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**UNDERSTANDING A MISUNDERSTANDING
DEMOCRACY AND DIALOGUE IN THE WEST VS. NON-WEST CONTROVERSY
OVER THE UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS**

By
R. Murat Özbek

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science
Carleton University
Ottawa, Canada
August 10, 2000
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in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Chair, Department of Political Science

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August 10, 2000

To my parents,
Eymen and Ferit Özbek,
and to my brother,
Ufuk Gültekin.

Without their unconditional love, trust, and support this thesis could not have been written.

Abstract

In June 1993, the United Nations' Second World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna witnessed a clash between the American Government and the Governments of the Asia-Pacific region, over the universality of human rights and democracy. Despite the fact that the Vienna Conference ended with a unanimous endorsement of the universality and indivisibility of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, this controversy continued to inform both governmental and academic discourses in both North American and Asian countries. This thesis focuses on the democratic theoretical foundations of this controversy in an attempt to find out whether an underlying basis of agreement between the positions espoused by the Asian and American governments during the Vienna Conference can be uncovered.

Textual analysis and interpretation of documentary and theoretical material reveal three major findings: First, the criticisms that the Asian governments leveled against the Western governments, as well as the Bangkok Declaration they adopted resonate in important respects and with a few reservations with the discursive concept of political legitimacy, elaborated in contemporary Western political thought by Juergen Habermas. Second, the persistence of the controversy over universality, even after the unanimous adoption of the Vienna Declaration and program of action can partially be explained by a misunderstanding on the part of the American government, of the resonance of this democratic theoretical common ground, in the Asian governments' Bangkok Declaration. Third, this misunderstanding can be understood in terms of the conceptual differences between two distinct theoretical approaches to questions of democracy and democratization. These two distinct approaches are the Schumpeterian-empiricist approach which jettisons normative questions of justice and legitimacy from the definition of democracy, and the normative approach espousing an emancipatory, egalitarian and solidaristic conception of justice and rationalistic conception of political legitimacy.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	i
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ii
CHAPTER 1 UNDERSTANDING A MISUNDERSTANDING	1
1. BACKGROUND	1
1.1. <i>The World Conference</i>	1
1.2. <i>The Controversy</i>	3
2. THE PROBLEM	8
3. TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONTROVERSY OVER UNIVERSALITY	15
3.1. <i>Cultural Incompatibility</i>	15
3.2. <i>Cultural Common-ground and Dialogue</i>	19
3.3. <i>Two World Historical Paths to the Future</i>	28
4. THE THESIS	30
4.1. <i>Understanding/Misunderstanding</i>	31
4.2. <i>Colonialist Mentality as a Blind Prejudice</i>	38
4.3. <i>American Exceptionalism as a Blind Prejudice</i>	44
5. OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS	52
CHAPTER 2 EMPIRICAL THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY (I): THE POST-WAR GENERATION	55
1. INTRODUCTION	55
1.1. <i>The Scope of the Chapter</i>	55
1.2. <i>The Substance of the Chapter</i>	56
1.3. <i>The Outline of the Chapter</i>	58
2. THE ORIGINS: SCHUMPETER IN NORTH AMERICA	59
2.1. <i>Schumpeter's Polemic Against the "Classical Doctrine of Democracy"</i>	60
2.2. <i>Schumpeter's "Another Theory of Democracy"</i>	62
2.3. <i>Schumpeter and other Continental Thinkers in North America</i>	67
2.4. <i>The Emergence of the Cold War as an Ideological Controversy</i>	72
2.5. <i>The Reception of Schumpeter by the American Political Science</i>	82
3. CONCEPTUALIZING DEMOCRACY AS THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE	86
3.1. <i>How can democracy be defined in an "operationally" meaningful way?</i>	86
3.2. <i>What is democracy?</i>	92
3.3. <i>How does democracy function?</i>	96

3.4. <i>What are the social and economic conditions of democracy?</i>	97
3.5. <i>What are the cultural and psychological basis of democracy?</i>	100
3.6. <i>How can the Rest of the World democratize?</i>	102
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION	110
CHAPTER 3 EMPIRICAL THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY (II): CRITICISMS AND REACTIONS	116
1. INTRODUCTION	116
1.1. <i>The Scope and Substance of the Chapter</i>	117
1.2. <i>The Outline of the Chapter</i>	119
2. IS "OUR WAY OF LIFE" THE DEMOCRATIC WAY OF LIFE?	120
2.1. <i>The End of Ideology or the Crises of Legitimacy?</i>	120
2.2. <i>Elitist and Neo-corporatist critiques of pluralism</i>	124
2.3. <i>Democracy and Citizen Participation</i>	128
2.4. <i>Democracy, State, and Capitalism</i>	134
2.5. <i>Neo-Pluralist Discovery of Marxism</i>	137
2.6. <i>(Post-)Marxist Discovery of Pluralism</i>	140
2.7. <i>Democratization: State, Civil Society, and the Cosmopolis</i>	154
2.8. <i>An Interim Summary</i>	160
3. THE RETURN OF SCHUMPETER IN THE FORM OF A NEO-CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY	162
3.1. <i>An Excess of Democracy?</i>	162
3.2. <i>The Rehabilitation of Minimal Democracy in American Politics</i>	164
3.3. <i>The Rehabilitation of Minimal Democracy in Development Studies</i>	166
4. MINIMAL DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY	173
5. CONCLUSION	181
CHAPTER 4 THREE NORMATIVE APPROACHES TO DEMOCRACY	185
1. INTRODUCTION	185
1.1. <i>The Scope of the Chapter</i>	187
1.2. <i>The Substance of the Chapter</i>	190
1.3. <i>Outline of the Chapter</i>	190
2. THE SENSE OF THE REAL	191
3. DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE	202
3.1. <i>The Content of Democratic Justice</i>	202
3.2. <i>The Principles of Democratic Justice</i>	207
3.3. <i>Sociological Foundations of Democratic Justice</i>	210
3.4. <i>Democracy and Justice: An interim summary</i>	215

4. DEMOCRACY AND DIVERSITY	215
4.1. Rawls' idea of an overlapping consensus	216
4.2. Held and "The Commitment to Democracy"	220
4.3. Habermas and the Discourse Theory	221
5. CONCLUSION	231
CHAPTER 5 DEMOCRACY AND DIALOGUE IN GLOBAL POLITICS	233
1. INTRODUCTION	233
1.1. The Substance of the Chapter	234
1.2. The Outline of the Chapter	234
2. RAWLS AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL TOLERATION	235
3. HABERMAS AND THE GLOBAL PUBLIC SPHERE	245
4. HELD AND COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRATIZATION	249
CONCLUSIONS	256
REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY	261

CHAPTER 1

UNDERSTANDING A MISUNDERSTANDING

1. Background

What does it mean to talk about the universality of human rights and democracy in the culturally diversified and globally inter-connected world of the late twentieth century? Rich with moral philosophical connotations, political theoretical implications, and socio-anthropological resonances though it is, this is not, or to be more precise, *not only* an academic question. In the Second World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, June 1993), this question stood at the center of a complex world political controversy between the American government and the governments of the Asia-Pacific region.

1.1. The World Conference

The Second World Conference on Human Rights was convened pursuant to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 45/155 of 18 December 1990. The objective of the World Conference was "to review and assess the progress that had been made in the field of human rights, and to identify obstacles to further progress in this area and ways in which they could be overcome" (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 92). In the UNGA resolution 45/155 member states agreed that the World Conference should serve as a forum to debate the possibilities of improving and expanding the UN's human rights system with a view on long term objectives, rather than as a forum evaluating individual member states' domestic performances in the field of human rights.

Pursuant to the UNGA resolution, the preparatory phase of the conference consisted of three regional inter-governmental meetings and four meetings of the

Preparatory Committee. The regional meetings were held by the governments of the Asian, Latin American and Caribbean, and African regions. The European, North American, Australian, and New Zealand governments declined to hold regional meetings. The Preparatory Committee was a general membership body constituted to draft a provisional agenda and a final document to be subsequently adopted at the World conference. In addition to these UNGA-resolution based preparatory activities, there were two more events that preceded the World Conference and had an impact on its outcome: The Jakarta Summit meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Countries; and the parallel (or satellite) meetings of the non-governmental human rights and development organizations (NGOs). The NGOs assembled both on a regional basis in San Jose, Bangkok, Tunis, Washington, and Cairo, and on a global basis, shortly before the World Conference, in Vienna.

In the preparatory phase of the World Conference, the parallel activities of the non-governmental human rights and development organizations signified their first coordinated effort to come together from various parts of the world in an attempt to deliberate and formulate a common understanding on values, goals, and required policies to protect and promote human rights at national, regional, and global levels.¹ If establishing an inter-national and inter-regional dialogue at a non-governmental level is

¹ Background information on the preparation of the parallel NGO activities and an account of the NGO contributions to the Vienna Conference can be found in F. Azam's (1993) "Non-Governmental Organizations at the UN-World Conference on Human Rights". For a more general discussion of the international human rights NGO's roles in the functioning of the UN's human rights machinery, see Rachel Brett's (1995) "The Role and Limits of Human Rights NGOs at the United Nations".

taken as measure, these NGO meetings were highly successful.² At the inter-governmental level, however, the preparatory phase of the World Conference witnessed the emergence of the above mentioned world-political controversy between the American government and the governments of the Asian region.

1.2. The Controversy

In the regional preparatory meeting (Bangkok, March-April 1993), the governments of the Asia-Pacific Region affirmed the universality of the norms and principles contained in the Universal Declaration. They stressed the need to give equal and balanced emphasis to the realization of the rights contained in the two covenants on social, economic, and cultural rights, and civil and political rights (Bangkok Declaration 1993, 2). They listed social, economic, and cultural under-development (Bangkok Declaration 1993, 4,5), and "terrorism in all its forms and manifestations" (Bangkok Declaration 1993, 5) as the major obstacles "to further progress in the field of human rights." In working towards the elimination of these obstacles and creating more humane living conditions for people living in impoverished regions of the world, the Asian governments stressed that the World Conference should take into account the particularities of regional and national economic and political realities, and the diversity of cultural, religious and historical backgrounds. In this framework the Asian governments proposed a more flexible and dialogical approach to international human

² In an article evaluating the outcome of the Vienna Conference Kevin Boyle reports: "Quite the most optimistic outcome of the World Conference was the depth of common understanding on the level of values, on goals, and required policies, expressed by human rights activists from both the South and the North of the world.... The common cause made across the globe was a victory for the human rights idea" (Boyle 1995, 81).

rights “within the context of a dynamic and evolving process of norm-setting.” This approach, they argued, must be based on mutual respect, cooperation and consensus among governments from different cultural, religious, and historical backgrounds, and socio-economic development levels, and not on confrontation and unilateral imposition of the incompatible values of one culture or nation on the others (Bangkok Declaration 1993, 2,4). In this process, they suggested, the international community should investigate ways and means of transforming the “neo-colonial” structure of the world economy. This structure, they argued, perpetuates and widens the gap between the North and South, the rich and poor nations (Bangkok Declaration 1993, 4,5).

Asian governments criticized the American government and its Western allies for using existing norms, standards, institutions and mechanisms of international human rights law, and existing practices of extending development assistance to the less developed nations selectively, as ideological and financial levers to fortify their particular, non-generalizable economic-military interests in world politics, rather than because of democratic and humanitarian concerns with enhancing social peace and justice around the world.³ In this context, they demanded that the Western governments observe the principles contained in the UN-charter, recognize the sovereign equality, territorial

³ Thus for example, in his official statement during the Vienna Conference, Liu Huaqiu, Head of the Chinese delegation, expressed the following views: “The views that human rights questions goes beyond boundary and that the principle of non-interference in other’s internal affairs is not applicable to it and actions on these premises are, in essence, a form of power politics. They run counter to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and to the lofty cause of the protection of human rights” (Huagiu 1993, 215). An anonymous article published in People’s Daily after the Vienna Conference elaborated on this theme in following words: “It must be emphasized that a lot of the fuss over human rights has nothing to do with human rights at all, but is merely a smoke screen for legalizing interference in other countries’ internal affairs, openly practicing hegemonism and power politics and disseminating Western values world wide” (A north south struggle over human rights 1997, 7).

integrity, and political independence of the member states from non-European historical and cultural backgrounds and regions, and refrain from interfering in their internal affairs (Bangkok Declaration 1993, 2).

For its part, the American Government defended a staunchly universalistic position, declining to consider the significance of national and regional particularities in setting, interpreting and implementing the global norms and standards of international human rights law. In this framework the American government criticized arguments purporting the diversity of socio-cultural contexts, religious traditions, and historical backgrounds as pretexts allowing “vocal human rights abusers” to evade international scrutiny for poor human rights records and authoritarian political practices.⁴ The American Government opposed what it interpreted to be an attempt to subordinate civil and political rights to economic, social and cultural rights, arguing that the realization of the goal of political democratization in the short-run is the most certain way to the realization of the goal of socio-economic development in the long-run.⁵ To counter-act

⁴ Christina Cerna, an international lawyer on secondment from the Organization of American States to the United Nations Center for Human Rights, reports the American government's position during the world conference as follows: “The US Administration dismissed the argument that any definition of human rights should consider regional social and cultural differences. It countered that such a position is a screen behind which authoritarian governments can perpetuate abuses” (Cerna 1994, 741).

⁵ Thus, an internal US-memo, circulated before the Conference, stated that “Washington must guard against efforts to particularize human rights.” It warned that “vocal human rights violators could undermine the success of the World Conference with attempts to: (1) dilute universal recognition of human rights standards by emphasizing a variety of contexts to justify exceptions, (2) deflect international scrutiny from poor human rights records by claiming that such scrutiny constitutes a violation of national sovereignty, (3) subordinate civil and political rights to economic and cultural rights, (4) make human rights improvements dependent upon availability of economic aid” (Vienna Showdown 1993, 16). Similarly, in its “recommendations” to the Preparatory Committee the American Government gave voice to its policy of prioritizing civil and political rights over economic, social and cultural rights in the following words: “we urge the Preparatory Committee to keep in mind the fundamental importance of effectively guaranteeing and fully implementing civil and political rights. We would be particularly

the hidden motives of “vocal human rights abusers,” the American Government insisted that the governments of the Asia-Pacific region, as well as other Latin American and African governments who lent support to the Asian position, ought to agree on an unequivocal and strong endorsement of the universality of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.⁶

The Vienna Conference ended with the unanimous adoption of the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action by the UN-members. The Vienna Declaration gave expression to the following compromises reached between the Asian and American governments: a strong and repetitive endorsement of the universality, non-selectivity, and objectivity of all human rights and fundamental freedoms (Vienna Declaration 1993, 449), an affirmation of the indivisibility of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights (Vienna Declaration 1993, 450, 453), a recognition of the significance of cultural, religious, and historical particularities in setting and implementing the standards of international human rights law (Vienna Declaration 1993, 450), a recognition of the right to development as a universal human right (Vienna Declaration 1993, 450), and an expression of commitment to a model of democracy which guarantees to peoples freedom to participate in all aspects of their lives, determine their social, economic, and cultural systems, and pursue their social, economic, cultural and political development (Vienna Declaration 1993, 450).

interested in exploring which existing United Nations mechanisms -- or new proposals -- might best help member States to achieve this goal” (United Nations General Assembly, 1991)

⁶ In an article published in the New York Times, Alan Riding reports that the first priority of the American Governments was “that the Conference issue[d] a strong endorsement of the universality of human rights and reject[ed] the idea that such rights can be measured differently in some countries” (Riding 1993, A3).

The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action was not, however, the last word in the controversy between the Asian governments and the American government. The agreed-upon compromise formulations of the Vienna Declaration in fact hid profound disagreements, and unresolved conceptual and political disputes on the substantive issues that had informed this controversy during the preparatory phases of the Vienna Conference. That this was indeed the case became evident when, in the aftermath of the Vienna Conference, the American Government and the Asian Governments staged the same controversy at various UN-forums and exchanged the same arguments and counter-arguments, criticisms and counter-criticisms, on the same issues. Two such occasions were the UNGA debates on the mandate of the newly created post of the UN-High Commissioner for human rights and the fiftieth session of the Human Rights Commission. In the first case, the controversy was settled, rather than resolved, by the American Government's agreement to trim the fact finding powers of the High Commissioner, in return for the Asian Governments' agreement to adopt a language that would allow the extension of development aid to be made conditional upon improvements in human rights records (United Nations General Assembly, 1993b). In the second case, the Chairman of the Commission, Peter Van Palthe complained that the work of the commission was hampered by the disputes which have been believed to be settled at the World Conference (Commission confronts new realities 1994, 43-6).

The UN's member states adopted the compromise formulations of the Vienna Declaration unanimously. The non-governmental human rights and development organizations from every region of the world used the Vienna processes as an opportunity

to establish the foundations of a promising dialogue and cooperation on human rights issues across the world. Yet since the Vienna Conference, it has become a commonplace in world political discourses to talk about the existence of an "Asian challenge" to the Western conceptions of universal human rights.

2. The Problem

What is the nature and significance of this "Asian Challenge" in contemporary world politics? How can we explain the perplexing persistence of the controversy about the universality of human rights in world political discourses, despite the unanimous adoption of the Vienna Declaration and Program of action by all governments from all regions of the world? Can this controversy be resolved? If so, how? These are the fundamental questions that motivate the discussion presented in this thesis.

In the literature on international relations we can find a number of well-known factors that can and do help us explain the persistence of the controversy over universality even after the unanimous adoption of the Vienna Declaration. Most notably these factors are associated with the strategic expediencies of the struggle for power in pursuit of national interests in world politics,⁷ structural inequalities in, and consequent political

⁷ In the post-second world war literature on international relations, E.H. Carr's (1939) Twenty Years of Crises and Hans Morgenthau's (1948) Politics Among Nations are credited with being seminal attempts introducing strategic struggle for power in pursuit of national interests as the building block of a conceptual framework designed to understand, explain, and act upon international political conflicts. The academic literature discussing, analyzing, and criticizing, advocating, and employing the "realist" approach to studying and practicing international politics is of enormous proportions. Among numerous meta-theoretical mappings that have been published in the last fifty years, Martin Griffiths' (1992) Idealism, Realism and International Politics remains to be the most balanced critical survey of the conceptual and practical weaknesses and strengths of the realist paradigm. For an insightful discussion of what it means to talk about realism in international politics, see Berki's (1981) On Realism.

disputes over the global distribution of economic resources between the Industrialized Northern and developing Southern regions of the world,⁸ and the tendency of world governments' to use the international forums of open diplomacy, strategically, to appease, manipulate and/or mislead the global public opinion.⁹

Without denying the significance, relevance, and reality of any of these factors, in this thesis I focus on the conceptual foundations of the controversy over the universality of human rights in the theory of democracy, in an attempt to find out whether an underlying basis of agreement between the "Asian" and "Western" positions can be uncovered. This attempt is motivated by the following understanding: There are a number of objective global problems that threaten not merely the survival of the human species on earth, but more fundamentally, the very physical existence of the earth -- the planet. These problems include, *inter alia*, the proliferation of conventional and nuclear mass-destruction technology, environmental issues associated with ecological degradation,

⁸ Among numerous works which has drawn the attention of the English-speaking readers to these structural inequalities in the organization of the global political economy, Frank's (1967) Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, and Cardoso's (1971) "Dependency and Development in Latin America" can be considered as the pioneers. A similar criticism found expression in Wallerstein's (1974) "The rise and future demise of the world capitalist system: concepts for comparative analysis." For a thoughtful critique of Wallerstein's "world system" theory, see Brenner's (1977) "The origins of capitalist development: A critique of neo-smithian Marxism." Mason's (1997) Development and Disorder: A History of the Third World Since 1945 presents a comprehensive and up to date review of this literature.

⁹ The criticism that government delegates use the open diplomatic forums of the United Nations as a public show-case finds expression, *inter alia*, in the works of such well-known students of the UN politics as Kaufman (1981 216-7; 1991, 133), Luard (1994, 57-61), and Baehr and Gordenker (1993, 24). While these authors express this criticism in the hope that the UN can be transformed into a forum of serious negotiations and debate, a retired Israeli ambassador to the UN, Eban, blames the idea of open diplomacy itself for the ineffectiveness of the inter-governmental debates at the UN forums: "open diplomacy and public debate do not work effectively in resolving international conflicts. Without phases of secrecy and avoidance of publicity, the resolution of a conflict is virtually impossible. The role of secrecy in negotiations is not a mere relic of tradition." (Eban 1995, 74)

violent ethnic and religious conflicts, and inequalities in the global distribution of wealth. In the academic literature on international relations, a number of scholars collaborate with the UN secretariat, non-governmental human rights and development organizations, and relevant agencies and departments of interested governments in investigating the possibilities of deepening, expanding, reforming, and strengthening the organizational structure of the UN in response to these existential problems of contemporary world politics.¹⁰ Yet, the persistence of the inter-governmental controversy over the universality of human rights adversely affects the possibilities of such a transformation of the UN-system. Therefore, a democratic theoretical attempt to overcome the estrangement between the Asian and Western positions on human rights issues must be carried out as an integral part of this process of global transformation.

In an attempt to contribute to such a reconciliation between the "Asian" and "Western" approaches to the universality of human rights, in this thesis, I draw attention to a little recognized, additional factor. *In addition to* well-researched, well-documented, and widely discussed political and economic "realities" of international politics in this thesis I seek to develop the argument that the persistence of the inter-governmental controversy over the universality of human rights can be explained, at a conceptual level,

¹⁰ The literature discussing the possibilities, need and necessity of the UN-reform is of enormous proportions. Baehr and Gordenker's (1993) and Luard's (1994) works not only present good introductory summaries of the functioning of the UN-system, but they also outline the institutional and organizational changes that are required to make the functioning of this system more effective. Carlsson's (1995) "The UN at fifty: a time to reform" and Kennedy and Russett's "Reforming the UN" provide succinct yet comprehensive reviews of the various practical issues involved in the UN-reform. Russett's (1996) "Ten Balances for Weighing the UN-reform proposals" presents a succinct yet comprehensive review of various reform proposals in circulation, as well as of the various practical difficulties and dilemmas that have to be overcome for the UN-reform to find a chance to proceed.

as the product of a misunderstanding by and between the Asian and American governments. This is a misunderstanding of a certain normative common ground on which the Asian Governments' criticisms of cultural and economic imperialism, and American Government's counter-criticism of political authoritarianism both rest. We can understand this misunderstanding in terms of the conceptual differences between two distinct theoretical approaches to questions of democracy and democratization: While the Asian governments' Bangkok Declaration resonates with what I call, for want of a better term, the enlightened normative approach, the American government's interpretation of and response to the Bangkok Declaration resonates with what I call, for want of a better term, the Schumpeterian-empiricist approach.

The origins of the enlightened normative approach can be traced to the works of the 17th and 18th century European political thinkers, such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant, whose ideas inspired the bourgeois revolutions in North America and Europe and influenced the thoughts of such influential 19th century thinkers as Mill, Bentham, Hegel and Marx. Authors associated with this normative approach draw inspiration from a conception of social justice which seeks to articulate, in one form or another, the three political ideals of the Enlightenment, namely freedom, equality, and societal solidarity for all, in a coherent and consistent conceptual structure. This enlightened conception of social justice also incorporates a notion of democratic legitimacy, which, in one form or another, makes the exercise of political authority dependent upon its *rational justifiability* from the point of view of those over whom this authority is exercised. In this framework, democracy is defined in terms of its enlightened claim to social justice and rationalistic

claim to political legitimacy. Democratization is conceptualized as a process of social, economic, cultural, political and institutional reform, in which this normative claim is implemented in actual practice. In the contemporary Western literature on democratic theory, this tradition of political thought is represented, *inter alia*, by three prominent thinkers: John Rawls, Juergen Habermas, and David Held.

The origins of the Schumpeterian-empiricist approach, in turn, can be traced to Joseph Schumpeter's influential 1943 work Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. This approach gained prominence in American political science in the immediate aftermath of the second world war and in the world political context of the Cold War. In the late 1960s and 1970s, this approach lost its credibility among the students of Western European and North American politics. Yet starting from late 1970s and early 1980s, in the world political context of the so-called "second Cold War", it found a renewed interest in the literature on questions of democracy and democratization in the developing societies. Authors associated with this approach take guidance from a positivistic theory of knowledge which allows them to jettison normative questions of social justice from the operational definition of democracy, and equate the legitimacy of the political authority to its *ad hoc* popularity among those over whom this authority is exercised. In this framework democracy is defined in terms of an empirical description which corresponds (or which is claimed to correspond) to the actually existing social, economic, cultural and political reality of the "Western European, North American, and Australasian" societies. Democratization is conceptualized as a process of "political development" in which this actually existing "Western" model of democracy is reproduced with the social, cultural,

economic, political, and institutional raw material found in the Asian, African, and Latin American societies. Among the contemporary authors who contribute to this literature are, *inter alia*, such well-known names, as Samuel Huntington, Seymour Martin Lipset, Juan Linz, Larry Diamond, and Guillermo O'Donnell.

Obviously we cannot say that when drafting the Bangkok Declaration, the Asian Governments were directly inspired by the philosophical debates conducted in the Western academic forums on the normative meaning of human rights and democracy, or on the relevance of the intellectual heritage of the tradition of enlightened political thought in contemporary world politics. Nor can we say that it was the empiricist and/or Schumpeterian students of democracy and democratization in the third world who directly dictated the American governments' interpretation of, and response to, the Asian Governments' Bangkok declaration. Nonetheless, for reasons which I clarify below in section 4, in this thesis I proceed on the assumption that by focusing on the conceptual differences between these two theoretical approaches to questions of democracy and democratization, we can gain a more insightful understanding of the inter-governmental controversy over the universality of human rights and democracy. More specifically by understanding the conceptual differences between these two theoretical approaches to democracy and democratization, we can gain a more profound insight into what exactly the Asian Governments objected to, when they objected "to the unilateral imposition of Western values", as well as what exactly the American government defended when it defended the universality of human rights and democracy during the Vienna Conference.

By developing such a democratic theoretical insight into the inter-governmental controversy over the universality of human rights, I also seek to present a clear and succinct understanding of the normative common ground that, I argue in this thesis, remained misunderstood during the Vienna Conference. To be more specific I argue that the Asian governments' criticisms of cultural and economic imperialism and the American governments' counter-criticisms of political authoritarianism both rest on the *dialogical* conception of democratic legitimacy and the *enlightened* conception of social justice. In the contemporary literature on democratic theory this conception of social justice and democratic legitimacy is expounded from within the conceptual horizons of the enlightened political thought in Habermas' work on discourse theory. Thus, one goal that I seek to achieve in this thesis is to clarify why Habermas' reconstruction and justification of the universality of human rights from the perspective of the discourse theory offers a more promising way to overcome the estrangement between the Western and non-Western positions in the inter-governmental UN forums.

Let me begin by clarifying the practical significance of, and conceptual issues involved in developing this argument by situating it within the context of the two divergent interpretations of the inter-governmental controversy about universality that we can find in the recent literature on the international politics of human rights.

3. Two Interpretations of the Controversy over Universality

3.1. Cultural Incompatibility

The first interpretation of the controversy about universality is associated with what I suggest to call, for want a better term, the “cultural incompatibility” school. Authors who write in this framework suggest that underlying the controversy staged between the American government and the governments of the Asian region during the Vienna Conference is a fundamental incompatibility between the ethical-political values by which the Asian societies live on the one hand, and the ideas, ideals, and aspirations associated with “human rights and democracy” that are intrinsic to the history and destiny of the ‘Western Civilization’ on the other. Samuel Huntington's influential Foreign Affairs article, first published shortly after the Vienna Conference, and two years later expanded as a book bearing the same title, “The Clash of Civilizations?” can be read as the paradigmatic statement of this interpretation. In this article Huntington writes:

At a superficial level much of Western culture has indeed permeated the rest of the world. At a more basic level, however, Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilizations. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist, or Orthodox cultures. Western efforts to propagate such ideas produce instead a reaction against “human rights imperialism” and a reaffirmation of indigenous values, as can be seen in the support for religious fundamentalism by the younger generation in non-Western cultures. The very notion that there could be a “universal civilization” is a Western idea, directly at odds with the particularism of most Asian societies and their emphasis on what distinguishes one people from another (Huntington 1993, 40-41).

In both academic and non-academic discussions on world politics, left-wing and liberal commentators often fail to take Huntington's generalizations about the Asian cultures seriously. Underlying this failure is the conviction that Huntington's generalizations carry an unfounded ethno-centric bias against peoples from non-European and non-Judeo-Christian cultural and historical backgrounds. It is only fair to point out, however, that Huntington is not an isolated Westerner who thinks that a form of "cultural incompatibility" is at play in the way Asian Societies receive and perceive the ideas and ideals associated with "human rights and democracy." In appraising the arguments advanced by the Asian Governments during the Vienna Conference from a "philosophical perspective," an *Asian* political theorist, Joseph Chan, makes similar generalizations about the Asian cultural traditions:

Asian societies in general seem to embrace a set of attitudes towards issues of values and morals which is [*sic*] different from that [*sic*] of the West. Many Asians do not value personal autonomy as highly as Western liberals do. In Asian political moralities, we can see a stronger emphasis on the stability, harmony and prosperity of society and a greater reverence for traditions, elders and leaders. Asians in general also have a more conservative attitude towards sexual morality.... Thus it is no surprise that the scope and limitation of human rights drawn by Asians would be different from those of the West, let alone the fact that Westerners can sometimes differ quite widely among themselves (Chan 1995, 35).

These generalizations about the incompatible distinctiveness of the Asian political moralities usually inform (and are informed by) a policy oriented assessment of the world political situation which "hypothesizes" the emergence of a new form of a "cold war" at the end of the twentieth century. This *new* form of a cold war, the adherents of the incompatibility school argue, will be fought not between two uncompromising

“ideologies”, but along the fault-lines of cultural and religious traditions of the “West and the Rest.” Thus, for example, the opening statement of Huntington’s above mentioned article runs as follows:

World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of what it will be -- the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the emerging reality. Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what global politics is likely to be in the coming years.

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future (Huntington 1993, 22).

Again, Huntington is not an isolated Westerner who sees in the controversy between the Asian and American governments the beginning of a new, civilizational Cold War in which nothing less than the continuing relevance and vitality of the ideas and ideals associated with “human rights and democracy” will be at stake. An Asian foreign policy analyst, James T. H. Tang, introducing a volume devoted to “Human Rights and International Relations in Asia-Pacific Region” in the aftermath of the Vienna Conference echoes Huntington’s interpretation and asks:

Western values appear to be set on a collision course with Asian traditions and economic priorities in the form of a ‘clash of civilizations.’ To what extent can different interpretations of human rights exist in the contemporary world? Have human rights differences between the

industrialized North and the developing South replaced the East-West ideological confrontation as the major source of international conflict? Can the differences over human rights between East Asian countries and the West be resolved? (Tang 1995, 2)

Tang's questions reveal that the expectation of a civilizational Cold War between the "West and the Rest" is not a peculiarity of Western students of world politics, but it is shared by Asian analysts as well. Underlying this expectation of a civilizational Cold War, we usually find a profound philosophical assumption which, however, is not always recognized and justified as a *philosophical* assumption. This is an assumption about whether or not different people born into and socialized in different socio-cultural contexts can engage in a meaningful communication with one another to reach a common agreement on the conditions, norms, and values of their co-existence at the common socio-political time and space they share. Thus, for example, in an essay published in 1976 Huntington addresses the question: "can cultures communicate?", and answers this question, on account of the deep emotional attachment one feels towards one's cultural, religious, or ideological background, in the negative. Similarly in the above quoted article, the Asian "philosopher" Joseph Chan refers to the observed socio-anthropological attributes of the Asian societies and expresses his doubt whether the Asian peoples can ever accept the common ground of tolerance and pluralism which is necessary to engage in a meaningful dialogue on human rights issues with the "Westerners." "It is doubtful", Chan writes, "whether many Asian would fully accept the spirit of pluralism and tolerance as understood by Western liberals" (Chan 1995, 135).

Neither the expectation of a civilizational Cold War in contemporary world politics, nor the assumption about the impossibility of a meaningful inter-cultural communication leading to a normative agreement on human rights issues, are merely of academic interest. Rather they reflect a present understanding among governmental policy and decision-makers about the nature of the political tension perceived to exist in the relations between Asian and Western countries. Thus for example, the catch phrase “the West vs. the Rest” that Huntington uses to introduce his version of the incompatibility thesis is taken from an article authored by Kishore Mahbubani who, in 1993, was the deputy secretary of foreign affairs of Singapore. In this article, Mahbubani expresses the following views:

In the face of growing evidence of social, economic, and occasionally moral deterioration of the fabric of many Western societies, it would be increasingly difficult for a Westerner to convince Asians that the West has found universally valid prescriptions for social order and justice. Eventually, as East Asia becomes more affluent, discussion will also take place from a position of political parity. In anticipation of the inevitable, the west should stop lecturing Asians (Mahbubani 1992, 13).

3.2. Cultural Common-ground and Dialogue

However doubtful we may find its socio-anthropological and political theoretical merits, and however undesirable we may feel the consequences of the emergence of a new kind of Cold-War in world politics would be, the cultural “incompatibility school” offers a possible interpretation of the nature and significance of the controversy over the meaning of the universality of human rights and democracy. The second interpretation is associated with what I suggest to call, again for want of a better term, the “cultural

dialogue and common-ground” school. Authors who write in this framework interpret the controversy staged by the American government and the Asian Governments during the world conference not as a confrontation between the incompatible cultural textures of the “Western” and “non-Western” societies, but as a confrontation between two divergent political attitudes to questions of social peace and justice, both of which are rooted in their own right in both the Asian and Western political-cultural traditions. These two divergent attitudes, for their part, resonate with those ideological divisions which have been introduced to political thought and practice with the onset of modernity, and more specifically, with onset of the bourgeois revolutions in Europe and North America, in the 17th and 18th centuries: ideological divisions like conservatism vs. progressivism, liberal individualism vs. republican socialism and/or republican communitarianism, rightism vs. leftism etc.

Michael Freeman is an international human rights theorist who writes in this framework. In an article devoted to a discussion of the Asian Challenge to universal human rights in the aftermath of the Vienna Conference, Freeman draws upon the survey research of David Hitchcok and interpretive analysis of Mahathir Mohammad. These authors present a catalogue of “distinctly Asian values” alleged to instigate the “Asian challenge” (Freeman, 1996). These values include, in order of preference, 1) an orderly society; 2) societal harmony; 3) the accountability of public officials; 4) openness to new ideas; 5) freedom of expression; 6) respect for authority. Freeman compares these values, with the corresponding values held by Americans: 1) Freedom of expression; 2) personal freedom; 3) the rights of the individual; 4) open debate; 5) thinking for one-self; 6) the

accountability of public officials (Freeman 1996, 355). Freeman summarizes the conclusion he reaches from this comparison as follows:

Almost all those values said to be “Asian” are similar to conservative Western values, and all the questions about the relations between human rights and other values that have been said to arise from the distinct nature of Asian cultures have been, and are still being, debated in the West (Freeman 1996, 352).

As it was the case with the authors of the incompatibility school, Freeman’s emphasis on the commonalties between the political values held by Asians and Westerners is informed by a policy-oriented interpretation of the contemporary world political situation and a specific understanding of the “universality” of human rights that is intrinsic to and/or stemming from this situation.

The claim that human rights are universal derives from the cosmopolitan point of view. According to this view the people of the contemporary world are sufficiently interdependent to require a common moral and legal order. Such an order does *not* require a uniform global culture, but a common framework of minimum standards. Such a framework exists in the form of international law, including human rights law. The promotion of human rights has therefore become a common project of humankind (Freeman 1996, 363).

Again, underlying this assessment of the world political situation we find a philosophical assumption, this time about the possibility of dialogue and mutual learning between cultures. Freeman gives expression to this assumption in following words:

The debate about Asian and Western values is confusing, because cultures are not isolated and wholly distinct. They interact and learn from each other. The “mutual enrichment” school of “Asian values” acknowledges

this better than the more confrontational approaches. There is now, consequently a cosmopolitan cultural network, which includes the values of human rights and democracy. Neither human rights, nor democracy is a recipe for cultural uniformity. They are not only consistent with, but often necessary for the protection of cultural diversity. Defenders of traditional cultures have more to fear from market forces than from human rights and democracy (Freeman 1996, 363).

Freeman is not alone in his optimism about the possibility of a meaningful inter-cultural dialogue between Westerners and Asians on human rights issues. Richard Falk is a well-known international lawyer, associated with the New York based "world orders models project." In an essay on the "cultural foundations for the protection of human rights", Falk draws attention to the dangers of the estrangement that results from approaching the West vs. non-West controversy on human rights from the perspective of an abstract and uncompromising dichotomy between universalism vs. relativism (Falk 1992). In this context, he emphasizes the:

inter-mediating relevance for both international law (standards, procedures, implementation) and for cultural hermeneutics, above all seeking to reconcile cultural and global sources of authority by reference to a core concern for the minimum decencies of individual and group existence. An emphasis on suffering and victimization provides indispensable guidance both in relation to gaps in international legal protection and to the task of distinguishing acceptable cultural orientations from unacceptable ones. Of course the whole undertaking is complicated and contingent as different observers and experts will often disagree. What is sought, and must be relied upon in the end, is a dialogue about appropriate behavioral standards in an atmosphere of growing toleration for divergency arising from varying cultural identities (Falk 1992, 46).

Neither Falk nor Freeman are isolated "Western liberals" who share the optimism that cultures can and indeed ought to communicate so that the "minimal

decencies of individual and group existence" can have a decent chance of protection in the globally inter-connected and culturally diversified socio-political space of the late-modern world. Abdullahi An-Na'im is an Arab international lawyer, well known for his research on the compatibility of the normative essentials of constitutional democracy with the Islamic tradition in general, and its divine law, Sh'aria in particular. An-Na'im shares Falk's and Freeman's understanding that internal as well as cross-cultural dialogue is both possible and necessary in addressing the problems associated with the international protection of human rights in different socio-cultural contexts. Thus, in introducing an edited volume on "human rights in cross-cultural perspective", An-Na'im proposes to explore the possibilities of:

cultural reinterpretation and reconstruction through internal cultural discourse and cross-cultural dialogue, as a means to enhancing the universal legitimacy of human rights. This approach does not assume that sufficient cultural support for the full range of human rights is either already present or completely lacking in any given cultural tradition. Rather, more realistically, prevailing interpretations and perceptions of each cultural tradition can be expected to support some human rights, while disagreeing with or even completely rejecting other existing human rights.... There may therefore be room for changing a cultural position from within, through *internal discourse* about the fundamental values of the culture and the rationale for these values.... This public awareness can be achieved through intellectual and scholarly debate, artistic and literary expression of alternative views on those issues, and political and social action furthering those views.... Furthermore, since cultures are constantly changing and evolving internally, as well as through interaction with other cultures, it may be possible to influence the direction of that change and evolution from outside, through cross-cultural dialogue (An-Na'im 1992, 3-4).

An-Na'im's comments reveal that the cultural common ground and dialogue school, like the cultural incompatibility school, have adherents in both Western and non-Western

societies. Again whatever the political philosophical and socio-anthropological merits of such an argument, the cultural common-ground and dialogue school offers another possible interpretation of and approach to the West vs. Non-West controversy about the universality of human rights.

It must be noted, in this context, that this interpretation seems to be more in line with how the Asian governments, as well as other governments classified as non-Western by the cultural incompatibility school themselves, present the nature and significance of their "challenge." Thus, in his official statement during the World Conference, Ali Alatas, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Head of the Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia, made the following observations. (At the time of the World Conference Indonesia was holding the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement, and in Alatas' words, it was "entrusted to reflect" at the world conference, "the consensus position on human rights taken by 108 member states of the Movement" (Alatas 1993, 228) which met at a summit conference in Jakarta, a year earlier. In view of its authoritative status in presenting the "official" interpretation of the Asian Challenge, by the Asian governments themselves, as well as in presenting the consensus position between the Asian governments and other NAM governments, I quote Alatas' statement at some length.)

We are... constrained to voice our concern at the recent spate of international media reports that tend to give the impression that the success of this conference is being threatened by a clash of values between the developed countries of the North and the developing countries of the South, by a confrontation between the perceived universal, mostly Western, concept of human rights that stresses political and civil rights, and the purported "dissident view", particularly of Asian countries, which emphasizes the indivisibility of all categories of rights and the need to take

into account the diversity of socio-economic, cultural and political realities prevailing in each country.

This depiction is not only erroneous but also unwarranted and therefore counter-productive. Speaking for Indonesia, and I believe for the other Asian countries, signatories to the recently adopted Bangkok Declaration, and the Non-Aligned Countries which all subscribe to the provisions on human rights contained in the Final Documents of the Jakarta Summit, I can say in all truthfulness that we have not come to Vienna to engage in confrontation, nor to advocate an alternative concept of human rights, based on some nebulous notion of "cultural relativism" as spuriously alleged by some quarters.

On the contrary, as clearly stated in the Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights, we recognize that the observance and promotion of human rights "should be encouraged by cooperation and consensus and not through confrontation and the imposition of incompatible values."

Indeed, there can and should be no room for confrontation or acrimony, considering that we all proceed from the same basic premises: our shared view on the universal validity of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms; our common adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and our commitment to the Charter of the UN which requires us to cooperate in promoting respect for human rights for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion....

Neither can it be said that the present concept of human rights, the theoretical basis of which was first conceived and developed in the West, is unknown or unappreciated in the countries of Asia and Africa. We in Indonesia do know how this concept sprang from the libertarian writings of such European political and legal thinkers as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Montesquieu, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Cesare Beccaria, and John Stuart Mill -- and from their various postulations and juridical constructions of a "social contract" and of the inherent, "natural" rights of individuals in facing the powers of the State and Governmental authority. These were the ideas that eventually gave birth to the modern state and the attendant civil and political rights of the citizen. But these were also among the same ideas that inspired the struggle of many new nations of Asian and Africa to cast the yoke of colonialism, just as they helped ignite, during an earlier time, the French and American Revolutions.

Thus, if today there appears to be still a debate on the concept of human rights, it is not so much from any contention between East and West, North and South but, it seems to me, the lingering echo of an earlier clash between two Western traditions, between the principle of individual liberty which for example, Thomas Jefferson passionately espoused and the principle of a strong lawful authority which Alexander Hamilton, just as passionately advocated....

In the field of human rights, the concepts, the instruments and the international understandings are already there for us to build upon. These we must continue to nurture so that in time they will be able also to bridge the vast diversity of cultures, traditions, and social, economic and political systems in the world today without disregarding any one of them, or allowing one of them to dominate others. Then we shall be able to weave together the three major strands as reflected in the UN-charter -- the resolution of conflicts, the promotion of development and observance of human rights -- which together compose the precious tissue of lasting peace (Alatas 1993, 228-234).

In this speech Alatas emphasizes the Asian and NAM governments' acceptance of the universality of human rights, denies the charge of relativism, draws attention to the common intellectual and philosophical foundations of the Enlightened political thought on which both the American revolution and constitution, and the Asian, African, and Latin American societies' struggles against colonial domination rest; and demands an approach premised on mutual respect, cooperation, and consensus to bridge the cultural estrangement between the Western and non-Western peoples on human rights issues. More cynical observers of world politics, as well as more enthusiastic, yet less perceptive human rights advocates among Western intellectuals usually mistrust the sentiments expressed in Alatas' speech as a public relations maneuver, deceptively worded to appeal to the better nature of the Western audience. Examples of such strategic "double talk" are not hard to come by in inter-governmental discourses on human rights.¹¹ On the strength

¹¹ Kevin Boyle clarifies what I mean by "strategic double-talk" in following words: "The argument can be made that the attack on universalism by some of the countries in Vienna represents a defensive reaction to the relativism practiced in foreign policy of powerful states toward human rights violators. For many countries it is still a case of ignoring violations of friends and attacking the violations of enemies. Objectivity, impartiality and consistency in treating human rights problems are concomitants of universalism. As far as most Middle East and Islamic countries have been concerned, the prime example has been at least until recently the indulgence of the United States towards Israel and the related failure of the United Nations to take any effective measures in response to that country's ignoring of Security Council resolutions arising from its

of the factual evidence about human rights violations perpetrated by such governments, as China, Indonesia, Malaysia, or Burma, to name a few, there *are* indeed good reasons to exercise caution before taking Alatas' statement on behalf of NAM governments at its humanitarian face value.

