**U.S. COLLECTIVE STABILITY:
NATO's Utility to American Security Policy in Europe - 1992-2001**

by

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A thesis submitted to
The Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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The Department of Political Science

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Abstract

This work seeks to explain U.S. security interests in Europe in the post-Cold War era. It is the contention of this paper that the U.S. has interests in maintaining its primacy and promoting stability in Europe and NATO is used by the United States to promote these goals and mitigate the tension between primacy and stability. There are numerous other perspectives, however, that give different explanations as to what U.S. interests are and the importance of NATO and these are critically analyzed. This work further proposes a different interpretation of how the U.S. uses NATO and develops a model entitled collective stability. To do this, this thesis examines the security interests of the United States in Europe explicitly stated by the William Clinton and George W. Bush administrations and implicitly displayed through NATO military activity in the Balkan region and NATO expansion into Central and Eastern Europe.

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INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War era, bipolarity characterized the international system, with the United States leading the capitalist west and the Soviet Union occupying a primary position in the communist east. An important feature of this bipolar system was the European security alliances that emerged along these ideological lines. In response to the massive military capabilities of the Soviet Union, the United States, Canada and Western European states formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deter any aggression on the part of the Soviet Union. The Soviets, along with their satellite states in Eastern Europe, developed the Warsaw Pact in response to the formation of NATO.¹

The original purpose of NATO has been described as an effort to “keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.”² Although greatly simplified, this contention accurately describes the purpose of NATO during the Cold War period. In the aftermath of World War II, Western Europe was decimated and facing a potentially hostile power, the Soviet Union. Further, there was continued fear that after reconstruction Germany would reclaim its expansionist goals and destabilize Europe for a third time in less than a century. NATO played an important role in alleviating these

¹ Although the Warsaw Pact was a formal alliance, it featured the security interests and armed forces of the Soviet Union to a much greater degree than any single state in NATO, including the United States. The Soviets were more concerned with the integration of Eastern Europe with the Soviets than actual security and defence, which were not a great concern given the massive superiority of Soviet forces in Eurasia and parity of nuclear arms with the United States. See Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Communism in Eastern Europe, ed. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone and Andrew Gyorgy (Bloomington, In: Indiana University Press, 1979), 322-323. This was seen in 1956 when Hungary announced its intentions to withdraw from the Pact. At that time, Soviet forces entered Budapest, disposed of Imre Nagy, then leader of the communist government in Hungary, and reinstated a Soviet dominated government. Further, in 1968, Alexander Dubcek loosened state controls in Czechoslovakia and again the Soviets, under the guise of the Warsaw Pact, replaced the reformist government with a puppet regime. See Richard H. Hudelson, The Rise and Fall of Communism (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1993), 115, 127. U.S. led operations of this nature did not occur when France removed itself from the command structure of NATO to attain greater independence in its security policy.

² Lord Ismay, quoted in Ted Galen Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1992), 26.

security concerns because the Alliance ensured a U.S. presence in Europe, which was important for two reasons. First, U.S. presence in Europe acted as a balance to Soviet military superiority on the Continent. Second, NATO tied German and other Western European powers' security into a Western European-wide security apparatus, where the U.S. presence reduced the risk of future adventurism by balancing all powers.

By Western European states committing their security arrangements to a multilateral force balanced by a superior power, they derived protection from themselves and the Soviets. The United States also derived benefits by participating and leading in NATO. Namely, the Alliance aided the avoidance of violent military conflict in a region that had drawn the U.S. into war twice in the first half of the twentieth century. Further, the Alliance gave the Americans a venue to express its own security interests in Europe.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, communism and the military threat it posed disintegrated, as the Warsaw Pact disbanded and the Soviet Union ceased to exist. NATO, more than a decade after this event, has continued to operate as a coherent organization even though the massive Soviet threat no longer exists. Instead of dealing with the now defunct threats posed by the eastern bloc, NATO has been involved in a number of other activities. Two NATO initiatives stand out in terms of their ambitions and effects they have had on the European continent; alliance military activity in Southeast Europe and NATO expansion into formally communist territory. These activities appear to depart from the initial *raison d'être* of the organization. As NATO's activities have apparently changed, this paper seeks to explain, first and foremost, what American interests are in the new European security environment and secondly what role NATO plays in promoting these interests. The hypothesis of this essay is the United

States has two main interests in Europe: the maintenance of its primacy and the protection of stability in Europe. However, primacy and stability are often seen as contradictory.³ NATO continues to be useful to the United States because this organization is an important tool in the promotion of these interests as it offers a vehicle to mediate conflicts that arise in response these two seemingly contradictory interests.

A. Contending Thoughts about NATO

Before NATO's use to the United States can be examined, it is important to look at varying positions that explain the nature of American interests in Europe, particularly as they pertain to NATO. The reason for focusing on NATO is pragmatic; NATO offers the United States a legal and political framework to be active in the security realm of Europe.⁴ This work will consider five positions.⁵ The first approach contends a partnership exists between Western Europe and the United States based on liberal values. In this conception, any state that achieves democracy can join the partnership of states characterized by liberal values. Further, because all the states in this union share similar values and have democratic institutional constraints on warring behaviour, war between liberal democratic states will not happen. Any national interest based disputes that arise from these states will be negotiated through liberal institutions designed to mitigate conflict among these states. NATO is an example of these institutions and serves as the

³ Waltz describes an international system where states not only act to benefit themselves but also provide means of protecting itself against others. States worry about relative gains made by other states and in this way an American attempt to maintain primacy could result in instability as European states may react against American efforts. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Don Mills, ON: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), 105-107. Mearsheimer further asserts that increasing state power is a sum-zero game as one states gain is another's loss. Therefore reaction to an increase of power of one state results in suspicious and hostile reactions from others, particularly when describing great powers. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 34.

⁴ Stanley R. Sloan, "NATO's Future," International Affairs 71, no.3 (1995): 218-219, 228.

⁵ Chapter three will describe the four positions and the material following in much more detail. This discussion is simply to serve as an introduction and road map to the rest of the paper.

principle organization to mitigate conflict in Europe. Subsequently, according to this perspective, NATO's utility lies in the ability of this organization to mitigate conflict through a collective security apparatus based on values. Therefore, it can be inferred that the main American interest in Europe is involvement in an equal partnership with other like-minded states to promote liberal values, which in turn creates stability.

A second approach, constructivist in nature, asserts that strategies are based on identities and norms and given the liberal identity of the United States and Western Europe, which is predisposed to institution building, the respective security policies of these states have increasingly been institutionalized. This approach suggests that international institutions increasingly determine actions of these states. Because of their liberal identity, both of these regions accept and desire this institutional outcome. Therefore, NATO, instead of becoming irrelevant in the post-communist era will continue to enjoy its high status as an important security organization and, in fact, will continue to increase in importance as more of the U.S. and European security policies are determined by institutional mechanisms. This suggests that American interests lie in the institutionalization of foreign security policy within organizations that reflect the liberal identity found in the United States.

A third approach, from realism, asserts that the United States is attempting to maintain its preponderance in Europe to maximize its ability to act on its interests and policies. In order to do this it is attempting to reduce perceptions of the threat that the massive power presented by the United States presents by working through an international organization that provides diplomatic cover for the activities of the United States. This conception views NATO's utility as a limited partnership, with the United

States involved in European security, while at the same time allowing the United States to avoid overly aggressive actions so Western Europe and Russia do not feel threatened and enhance their security capabilities and postures and challenge the United States' security interests and policies. In this conception, the United States retains the ability to act in its own interests, but voluntarily works within an organization. The utility of NATO, however, ceases at the point when the organization impedes the ability of the United States to act on its interests. From this perspective, so long as this organization reflects an appropriate power balance from the American perspective, the alliance remains useful. Thus, American interests reflect traditional realist assertions that preponderance is the singular goal of the United States in Europe.

There are other opinions that assert NATO should not or does not have any utility to the European security policy of the United States. A critical perspective suggests the United States, in partnership with Western Europe, seeks to dominate weaker and poorer countries by exercising neo-imperialist strategies that give economic and political control to the West, thus subjugating these less endowed states. This literature asserts that the U.S. and its client states in Western Europe are working together on the continent to exploit the previously communist parts of the region to maintain its political and economic dominance over underdeveloped and transition countries. From this perspective, NATO is a multilateral organization controlled by the United States that serves as a front of multilateral credibility covering up an American pursuit of raw power that is inherent in the structures of the international system. Therefore, U.S. interests in Europe reflect a desire to undermine weaker countries and NATO works to promote this

goal, but should be disbanded in an effort to create an international system not based on domination.

A second perspective critical of NATO comes from realism (neo-isolationists), which would like to see the U.S. exhibit more restraint internationally. This perspective asserts NATO is costly and encourages European free riding. Europeans should work out their own problems of security and the U.S. should cut back its international military commitments to only support its vital interests. This would not only increase funding to programs at home, but would also reduce the risk of raising the animosity of potential challengers to an internationally active United States. In this view, NATO would serve more utility to the United States if there were no American participation in the alliance. From this perspective, U.S. interests lie in disengagement from Europe, instead concentrating on dealing with America's domestic problems, which in turn would strengthen the U.S. internationally, reducing the risk of potential challenges to U.S. preponderance.

B. A New Perspective

This work will argue the above stated positions insufficiently describe U.S. interests in Europe. In each perspective, either stability (value and identity based interests) is stressed at the expense of primacy, or primacy (preponderance and neo-isolationist realists and critical scholars) takes precedence over stability. The assertion of this paper is both primacy and stability in Europe are interests of the United States. The premise for this assertion is based on the national security doctrines of Presidents Clinton and Bush, that both allude to the importance of maintaining primacy and safeguarding stability in Europe. Further, U.S. action in Europe (the intervention in Southeast Europe and NATO

expansion) seems to suggest that that the United States was in fact attempting to both create stability and bolster its primacy.

NATO has utility for the United States because the alliance offers a venue to fulfill American security interests of primacy and stability in Europe by managing the conflict between these two interests. By maintaining NATO and continuing its leading position in the organization, the United States ensures a legal and political influence over the security environment of Europe. Moreover, the existence of NATO ensures the primacy of the United States in European security because the armies of potential challengers are incorporated into NATO structures, on which the United States has a dominant influence. In addition to primacy, NATO and its policies and actions fulfill the American interest of regional stability by providing an institutional framework that the U.S. can act through either to incorporate states into the stabilizing NATO framework, or to prosecute military activity to promote European stability. Further, these activities can be done in a manner where the U.S. can act in a fashion that suitably embodies the other main U.S. interest, which is primacy. This mitigates the conflict between primacy and stability for two reasons. First, because the United States acts without outright unilateral action; it is able to reduce threat perceptions and this helps mitigate conflicts that could arise *vis a vis* European states. Second, Europeans derive security benefits because of American participation in the security structures, which they participate in because they can do so in an independent manner. As long as the United States is able to act independently within NATO to promote its interests of European primacy and stability and Europeans do not feel threatened by U.S. behaviour and continue to enjoy security benefits, NATO's

usefulness will continue to the United States in regulating conflicts between its two interests of primacy and stability.

C. Methodology

This work seeks to explain U.S. security interests in Europe. The hypothesis of this paper suggests that the United States has interests in maintaining its primacy and promoting stability in Europe and is using NATO to mitigate conflicts that could arise in the pursuit of these seemingly contradictory interests. To begin with, it is necessary to define what is meant by “primacy” and “stability.” First, primacy, in this case, will be discussed in a manner that focuses on the relative capabilities of a state *vis a vis* other states in the international system. Specifically, primacy suggests that a state will combine the following characteristics at a higher level than any other country in the international system: a high-level military power and preparedness, a strong economy, a large technological capacity, a large population and territory, bountiful resource endowment and influential ‘soft power’ attributes that include ideology and culture.⁶ Primacy must be distinguished from domination. Domination suggests that a state is actively seeking to control the policies of another state in a neo-imperial fashion, whereas primacy suggests that a state will be more capable to act on its interests than any other country. Therefore, in an attempt to promote primacy a state will attempt to further the characteristics described above or seek to undermine the same characteristics in other countries. Second, stability is defined, quite simply, as an absence of war or large-scale societal violence

⁶ Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment,” *International Security* 27, no.4 (1997): 54.

within or between states. In short, stability is international order.⁷ These are the definitions of the United States' security interests in Europe.

Stated plainly, this work seeks to determine U.S. security interests in Europe and, as stated in the hypothesis of this paper the key American security interests in Europe described in the hypothesis are primacy and stability. Therefore, this thesis will attempt to find evidence of the following condition:

The European security interests of the United States are the maintenance of its primacy and the promotion of stability in Europe.

As is clear by the contending descriptions above, there is disagreement over whether both primacy and stability are in fact the interests of the United States. If these disagreements are not addressed, the thesis of this study is severely undermined. However, it appears that contending interpretations of U.S. interests described above are misguided for numerous reasons. First, the United States does not appear to be looking for an equal partnership based on values with other like-minded states benevolently promoting liberalism and taking action out of humanitarian concern; it seems to want to take a lead role in global affairs to ensure that its security interests can be met, which suggests that primacy is an issue. Second, the United States does not appear to be institutionalizing its behaviour because this is what its identity dictates; rather it is seeking to maintain its capacity to act in an independent manner to promote its interests, again implying primacy. Third, the current preponderance literature on this topic literature suggests the United States is interested in acting in its own interests and is mindful that overly

⁷ Arguably, defining stability as simply the absence of war could be construed as developing a false dichotomy as there are likely degrees of societal stability. However, the absence of war is requisite for stability in a state to be a reality and will suffice for the purposes of this paper due to the fact that the region being discussed has recently experienced bitter wars. See conclusion for a further discussion on stability.

aggressive behaviour could result in competition. It appears to want as few exogenous constraints on its ability to act as possible, but is willing to work within organizations as long as these do not impinge on U.S. security interests. This position appears partially correct, but does not go far enough, as it does not take into account U.S. interests in stability promotion, nor does it explain how conflicts between preponderance and stability can be mitigated. Fourth, the statements and behaviour of the United States do not suggest this state is on an imperial mission, as is stressed by critical thinkers. Rather, it is attempting to act as a leader, maintaining to prerogative to act to fulfill policy goals based on its interests, not an imperial power controlling every affair of the constituent state in its empire. This behaviour would clearly indicate that the U.S. does not have an apparent concern for stability. Finally, the United States seems committed to maintaining NATO so the arguments of those calling for restraint and neo-isolation appear to be normative commentary as to what the interests should be, rather than what the actually are.

Policy statements appear to offer rationale to the thesis of this paper, and thus support the argument that primacy and stability in Europe are the United States' primary strategic concerns. One example of this strategy is an excerpt from the Pentagon as quoted in the *New York Times*, which reported the strategy of the United States is to

refocus on precluding the emergence of any future global competitor...establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role...[and] retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations.⁸

⁸ "Excerpts from the Pentagon's Plan: Prevent the Re-emergence of a New Rival," *New York Times*, 8 March 1992: A14.

This single statement is instructive but is insufficient to determine the actual European security interests of the United States. This work will outline the national security strategies of the Clinton and second Bush administrations to provide a more complete picture of what the interests of the United States are.⁹ Arguably, policy statements do not go far enough to explain if, in fact, the United States' interests are to maintain its primacy and ensure stability in Europe. An examination into the actions of the United States and NATO is necessary. This study, if it is to reveal insight into U.S. interests, should exhibit certain American behaviour and conditions resulting from actions. It is important to view outcomes of U.S. actions in Europe to determine interests as one could think of numerous explanations for U.S. military action in Southeast Europe and organizational expansion apart from primacy and stability. The CNN effect, humanitarian concern, and institutional mechanisms that oblige U.S. actions to name a few of the contending explanations of U.S. involvement in NATO's operations. However, if primacy and stability are in fact U.S. interests then these could be expected to be manifest in U.S. actions in Bosnia and NATO expansion.

Therefore, it is necessary to examine American security actions in Europe, particularly U.S. involvement through NATO in the organization's military activity and expansion. As mentioned above, it is necessary to examine U.S. action through the Atlantic alliance because this is the only existing legal and political framework for the promotion of the United States' security interests in Europe. This study will outline four predictions, or existing conditions and/or events, that could be expected to exist if the United States was seeking to both guard its primacy and ensure stability in Europe.

⁹ The second chapter of this work will detail the national security strategies of the Clinton and current Bush administration. This will also incorporate what the interest of the United States are.

The first prediction is as follows:

The United States was the primary actor in NATO operations in Southeast Europe and alliance expansion, even though the importance of European security is clearly higher for Europeans.

Have the stakes of expansion and military action been higher for the United States or Europe? Has the U.S. been the primary actor in initiating and conducting the military and expansion activities of NATO? If the Europeans were the primary actors in NATO initiatives and the U.S. was aiding their efforts, the U.S., in this instance, would simply be a good ally working within a European framework. Conversely, if the United States has been the impetuous in initiating and conducting NATO expansion and military action, it could be argued that it was doing so because its vital interests were at stake. If there is greater interest for the United States, then primacy may not be at stake, but rather vital national security interests. If these are not met, according the U.S. definitions of vital interests (discussed in chapter one), then the safety of the nation itself comes into question. This most likely is not the case as Europeans clearly have a greater interest in European security than the Americans do. That being said, simply because the U.S. has the capacity to act in situations such as Southeast Europe does not mean that it will, suggesting that stability is a concern.

Furthermore, NATO, before expansion, collectively furthered the military capabilities of the most powerful country as it combined the most advanced militaries in the world. The U.S., however, does not gain security by militarily expanding the organization into regions with weak militaries. However, expansion could further its zone of primacy and stability in Europe. Central and Eastern Europe, if not under the influence of NATO, could again fall under the influence of Moscow once Russia recovers from its

economic woes or under a more assertive Germany. Further, new countries under the auspicious of NATO are less likely to undertake independent military initiatives, such as acquiring nuclear devices or bilaterally aligning with other countries, thus limiting U.S. influence and stability in the region.

The second prediction that expresses the promotion of both primacy and stability includes the following condition:

European initiatives analogous to NATO expansion and military activities without the U.S. have been less effective at promoting stability than NATO activities

This prediction explicitly examines efforts by the European Union (EU) and powerful Western European states to stabilize the formally communist parts of the continent. Admittedly, the EU is not a military organization like NATO, but a comparison is valid as both have sought to engage and admit members from Central and Eastern Europe and both organizations are thought to have potentially stabilizing effects on this region. Further, the Western European powers that drive the EU do have military capabilities that could alleviate instability. A comparison of records will provide some insight of the efficacy of alternatives to initiatives without U.S. involvement in providing for the stability in the region. If the efforts of the EU and its powerful member states have been as effective, or more so, in promoting stability in Central and Eastern Europe than the United States may not have been actively promoting stability as these problems would have been dealt with.

The third prediction will examine the following condition of U.S. behaviour in NATO activity:

Admission requirements for expansion and terms of peace were done on U.S. terms and include provisions for ensuring stability in Europe.

NATO is a multilateral organization and if it was a relationship of equals or one based on common identity, one could expect that the final requirements for organizational entry or that the peace determined by the alliance's actions would reflect the desires of the entire organization and decisions made would be based on the collective will of the organization's members. If, however, the requirements for NATO entry and the ensuing peace after NATO military operations were shaped by U.S. initiatives that were not wholly acceptable to its European allies while at the same time strengthening the U.S. in these regions of action, then it would appear that primacy is a concern. Further, to show that stability is an interest, the conditions of admission and peace would have to reflect a commitment to stability, and not exclusively an effort to dominate.

The final prediction will examine the following condition of U.S. behaviour in NATO activity:

NATO's expansion and military action resulted in increased decisiveness in dealing with threats to stability in Europe while at the same time undermining European security desires in the region.

If Europeans, independently of NATO, had reacted decisively to the fall of communism by quickly stopping the problems that arose from this phenomenon and filled the security vacuum left behind by the disbanded Warsaw Pact, then there ostensibly would be little need for the United States to involve itself, through NATO, in the security affairs of the continent, as others would guarantee stability. However, if the presence of the United States in NATO was pivotal in influencing actions such as organizational expansion and military action and was able to act more decisively to alleviate security concerns, then NATO, and U.S. involvement in the alliance, could be considered to play an important role in fulfilling the stability interests of the United States. Further, if the United States

decisively acted in a fashion that undermined European interests and reflected American political preferences then a case can be made for primacy as well.

Explaining interests by interpreting conditions observed through behaviour is difficult, as behaviour can be explained in a variety of ways. For this reason each of the four predictions discussed above, although separate, should be examined as a unit to provide a more accurate explanation of U.S. security interests in Europe. However, each is important as it incorporates a different rationale. The first prediction (the U.S. as the primary actor), although showing an American concern for stability, does not expressively exhibit primacy. This variable could be displaying that the United States is taking a lead role in security activity in non-vital areas and is arguably doing so for reasons to enhance perceptions and realities of its power, or solidify its leadership role, important aspects of primacy. Conversely, the U.S. could have been acting out of humanitarian concern or because of pressure from its concerned citizenry after seeing horrible images on CNN. However, this is still an important condition as it provides a condition expressing certitude that necessarily must be present if a contention is to have viability, but does not suffice to prove a contention.¹⁰ If the United States were attempting to promote an interest in primacy it would necessarily have to take a lead role in NATO action. The second prediction (U.S. involvement led to better conditions for stability than non-U.S. initiatives) is a condition that also must be present to provide viability for the thesis of this work, but in this case, it examines a condition that must be present for explaining U.S. interest in stability. If the United States was not primarily

¹⁰ Although this thesis is not using an independent and dependent variable method of analysis, Van Evera's descriptions of tests in this method have been helpful in providing some rationale for the conditions that could be expected to exist. Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 30-32.

responsible or at least heavily engaged in the promotion of stability in the region than clearly it would not have had any great interest in European stability. The United States necessarily needs to be involved in NATO's military action in Southeast Europe and organizational expansion and in doing so actively showing concern for the promotion of stability if this in fact a European security interest of the United States. The third prediction (admission requirements and the shape of the peace plan), although not entirely conclusive, describes conditions that associated with interests of primacy and stability. This prediction requires that NATO military and expansion activities provide examples of the U.S. taking a lead role, working in a fashion to ensure that it will continue to enjoy independence of action, and operating in a manner where it can strongly influence the security policy of states brought under NATO's rubric. Additionally, this prediction must include conditions of stability promotion in admission requirements and peace agreements if fulfillment of the stability interest was attempted. The U.S. must shape events if it is to have primacy in a manner that improves stability if this is an interest and the events that the U.S. is shaping must further their primacy. The final prediction (increased decisiveness in stability creating actions that undermines European interests) describes conditions that could be expected if both primacy and stability is the intent of the United States in Europe. This encompasses conditions where the U.S. is actively seeking to ameliorate the environment of stability in Europe while at the same time undermining European desires as well as acting in a fashion that reflects American policy goals.

