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Gender Based Behaviour Among Women in the Russian Duma 1994-1995

by

Beth Richardson

**A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate
Studies in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts**

Institute of Central/ Eastern European and Russian-Area Studies

Carleton University

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Abstract

This thesis examines the contemporary political outlook of female parliamentarians in the last Russian parliament 1994-1995. It aims to test the hypothesis of the existence of some type of 'gender consciousness' leading to gender-based political behaviour. In doing so, this work uses four main methods to test this hypothesis: an examination of Duma voting behaviour, an examination of Duma debates, a short media review and analysis of short surveys administered by the author to female parliamentarians in Russia. Ultimately, gender was not clearly indicative of parliamentary behaviour, although women do exhibit some traits, such as greater participation in parliamentary voting, that distinguish them from their male counterparts.

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Chapter One - Introduction

Whereas a gender-based analysis of political systems and political behaviour in Western democracies has emerged in recent years, gender in transitional politics remains virtually unexplored territory. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the countries of the former Soviet bloc, seen by many Western feminists as havens of political and legal guarantees for women. Surprisingly, the precipitous drop in female political representation in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union since 1989 has not led to an evaluation of the roles female parliamentarians play in the new political systems of the region. This thesis aims to fill this lacuna in academic scholarship.

Post-Soviet Russia saw the emergence of a unique phenomenon, an entirely female political party. The creation of the Women of Russia party in 1993, signaled that women were not to be ignored during the painful transitional period. Indeed, the electorate agreed, giving Women of Russia more than 8% of the vote in the December 1994 elections, and voting in a total of 60 women from nine parties. Despite this unprecedented electoral success, many analysts have focused on the fact that female representation has dropped from about 33% under the Soviets to 13.36% during the last Duma (about the same level as North America and Western Europe).¹ Analysts, however, have failed to examine the changing role that these women play, nor have

¹ Soviet-era statistics from Women in Parliaments 1945-1995: A World Statistical Survey, Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva, 1995, pp. 212, 213. Russian Federation statistics from Slater, Wendy, 'Female Representation in Russian Politics', RFL/RE, Vol. 3, No. 22, June 1994, 27-33, p. 29

they analyzed the implications of their change in relative power.² Female leaders today appear to have more of an opportunity to influence policy than through their token seats under the Soviet regime. However, as new political movements emerge, leaders often find themselves at odds with one another, particularly in the transitional democracies of post-Communist societies, where overarching subservience to the Communist Party was previously the norm. Are new female leaders of varying political outlooks trying to influence policy based on a shared gendered perspective of the transformation process? I hypothesize that female deputies in the Russian Duma do indeed vote along gender lines on so-called 'women's issues' and that this gender cleavage is indicative of a supra-party consensus among women parliamentarians on these issues in order to achieve policy goals.

This question of female political behaviour is of interest particularly in the post-Soviet era, as parliamentarians struggle to reform a social and economic system designed to ensure equality of result. Compared to women in Western capitalist nations, women under Communism had better legislated maternal and child benefits, and won the right to vote and work earlier than their Western counterparts. Consequently, how this system's legal, financial and social characteristics change through the course of reforms is of particular interest to feminist scholars. Moreover, the role that female politicians play in this transformation process will directly affect the shape of the new society. The observation of the behaviour and political outlook of

²One analyst that does recognize and address this issue is Valentina Konstantinova, a self-proclaimed Russian feminist, in her article 'Women's Political Coalitions in Russia (1990-1994)', in Women's Voices in Russia Today, eds. Rotkorch, A, and Haavio-Mannila, E., Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, England, 1996, 235-247.

female parliamentarians during the transition period can provide a window through which to view the transition process and its particular effects on women.

Further, such an analysis can contribute both to our understanding of the current political situation in Russia and the development of Russian feminism. Russia has a relatively weak party system, thus, other group affiliations play an important role in policy creation. In contrast to North American democracy, the maintenance and improvement of the social policy sphere is an avowed political priority for virtually all parties in post-Soviet Russia. Russian feminism also has a different social foundation than here in North America, the Russian one generally based on social justice, nurturing and harmony. Through an analysis of political behaviour, I hope to contribute to a gender-based understanding of the Russian political system through the transition period.

Up until now, there has been a marked dearth of information on the role that female parliamentarians play in transitional democracies. There is, however, a significant body of literature on three areas of study that affect the choices these parliamentarians make: the role of political parties in transitional democracies; the nature of political cleavages in weak-party systems and the emergence of feminist political discourse in Russia.

The collapse of the Communist Party led to a flourishing of political ideas and expression. Coupled with a widespread aversion to rigid adherence to any political line, this individualism in political thought has made the development of a party system in Russia very difficult. During the critical period of party formation, between 1991 and 1993, party platforms, party affiliations and voter identifications were very fluid,

changing rapidly and sometimes significantly.³ The constantly changing political scene made it difficult for voters to identify parties with complementary policies, even if the voter was willing to support a given party.⁴ This in turn led to the 'politics of personality', whereby voters and other politicians identified with a given *person*, rather than with the policies s/he or her/his party espoused.

The electoral system under which the Duma operates also affects the voting behaviour of its members. In Russia there is a mixed proportional/plurality system; half the Duma seats are reserved for winners of "first-past-the-post" elections throughout Russia's 89 regions. The other 225 are elected on a proportional basis, whereby any party winning over 5% of the vote nationwide is entitled to a portion of seats in the lower house equal to their portion of the national vote. This system was specifically chosen to encourage party formation⁵ - many candidates running in single member districts were not affiliated with any party, but were desirable because they represented regional interests within the federation. By the same token, proportional representation encourages party growth because the senior members on a party list (the ones who get seats in the House) are more likely to support the party line over any regional interest. Thus one can expect to see female deputies voted in on party lists will be more likely to support the party line than women elected in single member districts who subsequently ally themselves with a particular party.

³See Remington, Thomas, 'Introduction: Parliamentary Elections and the Transition from Communism' and Remington, et al., 'Transitional Institutions and Parliamentary Alignments in Russia, 1990-1993', in Parliaments in Transition, ed. Remington, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994, 1-28, 159-180

⁴Remington, Thomas, 'Introduction: Parliamentary Elections and the Transition from Communism', Parliaments in Transition, ed. Remington, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994, 1-28, p. 4

⁵See Remington (1994) and Remington, Thomas, and Smith, Steven, 'The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia', Legislative Studies Quarterly (November 1995), 20, 4: 457-489

When political or social cleavages are studied in the Russian context, markers other than gender, such as ethnicity or regional disparities, are often used. Studies have been done on ethnic divisions based on language within the Ukrainian parliament⁶ and regional and party (reformist/anti-reformist) divisions within the Russian parliament.⁷ Sobianin points out that membership to a certain faction or party in the post-Communist context is rarely a reliable determinant of voting behaviour. Consequently, other attributes (language in Arel's study, region in Slider's) become more important, particularly on certain issues. Gender cleavages, if they exist, are then important, as a strong voting bloc of women on women's issues can have considerable influence over the policies passed or rejected. This in turn has implications for the way Russian policy is formed on particular issues. Is legislation that directly affects women largely constructed by women, or does it remain the domain of male parliamentarians? Likewise, do women have any significant impact *as women* on economic issues, or are they splintered along party lines, as are male parliamentarians?

Thirdly, there is an emerging discourse on the role of women in Russia. What implications will this new area of study have on female parliamentarians? Olga Voronina argues that 'female consciousness' is only beginning to develop because the patriarchal and paternalistic Soviet state took on, at least outwardly, feminist slogans of equal pay and emancipation from the home, leaving no room for feminist scholars.⁸

⁶See Arel, Dominique, 'Voting Behaviour in the Ukrainian Parliament: The Language Factor', in Parliaments in Transition, ed. Remington, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994, 125-158

⁷See Slider Darrell, et al. 'Political Tendencies in Russia's Regions: Evidence from the Parliamentary Elections', Slavic Review (fall 1994), 53, 3 and Sobianin, 'Political Cleavages Among the Russian Deputies', in Parliaments in Transition, ed. Remington, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994, 181-216

⁸Voronina, Olga, 'The Mythology of Women's Emancipation in the USSR as the Foundation for a Policy of Discrimination', Women in Russia: a New Era in Russian Feminism, ed. Posadskaia, Anastasia, Verso Press, London, 1994, pp. 37-56

With the new growth of civil society, female voices will begin to speak more freely, but Voronina argues that the new Russian state and polity remains essentially the same: politics by men for men, which leaves little room for maneuvering on the part of female politicians.

Feminist discourse is further hampered by the aversion to a unified line, which echoes a similar trend in party development. Nevertheless, "there is a remarkable consensus among the women activists... about the status of women during this difficult transition, about the problems they face, and about the need for action at the local and national level."⁹ Most women participants in this new discourse agree that women must take a more active role in politics, and must refuse to be shuttled back into the home.¹⁰ They all articulate the notion that women do not possess the full rights of citizenship under the new regime, and decry the development of democracy that ignores the gendered nature of half of its participants.¹¹

Lastly, the particular social problems faced by all women in post-Soviet society will also likely have a bearing on the voting behaviour of female parliamentarians, as they can not help but be affected by the processes affecting all women in Russia.¹² In the past three years, Russia has seen higher unemployment rates for women, accompanied by lower rates of rehiring, an increased polarization of gender roles, a

⁹Racioppi, Linda, and O'Sullivan See, Katherine, 'Organizing Russian Women', *Signs* (Summer 1995), 20, 4: 818-850, p. 820

¹⁰For more information on emerging feminist discourse, see Posadskaia, Klimentova and Konstantinova in *Women in Russian: a New Era in Russian Feminism*, ed. Posadskaia, Anastasia, Verso Press, London, 1994

¹¹ On the notion of gendered citizenship in the Russian state, see Posadskaia (1994), Waylen (1994) Einhorn (1993)

¹²This section comes from a previous paper I have written on the topic, published as 'Women in Russia: The More Things Change the More They Stay the Same', *Canadian Women Studies: Women in Central and Eastern Europe*, York University, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1995), 48-53

decrease in state protection for the unemployed, mothers and single parents, increased violence toward women and their continued *de facto* exclusion from political power. Issues commonly identified as 'gender specific' in both social and political life emerge from this understanding of the gendered nature of the transition process.

While democratization has undoubtedly brought many benefits to women, some of the concepts that underlie democracy have acted to exclude women from an active role in post-Soviet society. The shift from equality of result under communism to equality of opportunity under democracy has had detrimental effects on the female population because women frequently do not have the time, money or other resources to take advantage of that opportunity.

Further, Moghadam argues that the move away from quotas and limited but guaranteed representation by women for women has acted to reinforce the segregation of women from new democratic society.¹³ Barbara Einhorn furthers this notion, stating that with this new democracy has come a shift in the public/private split, where women are again being considered 'natural' inhabitants of the private, domestic sphere, whereas men partake of the public, political and economic spheres.¹⁴

Moghadam also discusses how Russia's gradual integration into the world economy has led to the rationalization of Russian labour, which frequently also entails

¹³Moghadam, Valentine, 'Introduction', ~~Privatization and Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union~~, World Institute for the Development of Economics Research, New York, 1995, 4-8, p 5

¹⁴See 'Ideology and the Role of the Family: Shifts in the Public-Private Boundary?' in Einhorn, 'Democratization and Women's Movements in Central and Eastern Europe: Concepts of Women's Rights', ~~Democratic Reform and the Position of Women in Transitional Economies~~, ed. Moghadam, Valentine, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, 48-74

the redundancy of low-skilled labour in favour of machinery, or the transfer of high-skilled jobs to the developed world. This rationalization affects women who predominate in low-skill labour and has led to a third major economic consequence of the transformation: the feminization of poverty in Russia.¹⁵

The emerging market economy has undoubtedly worsened women's working lives. Mentseva states that unemployment is emerging as a problem for Russian women, but underemployment, the concentration of women in low-status and low-paying positions and the ever-increasing pay gap between men and women are concerns more relevant to women's daily lives today.¹⁶ Even though Article 19 of the Russian Constitution guarantees equal rights to men and women, labour legislation provides few strategies or mechanisms to ensure equal opportunity. Equal pay for equal work is mentioned in the Russian Labour Code without mentioning mechanisms for its realization. Thus, many of women's work concerns operate in a real vacuum of useful, applicable legislation.

Zoia Khotkina's article 'Women in the Labour Market: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow', gives an excellent picture of women in the Russian workplace.¹⁷ Official unemployment in Russia today stands at about 6%, although it should be kept in mind that these are official statistics and do not include those who have given up looking for work, including women who have become full time homemakers. Of the unemployed,

¹⁵See Moghadam, Valentine, 'Gender and Restructuring: A Global Perspective', Privatization and Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, World Institute for the Development of Economics Research, New York, 1995, p 9-14

¹⁶Mentseva, Elena, 'Equality of Opportunities in Employment or 'Protective' Measures: Women in the Face of Choice', Zhenshchiny i sotsialnaia politika, ed. Khotkina, Zoia, Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Social and Economic Problems of the Population, Moscow, 1992, 23-47

about 70% are women.¹⁸ They are usually the first to be laid off and the last rehired, because they usually hold subordinate positions, or employers do not want to provide benefits like maternity leave or flex-time.¹⁹ Unemployment is a particular problem for women during the conversion of the military-industrial complex; they comprise over 50% of all military workers. Sixty to eighty percent of all women working in the military industry have higher education but are trained in professions not easily adapted to market conditions.

Many more women are underemployed, thus limiting their economic potential and ability to work in managerial positions. As in Canada, women are concentrated in lower-paying, low status jobs. They also perform many heavy labour jobs and outnumber men in night shift work. Women comprise 49.9% of all heavy labourers in light industry. "However, even when women comprise fewer than one half of workers in industry, they are still concentrated in the level of production with heavy physical labour."²⁰ In the service sector, women are concentrated in the so-called 'pink collar ghetto'. They outnumber men in administration, banking, education and social health and protection, but they are rarely in charge.²¹ A 1993 study done by Women and Conversion, a women's group created to help female military workers adapt to the

¹⁷Khotkina, Zoia, 'Women in the Labour Market: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow', Women in Russia: A New Era in Russian Feminism, ed. Posadskaia, Anastasia, Verso Press, London, 1994, 85-108

¹⁸Khotkina, Zoia, 'Women in the Labour Market: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow', Women in Russia: A New Era in Russian Feminism, ed. Posadskaia, Anastasia, Verso Press, London, 1994, 85-108, p. 98

¹⁹Mentseva, Elena, 'Equality of Opportunities in Employment or 'Protective' Measures: Women in the Face of Choice', Zhenshchiny i sotsialnaia politika, ed. Khotkina, Zoia, Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Social and Economic Problems of the Population, Moscow, 23-47, p. 25

²⁰Mentseva, Elena, 'Equality of Opportunities in Employment or 'Protective' Measures: Women in the Face of Choice', Zhenshchiny i sotsialnaia politika, ed. Khotkina, Zoia, Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Social and Economic Problems of the Population, Moscow, 1992, 23-47, p. 29

market, discovered that “99% of [female] respondents consider that a woman can’t take a high position even at the enterprise where she works.”²² Underemployment and dead end jobs waste women’s potential to become a positive force in the transformation of Russia.

In light of women’s low status at work, it is not surprising that the wage gap between men and women is increasing. While women’s emancipation was ‘officially’ achieved under the Soviet regime, women still only made 70 cents to every man’s dollar. Over the past three years, this wage gap has increased to as little as 40 cents to every man’s dollar. This enormous pay gap also has the effect of shuttling women back into the home: with fewer daycares, it makes more economic sense for a mother to stay at home while the father works at paid employment.

Despite this gloomy picture, as Khotkina and Mentseva points out, the Russian government is doing little to offset the unequal impact of economic restructuring. The state does provide unemployment benefits, but fails to address the fact that women make up 70% of all long-term (one year or more) unemployed, and does not gear any programs specifically toward women.

Mentseva also correctly points out that the state has also passed off many of its previous responsibilities like maternity benefits, day-care and sick leave onto individual

²¹For an examination of job segregation, see Khotkina’s section ‘Problems of Female Job Segregation’, in Khotkina, Zola, ‘Women in the Labour Market: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow’, Women in Russia: A New Era in Russian Feminism, ed. Posadskaia, Anastasia, Verso Press, London, 1994, 85-108

²²Women and Conversion, ‘Results of the Sociological Researches Made by the Association ‘Conversion and Women’, p2

employers.²³ In turn, employers are often unable or unwilling to provide such benefits and are never forced to do so. Because there is not real equality of opportunity in the workplace, women of childbearing age can and are being turned away, just because they might have children and become a problem for the employer. As a result, women accept jobs they don't like or are far below their qualifications.

As has been pointed out, "the formulation of effective policies for equal opportunities between women and men will be difficult to produce without a change in the traditional system of gender roles."²⁴ Voronina and Klimentova discuss the continued strength of the 'cult' of marriage and motherhood.²⁵ Russian women generally marry at a younger age and give birth earlier than their Western European and North American counterparts. The stigma attached to being a single woman remains strong.

Moreover, Russian society as a whole still generally supports traditional family roles, namely, a woman should have paid employment outside the home as well as fulfill the vast majority of domestic duties. This 'double shift' means that women have less time and energy to pursue other interests, be they political, economic or social.

Perhaps as a backlash to the publicly puritanical communist society, there has also been an alarming growth in the public objectification of women, through an

²³See Mentseva, Elena, 'Equality of Opportunities in Employment or 'Protective' Measures: Women in the Face of Choice', *Zhenshchiny i sotsialnaia politika*, ed. Khotkina, Zoia, Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Social and Economic Problems of the Population, Moscow, 23-47

²⁴Voronina, Olga, and Klimentova, Tat'iana, 'Gender and Culture', *Zhenshchiny i sotsialnaia politika*, ed. Khotkina, Zoia, Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Social and Economic Problems of the Population, Moscow, 1992, 10-22, p10

²⁵Voronina, Olga, and Klimentova, Tat'iana, 'Gender and Culture', *Zhenshchiny i sotsialnaia politika*, ed. Khotkina, Zoia, Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Social and Economic Problems of the Population, Moscow, 1992, 10-22

industry neither exclusively geared toward nor run by men. Klimentova argues in her article 'What Does Our New Democracy Offer Society' that the democratization of society has brought a warped acceptance of female objectification, and this may lead women to accept objectification as a part of their female identity.²⁶

Violence against women has also become far more prevalent in society over the past few years. Reports of rape and assault have increased dramatically over the past few years (14 000 were reported in 1992, 10 232 in the first 8 months of 1993),²⁷ either because of an increase in the absolute number, or the fact that more women are reporting abuse. Still, Natasha Gaidarenko, director of the Moscow Sexual Assault Recovery Centre, thinks that these statistics underestimate the problem by 80 to 90 percent.²⁸ Domestic violence is considered a foreign concept in Russia, presumably because there is the attitude that some violence in the home is not extraordinary. This attitude spills over into society, where women are regularly objectified and harassed. Further, the onus is often put on the woman to prove her innocence in cases of harassment or assault, rather than the reverse.

Moreover, given the Russian media's frequent attention to the looming demographic crisis, Russian women's health, particularly their reproductive health, demands special attention. In 1992 and 1993, birth rates in Russia dropped by 22%.²⁹

²⁶Klimentova, Tat'iana, 'What Does Our New Democracy Offer Society?', Women in Russia: A New Era in Russian Feminism, ed. Posadskaia, Anastasia, Verso Press, London, 1994, 14-36

²⁷Martina Vanderberg, assistant director of the Moscow Sexual Assault Recovery Centre, in Richardson, Beth, 'Position Paper on the Status of Women in Russia,' Canadian Embassy in Moscow (unpublished), 1994

²⁸Martina Vanderberg, assistant director of the Moscow Sexual Assault Recovery Centre, in Richardson, Beth, 'Position Paper on the Status of Women in Russia,' Canadian Embassy in Moscow (unpublished), 1994

²⁹'Russia Incurs Severe Pharmaceutical Deficit', *Business World Weekly*, 32/125, 1994, p. 12

This negative population growth has serious consequences for the future of Russian society, including future labour shortages, an unequal age distribution among the population (many senior citizens), a consequent overburdening of state funds for the elderly and increased health care costs. There are many reasons for this drop in the birth rate, including strong economic pressures. But Inga Grebicheva, director of the Russian Association of Family Planning (RAFP) believes that the condition of women's health definitely plays a major role in the population decrease.³⁰

Health care has not fared well under the Russian Federation. Many of the services that worked badly under communism have now stopped working at all. Maternity wards, primitive under communism, have worsened. Regular maternity wards lack medicines, sterilized instruments and even clean linens. Infant mortality from infections and other causes jumped 12% in 1992 to 200 out of every 1000 babies.³¹ These conditions are clearly a disincentive to women of childbearing age.

Contraceptives are also difficult to find, and while the country does produce some contraceptives, mostly condoms of questionable reliability, demand still far exceeds supply. The RAFP estimates that contraceptives in Russia satisfy a mere 5% of demand. Imported from Europe, birth control pills (used by 3% of fertile Russian women) and barrier contraceptives (19.3% of women) are available in urban areas, but are prohibitively expensive, particularly for young women. As a result, "the number of abortions in Russia in the last few years is not decreasing, and the risk of contracting

³⁰Richardson, Beth, 'Background Paper on the Status of Women in Russia,' Canadian Embassy in Moscow (unpublished), 1994

³¹'Russia Incurs Severe Pharmaceutical Deficit', *Business World Weekly*, 32/125, 1994, p. 12

venereal diseases and AIDS is growing.”³² Abortion remains the most widespread form of birth control in Russia. As a consequence, the few birth control options in Russia are either too physically dangerous, emotionally distressing, or expensive.

Lastly, Rueschmeyer and Wolchik all point out the low number of women in positions of power.³³ The Federation Council has 9 women out of 179 members (5%), while the Duma has 60 female deputies out of 449 (13.4%).³⁴ In the government sector, women still occupy traditional posts in health and social welfare. While many have the power to put forth initiatives, few have the power to ensure the financial support needed for their realization. Moreover, while women are represented in parliamentary and government sectors, power lays in the executive in Russia, where women are underrepresented. Ekaterina Lakhova, the Advisor to the President on Women, Children and the Family, remains the only prominent woman in the executive. She heads a committee by the same name, but while its duties include assessing new legislation and introducing initiatives, it has little real power. Like most women's groups in Russia, its ability to influence far exceeds their ability to change existing programs or institute new ones.

What, if any, influence does this understanding of the situation of women in contemporary Russian society have on women in the political arena?

³²Gyrkin, 'The Sexual Education of Girls', Family Planning: An International Medical Journal, No 1, 1994, p. 24

³³Rueschmeyer, Marilyn, 'Introduction', Women in the Politics of Post-Communist Eastern Europe, ed. Rueschmeyer, Marilyn, Sharpe Publishing, New York, 1994, xi-xvi, and Wolchik, Sharon, 'Women and the Politics of Transition in Central and Eastern Europe', Democratic Reform and the Position of Women in Transitional Economies, ed. Moghadam, Valentine, Clarendon Press, 1993, 29-47

³⁴Racioppi, Linda, and O'Sullivan See, Katherine, 'Organizing Russian Women', Signs (Summer 1995), 20, 4: 818-850, p. 827

The main study in this thesis is divided into two sections. First, I hypothesize that female deputies vote along gender lines on gender-specific issues because gender identification in those instances supersedes other identifications (particularly party affiliation). To support this hypothesis involves several steps. After identifying the deputies to be studied, I will turn to look at the issues and votes being studied. I have chosen 14 laws, seven of which are laws that are likely to affect women disproportionately, like pension and social support payments, unemployment insurance, child support and education, and seven of which deal with primarily economic issues, like the federal budget or support to mass media - issues that are unlikely to affect women in particular. The first set of laws touch on areas of state policy where women are overrepresented: among the unemployed or the elderly for example. Alternately, they fit into a category of laws that delineate the legal structure in an area in which women have a particular interest: child support laws and primary education systems in this instance. Laws in the second section govern areas in which women are equally or under represented: the media or business for example, or areas which do not target women directly. The 1995 Federal Budget was included in this section because budgetary funding, while it does have an impact on social policy issues, is one step removed from the actual direct impact social programs would have on women's lives. For example, the budget might envision paying out allowances to young mothers, but it is through more gender specific legislation - laws on child support - that this financing would be carried out. Furthermore, the budget as a whole considers many issue areas, while the 'gender specific' laws that have been chosen have as their *primary* impact targets women and families.

The definition of 'women's issues' can, of course, vary dramatically, especially across cultures. Thus, defining 'women's issues' according to North American standards is obviously problematic. Consequently, for the purposes of this study, Russian parliamentarians and feminist scholars' definitions will be used. Of course, using definitions of the political and academic elites also poses some problems, but given the resources available, this seems the most reliable method.

That being said, there are as many different views on women's interests in Russia as there are in North America. However, a broad consensus on certain issues seems to have emerged in Russia. Five main 'women's issues' can be identified, and these issues can generally be seen through the framework of one of three feminist analyses: liberal, social and maternal feminism.³⁵ The first and most important issues to female politicians and theorists alike is unemployment; resolving this problem, and the problem of underemployment, is vital to the well-being of Russian women. This issue corresponds most closely with the western idea of liberal feminism: i.e., ensuring women have an equal opportunity to compete in the paid workforce.

The next two points form the basis of social feminism; how can society accommodate women's self-fulfillment while accepting that women play a special role in the raising of children. In acknowledging this special role, how can one rectify the problems it raises (such as protracted periods of absence from the workplace, and the consequences of those absences, i.e., lower pay, less opportunity for advancement), questions that liberal feminism fails to address. Women in Russia are concerned first with social goods; health care systems and public education. The second issue is also

a social policy issue, and concerns guaranteeing a minimum standard of living to citizens, including concerns over the minimum wage and pension guarantees. These two points come up over and over in party platforms, feminist writings and female politicians' statements.³⁶

The last two 'women's issue' areas identified by Russian women stem from a maternal feminist viewpoint, i.e., women are instinctual nurturers and are by nature better able to regulate conflict than men.³⁷ This one idea manifests itself in both the private and public sphere. Privately, women are concerned about their families, about the physical and emotional well-being of their children and about maternity issues.³⁸ In the public realm, women are concerned with ideals of social justice: peace, harmony and participation of women equally in public life. The belief that by virtue of sex women are better able to promote these values is supported by the Women of Russia party, as well as female parliamentarians from other parties and is generally an idea also shared by Russian men. While there are likely other issues which could be deemed 'women's issues', these five: unemployment, the protection of public goods such as health care and education, the social support system, family issues and social justice are the most widely accepted and consequently will be used in this study.

Female deputies in the Fifth Russian Duma (1994-95) range in age from 38 to 61 and the overwhelming majority are ethnic Russians. Eleven come from "reformist-

³⁵For a more detailed explanation of different types of feminism, see Tong's Feminist Thought: a Comprehensive Introduction, Westview Press, Boulder, 1989

³⁶See Chapter Three for examples.

³⁷See Chapter Three, 'Prominent Women in the Russian Duma' for evidence of this belief.

³⁸There are two excellent books documenting everyday women's opinions on these issues. They are: Mamonova, Tat'iana, Women's Glasnost Vs. Naglost, Bergin Publishers, Conneticut, 1994, and On nous a

type” parties (Russia’s Choice, Yabloko, Liberal Democratic Union of December 12), 32 from “centrist” parties (Women of Russia, New Regional Policy), 10 from “conservative” parties (Communist Party, Agrarian Party, Russian Path) and 5 from a “nationalist” party (Liberal Democratic Party). I also intend to look at regional, professional, educational and age cohort divisions in this thesis.

To explore the hypothesis that women vote on gender lines on specific issues, one must prove that their voting behaviour is *strongly correlated* to gender, and not to age, ethnicity, regional divisions or party affiliation. A comprehensive statistical analysis can help prove this point. By comparing how female parliamentarians vote on specific issues to other (male) members of their party, other parliamentarians of their age cohort, region or ethnicity, etc. we can determine whether indeed gender is an overarching factor. If it is, we would expect women across party lines to vote similarly on issues that affect women, but that other factors would influence them more strongly on non-gender specific issues, such as economic reform, privatization or foreign relations.

In order to discover if this is true, I created a deputy database.³⁹ Using Clarisworks, a Macintosh database program, I designed a searchable database that listed every deputy’s party affiliation, sex, age, electoral district (if applicable), education, profession and committee membership. Some attributes, such as age, party affiliation and committee membership were taken directly from the biographical information on deputies published by the Institute of Legislation and Comparative

vole nos vies: lettres des lectrices soviétiques a leurs journaux 1990-1991, ed. Popova, Editions de Griot, Boulogne, 1992

³⁹ Please see Appendix A for more information.

Jurisprudence under the auspices of the government of the Russian Federation, entitled Vibory v Gosudarstvennuu Dumu: pravovye problemy, Federal'noe Sobranie spravochnik. Other markers, such as age cohort, education level or professional divisions were made by the author based on the aforementioned source. Secondly, based directly on the Duma's own publication, Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, the database lists the fourteen laws and how every deputy voted (or did not vote) on each. Once completed, I was free to search for whatever information was required (for instance, how many women over 40 with previous managerial experience supported the new Civil Code). Two final categories list how often a deputy voted (including abstaining votes) in each section, which was designed to assess comparative participation rates between women and men. If women regularly voted more or less frequently on a given set of laws, this could indicate a value difference on the issue between women and men.

