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THE CIVILIANIZATION THEORY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS:
THEY HAVE MET THE ENEMY AND HE IS US

by

STEPHAN B. FLEMMING, B.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
1 May 1989
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THE CIVILIANIZATION THEORY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS:
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Thesis Co-Supervisor

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ABSTRACT

This study critiques central assumptions of the dominant paradigm in North American civil-military relations theory. The civilianization model portrays historical change in civil-military relations as encompassing both the decline of military institutional traditions through the penetration of civilian administration, and the erosion of military professionalism as soldiers have adopted the civilian materialistic ethos.

War and society theory was employed in the conduct of three critical research strategies. The first examined the underestimated impact of military forces in the emergence of the nation-state, bureaucracy, and capitalism. The second considered documentary data, arguing that the prediction of the imminent collapse of the martial spirit reflects an enduring moral panic blaming the victim, the soldier. Finally, the belief that remunerative and normative techniques have limited reliance on coercion in disciplining Canadian troops was tested using post-Korean War period data. The study concludes that military decline has been greatly exaggerated.
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THE CIVILIANIZATION THEORY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: THEY HAVE MET THE ENEMY AND HE IS US

Introduction

The dominant paradigm in the sociology of military organization in North America is civilianization theory. While there are debates within the field, its practitioners accept as initially axiomatic the central assumptions of the theory of social change in the historical relationship between armed forces and society posited by the civilianization school. The work of Moskos (1977), Janowitz (1977, 1976, 1960), Huntington (1957) in the United States and Cotton (1980, 1973), Crook (1975), and Pinch (1982) in Canada is central in the field. This study critically evaluates these axioms of civilianization theory from the perspective of war and society theory of civil-military relations.

Civilianization theorists view civil-military relations as having chiefly comprised change on two broad levels: that of the institution, and that of the linkage between the individual soldier and the military. On the institutional level, military forces in the West are seen to be increasingly influenced by their civilian milieu. In other words, change is accelerating in the direction of convergence between civil and military institutions as a result of profound civilian penetration into previously autonomous military organizations, a process culminating in a dramatic weakening of military forces. Secondly, as Western nations have become increasingly individualistic and materialistic, the moral quality of soldiers is considered to have declined dramatically. Contemporary troops thus contrast poorly with soldiers of the past, when military personnel embraced the classic ethos of the unlimited liability of the soldier to duty, regardless of the potentially horrific consequences.
Military forces in this classic period viewed their service as a vocation, while contemporary forces regard their obligations to duty in a contractual manner and see their service in an occupational way.

Principal contemporary exponents of the emerging war and society paradigm, key arguments of which guide this analysis, are Giddens (1987, 1981), McNeill (1982), and, less directly, Foucault (1979). Three research strategies were employed in an examination of the central assumptions of historical social change in civil-military relations espoused by civilianization theorists.

Firstly, theory and evidence were reviewed with respect to the catalytic role of armed forces in the consolidation of the nation-state system, in the ascendance of bureaucracy as the focal principle of social organization in modern institutions, and in the emergence and international dispersion of capitalist enterprise. It is argued, based upon this analysis, that the ahistorical approach of the civilianization model misses not only the initial martial origin of central civil institutions, but more importantly the essentially military invention and propagation of bureaucracy. The similarity of military and civil institutions, lately discovered and deplored by civilianization theorists, is evidence from an historical point of view of the continuing influence of military forces in the broader social environment.

The second research strategy employed in this study examined the assumptions of civilianization theory as a set of beliefs: as reflections of a military "world-view". It was found through an exploration of sentiments expressed historically in the civilianization literature, classic military texts, and the writings of military personnel, that the apprehension of an imminent collapse of true commitment to
the unlimited liability to the exigencies of duty on the part of soldiers is an enduring moral panic which has persisted among armed forces since the industrial and democratic revolutions. This finding tests the theoretical contention that fundamental assumptions of the theory of social change employed by the civilianization literature are appropriately viewed as value-laden reflections of military beliefs, in part comprising an imagery of tremendous military strength in the past and apocalyptic moral weakness in the present.

While these two research strategies focussed on the historical validity of the civilianization model, the third examined aspects of contemporary civil-military relations in Canada. Tests were conducted using quantitative data on two levels in assessing the utility of the civilianization model in explaining recent transformations in, and the present state of, civil-military relations in Canada. Firstly, the statistical basis of the most influential study of the moral commitment of military personnel in Canada from the point of view of civilianization theory was critically reviewed. The technique of factor analysis was employed in examining the construction of Cotton's 1979 Military Ethos Scale (MES), the use of which generated his oft-noted finding that the majority of army personnel in Canada are "reluctant soldiers". Secondly, hypotheses drawn from the civilianization model which assert that dramatic institutional decline has occurred in the traditional use of coercive military compliance strategies in disciplining soldiers were subjected to a range of tests. Military discipline is argued to be at the heart of that which has distinguished the military from other institutions, and as such it is the appropriate focus of an evaluation of the belief that fundamental change has extended a civilian hegemony into armed forces.

The results generated through the employment of these
three research strategies are presented in the following manner. The first chapter reviews the emergence and central principles of civilianization theory. Chapter Two considers historical change on the broadest level in civil-military relations, concluding that military institutions have had tremendous impact in wider social life, an impact which cannot be theoretically ignored. A portrayal of the history of civil-military relations which considers as evidence of important change only that which has altered within military organizations is at best incomplete. When civilianization theorists have identified commonalities among military and civil institutions, they have done so within a normative context which does not consider the initial systematic connection operating among those institutions. This connection, it will be demonstrated in this study, includes the relatively unappreciated causal role of armed forces as institutional agents of elemental change.

The lament for the loss of true military professionalism among contemporary soldiers and predictions of the imminent collapse of the martial spirit are elements of an enduring moral panic, Chapter Three concludes, which has long exhorted men to become fully disciplined members of armed forces. Concentrating on the martial spirit of individual soldiers in assessing the operational effectiveness of armed forces, the moral panic accords little attention to systematic factors and blames the victim, condemning the relatively powerless soldier for his inadequate reverence for formal principles of military moral professionalism. Central assumptions of civilianization theory, this analysis attempts to demonstrate, are contemporary projections of the military moral panic which has been fostered throughout the history of the mass and professional army.

