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THE OPERATIONAL CODE BELIEF SYSTEM AND
FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING
THE CASE OF GAMAL ABDEL-NASSER

by

• Mohammad El-Sayed Selim

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in
partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

Carleton University

• Ottawa, Ontario

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The Operational Code Belief System and Foreign Policy Decision Making:
The Case of G.A. Nassar

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to (i) present an empirically supportable and systematically constructed configuration of President Gamal Abdel-Nasser's operational code belief system through the application of George's "operational code" construct; and (ii) to generate and test hypotheses on the impact of the individual's operational code on his policy choices and decisions. The study seeks further to make a methodological contribution by applying the technique of quantitative content analysis to the construction of an operational code.

Theoretically, this dissertation argues that the individual's cognitions are crucial to the understanding of his choices. It is further argued that at the level of the belief system, one can search for cognitions which exhibit cross-situational stability and yet discriminate among individuals. Beliefs constitute the individual's modus operandi for making choices. They orient him toward specific courses of action and perform a significant screening role in perceiving and interpreting information. Further, it is argued that the decision-making process is a result of the interaction between the individual's belief system and the information system. In the absence of the latter, the individual is usually compelled to rely only upon his belief system to make judgements. Accordingly, the decision-maker's belief system is likely to be particularly salient under foreign policy crisis conditions. These conditions are characterized by structural uncertainty: lack of information, unpredictability, and stress.

H1 : the decision-maker's political beliefs are more likely to be salient in foreign policy decision-making than in domestic policy decision-making.

H2 : The decision-maker's political beliefs are more likely to be salient under foreign policy crisis conditions than under foreign policy non-crisis conditions.

The operational code approach developed by Alexander George and Ole Holsti has been used to present an empirically replicable model of Nasser's belief system. All Nasser's publicly available documents were coded through the technique of quantitative content analysis. The validity and reliability of the techniques of investigation have been rigorously tested. The data was subjected to a series of statistical tests: frequency analysis, contingency analysis, correlational analysis, factor analysis and an analysis of centrality,

stability, and consistency. Such analyses helped in developing a model of Nasser's operational code which evolves around two limited sets of closely inter-connected and highly central beliefs. The first set defines the nature of his philosophical orientation: conflictual politics at all horizontal levels of domestic, regional, and global politics, and optimistic and historical-inevitable paradigm of political life coupled with an inclination to select optimal goals. The second set indicates Nasser's negative image of his adversaries, his deterrent strategy, and conflictual view of regional and global politics were always coupled with such instrumental safeguards as an incremental approach, delayed action, and avoidance of high risks. Nasser's optimal goal selection was negatively associated with his goal pursuit. A full and meaningful understanding of Nasser requires comprehension of such linkages. The structural analysis also confirmed a number of hypotheses:

- H6 : The operational code of executives is richer in its instrumental sub-system than in its philosophical sub-system.
- H8 : The operational code is usually characterized by the dominance of a specific sub-set.
- H9 : The philosophical part of the operational code tends to be more stable than the instrumental part.
- H10: The operational code beliefs change in an intense relationship of their centrality.
- H11: Logical and psychological consistency of the operational code are separate phenomena.
- H12: Operational code beliefs are basically interdependent.
- H14: Political leaders answer the operational code beliefs differently depending on the issue areas.
- H15: Political leaders use specific clusters of beliefs in dealing with specific issue areas.

It also disconfirmed a number of hypotheses:

- H7 : The operational code of executives is more differentiated in its instrumental sub-system than in its philosophical sub-system.
- H13: The more interdependent the more stable is the operational code.

Having developed such a model, we outlined the basic contours of Egypt's decision-making system under Nasser. In such a system, Nasser monopolized the process of foreign policy decision-making, reducing the role of other institutions to the role of validating his decisions. Such a finding increased our confidence in analyzing Egypt's policy decisions from the perspective of Nasser's operational code. Two basic methods were used to test the relationship between Nasser's code and his foreign policy decision-making. The first was the process-tracing method. We tested and confirmed three hypotheses pertaining to the impact of Nasser's operational code on his propensity to make choices:

- H3 : Decision-makers who hold a unitary image of the opponent are likely to advocate uncompromising policies.
- H4 : Optimists recommend compromising policies while pessimists advocate uncompromising policies.
- H5 : A decision-maker who attributes dispositional explanations to the opponent is likely to recommend unconciliatory policies.

The second was the congruence method through which we analyzed three major episodes in Nasser's foreign policy: the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, the decision not to resort to force to suppress the Syrian military coup, and the clusters of decisions taken in the course of the 1967 crisis. The analysis of these decisions demonstrated that Nasser's choice of a specific course of action was embedded in his operational code and was basically consistent with the calculation drawn from his operational code. Only in the case of the decision to close the Aqaba Gulf, we found inconsistency between Nasser's code and his decision. Such a finding highlights the limitations of the operational code approach. However, the overall analysis points out that the approach is a viable means of the understanding of foreign policy decisions under crisis conditions.

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M.E.S.

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to (1) present an empirically supportable, and systematically constructed configuration of President Gamal Abdel-Nasser's operational code belief system through the application of George's "operational code" construct; and (2) to generate and test hypotheses on the impact of an individual's operational code beliefs on his policy choices and decisions. The study is original in the sense that no one has previously used the operational code approach to study Nasser's belief system and decision making behaviour. The study seeks further to make a methodological contribution by applying the technique of quantitative content analysis to the construction of an operational code.

The choice of a central decision maker such as Nasser for the empirical domain of this study is justified on several grounds. From the foreign policy literature, it appears that "individuals constitute the ultimate locus of action. Individual decision makers act and speak for the nation-states... To know what is in the minds of men at the point of internationally relevant action is an important input to the study of the behavior of nation-states" (Kelman, 1970:4). The individuals to be studied for the purpose of understanding the foreign policy process are those "who perform the function of

political authorization in the foreign policy arena, that is, the head of government and the foreign minister" (Brecher, et al., 1969:86). This approach is particularly appropriate in under-developed countries where individual leader variables as opposed to system attributes are likely to be most important in explaining foreign policy behavior (Rosenau, 1971:148-149).

The choice of Nasser is particularly apt when applied to Egypt's foreign policy. First, Nasser was the head of both the Egyptian state and government for most of his years in power. In the Egyptian political system, the position of the head of state is a highly unstructured position which usually provides its holder with considerable authority over foreign policy. Consequently, a decision maker in such a role is more likely to reflect idiosyncratic variables in the making and implementation of foreign policy decisions than in more defined roles at lower echelons of the decision making process (Hermann, 1974:202). Secondly, Nasser maintained a highly personalized decision making system especially in the foreign policy domain. Foreign policy theorists and analysts concur that in such monolithic systems where the foreign policy organization is less differentiated, the decision maker's cognitive system will be more crucial in understanding the foreign policy process (Verba, 1961:103; Hermann, 1976:329-330). Thirdly, from a political viewpoint, Nasser played a crucial role in shaping the political life of contemporary Egypt and the Middle East in general. In the

prevailing rhetoric of the Middle East conflict, Nasser's beliefs and strategies have been frequently referred to with possible misinterpretations, even blatant distortions. This is another reason why, by using the operational code approach, we undertook this project to seek, through empirically replicable and scientifically testable methods, to reconstruct Nasser's political belief system.

The second objective of this project is hypothesis generation and testing with data from a single case study. The traditional single case study has been depicted as basically a descriptive exercise, largely concerned with the unique aspects of a particular case and largely unconcerned with generalizations. Undoubtedly, the "uniqueness" of Nasser as one of the best known leaders and statesmen deserves to be fully investigated and understood. However, we intend to go beyond the traditional conception of a single case studies by trying to draw some relevant hypotheses out of the study of Nasser. As Glaser and Strauss (1967) argued, the generation and testing of hypotheses from cases of the particular phenomena may provide an alternative to a priori theory.

The thesis will be divided into three parts. In part one, the theoretical framework underlying the study, the basic hypotheses and the data making operations will be outlined. Part two will deal with the analysis of Nasser's operational code and the testing of hypotheses related to the structures

and functions of the operational code. The third part will focus on the impact of Nasser's operational code on his foreign policy decision making behavior, through an analysis of some of his major decisions. .

PART I

The Operational Code Approach

A Theoretical Framework

CHAPTER I

COGNITIVE PROCESSES AND FOREIGN POLICY

From the time of Plato, if not earlier, students of politics have widely recognized that divergence exists between reality and what any given individual perceives as reality. It has been assumed that individual behavior is in large part shaped by the manner in which he or she perceives, diagnoses, and evaluates reality. A foreign policy maker's perceptions, images, and beliefs are crucial to understanding his foreign policy. Walter Lippmann (1965:10) explains that man is faced with such a massive, complex environment that he must develop aids to help in its interpretation, which he labels "pictures in our heads." These pictures constitute an:

...insertion between man and his environment of a pseudo-environment. To that pseudo-environment man's behavior is a response. But because it is behavior, the consequences... operate not in the pseudo-environment where the behavior is stimulated, but in the real environment where action eventuates.

1. The Cognitive Approach

If "reality" and "perceived reality" do not necessarily coincide with each other, and if the "perceived reality" is the basis of human behavior, then we must conclude that a foreign policy maker's perceptions, images and beliefs are

crucial to the understanding of his decisions. As Wright (1955:429) has noted "...international relations are in large measure relations between beliefs about nations, not between actual nations." Similarly, Boulding (1971:91) has argued that:

The people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the "objective" facts of the situation, whatever that may mean, but to their image of the situation.

In his theory of social evolution, Boulding (1978:132) generalized this proposition to human behavior at large:

Another capacity of human mind, which is of great importance in the genesis of human artifacts, is the capacity for forming complex images of the future, as a product of perhaps of a larger capacity for forming images of spaces and time. This capacity for forming images of the future is a necessary prerequisite for behavior directed toward fulfilling them.

The decision making models developed by Simon (1957), Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1962), and Steinbruner (1974) start from the same premise that the perceptual and cognitive system of the decision maker is crucial in the making of decisions.¹

¹ Cognition is an all-encompassing concept which includes all other perceptual concepts such as beliefs, images, perceptions or values. One can cognize without believing or valuing, but the reverse is not possible. The word cognition is derived from the Latin word cogna, to think about many things and bring them together in a unified way (Reed, 1972 and Bell, 1976). Cognition has been defined as:

The symbolic mental and inferred (not directly seen) processes of humans. Thus the sharpening and redefining of abstract concepts such as

In the area of foreign policy analysis, the Sprouts apply the cognitive model by assuming that men perceive reality only as it is filtered through their individual sets of images, values, and expectations. The resulting perception, the psycho-milieu, may be quite different from the operational, or real, environment; and in decision making, "...what matters is how the policy-maker imagines the milieu to be, not how it actually is" (Sprouts, 1957:318). The decision reached is based upon what the decision maker perceives as reality. However, the operational environment becomes of paramount concern in the implementation of the decision because it is in the real world that the decision is tested.

freedom and justice, the search for a solution to a problem, and the use of strategies in games are said to be instances of cognitive processes... Cognition thus typically refers to the class of processes involving such activities as thinking, reasoning, problem solving and conceptual learning." (Ellis, 1972:3)

Cognition occurs when the relevant spatial contexts become so complex that they must be cognitively organized and committed to memory. Such cognitive organization contains events and objects which are outside the immediate sensory field of the individual. This characteristic is what distinguishes cognition from perception. Perception involves awareness (sensory experience) rather than thought (Downs and Stea, 1973:14). Perception has a more direct sensory referent than cognition.

Perception is the total of meaningful stimuli than an actor or group of actors brings to and receives from a specific situation at a particular point in time. (Kirk, 1976:9).

The model developed by the Brecher group at McGill University is based on the same assumption that the image held by a decision maker is the decisive input of a foreign policy system (Brecher et al., 1969:86). Elite images of the operational environment are filtered through certain attitudinal prisms to produce certain actions or decisions.

Not surprisingly, theorists of deterrence have recently begun to abandon assumptions of rationality in deterrence models and to build new models of deterrence based on cognitive factors and beliefs. The models developed by George and Smoke (1974) and Snyder (1978) are based on the premise that cognitive processes of the decision makers are crucial in explaining the failure of deterrence.

Generally, the cognitive model is derived from some basic tenets which distinguish them from other structural and game-theoretical models. First: the individual decision maker (either acting alone or in a small group) is the basic unit of analysis. Second: the environment in which the individual functions is not a veridical one from which perfect information can be obtained. The real world is complex and relative. Third: in order to function the individual must relate himself in some way or the other to his environment. This is usually achieved by acquiring during the course of his development a set of beliefs about his environment. These beliefs provide him with a relatively coherent way of making sense of what

otherwise would be a confusing array of sensory signals.

Fourth: individuals, and certainly all political leaders, short-circuit the rational choice by relying on their beliefs and cognitive mechanisms to produce the necessary decisions.

Fifth: a decision process or a behavior is provoked when the decision maker organizes the environment into a pattern that suggests to him a decision or a behavior is appropriate. The reason why that pattern requires action rests within the decision maker's cognitive system.¹

2. Criticisms of the Cognitive Approach

Most theorists and analysts of foreign policy and decision making acknowledge the validity of these basic premises. However, the acknowledgement of the role of cognitive processes has not resulted in their incorporation in major models of international relations research. Three major factors have contributed to the relative disillusionment with the cognitive approach to the study of foreign policy:

First: Conceptual ambiguity of the cognitive approach:

The relative weight to be assigned to cognitions and perceptions has been one of the problems that plagued recent social-psychological research. The situational-behavioral school has argued that human behavior is a function of empirical events and

¹For further elaboration of these basic premises see George (1975); Bonham (1976:498-500); McGuire (1969:261) and Stein (1977:433).

situations. Behavior is no more than a response to environmental stimuli (Farber, 1965:6-8). This school has incurred severe criticism from students of psycholinguistics and clinical social-psychologists who argued that:

Situation is a function of the observer in the sense that the observer's cognitive schemes filter and organize the environment in a fashion that makes it impossible to completely separate the environment from the person observing it (Bowers, 1973:328).

This controversy in social psychology has led foreign policy analysts to question the wisdom of incorporating into their research social-psychological variables whose exact role is still not agreed upon among social-psychologists themselves. Because of this conceptual ambiguity, the cognitive approach has been criticized as being "atheoretical" and "pre-theoretical" (Kirk, 1976:10).

Second: The artificial-clinical nature of social psychological research:

The relevant social-psychological literature on cognitions and perceptions has emerged basically from the artificial environment of the laboratory. Such environment has little resemblance to the political environment. Many clinical techniques which social psychologists utilize cannot be readily adapted to foreign policy research. While social-psychological research has drawn the attention of foreign policy students to the central role of cognitive processes, it has failed to provide them with theoretical guidelines or applicable techniques.

Third: The results of research on attitudes and behavior:

Social-psychologists have applied the cognitive construct attitudes to predict behavior. The results have been devastating. Two reviews of literature on attitudes and behavior (Wicker, 1969 and Kiesler, 1969) have shown that attitudes are poor predictors of behavior.

Disillusionment with cognitive approaches has been enhanced because of the results of simplistic and mechanistic applications of cognitive processes in foreign policy research. Such applications assumed a one-to-one relationship between perception and behavior, and consequently failed to find significant correlations between the decision maker's perceptions and his immediate behavior.¹

These basic factors have led foreign policy analysts to articulate some particular misgivings pertaining to the cognitive analysis of foreign policy:

(a) Inadequacy of Cognitive Variables

Belief systems and cognitive variables play a peripheral role in foreign policy decision making and consequently have little explanatory power. Verba (1961:105) and Brodin (1972:101) argue that foreign policy decisions are made within complex bureaucratic and societal organizations which place

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One may cite the study of John Field (1972) which attempted to find correlations between perceptions of Indian and Chinese decision makers and their behavior during the same or following day.

severe constraints on the role of the decision maker's beliefs. Levi (1970:29) also argues that while the decision maker's beliefs help him to define a specific situation, the ultimate concern is not determined by his beliefs. Beliefs are likely to be changed to accommodate the realities of the situation. If beliefs and ideologies of the decision maker have any influence on foreign policy at all, Levi argues (1970:21), this influence is likely to be in the direction of adjusting rather than discarding the policy.

Their (decision makers') views and beliefs tend to cancel out because normally policies formulated in a hierarchy of officials or group meetings have to be justified on rational grounds rather than personal differences (Levi, 1970:25).

Other critics argue that foreign policy is a social process rather than an intellectual one. Political leaders, even the most authoritarian of them, are representatives of whole elites (Bauer et al., 1963). The basic contours of Soviet foreign policy, it has been argued, are exact manifestations of Soviet national interests and/or Marxism-Leninism (Aspaturian, 1972:182-184). The relative consistency of American foreign policy can be explained in the light of the durability of the American social system (Kolko and Kolko, 1972:7-8). Consequently, misperceptions and individual beliefs are not crucial to the understanding of government foreign policy.

(b) Reductive fallacy

The cognitive-perceptual framework amounts to a "reductive fallacy." It fails to assimilate into the single matrix of misperception the multitude of factors associated with human behavior in crisis situations. In a study on the role of misperception in the failure to respond to a pre-eminent attack, Ben-Zvi (1976:90-91) argued:

In addition to underrating the human capacity to innovate, initiate, and proceed beyond the range of fixed parameters and decision rules, the cognitive-perceptual category tends to de-emphasize the multitude of factors, dimensions and stages that constitute the process by which nations come to grips with threatening situations. Obsessed with the concept of misperception, it imposes a one dimensional explanation upon a phenomenon that is essentially multi-faceted...

Not only does this propensity to analyze complex environments with a single explanatory tool distort reality, but it may distract scholars and policy makers from the entire cluster of bureaucratic, organizational, and communication factors that ultimately determine whether the threatened state will respond appropriately to the challenge confronting it. (emphasis added)

Rummel (1977:88) also questions the possibility of explaining all aspects of human conflict in the light of misperceptions. Even though he acknowledges that "our actions follow our perceptions" Rummel contends that the misperception argument neglects the overwhelming importance of realistic conflicts that are based on actual clash of interests. The revolutionary and the governor, Rummel argues, are not

conflicting because of misperception but because of deeply felt opposing interests. Accordingly, Rummel argues that we should focus not on misperception itself but on the operation of the whole field in relation to the specific external forces confronting it.

(c) Lack of rigorous methods

Cognitive approaches lack any rigorous methods to reconstruct the decision maker's perceptions and cognitions. The methods that have been used are very questionable. Psychological clinical experiments cannot be applied to foreign policy research, and the method of relying on official statements and public utterances of decision makers is not likely to reveal the real perceptions and beliefs (Brodin, 1972:103, and Kolko and Kolko, 1972:7).

3. Counter Arguments

The cognitive approach like any theoretical and conceptual approach cannot, and should not, be considered as the ultimate paradigm. Given the complexity of human behavior, especially in the area of international politics, every approach has a limited explanatory power. Further, a theory of foreign policy is adequate to the extent that it accounts for the outcomes it seeks to explain (Bonham, 1976:505). Various applications of the cognitive approach have indicated that cognitive processes do explain human choice and perception, and that to understand human decision making, one must

take into account these processes. A quick review of the literature will readily show that the cognitive approach has been quite successfully applied.

Using a clinical social-psychological approach, Brim, Glass, Lavin, and Goodman (1962) conducted an impressive study on the relationships between the individual decision process and three classes of explanatory variables: personality variables (abilities, motivations, and beliefs)¹; social class and sex variables; and situational variables. The dependent variable is the decision process, that is, the individual behavior in the identification of the problem, evaluation and strategy-selection. Using self-administered clinical tests, Brim et al. administered a Decision Process Test pertaining to four social issues. The independent variables were assessed similarly and correlated with the decision process variables. Using factor analysis and correlational analysis, Brim et al. arrived at impressive results. The belief

¹Beliefs were divided into epistemological beliefs and instrumental beliefs. Some of the beliefs included are belief about the degree of mastery over environment, beliefs about the predictability of life, belief in optimism-pessimism, belief in multiple causation of events. These beliefs are also included in our analysis of the operational code belief system.

in the ability to control the environment was found to be positively correlated with the number of outcomes considered. Belief in the predictability of life was found to be a good predictor of the choice of the highest expected utility (Tables 28 and 29:255-256).

The second example is a political-empirical cognitive study. Stassen (1972) based his research on an earlier study by Rosenau (1968) who found that party and committee role determine what US senators said about Secretaries Acheson and Dulles. Republicans were more likely to support a Republican Secretary of State. Members of the Foreign Relations Committee were more supportive of secretaries, regardless of party, than were senators not in that role. Stassen added to the data the belief variable, and classified the senators according to some cognitive dimensions. He found that the individual's "belief-set" was more strongly related to senatorial comments about Secretaries of State than the role variable and the belief-set variable was capable of explaining more of the variance.

The Holsti study on Dulles' perceptions of the USSR is perhaps the most extended effort yet undertaken to assess empirically the validity of a cognitive approach to decision making analysis. The core of the Holsti (1967) study concerns the effect of the imbalance between the affective and cognitive elements of the belief system upon decision making.

Holsti points out that the receipt of information contrary to the existing cognitive structure generates intra-personal dissonance. Possible methods of achieving a re-balance include: discrediting the source of contrary information, searching for new information, re-interpreting the new information to make it consistent with the belief system, differentiating the new information into subcategories, or modifying the belief system so as to be consistent with the new information. Dissonance reduction produced via any of these methods, except the last, is likely to result in misperception. The choice of any of these methods depends on the content source of the discrepant information, the situation, and the personality of the decision-maker. Because of the nature of Dulles' cognitive system, Holsti predicted that Dulles would be likely to distort perceptions of reality rather than change his belief system of the Soviet Union. Holsti hypothesized that Dulles' perceptions of decreasing Soviet hostility resulted in no significant change in his general evaluation of the Soviet Union, and in assessments of decreasing Soviet capabilities. The analysis of the data generated through Evaluative Assertion Analysis confirmed the role of Dulles' belief system in relation to the policy of the USA toward the USSR.

The results of the above mentioned research clearly indicate that cognitive approaches can account for the outcomes they propose to explain. Furthermore, when compared with other societal-structural explanations of foreign policy behavior, the cognitive-perceptual approach was found to be a better predictor of behavior. Zinnes (1972), who reviewed and compared the findings of these two basic approaches, found that various cognitive-perceptual hypotheses were better predictors of foreign policy behavior than societal-systemic hypotheses.

Successful applications of the cognitive approach may lead its over-zealous advocates to fall into the trap of reductive fallacy. Fortunately, no cognitive researcher is naive enough to claim that a cognitive approach alone is capable of explaining the wide range of human behavior.¹ Rather, they argue that emphasis on structural and bureaucratic processes need not exclude a concern for cognitive processes.

¹ Interestingly enough, Ben-Zvi, the staunchest articulator of this criticism, has recently published a study analyzing the American-Japanese Pacific war solely from a perceptual-belief perspective. He concluded (Ben-Zvi, 1978:42) that "decision makers in foreign policy act in accordance with their perceptions of reality" (emphasis in original). However, he warned against the reliance on cognitive analysis of political processes in all situations.

of the individual decision makers, and that under certain conditions a cognitive perspective may be the proper way to approach human information processing and decision making.¹

Finally, one must agree with Kirk that most of the cognitive research lacks a well-integrated theoretical framework of testable hypotheses. This may be attributed to the lack of powerful and replicable instruments for the systematic understanding of the phenomena under investigation. Singer's (1969:30) diagnosis of the field of foreign policy and how it should be developed seems to be perfectly applicable to the field of belief system and cognitive research:

¹ In contrasting bureaucratic and cognitive approaches, George and Holsti (1975:13) argue that while a bureaucratic politics focus may be useful in understanding the slippage between an executive decision and foreign policy outputs which may emerge in the process of implementing the decision, it may be less viable (relative to a cognitive approach) for explaining the decision itself. Also, Art (1974:92) argues:

The abilities of bureaucracies to independently establish policies or for Congress to compel outcome is a function of Presidential attention. Presidential attention is a function of Presidential values. The Chief Executive involves himself in those areas which he determines to be important. And that attention is ultimately a reflection of his mental baggage, of generational mind sets, of beliefs concerning what man and society ought to be (emphasis added).

One of the reasons for the sorry state of our field is the tendency to by-pass existential descriptions of an operational nature in the search for original theoretical formulations with strong explanatory power. My view is that, while such enterprises ought to be continued by some, more of us should be developing operational descriptions, applying them to comparative analyses and producing data based on empirical generalizations.

This project is a step in that direction. It offers a data-based model of the operational code belief system of one decision maker using replicable methods, and utilizes the data to test some hypotheses that have been cited in the literature.

The final criticism concerning the inadequacy of the methods used to reconstruct belief systems raises validity issues which will be dealt with in our general discussion of problems of validity in the fourth chapter of this thesis.

CHAPTER II

BELIEF SYSTEMS AND HUMAN CHOICE

1. The Genesis of a Social-Psychological Paradigm

(a) The Cognitive Perspective

If cognitive processes are accepted as central to the analysis of policy choices and behavior, beliefs, as a major cognitive variable, deserve particular attention. Jastrow's (1927:284) assertion that "the human mind is a belief-seeking, rather than a fact-seeking apparatus" heralded the introduction and acceptance of a new social-psychological paradigm which conceives of man as an active constructor of beliefs which help him to cope with his environment. Since then social-psychologists have steadily rejected the Darwinian conception of the human mind as being a reactive mechanical robot, and accepted the notion that man is an active constructor of truth and beliefs which are in turn his action rules.

The acceptance of beliefs as a fundamental explanatory construct was highlighted by Lewin's dynamic field theory and Tolman's purposive behaviorism. Lewin (1936) spoke of the individual as acting in a life space, which is the totality of psychological influences operating upon a person in a given point in time. For Lewin, man's thinking and behaving are

inextricably connected. A man's action depends upon his salient goals as well as his conception of the likelihood that these actions will lead to success. Tolman (1932, 1959) argued that the human organism develops cognitive maps as a function of experience. These maps are composed of expectancies concerning what actions might lead to what consequences in the environment. Circumstances influence behavior through the mediation of a belief-value matrix. For Tolman, beliefs and cognitive dispositions are intervening variables between existing stimulus conditions (independent variable) and the organism's responses (dependent variable).

For the last six decades, social psychologists, behavioral geographers, and decision analysts have accepted this conceptualization of man as an active constructor of beliefs, and that "human spatial behavior is dependent on the individual's cognitive map of the spatial environment" (Downs and Stea, 1973:13, Emphasis in original). To this perspective, phenomenological and attribution theorists have recently introduced the notion that man is basically a "problem-solver". Man endeavors to control the outcomes of social situations. This endeavor is accomplished by the cycle of formulating hypotheses and testing their validity, continually construing choice-alternatives, and explaining and predicting the goals and behavior of other actors (Lamberth et al., 1978:142-144). Kelly (1955:46)--the pioneer of this perspective--argued that man represents rather than reacts to his environment.

He is not bound by his environment, but basically by his interpretations or representations of it. Central to this process, Kelly argues, are the superordinate core constructs, that is, the fundamental beliefs a person holds.

This conceptual social-psychological shift in the models of man has had a considerable impact on cognitive theory and decision making and foreign policy research. The acceptance of the centrality of beliefs has become almost axiomatic among social psychologists and decision making theorists. As Lane (1972:161-162) has argued, "an adequate explanation of public policy is achieved only through an understanding of the political belief systems prevalent in the society." A belief system, Lane adds, provides the individual with a sense of identity and guides for interpersonal behavior as well as means of interpreting the roles he and others occupy. In foreign policy research, Jervis (1976:28) came to the conclusion,

It is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without references to the decision-makers' beliefs about the world and their images of others.

Bonham and Shapiro (1973) developed a decision making model based on analysis of the decision makers' cognitive maps. The model is based on the notion that:

In the decision making process, beliefs act like templates for channelling information and for relating possible policy options to perceptions about the intentions and behavior of other nations and also the policy objectives of the decision maker (Bonham and Shapiro, 1973:61).

As an illustration, two cognitive models will be examined, the indirect linkage model, and the dual linkage model.

The indirect linkage model is constructed by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975:14-16). They argue that each person forms a set of beliefs about himself, about other people, about institutions and events. This set of beliefs serves as the base which determines his attitudes. Attitudes in turn determine a person's intentions to perform a variety of behaviors with respect to a certain object. Each intention is viewed as being related to a corresponding behavior. The indirect belief-behavior linkage in the Fishbein-Ajzen model has been schematically presented as follows:

Fig. 2.1--The indirect belief-behavior linkage
Source: Fishbein and Ajzen (1975:16)

The Holsti model outlined in the previous chapter is based on the premise of a dual connection between the decision maker's belief system and his action. The direct relationship is found in the aspect of belief systems which tells us what ought to be, acting as a direct guide in the establishment of goals. The indirect link lies in the role the belief system plays in the process of scanning, selecting, filtering, linking, organizing and reporting (Holsti, 1971).

Fig:2.2--The Dual Relationship Between Belief System and Decision Making

Source: Holsti (1971:33)

The two models--the indirect linkage model and the dual linkage model--stress the importance of the belief system in the decision making process. On the other hand, the two models are different in their emphasis on which element of the belief system plays a more crucial role. Whereas the Holsti model puts more weight on the normative element of the belief system, the Fishbein-Ajzen model is more reality-oriented with its feedback structure which may affect the decision maker's perception of reality and his normative stand toward that reality.

2. Belief Systems and the Decision Making Process

A Theoretical Framework

(a) The Believing Process and the Belief System

The operational environment is essentially a large-scale complex, and more or less unpredictable milieu. In contrast, the individual is a relatively small organism with limited stimulus-sensing capabilities and information-processing and storage capacity. The individual's capacity to receive, process, and assimilate information about his environment and to predict the probable consequences of his actions is limited. The individual receives a tremendous array of information from complex and uncertain sources via a series of imperfect sensory modalities. He also interacts with a multitude of relatively unpredictable actors whose orientations and goals are more or less different than his.

To cope with such diversity and limited capacity, the individual must form a certain representation of reality, that is, modes of thinking, adapting and responding to various stimuli.¹ The critical process in which these modes operate is the believing process. The believing process is basically an approximate psychological schematization of reality. By schematization of reality is meant the use of cognitive categories into which we code environmental information and by which we interpret such information. Through this process, the individual is related to his external world and informed of his identity in various systems (Sarbin, 1964:630-638, and Schiebe, 1970:23-24).

The believing process helps each individual to develop a set of beliefs about the nature of his environment and the ways of coping with its uncertainties. "Beliefs are...premises in our practical reasoning" (Armstrong, 1973:74). This set of beliefs is usually inter-linked through certain vertical and horizontal relationships. "Individuals do not subscribe to random collections of beliefs, but rather they maintain coherent systems of beliefs which are inherently consistent" (Bem, 1970:13). This system of beliefs constitutes the core

¹These modes may be unconsciously developed. Beliefs are states of mind which we need not even know that we possess (Armstrong, 1973:21).

of the individual's modus operandi for choices and responses.

"Beliefs are basically emergent guides for purposive behavior in a specific situation" (Schiebe, 1970:36).

Beliefs are maps by which we steer.
Unlike entertained propositions, beliefs are action guiding. Entertained propositions are like fanciful maps, idly scrawled out. But beliefs are maps of the world in which we are prepared to act (Armstrong, 1973:4, emphasis in original).

Beliefs are also the individual's vehicles for processing information. By information processing is meant the way in which the individual combines and inter-relates various conceptual rules to interpret and explain a phenomenon (Schroder et al., 1967:8). For example, facing an international issue, an individual may perceive only two dimensions: economic capabilities and ideology. These two dimensions are inter-related in one way or another to make this perceived phenomenon more comprehensible to him. Alternatively, the individual may conceptualize an issue in terms of a multitude of concepts. However, if these concepts are compartmentalized, his information processing capacity will be greatly reduced, or at least his behavior becomes incoherent.

The act of decision making is predicated on the processing of available information and facts in the light of the decision maker's beliefs and values. Regardless of their decision making model, rational or irrational, human beings make decisions through combining (perceived) facts relevant

to the situation and their sets of pre-determined beliefs and values about correct strategy and tactics. Simon (1947) argued that every decision is an imperative derived logically from another imperative (belief or value) and several relevant facts. Subramaniam (1963) expanded Simon's argument as a general model of decision making. According to this model, the crux of the decision making process involves the logical combination of relevant primary values with relevant facts in order to develop a series of intelligible derivative values and alternatives. A decision maker chooses a specific alternative through comparing the derived alternatives with his pre-determined order of preference.¹

(b) The Information Screening Role of the Belief system

Beliefs and belief systems are also crucial because they determine the range and content of the individual's perceptions and attitudes.² "The totality of a person's beliefs serves as the informational base that ultimately determines his attitudes, intentions, and behaviors" (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975:14). A decision maker's attitude toward a specific external actor is determined by the objects with which such actor is linked within his belief system. Not only do beliefs

¹The Simon and Subramaniam models are predicated on the assumption that decision makers will combine relevant values and facts in a rational and logical way.

²This is not to say that beliefs are the only determinants of perception. Other factors, such as socialization, personality, and attitudes are also important (Kirk, 1976:9ff).

determine what one perceives, but also what one does not perceive. Beliefs have a built-in mechanism through which they orient the individual to ignore or discredit certain types of information or signals (O'Shaughnessy, 1973:20).

In foreign policy, the decision maker's fundamental beliefs about the opponent and his approach to risk calculation play a crucial role in orienting the decision maker toward certain choices. For example, the decision not to pre-empt (in spite of signals of a pre-eminent attack) by the American State Department before the Korean war or by the Israeli Cabinet before the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, was determined by the decision maker's beliefs about the opponent's risk calculation. The Israeli leadership was so obsessed with the belief that Egyptian decision makers would never take the risk of launching an assault whose outcome is uncertain that they neglected reliable information to the contrary. Various psychological experiments have proven that the range of choice propensities which actualize in a specific situation is usually congruent with one's beliefs (DeRivera, 1968:20). Sears (1968) demonstrated that the higher the differentiation, intensity and stability of beliefs, the greater the likelihood that one will actually vote. Milbrath (1965) also demonstrated

that one's pattern of political participation can be explained in terms of his belief system.¹

One may schematically conceive the screening role of the belief system as follows:

Fig. 2.3--The Screening Role of the Belief System

3. The Role of the Belief System in Uncertain Situations

The major function of beliefs is to aid the individual in coping with environmental uncertainties by limiting the parameters of his choice propensities, which, in turn, help the individual to choose among a wide array of rationally-incalculable alternatives. Consequently, one can explain and predict an individual's choice by reference to his beliefs and adaptive strategies.

¹

On a systematic level, there is ample evidence that aggregate belief distribution in society tends to influence systemic outputs. Lack of differentiation and intensity of the beliefs of mass public are linked with system durability and stability. Economic development also correlates with a mass belief in one's ability to change his environment (Cobb, 1973:142-143).

However, human judgement and choice are not functions of beliefs only. Belief systems are merely "predisposing" factors which must be conjoined by "precipitating" factors (located in the environment and perceived by the individual) in order to be fully operative.¹ In addition to his belief system, which defines the individual's ideal blueprint for action in society, each individual develops an informational system which comprises representations of what exists or what is occurring in his environment. It is the interaction between these two systems that prompts the individual to choose a certain course of action (Bates and Harvey, 1975:240-241). The informational system consists of two sets of perceived information: (1) feed-in information; and (2) feed-back information. Feed-in information furnishes data to the individual about the characteristics of the situation in which he is operating. These data act as stimuli for action. Once the individual acts, he is likely to receive feed-back information which provides him with data about the appropriateness of his initial response. Depending on the nature of the feed-back information, the process which produced the initial response

¹Yinger (1963:585) illustrates this point by giving the example of individual suicidal behavior. A person caught in a thoroughly anomic situation and surrounded by other social forces strongly precipitating him toward suicide will have no likelihood of performing the act if his predisposition to suicide is zero. Similarly, if he is as thoroughly disposed, but is surrounded by a situation that contains no precipitating influence, suicide will not occur.

can be either reinforced or undermined. Gradually, the individual develops a relatively stable pattern of associations and reinforcements between his belief system and his perceived informational system. The ideal illustration for this case is the traditional scientific experiment. Through experimentation, the scientist obtains precise outcome information on the basis of which he may revise his initial judgement. In this case, feed-in and feed-back information about the experiment continually enables the scientist to adapt his cognitive judgements, beliefs and hypotheses. Therefore, the scientist's responses are largely an outcome of his cognitive system and informational (environmental) system.

What happens if the individual must make choices on the basis of uncertain informational system, under conditions in which the environmental system (feed-in and feed-back information) is unknown or confounded, or when the individual is confronted by a situation that produces a sudden flow of new information quite contradictory to what is already learnt or perceived? Rappoport and Summers (1973:5) argue that in this case the individual's cognitive (belief) system will be the only reference for choices and judgements. Under these conditions, the individual's cognitive system will be the only operative system in decision making. Rappoport and Summers distinguish between this single-system case of human

judgement and the two-system case in which the environment and the cognitive systems are fully operative.

The single case system of decision making is likely to be set into motion under specific facilitating situation factors namely:

(i) Non-routine situations that require more than merely the application of decision rules, such as decisions to initiate or terminate war, interventions and alliances (Holsti, 1976b:30).

(ii) Highly ambiguous situations which are open to different interpretations. Budner (1962:30) identified three types of ambiguous situations: (1) completely new situations in which there are no familiar cues; (2) complex situations in which there are a great number of cues to take into account; and (3) contradictory situations in which different elements suggest different structures.

These situations are simply criterion absent. The decision maker is then forced to rely upon his own pre-established beliefs in order to define the situation. On the other hand, social learning theorists argue that individuals who believe in their ability to control their environment are more likely to engage in greater information seeking when he defines the situation than individuals who believe that they cannot exercise such control. But they also add

that these relationships seem to work best in those situations which are highly unstructured and that permit varying conceptualizations by individuals (Phares, 1976:23-24).

If the cues of the specific situation are strong enough, the behavior of most individuals will be similar, regardless of their generalized beliefs. On the other hand, when the situation is ambiguous, the behavior of individuals is much more likely to reflect their generalized locus of control beliefs (Phares, 1976:172).

Goldhamer (1950:349-353), Levinston (1958:9), DiRenzo (1974:25) and Hermann (1976:331) hypothesized that in ambiguous situations the response of the decision maker is likelier to involve personality elements and beliefs. Pruitt (1965:391-430) contends that ambiguous information heightens the influence of perceptual predispositions on a given entity's behavior. Jervis (1976:Ch.4) similarly asserts that the more ambiguous the information, the greater is the impact of an individual's belief system on his interpretation of the information. Mueller (1970:17) asserts that when the probable outcomes of some alternatives are unknown and not obtainable, subjective and "instinctive" determinations prevail in decision making. For instance, the Franco-German conflict situation over Morocco in 1905 was so ambiguous for the French Premier Rouvier and his Foreign Minister Delcasse that they had different definitions of the situations and different policy recommendations. For Rouvier, the Germans were basically benevolent neighbours who were unjustifiably irritated by French moves, therefore

France must pacify Germany by offering concessions. Delcassé saw Germany as an implacable opponent who was likely to take advantage of any conciliatory moves. Therefore, he advocated a firm policy. Later, when the Germans made clear, through their communications, their goal of humiliating France, Rouvier's policy stance shifted to resemble Delcassé's (Snyder and Diesing, 1977:294).

Another ambiguous situation arises in the case of deterrence. The defender is highly uncertain about the possible payoffs of his strategies. Hence, his general beliefs about the opponent's behavioral style, goals, risk-taking are critical for the definition of the situation, interpretation of intelligence information, and policy recommendations.

(iii) Situations of high stress are also likely to activate the single system of decision making. Under stressful conditions, the individual's ability to absorb information is impaired. Thus, in spite of the availability of information, which is of little use to his decision making process, the individual behaves exactly in the same manner as in the situation of uncertainty, that is, his belief system plays a predominant role. Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965:509) hypothesized that personality variables are likely to be more important when stress is greater and information is less.¹

¹ For a detailed review of the literature: Verba (1961:100-102); Brim et al. (1962:9); Greenstein (1969), Kelman (1970:6); Steinbruner (1974:89-90); Holsti (1976b:30-31); Hermann (1978b:51-52) and Falkowski (1978:20-23).

In general, the role of the belief system is crucial in the following decision making conditions.

Fig. 2.4--The Role of Belief System Under Different Situations

Only in situation I, the environment has some indirect effect on the decision process. Situation II illustrates an ambiguous decision making context. In situation III, contradictory facts cancel each other, thus the decision maker must rely on his beliefs for his action. In situation IV, stress impairs the decision maker's rational calculations of the available information and alternatives.

Structural uncertainty is the common denominator of all those situations. By structural uncertainty is meant situations in which not only are probability distributions not known, but even the possible states of the situations are imperfectly

specified. Uncertainty encompasses two basic dimensions: (1) the unpredictability of the situation for the feed-in process; and (2) the inability to accurately predict the consequences of actions of the actor or other actors for the feed-back process. The less the predictability of one's environment, the more uncertain one is about it (Jenkins, 1975:76). The unstructured complexity and unpredictability of such situations compels the decision maker to resort to his belief system--the only criterion available--in order to process information and reach judgements quickly. Not knowing whether a particular event or class of events will occur, the decision maker has no way to choose rationally among various rational decision strategies or to calculate the expected payoffs for a potential decision or a strategy. What criteria should he use in selecting a strategy, a decision, or a course of action?

Decision theory provides no one best criterion for selecting a strategy under conditions of uncertainty. Instead, there are a number of different criteria, each of which has a perfectly good rationale to justify it. The choice among those criteria is determined by organizational policy and/or the attitudes of the decision maker (Miller and Starr, 1967:115). Emphasis added.

4. The Belief System and Foreign Policy

Most foreign policy situations are typical structural uncertainty situations. George Kennan (1967) has noted that foreign policy decisions are usually made on the basis of ambiguous information, and by the time they are put into effect it may be impossible to get reliable outcome and feed-back information, or conditions may have changed so drastically that outcomes cannot be related to decisions. In general, the uncertain nature of the foreign policy domain can be accounted for by three basic characteristics usually associated with uncertainty: ambiguous or contradictory information, unpredictable consequences, and high level of stress.

(a) Ambiguous and Unpredictable Conditions in the International System

The foreign policy decision maker can hardly obtain fully adequate and reliable information about the goals, strategies, future behavior of competing actors in the international system. Mandel (1979:88) notes that time pressures and information ambiguity have their greatest impact on distorted perceptions at the international level because this level has fewer gains than on the interpersonal and intergroup levels for verifying the interpretations of messages. In the foreign policy arena, there is also a multitude of actors whose goals and strategies cannot be directly controlled by the decision

maker. Jenkins (1975:81) argues that global uncertainty is a result of the inequality among countries' orientations toward their external environment. As the disparity among countries' orientations increases, uncertainty of the global environment also increases. Schelling (1966:94) also maintains that international relations processes are highly unpredictable and have the character of a competition under risk taking:

The actual decision to engage in war - whether the Korean War that did occur or a war at Berlin or Quemoy or Lebanon that did not - were decisions to engage in a war of an uncertain size, uncertain as to the adversary, as to the issues that might be brought and the possible outcomes that might result (Schelling, 1966:94).

(b) Stressful Conditions in the International System

Foreign policy is more of a source of constant threat to the decision makers' "irreducible" values and national interests than domestic policy issues, and thus is a source of higher stress to the decision maker (Holsti and George, 1975:260-261). In foreign policy, the survival of the country is largely at stake, whereas in domestic policy the stakes are not often as high. This condition of high stress is furthered by the multiplicity of actors, issues, interests and values which may be imbedded in any single foreign policy issue. In this state of "value-complexity", there is not "a single utility criterion" that a policy maker can rely on to make a rational decision in order to resolve a stressful problem. As a

consequence, the stress level is further intensified because of the lack of a ready-made answer to a life-and-death question.

(c) Foreign Policy Crisis Conditions

Conditions of structural uncertainty are usually present in foreign policy crisis situations. The essence of a crisis is its unpredictability (Schelling, 1966:97). McClelland (1968:179) has found that relative uncertainty is positively related to the level of crisis in international relations. An international crisis imposes time pressures and a sense of urgency on the decision maker who is normally unable to specify accurately probable outcomes of various alternatives. As a consequence, he must employ extra-rational axioms to process imperfect information and make decisions in the face of the crisis. Under these conditions of urgency, complexity and uncertainty, the policy maker must fall back to his beliefs as the only sensible criterion. In other words, the decision making process becomes highly fused with the cognitive process of the decision maker. His non-rational decision is based on his beliefs about (1) the nature of political life and international politics; (2) his ability to control historical and social development; (3) the goal of his opponents and their risk-taking calculations as perceived by him; (4) the appropriateness of various strategies and tactics to be assessed by his own personal values; and (5) the desirability of risk-taking vs. risk-avoidance (George, 1975:27; Snyder and Diesing 1977:286).

(d) The Cognitive Situational Model

The cognitive process leading to a particular policy choice is a highly complex one. First of all, the decision maker facing a complex foreign policy issue or an ambiguous or a stressful situation receives a stimulus from the environment which, in turn, activates core concepts in his belief system. The activation of constructs and axioms of the decision maker's belief system is more intense if the foreign policy issue is conjoined with a crisis situation. Inversely, the role of his belief system is the least salient in non-crisis domestic issues.

The model may be labelled the cognitive-situational model, as it invokes the situation and the issue area as precipitating factors for the salience of the belief system for a specific choice. It can be summarized in the following diagram and hypotheses:

		<u>Situation</u>		
		Crisis	Non-crisis	
<u>Issue-area</u>	Foreign	I	II	High saliency of the policy makers' belief system
	Domestic	III	IV	Low saliency of the policy makers' belief system
		High saliency of the policy makers' belief system	Low saliency of the policy makers' belief system	

Fig. 2.5--The Cognitive-Situational Model

In Figure 2.5, the decision maker's belief system is expected to be more salient in cell I than in all the cells and more salient in cell II than in cell III and cell IV.

From this model the following hypotheses can be deduced:

- H1 : The decision maker's political beliefs are more likely to be salient in foreign policy decision making than in domestic policy decision making.
- H2 : The decision maker's political beliefs are more likely to be salient under foreign policy crisis situations than under foreign policy non-crisis situations.

The relationships outlined in this theoretical framework simply state that when a decision maker is faced with a complex decisional problem, his belief system enters into the choice process. The final impact of the belief system is weighted by situational variables. However, their weight is likely to be reduced during a foreign policy crisis situation.

The dependent variable in this framework is behavioural choices and choice propensities of the central decision maker, that is, decisions and policy recommendations advocated and/or actually taken by the decision maker in a specific situation. The independent variable is the decision maker's belief system, which we propose to study through an analysis of the operational code.

5. The Operational Code

If an individual's beliefs are crucial in the process of decision making and policy choices especially under conditions of structural uncertainty, the most obvious question is how to approach the task of researching the decision maker's belief system. In this study, the operational code is proposed as a viable approach to systematize the independent variable of the theoretical framework.

(a) Elements of the Operational Code

The operational code is a method of reconstructing the decision maker's political belief system. The approach was first introduced by Leites in his publication, The Operational Code of the Politburo (1951) and was later expanded in his Study of Bolshevism (1953). Alexander George (1969) reformulated and systematized Leites' idea. As George has noted, the word "code" is a misnomer, since the operational code is an approach to political calculation, not a mechanical procedure.

The operational code is basically a belief system about political life. It consists of two sets of beliefs which are presumed to capture the essence of the decision maker's views on politics and political calculation:

I. Philosophical Beliefs

- (1) What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?

- (2) What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic or must one be pessimistic on this score and in what respect the one and/or the other?
- (3) Is the political universe predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
- (4) How much control or mastery can one have over historical development? What is one's role in moving and shaping history in the desired direction?
- (5) What is the role of chance in human affairs and in historical development?

II. Instrument Beliefs:

- (1) What is the best approach for selecting goals and objectives for political action?
- (2) How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
- (3) How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled and accepted?
- (4) What is the best timing of action to advance one's interests?

1

George (1969:191) argues that his operational code lists a sufficient number of fundamental beliefs which serve as a prism in influencing any actor's perceptions and diagnoses of events. These beliefs provide the actors with a set of

1

In his doctoral study of the operational code of Senator Vandenberg, Anderson (1974) suggested the addition of a third subset dealing with images of the international political system, which were subsequently incorporated and subsumed under the philosophical beliefs in Holsti's Operational Code Codebook and the codebook used in this project.

norms and guidelines which structure the strategies and alternatives that one develops. They influence, but do not determine, decision making behavior. The basic function of the operational code is to provide the actor with "diagnostic propensities" and "choice propensities" (George, 1975:27). Neither his diagnostic nor his choice is rigidly prescribed and determined by these beliefs. Rather, their function is to simplify and structure the task of processing information, inventing and appraising options and choosing a certain action.

(b) Usefulness

The power of the operational code lies in its parsimoniousness and generalizability from case to case. The code sets up a number of master beliefs which extract the essential elements of the person's political belief system which are likely to be of great relevance across situations. It does not comprise the total set of beliefs of the individuals, but only those which are relevant to political action. Holsti (1976c) argues that the master beliefs which comprise the operational code satisfy a number of research requirements: they are relatively few in number, sufficiently large in scope so that they are likely to be salient in any decision making situation. Kavanagh (1973:207) concluded from his study of the operational code of Ramsay McDonald that:

Such a code is useful in enabling the observer to reconstruct the way in which McDonald was likely to structure and identify the choices available to him.

Heradstveit and Narvesen (1978:32) have succinctly summed up the explanatory and predictive power of the operational code as follows:

It (the operational code) offers us a guide on how to increase the possibility of predicting and explaining the person's political behavior. The relevance criterion of different beliefs offers an analytical tool for, at cheaper costs, arriving at essential elements of the person's belief system.

The explanatory and predictive power of the operational code may be illustrated by few examples. For instance, George (1969) found in his study that the old Bolsheviks believed in pursuing more ambitious goals than were possible of achievement and in limiting the means employed on their behalf. This led them to employ an optimizing strategy in relations with opponents.

Similarly, using the same tool of analysis, George and Smoke noted that the operational code of the American decision makers involved in the Berlin Aide-Memoire crisis of 1961 had a considerable impact on their policy recommendations. The "hard-liners" represented by Johnson and Maxwell Taylor believed that the USSR was engaged in a serious threatening offensive operation, which could be contained only through vigorous and credible deterrence. The "soft-liners," on the other hand, represented by Harriman and Bohlen viewed the USSR as engaging in a defensive operation aimed at consolidating

its system in East Germany. Active negotiations, they argued, would convince the Soviets that their legitimate security demands would be respected (George and Smoke, 1974:431-437). An analyst in the Office of Political Research of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency reported that his Office has found the operational code a useful approach to provide a full rounded picture of how and to what extent a foreign leader's personality characteristics influence his political decision making (Heuer, 1977).

6. Operational Code: Theory and Research

As I have pointed out in previous sections, the cognitive approach is most relevant under conditions of structural uncertainty. In other words, the decision maker tends to rely on his belief system in situations of serious crisis, informational ambiguity and complexity. Within the conceptual framework of the operational code, such relationships may be schematically presented as follows:

Fig. 2.6--Schematic Presentation of the Operational Code Decision Making Nexus

Since the day of the publication of Leites', The Operational Code of the Politburo, the operational code has been extensively used to assess the relationship between the belief system of policy makers and their policy choices in various political contexts. In general, two methods of research design have been suggested: the congruence method and the process-trading method (George 1978:10).

(a) The "Congruence" Method

The congruence method investigates the decision maker's decisions to see whether they are "congruent" with his operational code. The method is deductive in the sense that the researcher deduces from the operational code the implications it should have for the content of the decisions.

Rosenberg (1978) used this method to show the congruence between Truman's belief system and his decisions to recognize Israel in 1948 and to remain in Berlin despite the imposition of the Soviet blockade in 1950. Rosenberg attempted to demonstrate that aspects of the situation and decision were affected by Truman's belief system. Lampton (1973) also analyzed the USA image of China in terms of some of the operational code categories, and found that the Truman-Acheson image of the opponent was congruent with the decision not to intervene in Indochina in 1954. Lampton (1973:48-49) concluded:

The concept of the ImOp (Image of the Opponent) has sensitized us to the fact that, in the three crises studied above, there were qualitative differences in the accuracy of the images held by the leading figures of three successive administrations. While the precise causal importance of the ImOp cannot be systematically weighted, this cognitive perceptual variable does appear to have materially affected the resulting policy in each case.

Walker (1977) analysed the interface between Kissinger's operational code and his negotiating behavior during the Vietnamese conflict. The American-Vietnamese behavior during the period 1969-72 was quantitatively measured. The overall picture of the dependent variable was found to be congruent with Kissinger's operational code. The Walker application of the operational code lends support to the predictive power of the operational code. The congruence method has also been used by Burgess (1967) to explain the Norwegian decision to join NATO. Burgess analysed the Norwegian leadership's strategic images and found that these images were consistent with the decision to join NATO.

In spite of the widespread use and utility of the congruence method, there are some potentially hazardous methodological and theoretical problems involved. Foremost among these problems is the tautological-circular and justificatory-deterministic overtone involved in this method. Most applications of the congruence method tend to come up with unwarranted conclusions of congruence by using the

arguments which the decision maker himself made to justify the decision, in order to predict the decision. Accordingly, the analysis amounts to no more than a justification, not an explanation, of why the decision maker had to take that specific decision. The problem lies in the fact that researchers tend to confine their analysis only to the decision under investigation, ignoring the fact that other options may have also been congruent with the same operational code.

To overcome the above theoretical problem, George (1978:19-20) suggests beginning the analysis by listing all the options available to the decision maker at the time. The investigator then must analyse whether the operational code (XX in the diagram) can only predict Option "A" which has been actually chosen, or it was also consistent with Option "B" which was not chosen because of situational or bureaucratic pressures. This way the analyst can establish the exact predictive power of the operational code and avoid the trap of retrodiction.

Fig. 2.7--The Operational Code - Decision Making Nexus

The investigator using the congruence method must also safeguard against two possible research design problems:

(i) It is possible that other independent variables (role for example) may also account for the same decision. This problem is obviously a perennial problem in any research design. In the absence of a cross-sectional universe of leaders and situations, the investigator may minimize the potential intervening impact of other independent variables by analyzing decisions taken where the impact of these variables is at minimum. An analysis of decisions taken by central decision makers (whose role is loosely defined) in highly monolithic decision structures, functioning under conditions of uncertainty and/or complexity, should satisfy these conditions.

(ii) The second problem is more obvious; it is possible that the same decision might have been taken in the absence of the particular operational code. This question raises the issue of the falsifiability of the impact of the operational code. In foreign policy analysis the investigation of such a possibility may be a matter of speculation. This can be investigated if we examine the possibility that two decision makers having different operational codes have arrived at the same choice or hold the same choice propensities. For example, the difference between the operational codes and decision calculus of Nasser and Sadat did not prevent

them from concurring on intervening in Yemen in 1962 and closing the Tiran Straits in 1967. However, one must check for the possibility that the concurrence of the other decision maker (Sadat in our case) was out of a low decision latitude, groupthink, and/or survival instinct.

The falsifiability of the operational code impact may also be plausibly tested if we examine a case in which two decision makers with different operational codes have taken two different decisions on the same issue and in the same situation. In Egyptian foreign policy, we have two occasions in which these conditions were satisfied. The first occasion was Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company in 1956. Sadat was not consulted or informed of the decision beforehand, and subsequently expressed to Nasser his disapproval of the decision. The second occasion was Sadat's decision (acting in his capacity as an acting President) to reject the Rogers Plan in 1970, a decision which Nasser subsequently reversed when he resumed his duties as President.

(b) The "Process-tracing" Method

This method seeks to establish the way in which the actor's operational code beliefs influenced his receptivity to and assessment of incoming information about the situation, his definition of the situation, his identification and evaluation of options as well as his choice of a course of action. The process-tracing method follows the "pattern"

mode of explanation, because it seeks to establish a pattern of relationship between the operational code and choice propensities. In suggesting this method, George and Holsti (1974:49) developed some hypotheses pertaining to the influence of the operational code on information processing tasks, such as:

- A decision maker who views the opponent as being a unitary actor is less likely to engage in extensive search for information about the opponent.
- A decision maker who views the political future as predictable is more likely to engage in extensive analysis of the political consequences of various policy options.
- A decision maker who is essentially optimistic is likely to avoid knowingly choosing high risk options..

Perhaps the study conducted by Heradstveit (1978) on the operational code of Arab-Israeli elites represents the only comprehensive and systematic application of the process-tracing method. Heradstveit selected a sample of various segments of Arab and Israeli elites. Using the technique of interviews, he generated their operational code along the dimensions of the image of the opponent, optimism, and policy propensities, in two separate time periods: 1970-72 and 1974-76.

Heradstveit investigated the psycho-dynamic stability of the operational code of Arab and Israeli from the perspective of attribution theory. He concluded that Arab and

Israeli elites maintain the stability of their beliefs through resort to various techniques of dispositional and situational attributions. Further, Heradstveit's study of temporal stability demonstrated that the image of the opponent was the most stable among all beliefs of Arab and Israeli elites. He also found that the most stable beliefs are those which exhibited a high level of response-response consistency.

The scope of Heradstveit's study is limited. He focused only on three elements of the operational code: images of the opponent, images of self, and images of change (optimism and pessimism), thus excluding the basic philosophical beliefs and all instrumental beliefs from his analysis. However, Heradstveit generated and tested some significant hypotheses which demonstrate how the operational code accounts for the variance in choice propensities of Arab and Israeli elites. Heradstveit found that one can make the strongest predictions of the decision maker's choice propensities by combining self-image and image of the opponent. Respondents who viewed themselves and the opponent as unitary actors consistently recommended non-conciliatory policies and vice versa.

The following hypotheses were generated for further testing:

- H3 : A decision maker who attributes dispositional characteristics to his opponent's goals and behavior is likely to recommend uncompromising policies.

- H4 : A decision maker who views the opponent as a unitary actor is more likely to recommend uncompromising policies.
- H5 : A pessimistic decision maker is more likely to recommend uncompromising policies.

7. Summary and Conclusion

We have outlined the basic tenets of the cognitive approach to the study of the decision making process. The decision maker's belief system is suggested as the criterion of human information-processing and policy choices. Belief systems are presumed to be highly relevant under conditions of structural uncertainty. The operational code is essentially an approach to the systematic reconstruction of the decision maker's belief system. It contains two sets of beliefs: philosophical and instrumental. These two sets are presumed to capture the fundamental elements of the decision maker's belief system and predict his policy choices.

In this study the operational code approach will be used to analyze Nasser's foreign policy decisions. The first step will be to content analyze his publicly available documents in order to reconstruct his operational code. The process-tracing method and the congruence method will be used to analyze the predictive power of the operational code. We will test some of the hypotheses developed through the application of the process-tracing method with reference to Nasser's operational code. Further, some of Nasser's fundamental decisions will be analyzed.

CHAPTER III

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OPERATIONAL CODE

The operational code is a system of fundamental beliefs about political life which enable the individual to perform certain functions related to information processing and decision making. It is just one of several approaches foreign policy analysts use to study beliefs and cognitions. In order to define its basic features; it is first necessary to spell out the differences and similarities between the operational code and other approaches which attempt to study the same phenomena..

1. The Uniqueness of the Operational Code

Of those approaches which are limited to analysis of the beliefs of key individual decision makers, four approaches other than the operational code can be identified. These approaches--the artificial intelligence approach, the cognitive mapping approach, the political style approach, and the ideology approach--differ in certain key respects from the operational code.

(a) The Artificial Intelligence Approach

This approach begins by posing a model of cognitive processes and uses it to generate linguistic responses to linguistic inputs. The model then is evaluated in terms of

the similarity of performance with actual performance in such situations. A typical example is the "Goldwater Machine" (Abelson and Carroll, Abelson, 1968). This computer based model contained a representation of Senator Goldwater's beliefs about cold war. The model was designed as an attempt to respond to new assertions such as he might respond to them. Another "Ideology Machine" sketched by Abelson (1973) is based on a form of linguistic analysis developed by Schank (1973) which has been adopted and expounded to deal with hierarchical belief systems (for the applications of the approach, Feigenbaum and Feldman, 1963, Minski, 1968).

The Artificial Intelligence Approach has been criticized for being very simplistic in describing the elements of a belief system and their inter-relationships especially in the area of international relations (Axelrod, 1976b). It is mainly a heuristic device since it seems to be mainly obsessed with linguistic manipulations of beliefs rather than spelling out their utility in explaining decision making and policy choices.

(b) The Cognitive Mapping Approach

A cognitive map is a mathematical representation of a subset of an individual's belief system. Generally, this subset concerns a policy issue area, such as British policy in Persia (Axelrod, 1976a), or Syria's intervention in Jordan in 1970 (Bonham and Shapiro, 1973). Thus, a

cognitive map neither portrays the full range of an individual belief system, nor even all the relevant political beliefs as does the operational code. Furthermore, it portrays only those beliefs which take the form of causal assertions between pairs of concepts in the decision maker's belief system.

A cognitive map is designed to capture the structure of causal assertions of a person with respect to a particular policy domain and generate the consequences that follow from that structure (Axelord, 1976a).

Accordingly, a cognitive map cannot capture the beliefs which are not causal.

The essential element of a cognitive map is the representation of the concepts of the decision maker as points, the causal links between these concepts as arrows between these points. The point represents a concept variable. Various studies have employed different types of concepts. For example, Bonham and Shapiro (1973) employ four types:

- (A) Affective concepts: Immediate policy objectives.
- (C) Cognitive concepts: Beliefs of a person.
- (P) Policy concepts: Possible alternatives from which a person selects policy.
- (V) Value concepts: Abstract values (e.g. national security).

The end result is a pictorial representation of the causal assertions of a person as a graph of points and arrows. In his Psycho-Algebra, Axelord used such cognitive maps to understand the decision making process. He argues that the

cognitive map enables us to calculate the utility of a certain choice (at least in being positive or negative).

One of the widely recognized models of cognitive mapping is Shapiro and Bonham's Cognitive Process Model. Shapiro and Bonham (1973) have developed a computer simulation of cognitive processing that include five decision processes: initial amplification of beliefs, search for antecedents, search for consequences, search for policy alternatives, and policy choices. In one study (1976), they were able, through interviews with American Middle East officials, to develop their cognitive maps. A simulation of the October war was run using this information, and four policy options tied for first place as policy choices.

Using what were close to verbatim transcripts of the meetings of the Eastern Committee of the British Imperial War cabinet, Axelord (1972b) constructed the cognitive map of the committee members. He found that the conclusions reached by the committee were indeed consistent with their beliefs and that there was a very high level of deductive consistency in their thoughts.

The operational code is wider in scope than the cognitive mapping approach. It does not refer to the cognitive organization related to a specific policy problem, but rather to a number of "master beliefs" likely to have great impact on the diagnoses of any foreign policy situation. Like the

cognitive map, the elements of the operational code are defined as a system of beliefs in which a certain set plays a crucial role in defining other elements and general approaches to political choice. Further, the cognitive mapping approach is essentially tautological in nature. By using the decision maker's arguments to predict his policy choices, already chosen, a cognitive map amounts to justification rather than explanation. That is why, in applying the cognitive map to oil decision making in Norway, the approach poorly predicted reactions of policy makers (Heradstveit and Narvesen, 1978:22) and in a recent application of the approach on Nasser's cognitive map during the Suez crisis of 1956, Fenn (1974) failed to predict Nasser's decision to reject the Anglo-French ultimatum.¹

(c) The Political Style Approach

The political style approach closely resembles the operational code approach, though it is less extensive in scope and less systematic in methods. Rather than defining a specific set of operationally defined beliefs, the political style approach concentrates only upon the decision maker's perception of his role and how it should be fulfilled. This more limited objective is illustrated in the descriptions of the approach given by two analysts in studies of political

¹For more detailed criticisms and comparisons of the two approaches, the reader may consult Trumble (1977) and Heradstveit and Narvesen (1978).

style. McLellan (1965:230) described the approach as seeking to establish

...a configuration of the way in which Acheson's perspectives and attitudes about government, leadership, innovation, reason, and the nature of world politics contribute to his choices.

Stupak (1969, 1971) also feels that his study presents a systematic presentation of Acheson's perceptions of how a Secretary of State should function to maximize his policy making role.

The political style approach does not provide us with a specified set of operational questions pertaining to the exact meaning of the political style, nor does it establish the theoretical or empirical link between the political style and policy choices.

(d) The Ideology Approach

Perhaps the most popular predecessor to studies of belief systems has been research on ideology. Converse (1970) indicated that the popularity of belief systems approaches was due to its predecessor, ideology, being used in so many different ways that researchers were looking for a new approach which did not have the normative overtones of ideology. The fundamental feature that distinguishes ideologies from operational codes is that ideologies, beside offering an idealistic schematic version of society, have the added element of emotional intensity, persuasiveness, the existence of a program of action and the association with an organization

intended to realize the goals specified in the ideology (Shils, 1968:67). Ideology tends to orient decision makers toward specific belief systems. For example, the Bolshevik operational code is highly influenced by the Marxist ideology. However, belief systems are more pervasive and fundamental than ideologies. Not all decision makers adhere to a specific ideology, while all decision makers must adhere to a certain set of beliefs about political life, strategy and tactics in order to make decisions.

The basic flaw in the ideology approach is the elusiveness of the concept which makes it susceptible to various interpretations and the unsystematic nature of the methods used to reconstruct the actor's ideology. Two studies on Nasser's ideology have been written, one by an Egyptian student (Al-Ashram, 1972) and one by an Israeli student (Rejwan, 1972). The studies demonstrate the wide disagreement of the two writers on the tenets to be included in Nasser's ideology. By contrast, the operational code defines a set of political beliefs which affect the decision maker's decision making process. It does not attempt to define the political leader's vision of the world and the future, but rather his approach to political action and how it affects his choices.

Other researchers have attempted to present frameworks that relate ideologies, culture, etc. to behavior. Schulze (1979) has constructed a model of the linkage between ideology

(socialism), values or goals (equality, justice, democracy), and attitudes or predispositions to action (economic equality, suffrage for all). But the study did not come up with specific hypotheses linking the ideology to policy choices or decision making.

2. The Operational Code as a System of Beliefs

The preceding survey of approaches which appear closely related to the operational code approach has established the uniqueness of the latter. This lies in the fact that the operational code approach establishes a specific set of operationally defined beliefs which are thought to be central in the decision making process and defining the limits of the political leader's policy choices. It has the capacity of constructing a model of a given belief system and the empirical measurement of the role of the decision maker's belief system in foreign policy decision making.

As has been mentioned earlier, the operational code is a system of fundamental beliefs about political life which enable the individual to perform certain functions related to information-processing and decision making. Two basic characteristics of the operational code emerge from this definition: (1) a set of beliefs; and (2) systematic connections among these beliefs.

(a) Beliefs in the Operational Code

A belief can be defined as an assertion or a proposition explicitly or implicitly stated that denotes a subjective probability judgement which describes and/or advocates and/or evaluates an object or a course of action linking such object or action to a specific attribute.¹

¹There are basically two types of beliefs: beliefs in the existence of an object (e.g. belief in equality), and beliefs linking an object to a certain attribute (e.g. belief about equality). We are basically interested in the second type of beliefs. There exists in the literature a wide disagreement on the definition of the construct belief. Aside from broad definitions which equate beliefs with any political orientation (e.g. Sniderman and Citrin, 1971), there are two major orientations in the definition of a belief: in one orientation, beliefs are defined as inferences which an individual has about the way things are (Rotter, 1968:114; Lukes, 1970:207; and Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975:12).

Belief is the probability dimension of a concept while attitude is its evaluative dimension (Fishbein and Raven, 1962:42).

Belief is a cognition to which credulity is attached, whereas values, attitudes are cognitions with attached valences (Milbrath, 1966:45).

This orientation restricts the construct belief to the categories of likely, unlikely, probable, improbable, etc..., whereas the second orientation asserts that a belief contains not only descriptive but also evaluative and prescriptive accounts. Sartori (1969:400), Rokeach (1972:113), and Lane (1973) concurred that a belief has descriptive-evaluative and prescriptive elements.

The first orientation hinges on the unwarranted assumption that beliefs are manifest cognitive (descriptive) assertions whereas attitudes are affective (evaluative) dispositions. Research has proved that attitudes are functionally related and can be predicted and inferred inter alia from the individual's beliefs about the same object but not vice versa (Fishbein, 1966:206; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975:53-105). This result suggests that the construct belief is an all-encompassing concept that cannot, by its nature, be restricted only to existential components. This conceptualization of belief as having descriptive-evaluative and prescriptive dimensions demonstrates the link between beliefs and decision making behavior, since it generally acknowledged that decision premises include propositions of fact and value (Simon, 1957:45-60).

Beliefs are not mere thoughts. The essential mark of beliefs, as opposed to thoughts, is the causal role which beliefs play in behavior (Armstrong, 1973:71-72). Beliefs also cannot be equated with attitudes. Attitudes are latent predispositions to respond in some way based on the evaluation of some object, person, or situation.¹ Attitudes are not subjective probabilities but affect for or against a psychological object. The operational code also is ~~not~~ concerned with the values of the decision maker. Values are assertions a person holds of the "good life" (such as equality, freedom, sense of achievement). Neither is the operational code to be equated with a set of images or perceptions. An image can be defined as:

The organized representation of an object in an individual's cognitive system. The core of an image is the perceived character of the object to which it refers--the individual's conception of what this object is like (Kelman, 1965:24).

Perception involves the awareness and recognition of social objects present in one's immediate sensory field and the impressions formed of persons or groups experienced at an earlier time. A person may hold an image of Nasser as being militant (image), although he may like or dislike his militancy (attitude), and the meaning attributed to this militancy may vary depending on the issues that come into focus in his mind.

¹ Evaluative beliefs are not synonymous with attitudes. It is possible to like something which we evaluate negatively (such as smoking) or to dislike something which we evaluate positively (such as physical exercise).

(perceptions). But if he assesses the correctness of Nasser's strategy toward Israel he is involved in belief-articulation.

(b) System of Beliefs

The operational code is more than a collection of beliefs. This collection has one fundamental characteristic, i.e., the boundedness of the elements of the operational code. The operational code is a belief system about political life and in this sense it has the connectedness characteristic of belief systems:

A belief system is an inter-related set of... affect-laden cognitions concerning some aspects of the psychological world of a single individual (Abelson and Carroll, 1965:24)..

A belief system is a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence (Converse, 1964:207).

A belief system can be defined as having represented within it in some organized psychological, but not necessarily logical form, each and every one of a person's countless beliefs about physical and social reality (Rokeach, 1972:2).

The belief-states involve elements in a relation (Armstrong, 1973:19)

(Emphases added)

The linkage between beliefs of the operational code is a consequence of its functions enabling the individual to cope with uncertainty and complexity. The individual must pull together, organize, synthesize, and evaluate innumerable

pieces of information. This information is mostly the result of many unstructured and disjointed experiences. Without some degree of reorganization, his experience of the environment would be meaningless. He must reduce and simplify his experience into a meaningful form of ordered knowledge.

Consistency among beliefs is the result of the categorization of information into larger sets inter-related through logical and psychological constraints (Kelman, 1965:73-74; Shapiro, 1969:1108-1110; Downs and Stea, 1977:83).

Since beliefs are related to each other, a change in the perceived status of one belief element requires some compensating change(s) in the status of other belief elements in the configuration (Converse, 1964:208). Converse argues that there are two types of interdependence or constraints, dynamic and static. Static constraints refer to the likelihood that an individual will hold a particular set of other beliefs, given that he holds a specific belief. Dynamic constraints are defined as a situation where a "change in one (belief) element psychologically requires a compensating change in other idea elements" (Converse, 1964:208).

The operational code exhibits both types of interdependence. Elements of the code tend to form clusters of beliefs. In this sense, the presence of a specific belief(s) facilitates the presence of other belief(s). Further, a change in the status of one belief or a set of beliefs tend to have

some repercussions on the status of other beliefs. Accordingly, the operational code has been defined as an open negentropic system, one which is capable of moving to higher levels of organization over time (Aggarwal, 1977:27).

3. Some Major Characteristics of the Operational Code

(a) Richness and Differentiation

In the initial stage of the development of the operational code, the individual usually holds a limited number of beliefs. As development proceeds, the richness of the operational code increases. By richness is meant the extent to which the individual's operational code contains all or some of the relevant beliefs. The richness of the operational code depends upon the amount of information available to the individual and the level of his emotional attachment to the issue or the ideological remoteness of the issue from his core values and interests (Lane, 1962:348-363).

Differentiation refers to the breaking down of operational code beliefs into more or less equally articulated sets of beliefs. Richness is not equivalent to differentiation. A belief may be articulated, but the number of beliefs subsumed under its rubric may be quite low. In its initial stages of development, the operational code is usually in a state of inclusiveness. As the operational code develops, beliefs are broken into smaller and inter-related elements. However, by virtue of the individual's attachment to certain beliefs, this

process does not equally occur to all beliefs. The end result is various degrees of balance/imbalance in the articulation of beliefs.

Along the dimension of richness, Tweraser (1976:7) argues that the operational code of legislators is more developed in terms of philosophical beliefs than instrumental items as a consequence of the remoteness of legislators from the locus of foreign policy making. We scanned the operational codes of three American legislators (Fulbright, Church, and Vandenberg) and two American executive decision makers (Dulles and Acheson). The results listed in Table 3.1 show that all of them have consistently articulated more philosophical than instrumental beliefs.¹ They also show that the differentiation coefficient of the instrumental part of the operational code is higher among the executives than legislators.² This finding supports Anderson's (1974:266)

¹This finding is very tentative, since we do not know the maximum number of categories used in each case.

²Differentiation coefficients have been calculated by using the nominal coefficient of dispersion whose purpose is to measure the frequency with which beliefs fall into different categories. The formula of this coefficient reads:

$$CD = 1 - \frac{\sum \left| \frac{N}{C} - f_i \right|}{2(N - \frac{N}{C})}$$

Where N = the total number of cases in the distribution;

C = the number of categories;

f_i = the number of cases in a particular category;

The nominal coefficient of dispersion ranges between 0 indicating no differentiation and 1; total differentiation.

TABLE 3.1
DIFFERENTIATION COEFFICIENTS OF THE OPERATIONAL CODE
OF FIVE AMERICAN NATIONAL LEADERS

	<u>Senator Fulbright</u>	<u>Senator Church</u>	<u>Senator Vandenberg</u>	<u>Secretary Dulles</u>	<u>Secretary Acheson</u>
Philosophical Belief					
Politics	5	4	3	4	7
Opponent	5	7	10		5
System	4	4	20	9	2
Optimism	2	3	2	5	3
Prediction	2	1	1	2	3
Control	3	3	2	6	4
<u>Total</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>24</u>
Coefficient of differentiation	<u>.80</u>	<u>.78</u>	<u>.45</u>	<u>.62</u>	<u>.80</u>
Instrumental beliefs					
Goal selection	4	3	9	4	4
Strategies	5	3	4	3	6
Risk	3	2	2	3	3
Timing	2	1	5	2	3
Tactics	3	1	14	4	3
<u>Total</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>19</u>
Coefficient of differentiation	<u>.84</u>	<u>.75</u>	<u>.65</u>	<u>.88</u>	<u>.84</u>

Derived from the operational code studies of:

Tweraser (1974) on Senator Fulbright

Johnson (1977) on Senator Church

Anderson (1974) on Senator Vandenberg (beliefs of the third period)

Holsti (1970) on Secretary Dulles

McLellan (1971) on Secretary Acheson

conclusion that a legislator should be expected to exhibit less differentiated instrumental beliefs. He found a great deal of imbalance in Vandenberg's operational code between the goal selection beliefs on one hand and beliefs on risk, timing and tactics on the other hand. This is not surprising because the issues of risk, timing and tactics are problems confronted daily and directly by executive decision makers but only seldom by legislators.

(b) Centrality in the Operational Code

The notion of centrality refers to the fact that an individual is not equally committed to various elements of the operational code. Certain beliefs are usually considered more central than others. Some cognitive theorists define centrality as the degree to which other beliefs in the operational code are dependent on a certain belief. According to this definition, a central belief is one whose change results in a chain of changes in other beliefs by virtue of the dependence of other beliefs upon that central belief (Bem, 1970:12). Other cognitive theorists suggest that one of the ways of getting at centrality in the operational code is to look at beliefs which remain stable and beliefs which fluctuate over time. According to this view, central beliefs are the most stable ones (Heradstveit and Narvesen, 1978:8).

These definitions of centrality in the operational code tend to equate centrality and other characteristics of the code, such as stability and interdependence. Empirical investigation may prove that centrality, stability, and interdependence are synonomous characteristics. However, this conclusion cannot be assumed a priori. Accordingly, the central belief is defined, as Luttberg (1968:399) suggested, as the most intense one. Intensity of commitment to the operational code beliefs will be measured as Pool (1959) suggested by the frequency of reference to various beliefs. Operationally, a central belief will be defined as the most frequently articulated one.

The operational code is usually characterized by a process of progressive centralization by which is meant the dominance of a specific subset of beliefs. For example, Anderson (1974:250) found that a subset of tightly integrated set of philosophical beliefs was dominant in Vandenberg's operational code. These were beliefs on the nature of the political universe, optimism, predictability, and the role of leader in controlling historical development. Anderson argues that this subset seems to have given rise to some instrumental beliefs, especially those pertaining to risk calculation and strategies. Holsti (1970:154) found that philosophical beliefs concerning the opponent were also dominant in the Dulles' operational code. Johnson (1977:118)

discovered that beliefs pertaining to the opponent, selection of goals and tactics were particularly dominant in the operational code of Senator Church, while Tveraser (1974:72-73) found that "the most powerful variable in Fulbright's foreign policy operational code was his image of malignant forces in world politics."

(c) Stability and Change of the Operational Code

At the initial stage of the development of the operational code, the individual holds a limited set of beliefs to which he may not be intensely committed. The lower level of the intensity of commitment makes it relatively easier for the individual to substantively and structurally alter his beliefs. As development proceeds, intensity of commitment to the operational code beliefs increases and structural change becomes more difficult. Upon reaching a certain level of intensity and complexity, the operational code tends to stabilize along the lines of organismic homeostatic systems. At this stage, the process of selective perception plays a crucial role in ignoring new information which seem to be inconsistent with the operational code. Exposure to new situations tends to reinforce the homeostatic position of the operational code. In this sense the operational code can be described as an adaptative morphogenetic system, that is, one that interacts with its environment.¹

¹As opposed to morphostatic systems, ones that retain their structure over time.

The operational code, once developed, is generally resistant to change. Decision makers tend to downgrade or reinterpret new discrepant information to reduce dissonance with the operational code beliefs.¹ However, under certain pressures, even the most structurally rigid operational code may be vulnerable to some changes. The analysis of Nasser's operational code before and after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war will prove this point.

(i) Philosophical vs. Instrumental Beliefs

As has been mentioned, the stability of the operational code tends to increase as the code develops over time. At some point the operational code beliefs become relatively fixed. This probably holds for philosophical beliefs to a greater extent than for instrumental beliefs. By their nature, instrumental beliefs as beliefs about strategy and tactics are more vulnerable to reality constraints than philosophical beliefs. Mongar (1974:348-349) argues that operational (instrumental) beliefs are open to revision, because they are basically testable approximations of immediately relevant events. Alternatively, ontological beliefs are generally resistant to change except under conditions of stimulus deprivation. In his study of the

¹In his belief system model, Holsti (1967) outlined the methods which individuals use in order to cope with discrepant information. These methods have been briefly outlined in the first chapter of this thesis.

operational code of Senator Vandenberg, Anderson (1974:247-250) found that once the philosophical beliefs were defined, none of them were ever discarded and no new beliefs were added. On the contrary, some instrumental beliefs were discarded, such as beliefs on isolationism, and other beliefs were added during the third period:

Most striking is the stability in the philosophical sub-set. Made up of eight beliefs, it remained intact, through all three periods.

Their (philosophical beliefs) stability through the three periods is impressive evidence that those questions did get at fundamental beliefs. (Anderson, 1974:247 & 264).

The operational code of Frank Church is not conclusive on this score. Two philosophical beliefs were modified while one instrumental belief was discarded (Johnson, 1977:113). Fulbright beliefs on the nature of political life were the most stable of his operational code beliefs (Tweraser, 1974:70). Heradstveit (1977:111) concluded from his comparative analysis of the operational code of Arab and Israeli elites that the image of the opponent is the most stable of the operational code beliefs which he studied.¹

¹This finding is not conclusive because Heradstveit eliminated instrumental beliefs from his analysis.