The second section of this study examines the motivational factors behind voting. If we know that women are influenced in part by gender on certain issues, we can move on to examining what this cleavage actually *explains* and what implications this fact has on policy development. If a gender cleavage cannot be found among all female parliamentarians, I would then look to examine whether it is present among some groups (cross-cutting cleavages mitigated by party affiliation, regionalism or class).

Consequently, I used four methods of qualitatively measuring whether a loose 'women's movement' actually existed in the 1994-95 Duma: a thorough examination of Duma speeches by women on the 14 laws selected, a further analysis of Duma

speeches on laws affecting women for which there is no roll call vote, an examination of images of female parliamentarians in the Russian press and questionnaire interviews by fax of a cross-section of female deputies.

Initially, I hoped to discover whether a gendered awareness of policy issues in the Duma developed or evolved through the course of the mandate. However, given the short mandate of the Fifth State Duma, and given its rather slow start in the spring and summer of 1994, the bulk of the laws being studied were passed in 1995. Consequently, a reliable analysis of changes over time could not be carried out.

With an examination of Duma speeches, I expected to find some evidence of solidarity among women on gender-specific issues, while I did not expect that this solidarity would exist on other issues. This examination would flesh out a simple statistical analysis of voting behaviour, as we might then see that women who abstain or vote against 'woman-friendly' policies may have other, articulated motivating factors.

With the interviews, I hoped to discover what the parliamentarians themselves think of their voting behaviour and the motivational factors behind it. Unfortunately, I was unable to get an unbiased cross-section of female parliamentarians, as the Duma does not keep records of what jobs former parliamentarians move on to after their term. Therefore, only women re-elected to the Sixth State Duma were interviewed.⁴⁰ Self-analysis is tenuous at best, but it does provide an excellent secondary source of information on the issues that influence voting behaviour.

⁴⁰Please see Appendix B for interview information.

Lastly, as a complementary resource for information on motivational factors, I examined interviews of and articles by these female parliamentarians in the Russian press. Again this provided some corroborating evidence on influencing factors and cross-party solidarity.

This paper was written to provide a basis for understanding female political behaviour in the new Russian Federation. Given the limits of a Master's thesis, I accept that this study can do little more than begin the academic development of this subject, as a thorough analysis would require a much broader sample size and more complete analysis of political culture, and political behaviour in Russia and Russian feminism. However, the methodology used here was designed to give as comprehensive a picture as possible.

Firstly, voting behaviour in a democratic polity is the most public and concrete display of political activism; this also holds true for parliamentary voting behaviour. It cuts through verbal rhetoric and provides a factual history of action. A study of political behaviour not centered on political actions, in my mind, would have little validity, as what politicians say to the electorate, especially during a campaign, usually has little to do with their practical work in the legislature. Conversely, examining *only* voting patterns, including the propensity not to vote, can also skew the interpretation of the true intentions of politicians, as voting based on political views can be mitigated by other factors: compromise, vote exchanges, or even an unannounced change in political outlook. Moreover, an analysis of voting behaviour cannot demonstrate motivating factors behind that vote. To identify motivation, though, is also a dubious undertaking, as motivation is always filtered by outside factors; political expediency,

the vagaries of media reporting (when women self-identify motivating factors) and the like. Consequently, whenever examining such a problem using inherently weak research tools, such as public pronouncements as a guide to personal beliefs, or self-identification of motivating factors, one must use as many methods as possible, or triangulate research methods, so as to come as close to the true answer as possible at the convergence of these methods. That is what has been done here.

These difficulties in choosing and using methodologies bring out the underlying assumptions in this thesis. The first is that what female parliamentarians say, in the House, in the media and in interviews, is actually what they mean or believe. I recognize that this is not necessarily the case. The second main assumption rests on the issue of representatives. While this thesis examines one Duma's voting patterns, I expect that in doing so, I can better understand the political system in Russia. This assumes that the parliament is representative of the political system in Russia and that an analysis of one legislative organ gives a true picture of political power. Given the existence of very strong executive power in Russia, the actual representativeness of Russia's legislative organs can be called into question. A more thorough examination of the topic would have to address the decisions women make in the Federation Council, as well as the behaviour of women in high level government ministry positions and in the executive. For the purposes of this study though, Duma was chosen over other organs of political power in Russia for two main reasons. First, as a democratically elected legislature, members are likely to express conflicting views more than appointed political actors, who owe their appointment not to the populace but to the political system. Further, the influencers of those in appointed positions are wont to be less visible or articulated than deputies who must debate publicly in the

legislature. While an examination of Federation Council members would have been enlightening, my sample size would have been even more severely limited and consequently, I think, less representative of female behaviour.

The second problem of representativeness concerns whether female political elites in Russia are representative of women in general, and subsequently, whether their beliefs can mirror the political views of women across Russia.

This problem echoes the problem of having studied a Duma with a two year mandate as well. The study of such a small cross-section of political life can give only limited insight, but given restrictions of time and space, I deemed a detailed snapshot of women's political opinions more valuable than a general overview of easily accessible information. Despite these limitations, the study does come to specific conclusions, for without some attempt at extrapolation, the study itself would have little purpose or add little insight.

In the end this thesis attempts to answer the two questions that first drew my interest to this topic - do women create or substantially influence the policies that affect them in Russia? What are the dynamics of that influence?

Chapter Two - Conceptualizing Gender in Russia - a Literature Review

The gendered nature of political systems and the gendered behaviour of their participants is a field of study often neglected in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Often, theorists assume that women will act as they do in the West, in concert with men possessing similar attributes of party, class or ethnicity. But is this assumption really valid in the former Soviet Union? Does gender have a significant impact on political beliefs, and if so, is this gendered impact visible in the parliamentary behaviour of female deputies? Can there be any room for a gendered perspective in the Russian political system? This chapter will argue that there is a place for scholarship in this field, and that this place exists at the convergence of three very different scholastic domains.

Russian politics since the collapse of the Soviet Union have been ever changing and dynamic. With such a system in constant flux, examining the motivating factors of actions such as voting patterns demands a complex study of primary source materials. However, documents alone cannot paint a complete picture nor can they situate actions within the context of the contemporary political environment. This chapter will examine three major areas of study that impact on the parliamentary behaviour of female representatives: the structure and nature of transitional democracies, particularly in the Russian context, political cleavages among citizens and parliamentarians in such democracies and the political discourse among women about possible avenues for action that may shape deputy beliefs and behaviour.

Transitional Politics in a Changing Society

Georgina Waylen states in her article 'Women and Democratization: Conceptualizing Gender Relations in Transition Politics' that transitional democracies in the post-Soviet region are a unique phenomenon. Unlike the transitional democracies of Latin America, they have emerged largely in the absence of any functioning civil society. Consequently, the foundations of civil society, such as functioning political dialogue and associations independent from the state, are poorly developed. Nevertheless, these post-Soviet democracies share many traits with other transitional democracies, such as the weakness of party systems and pervasive party fractionality.⁴¹

Russia's Political Inheritance

The political system in Russia in the mid 1990's owed its turmoil in large part to its recent history. When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he began his program of *perestroika*, a restructuring of the system designed to ensure the long-term survival of the Soviet state. To increase support for this restructuring, he also introduced a policy of *glasnost*, or openness. This policy encouraged Soviet citizens to speak their minds freely, without fear of repercussions. During this time, an embryonic civil society emerged, whereby citizens could come together freely to form associations independent of the state. It was this development that truly began independent political thought and action in Russia.

⁴¹ See the introduction of Waylen, Georgina, 'Women and Democratization: Conceptualizing Gender Relations in Transitional Politics', World Politics, (April 1994) 46, 327-54

In May of 1990, the first freely elected Congress of the Russian republic assembled in Moscow. In turn, this Congress elected a Supreme Soviet, which passed the laws declaring Russia an independent state. As is often the case in such transitional democracies, various independent groups were united by a common enemy, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and a common goal, the removal of that party from power. Over time, however, a divergence of beliefs and approaches to the transition period among parliamentarians and between the legislative and executive branches of power emerged. El'tsin and his supporters favoured the extraordinary power granted to him by the parliament in 1992, while many in the parliament supported the notion of the primacy of the elected representatives of the people: the legislative branch. The antagonism came to a head in 1993, when El'tsin used brute force to break this stalemate.

That October, Boris El'tsin disbanded the Supreme Soviet by firing on the White House. A new constitution and electoral system was created and the development of party politics past the fight against a common enemy began to be seen.

Factors that Shape Party Development

In their article 'The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia', Remington and Smith assert that the development of party systems is influenced or shaped by four main factors: the electoral law or electoral system, the arrangement of institutions, the alignment of preferences in the electorate and the stability of these three things: electoral law, institutional structure and the party system. An analysis of these factors provides one means by which we can begin to contextualize the roles and political positions of female parliamentarians.

The Russian Electoral System

Antonio Nadais and Thomas Remington have written on the electoral system in Russia and its implications for political party development.⁴² Both argue that an electoral system must mediate the conflict between representativeness and stability. Certainly this is true in the post-Soviet context. Poland's early experience with unlimited voting thresholds and the subsequent election of 29 parties to the Polish Sejm, who then could agree on nothing, illustrate the dangers of stressing representativeness over stability. On the other hand, pre-Gorbachev Soviet Union, with its one-candidate ridings and 99% voter turnout demonstrates the problems of stressing stability over representativeness.

As a consequence of this conflict, an electoral system that aimed to ensure both representativeness and stability was promulgated. Under El'tsin's September, 1993 decree,⁴³ the new Duma was to have 450 seats, of which half were to be proportionally elected, based on party lists, and the other half elected by single member district voting. Single member district voting aimed for representativeness, because the candidate was chosen directly by the electorate in his or her constituency. Like in Canada, the Russian Federation used the first-past-the-post system, where the candidate to garner the largest number of votes in any district won the seat. In contrast

⁴²Remington, Thomas, and Smith, Steven, 'The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia', Legislative Studies Quarterly, (November 1995) 20, 4, 457-489, 458-59, and Nadais, Antonio, 'The Choice of Electoral Systems', The New Democratic Frontier, eds. Garber and Bjornlund, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, United States, 1992, 190-303

⁴³Remington, Thomas, 'Introduction', Parliaments in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe, ed. Remington, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994, 1-28, p 18

to Western practice, however, members voted in through this system frequently ran as independents, belonging to no political party.

Stability was achieved through proportional representation. Proportional representation in Russia entails marking a preferred party on an electoral ballot. The number of deputies then chosen from pre-publicized party lists corresponds with the proportion of the general vote received in the election, subject to a 5% threshold to avoid the problems encountered in Poland. Nadais also argues that the five percent threshold discourages small parties from running for office. Because democratic parties tend to be divided while communist parties tend to be united, the election of small independent parties could act to divide the democratic camp and benefit the cohesive communists.⁴⁴

In 'The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia', Remington and Smith posit that this system was chosen to achieve several objectives. First, it ensured that many parties and political views would be heard in the Duma. Proportional representation would ensure the election of multiple parties. Generally in the West only well-funded and well-supported centrist parties can command the resources and forge the networks needed to ensure victory in a first-past-the-post system. Proportional representation would ensure that smaller party representatives unable to win the most votes in a district would then still have a chance to participate in government.

This proportional representation structure also simultaneously achieved its second goal; the structure virtually guaranteed that the Communists could not gain a

⁴⁴Nadais, Antonio, 'The Choice of Electoral Systems', The New Democratic Frontier, eds. Garber and Bjornlund, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, United States, 1992, 190-303, p 192

majority. Because only the Communist Party (and perhaps the Agrarian Party) had previous community linkages, they were theoretically the most likely to win. Moreover, Communist Party adherents tended to be located in rural areas, where smaller voting districts carried the same or equal weight as the city voting districts, which had several thousand more voters per district and a far greater number of pro-reform, pro-democracy supporters; thus, one rural Communist vote had comparatively more weight than one urban reformist vote. Therefore, the system of party list voting was designed to correct this imbalance by according more weight to urban districts through proportional representation and offsetting Communist gains in single member district voting in rural areas.⁴⁵

Remington and Smith also argue that the electoral system succeeded in its third objective: the promotion and development of a multi-party system.⁴⁶ The proportionality of the system ensured that several parties would be voted into power, while the concept of party lists was intended to encourage the formation of separate parties with distinct platforms.⁴⁷ Theoretically, party list voting encourages party formation because those deputies who owe their seats to their party as opposed to their constituents are more likely to support and advocate the party line.

⁴⁵See Slider, Darrell, et al., 'Political Tendencies in Russia's Regions: Evidence from the Parliamentary Elections', in Slavic Review, (Fall, 1994) 53, 3, for an examination of urban/rural cleavages in political support.

⁴⁶Remington, Thomas, and Smith, Steven, 'The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia', Legislative Studies Quarterly, (November 1995) 20, 4, 457-489, p. 468

⁴⁷Remington, Thomas, and Smith, Steven, 'The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia', Legislative Studies Quarterly, (November 1995) 20, 4, 457-489, p. 460

The Arrangement of Political Institutions

Remington and Smith also argue that the balance of power between institutions will affect the ultimate party system.⁴⁸ For example, they state that a strong executive encourages the growth of a bi-party system, where broad-based, loose coalitions of parties with similar outlooks emerge to vie for the presidency. Alternately, the supremacy of the parliament can yield a multi-party system, as incentives for coalition-building are weaker. Consequently, during the initial stage of political reform, parties with similar platforms multiplied.

Electorate Preferences

Remington and Smith correctly point out that parties will tend to cluster where they can garner the most political support.⁴⁹ In this connection, political cleavages among the general public increase in importance. Thus, multiple identities and cross cutting cleavages will tend to form multi-party systems, and the lack of this heterogeneity will form a bi-party system.

The Development of Political Parties

Both the situational context and the electoral system helped shape party formation in the Russian Duma of 1993-95. Remington and Smith argue that party systems were underdeveloped in Russia in 1993. "Russian parties themselves,

⁴⁸Remington, Thomas, and Smith, Steven, 'The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia', Legislative Studies Quarterly, (November 1995) 20, 4, 457-489, p. 459

however, remain inchoate, afflicted with weak organizations and preoccupied by internal disputes over personality and doctrinal identity.”⁵⁰ Their arguments are based on certain observations about the political system. First and foremost, the Communist Party legacy has led to a general aversion to hierarchical decision-making and policy formation in the political sphere. This aversion is evident in the number of independents in the 1993-95 Russian Duma, as well as the number of factions (3) and parties (8), many of whom had only vague party platforms.⁵¹ The fact that there is very little formalized party discipline in Russia also supports this idea; Duma deputies are reluctant to follow a dictated party line, and consequently, Sobianin observed, party affiliation is a poor indicator of voting behaviour in this Duma.

Another factor that contributes to the weak party system in Russia is related to this notion of fluid party platforms and a lack of party discipline.⁵² Politics in Russia are to a high degree driven by personality. In the absence of any steady party outlook, personality becomes a significant indicator of political choice.⁵³ For example, Western journalists refer to the Liberal Democratic Party as Zhirinovskii's Party, to the Communist Party as Ziuganov's Party, and to Our Home is Russia as Chernomyrdin's party. This emphasis on personalities acts cyclically to further hamper party growth, as parties become unable to function when they lose their 'personality'.

⁴⁹Remington, Thomas, and Smith, Steven, 'The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia', Legislative Studies Quarterly, (November 1995) 20, 4, 457-489 p 459

⁵⁰Remington, Thomas, and Smith, Steven, 'The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia', Legislative Studies Quarterly, (November 1995) 20, 4, 457-489, p. 462

⁵¹Statistics from Remington, Thomas, and Smith, Steven, 'The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia', Legislative Studies Quarterly, (November 1995) 20, 4, 457-489, p. 467

⁵²See Remington, Thomas, 'Introduction', Parliaments in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe, ed. Remington, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994, 1-28, p. 6

A last factor that impeded party development is the extreme polarization of the political system. Because of this polarization between market-non-market and reform-anti-reform oriented groups, and because these groups are often supported by the electorate specifically for their polarized positions, party elites are unwilling to bargain or form coalitions, the very acts necessary for a functioning democratic legislature.

Despite these negative, divisive factors, Remington and Smith argue that strong party cohesiveness developed in the 1993-95 Duma. They believe that the unequal weight accorded the executive branch promoted coalition and consensus-building among political parties.⁵⁴ "Plainly, Russia's parliamentary politics often involves bargaining and pragmatic trade-offs among factions, leaders, and even sub-groups of deputies."⁵⁵

I agree with this last argument, and believe that comments about party factionality generalize about party activity at a time in Russia where any cohesive but democratic party system would have been impossible. Particularly given the problems of an inadequate legal foundation on the subject of political representation, as well as a lack of commonly accepted guidelines party development was unavoidably fractured. However, I do not believe that the chaotic nature of party development before 1993 can be a reliable indicator of party development after 1993, by which time both politicians

⁵³Wolchik, Sharon, 'Women and the Politics of Transition in Central and Eastern Europe', Democratic Reform and the Position of Women in Transitional Economies, ed. Moghadam, Valentine, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, 29-47, p 38

⁵⁴Remington, Thomas, and Smith, Steven, 'The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia', Legislative Studies Quarterly, (November 1995) 20, 4, 457-489, p. 468

⁵⁵Remington, Thomas, and Smith, Steven, 'The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia', Legislative Studies Quarterly, (November 1995) 20, 4, 457-489, p. 482

and the electorate had had some experience working through the system and rules became more formalized.

Political Cleavages in Transitional Parliaments

Rae and Taylor carried out a comprehensive examination of political cleavages in 1970 in their book The Analysis of Political Cleavages. The concepts still hold true today and are useful in providing a theoretical framework within which to view contemporary political cleavages in Russia. Rae and Taylor assert that political cleavages can be based on three attributes. Differences in ideology breed a lack of consensus, differences in traits will indicate a heterogeneous environment, while a lack of common memberships breed factionalization.⁵⁶

Existing political cleavages either polarize or integrate a group. Taylor and Rae argue that if cleavages flow along clearly defined and distinct class, race or political lines, cleavages will be polarizing. Conversely, if these cleavages intersect, or cross-cut, the effect will be to integrate a political system.⁵⁷

What does this mean in the Russian context? Five major cleavage factors can be identified in the Russian Federation. These five factors act directly or indirectly to motivate or discourage parliamentary behaviour among male and female deputies alike. Remington and Smith argue that the most important cleavage in the Russian context is an ideological cleavage, which has two components: an economic cleavage

⁵⁶For an elaboration of these concepts, see Chapter One in Taylor, Michael, and Rae, Douglas, The Analysis of Political Cleavages, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1970

between those who support the market and those who do not, and the accompanying cleavage of those who support democratic reform and those who do not.⁵⁸ Sobianin's study of Russian deputies, as well as Medvedkov's and Slider's studies all echo this belief in the primacy of the reform/anti-reform cleavage in the political arena.

Sobianin argues that contrary to Western political systems, party or faction affiliation is not a reliable indicator of voting behaviour or particular political beliefs. "The platforms of factions are quite vague and are occasionally indistinguishable. Moreover, the actions of factional leaders do not always correspond to the platform of the faction."⁵⁹ Furthermore, the lack of party discipline means that deputies are not penalized when they fail to attend crucial votes or meetings.⁶⁰ This fact can probably be explained by Remington's theories about the weak party system and the consequent aversion to hierarchy and fluidity of political positions.

Next, ethnicity is a trait and/or membership cleavage in the Russian context. While most members of the 1993-95 Russian Duma were ethnic Russians, Dominique Arel has studied the concept of language/ethnicity as a cleavage in Ukrainian politics. He found that on issues of ethnic or linguistic importance (Ukrainian regional

⁵⁷For an elaboration of these concepts, see Chapter Four in Taylor and Rae

⁵⁸Remington, Thomas, and Smith, Steven, 'The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia', Legislative Studies Quarterly, (November 1995) 20, 4, 457-489, p. 463, and Remington, Thomas, 'Conclusion: Partisan Competition and Democratic Stability', Parliaments in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe, ed. Remington, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994, 217-231, p. 221

⁵⁹Sobianin, Alexander, 'Political Cleavages Among Russian Deputies', Parliaments in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe, ed. Remington, Thomas, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994, 181-215, p. 191

⁶⁰Sobianin, Alexander, 'Political Cleavages Among Russian Deputies', Parliaments in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe, ed. Remington, Thomas, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994, 181-215, p. 191

autonomy, economic integration with Russia and the use of Russian language in parliament in his study), deputies tend to cleave along ethnic lines.⁶¹ He further states that the language factor is central to the structure of post-Soviet Ukrainian politics.

Slider and Medvedkov examine regional cleavages in the Russian Federation and come up with similar data. Slider's study, 'Political Tendencies in Russia's Regions' examines the regional variations in party list voting in the December 1993 parliamentary elections.⁶² He claims that four different groups: reformers, anti-reformers, ultra-nationalists and centrists fought for political power in that election. Slider's study proves that regional differences directly impact electorate voting behavior. For example, reformers tended to do better in urban areas, where democratic parties had the most support. Conversely, anti-reformers did well in the southern, more rural republics. Areas of natural resource wealth and strong regional tendencies tended to support reformist parties, while areas supporting economic liberalism and advocating a strong centre would tend to vote along ultra-nationalist lines. Regions that advocated a strong centre and strong state control were the most conservative and anti-reform, while those supporting strong state control over the economy and strong regions tended to vote for centrist parties. Medvedkov et al., in their study 'The December 1993 Russian Election: Geographical Patterns and Contextual Factors', seem to support Slider's study in the cleavages between North and South and between supporters and opponents of reform.⁶³

⁶¹ Arel, Dominique, 'Voting Behaviour in the Ukrainian Parliament: The Language Factor', in Parliaments in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe, ed. Remington, Thomas, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994, 125-158, p 150

⁶² See Slider et al., for a more complete picture of the following argument.

⁶³ Medvedkov et al., 'The December 1993 Russian Election: Geographical Patterns and Contextual Factors', The Russian Review (January 1996) 55, 80-98

Finally, gender does seem to have some cleaving effect in Russian society as a whole, but a comprehensive study of gender cleavages in the Russian parliament has not yet been done. Tedlin and Yap examined gender cleavages in opinions toward politics in Moscow in the early 1990s and discovered that women were more conservative and risk-adverse than men. They were more likely than men to believe that reform was too rapid and were less supportive of competitive elections. Tedlin and Yap explain this phenomenon by asserting that while the past may have been marked by patriarchy, the rapid social change in Russia means that women, who are more likely to face social dislocation, fear change more than their male counterparts.⁶⁴ Similar findings by Hesli and Miller in a 1992 study point out that women were more likely than men to support the Communist Party and other established institutions and were less enthusiastic about economic reform.⁶⁵ Hesli and Miller also conclude that these gender cleavages exist because women have more to lose in the transformation process than men, an argument with which I strongly agree. As mentioned in the Introduction, according to all social indicators, women are more likely than men to be laid-off, to have difficulties finding new work and well-paid work, to be poor, and to be the head of a one-parent household. It would be natural to support a return to a system of guaranteed result under such conditions.

⁶⁴All conclusions from Tedlin, Kent, and Yap, Oi-Kuan Fiona, 'The Gender Factor in Soviet Mass Politics: Survey Evidence from Greater Moscow', Political Research Quarterly, (March, 1993) 46, 179-207, p 205

⁶⁵Hesli, Vicki, and Miller, Arthur, 'The Gender Base of Institutional Support in Lithuania, Ukraine and Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, (1993) 45, 3, 505-532

Feminist Political Discourse in Russia

Feminist political discourse, or the discourse among women on how best to solve the problems enumerated above, is a field of scholarship that is only now beginning to come into its own. There are several reasons for its conspicuous absence during the Soviet era and its slow development today, which need to be discussed before any examination of the actual discourse can take place.

The Influence of History

Several theorists examine the influence of the Soviet past on the development of a gendered political discourse in Russia today. Voronina's argument in 'Soviet Patriarchy: Past and Present', is the strongest.⁶⁶ She argues that under communism, the state usurped slogans and goals used by the Western feminist movement, (originally, universal suffrage, and later, the right to work, the right to participate in government, the right to social services), but that these slogans were used not to promote women's emancipation *per se*, but rather to achieve the objectives of state policy. For example, the Soviet state promoted women's right to work because the labour-intensive economy necessitated more labour-power than the male population, already decimated by war, could provide. Similarly, the state provided social services like child care and free abortions not with the goal of ensuring women had freedom of choice, but to facilitate women's entry into a labour-starved economy. Today women are being encouraged to demand the freedom of only one shift - the domestic one. Racioppi and O'Sullivan See support Voronina's point by arguing that "as the state no

⁶⁶See Voronina, Olga, 'Soviet Patriarchy: Past and Present', Hypatia, (Fall 1993) 8, 4, 91-112

longer requires [female] labour in the economy, the Russian woman is being asked to return to the home to her “traditional” duties and position in the family.”⁶⁷

Voronina further reasons that this usurpation of feminist goals by the state has led to the common belief that women’s emancipation is an accepted fact. She claims that the ‘myth’ of emancipation is so widely believed, even today, that women and men do not recognize the discrimination against women in society. She states,

in my view a specific type of patriarchy arose in the USSR, under which the basic mechanism of discrimination against women did not come from men as a group, but from the totalitarian state. It seems to me that political totalitarianism is, in principle, simply an extreme expression of a masculinist worldview and a patriarchal consciousness.... Paradoxically, the declared shift today in the type of the state’s political structure - from totalitarian to democratic - has not by any means led to a rethinking of the whole problem of the position of women and their status in society.⁶⁸

Today, the development of this discourse is hindered by factors that relate to this past. First, an extension of long-standing gender roles, women generally see the political system as corrupt and an inappropriate place for female activism.⁶⁹ There is also a growing feeling that politics is divorced from the daily hardships of a transforming Russia. Wolchik, in her article ‘Women and the Politics of Transition in Central and Eastern Europe’, outlines the decrease in political representation since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and concludes that women tend to act politically only when they feel that their rights or their ability to care for their families is

⁶⁷Racioppi, Linda, and O’Sullivan See, Katherine, ‘Organizing Russian Women’, *Signs* (Summer 1995), 20, 4: 818-850, p. 824

⁶⁸Voronina, Olga, ‘Soviet Patriarchy: Past and Present’, *Hypatia*, (Fall 1993) 8, 4, 91-112, p. 109-10

⁶⁹Wolchik, Sharon, ‘Women and the Politics of Transition in Central and Eastern Europe’, *Democratic Reform and the Position of Women in Transitional Economies*, ed. Moghadam, Valentine, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, 29-47, p. 33

threatened.⁷⁰ This theory seems to support the notion that women are not politically active because they see politics are largely irrelevant to their daily lives. There is also a residual fear of being vocal and outspoken, and the general perception of feminists as 'radical' and 'unfeminine' acts to discourage new voices. Todorova points out that women are reluctant to speak out on behalf of women for fear of being divisive, that is, of dividing along gender lines the camp to which they belong.⁷¹

Finally, Racioppi and O'Sullivan see remark that the formation of women's groups or female adherents to a particular line faces the same problem as political parties: an aversion to hierarchies and an unwillingness to give up independence in exchange for strength through unity.⁷² Ekaterina Lakhova, the Advisor to the President on Women, Family and Children, has said that "so far there is no system to direct and manage the women's movement, no mechanism to spread the message throughout the country."⁷³

The Continuity of Soviet Patriarchy

Nevertheless, a public debate among women about their role in society has emerged in Russia over the past five years. Most participants in this dialogue agree on the patriarchal structure of the Soviet state, and that that structure has continued on into the creation of the Russian state. Voronina, Posadskaia, Konstantinova and

⁷⁰Wolchik, Sharon, 'Women and the Politics of Transition in Central and Eastern Europe', Democratic Reform and the Position of Women in Transitional Economies, ed. Moghadam, Valentine, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, 29-47

⁷¹Todorova, 'The Bulgarian Case: Women's Issues or Feminist Issues?' Gender Politics and Post-Communism, eds. Funk, Nanette, and Mueller, Magda, Routledge, New York, 1993, 30-38, p 30

⁷²See Racioppi, Linda and O'Sullivan See, Katherine, 'Organizing Women before and after the Fall: Women's Politics in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia', Signs, (Summer 1995), 818-850

Einhorn have all written on the firmly entrenched nature of this patriarchy.

Posadskaia, in her article 'Women as Objects and Motive Force for Change', points out several occasions upon which the Soviet state changed its policy approach toward women, and that these changes were influenced by changing state needs.⁷⁴ This policy continues today, and Posadskaia states that 'no matter how progressive the conception underlying the state program, it remains, as before, a program *for* women, not one conceived *by* women themselves."⁷⁵

The Dialogue Among Women's Groups⁷⁶

The discourse is largely an ideological debate between three forms of feminism: Soviet feminism, which is a continuation of earlier beliefs about the role of women in communist society, Western liberal feminism, which advocates legal and practical equal rights, equal representation in decision-making bodies and a transformation in gender roles, and a particularly Russian brand of maternal feminism, which focuses on the role of woman as mother, nurturer, mediator and healer. This dialogue between feminisms is carried out primarily through the various women's groups and movements in the Russian Federation.