The final chapter of this study presents the results
of tests examining the explanatory efficacy of the civilianization model in the contemporary Canadian context. The construction of the attitudinal scale upon which much academic and other criticisms of the commitment of Canadian soldiers has been based, the MES, was found to inadequately represent the orientation of soldiers toward their service in uniform by significantly underestimating their support for classic norms of commitment to duty. This research questions the validity of the dark interpretation commonly accorded the influential findings of that study, and also indicates that important normative demands are made on contemporary personnel in the maintenance of military discipline. Further, empirical findings with respect to military discipline reviewed in Chapter Four suggest that the Canadian military erects powerful institutional barriers to external influence on a fundamental level and exhibits a strong adaptive facility in conditions of turbulence. The null hypotheses of the tests based on the civilianization model regarding discipline could not be rejected; the evidence indicates rather that a relative consolidation of traditional military compliance strategies has occurred in the post-Korean War period.

The theoretical significance of this research is its indication that social change has not altered the military to the extent most believe has transpired in recent years. The apprehension of institutional and moral decline has been greatly exaggerated. The evidence examined here indicates that military forces in Canada possess a tenacious and unappreciated resilience on many levels in civil-military relations, a resilience which demands theoretical recognition in understanding and illuminating the uneasy relationship between armies and civil populations.
comes to be rewarded in the way that military leadership skills once were. The military has thus become a complex, organically inter-dependent team in which technical and operational authority are tenuously separated. In this system, coercive traditional measures of control are not successful, necessitating a change "in the direction of one of the alternative modes - namely remunerative or normative" (Crook, 1975:54). The modern middle-class army must, in Crook's view, motivate its personnel either through incentives or by persuading them that it is in their interests to support the goals of the organization. In sum, Crook believes that military tradition and ritual provided a basis for collective identification and meaningful unit membership, making the facing of death an honourable activity. Bureaucracy does not provide a basis for this morale and group commitment, producing rather an "instrumental or manipulative view" of service, in which "calculation replaces loyalty, progressively eroding trust and commitment" (1975:56).

Pinch is chiefly concerned with "the military's capacity to maintain adequate levels of manpower, of sufficient quality and at a reasonable cost, to perform its role effectively" (Pinch, 1982:575). The all-volunteer-force manning model common to the American, British, and Canadian militaries is "extraordinarily sensitive to trends and perturbations within other societal institutions - for example, the education system and the civilian labour force - upon which it is most dependent for its source of personnel" (1982:575). Demographic shifts in the Canadian population, most notable among these being a substantial increase in average educational attainment and an aging labour force, have reduced the classic potential recruitment pool of unskilled young men in their late teens and early twenties (Tierney and Pinch, 1980). Evidence of the Canadian Forces' particular vulnerability to "societal shifts in age distribution, labour market and educational trends,
lines drawn in these works.

Huntington's principal focus was the relationship of the American officer corps to political leadership. He wished to identify the degree of "objective civilian control" which would both maximize national security and satisfy the liberal-democratic requirement of the subordination of armed forces to elected civil powers. He argued that civil-military relations consist of "a complex equilibrium" of tenuously balanced elements, in which change in one sector of the system produces concomitant and measurable changes in others. In his view, the functional imperative of defense accorded the military justifies the requirement of an institution shaped by a set of martial values incompatible with those adopted by other agencies in liberal democratic society. He proposed that direct control of the military by civilian masters was unnecessary. A relatively autonomous professional armed force, free of the influence of inappropriate value systems, would in his view respect and accept direction from the state. Only such a separation would avert, he argued, the growing tendency to "impose liberal solutions in military affairs", constituting "the gravest domestic threat to American military security" (1957:457).

Morris Janowitz, who continues to be the most influential of American military sociologists, advocates "a more pragmatic military professionalism" in which citizen-soldiers are subjectively controlled by democratically elected representatives "through law, tradition and an acceptance of civil values and institutions" (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1976:76). There remains an "essential requirement", Janowitz argues, in the face of the dramatic technical and organizational advances since the nineteenth century, to maintain a "depoliticized or politically contained" national military force; "if any variant of political
democracy" is to be achieved (Janowitz, 1976:191). It is precisely because the values of the professional soldiers are antithetical to those of the civil milieu, Janowitz argues, that strong structural political and normative linkages must dominate the relationship between armed forces and society.

Huntington asserts that there have been dramatic shifts in the nature of the military profession in the modernizing and industrializing West. Janowitz accepts this premise, and attempts to identify concrete examples of internal social change in the American military since the Second World War in terms of technology, international relations, strategic doctrine, and the civil-military interface (Martin, 1984:15). In sum, Janowitz has found that the military profession in the United States "is undergoing a long-term transformation which involves increased penetration by other professions and institutions" (Janowitz, 1977:53) characterized by "a shift from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus" (Janowitz, 1960:8). This has involved an "increasing concentration of technical specialists" whose "skills and orientations" are "common to civilian administrators and civilian leaders" (1960:9), a broadening and increasingly representative recruitment base among officers, a bureaucratization of career patterns, and a decline of the "traditional military self-images and concepts of honor" (1960:10-12). The history of the American military is, then, for both Janowitz and Huntington, a gradual process of social change in which the unique elements of the heroic warrior culture are eroded and subsumed into the pervasive managerial and materialistic ethic of Western society. Their positions diverge with respect to their advocacy of particular policies to deal with the new civil-military reality, concerning the extent to which each believe military commanders should be directed by and accountable to elected officials.
Possibly the most significant recent development in the field was the attempt to operationalize and measure the dramatic change in "actor commitment" among soldiers posited by both Huntington and Janowitz. While presenting a paper at the Regional Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS) in Alabama in 1976, Charles Moskos suggested that the attitudes of American military personnel toward their service could be distinguished along "institutional" and "occupational" lines (Janowitz, 1977:51). Members with an institutional attitude see their service as a calling and recognize "a purpose transcending individual self-interest" and accept demands of "all-sacrifice and dedication," whatever the cost (Moskos, 1977:42). Those ascribing to an occupational orientation, however, put their pecuniary and other interests ahead of the organization and are willing to serve only to the limits established under the legal contractual arrangement with their employer, the state. Moskos further argued that the occupational model was ascending in the American military, while those who saw their obligation to duty as something intrinsically more important than wage-labour were rapidly declining in numbers and status.

