the nation-state refutes the functionalist and neofunctionalist zero-sum conception of attitude change, where loyalties transfer incrementally away from the nation-state to the new functional organizations. While this assumes that functional loyalties are indivisible the data, in contrast, indicate that national and supranational identifications are compatible. This finding supports the pluralist and federalist notion of multiple loyalties. According to Guetzkow:

Loyalty is not a single entity - once used up, then exhausted. It is, rather an expandable quantity which can be generated

in increasing amounts toward a variety of objects. Thus there is no need to think that increases in loyalty to a supranational group necessarily means decreases in loyalty to the nation-state.¹⁴

Also, Easton maintains that:

For a person to say that he is a Parisian, a Frenchman, and a European indicates three different levels of political community to which he simultaneously adheres. Each of these communities stands at a different systems level with each lower community nestling within its next higher suprasystem.¹⁵

A citizen, therefore, may be quite comfortable with multiple loyalties where "each object of loyalty," whether "national or supranational", serves different needs.¹⁶

Given that the business of the EC is largely economic, the first image appearing in people's minds at the mention of the Common Market should be one of economic activity. Thus satisfaction with Community performance is associated with a favourable appraisal of the Common Market's effect on the national economy. Conversely, dissatisfaction stems from the opposite view and, in addition, a fear that the Common Market has an adverse effect on consumer prices. In summary, utilitarian support rises to an impressive level in those countries that have experienced prolonged Community activities. Moreover, utilitarian support is sensitive to the overall attitude that people have about the Common Market's effect on their economy and not exclusively, as functionalists conceived, on rational cost-benefit calculations of individuals about the source satisfying their welfare needs.

Support of a utilitarian nature, according to some regional theorists, is linked to the ability of the supra-national community in satisfying welfare needs. As such, this support dimension should be sensitive to variations in the economic environment which effect the material well-being of the citizens within the community. Times of economic prosperity should, therefore, stimulate the growth of utilitarian support, whereas, a period of economic malaise may result in an opposite effect. On the former point, the data analysis and other sources suggest that the unprecedented economic growth in the Common Market countries during the first two decades of Community development helped to generate utilitarian support. According to Etzioni:

a) formation of the EEC coincided and in all likelihood contributed to the economic growth and general prosperity of the member countries, and

b) in the public mind this prosperity became more closely associated with the formation of the EEC than economic analysis would demonstrate. Citizens and elites of the member-states believed that they were benefiting from the union. There was a myth of utilitarian benefit above and beyond the actual utilitarian integrating power. 17

Whether the EC contribution to economic growth and general prosperity was myth or "reality", it may have had the effect of stimulating utilitarian sentiment. However, with the advent of the energy crisis in 1973, all nine Community countries have experienced a slowing in economic growth, a

rise in the cost of living and increasing unemployment.
~~What~~ impact has the current economic crisis had on
supportive attitudes for the EC?

The effect that variations in economic conditions have on utilitarian support levels will now be examined. Figure 4.1 plots the difference scores between those respondents feeling that their nation's membership is "a good thing" minus "a bad thing" in the original member countries and in each of the new member countries for the twelve time points that the Eurobarometer surveys were conducted. A detailed inspection of the graph shows a positive evaluation in the Six for each time point. In the case of Ireland although attitudes are consistently positive reflecting the preponderance of a supportive orientation, they do not achieve the high level found in the original member countries. Again a different pattern emerges in the United Kingdom and Denmark where public appraisals of the benefits of membership tend to shift between a positive and negative view. Furthermore, their support levels have shown greater variability through time. The graph reveals two distinct patterns. First the contrast between the original member countries and the three new member countries is striking. The trend line for the Six is ~~relatively~~ stable fluctuating roughly between a high support level of 50 to 60% over the twelve time points plotted. In the case of the other

FIGURE 4.1

Public Appraisal of Membership in
the European Community*
Fall 1973 - Spring 1979

* the graph plots the different scores: percentage saying their country's membership is a "good thing" minus percentage saying their country's membership is a "bad thing".

The Six - _____
Ireland - - - - -
United Kingdom - - - - -
Denmark - + + + +

countries the support level is markedly lower and the oscillations from one time point to the next are greater. The second pattern that is observed is the amount of similarity in the rise and fall of the scores. By and large favorable appraisal rises to a peak in the Fall 1975, falls to a lower level in 1976 and then gradually has increased during recent years. The two patterns indicate that on the one hand, the six original countries have been in the Common Market for such a long period of time that supportive attitudes are relatively stable and perhaps impervious to major change based on variations in immediate economic conditions. Conversely, the support levels in the three new member countries reflect the absence of a reservoir of support, indicating the greater susceptibility of attitudes to shift directions based on changing perceptions about the Common Market's performance. On the other hand, given the similarity in the oscillation of the scores in each of the nine countries, the overall pattern may be attributed to current economic conditions that have a common effect on the Community as a whole.

The preceding paragraph was directed at assessing the trend in public support for the performance of the European Community. The support level is impressive and relatively stable, particularly in the six founder states. The fact that the trend lines do not reveal a significant increase in utilitarian support over the last few years challenges the

contentions of some regional theorists about the nature of utilitarian support. Rather than becoming stronger or fluctuating in relation to economic disruptions, there is evidence to suggest that this support dimension has reached a plateau. Tables 4.6a and 4.6b reveal that the general public is becoming less optimistic about the future good effects the Common Market relationship will provide for their country. Two questions in the 1971 survey were aimed at evaluating the present (1971) and the perceived (the next 10-15 years) effects of the Common Market on their country. In the Spring 1979 survey, respondents were asked how they feel about their country's membership in the Common Market now and for the future. Both sets of questions probe a similar dimension. Put simply, the respondent has been asked to evaluate present performance of the Common Market and moreover, to express his expectations about the following ten to fifteen years.

A detailed inspection of the two difference columns in Table 4.6a shows that in 1971 both perceived and expected effects of Common Market membership are positive. Clearly, the mass public in the five countries studied are generally satisfied with the past performance of the Common Market and seem convinced that the same will hold true for the future. Table 4.6b reveals a similar pattern in the Spring 1979, particularly for the general public in the six original member-states. There is a positive appraisal of Common Market

2

TABLE 4.6a

Public Appraisal of Common Market Membership

Present and Future

1971

(percentage)

	A Present			B Next 10-15 years			Expectations
	Good	Not Good	D	Good	Not Good	D	DB - DA
Netherlands	39	17	+22	47	13	+34	+12
Belgium	34	10	+24	44	7	+37	+13
France	27	12	+15	46	7	+39	+24
Italy	36	8	+28	51	4	+47	+19
Germany	54	14	+40	61	11	+50	+10

Question Wording:

A - "Have you had the impression until now that the Common Market has had on your province a very good influence, a rather good influence, no influence or a rather bad influence, very bad influence?"

B - "In the coming 10 to 15 years do you think that the Common Market will have on your province ...?"

Good = very good influence + rather good influence

Not Good = rather bad influence + very bad influence.

TABLE 4.6b
SPRING 1979

	A Present			B Next 10-15 years			Expectations
	Good	Bad	D	Good	Bad	D	DB - DA
Belgium	65	2	+63	61	3	+58	-5
Germany	66	5	+61	66	4	+62	+1
France	56	8	+48	49	6	+43	-5
Italy	78	2	+76	73	1	+72	-4
Luxembourg	83	3	+80	81	3	+78	-2
Netherlands	84	2	+82	80	2	+78	-4
Ireland	54	14	+40	55	10	+45	+5
Denmark	37	25	+12	30	19	+11	-1
United Kingdom	33	34	-1	41	25	+16	+17

Question Wording:

A - "Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the Common Market is a good thing?"

B - "And do you think that membership of the Common Market is a good thing ... in the light of (your country's) future in the next 10 to 15 years?"

membership, and a judgement that membership is a good thing in light of their country's future in the next ten to fifteen years. However, there is a difference in the perceived present good effects of the Common Market, compared to the expectations about the future performance of the system during the two time periods. The expectation column (expected-present effects) reveals that in 1971 the public in each of these five countries see the Common Market having even better effects in their province in the next ten to fifteen years. This is not the case in the Spring 1979 when expectations about the future are not as predominant. Only the British public see a positive aspect for the future which is not surprising given the present negative appraisal of membership in the United Kingdom. The difference in expectation scores between 1971 and the Spring 1979 can be explained by the fact that the evaluation of the present effects of the Common Market are higher in recent years. However, it is interesting that the European citizenry are not presently as optimistic, as they were in 1971, in terms of expectations about the future benefits of European integration. In summary, in the Six utilitarian support has reached a positive plateau, and in light of the current adverse economic conditions, there is little hope that Common Market membership will provide relief for their nation-state. The mass public in the three new member countries are largely skeptical of present benefits, with only the British anticipating that membership will be better for their country in the future.

Affective Systemic Support

Our next task is to examine the degree of affective support commanded by the EC. This type of support is not contingent on specific inducements or rewards but derives from an emotive attachment to the political system. In this respect affective support refers to nonutilitarian attitudes - those attitudes expressive of a diffuse, and perhaps emotional response to some of the vague ideals of unity embodied in the EC. According to Almond and Verba "the state of feeling or political emotion in a country is perhaps the most important test of the legitimacy of its political system - it is also the most important measure of political alienation and aspirations."¹⁸ Easton also pointed out that "the most stable support derives from the conviction on the part of the members that it is right and proper for him to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime."¹⁹ Therefore, a high degree of affective systemic support suggests a deep-seated and, because of its emotive origins, perhaps a stable attachment to the EC.

Nearly everywhere, except in Denmark, an absolute majority are in favor of the efforts being made to unify Western Europe. This pattern is displayed in Table 4.7 as a full three-quarters (75%) of those surveyed were for and only one out of every ten (11%) were against the unification issue in the Community as a whole. These results suggest a

TABLE 4.7

General Attitudes Towards the Unification
of Western Europe
Spring 1979
(percentage)

	For	Against	Don't Know	Difference
Luxembourg	89	6	5	83
Italy	87	4	9	83
Netherlands	84	8	8	76
Germany	82	7	11	75
Belgium	71	7	22	64
France	72	10	18	62
Ireland	64	7	25	57
United Kingdom	61	20	19	41
Denmark	49	31	20	18
EC*	75	11	14	64

Difference = For - against

* Each national sample weighted in proportion to that nation's population.

Question: "In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe?" If for: are you very much for this, or only to some extent? If against: are you only to some extent against, or very much against?

For = very much for + to some extent for

Against = very much against + to some extent against.

strong emotional identification with the European cause. A country-by-country analysis however, reveals a noticeable difference in supportive attitudes between the Six and the three new member-states. In Table 4.7 each country has been rank ordered according to the difference scores (For - Against) revealing a now familiar pattern. The proportion of positive scores are higher in the original member-states than in the new member-states. On average two out of ten interviewed in the United Kingdom and three out of ten in Denmark were against the efforts to unify Europe. Clearly, the general public in the three new member-states, although generally supportive toward European Union, had not achieved the high positive support levels exhibited by the public in the six founder states.

This question about efforts to unify Western Europe has been asked in four countries - Britain, France, Italy and Germany - over a period of twenty-seven years. A series of United States Information Agency Surveys conducted in the 1950's and 1960's asked basically the same question as did two Eurobarometer surveys in the Autumn 1978 and the Spring 1979. In addition, some of the other Eurobarometer surveys repeated the question in a modified form. This version was:

"Would you say that you are very favourable, rather favourable, indifferent, unfavourable, or very unfavourable to European unification?"

Figure 4.2 shows that as early as the Fall 1952 the idea of unifying Western Europe received widespread endorsement

FIGURE 4.2

Long-term evolution of favorable attitudes towards the
unification of Western Europe

Germany - ———

France - - - - -

Italy - ————

GB/UK -
S

* Great Britain from 1952 to 1974; United Kingdom as from 1975
}

by the public in these four countries. Seven out of ten Germans interviewed were in favour of the unification of Europe and supportive attitudes in the other three countries were expressed by six out of ten. The majority opinion, even before the formal establishment of supranational institutions, reflect in deep-seated commitment to the European cause.

A detailed inspection of the graph reveals an interesting pattern. It is worth noting that in the period prior to 1958 - the year the Common Market was launched - supportive attitudes tended to shift or change together in all these countries. In 1952, when the idea of unifying Western Europe perhaps brought to mind the European Coal and Steel Community, the British public seemed to be as pro-European as their continental neighbours. Indeed, right up until the establishment of the Common Market, British public opinion is practically indistinguishable from public opinion in the other countries. The most plausible reason, advanced in the literature,²⁰ to explain this pattern is that the European public were reacting jointly to current events. Accordingly, events such as the Korean War, the achievements reached with the Coal and Steel Community, the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the Suez crisis provided the stimulus or the incentives to seek union. On the other hand, an event like the failure of the European Defense Community had the opposite effect, resulting in an overall decline in support. In any case, about 1958 the pattern changes

with French, German and Italian opinion converging upwards, and British opinion declining, becoming less supportive. The British government's rejection of Common Market membership was reflected in a downturn in public support for unifying Western Europe. This has meant that in the 1960's and early part of the 1970's a gap has emerged in supportive attitudes between the public of those countries that find themselves in the system, and those like the British that had remained on the outside. Since Britain joined in 1973, there has been an increase in support.