In summary, this paper seeks to explain American security interests in Europe. This paper argues that these are, in fact, primacy and continental stability. The basis for

initially choosing these interests was policy statements from U.S. officials. However, in spite of these statements, there can still be debate as to what American interests are and for this reason U.S. action in Europe must be examined. To do this, organizational activities of expansion and military intervention in CEE are examined in light of four conditions that must be present if the United States has interests of stability and primacy.

D. Plan of the Paper

This work will contain six chapters and a conclusion in addition to this introduction. Chapter one will examine the security challenges in Europe, the relative capability of the United States to deal with these challenges and the stated American policy goals and interests. Chapter two will describe, in detail, the positions of various contending arguments regarding American security interests in Europe. This will be done under the rubric of NATO capacity for the promotion American interests because, as was explained above, this is the only existing venue for the promotion of U.S. interests. Chapter three presents an argument for a different interpretation of NATO's capacity for promoting the seemingly contradictory American interests of stability and primacy. Chapters four and five encompass the case studies of this work and the composition of these sections will examine NATO military intervention in the Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia) and NATO expansion into formerly communist territories, respectively. Chapter six, evaluates the information delineated in the two case studies in light of the contending conceptions U.S. security interests in Europe scrutinizes the new perspective described in chapter three. The final section will conclude this work with a discussion on the implications of current U.S. behaviour and implications for further study.

CHAPTER I: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY IN EUROPE

It is important to examine the security environment in Europe, as these conditions will affect the level of stability on the continent. Further, the United States, if it is to maintain primacy in European security, must confront the security challenges present on the continent. The first section of this chapter examines post-Cold War security environment in Europe and delineates what are the major concerns for the United States. These include security competition among European powers, instability in the formally communist CEE region and a hostile Russia. In addition, this section assesses the ability of the United States to deal with these security concerns, in the context of American relative capability to other states. Official statements are useful in determining the interests of United States. The second section examines the stated security interests of the last two post-Cold War presidents, which is important, as presidents are pivotal policy makers and decision takers.

A. European Security Environment

Before a meaningful discussion regarding American security interests in Europe can begin, it is necessary to examine the post-Cold War security challenges in Europe facing America and the international position of the United States. Before 1989, the primary concern of the U.S. was the threat of Soviet invasion of its allies in Western Europe. However, the Soviet/Russian threat to European security has since dissipated and the high-level priority of deterring European conquest has decreased.¹ The greatest challenge to stability of Europe is a renewed security competition among the powers on the continent, deviating from the unified institutional approach (NATO) seen in response

¹ Stephen M. Walt, "America and Europe in a New Era," Atlantic Security: Contending Visions, ed. Charles Kupchan (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1998), 17.

to the Soviet threat during the Cold War. A security competition could arise if the treatments of various security interests of the European states become divisive and competitive among foreign policy elites on the continent. Security policies are indivisible when states recognize that security is impossible by their own efforts and that the concerns of neighbours are important. Moreover, for security competition to occur, only one state needs to take the unilateral action of renationalizing its army and security interest. This would further result in other states reacting to this situation. Arguably, Europeans could avoid this scenario, if European security remains institutionalized.² Furthermore, once the security competition has begun, there may be attempts by a single European state to attain a position of primacy on the continent, which could destabilize Europe.³

In addition to the undermining of European stability from competition, there are also other security concerns from Eastern Europe. The United States fears that turmoil in the Balkans could spread to other countries in the region, thus threatening the stability of Europe. This would undermine U.S. political and security interests.⁴ A major concern for the United States regarding the Balkan conflict is the destabilization of Turkey, which is pivotal, not only to U.S. security designs in Europe, but also for policy goals regarding

² Robert Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly 111, no. 1 (1996): 2,6-7.

³ John W. Holms, The United States and Europe After the Cold War: A New Alliance? (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1997), 93, 103. It may seem that the potential for a renewed competition in Europe is unlikely, but Germany's former-Chancellor Helmut Kohl expressed fears that the integration so painstakingly achieved since the end of World War Two could come unravelled if the European states perceived each other, especially Germany, as a security competitor. See Art, 2. and Holger H. Mey, "A European Security and Defence Identity – What Role for the United States?" Comparative Strategy 14, no. 2 (1995): 313.

⁴ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia and the United States Role, 29 September 1993, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), 11.

the Middle East, Iraq in particular, and the Caucasus and Central Asia.⁵ The Balkan region is not the only cause for concern, as most of the Eastern European states include more than one ethnic group. This, coupled with the economic pressures on the region, could contribute to destabilization in Europe.⁶ This, however, is a doomsday scenario as the destabilization in Eastern Europe is unlikely to pose any great threat to the greater stability of Western Europe, let alone the United States. However, history has shown that in the event of European conflict, the United States' capacity to act comes into question. For example, as the war raged in Bosnia, the United States initially stood by idly. The U.S. believed that its lack of involvement in Bosnia, in light of the atrocities being committed, undermined its credibility and prestige as a superpower, which could result in problems in leveraging other actors to comply with its interests.⁷

Finally, although the massive Soviet threat that challenged U.S. strategies during the Cold War has subsided, there still are aspects about Russia that concern the United States. Any activity undertaken in Europe must display sensitivity towards Russia. The U.S. has no interest in weakening the reform process or cooling diplomatic relations.⁸ Although diminished in international stature, Russia is still a world military power with massive nuclear capabilities and must be considered when making strategy.⁹ Two areas where Russia has made its discontent known are in NATO expansion and NATO

⁵ U.S. Congress. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Developments in Europe and the Former Yugoslavia, 15 September 1993 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), 25.

⁶ Holms, 93, 100.

⁷ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Participation in UN Peacekeeping Activities, 24 June, 21 September, 7 October 1994 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994) 3, Ivo Daalder, Getting to Dayton (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 108 and John Arquilla, "Bound to Fail: Regional Deterrence After the Cold War," Comparative Strategy 14, no. 2 (1995): 123.

⁸ Sloan, 222.

⁹ Holms, 93.

airstrikes in Bosnia and this, in turn, was cause for concern for the United States.¹⁰ In short, a weakened Russia is still a concern for European security and the United States.

To sum up, there are three main security concerns that affect the security strategies of the United States in Europe. Probably the most important is renewed security competition among European powers. Second, a destabilized Eastern Europe not only affects interests in Europe, but also in the Middle East and Central Asia. In addition, a failure to act on conflicts in this region undermines the credibility of the United States, affecting its ability to deter possible aggression. Finally, a discontented Russia also poses challenges to the United States' ability to carry out its interests in Europe. Is the United States in a position to deal with these challenges?

Based on criteria of relative capabilities *vis a vis* other states in the international system, if the U.S. is unable to deal with these challenges than no other state would have the ability to do so either. The United States, quite simply, has achieved a position of primacy in the international system. That is to say, "only the United States currently excels in military power and preparedness, economic and technological capacity, size of population and territory, resource endowment and 'soft power' attributes such as ideology. All other would-be great powers are limited in one critical way or another."¹¹ In short, the United States is the most powerful state in the international system and for this reason it has relatively few exogenous constraints on its ability to use its power to act on its interests. The reality of American primacy means that it is most able to deal with the above-described European security concerns. Because of the preponderance of the United

¹⁰ Barbara Crossette, "Yeltsin Attacks NATO Role on Bosnia," *New York Times*, 23 October 1995: A1 and Boris Yeltsin quoted in Sean Kay "American Strategies Towards the Enlargement of European Security: Partnership or Cold Peace?" *The Transatlantic Relationship*, ed. Jerrod Weiner (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 50.

¹¹ Mastanduno, 54.

States and its ability to act, it is necessary to analyse American policy statements to gain a further understanding of how the one could expect the U.S. to act and what interests it will attempt to promote in Europe.

B. American Security Interests in Europe

To determine if the United States has interests in maintaining primacy and promoting stability it is useful to discuss the national security strategies of the administrations of Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. The reason for focusing on these presidents is pragmatic; the purpose of this study is to examine U.S. interests in the post-Cold War period. Although the first Bush was a post-Cold War president, his tenure during this era was arguably too close to the end of this conflict to make generalizations regarding his particular security strategies in Europe. Further, although the cases studied in this paper are events that both took place during the Clinton administration, the security strategies of both administrations are examined in an attempt to show that the post-Cold War goals of the U.S. are consistent, even if the visions on how to promote these goals may be different.

According to the Clinton administration, there are three main categories of interests: vital, important, and humanitarian and other interests. Vital interests are defined as those challenges that are important to the survival, safety and vitality of the U.S. and close American allies. Second level interests are those that are important to the United States but do not threaten the survival of the country, but may affect its well-being. The Clinton administration considered NATO and its activities, military and expansion, to be in this category. The third level of interests is humanitarian in nature. These challenges do not threaten the survival or well-being of the U.S., but will affect American action as

they constitute an affront to national values.¹² Likewise, The Bush administration, in the 2002 national security strategy, affirms that the most important interest the United States has is the defence of the country, which requires a deterrence of threats against U.S. interests and allies, as well as decisive action against challenges that are not resolved by deterrence. Additionally, the Bush strategy also calls for efforts to meet challenges to important interests in Europe dealing with regions where stability is a concern. Finally, like the Clinton administration, President Bush's team argues the importance of alleviating global humanitarian problems.¹³ Both administrations define interests in similar manner, and both administrations believe that issues of stability on the eastern fringes of Europe are important. However, it is clear that these do not fit into the category of vital interests, which is to maintain the survival of United States and its allies.

Two features are present in both articulations of security strategy that serve to inform the mode of operation for the United States; one is the desire to work with others and the other is to act unilaterally when necessary. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations put multilateralism as a priority. Bush's strategy states, "We have finite political, economic, and military resources to meet our global priorities.... The United States should invest time and resources into building international relationships and institutions that can help manage local crises when they emerge."¹⁴ Likewise, Clinton's national security strategy asserted,

International cooperation will be vital for building security in the next century because many of the challenges we face cannot be addressed by a single nation. Many of our security objectives are best achieved by leveraging our influence and

¹² President of the United States, A National Security for a New Century (Washington: The White House, 2000), 1 December 2002 <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss9912.htm>>.

¹³ President of the United States, The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington: The White House, 2002) 22 September 2002 <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss9.html>>.

¹⁴ The National Security Strategy of the United States, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss9.html>>.

capabilities through international organizations, our alliances, or as a leader of an ad hoc coalition formed around a specific objective.¹⁵

Clearly, then, the United States has an interest in working with others to meet the challenges to its interests. Although the willingness to work with others exists, both strategies delineate the importance of unilateral action if this is necessary. The Bush strategy states, “We will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require.”¹⁶ Clinton’s administration also reserved the right to commit the U.S. to unilateral action by affirming, “We must always be prepared to act alone when that is our most advantageous course, or when we have no alternative.”¹⁷ Therefore, according to the strategies of Presidents Clinton and Bush, both multilateralism and unilateralism characterize the mode of operation for the United States in meeting its challenges.

These seemingly paradoxical features leave much ambiguity regarding the potential behaviour of the United States. Because of this uncertainty, it is necessary to examine specific goals of the United States in the realm of security, particularly concerning security policy in Europe, which is the basis of this paper. Again, there is agreement between the current and previous administration. First and foremost, both presidents explicitly state that it is important the U.S. military maintain its preponderance *vis a vis* any other state. Clinton’s strategy comments on the fact that the United States remains the most powerful state and the “central challenge - and our responsibility - is to sustain that role by seizing the opportunities of this new global era for the benefit of our

¹⁵ A National Security for a New Century,

<<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss9912.htm>>.

¹⁶ A National Security for a New Century,

<<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss9912.htm>>.

¹⁷ A National Security for a New Century,

<<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss9912.htm>>.

own people and people around the world.”¹⁸ The Clinton administration further describes the importance of maintaining technological and military superiority to maintain the United States’ status. President Bush is unequivocal in his emphasis on preponderance. He declares, “We will maintain the forces sufficient to support our obligations, and to defend freedom. Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States.”¹⁹ Based on these statements, it is possible to argue that one central goal of the United States is to maintain its position as the strongest state, relative to all others, and ensure its freedom to act to promote its policies.²⁰

A second goal of both administrations is to create conditions of stability. As this paper’s focus is on Europe, this discussion will be limited to this geographical area. Bush contends that NATO is an important force for this goal and states that the United States must work to “expand NATO’s membership to those democratic nations willing and able to share the burden of defending and advancing our common interests.”²¹ Similarly, Clinton expresses numerous comments in his national security strategy that assert the importance of NATO in stopping conflict in the Balkans and entrenching stabilizing reforms in new members and in potential new members.²² Further, both administrations stressed the importance of the United States taking a lead role in these NATO initiatives. Based on these statements, it appears that two goals of the U.S. in Europe are to ensure

¹⁸ A National Security for a New Century,

<<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss9912.htm>>.

¹⁹ The National Security Strategy of the United States, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss9.html>>.

²⁰ This, as described in the introduction of this work, is what will be used as the definition of primacy.

²¹ The National Security Strategy of the United States, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss9.html>>.

²² A National Security for a New Century,

<<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss9912.htm>>.

the maintenance of U.S. preponderance in the region and support conditions that are conducive to stability.

Therefore, the United States, according to the current and previous presidents, has a clear set of national interests that place national survival and allied survival as the state's most vital interest. Further, there are also important interests that affect the well-being of the U.S. but do not threaten its survival. To ensure these interests are met the United States is willing to use both multilateral and unilateral modes of operation. However, two themes that permeate both presidential statements is the need for European stability and, more importantly, the necessity of the United States to maintain its primacy in the international system. It is through these strategies that the United States attempts to deal with the challenges outlined earlier in this chapter. Although these policy statements are clear, they are also quite broad and leave room for interpretation. For this reason it is important to examine various interpretations and conceptions of American priorities and behaviour as it pertains to the utility of NATO in meeting the objectives outlined by the current and previous administrations.

CHAPTER II: NATO AND U.S. INTERESTS

As mentioned in the introduction there are contending views of what U.S. interests are, in spite of the statements of the Bush and Clinton administrations. This chapter looks at other observations into U.S. interests by describing why and how NATO promotes the interests of the United States from different perspectives. It is necessary consider NATO in this manner because the Atlantic alliance must be considered in the examination of U.S. interests as this is the only existing venue for U.S. actions. The contention of this work is the United States is attempting to maintain its primacy and stability, but as there is disagreement over U.S. interests and therefore NATO's importance in promoting U.S. interests, it is useful to examine other perspectives that examine these matters.

The chapter examines five contending conceptions of these concerns. The first will outline the perspective taken by many liberal thinkers. This position asserts that NATO is an organization based on liberal democratic values and the importance of the alliance lies in the political and ideological similarity of the composite members and NATO's ability to provide collective security for these similar countries to deal with challenges to European security. This suggests the U.S. security interests in Europe are to promote stability and democratic values by working in a partnership of like-minded states.

The second is the institutionalist prospective, which argues that the United States has developed a multilateral institution in NATO to deal with European security issues in a manner that reflects American liberal identity. NATO's utility is indispensable to the United States because this institution has developed an identity of its own, one that

reflects American identity, and as a result determines, in large part, American behaviour, which is cooperative in nature, creating conditions of peace and stability. This describes a situation where, arguably, U.S. interests are in perpetuating an organization that reflects their liberal identity that will work to regulate the security challenges in Europe.

The third perspective will outline a variant of realism, which stresses the importance of American preponderance in Europe and asserts that NATO is useful in providing diplomatic cover for initiatives to promote American interests. According to the view of preponderance, if the organization were to inhibit U.S. hegemony and U.S. ability to act on its interests, then the Americans should withdraw from the organization. This suggests that the primary U.S. security interest in Europe is primacy, which better ensures the capacity to act. This view also recognizes that the United States benefits from the appearance of multilateral action, but if the freedom to act is inhibited then primacy is compromised.

The fourth part examines a view that is critical of NATO. This perspective incorporates thinkers who adhere to the critical school of thought and contend NATO is important as a tool for American global domination. In this case, U.S. interests are domination and NATO is a tool for this domination. They hold the normative position that U.S. interests of domination and the tools for its promotion should be scrapped along with the current structure of international relations. This explanation describes U.S. behaviour while at the same time describing how it should be changed

Finally, this chapter will examine an alternate version of realism, which argues for American restraint or neo-isolation manifested by a withdrawal from Europe to focus on domestic challenges to strengthen America and to avoid an international presence that

could result in direct challenges to U.S. power. NATO in this way undermines what these scholars view as the real American interests of domestic strengthening and the avoidance of international power competitions. This is a normative position that expresses what U.S. interests should be.

Table 2.1 NATO's Importance in Promoting U.S. Interests

Perspective	U.S. Interests Promoted Through NATO	Explanation
Liberal Perspective	Stability and the promotion of shared values, which promotes stability	NATO's utility lies in the fact that the alliance is a partnership of values where all states share a liberal ideology and have liberal institutions guaranteeing personal freedom that places constraints on warring behaviour. Disputes will sooner be settled in agreed and democratic forums, such as NATO, before liberal states resort to violence.
Constructivist Perspective	Stability and the maintenance of an institution that informs member states they have an interest in stability.	NATO is a product of the liberal identities of all of its member states, identities that are predisposed to institution building and allowing multilateral institutions regulate state behavior. NATO is becoming more useful because the alliance is informing security policies of the member countries.
Preponderance Perspective	Primacy	NATO is useful so long as it remains a tool to promote U.S. preponderance and acts as diplomatic cover reducing potential threats to its hegemony.
Critical Perspective	Domination and instability	NATO is simply a tool of Western and U.S. domination over weaker countries and is indicative of an international system based on violence, uneven power relations and marginalization. It should be disbanded.
Restraint Perspective	No interests in NATO	NATO is an excuse for the U.S. to remain in Europe to maintain its hegemonic status. This is self defeating and expensive as it encourages Europe to free-ride on U.S. defence spending and increases the potential of powerful American influence resulting in a challenger. NATO resources would be better spent to strengthen the U.S. domestically

A. Coherence of Values and Collective Security – Liberal Perspective

One of the perspectives that explains NATO and U.S. security interests in Europe is based on a collective security system. Although the following discussion does not explicitly state what U.S. interests are, by looking at the principles of collective security and U.S. behaviour within this system it is possible to explain American security interests

in Europe. Charles and Clifford Kupchan characterize NATO as a collective security system and outline three main conditions that must be present to make a security regime such as this a reality. The first condition contends there must not be an all-powerful state within a collective security system as all countries must be vulnerable to sanction. Second, views on what constitutes stability and a stable international system must be congruent among the states that participate in a collective security institution. Finally, it is important that political solidarity and a moral community exist.¹ In sum, Kupchan and Kupchan argue, “NATO has sustained its relevance and appeal precisely because it has moved beyond its role as a traditional alliance and is now functioning as a hybrid between a collective defense and a collective security organization.”² Charles Kupchan notes that the United States is the most powerful actor in the international system, but argues that the U.S. is committing itself to a division of labour where it is involved in Europe, but increasingly leaves European security to European states.³ Arguably, this constrained American role in Europe is what makes collective security possible on the continent because in this way, the U.S. is not overly powerful, which would undermine collective security. Ostensibly, the U.S. is willing to constrain itself because it has pooled its sovereignty with its NATO allies, an action made possible by the commonality of values and views of the nature of the international system among the organization’s members.

¹ Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe,” in, America’s Strategy in a Changing World, eds. Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 161.

² Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe: A Retrospective,” in, America’s Strategy in a Changing World, revised ed., eds. Michael Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 266.

³ Charles A. Kupchan, “The End of the West,” The Atlantic Monthly, November 2002: 43.

Janne E. Nolan also describes the characteristics of a collective security arrangement and the values inherent in this regime as it applies to NATO. Nolan describes the alliance as one that exhibits equality, reciprocity and obligations *vis a vis* all the members of NATO. Collective security, according to Nolan, is beneficial as it maximizes scarce resources and reduces the fragmentation of the international system. Further, collective security enables states to use military action as a last resort as collective arrangements such as NATO enable states to better use peacekeeping and diplomacy as well as strengthen conventional deterrence, which reduces the need for nuclear weapons.⁴ The author argues that the U.S. has an important role within NATO as the most powerful state by deterring the escalation of regional instability and aiding the formation of new relationships. Nolan asserts that this is possible because the U.S. and Europe have a common purpose.⁵ This common purpose suggests, following the contentions of Kupchan and Kupchan, that the United States and Europe share similar values and this makes a collective security system possible, which provides a framework for stability.

Although the above-discussion does not explicitly explain U.S. interests but rather describes U.S. behaviour, it is possible to ascertain interests based on the description of collective security and U.S. behaviour within this institution. The authors examined above assert that NATO is pivotal in creating stability because all the members share values and work together to create stability. There is like-mindedness and voluntary constraint among the alliance's members for the good of Europe and the other partners in

⁴ Janne E. Nolan, "Cooperative Security in the United States," in, *America's Strategy in a Changing World*, revised ed., eds. Michael Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 183-190.

⁵ Nolan, 195.

NATO. This suggests that primacy is not really a concern for the United States or any other member, as they voluntarily limit individual action and submit to a situation of pooled sovereignty. Stability, however, is a concern as the entire collective security institution is in place to ensure stability. There is an implicit assumption that states sharing democratic values will maintain stability through their relations and actions towards each other.⁶ Therefore, based on the characteristics of collective security and U.S. behaviour within this institution it can be argued that the primary U.S. security interest in Europe is creating stability by working as a partner in a multilateral institution.