While clearly grounded in Janowitz' heroic and managerial distinctions published some years earlier, Moskos' conceptualization attracted considerable attention in the wake of the American debacle in Vietnam. He has lately recognized that institutional attitudes persist in the American military in a manner inconsistent with his early assessments of the growing prevalence of the occupational orientation. He thus asserts now that "Both truths operate in such a way that the future of the Army enlisted man is best understood as the interplay between citizen-soldier and market-place trends" (Moskos, 1986:54). Moskos' change in approach may in part be the result of the at best ambiguous findings generated by attempts to empirically validate his work (Segal and Yoon,
1984: Stahl, McNichols, and Manley, 1981, 1980). Moskos continues to deplore, however, the "ascendant occupational model" of service and the increasing linkages to civil society it entails.

David Segal argues that the Huntington-Janowitz debate is too simplistic, but does not offer significant change to the theory. He suggests that a "combination of objective and subjective models" is likely "more amenable to meeting the problems of American civil-military relations in a post-Vietnam War era of all-volunteer armed forces" (Segal, et al., 1978:424). He departs from Moskos in not accepting that the dramatic changes brought about by civilianization have resulted in a clear re-definition of what service and commitment mean to personnel. Rather, he concentrates on identifying specific institutional shifts. Some of these have been, in his view, a declining quality of recruits, an exodus of well-educated personnel (particularly in technical trades) and an increasingly unrepresentative all-volunteer-force, as those who join tend to be motivated more by their own upward mobility (and are thus drawn disproportionately from minority groups, such as blacks and hispanics) than by a sense of duty to the nation.

The most important contribution Segal has made has been to point out the various political and social dimensions on which the civilianization debate shifts. He argues, for example, that while the U.S. military is becoming an occupation in terms of actual work much like any other in civil society, the direction of change on the broader political level is toward a divergent military increasingly free of the dictates of democratic institutions. Conceptually, he wishes to show that "it is necessary to distinguish the structural convergence of civilian and military institutions from the interdependence of these institutions" (Segal, et al, 1974:159). In other
words, the reality of civil-military relations in America is far too complex and empirically eclectic to be subsumed under the simple polar extremes of the convergence-divergence debate. He does not advocate the rejection of the civilianization model, however, but works toward refinement in the spirit of the original construction.

Broadly speaking, two positions inform the debate in the literature of civil-military relations in the United States. Some fear that increasing civilian control over the internal policy of the military will further erode the limited capacity of the armed forces to serve the nation effectively. They advocate a divergent military institution, unarticulated with civil society, relying on an heroic leadership style, a politically neutral officer corps, and a citizen force populated by personnel vocationally committed to the unlimited obligation to duty demanded by true service in the profession of arms. Others find no comfort in this description of military efficiency, arguing that only a military organization highly articulated with civil power structures and a politically sophisticated officer corps will ensure that the armed forces are responsive to democratic leadership in this age of unimaginably destructive technical acumen. They fear the consequences of a purely military world-view, dramatically different from the values guiding the civil population and held by a professional career force with substantial autonomy from civil checks and balances. While their prospective assessments thus differ greatly, both work from the view that the history of the American military is one of gradual change in the face of erosive influences from the external social milieu leading to a weakening of the bonds of commitment required to link individuals to the armed forces. In the following section, the subsequent application of the model to the Canadian context is reviewed.
Civilianization Theory in Canada

Prior to the mid 1970's, the sociology of Canadian military organization was of interest primarily to the then Defence Research Board of the Department of National Defence, which generated a number of internal studies. Increasing academic attention has subsequently taken the discipline into the policy and political apparatus of the military and the state.

The significance of the period during the late 1960's and early 1970's in which the processes of unification, integration, and the centralized base system commenced cannot be underestimated. For many, this was the culmination of a lengthy process in which the traditions of Canadian military institutions were progressively undermined by ever stronger linkages to the state and to civil society generally. These changes were seen to represent the adoption of a broadly bureaucratic administrative structure, which thus meant the abandonment of operational or combat organizational principles. Most contributions to the civilianization debate were made in the aftermath of this period, and were explicitly built upon the model of social change posited in the American work. Specifically, the work of Crook, Pinch, and Cotton will be briefly outlined.

Crook is considered to be the first to use the civilianization model in print in Canada. He examined the consequences of the "pursuit of technical rationality, so visibly successful in the realm of national science and technology" (1975:10) for the commitment of personnel to military roles in Canada. General social processes and assumptions, Crook argues, have in the advancement of industrial society produced a cash-nexus definition of value in human activity, dissolved the source of self-identity once
provided by the simplicity of role differentiation inherent in the traditional extended family, and eroded the complex network of kinship ties that inculcated diffuse commitments among members of highly bonded communities. His is an essentially Durkheimian assessment of modern society, finding that "the capacity of symbols to mobilize sentiments and focus human motivation" is lost in the face of the "onslaught of science", leaving modern societies with "the empty symbols of the past and without hope of the creation of new ones" (Crook, 1975:19). By replacing such customs, myths, and beliefs as the image of the "heroic warrior" with theories and hypotheses in our understanding of nature and ourselves, Western science has destroyed monuments which served as benchmarks for groups to grasp as sources of absolute truth and collective purpose. Scientific theories, by definition never "true", are unlike cultural values in a constant state of refinement, reformulation, and revolutionary change (see Kuhn, 1970). The twin manifestations of this fundamental shift in the nature of community in the West are, for Crook, technological advance and the promulgation of bureaucratic principles of organization.