Yet it is not only fair, but also prudent to remember that Alatas' comments are not reflecting exclusively the views of governments whose expressions of commitment to human rights and democracy can justifiably be mistrusted. Rather, Alatas' comments give expression to a sensitivity about questions of cultural diversity, universality of human rights, and international dialogue and cooperation which *also* finds expression in the joint statement of the Asian non-governmental human rights and development organizations. This joint statement was drafted and endorsed by "some 240 representatives of more than 110 non-governmental organizations from about 26 countries" the governments of which participated in the Asia-Pacific regions' Bangkok preparatory meeting:

Universality: We can learn from different cultures in a pluralistic perspective and draw lessons from the humanity of these cultures to deepen respect for human rights. There is emerging a new understanding of universalism, encompassing the richness and wisdom of Asia-Pacific cultures.

Universal human rights standards are rooted in many cultures. We affirm the basis of universality of human rights which affords protection to all of humanity including special groups such as women, children, minorities and indigenous peoples, workers, refugees and displaced persons, the

occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In other parts of the world the skepticism about human rights has been engendered by the sorry record of the West during the Cold War of ignoring dictatorships or even installing them with questions of human rights and democracy forgotten. The circle of hypocrisy is completed when states, for example in the Middle East, complain of double standards of others while denying the same international standards of human rights to their own populations. As already noted those states from Asia which spearheaded the attack on universalism have consistently failed to ratify the international human rights conventions" (Boyle 1995, 88).

disabled and the elderly. While advocating cultural pluralism, those cultural practices which derogate from universally accepted human rights including women's rights must not be tolerated. (Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights 1993, 5).

3.3. Two World Historical Paths to the Future

These two interpretations of the nature and significance of the controversy over the meaning of the universality of human rights and democracy, associated with the cultural incompatibility and cultural common ground schools, are logically incommensurable with one another. Yet, for the time being these two divergent interpretations coexist in official and academic, governmental and non-governmental discourses on world politics, both in the Asian and in the Western countries, explaining the same world political phenomenon. It is therefore pertinent to ask: Which of the claims raised by these two schools is likely to be verified by future developments in world politics? In other words will the incompatibility school win the day by increasing its credibility and popularity among governmental decision makers, international mass-media, and eventually among "Western" and "Restern" peoples, so that we shall witness the gradual emergence of a late-modern version of mediaeval crusades in world politics -- i.e., a military, economic, and political contest between uncompromising faiths, for the minds, souls, and "rights" of human beings who inhabit the earth? Or, will the commonalties between the Asian and Western sensitivities about human rights issues become more pronounced with the passage of time so that the common understanding and dialogue established at a non-governmental level during the Vienna Conference be reflected at the inter-governmental level as well?

Of course these are empirical questions about future developments which only time can answer with certainty. Nevertheless what the future holds for us is often conditioned, if not pre-determined, by the choices and decisions we make, the historical paths we take in the present. From this perspective the incompatibility and common-ground interpretations of the controversy over the universality of human rights and democracy seem to be significant not as falsifiable predictions about future developments in world politics, but as the markers of two divergent world-historical paths leading to the future -- two world historical paths at the inter-section of which we now stand. As a result of the intensified global inter-connectedness of our social, economic, and political relations, one or the other of these paths we shall take -- sooner or later, whether we like it or not.

The path indicated by the incompatibility school promises to keep the existing military, economic, and cultural *status-quo* intact, but in doing so it not only proposes to sacrifice peoples from non-European and non-Judeo-Christian backgrounds to this status quo in the short-run, but also threatens the human species with eventual self-destruction in the long-run. The path indicated by the common-ground school does not promise a future utopia of "perpetual peace and justice" -- no political theory and religious doctrine in human history has managed to keep such a promise. Yet at least it seeks to keep a present hope alive: that the compromise formulations of the Vienna Declaration will gradually evolve into a genuine cosmopolitan value consensus on the meaning of the goal of global peace and justice -- a consensus on the common-ground of which future

generation *may* find the opportunity to built, to quote Ali Alatas again, “a more humane, tolerant, and equitably prosperous” world.

4. The Thesis

In this thesis I seek to contribute to attempts to take the cosmopolitan path to the future. At the expense of sounding repetitive let me restate the main argument that I seek to develop and substantiate to this aim: the Asian governments' criticisms of cultural imperialism, and American government's counter-criticisms of political authoritarianism rest on a normative common ground. This common ground is the dialogical conception of democratic legitimacy and enlightened conception of social justice which is elaborated in the recent literature on political theory, *inter alia*, in Juergen Habermas' discourse theoretical work. This common ground finds resonance in the Asian governments' Bangkok Declaration, but the American government's interpretation of and response to this declaration reflects a misunderstanding of this point. Finally, this misunderstanding can be understood in terms of the conceptual differences between two distinct ways of approaching questions of democracy and democratization: For want of better terms, I call these two distinct approaches enlightened normativism and the Schumpeterian empiricism.

In developing and substantiating this argument I raise and address the following questions: What are the conceptions of democracy and democratization which find resonance in the Asian Governments' Bangkok Declaration and the American government's interpretation of and response to the Bangkok Declaration? Where, by whom, and under which world-political circumstances were these conceptions of

democracy and democratization developed? Are there substantive normative claims about what can be considered to be good, just and legitimate in politics that find expression in these conceptions of democracy and democratization? If so, what are they? If not, why not? Do these conceptions of democracy and democratization offer adequate conceptual frameworks to understand and respond to observed and experienced social, economic, and political practices which violate, what Richard Falk calls, the "minimum decencies of individual and group existence" in contemporary world politics? Finally how adequate are these conceptions of democracy and democratization to inform the process of reforming and restructuring the UN-system in response to the existential problems that threaten human survival on earth?

In a moment I shall present an introductory summary and outline of how I organize my discussion of these questions in the following chapters. Before doing so, however, let me briefly clarify a concept, which plays a key role in structuring the argument that I seek to develop in this thesis in response to these questions, namely, "misunderstanding."

4.1. Understanding/Misunderstanding

As anyone who speaks a natural language intuitively knows, understanding, as well as "misunderstanding" occurs in the course of a linguistic interaction between two or more communicating (groups of) human subjects. Such "inter-subjective" communication, or "dialogue" can take either the form of a conversation, discussion, debate, argumentation, or the form of reading a literary and/or philosophical text with the intent of comprehending the author's thoughts, or the text's literary intentions. We can

talk about the existence of a misunderstanding, when, in the course of an ongoing intersubjective conversation on a common topic, we have reason to think that two or more participants attribute different meanings to the same linguistic expressions and/or concepts; in other words when there is a “disagreement” between what a participant says and what the other participant(s) who respond to her think she means to say.

The phenomenology of the human experience of understanding is most lucidly elaborated in Hans Georg Gadamer’s investigations on philosophical hermeneutics (Gadamer 1977, 1988). According to Gadamer every human being is born into, and participates in the (re)production and transmission of a social-cultural context -- a tradition. The texture of this socio-cultural context is composed of traditionally handed-down “prejudices.” In the process of growing-up these prejudices become inalienable parts of our socio-cultural “identities”, so that we can say, in Gadamer’s words, “it is not so much our judgments, as our prejudices that constitute our being” (Gadamer 1977a, 9).¹² In an ongoing conversation on a common topic, when it comes to an encounter with a participant from a different cultural, historical, or philosophical background, these prejudices provide the initial points of reference with which and through which we orient ourselves to the other participant’s differences in meaning.¹³ In such an encounter the

¹² Also see Truth and Method: “In fact history does not belong us; we belong to it. Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in self-evident way in the family, society, and state in which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. *That is why prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of being.*” (Gadamer 1988, 277; emphasis in original).

¹³ “A person, who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a meaning of the text, as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges because he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to certain meaning. Working out this fore-projection, which is constantly revised in terms of

possibility of moving toward the formation of a mutual understanding with the other participant depends not so much on our ability to get rid of all our prejudices, as on our ability to be aware of our biases and remain "open" to the alterity of the other participant's meaning.¹⁴ Understanding, when and if it is experienced as the product of such a dialogical exchange between what have once been alien traditions takes the form of a "fusion of horizons" -- a mutual understanding (*Verstaendigung*) which neither eradicates nor subsumes the particularities -- the "prejudices" -- of one tradition to the other, but on the contrary raises these particularities to a higher level of universality which encompasses both traditions.¹⁵

Through his philosophical reflections on the human experience of understanding, Gadamer warns "social scientists" against the fundamental prejudice of

what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is understanding what is there" (Gadamer 1988, 267).

¹⁴ "A person trying to understand something will not resign himself from the start to relying on his own accidental fore-meanings (i.e. prejudices), ignoring as consistently and stubbornly as possible the actual meaning of the text until the latter becomes so persistently audible that it breaks through what the interpreter imagines it to be. Rather, a person trying to understand a text is prepared for it to tell him something. That is why a hermeneutically trained consciousness must be, from the start, sensitive to the text's alterity. But this kind of sensitivity involves neither "neutrality" with respect to content nor the extinction of one's self, but the foregrounding and appropriation one's own fore-meanings and prejudices. The important thing is to be aware of one's own bias, so that the text can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against one's own fore-meanings" (Gadamer 1988, 269).

¹⁵ "Just as the individual is never simply an individual because he is always in understanding with others, so too the closed horizon that is supposed to enclose a culture is an abstraction. The historical movement of human life consists in the fact that it is never absolutely bound to any one standpoint, and hence can never have a truly closed horizon. The horizon is rather something into which we move and that moves with us. Horizons change for a person who is moving. Thus the horizon of the past, out of which all human life lives and which exists in the form of tradition, is always in motion." In this sense, according to Gadamer, understanding (*verstehen*) an "alien" tradition means coming to an agreement (*verstaendigen*) with its otherness. "Transposing ourselves into an otherness consists neither in the empathy of one individual for another, nor in subordinating another person to our own standards; rather it always involves rising to a higher universality that overcomes not only our own particularity but also that of the other" (Gadamer 1988, 269).

rationalist political thought -- namely "the prejudice against prejudice, which denies the tradition its power."¹⁶ When reading Gadamer, however, we also find ourselves warned

¹⁶ The emphasis Gadamer puts on "the power of tradition" instigated a highly insightful debate between him and Juergen Habermas in the mid-1960s. While commending Gadamer for revealing the "dialogical" structure of understanding, Habermas took exception to what he considered to be Gadamer's attempt of undermining the epistemological grounds of "critical social science" by dissolving universal qualities of human reason into the historicity of cultural traditions. Gadamer responded that the normative elements informing reasoned political criticism in a given social context are themselves "handed down" by traditions so that "political criticism" cannot be conceived as an event that can transcend its own historical situatedness. Partly as a result of insights gained in this debate Habermas distanced himself from his research agenda in the 1960s, namely laying bare the epistemological foundations of critical social science, which found expression in his well-known Knowledge and Human Interests. The 1970s witnessed instead Habermas developing a new social theoretical architectonic, where "dialogue" or inter-subjective communication is introduced, not at an epistemological level, as normative foundation of "critical social science", but at the socio-ontological level, as the foundation of that thing called "society." Habermas' project of developing a new, communicative social theory" from within the horizons of the Enlightenment philosophy found expression in the two volumes of The Theory of Communicative Action.

While still raising Aristotelian/Hegelian objections to Habermas' latter work in the 1970s, in a letter written to Richard Bernstein in 1982 Gadamer commended this shift of emphasis in Habermas' thought in the following words: "[Reading Bernstein's manuscripts on Rorty and Habermas' works] I become acutely aware of just how much I am caught up, one might say, in the tradition of German Romantic and Post-Romantic philosophy. I live, as it were, in a closed horizon of problems and lines of questioning which still understands itself to be philosophy, and which recognizes neither a social-scientific nor a skeptical questioning of philosophy itself. But perhaps I should be more cautious, for this is not wholly the case in my relation to Habermas. It seems to me that he has taken up a task of his own, and I do not see why for my part I should not recognize this task" (Gadamer 1988a, 262). In the same letter Gadamer expressed his sympathy with Habermas' pro-Enlightenment political position in following words: "I too am in favor of a government and politics that would allow for mutual understanding and the freedom of all. But this is not due to the influence of Habermas. It has been self-evident to any European since the French Revolution, since Hegel and Kant" (Gadamer 1988a, 264). (With due respect to Gadamer's philosophical genius, in the context of our present discussion, it is pertinent to note, that the Europeans who favor a government and politics that would allow for mutual understanding and freedom of all, have also brothers and sisters, who prefer to call themselves Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans).

Reflecting on his exchanges in retrospect, Habermas, for his part, commended Gadamer for "being a teacher long after the period of learning has ended." (Habermas 1983). While still maintaining that Gadamer "understands of truth something that is opposed to method", Habermas no longer talks about "critical sciences" but he refers to what he calls "reconstructive sciences" (See Habermas' own re-evaluation of this debate in "Reconstruction and Interpretation in Social Sciences" published in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action). Reconstructive sciences are characterized by a division of labor between interpretive/philosophical reflections on questions of moral conscience on the one hand, and the empirical method of natural sciences to provide corroborative and/or falsifying evidence for the conclusions reached through such reflections, on the other. In this context the term "rational reconstruction" connotes the

against the failure to distinguish between what Richard Bernstein has dubbed as “enabling” (or justified -- *berechtigte*) and “blind” prejudices (Bernstein 1988, 128). Enabling prejudices are productive of knowledge and learning. In an encounter with those who speak from within the horizons of an alien tradition enabling prejudices function as the venues of our openness to that which, at a first glance, appears to be, ridiculous, wrong, challenging, threatening, in one word, incomprehensible to us. In such an encounter enabling prejudices precipitate the experience of understanding -- both in the sense of gaining a new and different awareness of our own “pre-judgments” hence of our own being through the introspection that this encounter instigates, and in the sense of comprehending through these pre-judgments what has once been the alien meaning of the other. In contrast, blind prejudices close our horizon and obstruct the venues of both introspection and communication with those who speak to us from within the horizons of a different tradition: As such they lead to misunderstandings -- both in the sense of not

meaning of “recovering” and/or “reproducing” at the level of theoretical abstraction species-specific moral competencies, which are already “handed down” and present in human experience, i.e., in social, cultural, and political practices. The end product of reconstructive sciences is both an immanent and universal standard of social and political criticism. In line with Gadamer’s objections, this form of social criticism does not pretend to be able to elevate itself over and above its own historical situatedness in political practice, hence it does not raise a claim to transcendence in the Kantian sense. Nonetheless the introduction of the inter-subjectivist concept of “communicative rationality” at the socio-ontological level, from within the conceptual horizons of the analytic philosophy of language, allows Habermas to gain an impartial point of view from which universally justifiable criticisms of inequitable and oppressive social and political practices “handed down” by cultural traditions can be produced. On this point also see Habermas (1990c, 195-216).

An excellent reconstruction and discussion of the Gadamer-Habermas debate is presented by Azzie (1995, 225-231). A lucid comparison of Gadamer’s and Habermas’ thought on legal-philosophical questions of social justice is presented by Georgia Warnke (1992). Richard Bernstein’s (1988) Beyond Objectivism and Relativism presents an excellent discussion and comparison of Habermas and Gadamer’s thoughts within the context of the contemporary debates on the normative foundations of social and political criticism.

being aware of the blindness of our own pre-judgments, and in the sense of reading the blindness of our own accidental fore-meanings into the different meaning of the other.

Now the misunderstanding that I argue in this thesis resonates in the American government's interpretation of, and response to, the Bangkok Declaration is a misunderstanding in this hermeneutical sense. Furthermore, my argument suggests that this is not a symmetric misunderstanding between two different cultural positions one favoring freedom, equality, and societal solidarity and endorsing the international human rights instruments that give expression to these democratic ideas and ideals, and the other not. Rather, my argument suggests that this is an *asymmetric* misunderstanding on the part of the American government alone, of the dialogical conception of democratic legitimacy and enlightened conception of social justice, which resonates in the Asian Governments' Bangkok Declaration.

We can talk about a misunderstanding in this hermeneutical sense because, as I seek to show in the following chapters, it is within the conceptual framework of the same tradition of democratic political thought that both the Asian governments' criticism of "the unilateral imposition of Western values" and their affirmation of the universality, indivisibility, and objectivity of all human rights, and the American government's criticism of political authoritarianism and its insistence on a strong endorsement of the universality of human rights can be interpreted. We can talk about an *asymmetric* misunderstanding because Ali Alatas' above quoted speech makes it clear, that the drafters of the Bangkok Declaration were aware of and accepted a certain historical fact

to which the American government does not make any reference in its interpretation of and response to the Bangkok Declaration.

This fact has been documented in 1986 by Partha Chatterjee in a research project, published by the United Nations University, on "post-colonial nationalism." It can be stated in terms of five points: First, the political theoretical foundations of the modern ideas of democracy and human rights have first been conceived by the political thinkers of the European enlightenment. Second, most Asian, African and Latin American struggles for national independence against colonialist rule have been inspired and informed by these enlightened political ideas and ideals (Chatterjee 1986, 1-36, *passim*). Third, underlying most of the "anti-Western" rhetoric of the post-colonial nations in world political forums, we find normative intuitions associated with this enlightened-normative conceptual framework (Chatterjee 1986, 37-54, *passim*). Fourth, as Ali Alatas correctly emphasizes in his speech, it was also these enlightened political ideals that informed the drafters of the American constitution. Finally, to point out the obvious, this American constitution is still in effect in the United States of America.

In precipitating and perpetuating this asymmetric misunderstanding on the part of the American government during, and in the aftermath of, the Vienna Declaration, two "blind prejudices" seem to have played a particularly significant role. The first "blind prejudice" is associated with the political and intellectual heritage of European colonialism, more specifically, the new forms that this colonialist mentality took in the post-colonial era. The second blind prejudice is associated with what is known in the

academic literature on American foreign policy as the doctrine of American exceptionalism.

4.2. Colonialist Mentality as a Blind Prejudice

In the second half of the twentieth century, in the world political context of post-war decolonization, the intellectual heritage of the colonialist mentality has been documented and eloquently criticized in such well-known works as Frantz Fanon's (1968) The Wretched of the Earth, Anwar Abdel Malek's (1963) "Orientalism in Crises", more recently, Edward Said's (1979, 1993) Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism. We can find a parallel criticism of this colonialist mentality of European imperialism from within the conceptual horizons of the Western political thought itself, in Hannah Arendt's (1951) the Origins of Totalitarianism. In the context of international law this "post-colonial" critique found expression as early as in 1967 in S. Parakh Sinha's New Nations and the Law of Nations. The same theme was addressed from a "Western" perspective, by Adda Bozeman, in 1971, in The Future of Law in a Multicultural World.

These works impress upon their readers the unresponsiveness of the colonialist mentality to the authentic social, political, economic and cultural experiences, needs, and demands of the non-European, non-North American, and non-Australasian peoples. Obviously we cannot say that at the dawn of the twenty-first century every "Westerner" suffers from this colonialist prejudice, and every Westerner who suffers from this blind prejudice suffers from it to the same degree. In the strongest case, this blind prejudice manifests itself as racial hatred in which the non-European "other" is believed to be as intimately "known" and as violently hated, as the familiar stereotype of an inhuman evil

or subhuman savage. In a milder case, this blind prejudice manifests itself as a patronizing interest in the development and welfare of endearing, nonetheless inferior beings, who are assumed to imitate and yearn to become *like* their former colonial masters. Finally, in the weakest case, this blind prejudice manifests itself in the form of an indifferent, self indulgent, and relativistic attitude of "tolerance" toward the different "cultures" of "other" societies and peoples. This is an attitude in which the blind-prejudiced mind fails to distinguish between humanly acceptable and unacceptable cultural practices, and ignores the unnecessary and unjustifiable suffering of millions living in Asian, African, and Latin American societies. Consider, for example, the well-known cases of "female circumcision", which is a cultural practice still perpetrated in some African societies, and respect for the wisdom of the elders, which is also a cultural practice in most "traditional" societies, and which is indeed the basis of all education, in "all" societies -- including the Western ones.

In all three cases the authentic reality, experience and meaning of the non-European other remains obscure to the blind-prejudiced mind: In the strongest and weakest cases no attempt to understand the other is shown: In one case a strong dislike of the other, and in the other case, a profound indifference toward the other undermines the will to understand and respond to the other's experience in its own terms. In the milder case the meaning of the other is assumed to be completely transparent from the perspective of the Western self's own experience and knowledge, so that when someone from *another* culture speaks to express his experience, needs, and demands, she is *assumed* to mean what the Western self *presumes* her to mean.

At this juncture a frustrated Western reader may ask in exasperation: what other attitude is there to show toward the non-European peoples, when it comes to an encounter with them? The point is, of course, it is exactly when the Western political thought raises this question seriously that it can dispose of the blind prejudice of the colonialist mentality, and only then can an understanding of "the other" begin to form in the Western mind. As a general rule of thumb, though, *listening to the other* with an open mind and trustful disposition, yet not forgetting that there *are* some "minimum decencies of individual and collective existence" seems to be the answer. It may turn out to be the case that the Western mind might not like what it hears. Yet, without listening to the other with an open mind and trustful disposition how can "a Westerner", or a "non-Westerner" for that matter, *understand* what "the other" says, and without understanding what the other says, how can one know what is acceptable and what is unacceptable in what one hears?

Now my argument suggests that the American Government's interpretation of and response to the Bangkok Declaration manifests that the milder version of this colonialist blind prejudice was at play during the Vienna Conference. In the Bangkok Declaration, the Asian Governments affirmed the universality, indivisibility, and objectivity of human rights in a number of paragraphs. They emphasized their commitment to the UN-charter. They invited all UN-members to accede and ratify the two covenants on civil and political rights, and social, economic, and cultural rights. It is true that the Asian governments emphasized the significance of their cultural differences in setting and implementing the international standards of the protection of human rights.

But they offered the option of dialogue based on mutual respect, as a way to overcome the interpretive disputes likely to result from these differences. Indeed, it was precisely these aspects of the Bangkok Declaration that received an unequivocal commendation from the NGO representatives who adopted the Joint Statement of the Asian human rights NGOs, mentioned above.¹⁷

By the time the Vienna Conference convened, there were obviously important questions or "contest areas" that required the governments of the UN's member states to engage in serious negotiations with one another. The meaning, relevance, or irrelevance of the principle of territorial state sovereignty in the international protection of human rights, the relationship between socio-economic development and the protection of human rights, the possibilities and desirability of expanding and strengthening the impartial fact-finding powers of the UN-secretariat in documenting systematic human

¹⁷ This commendation found expression in the following words of the joint response that the NGO representatives drafted after the adoption of the final draft of the Bangkok Declaration by the Asian governments: "The NGO representatives of the Asia-Pacific NGOs met this morning to consider a response to the Final Draft Declaration prepared by governments. This NGO response reflects the challenges and issues presented during this week in the form of the Bangkok NGO declaration prepared by some 240 representatives of 110 NGOs in this region.

The NGO representatives stress the following points:

i) There are several points to be commended in the Final Draft Declaration prepared by governments. In this regard:

--we welcome the specific sections on the rights of women and the rights of children;

--we are relieved to find a reaffirmation of the principles in the UN-charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

--we support the reaffirmation of the universality, indivisibility and interdependence of human rights.

--we share a concern for effective implementation of the right to development and the need arising from the situation in our region to recognize the impact of macro-economic issues and the disastrous results of poverty, evident in the widening gap between the North and South, the rich and poor.

ii) we are encouraged by the recognition of NGOs in the Final Draft Declaration and the fact that governments responded to the concerted representations by so many Asia-Pacific NGOs from day one of this Asia Regional meeting" (Bangkok Joint NGO response 1993, 211).

rights abuses in all regions of the world, the possibility of enhancing and strengthening the mechanisms of collective international action in response to grave human rights violations perpetrated in areas where legitimate state authority collapses altogether (such as ex-Yugoslavia Rwanda, and Somalia) -- these were a few of the important and urgent issues that demanded the World Governments' attention during the Vienna Conference.¹⁸ It was also in these issue areas, that the joint statement of the Asian human rights NGOs formulated a number of pointed criticisms of the Bangkok Declaration. Yet the universality of human rights was not an issue: No governmental or non-governmental actor from any region of the world that was present in Vienna, including the Asian Governments who adopted the Bangkok Declaration, disputed the validity and universality of the rights contained in the Universal Declaration and the two covenants.

Yet, taking counsel from their own experience with and knowledge about (international) politics the officials of the American government *presumed* that the affirmation of the universality of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bangkok Declaration was nothing more than a deceptive "public relations maneuver" on the part of the Asian governments. They interpreted the Asian governments' demand for a more dialogical approach to overcome interpretive disputes resulting from cultural differences, as nothing more than an ideological smoke-screen covering up for brutal third world tyrants. Finally, on the basis of these presumptions, they concluded that the *real* meaning of the Bangkok Declaration is a relativistic challenge to the universality of

¹⁸ Philip Alston's two articles, published shortly before (1992) and after (1994) the Vienna Conference present succinct and balanced accounts of the issues that had been on the agenda before the world conference, and that remained on the agenda after the world conference.

human rights. Thus the American government -- the newly elected "democratic" Clinton Administration -- built its negotiation strategy in Vienna on "controlling the damage" done by the Bangkok Declaration, to the universality of human rights. During the Vienna Conference, the American officials focused their efforts on effectively thwarting the "relativistic" Asian challenge to the universality of human rights. After the Vienna Conference, the American officials prided themselves for having out-negotiated the Asian governments into admitting, in strongest possible terms, the universality of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The American officials, and their supporters in popular mass-media, did not clarify, however, in what sense exactly the Asian Governments' endorsement of the universality of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the *Vienna Declaration* was more trustworthy and therefore signified "further progress" in the international protection of human rights in the Asia-Pacific region of the world, than the Asian Governments' endorsement of the universality of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the *Bangkok Declaration*. Nor did they clarify, why is it necessarily the case that the American governments' insistence on the universality of human rights in response to the Bangkok Declaration can be considered more trustworthy than the Asian governments' affirmation of the universality of human rights in the Bangkok Declaration? The question is justified in view of the fact that the American Congress ratified the covenant on civil and political rights as recently as in 1992, after a sixteen year delay caused by the "racial problems" in American politics; and Clinton administration's promise during the Vienna

Conference notwithstanding, the American Congress has yet to ratify the covenant on cultural, social and economic rights.

4.3. American Exceptionalism as a Blind Prejudice

In obscuring these inconsistencies in the American Government's position a second "blind prejudice" too seem to have played an important part. In the academic literature on American foreign policy, this blind prejudice is known as "the doctrine of American exceptionalism." The Doctrine of American Exceptionalism postulates that because the Americans are the descendants of a generation which fought the first war of independence in modern history and drafted the first modern constitution that entrenches the democratic principles of popular self-determination and equal rights and liberties for equal citizens they have: (1) privileged knowledge and expertise about questions and problems of democracy and democratization, (2) a moral duty to make the rest of humanity to benefit from this knowledge and expertise; (3) and a political mission to promote democracy and human rights in world politics -- either by example, as the "isolationist" Americans argue, or by decisive international action, as the "interventionist" Americans argue. Recently, David P. Forsythe, a well known student of American foreign policy in the field of human rights, summarized the significance of the doctrine of American exceptionalism in shaping the American perspective in world politics as follows:

There is a moral streak in US Foreign Policy rhetoric, a tendency for Americans to view their nation as a "city on a hill" and their history as a moral lesson to the world. Many Americans have difficulty seeing themselves as an ordinary nation (Forsythe 1995, 112).

Henry Kissinger, who is not only an influential and controversial political figure in American politics, but also a recognized academic authority on the history of international relations, concurs with Forsythe on the significance of the role that the doctrine of American exceptionalism plays in American foreign policy-making:

The singularities that America ascribed to itself throughout its history have produced two contradictory attitudes toward foreign policy. The first is that America serves its values best by perfecting democracy at home, thereby acting as beacon for the rest of the mankind; the second that America's values impose upon it an obligation to crusade for them around the world. Torn between nostalgia for a pristine past and yearning for a perfect future, American thought has oscillated between isolationism and commitment (Kissinger 1995, 18).

The academic literature supporting, criticizing, and analyzing what Kissinger refers to as "the singularities that America ascribed to itself throughout its history", and what Forsythe refers to as the "moral streak in US foreign policy rhetoric" is of enormous proportions. Most scholars who contribute to this literature would agree, however, that the following quotation from an article by William J. Barnds presents a clear, succinct, and accurate account of that which the America foreign policy makers believe to be unique in their history. Barnds is a professional foreign relations consultant who has served as the president of the Japan Economic Institute of America from 1985 to 1990, as the director of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs committee, and as a professional staff member of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. This article was published shortly after the Vienna Conference, in one of the rare volumes analyzing the international political aspects of the inter-governmental

controversy over the universality of human rights. The purpose of Barnds article was to explain the rationale underlying the "American policy toward Asia" from an impartial, academic perspective:

The United States is by no means the only nation in the world that is concerned with the international dimension of human rights. I believe that it is fair to say, however, that the United States has shown greater concern for human rights than any other major power, and that it has had greater impact on developments relating to human rights than any other nation. These conclusions do not rest upon a view that Americans are better or more moral than the citizens of other countries, but only that certain elements in the American experience have influenced the US policies and the attitudes of the American people since the beginning of our history as a nation.

The United States is unique among the major nations of the world in that it was created by an act of will by a group of individuals -- the Founding Fathers -- who won independence and established the nation on the basis of ideas concerning the relationship of men, government and society. (The fact that the Founding Fathers also had particular interests they sought to protect only demonstrates that they were not saints; it does not weaken the argument that the country was created on the basis of certain ideas). This is quite different from the history of almost all other nations, which gradually emerged as a result of the experiences of a particular group of people living in a specific geographical area. Moreover as the United States took on an increasingly multi-ethnic character because of the diverse origins of its immigrants, the importance of the American idea of limited self-government, of a written constitution, and of specific rights for its people became ever more important as a source of legitimacy for its political institutions.

Since the American revolution against the English Crown was based upon the assertion that all men had certain inalienable rights, a certain universalist and missionary attitude on the part of the successful revolutionaries and the citizens was virtually inevitable. The fact that America was a society in which some men, because of their race, and American women because of their gender, were not accorded equal rights did not prevent Americans from arguing that the United States had a universal message for the world. Americans have disagreed throughout their history, however, about whether that message should be spread by action, or example....

In this century, both World Wars and the Cold War had elements of human rights concerns involved in American participation, although concern for US security was the primary motivating factor. Making the world safe for democracy in the First World War, and opposing Germany and Japan in the Second World War, and the communist nations in the Cold War was due in part to the nature of these regimes. It must be acknowledged that large elements of expediency were involved -- aiding Stalin against Hitler, for example, or supporting right-wing dictatorships (and Tito and later Mao) against the Soviet Union.

Yet during the Cold War the core of the anti-Communist coalitions were democratic societies in Western Europe and Japan. Moreover, the United States favored freedom for colonial nations (self-determination or collective rights), although compromises were made in deference to our Western allies. Yet in broad terms, we were pursuing our values as well as protecting our security (Barnd 1995, 71-72).

This statement of the doctrine of American exceptionalism reflects a culturally and historically specific mind-set which convinces the American officials that they have a privileged voice and special mission when it comes to questions of promoting democracy and protecting human rights in world politics. A hermeneutically attuned reader can realize that the validity of this mind-set as a reliable framework for foreign policy-making rests on two specific cognitive claims. The first cognitive claim can be formulated as follows: It is unfortunately true that the actually existing reality of the American political system leaves something to be desired when judged by the stringent standards of the enlightened ideas and ideals that sparked the American revolution, and informed the founding fathers of the American constitution. It is a fact, however, that the American people was the first people in modern history that adopted a democratic constitution entrenching the "inalienable rights of all men." Therefore, the social, political, economic, and cultural institutions, structures, and practices found in the United States of America

in the latter half of the twentieth century must represent the most advanced stage in the historical evolution of democracy. In this sense the American social, political, economic, and cultural institutions and structures offer us an actually existing model of democratic government which guarantees and actualizes the "inalienable rights of all men" as much as humanly possible.

The second cognitive claim on which the validity of the doctrine of American exceptionalism rests is closely related to the first one: Since the contemporary American society has the most advanced-democratic social and political organizations, institutions, and structures that now exist on the face of the earth, the American "experts" on social, political, cultural, and legal issues must be considered the most qualified ones to pass final judgment on such questions concerning democracy, democratization, and the protection of human rights as follows: Which country, can be considered, how much democratic, in what sense; which human rights are worthy of international protection, why, and how; which culture, religion, or historical tradition is compatible or incompatible with democracy and democratization; and what should the educated elite of the developing Asian, African, and Latin American nations learn from the "American experience" in order to democratize their own societies, and protect the "inalienable" rights of their own fellow citizens?

It is precisely because of the fact that the validity of both of these two cognitive claims begs the question, that the doctrine of American exceptionalism must be considered as a blind prejudice. With respect to the first premise, it is not obvious that the actually existing American democracy in particular and the Western democracies in

general represent the apotheosis of democratic progress. It is doubtful whether the so-called "visible" minorities, the new immigrants, the guest-workers, the aboriginals, the unemployed, the homeless, or the uninsured sick would willingly and freely agree in a rational discourse, that the social, political, economic, and cultural structures of the "actually existing" Western democracies guarantee the enjoyment of their "inalienable rights" as free and equal human beings, as much as humanly possible. Seen from the perspective of these "losers" of the Western societies the political promise of the Enlightenment, namely freedom equality, and societal solidarity for all is not an actually existing "Western reality" in which they live, but it is an ideal which is yet to be achieved.

Indeed, a considerable number of students of North American and Western European politics who contribute to a body of academic literature which has grown since the 1960s to enormous proportions seem to agree that the actually existing models of Western democracy are not as democratic as they could and ought to be. These students of Western European and North American politics investigate whether certain redistributive socio-economic arrangements, institutional changes in the structure of the capitalist political economy, certain forms of affirmative action, and a revitalization of voluntary civil society organizations, can boost the participation of marginal groups in the public-political processes of policy and decision-making, and move the actually existing models of democracy in the Western societies closer to its enlightened ideas and ideals. The very existence of these debates on the possibilities of further democratization in the actually existing Western democracies in the Western European and North American

academic forums proves that the validity of the first cognitive claim on which the doctrine of American exceptionalism rests begs the question.

With respect to the second cognitive claim, it is not obvious why their experience with and knowledge about one incomplete model of democracy should give to the Western European and North American students of democracy (or to the students of Western European and North American democracies) a more authoritative voice in passing final judgment on questions of democracy and democratization everywhere on earth. Indeed there is a sense which holds that a direct experience with tyranny, discrimination, persecution, or socio-economic inequality which is unfortunately the daily ration of most human beings living in Asian, Latin American, and African regions of the world, can be more productive of an appreciative insight into the nature and working of democracy and democratic politics. If democratization and protection of human rights is indeed a worthy common goal for the humanity to pursue, then the relationship between the Western and non-Western actors pursuing democratization must be one of mutual learning, cooperation, and solidarity; rather than that of Western tutors lecturing non-Western pupils about the real realities, real needs, real meaning, and real possibilities of democracy and democratization in the non-Western societies.

As mentioned above, during the Vienna Conference the foundations of such a cooperative relationship had been established by and between the Western and non-Western human rights NGOs with promising success. It is true that the lingering echo of a form of Western-centric arrogance, not to say ignorance, can still be heard in the well-meaning but less perceptive enthusiasm of some Western human rights activists.

Nonetheless, it was at the governmental level that the doctrine of American exceptionalism was most effective as a blind-prejudice precipitating a hermeneutic misunderstanding of the Asian governments' Bangkok Declaration -- a misunderstanding that also lent a (misleading) sense of plausibility to the "cultural incompatibility and clash" interpretations of this intergovernmental controversy.

The doctrine of American exceptionalism precipitated a hermeneutic misunderstanding of the Asian governments' Bangkok Declaration because it obscured the fact that objecting to American government's economically and culturally expansionist, and unilaterally interventionist foreign policy is not the same thing as objecting to the universality of human rights and democracy. It obscured the fact that objecting to a model of political modernization, which takes the consumerist excesses of the "the American way of life" as its norm and goal, is not the same thing as objecting to democratization understood as a process of enhancing the enlightened claim to social justice and the rationalistic claim to political legitimacy. It obscured the fact that the Americans in general and Westerners in particular do not hold the exclusive intellectual property rights of the egalitarian, emancipatory, and solidaristic norms and values associated with the modern ideas of human rights and democracy. Finally, the doctrine of American exceptionalism obscured the fact that a genuine moral commitment to human rights and democracy, and indeed to the ideas and ideals of the American constitution itself, *requires* one to object to the notion that the actually existing reality of the contemporary American political system offers all that the losers of the world can

reasonably expect to get for the protection of their inalienable rights as free and equal human beings.

5. Outline of the Chapters

It is partly because of the fact that the doctrine of American exceptionalism *was* functional in shaping the American governments (mis)interpretation of and response to the Bangkok Declaration during the Vienna Conference, that in this thesis I proceed on the assumption that we can gain a more profound insight into the controversy over the universality on human rights by interpreting this controversy in terms of the conceptual differences between the Schumpeterian-empiricist and enlightened normativist approaches to democracy and democratization. In the second chapter, I begin my discussion by turning to Joseph Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. Schumpeter was the first theorist who sought to establish a conceptual equation between democracy understood as a normatively desirable form of government, on the one hand, and democracy understood as the actually existing social, political, economic, and cultural reality of the Western societies, on the other. Despite the popularity that this Schumpeterian approach to democracy has gained in American political science in the 1950s, in the world political context of the Cold War, it was defective in that it jettisoned normative questions of justice and legitimacy from the operational definition of democracy.

In the third chapter I turn to the enlightened criticisms that this defect in the Schumpeterian conceptual architectonic has received from left-wing and liberal authors from the early 1960s onwards. In this context I also refer the reader to the neo-

conservative reactions that these enlightened criticisms themselves attracted from the mid-1970s onwards. Concerned with the "decline of the American power and influence in world politics", the neo-conservative authors sought to re-establish the conceptual equation between the normative desirability of democracy, on the one hand, and the actually existing reality of the Western societies on the other. In the 1980s and 1990s, these neo-conservative attempts to re-assert the Schumpeterian view did not find much of a resonance in the academic literature debating the possibilities of democratization in the Western European and North American societies. Yet, the neo-conservative agenda found a firm foothold in the academic literature devoted to political development in the Asian, African, and Latin American societies and resonated in the American government's interpretation of and response to the Asian governments' Bangkok Declaration.

In the fourth chapter I turn to debates in the Western academic forums in which the normative meaning of human rights and democracy is explicitly thematized from within the conceptual horizons of the enlightened political thought. In this context I present an exegetical comparison and evaluation of the works of three prominent thinkers: Rawls, Held, and Habermas. These authors seek to re-articulate the democratic conception of social justice and rationalistic claim to political legitimacy in response to the existential problems that came to threaten human existence on earth in the second half of the twentieth century.

In conclusion I emphasize the point, that in the institutional context of the inter-governmental UN forums, Habermas' discourse theoretical approach is the more promising candidate to overcome the estrangement between the Asian and Western

positions on human rights issues. This is so because the text of the Asian governments' Bangkok Declaration suggests that Habermas' dialogical interpretation and reconstruction of the normative intuitions associated with the modern idea of universal human rights can be the focus of an "overlapping consensus", in Rawls' sense, between the "Western" and "Asian" cultural traditions. Therefore, the global process of cosmopolitan democratization, as elucidated by Held, can corroborate its practical cogency in contemporary world politics, by taking the discourse theoretical principles of universalization and democracy as its normative building blocks.

CHAPTER 2

EMPIRICAL THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY (I): THE POST-WAR GENERATION

1. Introduction

In the first chapter I introduced the argument that the controversy staged by the American and Asian Governments during the Vienna Conference can be interpreted as the product of a misunderstanding. This, I suggested, is a misunderstanding of the dialogical conception of political legitimacy and enlightened conception of social justice on the normative common-ground of which the criticisms and counter-criticisms of cultural imperialism and political authoritarianism both rest. We can understand this misunderstanding in terms of the conceptual differences between two ways of approaching to questions and problems of democracy and democratization: The Asian Governments' Bangkok declaration resonates with what I call, for want of a better term, the enlightened normative approach. The American government's interpretation of and response to the Bangkok declaration is informed by the doctrine of American exceptionalism, and as such it can be interpreted within the framework of the Schumpeterian-empiricist approach. In this and the next chapter I examine the Schumpeterian-empiricist approach.

1.1. The Scope of the Chapter

The origins of the empiricist approach can be traced to Joseph Schumpeter's influential work Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy so that the post-war corpus of empirical research on questions and problems of democracy and democratization in the American universities is often classified under the generic category: "Schumpeterian." An

account of this post-war approach to democracy would remain incomplete, however, if it did not include works which successive generations of students, among them today's policy and decision-makers, have considered to be twentieth century classics of political science. These include works such as Robert Dahl's A Preface to Democratic Theory, Who Governs? and Polyarchy, Seymour Martin Lipset's Political Man, Gabriel Almond's and Sydney Verba's The Civic Culture, David Apter's The Politics of Modernization, and Samuel Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies.

There are four sets of questions that are raised and addressed in this empiricist literature on democracy: (1) What is democracy? (2) How does it function? (3) What are the institutional, social, economic, and cultural conditions of its existence in a country and/or social organization? (4) How can democracy, its institutions, and its social, economic, and cultural conditions be brought into being in a country and/or social organization, where they do not exist? In this chapter I review the answers that the post-War classics of American political science give to these questions. In this review I emphasize the following four points.

1.2. The Substance of the Chapter

First, post-war empirical research conducted in American universities on questions of democracy and democratization tends to establish a conceptual equation between democracy understood as a normatively desirable form of government, on the one hand, and the actually existing, political, cultural, and economic reality of the "American" society in particular and Western societies in general, on the other. Second, the conceptual architectonic that issues from this equation breaks with the enlightened

tradition of normative political thought. This conceptual architectonic excludes the rationalistic notion of legitimacy (i.e., legitimacy understood as rational justifiability from the point of view of those over whom political authority is exercised), and enlightened conception of social justice from the operational definition of democracy.¹

Third, the exclusion of normative questions concerning social justice and the rational justifiability of political authority from the re-definition of democracy as the actually existing reality of American society makes logical sense only on either of the following two assumptions: (a) Normative questions concerning social justice and rational justifiability of political authority are of limited significance in democratic political theory and practice. (b) The way the American political system actually functions gives effect to the democratic claim to social justice and the rationalistic claim to political legitimacy in the actions and inter-actions of the American citizens as much as humanly possible. (In other words, if democracy is defined as a description of the way American political system actually functions, this definition would, *ipso facto*, include the best possible approximation of the democratic ideals of social justice and political legitimacy.) Fourth, Schumpeterian students of democracy accept either of these assumptions as an axiom in conducting political scientific research on democracy at the expense of logical inconsistencies permeating their conceptual architectonic and despite empirical evidence suggesting the contrary. The axiomatic acceptance of assumptions

¹ Schumpeterian authors replace the rationalistic notion of legitimacy as justifiability from the point of view of those over whom political authority is exercised, with the Weberian notion of the (popular) "belief in the legitimacy" of political authority. I shall return and clarify the significance of this point below, in my discussion of Lipset's Schumpeterian definition of democracy; as well as in the fourth chapter, where I discuss the normative theories of democracy. For an insightful discussion of this point see S. Benhabib (1994).

begging the question in *academic* research on democracy and democratization can be interpreted as reflective of the anxiety created by the existential threats that were believed to be posed to the "American way life" in the world political context of the Cold War.

1.3. The Outline of the Chapter

The chapter is organized in four sections. In the second section I present an exegetical summary of Schumpeter's own attempt to re-define democracy "more realistically", i.e., in a way that the definition of democracy would correspond to the empirical reality of the way politics is actually practiced in the "Western" democracies. In my discussion, I seek to situate this attempt within the historical and intellectual context of the questions and problems raised by the events that led to the outbreak of the second world war. I briefly compare Schumpeter's' approach to the thoughts of such continental political thinkers, as Horkheimer, Adorno, and Arendt who wrote in the same world political context, in the same period, in response to similar questions and problems. I suggest that the emergence of the Cold War, immediately after the second world war, was a not insignificant factor accounting for the relatively greater popularity that Schumpeter's approach to democracy has gained in American political science.