Kupchan and Kupchan describe NATO as a relationship of political solidarity and moral community. This suggests an institution not only for security, but also one of shared values. Why are shared values important in promoting stability in Europe, the primary interest of the United States according to this perspective? Michael Doyle argues liberal countries, such as those that comprise NATO accept a duty to protect other liberal countries. For this reason, there is no counter-balancing of power and aggressive expressions of sovereignty at the expense of other states within the community of liberal states.⁷ John Ikenberry adds to these ideas by arguing American power has become institutionalized in organizations such as NATO and this has resulted in a path dependent foreign policy that relies on multilateralism to promote order. This means that the United States and Europe will not engage in security competition to seek gains in sum-zero game, rather, these regions will work in an integrated manner to expand liberal order and

⁶ See page 40 for a discussion on the relationship between stability (peace) and democracies.

⁷ Michael W. Doyle, "A Liberal View: Preserving and Expanding the Liberal Pacific Union," in, International Order and the Future of World Politics, ed. T.V. Paul and John A. Hall (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 41-43.

values.⁸ Both of these authors argue that the United States is the most powerful country, but its values and its integrated status within multilateral organizations such as NATO ensure that it will not engage in competitive security policies *vis a vis* its European allies. Thus, the values that underlie U.S. interests are the protection of other liberal states and non-competitive behaviour that does not undermine the collective security of all states that share these values. It is not only the U.S. which has these values but, similarly, the other countries in NATO as well.

How are these similarities important for promoting the central interest of stability? Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin explain that NATO countries, because of their similarity, cooperate because they have significant common interests. NATO is an important venue for mitigating any difference of opinion and mistrust resulting from these differences because it reduces the level of distrust by creating conditions of reciprocity and transparency in the relations between countries. This, in turn, creates an environment conducive to eliminating the need for relative gains among countries.⁹ Elsewhere, Keohane outlines a theory of transaction costs which suggests that states, like corporations, reduce rent seeking and opportunistic behaviour by entering into institutional arrangements such as NATO.¹⁰ By reducing such behaviour through institutions (similar to the utilization of contracts among firms), which require

⁸ G. John Ikenberry, "Liberal Hegemony and the Future of American Post-War Order," in, International Order and the Future of World Politics, ed. T.V. Paul and John A. Hall (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 124-5.

⁹ Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 39, 43-4.

¹⁰ Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

transparency and codify behaviour, trust is developed among states thus creating conditions where it is in the interests of states to work together.¹¹

Although there are differences among the authors examined above regarding the security relationship between Europe and the United States, a common theme exists. Specifically, each author refers to the shared values of the United States and Europe as the primary dynamic of the relationship. These shared values make it possible for the U.S. and Europe to work together in a multilateral and transparent manner, not in a competitive fashion, to promote European stability. Joseph Nye Jr. succinctly summarises this idea when stating

The United States shares the values of democracy and human rights more thoroughly with the majority of European countries than most other states. Values matter in American foreign policy and the commonality of values between the United States and Europe is an important force keeping the two sides together.¹²

Nye further argues that the Europeans and the Americans do not threaten each other's vital interests and the two countries work as partners to deal with world challenges.¹³ Furthermore, the preponderance of American power, in the view of these authors, is simply a structural fact and does not pose any major threats to European interests, as Europe and U.S. have the same basic interests based on values. Rather, American power is in fact useful, as it gives greater power to the Atlantic partnership to promote its values. Unilateral behaviour and promotion of primacy is not an interest because this is not part of American value system in terms of its security interests in Europe. Rather, the promotion of its liberal democratic values for the creation of stability is the primary U.S. interest.

¹¹ Katja Weber, "Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: A Transactions Costs Approach to International Security," *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 2 (June 1997): 330.

¹² Joseph S. Nye Jr., "The U.S. and Europe: Continental Drift," *International Affairs* 76, no. 1 (2000): 55.

¹³ Nye, 55.

B. Institutional Identity and Security Community – Constructivist Perspective

A different interpretation of U.S. security interests in Europe comes from constructivist scholars who claim that interests are based on American identity. Often, the conclusions reached by these scholars are little different from those who purport the liberal values interpretation. The differences lie in how NATO as an institution is interpreted. Contrasting with liberal thinkers who argue that the primary U.S. security interest in Europe is stability created by collective stability, resulting from the shared values of NATO members; constructivists claim that interests are a reflection of the identities of the states. Alexander Wendt offers a concise explanation of the interface between identity and interests

A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward other objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them.... Actors acquire identities – relatively stable, role-specific understandings of expectation about self – by participating in such collective meanings.... Actors do not have a ‘portfolio’ of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations.¹⁴

In other words, what people identify with, or what people find and interpret meaning in, forms interests. People can only identify with objects and situations they have experienced and the collection of these experiences forms identity, which is, in part, a collection of norms. Furthermore, institutions, legal or political, are simply a stable set of identities and interests.¹⁵ Therefore, the identities of NATO members are informed, in part, by norms created by involvement and interaction within these institutions, which in turn forms the basis for state preference. Because all states within the alliance are

¹⁴ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 396- 398.

¹⁵ Wendt, 399.

informed by the same set of norms, there is a convergence of interests and actions, resulting in a security community of states with similar identities. Therefore, identity and understanding American identity is important to a discussion of U.S. interests because in understanding identity it is possible to ascertain interests.

John Ruggie presents a clear explanation of how identity manifests itself in international institutions such as NATO, which is the primary vehicle for promoting American interests. Ruggie argues post-World War II American foreign policy developed in a manner consistent with the identity of the American people who wished engagement with the rest of the world, but were unwilling to engage in the undemocratic imperialism that characterized the behaviour of past great powers. The result was a multilateral world order, where international institutions were designed to take a lead role in the regulation of global stability.

The multilateral world order principles invoked by [post-war American presidents] bear a striking affinity to America's sense of self as a nation: an expressed preference for international orders of relations based on 'a universal or general foundation open in principle to everyone,' not on discriminatory or exclusionary ties.... In short, the multilateral world order principles that American leaders have invoked when the remaking of the international order has been at stake reflect the idea of America's own foundation act of political communion.¹⁶

Ruggie contends that because the United States designed the post-World War institutions, NATO included, and these reflect American identity, the U.S. will work through the multilateral organizations to meet international challenges within the mandate of the organization. Ruggie asserts that the U.S. not only works through NATO, but also allows its foreign security policy to be directed by an organization that embodies its multilateral identity. Citing the Bosnian conflict as an example of this Ruggie argues

¹⁶ John G. Ruggie, "Interests, Identity and American Foreign Policy," in, Constructing the World Polity, ed. Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal (New York: Routledge, 1998), 218-219.

the Bush [Sr.] administration had little desire to become militarily involved [in Bosnia.] Once in office the Clinton administration, despite its campaign rhetoric followed suit. But the institutional tripwire ultimately kicked in. When the United States did become involved it was in large measure to salvage the ill-fated UN operation and, even more importantly the reputation of NATO.¹⁷

Bush Sr. and Clinton, respectively, were loath to involve the U.S. in any conflict, but did so to save the reputation of NATO, an alliance embodying the identity of the United States. What, then, are the American interests? When examining the constructivist perspective it is possible to infer that American security interests in Europe are engaging challenges to international order and maintaining an organization (NATO) embodying their identity, which is the source of their interest formation. In other words, NATO was created for the promotion of international order (stability) because this desire is central to U.S. identity, the country which created the alliance and NATO, in turn, informs the U.S. that its interests are to promote stability. Therefore U.S. security interests in Europe are stability and the maintenance of international organizations (NATO).

Why does NATO promote the interests of the United States? Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein argue that the security community worked in Europe precisely because there was a perception that Europe was similar in identity to the United States. Perceptions of collective identity shape multilateral action and Europeans and Americans have similar racial, historical, political and cultural backgrounds. In short, The United States can view Europe as an equal in the shared community. This perception of equality improves the level of trust among the countries of NATO and the perceived level of equality will determine the level of cooperation, as an affinity of identity will create a

¹⁷ Ruggie, "Interests," 226.

perception of suitability in terms of allies.¹⁸ Ruggie concurs with this assessment and contends that security communities

exhibit dependable expectations of peaceful change,” that is, the “assurance that members will not fight each other physically, but will settle disputes in some other way.” Expectations of peaceful change tend to be most dependable, the more they reflect cognitive bonds of “‘we-feeling,’ trust, and mutual consideration” among the constituent units – a sense of community, in short. The development of such bonds, in turn is aided by a number of background conditions, in particular a “compatibility of the main values” as to the political, economic and legal institutions.¹⁹

Therefore, the similarities among NATO partners result in a security community where all members trust each other and seek stable relations. In this way, NATO promotes the U.S. interest of stability.

How does NATO determine the interests of the United States? David Lake describes mechanisms of how the U.S. is bound to the norms of NATO. There is great potential for the U.S. to act opportunistically outside the institutional framework of norms established by NATO given the preponderance of power the United States currently possesses. Lake argues, however, there are safeguards within the alliance that bind the hands of the United States. States within NATO are concerned about opportunistic behaviour on the part of the U.S. and will resist surrendering increasing amounts of their sovereignty over to a superpower if they feel that it will be abused.²⁰ Therefore, to promote its interests of stability and organizational survival the U.S. surrenders its

¹⁸ Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why is there no NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organization 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 575-6, 587, 593.

¹⁹ John G. Ruggie, “NATO and the Security Community,” in, Constructing the World Polity, ed. Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal (New York: Routledge, 1998), 230-1. Ruggie quotes from E. Alder and M.N. Barnett, “Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the Study of Security Communities,” Ethics and International Affairs 10, no. 1 (1996): 63-98.

²⁰ David A Lake, Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 261.

sovereignty to an institution. If it did not do so, an important source of interest formation and stability, arguably, would be threatened.

Being the most powerful state, could the U.S. not ensure stability in a unilateral manner? Why is it in the interest of the United States to surrender its sovereignty to a multilateral organization to perpetuate an organization that limits U.S. sovereignty? Robert McCalla argues this interest is the result of the norms and rules that have developed and have been formalized within the organization. The security that the alliance provides has emerged through the shared expectations of each of the members. NATO, because of its co-developed norms of operation and the shared expectations that exist among the states, has created a system where countries do not have to adjust security ties *vis a vis* each other. This, in turn, has resulted in incentives to maintain the organization rather than seek alternatives to the security community that NATO provides. Therefore, states remain in NATO and conform to the norms of the organization, regardless if it goes against the independent desires or interests of any one state at any given time. This has brought about a convergence of identity among diverse actors because they are brought together by shared norms that have their basis in the organization.²¹ This suggests that the convergence of identity among NATO members has resulted in conformity with norms of stability and relationships within an organization, effectively eliminating an incentive to act outside the organization, an action that would offer less certainty and potentially more instability. In sum, the primary security interests of the United States, according to the institutionalist perspective, are the promotion of

²¹ Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War," International Organization 50, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 461-464.

stability and the maintenance of the organization that informs them this is, in fact, their interest

1. The Outcome of Values and Identity

As mentioned above, there is often little difference between the constructivist lens and liberal theory. Both perspectives reviewed in this paper assert the American security interest in Europe is stability. However, liberals assert that values and their promotion are central whereas constructivists claim identity and the organizations that identity create, which in turn informs interests are central to interests. Both, however, have a common denominator, which is democracy. Whether democracy is a value or an identity, the promotion of this concept is an interest because both perspectives assert this creates stability, a primary interest of the United States. Why does democracy create stability? Many scholars adhere to the democratic peace thesis, which posits that democracies do not go to war with other democracies, to explain the centrality of democratic values or identity in the American interest of stability.

Two main factors result in a democratic peace. First, democratic peace has its origins in liberalism, which emphasises the freedom of the individual. Freedom, in this case, includes freedom from arbitrary government authority, a system that protects the capacity and opportunity for freedom and allows for public participation in governance.²² Because of the primacy of these values or identity in a liberal democratic system, governments must get the consent of citizens before going war, because their personal welfare will be adversely affected by this activity.²³ Doyle summarizes his case by

²² Michael W. Doyle, "Kant Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs," in, *Debating the Democratic Peace*, eds. Michael Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), 4.

²³ Doyle, "Kant," 25.

stating, “To ensure that morally autonomous individuals remain free in those areas of social action where public authority is needed, public legislation has to express the will of citizens making laws for their own community.”²⁴ Ostensibly, harmful affects to personal welfare would be an infringement on individual freedom and there must be consent before the imposition of these hardships. War quite obviously imposes these effects on personal welfare. These constraints to warring behaviour are argued to be an institutional factor in the determination of democratic peace.²⁵ One of the requirements of NATO membership is states must be democratic. This ensures that the values or identities of democracy and liberalism will be present in each of the alliance’s member states. If these values or identities result in less bellicose behaviour by states, as the democratic peace thesis suggests, then arguably, states that exhibit these liberal values, or have a liberal identity, make more trustworthy partners as they are less likely to go to war.

In addition, norms of interstate relations between democratic states have been cited as a reason of why democracies do not go to war with each other. Liberal regimes respect the central tenet of international law, which is the right to be free from foreign intervention.²⁶ This is the case because liberal states, such as those in NATO, have developed a system where foreigners are treated as nationals, a high level of intersociety relations exists and deep economic interdependence has been attained. This interdependent relationship makes peace between liberal democracies more likely and has led to the collection of liberal democracies being characterized as a pacific union.²⁷

²⁴ Doyle, “Kant,” 5.

²⁵ Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant,” in, *Debating the Democratic Peace*, eds. Michael Brown, Sean, M. Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), 164. It must be noted that Christopher Layne is a critic of the democratic peace thesis, but does provide a thorough and concise summary of these ideas in this article.

²⁶ Doyle, “Kant,” 10,25.

²⁷ Doyle, “Kant,” 25-27, 31.

Therefore, NATO has developed out this cooperation and interdependence that is heavily based on values. However, states outside the pacific union, i.e. authoritarian states, do not share these close relationships because of differing values or identities and thus war with countries such as these is acceptable. The differing values or identities in question refer to a lack of individual rights in a state that commits human rights violations. Liberal states will intervene in non-liberal countries to ensure that these individual rights are being respected.²⁸ This has been called the norms and culture, or ideological, reason for the democratic peace.²⁹ NATO is important to maintain because this organization either provides a venue to spread these values or informs states of these ideational democratic principles. These principles, in turn, create stability among similar states.

John Owen has developed a useful model to map the conditions that cause the development of this idea. This conceptual aid of the democratic peace thesis can be exhibited in the following manner:

Figure 2.1³⁰

²⁸ Doyle, "Kant," 41

²⁹ Layne, "Kant or Cant," 165.

³⁰ John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, eds. Michael Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), 131.

Therefore, these values or identities link U.S. security interests to the domestic democratic political systems of other NATO states and for this reason, democratic values or identity and the promotion of these values or identity form the basis of American European security interests as these factors result in stability. There has been apparent support for these contentions in the realms of American foreign policy making. As stated by former-President Clinton

The promotion of democracy abroad is one of the primary foreign policy objectives of my administration. These efforts reflect our ideals and reinforce our interests – preserving America’s security and enhancing our way of life. Democracies are less likely to go to war with one another or to abuse the rights of their people. They make for better trading partners. And each one is a potential ally in the struggle against the forces of hatred and intolerance, whether rogue nations, those who foment ethnic and religious hatred, or terrorists who traffic in weapons of mass destruction.³¹

Therefore, this thesis, an outcome of liberal and constructivist thought, would suggest that the promotion of democratic values or a democratic identity is important because this generates stability, which both perspectives view as a primary European security interest of the United States.

C. Preponderance

Proponents of preponderance argue the U.S. must be engaged internationally in an effort to maintain its dominant position in the international system. According to preponderance scholars, U.S. security interests in Europe are neither values nor identity-based interests in stability. Rather, when viewed through the lens of this perspective, the primary U.S. interest is the ability to promote its ability to act with as few constraints as possible, necessitating the need to maintain its status as the most powerful actor in

³¹ President of the United States, “Support for a Democratic Transition in Cuba,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1, 28 January 1997 (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1998) 88.

Europe. According to this view, preponderance as an interest of the United States, is acquiring and maintaining the capacity to act in the interests of the state in the face of threats, in a variety of ways.

The realist scholar who is possibly most aggressive in promoting preponderance as an interest is John Mearsheimer. He argues that institutions such as NATO are neither communities nor collective in nature, but rather reflect the power distribution found in the international system. Participation is based on the self-interest of the state, members decide which behavior will most effectively promote their strategies and their interests.³² Mearsheimer asserts the international system is based on anarchy, offensive power, a lack of certainty concerning the behaviour of other states, and individual states providing for their own survival. The result of these conditions is fear and security policies that, at minimum, secure the survival of the states and, at maximum, attempt to maximize relative power. This further results in the desire of each state to become the foremost power, which would be the most effective manner to ensure survival. These factors, taken together, create a situation where cooperation is limited and relative capabilities become the primary concern of a state.³³ The sole utility of NATO in this analysis is as an arena where the U.S. can act on its power or increase it.³⁴ Therefore, the U.S. security interest in Europe is to maintain its primacy and its sole reason for being in Europe, NATO, should reflect this interest.

NATO was essentially an American tool for managing power in the face of the Soviet threat. Now, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, realists argue that

³² John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994-95): 7-9.

³³ Mearsheimer, 10-12.

³⁴ Mearsheimer, 13-14.

NATO must either disappear or reconstitute itself on the basis of the new distribution of power in Europe.³⁵

If this is unacceptable to these states, they must compete against the power of the U.S.

Although less aggressive than Mearsheimer, Michael Mastanduno also proposes the importance of preponderance for the United States by maintaining its status as a unipolar power. He contends

In a unipolar world, threats to the United States are minimized and foreign policy autonomy is maximized. The most important prediction one can infer from the theory is that, as an overall strategy, the United States will attempt to prolong the 'unipolar moment.' We should anticipate the U.S. officials will pursue policies aimed at dissuading other states from rising to great power status and, singly or in combination balancing against the United States.³⁶

Thus, according to this view the United States is seeking to maintain unipolarity so it can maximize its autonomy in foreign policy and minimize threats. Mastanduno suggests the U.S. will pursue policies that dissuade other states from balancing against its power. An important aspect of encouraging states not to balance the U.S. is convincing them that America is not a threat and NATO plays an important role in behaviour that discourages balancing. By participating in NATO, the United States signals to other countries that it is willing to work with others and this in turn reassures allies in NATO, as this behaviour signals less threatening policies on the part of the United States.³⁷ In this way, the U.S. can convince other alliance members that there is no need to balance as American actions will work closely and consult with the policies and interests of other states.³⁸ A balance against the United States would undermine the U.S. goal of primacy. Mastanduno argues that the U.S. has followed a policy of preserving NATO and the multilateral cooperation

³⁵ Mearsheimer, 14.

³⁶ Mastanduno, 60.

³⁷ Mastanduno, 61-2.

³⁸ Mastanduno, 66.

this entails, in part, because it wishes to keep the potentially regional powers of Germany and Russia, which it has engaged through NATO programs, from challenging U.S. preponderance. Further, the United States has encouraged the forming of European army, so long as it remains subordinated in NATO to reduce impressions of U.S. threat while at the same time keeping potential European challenges to U.S. primacy at bay.³⁹ In sum Mastanduno contends,

Multilateral decision-making processes help the United States to exercise its dominant power with legitimacy. They are key instruments of state craft – indeed of *realpolitik* – for a dominant state that is seeking, in a unipolar setting, to convince other states to cooperate with rather than balance against it.⁴⁰

Therefore, according to this view the United States really has only one primary security in Europe, which is primacy. The U.S. uses NATO to achieve this end because this organization allows the U.S. not only maintain its preponderance by incorporating European security through a multilateral organization, but also to exercise its dominant power with the support of its allies in NATO, thus adding legitimacy to policy implementing actions. Further, by acting through an international organization, it reduces the perception of threat its massive power poses to other states. This reduces challenges to American primacy and promotes the U.S. interest of maintaining primacy. Those who contend the United States is seeking a position of preponderance assert that the U.S. can deal with its security concerns in Europe by maintaining its primacy on the continent and acting independently to promote its policies.

D. U.S. European Domination – Critical Perspective

Contrary to both the constructivist institutional and the liberal values approaches that view U.S. interests in the promotion of democracy and the subsequent creation of

³⁹ Mastanduno, 68-9.

⁴⁰ Mastanduno, 73.

stability, there are those who view U.S. security interests in Europe as a pursuit for domination, which entails an interest in instability. Brand-Jacobsen and Jacobsen argue that the causes of instability and violence are the dominant cultures and structures that govern international relations. These authors argue that most approaches to international security are primarily Western in their orientation and utilize a top-down elitist resolution to instability. This approach tends to marginalize and neglect alternate structures and communities, which could have a positive impact on dealing with instability.⁴¹ The authors further characterize this approach as a war culture that embodies power-driven aspiration.⁴² Rather than dealing with the causes of violence, which are based in power-driven structures that guide international relations, NATO creates stability by great power *diktat*, which does not actually create conditions of peace and, in fact, exacerbates the situation because it alienates vast swathes of any given population where the alliance is active, creating fertile soil for extremism.⁴³ Additionally, the authors contend that NATO action in Europe is little more than gunboat diplomacy by the world's last remaining superpower, the United States. The reality of NATO actions, and thus American actions, according to Brand-Jacobsen and Jacobsen, is any activity undertaken without United Nations consent contravenes international law developed by this organization, the only body that can legally sanction military action. Moreover, the calculus of NATO action (primarily driven by the United States) is not, as stated by member states, to create peace, but rather to further their own domination and great power pursuits which include

⁴¹ Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen and Carl G. Jacobsen, "Beyond Mediation: Towards More Holistic Approaches to Peacebuilding and Peace Actor Empowerment," in, *Transcend: Searching for Peace*, eds. Johan Galtung and Carl G. Jacobsen (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 232-3, 237.

⁴² Brand-Jacobsen and Jacobsen, "Beyond Mediation," 242.