2

(ii) Central vs. Peripheral Beliefs

Other students of belief systems argue that the hypothesis stating that philosophical beliefs are less likely to change is unwarranted. The distinction should be made between core beliefs and peripheral ones. In general, they argue that the existence of extensive lateral and hierarchial relationships within a system of beliefs makes a major change of beliefs unlikely. But the core structure of beliefs are more resistant to change than others (Steinbruner, 1974:102 and Rokeach, 1972:41). Converse (1964:239) argued that the centrality of a specific belief in a larger belief system and its relative stability over time should be highly related. He adds that an understanding of what underlies high instability is at the same time an understanding of what underlies low constraint (Converse, 1964:241). Brenner (1973:268-269) stated that the beliefs of men change in inverse relation to the importance of such beliefs. George (1975:31) maintained that central beliefs remain relatively more stable over time than the less central ones. Jervis (1976:279) and Harvey and Schroder (1963:110) hypothesized that those parts of the image of belief system that are least central, i.e., the fewest other cognitions depend on them and least important, will change first. The overall stability and change of the total operational code may depend on two other factors:

(ii) Central vs. Peripheral Beliefs

Other students of belief systems argue that the hypothesis stating that philosophical beliefs are less likely to change is unwarranted. The distinction should be made between core beliefs and peripheral ones. In general, they argue that the existence of extensive lateral and hierarchial relationships within a system of beliefs makes a major change of beliefs unlikely. But the core structure of beliefs are more resistant to change than others (Steinbruner, 1974:102 and Rokeach, 1972:41). Converse (1964:239) argued that the centrality of a specific belief in a larger belief system and its relative stability over time should be highly related. He adds that an understanding of what underlies high instability is at the same time an understanding of what underlies low constraint (Converse, 1964:241). Brenner (1973:268-269) stated that the beliefs of men change in inverse relation to the importance of such beliefs. George (1975:31) maintained that central beliefs remain relatively more stable over time than the less central ones. Jervis (1976:279) and Harvey and Schroder (1963:110) hypothesized that those parts of the image or belief system that are least central, i.e., the fewest other cognitions depend on them and least important, will change first. The overall stability and change of the total operational code may depend on two other factors:

(1) The degree of connectedness of the elements of the operational code: When connections and constraints between various elements are weak, it will be easier for the individual to change his beliefs. Alternatively, a tightly connected operational code tends to change in an incremental fashion (Jervis, 1976:304). Pruitt (1965:411) also suggested that the more consistent the elements supporting the image, the less flexible the image.

(2) The Attributional Pattern: The stability of the operational code may also depend on the attributional pattern which characterizes the individual's conceptualization of the opponent. Individuals usually attribute the behavior and goals of their opponents to dispositional factors (located in the opponent). On the other hand, they tend to explain their own behavior and goals in the light of situational/external variables, such as environmental pressures and constraints.

Jones and Nesbit (1972:91) both argued "there is a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situational requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute the same action to stable personal dispositions." Some analysts make a distinction between the individual's attribution of the negative and positive sides of the opponent's goals and behavior. Jervis (1969:255) argued that "when the behavior of other states is undesired, it is usually seen as derived from internal forces."

Heradstveit (1978:63-64) also hypothesized that there is a tendency to make dispositional attributions when observing the opponent's bad behavior and a tendency to make situational attributions when observing the opponent's good behavior. Testing these hypotheses with reference to Arab and Israeli elites, Heradstveit (1978:67) confirmed that attribution depends upon the nature of behavior and goals observed.

The individual's pattern of attribution tends to affect the stability of his operational code because a dispositional attribution means a conceptualization of the opponent's goals and behavior as emanating from the fabric of his society or ideology which is, by its nature, relatively stable. Conversely, if the individual perceives his opponent as merely reacting to situational variables, his image of the opponent will be closely related to such changing situations. According to Heradstveit (1978:20):

The extent to which parties to conflict are dispositional in their analysis of the parties' behavior, these beliefs may be very hard to change.

Stability and change of the operational code may take one of two basic forms: (i) Simple accretion and/or diminution: which allows for minimum alteration of the operational code through the addition or deletion of peripheral beliefs. The operational code of John Foster Dulles may have exhibited this type of change. (ii) Radical re-organization of the operational code: which alters the contents and structures of the operational code. Such systems react to positive feedback through system

adaptation. The operational code of Senator Fulbright may be an instance of this type of change.

(d) Consistency in the Operational Code

Another aspect of the operational code is the degree of consistency among various elements of the code. By consistency is meant that the political leader's responses to various beliefs at a certain point in time tend to go in the same direction. If the political leader holds a negative view of the opponent's goals, other beliefs concerning the same opponent will be negative.¹ Converse (1964:208) differentiated between three types of consistency: logical, psycho-logical, and social. Logical consistency or constraint refers to "objective" or mathematical consistencies among beliefs. For instance, a legislator who believes in budget-balancing is also expected to oppose expansion of government welfare activities. However, response-response consistency may not stem from the rules of pure logic. The individual's idiosyncratic patterns of socialization and psychological experience may lead him to experience beliefs as consistent although they are not so consistent from the viewpoint of logic. This type of consistency is a function of the influence of society. The fact that an individual

¹Consistency should not be confused with interdependence. Whereas interdependence refers to the clustering of beliefs and/or the degree to which beliefs change together, consistency refers to the degree to which the political leader's stand on one belief affects his stand(s) on other beliefs.

belongs to a certain social class sets the parameters of certain clusters of beliefs. For instance, a General Motors top executive can hardly entertain a belief in state control of the economy.¹

(e) The Issue-Area Variability of the Operational Code

Political actors are forced by the nature of their position to deal with various issues. Each issue is a distinct psychological environment activating different clusters of operational code beliefs. Glenn (1966:130-131) contended that different types of situations call for different cognitive responses. Tweraser, (1974:70-72) reported that Senator Fulbright had three clusters of cognitive strategies available: in foreign policy, a cluster that may be termed the rationalist power politics paradigm focussing on the nation-state; in public welfare, a particularist issue politics paradigm which involves an incremental process of adjustment; and in race issues, a "no politics" paradigm which indicates a belief that the problem is insoluble through the political process.

In general, political actors tend to answer the operational code differently depending on the issue which is being considered. A decision maker may believe in an incremental approach in handling domestic socio-economic issues and in a blitzkrieg

¹Heradstveit (1977:142) found a high level of response-response consistency in the answers of the Arab and Israeli elites to some of the operational code questions. Support for consistency in the Arab side as a whole was 80% and for the Israeli side was 83%. That means that 80% and 83% of the Arab and Israeli respondents respectively were consistent in their articulation of the operational code beliefs.

approach in dealing with foreign policy issues. It may also mean that certain groups of beliefs tend to cluster with certain groups of issues.

4. The Operational Code Hypotheses

From the preceding review of the literature on the major characteristics of the operational code and the analysis of some of the available operational code studies, some major hypotheses may be derived. These hypotheses will be tested during the structural analysis of Nasser's operational code.

H6 : The operational code of executives is richer in its instrumental subsystem than its philosophical subsystem.

H7 : The operational code of executives is more differentiated in its instrumental subsystem than its philosophical subsystem.

H8 : The operational code is characterized by the dominance of a specific subset of beliefs.

H9 : The philosophical part of the operational code tends to be more stable than the instrumental part.

H10: The operational code beliefs change in inverse relation to their centrality.

H11: Logical and psychological consistencies of the operational code are separate phenomena.

H12: Elements of the operational code tend to be basically interdependent.

H13: The more interdependent, the more stable the beliefs.

H14: Political leaders answer the operational code beliefs differently depending on the issue area.

H15: Political leaders use specific clusters of beliefs in dealing with specific issue areas.

CHAPTER IV

METHODS OF ANALYSIS

1. Sources of Data and Operational Definitions

The data base of this project is President Gamal Abdel-Nasser's publicly available documents over his eighteen years in power. This includes two types of documents: (1) documents which were made available to the public at, or soon after, the time they were articulated by Nasser, such as speeches, addresses, press conferences and press interviews; (2) confidential documents which were subsequently made public such as minutes of closed meetings, cabinet discussions and private communications. A total of 1,117 documents were collected and subjected to a systematic content analysis. Documents which do not contain at least one operational code reference were eliminated. We were left with 764 documents representing 68% of the collected documents (Table 4.1).

The paragraph is used as the contextual unit of analysis. Only those paragraphs which contained at least one reference to one or more operational code beliefs were coded. A total of 3,838 paragraphs were coded which represents 26.2% of the total number of paragraphs.

TABLE 4.1

TYPES OF DOCUMENTS SUBJECTED TO CONTENT ANALYSIS

YEAR	TYPES OF DOCUMENTS CODED						DOCUMENTS		PARAGRAPHS	
	Speech	Press Conf. & Interview	Letter	Minutes	Book Article	Private Communi.	TOTAL CODED	TOTAL EXAMINED	TOTAL CODED	TOTAL EXAMINED
1953	33	11					44	68	113	460
1954	49	13	1		7		70	141	205	971
1955	34	16			1	1	52	91	144	828
1956	36	18	2				56	72	248	1,135
1957	10	12	1		1		24	32	151	691
1958	49	5			1	1	56	86	279	997
1959	61	10			1		72	97	343	1,340
1960	49	40					55	90	246	771
1961	29	6			3		38	50	237	689
1962	15	9	1	8	3		36	47	271	998
1963	18	3	6	19			46	58	250	1,116
1964	30	6		1			37	46	200	514
1965	30	7		8			45	76	260	788
1966	24	8		3			35	48	252	605
1967	19	3	2	2		1	27	32	196	684
1968	20	1		3			24	27	149	627
1969	13	4					17	20	115	460
1970	15	8	1	2		4	30	36	179	730
Total	534	146	14	46	17	7	764	1,117	3,838	14,404

Each paragraph is content analyzed to discover the operational code of President Nasser. Philosophical beliefs and instrument beliefs are coded as follows:

(a) Philosophical Beliefs on Conflict

- Nature of the Political Universe: is it essentially conflictual or harmonious?
- Causes of Conflict: are conflicts rooted in human nature? or are they derived from ideological, political, economic attributes of nation-states and those of the international system? or are they the result of power politics?
- Conditions of Peace: how can peace be realized? by education and communication between nations and people? by eliminating offending nations? by eliminating inequalities? by maintaining balance of power? by transforming the international system? or by eliminating injustices in general?
- Nature of Conflict: is conflict viewed as a zero-sum game situation or a non-zero sum game situation?
- Scope of Conflict: is each conflict viewed as a part of a larger and more fundamental conflict, or is each conflict treated separately?
- Role of Conflict: is conflict viewed as a necessary factor for progress? or at least functional? or entirely dysfunctional?

(b) Philosophical Beliefs on Opponents

- General Characters of Opponents: are they generally viewed as destructionist, expansionist, and aggressive, or defensive, conciliatory, active seeker of peace, and mainly concerned with domestic development?
- Sources of the Opponent's Goals: from what source(s) does the opponent derive his goals? ideology? historical tradition? internal needs? leader's aspirations? power politics? external pressures?

- Opponent's Hostility: is it general or specific to particular issues? is it permanent or temporary?
- Opponent's Response to Conciliatory Moves: is he likely to reciprocate, or ignore, or take advantage of the situation?
- Opponent's Response to Policies of Firmness: is he likely to back-down, or ignore, or reciprocate, or behave irrationally?
- Opponent's View of his Opponents: does he view his opponent as destructive, expansionist, and aggressive; or defensive, conciliatory, active seeker of peace, and mainly concerned with domestic development?
- Opponent's View of Conflict: does he view conflict as inevitable or avoidable? desirable or undesirable?
- Opponent's Decision Making Process: does the opponent decide as a unitary actor, or as a group of bureaucrats, or as a result of competition between rival groups inside the opponent's government?
- Opponent's International Role: is the opponent viewed as an imperialist/anti-revolutionary leader, or an imperialist agent, or a communist agent or a Zionist agent, or a regional spoiler?
- Opponent's Choice of Objectives: is he an optimizer or a satisficer? is he realistic or unrealistic? is he flexible or inflexible? is he predictable or unpredictable?
- Opponent's Method of Pursuing his Objectives: in pursuing his goals, is he careful through consultation with allies and search for relevant information, or is he careless? is he inclined to use the incremental approach or a blitzkrieg approach?
- Opponent's Favourite Strategy: "turn-the-other-cheek" strategy? or non-punitive strategy? or accommodative strategy? or deterrent strategy? or gratuitously aggressive strategy?

(c) Philosophical Beliefs on the International System

- Nature of International Politics: is it conflictual or harmonious?
- Causes of Conflict: the coding is the same as the coding of philosophical beliefs on conflict in general.
- Structure of the International System: is it a loose bi-polar or a tight bi-polar system? or is it a pluralistic system? or is it a detente system?
- Stability of the International System: which structures or process are stable? what are the sources of stability and change? in what direction is the system moving? how stable is the system?
- Role of the Leader's Nation: does he view his nation as the bastion of revolution-liberator, or regional leader/protector, or an active independent nation, or an anti-imperialist agent/liberator supporter, or an anti-communist agent, or an anti-Zionist agent, or an anti-revisionist agent, or a defender of the faith, or a mediator, or an integrator, or a developer, or a communicator, or a faithful ally, or a model, or a nation mainly concerned with internal development, or a protectee of other nation(s), or a world policeman, or a peace maker?

(d) Philosophical Beliefs on Optimism/Pessimism

- Should one be an optimist or a pessimist?
- Is optimism conditional or unconditional?
- Does optimism/pessimism refer to long range goals or policy undertakings?
- The Winner: is time on the actor's side or on his opponent's side?

(e) Philosophical Beliefs on Predictability of Political Life

- Predictability: is political life predictable or capricious?
- Predictable Elements in the System: Historical development or structures and attributes of the international system, or opponent's system, or policy outcomes, or specific events.
- Ability to Predict Events: with certainty, with some probability, or inability to predict events.

(f) Philosophical Beliefs on the Role of Leader

- Ability to Control Historical Development: from "man-is-the-master-of-his-own-destiny" to inability to control historical development.

(g) Instrumental Beliefs on the Nature of Goals and Goal Selection

- The Nature of the Leader's Goals: destructive, expansionist, defensive, conciliatory, restorative, or domestic development.
- The Best Approach to Goal Selection: are goals to be derived from a master plan or from the immediate problem at hand?
- Should one select optimal or feasible goals?
- Linkage between Goals: are all goals compatible and linked to each other (no tradeoff), or are they incompatible (tradeoffs are necessary)?

(h) Instrumental Beliefs on Approaches for Pursuing Goals

- Goal modification: should one modify, substitute, or abandon one's goals? or should one modify, substitute or abandon only means? or should one be firm?
- Approaches: what preliminary steps are to be taken? search for information and consultation with allies, or "try-and-see", or use the incremental approach, or use the Blitzkrieg approach?

(i) Instrumental Beliefs on Strategies

- Strategies: what is the best strategy? "turn-the-other-cheek"? or use an aggressive strategy?

(j) Instrumental Beliefs on Risk

- Risk Calculation: is risk calculation based on the comprehensive plan and all of one's goals and aspirations? or should one assess risks within the framework of a particular action?
- Methods of Controlling Risks: by scaling down goals or means? or by assessing carefully one's means and the opponent's strategies? or by avoiding risks?
- Types of Tradeoffs Associated with Risk: to maximize potential gains or to minimize potential losses?
- Risk Policies: high (or low) risk policies are mandatory, permissible, or prohibited?

(k) Instrumental Beliefs on Timing

- The Importance of Timing: timing is very important for success or timing does not make any difference.

(l) Instrumental Beliefs on Action

- When to Act: act quickly when opportunities arise or delay premature action.

(m) Instrumental Beliefs on Military Force

- The Utility of Military Force: the use of military force should be avoided, or it is the only viable means to advance one's interests.
- Method of Using Military Force: military force must be applied on a large scale or a graduated basis; military force must be used alone, or supplemented by other types of political and economic forces.

- Military Tactics: never launch the first strike or always take the initiative in applying military force. Military supremacy is crucial or is not crucial. One should retreat and regroup or one should hold and fight rather than retreat.
- Conception of Power: military only or multi-dimensional.¹

For a more detailed description of the coding system, the reader may refer to the Codebook presented in Appendix B.² For the time being, two important questions need to be answered: (i) how reliable is the empirical evidence used in this study? i.e. given the same instrument of observation or measurement do different coders extract the same evidence? (ii) how valid is the empirical evidence, i.e. does it accurately represent the operational code of President Nasser? These questions will be dealt with in the next two sections.

¹In addition, we coded the type of document being coded, the audience, the issues and adversaries referred to in each paragraph.

²The Codebook owes a great deal to Holsti (1976c), especially the operationalization of beliefs. Some of Holsti's codebook categories call for open-ended coding. These categories have been operationalized (e.g. action, military force). Some other categories have been added to enrich the analysis (e.g. the actor's conception of his and his opponent's international role).

2. Reliability

In general, reliability means that different observers using the same tools of observation on the same phenomenon will agree with each other. In this project, four types of reliability measure have been used to test the coding method.

a. Macroscopic Inter-Coder Reliability Test

This procedure measures the level of agreement of two or more coders over the entire document(s). For this measure, Janda (1965) uses the product-moment correlation which is calculated by treating the two coders as "variables," the frequencies with which each use a given code as "values" of the variables, and the coding categories as "cases." This test simply tells us the degree of agreement on finding references to the same beliefs in a given document(s).

Reliability tests were conducted on three documents, namely Kasser's speech at the IX General Assembly (Sept. 1960), Kasser's letter to Kennedy (Aug. 1961), and Kasser's resignation statement (June 1962). The Political Science doctoral candidates, in addition to the student himself, participated in the inter-coder reliability tests. The coders were chosen so as to reflect various levels of familiarity with the materials, code experience, different cultural backgrounds, and different linguistic familiarity with the documents. The cultural and linguistic factor was found to be the most discriminating factor in affecting the reliability coefficients generally. The two Arabic speaking coders A-C achieved a higher reliability agreement.

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Reliability tests were conducted on three documents, namely: Nasser's speech at the UN General Assembly (Sept. 1960), Nasser's letter to Kennedy (Aug. 1961); and Nasser's resignation broadcast (June 1967). Two Political Science doctoral candidates, in addition to the student himself, participated in the inter-coder reliability tests. The coders were chosen so as to reflect various levels of familiarity with the operational code approach, different cultural backgrounds, and different linguistic familiarity with the documents. The cultural and linguistic factor had turned to be the most discriminating factor in affecting the reliability coefficients. Generally, the two Arabic speaking coders (A-C), achieved a higher reliability agreement.

TABLE 4.2
RESULTS OF INTER-CODER MACROSCOPIC TEST

	Coders A-B	Coders A-C	Coders B-C
Document 1: Resignation Speech	.95	.83	.72
Document 2: Letter to Kennedy	.97	.95	.79
Document 3: UN Speech	.60	.86	.81

The average correlation is 0.83. It appears that the results presented in Table 4.2 of our coding efforts are quite reliable in spite of the high level of complexity of our coding scheme.

(b) Microscopic Inter-Coder Reliability Test

This test measures the agreement of two coders who check the same code for each category coded. The coefficient of composite reliability is as follows:

$$CR = \frac{2N}{N_1 + N_2}$$

- N = Number of codes that match between Coder A and Coder B.
 N_1 = Total number of codes used by Coder A.
 N_2 = Total number of codes used by Coder B

Because this test measures whether the same codes are used, rather than the total number of used codes, the coefficient is expected to be lower than that of a macroscopic test. The results are as follows:

TABLE 4.3
RESULTS OF INTER-CODER MICROSCOPIC TEST

	Coders A-B	Coders A-C	Coders B-C
Document 1	.52	.73	.64
Document 2	.53	.75	.70
Document 3	.50	.68	.64

The average coefficient of reliability is .62. Again, we may conclude that our method of coding is reasonably reliable.

(c) Intra-Coder Reliability Test

This method of reliability testing requires only one coder who performs the coding twice. The author himself coded the three documents once, then did it again two months later. The results of two codings are correlated according to two different methods. This reliability test tends to give relatively high coefficient of reliability because there is only one coder involved in the test, hence individual differences in interpretation of the coding scheme are minimized.

TABLE 4.4

RESULTS OF INTRA-CODER RELIABILITY TEST

	Macroscopic	Microscopic
Document 1	.94	.71
Document 2	.84	.82
Document 3	.92	.73
Mean	.90	.75

(d) Scott's Reliability Test

The macroscopic and microscopic tests of reliability have been criticized for not taking into account the possibility that agreement may result from chance (Holsti, 1969:140). To eliminate this possibility, Scott (1955:323-324) developed an index of reliability (P_i) which corrects not only for the number of categories, but also for the probable frequency with which each is used. Scott's P_i is computed as follows:

$$P_i = \frac{\% \text{ observed agreement} - \% \text{ expected agreement}}{\% \text{ expected agreement}}$$

P_i may be interpreted as the extent to which the coding reliability exceeds chance, and is usually calculated on any category set.

The work of Coders A and C on Document 1 was analyzed according to the above formula. In this case, we have found that the coefficient of reliability between the two coders is equal to 0.81, which is well above the level of chance.

3. Validity

A measuring instrument possesses validity when it actually measures what it claims to measure. By the same token, a data set is valid if it is relevant to the characteristics in which a researcher is interested. More specifically in our case, it is important to raise the question whether the operational code extracted from the coded documents truly represents President Nasser's beliefs. It is difficult to give an empirical answer to this question. On the one hand, we must be sure that President Nasser is the author of all the written documents and his verbal utterances were faithfully reported without too much distortion or omission. Once this question of authorship is satisfactorily answered, we must further assume that all the statements made in public (speeches, articles, books, etc.) faithfully reflect his inner thoughts and beliefs, which is a controversial assumption indeed.

(a) Problems of Authorship and Ghost Writing

It is a well-established fact that politicians usually resort to ghost-writers to write public statements, books, memoirs, etc. For example, it is known that Heikal wrote

the entire manuscript of Nasser's the Philosophy of Revolution (Matar, 1975:38) and his resignation broadcast in 1967 (Heikal, 1975:29).¹ Is it valid to rely on such documents to understand Nasser's operational code?

The question of authorship is rather a peripheral issue. What matters is not whether the political leader has written the document himself, but whether he accepted the document to be attributed to him as expressing his views. It is highly unlikely that a ghost-writer will write a document which diametrically contradicts his leader's view. However, this problem can be checked by comparing beliefs stated in those ghost-written documents and other authentic communications. We will examine the empirical evidence related to this issue in a later section.

(b) Problem of Sincerity

Some of the critics of the cognitive approach to foreign policy analysis argue that oral or written statements made by a decision maker are not likely to reveal his "actual" or "real" beliefs. In some cases, it is true that there is always a gap between what a person says and what he "really"

¹Heikal (1977:23) also says that he personally wrote some of Nasser's speeches such as his address to the National Assembly in 1964.

believes (Brodin, 1972). However, the use of verbal or written data to reconstruct an individual's operational code is justified by the following factors: (i) verbal utterances of political leaders are an integral part of their effort to explain and justify their policies and decisions. (ii) It is the public verbal behavior of politicians, and not what they "privately" or "really" think that has consequences for the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. Verbal behavior sets limits on possible actions and creates commitments and expectations that affect future behavior. (iii) Verbal articulations of political leaders denote how political leaders would like to be perceived and understood by others. (iv) Individuals strive toward consistency; hence a general pattern of inconsistency between verbal communications and actual beliefs is likely to indicate an abnormal personality. To answer the question of validity, we conducted two tests: a face-validity test and a construct-validity test.

(c) Face Validity

The face-validity test is derived from a very simple principle: an empirical evidence is valid if observers coming from various backgrounds agree with each other that it is so. In our case, the question is about the congruence between Nasser's public statements and his private beliefs, and we must rely on the opinions of those who know Nasser to check his sincerity, i.e., the validity of our data.

We found that Nasser's colleagues, aides and area experts split on the question of the sincerity of his public utterances. To give a few examples, a former Minister of National Guidance (Radwan, 1957:12), a Lebanese political scientist (Sayegh, 1965:164), an Egyptian professor of literature (Ayyad, 1970:142), and an Egyptian Minister of Culture (Al-Sibai, 1971:130) all concurred that Nasser's public articulations were good indicators of his real beliefs. On the other hand, a former Vice-President (Hussein, 1975), and a former Wafdist minister (Talaat, 1977) agreed that what he told them in private was not consistent with what he used to say in public. However, while the first group generalized this congruence as a pattern, the second group confined the incongruence to specific facts or events.

This apparently inconclusive finding prompted us to consult the specific judgements of area experts on Nasser's "real" operational code beliefs. If our method of relying on publicly available documents is valid, then Nasser's beliefs extracted from such documents should be congruent with his beliefs as judged by experts and colleagues. By comparing Nasser's "real" operational code beliefs as judged by experts and colleagues, presented in Table 4.5, and his operational code beliefs extracted from his publicly available documents, as presented in Part II, one can readily see that the two sets of beliefs are basically similar. The two sets are particularly congruent in the case of Nasser's beliefs about

the political universe, his image of Israel, Egypt's international role, optimism, the role of leader, goal selection, approach, timing, and action.

However, area experts did not completely concur on Nasser's strategies and estimations of the utility of military force, especially toward Israel. This is not unexpected. The inherently emotional nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict tended to affect the judgements of the Arabs and the Israelis on Nasser's "Israeli" operational code. Accordingly, we decided to probe the validity problem through an assessment of the construct validity of Nasser's documents.

(d) Construct Validity

The construct validity test is based on the assumption that people are more likely to be sincere in private communications than in public communications, and more likely to reveal their true feelings in spontaneously articulated statements than in ones that are premeditated. If this assumption is empirically supported, then the validity of our method of treating all documents on an equal basis is highly questionable. On the other hand, if we can prove that Nasser consistently articulated the same beliefs across all types of documents, audience and other means of communication, then we can conclude with some confidence that such articulated beliefs reflect his "real" beliefs. In other words, if the data were valid, there would be no significant difference

TABLE 4.5

NASSER'S OPERATIONAL CODE BELIEFS AS JUDGED BY
HIS COLLEAGUES AND EXPERTS

POLITICAL UNIVERSE	NATURE OF OPPONENT	EGYPT'S GLOBAL ROLE	OPTIMISM
Political universe is conflictual (1)	Israel is expansionist: Nile to Euphrates (8)	Liberator of Arabs (12)	Unqualified optimism (16)
Conflict is inevitable and permanent (2)	Israel is an agent of imperialism (9)	Regional leader of Arabs' (13)	
Two-tier system of conflict (3)	Opponent is likely to take advantage of any conciliatory move (10)	Example and developer (14)	
Class contradictions are the source of class conflict (4)	Opponent is likely to back down if confronted by firm policies (11)	A non-aligned active independent actor (15)	
All issues linked (5)			
Conflict is zero-sum and dysfunctional (6)			
Transform social system and disarm bourgeoisie to achieve social peace (7)			
(1) Saad Al-Din, 1970a and Mohieddin in Egyptian Left, V."	(5) Murad, 1975.	(8) Al-Houssaini, 1970.	(13) Soroor, 1957
(2) Mursi, 1970	(6) Heikal, 1977 and Youssef, 1970.	(9) Nassef, 1970 and Mahfouz, 1971.	(14) Heikal, 1962.
(3) Wahaba, 1975	(7) Saad Al-Din, 1970a. Wahba, 1975, and Heikal, 1977.	(10) Saad Al-Din, 1970a	(15) Birandragath, 1966.
(4) Mursi, 1970 and Saad Al-Din, 1970a.		(11) Meir, 1975 and Kora'a, 1959.	(16) Kora'a, 1959.
		(12) Korany, 1976b.	

ROLE OF LEADER	GOAL SELECTION	APPROACHES	STRATEGIES
Man can control his environment (1)	Select goals in a comprehensive framework (5)	Prepare ground (11)	Concentrate on one opponent at a time (the strongest), (15)
Leader is a reflection of the aspirations of his people (2)	Never abandon a goal or compromise on basics (6)	Build Arab power before liberating Palestine (12)	Defensive-deterrent strategy against Israel (16)
Leader is an honest guardian of his people (3)	Select feasible goals in inter-Arab politics (7)	Trial and error (13)	Dismember Israel through a two-stage operation (17)
Leader cannot control or do everything (4)	Adjust goals and means according to test of reality (8)	Incrementalism and gradualism (14)	
	Hierarchy of goals: Arab-African-neutral circles rank-ordered (9)		
	Schedule of goals: political before social revolution (10)		

- (1) Sayegh, 1965, Da'oud, 1970, Ibrahim, 1970 and Hewaidy, 1971.
 (2) Mansour, 1970.
 (3) Kora'a, 1959.
 (4) Hussein, 1975.
 (5) Mazhar, 1963 and Diab, 1975.
 (6) Al-Sadat, 1957 and Al-Sibai, 1971.
 (7) Nassef, 1970 and Mohieddin, 1970.
 (8) Sayegh, 1965 and Be'eri, 1970.
 (9) Chali, 1971.
 (10) Eskandar, 1970.
 (11) Al-Sadat, 1957 and Ghali, 1971.
 (12) Nassef, 1970 and Saad Al-Din, 1970a.
 (13) Mazhar, 1963, Khaddouri, 1973, and Birandranath, 1966.
 (14) Hatem, 1970 and El-Asharm, 1973.
 (15) Elwan, 1970 and Mohieddin, 1970.
 (16) Mahfouz, 1971, Kerr, 1973, Al-Hadidy, 1974 and Baker, 1978.
 (17) Laqueur, 1957, Raja, 1959, and Harkaby, 1977.

RISK	POLITICAL ACTION	MILITARY FORCE	POWER
High risk policies are permissible (1)	Act rationally and after careful calculations (3)	Avoid resort to force or bloodshed in domestic affairs (7)	Power is multi-dimensional: military, political, and spiritual (14).
TIMING	Avoid premature action (4)	Avoid use of force in Arab politics (8)	
Timing is crucial (2)	Delay escalatory action until you gain a position of strength (5)	Military force is the only means to achieve Arab unity (9)	
	Act quickly when opportunities of success arise (6)	Before 1967: Avoid a military confrontation with Israel (10)	
		After 1967: Military force is the only means to restore Sinai (12)	
		Use force supplemented (13)	

- (1) Eban, 1972, Ajami, 1974 and Nutting 1972.
 (2) Al-Louzi, 1970, Elwan, 1970, Rissan, 1973, and Beheary, 1970.
 (3) Ibrahim, 1970 and Hafez, 1976b.
 (4) Kora'a, 1959, Heikal, 1972 and Hatem, 1974.
 (5) Youssef, 1970, Eban, 1972, and Neguib, 1973.
 (6) Kora'a, 1959.
 (7) Ibrahim, 1970.
 (8) Ghali, 1971
 (9) Ghazali, 1976.
 (10) Al-Houssaini, 1970, Atwy, 1970 and Eban, 1972.
 (11) Snow, 1972, Al-Hadidy, 1974, Fawzi, 1977, Baker, 1978 and Heikal, 1977.
 (12) Salama, 1970, Meir, 1970 and Hafez, 1976a.
 (13) Al-Hadidy, 1974 and Hafez, 1976a.
 (14) Youssef, 1970, Ibrahim, 1970 and Mahgouz, 1971.

between various types of documents--public documents vs. private/confidential documents, spontaneous documents vs. non-spontaneous documents, or domestic vs. foreign audiences. Thus, we have five construct-validity tests.

I. Public vs. Private Documents

In the first test, operational code beliefs were sorted into two categories: (i) beliefs articulated in public documents such as public speeches, press interviews and conferences, letters, memoirs, books, and broadcasts; and (ii) beliefs articulated in private and confidential documents such as minutes of closed meetings and private communications with colleagues.¹ The results of the cross-tabulations of the operational code beliefs are presented in Table 4.6.² They show that Nasser's operational code beliefs did not vary significantly according to the type of document in which they were articulated.

¹ Publicly articulated minutes, such as Minutes of the National Congress of Popular Forces in 1962, have been classified as public documents.

² Due to the large sample, both levels of significance and strength of associations have been presented. Only relationships which exhibit strong levels of association of .50 or more and high levels of significance of .05 or less will be considered.

TABLE 4.6

NASSER'S ARTICULATION OF OPERATIONAL CODE
BELIEFS ACCORDING TO THE TYPE OF DOCUMENT

(A) Public Documents

(B) Private Documents

	I			II			III			IV	
	1	2		1	2		1	2		1	2
A	59	7		804	14		142	6		412	33
B	4	-		19	-		3	-		2	2
Phi	.09			.04			.21			.11	
P	.85			.72			.81			.01	
	V			VI			VII			VIII	
	1	2		1	2		1	2		1	2
A	190	3		57	25		205	24		212	181
B	14	-		10	1		4	-		28	2
Phi	.11			.21			.05			.21	
P	.61			.15			.82			.01	
	IX			X			XI			XII	
	1	2		1	2		1	2		1	2
A	89	389		16	17		35	1		68	94
B	2	10		3	6		2	1		8	1
Phi	.01			.09			.37			.22	
P	.89			.38			.05			.01	

- I. Nature of Politics (1 = Conflictual)(2 = Harmonious)
 II. Nature of Opponent (1 = Aggressive)(2 = Defensive)
 III. Nature of System (1 = Conflictual)(2 = Harmonious)
 IV. Optimism (1 = Optimistic)(2 = Pessimistic)
 V. Prediction (1 = Predictable)(2 = Capricious)
 VI. Role of Leader (1 = Active)(2 = Passive)
 VII. Selection of Goals (1 = Optimal)(2 = Feasible)
 VIII. Approaches (1 = Incremental)(2 = Blitzkrieg)
 IX. Strategies (1 = Accommodative)(2 = Deterrent)
 X. Risk (1 = High Risk)(2 = Low Risk)
 XI. Timing (1 = Crucial)(2 = Not crucial)
 XII. Utility of Force (1 = Avoid)(2 = Use)

II. Spontaneous vs. Premeditated Documents

In the second test, operational code beliefs were grouped into two categories: (i) beliefs which were articulated in spontaneous documents such as press conferences and interviews, and minutes; and (ii) non-spontaneous documents such as books, and articles.¹ This test is based on the expectation raised by Osgood and Anderson (1957) that the more carefully and deliberately planned the message, the more remote the link between the subject's attitudes and the message content. The results of this test are presented in Table 4.7. The only significant variation was in the case of the belief about the role of the political leader in controlling historical development. In spontaneously articulated documents, Nasser viewed his role as an active one. However, in premeditated documents, he conceptualized his role as passive.

III. Monologic vs. Dialogic Documents

In the third test of validity, operational code beliefs were sorted out into two groups: (i) beliefs articulated in documents which involved a dialogue between Nasser and others, such as minutes, press interviews, and private communications, and (ii) beliefs articulated in monologic documents, such as speeches, books, letters, and broadcasts. This test is predicated on the assumption argued by Sayegh (1965:17) that

¹ Speeches were excluded from the analysis because we were not sure of the spontaneity of their articulation.

TABLE 4.7

NASSER'S ARTICULATION OF OPERATIONAL CODE BELIEFS
ACCORDING TO THE SPONTANEITY/PRE-MEDITATION OF
THE DOCUMENT

		(A) Spontaneous		(B) Pre-meditated	
		I	II	III	IV
		1 2	1 2	1 2	1 2
A		18 2	222 3	33 2	31 11
B		1 -	28 1	7 -	11 1
Phi		.07	.05	.10	.18
P		.16	.95	.75	.36
		V	VI	VII	VIII
		1 2	1 2	1 2	1 2
A		42 3	25 4	25 7	69 33
B		1 -	- 2	11 -	6 13
Phi		.04	.53	.26	.27
P		.08	.04	.22	.01
		IX	X	XI	XII
		1 2	1 2	1 2	1 2
A		21 72	3 14	11 1	11 35
B		5 8	1 -	- -	4 3
Phi		.12	.45	-	.25
P		.37	.22	-	.17

- I. Nature of Politics (1 = Conflictual)(2 = Harmonious)
 II. Nature of Opponent (1 = Aggressive)(2 = Defensive)
 III. Nature of System (1 = Conflictual)(2 = Harmonious)
 IV. Optimism (1 = Optimistic)(2 = Pessimistic)
 V. Prediction (1 = Predictable)(2 = Capricious)
 VI. Role of Leader (1 = Active)(2 = Passive)
 VII. Selection of Goals (1 = Optimal)(2 = Feasible)
 VIII. Approaches (1 = Incremental)(2 = Blitzkrieg)
 IX. Strategies (1 = Accommodative)(2 = Deterrent)
 X. Risk (1 = High Risk)(2 = Low Risk)
 XI. Timing (1 = Crucial)(2 = Not crucial)
 XII. Utility of Force (1 = Avoid)(2 = Use)

"Nasser is perhaps at his best in face-to-face discussions. Challenge seems to bring out his deepest thoughts." Sayegh believes that documents such as Nasser's debates with members of the National Congress in 1961 or his discussions with the leaders of Syria and Iraq in 1963 are more accurate indicators of Nasser's beliefs than any other documents. Sayegh's expectations were found to be accurate in the case of beliefs about risk acceptance. Nasser tended to express acceptance of high risks in monologic documents whereas he tended to put an injunction against the pursuit of high risks in dialogic documents (Table 4.8).

IV. Ghost-written vs. Authentic Documents

In order to increase our confidence in the validity of our data, we compared the content of operational code beliefs articulated in the Philosophy of the Revolution, a document that has been widely cited as having been ghost-written, with the content of documents authentically articulated by Nasser in the same year. The results of the frequency analysis presented in Table 4.9 reveal no significant pattern of variation. In other words, what was said in the Philosophy of the Revolution about the operational code beliefs falls within the mainstream of Nasser's operational code.

V. Domestic vs. Foreign Audience

These four tests have clearly demonstrated that Nasser's operational code beliefs were basically stable across documents. Even so, we decided to push the validity testing one step

TABLE 4.8

NASSER'S ARTICULATION OF OPERATIONAL CODE
BELIEFS ACCORDING TO THE TYPE OF COMMUNICATION

(A) Monologue		(B) Dialogue	
I		II	
	1 2	1 2	
A	45 5	699 18	
B	18 2	222 3	
Phi	.00	.03	
P	.66	.43	
III		IV	
	1 2	1 2	
A	112 4	383 24	
B	33 2	31 11	
Phi	.04	.22	
P	.91	.001	
V		VI	
	1 2	1 2	
A	162 -	42 22	
B	42 3	25 4	
Phi	.23	.21	
P	.01	.07	
VII		VIII	
	1 2	1 2	
A	184 17	171 150	
B	25 7	69 33	
Phi	.15	.13	
P	.05	.03	
IX		X	
	1 2	1 2	
A	70 327	16 9	
B	21 72	3 14	
Phi	.05	.46	
P	.34	.01	
XI		XII	
	1 2	1 2	
A	26 -	47 78	
B	9 3	29 16	
Phi	.38	.24	
P	.05	.003	

- I. Nature of Politics (1 = Conflictual)(2 = Harmonious)
 II. Nature of Opponent (1 = Aggressive)(2 = Defensive)
 III. Nature of System (1 = Conflictual)(2 = Harmonious)
 IV. Optimism (1 = Optimistic)(2 = Pessimistic)
 V. Prediction (1 = Predictable)(2 = Capricious)
 VI. Role of Leader (1 = Active)(2 = Passive)
 VII. Selection of Goals (1 = Optimal)(2 = Feasible)
 VIII. Approaches (1 = Incremental)(2 = Blitzkrieg)
 IX. Strategies (1 = Accommodative)(2 = Deterrent)
 X. Risk (1 = High Risk)(2 = Low Risk)
 XI. Timing (1 = Crucial)(2 = Not crucial)
 XII. Utility of Force (1 = Avoid)(2 = Use)

TABLE 4.9

COMPARISON OF NASSER'S OPERATIONAL CODE IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION AND ALL OTHER
1954 DOCUMENTS

	The Philosophy of the Revolution	All other 1954 Documents
Nature of Politics	Conflictual	Conflictual
Image of the Opponent	Israel is imperialist agent.	Israel is imperialist agent, regional spoiler
International System	Our role; regional leader	Conflictual Our role: Integrator/ Leader
Optimism/Pessimism	Optimism/ Pessimism	Optimism/ unqualified
Prediction	No reference	Political Life predictable
Time	No reference	On our side
Role of Leader	Control uncertain, but must act	Discern histo- rical trends
Approaches	Prepare ground, Blitzkrieg	Prepare ground/ incremental, Blitzkrieg

further by examining the relationship between the distribution of beliefs and the types of audiences. Presumably, the sincerity of Nasser would be questioned if we found him presenting one set of beliefs to one type of audience and another set of beliefs to another type of audience. In other words, if our data were valid, the distribution of Nasser's beliefs would remain basically the same regardless of the type of audience.

In the first audience-related test, we sorted out Nasser's operational code beliefs into two categories: (i) beliefs which were presented to foreign audiences, such as his interviews with foreign correspondents and addresses to the United Nations and other international organizations; and (ii) beliefs which were presented to domestic audiences such as domestic speeches and broadcasts. This test is based on the hypothesis argued by Harkaby (1972:390) which states that "Arab public proclamations are more significant than the soft words articulated in interviews with foreign observers." In other words, Harkaby contends that Arab (including Nasser's) articulations to domestic audiences vary significantly from utterances to foreign audiences.¹

¹Harkaby argues that his hypothesis applies only to Arab leaders. He contends that in the case of American leaders, private conversations indicate their true beliefs, while their speeches to audiences of voters are a matter of "politics" in the pejorative sense. Paradoxically, Harkaby (1972:414) refutes this distinction by arguing five pages later that "the pronouncements of Arab leaders are often made for exhibitionist and tactical purposes and have no profound significance." However, such arguments did not prompt him to question the wisdom of his reliance upon such pronouncements to understand the Arab attitude toward Israel.

The results presented in Table 4.10 indicate that Harkaby's hypothesis is not supported. For example, in the case of military force, which was of particular interest to Harkaby, Nasser argued against resort to military force to domestic and foreign audiences, qualifying it with a belief in the utility of force as a deterrent to the adversary in domestic audience case.¹

VI. Masses vs. Intellectuals

In the second audience-related test, operational code beliefs were sorted out into two categories: (i) beliefs articulated in addressing domestic masses; (ii) beliefs articulated in addressing domestic intellectuals. If we can prove that Nasser articulated the same operational code beliefs in addressing both types of audience, then we can conclude with some confidence that our data truly reflects Nasser's real beliefs. The rationale of this test is based on the hypothesis by Axelord (1976c:272-273) which states that "a small audience composed of people who can check the veracity of the communication is likely to elicit a sincere expression of the speaker's beliefs rather than an audience composed of masses."

The data presented in Table 4.11 indicate that the type of domestic audience did not have any discernible impact on the articulation of any of Nasser's beliefs.

¹ This point is elaborated in Table 7.8 (Chapter 7) of this study.

TABLE 4.10

NASSER'S ARTICULATION OF OPERATIONAL CODE
BELIEFS WITH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN AUDIENCES

(A) Domestic		(B) Foreign	
I		II	
	1 2		1 2
A	57 6	636 18	
B	6 1	285 3	
Phi	.05	.05	
P	.79	.16	
III		IV	
	1 2		1 2
A	56 2	353 20	
B	89 4	61 15	
Phi	.02	.20	
P	.87	.01	
V		VI	
	1 2		1 2
A	158 -	61 5	
B	46 3	6 1	
Phi	.22	.09	
P	.01	.69	
VII		VIII	
	1 2		1 2
A	104 11	163 142	
B	45 13	78 41	
Phi	.23	-.11	
P	.001	.03	
IX		X	
	1 2		1 2
A	64 315	15 11	
B	27 84	4 12	
Phi	.08	.32	
P	.10	.08	
XI		XII	
	1 2		1 2
A	24 2	44 78	
B	13 1	32 16	
Phi	.02	-.28	
P	.62	.001	

- I. Nature of Politics (1 = Conflictual)(2 = Harmonious)
 II. Nature of Opponent (1 = Aggressive)(2 = Defensive)
 III. Nature of System (1 = Conflictual)(2 = Harmonious)
 IV. Optimism (1 = Optimistic)(2 = Pessimistic)
 V. Prediction (1 = Predictable)(2 = Capricious)
 VI. Role of Leader (1 = Active)(2 = Passive)
 VII. Selection of Goals (1 = Optimal)(2 = Feasible)
 VIII. Approaches (1 = Incremental)(2 = Blitzkrieg)
 IX. Strategies (1 = Accommodative)(2 = Deterrent)
 X. Risk (1 = High Risk)(2 = Low Risk)
 XI. Timing (1 = Crucial)(2 = Not crucial)
 XII. Utility of Force (1 = Avoid)(2 = Use)

TABLE 4.11

NASSER'S ARTICULATIONS OF OPERATIONAL CODE
BELIEFS WITH VARIOUS DOMESTIC AUDIENCES

(A) Masses

(B) Intellectuals

I

1 2

A	12	2
B	44	3

Phi .12
P .69

II

1 2

371	13
238	5

.04
.47

III

1 2

29	2
24	-

.17
.59

IV

1 2

233	3
113	15

.23
.01

V

1 2

A	110	-
B	49	-

Phi -
P -

VI

1 2

27	14
31	9

.13
.36

VII

1 2

99	9
59	2

-.10
.34

VIII

1 2

94	77
63	58

.03
.71

IX

1 2

A	46	184
B	17	122

Phi .10
P .08

X

1 2

6	3
9	8

.13
.79

XI

1 2

10	-
12	2

.26
.62

XII

1 2

22	37
19	39

.05
.75

- I. Nature of Politics (1 = Conflictual)(2 = Harmonious)
 II. Nature of Opponent (1 = Aggressive)(2 = Defensive)
 III. Nature of System (1 = Conflictual)(2 = Harmonious)
 IV. Optimism (1 = Optimistic)(2 = Pessimistic)
 V. Prediction (1 = Predictable)(2 = Capricious)
 VI. Role of Leader (1 = Active)(2 = Passive)
 VII. Selection of Goals (1 = Optimal)(2 = Feasible)
 VIII. Approaches (1 = Incremental)(2 = Blitzkrieg)
 IX. Strategies (1 = Accommodative)(2 = Deterrent)
 X. Risk (1 = High Risk)(2 = Low Risk)
 XI. Timing (1 = Crucial)(2 = Not crucial)
 XII. Utility of Force (1 = Avoid)(2 = Use)

This series of validity tests has proven that Nasser's operational code beliefs were basically similar across various means of communication and types of audience. As such, they lend considerable support to our reliance on Nasser's public utterances to extract his operational code. Further, the analysis of public documents has been supplemented by an analysis of all publicly available private communications.

4. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have presented the sources of the data used in this study and the methods applied to operationalize the operational code beliefs. Further, we have demonstrated the reliability of these methods and the validity of the data used to extract Nasser's operational code.

In the next part, these operational definitions will be used to analyze the essential elements of Nasser's operational code and to extract its basic structural characteristics in the light of the hypotheses developed in Part I of this study.

PART II

Nasser's Operational Code

INTRODUCTION

Nasser was the first native ruler of an independent Egypt since the Persian invasion which destroyed the twenty-sixth and last Pharaonic dynasty in 525 B.C. In the intervening twenty-five centuries, Egypt was ruled directly as a colony or indirectly as a protectorate by a wide variety of foreign rulers ranging from the Circassians and the Turko-Albanians to the French and British. Throughout this historical process, Egypt developed one of the world's most submissive political cultures, and a highly bureaucratized and centralized system of government.

Gamal Abdul-Nasser was born on 15 January 1918 in Alexandria where his father worked as a post office clerk. He was the first child of a family of eleven children. His family had strong rural roots and belonged socially to the middle strata of the Egyptian petty-bourgeoisie.¹ Nasser grew up in an unusually tumultuous environment. His childhood and adolescence were marked by restlessness and insecurity.

¹In an interview with David Morgan of the Sunday Times (17/6/62), Nasser identified his class roots as a son of the lower middle class. This fact affected his reformist attitudes at least during the first ten years of his rule. Vice President Al-Boghdady stated in his memoirs that Nasser told him that "our revolution is a bourgeois revolution" (Al-Boghdady, 1977:Part II:147).

He moved from one city to the other as his father was posted to different parts of the country. At the age of eight his mother died. This was "a cruel blow that was imprinted indelibly on his mind."¹ His father subsequently remarried and young Gamal moved to live with his uncle in Cairo.

Nasser grew up in the middle of the political upheavals which followed the 1919 Revolution against the British occupation. As a high school student, he participated frequently in political demonstrations and was wounded and arrested several times (DuBois, 1972:43-54). In March 1937 Nasser applied to the Military Academy, and was subsequently accepted after having been rejected the first time for lack of family connection (wasta). Nasser graduated with distinction on 1 July 1938 and was commissioned in the infantry. He was assigned to various posts in upper Egypt, Sudan and Alamain where he developed cordial relations with Anwar al-Sadat, Abdul-Hakim Amer, and Zakaria Mohieddin, who were later to launch, with others, the 1952 coup.

¹Quoted in an interview with David Morgan, The Sunday Times, 17 June 1962.

The national humiliation inflicted on Egypt by the 4th of February 1942 incident had far-reaching repercussions on Captain Nasser.¹ He reacted angrily, not because of any affection toward the King, but because he saw the British intervention as a national insult. Ten days later, he wrote a letter to a friend revealing his passionate pride and attachment to the idea of national dignity, and his belief that Britain would withdraw only if the Egyptians revolted against them.

Disillusioned with the regime of the time, Nasser concentrated his efforts on quietly recruiting officers for underground revolutionary activities. The movement was loosely organized and had no clear goal or strategy except a ~~wide~~ vision about national sovereignty for his humiliated country. During these years Nasser established close contacts with major political forces in the country including the extreme right (the Moslem Brothers, Ikhwan) and the extreme left (the communist HADETO Party). Nevertheless, Nasser kept his clandestine organization ideologically and organizationally independent.²

¹In this incident the British forces surrounded the Royal Palace and the British Ambassador forced King Farouk to assign Mustafa al-Nahas to the prime ministership to check the growing pro-German sentiment in the country.

²Recently released information reveals that for a short time Nasser was a member of the secret military wing of the Ikhwan (Hamroush, Part I:118), a fact which Nasser took great pain during his years in power to deny. It has also been revealed that Ikhwan and Hadeto knew in advance of the exact timing of

The day after the UN Palestine partition resolution, Nasser contacted Mufti Amin al-Husseini, the leader of the Palestine Arabs, in Cairo and offered his services and those of his colleagues. The Mufti told him that he must get permission of the government of Egypt. The government refused to give such permission. In April 1948 the Free Officers decided that some of them must join the Palestine resistance at once and others waited until the army entered Palestine officially. On 16 May, Nasser was dispatched to Palestine as a staff major attached to the sixth battalion which moved to Isdud.

In his memoirs, The Truth about the Palestine War, Nasser described the confusion and lack of a strategic vision which characterized the Egyptian campaign from the outset. Nasser's sixth battalion was posted to Iraq al-Manshiya in Negev to maintain contact with the Egyptian forces in the Hebron Hills. It was there that Nasser had his main battle experience and his first contact with the Israelis (Stephens, 1971:74-84). The Falluja brigade (which comprised Nasser's sixth battalion) was encircled by the Palmach forces under the command of Yigal Allon. Negotiations were conducted

the coup. On the morning of July 23rd, Ikhwan stationed their forces on the Cairo-Ismalia highway to block any British military intervention. Hadeto cadres also distributed leaflets in Cairo streets in support of the coup. Most of the leaflets of the then underground Free Officers movement were being printed on the presses of Hadeto (Hamroush, Part I:148 and Matar, 1975:53-64).

between Nasser as a representative of the Faluja brigade and Captain Yeurhan Cohen, a member of Allon's staff. Cohen (1953) says that Nasser's favorite topic was Israel's struggle against the British and the Kibbutzim movements.¹ In spite of the fact that the bulk of the Egyptian expeditionary force was highly demoralized and disorganized, Nasser rejected Allon's demands for a surrender. The Faluja garrison under Nasser withstood the second Israeli offensive in December 1948 and mounted a counter-offensive that inflicted heavy losses on the Israelis (Stephens, 1971:83). On 7 January 1949, the Egyptian Government asked for armistice talks. The talks resulted in an Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement signed at Rhodes on 24 February 1949. According to the agreement, the Egyptian forces returned home, leaving the entire Negev desert in Israeli hands.²

¹In February 1950, Nasser and Cohen met in El-Auja de-militarized zone and drove together to Faluja so that Nasser could point out the location of Israeli graves dug by the Faluja brigade. (Kurzman, 1972).

²The agreement was unilaterally annulled by Israel in the wake of the Suez war of 1956.

The Palestine war had had a lasting impact on Nasser's thinking. In Palestine, Nasser became convinced that the defence of Palestine was vital for Egypt's national security, that the real villain was British imperialism without which Zionism could not have succeeded, and most importantly that the road to the rectification of the Palestine defeat would begin by liberating Egypt itself.¹

As an instructor at the Staff College, Nasser turned to the task of reorganizing his secret army network. In early 1950, the movement was formally called the "Society of the Free Officers". An Executive Committee of ten officers was set up with Nasser as the unanimously elected chairman (Hamroush, 1974:Part I:147). Nasser managed to solidify his organization in the army to secure it against police infiltration. The Free Officers under Nasser got involved indirectly in the country's political crises. They successfully orchestrated a campaign to discredit and challenge King Farouk, which culminated in the election of General Neguib, a well-respected patriotic general, to the chairmanship of the Officers' Club against the wishes of the King. They also contributed to the secret struggle against the British in the Canal zone by supplying the HADETO organization with army weapons (Hamroush, 1974:Part I:162).

¹As argued by Nasser in his book The Philosophy of the Revolution (1954).

Under the nominal leadership of General Neguib,¹ the Free Officers launched a successful coup at 1.00 a.m. on the morning of 23 July 1952. On July 26, the King was forced to abdicate his throne and go into exile. It was Nasser who swung the Free Officers against the idea of executing King Farouk.

During the next two years, the Free Officers, now in the role of the Revolutionary Command Council, managed to launch a program of agrarian reform, ban all political parties, declare Egypt as a republic and evacuate the British forces from Sudan and Egypt. A split gradually developed, however, between General Neguib and Colonel Nasser. In March 1954, it developed into a total confrontation between the moderate forces supporting Neguib and the revolutionary orientation of members of the RCC under Nasser (Ramadan, 1975:91ff). The crisis finally ended in October 1954 when General Neguib was removed from the office of the presidency. Henceforth, and until his death on 28 September 1970, Nasser became the virtually undisputed ruler of Egypt.

¹The Free Officers chose General Neguib to be the front man of the coup in order to obtain the halo of legitimacy and recognition which they were sorely lacking.

In the next four chapters, we will examine the components and structural characteristics of Nasser's operational code. Through this analysis we will attempt to present a model of Nasser's operational code and a typology of operational codes which will be used to assess the similarities and differences between Nasser's operational code and those of other political leaders.

The analysis of the components of Nasser's operational code will be divided into three time periods: the first period extends from Nasser's advent to power in July 1952 until the end of the Suez crisis in December 1956; the second period falls basically between the end of the 1956 crisis and the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war; the third period extends from the end of the 1967 war until Nasser's death in September 1970. As can be readily seen, the criteria of periodization are the 1956 crisis and the 1967 crisis. By consensus, these crises represent major episodes in Nasser's political career the impact of which was indelibly marked on his political thinking. Such periodization will help us understand the evolution, stability and change of Nasser's operational code and to assess the impact of the crises on its development.

After analyzing the components of Nasser's operational code, we will examine its structural characteristics in the light of the data generated from Nasser's documents. The

structural analysis will include assessments of the richness, differentiation, centrality, stability and change, consistency, and interdependence of Nasser's operational code beliefs.

CHAPTER V

ELEMENTS OF NASSER'S OPERATIONAL CODE:

THE FORMATIVE YEARS (1952-1956)

The focus of this chapter is on the analysis of the components of Nasser's operational code during the period extending from the launching of the July 1952 coup until the end of the Suez crisis in 1956. The components of his philosophical and instrumental beliefs as extracted from the coded documents will be presented as a general description of the basic beliefs, which will be followed by a presentation of the quantitative distribution of such beliefs.

1. Philosophical Beliefs

(a) Essential Nature of Politics

1. Political life is a continuous process of political and social struggle: "The Two-Revolutions Theory".
2. The root of conflict lies in the anarchic nature and de-stabilizing impact of the system of occupation-exploitation.
3. Harmonize and regulate class interests in order to maintain social and political peace.
4. Conflict is a dysfunctional phenomenon.
5. Conflict is a zero-sum game.

Despite the political upheavals which characterized this period and the fact that Nasser was a junior officer with little inclination toward philosophizing about the nature of politics, his utterances and writings indicate that he had a clear idea about the essential nature of political life. He conceptualized the political process as one of fundamental struggle and social conflict. Epistemologically, he believed that:

Conflict between evil and good exists everywhere and at all times (30/4/54).

The struggle of the people never ends. It is a long road that extends through life itself. Whenever they conclude one phase (of struggle) another begins. (18/6/56).¹

In April 1954 Nasser published a booklet titled The Philosophy of the Revolution (Falsafat al-Thawra). In this booklet, Nasser outlined the roots of his revolutionary thinking, and his vision of Egypt's domestic and foreign policy. One of the ideas espoused in this booklet was "The Two-Revolutions Theory;" Nasser argued that each nation must go through two basic types of revolution: a political revolution against foreign occupation and domestic tyranny, and a social revolution against oppressing classes.

¹ All quotations and statements attributed to Nasser are taken from sources listed in Appendix A (Documents subjected to content analysis). Unless otherwise mentioned, the dates refer to those reported in Nasser's seven volume collected works.

The political revolution (i.e. the struggle for national independence) requires social unity and consensus whereas social revolution inevitably results in social disunity and conflict.¹

Every nation on earth undergoes two revolutions: one is political, in which it recovers its right for self-government from an imposed despot or an aggressive army occupying its territory without its consent. The second revolution is social, in which the classes of society would struggle against each other until justice for all countrymen has been gained and conditions have become stable.

The Two-Revolutions Theory was not conceived as a theory of Egyptian historical development, but as a basic principle which governs the development of all nations. Nasser conceived of Egypt's historical development since the Turco-Mamluk occupation as a process of intermittent but persistent conflict (7/12/53 and 5/9/54). The basic characteristics of Egyptian contemporary society, Nasser argued, lie in the social conflict

¹ Nasser's Two Revolutions Theory resembles Lenin's Two-Stage Revolution Theory. In his theory of the "Gradual Change of the Bourgeois Democratic Revolution into a Socialist Revolution," Lenin argued that a socialist revolution may be preceded by a bourgeois democratic revolution based on an alliance with petty-bourgeoisie. Such a revolution, Lenin added, would have to be followed by a socialist revolution based on the Dictatorship of the Proletariat (Lenin, 1964, vol. 24:43ff and 1965, vol. 9:84-86). It is doubtful, however, that Nasser was consciously rewording Lenin's theory. At this time, Nasser was probably not aware of the Leninist analysis.

between the feudal-capitalist oligarchy and the middle strata of the population which comprise workers, peasants and government functionaries (6/4/54 and 22/7/55).

Nasser saw the social revolution as an unpleasant inevitability. It is divisive but necessary to the achievement of social justice. This is almost the opposite of the Marxist conception. For the Marxists, it is the internal struggle that brings the best qualities of the oppressed classes, cements the unity of the working class and discourages the prehistorical instincts that run counter to class cohesion.

Conflict process was seen as an irreconcilable antagonism between contending forces. Nasser viewed conflict as a zero-sum game, one in which only one contender won at the expense of the others. Right and wrong cannot co-exist. "If the scale is not in favor of the right, it must tip in favor of the evil," Nasser argued (30/10/54).

Nasser's analysis of the basic sources of conflict was far from being class-oriented. He viewed the major source of conflict as emanating from the grand confrontation between a foreign power, aided by the exploitative and treasonous oligarchy, and the rest of society over the issue of political independence. The real villains were seen as foreign encroachments on national sovereignty and local traitors. The bulk of the Egyptian society was viewed as a grand homogeneous class consisting of workers, peasants, capitalists,

and government functionaries whose interests were basically compatible.

Consequently, the basic condition for the maintenance of social peace was viewed as the elimination of foreign occupation and the handful of local traitors. Other antagonisms can be reconciled, harmonized, and regularized. In an interview with the NBC in July 1954, Nasser expressed his conviction that social stability and trust can be created if relations between classes are organized on the basis of cooperation for the good of all. In this respect, Nasser was a nationalist reformer,¹ one who believes that conflict with the foreign occupier over sovereignty cannot be reconciled, but that inter-class conflict can at least be abated and reconciled. Table 5.1 presents a quantitative distribution of Nasser's beliefs about the nature of politics during this period.

(b) The Nature of the Opponent

An analysis of beliefs on the nature of the opponent is meaningful only in relation to specific opponents and issues. The Arab-Israeli conflict was undoubtedly the major foreign policy issue around which most of Nasser's beliefs about the opponent were articulated. It still remains the single major issue through which Nasser has been perceived and portrayed

¹

As opposed to Nasser the socialist-radical who emerged after 1961.

TABLE 5.1
DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S OPERATIONAL CODE BELIEFS
ABOUT THE NATURE OF POLITICS DURING
THE FIRST PERIOD (1953-1956)

Belief	53	54	55	56	Total
P-1. <u>Nature of Politics</u> ¹	-	6	1	2	9
- Conflictual ²		83%	100%	100%	89%
- Mixed		-	-	-	-
- Harmonious		17			11
a. <u>Sources of Conflict</u>		2			2
- Human nature					
- Nation's ideology					
- Nation's politics		100%			100%
- Nation's economics					
b. <u>Conditions of Peace</u>	3	1		5	9
- Education/Communication				20%	11%
- Eliminate offender					
- Eliminate inequalities	100	100		80	89
- Maintain balance of power					
- Transform system					
- Eliminate injustices					
c. <u>Nature of Conflict</u>	-	1		1	2
- Zero-sum game		100%		100%	100%
- Non-zero-sum					
d. <u>Scope of Conflict</u>	-	-	2	3	5
- All issues linked			100%	100%	100%
- High spillover					
- Issues separable					
e. <u>Role of Conflict</u>	-	3	-	-	3
- Necessary		33%			33%
- Functional					
- Dysfunctional		67			67

¹No. of coded references

²% of coded references

as a militant, uncompromising political leader whose only concern was the elimination of Israel as an international actor.¹ Therefore, and in addition to factors of data manageability and parsimony, the focus in the analysis of this portion of Nasser's operational code will be on Nasser's "Arab-Israeli" operational code.

6. Israel is essentially divisive, aggressive, and expansionist.
7. Israeli expansionism is a Zionist historical goal, while Israeli aggressiveness is a function of the character of her leaders and imperialist external influence.
8. Israel plays the role of imperialist agent and tension-creator in the Middle East. Western imperialism is the major adversary.

One of the striking features of Nasser's beliefs pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict is his refraining from publicly articulating any statements about it during his first two years in power. Most of his beliefs about the opponent evolved around the issues of the evacuation of the British forces from the Canal Zone and the suppression of domestic dissent. Table 5.2 lists the frequency of reference to domestic and foreign actors as opponents. It shows that in 1953 and 1954 the two most frequently perceived opponents (more than 75% of the universe) were Britain and domestic opponents (Wafd, Moslem Brothers, and Communists). Israel only emerged as

¹

Of particular significance are the accounts of Nasser's "Arab-Israeli" operational code by Laqueur (1956), Raga (1959) and Harkaby (1972, 1977) which will be assessed in the light of our analysis of Nasser's operational code.

TABLE 5.2
 OPPONENTS AS PERCEIVED BY NASSER
 (1953--1956)

	1953	1954	1955	1956	TOTAL
Israel	2.4%	15.3%	58.8%	22.4%	96
Israel & imperialism	1.2	1.6		10.9	20
Imperialism	10.6	5.6	8.8	10.9	39
Britain	60.0	13.7	2.9	10.3	86
USA	1.2		2.9	1.9	6
France				1.9	3
UK & France	1.2		2.9	19.9	34
West (other)	1.2	.8	1.5	10.3	19
East		.8			1
Arabs				2.6	4
Domestic	22.4	62.1	19.1	9.0	123
Other			3.0		2
N of references about opponents	85	124	68	156	433
N of coded references	113	205	144	247	709

the major opponent in 1955. Also, in his first public speech at the University of Cairo on 15 November 1952, the Palestine question was conspicuously absent. In his first interview with the Voice of America (Al-Ahram, 26/3/53), Nasser did not even mention Israel or the Palestine problem. He assured his American audience that his present policies "do not imply hatred or aggression against any nation, be it close or distant." Nasser pleaded to "all nations with whom there have been any misunderstandings or schism to prove through concrete actions that they are willing to correct their mistakes." In an interview with Al-Ahram on 2 March 1953 Nasser criticized President Truman for ignoring the Arabs' right to live in peace with the Jewish minority in Palestine within a unified economic and political framework.¹

From the signing of the armistice agreement of 1949 up until this time, the Egyptian-Israeli front remained quiet in spite of the banning of Israel shipping in the Aqaba Gulf and the Suez Canal by the Farouk regime. The first direct Egyptian-Israeli interaction occurred on 28 August 1953 when

¹ On 17/9/53 the weekly magazine Al-Tahrir (issued by the Public Affairs Department of the Egyptian Armed Forces) published a comprehensive summary of Yeruhan Cohen's article on his contacts with Nasser during the Palestine war (published in the Jewish Observer and Middle East Review on 13/2/53). What is important is that the official magazine of the Armed Forces, which was under control of Nasser's loyalists, found it fit to publish the story of Nasser's contacts with the Israelis during the 1948 Palestine war and his admiration of their struggle.

Israeli forces attacked the Palestinian refugee camp of Al-Bureig and 20 refugees were killed. One month later, Israeli forces drove Egyptian Bedouins from the Al-Auja de-militarized zone and set up a kibbutz there claiming sovereignty over the entire area (Love, 1970:12).¹ By March 1954, Israeli raids on Egyptian and Jordanian posts had risen sharply.²

In this context, Nasser wrote in March 1954 an introduction to the Arabic translation of Israel Cohen's book The Zionist Movement. Nasser enumerated three major opponents with which conflict was likely to escalate in the future: Imperialism, Communism, and Zionism. About Zionism he wrote:

¹ Nasser replied in January 1954 by discontinuing the practice of allowing Israel to transit the Suez Canal, and telling the Security Council that Egypt would not give up the new practice until the Council acted on Israeli truce violations.

² In October 1953 Israeli forces killed sixty-six Palestinians in a raid on the Jordanian village of Qibya and in March 1954 nine others were killed in a raid on Nahalin. On April 1954 three Egyptian soldiers were killed in two Israeli attacks. The Mixed Armistice Commissions censured Israel for these attacks. Israel justified them by Arab border infiltration and murder of Israeli civilians. Love (1970:57-6) reports that these infiltrations were conducted by individuals who were driven from their villages and were trying to regain lost properties. For example on 17 March 1954, eleven Israelis were killed in a bus incident in Eastern Negev. UN investigators determined that the killers were members of the Azzazma tribe of Bedouins whom Israeli troops had driven with casualties from their traditional watering grounds in southwest Beersheba to Sinai. General Bennike forwarded the results of the investigation, with the identities of the killers, to the Security Council. But by then Israel had retaliated against Nahalin (Love, 1970:61-62).

The battle between us and Zionism is not over. It may have not yet begun. Both of us have a near or distant future in which we will wash out a shame, achieve a hope and restore a light (Nasser, Tasrihat:61).

Thus, Nasser began to view Israel as an uncompromising actor whose only objective was to annex more Arab territories. In a mass rally on 19 April 1954, and for the first time, Nasser talked about world Zionism and its goal to "occupy the Nile Valley, parts of Iraq and Saudi Arabia." In an interview with the U.S. News and World Report (30 August 1954), Nasser argued that Israel's basic goal was to divide the Arab world into two halves. On 31 October 1954, Nasser wrote an article for the Egyptian daily Al-Akhbar on various forms of imperialism. Zionism, Nasser wrote, was another form of imperialism:

Another form is what Zionism has done in Palestine. The Jews emigrated to Palestine fleeing oppression. No sooner had they set foot on the land of peace, that they initiated a war, turned the people (of Palestine) homeless, and claimed that this land is theirs (Nasser, Tasrihat:117).

The articulation of beliefs pertaining to Israel's goals escalated sharply after the Gaza raid of 28 February 1955 in which forty-two Egyptian soldiers were killed.¹

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Up until the Gaza raid Nasser had only articulated beliefs about Israel's goals as expansionist, his own goals as the implementation of the UN Partition resolution, and a conciliatory-defensive strategy. Privately, Nasser maintained discreet contacts with Prime Minister Sharett of Israel through the Egyptian press office in Paris (Nutting, 1972:93-94). Uri Avneri says that in 1954 Nasser asked Sardar Panikar, India's Ambassador in Cairo, to arrange a secret meeting with

Nasser was alarmed by the ruthlessness of the raid and by the subsequent statements of the Israeli leaders in which

Sharett (Avneri, 1969:113), and according to the British Labour M.P. Maurice Orbach he managed to send Sharett a goodwill message. Simha Flapan wrote that Maurice Orbach, told him that he met Nasser on several occasions in 1954 at the request of Prime Minister Sharett and that he had reached the point of initiating a non-aggression plan with Nasser's assistants (Flapan, 1973:38). Khaled Mohieddin, a former member of the RCC, testified that during his exile in Switzerland in 1954, he learned of secret contacts between Egypt and Israel through the Egyptian press attache in Bern. The purpose of these contacts, Mohieddin adds, was to assure Israel that the Arab-Israeli problem would be settled after the British evacuation (Hamroush, 1977, Part IV:160). Also in his first meeting with General Burns, the UN truce supervisor, in November 1954, Nasser reiterated that he wanted no trouble on the borders with Israel (Burns, 1962:18). Nasser also approved of the American plan devised by Eric Johnston, President Eisenhower's envoy on the sharing of the waters of the Jordan River between Israel and the adjacent Arab countries. In January 1955, Nasser received the British member of parliament, Richard Crossman, whom he told that Israel was not considered a military menace and that he intended to hold Egypt's arms purchases to the minimum and devote the bulk of the budget to economic development (Love, 1970:14).

While these contacts were going on, Israeli intelligence masterminded a clandestine operation in July 1954 in which a series of bomb attacks on British and American establishments in Cairo were staged. The goal of the operation was to wreck Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the evacuation of the Suez Canal base and to ensure that the British would stay in Egypt. Egyptian police arrested members of the Israeli ring and some of them were executed. Lavon, the Israeli defence minister, resigned a few days after the execution of his agents and Ben-Gurion took his post. Six days after Ben-Gurion's return, Israel launched the Gaza raid. Israel justified the raid by statistics on border infiltrations. The evidence of the UN observers did not support this claim and the raid was censured by the UN. In his testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Henry Byroade, the then American Ambassador in Cairo, refuted the Israeli claim (Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Forces, U.S. Senate, 85th Congress, 1st Session, Jan-Feb. 1957, Washington, 1957:746-747 in Wheelock, 1960:222-223).

they pointed out the need for expansion. He quoted statements of Ben-Gurion (1/10/55) and Menachem Begin (2/10/55) and declarations of the World Zionist Congress of April 1956 (13/5/56) citing the need for expansion in Arab territories. Nasser called the Gaza raid the "turning point" in Egyptian-Israeli relations." As he told the New York Times (6/10/55),¹

Before the raid (on Gaza) we were not very much preoccupied with the Israeli danger. We used to consider the Israeli threat as a problem of our efforts to rebuild our country. We used to consider Israel's threat as the other side of Arab weakness... The smoke of the Gaza raid has vanished to unleash a serious fact: Israel is not the usurped territory behind the armistice lines, Israel is in fact an imperialist spearhead and a centre for the conglomeration of the forces of imperialism and world Zionism (22/7/57).

In another interview (1/4/57), Nasser reiterated:

In the beginning of the revolution I was against the idea of building a big army because I was hoping to live in peace and affection with all countries. But the savage Israeli assault on Gaza changed this idea. In the night of 28/2/55 I realized that we need weapons to defend ourselves.

¹

In his memoirs, Abdellatif al-Boghdady (a former member of the RCC, Nasser's vice-president and one of his critics since 1964) concurred with this assessment. al-Boghdady (Memoires 1973:Part I:197-202) says that after the settlement of the Nasser-Neguib rift in November 1954, Nasser was determined to concentrate on domestic development and keep military spending at a low level. The raid was the turning point in Nasser's perception of Israel, especially since it came two days after Eden's visit to Egypt in which he failed to persuade Nasser to adhere to a Middle East defense system, and three days after the signing of the Baghdad Pact. All of this prompted Nasser to believe that the raid was designed to expose Egypt's vulnerability.

By mid-1955, Nasser's image of Israel became more definite as a result of numerous military actions with Israel. Now Israel was seen as an inflexible and deadly opponent whose goal was the annihilation of Arab nationalism and the annexation of more Arab territories.¹

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However, Nasser continued his discreet efforts to pacify the border. In June 1955, he proposed to General Burns the physical separation of the Egyptian-Israeli forces through a de-militarized zone on both sides of the borders. He also accepted General Burns' proposal for a joint Egyptian-Israeli patrol. Israel rejected both proposals (Burns, 1962:79). In November 1955, Nasser met Lester Pearson and expressed to him his readiness to recognize Israel provided she would respect the rights of the Palestinian people (Pearson, 1972:221-222). He also reiterated the same conditions to Robert Anderson, President Eisenhower's emissary who attempted to reconcile Egyptian-Israeli differences in December 1955 (Heikal, 1972:55-56). Because of domestic and Arab constraints, Nasser was prepared to strike a tacit understanding with Israel as a first step toward a settlement. According to Amin Shaker, Nasser's chef de cabinet at that time, Nasser contacted Ben-Gurion through the Paris connection to urge him to abandon the theory of a forced settlement (Shaker, 1977). More importantly, in April 1956, Nasser agreed to meet an Israeli plenipotentiary to discuss the possibilities of a settlement. The meeting was blocked by the British Foreign Office during the uproar over the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in July 1956. However, Nasser rejected Ben-Gurion's request to attend the Brioni Conference which Nasser attended with Tito and Nehru (Selim, 1977:123).

In August 1955, after Israel rejected Nasser's proposals and after another Israeli raid on Gaza, Nasser ordered the formation of commando groups to strike deep inside Israel (Nutting, 1972:97 and Love, 1960:85). As a result, a series

The grand design is the obliteration of Arab nationalism. This is no longer a secret. The Zionist Congress which was held last month in Israel has called for the liberation from the Arabs of the Israeli homeland from the Nile to the Euphrates. For them the Arabs are aliens. For them Palestine is a land illegally occupied by Arabs. The Sharkia Province (in Egypt) for them is an occupied territory. Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq are also considered occupied territories (Address to the Officers Club in Gaza, 13/5/56).

On the occasion of the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956, Nasser reaffirmed his belief in the expansionist nature of Israel.

Zionists declare that their sacred land extends from the Nile to the Euphrates. They said in their parliament that they want a sacred war. The real issue is the annihilation of Arabs and genocide.

In addition to her expansionist goals, Nasser believed that Israel was a de-stabilizing force whose goal was the creation and magnification of tension in the politics and economics of Arab countries and the Middle East at large (19/12/54 and 16/11/55):¹

of raids and counter-raids developed until April 1956 when Nasser accepted a cease-fire agreement with Israel. During these skirmishes Israel occupied the entire al-Auja demilitarized zone. The most severe attack was on al-Sabha Egyptian post on the night of 2-3 November 1955. Nasser told the New York Times (3/11/55) that the irony of the Israeli attack on al-Sabha was that it came only 10 hours after Ben-Gurion offered publicly to meet with Nasser to achieve a mutual agreement.

¹In his speech at the occasion of the Third Anniversary of the July Revolution, Nasser referred to Israel, for the first time, as an "artificial state". In another address to the Gaza Arabs on 29/3/55, Nasser talked about Israel as an 'alien entity'.

If Israel represents external aggression and foreign pressures, then the existence of Israel, which has been created in this area as a tension-creating spot, represents two threats: aggression and foreign domination and intervention (13/7/55).

Nasser viewed the Arab-Israeli conflict as a triadic conflict. The principal actors were the Arabs and western imperialism. Israel was seen as a subordinate adversary because its role was to serve the interests of the imperialist state in the Middle East. Nasser perceived the Arab-western conflict over control of defence of the Arab-world as "the main issue in the Middle East, not the Arab-Israeli conflict" (14/5/56).

The issue is not Egypt and Israel. The problem is between Egypt and Britain. It is an issue of domination, of spheres of influence, and Israel is no more than a secondary factor (14/5/56).

As a result, Nasser viewed the west, especially Britain, as the main opponent to the cause of Arab liberation. The West's main interest, Nasser believed, was the elimination of Arab nationalism. The Dulles and Eden drive to recruit Egypt and other Arab countries into a western military pact was viewed as evidence of their intention to introduce new forms of imperialism in the Arab world (6/10/55 and 24/3/56).

This conceptualization of the Arab-Israeli conflict had been in Nasser's mind since late 1953. In a speech before the "Palestine Club" on 13 December 1953, Nasser told the

Palestinians that the principal adversary was not Israel but Britain, the country which encouraged Jewish colonization of Palestine, and supplied Israel with weapons. Israel, Nasser argued, was no more than a "stooge of Britain." As appears from Table 5.3 Western countries were referred to as opponents in 43% of the total references, whereas Israel was referred to as adversary in only 26% of total frequencies. Figure 5.1 sketches these basic relationships. The West, especially Britain, was the focal adversary which created and supplied Israel with weapons and at the same time occupied and denied arms to Egypt so as to enable Israel to perform its role to threaten Egypt's security and eliminate Arab nationalism.

Fig. 5.1---NASSER'S CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

According to Nasser, Israel played two basic inter-related international roles: imperialist agent and a regional de-stabilizer:

Israel was not created only to be a home for the Jews, but also to be an element for the destruction of Arab nationalism (14/5/56).

Imperialism has attempted by all means to weaken our nationalism and divide us. That is why it created Israel, the stooge of imperialism (26/7/56).

Imperialism has directed the common opponent (Israel) to launch this series of savage raids in order to de-stabilize peace in the Middle East (18/9/56).

The role that Israel played in the 1956 war convinced Nasser beyond any doubt that it was actually an imperialist agent.

The appearance of Israeli soldiers on the banks of the Suez Canal and Israel's decision to annex Sinai at a time when the British and French were trying to turn back the clock of Arab history and to humiliate Nasser, provided him with material evidence that Israel was a mortal adversary. In an interview with a Soviet delegation (28/12/56), he said:

The lesson of the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression is that Israel is a jumping off point for imperialism.

One of the striking features in Nasser's explanation of the sources of Israel's goals was his tendency to attribute Israel's aggressiveness to external pressures and the nature

of Israel's leaders.¹ Reprisals and retaliatory measures were depicted as operations designed by Ben-Gurion and the Israeli cabinet to satisfy their aggressiveness (2/10 and 6/10/55). Israeli hegemonic ambitions and aggressiveness were a function of pressures exerted on it to perform a certain role. Israel was deliberately created by imperialism to achieve certain goals for imperialism (13/7/55 and 18/9/56). However, Zionist expansionism was viewed as a part of the belief of Zionists in their historical right to the area extending from the Nile to the Euphrates (26/7/56). External attributes represented 55% of Nasser's explanations of the sources of Israeli aggressiveness, whereas ideological attributes represented only 25% of the 20 total references to the source of opponent's goals (Table 5.3).

9. The more concessions you offer your opponent, the more aggressive he is likely to become.
10. The opponent is likely to back down if we are firm and well-prepared.

Nasser subscribed to the 'bad faith model of the opponent'. He believed that his opponents were essentially evil and likely to interpret any conciliatory gesture as a sign of weakness. They would seize the opportunity of the relaxation of vigilance to launch an all-out offensive. If Israel felt at any point that Egypt was not well-armed, it was very likely to launch a

¹ In contrast to the dispositional attributions which dominated Nasser's analysis during the second and third periods.

TABLE 5.3

QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S BELIEFS
ABOUT ADVERSARIES DURING THE FIRST PERIOD

	53	54	55	56	Total
P-2 <u>Nature of Opponent</u> ¹	15	33	26	59	133
- Destructive	27%	39%	19%(12)	41%(8)	35%
- Expansionist	7	9(6)	(31)	39 (14)	26
- Aggressive	66	52(21)	50 (35)	20 (2)	39
- Defensive					
- Conciliatory					
- Seeker of peace					
a. <u>Sources of Opponent's Goals</u>	2	6	8	4	20
- Ideology	1%	67%		25%	25
- Historical goals	50			(25)	10
- Internal needs		17	13		10
- Leader's traits			(37)		15
- Power politics		(17)			5
- External pressures	50		50(37)	50(25)	35
b. <u>Generality of Hostility</u>	2	3		4	9
- General/permanent	100%	100%		100%(50)	100%
- General/temporary					
c. <u>Response to Conciliation</u>	2	4		1	7
- Reciprocate		25%		100%	29%
- Ignore					
- Take advantage of this	50	50			42
- Take advantage of other	50	25			29
d. <u>Response to Firmness</u>	3	3	4	3	13
- Back down	100%	100%	100%	67%	92%
- Ignore					
- Reciprocate				33	8
- Respond impulsively					
e. <u>Opponent's Image of One's Own Nation</u>	3	1		5	9
- Destructive		100%			11%
- Expansionist	33			100	67
- Aggressive	67				22
- Defensive					
- Conciliatory					
- Seeker of peace					

¹ percentages between brackets denote percentages of reference to Israel

	53	54	55	56	Total
f. <u>Opponent's View of Conflict</u>				1	1
- Inevitable				100%	100%
- Avoidable					
- Desirable					
- Undesirable					
g. <u>Opponent's Decision Making Process</u>					
h. <u>Opponent's International Role</u>	1	4	4	7	6
- Imperialist leader					
- Imperialist agent	100%	50%	(25)	(86)	63%
- Communist agent			25		6
- Zionist agent					
- Regional spoiler		50	(50)	(14)	31
i-1 <u>Opponent's Goal Choice I</u>	3				3
- Optimizer	100				100
- Satisfier					
2 <u>Opponent's Goal Choice II</u>					
3 <u>Opponent's Goal Choice III</u>		1			1
- Flexible					
- Inflexible		100%			100%
4 <u>Opponent's Goal Choice IV</u>		1	1		2
- Predictable		100%	(100%)		100%
- Unpredictable					
j. <u>Opponent's Approach</u>	2	1		1	4
- Prepare ground		(100%)			25%
- Try and see	100				50
- Incremental					
- Blitzkrieg					
- Mobilizing strategy				100	25
k. <u>Opponent's strategy</u>	8	12	3	24	47
- Accommodative					
- Deterrent					
- Aggressive strategy	100%	100%(17)	100%(33)	92%(21)	4

total offensive (26/11/55). But if Egypt was firm and tough, the opponent was likely to back down and Egypt would win the battle without actually fighting it. The opponent would be deterred from violence by Egypt's firmness because he would realize that his chance of winning was slim (21/12/53). Nasser believed that as soon as the British realized that Egypt was strong they would not stay in the Canal Zone, but weakness would prompt them to ignore Egyptian demands (1/1/54). Hence, Nasser believed that, as a general rule, vigilance and firmness were the best strategies. A quantitative distribution of Nasser's beliefs about his adversaries is presented in Table 5.3.