There are few remaining groups that have failed to adapt to the new political and economic climate and continue to espouse purely communist or state-socialist

⁷³Lakhova, Ekaterina, in Issraelyan, Evgenia, 'Women's Organizations in Russia', Canadian Embassy in Moscow (unpublished), 1993

⁷⁴Posadskaia, Anastasia, 'Women as Objects and Motive Force for Change', Women in Russia: A New Era in Russian Feminism, ed. Posadskaia, Anastasia, Verso Press, London, 1994, 8-13, p. 10

⁷⁵Posadskaia, Anastasia, 'Women as Objects and Motive Force for Change', Women in Russia: A New Era in Russian Feminism, ed. Posadskaia, Anastasia, Verso Press, London, 1994, 8-13, p. 11

ideals. The government sponsored Soviet Women's Committee was a organization created in 1941 to fight for women's emancipation worldwide. This group transformed in 1990 to the Women's Union of Russia, which has a far more liberal feminist outlook.⁷⁷ However, another group carries on the ideals of the Soviet Women's Committee. The Congress of Soviet Women supports a return to socialism and the reunification of Soviet society as a means to achieve true emancipation.⁷⁸

Groups that adhere to the liberal feminist vision can be broadly classified into four categories: those that deal with legal rights, those that deal with economic rights, those concerned with a social transformation and those concerned with political change. Groups that advocate the creation of legal and institutional structures that will benefit women include Interlegal and the Moscow Centre for Gender Studies (MCGS). Both organizations lobby the government for institutional changes for women, and Interlegal offers legal advice to women.

Organizations that deal with providing women with economic equality through a liberal feminist view of the marketplace include the Women's Union of Russia, the Association of Women-Entrepreneurs of Russia and a Moscow organization called Guildea. The first organization is a national one that runs projects designed to retrain unemployed women and help them find new work.⁷⁹ The Association of Women-Entrepreneurs is also a national organization that aims to bring together

⁷⁶Information about women's groups in Russia is based primarily on my research done in the summer of 1994. Unnoted comments about the political/sociological orientation of these groups stems from interviews with group members or fact sheets put out by the organizations themselves.

⁷⁷ Issraelyan, Evgenia, 'Women's Organizations in Russia', Canadian Embassy in Moscow (unpublished), 1993, p. 3

⁷⁸Issraelyan, Evgenia, 'Women's Organizations in Russia', Canadian Embassy in Moscow (unpublished), 1993, p. 25

businesswomen. A major project involves the revival of Russian arts and crafts.

The organization also lobbies the government for tax breaks for women business owners and other economic incentives for women.⁸⁰ Guildea is a small business consulting firm that deals almost exclusively with women and aims to give women an equal opportunity at functioning in the marketplace. The group also runs business courses for women.⁸¹

The group most concerned with societal issues of women's rights through a liberal feminist framework is the Moscow Centre for Gender Studies. This Centre researches the situation of women in Russia, and sponsored two national conferences to bring together Russian women to conduct political discourse in 1991 and 1992. The group also encourages organization among women's groups and acts as a networker between various groups.⁸² Another state organization, the Centre for Women, Family and Gender Studies, focuses its efforts on stopping violence against women.⁸³ Missiia, a national non-profit organization, was founded in 1990 to promote women to positions of power in all areas: economics, politics and social life. It carries out several projects, including employment counseling and small business support and enterprise consulting.⁸⁴

⁷⁹The Women's Union of Russia: Fact Sheet', Moscow, 1993

⁸⁰Issraelyan, Evgenia, 'Women's Organizations in Russia', Canadian Embassy in Moscow (unpublished), 1993, p. 6

⁸¹Richardson, Beth, 'Background Paper on the Status of Women in Russia', Canadian Embassy in Moscow (unpublished), 1994

⁸²Richardson, Beth, 'Background Paper on the Status of Women in Russia', Canadian Embassy in Moscow (unpublished), 1994

⁸³Issraelyan, Evgenia, 'Women's Organizations in Russia', Canadian Embassy in Moscow (unpublished), 1993, p.p. 18-20

⁸⁴'All-Russian Women's Association Missiia: Fact Sheet', Moscow, 1994

Politically, one group straddles the divide between liberal and maternal feminism. The Women of Russia political party, which won over 8% of the vote in the December 1993 election, is a rather unique group. It adopted occasionally the maternal feminist position, but more frequently advocated the liberal feminist position. For example, party members generally support government initiatives on economic reform. Conversely, they support the opposition (anti-reform, anti-market) parties on issues like child care and family allowance.

Ekaterina Lakhova also seems to vacillate between camps. She believes that women's role is essentially in the home, yet conversely, believes that women should have to right to choose their own destiny.

Notwithstanding the preponderance of liberal-feminist groups, there are a number of Russian women's groups that espouse a mixed type of feminism. GAIA is a Moscow group that aims to help women through their everyday lives. This organization was created to raise women's consciousness and encourage self-reliance, but at the same time, many of the group's programs focus on children, and the centre's mission to help women raise their self-esteem and encourage social and civic projects.⁸⁵

While the liberal feminist perspective seems to have the most adherents, I would assert that maternal feminism is really more popular, particularly at the grassroots level. The prevalence of liberal feminist women's organizations can in part be explained by their organizational ability, and their contacts with the West and with

⁸⁵Issraelyan, Evgenia, 'Women's Organizations in Russia', Canadian Embassy in Moscow (unpublished), 1993, p. 8-11, and Racioppi, Linda, and O'Sullivan See, Katherine, 'Organizing Women before and after the Fall: Women's Politics in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia', *Signs*, (Summer 1995), 818-850, p. 841

Western women's organizations, which may mean they are better known than Russian feminist groups that may not conform to Western notions of the feminist ideal. Further, I would argue that maternal feminism is a concept more frequently endorsed by the average woman in Russia. It is certainly the notion of women endorsed by men, including Gorbachev, who in 1987 announced his desire "to return women to their purely womanly mission",⁸⁶ and former Labour Minister Gennadii Melikian, who in 1994 advised women to return to the home and leave the few jobs remaining to men.⁸⁷ It is this brand of feminism that I believe to be the most important in understanding Duma deputies' behaviour.

Situating Women in the Russian Political Context

What insights can these differing areas of scholarship provide? I believe these four areas form the fundamental building blocs needed to understand female parliamentary behaviour. Theories about transitional politics explain how the structure of legislative institutions sets the framework for political choice. Within such a framework, the transitional politics theory advanced by Remington and others helps to explain why female deputies are not strongly motivated by party alignments and may be influenced by other factors, such as personal conviction or individual leaders. An examination of the political cleavages in Russia acts to identify the various cleavage factors that may act in concert with, contradict or supersede gender identity. Factors such as ideology, ethnicity and regional identification all may intersect and transform gender cleavages.

⁸⁶Gorbachev; Racioppi, Linda, and O'Sullivan See, Katherine, 'Organizing Women before and after the Fall: Women's Politics in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia', Signs, (Summer 1995), 818-850, p. 824

The problems faced by Russian women in general will influence female parliamentarians' voting behaviour. When these women experience events common to other women, they may become more aware of commonalities of gender over other similarities. Further, I maintain that most parliamentarians in any country are influenced by their own personal experiences and history. In the Russian context, this becomes quite important because women and men tend to experience economic transformation and marketization in substantially different ways.

Lastly, a discourse among women about their role and situation in a transforming society will influence the ideological outlook and consequent policy choices among female deputies. This discourse helps set the parameters of the achievable as well as the desirable for women, and female legislators are not immune to these social influences.

This chapter has attempted to set out the contextual framework within which female parliamentary behaviour in the 1993-95 Russian Duma can be studied. A lack of earlier work on this subject necessitates such a thorough examination of all influencing factors for voting behaviour, so that the analysis of voting behaviour can be carried out in a multi-dimensional, multi-factor and contextualized manner.

⁸⁷Issraelyan, Evgenia, 'Women's Organizations in Russia', Canadian Embassy in Moscow (unpublished), 1993, p. 4, 5

Chapter Three - The History, Political Context and Structure of the Fifth State Duma

This chapter deals with the practicalities of political representation in the Russian Federation. The 1993 elections were the first of their kind in Russia; the first multi-party parliamentary election, the first Western-style political party campaigning, and, I argue, one of the first true tests of parliamentary democracy in that country.

In the West, the rules governing activities inherent during the parliamentary process: voting, articulating interests and campaigning, are all fairly well understood by the polity at large. In Russia, however, the populace historically has known neither the rules nor the methods of action required for democracy. Consequently, the Soviet system in practice, combined with a pre-Revolutionary authoritarian tradition, made the rise and development of parties in Russia an agonizing and sometimes chaotic experience. This chapter deals briefly with the issue of political culture in Russia and then goes on to examine the parties contesting the December 12, 1993 elections.

As the main function of this thesis is to discover whether gender based voting patterns existed in Russia, the following chapter provides the reader with background information on possible cleavages and affiliations in the Duma, on which basis voting patterns will be analyzed. Preliminary evidence of female solidarity in some areas, which will be refined in the following chapters, will also be introduced.

Electoral history in the Russian Federation

While the previous chapter dealt with the scholarly notions of the existence or absence of democratic culture, this section will deal concretely with the issues of democratic, and more specifically, parliamentary experience.

Throughout Russian history, there has been a tradition of group decision-making particularly at a lower level. Ian Thatcher, in his article 'Elections in Russian and Early Soviet History', details the collective decision-making process in the village commune, and in this limited political activity sees proof that Russia had a tradition of democratic participation.⁸⁸ He rejects Richard Pipes's argument that the high level of state control over the democratic process in all these areas, the commune, the municipality and later the Dumas effectively meant that no democratic tradition existed. I tend to favour Pipes' argument; while I do believe these forums provided individual participants an arena in which to voice their opinions, those individuals could in no real and meaningful way *direct* the political process. Consequently, without the ability to determine the political course of a community, democratic experience is limited to the ability to *voice* particular interests without the subsequent ability to *further* those same interests.

With the Soviet revolution, there was undoubtedly great hope that this ability to comment would change into an ability to act. However, as the new system entrenched itself, the same limitations re-emerged. Initially, there was comparatively free discussion of issues and votes to determine results, but as the Communist Party became stronger, the limits of debate became increasingly prescribed - the limits of individual action even more so.

The advent of *perestroika* in 1985 and *glasnost* a few years later signified a dramatic departure from the traditions of an entrenched Soviet hierarchy. This departure began with a renewed ability to voice dissent and individual or non-state group interests. However, the freedom granted under *glasnost* quickly surpassed pre-Soviet freedoms, as citizens began not only expressing opinions about particular matters that affected them personally, but matters of much larger significance: citizens began to question the nature of the political system itself, something never permitted even in pre-Soviet times.

The ability to do more than *voice* dissenting opinions, but to actually *change* the path of political development in Russia, i.e., through free elections, marked the first step toward the solidification of this new system. In early March 1989, elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies were held. During this election, one-third of the 2250 seats were reserved for organizations under the aegis of the CPSU, and although "cumbersome registration procedures filtered out almost all noncommunist candidates well before the vote"⁸⁹, a few independent pro-democratic candidates managed to run.⁹⁰ However, reform at this point was still seen as taking place within the system.

As *glasnost* raced out of control, the Democratic Platform of the CPSU was founded in January 1990, and that summer El'tsin, then a People's Deputy, announced his resignation from the Party.⁹¹ In March of that year, the RSFSR held its Congress of People's Deputies elections, where hundreds of seats were contested. From among

⁸⁸ Thatcher, Ian, 'Elections in Russian and earlier Soviet History', Elections and Political Order in Russia, ed. Lentini, Peter, Central European Press, London, 1995, 15-35

⁸⁹ McFaul, Michael and Markov, Sergei, The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy: Parties, Personalities, and Programs, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1993, p. 7

⁹⁰ Fish, Steven, Democracy from Scratch, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995, p. 35

⁹¹ Fish, Steven, Democracy from Scratch, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995, p. 42

the deputies chosen first emerged the Democratic Russia opposition movement. Yet while popular democracy seemed to be emerging in Russia, elected leaders' true ability to change the course of politics was limited by the old guard, as was evidenced in the August 1991 putsch.

"The most important single obstacle to the transition from a totalitarian to a democratic society is the incompatibility of the new forms of social life and the new political institutions with the political culture of the nation."⁹² Most scholars agree that Russia had few strong traditions in effective, participatory democracy before the breakdown of the Soviet Union, and was slow to build them in the new Russian Federation. Further, Vasilii Vlashin argues in 'Toward a Rule of Law and a Bill of Rights for Russia', that Russians had no history of a rule-of law state and consequently had a poor understanding of their rights under those laws. "In my view, the largest roadblock [in Russia] is the lack of the traditions of democracy and constitutionalism and of a genuinely free legal culture."⁹³ Lastly, when political dialogue did appear (as opposed to simple opposition to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its policies), the impetus did not emerge from the general population. "What existed until recently in Russia under the name of political parties amounted largely to intellectuals' discussion clubs that did not represent any broad sections of society."⁹⁴

⁹²Sergeyev, Victor and Biryukov, Nikolai, Russia's Road to Democracy: Parliament, Communism and Traditional Culture, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, London, 1993, p. 207

⁹³Vlashin, 'Toward a Rule of Law and a Bill of Rights', Law and Democracy in the New Russia, eds. Smith and Danilenko, Brookings Dialogues on Public Policy, Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 1993, 43-52, p. 47

⁹⁴Tolz, Vera, 'Problems in Building Democratic Institutions in Russia', RFL/RE, Vol. 3, N. 9, March 4, 1994, 1-7, p. 4

Political context of Fifth Duma

The first steps toward participatory democracy were not made without faltering and were not accepted unambiguously. In the best of cases, democratic culture requires both time to grow and the public space, or civil society, within which to do so. I hold that the Russian Federation in 1993 had neither of these.

First and foremost, I believe that Russians generally, including politicians and policy makers, had no clear vision of the path down which they wished to travel. This lack of consensus led policy makers to vacillate between extremes, and because of this tee-tottering effect, hindered political leaders from making clear the rules of the political game. This lack of clear policy direction on a very practical level, i.e., what is political coercion vs. political campaigning; what is a bribe vs. a campaign or party donation; and fundamentally, what rights may be legally temporarily suspended in a democracy, coupled with widely opposing political statements issued by the same politicians, i.e. democracy is positive and desirable, but only when it does not impinge on one's ability to lead, made for a confusing and potentially manipulable political environment.

The October events became the overarching prism through which to see the 1993 elections. Whether Russia would have an executive or legislative system as its power base was still a battle to be fought during the 1991-1993 period. When El'tsin bombed the parliament in early October 1993, it seemed as if the executive branch had won. Yet even after the October events, there remained no clear delineation of executive and parliamentary powers, only a parliamentary power vacuum filled by the then executive. Shetsova argues that Russia at this stage was an 'unconsolidated democracy' where political players could not agree on the rules of the political game,

and played in an increasingly polarized environment.⁹⁵ This unstable environment was exacerbated by the lack of a Russian constitution or law on the elections.

Most importantly, the earlier system of parliamentarianism, a system designed to represent all segments of society, had been destroyed, while a new one had not yet solidified. Consequently, prospective deputies were forced to act in conditions of great uncertainty.

Structure of Fifth Duma

The Fifth State Duma was formed on the basis of the December 12, 1993, national election, in compliance with the October 1, 1993 edict 'Regulations Concerning the Election of Deputies to the State Duma in 1993'.⁹⁶ This edict stipulated that the Fifth Duma be a transitional one, to sit for only two years, where subsequent Dumas would sit for a four year term. Moreover, the composition of the Duma envisioned a radical departure from previous congress compositions - it would have 450 seats, to be divided equally among party list seats and single mandate constituency seats. Through such a division, the President and others hoped that the need for regional expression through the parliament could be satisfied while simultaneously encouraging party group through party list seats.

⁹⁵Shetsova, Lilia, 'Parliament and the Political Crisis in Russia, 1991-1993', in Democratization in Russia: the Development of Legislative Institutions, ed. Hahn, Jeffrey, M. E. Sharpe, New York, 1996, 29-48, p. 34

⁹⁶Levchik, D., 'The Principle Elements of Electoral Law and Their Application in Russian Legislation During 1992-94', Russian Politics and Law, January-February 1996, 5-16, p. 12

Party Affiliation⁹⁷

When one speaks of politics, political parties are generally seen as the base denominator, the primary affiliation of all representatives. While this is also true of Russian parliamentarians during the Fifth Duma, other affiliations are also vital in understanding the voting activity of representatives. Party affiliation for the December 12, 1993 elections was weak and fragmented, for a variety of reasons.

First and foremost as an impediment to the appearance of strong parties on the eve of the December elections was the short time between the dissolution of the Congress of People's Deputies and the new elections. New elections were called in mid-October, and parties wishing to compete in the elections had to submit their intentions and 100 000 signatures from at least seven different regions (neither region having more than 15% of all signatures) before November 12.⁹⁸ Such a tight time limit also encouraged the growth of weak coalition groups, all trying to amass enough signatures to participate. However, these unions were frequently based on convenience, not ideological coherence, and many affiliations disintegrated almost immediately after the elections.

Further impediments to the growth of strong party politics also stemmed from the short campaign period. Many candidates were unknown to their electorates, few parties could amass sufficient resources in such a short period of time to campaign

⁹⁷Information on specific political parties, unless otherwise noted, is from three sources: the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Jurisprudence under the auspices of the government of the Russian Federation, *Vybory v Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu: pravovye problemy*, Federal'noe Sobranie spravochnik, Moscow, 1994 and Ostapchuk, A., Krasnikov, E., and Meier, M., *Spravochnik: politicheskie partii, dvizheniia i bloky sovremennoi Rossii*, Nizhni Novgorod, 1993, and Lentini, Peter, *Elections and Political Order in Russia*, ed. Lentini, Peter, Central European University Press, New York, 1995, (Appendix: Electoral Associations and their Programs).

⁹⁸Rahr, Alexander, 'Preparations for the Parliamentary Elections in Russia', *RFE/RL*, Vol. 2, No. 47, November 26, 1993, p. 1, and Hough, Jerry, Davidheiser, Evelyn and Goodrich Lehmann, Susan, *The 1996 Russian Presidential Election*, Brookings Occasional Paper, the Brookings Institute, Washington D.C., 1996

nationally. In fact, Hough states that “even at the end of the campaign, 44 percent of respondents in our 1993 survey stated that they had not seen any election posters for the previous seven days.”⁹⁹

Michael McFaul argues that there were simply too many parties, and indeed, party platforms were sometimes so similar as to be indistinguishable. In turn, this impeded party ability to articulate the desires of a specific segment of the population and build voter loyalty.¹⁰⁰ And, of course, many scholars have pointed to Russian’s general voter apathy or political fatigue in light of the political battles of recent years and the October events to explain why many parties had difficulty acting as interest group representatives within the political system.¹⁰¹

In the end, 21 parties registered with the central electoral commission, and 13 were deemed to have legitimately acquired their signatures and were allowed to participate. A brief party history and party platform for these parties are given below, and a brief analysis of party development during the Fifth Duma follows this section.

Parties that won party and list seats¹⁰²

Russia’s Choice is likely the best known reformist party in Russia. It emerged out of Democratic Russia, a broad based, reformist political movement which began in the fall of 1990. Officially, Russia’s Choice came into being in June 1993, as a pro-

⁹⁹Hough, Jerry, et al., The 1996 Russian Presidential Election, Brookings Occasional Paper, The Brookings Institute, Washington D.C., 1996, p. 27

¹⁰⁰McFaul, Michael and Markov, Sergei, The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy: Parties, Personalities, and Programs, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1993, p. 10

¹⁰¹Rahr, Alexander, ‘Preparations for the Parliamentary Elections in Russia’, RFE/RL, Vol. 2, No. 47, November 26, 1993, p. 1-6

¹⁰²All statistics in this chapter, including party size, election information, regional, age, ethnic and employment affiliation, as well as committee information is taken from a database constructed by the author. See Appendix A.

presidential and pro-reform party, and was dedicated to democratization and the development of a western-style market economy, including tax reform, a reduction in military expenditures and the privatization of industry and land.¹⁰³ The bloc also upheld the principles of the accountability of public figures and the rule of law.

Russia's Choice bloc was generally seen as the best organized among reform parties, and ran candidates all across the country. The bloc received 15.5% of the vote and, as of the January 13, 1994, registration, Russia's Choice comprised 40 party seat deputies and another 34 deputies from single constituencies, making it the largest group in the Duma.

The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia was also very successful in the December 1994 elections. Vladimir Zhirinovskii, with his eclectic mix of xenophobia, nationalism and support for a limited market economy, managed to grab 22.9% of the vote, adding up to 59 party seats and 5 single constituency seats.

In fact, Zhirinovskii's party was one of the oldest in the Russian Federation, having been founded as far back as 1988. It advocated a strong Russian state within the 1900 borders, or, barring that, the borders of the former Soviet Union,¹⁰⁴ the discontinuance of foreign aid, the restoration of Russia as a major international arms merchant and most importantly, the forceful protection of Russians abroad. The party stated that "the most important and most painful question in this country is the national one."¹⁰⁵ Concurrently, the LDPR planned to encourage industrialists through

¹⁰³Aleksandrovna, Liudmila, 'Program of Russia's Choice Party' (June 12, 1994), Russia and Eurasia Documents Annual 1994, ed. Black, Academic International Press, Gulf Breeze, Florida, p. 107

¹⁰⁴RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 238, December 14, 1993, by Internet

¹⁰⁵'Elections '95' Airs LDPR Program', *St. Petersburg Fifth Channel*, November 15, 1995, in FBIS, November 21, 1995, p. 4

favourable tax incentives, to support private property ownership and control organized crime.

The Agrarian Party of Russia was seen by many as a special interest group party. Founded in February of 1993, it claimed to represent those Russian working and living on the land. However, it enlarged its mandate to include all those who recognized the importance of the revival of the Russian countryside. "...[T]here will be no prosperity in Russia without the rebirth of the Russian village, which is a source of our Russian nation, a source of life, a source of culture, morality and health."¹⁰⁶ At the centre of its party program was the citizen's relationship with the land. "The concern of feeding people has always been the main concern and the main Russian problem. Without resolving it, no political promises and no plans will work and we will never create a great Russia. The agrarian issue is the key issue...."¹⁰⁷ The Agrarian Party believed that only those who work the land have a legal right to it, and consequently opposed the large scale voucher privatization of land, even while the party was not in theory against the private ownership of land itself. Further, the party promoted ideals of social justice while accepting limited marketization.¹⁰⁸ The Agrarian Party won nearly 8% of the vote; 21 party seats and 34 single mandate seats.

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation was the progeny of the Communist Party of the RSFSR. Banned after the 1991 coup, a 1992 Constitutional Court decision allowed the party to once again become active. The Communist Party,

¹⁰⁶Mikhail Lapshin, Chairman of the Agrarian Party, from 'Women's Group, Shakhrai on Election Programs', *Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network*, November 26, 1993, in FBIS, November 29, 1993, p. 42

¹⁰⁷Klochov, Igor, Agrarian Party representative, in 'Agrarian Party Representatives Outline Priorities', *Moscow Television Network*, November 26, 1993, in FBIS, November 29, 1993, p. 42

¹⁰⁸'The Land is the Mother of Wealth. Election Program of the Agrarian Party of Russia' *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, December 8, 1993, p. 2, in FBIS, December 9, 1993, p. 30

having inherited channels of influence and contacts nationwide, had the largest membership of any party in the Russian Federation. Its members opposed El'tsin's 'populist course' and supported renewed state control over the economy and a state of emergency to combat organized crime. The party won 12.4% of the vote, receiving 32 party seats and 10 constituency seats.

Sergei Shakhrai's Party of Russian Unity and Accord claimed to speak for the regions in Russia. Formed in the spring of 1993, its party platform advocated the creation of true federalism to promote a unified Russian state. PRUA supported the transition to a market economy, albeit a more socially-oriented transition. It advocated the mixed ownership of land, the devolution of power to the regions and increased support to Russian entrepreneurs and industrialists. The party won a total of 22 seats in the Duma, four in single constituency seats, by winning 6.7% of the vote.

Yabloko, like PRUA, aimed to stake out the position of constructive democratic opposition. Formed in the fall of 1993, its ranks were made up primarily of social and academic scholars from Grigorii Yavlinskii's EPICentre (Centre for Economic and Political Study) and members of the Russian Christian Democratic Union - New Democracy, the Republican Party of Russia and the Social Democratic Party of Russia. Yabloko focused on the democratization of society, while simultaneously supporting a gradual transition to a market economy. It received 7.9% of the vote, 20 party seats and 7 single seats.

In view of topic of this study, the Women of Russia political movement is undoubtedly one of the most interesting phenomenon of the first Russian parliamentary elections. Unique in the world as an exclusively sex-based party, it was formed after several prominent women sent surveys to 27 other political parties about

the parties' respective programs toward women and received only three replies.¹⁰⁹ As a result, three organizations, the Russian Women's Union, the Association for Women Entrepreneurs and the Union of Navy Women, came together on October 14, 1993, specifically to fill the void of women-oriented programs.¹¹⁰ This being said, movement leaders clearly stated that they were opposed to policies 'based on sexual premise'¹¹¹ and saw as their main concern unemployment, maternity and children's rights and other issues of social protection.¹¹² Women made up almost three-quarters of all unemployed, and issues of government pensions and other insurance payments were general felt to affect women in particular.¹¹³ Yet the Women of Russia movement was not leftist, and agreed with El'tsin on many economic matters. In short, like many other parties, the group believed in marketization, but not at any cost. Women of Russia did well in the elections, especially given its admitted focus on women and social policy. The party won 8.1% of the vote and 21 party seats, along with 2 single mandate seats.

The majority of parties were formed specifically with the intent to participate in the elections. However, the Democratic Party of Russia, along with the LDPR, was one of the oldest parties to run. Formed through a union of the Moscow Voter's Association, the Leningrad People's Front, the Inter-regional Group of Deputies and the Democratic platform of the CPSU, the Democratic Party of Russia held its founding congress in May

¹⁰⁹Sukhomlinova, Tat'iana, 'Democracy in Russia: Reality and Forecasts' (interview with Ekaterina Lakhova), *Rossiiskie Vesti*, December 10, 1993, *FBIS*, June 8, 1995, p. 23

¹¹⁰Khudiakova, Tat'iana, 'Women Conclude Triple Alliance on Eve of Elections', *Izvestiia*, October 16, 1993, p. 2, in *FBIS*, October 19, 1993, p. 29

¹¹¹'Women's Group, Shakhrai on Election Programs', *Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network*, November 26, in *FBIS*, November 29, 1993, p. 42

¹¹²Popov, Eduard, 'Women of Russia' Seeks Control over Power Ministers', *ITAR-TASS*, September 27, 1995, *FBIS*, September 28, 1995, p. 1

¹¹³Zamiatina, Tat'iana, 'Women of Russia Bloc Leader Explains Role, Aims', *ITAR-TASS*, December 10, 1993, *FBIS*, December 13, 1993, p. 29

of 1990.¹¹⁴ This centrist party supported a mixed market economy, the strengthening of the rule of law and the fight against corruption, limits on the sale of land, and protectionism of Russian state goods in the world market.¹¹⁵ Above all, the Democratic Party “affirm[s] that an individual's interests are higher than the state's. Why do we start to develop the economy? Why do we build the state? To meet more fully the demands of the individual.”¹¹⁶ It received 5.5% of the vote, totaling 14 party seats and one single seat.

Parties that won less than 5% of the popular vote

Saint Petersburg mayor Anatolii Sobchak headed the party list for the Russian Movement for Democratic Reform, a party founded in February 1992 and dedicated to the further development of a democratic polity through constructive engagement with democrats of the ‘system’, i.e., those involved in government. At pains to declare themselves democratic, yet opposing the present regime, they hoped to form a democratic opposition in the new parliament, and in December 1993, published a statement in *Izvestiia*: “The people should know that not all democrats see the exit from this crisis through mass bankruptcies, unemploy[ment], the depreciation of savings, the bargain sale of factories and stores, ignorance of the problems of the decrease of the scientific and technical potential of Russia....”¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴McFaul, Michael and Markov, Sergei, The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy: Parties, Personalities, and Programs, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1993, p. 61

¹¹⁵‘Optimism is Good, Realism is Better’ - Election Platform of the Democratic Party of Russia’ *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, December 8, 1993, p. 2, *FBIS*, December 9, 1993, p. 29

¹¹⁶Travkin, in McFaul, Michael and Markov, Sergei, The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy: Parties, Personalities, and Programs, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1993, p. 69

¹¹⁷Institute of Legislation and Comparative Jurisprudence under the auspices of the government of the Russian Federation, Vibory v Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu: pravovye problemy, Federal'noe Sobranie spravochnik, Moscow, 1994, p. 143

The population apparently did not share the view of the need for a democratic opposition, as the Russian Movement was not able to clear the 5% hurdle, winning only 4.08% of the vote. However, Movement members won five single mandate seats: two deputies sat with New Regional Policies, one with Russia's Choice and two with the Union of December 12.

Civic Union in the name of Stability, Justice and Progress is perhaps the most well known among the parties unable to clear the 5% hurdle. By fall of 1993, the old Civic Union had collapsed, although this group, formed in October 1993, from the ashes of the earlier Civic Union, brought together many of the same organizations. Similarly, the new Civic Union aimed to give voice to the industrialists and entrepreneurs of Russia.¹¹⁸ As before, the Civic Union advocated a strong economic state and the directed development of the Russian economy, although the group maintained that poorer members of society had to be protected. Although reform minded, the Union generally believed that El'tsin failed in his attempt to transform the Russian economy.

Civic Union won only 1.93% of the popular vote, but 10 members won constituency seats, and another 11 single mandate deputies won with the support of the Civic Union. Of these 21, one third joined the financial-industrial group headed by Mark Goriachev, which later joined the Party of Russian Unity and Accord group in the Duma. Another seven chose to sit with New Regional Policies.