The magnitude of the change in favorable attitudes over time is shown in Table 4.8. In the twenty-one year period between 1952 and 1973 support levels have increased substantially in Germany, France and Italy. Conversely, the British support level drops dramatically by -21% over the same period. Between 1973 - the year Britain became a member of the Common Market - and 1979 there is striking upward swing of opinion converging towards the other three countries. Although there still remains a relative gap in supportive sentiment between the new and old member-states, the trend lines (see Figure 4.2) suggest the growth of an overall pro-European consensus.

The affective support indicator introduced in the preceding section measures a general emotional backing for or against unifying Western Europe. The data analysis revealed a positive balance of responses over the last twenty-

TABLE 4.8

Change in Favorable Attitudes Towards
the Unification of Western Europe
(percentage)

	A	B	C	D	E
	1952	1973	1979	B-A	C-B
Germany	70	78	82	+8	+4
France	60	68	72	+8	+4
Italy	57	70	87	+13	+17
GB/UK	58	37	61	-21	+24

seven years suggesting the growth of affect support for the European idea. There is a problem, however, in relating these findings about affectivity to the Common Market. The wording format of the question is so general that many of the respondents may have only a vague idea of what they are actually supporting. Therefore, it can not be inferred that the idea of unifying Europe immediately produces the image in peoples minds of the European Community. If this is the case, support for the European idea may not mirror support for the Common Market. More clear-cut questions will be used to examine whether the European people support the idea of unification with the Common Market explicitly in mind. The following paragraphs offer a more detailed picture of exactly how the various European publics feel about European integration in relation to the European Community.

In some of the European Community surveys from 1973 to 1979, the publics were asked:

"Some people consider the Common Market as being a first step towards a closer union between the Member-States. Personally, do you yourself think the movement towards the unification of Europe should be speeded-up, slowed down, or continued as it is at present?"

Figure 4.3 displays the results for the Community as a whole, from the Fall 1973 to the Spring 1979. Until recently the majority opinion clearly favored speeding-up the movement towards European union. Furthermore, the two

FIGURE 4.3

Speedup, Continue as at Present, or
Slowdown the Movement towards European Unification
European Community as a Whole*

Question Wording: "Some people consider the Common Market as a first step towards a closer union between the member states. Personally, do you yourself think the movement towards the unification of Europe should be speeded up, slowed down, or continued as it is at present?"

* weighted average

Speeded up - - - - -

Continue as at present - - - - -

Slowdown - - - - -

supportive categories - speeding-up or continue as it is at present - predominate over the non-supportive category - slowing down. By and large, public opinion has been relatively stable on these items until recently when a transposition took place, with the advocates of continuing the present process becoming more numerous than the proponents of speeding up. The shift to a more conservative opinion is better illustrated in Table 4.9, which provides a country-by-country analysis. In the Fall 1978 five countries favoured speeding-up compared to four countries that were satisfied with continuing at the same pace. By the Spring 1979 the publics of France, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg opted for the more conservative option leaving the Italians as the sole advocates of the extremist view. In summary, there has been a recent change-over in the balance of opinion, from accelerating the integrative process, toward maintaining the status quo. The affective links, however, appear to remain strong. Indeed, very few people think the movement towards unification should be slowed down (an average one out of every ten in the Community).

So far the data analysis indicates overall public support for past efforts to unite Western Europe and the growth of support for maintaining the status quo. There is also evidence to suggest support for the future evolution of the Common Market towards European political union. The public

TABLE 4.9

Percentage "For" Three Views About
the Movement Towards European Union

	<u>Fall 1978</u>	<u>Spring 1979</u>
1. Majority "Favour Speeding up"	France 40 Belgium 37 Italy 59 Germany 38 Luxembourg 40	Italy 55
2. Majority "Favour Continuing as at present"	Netherlands 46 Ireland 47 Denmark 47 United Kingdom 52	Netherlands 46 Ireland 47 Denmark 43 United Kingdom 40 France 47 Germany 46 Belgium 43 Luxembourg 49
3. Sizeable Minority "Favour Slowing down"	Denmark 27	Denmark 28 United Kingdom 18

in the nine nations have been asked:

"There is a proposal to create a European political union among the member countries of the Community by 1980, with a European government which would decide on major issues and a European Parliament to monitor its activities. Do you approve or disapprove of this plan for European political union?"

When this question was asked in the Fall 1975, it referred to the Tindeman's report on ways of forging European union. But the idea has been a long term aim in the Community and, therefore, the public has been asked about political union during earlier surveys. Although the Tindeman Report was endorsed by the leaders of the nine nations at a European Summit in 1976, it has not resulted in much progress toward supranational unification among the nine. Surprisingly, the reluctance of national leaders to take substantive steps towards forging a more binding union in the nature of a genuine European federation does not appear to have adverse effects on the level of public support for the idea. Table 4.10 shows the percentage in favour of European political union, in each nation, for the six time points at which the question was included in the European Community surveys. In the Community as a whole an absolute majority support the evolution of the Common Market into a European government. Public support in the six founder states is overwhelming considering the caution with which the national leaders have approached the issue, whereas, the public in Denmark and the United Kingdom tend towards a non-

TABLE 4.10

Percentage for the Evolution of the Common Market
Towards European Political Union

	France	Belgium	Netherlands	Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Denmark	Ireland	United Kingdom	EC*
Fall 1970	63	62	75	70	77				26	
1971	50	51	68	72	72					
Fall 1973	57	58	55	70	65	69	28	45	26	54
Spring 1975	66	51	54	70	71	71	21	37	36	59
Fall 1975	66	52	52	67	77	75	21	49	34	59
Spring 1976	58	55	68	64	71	71	24	44	34	57

Question Wording:

Fall 1970 - "Are you for or against the evolution of the Common Market toward the political form of a United States of Europe?"

Fall 1973 - "Are you, yourself, for or against the Common Market developing into a political European union?"

Fall 1975 - "There is a proposal to create a European Political Union amongst the member countries of the Community by 1980 with a European Government which would decide on major issues and a European Parliament to monitor its activities. Do you approve or disapprove of this plan for European political union?"

* weighted average

support orientation. Even more striking than the high support level in the Six in favour of European union, is the degree to which the European public are willing to see the Union undertake important tasks. Table 4.11 shows that in the Spring 1976 a vast majority endorse common policy making for four precise areas - foreign policy, economic and monetary policy, regional and social policy and protection of fundamental rights.

Affective support has emerged for past, present and future phases of European integration. Moreover, the European public tend to surpass their national leaders in willingness to move toward greater supranationalism. Clearly, the European Community has been able to generate affective appeal. The final issue which will be examined and which is perhaps the most sensitive indicator of pro-European sentiment concerns the recent direct elections to the European Parliament. This is a subject about which the general public should be relatively well-informed for it has been a matter of public debate over the years. Indeed the concept of holding direct elections has evolved from a hypothetical proposal - prior to its official endorsement by Community leaders in the Fall 1976 - to an actual reality - in June 1979. During this period Community institutions attempted to increase public awareness of both the existence and functions of the European Community, and the necessity of participating in the elections. In particular, the Commission addressed itself to the creation

TABLE 4.11

Percentage for Principal Aspects of the
European Political Union*
Spring 1976

	France	Belgium	Netherlands	Italy	Luxembourg	Germany	Ireland	Denmark	U.K.	EC
Common Foreign Policy:										
For:	64	57	66	66	79	74	65	37	56	65
Against:	18	11	16	14	6	14	14	42	36	18
Difference	+46	+46	+50	+52	+73	+60	+51	- 5	+20	+47
Common Economic and Monetary Policy:										
For:	75	65	72	75	81	70	70	41	57	68
Against:	12	7	10	8	5	20	13	38	27	17
Difference	+63	+48	+62	+67	+76	+50	+57	+ 3	+30	+51
Common Regional and Social Policy:										
For:	77	63	79	76	79	62	73	49	57	67
Against:	9	7	7	8	7	23	10	29	23	16
Difference	+68	+56	+62	+68	+72	+39	+63	+20	+34	+51
Protection of Fundamental Rights:										
For:	69	62	73	71	83	76	77	42	62	69
Against:	15	6	12	9	4	12	9	34	23	15
Difference	+54	+56	+61	+62	+79	+64	+68	+ 8	+39	+54

* No Reply are not shown

Question Wording: "Here is a list of important aspects of the idea of European political union, which is at present being discussed. Could you please tell me, for each of these aspects, whether you agree totally, agree on the whole or disagree totally?"

of a Citizen's Europe by fostering support for the European Community. Furthermore, Community decision-makers viewed the elections as a means of stimulating a sense of common identity among the electors by making the Community a "practical reality in terms of everyday life". In addition, the Commission's informational role was supplemented by political parties in each of the nine nations and transnational party groups, engaged in the election campaign, who attempted to focus the public's attention on European issues. It seems reasonable to believe that this increase in activity, directed towards increased exposure of the European Community, would have a repercussion on the centrality of attitudes about European affairs in the minds of the public. Thus it could be argued, tentatively at least, that direct elections to the European Parliament while politicizing Community issues, perhaps engendered a growth in support for European institutions.

Figure 4.4 shows the direction of support "for" a directly elected European Parliament, in the Six and each of the new member states, for each of the twelve time points at which the European Community surveys have been conducted. It is worth noting that the wording format of the question has changed over time to reflect current events. However, the question has been designed to gauge one specific dimension - public support or opposition to a directly elected European Parliament. A detailed inspection of Figure 4.4 shows a

FIGURE 4.4

Long Term Trends in Favourable Attitude

Towards the Election of the European Parliament

The Six - —————
Ireland - - - - -
U.K. - - - - -
Denmark -

Question Wording:

Fall of 1973 - "Are you for or against the election of a European Parliament by a popular vote of all the citizens in the member-states of the European Community?"

Spring 1975 - "One of the main proposals is to elect a European Parliament in May 1978, by a popular vote of all the citizens in the member-states of the European Community (Common Market). Are you, yourself, for or against this proposal?"

Fall 1976 - "The governments of the member countries of the Common Market have reached agreement to hold the first elections to the European Parliament by universal suffrage, this is, by direct vote of all citizens, in May, 1978. Are you, yourself for or against

this particular election."
Fall 1978 - "In June of next year the citizens of countries
belonging to the European Community, including (your country)
will be asked to vote to elect members to the European
Parliament. Everybody will be entitled to vote. Are you,
yourself, for or against this particular election?"

dramatic upward convergence of opinion in the three new member countries towards the high positive support level found in the six original member states. This public opinion trend is striking, taking into account the divergence in opinion mentioned in the preceding sections, between new and old member states. Public opinion in the original six member states changed gradually in an upward direction, whereas, opinion in the other countries experienced a more impressive rate of change towards pro-European sentiment. Table 4.12a & b shows the difference in percentage for or against direct election in the Fall 1973 and the Spring 1979. In the Fall 1973 there is a marked preponderance of favourable opinion in the original six member-states. In contrast, the majority in Britain and Denmark opposed European elections. The data displayed for the Spring 1979 show a dramatic change. Public support for holding such elections has experienced impressive growth in each of the nine nations. In the Community as a whole, support was voiced by 74%, an increase from 54% in 1973. In each nation support outweighed opposition exceeding 80% in four countries (Netherlands, Italy, Luxembourg and Germany). The public in Britain and Denmark are no longer against the election as an average six out of every ten respondents express their support.

In conclusion, the preceding data analysis suggests that affective support is present for past, present and future

TABLE 4.12a

For or Against the Election of the European
Parliament by Direct Universal Suffrage

Fall 1973
(percentage)

	France	Belgium	Netherlands	Italy	Luxembourg	Germany	Ireland	Denmark	U.K.	EC
For	51	52	62	64	67	69	45	36	33	54
Against	18	14	16	12	12	12	31	43	49	23
Don't Know	31	34	22	24	21	19	24	21	18	23
Difference	+33	+38	+46	+52	+55	+57	+14	- 7	-16	+31

TABLE 4.12b

Spring 1979

For	71	62	84	85	86	80	72	58	61	74
Against	13	16	6	6	8	6	8	17	17	11
Don't Know	16	22	10	9	10	14	20	25	22	15
Difference	+58	+46	+76	+79	+78	+74	+64	+41	+44	+59

aspects of European integration. Moreover, when national leaders become actively involved in influencing public opinion it is clear that the Community is capable of generating increasingly high levels of affective support, even in the three new member countries where support tends to be low.

The Interrelationship Between Supportive Dimensions

The dimensions of support describe the mass public's evaluative and emotive orientations towards the EC and the process of European unification. It is worthwhile noting again that an individual's loyalty or support can be categorized into support of a utilitarian and affective nature. However, this distinction is for analytic purposes because the two sources of support are not unrelated. While Functionalists and Neofunctionalists conceived of a separability between the two support dimensions, they also envisage a sequence in which utilitarian support precedes affectivity. Once a functionally specific organization emerges it can become the stimuli for the growth of a sense of community. The first type of support that the members develop is utilitarian as they experience the various advantages that result from successful performance. Thus people base their initial support on their perceptions about the benefits and gains arising from the new organization. Support based on feelings of affection, confidence or trust comes later and to some extent, is a result of the increasing

levels of utilitarian sentiment. In this respect, utilitarian support may precede and become a condition for the growth of affective sentiment. Given that affective support emerges gradually, over a long period of time, as a consequence of prolonged utility, it is further argued that it will serve as a reservoir of support during periods of uncertain economic conditions when outputs are perceived with dissatisfaction. A citizen, once imbued with an affective attachment to the wider political system, may be willing to accept personal disadvantage or the diminution of the traditional authority of the nation-state to the new decision-making structures. According to Easton "such an orientation would explain the readiness of an individual to tolerate outputs that are perceived to run contrary to his wants and demands."²¹ In summary, the continuous satisfaction of utilitarian interests leads to the stimulation of affective links which become independent from the effects of daily performance.