(c) Contemporary International System

11. The contemporary international system is fundamentally conflictual. The Cold war is the essence of the system.
12. The system is inherently stable.
13. The international and Middle Eastern systems have become fundamentally unstable: war is highly likely.
14. In order to maintain international peace, change the ideological differences into a universal belief in democracy, solidify international law, promote international communication, and eliminate colonialism.
15. Egypt's roles in the international system: integrator and liberator of Arabs, and active independent.

Nasser's conception of the international system in the early fifties was an extension of his view of politics as a conflict-ridden process. Cold war between the imperialist,

west and the communist east was the central feature of the system (1/1/55). The system was ideologically divided by two basic social doctrines: communism and imperialism. The international system was believed to be a tight bipolar system, divided between the "countries of the Iron Curtain" under communist domination and "western countries under the system of imperialism" (5/9/54). According to Nasser's assessment, relations between the two blocs--imperialism vs. communism--were governed by the nuclear balance of terror. This tended to reduce the danger of war and stabilized the system (20/8/54). Nasser, therefore, discounted Dulles' arguments that the communist countries were de-stabilizing the international and Middle Eastern systems, a claim he advanced to justify his policy of containment and military alliances. In an interview with the Iranian daily Ettelat (13/2/55), Nasser argued that a third world war is not likely. Besides the major conflict between the two blocs, at the regional level Nasser believed that there was a fundamental conflict between Arabs on the one side and imperialism, communism and Zionism on the other side.

After the Israeli raid on Gaza, Nasser's perception of the stability of the system was reversed. Now the system was seen as characterized by tension, instability and a high likelihood of war (14/4/55). Nasser, who had viewed the system two months earlier as stable, became more concerned with the stability of the international system. Now he argued that the

end of the world loomed large on the horizon (19/4/55) and that the Middle Eastern system was on the brink of war (17/6/55).

Given the fact that Nasser viewed the global system as plagued by ideological conflicts, he suggested that the only way to achieve global peace was to iron out these ideological differences and put an end to the hegemony of imperialism and communism. In a broadcast on the 10th anniversary of the UN on 23/10/54, Nasser said:

A common effort must be conducted in order to change the fundamental doctrines of the contemporary international system...The unity of human rights must pave the way to a universal doctrine based on belief in democracy.

According to his assessment, the best method to promote peace was to develop communication among nations:

We can achieve this major goal (prevention of war) by holding international meetings which will help buttress the relations of fraternity and friendship between the nations of the world on the basis of freedom, justice and the right of self-determination (14/4/55).

In his speech at the Bandung Conference on 19 April 1955, Nasser defined peace as "not only the absence of war, but a co-ordinated effort to achieve political stability and economic growth." For Nasser, the elimination of offending phenomena such as armament, apartheid, power politics, and colonialism were essential conditions of international peace.

Nasser did not subscribe to the old Bolshevik operational code which viewed the total victory of communism, and the overthrow of the bourgeoisie international relations, as conditions of peace. On the contrary, he believed that respect for the present charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of present international law could realize the cherished peace (21/11/56). In this respect, as in his beliefs on politics and conflict, Nasser was a believer in system-regulation rather than system-change as the road to peace.

Where did Egypt stand in this system? Nasser conceived of Egypt's systemic relations as composed of three circles: Arab, African, and Islamic. Egypt's natural role, by location and culture, Nasser argued, lay in the Arab circle. Egypt must shoulder the role of the defender and integrator of the Arabs (2/8/54).

In The Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasser likened Egypt's role in the Arab circle to one wandering in the region in search of a hero. He recalled Pirandello's play Six Characters in Search of an Author, and drew a parallel between the play and Egypt's role:

I do not know why it seems to me that this role, exhausted by its wanderings, has at last settled down, tired and weary, near the border of our country and is beckoning to us to move... Here let me hasten to say that this role is not one of leadership. It is rather a role of interaction.

Nasser viewed the Arab world, not as a simple geographic area, as Dulles tended to view it, but as a nation having common interests and security priorities. The immediate threat, Nasser argued, came from Israel, not the Soviet Union (as Dulles tried to convince Nasser). As a result, Nasser rejected the Anglo-American plan to lure Egypt and the rest of the Arab world to enter into a Middle East defence system, and advocated the creation of "a strong independent Arab entity which enjoys full control of its domestic and foreign policy" (31/3/55), and within which Egypt would play a leading role in defending and integrating Arabs (30/8/54).

Closely related was the conceptualization of Egypt's international role as an active independent and positively neutral actor. One of the most recurring themes in Nasser's operational code during this period was the determination to solidify Egypt's newly-gained independence and to emerge in the international system as an actor which fully controls its foreign policy decisions and rejects military alliances with Big Powers. He affirmed his intention to resist any American or Soviet guardianship over Egypt's decision making powers, even if such resistance entailed the use of force (2/8/55, 15/4/56, and 1/6/56). Nasser's refusal to join a Middle East defence pact was predicated on his fundamental belief that such a pact would turn Egypt into a satellite state. The intensity of this belief is reflected in its expression in 66% of the 105 references to roles as presented in Table 5.4.

TABLE 5.4

QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S BELIEFS
ABOUT THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
DURING THE FIRST PERIOD

	53	54	55	56	Total
P-3 <u>International System</u>		4	4	4	12
- Conflictual		100%	100%	100%	100%
- Harmonious					
a. <u>Sources of Conflict</u>		3	4		7
- Human nature			25%		14%
- Ideology of nation					
- Politics of nation					
- Economics of nation					
- Ideology in system		100			43
- Nationalism in system			25		14
- Economics in system					
- Power politics			50		29
b. <u>Conditions of Peace</u>		4	12	8	24
- Education/Communication			50%	50%	42%
- Eliminate offending nations			42	25	29
- Eliminate inequality		50			8
- Maintain balance of power			8		4
- Transform system					
- Eliminate injustices		50		25	17
c. <u>Structure of System</u>		1		1	2
- Loose bipolar		100%		100%	100%
- Tight bipolar					
- Pluralistic					
d. <u>Stability of System</u>		1	6	1	8
- Stable		100%	33%	100%	50%
- Unstable			67		50
3. <u>Egypt's role</u>	2	15	28	60	105
- Liberator					
- Regional leader		20%	4%	12%	11%
- Active independent		7	71	80	66
- Anti-imperialist agent	50	13	7	3	6
- Anti-Zionist agent					
- Defender of faith					
- Mediator					
- Integrator		40	11	3	10
- Developer		13			2
- Internal developer	50	7	7	2	5

(d) Optimism/Pessimism

16. Substantial change for the better is likely.

Nasser did not adhere to an ideology that entailed specific beliefs about the future. Unlike the Bolsheviks who believed that their goals would inevitably be realized because of the laws of historical determinism, Nasser was an ad hoc revolutionary optimist. He firmly believed that his goals were likely to be achieved not out of any historical laws, but simply because they were the correct goals and policies. This led him to view the achievement of his goals as mostly unconditional upon some extraneous factors. However, in 37% of the cases, Nasser's optimism was conditional upon satisfying certain conditions. The evacuation of British troops from Egypt--which he believed would eventually occur--was conditional on the pursuit of a strategy of negotiation and military threat (9/4/53). The goal of establishing a true democracy was likely to be achieved, conditional upon the purge of domestic imperialist stooges (15/11/54).

TABLE 5.5
QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S BELIEF
ABOUT OPTIMISM/PESSIMISM DURING
THE FIRST PERIOD

	53	54	55	56	Total
P.4 <u>Optimism/Pessimism</u>	15	32	20	20	87
- Unqualified optimism	73%	94%	95%	100%	92%
- Qualified optimism	27	3			6
- Mixed		3			1
- Pessimistic			5		1
a. <u>With Reference to</u>	14	32	20	20	86
- Long term goals	36%	69%	85%	75%	69%
- Policy undertaking	64	31	15	25	31
b. <u>Conditional</u>	8	22	18	11	59
- Conditional	87%	27%	22%	45%	37%
- Unconditional	13	73	78	55	63

(e) Is Political Life Predictable?

~~17~~ 17. Limited short-term predictions are possible.

18. Chance plays a role in political life.

As a new power practitioner with no ideology, Nasser's relevant future was relatively a short one. His predictions were confined to the short-run and based on experience rather than a clear conception of the future or on a priori historical view. Nowhere in the sources searched for this period did Nasser reduce political life to a recurring pattern of regularities in human life. At least on one occasion, Nasser referred to chance as playing a role in political affairs: nuclear war might occur because of totally unexpected and uncalculable factors (26/3/56). Being a pragmatic leader, Nasser's predictions were basically related to specific policy outcomes and the opponent's potential moves. He predicted a total victory over Britain in the battle to end the British presence in the Suez Canal Zone (23/5/53). On other occasions, he reiterated his belief that domestic opponents were very likely to launch counter-attacks against the revolution in the future and would attempt to ignite class feuds in the country in order to recapture power (14/6/53 and 29/7/54). Nasser also predicted that Israel would continue her efforts to frustrate the peaceful development of Middle Eastern countries (19/12/54), and that Western powers would always supply Israel with arms in order to ensure her military superiority over the Arabs (13/5/56).

TABLE 5.6
 QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S BELIEFS
 ABOUT POLITICAL PREDICTABILITY DURING
 THE FIRST PERIOD

	53	54	55	56	Total
P-5 <u>Predictability</u>	2	11	8	1	22
- Predictable	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
- Unpredictable					
a. <u>Aspects predictable</u>	2	11	8	1	22
- Historical development		9%			5%
- State of system					
- Opponent	100	64	25	100	54
- Policy outcomes		18	75		36
- Specific events		9			5
b. <u>Degree of predictability</u>	2	11	7	2	22
- Certainty	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
- Probability					
- Uncertainty					

(f) The Role of Leader in Controlling Historical Development

19. The political leader is basically a political broker. The political leader cannot control historical development, but must act to minimize its dysfunctional effects.

Nasser came to power in July 1952 without a specific ideological outlook or a program of action which defined the role of various social and political forces in achieving his ultimate goals. Lacking experience and programs of action, Nasser portrayed an unusually low level of belief in his political efficacy. For example, he responded to the massive expectations which overwhelmed the Revolutionary Command Council after the coup by publicly admitting that the achievement of the goal of economic development was beyond his capabilities:

We are not magicians who perform miracles.
 The reconstruction of our country needs all
 the efforts of all the people (10/4/53).

If I said that we can solve all problems, I'd be daydreaming and I do not believe in daydreams. We do not have the ability or the experience to solve all these problems (22/7/53).

In The Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasser argued that historical development could not be easily controlled, that political leaders could not prevent the co-occurrence of political and social revolutions. Thus, the only role which a political leader can play is to lessen the dysfunctional side-effects of the social upheavals resulting from such co-occurrence. A political leader cannot artificially create or abort social and political revolution, but he can act to bolster its positive sides rather than the negative ones. In this context, Nasser believed that his role was that of a mediator or a political broker among various social classes. In The Philosophy of the Revolution, he likened his role to that of a shepherd of a dispersed caravan (the Egyptian people), whose only role is to make sure that the wandering sheep are on the correct road, and then to leave them to continue their march alone. In another analogy, Nasser likened his role to that of a referee of a match, a man supposed to be impartial and fair to all actors in the game. Similarly, Nasser argued, the role of the political leader should be

confined to the harmonization of the interests of all classes, workers and capitalists included (6/4/54 and 19/4/54).¹

By early 1955, Nasser had altered his beliefs in his ability to control social and historical development from that of political broker to full partner in the political process. Nasser conceptualized his role now, not as a mediator between capitalists and workers, but as a saviour of the oppressed classes from exploitation, slavery and corruption, and even to enhance their political consciousness (12/2/55). The leader's role is to control and guide socio-economic development.

The state is responsible for the interests of the collectivity and protecting these interests against monopoly and exploitation The state represents the interests of the collectivity in all aspects. Consequently, the state must guide. This economy must be a guided economy. The state guides and interferes to achieve one goal, that is to cut down monopoly and to maintain the balance between all interests and to accelerate the process of socio-economic development (1/6/56).

¹ Nasser's beliefs in his role as a political leader were derived from, and congruent with, his acceptance of the Egyptian capitalist system. Nasser believed that economic development is not the task of the new political leadership, but rather the task of the industrial and agrarian bourgeoisie and foreign investment. The role of the new leadership is to free and strengthen the capitalist potential of the Egyptian bourgeoisie, with the minimum intervention possible. Many laws were enacted to achieve that goal. When the Egyptian bourgeoisie and foreign capital declined to function under these assumptions, Nasser changed his views about his role from that of a political and economic entrepreneur.

The dominance of the role of mediation and brokerage in Nasser's code is reflected in its articulation in 42% of his 19 references to the role of leader (Table 5.7).

TABLE 5.7
QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S BELIEFS,
ABOUT THE ROLE OF LEADER DURING
THE FIRST PERIOD

	53	54	55	56	Total
c. <u>Role of leader in</u>					
<u>Historical Development</u>	5	8	2	4	19
- Actively use politics		13%	50%	25%	16%
- Intervene when feasible					
- Mediate between forces		62			26
- Discern trends			25		5
- Avoid intervention					
- Control uncertain but must act		25			11
- Leader cannot control alone	100		50	50	42

2. Instrumental Beliefs

(a) The Nature of Egypt's Goals and Goal-Selection

20. Our foremost goals are those of full sovereignty, economic development, and social justice.
21. Egypt's goal in inter-Arab relations is to unify the Arabs.
22. Egypt's goal in the Arab-Israeli conflict is the implementation of the United Nations 1947 and 1948 resolutions pertaining to the Palestine problem.

Among Nasser's operational code beliefs, his goal beliefs were the most frequently articulated. He was committed to certain national domestic goals which he considered sacrosanct, more significant than any other goals, and therefore not subject to compromise. Among Nasser's goals, two were fundamental: (i) the achievement of Egypt's full independence and

the elimination of all encroachments on its sovereignty, whether resulting from outright military occupation or more subtle political subordination; and (ii) the furtherance of the process of economic development and the realization of social justice:

We want to abolish political oppression which has been imposed on us as a consequence of the British occupation. Besides, we want to establish social justice and to raise the standard of living of our people (28/7/54).

In the domain of inter-Arab relations, Nasser was the first Egyptian politician to identify Egypt with Arab nationalism. The debate which had been raging among Egyptian intellectuals since the thirties, over the question whether Egypt is an Arab or Pharaonic country, was brought to an end. Egypt's natural place is in the Arab circle. Egypt is an Arabic country by location, culture, and history, Nasser argued. Thus, in this area, his goal was to develop a pan-Arabic system solely based on common interest. In his interview with Newsweek (15 July 1954), Nasser clearly defined his "Arab" goal as follows:

...the Arabs must be one nation working for her common interests. We believe that the location of the Arabs, their contribution to civilization, their enormous economic resources and communications with the Islamic East and the East at large, place them in a good position.

As far as the Palestine problem is concerned, Nasser expressed in an interview with Al-Ahram on 22 August 1953, his readiness to sign a peace treaty with Israel. He argued that Israel must show some evidence that she was ready to respect the UN resolutions and to observe the conditions of the armistice agreements. Nasser's basic interest in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict was to see implemented the UN resolutions on the rights of Arab refugees and the partition of Palestine.

Israel must respect the UN resolutions on refugees, and the Arab part of Palestine, these resolutions which have been issued in 1948 must be implemented before talking about reconciliation (19/4/54).

In an interview with the New York Times (20/8/54), Nasser said:

There is no hope that Egypt will change her position toward Israel unless the UN resolutions on the rights of Arab refugees and the partition of Palestine are respected.

On 9 November 1955, Sir Anthony Eden proposed an Arab-Israeli negotiation to solve the Palestinian problem along the lines of the UN Partition resolution. Three days later Nasser stunned his Arab critics by endorsing Eden's proposal.

Any negotiations for reconciliation with Israel must be based on this resolution. According to this resolution Israel must go back to the 1947 borders stipulated in the 1947 resolution, compensate Arabs, allow those who want to return to exercise this right and internationalize Jerusalem (interview with News Chronicle, London, 12 November 1955).

Unfortunately, Israel rejected Eden's proposals and intensified its reprisals policy which put Nasser in a difficult position with members of the Arab League. By the end of the year, Nasser came to the conclusion that:

the policy of peace (with Israel) is useless. There could be no peace on one side when the other side is committing aggression... (interview with Al-Ahram on 15 December 1955).

23. Always aspire to and demand optimal goals..
24. Don't abandon, or modify your optimal goals, but be realistic enough to modify the means of achieving them.

Nasser was a maximalist. He believed that a political leader should not settle for goals which seem to be feasible in the present circumstances. Rather, he should select optimal goals. Selection of feasible goals or bargaining on fundamental goals, Nasser believed, would likely result in the loss of the battle before it begins. This belief was frequently articulated with reference to the issue of the British occupation of the Suez Canal Zone. On more than one occasion, Nasser asserted that he was not prepared to settle for less than full independence (23/2/53, 17/3/53).

Once these goals had been defined, they should never be changed, abandoned, or modified. Nasser was not prepared to bend on his optimal goals, "even if it meant the sacrifice of (his) life" (19/6/56).

Despite his strong inclination to the selection of optimal goals, Nasser was realistic enough not to imperil the immediate prospects of the eventual attainment of his goals by rigidly adhering to certain inflexible means. During his first two years in power, Nasser committed himself publicly to the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all British forces from the Canal Zone. Suddenly he accepted a deal with Britain which fell short of that goal.¹ To his critics Nasser replied that the means of achieving the same optimal goal may change. It was quite acceptable, Nasser said, to let the British forces return to the Canal base since the agreement stipulated an eventual withdrawal of all foreign soldiers from Egypt (29/7/54). He wanted to be realistic by accepting a few obligations in exchange for the evacuation of the British forces, Nasser added (21/8/54).

¹ In that agreement Nasser accepted the retention of some 1500 British technicians to supervise the adequate functioning of the Canal base. He also accepted that British forces be allowed to return to the base in case of an aggression on Turkey, or any of the members of the Arab Common Defence Pact.

TABLE 5.8

QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S BELIEFS
ABOUT GOAL SELECTION DURING
THE FIRST PERIOD

	53	54	55	56	Total
<u>I-1 Goal Selection</u>					
a. <u>Egypt's goals</u> ¹	55	74	70	93	292
- Destructive	15%	9%	6%	2%	7%
- Expansionist					
- Aggressive					
- Defensive		(3)	29	34	19
- Conciliatory	2	(4)	1	9	5
- Seeker of peace	4	3	23(10)	18	13
- Domestic development	77	80	38	30	53
- Restorative	2	(1)	3(1)	4(2)	3
b. <u>Nature of goals</u>	18	11	6	7	42
- Optimal	100%	73%	100(17)	100%	93%
- Feasible		27			7
c. <u>Value Conflict</u>	6	11	4	1	22
- All goals compatible	17%	9%	75%		23%
- Tradeoffs necessary					
- Schedule of goals	83	65	25	100	64
- Hierarchy of goals					
- Harmonize goals		26			13
d. <u>Goal Pursuit</u>		2	2		4
- Modify goals			50%		25%
- Abandon goals					
- Modify means		100	50		75

¹ percentages between brackets refer to Israel

(b) Goal Pursuit

25. Because Egypt's goals are not all compatible, one must concentrate on one goal at a time through a schedule of goals.
26. One must pursue goals in an incremental way after careful preparation.

During the early fifties, Nasser's basic approach to the realization of his goals amounted to unadulterated caution and incrementalism. Nasser believed that, while grand and ultimate goals may be inherently compatible, tactical and medium-range goals are incompatible and should not be simultaneously pursued. In this respect, one must concentrate on one goal at a time. Nasser argued that the goals of independence and domestic development are compatible and must go hand in hand (18/11/53). Similarly, the goal of uniting the Arabs within the framework of the League of Arab States does not contradict the goal of Islamic solidarity (27/7/54). Nevertheless, one may be forced to have a scale of priority and pursue one goal after another according to an appropriate time table. Thus, the goal of evacuating the British forces from Egypt cannot be achieved before purging all domestic traitors (18/4/53), and the goals of crushing domestic oppression and achieving domestic

development can be achieved only after evacuating British forces (23/7/53, 28/7/54, and 2/8/54).¹

In general, goals must be pursued incrementally and only after careful preparation and without undue acceleration. To prove the correctness of this approach, Nasser used to quote verses of Koran which tell the faithful that God created the universe in six days (30/1/53).² Consequently, one must be patient in pursuing our goals and proceed "step by step" (3/4/54, 6/4/54 and 9/4/53):

1

Even when such values are incompatible, one must strive to harmonize them by all means. In The Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasser argued, political and social revolutions are mutually exclusive, because the first requires the unity of all classes while the second implies inter-class conflict. However, one must endeavor to minimize such contradictions and pursue them simultaneously, (also expressed in an interview with the Observer, London, 21/10/54). On 27/7/55, Nasser reasserted that "we are pursuing the two revolutions of liberation and production at the same time."

2

Throughout his speeches, Nasser used to quote Koranic verses to appeal to the majority of the rural masses. However, Nasser was a believer in secularism. In a meeting with the leaders of the Wafd Party, on 20 August 1952, Nasser argued very clearly that politics has nothing to do with religion (Ibrahim Talaat, 1976).

A correct representative life can be brought about only after many experiments and gradual stages...Political development cannot succeed unless the proper environment is created first (22/8/53).

The realization of our goal of complete equality requires gradual steps (2/4/54).

(c) Strategy

27. Egypt's general foreign strategy must be an accommodative one. However, its strategy toward Israel must be deterrent, and toward domestic opponents, it must be an aggressive one.

Nasser did not believe in a single unifying strategy of goal attainment. Rather he conceptualized strategy as a three-tier system which distinguishes between different adversaries and issue-areas. His strategy can be summed up in three basic maxims: engage in accommodative interactions with all international actors at large, deter direct international adversaries, and crush domestic opponents.

Nasser believed that the general line of foreign policy strategy must be based on the principle of reciprocated accommodation. He devised a tautological foreign policy slogan saying, "we are the friends of our friends and the enemies of our enemies" (23/2/53, 26/2/53 and 19/6/56).

International adversaries should not be accommodated since they are likely to see accommodation as a sign of weakness, and would be encouraged to take aggressive actions. They must be dealt with firmness through a strategy of deterrence.

By virtue of her military presence in Suez Canal Zone, Britain was the first adversary with which Nasser had to deal. Nasser combined threats with promises in order to persuade Britain to evacuate the Suez base. He threatened to launch an all-out bloody guerilla warfare against British forces in Egypt, and at the same time expressed desire to solve the conflict peacefully and establish cordial relations with Britain (17/3/53, 26/3/53 and 12/3/53).

Nasser's strategy toward the West in general was tailored along the same lines of accommodation-deterrence. This strategy was applied during the crisis over the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. Nasser replied to the western sense of outrage by asserting that

we will secure the freedom of navigation in the Canal, but we will vigorously defend our land. The Imperialists should know that if they impinge on our rights, their catastrophe will be unsurmountable (1/8/56).

Nasser warned Britain and France that, if they attacked Egypt, he would reply by an all-out war which would result in the total destruction of their interests in the Middle East (15/9/56). Meanwhile, he suggested that Britain and France settle all outstanding issues through negotiations, and expressed his readiness to attend an international conference in London to discuss these issues (12/8/56). Nasser's advocated strategy on the whole was a combination of deterrent

threats and accommodative promises, through which he was hoping to foil any Anglo-French attempt to orchestrate military action against Egypt.

The major thrust of Nasser's strategy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict was to focus the Arabs' attention on Britain as the chief adversary who orchestrated the Palestine debacle. Nasser endeavoured to reorient Arab strategy toward his short-term goal of coercing Britain to evacuate the Canal Zone. He conceptualized the Arab-Israeli conflict as a triadic relationship in which Britain was the center of all interactions and Israel was an agent of British imperialism. Thus, before 1955, Nasser advocated a defensive-conciliatory strategic posture toward Israel. His strategy meant that Arabs should coordinate their defensive capabilities and gradually move from a defensive position toward conditional reconciliation with Israel. Nasser emphatically assured Israel that "we do not intend to begin a conflict" (19/12/54), that the "Arabs do not intend to attack Israel" (20 August 1954), and that he was ready to reconcile all differences with Israel "if she is ready to observe the UN resolution on the Palestine problem" (22 August 1953).

The Gaza raid heralded a shift in Nasser's "Israeli" strategy from a defensive-conciliatory posture to a defensive-deterrent one. Nasser told the Al-Arish garrisons that any future war would be fought and won in Sinai (30/3/55).

The next day, in a lecture delivered on the occasion of the Cultural Week of the Armed Forces, he emphasized that "all our battles against Israel are purely defensive." Meanwhile, Nasser began to predicate his strategy on three basic propositions: (i) any attack by Israel in the future would not be tolerated, "Egypt will answer aggression by a similar aggression" (9 July 1955); (ii) Egypt must build a credible military power to deter any Israeli attack (22 July 1955) since "peace can only be protected by military force (and) our ability to fight" (13 May 1956); (iii) Egypt must strengthen the inter-Arab regional system of collective defence. In this respect, Egypt must oppose any Arab-Western defence plan such as the Baghdad Pact because "if such a plan succeeded, the Arabs' attention will be distracted to the North (i.e. Soviet Union) while Egypt will be exposed to the real danger of Israel" (The Observer, 26 March 1956).

Domestic opponents had to be dealt with in a more aggressive way. Domestic opposition, Nasser believed, should not be deterred but rather crushed "through continuous and relentless war" (3/5/53 and 9/4/53). Nasser tended to view domestic opposition to his policies as tantamount to treason (26/8/53). Accordingly, he advocated the deprivation of all political opposition groups (Communists, Moslem Brothers and Wafel) of their freedom "even if this involved turning the revolution into a red one" (29/10/54).

Nasser was candid in admitting the aggressive nature of his strategy toward his domestic opposition. He rationalized that the repression of "the enemies of freedom" would accelerate the success of the revolution and, in the long run, ensure the freedom of all individuals:

We will take freedom from the enemies of freedom. We will deprive them from their freedom in order to insure the freedom of the individual and the freedom of the collectivity (25/11/54).

TABLE 5.9

QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S BELIEFS
ABOUT GOAL PURSUIT DURING
THE FIRST PERIOD

Beliefs	53	54	55	56	Total
I-2 Approaches	30	25	6	9	70
- Prepare ground	63%	44%	17%	33%(11)	48
- Try and see	17			11	9
- Incremental		40		22	17
- Blitzkrieg	3	8	50(33)	11	10
- Mobilization	17	8	(33)	22	16
a. Strategy	27	31	22	59	139
- Turn other cheek					
- Non-punitive					
- Accommodative	15%(4)	10%(3)		25%	16
- Deterrent	52	52(13)	45(58)	55(20)	55
- Aggressive	33	39	32	20	29

1

percentages between brackets refer to Israel

(d) Risk Acceptance and Avoidance

28. Limited and calculated risks are acceptable.

29. Control risks by scaling down means employed on their behalf.

Nasser was prepared to accept risks provided that they were limited and well calculated. He believed that, in approaching the task of determining political strategies, one ought to combine realism with the determination to achieve basic goals even if this involved some risks and hazards (Tasrihat:63). In a speech before the Indian Parliament, Nasser expressed determination to maintain Egypt's independence "whatever the price" (14/4/55). On another occasion he cited the case of President Tito who resisted Soviet domination regardless of the risks involved (31/5/55).

Nasser, however, maintained that risks should not be accepted unless they are well calculated. On two occasions Nasser argued against the acceptance of uncontrolled risks. The first was the Anglo-Egyptian conflict over the British Canal Zone. Nasser told the Egyptians that they must be particularly cautious in using force against the British. It should be used only "when we know in advance that we will win" (20/11/53). The second occasion was the negotiation between Egypt and the World Bank over the financing of the High Dam project. Nasser rejected the World Bank's offer to finance the initial phase of the project and negotiate

the completion phase at a later date. He argued, in the speech which announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, that such an offer involved a very high risk of becoming subservient to the Americans. The World Bank and the USA could stall the second phase negotiations in order to force Egypt to accept their conditions.

During the Suez crisis, Nasser developed a strategy of risk-taking through which calculated risks could be taken provided that the means employed on behalf of the risk action would be scaled down immediately after taking the action. The scaling down of means could be realized by offering the adversary a series of concessions designed to diffuse the crisis created by the initial risk action. After Nasser announced the decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company, he moved to offer Britain and France a series of concessions which stop short of total retreat.¹

TABLE 5.10
QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S BELIEFS
ABOUT RISK DURING THE FIRST PERIOD

	53	54	55	56	Total
P-3 Risk Calculation	1	1			2
- Comprehensive	100%	100%			100%
- Specific issue					
a. Risk Control	1	3		5	9
- Limit goals					
- Limit means				60%	33%
- Assess means	100	67			33
- Assess opponent's means					
- Assess opponent's strag.		(33)		20	23
- Avoid two risks				20	11
b. High & Low Risks	1	3	1	2	7
- High risk mandatory				100%	29%
- High risk permissible		67			29
- High risk prohibited	100				13
- Low risk mandatory		33	100		29
- Low risk permissible					
- Low risk prohibited					

¹The strategy was typically followed during the 1967 Arab-Israeli crisis.

(e) Timing of Political Action

30. The success of any action hinges on accurate timing.

As a professional military officer, and an instructor of military tactics in the Staff College, Nasser developed an acute sense of the importance of the right timing of action. He believed that most wars occurred because decisions were not taken at the proper time (14/4/55). The mere assembly of resources, Nasser argued, was not enough. Resources should be committed to action only at the proper time. This belief was explicitly expressed during the Anglo-Egyptian conflict over the Suez base. Nasser advised the advocates of an immediate military action against the British that:

We have all the weapons. We will decide the time of the battle. We will begin at the time of our choice. Thus, we can secure victory (14/6/53).

31. Avoid premature action; act only when you are sure of success.
32. Act rationally; delay escalatory/conciliatory action until you gain a position of strength.

Nasser's emphasis on the significance of timing was reflected in his beliefs regarding the appropriateness of various political tactics. He argued that in making decisions and taking action, we should avoid emotion and rationally calculate possible consequences in advance, in order to be absolutely certain of the ~~high~~ likelihood of success (20/11/53, 21/8/54 and 1/6/56).

Nasser also believed that action, whether of a conciliatory or escalatory nature, should be taken only from a position of strength. For example, he argued that the political detainees had been released only because the revolution's domestic position had been firmly solidified (1/6/56).

TABLE 5.11

QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S BELIEFS
ABOUT TIMING OF POLITICAL ACTION DURING
THE FIRST PERIOD

	53	54	55	56	Total
P-4 <u>Timing</u>	4	1	1		6
- Crucial	100 %	100 %	100 %		100 %
- Wise management					
- Not crucial					
P.5 <u>Action</u>	3	2	2	3	10
- Act quickly	33 %				10 %
- Intolerable provocation			(50)		10
- Delay conciliation		50		33	20
- Delay escalation			(50)	33	20
- Avoid premature action	67	50			30
- Do not yield					
- Assess all issues				34	10
- Before opponent gains strength					

3

(f) The Utility and Use of Military Force

33. Power is not necessarily equivalent to military force.
34. Avoid the use of military force except as a last resort.
35. With Israel, avoid the resort to military force.
36. Military force is useful to deter your opponent.
37. Political negotiations and military preparedness should go together.
38. Resort to military force is preferable to surrender or blackmail.
39. Always maintain military supremacy over your opponent.
40. In applying military force, better retreat and concentrate than be trapped.

Nasser conceptualized power as a multi-dimensional phenomenon, and military force is just one of several aspects of power. According to Nasser, power also meant the determination and will to achieve one's goals. Thus, power may be expressed in various forms, such as psychological and moral support, courage, economic resources, geographic location, and military insight. Interestingly enough, in his assessment of Arab power, Nasser never mentioned military force. In his The Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasser defined Arab power as including inter-Arab spiritual and moral links, strategic location, and oil. In an interview with the Times of India (October 1954), Nasser presented the same analysis:

The basis of the power of the Arab world is oil, spiritual and material relations which link it with adjacent countries, and its strategic location.

On another occasion Nasser reasserted:

Our power lies in our nationalism. Our power lies in our resources. Our power lies in our location. With our nationalism, resources and location, we will march toward the realization of real (military) power (2/2/55).

When Nasser talked in his speeches and interviews about the use of power to achieve certain goals, he was in fact talking about all these elements, and not about the outright application of military force.

Nasser conceptualized military force as only one element of power. Military force, he maintained, should be integrated into the overall strategy of deterrence (16/4/53 and 1/8/53). As a believer in the classical theory of deterrence, Nasser argued that peace could only be brought through the credible build-up of military might because such a build-up will convince the opponent to think twice before attacking, especially if Egypt could maintain military superiority over her opponents.

Peace can only be protected by military force because peace will be achieved when all aggressors realize that we can resist them (14/5/56).

Beliefs about military force were first articulated with reference to the Egyptian-British negotiations over the Suez Canal base. In a speech delivered on 17/3/53, Nasser said:

we are prepared to be reasonable. But if we feel that Britain is procrastinating, we will withdraw from the government in order to prepare the people for war against the British. It will be a guerilla warfare. We will assassinate the British in the streets. We will throw hand grenades. Guerilla warfare will spread out and the British will eventually realize that the price of occupation is very high indeed.

We will do our best to preserve Egyptian blood. We will not allow it to be shed until we realize that such course of action is inescapable (1/8/53).

Even when the Anglo-Egyptian negotiation broke down, and Nasser cried that "imperialism will quit by force and only by force" (13/12/53), Nasser held firmly to the belief that, if he could credibly threaten the British by moving quickly to build up Egypt's military force, they would be very likely to back down (1/1/54).

Nasser's cautious approach to the use of military force was even more visible in the Arab-Israeli conflict. While the Gaza raid may have affected Nasser's image of Israel, it did not alter his beliefs about the utility of military force. War with Israel, Nasser argued, should be avoided because any such war would hamper our development programs (19/12/54).

We do not intend to start any conflict (with Israel). War has no place in the constructive policy which we have designed to improve the lot of our people. We have much to do in Egypt, and the rest of the Arab world has much to do. A war could cause us to lose, rather than gain, much of what we seek to achieve (Nasser's article in Foreign Affairs, January 1955).

In an interview with Newsweek in 1955, Nasser ruled out the possibility of resorting to military force in the Arab-Israeli conflict:

Certainly we do not harbor any aggressive intentions toward Israel or toward any other nation. As a soldier I have seen enough of battles to make me a sincere peace-seeker. As a leader of my country, I know what ought to be done to achieve the prosperity of my people. Peace and prosperity go hand in hand, and war has no place in our constructive policy (Nasser, Tasrihat:136).

Military force can be applied only if one of two conditions were present: exhaustion of political negotiations and conditions in which one is directly forced to surrender cherished optimal goals, or faced with immediate national annihilation. Nasser adhered to the belief that negotiations and peaceful solutions must be exhausted before resorting to force. In his rebuttal to the advocates of an all-out guerilla war against the British forces in the Suez Canal Zone, Nasser said:

While we are negotiating with Britain, we will spare no effort to prepare for our battle. If we fail to obtain our rights by peaceful means, then we will go ahead with our military preparations (1/8/53).

The second condition under which force should be applied is the defence of ultimate optimal goals, such as national sovereignty. When Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956, he was certain that Britain would use military force to regain control of the Canal. In order

to diffuse the crisis, and avoid a military confrontation with Britain, Nasser offered Western countries every guarantee --except direct controls--of free navigation in the Canal.

In the meantime, Nasser warned that, in case of military confrontation, "we will defend our rights to the last drop of our blood" (12/8/56 and 2/9/56). Almost immediately, France and Britain gave Nasser an ultimatum ordering him to let them occupy the Suez Canal Zone. Nasser's instant public reaction was to assert that he'd rather fight with force than surrender (9/11/56). To back up his words, he withdrew his troops from the Sinai front, and regrouped them on the Canal front, even though Israel was conducting an all-out assault on Sinai.

Nasser's views regarding military tactics highlight his cautious approach. He maintained that, in applying military force, one should ensure superiority over his adversary (14/5/56), and observe the rule of tactical flexibility. In this regard, Nasser argued, it is preferable to accept temporary strategic retreat than take the risk of being trapped (2/11/56). The tactics were clearly articulated during the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956. Nasser decided to evacuate Sinai when it became clear that the army could be encircled by the invading forces. For Nasser, such a retreat was not to be viewed as a military defeat because he regarded his political victory over the

invading powers, and the preservation of the army, as more important than a tactical retreat.

TABLE 5.12
QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S BELIEFS
ABOUT MILITARY FORCE DURING
THE FIRST PERIOD

	53	54	55	56	Total
a. <u>Military Force</u> ¹	17	8	7	19	51
- Avoid resort to force	6%	(13)	86(12)		16%
- Last resort	47	62	(14)		27
- Only means	6	25			6
- Available means	41			42(11)	29
- Use then surrender				58	22
b. <u>Application of Force I</u>			1	6	7
- Large scale			(100%)	83%	86
- Graduated scale					
- Use alone					
- Supplemented				17	14
c. <u>Application of Force II</u>		2		16	18
- Never launch first strike		(50%)		(13%)	17
- Take initiative		50			5
- Retreat than trapped				68(19)	61
- Fight then retreat					
- Supremacy crucial				19(13)	17
- Supremacy not crucial					
d. <u>Power concept</u>	3	4	5	2	14
- Multi-component	100%	25%	100%	100%	79
- Military		75			21

¹ percentages between brackets refer to Israel

3. Summary and Conclusion

The picture of Nasser which emerges during this period is a picture of a nationalist-reformer. He perceived society and politics from the perspective of the bourgeois democratic revolution. He saw society as a large middle class with homogeneous interests which collide with external opponents. He was also committed to the regulation and orderly change of society and the global and regional systems, and advocated the maintenance of a low profile toward the immediate regional conflict, the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nasser did not have any illusions about his political efficacy as a leader. His commitment to certain optimal goals was balanced by a firm belief in flexibility and rationality in political tactics; the pursuit of political goals in an incremental fashion, and the avoidance of military force unless forced to face a military confrontation over fundamental goals. He was prepared to take some risks, provided that such risks were calculated.

As a nationalist reformer with limited socio-political experience, Nasser's beliefs during this period were basically banal and routine, especially his instrumental beliefs about risk, action, and military force. In this sense, Nasser was a true reflection of the traditional nature of the Egyptian society during this period.

CHAPTER VI

NASSER'S OPERATIONAL CODE, 1957-1967

THE RADICAL SHIFT

The period extending from 1957 to 1967 was a highly unusual period in Egypt's history. Falling mainly between the second and third Egyptian-Israeli wars on October 1956 and June 1967 respectively, it was the only period in Egypt's medieval and recent history in which no foreign troops occupied Egyptian territory and Egypt enjoyed a prestigious international role of active independence and leadership among Arab, Afro-Asian and non-aligned countries. It was also a period of domestic stability accompanied by fundamental, peaceful socio-economic transformations. By 1962, Nasser finally opted for the socialist option as the "inevitable" solution to Egypt's overwhelming domestic problems. It was also a period of unusual tranquility on Arab-Israeli borders, interrupted only by sporadic skirmishes.

Nasser emerged from the Suez crisis as the dominant leader in the Arab world. His challenge of the western arms embargo, the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, and the political victory snatched from the military debacle of the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion, all this contributed to his emergence as the saviour of the Arabs. As Nutting (1972:196) said "it would have required a man of almost superhuman qualities not to be carried

away by the idolatry with which Nasser was now hailed by the Arab masses. And for all the skill and judgement which he had shown in steering the Egyptian ship of state between the treacherous reefs and shoals of the Suez crisis, the rais was no superhuman." His relations with Arab regimes oscillated sharply between the two ends of the war-peace continuum.

Nasser was torn between his endeavour to rally Arabs, regardless of their ideological outlook, to withstand a perceived Israeli threat and his quest for Arab modernism and independence which inevitably plunged him into a Cold War with most Arab regimes. He succeeded in stabilizing the situation on the Egyptian-Israeli lines through a strategy of disengagement and deterrence, but blundered through a series of miscalculations in May and June 1967.

1. Philosophical Beliefs

(a) Essential Nature of Politics

1. Political universe is a constant struggle for life and power.
2. Conflict is innate in all social animals, a permanent and natural characteristic of human life. Conflict will continue as long as life continues.
3. Conflict is a two-tier system: vertical and horizontal.
4. Human nature is the basic source of most conflicts.
5. Social and political inequalities are the basic source of class conflict.

6. In order to maintain social and political peace; maintain a careful balance between social classes.
7. In order to maintain social and political peace; eliminate inequalities between social classes, disarm and isolate the oppressing class, peacefully.
8. Domestic and regional conflict is a fixed-sum game; but international conflict is a non-zero-sum game.

Nasser defined politics as the process of conflict and conflict resolution. His paradigm was Hobbesian. Politics was characterized by fundamental and permanent war between the oppressing and oppressed classes and nations (5/12/57). Conflict, exhibited in the clash between good and evil, has existed since the creation of the human race. "In each society since the creation of humanity, since man killed his brother, there have been deviations and there has been evil and good," Nasser argued (12/11/64). He conceived of political conflict as a process of continuous struggle for power and life (21/2/59). As such, he believed conflict was a natural and permanent phenomenon:

There are contradictions between the workers, petty-bourgeoisie, peasants, and intellectuals. Such contradictions will always continue. There may also be contradictions between you (the people) and the government at some time because the government is not responsive. Such contradiction can be solved, but it will always exist in daily life (26/5/62).

We must realize that there are differences and contradictions among the people. These contradictions will never disappear. There are always other forms of disagreements other than those between the people and their opponents. There are intra-people disagreements similar to intra-family disagreements... Everywhere there are contradictions of interests (25/11/61).

Conflict was not only a permanent characteristic of political life, but also general and inevitable, Nasser argued. Social conflict characterizes all social systems including socialist systems. The inherent social conflict does not end with the assumption of power by socialist forces. It only takes other forms (16/5/65).

According to Nasser, the inevitability of social conflict stems from being rooted in the non-manipulable source of human nature. Man was created selfish, egoistic, irrational and fanatic. Therefore, his individual interests are always at odds with public and other individual interests (25/2/65).

Conflict, he added, cannot be avoided or prevented, it can only be regulated:

God created life and with it created fanaticism and fanatics. When life ends someday, there will still be fanaticism and fanatics. This problem will never end (22/7/65).

If we look at history, to revolutions, uprisings or major world episodes, and if we look at the setbacks of these revolutions and uprisings across history, we find that human nature was always the source (4/8/60).

We are not in or near Plato's republic. The problem goes back to the beginning of human life, to the days of Cain and Abel when man betrayed man. We always have such things. There will always be the good and the evil (27/11/61).

Human relations are variable, varied, contradictory and conflictual... These are the characteristics of human nature (17/3/67).

Nasser attributed some of the failures of his revolutions to the "supremacy of individual selfishness over public interests. Such selfishness exists in our souls and minds everywhere and at all times" (22/7/57). Also, in justifying why he decided to keep secret the names of the members of the vanguard organization of the Arab Socialist Union, Nasser said:

I believe if we declare that we have appointed X to the political apparatus and excluded Y, all Y's will unite to discredit all X's. You know these conflicts that exist in society and which can never be overcome (7/8/66).

Beside this basic form of inter-personal conflict, Nasser defined two other forms: class conflict and regional conflict. Nasser defined the first as "class contradictions which result in the prevailing class exploiting the working classes" (17/8/61). In an argument reminiscent of Rousseau's theory of the social contract, he contended that class contradictions were not born with society. The structure of society as created was fundamentally harmonious, one in which every individual gets according to his work. Classes were created in a later stage (17/8/61). Consequently, class conflict

became an essential feature of all societies (27/2/61). As long as there are class differences and gaps, there will always be class conflicts between the haves and the have nots (25/11/61):

There is class conflict everywhere. There is class conflict between those who inherited the wealth and golden spoons and those who inherited ignorance, disease, and poverty. Conflict exists regardless of our attempt to ignore it (25/11/61).

All these contradictions are there and will always remain. Our goal is to liquidate the differences in classes. Until we achieve this goal there will always be contradictions in society. Class conflict will remain... Classes exist everywhere (17/3/67).

The second conflict perceived by Nasser was regional. As Marx extrapolated his theory of conflict from the history of Europe, Nasser's theory evolved around Arab history. His reading of the history of the present Arab zone since the times of the Greeks, the Crusaders, and the Ottomans led him to the conclusion that the struggle for power was the essence of political life. Such a struggle, he argued, was a permanent feature of the region and closely inter-woven in the overall will for life itself.

The area in which we live has learnt through its long history that struggle for power and life go hand in hand with the struggle for unity. We must also not forget that this was an expression of the will. Struggle for power is the will of life and struggle for unity is the will of victory. This is the lesson of history, the history of this area since the ancient ages, since the invading empires of the Greeks, Romans, Crusaders and the Ottoman conquest (21/2/59).

Accordingly, Nasser conceptualized the 800 years of Arab history as a process of long-enduring conflict between Arabs and foreign dominators. Likewise, the present conflict will never end because our world is characterized by an endless multitude of adversaries:

The struggle is not over yet. Conflict will continue as long as life continues (16/5/58).

Conflict between reactionary elements and revolutionary forces will not end. This is the nature of the universe (20/2/66).

Nasser conceptualized class and regional conflicts as both vertical and horizontal. The vertical conflict is fundamental and irreconcilable, because it comprises the essential contradictions between the exploiting classes and the alliance of the working people or between the conservative and imperialist forces on one hand and the Arab revolutionary forces on the other. Underlying horizontal conflict is a fundamental harmony of interests. The interests of the various elements of the working people (workers, peasants, intelligentsia, soldiers, and national capitalism) are relatively similar and interdependent. However, there are certain secondary contradictions between their class interests.

There will always be contradictions within this alliance (of the working people). Contradictions between workers, peasants, intelligentsia and national capitalism will continue. But all of them will clash with the alliance of feudalism and exploitative capitalism (8/4/63).

Likewise, the Arab peoples enjoy a fundamental harmony of interests exhibited in the unity of their language, culture, and history. Harmony in Arab politics is a historical fact whereas conflict is an aberration, Nasser argued (8/3/59). Underlying Arab conflicts is a fundamental harmony of minds and consciousness which transcends any transitory divisions (20/5/64).

During the five years following the Suez War of 1956, Nasser's beliefs regarding the modes of conflict resolution were fairly conservative. Nasser argued that the creation of a society in which all classes could co-operate was the best method to abort conflict through "toleration and mutual affection" (22/7/57 and 20/9/59). He believed that social peace can be buttressed by maintaining a balance between social classes and by creating a broad political organization within which social contradictions will be solved, balanced, and compromised in a peaceful way (9/7/60). Nasser underscored the significance of the peaceful solution of social conflict. He abhorred the idea of the physical liquidation of the oppressing class (27/2/61) and the theory of the dictatorial domination of one class. Nasser argued that he differed with Marxism on two basic accounts: first, Marxism-Leninism advocates the violent liquidation of the bourgeois class. For Nasser such liquidation must be realized peacefully within the framework of national unity and should be confined only to social

privileges, not individuals. Secondly, Marxism advocates the dictatorship of the proletariat over all other classes, whereas Nasser favored a system based on the alliance of the working people.

Nasser never abandoned the peaceful resolution of conflict through social equilibrium. Despite his radical shift after July 1961, he continued to believe that "class conflict should be solved not by eliminating one class to the benefit of the other, but by creating a balance of power between social classes" (22/7/61). However, after July 1961, he added to his modes of conflict resolution a more radical element. He argued that social contradictions must be solved by eliminating class (not individual) inequalities and by embarking on a radical and accelerated transformation of the social system (26/7/61 and 4/7/62).

The crux of these systemic transformations was the transfer of political power from the feudalist-capitalist alliance to the alliance of the working people, and the further use of such political power to accelerate the pace of social transformations (12/11/64). Class inequalities must be abolished and the exploiting class must be economically disarmed and politically isolated. the new social system must be based on equality of opportunity, elimination of exploitation, and the deprivation of the exploiters from all forms of economic and political power (9/1/63).

These social systemic transformations must be accompanied by politico-economic systemic changes. The liquidation of class differences can be achieved through "the development of socialist forces, the control of the productive forces in society, and the organization of the working people" (12/11/64).

Secondary class conflict can be solved through a process of education, mutual understanding, and continuous communication between the elements of the working people within the framework of the pan political organization (9/1/63 and 25/2/65).

Nasser differentiated between two types of conflicts: domestic and regional conflict, and global conflict. Such distinction runs almost parallel to the distinction between conflicts in which he was directly involved and those between third parties (super-powers). The last type of conflict was viewed by Nasser as essentially a non-zero sum game. The introduction of weapons of mass destruction, Nasser argued, had turned the international game into a chicken game; both actors must co-operate or they will both vanish:

World peace is a necessity for future security, especially after the invention of weapons of total destruction, because if war broke out between big powers, no country and no people will be saved (28/7/63).

However, Nasser viewed domestic and regional conflict as zero-sum games, the pluses on one side were equal to the minuses for the other. Unity on the Arab side was the

equivalent to the dismantling of imperialism (27/2/58), the end of Israeli aggression (4/3/60) and the collapse of Arab reactionaries (21/2/65).

Perusal of Table 6.1 shows that 91% of Nasser's 55 references to the nature of politics were conflictual references. Almost 43% of his 44 references to the source of conflict were related to human nature and 27% were related to the class exploitation. More than 86% of his 113 prescriptions to achieve social peace evolved around the elimination of economic inequalities, the maintenance of a social balance of power, and the transformation of the social system. In 77% of his 26 references to the nature of conflict, conflict was viewed as a zero-sum game.

9. Conflict is highly dysfunctional.

10. All issues of conflict are highly inter-related.

There are two basic theories on the role of conflict in political life. The first emphasizes the beneficial consequences to the overall social performance. Coser (1956:121-28, 133-149) underscored the unifying role that conflict plays in the formation of political coalitions, maintaining balances of power, and creating understanding among potential adversaries. According to the second theory, conflict is highly disruptive. Parsons regarded conflict as a reflection of a pathological strain in the social system and constitutes a threat to systemic equilibrium.

Nasser subscribed to the second theory. Although he rejected the notion that conflict was transitory, he viewed conflict as a highly dysfunctional phenomenon. He viewed class conflict as basically destructive, and uncondusive to the uniting of all classes (20/9/59). Nasser's dislike of class conflict resulted from his belief that it implies violence and bloodshed (18/12/60). As a result, he contended that one must attempt to ameliorate class conflict by resolving it in a peaceful way (9/7/60).

Another characteristic of politics and conflict envisaged by Nasser was the existence of an intimate and necessary link between all aspects of social existence. A significant change in one brings about changes in the others. The inter-relatedness of elements of politics in Nasser's operational code took two forms:

I Interaction between political and economic aspects of power

Nasser believed that there was a dialectic relationship between political, economic, and cultural aspects of society and power. However, he tended to contradict himself in defining the direction of this relationship. At one time, he argued that it was mutual. "Political and economic situations affect culture. Conversely, cultural situations affect social and economic situations," (28/12/61). However, on other occasions, Nasser adopted the Marxist position by arguing that "political power in any country is an external reflection of the distribution of economic power," (25/3/64).

TABLE 6.1
QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S BELIEFS ON THE NATURE OF POLITICS
DURING THE SECOND PERIOD (1957-1967)

BELIEFS	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67(I) TOTAL
P-1 Nature of Politics (1) 4	2	5	80%	100%	89%	87%	100%	5	11	5	55
- Confictual (2)	100%	100%			11	13		80%	91%	100%	91%
- Mixed									9		5
- Harmonious			20					20			4
a. Sources of Conflict 3											
- Human nature	33		4		9	7	1	3	10	4	44
- Ideology of nation			25		22	43		33	50	75	43
- Politics of nation						14		33			5
- Economics of nation	33		25		22	14			20		16
- Ideology in system					56	29	100	34	30		27
- Nationalism in system	34		50							25	2
b. Conditions of Peace 1	4	15	3	11	32	12	14	21			7
- Education/Communication											113
- Eliminate offenders									33		6
- Eliminate inequalities	100								5		1
- Maintain balance of power			93	100	18	91	92	71	52		74
- Transform system					36	6					6
- Eliminate injustices			7		27	3	8	29	10		6
					18						6

(1) N of coded references

(2) percentage of coded references

BELIEFS	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67(I) TOTAL
c. <u>Nature of Conflict</u>	2	3	5	8	2	-	2	2	2	-	26
- Zero-sum game	100%	100%	80	88	100	-	-	-	100%	-	77%
- Non zero-sum game			20	12			100	100			73
d. <u>Scope of Conflict</u>	5	6	6	7	12	6	3	12	8	5	73
- All issues linked	100	67	100	43	100	83	33	67	63	100	78
- High spillover		33		43		17	67	17	37		17
- Issues separable				14				16			5
e. <u>Role of Conflict</u>	-	-	6	5	2	-	1	-	1	-	15
- Functional											
- Dysfunctional			100	100	100	100	100		100		100

II Interaction between conflicts in different geographic areas

Nasser argued that the revolution in the means of communications had turned the entire globe into a crucible for human interaction (11/5/64). Hence, the triumph of freedom and peace in one country would inevitably lead to the same triumph in other countries (1/5/58 and 16/12/60).

(b) The Nature of the Opponent

11. The main opponent is western imperialism.
Israel is a mere imperialist agent.

Nasser's beliefs about the nature of the opponent were characterized by their centrality, undifferentiation, and triadic conceptualization: (i) next to goal beliefs, Nasser's beliefs on the nature of his adversaries were the most frequently articulated. The frequency of reference to his adversaries indicate that Nasser actually believed that "a clear definition of the opponent is essential to the success of any strategy" (13/5/62). (ii). He viewed his domestic, regional, and global opponents as sharing the same interests. Domestic opponents were perceived as agents of foreign opponents, consciously or unconsciously. For instance, local communists were labelled Soviet agents and the Moslem Brothers were regarded as agents to Arab reactionaries. Student demonstrations in 1968 were portrayed as inspired by Israeli agents.

(iii) Nasser perceived a closely inter-related triad of adversaries: Western imperialism, Israel, and Arab conservative regimes. The centrality of his triad in his operational code was exhibited in his references to adversaries which are presented in Table 6.2. This group of adversaries represented between 75% and 99% of all perceived opponents (excluding the year 1963 which witnessed the Nasser-Baath rift). In 9 out of the 11 time periods, the western countries occupied the first or the second place in the array of perceived adversaries, representing between 30% and 60% of the total. Israel occupied second place, representing between 15% and 40%. Further, in at least 10% of Nasser's references to adversaries, Israel and Arab conservative regimes were directly linked to imperialism.

This triadic perception of adversaries was exhibited in Nasser's conceptualization of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nasser clung to his previously articulated concept of the conflict with the added element of Arab reactionaries which were classified in the same category with Israel. Western imperialism was viewed as the master co-ordinator of the war launched by Israel and Arab conservatives (15/6/66). Britain, Nasser argued, gave Zionists the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and orchestrated the 1948 fiasco by persuading Arab traitors to abandon Palestine (11/3/58). She still pumps \$1 billion annually from Arab oil resources and uses the money

TABLE 6.2

OPPONENTS AS PERCEIVED BY NASSER
(1957-1967)

	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67(I)	TOTAL
Israel	25.3%	17.0%	31.9%	34.1%	20.6%	20.1%	15.4%	34.5%	40.1%	20.7%	51.7%	418
" & Imperialism	5.5	6.1	4.3	11.0	5.8	2.2	1.5	8.8	7.9	4.1	2.6	82
Imperialism	29.7	29.3	12.6	12.1	17.4	11.9	6.6	9.7	6.6	15.2	2.6	212
Britain	4.4	.7	2.4	.6	.6	.7	.7	13.3	.7	4.1	2.6	37
U.S.A.	20.9	8.2	.5	4.6	3.9			2.7	7.2	5.5	2.0	75
France	2.2	1.4		1.7	3.2	.7						13
UK & France	3.3	5.4	2.4	.6			.7	.9				19
Saudi Arabia		2.7			.6	8.2	6.6	.9	1.3	7.6	2.6	40
Iraq		2.0	10.1	4.6								31
Jordan		4.8		6.4	1.3	3.0					3.5	33
Tunisia		.7	.5						4.6	4.1	1.7	16
Baath					2.5	.7	31.6	3.5				57
Arab Reaction	1.1	6.1	.5	2.9	6.5	14.9	11.8	5.3	2.6	8.3	7.0	92
" " & imperialism		.7	5.8	6.9	3.2	16.4	8.1	3.5	5.3	13.1	4.4	93
Other Arabs		6.8	1.4	1.2	2.6				.7	2.1		33
USSR			.8		.6							11
West (Other)		8.2	3.4	5.2	4.5	1.5	.7	3.5	13.8	3.4	6.9	72
East (Other)			1.0			.7	.7					4
Domestic	7.7		17.4	5.8	21.3	13.4	12.5	8.8	3.3	9.7	6.6	151
Other			1.0	2.4	5.1	5.2	2.9	3.8	2.0	1.4		32
N of opponent paragraphs	91	147	207	173	155	134	136	113	152	145	68	1521
N of total paragraphs	150	279	343	246	237	271	250	200	260	252	88	2576

to assist Israel in building a strong military force (26/4/64 and 1/5/64). In Palestine the whole work has been done by western imperialism, not Zionism:

Imperialism has descended on the Arab Palestinian homeland, divided it, destroyed its civilization, forced its people to live in refugee camps, and assigned its land to a racist aggressive alien entity for which he paved the road through treason, forgery, and conspiracy and war. All of this in order to create amidst the Arab people a base from which it can implement its plans and designs for quashing and threatening Arab security and progress (21/11/64).

Accordingly, Nasser argued that the main opponent was western (British and American) imperialism and Arab strategy should be directed basically to combat such imperialism. In this master plan Israel plays the international role of an imperialist agent. Israel was seen as an integral part of the imperialist system in the Middle East. It has been created in order to de-stabilize the political situation in the Middle East and to wipe out Arab nationalism.¹ Arab conservative regimes, (by which is meant Saudi Arabia, Jordan) were also seen as agents of the main opponent. The relationship between

¹ In some cases Nasser argued that the Israeli-Imperialist relationship may be a dyadic one. The imperialist master may also be under the control of the powerful client. In an interview with the Indian journalist Karanjia, Nasser said that the Protocols of the Elders of Zion prove that the destiny of Europe is under the control of 300 Zionists (29/9/58). The U.S. Congress was once labelled a Zionist agent (7/5/60).

the two clients, i.e. Israel and Arab reactionaries, was seen as an organic one. They share the same interests of wiping out Arab progressives and weakening the Palestine entity; and they serve the same master, Nasser argued (24/11/66 and 4/2/67). Arab reactionaries may be the source of immediate danger and threat because their enmity was concealed by their strategy of a smile-on-your-face and a stab-in-your-back (15/6/66). These interactions can be sketched as follows:

Fig. 6.1--NASSER'S CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT (1956-1967)

In Figure 6.1 Israel is viewed as part of a system designed and co-ordinated by the imperialist powers. Israel plays two closely linked roles: imperialist agent and a regional spoiler.

I Israel as a base for western imperialism:

Israel is the agent of imperialism. When imperialism attacked Egypt, it relied mainly on its client Israel. When imperialism established Israel amidst the Arab world it wanted to create a bridgehead in order to achieve its goals of quashing Arab nationalism and dividing Arabs (22/7/57).

Israel performed the role of the subordinate during the famous tripartite aggression. Thus, she uncovered her true military and political character as no more than a base for imperialism and his tool for endangering Arab domestic progress and inhibiting Arab national co-ordination (25/3/64).

II Israel as a regional spoiler:

Israel's second international role as viewed by Nasser is that of a divider of the natural geographic extension of the Arab world and political de-stabilizer in the Middle East. Chapter four of the Charter of the National Action states:

Part of the Arab territory of Palestine was handed to an aggressive racist movement with neither historical nor any natural justification, to be used by the imperialists as a whip in their hands to fight the struggling Arabs if one day they were able to overcome their humiliation and survive crises.

The imperialist intended this territory to be a barrier dividing the Arab East from the Arab West and a constant drain on the energy of the Arab nation diverting it from positive construction.

The same belief was frequently articulated on other occasions:

In this area of the world, Israel represents a bridgehead for aggression. The establishment of Israel in this area was designed as a threat to Arabs (15/5/58).

Imperialism implanted Israel in the Arab heartland in order to isolate the Arab East from the Arab West (21/2/65).

Table 6.3 shows that Nasser had articulated 251 references to his adversaries' international roles. All of his references to Israel (113 statements) fall in either of the two categories: imperialist agent (78%) or regional spoiler (22%).

12. Israel was created for the goal of annihilating Arab nationalism and the Palestine people.
13. Zionists want to turn the area between the Nile and the Euphrates into a holy Jewish home.
14. Israel wants to impose a settlement on the basis of the status quo.
15. Israeli expansionism is a function of Zionist ideological-historical goals and the intrinsic demographic needs of the Israeli society.

In articulating beliefs about Israel as such, Nasser asserted that his animosity did not imply any anti-Jewish or anti-semitic emotions. He distinguished between Jews as adherents to a certain religion and Israel as a Zionist state (22/6/62). His animosity toward Israel, Nasser argued, was rooted in the practices of the Zionist movement in Palestine:

I have never been personally anti-semitic. It is impossible for any educated Egyptian to be anti-semitic because there have been many bonds between us and the Jews as a people. Moses was Egyptian. My anti-Israeli feelings and actions were born out of one single cause, that is the Zionist movement which has usurped part of the Arab land (30/6/62).

Israel was perceived by Nasser as an hegemonic opponent, whose goal was the enslavement of the Arabs, the annihilation of their nationalism, and the radical transformation of the Middle Eastern system via the elimination of Arabs as an international actor:

Israel has been created amidst the Arab world in order to separate Arabs of Asia from Arabs of Africa and to annihilate Arab nationalism in Palestine as a prelude to the annihilation of all Arabs in the area which extends from Nile to Euphrates. This is not mere intuition or speculation. It has been said by Israeli leaders. They talked about the kingdom of Israel which extends from Nile to Euphrates (5/8/59).

The view of Israel as expansionist, with unlimited goals of regional hegemony, dominated Nasser's image. It was viewed as upholding an illegitimate status quo and ever wanting to maximize such illegitimacy through more expansion. From time to time he would produce evidence from the Israeli's sources to substantiate his belief. He quoted, for example; the Israeli Military Review (14/3/59) and statements of the Israeli leaders. On one occasion he publicly displayed a map of Greater Israel printed by a Zionist group based in London (22/7/65). For Nasser the real problem was not Israel as she exists today, but Israel's obsession with territorial expansionism and regional hegemony. The frequency and intensity of his references to Israel as expansionist underscore Nasser's strong conviction that Israel was actually planning to annex more

Arab territories in the future:

We are worried about Israeli expansionist intentions which the Israeli declared during the 1955 election campaign. Some of their leaders said at the time they want to achieve their goal of acquiring the land from Nile to Euphrates. Undoubtedly, this means they want to annex Egyptian land to Israel (Interview with USA journalists on 27/1/58).

Israel has a well-known policy, that is to establish the state of Israel, I mean the holy state which extends from the Nile to Euphrates including parts of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Egypt until the Eastern province of al-Sharkia (21/9/59).

Israel is a real expansionist danger. She is planning for a greater state which extends beyond the present borders, a state extending from the Nile to Euphrates in which Arabs will be turned into refugees (25/3/64).

Besides, Nasser viewed Israel as an aggressive actor waiting for the right time to imperil Arab security (9/3/65 and 10/5/66) and to disrupt the Egyptian model of socialist development which Israel believed would lead to a qualitative change in the Middle Eastern balance of power (28/7/63 and 10/3/65).

A closer examination of Nasser's image of Israel reveals some contradictions. On the one hand, Nasser viewed Israel as an hegemonic expansionist actor. On the other hand, he argued that Israel's goal was to impose a settlement on the Arabs on the basis of the status quo which implies that Israel wanted to legitimize the present situation without further expansion (17/9/57, 21/9/59 and 16/10/60).

Such inconsistency was less apparent to Nasser himself because he considered the present status quo as part of the expansionist designs of Israel. Nasser reasoned that Israel had annexed more territories than had been allotted to her under the Partition Resolution, and he used this as evidence of Israel's intentions.

One of the major shifts in Nasser's view of Israel during this period was toward dispositional attributions to explain the sources of Israeli goals. Israeli expansionism, Nasser said, was not a temporary phenomenon, but rather a continuation of the old Zionist ideology which had been historically espoused by Herzl and his followers, and formalized in the Balfour Declaration of 1917. Further, expansionism was viewed as intrinsic to the Israeli society. Israel wanted to expand simply because she needed more territories to settle the endless flow of immigrants. As long as Israel continued to encourage unlimited Jewish immigration, one must always expect more Israeli expansionist policies, Nasser argued:

Israel has imported a million immigrants during the last ten years. Ben-Gurion says he wants to bring another two million during the next two years... In this case the only solution open to them is expansion given their faltering economy (21/2/59).

An examination of Table 6.3 reveals that dispositional attributions were articulated in almost 85% of his references to the nature of Israeli goals.

16. Israeli hostility is permanent and general.
17. When it comes to expansion and aggression, the Israeli political elite is consensual and monolithic.

The dispositional attributions of Israeli goals led Nasser to articulate two major beliefs about the nature of Israeli society and decision making. First, the animosity of Israel was not likely to dissipate in the near future, or the intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict to de-escalate. If the opponent's hostility was deep-rooted in his character, then it is only logical to deduce that he was not likely to change (8/10/63, and 22/2/66). Second, Nasser perceived Israel as a monolithic opponent. Differences among various segments of the Israeli elite in policy stances were perceived as minor. All of them, Nasser argued, want to expand although some may be more subtle and restrained than others. In an interview with the CBS network on 6/4/58, Nasser argued that there was no significant difference between the government and opposition in Israel. The former wanted imposed peace, and the latter the "promised land."

18. Israel believes that Nasser wants to build an Arab empire and throw her into the sea.
19. Israel believes that the Arab-Israeli conflict is a zero-sum game.
20. Israel believes that a prolonged conflict in the Middle East is necessary to secure the flow of foreign donations.

21. Israel believes that the Arabs are incapable of translating their goals into specific actions.

Nasser's image of Israeli images of Arabs were basically symmetrical with his images of Israel. Just as he viewed the Arab-Israeli as a zero-sum game (Belief 8), he estimated that Israel also viewed the conflict from the same perspective. According to Nasser, Israel believed that a long and protracted conflict with the Arabs was crucial to survival because it provided her with propaganda ammunition to ensure the uninterrupted flow of foreign donations (20/9/59). Such conflict, Nasser added, was viewed by Israel as essentially a game in which one side can only win. "Israel believes," Nasser said, "that her death lies in the development of our society" (10/3/65), and "Arab unity and economic progress are incompatible with her goals" (25/4/59). Further, Nasser's view of Israel as expansionist was accompanied by a similar belief that Israel viewed him as espousing expansionist goals in the Arab world and destructive goals toward Israel.

Imperialists, Zionists, and exploiters claim that I want to establish an Arab empire (10/3/57).

Israel says that Arabs want to sweep her off and throw her into the sea (27/1/58).

Let us review Israeli broadcasts for the last four years: Nasser wants to expand, Nasser wants to build an empire in which Egyptian imperialism rules Syria (26/11/59).

In almost 95% of Nasser's references to Israel's goals, Israel was perceived as expansionist-aggressive-destructive. The same percentage holds in his estimation of Israel's perception of the nature of his goals.

Further, after late 1965, another perception began to emerge in Nasser's reading of Israeli perceptions of Arab intentions. He argued that Israel viewed the Arabs as incapable of co-ordinating any action to carry out their goals (2/12/65). Nasser was aware that Israel's recent bold reprisals against Arab villages and determination to go ahead with the diversion of the Jordan River waters, was due to the fact that Israel did not take the Arab deterrent capability seriously. This in turn led him to estimate that the only way to check Israeli anti-Arab action was to demonstrate the Arab capability to deter Israel. This led him to sign the defence pact with Syria in 1966 and to attempt to check Israeli threat against Syria in May 1967 by demonstrating his deterrent capability.

22. Israel is pursuing an optimizing, predictable, albeit unrealistic pattern of goals.
23. Israel is pursuing its expansionist goals rationally-incrementally.
24. Israel's strategy is predicated on deterrence-aggression.

Crucial to the understanding of Nasser's beliefs about Israel is his estimation of her "operational code" choice and pursuit of objectives. Nasser estimated that Israel was following a maximalist model in her goal selection.¹ Israel would never satisfice, Nasser believed. She would always endeavor to maximize her territorial gains at the expense of the Arabs (25/4/59 and 6/2/64). This was a consistent and predictable pattern in Israeli approach to goal selection, Nasser argued (8/3/65). Accordingly, one should always expect Israel to behave in accordance with such pattern of goals. Nevertheless, the goals which Israel was trying to optimize were unrealistic. The goal of territorial expansion from the Nile to the Euphrates was regarded as utopian and the goal of eliminating Arab nationalism was labelled as more daydreams (16/2/60, 21/2/60 and 1/9/66).

How did Nasser estimate Israel's approach to the pursuit of such goals? Despite his belief that she was pursuing unrealistic goals, Nasser contended that Israel was implementing the goal of expansion through a carefully designed plan of incremental expansion over several years (3/3/59 and 25/4/59). Meanwhile, Israel's immediate strategy was regarded as a combination of deterrence and terror, ensuring that Israel alone enjoyed

¹ We will see later that Nasser also believed in selecting optimal goals for political action.

the freedom of action in the Middle East (9/3/65) and repelling any Arab action against her interests by a massive show of force (21/2/65).

25. Israel is likely to take advantage of Arab policies of accommodation and acquiescence.

26. Israel is likely to back down in front of Arab policies of firmness and resolve.

Nasser's estimation of Israel's potential responses to various Arab policies of firmness and/or conciliation were consistent with his general view of Israel. If the adversary was expansionist by nature, then it was only logical for Nasser to deduce that it was waiting for the first sign of relaxation of vigilance to achieve its goals: "If we are not well-armed, tomorrow we will wake up to find Ben-Gurion in Cairo," Nasser argued (28/7/63). However, if the Arabs pursue a policy of firmness and vigilance, Israel was very likely to be deterred (30/6/62). As a result, Nasser never expected Israel to reciprocate policies of conciliation.

27. Israel controls risks of anti-Arab action by ensuring the full support of at least one big power at any point in time.

28. Israel controls the risks of anti-Arab actions by pursuing policies of indirect confrontation.

Nasser's obsession with the organic link between Israel and western powers, and his experiences during the 1948 War and the 1956 Suez crisis, led him to adhere to incorrect assessments of Israel's approach to risk-taking, which affected

his subsequent policies during the 1967 crisis. The view of Israel as an imperialist agent led him into total incomprehension of the Israeli frame of reference, and miscalculation of the Israelis' capacity to take risks. Nasser viewed Israel as pursuing a two-dimensional, ultra-cautious approach to risk control: dependence on the West and avoidance of direct confrontation. He reasoned that Israel controlled risks by ensuring that at any point of time, there was at least one big power that fully supported her policies, and to avoid embarking on any anti-Arab military action unless she was fully supported by one big western power (24/4/64, 26/5/64, Al-Ahram, 26/7/66). He argued that Israel dared to attack Egypt in 1956 only when it was fully assured of Anglo-French participation (28/7/59). He was also sure in July 1959 that Dayan would not carry out his threat to re-occupy Sinai due to the lack of big power support (26/7/59). The second dimension of Israel's strategy was the avoidance of frontal and direct attacks on Arabs. Israel, Nasser said, never dared to fight face-to-face with Arab and Egyptian forces in 1948 and 1956 and preferred to minimize casualties by resorting to "perfidy" and "reliance on imperialist lackeys". (26/7/59 and 4/3/60).

TABLE 6.3
QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S BELIEFS ABOUT ADVANTAGES DURING
THE SECOND PERIOD (1957-1967)

BELIEFS	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67(1)	TOTAL
P-2 Nature of Opponent	52	76	131	81	48	38	35	43	67	56	38	675
- Destructive	33% (7)	33% (5)	36% (5)	36% (9)	40% (8)	29% (8)	29% (8)	14% (6)	9%	30% (5)	21%	21%
- Expansionist	23 (4)	26 (19)	32 (19)	10	12 (8)	16 (8)	16 (8)	33 (15)	15 (11)	16 (7)	16	29
- Aggressive	40 (12)	29 (4)	31 (9)	11 (11)	44 (4)	55 (8)	60 (9)	53 (16)	67 (15)	52 (13)	63 (2)	45
- Defensive	4			(1)					1	52		1
- Conciliatory		2	(1)		2				7 (2)			1
- Seeker of peace					2				1			3
a. Sources of Opponents	2	6	25	14	3	3	1	4	7	10	4	79
Goals												
- Ideology		33%	36% (38)	7%	33%	67%	100%			100%		33%
- Historical Goals	100 (50)	(50)	(32)	(50)		(33)		(25)	(43)	(40)	25	33
- Internal Needs		(16)	(16)	43 (29)	(33)			75 (25)	14		25	20
- Leader's traits			(8)		34							4
- External pressures	17		8						(43)		50	10
b. Generality of hostility	12	11	10	15	1	2	3	9	5	5	4	77
- General/Permanent	92%	100%	100% (20)	100% (30)	100%	100%	100% (33)	67%	100% (40)	100% (40)	100%	95%
- General/Temporary												4
- Specific/Permanent								33				1
- Specific/Temporary	8											
c. Response to Conciliation	3		6	1	8	3	4	1		3	5	34
- Reciprocate	33%				25%	33%	25%					15%
- Ignore											20	3
- Take advantage in this	67 (33)		83		12		50	100		33	80 (20)	46
- Take advantage in other			17	100	63	67	(25)			67		36

(1) Percentages between brackets denote references to Israel

BELIEFS	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67(I)	TOTAL
d. Responses to Firmness	3	3	4	-	-	1	1	1	6	1	1	20
- Back down	100%	67%	75%(25)	-	-	100%	100%	100%	67%	100%	100	76%
- Ignore												5
- Reciprocate		33	25						17			14
- Respond impulsively									16			5
e. Opponent's image of one's own nation	5	18	24	15	3	10	19	6	11	3	2	116
- Destructive	40%(20)	17%	(47)*	7%			(57)			33%		8%
- Expansionist	60	44	58	60 (7)	33	60	63(11)	50	55		50	54
- Aggressive		39	38(8)	33 (7)	67	40(10)	32	50(33)	27(9)	67	50	36
- Defensive									(18)			2
f. Opponent's view of conflict			3	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	5
- Inevitable			33%									20%
- Avoidable												
- Desirable			67(33)			100						80
- Undesirable			(33)							100		
g. Opponent's decision process		1	7	-	-	-	6	1	-	-	-	13
- Unitary actor		(100%)	86%(29)			-	257					62%
- Competitive model			14				75	100				38

BELIEFS	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67(1) TOTAL
h. Opponent's international role											
- Imperialist leader	5	17	40	30	19	20	9	22	34	34	251
- Imperialist agent	(80)	82(29)	41(20)	73(23)	89(68)	70(35)	100	82(59)	65(32)	76(32)	1%
- Communist agent			2	10	11		(45)				71
- Zionist agent	20	6	2	13		10		4	14	15	10
- Regional spoiler		(12)	(10)	(4)		(15)		(14)	21(17)	9(6)	8
											10
i-1 Opponent's goal											
Choice (I)	2	5	14	4	10	6	15	6	2	8	75
1. - Optimizer	(50%)	100(20)	100(36)	100%	100(10)	100(33)	100%	100(17)	100(15)	100%	99%
2. - Satisfier	50										1
i-2 Opponent's goal											
Choice (II)	-	1	-	5	1	-	-	-	-	-	7
1. - Realistic					100%						14%
2. - Unrealistic		100		(100)							86
i-3 Opponent's goal											
Choice (III)	-	-	1	2	-	2	-	-	2	-	7
1. - Flexible			100%			100%					43%
2. - Unflexible				100 (50)					100		57

BELIEFS	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67(1) TOTAL
1-4 Opponent's goal choice (IV)	5	4	3	4	6	3	4	6	3	-	42
1. - Predictable	40%(20)		100%(33)	100%(75)	83%	100%	77%	100%(17)	67%		76%
- Unpredictable	60	100			17		25		33		24
j. Opponent's Approaches	4	1	7	5	4	-	2	2	-	1	30
- Prepare opponent	25%	100%		(20%)	25%					(100%)	20%
- Incremental	25		57(14)								17
- Blitzkrieg	50		29	40	25			50			28
- Total mobilization			14	40	50		100	50			35
k. Opponent's Strategy	22	22	32	17	1	20	37	25	25	37	238
- Deterrent						15%		(8%)	32%	37%	6%
- Aggressive	100(16)	100	100(9)	100	100	85(5)	100(5)	92(24)	68(20)	97(5)	94

(c) The Contemporary International System

29. Regional and global politics are conflict-ridden.
30. The global system is basically a loose bipolar system but since the mid-sixties it has moved toward a pluralistic system.
31. The anarchic nature of the global system is the basic source of global conflict.
32. Global conflicts can be mitigated through international communication, negotiation, disarmament, de-colonization, and the narrowing of the North-South gap.

Nasser's regional and global paradigm of politics was as conflictual as his paradigm of domestic politics. He viewed international politics at the global and regional levels as fundamentally conflict-ridden. Structurally, the global system was perceived as a loose bipolar system, one that consists of two basic contending global powers with a group of non-aligned actors who endeavor to co-ordinate their goals with those of the United Nations as a universal actor and perform the role of international mediation (22/7/58, 10/10/60, 30/6/62, and 1/10/63). However, by the mid-sixties, Nasser perceived a movement in the system toward plurality. The disintegration of the two global blocs and the increasing cohesiveness of the non-aligned group, Nasser argued, had led to the multiplication of global centers of power (25/11/65 and 21/10/66).

The change in Nasser's perception of the structure of the global system helped to perpetuate his conflictual paradigm of the system. He regarded the global system as consisting of different and closely inter-related subsystems, each of which was ridden by intrinsic conflicts. The Middle East subsystem was viewed as ridden by three basic conflicts that define its basic contours: conflict between Arab nationalism and Zionism over territory, conflict between Arab nationalism and the West over independence, and conflict between Arab nationalism and regional communism over nationalism (25/4/59). These conflicts were viewed as fundamental and very likely to continue for an unlimited period of time (16/5/58).

Our battle with imperialism, Zionism, and the stooges of imperialism in any part of the Arab world is a battle that affects the very root of our life and embraces the very root of our present and future too (3/12/58).

By the mid-sixties, Nasser perceived one basic, polarized conflict, the one between Arab radical regimes on one side and imperialism, Zionism, and Arab reactionary regimes on the other side (1/4/63, 1/10/63 and 21/2/64). Likewise, the African subsystem was plagued by conflicts exhibited by imperialist colonization, power politics and social oppression in southern Africa. In all his addresses to African summits, Nasser underscored this conflictual paradigm of African politics (24/5/63 and 17/9/63).

Nasser regarded the conflictual nature of the Arab and African regional systems as part of the overall global conflictual relations. The international system was viewed as anarchic, conflictual and lacking economic and political equilibrium. The international environment, he argued, was dominated by the Cold War and Big Power rivalry:

It is about time that all nations should cooperate to create a healthy and prosperous life for the human race. Such a life is impossible to achieve under the present devastating tension which underlines present international relations, especially Big Powers' relations. Underlying these relations is the ghost of war which has been flooding the world with weapons of total destruction (24/4/59).

By 1965, Nasser was alarmed by the increase in the global disequilibrium exhibited in three basic dimensions:

(i) inter-superpowers' conflicts exhibited in the Cold War, arms race, Sino-Soviet conflict, and the American military escalation in Viet-Nam; (ii) North-South economic conflict over the issue of the distribution of global wealth (21/2/65 and 24/11/66); and (iii) the global crisis of capitalism as embodied in the contradictions confronting world financiers (24/11/66). Nasser was particularly alarmed by the unmistakable tide in the American offensive against Third World nationalist governments. He viewed himself as marked as a prime target of American "counter-revolution" in co-operation with Israel (1/5/67).

In contrast to philosophers such as Spinoza and Marx, who identified the locus of international conflict in human imperfections and the domestic structure of the state respectively, or behaviorists who saw the origins of conflict in misperceptions, Nasser subscribed to the power political perspective analysis of international conflict. According to him, the locus of global conflict can be found in the anarchic nature of the international system, the global competition for power and global economic disparities. Almost 95% of Nasser's 78 references to the sources of international conflict were to systemic sources: 40% to "power politics;" 28% to "nationalism in the international system," 16% to the "economic attributes of the global system," and 11% to the "ideological attributes of the system."