"The emergence of bureaucratic systems," Crook writes, to manage the anomic complexity of modern social life, "acts without doubt to increase the sense of powerlessness experienced by many" (1975:20). Without the sense of community involvement and connection to others in the social system, bureaucracy leads to a calculative career rationality, in which the goal of one's labour is upward mobility in the status hierarchy. Values such as commitment to duty and service to the community cannot be readily defended in any empirical fashion and are lost to the inherently individualist and instrumentalist morality of advanced industrial capitalism. The primary consequence for the armed forces in Canada has been, according to Crook, a blurring of the distinction between commissioned and non-commissioned ranks, as technical expertise
comes to be rewarded in the way that military leadership skills once were. The military has thus become a complex, organically inter-dependent team in which technical and operational authority are tenuously separated. In this system, coercive traditional measures of control are not successful, necessitating a change "in the direction of one of the alternative modes - namely remunerative or normative" (Crook, 1975:54). The modern middle-class army must, in Crook's view, motivate its personnel either through incentives or by persuading them that it is in their interests to support the goals of the organization. In sum, Crook believes that military tradition and ritual provided a basis for collective identification and meaningful unit membership, making the facing of death an honourable activity. Bureaucracy does not provide a basis for this morale and group commitment, producing rather an "instrumental or manipulative view" of service, in which "calculation replaces loyalty, progressively eroding trust and commitment" (1975:56).

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broad value trends, and shifting career expectations" (Cotton and Pinch, 1986) may be found, it is argued, in many areas. Among these are the ongoing mass promotion of private soldiers to corporal in order to ensure that military salaries match the wage scales of the Public Service of Canada, the divisions of other-rank compensation into pay groupings according to specialist roles within ranks, and in general the relatively high rates of pay, particularly among the other-ranks (Cotton and Pinch, 1986).

"The military is characterized," Cotton writes, "by conflicting role orientations among its members" (1980:10). The sanguine view of the military widely held in civil society which assumes "value and attitudinal homogeneity in Canada's Army" (1980:16) is a mistaken one, Cotton argues. He used Moskos' occupational/institutional model to demonstrate structural differences in definitions of military service among Mobile Command\(^1\) personnel in terms of commitment. His study, conducted in the late 1970's, developed a survey measure called the Military Ethos Scale (MES) which was intended to tap the respondents' orientation toward military service. He found that "junior enlisted personnel in both combat and support segments tended to have an occupational orientation... defining their involvement in a contractually limited way", while "officers and senior enlisted ranks displayed an institutional, or vocational, orientation characterized by norms of unlimited commitment" (Cotton and Pinch, 1986:242). Further, the study identified systematic tensions along attitudinal lines both vertically and horizontally within the army; between officers and the junior other-ranks, and between combat and support personnel. These fundamental conflicts significantly undermine military effectiveness, in Cotton's view, as unit cohesion is

\(^1\) The term "Mobile Command" refers to the Canadian army under the unified system.
the sine qua non of combat success and survival. Following Moskos, Cotton identifies in his use of the MES a three-way typology of "latent role types"; including soldiers, "who expressed a strong institutional orientation", employees, "who expressed a strong occupational orientation", and ambivalents, "who fell between the two extremes" (Cotton and Pinch, 1986:242). In structural terms, Cotton argues, the army resembles civilian society in its degree of internal attitudinal differentiation, division of labour, and emphasis on administrative sectors (Cotton, 1980:28). In sum, military service in Canada is increasingly defined not in terms of duty or obligation to the country, but as "simply another job option and career opportunity" (Cotton, 1979:15).

The history of Canadian military organization is, then, according to those few sociologists who have examined civil-military relations in Canada, a progressive erosion of elements of the traditional military institution as the diffuse, relatively autonomous authority of commanders in the pre-World War period has given way to ever stronger structural linkages to the state and to the broader external environment.

Prior to this diffusion of roles and structures associated with bureaucratization, Cotton argues, commanders influenced and were cognizant of all aspects of their soldiers' lives in the military - officers were paymasters, administrators, counsellors, lawyers, judges, and so on. The bureaucratization of the Canadian military has tended to separate the commander from these diverse functions, creating a plethora of administrative structures and limiting the officers' access to the primary military potential of the units they direct. Rather, the heroic or charismatic leadership style which inspires total commitment is "replaced by a technocratic method and managerial expertise" (Cotton, i973:i). The officer as official, as "organization man", as a result views the rank
hierarchy as a vehicle for upward career mobility and adopts the "remunerative calculative rationality" of liberal democratic capitalist society as the central indicator of career success and individual achievement. The consequences of the pervasive individualism of civilianization for the military value system, which demands selfless sacrifice to service regardless of the cost, have been clear and dire (Crook, 1975:23) in the view of these theorists.

Civilianization theory has been employed widely; its formal use outside the United States has not been limited to Canada. Some recent applications are found in the context of the Australian army (Pratt, 1986), the Brazilian military establishment (Zirker, 1986), and the Soviet armed forces (Jones, 1986). The core historical pattern is uniformly accepted; modern military forces are characterized as softened by moral weakness as a consequence of the penetration of civil values. Concomitantly, modern soldiers contrast poorly against those in the armies of the historical period of true vocational commitment to duty by military personnel.

This chapter has briefly outlined the central theses of civilianization theory with reference to its development and main proponents in the United States and Canada. In the following chapter, these main theses of change argued to have occurred on the institutional level in the intersection of armed forces and civil institutions are critically examined from an historical perspective.
CHAPTER 2: 
NATION-STATE, BUREAUCRACY, COMMAND ECONOMY, 
AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

As was outlined in the previous chapter, 
civilization theorists argue that traditional aspects of 
military organization have been gradually eroded in the face of 
penetration by increasingly powerful civil agencies. This 
chapter employs a critical perspective in evaluating the 
utility of the civilization model in the explanation of 
historical transformations in the relationship between military 
and other social institutions.