According to R. Shepherd "the EC has been concerned with economic integration and it should therefore follow that support will be mainly utilitarian, with economic self interest predominating over political self interest."²² The data analysis however, shows considerable growth in both utilitarian and affective support. In recent years utilitarian support has achieved a high positive level in the original six countries, while it is less pronounced and far more volatile in the new

member-states. Moreover, affective support has generally approached higher positive levels in each of the nine countries. The difference in the trends in support dimensions is better illustrated in Figure 4.5. The graph plots the net scores for each of three support measures, by combining the favourable responses and then subtracting the unfavorable responses, over twelve time points, for the Community as a whole. A positive swing is particularly marked on the question about direct elections to the European Parliament. Indeed in the Fall 1973 this item was the least popular, falling far below the net scores for the utilitarian support measure. By the Spring 1976 more people were in favour of direct elections than felt their country benefited from Common Market membership. Again, for the Community as a whole, affective support for the Common Market has become more pronounced than the general public perceptions of gain. In the seven years studied support for the idea of European unification has remained positive and relatively stable. In addition, the trend line for support of direct elections has been gradually converging upwards towards the support level of the other affective indicator. The graph reveals a different pattern for the utilitarian support measure. There is a definite rise and fall of attitudes toward Common Market membership that does not parallel the trend in affective support. The Common Market may have been successful in building up a reservoir of "diffuse"

FIGURE 4.5

Long Term Trends in Affective and Utilitarian
Support for the European Community
(Net Responses)

Public evaluation of Common Market Membership - —————

Attitudes about Direct Elections - - - - -

Attitudes about Unifying Western Europe - ——— - ———

TABLE 4.13

For or Against the Election of the European
Parliament by Direct Universal Suffrage
Related to Opinion on the Common Market

(Community as a Whole)*
(percentage)

Fall 1976

Think the Common

Market is:

a good thing

a bad thing

FOR	AGAINST
94	6
46	54

* weighted average

Note: Significance at the .001 level

or "affect" support that is not contingent on attitudes that are more utilitarian in nature. In practice this means that a downturn in support based on public dissatisfaction with Common Market activities may not immediately translate to a decrease in the level of general attachment to the European Community. This possibility is reflected in Table 4.13 which relates attitudes about direct elections to public appraisal of Common Market membership in the Fall 1976. The relationship is not symmetrical. Almost all those who considered the Common Market "a good thing" supported the proposal for a directly elected European Parliament (94%). But, a substantial 46% of those who do not favour Common Market membership also supported the direct elections. The relationship suggests that a large proportion of the mass public in the nine nations extend affective support towards the European Community institutions in the absence of satisfactions over Community performance. However, the trends in supportive attitudes in each of the nine nations show some interesting national variations from the general pattern.

Figures 4.6 a - i show the trends in public opinion for each of the nine nations from the Fall 1973 to the Spring 1979. Each graph displays the percentage difference, in terms of "for" minus "against" responses, for two attitudinal support indicators - public attitudes about direct elections and public appraisal of Common Market membership. These graphs

FIGURE 4.6a

Long Term Trends in Affective and Utilitarian
Support for Each of the Nine Nations
(Net Responses)

FIGURE 4.6b

Long Term Trends in Affective and Utilitarian
Support for Each of the Nine Nations
(Net Responses)

Common Market Membership - —————

Direct Elections - - - - -

FIGURE 4.6C

Long Term Trends in Affective and Utilitarian
Support for Each of the Nine Nations
(Net Responses)

Netherlands

Common Market Membership - —————

Direct Elections - - - - -

FIGURE 4.6d

Long Term Trends in Affective and Utilitarian
Support for Each of the Nine Nations

(Net Responses)

Germany

Common Market Membership - —————

Direct Elections - - - - -

FIGURE 4.6e

Long Term Trends in Affective and Utilitarian
Support for Each of the Nine Nations
(Net Responses)

FIGURE 4.6f

Long Term Trends in Affective and Utilitarian
Support for Each of the Nine Nations
(Net Responses)

Italy

Common Market Membership - —————

Direct Elections - - - - -

FIGURE 4.6g

Long Term Trends in Affective and Utilitarian
Support for Each of the Nine Nations
(Net Responses)

Common Market Membership - ———

Direct Elections - - - - -

FIGURE 4.6h

Long Term Trends in Affective and Utilitarian
Support for Each of the Nine Nations

(Net Responses)

Denmark

FIGURE 4.6 i

Long Term Trends in Affective and Utilitarian
Support for Each of the Nine Nations
(Net Responses)

United Kingdom

reveal a pattern that is not apparent in the data when looking at the weighted average for the Community as a whole. Again, the difference is between supportive attitudes in the six original member-states and the three new member-states. In France, Germany and Italy affect support levels tend to be higher than utilitarian support levels. The opposite is true in Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The gap between the support levels, however, is not well defined and in most of these countries the preponderance of one support dimension over the other is almost evenly balanced. Moreover, there is a certain parallelism in the rise and fall of the utilitarian and affective measures in each of the nine countries. Though there are some cross-national differences, particularly in the magnitude and frequency of oscillations, in general, both support dimensions seem to rise and fall at about the same time. A different pattern is found in the three new member-states.

An inspection of Figures 4.6 g - i show that in each of the new member countries the space between the support levels is greater than that found in any of the other countries, and the height of the two support levels are noticeably lower. Also, the entire seven years could be broken into two periods that describe different patterns. Between the Fall 1973 and 1976 public appraisal of Common Market membership outweighed support for the proposal of a directly elected European

parliament. In fact, in this period the public of Denmark and the United Kingdom were largely opposed to direct elections, whereas, there was a preponderance of favorable appraisal of Common Market membership. These support levels are not surprising. The mass public in these three countries had just joined the European Community and undoubtedly felt that there should be some advantages from membership. On the other hand, their unfamiliarity with common supranational institutions may have made them particularly suspicious and therefore opposed to changes in the existing Community structure. The second period, from 1976 to the Spring 1979, saw a sharply rising trend in favorable opinion toward direct elections that has far surpassed the utilitarian support level, which has tended to decline or remain static. The rise in the level of affective support occurred about the same time that the national leaders officially endorsed the proposal for holding such elections. Although it is impossible to establish a causal linkage, it is plausible that increasing trends in affective support may be attributed to the positive actions taken by the national elite to inform and influence the mass public in each of the nine nations about direct elections.

A clear picture of the cross-national differences in supportive attitudes (new versus old membership) and the direction and overall extent of change of the support dimensions between 1973 and 1979 is provided in Figure 4.7. Figure 4.7

FIGURE 4.7

Linear Trends in Affective and Utilitarian Support

x The standard formula for "least squares" linear regression"

$$y = a + bt$$

where, in this case, y is the level of utilitarian or affective support, t is the time dimension measured in months (1 = September 1973 to 68 = May 1979), a is the height of the trend line on the vertical axis at $t = 0$, and b is the average monthly change in y .

The formula for the Six:

utilitarian support	$y = 59.57 - .0373t$
affective support	$y = 51.09 + .2502t$

for the United Kingdom:

utilitarian support	$y = 10.3168 - .092t$
affective support	$y = -22.5 + 1.146t$

The idea for this approach was taken from R.L. Merritt and D.J. Puchala, eds., Western European Perspectives in International Affairs, p. 121.

displays the linear regression trend lines for the two support measures in the case of the six original member-states (weighted average), and the United Kingdom. The technique of linear regression is employed here to remove the short term oscillations in the data (net response scores at each time point) in order to reveal the underlying trend. Once again a considerable gap in supportive attitudes between the Six and a new member state is noticeable in the Fall 1973. Through time, the utilitarian and affective support trend lines have moved in opposite directions. In both the Six and the United Kingdom the trend in utilitarian support has been downward (an average monthly change of $-.0372$ percent and $-.092$ percent respectively) at about the same average rate so that the gap between their support levels has remained relatively constant. Since the decline in support is not precipitous those publics in the six original member-states that were already strongly favorable to membership in 1973 remained relatively favorable. The same cannot be said about the British public. Public evaluation of EEC membership was not very favorable in 1973 and it had become a little less so by the Spring 1979. In contrast, favorable attitudes towards direct elections have risen slightly in the six original member-states, and rather impressively in the United Kingdom. The rise in affective support in the United Kingdom is striking. From a preponderance of unfavorable opinion about direct elections in 1973 British

public opinion shifted dramatically upward towards the high support levels characteristic of the six founder states. It is clear that the Community is capable of generating affective support in the absence of strong utilitarian links. However, the presence of affective support, that cannot be traced back to satisfactions of a utilitarian nature at some earlier time, may not be a salient measure of the actual degree of attachment people feel towards the Community. Some evidence is offered in Table 4.14.

In the Fall 1976 the public in each of the nine nations were asked:

"All in all, if (your country) were not a member of the Common Market, do you think that for us things would go much better, a bit better, a bit worse, much worse?"

Table 4.14 shows that the majority opinion in the six founder states, where utilitarian and affective support are relatively high, is that it is better to be inside than outside, and that without the Common Market things would be worse. It is worth noting that in France, Belgium and Germany a sizeable minority were ambivalent, answering that things would be neither better nor worse if their country were not a member of the Community. This relative indifference may be related to the slight decline, noted in utilitarian support and the overall pessimism about future benefits of EC membership. In the United Kingdom and Denmark the unfavorable view prevailed. That a majority thought things would be better outside the Common Market shows that the

TABLE 4.14

Would Things go Better or Worse if Your Country
Were Not a Member of the European Community

Fall 1976
(percentage)

	France	Belgium	Netherlands	Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Ireland	Denmark	U.K.
Feel that things would be worse:									
much worse	6	16	22	5	20	45	24	6	12
a bit worse	<u>28</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>18</u>
Total (a)	34	45	60	36	59	63	49	29	30
Feel that things would be better:									
much better	3	2	3	5	4	5	13	6	19
a bit better	<u>17</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>31</u>
Total (b)	20	12	17	27	15	16	34	40	50
No Difference	30	24	11	25	12	11	10	16	12
Don't Know	16	19	13	13	14	10	7	14	8
Difference (a) - (b):	+14	+33	+43	+9	+44	+45	+15	-11	-20

Question Wording: "All in all, if (your country) were not a member of the Common Market, do you think that for us things would go much better, a bit better, a bit worse, much worse?"

growth in affective support does not necessarily override dissatisfaction with Community performance. Clearly, the public in the new member-states feel that national interests may be better realized outside the present Community framework.

The main findings about the relationship between affective and utilitarian support can be summarized under the following points:

1. There are significant cross-national differences in support levels (utilitarian and affective) that may be based on the length of time of membership in the European Community.
2. Affective support for European union and European institutions have become greater than utilitarian support for the Common Market although the distinction is not clear in the original six member-states.
3. There has been a trend toward upward convergence in affective support in each of the nine nations whereas utilitarian support, which has achieved high levels in the six original countries and far lower levels in the three new countries, has declined slightly or remained static.
4. Increased affective support for the European Community does not seem to have been adversely effected by the decline in utilitarian support.
5. The relationships between the support dimensions are related to the perception that the European Community seems to have had a positive economic effect on the individuals nation-state.

In conclusion, the data analysis raises a perplexing question as to what the actual extent of the European public's commitment is to European integration and the European

Community? It has been noted that affective and utilitarian supports have emerged and that they are quite strong, particularly in the six founder states. Moreover, we have an idea of the trend in supportive attitudes and a basic understanding of the relationship between affect and utility. Support for the EC has been building over a long period of time and it has reached a relatively high positive level in the six original member-states. Although public evaluations of EC membership declined slightly from 1973 to 1979 outright opposition remained minimal. The pattern is significantly different in the three new member countries. Here the absence of strong utilitarian support has not impeded the rise in affective sentiment. This implies, contrary to the Functionalists' and Neofunctionalists' argument, that the satisfaction of utilitarian needs is not necessarily requisite for the stimulation of affective attachment to the EC. As Lodge has suggested "citizen's emotional ties to the supranational community will depend upon the stimulation of affective-identificational links which may be independent of, rather than necessarily consequent upon, the satisfaction of utilitarian interests."²³ The EC, in the case of direct elections, has been able to increase its visibility thereby encouraging the development of affective links.

Although the data analysis is suggestive of generally favorable attitudes, particularly among the mass public of

the six original members, there are limitations to the degree of public support commanded by the Community. It would be a mistake to conclude that people in the Six are unconditional Europeans, committed totally to European integration, whereas, people in the other countries are not yet instilled, because of recent entry, with a truly European outlook. Support breaks down in the face of demands that require definite personal sacrifice. Table 4.15 displays the results of a question taken in the Fall 1975 in the nine nations, which asked:

"Would you, or would you not, be willing to make some personal sacrifice, for example, pay a little more taxes to bring about the unification of Europe?"

In all of the nine countries respondents were clearly unwilling to pay more taxes for the sake of European integration. In fact, the idea of paying higher taxes proved unpopular even among the most pro-European people. This relationship is shown in Table 4.16. Though the people that support the two measures are more willing to make personal sacrifices than the non-supporters, the unfavourable view prevailed.