Three organizations; the Youth Movement of the People's Party of Russia, Civic Union and the Russian Union of Youth (former Russian Communist Union of Youth), came together in the fall of 1993 to form Future of Russia- New Names. Under the

slogan 'To live in our country without fear, in prosperity, and to have pride in Russia', this group supported basic democratic and capitalist values, including encouraging the growth of exports and the privatization of land. Future of Russia - New Names received 1.25% of the popular vote and two members and one former member won single mandate seats. One deputy sat first with New Regional Policies and later switched allegiance to the Russia's Path group. The other member, Anatolii Gus'kov, sat with Women of Russia until March 1994, at which time he became an independent.

The Constructive - Ecological Movement of Russia (KEDR) was founded in the spring of 1993 and became a national party in the summer of that year. Initially founded by functionaries at the State Supervisory Committee for Sanitation and Epidemics, organizations with ties to the Ministry of Ecology of the Russian Federation and the women's organization 'Soldiers' Mothers of Russia', the movement signed, in October 1993, an agreement on joint political activity with other ecological groups. On November 2, KEDR published its candidate list for the December elections.

KEDR has as its fundamental policy the protection of the health of Russian citizens and the protection of the ecology of Russia. It advocated the rule of law and a social democratic state. The group was led by Anatolii Panfilov, while the party list was headed by Liubov' Limar', chair of the 'Soldier's Mothers' group. Aleksandr Lebed' was fourth on KEDR's party list going into the elections.

This movement won only 0.76% of the popular vote and consequently won no party seats in the House. One member, from Cheliabinsk Oblast', won a constituency

¹¹⁸Zhirinovskii, Vladimir, 'Civic Union Preset Election Broadcasts', *Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network*, November 26, 1993, FBIS, November 29, 1993, p. 43

seat and sat with the Party of Russian Unity and Accord. However, soon after this election, this group all but disappeared from the political scene.¹¹⁹

The federal political movement Dignity and Charity was created specifically for the elections in October of 1993. The movement was a response by many social groups, including the All-Russian Council of Veterans of War, Labour and Armed Forces and the All-Russian Society of Invalids, to the perceived failure of the government and Congress of People's Deputies to deal with social policy problems. Like many other political parties, it supported economic development, but not at any cost. Any reforms undertaken, according to Dignity and Charity, had to "guarantee Russia's citizens a decent standard of living and social stability at all stages of the reforms."¹²⁰

This movement received the lowest percentage of the vote - 0.70%, and won no party seats. Three of its members were elected in constituency seats (one with the support of Russia's Choice). Showing a divergence of fundamental political opinions, one member sat with Russia's Path, Sergei Baburin's nationalist party, another with the strongly market reform-oriented Liberal Democratic Union of December 12 party, and the last with the New Regional Policies group.

Party Development during the Fifth State Duma

¹¹⁹Kozyreva, A., 'Business Backing for Parties, Election Campaigns Detailed', *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, April 11, 1995, in *FBIS*, April 27, 1995, p. 3

¹²⁰'Parties Socioeconomic Programs Summed Up', *Rossiiskie vesti*, November 16, 1993, p. 1, in *FBIS*, November 17, 1993, p. 33

The rapid and unpredictable party and group growth and development during the Fifth State Duma belies its transformative character. Many constituency mandate deputies ran with the support of this party or that, but once in the Duma were free to change their party affiliation, which they did, sometimes repeatedly. Consequently, statistics about the actual level of party representation differ according to the source.¹²¹ Moreover, the large group of independents and their changing affiliations also had a decisive influence on party and group structure, stability and support.

Further, as party platforms developed, and daily political work in the Duma changed from the personalities of the election campaign to the political positioning required in parliamentary debate, many representatives came to realize that their personal political beliefs diverged from those of their chosen political party considerably. (Ella Pamfilova, in her decision to quit Russia's Choice Party, is an excellent example of this realization.)

Given this rather confusing picture of political group development in the Duma, what follows is a picture of movement within the broad categories of democratic, centrist and conservative parties.

Generally, parties in Russia with an established order, party discipline and clearly identifiable constituency, i.e., the Communists and Agrarians, had the highest rate of party loyalty. These deputies were also more likely to have had some representative experience before the transformation of the Soviet system and were

¹²¹I have found thus far several differing accounts of party size., largely depending on the date that the source examined the Duma records. I have used the official Duma records. For example, during the first week of party registration in the Duma (the week of January 13), party membership varied dramatically. Irina Khakamada wanted to create the Liberal Democratic Union of December 12, and asked Russia's Choice to lend them some members to register, which they did briefly, but the LDU ended up sitting with RC for the first few months of parliament - thereby increasing RC membership - and causing a sharp drop in membership when the LDU left Russia's Choice in April. Similarly, Mark Goriachev, a single mandate

more likely to have strong ideological beliefs. On the other hand, democrats, who were generally new to the system had not had as much political experience and did not have a clear constituency, especially given the clustering of parties with barely differentiable mandates on the reformer side of the spectrum. Moreover 'democrats' tended to still be evolving in their political beliefs. However, the centrists showed the most vacillation among party affiliation, changing depending on the issue or political climate. This phenomenon was exacerbated among single member constituency deputies in the centre, who frequently joined the Duma professing allegiance to no party.

At the opening of the Duma, deputies began the debate as to what would constitute a Duma faction. The Communist Party proposed that groups with 50 members or more be granted group status, which would act to restrict the entrenchment of certain Duma rights for small radical groups. Conversely, Russia's Choice, the PRUA and Irina Khakamada's group, then called the August bloc¹²², supported a minimum level of 14 people, to allow more broad representation.¹²³ A compromise of 35 members was reached, and only groups with this number of deputies, according to Duma procedural rules, could register to become an official Duma entity and consequently take part in deciding the Duma agenda. As a consequence, this rule acted as an impetus for the highly fractured centrist members to band together in order to play a role in the direction of Duma work.

deputy, sat in his own group for a few months, after which he joined PRUA, thereby boosting their membership.

¹²²This group was first called the August bloc, then the Union of December 12, then the Liberal Democratic Union of December 12, then simply the Liberal Democratic Union.

¹²³Chugaev, Sergei, 'In the State Duma: Lukianov could become Speaker again, at least for Two Hours', *Izvestiia*, January 12, 1994, p. 1-2, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1994, p. 9

As mentioned above, the conservative camp showed the lowest attrition rate of all deputies. Membership in the Communist and Agrarian parties stayed fairly constant, although there was the creation of one new group among this camp. Ivan Rybkin, the speaker of the House and originally a member of the Communist Party, was later expelled. He later created the Bloc of Ivan Rybkin, but was not successful in gathering adherents.

The leading nationalist group in the Duma, the Liberal Democratic Party, also saw little movement, although another nationalist group, Russia's Path, did form in the Duma in early January, 1994. This bloc, headed by Sergei Baburin, a single mandate deputy, never gained enough support to be deemed an official group, although it did lure members away from the LDPR.

Derzhava was another group that formed in early June, 1994, comprised of five former LDPR members. They stood for the resurrection of the Great Russian state within the borders of the former USSR through the free will of the people.

Another small group that even surpassed the frequently bizarre LDPR was founded by a former LDPR deputy. This deputy, Viacheslav Marichev, left the LDPR soon after Duma work began and founded the Group of Sexual Minorities. He was a group of one.

There was a great deal of development among the democratic camp, largely because of similar party platforms and a similar constituency. Because of these two similarities, members frequently transferred allegiances based on the issue at hand. In this respect, Russia's Choice was particularly hard hit, losing several prominent politicians during the Duma's two year term, including Andrei Kozyrev, Boris Fedorov

and Ella Pamfilova.¹²⁴ Conversely, Russia's Choice also saw the greatest initiative among groups and factions at party building, founding a party based on the faction in June of 1994.¹²⁵

One wholly new group was formed among the democrats - the Union of December 12, later renamed the Liberal Democratic Union of December 12. This group, headed by Boris Fedorov and Irina Khakamada, was as or more reformist than Russia's Choice, and supported aggressive economic reforms. In fact, Khakamada was eager to distinguish between the position of Russia's Choice and the LDU of December 12, saying "We are closer to market reforms than anybody else, regardless of party affiliation."¹²⁶ Initially, this group choose to sit with Russia's Choice, but later opted for independence, and by April 16, 1994 had garnered enough support to be registered as a faction. However, as Duma work progressed, this group lost more and more members and collapsed in early 1995.¹²⁷

Smaller groups also formed within the democratic camp, but these groups usually joined larger ones. For example, Mark Goriachev, a member of Civic Union elected in a district seat, formed the loose 'financial-industrial group of Mark Goriachev'. This group was unable to gather 35 members, and, after receiving offers to join several parties, joined PRUA.¹²⁸

¹²⁴Konstantinova, Natal'ia, 'Russian Federation Duma Two-Year Results Summed Up' *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, December 2, 1995, p. 1-2, in *FBIS*, December 28, 1995, p. 15

¹²⁵Tolz, Vera, 'Significance of the New Party Russia's Democratic Choice', *RFL/RE*, Vol. 3, No. 26, July 1, 1994, 25-29

¹²⁶Aleksandrovna, Liudmila, 'Deputies Comment on Opening Work of State Duma', *ITAR-TASS*, January 20, 1994, in *FBIS*, January 24, 1994, p. 48

¹²⁷Arkhangelskaia, Natal'ia, 'Regrouping of Forces in the State Duma: They Meant Well but the Result is the Same Old Thing', *Kommersant-daily*, November 15, 1994, p. 4, *FBIS*, April 13, 1995, p. 23

¹²⁸Kuznets, Dmitri, 'Duma: Deputies Groups are Formed', *Sevodnia*, January 13, 1994, p. 1, in *Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press*, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1994, p. 11

The centrists showed the greatest activity. Travkin, the chair of the Democratic Party of Russia, lost the support of his colleagues in November 1994, and was replaced by Stanislav Govorukhin,¹²⁹ while the New Regional Policies group was formed on the first day of work in the Duma, partly out of a desire to sit on the Duma agenda setting committee, in which only party or group heads could take part. "When we 'independents' were elected, we never even thought about uniting to form some kind of wing. But in light of this turn of events [the need to be a registered group of at least 35 to participate in agenda setting], more than 50 deputies from the regions got together and decided not to be fragmented in the parliament hall, but together to defend the stability of the Duma against unilateral party actions."¹³⁰ This group was a broad coalition of independents who sought to promote regional interests, under the banner of 'strong regions - a strong federation'.¹³¹ Largely dominated by industrialists and fuel and energy complex executives, New Regional Policies was headed by Vladimir Medvedev, the president of the Russian Union of Gas Industrialists. Created on December 13 with 65 deputies, it then became the second largest group after Russia's Choice in the Duma.¹³²

¹²⁹Pestrukhina, Elena, 'A Season of Divorce in Parliament' (December 1, 1994), Russia and Eurasia Documents Annual, ed. Black, Academic International Press, Gulf Breeze, Florida, 1995, p. 108

¹³⁰'Independents Deprived of a Voice. Duma Not Yet in Session, but Confrontation Already Growing', *Rossiskaia gazeta*, January 11, 1994, p. 2, in FBIS, January 12, 1994, p. 56

¹³¹Zarniatina, Tat'iana, 'Highlights of 1st State Duma Deputies Group', *ITAR-TASS*, January 13, 1994, FBIS, January 14, 1994, p. 68

¹³²Here again, there is some debate as to the actual number. All statements in the press say that the NRP group had 65 members while the official Duma records list only 64 deputies.

Smaller groups also formed within the centrist camp. For example, former Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Dzasokhov formed an autonomous group of 22 deputies that later joined the New Regional Policies Group.¹³³

As the Duma's mandate progressed, however, many groups lost their allure and others disappeared altogether. By November 1995,

the Agrarian Party ha[d] dwindled in the parliament. There used to be 57, now there are 50. The number of ladies in the "Women of Russia" movement faction has fallen from 23 to 20. The PRES [PRUA] party faction appears to contain fewer and fewer supporters of Russian unity and accord. Only 13 people remain out of the 30 who entered the Duma beneath Sergei Shakhrai's banners. The number of supporters of the new regional policy in the Duma has nearly halved (65 to 35).... Russia's Choice struggles to make 27 deputies... The Democratic Party faction... lost one fifth of its supporters.... Even the faction of the world's most liberal democrats, Zhirinovskii's, has diminished: there were 63, there remain 55.¹³⁴

However, during the spring of 1995 two new centrist groups emerged in the Duma: Stability and Russia. Despite a professed centrism, Stability gained the support of several LDPR and Agrarian Party members.¹³⁵ Conversely, the group also had the strong support of Oleg Boiko, the head of a large Russian company, who stated that Russian big business actively supported the creation and maintenance of Stability.¹³⁶

¹³³Chugayev, Sergei, 'The State Duma: Two Sensations in Half an Hour', *Izvestiia*, January 14, 1994, p. 2, Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1994, p. 12

¹³⁴Dorofiev, Nikolai, 'Changes in Duma's Deputies' Party Affiliations Viewed', in *Trud*, November 4, 1995, p. 4, in FBIS, November 8, 1995, p. 31

¹³⁵Arkhangelskaia, Natal'ia, 'Regrouping of Forces in the State Duma: They Meant Well but the Result is the Same Old Thing', *Kommersant-Daily*, April 13, 1995, p. 3, in FBIS, April 13, 1995, p. 23

¹³⁶Alekseev, Sergei, 'Stability' Duma Group seen as Pursuing Antidemocratic Aims' *Rossiia*, April 12-18, 1995, p. 4, in FBIS, April 13, 1995, p. 22

The Russia group, registered March 27, 1995, welcomed members from across the political spectrum and claimed to be the voice of the conservative centre.¹³⁷

In the end, the unpredictable and unstable development of Duma party allegiances attests to the weakness or embryonic development of party systems in the first post-Soviet Russian parliament. "Basically, deputies are moving either to bring their political views into line with current trends or, on the other hand, harsh Russian reality is forcing disenchanted parliamentarians to abandon their former ideals."¹³⁸

Prominent Women in the Russian Duma

As in many Western and other post-Soviet parliaments, men by and large hold the reins of power. In this Duma, of eight parties and three groups, only one party has a female deputy at its head; the speaker of the House is male, twenty-one of 24 committee heads are male. Even when women are elected, they generally do not function primarily in a policy-making capacity within their parties. However, this is not always the case, and four women: Alevtina Fedulova, Irina Khakamada, Ekaterina Lakhova and Ella Pamfilova, had leading roles in the articulation of their respective party platforms as well as generalized 'women's interests'. This section is designed to introduce the reader to the major female players in politics, and these four are undoubtedly the most visible of women in the Duma, and among women seem to hold the most power.

¹³⁷Cherkasov, Gleb, 'New 'Russia' Duma Faction Formed', *Sevodnia*, March 30, 1995, p. 2, in FBIS, March 31, 1995, p. 23

¹³⁸Dorofeev, Nikolai, 'Deputies' Migration Routes are Incomprehensible' *Trud*, November 4, 1995, p. 4, in FBIS, November 8, 1995, p. 31

Alevtina Fedulova and Ekaterina Lakhova both won party seats on the Women of Russia ticket. Fedulova, as the leader of the Women of Russia party, was the primary articulator of the party platform. She advocated a relatively centrist position: support for basic social policies, and claimed that female politicians “have all the qualities necessary to bring them to the top at every level.... If we lack anything, then it is the chance to show our worth.”¹³⁹ Furthermore, she, like many other feminists in Russia, saw ‘women’s characters’ as uniquely suited to overcoming the political and economic crisis created by men: “well-educated, well-trained, level-headed, thoughtful and peace loving, women can and must independently defend the interest of families, their children, veterans, invalids and our whole Russia. We cannot take yet another four years of political aggression and confrontation.”¹⁴⁰ At all times throughout the campaign, though, she took great care to stress that she personally, as well as her party, was categorically “against a policy based on sexual premise.”¹⁴¹

Lakhova was the only member of the executive among female parliamentarians, acting as the advisor to the President on issues of the family, women and children. While sharing the views of members of her party, Lakhova was a particularly strong advocate of women in politics. “[W]omen’s movements must get stronger within the parties. Then, possibly, there will no longer be a necessity for our movement to go to the election in [sic] a separate list. But currently for us this is the only true alternative for getting closer to the execution of tasks that were listed in the charter of the ‘Women of Russia’ political movement: the raising of the status of

¹³⁹Fedulova, Alevtina, ‘Men Have Already Exhausted their Potential’, *Moscow News*, October 20-26, 1995

¹⁴⁰Fedulova, Alevtina, in ‘“Women of Russia Features Video Clips’, *Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network*, FBIS, November 24, 1995, p. 3

women in public life; the promotion of woman [sic] to the level of making state decisions...."¹⁴² Like Fedulova, Lakhova saw female parliamentarians as essentially different, more peaceful, and more empathetic to constituent concerns by virtue of their sex.¹⁴³

Irina Khakamada, the general secretary of the Party of Economic Freedom, won a district seat and went on to head a new Duma group- the Liberal-Democratic Union of December 12. PEF was a party for industrialists and espoused a classic liberal view of the transformation process.¹⁴⁴ Similarly, Khakamada advocated a strongly reformist economic platform in the parliament. "By calling ourselves liberals we are declaring that we support a market economy.... I got sick and tired of a society of semi-slaves who dined solely from the bowl of happy certainty that everyone was equal."¹⁴⁵ Yet she too, shared the view that women by virtue of sex alone act differently in politics: "By their very nature women are oriented toward compromise. They are more flexible and more patient. They adapt to life better.... Is it not women who are today saving us from civil war [by virtue of their patience]?"¹⁴⁶ Khakamada acknowledged the uphill battle women in politics face, saying in an interview that politics is still male-

¹⁴¹Fedulova, Alevtina in "Women's Groups, Shakhrai on Election Programs', *Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network*, FBIS, November 29, 1993, p. 42

¹⁴²Lakhova, in Sukhomlinova, Tat'iana, 'Democracy in Russia: Reality and Forecasts', *Rossiiskie vesti*, May 18, 1995, p. 2, in FBIS, June 8, 1995, p. 23

¹⁴³Lakhova, Ekaterina 'To Change the Rules of the Political Game', *Argumenty i fakty*, December 1995, p. 10, in FBIS, December 18, 1995, p. 29

¹⁴⁴A Ostapchuk, E. Krasnikov and M. Meier, *Spravochnik: politicheskie partii, dvizheniia i bloky sovremennoi Rossii*, Nizhni Novgorod, 1993, p. 71

¹⁴⁵Khakamada, Irina, in Rudenko, Inna, 'Three Meetings with a Duma Deputy: Irina Khakamada, One of Three Russian Politicians for the 21st Century, Claims TIME Magazine', *Novaia ezhenedevnaia gazeta*, December 28, 1994, pp. 1, 3, in FBIS, January 23, 1995, p. 12

¹⁴⁶Khakamada, Irina, in Rudenko, Inna, 'Three Meetings with a Duma Deputy: Irina Khakamada, One of Three Russian Politicians for the 21st Century, Claims TIME Magazine', *Novaia ezhenedevnaia gazeta*, December 28, 1994, pp. 1, 3, in FBIS, January 23, 1995, p. 13

dominated, and to succeed women must be 'stronger and cleverer than men.'¹⁴⁷ Further, despite her avowed allegiance to classic liberalism, Khakamada still supported educational and health sector guarantees.¹⁴⁸

Ella Pamfilova, the long serving Minister for Social Protection, initially ran and won with the support of Russia's Choice. However, she left the Ministry of Social Protection to protest the government's inattention to social support fund difficulties and later withdrew from Russia's Choice to protest the party's support for drastic cuts to social programs. Pamfilova's political outlook seems to have been strongly influenced by these two factors, and she stood on two main points politically. First, she was vehemently opposed to drastic social spending cuts. While she supported marketization as a means to an end, she firmly believed that "social policy is not an inflationary factor, not an impediment to reforms but rather the heart, the engine of them."¹⁴⁹ Pamfilova was also an outspoken opponent of official privilege, going so far as to co-found a party with this message of representative accountability as a major party plank before the 1995 elections. Like the three women mentioned above, Pamfilova was also against policies based on sex.¹⁵⁰ However, also like the three women mentioned above, Pamfilova did identify enough with women as a group to support specific initiatives to help them. In February 1994, Khakamada and Pamfilova co-founded the Liberal Women's Foundation, an organization dedicated to help women in their professional undertakings, and went so far as to "call for a 'women's'

¹⁴⁷Fossato, Floriana, 'Russian Women Seek Recognition in Elections', RFE/RL, December 4, 1995, by Internet

¹⁴⁸Fossato, Floriana, 'Russian Women Seek Recognition in Elections', RFE/RL, December 4, 1995, by Internet

¹⁴⁹Pamfilova, Ella, in Valiuzhenich, Galina, 'Why Pamfilova Left', *Argumenty i fakty*, February 1994, Russia and Eurasia Documents Annual, ed. Black, J., L., Gulf Breeze, Florida, 1995, p. 103

revolution - granted, one that would not lead to new bloodshed but to changes in ideas about the role of women in public life.”¹⁵¹

It is far beyond the scope of this thesis to examine whether female parliamentarians do, indeed, compromise more frequently, or work more fervently for peace in Russia than men do. What is important to note is that women from diverse backgrounds holding varied political views all publicly oppose ‘special’ benefits or programs for women, but all see women as needing a greater role in public life, and are willing to support measures to help women achieve that role, even if those measures contradict their basic political views.

Through this section, I have tried to provide a context in which to assess the actions of Duma deputies, as well as to provide some background on the political views articulated in the public sphere. This Duma was substantially different than previous Soviet organs of parliamentary power: it was less representative of society as a whole, had fewer women and fewer urban workers, while deputies had higher levels of education and more managerial experience. Further, despite the decline in female representation, there were several prominent and active women in the Fifth State Duma who had real decision-making power. The following chapters have as their goal to ascertain whether these strong women and other female parliamentarians used this power in concert or not.

¹⁵⁰Pamfilova, Ella, in Valiuzhenich, Galina, ‘A Dialogue that did not Take Place, The Falcon did not Fly in’, *Argumenty i fakty*, December 1995, p. 3, in *FBIS*, December 15, 1995, p. 1

¹⁵¹Cherkasov, Gleb, ‘New Challenge to Russian Traditions- Liberal Women’s Foundation is Created’, *Sevodnia*, February 15, 1994, p. 2, in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, February 18, 1994, p. 17

Chapter Four - Deputy Affiliations and Committee Membership in the Fifth Russian Duma

This chapter will examine two major areas: possible cleavages and committee structures. Generally, when political scientists observe a political system, they look for cleavages based on party affiliation. As previously mentioned, Russia's weak parliamentary tradition leads me to hypothesize that other cleavages, present even the strongest party system state to some degree, play a substantially greater role in Russian politics.¹⁵² In order to assess the importance of other cleavages, such as party seat deputies versus single mandate deputies, regionalism, age, ethnicity, education and previous employment experience, the following section aims to give an overview of the competing cleavages, particularly within the framework of a gender based analysis. Committees, the venues in which concrete decision-making in parliamentary democracies takes place, can also demonstrate political cleavages existing within a system.

Party List Deputies

A mixed party system was created with the hope that such a system, and the deputies that owed their seats to party lists, would strengthen party affiliation in Russia, a trait deemed necessary by El'tsin and others for the smooth development of a democratic polity.

¹⁵²Peter Lentini wrote an interesting article on women in the CPSU Central Committee using the cleavage attributes discussed in this chapter. Many indicators were similar to the results here, with the exception of education. Where he found women in politics to be slightly less educated than men, women in the Fifth State Duma all had post-secondary education, while several men did not. His article is entitled 'A note on Women in the CPSU Central Committee, 1990', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1993, 729-736

Figure 1 (Source: Database constructed by author; see Appendix A)

These deputies would in theory support party policy above all else, and would be free from the potential conflict between constituent desires and party orders. In fact, despite party list seats, party discipline remained weak, as will be shown in the following chapters.

Women made up a slightly larger percentage of party seats than single mandate seats (59%), although this can be attributed in large measure to the popular vote success of the Women of Russia, where women comprised 100% of the party list (23 seats). The other seven parties that won party list seats obviously came nowhere close to this figure, with the CPRF with nearly 13% of positions given to women, followed by Yabloko (9%) and the LDPR (8.5%) respectively.

Figure 2 (Source: Database constructed by author; see Appendix A)

Regional Identification

Deputies winning in single seat constituencies, on the so-called 'first-past the post' system, regional influences and constituency demands can also be prime indicators of later Duma activity. City or countryside, industrial area or agricultural area and the nature of centre-periphery relations can all help explain the motivation behind voting behaviour.

However, this election sometimes saw candidates from outlying areas, particularly democratic candidates, running for seats in urban centres. For example, Irina Khakamada, originally from Primorskii krai, decided to run for a Moscow seat. For this reason, looking at the distribution of single constituent mandates may not always give the reader as clear a picture of regional perspective as might be hoped. Further, given the information available, the regional make-up of Duma deputies can only be analyzed among single constituent deputies. Although it is these deputies that should in theory have the most stringent regard for the areas from which they come, a regional perspective is similarly likely to taint the political outlook of party list members. (In Canada, a state with a strong party system, Western, Central and Eastern party members will bring with them regional perspectives shaped by the communities in which they live.) Moreover, some parties chose also to have party list seats divided by region, notably Russia's Choice. However, for the purposes of this analysis, only the 225 single constituent deputies were analyzed.

In this study, these 225 deputies were divided into eleven regions, based on the division put forth by Orttung and Parrish in their study on voter support by region. (See Appendix A for the division). As expected, the Central region had the highest number

of deputies elected to the Duma (46), followed by the Urals region (29) and the Volga (25).

There has been some debate in Russia as to the equality of the voting districts. Many claim, as in Canada, that rural votes tend to carry proportionally stronger weight than urban votes given constituency size. Peter Lentini, in his book Elections and Political Order in Russia, discusses the inequities in electoral districts. For example, one district in Astrakhan comprised some 737 800 electors, while a deputy in Evenkia represented a mere 13 800 voters.¹⁵³ However, as in Canada, the political system in Russia has attempted to balance the regional demands of huge tracts of sparsely populated areas (i.e., the Far East), with more densely populated areas in European Russia.

Women won between 6.3% (East Siberia) and 22% (North) of single mandate seats, with the exception of the Northwest region, where no women were elected. Centre-periphery comparisons seem inconclusive - women won a total of 9.5% of seats in Moscow and Saint Petersburg, 17% of seats in the Northern Caucasus and 7.4% of seats east of the Urals. Primary industry comparisons are similarly not conclusive. The primarily agricultural area of the Central (with the exception of Moscow city), Volga-Viatka and Central Black Earth regions voted in eight women (14.5%), while the Urals region elected 3 women (10.3%).

Similarly, the success of women in historically neglected areas is not significant. The Northern Caucasus region and Siberia seem to contrast one another, with 17% of seats in the former going to women, but only 7.4% going to women in West and East Siberia and the Far East.

Overall, women won 26 of the 224 single mandate seats available (11.6%), lower than the 15.5% of party seats gained (although this percentage drops to 5.9% when the Women of Russia party seats are excluded.). This phenomenon can likely be explained first and foremost by the high popular vote percentage won by the Women of Russia.

Figure 3 (Source: Database constructed by author; see Appendix A)

Ethnicity

Ethnicity, although possibly a strong indicator of voting behaviour in some instances, was not a relevant factor in the December 12, 1993 election, as 382 candidates, including 54 of the 63 women (85.7%) declared themselves to be ethnic Russian - an overall average of 82.7% of all deputies. Moreover, even candidates in republics were frequently Russian. In the 20 republics participating in the elections, Russian men won 15 of the 33 seats available (45.5%). Russian women won 2 of those available seats (6%), while men of all other ethnicities combined won 15 seats (45.5) and one Tuvian woman won a seat. However, outside of ethnically based territorial

¹⁵³Lentini, Peter, 'Overview of the Campaign, in *Elections and Political Order in Russia*, ed., Lentini, Central European University Press, Budapest, 1995, 63-96, p. 75

divisions, there may be some benefit to listing oneself as purely ethnically Russian. One female candidate, born of a Russian mother and Japanese father, listed herself as Russian in official Duma records.

Age cohort identification

Historically, when the layperson thinks of Russian leadership, she thinks of geriatric leaders and the old cronies in the Politburo: a sharp contrast to many Western democracies. Certainly in the past it has been the case that only more senior bureaucrats could work their way up to positions of power in the CPSU. However, with the ascension of Gorbachev to the post of General Secretary, this situation began to change, and the average Fifth Russian Duma deputy was in his mid 40s.

The Edict 'Regulations Concerning the Election of Deputies to the State Duma in 1993' (1993) stipulated that all candidates for election had to attain the age of 21 before the 12th of December to be eligible. Consequently, with this new rule, and the disappearance of Komsomol' quota seats, the Fifth Duma had no deputies under the age of 21, although one male deputy was elected at the age of 22. Surprisingly, there were no deputies older than 70 years of age, the oldest being Georgi Lukava, who was 68 at the time of his election.

Women tended to be more clustered around middle age than men, with almost 60% of female deputies between the ages of 41 and 50 on January 1, 1994. There were no female deputies under 30 and only one over 60. The age distribution of men was more even among all cohorts, but most were between 40 and 50 as well.

Age has implications on identification because younger people generally adapt faster in transformative societies, and the elderly in Russia tend to be more

conservative and oppose 'shock therapy-type' reforms to a greater extent than younger citizens. In a survey conducted by the All-Russia Centre for the Study of Public Opinion in 1995, researchers discovered that the older the respondent, the more likely they were to agree with the statement "it would have been better if everything had remained as it was before 1985." An average of 16% of respondents were disillusioned with life in Russia in 1995, but among those over 60, the figure jumps to 23%. Conversely, those under 30 were most optimistic about economic, political and social changes.¹⁵⁴

Figure 4 (Source: Database constructed by author; see Appendix A)

Educational and Employment identification

Under the Soviet system, the Supreme Soviets were intended to mirror social composition as much as possible. Consequently, while soviet members in reality had little power, soviets had a far higher number of agricultural workers, factory workers and women than has traditionally been seen in Western assemblies.