In the third section, I present a critical review of the answers that empiricist students of democracy, who followed in Schumpeter's footsteps in the immediate post-War decades gave to the above mentioned four questions concerning democracy and democratization. The fourth section concludes this chapter, with a general summary and evaluation.

Thus outlined, this chapter seeks to present an exegetical summary and critical evaluation of the basic assumptions and conclusions about democracy and democratization shared by the post-war generation of empiricist authors. In the next chapter we shall focus on the political theoretical debates instigated by New Left criticisms that this Schumpeterian position received from the late 1960s and early 1970s onwards, and review some of the "neoconservative" reactions that these criticisms themselves attracted. While the new-left criticisms were re-introducing the significance of normative questions of justice and legitimacy into democratic theory and practice within the context of North American and Western European societies, the neoconservative authors revitalized the Schumpeterian approach as a more realistic and moderate alternative to address questions concerning "political development" in the Asian, African, and Latin American societies. It is also in the next chapter that I shall clarify how and in what sense exactly this Schumpeterian neo-conservative agenda came to resonate in the American government's interpretation of and response to the Asian Governments' Bangkok declaration.

2. The Origins: Schumpeter in North America

In 1942, when Joseph Schumpeter first published Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, victory in the second world war was still hanging in balance between allied and axis powers. The malfunctioning of the liberal democratic Weimar constitution, which had carried the Nazi party to power through popular vote in 1933, was still fresh in memory. The magnitude of the Nazi atrocities was not yet known to its fullest. Nonetheless millions of displaced people who had been forced to seek refuge from Nazi

oppression in the Western world had already provided their hosts with first hand accounts of what tyranny and persecution meant. Making sense of this collapse of humanistic reason, reflecting upon the social and political turbulences of the inter-war period, and developing responses to the foreseeable problems of human survival were priority items motivating creative social and political thinking in this period.

Joseph Schumpeter's venture to step out of his "area of specialization," namely economics, and develop "another theory of democracy" in a direct and explicit polemic against what he called the "classical doctrine of democracy" should be understood in this general historical and intellectual context. The difficulties and disappointments Schumpeter had experienced as a one-time minister of finance of Austria, and as an involved observer of the rise of Nazism and Fascism as popular movements in inter-war Europe resonate in his attempt to cut the normative claim of democracy, namely liberty and equality for all, to a "safe" minimum.

2.1. Schumpeter's Polemic Against the "Classical Doctrine of Democracy"

In Schumpeter's discussion the term "classical doctrine of democracy" refers to the following idea: There is a common good in every self-governing political community on which equal and free citizens can form a consensus through rational discussions. By taking guidance from these public discussions citizens can make, either directly, or indirectly through their elected representatives, intelligent public policy choices and decisions. In Schumpeter's words:

The eighteenth century philosophy of democracy may be couched in the following definition: the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common

good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will.... It is held, then, there exists a Common Good, the obvious beacon light of policy, which is always simple to define and which every normal person can be made to see by means of rational argument (Schumpeter 1987, 250).

Schumpeter's polemic against this "classical doctrine of democracy" is based on two counter-arguments:² The first counter-argument is that "there is... no such thing as a uniquely determined common good" (Schumpeter 1987, 251). "Even if a sufficiently definite common-good... proved to be acceptable to all, this would not imply equally definite answers to individual issues" (Schumpeter 1987, 251-2). In other words, different people have different and contradictory ideas about what the common good of the political community is, or how to achieve it. This means, the so-called public opinion and the "general will of the people," lacks "rational unity and sanction." Therefore, public opinion, the general will of the people, the common good of the political community, and reasoned argumentation between free and equal citizens making up the political community, all central to the classical doctrine of democracy, cannot and indeed should not be taken as reliable guides in making and implementing public policy choices and decisions.

² Under the above quoted definition of "the classical doctrine of democracy", Schumpeter collapses various strands of political philosophical thought, ranging from ancient Greek, to Rousseau-Marxist, Kantian and utilitarian approaches. Obviously there are important theoretical and practical differences between these political philosophical approaches, particularly with respect to how they define "justice" and "legitimacy." Thus collapsing these different approaches under one heading can be construed as a serious misrepresentation on Schumpeter's part. Nonetheless, all these political philosophical approaches have one thing in common: They may define "justice" and "legitimacy" differently, yet they all take the normative questions of justice and legitimacy seriously. Therefore, it is possible to interpret Schumpeter's polemic against what he calls the classical doctrine of democracy as a polemic against normative political thought as such. On this point also see Held's (1987, 164-185) excellent discussion in the Models of Democracy. In either case, in what follows I take Schumpeter's own definition of the "classical doctrine", as my reference point.

The second counter-argument is that in terms of the "genuine" long-term interests of "the people", unpopular policy choices are often more effective than popular ones. This is so because typical citizens usually show a lower level of intellectual performance in politics than in economics. They usually tend to yield to "extra or irrational prejudice and impulse." They are susceptible to ideological propaganda and manipulation tactics. In Schumpeter's words:

[T]he typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He becomes primitive again. His thinking becomes associative and affective....

The only point that matters here is that Human Nature being what it is [extremist groups] are able to fashion and, within very wide limits, even to create the will of the people. What we are confronted with in the analysis of political processes is largely not a genuine but manufactured will. And often it is this artifact that is all that in reality corresponds to the *volente general* of the classical doctrine. So far this is so the will of the people is the product and not the motive power of the political process (Schumpeter 1987, 262).

Given their gullible and egotistical nature, hence infantile behavior in the "political field," then, "typical citizens" cannot, and indeed, should not be entrusted with democratic self-government.

2.2. Schumpeter's "Another Theory of Democracy"

Schumpeter developed this polemic against the "classical doctrine of democracy" in the midst of the second world war, at a time when the survival of reason depended upon the strength of the military and technological "might" it could mobilize in

its service. Under these conditions he was understandably reluctant to draw from observations reflecting the experiences and disappointments of the inter-war period, a conclusion that would condemn democracy as an untenable form of government as such. Therefore, instead of discarding "democracy" altogether Schumpeter sought to redefine it in what he considered to be a more "realistic" fashion. In this "realistic" definition of democracy, Schumpeter "reversed" the roles of the electorate and elected representatives: In this new institutional arrangement the role Schumpeter ascribed to "typical citizens" was *not* to participate in the making of policy choices and decisions, by giving voice to informed criticisms, approvals, and/or disapprovals. Rather, the "typical citizen's" new role was to select the "men who are able to do the deciding" for them:

It will be remembered that our chief troubles about the classical theory centered in the proposition that "the people" hold a definite and rational opinion about every individual question and that they give effect to this opinion -- in a democracy -- by choosing "representatives" who will see to it that that opinion carried out. Thus the selection of representatives is made secondary to the primary purpose of the democratic arrangement which is to vest the power of deciding political issues in the electorate. Suppose we reverse the roles of these two elements and make the deciding of issues by the electorate secondary to the election of the men who are to do the deciding. To put it differently, we now take the view that the role of the people is to produce a government, or else an intermediate body which in turn will produce a national executive or government. And we define: the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote (Schumpeter 1987, 269).

Democracy, thus redefined, is competitive elitism, or better yet competitive technocracy.³ If we look from the perspective of the "typical citizens," this definition restricts democratic political practice to voting in regular elections for possible teams of political leaders. If we look from the perspective of possible teams of political leaders, this definition restricts democratic political practice to campaigning, in regular intervals, for the votes of those who are *not* capable of deciding. In either case, the making of policy choices and decisions affecting the whole of the political community, as well as the *accountability* of those who make these decisions and choices, hence the question of the legitimacy of these decisions and choices are not included in the definition of what Schumpeter calls the "democratic method." For Schumpeter the making of public policy agenda, and the accountability of those who make and implement this agenda, are not normative questions of legitimacy to be judged in reasoned discussions by and between equal and free citizens (or their elected representatives). Rather, they are technical problems of public administration to be solved by professional "career politicians" (with the help of their expert advisors). The validity of the policy choices and decisions thus made does not hinge on whether these choices and decisions can meet "with the approval of all affected citizens, in their capacity, as equal and free participants in rational discourses." Their validity depends, rather, on their "effectiveness" in achieving the genuine long-terms "interests" of the citizens (as defined and specified by their "able" political leaders).

³ The term Schumpeter prefers is "competitive leadership" (Schumpeter 1987, 284).

Schumpeter has some legitimate ground to claim the title of "democracy" for this theory of competitive technocracy. He has some legitimate ground because this theory retains the requirement of holding regular elections between competing teams of political leaders; and within this requirement, the two central normative ideas of "democracy" in their "minimized" form, namely, political freedom and political equality. In its minimized form the political freedom of the citizens involves their formal freedom to bid for "leadership." Yet it does not include their freedom to (not to be confused with "obligation to") keep themselves informed and voice their reasoned criticisms and opinions to guide the elected or appointed policy-makers. In its minimized form, the political equality of the citizens involves their formal equality of each having one vote in the selection of political decision and policy-makers. It does not include, however, their social and economic equality in developing the capacities and competencies required for their informed participation in the making of public policy choices and decisions affecting the whole of the political community.

To compensate for these losses in political equality and political freedom Schumpeter's theory of competitive technocracy offers two practical advantages. Schumpeter presents these as if they were incentives designed to encourage his readers to cancel their subscription to the "classical doctrine" and subscribe instead to his "another theory of democracy." These two "incentives" also illuminate what Schumpeter means when he claims that his "another theory of democracy" is more "realistic" than the "classical doctrine." In Schumpeter's words:

I think that most students of politics have by now come to accept the criticisms leveled at the classical doctrine of democracy in the preceding chapter. I also think most of them agree, or will agree before long, in accepting another theory which is much truer to life and at the same time salvages much of what sponsors of the democratic method really mean by these terms (Schumpeter 1987, 269).

The first "incentive," namely the claim that Schumpeter's "another theory of democracy" is "truer to life" is offered to attract those "students of politics" whose scholarly values oblige them to face facts as facts, truths as truths -- however undesirable and/or disappointing these may be. The emphasis his new theory of democracy puts on the regular competition between career politicians, Schumpeter claims, corresponds to the way in which democratic politics is actually practiced, and public policy choices and decisions are actually made in the actually existing democracies. Schumpeter describes this actually existing reality in following words:

If we wish to face facts squarely we must recognize that in modern democracies of any type other than the Swiss, politics will inevitably be a career. This in turn spells recognition of a distinct professional interest in the individual politician and of a distinct group interest in the political profession as such.... Politically the man is still in the nursery, so as never to forget, the saying attributed to one of the most successful politicians that ever lived: "What businessmen do not understand is that exactly as they are dealing in oil so I am dealing in votes" (Schumpeter 1987, 285).⁴

⁴ Schumpeter does not tell us who this successful politician is. But in a footnote he qualifies and defends this observation in following words: "Such a view is sometimes disapproved of as frivolous or cynical. I think on the contrary that it is more cynical to render lip service to slogans for which in private one has nothing but an augur smile" (Schumpeter 1987, 285). One must agree with Schumpeter that this may well be the way that some, or most professional politicians in actually existing modern democracies understand what politics is about. It is far from obvious, however, why a political theorist should restrict his options in constructing "another theory of democracy", to choosing between a cynical and more cynical view of politics.

The second incentive, namely the claim that Schumpeter's theory salvages much (though not all) of what sponsors of democracy believe it to be is, in turn, offered to attract those human beings, who would have liked to make sense of what they were dying and killing for in the existential struggle called the second world war. His theory, argues Schumpeter, provides:

...a reasonably efficient criterion by which to distinguish democratic governments from others. We have seen that the classical theory meets with difficulties on that score because both the will and the good of the people may be, and in many historical instances have been, served just as well or better by governments that cannot be described as democratic according to any accepted usage of the term. Now we are in a somewhat better position partly because we are resolved to stress a *modus procedendi* [i.e., regular and free competition for free vote] the presence or absence of which is easy to verify (Schumpeter 1987, 270).

For the native speakers of English in 1942, to whom Schumpeter's book was addressed, distinguishing between democracy and non-democracy meant nothing less (but also nothing more) than distinguishing between friends with whom one could live, and enemies whom one had to kill in order to be able to live.

2.3. Schumpeter and other Continental Thinkers in North America

Obviously, Schumpeter's theory of competitive technocracy was not the only piece of creative political thinking trying to come to terms with the existential questions of the period. What happened in the first half of the twentieth century defied reason, but at the at the same time it called for a reasonable explanation and an intelligent response.

Schumpeter's polemic against "the classical doctrine of democracy", more specifically, his low opinion of the "typical citizen's" mental capacities and infantile behavior in politics, was only one way of explaining the perplexing events of the period. His "another theory of democracy", more specifically his trust in the educated technocrats' ability and responsibility to calculate the long term consequences of their own political decisions and actions, was only one way of responding to them. There were other names with whom Schumpeter shared the unenviable fate of being an intellectual émigré in North America burdened with the same existential questions. Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Hannah Arendt were three such thinkers who thought about similar problems of (democratic) politics in the same world historical context.

In 1947, before returning to Germany, Horkheimer published The Eclipse of Reason. In this book Horkheimer introduced the "Frankfurt School of Critical Theory" to English speaking readers. As developed by Adorno and Horkheimer the Frankfurt school of Critical Theory is premised upon a humanistic critique of modern social and political thought -- more specifically one aspect of it, namely the dominance of "instrumental rationality." Instrumental rationality is that form of strategic reasoning process which we employ whenever we calculate the most efficient and effective means to achieve a given end, but which does not tell us, in itself, whether the end we seek to achieve, is good, right, just, or legitimate in a moral sense. The rigorous application of this form rationality in the sphere of social, political, economic, and military activity was an integral part of a number of events that perplexed the human mind in the first half of the twentieth century. These include, for example, the "effectiveness" of the Nazi Propaganda machine in

erasing reason from the public consciousness of the "typical" German citizens; the horrible "efficiency" of the Nazi death factories; the unprecedented scale and scope of the Second World War; the pursuit of total (aerial) victory without distinguishing between combatant soldiers and non-combatant civilians; and the allied victory which ended this first truly global and thoroughly technological war in human history.⁵

In the Eclipse of Reason, in criticism of the dominance of this form of rationality in modern social and political thought, Horkheimer wrote:

At the moment of this writing the peoples of the democratic nations are confronted with the problems of consummating their victory of arms. They must work out and to put into practice the principles of humanity in the name of which the sacrifices of war were made. The present potentialities of social achievements surpass the expectations of all the philosophers and statesmen who have ever outlined in utopian programs the idea of a truly human society. Yet there is a universal feeling of fear and disillusionment. The hopes of mankind seem to be farther from fulfillment today than they were even in the groping epochs when they were first formulated by humanists. It seems that even as technical knowledge expands the horizon of man's thought and activity, his autonomy as an individual, his ability to resist the growing apparatus of mass manipulation, his power of imagination, his independent judgment appear to be reduced. Advance in technical facilities for enlightenment is accompanied by a process of dehumanization. Thus progress threatens to nullify the very goal it is supposed to realize -- the idea of man. Whether this situation is a necessary phase in the general ascent of society as a whole, or whether it

⁵ As another émigré scholar, Hans Morgenthau, pointed out in 1946, it wasn't the superior bravery of the allied soldiers, or the rightness of the cause for which they fought that eventually won the war for the "democratic" nations -- however brave the allied soldiers were, and however right their cause was. It was the efficiency in conceiving and implementing military strategies and tactics, and the technological effectiveness of the weapons used on the battle-field that determined the outcome of the war. See Hans Morgenthau's Scientific Man vs. Power Politics: "It would be tempting, yet rash to take it for granted that those who believe in these [rationalistic] assumptions were victorious in war because they believe in them. Military victory proves only what it actually signifies: that militarily one group of men is superior to another. Those men may excel in philosophic insight, moral wisdom, and statecraft; but if they do, they do so by virtue of their excellence in these respective fields and not because they have shown themselves adept in warfare" (Morgenthau 1946, 6).

will lead to a victorious re-emergence of the neobarbarism recently defeated on the battlefields, depends at least in part on our ability to interpret accurately the profound changes now taking place in the public mind and in human nature.

....As understood and practiced in our civilization, progressive rationalization tends, in my opinion, to obliterate that very substance of reason in the name of which this progress is espoused (Horkheimer 1947, v-vi).

Horkheimer offered this characterization of the dehumanizing consequences of progressive (instrumental) rationalization, as a diagnostic insight into what happened, and why it happened in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. Hannah Arendt was another thinker who sought refuge from Nazi oppression in North America during this period. In 1950 Hannah Arendt published another stimulating account of what happened in Europe, why it happened, and what she thought ought to be done in response to it. In the Origins of Totalitarianism she wrote:

Anti-Semitism (not merely hatred of Jews), Imperialism (not merely conquest), totalitarianism (not merely dictatorship) -- one after the other, one more brutally than the other, have demonstrated that human dignity needs a new guarantee which can be found only in a new political principle, in a new law on earth, whose validity this time must comprehend the whole of humanity while its power must remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by newly defined territorial entities.

We can no longer afford to take that which was good in the past and simply call it our heritage, to discard the bad and simply think of it as a dead load which by itself time will bury into oblivion. The subterranean stream of Western history has finally come to the surface and usurped the dignity of our tradition. This is the reality in which we live. And this is why all efforts to escape from the grimness of the present into nostalgia for a still intact past, or into the anticipated oblivion of a better future, are vain (Arendt 1951, ix).

Though following different tracks of thought, Horkheimer and Arendt shared a similar insight about the social and political problems of the time, namely, the insight that unreflective progress on the path opened by instrumental rationality, on the path which had led to the collapse of humanistic reason altogether, is *not* the answer. They also posed similar intellectual challenges to their contemporaries: To think hard, to find a different, more humane way of thinking and practicing politics. As such, their thought stood in a sharp contrast with Schumpeter's attempt to come to terms with the perplexing questions of the period. For if we pursue Schumpeter's response to its logical conclusion, we arrive at the following suggestion: Erase imprecise questions of justice and legitimacy from the definition of democracy, jettison fallible human beings -- typical citizens -- from political processes, replace them with ideally rational, competitive, and "responsible" technocrats, and thus carry "*dehumanizing* rationalization" of the society, to its consummation.

At the end of the twentieth century, the intellectual challenge that Arendt and Horkheimer posed to their contemporaries in the late 1940s and 1950s is still relevant. Indeed, in our ecologically degraded, culturally diversified, globally inter-connected, nuclear times, when what Horkheimer has called "the neobarbarism recently defeated on battle fields" makes a glorious re-emergence in the form of violent ethnic conflicts, this challenge is even more urgent. Thankfully, their works still instigate insightful debates mostly among sociologists and philosophers who understand and take the existential dimension of politics seriously.⁶ Unfortunately, however, neither Arendt, nor Horkheimer

⁶ For a perceptive discussion of the relevance of Hannah Arendt's thought in the context of contemporary debates about international human rights, see J.C. Isaac (1996) "A New Guarantee on Earth: Hannah Arendt on Human Dignity and the Politics of Human Rights". David Held's (1980) Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to

had the impact that Schumpeter had on American political science. They did not, because soon after the Second World War, came the Cold War. And the ideological dimension of the Cold War increased the misleading seductiveness of the two incentives Schumpeter offered as subscription bonuses to his "pragmatic" American readers: a clear "no-nonsense" criterion to distinguish democracy from non-democracy, and descriptive accuracy in defining democracy.

2.4. The Emergence of the Cold War as an Ideological Controversy

The War-time camaraderie between Russians and the Western allies did not last long after the end of the Second World War. After the War Stalin resisted Western demands to let non-communist groups and interests be represented in the post-war reconstruction of the Eastern European states. He thought that the installation of friendly governments in countries which fell within the "Russian Zone of Influence" after the war was a "right" that Russian people had won on the battle-fields, with enormous sacrifices.

For the American and British governments, however, victory in the war was not something that could be interpreted as generating a territorial right. Therefore they interpreted Stalin's recalcitrant attitude in Eastern Europe as the indisputable proof of Soviet Union's aggressive, expansionist intentions in post-War world politics. What Washington and London could not be so sure about was whether the Soviet union posed a primarily geopolitical or a primarily ideological threat to the British and American interests. In other words was Stalin's main goal to shift the European balance of power in

Habermas remains to be the most accessible discussion of the thought of the inter-war generation of Frankfurt School thinkers.

favor of Russia? Or was it to export the communist ideology of the Soviet Union to the rest of the World?

Among American foreign policy experts, opinion differed. Experts familiar with the continental way of conducting foreign policy, like Walter Lipman and Hans Morgenthau, thought that it was the former: In Morgenthau's opinion, "ideology" was an instrument, rather than an end in itself, which Stalin cynically used to pursue traditional Russian foreign policy goals -- namely territorial expansion toward the West, and access to "warm waters" toward the South.⁷ The Soviet Union's pre-war conduct -- such as the non-aggression pact Stalin signed with the Nazi Germany in 1939 -- provided ample evidence for the plausibility of this "realistic" interpretation. Stalin's post-war demand of Soviet control over the straits which connect the Black Sea to the Aegean; and his territorial demands in Eastern Anatolia were further points lending credibility to the geopolitical interpretation of the Soviet threat.

According to George Kennan (who was then working as a "Russia" expert in the US embassy in Moscow), however, underlying the threat from the East was not the traditional geopolitical ambitions of Russia, but the "communist dogma" of the Soviet Union. He wrote:

In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose; they [the Russians] found justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the

⁷ "[F]or the Soviet Union it [ideological commitment] was a means to the end of the security of the Russian state. More particularly, Stalin was not prevented by his psychological weaknesses from playing an extremely cynical and flexible game in Eastern Europe, becoming inflexibly committed to the imposition of communism [on Eastern Europe] only after it had become apparent that only Communist governments would do the bidding of the Soviet Union" (Morgenthau 1970, 121).

dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifices they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today, they cannot dispense with it (Kennan 1946, 700).

Ironically what the American and British governments perceived to be the sure sign of Soviet threat, whether this threat was interpreted in terms of ideology or in terms of geopolitics, was for Stalin basically a defensive maneuver. In his memoirs, Anatoly Dobrynin, Moscow's Ambassador to Washington from 1962 to 1986, summarizes Stalin's perception of American intentions in the aftermath of the Second World War in following words:

Stalin saw US plans and actions as preparation for an all-out war of aggression against the Soviet Union. As his successor Nikita Khrushchev later recalled, the Soviet leadership then believed that the United States, with its superiority in nuclear weapons, would ultimately go to war with the Soviet Union. Soviet diplomacy was heavily influenced by this Stalinist dogma about the inevitability of a world war, and this of course affected our relations with the United States at that time. But the dogma itself was also strengthened by the permanent postwar hostility of the United States and its own intransigence toward the Soviet Union (Dobrynin 1995, 26).

Henry Kissinger, who in his capacities as National Security Advisor, and Secretary of State crossed swords with Dobrynin in the latter phases of the Cold War, concurs with this summary of Stalin's state of mind in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War:

Paradoxically, the drift toward the Cold War was accelerated by Stalin's knowledge of how weak his country really was. Soviet territory west of Moscow had been devastated, for the standard practice of retreating Armies -- first the Soviet, then the German -- had been to blow up every chimney in order to deprive their pursuers of shelter against Russia's brutal climate. The number of Soviet War dead (including civilians) was over 20 million.... Now this worn-out country found itself suddenly faced with America's technological breakthrough of the atom bomb. Could it mean that the moment long dreaded by Stalin had finally arrived, and that the capitalist world would be able to impose its will? Had all the suffering and exertion, inhuman by even Russia's exorbitant tyrannical standards, brought them to nothing better than a one-sided capitalist advantage?

With almost reckless bravado, Stalin chose to pretend that the Soviet Union was acting from strength, not weakness. Volunteering concessions was, in Stalin's mind a confession of vulnerability, and he viewed any such admission as likely to generate new demands and pressures. So he kept his army in the center of Europe, where he gradually imposed Soviet puppet governments. Going even further, he conveyed an image of such implacable ferocity that many thought him poised for a dash to the English Channel -- a fear widely recognized by posterity as chimerical (Kissinger 1994, 438-39).

In this passage Kissinger admits that in the emergence of the Cold War a mutual misunderstanding between the Western nations and the Soviet Union played an important part -- a misunderstanding in which each defensive geopolitical move made by one party was interpreted as further proof of ideological aggressiveness by the other party. Reflecting on the origins of the Cold War in retrospect, Hans Morgenthau summarized this misunderstanding in following words:

The new dimension which set this conflict apart from its predecessor and transformed it into a Cold War was the Communist character of the Soviet State and of its foreign policy. More particularly, it was Stalin's fusion of the traditional national interests of Russia with the tenets of communism and its misunderstanding by the West, as well as Stalin's misunderstanding of the West's reaction, that were responsible for that transformation (Morgenthau 1970, 92).

The fundamental problem that explains the diplomatic misunderstanding to which Morgenthau draws attention, as any other misunderstanding, was the lack (or some may say impossibility) of open and sincere dialogue between the parties. This problem was further aggravated when the Truman administration discovered that the "ideological" interpretation of the Soviet threat was easier to sell to the American public in general, and to the congressional leaders in particular, than the "geopolitical" one. This discovery was made in the Oval Office, in a meeting between President Truman, then-Assistant Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and a congressional delegation led by Senator Arthur Vandenberg. In this meeting Truman and Acheson sought to convince congressional leaders that the "Soviet Threat" was real and grave enough to warrant financial and military overseas involvement on the part of the American government. When the geopolitical argument failed to secure congressional support, Dean Acheson tried the ideological argument for size. It fitted nicely with congressional leaders' anxieties and sensitivities.⁸ In a standard text book on American Foreign Policy, John Spanier offers a more general interpretation for this particular Oval Office episode in which the American government adopted "ideological" rather than "geopolitical" confrontation as the official interpretation of the Cold War:

It was not until a year and half after World War II ended that the Truman Doctrine was enunciated.... Hostile Soviet Behavior was the reason for the gradual shift of American policy and public opinion from amity to enmity; American policy was not the product of virulent and pre-existing anti-Communist ideology....

⁸ This "Oval Office" episode is narrated in Henry Kissinger (1994, 451-452).

The Role of anti-Communism in American policy was essentially to mobilize Congressional and public support for the policy once it had been decided upon. A nation that had historically condemned power politics as immoral and as a corruption of the democratic ideal needed a moral basis for its new use of power. Anti-communism fitted into the familiar dichotomy of a peaceful and democratic New World confronted by a warlike and dictatorial Old Europe. For a people weary after four years of war, who identified the termination of war with the end of power politics, who were used to isolation from Europe's wicked affairs, and who were preoccupied with the pursuit of happiness, success, and the dollar at home, anti-Communism was like the cavalry's bugle call to charge; it fitted neatly into the traditional American dichotomy of the world into extremes of evil and morality, thereby arousing the nation for yet another foreign policy mission (Spanier 1977, 42-43).

Having secured the support of the congress, president Truman did not wait long before announcing the famous doctrine known by his name. According to the Truman Doctrine, the United States of America pledged military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey as part of its "geopolitical" defensive against the "Soviet threat." The wording of President Truman's announcement was, however, such that it described the American government's conflict with the Soviet Union not as a geopolitical dispute, but as a clash between two fundamentally incompatible "ways of life."

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed election, and the suppression of personal freedoms (Truman 1947, 178).

The "anti-Communist" "pro-freedom" rhetoric invented for the purpose of gaining public support for the Truman Doctrine eventually found its way into the famous National Security Council (NSC) document, NSC-68 of 1950, which committed the American Government to the "containment policy." The containment policy was designed to prevent the supposedly "virulent spread" of Soviet communism in world politics. It had been anticipated in a 1947 article published in the Foreign Affairs by an author "X" who was later identified to be George Kennan. Inspired by Kennan's recommendations, NSC-68 defined the "Soviet threat" as follows:⁹

Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world.

According to this document, what was challenged by the "fanatical faith" of the Soviet Union, was:

Our determination to maintain the essential elements of individual freedom, ...our determination to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination to fight if necessary to defend *our way of life*.

To defend the American people's "free and democratic way of life" against the "fanatical faith" of the Soviet Union, the American administration was determined to pursue two policies:

⁹ The text of NSC-68 is reproduced in Kesaris' (1987) Documents of the National Security Council, 1947-1977. The following excerpts are quoted in David Campbell (1998, 23-24).

One is a policy which we would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat. It is a policy of attempting to develop a healthy international community. The other is the policy of "containing" the Soviet system. These two policies are closely interrelated and interact with one another.

From the American perspective containing the Soviet system was necessary, not only to defend the "American way of life" against its fanatical enemy, but also because the American way of life was a beacon showing how to live to the rest of the humanity.

The potential within us of bearing witness to the values by which we live holds promise for a dynamic manifestation to the rest of the world of the vitality of our system.

NSC-68 marked the point of no return in the evolution of the Cold War. This point was reached through an abstract quagmire of misunderstandings and confusions between the Soviet and American governments about what each other's post-war intentions were. In bringing about this elusive quagmire, interpretive disputes among the intelligentsia of the American foreign policy establishment played a significant role. So did Stalin's paranoia in playing the strategic game of power politics and American administrations' strategic maneuvers to gain congressional support for a foreign policy thought to be expedient. The abstract and almost trivial nature of these confusions and misunderstandings notwithstanding, however, that which issued from them, namely the Cold War, was not unreal. It was a nightmarish reality in which a "third world war" loomed as an imminent possibility. This was a precarious situation which Hans Morgenthau, following Raymond Aron, described as the "impossibility of peace and the

improbability of war" (Morgenthau 1970, 80). Peace was impossible because the enemy's "faith" was supposed to be "antithetical to our own." War was improbable, because its foreseeable costs in terms of human suffering were too high. When, in the fullness of time Soviet Union and its allies reached "nuclear parity" with the West, "mutually assured destruction" made war more improbable, but peace did not become less impossible. It did not, because along with "mutually assured destruction", mutual misunderstandings and ideological mistrust remained as the defining characteristics of the Cold War.¹⁰

¹⁰ An episode related in Henry Kissinger's memoirs, covering the years of Ford's presidency, gives a good sense of how "ideological mistrust" kept the "Cold War" going. The scene of the episode is the informal preliminary session of the Vladivostok summit meeting (December 1974) between Ford and Brezhnev which was part of the second round of "Strategic Arms Limitation Talks" (SALT II). In this informal session Brezhnev expresses his dissatisfaction with the way SALT II is progressing -- more specifically with its focus on technical and numerical aspects of Arms Control to the exclusion of its humanitarian dimensions: "Let us not speak as diplomats but as human beings" says Brezhnev to Ford. "Both you and I fought in World War II. That war was child's play as compared to nuclear war. Off the record, I am of the opinion that we have proceeded incorrectly, along a wrong course. We have not achieved any real limitations, and in fact we have been spurring the arms race further and further. That is wrong. Tomorrow science can present us with inventions we cannot even imagine today, and I just don't know how much farther we can go in building-up so-called security. This does not mean that I am not prepared to discuss numbers or levels, but I do want to say that this arms race is fraught with great danger... The people don't know all the details, otherwise they would really give us hell. We are spending billions on all these things, billions that would be much better spent for the benefit of the people."

On advice from Kissinger and thinking of the defense hawks back in Washington who saw in the policy of nuclear deterrence the only way to contain the expansion of the Soviet's "antithetical faith," Ford declined Brezhnev's implicit offer to take a more sweeping approach to Arms Control. The talks continued on their planned technical course, reaching an interim agreement on a numerical upper-limit for nuclear weapons for both sides, which, ironically, was set higher than the existing nuclear arsenals of both the Soviet Union and the American government at the time of the summit meeting.

Reflecting on this episode in retrospect, Kissinger writes about the point Brezhnev made: "It was a good point, in many ways at the heart of the Cold War dilemma: the arms race was insoluble without a measure of confidence, but the ideological gulf was so great that both sides were defining security only in technological terms, which evoked as many perplexities as solutions, driving them back to protecting their basic strategic programs. It was a pity that we were not free to explore where Brezhnev's ruminations might have led him and that soon after he became too disabled [due to a stroke] for creative diplomacy" (Kissinger 1999, 289).

To emphasize the point that in the immediate post-war years, the Soviet Union's foreign policy toward the United States of America was, in fact, geopolitically defensive, yet it was misperceived by the American foreign policy elite to be ideologically aggressive, is not to apologize for the oppressive political practices that had been perpetrated within the territorial borders of the Soviet Union, and its "zone of influence" in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era. Similarly, to emphasize the point that in the formative years of the Cold War American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union was, in fact, defensively motivated, but it was believed to be aggressive by the Soviet leaders, is not to apologize for the racist and inequitable social and economic practices perpetrated within the territorial borders of the United States of America, and within the colonies of its European allies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Rather, in the context of this thesis emphasizing the point that in the formative years of the Cold War, the foreign policies of both the Soviet Union and the United States of America were geopolitically defensive toward one another, yet each party misinterpreted the other's foreign policy to be ideologically aggressive, is important for three reasons.

First, it is important to know that among many other historical events, social, economic, and political factors, there *was* also a historically well-documented case of diplomatic misunderstanding which played a not insignificant role in precipitating the emergence of the Cold War. Second it is important to know that the "anti-Communist, pro-freedom and pro-democracy" foreign policy rhetoric that issued from this misunderstanding created a climate of insecurity in American political thought and practice. In this precarious climate the majority of the American citizens, as well as

academic and governing elite, sincerely but mistakenly believed that "our free and democratic system" was under an existential threat from an enemy as dangerous, bellicose, and determined as Japan and the Nazi Germany. Finally it is important to know that it is in the general historical and intellectual context of this existential Cold War anxiety, as expressed in NSC-68, and the original misunderstanding on which this anxiety rested, that Schumpeter's "another theory of democracy" found a receptive audience in American political science.

2.5. The Reception of Schumpeter by the American Political Science

Indeed, there was an unmistakable coalescence between the anti-Communist, pro-freedom and pro-democracy foreign policy rhetoric of the American government as expressed in the National Security Council document No.68 on the one hand, and academic research conducted in the American universities on questions of democracy and democratization in the immediate post-War decades, on the other. The post-war research agenda of American political science can be summarized under four major headings: methodological, theoretical, descriptive, and prescriptive. The methodological research agenda consisted of an effort at positivism to make a fresh start in political theory, by turning the study of democratic politics into a value-free, positivistic, unbiased, objective, exact science. The theoretical research agenda consisted of the corresponding effort to develop a coherent and consistent conceptual framework, in which a "free and democratic" political system could be defined operationally, and from which practically meaningful, falsifiable hypotheses about questions of democracy and democratization could be derived. The descriptive research agenda consisted of an effort to accumulate

and analyze statistical data about the functioning of "free and democratic" political institutions, their social and economic conditions, and cultural and psychological bases. Finally, the prescriptive research agenda consisted of an effort to investigate ways and means of creating and consolidating free and democratic political institutions, their social, economic, and political conditions, and cultural and psychological bases in "other" countries where they, by definition, did not exist. In a moment I shall discuss some key texts that issued from this ambitious research program in greater detail. At this point it is more relevant to note that Schumpeter's "new theory of democracy", with its claim to accuracy in describing a "free and democratic" system as it actually functioned, and its promise to provide a reasonable and clear criterion to distinguish a "free and democratic" political system from that which is "antithetical" to it, provided a favorable starting point to develop and articulate this research program.

Of course the coalescence between the pro-freedom and pro-democracy foreign policy rhetoric of the American government as expressed in NSC-68, on the one hand, and the post-war research agenda of the American political science on the other, cannot be interpreted as the product of a conspiracy between the academic and governing American elite. Nevertheless, this coalescence cannot be dismissed as a mere coincidence either. For this coalescence created a self-reproducing and self-justifying discursive reality. In this discursive context, elected and appointed public officials could refer to the academic authority of the political scientists to substantiate the point that "ours" is indeed a "free and democratic" system and "theirs" is antithetical "to our way of life." Similarly, in raising or distributing funds for academic research political scientists

could refer to the evidence of authoritative government documents, to substantiate the point that comparative studies on democracy and democratization were not merely of academic interest but were also of enormous practical and political significance in the "real world" outside the university campuses.

Indeed, with the passage of time this self-reproducing and self-justifying discursive reality has implanted itself so firmly in American political thought and practice that such mutually supporting references between governing and academic elite ceased to be necessary. The original misunderstandings, confusions, interpretive disputes, and strategic maneuvers which precipitated the emergence of the Cold War as an ideological controversy disappeared in the archives housing millions of other historical trivia. Just as the Cold War evolved into a nightmarish reality in world politics, the conviction that "ours is a free and democratic system", "theirs is the antithesis of our system", and "they" threaten "our way of life", became an undisputed common knowledge in American political thought and practice.

Unfortunately, however, in the 1950s this undisputed common knowledge prevented most American students of American politics from addressing the one significant question that had indeed been raised by Schumpeter's claim that his theory of democracy accurately described the way democratic politics is actually practiced in the actually existing democracies -- including the United States of America. If Schumpeter was right in this claim, then "competitive elitism" (or something similar) was a more correct term to describe the American political system, than "democracy." Moreover if the American constitution was the first "democratic" constitution of the modern age, and as

such the normative ideals that Schumpeter discarded as the "classical doctrine" were inscribed into the American constitution by its authors, this meant that the way United States of America's "free and democratic system" was actually functioning in the 1950s was at odds with the normative ideals inscribed into the American political institutions *during* their very constitution. This, of course, raised the significant question whether there was need and room for further democratization in American politics.

In the 1950s, however, with two world wars behind, one looming ahead, and with an existential conflict in place which was sincerely but mistakenly believed to be threatening "our way of life", the historical and intellectual climate in the United States of America was simply not conducive for the political scientists to pose and address this question. True, in the 1950s there were some American political scientists, contributing to the four-fold research agenda on democracy mentioned above, who sensed and sought to eliminate the discrepancy between the normative self-understanding of American political institutions on the one hand, and the way politics is actually practiced in this institutional media, on the other. Yet they ended up seeking to eliminate this discrepancy not by investigating the possibilities for further democratization of the American political system, but by investigating the possibilities of re-defining, describing, and prescribing democracy in the way politics is actually practiced in the United States of America in the 1950s.

This effort to re-define, re-describe, and prescribe democracy as the American way of practicing politics signified an attempted epistemological break with the enlightened normative tradition in American political thought. In the period roughly from

the early 1950s to about early 1970s, the overwhelming majority of the American students of politics -- the mainstream of political science -- would not turn to, read, interpret and discuss the key texts of early modern and enlightened political philosophy (such as that of Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx), or the key texts that issued from the 18th and 19th century bourgeois revolutions (most notably the American Constitution and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man), in order to address the question: What is democracy? What ought it to be? Rather it will be Schumpeter's "another theory of democracy" and the key texts that issued from post-war empirical research on democracy in this conceptual framework, that will become the most popular political scientific sources on what democracy actually is, has been, will be, and can be.

3. Conceptualizing Democracy as the American Way of Life

3.1. How can democracy be defined in an "operationally" meaningful way?

Robert Dahl's A Preface to Democratic Theory, first published in 1956, can be read as an influential and conceptually sophisticated text in which this post-War attempt to break with the enlightened normative tradition found its clearest expression. Dahl's new preface to democratic theory was based on the premise that "after so many centuries of political speculation, democratic theory continues to be -- if I am correct in my basic assumption -- rather unsatisfactory, whether the theory be regarded as essentially ethical in character or essentially an attempt to describe the actual world" (Dahl 1956, 1). What Dahl had in mind when he referred to "ethical" theories of democracy were two different

approaches to the interpretation of the American constitution. The "bipartisan" structure of the American political system was resting on these two different traditions of interpreting the constitution. At that time these two traditions were still effective in American political thought and practice. The Madisonian tradition informed the "Republican" interpretation of the Constitution. What Dahl called the "populist" approach informed the Democratic one.

Dahl was (and still is) himself more of a populist, hence a "Democrat" than a Madisonian, hence a "Republican." Yet being an "unbiased" political scientist, Dahl did not refrain from pointing out what he thought was the fundamental problem that both approaches shared: they both defined democracy with what Dahl called the "method of maximization." In other words these approaches singled out certain political "values" and sought to define democracy as the system of government that maximizes these values (Dahl 1956, 63). The value that the Madisonian approach sought to maximize was "a non-tyrannical republic" in which the rights of wealthy minority are protected against the tyranny of poor majority (Dahl 1956, 1-3). The value that the populist approach sought to maximize was "popular sovereignty and political equality" (Dahl 1956, 34-62). Of course, "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" was the value which both approaches sought to maximize.

In Dahl's opinion a more sensible way of defining democracy was what he called the "descriptive" method -- namely the method of:

[considering] as a single class of phenomena all those nation states and social organizations that are commonly called democratic by political scientists, and by examining the members of this class to discover, first the

distinguishing characteristics they have in common, and second, the necessary and sufficient conditions for social organizations possessing these characteristics (Dahl 1956, 63).

"Maximization" was the method that normative theorists of politics from Plato and Aristotle onward had employed to define and classify different types of political regimes (or state constitutions), including democracy. The method of description for its part resonated with the realistic Schumpeterian approach to defining democracy. Dahl thought a *compromise* between these two divergent methods of defining democracy was possible:

These [maximization and description] are not, however, mutually exclusive methods. And we shall see that if we begin by employing the first method it will soon become necessary to employ something rather like the second as well (Dahl 1956, 63-4).

The compromise Dahl had in mind was presenting democracy in the populist tradition, according to the first method, as "the value" to be maximized, and defining democracy thus presented in the Schumpeterian fashion, according to the second method, as a description of the "states and social organizations commonly called democratic by political scientists."

To formulate this compromise in a consistent conceptual architectonic, Dahl followed the following procedure: first he conceptualized the practice of decision and policy making in a complex, self-governing political community composed of equal and free citizens as a dynamic and continuous process. Dahl divided this process into four

identifiable and repetitive phases: Pre-voting, voting, post-voting and inter-election periods. Then, drawing upon the "populist" tradition, he identified "eight conditions." These eight conditions outlined the procedural rules that free and equal members of a complex self-governing social organization ought to follow at each of these four phases of the process of democratic decision-making: Dahl listed these eight conditions as follows: during the prevoting period: (1) each and every member must have an equal right to insert policy and/or leadership alternatives into the decision-making agenda, (2) each and every member must have equal and/or identical information about policy and/or leadership alternatives. During the voting period: (3) each and every citizen must have a right to vote, (4) each and every citizen's vote must carry equal weight, (5) the policy or leadership alternative which registers the majority of votes wins. Postvoting period: (6) policy and/or leadership alternatives with fewer votes must drop from the agenda of policy and decision-making, (7) elected leaders must be obeyed, and winning policy choices must be implemented. In the inter-election period: (8-a) either all the inter-election decisions and choices made by elected and appointed public officials conform to those reached during the election period; (8-b) or new decisions must be reached in accordance with the previous seven conditions, (8-c) or both.

Having outlined this model of democratic decision and policy making as the "value to be maximized" Dahl set upon reading this hypothetical model into the empirical description of the "states and social organizations commonly called democratic by political scientists." Dahl summarized the circular reasoning he required to move from theoretical abstraction to empirical description as follows:

We started by searching for conditions that would be necessary and sufficient in the real world in order to maximize so far as may be possible popular sovereignty and political equality. We found that we could answer this question by measuring the extent to which the Rule [i.e., the sum total of the procedures that equal and free members of a complex self-governing social organization must follow in making and implementing public policy choices and decisions] is employed. But in order to measure the extent to which the Rule is employed we had to lay down eight more or less observable conditions. These we interpreted as limits, which we saw to be unattained in the real world, and quite probably unattainable; and then we reinterpreted them as ends of eight continua or scales which it was suggested, might be used in measurements. Now our question must be rephrased as follows: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions in the real world for the existence of these eight conditions, to at least the minimum degree we have agreed to call polyarchy? In order to answer this question, it would be necessary to classify and study a considerable number of real world organizations. Thus we close the circle between the method of maximization and the descriptive method (Dahl 1956, 74-5).

This was indeed an ingenious attempt to present the factual "is" of the empirical political science (i.e., the actually existing reality of countries and social organizations commonly called democratic by American political scientists) as the "moral ought" of the normative political thought (i.e., as the prescriptive model of democracy to be maximized in countries and social organizations not commonly called democratic by American political scientists). It was ingenious because Dahl's circular reasoning allowed him to develop a prescriptive model of democracy, but nonetheless to by-pass the necessity to resort to a "*theory about the validation of ethical propositions*" (Dahl 1956, 35). To put it more clearly, Dahl's circular reasoning allowed him to prescribe what NSC-68 called "our free and democratic system" as a value to be maximized, without having to address

the normative question: Is what NSC-68 calls "our free and democratic system" indeed a just and legitimate model of democracy that *deserves* to be "maximized?"