To some extent, the negativism towards a European tax derives from the heavy national tax burden of the citizen's in each of these countries. For example, the cost of social welfare programs in Belgium in 1979 was 46 percent of workers' wages with the workers contributions slightly less than half and the employers the rest.²⁴ Consideration of this existing tax burden suggests that citizens would oppose the imposition

TABLE 4.15

Willingness to Make Personal Sacrifices

Fall 1975

(percentage)

	France	Belgium	Netherlands	Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Denmark	Ireland	U.K.
Willing	27	18	30	27	35	22	16	26	19
Not Willing	67	74	50	69	58	69	72	67	75
Difference	-40	-56	-20	-42	-23	-47	-56	-41	-56

Question Wording: "Would you, or would you not, be willing to make some personal sacrifice, for example, pay a little more taxes to bring about the unification of Europe?"

TABLE 4.16

Willingness to Make a Personal Sacrifice Related
To Utilitarian and Affective Support Measures

Fall 1975 (percentage)

	The Six				The Three				EC			
	A		B		A		B		A		B	
	G	B	F	A	G	B	F	A	G	B	F	A
Willing	41	10	40	11	33	8	38	7	40	9	39	8
Not Willing	59	90	60	89	67	92	62	93	60	91	61	92

A = Is EEC Membership Good (G) or Bad (B) ?

B = Is the Respondent in favour of a directly elected
European Parliament For (F) or Against (A) ?

Note: Significance at .001 level

of further taxation at the supranational as well as national levels. However, the data do indicate that supportive attitudes will change significantly, in a downward direction when the question becomes salient to the individuals' particular interests. The implications of this, according to R. Inglehart, is that "if it were generally felt that the Community had fundamentally negative economic effects, the Community would become generally unpopular."²⁵ But the EC has not been viewed as having either a significant or negative economic effect on its' citizens. Some evidence was provided (see p. 78) that support stems primarily from perceptions about the effect of the Common Market on the economy, in general, and not on personal experience. Moreover, a majority of people particularly in the six original member-states feel that the EC has had positive economic effects on their nation-state. Current economic problems do not seem to have had an overwhelming impact on the utilitarian support levels, except in the three new member countries which lack experience with the benefits viewed as accruing from membership. Therefore, if the mass public continues to feel that the EC will have neutral or positive economic effects on their nation-state and their personal lives, actual behaviour will continue to be based on generally favourable attitudes toward the Community.

In Britain and Denmark where support levels are problematic a comprehensive program by Community institutions

to increase EC visibility would have the effect of stimulating popular identifications. In particular, the European Parliament can play an important role in the promotion and creation of affective-identitive support for the EC.

Notes

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9. see Wildgen and Feld, p. 80. R. Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), and R. Inglehart, "Economic Uncertainty and European Solidarity: Public Opinion Trends", American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 440 (November 1978).
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21. Easton, p. 272.

22. R. Shepherd, Public Opinion and European Integration, p. 94.

23. Lodge, p. 240.

24. M. Seeger, "Social Welfare Costs Strain Coffers of Four European Countries", Toronto Star (March 16, 1980), p. 15.

25. R. Inglehart, The Silent Revolution, p. 356.

CHAPTER V

THE DETERMINANTS OF EUROPEANISM: INDIVIDUAL LEVEL DIFFERENCES IN SUPPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Chapter IV shows that impressive growth in public support for the European Community took place during the last three decades. Analysis of public opinion survey data reveals variations in public attitudes across time and considerable cross-national differences in support levels for the EC polity. After the founding of the EEC in 1958 support for European integration among the publics of the original six member states showed a clear tendency towards upward convergence. Conversely, there is evidence that the publics of the three new member nations are far more skeptical about the advantages of EC membership. In order to understand these findings the present chapter focuses on the factors that seem particularly important in explaining support or opposition for European integration. Traditional survey research points to three main types of explanations:

1. an individual's psychological make-up,
2. his social position, and
3. external influences from reference groups (political parties, foreign travel) and historical events.

Detailed examination of these background variables should provide the necessary insight for a better understanding of the growth and direction of public support.

A further research interest is to contribute to the discussion about the prospects for future European integration. Since the launching of the EEC, regional integrationists have been interested in determining whether integration is progressing or not in order to predict the outcome of European unity. To cite one scholar, Deutsch maintained, after having analysed behavioral indicators (trade statistics, mail, student exchanges etcetera), editorials and mass and elite survey data, that the process of integration had come to a grinding halt in the mid-1950's and that there was no strong evidence to suggest further integration.² For others the state of European integration has proven more ambiguous. According to R. Hansen, in an article aptly entitled "European Integration, Forward March, Parade Rest, or Dismissed", "nobody knows" as "neither theory nor practice gives us enough of an answer to make a safe prediction."³ A more optimistic attitude has been voiced by Ronald Inglehart. Inglehart, as pointed out earlier, working mainly with survey data, challenged Deutsch's conclusion about the halt in integrative activities. To summarize, he argues that preadult socialization factors will work as long term influences favouring further European integration. Thus in his words "the full impact of the post-war European movement

has not yet manifested itself among the adult population."⁴

We support Inglehart's use of survey research as a technique to assess the prospects for European integration. It is possible, in analysing mass attitudes about the EC in terms of psychological and sociological variables, to identify those segments of the public exhibiting a strong and perhaps stable tendency to be pro-European. Thus, any trends in favourable opinion rooted in a group's psychological or social make-up, or owing its origins and continuation to external factors that are lasting, may portend well for the integration process. Accordingly, some individual level characteristics of EC supporters will now be examined.

What are the determinants of Europeanism? In earlier works scholars turned their attention primarily to sociological variables, such as income, occupation and education, to explain support for the Community. For example, in Lindberg and Scheingold's study public opinion data suggested that support for the Community varied directly with the variables of social status, education, income and travel.⁵ Significantly, they found that the "higher the social class position, the levels of income and education and the foreign travel experience of the individual, the more likely they were to be generally supportive of the Community and its works and to feel its immediate relevance to their daily lives."⁶ Thus, a survey of French adults in the summer of 1968 showed "support for

the Community is higher among professional-executive and white collar groups." ⁷

An analysis of more recent data taken in the Spring 1976 corroborates Lindberg and Scheingold's findings. Table 5.1 shows the percentages making positive appraisals of European Community membership by education and occupation in the Community as a whole. It is clear that support for the EC is higher among the highly educated than the less educated. Moreover, support tends to increase with high occupational status as households headed by a person with a professional-executive occupation are more favourably disposed to Common Market membership.

Since education is related to occupation and income, in that the highly educated tend to attain a high social class level and accordingly receive higher income, it can be used as an indicator of affluence or social status. Therefore, the data in Table 5.1 suggest that higher education and thereby higher social status tend to correlate positively with support for the EC. This observation is corroborated by the fact that respondents in households headed by professional-executive occupations make more favourable appraisals of Common Market membership than those headed by manual labourers and farmers. These findings suggest that support may be a class phenomenon. Although difficult to quantify in real terms, it could be argued tentatively at least, that support for European

TABLE 5.1

Appraisal of European Community Membership

By Education and By Occupation

Head of Household in EEC as a whole*

(Percentage Saying Their Country's Membership
is a Good Thing)

Fall 1976

1. By Education

Respondent Left School at:

Age 15 or younger	53% (2305)
Ages 16 - 18 years	62 (1376)
Age 19 or older	76 (967)
Eta = .17	

Significance at .001 level

2. By Occupation, Head of Household

Professional - executive	74% (556)
White Collar	68 (1311)
Artisans, Skilled Tradesman	71 (583)
Manual Labour	48 (1194)
Farmer	52 (194)
Inactive	57 (1241)
Eta = .19	

Significance at .001 level

* weighted average

integration is linked to a general perception that the Common Market benefits higher social classes more than it does the working classes. Generally speaking, this interpretation of the data is consistent with the Functionalist views on the nature of support. It follows that if the upper and middle class think that European integration contributes towards higher income and social status they would more readily support the EC. In contrast, working class opposition derives from perceptions about limited economic pay-offs. Further inspection of the data, however, shows that the difference in support levels according to education and occupation is not overwhelming. Clearly, an absolute majority of the less-educated respondents make favourable appraisals, while a majority in each occupational category, including farmers and manual workers having the lowest social status, support EC membership. Social class interest therefore may not be the best predictor of pro-European orientations. Consequently, the socialization research of R. Inglehart which points out certain long term influences in explaining support or opposition for European integration will be considered.

Socialization Research: Prospects for the Future

Earlier analysis of public opinion survey data revealed significant variations in support for the EC according to age. In particular, Ronald Inglehart, in a study of the attitudes of youth in the Netherlands, France, West Germany

and Great Britain,⁸ found that youth had a more stable tendency towards pro-European responses than did adults. Essentially, Inglehart, working with 1963 survey data, found that in each of these countries the youngest generation (16 - 19 youth sample) was the more favorable to European integration, and conversely, the age group which was 55 or over, shows the lowest overall support for his European integration measures. He attributes this intergenerational gap between adults and youths European outlook to three differences in the conditions of early socialization among the age groups. These conditions include:

- a) an absence of a major intra-European War from the younger individuals' experience,
- b) a marked increase in intra-European transactions with a possible reduction in the psychological distances between the groups concerned, and
- c) the development of European institutions which perform important functions and are widely regarded as beneficial.

9

In other words, the European orientation of the youth sample derives from the fact that these young people were socialized in the post-war period when nationalist sentiment was largely overshadowed by the European integration movement. In contrast, the older cohorts were socialized in the nationalistic atmosphere prevailing in these countries up through World War I and would, therefore, "retain a relatively nationalistic basic attitude which would tend to work against the acceptance of supranational integration."¹⁰

Since Inglehart believed that the socialization process crystallized and had its greatest impact on an individual at an early age in life, he goes on to hypothesize that youth will retain a relatively European outlook when they become adults. The notion of early crystallization is taken from a doctrine of generations that argues "a particular age cohort becomes permanently marked by the prior experiences and events in its formative years, and therefore responds differentially to subsequent events in light of its stable predispositions."¹¹ The theory assumes that the aging process has stopped and that "the old and the young reflect essentially the respective conditions prevailing in their formative years."¹² Taking this view, Inglehart argues that the European outlook of the younger generation will be stable and lasting, so that a public opinion movement in a European direction will continue as a long term trend. Thus, he suggests that there is a gap in time between early attitude development and the resulting feedback into the political system. The European outlook of post-war youth will not have a significant effect on the political system until that group becomes politically relevant. Inglehart therefore, concludes that the "full impact of the post-war movement has not yet manifested itself among the adult population."¹³ In order to test Inglehart's hypothesis we examine whether or not post-war youth have retained their European perspective in the 1970's.

Table 5.2 displays data about the public's appraisal of Common Market membership by age cohort taken in the Fall 1976. The first thing that we might note is the absence of any overall pattern in age cohort differences among the nine Community countries. According to Inglehart, the European orientation of post-war youth should be reflected in later years when that age cohort reached political relevance. (21 years is arbitrarily selected by Inglehart.¹⁴) A detailed inspection of Table 5.2 shows that in the original member-states, the age cohorts (20 - 24 and 25 - 34 age categories) who experienced their formative years in the post-war period are favorable to Community membership. However, the difference in support levels between age cohorts is not overwhelming and in some of these nations the younger and/or older age cohorts express relatively more favorable opinions. In the case of the new member-states, while public appraisals are less favorable, there is no discernable intergenerational gap in opinion.

The impression that these data convey is that there has been an upward convergence in positive appraisal, particularly in the six original members, across age cohorts. The data analysis, although finding that age cohorts experiencing pre-adult socialization in the post-war period retain their pro-European orientation, suggests some reservations to Inglehart's hypothesis. It was pointed out earlier that Inglehart stresses

TABLE 5.2

Appraisal of European Community Membership

By Age

(Percentage Saying Their Country's Membership

is a Good Thing)

Fall 1976

AGE	France	Belgium	Netherlands	Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Ireland	Denmark	Great Britain	EEC*
15 - 19	52	85	87	64	72	85	49	30	43	61
20 - 24	57	79	77	76	72	81	54	22	40	59
25 - 34	56	77	79	70	75	67	54	28	50	61
35 - 44	57	71	88	65	79	80	50	39	45	63
45 - 54	52	74	82	58	76	83	49	34	41	59
55 - 64	63	77	79	57	75	81	60	39	41	61
65+	50	71	74	50	79	92	51	31	33	54
Significance level .3 * weighted average	.2	.05	.003	.8	.12	.6	.12	.1	.001	

the importance of early childhood experience after World War II as a long term influence favoring the growth in public support. Traditional integrationists also emphasized early crystallization and generational change as major aspects of the integration phenomenon. Thus one of Karl Deutsch's criteria for successful integration was that a new generation had to arrive on the political scene, and that the "arrival of this new generation is highly probable, since it occurred roughly every fifteen years."¹⁵ As Hyman states "it is an inevitable fact of life that the young will replace the old and will determine the future course of any trend."¹⁶ The notion of early crystallization of political orientations and the delayed feedback into the political system during adult years is clearly a predominant theme in the literature on socialization and development. However, it is also generally agreed that socialization continues throughout the whole of life. Accordingly, O. Brimm explains that "later-life socialization may require adaptation or replacement of early learning, particularly where there arises discontinuity and conflict between earlier and later learning."¹⁷ Taking this view, it seems probable that long term experience with Community institutions, policy-makers, and outputs has generated an overall growth in public support even among those age cohorts born into the nationalistic atmosphere of the pre- 1945 period. Of course, this does not signify that the nationalism of the older age cohort

has been eroded by supranational identification. According to federalist theorists, multiple non-conflicting loyalties to both national and international authorities are possible. Guetzkow, for example, sees no reason why increases in loyalty to a supranational group necessarily means decreases in loyalty to the nation-state.¹⁸ In conclusion, the survey data suggest that differentiation of formative experience between age cohort is overrated as an explanation of the growth in public support for European integration. It is probable that the stimuli for increasing public support may have taken place in later life through adult socialization.