Nasser attributed the anarchic nature of the system to the superpowers' conflict over spheres of influences, the policy of military alliances, and to the contradictions between the growing nationalist tide in the Third World and the politics of traditional imperialism, neo-colonialism, racial discrimination. Besides, he attributed a great proportion of the variance in international conflict to the widening gap between the developed and underdeveloped countries and the economic systems of capitalism and communism (1/10/63 and Al-Ahram, 20/10/66).

Nasser's prescriptions for the maintenance of internationalized peace were fairly traditional. Unlike the Marxist-Leninist solution which envisaged the radical transformation of the international system, he believed that international anarchy could be mitigated through international communication and negotiation, disarmament, and the orderly re-adjustment of international interactions in order to remove the present inequalities and injustices. The methods of international conflict resolution suggested by him tended to vary according to the specific issues which were being considered, as appears in Table 6.4. Negotiation, communication, and disarmament were considered the most appropriate methods to settle inter-superpower conflicts but they were considered totally inapplicable in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In his speech at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations (27/9/60), Nasser vehemently advocated Soviet-American consultation and negotiation as the only method to mitigate the Cold War.

We believe that the expansion of consultation and communication is in itself a positive contribution to the mitigation of tension. We also believe that conducting consultation and communication within the United Nations framework is a guarantee that no one will go his own way.

TABLE 6.4

ISSUES AND CONDITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE
(1957 - 1967)

ISSUES	CONDITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE				
	Education communication	Eliminate Offenders	Eliminate inequalities	Eliminate injustices	Total
Relations with the West	1	1	1	3	6
Relations with Third World	3	1	2	3	9
Inter-Arab relations	4		1		5
Arab-Israeli conflict				14	14
Foreign General	25	18	14	12	69
TOTAL	33	20	18	32	103

Nasser also spoke insistently of "closing the gap" between North and South through a set of egalitarian global principles. Included in his prescriptions were major transfer of resources, revising old contracts to ensure fair pricing in addition to a broad menu of programs to speed growth in underdeveloped countries (4/2/63 and 5/10/64).

In his address to the First Conference of Non-Aligned countries at Belgrade, Nasser contended that inter-superpower summit negotiations and inter-non-aligned countries consultations were the only method to mitigate the Cold War (1/9/61). On another occasion he added that:

We believe that the present contradictions between the economic capitalist and communist systems can be mitigated through the intensification of communications and contacts between the heads of states in both camps. In my view any meeting may promote understanding more than the mere exchange of reports and letters because those meetings enable the heads of states to know each other and understand each other.

We encourage communications among all peoples of the world for the realization of super-ordinate human goals (1/10/63).

Conflicts emanating from the pursuit of power politics, Nasser contended, could be mitigated by eliminating imperialism, racial discrimination, nuclear tests and by total disarmament and the strengthening of the United Nations:

There is no alternative to the United Nations. We admit the shortcomings of the UN. But the solution is not to freeze the UN but to correct the shortcomings (27/4/65).

We understand that disarmament is the real guarantee against the potential danger of escalation which may expose humanity to devastating risks (10/5/66).

However, Nasser did not consider negotiations and disarmament as the most appropriate methods to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict. He contended that Israel wanted negotiations,

without committing itself to a just solution, in order to conceal the real issues. The solution, Nasser said, already existed in the United Nations resolutions (1/5/65).

Nasser argued that the elimination of injustices imposed on the Palestinian people was the only way to achieve Arab-Israeli peace, the realization of justice meant that the displaced Palestinians would be allowed to return to their homes, and the Palestinians under Israeli rule would be treated fairly by Israel (1/10/64). The elimination of injustices was regarded as the most appropriate method to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict and probably most global conflict:¹

The endeavor to avoid the use of force in international relations can be achieved only through the solution of each problem separately and in isolation from other problems. It can be realized through the creation of a real conceptualization of peace based on justice. Justice is the only path that ensures permanent peace (address to the Second Non-Aligned Conference held in Cairo 5/10/64).

¹ Disarmament was also not considered a condition to achieve Arab-Israeli peace. Nasser argued that Israel would always find clandestine means to obtain arms. The control of the arms race in the Middle East, before settling the basic issues in the conflict, he argued, would be in fact directed against the Arabs (5/7/64).

33. Egypt's global role is that of active, independent, non-aligned, and peace-maker.
34. In inter-Arab interactions Egypt plays the role of the liberator, defender, and integrator of Arabs.

The decision maker's national role conceptions have been postulated as determinants of foreign policy behavior. Holsti (1970:239-240) contended that decisions and actions of governments may be explained primarily by reference to the policy makers' own conceptions of their nations' role in a region or in the international system as a whole.

Table 6.5 includes cross-tabulations of Nasser's perceived national role conceptions and the issue-areas with which these roles were articulated. The inter-Arab system and the global system were perceived as the main locus of Egypt's national role. National roles articulated in the domain of domestic interactions accounted for only 8% of the totally articulated national roles in contrast to 35% and 34% articulated for the inter-Arab and global systems of influence.

Nasser regarded Egypt as playing a whole array of regional and global roles depending on the systems of influence and the issues involved. In the Arab circle, Egypt was viewed as playing the role of an anti-imperialist agent and regional leader, defender and integrator. However, in the global system, Egypt was perceived as an actively independent, non-aligned actor and a peacemaker. The roles of independent and

TABLE 6.5

CROSSTABULATION OF ISSUES* AND NASSER'S NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS

	Regional Leader	Active Independent	Anti- Imperialist	Integrator	Developer	Example	Peace Maker	Mediator	TOTAL
Domestic issues	2	21	10	1	1	1	2		38
Egyptian-Western	2	34	4	1			1		42
Egyptian-Eastern		7	1						8
Egyptian- Third World	3		18		4	1			26
Inter-Arab system	35	12	76	17	14	6	3		163
Arab-Israeli system	7	22	12	2			2		25
Foreign-general	5	98	16	3		4	26	4	156
TOTAL	54	174	137	24	19	12	34	4	458

*For definitions of the labels see column 51-52 in the Codebook (Appendix B)

anti-imperialist were the most salient roles perceived by Nasser accounting for 38% and 30% of all articulated national roles, followed by the role of regional Arab leadership and peace-making which accounted for 12% and 7% respectively.

Nasser's engagement in inter-Arab politics was dictated not only by his vision of anti-imperialist liberation but also by his view of the value of Arab nationalism to Egypt's interests. He regarded Arab solidarity as indispensable to Egypt's security. For him, Arab nationalism was a defensive mechanism to curb foreign intrusions and protect Egypt's active independent global role by forcing the invading adversary to disperse his power on a wide front (2/2/59 and 3/9/59). As a result, Nasser began to seek a more ambitious Arab role. He argued that Egypt's basic role was in the inter-Arab system as a liberator, integrator, and collaborator. He viewed Egypt's role as the base of Arab anti-imperialist liberation and

This Republic is the vanguard of Arab struggle and the vanguard of Arab unity (28/9/61).

Our people will never hesitate to perform its role in the Arab struggle for freedom socialism, and unity and will never hesitate to shoulder his responsibility towards national liberation movements (Al-Ahram, 9/11/66).

Egypt's second major role in Arab politics was regarded as a leader and defender of the Arabs. Nasser saw Egypt as the leader on the international stage of a group of countries with strong historical and cultural ties and important strategic location. Egypt's role was to lead and defend this group of countries against foreign intrusions:

The UAR has taken the responsibility to be the first line of defence of the Arab nation (20/3/58).

Our Arabism has imposed a role on us, that is, to defend Yemen. Arab struggle obliged us to undertake this task. That is why we sent our Armed Forces to Algeria, Iraq, and Yemen (22/3/66).

Nasser regarded Egypt as playing other roles such as an integrator and developer of Arabs and a model of Arab socialist progress. He argued that the role of Egypt was to bring the Arab countries together in order to build a wider Arab community. His engagement in the Arab integration movement in the ten years after Suez passed through two distinct phases, until the Egyptian-Syrian union of 1958, Nasser continued to adhere to his first period belief that Arab integration was not an immediate goal. He admitted that he did not think in "any kind of federation or confederation or any other form of unity with any Arab country." "Instead," Nasser argued, "we concentrate on the unity of ideas and faith... At the moment I prefer to concentrate on strengthening the League of Arab States" (10/3/57). However, after the merger with

Syria was forced on him, Nasser began to champion the role of formal integrative relationships among Arab countries:

Egypt endeavors to realize Arab unity as a historical responsibility which she shoulders by virtue of her latent capabilities and potentialities (22/2/62)

We will spare no effort to unify the Arab countries and peoples for the reconstruction of the Arab world (31/1/66).

After the break with Syria, Nasser's perception of Egypt's role gained a new theoretical dimension--the idea of "Arab Socialism." Nasser conceptualized Egypt's role not only from an integrative nationalist perspective but also as a centrifugal model of Arab socialist development. Thus, Nasser was able to reconcile the priority given to the social revolution in Egypt itself with his commitment to Arab nationalism. By focussing on domestic socialist development, Nasser contended, Egypt could play an important role in developing other Arab countries and solidifying the integrative core in Egypt:

Our people realizes that it is not building socialism for the Egyptian society alone, but is trying to build the ideal society for all Arab nations. If Arab unity is a fact of existence, then the best way to disseminate its appeal is the way of building the Arab society, the vanguard and the base (9/1/64)..

In contrast to his liberationist-defensive-integrationist role in Arab Affairs, Nasser regarded Egypt's main global role as that of an active independent actor and a peace-maker. He contended that Egyptian foreign policy decisions must be made to serve national interests rather than the interests of any foreign power. His rejection of the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 (24/1/57 and 26/7/57) and his clash with the Soviet Union and Arab communists in 1959 (22/3/59) was attributed to perception of intrusions on Egypt's active independence.

The role of active independence was embodied in the principle of non-alignment. It meant, Nasser argued, that Egypt's policy was independently formed: it judged each case on its merits rather than adopting automatically the attitude of an alliance. It also meant an active involvement in global affairs through the extension of diplomatic and commercial co-operation and in global conflict resolution through inter-bloc mediation and peacemaking.

Nasser summed up the various roles which he viewed Egypt as playing:

The UAR took responsibility to be the first line of defence of the Arab nation... This Republic has also shouldered the responsibility of being a real model of Arab unity, progress, and Arab liberation and to help the freedom-fighters in every Arab country against imperialism and its stooges. It also shouldered a responsibility toward world peace because we pursue a policy of non-alignment and independence (20/3/58).

TABLE 6.6

QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S BELIEFS ABOUT THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM DURING THE SECOND PERIOD (1957-1967)

BELIEFS	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67(I)	TOTAL
P-3 International System	7	10	15	14	14	6	12	6	15	31	4	134
- Conflictual	100%	100%	100%	79%	100%	100%	100%	67%	93%	100%	100%	95%
- Mixed								33				2
- Harmonious				21					7			3
a. Sources of Conflict	2	5	14	2	4	6	10	2	9	20	2	76
- Human nature			14%									3%
- Ideology of nation			7									1
- Politics of nation						17	30			25		11
- Ideology in system												
- Nationalism in system	100	60	21		75	17	40		33	10	50	28
- Economics in system			7		25	33	10	50	11	20	50	16
- Power politics		40	51	100		33	20	50	56	45		40
b. Conditions of Peace	13	5	6	17	10	5	16	19	6	13	3	103
- Education/communication		20%	17%	46%	60%	40%	43%		33%	31%		30%
- Eliminate offenders	67	60	50	18	10		19	16	17	8		18
- Eliminate inequalities			17	12	20	60	19	21	33	15		19
- Eliminate injustices	33	20	16	24	20		19	63	17	45	100	33

BELIEFS	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67(1)	TOTAL
c. Structure of System	1	2	-	5	7	3	3	4	2	1	-	28
- Loose bipolar	100%			60%	100%	100%	100%	50%				61%
- Right bipolar		50		20				50				18
- Pluralistic		50		20					100	100		21
d. Stability of system	-	2	2	1	3	1	2	4	6	8	-	29
- Stable			100	100	100	100%	100	50%	33%			17%
- Unstable		100					100	50	67	100		83
e. Egypt's Role	34	79	81	56	38	35	41	34	31	30	3	462
- Liberator		17%	17%	47%	13%	97%	15%	24%	6%	3%		5%
- Regional Leader	12	11	15	14	8	23	5	53	10	17		16
- Active independent	73	49	63	25	13	20	20		26	33		37
- Anti-imperialist agent	6	24	9	23	47	9	38		29	27	33	28
- Anti-communist agent		1							3			2
- Defender of faith												2
- Mediator				5	3							8
- Interpreter	6	3	7	16	3	6				7		4
- Developer		1	1			14	15	6	6	3	33	4
- Bridge										3		2
- Example	1	1	4	13	3	6	7	12	3			4
- Peacemaker	3	9			11	14		6	16	27	34	6

(d) Optimism/Pessimism

35. It is a certain fact that Egypt's goals will be achieved.
36. Success is inherent in the nature of Egypt's goals and does not depend upon any extraneous factors.
37. The immediate realization of Egypt's goals may be delayed in the short run, but in the long run such goals will prevail.

Nasser was an unqualified optimist. He believed that there was no credible prospect of failure in the achievement of goals simply because they were the correct goals and because this was God's will (7/3/58). In almost 82% of the optimism/pessimism references during this period, Nasser was an unqualified optimist. Furthermore, his optimism was characterized by an air of dogmatism. He did not believe that the realization of goals was conditional on performance or any extraneous conditions. Success was believed to be inherent in the nature of the goals. At least 63% of the statements implied that his optimism was unconditional.

Nasser's optimism was mainly related to his long-term goals rather than specific policy undertakings. Specific policies may fail or succeed depending upon the present conditions, but the net cumulative results are always positive:

The road of patriotic and national struggle is strewn by thorns and mines. But at the end, life will triumph and the real victory of the people over all deviants and power-hungry elements will be realized (22/7/63).

Nasser's optimism was interspersed with pessimistic beliefs. He was pessimistic about the prospects of achieving the goal of Arab solidarity in the near future (26/7/57 and 29/8/65), and about the possibility of achieving a peaceful settlement with Israel:

The problem between the Arabs and Israel has been first a problem of the usurped rights of the Palestine people. Then Israel expansionist goals were added... Do you really think that all of this leaves room for a solution? (29/9/58)

Nasser admitted candidly that the goal of liberating Palestine was not likely to be achieved in the near future. The liberation of Palestine was a long-term and complicated process that basically involved surpassing Israel socially and economically. Hence, Nasser was certain that such a goal would never be realized in his generation (1/5/65). Further, Nasser was not optimistic about the immediate prospects of the process of socialist transformation of the Egyptian society (12/11/64) or the realization of world peace (27/4/65). However, pessimistic statements constituted only 8% of his total references implying optimism or pessimism.

(e) Predictability of Political Life

38. The role of chance in history is minimal.
39. The historical process is essentially an inevitable-circular-progressive process. Accordingly one can identify a set of predictable patterns in historical development.
40. The essence of present historical trends lies in Arab human resources.

We have seen that Nasser during the first period did not have a clear conception about historical political trends. His gradual shift toward socialist ideology began to entail specific beliefs about the existence of historical laws and trends from which one can identify future outcomes.

Nasser conceptualized political life as a set of recurring and regularized patterns and laws. The basic pattern of political life was that of change, motion, and evolution. According to Nasser, there was no such thing as stability. Since the creation of mankind, life has been dynamically changing. "Motion and evolution is a law of life" (8/3/65). Nasser believed that political life evolves and changes in a certain pattern that can be anticipated and understood. His belief in prediction was predicated on his conception of history. He believed that historical evolution has two basic characteristics: circularity and inevitability. According to Nasser, history repeats itself. Contemporary and future events are basically replays of past scenarios with minor variations. Consequently, one can predict the outcomes of present situations and project policy outcomes and long-term trends by analyzing past trends.

Nasser predicted that the entire Arab nation would be liberated because, according to the circular pattern since the Crusaders and the Tatars, whenever the Egyptian and Syrian armies unite the Arabs were always able to defeat their opponents. Now that Egypt and Syria have united we will be able to defeat our present opponents, Nasser argued (14/3/59 and 28/7/59). According to the same circular concept, it was only logical for him to predict that Palestine must eventually be liberated, since the history of the Crusaders pointed to that outcome:

They (Palestinians) will return. The Crusaders occupied our land in Palestine for seventy years. But the Arabs continued to fight for their land until they restored it at the end. I have no doubt that history will repeat itself (6/2/64)

Nasser believed that the role of chance in history is very minimal. History takes a certain inevitable course which cannot be resisted or halted (19/11/65). Nasser's theory of historical inevitability was deduced from Arab history. He argued that Arab history has followed a certain pattern based on the recurring congruence between power and unity. According to this pattern, "whenever unity vanishes, power follows and whenever power exists, unity becomes a natural consequence" (5/2/58). On the basis of this historical pattern which was viewed as "the clearest landmark in the history of our nation," Nasser predicted that:

Q

Arab unity is inevitable. It will be achieved. It may be delayed for some years but it is an historical inevitability (21/2/65).

The steadfastness of the Egyptian people will result in the ebb of the imperialist-reactionary tide according to the inevitability of development and history. In their next plan there is a clash imposed on us... I believe that this clash will go on hand in hand with the normal course of history and the normal course of affairs. The reactionary forces and the stooges of imperialism will be liquidated (1/5/66).

The essence of the historical process, Nasser believed, was social progression. According to him, the circularity of history did not mean the repetition of the same events and forms of exploitation because history was viewed as progressive. "The greatest motor of history," Nasser said, "is the will of change of the oppressed classes toward the ideal model" (23/7/64). As a result, Nasser discerned a global trend toward socialism and social justice (1/10/63) and predicted that historical development would work in favor of the oppressed peoples and liberation movements. It was on that premise that he was able to predict the collapse of Arab conservative regimes. They, he said, are against the inevitable progressive course of history (26/7/62 and 23/12/63).

The current of history is progressive. When Big Powers attempted to halt this current, they failed to overcome the natural current of history (26/11/59)

I reject completely the assertion that previous generations are better than new generations... I reject that logic because it is incompatible with the pattern of evolution (15/12/62).

The current of history is overwhelming in its developing and changing ability. All of this is inevitably for the sake of progress (19/11/65).

History never goes backward. History develops in an inevitable pattern. It is always progressive (21/2/65).

Nasser's belief in the predictability of political life was also based on his reading of contemporary socio-economic and political trends. He believed that the essence of contemporary historical inevitability lies in one element, i.e. human resources. More rapid increase of Arab human resources compared to the Israeli increase, Nasser argued, would inevitably tip the balance of power in favor of Arabs and enable them automatically to win the Palestine conflict. The mere passage of time without concrete actions should not worry Arabs because every passing day accelerates historical inevitability (23/12/62, 1/5/65, and 10/5/66). Further, Nasser predicated his prediction that Arab progressive regimes would triumph on the assumption that "trends in the countries which rejected dictatorship, fascism, and terrorism are indicative of this prospect" (1/10/63). Socialist contradictions would remain in the socialist society, Nasser said, because this has been the trend in all other socialist societies" (12/11/64 and 16/5/65).

The concept of historical inevitability, upon which the bulk of Nasser's prediction were predicated, injected a sense of absolute certainty in his predictions. These resembled the certainty of meteorological forecasts, or biblical and Islamic prophecies, rather than the probability of political and social science predictions. If the course of history is seen as inevitable, it is likely one will be absolutely certain about its outcomes. 98% of Nasser's beliefs about prediction indicate that political life was believed to be predictable, and in 95% of the references to the degree of predictability, it was perceived as absolutely certain.

(f) The Role of Leader in Controlling Historical Development

47. Abdel-Nasser is the mere executor of the will of the people and its determination to march toward evolution and Arab nationalism.
48. No single individual can control everything in life.
49. My role is to study the non-organized opinions of the masses, harmonize and aggregate these opinions.
50. A political leader must attempt to shape immediately-relevant events in his own polity.
51. In inter-Arab relations and social relations of women, the role of leader is limited.

Social learning theorists distinguish between externals and internals. Externals believe that forces beyond their control play a significant role in determining outcomes. Internals, however, believe that they control their own destiny (Phares, 1965). Likewise, political leaders differ in the extent to which they believe that they can significantly affect the fundamental direction of historical development. Some leaders, such as Lenin, believe that dedicated and historically conscious political actors can play a major role in "moving" history in the desired direction. Others, such as Brandt, believe that the possibilities of control are limited.

The foregoing analysis of the Nasserist theory of historical-circular inevitability shows that Nasser viewed history as a progressive-circular pattern of objectively determined events. Consequently, Nasser believed that the ability of the individual to control such inevitable process was limited. Historical development, Nasser argued, was shaped by "the will of the masses." The role of leader was to discern the progressive trends of history and respond positively. Nasser argued that his role in shaping the historical trends of Arab nationalism was restricted to the explication of the issues and problems resulting from the realization of the historical unitary drive of the Arabs and to execute the historical will of the people. A leader, Nasser argued, should neither block nor shape these historical

trends (21/2/59 and 17/2/60) because, as he said in his resignation speech on 9/6/67, "any individual, no matter his role or his contribution to his country, is a mere instrument of the popular will, and not the maker of this will."

"No single individual can make the destiny of the people or affect its will. It is the people that decides its own destiny. I as Gamal Abdel-Nasser used to believe that Egyptian-Syrian unity would be accomplished within five years or more, but, it is not me who accomplished the unity of Egypt and Syria, it is the Arab people in Syria and the Arab people in Egypt who imposed their will... The sacred popular will has begun and the role of leadership is only to remove the obstacles" (20/3/58).

The banner of Arab nationalism will be always triumphant, because it is not restricted to Gamal Abdel-Nasser or his assistants, but represents the Arab nation... Arab nationalism is not the result of one individual, but of all the people (18/7/58).

Two areas in particular were considered uncontrollable: Arab politics and social status of women. Nasser's rift with the Syrian Baath Party, and the disarray which prevailed in the Arab world in 1963, led Nasser to realize the limitations of his Arab role. He argued that in inter-Arab relations he was almost helpless. "I cannot," Nasser said, "control even those who claim that they are my partisans" (9/7/63). Accordingly, he believed, no one should expect him to intervene actively to create an Arab unified movement (22/7/63):

We cannot control developments forever.
Suffice to uncover these (Arab reaction-
ary) regimes for a limited time... I
 talked about the unified Arab movement.
I'd like to say I'll not create such
movement. But I call on all unitary
 revolutionaries to try to create such
 unified movement (11/8/63).

We do not change Arab regimes because
we cannot change Arab regimes. Only
 the Arab peoples have such capabilities
 (18/11/65).

I cannot create the Arab unified movement.
 If I tried, it would be born dead... The
 Arab unified movement is not my responsi-
 bility. It is not my responsibility to
 go to each Arab country and try to create
 a unified movement (22/2/64).

The code of the rights of women introduced by Nasser came under subtle criticism from Egyptian Islamic fundamentalists. On more than one occasion he was asked to intervene to curtail the women's liberation movement in the country and to enforce the traditional Islamic wear. Nasser told his critics, "if you cannot force your daughters and wives inside your homes to wear the Islamic wear, how could you expect me to do it in the whole country?" (28/5/62 and 18/11/65).

Notwithstanding his deterministic conception of history, Nasser was not a fatalist. Even though he did not regard himself as the master of historical development, he believed that the short run was characterized by many zigs and zags which require active leadership. A leader, he believed, can

mold the unfolding of the immediately-relevant social and political events in his own polity.¹ However, he did not go as far as to accept the Carlylian paradigm of the great man in history. The role of political leader was viewed as a part of an overall social mechanism which ought to function as a well-integrated dynamic whole in order to affect political events. No individual can control everything in life by himself. It is the interplay between the leader and the masses that can guarantee the realization of goals. Issues of economic development and political organization were particularly cited as uncontrollable without leader-people interplay (12/11/64 and 16/11/64):

No single leader or few leaders can develop society, lay the foundations, and guarantee that the process would be operative, unless there were other leaders at all levels (4/8/59).

No leader, whatever his knowledge and wisdom, can accomplish victory unless there are other soldiers (16/2/60).

Leadership cannot protect these principles alone. It can neither implement them alone. Only the people can protect them (26/7/63).

¹ The notion that man cannot control history, but can shape short-term effects was not new. It can be traced to Saint-Simon's historicist theory which was later developed by Marx (Lyon, 1961:55-56).

I cannot build everything alone whether in the country, in the government, or in the Arab Socialist Union. You either cannot do everything alone. Hence, we must rely upon the masses and other leaderships in order to build the Arab Socialist Union (12/11/66).

The analysis of Nasser's first period beliefs showed that Nasser reacted to the failure of the Egyptian bourgeoisie to take an active role in economic development by advocating an interventionist role for the state. Up until 1962, Nasser continued to advocate a modified version of this active role. According to him, political leaders should play the role of guardian-observer. The political and economic initiative must be retained in the hands of the political leadership in order to ensure the harmony of interests of all classes. However, a political leader should not get involved in direct economic activities. Such activities, Nasser argued, should be the domain of private capital. The political leader's role is to "observe", "guide", retain the initiative of economic planning and stimulation, and ensure that capitalism would not exploit the people (5/12/57 and 30/7/59).

In our socialist-cooperativist system, we consider that the state has guardianship over everything, over private ownership and public ownership. The state is responsible for the protection of the individual from the exploiters. The state protects, and liberates from economic social exploitation. (22/7/59).

Nasser's evolution to activism was essentially a pragmatic process, based largely on reaction to the collapse of the Egyptian-Syrian union and his suspicion that the Egyptian bourgeoisie was planning to set the revolution in reverse. Consequently, Nasser decided to abandon his ideas of entrusting the management of Egyptian life to the middle class and to take an active role in the shaping of the Egyptian society through socialism. Theoretically, he based this evolution on two basic premises which were revealed in his debates with members of the General-Secretariat of the Arab Socialist Union in February 1965 (in R. Al-Sayeed, Awraq Nasirya, 1975). The first premise was the Michelian Iron Law of Oligarchy. Even though Nasser argued publicly that the masses are the basic agents of social change, he believed that operational social change can only be brought about by the political oligarchy. Nasser argued that all organizations and social movements are oligarchic in nature because "it is the oligarchy which leads the struggle in all movements in the world." Consequently, socialism, Nasser argued, would only be built by the oligarchy. The second premise on which Nasser based his activist role was the necessity of subsystem subordination to build socialism. Nasser told the leadership of the ASU that subsystem independence was incompatible with the building of a socialist state. All institutions must be put under central political control. Universities and the National Assembly, Nasser said,

cannot be autonomous units within the state because this will mean political chaos.

Given these two basic premises, Nasser believed that as a political leader he ought to play an active role as interest aggregator and political educator. He conceptualized his role as the basic agent of interest articulation and aggregation. According to him, a political leader must not only monitor the narrower expression of interests but also get actively involved in the interest combinatory process. In this respect, the role of leader, he maintained, transcends the role of parochial interest groups and the single political organization:

My role is to study carefully the non-organized opinions of the masses, harmonize and aggregate these opinions and then give them back to the masses (as policies). If you leave the masses to themselves they will always articulate unsystematized and non-organized views (12/11/66).

A political leader must also play an active role in the political education and culturing of the workers and peasants. The role of political leader, Nasser argued, was to intervene actively to enable the workers and the oppressed classes to play an active role in the political process, anticipate their demands and problems, and solve them through a national plan (26/5/62, 19/7/63 and Al-Ahram, 7/8/66). In his deliberations with the Secretaries of the Executive Bureaus of the ASU on 7/8/66, he defined his educational role as:

TABLE 6.9

QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S BELIEFS ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE LEADER

DURING THE SECOND PERIOD (1957-1967)

BELIEF	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	TOTAL
P-6 <u>Role of Leader's Historical Development</u>	3	5	7	6	1	10	8	7	12	9	1	69
- Actively use politics	33%		29%	17%		60%	25%	29%	42%	78%		38%
- Respond positively		20	14					14				4
- Intervene when feasible	67		14			10						6
- Mediate between forces				17								2
- Discern trends									8			2
- Avoid intervention		40			100		13	29	8			10
- Control uncertain but must accept						30	13					1
- Cannot control		40	43	66			50	29	42	22	100	37

...the education of those (working class) people and culturing them. We cannot escape such responsibility. We are actually responsible as a leadership.

The quantitative distribution of Nasser's beliefs on the role of leader indicate that in 75% of the statements, he conceptualized his role as an active interventionist in co-operation with other societal elements. In almost 20% of the statements (a total of 69), he perceived his role as a discerner of historical trends.

2. Instrumental Beliefs

(a) Egypt's Goals and Goal Selection

52. The establishment of an egalitarian society is Egypt's basic domestic goal.

53. Egypt's basic goals in the Arab-Israeli conflict are: the maintenance of peace on Egyptian-Israeli borders; the settlement of the issue of Israeli passage in the Suez Canal through adjudication or comprehensive settlement; and the implementation of all the UN resolutions pertaining to Palestine.

54. Egypt's basic goal in inter-Arab interactions is the dismantling of Arab reactionary regimes.

Nasser was frequently accused of grandstanding in the international arena to the detriment of Egypt's goals of domestic development. The data included in Table 6.10 reveal that foreign policy goals combined overwhelmingly overshadowed his domestic goals. Despite his warning that "our Arab commitments should not distract our attention from our major goal of doubling the national income," (23/12/59) Nasser

failed to achieve balance between foreign and domestic goals. For Nasser there was nothing irrational about this. He grasped the functional linkage between foreign and domestic politics and sought to exploit it to supplement Egypt's meager resources. Nasser thought that a strong Arab and international position for Egypt could reinforce programs of domestic development. In an address to the National Assembly on 12 November 1964, he acknowledged that Egypt could never raise its investment goals if it relied solely on its own domestic resources. He explained that it was only with an activist foreign policy that Egypt could ensure its independence and the large scale aid it required. In addition to practical considerations, there was also an ideological component to Nasser's reasoning. He saw Egypt's struggle as but one part of a global movement toward national liberation.

On the domestic level, egalitarianism was the major political value around which most of Nasser's political values and domestic goals were articulated. This was expressed in his slogan "the only banner that prevails in this republic is the banner of equality" (26/2/59).

In a speech before the Co-operativist Conference on 5 December 1957, Nasser spoke for the first time about the establishment of a co-operativist democratic socialism based on the narrowing of the gap between classes. Nasser's version

TABLE 6.10
CROSSTABULATIONS OF NASSER'S GOALS AND ISSUES.
(1953 - 1970)

Goals Issues	Aggress- sive	Defen- sive	Concil- iatory	Domestic develop.	Restor- ative	Total
Domestic Issues	58	9	5	395	2	469
Arab Issues	42	16	47	27	6	138
Arab-Israeli Issues	25	54	50	7	202	338
Foreign Issues	37	47	176	23	8	291
Total	162	126	278	453	218	1236

of socialism was reminiscent of the commonplaces of the Western European social democracy. He envisaged a system based on ending socio-economic exploitation and achieving a balance between social classes without altering the basic features of the present capitalist system:

...We want to work so as one class will not dominate other classes. We want to get rid of human and social exploitation, the exploitation of the majority by the few. We want to narrow the gap between classes, to organize the economy according to a plan put together for the sake of the people... We want to maintain the principles of social justice and to harmonize the public social activity of the state with the private economic activity of individuals...

The role of the state is one of a guardian, that is the protector of the interests of the petty bourgeoisie and small capitalists. Meanwhile, the state should avoid state capitalism by not getting involved in economic projects. It should leave private capital free to work within certain limits. The goal is not to eliminate capitalism, but to regulate it so as it does not exploit the majority.

By July 1961, Nasser's operational code began to exhibit change toward radical socialism. The shift was accelerated after the Syrian coup in September 1961 and given its ideological expression in the Charter of National Action presented to the National Congress of Popular Forces in May 1962. In Chapter six of the Charter, Nasser argued that "economic freedom" cannot be achieved in the capitalist mold. Such a mold, Nasser added, "could only reinforce the political power of the class that owns and monopolizes the wealth." Accordingly, Nasser argued that socialism was no longer a choice but an inevitability. The basic goal of Nasser's socialism was to dismantle the feudal-capitalist alliance and to replace it by a new political alliance of the working people: peasants, workers, intellectuals, soldiers, and national bourgeoisie, and the total control by the people of the basic means of production within the framework of a national economic plan. Nasser defined socialism as the pursuit of "sufficiency" and "justice." By sufficiency he meant the expansion of the nation's wealth. Justice connoted the end of exploitation and the enjoyment of an equal

opportunity to develop one's abilities and to receive a fair share of the nation's wealth according to one's efforts (16/10/61 & the Charter, ch.:5). The frequency of his reiteration of the values justice and equality and the passion he displayed in his elaboration of this theme indicate clearly that Nasser was a genuine seeker of the end of social exploitation. However, Nasser warned that justice without sufficiency would mean the distribution of poverty. He also warned that to strive for equality was not to assume equality among individuals. As human beings they were entitled to equal chances to actualize their potentialities, but beyond the opening up of equal opportunities to all individuals, socialism cannot intervene to equalize among individuals who were essentially unequal in their potentialities (22/7/61).

The radical shift in Nasser's domestic goals coincided with a similar shift in his Arab goals. The involvement of Arab conservatives in the separatist coup in Syria prompted Nasser to suspect that they were attempting to undermine his regime in Egypt. As a result, Nasser raised the slogan "no truce with Arab reactionaries" (16/10/61), by which he meant that an all-out war ought to be launched to dismantle Arab conservative regimes especially Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

In the Arab-Israeli conflict Nasser articulated three basic goals: (i) the maintenance of peace on the Egyptian-

Israeli borders through the presence of the United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF); (ii) the settlement of the issue of Israeli passage in the Suez Canal either through international adjudication or a comprehensive political settlement; and (iii) the implementation of the United Nations Partition Resolution of 1947 and all UN resolutions pertaining to Palestine.

Nasser allowed the UNEF to function on the Egyptian side of the Egyptian-Israel armistice line in order to maintain peace and stability, (8/7/57). He also offered Israel one of two options to settle the issue of Israeli passage in the Canal. The first option was a legal one. He suggested the reference of the issue to the International Court of Justice and expressed his readiness to accept beforehand the decision of the Court, provided that Israel would also declare in advance her willingness to do likewise. The second option was political. Nasser argued that the issue of Israeli passage in the Canal was part of the overall Palestine problem and should be settled within the framework of a comprehensive political settlement based on the implementation of all the UN resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In an interview with Keith Wheeler, of Life (14 July 1959), he argued that it was not logical that Egypt would unilaterally abdicate her rights under the Constantinople Convention and allow Israel to

use the Suez Canal whereas Israel had refused to abide by any of the United Nations resolutions. Israeli passage in the Canal, Nasser contended, was "a part of the entire Palestine problem and is linked to the restoration of the rights of the Palestine people" (28/7/59 and 26/2/60).

Nasser explicitly promised to let Israel use the Suez Canal if she fulfilled her obligations under the UN resolutions (25/4/65).¹ Furthermore, he answered in the affirmative a question on whether he would co-operate with a UN commission to accomplish that goal:

Restrictions on the passage of Israel vessels in the Canal will be lifted if the Arabs of Palestine are simultaneously allowed to return to their homes (25/4/65).

Nasser's major goal in the Arab-Israeli conflict was the implementation of the United Nations 1947 Partition Resolution and the 1949 resolutions pertaining to the right of return or compensation. Nasser was asked to put to Israel specific proposals to settle the Palestine problem. He replied

¹ However, cargos of non-strategic goods were allowed to pass to and from Israel until May 1959 when a Danish freighter attempting to transit the Canal with an Israeli cargo was seized. Meanwhile, Nasser worked out with Dag Hammarskjold a plan to settle the problem. According to the plan submitted to Israel by Hammarskjold, publicity on the sailing of any Israeli cargo through the Canal would be banned and Israeli cargoes would be purchased by receivers before leaving Israeli ports for the Canal. The plan was rejected by Golda Meir, the then foreign minister of Israel (Hofstadter, 1973b:68)

We mean that all resolutions pertaining to Palestine are indivisible, that is, the right of refugees to return and their right to re-take their possessions or to be compensated. The issue is clear and easy. We demand all the rights of the Palestine people... Israel also demands the right of passage in the Suez Canal ignoring the rights of the Arabs... Is it possible that the UN resolutions would be mandatory on one side and optional to the other? If we accept the passage of Israeli ships in the Canal, that would mean that Israel would obtain all her goals and the Arabs would lose all their rights (9/10/59).

Nasser was not prepared to accept a peaceful settlement with Israel on the basis of the compensation and re-settlement of Palestinian refugees in other Arab countries. According to him, such settlement would be a one-sided acceptance of the fait accompli, "an aggression masked by the cloak of peace". (20/5/63). Nevertheless, Nasser expressed readiness to accept a peaceful settlement with Israel if it accepted the return of all Palestinian refugees (Al-Ahram, 20/7/66).

55. One must aspire for optimal goals.
56. One must pursue feasible goals in inter-Arab and inter-African politics.
57. Once optimal goals have been defined they should never be abandoned, changed, or substituted.
58. Optimality of goals should not mean the rigid adherence to specific means.

Despite the radical shift in the nature of his domestic goals, Nasser continued to adhere to the belief that a decision maker ought to select optimizing goals of political action.

Settling for the most feasible goals in the circumstances or compromise, Nasser argued, would mean "signing the document of our enslavement" (17/4/59, 26/11/59 and 7/5/60). Nasser believed that the immediate prospects of the realization of goals might be an irrelevant issue. One should approach the task of goal selection regardless of short term consequences. As a result, he refused to settle for compromise of "half solution" with the Syrian separatist officers in September 1961 (28/9/61) and attacked Bourguiba in February 1967 for suggesting a compromise on the Palestine problem (22/2/67). Nasser reasoned that "the method of bargaining will never realize our goals" (12/3/65).

Nevertheless, Nasser advocated the pursuit of feasible goals in two specific issue areas: Arab and African politics. The serious pursuit of foreign policy goals, Nasser argued, requires the assumption of only "those responsibilities which correspond with our capabilities." According to Nasser, such an approach could be pursued by defining the specific limited goals for each stage (24/1/61). He contended that the optimal goal of total Arab unity was unattainable at the present. Instead, one must focus on the feasible goal of promoting inter-Arab solidarity. Nasser made it abundantly clear after Suez that he was not looking for any form of formal Arab federation or confederation and that he preferred to concentrate on the unity of ideas (10/3/57). Also, in spite of

his awareness of the limitations of the Arab League system and its incapacity to realize the optimal goal of Arab integration, Nasser was prepared to work within that system in order to achieve some useful feasible decisions (31/5/65 and 7/6/65). Likewise, in all his addresses to the African summits, Nasser kept underscoring the belief that Africans need not indulge in the search for optimal constitutional unity. Rather, they should not jeopardize the prospects of more feasible co-operation (24/5/63 and 17/7/64).

Once the decision maker decides on an optimal goal, Nasser argued, he should never change or abandon it. On many occasions, he emphatically asserted that under no conditions would he abandon the Arabness and total independence of Egypt or the goal of accelerated economic development (10/10/60, 31/1/61, 22/2/63 and 1/5/64). Nasser pleaded publicly to Dulles to understand that Egypt would never abandon the goal of total independence and non-adherence to military alliances. He told Dulles that if he read the minutes of their talks in 1952 he would find that the same goals had been underscored at that time and had never been abandoned since.

However, Nasser was a master tactician. Despite his belief in goal optimality, and dislike for bargains, he advocated the pursuit of flexible means "within the framework of the moral ideals and goals of our struggle" (26/5/62).

Nasser expressed this belief in a crucial statement articulated on 5 December 1957

Our goal was always constant, but the means of achievement were always changing and developing. At one time it took the form of negotiations. At other times it took the form of crises and guerilla warfare in the Canal.

Nasser's strong belief in the flexibility of tactics was exhibited in his persistent refusal to adhere to a specific ideology which would dictate to him specific means. Instead, he preferred to take actions and decisions according to the merits of the specific problem (23/7/64 and 24/11/66). One of the standard themes in his speeches was the argument that theories of socialism were basically the same, but the means of socialist application and practice vary according to the prevailing conditions. Accordingly, it was not surprising to see Nasser lecturing the political cadres of the ASU on the possibility of adopting the capitalist methods of management and industrialization as long as the goal of ending exploitation remained unchanged (7/3/66 in Al-Tanzim wal-Haraka). He also lashed out at those who criticized his decision to declare Port Said a free zone as a non-socialist decision on the basis that anything that might be profitable was desirable (18/11/65).

The same belief pervaded Nasser's Arab goals and means. He argued that any method of achieving Arab unity that could be functional under the present conditions was acceptable to

him (20/3/63 in Minutes of the Unity Talks). The optimal goal of Arab integration can be achieved through a variety of methods ranging from constitutional unity to mere political co-operation (22/7/63). As a result, Nasser pursued various approaches in dealing with the Arabs, such as the unity of ranks, by which he meant co-operation with all Arab regimes, and unity of goals, by which he meant unity with revolutionary forces only. All of these approaches were justified by the need for tactical flexibility and circumstantial changes (22/2/62 and 22/2/67).

59. All Egypt's goals are inherently mutually compatible.

60. There is certain value-incompatibility in the field of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Such incompatibility could be solved through the establishment of a schedule of goals.

One of the remarkable shifts in Nasser's operational code during this period was the denial of any value incompatibility.¹ In 84% of the references, Nasser perceived his values and goals as inherently compatible.²

¹ In contrast to the admission during the first period that values and goals were incompatible and ought to be pursued through a schedule.

² Such shift in Nasser's operational code substantiates the single value hypothesis of cognitive theory. The cognitive paradigm suggests that the information processing mechanism of the mind operates to deny the trade-off relationship between two goals or values embedded in a single situation, unless compelled to recognize it by reality constraints. Instead of weighing values in relation to each other, as the analytic paradigm suggests, the human mind separates the two

Nasser tended to deny any value-incompatibility by integrating all goals around a single value. In domestic politics, Nasser viewed social and political revolution as mutually complementary. The successful consummation of the political revolution was a prerequisite for the launching of the social revolution (22/7/61). The obverse was also true. The social revolution was supposed to create higher levels of political revolution. Likewise, the goals of achieving democracy and socialism were seen as inherently compatible:

There is complete fusion between socialism and democracy. Without socialism, which is in its essence the liberation of the individual from exploitation, there could be no democracy. Without democracy, which is in its essence the participation of each individual in the decision making, there could be no socialism... There is an organic link between socialism and democracy. Socialism is the democracy of the economy and democracy is the socialism of politics (9/7/60).

Political independence, Nasser argued, cannot be secured without economic independence (9/5/64 and 9/11/66), and socialism was not incompatible with religion (25/2/65).

According to Nasser, the basic values pursued in inter-Arab politics were compatible. He foresaw three basic mutually inclusive revolutions in the Arab world: a patriotic revolution to achieve national independence, an Arab revolution to unify

values of a complex problem as if they were independent values. It then severs the lateral relationship between the separate values, sets up single value problems, and assumes that all values are satisfied under this new all-encompassing value.

TABLE 6.11
QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S BELIEFS ABOUT GOAL SELECTION
DURING THE SECOND PERIOD (1957-1967)

B E L I E F S	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67 TOTAL (1)
P-7 Goal Selection				2			2		2	1	7
- Comprehensive				100%			100%		100%	100%	100%
- Individual Issues											
a. Egypt's Goals	39	76	140	105	62	88	54	69	92	70	32 827
- Destructive	8%	16	11%(4)	17%(1)	24%(3)	22%(1)	31%(2)	14%	9%(4)	10%(3)	9% 15%
- Expansionist		(1)		(1)	27	6	6	1		1	1
- Aggressive	(15)	16(4)	19(6)	8(1)	35	1	(2)	3(2)	5(4)		3
- Defensive	18(3)	9	10(1)	9(5)	5	5	4	9	21	1	16(6)11
- Conciliative	21	26	9	10	11	10(2)	20	19(2)	11(1)	26	16(6)10
- Seeker of peace											(3) 9.9
- Domestic Develop-											
ment	26	21	43	21	38	51	24	30	33	52	9 34
- Restorative	13(10)	11(7)	(9)	35(25)	10(6)	11(5)	13(9)	23(17)	21(17)	10 (6)	47(40)17
b. Nature of Goals	3	15	19	21	27	12	11	8	26	5	14 161
- Optimal	67%	100%	74%	100%(43)	85%(7)	100%(12)	73%	87%(13)	77%(19)	100%	100%(71)88
- Feasible	33	26	26	15	15	27	27	13	23(4)		12

BELIEFS	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67 (1)	TOTAL
c. Value Conflicts	4	2	12	7	10	11	13	7	1	4	3	76
- All goals compatible	50%	100%	100%	100%(14)	70%	82%(9)	77%	86%	10%	75%	100%	84%
- Tradeoffs necessary												
- Schedule of goals	25				30	18	8	(14)		25		11
- Hierarchy of goals	25						15(7)					4
- Harmonize goals												1
d. Goal modification	1	1	2	1	2	5	8	3	7	7	3	40
- Modify goals												
- Substitute goals									(14%)	14%		3%
- Abandon goals	100		50									3
- Modify means		-100	50	100	100	60	38	100	72(14)	71	33	59
- Substitute means						20	62		(14)	15	67	20
- Abandon means						20						10

Arabs, and a social revolution to accomplish social justice. These three, Nasser believed, were inherently harmonious, inseparable and reinforcing each other (9/7/60).

In the field of foreign policy, Nasser viewed all his goals as inherently compatible and to be pursued simultaneously. According to him the quest for Arab integration did not contradict the quest for Pan-Africanism or Islamic solidarity (30/6/62). He also did not see any contradiction between the goal of global peace and arms buildup (1/10/65).

(b) Approaches to Goal Pursuit

61. The best approach in all issue-areas, except economic issues, is the incrementalist approach.
62. Neo-functionalism is the best approach for Arab integration.
63. The goal of economic development ought to be approached through a strategy of blitzkrieg and total mobilization.

Having decided on an all-encompassing single value, what was Nasser's preferred approach to implement it? Nasser was a pragmatist. Theory or ideology never occupied a prominent place in his operational code. On the few occasions when Nasser touched upon the subject of theory, he invariably displayed a disinclination toward theorizing as against experimentation through trial and error. In his address to the members of the Preparatory Committee of the National Congress on 25/11/61, Nasser criticized those who

were calling for the adherence to a well-defined theory.

Theory, Nasser argued, was no more than a guide of action and ought to be deduced from reality and practice. According to him, the formulation of a theory was a long-term process that involves trial and error. In the Charter of National Action Nasser rejected the adherence to a certain theory as a form of "intellectual adolescence." What was needed, Nasser added was "intellectual clarity" and experimentation. Nasser's view of the relationship of theory and practice was expressed in the Charter as follows:

Intellectual clarity helps considerably to make the experiment a success, just as the experiment in turn enhances the clarity of thinking, and gives thought fecundity and power, enabling it to influence reality as reality influences thought. By virtue of such creative interaction, national action will have a greater chance of success. (Chapter 8).

The same approach was applied to goal-implementation. He believed that once an optimal goal had been defined, it should be pursued through a series of successive and incremental actions. Nasser's favorite example was the Koran. He contended that the Koran was written in twenty-three years through a series of statements which were sent down to the Prophet according to the prevailing circumstances. The Koranic statements on the ban of drinking, Nasser said, were altered incrementally from dissuasion to partial to total ban. God, Nasser said, did not give the Prophet a ready made theory to apply, but proceeded step by step until

the full theory of Koran was laid down (8/8/59 and 25/11/61). Accordingly, incrementalism, gradualism, and trial-and-error were seen as the best approaches to goal implementation.¹

"The experiment of trial-and-error in the life of nations," Nasser said in the Charter "is the road to maturity and clarity."

The same gradualist-incrementalist approach was recommended regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nasser viewed the process of the restoration of the rights of the Palestinians as a long historical process which would inevitably occur as a result of the Arabs' historical deep-rootedness in Palestine. He admitted that even though he was determined not to relinquish the right of the Palestinians to return to Palestine, he did not know how this could be accomplished (1/10/63). By concentrating on Arab economic development and integration and the elimination of imperialist influence and Arab reactionary regimes, Nasser reasoned, the rights would be restored without resort to a military battle. These steps, he argued, ought to be simultaneously and incrementally pursued regardless of the time involved.

1

The only exception to gradualism and incrementalism were the issues related to economic development. Nasser believed that the magnitude of Egypt's economic problems required a total mobilization of resources in order to achieve a blitzkrieg style big economic push (24/7/59, 9/7/60 and 28/7/63). The movement toward economic development, Nasser said, should proceed in a double speed to achieve accelerated growth.

Israel's threat will wither away without a military battle if we rid ourselves of underdevelopment (22/2/62).

I believe that the building of economy of the Arab world and raising the living standards will enable us to reach a state in which we can pressure Israel and those who are behind her, to the extent they realize that resistance is useless (30/6/62).

Arab self-power is a danger to Israel.. Heavy industry is a danger to Israel; socialism is a danger to Israel... All of this creates essential transformations in the Arab's capacity to confront Israeli aggressive behavior (9/3/65).

Further, Nasser predicated his approach on the assumption that, if Israel was an imperialist agent, then it was only logical to concentrate on the elimination of the influence of the imperialist patron which would, in turn, reduce the power of the agent:

Experience and induction of history has shown that Israel cannot exist without imperialism. She is for it and for its goals of domination and exploitation. Hence, her existence is an extension of imperialist existence. Consequently, the triumph of freedom and peace over imperialist existence cannot go without having an impact on Israel's existence. This is one inter-connected battle even if its domain includes whole continents. When freedom accomplishes her final victory in Africa--and it will not matter the hardships are--the declining sun of imperialism will sink in the ocean along with its tail. Israel will never escape her fate. (25/3/64).

Likewise, Nasser contended that the basic reason for the Arab defeat was the treason of Arab reactionary regimes. As a

consequence, any action to rectify the injustice of 1948 should wait until such regimes were liquidated (17/10/60, 19/10/60, and 23/12/62), and total Arab integration has been achieved (8/3/65, and 22/2/62). Nasser admitted that he had no tactical plan to liberate Palestine, but Arab unity and the liquidation of Arab reactionaries were his approaches to restore Palestine (22/7/63). He adhered firmly to this position despite the provocations of Jordan and Saudi Arabia who dared him to move one step to liberate Palestine and asked him to specify what he was waiting for to realize that goal. Nasser replied:

I'm waiting until I finish the reactionaries and the Fifth Column first. I'm waiting for the Arab people to rid itself and purge itself from the Fifth Column. Only then, the battle for Palestine will be close (23/12/61).

In short, Nasser's approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict was predicated on his historical paradigm of politics. The resolution of the conflict would come about when the Arabs build a sound and integrated socio-economic infrastructure and liberate themselves from reactionary-imperialist influence. The incremental pursuit and realization of such steps, Nasser argued, would create fundamental qualitative changes in the Arab-Israeli balance of power, which would inevitably force Israel to accept Arab demands without a military battle.

Nasser's approach to Arab integration falls within the basic orientation of the neo-functionalist approach to integration. He viewed the process of integration as an incremental process which would come about through the interaction of Arab revolutionary forces-parties and governments and the step-by-step build up of a sound socio-economic basis before embarking on political integration.¹ In chapter nine of the Charter, Nasser argued that Arab integration ought to be accomplished on several successive and carefully timed stages. Accelerating the implementation of any state, Nasser added, would create economic and social gaps and loopholes which could undermine the integrative process itself. As a result, during the Egyptian-Syrian-Iraqi talks in 1963 to form a union, Nasser insisted that the model of the European Economic Community was the best model for Arab integration.

Nasser conceptualized Arab integration as an incremental process of change which would come about as a result of the voluntary consent of all popular forces in each Arab country and which would lead to some sort of Arab political community. The key elements in this process, Nasser argued, were: voluntarism, unanimity, and the similarity of the stage of socio-economic development among Arab countries. Nasser believed

¹ Nasser rejected the demand of the Syrian politicians in 1957 for an immediate Egyptian-Syrian merger on the basis that such merger would require at minimum five years of socio-economic preparations. He made it clear in his speeches in Syria that he accepted the merger under pressure.

that "Arab unity must be based on voluntary action, not coups" (22/8/60). The consent of all political forces of the Arab country which embarks on this venture was considered crucial:

We will never accept under any circumstances a merger with any Arab country whose people are not unanimous in demanding unity... We believe that even a small minority opposing the merger may expose the country to civil war (16/5/61).

According to Nasser, majority consent was not sufficient to build or sustain Arab integration. The voluntary consent of all political forces was seen as indispensable: Further, after the Syrian separatist coup and the emergence of the Arab radical-conservative rift, Nasser suggested that integrating Arab countries must reach the stage of socialist development in order to ensure the soundness of the new political community. Any country which did not reach such level, Nasser argued, should be permitted to proceed at its own pace (30/6/62).

According to the blueprint of Arab integration enunciated in the Charter of National Action and the Tripartite Unity Talks, the first operational step toward unity ought to be the "building of a unified Arab nationalist framework which could assemble all nationalist movements in all Arab countries," (22/7/63). Rather than refer to states in the holistic sense, Nasser preferred to identify them with specific political forces. Such forces--consisting of socialist revolutionary forces--ought to interact among themselves at the national

level within a political non-governmental framework in order to promote the ideas of Arab integration within their respective countries. Once these forces seize power in their own countries, Nasser argued, the role of central institutions becomes crucial. During the Egyptian-Syrian-Iraqi unity talks of 1963, Nasser contended that the unification of inter-state political leadership ought to be the first step toward the creation of an Arab federal state:

In order to integrate (Egypt, Syria and Iraq), one must first integrate the leaderships. In order to realize this, we need stages. We need gradualism... We must create the front first, then a unified political leadership. This will eventually lead to a state (19/3/63 in Minutes of the Unity Talks).

(c) Strategies

64. One ought to pursue a strategy of mutual accommodation toward international actors at large.
65. Domestic political opposition (counter-revolutionaries) ought to be eliminated and public participation ought to be confined to apolitical issues.
66. Arab strategy toward Israel ought to be a defensive-deterrent one.

Nasser maintained the same pattern of strategic differentiation which emerged during the first period, that is, the advocacy of different strategies toward various actors and adversaries. His general foreign policy strategy was postulated on the principle of reciprocal accommodation:

4

Ours is a policy of friendship and affection toward all countries on condition that our independence and dignity will not be impinged upon. We are determined not to be hostile to any people. (16/5/58).

Although we differ with the American policy of force and the British imperialist policies, we want to maintain friendly relations with them. Our strategy is to oppose their policies, but to extend hands of friendship. (12/11/64).

De-politicization was Nasser's basic strategy toward domestic political opposition and the masses at large. By de-politicization is meant the prevention of some viewpoints and interests from finding political expression and reducing the effective role of the masses in political decision making. Nasser never tolerated the existence of an articulate "political" opposition. He consistently rejected the creation of a competing political party on the assumption that it would be an agent for a foreign power. After the Syrian secession, he intensified his campaign to annihilate bourgeois adversaries by officially depriving them of political rights. This is the strategy which he called the strategy of "political isolation" (29/11/61). Toward the masses at large, Nasser's strategy was to restrict their public participation to non-political activities. According to Nasser, the masses were encouraged to participate in "political action," but he defined political action as

any behavior oriented toward the solution of day-to-day problems such as transportation. In other words, Nasser defined political action in a way that guarantees that such participation would be restricted to non-political activities.

Nasser's strategy toward his Arab adversaries was ambivalent, inconsistent, and vulnerable to circumstantial changes. For instance, in one month (March 1958), he articulated two contradictory strategies: "total elimination of Arab reactionary rulers" (11/3/58), and "peaceful co-existence" (20/3/58). However, after the secession of Syria, Nasser temporarily abandoned his strategic ambivalence and raised the slogan "no truce with Arab reactionaries" (5/10/61 and 16/10/61). He advocated a strategy of "unity of goals" (wahat al-hadaf), meaning the unity of progressive forces to dismantle Arab conservative regimes. The strategy culminated in Nasser's military intervention to prop up the new republican regime in Yemen in September 1962. The intervention was justified as an attempt to deter the Saudi regime which was spearheading the anti-Nasser Arab campaign.¹

¹ Nasser justified his military intervention in Yemen on the basis that Saudi Arabia was already assisting the deposed Imam. In a recently published account of the Nasserist decision to intervene in Yemen, Heikal (1977:31) revealed that there were three basic trends in the Egyptian leadership pertaining to the Yemeni request for military assistance. Anwar Sadat advocated full intervention on the premise that Egypt cannot stand still in the face of Saudi active intervention. Heikal himself stood for indirect intervention through volunteers from all Arab countries rather than intervention through the regular army. Heikal rationalized his stand on the basis that objective conditions in Yemen cannot

Nasser continued to preach the cause of total war against Saudi Arabia and Jordan until he suddenly called for the convening of an Arab summit conference (23 December 1963) to discuss the issue of Israel's diversion of the Jordan River water. The emphasis was shifted toward a strategy of "unity of action" with all Arab regimes regardless of social and political regimes. However, the strategy of unity of action through summits failed to achieve what Nasser considered the necessary minimum consensus and military co-ordination. On 23 July 1966, Nasser himself announced the abandonment of the strategy of summits.¹ In lieu of the Arab summits, Nasser advocated a strategy of the unity of Arab revolutionary forces against Arab reactionary forces. He reasoned that co-ordination with Jordan, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia was hopeless because they were organically linked to imperialism and Israel. Hence

withstand the burden of a full military intervention. Nasser rejected Heikal's argument. He reasoned that non-intervention would herald a general retreat in the Arab progressive movement. The reactionary regimes ought to be deterred, Nasser contended. He also argued that at any rate military intervention would be a limited operation launched by a few commando units and one Air Force squadron and designed to show support to the Yemeni revolution.

¹Heikal justified the decision to abandon the strategy of Arab summits on the basis that the Egyptian General Intelligence had gathered information through agents in Rome assuring that the Jordanian Prime Minister had been passing all the plans of the Arab Unified Command to American agents. Egyptian agents, Heikal said, had obtained a copy of Jordan's share in the Arab plan through their Italian connection. (Heikal, 1966b).

the only alternative, Nasser argued, was a revolutionary strategy based on a continuous dialogue among various sections of Arab revolution and a relentless effort to topple the conservative regimes (23/12/66 and 22/2/67).

The Arab-Israeli conflict was viewed by Nasser as a "prisoner's dilemma" game, with the only rational Egyptian strategy as "defection" (deterrence). He understood deterrence as a defensive strategy whose purpose was to persuade the adversary to refrain from initiating an attack. On more than one occasion, he argued that he had no plan to launch a military offensive against Israel and that his entire strategy was to deter Israel from attacking any Arab country:

We have no plan to liberate Palestine.
But we only have a plan in case if
Israel attacked us or any Arab country
 (22/7/63).

We must work in stages. In the first stage we will strengthen our defensive capabilities so as Israel will not be able to strike at any Arab country. At the same time we will build an Arab deterrent force, so as if Israel penetrated any Arab country, she will be confronted by a deterrent force which will prevent her from infiltrating (Arab territory). This is an urgent goal. Regarding the national goal of the liberation of Palestine, we must get prepared until we find the proper international circumstances.
 (29/8/65).

Nasser's "Israeli" strategy of deterrence contained two basic components: the mobilization of Arab human resources to build a strong deterrent force, and the support of the

Palestinians in their endeavour to restore their rights. Nasser argued that Arab superiority in human resources was capable of offsetting the Israeli technological progress and altering the Arab-Israeli balance of power in favor of Arabs:

We need to assemble our resources and mobilize them in one front. We also expect to assemble all other potentialities especially economic ones, so as if Israel attacked us we can measure up and stand a total war (7/2/64).

We must have our own power. They are two million Jews and we are a hundred million Arabs... Ours is the road of struggle. However, struggle does not mean war only. In order to fight we have our own power, we must produce our products, and we must surpass Israel. If we buy 200 tanks, they will buy 200 tanks and if we buy 300 tanks, they will buy 300 tanks. Therefore, we must search for something they cannot do, i.e. recruit five million men under arms. They cannot do that (25/2/65).

The second part of the Nasserist strategy was to lend full support to the Palestinians in their endeavor to restore their rights. Nasser explicitly disavowed the responsibility of directly interfering to initiate a military action or to execute a Palestinian strategy against Israel. He contended that the operational implementation of a strategy of restoration ought to be left to the Palestinians themselves. Egypt's only role, Nasser explained, was to buttress the Palestinian strategy:

The UAR puts all her capabilities behind the Palestinian struggle because we believe that the people of Palestine must be the spearhead in the road of return supported by all the political, economic, and military capabilities of the entire Arab nation (24/11/66).

The success of deterrence depends largely on the extent to which the limits of intolerance were made explicit to the adversary. By limits of intolerance is meant the limits beyond which any action on the part of the adversary would be considered as a casus belli. Nasser made explicit two basic limits: Israeli's actual occupation of territories of any Arab country and the assurance that Israel was about to produce a nuclear bomb:

I. Nasser made it clear that he would use active force against Israel if Israel actively moved to occupy any Arab territory. Sporadic reprisals or border skirmishes were not considered within that limit.¹

The UAR will respond forcefully to any attempt on the part of Israel to attack any Arab country. If Israel thought of developing her assault to the level of occupying an Arab land, she will find the forces of the UAR ready for action (7/6/65).

In the Second Arab Summit held in Alexandria in September 1964, Nasser told other Arab heads of states that his strategy was to "deter a possible Israeli aggression against the installations of the Jordan River project." He set the only condition for active military intervention as "Israeli penetration and possession of Arab territories." The mere outbreak of an Arab-Israeli war, Nasser reasoned, was not considered as a casus belli. Only Israel's actual occupation of an Arab territory warrants an offensive strategy. (Memoires of an informed Arab politician, Part 41, Al-Ahram, 6/7/78 and Part 46, Al-Ahram, 10/8/78).

II. The second limit of intolerance which Nasser set for Israel was the gathering of solid information to the effect that Israel was about to produce a nuclear bomb. He reasoned that the introduction of the nuclear element to the Arab-Israeli conflict would freeze the situation to the detriment of the rights of the Palestinians (20/2/66).¹

To conclude, Nasser's strategy toward Israel was one of deterrence rather than liberation; and support for the Palestinians rather than initiating an independent action. Liberation was viewed as a historical-incremental process which would be realized in the long run as a result of the accumulation of a multitude of factors which would eventually force Israel to yield to Palestinian rights.

(d) Calculation and Control of Risk

67. High risk policies are prohibited in Arab-Israeli relations.
68. High risk policies are permissible in inter-Arab relations, and domestic politics.
69. To control risks of action in inter-Arab politics, scale down goal of Arab unity and pursue it incrementally.
70. To control risks of action in Arab-Israeli interactions, scale down goals and pursue a deterrent strategy.
71. To avoid risks of action in domestic affairs, liquidate class contradictions, adopt unipartyism and socialist democracy, and maintain collective leadership.

¹ The belief in the necessity of action to prevent Israel from developing a nuclear bomb was changed after the 1967 War. Nasser stated that in this case "we will produce a nuclear bomb if Israel produced one" (26/2/69).

72. In confronting risks associated with value tradeoff situations, settle for the value that achieves minimum potential losses.

Nasser's beliefs on risk acceptance and risk control were characterized by a high level of cross-situational variability. In inter-Arab relations high risk policies were deemed permissible, whereas in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Nasser advocated the avoidance of high risk policies. According to Nasser, gambling is prohibited when it comes to the Arab-Israeli conflict (22/6/62). Nasser argued that the stakes in the Arab-Israeli conflict are too crucial to permit embarking on an action without being fully assured on its advantageous consequences:

We cannot use force today... If I go to war at this time I'll be leading my country to a disaster. I'll be risking the whole country and this is prohibited (23/12/63)

Israel no longer enjoys the freedom of action as opposed to Arab paralysis. Our alertness to the opponent is no longer mere wishes or daydreams, but it did not reach the level beyond which we can afford a risk and take its responsibilities (25/11/65).

We must prepare for all possibilities and avoid getting involved in any adventures (25/2/65).

Accordingly, Nasser made it clear to Israel that he had no intention to launch a pre-emptive attack because such attack involves "dangers greater than anyone can shoulder," that is, the danger of a third world war (14/6/57). On 22/6/62, Nasser uncovered the story of his rift with the Syrian

Baath ministers in 1959 over the issue of the use of force to prevent Israel from diverting the Jordan River water. Nasser said that he adamantly rejected the Baathists demand to use force immediately because,

I have no guarantee that Ben-Gurion will reply by a limited military operation. He may occupy Damascus. Such high risk action cannot be pursued.

Nevertheless, Nasser regarded the domestic and inter-Arab domains safe enough to permit him to pursue some high risk policies, not in the sense of pursuing adventurous or aggressive policies but in the sense of risking the sacrifice of resources or the failure of some goals in order to attempt to achieve some optimal goals. For instance, Nasser argued that he knew that by nationalizing industries he was running a high risk of putting the economy in chaos, but he added that he had to take such risk (22/2/62). Nasser's inclination to pursue risk policies in inter-Arab relations was exhibited in his signing of mutual defence pact with the new republican regime in Iraq in 1958 knowing that such an agreement amounted to "a gamble with the very independence of the United Arab Republic" (21/5/59) because it involved the exposure of "our entire destiny to the danger of a clash with Big Powers" (16/2/60). Further, Nasser justified his acceptance of forming a weak federation with Syria and Iraq in 1963 on the basis that he had to take a "calculated risk" in order to save the cause of Arab unity (22/7/63).

Nasser suggested that to minimize the potentially dysfunctional consequence of high risk policies a decision maker ought to scale down his goals and pursue a cautious strategy of incrementalism and deterrence. For example, he suggested to scale down the huge Arab expectations of an immediate and comprehensive unity in order to control the risks of Great Powers intervention to check the revolutionary-unitary tide which prevailed in the Arab world in the wake of the Egyptian-Syrian merger and the Iraqi coup of 1958.

We must build dams in front of our hopes, in which we open the eyes of wisdom as we do with water reservoirs which we build to control huge floods. We must regulate our hopes because if we do not these hopes will turn into a flood that will wipe out our hopes (29/9/58).

Nasser also argued that the best approach to control risks in the Arab-Israeli conflict was to scale down the grandiose goal of the liberation of Palestine. If the Arabs were not capable of achieving certain goals pertaining to Israel, then they ought to scale down such a goal:

Today we have 50,000 soldiers in Yemen. If I want to attack Israel I must first withdraw them from Yemen... If we are not capable of diverting (the Jordan River water), then we must postpone the diversion until we are capable of protecting it. (31/5/65).

The scaling down of goals, Nasser argued, must be supplemented by the pursuit of ultra cautious strategies and approaches. To circumvent the risks of Israeli expansion, Nasser maintained, the Arabs ought to pursue a deterrent strategy (5/8/59 and

10/8/59). Likewise, to control the risks of potential rupture in future Arab integrative ventures was to pursue an incremental approach and to ensure that the proper grounds were laid first (7/4/63, 26/5/64 and 20/2/66). During his talks with the Syrian and Iraqi leaders to form a federation, Nasser suggested a whole series of mechanisms to control the risks of a possible rupture: gradualism, unifying political leadership, and ensure the participation of all political forces in the process (19/3/63, 20/3/63 and 13/4/63 in Minutes of the Unity Talks).

Nasser viewed the potential reversal of the revolution through a bourgeois comeback as the biggest risk which ought to be eliminated at all costs. As a result, in contrast to his relatively cautious foreign risk control mechanism, Nasser's approaches to control domestic risks were more positive and aggressive. Such risk, Nasser argued, can be controlled through the following measures:

1. Liquidate class contradictions to prevent a bourgeois comeback (26/1/67).
2. Avoid the establishment of competing political parties because they could force Egypt into the Cold War through their foreign patrons (22/7/59).
3. "To control the risks of a return to dictatorship and deviation from the national goals, ensure that political power is in the hands of the elected popular councils (Ch. 5 of the Charter)."
4. "Collective leadership is the only approach to control the risk of individual deviations (26/5/62)."

5. Science is the only guarantee against the risks of trial and error (Ch.8 of the Charter).

The complexity of the decision makers' dilemma of deciding the parameters of risk acceptance and avoidance and the mechanisms of risk reduction, increases when the values associated with the risk situation over tradeoff values. In this situation the decision maker is forced to choose one value to the detriment of other values. Nasser was confronted with this situation during the Egyptian-Syrian-Iraqi unity talks in 1963; he advocated the creation of a strong federation with a common ideological aim and unified political leadership. However, the talks ended up with a plan which fell short of his minimum requirements. Nasser was sure that the plan would not work and that by accepting the plan he was taking a "calculated risk." He argued that there were two basic values involved in this risk situation: the cause of Arab unity which would be dealt a fatal blow if the unity talks collapsed and the cause of democracy which would also be sacrificed if the proposed plan was approved. As Nasser pondered this dilemma, it occurred to him that the proposed union might well turn out to be a positive step toward a pan-Arab union. At the last session of the talks he told his counterparts that he would accept the proposed plan in order to save all that can be saved. Stonewalling, Nasser said, will result in an irreparable setback and one must choose the option which achieves minimum losses.

TABLE 6.13.

QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S BELIEFS ABOUT RISK
DURING THE SECOND PERIOD (1957-1967)

	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	TOTAL
P-3 Risk Calculation												
- Comprehensive	1					1	3		4	3	3	15
- Specific issues	100%					(100%)	33%		100%	(50)	(33%)	67%
							67				67(33)	33
a. Risk Control	1	3	3	1		12	13	10	15	3	3	64
- Limit goals		33%					8%		40%(6)		(33%)	14
- Limit means	100	67		100		25(17)	8	10	13(6)	67		20
- Assess means			(100)			75(8)	8	20(10)	13(6)		(67)	29
- Assess opponent means									34(6)			8
- Assess opponent strategy							77	70(20)		33		29
b. High and Low Risks	1		1	✓	1	6	8		5		1	24
- High risk mandatory						33%						13%
- High risk impossible			100	100	100		50		20	(100)		33
- High risk prohibited						(50%)	(50%)	(13)	80%(40)			50
- Low risk mandatory						17						4

(e) Timing

73. Timing of the liberation of Palestine spells out the difference between success and failure.

Nasser's belief on the cruciality of timing to the success or failure of goal-implementation was basically used as a mechanism to remove the risk of immediate action. It provided him with an outlay for articulating grandiose goals without being committed to their implementation. Thus, he could afford to champion the goal of the liberation of Palestine simply because the implementation of this goal, as he repeatedly stated, must wait for the proper time (22/2/64 and 4/2/67). Nasser argued that the success or failure of the liberation of Palestine hinges on the proper timing. The Arabs must be the party who decides the time and place of any battle with Israel:

It is a general rule that anyone who wants to fight must decide the timing of the battle. The proper time is the time in which he is capable and ready and when the circumstances are favorable (18/11/65)

The proper time, according to Nasser, will come about only when the Arabs eliminate reactionaries, are fully united and capable of defending themselves (22/6/62). At the root of Nasser's cold war with Arab conservatives and ultra-radicalists alike was the issue of timing. Nasser considered the reactionary

regimes as more dangerous than Israel "because reactionaries will push us for a premature battle with Israel" (22/3/66).

He frequently rebuffed the demands of Syrian Baath and Jordan to remove the United Nations Emergency Forces from Sinai and to support Syria in her military engagements with Israel because, as he argued, this means giving Israel the power to decide the timing of the battle.¹

They claim that we must remove the international police (from Sinai) But, we must have a plan first. If Israel attacked Syria, do I have to attack Israel? If this is the case then Israel can define the timing of my battle. Why? Because Israel can destroy one or two Syrian tractors in order to drag us to attack her. Is that a wise approach? We must be the party who chooses the timing of the battle (31/5/65).

(f) Action

74. Avoid premature action.
75. Delay escalatory action until you gain a position of strength.
76. Don't act until all issues are assessed and success is assured.
77. Act quickly when opponent's provocations become intolerable.

¹ According to King Hassan of Morocco, the issue of the proper timing was one of the issues which dominated the deliberations of the third Arab Summit Conference held in Morocco in 1965. Nasser told the Arab heads of states that he would be the one who decided the time of the battle with Israel. The Algerian President Boumedienne, the Syrian President Amin Al-Hafiz and King Hassan argued that they believe now is the proper time. Nasser replied angrily that when he chooses the proper time he will not need the Syrian army (Hassan, 1973).

78. Act quickly before your opponent gains a position of strength.

One would expect a decision maker such as Nasser, who believed in the cruciality of the timing of action and was not prepared to accept high risks, to be particularly cautious in tactical goal-implementation. This was the case in Nasser's operational code. Its cardinal rule was the avoidance of premature action, one initiated by an unprepared actor, the favorable consequences of which were not fully assured. He argued that action against Israel should not be initiated unless success was 100% assured (22/2/63, 18/11/65 and 22/3/66). Actions, especially those of an escalatory nature, should be delayed until all salient issues are assessed and the actor gains a position of strength (2/7/62, 23/2/63 and 24/11/66).

Fighting with Israel without being fully prepared amounts to gambling and treason (22/6/62).

The First Five-Year Plan has resulted in some gaps. We should not proceed with the Second Five-Year Plan until all these gaps are dealt with (Al-Ahram, 24/11/66)

However, Nasser believed that action was mandatory under three conditions: (1) when the decision maker feels that the opponent is about to gain an irreversible position of strength. On two occasions Nasser made it clear that a pre-emptive military action would be deemed mandatory "if we felt that Israel was about to develop a nuclear bomb." (2) when the

TABLE 6.14
 QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S BELIEFS ABOUT TIMING AND ACTION DURING
 DURING THE SECOND PERIOD (1957-1967)

B E L I E F	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	TOTAL
P-4 Timing	1			1	1	3		1	7	4	7	25
- Crucial	100%				100%	100%(67)		100%	86%(57)	100%	100%(57)	92%
- Wise Management									4%			4%
- Not Crucial				100								4%
P-5 Action	2	1	3		1	5			2	5	5	24
- Act quickly												
- Intolerable provocation	50%								50%	20%	(40%)	21%
- Delay escalative	50%					(100%)	(20%)					12%
- Avoid punitive action						(20%)	(20%)			20%		8%
- Don't yield			100%			(60%)	(50%)					25%
- Assess issues		100%								20%		8%
- Before opponent										(40%)	60	13%

opponent's provocations reach an intolerable limit. According to Nasser, the Egyptian offensive against the Baghdad Pact was considered inescapable when "the battle of military alliances went beyond Iraq's borders and was extended to all Arab countries. This was a real danger to us because if all Arab countries adhered to the Baghdad Pact, Egypt would be isolated and exposed alone to Israel" (22/7/57); and

(3) when definitive opportunities of success arise. The acceleration of the pace of socialist transformation of the Egyptian society was believed to be a response to "the opportunities which arose by the readiness of the masses to sacrifice" (2/5/67).

(g) Utility of Military Force

79. Spiritual energies of the people can provide a dynamic power for the realization of popular aspirations.
80. Avoid resort to military force in international relations.
81. Never resort to military force in inter-Arab interactions.
82. Military force is useful only as a protective-deterrent mechanism (and is preferable to surrender).
83. Never initiate military force especially in Arab-Israeli relations, unless attacked directly, or being certain that Israel will develop a nuclear bomb.
84. Military superiority is crucial to successful deterrence.
85. Tactically, military force ought to be applied massively and on a large scale basis.

86. Tactically, military force ought to be supplemented by other types of force, economic and otherwise.

Nasser conceptualized power as the ability to accomplish goals and affect the distribution of political results.

According to him, the crucial element in the basis of power was human and intellectual resources. Armaments and military resources were considered a subsidiary element in defining the power base of any country. One can affect the distribution of results in a political conflict, Nasser argued, without even resorting to military force.

The political victory which Nasser had extracted from the military defeat in the Suez War and his emergence as the dominant leader in the Arab world, convinced him that military force was not that crucial in determining the decision maker's ability to achieve goals. He frequently underscored the theme that power base was material and moral resources (2/3/58, and 13/11/58), and that Arab nationalism was his real power base (22/7/57, and 3/9/58).

As a result, Nasser believed that the use of military force in international relations must be avoided, except as a last resort. Military force, Nasser argued, triggers a chain of violence which might be difficult to control (1/4/57). It may also be counter-productive as the lesson of Suez had proven (23/12/59).

If military force should be used only as a last resort in inter-state relations, it should never be used even as a last resort in inter-Arab relations. This was one of the cardinal rules in Nasser's operational code which he kept underscoring since the Egyptian-Iraqi feud of 1959. According to Nasser "the Arab weapon should never be used against other Arabs" (22/2/58). Nasser justified his decision not to respond to military provocations and attacks by the Qassem regime of Iraq in March 1959 on the ground that a reprisal by the U.A.R. would inevitably involve the use of military force against other Arabs:

Qassem of Iraq ordered his Air Force to attack our Republic, some houses were destroyed. We were able to respond, but we did not because the villages which we may attack are Arab villages... We accepted Qassem's aggression, not because we like it, but because we do not want to attack any Arab village in Iraq or to shed any Arab blood (12/3/59).

Nasser also deplored the Qassem's regime's attempt to forcibly annex Kuwait in 1961. He argued that military force should never be used to achieve Arab unity:

Force should not be our road to achieve Arab unity. We are one Arab nation with the same aspirations. Force should not be our way to achieve these aspirations (17/8/61).

Notwithstanding Nasser's misgivings about the utility of military force, he believed that force may be useful as a deterrent to potential aggressors. According to him a strong

national army is indispensable to the protection of national security and domestic actions. "A politician cannot function without an Armed Force to support him," Nasser believed (27/2/58 and 30/7/58).

Military force must be used only to repulse aggression and after peaceful negotiations fail (9/4/60).

We believe that the Armed Forces are the protective shield of the socialist society... The Armed Forces are also a means to enable us to enforce our independent policy (15/7/63)...

Military force also ought to be used if the decision maker is faced with a situation in which he is forced to choose between the direct resort to military force and total surrender to the opponent's demands, Nasser believed (8/5/61). According to him such a situation may develop if he was sure that Israel was about to develop a nuclear bomb. In this case, the decision maker is entitled to pre-empt the opponent by direct resort to military force (23/12/60).

As a general rule, Egypt should refrain from initiating the use of military force especially in Arab-Israeli relations. Nasser publicly admitted that he had no plan to liberate Palestine by the use of military force. According to him military force will be used only if Israel attacked any Arab country (22/7/63).¹

¹

In Summer 1959 the cabinet of the UAR met to discuss the problem of Israeli attempts to divert the Jordan River waters. The Baathist ministers in the cabinet advocated an immediate attack to destroy the Israeli project similar to the Syrian

Since 1964 Nasser believed that a war with Israel was inevitable. But he never viewed himself as the potential initiator, nor did he anticipate it would occur in his generation or think of it in purely military terms:¹

It seems that a war in Palestine is inevitable. Israel is determined to challenge not only Arabs but the whole international community. Such challenge cannot go undeterred or unchecked. (Interview with Karanjia on 6/2/64).

War between us and Israel cannot be avoided because Israel is the aggressor and the kind of peace we want is peace based on justice (1/7/64).

Palestine was usurped by military force and can only be restored by force (31/5/65).

In an interview with CBS, Nasser reiterated his belief that a war with Israel was unavoidable. However, he added:

army attacks in 1953 which succeeded in aborting the Israeli project. Nasser was adamant in his rejection of the Syrian ministers' demand and warned them that there was no guarantee that such limited war would be retained as such by Israel. He told al-Nafoury that he would launch such limited attack if he gave him a guarantee from Ben-Gurion that the war would be kept limited. Nasser seemed to defend the Israeli position when he told the Baath ministers that Israel today is pumping water from inside her territory which was not the case in 1953 (Hamroush, 1976:Part III:65-66; Heikal, 1972:27).

¹ Nasser was fundamentally convinced that such application of force would not occur in his generation. During the May-June 1967 crisis, he told Vice President Ibrahim (1977) "I will not fight. My successor is the one who will take you to Tel-Aviv, not me."

The restoration of Palestine means the development of Palestine's power. Not only the army, but also the economy, industrial and military power, and military production and civilian production (22/6/64).

In the application of military force, Nasser maintained, certain cardinal rules ought to be observed: (i) strive to achieve military superiority over the adversary (19/9/57, 23/12/60 and 20/2/66); (ii) apply military force massively. An incremental or graduated application of force or limited localized reaction to a military assault would result in failure (19.7/58 and 8/8/59); and (iii) not only should military force be applied on a large-scale basis, but it should also be used in conjunction with other forms of political, economic and psychological force. According to Nasser, the mere tactical application of military force is not in itself a guarantee for success unless such application was buttressed by the tactical application of economic and information war. Nasser revealed that when he received President Kennedy's letter some of his aides persuaded him not to reply. Nasser rejected his aides' advice on the grounds that "the front of guns and front of words are one front on the same continuum" (22/7/61). Also in commenting on the Kurdish insurrection in Iraq, Nasser said:

But, it (war) may not occur today or within five or even ten years. When the Crusaders occupied part of the Arab world, the Arabs waited for seventy years (9/7/65).

On 24/2/61, Nasser argued that force was the only way to liberate Palestine, but he went on to explain that force was not only military force. For him, force included industrialisation and the building of a sound infrastructure. War with Israel, Nasser added, was not the equivalent to an armed clash, but the equivalent to a race for accelerated economic development. He explained that he meant by the inevitability of war that Arabs would not accept the fait accompli which Israel had created in Palestine by expelling the Palestinians from their homeland (5/7/66).