⁴³ Brand-Jacobsen and Jacobsen, "Beyond Mediation," 242-3.

containing Russia and guaranteeing access to the Caspian Sea oil region.⁴⁴ In this way, the West (*viz.* the United States) forces its will on other states and instead of creating peace and security,

security institutions, which have existed in the past (some of which continue to this day), such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, can themselves be seen as having been (and continuing to be) direct threats to security. In so far as they served to divide the world, opposing 'blocs', to promote confrontation based on black/white, good vs evil, win/lose, zero-sum thinking, and to militarize their societies (and the world) to the point where mutual annihilation became an all too real possibility, they served, contrary to their own self-justification, not to increase security, but to promote *insecurity*.⁴⁵

Based on the above discussion, Brand-Jacobsen and Jacobsen describe U.S. interests as perpetuating a war culture for the purposes of fulfilling great power policies. Instead of contributing to peace and stability, NATO, in fact, perpetuates violent structures that exclude large portions of the world's population, which in turn perpetuates violence.

Where Brand-Jacobsen and Jacobsen describe international structures Noam Chomsky specifically describes U.S. actions and interests concerning NATO and its designs not only in Europe, but worldwide as well. Every occasion the U.S. acts militarily through NATO without the express consent of the UN, it is showing contempt for world order. In this way, Chomsky contends that NATO, controlled by the U.S., is threat to the world and a "rogue superpower."⁴⁶ Chomsky argues that the United States is a rogue state because it does not adhere to international laws that speak against aggression. Chomsky further states that NATO is simply a diplomatic cover for the United States to give multilateral credibility to actions that are designed to ensure its dominancy and to

⁴⁴ Brand-Jacobsen and Jacobsen, "Beyond Mediation," 244, 246.

⁴⁵ Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen and Carl G. Jacobsen, "Beyond Security: New Approaches, New Perspectives, New Actors," in, Transcend: Searching for Peace, eds. Johan Galtung and Carl G. Jacobsen (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 270. Emphasis in the original.

⁴⁶ Noam Chomsky, Rogue States: The Role of Force in World Affairs (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2000), 46-7.

promote the policies of the world's most powerful state.⁴⁷ Moreover, intervention into humanitarian crisis undertaken by the U.S. and NATO, in cases where action has been taken, is done because the economic interests of rich countries are being threatened.⁴⁸ NATO, although a multinational organization, is acceptable to U.S. power designs because it is under American control.⁴⁹ Chomsky's position regarding NATO is, "The U.S. made it clear a long time ago that it has total contempt for the institutions of world order, the UN, the World Court and so on...NATO at least has the advantage of being pretty much under US domination."⁵⁰ The central interests of the United States, then, are domination and destabilization that furthers American domination, and NATO is simply a tool to promote these interests. Therefore, from a critical perspective NATO should be disbanded because the purpose and reality of this organization is it promotes the interests of the rich and perpetuates a system of violence. It does not alleviate the security challenges in Europe because the U.S. is working to dominate Europe, an effort that seeks to alienate and suppress other countries. Therefore, NATO and U.S. domination in Europe destroy rather than build peace.

E. Anti-NATO - Restraint Perspective

The neo-isolationist perspective suggests that the real U.S. security interest in Europe is to disengage. These scholars argue that NATO saps American resources and for this reason, the U.S. should not participate. Proponents of this position assert that the United States should enormously scale back their international security commitments and let regions that are not of vital interest to the U.S. take care of their security issues

⁴⁷ Chomsky, *Rogue States*, 1-6, 37.

⁴⁸ Chomsky, "Kosovo," 264.

⁴⁹ Noam Chomsky, "Kosovo: The Truth According to Noam Chomsky," *The Ecologist* 29, no. 4 (July 1999) 264.

⁵⁰ Chomsky, "Kosovo," 264-5.

independently. One position from this perspective, elucidated by Eugene Gholz, Daryl Press and Harvey Sapolsky, states that the U.S. has little to gain and much to lose by being active in Europe. These writers argue the United States should commence a policy of military restraint, where the armed forces only act when the vital interests of the country are at stake, such as a direct attack on U.S. territory or an attempt to undermine the economic system of the United States.⁵¹ The importance of cutting the massive military budget is simple; freeing resources previously spent on the U.S. military machine and using these to alleviate the ills of American society could make the country stronger. They argue that inflated American spending in defense is due, in part, to free riding on the part of European states in NATO. In the opinion of these scholars, there is no real threat coming from Europe, particularly because decrepit Russia is currently in no position to threaten U.S. interests and does not look to have the capabilities to menace anytime soon. American presence on Europe is encouraging military adventurism and drawing the U.S. into conflicts, like Bosnia, where there is no real national interest at stake largely because the Europeans do not have the capabilities to conduct their own security operations and rely heavily on U.S. power. Gholz, Press and Sapolsky contend that an American withdrawal would force the Europeans up to speed, reducing their dependence on U.S. firepower, expertise and logistics.⁵² Furthermore, a large and active military presence on the continent faces the risk that others will attempt to balance due to anger and resentment directed at American primacy, possibly resulting in challenger to the United States in the Eurasian region.⁵³ In this way, American involvement in NATO

⁵¹ Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," *International Security* 21, no. 4 (Spring 1997): 6,8.

⁵² Gholz, Press and Sapolsky, 11-18.

⁵³ Gholz, Press and Sapolsky, 35-37.

not only takes resources away from national problems, which weakens the country, but also could result in an aggressive challenger reacting to U.S. adventurism.

Christopher Layne offers similar recommendations, but focuses more on international dynamics than on domestic issues. He argues that the rise of challengers to the United States is inevitable and American power has and will continue to decline in relative terms. Layne argues American involvement in Europe is difficult, dangerous and costly and for these reasons, the U.S. should disengage itself from Europe. Any involvement in Europe, according to Layne, are attempts to maintain hegemony, which is a self-defeating proposition as states will attempt to balance the power of the United States.⁵⁴ Additionally, the U.S. stands to gain because instead of acting as a balancer in Europe, other states will rise up, provide for their own defense and play the regional balancing role for the United States. Agreeing with Gholz, Press and Sapolsky, Layne contends the United States could cut military spending and conserve valuable resources, which could be put towards domestic economic improvement.⁵⁵ This disengagement has two other benefits in terms of international power. First, if the U.S. disengages itself from NATO, Layne contends there will be more options in the realm of security because there will be little strategic interdependence, which places constraints on the United States.⁵⁶ Second, Layne contends that the relative power of the United States *vis a vis* others in the international community would increase due to interstate competition among other states.⁵⁷ “Great powers that stand on the sidelines while their peers engage in security

⁵⁴ Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” *International Security* 22, no. 1 (Summer 1997): 87, 112-3.

⁵⁵ Layne, “From Preponderance,” 117-8.

⁵⁶ Layne, “From Preponderance,” 116.

⁵⁷ Layne, “From Preponderance,” 119.

competitions and conflict invariably gain in relative power.”⁵⁸ Therefore, these writers assert that the U.S. interest is primacy but this must be attained through a disengagement from Europe. This will free up resources to strengthen the U.S. domestically and while reduce the potential to international challenges to the United States, both factors that would promote American primacy.

⁵⁸ Layne, “From Preponderance,” 120.

CHAPTER III: COLLECTIVE STABILITY

This paper argues that U.S. security interests in Europe are to maintain its primacy and promote European stability. The above-described perspectives inadequately explain U.S. security interests in Europe and how NATO promotes these interests. This chapter will develop a different model of NATO's utility to the United States; *collective stability*, which allows it the benefits of shared costs and freedom of independent action as well as mitigates the conflict between the pursuit of primacy and stability. This model asserts that preponderance is the basis of American security policy in Europe, but offers a different interpretation than those previously presented.

Arguably, collective stability has been the tool of U.S. interest promotion in Europe since the end of the Cold War. The Soviet threat no longer exists so the United States has had to balance its interests primacy and stability in Europe without appearing threatening or too influential on the continent. The U.S. has interests in primacy so it can maintain its freedom to implement policies and wishes to promote stability so different states do not take independent action to regulate challenges to security, thus pre-empting U.S. action and influence. In addition to this, the U.S. must continue to economize its resources deployed for European interests with the means to promote its interests and security strategies in other parts of the globe. In an effort to appear less threatening to potential challengers, while at the same time economizing its resources, the United States has continued to promote its interests within NATO, but acts with considerable political advantage and leadership in the alliance. In an effort to expand its ability to influence and create stability in the region, the United States has sought to enlarge the NATO framework to include its formerly communist enemies, as well as using the alliance to

enforce stability during the violent dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, by acting within an institution, the United States has been able to share the costs of implementing its strategies, thus freeing up resources for strategic interests elsewhere. Thus, the nature of the American collective stability strategy in Europe is to expand the NATO framework and use the organization to enforce stability, while maintaining political influence to promote its strategies, without threatening would-be challengers, and free resources to promote its interests elsewhere in the world.

A. A Transaction Costs Model

At this time it is necessary describe the basis of the collective stability perspective with regards to the utility of NATO to the United States. As mentioned, this model assumes a realist interpretation of preponderance concerning U.S. strategies in Europe. “It is the testing of this rational hypothesis against actual facts and their consequences that gives meaning to the facts of international politics and makes a theory of politics possible.”¹ Because of this, it is necessary to determine the rationality, an important assumption of realism, of collective stability as a vehicle to promote national interest. A transaction costs model allows for such a test. This approach has been used to test other conceptions of institutions.² Although similar in principle to other uses of transaction costs, the model built in this paper will test the utility of the Atlantic alliance to fulfill the interests of individual countries, with a particular focus on the United States.

¹ Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 6th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1985), 5.

² Various authors have used a transaction costs model in various ways. Keohane and Martin use this tool to explain why states make the choices they do with regards to developing and joining institutions. Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) and Lisa Martin, “The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism,” in, Multilateralism Matters, ed. John G. Ruggie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 91-121. Weber uses transaction costs modelling to determine the degree of commitment allies have to each other within an alliance. Katja Weber, “Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: A Transaction Costs Approach to Security Cooperation,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (1997).

The transaction costs logic originates in microeconomic firm theory, first advanced by Ronald Coase in 1937. He contends,

A firm...[has] a role to play in the economic system if...transactions [can] be organized within the firm at less cost than if the same transactions were carried out through the market. The limit to the size of the firm...[is reached] when the costs of organizing additional transactions within the firm [exceed] the costs of carrying out the same transactions through the market.³

If the terms institution or organization substitutes for “firm” and international system replaces “market,” it is possible to use this model in the study of international relations.⁴

Broken down, this model has two parts. The first suggests that if there is a cost reduction in terms of economic and political resources to fulfill interests (transactions), then a state has incentive to act within an institution. However, if an institution or an organization grows either in member size or in institutionalized constraints, and the costs of carrying out these interests cost more economic and political capital than acting alone, the limits to the institution have been reached.

There are two main assumptions to this model, as modified to apply to international relations. The first is bounded rationality, which suggests that states will attempt to act rationally, but cannot act with perfect information and therefore what may seem like rational behaviour, is, in fact, irrational.⁵ The second assumption explains, in part, the first assumption because states will act in an opportunistic manner. “Promises to behave responsibly that are unsupported by credible commitments will not, therefore, be reliably discharged.”⁶ The non-aggression pact between the Soviets and Nazis is a good

³ Ronald Coase as quoted in Oliver E. Williamson, “The Logic of Economic Organization,” in, The Nature of the Firm, ed. Oliver E. Williamson (New York : Oxford University Press, 1991), 90.

⁴ The model discussed in this work relies heavily on microeconomic theories of the firm. The focus of this paper is on strategic political and security interests in international relations and for this reason economic terms and intents have been replaced with political counterparts throughout the work.

⁵ Williamson, 92.

⁶ Williamson. 92.

example of this. When the Nazis broke the pact, the Soviet Union was arguably worse off than if it would have been if it had allied against Germany from the start of the war. The non-aggression pact was, for all intents and purposes, a non-binding agreement with very little incentive to give credible information on the behaviour of a state. Russia acted with the assumption that Germany would not attack, but Germany reneged on the agreement when a suitable opportunity presented itself. Therefore, to avoid problems inherently resulting from imperfect information and opportunistic behaviour, it is in the interests of a state to work within an institution that can provide constraints on self-serving actions of other states that are detrimental to its own interests, while at the same time minimizing the negative affects of information limitations by sharing costs. Simply put, states can “organize [security] activity so as to economize on bounded rationality while simultaneously safeguarding the transactions in questions against the hazards of opportunism.”⁷ In this way, promoting state interests through institutions can be rational behaviour.

The discussion thus far has outlined the rationality of a security organization, but must study the transaction costs that institutions help mitigate. This paper will study two dimensions of transaction costs and, as outlined by Joskow, these include asset specificity and uncertainty.⁸ If an asset has very specific uses, it is likely that states will seek to minimize costs by institutionalizing, rather than procure the asset individually, especially if the cost of that asset is high.⁹ Military assets do not have any (legitimate) use outside the realm of protecting the security interests of a state and therefore have a high level of

⁷ Williamson, 93.

⁸ Paul L. Joskow, “Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships,” in, The Nature of the Firm, ed. Oliver E. Williamson (New York : Oxford University Press, 1991), 121.

⁹ Joskow, 121.

specificity. For this reason, to fulfill strategic interests states will institutionalize this cost because, “states have to fear opportunistic behaviour on the part of their allies – that is, that allies seek to cheat on their defence contributions or defect from the security arrangement.”¹⁰ In terms of political and security costs, stability is a very specific asset as it is not readily replaced; therefore if institutionalization promotes stability then states will seek to fulfill this interest through an organization.¹¹

Uncertainty is another transaction cost and the greater the uncertainty of security interests, the more likely states will institutionalize their security strategies.¹² Security, according to realist thought, is the most important interest a state needs to consider so it stands to reason that high levels of uncertainty in fulfilling this interest is unacceptable. Weber argues, “As the degree of uncertainty increases so does the likelihood that countries will create more binding security arrangements.”¹³ In short, states will enter security institutions with varying degrees of restrictions depending on the level of uncertainty in meeting security interests.

Therefore, if there are high transactions costs in terms of asset specificity and high levels uncertainty it is in the interests of a state to institutionalize its security strategies, which can help mitigate these costs. However, if institutionalization poses high restrictions on a state’s ability to act to promote its interests or the size of an institution renders it unruly and ineffectual, there is little incentive to join or continue membership in an institution and unilateral action is likely more effective. If institutionalization is

¹⁰ Weber, 532.

¹¹ Granted, there are degrees of stability, however, this work assumes stability to be indivisible and further supposes that the alternative is war. An in-depth discussion into the nature of stability is beyond the scope of this work.

¹² Joskow, 122.

¹³ Weber, 531.

more effective at promoting interests, then it is rational for states to enter a collective institution. Table 3.1 outlines four different scenarios that evaluate the utility of institutionalizing security strategy and a state's likelihood of an organization. Based on a transaction costs model, it appears that collective stability can be a useful security strategy to promote interests. Has the United States applied collective stability in Europe?

Table 3.1 – Utility of Institutions in Promoting Security Strategies

	Low Degree of Asset Specificity	High Degree of Asset Specificity
Low Degree of Uncertainty	Institutionalization unlikely, little incentive to join binding security organization	Likelihood of institutionalization variable - depends on economic resources required to meet interests
High Degree of Uncertainty	Likelihood of institutionalization variable - depends on level of challenge to security strategy and constraints on acting on national interest.	Institutionalization likely, great incentive to join binding security organization.

B. The Role of NATO in Promoting U.S. Interests in Europe

As mentioned, the strategy of the United States is to pre-empt challenges to its primacy and maintain stability in Europe. NATO is an important tool for promoting this goal. The United States has had political difficulties undertaking military action on its own for two main reasons. First, the U.S. public is unwilling to pay a substantial price in terms of blood and treasure lost to guarantee primacy and stability in Europe.¹⁴ Second,

The unilateralism implied by assigning primary responsibility for global security and stability to the United States without support from or regard for the perspective of regional allies is hardly consistent with the desire to exercise American power without arrogance and to pursue its interests without hectoring and bluster.¹⁵

¹⁴ Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Goldgeier, "Putting Europe First," *Survival* 43, no. 1 (2001) 79.

¹⁵ Daalder and Goldgeier, 72.

Unilateral action is unpopular with the European allies of the U.S., as they would have to follow a lead imposed by the United States, regardless of their own security interests.¹⁶ This could ostensibly lead to potential challenges to the U.S. if the challenge to European interests was sufficiently large. For these reasons, there is incentive to act within an institution because challenges to U.S. actions would likely impede its ability to act and the United States holds its blood and treasure dear and NATO reduces expenditures in these areas.¹⁷ This is the basis for why the Atlantic alliance is the focal point of U.S. policies on European security.

Furthermore, NATO provides a useful venue for continued U.S. influence over European policy, as the United States is the primary impetus driving the organization, and also ensures, to a certain degree, the sharing of military and financial burdens of guaranteeing security on the continent.¹⁸ More importantly, without NATO the United States would have neither the legal and political infrastructure nor the right to be in Europe, which would mean no military involvement with forces on the Continent without aggressive action or invitation to participate.¹⁹ Moreover, there is little need to act unilaterally in Europe as the United has maintained political dominance over the direction of the organization. An example to illustrate the above points are continued U.S. requests that the Europeans contribute more resources to NATO, while at the same time cautioning against policy that would undermine the alliance, and by extension,

¹⁶ Daalder and Goldgeier, 72.

¹⁷ This refers to U.S. action in Europe, the U.S. has shown that it can act outside of Europe with little European support in Afghanistan and more recently in Iraq.

¹⁸ The low European defence spending has been a long-running point of contention for U.S. policy makers, but European NATO members provide bases, soldiers and other military supplies. Although the U.S. pays the majority, it does not pay all of the costs, so there are savings for the United States. Furthermore, if NATO was not in place it is reasonable to expect the cost of engaging the security challenges in Europe would be substantially higher.

¹⁹ Sloan, 218-219, 228.

Washington's political leverage. "Washington has consistently urged its European allies to do more. But it has just as consistently warned them not to do so in ways that challenged NATO or in any other way weakened alliance unity."²⁰

In addition to the above-mentioned benefits, NATO alleviates the three main European security concerns described in chapter one. First, the presence of the United States in Europe adds a balancing affect to European powers and institutionalizes the armies of Western Europe into NATO. This allows the United States to influence the military policies of European states and, as it concerned with stability, can use this influence to reduce the risk of security competition. This suggests NATO is an important tool for placating potential challengers to U.S. preponderance and it reduces the economic and political cost to the United States of maintaining stability in Europe.

NATO also alleviates the challenge to stability coming from the eastern part of Europe in two ways; one is a carrot and the other is a stick. First, due to lingering fears of Russian *revanchism*, regional instability, and the increasingly slow EU expansion process, many of the states in CEE are clamouring to get into NATO.²¹ This provides an opportunity for the United States to influence the political reform and stability of transition countries. In order to become a NATO member, aspirants must be a stable democratic state, ensure individual liberties, have a free market, and have resolved external minority issues.²² "Enlargement's main goal is to extend the zone of stability and security further east by providing states in the region with incentive to undertake political, economic and military transitions necessary to become a part of the European

²⁰ Daalder and Goldgeier, 79.

²¹ Kay, 45.

²² Zlatko Isakovic, "NATO and South-Eastern Europe: Powerless of Powerfals and Power of Weak in Ethnic Conflicts," COPRI Working Paper 21 (Copenhagen: The Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 2001), 2.

mainstream of market democracies.”²³ In short, states must reform in manner consistent with the NATO framework or risk being left out the security that NATO provides. Second, if the lure of membership is not enough to promote European stability, NATO can use its military might to promote security interests, as was seen in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is important to note that even though NATO had expanded its framework, it was still able to act effectively in the Balkans, suggesting that current alliance size is not an impediment to effective action.²⁴ NATO enables the United States to link its military power with its interests of political reform in Europe, and for this reason can enforce these interests in countries that threaten European stability.²⁵

The United States, working through NATO, has been less successful placating Russian misgivings at promoting its interests in Europe due to Russian concerns over NATO activities in Bosnia and Kosovo or NATO expansion.²⁶ However, the U.S. has actively engaged Russia and has considered their concerns when making policy. The Russians have been included in NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program and Combined Joint Task Forces as well as having been granted special relationship status with the organization.²⁷ In this way, the United States has partially institutionalized Russia into the NATO framework by giving it a venue to express its concerns without seriously undermining the organization’s ability to act by giving it a deciding vote.

Undoubtedly, NATO is an important tool for the promotion of American interests in Europe. This organization provides a venue for the United States to exert influence on the security environment in Europe and mitigates the cost of ensuring this security. By

²³ Daalder and Goldgeier, 81.

²⁴ Jiri Sedivy, “The Puzzle of NATO Enlargement,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 22, no. 2 (2001): 1.

²⁵ Sloan, 220.

²⁶ Sedivy, 1, 7 and Sloan, 226.

²⁷ Kay, 46,58.

using NATO to implement its European security strategies, the United States also appears less threatening to would-be competitors, but at the same time has freedom of action because of its ability to influence NATO. In addition, it can spread its influence to Eastern European states who must adopt certain practices to join the organization, and if these states create regional instability, NATO provides the force necessary to ensure compliance with the European security strategies of the United States. Finally, by engaging Russia, the United States, through NATO partnership programs, is partly able to co-opt Russia into their European security strategy, without diluting its ability to act.

It is in this way that the NATO is pivotal in mitigating conflict between the U.S. interests of maintaining primacy and promoting stability. The organization relaxes tension among its members because action is done through a multilateral organization so behaviour is more transparent and there is a forum where weaker Europeans can attempt to influence the United States. However, the U.S. has decisive influence over NATO and can still act in an independent manner. Outright unilateralism is unnecessary for the United States because it is able to maintain its primacy through NATO and use this organization to promote stability in Europe. Apart from being the only venue for U.S. political action in Europe, this is why NATO is useful in promoting U.S. security interests in Europe.