This was an ingenious attempt to avoid normative questions of justice and legitimacy in developing a prescriptive model of democracy. Its ingenuity notwithstanding, however, there were two basic problems which Dahl overlooked in the Preface. The first problem was a logical fallacy known as "begging the question": even if we admit, for the sake of the argument, that the eight conditions Dahl outlined in the Preface depicted a normatively valid and complete picture of democratic decision and policy making, Dahl's compromise begged the following question: why was it necessarily the case that the "states and social organization commonly called democratic" by political scientists represented the degree to which these eight ideal conditions can realistically be expected to be met "in the real world?" What was it that necessarily prevented an academic student of politics from investigating the practical possibilities of a better harmonization between the norm of democracy and its actually existing reality?

The second problem was a performative contradiction, i.e., a discrepancy between Dahl's theoretical assumptions, and his activity as a political theorist/scientist. If in the 1950s democratic political theory was in such a sorry state as to justify Dahl's writing a new preface, developing a new definition of democracy, why should one take the word of political scientists that the states and social organizations they commonly called democratic, were indeed democratic? Or conversely if the political scientists already knew what democracy was so that they could categorize states and social

organizations as democratic and non-democratic ones, why did Dahl write a new preface to democratic theory, developing a new definition of democracy?

From the point of view of theory construction, one significant consequence of overlooking these two basic problems was that Dahl included the theoretically yet-unsubstantiated assumption of the American government's Cold War rhetoric in the basic premises of his conceptual architectonic. More specifically Dahl's failure to look these two logical problems in the face allowed the following assumption to become an integral part of his definition of democracy: the American political system, as it actually functioned and existed in the 1950s, *was* a democratic political system; "our" way of life, as "we" actually experienced it in the 1950s, *was the* best approximation of a democratic way of life. Dahl's logical-positivistic claim to bias-free objectivity in the Preface notwithstanding, therefore, when read within the world political context of the Cold War, his preface to democratic theory carried an unmistakable pro-American, bias: Dahl's Preface defined democracy as the American way of life, and in doing so, it offered a political scientific justification for the "non-democratic" aspects of the American political system.

3.2. What is democracy?

Equating the conceptual definition of democracy to the actually existing reality of "the American Way of Life" required Dahl to make a minor revision in Schumpeter's "another theory of democracy." Dahl thought that Schumpeter made one mistake in his otherwise admirable analysis of democracy: he confined democratic political practice to campaigning and voting during the elections periods, and failed to pay attention to the

actual making and implementing of public policy choices and decisions in the inter-election periods (Dahl 1956, 131). Dahl was sharp in noticing this mistake in the conceptual architectonic of Schumpeter's theory. In his own attempt to remedy for Schumpeter's lack of interest in the political processes of decision and policy-making in the inter-election periods, however, Dahl did not depart substantially from Schumpeter's example. On the contrary Dahl followed Schumpeter faithfully in not including reasoned deliberation between equal and free citizens, in either of the eight procedural conditions he identified at either of the four phases of democratic policy and decision-making process.

Dahl sought to fill the vacuum left in the Schumpeterian conceptual architectonic by the absence of the practice of reasoned deliberation between equal and free citizens in the inter-election periods, with assumptions that he borrowed, in equal measures, from the "Madisonian" tradition and liberal economic theory. For the purposes of his political theory, Dahl called these assumptions "pluralist." Accordingly, Dahl conceptualized political decision and policy making processes in the inter-election periods as a dynamic and harmonious equilibrium between competing interest groups. In their efforts to lobby the elected and appointed public officials these groups mutually cancel out whatever contradictory demands they make upon them. Therefore the policy choices and decisions made by elected and appointed public officials invariably represent compromises between conflicting interest positions in the society. These compromises are equally satisfactory or unsatisfactory for different groups of citizens who pursue different interests and goals in the society. On aggregated balance, therefore, no one class,

segment, or group can be said to dominate, oppress, or suppress the interests of another segment, group, or class in the society.

In Dahl's opinion, three factors accounted for this curious state of affairs: The first factor was the equal distribution of political power (defined as "A's capacity to control the behavior of B") among various interest groups. In Dahl's opinion this lent fairness to political processes. The second factor was the presence of cross-cutting cleavages in the society, and overlapping membership bodies of different interest groups. In Dahl's opinion this prevented political polarization between conflicting interest positions and reduced the risk of civil strife. The third factor was a widely shared cultural consensus on certain political "values", which, in a latter work, Dahl called the "democratic creed" (Dahl 1963, 323). In Dahl's opinion widespread consensus on the democratic creed moderated demands for radical changes and enhanced the stability of the political system.

In Dahl's account, then, a "pluralist" democracy is the political equivalent of an economic market place. In this political market place, however, Adam Smith's invisible hand is replaced by elected and appointed public officials. These officials act as neutral arbiters between different demands made by different interest groups upon the governmental mechanisms. While competition among stake-holders (i.e., citizens) is continuous, their possession of shares in competing firms (i.e., interest groups) tones down bitter price-wars (i.e., civil strife). Sustaining this political market place is a culture in which this business model of politicking is believed to be in the natural order of things.

Having built this conceptual architectonic which was inspired more by liberal economic than democratic political theory, Dahl refrained from calling the system of government described by this conceptual architectonic, "democracy." Later, in 1971, Dahl would inform his readers, that "Democracy" was the term he reserved for "a political system one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens" (Dahl 1971, 2). The model he described in the Preface was rather, the realistic second best alternative. It was the "American hybrid." It was "polyarchy" (Dahl 1956, 124-51). Unfortunately, however, Dahl's colleagues were not as precise in choosing and using political theoretical terms, as Dahl himself. Thus, Seymour Martin Lipset condensed Schumpeter's theory of competitive elitism to the following, widely quoted operational definition of "democracy":

Democracy in a complex society may be defined as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office.

This definition, abstracted largely from the work of Joseph Schumpeter and Max Weber, implies a number of specific conditions: (1) a political formula or body of beliefs specifying which institutions -- political parties, a free press, and so forth -- are legitimate (accepted as proper by all); one set of political leaders in office; and (3) one or more sets of recognized leaders in attempting to gain office (Lipset 1981, 27).

Here, however, it is clear that Lipset was equating democracy with what Dahl called polyarchy. In the voluminous academic literature on democracy and democratization that empiricist authors came to produce, this "operational definition"

would confront us under various guises, with various adjectives attached to it: "minimal democracy", "political democracy", "formal democracy" or "procedural democracy." Bearing this definition's claim to descriptive accuracy in mind, in what follows, I use the term "actually existing democracy" inter-changeably with this definition.

Having arrived at an operational definition of "democracy", the second major item on the post-War research agenda on democracy of the American political science was that of description: This descriptive research agenda, for its part, had three different items on it. It required American political scientists to compile empirical evidence first, on the functioning of actually existing democracy, second on the social and economic conditions necessary to sustain actually existing democracy, and finally, third, on the cultural values shared by the citizens living in an actually existing democracy.

3.3. How does democracy function?

It was once again Robert Dahl who collected empirical evidence on the functioning of "polyarchy." In a 1961 research on city politics in New Haven, titled Who Governs? Robert Dahl set out to prove that his "pluralist" theory accurately describes the way an actually existing "polyarchal democracy" actually operates. Predictably Dahl's empirical research yielded that answer to the question in the title of his book which he had already inscribed into the theoretical definition of polyarchy in his earlier work: In a polyarchy such is the distribution of political power among conflicting interests, that nobody can be said to "govern." There was nothing new in this empirical finding, of course -- this was what Dahl had already said to be the case in the Preface to Democratic Theory. Yet the application of rigorous empirical research methods and statistical data

analysis techniques to answer questions derived from the theoretical definition of polyarchy helped Dahl to claim for his "opinions" on democracy the status of scientifically proven "knowledge" based on "hard facts."

Dahl's was not the only opinion that we were asked to take on the authority of quantitative research methods in political science. His colleague, Seymour Martin Lipset, a political sociologist testified to the "truth" of Dahl's conclusions. In Lipset's opinion too, in an actually existing democracy "the problem of societal decision making" is resolved "among conflicting interests groups with minimal force and maximal consensus." In this process "the state" plays the role of a neutral arena, a political market place for competition. Therefore "the state" cannot be seen as an overriding source of social and political power. A student of politics would commit an error if s/he dealt with "the state and society as two independent organisms" and asked "which is the more important or preferable." S/he would commit an error because the state is "just one of many political institutions, and political institutions are only one of many clusters of social institutions" (Lipset 1981, 3).

These observations were, however, only a prelude before Lipset addressed the second item on the descriptive research agenda, viz., the task of describing the social and economic conditions that were necessary to sustain the actually existing democracy.

3.4. What are the social and economic conditions of democracy?

In the Political Man, a statistical multi-variant analysis allowed Lipset to turn highly complex demographic data into clearly itemized social and economic conditions

necessary to keep actually existing democracies in operation. But where could we find these actually existing democracies? In other words, which were the countries commonly called democratic by political scientists? Lipset told his readers that the actually existing model of democracy can be found exclusively in "the countries of North-West Europe, and their English speaking offspring in North America and Australasia" (Lipset 1981, 54). Therefore the social and economic conditions prevalent in these countries must be those social and economic conditions which are necessary, if not sufficient, for the existence of this actually existing model of democracy.

There is, of course, no doubt that the quantitative research methods Lipset used in the Political Man were the most sophisticated ones. There is also little reason to doubt the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the demographical data Lipset used in his analysis. Finally there is no need to question Lipset's methodological objectivity in using statistical multi-variant analysis techniques. In short we can take Lipset's word about the conclusions he reached in his analysis: In the 1950s high levels of per-capita national income; high levels of education, urbanization and industrialization, low levels of citizen participation (i.e., high levels of political apathy) and a capitalist market economy were the social and economic conditions that were prevalent in the countries of "North-West Europe and their English speaking offspring in North America and Australia." These were the necessary if not sufficient conditions to sustain the political systems -- actually existing democracies -- found in these countries (Lipset 1981, 27-63).

But were (and are) these social and economic conditions the conditions of a just and well-ordered society? Was the political system, sustained by these social and

economic conditions, a legitimate political system? Lipset's Political Man had no answer to offer to these questions. It had no answer to offer simply because Lipset did not raise and address these normative questions. His self-conscious attempt to evade normative questions of justice and legitimacy notwithstanding, however, one of the conclusions Lipset reached in the Political Man was about "legitimacy." The stability of a political system, including actually existing democracy, Lipset told his readers, depends upon the system's ability to "engender and maintain the belief" that "the existing institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society" (Lipset 1981, 64). This "belief" was what Robert Dahl called the "democratic creed."¹¹ Gramscian-Marxist thinkers had another name for this "belief": the "hegemonic ideology" -- a vague, fluid, constantly forming and re-forming value consensus, without which not even a dictatorship can survive for too long. But what exactly was this "belief" in the legitimacy of a model of democracy which jettisons the normative questions of justice and legitimacy from the very definition of democracy? Paradoxical as it may sound, this was the third question on the descriptive research agenda of the American political scientists.

¹¹ Robert Dahl characterizes what he refers to as the democratic creed as follows: "To reject the democratic creed is in effect to refuse to be an American. As a nation we have taken great pains to insure that few citizens will ever want to do anything so rash, so preposterous -- in fact, so wholly un-American" (Dahl 1961, 266). Similarly: "[W]ide consensus on the democratic creed does have two important kinds of consequences. On the one hand, this very consensus makes occasional appeal [to public opinion] all but inevitable, for the creed itself gives legitimacy to an appeal to the populace. On the other hand, widespread adherence to the creed limits the character and the course of an appeal. It ensures that no appeal is likely to succeed unless it is framed in terms consistent with the creed- which is perhaps not so small a constraint" (Dahl 1961, 324).

3.5. What are the cultural and psychological basis of democracy?

In another influential text of the Cold War era, The Civic Culture, Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba (1963) took over from where Lipset left, and set out to investigate, the "cultural and psychological bases of democracy." The intended outcome of this study was a quantified catalogue specifying the norms and values making up *the* "civic culture" of the actually existing democracy. The method Almond and Verba used to compile this catalogue was such that it masked the discrepancy between the normative self-understanding of the existing democratic-political institutions of the "West", on the one hand, and the popular perception of politics as actually practiced in and through this institutional media on the other. This was so because Almond and Verba refrained from "inferring the properties of democratic culture from existing political institutions or social conditions." Instead, they "specified the content of the democratic political culture by examining political attitudes in a number of operating democratic systems" and by comparing these popular but not necessarily "democratic" attitudes with those different attitudes found in *other* countries, which were, by the definition of American political science, not democratic (Almond and Verba 1963, 10-11). Almond and Verba chose five countries for this purpose. The United States of America and Great Britain were chosen because they represented "relatively successful experiments in democratic government." Germany was chosen because of its historical record of "subject political culture." Finally Italy and Mexico were chosen because they represented "transitional political systems."

The goal that motivated Almond and Verba to conduct this comparative study was not a critical introspection and normative evaluation and/or re-valuation of the

"Western" civic culture. Nor was it to facilitate a dialogical engagement between the Western political culture and other cultural traditions. The intended contribution of the Civic Culture was, rather, to the solution of the technical problems of social and political engineering that arose from the perceived need of "democratizing" those countries which were not commonly called democratic by political scientists. This was evident in how Almond and Verba answered the question: "why study political culture at all?"

If we are to come closer to understanding the problems of the diffusion of democratic culture, we have to be able to specify the content of what has to be diffused, to develop appropriate measures for it, to discover its quantitative incidence and demographic distribution in countries with a wide range of experience with democracy. With such knowledge we can speculate intelligently about how much of what must be present in a country before democratic institutions take root in congruent attitudes and expectations (Almond and Verba 1963, 55).

In other words, for Almond and Verba, the Civic Culture was to serve as the cultural blueprint of democratization understood as Westernization. As a text itemizing in clear and specific terms that which the American foreign policy rhetoric in NSC-68 referred to as "the values by which we [Americans] live", and as an attempt to "diffuse" these values to the rest of the world, the Civic Culture was an integral part of the self-reproducing discursive reality of the Cold War. Like the other descriptive texts we referred to above, the Civic Culture was indeed a very "useful" piece of academic work for elected and appointed foreign policy-makers of the American government to read in the ideological context of the Cold War. By reading these texts the governing American elite could learn, in clear and specific terms, the anti-thesis of what exactly the Cold

Enemy's "fanatical faith was", and what exactly they had to diffuse, in order to "contain" the expansion of this "fanatical faith", and to "manifest to the rest of the world the vitality of our system."

This coalescence between the academically motivated descriptive research on democracy on the one hand, and the world-politically motivated foreign policy rhetoric of the American government in the context of the Cold War on the other, was most conspicuous in the texts contributing to what I called above the "prescriptive" research agenda. The works contributing to this research agenda can be read as a response to the following question: How exactly should the "rest" of the world's peoples refashion their cultures, social and political institutions and practices, so that they jettison the enlightened sense of political legitimacy and justice which had informed their struggles of independence against colonial domination, and attain the dubious distinction of being commonly called "democratic" by political scientists?

3.6. How can the Rest of the World democratize?

Addressing this question required the theorists of what David Apter called "the politics of modernization" to perform two tasks: First, they had to outline a step-by-step program of political modernization. Such a master-plan of political modernization was necessary to guide attempts to reproduce the "free and democratic" American way of life in the rest of the (third) World. Second they had to develop political strategies for the realization of this master plan of democratization-as-Americanization in "traditional socio-cultural contexts." Such strategies would guide foreign policy and decision makers in newly independent countries. Such expert help was necessary because in these

countries "freedom and democracy" competed both with the forces of tradition resisting modernization, and with the communist alternative that the Soviet Union offered.

Students who sought to devise a master-plan of modernization took the British experience as *the* model of societal transformation toward the "actually existing" model of democracy. (After all Great Britain was one of the countries American political scientists commonly called democratic.) Accordingly, in England, the emergence of capitalism as a dominant mode of exchange emanated "a vigorous and independent class of town dwellers", i.e., the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie was "an indispensable element in the growth of parliamentary democracy". Therefore the first lesson for the "developing" world to learn was: no market economy, no bourgeoisie; no bourgeoisie, no democracy" (Moore 1966, *passim*). Historically, modern parliaments have evolved from the European estate assemblies. They were then gradually extended to "previously unrepresented classes" (Bendix 1964, 74-104). This sequence of events, in turn, found expression in what Dahl advised to be "the most stable path to polyarchy": "a closed hegemony first increases opportunities for public contestation and thus is transformed into a competitive oligarchy; the competitive oligarchy is then transformed into a polyarchy by increasing the inclusiveness of the regime" (Dahl 1971, 11).

Theorists who undertook the second task of developing political strategies to implement this master plan, were aware that embodied within "our democratic system" are "all the past revolutions of history." They knew that "such countries as Indonesia, Egypt, Ghana or Tanzania" had been unable to take part in these revolutions as active beneficiaries. (Theirs was rather the passive role of the "colonized" people.) Therefore,

they considered these societies as "pre-democratic" rather than as non-democratic (Apter 1965, 2). The implication, was of course, that there were some "democratic" countries in existence on the face of the earth -- notably on the Western hemisphere of the world maps, that were drawn in the West, with Europe on the center. The technical problem that the strategists of modernization had to solve in such pre-democratic non-Western countries was, then, how to accelerate their historical evolution to the zenith of societal progress: the actually existing democracy, defined, described, and prescribed in Schumpeterian terms.

The solution that the strategists of modernization found was inspired by the Turkish experience with modernization-as-Westernization. Accordingly, the necessary instrument to accelerate the historical evolution of the "pre-democratic" societies was a team of native operators who would rigorously implement the master-plan of political modernization, in their own traditional contexts (Apter 1965: 138). Finding, supporting and educating such a "pro-American" team of native operators -- a "modernizing elite" was, therefore, an essential part of the project of democratization in the third world. It was essential, because "the rules, the practices and the culture of competitive politics" were more likely to develop first "among a small elite". "The critical transition from non-party politics to party competition" was also more likely to be triggered by such an elite team of political modernizers (Dahl 1971, 36).

In the Political Order in Changing Societies Samuel Huntington translated the Schumpeterian wisdom of this project of imposed modernization from above into concrete policy recommendations. The addressees of Huntington's recommendations were

both the foreign policy and decision makers of the United States of America, and the native instruments -- the Americanizing elite -- used by the American government in the "third world." Huntington advised that American policy-makers should show tolerance to, and if necessary encourage native Americanizers, when they use certain "institutions of coercion" in their attempt "to organize and integrate the modernizing community." This was necessary, according to Huntington because, the process of economic and political development was inherently de-stabilizing in traditional socio-cultural contexts. In such socio-cultural contexts using coercive means might be the only way to assert governmental authority and maintain and/or establish political order. Furthermore, warned Huntington, if "we" Americans, cannot find a way to deal with this problem of political instability in the third world authoritatively and decisively our communist Cold War enemy would beat "us", Americans, to it:

History shows conclusively that communist governments are no better than free governments in alleviating famine, improving health, expanding national product, creating industry and maximizing welfare. But the one thing the communist governments can do is to govern; they do provide effective authority. Their ideology furnishes a basis of legitimacy, and their party organization provides the institutional mechanism for mobilizing support and executing policy. To overthrow the government in many modernizing countries is a simple task: one battalion, two tanks, and a half dozen colonels may suffice. But no communist government in a modernizing country has been overthrown by a military coup d'état. The real challenge which the communists pose to modernizing countries is not that they are so good at overthrowing governments (which is easy), but that they are so good at making governments (which is a far more difficult task). They may not provide liberty, but they do provide authority; they do create governments that can govern. While Americans laboriously strive to narrow the economic gap, communists offer modernizing countries a tested and proven method of bridging the political gap. Amidst the social conflict and violence that plague modernizing countries, they provide some assurance of political order (Huntington 1968, 7-8).

In this passage Huntington expresses his admiration for the communist enemy's ability to create political systems that could "govern" under the turbulent social and economic conditions of the "modernizing countries." However, this expression of admiration does not reflect a healthy, humanitarian respect for and concern with the needs, demands, and experiences of the people living in these "other" societies. Rather underlying this expression of admiration we find a "self-centered" patriotic concern with the "Americans'" own failure to be as successful as their communist enemy. As a political scientist Huntington wanted -- to use an expression that he used in his inaugural speech when elected American Political Science Associations' president in 1988 -- "to do good." Yet what he wanted to do was not necessarily that which was indeed good for the peoples of the modernizing countries. Rather, what Huntington wanted to do was what he opined to be good for the United States of America. And what Huntington opined to be good for the United States of America was to create strong, autocratic governments in the "modernizing societies" that would side with the Western block in the global fight against communism.

There were, however, three points that Huntington's deeply felt patriotism, i.e., his love for the "American way of life", which for him was synonymous with democracy, which, in turn, was synonymous with anti-communism, made him, and those who agreed with him, to miss entirely. The first point was (and still is) this: the communist ideology did indeed lend a sense of legitimacy to some of the political systems erected in the post-War era, in some of the decolonized countries in Asian, African, and Latin American

regions. As such, it indeed helped -- for a while at least -- to maintain political stability in these countries. Yet, it did so, not because communism was an ideology, but because it was an ideology that promised emancipation, equality and societal solidarity to all -- including to the human beings living under extreme conditions of socio-economic deprivation in the post-colonial societies. Huntington failed to understand that it was more the promise of social justice, and less the effectiveness of the Soviet propaganda machine in airing this promise, or the iron fist of the autocratic regimes in suppressing opposition to this promise, that accounted for the "communist enemy's" success in creating governments that could "govern" under extreme conditions of socio-economic deprivation.

The second point Huntington missed was the political philosophical insight that tells us, that "political stability" is not an end in itself that should and can be achieved effectively and efficiently by any technological means available to us -- including military and police coercion and ideological propaganda and manipulation of the public opinion. Rather, political stability is the happy by-product of a just and legitimate, in this normative sense, "well-ordered" political system. In other words the promise of justice and legitimacy is not merely a means to achieve the end of political stability. Justice and legitimacy are, rather, moral ends the achievement of which brings about political stability. In this sense, we can say that a just and legitimate political system is also a stable political system. Yet not every political system which *appears* to be stable because it is marked by an observed absence of popular discontent, can be said to be just and legitimate. Huntington failed to understand that in a modernizing society (indeed in any

society) political stability cannot be maintained at the expense of justice and legitimacy; and siding with this or the other ideological alternative in a world-political conflict is neither a sufficient nor a necessary criterion for a government to deserve to be called just and legitimate.

The third point Huntington missed was the moral insight that had been brought about by the experience with the events that led to the outbreak of the Second World War. This was the insight which motivated Horkheimer to point out that "as understood and practiced in our civilization, progressive [instrumental] rationalization tends, to obliterate that very substance of reason in the name of which this progress is espoused." It was the insight that motivated Arendt to talk about the "usurped dignity of the Western tradition", and demand "a new guarantee for human dignity, which can be found only in a new political principle, in a new law on earth, whose validity this time must comprehend the whole of humanity while its power must remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by newly defined territorial entities." It was the insight that the self-absorbed post-war students of the actually existing American democracy, overwhelmed by their existential anxiety in the heat of the Cold War, failed to understand entirely. It was the insight that was, however, very well understood by the intellectuals of those "other" societies, which Huntington treated as if they were just another battle-ground to fight the good fight against communism. Thus, in 1963, five years before Huntington opined on the "political order in the changing societies", Anwar Abdel-Malek set the parameters of what eventually came to be known as the "post-colonial critique" as follows:

For centuries, Europe has considered "civilization" to be its own, what is good for Europe is good for the World. Today, whatever originates in the West, is sure to be reproduced in the areas of periphery.... Western centricism has taken over from Euro-centricism, and constitutes today even for Europe itself the major obstacle to the possibility of posing the problem of an alternative civilizational project (Abdel-Malek 1963, 128).

The skepticism that Abdel-Malek expressed about the notion that what is good for the West is good for the Rest cannot be understood as a nostalgic invitation to return to an immaculate, pre-modern past which is assumed to be still intact in the non-Western societies. Nor can the reference to the need for an alternative civilizational project be understood as premised on the romantic assumption that such an alternative project can be found in pre-fabricated form in the various traditions and cultures of the so-called non-Western societies. Rather, like Horkheimer and Arendt what Abdel-malek expressed was an intellectual challenge, viz., the challenge to think hard to come up with a new civilizational project, and do so for the good of the *humanity as a whole*.

In one sense this divergence between Abdel-Malek's humanistic and cosmopolitan criticism of western-centricism on the one hand, and the Western-centric Schumpeterian outlook to questions of democracy and democratization on the other, set the earliest parameters of what I referred to in the previous chapter, as the cultural incompatibility and cultural common-ground interpretations of the inter-governmental controversy staged during the Vienna Conference. In 1993, after decades of American efforts to propagate Schumpeterian modernization models, the Asian Governments' audible objections to the "unilateral imposition of Western values" forced Huntington to see the "modernizing societies" in a new and more cautious light: Now that the criticisms of the governments of these modernizing societies proved that "Western" attempts to

propagate western-centric modernization models have failed, Huntington could no longer see and treat these societies merely as battle-grounds to fight the good fight of the United States of America. The communist enemy being already defeated in 1989, Huntington came to fear that the "modernizing societies" themselves became existential enemies who threatened that which he loved most, viz., the American way of life, which for him was (and still is) synonymous with democracy, human rights, and indeed the zenith of (Western) Civilization as such. 25 years after the publication of the Political Order in the Changing Societies, the ideological Cold War against communism was won; but there still was a "civilizational" Cold War for Huntington and his followers to fight.

4. Summary and Conclusion

Let me conclude this discussion by summarizing the premises, assumptions, axioms and conclusions about democracy and democratization that the post-War texts reviewed in this chapter share. In this context, I would also like to summarize the points that I sought to emphasize in my discussion, and respond to some possible criticisms thereof.

The texts discussed in this chapter are situated in and respond to the world political context in which they have been written. In Schumpeter's case this is the world political context depicted by the rise of Nazism and Fascism in inter-war Europe, and the second world war, in which the emergence of these ideologies culminated. In the case of American authors who wrote in the aftermath of the second world war, this context is expanded by the world political context of the Cold War, the emergence of which was

precipitated, *inter alia*, by a quagmire of misunderstandings between the governing American and Soviet elite.

In the texts written in this world political context, "democracy" is (re)defined as an actually existing model that corresponds to the American way of life. The social and economic conditions and cultural and psychological attitudes that were prevalent in countries of "North-West Europe and their English speaking offspring in North America, and Australasia" are described as the necessary conditions sustaining this "actually existing" model of democracy. In doing so, these texts relegate three normative ideas which had been central to democratic political thought and practice until Schumpeter decided to dismiss them for being "unrealistic" to the status of unfounded superstition. In these texts, "the common good of the political community", "the general will of the people", and "reasoned deliberation between free and equal citizens" are stripped of their authoritative meaning in guiding political action, and turned into utopian fancies. The authors of these texts grant that these democratic fancies of justice and legitimacy appeal to emotions when used as political slogans. Yet apart from their instrumental value in sustaining political stability, they doubt whether these fancies of justice and legitimacy have any basis, either in reason or in fact, as ends in themselves. Moreover, they present this empirically accurate, but normatively void picture of democracy as the apotheosis of historical evolution, the zenith of societal progress, *the* actually existing model after which the rest of the world's peoples ought to re-fashion *their* ways of life.

The cognitive validity of these post-war claims about democracy and democratization rests on two inter-related axioms both of which beg the question: first,

the American political system as it actually existed and functioned in the 1950s, *was* a democratic political system, or alternately it was the best possible approximation of a democratic system that could ever be achieved on this planet; second, normative questions of justice and legitimacy do not have any significance in democratic political theory and practice, beyond that of an ideological belief; or alternately, the American political system gives effect to the democratic claim to social justice and legitimacy in the actions and interactions of its citizens as much as humanly possible.

In my discussion I sought to emphasize, by giving concrete examples, that in the immediate post-war decades major American students of democracy (or major students of American democracy) accepted these assumptions as axiomatic givens. They did so despite the fact that in the context of the Cold War, these assumptions begged the question. I also argued that the axiomatic acceptance of these problematic assumptions by academic students of politics in the immediate post-war years coalesced with the pro-freedom and pro-democracy foreign policy rhetoric that issued from American government's misunderstanding of the world political situation (more specifically, the Soviet Union's post-war foreign policy toward Western nations) in the same period. I further suggested that the concrete product of this particular diplomatic misunderstanding in the immediate post-war years was the blackmail of the Cold War, i.e., the anxiety that the American way of life is under an existential threat from an enemy as fanatical, bellicose, and determined, as Japan and the Nazi Germany. Finally, I suggested that this anxiety played a not insignificant role in obscuring the problematic nature of the

assumptions that both American political scientists and American foreign policy-makers took as axiomatic givens in their common approach to democracy.

The texts we reviewed in this chapter were, of course, not exhaustive of the voluminous empiricist literature on democracy and democratization that has culminated in the immediate post-war period. We can also not say that these texts were *uniquely* American in their approach to democracy. Undoubtedly there were other political scientists and thinkers from other (Western and non-Western) countries and historical periods, who shared the premises, assumptions, and conclusions of the Schumpeterian approach, just as there were political scientists and theorists, even (or particularly) in the American universities who did not subscribe to this position at all.

I think, however, most political scientists would agree, that the texts referred to in this chapter were *representative* of and influential in shaping the *dominant* empiricist canon in American political thought in the immediate post-war era, and this canon was premised upon a self-conscious attempt to break with the normative tradition in democratic theory. Furthermore, for the purposes of the argument developed in this thesis it is not significant whether or not this empiricist canon was (and is) *uniquely* American in its basic premises and assumptions, or whether these premises and assumptions had been previously formulated in the works of other, non-American, theorists in other, earlier world historical epochs. Given the limited focus of this chapter on the conceptual history of the position espoused by the American government during the Vienna Conference in June 1993, it is enough that we understand the following point: In the immediate post-war years, along with a good many other supporters and critics of

democracy, in a good many other countries and regions of the world, in a good many other historical periods, the majority of the American policy makers and American political scientists too subscribed to the premises, assumptions, and conclusions about democracy and democratization summarized in this chapter. This position signified a self-conscious attempt to make a fresh start in democratic theory by breaking with the normative tradition of political thought. And it was this normative tradition of political thought, which had informed, along with other bourgeois revolutionaries of the 18th and 19th century, also the drafters of the American constitution.

This position was, however, not the last word in the post-war evolution of democratic thought and practice -- not even in the American universities. Nor did American government's foreign policy rhetoric, which shared the same problematic axioms with the dominant empiricist canon on democracy in the immediate post-war era succeed in remaining above political scientific criticism. Indeed, from the 1960s onwards the wisdom of this Schumpeterian approach to democracy, as well as the cogency of the American government's foreign policy rhetoric has been challenged "from within", both at practical and theoretical levels. At the practical level they were challenged by various social movements demanding, *inter alia*, nuclear, conventional and ecological peace, racial and gender equality, and industrial democracy. At the theoretical level this approach was challenged by political theorists associated with the so-called New Left, who responded in various publications to that question which had already been raised by Schumpeter's claim to descriptive accuracy for his competitive elitist theory of minimal democracy: Is what American government's foreign policy rhetoric refers to as "our free

and democratic" system, indeed a free and democratic system? If not, how can we further democratize it? It is to these "New Left" criticisms of the "actually existing" model of American democracy, and to the neo-conservative attempts to re-assert the Schumpeterian view in reaction to these New Left criticisms, that we turn our attention in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3 EMPIRICAL THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY (II): CRITICISMS AND REACTIONS

1. Introduction

In the previous chapter I argued that the basic conceptual premises and assumptions of the Schumpeterian approach to democracy are such that they tend to establish an equation between "democracy" as a normatively desirable system of government on the one hand, and the actually existing reality of the political systems found in "North West Europe, and their English-speaking offspring in North America and Australasia" on the other. I emphasized, that Schumpeter and empiricist authors who follow in his footsteps can and do establish this conceptual equation between normative desirability and empirically observed reality of democracy only because they jettison three normative ideals of enlightened political thought from the very definition of democracy. We have seen that the three ideals which Schumpeter and his post-war followers self-consciously and explicitly jettisoned from the very definition of democracy were: the *common good* of the political community, the *general will* of the people, and *reasoned deliberation* among equal and free citizens.

In this chapter I review the criticisms that this Schumpeterian view received from the early 1960s onwards in the academic literature on the problems and prospects of democracy and democratization, as well as the academic attempts to revive the Schumpeterian approach in reaction to these criticisms. In this review I cover the following ground and emphasize the following points.

1.1. The Scope and Substance of the Chapter

From the 1960s onwards, the Schumpeterian/pluralist/empiricist approach came to be challenged by authors associated with the so-called "New Left," and later, starting from the late 1970s and in the 1980s, also by authors who are known to take a more "liberal" position in their works. These authors pointed out the normative emptiness, descriptive inadequacy, and social and economic undesirability of the Schumpeterian model. In this context, they investigated the possibilities for a political change in those "North Western European, North American and Australasian" countries on the empirical description of which the post-War generation of Schumpeterian authors based the operational definition of democracy. The goal that motivated the so-called "New Leftist," "neo-Marxist", "neo-liberal", "neo-corporatist", "neo-pluralist" and "post-Marxist" authors in investigating the theoretical and practical possibilities of a political change in Western countries was, however, not to get rid of the already existing democratic political institutions and practices found in these societies -- such as universal suffrage, elected parliaments, accountable government, formal equality before the law, public forums of, and legally and constitutionally institutionalized guarantees for free speech and reasoned debate etc. On the contrary these authors investigated the possibilities of *further democratization* in "half-way" democratic institutions, by opening these institutions to increased participation by equal and free citizens, and by transforming the social, economic, and cultural conditions sustaining these institutions in a more humane, egalitarian, and tolerant direction.

From the mid-1970s onwards, this demand for further democratization attracted a "New-Right" reaction, which re-asserted the Schumpeterian model of "minimal" democracy as a more "moderate" alternative to excessive neo-Marxist, neo-liberal, neo-pluralist etc. demands. This "neo-conservative" reaction was instigated, *inter alia*, by a concern with the decline of the American power and influence in world politics, as perceived in the late 1970s and 1980s, within the international conjuncture of the Cold War. It was thanks to the discursive context created by the neo-conservative attempts to re-assert "the vitality of our system" against that of the enemy, that in the final decade of the Cold War, the Schumpeterian approach to democracy found a new foothold in political science departments -- most notably in the voluminous academic literature on political democratization in the "Third World."

The renewed "political scientific" foothold that the Schumpeterian approach found in the academic literature on development in the Third World lent a misleading sense of plausibility to the doctrine of "American exceptionalism" introduced in the first chapter. The doctrine of American exceptionalism was not only shaped by the American government's anti-Communist foreign policy rhetoric during the Cold War, the origins of which we discussed in the second chapter, but in one sense it was itself a product of this foreign policy rhetoric. More specifically the doctrine of American exceptionalism reflected the need to create an anti-Communist American identity by re-interpreting the post-revolutionary history of American foreign policy, from the perspective of the American government's then-contemporary world political conflict with the Soviet Union. As we have seen in the first chapter, the central idea of the doctrine of American

exceptionalism is that the values popular in the contemporary political culture of the American society in particular, and Western societies in general on the one hand, and the values associated with the enlightened conceptions of human rights and democracy on the other, are synonymous concepts. In the world political context of the end of the Cold War, which was interpreted in the American foreign policy rhetoric as an "American" victory leading to a "new world order", it was this unfounded conceptual equation between the normative desirability of democracy, and the actually existing reality of the American political system, that allowed American policy-makers to (mis)interpret the Asian Governments' objections to the culturally and economically expansionist and unilaterally interventionist US foreign policy, as objections to the Universality of Human Rights and Democracy.

1.2. The Outline of the Chapter

The chapter is organized in four sections. By way of an introduction, in section 2 I start by going over a controversy which, in one sense, marked the dividing line between the New Left and New Right perspectives in the 1960s, namely, the controversy over the "End of Ideology" thesis. Then I review the various criticisms that the dominant Schumpeterian-empiricist canon received in American and Western European academic forums. In this context I also discuss some of the attempts to develop more viable conceptual and practical alternatives to this post-war approach to democracy. In section 3 I review the attempts to re-assert the Schumpeterian view in reaction to these criticisms and attempts. In Section 4 I indicate how and in what sense exactly these Schumpeterian

reactions came to resonate in the American government's interpretation of and response to the Asian governments Bangkok Declaration.

Thus outlined, this chapter concludes our discussion of the Schumpeterian-empiricist approach to democracy and democratization. As we can remember, an important component of the argument that I develop in this thesis is that the American government's interpretation of and response to the Asian Governments' Bangkok declaration can be understood in the conceptual framework of this Schumpeterian-empiricist approach to democracy. In the next chapter we shall turn our attention to the normative approach to democracy and democratization. In the context of this discussion I shall seek to clarify how and in what sense exactly we can find a resonance of Habermas' theoretical approach on discourse in the Asian Governments' Bangkok Declaration.

2. Is "Our Way of Life" the Democratic Way of Life?

2.1. The End of Ideology or the Crises of Legitimacy?

If we take the civil rights movement of the late 1950s as a beginning point, the New-Left challenge of the "actually existing democracy" emerged almost at the same time that certain empiricist students of Western European and North American politics declared "the end of ideological conflict" in these regions of the world. The "end of ideology" thesis can be understood as a clear expression of the self-congratulatory sense of democratic fulfillment shared by the post-War generation of authors some of whom we reviewed in the previous chapter. One of the leading proponents of this thesis was Lipset. In the Political Man, Lipset announced that in the aftermath of the second world war,

Western European and North American societies had overcome class-based controversies that had dominated much of their history in the first half of the twentieth century. Consequently, argued Lipset, domestic politics in these countries showed all the signs of blissful stability:

The only issues are whether the metal workers should get a nickel more an hour, the price of milk should be raised or old-age pensions extended.... This change in the Western political life reflects the fact that the fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution have been solved: the workers have achieved industrial and political citizenship, the conservatives have accepted the welfare state; ...the very triumph of the democratic social revolution in the West ends domestic politics for those intellectuals who must have ideologies or utopias to motivate them to political action (Lipset 1981, 242-3).

Interestingly enough, Lipset was not the only academic observer who, in the 1960s, perceived a state of ideological tranquility in "Western Political life". Two names, closely associated with Marxist political thought in North America, Ralph Miliband and Herbert Marcuse shared Lipset's perception, if not his exaltation of a socio-political stagnation in the actually existing democracies. In 1961, in Parliamentary Socialism, Miliband made the following observations about the British Labor party:

...the leaders of Labor party have always rejected any kind of political action (such as industrial action for political purposes) which fell, or appeared to them to fall outside the framework and conventions of the parliamentary system. The labor party has not only been a parliamentary party, it has been deeply imbued by parliamentarism. And in this respect, there is no distinction to be made between Labor's political and industrial leaders. Both have been equally determined that the Labor Party should not stray from the narrow path of parliamentarism (Miliband 1961, 13).

In emphasizing that the British labor movement was manifesting a fundamental conformity with the "narrow path" of parliamentary democracy, Miliband was not alone. In his classic, One Dimensional Man, Herbert Marcuse too made a similar observation: "Mobilized against the [communist] threat," wrote Marcuse, "capitalist society shows an internal union and cohesion unknown at previous stages of industrial revolution" (Marcuse 1964, 54). According to Marcuse, accounting for this solidarity shown in defense of "our way of life" was the post-War capitalist development. This development,

...has altered the structure and function of these two classes [the bourgeoisie and the proletariat] in such a way that they no longer appear to be agents of historical transformation. An overriding in the preservation and improvement of the institutional status-quo unites the former antagonists in the most advanced areas of contemporary society (Marcuse 1964, xiii).

The emphasis Marcuse put on the commonalty of interest between the Western bourgeoisie and Western proletariat in preserving the institutional status quo implied that a state of a post-ideological tranquility indeed characterized the post-war political life in the Western societies. Whether it was based on socialist premises, as in the case of Miliband and Marcuse, or on self-congratulatory conclusions, as in the case of Lipset, this observation of political harmony and stability in the Western societies was misleading to say the least. It was misleading, because, by the late 1960s, "boring", "tranquil", and "cohesive" were hardly the adjectives describing the turbulent domestic political situation

in the Western societies. David Held relates the turbulent days of the 1960s, in following words:

The anti-Vietnam war movement, the student movement and a host of other political groups associated with the New Left began to alter the political pace: it was a time of marked political polarization. Demands for peace, the extension of democratic rights to industry and to local communities, the liberation of women and resistance to racism were just some of the issues which produced unparalleled scenes of protest in (post-War) London and Washington and took France to the edge of Revolution in May 1968. The new movements defined themselves against almost everything that the traditional political system defended. They defined the system as rigid, regimented, authoritarian and empty of moral, spiritual and personal qualities (Held 1987, 199).

The issues that motivated these protest movements -- industrial democracy, women's rights, racism, and peace -- were not as insignificant as a "nickel increase" in the hourly rate of the metal workers. This was what Lipset, with a hint of jubilation, suggested.¹

¹ In a chapter added to the 1981 edition of the Political Man Lipset responds to criticisms that the "end of ideology" thesis has received in the late 1960s and 1970s, from what he calls, "assorted New Left" quarters. These critics claim that Lipset's "end of ideology thesis" and his advocacy of pluralist politics in this context, is a new form of ideology, helping to preserve existing interest configurations in the Western societies.

Lipset's response consists of an effort to show, through a historical survey of the literature, that the concept of "end of ideology" is firmly rooted in Left-wing political thought. In this sweeping and fairly accurate survey Lipset refers to the works of various authors -- from those associated with the inter-war period of the Frankfurt school, such as Karl Mannheim, to those associated with contemporary Marxist social historiography, such as Barrington Moore. Lipset also points out that some of his Marxist contemporaries, for example Herbert Marcuse, shared his perception of a post-ideological tranquility in Western societies. Lipset concludes his response by accusing his "assorted New Left" critics for confusing "social scientific validity" with "ideological evaluation."

Lipset does not tell us, however, how he jumps from the observation that both he, and the Left-wing thinkers he refers to shared the same perception of post-ideological tranquility in the actually existing Western European and North American political systems, to the conclusion, that this perception is a valid perception of the actually existing reality of Western European and North American politics in the post-War era. If anything, the sharp contrast between the sense of tranquility conveyed by the "end of ideology" thesis, Lipset undeniably helped to popularize in the 1960s on the one hand, and the undeniable reality of socio-political unrest of the period on the other, proves, that

Similarly, the vigor of this challenge proved anything but the deterioration of revolutionary potential in Western European and North American politics. This was what Marcuse and Miliband, with a sense of disillusionment, suggested. What these movements challenged was nothing less than the "legitimacy" of the "actually existing" democracies. What the vigor of their challenge was attesting to was what Habermas called, "the legitimation crises" of (or in) the Western European and North American societies (Habermas 1975, *passim*). Far from signifying the "end of ideology", therefore, the unrest of the late 1960s urged political theorists to re-open all the questions about democracy and democratization that the Schumpeterian authors had hoped to have answered and shelved for once and all: Is the "actually existing" model of democracy, as defined, described, and prescribed by empiricist political scientists in the aftermath of the second world war, actually democratic?

2.2. Elitist and Neo-corporatist critiques of pluralism

The earliest theoretical critique of the "actually existing democracy" as described by the "pluralist" theorists of empirical political science came from Bachrach and Baratz (1962): The question Bachrach and Baratz raised was fundamental: Is it indeed the case that the actually existing democracy functions as a harmonious equilibrium between competing interest positions? Is it indeed the case that in an actually existing democracy no particular class, or group in the society, can be said to dominate other groups, classes,

both he and the left-wing authors he refers to were mistaken in the perception of reality they shared.

and interest positions? In other words, is Dahl right in asserting that in an "actually existing democracy" nobody actually rules?