War is not only a war of guns, jets, tanks. War is an uninterrupted work, faith and effort for the evolution of life itself. In this life war becomes a total war not only against imperialism but also a war for scientific, economic, cultural, political, and military power. Such power is the only path to the evolution of life itself (15/12/64).

We will not be able to repel Zionism without power, industrialization and development and continuous work in all realms. This is our approach to force. We are preparing to repulse our opponents through unity, consciousness, industrialization, developing our agriculture, and increasing our income (3/3/59).

TABLE 6.15
QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S BELIEFS
ABOUT MILITARY FORCE DURING
THE SECOND PERIOD

BELIEFS	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	(1) TOTAL
a. Military Force												
- Avoid resort to force	5	11	6	2	12	4	6	10	8	5	3	72
- Last resort	20%	45%	83%(17)	100(50)	58%(8)		17	10%	13%	20%		28%
- Only means	40(20)									60	(33)	13
- Available means	20	55(9)			8	100(25)	8(33)	70(38)	75(50)	20	67	13
- Use than surrender	20		17		17							40
b. Application of Force (I)												
- Large-scale	2	1	5	2	2	1	1			2	4	18
- Supplemented	50%	100%	80%(60)	(50)	50%	100	100			100	(50%)	50%
c. Application of Force (II)												
- Never launch first strike	1	1	6	2	1	2	2	1	4	7	6	33
- Take initiative		(100%)	83%(66)	50			100%(50)	(100)		15	100%(66)	45%
- Retreat than trapped						50				57(6)		8
- Superiority crucial	(100)		17	(50)	100	50			(100)	28		14
- Superiority not crucial						50						33
d. Power Concept												
- Military	4	27	47	29	5	20	9	27	28	9		205
- Multi-component	100	96	100	100	100	100	11%	100	100	100		1%
							89	100				99

In my view force is not the only path to end the mutiny, but with force and military action, politics must play its role in order to end the mutiny as quickly as possible (20/2/66).

3. Summary and Conclusion

During this period, Nasser's operational code became richer and shifted radically in its socio-political orientation. This was exhibited in the development of basic theories on the origins of conflict, the predictability of politics, the role of leader in shaping history, and egalitarianism. Nasser's paradigm of politics was essentially conflictual. He believed that conflict was innate in human nature and could only be ameliorated. He conceived conflict as a zero-sum game in which all actors are closely inter-linked. However, Nasser was mainly concerned about class conflict, which he defined as the basic form of political conflict, it can only be controlled by the maintenance of social balance and the elimination of inequalities which are inherent in the capitalist system.

In contrast to his first period, Nasser developed an integrated theory about an inevitable-circular-pattern in history. This prompted him to conceive of his role in shaping history as minimal. However, he moved from his first period of passivity into a more activist role predicated on the ability of the leader to control immediately-relevant events in his own polity.

Nasser's general conceptualization of politics and history spilled over with his beliefs regarding adversaries. He perceived a well-integrated tripartite system in which Israel played the role of imperialist agent. One of the striking features of this perception was the expectation that the adversary would subscribe to the same images, strategies, and approaches to risk acceptance which he himself held. In many cases, this led him into misunderstanding the adversary's frame of reference, and differences inside its perceived system of adversaries, or within each adversary.

Nasser's highly negative image of his opponents, and conflictual paradigm of politics, lured him to adopt an optimizing, inflexible approach to the selection of goals. He contended that one should not approach the task from the perspective of the present capabilities, but in the light of the general course of history and inherent potentialities.

Nasser did not link his negative image of the adversary and grandiose approach to goal selection, with a similar approach to goal pursuit. Rather, he placed his relationship with foreign adversaries in an historical perspective which informed him that optimal goals would inevitably be realized, regardless of temporary difficulties. As a result, he persisted in the advocacy of gradualism, incrementalism, and deterrence. He also placed an injunction in his code

against the pursuit of high risk policies, the initiation of premature action, or resort to military force against external adversaries, especially Israel. For him the Arab-Israeli conflict was essentially an historical power relationship. The winner will be decided in the field of economic power rather than by military force. However, Nasser was more aggressive and willing to take risks in his domestic and Arab interactions.

CHAPTER VII

ELEMENTS OF NASSER'S OPERATIONAL CODE, 1967-1970

THE YEARS OF DISILLUSIONMENT

The period that followed the June 1967 defeat until Nasser's sudden death in September 1970 was probably the most tumultuous and humiliating period in his political career. For the first few weeks, he remained in a state of depression and disbelief. The magnitude of the defeat, he confided to his friend Mahgoub, the Prime Minister of Sudan, was beyond his wildest expectations (Mahgoub, 1974).

Once recovered from the shock of defeat, Nasser began to work out a plan to restore the occupied territories. He moved quickly to rebuild the army, restructure the political system, close ranks with Arab conservative regimes, and win global support.

The military operations in the Canal Zone resumed a few days after the announcement of the cease-fire. In November 1967, Nasser declared that Egypt had completed its defence lines, and by March 1969 he launched a War of Attrition in order to exhaust the Israeli forces on the Canal front. The War of Attrition finally resulted in an American peace proposal which Nasser accepted. He argued that political solutions

should be exhausted before launching all-out war. He also needed time to install anti-aircraft missiles on the Canal front.

As soon as Nasser accepted the American peace plan, Jordanian-Palestinian conflict escalated into an all-out civil war in September 1970. An Arab summit conference was quickly convened in Cairo to deal with it. Through intensive negotiations, Nasser succeeded in getting King Hussein and Yasser Arafat to agree to a temporary settlement. On the final day of the conference, he suffered a major heart attack and died at 5 p.m. on 28 September 1970.

Because of the remarkable stability of most of Nasser's operational code beliefs, and the relatively low frequency of their articulation, the philosophical and instrumental beliefs will be combined.

1. Philosophical Beliefs

(a) General Philosophical Beliefs

1. Political life amounts to dialectical clashes and contradictions.
2. Political conflicts and contradictions are an inseparable part of human nature.
3. Class conflict must be solved peacefully.
4. Domestic, regional, and global issues are inter-related.
5. The global economic and political systems are conflict-ridden.

6. Imperialism and the quest for national liberation are the basic sources of global conflict.
7. The elimination of injustices inflicted on the Third World and the Palestinian people is the basic condition of global peace.
8. Egypt's main global roles are non-alignment and anti-imperialist liberation.
9. The lessons of history testify that the struggle of the people always triumphs.
10. The goal of restoring the Arab occupied territories will not be realized overnight.
11. The recovery of the occupied territories is contingent upon the total mobilization of Arab resources.
12. Time is actually on the side of the Arabs.
13. Gamal Abdel-Nasser cannot do everything.
14. Leadership is a process of compromise and brokerage.

Beliefs about the nature of political life remained remarkably stable during this period. Nasser argued that life amounted to "a conflict between how things are and how they ought to be" (25/4/68). Class contradictions were viewed as existing in all social systems (3/3/68 and 1/5/68); class struggles and intra-leadership conflicts were perceived as a general phenomenon in all countries, regardless of their political system (23/11/67 and 26/2/69).

Nasser also continued to attribute conflict to human nature (30/3/68), to advocate the peaceful solution of conflict (3/3/68), to subscribe to the theory of the two-tier system

of conflict (1/5/68), and to view conflicts from a comprehensive framework as inherently inter-linked (25/4/68).

Likewise, the global system was viewed as conflictual, and loose bipolar. The only source of conflict was the imperialist scramble to crush the nationalist movements in the Third World. In 40% of the references, Egypt's international role was perceived as an actively independent and non-aligned actor and, despite the June defeat, Nasser continued to conceive Egypt's role as an anti-imperialist actor (20%) and a developer and integrator of Arabs (40%).

Nasser continued to be fundamentally optimistic about long term goals. At the depth of his most humiliating defeat, a time during which he knew that nothing stood between him and the Israeli forces (the night of the 9th of June 1967), Nasser was remarkably optimistic that the Arabs would be able to eliminate the traces of aggression. In his resignation broadcast, he stated:

I have unlimited faith in this alliance as the leader of national action: the peasants, the workers, the soldiers, the intellectuals, and national capital. Its unity and cohesion and creative response within the framework of this unity are capable of creating through work, serious work, difficult work--colossal miracles for this country in order to be a strength for itself, for its Arab nation, for the movement of national revolution.

In his first public speech after the June defeat, Nasser expressed optimism that the Arab occupied territories would be eventually recovered, although he candidly warned his audience not to expect results in the near future (23/7/67 and 25/4/68).

Nasser never abandoned his supernatural sense that his goals would be achieved eventually because they were part of the natural evolution of history (26/2/69 and 29/3/69). Nevertheless, his optimism became noticeably more qualified and conditional. The percentage of qualified optimism statements rose to 15%, compared to 10% in the first period; the percentage of pessimism statements rose to 19% compared to 7% in the first period; and the percentage of conditional optimism statements rose to 75% compared to 37% during the first period. Nasser warned Arabs that the goal of regaining the occupied territories might not be realized as quickly as he had hoped (23/7/69). He also warned that this was contingent upon the presence of certain conditions without which historical inevitability would become virtually inoperative.

Nasser's belief in the predictability of political life was discarded in the post-1967 era. The June defeat had shaken his faith in the inevitable victory of the revolution. The circular-inevitable-progressive conceptualization of history was never again articulated. Further, the June defeat seemed to have convinced Nasser that historical

inevitability was neither unidimensional nor automatic, as he seemed to believe during the second period. The sheer increase in population was no guarantee that the net relative change in capabilities would be on the Arabs' side. Nevertheless, Nasser clung to his faith that time was the Arabs' main ally, without providing any justification for such a belief. As a result, his belief became increasingly characterized by mysticism and dogmatism. In his first public speech after the June defeat, he reasserted that time was short for the USA and Israel, and in fact on the side of the Arabs. However, his few limited predictions were presented as probabilities in contrast to his absolute certainty during the first period.

Nasser's disillusionment was clearly reflected in the discarding of his role as a political educator and interest aggregator. He reverted to his earlier role as political broker and mediator. He maintained that his role in the political process was to mediate between contending trends at the level of political leadership, and to develop compromises to balance various political views (30/3/68).

You may believe that Gamal Abdel-Nasser can do everything. This is impossible by the nature of things... Governing is not mere rules. It involves thinking, discussions, disagreements and agreements. No one in this life, whatever his power is or whatever his popularity, can do everything and ensure the acceptance of his orders unless his assistants are puppets (15/2/68).

In March 1968 public frustration with the inefficiency of the regime burst into the open in riots by workers and students. To meet the demands for more efficiency and decisiveness, Nasser issued the "30 March Statement" which outlined a program of economic and political re-organization. In the Statement, he defined his role as a mediator between various political forces in the country. He was not presenting a program of his own, but only summing up various popular demands:

It was my duty to sum up the Statement, remove any imperfections in it, co-ordinate its contents, and undertake the process of attuning it to prevailing circumstances by virtue of the responsibility I shoulder. This was my only role in the Statement.

Nasser developed a sense of powerlessness reminiscent of Islamic fatalism:

Everything is subject to its own circumstances. We cannot change the universe overnight. We cannot suddenly improve the lot of everyone (1/5/68).

I must confess to you that I do not know yet a method by which I can press a button so as all changes can occur immediately according to our wishes (2/12/68).

This is evident in the fact that 80% of his references to the role of leader were references to his role as a mediator or discerner of trends, compared to 20% during the second period.

TABLE 7.1

DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S GENERAL PHILOSOPHICAL
BELIEFS DURING THE THIRD PERIOD

(1967 - 1970)

Beliefs	67 (2)	68	69	70	Total
P-1. <u>Nature of Politics</u>	1	1	1	-	3
- Conflictual	100%	100%	100%		100%
- Harmonious					
a. <u>Sources of Conflict</u>	-	3	1	-	4
- Human nature		33%			25%
- Nation's ideology		33%			25%
- Nation's politics		30%	100%		50%
b. <u>Conditions of Peace</u>	-	-	-	-	-
c. <u>Nature of Conflict</u>	-	3	1	-	4
- Zero-sum-game		100%	100%		100%
- Non-zero-sum					
d. <u>Scope of Conflict</u>		4	2	-	6
- All issues linked		100%	50%		83%
- High spillover			50%		17%
- Issues separable					
e. <u>Role of Conflict</u>	-	1	-	-	1
- Functional					
- Dysfunctional		100%			100%
P-3. <u>International System</u>	-	2	1	2	5
- Conflictual		100%	100%	100%	100%
- Harmonious					
a. <u>Sources of Conflict</u>	-	1	1	-	2
- Nationalism in system		100%	100%		100%
b. <u>Conditions of peace</u>	-	2	-	8	10
- Eliminate injustices		100%		100%	100%
c. <u>Structure of System</u>	-	3	-	-	3
- Look bipolar		100%			100%
- Detente					

Beliefs	67 (2)	68	69	70	Total
d. <u>Stability of System</u>	-	1	-	-	1
- Stable		100%			100%
- Mixed					
- Unstable					
e. <u>Egypt's Role</u>	1	6	2	1	10
- Liberator					
- Regional leader					
- Active independent		50%	50%		40%
- Anti-imperialist agent		17%		100%	20%
- Integrator	100%				100%
- Developer		33%	50%		30%
P-4. <u>Optimism/Pessimism</u>	3	13	12	13	41
- Unqualified optimism	100%	54%	67%	69%	66%
- Qualified optimism		8%		8%	15%
- Pessimistic		38%		23%	19%
a. <u>With Reference to</u>	3	13	12	13	41
- long-term goals		8%	33%	15%	
- Policy undertaking	100%	92%	67%	85%	
b. <u>Conditional</u>	2	7	6	1	16
- Conditional		100%	67%	100%	75%
- Unconditional	100%		33%		25%
c. <u>On whose side is time?</u>	2	3	3	4	9
- Our side	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
- Opponent's side					
P-5. <u>Predictability of Political Life</u>	4	1	-	3	8
- Unpredictable	100%	100%		100%	100%
- Unpredictable					
a. <u>Aspects predictable</u>	5	1	-	3	9
- Historical development	20%				12%
- State of system					
- Opponent	40%			33%	33%
- Policy outcomes	20%	100%			22%
- Specific events	20%			67%	33%

Beliefs	67 (2)	68	68	70	Total
b. <u>Degree of predictability</u>	5	1	-	3	9
- Certainty	60%	100%		33%	56%
- Probability	20%			67%	33
- Uncertainty	20%				11%
c. <u>Role of Leader in Historical Development</u>	1	4			5
- Actively in politics	100%				20%
- Respond positively					
- Intravene when feasible		50%			40%
- Mediate between forces		50%			40%

(b) Philosophical Beliefs about the Opponent

15. Expansionism is the raison d'etre of Israel.
16. Expansionism is rooted in Israel's historical goals and in the fabric of the Israeli system.
17. There is an organic linkage between Israel and the United States.
18. I do not believe that there are hawks and doves in Israel.
19. Many voices in Israel have started to warn about the dangerous road on which the ruling Israeli clique is heading.
20. Israel portrays us to the world as wanting to destroy her.
21. Israel is likely to take advantage of any future cease-fire or direct negotiations.
22. Israel is not likely to withdraw unless convinced that we could dislodge her force.
23. The law of optimization controls Israel's goal selection. Israel pursues her goals by a rational-incremental approach.
24. Israel strategies are predicated on the imposition of a settlement through psychological and military coercion.

Nasser's overall overview of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the post-June War era underwent significant change in terms of the identity and pre-eminence of the actors, and the direction and intensity of interactions. The most noticeable was the emergence of Israel as the principal and direct opponent. The percentages of frequency of reference to adversaries presented in Table 7.2 indicate that Israel was perceived as an opponent in at least 75% of the frequencies.

Before the 1967 War, Nasser perceived an elaborate array of adversaries among whom Western imperialism represented the principal actor with two clients, Israel and Arab reactionaries. However, the defeat of June 1967 brought Israel closer militarily to the Egyptian heartland, and she became an immediate, direct challenge that could no longer be ignored.

The second major perceptual change was the view of Arab conservative regimes as allies fighting the same battle for the recovery of the occupied territories. The June War made the radical-conservative distinction irrelevant. After all, the Jordanian monarchy fought the war on the side of Egypt, not Israel, and the very survival of the Egyptian economy was dependent upon the support of the conservatives. Nasser argued that Israel's territorial designs did not distinguish between revolutionaries and reactionaries. All Arabs were under the threat of national annihilation. As can be seen in Table 7.2, after 1967 Nasser rarely perceived any Arab actor as an adversary, whereas Israel emerged as the most frequently perceived adversary.

There was a shift not only in the emphasis on adversaries but also in the nature of their interactions. Israel was still seen as a mere instrument in the global American plan to dominate the Middle East and to topple Arab revolutionary regimes. Nasser argued that Israel's designs were beyond her capabilities. Without American guardianship, she could never publicize her expansionist goals (23/7/69 and 11/4/70).

TABLE 7.2
 OPPONENTS AS PERCEIVED BY NASSER
 (1967 - 1970)

	1967(II)	1968	1969	1970	TOTAL
Israel	72.3%	75.2%	82.2%	72.0%	319
Israel and Imperialism	2.1	5.3	2.2	1.2	11
Imperialism	-	1.8	1.0	3.1	8
Britain	-	-	-	-	-
U.S.A.	8.6	5.3	10.9	17.8	54
UK & USA	-	.9	1.0	.6	3
Saudi Arabia	2.1	-	-	-	1
Jordan	-	-	-	1.2	2
Tunisia	-	-	1.0	-	1
Arab Reactionaries	6.4	-	-	-	3
Arabs (Other)	2.1	-	-	.7	2
West (Other)	6.4	1.8	-	1.2	7
Domestic	-	8.8	1.0	-	12
Other	-	-	-	.6	1
N no. of opponent references	47	113	101	163	424
N no. of coded references	54	149	115	179	497

Nevertheless, the relationship between Israel and American imperialism was still viewed by Nasser as organic and multi-dimensional. He perceived a new Israeli-American connection in which the two actors were indistinguishable. The roots of this relationship, he argued, lay in the American hegemonic interests in the Middle East, and most significantly in the Jewish vote in the United States (19/9/68). In an interview with the Indian journalist Karanjia, Nasser spelled out this conceptualization of the American-Israeli interactions:

The USA does exist in Israel. Israel is her front base in Western Asia. Is there any stronger interdependence than the Israeli-American connection? Time after time Washington has repeated Israel's views. The memos which the USA send us are mere repetitions like parrots of the words and statements which Meir and Eban use. (18/4/70).

The net result of these perceptual shifts was a new conceptualization of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a dyadic conflict, one in which the two principal sides were Egypt and the Arabs on one side and Israel and the USA on the other side.

Nasser's beliefs about the basic character of Israel per se remained relatively stable. He viewed Israel as an actor with boundless expansionist goals and intrinsic enmity. He also held to his belief that Israel was an alien minority claiming for herself what did not belong to it, and to an imperialist design predicated on racism (23/7/69). In his last Labor Day speech, Nasser reiterated his fundamental

conviction that Israel's basic goal was expansion from "Damietta in Egypt, including the Sharkia Province and other parts west of the Canal; to Iraq including Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the northern parts of Saudi Arabia" (1/5/70).

Israel's goal of annexing some of the Arab territories occupied in 1967 was viewed as an extension of the historical goals espoused by Zionism since the times of Herzl. Nasser argued that Israeli territorial ambitions were predicated on the Herzl map of Greater Israel (18/4/70). He viewed Israeli leaders as executors of the old religious visions of the Torah, which had been revitalized by Herzl in the Basle Conference in 1897:

The opponent wants to expand, Dayan said... that as long as there is a Torah, there will be the land of the Torah, by which he means all the land of Palestine, and parts of the Arab nation from the Nile to the Euphrates (23/7/70)...

The Israeli Minister of Communications said that the border of Israel extended from the Nile to the Euphrates and that Israel's map is the map drafted by Herzl seventy years ago (23/7/70).

Another major change in Nasser's perception of Israel was his view of Israel's decision making process. Initially, Nasser held to his belief that Israel was a unitary decision making actor. He argued that policy differences among various segments of the Israeli political elite were negligible, especially when it came to the occupied territories; all of

them wanted to annex some parts of the Arab occupied territories, but some wanted a larger piece than the others:

I do not believe there are hawks and doves in Israel. Some of them, such as Eban, prefer to talk in a diplomatic language, about his dovish tendencies, although he supports the continuation of occupation of Arab territories... There is difference in roles but not in aggressive tendencies (26/2/69).

There are no doves and hawks in Israel. Those who are responsible for Deir Yassin are members of the Israeli cabinet (i.e. Begin). The entire Israeli society has been transformed into a military society based on the mentality of terrorism and expansion... If this is the case how can I tell myself or others tell me that there are doves and hawks in Israel (12/5/69).

There are disagreements even among the Israelis themselves. Some of them want to annex a certain piece of land, others want a larger piece, still some others want to annex all the occupied territories. I believe that most of the Israelis and the Jews want to annex all the occupied territories (13/2/70).

By early 1970, Nasser began to view Israeli society as composed of various groups with fundamentally different policies toward the Arabs. The "moderates" called for a "just" peace, while the "hard-liners", represented basically by the Israeli military establishment, advocated a total annexation of the occupied territories:

The secure and recognized borders which the Zionist leaders want are the ones which are based on the annexation of Arab territories. Those who support just peace in Israel are suffering under the burden of the Israeli military establishment which dominates the state from top to bottom (Interview with Eric Roleau, 18/2/70).

Many voices in Israel itself are beginning to warn about the dangerous road which the ruling Israeli military clique is leading the country and the entire Middle East too (1/5/70).

The shift in Nasser's view of Israel from a unitary-monolithic type of decision-making into a pluralistic model was crucial. It was the first time that Nasser had ever perceived hawks and doves in the decision-making structure of Israel. It also coincided with his peace appeal to President Nixon, and his acceptance of the Rogers Plan.

Nasser's other beliefs on the nature of Israel's "operational code" remained relatively stable. She was viewed as selecting her goals in an optimizing and predictable pattern (1/5/70). One should not expect Israel to be satisfied with annexing the recently occupied territories, and after ten years she would seek to annex still more territories (13/2/70). Further, Nasser expected Israel to take advantage of his conciliatory policies. He believed that, given the present power disparity, negotiations would only lead to unconditional surrender to Israel's demands:

If we sit down with Israel for direct negotiations she will impose her conditions and force us to surrender (19/4/69).

If we accept a cease-fire, Israel will take advantage of this opportunity in order to solidify her occupation (18/2/70).

Likewise, Israel was expected to soften her intransigence only if she was sure that the Arabs were strong enough to inflict heavy losses:

The Israelis refuse to settle any issues. They will not understand anything unless they feel that we have an effective fighting force (4/3/68).

Israel will never agree to withdraw unless she feels that our Armed Forces are capable of launching effective operations and crossing the Canal (16/5/70).

In depicting the nature of Israel's approaches and strategies, Nasser noted the salience of the rational-incremental approach in implementing the expansionist design (11/3/68), and the emphasis on "systematic terrorism," "psychological coercion," and "deterrence" (23/7/69). Israel's operational strategy was to demand direct negotiations and the signing of a reconciliation treaty under the threat of annexing the occupied territories: if the Arabs rejected such a demand, Israel would continue the occupation and endeavor to destabilize and change the revolutionary regimes (29/4/68, 23/7/68, and 13/2/70).

TABLE 7.3

QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S BELIEFS
ABOUT ADVERSARIES DURING THE THIRD PERIOD

(1967 - 1970)

Beliefs	67 (II)	68	69	70	Total
P-2 <u>Nature of Opponent</u>	8	36	34	56	134
- Destructive	50%	28%(14)	9%(6)	12%(4)	18%
- Expansionist	(13)	28 (75)	(53)	(61)	46
- Aggressive	37	4 (19)	26 (6)	25 (5)	31
- Defensive			(9)	2	3
- Conciliatory		3 (3)			1
- Domestic Development			3		1
a. <u>Sources of Opponent's Goals</u>	-	7	6	11	24
- Ideology			(17)	(9)	9
- Historical goals		74 (57)	(32)	(64)	58
- Internal needs		26	(17)	(27)	25
- Leader's traits			(17)		4
- Power politics					
- External pressures			17		4
b. <u>Generality of Hostility</u>		4	3	1	8
- General/permanent		100	100	100	100
- General/temporary					
c. <u>Response to Concil'n</u>	-	6	3	6	15
- Reciprocate			33		7
- Ignore					
- Take advantage of this		67 (50)		(100)	67
- Take advantage of other		33	(67)		26
d. <u>Response to firmness</u>	-	3	6	5	14
- Back down		(100)	67(50)	100 (80)	
- Reciprocate			33		

Percentage between brackets denote reference to Israel as a percentage of the total references for each year.

Beliefs	67 (II)	68	69	70	Total
e. <u>Opponent's image of one's own nation</u>	1	2	4	8	15
- Destructive	(100)	(50)	(25)	50 (13)	47
- Expansionist		(50)	(75)	50 (37)	53
- Aggressive					
f. <u>Opponent's View of Conflict</u>	-	-	-	1	1
- Inevitable/desirable				(100)	100
- Inevitable/undesirable					
g. <u>Opponent's decision process</u>	-	-	2	5	7
- Unitary actor			(100)	(20)	43
- Competitive model				(80)	57
h. <u>Opponent's International Role</u>	3	7	3	9	22
- Imperialist leader (33)					5
- Imperialist agent (67)		(72)	(67)	(67)	69
- Zionist agent		(14)		22 (11)	13
- Regional spoiler		(14)	(33)	(11)	13
i-1. <u>Opponent's Goal Choice (I)</u>	2	4	5	5	14
1. Optimize	100	100	100	100	100
2. Satisfies	(50)	(25)	(60)	(20)	
2. <u>Opponent's Goal Choice (II)</u>	-	-	-	-	--
3. <u>Opponent's Goal Choice (III)</u>	-	-	2	-	2
1. Flexible			(100)		100
2. Unflexible					

Belief	67 (II)	68	69	70	Total
4. <u>Opponent's Goal Choice. (IV)</u>	-	1	2	2	5
1. Predictable		(100)	(100)	100(50)	100
2. Unpredictable					
j. <u>Opponent's Approaches</u>	1	4	2	1	8
- Prepare ground					
- Try-and-see				(100)	13
- Incremental		75(50)	50		50
- Blitzkrieg	(100)	(25)			25
- Mobilizing strategy			(50)		12
f. <u>Opponent's Strategy</u>	1	5	12	24	42
- Turn-other-cheek		20			2
- Non-punitive strategy					
- Accommodative			(17)	38(8)	27
- Deterrent					
- Aggressive strategy	100	80 (60)	(83)	62 (54)	71

2. Instrumental Beliefs

(a) Instrumental Beliefs on the Nature of Goals and Goal Selection

25. A decision maker must always select optimal goals.
26. A decision maker should not abandon, modify, or substitute his optimal goals.
27. Means of achieving optimal goals can be abandoned, modified, or substituted.
28. All Egypt's goals are inherently comparable.
29. Egypt's foremost goal is the restoration of the territories occupied in June 1967, the settlement of the Palestine conflict either through a binational secular state in Palestine or the establishment of a Palestine state in the West Bank.

Nasser's overriding goal after the 1967 defeat was to remedy Egypt's total defencelessness, to give her greater bargaining power and to enable her eventually to force the Israelis to withdraw from the occupied territories, assuming they could not be dislodged by diplomacy. His foreign policy had the double goal of seeking a peaceful settlement and also of gaining time in order to overhaul Egypt's armed forces (29/4/68).

Nasser's conceptualization of the Israeli-Palestinian dyad as the crux of the Israeli-Arab conflict exhibited a high degree of stability. In an interview with the editor-in-chief of Look magazine (4 March 1968), Nasser contended that Israel's withdrawal from the territories occupied in

1967 would not terminate the conflict because the Palestine issue would remain unresolved.¹ He rejected the idea of a Palestinian state on the West Bank because such a state would be a protector of Israel.² Instead, Nasser advocated, (2 February 1969), the establishment of "a state in Palestine which consists of Jews, Moslems and Christians." However, in an interview with the New York Times (19 April 1969), Nasser underscored his desire to reach a political settlement based on the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Palestine, especially on the return of the Palestinian refugees to their homeland. In such a settlement, Nasser said, Israel would be permitted to use the Suez Canal provided she abandoned her expansionist policies.

Gradually, Nasser's acceptance of Israel and his desire for an "honorable peaceful settlement" became more apparent. In an interview with Time (12 May 1969), he expressed his readiness to recognize Israel within the framework of a "humanitarian" settlement to the entire Palestine problem. In another

¹ In his inaugural address to the Egyptian National Assembly on 20/1/69, Nasser maintained that Security Council Resolution 242 might be sufficient to erase the traces of the 1967 aggression, but it stood short of handling the Israeli-Palestinian dyad.

² However, in an interview with Roger Fisher of Harvard University on 14 June 1970, Nasser abandoned his rejection of the creation of a separate Palestinian state and argued that such option would be left to the Palestinians themselves to choose.

interview with the Los Angeles Times (3 February 1970), Nasser defined his basic goals as total Israeli withdrawal from all Arab occupied territories and co-existence between Palestinians and Israelis "as they are today."¹ When asked by the correspondent of the U.S. News and World Report, (12 May 1970), if he would accept the existence of a Jewish state in Palestine, Nasser replied that the only thing he rejected was that state's occupation of Arab territories and her denial of the rights of the Palestinians.

The perception of Nasser in some of the traditional literature as unconciliatory, especially toward Israel, stemmed largely from the focus on his approaches to goal selection. As we have mentioned in the analysis of first and second period beliefs, he approached the task from the perspective of optimization and rigidity. He continued to adhere to this approach during the third period. For example, he insisted on the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories occupied during the course of the 1967 War (23/7/68).

At this time, Nasser accepted President Tito's suggestion to arrange a direct meeting with Nahum Goldmann, the President of the World Zionist Council. A meeting in Paris was arranged between Goldmann and Nasser's emissary, Ahmad Hamroush. Hamroush told Goldmann that Nasser would like to see him and he did not object to publicly announce a visit. Goldmann flew to Israel immediately where he informed Eban, Dayan, and Meir of Nasser's proposal. Prime Minister Meir rejected Nasser's proposal and insisted on discussing the whole matter with the cabinet. According to Goldmann, Meir did not want any negotiations with Nasser because she believed that the status quo was the best alternative for Israel. She succeeded in persuading the cabinet to reject a meeting between Goldmann and Nasser (from Goldmann's interview with Al-Ahram, 27 May 1978).

He believed that there was no room for compromise on that goal. In his speech before the Egyptian Parliament on 23/11/67, Nasser maintained that he would not compromise with Israel on the principles of the full withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967. He made it clear that he would not accept the abandonment of any part of the occupied territory, and would not settle for less than the restoration of all the territories occupied in 1967 (29/4/68). An honorable political solution was defined as one "in which Israel does not annex one inch of the Arab occupied land" (4/12/68). Nasser's refusal to negotiate with Israel stemmed in part from his belief that such negotiations, considering the balance of power and Israeli occupation, would necessarily result in the legitimization of Israeli occupation of some territories, and the Arabs would end up with less than their optimal territorial goal (29/4/68, 23/7/68, 4/12/68 and 20/1/69).

For Nasser, the selection and insistence on optimal goals did not mean the selection of inflexible or optimal strategies. He contended that the means of restoring the occupied territories can be changed, modified, or abandoned. He also insisted on integrating all his values which permitted him to pursue different low risk tactics without being compelled to acknowledge that he was abandoning the optimal goal. Nasser did not view political settlement and military confrontation as two alternatives, but rather as two complementary values which ought to be pursued.

TABLE 7.4
 QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S BELIEFS
 ABOUT GOAL SELECTION
 DURING THE THIRD PERIOD (1967-1970)

Beliefs	67 (II)	68	69	70	Total
a. <u>Egypt's Goals</u>	8	37	29	49	123
- Destructive		2(11%)			3%
- Expansionist					
- Aggressive					
- Defensive	(13%)				1%
- Conciliatory	(12%)	4%	10%(4)	18%(10)	15%
- Seeker of peace		3%	7%(4)	25%(16)	13%
- Domestic develop- ment	25%	27%	17%	2%	15%
- Restorative	(50%)	46%(41)	66%(55)	55%(49)	53%
b. <u>Nature of Goals</u>	3	6	11	10	30
- Optimal	(100%)	83%(57)	100%(73)	100%(90)	97%
- Feasible		17%			3%
c. <u>Value Conflicts</u>	1	7	1	4	13
- All goals compatible	(100%)	14%		100%(50)	46%
- Bolstering		85%(57)	(100%)		54%

(1) Percentages between brackets denote references to Israel

simultaneously (23/11/67). Neither did he see any contradiction between the acceptance of a cease-fire in compliance with the Rogers peace proposals, and total preparation for battle (24/7/70). In a speech to the Egyptian Parliament, Nasser succinctly summed up the basic feature of his ends-means approach:¹

It may be true that we have one specific goal, but it is also true that we do not have one path to the realization of this goal. We move on multiple paths, and with speed and flexibility capable of responding to new variables (24/3/70).

(b). Instrumental Beliefs on Goal Pursuit

34. The elimination of the traces of aggression requires multiple movement on various paths of action.
35. The actual movement to dislodge Israeli occupation is an incremental-gradual process.
36. Right without might is unattainable. The buildup of a deterrent force may be an alternative to its actual use.
37. We have no battle with any Arab regime, we will not reciprocate any Arab criticism.

¹ In his memoirs, Mohammad Mahgoub, Sudan's former Prime Minister and the architect of the Arab Summit held in Khartoum in August 1967, revealed that Nasser was very flexible during the Summit on the means of restoring the occupied territories. He suggested that the Summit might give King Hussein the green signal to strike a unilateral peaceful settlement with Israel. Hussein categorically declined. Mahgoub (1974:142-143) also adds that the four "nos" of the Arab Summit pertaining to a future settlement were included in the final communique at his (Mahgoub) insistence despite Nasser's suggestion to remove them from the communique.

38. If the elements of counter-revolution attempted to exploit the present situation, we will crush them.
39. Avoid high risk policies in the Arab Israeli conflict.
40. We must wait and organize our Armed Forces to fight the opponent at the time and location of our choice.
41. Avoid premature action. Do not act until you assess all salient issues.
42. Delay escalatory action until you gain position of strength.
43. Do not yield to enemy provocations.
44. Power has multi-levels ranging from the power of political action to the power of military action.
45. What has been taken by force can only be restored by force.
46. Military force will ultimately be used if peaceful means fail to achieve our goals.
47. Military force must be supplemented by political force.
48. Military force must be applied on a graduated basis.

Nasser's insistence on flexibility in goal pursuit was clearly reflected in his ultra-cautious approaches and strategies, his unwillingness to take risks, his emphasis on timing to justify inaction, and his conceptualization of power and military force. As we have seen, in the first two periods Nasser perceived the Arab-Israeli conflict from a historical paradigm as an incremental process which involves economic and technological competition without resort to military force.

The occupation of Sinai did not change that paradigm drastically. He continued to emphasize incrementalism in the movement toward dislodging Israel from the occupied territories through a series of movements from mere steadfastness to passive defence to active defence and the liberation of Sinai (2/12/68). The shift from one stage to the other, Nasser argued, should be carefully assessed and implemented in a gradual way (2/12/68).

Nasser also clung to his essentially deterrent strategy toward Israel. He aimed to rebuild his armed forces as quickly as possible and use his newly gained power to exert political pressure to reach a political settlement (16/5/70). Such strategy was based on the assumption that Israeli arrogance would be limited only through the build-up of a credible military deterrent which could eventually bring Israel to reason (23/7/67 and 30/3/68). As a result, Nasser believed that the ultimate solution to Israeli occupation of Arab territories would come about as a result of a skillful combination of military deterrence and political pressure.

Nasser's operational strategy against Israel from November 1967 until his death in September 1970 evolved around the active use of limited military force in order to turn

Israel's occupation into an expensive venture and to prevent her from escalating her military operations:¹

Deterrence is the only path to protect us from Israel's designs. The opponent has armed himself with arrogant power and we must arm ourselves with rational power (30/3/69).

Neither did the actual occupation of an Egypt territory change Nasser's unwillingness to take risks to restore such territory. His argument in the first public speech after the defeat, that "nations who do not take risks are destined to be stationary and undeveloped" (23/7/67), stands as an aberration that was never developed. In his address to delegates of the Arab Bar Association, Nasser maintained that the battle with Israel involved high risks which were not easy to take (10/4/68). In addition, in an interview with Time magazine (12/5/69) and in his inaugural address to the Summit of the Arab confrontation states (1/9/69) Nasser reasoned that the Arabs could not afford any risks

Meanwhile, Nasser replaced his aggressive strategy toward Arab conservatives by a strategy of unilateral accommodation. Nasser made it clear that he regarded all inter-Arab disputes as secondary ones (23/7/69). He emphasized that he would not reciprocate any Arab criticism of his policies (1/9/69 and 16/5/70). However, he clung to his clandestine view of domestic opposition. He continued to defend sequestration of political adversaries even in the absence of legal charges against them, and threatened to annihilate "elements of counter-revolution" if they attempted to exploit the present crisis (10/3/68).

or adventures simply because they could not afford to lose the next battle.

Nasser's extreme caution and risk-rejection was vocally articulated during the Arab Summit held in Cairo in September 1970 in the wake of the Jordanian-Palestinian civil war. Calls from South Yemen and Libya to send troops to Jordan to fight with the Palestinians were rejected by Nasser. He reasoned that Arab military intervention involved a high risk of escalation and Israeli intervention:

We have learnt caution after 1967, and after the Yemenis dragged us into their affairs in 1962, and the Syrians into war in 1967. That is why I said yesterday I am not prepared to send troops to Jordan... We went to war in 1967 for the sake of Syria not Egypt. We suffered 19,500 casualties. We cannot afford to gamble again and make it possible for Israel to cross the Canal (The Secret Minutes of the Meetings of Arab Heads of States before Nasser's death, September 1970. In M. Sabry, Watha'iq Harb October: 170-171, 185).

Having ruled out the permissibility of taking a risk against Israel, Nasser returned to the old theme of underscoring the necessity of proper timing and the avoidance of any action "unless we are fully capable of taking its responsibilities," (23/11/67 and 18/4/70). Nasser reiterated that Egypt must delay any escalation of operations and avoid being provoked by Israel's bombardment of civilian targets (10/3/68 and 12/5/70).

The only noticeable change in Nasser's approach to goal pursuit was in the utility of military force. In a radical departure from his pre-1967 belief that it ought to be used only as a last resort, he raised the slogan "what has been taken by force can only be restored by force," by which he meant that Israel had occupied the Arab territories by force and she would be dislodged from them only by force (23/11/67 and 10/3/68). Nasser argued that a military showdown with Israel was inevitable because Israel would not abide by any political solution (29/4/68).

Meanwhile, Nasser maintained that "if we fail to liberate our land peacefully, we will have to fight" (4/3/68):

We are not warmongers. If we can restore our territories through political action as we did in 1957, that will be acceptable to us. But if this is not the case we have to resort to military force (23/7/68).

We must realize that the opponent will not back down unless we force him to retreat by force... We have accepted the Security Council Resolution of November 1967 despite its shortcomings under the assumption that if there was a political means to eliminate the traces of aggression, this means must be given a full chance (20/1/69).

We do not want war for the sake of war. In fact no one in this life does. One defines his goals and explores the chances of their achievement by peaceful means. If he cannot then he will have to resort to war. We all know that war is a continuation of political action by other means, i.e. force (16/5/70).

The key to the understanding of this apparent contradiction lies in Nasser's conceptualization of power and military force. Nasser believed that the restoration of the occupied territories would be accomplished not through negotiations (because this would mean surrender), but through the application of power. He regarded power as a continuum ranging from the mere application of political pressure to the outright application of military force. In between these two extremes, Nasser argued, there was a whole array of options.

Power has multi-levels starting from the power of political action and escalating up to the level of military action. Political action means the use of one aspect of power or one level of power, while military action escalates power to its violent levels (23/11/67).

As a consequence, Nasser maintained that the distinction between a purely political solution or a purely military solution was artificial (23/7/67). Military force must be used in conjunction with political manoeuvring in order to realize the ultimate goal of restoring the occupied territories. Nasser argued that at one point in this complicated process, military force would have to be used. But force would be used only when political approaches had been stalemated, and in order to reduce the opponent's arrogance.

The second change in Nasser's beliefs about military force was his emphasis on the significance of taking the initiative in any future military operation with Israel (23/11/67). The decisive battle would be initiated when two conditions were

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TABLE 7.5

QUANTITATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF NASSER'S BELIEFS

ABOUT GOAL PURSUIT DURING
THE THIRD PERIOD (1967-1970)

Beliefs	67 (IJ)	68	69	70	Total
I-2 <u>Goal Pursuit</u>	1	3		7	11
- Modify means	100%	67%		(100)	91%
- Substitute means					
- Abandon means		33%			9%
a. <u>Approaches</u>	7	29	11	14	61
- Prepare ground	(86%)	41% (31)	(9%)	57% (14)	44%
- Try-and-see					
- Incremental		14% (10)	18% (9)	7%	12%
- Blitzkrieg					
- Mobilization	14%	45% (35)	73% (45)	56% (36)	44%
b. <u>Strategy</u>	3	13	7	11	34
- Turn-other-cheek					
- Non-punitive			14%		3%
- Accommodative		8%		9%	6%
- Deterrent	(100%)	59% (39)	(86%)	(91%)	76%
- Aggressive		38% (8)			15%
P-3 <u>Risk Calculation</u>			1		1
- Comprehensive			(100%)		100%
- Specific issues					
a. <u>Risk Control</u>		1	3	10	14
- Limit goals				30%	21%
- Limit means			33%	20%	20%
- Assess means		(100%)	(67%)		14%
- Assess opponent's means				(50%)	35%

Beliefs	67 (II)	68	69	70	Total
b. <u>High & Low Risks</u>	4	1	3	8	16
- High risk mandatory	50%				18%
- High risk permissible	(50%)				18%
- High risk prohibited		(100%)	(100%)	100%	64%
P-4 <u>Timing</u>	2	3	1	1	7
- Crucial	(100%)	(67%)	(100%)	100%	86%
- Wise management		(33%)			14%
- Not crucial					
P-5 <u>Action</u>	6	6	3	6	21
- Act quickly				(33)	9%
- Delay escalation	(33%)		(67%)	(50%)	33%
- Avoid premature action	(50%)	(33%)	(33%)		29%
- Don't yield	(17%)	(50%)			19%
- Assess all issues		(17%)		17	10%
a. <u>Military Force</u>	4	9	11	24	48
- Avoid resort to force	50%(25)			21%	15%
- Last resort	(25%)	(22%)	(36%)	42% (33)	36%
- Only means	(25%)	(33%)	(55%)	(17%)	29%
- A viable means		45% (33)	(9%)	(12%)	16%
- Use then surrender				(8%)	4%

Beliefs	67 (II)	68	69	70	Total
b. <u>Application of Force (I)</u>	4	1	3	1	9
- Large-scale	(25%)			(100%)	22%
- Graduated scale			(33%)		11%
- Use alone					
- Supplemented	(75%)	(100%)	67%(33)		67%
c. <u>Application of Force (II)</u>	5	1	1	5	12
- Never launch first strike	(60%)				25%
- Take initiative	(20%)		(100%)	(40%)	33%
- Retreat than trapped	(20%)				8%
- Superiority crucial		(100%)		60%(40)	34%
d. <u>Power Concept</u>	2	5		1	8
- Military		20%			13%
- Multi-component	(100%)	80%		100%	87%

satisfied: air parity with the adversary (25/6/70), and certainty of military success (24/7/70).

According to Nasser, military force must be applied on a graduated basis through a process of long-term attrition of the adversary's capabilities, and a gradual escalation which would culminate in a decisive battle (23/7/69). Nasser believed that force should be applied only by the regular army. He never trusted guerilla warfare, especially in Sinai (14/9/68). He supported the Palestinian resistance only because he viewed it as a source of anxiety to Israel, not as a means to restore the occupied territories.

3. Conclusion: A General Assessment of Nasser's Operational Code

At the heart of Nasser's conceptualization of politics was the view of conflict as a permanent and inevitable feature of political life. Nasser believed that men were created with some innate imperfections that resulted in the rise of inter-personal conflict. However, all men were created fundamentally equal and free. The rise of the class system exhibited in class inequalities and the concomitant characteristic of class exploitation had eroded this natural equality and freedom. Nasser viewed the class system as a two-tier system of conflict. The vertical tier, which defines the essence of the system, was considered as inherently conflictual. The horizontal tier was perceived as essentially harmonious, but potentially conflictual.

Nasser argued that the elimination of socio-economic inequalities and the maintenance of social equilibrium was the only path to social conflict resolution. As for the horizontal level, he advocated communication and compromise as the basic method of conflict resolution. In contrast to the Marxists, who regarded conflict as necessary and functional, Nasser contended that even though conflict was permanent and inevitable, it was inherently disruptive and dysfunctional. Conflict, he argued ought to be mitigated and avoided. Further, Nasser tended to view the conflicts in which he was directly involved (domestic and regional) as zero-sum situations. However, the potential for a global nuclear holocaust, he argued, rendered the global conflict a non-zero-sum game. The basic contours of the global system were seen as evolving around conflict and instability. Nasser regarded them as emanating from power politics, politics of neo-colonialism, the quest for national liberation and the widening gap between the developed and underdeveloped countries. An orderly re-adjustment of the global system through negotiation and communication, disarmament and decolonization and the elimination of international inequalities were all advocated by Nasser as the most appropriate methods of international conflict resolution.

Nasser was fundamentally optimistic about the eventual realization of his goals. This optimism was mostly unconditional and related to his long range goals. Specific policy

undertakings, he believed, might not be fulfilled, but the cumulative result was always viewed as inescapably positive. Nasser's optimism was predicated on a belief that time was on his side. This and the concomitant net growth of Arab demographic power would eventually result in the realization of his goals.

Two basic theories were particularly salient in Nasser's operational code. The first was the predictability of history and politics. Nasser believed that the role of chance in history was minimal, since history was essentially an inevitable circular-progressive process. For Nasser, history amounted to a pattern of regularly recurring events which emanated from certain objective conditions independent of human will. Such patterns of events did not mean the repetition of the same historical scenarios because history always moves toward higher forms of social and political organization. Accordingly, Nasser was able to predict the final victory of the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict (because they had triumphed over the Crusaders) and the collapse of the Arab conservative regimes (because history was a progressive process).

The second theory concerned the role of political leadership in controlling history. Nasser believed that the ability of the individual to control the process was limited. The only role he could play was to explicate and facilitate the normal unfolding of historical events. Notwithstanding the deterministic conception of history, Nasser believed that a

political leader could mold immediately-relevant social and political events in his own polity, in conjunction with other social and political forces. He could play an active role in the political education of his people and the aggregation of their interests.

The crux of Nasser's instrumental operational code evolved around the nature of his goals, his beliefs in goal-optimization, and conservatism in goal pursuit. Nasser was a socialist revolutionary. He was strongly committed to the economic development of his country, the uniting of Arabs and the creation of a strong Arab international entity, and the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people. From his first days in power, he attempted relentlessly to promote an atmosphere of tranquility between Arabs and Israelis through which a peaceful settlement could be achieved. Israeli collusion with France and Britain in the Suez invasion did not drastically change this orientation. Nasser's basic goal was to settle the conflict through the avenues of international legitimacy. Having failed to achieve that goal, however, Nasser resorted to his historical paradigm of politics. He believed that Israeli intransigence was a result of Arab disunity and powerlessness. Accordingly, he argued that Israel would be induced to accept a settlement through the incremental buildup of Arab economic power and unity.

He surmised that his goals might not be realized in his generation, but judging from the inevitable-circular-progressive nature of the historical process, Arab historical performance, and the present Arab-Israeli demographic imbalance, Nasser was confident that these goals would eventually be realized. As a result, he considered that the operational achievement of the goal was not an immediate responsibility of his generation.

Our assessment of Nasser's operational code which we extracted from Nasser's documents is basically supported in the bulk of the literature. One can only refer to the analyses by the Israeli writer Dan Shueftan (1977), the Arab writers Heikal (1977), Al-Hafez (1972), Haddad (1975), and Auda (1971) and to the assessments provided by Kerr (1973:126), Baker (1978:118) and Vatikiotis (1978:249-260). However, in other parts of the traditional literature, Nasser was frequently referred to as having espoused the dismemberment of Israel. For instance, in an early study by Laqueur (1956:23) it was concluded that:

The immediate aim of Egyptian policy in regard to Israel is clearly a Middle Eastern "Munich." This fact is dexterously veiled in Colonel Nasser's frequent interviews with foreign journalists, in which he is at pains to explain that Israel can have peace at the price of unspecified territorial concessions. Privately, the leaders of the Junta have made it clear that they would regard such concessions as a first step toward the complete dismemberment of Israel. It is a two stage operation modelled on Hitler's destruction of Czechoslovakia (emphases added).

Also, in his thirty-one page Master's dissertation submitted to the University of Chicago, Raga (1959) analyzed Nasser's policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and concluded that Nasser's basic goal was the destruction of Israel:

His desire is simply to drive Israel into the sea, eliminating from the Arab world a state which he regards as a product of imperialism. He sees the Balfour Declaration and every subsequent action that contributed in any degree to the establishment of Israel (such as the UN Partition Resolution of 1947), as typical imperialistic stratagems being employed against a weak and disunited people (i.e. the Arabs). With such an inflexible approach on Nasser's part toward the existence of Israel, his preferred solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict would be their total destruction (emphases added) (Raga (1959:7-8)).

In his analysis of Arab attitudes toward Israel, Harkaby (1972) concluded that Nasser's basic goal was "politicide which means 'the annihilation of the wrong involved in the very existence of Israel'" (1972:8). Harkaby (1972:389) admits that in private conversations with foreign observers, Nasser had implied that Israel was a fact and that a solution to the problem would better be left to the future. Nevertheless, Harkaby dismisses this conciliatory tone as a mere attempt to impress his foreign hosts. He would prefer to rely upon Nasser's public non-conciliatory statements of goals.

The three assessments of the nature of Nasser's goals toward Israel have in common that his basic goal was the annihilation of Israel, and that he spoke differently to different audiences about this goal. Whereas Laqueur believes that Nasser was more frank with foreign audiences, Harkaby argues that his conciliatory tone with both foreign and private audiences ought not to be taken seriously. His public aggressiveness, Harkaby contends, is the true indicator of his goals.

These assessments of Nasser's goals toward Israel diametrically contradict the empirical evidence presented in this study. They also contradict the evidence gathered by observers who knew Nasser very closely. Most of their statements are undocumented and tend to stretch Nasser's statements of goals beyond any logical or contextual interpretation. For example, Laqueur did not specify the sources to which Nasser had privately made clear his two stage operation in the destruction of Israel. Raga's only evidence of Nasser's destructive goals is a single assertion by Nasser in his book The Philosophy of the Revolution, that Israel was an outcome of imperialism. From this single assertion, Raga deduces the claim that Nasser wanted to drive Israel into the sea, a statement which Nasser never articulated.

Harkaby insists on interpreting every single statement of goal articulated by Nasser toward Israel as implying the

destruction of Israel. A few examples may be in order. The goal of realizing peace based on justice is understood by Harkaby (1972:106) not as Nasser had defined it (the implementation of the UN resolution), but "peace without Israel." He also conceptualizes Nasser's goal of compliance with the UN resolutions on Palestine as "might be taken to imply that Israel's right is no longer valid" (Harkaby, 1972:20-21). The elimination of the consequences of the 1967 aggression is not interpreted as the restoration of the territories occupied in 1967 as Nasser had always said, but as "implying the possible broader meaning of the liquidation of Israel" (Harkaby, 1972:13).¹

Harkaby goes on to argue that Nasser had justified and acquiesced with Nazi crimes against Jews. He uses the following statement:

They say that in the Second World War, the Jews suffered from Germany. Was it only the Jews who suffered from Germany? The Czechs suffered from her, the Yugoslavs suffered, the French suffered (8/3/65).

The statement appears in Nasser's collected speeches (8/3/65, Vol. V:211) in the context of Nasser's criticisms of West Germany's policy, as follows:

During the last ten years, Israel took from West Germany \$3700 million, that is more than \$1 million a day as a donation to Israel. Why does West Germany give all that money to Israel to the exclusion of all the world? They say that the Jews have suffered during the Second World War from Germany. But is it only the Jews who suffered from Germany? The Yugoslavs suffered from Germany and the French suffered from Germany. Thus, there are manoeuvres and pressure to strengthen Israel economically.

It is evident from the statement that Nasser was not justifying Nazi atrocities against the Jews, but was criticizing West Germany for providing Israel with massive economic and military assistance and was citing the exclusion of other Nazi victims as an evidence of bad faith.

Not only does Harkaby stretch Nasser's statements beyond any logical interpretation, but he also attributes to Nasser, statements and goals which he never articulated. For instance, Harkaby cites from Nasser's speech in the United Nations on 27 September 1960 the following:

The only solution to Palestine... is that matters should return to the condition prevailing before the error was committed--i.e. the annulment of Israel's existence (Harkaby, 1972:4).

Consider also the following statement which Harkaby (1972:110) uses as an evidence of Nasser's rejection of any peaceful settlement with Israel:

A settlement would not be the end of the aggression but the beginning of new aggressive measures for the realization of the crazy Israeli dream of a homeland stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates (8/2/60).

The statement appears in Nasser's collected speeches (Vol.III:1) as follows:

We know that Israel has been trying to arrive at a settlement, but Israel wants a settlement at the expense of the rights of the Palestinians. Such a settlement, we are sure of that and Israel does not hide it, will not be the end of aggression, but will be the beginning of new aggressive measures for the realization of Israel's crazy dream of a homeland stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates.

Nasser continued to assert that between the present status quo which Israel wants to legitimize and the prospect of total war, there was a third path, that is, the path of the implementation of the UN resolutions on Palestine. The abridged statement quoted by Harkaby gives subtle impression that Nasser had rejected any settlement with Israel, whereas Nasser had in fact rejected only a settlement based on the recognition of Israel's annexation of territories beyond the 1947 Partition Resolution and the displacement of the Palestinians.

The last four words of the quotation do not appear either in the Arabic text of Nasser's speeches or in the official United Nations Verbatim records of the proceedings of the General Assembly.

As evidence of Nasser's religious hatred of Zionism, Harkaby (1972:204) quotes Nasser (Time, 16/5/69) that he used to read the Bible to understand Israel's behavior. A review of the interview as published in Time magazine and Nasser's Arabic collected speeches fails to confirm Harkaby's claim.¹ Harkaby goes further to describe Nasser as anti-semitic. His only evidence for that is the phrase "commercial methods of a Cohen" which he alleges to have been articulated by Nasser on 7 May 1969. Unfortunately, Harkaby did not mention the source of such phrase, nor did he pay attention to the fact that Nasser did not make any statement on that date. On the contrary, in his speech on the occasion of Labor Day on 1 May 1969, Nasser talked about the historical peaceful co-existence between Moslems and Jews in the Middle East.

Nasser never spoke of "driving the Jews into the sea" or "liquidating the state of Israel" in the sense of massacring its inhabitants. If we examine Table 7.6 which crosstabulates Nasser's goals with the adversaries to whom these goals relate,

¹ On the contrary, in that particular interview, Nasser expressed acceptance of the reality of Israel if there was a humanitarian solution to the Middle East problem.

TABLE 7.6

CROSSTABULATION OF NASSER'S GOALS TOWARD VARIOUS ADVERSARIES
(1953 - 1970)

Goal Opponent	Destruct- ive	Aggres- sive	Defen- sive	Concil- iatory	Peace	Rest- orative	Total
Israel	21	2	54	26	21	179	303
Arabs	42	1	7	21	7	8	86
West	41	1	24	39	35	18	158
East				2			2
Domestic	48	4	4	1			57
TOTAL	152	8	89	89	63	205	606

V = .52

p = .02

we find an interesting pattern. Statements implying aggressive and destructive goals represented only 6% of the total goals articulated in relation to Israel. If we exclude statements of restoration, the percentage rises to 17%. A closer examination would reveal that Nasser was more conciliatory toward Israel than toward his Arab or domestic opponents. The ratio of aggressive/destructive to conciliatory statements of goals toward Israel is 1:4.38 compared to 1:.81 and 1:2.28 and 1:.10 toward his Arab, western, and domestic opponents respectively. In general, Nasser articulated goals toward Israel that were more conciliatory than his goals toward all other perceived adversaries.

Further, Laqueur's and Harkaby's contention that Nasser used to articulate different goals in addressing foreign audiences is unsubstantiated by the empirical evidence. The validity analysis of Nasser's operational code beliefs has confirmed that Nasser's beliefs were basically consistent across various types of documents and audience. If we restrict the analysis to goals articulated toward Israel, the results do not vary. As presented in Table 7.7, we find that Nasser consistently articulated the same goals toward Israel regardless of the audience he was addressing or the means of communication.¹

¹ These results may also be substantiated if we examine Lester Pearson's findings about Nasser's goals during their private meeting in November 1955. Pearson stated that Nasser expressed his readiness to recognize the existence of a state of Israel provided that the refugee problem and the boundaries problems were settled (Pearson, 1973:221-222).

TABLE 7.7

NASSER'S GOALS TOWARD ISRAEL AND THE TYPE
OF AUDIENCE AND MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS

	Audience			Communication		
	Domestic	Foreign		Public	Private	
Destructive	16	6	22	21	2	23
Conciliatory	180	96	276	276	4	280
	196	102	298	297	6	303
	Phi = .05			Phi = .17		
	p = .23			p = .14		

If this was the case, how did it come about that Nasser was perceived as a totally uncompromising leader? We have just alluded to the tendency to interpret Nasser's goals through the process of "wishful thinking." In addition, unfamiliarity with the essential link in Nasser's operational code between goal optimization and unchangeability and conservatism in goal pursuit may have also contributed to unidimensional assessments of Nasser's beliefs. In Nasser's view it was not necessary to approach the task of selecting goals by trying to calculate

precisely the immediate probability of success or failure.

A decision maker, Nasser believed, ought to select optimal goals, even though a strategy of operational action was difficult to calculate and the prospects of short-run success were uncertain. According to Nasser, a satisficing strategy of goal selection would inevitably mean surrender before the actual battle begun. One should select goals not in the light of the present capabilities but according to the inherent potentialities and historical trends. Further, Nasser believed that such optimal goals should not be abandoned, modified, or substituted. A decision maker should not only select optimal goals, he argued, but should also insist on the full realization of such goals. As a result, he insisted on the full implementation of all the UN resolutions and rejected Israel's demand for negotiations without prior commitment to such implementation.

However, Nasser was no adventurer. His resort to optimal goals; and insistence on their full implementation, was not matched by a parallel resort to an optimizing and inflexible strategy of action. He placed several limits on his strategy in order to ensure that the risk of immediate goal implementation was several steps removed. The first of these limits was an injunction against the assumption of immediate responsibilities beyond one's capabilities. Nasser believed that in initiating an action one must be concerned with ascertaining

the goals that are "objectively feasible" in the light of the present global balance of power and regional and domestic contradictions. He frequently asserted that the fundamental problem in the Arab-Israeli conflict was not Israel alone, but also the other global powers who supported Israel.

Complacent miscalculations and truncated analyses of the regional balance of power must be avoided. The belief in risk avoidance was also one of the constraints Nasser used to place some limits on goal pursuit. He believed that the stakes in the Arab-Israeli conflict were too crucial to permit the pursuit of adventurous policies. As a result, the liberation of Palestine, central and crucial as it might be, ought to be scaled down as long as prospects for success were not certain. Thirdly, Nasser placed another injunction against the application of military force. Force, he argued, was useful only as a deterrent device. The basic problem in resort to military force was that once it was applied it might not be possible to contain it. Hence, he never envisaged the implementation of the goal through the application of force in the short or the long run. Such crucial injunctions stemmed basically from his historical vision of politics in general and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular. Nasser conceptualized the Arab-Israeli conflict as a historical relationship, both long and protracted. The winner would be decided, he believed, not on the battle ground, but rather

through the long process of competition for socio-economic development. If the Arabs were capable of surpassing Israel in this competition, they would be able to bring about a qualitative change in regional power distribution. Such a change would make it impossible for Israel to continue its denial of Arab rights. This vision was operationally reflected in his insistence on the pursuit of goals through a schedule. The realization of the Arab goal of restoring Palestinian rights should be postponed until imperialist influence and Arab reactionary regimes were eliminated, a sound Arab economic infrastructure was built, and full Arab integration had been achieved. This process, Nasser argued, ought to be a slow and incremental one through which the Arabs would gradually surpass Israel and restore their rights without resort to military force. Accordingly, Nasser made it explicit that he had no operational plan to liberate Palestine, or to apply military force. This liberation, Nasser argued, ought to be left to the long historical and incremental process. Meanwhile, the Arabs ought to pursue an operational strategy of deterrence. Nasser conceived of successful defence as equivalent to military victory.¹

¹ Because of the array of limits on goal pursuit, Nasser was often accused by the Baath Party of treason and cowardice in confronting Israel. He was accused of following a policy of positive neutrality only between the Arabs and the Israelis and of implementing American policy by paving the way for the final liquidation of the Palestine question through a territorial settlement with Israel (Hamroush, 1977:109-110).

Unfamiliarity with these basic dimensions of Nasser's operational code, and incomprehension of the link between goal selection and goal pursuit, may be an explanation of the unwarranted conclusions presented in Harkaby's Arab Strategies and Israeli Responses (1977). Harkaby contends that Nasser's approach was the obliteration of Israel through an all out war. Harkaby applies the rules of logical consistency to deduce from the nature of Nasser's political goals that he had rejected the incremental approach in favor of a final, brief and decisive war. The basic flaw in Harkaby's assessment was that he did not study empirically Nasser's strategy and approaches, but rather preferred to assume logical consistency and deduce from the nature of the image of the opponent and goals, their logical implications for strategy. As we will see later in the analysis of the logical and psychological consistency of Nasser's operational code, his negative image of the adversary was not matched by a similar negative approach to the pursuit of goals. Nasser advocated the adoption of an historical-incremental approach, avoidance of risks, and moreover avoidance of resort to military force. Nasser did not envisage war to the bitter end. As we have pointed out in the analysis of Nasser's first and second period beliefs, he believed that military force can be useful only as a deterrent. As a general rule, he argued that Arabs should refrain from resort to military force against Israel. He specified two conditions under which he would apply military

force: Israel's actual occupation of Arab territories (not mere reprisals) and the gathering of solid evidence to the effect that Israel was about to develop a nuclear bomb. This refraining from resort to military force was not advocated as a temporary strategy that would be abandoned once the Arabs obtained military superiority. Nasser never viewed himself as a potential initiator of war against Israel, nor did he anticipate such a war in his generation.

An examination of Table 7.8 which crosstabulates Nasser's beliefs about the utility of military force with various

TABLE 7.8
NASSER'S BELIEFS ON THE UTILITY OF MILITARY FORCE
CROSSTABULATED WITH VARIOUS ADVERSARIES

	Avoid	Last resort	Viable Means	Only Means	Total
Israel	7	18	29	20	74
Arabs	4	3	5	-	12
West	7	13	9	3	32
Domestic	4	4	1	1	10
TOTAL	22	38	54	24	128

V = .22

P = .02

adversaries reveals that in 34% of his references to Israel, Nasser conceived of military force as a device to be totally avoided or used as a last resort. In 39% of his references, force was believed to be a deterrent. The bulk of the remaining 27% of the references to force as the only means were articulated after the 1967 War in the context of his emphasis on the application of a combination of military force and political pressure to dislodge Israel from Sinai.

In short, an understanding of the link between Nasser's conflictual and historical paradigm of politics, his optimizing approach to goal selection, and his conservative approach to goal pursuit is crucial to a balanced and comprehensive understanding of Nasser's operational code. His conflictual paradigm of politics led him to subscribe to a highly negative, unitary and dispositional image of his adversaries and an optimizing approach to the choice and the non-changeability of goals. However, these beliefs were placed within the framework of his inevitable-progressive-circular paradigm of history. This paradigm had some crucial implications for his goal pursuit. It provided him with a sense of certainty about the eventual realization of goals and, as a result, induced him to advocate an incremental process of change and a conservative strategy of action.

CHAPTER VIII

NASSER'S OPERATIONAL CODE

A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

As we have pointed out previously, an operational code is essentially a belief system which is used for evaluating alternative choices and making decisions. All the belief elements are organized into a system which has certain characteristics. In this chapter, we will examine Nasser's operational code within the framework of the belief system theory, and test our hypotheses as presented in Chapters 2 and 3. We will focus our analysis on the following points: (i) structural differentiation, (ii) structural interdependence, and (iii) system functions.

1. Structural Differentiation

(a) Richness of Nasser's Operational Code

An operational code is defined as rich if it holds a large percentage of the possible belief categories, or poor when it has only a small percentage. Our coding system consists of 168 categories for coding philosophical beliefs and 83 for instrumental beliefs. It is obvious that not all 251 beliefs in our content analysis were articulated by Nasser during his political life. When we count the number of belief categories, we find that his operational code includes

no more than 181, or 72% of all possible beliefs in the coded system (Table 8.1).

To have a clear picture of Nasser's code, we examined the three periods of his political life: the first from 1953 to 1956 was one of maturation and exploration; the second, from 1957 to 9 June 1967, was a period of confident leadership as a result of his political victory on the Suez Canal issue; the third was of decline, especially after the debacle of the 1967-War. Nasser's operational code changed with these ups and downs. First of all, we notice that it was richest during the second period (73% of the possible beliefs), and poorest during the third (47% of the possible beliefs). The differences are more striking when we examine only his subsystem of philosophical beliefs (49% for the first period, 77% for the second, and 41% for the third). In general, it seems that the more active and confident an individual in his role of leadership, the richer is his operational code. On the contrary, disillusionment and lack of self-confidence in coping with problems are associated with a decline in richness of the operational code.

TABLE 8.1

NUMBER OF BELIEFS IN NASSER'S OPERATIONAL CODE

	Maximum Number of Cate- gories	Number of Beliefs Articulated		
		Period 1	Period 2	Period 3
<u>Philosophical Beliefs</u>				
- Nature of Politics	27	9	19	8
- Opponents	68	32	52	35
- Int'l System	44	20	31	8
- Optimism-Pessimism	10	10	9	6
- Predictability	11	6	9	8
- Role of leader	8	5	8	3
TOTAL	168	82	128	69
Richness Coeffi- cient		49%	77%	41%
Coefficient of Dispersion (C.D.)		.91	.99	.82
<u>Instrumental Beliefs</u>				
- Goals	27	13	21	12
- Approaches	5	5	5	3
- Strategies	5	3	5	4
- Risk	14	9	11	8
- Timing	3	1	3	2
- Action	8	6	7	5
- Military Force	21	13	13	14
TOTAL	83	50	53	48
Richness Coeffi- cient		61%	64%	58%
Coefficient of Dispersion (C.D.)		.95	.98	.82
GRAND TOTAL	251	132	181	117
GRAND RICHNESS COEFFICIENT		53%	73%	47%
GRAND C.D.		.91	.99	.86

Secondly, when we compare the sub-systems of philosophical beliefs with the sub-systems of instrumental beliefs throughout the three periods, we will notice another interesting pattern: in general, the sub-system of instrumental beliefs tends to be richer than the sub-system of philosophical beliefs. This is not unexpected given the fact that Nasser was a politician who was more involved in tactical issues than in theorizing (on the average 61% of the possible instrumental beliefs versus 56% of the philosophical beliefs). This finding lends some modest support to.

H6 : The operational code of executives is richer in its instrumental sub-system than in its philosophical sub-system.

On the other hand, when we examine the three periods separately, we notice that the changes in the level of richness of the sub-system of instrumental beliefs are relatively smaller than the changes of the sub-system of philosophical beliefs. The average change of the instrumental belief sub-system is 4% whereas the average change of the philosophical belief sub-system is 24%.

In other words, it seems that the level of richness of the philosophical sub-system is affected by the ups and downs of the individual to a greater extent than that of the instrumental belief sub-system.

(b) Differentiation of Nasser's Operational Code

Differentiation refers to the way in which beliefs are distributed among belief categories. Given two operational

codes of equal richness (the same number of articulated beliefs), they may not have the same level of belief distribution. An operational code has a low level of differentiation if all the articulated beliefs are concentrated in one single master belief category. It is maximally differentiated if the articulated beliefs are proportionally distributed to all master belief categories. Thus, a coefficient of dispersion (C.D.) is created as a measure of differentiation in terms of belief distribution.¹ This coefficient has a range from 1 (maximum differentiation) to zero (minimum differentiation). The coefficients of dispersions calculated for the three periods of Nasser's life are presented in Table 8.1.

First of all, it seems that Nasser's operational code is highly differentiated in terms of belief distribution. The average C.D. for the three periods is .92. Secondly, as expected in the belief system theory, the differentiation of Nasser's operational code increased considerably. However, the traumatic experience of the June defeat seems to have reversed the trend by reducing the level of differentiation and richness of Nasser's operational code. Thirdly, we found that the philosophical set and the instrumental set are equally

¹ Let Y_i be the maximum number of beliefs in the i th master belief category, and y_i be the actual number of articulated beliefs in the i th category. $N = Y_i$ and $n = y_i$. Thus, the expected articulated number of articulated beliefs in the i th category is $E_i = n(Y_i/N)$. The Chi-Square value is computed from E_i and y_i . Coefficient of Dispersion (C.D.) = $1 - \frac{(\text{Chi-Square})}{n}$

differentiated. This finding largely disconfirms

H7 : The operational code of executives is more differentiated in its instrumental sub-system than in its philosophical sub-system.

It seems that the operational code is richer in its instrumental part than in its philosophical part and the two parts tend to be equally differentiated.

Fourthly, there is an association between the leader's political career and the richness and differentiation of his operational code. Political decline is associated with undifferentiation and less richness. Conversely, political ascendancy increases the richness and differentiation of the leader's operational code. This was exhibited in the rise and decline of the two dimensions during the second and third periods of Nasser's operational code respectively.

(c) Centrality in Nasser's Operational Code Beliefs.

The rationale of the operational code is to deal with a few manageable beliefs which extract the basic elements of the decision maker's belief system. The basic assumption is that knowledge of these beliefs enables us to predict the decision maker's potential political choices.

Heradstveit and Narvesen (1978:8-9) define centrality as equivalent to stability and interconnectedness. According to them, central beliefs are the ones which remain stable over time and/or the ones which have the most connections with other beliefs. Such a definition arbitrarily equates centrality with stability and interdependence. We preferred to assess the dimensions of centrality, stability, and interdependence separately from each other in order to discover empirically whether central beliefs are in fact the most stable and most interdependent beliefs.

Central beliefs are defined as the most frequently articulated.¹ Operationally, a belief is defined as central if its score of frequency of articulation is above the median of the frequencies of all master beliefs. Conversely, a belief is considered peripheral if its score is below the median frequency.

Our problem is to select out of 55 beliefs a small number of beliefs to keep our data analysis at a manageable level.

¹ Underlying this definition of centrality is the assumption that the more relevant the belief (or any personal characteristic) to a political leader, the greater the number of references he will make that can be classified as indicating the belief (Pool, 1959:194 and Hermann, 1977:9). In her analysis of the images of Nehru and Menon, Stein (1969:414) found that frequency analysis has extracted the most intense components of their images. The frequency of the occurrence was found to be a reliable indicator of the importance and centrality of various components of the image.

Our selection of 12 beliefs is based on the following criteria:

- (i) the selected beliefs must cover all the belief categories;
 - (ii) they must be adequately relevant representatives of each belief category;
 - (iii) they may be legitimately treated as interval variables so that we can conveniently use the regression method to analyze the data; and
 - (iv) they are the same beliefs originally used by Leites, George, and others so that the results of our research could be used to compare Nasser with other leaders whose operational codes have been investigated.
- On the basis of those criteria, we have selected the following beliefs:

Philosophical Beliefs

1. Nature of Politics:	(1) conflictual	(2) harmonious
2. Nature of Opponents:	(1) aggressive	(2) conciliatory
3. International System:	(1) conflictual	(2) harmonious
4. Optimism:	(1) optimistic	(2) pessimistic
5. Predictability of politics:	(1) predictable	(2) capricious
6. Role of Leader:	(1) active	(2) passive

Instrumental Beliefs

1. Goal Selection:	(1) optimal	(2) feasible
2. Approaches:	(1) Blitzkrieg	(2) incremental
3. Strategies	(1) aggressive	(2) accommodative
4. Risk Policy	(1) high	(2) low
5. Action	(1) quick	(2) slow
6. Military Force:	(1) to be used	(2) to be avoided

Table 8.2 presents the result of our frequency analysis. Several interesting patterns reveal themselves. First of all, there is no difference between philosophical beliefs and instrumental beliefs in terms of centrality. In general, the centrality rankings of the two sub-systems are more or less equal. One may notice a slight difference between the two sub-systems during the second period when Nasser was firmly established as a victorious leader of Egypt. During this golden era of Nasser's leadership, his philosophical beliefs tended to be more "central" in his operational code than his instrumental beliefs. However, the difference in rankings between the two sub-systems is not significant enough for us to warrant a stronger conclusion about the relationship between Nasser's political career and the organization of his operational code along the central-peripheral dimension. We can test this relationship directly by comparing the rankings of the three periods without making a distinction between philosophical and instrumental beliefs.

TABLE 8.2

FREQUENCY ANALYSIS OF MASTER BELIEFS

	Period 1	Period 2	Period 3	Total Life Time	
Philosophical Beliefs	Nature of Politics	9 (11)	55 (9)	6 (9)	70 (10)
	Nature of Opponents	133 (2)*	675 (1)*	134 (1)*	942 (1)*
	International System	12 (9)	134 (12)	5 (10)	151 (8)
	Optimism	87 (3)*	322 (2)*	41 (4)*	450 (3)*
	Predictability	22 (7)	177 (5)*	9 (12)	208 (6)*
	Role of Leader	19 (8)	69 (8)	5 (11)	92 (9)
Instrumental Beliefs	Goal Selection	42 (6)*	161 (6)*	30 (6)*	233 (5)*
	Approaches	70 (4)*	295 (4)*	61 (2)*	426 (4)*
	Strategies	139 (1)*	318 (3)*	34 (5)*	491 (2)*
	Risk Policy	7 (12)	24 (10)	16 (8)	47 (12)
	Action	10 (10)	24 (11)	21 (7)	55 (11)
	Military Force	51 (5)*	72 (7)	48 (3)*	171 (7)

*Central beliefs.

In general, two major findings can be drawn; firstly, there is a slight change between the three periods. The Spearman rank correlation is 0.89, between the first and second period; 0.70 between the second and third periods; and 0.63 between the first and the third period. In general, Nasser's operational

code consistently articulated the same central beliefs up until 1967. However, one notices a gradual change from one period to the next. The change is greatest between the second and third period. After the crushing defeat of the 1967-war, some structural organization occurred in his operational code. For example, Predictability of the Political Life was moved from the intermediate area (rank 5 during the second period) to the extreme peripheral area (rank 12 during the third period); the Role of the Leader was less emphasized after the debacle (from rank 8 to rank 11); such instrumental beliefs as Risk Policy, Action and the Use of Military Force became, relatively speaking, more dominant.

The structural change of Nasser's belief system after 1967 illustrates an important theoretical point. In a normal situation, it is reasonable to expect that a given system will remain stable. However, one should not expect such a stability to persist in a crisis situation. Consequently, in analyzing the predictive power of an operational code, one must take into account the possibility of some structural change in the system. For example, one may not legitimately use Nasser's pre-1967 operational code to predict his political choices in the post-1967 era.

The second finding relates to the persistence of the dominance of a specific subset of beliefs in Nasser's operational code. The central beliefs which appeared in his aggregate operational code (left hand column in Table 8.2) appeared also as the same most central beliefs in the first and second periods, and to a lesser extent in the third period. Not only did they persist in their centrality, but also in the relative magnitude of centrality. Spearman rank code correlations between the total central beliefs and the central beliefs of the first, second and third periods are .96, .91, and .65 respectively. This finding confirms H8 which states

H8 : The operational code is usually characterized by the dominance of a specific subset.

(d) Stability and Change of Nasser's Operational Code Beliefs

How stable were Nasser's operational code beliefs? We must remember that stability is not equivalent to centrality. Centrality refers to the intensity of commitment to the overall belief regardless of the direction of articulation of such a belief. For instance, strategy might occupy a central place in the operational code of a political leader, but the specific type of strategy advocated may change temporally. Stability refers to the relative temporal persistence of a specific answer to the belief. Here we are not interested in knowing the place of the belief on the essential nature of politics,

relative to other beliefs, but whether the conflictual conceptualization of politics had persisted or changed over time.

The coefficient of variation has been used to assess the stability and change of Nasser's operational code. Before using this coefficient, we treated each belief as an interval variable. Then we calculated the annual average score of each belief variable which is considered as a measure of Nasser's position on that particular belief during that year. We assumed that the higher the mean of a particular belief variable, the more Nasser changed his position on that variable. The next step was to calculate the coefficient of variation which is simply the standard deviation divided by the mean:

$$V = \frac{S_i}{\bar{X}_i}$$

The coefficient varies between 0.00 which indicates that the belief variable was totally stable and 1.00 which denotes a total change in Nasser's position on that belief. The results of the stability and change analysis are presented in Table 8.3.

It reveals that beliefs pertaining to the image of the opponent, the conflictual nature of politics and the global system, the predictability of political life, optimism, and the selection of goals were the most stable among Nasser's beliefs. This is not unexpected. Nasser never modified or discarded his fundamental conviction that his political goals

5

would be eventually achieved, his semi-theological political certainty, and his conflictual view of domestic and global politics. Further, Nasser persisted in his belief that Israel was fundamentally expansionist. Nasser considered expansionism as inherent in the essential character of Israel and the Zionist ideology, a characteristic which was not likely to change unless Israel abandoned its ideology. Nasser's answer to such perceived expansionism was to persist in emphasizing the pursuit of optimal goals toward Israel. It was a fundamental tenet in his code not to approach the process of goal selection toward Israel by specifying beforehand the most feasible political goals but rather by opting for optimal goals whose means of achievement might be altered according to the prevailing circumstances.

Beliefs related to military force, the role of the political leader and risk were the least stable among Nasser's beliefs. Nasser changed his belief on the utility of military force against Israel from a belief that it ought to be avoided during the first period to a belief in the avoidance of initiating resort to military force coupled with the assertion that military force might be a viable means of deterrence during the second period, into a belief that military force ought to be used at some stage in conjunction with political methods to dislodge Israel from the territories occupied in June 1967. Likewise, Nasser's belief pertaining to risk acceptance and avoidance

changed from a belief in the acceptance of some limited risks during the first period of an injunction against the pursuit of high risk policies, even after Sinai was occupied in 1967. His belief about the role of a political leader in shaping historical development changed from an emphasis on the role of the leader as a mere socio-economic broker during the first period to a relatively more active role during the second period, followed by a reverse toward the passive after the 1967 War.

Three major findings may be extracted from the variation coefficients in Table 8.3: (i) on the average, Nasser's operational code exhibited a noticeable degree of stability. It has a mean stability coefficient of .139 which shows that Nasser tended to subscribe to the same answers to the operational code beliefs over time; (ii) the philosophical set of beliefs was more stable than the instrumental set of beliefs. The mean stability coefficient for the philosophical set is .112 compared to an instrumental mean variation coefficient of .171. Such finding supports the hypothesis stating:

H9 : The philosophical part of the operational code tends to be more stable than the instrumental set.

(iii) the last finding relates to the relationship between the stability and centrality of beliefs. Is it true as Heradstveit and Narvesen claims that centrality of operational code beliefs

TABLE 8.3

NASSER'S OPERATIONAL CODE =
MEASURES OF STABILITY AND CHANGE*

	Measures of Stability	Stability & Change*	Central Peripheral
<u>I. Philosophical Beliefs</u>			
- Nature of politics	.086	Stable	Peripheral
- Nature of opponent	.035	Stable	Central
- Int'l System	.090	Stable	Peripheral
- Optimism	.130	Stable	Central
- Predictability	.069	Stable	Central
- Role of leader	.262	Changed	Peripheral
<u>II. Instrumental Beliefs</u>			
- Goal Selection	.117	Stable	Central
- Approaches	.136	Changed	Central
- Strategies	.140	Changed	Central
- Risk	.266	Changed	Peripheral
- Action	.151	Changed	Peripheral
- Force	.217	Changed	Peripheral

Average of Philosophical beliefs	"	.112
Average of Instrumental beliefs	"	.171
Average of Central beliefs	"	.105
Average of Peripheral beliefs	"	.179

* Beliefs were rank ordered according to the magnitude of their co-efficient of variation. Beliefs which fell below the median were considered stable. Conversely, beliefs which fell above the median were considered unstable.

can be assessed through an analysis of stability? We found that four out of the six most central beliefs were in fact among the six stable beliefs; images of the opponent, optimism, prediction, and selection of goals. Strategy beliefs appeared among the most central and least stable. Further, we found that central beliefs were in general significantly more stable than peripheral beliefs. The score of stability of the central set was .105 compared to .179 for the peripheral set. These results confirm the hypothesis widely stated in the literature which states:

H10 : Operational code beliefs change in an inverse relationship to their centrality.