With European stability strengthened, the U.S. has more freedom to use otherwise occupied for other regions of bigger concern to the grand strategy of the United States. Condoleezza Rice, President George W. Bush's national security advisor, has confirmed the current administration's desire to reduce its activities in Europe, leaving the

Europeans to supply personnel for extended peacekeeping missions.²⁸ These statements implicitly suggest that while Balkan instability occupies the Europeans, who would be doing the work determined through NATO, an institution heavily influenced by the U.S., the United States could act unilaterally in other areas of concern, without the constraints of institutionalization.²⁹ This is important as other areas arguably pose greater challenges to U.S. interests than European security concerns. East Asia; with North Korea's nuclear proliferation threat, Japan's regional influence and Chinese growing military and economic prowess, to name a few of the concerns; poses a greater challenge to U.S. strategies than integrating Europe.³⁰ In addition, one simply has to open newspaper to see that the security concerns in the Middle East are far greater than those in Europe. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict rages on, affects important U.S. relations with other states in the region, and this, in turn, inhibits its ability to promote its interests.³¹ Iraq, over a decade after the Gulf War, continues to concern American interests because of suspected terrorist links and weapons of mass destruction proliferation.³² Further, the Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, have governments that lack widespread legitimacy and an overthrow of these regimes risks fundamentalist rule hostile to the United States.³³ Undoubtedly, there are many regional challenges to the interests of the United States and the United States has been active in all these areas. However, maintaining stability in the various regions of the world cannot alleviate the greatest security threat to the United States. This threat is terrorism and rather than a war over territorial stability it is one over

²⁸ Michael R. Gordon, "Bush Would Stop U.S. Peacekeeping in Balkan Fights," New York Times, 21 October 2000: A.1.

²⁹ Daalder and Goldgeier, 71.

³⁰ Robert O'Brian, "Manifest Destiny and the Pacific Century: Europe as No.3?" in, The Transatlantic Relationship, ed. Jarrod Wiener (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 119-120.

³¹ "Too Bloody to Ignore," The Economist, 16 March 2002: 13

³² "George Bush and the Axis of Evil," The Economist, 2 February 2002: 13.

³³ "The Difficult Future of Holy Struggle," The Economist, 2 February 2002: 40.

ideas that has antagonists diffused around the globe with no territorial base.³⁴ Arguably, because of this the United States needs as many military resources as possible to exert influence in all corners of the globe. Europe, although an important ally to the United States, does not exhibit the same degree of security concern and uncertainty as many other parts of the world. American presence is needed in Europe but acting within an institutional venue heavily influenced by the United States fulfills U.S. interests and reduces the need to act unilaterally, which sets potential regional challengers at ease and frees up resources to use in the areas of described above. Powers on the continent currently accept this arrangement because Europe needs NATO to placate Russia, eliminate security competition, and fill the security vacuum in Eastern Europe, and NATO needs the United States to be credible as a military organization.³⁵

The nature of American collective stability strategy in Europe, as described above, is maintaining and expanding political influence in the region through the institutionalization of its security interests, which promotes its strategies of continental stability without threatening would-be challengers, while making resources available to promote its interests elsewhere in the world. Applying a transaction costs analysis provides rationale for this security model. Although the level of uncertainty in Europe is substantially less than that in other parts of the world, the asset specificity of military equipment and personnel is quite high, as is the economic resources to maintain and develop these resources. Therefore, membership in the alliance offers the United States the opportunity to economize its resources in Europe, thus better enabling it to pursue its interests elsewhere, without undermining its ability to promote its European interests.

³⁴ "What September 11th Really Wrought," *The Economist*, 12 January 2002: 24.

³⁵ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Policy Towards Bosnia, 30 November 1995 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 4.

Therefore, it is possible to argue that collective stability is the strategic policy currently pursued by the United States in Europe and this is a rational strategy it enables the U.S. to pursue the maintenance of primacy and the promotion of stability. However, this position adds to the disagreement over U.S. European security interests and NATO's capacity to promote these interests described in the previous chapter. To better explain U.S. interests and NATO's role in their promotion, it is necessary to turn this study's cases: military action in Bosnia and NATO expansion to see if U.S. behaviour can shed light on the different assertions.

CHAPTER IV: NATO MILITARY ACTION IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE

Perhaps the most obvious example of American actions to promote its goals of stability and primacy on the European continent has been its military involvement in Bosnia. There are three distinct periods of American involvement in this conflict which all exemplify the importance as well as the fact of U.S. primacy and stability in Europe. The first period describes the ineffectual effort of an independent European effort in alleviating the Bosnian conflict. This section will describe U.S. and European sentiments and interests in the conflict. The second period described below outlines U.S. actions that eventually brought an end to the interethnic conflict. Like the first section, this part will consider the reactions of European parties to U.S. involvement. Finally, the form of peace created and imposed by NATO will be examined.

A. American Inaction

In the early years of the war in Bosnia, American policy can be characterized by a lack of will. Warren Christopher, Clinton's first secretary of state, claimed that, "Bosnia was not central to American interests."¹ However, Secretary Christopher said this after a U.S. disagreement with France and Britain over how to prosecute an intervention in Bosnia. Europe had a strong interest in keeping U.S. involvement in the region limited. There are four reasons the EU, then the European Community (EC), wanted a role of primacy in dealing with the Bosnia. First, Bosnia offered an opportunity for a political show of unity in the post-Cold War era. Second, the ability to shape events in the Balkans would have provided international prestige for a region that was deepening its integration. Third, if the EC as an organization was not involved, Germany, acting in its

¹ Steven L. Burg, War or Peace? Nationalism, Democracy and American Policy in Post Communist Europe (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 105.

traditional sphere of influence may have acted unilaterally in Bosnia, thus derailing the common European political position that had been painstakingly achieved by the Vance-Owen peace proposal process for the region and potentially undermining the common EC approach. Finally, the EC was opposed to the use of force in the region and preferred traditional peacekeeping methods to achieve an end to fighting. This largely consisted of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), charged at that time with the duty of keeping the peace in Bosnia by ensuring 'Safe Havens,' or places of refuge for non-combatants.²

The Vance-Owen plan, mentioned above in the third point, needs to be touched on briefly, as it was the first major effort to settle the Bosnian dispute. This plan was the main EC initiative to resolve the conflict. The plan called for a system of seven to ten cantons, which would approximate an ethnic partition of the country. Rather than separate the country into three polities reflecting Serb, Croat and Bosniac divisions, this effort attempted to create a decentralized regional state with numerous multiethnic regional governments reliant on neighbouring and different ethnic regions. The Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban signed immediately, largely because the Croats had the most to gain territorially from the agreement. The Bosniac and Bosnian Serb leaders, Alija Izetbeovic and Radovan Karadzic, respectively, did not accept the proposed division of Bosnia. The Serbs, according to the plan, would have been territorially separated under the proposed agreement and the leadership found this unacceptable. The Bosniacs did not sign, in large part, because the U.S. viewed the initiative as less than favourable. The United States' cool reaction to Vance-Owen gave the Bosniacs hope that if they held out for more territory, eventually the U.S. would intervene militarily on behalf of Bosnia's

² Burg, 74.

Muslims.³ The result was a serious deterioration in U.S.-European relations and the failure of the Vance-Owen process. “The fall-out from the disagreements was to leave U.S.-European relations – especially U.S.-UK relations – in their worst conditions since the Suez crisis of the 1950s.”⁴ In essence, American involvement in the first attempts to create peace in the region resulted in the rejection of a European led initiative and exacerbated the tensions that ultimately resulted in what can be described as international inaction due to the bickering among the great powers.

There were other reasons for the lack of U.S. action in Bosnia apart from European efforts to control the process. The U.S. was in favour of a ‘lift and strike’ policy in Bosnia. The ‘lift’ portion of this policy referred to the United Nation Security Council’s resolution that imposed an arms embargo to the former-Yugoslavia region. The United States wanted to arm the Bosniacs so they could more effectively defend themselves against what the U.S. administration viewed as Serb aggression. The pressure for this was greatest in the U.S. Congress. London, Paris and the United Nations expressed deep concern about this, putting the Clinton administration in a difficult position *vis a vis* national and international pressures.⁵ The ‘strike’ segment referred to the use of NATO air strikes on Serb positions to intimidate the Bosnian Serbs into negotiations.⁶ However, because of European desire to handle the Bosnia situation on its own in a traditional peacekeeping manner and the fact that NATO bombing would have endangered European peacekeepers, the Europeans strongly opposed aggressive action of

³ James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 223-250.

⁴ Gow, 245.

⁵ Elaine Sciolino, “Defiant Senators Vote to Override Bosnian Arms Ban,” New York Times, 27 July 1995: A1.

⁶ Ivo Daalder, Getting to Dayton (Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2000), 12.

this nature.⁷ In addition, any NATO action would have resulted in a negative reaction by the Russians. Russia has traditionally been a Serb ally and this would have resulted in heightened east-west tension. The official Russian foreign policy line on Bosnia was to work exclusively through the United Nations Security Council.⁸ Further, if the United States would have acted unilaterally, there was a very real risk that NATO could have disbanded over the friction that would have been caused by the U.S. countering European wishes and carrying out air strikes.⁹ The European desire to regulate the Bosnia conflict itself, Russian wariness and the risk of NATO being disintegration resulted in U.S. inaction and a willingness to let Europe take care of the problem in the Balkan region.

What resulted from the different priorities of the Europeans, Russians and Americans was a five-nation contact group. Officials from Bonn, Moscow, London, Paris and Washington agreed to work together to find a solution to the ethnic strife tearing apart the region.¹⁰ Initially, the contact group had little to show for its efforts. There were attempts to implement a peace process similar to Vance-Owen, with Cyrus Vance being replaced by Thorvald Stoltenberg. There was a proposed Stoltenberg-Owen initiative, which separated Bosnia into two entities. This plan projected that one would be controlled by the Muslim-Croat federation and approximated 51 percent of the territory; the other would be a Serb entity comprising roughly 49 percent of Bosnia.¹¹ All parties duly rejected this initiative and the fighting continued.¹² In short, there was very little

⁷ Daalder, 7.

⁸ Barbara Crossette, "Yeltsin Attacks NATO Role on Bosnia," New York Times, 23 October 1995: A1

⁹ Michael Gordon, Douglas Jehl and Elaine Sciolino, "Conflict in the Balkans: The Policy; Colliding Missions-A Special Report: U.S. and Bosnia: How a Policy Changed," New York Times, 4 December 1994: A1, A20.

¹⁰ Gow, 156-7.

¹¹ Daalder, 28

¹² There were, in fact, nine different attempts to create peace in the region without the United States that ended in failure. It was only when the United States gave Bosnia-Herzegovina its full attention and effort

meaningful progress in creating peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Europeans wanted to make a political statement and were unwilling to risk the lives of peacekeepers on the ground and the Americans were reluctant to compromise their position with the EC and were averse to risking the dissolution of NATO over the Bosnia and Herzegovina crisis.

B. American Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In 1995, there was a shift in American policy regarding Bosnia. In late 1994, former-President Jimmy Carter had managed to negotiate a four-month cease-fire among the warring parties from 1 January 1995.¹³ Although the Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs had agreed to a cessation of violence, there were numerous violations of the truce over the four-month period.¹⁴ During this time, the Contact Group continued to push their American-backed plan and petitioned Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to take a more active role in prodding the Bosnian Serbs toward signing the proposal for Bosnia. The Contact Group held out a carrot for the Yugoslav president by offering to lift economic sanctions in exchange for signing the peace agreement, which required recognition of the state proposed by this group. President Milosevic refused to sign the proposal after numerous attempts to convince him to get on board.¹⁵

At the end of the four-month ceasefire, there was still no resolution to the Bosnia crisis. Diplomacy had repeatedly failed and to make matters work, Bosnian Serbs began

that the violent hostilities stopped. For a description on the various plans and negotiations see, Paul C. Szasz, "The Quest for a Bosnian Constitution: Legal Aspects of Constitutional Proposals Relating to Bosnia," *Fordham International Law Journal* 19, no. 2 (December 1995): 363-407.

¹³ Stephen Kinzer, "Bosnian Muslims Agree to Four Month Truce," *New York Times*, 1 January 1995: 18.

¹⁴ Roger Cohen, "A Fragile Truce in Bosnia: No Will or No Way," *New York Times*, 19 January 1995: A3. This is only one example of the many violations of the cease-fire that occurred. The Carter truce was more of a cooling off period and a de-escalation of violence, rather than a meaningful cessation of violence.

¹⁵ Steven Greenhouse, "Serbia Rejects New U.S. Plan On Bosnia War," *New York Times*, 23 May 1995: A6.

to shell UN safe havens.¹⁶ After months of lobbying the UN and its NATO allies, the U.S. finally gained acquiescence from these groups and began bombing Serb positions. The UN and other NATO countries, however, refused to authorize a sustained campaign.¹⁷ The United States, sticking by their proposed policy of 'lift and strike', continued to petition their allies and act in ways to buttress these actions, both through congressional attempts to lift the embargo and U.S. diplomacy on all fronts.¹⁸

The Serbs responded by intensifying attacks on UN 'safe havens' and upped the stakes further by holding UN peacekeepers hostage by chaining them to potential NATO targets.¹⁹ The United States, in turn, moved to mobilize troops in the area, while at the same time its NATO allies were reconsidering their efforts, due to the likelihood of further NATO strikes and the subsequent safety of their peacekeeper on the ground.²⁰ However, this did little to assuage the Bosnian Serbs offensive as their military actions against Bosniacs continued to intensify and the hostages remained in Serb control. The peacekeepers were finally released after the UN and NATO allies agreed to give up their protection of Sarajevo in exchange for the freeing of the hostages. The Serbs proceeded to bombard Sarajevo and other UN safe havens, including Srebrenica, which resulted in the town's capture and the massacre of thousands of Bosniacs.²¹

¹⁶ Roger Cohen, "Serbs Attack UN 'Safe Areas,' Killing Dozens," New York Times, 26 May 1995: A1, 8.

¹⁷ Daalder, 41.

¹⁸ Stephan Engelberg and Alison Mitchell, "A Seesaw Week for U.S. Policy in the Balkans," New York Times, 5 June 1995: A1,9 and Elaine Sciolino, "Defiant Senators Vote to Override Bosnian Arms Ban," New York Times, 27 July 1995: A1.

¹⁹ Alison Mitchell, "Clinton Defends NATO Air Strikes in Bosnia and Calls on Serbs to Free U.N. Hostages," New York Times, 27 May 1995: A4.

²⁰ Roger Cohen, "U.S. Set to Offer Aid to Reinforce UN Bosnia Troops," New York Times, 31 May 1995: A1, 8 and John Farnton, "Questions Over Mission in Bosnia: Peacekeeper Nations Rethink Aims," New York Times, 3 June 1995: A5.

²¹ Roger Cohen, "UN Gives Up Effort to Shield Sarajevo," New York Times, 19 June 1995: A1,7 and Chris Hedges, "Bosnian Serbs Overrun Town Protected by UN," New York Times, 12 July 1995: A1,6.

U.S. and European reaction to this was dismal. White House spokesman Michael McCurry lamented, "Clearly with respect to the protection of this particular eastern enclave, it has not been a good day," and a senior European was even more sullen characterizing the event as "the worst day in the war."²² Plans to deal with this growing situation were drawn up by the U.S., France and Britain. The French wanted to commit more troops to protect the remaining UN safe havens, the British preferred a policy of reinforcing the existing UN mission and the Americans, true to their original policy, suggested lifting the arms embargo as well as airlifting the UNPROFOR troops out of Bosnia and commencing a massive air strike operation.²³ Both the French and the British plan would require placing U.S. troops in harms way and the Clinton administration was unwilling to risk this action.²⁴

The fall of Srebrenica and the hostage taking appeared to be the turning points for American intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as other safe havens were being threatened. Two main events signaled this change. First, the United States, for the first time in the war, took the lead instead of suggesting that it was a European problem, as in the past. President Clinton sent high-ranking officials, his national security advisor Anthony Lake and Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff, to Europe stating that the United States was willing to act unilaterally in Bosnia. In fact, an official at the White House stated on 8 August 1995, "We need badly to get something done by September 1." Another official commented, "The time for seminars on Bosnia has long passed."²⁵

²² Eric Schmitt, "U.S. and NATO Face Unhappy Choices for the UN force in the Balkans," New York Times, 12 July 1995: A6.

²³ Daalder, 69-72.

²⁴ R.W. Apple Jr., "U.S., Rejecting French Plan Urges Air Attacks in Bosnia," New York Times, 20 July 1995: A1, A5.

²⁵ R.W. Apple Jr., "Clinton Sending Two Foreign Policy Advisers to Europe with New Proposals on Balkans," New York Times, 9 August 1995: A7.

Considering the U.S. never wavered on its policy of lift and strike the meaning was clear; if there was no agreement among U.S. allies in Europe the United States would act alone. After three weeks of pressuring the UN and the European NATO countries, the U.S. managed to secure the assent of these organizations to a bombing campaign in Bosnia.²⁶ Although the Europeans agreed to a NATO military attack against the Serbs, the Europeans continued to be wary of the armed offensive largely because the strikes did not have official UNSC sanction and was against their interests of a European led solution.²⁷ The U.S., however, wasted little time in carrying out its objectives. Demands to end the 40-month siege of Sarajevo were made again with the ultimatum of air strikes. The Serbs, as in the past, did not comply and on 5 September 1995, NATO resumed its bombardment of the Bosnian Serbs.²⁸

The other event that appeared to be a watershed for U.S. foreign policy in Bosnia was the Croat offensive against Croatian and Bosnian Serbs. Croatia proper was home to a Serb minority, concentrated along the border regions of the country in an area called the Krajina. Since 1991, the Serbs in this region had managed to create a *de facto* state that existed outside Croatian law. However, in early August 1995, the Croatian army launched an offensive, effectively taking back the Krajina. After regaining authority in territory that had, in effect, separated from their sovereignty, the Croat army, along with their Bosnian Croatian counter-parts and the Bosniacs, who had entered into a federation

²⁶ Stephen Engelberg, "How Events Drew U.S. into Balkans," New York Times, 19 August 1995: A1, 4 and Steven Greenhouse Response to Shelling: A Knife Edge Decision," New York Times, 30 August 1995: A8.

²⁷ Barbara Crossette, "Yeltsin Attacks NATO Role on Bosnia," New York Times, 23 October 1995: A1 and Daalder, 119.

²⁸ Roger Cohen, "NATO Resumes Bombardment of Serbs," New York Times, 6 September 1995: A1,12.

with the Bosnian Croats, continued their attack into Bosnia.²⁹ In addition to not criticizing this offensive, there are some reports that suggest the U.S. aided in the planning process.³⁰ Further, the U.S. later admitted that they had allowed Iranian arms smugglers into Croatia and Bosnia, even though there was a UN arms embargo in place, making the embargo ineffective, reflecting U.S. interests of “lift and strike”.³¹ The Croat army moved quickly and managed to take positions long held by Serbs. What resulted was a drastic shift in the balance of power in a country where the Serbs had continually held the upper-hand in military and territorial strength. Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. chief negotiator in the region, asserted, “the Croatian offensive was valuable to the negotiating process. The time would come when a cease-fire was desirable, but right now the trend on the battlefield was, for the first time, favouring the Bosnians.”³²

With the duo pressures of the NATO bombing and Croat-Bosniac gains, the Serbs, along with the other parties agreed to come back to the bargaining table and the U.S., lead by Holbrooke, continued to push for peace.³³ After two months of talks, the parties moved the process to Dayton, Ohio and on 21 November 1995 President Tudjman of Croatia, President Milosevic of Yugoslavia, and President Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the Dayton Peace Accord. Warren Christopher, U.S. Secretary of State, also signed the agreement on behalf of the United States and President Clinton pledged troops to a NATO operation that, under U.S. command, would keep peace in

²⁹ Craig R. Whitney, “Bosnian Muslims and Croats Reaffirm Their Federation,” New York Times, 6 February 1995: A3.

³⁰ Roger Cohen, “Cautiously Clinton Backs Croatian Goals,” New York Times, 6 August 1995: A9.

³¹ Elaine Sciolino, “US Defends its Silence on Tehran’s Arms Smuggling to Bosnia,” New York Times, 16 March 1996: A5.

³² Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), 86.

³³ Elaine Sciolino, “U.S. Envoy Highlights Fine Print on Bosnia,” New York Times, 13 September 1995: A10.

Bosnia and Herzegovina.³⁴ In this way, the United States, through NATO, not only played a role in the development of peace, but also took the lead and underwrote the success of the whole process.

C. The Dayton Peace Agreement

The United States led the diplomatic and military efforts in Bosnia resulting in the Dayton Peace accord. The Dayton Peace Agreement attempted to create conditions of stability with various annexes delineating these principles. Annex three of the Dayton agreement is a clear indication of the importance placed on free elections to the process of creating stability. This annex states:

The Parties shall ensure that conditions exist for the organization of free and fair elections, in particular a politically neutral environment; shall protect and enforce the right to vote in secret without fear or intimidation; shall ensure freedom of expression and of the press; shall allow and encourage freedom of association (including of political parties); and shall ensure freedom of movement.³⁵

Not only does this annex ensure elections, but it also encourages the development of civil society through the encouragement of political and other associations. True to the letter of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia held its first post-war elections in September 1996. "The agreement....empowered the OSCE to certify whether 'social conditions' for 'effective' elections existed, and then to administer the elections themselves. Under considerable pressure from the United States on June 25, 1996, the OSCE certified that these conditions existed...."³⁶ This statement shows that the United

³⁴ Elaine Sciolino, "Accord Reached to End the War in Bosnia; Clinton Pledges U.S. Troops to Keep Peace," New York Times, 22 November 1995: A1,10.

³⁵ Office of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia, 14 November 1995, United Nations, 15 October 2001, <<http://www.ohr.org>>.

³⁶ Roland Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," International Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 72.

States placed a high priority on elections in Dayton and pushed for these provisions of the agreement to happen as quickly as possible.

In addition to democratic development and elections, Dayton sought to create conditions conducive to a free market economy. Annex four, arguably the most important of the agreement, is the constitution of Bosnia. Within this annex, there are numerous references to the development of a market economy. The preamble to the constitution states that this document is, “Desiring to promote the general welfare and economic growth through the protection of private property and the promotion of a market economy.”³⁷ Article one adds to the general terms mentioned in the preamble, as it ensure the free movement of goods, capital, people and services within the country and article two, which enumerates citizen rights, offers a guarantee of property ownership.³⁸ The goals of economic liberalization were to create a single economic space in Bosnia, to improve the business environment thorough economic reform and restructuring, promote privatization of socially owned industries and promote social sector reforms.³⁹ These initiatives were in place to create a unified Bosnian state with free markets. To ensure these reforms, the United States used the IMF and World Bank to develop these economic institutions.⁴⁰ Economic liberalization has been an important outcome of the

³⁷ The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia, <<http://www.ohr.org>>.