In sharp contrast to Soviet times, new parliamentarians were overwhelmingly educated and came to the new Duma with a background in government, politics or management. Of the 462 deputies elected, fully 439 were listed as having higher

¹⁵⁴ Levada, Iurii, 'Three *Perestroika* Generations', *Sevodnia*, June 7, 1995, p. 3, in Current Digest of the Post-

education, including all 61 women for which educational information was listed. Only eight deputies completed middle level education and another eight had received some type of specialized technical education. There was no correlation between a deputy's level of education and party affiliation; of the sixteen men with middle or specialized technical education, four came from Russia's Choice, three from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, five from the Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian Federation and four from other parties.

Occupationally, Fifth State Duma members came from far less varied fields than their predecessors in the Supreme Soviets.¹⁵⁵ However, many more had had independent political experience or managerial experience. Of the deputies elected to the Duma, 81 (17.5%) had previously sat as a deputy, either in 1989 or 1991. Of these, 6 women, or 9.5% of female representatives had previous experience in political representation.

Occupational divisions by party were not great, but were visible.¹⁵⁶ Democratic party members generally had more experience in politics and government bureaucracy, while centrist and conservative groups had more managerial activity. For

Soviet Press, Vol. 47, No. 26, 995, 12-13

¹⁵⁵Please note that for the following occupational analysis, employment experience was divided into sixteen categories - with former political deputies listed as a separate category - please see the appendix for a listing. Because some occupations were deemed to cross boundaries between categories, for example, a company director and owner of a private business, and because many deputies had more than one job, all deputies could be listed in up to two different categories. Consequently totals add up to more than 462.

Moreover, occupational analysis is problematic given this overlap. For example, what relationship does a full-time politician and simultaneously a government worker have with the state, and how is her outlook shaped by such a duality of perspectives? As a result, this section is designed to provide a general overview of the employment profile of deputies and is not intended as a categorical definition or predictor of future behaviour.

Lastly, only those who had *substantial* political employment at the time of the elections were placed in the politician category. Those deputies claiming simple membership in a political party were not included in this group.

¹⁵⁶The six Independents in the State Duma were analyzed for this section, but because of their insignificant numbers, were not included.

example, Yabloko had the most deputies with government or political experience (83.3% of deputies), followed by the Democratic Party of Russia (75%) and Russia's Choice (71.8%). The Russia's Path group had the smallest numbers of deputies with such experience, at 14%. Conversely, in managerial and business experience, the Agrarian Party of Russia came out ahead, with 43.8% of deputies reporting experience in these profession. This statistic, however, is tempered by the large number of deputies with agrarian managerial experience - 24.6% of all Agrarian deputies. After the Agrarian Party, the New Regional Policies group was the bastion of managerial expertise, with 31.3% of members having help positions of leadership in the economy. Yabloko had the lowest percentage of deputies involved in the economic sphere; only 6.7% (a mere two deputies).

Experience in the academic sphere, as a scholar, scientist, teacher, professor or school director was mixed. Yabloko topped the list with 43% of members employed in this field, primarily as scholars at Yavlinskii's Moscow EPICentre (Centre for Economic and Political Study). Following this, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation had 31.8% of its members involved in this field, with all 14 deputies having been employed as teachers, professors or school directors. Russia's Path had no members with this type of experience and the Agrarian Party had five members (8.8%).

Women tended to be fairly well divided among occupational categories. Ninety-six deputies (including 11 women - 11.5%) had as their occupation full-time political work. Another 126 deputies (15 women - 11.9%) had bureaucratic experience in various levels of government. Further, financial managers and company officers (including managers, directors, chairs of the Boards of Directors and presidents) comprised 58 deputies (6 women). Women were well represented in every

occupational category, ranging from 24.1% of all professionals, including doctors, lawyers and consultants, to 5.3% of all agrarian managers.

Figure 5 (Source: Database constructed by author; see Appendix A)

Committee Structure and Gender component

In the West, most real policy-making happens within the framework of committee decision-making, not during question period in the House. The Fifth Russian Duma was no different, with parliamentarians in the Duma taking up the study results and recommendations of Duma committees in the House only for general debate and voting. Committees provide a forum to recommend new bills, take the time to analyze bills under debate in depth, and come up with recommendations to improve bills or encourage compromise to ensure passage of bills. When observers generally look at parliamentary members as they act out their roles *in parliament*, they often forget to look at the arena in which much policy-making power is invested. Unfortunately, a lack of resources precludes a detailed examination of committee decisions, but a look at committee structures and the status of women in those committees can give a more detailed picture of the actual strength of female representatives in the parliamentary process.

Duma Committees were established January 17-21, 1994. There were originally 23 standing committees and one commission on mandates. Later, four more commissions were added, but did not have the same stature as the standing committees.¹⁵⁷ According to Duma rules, deputies holding the positions Duma Chair, Duma Deputy Chair, faction and group leader or members of government were not obliged to belong to a committee, but all other deputies had to participate in a committee. Committee Chairs, Deputy Chairs, the four Deputy Chairs of the Duma (of which Alevtina Fedulova (WofR) is one), and the chair of the Mandate Commission were decided on the basis of a coalition list agreed upon in the Duma; all other deputies were free to choose the Committee in which they wished to serve. Deputies generally chose Committees whose work addressed some issue in which they were particularly interested or some field of study in which they had worked.

At first glance, women appear to be evenly distributed among Committee seats, holding 3 of the 24 available chairmanships (12.5%), 11 of the available 70 Deputy Committee positions (15.7%), 12 of the 82 available subcommittee chairs (14.6%) and 33 of all 300 regular committee member positions (11%) - all well in line with their 13.6% of Duma seats. However, a closer analysis shows that, although *on average* female representation mirrors the overall percentage in the Duma, individual committee balances are frequently wildly skewed, and generally conform to popular beliefs about 'women's issues' areas.

¹⁵⁷Plataia Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Russian State Duma, Moscow, 1994, p. 76

Figure 6 (Source: Database constructed by author; see Appendix A)

What is of particular interest in this study is those committees in which female representation is vastly different than the average of female representation in the Duma (shown as a black line on graph). Two committees: On the protection of health (C on the graph); On the affairs of women, family and youth (F) have more than double the percentage of female representation in the Duma, while six committees - On ecology (D); On property, privatization and economic activities (I); On industry, construction, transport and energy (K); On defense (M); On local self-government (S) and On the organization of State Duma work (U) have less than half the 13.6% representation in the House.

In the Health Committee, Bela Denisenko, a doctor, holds the Chair, while women hold 5 of the 7 subcommittee Chair positions. The two men hold chairmanships of the sub-committees on the formulation of health education for life, physical culture and sport, and on questions on property and the privatization of the protection of health, interesting given that women were also completely shut out from the Committee in property, privatization and economic activities.

Realistically, given the employment experience of many female deputies, one could expect that women would hold significant positions in the Committee on the affairs of women, family and youth. Galina Klimantova, a former department chief on family affairs in the Udmurt Council of Ministers, holds the Chair, and women also hold 2 of the three Deputy Chair seats. The other was given to Y. P. Kuznetsov, a LDPR member who worked as a psychoanalyst before his tenure in the Duma. A third Committee - on labour and social support - has 26.7% female representation, close to twice the amount of female representation in the House. This Committee deals with employment, a factor admittedly important to women in the Duma given the disproportionate number of female unemployed, and pension and other state moneys management.

While this concentration of women in areas of health and social policy could have been expected, it is the committees where women play a incommensurably small role that shows the real limits in active policy-making activities. Of 26 possible positions, there is not one female deputy in the privatization committee, which is one of the central activities in the creation of the new economic system in Russia. Women hold one of a possible 27 seats in the Committee on industry. The woman, an natural gas extraction engineer, holds only a subcommittee member position.

The defense committee has one women member among fifteen. Maria Dobrovol'skaia, Head of the Union of Navy Women and a founding member of the Women of Russia party, holds sub-committee chair position. The subcommittee is on social and legal guarantees to servicepeople and their families, and relations with society.

Another surprising fact is that there is only one female representative, the Committee Secretary, among the 17 members in the Committee on the organization of the work of the state Duma. This committee has the ability to introduce so-called 'position projects' to Duma leaders, register groups and fractions and oversee the observance of Duma regulations in the House.

What becomes apparent through this rather short analysis, is that, by and large, women are prominent in specific policy areas - health and social policy. Moreover, even when women participate in committees that do not deal with these areas, they tend to be involved in sub-committees that reflect this gender split: Maria Dobrovol'skaia in the defense committee, for example. Moreover, even though a large number of women held positions in bureaucracy and industry before their election, for some reason they are not in appearance in committees that deal with these matters. Consequently, even before continuing the analysis of the central theme of this thesis, I argue that there exists a gender split among committee members, apparent through several phenomena. First, the positions of leadership awarded to female deputies; chairs and Deputy Chairs, are almost exclusively in the above mentioned policy areas. These were the positions agreed to by all members of the House. Secondly, women in other positions also predominate in health and social policy committees. These seats were chosen voluntarily by the deputies themselves. Further, the absence of male representation in those committees on health, labour and social policy, combined with the preceding two factors, hints at underlying assumptions on the part of both women and men, about 'women's' policy areas.

Conclusion

With the last two chapters, admittedly fragmented, I have attempted to give a situational context in which the Fifth State Duma operated, in order to be better equipped to analyze the voting behaviour patterns in the following chapters. Party origins and development and an analysis of deputy affiliations - possible future cleavages - aimed to provide insight into future behaviour, while the sections on powerful female parliamentarians and a gender-based analysis of committee structure provides the first clues to solve the puzzle of my hypothesis - that women do agree on the existence of issues of common interest and do act in concert on those certain issues.

Chapter Five - Vote and Debate Analysis of Gender Neutral Laws

Chapters Five and Six comprise the heart of this thesis. With a comprehensive analysis of voting patterns and debates on fourteen laws passed by the Fifth Russian Duma during January 1994 and December 1995, I aim to test the hypothesis laid out in the Introduction.

I have created a database (please see Appendix A for more information) that assembles all the variables needed to identify influencing factors. The following two chapters will be an analysis of these variables.

Ideally, I would have been able to choose a random sample of votes in the House. However, over the course of the Fifth Duma's two year mandate, only 92 of the hundreds of votes on federal laws taken were listed by roll call votes, and of that 92, only 32 had published texts.¹⁵⁸ From these 32, I chose 14 that suited the criteria required: that the laws from the first section, the section that this chapter covers, have no special provisions for women or children and that they be major pieces of legislation.

Unfortunately, I was not able to demand such criteria to the second group of laws, the laws that will be dealt with in the sixth chapter. Frequently major pieces of legislation that dealt directly with 'women's issues' were not listed by roll call vote. Consequently, this list of seven laws contains two that are changes and amendments to previous laws. Nonetheless, even given my limited choice of laws in the second

¹⁵⁸I used several different sources for law texts, but the one most frequently used, and by far the best source, was an internet database from Novosibirsk, at <http://black.inforis.nnov.su>. Other sources included the booklets of collected legislation put out by the Duma and Westlaw, an internet based legal database.

section, I believe that they still can adequately test my hypothesis. This will be discussed further in Chapter Six.

The laws in this section were deemed not to have a direct or disproportionate effect on women, and consequently includes laws on the legal basis for economic structures, state security, elections and voting rights. The budget was also included in this section despite its influence on social policy decisions for the reasons laid out in the Introduction: I believe its effect to be dispersed, not targeted specifically toward women. Budget monies affecting women directly are likely to be channeled through services governed by specific laws, such as unemployment retraining programs under the Employment Law and the like.

This chapter details each of the seven votes separately, and will sum up overall voting patterns in the conclusion. Every vote analysis will be preceded by a short summary of the law itself, and a background of the context in which it was passed. Vote analysis will then be followed by a brief analysis of one or two debates in the House on that specific law.

The Federal Budget of 1995

The Federal Budget

The Federal Budget was one of the most important pieces of legislation passed in 1994. Though not directly, the budget articulates government priorities for the fiscal year, including financial support to the defense, infrastructure, education and health sectors. Given the length and complexities of the budget, this section will deal only with notable provisions in the law.

The main priorities for the government in the formation of this law were to increase revenues by streamlining the tax system and stepping up enforcement, while at the same time cutting expenditures as much as possible.¹⁵⁹ In the final version, the budget allotted 17.5% of budget expenditures to the Armed Forces, 240 billion roubles for a new Crime-Fighting Fund and another 14 968 billion roubles on law enforcement, including almost 212 billion roubles for the tax police. In the economic sphere, 5.7 billion roubles in aid to small business and the creation of infrastructure for the development of small businesses. In the social sphere, the budget envisioned 8 998 billion roubles for education, of which 5% would go to primary and secondary education, while 57% would go to post-secondary education. Health care received 31.4% of federal expenditures and social policy, including social policy institutions, social aid and youth policy, made up 4 470 billion roubles.

Background

The federal budget is a compromise document in any democracy, and this budget was no different. The major points of contention were: the figures for anticipated revenues, the funds allocated for the Armed Forces and for agriculture, and the need to keep the deficit low in order to encourage the IMF to release the next tranche of its loan.

In the first and second reading, some deputies argued that the envisioned revenues were too high. So, in a delicate balancing act, the budget was reworked

¹⁵⁹ 'The 1995 Draft Federal Budget: Russia's Economic Strategy', *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, October 29, 1994, p. 2, in *FBIS*, November 1, 1994, 22-26, p. 22

before the third reading, lowering expected revenues from individuals, but increasing expected revenues from VAT and import and export duties.¹⁶⁰

Budget expenditures on the Army were reduced at this time, while spending on law enforcement, agriculture education and health care increased.¹⁶¹ Specifically, the Agrarian Party had demanded a special 1.5% agricultural tax, which was included in the budget before its third reading.¹⁶²

Other weaknesses in the law were duly pointed out by its opponents, primarily the CPRF, Yabloko, the DPR and some members of the NRP.¹⁶³ Sergei Glaz'ev, a DPR member and Chair of the Committee on Economic Policy, pointed out that 'The government is not outlining any significant measures for improving the collectability of taxes.... It is also unclear how the financing of the budget deficit will be implemented at the expense of the emission of securities: there are no specific plans for the distribution of state bonds, nor for computing the demand for them.'¹⁶⁴

The Vote

This vote is the first reading of the budget, on December 22, 1994. According to the law, the budget requires four readings, and it was adopted in its final form March 15, 1995 and one week later it won the approval of the Federation Council.

¹⁶⁰Zhuravliov, Piotr, 'Federal Budget for 1995 Adopted on Third Reading', *Sevodnia*, February 25, 1995, p. 1, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 47, No. 8, 1995, p. 18

¹⁶¹Zhuravliov, Piotr, 'Federal Budget for 1995 Adopted on Third Reading', *Sevodnia*, February 25, 1995, p. 1, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 47, No. 8, 1995, p. 18

¹⁶²Kirpichnikov, Aleksandr, 'Portrait of the Duma Against the Background of the Budget', in *Sevodnia*, January 28, 1995, p. 2, in FBIS, February 14, 1995, 2-3, p. 2

¹⁶³Kirpichnikov, Aleksandr, 'Portrait of the Duma Against the Background of the Budget', in *Sevodnia*, January 28, 1995, p. 2, in FBIS, February 14, 1995, 2-3, p. 2

¹⁶⁴Glaz'ev, Sergei, in 'Budget Games on a Political Field', *Moskovskie Novosti*, November 4, 1994, p. 6, in FBIS, December 21, 1994, 1-3, p. 1

Participant rates for female parliamentarians was slightly higher than for males: 81.4% versus 73.8%. The percentage difference for women and men supporting the law was similar (55.9% vs. 43.8%), although proportionally more women opposed this law (25.4% of women vs. 28.5% of men).

Figure 1 (Source: *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii*, No. 75 (December 21, 1994))

On this vote, the hypothesis set out in the Introduction seems to ring true - gender solidarity is non-existent, while party solidarity is quite strong (see

figure). While 91% of WofR members and 100% of LDPR's female members supported the law, no female Yabloko, Agrarian Party or LDU members supported the bill.

Interestingly, a large gap emerged between party list and single seat female deputies (72.7% approval for the budget vs. 34.6% approval) which was not evident among male deputies (48.1% vs. 40.3%).

Regional variations within the context of this project are difficult, given that no more than four female deputies come from any one region, making compilations between men and women problematic. For example, neither of the two female deputies from the Ural region supported the bill, while nine of the 25 men did. However, comparing a figure of 0% female support vs. 36% support for men is misleading given the small sample size.

Professionally, there was no clear coherence among women. 54.5% of females with political experience supported the budget along with 60% of female bureaucrats, while 100% of businesswomen, 75% of female company directors and only 50% of female professionals supported it. Similarly, age does not appear to be a factor among women or men, with groups in every age cohort studied voting within 15% of one another.

The Debates¹⁶⁵

This law was one of the most important laws passed in 1995. Given the volume of debates on the bill, this section will only address women's participation. This law was first introduced in the House on November 25, 1995, when Vladimir Panskov, the Finance Minister, and Mikhail Zadornov, Chair of the Budget, taxes, banks and finance Committee both gave presentations. After their presentations, thirty-eight male deputies and four female deputies made comments and asked questions.

First, Nadezhda Bikalova (NRP) spoke, and asked a question about funding for social support for children. In practice, this support had not been included in the budget, and she questioned the state's commitment to children's well-being when again child support benefits had not been envisaged in state expenses. In response, Panskov said that a realistic budgetary bill had to be submitted, or else it would never pass. Further, the budgetary means for such expenditures could never be found.¹⁶⁶ Next, Bela Denisenko (RC), Chair of the Committee on health, who decried the system of funding regional health centres through regional transfer payments, as well as the fall in budget financing for health care. Galina Parshentseva (WofR) argued that the

¹⁶⁵The debates studied for this section are the introduction to the law (November 25, 1994) the first reading (December 21, 1994), the second reading (January 20 and 25, 1995) and the fourth reading (March 15, 1995).

money allotted to law-enforcement, state security services, the courts and for human rights protection was insufficient. Lastly, Liubov Rozhkova, Chair of the Committee on Education, Culture and Science urged deputies to reject the bill, as it provided insufficient funds for education, the arts and science.

Not one woman asked a question or made a comment in nearly 40 pages of parliamentary debate at the bill's first official reading in late December, 1994. However, as all factions were required to give a brief presentation, one woman did speak as the representative of the Women of Russia. She stated that given the fact that the lowering of social support payments would intensify social dislocation in Russia, the Women of Russia could not unequivocally support such a bill. She agreed with the proposition put forth by a member of the Agrarian Party to increase taxes and subsequently increase social support benefits.

At the second reading, Tamara Gudima (CPRF) was the only woman to speak. In contrast to the women who had spoken earlier, she believed not only that there need not be more expenditures, but that the expenditures envisioned already made the budget useless. She claimed that "we are passing numbers [in the bill] that are absolutely not realistic."¹⁶⁷

The Civil Code of the Russian Federation

The Civil Code: Part One

The Civil Code was one of the fundamental pieces of legislation required in the transition to a market economy. It sets out the legal structure of relationships between

¹⁶⁶Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, No. 68, November 25, 1994, pp. 29-30

¹⁶⁷Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, No. 81, January 20, 1995, p. 30

business entities in the Russian Federation. This law guarantees the inviolability of property rights, the freedom to contract and the freedom to conduct business without encumbrance (Article 1). The Civil Code defines the individual and the legal entity (company) in business dealings, outlines the rights and duties of participants in business transactions, such as forming or breaking partnerships, co-operatives and joint-stock companies, sets the legal basis for the distribution of securities and bankruptcy.

Background

The one contentious aspect of the Civil Code is the section on the right to land (Chapter 17), which allows the unfettered buying and selling of land by individuals. Communist and Agrarian Party members fought hard against this section of the Code, and enactment of Chapter 17 was later linked to the enactment of the Land Code, a separate piece of Legislation, rather than the Civil Code.

The Vote

This was the third and final reading of the law, and enacts the first part of the Civil Code. Participation rates for men and women were both high, although 13% more women proportionally supported the bill than their male colleagues. As with the Federal Budget, women seem more in tune with members of their own party than members of their sex. All party members regardless of gender voted within 25% of one another. On the other hand, 100% of Russia's Choice's female members supported the law, while 20% of the LDPR colleagues did and no female CPRF supported this bill. Single constituent women were most likely to support this bill (76.2%), while party list men were least likely to do so (41.8%). Older women were the age cohort least likely to

support the Civil Code (40%), while for their younger female counterparts the converse was true (approval rating at nearly 75%)

Figure 2 (Source: *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii*, No. 58 (October 21, 1994))

The Debates¹⁶⁸

Four male presenters, one from the Duma, one from the President's office and two from academia rose to speak on the law, and the main provisions it contained. Nineteen men and one woman from various parties then rose to debate specific legal points. Many questioned the purpose of the law, given that it provided only a legal framework, but no concrete steps to realize this framework. But one of the most contentious in this debate was the debate between public and private goods, and particularly the issue of land ownership.

The one woman, Tamara Gudima (CPRF) voiced the opinions of her party in decrying the absence of a clear system for the maintenance of public lands, and asked whether this law would affect the privatization process in any way. She further asked why the law only guaranteed private property, but did not provide for the opportunity for the creation of such property.

The government's response to this line of questioning by several deputies was to reiterate the purpose of this Code: to protect property regardless of ownership, and to provide the courts with a legal framework within which to judge conflicts in the civil sphere.

The third reading mirrored the first debate, when two male deputies questioned the inclusion and provisions for land ownership in the Code. No women spoke at this reading.

On Fundamental Guarantees of the Voting Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation¹⁶⁹

The Federal Law

This law dealt with two main facets of democratic elections in the Russian Federation: voter rights and the rights of participants in the elections process. First, the law sets out that voting in Russian is universal, voluntary and secret for citizens over 18 years of age. Proxy voting is prohibited. Voting rights are guaranteed by an independent Central Electoral Commission, which was to be formed within three months of entry into force of this act (Articles 11, 12, 36).

Later chapters of this law outline the rights of citizens nominated for public office. Citizens may be nominated by any electoral association (party, group) and must subsequently register with the local Electoral Commission. Importantly, any refusal to register a nomination on the part of an Electoral Commission must be accompanied by an explanation in writing for the refusal (Article 20).

¹⁶⁸The debate to be studied here is the bill's second reading (July 22, 1994) and third reading (October 21, 1994).

Candidates have the obligation to leave work in the government, media or military during an election campaign and will be reimbursed their wages by the Electoral Commission, and may not be subject to criminal investigation.

All candidates and electoral associations have the right to an equal share of mass media time, and they may purchase additional time of desired, although these venues may not be used to 'stimulate social, racial, national or religious intolerance or animosity, shall not appeal to the seizure of power, the violent overthrow of the constitutional system or state integrity [and] shall not involve propaganda of war.' (Article 26)

Campaign donations, a fuzzy issue in the 1993 elections, must be publicly disclosed and may not come from any foreign entity, including from any Russian entity with 30% or more foreign participation. Lastly, local Election Commissions are required by law to provide district vote results to the mass media within three days of the elections.

The Vote

Passed by the Duma in its third reading on October 26, 1994, this law was approved by the Federation Council on November 16, 1994. Again, participation rates for women were higher than for men (80.3% vs. 70.4%) as were approval rates for the law (73.8% vs. 65.2%).

On this law as well, women seemed more swayed by party than gender.

¹⁶⁹The text of this law was taken from the internet at <http://www.ifes.express.ru/guarant.htm>

Figure 3 (Source: *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii*, (October 26, 1994))

The only party that seemed to categorically reject this law was Yabloko, where 100% of female members and 95.7% of male members did not support the law, and Russia's Choice, where 100% of women and 72.5% of men rejected the bill. WofR, LDPR, CPRF, APR and NRP all had approval rates of over 80% among both men and women. Also, within keeping with general participation rate trends, there were no substantial differences between single seat and party list deputies or among different age groups, regardless of sex.

Professionally, the female group most likely to reject this law were those with media experience, followed by social scientists (mostly Yabloko members), artists and writers. 54.5% of females with political experience supported the bill, while bureaucrats and company managers had a 75% approval rate. Approval rates for males professionally generally mirrored the female's experience, with the exception of a higher number (65%) of male media professionals who supported the bill.

Female Russia's Choice and Yabloko members were more likely to actively oppose the vote, while their male counterparts tended not to vote.

The Debates¹⁷⁰

There were two presenters at the second reading of this law on June 22, 1994; the chair of the sub-committee of federal and regional policies, Vladimir Ryzhkov and the President's representative and deputy head of the Central Electoral Commission Aleksandr Ivanenko. Despite lively debates in the House, discussion on this law mirror others in this section in the notable absence of female participants. No woman presented on this law, and of the three questions or comments made at the first reading, thirteen at the second reading and ten at the third, not a single woman participated.

On Economic Support for Regional (municipal) Newspapers

The Federal Law

This law is a fairly straightforward one: the federal state promises to provide funding to local newspapers. The law was designed to "guarantee the constitutional right of citizens to receive timely and objective information... and an active role of citizens in local self-government." (Article 2) Any local paper not advocating a political or specialist outlook may apply for admittance to the state register for support, however, only one newspaper per raion will be supported. Conditions for competition include the level to which newspapers represent elected organs of self-government, whether the paper has an already existing solid financial base, both the quantity and extent throughout the raion of its circulation, and the level of support of its readers.

Once admitted onto the register, city papers can expect support up to 50% for their copying, newsprint and distribution costs. Rural papers will be paid for up to 70%

¹⁷⁰The debates to be studied here are the bill's first reading (June 22, 1994, July 14, 1994) and second

of these costs, while papers in the Far North, Far East and Northern Caucasus can expect support of up to 80%. (Article 5.2)

The Vote

This bill was originally passed on July 13, 1995, but was subsequently vetoed by the President. On October 11, 1995, the Duma again voted on this bill, hoping to override the Presidential veto with the required 300 votes.

Figure 4 (Source: Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, No. 128 (October 11, 1995))

Women again both voted more frequently than men (80.7% vs. 70.2%) and supported the bill more than men. Motivational factors were not as clear on this law, where

66.7% of Russia's Choice

female adherents to 100% of female Yabloko, Russia's Path and Agrarian Party members. However, most of these women's male party colleagues voted similarly, the greatest gap emerging between NRP women (42.8% support) and men (63.5%).

Professionally, twice as many (percentage-wise) female bureaucrats supported this law than women with political experience (86.6% vs. 40%), while the proportion of men who voted yes in both categories was more level (74.4% vs. 67.3%). In all other occupational groups, voting was generally the same among both women and men.

The Debates¹⁷¹

reading (October 26, 1994).

¹⁷¹The debates studied for this section are the first and third reading (July 13, 1995) and the veto override attempt (October 11, 1995).

This bill was introduced by Mikhail Poltoranin (RC), Chair of the Committee on Information Policy and Communications. At the first reading of the bill, he argued that given the critical financial situation facing many local and regional newspapers and their staff, the passing of this law was of utmost importance. Anatolii Luk'ianov (CPRF) then voiced support for the bill, pointing out that it had the potential to touch the lives of "literally millions of voters."¹⁷² The law passed in its first reading.

Poltoranin then attempted to have the law passed in its final reading, where it passed. No women participated in this debate.

After the Presidential veto the bill was once again sent down to the House, where Aleksandr Yakovlev, a Presidential representative, explained the Presidential veto, stating that "the norms of this law contradict the Constitution at almost every step."¹⁷³ Although he agreed with the principle of the law, he said that, in essence, parliamentarians had overstepped the boundaries of their mandate by legislating the sources of budgetary funding and the division and oversight of that funding, these areas being under government, not parliamentary, control. Further, if the House insisted on passing this law, Yakovlev guaranteed that the legality of the law would be taken to the Constitutional Court.

In response, Poltoranin pointed out that both the Federation Council and the Presidential Office had had ample opportunity to comment on the draft, and neither did. Again he was supported by Luk'ianov (CPRF) who pointed out the hypocrisy of El'tsin's veto, given that he himself had just overstepped the boundaries of his mandate

¹⁷²Lukianov, Anatolii, in Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedaniia, No. 118, July 13, 1995, p. 40

¹⁷³Yakovlev, Aleksandr, in Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedaniia, No. 128, October 11, 1995, p. 10

is declaring elections in the regions. The Duma agreed with its deputies and overturned the veto. No women participated in this reading of the bill either.

On the Federal Organs of the Security Services of the Russian Federation

The Federal Law

This law aimed to clarify the role and responsibilities of the new federal security organs in the Russian Federation, which comprise federal security forces, regional detachments and the armed forces. Any activities carried out by these three constituent parts must be based on: the rule of law, the observance of human rights, humanism and security. The role of the security services is to carry out three primary tasks: gather intelligence, counter-intelligence, and fight against crime. In doing so, they have the responsibility to: report to the President, apprehend those intending to do harm to the security of the Russian Federation, obtain information in the interests of guaranteeing the security of the Russian Federation, preventing terrorism, etc. (Article 12). Federal security services are prohibited from forming or acting in political parties or social movements that advocate political goals. (Article 2) The law then goes on to discuss the rights, including social rights, and obligations of military and civilian personnel employed in the federal security services. This law also envisioned parliamentary oversight of the financial activity of state security organs. (Article 23, 24)¹⁷⁴

Background

This law was a matter of some debate between the President and the Duma, having gone through a conciliatory commission and finally being adopted in its fourth

reading in late March 1995. According to a journalist at *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, "The commission's activity can be deemed to have resulted not only in a well-conceived document but also in fruitful experience of cooperation producing positive results."¹⁷⁵

The Vote

This vote took place on February 22, 1995 and was the third reading of the draft law. Nearly 25% more women supported the bill than men, but party was surely the most important influencing factor in this law.