Our findings indicate that, on the average, stability of beliefs seems to be dependent on their centrality. This does not rule out the possibility that under conditions of crisis and stress central and peripheral beliefs may be equally vulnerable to radical change in order to adjust to the new situation. This happened to Nasser after 1967. He almost discarded the belief in the predictability of political life, modified his belief in the ability of political leaders to shape developments in his policy and his belief in the avoidance of military force and high risk after the 1967 war. There were also some signs a few months before his death that he was about to change his image of Israel from an uniformly hawkish society to a competitive society divided between doves and hawks.

2. Structural Interdependence

One of the major characteristics of the operational code is the interconnectedness among various philosophical and instrumental beliefs. The search for belief linkages is vital to the understanding of a decision maker's operational code. It helps in predicting, given certain initial knowledge that a political leader holds a specified belief(s), that he holds certain other operational code beliefs, and accordingly may help in developing typologies of operational codes.

As has been indicated in the analysis of the general characteristics of the operational code, interdependence may take two forms: static and dynamic. Static constraints refer to the likelihood that an individual will hold a particular set of beliefs given that he holds a specific belief. Dynamic interdependence refers to the likelihood that a change in one belief will bring about a series of changes in the status of other beliefs. Static interdependence will be analyzed by contingency analysis. Dynamic interdependence will be studied by assessing the predictive power of each belief through correlational analysis. The overall interdependence of Nasser's operational code will be assessed by factor analyzing the master philosophical factors which extract the essence of Nasser's operational code.

Before analyzing these aspects of interdependence, we will analyze a closely related form, that is, the response-response consistency of the operational code.

(a) Consistency of the Operational Code

Consistency means that the decision maker's responses to various beliefs at a certain point in time tend to go in the same direction. A leader who believes in conflictual politics is also expected to view his opponents as aggressive and to advocate deterrent-aggressive strategies. Consistency does not mean that over time the decision maker will articulate the same responses. As a matter of fact, we know from our study of stability and change that such responses can vary over time. In short, consistency refers to response-response consistency rather than temporal stability.

The first step in the analysis was to scale the operational code beliefs along the dimension of "hawkishness" and "dovishness". We expect a decision maker who takes a hawkish stand on one belief to take a similar (consistent) stand on another belief according to the following pattern:¹

¹ The scaling of optimists as hawks and pessimists as doves is justified by the fact that optimists are fundamentally certain about the realization of their goals. They do not see any credible opportunity of failure. Conversely, pessimists are more realistic. They perceive possibilities of failure. This definition, which refers to the long run, differs from Heradstveit's definition which has been used in testing H4. He defines optimism as a belief that a settlement is likely to occur in the immediate future.

1. A consistently "Hawkish"
Operational Code

2. A consistently "Dovish"
Operational Code

Conflictual politics
Aggressive opponents
Conflictual system
Optimistic
Predictability
Active roles
Optimal goals
Blitzkrieg approach
Aggressive strategy
High risk policy
Quick action
Use military force

Harmonious politics
Conciliatory opponents
Harmonious system
Pessimistic
Unpredictability
Passive roles
Feasible goals
Incremental approach
Accommodative strategy
Low risk policy
Slow action
Avoid force

Operationally, we dichotomized each belief into an interval variable with two poles -- "1" to designate the "hawkish" pole and "2" to designate the "dovish" pole. The score of the decision maker on each belief is the mean of all articulated references to that belief at a specific time period.

According to the definition of consistency, a consistent operational code is one that has consistent scoring values on all twelve dimensions, which in our case, the total score on all the twelve beliefs. The resulting scores is divided by the number of beliefs producing the average consistency-inconsistency score. If the average score is closer to "1" or "2", then the articulation of beliefs at that point of time was consistent. If the mean is equal to or approximates 1.5, that means that the decision maker used to take one stand on

some beliefs and different stands on other beliefs. In other words, the simple deviation from 1, or from 2 is a measure of inconsistency.¹

Table 8.4 presents the mean of each belief variable and the general average consistency score. The results indicate that Nasser's operational code within each period was relatively consistent. The average score during each period was approximately 1.2 which approximates the "hawkish" pole on the scale. The existence of a .2 of inconsistency is a result of an apparent incongruence between a totally hawkish image of the opponent and Nasser's advocacy of incremental approaches, low risk policies, delayed action, and avoidance of resort to military force. Contrary to our expectations, Nasser's negative image of the opponent and optimizing strategy of goal selection were not matched by "hawkish" stands on issues of risk and the use of military force. Nasser "consistently" warned against pursuit of high risk policies against Israel or resort to military force in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

¹In order to eliminate the potentially intervening impact of cross-situational variability, we decided to analyse the instrumental beliefs as they relate to one issue, the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Two other interesting findings emerged from the consistency analysis: (i) Nasser's philosophical beliefs were more consistently articulated than his instrumental beliefs; and (ii) the set of central beliefs as extracted from our centrality analysis exhibited more response-response consistency than peripheral beliefs.

TABLE 8.4
MEASURES OF CONSISTENCY

	Period 1	Period 2	Period 3	Value Labels
Nature of Politics	1.111	1.024	1.100	Conflictual (1)
Nature of Opponents	1.000	1.024	1.035	Aggressive (1)
International System	1.000	1.046	1.000	Conflictual (1)
Optimism	1.023	1.084	1.151	Optimism (1)
Predictability	1.000	1.017	1.000	Predictable (1)
Role of Leader	1.421	1.206	1.667	Active (1)
Goal Selection	1.071	1.136	1.023	Optimal (1)
Approaches	1.743	1.512	1.609	Incremental (2)
Strategies	1.158	1.212	1.100	Aggressive (1)
Risk Policy	1.429	1.465	1.583	Low (2)
Action	1.900	1.789	1.808	Slow (2)
Military Force	1.431	1.521	1.490	Useful (1)
Average Consistency Score	1.167	1.203	1.228	
Average of Philosophical Beliefs	1.093	1.067	1.159	
Average of Instrumental Beliefs	1.241	1.339	1.296	
Average of Central Beliefs	1.202	1.160	1.198	
Average of Peripheral Beliefs	1.132	1.246	1.257	

The basic problem in our consistency analysis is that it is restricted to analysis of logical consistency and constraints.¹ Cognitive theory states that belief linkages and constraints need not arise from a single pattern of logic. The internal logic that marks a system of beliefs may have its roots more in "psycho-logic" than pure logic (Abelson and Rosenberg, 1958): According to Converse (1964) what is important is that the individual may experience such beliefs as logically constrained clusters of beliefs. Such consistency is often quasi-logically argued and justified on the basis of an appeal to some superordinate value or posture toward man and society. This was the case in Nasser's operational code. For Nasser, the dovish stand on issues of risk, action, and military force was psychologically experienced as mechanisms of creating balance in the operational code by ensuring the removal of prospects of immediate action which may logically follow from the "hawkish" image. In this sense they were "consistent" with other dimensions of the operational code, although they were definitely "inconsistent" from the viewpoint of pure logic.

¹As has been the case in Harkaby's (1977) analysis of Nasser's operational code from the viewpoint of logical consistency.

These results confirm

H11 : Logical and psychological consistence of the operational code are separate phenomena.

(b) Contingency Analysis¹

Contingency analysis is a technique for making inference about the association structure of beliefs from the "contingencies" or "co-occurrences" of beliefs within the content of messages. This inference is based on the assumption that greater-than-chance contingencies of items in messages would indicate associations in the source. Correspondingly, less-than-chance contingencies of items in messages would indicate dissociations in the thinking of the decision maker. If, as in the former case, two items are associated or contingent, the occurrence of one logically facilitates the occurrence of the other (Osgood, 1959:54-65).

Contingency analysis does not provide us with information about the direction of the association, that is, whether they are positively or negatively associated. Contingency analysis

¹ Because of the nature of this test, we carried out the analysis on a stratified and random sample of documents of 10% of the originally coded documents. Because the documents vary in length and the number of paragraphs, the documents selected were those which contained at least 50 paragraphs.

depends only on the location of symbols (beliefs), not upon how they are linked. Moreover, this method does not take into account the intensity with which assertions are made. Contingency analysis is largely independent of frequency analysis (centrality). Indirectly, however, the magnitude of the contingency relation may indicate the intensity of the relation as the stronger the association of two beliefs, the more regularly the occurrence of one conditions the occurrence of the other.

Contingency analysis involves the following basic steps:

- I Select the units of analysis:
A stratified random sample of 80 documents representing 10% of Nasser's coded documents per year was selected.
- II Determining coding categories:
These are the master philosophical and instrumental beliefs of the operational code.
- III Create a raw data matrix of scores:
The frequency of each belief in each document was scored in a raw data table. This table was then used to determine whether each belief occurred above or below its own mean frequency. This was done by dividing the total occurrences by their number. All occurrences above the mean level were scored as plus and all occurrences below the mean level were scored as minus.
- IV Determine significant occurrences:
The expected or chance contingency for each pair of columns is obtained by multiplying the rates of occurrence of these two categories (beliefs). Thus, if Belief A

occurs 40% and Belief B occurs 20%, we expect them to occur together (be contingent) in only 8% of the units on the basis of chance. The actual contingency is the percentage of units where A and B occur together, that is, where both score plus. If the actual contingency is greater than the expected frequency these beliefs are occurring together more often than the chance. Conversely, if the actual contingency is less than the corresponding expected contingency, these beliefs are co-occurring less often than by chance.

V Determine the level of significance:

The appropriate technique is Chi-Square, but its application becomes laborious with a large number of units and variables. Consequently, contingencies have been expressed as ratios which have some properties of correlation co-efficients. The index used is the ratio

$$\frac{2 \times \text{no. of units in which P1 and P2 are contingent}}{\text{Total no. of units in which P1 occur} + \text{Total no. of units in which P2 occur}}$$

If there is no instance of contingency, the ratio will be zero. If all occurrences are contingent, the ratio will be 1.00. All ratios above .50 are treated as significant, that is, the two relevant beliefs occur together significantly more often than by chance.

Using the results of contingency ratios, we have obtained the contingency matrix of relations in Table 8.5. Almost 63% of inter-contingency ratios listed in Table 8.5 were .5 or above. The overall inter-contingencies of the operational code may be assessed through the calculation of the Index of Agreement which is simply the arithmetic mean of contingency ratios. The

TABLE 8.5

CONTINGENCIES OF NASSER'S OPERATIONAL
CODE BELIEFS

	Politics	Opponent	System	Optimism	Prediction	Leader	Goal Selection	Approaches	Strategies	Risk	Action
Politics	-										
Opponent	.53										
System	.26										
Optimism	*	.59	.55								
Prediction	.40	.56	.35	*							
Leader	.35	*	.26	.34	.35						
Goal Selection	.36	.59	.34	.59	*	*					
Approaches	.50	.62	.33	.67	.51	.51	.52				
Strategy	.56	.61	*	.50	.55	.41	.53	.52			
Risk	.55	.63	*	.64	.40	.38	.53	.53	.58		
Action	.53	.50	.27	.40	.28	.36	.53	.35	.54	.52	
Force	.57	.54	*	.68	*	.26	.71	.63	.53	.54	.40

* denotes chance occurrence

Index of Agreement for Nasser's operational code is .51, which indicates a moderately cohesive operational code. The general intercontingencies of the operational code increase if we concentrate on specific sets of beliefs. As we will demonstrate in a later section, there were three basic clusters of contingent beliefs in Nasser's operational code whose Index of Agreement ranges between .55 and .59.

These results indicate that Nasser did not subscribe to a set of randomly articulated beliefs, but rather to a system of beliefs, one in which the existence of a set of beliefs facilitates the existence of some other sets.

Two other significant findings emerge from Table 8.5: The first finding relates to the relative internal interdependence of the philosophical set against the instrumental set. Instrumental beliefs are generally more internally cohesive and interdependent than the philosophical set of beliefs. The Philosophical Index of Agreement is .42 whereas the Instrumental Index of Agreement is .54. Further, the philosophical set of beliefs is moderately contingent upon the instrumental set. The Philosophical-Instrumental Index of Agreement is .51. This indicates that Nasser's instrumental set of beliefs was more internally cohesive than the philosophical set of beliefs.

Another significant finding is that specific beliefs exhibited more significant contingencies than other beliefs. Perusal of Table 8.6 reveals that the approaches belief was contingent upon 9 other beliefs, whereas belief on the role of leader in controlling historical development was contingent upon only one belief.

TABLE 8.6
CONTINGENCIES OF OPERATIONAL CODE BELIEFS

Belief	Number of contingencies
1. Approaches	9
2. Strategies	9
3. Image of the opponent	8
4. Goal Selection	8
5. Risk acceptance	8
6. Optimism	7
7. Utility of military force	7
8. Nature of politics	6
9. Action	5
10. Predictability of politics	3
11. Nature of global system	1
12. Role of Leader	1

It also appears from Table 8.6 that instrumental beliefs were more contingent on other operational code beliefs than the philosophical set of beliefs. Instrumental beliefs were contingent upon some other 51 beliefs whereas philosophical

beliefs were contingent upon 26 beliefs. These findings indicate that instrumental beliefs are more internally cohesive and externally correlated with other operational code beliefs than philosophical beliefs.

The contingency matrix have been used to discover patterns of associations, that is clusters of beliefs which are highly related, and interdependent. Through the technique of cluster analysis, beliefs have been rotated, based on initial observation of clusters of beliefs that are significantly related to each other, until significant patterns have emerged.¹

	Politics	Opponent	Optimism	Prediction	Goal Selection	Approaches	Strategies	Risk
	A							
Goal Selection		.59	.59	B				
Approaches	.50	.62	.67	.51	.52			
Strategies	.56	.61	.50	.55	.53			
Risk	.56	.63	.64		.53	C	.53	.58
Action	.53	.50			.53		.54	.52
Force	.57	.54	.68		.71	.50	.63	.54

Fig. 8.1--Clusters in Nasser's Operational Code

¹For a more detailed explanation of the cluster analysis technique, see Stein (1969).

A cluster of beliefs is defined as a given number of beliefs which occur together with a certain percentage of magnitude. It appears from the matrix of correlations presented in Table 8.7 that there were three major clusters of beliefs in Nasser's operational code denoted A, B, and C. (i) Cluster A of beliefs combines the philosophical beliefs of the nature of the political universe, image of the opponent, optimism with all the six instrumental beliefs. This indicates that the articulation of beliefs related to the political universe, opponent, and optimism tends to facilitate the articulation of approaches to goal selection and implementation, acceptance of risk, and political tactics. The only exception to this tightly associated set is that the first philosophical belief (political universe) is not related to the first instrumental belief (goal selection) and the optimism belief is not associated with political tactics. (ii) Cluster B of beliefs combines the three instrumental beliefs related to political approaches and strategies and risk acceptance or avoidance are closely associated with the philosophical-instrumental set of political universe, image of the opponent, optimism, prediction, and goal selection. It provides strong evidence that the articulation of certain approaches to goal selection and certain views of politics and images of the opponent strongly facilitates the articulation of approaches and strategies to the achievement of goals. (iii) Cluster C of

beliefs is purely instrumental. It indicates a pattern of co-occurrence between the articulation of approaches and strategies and the articulation of beliefs about risk acceptance, political action, and the utility of military force.

These three sets of beliefs represent internally cohesive and interdependent clusters of beliefs which co-occur in a systematic way. Cluster A has an index of agreement (cohesiveness) of .59 whereas the same index for clusters B and C is .58 and .55 respectively.

The internal connections of these three clusters can be schematically presented in the following figure:

Fig.8.2--Relationships of Contingencies among Nasser's Operational Code Beliefs

It appears from the clusters illustrated in Figure 8.3 that the set of philosophical beliefs related to the nature of politics, images of the opponent and optimism and the set of instrumental beliefs related to selection of goals, strategy, risk acceptance, and utility of military force have been articulated as a well-integrated cluster of beliefs.

What is the relationship between the interdependence and centrality of operational code beliefs? A comparison of the six most central beliefs in Table 8.2 and the six most interdependent beliefs in Table 8.6 points out that five out of the six most central beliefs were also the most interdependent beliefs. Beliefs pertaining to approaches, strategies, images of the opponent, optimism, and goal selection did appear as the most central (measured by frequency) and as the most interdependent (measured by contingency analysis). Spearman rank order correlation between beliefs ranked according to their centrality and according to their contingencies is .71 which indicates that the most central beliefs were generally the most contingent ones.

These findings support the hypothesis cited in the literature of content analysis (Pool, 1959, and Stein, 1969) which states that frequency of symbols is an accurate indicator of the intensity of commitment to such symbols.

This finding is also supported when we examine the relationship between interdependence and stability. Is it true as Pruitt claims that the flexibility (changeability) of a belief system is an inverse function of its interconnectedness? Our comparison between the six most stable beliefs as presented in Table 8.3 and the six most contingent beliefs as presented in Table 8.6 indicates that only three beliefs (image of the opponent, optimism, and goal selection) were highly stable and interdependent. Beliefs about the nature of politics, international system, and the predictability of political life were highly stable but did not exhibit high contingency. Spearman rank-order correlation between beliefs rank ordered according to their stability and according to their contingency is .06. This indicates no relationship between the flexibility of the belief and its contingency upon other beliefs. This finding disconfirms¹

H13 : The more interdependent the more stable
is the operational code.

¹ Stein (1969:401) also found the same finding when she analyzed the image of Menon. The interdependence of his image was not a crucial factor in its stability.

(c) Dynamic interdependence

The purpose of the analysis of the dynamic interdependence of operational code beliefs is to discover whether a change in one set of the operational code beliefs is usually accompanied by a similar change in other beliefs. In order to discover this aspect of structural interdependence, we treated each operational code belief as an interval variable with value "1" indicating the direction towards one pole and value "2" referring to the opposite pole of the same belief. Thus, each belief has a quantitative value for the average position of Nasser on various belief variables for each year. The dynamic interdependence can thus be investigated by the use of the correlation technique. The stronger the correlation between any pair of beliefs, the greater the level of interdependence.

From the simple correlations presented in Table 8.7, we may draw some generalizations about the dynamic interdependence in Nasser's operational code beliefs:

- I. (i) The more he viewed politics as conflictual, the more he tended to be optimistic about long-term goals.
- (ii) The more he viewed politics as conflictual, the more he tended to believe in an active role as a political leader.
- (iii) The more he viewed politics as conflictual, the more he tended to choose optimal rather than feasible goals.

TABLE 8.7

CORRELATIONS AMONG NASSER'S OPERATIONAL CODE BELIEFS

	Politics	Opponent	System	Optimism	Predict- ability	Leader	Goal Selection	Approaches	Strategies	Risk	Action
Politics	.085										
Opponent	.220	-.097									
System	.467	.318	-.051								
Optimism	-.274	.194	-.006	.022							
Predictability	.551	.316	-.179	.464	.210						
Leader	.493	.093	.147	.211	.382	.559					
Goal Selection	-.245	-.497	-.293	-.264	.407	.087	.176				
Approaches	-.196	-.103	-.078	-.033	.053	-.218	-.173	-.141			
Strategies	.191	.317	-.329	-.372	-.211	-.031	.098	-.053	-.054		
Risk	-.251	.256	.161	.122	.184	.188	-.110	.139	-.336	.041	
Action	-.356	-.248	-.046	-.078	.196	-.048	-.245	.161	.033	.057	-.103

- (iv) The more he viewed politics as conflictual, the less he advocated the use of military force and the less he advocated the pursuit of Blitzkrieg approaches.

Nasser's conflictual view of the political universe in general was accompanied by an optimistic view, an ability to control immediately relevant events in his own society, choice of optimal goals and incremental strategies, whereas his relatively harmonious view of inter-Arab politics was correlated with a belief in the unlikelihood of achieving Arab unity in the near future, the inability to control Arab historical development and choice of optimal goal. However, his harmonious view of Arab politics was not accompanied by an advocacy of Blitzkrieg approaches or military force.

- II (v) The more he viewed his opponent as aggressive, the more optimistic he was.
- (vi) The more he viewed his opponent as aggressive, the less he advocated blitzkrieg approaches and the less he believed in the utility of military force.

Nasser's view of Israel as expansionist was always associated with a belief that Arab goals toward Israel would be achieved in the long run. However, he was ultra-careful in dealing with Israel or advocating use of force.

- III (vii) The more optimistic he was about the long term trends, the more he was confident about his ability to control developments in his own society.
- (viii) The more optimistic he was, the less he advocated the pursuit of high risk policies.

This pattern was persistent in Nasser's operational code. His pessimism toward the prospects of achieving Arab unity was associated with a belief that he could not control Arab politics and a belief in the permissibility of pursuing high risk plans in Arab relations. However, his optimistic view toward the Arab-Israeli conflict was associated with an injunction against the pursuit of high risk policies.

- IV (ix) The more predictable he viewed political life, the more he advocated the selection of optimal goals and the advocacy of blitzkrieg and total mobilization approaches.
- V (x) The conceptualization of the role of the leader as an active one, was associated with the choice of optimal goals.
- VI (xi) The selection of optimal goals was associated with an injunction against the application of military force.

Nasser's belief that he ought to select optimal goals in the Arab-Israeli conflict was associated with an injunction against the application of force in that conflict.

These dynamic relationships in Nasser's operational code can be illustrated as follows:

Fig. 8.3--An Illustration of the Dynamic Interdependence of Nasser's Operational Code Beliefs

These results indicate that Nasser's operational code constituted a system of statically and dynamically interdependent beliefs. As such they confirm

H12 : Operational code beliefs are basically interdependent

(c) Factor Analysis

Finally, we would like to see how Nasser's beliefs are structured, what beliefs go together, and how many dimensions are in the code. To answer these questions, we factor analyzed the 12 master belief variables. The results are presented in Table 8.8. In general, we found that Nasser's operational code is quite complex: five factors are extracted from the 12 belief variables.

The five factors may be described as follows:

I The Philosophical factor

This factor explains 34% of the variance in Nasser's operational codes. It has strong positive loading from the philosophical sub-system: nature of politics, coupled with optimism, role of leader, a strong positive loading from the selection of goal beliefs, moderate negative loading from the utility of force belief.

II The Opponent factor

Although this factor only explains 23% of the variance in Nasser's operational code, it reveals a very important pattern. The strong positive loading from the image of the opponent is coupled with a strong negative loading from the approach belief. Nasser's negative image of the opponent was always coupled with an injunction against immediate implementation.

III The Instrumental/Philosophical factor

This factor has strong positive loadings from the predictability of political life beliefs, goal selection and approaches belief.

IV The Strategic factor

The strong negative loading from the strategy belief and the strong positive loading from the action belief on that factor indicate that these two variables were disjointed in Nasser's code. His advocacy of a deterrent strategy did not mean a quick or immediate action to implement such strategy.

V The Global factor

This factor indicates Nasser's unwillingness to take risks when confronted with a conflictual relationship. The strong positive loading from the risk belief and the strong negative loading from the nature of global and regional system belief indicate that the perception of a conflictual relationship (such as the Arab-Israeli relationship) tended to invoke an injunction against high risk.

The five factors can be presented as follows:

Factor I	(politics + optimism + leader + selection)	- force
Factor II	(opponent image + optimism)	- approaches
Factor III	(prediction + goal selection + approaches)	-
Factor IV	(action)	- strategy
Factor V	(system)	- risk

TABLE 8.8

FACTOR ANALYSIS
OF NASSER'S OPERATIONAL CODE BELIEFS

Belief	FACTORS				
	I	II	III	IV	V
Nature of Politics	.946*	.014	-.217	-.099	-.055
Opponent	.036	.769*	.173	-.201	.169
System	.104	.094	-.010	.064	-.721*
Optimism	.482*	.382*	.004	.100	.283
Predictability	-.086	.029	.824*	.079	.097
Leader	.643*	.017	.259	.280	.194
Goal Selection	.664*	-.056	.542	-.289	-.111
Approaches	-.121	-.742*	.407*	-.223	.243
Strategies	-.315	.065	.074	-.450*	.029
Risk	.134	.298	.112	-.021	.470*
Action	-.118	.157	-.115	.732*	-.050
Force	-.390*	-.133	-.119	-.051	.081
Variance Explained	34.41	23.4	19.41	13.11	9.71

*denotes significant loadings

The first factor extracts Nasser's basic philosophical orientation: conflictual politics, optimistic view, active role and optimal goal. The second, fourth and fifth factors extract the essence of Nasser's instrumental orientation. They indicate that Nasser's negative image of the opponent, deterrent strategy and conflictual view of regional politics were always coupled with instrumental safeguards: incremental approach, delayed action, avoidance of high risks. More importantly in all factors, Nasser's negative image of the opponent did not contribute significantly to the structure of the factors. The goal selection and goal pursuit (negatively associated) were more important than the image of the opponent. This indicates that an emphasis on Nasser's image of the opponent, as in some of the traditional literature, fails to capture the essence of his operational code. A more realistic and comprehensive view would take into account the salience of his approach to the selection of goals (optimal vs. feasible) and the safeguards placed on the pursuit of such goals placing them in the conflictual-historical conceptualization of the political universe. Further, the factors loadings indicate that the basic defining characteristics of Nasser's operational code lie in his conflictual view of domestic and global politics,

his negative image of the opponent, fundamental certainty of the achievement of goals because of historical development, and selection of optimal goals. This set of relatively central, stable, and inter-related beliefs was linked to another set of instrumental beliefs designed to balance the first set. Nasser advocated incrementalism, trial and error as the basic approach to goal implementation, deterrence as the best approach to control the opponent's behaviour, and the avoidance of linking optimality with pursuit of high risk policies.

(d) The Issue-area Variability of the Operational Code

Up until now we have presented a simplified model of Nasser's operational code consisting of a limited and closely inter-connected set of beliefs which exhibited a considerable degree of centrality, and stability. As we have already noticed in the analysis of the elements of the operational code, Nasser's operational code operated in different issue-areas. At each level, the code functionally adjusted itself to the particular characteristics of the issue. For example, Nasser's "Arab" operational code was not exactly similar to his "Arab-Israeli" operational code or his "domestic" or "general foreign" operational code. Each issue tended to activate different responses to the operational code beliefs. As a result, specific beliefs were particularly salient in some issue areas than in others.

Table 8.9 presents cross-tabulations of Nasser's twelve operational code beliefs with ten issue-areas: domestic-security, domestic-political, domestic-economic, domestic-status, foreign-relations with the West, foreign-relations with the East, and the Third World, foreign-relations with Arabs, foreign-military Arab-Israeli relations, foreign-political Arab-Israeli relations, general foreign relations. The correlations and levels of significance presented reveal that seven of Nasser's operational code beliefs functionally operated at the particular level of each issue.

The six operational code beliefs varied according to the following pattern:

I Optimism/pessimism:

1. In domestic economic issues:	Unqualified optimism
2. In issues related to domestic status:	Unqualified optimism
3. Inter-Arab politics:	Optimism qualified with an aura of pessimism about the short run
4. Arab-Israeli politics:	Optimism qualified with pessimism about the immediate prospects of an Arab-Israeli settlement

II Role of leader in shaping historical development:

1. In domestic political issues:	Leader can control immediately relevant political problems
2. In domestic economic issues:	Leader cannot achieve all economic goals, at least not alone

- 3. In domestic status issues: Leader can generally play an active role but he cannot control history
- 4. Inter-Arab politics: Leader cannot control Arab historical development

III Goal-selection

- 1. In all domestic issues: Choose optimal goals
- 2. Foreign relations with the West: Choose optimal goals
- 3. Foreign relations with the Third World: Generally feasible goals
- 4. Arab politics: Be prepared to settle for feasible goals but select optimal ones
- 5. Arab-Israeli conflict: Select optimal goals only

IV Approaches to goal pursuit:

- 1. In issues related to domestic politics and inter-Arab relations: Prepare ground/Incremental approach
- 2. Domestic economic issues: Blitzkrieg approach/total mobilization of resources
- 3. The Arab-Israeli conflict: Prepare ground/total mobilization of resources

V Strategies of political action:

- 1. In issues related to domestic security and relations with opponents: Aggressive strategy of political annihilation
- 2. Inter-Arab relations: Strategy of mutual accommodation and deterrence of reactionaries
- 3. Arab-Israeli conflict and relations with the West: Deterrent strategy
- 4. Foreign relations in general: Accommodative strategy based on reciprocation of hostility and friendship

TABLE 8,9

VARIATION OF NASSER'S OPERATIONAL CODE BELIEFS
ACCORDING TO ISSUE AREAS

Beliefs Issues	I		II		III		IV		V		VI		VII		VIII		IX	
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
Domestic military-security	5	1	42	1			12	-	12	1	-	1	8	1	4	-	2	49
Domestic political issues	18	1	8	-			18	3	16	-	23	2	3	-	35	12	-	18
Domestic economic issues	10	-	6	-			37	2	8	-	9	6	9	-	33	61	-	17
Domestic status	21	2	14	2	5	-	95	1	16	-	23	11	38	3	38	26	3	33
West			194	6	16	-	21	-	27	2	1	-	23	-	5	1	20	46
East and Third World			18	-	13	-	6	-	5	-	-	-	4	3		5	2	4
Arabs	5	3	221	4	21	3	115	10	70	1	8	5	41	16	52	19	23	60
Arab Israeli military			37	2	1	-	13	2	11	-	8	-	3	-	8	8	1	66
Arab-Israeli political	1	-	338	6	12	-	54	11	20	-	-	1	59	1	81	44	5	87
Foreign Status General	2	-	39	-	77	3	41	6	20	-	3	-	20	1	4	7	34	25
TOTAL	62	7	917	21	45	6	412	35	205	3	67	26	208	24	241	183	90	399
CRAMER' V	.358		.133		.228		.27		.193		.390		.44		.331		.524	
P =	.18		.21		.64		.003		.739		.08		.001		.01		.0	

TABLE 8.9 (cont'd)

Beliefs Issues	X		XI		XII	
	1	2	1	2	1	2
Domestic military-security	1	7			3	2
Domestic political issues	1	5				
Domestic economic issues	-	1	-	1	1	1
Domestic status	1	2	16	13	1	7
West	3	-	13	16	-	1
East and Third World			1	-		
Arabs	11	5	20	5	1	4
Arab-Israeli military	3	4	8	16	1	14
Arab-Israeli political	-	7	17	35	5	12
Foreign Status General	6	1	8	7	1	3
TOTAL	19	23	76	95	10	45
CRAMER' V	.654		.395		.366	
p =	.02		.02		.69	

LEGEND:

I Nature of Politics	(1) Confictual	(2) Harmonious
II Nature of Opponent	(1) Aggressive	(2) Conciliatory
III Nature of system	(1) Confictual	(2) Harmonious
IV Optimism	(1) Optimistic	(2) Pessimistic
V Predictability	(1) Predictable	(2) Capricious
VI Role of Leader	(1) Active	(2) Passive
VII Goal selection	(1) Optimal	(2) Feasible
VIII Approaches	(1) Incremental	(2) Blitzkrieg
IX Strategies	(1) Accommodative	(2) Deterrent
X Risk	(1) High	(2) Low
XI Action	(1) Actively	(2) Slow action
XII Force	(1) Avoid	(2) Use

VI Risk acceptance and avoidance:

1. Arab-Israeli conflict: High risk policies prohibited
2. Inter-Arab relations: High risk policies permissible
3. Foreign relations in general: High risk policies permissible/mandatory

VII The utility of military force:

1. In issues related to domestic politics, inter-Arab relations and foreign relations in general: Avoid resort to military force. Force is useful only as a deterrent
2. Arab-Israeli conflict: Military force is a viable means to deter Israel

These findings confirm

H14 : Political leaders answer the operational code beliefs differently depending on the issue areas

The result of such variations was the articulation of a complex multi-level operational code which consists basically of specific sets of beliefs clustering around certain issue areas and/or being answered differently according to the issues being addressed. Nasser's operational code contained five basic levels: the domestic-security operational code, the domestic economic-political operational code, the general foreign policy operational code, the "Arab" operational code, and the "Arab-Israeli" operational code.

Nasser's operational code varied in the level of simplicity/complexity and in the degree of "Hawkishness-dovishness" portrayed. For example, the domestic-security level, which dealt

with relations with domestic opponents, was highly simple and hawkish. For Nasser, domestic critics, especially those who belonged to the ancien regime, the Moslem Brothers, and the communists were either imperialist or Soviet agents. Their goals were viewed as fundamentally incompatible with his own goals. Hence, his strategy was to crush them ruthlessly. The general foreign policy level, despite its obvious simplicity, was more dovish in the sense that the strategy advocated was one of mutual accommodation, accommodation, and negotiation rather than permanent war as was the case in the domestic-security operational code. However, the general foreign policy level provided Nasser with a leeway for articulating high risk policies which he was not willing to pursue in the "Arab-Israeli" level.

The "Arab" and "Arab-Israeli" levels of Nasser's operational code exhibited a higher degree of complexity and richness with varying degrees of hawkishness. The distinguishing features of both levels lie in the goal selection, risk, and military force beliefs. Nasser was willing to select feasible goals in dealing with the Arabs especially in achieving Arab unity. He was prepared to settle for the goal of Arab economic and political co-operation instead of the optimal goal of Arab constitutional unity which was viewed as achievable only in the long run. This did not imply an abandonment of total constitutional unity, but a realistic recognition of Arab diversities

TABLE 8.10

NASSER'S MULTI-LEVEL OPERATIONAL CODE

BELIEFS	DOMESTIC-SECURITY ISSUES	DOMESTIC ECONOMIC & POLITICAL ISSUES	GENERAL FOREIGN POLICY
Opponent Image	Domestic opponents are destructionists.	<p>Success is inherent in the nature of our goals.</p> <p>Domestic politics follows a predictable pattern.</p> <p>Leader can control economic and political issues, but not alone. Select optimal goals of doubling GNP in ten years. Modify means of applying socialism.</p>	<p>The international system is conflict ridden.</p>
Global System			
Optimism/Pessimism			
Prediction			
Leader's role	Our strategy is to liquidate domestic opposition.	<p>Incrementalism, trial and error are the best.</p> <p>Avoid premature action.</p> <p>Avoid resort to violence and force.</p>	<p>Select only optimal goals.</p> <p>Pursue a strategy of mutual accommodation.</p> <p>High risk mandatory.</p>
Goal selection			
Approaches			
Strategies			
Risk			
Action			
Military Force			

BELIEFS	INTER-ARAB POLITICS	ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
Opponent Image	Arab conservatives are imperialist agents.	Israel is expansionist. This is a consequence of Zionist ideology and internal needs.
Global system	Radical-conservative conflict, but harmony among Arab peoples.	Arab-Israeli regional system is conflictual.
Optimism/pessimism	Arab unity will be achieved <u>only</u> in the long run.	Optimist that Palestine will be liberated, but pessimist about immediate settlement.
Prediction	Arab history follows a regularized circular and progressive pattern.	Arab history predicts an Arab triumph in the long run.
Leader's role	Leader cannot control Arab historical development. Depends. Feasible goals in the short run without abandoning optimal goal of unity. Flexible on means of unity.	Select optimal goals only. Flexible on means but not on goals.
Goal selection	Prepare ground for Arab unity.	Prepare ground by building Arab economic power and unity, mobilize Arab resources.
Approaches	Deter Arab conservatives and attempt to end their regimes. High risk policy permissible. Timing not crucial for Arab unity.	Deterrent strategy
Strategies	Avoid resort to force with Arabs.	High risk policy prohibited. Timing crucial for Arab action. Delay action against Israel. Avoid being provoked. Force is viable means to deter Israel but not to be initiated.
Risk		
Timing		
Action		
Military force		

and contradictions. However, Nasser was willing to select only optimal goals in his dealings with Israel. Any change or modification of the goal of the full restoration of Palestinian rights as stipulated in the UN resolutions was viewed as an abandonment of the Palestinian cause.

Nasser was not prepared to take high risks in dealing with Israel, but he was willing to take such risk in dealing with the Arabs, especially in experimenting with various forms of Arab formal unity. The injunction against the pursuit of high risk policies against Israel was coupled with a parallel injunction against the initiation of military force, the embarkment on a premature action, or miscalculating the cruciality of the timing of such action. Apart from the injunction against resort to military force in Arab politics, Nasser was willing to pursue a more aggressive strategy against Arab conservative regimes, without being able to define the limits of his Arab action. On the contrary, he acknowledged that the timing of Arab action may not be crucial because the goal of unity would be achieved, according to Arab historical determinism, regardless of present obstacles. Such results lend support to

H15 : Political leaders use specific clusters of beliefs in dealing with specific issue areas.

3. Functions of the Operational Code

Having examined the structural characteristics of the operational code, we can turn to the task of testing hypotheses pertaining to its salience. First, we will try to see under what conditions the operational code is articulated. Secondly, we will examine the relationship between particular beliefs and choice propensities.

(a) Issues and the Operational Code

We have theorized that

H1 : The decision maker's political beliefs are more likely to be salient in foreign policy decision making than in domestic policy decision making.

To test this hypothesis, we compared the two categories of issues: foreign and domestic in terms of the frequencies of beliefs. The empirical evidence seems to support this hypothesis. The results presented in Table 8.11 reveal two major findings: (i) only 11 % of paragraphs referring to domestic issue area contained operational code beliefs. There are almost three times as many paragraphs containing one or several operational code beliefs, related to foreign issues as domestic issues. Almost 30% of paragraphs in which foreign policy issue areas were articulated contained operational code beliefs. Given the size of the sample, a 19-point difference between the salience of articulation of operational

TABLE 8.11

AGGREGATE ISSUE AREA DISTINCTION OF
NASSER'S OPERATIONAL CODE

Belief	Domestic Issues	Foreign Issues	Total
Nature of Politics	58	11	69
Image of Opponent	73	864	937
International System	5	145	150
Optimistic/Pessimistic	168	279	447
Prediction	48	160	208
Role of Leader	75	17	92
Goal Selection	13	149	162
Approaches	209	217	426
Strategies	116	373	489
Risk	6	36	42
Action	13	42	55
Military Force	11	44	55
TOTAL NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL CODE PARAGRAPHS	795	2337	3132
TOTAL NO. OF PARAGRAPHS	6991	7413	14404

%

11%

30%

21%

code beliefs in domestic and foreign policy issue area is very significant. (ii) Almost 74% of all Nasser's operational code beliefs were articulated in conjunction with foreign policy issues. Further, twelve out of the fourteen operational code beliefs were articulated more with foreign policy issues than with domestic policy issues.

These results clearly confirm that operational code beliefs are more salient in foreign policy than in domestic issue areas.

(b) Crises and the Operational Code

A crisis is a situation of high uncertainty and tension. In our theoretical framework, we expected that the articulation of belief will be more frequent in a crisis situation than in a non-crisis situation.

H2 : The decision maker's political beliefs are likely to be more salient under foreign policy crisis conditions than under foreign policy non-crisis conditions.

Operationally, a crisis period is defined as the interval between initial receipt of information or the precipitating event and the first action taken to resolve the decisional crisis by the decision maker. A precipitating event is defined as the event cited in the literature as the first action which triggered the crisis. According to this definition, the crisis period of the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company crisis in 1956 is the interval between Nasser's initial receipt

of the Dulles' declaration that the USA would not finance the High Dam Project on 19 July 1956 and Nasser's announcement of his decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956. Likewise, the crisis period of the Syrian secession crisis of 1961 extends between Nasser's receipt of information on the morning of 28 September 1961 that a coup was launched in Syria and his announcement on 5 October that he respects Syria's right to go its own way. According to the same definition, the crisis period of the 1967 crisis is the interval between Nasser's receipt of information concerning Israeli threats against Syria on 10 and 11 May 1967 and his acceptance of the cease-fire resolution on 9 June 1967. For each of these three crises, a pre-crisis phase is defined as a comparable time-period preceding the initial precipitating event. A post-crisis phase is defined as a comparable time period following the first resolving event.

The next step in testing H2 is to tap the frequencies of reference to the operational code beliefs during each of these three phases as an indicator of the salience of these beliefs in each phase. This test is based on three basic assumptions: (1) the linguistic expression of beliefs is an indicator of their importance. Beliefs which are not or cannot be expressed are secondary beliefs (Armstrong, 1973:29); (2) whenever a belief is manifested, initiating causes will always be present (Armstrong, 1973:16). The increase in the

rate of belief-articulation reflects the presence of "abnormal" initiating causes (crisis, stress, etc...); (3) frequency of reference to operational code beliefs provides a relatively accurate indicator of their intensity and salience to the decision maker. Pool (1959:194) asserts that much of the total variance in intensity can be accounted for by one component, frequency.

As it appears from the results presented in Table 8.12, there was a consistent sharp increase in the articulation of operational code beliefs during the three crisis periods compared to the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods.

TABLE 8.12
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF NASSER'S
OPERATIONAL CODE BELIEFS IN THREE CRISES

	the 1956 crisis	the 1961 crisis	the 1967 crisis
Pre-crisis	3	00	14
Crisis	18	23	65
Post-crisis	10	00	11
Total	31	23	90

A definite increase in the absolute frequency of articulation of beliefs during crisis periods does not prove the relative salience of such belief. Consequently, we calculated an index of salience of operational code beliefs for each of the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods. This index is simply the percentage of operational code paragraphs of all articulated paragraphs. The percentages presented in Table 8.13 show an increase in the salience of operational code beliefs in two out of the three crisis studied. In the case of the 1961 crisis, there was a 29-point difference between the salience of operational code beliefs in the pre-crisis and the crisis periods (no documents were articulated in the post-crisis period). Similarly, there was a 10-point increase in the salience of the operational code beliefs in the 1967 crisis period compared to a 13-point decrease in the post-crisis period. The results of the 1956 crisis were less conclusive. The index of salience of the operational code changed only by three points in the crisis and post-crisis periods.

At any rate, it seems from this empirical testing that the hypothesis is generally confirmed.

TABLE 8.13
THE SALIENCE OF NASSER'S OPERATIONAL CODE
(PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PARAGRAPHS CONTAINING CODE STATEMENTS)

	The 1956 crisis	The 1961 crisis	The 1967 crisis
Pre-crisis	20%	00	31%
Crisis	23%	29%	41%
Post-crisis	20%	00	29%

(c) The Operational Code and Choice Propensities

The logic of the operational code is based on the expectation that a systematic relationship exists between the decision maker's beliefs and his choice propensities. According to Heradstveit (1978:134), choice propensities do not refer to actual choices, but rather to the policy choices he advocates before intervening variables force him to modify his original position. Heradstveit distinguished between two possible choice propensities toward any issue area: advocacy of compromise and negotiation with the adversary now, and advocacy of non-compromise and non-negotiation with adversary at least for the time being. Heradstveit suggested three basic hypotheses which link some operational code beliefs with choice propensities:

- H3 : Decision makers who hold a unitary image of the opponent are likely to advocate uncompromising policies.

H4 : Optimists tend to recommend compromising policies while pessimists tend to advocate uncompromising policies.

H5 : A decision maker who attributes dispositional explanations to the opponent is likely to recommend unconciliatory policies.

The dependent variable of choice propensities was operationalized along the conciliation-nonconciliation scale suggested by Heradstveit. However, the scale was expanded into a four dimensional scale to distinguish between various degrees of conciliation and non-conciliation:

- 1) Highly non-conciliatory: The leader expects from the adversary unprecedented conditions to show good faith such as unilateral disarmament or total surrender. He also rejects negotiations.
- 2) Non-conciliatory: The leader argues that the adversary must accept his viewpoints and goals as conditions for compromise. He puts the onus on the adversary to arrive at a compromise. He also rejects negotiation now.
- 3) Conciliatory: The leader does not expect any unilateral concessions from the opponent. Rather, he expects the adversary to reciprocate conciliation. He also advocates entering into negotiations today to settle outstanding issues.
- 4) Highly conciliatory: The leader emphasizes his determination to pursue an active policy of accommodation and negotiation with the opponent even if the opponent does not reciprocate.

The three hypotheses have been tested as follows:

- H3 : Decision makers who hold a unitary image of the opponent are more likely to advocate uncompromising policies than those who hold competitive images.

The results of the testing of this hypothesis are presented in Table 8.14. They lend strong support to the hypothesized relationships between the decision maker's conceptualization of the adversary's decision making model and his choice propensity:

TABLE 8.14

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMAGE OF THE OPPONENT
AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Policy Choices	Opponent		TOTAL
	Unitary Actor	Competitive Actor	
Highly Uncompromising	5	-	5
Uncompromising	9	1	10
Compromising	1	2	3
Highly Compromising	1	3	4
TOTAL	16	6	22

$$V = .72$$

$$p = .01$$

For example, from 1955 through 1969, Nasser viewed Israel from the perspective of the unitary decision making model. He argued that all Israeli political factions and all Zionist organizations subscribe to the same expansionist goals. The only difference - Nasser said - might be in the level of articulation, not in the depth of conviction. Sometimes, he used to extrapolate the policies of the Israeli opposition parties to the general policy of the Israeli government.

Meanwhile, from 1955 on, Nasser rejected any negotiations with Israel. He reasoned that such negotiations were not necessary because solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict already existed in the UN resolutions.

The hypothesis may be further confirmed if we look at Nasser's later views of Israel. By 1970, Nasser altered his unitary image of Israel. He began to view differences in the Israeli society between the ruling military elite and the oppressed portion of the Israeli people who advocate a just settlement. Further, he viewed more contradictions within the ruling elite between "hawks" and "doves". Such image change coincided with Nasser's subsequent overtures to the United States to take an active part in reaching a political settlement in the Middle East and his acceptance of the Rogers Proposals

in July 1970. It also coincided with his overtures to enter into a dialogue with Nahum Goldmann, then president of the World Jewish Congress, with the purpose of negotiating a settlement.

On 22 July 1963, Nasser justified his reluctance to criticize the policies of the Baath Party of Syria on the basis of his perception of the Baath Party from the perspective of the pluralistic decision making model. He reasoned that he perceived an inter-party disagreement on the correct Arab policy between the grassroots and the leadership of the Party. The grassroots were pressing for more conciliatory policies toward Arabs and domestic opponents whereas the party leadership was holding to non-conciliatory policies. He also viewed an intra-leadership conflict between the Bitar faction supporting unitarianism and the Hourani faction supporting separatism. Nasser argued that he decided to attack the party when it became clear that the grassroots and the doves had lost and the Baath shifted to a relatively unitary model dominated by the hawks.

H4 : Optimists recommend compromising policies while pessimists advocate uncompromising policies.

Heradstveit (1978:161-62) hypothesized that optimistic and/or pessimistic images of change do affect choice propensities. Optimism was defined as a belief that a settlement of the conflict is highly likely in the immediate future. Conversely, pessimism was conceptualized as a belief that a quick settlement is unlikely to occur.

The evidence in Nasser's case supports the optimism/pessimism hypothesis. The results presented in Table 8.15 indicate that Nasser's optimism about the likelihood of achieving goals and/or arriving at a settlement on a certain external issue tended to be correlated with advocacy of compromising and highly compromising policies, and vice-versa.

TABLE 8.15
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPTIMISM/PESSIMISM
AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Policy choices	Belief		Total
	Optimistic	Pessimistic	
Highly Uncompromising	-	3	3
Uncompromising	4	17	21
Compromising	16	1	17
Highly Compromising	8	1	9
TOTAL	28	22	50

$$V = .81$$

$$p = .01$$

Nasser's pessimism about the immediate prospects of reaching an Arab-Israeli settlement coincided with his rejection of negotiations with Israel whereas his optimism about the prospects of improving Egyptian-American relations tended to

coincide with advocacy of correspondence, negotiation, and mutual accommodation with the USA (especially during the Kennedy administration) on the Palestine issue (for example, speech on 22/7/1961).

H5 : A decision maker who attributes dispositional explanations to the opponent is likely to recommend unconciliatory policies.

The individual's pattern of attribution affects his information processing capacity, responsiveness to the opponent's policies, and readiness to advocate compromising policy. Attribution theories argue that individuals explain the opponent's behavior and goals in terms of dispositional explanations, tend to ignore the opponent's friendly behavior and goals by simply attributing them to some situational factors. They tend to dismiss the opponent's friendly overtures as mere reaction to some environmental influences and constraints. Such rigidity makes the individual insensitive to the possibilities of change. Under these conditions, Heradstveit argues, the individual feels that there is no need to initiate moderate policies to reciprocate the opponent's conciliatory moves (Heradstveit, 1978:192). Further, such individuals are also likely to attribute situational explanations to their own behavior and goals and perceive themselves as merely reacting to some external imperatives. Consequently, they tend to perceive themselves as having little freedom of choice and limited ability to move away from their pre-determined policies.

According to Heradstveit (1978:193-195), this prevents the type of integrative thinking that enables one to see other options and leads the individual to de-emphasize the need for concessions on concrete issues.

Holsti (1977:13) also hypothesized that persons who regard other nations as reacting to aspects of the international system (situational attribution) are likely to prescribe policies that are rather different from those espoused by persons who believe that the source of action derives from the actor's dispositions or attributes. Holsti recalls the debate in Washington during the months following the end of the Second World War on sources of Soviet foreign policy. Henry Wallace and Joseph Davis argued that the Soviets were merely reacting to protect themselves against external threat (German militarism). As a result, they warned against American actions that could be interpreted by Stalin as confirming their fears. In contrast, Averell Harriman and George Kennan emphasized that the sources of Soviet behavior could be traced to the Soviet regime and that a policy of concessions and compromise would only embolden Stalin.

The results extracted from the case of Nasser lend support to the attributional hypothesis as indicated in the following table:

TABLE 8.16
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTRIBUTION AND
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Policy choices	Belief		TOTAL
	Dispositional	Situational	
Highly Uncompromising	4	-	4
Uncompromising	15	4	19
Conciliatory	3	6	9
Highly Conciliatory	-	1	1
TOTAL	22	11	33

$$V = .54$$

$$p = .02$$

In the case of Nasser, we found a similar pattern in support of the hypothesis. For example, during his first two years in power, Nasser attributed Britain's goal to ensure some kind of military presence in the Suez Canal base to a legitimate quest to secure British global lines of communication. However, such quest for security, Nasser added, cannot be guaranteed through the forcible occupation of the Suez base but by mutual negotiations between Egypt and Britain. He expressed his readiness to be reasonable and accommodate Britain's

interests provided that Britain would reciprocate. On the other hand, after 1955, Nasser attributed Israel's expansionist and aggressive behavior to dispositional factors, the essential nature of the Zionist ideology, Israel's historical goals, and the demographic needs of the Israeli society. He argued that expansionism is intrinsic in the very fabric of the Israeli society. Consequently, Nasser reasoned that Israel must accept first all the UN resolutions on Palestine before finalizing any lasting settlement.

4. Summary and Conclusion

In this chapter we have analyzed the structural characteristics of Nasser's operational code. Through an analysis of the richness, differentiation, centrality, stability, consistency, contingency, and dynamic interdependence of elements of Nasser's operational code, a simplified model of Nasser's code has been extracted. The limited set of beliefs pertaining to the essential nature of politics, opponent image, optimism, strategy, and military force was found to be highly central, stable and positively inter-related. The same set of beliefs has been found to be negatively related to the central belief about the selection of goals. These two sets of beliefs together define the essential characteristic of the operational code of Nasser. We also found that Nasser's operational code had functioned on a multi-level of issue-areas and had varied considerably in terms of complexity, simplicity and hawkishness/dovishness.

Further, some hypotheses pertaining to the predictive power of the operational code beliefs were tested. The results confirmed the salience of the operational code under foreign policy conditions and crisis situations and the ability of some operational code beliefs to predict the propensity of the decision maker to advocate certain policy choices. The basic limitation on this test is that it did not test the power of the operational code to predict actual policies, but rather advocated choices. In the next part, we will analyze some actual policy choices and decisions taken by Nasser from the perspective of the operational code. But before we turn to this task, we will attempt a systematic comparative analysis between Nasser's operational code and the operational codes of other leaders.

CHAPTER IX

NASSER'S OPERATIONAL CODE, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

To what extent does Nasser's operational code differ from or resemble operational codes of other political leaders? To answer this question we will resort to the typology of operational codes developed by Holsti (1977). This will help us in placing Nasser's operational code within the general perspective of the operational code approach.

1. The Holsti Typology

Holsti built his typology around two basic dimensions: the first philosophical belief on the essential nature of the political universe and the belief about the basic source of human conflict. Answers to these two questions gave rise to six different types of operational codes as depicted in Table 9.1. Type A includes those that locate the sources of conflict in certain aspects of human nature, but they also believe that these conflict-causing qualities are capable of being circumvented. An example may be Senator Church of the USA or Chancellor Brandt of West Germany. Persons with Type B orientation believe that, because the sources of conflict are

to be found in the attributes of certain nations, the necessary conditions of peace are to reform or eliminate such attributes. The Bolshevik view of a world without capitalist states or the Dulles view of the world without communist states are two instances of this type. Type C includes those who emphasize that conflict is inevitable in an anarchical world and peace can be achieved through the transformation of the global system.

The defining characteristic of the other three types, according to Holsti, is the belief that conflict is a permanent part of the political universe. According to Type D, the roots of conflict are to be found in certain permanent features of the human nature. It is utopian to believe that these human characteristics can be permanently altered. An example may be Senator Fulbright and Senator Vandenberg of the USA. Persons classified as Type E, such as Secretary Acheson and Secretary Kissinger, believe that the roots of conflict are inherent in the structure of the nation state. The system would continue to be plagued by conflict because this structure cannot be eliminated. Type F operational code is typical of those who locate the roots of conflict in an anarchical environment. Unlike Type C, these persons are skeptical about the prospects for systematic reform to eradicate the sources of conflict.

Having developed the six "ideal types" of operational codes, Holsti proceeds to develop a series of hypotheses about the linkages between each type and the rest of operational code.

TABLE 9.1

A SUMMARY OF THE HOLSTI OPERATIONAL CODE TYPOLOGY

Belief	Type A	Type B	Type C
Nature of Politics	Conflict temporary	Conflict temporary	Conflict temporary
Sources of conflict	Human nature	Warlike states	Global system
Condition of peace	Education	Eliminate offender	Transform system
Nature of conflict	Non-zero sum	Zero-sum	Mixed
Scope of conflict	Issues separable	Issues linked	Mixed
Role of conflict	Dysfunctional	Functional	Dysfunctional
Nature of Opponent	Limited adversary	Destructionist	Variable
Source of goals	Security	Adversary's regime	Variable
Response to concil'n	Reciprocate	Take advantage	Uncertain
Response to firm's	Reciprocate	Back down	Uncertain
Optimism/pessimism	Optimistic	Optimistic	Pessimistic
Time, on whose side?	Can be used for all	Our side	Opponent's side
Predictability	Predictable	Predictable	Capricious
Role of leader	Actively guide	Actively guide	Control is limited
Selection of goals	Shared interests	Optimal goals	
Pursuit of goals	Incremental, flexible	Vigorous	
Risk	Limit means	Limit means	
Timing	Crucial	Crucial	
Action	Act quickly when chances of success arise	Use force when it offers prospects of success	
Power concept	Multi dimensional	-----	

Belief	Type D	Type E	Type F
Nature of politics	Conflict permanent	Conflict permanent	Conflict permanent
Source of conflict	Human nature	Nation states	Global system
Condition of peace	Equilibrium in system	Reform states	Change system
Nature of conflict	Zero-sum	Zero-sum	Zero-sum
Scope of conflict	Strong linkages	Variable	Variable
Role of conflict	Sometimes functional	May be functional	May be functional
Nature of Adversary	Variable	May vary widely	May vary widely
Source of goals	Variable	Self-interest	May vary widely
Response to conciliation	Uncertain	Depends	Depends
Response to firm's	Uncertain	Depends	Depends
Optimism/pessimism	Pessimistic	Moderate optimism	Pessimistic
Time, on whose side?	On either side	On either side	On either side
Predictability	Variable	Mixed	Mixed
Role of leader	Actively guide	Leadership crucial	Leadership crucial
Selection of goals	Feasible goals	National interests	Feasible
Pursuit of goals	Moderation, caution	Negotiations	Moderation
Risk	Avoid high risk	Avoid high risk	Depends
Timing	Crucial	Crucial	Depends
Action	Force last resort, prefer negotiations	Military force may be crucial	Depends
Power concept	Multi-dimensional		

beliefs. He then conducted two empirical tests of the typology. In the first empirical test, Holsti drew upon the existing operational code studies of five American leaders; Church, Hatfield, Vandenberg, Dulles, and Acheson, by using information on the first philosophical belief to classify subjects within the typology, and data on the remaining beliefs to assess the hypotheses developed. The second empirical test was based on the assessment of consistencies between judgements of independent coders and the hypothesized responses with reference to the cases of Hatfield, Church, Fulbright, Vandenberg, Acheson, Byrnes, Dulles, Kissinger, the Bolsheviks, Ramsay MacDonald, Kurt Schumacher and Willy Brandt. The results of the two empirical tests provided moderate support of the typology. Holsti, however, acknowledges that the typology represents at best a preliminary effort that falls far short of being the final word on the matter.

There are two basic methods to ascertain the location of Nasser's operational code within the typology: logical and empirical. According to the logical method, information on the first philosophical belief, upon which the typology is based, is used to classify subjects within the typology. Nasser's operational code can be categorized as a Type D operational code, one that is based on the conceptualization of the political universe as inherently and permanently conflictual and locates the source of conflict in human nature. However, some major

discrepancies between Nasser's code and Type D emerged. Contrary to this type, Nasser believed that conflict was a dysfunctional phenomenon, was optimistic, certain about the expansionist nature of the opponent and his likely response to policies of firmness and conciliation, and believed in the predictability of political life and the selection of optimal goals.

According to the empirical method, the leader's responses are compared with the hypothesized responses in each type of the typology in order to ascertain the goodness of fit between both responses. Each of the nineteen responses (beliefs) is given a code and a score representing a rough estimate of the degree to which it is in agreement with the hypothesized responses:¹

- ++ very substantial agreement (2)
- + substantial agreement (1)
- 00 inconclusive evidence (0)
- substantial disagreement (-1)
- very substantial disagreement (-2)

The aggregate score for each type represents the degree to which Nasser's operational code fits that type. The score can vary between + 38 which indicates very substantial agreement and -38 which indicates very substantial disagreement. The higher the positive score the more the goodness of fit between the leader's code and the specific type.

¹ Type C operational code has been excluded from the analysis due to the lack of evidence on most of the hypothesized responses.

TABLE 9.2

GOODNESS OF FIT BETWEEN NASSER'S OPERATIONAL
CODE AND HOLSTI'S TYPOLOGY

TYPE	SCORE OF GOODNESS OF FIT
A	3 (9%)
B	20 (53%)
D	12 (32%)
E	12 (32%)
F	00 (00%)

The scores of the goodness of fit presented in Table 9.2 indicate that Nasser's operational code does not fit Type D operational code as the typology has predicted. It is closer to Type B operational code; one that is based on the view conflict is temporary and attributes conflict to structures of states. Such findings seem to contradict Nasser's actual operational code which is predicated on the belief in the permanency of conflict and attributes conflict to human nature. Additionally, subsumed under Type B is a belief in the vigorous pursuit of goals which seems to contradict Nasser's incrementalist approach.

2. A Proposed Typology

These discrepancies suggest that the two dimensional typology may not be sufficient to distinguish among various types of operational codes. It seems that there is no significant difference between those who believe in various sources of conflict, at least as far as the operational code is concerned. The inter-relatedness among the basic dimensions of Nasser's operational code, especially between the first philosophical belief and the first instrumental belief, suggests to us that a more plausible typology could evolve around these two dimensions. In this sense, one may distinguish between two basic types of operational code; Type A includes those who view the political universe as inherently conflictual and accordingly tend to select optimal goals, and Type B, including those who view the political universe as either harmonious or view conflict as a transitory phenomenon that could be circumvented and accordingly tend to select feasible goals. Extrapolating from the dynamic interdependence of Nasser's operational code beliefs we can proceed to develop a series of hypotheses about the potential responses of each of these two types to other operational code beliefs.

Leaders who belong to Type A operational code are generally more active and idealistic than those who belong to Type B. They tend to view fundamental and insoluble contradictions in the political universe, and irreconcilable adversaries in both domestic

and international politics. They are certain that their goals will be achieved regardless of any short-term difficulties. This is because they perceive a predictable pattern of political events which tells them that time is on their side. They also tend to believe that whereas a leader cannot play a fundamental role in molding history, a leader can shape most immediately relevant events. On the contrary, leaders who belong to Type B tend to view a fundamental harmony of interests in political life, or at worst a mixture of harmony and reconcilable conflict, and usually hold a relatively benign image of the opponent. They differentiate between domestic and international opponents and tend to view international opponents as pursuing some legitimate goals stemming from their quest for national security. They are generally more realistic in their conceptualization of the likelihood of achieving their goals, but more optimistic (than Type A) in their anticipation of the resolution of their conflicts with external opponents. They tend to view history as an ad hoc process with no built in pattern and judge events as they unfold rather than engage in historical forecasting. As a corollary they also conceptualize the role of the leader as a mere political mediator and/or broker of power rather than an active mold of events and society.

Leaders who hold a Type A operational code usually select optimal goals. They are not content with achieving what seems to be a more realistic goal but always aspire to achieve ideal.

goals even if such goals seem to be unachievable in the present circumstances. Consequently, they refuse to abandon, modify, or substitute their goals, but they may be prepared to abandon, modify, or substitute means of achieving such goals. They prefer to pursue a deterrent strategy toward their opponents and are prepared to accept some risks. However, some of them differentiate between various domains of risk acceptance and avoidance. The same rule applies to their belief in the utility of military force in achieving political goals. They prefer to utilize military force as a potential deterrent to the opponent, but they also differentiate between various universes. On the other hand, leaders who belong to Type B, are content with the selection of feasible goals. They are prepared to settle for half a loaf and consequently are prepared to modify and even abandon some goals if this is necessary to keep the process going. These leaders tend to advocate negotiation and compromise with their opponents, abhor the pursuit of any high risk policies, or the application of military force in any issue area.

These two types of operational codes presented in Table 9.3 ought to be considered, at best, as "ideal types" which specific operational codes approximate with varying degrees of fit. The typology can also serve as a basis for comparison among various operational codes.

TABLE 9.3

A TYPOLOGY OF OPERATIONAL CODES

Belief	Type A	Type B
Nature of Politics	Conflictual	Harmonious/Mixed
Nature of Adversary	Expansionist/Aggressive Undifferentiated	Conciliatory/Mixed Differentiated
Optimism/Pessimism	Optimist about goals Pessimist about conflict resolution	Pessimist, more realistic about goals
Prediction	Predictable pattern	Unpredictable Mixture
Leader's Role	Leader can play an active role especially in immediate events	Leader is a mediator or a broker
Goal Selection	Optimal goals	Feasible goals
Strategy/Approach	Deterrent/Aggressive	Accommodative
Risk	Some risk may be acceptable	Avoid all risks
Timing of Action	Crucial	May not be crucial
Military Force	A deterrent means, but last resort	Avoid military force

3. Testing the Typology

In order to test the typology, we collected data on the operational codes of twelve political leaders. The operational codes are summarized in Table 9.4. It will be used to test the validity of the typology and to compare Nasser's operational code.¹

We assessed the goodness of fit between specific operational codes and the typology. Each of the ten dimensions of the typology was given a score representing a rough estimate of the goodness of fit between the hypothesized responses in the typology and the specific operational code. The aggregate score ranges between 20 which indicates that the specific operational code totally fits one part of the typology to -20 which indicates that the leader's operational code does not fit the typology.

We found that the Bolshevik operational code and the operational code of Kurt Schumacher are in complete agreement with Type A operational code with a score of 20. The operational codes of Nasser and Dulles approximated the same type with scores of 19 and 18 respectively.

On the other hand, the operational codes of Senator Byrnes and Hatfield are typical examples of Type B operational code

¹The data has been drawn from the summaries of the twelve operational codes presented in Holsti's typology (1977).

TABLE 9.4

A SUMMARY OF THE OPERATIONAL CODES OF THIRTEEN POLITICAL LEADERS

BELIEF	BOLSHEVIKS	DULLES	SCHUMACHER	ACHESON
Nature of Politics*	Conflictual	Globe conflictual	Conflictual	Mixed
Source of conflict	Economic attributes	Communist nations	Nation-states	Power politics
Condition of peace	Eliminate offenders	Transform communists	Eliminate opposition	Balance of power
Nature of conflict	Zero-sum	Zero-sum	Zero-sum	Can become zero-sum
Scope of conflict	Issues linked	Issues linked	Issues linked	High spillover
Role of conflict	Functional	Can be functional	Necessary	Mixed
Nature of Adversary*	Destructive	Immoral	Destructive	Expansionist
Source of goals	Opponent's system	Marxism-Leninism	Take advantage	Power politics
Response to concil'n	Take advantage	Take advantage	Take advantage	Take advantage
Response to firmness	Back down	Back down	Reciprocate	Back down
Optimism/Pessimism*	Long-term optimism	Long-term optimism	Long-term optimism	Mixed
Predictability*	Predictable	Order in history	Predictable	Mixed
Role of Leader*	Can plan active role	Actively intervene	Active role	Can mold events
Goal Selection*	Optimal goals	Optimal goals	Optimal	Feasible
Alteration of goals	Alter means only		Don't modify means	Modify goals
Goal Pursuit	Push harder	Deterrent	Aggressive	Negotiations
Risk*	High risk permissible	High risk permissible	High risk mandatory	High Risk prohibited
Action*	Crucial	Crucial	Crucial	Crucial
Military Force*	Useful means, avoid premature action	Useful means, delay conciliatory action until you gain strength	Use force	Last resort

*Variables used for the statistical comparative analysis.

BELIEFS	VANDENBERG	HATFIELD	BYRNES	FULBRIGHT
<u>Nature of Politics</u>	Mixed	Mixed	Harmonious	Harmonious
<u>Source of conflict</u>	Human nature	Human nature, system	Human nature	Human nature
<u>Condition of peace</u>	Education/communication	Eliminate inequality	Communication	Communication
<u>Nature of conflict</u>	Non-zero-sum	Non-zero-sum	Non-zero-sum	Non-zero-sum
<u>Scope of conflict</u>	High spillover	All issues linked	Issues separable	Issues separable
<u>Role of conflict</u>	Mixed	Dysfunctional	Dysfunctional	Dysfunctional
<u>Nature of Adversary</u>	Mixed	Limited	Limited	Aggressive
<u>Source of goals</u>	Historical/ideology		Historical	
<u>Response to conflict</u>	Take advantage	Reciprocate	Reciprocate	Take advantage
<u>Response to firmness</u>	Back down	Reciprocate	Reciprocate	Back down
<u>Optimism/Pessimism</u>	Optimist	Mixed	Pessimist	Pessimist
<u>Predictability</u>	Mixed	Capricious	Mixed	Predictable
<u>Role of leader</u>	Intervene when feasible	Control uncertain	Mediate	Actively use politics
<u>Goal Selection</u>	Feasible	Feasible	Feasible	Mixed
<u>Alteration of goals</u>	Modify goals	Modify goals	Modify goals	Modify goals and means
<u>Goal Pursuit</u>	Incremental		Accommodative	Accommodative
<u>Risk</u>	Avoid high risk	Avoid high risk		
<u>Action</u>	Crucial	Crucial	Not crucial	Crucial
<u>Military Force</u>	Last resort	Avoid force	Last resort	Last resort

BELIEFS	RAMSAY MacDONALD	KISSINGER	CHURCH	WILLY BRANDT
<u>Nature of Politics</u>	Harmonious	Mixed	Harmonious	Harmonious
<u>Source of conflict</u>	Human nature	Political leadership	Nationalism	
<u>Condition of peace</u>	Education/communic'n	Balance of power	Transform system	Co-operation
<u>Nature of conflict</u>	Non-zero-sum	Issues separable	Non-zero-sum	Non-zero-sum
<u>Scope of conflict</u>	Limited	Dysfunctional	Issues separable	Issues separable
<u>Role of conflict</u>	Dysfunctional		Dysfunctional	Dysfunctional
<u>Nature of Adversary</u>	Conciliatory	Aggressive	Conciliatory	Limited
<u>Source of goals</u>	Situational	Dispositional	Power politics	Security
<u>Response to concil'n</u>	Reciprocate	Take advantage	Reciprocate	Reciprocate
<u>Response to firmness</u>		Depends	Reciprocate	
<u>Optimism/Pessimism</u>	Optimism	Mixed	Qualified optimism	Optimism
<u>Predictability</u>	Predictable	Mixed	Mixed	Unpredictable
<u>Role of Leader</u>	Interpret history	Control uncertain	Actively use politics	Limited role
<u>Goal Selection</u>	Feasible	Feasible	Feasible	Feasible
<u>Alteration of goals</u>	Modify goals	Modify goals/means	Modify goals/means	Modify goals
<u>Goal Pursuit</u>	Incremental	Accommodative	Incremental	Flexible
<u>Risk</u>	Avoid high risks	High risk permissible		Avoid high risk
<u>Action</u>	Crucial	Crucial	Crucial	Not crucial
<u>Military Force</u>	Avoid force	Avoid force	Avoid arms race	Avoid force

with scores of 20. The operational codes of Vandenberg, Willy Brandt, Ramsay MacDonald, Frank Church, and Henry Kissinger, fitted Type B with scores ranging between 19 and 18. However, we found that the operational codes of Dean Acheson and Fulbright exhibited the least level of goodness of fit with Type B, with scores of 16 and 15 respectively. Contrary to our expectation, although holding a Type B operational code, Acheson held a negative image of his opponents and subscribed to an active role for the political leader. In the case of Fulbright, there was a belief in the predictability of political life which is relatively incongruent with the hypothesized response in Type B.

Such incongruencies are not unexpected given the fact that in some cases the inter-relationships among various operational code beliefs may stem from a "psychological" experience of the political leader rather than the necessities of pure logic. That is why the two types of operational codes suggested here are proposed as ideal types which various operational codes may approximate with various levels of goodness of fit.

4. A Comparative Analysis

Among all operational codes, Nasser's stands out as one that holds that conflict is a permanent characteristic of the political universe and advocates the pursuit of optimal goals. Unlike the operational codes of most American political leaders, such as Church and Acheson, who viewed politics through a pragmatic conservative paradigm as the process of maintaining a manageable social universe, Nasser concurred with the Bolsheviks

that conflict, and class conflict in particular, is a fundamental characteristic of the political universe. Nasser's conflictual paradigm was more acute than the Bolshevik paradigm. The Bolsheviks believed that this conflictual process would be terminated once the bourgeoisie has been eliminated and the classless communist society has been established. On the other hand, Nasser believed that conflict can never be terminated because of the imperfections of human nature. It can only be regulated and ameliorated through the creation of social balance and the termination of class exploitation. Further, Nasser rejected the Bolshevik view which regards conflict as a functional phenomenon which brings out the best qualities of human nature. He viewed conflict as inherently dysfunctional and consequently undesirable. However, Nasser shared with the Bolsheviks the conceptualization of conflict as a zero-sum game and the view of conflict through the comprehensive paradigm that emphasizes the inseparability of social and political issues. This was a result of the common belief in the dialectical nature of the political process, one in which all issues are inter-related.¹

Likewise, Nasser shared with Dulles the view of the conflictual nature of the global system. However, they differed sharply on the perception of the nature of the global conflict and prescriptions of peace. Whereas Dulles regarded the global conflict

¹ On the contrary, most Western political leaders, such as Church and Willy Brandt, tend to compartmentalize conflict related issues by separating them into microcosms that ought to be dealt with separately.

between the super-powers as a zero-sum game, Nasser viewed such conflict as a non-zero-sum game, one that is potentially destructive to all actors. Nasser reserved his zero-sum view of international conflicts to regional conflicts, that is, the Arab-Israeli conflict and inter-Arab conflict. Whereas Dulles viewed the communist nations as the basic source of global conflict, Nasser viewed neo-colonialism and the widening gap between the North and the South as the major sources of conflict. He also rejected Dulles' surgical prescription of peace (which called for the radical transformation of communist nations) and the Bolshevik view which advocated the total victory of communism and the overthrow of bourgeois international relations as the basic condition of international peace. Nasser believed in an orderly re-adjustment of the system through a process of negotiation and communication and the application of UN resolutions.

The second dimension of the suggested typology, goal selection, distinguishes drastically among various operational codes. For Nasser and the Bolsheviks, it was not necessary to approach the task of selecting goals by carefully examining the prospects of success or failure because success is inherent in the logic of historical inevitability. Accordingly, Nasser and the Bolsheviks (and Dulles to a large extent) advocated the pursuit of optimal goals regardless of the immediate difficulties. In the operational code of most Western political leaders there is a clear emphasis on the selection of feasible goals in most issue areas. Nasser was prepared to pursue such goals in issue areas which he perceived

as inherently harmonious, such as inter-Arab politics and inter-African relations. Nasser also was not prepared to modify, substitute, or abandon his optimal goals. Unlike Chancellor Brandt or Secretary Dulles, who advocated the substitution of goals when they are clearly unattainable, such substitutions was unthinkable for Nasser.

However, Nasser was more cautious in his goal pursuit than the Bolsheviks. Whereas the Bolsheviks advocated a dialectical combination of offense and defense, Nasser stood for incrementalism, gradualism, trial-and-error and delayed confrontation. Nasser was in full agreement with most Western leaders, on the avoidance of high risk policies and striving to minimize risks emanating from miscalculation and improvisation. Further, he placed more injunctions and safeguards on the pursuit of high risk policies than Dulles and the Bolsheviks. In contrast to the Bolsheviks who were prepared to scale down the means of achieving goals to control risks, or Dulles who advocated limiting goals rather than means, Nasser contended that both means and goals ought to be scaled down if the risks of action are to be avoided. If the Arabs stand a high risk of loss in an Arab-Israeli confrontation, Nasser argued, then they ought to scale down the goal of the restoration of Palestinian rights, and avoid premature action and the application of force in Arab-Israeli relations.

The Bolshevik, Dulles, and Nasser operational codes were basically similar in their conceptualization of the essential character of the adversary, optimism/pessimism, the predictability of political life, and the role of leader in moving

historical development. The three of them tended to view the opponent from the perspective of the bad faith model: the adversary is inherently expansionist and immoral, his goals emanate from the basic fabric of his society and ideology rather than from situational or external attributes, the opponent is likely to interpret any conciliatory moves as a sign of weakness and will eventually take advantage of such conciliation to further his goals, and the opponent will only back down if confronted with firm policies. This cluster of beliefs is diametrically opposed to those of Senator Church or Chancellor Brandt. They viewed the adversary as inherently conciliatory, attributed his goals to the legitimate situational attributes of power politics and the quest for national security, and expected the opponent to reciprocate hostility and friendship rather than back down or take advantage. Nasser also tended to view his opponents from the perspective of the unitary decision-making model and never differentiated between domestic and external opponents. They were all viewed as an undifferentiated set of aggressors. By contrast, political leaders like Church and Vandenberg held benign view of domestic opponents as ones who are trying to serve their country and a relatively negative image of external opponents.

The operational codes of Nasser, Dulles, and the Bolsheviks also shared the belief in the eventuality of realizing their goals regardless of short-term hardships, and that time was in fact working on their side rather than the adversary's.

However, both were pessimistic about the prospects of immediate conflict resolution with the opponent. They concurred that the role of chance in history is minimal. Nasser and the Bolsheviks contended that history is essentially an inevitable and progressive process which proceeds according to a certain logic. Likewise, Dulles believed that there was a certain order in historical development from which one can predict political events. On the contrary, Willy Brandt believed that there is no pattern of predictabilities in political life in the sense that certain outcomes are inevitable or certain.

Additionally, the four operational codes subsumed under Type A, (Nasser, Dulles, Schumacher, and the Bolsheviks) share the belief that a political leader ought to play an active role in "moving" immediately relevant events. However, Nasser placed several limits on the role of leader. A leader, Nasser contended, cannot move historical development because this is determined by objective forces. He can only affect immediately relevant developments in his own policy. This can only be accomplished Nasser added, in co-operation with all other social forces.¹

¹ In comparing the Nasser operational code with operational codes of other leaders, we assumed that the cultural variable does not significantly affect the comparison. This assumption is derived from a study of the impact of the cultural variable on the values of Churchill, Montgomery, Mao Tse-Tung and Hsiao K'e. Cummins (1973:60) found that the cultural variable was not significant in discriminating among the values and beliefs of the four leaders. He also did not find the professional background of the leaders (political or military) a significant variable in determining their beliefs.

5. Summary and Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined the typology of operational codes proposed by Holsti. We concluded that the dimension of the sources of conflict may not discriminate among various operational codes. Alternatively, we suggested a simplified typology based on the first philosophical belief and the first instrumental belief. The two tests of the typology have shown that Nasser, Dulles, and the Bolshevik operational codes are typical cases of Type A whereas Brandt, Church, and Hatfield are typical examples of Type B.

In the next part, we will examine the Nasser foreign policy decision-making process from the perspective of his operational code.

PART III

FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING IN EGYPT

INTRODUCTION

1. The Scope of the Study

The purpose of this final part is to analyze some major foreign policy decisions taken by Nasser from the perspective of the operational code approach. Three basic decisions have been selected for analysis: the decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company in 1956, the decision not to use military force to quash the Syrian coup in 1961, and the decision to close the Aqaba Gulf in 1967. These three decisions have been singled out among a whole array of foreign policy decisions taken by Nasser during his eighteen years in power for two basic reasons: (i) they represent major episodes in Egypt's inter-Arab, Arab-Israeli, and global foreign relationships and as such are likely to shed light on the basic contours of Egypt's foreign policy under Nasser. (ii) In each case there is sufficient material available to make plausible judgements about both the sequence of events and the role of the operational code in decision making. For the last five years, there have been an outpouring of Egyptian publications studying various aspects of the Nasser era. Some of them reveal interesting facts about the Egyptian decision making process during the Nasser era. Salient among them are the memoirs

of Al-Sadat (1977) and Al-Boghdady (1977), the analyses of Heikal (1977 and in Matar, 1975) and the four-volume study of Ahmad Hamroush, in addition to various revelations by some of Nasser's assistants and secretaries, such as Al-Gayar (in Bebers, 1977) and M. Hafez (1976a,b,c).

2. The Concept of Decision

The concept, "decision," involves essentially the selection, among perceived alternatives, of one option leading to a course of action. According to one school, the act of making decisions is an integral part of the entire decision making process. The act of deciding cannot be compartmentalized and analyzed in isolation from the totality of processes which contributed to its choice (Snyder et al. 1962:91 and Frankel, 1963:1). However, according to another school, a decision is a clearcut choice made by identifiable individuals who are authorized by a state's political system to act within prescribed sphere of behavior. In this sense, the decision's boundaries and parameters are identified and analyzed (Brecher, 1974:1).

The difference between these two schools is in emphasis rather than conceptualization. Whereas the first emphasizes the factors which contributed to the making of the decision, the second chooses to focus on the dynamics of the act of decision making with particular reference to the immediate psychological environment.

In this study we are concerned about the decision maker's operational code belief system and its implications for the choice of one identifiable decision among various available alternatives. Hence, we will focus on the decision maker's operational code prior to the taking of one specific decision and the dynamics of the decision making process in the light of the various available alternatives. In this sense we will be able to assess the explanatory and predictive power of the operational code and to understand better the process which resulted in that particular decision.

Since it is generally accepted that the structure of the decision making system affects its process and outcomes (Robinson and Snyder, 1965 and Hermann, 1978), it is desirable first to outline the main contours of Egypt's decision making system under Nasser.

CHAPTER X

EGYPT'S DECISION MAKING SYSTEM UNDER NASSER

1. General Characteristics

The decision making system which Nasser built was characterized by four basic dimensions: (i) it was oligarchic in nature, largely dominated by a small praetorian elite; (ii) the relative separation between the constitutional avenues of decision making and the actual locus of decision making power; and between foreign and domestic decision making systems; (iii) the system was highly personalized and uninstitutionalized; there was a striking lack of institutionalized units and effective lines of communications within the system; and (iv) the system was also characterized by acute interpersonal and inter-organizational conflict; there was conflict between the presidency and the military establishment, between the Arab Socialist Union and the military establishment.

2. Centralism and the Fusion of Power

The Egyptian system of decision making was characterized by a high degree of governmental centralism. Subnational units had little institutionalized influence on the national decision making process. Cairo had the power to create and

Traditionally, by virtue of its "hydraulic" character, Egypt has been one of the most centralized and territorially and functionally united countries. Since the Pharaonic ages, subnational units have always been subordinated to the central power of Cairo (Wittfogel, 1957).

abolish provinces and localities and delegate or withdraw powers from them. Provinces were directly controlled by the President through the appointment of governors and local executives and funding.

In addition to its centralized character, the Egyptian decision making system was predicated on the notion of the fusion of power and the domination of the legislative power by the executive power of the President. In his capacity as the chief executive, Nasser had the power to initiate, ratify, and block legislation, draw major policies, appoint and dismiss members of the cabinet.¹ In a study of the Egyptian constitutional system during the Nasser era, Al-Bishry (1975:24-26) argued that constitutional life in Egypt evolved around the powers of the president who was the source of political and

Nasser rejected the theory of the separation of powers as unrealistic. He reasoned that legislative and executive powers have been traditionally and historically fused in all countries including Britain. On 2 July 1962, he told members of the National Congress of Popular Forces:

Some people say the government should not get involved in legislative power, that is the theory of the separation of powers. This is an old theory. But, has it ever been applied? Has the executive power been separate from the legislative power in any country?

For an analysis of Nasser's conceptualization of the theory of the separation of powers the reader may consult Imam (1977). Detailed accounts of the macro structure of the Egyptian political system under Nasser may also be found in: Abdel-Malek (1968), Robinson (1968), Perlmutter (1974), Hudson (1977), Vatikiotis (1978) and Baker (1978).

constitutional legitimacy. Perlmutter (1974:175) also maintains that Nasser served as chief and final arbiter among the three basic bureaucracies: the military, the government and the Arab Socialist Union. He declined to permit any institutional interaction between them except through him. Vatikiotis (1978:169-175) asserts that Nasser built an authoritarian "leader-state" system of decision making in which he himself was the undisputed leader and arbiter.