³⁸ The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia, <<http://www.ohr.org>>.

³⁹ The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia, <<http://www.ohr.org>>.

⁴⁰ Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” 58 and Roland Paris, “Wilson’s Ghost: The Faulty Assumptions of Postconflict Peacebuilding,” in, Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela R. Aall. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 774. Paris argues that although it is possible to imagine a democratic system without a free market, such an arrangement has never existed. He further argues that it is unlikely to exist based on the difficulty of ensuring political liberty, yet restricting economic freedom.

Dayton agreement. The United States has made this a policy priority and has gone to great lengths to influence the direction and rapid pace of economic liberalization.⁴¹

Other annexes within the Dayton Peace Agreement promoted power sharing. Dayton ensured two main provisions for stability including political guarantees and ethno-territorial separation. Annex four outlined the political arrangements in Bosnia. This annex split Bosnia into two entities, within one country; one comprised of the Croat-Muslim federation and the other of the Serb Republic. Bosnia's legislative branch of government was to be a bicameral parliamentary assembly. Ethnic division characterized the upper house, with each group receiving one third of the seats. The lower house is similar, but the Muslim-Croat federation is a single unit (instead of two as in the upper house) and receives two-thirds of the seats and the Serb Republic one-third. The executive branch is also an ethnic affair as citizens elect three presidents, one from each ethnic group. The individual with the most votes becomes the chair, but there must be consensus to make a decision. If a decision made harms the vital interests of an ethnic group, that group can exercise a veto. The president must disagree with his or her colleagues and get the support of two-thirds of the representatives in parliamentary assembly. Further, ethnic groups, in part, also choose the judiciary.⁴²

In addition to political safeguards for the three ethnic groups, Dayton, in annex two, codified a territorial division as well, which roughly mirrors the ethnic divisions that were determined by the war.⁴³ Although the agreement separated the ethnic groups into rough territorial units, annex seven guaranteed the right for refugees to return to their

⁴¹ Michael Pugh, "Protectorates and Spoils of Peace – Interethnic Manipulations of Political Economy in Southeast Europe," COPRI Working Papers no. 36, November 2000, Copenhagen Institute of Peace, 15 November 2001, <<http://www.copri.dk/publications/WP/WP%202000/36-2000.doc>>.

⁴² United Nations, The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia.

⁴³ The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia.

prewar homes and receive compensation for losses incurred during the war. This annex states

all refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them. The early return of refugees and displaced persons is an important objective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴⁴

Caplan argues it is important that refugees return to their pre-war homes because public security and the resettlement of refugees is linked. If refugees are not returning home, the reason is likely ethnic intimidation, which adversely affects public security.⁴⁵ Arguably, threats to public security undermined conditions for stability and Dayton explicitly sought to create an environment where refugees can return to prewar homes.

Although the structures implemented by NATO and other international bodies appear to focus heavily on a Bosnia democracy and free market, Bosnia stability is still heavily dependent on U.S. leadership. NATO military leadership, which enforces Dayton, is under the command of the United States. In addition, the United States has a *de facto* veto over the decisions taken by both the IMF and the World Bank, the bodies that control the economic reforms in Bosnia. Further, the United States was able to pressure the OSCE to hold election according to the U.S. agenda, not the OSCE's. In this way the United States has been able to direct the agenda of Dayton during its implementation. Furthermore, Daalder argues that the United States has reduced the power of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the office that was initially set up as a tool for organizing civilian efforts at maintaining peace and reconstructing Bosnia.

⁴⁴ The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia.

⁴⁵ Richard Caplan, "A New Trusteeship? The International Administration of War-torn Territories," Adelphi Paper 341 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), 36.

Once it was clear that a European rather than an American would be the first High Representative, American negotiators worked hard to limit the authority and responsibility of the High Representative for fear that a powerful person whom Washington could not control might fumble the implementation effort, or interfere with the military effort.⁴⁶

Pauline Neville-Jones, Britain's negotiator at Dayton observed that the high representative "is not fully responsible to any body of uncontested international authority and operates in a uncomfortable and unconvincing limbo."⁴⁷ Moreover, the OHR, responsible for organizing civilian implementation of the agreement, has no military power to enforce its initiatives. NATO, the military force backstopping Dayton, is not under the authority of the OHR and is free to choose which policies it wishes to enforce.⁴⁸ This allows NATO, and thus the United States, considerable influence over which OHR policies it wishes to implement.

⁴⁶ Daalder, 157.

⁴⁷ Pauline Neville-Jones, "Dayton, IFOR and Alliance relations in Bosnia," *Survival* 38, no. 4 (Winter 1996-97): 51-52.

⁴⁸ Daalder, 155..

CHAPTER V: NATO EXPANSION INTO CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

The United States and NATO have methods of creating stability other than those that rely on force. As opposed to the military involvement in Bosnia, NATO expansion has been used as a carrot to entice political and economic reforms in CEE suitable to U.S. European security interests in exchange for NATO membership. In examining this second case of major NATO activity in the post-Cold War era, three sections will be included in this chapter. First, it is necessary to examine the interests of major NATO allies who have been affected by NATO expansion to understand the behaviour of the U.S. *vis a vis* its NATO counterparts. Second, the process of enlargement also needs examination. These processes include the driving forces behind expansion, agendas and timelines as well as requirements for entry; this section will outline American interests, as this is the United States was the most influential in the expansion process. Finally, it is necessary to study the political and security effects of NATO expansion in terms of Western European reaction, behaviour of NATO candidate states and Russian relations to the West in light of the broadening alliance. These three sections are instructive in determining U.S. interests because its behaviour can be examined and from this behaviour it will be possible to explain U.S. interests.

A. Interests

At the end of the Cold War, there was very little European interest in expansion of the organization. Britain, arguably interested in maintaining the status quo, was ambivalent towards the idea of adding new members to the Alliance. Most states, including the relatively powerful Italians and French, were against expansion. The only

staunch supporters of expansion were Iceland and Germany.¹ This broadly describes the sentiments and interests of European allies in NATO, but this work will focus specifically on the interests of Britain, France and Germany.² Britain, to begin with, has had three main interests that appear to have their foundations in cautious pragmatism. First, London was opposed to the first NATO expansion of the post-Cold War era, which was the unification of Germany.³ The reason for this was clear; a unified Germany is more powerful and more difficult to keep in check militarily, politically and economically. Obviously, the desire to stop unification was futile and this unrealistic interest was unfulfilled. Second, Britain has been ambivalent towards a growing NATO because it fears the alliance will lose its military integrity. By adding economically poor countries with relatively backward militaries, London worries that the alliance will become ineffective.⁴ Finally, Britain has concerns about Russian reaction to enlargement and does not want to damage its and NATO's relationship with this country, especially considering the relatively warm relations between these countries.⁵ Therefore, although not explicitly opposed to expansion, Britain has been cautious over the issue of NATO enlargement.

France, however, has worked the hardest of all European States to thwart efforts to expand the alliance. Like the British, French officials were against the reunification of Germany arguably for the same reasons as Britain.⁶ French opposition to the expansion of the alliance went much further than simply keeping Germany as a reduced power as Paris

¹ Steven Lee Meyers, "U.S. Now at Odds with NATO allies on New Members," New York Times, 30 May 97: A1,9

² The reason for focusing on Britain, France and Germany is these three states are the most powerful on the continent and for this reason have the most ability to influence the direction of the alliance.

³ William G. Hyland, "NATO's Incredible Shrinking Defence," in, NATO Enlargement: Illusions and the Reality, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry (Washington, D.C.: The Cato Institute, 1998), 33.

⁴ Sedivy, 8.

⁵ Sedivy, 8-9.

⁶ Hyland, 33.

was also concerned about expanded U.S. influence over European security affairs. After the Cold War, France was hoping to negotiate a new relationship with the United States, reducing the superpower's influence and developing a unified Europe into an autonomous world power capable of balancing against the United States.⁷ France spearheaded an initiative in the early 1990's to create a German-French lead Eurocorps that would operate independently of NATO and the United States.⁸ More recently, French efforts have focused on creating the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), a body that is subordinate to NATO, but made up of exclusively European forces.⁹ Additionally, France attempted to take a larger role in the reform of NATO by rejoining joint command structure in exchange for giving the French a larger role in the management of NATO's Mediterranean duties, and the reducing the role of the Americans.

The French government says that, since NATO is supposed to become more European, and since a European-led sub-command is to go, the Americans should give up the Naples job [Mediterranean command]. The Americans reply bluntly that, if Naples is the price of France rejoining, it had better stay out.¹⁰

Further, France has attempted to slow the pace of NATO enlargement by attempting to link expansion with similar processes by the EU. This, obviously, has failed as well as alliance enlargement has continued.¹¹ Finally, France has sought to balance NATO and U.S. influence by embracing the Gaullist dream of a Europe from the Iberia to the Urals by giving support to a strengthened Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

⁷ Marie-Claude Plantin, "NATO Enlargement as an Obstacle to France's European Designs," in, The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia and European Security, ed. Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Levesque (Montreal, PQ: McGill-Queens University Press, 1999), 95-7.

⁸ Benjamin Schwarz, "NATO Enlargement and the Inevitable Costs of American Empire," in, Illusions and the Reality, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry (Washington, D.C.: The Cato Institute, 1998), 65.

⁹ Plantin, 99.

¹⁰ "War Over Naples," The Economist, 30 November 1996: 46.

¹¹ Plantin, 100.

(OSCE). By giving this separate organization a higher standing and more influence, the French were hoping to create a system similar to the UN Security Council, where all larger powers would have an equal say and add another security option for Europe apart from NATO. This idea, like the other French initiatives to limit U.S. power on the continent, has been a non-starter.¹² In general, France's reaction to the entire NATO reformation was, "Indignant rhetoric [that] was wont to proclaim that no fundamental shift was underway, and to emphasize the need for Europe to acquire an autonomous defence capability – autonomous, that is, with regard to the United States and NATO."¹³ Therefore, French opposition, although thwarted at every turn, has been based on a distrust of expanded American influence and a desire to negotiate a new European security landscape where it would have more influence.

As opposed to Britain and France, Germany had an interest in expanding the NATO framework to include those formally communist countries on its eastern border.¹⁴ In the post-Cold War era, Germany has had security worries concerning its eastern border due to fears of instability in the CEE region. Before a discussion of German security interests is undertaken, it is important to examine the potential security morass of CEE. Central and Eastern Europe could be destabilized in a variety of ways involving numerous states. Hungary, pledging to protect Hungarians not only in Hungary proper but also in its diaspora, has had cool relations with Romania, Yugoslavia and Slovakia over the treatment of Hungarian minorities living in these states. Further, Romania has territorial issues with Moldova and Ukraine, which could result in regional instability as

¹² Plantin, 106-7.

¹³ Anand Menon, "From Independence to Cooperation: France, NATO and European Security" *International Affairs* 71, no. 1 (1995): 26-27.

¹⁴ The desire to unify with Eastern Germany need not be examined in a discussion of NATO enlargement, as clearly there would have been little, if any, German opposition to this.

well as bring Russia into any potential conflict. Additionally, Poland's porous eastern border is also a concern as Belarus, with its authoritarian president Alexander Lukashenko, is susceptible to civil unrest. Furthermore, Russian and Belarusian authorities have recently committed to closer ties, which could bring Russian power further west than it currently is. Finally, although there are few security concerns from the Czech Republic, there is tension over the German population transfers out of the western part of this country in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.¹⁵ In fact, countries in the region have their own security doubts, stemming from fears of both regional instability and a *revanchist* Russia. This is reason CEE countries wanted a NATO expansion with institutional "tripwires," meaning NATO (American) troops stationed in new-member countries so the U.S. would be forced to act if these countries came under attack.¹⁶ Although all of these countries do not directly touch its borders, it is difficult to imagine that instability in any of these countries would not have adverse effects on Germany. Therefore, the German state has clear security doubts concerning CEE and has an interest in an alleviation of these problems.

Due to these concerns, Germany had an interest in an institutional response to regulate the security fears generated by CEE. If there was no instructional response to this potential for instability, such as EU or NATO expansion, Germany arguably would have had to act unilaterally, which could have led to uneasiness among allies in Europe,

¹⁵ Barbara Conry, "New Problems for NATO: Potential Conflicts Involving the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland," in, Illusions and the Reality, eds. Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry, 71-83 (Washington, D.C.: The Cato Institute, 1998), 73-74 and Jane M.O. Sharp, "The Case for Opening NATO to the East," in, The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia and European Security, ed. Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Levesque (Montreal, PQ: McGill-Queens University Press, 1999), 27.

¹⁶ Ted Galen Carpenter, "Strategic Evasion and the Drive for NATO Enlargement." In, NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality, eds. Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry (Washington, D.C.: The Cato Institute, 1998), 27.

as well as from Russia.¹⁷ Germany, recognizing the role Russia has in promoting stability in Europe and its involvement in the reunification process, has been careful not aggravate Russian sensitivities.¹⁸ For these reasons, Germany wished for an institutional solution to questions of stability to its east. However, although some argue that EU expansion would have been much more effective at creating stability. "In our view, it would have been preferable not to invite more countries to join NATO. At the very least it would be desirable for the European Union to process with its planned expansion before NATO completes its acceptance of new members."¹⁹ However, the European Union was too occupied with its failure on Bosnia, its development of political and economic processes of the organization and monetary union to focus on effective ways to bring in new members that would have given more stability to the CEE region.²⁰ This left NATO to fill the security vacuum; the only organization that was willing to fill this role and operate with credibility.²¹ With NATO expansion, concerns about CEE stability could be alleviated without Germany having to act on its own. Further, its positive contacts with Russia have also aided the Russian-NATO relations, which can only help European security.²² There is a further geopolitical benefit to NATO expansion for Germany. With the addition of CEE countries, the eastern border of the alliance is no longer the German

¹⁷ James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When? The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1999), 12.

¹⁸ Paul Letourneau and Phillipe Hebert, "NATO Enlargement: Germany's Euro-Atlantic Design," in, The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia and European Security, ed. Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Levesque (Montreal, PQ: McGill-Queens University Press, 1999), 111.

¹⁹ Howard Baker Jr. et al. "NATO: A Debate Recast," New York Times, 4 February 1998: A23.

²⁰ Richard Holbrooke, "Correspondence," World Policy Journal 14, no. 4 (Winter 1997/98): 100 and Goldgeier, 31.

²¹ Jane M.O. Sharp, 27-34.

²² Asmus, Ronald D., Richard L. Kugler and Stephen F Larrabee, "Building a New NATO," Foreign Affairs, 72 (September/October 1993): 31-32.

frontier, but rather the eastern reaches of Poland and the Czech Republic.²³ Thus, Germany had much to gain through NATO expansion and supported enlargement, but was cautious over Russian reaction. Therefore, it can be said that the main European powers in the Atlantic alliance have definite interests in the direction and shape of NATO. The preceding exercise is important because if there was a conflict between U.S. and European interests, there may have been a threat to U.S. primacy or stability in the region. At this time, it is necessary to examine the processes of NATO enlargement to determine which interests have been served.

B. Process of Expansion

The process of NATO expansion was one that lasted most of the 1990's. In the immediate aftermath of the fall of communism, there was little support for any NATO expansion. The Europeans (save for Germany, which was initially lukewarm towards enlargement due to fears of Russian reactions but shortly became a strong supporter) and the Americans were against the idea of adding new members to the alliance.²⁴ In fact, in early 1990, then Secretary of State James Baker stated, "There is no intention of extending the NATO area to the East."²⁵ Although there was reluctance to expand NATO, as there was fear of Russian reaction and reducing the efficacy of the alliance, the United States was interested and strongly committed to eliminating the power vacuum in CEE that could contribute to instability in the region as well as ensuring its influence in the European theatre.²⁶ In an effort to alleviate security concerns in this potentially unstable area, the U.S. commenced several programs that fell well short of NATO

²³ Letourneau and Hebert, 110.

²⁴ Hyland, 35.

²⁵ James Baker, quoted in Goldgeier, 15.

²⁶ Sloan, 218, 222.

membership, but engaged the countries of the CEE region and the former Soviet Union. This process of engagement led to the creation of several consultative bodies that shaped U.S. policy and paved the way for NATO expansion. In 1991, NATO developed a consultation body, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which acted as a mechanism that established links between NATO and formerly communist countries. These links were largely political in nature and were developed to facilitate security cooperation among the participating countries. In 1997, the NACC became the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The purpose of this newly named council was similar to the NACC, but embodied a deeper level of cooperation on political and security measures.²⁷

Another important body that functioned as way to engage formally communist countries was the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Initiated in January 1994, this body's goal is to "reinforce stability and security across Europe."²⁸ Much like the EAPC, this body is a venue for consultation and political cooperation. In addition to these functions, the PfP also provides a framework for joint military training operations among participating countries. Further, this body has also served a preparatory function for the new NATO entrants: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.²⁹ The PfP was developed in response to growing pressure from CEE countries, which wanted the assurance of NATO membership to shore up their security concerns. However, there was strong Russian pressure against NATO expansion to include countries that had been in the Warsaw Pact. The PfP was intended to be a compromise that would engage CEE with NATO, without

²⁷ L'Organisation du Traite de la Atlantique-Nord, Manuel de l'OTAN (Bruxelles, Belgique: Bureau de l'information et de la presse de l'OTAN, 2001), 18-20.

²⁸ Manuel de l'OTAN, 74.

²⁹ Manuel de l'OTAN, 74-77.

alienating Russia. Further, the partnership also gave the U.S. administration under Clinton the opportunity to put off a decisive decision on NATO enlargement, giving it time to flesh out its policy on both Russian misgivings toward alliance expansion and how to deal with the security vacuum in CEE, or the opportunity to forego enlargement altogether.³⁰

However, CEE countries, particularly Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, were not impressed with the PfP, as they viewed this organization as a measure to keep them out of NATO. In fact, President Lech Walesa of Poland stated, “It is difficult for me to hide my doubts and reservations....The idea of a divided and confrontational Europe has revived.”³¹ The passion for NATO entry impressed the Clinton administration. This passion coupled with growing support in the domestic political landscape, gave impetus to quicker and more decisive action by United States.³² These factors, along with the interest in maintaining stability in CEE, led to serious U.S. efforts to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in the NATO framework at the start of 1995.³³ Finally, at the 1997 Madrid conference, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were formally invited to join the alliance and, in 1999, formally entered NATO.³⁴ This expansion effort was, for the most part, solely the initiative of the U.S., and as mentioned above, was against the desires of many of the European states in NATO. Therefore, approximately ten years after the end of the Cold War, and after the creation of consultative bodies that

³⁰ Goldgeier, 24-45.

³¹ Lech Walesa, quoted in Goldgeier, 55.

³² President of the United States, “The President’s News Conference,” 17 June 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1993, Book 1, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994) 868-69 and Goldgeier, 56.

³³ Sedivy, 5.

³⁴ Manuel de l’OTAN, 67-71.

offered little security assurance to CEE, NATO, at the behest of the United States, expanded to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

Throughout the process of expansion, Russia attempted to influence the process. There were serious misgivings on the part of Russia towards NATO enlargement resulting in serious tension with the alliance. Although the United States and NATO has considered Russian reaction and interests, Secretary of State Colin Powell succinctly summed up U.S. sentiments and behaviour towards Russia, "Our relations with Russia must not be dictated by any fear on our part. If we believe the enlargement of NATO should continue....-and we do- we should not fear that Russia will object."³⁵ Secretary Powell's statements are clearly supported by the NATO activity described above in face of great Russian opposition to alliance expansion. Initially there was little U.S. interest in NATO expansion. This sentiment relieved the Russians greatly because of the security threat they perceived from an expanded NATO.³⁶ Because the Russians believed there was little U.S. interest to expand the Atlantic alliance, Russia was initially supportive of U.S. and NATO efforts to slow expansion with the development of the PfP. In fact, the Russians viewed NATO's limited eastward movement that focused on the PfP as a great foreign policy success and a positive development in the relations between the West and Russia.³⁷ Moscow developed these sentiments largely because the U.S. gave little indication that it had designs other than the PfP initiative. In fact, even Western European allies were surprised at the insistence of the U.S. to expand.³⁸ The explicit decision to expand NATO resulted in hostile Russian opposition and relations between NATO and

³⁵ Colin Powell, quoted in Sedivy, 7.

³⁶ Goldgeier, 15.

³⁷ Martin Walker, "Clinton's Great Successes," *Washington Post*, 4 September 1994: C1.

³⁸ Craig R. Whitney, "Why Europe is Careful not to Scold the Bear," *New York Times*, 2 January 1995: A6.

Russia deteriorated to the point where Russia refused to sign the PfP agreement and attacked NATO's new expansionist direction and the West in general.³⁹ Russia-NATO relations did manage to improve as NATO forged a new relationship with Russia. In the same year Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were invited to join the alliance, NATO and Russia formed the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, which was

established as a means of facilitating regular consultation and discussion of security matters...[ranging] from peacekeeping in the Balkans, crisis management and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to defence conversion, environmental protection and civil emergency planning.⁴⁰

In short, in an effort to alleviate the negative effects of NATO enlargement and to promote better relations between the alliance and Russia, NATO developed another consultative body as a parallel process to expansion.

C. The Effects and Potential Problems of NATO Expansion

Although the United States pushed through its agenda to enlarge NATO, there has been opposition in Europe. There was little support from the European allies in NATO for the process of alliance expansion. France in particular was against the strong and largely independent efforts of the United States. Even when the French attempted to work within the NATO expansion framework, they were rebuffed. During the initial expansion process, Paris worked hard to include Romania and Slovenia in the list of invitees, but this process was vetoed by the United States.⁴¹ The unilateral initiatives by the United States led some French officials to question, "When exactly the Americans go from

³⁹ Goldgeier, 85.

⁴⁰ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO in the 21st Century (Brussels, Belgium, NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 11.