In more recent work, Ronald Inglehart links the impressive growth in public support for the EC with the theme of a "silent revolution"¹⁹ in Europe. According to Inglehart, the silent revolution encompasses two reinforcing processes - changing value priorities and shifts in the distribution of political skills. Both evaluative and cognitive change owe their origins to the increasing economic and technological developments that have taken place since World War II. Moreover, Inglehart contends that these two processes of change seem to favor European integration. Thus he states that "it is not one's age or social class per se that explains support or opposition for European integration, but the values, skills and experiences of given generation units in given nations."²⁰

What Inglehart proposes is a long term trend in support for European integration based on evaluative and cognitive changes that have taken place in the post-war decades. Essentially he notes a strong relationship between certain value types, cognitive skills and developing supra-national attitudes. The remainder of this chapter is intent on appraising Inglehart's theme, and in particular re-examining the hypothesized relationship between cognitive and evaluative factors and public support for the EC. For purposes of comparability to Inglehart's work, the research is restricted to the 1973 data set. The selection of this data set is based on two considerations. First, the silent revolution is premised on increasing economic affluence. However, in recent years the energy crisis precipitated by the Arab oil embargo in the Fall 1973 has brought about a slowing of economic growth and a halt to increasing economic prosperity. Thus, Suzanne Berger, in a recent article appraising contemporary Western European politics, speaks of the "end of growth" and the reappearance of "scarcity politics."²¹ The year 1973 is perhaps a watershed in Western history, separating a period of general affluence from a period in which the effects of the economic reversals had not yet had a chance to manifest themselves on the mass public. Second, evidence will be produced to show whether or not early versus late membership is a better predictor than

values or skills, of support for the EC. Traditional literature on integration, particularly Functionalist, assumes that the generation of public loyalties towards supranational communities occurs through experiencing socio-economic benefits from cooperation. Since Britain, Ireland and Denmark did not join the EC until 1973, their publics had not yet had the opportunity to experience at first hand Community performance. Therefore, it would be expected that public loyalties in these countries would be far less pronounced than in the six original member-states.

Clearly, Chapter IV reveals variations in public attitudes across the nine member EC, particularly between the publics of the three new member states and those of the six original member-states. Further evidence to support this observation is provided in Table 5.3 which displays two summary statistics for a composite index of support or opposition to European integration. The European integration support index is based on four questions introduced in Chapter IV:

1. Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership in the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?
2. Are you for or against the election of a European Parliament by a popular vote of all the citizens in the member-states of the European Community?
3. Would you or would you not be willing to make some personal sacrifice, for example,

TABLE 5.3

European Integration Support Index by Nation

Fall 1973

(Mean Scores and Skewness of the Distribution)

Publics of Original Members

	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Skewness</u>
Italy (1301)	3.15	-1.23
Germany (1360)	3.12	-1.35
Luxembourg (236)	3.03	-.91
Netherlands (1013)	2.92	-1
Belgium (757)	2.74	-.83
France (1357)	2.72	-.8
Mean :	2.95	

Publics of New Members

	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Skewness</u>
Ireland (831)	2.40	-.40
Denmark (838)	1.80	.16
Great Britain (1307)	1.57	.40
Mean :	1.92	

Note: Significance at .001 level

pay a little more taxes, to help bring about the unification of Europe?

4. All things considered, are you in favor of the unification of Europe, against it, or are you indifferent?

The index was constructed by giving one point for each favorable response and thus, it ranges from 0 for non support, through intermediate categories, to 4 for maximum support. As previously suggested, given the findings in Chapter IV Table 5.2 reveals a striking difference in support levels between the publics of the new and old member-states. The Italian public shows the greatest support for European integration followed very closely by the Germans. Furthermore, the fact that each of the six countries exhibits a negative skewness indicates a tendency for public opinion to lump on the pro-European side of the index. In contrast, the publics of the three new member-states are at the bottom of the index and in the case of Britain and Denmark, a positive skewness shows a tendency for public opinion to aggregate on the negative side. The data have shown that the newcomers - particularly Denmark and Britain - apparently do not share the same feelings about the European Community as their neighbours.

Before examining the relationship between cognitive and evaluative change and public support for European integration, one more point on methodology deserves mention. In the remainder of this chapter, consideration is given to

only five countries - France, West Germany, Italy, Denmark and Britain. The first three countries are founding members of the EC and as such they provide a good representation of national variations in support levels toward the Community. Indeed, Table 5.3 demonstrated that the mass public in Italy and Germany are the most supportive of the nine Community countries; whereas, the French public are the least supportive among the original six member-states. Britain has twice been refused membership in the Community, and along with Denmark (and Ireland) has only recently joined the club. Moreover, the general public of these two newcomers are by far the least favorable towards European integration.

Changing Value Priorities

In the fifties and sixties, scholars wrote of a "new Europe", a type of society they labelled post-industrial, post-bourgeois.²² This New Europe brought prosperity through sharply rising industrial affluence and a mass consumption society in which "a sufficient proportion of the population feels the advantages of economic growth."²³ What effect did burgeoning prosperity have on the political culture of these countries? According to Inglehart, there has been a significant change in the evaluative framework of the Western public which he describes in terms of a silent revolution.²⁴ Thus, Inglehart presents an interesting thesis that the values of Western publics have been shifting from an overwhelming

emphasis on material well-being and physical security toward greater emphasis on the quality of life.²⁵ Moreover, he believes that value changes have had a long-term influence favoring the growth of mass support for European integration.

Inglehart's arguments are based on Abraham Maslow's theory of the need-hierarchy of human motivation. According to the theory, people strive to fulfill needs in an ascending order, beginning with sustenance and safety needs. Once people satisfy their basic physical and economic needs, they are free to concentrate upon fulfilling the higher order needs of love, belonging, esteem and finally at the top of the hierarchy, self-actualization needs. The lower order needs relate to materialist or acquisitive requisites, whereas the higher order needs are non-materialists consisting of a set of goals relating to intellectual and aesthetic satisfactions.

Essentially, Inglehart uses the need hierarchy to describe a transformation in values among the Western publics. He suggests that the unprecedented period of economic growth leading to wide scale prosperity, combined with the absence of a major war, has allowed people to satisfy their physical and economic security needs. As their economic well-being has been secured, they have been able to turn their energies toward non-materialist goals.

Inglehart operationalizes value priorities by the use of the following multiple response questions:

"If you had to choose among the following things which are the two that seem most desirable to you?

1. Maintaining order in the nation.
2. Giving the people more say in important political decisions.
3. Fighting rising prices.
4. Protecting Freedom of Speech.

According to Inglehart, respondents fell into three categories - the Materialists (those who chose the first and third items together); the post-Materialists (those who chose the second and fourth items together); and the Mixed types (those choosing any of the four remaining combinations).²⁶ Essentially, the index assumes that "the Materialist value type tends to focus mainly on the pursuit of economic and physical security, while the post-Materialist type places more emphasis on belonging and intellectual pursuits."²⁷ Table 5.4 displays the distributions according to value type by nation. The first thing that should be noted is that post-Materialist values describe a relatively small minority of the public within the EC member-states. In contrast, those choosing a mixture of the two goals are the largest group comprising 50 to 60 percent of the public in the five nations. Furthermore, those emphasizing materialist goals are almost as numerous.

The data demonstrate that an overwhelming transformation towards non-materialist goals has not occurred. Post-Materialist values do not exceed 9 percent in the

TABLE 5.4

Value Priority Type By Nation

Fall 1973

	Germany	Italy	France	Britain	Denmark	EEC*
Materialist	42	40	35	32	42	37
Mixed	50	51	53	61	52	54
Post-Materialist	8	9	12	8	7	9
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	1954	1899	2144	1917	1188	13294

* weighted average

Community as a whole. Inglehart, however, found that the presence of Post-Materialist value priorities show significant linkage with public support for European integration. Two reasons are given to explain this support preference. First, the Post-Materialists are not as concerned with immediate concrete needs and therefore can invest more time in relatively remote abstractions such as the EC. Second, the Post-Materialists no longer find questions of national security an immediate priority.²⁸ Thus, the Materialist/Post-Materialist hypothesis implies that the economically secure groups - the post-Materialist types as defined by the value priorities index - will tend to be relatively favorable towards European integration.

This hypothesis will be empirically tested using the same value priority item as Inglehart and our European integration support index. First, however, it is necessary to elaborate on a second interrelated process of change that has also been linked with the growth in public support for the EC. Let us focus, therefore, on the notion of cognitive mobilization.

Cognitive Mobilization

Cognitive change or the process of cognitive mobilization as it has been termed by Inglehart, involves an increase in the level of the political skills of the Western public. Two factors have been predominant in developing

these political skills: first, the increase in mass communication and second, the expansion of public education. Essentially, the Cognitive Mobilization hypothesis argues that the proliferation of the electronics media reinforced by the building of more educational facilities, and the increased opportunity for individuals to achieve a secondary and post-secondary education has resulted in a growing political sophistication on the part of the electorate. Social scientists have also noted cognitive development among the American electorate. According to Bishop, studies conducted in the past decade suggest the American voter has become increasingly sophisticated ideologically and that this is due largely to the combined impact of the growing educational attainments of the United States public and the greater salience of politics in the 1960's and 1970's.²⁹ In Inglehart's view, the consequences of cognitive change in Western Europe is that "for those with high levels of political awareness and skills in political communication, there is at least a good chance that one will come to identify with a supranational political community, for those who lack them the probability seems low."³⁰ Thus, he argues that cognitively mobilized people are "relatively likely to know about and discuss European politics and to view things from a European perspective."³¹

In earlier discussions education was introduced as an indicator of affluence or social status. Education can also

be used as an indicator of general cognitive development. Indeed, it is a commonly accepted notion among social scientists that rising educational levels provide the cognitive tools that are necessary to understand political abstractions. To cite but one scholar, Hyman has pointed out that:

the better educated have learned the skills and interests which dispose them to absorb the information later presented in their adult environments and the uneducated have not had the earlier opportunity to learn the skills and interests which they will need later if they are to incorporate the information that becomes available to them. 32

Thus, the more educated people have learned skills that will help them absorb and understand Communications about domestic and global events.

We have already noted (see Table 5.1) that formal education is linked with public support for the EC. The relationship holds true in each of the nine countries as the highly educated are consistently more favorable than the less educated. Although the relationship is clear, there are some ambiguities in its interpretation. As was hinted earlier, education can be used both as an indicator of cognitive development as well as affluence or social status. Thus, a formal education variable may be an inappropriate measure of cognitive mobilization given that the term is primarily related to political skill development defined as "the ability to handle abstractions and to process information about

remote and complex realities". To clarify the impact of cognitive change on public support, Inglehart develops an indirect measure of cognitive levels. The Cognitive Mobilization indicator is based on responses to the following two questions:

1. When you get together with your friends, would you say that you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?
2. When you yourself hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views? (If yes): Does this happen often, from time to time or rarely?

Respondents who discuss politics frequently or occasionally and persuaded other people often or from time to time are classified as having high levels of Cognitive Mobilization. Also, those who discussed politics frequently were ranked high even if they didn't persuade others to accept their views. The remaining respondents were classified as low on Cognitive Mobilization.³³ Table 5.5 shows that the public in Denmark and Germany have relatively high levels of cognitive mobilization. In the other countries, particularly France and Britain, rising levels of political skills are far less apparent.

The Cognitive Mobilization indicator is an indirect measure of the level of political skills. As such, it is only one aspect of a complex cognitive dimension. In particular, the indicator does not tap another salient

TABLE 5.5

Level of Cognitive Mobilization By Nation

Fall 1973

	Germany	Italy	France	Britain	Denmark	EEC*
Low	45	54	61	65	47	56
High	55	46	39	35	53	44
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	1853	1842	2173	1852	1175	12902

* weighted average

characteristic of the public's cognitive orientations in terms of the level of public information and knowledge about the EC. The level of public information is undoubtedly an important factor in understanding public support, given that the national elite select the type of information which is received by the public about Community affairs. Generally speaking, national elite manipulate the main media of information: the daily papers, radio and television which contribute to keeping the public informed about current events concerning the European Communities. It is therefore possible for them to describe Community institutions and activities as either advantageous or detrimental to national interests and the public welfare. On the whole, the latter option seems predominant. As Michael Shank points out:

The Commission provides a very convenient alibi for national politicians when unpleasant decisions have to be taken. When there is money to be distributed or favourable decisions to be announced, on the other hand, national politicians like to take the credit. By and large, the mass media in all the member-states of the EEC remain highly nationalistic, so journalists listen to their own country's ministers rather than to Commission officials when preparing their stories. Inevitably, therefore, the Commission tends to get bad press. ...national governments find the Commission a convenient whipping boy when things are going badly, and have no wish to see it as a possible rival in public esteem in their home countries. 34

The consequences of such actions over a prolonged period are straightforward. According to the Functionalist theorists "if the member states media and politicians evaluate EC

outputs as detrimental to citizens socio-economic welfare, it is unlikely that public loyalties can be stimulated for the EC."³⁵ In this respect, the level of public information may be a decisive factor in the growth of public support. On the one hand, the less informed would tend to formulate opinions about the EC on the basis of limited and perhaps biased information. Undoubtedly the restriction of information to bad news would lead to unfavourable appraisals. On the other hand, a high level of public information might counteract adverse publicity and provide for a genuinely balanced appraisal of the Common Market.