Figure 5 (Source: *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii*, No. 88 (February 22, 1995))

Other factors were also in evidence: women from party lists supported the law 11% more often than their female colleagues in single mandate seats; older

women were the most likely

of any age group to support the law (90%), while young men were the least likely (34.4%). Lastly, twenty five percent more female bureaucrats supported the bill than males in that category.

The Debates¹⁷⁶

The first reading of this law, which took place on November 18, 1994, was one of the longest and most boisterous debates studied in this thesis. As this draft law originated in the office of the President, Sergei Stepashin, the Director of the Federal

¹⁷⁴Iamshanov, Boris, 'Now We Have a Security Service, That Means we Will Have Security', *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, March 29, 1995, p. 10, in *FBIS*, March 31, 1995, p. 25

¹⁷⁵Iamshanov, Boris, 'Now We Have a Security Service, That Means we Will Have Security', *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, March 29, 1995, p. 10, in *FBIS*, March 31, 1995, p. 25

Counterintelligence Services and the President's representative, began the debate by stressing the need for a new law in this area. He pointed out that given the changing security situation in Russia, the mandate of the Intelligence Services needed to be widened to include the fight against crime, corruption and terrorism. He stressed the need to give these special services more investigative powers, all the while acting within a legal framework.

Viktor Iliukhin, Chair of the Committee on Security, then took the floor, where he supported the bill with certain reservations, the most important of which was a call for parliamentary, not governmental oversight of the new services. Nevertheless, he urged House members to pass the bill, and promised to 'correct' its imbalances before the second reading.

There was a great deal of discussion on this bill; nine males deputies from several different parties rose to question the bill. Debate centered primarily around the manner in which this new Federal Service would be accountable to the parliament and to the people, as well as how Stepashin could truly guarantee that security service members would carry out their work 'in the respect and observance of human rights', as stated in the law's preamble. Iu. Rybakov (RC) went so far as to pick out the clauses that could violate this preamble. A clause not uncommon in Western laws caused some commotion in Russia; namely, that under extraordinary circumstances, security service employees would not be required to obtain prior legal permission to violate some human rights. Alevtina Fedulova, (WofR) also participated in this debate briefly to call for the establishment of a Security Services Ministry.

¹⁷⁶The debates studied include the first reading (November 18, 1994) the second reading (February 15, 1995) and the third reading (February 22, 1995).

The debate ended when Zhirinovskii accused Stepashin of being a Mossad agent, Stepashin threatened to sue for slander, and Zhirinovskii was banned from the next three Duma sessions.

The second reading on February 15 proved to be somewhat anticlimactic compared to the first. Iliushin presented again, outlining the changes that had been made in the law, including a new name to reflect a broadened mandate, and a guarantee of parliamentary oversight. The bill passed without debate. He spoke again at the third reading to emphasize the legislative governance of the new security services and the law passed without debate. Consequently, in three readings, only one woman made one comment.

On Financial-Industrial Groups

The Federal Law

This law was one of the many designed to lay the legal foundation required for a market economy in the Russian Federation. It was adopted by the Duma in October of 1995, and signed into law on November 30, 1995.

Article Two of the law defines a financial-industrial group as any entity comprising a financial (i.e. banks, credit unions) and industrial (i.e., a company producing good) components coming together to invest or begin programs designed to increase competitiveness, expand markets, increase efficiency or create jobs. This definition may include non-commercial organizations but excludes social or religious organizations.

The law lays out how these financial-industrial groups may be created and how they register themselves with the state. Later chapters also describe the corporate

structure of such entities (i.e., a Board of Directors) and set out the possible activities and accountability for those activities that may be undertaken. For example, the state may eliminate some customs duties for financial-industrial groups, and operations between different enterprises in a group will be treated by the state as transitions between subdivisions of the same enterprise.¹⁷⁷ Finally, the law outlines the steps taken in the dissolution of such a group

Background

Many hoped that financial-industrial groups would bring about an increase in industrial production in Russia, and consequently, economic growth. "Both financial stabilization and the formation of powerful corporate structures are important in realizing the long-range objectives of Russian reforms."¹⁷⁸ By September 1995, 21 groups had been created comprising 219 industrial enterprises and 62 financial institutions.¹⁷⁹ It was hoped that these groups could help rebuild the economic links severed by the political breakdown of the Soviet Union. In fact, Nikolai Gonchar, chair of the Budget and Finance Committee, "declared that one of the principle goals of the draft law is the promotion of integration processes in the industry of CIS countries."¹⁸⁰

The Vote

The vote analyzed in this section is the vote on the first reading of this law, on July 20, 1995. The first, second and third readings all took on October 27, 1995.

¹⁷⁷Boiko, Boris, 'Consortium's Ideas to Receive Legislative Basis', *Kommersant-daily*, July 21, 1995, p. 2, in *FBIS*, August 21, 1995, p. 14

¹⁷⁸Lenskii, Evgenii, member of the presidium and secretary of the Council on Industrial Policy and Free Enterprise, 'The Supports of Russian Capital', *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, October 26, 1995, p. 2, in *FBIS*, November 3, 1995, 23-25, p. 23

¹⁷⁹Lenskii, Evgenii, member of the presidium and secretary of the Council on Industrial Policy and Free Enterprise, 'The Supports of Russian Capital', *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, October 26, 1995, p. 2, in *FBIS*, November 3, 1995, 23-25, p. 24

Figure 6 (Source: Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, No. 121 (July 20, 1995))

As with other laws, female participation rates were much higher than those for males, with 74.4% of women voting and 70.7% of women approving the law, while only 49.6 percent of men voted at

all, and of those, 49.4% approved the law. However, like the earlier laws studied, party affiliation was the primary indicator of voting choice. Women voted with members of their party (within a 10% margin) in every party except for LDPR and LDU.

On this law, women in party seats were far more apt to give their approval than women in single seats, while the converse is true for men, where half the single seat members approved the law, but only one in four of party seat men did.

The Debates¹⁸¹

Vladimir Gusev (LDPR), Chair of the Committee on Industry, Construction, Transportation and Energy spoke briefly at the first reading of this bill on October 27, 1995. He only managed one sentence: "This morning we [other committee chairs and I] gathered and actively agreed among all fraction heads and committees, that financial-industrial groups should be limited to Russian soil", before the Speaker of the House cut him off and called for a vote. Moreover, an otherwise impartial speaker

¹⁸⁰Boiko, Boris, 'Consortium's Ideas to Receive Legislative Basis', *Kommersant-daily*, July 21, 1995, p. 2, in *FBIS*, August 21, 1995, p. 14

¹⁸¹The debate studied under this section is the first reading on October 27, 1995.

actively pushed this law through its second and third readings, arguing that because of its importance, further debate was not needed.¹⁸²

On the Elections of Deputies to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation

The Federal Law

This federal law outlines many of the same provisions set out in “On fundamental Guarantees to voting citizens of the Russian Federation”, but has several points of law that deal only with the election of parliamentary deputies.

There are four main sections of this law that do not appear in the earlier one, and were the points most hotly contested: the distribution of seats between party and single mandate seats, campaign funding, candidate’s ability to work during the campaign and minimum election turnout.

The most contentious point contained in this law is the distribution of seats between party and single constituency members. Article Five establishes the continuance of the status quo in Russia: 225 seats to party lists based on proportional representation and 225 seats to single members elected in the first-past-the post system. Moreover, candidates have the right to run simultaneously in their constituencies and on a party list. This law also upholds the 5% barrier for party list representation in the Duma (Section 70).

Further, electoral districts shall be decided based on an equal division of the population into 225 districts, with a variation of 10%, or 15% in remote areas. In contrast to the limits set out in the ‘Fundamental Guarantees of Voting Rights of citizens in the

¹⁸²Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedaniia, No. 133 (October 27, 1995), pp. 18-19

Russian Federation', all Duma candidates may be released from their work *in any field* until the publication of the official election results (Section 44).

Campaign fund openness is also discussed at length in this law. Candidates in single member constituencies may spend no more than 10 000 times the minimum wage established by law, while parties may not exceed 250 000 times the minimum wage. (Section 52). Individual contributions to campaigns must fall between 200 and 2000 minimum wages.¹⁸³ This law prohibits candidates and their representatives may from offering the electorate from offering money or gifts to the electorate in the course of campaigning (Section 46).

Parties must be registered with the Ministry of Justice at least six months prior to any subsequent election, and submit their party list to the Central Electoral Commission. Candidates on a party list must collect at least 200 000 signatures, where no more than 7% of votes coming from a single administrative district (republic, autonomous oblast', etc.) Candidates in single member districts must gather the signatures of at least 1% of the constituents in their ridings.

The President wanted to change the minimum election turnout from 25% to 50% for valid election results. Most deputies argues that this level was too high, and fought to maintain it at 25%.

Background

This law was one of the hottest political issues in 1995, and was volleyed back and forth between the two Houses and the executive on numerous occasions. The initial draft law was first introduced and debated in the Duma in the fall of 1993 and

¹⁸³Velikanova, Irina, 'The Elections: Once Again Nothing Will Happen to the Violators', in *Obshchaia gazeta*, April 27-May 3, 1995, p. 8, in *FBIS*, May 18, 1995, 25-26, p. 25

had its first reading on November 23, 1994. After a March 15 second reading and a March 24 third reading, the bill went to the Federation Council.

Before the Duma's second reading, though, President El'tsin had drafted another version of this law, setting out a 300 single mandate and 150 party list seat structure. The Duma rejected this draft and retained the Duma draft law version's 225:225 ratio. However, the Federation Council opposed the 1:1 ratio of party to single seats, and so rejected the Duma's draft law. Like the President, the Federation Council wanted more regional political representation, and argued that the party system in Russia was too weak and fractured to be effective: regional representation would be a more accurate measure of civil will.¹⁸⁴ In fact, some Council members wanted to do away with party seats altogether.¹⁸⁵ Council members and the President also argued that candidates should not be able to run simultaneously on party lists and in their constituencies.¹⁸⁶ One Federation Council member said that "250 votes for parties in the Duma is too many because the party structuralization of society has not taken place."¹⁸⁷

However, because of an inability to reach quorum on debates, the Council did not offer amending suggestions to the Duma. The Duma consequently re-voted and passed the law April 21. At this point, the Duma, fearing that the final law might not be signed before July, added an amendment to override a the section in the law that dictated that political parties wishing to participate in elections had to register at least 6

¹⁸⁴Tsukanova, Liubov, 'Party of the Regions Wants to Control Elections', *Rossiiskie vesti*, April 14, 1994, p 1, in *FBIS*, April 18, 1995, p. 35

¹⁸⁵Mitenev, Valerii and Filippova, Galina, 'Conciliation Commission Appointed on Election Bill', *ITAR-TASS*, May 4, 1995, in *FBIS*, May 5, 1995, 33-34, p. 33

¹⁸⁶Dunaieva, Indira, 'Deputies Approve Laws on Elections - Now it's up to the Senators', *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, April 22, 1995, p. 2, in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, Vol, 48, No. 16, 1995, p. 19

months prior to the election with the Central Electoral Commission. Many feared the disagreements surrounding the law would provide the pretext for a postponement of the elections, and so the amendment stipulated that if the President did not call elections within the period prescribed by the Constitution, elections would automatically be held the first month after the end of the Duma's mandate. In the case of a dissolution of the Duma, elections would be held three months after the dissolution.¹⁸⁸

The Federation Council again rejected this version on May 4. The Duma again overrode this veto and sent the law to the President in mid-May. However, the President, also concerned about the 1:1 ratio, vetoed the law on May 22, writing

It is my judgment that the equal number of deputies to be elected to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly from one-mandate constituencies and from the federal constituency (225 and 225 respectively) as stipulated in this Federal Law does not reflect in full measure the role which the political parties and other public associations pursuing political goals play in the socio-political life of the Russian Federation; neither does it take sufficient account of the interests of the component parts of the Russian Federation. With this in mind, I propose that this ratio be changed to envision the election of 300 deputies from one-mandate constituencies and 150 from the federal constituency. The turnout of voters which Section 4 of Article 61 of the Federal Law proclaims necessary to declare the elections good [25%] is inappropriately low.... I propose that the turnout requirement be increased to 50%.¹⁸⁹

He then suggested the establishment of a conciliatory commission. The Duma, unable to override the Presidential veto, agreed to the commission.

¹⁸⁷Tsukanova, Liubov, 'Party of the Regions Wants to Control the Elections', *Rossiskie vesti*, April 14, 1995, p. 1, in *FBIS*, April 18, 1995, p. 35

¹⁸⁸'Duma Passes Law to Retain Current Electoral System', *ITAR-TASS*, April 21, in *FBIS*, April 21, 1995

¹⁸⁹El'tsin, Boris in 'Yeltsin Letter to Rybkin on Veto', *ITAR-TASS*, May 23, 1995, in *FBIS*, May 23, 1995, 15-16, p. 15

There, certain compromises were made - for example, the ratio remained at 1:1 but party lists were to require an adequate regional balance - with no more than 12 party list members from the centre (Moscow and Saint Petersburg) - a move that assuaged the President's concerns.¹⁹⁰ Moreover, the President had earlier argued that those working in politics, government or the media should step down during the campaign, while deputies claimed this violated Section 43 of the law, which guarantees the equality of all candidates. At the commission, the wording was changed to say that all candidates could continue to work but no candidate could use his or her position to benefit politically.¹⁹¹

The amended law was then approved by the Duma, and finally, on June 15, also approved by the Federation Council. It was signed into law on June 20, 1995, just under the wire for the six month pre-election registration deadline.

There were reported disagreements on the new law within the Duma. Russia's Choice favoured the official Duma version, as did the Agrarian Party, the Communist Party and the Women of Russia, while the Liberal-Democratic Union of December 12 supported the Federation Council members who wanted to eradicate party seats in their entirety. LDPR members, all but five of whom won their seats through the party list, wanted to get rid of single mandate seats.¹⁹²

The Vote

This vote was the Duma vote on the version written up by the conciliatory commission, which ended up being the final version signed by President El'tsin. Men

¹⁹⁰Kuznetsov, Pavel, 'Duma Overrides Yeltsin Decision on Elections', *ITAR-TASS*, June 9, 1995, in FBIS, June 12, 1995, 33-34, p. 34

¹⁹¹Novikov, Ivan, 'Yeltsin, Deputies Agree to Amend Election Law', *ITAR-TASS*, May 25, 1995, in FBIS, May 26, 1995, 21-22, p. 21

and women generally voted along party lines on this law, with the exception of Russia's Path two female members, who both supported the law, and Yabloko's three women, who also supported the law. Further, participation rates for men and women were more similar (78% vs. 65%) than for other laws in this section.

Figure 7 (Source: *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii*, No. 109 (June 9, 1995))

The interesting point to note on this law is the division between deputies elected on party lists and those in single mandate seats. With the threat of the disappearance of the latter group's seats, these deputies were far more likely to oppose the law (about 15% of both men and women did) than their party seat counterparts, who averaged a 2% rejection rate.

There were no significant differences based on profession, including those with previous parliamentary experience, on this law.

The Debates¹⁹³

After the Presidential veto, the Duma tried to gain the necessary support in the House to enact the law despite the President. On May 24, 1995, Vladimir Isakov (AP), the Chair of the Committee on legislation and legal reform, gave a short presentation in

¹⁹²Barinova, Elena, 'Whom Will We Elect, When and How?', *Megapolis-express*, November 2, 1994, p. 11, in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, Vol. 46, No. 43, 1994, 10-11, p. 11

¹⁹³The debates to be studied in this section include the two debates held after the President's veto of the bill - the first on May 24, 1995, to try to override the Presidential veto, and the second, in June 9, 1995, to agree to the conciliatory commission's version.

which he outlined the three options available to Duma deputies: first, to override the Presidential veto; second, to give in to the Presidential and Federation Council demands of a 300-150 party list, single member division in the Duma, or; third, to send the bill to a conciliatory commission. Six male deputies asked questions about specific provisions of the bill. Tamara Gudima (CPRF) was the only female deputy to participate in the debate, lending her support to the Federation Council proposal that all deputies, including those on party lists, be required to gather signatures in order to run. In the end, deputies voted to send the bill to a conciliatory commission. Just three weeks later, the conciliatory commission version came back to the House. Again Isakov presented, this time outlining the changes that had been made, including limiting the number of party list deputies that could come from the centre (Moscow and Saint Petersburg) to 12, changing the tax laws that govern party financing, changing the article on a candidate's ability to continue working during the campaign period and maintaining the minimum percentage of voters necessary for valid elections at 50%. Nineteen men then rose to ask specific questions of Isakov, along with one women, Arakchaa (NRP) who asked about constituent residency requirements. After questions, one representative from each faction stated briefly the faction's position on the law. Only the Women of Russia party put forth a female representative, Liudmila Zavadskaia, who was also a lawyer and member of the Committee on legislative and legal reform. According to Zavadskaia, WofR supported an equal division between party and single member seats, despite their disproportionate success in party seats. Secondly, WofR believed that the number of party list deputies that could come from the centre should be fixed at 5% of seats (19 seats). Lastly, WofR supported Isakov in

saying that the 50% turnout for valid elections proposed by the President was too high, instead, the 25% level should be maintained.

Conclusions

Several conclusions can be made on these laws. First, women participated much more actively in voting on these laws than men. Women voted, on average, 10-15% more frequently than men on these laws. Secondly, women are more likely to support new bills than men. Female support rates for the laws range from 6% more than their male colleagues (on the election bill) to 21% (on the financial-industrial groups bill).

Despite these differences in participation, women did vote along party lines on the laws studied in this section. Women from different parties were frequently polarized in their voting, and party identification was definitely the strongest influencer of voting behaviour.

Moreover, as men dominate on committees related to these types of laws, they also dominated in debates. Because of their committee positions, men overwhelmingly dominated as presenters on laws of this type. Women proportionally did not ask as many questions as men during debate. When women did participate, most raised issues relevant to their parties or asked for clarification.

Based on this data, the first part of the hypothesis laid out in the Introduction seems to be correct. Women do indeed generally vote along party lines on issues not related specifically to gender. They also participate little in parliamentary debate, and do not bring a gendered perspective to their comments when they do speak.

Chapter Six - Vote and Debate Analysis of Gender Specific Laws

Chapter Six builds on the results of Chapter Five and will examine the votes and debates of seven laws that affect women in particular. As mentioned briefly in the introduction to Chapter Four, these laws are not as unequivocally 'women's issues' laws as I had originally hypothesized, but all affect women directly and disproportionately and consequently, in re-examining Russian notions of 'feminism' and 'women's interests', strong arguments can be made for their inclusion in this chapter.

Two laws fit securely into the 'woman's sphere'. The first is the Family Code of the Russian Federation, passed in the fall of 1995, which governs marriage and divorce and financial and material support to children. The second, a resolution passed in the winter of 1994, concerns benefits to families with children. As the proportion of single mothers in Russia is considerably higher than here in North America, these benefits disproportionately affect women.

While the following two laws do not deal with women specifically, they have a direct impact on women through their effect on activities traditionally thought to be under the woman's sphere of influence in Russia. The first outlines the provision of state support to the elderly and infirm, while the second deals with changes in the education system that affect children. Because women in Russia, as in North America, are the primary caregivers for the young and the old, these provisions affect them in particular.

Thirdly, while not a strong component of feminism in North America, access to work and unemployment during the transition period are very strongly associated with

gender in Russia (at least, by women). Consequently, a law outlining changes to the unemployment system was included in Chapter Six.

Lastly, two laws on pensions were included in this section, not because female parliamentarians had specifically targeted female pensioners as needing support, but for two other related reasons. First, female parliamentarians across the board decried the effects of the quick pace of reforms on the most vulnerable in society - the elderly and the sick. However, many male politicians shared this view, so this alone is not enough. Women also make up a highly disproportionate number of pensioners, and for this reason, coupled with the first, pension issues will affect women disproportionately.¹⁹⁴

This chapter follows the same structure as Chapter Four by detailing the seven votes separately, and sums up overall voting patterns in the conclusion. Every vote analysis will be preceded by a short summary of the law itself, and a background of the context in which it was passed. Vote analysis will then be followed by a brief analysis of one or two debates in the House on that specific law.

The Family Code of the Russian Federation

The Family Code

The Family Code was one of the most important pieces of social policy legislation adopted during the Fifth Duma. It replaced the 1969 Supreme Soviet Code and all subsequent amendments to that Code. This 1995 Family Code sets out the

¹⁹⁴According to an article published in *Sevodnia* on July 19, 1995, Elmira Pogorelova, Director of the Russian Federation Ministry of Public Health, female life expectancy in Russia was fully 14 years shorter than men's. Moreover, Ms. Pogorelova predicted that men's life expectancy in 1995 would be 57 years, meaning that the average man would die before reaching pensionable age.

foundation for understanding the family in the Russian Federation, proclaiming that the sphere of the family, maternity, paternity and childhood all lay under state protection, and that all marriages must be based on a free and voluntary union of a man and a woman, both equal under the law (Article 1, 3, 31). The Code is divided into seven main sections: the first deals with the act of marriage. It sets out the conditions (voluntary union between a man and woman), age (18), prohibitions on marrying relatives, and medical services, including free family planning services, available to married couples.

Section two and three deal with the dissolution of marriage: section two - by divorce, section three - by annulment. Articles 16 to 26 define the act of divorce. One article of particular note is Article 17, which prohibits men from divorcing their pregnant wives or wives with children one year of age or younger without the wife's consent. Divorce by mutual consent is legal if both partners make a notarized written declaration to that effect. In contested cases, a court can also declare a couple divorced. Under section three, an annulment will be granted if the partners are related (in violation of section one), if one partner has knowingly concealed his/her infection of a venereal disease or AIDS, or if one partner conceals the fact that s/he has no intention of starting a family.

Section four details the rights and obligations of parents and minor children. Under section five, children born out of wedlock have the same legal rights as children born to married couples. All children have the right to be raised in a family, and to have contact with their extended family. They have the right to be protected, even from their parents. They also have a right to own their own property. Parents have the right to raise their children as they see fit, but the exercise of parental rights can never

contradict the interests of the child. The courts may take away parental rights if parents: do not fulfill their parental obligations, become dependent on alcohol or drugs, or harm their children or their spouse.

Section five outlines the obligations to support family members. Under this section, parents are required to provide support (financial, material, etc.) to their minor children and to children unable to work. Spouses must also provide support to one another, especially if one spouse is unable to work, is caring for an invalid child, or is pregnant or has a child under the age of three (women only). Article 90 details the support that must be extended between former spouse, including child support and alimony. Interestingly, brothers and sisters of legal age are required by law to provide support to their siblings if the parents are unable to do so, as are grandparents obligated to support their grandchildren under such a condition. The rest of the section outlines the level and method of paying for support, and under what conditions that support may be terminated.

Section six addresses in great depth the situation of children without guardians, the role of guardians or foster parents and the role of adoptive parents. First, state children's institutions fall under local jurisdiction and have the same obligations to raise children and provide them with sustenance, education, and opportunities for self-realization as children with parents. In the section on adoption, Article 132 states that a child aged 10 or over may veto an adoption if s/he thinks that would harm his/her interests. Further, Article 124 states that siblings must be adopted together. Children may be adopted by non-Russian nationals only when a suitable home for them can not be found in Russia. Children under foster guardianship have the same rights as children living in state institutions and children living with their parents, while the same

conditions apply to place a child under guardianship as under adoption. Lastly, section seven addresses family relations involving foreign nationals and people without citizenship.

Background

This law was designed to reflect the “radical changes in the country’s economic and political life immediately affecting such major social institutions as marriage and the family”.¹⁹⁵ Despite these grand assertions, one analyst noted that “the 1995 budget was adopted very late, and in one swoop they adopted a Family Code which, by the admission of specialists, needs more careful examination.”¹⁹⁶

The Vote

As with the votes listed in Chapter Four, a higher percentage of women participated in the vote than men (78.9% versus 65.6%). No women opposed or abstained from this bill, while one male deputy opposed it and four men abstained.

The expected consensus among women did not emerge on this vote, although there was a tendency among women to pass the law. Of the eight parties studied, six had law approval rates of over 80%, while of the four female members of the LDPR, only two approved it, and none of the three female Yabloko members voted at all.

There was an inverse trend on party list/single member voting, with 70% of female party list deputies approving the law, but a full 88.5% of single constituency female deputies approved it. There were no differences in approval rates among women based on age or region. Professionally, 70% of politicians, 80% of professionals,

¹⁹⁵Novikov, Ivan, ‘Duma Approves Bill to Protect Families, Minors’, *ITAR-TASS World Service*, May 17, 1995, in *FBIS*, May 18, 1995, p. 32

93.3% of bureaucrats and 88.9% of teachers approved the law, while only 25% of company directors, and none of the social scientists (Yabloko members) approved the bill.

Figure 1 (Source: *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii*, No. 130 (October 18, 1995)

Women approved the law in greater numbers in almost every attribute over their male counterparts.

Whereas 80% of female Russia's Choice members

approved the law, only 55% of

males did; 100% of female Agrarian Party members approved the law, but only 84% of male members did. However, 50% of female LDPR members approved the bill, while 73.7% of their male counterparts did. None of the female Yabloko members voted, but 32% of their male counterparts approved of the law.

In other attributes, men approved the law in fewer numbers than women. Among women aged 31-60, 78.6% votes yes, while among men in the same group, the approval rate was only 64.8%. In looking at professional affiliation, male bureaucrats (93.3% vs. 61.8%), scientists (100% vs. 46.7%), members of the media (100% vs. 58.8%) and professionals (80% vs. 52.9) differed significantly from female members of the same group. Interestingly, company directors of different sexes also differed: while only 25% of women supported the bill, 70.6% of men did.

¹⁹⁶Konstantinova, Natal'ia, 'Two Years of Russian Parliamentarianism - Next Week the Present Membership of the State Duma Completes its Work', *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, December 2, 1995, p 1-2, in *FBIS*, December 28, 1995, 15-17, p. 15

The Debates¹⁹⁷

Galina Klimantova (WofR), the chair of the Committee on the Affairs on Women, the Family, and Youth, introduced the first reading of the bill on May 17, 1995. She began by stressing the importance of passing a new Family Code, given the new realities of a post-Communist Russia. Outlining the major improvements in this law over the previous one, including the strengthening of children's rights and property rights within the family, she appealed to the House to pass it.

Three male deputies asked questions of Klimantova; one who asked how this Family Code will be reconciled with Muslim culture in the South of Russia, given that many provisions directly contradict Muslim culture. She answered that the law was in keeping with the interests of the country and state.

Klimantova also spoke at the second reading of the bill on October 18, 1995, when she listed those who have participated in the revision of the law since May and put forth four amendments to the law. These four amendments suggested by other Duma deputies, include changes in the division of property between couples and two articles on parental obligations to support children in post-secondary education. Again, no women questioned or requested clarification of the bill.

On the Social Protection of Invalids in the Russian Federation

The Federal Law

"The present law delineates state policies in the area of the social protection of invalids in the Russian Federation, the goal [of this policy] being to guarantee to

¹⁹⁷Two debates were studied: the first reading on May 17, 1995, the second reading on May 18, 1995, and December 8, 1995 in the version agreed upon with the President (this was a vote only).

invalids equality of opportunity in the realization of civil, economic, political and other rights and freedoms, on an equal basis with other citizens" (Preamble). This law, passed by the Duma on July 20, 1995, sets out state policy vis-a-vis persons with disabilities in the Russian Federation. In it the state undertakes to provide those with disabilities with medical and social expertise in the form of personalized medical/physical rehabilitation programs, aid to living services, including free access to information, access to service infrastructure, living quarters, specialized aid to children with disabilities and guarantees to free education. The law also sets out measures by which the state guarantees employment to those with disabilities. (Article 20) Organizations, regardless of their form of ownership, may have to fulfill quotas imposed by the state for employees with disabilities, the state has the right to reserve positions for disabled workers, and may encourage organizations to do the same. The federal government may also set up specialized workplaces for disabled workers. (Article 22) The state also guarantees to those with disabilities material well-being, social and medical services, and transportation subsidies, including free transportation to all children with disabilities and a 50% reduction in inter-urban transport for all citizens with disabilities. (Article 30)

The Vote

This law was first passed by the Duma in January 1995, but was subsequently vetoed by the President. It returned to the House on October 6, 1995, and was passed again in the same wording by more than 2/3 of the deputies, thus overriding El'tsin's veto.

Again, women's participation rates were significantly higher than men's (87.7% vs. 71.2%). However, all women did not vote the same: WofR, CPRF, APR, NRP and RP

female members all approved the vote by 90% or more, while two-thirds of female Yabloko and LDU supported the bill and only 60% of Russia's Choice's women did. Taking into account the lower participation rates for men, male and female deputies generally voted along party lines on this law.

Figure 2 (Source: Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, No. 127 (October 6, 1995))

Again, deputies of similar age and professional affiliation voted similarly, regardless of gender. One possible exception here is

the professional category, which included doctors and lawyers. All five women fitting into this category supported the law, while only 12 of the 21 men did.