Armed forces in time of both peace and war have been 
accorded relatively limited attention by academic sociologists; 
the sociology of military organization is among the more 
peripheral fields of the discipline. This disinterest is in 
part explained, Kourvetaris and Dobratz (1976) have argued, by 
the currency of anti-war sentiment in the United States within 
the university community during the period which saw tremendous 
growth in the discipline in North America. Theoretical 
approaches to civil-military relations favoured by those 
relatively few academics working in this area during that 
period, notably Lasswell’s "garrison state" model and military-
industrial-complex theory, largely identified with Mills, 
imputed to what Althusser has called the "repressive state 
apparatus" power over civil populations on several levels and 
latent influence in central institutions. An emerging theory of 
war and society marking a return to interest in these issues is 
reviewed in this chapter. Beginning from a similar initial 
position as that employed in these earlier models regarding the 
relative centrality of armed forces in social life, the central 
tenets of the essentially Weberian arguments employed in this 
emerging paradigm are discussed in the following pages.
Three broad themes in the historical model upon which war and society theory is based are of particular significance for this study. Firstly, the mass army is seen to have been a crucial catalytic agent of institutional change in the formation and consolidation of the nation-state system\(^2\). The second is the role of the mass army in the refinement and propagation of bureaucracy and its attendant mechanisms of control, which have become the preeminent disciplinary compliance strategies operating in the organization of labour in the West. Thirdly, armed forces have galvanized the development of capitalist economies through state-sponsored acquisition, regulation, and demands for technical innovation, all to a degree impossible to achieve through the mechanisms of the market alone.

The significance of the theory and evidence discussed in these three sections, this chapter concludes, is that the portrayal of the history of Western civil-military relations by civilianization theorists as a largely if not singularly accelerating process of the erosion of distinctive elements of military institutions by powerful civil institutions is theoretically insufficient.

Section 1: 
The Mass Army and the Nation-State

The influence of the rationalization of European martial forces on civil institutions is, according to war and society theory, evidenced by three principal historical processes. Virtually entire populations became participants in the activities of the state, a wide range of civil agencies and

\(^2\) There were 500 monarchistic "absolutist" states in Europe in the sixteenth century. By 1900, there were twenty-five nation-states (Giddens, 1981:187).
occupations were absorbed within military institutions, and a plethora of subordinate civil agencies arose to meet military demands. Perhaps the most influential statement of the consequences of these transformations is the following by Jacques van Doorn.

The old relation between the man and his equipment has been reversed. The armed man has become an armed weapon, the laborer and his tools a manned machine, and in both cases groups, teams, and crews are often concerned which assist in servicing the machine or weapon.

(van Doorn, 1975:20)

1) The Development of the Nation-State

Military service offered the otherwise largely alienated populations of post-feudal Europe an avenue of direct participation in the affairs of the state (see Janowitz, 1976; Giddens, 1987; Feld, 1977; De Grazia, 1981). The mass army accelerated the consolidation of the nation-state through the political enfranchisement of the relatively dispossessed populations of post-feudal Europe. In an ideal-typical sense, the mass army was a large weapons system directed by a professional general staff. The maintenance of the constituent agencies of this weapons system demanded a tremendous volume of labour, which was by design unskilled. The conscription of vast numbers of men, who previously had little utility in combat as they lacked the essentially aristocratic skills of yeomanry and riding, extended the grasp of the apparatus of emerging states into all corners of their national territory. This argument is taken further by De Grazia, who has suggested that

The rise of political equality, then, may turn on arms and fighting. The possessor of equal political rights, of the jus activae civitatis, the citizen, was in origin a soldier. He came into his rights, in the history of Europe, it seems, by his bearing of arms. The right to fight leads directly to
the right of equal vote.  
(De Grazia, 1981:185)

The price men concretely paid for this admittedly 
marginal, relatively powerless, and tenuous foothold in the 
state is, of course, incalculable. This process in which the 
endurance of sacrifice in war by national populations fosters 
their increasing participation in the state continues to 
operate, as is evidenced by the extension of the vote to women 
in several Western nations after the First World War and the 
lowering of the voting age in the United States in the wake of 
Vietnam. The dramatic fall in the mean age of American combat 
troops from World War II to Vietnam heightened the irony that 
an eighteen-year-old man was mature enough to die in military 
service but was too young to participate in the democratic 
process.

It has been not only the masses of soldiers who have 
been assimilated by the state in rationalizing the 
effectiveness of national resources. The Franco-Prussian War of 
1877 has been viewed as an important indicator of what has been 
called "the death of the civilian" (Hartigan, 1982). The 
conduct of total war gradually eroded the distinction commonly 
and legally made between soldiers and non-combatants. The logic 
of national survival and the obvious benefits of mass 
production enveloped a multiplicity of civil agencies in the 
efforts of war, serving to involve most of the population in 
some way in the conflict and making them targets of the enemy. 
As a result, as the effort required to keep troops in combat 
increased, civilians working in support of the troops came 
under actual fire. Additionally, civilian populations were and 
are attacked in attempts to erode the will of a nation to field 
an effective force. The Prussian bombardment of Strasbourg and 
Paris had no tactical or strategic goal on the field of battle 
itsel, but terrified the population, the performance of whom 
in modern combat is critical.
While the indiscriminate destruction of civilian targets has in modern war often had the effect of strengthening rather than eroding national will, no current doctrine of war absolves those non-uniformed citizens who work for the state in any fashion from a "just" death at the hands of an enemy in time of war. The application of scientific techniques in managing national resources, both human and natural, in maximizing performance in war, has in effect made all citizens a de facto agents of the means of violence, while consolidating the nation-state system.