According to Bachrach and Baratz, Dahl's empirical findings suggesting that this is indeed the case, are misleading. They are misleading because of the definition of power upon which Dahl builds his pluralist conceptual architectonic. Dahl defines political power one dimensionally, as "A's capacity to control the behavior of B." According to Bachrach and Baratz, however, political power is contained not only in the capacity to influence those who make binding policy choices and decisions that affect the whole of the political community, or in the authority to make these decisions and choices. Political power is also contained in the capacity and authority not to make any decisions at all. In other words political power is exercised not only in implementing the public-policy agenda, but also in setting, formulating, and manipulating this agenda. By ignoring this second dimension of power, the "pluralist" model fails to take account of the fact, that elected and appointed public officials -- the political elite -- "may and often do exercise power" by "confining the scope of decision making to relatively 'safe' issues" and by deciding what counts as "'important' and 'unimportant' issues" (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 948). Therefore, the pluralist model conceals "the manner in which *status quo* oriented persons and groups" influence "the community values and political institutions" (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 951).

In the 1960s, Bachrach and Baratz's "elitist" critique of the "pluralist" description of the "actually existing democracy" launched a meta-theoretical debate in

empirical political science.² In the 1970s, this meta-theoretical debate culminated in the emergence of a new empirical research agenda: neo-corporatism. The authors who contributed to this research program called themselves *neo-corporatists*, in order to distinguish *their* conceptual architectonic from the corporatist mode of "interest representation" that had come into being in the inter-war Europe, under fascist regimes. Schmitter, one of the leading proponents of this new research agenda defined the key concept, corporatism, as follows:

[A] system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports. (Schmitter 1977a, 9)

By drawing upon observed similarities with this fascistic form of "licensed" interest representation, the neo-corporatist research program hoped to provide a more accurate description of how "interest representation" occurs in an actually existing democracy. In this context, the emphasis that neo-corporatist authors put on the role of and relations between the "managerial" elite of interest organizations, and elected and appointed public officials, brought them closer to Schumpeter's original model of competitive technocracy. Neo-corporatist authors followed their mentor, Schumpeter, also in the way they announced the coming into being of this new research program. Like

² A comprehensive review of this debate can be found in Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland's Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy, (1985, pp. 161-267).

Schumpeter, Schmitter, the editor of a 1977 special issue of Comparative Political Studies devoted to neo-corporatism, invited his colleagues in empirical political science, to cancel their subscription to the pluralist model of democracy, and join the "informal, nonspatial, and unfunded working group" of the neo-corporatists. In this working group, wrote Schmitter:

The nature of membership is purely voluntary, the costs of joining are few; the barriers to the entry of new -even competing- participants are low, the access of persons of different academic status and national origin is rigorously equal; the amount of internal differentiation and authority is minimal; the degree of control over member attitudes and activities is nil; the correspondence between spontaneously expressed member interests and collectively implemented group functions is high, the freedom to leave is unrestricted. Indeed, if all these were characteristics of modern interest associations there would be no need for our collaborative effort of conceptual redefinition and empirical reexamination. The pluralist paradigm would continue to do just fine (Schmitter 1977b, 5-6).

This neo-corporatist critique of pluralism, particularly the ironic emphasis Schmitter put to the actually existing barriers to popular participation, was motivated more by a concern with providing a descriptively more accurate picture of the "actually existing democracy" than by a concern with the legitimacy of the picture thus "reconceptualized and reexamined." The opposite was, however, the case with the criticism C.B. Macpherson leveled against the Schumpeterian models of "actually existing democracy."

2.3. Democracy and Citizen Participation

The 1965 Massey Lecture was given by C.B. Macpherson on The Real World of Democracy. In this lecture, Macpherson reminded his English speaking colleagues in "Northwest European, North American and Australasian" universities, as well as the "typical citizens" of these countries, of one simple, yet significant fact about democratic political theory: "Democracy is not properly to be equated with our unique Western-Liberal democracy" wrote Macpherson, "but the clearly non-liberal systems which prevail in the Soviet countries, and the somewhat different non-liberal systems of most of the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa, have a genuine historical claim to the title democracy" (Macpherson 1965, 3):

It is just as unrealistic for us to assume that ours is the only true democracy as it is for the Soviets or the Third World to insist that theirs is the only genuine kind. The three kinds are so different that one might ask whether one word should properly be used to describe them all. Can three such different animals really be given the same name? To this one might object, of course that the communists and the third world have simply pounced on a good Western word when they saw it; and have appropriated it to their own systems for public relations purposes. This seems to be the view of a good many of our newspaper writers and publicists, who are perhaps more familiar with public relations than with democracy. But this view is quite false. The idea goes a long way farther back than the period of liberal democracy, and the modern non-liberal notions of democracy are plainly drawn from that original notion.

And when all three concepts of democracy are seen in perspective another reason appears why they should share a single name. They have one thing in common. Their ultimate goal is the same: to provide the conditions for the full and free development of the essential human capacities of all the members of the society. They differ in their views as to what conditions are needed, and as to how they must move to achieve those conditions. And those who live in one system commonly judge that other systems are going about it in an impossible way, or are not going about it at all. These differences of judgment about means commonly obscure the fact that they share the same ultimate moral end (Macpherson 1965, 37-38).

The simple fact that Macpherson emphasized in this passage was this: The fact that George Washington and his friends, or Robespierre and his Jacobin cronies have successfully carried out the first revolutions in modern history, which revived the ancient idea of democracy, i.e., the idea of government by free and equal citizens themselves does not confer upon their descendants in the contemporary Western societies the intellectual property rights of the normative intuitions associated with democracy. Rather the central normative idea of democracy, namely the "free development of the essential human capacities of all the members of the society" has by now become the "collective intellectual property" of the human kind. As such the various political systems that seek to achieve this common democratic ideal are open to improvement through reasoned criticisms from diverse cultural and historical perspectives in which this common ideal has been received and interpreted in the last two centuries.

Having noted this simple fact about the Real World of Democracy, in a latter work Macpherson criticized "our unique Western-liberal" democracy as defined, described, and prescribed by American political scientists in the aftermath of the second world war (Macpherson 1973). Macpherson's The Lifes and Times of Liberal Democracy can be read as a direct rebuttal of both the pluralist and the neo-corporatist followers of Schumpeter. According to Macpherson the followers of Schumpeter conceptualize democracy as a procedural mechanism to aggregate, sort out, and balance conflicting interest positions in the society. In doing so, they not only fail to take citizen participation through reasoned deliberation as an integral aspect of the democratic political process, but

they also discredit citizen participation as a burden jeopardizing the stability of this process. Underlying this apathetic model of democracy is the technocratic-competitive mentality of a society, "permeated by market behavior." In the Schumpeterian descriptions of our unique Western-liberal democracy, writes Macpherson:

Participation is not a value in itself, nor even an instrumental value for the achievement of a higher, more socially conscious set of human beings. The purpose of democracy is to register the desires of people as they are, not to contribute to what they might be or might wish to be. Democracy is simply a market mechanism: The voters are the consumers; the politicians are the entrepreneurs. It is not surprising, that the man who first proposed this model was an economist who had worked all his professional with market models. Nor is it surprising that the political theorists (and the publicists and the public) took up this model as a realistic one, for they also have lived and worked in a society permeated by market behavior. Not only did the market model seem to correspond to, hence to explain, the actual behavior of the main component parts of the political system -- the voter, the parties; it also seemed to justify that behavior, and hence the whole system (Macpherson 1973, 79).

In this passage Macpherson emphasizes the inadequacy of the economic market model in describing and explaining democratic political phenomena. According to Macpherson this inadequacy stems from the Schumpeterian model's jettisoning of "citizen participation" as a democratic value in it self. In doing so, Schumpeter's competitive-technocratic mentality turns a blind eye to the moral substance of democracy. Consequently, neither he nor his followers can conceive democracy as a "society striving to ensure that all its members are equally free to realize their capabilities." Indeed, far from offering an explanatory and descriptive model of democratic politics, the political

institutions and practices associated with capitalist market economy impede the realization of the idea of democracy:

Here I am simply suggesting that a liberal position need not be taken to depend forever on an acceptance of capitalist assumptions, although historically it has been so taken. The fact that liberal values grew up in capitalist market societies is not in itself a reason why the central ethical principle of liberalism -the freedom of the individual to realize his or her human capacities- need always be confined to such societies. On the contrary, it may be argued that the ethical principle or if you prefer, the appetite for individual freedom, has outgrown its capitalist market envelope and can now live as well, or better without it. (Macpherson 1973, 2).

Taking guidance from this idea that democracy can live better without the competitive mentality of the capitalist market economy Macpherson suggests that "we" change certain aspects of "our way of life:"

[A] change in people's consciousness (or unconsciousness), from seeing themselves and acting as essentially consumers to seeing themselves and acting as exponents and enjoyers of the exertion and development of their own capacities. This is requisite not only to the emergence but also to the operation of a participatory democracy. For the latter self-image brings with it a sense of community which the former does not. One can acquire and consume by oneself, for one's own satisfaction or to show one's superiority to others: this does not require or foster a sense of community; whereas the enjoyment and development of one's capacities is to be done for the most part in conjunction with others, in some relation of community. And it will not be doubted that the operation of a participatory democracy would require a stronger sense of community than now prevails (Macpherson 1973, 99-100).

Before "communitarianism" became an "in" word in American political discussions in the 1980s and 1990s, this passage by Macpherson reveals that the need for a more solidaristic and communitarian and less competitive approach in democratic politics was evident from a New-Left perspective in the early 1970s. In this period, another political theorist who was traveling on the participatory path opened by Macpherson at the intersection of liberalism, Marxism, and Third World republicanism was Carol Pateman. In an article published in 1971, Pateman directly contradicted the conviction that the "actually existing model of democracy" represents the apotheosis of historical evolution -- an imperfectible excellence in its own right, which cannot, and ought not to be changed. Ironically, Pateman found "empirical" support for the need to transform the "actually existing democracy" into a more equitable and humane model of participatory democracy, in Almond's and Verba's Civic Culture. Criticizing Almond and Verba for misinterpreting their own data, Pateman wrote:

The conclusion of studies of the aspects of the Anglo-American political culture relevant to the sense of political efficacy and to political participation is that change is neither required, nor feasible. Or, rather more accurately, because it is assumed that the existing political structure is responsive to citizen's needs and demands and that the only real task is to see how the existing political culture contributes to, or detracts from stability of that structure, we are confronted with a premise rather than a conclusion. It is assumed that questions about radical changes in political culture are relevant to the modernizing or developing countries, not to our own; consider the question posed by Almond and Verba of what kind of political culture it is that "fits" a democratic political structure. Given that they assume that we do have a stable, successful, democratic structure, their answer is hardly surprising, that it is our own "civic culture" that provides the best fit. What is problematical is whether the modernizing countries, where Almond and Verba see a "participation explosion" occurring, will also develop this culture.

The ironical aspect of all this is that the writers on political efficacy and participation, due to their own assumption and approach, have been taken completely unawares by the demands for a participation explosion within their own polities (Pateman 1971, 301-2).

In this passage Pateman draws attention to the problematic nature of the equation that Almond and Verba establish between the civic culture of democracy on the one hand, and the political values that happen to be popular in the contemporary Western societies on the other. In this context Pateman emphasizes that the fact that "political apathy" is a common attribute of the citizens living in the contemporary Western societies does not necessarily make "political apathy" a democratic virtue. Pateman argues that a re-interpretation of Almond and Verba's evidence shows "that those who tend to be politically apathetic individuals from lower [socio-economic] backgrounds, have typically had few or no opportunities to participate in different social spheres from childhood through the adult life." Such an insight throws:

considerable doubt on the claim that existing patterns of political participation must be taken as given. If an explanation can be found for the tendency for low rates of political participation to be concentrated among citizens from low SES [socio-economic status] backgrounds, then, at the very last the question of whether these rates could be increased is still an open one (Pateman 1971, 303).

The answer that Pateman offers to this (still) open question resonates with that of Macpherson: a "radical change" in the ways how individuals socialize into the political culture of democracy:

It would not be enough to modify the national political structure to make participation more worthwhile if the citizens required to participate do not feel (psychologically) confident to do so; to influence the latter aspect a change in the socialization process, a change in the intermediate authority structures, especially that of the workplace is also required (Pateman 1971, 304).

2.4. Democracy, State, and Capitalism

In the early 1970s, Macpherson and Pateman were navigating between liberalism, Marxism, and third world republicanism. They were investigating the possibilities of change in this direction in the "actually existing" democracies. While they were doing so, another group of authors, associated with the neo-Marxist thought, were discussing, as a prelude to an anticipated socialist transformation of "our free and democratic system", the following question: How exactly do the interventions of governmental mechanisms in the economy contribute "to the reproduction of basic relations of domination and oppression" prevalent in capitalist Western states (Mahon 1991, 122)? Instigated by Nicos Poulantzas' Althusserian critique of Ralph Miliband's The State in Capitalist Society, and echoing Bachrach and Baratz's earlier criticisms, this neo-Marxist debate directly contradicted one of the core convictions of the Schumpeterian/pluralist authors: that "the state" is a neutral arena, "a simple black box for processing diverse claims of interest groups." As such, it provided "a powerful critique of the then-dominant pluralist conception of power (a very fluid equilibrium among a multiplicity of overlapping group interests, in which no one interest predominated)" (Mahon 1991, 122).

Penetrating though the neo-Marxist critique was, in the early 1970s, the contributors to this literature entertained an unfortunate mistrust in "democracy" for being an integral part of the hegemonic capitalist ideology. This mistrust found expression in the following words of Louis Althusser:

it is the ideological state apparatuses which largely secure the reproduction specifically of the relations of production behind a shield provided by the repressive state apparatuses.... Each of them contributes towards this single result in the way proper to it. The political apparatus by subjecting individual to the political state ideology, the indirect (parliamentary) or direct (plebiscitary or fascist) democratic ideology (Althusser 1971, 154).

This mistrust in democracy resulted in a paradox in the works of the neo-Marxist authors: On the one hand, they all shared the conviction, that the "capitalist society" ought to be transformed, in a more equitable and humane direction. On the other hand, however, the very goal for which the neo-Marxist authors desired this transformation, in other words the end toward which they sought to move the "capitalist society" remained unspecified. As Mahon argued in the 1970s the neo-Marxist literature on the capitalist state failed to:

flesh out a vision for the future. Although Stalinism cast a shadow over the Western left, socialism remained the unquestioned objective to which we in the west would be able to find the democratic road (Mahon 1991, 122).

It was not until the late 1970s and early 1980s that the Western Marxists started to renew their confidence in democracy. They realized that there is a difference between

the normative meaning of modern democracy as it had been conceived by the political thinkers of the European Enlightenment and inscribed into the normative self-understanding of democratic political institutions in the 18th and 19th centuries, on the one hand; and the actual practice and perception of democratic politics in and through this institutional media, as defined and described by empiricist political scientists in the aftermath of the second world war, on the other. Thus in 1980 Alan Hunt wrote:

The project of socialism has as its goal the completion or realization of the democratic project initiated by the bourgeois revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although often presented as goals in their own right, nationalization and collectivism are means in the realization of the democratic project. Thus, the realization of democracy involves not the smashing of bourgeois democracy but its completion, liberated from the undemocratic framework of capitalist relations. Political competition, representative government, political rights do not bear an historical capitalist essence, but provide elements whose transformation makes possible the attainment of the socialist project. The transformation of bourgeois democracy should not be seen as a process that occurs only *after* the moment of revolution. Rather its transformation lies at the center of the struggle for socialism; hence the expansion of the sphere of democracy is an integral and even central feature of class struggle under capitalism (Hunt 1980, 17).

Hunt's affirmation that expanding and deepening democracy is a legitimate goal for the socialists to pursue was also in accordance with the conclusion that the influential thinker of the Althusserian state theory, Nicos Poulantzas, reached at the end of the 1970s. In 1978, in State, Power and Socialism, Poulantzas wrote that the ultimate political question facing the socialists is to find an answer to the following question:

How it is possible radically to transform the state in such a manner that the extension and deepening of political freedoms and institutions of

representative democracy... are combined with the unfurling of forms of direct democracy and the mushrooming of self-management bodies (Poulantzas 1978, 256).

In the 1980s, this question of how to maintain the main institutions of representative democracy, but also to deepen and extend them so as to increase the equality of citizens in participating in self-government, was addressed not only by socialist but also by neo-pluralist, and post-Marxist authors.

2.5. Neo-Pluralist Discovery of Marxism

In the 1980s, at around the same time when Western Marxists were renewing their confidence in democracy as a legitimate goal to pursue, some of the empiricist political theorists of the post-War era were overcoming their existential Cold War anxiety -- the fear of Marxism. This was evident in the second preface Dahl published in 1985: A Preface to Economic Democracy. Writing this work was Dahl's way of admitting, without saying in so many words, the justice of the criticisms, that his earlier work received in the late 1960s and 1970s: It is not the case, Dahl admitted, that the actually existing American democracy functions as a harmonious equilibrium in which no interest predominates. It is not the case that political power is so evenly distributed in the actually existing American democracy that nobody can be said to govern. Therefore, it is not the case that the actually existing American democracy represents the apotheosis in the evolution of democracy -- an excellence in its own right that cannot, indeed that ought not, to be changed.

In Dahl's reconsidered opinion it is the case, however, that the actually existing American democracy suffers from a serious affliction. Dahl calls this affliction "for want of a better term, Corporate Capitalism." By corporate capitalism Dahl means the concentration of ownership and control of wealth and economic resources in large, impersonal, hierarchically organized, national and multinational business enterprises. According to Dahl the concentration of wealth and economic resources in large corporations *is* an affliction from which the actually existing American democracy suffers, because of reasons which are well-known to readers of Marx's works:

Ownership and control contribute to the creation of great differences among citizens in wealth, income, status, skill, information, control over information and propaganda, access to political leaders, and, on the average, predictable life chances, not only for mature adults but also for the unborn, infants, and children. And after all due qualifications have been made, differences like these help in turn to generate significant inequalities among citizens in their capacities and opportunities for participating as political equals in *governing the state*. (Dahl 1985, 55. Emphasis in original).

In Dahl's re-considered opinion the right to accumulate unlimited wealth, and the resulting concentration of political power in large corporations is not an inevitable consequence, a sine-qua-non aspect of what NSC-68 called "our free and democratic system." It is not, because, we cannot leap from an "entitlement to secure possession of the shirt on my back or the cash in my pocket to a fundamental moral right to acquire shares in IBM and therewith the standard rights of ownership that shareholdings legally convey" (Dahl 1985, 74-5). Corporate capitalism, and the resulting inequalities pose, rather, the most fundamental challenge to the great American ideal, namely freedom.

[T]he most fundamental challenge to liberty derives from inequality, or liberty of a certain kind: liberty to accumulate unlimited economic resources and to organize economic activity into hierarchically governed enterprises (Dahl 1985, 50).

Therefore, "our free and democratic" system cannot live up to its Enlightened promises of "freedom and democracy", unless "we" explore:

the possibility of an alternative economic structure that would... help to strengthen political equality and democracy by reducing inequalities originating in the ownership and control of firms in a system like that we know poses (Dahl 1985, 50).

This is a perceptive invitation to think and investigate the practical possibilities of democratizing the actually existing American "polyarchy." As such Dahl's "neo-pluralist" second preface signifies a sharp break with his pluralist first preface. As we have seen above, the first preface reflects the blackmail of the Cold War -- more specifically the existential anxiety created by the "misunderstood" Soviet threat "to our way of life." There, democracy is a Schumpeterian "description" of the way politics is actually practiced in the United States of America in the 1950s -- a description which ought to be maximized elsewhere on earth. In the second preface, however, democracy is a system of government that does not yet exist in the United States of America, or elsewhere on earth. It is a system which "maximizes" political equality, by putting limits on economic liberty. The immediate practical question raised by the first preface is how can "we" diffuse and maximize "our way of life" in the rest of the world. The immediate practical question

raised by the second preface is, by contrast, this: how can we democratize the social and economic aspects of our way of life so that the political equality of American citizens in governing the state be maximized as much as possible?

In the 1980s, this question raised by the neo-pluralists' discovery of Marxist insights was addressed by those Western Marxists, who had already renewed their confidence in democracy, as a legitimate goal to pursue. This so-called "post-Marxist" debate was, however, not without its own ironies: In an influential work, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, two well-known contributors to this debate, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe found themselves in a fundamental agreement with the conclusions that the pluralist authors of the old school reached in the 1950s: It does not make sense to suggest that there is a politically meaningful difference between the state and society, agreed Laclau and Mouffe, the state is "just one of many political institutions, and political institutions are only one of many clusters of social institutions."

2.6. (Post-)Marxist Discovery of Pluralism

In the Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe seek to convince the "Western" Leftists, that they should re-think what they mean when they say they are on the Left. In Laclau and Mouffe's opinion, such a rethinking should involve changes, both in the strategies of "socialist struggle" under capitalism, and in what the socialists envision the end-product of this struggle will be.

Concerning the socialist strategy, Laclau and Mouffe suggest two changes: First, they advise the socialists to abandon the Enlightened intellectual assumptions that had

guided left-wing political action, since Rousseau and Marx. They offer instead, French post-structuralism as the new source of inspiration for the Left. This new source includes the works of authors such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida as well as the works of *their* intellectual sources of inspiration, Nietzsche and Heidegger. This shift from Rousseau and Marx, to Nietzsche and Heidegger requires the Left, in Laclau and Mouffe's words, to renounce "the discourse of the universal and its implicit assumption of a privileged point of access to 'truth', which can be reached only by a limited number of subjects" (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 192). This means, the leftist thought should cease to take guidance from such "metaphysical" notions of validity, as truth, rightness and sincerity. The Left should, instead, admit the power of political power to (re)define truth, and think and act accordingly.

The second change in the socialist strategy concerns the agents and sites of the socialist struggle. Laclau and Mouffe urge the socialists to give up trying to find *a priori* agents of change (the working class) levels of effectiveness in the field of the social (the state, economy), and privileged points and moments of rupture (the revolution) (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 178-9). Instead of trying to mobilize working classes to seize state power, Laclau and Mouffe suggest the Left should fight the Right with their own weapons on their own ground: In other words the Left should engage in a politics of reality definition in *the civil society*, on the terrain of culture. The Left's failure to do so, warn Laclau and Mouffe, would leave "the whole of the vast field of culture and the definition of reality built upon the basis of it, the whole effort of hegemonic rearticulation

of the diverse discursive formations, for the initiative of the right" (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 174).

These two changes in the socialist strategy also require a change in the socialist goals: Accordingly, Laclau and Mouffe advise the "Western Left" to abandon their "dogmatic" conviction that a "sutured society" (i.e., a society which is composed of equal and free members whose interests, goals, aspirations, rights and obligations can be brought in harmony in their actions and interactions in the life contexts of their daily co-existence) is indeed possible (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 179-80). Instead of pursuing the goal of a harmonious, well-ordered, and just society, Laclau and Mouffe suggest that the Western Left should adopt the competitive mentality of the liberal-democratic ideology as its own, and seek to expand and deepen it in a radical and plural direction:

The alternative of the left should consist of locating itself fully in the field of the democratic revolution and expanding the chains of equivalents between the different struggles against oppression. The task of the Left therefore cannot be to renounce liberal-democratic ideology, but on the contrary, to deepen and expand it in the direction of a radical and plural democracy (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 176).

In The Return of the Political, a collection of articles Mouffe published after the Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, she clarifies how we must understand what she means by "radical and plural" democracy:

A pluralist democracy contains a paradox, since the very moment of its realization would see its disintegration. It should be conceived as a good that only exists as good so long as it cannot be reached. Such a democracy will therefore always be a democracy 'to come', as conflict and antagonism

are at the same time its condition for possibility and the condition of impossibility of its full realization (Laclau and Mouffe 1993, 8).

The point that conflict and antagonism are inevitable parts of democratic politics, therefore democratic politics ought to be conceived as a continuous dialectic between societal harmony and political controversy is, of course, an important insight which enhances our understanding of the fragile and dynamic nature of democratic politics as a *process*. In fairness, however, we must note that this point can hardly be considered as the patented intellectual property of radical left-wing political thought. Indeed, this point resonates, *inter alia*, with what Robert Dahl said about the "democratic creed", more than twenty years earlier:

Most of us, I suppose, are ready to recognize long-run changes in the beliefs expressed by the more articulate segments of the political stratum and the intelligentsia, and we can infer from various kinds of evidence -- all of it, alas, highly debatable -- that changes of some sort take place over long periods of time in the attitudes about democracy held in the general population. We tend to assume, however, that except for these long-run shifts, beliefs about democracy are more or less static. I want to propose an alternative explanation, namely that democratic beliefs like other political beliefs, are influenced by a recurring process of inter-change among political professionals, political stratum, and the great bulk of the population. The process generates enough agreement on rules and norms so as to permit the system to operate, but agreement tends to be incomplete, and typically it decays. So the process is frequently repeated. "Consensus", then, is not at all a static and unchanging attribute of citizens. It is a variable element in a complex and more or less continuous process (Dahl 1961, 316).

Not exactly original though it is, Mouffe's (re)discovery of Dahl's theoretical insight that democratic consensus is "a variable element in a complex and more or less continuous process", leads her to carry her strategic point of hitting the Right with its own weapons, one step further. In the Return of the Political, Mouffe adds another name from the "Right", to the list of new sources of intellectual inspiration for "the Left." She suggests that the Left should read Carl Schmitt's polemic against liberal democracy, learn from it, and use the lessons thus learned, in the struggle to deepen and expand democracy in a radical and plural direction:

Schmitt's critique of liberal democracy constitutes, in my view, a challenge that we cannot ignore. Yet I also think that by revealing the deficiencies of liberalism, he can help us --unwittingly -- to identify the issues that need to be addressed and thereby to gain a better understanding of the nature of modern democracy. My objective is to think with Schmitt, against Schmitt, and to use his insights in order to strengthen liberal democracy against its critiques (Mouffe 1993, 2).

There are two lessons, in particular, that Mouffe thinks the Left should learn from Carl Schmitt: First, it is only by identifying ourselves with "friends", and distinguishing ourselves from "enemies" that we gain the knowledge of our identities, i.e., the knowledge of who we are, and who we are not. And therefore, second, existential conflict and antagonism between friends and enemies, "us" and "them", "self" and "other", "our faith" and "their faith" are facts of life, from which there is no escaping:

When we accept that every identity is relational and that the condition of existence of every identity is the affirmation of a difference, the determination of an "other" that is going to play the role of a "constitutive outside", it is possible to understand how antagonisms arise. In the domain

of collective identifications, where all what is in question is the creation of a "we" by the delimitation of a "them", the possibility always exists that this we/them relation will turn into a relation of the friend/enemy type; in other words, it can always become political in Schmitt's understanding of the term. This can happen when the other, who was until then considered only under the mode of difference, begins to be perceived as negating our identity, as putting in question our very existence. From that moment onwards, any type of we/them relation, be it religious, ethnic, national, economic, or other, becomes the site of political antagonism (Mouffe 1993, 2-3).

The best one can hope for a relatively peaceful political existence is, therefore, not a harmonious world full of emphatic friends. The best one can hope is, rather, learning how to distinguish between one's existential enemies and one's political adversaries. One's existential enemies are those whom one would physically, hence mentally and spiritually destroy, without thinking (because if one does not, "they" would do the same to "us".) One's political adversaries are, in turn, those whom one would do anything in one's power to beat but whom one would refrain from destroying:

Once we accept the necessity of the political, and the impossibility of a world without antagonisms, what needs to be envisaged is how it is possible under those conditions to create and maintain a pluralistic democratic order. Such an order is based on a distinction between enemy and adversary. It requires that, within the context of the political community, the opponent should be considered not as an enemy to be destroyed, but as an adversary whose existence is legitimate and must be tolerated. We will fight against his ideas but we will not question his right to defend them (Mouffe 1993, 4).

According to Mouffe, learning this "realistic" lesson from Carl Schmitt means two things for the Western Left: First, the Left should give up any effort to generate a

popular "consensus" on the moral norms and values associated with the universalistic political thought of the Enlightenment. It should, because attempts to create a normative consensus on universal moral norms through reasoned criticism and argumentation are likely to alienate ethnic, racial, and religious minorities in the Western societies, forcing them to seek fundamentalist alternatives. Such "universalistic" attempts, therefore, would be counter-productive and play directly into the hands of the right-wing adversaries:

The illusion of consensus and unanimity, as well as the calls for "anti-politics", should be recognized as being fatal for democracy and therefore abandoned. The absence of a political frontier, far from being a sign of political maturity, is the symptom of a void that can endanger democracy, because that void provides a terrain that can be occupied by the extreme right to articulate new antidemocratic political identities. When there is a lack of democratic political struggles with which to identify, their place is taken by other forms of identification of ethnic, nationalist or religious nature, and the opponent is defined in those terms too. In such conditions, the opponent cannot be perceived as an adversary to contend with, but only as an enemy to be destroyed....

When, as is the case today, liberal democracy is increasingly identified with actually existing liberal democratic capitalism, and its political dimension is restricted to the rule of law, there is a risk that the excluded may join fundamentalist movements or become attracted to antiliberal, populist forms of democracy. A healthy democratic process calls for a vibrant clash of political positions and an open conflict of interests. If such is missing, it can too easily be replaced by a confrontation between non-negotiable moral values and essentialist identities (Mouffe 1993, 5-6).

The second conclusion that Mouffe reaches from the lessons learned from Carl Schmitt is this: instead of harboring illusions of consensus and unanimity the Left should seek to create a "radical and plural democratic" common-sense among "diverse discursive formations" and "subject positions" struggling against "oppression and domination" in the

Western societies. Such a "radical and plural democratic" common sense would allow various marginal groups to respect and tolerate each others' differences; yet it would also help them to coordinate and mobilize their efforts in their struggles against their common "adversary," the Right.

If the task of radical democracy is indeed to deepen the democratic revolution and to link diverse democratic struggles, such a task requires the creation of new subject positions that would allow the common articulation, for example, of antiracism, antisexism, and anticapitalism. These struggles do not spontaneously converge, and in order to establish democratic equivalences a new "common sense" is necessary which would transform the identity of different groups so that demands of each group could be articulated with those of others according to the principle of democratic equivalence (Mouffe 1993, 18).

Having come this far Mouffe assigns this last task of creating a "radical and plural democratic" common sense to political philosophy: Unfortunately for Mouffe, however, there are not too many actually existing political philosophers, actually thinking, writing, and teaching in actually existing universities, who actually understand their vocation as that of creating a "radical and plural democratic" common sense among marginal social groups. Therefore, Mouffe seeks to overcome this little problem with the actually existing reality of philosophy, by redefining what political philosophers' primary occupation should be:

Political philosophy has a very important role to play in the emergence of this common sense and in the creation of these new subject positions, for it will shape the "definition of reality" that will provide the form of political experience and serve as a matrix for the construction of a certain kind of subject (Mouffe 1993, 19).

According to Mouffe, then, philosophy must drop its more than 2000 years old preoccupation with metaphysical questions of morality, justice and legitimacy. It should abandon its Kantian quest for the *a priori* conditions of experience. It should give up reflecting on what a just and well-ordered society, would look like. It should drop its platonic claim to privileged access to truth. Philosophy must be, instead, the medium in which Left-wing strategists of "hegemonic articulation", use the power of written and spoken word, to beat the Right-wing manufacturers of public opinion in the "terrain of culture".³

So far, Mouffe's strategic reasoning in devising ways for the Left to beat the Right *seems* to be impeccable. There are, however, one or two points which neither Mouffe, nor her political adversaries, the followers of Schumpeter, realize in their deification of "strategy" -- more specifically, in the disproportionate role they ascribe to the strategic struggle for ideological hegemony in democratic theory and practice. At the expense of anticipating some of my discussion of Habermas' work in the next chapter, let me open a parenthesis here, to see what these are.

One can admit that how political power is generated, distributed, and used, to what end, how it operates in the terrain of culture with what consequences, are important questions in politics, including democratic politics. The point that one's socio-political

³ Mouffe's comments on Rawls' Theory of Justice (which we shall discuss in the next chapter) are particularly expressive of the strategic role she ascribes to political philosophy. See her chapters on "American Liberalism and its Communitarian critics" and "Rawls: Political Philosophy without Politics", in the Return of the Political (Mouffe 1993, 23-59).

identity is relationally constructed, and involves a differentiation between a friendly self and inimical other -- this point too is important and must be born in mind, particularly when thinking about violent ethnic conflicts that plague contemporary world politics. One can also admit that "the terrain of culture" (or to use plain English: public opinion) *is* a political site where power operates to "manufacture" public consent for unjust and oppressive policies and practices. We can acknowledge the contribution of these insights to our understanding of democratic politics as a dynamic, evolving, and fragile process. Yet this acknowledgment does not necessarily mean that philosophers in general, and democratic political theorists in particular, must drop such universal notions of validity, as truth, justice, legitimacy, and sincerity. Nor does it mean that they must cross the dividing line between studying and practicing politics, and fully locate themselves in the "terrain of culture" as committed political actors.

To understand this a strategist of "hegemonic articulation" has to understand that at the end of the twentieth century when one talks about "beating a political adversary in public opinion" one talks about using any or a combination of the three methods: argumentative, competitive, and deceptive.

First, one can beat a political adversary in the public opinion through reasoned criticism. In other words, one can show that one's political adversary is not telling the *truth* on this or the other subject, i.e., she deliberately suppresses relevant information, or gives false information in her public declarations and/or speeches on the subject in question. One can show that the policies and strategies one's adversary advocates are unjust, i.e., they are likely to result in avoidable hardships for some human beings and

unjustifiable and/or unfair advantages for some others. One can show, that one's political adversary is untruthful in her actions and promises, i.e., she fails to act as she promised she would. Finally, one can show, that one's adversary contradicts herself, i.e., her conclusions and/or actions do not follow from her premises and/or declared intentions. This is the argumentative method of beating a political adversary.

Second one can beat a political adversary as if she were a business rival, i.e., one can use commercial advertisement and campaigning techniques, or offer better and more advantageous promises, to induce his followers to desert him and join the opposite camp. This is the competitive method of beating a political adversary.

Third one can beat a political adversary through devious tactics, such as disseminating false information about her to ruin her reputation, or deliberately feeding her misinformation to denigrate the credibility of her actions and decisions. This is the deceptive method of beating a political adversary.

Now, at the end of the twentieth century, in any complex social organization, when we talk about "beating a political adversary in public opinion" we do not talk exclusively about the last two of these three methods -- as Mouffe, her right-wing adversaries, and other witting or unwitting Machievellians of late-twentieth century post-Marxism seem to believe. Rather, we talk about using *all three* of these methods -- if not as actually existing realities, then as actually existing possibilities. Indeed unless Mouffe uses her intuitive sense of morality and passes the normative judgment that the first, argumentative method of beating a political adversary is better than the second, competitive method of beating a political adversary, the second, competitive, method is

better than the third, devious method, and the third, devious method is better than outright use (or threat of use) of force, it is hard to see how she can hope to be able to distinguish between the "existential enemies" and the "political adversaries" of "radical and plural democracy." Similarly unless Mouffe attributes a privileged position to those "discursive formations" and "subject positions" which rather argue than compete, rather compete than manipulate, rather manipulate than use force, over those political identities which fail to put reasoned argumentation on top of this list, it is hard to see how she can hope that a radical and plural democratic society can sustain social, cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity, yet maintain political stability.

It is hard to see, because what distinguishes democratic form of government from other forms of government is not that democracy is based on the consent of governed and that in the unavoidable dialectic of conflict and harmony, this public consent runs the risk of dissolution at any given moment. When it comes to that no form of government can survive for too long solely on the strength of state coercion; as Mouffe's intellectual mentor, Antonio Gramsci, had the wisdom to suggest, even dictators need the consent of those over whom they rule, to rule effectively for extended periods of time. What distinguishes democratic form of government from other forms of government is, rather, the means that is used to manage the risk of the dissolution of public consent.

In other words a democratic government is a democratic government not because it derives the legitimacy of its authority from the consent of the governed, but because of *how* this consent is (re)generated and maintained in the political interactions

between the citizens, and between the citizens and the elected and appointed government officials, once and if it dissolves. Suppression of opposition, ideological manipulation of public opinion, and constraints on the freedom of expression and access to information are the hallmarks of authoritarian political regimes, not because sadistic right or left-wing dictators, or primitive native tyrants derive a perverse pleasure from using these tactics as "ends in themselves", but because *these* are the means that *they* use to manufacture and maintain consent. In a "radical and plural" democracy, by contrast, that linguistic practice, into which we would not even bother to enter without presupposing such notions of validity, as truth, rightness, and sincerity, namely "rational argumentation", *ought* to be the primary means to manage the risk of the dissolution of public consent.⁴

In the complex societies of late-modernity, a radical political strategy which relies solely on a clever strategy to redefine the reality in the "terrain of culture" and loses sight of such universal notions of validity as truth, rightness and sincerity would be as much, even more ineffective in achieving its lofty ends, as a radical political strategy, which loses sight of the power of political power to manipulate public opinion and relies solely on the truth of its interpretations, rightness of its causes, and sincerity of its actions. Indeed it is hard to see how "oppressed" and "marginalized" groups in the "actually existing democracies" can resist to ideological hegemony of the Right without recourse to such universal notions of validity as truth, legitimacy, justice, and sincerity, hence to reasoned criticism and argumentation.

⁴ I elaborate on this point in greater detail in the next chapter, where I discuss Habermas' discourse theoretical work.

In these ideological attempts to "re-define" the social reality the "losers" -- the homeless, the unemployed, the new immigrant, the member of the ethnic, religious, or racial minority, etc. -- are presented as if they "deserve" their plight even when they do not, and/or as if their plight is the tragic, i.e., sad but inevitable cost of maintaining public order even when it is not.⁵ It is, therefore, not obvious why anyone who is not "oppressed and marginalized," whose personal experience is confined to the deceptive tranquility of the middle-class life in "Western Europe and North America", who, in short, belongs to what Richard Nixon used to call in his election campaigns "the silent majority", should feel obliged to oppose oppressive and unjust social and political practices and policies. It is not obvious that is, unless these oppressed and marginalized human beings formulate and voice a moral claim justifiable on such grounds of validity as truth, justice, legitimacy and sincerity. It is also not obvious who will formulate these claims, who will develop and substantiate these arguments, who will meticulously research and document this ideological "redefinition" of reality if, in their quest of a "radical" political strategy, left-

⁵ "The excess of democracy" thesis Samuel Huntington develops in his chapter on "America" in the The Crises of Democracy; Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission, is a typical example of these Right-wing attempts to redefine the social reality at the expense of "losers." I discuss this thesis in greater detail, below, pp. 127-127 For the sake of clarity, and anticipating my discussion in the next chapter, I should note here, that by disputing this "Right-wing" redefinition of reality, I do not mean to suggest that in a democracy there is, or there ought to be, no room and need to use "coercive" means to maintain public order. I also do not mean to suggest that those who are in a position to decide to use (or in a position to use) these coercive means in the interests of public order should deliberate endlessly to decide and act when confronted with an emergency. I suggest, however, following Habermas, that the norms and rules specifying when and how coercive means are allowed to be used, i.e., the legal basis of using coercive means, must be "justifiable" to all citizens, including the "losers", in their capacity as equal and free participants in rational discourses. This legal framework itself must be open to change through reasoned criticisms. The legal venues of such legislative change must be guaranteed by what A.H.L. Hart (1961) called "secondary rules" regulating the procedures of legislative change. And these procedural rules of legislative change should themselves outline an argumentative and deliberative, i.e., "discursive" process of law-making between free and equal citizens.

wing academics themselves undermine these grounds of validity, and belittle the significance of such notions as truth, justice, legitimacy, and sincerity.

These are, then, some of the points, that the post-Marxist radicals missed in their attempt to democratize the "actually existing" Western democracies.

2.7. Democratization: State, Civil Society, and the Cosmopolis

In the 1980s, while post-Marxists were busy re-discovering old pluralism and neo-pluralists were busy re-discovering old Marxism, another author, David Held, was advancing on the participatory path Macpherson opened in the late 1960s, between Liberalism, Marxism, and Third World Republicanism: By the late 1980s and early 1990s Held was ready to formulate a more sensible "strategy" to democratize actually existing Western democracies. This strategy seemed to be more sensible, not only because it promised to avoid the embarrassing pitfalls of "post-Marxist" radicalism. It seemed to be more sensible also because it promised to cure problems which both the neo-Marxist and neo-pluralist authors diagnosed as afflicting actually existing Western democracies.

In Political Theory and the Modern State Held (1989) directly contradicts the post-Marxist suggestion that in order to pursue the project of democratizing actually existing Western democracies, the Left must engage in political theory *as* political practice. Held realizes that this suggestion jumps from the premise that there is not a stable epistemological ground, an Archimedean point, on which to base social and political criticism as secure theoretical knowledge, to the conclusion that universal notions of validity as truth, justice, legitimacy and sincerity, must inevitably be

subordinated to the reality of the struggle for political power. "While [the] rejection of an Archimedean point is, in my judgment correct in general terms" writes Held:

it by no means invalidates the project of political theory as the critique of ideology. For differences of evaluative moral appraisal are never merely a clash of discrepant ultimate values which one must either simply accept or reject. The meaning of evaluative standpoints always depends... on a framework of a web of concepts and theories in which the factual and normative inform one another, and which are open to appraisal in philosophical and empirical terms (Held 1989, 5).

In Models of Democracy, Held also contradicts the post-Marxist suggestion that the left-wing "struggle" to democratize actually existing democracies should be carried out exclusively on the terrain of culture in the civil society. In Held's opinion, this one-sided approach cannot respond to the basic, two-fold institutional and organizational problem from which actually existing Western democracies suffer. In Held's words:

The problems are, in sum, twofold: the structure of civil society (including private ownership of productive property, vast sexual and racial inequalities) -- misunderstood or endorsed by liberal democratic models -- does not create conditions for equal votes, effective participation, proper political understanding and equal control of the political agenda, while the structure of the liberal democratic state (including large, frequently unaccountable bureaucratic apparatuses, institutional dependence on the process of capital accumulation, political representatives preoccupied with their own re-election) does not create an organizational force which can adequately regulate "civil" power centers. (Held 1987, 282-283).

In Held's opinion this two-fold ailment requires a double-sided cure:

[F]or democracy to flourish today, it has to be reconceived as a double-sided phenomenon: concerned, on the one hand, with the re-form of state

power and, on the other hand, with the restructuring of civil society. The principle of autonomy can only be enacted by recognizing the indispensability of a process of "double democratization:" the interdependent transformation of both state and civil society. Such a process must be premised by the acceptance of both the principle that the division between state and civil society must be a central feature of democratic life and the notion that the power to make decisions must be free of the inequalities and constraints imposed by the private appropriation of capital (Held 1987, 283).

In Held's opinion, this "double-sided" process alone, necessary though it is, is not sufficient to carry the project of democratizing actually existing Western democracies to its conclusion. At the end of the twentieth century, irrevocable reality of global inter-connectedness defines the social, economic, and political conditions under which human species exists on the face of the earth. Therefore a project of democratization would remain incomplete if it does not take into account this actually existing reality of world politics:

[T]he problem, for defenders and critics alike of modern democratic systems, is that regional and global inter-connectedness contests the traditional national resolutions of the key questions of democratic theory and practice. The very process of governance can escape the reach of the nation state. National communities by no means exclusively make and determine decisions and policies for themselves, and governments by no means determine what is appropriate for their own citizens. To take some topical examples: A decision to increase interest rates in an attempt to stem inflation or exchange-rate instability is most often taken as a "national" decision, although it may well stimulate economic changes in other countries. A decision to permit the harvesting of the rainforests may contribute to ecological damage far beyond the borders which formally limit the responsibility of a given set of political decision-makers (Held 1995, 18).

In Held's opinion, in addition to such practical ambiguities that the actually existing reality of global inter-connectedness creates in a world organized on the basis of the principle of territorial sovereignty, it also raises important conceptual questions in and about the theory of democracy.

[T]he very idea of consent through elections, and the particular notion that the relevant constituencies of voluntary agreement are the communities of a bounded territory or state, become problematic as soon as the issue of national, regional, and global inter-connectedness is considered and the nature of a so-called "relevant" community is contested. Whose consent is necessary and whose participation is justified in decisions concerning, for instance, AIDS, or acid rain, or the use of non-renewable resources, or the management of transnational economic flows? What is the relevant constituency: national, regional, or international? (Held 1995, 18).