⁴¹ Plantin, 103

leadership to hegemony?”⁴² In fact, Germany, a strong supporter of NATO expansion, along with the rest of Europe expressed disgruntlement at the fact that United States did not consult its allies, but simply negotiated alliance enlargement and presented NATO members with a choice.⁴³ As mentioned above, there have been efforts to create a Euro defence apart from NATO that have failed, but in 1999, the Western European Union (WEU) the defence arm of the EU, initiated the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). This defence body, at this time, is subordinate to NATO, but it is an independent European military effort.⁴⁴ There is little to suggest this independent effort is in response to the unilateral behaviour of the United States, but this does suggest European allies in NATO are beginning to take a stronger interest in developing a capacity to provide for their own defence, which could prove problematic for the U.S. in future involvement in Europe. In short, and most importantly, the unilateralist efforts to expand NATO by the United States have led to misgivings on the part of its European allies.

There has also been criticism directed at NATO expansion regarding the commitment of the United States and its European allies in defending the states of CEE. Ted Galen Carpenter argues that the defence of CEE would require immense resources in terms of costs (military personnel and/or weaponry, potentially nuclear) or credibility if NATO countries would prove unwilling to come to aid of new member. He further argues that credibility is likely the biggest concern because during the Cold War, Western countries were unwilling to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary and

⁴² Steven Erlanger, “Yeltsen Basks at Summit; Some Europeans are Cool to the U.S.” New York Times, 30 May 1997: A6.

⁴³ Goldgeier, 85.

⁴⁴ Manuel de l’OTAN, 107-110.

are unlikely to do so now.⁴⁵ Further, William Hyland states that the new members, let alone prospective members, cannot be credibly defended by NATO because the resources simply do not exist right now and are unlikely to be devoted to CEE defence in the future. Barbara Conry also argues that NATO cannot provide stability for the CEE region, much as it did for Western Europe. Conry asserts that NATO has done little for the animosity between Greece and Turkey and would have to deal with many more problems by accepting new members from CEE. These new problems could have the effect of reducing the credibility and/or destroying the alliance.⁴⁶ Finally, there are those who worry that another line, similar to iron curtain, is developing in Europe, but it is further east than during the Cold War. This new line separates those who are in a stable Europe defended by NATO and those left to their own devices outside of the “club.”⁴⁷ Therefore, although NATO expansion may bring short-term stability to CEE, there are serious concerns it may end up destabilizing the entire continent by excluding some countries to the detriment of the CEE region’s security and destroying the alliance through a lack of credibility and an introduction of stability problems into NATO.

However, probably the biggest concern of NATO expansion is the reaction of Russia. Although NATO and Russia signed an agreement that created the Joint Permanent Council, some commentators, such as Anatol Lieven argue that Russia only signed the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council to save face over the fact that it was powerless to effectively challenge the United States and NATO. Lieven further argues that Moscow, particularly the military, is generally bitter toward the United States and

⁴⁵ Carpenter, 20-21.

⁴⁶ Conroy, 95-99.

⁴⁷ Goldgeier, 50. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Shalikashvili, expressing the sentiments of Pentagon, stated that NATO expansion risked developing a new line after the U.S. had spent forty years removing the previous line created by the Cold War.

NATO over the expansion.⁴⁸ Further, Christopher Layne contends that although NATO and the United States have asserted that their intentions of enlargement are benign, states give more weight to power and military capabilities than verbal assurances. Furthermore, Layne notes that since NATO expansion, Russia has bolstered its ties with Belarus, China and Iran.⁴⁹ Hugh de Santis has also noted an increase in Russian cooperation with the above-mentioned states, as well with Ukraine and India. He notes that although the formation of a counter-alliance to NATO is highly improbable, all of the states mentioned would gain if they only had to worry about American power, rather than challenges from each other as well. Moreover, the cooperation between these states is largely technological and military in nature, which ostensibly improves the capabilities of states that could potentially challenge American interests and, in the case of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, the stability of Europe.⁵⁰ Finally, as mentioned above, there are some questions as to the credibility of NATO's commitment to the defence of CEE.

Much like the process of NATO involvement in Bosnia, there have been some examples of how U.S. efforts of enlargement have had success. Although there are many ethnic groups in states that have been included in expansion and in those that are now being considered, there has been no outbreak of hostilities seen in Bosnia. The United States, unlike the initial years of the Bosnian conflict, got involved in NATO engagement with CEE shortly after the end of the Cold War. This has been instrumental in the region

⁴⁸ Anatol Lieven, "The NATO-Russia Accord: An Illusionary Solution," in, NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry (Washington, D.C.: The Cato Institute, 1998), 143.

⁴⁹ Christopher Layne, "Why Die for Gdansk? NATO Enlargement and American International Security Interests," in, NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry (Washington, D.C.: The Cato Institute, 1998), 65-66.

⁵⁰ Hugu de Santis, "NATO's Manifest Destiny: The Risk of Expansion," in, NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry (Washington, D.C.: The Cato Institute, 1998), 170-173.

because independent European action to give stability to the region between Germany and Russia would not have sufficed. Western European action without NATO lacks the credibility necessary to affect stability, as was clearly seen in the Bosnian case. The Bosnia debacle exhibited European impotence in the realm of security, which stressed that security and stability is divisible on the continent. Further, Bosnia exhibited the fact that if the United States is not involved in European security initiatives, stability suffers.⁵¹

Not only has war not broken out between various ethnic groups in regions where NATO has enlarged or is thinking of doing so, states hoping for membership have gone to great lengths to repair historical grievances among ethnic groups. The Czechs have apologized to the German government for population transfers at the end of the World War II, Romania and Hungary have actively attempted to reduce tensions arising from the rights and treatment of ethnic minorities in Transylvania, Poland has solidified civilian control over the military and even the Russian minorities in the Baltic countries have seen improvement in their treatment.⁵² These are all countries that have attained NATO membership or are attempting to do so. Arguably, the Preamble and Article Two of the 1949 Washington Treaty, which serves as the founding charter of the alliance, has been pivotal in these developments. These sections of the treaty stress the importance of the maintenance of individual rights in NATO members and further stipulate the necessity of cooperation and good relations with neighbouring countries. The preamble states parties to the treaty will “safeguard the liberty of their people, their common

⁵¹ Sharp, 31-33.

⁵² Craig Whitney, “Germans and Czechs Try to Heal Hatreds of the Nazi Era,” *New York Times*, 22 January 1997:A8, Miklos Haraszti, “Toward a New Europe,” *New York Times*, 27 January 1997: A22 and Sharp, 27.

heritage and their civilization founded on democratic principles, individual freedom and the rule of law.”⁵³ Article two stipulates that the parties will work to

contribute to the development of peaceful and friendly international relations by reinforcing their free institutions by ensuring a better understanding of the principles on which these institutions are founded and by developing the necessary conditions to ensure stability and well-being.⁵⁴

When compared with the violence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the CEE countries contending for NATO membership have been paragons of stability and have made the necessary reforms to be considered by the alliance. In this way it is possible to argue that NATO enlargement, accomplished through largely U.S. efforts, has made positive contributions to stability on the continent. Therefore, although U.S. behaviour during the enlargement initiative has resulted in problems in its relations with NATO allies and with Russia as well as raised questions concerning the credibility of its commitment to defend new members, there have been definite benefits to continental stability. The U.S., through expanding NATO, is using this organization to increase its influence in formally communist Europe, without expending a great amount of resources. It is able to do this without acting unilaterally or through bullying by providing an institution that CEE states want to join. Great European powers accept these actions because NATO is an important institution to them or, in the case of Russia, there is little that can be done to change the U.S. course of action. In this case, collective stability appears to explain U.S. behaviour.

⁵³ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949, <www.nato.int>, 01 January 2003.

⁵⁴ The North Atlantic Treaty, <www.nato.int>.

CHAPTER VI: EVALUATING THE CASES AND THE ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES

The purpose of this paper is to explain the security interests of the United States in Europe. As described in the third chapter, there are varying conceptions of the alliance's use to the United States. Because of this divergence of views, it is necessary to examine the evidence provided in the two case studies outlined above as applied to the methodology described in the introduction to this essay. This paper contends that the security goals of the United States in Europe are to maintain its primacy and keep stability. Are these, in fact, the goals of the United State and has NATO been successful in fulfilling these goals?

A. Evaluating the Cases

First, if primacy and stability are indeed the interests of the United States in Europe, we could expect to see that *the United States was the primary actor in NATO operations in Southeast Europe and alliance expansion, even though the importance of European security is clearly higher for Europeans*. In the case of alleviating the ethnic violence in Bosnia, there are two distinct periods of time: the years of American inaction and the period where the U.S. was actively involved in Bosnia. As mentioned above, during the initial years of the Balkan conflict the Europeans attempted to deal with the situation with traditional means of peacekeeping and in a manner independent of the United States. The U.S. was cold towards these measures, as it favoured a more militaristic response, failed to give its support, and, at times, undermined European efforts. After it was clear traditional peacekeeping had failed in Bosnia, the U.S. intervened on its own terms and threatened unilateral action if Europe would not go along

with its plans. European states, after U.S. pressure, got behind American efforts and abandoned European strategies.

This behaviour is consistent with the explanation that the United States acting to maintain its primacy by undermining the interests of Europeans while at the same time promoting stability in the region. This behaviour was not undertaken because the U.S. had a vital interest in Europe.¹ Based on statements by then Secretary of State Warren Christopher and the inaction of the Bush Sr. and early Clinton administrations, it is clear that the United States did not have sufficient interest in the region to involve itself in the Bosnia conflict early on in the hostilities to conclude the war rapidly. This would have suggested American values had been offended and it great humanitarian concern for the issue. Moreover, the U.S. refused to give its support to initiatives undertaken by the United Nations and the European Union. It refused to support the European initiative in large part because the U.S. favoured a military option of “lift and strike,” which the Europeans hoped to avoid. If the U.S. could not act on its own interests, it refused to get involved. Because of this lack of support, the early efforts failed and relations between Europe and the U.S. deteriorated. This does not suggest that there was institutional or identity convergence among NATO members. The Europeans went along with the American initiative because the U.S. was threatening to act unilaterally, which would have completely excluded Europe and undermined NATO, which suggests that they recognize the importance of the United States for military action to create stability in the region.

¹ As noted in chapter one, both the Clinton and Bush Jr. administrations viewed Europe security as an important interests, not a vital one, defined a security threat that compromises the safety of the state.

In the case of NATO enlargement, it is clear that the United States drove the process from the very beginning. While European states were either completely uninterested in expansion (France) or felt that appeasing the Russians was priority-one (Britain and Germany), the United States, through a series of steps developed a NATO framework that ranged from consultation (EAPC), to collaboration (PfP), to actual membership. When France, belatedly, attempted to influence the enlargement process by pushing Romanian and Slovenian entry in to NATO to give greater weight to the southern portions of Europe, the U.S. vetoed the plan.² The U.S. was acting on political interests (domestic pressures at home, pressure from East Europeans to take a more active stand on their security and fear of non-American initiatives regulating security concerns in the region) and Romania and Slovenia were not important enough to the United States to be considered in the first enlargement wave and were therefore excluded.³

Although the United States is less affected by instability on Europe, it was the Americans who drove the expansion of NATO. Arguably, the reason for this is the U.S. was hoping to avoid action independent of the United States in CEE to create stability.⁴ Conversely, the Europeans had different interests. Britain preferred a strategy that would have been agreeable with the Russians to avoid continental hostility; France preferred no enlargement whatsoever, as Paris feared it would become a venue for increased U.S. power on the continent; and Germany, whose interests are most congruent with the United States in matters of continental security, also questioned an enlargement process that alienated the Russians, which could cause problems given the relative proximity of

² Goldgeier, 120 and Plantin, 103.

³ President of the United States, "The President's News Conference," 17 June 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1993, Book 1, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994) 868-69, Goldgeier, 56, and Sedivy, 3.

⁴ Asmus, Kugler, Larrabee, 31-32.

Germany to Russia.⁵ These countries, especially Germany, would have had the most to gain from stability in CEE, but also had the most to lose from the fallout from enlargement.⁶ Europeans, for the most part, attempted to impede the U.S. drive to enlarge NATO, because the manner the alliance was expanding did not meet their interests. Again, as in the case of military action, it does not appear that there a great drive to spread values as Slovenia and Romania were left out of initial expansion. Further, each state had different interests in the region, yet the American plan was implemented at the expense of other states' interests suggesting there was not a convergence of identity.

Second, if stability is indeed an interest of the United States in Europe, we could expect to see that *European initiatives analogous to NATO expansion and military activities without the U.S. have been less effective at promoting stability than NATO activities*. This condition is important as it shows that the United States is actively involved and necessary to promote stability. If stability is an American interest, we could expect that the United States would be involved. This condition does not exhibit primacy, but is important to establish American involvement in the amelioration of European security challenges. In terms of military activity, it is clear that the United States is pivotal. France attempted to create a Europe-only defence group, but was thwarted by the United States. Further the ESDI, the European wing of NATO is weak and relies heavily on NATO.⁷ Further, there are serious questions regarding the European interest in committing the necessary funds to create a European army capable of prosecuting a war

⁵ For a discussion on German and American congruence on issues of European security, see Mey. Goldgeier, 120, describes the hesitant pan-European response to U.S. plans for expansion.

⁶ Mey, 208-9.

⁷ The ESDI has made some gains in operability and is currently in Macedonia on a low-intensity peacekeeping mission, but it still relies heavily on NATO logistics and equipment and if the tensions among the groups in Macedonia rise, there is a tripwire that ensures NATO involvement.

such as that seen in Bosnia. In November 2001, the European Union discussed the future of a European army. There were few concrete plans and there was no clear commitment for increased spending for a joint European army. The EU released a statement that called for the ability to make peace by separating warring parties and further the European ability to undertake humanitarian missions, but there was substantial opposition within the EU to these mild military measures from the more pacifistic members of the Union.⁸ Further, the WEU, the current military group made up of Western European countries, proved incapable of stopping the violence in Bosnia and lacks the ability and the credibility of NATO, largely because it has no connection to U.S. power.⁹ Though the French despair the fact, European leaders recognize the importance of U.S. involvement in Europe simply because they do not have the ability to undertake missions the size of Bosnia, or even the relatively low level peacekeeping operations in Macedonia.¹⁰ In short, independent European military initiatives have fallen far short of NATO's capability, largely because Europe simply does not have the military power of the United States.

Although Europe lacks an effective European armed forces organization, it has a well-functioning economic union that strongly influences political affairs on the continent. However, unlike NATO, the EU has been loath to accept new members and has not yet done so. Richard Holbrooke, in the early 1990s, believed the European Union would be more effective at reforming the formerly communist states of CEE than NATO would have been. Holbrooke, however, recognized that the EU was both unwilling and incapable of fulfilling its task, because of its failure in Bosnia, its work on its own projects

⁸ "If Only Words Were Guns," *The Economist*, 24 November 2001: 47-48.

⁹ Sharp, 31-32.

¹⁰ "Wake Up, Europe!" *The Economist*, 15 September 2001: 45-46.

and the uncertainty of the further direction the EU.¹¹ In fact, it was only on 13 December 2002, roughly thirteen years after the fall of the Berlin, that the EU officially invited countries from the formally communist CEE to join the union. However, Romania and Bulgaria, the poorest CEE countries with many potential points of instability, were excluded.¹² Therefore, the EU, a potential anchor of stability for CEE, has been inactive in opening its doors to membership and has been much slower than NATO in expanding its organizational zone of stability.

It does not appear that European initiatives, either military action or organizational expansion, have been as effective as NATO at engaging problems in Central and Eastern Europe. Military activity undertaken by Western European states has been rather unconvincing and ineffectual. There has been some movement to create a stronger European force, but Europe currently lacks the military efficacy of the United States to militarily ensure stability on the continent. In short, Europe needs the United States to ensure stability on the continent. Further, the EU, although finally expanding, has taken thirteen years to simply invite new members to join. NATO had created structures to engage CEE countries as early as 1991 and invited the first members to join in 1997. Therefore, these factors suggest that NATO has been more effective a more effective organization than independent European institutional efforts at engaging CEE countries and the potential problems in the region.

Simply because Europe needs the United States does not mean the U.S. will get involved. If the United States did not get involved the war in Bosnia arguably would not have been resolved as quickly as it was, based on the peacemaking performance of the

¹¹ Holbrooke, *Corresponding*, 100.

¹² "And Now Let's Have Another Look at the Road Map," *The Economist*, 21 December 2002: 67.

Europeans. Additionally, the EU showed that it was unwilling to engage Eastern Europe in fashion that would speed the enlargement process. The United States, through NATO, was much quicker to engage Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, the U.S. led initiatives were much more effective, which suggests the U.S. was actively engaged which is consistent with an interest in the promotion of stability. This suggests that stability is important to the United States and that it does not operate in Europe to dominate the weaker countries on the continent or it is exclusively seeking freedom of action. The U.S. is concerned with the promotion of stability.

Third, we should expect to see that *admission requirements for expansion and terms of peace were done on U.S. terms and include provisions for ensuring stability in Europe*. This prediction should exhibit that the United States took a lead role in NATO military and expansion and worked to ensure that the U.S. would continue to enjoy independence of action, and operating in a manner where it can strongly influence the security policy of states brought under NATO's rubric. Additionally, this prediction must include conditions of stability promotion in admission requirements and peace agreements if fulfillment of the stability interest was attempted. If these conditions are present, an argument can be made that U.S. are primacy and stability.

The Dayton Peace Accords were largely an American military and diplomatic effort, with the United States co-signing the peace agreement along with the leaders of Croatia, Yugoslavia and the leader of the Bosniacs. As described in the fourth chapter, the agreement reflects U.S. priorities and gives the United States, though its influence in NATO, a deciding voice in the political affairs of the new Bosnian state. Although the OHR is technically responsible for administrating Bosnia and ensuring smooth

governance in everyday affairs, this office is contingent on NATO's willingness to execute the policies of the High Representative. Further, although not related to NATO, the United States further able to direct politic and economic affairs through the OSCE, the World Bank and the IMF. The U.S. holds decisive sway over each of the main international organization involved in Bosnia. The United States in large part set the terms of peace and continues to influence the affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although the U.S. has decisive influence over Bosnia, the structures in place are designed to eventually create a stable and responsible Bosnian government with a functioning free market. This suggests that stability is also a goal of the United States.

NATO expansion also reflects U.S. interests and initiatives in terms of admission requirements. The pace of enlargement and necessary steps for admission (EAPC, PfP and finally NATO membership) were all under American tutelage and initiative. Additionally, Sedivy argues that the initial expansion that included Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic reflected the political interests of the United States, which focused on CEE stability and precluding independent German action, which may have undermined the NATO framework, as independent security action on the part of European states is one activity NATO was designed to preclude. There were very good reasons for including Romania and Slovenia in the initial round of expansion (stemming Balkan stability from crossing borders in terms of refugees and warring parties), but the U.S. demurred at French efforts to do so.¹³ However, the U.S. did act to maintain the integrity of NATO by pre-empting independent action, which potentially could have raised tensions as states would have been operating out of the joint framework that provides for the defence of all.

¹³ Sedivy, 3.

Therefore, the United States had a heavy hand in bringing peace to Bosnia, sponsoring the Dayton peace accords and in the governance of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is in light of the fact that its stakes in Balkan peace are substantially lower than those of its Western European NATO allies. Likewise, the process of expansion and requirements for admission were U.S. initiatives and the United States continues to influence membership processes. The conditions that followed the third prediction gives further credence to the assertion that the United States is actively seeking to maintain its primacy in Europe, while at the same time promoting stability. It is acting on its own terms, suggesting that partnership is not present. Although it is promoting democracy, it is not doing so through a collective security apparatus. The U.S. diverges from the other NATO members on the policies it implements, suggesting common identity is not dictating U.S. behaviour. However, the U.S. is promoting a stable, responsible and democratic state, which suggests that domination is not the goal and there is more to U.S. interests than simply primacy.

Finally, if the U.S. does indeed have interests in primacy and stability we should expect to see that *NATO's expansion and military action resulted in increased decisiveness in dealing with threats to stability in Europe while at the same time undermining European security desires in the region.* This encompasses conditions where the U.S. is actively seeking to ameliorate the environment of stability in Europe while at the same time undermining European desires as well as acting in a fashion that reflects American policy goals. When looking at NATO intervention in Bosnia, it is clear that once the United States decided that military action was the best policy, there was a quicker conclusion to the war. The disintegration and war of Yugoslavia began with the

declared independence of Slovenia and Croatia in the summer of 1991. The following year, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence, sparking a civil war in this region between the Croats, Serbs and Bosniacs.¹⁴ From 1992 until September 1995, the Europeans spearheaded various efforts to bring peace to the region, but the conflict among the three groups continued.¹⁵ However, in September 1995, the Americans decided to act on their plan to use force and through the support of the Croat army and the use of NATO air strikes, the U.S. attempted to coerce the parties into peace. Less than two months later, all the parties signed a peace agreement sponsored by the United States. However, U.S. action was taken at the expense of the European method of regulating the problems in Bosnia. It may have been that adding more peacekeepers and extending the number of and commitment to safe zones would have been ineffectual and military strikes would have been necessary in any case, but from the beginning of the conflict, the U.S. was unwilling to give countenance to these European initiatives. The U.S. rejected alternatives and acted in a fashion that undermined European initiatives.

In terms of expansion, Europe did little to alleviate security concerns in the worrisome region between Russia and German. European powers all had different goals and interests that dominated their conception of the shape of European security. It was an American effort that created various bodies where security consultation, collaboration and membership to organizations could be possible. While France and Britain were worried about the dangers of a unified Germany, the U.S. supported this measure. While Britain and Germany worried about Russia and France worried about American *puissance*, the U.S. began to take concrete measures to bring CEE countries into NATO

¹⁴ Svetozar Stojanovic, "The Destruction of Yugoslavia," Fordham International Law Journal 19, no. 2 (December 1995): 352,354

¹⁵ Szasz, 363-374.

and the NATO framework, giving these formally communist countries incentive to reform, which furthered the stability of the continent. Throughout the entire process, the U.S. actively engaged CEE rejecting the concerns of the Europeans. The actions they took arguably created stability, but undermined the cautious policies of European states.