2) The Assimilation of Civil Professions and Occupations

"More and more categories of the civilian population" in combative European nations in this period, Iverson argues, including "clerks, accountants, chaplains, lawyers, medical workers, secretaries, teamsters - became functionaries of the state serving military needs" (1984a:3). Just as armed forces created armaments industries in order to control the provisioning of weapons and the providers themselves, so too have a multiplicity of civil professions and occupations been incorporated within armed forces, their skills transformed into military roles. This permitted the internal performance of specific services, obviating the requirement of relying upon unpredictable and relatively autonomous agencies and individuals.

The realization that a quasi-legislative code could be drafted for the formation and control of effective armies culminated in the policy of having a legal and administrative system to exploit the entirety of society's resources for military ends. The search for skills and techniques specifically designed for rationalizing warfare developed into the practice of studying every socially approved technique of the armed state. Truck drivers, ...professors, artists, and poets all had their appropriate niches in the mobilized society.

(Feld, 1975:194)
Additionally, some occupations now believed to be among the classic core military roles were originally civil occupations, absorbed as part of this process. Artillerymen, for example, were initially civilian tradesmen who trained as apprentices in the use of cannon and acquired a master’s certificate, as was the case in other civil trades. Artillerymen were actually organized in guilds for many years, and it was not until the 18th century that they formally became uniformed members of armed forces (van Doorn, 1975:17). This process of assimilation continues, as the support elements of military forces have grown to exceed the size of the actual combat component of many armed forces, including that of Canada. From an historical point of view, this phenomenon points to the increasing power of military institutions within their host societies, as more and more sectors of the civil population are brought into the moral and administrative fold of the means of violence. The admission of women in Canada to combat roles may be viewed as an important contemporary manifestation of this historical process of assimilation.

3) The Formation of Subordinate Civil Occupational Sectors

A concomitant transformation was the emergence of civilian professions and occupations to fulfill specific military demands, the organization of many of which being modelled upon the military in a direct manner, serving to further extend military experience and influence into Western populations.

The most familiar of these revolve around technical support with respect to armaments development, of which the nuclear industry is perhaps the archetypical example (see McNeill, 1982). Of greatest significance for this study, however, has been the emergence of paramilitary organizations; militia, police forces, reserves, and so on. Less well known is
the military origin of the Salvation Army and Church Army; of such youth groups as the Boy Scouts; and of such service groups as fire brigades. The origins of the nursing profession in Britain, for example, were in support of the troops during the Crimean War (Wilson, 1980). In each of these, central elements of military bureaucracy and discipline were and are evidenced in varying degrees. The relationship is closest among the youth groups; the scouts and the cadets, which perform important recruiting and pre-socialization tasks. The wearing of a uniform, accompanied by badges signifying the identity of the group and the rank of the individual within it, is common to all these agencies but no longer serves to foster a disciplined consciousness in only the military or paramilitary contexts; it has become a pervasive device used among workers in occupations in virtually all employment sectors.

Section 2:  
The Mass Army and the Bureaucratic Organization of Labour

The intellectual roots of most of the ideas discussed in this section may be found in the work of Max Weber, who understood that "military organization was the prototype of modern organizations" (in Janowitz, 1976:188). Just as armed forces have been leading sources of innovation in the technical manipulation of physical resources, so too have they been at the fore in the generation of technical processes in the control of human resources. The predecessor of the modern bureaucratic official is the military officer of the early professional and mass armies, and the control of troops evidenced therein the leading edge of a transformation in rational over paternal mechanisms of authority, culminating in

3 Weber makes no distinction between these two types of organization along this dimension, arguing that their internal authority structures were effectively the same during this initial period of development (See Gerth and Mills, 1958:260-1).
their pervasive adoption by modern social institutions.

In exploring these arguments, the following general themes are developed. Two segments are devoted to the nature and origins of military bureaucracy respectively. The third and final segment discusses the mechanisms of disciplinary control fostered by bureaucratic organizations, and discusses their linkages with military innovations.

1) The Principles of Bureaucratic Organization

"Sins generally attributed to bureaucracy", Perrow (1972) has observed, "are not sins at all or are consequences of the failure to bureaucratize sufficiently". Far from being antithetical to military organization, as many theorists and military officers alike suggest, the classic organization of an operational army respects fundamental bureaucratic principles. A bureaucracy is, in the most simple sense, an impersonal system of organization with a hierarchy of positions or offices filled by individuals who attain a higher office through the demonstration of the knowledge and skill necessary for that position. The duties of each office are recorded in widely available written documents, and the organization runs according to rules which are "more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned" (Gerth and Mills, 1958:198). Higher offices supervise lower, and respect for individuals in higher offices is directed to the quality of their offices rather than the persons inhabiting them. Communication flows up and down in the form of information and orders. Officials make the goals of the organization their own, and inextricably link their own careers with the survival of the organization, and their duties demand their full working capacities (Porter, 1965; Gerth and Mills, 1958). While this is of course a very brief treatment, each of these most basic principles are central to the ideal of the classic military
institution.

A problematic aspect of this connection concerns, however, the military demand that personnel embrace the goals of armed forces in a normative, unlimited way, while bureaucracy in an ideal-typical sense expects moral detachment of its officials. In the transition of an army from war to peace, certain systematic contradictions emerge. Moral detachment has obvious advantages for soldiers in war, and this is even more so the case for commanders, but in the peacetime military bureaucracy it becomes dysfunctional in some respects. The competing demands of families and of other sources of self-identification are regarded as threats to the integrity of military units in time of peace, and the response has been to attempt to limit the soldiers' contact with such external sources of identity. The denial of permission for military personnel to marry and frequent relocation are two of the devices used historically to delimit the moral boundaries of the soldier's horizon, the ultimate goal being the artificial peacetime maintenance of the bureaucracy of an army at war.

Bureaucracies generally, and armed forces in particular, are as the previous discussion illustrates designed to impose predictability on an inherently chaotic environment. Military organizations have maximized bureaucratic potential as no other and are the archetypal forms to which all large organizations aspire in their similar search for a system which individuals will collectively internalize and become disciplined members, despite the contradictions which emerge in time of peace. As Liston found upon comparing the literature of modern business management theory with basic tenets of military leadership, the great schism thought to exist between the way military forces and civilian business would like to direct and motivate their people is largely a myth (Liston, 1977). The ideal to which all large, complex organizations aspire is
remarkably similar, and is based upon the triumph of scientific reasoning and logical, predictable coordination over the wasteful, disordered tyranny of individual action.