Held summarizes the challenge posed to democratic theory and practice by the discrepancy between the actually existing reality of global inter-connectedness and the fundamental organizing principle of international relations, namely territorial sovereignty, in the following words:

Territorial boundaries demarcate the basis on which individuals are included in and excluded from participation in decisions affecting their lives (however limited the participation might be), but the outcomes of these decisions often 'stretch' beyond national frontiers. (Held 1995, 18)

The conclusion that Held suggests that the actually existing ambiguities of this actually existing global reality impose upon the defenders of democracy, whether they like it or not, is this: "Paradoxically, perhaps, democracy has to be extended and deepened

within and between countries for it to retain its relevance in the future" (Held 1995, 22-23). In other words, under conditions of global inter-connectedness, democracy cannot flourish within the territorial boundaries of a nation-state, Western or non-Western, Northern, or Southern, unless it also flourishes both within the territorial boundaries of *other* nation-states, and *between* them. To put it more clearly, actually existing Western democracies cannot democratize unless "the rest" of the world democratize. The rest of the world cannot democratize, unless the actually existing Western democracies democratizes. Finally, neither the "actually existing Western democracies" nor the rest of the world's societies can democratize unless the regional and global institutions of international politics democratize.

In Democracy and the Global Order David Held presents a detailed program of how such a complex and multi-layered process of "cosmopolitan democratization" can be carried out at national regional, and global levels. Table 1 reproduces Held's schematic summary of this program.

Table 3.1. Objectives of the cosmopolitan model of democracy, illustrative**issues:**

<i>Short Term</i>	<i>Long Term</i>
<i>Polity/Governance</i>	
1. Reform of UN Security Council (to give developing countries a significant voice and effective decision-making capacity)	1. Entrenchment of cosmopolitan democratic law: new Charter of Rights and Obligations locked into different domains of political, social and economic power
2. Creation of a UN second chamber (following an international constitutional convention)	2. Global Parliament (with limited revenue raising capacity) connected to regions, nations, and localities. Creation of a public issue Boundary Court
3. Enhance political regionalization (EU and beyond) and the use of transnational referenda	3. Separation of political and economic interests; public funding of deliberative assemblies and electoral processes
4. Compulsory jurisdiction before the International Court. Creation of a new, international Human Rights Court	4. Interconnected global legal system, embracing elements of criminal and civil law. Establishment of an international Criminal Court
5. Foundation of a new coordinating economic agency at regional and global levels	5. Establishment of the accountability of international and transnational economic agencies to parliaments and assemblies at regional and global levels
6. Establishment of an effective accountable international military force	6. Permanent shift of a growing proportion of a nation-state's coercive capability to regional and global institutions, with the ultimate aim of demilitarization and the transcendence of the war system
<i>Economy/civil society</i>	
I. Enhancement of non-state non-market solutions in the organization of civil society	1. Creation of a diversity of self-regulating associations and groups in civil society
II. Systematic experimentation with different democratic organizational	2. Multisectoral economy and pluralization of

	forms in the economy	patterns of ownership and possession
III.	Introduction of strict limits to private ownership of key “public-shaping” institutions: media, information, and so on	3. Social framework investment priorities set through public deliberation and government decision, but extensive market regulation of goods and labor remain
IV.	Provision of resources to those in the most vulnerable social positions to defend and articulate their interests	4. Guaranteed basic income for all adults, irrespective of whether they are engaged in market or household activities

Source: David Held, Democracy and Global Order, 279.

Hopelessly utopian though it may sound to ears trained to listen to the parasitic noises of the Cold War, this program is institutionally the most realistic and innovative response yet given to Hannah Arendt’s by now 40 year old demand. As we have seen above, the challenge that Arendt posed to thinking and feeling human minds forty years ago, was this:

[H]uman dignity needs a new guarantee which can be found only in a new political principle, in a new law on earth, whose validity this time must comprehend the whole of humanity while its power must remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by newly defined territorial entities (Arendt 1950, ix).

2.8. An Interim Summary

I shall return to and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of Held’s project of cosmopolitan democratization in the fifth chapter of this thesis. At this point of our discussion it makes more sense to summarize what we have so far seen in our review of the criticisms that the empirical theories of democracy received in the past three decades.

From the mid-1960s onwards, the actually existing model of democracy, as defined, described, and prescribed by the followers of Schumpeter in empirical political science, has been challenged, both at practical and theoretical levels, for being: descriptively inadequate (Bachrach, Baratz, and Schmitter), devoid of ethical substance (Macpherson, Held), uncondusive to citizen participation (Macpherson, Held, Pateman), socio-economically inegalitarian (Miliband, Poulantzas, Hunt, Mahon, Dahl, Held), and not liberal enough (Laclau, Mouffe). The debates instigated in the context of these criticisms, culminated in a programmatic demand for further democratization, not only in the actually existing Western democracies, but also in and between the rest of the countries of the world.

Authors whom we reviewed in this section have undoubtedly significant political, epistemological, and methodological differences. In the works we discussed in this section, however, they share two basic insights: First, they think that the actually existing model of democracy, as defined, described and prescribed in the aftermath of the second world war by the empiricist followers of Schumpeter, is not a normatively viable model. They think that there is a real, actually existing need for a better theory of democracy, and a better, more democratic way of organizing and practicing politics, at national and/or regional and/or global levels. Second, whatever they mean by a better theory and practice of democratic politics, or wherever they seek the answers to the contemporary questions and problems of "democracy and democratization", they think, with the exception of Schmitter, that these answers are *not* to be found in Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. Indeed, most of them think, quite perceptively,

that Schumpeter's "another theory of democracy" is, if not an integral part, then symptomatic of the problems from which actually existing Western democracies suffer.

3. The Return of Schumpeter in the form of a Neo-conservative Ideology

3.1. An Excess of Democracy?

This snow-balling demand for further democratization in the actually existing Western democracies did not, of course, fail to attract a right-wing reaction. In 1975, at a time when the peace movement was celebrating American withdrawal from Vietnam, and the shockwaves of the Watergate Scandal were raising audible questions about whether "our free and democratic system" is indeed free and democratic, the Trilateral Commission summoned Samuel Huntington to urgent consultation. Taking a short leave from advising American foreign policy-makers about modernization-related problems encountered in the "Third World", Huntington accepted this temporary assignment. In 1975 drawing upon the authority of his well established academic credentials as an "objective" political scientist, Huntington commented on the domestic problems confronting American democracy in following words:

Al Smith once remarked that "the only cure for the evils of democracy is more democracy." Our analysis suggests that applying that cure at the present time could well be adding fuel to the flames. Instead, some of the problems of governance in the United States today stem from an excess of democracy -- an "excess of democracy" in much the same sense in which David Donald used the term to refer to the consequences of the Jacksonian revolution which helped to precipitate the Civil War. Needed, instead, is a greater degree of moderation in democracy (Huntington 1975, 114).

Huntington clarifies what he means by a "greater degree of moderation in democracy" in the following words:

The effective operation of a democratic political system usually requires some measure of apathy and noninvolvement on the part of some individuals and groups. In the past, every democratic society has had a marginal population, of greater or lesser size, which has not actively participated in politics. In itself, this marginality on the part of some groups is inherently undemocratic, but it has also been one of the factors which has enabled democracy to function effectively. Marginal social groups, as in the case of the blacks, are now becoming full participants in the political system. Yet the danger of overloading the political system with demands which extend its functions and undermine its authority still remains. Less marginality on the part of some groups thus needs to be replaced by more self-restraint on the part of all groups (Huntington 1975, 114).

In Huntington's expert opinion, "overloading" the American political system with the excessive demands of "marginal social groups," such as "the blacks", and the consequent "decline in the governability of democracy" is not good. It is not good because it is:

closely related, as both cause and effect, to the relative downturn in American power and influence in world affairs. A decline in the governability of democracy at home means a decline in the influence of democracy abroad (Huntington 1975, 106).

According to Huntington, then, to increase the influence of democracy in world politics, hence to contain "the fanatical faith" of the Cold War enemy, hence to defend "our" American way of life, "we" (i.e., the Americans) need to increase the governability

of the American political system. To increase the governability of the American political system, in turn, "we" need a less participatory, less egalitarian, and more competitive, in short, a more restricted, model of democracy. Fortunately for "us", the "minimal" model of democracy that "we" urgently need has already been developed as a description of "our" way of life in the early decades of the Cold War.

Now, these studies of objective political science have shown to "us" scientists of democratic politics, that "the stability and effectiveness of a political system depends upon the system's capacity to engender the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society." When "we" apply this "objective" law of political science, to solve the "observed" problem of governability in "our" country, "we" reach to the following conclusion: "we" must somehow instill and foster the belief among our "typical" American citizens that minimal democracy, as defined, described, and prescribed in the early years of the cold war, is good democracy. It is good democracy, not only because it is the most "effective" way for "our" elected and appointed public officials to govern our democracy, but also because it is the safest way of defending "our way of life" against non-democracy.

3.2. The Rehabilitation of Minimal Democracy in American Politics

In the 1980s and 1990s, this strategically impeccable, but morally defective and monological reasoning, motivated neo-conservative authors to seek to rehabilitate the credibility of Schumpeter's minimal model of democracy in American public's opinion. The following lines from Lipset's Political Man -- lines which Lipset wrote overlooking the fact that Schumpeter has developed his "another theory of democracy" in a direct,

explicit, and self-conscious polemic against the ethical notion of the "common good" -- came in handy for this purpose:

Democracy is not only or even primarily a means through which different groups can attain their ends or seek the good society, it is the good society itself in operation. (Lipset 1981, 439).

In an even more enthusiastic attempt to "engender and maintain" the popular belief that less democracy is good democracy, because it is effective democracy and effective democracy is not non-democracy, Huntington amplified Lipset's statement:

[I] believe that democracy is good in itself, and that... it has positive consequences for individual freedom, domestic stability, international peace, and the United States of America (Huntington 1991, xv)

Needless to point out these neo-conservative attempts to rehabilitate the credibility and popularity of "minimal" or "political" democracy did not find much of a resonance among students and theorists of further democratization *in* Western European, North American and Australasian societies. (A possible exception was, perhaps, the impression that the effectiveness of the neo-conservative strategies in manipulating public opinion left on Laclau and Mouffe.) As we have seen above, in the 1980s most of the Western European, North American and Australasian theorists were busy investigating the possibilities of a better theory and practice of democratic politics -- better, that is, than Schumpeter's minimal theory of democracy. In another subdiscipline of political science, however, the neoconservative authors were more successful in

finding a favorable climate to re-breed the popularity of Schumpeter: "development studies."

3.3. The Rehabilitation of Minimal Democracy in Development Studies

In the 1980s and 1990s, well-known students of political development, including Juan Linz (1978, 1990) Guillermo O'Donnell, (1986, 1992) Philip Schmitter (1986) Larry Diamond (1991, 1994), Marc Plattner (1995), Lorraine Whitehead (1986) and of course, Samuel Huntington and Seymour Martin Lipset launched a new research project. This project produced a voluminous academic literature on what came to be known as "transitions to democracy." The key empirical/practical question which the authors contributing to this literature seek to answer is this: Do the developing countries of the South follow what Robert Dahl has described in 1970 as the "most stable path" leading to "the second best alternative to democracy -- namely polyarchy, or to use the term better known in this literature, "political democracy."? If not, how can those developing societies be set on the right track?

The theoretical reasoning that the authors contributing to this literature follow, in turn, is this: A categorical distinction must be made between what Juan Linz dubs as political democracy and democratic society. Political democracy is the "pre-requisite of a democratic society" (1978). Therefore, "transition to" and "consolidation of" political democracy must both logically and time-wise precede attempts to create a "democratic society." Political democracy is characterized by competitive multi-party politics, periodic, regular, free, and fair elections. Democratic society, in turn, is an open question to which students of Western European and North American politics still seek an answer

in variously labeled debates. But we already know, from our reading of Western history, that political democratization has logical and practical priority over the creation of a democratic society. We also believe, that political democracy is "good in itself, and that it has positive consequences for individual freedom, domestic stability, international peace, and the United States of America." Therefore there is no pressing need for us to engage in endless debates about what a democratic society is. We can research the possibilities of political democratization in the third world just as well without taking guidance from such normative debates.

It was this reasoning which resonated in 1990, when Seymour Martin Lipset, Larry Diamond, and Juan Linz introduced an encyclopedic, three-volume edition devoted to political democratization in the third world:

Why study political democracy at all? Some critics suggest it is the wrong problem to be studying. They ask: Are there not more pressing issues of survival and justice facing developing societies? Does the limited question not conceal more than it reveals. They ask (or assert): If in some society democracy (in our liberal sense) has to work against so many odds, as our research unveils, is it worth striving for and encouraging an opposition that purports to establish it, or are there alternatives to democracy that should be considered and whose stability should be supported.

We wish to state here quite clearly our bias for democracy as a system of government. For any democrat these questions carry serious implications: the former suggests that economic and social rights should be considered more than civil and personal liberties, the latter implies granting some forms or cases of authoritarian rule the right to use coercive measures, in the name of some higher good, to suppress democratic opposition. For ourselves neither of these normative suppositions is tenable. (Lipset, Linz, Diamond 1990, 2-3).

According to Linz, Diamond and Lipset, then, neither the prioritization of the goal of socio-economic development, nor the suspension of some civil and personal liberties (such as the liberty to accumulate unlimited wealth) to achieve this goal, are normatively tenable options in studying the possibilities of democratization in the Third World. Ironically, however, the normatively tenable option for them is the Schumpeterian model which does not include any normative notion of social, economic, cultural, and political "rights", because it jettisons the Enlightened conceptions of social justice and political legitimacy (i.e., legitimacy as rational justifiability) from the operational definition of democracy. There is no room for doubt that these authors have Schumpeter in mind when they talk about "political democracy in our liberal sense." There is no room for doubt, because in 1991 Huntington, writing for an "elite" audience charged with the task of democratizing Eastern European, Latin American, Asian and African societies took the liberty to announce the victory of Schumpeter in democratic political theory:

For some while after World War II a debate went on between those determined, in the classical vein, to define democracy by source or purpose, and the growing number of theorists adhering to a procedural concept of democracy in the Schumpeterian mode. By the 1970s the debate was over, and Schumpeter had won. Theorists increasingly drew distinctions between rationalistic, utopian idealistic definitions of democracy, on the one hand, and empirical, descriptive, institutional, and procedural definitions, on the other, and concluded that only the latter type of definition provided the analytical precision and empirical referents that make the concept a useful one. Sweeping discussions of democracy in terms of normative theory sharply declined, at least in American scholarly discussions, and were replaced by efforts to understand the nature of democratic institutions, how they function, and the reasons why they develop and collapse (Huntington 1991, 15).

There were two "facts", however, which Huntington did not mention when celebrating the neo-conservative victory of Schumpeter in the development studies -- two simple facts, which are nonetheless of enormous political significance. First, Schumpeter did not win in the "American scholarly discussions" in the 1970s. As we have seen above, far from being over in the 1970s, the debate was only beginning to gain momentum. Far from signifying a sharp decline in what Huntington called "sweeping discussions of democracy in terms of normative theory", the publication of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice in 1971 revitalized political philosophical inquiry into the normative meaning of democracy. In addition to authors whom we referred to in the previous section, in the 1970s and 1980s, these "American scholarly discussions" on the possibilities of a normatively meaningful model of democracy were enriched by the contributions of such well-known North American authors as Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor, Alistair Macintyre, Michael Saendel and Jean Bethke Elshtain, to name just a few.⁶ These debates re-introduced to discourses on aspects of American politics the thoughts of philosophers whom Schumpeterian theorists of democracy, having taken one or two "history of political ideas" courses as undergraduate students, have conveniently forgotten when doing "real" research in the "real" world of political "hard facts", names like Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, etc. In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, interest in the works of these philosophers among the students of politics, including (North) American ones, increased at an accelerating rate, not because these philosophers were of historical interest like museum pieces, but because

⁶ A general review of these debates can be found in Mulhal and Swift's (1992) Liberals and Communitarians.

the thoughts of these philosophers were (and still are) relevant to understand and respond to contemporary problems and questions of democratic politics.

One can only speculate why none of the authors who joined in and contributed to these "sweeping discussions of democracy in terms of normative theory" raised their voice against Huntington's obvious and well-publicized denial of their own reality, of their own existence in American scholarly discussions. Can it be because they share the same Western-centric bias, the same "blind prejudice", from which the neo-conservative authors proudly and unapologetically suffer? Can it be that these defenders of a more egalitarian model of democracy, of a more "communitarian way of life" in the West, think that the Schumpeterian theory of democracy is not good enough for the Western societies, but it is good enough for the Rest of the World's peoples? Or can it be that these critics were complacent enough not to care or think about the implications of their criticisms of the actually existing "Western" model of democracy for the prospects of democracy and democratization in the rest of the world? One should hope that the true answers to these questions are negative or will become negative in the fullness of time.

There is, however, no room for speculation as to why Huntington suppresses the facts of which he has full knowledge. He is, for example, well aware of the fact, that in 1971 John Rawls has published A Theory of Justice and that this book was praised, by "American scholars" for being an important contribution to what Huntington calls, "sweeping discussion of democracy in terms of normative theory." The proof of Huntington's awareness of this fact is the words with which he complains about the

egalitarian emphasis of Rawls' Theory of Justice in his report to the Trilateral Commission:

The 1960s also saw a reassertion of the primacy of equality as a goal in social, economic, and political life. The meaning of equality and the means of achieving it became central subjects of debate in intellectual and policy-oriented circles. What was widely hailed as the major philosophical treatise of the decade (Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*) defined justice largely in terms of equality. Differences in wealth and power were viewed with increased skepticism. The classic issue of equality of opportunity versus equality of results was reopened for debate. The prevailing preoccupation with equality was well revealed in the titles of books produced by social theorists and sociologists over the course of three or four years. This intellectual concern over equality did not, of course, easily transmit itself into widespread reduction of inequality in society. But the dominant thrust in political and social action was all clearly in that direction (Huntington 1975, 62).

The reason why Huntington calculated that it is inadvisable to inform the readers of development studies of the existence of these "sweeping discussions of democracy in terms of normative theory" was in turn clear: It was inadvisable because doing so would undermine the power and influence of "our way of life", of our minimal, competitive, elitist, and inequalitarian model of democracy in world politics. This self-conscious, self-imposing, Machievellian calculation was evident in the following words from The Third Wave:

The current book focuses on democratization. I have written it because I believe that democracy is good in itself, and that... it has positive consequences for individual freedom, domestic stability, international peace, and the United States of America.... I have attempted to keep my analysis as detached as possible from my values; at least that is the case in 95 percent of this book. It did seem to me, however, that it might be useful, occasionally, to spell out explicitly the implications of my analysis

for people wishing to democratize their societies. Consequently, at five places I have abandoned the role of social scientist and assumed that of political consultant, and set forth some "Guidelines of Democratizers." If that makes me seem like an aspiring democratic Machievelli, so be it (Huntington 1991, xv.).

There was, however a second, more simple, yet more vital fact which remained concealed behind Huntington's neo-conservative ideology. In all these "sweeping discussions on democracy in terms of normative theory," the key question was not whether or not "democracy is good in itself." The key question was, rather, whether the Schumpeterian/empirical models of democracy, and "the actually existing democracies" on the description of which these models were (and are) claimed to be based were (and are) *good* models of democracy: can a society the empirical description of which jettisons the concern with social justice and political legitimacy from the very definition of democracy be considered, in all conscience and reason, a "good" society? Can a "way of life" which replaces the communicative rationality of reasoned deliberation between equal and free citizens with the strategic, technical rationality of economic competition in the market place be considered, in all conscience and reason, a democratic way of life? Can a country whose influence in world politics derives from, indeed depends upon the non-involvement and "apathy" of its citizens from lower socio-economic backgrounds ("as in the case of the blacks") be called, in all conscience and reason, a democratic country? Does such a country have any right, in all conscience and reason, to seek to transform the rest of the world in the image of this amoral and inegalitarian model of democracy?

4. Minimal Democracy and American Foreign Policy

So far, in my discussion I sought to emphasize the point that the conceptual evolution of the Schumpeterian approach to democracy and democratization is inextricably intertwined with the historical evolution of the Cold War. The emergence and acceptance of the Schumpeterian approach as the paradigmatic perspective through which the American political scientists posed and addressed questions of democracy and democratization, coincided with the emergence of the Cold War in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Schumpeter's fall from grace in the 1960s and 1970s in the academic literature on Western European and North American politics coincided with the "peaceful co-existence" and *détente* periods of the Cold War. Finally, Schumpeter's rehabilitation in the development studies, coincided with the heightening of the tensions between the American and Soviet governments in the so-called "second cold war." In one sense, therefore, we can say that the Schumpeterian approach to democracy and democratization was as much a peculiarity of the Cold War, as the Cold War was an ideological contest between the American and Soviet empires about the *best* way of organizing and governing a complex late-modern polity composed of free and equal citizens. It was unfortunate, but perhaps inevitable, that even academics, who were supposed to manifest the scholarly virtues of impartiality of perspective, faithfulness to truth, and independence of judgment, have been drawn into the whirlpool of this ideological controversy.⁷

⁷ For comprehensive and compelling documentary evidence and a thoughtful discussion of the two-way interaction between the American foreign policy establishment, and the management and organization of social scientific research in American universities on "political modernization" in the developing societies see Gendzier's (1985) Managing Political Change: Social scientists and the Third World.

Since December 1989, however, we do not have a Cold War -- not yet, at any rate. Yet, the ideological legacy of the Cold War, namely the Schumpeterian approach to democracy and democratization, is still with us. It thrives in the debates in the North American and Western European academic forums, about the possibilities of democracy and democratization in the Asian, African, and Latin American societies. The question we have to ask at this juncture is, therefore, this: does the persistence of the Schumpeterian approach merely reflect an anachronistic habit of thought, an essentially harmless scholarly mistake, which, if pointed out in academic forums, in an appropriate academic language, would easily disappear? Or does the persistence of the Schumpeterian approach reflect the political reality of the socio-economic power configurations outside the university campuses -- a larger socio-political reality, of which the academic rehabilitation of the Schumpeterian approach in the debates on political development is an integral part?

The American government's foreign policy rhetoric in the final decade of the Cold War and the early years of the "post-Cold War" era offers some evidence that the latter seems to be the case. Now, this is not the appropriate context to engage in the debate, whether the end of the Cold War signifies an American victory that came about as a result of 45 years of dedicated struggle against communism, or whether it was merely a victory by default, that came about when the Soviet Union crumbled under the heavy economic weight of the arms Race which was incompatible with its internal commitment to socio-economic equality and welfare. It is a well-known fact, however, that the dominant Republican wisdom in American politics interprets the end of the Cold

War as the victory of "democracy" over "communism", and credits Ronald Reagan's foreign policy in the last decade of the Cold War for this victory. Henry Kissinger, the veteran authority on American foreign policy, is one of the names who evaluates the end of the Cold War in this framework:⁸

Victory in the Cold War was not, of course, the achievement of any single administration. It came about as a result of confluence of forty years of American bipartisan effort and seventy years of communist ossification. The phenomenon of Reagan sprang from a fortuitous convergence of personality and opportunity: a decade earlier, he would have seemed too militant; a decade later, too one-track. The combination of ideological militancy to rally the American public and flexibility, which conservatives would never have forgiven in another president, was exactly what was needed in the period of Soviet weakness and emerging self-doubt (Kissinger 1994, 802).

⁸ Henry Kissinger is such a well-known and controversial figure of the American socio-political establishment, that it does not seem to be necessary to introduce him to the reader. Nonetheless, it is relevant to note at this point that Kissinger was the target not only of the American Left when he was holding the office of the Secretary of State and Chairman of the National Security Council in the early 1970s, but also of the new brand of neo-conservatives associated with corporate capital, whose reaction to the New Left became an important source of influence in American politics in the latter half of the 1970s. The "neo-conservatives" criticized Kissinger's "realistic" policies of *detente* with the Soviet Union and openness to China on the grounds that Kissinger's approach to foreign policy was "un-American," in essence creating an unacceptable "moral equivalence" between the "American way of life" and the "communist ideologies" of the Russian and Chinese enemies. In 1979, a coalition between the "neo-conservative" and "religious right" elements in American politics brought Reagan to the presidency and alienated Kissinger from the inner foreign policy circles of the Republican party. For his part, Kissinger criticized the celebrated leader of this governing coalition, Ronald Reagan, for being the most "unintellectual" of all American presidents: "Reagan knew next to no history, and the little he did know he tailored to support his firmly held preconceptions. He treated biblical references to Armageddon as operational predictions. Many of the historical anecdotes he was so fond of recounting had not basis in fact, as facts are generally understood. [...] The details of foreign policy bored Reagan. He had absorbed a few basic ideas about the dangers of appeasement, the evils of communism, and the greatness of his own country, but analysis of substantive issues was not his forte." (Kissinger 1994, 765.) This sharp-witted criticism of Reagan's intellectual qualities as a "statesman" notwithstanding, when looking to the period of his presidency in retrospect Kissinger was not above admiring Reagan's success in bringing about the end of the Cold War with an undisputed American victory.

It is common knowledge that the alleged success of Reagan administration's foreign policy in "winning" the Cold War, an expression of which we find in Kissinger's above quoted evaluation, was based upon two pillars: The first was a policy of escalating the nuclear Arms race with the Soviet Union, which Reagan publicly declared, and to all appearances, sincerely believed to be, the "evil empire." In the second term of his presidency, however, Reagan discovered, to his own surprise, that Gorbachev was not the personification of evil, and that negotiating with him "man-to-man" was indeed possible. As a result of this discovery Reagan's policy of nuclear escalation somewhat slackened in the latter half of the 1980s. As we can still remember, Reagan's "man-to-man" negotiations with Gorbachev culminated in 1987, in the Treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces. In one sense, this treaty marked the beginning of the end of the military dimension of the Cold War.

The fact that the nuclear annihilation of the earth is still within the realm of technological feasibility, even after the end of the Cold War, hence the question whether and/or how the de-nuclearization of world politics can be achieved, is not directly relevant to our discussion, at this point. The second pillar of Reagan's crusade against communism is, however, of direct relevance to our discussion. This second pillar was a policy of escalating the ideological assertiveness of "the American way" in world politics. In 1983, in a speech to the American Legion, Reagan announced this new instrument of American foreign policy in following words:

By wedding the timeless truths and values Americans have always cherished to the realities of today's world, we have forged the beginnings of a fundamentally new direction in American foreign policy -- a policy

based on the unashamed, unapologetic explaining of our own priceless free institutions (Reagan 1983, 270).

What Reagan wanted to "explain" in his foreign policy rhetoric, "unashamedly and unapologetically", were, obviously, the American ideas about "democracy." Now, the idea that ideological assertiveness can be used as a powerful weapon to fight the good fight against communism did not occur to Reagan, on his own accord. As we have seen in chapter 2 the formation of the idea that the Americans should use "ideological assertiveness" as an instrument of foreign policy, was already evident as early as in 1968 in Huntington's admiration of the Soviet Union's success in creating governments that could "effectively govern" the "modernizing societies." Nor was Huntington an isolated academic who owned the patent of this new, ideological technology of conducting foreign policy. Rather, the idea that "ideological assertiveness" can be used as an instrument in pursuing US foreign policy goals in world politics was the common trait that all "neo-conservatives" of the Reagan Right shared. Deudney and Ikenberry summarize this common trait in following words:

Underlying [the Reagan right's perspective on foreign policy] is a deeply ideological philosophy of politics and history. The Reagan Right tended to view politics as a war of ideas, an orientation that generated a particularly polemical type of politics. As writer Sidney Blumentahl has pointed out, many of the leading figures in the neo-conservative movement since the 1960s came to conservatism after having begun their political careers as Marxists or socialists. That perspective sees the Soviet Union as primarily an ideological artifact, and therefore sees struggle with it in particularly ideological terms. "The neo-conservatives believe, like Lenin, that ideas are more fatal than guns" (Deudney and Ikenberry 1992, 133)

As noted earlier, whether it was indeed the ex-leftist new-rightist American ideas about democracy that proved to be fatal for the Soviet Union is a matter of dispute. As it happens, however, when Gorbachev's foreign affairs minister, Shevardnadze announced the so-called Sinatra Doctrine and the Eastern bloc countries started "doing it their own way, the notion that the American ideas about democracy won the Cold War became the dominant Republican view. It fell to George Bush, Reagan's vice-president and successor as president, to popularize this dominant Republican view. Bush did so in a celebrated speech to the UN-general Assembly, in which he announced the coming of a new era in world politics -- a "new world order", a new "democratic" pax-Americana, a period of peace, prosperity, and cooperation in international relations.

Now, it is also common knowledge that this speech was written by Francis Fukuyama. Whether Fukuyama was Bush's speech-writer, or whether Bush was Fukuyama's speech-reader is, once again, a matter of dispute. The indisputable fact is that Fukuyama is a political theorist who became famous when he published an article in which he referred to Kojève's and Hegel's authority to suggest that, with end of the Cold War, the history has ended, communism has been defeated, and democracy has won. When Fukuyama followed a recent academic trend, and converted his popular article into a full-scale treatise, it was to Lipset's Schumpeterian definition of democracy, and to the "empirical" data collected on the basis of this definition of democracy that he resorted to prove his point (Fukuyama 1992, *passim*). His point was that at the end of the history "democracy" is the sole surviving ideological alternative in existence on earth -- with the

possible exception of "Islam", which nonetheless lacks the power and technology to seriously challenge American ideas about democracy.

All of this goes to show, that when we hear Republicans talk about "democracy" in a *foreign policy* context, we have good reason to suspect that it is not the egalitarian, emancipatory, and solidaristic ideas and ideals associated with the Enlightenment concept of democracy that s/he (or his/her speech-writer) refers to. Rather, it is more likely the case that it is the Schumpeterian approach which jettisons these normative ideas and ideals from the operational definition of democracy and offers the competitiveness of the economic market place as a substitute for reasoned deliberation between free and equal citizens, that s/he refers to. We have good reason to suspect that this is indeed the case, because the Republican politicians "unapologetically, and unashamedly" admit that they use ideological manipulation of public opinion as an instrument in pursuing US foreign policy goals. We have good reason to suspect that this is indeed the case, also because Samuel Huntington, a well-known academic whose association with Republican foreign policy think-tanks is not a secret, "unashamedly and unapologetically" declares that by the "1970s" the debate about the meaning of democracy was over, and Schumpeter had won.

Now we must ask: The Vienna Conference convened during the early months of Bill Clinton's "democratic" administration. How then did the Republican ideas about democracy and democratization come to resonate in the Democratic Clinton administration's interpretation of and response to the Asian Governments' Bangkok Declaration? The following quotation from a feature Article run by the Far Eastern

Economic Review, shortly before the Vienna Conference, may suggest an answer to this question:

Clinton said during last year's [1992] election campaign that he wanted to promote democracy and human rights together "because democracies are more likely to respect civil liberties, property rights and the rule of law."

In fact, Clinton was trying to bring together to rival positions within his Democratic Party. The first is a group of liberal Democrats who were associated with "human-rights president" Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s; they are primarily interested in protecting the individual person from abuse. The other group is loosely knit circle of conservative Democrats -- known as "Neocons" for neoconservatives -- who have been more interested in democratization, arguing that only by building democratic institutions would human rights be protected in the long run. The liberals said the Neocons were soft on right-wing dictatorships, while the Neocons accused the liberals of being loud but ineffective, and soft on communism (Vienna Showdown 1993, 20).

In the event the position that the American government defended during the Vienna Conference achieved Clinton's goal of "bringing together the liberal democrats and neocons", as only a good political tactician could calculate. By defending the universality of human rights against the allegedly relativistic challenge posed by such "vocal human rights abusers" as Indonesia and Myanmar etc., the Clinton Administration increased its public opinion rating among the "liberal democrats". By defending the priority of civil and political rights over social, economic, and cultural rights, and opposing the idea that the goal of socio-economic development should be given priority in the "Third World", the Clinton Administration gained the favour of the "neocons" of both democratic and republican variety whose majority dominated the congress.

When the international human rights activists from both "Western" and "non-Western" societies criticized the alleged success of the Vienna Conference arguing that the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action is little more than a hoax, leaving most substantial issues concerning the promotion and protection of human rights unresolved, both the "liberal democrats" and "the neocons" (of both democratic and republican) variety told them to get real: a strong endorsement of the universality of human rights and democracy by such vocal human rights abusers as Indonesia, Myanmar, Burma, and China themselves was not an achievement to belittle. After all these governments signed the Bangkok declaration in which they stated that "the promotion of human rights should be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of norm-setting based on cooperation and consensus and not on confrontation and imposition of incompatible values." Never mind that, in the Bangkok Declaration, these governments also affirmed the universality, indivisibility, and objectivity of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, and invited all world governments to accede to and ratify the two covenants on civil and political, and economic, social, and cultural rights. We all "know" what a "dynamic and evolving process of norm setting based on cooperation and consensus, and not on confrontation and imposition of incompatible values," *really* means: cultural relativism.

5. Conclusion

Let me conclude this chapter by summarizing what we have seen in our discussion so far: In 1942, reacting to the disappointments of the inter-war era, Joseph Schumpeter cut the normative dimension of democracy down in size by jettisoning three

important building blocks from its definition: reasoned deliberation between free and equal citizens, the common good of the political community, and the general will of the people. In the aftermath of the second world war, in the emerging context of the Cold War, amidst interpretive disputes, confusions, and strategic maneuvers in and between American and Soviet foreign policy elite, Schumpeter's "another theory of democracy", won the popularity contest in American political science, against formidable and more insightful rivals. Empiricist students of democracy in American universities preferred Schumpeter's technocratic "realism", over Horkheimer's and Arendt's perceptive humanism, broke with the normative tradition of political thought that had informed the drafters of the American constitution, and re-defined, described, and prescribed to the rest of the world, "the American way of life" as *the* democratic way of life. From the 1960s onwards this American model of democracy was challenged "from within" both at practical and theoretical levels precisely because of this model's indifference to normative questions of legitimacy and social justice. This challenge culminated in a programmatic demand for further democratization, not only internally, i.e., *in* the Western and non-Western countries sharing the physically limited and socially and economically inter-connected space of the earth, but also internationally, *between* the Western and non-Western countries and regions of the World.

Yet, from the mid-1970s onwards, the concern with the decline of American power and influence in world politics led the followers of Schumpeter in empirical political science to dismiss these criticisms, ignore the demands for further democratization, and to promote and propagate the Schumpeterian model of democracy,

its indifference to normative questions of justice and legitimacy notwithstanding, as "a good in itself." In the 1980s, when a coalition between religious right and neo-conservative elements in American politics brought Reagan to the presidency, this Schumpeterian agenda found a chance of being implemented in actual practice. After the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was this Schumpeterian view that allowed the neoconservatives to declare the victory of the American ideas about democracy over communism. It was also this neo-conservative view of democracy that found expression in the interpretation that the Democratic Clinton administration imposed upon the Asian governments Bangkok declaration. Hence it was this neo-conservative view of democracy that the American government defended in the name of defending the universality of human rights and democracy during the Vienna Conference. Finally it was and it still is this neo-conservative view of democracy that informs what I referred to in the first chapter, as the "cultural incompatibility and clash" school of analyzing the "West vs. Non-West" controversy. Hence it was and it still is the Schumpeterian/empiricist axioms about democracy and democratization that are responsible for the conceptual misunderstandings which, I argue in this thesis, contribute to the estrangement between the Western and non-Western perspectives on human rights issues.

In the next chapter we shall turn our attention to what I called above the Enlightened normative approach to democracy. We shall discuss that vital question, the jettisoning of which from the definition of democracy I emphasized in this and the previous chapter, is the major problem with the Schumpeterian/empiricist approach to democracy: what *is* the sense of justice and legitimacy that a *good* democratic society

ought to foster in the actions and interactions of its members? We shall see, that the text of the Asian Governments' Bangkok Declaration is not too far away from the answers that three major *Western* political theorists, Rawls, Held, and Habermas give to this question. We shall also see that the common interest of the human species in surviving on the face of the earth overrides the particularity of the neoconservative interest in unapologetically and unashamedly explaining their unhuman (not to be confused with inhuman) model of democracy.

CHAPTER 4 THREE NORMATIVE APPROACHES TO DEMOCRACY

1. Introduction

In the first chapter I introduced the argument that the controversy over the universality of human rights and democracy staged by the American government and the governments of the Asia-Pacific region during the Vienna Conference can be understood, at a conceptual level, as the product of a misunderstanding. This, I suggested, is a misunderstanding of the democratic conception of social justice and political legitimacy on the normative common-ground of which the criticisms and counter-criticisms of cultural and economic imperialism and political authoritarianism rest. Underlying this misunderstanding, I further suggested, is the difference between two different ways of approaching the questions of democracy and democratization. For want of better terms I called these two different approaches post-war empiricism and Enlightened normativism.

In chapter 2 and 3 we examined the first of these two approaches. In chapter 2 we traced the origins of the empiricist approach to Joseph Schumpeter's influential work: Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. We reviewed the works of some of the major American political scientists who followed in Schumpeter's footsteps in the immediate post-war war years. We saw that these authors sought to establish a conceptual equation between "democracy" as a normatively desirable system of government, on the one hand, and the actually existing social, political, economic, and psychological/cultural reality of the American/Western way of life' on the other. I suggested that this conceptual equation

reflects the blackmail of the Cold War as (mis)perceived from the American/Western perspective, in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.

In Chapter 3 we reviewed the "New Left" criticisms that this conceptual equation received from the 1960s onwards at theoretical and practical levels, as well as some of the neo-conservative reactions that these criticisms themselves attracted from the 1970s onwards. In reaction to the New Left demands for further democratization, and concerned with the decline of the American power and influence in world politics, neo-conservative authors re-asserted the Schumpeterian model of "minimal" democracy as a more moderate and effective alternative. We saw that while this neo-conservative attempt to re-assert the Schumpeterian view failed to gain audience in academic discussions on the problems and prospects of democracy in the Western/Northern countries, it found a wider resonance in another sub-field of political science devoted to questions of democratization in Eastern European, Asian, African, and Latin American countries: development studies.

In chapters 2 and 3 I emphasized the point that the major problem with the Schumpeterian approach to democracy is that it jettisons normative questions of justice and legitimacy from the very definition of democracy. Most authors who write in criticism of the Schumpeterian model presuppose intuitively, even if they do not articulate and/or acknowledge explicitly, a normative ground premised upon enlightened ideas of equality, freedom, and societal solidarity. Neo-conservative authors present the Schumpeterian model of democracy, the conceptual architectonic of which is blind to this moral ground, as "a good in itself." This new ideological polarization between the

enlightened new left, and technocratic and non-egalitarian neo-conservative positions on democracy, concluded our discussion in Part I with a question: What is the conception of justice and legitimacy that a good democratic society ought to foster?

In this chapter we turn our attention to contemporary debates in Western political thought in which this normative dimension of democracy is explicitly thematized and discussed. Of course we cannot say that when drafting the Bangkok Declaration the Asian governments were directly inspired by the philosophical debates on the normative meaning of democracy conducted in Western European and North American academic forums. Whatever the Asian governments' immediate sources of inspiration and/or motivation were, however, I argue that the normative intuitions articulated in these "Western" debates on democracy find a clear resonance in the text of the Bangkok Declaration.

1.1. The Scope of the Chapter

In the contemporary literature on Western political philosophy, there are three major authors who seek to articulate a new formulation of the normative meaning of democracy from within the conceptual horizons of the enlightened political thought: John Rawls, David Held, and Juergen Habermas. In their works these authors discuss three questions that are of relevance to the argument of this thesis: what is the most appropriate conception of justice, and the accompanying notion of legitimacy, that the basic social, political and economic institutions of a late-modern constitutional democracy composed of free and equal citizens ought to foster? How can this conception of justice be justified under conditions of religious, philosophical and ideological diversity? How can this

conception of justice be articulated in such a way that it would allow the people(s) of the world to peacefully cohabit the physically limited space of the earth and cooperate in this framework to find and implement common solutions, to common global problems?

These questions are not new. In one sense they are as old as the history of political thought, and Rawls, Held and Habermas do not raise and address them in an archival vacuum. The political thoughts of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx, as well as Aristotle find clear resonances in their works. Yet Rawls, Held, and Habermas do not simply reiterate the answers that the philosophers of classical Greek, early modern and enlightened political thought have given to these questions. None of these earlier thinkers could foresee, imagine, and reflect in their thoughts, experiences which are truly unique to our twentieth century. Consider, for example, the two world wars; the invention of the crime of genocide; the emergence of a nuclear technology which introduced to human consciousness the actually existing possibility of the physical annihilation of the earth; or on a more optimistic note, the world political experience with the United Nations which, as a social, political, and economic organization of global scope has been operating for more than 50 years -- admittedly less successfully than it could or should be, but nonetheless is.

In re-raising and discussing the above mentioned questions of democratic political thought, Rawls, Held, and Habermas draw upon this novel repertoire of historical experiences and reflect this awareness in the new answers they offer to these old questions. This explains why none of them readily and willingly admit to a standard-issue ideological and/or philosophical category that would make his thought seem to be

confined to the conceptual horizons of the intellectual/philosophical tradition within the Enlightenment tradition, in which his process of reasoning has originated. Rather, all three authors seek to reach out to the neighboring traditions, respond to their adherents' theoretical and philosophical objections, and gain their reasoned and principled assents. Therefore, all three authors claim a measure of originality for their thoughts -- a measure of originality that both builds upon and moves beyond the conceptual horizons of the intellectual/ideological tradition from within which they (started to) think and write about democratic politics.

In Rawls' case, this claim to originality includes (but is not restricted to) his conception of justice as fairness as well as the innovative idea of an overlapping consensus that can support a "free-standing" political conception of democratic justice as the basis of social unity and political stability in a pluralistic society. In Held's case, this claim to originality includes (but is not restricted to) his "principle of autonomy", and the project of cosmopolitan democratization to which we had occasion to refer in the previous chapter. Finally, Habermas' claim to originality involves (but is not restricted to) his inter-subjectivistic discourse theory of justice and the discourse theoretic reconstruction of the "system of rights."

In this chapter I present a comparative review of the new answers that these three authors give to the above mentioned three old questions. In this review, I focus on those ideas for which these authors claim, correctly I believe, originality. Of course, this review should not be confused with a rigorous philosophical evaluation of the thoughts of these three authors -- that would be far beyond the limited focus of this thesis. Rather, I

seek to offer a political evaluation of the practicability of these three authors' approaches, in the specific institutional setting of the UN in the field of human rights. In this discussion I seek to emphasize the following two points.

1.2. The Substance of the Chapter

First, while all three authors seek to articulate similar normative intuitions associated with the modern idea of democracy the dialogical/deliberative building block of Habermas' discourse theoretical approach to the question of justice offers a more cogent way of dealing with the conceptual and practical questions concerning the justification of the universality of human rights and democracy under conditions of religious, philosophical, and cultural, and ideological diversity.

Second this is so partly because Habermas' discourse theoretical reconstruction and dialogical interpretation of democracy and human rights appears to be the most likely candidate to be supported by an "overlapping consensus" in Rawls' sense, at the world political forums of the United Nations.

1.3. Outline of the Chapter

The chapter is organized in four sections. In section 2 our discussion opens with a brief review of the three factual dimensions of the contemporary political reality in response to which Rawls, Held, and Habermas re-raise the above mentioned questions of normative democratic thought. Sections 3 and 4 are thematically organized around the first and second of the three questions mentioned above, namely, the question of democratic justice and the question of justification of democratic justice under conditions

of cultural diversity. In each section I seek to summarize, compare, and evaluate the approaches of these three authors to these two questions. The chapter concludes with a clarification of how and in what sense exactly Habermas' discourse theoretical reconstruction of the normative intuitions associated with human rights and democracy finds a resonance in the Asian Governments' Bangkok Declaration.

In the next chapter we shall turn our attention to how these three authors approach the third question mentioned above, namely, the question of global justice. In this context I shall clarify how and in what sense Habermas' discourse theoretical principles of universalization and democracy offer practically more viable alternatives to inform Held's project of cosmopolitan democratization.

2. The Sense of the Real

As noted above the three authors we review in this chapter, Rawls, Held and Habermas re-raise and re-address perennial questions of political philosophy concerning justice in a democratic society. It would be wrong to think, however, that because these authors raise the unresolved, and presumably unresolvable questions of political philosophy, and because they talk about the elusive "concept" of justice, which cannot be seen, touched, smelled, or tasted, their works must remain hopelessly detached from the realm of the politically real, and practically relevant. On the contrary, all three authors manifest an acute sense of reality in their thoughts and prove this sense through their awareness of three important dimensions of the contemporary political reality.