For our purposes, the level of public information is defined from two points of view.

A. Knowledge of Community membership.

In the Fall 1973 samples of the population in each of the nine countries were asked two open ended questions:

1. As you know, several countries have recently joined the Common Market, i.e. The European Community. Can you tell me which countries they are?
2. And can you name some of the countries which were already members of the Common Market before these new countries joined?

In order to construct a scale as a measure of familiarity with the EEC member nations, respondents were given a point for each country correctly named. Thus, the scores range from 0, for no countries named, to 9 for a maximum score in terms of the index.

This approach is different from the one used by Inglehart in early work³⁶ in which he combined these questions with the ones about political skills to construct a Cognitive Mobilization Index. We want, however, to keep the variable about knowledge distinct from skills in so far as possible. Essentially, these two variables describe quite different aspects of the public's cognitive orientations toward the EC.

B. Knowledge of Community affairs through the media and discussions concerning Europe.

At the time of the 1973 survey, people were asked whether they paid attention to main media coverage about the EC. Specifically, there were two information questions which read as follows:

1. There is not always time to read everything of interest. When you see in your newspaper or in any other publication an article about the EC, do you read it, almost always, from time to time, never?
2. And on television, when there is a program about the EC, do you watch it, almost always, from time to time, never?

Also, the survey asked them whether the EC had ever become a topic of discussion. Respondents were asked:

Have you ever discussed the Common Market or the unification of Europe with anyone else in (Nation) or abroad?

Respondents were given a point for each item if they read or watched about the EC almost always or from time to time and,

TABLE 5.6

Knowledge of EC Membership By Nation

Fall 1973

	Germany	Italy	France	Britain	Denmark	EEC*
Low (0-3) ¹	11	41	31	27	11	26
Medium (4-6)	27	31	33	39	20	32
High (7-9)	62	28	36	34	69	42
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	1957	1909	2036	1660	1199	12830

¹ number of countries named

* weighted average

TABLE 5.7

Level of Public Information By Nation

Fall 1973

	Germany	Italy	France	Britain	Denmark	EEC*
Low	10	25	19	9	4	16
Medium Low	7	19	19	9	7	13
Medium High	33	30	35	26	21	31
High	50	26	28	56	68	40
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	1719	1678	2017	1821	1159	12171

* weighted average

discussed the Common Market or the unification of Europe. Thus, the scale scores went from 0 for those who lack exposure to the EC, to 3 for a perfect score.

The simple summated index provides an indirect measure of the level of public information. We assume that those exposed to media coverage and those who take a more active part in political discussion about the EC should show a tendency to have a relatively higher level of information. Furthermore, it seems more than likely that one's propensity to pay attention and discuss EC affairs would also reflect one's interest in the Common Market. In our view, a degree of familiarity and interest in the European Communities may be a key requirement to the development of salient opinion for "people are more likely to be concerned about issues which they can see and have experienced than about those which are beyond their experience and perception."³⁷ Tables 5.6 and 5.7 display the distributions for our two cognitive-type variables. Knowledge about EC membership is high in Germany and Denmark, the two most cognitively mobilized countries. With respect to the level of public information, a similar pattern emerges. The mass public in Germany and Denmark are relatively well-informed about EC affairs; whereas, those in Italy show a tendency towards low scores in information, knowledge and political skills. In general, the picture in Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 coincide with the one reported by Almond and Verba's

Civic Culture. They found Britain and Germany high in following political and governmental affairs and Italy low.³⁸ However, in the case of Britain, there is a certain incongruity in response patterns. Although the British public show a tendency towards low cognitive skills, they express a high level of information and moderate knowledge about EC membership. Suffice it here to say that the British public seem to have had more exposure and a greater knowledgeability about the EC than we might have anticipated given their Cognitive Mobilization score.

A final factor which deserves mention, is the emergence of a cosmopolitan political identity within the European Community. A cosmopolitan outlook is defined as a feeling of attachment or, a sense of belonging to Europe or the World as a whole. Thus, Inglehart operationalizes a sense of geo-political identity by the use of the following item:

Which one of the following geographical unites would you say you belong to first of all?...and the next?

- The locality or town where you live
- The region or province where you live
- (Great Britain, Germany, etc.) as a whole
- Europe
- The World as a whole

Not surprisingly, as Table 5.8 shows, a vast majority gave the town, province or nation as their first and second choice in each of these countries. Yet, a substantial minority, 33 percent in the Community as a whole, do express a sense of belonging to some unit greater than the nation-state.

Inglehart has shown how one's value priorities and cognitive skills seem relevant to whether one has a

TABLE 5.8

Sense of Geo-Political Identity By Nation

Fall 1973

	Germany	Italy	France	Britain	Denmark	EEC*
Nation/Region	66	60	69	72	85	67
Europe/the World	34	41	31	28	16	33
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	1836	1776	2086	1802	1159	12652

* weighted average

cosmopolitan or a parochial outlook. Specifically empirical tests indicated that both post-materialists and the cognitively mobilized manifest a tendency to feel that they belonged to Europe or the World as a whole.³⁹ More significantly, for our purposes, Inglehart found that support or opposition to European integration is strongly correlated with an underlying parochial-cosmopolitan identity.⁴⁰ This leads us to include the variable as a potential competing predictor of public support for European integration.

The Relative Impact of Selected Variables on Support for European Integration

The present chapter has been concerned with finding the primary underlying determinants behind the growth in public support for the EC. As discussed earlier, Inglehart has pointed towards two main avenues of explanation: cognitive mobilization and changing value priorities. To summarize, he presents a persuasive argument linking the evaluative and cognitive changes taking place among Western publics with the emergence of a European outlook. Empirical tests, conducted by Inglehart, revealed that the presence of "Post-Materialist" value priorities and of relatively high levels of Cognitive Mobilization show significant correlations with public support for European integration. Therefore, the Cognitive Mobilization variable and the Post-Materialist/Materialist variable were chosen for study because of their presumed importance in explaining

public support. In order to test the relative impact of these variables we introduced three conceptually different variables as potential independent determinants of Europeanism. Two of them tap a cognitive dimension in terms of the level of public information about the EC. Specifically, one is a direct measure of the public's familiarity with EC membership and the other gauges the degree of public exposure to Community affairs. The final variable focusses on the public's feeling of belonging to some geographical unit. In other words, their sense of geo-political identity.

In order to assess the relative influence of these selected variables on support for integration we went through a country-by-country multiple regression analysis. This multivariate technique is employed primarily to study the combined and separate effects on our European Integration Support Index of the five predictor variables - Materialist/Post-Materialist Value Priorities, Cognitive Mobilization, Knowledge of EC Membership, Level of Public Information and sense of Geo-Political Identity.⁴¹

The results are surprising, given the heavy emphasis Inglehart places in evaluative and cognitive factors in explaining support for European integration. Indeed, a preliminary inspection of Table 5.9 suggests some reservations about the importance of value priorities and cognitive skills as predictors of support for integration. First, note the

TABLE 5.9

Stepwise Multiple Regression

The Relative Impact of Five Predictor Variables on

Support for European Integration By Country

Fall 1973

Variable	Multiple R^2	SP^2	Simple R	B	STD ERROR B
<u>Germany</u>					
M/PM	.020	.003	.142	.227	.105
G1	.083	.035	.274	.467	.064
P1	.160	.043	.329	.348	.044
KM	.161	.001	.152	.012*	.016
CM	.173	.012	.255	.291	.071
N(1166)					
<u>Italy</u>					
M/PM	.003	.000	.057	.021*	.103
G1	.038	.021	.194	.321	.063
P1	.097	.028	.266	.201	.034
KM	.109	.011	.230	.049	.013
CM	.110	.001	.124	.049*	.066
N(1099)					
<u>France</u>					
M/PM	.009	.002	.097	.153*	.095
G1	.041	.013	.191	.291	.073
P1	.129	.064	.329	.340	.039
KM	.133	.003	.189	.029	.015
CM	.133	.000	.149	.015*	.073
N(1045)					
<u>Great Britain</u>					
M/PM	.007	.001	.085	.175*	.163
G1	.060	.039	.242	.056	.102
P1	.112	.02	.240	.281	.061
KM	.144	.028	.272	.111	.02
CM	.146	.002	.163	.140*	.101
N(1045)					

TABLE 5.9 cont'd

Denmark

M/PM	.002	.007	-.041	-.458	.194
G1	.025	.011	.146	.427	.142
Pl	.058	.012	.193	.270	.086
KM	.098	.039	.255	.152	.027
CM	.098	.0003	.109	.049*	.114

N(734)

M/PM: Materialist - Post Materialist Value Priorities

G1: Sense of Geo-Political Identity

Pl: Level of Public Information

KM: Knowledge of EC Membership

CM: Cognitive Mobilization

* (these unstandardized regression coefficients are not significant at .05 level)

Note 1. SP^2 is the square of the part or semipartial correlation coefficient. It signifies the increase in the squared multiple correlation when X_1 is included over the R^2 which includes the other $K-1$ independent variables but not X_1

see: J. Cohen and P. Cohen, Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences.

2. Correlation Matrices are in the Appendix.

differences between the correlation scores in each of the EC countries. The relative size of the simple R's suggests that the level of public information in the original member-states and familiarity with EC membership in the new member-states prove to be more powerful predictors of attitudes than does value priorities or political skills. In particular, in each nation, the correlation between support for European integration and value priorities is consistently weaker than with any of the other predictor variables. Second, note the difference in the squared semipartial correlations which are percentages of the total variance (with the particular order of entry of the variables).⁴² A simple comparison of the size of these scores confirms a similar pattern. In other words, the SP^2 demonstrate that most of the variance of the European integration support index in the original member-states seems to be due to the level of public information, a measure constructed from three questions, the answers to which reveal the degree of public exposure to Community affairs. Moreover, it is also clear that in Denmark, simple knowledge of EC membership appears to be the best predictor. Given this particular pattern of interrelationships, we conclude that the contribution of value priorities, and to a lesser extent, political skills, are trivial when used in combination with the other selected variables.

On examining the results on a Community wide basis, we found that 12 percent of the variance in support for European integration is explained by the joint effects of our five predictor variables. In Table 5.10, the Simple R and SP^2 scores demonstrate that geo-political identity and level of public information are perhaps better predictors than knowledge and political skills which are virtually tied in relative contributions to the variance in our dependent variable. As we expected, given the results of the cross-national analysis, value priorities appear to have the smallest increase in R Square. More significantly, when we added a dummy variable based on early versus late membership in the regression equation, R Square leaped to 28 percent. Obviously, length of membership proves to be the strongest predictor of support or opposition to European integration. In this respect, the sheer passage of time within the Community explains supportive orientations better than long term factors such as the presence of Post-Materialist value priorities and high levels of "Cognitive Mobilization".

It appears that societal trends, such as changing value priorities and cognitive skills, are not as informative as simple length of membership in the Community in explaining variations in public support for the EC. In particular, the relatively slight overall impact of value priorities is perplexing given Inglehart's hypothesis. Certainly there is

TABLE 5.10

The Relative Impact of Six Predictor Variables on
Support For European Integration in the
European Community as a whole

Variable	Multiple R ²	SP ²	Simple R	B	STD ERROR B
<u>EEC*</u>					
M/PM	.009	.001	.095	.102	.044
G1	.061	.023	.242	.432	.029
P1	.086	.025	.184	.262	.017
KM	.101	.005	.210	.043	.006
CM	.117	.004	.217	.178	.03
E/LM	.275	.159	.414	1.337	.003

N(7235)

* weighted average

M/PM: Materialist - Post Materialist Value Priorities

G1: Sense of Geo-Political Identity

P1: Level of Public Information

KM: Knowledge of EC Membership

CM: Cognitive Mobilization

E/LM: Early versus Late Membership

Note: The data were subjected to an analysis of covariance. The interaction terms were not significant at .05 level.

a positive correlation between support for the Community and the presence of Post-Materialist value types in most Community countries. However, Denmark is an exception for the value priorities index is negatively correlated with the European Integration index ($r = -.04$). If this is the case, Post-Materialists in Denmark are less pro-European than Materialists. In fact, Table 5.11 indicates that in Denmark and Britain, there are actually no significant differences in support scores by value priority type. Moreover, while support for the Community within Germany, Italy and France is relatively higher among the Post-Materialists, the gap in mean scores between value types is not overwhelming. It is clear that in the original member-states Materialist - people who give top priority to economic and security needs - also tend to be favourable to European integration.