The military approximation of this ideal was unleashed by the machine-like predictability of bureaucratic European military forces, resulting in a "qualitative transformation in the relations between the state and its citizens" (Dews, 1984:74), and signalling the rise of a superior form of social control. This disciplinary process sought and seeks to produce "regimented, isolated, and self-policing subjects" (Dews, 1984:77) in the maintenance of order.

The moment that saw the transition from historico-ritual mechanisms for the formation of individuality to the scientific-disciplinary mechanism, when the normal took over from the ancestral, and measurement from status, thus substituting for the individuality of the memorable man that of the calculable man, that moment when the sciences of man become possible is the moment when a new technology of power and a new political anatomy of the body were implemented.

(Foucault, 1979:193)

In the broadest sense, Weber argued, "nothing is more efficient and more precise than bureaucratic management" (Gerth and Mills, 1958:50). When a bureaucracy is firmly established, Weber argues, it "is among those social structures which are among the hardest to destroy... and where the bureaucratization of administration has been completely carried through, a form of power relation is established that is practically unshatterable. We must remember this fact... that 'democracy' as such is opposed to the 'rule' of bureaucracy" (Weber, 1968).

2) The Mass Army and the Origins of Bureaucracy

The principal engineers of the initially successful applications of techniques of rational administration to the
organization of armed forces were, according to Iverson (1984), Maurice of the House of Orange of the Netherlands, 1567-1625; Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, 1591-1632; and Oliver Cromwell of England, 1599-1658. An historical watershed in the wider promulgation of the rational-legal plan in the conduct of armies and actual warfare was the Franco-Prussian War. In that conflict, the seemingly invincible hardened French veterans, who were led by fiat by their most experienced soldiers, were crushingly defeated by the Prussians and their essentially civilian massed troops. When the Prussians lost an officer, another stepped in to perpetuate the "enduring, established, and objective conditions of a disciplined machine" (Weber, 1978:145). Without this "routinized charisma", without the highly developed division of labour and well articulated duties and responsibilities codified in "the plan", the French command structure with its reliance on charismatic and experienced leadership dissolved with the deaths of its NCO's (McNeill, 1982). The victory was based in part upon the lessons Moltke learned in defeating the Austrians in 1866, during which conflict Prussian troops were moved by rail and the electric telegraph was used for communications among commanders and forward units (see Bond, 1984:12-17).

This consolidation of power in over-arching organizational structures at the expense of individual initiative and myth has altered the meaning of heroism in an important way in the military context. While the modern battlefield requires tremendous courage, the potential for individuals in the context of a division-level attack to exhibit the kind of dramatic example to others once so central to victory in combat is much reduced. Successful armies have institutionalized or routinized heroism by identifying modal technical factors which permit officers to wear what Keegan calls "the mask of command", generating an approximated or learned charisma which large numbers of officers can adopt. The
bureaucracy thus need not rely solely upon the rise of such skills from the crucible of experience. The modern bureaucratic army seeks to de-mystify the hero, to make aspects of his behaviour predictable aspects of the behaviour of soldiers and most importantly that of their officers. This is the latent intent of "leadership by example", the most important single principle officers in training are expected to assimilate.

The "elective affinity" which united large-scale capitalist industrial enterprise with bureaucratic structure in the 19th century was made possible by the convincing demonstration of the human power of bureaucracy on the battlefields of Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. Emerging nation-states monopolized the means of violence in specific territories by introducing secular, rational mechanisms of control which dispersed the broad, mystical, and paternalistic powers of feudal military commanders and centralized the "ownership" of military forces in the state (Gerth and Mills, 1958:48-50). The autonomy of individual warriors and their mercenary associations, of that time motivated primarily by prospects of materialistic plunder (see Keegan, 1976), was shattered when it became cruelly clear that independently heroic warriors, fighting on horseback with light weapons and courageous if uncoordinated initiative, could not match the violent machinations of a closely disciplined, heavily armed, and well-supported bureaucratically structured army.

3) Bureaucracy and Discipline

Weber's analysis of the advance of secular rationality at the expense of sacred truths concentrates on the legal and political strata of modern societies. Foucault extends this argument, as O'Neill (1986, 1986a) has argued, attempting to identify the mechanisms of power generated within the central institutions of army, school, factory, and
hospital, and relate these to the broader historical shift toward the rational society. At its most fundamental, Foucault's theory sees in modern history the replacement of "overt violence by moralization" in the control of Western populations, a process most clearly seen in punishment. The gradual replacement of corporal and capital punishment with psychological incarceration, the former being a ritual "intended to restore the sanctity of the law being broken", and the latter part of a "pervasive, impersonal system of surveillance and correction... to the 'psychology' of the individual, since intention rather than transgression now becomes the central criterion of culpability" (Dews, 1984:76) is for Foucault evidence of the entrenched operation of scientific ideology through central institutions.

Disciplinary society theorists argue that the ascendancy of bureaucracy as the principal form in which work in contemporary societies is organized initiated a new "technology of power" in the control of national populations (see Foucault, 1979; Dews, 1984; and O'Neill, 1986). The rational manipulation of the subject, through the psychology of identity and the political control of the body, has according to this view replaced, and is far more powerful than, the violent coercion which had served to extract compliance in the maintenance of pre-scientific social order.

It is important to note that the theorists considered here do not impute a simple linearity in the transfer of military disciplinary controls through bureaucracy to civil institutions. Rather, an interactive effect is assumed, in which dramatic catalytic advances are ordinarily located in the military sector. Jacques van Doorn, for example, notes the remarkably similar consecutive development of military and civilian bureaucracies. He argues that the correspondence between Dutch military innovations of the 17th century and the
principles of scientific management espoused by Taylor are too great to be considered coincidental. Both systems of organization revolve around the belief that human performance can be maximized through the "decomposition of human labour into its components of movement" (van Doorn, 1975:10). Concrete applications of this central belief had been extant in the handling and coordinated operation of weapons within armed forces for three centuries prior to Taylorism. McNeill describes the consequences of the concrete military manifestations of scientific administration, most importantly seen in drill, as follows.