First, these authors are aware that there is an actually existing need and demand for further democratization in the complex societies of late modernity. In chapters 2 and 3 we have already gained an idea of what this need and demand consists of and what Held thinks on this subject. Rawls, for his part, joins the camp of the advocates of further democratization by criticizing the actually existing model of democracy, namely the American political system, in following words:

The present system woefully fails in public financing for political elections, leading to a grave imbalance in fair political liberties; it allows a widely disparate distribution of income and wealth that seriously undermines fair opportunities in education and in chances of rewarding employment, all which undermine economic and social equality; absent also are provisions for important constitutional essentials such as health care for many who are uninsured (Rawls 1995, 159-60).

Rawls' observations about the short-comings of the American political system, particularly his emphasis on social, political, and economic inequalities that this system breeds, show important commonalities with the criticisms that the Schumpeterian descriptions of this system have received in the 1970s from what Lipset called "the assorted New Left quarters" (Lipset 1981)¹. Habermas is a name who is more directly

¹ On the left Rawls has the unfortunate reputation of being an apologist for the excesses of American capitalism. This interpretation is inaccurate to the texts of Rawls' works, and it often obscures the normative concerns that Rawls shares with the Left, as well as the important Left-wing insights with which he further developed and revised his thought on the question of democratic justice, after the publication of his first major work, A Theory of Justice (1971). As we shall see below, there are still some important aspects of his thought which are open to criticism from a more egalitarian perspective (Habermas, 1998a and 1998b; McCarthy 1994), particularly when it comes to questions of global justice (below, 255 - 255; McCarthy 1997). The fact remains, however, the egalitarian features of Rawls' "conception of justice as fairness" is stronger than any other known version of liberalism, and the democratic socialist left can learn from Rawls, as much as Rawls did learn from the Left. Rawls preface for the French edition of A Theory of Justice (1987a) is particularly instructive in emphasizing these commonalities, and the

associated with the New Left than Rawls. He introduces his latest major work, Between Facts and Norms, with the following comments about "politics in the Western societies:"

In contemporary Western Societies, governed by the rule of Law, politics has lost its orientation and self-confidence before a terrifying background: before the conspicuous challenges posed by ecological limits on economic growth and by increasing disparities in the living conditions in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres; before the historically unique task of converting state socialism over to the mechanisms of a differentiated economic system; under the pressure of immigration from impoverished southern regions -- and now eastern regions as well; in the face of renewed ethnic, national, and religious wars, nuclear blackmail, and international conflicts over the distribution of global resources. Behind the hackneyed rhetoric, timidity reigns. Even in established democracies the existing institutions of freedom are no longer above challenge, although here the populations seem to press for more democracy than less. I suspect, however, that the unrest has a still deeper source, namely, the sense that in the age of a completely secularized politics, the rule of law cannot be had or maintained without radical democracy (Habermas 1995, xLii).

Habermas' comment not only sounds the internal demand for further democratization in the Western societies, but it also refers, as an integral part of this internal demand, to global problems which threaten not merely human existence on earth, but the very physical existence of the earth -- the planet. In the third chapter we have seen that the awareness of these real problems of contemporary world politics was an important aspect of Held's thought on the possibilities of cosmopolitan democratization. Two essays Rawls published in 1993, and 1995, namely the "Law of Peoples" and "Fifty years after Hiroshima", prove that he too is not unaware of this global dimension of

openness of his thought to a democratic socialist reading. (FIND AND INSERT REFERENCE TO THE ESSAY "RAWLS AND THE LEFT")

contemporary political reality -- though, I shall argue later, he seems to miss some important points in his perception of and response to this reality.

Finally, these authors are also aware of another significant dimension of reality, namely of the reality of what Rawls refers to as the "fact of reasonable pluralism."² This term refers to five interrelated phenomena. First, it refers to the fact that in the complex societies of late modernity there do exist a number of people, who are not necessarily religious fanatics, Jacobean zealots, or ideological crusaders, but who, nonetheless, affirm various religious, philosophical and ideological doctrines that espouse contradictory views about what can be considered to be good and right in politics. Note that the idea of "reasonable pluralism", which allows Rawls, Held, and Habermas to perceive and accept the existence of such people on the face of the earth as a fact, is significantly different from the idea of "simple pluralism" that we find in the works of post-war generation of empiricist authors.³ Let me open a brief parenthesis here to clarify this difference.

As we have seen in the third chapter empiricist authors conceive pluralism in Schumpeterian terms. In their opinion, pluralism is the "product of self- and class

² The term "the fact of pluralism" is used by Rawls (1987b, 1993a). Habermas refers to the same phenomenon as the diversity of worldviews [Weltanschauung], and often uses the Weberian term "the plurality of gods and demons" (Habermas 1990, Habermas 1993, Habermas 1996, Habermas 1998). Held, for his part, refers to the "diversity of political aspirations and identities" (Held 1987, Held 1995). These terminological differences do not reflect significant differences among the three authors in how they perceive and understand this phenomenon. The description and discussion of the conceptual and practical problems associated with this phenomenon that follow below is accepted by all three authors. As we shall see further below, however, there are some significant differences in the responses that these three authors develop to these conceptual and practical problems.

³ The conceptual distinction between reasonable and simple pluralism is made by Rawls (1993, 36-37). Although Rawls does not make explicit reference to the post-war generation of empiricist authors, it is clear that his understanding of "simple pluralism" corresponds to the Schumpeterian view.

interests, or of peoples' tendency to view the political world from a limited standpoint" (Rawls 1993, 35). As such, simple pluralism is comparable to the diversity of conflicting interests associated with competing "rational" actors in a market economy. In a market economy rational actors, whether they are sellers or buyers, interact in pursuit of opposing interests, but they have one goal in common which they all know that all others know and accept as legitimate: to maximize their self-defined economic advantages. When applied to the sphere of the politics, therefore, simple pluralism implies the plurality of opposing rational advantages or "self-interests" of political actors interacting in the public process of policy and law-making, but it does not imply the plurality of ethical-political goals that can conceivably be pursued in these processes through political action, nor the plurality of "reasons" that can conceivably be given to publicly justify such political action.

By contrast, the idea of "reasonable pluralism" refers to the diversity of religious, philosophical, and ideological doctrines. These doctrines not only give substance and meaning to what different people consider to be just and/or good in politics, within the bounds of reason, but they also shape in important respects how different people define their self-interests (whether as individuals citizens or as collective political actors) when they engage in socio-political interaction with one another. Therefore, the idea of "reasonable pluralism", as different from "simple pluralism," does not only refer to the diversity of self-interests, or rational advantages of different people. It refers to that, but it also refers to the diversity in ethical-political ends as well as to the diversity of publicly acceptable reasons that can be given to justify such ends.

The second phenomenon to which the term "the fact of reasonable pluralism" refers is this: this diversity of religious, philosophical, and ideological worldviews in the common time and space of a complex late-modern society is not a transitory feature or an unfortunate condition of human life that may be expected to disappear in a latter, more enlightened, or otherwise more advanced stage of human history. This diversity is, rather, the inevitable consequence of the experience with a form of government, the institutions of which came to be structured in the last two hundred years on the premise of freedom and equality for all. Admittedly, in most "actually existing" democracies, this promise of the Enlightenment remains unfulfilled, or better yet, incompletely fulfilled (Habermas 1987a). Yet, even as incompletely fulfilled promises, the ideals of freedom and equality proliferate and sustain religious, ideological and philosophical diversity. Therefore, as long as democracy remains in vogue in public discourses as a normatively desirable system of government, and as long as the ideals of freedom and equality continue to have the potential to motivate political action, the fact of reasonable pluralism will remain as a permanent feature of social and political life (Rawls 1993, 36).

The third phenomenon, to which the "fact of reasonable pluralism" refers, directly infers from this second phenomenon: the late-modern world is marked by a speedy and relatively easy flow of ideas across continents about alternative life styles and opportunities for achievement. Yet, even under these conditions of global-inter-connectedness and relatively free flow of ideas, one can say that the nostalgic ideal of community, that is to say, the ideal of a religiously authentic or ethnically pure people united by a common faith and a common understanding of their history and destiny is

within the realm of technological feasibility. In other words, more devoted adherents of a particular religious or ethnic-nationalist doctrine can indeed produce an "authentic community" in a few generations time (Howard 1993, Howard 1995). They can do so, however, only through extensive use of physical and ideological coercion -- more specifically through extensive use of conventional and psychological warfare technology, the advances in and successful experiments with which have reached an unprecedented high in the twentieth century. This third phenomenon is, in fact, the reverse side of the fact of pluralism. Presumably because of this reason, Rawls suggests that it can also be assigned a separate name, viz., "the fact of oppression" (Rawls 1993, 37).

The term "the fact of reasonable pluralism" also refers to a fourth, somewhat paradoxical phenomenon: a well-ordered constitutional democracy can survive only if a substantial majority of its politically active citizens "willingly and freely" support its institutions as just and legitimate. This is a somewhat paradoxical phenomenon because it seems to be the case, that a democracy can secure its continuing existence only by breaking its own enlightened promises of freedom and equality for all. In other words, given the second phenomenon, which postulates the inevitability of diversity under conditions of freedom and equality, and the third phenomenon, which postulates that in a pluralistic society, unity can only be achieved through "oppression", the survival of a democracy seems to depend upon its success in subduing other religious, philosophical and ideological doctrines, and imposing in their stead what various authors have called its "democratic creed" (Dahl 1961); "civic political culture" (Almond and Verba 1963),

"hegemonic ideology" (Althusser 1971) or to use an alternative, Rousseauian term, "civil religion."

Finally the term "the fact of reasonable pluralism" refers to a fundamental and real conceptual problem raised by this acute paradox of democratic political thought and practice: namely, the problem of justifying democracy as a normatively desirable form of government vis-à-vis the religious, philosophical and ideological doctrines that inevitably cohabit the socio-political time and space of a democratic society composed of free and equal citizens. This is a fundamental conceptual problem because, if a democratic political system cannot justify its own claim to justice and legitimacy from the point of view of its own citizens, we cannot say that it is the government of the people, by the people, for the people. This is a real conceptual problem because it stands at the center of a real political controversy, between real governmental and non-governmental political actors, at a real international political forum. I mean, of course, the inter-governmental controversy over the interpretation of the universality of human rights and democracy at the UN-forums.

Yet there are not too many political theorists and political scientists who think that the conceptual problem of justifying democracy under conditions of religious, ideological and philosophical diversity is a real problem. On one extreme we find theorists who attach to their thoughts the prefix of "post" in one form or another to signify that they profess an epistemologically anti-foundationalist position in democratic political theory. These theorists think that from an epistemological point of view, to develop a normative justification of democracy under conditions of cultural diversity is not

possible, and from a pragmatic point of view, it is not necessary. Since these theorists earn their living by teaching and publishing on questions of political philosophy, and since the point that from an epistemological point of view, a normative justification of democracy is not possible to develop is a philosophical point, we can call their position "pseudo-philosophical pragmatism."

In the third chapter we have seen an example of this form of pseudo-philosophical pragmatism in the "post-Marxist" thoughts of Laclau and Mouffe. The following quotation from Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is another example:

To drop the notion of the philosopher as knowing something about knowing which nobody else knows so well would be to drop the notion that his voice always has an overriding claim on the attention of the other participants in the conversation. It would also to drop the notion that there is something called "philosophical method" or "philosophical technique" or "the philosophical point of view" which enables the professional philosopher, *ex officio*, to have interesting views about say, the respectability of psychoanalysis, the legitimacy of certain dubious laws, the resolution of moral dilemmas, the soundness of schools of historiography or literary criticism, and the like (Rorty 1979, 392).

In this passage Rorty gives expression to a meta-philosophical denunciation of social and political philosophy as a disciplined inquiry in pursuit of objective truths and universal moral norms in social and political life. The democratic theoretical conclusion about the possibility of developing a normative justification of democracy under conditions of cultural diversity that Rorty draws from this denunciation of philosophy is

this: when it comes to an encounter between "late twentieth century Western social democrats" and "other cultures" Rorty writes:

we cannot leap outside our Western social democratic skins... and we should not try. All we should try to do is to get inside the inhabitants of that culture long enough to get some idea of how we look to them, and whether they have any ideas we can use. That is also all they can be expected to do on encountering us. If members of the other culture protest that this expectation of tolerant reciprocity is a provincially Western one, we can only shrug our shoulders and reply that we have to work by our own lights, even as they do, for there is no supercultural observation platform to which we might repair (Rorty 1991, 212).

This passage reveals that Rorty's meta-philosophical denunciation of the philosophic enterprise allows him to be so "tolerant" toward other peoples from other cultures that he can shrug his "Western social-democratic" shoulders even when other peoples from other cultures challenge the "expectation of tolerant reciprocity" as a universal moral ideal in political life.

On the opposite extreme of Rorty's pseudo-philosophical pragmatism we find students and students' students of Leo Strauss who seek to mobilize doctrinal dogmatism in defense of democracy. The reasoning goes, we understand, as follows: the moral truths of the "Judeo-Christian" civilization are accessible to and self-evident to those who possess philosophical insight and/or intuition. Those who possess philosophical insight and/or intuition already know that the actually existing liberal democracy is the best regime among its various contemporary alternatives in which such "self-evident moral truths" can survive in this modern day and age. Therefore there is no real need to offer a

normative justification of democracy. A simple assertion, made on the authority of political philosophy, that the self-evident moral truths of the Judeo-Christian tradition are self-evident must be enough. If someone, for example from a Hindu or Moslem background disputes the self-evidentness of these moral truths -- well, there are always a few Huntingtons around who are ready and willing to mobilize the military and economic might of the American empire in defense of our civilization. We can find an expression of this form of philosophical dogmatism in the following words of T. Pangle:

It is a tribute to the acuteness of their senses of reality as well as philosophical insight that Rawls, Held, and Habermas navigate the middle road between the two extremes of anti-foundationalist relativism, and Platonic absolutism: They take the *conceptual* problem of justifying democracy vis-à-vis various religious, ideological, and philosophical doctrines seriously, as they think that the fact of pluralism is a fact, the world *is* globally inter-connected, and there exist some grave injustices and a lot of unnecessary human suffering in this world that *can* be eliminated through further democratization.

It is, then, in response to such observed, and often painfully experienced, in this sense real, conceptual and practical problems of democracy in the realm of the political that Rawls, Held, and Habermas re-raise the old question concerning "justice" in a

democratic society. In doing so they expound (that is to say, articulate, explicate, and document for the purposes of public reflection and academic discussion) an already "present" but *latent* normative potential that is associated with the modern idea of democracy. They regard this potential as inadequately understood and incompletely realized in "the actually existing" political systems of the late-modern world. Hence, they retain and express the hope that this potential can be revitalized for purposes of social, economic, political and institutional reform; and their publications can contribute to the achievement of this practical goal.

3. Democracy and Justice

There seems to be a broad agreement among Rawls, Held and Habermas on the general direction that such reform should take. In other words, they concur on what a political system should look like in order to deserve to be called a just democracy. In their shared opinion, a normatively meaningful model of democracy should incorporate, at a minimum, *all* of the following six characteristics:

3.1. The Content of Democratic Justice

First in a just model of democracy the "rule of law" should hold. This means that in a just democracy political authority should be exercised according to general, coercible laws that are equally binding for every citizen. The legal administration of public justice must be swift and impartial, the enforcement of coercible laws and the punishments associated with them must be proportionate to the crimes they define. No group of citizens should be able to think that they are "above the law" by virtue of the economic

class they belong to, status they hold in the society, administrative posts they hold in governmental bureaucracy, or elected posts they hold in public office. Furthermore in a just democracy the citizens' expectations with respect to the rule of law must be more or less stable. In other words the citizens must be able to entertain a well-founded sense of certainty that the "rule of law" cannot be revoked overnight at the whim of an administrative decision by the incumbent political authority or by a governmental or non-governmental group of thugs who think and act as if they were above the law.

Second in a just democracy the basic legislative, administrative, and judiciary institutions of the rule of law, and the conduct of political, administrative and judicial actors in this institutional media should entrench appropriate guarantees for the protection of what is known in the literature in political theory, as the "negative liberties" of the citizens. This means that in a just democracy *all* citizens must be free from *arbitrary* intrusions of the political and administrative authority in their private life contexts as well as from coercible restrictions on the thoughts and opinions they express in public forums. In other words in a just democracy the citizens should not be denied, in the name of the public good, a degree of personal privacy consistent with their human sense of dignity, integrity, and identity. They should not be persecuted because of their religious or ideological convictions, ethnic and/or sexual identities, and the thoughts and opinions they express on questions of public policy.

Third, in a just democracy the basic legal and political institutions of the rule of law should also entrench appropriate guarantees for what is known in the literature on political theory, as the "positive liberties" of the citizens. In other words in a just

democracy all citizens must be *equally free* (but not obliged) to participate in the exercise of political power to formulate, make, change, and implement policies, and coercible laws, that effect the whole of the political society. This means not only that the citizens must be equally free to run for public office, or to campaign and vote for a candidate who runs for public office. It means that, but it also means that the citizens must have equal and fair opportunities to introduce new items to the public agenda of policy, decision, and law-making, to form and express their own opinions on the questions of public policy and law-making in deliberation with other citizens and to seek to convince other citizens and elected or appointed public officials to act and decide in a way which they have reason to think is good from the point of view of each and every citizen.

Fourth, in a just democracy, the basic social, economic, and cultural structures of the society must allow all citizens to benefit equally from the legal protection of their negative and positive liberties. In other words, the social, economic, and cultural structures of a just democracy must not promote systematic discrimination against clearly identifiable groups of citizens who share similar racial, ethnic, gender or other relevant attributes. To say that a just democracy must be free from systematic racial, ethnic, or gender discrimination is not to say that all citizens must be guaranteed to enjoy the same high levels of health, wealth, social status, intelligence and talent. No human institution can and should promise the ultimate leveling of innate human differences. It is to say, however, that in a just democracy, the less fortunate and politically less active citizens must not be observed to belong to identifiable racial, ethnic, or gender groups the members of which have been consistently, repetitively, from one generation to the next,

denied equal socio-economic and educational opportunities to develop and realize their inborn human capacities.

Fifth, in a just democracy the basic public institutions, laws and policies concerned with the production and distribution of economic goods and resources must function as the mediating mechanisms for citizens to meet, in a spirit of societal solidarity, each other's basic human needs, namely, food, shelter, health care, education, and a clean and healthy environment. In other words, a just democratic society should not leave the meeting of basic human needs of its "less-fortunate" members to the charitable feelings of its "more fortunate" members, but it should provide for public mechanisms and institutions of organized solidarity to meet these needs.

Finally, in a just democracy, the citizens must be able to obey the law, and assume the social, economic, and political obligations and responsibilities of democratic citizenship willingly and freely, for the right reasons. In other words, in a just democracy the citizens must be able to obey the law, not simply because they fear state coercion, or they believe in the legitimacy of the law in the same way that children believe in the existence of Santa Claus. Rather, in a just democracy the citizens must be able to obey the law, and assume the obligations and responsibilities of democratic citizenship, because the basic political, economic, and social institutions of the society in which they live, and the policies and coercible laws made, changed, and implemented in and through this institutional media are *rationaly justifiable* from the point of view of each and every citizen. In other words, in a just democracy the political power of the concept of legitimacy in motivating obedience to laws, and the moral grounds of using physical

coercion in enforcing the laws, should not derive from the accidental popularity of a mythical belief in the legitimacy of the basic political structure of the society, but from this basic political structure's rational justifiability from the point of view of each and every citizen.

To summarize, then, Rawls, Held, and Habermas agree on the following six ideas to be worthy of inclusion in a normatively meaningful definition of democracy: The rule of law, legally institutionalized protection of negative and positive liberties, non-discrimination, organized socio-economic solidarity, and the idea of political legitimacy as rational justifiability from the point of view of the citizens themselves.

Now, from the perspective of a historian of political thought these six ideas are not original. They are not original in the sense, that each of them can be traced to the seminal work of a well-known political thinker in the history of political thought. The origins of the idea of "the rule of law" as well as the idea that links the legitimacy of the political authority to its rational justifiability from the point of view of citizens themselves can be traced to Thomas Hobbes' political thought. The idea of the protection of negative liberties, and the associated idea of limited government can be traced to John Locke's political thought. The idea of the protection of positive liberties and the associated idea of "autonomy" or "self-rule" can be traced, depending whether one speaks of the autonomy of an individual or of a people, to the political thoughts of Rousseau and Kant. The idea of non-discrimination, i.e., treating equals as equals, and unequals as unequals finds its first expression in Aristotle's ethics. Finally the idea of organized solidarity has its roots in Marxist thought.

What is of interest in Rawls, Held's and Habermas' works on the question of democratic justice is not the novelty of the ideas and ideals that inform their thoughts. What is of interest in their works is, rather, their attempt to organize, harmonize, and articulate these democratic ideas and ideals in clearly worded, logically coherent, consistent, and concise principles as well as their attempt to justify these principles under conditions of religious, ideological and philosophical diversity.

3.2. The Principles of Democratic Justice

Let us, therefore, take a closer look at the principles in and through which Rawls, Held, and Habermas seek to organize, harmonize, and articulate the normative substance of democracy. Let me first quote these principles without comment. Rawls offers us the two principles of what he calls the conception of justice as fairness:

- (a) Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the scheme for all, and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties are to be guaranteed their fair value.
- (b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: First, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society (Rawls 1993, 6-7).

Held, for his part, offers us what he calls, "the principle of autonomy:"

Persons should enjoy equal rights and, accordingly equal obligations in the specification of the political framework which generates and limits the determination of the conditions of their own lives, so long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of others (Held 1995, 147).

Finally in Habermas' work we find two interrelated principles. The first is a "moral principle of universalization." It states:

Every valid norm must fulfill the following condition: (U) All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation) (Habermas 1990a, 65).

The second is a "principle of democracy" which presupposes the validity of "U" as a procedural rule of argumentation in a rational discourse. It states:

Only those statutes can claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent (*Zustimmung*) of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted (Habermas 1996, 110).

Now, there are obvious differences in the way that Rawls, Held, and Habermas word these principles. The most significant difference is this: Rawls' two principles of "justice as fairness" and Held's principle of autonomy offer *substantive* answers to the question of justice in a democratic society, whereas Habermas' principles of universality and democracy outline a *procedural answer*. Rawls' and Held's principles offer substantive answers to the question of justice in the sense that they include the idea of equal rights and equal obligations in their wording, arrange the wording of this idea in such a way that it would lend itself to a socio-economically solidaristic reading, and specify in broad terms, how it should be interpreted when it comes to practical questions of their application to real-world cases.

By contrast Habermas outlines a procedural answer to the question of justice in the sense that he introduces the principle of universalization as a rule of argumentation in a "moral discourse" in which free and equal participants test the validity, i.e., intersubjective justifiability of a proposed norm of action (Habermas 1990a, 57-66). The principle of democracy then incorporates this idea of a rational discourse in its wording, giving expression to a normative criterion of legitimacy which links the validity of a statute to its justifiability in a rational discourse in which the citizens themselves participate (Habermas 1996a 82-118). Therefore the principle of democracy does not tell us what the substance of justice is or ought to be. Rather it tells us what communicative/dialogical procedures the citizens should follow in their deliberations with one another in order to be able to determine whether an existing or proposed statute can be considered just and/or legitimate.

As will be further clarified below this difference between Rawls and Held on the side of substance and Habermas on the side of the procedure is not insignificant. Nonetheless we must be careful not to misinterpret this difference as the sign of a fundamental disagreement between these three authors about which ideas they think that a normatively meaningful definition of democracy should include. For their part, both Rawls and Held make the conceptual distinction between "legitimacy as belief" and "legitimacy as rational justifiability", and admit to a dialogical notion of legitimacy similar to the one we find in Habermas' approach (Rawls 1999g, 582; Held 1980, and Held 1995, 162-166). Habermas, for his part, inscribes the moral notion of equal rights and obligations into the linguistic structure of the rational discourse among free and equal

participants. The idea of legally "constituting" such a discursive process of law-making (which is expressed in the last phrase of the principle of democracy) then leads Habermas to the formulation of a system of rights similar to the one that Rawls and Held include in the wording of their principles of justice (Habermas 1996, 82-118).⁴

While the difference between substantive and procedural wordings of Rawls, Held's and Habermas' principles does not signify a fundamental disagreement on the democratic ideas and ideals they seek to articulate through these principles, it does reflect a disagreement on another subject, namely, on the subject of how these normative ideas and ideals can be shown to be anchored in the actually existing social and political reality as a "latent" potential. To put it more clearly, Rawls and Held differ from Habermas in where they look to find the sociological foundations of the democratic conception of justice and legitimacy.

3.3. Sociological Foundations of Democratic Justice

Rawls thinks that the democratic ideas and ideals that he seeks to organize, harmonize, and articulate through the two principles of justice as fairness are "embedded", at an "intuitive" level, in the "political institutions of a constitutional democratic regime and the public traditions of their interpretation" -- in other words, in the sedimented political culture and institutions of the half-way democratic Western societies (Rawls 1999d, 390). By making this claim, however, Rawls does not mean to say what Almond and Verba did say in the Civic Culture, namely, if we conduct a survey

⁴ On this point also see McCharty (1994), and the exchange between Habermas (1998a and b) and Rawls (1995a).

to compile a catalogue of political values that happen to be popular in the United States of America and the Great Britain at the historical moment the survey is conducted, we would gain an adequate and complete understanding of the normative content of democracy (Almond and Verba 1963). What Rawls means to say is, rather, this: were the persons born and socialized in a Western socio-cultural context in the latter half of the twentieth century asked to *reflect* on the question of justice in a democratic society, in a systematic, disciplined, and impartial way, were they given an opportunity to bring their "*considered* judgments" on the question of justice, in a "reflective equilibrium," they would arrive at a conception of justice as the two principles of justice as fairness articulate (Rawls 71, 19-21, 48-51, Rawls 1999a, 288-289, Rawls 1999d, 393, Rawls 1993, 8) .

To substantiate this claim, Rawls offers a simple thought experiment which requires us to use our imagination in a certain way. Rawls invites us to imagine ourselves in a hypothetical pre-social situation which he calls the "original position." In the original position we find ourselves as free and equal persons who deliberate behind a "veil of ignorance" with other free and equal persons. We are free and equal in the sense that each of us possess two moral powers to a requisite minimum degree: first, we have "a capacity for a sense of justice and of the good", and second, we have "the powers of reason (of judgement, thought, and inference connected with these powers)" (Rawls 1993, 19). The purpose of our deliberations is to choose the most appropriate principles of justice that should govern the basic political structure of the society in which we are soon going to live together. The "veil of ignorance" deprives us from the knowledge of our "real" social

and cultural advantages and disadvantages; whether we are rich or poor, believe in this or the other religion, belong to this or to the other racial or gender group etc. In so doing the veil of ignorance ensures that as imaginary participants in the original position we remain symmetrically situated, fair and impartial toward other participants. Rawls claims that if we carry out this thought experiment, i.e., if we reflect on the question of justice, in this hypothetical situation, with these hypothetical restrictions on our reasoning in place, we would arrive at a conception of justice, as expressed in the two principles of justice as fairness (Rawls 1999d, 402-403, Rawls 1993, 22-28).

Rawls clarifies the purpose of this thought experiment in the following words:

[T]he idea of the original position serves as a means of public reflection and self-clarification. It helps us work out what we now think, once we are able to take a clear and uncluttered view of what justice requires when society is conceived as a scheme of cooperation between free and equal citizens from one generation to the next. The original position serves as a mediating idea by which all our considered convictions, whatever their level of generality -- whether they concern fair conditions for situating the parties or reasonable constraints on reasons, or first principles and precepts, or judgments about particular institutions and actions -- can be brought to bear on one another. This enables us to establish greater coherence among all our judgments, and with this deeper self-understanding we can attain wider agreement among one another (Rawls 1993, 26).

According to Rawls, then, as a thought experiment the original position is there to help us to gain a "deeper" understanding of "our" democratic political institutions and culture -- deeper that is, than our spontaneously expressed on-the-spot opinions about them. He thinks that it is in this deeper self-understanding of our own political culture, and the

democratic political institutions and practices that embody this culture, that the normative ideas articulated by the two principles of justice as fairness are rooted in the ultimate analysis.

On this matter of the social foundations of the democratic conception of justice, Held follows Rawls closely. In offering what he calls a "standing rationale" for his principle of autonomy, Held too claims that this principle is embedded, at an intuitive level, in the public political culture of the late-modern Western societies (Held 1995, 148). To substantiate this claim he too invites us to conduct a "democratic thought experiment", which he claims would disclose "the constitutive basis of democratic public law -- the political, economic and social circumstances consistent with equally free participation" (Held 1995, 163). Yet in designing his thought experiment Held draws on Habermas' idea of an "ideal deliberative situation" (or, in Habermas' own terminology, an "ideal speech situation") rather than on Rawls' idea "of an original position."⁵ Unlike Habermas and like Rawls, however, Held refrains from raising a strong universalistic claim on behalf of the democratic ideas and ideals that he seeks to articulate through the principle of autonomy. Instead Held refers to Gadamer to emphasize the impossibility of overcoming the situatedness of these ideas and ideals in the particular historical and cultural traditions of the late-modern Western societies (Held 1995, 166).

Habermas, for his part, agrees that the normative substance of democracy can be found where Rawls and Held seek its roots, namely, in the Western tradition of democratic political thought and practice, and the half-way democratic political

⁵ I shall introduce this model of a rational moral discourse below, on p. 232

institutions that grew out of this tradition. He thinks, however, that democracy has deeper roots, firmer foundations, and a culturally and historically more general validity than the particular political culture and institutions of the contemporary Western societies. He thinks that the normative potential of the idea of democracy springs from the "ontological" foundations of the human society as such, namely, from the forms of communicative action through which a person comes to know and relate to herself, family, friends, colleagues etc. as significant human beings, as indispensable building blocks of a self-evident "life-world" (Habermas 1987, 119 - 152, Habermas 1996, 82-192). In other words the linguistic form and structure of the communicative process of socialization through which a newly born human person learns, understands, internalizes, produces and reproduces the conventions, rules, norms, and values of the society into which she has been born is where Habermas thinks that the latent normative potential of democracy can be found to be rooted in the ultimate analysis.

This difference between Rawls, Held, and Habermas about how deep one must go, in order to find the sociological foundations of democratic ideas and ideals is not merely of academic interest. Its practical significance will become apparent once we start considering the second question of justifying democracy under conditions of religious, philosophical, and ideological diversity and extend this discussion into the practical realm of international law and politics. Before doing so, however, let me summarize the points I sought to emphasize in this section.

3.4. Democracy and Justice: An interim summary

Rawls, Held, and Habermas agree that a normatively meaningful definition of democracy should include the following six ideas: The rule of law, legally institutionalized protection of negative and positive liberties, non-discrimination, organized solidarity, and the idea of political legitimacy as rational justifiability from the point of view of the citizens themselves. They seek to articulate these ideas in clearly worded, logically coherent, and concise principles: the two principles of justice as fairness (Rawls), the principle of autonomy (Held), and the principles of universalization and democracy (Habermas). The differences in the substantive (Rawls and Held) and procedural (Habermas) wordings of these principles reflect differences in where these three authors seek the social foundations of democracy. Rawls and Held seek the social foundations of democracy in the "deep-self-understanding" of the democratic political culture and institutions of the Western societies. Habermas agrees that the normative potential of democracy can be found embedded in the deep self-understanding of public political institutions and culture of the modern Western societies. He thinks, however, the roots of this potential go deeper into the communicative infrastructure of the human society as such.

4. Democracy and Diversity

Above, in section 2, I clarified the sense in which the conceptual problem of justifying the democratic ideas and ideals under conditions of religious, ideological, and philosophical diversity is both fundamental and real. Held and Habermas agree with Rawls' characterization of this problem of justification as a fact -- namely the "fact of

pluralism." Again, however, Rawls and Held differ from Habermas in the conceptual responses they offer to this fact.

4.1. Rawls' idea of an overlapping consensus

Rawls' response to the problem of justification reflects his conviction that the two principles of justice as fairness are embedded, at an intuitive level, in the public political culture of the late-modern Western societies. Presumably because of this conviction Rawls raises and addresses the problem of justification, not within the context of the "global society of the human family" as such, but within context of what he calls a "closed", pluralistic, late-modern Western society. Rawls defines a society to be closed in the sense that "it is self-contained and [h]as no relations with other societies. Its members enter it only by birth, and leave it by death" (Rawls 1993, 12). Rawls knows and admits that this idea of a "closed society" is an abstraction that does not live up the factuality of global inter-connectedness at the end of the twentieth century. Yet he takes this abstraction as a temporary axiom that can be dropped once it serves its function, by setting a logical train of thought into motion. For Rawls, this abstraction serves a useful purpose because it allows him to formulate and address the problem of justification in the context of a pluralistic late-modern Western society, from within the tradition of Western democratic political thought itself (Rawls 1993, 12).

The solution Rawls offers to the problem of justification consists of two theoretical moves. In the first move, Rawls makes a conceptual distinction between a "political conception of justice" on the one hand, and a "comprehensive moral doctrine" on the other. According to Rawls, a "comprehensive doctrine" is distinguished from a

"political conception of justice" by its level of generality. It furnishes answers to a wide range of normative questions that one can ask over a life time. The subjects to which a typical comprehensive doctrine applies include such questions as "what is of value in human life, ideals of personal character as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit... our life as a whole" (Rawls 1993, 13). According to Rawls, a comprehensive doctrine that furnishes answers to such normative questions should not necessarily be of a religious nature. Thus, he includes Kantian (Rawls 1993, 125) and Utilitarian (Rawls 1993, 13) versions of liberalism alongside with the obvious religious doctrines in this comprehensive category.

By contrast the scope of a "political conception of justice" is limited to one particular subject. It applies to "a society's main political social and economic institutions, and how they fit together into one unified system of social cooperation from one generation to the next"(Rawls 1993, 11). In other words a political conception of justice furnishes answers to one and only one family of normative questions concerning the "basic political structure" of a society. This family includes what Rawls refers to as "fundamental political questions" concerning "constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice in a society." Who has the right to vote, what religions are to be tolerated, or who is to be assured of fair equality of opportunity or to hold property?" are examples of such "fundamental political questions" (Rawls 1993, 214).

Rawls' second theoretical move consists of arguing that the two principles of justice as fairness outline a "political conception of justice" on which various

comprehensive doctrines that coexist in the common time and space of a "closed democratic society" can form an "overlapping consensus". In this context the idea of an "overlapping consensus" denotes the possibility that different citizens, affirming different comprehensive doctrines, can agree on the same political conception of justice -- in Rawls' case on the two principles of justice as fairness -- because of different philosophical, religious, or ideological reasons (Rawls 1993, 10, 13-15 and 131-58). To illustrate what he means by an "overlapping consensus" Rawls refers to the Islamic international lawyer, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im's work (An-na'im 1990, 52-57). Let me quote the passage, in which Rawls summarizes An-Na'im's argument, and claims that it outlines a "perfect example of overlapping consensus", at some length:

Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im... introduces the idea of reconsidering the traditional interpretation of Shari'a, which for Muslims is divine Law. For his interpretation to be accepted by Muslims, it must be presented as the correct and superior interpretation of Shari'a. The basic idea of An-Na'im's interpretation, following the late Sudanese author Ustadh Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, is that the traditional understanding of Shari'a has been based on the teachings of the later Medina period of Mohammed, whereas the teachings of the earlier Mecca period of Mohammed are the eternal and fundamental message of Islam. An-Na'im claims that the superior Mecca teachings and principles were rejected in favor of the more realistic and practical (in a seventh-century historical context) Medina teachings because society was not yet ready for their implementation. Now that historical conditions have changed, An-Na'im believes that Muslims should follow the earlier Mecca period. So interpreted, he says that Shari'a supports constitutional democracy.

In particular, the earlier Mecca interpretation of Shari'a supports equality of men and women, and complete freedom of choice in matters of faith and religion, both of which are in accordance with the constitutional principle of equality before the law. An-Na'im writes: "The Qur'an does not mention constitutionalism, but human rational thinking and experience have shown that constitutionalism is necessary for realizing the just and good society prescribed by the Qur'an. An Islamic justification and support for constitutionalism is important and relevant for Muslims. Non-Muslims

may have their own secular or other justifications. As long as all are agreed on the principle and specific rules of constitutionalism, including complete equality and non-discrimination on grounds of gender or religion, each may have his or her own reasons for coming to that agreement (This is a perfect example of overlapping consensus) (Rawls 1999g, 590n).

This example illustrates that Rawls' idea of an "overlapping consensus" is *not* intended to offer a "transcendental justification" of the democratic conception of justice. In other words, Rawls does not seek to justify, in his particular case, the two principles of justice as fairness, from what Richard Rorty argued to be an impossible point of view, namely, the point of view of a "cultural overseer who knows everyone's common ground - - the Platonic philosopher-king who knows what everybody else is really doing whether *they* know it or not, because he knows the ultimate context (the Forms, the Mind, Language) within which they are doing it" (Rorty 1979, 317). Rather, the idea of an overlapping consensus allows Rawls to decenter and shift the normative burden of justifying democracy to the various comprehensive doctrines themselves. This, in turn, allows him to argue, that as long as it can be shown that the democratic conception of justice can find ethical footholds in the different religious, philosophical, and ideological traditions that cohabit the common socio-political time and space of a "closed" democratic society, it can claim a "free-standing" political-moral validity of its own (Rawls 1993, 10).

4.2. Held and "The Commitment to Democracy"

As noted earlier Rawls introduces the idea of an overlapping consensus in the context of a closed, pluralistic late-modern Western society from within the tradition of democratic political thought itself. This allows him to avoid a difficult problem with which Held finds himself confronted: namely the problem of showing why it should necessarily be a democratic conception of justice that is "embedded" in the Western cultural tradition, and not another conception of justice, that is embedded in another cultural tradition, on which there can form an overlapping normative consensus between various comprehensive doctrines. Held confronts this problem because like Rawls, he thinks that his principle of autonomy can be supported by an "overlapping consensus" between various comprehensive doctrines cohabiting the common time and space of a late-modern Western society (Held 1995, 148). Unlike Rawls, however, Held introduces his principle of autonomy as the normative building block of a cosmopolitan model of democracy, within the context of the global society, where the "Western cultural tradition" is only one among many.

Held seeks to circumvent this problem, by referring to what he calls "the appeal of democracy as a grand or meta-political narrative in the contemporary world:"

A cosmopolitan democratic community does not require political and cultural integration in the form of a consensus on a wide range of beliefs, values and norms. For part of the attraction of democracy lies in its emphasis on the primacy of those political preferences generated by people themselves and on the public settlement of differences. Democracy has an appeal as the "grand" or "meta-political" narrative in the contemporary world because it offers a legitimate way of framing and delimiting the competing narratives of the good. It is particularly important because it holds out the prospect of the constitution of the political good as the

democratic good -- the pursuit of the "good life" defined under free and equal conditions of participation. Thus, the resolution of value conflicts becomes a matter of participating in public deliberation and negotiation, subject of course, to provisions protecting the shape and form of these processes themselves. However, what is clearly also required is a "commitment" to democracy, for without this, there can be no sustained public deliberation, democracy cannot function as a decision making mechanism, and divergent political aspirations and identities are unlikely to reach an accommodation (Held 1995, 282).

In this passage Held correctly identifies the meta-political appeal that the idea of democracy commands in the late-twentieth century world politics. He is also correct in observing that a "commitment to democracy" understood as a commitment to "sustained public deliberation" is a necessary requirement for divergent religious, cultural, and ideological "aspirations and identities" to reach an accommodation in the physically limited and socio-economically inter-connected space of the late-modern world. Since, however, he proceeds on the assumption, that the normative potential of the idea of democracy is embedded in the "sedimented political culture of the contemporary Western societies" he incurs a theoretical burden of proof that these two points do not completely discharge: namely the burden of showing why the *other* societies from *other* cultural backgrounds should assume the same "commitment to democracy" as the Western societies.

4.3. Habermas and the Discourse Theory

On this matter of showing the cross-cultural justifiability of the commitment to democracy as a process of sustained public deliberation, Habermas has a clear advantage over both Rawls' and Held. This is so, because of two reasons. The first reason is already

mentioned above: Habermas' principle of democracy derives its claim to normative validity from the ontological foundations of the human society as such, namely, from the form and structure of the processes of socialization through which a human person learns, understands, internalizes, produces, reproduces, and transmits to the further generations, the norms, rules, values and conventions of the society into which she has been born. According to Habermas, the form and structure of this process of socialization is the same for every socially constructed and traditionally transmitted -- to borrow a phrase from Held -- "political aspiration and identity." It occurs in and through the medium of language, the telos, i.e., the purpose of every natural language is mutual understanding, and inscribed into the linguistic telos of mutual understanding is a form of reason which Habermas terms "communicative."

Communicative reason is distinguished from the subjectivistic form of practical/instrumental reason expounded in Rousseau's political thought, Kant's moral philosophy, and Weber's neo-Kantian sociology, by its thoroughly inter-subjectivistic and decentered character. In other words, communicative reason can neither be attributed to an autonomous individual subject as in Kantian moral philosophy, nor to a macro-subject of a people or state as in Rousseau's political thought, nor can it be equated with the instrumental/strategic reason of a purposive rational social actor, as in Weberian sociology. Rather we can talk about the existence or absence of "communicative reason", only within the context of a communicative interaction between at least two micro or macro-subjects who use a natural language in its spoken or written form, to mutually understand one another (Habermas 1984, *passim.*, Habermas 1996, 3-6).

Habermas' idea of a "rational moral discourse" spells out the possibility of employing this inter-subjectivistic form of communicative reason in the resolution of normative socio-political conflicts. Such conflicts occur between social actors who take guidance from contradictory moral norms in their political actions, but whose paths cross one another in the common socio-political time and space in which they live together. When it comes to an encounter of this sort there is only a limited number of courses of action that the actors can take: First, they can seek to avoid further political interaction with one another. In cases where the actors cannot avoid each other's physical presence because of the restricted socio-political space they occupy this course of action may also take the form of an emotional clash of wills, which may lead, in extreme cases, to the use of physical force.⁶ Second, instead of trying to avoid further interaction, or resorting to physical force, the actors can engage in a "strategic" inter-action with one another, i.e., they can seek to reach a mutually accommodating "compromise" or *modus vivendi* through reciprocal exchanges of threats and favors. If reached, such a *modus vivendi* would be based on a balance of power and self-defined purposive-rational advantages of the actors involved, and leave the underlying normative dispute unresolved. Therefore a compromised settlement of a normative conflict would be inherently unstable, i.e., it would be under the constant threat of degenerating into an emotional clash of wills, hence into a potentially violent encounter.⁷ Finally, therefore, the actors can seek to convince

⁶ To give a concrete example, much of the ethno-nationalistic and religious conflicts that plague the landscape of the contemporary world can be interpreted in this framework.

⁷ To give concrete examples the "peaceful co-existence" and "detente" phases of the Cold War can be interpreted in this framework. The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, that has been adopted at the Second World Conference on Human Rights too can be interpreted of as a document giving expression to such a "compromised" settlement of the dispute between the "Western and non-Western governments."

one another, through the "unforced force of better reasons" that the norm in dispute can (or cannot) be considered to be right or just. This means they can seek to resolve the underlying normative conflict in and through a rational moral discourse.⁸

A rational moral discourse can be understood as a "communicative" process in which equal participants seek to reach a rationally-motivated inter-subjective agreement on the validity (i.e., rightness or justness) of a disputed norm of action through reasoned argumentation. The participants in a moral discourse cannot hope to reach such an agreement, however, if they merely assert the validity (or invalidity) of the norm in dispute -- they must be able back such claims to normative validity with adequate reasons. Nor can the participants hope to reach such an agreement if they only offer reasons that *they themselves* think are *good* enough. Rather the possibility of reaching an agreement on the validity of the norm in dispute hinges on the actors' ability to engage in a reciprocal practice of what Habermas calls, following Herbert Mead, "ideal role-taking."