If the nature of the Common Market is taken into account, these findings are not surprising. Simple observation indicates that the EEC is an economic organization fulfilling the goals and policies of national governments. In addition, a cursory investigation of the full range of Community activities from the perspective of functionalist theory reveals a bureaucratic organization, run by technocrats pursuing integration in economic sectors for the purpose of achieving "greater growth, higher productivity, and enhanced social and psychological well-being."⁴³ It appears that this is the way that some people

TABLE 5.11

European Integration Support Index by
Value Priority Type

(Mean Response where 0 = no support,
4 = maximum support)

Fall 1973

	Germany	Italy	France	Britain	Denmark
Materialist	3.00	3.03	2.61	1.63	1.81
Mixed	3.13	3.20	2.70	1.49	1.82
Post-Materialist	3.62	3.28	2.99	1.90	1.54
<hr/>					
R (Product Moment correlation)	.13	.08	.09	.01*	-.04
<hr/>					
Significance	.0000	.009	.001	.014	.34

view the Community. For example, a sample investigation conducted by the EC Commission in February-March 1970 found that:

the image the general public is forming of the achievements of the EC is of a technical or even bureaucratic character which is attractive enough to the reasoned approach, but makes no appeal to sentiment and seems to reflect the administration of things rather than the government of human beings.

44

The preceding observations suggest that Materialists will support a supranational organization that can be viewed as an instrument of national economic policies, particularly when it is given the task of fulfilling socio-economic welfare needs. While the reason for their attitude preference may differ, the evidence therefore suggests that both Materialist and Post-Materialist support the EC.

In conclusion, early versus late membership proves the most important factor explaining variations in public support for the EC. There is reason to believe that recent troubled economic conditions present since 1973 have not substantially changed the pattern of interrelationships. Clearly, the findings in Chapter IV indicate that there remains a considerable divergence in support levels between the original member publics and those of the three new members. It appears that the publics in Denmark and Britain have not developed a pro-European consensus, while European sympathies among those in the original member-states have remained relatively stable.

Notes

1. N. Petersen, "Europeanism and Its Foreign Policy Attitude Correlates: A Political Belief System", Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 10 (1975), p. 144.
2. K. Deutsch, Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance, (New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 20.
3. Roger D. Hansen, "European Integration: Forward March, Parade Rest, or Dismissed?", International Organization, vol. 27, (1973), p. 254.
4. R. Inglehart, "An End to European Integration?", American Political Science Review, vol. 61 (1967), p. 97.
5. L. Lindberg and S. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1970).
6. Lindberg and Scheingold, p. 256.
7. Lindberg and Scheingold, p. 257-8.
8. R. Inglehart, "An End to European Integration", pp. 91-105.
9. R. Inglehart, "An End to European Integration", p. 98.
10. R. Inglehart, "Public Opinion and Regional Integration", in L. Lindberg and S. Scheingold, eds., Regional Integration Theory and Research, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) p. 164.
11. H. Hyman, Secondary Analysis of Sample Surveys: Principles, Procedures and Potentialities, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1972), p. 248.
12. Hyman, p. 264.
13. Inglehart, "An End to European Integration?", p. 95.
14. Inglehart, "An End to European Integration?", p. 95.
15. Karl W. Deutsch, "Attaining and Maintaining Integration", in M. Hodges, ed., European Integration, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1972), p. 118.
16. Hyman, Secondary Analysis of Sample Surveys, p. 248.

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17. O. G. Brim and S. Wheeler, Socialization After Childhood, (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1966), p. 22.
18. H. Guetzkow, Multiple Loyalties, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), p. 61.
19. Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).
20. Ronald Inglehart, "Long Term Trends in Mass Support for European Unification", Government and Opposition, (1977), p. 163.
21. Suzanne Berger, "Politics and Antipolitics, in Western Europe in the Seventies", Daedalus, (Winter 1979), p. 416.
22. E. Haas, "Technocracy and Pluralism and the New Europe", in S. R. Graubard, ed., A New Europe, p. 64.
23. E. Haas, "Technocracy and Pluralism and the New Europe", p. 70.
24. R. Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics.
25. R. Inglehart, The Silent Revolution, p. 3.
26. R. Inglehart, "Economic Uncertainty and European Solidarity: Public Opinion Trends", American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 440 (November 1978), p. 88.
27. R. Inglehart, "Economic Uncertainty and European Solidarity", p. 87.
28. R. Inglehart, "Long Term Trends in Mass Support for European Unification", p. 151.
29. G.F. Bishop, R.W. Oldendick and G.F. Farber, "Effects of Question Wording and Format in Political Attitude Consistency", Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 42, No. 1 (Spring 1978), p. 81.
30. R. Inglehart, "Long Term Trends", p. 160.
31. R. Inglehart, "Economic Uncertainty and European Solidarity", p. 86.
32. H. Hyman, Secondary Analysis of Sample Surveys, p. 205.
33. R. Inglehart, "Economic Uncertainty and European Solidarity", p. 85.

34. Michael Shanks, "One Gap the EEC Cannot Seem to Bridge", Times (London), (July 7, 1978), p. 16.

35. Lodge, "Loyalty and the EEC", Political Studies, 26(2) June 1978, p. 244.

36. R. Inglehart, "Long Term Trends in Mass Support for European Unification", p. 162.

37. J. Best, Public Opinion, (Homewood Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1973), p. 163.

38. G. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), p. 53.

39. R. Inglehart, "Long Term Trends in Mass Support for European Unification", p. 163.

40. R. Inglehart, "Long Term Trends in Mass Support for European Unification", p. 166.

41. We restrict the analysis to these six variables because there is limited usefulness in adding new variables to a regression equation. As Kerlinger has pointed out "because many variables of behavioral research are correlated, additional variables may prove redundant with the first three or four of the equation." For example, "if $R^2_{y.123} = .50$ then it is unlikely that $R^2_{y.1234}$ will be much more than .55, and $r^2_{y.12345}$ will probably not be more than .56 or .57."

F. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research, p. 625.

42. The order of entry of the variables into the regression equation was based on an assumption about temporal sequence. We assume that both value priorities and a sense of belonging to some geo-political unit are instilled in early life while the acquisition of knowledge and political skill development occur incrementally throughout the aging process. Furthermore, when we let the computer choose the variables in order of the size of their contribution to the variance of the dependent variable, the same pattern was apparent. i.e. the primacy of the public information variables.

43. J. Caporaso, "The EC in the World System", Journal of European Integration, Vol. 2, No. 3 (May 1979), p. 421.

44. "European Union and Public Opinion", Information, Commission of the European Community, 37 (1973), p. 1.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In establishing the European Communities the participating nation-states committed themselves not only to the goal of a customs union and eventual economic and political union but also to the "integration of people". Generally speaking, the Community has had significant successes toward goal achievement notwithstanding major political and economic barriers. With regard to the customs union, it is generally agreed that there has been outstanding progress, in fact, at times ahead of schedule in implementing the provisions of the Treaty of Rome. When one examines common policies, coordination has taken place among Community nations on a wide range of issues, including such sensitive matters as agriculture, commercial relations, monetary coordination, economic planning and social policy. Since regional integrationists have not invested much time or energy toward empirical research about the integration of people, the picture here has been more uncertain. In order to understand the effects that Community development has had on the European citizen, the present thesis has concentrated on attitudinal integration. In particular, the thesis has examined the extent to which the mass public of the Nine has developed a sense of identification with, and

attachment to the EC and the broader process of European union. By and large, the preceding chapters found that in the decades following the launching of the European Communities there has emerged a favorable consensus towards the EC polity. It is clear that the EC has been able to generate both utilitarian and affective appeal.

There does appear to be widespread attitudinal support in the Community for past, present and future aspects of European integration. This assessment, however, applies primarily to the mass publics of the original members for a large majority among the newcomers do not share the same feelings, as their continental neighbours. In the six founder states, support for the EC has been building up over a long period of time and it has reached a high positive level. This factor, combined with the absence of major national variations in pro-European sentiment among the general public of these states, lends support to Lindberg and Scheingold's notion of a permissive consensus.

In Europe's Would-Be Polity, Lindberg and Scheingold contend that the Community functions smoothly without major difficulties because of the existence of a "permissive consensus", that is generally favorable orientations of both elites and mass public toward European integration.¹ In their view, this permissive consensus serves as a parameter in which national and Community decision-makers can conduct European

affairs without encountering significant opposition.² It is clear from Chapter IV that a permissive consensus exists in the original member-states as support for the Community has shown a tendency to remain positive, deep-rooted and relatively stable over the last decade. Generally speaking, there has emerged an overall feeling that European integration has been good for the nation-state and therefore, it is worthwhile pursuing. Even the recent adverse economic conditions have not precipitated a major decline in pro-European responses, which seems to have reached a maximum positive level, although a certain skepticism has emerged about the future advantages of the Common Market link (see Table 4.7b). On the whole, the evidence points to strong emotional identification with the European cause.

Furthermore, the findings in Chapter V do not reveal any strong polarization on European issues according to education, social class, age, or value priorities. By and large, the lack of a coherent opposition and the absence of major national variation among the Six provides some verification that a coalescence towards a mutual value system is taking place in these Community nations on European issues. The public's ability to share or develop a mutual value system has been viewed as a prerequisite to successful integration. Accordingly, Jacobs and Toscano hypothesize that "social homogeneity will contribute strongly to the feasibility of

political integration and conversely, communities whose members are very different from one another, will have a very hard time achieving or maintaining political integration."³

In addition, the fact that the well-educated, and economically-secure groups will tend to be relatively favorable to European integration has important implications on the future prospects for integration. This group is in a strategic position to have an effect on the operation of the Community institutions. For example, some individuals may be participants in the Community framework (those working in or with the Community's central institutions), while others may have access to some level of the national decision-making process that effects Community policy. Thus, according to Taylor, in a survey study of Community officials, "the Eurocrats support the efforts to achieve European Union, and although, pessimistic about the immediate future they anticipate some progress towards European Union."⁴ At the very least, this socio-economic group encompasses the opinion leaders,⁵ in other words, the politically relevant who are more prone to be mobilized on political issues in support of European integration.

However, the presence of a permissive consensus breaks down in light of the enlargement of the Community to include Britain, Denmark and Ireland. On almost every item tested in Chapter IV, there is a divergence in support levels

(excluding the question about the direct elections to the European Parliament) between the publics of the original members and those of the new members. In particular, the general publics in Britain and Denmark are inclined to oppose many aspects of European integration. The importance of length of membership in the Community on public support for the EC was underlined in Chapter V. Indeed, empirical tests indicated that early versus late membership was the strongest predictor of support or opposition to European integration.

Perhaps the gap in pro-European consensus between the original six publics and those of the three new members can be understood with reference to historical circumstances. The publics of the original six members have lived under European institutions for many years, including a period of economic prosperity which undoubtedly helped to foster a growth in support for European integration; the publics of the three new members have had Community experience for a comparatively short time (1973), in fact, joining the Common Market in a period of increasing economic disorder. The recent economic malaise combined with the absence of deep-rooted, pro-European loyalties has not provided an appropriate climate in the new member states that would facilitate the growth of European sympathies. Under such circumstances, the new member publics feel that their national interests would be better realized outside the present Community framework (see Table 4.17).

To sum up, the analysis of support in Chapter IV and Chapter V revealed generally favorable orientations among the mass public, particularly in the Six, towards the principles, practices and institutions of European integration. The important question however is whether the presence of a permissive consensus in some Community nations denote strong Euro-loyalties? On the one hand, some evidence indicates that while there are very favorable dispositions towards the EC, mass loyalties show a tendency to be relatively weak when concrete demands are made. It is worthwhile noting again that the publics in all the nine countries are unwilling to make personal sacrifices to help bring about European unification (see Table 4.18). On the other hand, the impressive growth in support for the EC occurred at the same time as an overall decline in the degree of attachment to traditional national symbols. Table 6.1 demonstrates that throughout the countries of the Community there are more and more people in favour of replacing national symbols such as currency, Olympic teams and the flag with European ones. It is in the six original member-states that the European symbols would be most easily accepted.

Given the preceding observations, it seems probable that the Community has fostered incipient Euro-loyalties. Moreover, the emergence of mass loyalties toward the EC has not taken place at the expense of the nation-state. In

TABLE 6.1

Degree of Attachment to National Symbols

(Percentage "For" the currency, Olympic Teams and Flag of Your Country being replaced by a European currency, team and flag)

1970 - Fall 1976

	France	Belgium	Netherlands	Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Ireland	Great Britain	Denmark
<u>Does the Respondent Favor a European Currency?</u>									
For:									
1970	51	49	46	52	51	63			
Fall 1976	52	53	51	33	67	66	38	30	21
Difference	+ 1	+ 4	+ 5	-19	+16	+ 3			
<u>Does the Respondent Favor a European Sports Team?</u>									
For:									
1970	34	26	19	25	24	53			
Fall 1976	48	39	28	35	43	33	14	14	8
Difference	+14	+13	+ 9	+10	+19	-20			
<u>Does the Respondent Favor a European Flag?</u>									
For:									
1970	22	26	19	35	24	26			
Fall 1976	49	44	4	49	58	44	27	20	13
Difference	+27	+18	+15	+14	+34	+18			

contrast to the functionalist concept of the loyalty building process, the findings indicate a simple bifurcation of loyalty. In this regard the federalist notion of multiple loyalties is particularly salient, in that the acquisition of dual non-conflicting loyalties to both national and supranational authorities are deemed possible. By and large, the publics in the original member-nations do not perceive the Community as a competitor with the nation-state for their loyalties. Thus, support derives primarily from nationalistic feelings rather than individual self-interests (see Table 4.3). In the final analysis, the impressive growth in public support for the EC has not contributed to a process, which, some regional integrationists⁶ argued, would culminate in "the withering away of the nation-state". In fact, it is probable that for more and more people in the Six, the Community has become an integral part of the status quo.