The Debates¹⁹⁸

This bill saw its first reading in July of 1994, when Valentin Lednev, Chair of a subcommittee on work and social support, laid out its main provisions in his speech. The new law would cost about 50 trillion roubles and would guarantee to Russia's seven million invalids their constitutional right to a decent standard of living. At this reading, two deputies, one from Russia's Choice, the other from PRUA voiced concerns that would later form part of the heart of the debate on this issue: would there be sufficient financial resources to carry out the programs envisioned in this law?

During the section reading, individual proposals on taxation benefits, rehabilitation funds and legal reform were on the voting agenda, and the law passed by

a large margin. After reworking the law in these areas, it passed on its third reading on January 20, 1995. However, the President soon informed the parliament that he would not support the law, and so a conciliatory commission was struck, which continued to work on the law over the following five months. In July, the agreed version was debated, and Lednev and Sergei Kiselev, the Presidential representative, both spoke. Kiselev argued that the President would still not support the bill, as certain provisions on taxation benefits and legal norms it contained violated the constitution and the Civil Code of Russia. Lednev replied that the law was fully within these norms, and the bill passed again.

As expected, El'tsin vetoed the bill, and in October, Lednev again put the bill in its conciliatory commission version to a vote, where he gained the necessary support to override the Presidential veto. No women participated in debates or presentations on this law.

On Changes and Amendments to the Law of the Russian Federation "On Education" **The Federal Law**

The law details the manner in which Russians' constitutional rights to education may be fulfilled. Article 4 sets out the goals of the law: to delineate areas of state competence in education, to guarantee and protect the constitutional right to education, to create legal guarantees for the unfettered functioning and growth of the education system and to define the rights, duties and responsibilities of citizens and organizations in the provision of education, as well as the regulation of their activities.

¹⁹⁸The debates studied in this section include the first reading (July 22, 1994), the second reading (December 22, 1994), the third reading (January 20, 1995), the version proposed by the conciliatory

First, the law outlines state obligations in the field of education, including the free and universal provision of elementary, middle, and early professional education, as well as the provision on a competitive basis of middle, advanced and post-secondary professional education (including universities and colleges). Educational institutions may be public or private, with the exception of military training, which may only be undertaken by the state. Article 13 outlines the requirements to be recognized as an educational establishment, while the following article sets out the orientation of these establishments. They must strive to: guarantee the self-fulfillment of the individual, promote the growth of society and strengthen and modernize the state. Educational establishments can provide education at any level, including pre-school and post-secondary, and this law sets out the requirements of each level.

Despite allowing private education, the state retains the right of governance over these institutions (section two), including the right to set standards, make funding decisions, to license establishments, etc. This law also sets out the responsibilities vis-a-vis the state and citizens of educational establishments, and the manner in which educational establishments can be reorganized or liquidated if they fail to fulfill these responsibilities.

Lastly, the law outlines at great length the availability and dispensing of financial and material aid to both private and public educational establishments.

The Vote

This law passed July 12, 1995, but was subsequently vetoed by the President. On October 11, 1995, the Duma again voted on the bill that had previously passed -

commission (July 20, 1995) and another vote on that version after the Presidential veto (October 6, 1995).

aiming to gather the 300 votes necessary to override the Presidential veto, which they did. Again, participation rates were higher for women - 87.7% vs. 71.4%.

There were gender differences among members of Russia's Choice (100% of women in favour vs. 63.8% of men), Yabloko (100% vs. 80%), LDU (66.7% vs. 46.7%) and Russia's Path (100% vs. 72.7%), while LDPR, CPRF, APR and NRP male and female members voted in concert.

Figure 3 (Source: Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, No. 128 (October 11, 1995))

Age affiliation was not strong, except among young men, who had the lowest rate of approval (57.1%) followed by women over 50 (70%). All six of the women with previous parliamentary experience supported this law, while only 60.2% of men in the same category did.

Professionally again, female bureaucrats were 30% more likely to support the law than their male counterparts; female media workers were 40% more likely, female professionals twice as likely to vote yes, while male scientific workers were twice as likely to support this bill.

The Debates

Unfortunately, there was no debate of the bill neither on July 12 nor October 11, 1995 - the Speaker simply put the bill to a vote.

On Changes and Amendments to the Law of the Russian Federation “On the Employment of the Population of the Russian Federation”¹⁹⁹

The Federal Law

The law, finally adopted in the Sixth State Duma on March 22, 1996, clarifies three main areas: the definition of unemployed, including the rights of the unemployed; the state's guarantees in the field of employment and the state system to deal with the unemployed.

The law iterates the citizen's right to freely dispose of their own labour. Secondly, all those citizens who are ready and able to work and register themselves at an employment agency will be considered officially unemployed and after a waiting period of eleven days may begin to receive unemployment insurance benefits. However, if a citizen receiving payments rejects two suitable opportunities for work or professional training, s/he loses her/his unemployed status.

The state endeavors to achieve equal opportunities of all citizens of the Russian Federation and aims to prevent widespread and long-term unemployment (Clause 5, Article 2).

Citizens in Russia have the right to receive professional orientation and professional training at agencies of the employment services, while the state guarantees social support for the unemployed and professional assistance to the unemployed, up to and including the provision of free medical services and medical exams in order to find work (Chapter III, Clause 12, Article 2).

¹⁹⁹The text of this law is from Westlaw, an internet based legal database. The law text is in English from *Ruslineleg*, their database of economic-oriented Russian legislation.

This law also stipulates that citizens laid off due to economic hardship maintain the same priority as continuing employees in access to housing and child care, while discharged military personnel and their families have preferential rights to employment in state and municipal companies. Trade unions are legal, and no mass lay-offs can take place without three months advance warning given to those trade unions, as well as local employment agencies in official written form. (Clause 21, Article 3).

The crux of the legislation is to provide workers with unemployment insurance. This benefit can be paid out to those having at least 26 payable weeks of work, and benefit levels are divided into three stages: for the first three months of unemployment, applicants receive 75% of their previous wage, for the next four months - 60% and subsequently 45%, although these benefits can never fall below the minimum labour remuneration and may never exceed the average labour remuneration in the Russian Federation. Benefits can be claimed no more often than 12 out of every 18 months. Interestingly, those citizens never having worked can also apply for unemployment benefits, and are paid at the level of minimum labour remuneration in the Russian Federation.

The Vote

This law had its second and third readings on July 12, 1995 and passed on that day. This section examines the vote on October 11, 1995, where the House tried to override the Presidential veto by 300 votes or more in support of the law.

Changes and Amendments to Employment

Support for Law by Party and Sex

Figure 4 (Source: Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, No. 128 (October 11, 1995))

As with other votes, female participation and female support for the law surpassed that of men's (87.9% vs. 69.1%) Again

support for the bill was slightly higher among women sitting in party seats. Members of Russia's Path, LDU and NRP were least likely to support this bill. Among members of three parties there were significant gaps in voting between women and men. Russia's Choice, Yabloko, LDU members all differed along gender lines.

Age also played some role in this vote: men aged 31-40 were least likely to support this bill (compared to men and women in other cohorts) by a significant margin - almost 20%. Regional divisions were surprisingly not apparent, given the different participation rates for men and women.

Interestingly, this vote had the most variation between men and women of different professions. Ninety-three percent of female bureaucrats supported the bill, while only 67.3% of male bureaucrats did. One hundred percent of female workers in education supported the bill, while only 80% of men did. Women in the media and professional women supported the bill one-third more frequently than men in those categories. Conversely, two-thirds more male scientists supported the bill than female scientists.

The Debates²⁰⁰

²⁰⁰The debates studied in this section are the first reading (April 26, 1995) the second and third readings (both on July 12, 1995) and the veto override attempt (October 11, 1995).

As with the education bill, there was no discussion of this bill on October 11, 1995; the Speaker simply called the bill up for voting once again.

At the first reading on April 26, 1995, two presenters, Fedor Prokopov, Director of the Federation Employment Services, and Sergei Kalashnikov (LDPR), Chair of the Committee on work and social support, spoke in favour of the law. While admitting some disagreements existed about certain clauses in the bill, both expressed the hope that it would be passed, and that those disagreements could be worked out before the second reading. In contrast, several deputies brought up the most contentious issue: the lack of detail in the law. One asked where the money for a new federal level employment service would come from, and how this agency would be structured. Another asked the speakers to clarify the financial role of local governments in carrying out the federal employment service plan. Still another asked why the House was being asked to pass a bill to which significant changes would be made in the near future. However, according to the presenters, a new bill had to be formulated given the limited usefulness of its outdated predecessor - a law passed during the August 1991 coup, and they again pleaded with House members to pass the bill despite its incomplete form. Women participated neither as presenters nor as debaters in this debate.

The second reading of this bill, on July 12, 1995, saw the vice-Chair of the Committee on Labour and Social Support Tat'iana Yarygina (Yabloko) give a short presentation. She spoke about the hundreds of suggestions received since the first reading and addressed some of the issues to which the suggestions gave rise. First, she said, the Committee was unable to comply with several suggestions that supported the inclusion of a protection from unemployment clause in the new bill. Given the current

situation, said Yarygina, such a promise would be unattainable, and, moreover, could contravene the Russian Constitution (Article 55 and 37). Further, she pointed out that the law now contained a clear division of power between federal, regional and local governments in employment services delivery - a division not clearly laid out in the first draft.

After winning approval for the second draft, Yarygina suggested the House vote a third and final time on that draft, which passed without debate.

On State Assistance to Citizens with Children

The Federal Law

A resolution was adopted on December 9, 1994, and was the basis for the further development of the federal law by the same name.²⁰¹ This resolution called specifically for the first reading of this law to go to the Duma Committees and responsible government departments for further study. It also stipulated that the State Duma Committee for the Affairs of Women, the Family and Youth return the document with remarks for its second reading by the seventh of February, 1995.

At its third reading on April 26, 1995, the law identified the five types of state assistance provided under this law: an allowance provided to the mother during pregnancy (varying from the average wage if the woman is employed, to the minimum wage if unemployed, to a stipend if a student), an allowance provided to women under supervised medical care in their last trimester (minimum wage), upon the birth of a child (fifteen times the minimum wage), a child allowance up to 18 months of age

²⁰¹The text of the first reading resolution comes from Sobranie zakonodatel'stvo, No. 34, December 19, 1994, p. 5039-5040

(twice the minimum wage per household) and child allowance payments from age 16 months to 18 years (17% of the minimum wage. The sources of this state assistance include the social insurance fund and certain budgets from the federal budget.

The Vote

The first clause in this resolution called for the adoption of the federal law of the same name in the first reading, and consequently, was a vote of approval for that first reading. This first reading is the only one for which a roll call vote was available.

Again, women participated far more actively in voting than men (76.3% vs. 59.2%) and 15% more female than men deputies supported the law (71.2% vs. 56%)

Figure 5 (Source: Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, No. 70 (December 9, 1994))

parties studied showed female support for the law above 80%, and of four of these parties, in three male support also topped 80%. For example, while 82.6% of female WofR members support this law, no female Russia's Choice member did (only 11.4% of RC male members supported the bill). Similarly, two thirds of female Yabloko members supported this law, along with 40% of male members of this party, while 50% of female New Regional Policies deputies supported the law, along with 62.1% of their male counterparts.

There was also a 20% spread in support between female party list and single member deputies - a difference unmatched among their male counterparts. Lastly,

Despite this more active participation, women seemed more in concert with their parties than with one another. Only five of the nine

there were greater differences in support between women from different regions (ranging from 0% in Moscow to 100% in the North and in Siberia) than among men and women from the same regions, making regionalism a greater factor than gender on this vote. In addition, there were no consensus based on shared professions, either among women, or between women and men.

Consequently, affiliation with deputies from the same region and/or party in this law seems to override gender-based voting.

The Debates²⁰²

This bill first emerged as a response to the constitutional pledge to provide social protection to every Russian citizen. The first reading of the bill took place on December 9, 1994, and is one of the most interesting examples of political differences among women with the same general social policy outlook. First Raisa Skripitsyna (WofR), Minister of Social Protection of the Population and Chair of a subcommittee under the Committee on the Affairs of Women, the Family and Youth asked the House to support the government-approved bill. Irina Khakamada (LDU) then rose to garner support for another version of the bill, one developed by parliamentarians. Lastly, Galina Klimantova (WofR), chair of Committee on Women, the Family and Youth rose to lend qualified support to the government version of the bill.

The main issue centered around the basis on which payments would be made: Skripitsyna advocated tying payments to the minimum wage, Khakamada to a yet-to-be-established minimum living standard. Skripitsyna started her speech by pointing to and explaining three main attributes of the law. First, payments were to be made for all

²⁰²The debates studied in this section are the first reading (December 9, 1994) and the third reading (April 26, 1995).

children, regardless of the living standard of their parents, which was an attempt to honour the egalitarian wording of the constitutional guarantee. Secondly, no concrete infrastructure to provide these payments existed, so the law was developed to take advantage of the easiest existing method of payment, which led, thirdly, to the decision to base payments on the minimum wage instead of a minimum standard of living. Skripitsyna argued that to base payments on a minimum standard of living would be pure folly: families needed help now, and as a minimum living standard had not yet been established by law, it could take months or years for payments to begin under such a system, while one based on the established minimum wage could start immediately. Further, even given the theoretical feasibility of a minimum standard of living base, there were insufficient budgetary funds for such a program.

Conversely, Khakamada argued that the difficulty of bringing in new legislation should not impede parliamentarians from setting the “absolutely civilized standard” of payments based on a minimum living standard.²⁰³ She argued that as money to begin the program envisioned by Skripitsyna had not been allocated in the 1995 Budget, the project could only begin in early 1996, and consequently, arguments for the speed of payment disbursements were not valid. She also countered Skripitsyna’s comment about the lack of existing infrastructure to make payments, saying this enormous gap in the bill would cause problems for municipal governments, who would be the most likely level of government to get stuck with the bill. Lastly, Khakamada addressed the problem of a lack of budgetary funds for such a standard, saying that many deputies campaign on social security issues, and if there existed parliamentary and executive

²⁰³Khakamada, Irina, in Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, No. 70, December 9, 1994, p. 31

will to provide real social security through a minimum standard of living guarantee, budget funds would be found.

Klimantova agreed with many of Skripitsyna's arguments regarding the ease with which a system based on the minimum wage could be put into place, and thus supported the first bill. By the same token, she urged the parliament to continue work on a minimum standard of living bill which had been struck down in its second reading earlier in 1994. She also agreed with the principle of tying social payments and the minimum wage to this new standard, but disagreed with Khakamada in saying that this step could not be taken under the present economic situation in the Russian Federation.

The third reading of the bill took place on April 26, 1995, where Raisa Skripitsyna again asked for support for the bill previously approved in its second reading, and briefly discussed the one change: an increase in the one time payment for the birth of a child from 5 to 10 times the minimum wage. According to Skripitsyna, this change was made on the suggestion of members of the Social Insurance Fund, the budget Committee and the Labour Committee. Both the amendment and the bill as a whole passed without questions.

On Raising the Minimum Wage, On the Order of Calculation and Indexation of Pensions

The Federal Law

This law, passed by the Duma on July 19, 1995 and signed into law by the President on July 27, 1995, forms part of a group of laws that were regularly amended during times of high inflation in Russia. It reset the minimum pension at 55 000 roubles

a month, while the calculation of subsequent pensions would be raised by 1.05% over the amount paid out in July 1995. The money for this increase was to come from the Pension Fund, specifically from monies allocated for pensions in the 1995 Federal Budget.

The Vote

Figure 6 (Source: Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, No. 120 (July 19, 1995))

The vote to be studied here is the third and final reading of this law, on July 19, 1995. The gap between male and female participation rates on this law was greater than with other laws: 73.7% for

women and 44.3% for men. On this law it seemed as if half the women, those from the LDPR, APR, NRP and RP voted along gender lines, as their support rates for the law were significantly higher than that of their male colleagues. Conversely, women from Russia's Choice, CPRF, Yabloko and the LDU voted in tune with their parties.

The age trends seen in other laws were repeated here; older women were most likely to support the law (80% support) while young men were the most opposed (29% support).

The Debates²⁰⁴

As with the Changes and Amendments to the Education Law, this was passed in its final form without debate.

²⁰⁴The debate studied here is the third reading (July 19, 1995).

On Raising the Minimum Pension, the Order of Indexation and the Recalculation of Pensions in the Russian Federation
The Federal Law

This law, passed by the Duma on October 13, 1995, was a repeat of the earlier law passed in July. It raised the minimum pension in November 1 to 57 750 roubles a month; December 1 to 60 500 roubles a month and January 1 to 63 250 roubles a month. It also indexed pensions by 1.05 times the October rate in November; 1.1 times in December and 1.15 times in January. This law, however, differs subtly from the July law in that it does not explicitly state that the pension increase will come from the budget of the Pension Fund. Rather, it simply states that monies will come from sources that provide payment for appropriate pensions.

Background

Although lawmakers realized that pensions would have to be continually adjusted, the cash flow problems of the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation became more severe over time, largely because of the government's inability to keep its agreement to reimburse the Pension Fund for its payments to the population. This law was chosen despite the similar law in July to ascertain whether increasing financial difficulties of the state fund might prompt some deputies to vote against this legislation.

In fact, over the course of the summer and fall, a number of articles appeared in the press detailing the Pension Fund difficulties.

Whereas in June the payment delays were still being blamed on the [Pension Fund's]... inability to pump resources from one region to another quickly enough, the reasons for the delays today, according to the repeated statements of the Pension Fund of Russia spokesmen, is the growing deficit in the Pension Fund

budget. The deficit was over 2 trillion rubles in July and in excess of 3 trillion in August.... Pension Fund spokesmen are blaming the deficit not only on the money enterprises owe to the Pension Fund... but also on the federal budget resources owed to the fund (1.1 trillion rubles for 1994 and 500 billion for 1993).²⁰⁵

Others contended that the entire Pension Fund needed to be reformed, as payments were too high given the crumbling industrial foundation on which contributions were based.

The Vote

Again, women posted far higher participation rates than men; nearly 30% of men abstained, while 89.5% of women voted.

Figure 7 (Source: Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, No. 129 (October 13, 1995)

100% in favour of the law. Only members of the Liberal Democratic Union bucked the trend - one of its three women voted to support the law.

A nearly equal percentage of female party list and single mandate deputies supported the law (90.3% vs. 88.5%).

Seventy percent of men supported this law, although Russia's Choice (59.4%), New Regional Policies (64.9%), the Liberal Democratic Union (46.7%) and Russia's Path (40%) fell under this average. There was no great variation between male and

Women were largely in agreement on this vote. Only ten percent of women did not vote and women in

five of the nine parties voted

²⁰⁵Kuminova, Irina, 'Disparities in Wage and Pension Adjustments are Undermining the Pension Fund Budget', *Sevodnia*, September 26, 1995, p. 8, in *FBIS*, October 16, 1995, 31-32, p. 32

female members of the same profession: 70% of female politicians and 74.4% of men in this category; 77.8% of women involved in education and 82.0% of men and 75% of female company directors and 76.5% of male directors gave their support to this law.

Voting on this law supports the notion of gender based behaviour - as there are few divisions among women themselves, although there is a significant difference in voting activity between men and women voters.

The Debates²⁰⁶

This law was adopted without debate on October 13, 1995. However, it had first been brought up in the House in mid-July, when it was defeated. At that time, Anna Vlasova (WofR), Chair of a subcommittee on work and social support, outlined that this new bill would bring pensions in line with the increased minimum wage and with inflation. First, Iurii Iarov, a government representative, argued that the government had not had enough time to study the bill, to which Vlasova replied that she had personally handed him the draft bill some time ago. An independent male deputy then asked why the parliament was working on a bill the government itself was set to reject, a comment echoed by two other male deputies. Conversely, another asked why the increase was tied to the minimum wage and not to prices. When the bill was finally put to a vote, it lost by a small margin. No women debated this law.

Conclusions

Given the results of this chapter, the hypotheses laid out in the Introduction do not ring true. While women do participate more in debates on these issues than on

²⁰⁶The debate studied here is the vetoed first reading on July 19, 1995.

issues in the previous chapter, their participation does not always match the level of their male cohorts.

However, as with the laws studied in Chapter Five, women vote more frequently and support laws more frequently than their male counterparts. On these laws, about 15% more women than men voted and support for the laws also hovered around 15% higher than male support.

Moreover, women do vote along gender lines more frequently on these types of laws, but the evidence is not unequivocal. Thus, while women are less in tune with their parties than on the earlier laws studied, a quick glance at the graphs in this section will show that women did not agree conclusively on the bills proposed.

Women also participate more frequently in parliamentary discussion, but this increase in participation is largely attributable to committee membership. Female committee and sub-committee chairs made several presentations on the laws listed here, but female participation remains low in debates.

Consequently, the second half of the hypothesis laid out in the Introduction is only partially true. While women do seem to be influenced by gender in their voting behaviour, this influence does not completely supersede party influence. Further, women in debates do not show themselves to be working toward a common goal as women, calling into question the accuracy of the belief that the gap in voting preferences between men and women of the same party is evidence of a 'gender consciousness'.

Chapter Seven- Debates on Social Policy Issues

One of the weaknesses of this study is the small number of laws chosen to test the hypothesis laid out in the first chapter. However, some conclusions can be drawn from the results of the study: first, women participate more frequently in votes than men. Secondly, women vote in favour of draft laws more than men, and thirdly, women participate most frequently in readings on issues that affect women more closely (the second group of laws).

This chapter attempts to fill out the data on the third assertion - that women participate in the House more frequently on issues that concern the social policy sphere. By examining the debates on six laws in this area, I would hope to find evidence that collaborates the conclusions made in the last two chapters. These six laws were chosen on their social policy relevance, the existence of a final legal text and the availability of two or more readings (debates) on the issue. This chapter will begin by briefly outlining the content of the six laws.²⁰⁷ An analysis of general trends in female parliamentary political behaviour, based on the debates for these six laws, will follow.

The first law to be studied - On changes and amendments to the Marriage and Family Code of the Russian Federation - was passed by the Duma on November 18, 1994. It adds several small items concerning child support payments to the law originally passed in 1969. In point four, it sets out that child support payments may be agreed upon in writing by both parents without court intervention, while this amount can never be lower than the minimum amount set out under point five; one-quarter of the absent parent's salary for one child, one-third for two children and one-half for

²⁰⁷As with the previous chapters, law texts were obtained via the internet at <http://black.inforis.nnov.su>

three or more children. The law also provides for the garnishing of personal property or land if the absent parent does not have sufficient liquid funds to pay child support (point ten).

Another set of amendments to this law was passed in February of the following year. These amendments deal exclusively with the adoption of Russian children. It lists that children must be placed with Russian families if possible, and that adoption services in the Russian Federation will be under the auspices of the Ministry of Education.

The third law is the budget of the state social insurance fund for 1994, which was passed by the Duma on December 23, 1994 and came into law on January 20, 1995. It sets out the areas covered by this fund in 1994, and sets the working capital reserve for 1995 at 5220.9 billion rubles. Three types of expenditures are of particular interest to women. Under this law, 588.4 billion rubles (10% of total expenditures in this fund) are set aside for pre-natal care, 345.1 billion rubles (6% of total expenditures) for post-natal care and 118.6 billion rubles (2%) for childbirth. The largest single expenditure is for temporary disability (81% of total expenditures).

On Social Services to Elderly Citizens and Invalids was passed by the Duma in May of 1994 and articulates state services available to these two social groups. State and non-state activity in this sphere will be based on: the observance of human rights, the guarantee of equal opportunity in the receipt of social services, the continuance of existing services, an individual focus in patient care, and a focus on social adaptation for the elderly (women over 55 and men over 60) and invalid. These services would be available to citizens and non citizens alike on the territory of the Russian Federation. (Article 6). The elderly and invalid's rights are laid out, including the right to choose the

form of service and the institution from which they wish to receive it, information on their rights and obligations, the right to refuse social services, and the right to protect their rights and interests. (Article 7) Members of these two groups living in state institutions have rights over and above those laid out in Article 5, including the right among others to a decent standard of living, free specialized services and rehabilitation services and free legal counsel. The law then goes on to outline the specific services available in the home and in institutions. Lastly, the law outlines sources of funding for these services, and deals with the rights and obligations of social sector workers.

In November of 1995, the Duma passed a law restricting the production and sale of alcohol. This law outlined the jurisdiction of the state; including the authority to set prices for ethyl alcohol (the base product in alcohol), to control the import and export of ethyl alcohol and the import of alcoholic products, to create and utilize a state regulatory board on production of ethyl alcohol and alcohol products, to set standards for production, to license production and sale activities, etc. (Article 3) Retailers are prohibited from selling alcohol to children under 18 or at health facilities, and may not sell high proof (above 12%) alcohol at train stations, airports, metros or military facilities. (Article 16)

Lastly, shortly before the end of the parliamentary mandate, the Duma passed the law 'On Fundamental Social Services to the Population of the Russian Federation, which set out the overarching framework for social service delivery. According to this law, social services in the Russian Federation would be based on seven fundamental principles: targeted aid, accessibility, voluntary participation, humanitarian aims, a focus on children, confidentiality and a focus on prevention. (Article 5) Every citizen and resident of the Russian Federation has the need-based right to material assistance,

home and institutional (long-term and daily) based services and consolation and rehabilitation services. (Articles 8-14) Certain services, such as those geared toward children, those with disabilities and the elderly and infirm, or those designed for citizens living through a natural disaster, war or unemployment, will be offered free or charge, while other services, such as gerontological care centres, may be provided by private industry. Private facilities, however, must conform to the norms set out by the state.

Contrary to my expectations, women did not participate more frequently than men in debates on social policy issues in the Duma. In fact, the opposite was true, a result that is also in evidence in Chapter Six: women participate, on a proportional basis, even less frequently than men. As in Chapter Six, the reason for this lack of participation stems mainly from the Duma committee structure, i.e., few women heading committees, a disproportional smaller number of women gave official presentations on these six laws, despite the issues they covered. In fact, from a grand total of fifteen presentations on these laws, women made six, one on the law concerning alcohol, and five on behalf of the amendments to the Marriage and Family Code on child support and child adoption.

Secondly, as participants in debates women also played a smaller role, even given the content of these laws. Only one woman asked a question (about the administration of the law) during the reading on the Marriage and Family Code on adoption. The other thirteen questions or comments on this and other laws were made by men.

Interestingly, the manner in which the (female) presenters and men approached the law on The Marriage and Family Code differed. The women framed

their support for the adoption of Russian children by non-Russians in terms of personal experience and the primacy of the child. Galina Gusarova (Samara Oblast') told the story of her experiences trying to find a home for a three year old with disabilities while working with orphaned children in the Samara Oblast' administration.²⁰⁸ Similarly, Tamara Leta (Vologodskii Oblast'), deputy Chair of the Committee on Women, the Family and Youth, said, "We have 108 thousand children in orphanages. This is not the best way to grow up.... Above all, we must think about the children, and not of the ideological positions that we have taken for so long."²⁰⁹ Galina Klimantova agreed, stating "we must always look at the bill from the perspective of the interests of the child."²¹⁰

Men took a more universal view of the problem, without addressing the children's well-being. Andrei Drovskii (Saratov Oblast') argued that children should not be given to foreigners because of the poor economic situation in Russia; parliamentarians should instead work toward fixing the economic problems. Aleksandr Nevzorov saw no benefit to the child to be adopted abroad, asking "Who are we to take someone from their homeland? Why this attitude toward children, as if they were just resources?"²¹¹ Another unnamed male deputy chastised Tamara Leta for her concern for orphans' well being, saying "You, like a mother, are feeling intuitive. But let's look at this like parliamentarians."²¹²

Given this minimal female participation in social policy debates, coupled with the results of Chapter Six, one can conclude at the very least that debates are not the

²⁰⁸Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, No. 44, p. 26

²⁰⁹Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii No. 44, p. 19, 20

²¹⁰Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii No. 44, p. 28

²¹¹Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii No. 44, p. 20

primary forum in which women choose to articulate their political goals. This consequently casts doubt on whether women do indeed perceive that they have common interests as women, with the possible exception of children's issues. Yet if these women do not see themselves as having common goals, what would be the motivating factor for voluntary committee membership in largely sex-segregated committees?

²¹²Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii No. 44, p. 23

Chapter Eight- Gender Consciousness versus Social Values - an Examination of the Press and Female Self-Identification.

When she came into the room she seemed to float. A long proud neck, a thin waist, and a long black dress, extremely simple yet at the same time indescribably elegant. In this office, unremarkable in its ordinariness... she seemed not its occupant, but rather a guest who had accidentally stumbled into it out of some society drawing room or some aristocratic house.... She gingerly perched at her office desk as if it were a lady's dressing table and looked at me calmly....

With her, with someone like her, I wanted to talk about evening balls where women in long dresses dance, or about quiet lakes where swans with their long, proud necks swim, or flower-filled hothouses where gently white lilies grow instead of thorny red roses.

But it was a politician I had come to see.

[introduction to political interview with Irina Khakamada, LDU]²¹³

Earlier chapters have proven that part, but not all, of my original hypotheses were correct: i.e., proportionally women participate less in laws that do not affect them, but more in the laws that do. However, that increased participation does not translate into increased gender solidarity - the second hypothesis laid out in the Introduction. How can the scholar account for this phenomenon? This chapter will examine briefly how the outside world, through the eyes of the media, perceive female parliamentarians, and in turn, how they perceive themselves.

The Media

In the twentieth century, the media has become the medium of politicians. Particularly in a country as large as Russia, with a highly literate and politically aware population, the media has quickly developed into a premier vehicle for campaigning.

This section takes a brief, somewhat anecdotal look at the way female deputies are portrayed in the press.