3. The Role of Various Institutions

The reality of Nasser's actual decision making power was more complex and multi-dimensional. In theory and practice, from his accession to the premiership of Egypt in 1954 until 1961, Nasser enjoyed considerable power in the areas of domestic and foreign policy decision making. Nasser highlighted the scope of this power when he told the Egyptians in a broadcast on 24 September 1962 that for the last ten years the decision making had been characterized by individualism. "The major decisions that have been taken," Nasser added, "were very detrimental to the future of this country. I took these decisions depending upon God, the faith of this people, and the fact that these decisions achieve the hopes and aspirations of this people." On top of the decision making structure was Nasser himself, and a handful of his closest advisors, almost all of whom were veteran officers. The only duty officer in this group was Marshal Abdel-Hakim Amer who,

through his power base in the military establishment, managed from 1961 to short-circuit the power of the group and exercise considerable decision making power, transcending the role of all the constitutional institutions including the presidency. Accordingly, neither the locus of decision making power, nor the actual distribution of decision making powers and jurisdictions, flowed from the officially prescribed channels. Rather, the military establishment blocked organizational access to the decision making process and limited Nasser's role mainly to the foreign policy decision making domain. The legislature and the cabinet did not play a significant role in the decision making process especially in making foreign policy decisions. Candidates to the Assembly were screened before their nomination. The Assembly served mainly as a two-way instrument to channel popular desires upward to the President on the one hand, and to explain the policies of the regime to the masses on the other. On balance, the Assembly was more effective in the area of domestic policy decision making than in foreign policy. It managed to revise and block some of the domestic decisions of the regime, as in the case of higher education. However, in the field of foreign policy, the Assembly performed the role of a ceremonial legitimizer of presidential decisions through their regular and ritual acceptance and glorification. For example, the maximum input the Assembly had in the Egyptian military intervention in Yemen was to arrange for a closed session with Marshal Amer

in order to hear him outlining the dimensions of the Egyptian policy in Yemen (Dekmejian, 1968:365 and Ismael, 1970:325). Likewise, the Egyptian cabinet lacked genuine autonomy. It existed only to implement the policies laid down by the President himself. Despite its control of the civil bureaucracy and the whole gamut of Egyptian socio-economic life, the cabinet lacked fundamental autonomy from the presidency. Nasser always combined the presidency with the chairmanship of the cabinet, except for the period 1962-1967. Issues pertaining to foreign policy and defence were excluded from the jurisdiction of the cabinet, as Nasser explained during the Egyptian-Syrian-Iraqi unity talks in 1963 (11/4/63). For example, Nasser took the decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company in 1956 without consultation with the cabinet, which was ceremonially informed of the decision one hour before its announcement. Nor was the cabinet ever consulted or informed in advance of the decision to close the Aqaba Gulf in 1967. The foreign ministry played the role of monitoring foreign policy developments, submitting technical advice to the President, and carrying out policies and decisions taken by the President.

The Civil bureaucracy and the judiciary hardly played a discernible role in domestic or foreign policy decision making. Despite the phenomenal growth of the bureaucracy, the regime relied heavily on it only as a tool of policy implementation. (Berger, 1957 and Harik, 1972). Likewise, despite their autonomy, regular Egyptian courts lacked any lever in the

decision making process. Courts had no power to determine the constitutionality of laws. Many presidential decisions were issued with built in provisions declaring them outside the scrutiny of the courts (Al-Bishry, 1975:22).

Nasser created three successive political organizations as a means of organizing and mobilizing the masses: the Liberation Rally in 1953, the National Union in 1957, and the Arab Socialist Union in 1962. By all accounts all of them can be described as captive political organizations. Despite the supreme position the party was supposed to occupy above the executive branch, the three political organizations were totally subordinate to the presidency and the executive branch of the government. Harik (1973:79) described the Nasserist political parties as collaboration movements that served as a mechanism for identifying and organizing the regime's collaborators and providing a formal link between the nationally dominant leader and his regional and local collaborators. An interlocking relationship existed at the top between the party and government structure. For example, all members of the Executive Committee of the Arab Socialist Union were either veteran officers or cabinet ministers. According to Dekmejian (1971:192-192), the party was considered as a place for retiring governmental leadership rather than a source of political recruitment or policy-making. Consequently, the party shared in decision making only to the extent that officers of its national command structure were active ministers of the state.

or members of the military establishment. Nasser and the military took all precautionary measures to ensure the party's subordination to the state hierarchy. For example, when Ali Sabry attempted in 1965-1966 to revamp the ASU and reorganize it as a credible political force, the military establishment moved quickly to curtail his efforts (Harik, 1973:93-98).

4. Nasser and the Military: a conflict model

The military establishment was the only institution which played an active role in the decision-making process, sometimes to the detriment of Nasser's powers. After the 1952 coup, decisive power was consistently concentrated in the hands of Nasser, and approximately a dozen officers, within the framework of the Revolutionary Command Council. The Council was a truly competitive decision making structure. It used to debate all viewpoints and take decisions according to majority rule (Hamroush, 1975:II:123-124). In 1956, Nasser was elected President and the Council was dissolved. All his key lieutenants resigned their military commissions to assume ministerial positions. Since then, Nasser began to rely heavily on the Armed Forces and the General Intelligence in governing the country. The Armed Forces became the main source of ministerial and top governmental positions. Between 1953 and 1967 the positions of President, Vice-Presidents, Prime Minister and senior ministers were held by veteran officers. Officers also occupied crucial positions in the National Union (and subsequently in the ASU), public

corporations, and the foreign ministry. Dekmejian (1971: 170-171) found that 44 out of the 131 cabinet ministers between 1952 and 1969 were veteran officers. They occupied the key ministries such as premiership, ministries of War, Interior, Information, External Affairs, Local Administration, etc... Additionally, intelligence organizations multiplied and their influence extended almost to all aspects of social and political life. There were three basic intelligence organizations: the General Intelligence Agency (Al-Mukhabarat Al-Amma) headed by Salah Nasr, which took over external political intelligence, the Military Intelligence (Al-Mukhabarat Al-Harbiya) which concentrated on the security of the Armed Forces, and the General Security (Al-Mabaheth Al-Amma) focusing on domestic intelligence. The General Intelligence Agency and the Military Intelligence entered into a complex interlocking alliance with the military power center of Marshal Amer, an alliance which had turned out to be a crippling handicap to Nasser's power.

The military-intelligence power center emerged as a serious contender after the Syrian secession in 1961. It centered around the personality of Field Marshal Amer who managed through social and material privileges, and sophisticated intelligence, to build an elaborate network of client officers owing him personal loyalty. The Amer military network was inefficient and corrupt. Its greed for material benefits and lack of professionalism was mainly responsible

for the success of the Syrian coup in September 1961. Consequently, in October 1961, Nasser decided to strip Amer from his military post as commander-general, leaving him only with the position of Vice-President. However, Nasser was forced to cancel the decision when Amer threatened to resign in protest.

Another crisis developed inside the Presidential Council, a collective body of decision making which Nasser created in September 1962. In October 1963, the Council decided to include within its jurisdiction all military promotions above the rank of colonel. Amer rejected this decision, submitted his resignation, and disappeared amid rumours of his army clients rallying to his side and troops on the move. His clients reproduced his resignation letter denouncing Nasser's dictatorial powers and demanding the establishment of a democratic regime. Nasser feared the result would be a split inside the army and a possible civil war. To prevent such a split, Nasser retreated. Amer returned to his military position, more powerful than ever. Further, the Presidential Council itself was dissolved in March 1964 and Amer was appointed First Vice-President, ensuring his seniority over all Nasser's other lieutenants.

The 1961 and 1963 "silent coups" by the Amer group almost stripped Nasser of his effective domestic power. Since then, and until June 1967, the real power in the country came into

the hands of Amer's military network operationally administered by Shams Badran, his office director and Minister of War since 1966, in close alliance with General Salah Nasr, the chief of the General Intelligence Agency. The Amer-Badran-Nasr group almost monopolized the domestic power structure in Egypt until 1967.. Its power was formalized when they pressured Nasser to issue the "Law of Military Rules," which gave the military judiciary jurisdiction over all relationships in which any present or former military man is a party (Hamroush, 1975:II:216 and M. Hafez, 1976c). In their memoirs, Al-Boghdady (1977:II:171-172) and Anwar Al-Sadat (1977:215-223) concurred with this assessment. Al-Boghdady said that Nasser complained of the power duality in the country: the army and the political power. Al-Sadat also maintained that after 1961 Marshal Amer concentrated on solidifying his power base in the Armed Forces and controlling most of the state institutions. At one time Nasser complained to him that Amer and the military establishment decided and implemented decisions without regard to his official responsibilities.¹ Nasser himself admitted that before the June

¹ Anwar Al-Sadat (1977:220) also provides the case of the Higher Committee for the Liquidation of Feudalism which was formed in 1966 under the chairmanship of Amer as an example of the real power of the military establishment. The Committee went on the rampage, taking personal retaliatory measures despite numerous protests by Nasser. Also Rashad (1977:15-16).

1967 War his power was constantly challenged by the military establishment and that such challenges hindered his capacity to take decisions (23/11/67). In short, as an Egyptian writer (Bebbers, 1975:64) argued, Nasser was a mere "facade" of the regime and almost controlled by the military establishment.

The constant intervention by the military in most aspects of the Egyptian decision making system inevitably put the military on a collision course with almost all political forces in the country, including Nasser. The relations between Nasser and Amer were characterized by acute conflict over power distribution (Al-Sadat, 1977:209). According to Nasr, the Chief of the General Intelligence, the military establishment and the General Intelligence sometimes blocked Nasser's orders and turned down some of his requests. Nasr adds that this conflict seriously paralyzed the Egyptian decision making system at all levels (in Kroom, 1976:64, 118-121). The rest of the elitist free officers group resented Amer's influence and the blockage of their access to the decision making process. For example, Vice-Presidents Kamal Hussein and Al-Boghdady resigned in 1963 and 1964 respectively in protest against policies of massive socialization of the economy and the role of the Amer clique in domestic affairs (Goher, 1976:119; 134-136). In 1966, Vice-President Ibrahim also resigned protesting his diminishing role in the decision

making process. Another conflict developed between the Amer military group and the political group headed by Ali Sabry, the Secretary-General of the Arab Socialist Union, and Shafawi Goma'a, the Minister of Interior. The conflict was basically between two orientations: the first argued that the army is the only qualified institution to solve most of Egypt's social problems. The second stood for the politicization of society through the initiatives of the Arab Socialist Union.

The end result of all these conflicts was a system of decision making ridden by acute interpersonal clashes and crippled by the lack of viable institutions. Khaled Mohieddin (1975), a former RCC member, said that Egypt under Nasser lacked an institutionalized decision making mechanism to gather information and recommend policy alternatives. General Fawzy (1977a), Chief-of-Staff during the June War and subsequently a Minister of War, testified that the National Defence Council which was supposed to be the highest politico-military decision making institution was never convened before the 1967 War.

5. Inter-system Communications

Additionally, there was a remarkable lack of efficient lines of communications among various participants in the decision making process, especially between Nasser and the military. Unpleasant information was often blocked before reaching Nasser. Heikal (1962:9) and Hamroush (1976:III:80) stated

that many intelligence reports were written before the Syrian separatist coup in 1961 indicating that a military coup may be imminent. These were blocked by the Amer group before reaching Nasser's office. Al-Gayar, Nasser's personal secretary, said that despite the sophistication of Egypt's intelligence organizations, they used to hide and distort valuable information (in Bebers, 1977). General Al-Hadidy, Commander of the Eastern Front in 1967, wrote that, contrary to the widely held belief that the Israeli offensive on 5 June began by an air strike at 8:45 a.m., the actual offensive began by a ground assault on the position of Omm Basis at 7:30 a.m. The cable which the local forces of Omm Basis sent to Cairo informing the General Staff of the Israeli assault was never read or passed to the President (Al-Hadidy, 1974). In addition to the blockage and distortion of information, some of Nasser's orders were never carried out, or even conveyed to those who were supposed to carry them out. General Al-Hadidy (1974:172) cites the case of the breakdown of the lines of communication in the General Staff before the outbreak of hostilities on 5 June, exhibited in the ignoring of Nasser's orders to the General Staff to be on alert for a potential Israeli air strike on 5 June 1967.

6. Nasser: The Central Foreign Policy Decision Maker

Despite all the limitations on Nasser's domestic decision making power, he enjoyed almost unlimited powers in conducting

foreign policy decision making. The military elite rarely intervened in either the discussion, or the making of foreign policy decisions. In addition to their lack of expertise, the military was not attracted to foreign policy because it did not provide them with immediate material returns. Accordingly they preferred to concentrate on solidifying their domestic power leaving Nasser with almost a free hand in the conduct of foreign policy. Major foreign policy decisions, such as the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company were taken largely unilaterally by Nasser with but minor input from the military. Hence, foreign policy decision making was to a remarkable extent an extension of Nasser's personality (Magnus, 1976:229). Baker (1978:91) asserts that Nasser enjoyed radical freedom in conducting Egypt's foreign policy because the military and the bureaucracy had no vested interests in foreign affairs. Nasser himself summed up the essence of his foreign policy decision making power when he told James Birdzal, President Johnson's envoy to Nasser after the June War, "no one in Egypt can decide or offer his viewpoint on any matter before checking with me personally" (Hafez, 1976b). The result was a dualistic system of decision making: domestic dominated by the Amer clique and various intelligence organizations and a foreign system in which Nasser was the sole actor, and which can be safely assessed from the perspective of Nasser's own beliefs and perceptions.

6

7. The Decision Making Process

Little is known about the dynamics of the foreign policy decision making process and Nasser's decisional style. Generally, the process was characterized by presidential advocacy rather than multiple options analysis.¹ Nasser retained the initiative of suggesting specific issues for debate, and putting forth specific recommendations before the decision making group. Members of the group were not supposed to come up with their own alternatives but rather to assess the already suggested proposal. Nasser once argued that he did not approve of giving committees and other decision groups the power to suggest their own options. Rather, he preferred to put before them specific recommendations to study (2/5/62).²

¹ Nasser's decision making style may be contrasted with U.S. Congressional decision style. The U.S. Congress style is mostly predicated on the notion of mutual responsiveness and readjustment of policy options to accommodate contending views. Decisions emerge from an exhaustive and collegial process of accommodation. In this respect, one may point to Manley's (1959) study on decision making in the Ways and Means Committee of the Congress under Wilbur Mills.

² Al-Hamamsy said that Nasser used to think and take decisions by himself, then discuss the decision with his aides (in Al-Sudani, 1977:49). On the other hand, Fathi Radwan, Nasser's Minister of National Guidance in 1955-1956, and Professor Al-Burullusi, Minister of Higher Education in 1968-1970, testified that Nasser used to consult his cabinet ministers before taking decisions, and to reverse decisions if convinced of the merits of the other option (in Al-Sudani, 1977:79,87). The testimony of the two cabinet ministers appears to apply to minor decisions such as appointment of senior bureaucrats.

8. Summary and Conclusion

In this chapter we have outlined the basic contours of the decision making system which Nasser built. He almost monopolized the process of foreign policy decision making reducing the role of other institutions to the role of mere validation of his decision. The military played the dominant role in the field of domestic decision making, leaving Nasser with the task of laying down policy guidelines without being capable of taking independent decisions.

Having identified as the locus of foreign policy decision making in the system, we shall analyze three major foreign policy decisions from the perspective of Nasser's operational code.

CHAPTER XI

THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL COMPANY DECISION

The crisis which flared up in the Middle East during the summer of 1956 was the major turning point in the positions of global powers in the Middle East and in the direction of Egypt's foreign policy for the following twenty years. It was triggered by an American decision on 19 July 1956 to cancel the offer of aid to build the High Dam in Egypt. In less than a week, Nasser announced his decision to:

Nationalize the Global Maritime Suez Canal Company

1. A Prelude to the Crisis

Nasser came to power in July 1952 without any clear notion about the possible direction of Egypt's foreign policy. The communique broadcast on the morning of 23 July was conspicuously silent on the matter. Neither did the Six Principles of the Revolution contain any reference to it. By the end of 1954, Nasser appeared to be inclined toward a policy of building an Arab defence system in close cooperation with the West, a quiet border with Israel, and concentration on economic and social development through western investments and aid. To this end, Nasser began to consider seriously an old plan for a giant dam on the Nile South of Aswan. The project would provide long-term storage of the Nile waters, extend perennial irrigation in Upper

Egypt and enable another million and a quarter acres of land to be brought under cultivation. It would also generate large quantities of electric power for industrialization. The cost was estimated at some \$1.3 billion of which about a third would have to be in foreign currency (Stephens, 1971:170).

Approaches were made to the United States, Britain and the World Bank; and in 1955, after the Bank had consulted expert opinion as to the practical feasibility of the project, it was agreed in principle that the Bank would contribute one half of the necessary foreign exchange and the American and British governments the other (Nutting, 1972:130).

The two governments expressed more interest in financing the High Dam after the Soviets offered Nasser in October 1955 to finance the project. On 17 December 1955, the American and British governments announced that they would contribute part of the foreign exchange costs of the first stage of the Dam. The two governments laid some conditions, such as Egypt's refusal of aid from Communist sources. More importantly, they did not commit themselves to finance the second phase of the project. The World Bank in turn specified its own conditions on the conduct of the Egyptian government finances, both as to the budget and the balance of payments.

Nasser was suspicious about these conditions. He viewed them as tantamount to foreign supervision of the Egyptian economy. Nevertheless, he decided to accept the Western offer in principle. Accordingly, he reached an agreement with

Eugene Black, the Director of the World Bank, on 6 February 1956 on the World Bank's controls and amount of subsidy. The signature of the Black-Nasser agreement was dependent upon reaching an agreement on the terms set out in the British and American aides-memoires. Despite his numerous signals to the West that the Soviet Union had offered to finance the project, and his preference for Western aid, the American and British governments stalled negotiations over Nasser's proposed amendments. The USA linked the High Dam loan to Egypt's termination of her military relations with Moscow and acceptance of a settlement with Israel. Further, it insisted on financing the ten-year project on a year-by-year basis. Nasser suspected that such an offer would provide the USA with an opportunity for pressure when each year's aid came up for discussion (Heikal, 1972:62-63). On the other hand, Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister, implicated Nasser in the dismissal of General Glubb, the British Commander of the Jordanian Legion. John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State, was outraged over Nasser's recognition of the People's Republic of China in May 1956. He also thought that the alleged Soviet offer was a bluff. By refusing to finance the project, the Soviets would be forced to choose between honoring their offer (which he thought they could not carry out) or risk losing their status in the Third World. Further, Dulles thought that letting down Nasser would be a sharp lesson to other neutralists who were trying to play one bloc against the other.

Nasser, relying upon intelligence information about the discussions of the foreign ministers of the Baghdad Pact in Tehran in the middle of March, leaked to him through an Iraqi minister (Heikal, 1972:64), knew that the Americans were going to renege on their offer even if he accepted all their conditions. Accordingly, when he met Ahmad Hussein, his Ambassador in Washington, on 23 June, he told him to go back and tell Dulles that he had accepted all his conditions. He also made clear to Hussein that Dulles would not honor his offer.

On 17 July Ambassador Hussein returned to Washington and announced to the press that Egypt intended to take up the West's High Dam offer. He sought an early interview with Dulles to give him Nasser's decision. Dulles kept him waiting until 19 July. Then in a short meeting, Dulles handed Hussein a statement announcing withdrawal of the American offer. The statement, which was circulated to the press immediately, predicated the withdrawal of the offer on the weakness of Egypt's economy and her lack of credit worthiness. Shortly after, the British government withdrew its offer.

Nasser received the text of the American statement as he was flying in the middle of the night from Brioni to Cairo after a tripartite meeting with Nehru and Tito. The reference in the Dulles statement to the Egyptian economy evoked his nationalist sentiments. As he revealed ten years later, this reference made it mandatory to reciprocate the Anglo-American blow (Al-Ahram, 26/7/66). Before proceeding further to analyze the decision

process which culminated in the decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company, we shall review the basic contours of Nasser's operational code during the preceding twelve months (25 July 1955 - 25 July 1956).

2. Nasser's Operational Code

Five sets of beliefs were particularly salient in Nasser's operational code during the twelve months which preceded the Suez Canal Company decision: (i) his image of the Western powers as the main opponent of the cause of Arab liberation, and his expectations of their potential responses to various policies, (Beliefs 8, 9, and 10). These images and expectations led him to believe that vigilance and firmness were the best strategies in dealing with western imperialist powers; (ii) his vision of Egypt's independent role in the international system and his determination to resist any foreign encroachments on its sovereignty (Belief 15); (iii) his belief that optimal goals ought to be selected which inclined him toward the selection of the option which offered the highest payoff provided that the risks were relatively equal (Beliefs 22 and 23); (iv) his approach to risk acceptance and avoidance. Nasser was prepared to take some limited risks in the process of maintaining and solidifying Egypt's independent role (Belief 28); and (v) his belief concerning the avoidance of force, especially in dealing with Israel (Belief 34).

These beliefs were clearly articulated in the speeches he delivered shortly before the nationalization decision.

On 19 May 1956, Nasser criticized the conditions which Britain and the U.S.A. laid on their offers to finance the High Dam Project. He could not see any reason for them except the erosion of Egypt's independence. He stated that he would not tolerate the attempt of the two western countries to administer the Egyptian economy under the guise of financing the project. The more the U.S.A. and Britain persisted in laying conditions, the more he became suspicious of their real intentions.

During negotiations with the U.S.A. and Britain, Nasser publicly stated that the Soviet Union had offered to finance the project. "We refused the Soviet offer," Nasser told the New York Times (2/4/56), "but if negotiations with the West failed, we would consider the acceptance of this offer which is still standing." Almost one month before the nationalization decision, Nasser reiterated his determination to resist Western pressure and warned that he would accept economic aid "from whoever offers such aid unconditionally" (19/6/56). In the same speech, Nasser called for the intensification of vigilance with the struggle for full independence. He argued that the struggle of the people was a permanent process which extends through life. Further, the Czech arms deal enhanced Nasser's confidence in the ability of his army to withstand a defensive battle against the West or Israel. He stated that the Egyptian army had absorbed the Soviet arms and was

capable of repelling any potential threat (13/5/56). As a result, Nasser was led to believe that the West's hostile actions could be reciprocated with minimum risks.

In a speech delivered forty-two hours before the announcement of the nationalization decision, Nasser expressed anger about the reference in the Dulles communique to the uncreditworthiness of the Egyptian economy. He argued that the U.S.A. and Britain were trying to infringe on Egypt's freedom and sovereignty and that he would not permit them to do so. He continued to express his determination to build the High Dam and proceed with economic development. He concluded his speech with a warning that his response on 26 July would ensure two basic goals: self-reliance in building the High Dam and foiling Anglo-American attempts to dominate Egypt economically and politically.

3. Available Alternatives

What were the courses of action available to Nasser after he learnt of the Anglo-American renege? In their accounts of the Suez Canal crisis, Dougherty (1959) and Heikal (1966a) enumerated the seven basic options listed in Figure 11.1.

According to Dougherty (1959:41), Option A and Option B would not have accomplished anything as far as financing the High Dam was concerned. Additionally, Option B was obviously contradictory with Belief F concerning the injunction against the use of military force against Israel. Option F

Fig. 11.1--Options Available to Nasser before the Suez Canal decision

was also unlikely to be considered for two reasons:

(i) it contradicted with Nasser's belief that reciprocating conciliation for hostility would result in the perpetuation of the adversary's hostility; and (ii) the way the U.S.A. and Britain withdrew their offer, after Nasser had accepted all their conditions, made it impossible for him to pursue that option unless he was prepared to compromise on Belief A. Option G was ruled out from the beginning because Nasser was so committed to the cause of social and economic development, which was at the root of the legitimacy of his revolution, that it was inconceivable that he would simply abandon the project and let the U.S.A. and Britain get away with their public insult to the efficiency of his regime. After all, Nasser did not abandon his quest to purchase arms simply because the West denied him such arms. Instead, he struck an arms deal with the Soviet Union.

Nasser was then left with two basic alternatives: partial or full takeover of the revenues of the Suez Canal Company and/or seeking Soviet aid without touching Western interests. His final course of action was a combination of the three alternatives. According to Stephens (1972:202) Nasser took a decision which reflected his "endeavor to assert political and economic independence and to reduce his economic dependence on the West." This decision, Dougherty (1959:51) argued, "was perfectly consistent with his nationalist policy."

4. Nasser and the Suez Canal

The option of taking over the Suez Canal did not appear as a mere reaction to the Dulles renege. According to Vice-President Al-Boghdady (Mempires:I:22-24), it was part of Nasser's beliefs since the revolution. He was on record that he would not renew the Company's concession after its expiry in 1968.

On 17 November 1954, the eighty-fifth anniversary of the opening of the Suez Canal, Nasser broadcast his first public statement on the issue. Nasser spoke of the Canal historically as having been "among the principal causes that impelled imperialism to the occupation of our country." This era, he said, would end with Britain's withdrawal. He announced "the beginning of the period which will facilitate Egypt's taking over the Canal upon the expiry of the term of the concession," explaining that Egypt was beginning 14 years in advance in order to "beware of falling anew into the mistakes of the past, when problems caught us unawares and weak." He underscored his intention to restore the Canal to Egypt in the future.

As early as November 1952, Nasser invited Mustafa Al-Hifnawy, an academic authority on the Suez Canal, to lecture in the Cultural Festival of the Armed Forces on the topic of the Suez Canal. He also established the "Suez Canal Office" as a cabinet organ in order to prepare studies on

the Canal. The Department of General Mobilization of the Armed Forces was also instructed to collect information on the Suez Canal Company (Hamroush, 1975: 88-89).

At this time Egypt was allotted only 7% of the Company's profits. When Nasser requested the Company's management in Spring 1955 to increase Egypt's share, it insisted on extending its concession beyond 1968 as a pre-condition for any negotiation on the request. Nasser was successful only in signing an accord with the Company according to which the Company was committed to hire more Egyptian pilots and to invest in Egypt by the end of 1963 about \$44,800,000 of the foreign currencies it had traditionally held outside Egypt. In return, Egypt passed a law confirming the Company's exemption from certain foreign exchange controls and taxes (Love, 1970:160).

The negotiations which Nasser held with the Suez Canal Company in 1955 convinced him that the Company was acting as a "State within the State." Shortly after the nationalization, Nasser told Edward Murrow that after these negotiations

We came to the decision that this concession must come to an end and must not be prolonged. We haven't really fixed the time at all but we thought that it will be within one year or two years or three years. (Love, 1970:159).

As soon as the negotiations were over, Nasser instructed the Egyptian Intelligence to intensify its search for information about the intervention of the Suez Canal Company in

domestic affairs. The Agency brought him information to the effect that the real income of the Company was much higher than it had revealed during the negotiations.

As negotiations with the U.S.A. and Britain began to stall because of Nasser's resentment of the conditions, he began to consider the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. In May 1956, he summoned Fouad Hilal, the intelligence officer in charge of the Canal Zone, to prepare an appreciation of the possible consequences of nationalization. He also instructed Tharwat Aukasha, the Deputy Chief of the General Intelligence Agency, to keep a close eye on the Company (Hamroush, 1975:II:89).

5. The Decision Process

The option of nationalizing the Suez Canal Company was thus considered by Nasser at least eighteen months before it was decided. The Anglo-American renege on the financing of the High Dam Project, and the insulting way in which it was announced, was the actual trigger which prompted Nasser to decide that nationalization was the only viable way to reciprocate.¹

(a) Nasser's Calculations

Between 19 July and 21 July 1956, Nasser arrived at some major postulates upon which any response must be predicated: (i) the High Dam must be built; (ii) the Suez Canal

¹As Nasser revealed in a press interview on 12 August 1956.

must play its role in the financing of the project.

(iii) there is no logic in asking for 50% of the revenues of the Suez Canal Company because the risks of partial takeover are relatively equal to the risks of a full takeover;

(iv) the Egyptian response must be equivalent to the Anglo-American action, severe and insulting; (v) re-opening

negotiations with the West would imply acceptance of the Anglo-American insult.* Such a conciliatory action, Nasser argued, would likely to result in more insults (Heikal, 1966a and Nasser on 14/6/57).

From these basic postulates, Nasser proceeded to evaluate the risks involved in the nationalization of the Company. The first step was to assess the possibilities of an immediate British intervention. He ordered Egyptian intelligence officers in Cyprus to obtain information on British forces on the island. Egyptian officers obtained this from the Cypriot EOKA organization, two infantry brigades and three paratroop battalions, all tied down in anti-EOKA operations, and two air squadrons. Egyptian agents in Malta and Aden reported on British naval and troop strengths there. The Tenth Armored Division was divided between Libya and Jordan, whose Arab governments would prevent its use against Egypt. No other significant British forces were nearer than England itself (Love, 1970:334-335). This information assured Nasser that there was no risk of immediate British intervention. The next step was to calculate potential actions

of Western powers to the nationalization move. Nasser wrote out what he called "an appreciation from the western viewpoint in case of nationalizing the Suez Canal Company :". In it Nasser tried to answer four basic questions: what would Eden do? What would Mollet do? What would Dulles do? Would Israel exploit the opportunity? Nasser tried to put himself in Eden's place and predict his possible reactions through an estimation of his approach to risk calculations. He estimated that the basic risk involved was 'an immediate Anglo-French military intervention. Nasser wrote that Eden would be tempted to use military force against Egypt, but he would probably not be able to mobilize enough troops before two months. If Eden took quick action, Nasser estimated, he would likely be defeated because of the increase in the defensive capability of the Egyptian forces. However, if he waited until all forces were mobilized, it would be politically impossible to launch the campaign. Egyptian diplomacy could be activated to mobilize world public opinion in a way that would make it unthinkable for Eden to use military force. Additionally, Nasser ruled out France and the U.S.A. from his calculations. He estimated that France was so occupied in Algeria that she would not be able to participate in a military action against Egypt. The U.S.A. was likely to participate only in economic pressure rather than a military campaign. Nasser also excluded the possibility of British collusion with Israel. He reasoned Eden would not risk

undermining Britain's traditional influence in the Arab world by co-operating with Israel in a military action against an Arab country (Heikal, 1966a, and Love, 1970:336-337). When Khaled Mohieddin sent him a message in September 1956 that the British and the French were planning to attack Egypt in league with Israel, Nasser dismissed the information as a hoax designed to lure him into making some false move against Israel (Al-Boghdady:I:327).

The only perceived immediate risk was the freeze of Egyptian reserves in American, British, and French financial institutions. He asked Dr. Al-Kaisouny, the Minister of Finance, to transfer to Swiss banks as much as he could from Egypt's balances in American, British and French banks.

The next step was to approach the Soviet Union to obtain a solid commitment on the financing of the project in the light of the coming break with the West. Although the Soviets were not informed of the decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company, they assured Nasser of their readiness in principle to finance the project (Al-Boghdady, I:327).

Thus, the option of nationalizing the Suez Canal seemed to satisfy certain cardinal rules in Nasser's operational code. It appeared as a strong response to the Anglo-American insult and a step toward economic independence. Further, it was viewed as a limited risk policy:¹

1

As Nasser had argued in an interview with David Morgan in June 1962. However, in another interview on 29/1/61 Nasser stated that the nationalization option was viewed at the time as a

It looked safe enough, not only to nationalize the Canal Company and apply the profits toward building the dam, but to make a dramatic political coup and out of it redress the injury done by Dulles and the British Foreign Office (Love, 1970:336-337).

(b) Nasser's Consultations

On Saturday, the 21st of July 1956, Nasser concluded that the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company was a limited risk option in the light of the inability of Britain to launch an immediate military campaign. Accordingly, he decided to adopt it. On Monday 23 July, he met three of his top lieutenants, General Amer, Al-Boghdady, and Zakaria Mohieddin. Nasser conveyed to them his intention to nationalize without informing them that he had actually decided on that course and had actually begun to implement it. Mohieddin and Al-Boghdady concurred that the risks of an Anglo-French intervention were 40%, and that the nationalization constituted a "calculated risk" (Hamroush, II:91). However, Amer advocated a more cautious approach. He favored the option of demanding an increase in Egypt's share in the revenues of the Company to 50%. Nasser rejected this view on three basic grounds: (i) the costs of negotiating such

high risk policy, because it might involve the loss of his life as a result of an Anglo-French military intervention. Nasser added that he was convinced that this risk must be taken without any hesitation. His last argument seemed to be an attempt to magnify the heroism of his decision rather than a reflection of his thinking at the time.

increase would be high because the Company would demand (as it had already done) an extension of its concession beyond 1968; (ii) the risks involved in forcing the Company to concede 50% of its revenues were almost equivalent to those involved in full takeover; and (iii) raising Egypt's share by 50% would not be sufficient to finance the High Dam project (Al-Boghdady, I:328).¹

Those who opposed nationalization predicated their opposition on their beliefs about risk acceptance and avoidance. Al-Hifnawy, the officer-in-charge of the Suez Canal Office,² argued that nationalizing the Company in the present circumstances would mean assured destruction through an Anglo-French military action (Hamroush, 1975:II:93). He tried to persuade Nasser to abandon the idea, but Nasser replied that the wheel had already been set in motion. Anwar Al-Sadat, the then Minister of State, was not consulted or informed of the decision before its announcement. When Nasser returned from Alexandria after announcing the decision, Al-Sadat expressed his disapproval of the decision. Al-Sadat argued that:

¹ According to Salah Nasr, the then Deputy Chief of the General Intelligence Agency, Nasser told Amer of the decision on 25 July while accompanying him on the train to Alexandria. Amer protested that as Commander General he should have been informed in advance in order to make sure that the armed forces were capable of carrying out the decision. (Interview with Salah Nasr, in Hamroush:IV:188).

²

As an academic specialist on the subject of the Suez Canal, Al-Hifnawy was publicly known as the staunchest advocate of its nationalization.

Such a step would mean war. We are not ready yet. We have just received the arms from Russia in September and our forces are not yet fully trained in these arms (Al-Sadat, 1977:188).

It is obvious that the crucial element in taking or rejecting the nationalization decision was the approach to risk calculation adopted by Nasser and Al-Sadat. Nasser was prepared to take limited risks, and the nationalization was perceived as a calculated risk. He knew that his army would not be capable of repelling full Anglo-French invasion. But he was prepared to take the risk--as he told his cabinet two hours before announcing the decision on 26 July--of attempting to postpone the British military reaction for one month during which he could mobilize world public opinion to his side (Heikal, 1972:90).

6. Nasser and the Strategy of

Scaling Down Means

One of the cardinal rules in Nasser's approach to risk control was the choice of optimal goals but the scaling down and limiting of the means employed on their behalf. Accordingly, as soon as the nationalization decision was announced, Nasser proceeded to offer the West a series of concessions designed to diffuse the crisis created by his decision. He announced that he was prepared to make the West any concession, short of surrender of full Egyptian control of the Canal. He stressed his intention to guarantee freedom of

navigation and proposed a conference of the signatories of the 1888 Convention of the Canal's Users to reconsider the Convention. He did not insist that all ships pay their Canal dues to the new Egyptian authority. When the British and French ordered their ships to pay dues to London or Paris, he continued to allow British and French ships to pass through the Canal. He also assured all shareholders that they would be compensated, and refrained from protesting the freeze of the Egyptian assets in Western banks. Meanwhile, Nasser called off all guerilla operations against Israel and offered to enter into a binding agreement concerning the establishment of just and equitable tolls and charges. Finally, Nasser accepted the Six Principles for a settlement proposed by Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary, in September 1956 (Stephens, 1971:207-213 and Nutting, 1972:148-151).

The British and French governments rejected all Nasser's proposals and dismissed all his concessions. For them, as for Nasser, the real issue was who controls the Suez Canal. Therefore, while Nasser was attempting to use the two month period which followed the announcement to gain worldwide support, the British, French, and Israeli governments were secretly mobilizing their forces for a full military invasion of Egypt. By October 1956, Nasser began to believe that his strategy had worked, and that the British and French governments could not undertake a military campaign against Egypt. Nasser's calculations were wrong. On 29 October, Israel

began a full invasion of Sinai. The next day the British and French governments followed suit.

7. Conclusion

Two basic findings can be drawn: (i) the nationalization option, or at least the eventual takeover of the Company after the expiry of its concession, was embedded in Nasser's thinking long before its actual implementation. It was the Anglo-American challenge to the legitimacy of the Nasser regime on 19 July 1956 that activated this option by making a strong response necessary (or desirable); (ii) the nationalization was basically consistent with Nasser's operational code. The option seemed to him as: First: a means to provide him with enough revenues to finance the High Dam project and also reciprocate the Anglo-American blow. Other options, such as breaking diplomatic relations with the U.S.A. and Britain; or the forcible takeover of 50% of the Company's revenues, would not have satisfied these two rules. Second: a limited risk policy in the light of his estimation that an immediate British military intervention was unlikely.

CHAPTER XII

THE SYRIAN DECISION

The twenty-eighth of September 1961, was perhaps the longest day in Nasser's political history. The twenty-hour crisis, which began in the early hours and ended at midnight, not only irreparably damaged inter-Arab relations, but also subjected him to considerable psychological stress and irreversibly affected his health. The crisis began at 6 a.m. when a group of Syrian officers launched a coup in Damascus to break up the Egyptian-Syrian union announced in February 1958. Nasser replied to the coup deciding

not to use military force to suppress
the Syrian military coup and to let the
Syrians go their own way if they wished.

1. A Prelude to the Crisis

Nasser was the first Egyptian head of state to identify Egypt as an Arab country. The 1956 constitution referred to Egypt as a "part of the Arab nation." Further, Arab collaboration with Nasser during the Suez crisis re-inforced his conviction that closer co-operation with the Arabs was crucial to Egypt's security. He also envisaged an ultimate union among Arab countries by virtue of their

common language, culture, and history. However, Nasser believed that such a union would come about as a result of a long functional-incremental process in which political unity would be the final step.

Accordingly, Nasser rejected the overtures of some Syrian politicians, from 1955 on, to unite Egypt and Syria. He put to them that closer economic, cultural and military cooperation through bilateral agreements, and through the Arab League, would be more beneficial (Nutting, 1972:204-205).

By late 1957, the political situation in Syria had deteriorated sharply. Leftist political parties, such as the Baath, were pulling for pan-Arabism and socialism, whereas rightist parties, such as the People's Party, were working for union with Iraq backed by the West. The Syrian President, Al-Quwaitly, was seeking closer ties with Saudi Arabia. The Syrian Communist Party was actively drumming up support for more leftist policies and closer ties with the USSR. Confusion reigned supreme, with no political force able to command an absolute majority for its policies. Further, Syrian Intelligence discovered a CIA plot to restore a pro-Western government (Nutting, 1972:211).

In order to salvage Syria from falling to the Iraqis or the Saudis, the Baath politicians renewed their overtures to Nasser to take over their country. Nasser still argued that there was no socio-economic foundation for such a venture.

In a desperate move to pressure Nasser, twenty Syrian officers flew to Cairo in February 1958 in defiance of their government. They explained that Syria was on the verge of political chaos and a full Egyptian-Syrian merger was the only alternative. The officers, and subsequently all nationalist parties, accepted Nasser's conditions for an immediate union: all political parties were to be banned and the army de-politicized. In this way, on 22 February 1958, Nasser was forced to accept the union of Egypt with Syria under the name of the United Arab Republic, despite numerous arguments that the union would require at least five years of preparation.

It is no exaggeration to say that the Egyptian-Syrian union began to break up under pressures from both within and without on the day it came into existence. Virtually all Syria's neighbors and all the great powers were hostile to this projection of Nasser's power. King Saud even attempted to bribe Syrian officers to prevent the formalization of the union. Furthermore, Nasser alienated all Syrian parties, especially the influential Baath, by insisting on their absorption into the powerless National Union. The extension of land reform and nationalized industries to Syria alienated the strong bourgeoisie. Resentment in Syria grew when Nasser sent Amer to be his viceroy in Damascus with full authority over the Syrian regional government.¹ Amer and

¹ As a result of this appointment, all Baathist ministers resigned from the UAR cabinet.

his entourage of corrupt officers abused their positions to smuggle huge quantities of goods in military aircrafts, and consequently reinforced resentment in the army. To make matters worse, in September 1961 Nasser transferred El-Sarraj, his strong Syrian intelligence man, to Cairo to occupy the nominal position of vice-president, thus losing his last firm grip on power in Syria.

The climate was ripe for a military coup. Nasser's Jordanian and Saudi adversaries were quick to exploit it to entice thirty-seven officers in the Syrian First Army to launch a separatist coup in Damascus. The coup was operationally organized through Jordanian agents and financed by King Saud of Saudi Arabia.¹ Before analyzing the decision process through which Nasser opted for non-interference, we will review Nasser's relevant operational code beliefs at the time of the decision.

2. Nasser's Operational Code

Four sets of beliefs were particularly relevant to the decision not to use military force to suppress the Syrian military coup: (i) his estimation of the adversary's potential responses to policies of conciliation. It was a cardinal rule in Nasser's code that an adversary was not likely to reciprocate a policy conciliation. Rather, Nasser believed an adversary was

¹ When Nasser met King Saud in January 1964, during the first Arab Summit conference, he asked Saud, "Is it true that you paid \$7 million to finance the secession operation?" King Saud candidly replied, "God bless you Mr. President, \$12 million, not \$7 million" (Heikal interviewed in Matar, 1975:150).

highly likely to become bolder and take advantage of any acts or accommodation and reconciliation. Likewise, an adversary was expected to soften his intransigence, or even back down, only if confronted with a policy of firmness and vigilance. Hence, Nasser always refused to negotiate with adversaries except from a position of strength (Beliefs 24/26); (ii) his opposition to any compromises on what was considered as an optimal goal. Nasser always rejected what he labelled "half-solutions." He believed that such solutions, and the compromises they entailed, would inevitably be the first step on the road to retreat (Beliefs 55,56,57); (iii) his approach to Arab integration. One of the basic themes in Nasser's documents before the outbreak of the coup was the emphasis on the belief that Arab integration was essentially a voluntary process which required the "unanimity" of political forces in any Arab country, majority consent was not enough (Belief 62); (iv) his belief that military force ought to be avoided in inter-Arab relations. He insisted that Arab unity ought to be achieved by peaceful means and argued that unity "is a voluntary action that cannot be imposed by military force or realized through annexation" (Belief 81).

3. Available Alternatives

The outbreak and the success of the separatist coup highlights the screening role which Nasser's belief system played in ignoring reliable information that a coup in Damascus was impending and that there was a breakdown in communications in

his decision making system. Nasser and Vice-President Amer had received reliable information well before the actual launching of the coup that there were signs of conspiracy inside the Syrian Army. Nasser was confident of the support of the Syrian people and army to the extent that he deliberately ignored this information (Al-Taghlaby, 1970 and Nutting, 1972: 265). During one of his visits to Damascus, Amin Shaker, former chef de cabinet to Nasser, received information from a Syrian professor about disturbing signs in the army. Immediately, Shaker met Marshal Amer in Damascus and informed him of the information. Amer's only reply was to insult and dismiss him. Shaker then took his information to Nasser himself. He did not seem to be impressed (Hamroush, 1976:III:80).

Amer received three other pieces of intelligence about the impending coup. They were discredited and kept from Nasser. The first was relayed by Ahmad Kamel, then Egyptian commander of the Aleppo anti-aircraft battalion, in December 1959. Amer's response was to tell Kamel that he was psychologically exhausted, and he transferred him from Syria to be a military attache in Pakistan (Hamroush, 1977:IV:66-67). In the second case, the Egyptian Director of the Military Criminal Intelligence relayed to Ali Shafik, Amer's officer director, information received from a Baathist officer about an impending coup. Shafik ridiculed the information arguing that no one in Syria could move against Nasser. The third piece of information was devastatingly accurate. A Syrian officer informed Colonel Al-Hamzawy, the

Director of the Egyptian Liaison Office in Damascus, that there was a plan for some officers to move from the Katana Barracks, arrest Amer and break up the union. At midnight, Al-Hamzawy took the information to Amer who discredited it and declined to meet the informants (Hamroush, 1976:III:80-81).

Despite this ample information, the news of the coup was a tremendous shock to Nasser. The psychological stress to which Nasser was subjected was so great that he became diabetic after that episode (Matar, 1975:201). Hassan Diab, Nasser's special photographer, reported that he saw Nasser on the verge of tears on that day (Diab, 1970). Al-Gayar, his personal secretary also reported that he was terribly worried about the signs of psychological stress which Nasser exhibited during the decisional process (interviewed in Bebers, 1977). Under these conditions, the operational code approach predicts that the decision maker is more likely to rely upon his beliefs as an aid for decision making. In order to test this contention, we will review the four basic options open to Nasser when he received the information about the Syrian coup.

Fig. 12.1--Options available to Nasser before the Syrian Decision

The first option definitely contradicts the cardinal rule in Nasser's operational code of avoiding resort to military force in inter-Arab politics. A massive military operation to suppress the coup would have necessarily involved the actual use of military force given the quick support which the separatists received from some crucial units. Option B of flying to Damascus to convince the separatists to abandon their project and Option D of compromising with the separatists were also ruled out because the first communique broadcast by the separatists established a clear adversary relationship between them and Nasser.¹

¹ Nasser also received information from the Syrian ministers in his cabinet that the separatist officers were known conspirators and adventurers (Matar, 1975:147-148).

Under these conditions, Belief A and Belief B were invoked. Nasser estimated that the separatists were likely to take advantage of any conciliatory move to consolidate their position. Further, Nasser was not prepared to compromise on the principle of unit itself. He was prepared to compromise on administrative issues once the officers returned to their barracks. Likewise, Option E was incongruent with Nasser's known devotion to the cause of Arab integration. Had he accepted the secession of Syria without challenging its legitimacy, his credibility among Arabs would have been seriously eroded. Nasser was then left with one option which was basically congruent with his operational code, that is to attempt to challenge the separatists, without actually applying military force, in order to keep the Egyptian-Syrian union intact.

4. The Decision Process

The first inkling of the separatist coup reached Nasser at 6 a.m. on the morning of 28 September 1961 when Abdel-Kader Hatem, Minister of National Guidance, telephoned him from Cairo Airport to say that he feared a revolt had started in Syria. Hatem was on his way to Damascus when he learned at the airport that the early morning flight which carried the morning newspapers to Syria had returned to Cairo upon being told that Damascus airport was closed. Nasser turned to Radio Damascus where he heard the first communique broadcast at

7 a.m. announcing a military revolt against the Nasser regime in Syria:

As the martial music customary on such occasions blared forth from his receiver, Nasser sat for several minutes like a man in shock, too overwhelmed by the suddenness of the blow to react in any way or even to be able to feel the hurt and anger which were to follow in due course (Nutting, 1972:267).

Nasser's first action was to go to Cairo Broadcasting House where he was given a direct line that enabled him to monitor Radio Damascus more closely (Matar, 1975:199).

After he regained his composure, Nasser thought that he should tell the Egyptians about the Syrian coup and prepare them for the events that would follow. He conveyed to the Egyptians that some military units from the Katana Barracks had moved to Damascus and that he intended to preserve the integrity of the United Arab Republic. He also expressed apprehension about the prospect of bloodshed and determination to avoid it. After the broadcast, Nasser went to the Military Headquarters where he put the Air Force, the Navy, and all commando units on full alert. He also gave General Ali Amer,¹ the then Chief-of-Staff, orders to prepare for the dispatch of formation of paratroopers to Al-Demir Airport near Damascus. Nasser ordered General Amer not to carry out the actual dispatch

¹ Who should not be confused with Marshal Abdel-Hakim Amer, Nasser's Vice-President.

until he received the go ahead from him personally. Shortly after, Nasser learned that Al-Demir Airport had fallen to the mutineers. The site of the operation was then switched to the Latakia Airport in the north.

Nasser estimated that if some units were dispatched to northern Syria after the airport had been secured by the paratroopers, then he could go personally to Latakia to confront the separatists. He thought that his presence in Syria would stimulate popular outcry against the handful of officers who launched the coup. The operation was never meant to be an actual application of military force against the mutineers, but an attempt to boost the morale of loyal military and popular forces in Syria. Abdellatif Al-Boghdady, Nasser's Vice-President, wrote in his memoirs:

The purpose of these operations was basically psychological. They were not meant to involve the actual use of military force against the Syrian troops unless in self-defence. The assumption was that once our forces arrive at Latakia and marched to Aleppo and Damascus, the Syrian anti-separatist forces will move to end the separatists (Al-Boghdady, II:116).

According to Heikal (interview in Matar, 1975:146) the forces were given strict orders not to open fire. Their task, Heikal added, was confined to supporting resistance against the mutiny.

At noon, Nasser contacted Admiral Kazim Zaytona, the Syrian commander of the Latakia Maritime Base, and ordered him to secure the Latakia Airport and report back. Admiral Zaytona reported back informing Nasser that the airport was ready for the landing of the paratroopers. Only then, Nasser gave the go ahead to General Amer. The paratroopers were to land in Latakia and three destroyers were to be dispatched by 8 p.m. to arrive at Latakia at 4 p.m. the next day.

At 1 p.m. Radio Damascus broadcast that Marshal Amer had taken steps to resolve outstanding problems and that the situation had been normalized. Nasser thought that the new conciliatory tone of the separatists was a sign of a concealed plan. He believed that the mutineers were trying to do with him what he himself had done in July 1952 with King Farouk when he deceived Farouk by submitting moderate demands in the beginning of the coup until the Free Officers' position had been secured. Nasser contacted Amer in Damascus and instructed him not to compromise with the mutineers because forces were on their way to support resistance. According to Al-Gayar, Nasser's secretary (interviewed in Bebers, 1977:65), Nasser told Marshal Amer:

If they (the mutineers) are really serious, ask them to return to their barracks first or else you will be their hostage. Any communique from you will serve their interests. Don't let them repeat with you what we had done with Farouk. Don't worry and never bargain. We are moving our forces now.

At 7 p.m. Nasser broadcast another message from Radio Cairo affirming that he would not agree to compromise or bargain with the separatists. "When compromise and half-solutions enter into a struggle," Nasser said, "it loses its sanctity." "A compromise with the separatists would mean the signing of the document of our slavery," he added.

To Nasser's dismay, at 10 p.m. Radio Aleppo announced that the armoured units of Aleppo and the Executive Committee of the National Union had joined the separatists. Shortly after, the Latakia Maritime Base halted all communication with Cairo. At midnight, Latakia declared support for the coup.

The Latakia broadcast changed the whole situation. Now the paratroopers, who were already off to Latakia, had to fight their way into the airport. Military force would have to be applied, not shown, if the coup was to be crushed. This would be in full contradiction with Nasser's operational code. Immediately, Nasser ordered the whole operation to be halted. The forces which had actually landed in Latakia were to surrender to the commander of the Latakia base and to avoid opening fire unless directly attacked. The three

destroyers were ordered to return to Alexandria and other paratroopers who were still on their way to Latakia were ordered to return to Cairo.

After Nasser gave these instructions to General Amer, he sat almost physically shaken listening to the outpouring of insults directed at him from Radio Aleppo. His Vice-President, Kamal Al-Din Hussein, who could not take this verbal abuse any longer, acted alone and ordered Marshal Sidky Mahmoud, the Air Force Marshal, to silence Radio Aleppo. Upon learning of Hussein's orders, Nasser rushed to cancel the instructions. The following dialogue took place between Hussein and Nasser:

Hussein: "Do you accept these insults and rudeness from this station?"

Nasser: "And do you want to sever forever our relations with the Syrian people? Aleppo Broadcasting House is located in a populated area. Do you want to see a sea of blood between us and the Syrians?"

(According to the story of Al-Gayar in his interview with Bebers, 1977:71)

At 2 a.m. on the morning of 29 September, Nasser called a special meeting with the Syrian ministers of his cabinet. The ministers urged him to use military force to crush the coup. Nasser's answer was a firm no. The whole operation, Nasser said, would look like an invasion of Syria by Egypt.¹

¹ A few months after the coup, a Syrian officer contacted Nasser and informed him of a plan to launch a counter-coup to restore Syria to the UAR. Colonel Fayez Al-Rifai asked for Nasser's support. Nasser declined to give support arguing that unity could not be rebuilt by a military coup.

Nasser justified his decision to refrain from resorting to military force by three basic arguments:¹ (1) there should be no military clash between the two armies of the United Arab Republic; (2) military intervention would mean bloodshed and this would result in a permanent rupture in Egyptian-Syrian relations; (3) one should not look at the short-run prospects, but rather the long-term consequences.

At 6.p.m. on 29 September, Nasser addressed a mass rally about the latest developments. He argued that the purpose of dispatching troops to Syria was to raise the morale of the Syrian unitarian forces, and that he withdrew the troops after it became clear that Arab blood would be shed if the operation continued. Nasser reminded his audience that in 1958 he had advocated a five-year transitional period to lay the economic and cultural foundations for the proposed Egyptian-Syrian union. On 5 October, Nasser formally announced his decision to let the Syrians go their own way.

5. Summary and Conclusion

The analysis of Nasser's decision not to use military force to resist the Syrian military coup against the United Arab Republic in September 1961 reveals two major findings: (i) the coup and the subsequent verbal attacks from the separatists placed Nasser under high stress which, in turn, activated his operational code beliefs about the correct approaches to

¹ Cited by Heikal (1962) in a series of articles published immediately after the Syrian coup and titled, What Happened in Syria?

dealing with the Arabs: (ii) during the entire crisis, Nasser decided and behaved in a way which was highly congruent with his operational code especially the belief that unanimity and voluntary consent were crucial conditions without which any integrative movement would fail and the belief that military force should not be applied in inter-Arab relations. With these two basic beliefs in mind, it was improbable that Nasser would contemplate the use of force to crush the coup.

CHAPTER XIII

THE MAY-JUNE 1967 DECISIONS

The Arab-Israeli crisis which evolved during the second week of May 1967 was perhaps the most severe crisis which Nasser had ever experienced. What began on 14 May as a limited attempt to deter a possible Israeli attack on Syria developed into an all-out war which shattered Nasser's leadership and regime. Through a series of miscalculations which were partly embedded in his operational code, the nature of his decision making system, and the mechanism of the inter-Arab system, Nasser took four basic decisions.

Decision A: The decision to mobilize troops and concentrate them in Sinai on 14 May 1967.

Decision B: The decision to demand the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. from Sinai on 16 May 1967.

Decision C: The decision to close the Aqaba Gulf to Israeli ships and to all ships carrying "strategic" materials to Israel on 22 May 1967.

Decision D: The decision not to launch a first strike against Israel and to maintain a defensive posture on 30 May 1967.

1. A Prelude to the Crisis.

It is no exaggeration that the seeds of the June 1967 crisis were planted immediately after the Syrian secession in September 1961. The separatists, with the collaboration of Al-Hourani, Nasser's Syrian Vice-President, launched a campaign

accusing Nasser of being an American agent who was ready to accept a peaceful settlement with Israel. This culminated in the Arab League's Shtoura conference in which the Syrians and the Jordanians ridiculed Nasser's hiding behind the protection of the U.N.E.F. and his acquiescence in Israeli navigation through the Aqaba Gulf. The campaign intensified after the collapse of the Egyptian unity talks with the new Baathist regimes in Syria and Iraq in 1963. The new Syrian regime, under the leadership of Amin Al-Hafez and Mounif Al-Razzaz, accused Nasser of shelving the Palestine problem. Nasser, in turn, countered the mounting Baathist-Jordanian-Saudi criticism by calling for an Arab summit conference. Three conferences were held consecutively in Cairo, Alexandria, and Casablanca. During these conferences, Nasser pleaded for moderation and made it clear that he would not attack Israel unless it moved to occupy new Arab territories. During the Alexandria conference, a major clash developed between him and General Al-Hafez of Syria who was calling for an immediate war of liberation. As a result, Nasser decided to abandon the summit strategy, and the propaganda campaigns were renewed.

On 23 February 1966, the Baathist regime of Al-Hafez was overthrown by another Baathist faction headed by Al-Atassi and Zuayn. The new ultra-radical leadership raised the slogan of the people's war of liberation and embraced the newly born Al-Fatah guerilla organization. This indirectly helped to expose Nasser's inaction on the Palestine issue. Further,

clashes between Syria and Israel escalated as a result of Israel's violations of the de-militarized zone, and Syria's backing of the guerilla operations launched from Syrian territory. In addition, Nasser received information from his ambassador in Brussels that the Americans had told a secret meeting of NATO representatives that they had given up hope of co-existence with Nasser and were working out a new strategy in collaboration with Israel and Turkey (Nutting, 1972:390). Coming up on top of announcements that a large consignment of American military aircrafts was on its way to Israel, Nasser began to suspect an American-Israeli conspiracy similar to the Anglo-French-Israeli conspiracy in 1956.

At the suggestion of the new Baathist regime, Nasser signed a mutual defence pact with Syria in October 1966. He reasoned it would provide him with some leverage over the growing militancy of the Syrian regime, but made it clear that it did not oblige him to intervene automatically on Syria's behalf.¹

Within nine days of the agreement's signature, Israel launched a raid against the Jordanian village of Al-Sammu following a guerilla operation in Israel. The Jordanian regime accused Nasser of failing to come to Jordan's aid, and of assisting

¹ At that time Nasser did not anticipate a military clash with Israel, at least in the near future. In 1966 most of Egypt's military factories were transformed into civilian production (Al-Sadat, 1972), and the military budget was drastically reduced resulting in the cancellation of many military installations and formations (Al-Hadidy, 1974:31).

Israel by letting her use the Aqaba Gulf. The charges were renewed after a Syrian-Israeli aerial clash in April 1967.¹

Soon after, the Israeli leaders began to issue threats of an all-out operation to topple the Syrian regime. On 13 May, the New York Times revealed that Israeli leaders "had decided that the use of force against Syria" might be "the only way to curtail increasing terrorism." Syria formally drew the attention of the UN to these threats (Khoury, 1974:244).

On 8 May, Syrian intelligence officers informed Nasser of an impending Israeli attack on Damascus between 16 and 22 May.

Soviet President Podgorny informed Al-Sadat, who was visiting Moscow at that time, that Israel was deploying troops on Syrian borders. This development placed Nasser in a quandary.

Before analyzing how Nasser coped with this crisis, we shall outline briefly the relevant elements of his operational code during the twelve months preceding the crisis.

¹ According to Salah Nasr, the Egyptian Chief of Intelligence, Nasser attempted to dissuade Israeli reprisals by hinting to the USA and Israel that he would take a counter measure. Nasser asked Marshal Amer, who was about to visit Pakistan after the Syrian-Israeli aerial fight, to send him a cable from there urging him to withdraw UNEF and close the Gulf of Aqaba. Nasser rationalized that the cable would be intercepted by Israeli and American intelligence and could dissuade Israel from escalating its reprisals (Nasr interviewed in Hamroush, 1977:IV:194).

2. Nasser's Operational Code

Six major sets of beliefs were particularly relevant to the decisions which Nasser took during the May-June 1967 crisis. These were outlined in detail in the analysis of his second period beliefs: (i) his image of American hostility and the American-Israeli client relationship. This image was intensified during the six months preceding the crisis as Nasser saw himself as the target of an American plot in which Israel would play a major role to topple his regime (Beliefs 11 and 29-31); (ii) his assessment of Israel's approach to risk-taking. In spite of his negative image of Israel he believed that Israel would only take limited risks (Beliefs 27 and 28); (iii) his approach to the realization of Arab goals toward Israel. Nasser preferred to focus on Egypt's social and economic development, and on the elimination of imperialism and Arab reactionaries. He believed that only a strong, liberated, and united Arab world could deal with Israel efficiently. The creation of this world was viewed as a long historical process and not an immediate task (Belief 61); (iv) his deterrent-defensive posture toward Israel. Nasser believed that Israel would only back down if confronted by firmness. Accordingly, he advocated a strategy of deterrence to dissuade Israel from annexing more Arab territories (Beliefs 25, 26 and 66); (v) his strategy of risk-taking and risk control (Beliefs 67 and 70); (vi) his belief that Arabs should refrain from

initiating the application of military force in the Arab-Israel conflict and that successful defence was the equivalent to successful offence (Beliefs 82-86).

Nasser's beliefs were clearly manifested in two crucial documents during the first two weeks of May 1967. The first was his Labor Day speech on 1 May in which he stated that Israel and the imperialist powers would never forgive his revolutionary drive, and that they were pursuing a relentless American-inspired war against the Egyptian regime. Nasser made clear his determination to deter any Israeli threat against Syria by providing Syria with the necessary aerial support. The second was a message he sent to a rally of Arab students in Britain on 14 May. He repeated his theme that the "Arab revolution" was faced by a coordinated conspiracy in which "imperialism," meaning the United States and Britain, was acting together with both Israel and "Arab reaction." In his speech on Unity Day, 22 February 1967, Nasser reasserted the incremental-historical approach and deterrent strategy themes.

3. The Decision Process

The information which Nasser received about Israeli troop concentration was contradictory. On the one hand, he was assured by Syrian intelligence and the Soviet Embassy that Israel was massing troops along its borders with Syria.¹

¹ According to General Salah Nasr, the then Egyptian Chief of Intelligence, there were no actual troop concentrations. However, Israel deliberately sent signals indicating that

On the other, he received a report from his Chief-of-Staff, who had been sent to Syria to investigate, that there were no such concentration. Further, the statements of Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol and Chief-of-Staff Rabin that they intended to topple the Syrian regime, and the severe Jordanian and Saudi criticism of Nasser's failure to stand by his Arab allies, added to his dilemma.

Nasser was confronted with one of two alternatives: let Israel carry out its threat to topple his closest ally, or take a concrete diversionary action to alleviate Israeli pressure on Syria. The first option was certainly contradictory to his firm belief that Israel ought to be deterred, not accommodated, and to his belief that Israel would likely take advantage of Arab lack of vigilance to deal a blow to other Arab regimes. Further, this option would invite the scorn of the conservative regimes for hiding behind the UNEF while his allies were being slaughtered. Given the contradictory nature of the information he had received, and the confusing nature of the situation, Nasser decided to take a deterrent but cautious step. On 14 May he decided to mobilize his forces and station two divisions in Sinai. On 16 May he backed up his first decision by asking the UNEF stationed on the Egyptian-Israeli border to vacate their positions. It is important to

she was preparing to invade Syria. The signals were intercepted by the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean and immediately relayed to Nasser (interviewed in Kroom, 1976:141-2).

note that Nasser did not demand the withdrawal of UNEF from Gaza and Sharm Al-Sheikh, (which controls the Aqaba Gulf). However, when the Secretary-General of the United Nations insisted on the full withdrawal or full re-instatement of UNEF, Nasser had no option but to request full withdrawal (Heikal, 1977:75-78).

As predicted by the cognitive paradigm, Nasser's two decisions, which were both taken under conditions of uncertainty, were basically congruent with his operational code beliefs. The consensus in the literature is that the two decisions were highly influenced by his images of American and Israeli goals and relationships. Stephens (1971:436) singles out two basic beliefs which were particularly relevant: that of an American campaign to subdue the Egyptian revolutionary regime, and the firm belief that Israel would play a prominent role in such a scheme. Safran (1969:285), adds that Nasser viewed the decisions to mobilize and the request for the withdrawal of "some" UNEF forces, as a limited risk policy. When Nasser took the decisions, he estimated that the risk of war was 20%, as he revealed in a later speech (23 July 1967).

Nasser's moves were overwhelmingly deterrent in character. This was clearly reflected in his statements to Ibrahim Makhus, the Syrian Foreign Minister, whom he met after the two decisions were taken:

By massing our forces in Sinai, we wanted to launch a big demonstration that may be a message to Israel to rethink her position. I hope that you in Syria will exercise self-restraint and will not push the situation to the brink of war. I do not want to block the door of retreat for Israel. I want them to retreat quickly because it is dangerous in times of crises to block the door of your enemy's line of retreat.

My plan now is to leave the UNEF in Sharm Al-Sheikh and Gaza. We asked only for their withdrawal from the Taba-Rafah line in order to open the line of confrontation if necessary.

I want you in Damascus to realize that the situation is ominous, and to help me by refraining from any provocative action (Heikal, 1977:77).

Nasser's dialogue with the Syrian Foreign Minister indicates that the basic purpose of his decisions was to dissuade Israel from attacking Syria, and that it was predicated on his cautious approach.

Although the mobilization and UNEF decisions seemed to have achieved their purposes, Nasser moved on 22 May to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli ships and other vessels carrying strategic cargoes to Israel.

This decision does not seem entirely congruent with his operational code. He knew very well that the closure was a high risk policy, as he himself stated in his resignation speech on 9 June. Two days before the decision was taken, the Egyptian General Intelligence Agency submitted a report to Nasser indicating that such a step would inevitably mean a military confrontation with Israel (Nasr, 1977:94). On 21 May, the GIA repeated its warning and specified that if

the Gulf was closed, Israel could pursue one of three alternatives: occupy Gaza, send an Israeli-Western flotilla into the Gulf, or a blitzkrieg attack on Sinai. Meanwhile, on 19 May, the Military Intelligence reported to Nasser that Israel would not take a military initiative (Fawzi, 1977a). Such contradictory reports rendered the situation completely ambiguous in Nasser's mind, as the Chief of the GIA argued. Under these conditions, one would expect Nasser to avoid any action that might involve high risks. However, on 22 May, Nasser summoned the Executive Committee of the Arab Socialist Union and suggested the closure of the Gulf. All members (including Anwar Al-Sadat) concurred. The only dissenter was Prime Minister Sidky Soliman who pleaded for caution because the economy was not in a position to take the burden of war (Al-Sadat, 1977:225). According to Shams Badran, the then Minister of War, Nasser did not consult the Soviets before taking the decision (Badran, 1977:19). Nasr (1977:101) also argued that Nasser did not consult the GIA; nor did he consult the National Defence Council, which was supposed to be the highest political-military decision making body.

It is evident then that the decision was Nasser's. Why did he take such course of action which he acknowledged implied a high risk? The crucial factor was the Jordanian-Saudi criticism of his acquiescence in Israel's use of the Aqaba Gulf since 1956. According to the chief of the GIA, "Nasser's main

goal was to silence Saudi-Jordanian charges that he had allowed Israel more gains since 1956" (Nasr, 1977:101). General Rabin, the then Israeli Chief-of-Staff, argued in a recent interview that Nasser did not want to go to war in May-June 1967. He only wanted to end Arab criticism and to strengthen his position in the Arab world (Rabin, 1977:65). In an analysis of Nasser's policy during the 1967 crisis, the Israeli writer Schueftan (1977:139) also contended that Nasser did not want a war with Israel. "He was pushed into a situation in which he was compelled to bring about the very thing he most wished to avoid."

Another factor in the decision was Nasser's belief that his forces could withstand a defensive battle with Israel. He knew that his forces were not capable of launching a successful assault, but at worst he thought they could repel any Israeli attack and inflict heavy losses on them on the Passes Line. For Nasser, successful defence was almost the equivalent to successful offence. If Israel attacked and his forces were able to withstand it, the net result would be a loss for Israel. This belief was magnified in the light of the erroneous reports which Nasser received from the Military Intelligence that an Israeli first air strike would at best result in 20% losses (Bradani, 1977:20), and the assurances he received from Marshal Amer during the meeting of the Executive Committee on 21 May that the Armed

Forces were ready (Al-Sadat, 1977:225). Heikal (1977:79) maintained that Nasser estimated that if war broke out, his forces would be able to fight a long defensive war either on the first defense line near the Egyptian-Israeli border or on the second defence line. Nasser estimated that Israel would not be able to fight a long protracted war given its mobilization limitations.

The centrality of these two factors in Nasser's decision to re-institute the closure of the Gulf was expressed by him in an address to a delegation of Arab trade unionists during the crisis. He alluded to Arab criticism of his previous policy on the Aqaba Gulf and to assurances he had received that Egyptian armed forces were capable of fighting a defensive war (26/5/67).

These explanations indicate that Nasser's decision flowed less from its own operational code than from pressures within the inter-Arab system. However, one should not rule out the impact of his own beliefs. His error of judgement was partially embedded in his code, especially in his analysis of Israel's approach to risk acceptance and avoidance. As we have seen in the analysis of his second period beliefs, there was a striking symmetry between his approach to risk acceptance and his image of Israel's approach. Nasser believed that "Israel would not dare to attack unless she is fully supported by the West and the West was not in a position to support her because the U.S.A. was tied up in Viet-Nam," (Nasr, 1977:101).

Nasser never believed that Israel would take the risk of initiating a unilateral attack on Egypt. The experience of Israel's participation in the Suez invasion of 1956 under full Anglo-French protection led Nasser to believe that Israel would only replay the same scenario under the same conditions (Nasr in Kroom, 1976:143). It is revealing that in the address in which he announced the decision, Nasser alluded to the 1956 experience and to his belief that Israel would not take the risk of initiating an attack against Egypt (23/5/67). Nutting (1972:398) summed up Nasser's calculations as follows:

As emerged all too clearly from a long discussion which I had with him a few hours before the Six Day War began, he was still living in the atmosphere of 1956. Because of this, he was convinced that the Israelis would not be prepared alone to fight a war on two fronts, if only for fear of the striking power of Egypt's Russian-equipped air force. Therefore, he believed that unless they could count on the West joining in the fighting, at least to the extent of providing air cover, as Britain had done in the Suez War, he would be able to thwart their plans by showing that Egypt would fight for Syria. (Emphasis added)

The basic error of judgement could then be traced to Nasser's operational code which contained two contradictory beliefs. His analysis of Israel's approach to risk calculation led him to deviate, under Arab pressure and false information, from his conservative approach to risk acceptance by deciding to close the Aqaba Gulf.

Nasser's calculations when he took the Gulf decision were strikingly similar to those when he decided to nationalize the Suez Canal Company. He estimated that because of the high unlikelihood that Israel would take a high risk, she would not be in a position to move militarily against Egypt within six or seven months.¹ He also estimated that he could use this "breathing space" to launch a massive political effort to de-escalate the crisis through a series of concessions and that by the passage of time the probability of war would diminish considerably (Heikal, 1977:79).

Through this scaling down of goals and means, Nasser thought that a military confrontation could be avoided, as he told his Chief of Intelligence, Nasr (in Kroom, 1976:155).

His first concession was offered to Israel indirectly through the Secretary-General of the UN. Thant met Nasser on 24 May and asked if he would comply with a moratorium which he would ask all parties to declare. He added that a moratorium would involve freezing the situation as it then stood, that Israel would not challenge the blockade, and that Egypt would not inspect third parties' vessels. Nasser accepted, provided that all other parties accepted. However, he did not wait for Israel's acceptance: he instructed his troops in Sharm al-Sheikh not to inspect third party non-Israeli vessels (Heikal, 1977:80-81). Further, Nasser was

¹ As he told Vice-President Al-Boghdady (1976:Part II:274) on 29 May 1967.

prepared to acquiesce in Israeli passage in the Gulf. He instructed Badran, his Minister of War, to inform the Soviet leaders that if Israeli ships attempted to cross the Gulf, they would not be stopped (Badran, 1977:20). In his press conference on 30 May, Nasser suggested that the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission should be revived to supervise the withdrawal of Egyptian and Israeli troops, and he offered to refer the question of Israeli passage in the Gulf to the International Court of Justice for arbitration. He also met the special envoy of President Johnson, and agreed to send Vice-President Mohieddin to confer with the American President on Monday 5 June.

Nasser's next decision to refrain from initiating the first strike was a part of his strategy to scale down the crisis. As such, it was congruent with his deterrent-defensive strategy which had followed since 1955. All Egyptian military plans under Nasser were purely defensive. He never thought of launching large scale offensive operations against Israel. The major strategic goal of all his military strategies was to prevent Israel from reaching the Suez Canal (Al-Hadidy, 1974:109).

By early June, Nasser realized that the situation had changed. The cabinet shuffle which brought Dayan and Begin to the centre of the decision making process prompted Nasser to believe that the likelihood of war had risen considerably.

Nevertheless, he decided to adopt a defensive strategy and formalized the decision during a political-military meeting held in the Military Headquarters on 2 June. Nasser warned that the probability of war had risen from 80% to 100% and that Israel would attack within three days. The Israeli attack, Nasser added, would begin by an air strike. Marshal Amer and Air Marshal Mahmud advocated an offensive strategy through which the Gaza strip would be abandoned because it was indefensible and Negev would be captured. Nasser rejected those arguments. He reasoned that an assault would mean war with the U.S.A. and Israel together. the Armed Forces, Nasser said, must serve the country's political goals and not vice versa. As a result, he argued that Egyptian forces should absorb the Israeli first strike and respond accordingly. He also instructed the military chiefs to defend the Gaza strip, to abandon any ideas about capturing Negev and to be on full alert for the Israeli air strike within two or three days.¹

4. Summary and Conclusion

The cluster of decisions which Nasser took during the May-June 1967 crisis highlights the limitations of the operational code approach. Whereas the mobilization, UNEF,

¹ For further details on the discussions which took place in this meeting: the testimony of Marshal Fawzi (1977a), the then Chief-of-Staff and the study of General Al-Hadidy (1974), the then Commander of the Eastern Front. Excerpts of the debates have been published in Sabah Al-Khair (Cairo), 10/2/77.

and non-initiation of war may be understood by reference to Nasser's operational code, the crucial Gulf decision cannot be fully explained in this way. The workings of the inter-Arab system played a crucial factor in pressuring Nasser to shift from his cautious approach. This pressure was facilitated by the false information which Nasser had received about the capabilities of his forces, and his beliefs about Israel's readiness to take risks.

CHAPTER XIV

CONCLUSION:

EVALUATING THE OPERATIONAL CODE APPROACH

This study has had two major objectives: (i) to present a model of Nasser's political belief system by using the operational code approach; and (ii) to test and generate hypotheses about the impact of the individual's operational code on his policy choices.

1. A Model of Nasser's Operational Code

Nasser's operational code evolved around two limited sets of closely-interconnected and highly central beliefs. The first set defines the nature of his philosophical orientation: conflictual politics at all horizontal levels of domestic, regional, and global politics, an optimistic and historical-inevitable paradigm of political life coupled with an inclination to select optimal goals. The second set indicates that Nasser's negative image of his adversaries, his deterrent strategy, and conflictual view of regional and global politics were always coupled with such instrumental safeguards as an incremental approach, delayed action, and avoidance of high risks. Nasser's optimal goal selection was negatively associated with his goal pursuit. These two sets functioned in Nasser's operational code as a dynamically

interdependent unit in which one element was supposed to balance the other. A full and meaningful understanding of Nasser requires comprehension of such dynamic linkages.

Given the nature of Egypt's decision making system under Nasser, such operational code model was highly relevant to the calculations which entered into the process of making foreign policy decisions. Egypt's decision making system was oligarchic and dualistic. Despite the fact that Nasser's actual decision making power was limited in domestic affairs, he was the undisputed foreign policy decision maker. The uninstitutionalized nature of Nasser's decision making system helped to magnify the role of his operational code through the distortion and screening of information. Hence, in most of his foreign policy decisions, Nasser relied almost exclusively upon his operational code to calculate possible choices. The three clusters of decisions analyzed in this study have demonstrated that Nasser's decisional calculations were deeply embedded in his operational code. The variation of his operational code regarding the Arab and Arab-Israeli domains was accompanied by a concomitant variation in the policies pursued and/or advocated in the two fields. However, by virtue of his leadership in the Arab world, Nasser was sensitive to the impact of the inter-Arab system. This was clearly exhibited during the 1967 crisis. The pressure of the inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli systems was so strong that it forced Nasser to deviate from his operational code. That is

why we argue that the decision maker's operational code ought to be considered within the framework of the causal chain leading to certain choices.

2. The Testing of Hypotheses

In this study we have tested fifteen hypotheses which were grouped as follows:

- (a) Hypotheses related to the functions of the operational code:

H1 : The decision maker's political beliefs are more likely to be salient in foreign policy decision making than in domestic policy decision making.

This hypothesis was confirmed. We found that 30% of Nasser's references to foreign policy issues contained operational code beliefs whereas only 11% of his domestic policy references contained such beliefs. This hypothesis suggests that analysts of foreign policy decision making ought to pay more attention to the role the decision maker's beliefs play in making decisions.

H2 : The decision maker's political beliefs are more likely to be salient under foreign policy crisis conditions than under foreign policy non-crisis conditions.

This hypothesis was largely confirmed. During the three crises which we analyzed, we found a large increase in the absolute and relative articulation of operational code beliefs which suggests that crisis conditions tend to invoke the decision maker's beliefs upon which he bases his appreciation of the situation and the available alternatives.

H3 : Decision makers who hold a unitary image of the opponent are likely to advocate uncompromising policies.

The testing of this hypothesis indicates that the decision maker's conceptualization of the opponent's decision making model largely influences his propensity to choose various policies in dealing with such opponent. This was demonstrated by Nasser's analyses of the decision making process of Israel and the Baath Party.

H4 : Optimists recommend compromising policies while pessimists advocate uncompromising policies.

This hypothesis was largely supported. Nasser's pessimism about the immediate prospects of reaching an Arab-Israeli settlement coincided with his rejection of negotiations with Israel whereas his optimism about the prospects of improving Egyptian-American relations coincided with advocacy of negotiation and mutual accommodation with the USA especially during the Kennedy administration.

H5 : A decision maker who attributes dispositional explanations to the opponent is likely to recommend unconciliatory policies.

The case of Nasser substantiates the attribution hypothesis.

Nasser's attribution of Britain's goals in 1953-1954 as emanating from some legitimate security demands was accompanied by an advocacy of negotiation as the only means to settle the outstanding issues. Meanwhile, his attribution of Israel's goals as an intrinsic part of Israeli society and its history led him to reject negotiations and to insist on the total implementation of all UN resolutions.

(b) Hypotheses related to the structures of the operational code:

H6 : The operational code of executives is richer in its instrumental sub-system than in its philosophical sub-system.

H7 : The operational code of executives is more differentiated in its instrumental sub-system than in its philosophical sub-system.

The case of Nasser lent modest support to the first hypothesis and disconfirmed the second. We found the operational code of Nasser richer in its instrumental sub-system than in its philosophical sub-system. However, the two sub-systems were found to be equally differentiated.

H8 : The operational code is usually characterized by the dominance of a specific subset.

This hypothesis was largely confirmed. Six basic beliefs dominated Nasser's operational code up until 1967. They were images of the opponents, strategies, approaches to goal pursuit, optimism, goal selection, and predictability of political life. Not only did they dominate and persist in their centrality, but also in the magnitude of centrality.

H9 : The philosophical part of the operational code tends to be more stable than the instrumental part.

Nasser's operational code was generally stable. However, the stability of the philosophical sub-system consistently exhibited a higher level of stability than the instrumental sub-system.

This is not surprising. Philosophical beliefs are by their nature beliefs about fundamental issues of life and politics.

whereas instrumental beliefs are related to issues of strategy and tactics and as such more vulnerable to change.

H10 : Operational code beliefs change in an inverse relationship to their centrality.

This hypothesis was largely confirmed. The case of Nasser indicate that the most central beliefs were less vulnerable to change. Conversely, the most peripheral beliefs were easier to change.

H11 : Logical and psychological consistency of the operational code are separate phenomena.

The analysis of Nasser's operational code supported Converse's hypothesis that belief systems may be consistent from a psychological viewpoint, although they may not be consistent from a logical or mathematical perspective. Nasser's images of the opponent, conflictual view of politics, and optimizing approach to goal selection were not "logically" consistent with his conservative approaches and strategies. Nasser "experienced" these conservative approaches as safeguards against immediate action that might "logically" flow from his negative images and optimizing goals.

H12 : Operational code beliefs are basically interdependent.

Nasser's operational code emerged as a system of statically and dynamically interdependent beliefs. We found that there were three basic clusters of beliefs: (i) the cluster of politics, opponent images and optimism tended to co-occur with most instrumental beliefs; (ii) the instrumental cluster of

approaches, strategies and risk tended to co-occur with most philosophical beliefs; and (iii) instrumental beliefs related to approaches, strategies, risk, action, and use of military force tended to be contingent upon one another. Further, we found that operational code beliefs tended to change together. The systemic nature of the operational code was confirmed by the existence of a few factors which defined the essence of Nasser's operational code.

H13 : The more interdependent the more-stable is the operational code.

The case of Nasser provided additional evidence that this hypothesis is largely unjustified. We found that the most interdependent beliefs are not necessarily the most stable ones. Images of the opponent, optimism, and goal selection beliefs were the only ones which exhibited high stability and interdependence.

H14 : Political leaders answer the operational code beliefs differently depending on the issue areas.

H15 : Political leaders use specific clusters of beliefs in dealing with specific issue areas.

These two hypotheses were largely confirmed. We found that Nasser's operational code tended to function differently depending on the issues being addressed. For instance, Nasser articulated different approaches, strategies, and goal selection strategies and risk calculation at the level of inter-Arab politics and the level of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Further,

specific issues tended to invoke specific beliefs. For instance, images of the opponent and strategies were the only issues invoked in dealing with domestic issues related to adversaries and security, whereas approaches to goal selection, risk, and the global system tended to be articulated when dealing with general foreign policy.