The development of Euro-loyalties among the new members' publics is more problematic. However, there is evidence that as knowledgeability and familiarity of the EC increases, so does support for European integration. Specifically, there is a relatively high positive correlation between support for the EC and both level of public information about the EC and knowledge of EC membership in each Community nation. Consideration of this relationship suggests the EC has the capacity to stimulate Euro-loyalties through an active

promotion of a Human Union. According to Lodge "Human Union is the term given to the creation of a sense of awareness of and identification with the EC and each other among the member states' publics."⁷ This conception rests on the assumption that knowledge reduces fear, builds understanding, engenders support and should make the Common Market less remote and more attractive to the European citizen.

The merits of such an approach are increasingly apparent if consideration is given to the issue about the direct elections to the European Parliament. This is a subject that has been a matter of public debate over the years. In addition, direct elections to the Parliament provided not only an opportunity for the member publics to participate in the EC's political life, but also it had the effect of increasing the EC's visibility and underlining the notion of a transnational socio-psychological community.⁸ Moreover, it is probable that increasing public exposure to the election event can be associated with a striking upward shift "for" a directly elected European Parliament among the publics of the new member states (see Table 4.13a & b). Thus, active promotion on behalf of the EC can stimulate public support for European integration.

In the final analysis, public support for the EC is closely associated with an impression of long-term

mutually rewarding experiences within the Community framework.

As the Community has become visible in an attractive light to more and more people, European citizens have come to accept EC membership as a largely beneficial and perhaps indispensable aspect of their socio-political environment.

Notes

1. L. Lindberg and S. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), pp. 249-279.
2. Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity, p. 62.
3. V. Toscano and J. Jacob, eds., The Integration of Political Communities, (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1964), p. 19.
4. P. Taylor, "Public and Elite Support for European Union", Journal of European Integration, vol. 2, No. 2 (January 1979), p. 249.
5. Opinion leaders is a term used by Rosenau to stress the central role played by those who relay ideas and information from the impersonal channels to the personal ones.

J. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 30.
6. J. Lodge, "Loyalty and the EEC: The Limitations of the Functionalist Approach", Political Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1978), p. 234.
7. J. Lodge, "Loyalty and the EEC", p. 247.
8. Lodge, "Loyalty and the EEC", p. 246.

APPENDIX

A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

The methodology we employ in this thesis is a secondary analysis of survey data. This approach, according to Herbert Hyman, involves "the extraction of knowledge on topics other than those which were the focus of the original surveys."¹ The practical benefits of a secondary analysis are self-evident as "an analysis of existing survey data, rather than collecting data in a new survey, economizes on money, time, and personnel."² For these reasons the data utilized in this thesis were taken from existing survey studies conducted by professional polling agencies and academic researchers. In particular, our primary data source was the Euro-Barometer series. These bi-annual studies are part of an ongoing program of public opinion research sponsored by the European Community.

Important as the practical benefits are, one of the crucial difficulties in secondary analysis is that the analyst cannot design the items or questions that may be especially appropriate to the problem or concepts that he intends to investigate. Thus the secondary analyst must search among the available surveys for the appropriate indicators to act as operational definitions for his theoretical concepts. The procedure that we employ in Chapter IV to select appropriate indicators as measures of either utilitarian or affective support dimensions is based on two considerations. First, a review of the codebooks available led to the selection of individual

questions that seem to tap at an intuitively obvious sense of utilitarian or affective support. In short, the selection is based on an assessment of "face validity"; that is, "the relevance of the measuring instrument to what one is trying to measure is apparent 'on the face of it'."³ The second consideration is related to studies where data reduction techniques, such as factor analysis, were employed to distinguish between the support dimensions. Specifically we are referring to a factor analysis utilized by John Wildgen and Werner Feld⁴ on data gathered Community-wide in 1973 that distinguishes between utilitarian and affective aspects of support. Put simply, they select 10 items for factor analysis that in their view "were least ambiguously related to the idea of support."⁵ Table A.1 displays their findings.

Clearly the pattern of loadings is consistent with the idea of distinguishing two kinds of support. Furthermore we are in agreement with the arguments advanced by Wildgen and Feld that the first three items emerge as utilitarian in nature, while the ~~rest~~ are indicative of affective support.⁶ Thus in the data analysis in Chapter IV of this thesis we utilize similar items as measurement instruments of utilitarian and affective support.

In Chapter V we remove the analytic distinction drawn between the two support dimensions in order to develop a composite index of support or opposition to European integration. Our primary purpose in index construction was to provide a suitable dependent variable for a multiple regression analysis. Taking this approach, the

TABLE A.1

Loadings of Affective and Utilitarian
Support Items: European Communities Study, 1973

Varimax Rotation

Item	Factor 1 Affective	Factor 2 Utilitarian
Country Benefits	.272	.831
Personal Benefits	.183	.856
Scrap EEC	.374	.712
Political Union	.696	.337
European Parliament	.742	.269
Personal Sacrifice	.477	.353
European Unification	.648	.470
Importance of Unification	.628	.396
Speed of Unification	.674	.259
Supranational Government	.715	.059

European integration support index was derived from four indices of affective and utilitarian support for the Common Market and European integration.

1. Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership in the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?
2. Are you for or against the election of a European Parliament by a popular vote of all the citizens in the member-states of the European Community?
3. Would you or would you not be willing to make some personal sacrifice, for example, pay a little more taxes, to help bring about the unification of Europe?
4. All things considered, are you in favor of the unification of Europe, against it, or are you indifferent?

The index was constructed by giving one point for each favorable response and thus, it ranges from 0 for non-support, through intermediate categories, to 4 for maximum support.

The items from the 1973 European Community study used as independent variables in the multiple regression analysis were:

a) Post-Materialist/Materialist. This variable was derived from two questions measuring first and second preference among four objectives.

1. If you had to choose among the following things, which are the two that seem most desirable to you?
 - maintaining order in the nation.
 - give the people more say in important government decisions.
 - fighting rising prices.
 - protecting freedom of speech.
2. And what would be your second choice?

The index was composed of a three point scale of post-Materialists (those who chose the second and fourth items together in both questions were coded "2"), Materialists (those who chose the first and third items together in both questions were coded "0") and the mixed types (those choosing any of the remaining combinations were coded "1").

b) Cognitive Mobilization. This indicator was based on responses to the following two questions:

1. When you get together with your friends, would you say that you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?
2. When you yourself hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views? (If yes): Does this happen often, from time to time or rarely?

This index was dichotomized between High (coded "1") and Low (coded "0") levels of Cognitive Mobilization. Respondents who discuss politics and persuaded other people were classified as having high levels of Cognitive Mobilization. Also, those who discussed politics frequently were ranked high even if they didn't persuade others to accept their views. The remaining respondents were classified as low on Cognitive Mobilization.

c) Knowledge of Community membership was measured by two questions about ability to name EEC member nations.

1. As you know, several countries have recently joined the Common Market, i.e. the European Community. Can you tell me which countries they are?

2. And can you name some of the countries which were already members of the Common Market before these new countries joined?

Respondents were given a point for each country correctly named so that the scale scores range from 0, for no countries named, to 9 for a maximum score in terms of the index.

d) Level of Public Information. This variable was derived from three questions measuring the degree of public exposure to Community affairs.

1. There is not always time to read everything of interest. When you see in your newspaper or in any other publication an article about the EC, do you read it, almost always, from time to time, never?
2. And on television, when there is a program about the EC, do you watch it, almost always, from time to time, never?
3. Have you ever discussed the Common Market or the unification of Europe with anyone else in (Nation) or abroad?

Respondents were given a point for each item if they read or watched TV programs about the EC and discussed the Common Market or the unification of Europe. Thus the scale scores went from 0 for those who lack exposure to the EC, to 3 for a perfect score.

e) Sense of Geo-Political Identity. This variable was measured by responses to the following two questions:

1. To which of the following geographical groups would you say that you belong to first?
 - the locality or town where you live.
 - the region or province where you live.
 - (Nation) as a whole.
 - Europe.
 - The world as a whole.
2. And the next?

The variable was dichotomized between those who named Europe or the world as a whole as first or second choice (coded "1") and those who did not (coded "0").

The correlations between these variables are displayed in matrices by nation and for the Community as a whole on the next four pages.

Correlation Matrix
(Pearson Correlation Coefficients)

Fall 1973

GERMANY

	ELSI	P/PM	GI	PI	KM	CM
ELSI	1.000 S=.001	.14 S=.001	.274 S=.001	.333 S=.001	.157 S=.001	.254 S=.001
P/PM		1.000 S=.001	.201 S=.001	.11 S=.001	.034 S=.125	.135 S=.001
GI			1.000 S=.001	.19 S=.001	.196 S=.001	.155 S=.001
PI				1.000 S=.001	.293 S=.001	.397 S=.001
KM					1.000 S=.001	.199 S=.001
CM						1.000 S=.001

N=1184

ITALY

	ELSI	P/PM	GI	PI	KM	CM
ELSI	1.000 S=.001	.062 S=.018	.201 S=.001	.262 S=.001	.223 S=.001	.119 S=.001
P/PM		1.000 S=.001	.167 S=.001	.097 S=.001	.153 S=.001	.077 S=.005
GI			1.000 S=.001	.125 S=.001	.169 S=.001	.081 S=.003
PI				1.000 S=.001	.42 S=.001	.32 S=.001
KM					1.000 S=.001	.237 S=.001
CM						1.000 S=.001

N=1131

FRANCE

	ELSl	P/PM	Gl	Pl	KM	CM
ELSl	1.000 S=.001	.096 S=.001	.185 S=.001	.32 S=.001	.168 S=.001	.158 S=.001
P/PM		1.000 S=.001	.148 S=.001	.093 S=.001	.103 S=.001	.182 S=.001
Gl			1.000 S=.001	.175 S=.001	.209 S=.001	.181 S=.001
Pl				1.000 S=.001	.335 S=.001	.34 S=.001
KM					1.000 S=.001	.253 S=.001
CM						1.000 S=.001

N=1102

GREAT BRITAIN

	ELSl	P/PM	Gl	Pl	KM	CM
ELSl	1.000 S=.001	.071 S=.012	.256 S=.001	.244 S=.001	.283 S=.001	.177 S=.001
P/PM		1.000 S=.001	.165 S=.001	-.014 S=.326	.052 S=.048	.092 S=.002
Gl			1.000 S=.001	.056 S=.037	.134 S=.001	.104 S=.001
Pl				1.000 S=.001	.329 S=.001	.312 S=.001
KM					1.000 S=.001	.282 S=.001
CM						1.000 S=.001

N=1036

DENMARK

	ElSl	P/PM	G1	P1	KM	CM
ElSl	1.000 S=.001	-.039 S=.137	.135 S=.001	.187 S=.001	.243 S=.001	.114 S=.001
P/PM		1.000 S=.001	.113 S=.001	.074 S=.019	.102 S=.002	.055 S=.061
G1			1.000 S=.001	.115 S=.001	.144 S=.001	.139 S=.001
P1				1.000 S=.001	.273 S=.001	.343 S=.001
KM					1.000 S=.001	.202 S=.001
CM						1.000 S=.001

N=780

EEC*

	ElSl	P/PM	G1	P1	KM	CM	E/LM
ElSl	1.000 S=.001	.09 S=.001	.248 S=.001	.177 S=.001	.214 S=.001	.224 S=.001	.414 S=.001
P/PM		1.000 S=.001	.172 S=.001	.07 S=.001	.088 S=.001	.12 S=.001	.039 S=.001
G1			1.000 S=.001	.107 S=.001	.151 S=.001	.141 S=.001	.104 S=.001
P1				1.000 S=.001	.37 S=.001	.325 S=.001	.158 S=.001
KM					1.000 S=.001	.257 S=.001	.057 S=.001
CM						1.000 S=.001	.119 S=.001
E/LM							1.000 S=.001

N=7603

* weighted average

Note:

ElSl: European Integration Support Index

M/PM: Materialist - Post Materialist Value Priorities

G1: Sense of Geo-Political Identity

Pl: Level of Public Information

KM: Knowledge of EC Membership

CM: Cognitive Mobilization

E/LM: Early versus Late Membership

S= Significance level

N= Number of cases

Notes

1. Herbert Hyman, Secondary Analysis of Sample Survey: Principles, Procedures and Potentialities, (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1972), p. 1.

2. Herbert Hyman, Secondary Analysis of Sample Surveys, p. 6.

3. C. Selltiz, M. Jahoda, M. Deutsch and S. Cook, Research Methods in Social Relations, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1959), p. 164.

4. J. Wildgen and W. Feld, "Communist Publics and Activists: Some Implications for European Integration", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (December 1976), p. 77-92.

5. J. Wildgen and W. Feld, "Communist Publics and Activists", p. 79.
The questions asked about:

1. Was the Common Market good for the respondent's country?
2. Was the Common Market good for the respondent personally?
3. Would the respondent be sorry if the Common Market were scrapped?
4. Should the Common Market develop into a political union?
5. Should the European Parliament be directly elected?
6. Would the respondent pay more taxes to unify Europe?
7. Does the respondent favor European unification?
8. Is the issue of unification important to the respondent?
9. Should unification be speeded up?
10. Does the respondent favor a supranational European government?

6. J. Wildgen and W. Feld, "Communist Publics and Activists", p. 79.

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