When women's differentness is recognized, members of the media, men and women alike, share a traditional view of women as peacemakers and compromisers, while feminists are generally seen as radical and destructive. One journalist, after talking about gender quotas in parliament, comments that in Norway, "women make up over one-third of parliament, and the government is gentler and nicer with ministers from the fairer sex."²¹⁴

On the other hand,

men don't like feminists.... Women don't like feminists either - they don't seem to like them because it seems to them that feminism infringes in women's sacred right to be the weaker sex. On the whole, in our country, the attitude of the two halves of the human race toward feminism can most often be reduced to the words 'it's all a lot of nonsense.' [introduction to a new feminist magazine] ²¹⁵

I argue in this section that the media generally portrays women parliamentarians in one of two ways: either as 'ungendered (male) citizens' or as exclusively and traditionally female. Consequently, interviewers, both male and female, frequently either ask not one single question about family, women's or children's issues, or discuss these issues, along with commentary on appearance, almost exclusively. For example, in an interview with Ekaterina Lakhova for *Sel'skaia Zhizn*, the female journalist began her article:

²¹³Rudenko, Inna, 'Three Meetings with a Duma Deputy: Irina Khakamada, One of Three Russian Politicians for the 21st Century, Claims TIME Magazine', *Novaia ezhenedevnaia gazeta*, December 28, 1994, pp. 1, 3, in *FBIS*, January 23, 1995, 12-17, p. 12

²¹⁴'Khasbulatov Discusses Quota for Female Deputies', *Moscow Russian Television, Vesti Program*, March 4, 1993, in *FBIS*, March 8, 1993, p. 47

She looks so wonderful in a red jacket... She is also stunning in a bright yellow one... Ceremonious in white... Delightful in apricot... Always with a fine hairstyle, smart in appearance, elegant, business-like, and invariably feminine. And therefore, as I asked my first question of the Chairman of the State Duma faction "Women of Russia" E. Lakhova, I simply could not resist giving her a compliment. [to Lakhova] Yekaterina Filippovna, your knowing how to look and dress can not help but delight one!²¹⁶

Conversely, several of the interviews with female politicians contained no gender references at all. ²¹⁷

Women in the Media

The way women portray themselves in the media, either as feminine or feminist, is an important clue in solving the puzzle presented in this essay. First, the media is a way for parliamentarians to reach a broad segment of the public and promote their causes, so fashioning an appealing political image is vital to success. Conversely, through media interviews, women can and do reveal their personal belief about the role of women in politics and society.

A curious contradiction emerges when female deputies begin to talk about their political work and gender issues. All are at pains to declare that they are not feminists, and yet many have what would be considered in the West to be a decidedly feminist outlook.

²¹⁵Kravchenko, Tat'iana, 'The Devil's not as Black as He's Painted', *Literaturnaia gazeta*, May 17, 1995, p. 4, in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, Vol. 47, No. 20, 1995, 16-17, p. 16

²¹⁶Shevchenko, Nadezhda, 'Yes, I was not at the Farm!... Compliment and Objection to Yekaterina Lakhova', *Sel'skaia Zhizn*, March 7, 1995, pp. 1-2, in *FBIS*, March 16, 1995, 25-28, p. 25

²¹⁷For examples of these types of interviews, see Valiuzhenich, Galina, 'Why Parnfilova Left', *Argumenty i fakty*, February 1995 (No 5), in *Russia and Eurasia Documents Annual 1994*, ed. Black, Academic International Press, Gulf Breeze Florida, 1995; Solomonova, Olga, 'Will the Republicans Become Parnfilovite Heroes?', *Trud*, June 2, 1995, p. 1, in *FBIS*, June 5, 1995, p. 12; 'Parnfilova Interviewed on Bloc's Program', *Moscow Russian Television Network*, November 21, 1995, in *FBIS*, November 22, 1995, p. 13

As mentioned in Chapter Four, several of the women have declared in interviews to be against politics based on feminism.²¹⁸ However, this concept of feminism seems to be understood in terms of privileges for women over men, not as sexual parity. "We do not acknowledge female or male policy and privileges for women are not our aim."²¹⁹ Moreover, feminism seems to be understood as an anti-male stance: when Irina Khakamada was asked whether she is a feminist, she replied "No, I favor equality of choice, but I am for different sexes... And feminists don't like men."²²⁰ However, women politicians do seem willing to identify differences between men and women. Irina Khakamada said in one interview, "By their very nature women are more oriented toward compromise. They are more flexible and more patient. They adapt to life better, and they can, if necessary, blend into the background. But men, like roosters, are unable to share anything."²²¹ Alevtina Fedulova, in a discussion with Aleksandr Rutskoi, argued that "We, the women have eschewed verbiage, politicization, and pontification, and work daily and painstakingly on concrete laws."²²² This acceptance of difference also sometimes leads to the conclusion among women parliamentarians that women need to play a special role based on gender. Ekaterina Lakhova said in an interview: "well-educated well-trained, level-headed, thoughtful

²¹⁸See interviews mentioned, as well as Valiuzhenich, Galina, 'A Dialogue that Did not Take Place. the Falcon did not Fly In', *Argumenty i fakty*, December 1995, p. 3, in FBIS, December 15, 1995, 1-2, p. 2; 'Women's Groups, Shakhrai on Election Programs' *Moscow Ostankino First Channel Network*, November 26, 1993, in FBIS, November 29, 1993, 42-43, p. 42

²¹⁹Fedulova, Alevtina, in Zamiatina, Tamara, 'Women of Russia Bloc Leader Explains Role, Aims' *ITAR-TASS*, December 10, 1993, in FBIS, December 13, 1993, p. 29

²²⁰Khakamada, Irina, in Rudenko, Inna, 'Three Meetings with a Duma Deputy: Irina Khakamada, One of Three Russian Politicians for the 21st Century, Claims TIME Magazine', *Novaia ezhenedevnaia gazeta*, December 28, 1994, pp. 1, 3, in FBIS, January 23, 1995, 12-17, p. 16

²²¹Khakamada, Irina, in Rudenko, Inna, 'Three Meetings with a Duma Deputy: Irina Khakamada, One of Three Russian Politicians for the 21st Century, Claims TIME Magazine', *Novaia ezhenedevnaia gazeta*, December 28, 1994, pp. 1, 3, in FBIS, January 23, 1995, 12-17, p. 13

and peace-loving, women can and must independently defend the interests of families, their children, veterans, invalids, and our whole Russia. We cannot take yet another four years of political aggression and confrontation.”²²³

At the same time, some female deputies interviewed in the press also talk about their femininity, i.e., clothing, household work, creating an image virtually unknown to Western female political thinkers. Ekaterina Lakhova, in an interview with a woman's magazine in Russia, talked of her fondness for cooking and entertaining. She went on to comment that “I believe that the work of women - is working for the family, raising children, and then self-expression through interests: art, music, science, business. To realize this, men should work in the country so that social problems should be resolved.”²²⁴ A female politician from Saint Petersburg commented, “The fact that I am a woman can be used by me as a weapon against a man... For a businesswoman, the appearance is very important; make-up, clothes, shoes... She must kill a man by her appearance.”²²⁵ Media questions reflect this trend: a sampling of questions from published interviews include: “You have such a nice figure... What diet do you follow?” “What kind of dress did you wear to the reception? A Cardin or a Christian Dior? Who makes your clothes?”

²²² Alevtina Fedulova, in ‘Wood Grouses are Not the Only Ones Who do Not Hear Each Other’, *Argumenty i Fakty*, No. 45, (November 1995), in *Russia and Eurasia Documents Annual 1995*, ed. Black, Academic Press, Gulf Breeze, Florida, 1996, 119-123, p. 120

²²³ Lakhova, Ekaterina, ‘Women of Russia Feature Video Clips’, *Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network*, November 22, 1995 [election campaigning], in *FBIS*, November 24, 1995, 3-4, p. 4

²²⁴ ‘Politicheskaya Deklaratsiya s seksual'nim ukonom’, *Gazeta dlia zhenshchin*, No. 8 (August), 1994

²²⁵ Konstantinova, Valentina, ‘Women's Political Coalitions in Russia (1990-1994)’, *Women's Voices in Russia Today*, eds. Rotkorch, A, and Haavio-Mannila, E., Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, England, 1996, 235-247, p. 220

Women in Interviews²²⁶

In order to clarify how women parliamentarians truly saw their political landscape, I conducted interviews by fax with them (see Appendix 2). I received five replies from the 17 questionnaires sent out; this section examines those replies. Of these five women, four won party list seats, one was not ethnically Russian, and they were all aged between 31 and 60. Two are members of the Communist Party, one of the LDPR, one of WofR and one New Regional Policies member. Two were teachers, one a bureaucrat, one a scientist, and one was unemployed before their tenure in the House.

The main focus of these surveys was to discern the perceived importance of party affiliation and gender affiliation in Duma work. The survey consisted of several questions on this subject, as well as more generalized questions about the state of women in Russia

The variance in opinion on gender affiliation was surprising. There was only one question on which there was consensus: all five women agreed that the social safety system in Russia is inadequate. However, only one woman supported the notion that women should work together, and even she gave only qualified support saying "in what concerns children's affairs, they [women] should vote together, but on other issues they can have different opinions." Krivel'skaia wrote that women could play a greater role in the area of policy making on women, the elderly and children's issues.

Of the four women in party seats, three agreed that party-line voting was most important, citing the need to work together to achieve common goals. One woman qualified her statement by saying regional influences sometimes contradicted this

²²⁶See Appendix B for information on the surveys.

trend, while another stressed the need to vote based on convictions. Yet party affiliation among these women seemed to carry more weight than any gender-based action.

Interestingly, two questions asked women to identify their priorities and then the priorities of their party. Most of the lists were similar, yet the two (CPRF members) of the three women to complete the section said that issues of motherhood and childhood were more important to the party than to them personally, and two (CPRF, LDPR) said that issues of social protection were more important to their party than to them. The LDPR member identified economic security as her main priority; Liubov Oleinik (CPRF) chose the creation of a democratic polity as her priority, while Gudima agreed with the CPRF that the social protection of the population was the most important goal.

Given such a small sample size, conclusions are bound to be simplistic and over-generalized. However, among the survey respondents, no woman advocated gender-based voting. Party members advocated voting along party lines, while the single constituency member advocated voting based on constituent preferences. Further, two of the five also claimed to vote with other members of their profession.

Based on these few surveys then, despite feminine or feminist messages in the media, women parliamentarians generally think party affiliation supersedes any gender solidarity across party lines.

Chapter Nine - Conclusions

When I began this thesis, I aimed to test a hypothesis: that female deputies had developed some type of 'gender consciousness' in the Fifth State Duma, and that this consciousness could be seen in gender-based voting on gender issues, and by speeches by women in the Duma. The results were not nearly as clear-cut as I had expected.

Now, in the last chapter of this thesis; the contradiction that has emerged over the course of this work remains: women publicly articulate a view of female differentness and public and media pronouncements about this view supersede comments about the importance of party solidarity. At the same time, women act as if that is not central to their understanding of the political world.

While it may be said that women are influenced by gender more than any indicator other than party, particularly on gender issues, the evidence does not support the unequivocal acceptance of my hypothesis: that 'gender-based' behaviour is indicative of some type of 'gender consciousness' or 'gender solidarity'.

In the first set of laws I studied, women generally voted with the men in their party. In the second set of laws, I expected to see the reverse, and certainly in votes for those laws gender was an influencing factor. But that influence did not regularly and reliably supersede party identification, nor was it as absolute as I had expected.

Debates showed the same trend. While women did participate more in gender specific debates, their participation was not as high as was expected. Even on social policy issues, to which many women have publicly ascribed importance, women still do not participate in debate as much as men, with the exception of children's issues.

Even when women participated in debates and articulated gender interests, they voiced no solidarity with other women in parliament.

Nevertheless, certain observations about women can be made. First, women are far more participatory in parliamentary voting than men, regardless of the law at hand. More than 77% of women voted five times or more on the first set of laws, compared to only 54% of men. On the gender specific laws, more than 85% of women voted five times or more out of the seven votes, while only 58% of men did. Moreover, every female deputy voted at least once in each section, whereas 90% of male deputies did the same during the period studied. Secondly, women are more likely to support a new bill than men. This was the case in all fourteen votes.

However, differences appeared among women as well. For example, women elected on party lists and women elected in constituencies demonstrated a far greater incidence of voting cleavage than men from the two groups. Party list women were generally more loyal to the party line than their male colleagues, while single mandate women voted differently from one another more often than did single seat males.

Age also seems to have played some role in voting, as women over 50 were nearly always the age and sex group most willing to support new bills, while men under 40 were nearly always the most reluctant to do so.

The second part of this project; to explain why these differences emerged, was far more problematic. However, here too certain observations become apparent.

First, women are highly sex-segregated on Duma committees. Not only do they hold more positions on 'women's sphere' committees (health and women), only on these committees do they play leadership roles.

As a consequence, female participation in Duma debates was far lower than I had originally anticipated. In hindsight, an examination of Duma Committee meetings would have been far more informative about women's voting motivations. However, even if these documents were published, gaining access to them would have been difficult.

Moreover, I did not expect the high level of non-participation by all deputies in Duma debates, just as I did not expect the very high incidence of non-voting in the Duma, making motivating factors harder to discern.

Consequently, the problem laid out briefly in my introduction still remains; how to reconcile female deputies collectively and publicly held view of women as different and more capable in certain areas than men with the predominance of party-based voting in the Duma?

Based on the evidence obtained through my research, I now conclude that this contradiction stems from the overlay of traditional *societal* ideas about women as better nurturers and better compromisers onto the newly emerging public, political sphere.²²⁷ For example, Committee chairs had to be approved by the Duma as a whole, and men and women both agreed that women should direct the Committees they do: health and women and family issues. Women not holding chairs also chose their committees, as the men did theirs, which may be indicative of a general consensus on the proper or appropriate roles of women and men in public life.

²²⁷ This conclusion mirrors the conclusion of a study of women parliamentarians in Saint Petersburg in 1994. Anna Temkin, one of the study's researchers, noted in her summary of the study, entitled 'Entering Politics: Women's Ways, Gender Ideas and Contradictions of Reality' that "A contradiction exists between the traditional or stereotyped gender ideals of active women, their egalitarian (or gender-neutral) behaviour in the public sphere and their self-image. The characteristics of political women are articulated according to a traditional understanding of gender difference." (in *Women's Voices in Russia Today*, eds. Rotkorch, A, and Haavio-Mannila, E., Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, England, 1996, 206-233, p. 207)

Consequently, women speak in terms of gender difference in the media, but these actions appear to be a manifestation of a shared view among women and men about women's different abilities and interests. "A woman is the hearth of the home, she must go into politics in order to create. Not to call for demonstrations, but to build as at home."²²⁸

In retrospect, the various streams of literature used to provide a theoretical framework for understanding female political behaviour were woefully inadequate. Traditional literature on political cleavages is not helpful, as gender cleavages really are not as pronounced as party ones. Nor do I believe that feminist discourse in Russia is an adequate tool to understand these problems. Feminist scholars and female politicians are speaking different languages; articulating different goals and different ways of achieving them.

As for the prospects of future female political representation - that is an interesting question indeed. Under communism, the state enroached upon the activities of the individual, and the private sphere became the public sphere. So whether this transposition of the private sphere of the home onto public political life is a natural continuation of this earlier trend (i.e., because the home became part of public life, so too is a woman's duty in the home a matter of public life) or a break with this trend (i.e., women are taking back the private sphere into their own hands), I am still unsure. After having done this research, I suspect that taking up 'women's issues' publicly is the most common way for women to find a space to articulate their political views in the public arena of post-Soviet Russia.

²²⁸ Female participant in the study by Anna Ternkin, 'Entering Politics: Women's Ways, Gender Ideas and Contradictions of Reality', *Women's Voices in Russia Today*, eds. Rotkorch, A, and Haavio-Mannila, E., Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, England, 1996, 206-233, p. 220

This potential conflict between form (what women say) and substance (what women mean) will likely continue to develop in Russia as feminist scholars improve their organizational and educational abilities, as female politicians settle into the new political structure, and as millions of highly educated women weather through this transformative time.

Appendix A - The Database

An extensive database forms the basis for the research presented in this thesis. This database provided the analysis of deputy affiliations in Chapter Four and all the analysis of voting behaviour in Chapters Five and Six. Through this database, I was able to test the first hypothesis posed in my introductory chapter: that female parliamentarians during the Fifth State Duma voted together on issues of particular interest to women, and differently on issues of general interest. Consequently, the database was constructed to answer questions about voting behaviour by locating the influencing factors for voting.

The database was built on two sources, as well as the author's input. The first was biographical information about the deputies, which was published by the Institute for Legislation and Comparative Jurisprudence under the Auspices of the Government of the Russian Federation in a book called *Vybory v Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu: pravovye problemy* (Federal'noe Sobranie: Sovet Federatsii, Gosudarstvennaia Duma Spravochnik, Izdatel'stvo Vek Publishers, Moscow, 1994). All vote counts were taken from Official Duma records, as reported in the daily *Federal'noe Sobranie, stenogramma zasedanii - Gosudarstvennaia Duma*. This record is published by EastView Publications in Minneapolis every day the Duma sits. Any information added by the author is based on these sources.

The database was constructed using Clarisworks, a Macintosh-based product, and was designed by the author. Here follows a sample record of the database and an explanation of the categories it contains:

Name	Name			Problem	Problem
Party	Party	Party2	Party2	Year of Birth	Year of Birth
Sex	Sex			Age cohort	Age cohort

Election Method	Election Method
Voting District	Voting District
Region	Region
Nationality	Nationality
Education	Education

	Former People's Deputy	Former People's
Previous Employment	Previous Employment	

Employment Category	Employment Category	Employment Category2
Duma Committees	Duma Committees	
Position	Position	
Duma Committees2	Duma Committees2	
Position2	Position2	
Duma Committees3	Duma Committees3	
Position3	Position3	
Other	Other	

VOTES

	Vote 1	Vote 2	Vote 2	Vote 3	Vote 3
Vote 4	Vote 4	Vote 5	Vote 5	Vote 6	Vote 6
Vote 7	Vote 7	Vote 8	Vote 8	Vote 9	Vote 9
Vote 10	Vote 10	Vote 11	Vote 11	Vote 12	Vote 12
Vote 13	Vote 13	Vote 14	Vote 14	Vote 15	Vote 15
			Vote 16		

Name: A self-evident category - the official name of the deputy

Problem: This category denoted any change during the course of the mandate, and was used to identify those deputies who quit, who died or who were killed, as well as those deputies who were elected in by-elections or in the late elections in Tatarstan, who began their term in during the Duma's two year mandate.

Party: This category lists the Deputy's *primary* party affiliation, or the party to which he or she was registered on the Duma's first day, January 13, 1994

Party 2: This category lists the Deputy's *secondary* affiliation, or the party to which s/he subsequently belonged, or to which s/he concurrently belonged, which was listed second according to the source materiel.

Year of Birth: Self-explanatory.

Sex: Male or Female

Age Cohort: Deputies were divided into six groups, or cohorts, based on age: 21-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60, 61-70 and 70 plus. Admittance to cohort was based on deputy age as of January 1, 1994, assuming no deputy had a birthday on that day.

Election Method: This category listed whether the deputy was voted in on a party list or in a single member constituency.

Voting District: This lists the actual administrative district from whence the deputies won their votes. No deputies from party lists were included in this category.

Region: This section divided the nation into eleven different sections, in order to provide a more useful regional analysis of the country's vote. Divisions were: North, Northwest, Central, Central Black Earth, Volga-Viatka, Volga, North Caucasus, Urals, West Siberia, East Siberia and the Far East. Divisions were made according to the divisions set up by Robert Ortung and Scott Parish in

their article 'Duma Votes Reflect North-South Divide', in Transitions, February 23, 1995.

Nationality: Although most deputies were ethnic Russians, or identified themselves as such in the source material, this category also listed another nationalities when a deputy claimed membership into one.

Education: As listed in the *Spravochnik*, deputy education was classified into higher, middle, technical, or none.

Former People's Deputy: This category listed deputies that had been a USSR Congress of People's Deputies, or a Russian Deputy prior to the December 1993 elections.

Previous Employment: This category listed the previous work experience deputies had had. It listed up to three previous jobs.

Employment Category 1&2: These were categories created by the author based on the employment history given. All deputies were put into at least one of sixteen employment category, although many, because of the interdisciplinary nature of their work, were listed in two categories. The categories were: Politician (only if their full-time work constituted political activity); Bureaucrat; Professional (Lawyers, doctors and consultants); Artist, Writer or Musician; Other intelligentsia; Agricultural Manager; Financial Manager; Scientist or Manager in a scientific field; Other manager; Teacher, Professor or School Director; Social, political or economic scholar; Private businessperson; Company director; Media; Military or law enforcement and Other (including a race car driver, a test pilot, and unemployed deputies, among others),

Duma Committees: There were twenty-three Duma Committees and one Commission on Mandates. The twenty-three committees were: On legislation and legal reform, On work and social support, On education, culture and science, On ecology, On the protection of health, On women, family and youth affairs, On international affairs, On the budget, banks, taxes and finance, On economic policy, On property, privatization and economic activities, On agrarian questions, On industry, construction, transport and electricity, On natural

resources and their uses, On defense, On security, On the CIS and our compatriots, On nationalities, On State Duma Work, On geopolitical questions, On local self-government; On information policy and communications and On regional and social organizations. Further, almost all committees had sub-committees. Committee and sub-committee membership was noted, and several deputies belonged to two or three.

Positions: Committee and sub-committee positions: Chair, Vice-Chair, Member or Secretary were noted.

Other: This category was a catch-all one, designed to provide a place for information that did not fit anywhere else. It generally explained the reason, if given, behind the entry in the **Problem** category.

Votes: All votes in this database come from roll call voting lists in the Duma's daily publication. Each vote's title, reading and date is listed below.

One: The 1995 Federal Budget; First Reading; December 21, 1994

Two: On the introduction into force of Part One of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation; Second Reading; October 21, 1994

Three: On the Fundamental Voting Rights of the Citizens of the Russian Federation

Four: On Economic Support to Regional (Municipal) Newspapers: Agree to an earlier version struck down by the President of the Russian Federation: October 1, 1995

Five: On the Federal Organs of the Security Services in the Russian Federation; Third Reading, February 22, 1995

Six: On Financial-Industrial Groups; First Reading: July 20, 1995

Seven: On the Election of Deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; In version provided by conciliatory commission; June 9, 1995

Eight: On the Family Code of the Russian Federation; Second Reading; October 18, 1995

Nine: On the Social Protection of Invalids in the Russian Federation; Agree to earlier, passed version; October 6, 1995

Ten: On the introduction of Changes and Amendments to the Law of the Russian Federation "On Education"; agree to earlier, passed version that was subsequently struck down by the President of the Russian Federation; October 11, 1995

Eleven: On the introduction of Changes and Amendments to the Law of the Russian Federation "On the Employment of the Population of the Russian Federation"; agree to earlier, passed version that was subsequently struck down by the President of the Russian Federation; October 11, 1995

Twelve: On State Support to Citizens with Children; First Reading; December 9, 1994

Thirteen: On the Order of Indexation and Calculation of Pensions, First Reading; July 19, 1995

Fourteen: On the Increase of the Minimum Pension, the Order of Indexation and the recalculation of State Pensions in the Russian Federation; October 13, 1995

Fifteen & Sixteen: Section fifteen and sixteen actually calculated the number of times out of seven (each section) the deputy had voted, giving an overall indication of participation rates for different groups.

Appendix B - The Surveys

The surveys, unlike the database, were designed to provide qualitative answers in order to test the second hypothesis in this thesis - that women vote along gender lines on issues that affect women in particular *because they are women*, i.e., they are motivated primarily by gender. In order to test this very speculative proposition, the author wrote and sent a questionnaire or survey by fax to seventeen female deputies. These deputies sat in the Fifth State Duma and were re-elected by the Sixth State Duma: Tat'iana Astrakhankina (ind-CPRF), Ekaterina Lakhova (WofR), Anna Vlasova (ind-WofR/NRP), Zhanna Lozinskaia (WofR), Alevtina Aparina (CPRF), Ella Pamfilova (ind-RC), Tamara Gudima (CPRF), Irina Khakamada (ind-UofD12), Tamara Zlotnikova (ind-Yabloko), Nina Zatsepina (ind-RP), Nina Krivel'skaia (LDPR), Tamara Pletneva (ind-CPRF), Tat'iana Yarygina (Yabloko), Oksana Dmitrievna (Yabloko), Liubov Oleinik (CPRF), Svetlana Orlova (WofR) and Tat'iana Nesterenko (ind-NRP). These surveys were carried out between late May and late June, 1997. Surveys were sent out in two rounds, as no one replied to my first round of faxes. Consequently, about three weeks after the first faxes were sent out, they were all sent out again with a revised introductory letter. Five women responded to this second set of faxes.

The questions in this survey all had an open-ended component, although some provided a list of options from which to choose. This mix of open-ended and option lists with an other category was designed to elicit the most comprehensive response from deputies; close-ended response surveys tend to miss critical information, while respondents are generally unwilling to complete completely open-ended response surveys, as these type of surveys require more input from the participant. To ensure

confidentiality, all deputies were all assigned a random number to identify the surveys received. However, all five respondents agreed to have their names used in this work.

Further, the questions are all opinion questions, as factual information is generally best studied through factual records such as Duma voting, rather than respondent memories of actions taken more than two years ago. Moreover, as this survey was designed to elicit opinion questions, question nine was used as a marker to see if perception (what the deputies remembered about how they had voted) and reality (how deputies actually voted) matched.

This small test actually hints at a larger phenomenon observed in the course of researching this thesis and a phenomenon the author tried to measure with this survey. Many women parliamentarians vociferously protest that they are not feminists, yet many simultaneously express views that would be seen as a 'female consciousness' (see Chapter Eight for more on this paradox). Consequently, this survey intersperses repeated questions on gender versus party affiliation with questions, like numbers six, seven and eight, on gender affiliation, before returning to party-line voting questions. Consequently, I hoped to see whether the answer to question eleven differed from question five and whether women saw a conflict between their political goals and those of their party.

Here follows a copy of the questionnaire (in English) sent to these deputies (the originals were set in Russian).

Questionnaire

Number _____

1. In your opinion, which bill or issue was most important during the Fifth State Duma?
2. In the opinion of the party to which you belong, which bill or issue was most important during the Fifth State Duma?
3. From the following list of issues, which, in the opinion of the political party you represent, is most important (1-most important; 9 - least important)
 - ☐ press freedoms
 - ☐ international affairs
 - ☐ state funds and the federal budget
 - ☐ maternity and children's issues
 - ☐ the creation of a market economy (taxes, privatization, etc.)
 - ☐ social protection of the population
 - ☐ the creation of a democratic society
 - ☐ other issues: _____
4. And in your opinion?
 - ☐ press freedoms
 - ☐ international affairs
 - ☐ state funds and the federal budget
 - ☐ maternity and children's issues
 - ☐ the creation of a market economy (taxes, privatization, etc.)
 - ☐ social protection of the population
 - ☐ the creation of a democratic society
 - ☐ other issues: _____
5. Duma voting along party lines is:
 - ☐ very important ☐ important ☐ somewhat important
 - ☐ rarely important ☐ not important at all
 Why?
6. Is the social protection system in Russia adequate or inadequate? On what factors is your opinion based?
7. In your opinion, do women have interests in common in Russia (child rearing, social protection, peace in Russia, etc.....) What are those interests?
8. Do you believe that women deputies in the Duma should vote and work together? Why do you agree or disagree with this statement?
9. Did you vote for or against the federal budget in 1995? Why?
10. You voted for/against (depends on recipient) the Family Code (vote date: 18/10/95). Why did you vote this way?

11. In general, with whom did you regularly vote during the course of the Fifth State Duma?

☐ with my party

☐ with my constituency

☐ with other women

☐ independently

☐ with members of my profession

☐ with: _____

Do you have any other comments?

May I cite your answers by name in my thesis?

☐ Yes ☐ No

Would you like to receive a copy of the results of this study (in English)

☐ Yes ☐ No

Thank you very much. The information you have provided is very important and will help me to better understand the Russian political system.

Appendix C - Figure Compilation

Figure 1 (Source: Database constructed by author; see Appendix A)

Figure 2 (Source: Database constructed by author; see Appendix A)

Figure 3 (Source: Database constructed by author; see Appendix A)

Figure 4 (Source: Database constructed by author; see Appendix A)

Figure 5 (Source: Database constructed by author; see Appendix A)

Figure 6 (Source: Database constructed by author; see Appendix A)

Figure 7 (Source: Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, No. 75 (December 21, 1994))

Figure 8 (Source: Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, No. 58 (October 21, 1994))

Figure 9 (Source: Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, (October 26, 1994))

Figure 10 (Source: Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, No. 128 (October 11, 1995))

Figure 11 (Source: Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, No. 88 (February 22, 1995))

Figure 12 (Source: Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, No. 121 (July 20, 1995))

Figure 13 (Source: Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, No. 109 (June 9, 1995))

Figure 14 (Source: Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, No. 130 (October 18, 1995))

Figure 15 (Source: Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii, No. 127 (October 6, 1995))

Figure 16 (Source: *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii*, No. 128 (October 11, 1995))

Figure 17 (Source: *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii*, No. 70 (December 9, 1994))

Figure 18 (Source: *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii*, No. 120 (July 19, 1995))

Figure 19 (Source: *Gosudarstvennaia Duma: stenogramma zasedanii*, No. 129 (October 13, 1995))

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