Based on the above discussion it is possible to say that once the United States decided to involve itself in Bosnia, the violent conflict was resolved decisively. The Europeans worked on the Bosnia question independently for almost three years and the fighting continued unabated. Using NATO, the Americans finally took strong action in September 1995 and Dayton was signed on November 21st of the same year. Europe could not completely agree on the shape of Western Europe, let alone make serious inroads into solving the security concerns of Eastern Europe. The U.S. took decisive action and engaged the CEE immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

In both occasions of NATO activity, Europeans had different concerns and policies they were following than the United States. In both military action and expansion the Americans got their way and NATO activity progressed in a fashion that reflected U.S. interests, not those of the Europeans. However, the American methods of dealing with security challenges were effective and stability was promoted. Therefore, domination, shared values, common identity and the exclusive pursuit of primacy do not appear to be the American security interests in Europe.

B. Evaluating Contending Conceptions NATO and American Interests

Based on the above cases and the conditions present in these cases, it is possible to assert that the primary security goals of United States in Europe are primacy and stability. Moreover, it is further possible to assert that NATO has been instrumental to the

U.S. in fulfilling these goals. This is in contrast to the contending approaches presented in chapter two of this work. As mentioned above, the liberal approach argues there is a partnership exists between Western Europe and the United States based on similar values that establish democratic institutional constraints on behaviour that causes instability. Liberal thinkers argue that NATO is a liberal institution that mitigates national interest-based disputes among member states and aids the negotiation of settlements acceptable to all parties. In short, the U.S. uses NATO to fulfill its interests of creating stability and promoting liberal values.

The second approach discussed in the chapter two focuses on the identity of the U.S. and Europe. According to this approach, NATO is a product of the collective identities and norms of the United States and European. NATO, in turn informs the strategies of the member countries of the alliance. In this way, NATO, and the liberal norms developed through the institution, will increasingly determine the actions of the member states. Because of their liberal identity, both of these regions accept and desire this institutional outcome. Therefore, the U.S. uses NATO to fulfill its interests of promoting stability and maintain a source that informs its interests.

Neither of these approaches appears to be consistent with the behaviour exhibited by the United States. In both NATO's military intervention in Bosnia and in NATO expansion, the United States operated according to its own principles. Europe and the U.S. debated over how to create stability in Bosnia and the U.S. threatened to act unilaterally if the other NATO countries did not go along with the "lift and strike" option. Its European allies followed suit. Further, the United States, for the most part, negotiated NATO enlargement and then presented to its NATO allies as a *fait accompli*. It largely

ignored the concerns of its allies and rejected their input when it was given. This behaviour does not suggest that the United States is in an equal partnership promoting values with its European allies, nor have U.S. actions implied that NATO is an organization based in a shared identity. Europe was placing heavy emphasis on humanitarian peacekeeping missions, whereas the U.S. wanted to allow the combatants to acquire arms and conduct NATO military operations. These different preferences suggest that the values and the identity of Europe and the United States are not so similar. Further, NATO did not determine the U.S. response to war in the Balkans and potential instability in CEE. The fact that the U.S. threatened to go it alone in Balkans against the wishes of its NATO allies does not suggest that institutional mechanisms determine U.S. foreign policy for European security. The United States had clear interests in stability and primacy and acted on these interests. Liberal and constructivist approaches describe stability as an interest, but do not include primacy. The U.S. acted in a manner consistent with the promotion of primacy as well, irrespective of the sentiments and values of its European NATO allies or of the institutional framework in place. Instead of being informed by institutional identity, the U.S. used the existing institutional framework to fulfill its policy goals. Instead of promoting collective values, the U.S. acted independently and used NATO to promote its interests, which does not suggest that the values of the NATO members are the same.

Those opinions that assert NATO should not or does not have any utility to the European security policy of the United States are largely moot because the U.S. is involved in NATO and this organization is effective at fulfilling American goals of primacy and stability in Europe. The critical perspectives takes the normative position

that NATO is simply a vehicle of domination and exploitation that offers a multilateral veil covering the pursuit of raw power and an international system based on violence. Primacy, as explained above, does not necessarily equate with domination. The U.S. desires freedom of action, not control of other states. Domination does not appear to be the interest of the U.S. because the Bosnian constitution developed through Dayton, a NATO enforced peace, attempts to develop responsible democratic government for Bosnia. It is true that the U.S. currently has decisive influence in Bosnia, but this is maintained to prevent a return to hostilities. Dayton describes the future of Bosnia, and this description provides for independence. Further, NATO membership requires the enshrinement of individual rights and good relations with neighbouring states. This is not the behaviour of a dominating power. Whether or not NATO should exist or what the shape of the international system should be is an important debate, but does not fall under the rubric of a discussion such as this, which examines the organization's utility to current debate. While the U.S. does maintain its capacity for freedom of action, it does not seek continued domination of Europe. Further, the U.S. has clearly acted to alleviate the security challenges in Europe, thus stability is arguably an American interest.

The realists who would like to see the U.S. exhibit more restraint internationally also, in large part, focus on a discussion that stresses the cost of U.S. expenditures on matters that do not fall under the category of vital interests and the moral hazard of European free riding on American defence spending. This is a question of U.S. spending priorities and what the true interests of United States are. "The debate between the advocates of preponderance and offshore balancing, however, is about more than

strategy; it is also about values.”¹⁶ Again, a discussion that focuses on what the priorities of the United States should be is as interesting as it is important, but does not reflect the current situation. The U.S. has two main security goals in Europe: the desire for stability and primacy. NATO helps the U.S. fulfill these current security goals and therefore has utility to the United States, regardless what these critics feel American goals and policies should be.

The second variant of realism examined in this paper is the most supported by the evidence described above. This approach argues that NATO’s utility lies in the American ability to use this organization to maximize its ability to act on its interests and policies in Europe. These realists argue NATO offers a venue to reduce perceptions of the threat the United States presents by allowing to work through an international organization that does not place great restraints on its ability to act. If these benefits are not manifested through NATO membership, NATO ceases to have utility for the United States. The evidence provided by the case studies supports this approach. However, current literature from this approach does not go far enough in its explanation of NATO. This realist description appears to argue that NATO is simply diplomatic cover for the United States, and serves little purpose outside of this function. Further, this explanation appears to assert that stability is not really a concern, particularly as some scholars see the pursuit of primacy as a destabilizing endeavour.¹⁷ As was seen in the case studies of NATO intervention into Bosnia and NATO expansion, the alliance was more than diplomatic cover; this organization proved to be a valuable resource that carried out U.S. interests in the CEE region. As mentioned above, NATO is the only political and legal justification

¹⁶ Layne, “From Preponderance,” 124.

¹⁷ See Mearsheimer and Waltz, note 3, chapter 1.

for the United States in Europe and the U.S. was able to use this justification and institutional policy to fulfill its interests of primacy and stability. At this time, it is necessary to evaluate the collective stability model presented in chapter three, which seeks to explain why NATO is successful at promoting U.S. European security interests of primacy and stability and how it mitigates conflict between these two interests. This model seeks to further currently realist literature by developing a framework to examine the rationale of using an international security organization such as NATO and deepening the explanation into how NATO is beneficial to the United States.

C. Evaluating Collective Stability

NATO does more than provide a diplomatic cover for the security actions of the United States. The United States has been the leading actor in NATO, as has been seen through its pivotal role in NATO intervention in Bosnia and the alliance's expansion. The benefits to U.S. involvement in NATO and the activities the organization has undertaken have been increased stability and primacy on the European continent, the two primary goals of the United States. Through NATO, the U.S. was able to influence the security environment of the continent without having to act in a unilateral manner and to work within its legal and political right to be active in Europe. In addition, NATO incorporates the armed forces of European powers, thus reducing the risk of independent challenges to the primacy of the United States and security competition on the continent. Not only does NATO reduce challenges to the United States, but the alliance also incorporates U.S. security objectives in Europe through the organization's framework, ensuring the other member states not only follow U.S. interests, but aid the prosecution of American goals as well. This has meant the United States has been able to use the resources of European

armed forces to create stability in Bosnia.¹⁸ In addition, NATO has also provided an institutional framework that engages the potentially unstable CEE region and encourages reform in a manner acceptable to NATO, an organization strongly influenced and led by the United States. This is the essence of collective stability; the U.S. uses the collective resources of European powers within an organization, over which it has a considerably high level of influence and through this process is able to shape a stable security environment of Europe. However, by acting through this multilateral organization and incorporating interests into the alliance, it is able to offset the instability that could arise in the pursuit of primacy.

Collective security works for numerous reasons that have their basis in transaction costs. Using an organization such as NATO, the United States enjoys a cost reduction in terms of economic and political resources used to fulfill interests (transactions). Institutions reduce two main transaction costs: the costs related to a lack of transparency and information as well as the costs of assets with highly specific uses. It is because of this reduction in costs that the United States has an incentive to act within NATO. By operating within NATO, an organization in which the U.S. has decisive influence, the U.S. is able to bind the security decisions of the alliances members to a certain degree. In this way, the United States is able to act with better information on the potential behaviour of other members NATO, because the organization provides constraints on the activity of other states. This reduces uncertainty, due to increased information and transparency of action, which is an important cost reduction as better decisions can be

¹⁸ An example of this is currently European peacekeepers outnumber U.S. peacekeepers in Bosnia and, in fact, peacekeepers exclusively from France outnumber the U.S. forces in Bosnia. SFOR Organization, 8 January 2003, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 12 March 2003, <<http://www.nato.int/sfor/organisation/sfororg.htm>>.

made. Uncertainty was further reduced because the United States was able to use NATO to prosecute military action in Bosnia and to set the terms of alliance expansion, as opposed to waiting for the Europeans to sort out continental security issues. This was possible because it could reasonably expect that NATO was important to the other powers in the alliance, as European security relies in no small part on the U.S., and would not risk their credibility as important players within the organization and internationally by rejecting U.S. demands which would have likely precipitated in American unilateral action. Western European states have an interest in American involvement in the region because the U.S. provides a balance of power to the major powers in the region, thus reducing the risk of a security competition. Further, U.S. involvement in a mainly European organization ensures financial burden sharing for continental stability.¹⁹ Moreover, Western European states gain because the risk of unilateral American action is reduced through the existence of NATO. Although the United States acted independently in Bosnia and in the expansion process, it did not act unilaterally. NATO, at the very least, provided a forum of discussion where European views could air their views and attempt to influence U.S. policy. Further, NATO provided a framework for Europe to collaborate militarily with the United States. This also worked to reduce the tension between stability and primacy.

Costs are further reduced for the United States, and Europe, because NATO enables states to minimize costs through an institution where each member can share collective assets. This is particularly important for military assets because the use of these goods and services is highly specific. In the case of intervention into Bosnia, the simple

¹⁹ Chapter two of this work outlines in more detail the concerns regarding security competition among Western European states in a Europe without the involvement of the United States.

existence of European armed forces bases ostensibly cut the costs of intervention for the United States. Instead of prosecuting the air raids from aircraft carriers, which would require numerous support staff and extra costs, the U.S. was able to utilize staff and well-stocked bases currently being utilized by American armed forces in Europe. Further, expansion into CEE offers similar benefits seen in Western Europe by providing a jump-off point for any future action that may be necessary from the Baltic to the Balkan regions.²⁰ This frees resources for the U.S. to promote its interests elsewhere on the globe. In addition, the United States, through NATO, was able to enhance stability in Europe. Stability, arguably, is in large part dichotomous as either it exists or if it does not, a society is in a state of war. Therefore, stability is highly specific as there is no acceptable alternative. NATO aids the promotion of stability and therefore provides a very specific asset for the United States.

As outlined in Table 3.1, four scenarios describe the interface between asset specificity and uncertainty. Briefly summarized, if there are high transaction costs in terms of asset specificity and high levels uncertainty, a state is likely to institutionalize to mitigate costs. If both costs are low, there is little need to participate in an organization. If either of the transaction costs is high while the other is low, the response will depend if institutionalization is a more effective strategy to promote interests than unilateral action. This is the current scenario for the United States. As described above, military assets and stability are highly specific commodities. Uncertainty, however, is relatively low among NATO members considering European states are close allies and important trading partners with the United States and this would likely be the case if NATO did not exist,

²⁰ Richard L. Kugler, "Will Enlargement Succeed?" in, The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia and European Security, ed. Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Levesque (Montreal, PQ: McGill-Queens University Press, 1999), 58.

although probably to lower degree.²¹ That being said, the uncertainty present in non-NATO states in Europe is a concern and the NATO framework of engaging non-member states alleviates this source of uncertainty. However, as seen above, NATO is instrumental in promoting U.S. goals of stability and primacy in Europe so NATO is a useful organization for the United States, even though the transaction cost of uncertainty is low. In this way NATO has been able to extend the attenuation of uncertainty in non-NATO parts of Europe.

The Atlantic alliance has been used to create a situation of collective stability in Europe, which promotes U.S. goals of stability and primacy in Europe. Collective stability is a rational and important strategy because involvement in NATO lowers costs for the U.S. in terms of uncertainty and asset specificity and therefore is preferable to acting unilaterally, which would accentuate these costs. Therefore, NATO is an important and desirable tool for American security policy in Europe. In this way collective stability furthers current realist literature on the utility of NATO to the United States by explaining the rationale of a security alliance and describing how it was used by the United States to further its goals, instead of simply stating that NATO's sole importance is diplomatic cover.

²¹ Austria and Switzerland, to name two European countries, are not in NATO and there are good relations and trade between the U.S. and these states.

CONCLUSION

There are numerous policy and study implications that arise from the U.S. collective stability security model described above. To begin with, this section will address some implications for study. This discussion, at the same time, will also serve as opportunity to outline some of the limitations of this work. First, the collective security model outlined above must be taken at face value. It cannot be considered theory or a theoretical variant on existing realist thought, it is simply a model that attempts to explain U.S. policy in Europe. However, there is potential, with future study, to further test the claims made in this paper. A possible study direction could include further work into alliance utility for states. Although this work attempts to further current realist literature, there is also potential for deeper examinations into the implications for realist thought which would include a more positive role for institutions as important tools for state policy that maximize the ability of a state to act. Much more research needs to be done before this will be possible. Less ambitiously, the existing research done in this paper has the possibility for expansion. This work looked at only two cases: the intervention into Bosnia and the alliance enlargement that included Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Since these events, NATO undertook a massive air campaign in Kosovo and recently extended invitations for membership to seven new countries.¹ These activities, much like the cases reviewed above, are ambitious for the alliance and this work opens the door for future study in this area. Finally, the concept of stability, as applied to this paper, needs further study. What does stability actually mean? The assumption of this paper is stability is a dichotomous, where the opposite of stability is war. This is most

¹ In December 2002, NATO extended invitations to the three Baltic countries, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, as well as Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Slovenia.

likely false dichotomy and the degrees of stability should be defined in future work.² In addition, it would be useful, when examining stability as a goal for the United States, to determine what constitutes stability for U.S. policy makers. The American definition of stability is of utmost importance as it is U.S. power that is largely enforcing peace in the Balkans. The level of stability desired by the U.S. could determine the commitment to reform the United States has and effort America is willing to exert to foster stable and functioning countries. Again, this study is beyond the scope of this work but offers promise for future study.

The collective stability model described above also has implications for policy. This work will consider specific policies for the current situation in Bosnia and for NATO expansion as well as general considerations for U.S. security policy in Europe. Although the Serb, Croats and Bosniacs are no longer fighting a large-scale war there are still massive social, political and economic problems that require NATO and American resources.³ There are various U.S. actions that would better promote stability in Bosnia,

² Stability, as is seen Bosnia-Herzegovina, is a varying term. Bosnia is more stable now than it was during the war based on the number of annual casualties, refugee flows, crimes against property, etc., but it still cannot be considered as stable as the functioning democracies of Western Europe or semi-authoritarian Turkey.

³ Although the U.S. has attempted to create conditions of stability there are serious problems that remain in Bosnia. Electoral institutions have been implemented to ensure democratic proceedings. However, Bosnia has continued to exhibit strong ethnic divisions that mirror territorial lines. Local, not state, political candidates and leaders vie for political power. Problems have arisen because the elections have resulted in the selection of local nationalist leaders who are uncompromising toward other ethnic groups and are generally unqualified and ill equipped to rebuild the war torn country. The new economy and economic relationships in Bosnia have not been conducive to stability. One of the main purposes of Dayton was to create a free market and privatized economy, as per the influence of the IMF and the World Bank. The result has been reduced state influence and a privatized industrial infrastructure that was once a social and public commodity. Those who are able to purchase industries consist of mainly the nationalistic elite and the mafia who have curried favour with the external representatives of international organizations and states and have often attained the resources necessary to acquire enterprises through networks of smuggling, crime and the black market relied upon during the war. International actors and the United States tolerate this behaviour because those who are in a strong economic position also have the ability to destabilize the country. Because of this, the economic provisions of Dayton arguably reinforce mafia and clientist economic behaviour. See, Michael Pugh, "Protectorate Democracy' in Southeast Europe," COPRI Working Paper 10, May 2000, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 15 November 2001,

ostensibly reducing the need for extensive resources NATO currently expends to keep the peace. Changes in Bosnia would further U.S. goals by fostering a better environment for stability and security in this Balkan country. First, more support given to moderate political groups and associations with crosscutting interests could work to alleviate tensions. Second, increased social funding could reduce the power of criminal and nationalistic economic elites, as reliance on the services provided by this group would diminish. Finally, when and if political conditions are favourable, there should be attempts at constitutional reform to codify cooperation in the constitution. The current system in Bosnia has further divided the people and has provided little incentive for the cooperation and good relations that are necessary for a viable state. The U.S. could aid the process.

There are also concerns regarding NATO expansion that need addressing. NATO expansion has been an important act that has contributed to the stability of Europe. However, if an institution or an organization grows either in member size or in institutionalized constraints, and the costs of carrying out these interests could cost more economic and political capital than acting alone as more members would need appeasing, making NATO cumbersome. Additionally, the criticism raised by some scholars that question the United State's commitment to protecting new members is a valid one.⁴ In the

<<http://www.copri.dk/publications/WP/WP%202000/10-2000.doc>>, "OSCE Disqualifies 200 Election Candidates," HINA [Zagreb] 13 August, 1998 (FBIS: 008050D750A5BCCA32C60), International Official Appoints Entire Board of Federation TV Governors," Onasa [Sarajevo] 7 December 1999 (FBIS: 08050E1890F8E8D50EB5), "International Envoy Decides on Bosnian Flag," HINA, [Zagreb] 4 February 1998 (FBIS: 008050D3690EFB4C665AA), "High Representative Presents New Common Currency," Beta, [Belgrade] 21 January 1998 (FBIS: 008050D323F2EDB42B0CA), Bosnian Serb Speaker Calls for Presidential Elections and Privatization," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 17 November 1997 (FBIS: 008050D1E75FCF3BBD255), and "Bosnian Serb Government Adopts Economic Development Strategy Until Year 2005," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 8 November 2000 (FBIS:008050E82CEB15CB187E9)

⁴ See chapter four, pages 90-93.

event Russia invades a Baltic state, potentially under the auspices of protecting the Russian minority, what incentive does the U.S. have to risk war with a nuclear power to protect a state? The U.S. should consider the importance of NATO to promoting its goals and carefully evaluate the risks of expanding to regions it is unwilling to commit militarily, the costs of defending marginal regions and it should not include too many members, which would risk turning NATO into an ineffectual and unruly political organization, nullifying any use for the United States. If NATO would become ineffective or disintegrate, the United States would lose the primary venue for promoting its goal of primacy on the continent. For this reason, it is necessary that U.S. take a second look at NATO expansion.

Finally, there are some general policy comments that can be made regarding American security policy in Europe. If the efficacy of the collective stability model is to continue, the United States needs to maintain a balance where it does not alienate Western European powers, yet is not overly restrained in pursuing its interest. The anti-American sentiment that was seen in the recent German election, Russia's warming to unsavoury states and France's recent rhetoric and military funding increases arguably are signs that the power of the United States is being watched with a wary eye.⁵ Action insensitive to European interests could result in a European rejection of the U.S., which would severely undermine NATO's existence and its *raison d'être* to the United States. Additionally, although the rhetoric is increasing there is still a danger of European free-riding, which could result in the United States increasingly shouldering a disproportionate burden of providing security resources, undermining its ability to act on its interests

⁵ "French Defence Policy," The Economist, 19 October 2002: 46, and "Living with a Superpower," The Economist, 4 January 2003: 18-20.

elsewhere. Encouraging more European independence in security matters would not only lessen suspicions of U.S. power, it would also reduce costs for the United States.

U.S. policy makers must address these issues. There are three main policy decisions that could ameliorate these concerns. The first policy the United States should consider is encouraging more independence on the continent in matters of security. This would benefit the U.S. because European states would be less threatened by the power of the U.S. and this would arguably lessen the adverse behaviour currently seen by European powers. Second, related to the first, the United States should increasingly scale back its military presence on the continent. This is not to say the U.S. should disengage itself from Europe, but it should reduce its contribution to essential military services and materials that the Europeans cannot provide. In other words, the U.S. should commit to a more equitable division of labour and clearly define its reduced role to the Europeans so they can make the necessary adjustments to their security apparatus and budget. In this way, the U.S. will remain indispensable to Europe so it can continue to be involved and influence the security of the continent, while at the same time reduce the risk of free-riding. Finally, the United State must consistently evaluate its strategic priorities to determine changes in the transaction costs of working within NATO to ensure it is able to act independently as well as fulfill its security goals. If it is carrying too much of the financial burden in providing specific assets, perhaps it would be more useful to act unilaterally, so action could be more decisive.

Therefore, as effective as collective stability has been for the United States, there are problems with NATO military action and enlargement that could undermine the interests of the United States. The U.S. should make changes to its behaviour or risk

losing the organizational tool that made primacy and stability possible. If the ethnic conflict of Bosnia-Herzegovina would re-erupt, stability would again be compromised and the current system created by Dayton could result in this negative situation. Over-expansion of NATO could undermine the efficacy of the alliance, rendering it useless as an organization that is capable of fulfilling military missions. The primacy of the United States in Europe could be perceived as overly dominant, resulting in completely independent military initiatives by the European NATO members, thus undermining the alliance. In spite of these concerns, it is clear that the United States has been remarkably successful at promoting its goals of primacy and stability in Europe through a system of collective stability. This model has benefited Europe and has fulfilled the interests of the United States. For this reason, collective stability is a worthy strategy and with modification, a model the United States should continue employ.

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