3. Hypotheses Emerging from the Data

Several new hypotheses can be drawn from Nasser's operational code data set. They must all be tested in future research:

1. The operational code of political leaders articulated in public documents is not significantly different from the operational code articulated in confidential documents. The operational code is a set of fundamental beliefs about politics and goal selection and pursuit. It is embedded in the political leader's pattern of socialization, societal and personal experience, and his own mental set. As such, and by virtue of their striving toward consistency, political leaders cannot significantly "lie" about such fundamental beliefs. They may deliberately articulate different perceptions of facts as in the case with Nasser. However, they are not likely to articulate a "public" operational code and a "confidential" one. The case of Nasser has provided us with strong evidence to that effect.
2. The operational code's richness and differentiation are strongly related to the decision maker's political situation. We found that the political ascendancy of the decision maker

positively related to the richness and differentiation of his operational code. Likewise, traumatic experiences, such as the 1967 defeat, may result in the decrease in the richness and differentiation of the operational code.

3. The level of richness of the philosophical sub-system is affected by the ups and downs of the decision maker's career to a greater extent than the instrumental sub-system. The articulation of the philosophical subset usually declines more rapidly under traumatic conditions than the instrumental subset. The latter usually persists as a tool to deal with the new situation.

4. There is no significant difference between philosophical beliefs and instrumental beliefs in terms of centrality. The two sets are equally central.

4. Evaluating the Operational Code Approach

Systematic research on the operational code has barely begun. The dozen operational code studies which have been conducted are essentially unsystematic. Apart from the ten operational code questions formulated by Leites and George, the approach lacks clearly defined and replicable methods of data generation and analysis. Nor do the studies demonstrate the capacity of the operational codes to explain and predict decision making behavior. The study conducted by Heradstveit is perhaps the only systematic attempt to generate operational code data and to test hypotheses. However, this study is an

incomplete application of the operational code because it deals with only two operational code beliefs out of the ten presented by George; namely, image of the opponent and optimism. This study is predicated on a complete data set generated through a systematic quantitative content analysis of all publicly available documents of Gamal Abdel-Nasser. It attempts to place the operational code into a theoretical framework and to delineate its structures through careful empirical demonstration.

The study of Nasser's operational code strongly suggests that the set of questions upon which the operational code is predicated are essential to the understanding of the modus operandi of the decision maker. They orient the researcher toward the basic axioms which, under certain conditions, govern and limit the decision maker's range of choice and suggest to him a specific course of action. This has been demonstrated in the analysis of some of Nasser's basic decisions. In most cases, Nasser's operational code beliefs were capable of predicting his decisions. Further, the operational code orients the analyst toward the totality of the decision maker's belief system, and the crucial links between images and goals on the one hand and strategies and tactics on the other. In this sense it helps us to understand and explain some choices which otherwise may seem incomprehensible. We have seen in our analysis of some previous studies that unfamiliarity with the total picture of a leader's operational code, and the crucial

links among various beliefs, are responsible for unidimensional and distorted analysis. In this sense, the operational code approach yields a more objective picture of the decision maker's belief system. In short, the study has demonstrated that the operational code is a useful path to foreign policy analysis through its ability to extract the essential dimensions of the decision maker's political calculations which, in turn, enter into his decision making process.

However, the operational code must not be considered the ultimate explanation of foreign policy decision making. First of all, research on the operational code is inherently an ex post facto research. The researcher has no direct control on the independent variable (i.e., the operational code) because the manifestations have already occurred. Hence, the truth of the hypothesized relationships between the operational code and decisions or policy choices cannot be asserted with the confidence of experimental research. Accordingly, the conclusions derived from operational code research are inherently probabilistic.

Another problem which plagues operational code research and inevitably limits its explanatory power is the difficulty of holding other variables constant. Even if we arrive at statistically significant relationships between the operational code and policy choices, we cannot state a causal connection because there are a number of other variables, any one of which, or any combination of which may have caused the choice. This

has been demonstrated in the case of Nasser's decision to close the Gulf of Aqaba which was a result of the interaction of some operational code and non-operational code variables. One of the means of handling this problem is to set up and test alternative hypotheses. This can be done by probing the possibility that other independent variables can account for the same result, and/or testing alternative dependent variables. In this study we followed the second course by attempting to probe the possibility that X (operational code) can only account for Y1 (decision actually taken), and not Y2 or Y3 (options which may have been taken).

Further, inherent in the nature of operational code research is the problem of breakpoints in the code. By breakpoints is meant the shift in the initial structure of the operational code as a result in some situational factors. If this occurs, then it would be theoretically untenable to use the operational code to predict decisions in an entirely different situation, as was the case of Nasser after 1967.

Considering these limitations, the operational code emerges as only one element in the causal chain leading to policy outputs. Clearly, the analyst should pay attention to the gamut of systemic and sub-systemic variables in order to understand foreign policy decision making. These limitations underscore the need to use a systematic method, as in this study, to construct the operational code of leaders in several types of political systems, and to test the linkages between the operational codes and policies.

Appendix A

Documents subjected to content analysis

I. Collected Works:

1. Majmoua'at Khutab was Tasrihat wa Bayanat al Ra'is Gamal Abdel Nasser (Compendium of the Speeches, Releases, and Announcements of President Gamal Abdel-Nasser)

Vol. 1 (23 July 1952 - January 1958)

Vol. 2 (February 1958 - January 1960)

Vol. 3 (February 1960 - January 1962)

Vol. 4 (February 1962 - June 1964)

Vol. 5 (July 1964 - June 1966)

Cairo, Ministry of National Guidance, State Information Service, n.d.

2. Tasrihat al-Ra'is Gamal Abdel-Nasser (Announcements of President Gamal Abdel-Nasser)

Cairo, Information Department, n.d.

3. Watha'iq Abdel-Nasser (Abdel-Nasser's Documents)

Vol. 1 (January 1967 - December 1968)

Vol. 2 (January 1969 - September 1970)

Cairo, the Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram, 1973).

II. Books and Articles:

1. "How we planned this coup, Part II", Al-Tahrir (Cairo), 15 October 1952: 10-12.

2. Falsafat al-Thawra (The Philosophy of the Revolution), Cairo, 1954.

3. "The Egyptian Revolution", Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1955: 199-211.

4. "Egypt as a radiating source of civilization to the world", an introduction to Hussein Mu'nis (1956), Misr wa-Risalatuha Egypt's Mission, Cairo, Ikhtarna Laka no. 55: 5-8.

5. "Introduction" to Mohammad Ata, Al-Da'wa Al-Islamiya (The Islamic Call) Cairo, Ikhtaran Laka series, n.d.

6. Mithaq al-Amal at-Watani (The Charter of National Action), Cairo, 1962.

7. "Introduction" to Anwar Al-Sadat, Asrar al-Thawra al-Misraya (The Secrets of the Egyptian Revolution), Cairo, Dar Al-Hilal, 1957: 8-11.

III. Private Communications:

"Recordings of some of Nasser's conversations with Marshal Amer: 1962, 1965, 1967", Sabah Al-Khair, Cairo: 10 February 1977.

IV. Memoires and Diaries:

The Truth about the Palestine War, Cairo, Al-Tahrir Press, 1956.

V. Minutes:

1. "Minutes of the Preparatory Committee of the National Congress of Popular Forces, 26 November - 4 December 1961", in On Revolutionary Planning for the Future, Cairo, the Province of Cairo, Dept. of Public Relations.
2. Minutes of the Tripartite Unity Talks (March - April 1963), Cairo, Al-Ahram, 1963.
3. "Minutes of the Meetings of the General-Secretariat of the Arab Socialist Union (24 November 1964 - 11 May 1965)", in Rifa'at Al-Sayeed, Awarag Nassirya fi Milaff Sirri lil Ghaya (Nasserist Papers in a Top Confidential File), Cairo, Dar Al-Thaqafa Al-Gadida, 1975: 20-82.
4. "The Secret Minutes of Nasser's Discussions with the Secretaries of the Executive Bureaus of Cairo and Giza Provinces", Part 1: 7/3/66: 22-57 and Part 2: 8/3/66: 59-96, in Al-Tanzim wal Haraka (Organization and Movement), Beirut, n.d.
5. "Abdel-Nasser's Secret Papers", Part I, Al-Dastour (London), 7/6/78: 32-45. Contains Minutes of Nasser-Podgorny meeting of 22/6/67.
6. "Abdel-Nasser's Secret Papers", Part II, Al-Dastour, 14/6/78: 31-35. Contains Minutes of Nasser-Podgorny meeting of 23/6/67.
7. "Abdel Nasser's Secret Papers", Part VIII, Al-Dastour, 6/8/78: 31-35. Contains Minutes of the Egyptian Cabinet of 18/2/68; Minutes of the Egyptian Cabinet of 7/4/68; Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Arab Socialist Union, 28/10/68.
8. "Minutes of Nasser's deliberations with the members of the General-Secretariat of the Arab Socialist Union", Al-Tal'ia (Cairo), March 1966.

9. "The Secret Minutes of the Meeting of the Arab Heads of States before Nasser's death, September 1970", in Moussa Sabry, Watha'iq Harb October (The Documents of the October War), Cairo, Al-Maktab Al-Masri Al-Hadith, 1975: 153-198.
10. "Minutes of Nasser's discussions with Egyptian Missionaries, 1970", in Rifa'at Al-Sayeed, op.cit.: 85-104.

VI. Other Documents:

1. Nasser's speech at al-Hawmdiya, Al-Ahram, 27/3/1953.
2. Nasser's press interview with the Egyptian News Agency, Al-Ahram, 26/2/1953.
3. Nasser's letter to King Hussein, Sept. 1961, in Today's Youth and Tomorrow's Men, Cairo, Province of Cairo, Al-Shaab Press, 1961.
4. Nasser's address to Arab students in Moscow, Al-Ahram, 30/8/1965.
5. Nasser's address to the Arab-Soviet Friendship Society in Moscow, Al-Ahram, 30/8/1965.
6. Nasser's address to the Third Arab Summit Conference in Casablanca, Al-Ahram, 14/9/1965.
7. Nasser's interview with the Guardian, Al-Ahram, 20/7/1966.
8. Nasser's speech at the occasion of the July 23rd Revolution, Al-Ahram, 23/7/1966.
9. Nasser's speech on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, Al-Ahram, 27/7/1966.
10. Nasser's address to Professors of the University of Alexandria, Al-Ahram, 28/7/1966.
11. Nasser's address to Egyptian Student missionaries, Al-Ahram, 7/8/1966.
12. Nasser's discussions with Egyptian Student missionaries, Part I, Al-Ahram, 8/8/1966.
13. Nasser's discussions with Egyptian Student missionaries, Part II, Al-Ahram, 9/8/1966.

14. Nasser's letter to the Conference of the Organization of Arab Students in the USA and Canada, Al-Ahram, 1/9/1966.
15. Nasser's speech at Dar Al-Salaam, Al-Ahram, 23/9/1966.
16. Nasser's speech in Zanzibar, Al-Ahram, 25/9/1966.
17. Nasser's speech at Dar Al-Salaam, Al-Ahram, 27/9/1966.
18. Nasser's address to the Tanzian National Assembly, Al-Ahram, 28/9/1966.
19. Nasser's speech on the occasion of his visit to India, Al-Ahram, 21/10/1966.
20. Nasser's press conference in New Delhi, Al-Ahram, 25/10/1966.
21. Nasser's speech at the meeting of the Organization of Afro-Asian Solidarity in New Delhi, Al-Ahram, 27/10/1966.
22. Nasser's speech in a mass rally in New Delhi, Al-Ahram, 27/10/1966.
23. Nasser's speech at the conclusion of his visit to India, Al-Ahram, 27/10/1966.
24. Nasser's speech at Addis Abbaba, Al-Ahram, 7/11/1966.
25. Nasser's speech welcoming President Novotni of Czechoslovakia, Al-Ahram, 14/11/1966.
26. Nasser's speech welcoming the President of Bulgaria, Al-Ahram, 21/11/1966.
27. Nasser's speech at the opening of the new session of the National Assembly, Al-Ahram, 25/11/1966.
28. Nasser's speech welcoming the Algerian President Boumedienne, Al-Ahram, 29/11/1966.
29. Nasser's speech at a special session of the National Assembly in honor of the Algerian President, Al-Ahram, 1/12/1966.
30. Nasser's speech at the occasion of Victory Day, Al-Ahram, 24/12/1966.
31. Nasser's letter to King Hussein on the 6th of June 1967, in Peter Snow, Hussein, Washington, Robert B. Luce, Inc.: 191-192.

Appendix B

CODING OPERATIONAL CODE BELIEFS

A CODEBOOK

GENERAL INFORMATION

The purpose of this Codebook is to provide you with instructions for identifying and coding materials about "operational code" beliefs. Before beginning to code give the document an Identification Number. Number the paragraphs in the document consecutively, placing the number in the left hand margin at the top of the paragraph (that is, by the indentation which indicates the beginning of a new paragraph). Indented quotations within a paragraph should NOT be assigned a separate number. If you are coding a press interview or conference each answer should be assigned one number. In case of Minutes, each uninterrupted passage should be coded as one paragraph.¹ Numbered items within the same paragraph and/or items stated after a colon within a paragraph should not be assigned a separate number.

Your task is to determine whether each paragraph contains materials relevant to any of the philosophical and instrumental beliefs. Read the source materials that you will be coding as a whole. This will give you a general idea of the referent beliefs, issues, adversaries, etc...Return to the beginning of the source material to be coded and begin with the first paragraph. Does this paragraph contain a sentence, or a passage which expresses a descriptive, evaluative, or an advocacy belief relevant to any of the operational code beliefs?² If the answer is in the affirmative enclose the relevant sentence or passage in the text with parentheses. This process will help you determine which operational code beliefs will be coded. Some paragraphs will not be relevant to any of the operational code beliefs, consequently they should not be coded.

1. A paragraph may contain more than one sentence relating to the same belief. However, no more than one sentence, per paragraph, for each belief should be coded.

¹Sessions of Minutes or chapters of books should be coded as separate units.

²The coding instructions below will provide you with a set of operational indicators to assist you in answering that question.

- II. No sentence, phrase, or passage should receive more than a single code. Double coding can create problems of inference at later stages of the analysis. This is not an injunction against the possibility that even a single sentence may in fact be properly coded for two different beliefs. However, no part of the sentence should automatically determine how the second part will be coded. Consider the following example:

Although the Saudi regime is still committed to the destruction of the Yemeni Revolution, the progressive regime in Yemen will emerge triumphant.

In this case it would be appropriate to code the first part of the sentence for a belief about the adversary (P-2), and the second part for an expression of optimism (P-3). Note that in doing so it has been possible to avoid overlap, and the code assigned to the first part of the sentence did not automatically determine how the second was to be coded.

- III. A specific sentence or phrase may contain more than one answer to the same belief. Consider this example:

The June aggression was no more than an attempt to divert the attention of the Israeli public away from domestic economic and social problems, and to fulfill the old Zionist dream, "From the Nile to Euphrates."

This sentence may be coded as a belief about sources of opponent's goals and action. However, two answers may be checked: internal needs, and historical goals. In all cases the two answers should be EXPLICITLY stated, not inferred.

- IV. Do NOT code purely factual, non-judgemental materials.

Consider the following examples:

The US is the world's strongest power.

The USSR exploded its first thermonuclear bomb in 1957.

Such materials should NOT be coded because, by themselves, they would appear to be no more than statements of fact upon which there would be little, if any, disagreement. Such recounting of facts does not appear to tell us very much about the author's beliefs. If, however, a factual statement is presented as a part of an evaluation,

judgement, or prescription, then it is the latter that interests us. Examples of the uses which may be made of "factual" statements about the adversary include the following:

1. As evidence about the opponent's goals, operational code, etc....
2. As a source of "lessons" about how to cope with the adversary.
3. As a part of a judgement about some aspects of the opponent's policies.

In some cases it will be difficult to determine what constitutes a judgement and what constitutes a fact. Consider the following example:

Israel orchestrated the secessionist plot in Syria.

Any evidence about Israel's involvement in the Syrian secession is lacking, an assertion of this type largely constitutes a judgement on the part of the author. It should, therefore, be coded.

V. The materials to be coded may have been by persons who are more or less familiar. The coder may in fact have rather strong preconceptions about what X "really meant" when he said Y- that is he is making a statement that is out of character with the coder's view of his "real" beliefs. Nevertheless, the materials should be coded as they appear in the text. Use of irony or sarcasm should be literally interpreted.

VI. Answers to the operational code beliefs may appear to form some recurring patterns. For example, one who believes in a high degree of control over historical development, is more likely to accord a lesser role to chance. You must take care to code only what appears in the text, and not to assume the existence of unstated beliefs just because they are likely to be associated with others that one found in the materials to be coded.

Column:

1-4 Document Identification Number

Each document should be assigned a serial identification number, which should also be entered on the first page of the text.

5-6 () Year

Enter the last two digits of the year, for example for 1968 enter 68.

7-8 () Month

(01) January	(05) May	(09) September
(02) February	(06) June	(10) October
(03) March	(07) July	(11) November
(04) April	(08) August	(12) December

9-10 () Day

Enter the day of the month (01-31) on which the verbal utterance was articulated (not when it was reported). This will be easy to identify in the case of speeches, press conferences, and interviews.

*Books: Look for the date of the first introduction, if not available, for the date of the first edition.

*Memoires and Diaries usually refer to beliefs previously held. We should look for the dates referred to. Consider this example:

"When the Baath ministers argued, during the union with Syria, for a preemptive attack to prevent Israel from diverting the Jordan River, my answer was we must be cautious, because the USSR will not support us in such venture."

This sentence should be coded as a belief about the assessment of risks (I-3). However, it refers to a belief held in the past. We should look for that date in other parts of the speech or the memoire. If this date is not available, code the week of month in which the belief was articulated by entering 05 in Column 9 and then the week of the month in Column 10, e.g. 2nd week of the month would be coded 52. If you cannot determine the week of the month, enter 00 in Columns 9-10. If you cannot also determine the month, take the median month of the period referred to. In our example, June 1959 will be considered as the median month in the period of the Egyptian-Syrian union (Feb. 1958 - Sept. 1961).

If the author indicates that he is still adhering to the same belief, it should also be coded for the date of the articulation. However, if the author is referring to a previously held belief which was already coded at the time, DO NOT code it. Example:

"In my press conference before the (June) war, I said that we do not want to fight against the US, but will defend our country if attacked. Some people criticized me for saying that. But, I still believe that this is the correct strategy."

This sentence should be coded as a belief about the strategy (I-2B) ONLY for the date it was articulated, because it has been already coded when the press conference was coded.

11 Type of Document:

(1) Speech	(6) Minutes
(2) Press Conference	(7) Books/Introductions to
(3) Press Interview	Books/Articles/Broad-
(4) Letter	casts
(5) Memoires/Diaries	(8) Private communication

12 Audience:

(1) Mass Rally	(6) Group of Intellectuals
(2) Nationwide TV/Radio	(7) Foreign Politicians
(3) The Parliament	and diplomats
(4) UN and its agencies	(8) Foreign audience - general
(5) Armed Forces	(9) Domestic audience -
	general

13-15 Number of Paragraphs in the Document

16-18 Paragraph Number:

Enter the number of the paragraph that is being coded.

19-20 Issue:

Enter the issue which is being discussed at the point the material related to the operational code belief appears. You may look to preceding or subsequent paragraphs for information, be sure that there has not been an intervening change of context.

To determine whether a specific issue is in fact a domestic or foreign issue-area, look for the impact of the interaction involved. If the location of the interaction is located in the domestic domain, it should be coded as domestic. For example, the issue of British occupation of Egypt involves an interaction that is located in the Egyptian domestic sphere and related to Egypt's national independence. Therefore, it should be coded as

Domestic-status. An issue like Egypt refuses to sign a defence pact with Britain involves an interaction located in the external environment.¹

(01) Domestic military-security

All issues which focus on domestic violence, domestic order, relations with domestic opponents, security, and armament.

(02) Domestic political issues

Specific developments in the domestic political structures and processes.

(03) Domestic economic-developmental

Issues involving acquisition and allocation of resources such as plans for economic reform, development, trade, budget, etc.

(04) Domestic-status

Issues related to national independence, integration, national symbols, etc.

(05) Domestic-cultural

Cultural programs, educational issues, etc.

(06) Foreign-status

Issues related to the perception of the decision maker of his country's role in the global system.

(07) Foreign-cultural

Issues pertaining to cultural and educational exchange with other countries.

(08) Foreign-economic developmental

Issues related to the acquisition, allocation of resources such as foreign trade, foreign aid, and foreign investment.

(09) Foreign-military-security: Relations with Western countries

¹Operational code beliefs are always linked to a specific issue.

Issues related to alliances, weaponry, and all issues perceived as constituting military threat.

- (10) Foreign-military-security: Relations with communist countries
- (11) Foreign-military-security: Relations with Third World
- (12) Foreign-military-security: Immediate regional system and/or allies
e.g. Arabs for Egypt, NATO for USA, Warso Pact for USSR.
- (13) Foreign-military-security: Immediate regional and/or global conflict
e.g. Arab-Israeli conflict for Egypt, East-West conflict for USA or USSR, Taiwan conflict for PRC, etc....
- (14) Foreign-military-security: General
Issues which involve more than one global relationship, e.g. OP code beliefs as related to East-West.
- (15) Foreign-political-diplomatic: Relations with western countries
Issues involving interaction with western countries in all issues except those involving status, violence, economic, and cultural.
- (16) Foreign-political-diplomatic: Relations with communist countries
- (17) Foreign-political-diplomatic: Relations with Third World
- (18) Foreign-political-diplomatic: Immediate regional system and/or allies
- (19) Foreign-political-diplomatic: Immediate regional conflict
- (20) Foreign-political-diplomatic: General
- (88) Other

21-22 Adversary

Enter the adversary which is referred to in the paragraph.

In some cases it may be necessary to look somewhere else within the document for information. Use the attached code list.

*Do not code this category if there is no adversary.

*Multiple adversaries: The author may refer to more than one adversary in a single paragraph. However, we are interested only in principal and direct adversaries. If there is more than one principal and direct adversary, each of them should be considered as involving a separate operational code belief. For example: USA and Israel are pursuing aggressive policies in the Middle East. This statement should be separated into two op code beliefs (P-2): The USA is aggressive, and Israel is aggressive and coded accordingly.¹

*In some cases there may be no direct statement within the document that enables you to answer that question, but the text leaves you with little doubt as to the answer. For example, there may be only reference to "the bearded", but it seems clear that the reference is to King Faisal. In this case code King Faisal as the adversary.

23 Sources of Knowledge about the Operational Code Philosophical Belief(s) Cited in the Paragraph:

This question focuses on the author's epistemology. What are the sources of politically-relevant knowledge? The author may indicate that he is relying upon theory or ideology, experience, extrapolation of theoretical trends, historical analogies or "lessons", specific events, etc... This category refers to sources of knowledge as related ONLY to the cited philosophical belief(s). Check one of the following answers:

- (1) Theory/ideology: The author draws upon or cites a body of thought, literature, or beliefs as a guide to understanding or in support of his assertion.
- (2) Trends: In support of his belief(s) the author points to or extrapolates from a series of events, with a view to indicating what is likely to follow.
- (3) Experience: The author draws upon his personal experiences as a way of substantiating his point.
- (4) History: The "lessons" of history are cited as evidence of the author's diagnoses or prescription.

¹For purpose of the present project, and due to the voluminous amount of data involved, the code list below will provide you with combinations of potential adversaries.

- (5) Specific event(s): The author generalizes from specific event(s).
- (6) Faith: The author indicates that the point he is making must be accepted on faith, without citing some alternative basis for his beliefs.
- (7) Religion.
- (8) Other.
- (0) NO Reference.

24 Nature of the Political Universe (Philosophical Belief No. 1) P-1

The belief referred to in this column and the sub-beliefs referred to in columns 25-29 encompass basic beliefs about the more or less enduring characteristics of politics, history, and social life. This is in contrast to diagnoses that applicable only to specific actors, situations, events, or actors.¹ If however, such single examples are cited for the purpose of illustrating some general truths about the nature of politics, the passage should be coded.

This category refers to a question about the essential nature of political universe: Is conflict the normal state of affairs, or is it an aberration that occurs from time to time in an essentially harmonious universe? Is the political universe a Hobbesian one (a war of all against all) in which only a thin veneer of civilization or strong social controls stand in the way of the constant danger of anarchy, or is there a basic harmony of interest among men and nations? In the latter case the author may believe that the underlying harmony of interests exists even though it may not necessarily be reflected in the contemporary situation. That is, the harmony of interests is latent rather than manifest. Does the political universe consist essentially of friends and enemies, or are intermediate positions such as non-involvement or non-alignment recognized and accepted? Check one of the following answers:

- (1) Conflictual: The author indicates that conflict is the normal state of relations in political life. It is an inherent aspect of politics rather than a temporary aberration.

¹ However in subsequent references to sources, role, nature of conflict and conditions of peace you may code statements related to specific conflicts.

- (2) Mixed: Use this category when there is reference to both conflictual and consensual elements. The potential for both is inherent in the system. For example, this would be used if the author referred to the basic harmony on some types of issues as well as to fundamental conflict on others.
- (3) Harmonious: The author regards the political universe as one with many shared interests among individuals, nations, etc. The harmony of interests may be latent, imperfectly recognized, or temporarily overridden--thus resulting in war or other forms of conflict--but underlying these conditions is a harmony of interests. The barriers to adequate recognition of that harmony are capable of being reduced or eliminated by various types of reforms.

(0) NO Reference.

25

Sources of Conflict (P-1A)

Is conflict rooted in relatively permanent, non-manipulable features of the political universe? (e.g. aggressiveness is part of man's human and biological nature). Alternatively, can conflict be traced to more or less transitory, relatively easily-correctible phenomena? Does conflict arise from fundamental and relatively permanent differences of principles (ideology, religion, world view, etc..) or does it arise from rather specific, concrete issues (e.g. West Germany and East Germany cannot both enjoy full sovereignty over West Berlin)? Check one of the following answers:

- (1) Human Nature: Reference to the source of conflict in some quality that is seen as widely shared by human beings; for example, selfishness, irrationality, limited ability to cope with complexity, and the like. If the reference is to the personal attributes of a specific leader (e.g. Hitler's madness) or a group of leaders (e.g. the aggressiveness of communist leaders), it should be coded under category 3 below. The test is this: Is there reason to believe that the attribute in question is thought to be widely shared, or does the author believe that it is confined to some individual or identifiable subgroup? The former should be coded as "human nature", whereas the latter case should not.
- (2) Ideological Attributes of Nation(s): Conflict is believed to arise from the qualities of a specific philosophy, religion, or world view (e.g. messianic goals of Marxism-Leninism, the aggressiveness of Islam).

- (3) Political Attributes of Nation(s): The author states that the sources of international conflict can be traced to certain types of political structures or processes. References to conflict arising from the inherent aggressiveness of totalitarian states, or the unstable foreign policies of democratic states, or the personal attributes of a specific leader or a group of leaders, are examples that should be coded under this category.
- (4) Economic Attributes of Nation(s): This category should be used when the author cites the qualities of a particular system of acquisition, production, or distribution of material goods as the basic source of conflict. It should also be used when there is reference to conflict arising from other economic attributes of nation; for example, when the motives for expansion or aggression are traced to a nation's lack of sufficient resources, requirements for markets, etc.

In some cases it may not be clear whether to code an assertion as an "ideology" or "economics". Consider a statement that communism is the source of international conflict. If the context indicates that some aspect of acquisition, production or distribution of material resources is a salient aspect of the conflict, it should be coded as economics. If, however, the passage appears to refer to a doctrine, a set of beliefs, or a world view, then the statement should be coded as ideology.

- (5) Ideological Attributes of the International System: Conflict is seen as the result of the differences or incompatibility of two or more doctrines, beliefs, or world views (e.g. the irreconcilable differences between the Christian and communist views of man and society).
- (6) Nationalism in the International System: This category is used for references about conflict arising from antipathies between two or more ethnic, cultural or linguistic groups. Included also would be assertions about anti-colonial sentiments. Analyses of conflict arising from two types of group feelings should be excluded from this category: religion (including secular variants) as the source of conflict should be coded under "ideology", and race as the course of conflict should be assigned to the nationalism category.

- (7) Economic Attributes of the International System: Two types of assertion should be coded under this category: (1) the unequal distribution of resources or other material goods is the basic source of conflict, and (2) conflict arises from the differences or incompatibility of two or more systems of acquisition, production, or distribution of material goods.
- (8) Power Politics: Use this category when conflict is seen to arise from the interaction of nations searching for or threatening national security. References to conflict stemming from arms races, alliance commitments, the "security dilemma", geopolitical maneuvering, etc. would all be coded under this category, as would statements indicating that conflict is inherent in an international system in which each state is responsible for its own security.
- (0) NO Reference.

26

The Conditions of Peace (P-1B)

Does the author discuss the necessary or sufficient conditions for establishing or maintaining peace? There are a wide range of possible answers to this question. Probably most of them will fall into one of three clusters, focussing on: the individual (better education, knowledge, or communication among people and nations to break down misunderstanding, suspicions, etc.); the nation (eliminate or transform a specific nation, or nations of a particular class, or otherwise affect changes in the attributes of nations); and the international system (eliminate inequalities among nations, maintain a balance of power, transform some basic features of the international system, etc.). Check one of the following answers:

- (1) Education/communication: The author states that better education and information, or better communication between nations and peoples will allay the misunderstandings, the misperceptions, lack of trust, xenophobia, irrational hatreds, and other sources of conflict. Education and communication can lead to an understanding and appreciation of the fundamental harmony of interests.
- (2) Eliminate offending nation(s): The author indicates that the necessary or sufficient conditions of peace require the elimination or transformation of a

specific nations or a class of nations (e.g. communist nations, capitalist nations). Alternatively, it is stated that a world in which all nations share some important attributes (e.g. a world composed of democratic nations) will more likely be a peaceful one.

- (3) Eliminate inequalities: The author states that eliminating inequalities among nations will create the conditions for peace, this theme is most likely to occur with references to wealth, resources, productivity, standards of living and other aspects of economic conditions.
- (4) Maintain balance of power: The author asserts that the best or only means of ensuring peace is to maintain a balance of power, to prevent expansion by ambitious adversaries, to deter aggression, to maintain stability, etc.. Sometimes this is expressed in some form of the "para bellum" doctrine: "If you want peace, prepare for war".
- (5) Transform the system: Categories 4 and 5 above focus on the international system, but both of these responses accept the system and its basic features (e.g. the primacy of the nation-states). Others may propose some significant changes in the structure and functioning of the system. For example, various types of proposals for world government illustrate this category of responses, as do suggestions that international organizations be given primary responsibility for maintaining the security of member nations.
- (6) Eliminate injustices: In contrast to strategy 3, the author advocates the settling of a problem or a set of problems in a way that eliminates what he perceives an injustice.
- (8) Other
- (9) NO Reference.

27

The Nature of Conflict (P-1C)

Is conflict viewed as a zero-sum situation (one actor's gain is another's loss), or is it non-zero-sum (both parties may gain, or both may lose in a given situation) in nature. Alternatively, what types of conflict are zero-sum in nature, and what types are non-zero-sum? Check one of the following answers:

- (1) Zero-sum: This refers to situations in which the gains of one party result in an equal loss to the other. Sometimes the same idea is expressed as a "fixed-sum" situation - the total of the values for which the parties are competing is fixed and, therefore, whatever one gains is at the cost of others. Poker is an example of a zero-sum game. In international politics, territorial disputes often have this character.
- (2) Non-zero-sum: In a non-zero-sum situation both parties may gain, both may lose, or the gain of one may be greater or less than the other's loss. That is, the sum of values, rather than being fixed, may expand or contract. Unlike a zero-sum situation, in which the interests of the competing parties are diametrically opposed, in this case there is at least some degree of common interest, cooperative action may increase the sum of values, whereas conflict may reduce the total. The following examples would indicate a belief that a conflict situation was a non-zero-sum one: "The more secure the Soviet Union's deterrent forces, the greater our own security" (that is, the sum total of security is not fixed, and in some circumstances both the United States and the U.S.S.R. may gain); "in a nuclear war there can be no winners, only losers, as both nations will inevitably suffer catastrophic devastation" (that is, one party's loss in this case is also seen as the other's loss).
- (3) Mixed: Use this category when the author indicates that on some issues there are mutual interests, whereas on others they are diametrically opposed.

(0) NO Reference.

28 Scope of Conflict (P-1D)

- (1) All issues linked: The author believes that each issue is a part of a larger or more fundamental conflict. An example is the belief that all the important issues in politics are essentially part of a larger struggle between the forces of freedom (progress, enlightenment, etc.) versus those of repression (totalitarianism, imperialism, etc.).
- (2) High-spillover: Although not necessarily viewing all conflicts as linked, the author believes that each one has a high potential for spilling over into others. Spillover may take several forms:

- a. From one issue-area to others (e.g., economic conflict will tend to exacerbate political relations; conversely, economic cooperation will likely result in forms of political cooperation).
- b. From one geographical area to others (e.g., a local conflict in the Far East is stated to have a significant probability of increasing conflict in other regions).

(3) Issues separable: The author states that issues should be appraised on their own merit; that one should avoid the temptation to link each conflict to a larger or more comprehensive one; and that one should recognize that there are likely to be more rather than fewer sources of causation in political life.

(0) NO Reference.

29 The Role of Conflict (P-1E)

- (1) Necessary: Conflict is regarded as not only indispensable for the achievement of important goals and for progress, but it is also viewed as inherently valuable in its own right. Conversely, the absence of conflict is believed to result in stagnation and lack of progress. Social Darwinists are among those who might make assertions of this type.
- (2) Functional: According to this view conflict may be costly or even distasteful, but it also helps one to achieve important goals. Conflict is a necessary cost to be borne in the pursuit of one's goals.
- (3) Mixed: For some goals or in some circumstances conflict may be necessary or functional, but in others it is not.
- (4) Dysfunctional: Conflict is viewed as standing in the way of achieving important goals, or otherwise diminishing the prospects for success.

(0) NO Reference.

Philosophical Belief No. 2

30 What is the Fundamental Character of One's Political Opponents and of Other Significant Political Actors? (P-2)

This category includes beliefs about goals, strategies, tactics, sources of motivation, approaches to political calculation and other characteristics of major actors.

It is possible that some of the most revealing assessments of the adversary will occur when comparisons are made of the opponent and other key actors, including oneself. Such statements may also reveal aspects of the author's typology of political actors. Because there is a large number of actors about whom there may be some passing reference, making the task of coding extraordinarily complicated, unless otherwise stated we shall confine the coding to beliefs about adversaries. In later analyses of specific cases it may be necessary to include a large number of actors.

Category P-2 per se is restricted to one fundamental question: what does the author believe are the fundamental goals of the opponent? Are they essentially limitless aspirations that include achievement of a hegemonial position, elimination of other key actors, or a basic restructuring of the international system? Or, is the adversary regarded as pursuing the same kinds of goals (e.g. extension of power and influence) that are not dissimilar from those of other nations. Are the opponent's goals such basically conservative ones as attempts to maximize security, maintain the status quo, etc.? Alternatively, is the opponent believed to be pursuing purely restorative goals such as the restoration of a lost territory or resources, or is he believed to be willing to pursue policies of at least limited accommodation, or even to take an active role in the search for better relations with other actors in order to achieve international stability?

Check one of the following answers:

- (1) Destructionist: The opponent is believed to have virtually unlimited goals; such as universal hegemony, destruction or radical transformation of the existing international system, destroying or otherwise eliminating other actors in the system, conquest and enslavement, etc.
- (2) Expansionist: The opponent is perceived as wanting to maintain or to extend its territorial control over the other side's territory.
- (3) Aggressive: The opponent is regarded as aggressive in the pursuit of its interests and in seeking areas of weakness in which it can expand its influence. It is active and opportunistic in pursuing its interests, but its goals will usually fall short of those sought by destructionist states; for example, they do not include destruction or radical transformation of the international system.

- (4) Defensive: A defensive opponent is believed to be primarily concerned with its own security or maintenance of the status quo rather than with aggrandizement for its own sake. The search for security may lead to the infringement on the security -- or even the sovereignty -- of others; the conception of what constitutes adequate security may be rather grandiose; and the fears that motivate it may be poorly grounded in fact. Moreover, the status quo that the opponent is trying to maintain may be regarded as neither justified nor legitimate (e.g., Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe). Nevertheless, the opponent is regarded as motivated primarily by preservation rather than by further aggrandizement.
- (5) Conciliatory: The opponent is viewed as ready and willing to undertake at least limited accommodation when it is in its interest to do so.
- (6) Active seeker of peace: This category is not likely to be used often in connection with adversaries, as it expresses the belief that the opponent is prepared to undertake major initiatives and to make important concessions in the interests of international stability and better relations with others.
- (7) Domestic development: The opponent's goals are basically domestic, political, economic and/or social development and/or change.
- (8) Restorative: The opponent is believed to be primarily concerned with restoring territory, status, human or non-human resources, etc... that had been previously held or owned, as opposed to acquiring something not previously owned (as in items 1 and 2).
- (0) NO Reference.

31 Sources of the Opponent's Goals (P-2A)

In formulating goals and policies, is the opponent believed to be acting primarily as a result of its own qualities and dispositions (e.g., the ideology, beliefs, values, or personality traits of a particular leader or group of elites; its historical goals and policies; structural and other characteristics and requirements of its society, government, major institutions, etc.)? Alternatively, does the author believe that the adversary is acting in response to situational forces (e.g., pressures and constraints from the international environment; the search for security within a system of power politics; policies of other actors, including one's own).

nation, etc.)? This distinction largely corresponds to the beliefs that the opponent's motivations come from internal and external forces, respectively.

Check one of the following answers:

- (1) Ideology: The opponent's goals and aspirations are prescribed by a philosophy, world view, religion, or other forms of doctrine.
- (2) Historical goals: The opponent is seen to be pursuing goals that have traditionally been associated with that nation, irrespective of the regime, leadership, or specific circumstances.
- (3) Internal needs: The policies of the adversary are seen as stemming from pressures and constraints within its own borders. These may take a variety of forms, including: responses to the needs and demands of powerful segments of the society (e.g., the army), actions that are designed to divert attention from a particular domestic problem (e.g., some type of intrasocietal cleavages and conflict), or to overcome a lack of certain types of resources or capabilities.
- (4) Leader traits: This category should be checked when the author asserts that the opponent's goals and aspirations essentially reflect the needs, motivations, values, aspirations, or personalities of its present leader(s).
- (5) Power politics: The opponent's goals and aspirations are believed to be essentially similar to those of any nation (e.g., security, self-extension, the pursuit of power and influence, etc.), irrespective of its social, political, or economic institutions, or the nature of its leadership.
- (6) External pressures: The opponent is believed to be responding primarily to pressures from its external environment. That is, the adversary is essentially reacting to and constrained by the policies of others, rather than initiating foreign policy undertakings that reflect its own goals.
- (8) Other.
- (0) NO Reference.

32 Generality of adversary's hostility or opposition (P-2B)

- (1) General/permanent: The author believes that the opponent's hostility or opposition is not limited to a specific issue, nor does it arise from sources that are rooted in such broad, basic differences that neither a single policy initiative nor resolution of a particular issue is likely to change the fundamentally antagonistic nature of relations between the nations.
- (2) General/temporary: The author believes that the opponent's hostility is not limited to a specific issue, but he believes also that such hostility is not rooted in any fundamental differences between one's own nation and the enemy.
- (3) Specific/permanent: Although the range of the adversary's hostility is limited to a specific issue or a set of issues, the differences between the two sides is so deep and fundamental that it is highly unlikely to be resolved in the near future.
- (4) Specific/temporary: The author believes that relations with the adversary are shaped by conflict on issues of a specific nature that, if resolved, would result in at least normal relations between the opponent and one's own nation. Thus, the adversary's hostility or opposition is likely to be limited to the period of time required to resolve the issue. It should be added that the specific issue in question need not be merely a trivial one; it might, for example, be as important as "normalization of relations in Europe", "the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people".
- (0) NO Reference.

33 Likely response of the adversary to our conciliatory moves (P-2C)

This category deals with the author's estimate of the manner in which the opponent would respond to conciliatory moves, concessions, etc.

- (1) Reciprocate in this situation: The author believes that a conciliatory move will lead the opponent to reciprocate with a conciliatory move or with concessions on the particular issue under consideration. The adversary is likely to accept conciliatory moves at face value and respond in kind.

- (2) Reciprocate in other situations: If one undertakes conciliatory actions the adversary is believed to be willing to make concessions in other issues as well. That is, the author believes that there will be a transfer or "spillover" from one issue to others as a consequence of conciliatory moves one might undertake, resulting in generally better relations.
- (3) Ignore: The author believes that whatever concessions one might make are quite irrelevant to the opponent's policy calculations. The adversary's goals and means of pursuing them are not sensitive to any actions one might undertake. They are thus unlikely to be affected in any significant way by one's conciliatory moves.
- (4) Take advantage in this situation: According to this view, if one makes a concession or a conciliatory gesture, the adversary will seize the opportunity to register a gain, will interpret it as a sign of weakness that may safely be exploited, or will otherwise make an effort to put it to his advantage rather than to ignore it or reciprocate with a similar move. Taking advantage is limited to the specific issue under consideration.
- (5) Take advantage in other situations: This view is very close to the Munich syndrome. That is, the author believes that not only will the adversary take advantage of a conciliatory move on one issue, but it will take it as a sign that one's own nation lacks resolve everywhere. Therefore, the likely result of such policy moves is that the adversary will be emboldened to probe, or push forward on other issues or in other areas as well. Put somewhat differently, matters of resolve and credibility are seen as tightly linked because the adversary's characteristic manner of appraising one's actions and responding to them.
- (8) Other.
- (0) NO Reference.

34 Likely response of the adversary to our policies of firmness (P-2D)

- (1) Back down: By pursuing a policy of firmness or boldness, one will cause the opponent to back down, to concede important points, or even to abandon major foreign policy undertakings. Sometimes this belief is couched in something like the following terms:

"By standing firm we can force the enemy to back down (the enemy may be bluffing, testing our resolve, probing, etc.). If, however, the enemy does not back down in these circumstances, this demonstrates that he is prepared to go to war, and we might as well have the showdown now rather than later".

- (2) Ignore: The enemy is believed to be acting on the basis of its own firm goals and timetable. Therefore, our firmness is not likely to have any significant effect one way or the other, on the opponent's policies.
- (3) Reciprocate in this situation: If we pursue a policy of firmness or a "hard line", the opponent is likely to harden its own position with respect to the particular issue under consideration. That is, the author believes that within the context of the given issue a firm policy will result in deadlock at minimum, and possibly escalation as well.
- (4) Reciprocate in other situation: The author believes that the result of our policy of firmness will be that the opponent will harden its own policies on other issues or in other situations. That is, the confrontation or escalation is likely to "spillover" into other issues.
- (5) Respond impulsively/irrationally: The author believes that if one pursues a firm or hard line, it is likely to push the adversary into a corner, creating a situation in which the enemy may respond impulsively or in an emotional rather than in a calculating manner. For example, the author may believe that a hard line will result in frustration of the opponent to the point that it may respond with an aggressive response that is not rational in the circumstances.
- (8) Other.
- (0) NO Reference.

35 Opponent's Image of one's own Nation (P-2E)

We are interested in the author's conceptualization of his adversary's image of the author's nation.

The coding categories parallel those of Column 30.

36 Opponent's View of conflict (P-2F)

- (1) Inevitable: The enemy believes that sooner or later

there will be some type of ultimate show-down with one's own nation.

- (2) Avoidable: The opponent believes that such show-down can be avoided.
- (3) Desirable: The author asserts that the adversary welcomes or seeks conflict as a means of coping with domestic problems, of enhancing the prospects of realizing certain aspirations, or of maintaining vigilance.
- (4) Undesirable: The opponent is believed to regard a diminution of conflict as a necessary or desirable condition for the effective pursuit of goals.
- (5) Inevitable/desirable.
- (6) Inevitable/undesirable.
- (7) Avoidable/desirable.
- (8) Avoidable/undesirable.
- (0) NO Reference.

37 Opponent's decision-making process (P-2C)

- (1) Unitary actor: The opponent's nation is seen as a unitary actor insofar as making foreign policy decisions is concerned. The adversary's political system is a monolithic one or, at least for purposes of diagnosis and understanding the opponent's foreign policy, one may overlook the existence of parties, pressure groups or other factions.
- (2) Bureaucratic model: Policies are believed to reflect the inertia and other attributes and consequences of policy-making by large bureaucratic organizations. Thus, policy is likely to be characterized by continuity (even when circumstances have changed enough to result in something less than totally-rationally policies). Leaders come and go, but the main contours of policy at a glacial pace, if at all, because pre-existing organizational processes, commitments, etc., importantly influence policy.
- (3) Competitive model: The author conceives of the government as being composed of competing factions. Policy may be seen as emerging out of the interplay of that competition; or the author may believe that there are at least groups within the opposing nation that would

pursue different policies. Sometimes the latter view is couched in terms of "hard liners" versus "soft liners"; for example, the author may indicate the present ruling group represents the "moderates", at least in the sense that they are more likely than alternative elites to be people one can deal with.

(8) Other.

(0) NO Reference.

38 Our Conception of the Opponent's International Role (P-2H)

This category relates to the author's conception of the role which the opponent is playing in the international or regional system on a continuing basis, that is, the author's definitions of the general kinds of orientations and roles which the enemy is believed to be performing.

(1) Imperialist/anti-revolution leader: The author believes that his opponent's international role is to lead the forces of colonialism and imperialism and the forces of counter-revolution on a global level.

(2) Imperialist agent: Unlike category 01, this category suggests that the opponent is playing the role of the lacky to a global power either on a regional or global level.

(3) A Communist agent: The author perceives his enemy as the agent of another global communist power.

(4) Zionist agent: The opponent is believed to be a part of an over-all mechanism to implement Zionist objectives.

(5) Regional spoiler: The opponent is believed to be performing the role of disrupting regional stability, security, and/or integration.

(8) Other.

(0) NO Reference.

39 The Opponent's "Operational Code"; Choice of Objectives, I (P-2I)

(The four columns relating to the operational code choice of objectives, correspond to instrumental belief No. 1)

(1) Optimizer: The opponent is believed to identify and pursue the best goal -- that is the highest payoff,

the maximization of values -- existing in any situation.

- (2) Satisficer: The opponent is regarded as being prepared to settle for a goal that is satisfactory in a given set of circumstances, even if it falls somewhat short of the ideal.

(0) NO Reference.

40 The Opponent's "Operational Code" Choice of Objectives, II (P-2I2)

- (1) Realistic: Indications that the opponent is believed to set goals that can reasonably be regarded as attainable in a given set of circumstances should be coded as realistic.
- (2) Unrealistic: The adversary is believed to set unattainable or utopian goals.

(0) NO reference.

41 The Opponent's "Operational Code" Choice of Objectives, III (P-2I3)

- (1) Flexible: References to the opponent's ability to reassess and alter goals in light of feedback should be coded as flexible.
- (2) Inflexible: The opponent is regarded as adhering rigidly to goals, once established, no matter what the indications that they are outdated.

(0) NO Reference.

42 The Opponent's "Operational Code" Choice of Objectives, IV (P-2I4)

- (1) Predictable: The adversary is believed to adhere to a consistent and discernible pattern of behaviour in foreign policy.
- (2) Unpredictable: The opponent is not adhering to any specific pattern.

(0) NO Reference.

43 The Opponent's Operational Code Pursuit of Objectives (P-2J)

- (1) Prepare ground.

- (2) Try and see.
- (3) Incremental approach.
- (4) Blitzkrieg Strategy.
- (5) A mobilizing strategy.
- (8) Other.
- (0) NO Reference.

Check column 68 for description of these categories.

44 The opponent's strategies

Our concern here is with a basic stance toward the application of goals as related to specific opponents in specific situations.

There are five possible strategies to the pursuit of goals:

- (1) Turn the other cheek.
- (2) Non-punitive strategy.
- (3) Accomodative strategy.
- (4) Deterrent strategy.
- (5) Gratitously aggressive strategy.
- (8) Other.
- (0) NO Reference.

Check column 69 for description of these categories.

45 Our policies toward the opponent

This category refers to specific policies which the author advocates as the most proper ones rather than general beliefs. Recommended policies vary according to the degree of conciliation-non-conciliation involved.

- (1) Highly non-conciliatory: The author expects from the adversary unprecedented conditions to show good faith such as a unilateral disarmament and total surrender.
- (2) Non-conciliatory: The author argues that nothing short

of the total acceptance of his goals and viewpoints by the opponent will convince him of the adversary's sincerity. Example: the author argues that his goal is to implement the UN resolutions in the Palestine issue. Then, he goes on and argues that if the opponent is sincere and interested in peace, he must accept these resolutions. The author puts the onus on his opponent unilaterally to achieve peace and does not point out any readiness to take an active role in bringing about peace. He also rejects any negotiations with the opponent.

- (3) Conciliatory: The author does not expect any unilateral concessions from the opponent. Rather, he expects the opponent to reciprocate his good faith by demonstrating willingness to negotiate and reconcile. The emphasis is on bilateral accommodation and/or negotiations.
- (4) Highly conciliatory: The author emphasizes his determination to pursue an active policy of accommodation and negotiation with the opponent, even if the opponent does not reciprocate.

(0) NO Reference.

46. What is the Nature of the Contemporary International System? (P-3)

Whereas belief 1 focused on the more or less permanent features of political life, this one is concerned with the author's beliefs about the most salient characteristics of the contemporary international system. The answers to questions P-1 and P-3 may be closely related. They may also differ, as in the case of one who sees the political universe as fundamentally harmonious, and yet who views the contemporary international system as highly conflictual owing to some more or less temporary conditions (e.g., the policies of a particular state or leader which threaten peace and stability).

Some materials may appear to be related to both P-2 and P-3; for example, when the discussion centers on the interaction or linkages between the opponent's policies and the international system. The following guidelines may be helpful in making a distinction. If the material refers to the impact of the international system (e.g., as a source of constraints, etc.) on the opponent's policies, motivations, etc., it should be coded as part of the image of the opponent (P-2). If, on the other hand, the passage discusses the impact of the opponent's actions on the international system (e.g., the system is

48 The Conditions of Peace in the International System
(P-3B)

The same as the categories of Column 26.

49 Structure of the International System

- (1) Loose Bipolar System: The author believes that the present international system essentially has two centers of decision; a concentration of power under the effective control of one or a limited number of nations in each camp; and a similar line-up of allies and adversaries on most, if not all issues. Put somewhat differently, the system is seen as a relatively rigid one in which relations between members of the blocs are typically antagonistic on most issues. The author sees the international system as having also some national actors adopting the position of non-alignment who are acting to reduce the danger of war between the two blocs..
- (2) Tight Bipolar System: The international system is seen as a bipolar system, but non-bloc members disappear entirely or cease to be significant. A non-alignment position is considered as impossible or non-significant.
- (3) Pluralistic System: A pluralistic system is one with multiple centers of decision-making and power; greater flexibility in the alignments that arise from issue to issue; and patterns of relations within and between alliances that are somewhat less predictable -- compared to a polarized system -- from issue to issue. This is basically a "balance of power" system in which competitive equilibrium among multiple coalitions is the essential feature.
- (4) Detente System: This is a bipolar world in which relations between the two major powers are strongly competitive but the competition is not conflictual. The author believes that the essential feature of the international system is one of collaboration between the two superpowers and agreement to avoid direct confrontation, and a loosening up of internal organization of the two blocs..
- (8) Other.
- (0) NO Reference

described as polarized as the result of X's policies, then P-3 is the appropriate category.

In summary, the rule to follow in coding such materials is to determine where the impact of the interaction is located. If the discussion emphasizes the impact on the adversary's policies, it should be coded as P-2. If it focuses on the consequences for the system, then code it as P-3. Finally, if the passage discusses the impact of both directions, then the two statements should be separated -- that is, a separate pair of parentheses placed around each.

For P-3 check one of the following answers:

- (1) Conflictual: The author indicates that the present international system is dominated by conflictual relations among nations or coalitions of nations. This category should not be used simply because there is reference to the existence to some conflict within the international system. Rather, it should be reserved for assessments that the most significant patterns of relations are those of conflict.
- (2) Mixed: Use this category when there is reference to both conflictual and more harmonious patterns of relations within the contemporary international system. The mixed assessment might arise from geographical variations (e.g., reference to East-West cooperation on establishing permanent frontiers in Europe, counter-balanced by deep American-Soviet divisions on a Mid-East settlement), or from distinctions across issues (e.g., an assessment of a mutual interest in some forms of trade, but a complete lack of agreement on how to cope with a dangerous arms race).
- (3) Harmonious: The author regards the contemporary international system as one in which mutual interests are dominant -- and are recognized as such -- even though there may be specific issues on which there is a lack of accord. Where conflicts of interest exist, they are regarded as generally capable of being resolved by means other than recourse to military threats or violence.

(0) NO Reference.

47 Sources of Conflict (P-3A)

The same as the categories of Column 25.

48 The Conditions of Peace in the International System
(P-3B)

The same as the categories of Column 26.

49 Structure of the International System

- (1) Loose Bipolar System: The author believes that the present international system essentially has two centers of decision; a concentration of power under the effective control of one or a limited number of nations in each camp; and a similar line-up of allies and adversaries on most, if not all issues. Put somewhat differently, the system is seen as a relatively rigid one in which relations between members of the blocs are typically antagonistic on most issues. The author sees the international system as having also some national actors adopting the position of non-alignment who are acting to reduce the danger of war between the two blocs..
- (2) Tight Bipolar System: The international system is seen as a bipolar system, but non-bloc members disappear entirely or cease to be significant. A non-alignment position is considered as impossible or non-significant.
- (3) Pluralistic System: A pluralistic system is one with multiple centers of decision-making and power; greater flexibility in the alignments that arise from issue to issue; and patterns of relations within and between alliances that are somewhat less predictable -- compared to a polarized system -- from issue to issue. This is basically a "balance of power" system in which competitive equilibrium among multiple coalitions is the essential feature.
- (4) Detente System: This is a bipolar world in which relations between the two major powers are strongly competitive but the competition is not conflictual. The author believes that the essential feature of the international system is one of collaboration between the two superpowers and agreement to avoid direct confrontation, and a loosening up of internal organization of the two blocs..
- (8) Other.
- (0) NO Reference

50. Stability of the Contemporary International System (P-3D)

Check one of the following answers.

- (1) Stable: The author believes that the essential structures and processes of the present international system are relatively enduring. The author believes that it is unlikely that a sudden and basic change in the system will occur.
- (2) Mixed: The author believes that some elements of the contemporary international system are relatively stable; nevertheless, other structures and/or processes are likely to experience sudden and basic change. Example, while the author may view the totality of the international system as highly stable, he may sense some elements of instability in some regional systems (e.g., Middle East)..
- (3) Unstable: The international system as a whole, or at least its major structures and processes are viewed as inherently unstable.
- (0) NO Reference.

51-52 National Role Conceptions (P-3E)

In this category we are concerned with the author's conception of the role of his own nation in the regional/or international system. By national role conception is meant the author's definition of the general orientations commitments, decisions and actions suitable to his own state and the functions, if any, his state should perform (and/or is performing) on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems"

- (01) Bastion of revolution liberator: The author holds his country has a duty to organize or lead various types of revolutionary movements abroad, to provide an area which foreign revolutionary leaders can regard as a source of physical and moral support, as well as an ideological inspirer.
- (02) Regional leader/protector: The author's country has a responsibility to lead and/or to protect the states in a particular region.
- (03) Active independent: This national role conception emphasizes national independence (foreign policy decisions are made to serve national interests.

rather than the interests of others) and active programs to extend diplomatic and commercial relations to diverse areas of the world.

- (04) Anti-imperialist agent/liberator supporter: Unlike category (01), this category suggests rather unstructured, vague support to liberation movements, and commitment to combat imperialism within indicating formal responsibilities.
- (05) Anti-communist agent.
- (06) Anti-Zionist agent.
- (07) Anti-revisionist agent: refers to deviations from communist faith.
- (08) Defender of the faith: The author believes that his nation is defending value systems (rather than territories) from attack, such as defending freedom, communism, etc.
- (09) Mediator: The author perceives his country as capable of, or responsible for, fulfilling undertaking special tasks to reconcile conflicts between other states or groups of states as a continuing task.
- (10) Integrator/regional subsystem collaborator: The author believes that the role of his country is to integrate, unify, or bring together in a formal way a specific group of countries, in order to build wider communities.
- (11) Developer: The themes in this role conception indicate a special duty or obligation to assist underdeveloped countries.
- (12) Bridge: This category implies a communication function, that is, acting as a "translator" or "conveyor of messages and information" between peoples of different regions and countries.
- (13) Faithful Ally: This role refers to a specific commitment to support the policies of another government, e.g., Bulgaria's support to USSR, or Luxemburg's total devotion to NATO.
- (14) Example: The author emphasizes the importance of promoting prestige and gaining influence in the international system by pursuing certain domestic policies. He does not refer to formal diplomatic

programs or special tasks outside the boundaries of his own state, e.g., to show the Arabs through our achievements that socialism pays off.

- (15) Internal development: The author believes that the role of his country is to remain uninvolved in international political manners (not economic or technical) and to concentrate on internal economic development.
- (16) Protectee: The author alludes to responsibilities of other states to defend his own state, without indicating any particular active role, e.g., Novotni refers to USSR's responsibility to defend Czechoslovakia.
- (17) World Policeman: The author believes the role of his country to act as a deterrent against aggressors in any part of the world.
- (18) Peace-maker: The author believes that he has a messianic role of advocating, preaching, and maintaining the cause of peace and justice.
- (88) Other.
- (00) NO Reference.

53 The Nature of one's own goals

The coding here parallels the coding categories in Column 30.

Philosophical Belief No. 4

54 What are the prospects of the eventual realization of one's fundamental goals? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and, in what respect that one and/or the other? (P-4)

- (1) Optimism, unqualified: The author expresses the belief that the goals or aspirations will be met, without qualifying his optimism in any respect.
- (2) Optimism, qualified: The author believes that the goal is likely to be achieved, but he also qualifies his judgement by suggesting there is a probability of failure; that the costs and duration of time required to achieve a goal may vary significantly; that certain events may intervene to spoil the prospects for success; or that optimism is conditional upon certain actions, events, or conditions.

- (3) Mixed: The author expresses optimism with respect to some goal or goals, and pessimism with respect to some others.
- (4) Pessimistic: The author indicated that there is a low probability (or worse) of being able to achieve his goals.
- (0) NO Reference.

55 Optimism/pessimism with reference to (P-4B)

- (1) Long term goals: Assertions about major, fundamental, long-range aspirations (referred to in Col. 53) should be coded here.
- (2) Policy undertaking: Use this category for expressions of optimism or pessimism with respect to more specific policy undertakings and aspirations; for example, increasing foreign trade with Eastern Europe, stimulating the unification of Western Europe, preventing an arms race in Latin America, increasing the peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations, settling the Berlin issue, intervening in Vietnam, undertaking a new round of arms control talks to regulate strategic weapons, etc.
- (0) NO Reference.

56 Optimism or pessimism conditional? (P-4C)

- (1) Conditional: The author asserts that his optimistic or pessimistic appraisal is conditional upon some other action, event or condition being present or absent. Examples include statements of the form:

"We can achieve our goal X, but only if we take action Y", or "We are likely to succeed in X, if event Y happens to intervene", or "Undertaking X will be successful if Y responds as predicted".
- (2) Unconditional: The author asserts that his optimism or pessimism does not depend on the presence or absence of any other action or response.
- (0) NO Reference.

57 On Whose Side is Time? (P-4D)

In what direction is the tide of history moving? How is time likely to affect the prospects for realization of one's fundamental values and aspirations? How is it

likely to affect one's prospects relative to other actors, especially opponents? Note that this question does not overlap with instrumental belief No. 4 (What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interests?). The former question is concerned with one's broad general outlook on historical development and the likelihood that things will get better or worse for one's cause. The latter question focusses on the much narrower problem of how to time action in order to improve the prospects of success in an undertaking. There are, of course, some circumstances in which the two beliefs may be linked. For example, one may believe that each passing year will improve one's position relative to that of the opponents, and then follow this up with the suggestion that it would therefore be wise to delay action until a more favourable moment in the future. In that case the first statement should be coded P-4D (time is on our side), and the second one should be coded as I-4 (it is best to delay action until one's position relative to that of the adversary improves)..

- (1) Time is on our side: The author asserts that in the future one's own situation is likely to become better relative to that of the adversary.
- (2) Time is on the adversary's side: The author asserts that in the future one's own position is likely to become worse relative to that of the adversary.
- (0) NO Reference.

Philosophical Belief No. 5.

58 Is Political Life Capricious, or does it conform to a more or less discernible pattern? What is the Role of Chance in Human Affairs and History? P-5

Some questions have been raised about the difficulty to distinguish between statements of optimism and statements of prediction. Optimism is usually linked to one's goals and refers to the likelihood of the goals to be realized in the future, e.g., "We look forward to improve our relations with the USA, and we think, with some patience and perseverance, we will be able to do that. Statements of prediction are usually linked to a recurring pattern of regularities in human life, e.g., "The Arab nation will triumph as it has always triumphed in the past". If there is no reference to such regularities, the discriminating factor is whether the statement is linked to a specific goal. Consider this example: "In ten years the international system will be a multi polar one". Such a statement should be coded as prediction because it is.

not explicitly considered as a goal. However, a statement such as "The liberation of Palestine is our constant operation and we think Palestine will be liberated". This is a statement of optimism, not prediction.

- (1) Predictable: The author expresses the belief that there are discernible patterns in political life, that one can forecast at least the main contours of events, and the likely consequences of one's own actions, etc. Emphasis is placed on at least some types of regularities in situations and the manner in which key actors are likely to respond to them.
- (2) Capricious: The author characterizes political life as dominated by uncertainty, chance, the unpredictable, randomness, etc. Emphasis is placed on the uniqueness of each situation.
- (3) Mixed: The author asserts that some aspects of political life are predictable, meanwhile he characterizes some other aspects as capricious.
- (0) NO Reference.

59 What aspects of Political Life are predictable or unpredictable? (P-5A)

- (1) Historical development: Use this category when the author discusses broad, long-term trends and developments. Illustrations would include discussion of: "The prospects of democratic development", "the evolution of communist societies", "the effects of unrestricted population growth", and the like.
- (2) State of the system: This is the appropriate category for beliefs about the structure and other important attributes of the international system. Predictions about the future of the nation-state system, the consequences of nuclear proliferation, the future of war, etc. would be coded under this category.
- (3) Opponent: References to one's ability to predict developments in the adversary's social system, its prospects for success or failure, etc. would be appropriate for this category. References to the predictability or unpredictability of the opponent's foreign policy should be coded under Col. 42, rather than here.
- (4) Policy outcomes: This category is used for assertions about one's ability to forecast or predict the

results of certain courses of policy; that is, the relationship between means and ends. Assertions will sometimes take the form, "If we do X, then Y (may, will probably, will certainly) occur".

- (5) Specific events: If the author discusses his ability or inability to predict a specific event -- an action taken by a specific actor with respect to a given issue -- the material should be coded in this category.
- (8) Other.
- (0) NO Reference.

60. Degree of Predictability (P-5B)

- (1) Certainty: The author indicates that his ability to forecast certain developments, outcomes, events and the like is not hedged with qualifications or doubts.
- (2) Probability: The author asserts that there are developments and outcomes that may be predicted with a moderate to high degree of confidence, but with less than certainty.
- (3) Uncertainty: The author states that development and outcomes cannot be predicted, or he asserts that the nature of politics is such as to make predictions inherently impossible.
- (0) NO Reference.

Philosophical Belief No. 6

61. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? What is one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction? (P-6)

Philosophical Belief No. 6 concerns the feasibility of shaping or controlling historical development and of "making a difference" with respect to important goals. It deals with beliefs about the leader's role and obligations in the sphere of political action. Can one significantly affect the fundamental direction of historical development or are the possibilities largely limited to affecting the pace, costs or details of steps leading to outcomes that are largely determined? What constraints on action must be recognized and respected? Should the leader accept an active role in attempting to shape historical development, or must he assist the temptation

to do so? What role should the leader play in defining goals, selecting means, managing conflict, etc.? For what goals or values should one actively attempt to "move" history? For which should one adopt a more passive role?

Check one of the following categories:

- (1) Man is the master of his own destiny: Man can guide or shape the essential features of historical development. The leader must actively use the political process to achieve desired ends. Given wisdom and skilled leadership, most problems can be solved.
- (2) Respond positively: The author believes that he has a positive role to play in shaping historical development. Nevertheless, in playing such positive role, he is responding to some objective environmental and/or situational factors.
- (3) Intervene when feasible: One should actively intervene in human affairs when it is possible to solve problems by doing so. The skilled leader knows which problems are tractable and which are not; that is, he does not expend his political resources in pursuing goals that are unrealistic, or attempting to solve problems that are incapable of being solved.
- (4) Mediate between contending forces: The author asserts that the role of the leader is to act as a broker and to use that role to seek the best resolution of conflicts.
- (5) Discern historical trends: The role of the leader is to identify the main trends of historical development and to pursue policies that are in harmony with those trends. One cannot control historical development; the basic patterns are beyond man's control. At best one can discern which way the tide is running and accept one's fate with grace and dignity.
- (6) Avoid intervention: One should usually avoid active attempts to intervene in human affairs. Most issues are best dealt with by letting them unfold at their own pace; attempts to intervene will often make things worse, whereas if one adopts a somewhat passive role, a number of seemingly urgent problems will usually resolve themselves or otherwise disappear.
- (7) Control uncertain, but must act: The author believes that whether one can or cannot significantly affect historical development is unknowable. But this is

not the most important point, for one must act as if it is possible to make a difference. That is, lack of certainty about the ability to control historical development does not relieve one of the obligations to act.

- (8) Leader cannot control historical development alone:
Although human affairs are controllable, such control cannot be conducted by the leader alone.

(0) NO Reference.

62 Sources of Knowledge about the Operational Code Instrumental Belief(s) Cited in the Paragraph

In this Column, we are interested in the sources of knowledge cited in the paragraphs as related ONLY to instrumental beliefs.

The coding categories resemble those of Column 23.

Instrumental Belief No. 1

63 What is the Best Approach for Selecting Goals of Political Action?

- (1) Comprehensive framework: The author states that goals must be worked out within an overall framework or master plan. Without such a blueprint one will be led astray and possibly lose the opportunity to achieve one's major aspiration.
- (2) Mixed: Depending on the circumstances, the issues, and the nature of the adversary or adversaries, one must appraise whether it is best to take a comprehensive or more piecemeal approach to the task of establishing goals. Neither approach is automatically to be condemned.
- (3) Individual issues: One should look at the immediate problem at hand and the opportunities afforded by the circumstances, in establishing goals. Useful as an overall blueprint of action might be, it should not stand in the way of establishing feasible, intermediate range goals. It is possible to separate issues and deal with each one on its own terms.

(0) NO Reference.

64 Nature of Goals Sought (I-1A)

- (1) Optimal: One should stick to one's fundamental goals.

To compromise on matters of principle for purposes of achieving short term gains is to run the risk of abandoning major aspirations in a piecemeal fashion. To settle for half a loaf is to lose the opportunity to attain a whole loaf (which one may do by sticking to principles). Subdivision of major goals into a series of lesser ones entails the risk that one will settle for less than one could otherwise achieve.

- (2) Feasible: In appropriate circumstances, one should be prepared to strive for goals that advance one a limited distance toward the long term goals. One need not fear working toward one's aspirations one step at a time. There are circumstances in which seeking the perfect is to lose the good. It is permissible to subdivide major goals into a series of lesser ones, and to work sequentially toward their achievement.
- (3) Mixed strategy: Depending on the circumstances, issues, etc., one may adopt either a strategy of pursuing the optimal or the feasible.
- (0) NO Reference.

65 Paths to achievement of ultimate goals or aspirations
(I-1B)

- (1) Single correct path: To achieve a given goal, there is but a single path, strategy, or sequence of events that will yield success. To be flexible about the relationship of means to ends, or to abandon the correct strategy is to lose or endanger the opportunity to achieve one's goals. The author tends to assess the prospects associated with any option as either zero or 100%. It is not enough for the author to stress a single approach, but he must state explicitly that there is but one correct path.
- (2) Multiple paths: There are several paths to provide some prospect for achievement of one's goals. Probabilities of success for any path are likely to be assessed are more than zero but less than 100%.
- (0) NO Reference.

66 How does one cope with value conflicts and tradeoffs?
(I-1C)

Subsumed under this belief are a number of related questions:

- a. How does one cope with incomplete knowledge and uncertainty?
- b. How does one calculate the relationship between long-term and short-term objectives, and how does one cope with possible tradeoffs between them? That is, do long-term goals dominate and determine those that may be pursued in the short or intermediate term, or should preference be given to a strategy of judging the possibilities for short-term gain on their own merits?
- c. How does one cope with the tradeoffs between values in a situation (that is, with the inability to achieve all of them simultaneously with any single policy)?
- d. How does one establish a schedule of goals?

Check one of the following categories:

- (1) All goals compatible: When two or more important goals or aspirations are being considered, the author expresses the belief that: (a) they are compatible; (b) they are linked in such a way that achievement of one will ensure or enhance the prospects for success in others; or (c) that there exists a course of action that will enable one to achieve all major aspirations.
- (2) Tradeoffs necessary: The author recognizes that two or more major goals are incapable of being achieved simultaneously; that the vigorous pursuit of one goal may retard or even jeopardize the achievement of others. In short the author acknowledges that, at least in the circumstances of the moment, there are incompatibilities or conflicts in major goals.
- (3) Tradeoffs necessary, a schedule of goals: Category 2 refers to a mere acknowledgement by the author that tradeoffs are necessary without pointing out to a specific strategy to cope with such value conflict. Here the author establishes a schedule of goals emphasizing that one should work at achieving them serially.
- (4) Tradeoffs necessary, a hierarchy of goals: The author places the conflicting goals in a hierarchy so that one takes precedence or primacy over other(s), e.g., honor is more important than peace.
- (5) Tradeoffs necessary, bolstering: The author

acknowledges the incompatibility of his goals, but he also increases the importance of a preferred goal, magnify its expected gains and downgrades the usefulness of the other goal, e.g., to magnify the goal of unity of Arab revolutionaries at the expense of Arab unity at large.

- (6) Goals incompatible, but must harmonize them.
- (8) Other.
- (0) NO Reference.

Instrumental Belief Number 2.

67. How Are the Goals of Political Action Pursued Most Effectively?

The first instrumental belief is concerned with establishing the goals for political action. Instrumental Belief No. 2 focusses on the most effective strategies for pursuing these goals.

This part of I-2 focusses on the following question: Under what circumstances is it permissible to modify, substitute for, or abandon a goal or a means to achieving goals? I-2.

Check one of the following answers:

- (1) Modify goals: The author indicates that in a given circumstance one may either scale up, scale down or compromise the original goals being pursued.
- (2) Substitute goals: The author indicates that a different goal should be pursued as a replacement for the previous one.
- (3) Abandon goals: The author states that a goal may be abandoned.
- (4) Modify means.
- (5) Substitute means.
- (6) Abandon means.
- (7) Never modify, substitute, or abandon means.
- (0) NO Reference.

(68) Approaches to the pursuit of Goals (I-2A)

This belief evolves around the questions of: What preliminary steps in planning, preparing the ground, etc., should be undertaken? Should one commit resources gradually, on a try-it-and-see basis, or is it better to employ one's resources at one for a decisive and quick achievement of goals.

Check one of the following answers:

- (1) Prepare ground: The author believes that the most effective way to pursue goals is to make very careful prior preparations, e.g., thorough search for information, consultation with allies, etc.
- (2) Try-and-see: In pursuing goals one should be prepared to take action as a way of testing what is feasible and what is not, what will work and what will not. It is not necessary -- or possible -- to determine in advance precisely what outcomes can be expected; a "try-and-see" approach can be useful in obtaining information on this score.
- (3) Incremental approach: The best way to pursue goals is to adopt a piecemeal approach that emphasizes the values of limited gains on various parts of the problem. This view takes the position that an incremental approach is not only prudent, but that a series of limited achievements on parts of the problem will have an important cumulative effect.
- (4) A blitzkrieg strategy: The author believes that the most effective strategy involves committing a major portion of one's resources and a full-scale effort to deal with the problem. A "try-and-see" or an incremental approach is likely to prove ineffective, a waste of one's resources, and gives up a number of important advantages (e.g., surprise).
- (5) Mobilization strategy: involves also committing one's total resources but the element of quickness and surprise is not emphasized.
- (8) Other.
- (0) NO Reference.

69 What are the Various Strategies that may be used to Pursue Goals? (I-2B)

Our concern here is with a basic stance toward the

pursuit of goals, i.e., broader range of possible strategies. Specific applications of a strategy, i.e., tactics (e.g., air strikes, military intervention, blockade, etc. all of which are specific applications of force) will be coded under I-5.

There are five possible strategies to the pursuit of goals:

- (1) Turn the other cheek: The author believes that the best strategy is to respond to attacks or threats by altruistic behavior and with cooperative reaction, i.e., return conciliation for hostility. Examples may be to offer concessions, retreat, or surrender in the face of hostile gesture from the opponent.
- (2) Non-punitive strategy: The best strategy is to react self-protectively with counter-attacks or counter-threats when attacked or threatened; otherwise the author believes in reciprocating the opponent's behavior. The author places his emphasis on rewarding cooperation and on neutralizing or non-rewarding aggressive behavior. He appeals to the self-interest of the enemy through positive rather than negative incentives.
- (3) Accommodative strategy: The author acts positively by offering compromises with the opponent (offers of negotiation, conciliation, etc.). The author does not offer unilateral concessions (strategy 1) but emphasizes a two-way cooperative strategy, he is firm but cooperative.
- (4) Deterrent strategy: The author believes in pursuing a strategy that implies a threatening response to any non-cooperative acts of the opponent, and to counter-attack when attacked.
- (5) Gratuitously aggressive strategy: The emphasis is on the employment of force, engagement in coercive diplomacy, the escalation of conflicts, making threats, increasing demands on the opponent, and the like. Example: "The only language which our opponent understands is the language of force".
- (8) Other.
- (0) NO Reference.

70 Under what circumstances is unilateral/multilateral action preferable? (I-2C)

- (1) Unilateral action: The author prefers his own nation acting alone.
- (2) Multilateral action: The author expresses preference for action in concert with allies, regional and/or global organizations, etc.
- (0) NO Reference.

Instrumental Belief No. 3

71 How are the risks of political action calculated and controlled? (I-3)

- (1) Comprehensive framework: Risks are assessed in relation to all of one's goals and aspirations, rather than just the specific problem under consideration.
- (2) Specific undertaking: Risks are calculated in light of a particular policy or undertaking.
- (3) Specific tactics: Risks are assessed solely in terms of the tactics that may be pursued in a given situation. This category may be appropriate if one appraised the risks of a bombing raid solely in terms of the prospects of success or failure, rather than with a broader framework.
- (8) Other.
- (0) NO Reference.

72 What approach should be employed to limit or control risks? (I-3A)

- (1) Limit or scale down goals to be pursued.
- (2) Limit or scale down means to be employed.
- (3) Assess carefully your means.
- (4) Assess carefully your opponent's strategies.
- (5) Avoid engaging in two simultaneous risks.
- (8) Other.
- (0) NO Reference.

73 How should one deal with various type of tradeoffs associated with risks? (I-3B)

Here we are concerned with various strategies used by the author to cope with tradeoffs involved in situations characterized by risk, and the risks involved in trading off two alternatives, such as: risks of action versus risks of inaction, risks of immediate action versus risks of delay, risks of innovation in policy versus those associated with familiar, "tried-and-true" policies?

Check one of the following answers:

- (1) Pursue policies that maximize potential gains.
- (2) Pursue policies that minimize potential losses.
- (8) Other.
- (0) NO Reference.

74 High and low risk policies (I-3C)

Under what circumstances (what situations, what issues, what opponents) are high or low risk policies mandatory? permissible? prohibited?

Check one of the following answers:

- (1) High risk policies mandatory.
- (2) High risk policies permissible.
- (3) High risk policies prohibited.
- (4) Low risk policies mandatory.
- (5) Low risk policies permissible.
- (6) Low risk policies prohibited.
- (8) Other.
- (0) NO Reference.

Instrumental Belief No. 4

75 What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interests? (I-4)

- (1) Timing spells out difference between success and failure.

- (2) Timing is a matter of managing one's own resources prudently, but it is not a matter of fundamental strategy.
- (3) Timing does not make difference for the success or failure of a long-term objective and/or a policy undertaking.
- (8) Other (9) No Reference.

Instrumental Belief No. 5

76 When is action required, permitted, or prohibited? (I-4A)

The purpose of this item is to assess the circumstances under which one must avoid, temporize, delay action, when one must take action, and when it is permissible but not necessary to do so.

Check one of the following answers:

- (1) Act quickly when opportunities of success arise.
- (2) Act when enemy provocations become intolerable.
- (3) Delay conciliatory action until you gain a position of strength.
- (4) Delay escalatory action until you gain a position of strength.
- (5) Avoid premature action.
- (6) Do not yield to enemy provocations.
- (7) Do not act until you assess all relevant issues.
- (8) Act quickly before your opponent gains a position of strength.
- (0) NO Reference.

77 What is the utility of different means for advancing one's interests? (I-5)

Whereas I-2 deals with broad approaches to the pursuit of goals, I-5 deals with specific tactics. What tactics are likely to be effective in what situations? Against what opponents?

Example: the author states that the only way one can advance his influence with the opponent is to confront it with military force, and it is vital to apply force massively rather than in a graduated series of steps: (I-2A). The author goes on to assert that the success of the entire enterprise hinges on immediate action, for any delay favors the opponent: (I-4A). The paragraph concludes with an argument for intervening in a specific situation with large scale conventional forces: (I-5). Instrumental belief No. 5 focusses on questions related to the utility of military force to advance one's interests and how to apply military force in a specific situation.

The utility of Military Force to advance One's Interests:

- (1) Avoid the use of military force.
- (2) Avoid the use of military force, but force is not ruled out as a last resort.
- (3) Military force is the only viable means to advance one's interests.
- (4) Military force is a viable means to advance one's interests.
- (5) Resort to military force rather than surrender.
- (8) Other.
- (0) NO Reference.

78 How to apply Military Force to advance One's Interests?

- (1) Military force must be applied on a large scale basis.
- (2) Military force must be applied on a graduated basis.
- (3) Military force must be used alone.
- (4) Military force must be supplemented by other types of political and economic force.
- (5) Military force must be applied alone, on a large scale basis.
- (6) Military force must be used alone, on a graduated basis.
- (7) Military force must be used on a large scale basis supplemented by other types of force.

(8) Military force must be used on a graduated basis supplemented by any other type of force.

(0) NO Reference.

79 How to apply Military Force to advance One's Interests II?

(1) Never launch the first strike.

(2) Take the initiative in applying military force.

(3) Better retreat and regroup than being trapped.

(4) Better hold and fight rather than retreat.

(5) Military supremacy is crucial to victory.

(6) Military supremacy is not crucial to victory.

(8) Other.

(0) NO Reference.

80 How is Power conceptualized?

We are concerned here with what the author believes to be the key elements of politically-relevant power. Does he conceive of power in a strictly military sense (e.g., "How many divisions has the Pope?"), or is his definition a broader one? Some materials may contain a good deal of space devoted to the capabilities of the author's nation. Examples might include statistics on the GNP or economic growth rates, military capabilities, etc. However, this type of purely factual information should not be coded unless the author indicates that the resources in question -- or lack thereof -- are linked to the types of goals, strategies, and tactics that may be pursued. That is our interest not in the resources per se, but in the author's beliefs about resources that constitute politically-relevant power, and their availability or non-availability. Thus, coding should focus on references to resources that make possible the pursuit of goals, or those whose absence acts as a constraint upon action. Check one of the following answers:

(1) Military only.

(2) Military sources are only one of the components of power.

(0) NO Reference.

COUNTRY CODE LIST

Country	Code	Country	Code
Australia	01	Vatican	49
Belgium	02	Vietnam-South	50
Canada	03	Vietnam-North	51
China, PRC	04	Yemen	52
China, Rep.	05	Yemen-South	53
Congo, Kinshasa	06	Yugoslavia	54
Denmark	07	Domestic Group	55
Ethiopia	08	Western Occupying Powers	56
France	09	The West	57
Germany-East	10	Latin America	58
Germany-West	11	North America	59
Greece	12	Western Europe	60
Hong Kong	13	Arab League	61
India	14	Arab Reactionary rulers	62
Indonesia	15	Syr. Nationalist Party	63
Iran	16	Baath	64
Iraq	17	Arab Reaction & Imperialism	65
Israel	18	Zionists	66
Italy	19	Jews	67
Japan	20	Crusaders	68
Jordan	21	Imperialism	69
Kenya	22	Communits (local)	70
Korea-South	23	World Communism	71
Korea-North	24	Moslem Brothers	72
Kuwait	25	Big Powers	73
Lebanon	26	NATO	74
Liberia	27	WARSO	75
Libya	28	OAS	76
Morocco	29	SEATO	77
Muscat & Oman	30	UN	78
Netherlands	31	Other World Organizations	79
New Zealand	32	EEC	80
Panama	33	COMECON	81
Poland	34	Baghdad Pact	82
Portugal	35	UK, France, Israel	83
Qatar	36	UK, USA	84
Rhodesia	37	UK, France	85
Saudi Arabia	38	UK, France, USA	86
Somalia	39	Israel, Imperialism	87
South Africa	40	Arab Reactionism,	88
Sudan	41	Imperialism, Communism	
Syria	42	Arab Reactionism,	89
Tunisia	43	Imperialism, Israel	
Turkey	44	UK and Reactionaries	90
USSR	45	Zionism and Communism	91
Union of Arab Empirates	46	Islamic Alliance	92
United Kingdom	47		
USA	48	Unidentified Adversary	00

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