To engage in the reciprocal practice of "ideal role taking" the participants must be able to look to the norm in dispute from the point of view of other participants. To do so, they must seek to develop a "deep" understanding of their interlocutors' different perspectives. In other words they should learn about the cultural, historical, philosophical, ideological tradition from within which their interlocutors in the discourse define their yes or no positions vis-à-vis the norm in dispute. This would enable the participants to

⁸ For a thoughtful conceptual clarification and discussion of the difference between the resolution and settlement of a dispute from the perspective of argumentation theory see Grotendorst and Eemeren (1993).

formulate and offer reasons in support of their claims to normative validity which the *other* participants too can find *good* enough. In this sense in a rational moral discourse the process of reasoned argumentation also functions as a process of mutual learning between the participants. Therefore the agreement reached in a moral discourse would not merely settle the dispute through a compromise; but it would *resolve* the dispute through a genuine normative consensus. Such a consensus would transform and preserve the participants' initial claims to normative validity at a "higher level of universality" -- i.e., on a level of universality that rests on reasons which all participants can equally accept as good (Habermas 1990a, 90, Habermas 1993a and 1996, Habermas 228-229).

The rational validity of the consensus reached in such a moral discourse does not, however, depend upon the *goodness* of the *particular* "reasons" as judged by a transcendental standard of moral truth -- that is to say a standard of moral truth which is supposed to be absolute and accessible only through metaphysical-philosophical insight and/or religious revelation. The reasons for which the participants form an agreement on the validity (or invalidity) of the norm in dispute, the adequacy of these reasons, hence the substance of the normative consensus reached in a moral discourse, may vary depending on the norm in dispute, who the actual parties to the dispute are, what the actual circumstance of the conflict is, etc. Rather the rational validity of the agreement reached in a moral discourse is ensured by the *procedural* rules of reasoned argumentation. According to Habermas these rules cannot be shown to be of transcendental validity in a metaphysical sense, but, through a formal-pragmatic analysis in the philosophy of language they can be shown to be of universal validity nonetheless. In other words,

according to Habermas the procedural rules of reasoned argumentation can be shown to remain the same despite all possible variations in cultural, historical, or other relevant factors and circumstances that can be thematized in a rational moral discourse (Habermas 1979a, Habermas 1990a and Habermas 1996).

Habermas associates these procedural rules of reasoned argumentation with the counter-factual, nonetheless pragmatically necessary, pre-suppositions and idealizations to which communicatively competent participants in a rational discourse must commit themselves in order to be able to engage in the practice of rational argumentation in the first place. These are "counter-factual" idealizations and presuppositions in the sense that in real-life situations they can never be fully satisfied, but only approximated. They are, however, pragmatically necessary idealizations and presuppositions, in the sense that a competent speaker of a natural language must make them in order to be able to actually begin arguing. To put it differently, whenever a competent speaker of a natural language engages in rational argumentation she must have committed herself to these counter-factual presuppositions and idealizations -- whether she is aware of having done so or not. Finally these pragmatic presuppositions and idealizations are universally necessary because no competent speaker can offer to other competent speakers an argument refuting these idealizations and pre-suppositions without falling in a performative contradiction. In other words, no competent speaker can refute the necessary presuppositions and idealizations of rational argumentation in a rational discourse without first making these presuppositions and idealizations herself (Habermas 1979, 1984b, Habermas 1990 and Habermas 1993).

A few examples: The competent speakers of a natural language would not and cannot begin arguing with one another on the validity of a moral norm if they do not (or cannot) presuppose the following: All participants in the discourse offer their arguments in good faith to the best of their ability. All participants in the discourse are accountable, i.e., they are autonomous and sincere both with themselves and with others. All participants ascribe identical meanings to common expressions. All participants have an equal right to take a yes or no position toward the reasons offered in support or opposition to the disputed norm in question. All participants have an equal obligation to redeem their yes or no position with adequate reasons. A consensual agreement can result only from the "inter-subjective" recognition of a disputed norm as valid for reasons that all participants can share. All participants are ready and willing to take on the obligations resulting from consensus and relevant further interaction (Habermas 1979a, Habermas 1984b, Habermas 1990, Habermas 1993, Rehg 1990).

Habermas introduces the above quoted principle of universalization as a procedural rule of argumentation which is derived from these and other necessary pre-suppositions and idealizations that participants in a rational moral discourse must necessarily make (Habermas 1979, Habermas 1990a, Rehg 1990). The principle of universalization allows Habermas to "reconstruct" (i.e., recover and re-interpret at the level of theoretical abstraction) the normative substance of the idea of universal human rights as the rights that free and equal citizens in a late-modern constitutional democracy ought to grant to one another, in order to be able to resolve their normative conflicts through reasoned argumentation. This reconstructive exercise then yields a "system of

rights" that resonates with those rights which find expression in the Universal Declaration, and the two UN covenants on civil and political, and social, economic, and cultural rights (Habermas 1996, 100-104, 118-131).

The principle of democracy, also quoted above, spells out the possibility of formally institutionalizing such a deliberative model of democracy in response to the integration problems confronted in the complex, oversized, and pluralistic societies of late-modernity. Habermas conceptualizes this possibility from two different but mutually presupposing perspectives of legal and political theory. From the perspective legal theory, the possibility of institutionalizing a deliberative model of democracy is premised on the possibility of constitutionally entrenching the discourse-theoretically grounded system of rights in the form of "positive law." The constitutional entrenchment of the "system of rights" in the form of positive law then yields the administrative, legislative, judicial, public-political, and procedural media of a complex and pluralistic late-modern democracy. These media are necessary for the free and equal citizens of a complex late-modern society to regulate and coordinate their interactions, by making, changing, implementing and enforcing "legitimate" laws. From the perspective of political theory, making, implementing and enforcing laws made in and through these media, are premised on the possibility of generating the political will and power to do so. In Habermas' deliberative model of democracy this political will and power is generated in and through public political discourses, i.e., in and through the reasoned deliberations between free and equal citizens in formal and informal public forums. These forums include but (are not restricted) to formally institutionalized legislative assemblies as well as the informal,

nonetheless public forums of such social institutions as the press and universities (Habermas 1996, 132-168, Habermas 1994.)

According to Habermas, these two perspectives of legal and political theory are "mutually pre-supposing " in the sense, that on the one hand, in a complex, diversified, oversized late modern society, free and equal citizens cannot engage in the deliberative-democratic practice of self-rule without the constitutional entrenchment of the discourse theoretically grounded "system of rights." On the other hand, however, without the citizens' participation in the deliberative processes of public opinion and will formation, the system of rights would remain merely as black ink on white-paper -- i.e., there would not be either the political will, or "legitimate" political power to make, implement, and enforce "legitimate" laws. Needless to repeat, in this context the term "legitimacy" refers to the notion of inter-subjective justifiability from the point of view of citizens as participants in a rational moral discourse.

To summarize, then, the first reason why Habermas has a clear advantage over both Held and Rawls in showing the cross-cultural justifiability of the commitment to democracy understood as a commitment to sustained public deliberation is this: he grounds both the idea of deliberative democracy and the idea of universal human rights on a practical foundation which is shared by all human beings, in every culture and historical epoch; and which indeed seems to be the socio-ontological commonalty to which all religious, philosophical, and ideological traditions owe their very existence. Since time immemorial human beings in every culture and region of the world have been transmitting, creating, and changing socio-cultural traditions by speaking to other human

beings in order to explain themselves; listening to other human beings in order to understand them; and arguing with other human beings in order to convince them.

The second reason why Habermas has an advantage over Rawls and Held in showing the cross-cultural justifiability of the normative commitment to democracy, is this: Habermas' dialogical interpretation of democracy and human rights seems to be the most likely candidate to be supported by an "overlapping consensus" in Rawls' sense, in the World Political forums of the United Nations -- or so, at least, we can interpret the "pro-dialogue" position that the non-Western governments as well as non-Western human rights NGOs took during the Vienna Conference on the question of the universality of human rights and democracy under conditions of cultural diversity.

Let me clarify this: In the official declarations adopted during the preparatory phases of the Vienna conference, all non-Western governments, and non-governmental human rights activists including the Asian Governments, endorsed the universality and indivisibility of the rights expressed in the Universal Declaration and the two UN-covenants, affirmed a model of democracy based on the participation of the people in all aspects of their lives, emphasized the right to popular self-determination, objected to the unilateral imposition of the values popular in one culture or region of the world on the others, and defended a more dialogical and dynamic process of international norm and standard setting in the area of human rights. Thanks to its dialogical building block, Habermas' theoretical reconstruction of the ideas of universal human rights and democracy covers all these points in a logically coherent conceptual structure. There is no necessary reason not to assume that the best judges of the various religious, ideological,

and philosophical traditions, the richness and diversity of which the "non-Western" governments as well as the Human Rights activists from these regions of the world affirmed during the Vienna Conference, are these "non-Western" governments and "non-Western" Human Rights activists themselves. It seems therefore to be the case, that Habermas' dialogical interpretation of human rights and democracy can find ethical footholds not only in the "sedimented political cultures of the Western societies", but also in each of these various non-Western religious, philosophical, and/or ideological traditions. In this sense there appears to be some *prima-facie* evidence that Habermas' theoretical interpretation of the ideas of deliberative democracy and universal human rights can be supported by an overlapping consensus at the world political forums of the United Nations.

5. Conclusion

Let me conclude this chapter by summarizing the points I sought to emphasize so far: Rawls, Held, and Habermas agree that a normatively meaningful definition of democracy should include the following six ideas: the rule of law, the protection of positive and negative liberties of the citizens, non-discrimination, organized solidarity and the idea of legitimacy as (communicative) rational justifiability. They seek to articulate these ideas in clearly worded, concise, and logically coherent principles. To justify these principles under conditions of cultural diversity Rawls and Held draw upon the idea of an "overlapping consensus", i.e., upon the possibility that different people can agree on the same principles of democratic justice for different ideological, religious, etc. reasons. Since neither Held and nor Rawls want to raise a stronger claim to universality,

however, they manifest an elaborate form of Western-centricism in that they conceive the possibility for an overlapping consensus to form on the normative substance of democracy exclusively within the socio-cultural context of the "half-way" democratic Western societies.

By contrast, Habermas raises a stronger claim to universality, in that he derives the normative substance of the modern idea of democracy, from a universally shared human practice, namely dialogue. Furthermore, his discourse theoretical reconstruction and interpretation of human rights appears to be a likely candidate on which there can form an "overlapping consensus", in Rawls' sense, at the inter-governmental forums of the United Nations, between the "western" and "non-western" approaches to human rights issues. This is so, because Habermas' thought originates in the Western tradition of political philosophy, and the normative intuitions he seeks to articulate in his discourse theoretical work, find a clear resonance, *inter alia*, in the text of the Asian Governments' Bangkok Declaration, which affirms the richness and diversity of the Asian traditions.

CHAPTER 5

DEMOCRACY AND DIALOGUE IN GLOBAL POLITICS

1. Introduction

The upshot of our discussion in the previous chapter was that Habermas' discourse theoretical interpretation and reconstruction of the "system of rights" is a likely candidate to be the focus of an "overlapping consensus" at the world political forums of the United Nations. This being the case, two of the three authors whose thoughts on the question of justice we reviewed in the previous chapter, namely Rawls, and Habermas, address the question of democratic justice primarily within the context of domestic politics in a territorially delimited "national" polity, rather than within the context of international politics in the socially and economically inter-connected space of the global polity. This does not mean, however, that these two authors are unresponsive to the late-modern factuality of international politics under conditions of cultural diversity and global inter-connectedness. On the contrary more recent publications of these two authors reveal that Rawls and Habermas are as convinced as Held that the question of democratic justice is of direct relevance to contemporary questions and problems of global politics.

In this chapter, as in the previous chapter, I present an exegetical comparison and evaluation of the thoughts of these three authors on the question of global justice. In this review I emphasize the following points.

1.1. The Substance of the Chapter

The formation of an "overlapping consensus" on the egalitarian and dialogical dimensions of democratic justice is a practical pre-requisite to launch extensive reforms in the UN's existing institutional structure, eliminate existing obstacles, and make further progress in the field of human rights. Yet, in his own approach to the question of global justice, Rawls drops this egalitarian and dialogical dimension of democratic justice in an attempt to expand the scope of a Western liberal's tolerance toward hierarchically organized theocratic non-Western regimes. By contrast Habermas' strong claim to universality allows him to show a greater consistency when it comes to addressing questions of global justice. Furthermore, his discourse theoretical principles of democracy and universalization offer practically more viable alternatives than the principle of autonomy to inform Held's project of cosmopolitan democratization.

1.2. The Outline of the Chapter

The chapter is organized in four sections. In section 2, I present a critical discussion of Rawls' approach to the question of global justice. In section 3, I indicate the sense in which Habermas' discourse theoretical framework offers a more viable alternative within the practical context of global politics. Section four presents a discussion of the practical problems and strengths of Held's project of cosmopolitan democratization.

Thus outlined, this chapter concludes our discussion of the enlightened normative approach to democracy. It does so with a clarification of why understanding the misunderstanding that informed the inter-governmental controversy over the

universality of human rights during the Vienna Conference is a practical necessity for the transformation of the UN in a cosmopolitan democratic direction.

2. Rawls and the Limits of Liberal Toleration

As noted above Rawls introduces the idea of an overlapping consensus in the context of a "closed" Western society, from within the tradition of democratic political thought itself. Underlying this theoretical move is Rawls' conviction that the two principles of justice as fairness express the normative intuitions embedded in the sedimented political culture of the Western societies in a "reflective equilibrium." The corollary of this conviction is that these normative intuitions are not likely to find much of a resonance in the sedimented political cultures of other societies, from other religious, philosophical or cosmological backgrounds. Presumably because of this conviction Rawls does not make the most logical theoretical move when it comes to addressing the question of global justice, namely, investigating the possibility whether the democratic ideas and ideals he seeks to articulate through the two principles of justice as fairness can be the focus of an overlapping consensus among the various "comprehensive doctrines" cohabiting the common socio-political space of the world. Instead Rawls poses the question of global justice as the problem of determining the limits of a Western liberal's toleration. Thus, he opens his essay on the "Law of Peoples" with the following question:

In particular we ask: What form does the toleration of nonliberal societies take...? Surely tyrannical and dictatorial regimes cannot be accepted as members in good standing of a reasonable society of peoples. But equally not all regimes can reasonably be required to be liberal, otherwise the law of peoples itself would not express liberalism's own principle of toleration for other reasonable ways of ordering society, nor further its attempt to

find a shared basis of agreement among reasonable peoples. Just as a citizen in a liberal society must respect other person's comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral doctrines provided they are pursued in accordance with a reasonable political conception of justice, so a liberal society must respect other societies organized by comprehensive doctrines, provided their political and social institutions meet certain conditions that lead the society to adhere to a reasonable law of peoples.

More specifically we ask: Where are the limits of toleration to be drawn? (Rawls 1999e, 530)

To answer this question, i.e., to find out the outmost limits of liberal toleration in the realm of international politics Rawls makes a special modification in the normative content of the democratic conception of justice, namely, he drops the egalitarian dimension of justice as fairness; and settles on a less egalitarian, but "more general" version of liberalism:

I understand [the liberal ideas of justice] to contain three main elements: (i) a list of certain basic rights and liberties and opportunities (familiar from constitutional democratic regimes); (ii) a high priority for these freedoms, especially with respect to claim of the general good and of perfectionist values; and (iii) measures assuring for all citizens adequate all-purpose means to make effective use of their freedoms. Justice as Fairness is typical of these conceptions except that its egalitarian features are stronger. To some degree the more general liberal ideas lack the three egalitarian features of the fair value of the political liberties, of fair equality of opportunity, and of the difference principle. These features are not needed for the construction of a reasonable law of peoples, and by not assuming them our account has greater generality (Rawls 1999e, 537).

This conceptual modification deprives the democratic ideas and ideals that the two principles of justice as fairness articulate of the egalitarian half of their normative substance. Yet this modification allows Rawls to formulate a specifically "international"

conception of justice that "liberal" (in the "more general" sense) societies honor in their external relations with one another. This conception consists of seven principles:

- (1) Peoples (as organized by their governments) are free and independent and their freedom and independence is to be respected by other peoples.
- (2) Peoples are equal and parties to their own agreements
- (3) Peoples have the right to self-defense but no right to war
- (4) Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention
- (5) Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings
- (6) Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions on the conduct of war (assumed to be in self-defense)
- (7) Peoples are to honor human rights (Rawls 1999e, 540).

These seven principles outline the normative substance of what Rawls thinks that a Western liberal (in the "more general" sense) can consider to be a "reasonable law of peoples." Since these principles are devoid of the egalitarian dimension of democratic justice they allow Rawls to include what he calls "well-ordered hierarchical societies" within the limits of liberal toleration. Rawls describes a these societies in following words:

[They] are well-ordered and just, often religious in nature and not characterized by the separation of church and state. Their political institutions specify a just consultation hierarchy, as I shall say, while their basic social institutions satisfy a conception of justice expressing an appropriate conception of the common good (Rawls 1999e, 537).

Rawls does not give us any concrete examples of such societies, but there is no doubt that this description fits to the hierarchical theocracies and/or traditional monarchies found in the Islamic countries of the Middle East -- obviously not in the form that these islamic regimes actually exist and operate, but in the ideal form that the proponents of these regimes think that these regimes can be at their normative best.

Rawls thinks that three undemocratic characteristics of a "well ordered hierarchical society" can be tolerated by the liberal (in the more general sense) societies of the West, to the extent that the hierarchical society in question fulfills three requirements. The three undemocratic characteristics that Rawls pronounces to be tolerable are as follows: First the persons living under a hierarchical regime "are not regarded as free and equal citizens" having equal rights to participate in governing the state -- which, however, Rawls thinks is (or to be more precise, ought to be) the case in a liberal (in the less general and more egalitarian sense) society. Second in a well-ordered hierarchical society "individuals do not have rights to free speech" as in the liberal societies. This means, in a well-ordered hierarchical society, citizens cannot freely express and form their opinions on policies and decisions affecting the whole of the political community, through reasoned criticisms in open public debates. Third in a hierarchical society the freedoms of conscience and thought are not "in general equal for all members of the society as they are in liberal regimes." In other words, in a theocratic society those members of the society who believe in the "state religion", or think the same way that the state officials think may enjoy certain civil and political privileges over other

members of the society who are in minority in what they believe or think (Rawls 1999e, 545-46).

Rawls is willing to tolerate these three undemocratic characteristics of a "well-ordered hierarchical society" to the extent that it fulfills the following three requirements: First, the "comprehensive doctrine" that guides the actions of the hierarchical society in international politics should not be expansionist. In other words it should allow the hierarchical society in question to respect "the civic order and integrity of other societies." This means that in its external relations with the liberal societies a hierarchical society should honor the same "reasonable law of peoples" that regulates the external relations of the liberal (in the more general and less egalitarian sense) societies with one another. Hence, a hierarchical society should pursue its "legitimate goals" in world politics "through diplomacy and trade, and other ways of peace" (Rawls 1999e, 545-6).

Second, the basic domestic legal structure of a hierarchical society "must sincerely and not unreasonably believe to be guided by a common good conception of justice." In other words it should take "into account people's essential interests and impose moral duties and obligations on all members of society." This second requirement also includes the idea that the domestic political structure of a theocracy must be based on a "hierarchy of consultations." This means, the political decisions religious-authoritatively made by the person at the top of the hierarchy should be informed by the views expressed by persons in their capacity as members and leaders of socio-economic associations and corporations that form the lower echelons of the consultation hierarchy (Rawls 1999e, 546).

Third, the common good conception of justice of the hierarchical society should secure for all persons certain minimum "basic rights." Rawls includes the following rights in this category: "the right to means of subsistence and security (the right to life) to liberty (freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupations), (personal) property as well as freedom to *formal* equality before the law as expressed by the rules of natural justice (for example, that similar cases be treated similarly)" (Rawls 1999e, 546-47).

To summarize, then, Rawls is willing to drop the egalitarian dimension of democracy when it comes to questions of global justice in order to be able to tolerate the following characteristics of a hierarchical society: civil and political discrimination against religious minorities, and the legal, political, and moral restrictions imposed on the rights to participation, free speech, and freedom of thought and conscience, of the members of a hierarchical society. Rawls is willing to tolerate these undemocratic characteristics to the extent the hierarchical society in question conforms to the standards of international law that govern the relations of the liberal Western societies; the theocratic leadership genuinely cares for the common good of the people, and the individuals living in the hierarchical society are guaranteed a basic minimum of rights compatible with their dignity and integrity as human persons.

Now admirable though the generosity of Rawls' well-meaning liberal heart in trying to find ways and means to reconcile the Western societies with the political differences of other societies from other cultural and religious backgrounds, the theoretical moves he makes to this aim, and the conclusions he reaches are difficult to understand and accept. Let me clarify why:

First, Rawls' reticence in not applying his idea of an overlapping consensus when it comes to the question of global justice is difficult to understand because of the following reasons: The assumption of a "closed society", which allows Rawls to introduce the idea of an overlapping consensus within the context of the Western societies, is, as he is well aware, nothing more than an abstraction -- a temporary axiom to be dropped once it sets a logical train of thought into motion. This assumption is an abstraction in the sense that every national society that exists on the face of the earth at the dawn on the twenty-first century inter-act with other societies in such a complex global web of social, economic, and political relations, that we cannot say, that any one of them is "closed" in Rawls' sense. That is, we cannot say that they do not have any relations with other societies, and that persons enter into them by birth, and leave them by death. Yet there is one human entity that actually exists on the face of the earth, for which this assumption of a closed society holds true, and it holds true not merely as a temporary axiom, but as a permanent condition of humanity, namely, the global society of the human family. It is only into this global society of the human family that we enter by birth and leave by death, and it is only this global society that does not have any relations with other societies -- as long as, that is, the science-fiction fantasy of intelligent life in the outer space remains as a science-fiction fantasy.

In this closed global society of the human family, there do live a number of people who come from a number of cultural backgrounds. The Western cultural tradition, in which the idea of democracy, and the enlightened ideals of liberty equality, and societal solidarity are embedded, is one of these various traditions. Yet there is no plausible

reason to assume that the peoples living in contemporary Western societies have exclusive intellectual property rights of the democratic ideas and ideals. Indeed, any society that has fought a nationalist war of independence against colonial domination, i.e., the majority of the UN-members have as much claim to the historical heritage of the enlightened political thought as part of their own "sedimented political cultures" as the Western societies. It is, therefore, not implausible to think, and certainly worth further investigating, that an overlapping consensus of global scope can form between the various comprehensive doctrines that cohabit the closed global socio-political space of the world on that very egalitarian dimension of democratic justice which Rawls thinks is superfluous "in the construction of a reasonable law of peoples."

Second, Rawls' willingness to drop this egalitarian dimension of democracy when it comes to questions of global justice is difficult to understand and accept because of the following reasons: his conception of "justice as fairness" has the "stronger egalitarian features" as he calls them, for the very good reason that there are some unjustifiable socio-economic and political inequalities between the citizens living in the half-way democratic Western societies -- unjustifiable, that is, in a moral discourse, from the point of view of those who are on the disadvantaged side of these inequalities. However, such inequalities exist not only in the Western societies but also in the non-Western societies, and not only within the territorial borders of the national societies, but also between them. Indeed, in the contemporary world the wider socio-economic discrepancies can be found not within the territorial borders of national societies, but

between the rich minority living in Western European, North American and Australasian countries, and the poor majority living elsewhere on earth.

Therefore it is particularly in the context of global politics that the idea of democracy cannot do without the egalitarian dimension of its normative substance. It is true that the only way for a Western liberal to tolerate the undemocratic aspects of a hierarchical society is to drop the egalitarian dimension of democratic justice. Yet a Western liberal's well-meaning desire to be tolerant toward other societies from other cultural backgrounds is not a good reason which, for example, a human being who is literally starving to death in Africa can find convincing enough to accept a less egalitarian conception of global justice. Moral arguments premised on the egalitarian dimension of democratic justice are the only "means of peace" -- to use Rawls' words -- that the disadvantaged peoples of the world can use in their pursuit of an even break with their richer and more powerful, Western neighbors. If Western liberals close their minds and hearts to such arguments and reconcile themselves to tolerating the intolerable, it is hard to see how they can morally condemn and politically combat "international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations" -- as I think they should.

Third, if I am correct in my assumption and what Rawls seeks to do is indeed to reach a reconciliation with the Islamic theocracies in the Middle East, his dropping the egalitarian dimension of democratic justice to this aim makes even less sense for the following reasons: as much as it is a fact that Islam has a spiritual power that commands the minds and hearts of the majority of the people living in these regions of the world, it owes its contemporary popularity as a political movement, not so much to its religious

teachings, but to its promise of socio-economic justice to the disadvantaged peoples living in these regions of the world. Therefore, by dropping the egalitarian dimension of democratic justice and tolerating instead the hierarchical political organization that fundamentalist movements and the theocratic nomenclature of the so-called Islamic "republics" espouse, Rawls, in fact undermines his chances of achieving the very practical goal he sets for himself as a political philosopher; namely, finding a "shared basis of agreement between reasonable peoples." Metaphorically speaking, Rawls throws the egalitarian baby out, and keeps the hierarchical bath water instead. Why Rawls takes this self-defeating course is particularly puzzling in view of the fact that he is aware of the Islamic international lawyer Abdallahi An-Na'im's argument that constitutional democracy, complete with its egalitarian dimension, can and does find an ethical foothold in the Islamic tradition itself.

Finally underlying the self-defeating conundrum into which Rawls' traps himself is the fundamental one-sidedness of perspective from which his reasoning suffers: he tells us under what conditions other societies, from other cultural backgrounds, can accede to the same standard of "reasonableness" that regulate the external relations between the "liberal" Western societies (in the more general sense) and clarifies for the benefit of the Western liberals how and why they can tolerate the political differences of other societies from other cultural backgrounds. But this account remains fundamentally incomplete because it is not informed by an understanding of how and under what conditions "the other societies" themselves are willing and ready to tolerate what they perceive to be the hedonistic and self-indulgent excesses, and inegalitarian shortcomings of the liberal

Western societies. To put it differently Rawls does not seem to realize that the question of the "limits of tolerance" is not a problem for the leading philosopher of Western liberalism to solve over the heads of those who are supposed to be tolerant toward one another. Rather, the limits of tolerance is a real question of international politics that needs to be debated and agreed upon by those very "reasonable peoples" who are supposed to be tolerant toward one another.

In the contemporary context of global politics, if this question of the limits of tolerance is not to lead to a "clash of civilizations" in Huntington's sense, it should be a matter of an actual "moral discourse" among the various "comprehensive doctrines" that cohabit the "closed" socio-political space of the earth. In the preparatory phases of the Vienna Conference the Asian, African, and Latin American governments expressed their willingness to engage in such a dialogue with the Western European, North American, and Australasian governments. At the non-governmental level, such a discourse already exists among intellectuals, scholars, human rights organizations and activists who come from as diverse cultural, religious, philosophical, and ideological backgrounds as the world can offer. Yet by dropping the egalitarian dimension of democratic justice in his pursuit of greater tolerance in international politics, Rawls undermines the very grounds of tolerance and dialogue on which these actually existing discourses about constructing a moral order of global scope are actually being carried out.

3. Habermas and the Global Public Sphere

Compared to Rawls, in his reflections on the question of global justice, Habermas shows a greater understanding of the fundamental choice that actors in

international politics have to keep in mind in every step of their actions and decisions: I refer to the choice between diplomacy and dialogue on the one hand, and what Clausewitz called the continuation of politics by other means, namely, war, which, in the historical context of the twentieth century came to mean, not only conventional war between the regular armies of sovereign states, but also nuclear, biological, chemical, psychological, and special war (in contemporary military terminology "special war" refers to undercover guerrilla operations in which the combatants are not necessarily and/or officially associated with a sovereign state). This allows Habermas to show a greater appreciation of the actually existing discourses and the actually existing global political institution, namely the United Nations, in and through which common solutions to common global problems are investigated through the participation of people who come from all regions and cultures of the world. Thus in an essay evaluating "Kant's idea of perpetual peace with the benefit of two hundred years of insight", Habermas notes:

It was only very recently that the United Nations organized in rapid succession a series of conferences on global issues, including ecology (in Rio de Janeiro), population growth (in Cairo), poverty (Copenhagen), and global warming (in Berlin). These "world summits" can be interpreted as so many attempts to bring some political pressure to bear on governments simply by making the problems of human survival themes for the global public -- that is, by appealing to the force of world opinion (Habermas 1997, 124).

Appreciative though Habermas is of such attempts to appeal to the unforced force of the world opinion he also realizes that such "issue-specific" inter-governmental summits are not sufficient in themselves to develop effective responses to the challenges

of the globally inter-connected and culturally diversified world of the early-twentieth century:

Supporting structures are needed to stabilize contributions between spatially distant participants, who exchange contributions at the same time on the same themes, with equal relevance. In this sense there is not yet a global public sphere let alone a European one, as urgently needed as it is (Habermas 1997, 125).

Habermas understands that the "creation of a global public sphere" in which the already existing discourses on constructing a moral order of global scope can be structured more coherently requires the transformation of the UN-system in a "cosmopolitan democratic" direction:

The UN-still clings to features of a "permanent congress of states." If it is no longer to be a mere assembly of government delegations, the General Assembly must be transformed into a kind of parliament that shares its powers with a second chamber. In such a parliament, peoples will be represented not by their governments, but by the elected representatives of the totality of world citizens (Habermas 1997, 134).

Finally, Habermas understands that such a transformation of the UN in a cosmopolitan democratic direction can only proceed if the governments of the sovereign member states of the UN can form a consensus on the following three points: There are developmental differences among the societies that cohabit the closed global space of the world at the end of the twenty-first century; the international human rights law is there to facilitate reasoned deliberation among free and equal citizens to exercise their moral right

to popular self-determination; and "peace" means not merely the absence of war, but decent and dignified living standards for everyone who lives on this earth. Habermas expresses this requirement in following words:

The politics of the United Nations can take this real abstraction seriously only if it works to overcome social divisions and economic imbalances. This aim could, in turn, succeed in the face of the stratification of world society only on the condition that a consensus forms in three areas: a historical consciousness shared by all members concerning the nonsimultaneity of the societies simultaneously related by peaceful coexistence; a normative agreement concerning human rights, the interpretation of which remains disputed between the Europeans and the Asians and Africans; and a shared understanding concerning the meaning of the goal of peace (Habermas 1997, 133).

The idea that an inter-governmental consensus should form on these three areas so that the UN can be transformed in a cosmopolitan democratic direction is not merely wishful thinking. It is not merely wishful thinking because as we have seen in the previous chapter, the Asian Governments' Bangkok Declaration is not too far away from officially admitting all three of these points. For such a consensus to have a more "realistic" chance to form, however, two more conditions must be fulfilled: first, the Western political thought and practice must dispose of the two blind-prejudices associated with the colonialist mentality and the doctrine of American exceptionalism, and understand neo-conservatism for what it is, namely, an ideology distorting the reality and meaning not only of the non-Western societies, but also of the Western societies themselves. Second, the Western governments, and particularly the American government must be convinced to officially admit that they misunderstood the Asian governments'

Bangkok declaration, by interpreting this declaration as a relativistic challenge to the universality of human rights and democracy. To understand why such an official admission on the part of the Western governments is not merely a formal requirement but also a practical necessity for the transformation of the UN in a cosmopolitan democratic direction we must turn our attention to Held's project of cosmopolitan democratization.

4. Held and Cosmopolitan Democratization

As we have seen in the third chapter Held's project of cosmopolitan democratization is based on a perceptive understanding that the possibility of democratization within the territorial borders of national societies that cohabit the closed socio-political space of the early twenty-first century world on the one hand, and the possibility of democratization in the international structure and organization of global politics on the other, mutually presuppose one another. To be more specific Held conceives "democratization" as a multi-layered and multi-faceted process of transforming the existing social and economic political and cultural institutions and structures to entrench the democratic conception of justice at national, regional and global levels. It may be the case that the specific reforms that are needed in one region or country of the world at a national or regional level are different from those in another country or region of the world at another level, but the purpose of these reforms, namely "achieving a global democratic polity" premised, in Held's case, on the "principle of autonomy", remains the same.

In the third chapter we have already seen the long term goals that Held sets for this process of global transformation. Instead of repeating them here, therefore, let me

summarize the immediate and short-term action plan that Held proposes to achieve these long-term goals. According to Held, the first step in the project of cosmopolitan democratization is to be taken within the institutional framework of the United Nations:

A first step in the direction of an international democratic polity, albeit a transitional step lies within the grasp of the UN-system, but would involve the latter actually living up to its Charter. Among other things this would entail pursuing measures to implement key elements of the UN Rights Conventions, enforcing prohibition of the discretionary right to use force, and activating the collective security system envisaged in the Charter itself (Held 1995, 283).

Having achieved this immediate goal of making the UN-system fully functional within the framework of its existing charter and rights conventions; Held suggests, the next step should be to reform of the UN Security Council, to "give developing countries a significant voice and effective decision-making capacity." This second step is, then, to be followed by an "international constitutional convention" to revise the UN-charter and create a second, elected non-governmental UN-chamber.

Given the factuality of global inter-connectedness, the social and economic discrepancies between the living conditions of the Northern and Southern peoples, the ecological problems, and the blackmail of unconventional warfare technology that threaten every living being on the face of the earth, irrespective of national, regional, and cultural borders, it is impossible to dispute that these reforms in the UN-structure are actually needed and necessary at the dawn of the twenty-first century. These three reforms proposals outline what *ought to be urgently* done in response to the existential problems

that threaten not merely human survival on earth but the very existence of the earth -- the planet.

Yet, most practitioners and students of international politics, would agree, that even the first goal of making the sovereign members of the UN live up to the letter and spirit of the existing UN-charter and rights conventions is a goal of formidable proportions. Reform proposals to democratize the Security Council are widely discussed among contemporary students of the UN, but their actual implementation is even more difficult to envision than the first goal: This is so, because the Security Council reform requires that the permanent members of the UN either give up their veto powers altogether or share them with newly appointed members from the pool of the developing countries (Brazil and India seem to be under consideration for this purpose). But the third reform of creating a non-governmental second chamber poses the most formidable difficulty of all, because, while the first and second reform proposals can be implemented within the framework of the existing UN-charter, the creation of a second, non-governmental UN-chamber requires a revision in the UN-charter itself.

The key practical difficulty in all these three areas appears to be the generation of the political will on the part of the governments of the member-states of the UN to implement these reform proposals. Held seeks to circumvent this difficulty by relying upon three resources: the formidable activism of the international NGOs at the UN-forums, what Habermas calls the "unforced force" of public opinion, and the relatively greater susceptibility of the half-way democratic Western governments to public opinion. Accordingly the international NGOs are supposed to generate a public opinion specifying

what ought to be done in response to the existential problems threatening human survival on earth; they will then exert the pressure of this public opinion on the "relatively more" democratic Western governments; which governments will then exert their political, economic, diplomatic, and where necessary military pressure, on the "less democratic", or out-right tyrannical non-Western governments. This strategy explains Held's comment that in contemporary world politics cosmopolitan "democracy can result from and only from a nucleus or cluster of democratic states and societies." It also explains why Held considers that internal democratization through a "double-sided" process of "reforming the state power and re-structuring the society" on the one hand, and the external democratization of the international structures of global politics on the other, are mutually presupposing goals, leading to the common end of a cosmopolitan model of world governance.

This strategy of cosmopolitan democratization envisions using the activism of international NGOs to generate and mobilize the unforced force of the public opinion in the service of finishing what Habermas calls "the unfinished project of the Enlightenment." In other words this strategy envisions utilizing the latent potential of already existing democratic institutions and practices in the service of further democratization. Such a strategy is obviously a *sine-qua-non* if the human species and the earth on which this species live has to have a real chance of survival at the dawn of the twenty first century; and if in this process of global transformation the use of the force of arms is to be reduced to the necessary minimum.

Yet, missing in this strategy is an important insight, namely, the insight that generating the inter-governmental political will to reform the institutional structure of the UN in a cosmopolitan democratic direction would remain an impossible goal to achieve unless this strategy is augmented by a good dose of genuine dialogue, reasoned argumentation and mutual understanding among the legitimate concerns and interests of both the Western and non-Western governments; and between the governments and non-governmental organizations. In this context, the terms "genuine dialogue", "mutual understanding" and "reasoned argumentation" do not refer to nice-sounding but impractical and idealistic metaphors but, as noted earlier, to an actually-existing and realistic practical necessity. Let me clarify why:

Unlike a national society, the basic constitutional structure and political institutions of which can be subject to *de facto* revocation and/or revision through the force of arms (as it often happens in a revolution or military coup), the basic institutional structure of the UN can only be subject to *de jure* change through the unanimous consent of all of its members. This is so because the principle of the sovereign equality of the member states of the UN is the whole basis of the UN-charter, and even an attempt by a member or group of members to unilaterally change the basic institutional structure of the UN through the force of arms would mean the instantaneous collapse of the UN as a legitimate international organization of sovereign states. This means the necessary political will to revise the existing UN-charter must be generated from within the existing structure of the UN, in accordance with the existing UN-charter, so that the UN can self-transform without undermining its legitimate existence as an international organization.

To put it more clearly, the UN-reform can only proceed if the governments of the UN's member states agree with one another on the necessity and direction of such reform.

In case of the third reform proposal mentioned above, but also in forging a more effective mechanism for the international protection of human rights, this means that the governments of the member states of the UN must agree with one another on creating a second UN-chamber, and on *simultaneously* transferring *equal* portions of their sovereign powers to this newly created elected body. (Held understands this, in that he envisions an international constitutional convention to launch this reform). Yet no self-respecting and responsible elected or appointed official of a government would, indeed ought to, agree on giving up a portion of the sovereign powers of the people she represents at the UN-forums, as long as s/he has good reasons to believe that doing so would be detrimental to the interests of that people. In this context the term "interests" does not only refer to what the "realist" scholars in international relations theory usually mean by this term, namely, interests defined in terms of military and political power. It refers to that but it also refers to social and economic interests as well as to interests defined in terms of and from within a "sovereign" people's, cultural, religious, philosophical, and/or ideological perspective.

This is why augmenting the strategic process of lobbying the governments through NGO activism, with a dialogical process of reasoned argumentation aimed at mutual understanding among the governments and between the governments and the NGOs is a practical necessity: Political and diplomatic pressure, or economic and military sanctions authorized in accordance with the existing UN-charter can force a government

to act in this or the other way, but only the unforced force of reasons, that all the "peoples of the United Nations", can accept as good in their capacity as equal participants in a rational discourse can lead to the self-transformation of the UN without undermining its legitimate existence as an international organization. This is also the reason why Held's project of cosmopolitan democratization would have better chance of being implemented in actual practice if it takes Habermas' discourse theoretical principles of universalization and democracy instead of his own principle of autonomy as its normative building block.

CONCLUSIONS

In this thesis I sought to develop an understanding of a certain misunderstanding. This misunderstanding, I argued, contributed to the estrangement between the Western and non-Western positions in the inter-governmental controversy over the universality of human rights and democracy. By understanding this misunderstanding, I argued, we can gain a more profound insight into what the non-Western governments objected to when they objected to the "unilateral imposition of the Western values", and what the American government defended, when it defended the universality of human rights and democracy. Finally, I sought to show that this misunderstanding can be understood in terms of the conceptual differences between two distinct approaches to questions of democracy and democratization.

The first of these two approaches, the Schumpeterian-empiricist approach, jettisons normative questions of justice and legitimacy from the operational definition of democracy, and equates the normative desirability of democracy with the actually existing social political reality of the Western European, North American, and Australasian countries. From this perspective questions concerning "democratization" are seen to be relevant to raise only within the context of the so-called "developing" Asian, African and Latin American societies. "Democratization" is conceptualized as a process of "political development" in which the socio-political and cultural reality of the Asian, African, and Latin American societies are transformed in the Schumpeterian image of the actually existing Western democracies.

In the field of art, culture, and socio-political thought this approach to democracy and democratization resonates with the mentality of a European colonizer who believes that he has the monopoly of true faith, true wisdom, and true civilization, and that he has a lot to teach, but nothing to learn from the inferior cultures he encounters in the Asian, African, or South American regions. In the field of foreign policy the Schumpeterian-empiricist approach resonates with the doctrine of American exceptionalism, i.e., with the idea that the American people have a special mission and privileged voice when it comes to questions of promoting and protecting human rights and democracy in world politics.

Both, the mentality of the European colonizer and the doctrine of American exceptionalism are blind prejudices, obscuring the late-modern reality not only of the so-called non-Western societies, but also of the Western societies themselves. They are blind prejudices, because democracy is not an accomplished reality anywhere on earth. Yet, in the face of the objective problems that threaten not only the survival of the human species on earth, but also the very physical existence of the earth, global democratization is, and if it is not, it ought to be, a shared goal of the humanity. In pursuing this common goal the Westerners can learn as much from the non-Westerners, particularly about the meaning of ethico-political solidarity, as the non-Westerners can, and did, learn from the Westerners, particularly about the meaning of freedom and equality.

In the Vienna conference, it was the conceptual equations established within the Schumpeterian framework, that allowed the American government to interpret the Asian governments' objections to the "unilateral imposition of Western values" as objections to

"the universality of human rights and democracy." It was also this Schumpeterian approach, more specifically its technocratic and amoral (not to be confused with "immoral") conception of politics as a practical activity, that allowed the American government to interpret the Asian governments' demand for a more dialogical, dynamic and flexible approach to human rights standard-setting, as a deceptive public relations maneuver, covering up for brutal third world tyrants.

This, however, was a misinterpretation of the Asian governments' Bangkok declaration. It was a misinterpretation because there is no necessary logical contradiction between demanding a more dialogical approach to overcome interpretive disputes resulting from cultural and regional differences in setting and implementing the international standards of human rights on the one hand, and affirming the universality of the principles contained in the UN-charter, the universal declaration, the two covenants on the other. Indeed, Habermas' reconstruction of human rights and democracy from within the legal, political, and moral perspective of the discourse theory reveals that dialogue, more specifically the inter-subjectivistic notion of "communicative rationality", is a key concept in structuring the normative promise of the enlightenment, viz., liberty, equality, and societal solidarity for all, in a logically coherent and consistent conceptual framework. Similarly, an actual dialogue between the different cultural and ideological traditions is a necessary, if not sufficient, practical requirement to reach a consensus on global norms and values that can regulate our interactions as democratic actors sharing the culturally diversified socio-political space of the late-modern world.

On account of their poor human rights records, the motives of some Asian governments in giving voice to the demand for a more dialogical and flexible approach can justifiably be mistrusted. The fact remains, however, the idea of dialogue, more specifically decision-making through reasoned deliberation and argumentation between free and equal citizens is central to normative democratic thought and practice. The idea of dialogical resolution of normative conflicts gives to "human rights and democracy" their enlightened-normative meaning and substance in the complex, oversized, and diversified societies of late modernity. The centrality of the idea and practice of dialogue in *democratic* politics holds true not only for the Western, but also for the non-Western countries, not only for domestic political processes *in* them, but also for the "international" political processes *between* them. It is, therefore, more prudent to interpret the Bangkok declaration as giving voice to a dialogical promise which the Asian governments can be hold responsible to keep, rather than to dismiss the Bangkok declaration as a public relations maneuver, deceptively worded to appeal to the better nature of the Western audience. Indeed, far from posing a relativistic challenge to the universality of human rights, the Asian governments' Bangkok declaration gives us a measure of the extent to which a dialogical interpretation of human rights and democracy can find ethical footholds in the diverse socio-cultural, religious, and ideological traditions of the Asian societies.

This interpretation of the Bangkok Declaration can not only meet with the assent of those "losers" of the late modern world, whose civil, political, economic, cultural, and social "rights" as equal and free human beings, the international human

rights law is there to protect and promote, but it can also forestall the actually existing possibility that the expectation of a "clash of civilizations" between "the West and the Rest" may turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. The extent to which this "more charitable" interpretation of the Bangkok declaration sounds outlandish is the measure of the pervasiveness and blindness of the two prejudices through the perspective of which the neo-conservative mind (mis)interprets the post-colonial objections "to the unilateral imposition of Western values." The extent to which these two blind prejudices can be erased from public political consciousness through reasoned criticisms, artistic and literary exchanges among diverse cultural, religious, and ideological traditions, and serious negotiations between governments, and between governments and non-governmental organizations, is the measure of our distance from the equitable, prosperous, tolerant, cosmopolitan and just world order that we *can* leave to future generations.

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