And since each soldier could be trained to the precise movements of standardized drill, reinforcement of the depleted personnel of any given unit became almost as simple as replacing spent musket balls. Soldiers, in short, tended to become replaceable parts of a great military machine just as much as their weaponry. Management of such an army was easier and more likely to achieve expected results than anything possible before. 

(McNeill, 1982:141)

Section 3:
The Command Economy and Capitalist Enterprise

"History has been written", Giddens has observed, "almost wholly on an economic level, as if the sole significant influences in the world system were the production and exchange of goods" (Giddens, 1982:161). Marxists, industrial society theorists, and classical liberal economists alike assume, in Giddens’ view, that the industrial revolution substituted "peaceful economic exchange relations for the militaristic order of feudalism" (1982:161). Recent neo-Weberian conflict theory, in which the work of Giddens is central, argues that the rise of capitalism was in part contingent upon both the conjoined effects of regulation and planned intervention in the market by nation-states prosecuting war, and upon the demands
of and protection offered by the dramatically intensified destructive power of military forces.

Conflict theory, of which the war and society work discussed here is a part, employs greater fluidity in the discovery of causal factors in the explanation of social phenomena than do other paradigms, Craib has argued, and "points instead to the complexity of the real world and... encourages us to discover this complexity empirically rather than hide it theoretically" (1984:68). Contemporary analyses of state capitalism from the perspective of historical materialism underplay, in Giddens' view, "the role of military power and warfare among states" in understanding the international capitalist economy, "which is at one and the same time a world military order" (Giddens, 1981:197-198). Liberal and Marxist critics of military organization have "seized upon the element of greed in the context of private profit making" (Giddens, 1984:16) in explaining the simultaneous ascendancy of capitalist economies and military power. On the broadest level, conflict theory of civil-military relations argues rather that a complex of significant causal factors "which must be assessed anew in each historical situation" (Domhoff, 1986:155) has conditioned the development of Western societies.

The role of the state in the rise of capitalism is, according to this view, ordinarily accorded insufficient theoretical weight, most viewing economic intervention by governments as either a hindrance to growth or as regulatory activity in the protection of the interests of ownership classes. "The state, in short," Giddens notes, "is not conceived of as a nation-state, existing in relations of potential or actual antagonism toward other states" (1982:161).

The unprecedented expansion of capitalism occurred within a "military cockpit", requiring the legal apparatus of
the rational state and the industrial and technical demands as well as the protection of armed forces. "The history of capitalism", Iverson argues, "has been a history of static protectionism (legal and military), financing, and participation" (1984:3). National governments underwrote the costs of ventures which stimulated private capital and opened previously uncharted areas of the globe to European merchants. By negotiating trade and tariff agreements with other governments, by "furnishing the necessary infrastructure of roads and rail lines, canals and harbour facilities" (Iverson, 1984:2), and by policing their working populations, nation-states created the legal and financial climate which permitted the development of Europe and North America. As Polanyi notes, "the road to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled interventionism" (in Iverson, 1984:3).

McNeill traces the metamorphosis of the command economy to major European conflicts of the 16th century. The mass army, directed by state political institutions, had existed in various forms for approximately two hundred years prior to this period, but it was only in the crucible of protracted combat among powerful and highly visible forces that the success of bureaucratically structured armies with extensive supply and administration networks was firmly established. The near-panic circumstances, McNeill argues, when "more and more shells, gunpowder and machine-guns suddenly became the price of survival as a sovereign state" (1982:331), fomented a massive infusion of capital and regulatory coordination into the indigenous economies of nations, indeed into all areas of social life. The resulting command economy "inaugurated a new epoch in world affairs" (McNeill, 1982:308) in which "innumerable bureaucratic structures that had previously acted more or less independently of one another in a context of market relationships coalesced into what amounted to
a single national firm for making war" (McNeill, 1982:317). Thus, as Ashworth and Dandeker have argued, "in the context of West European development, far from capitalism creating the geo-political struggles for power between nation-states, it was the latter which have provided the conditions for the flourishing of the former" (1987:317).

This approach to Western history has been called "neo-Machiavellian". Ashworth and Dandeker link the Weberian attention to armed forces and war to the work of Pareto, Mosca, and Michels, arguing that they share a "conviction that social conflicts, and by implication the possibility of war" are "constitutive features of human societies rather than being contingent upon either the existence of class divisions or economic scarcity" (Ashworth and Dandeker, 1987:4). The connection to Machiavelli is argued to be in the portrayal of social organization as an arena in which political strength and actual force are regularly exercised in a protracted struggle for power. Far from admiring such power, however, war and society theorists appreciate its exercise for its terrible historical toll and its remarkable tenacity. This theoretical linkage has not gained substantial currency.

The remainder of this section briefly traces the historical evidence generated by war and society theorists in support of the contention that relatively independent armed forces and the prosecution of war by nation-states contributed significantly to the creation of historical circumstances making the rise of capitalism possible.

Capital and the Command Economy

The transfer of weapons production from the hands of craftsmen and artisans to those of workers using mass-manufacturing techniques is first found on a broad scale during
the Crimean War of 1854-1856. That conflict demonstrated that the demands of modern forces for supplies, extended as the English and French navies were into the Black Sea, were too great and too precise to rely on the unpredictable and time-consuming work of autonomous private artisans. King Frederick William of Prussia, for example, determined in 1840 that his 320,000 soldiers should be armed with breech-loading muskets and commissioned an individual inventor with the order. After seven years, only 10,000 weapons were being produced annually, and even at this rate there were serious design flaws. In 1854 the Prussians opted for rifles instead of the muskets and purchased American bullets, outfitting their armies completely in only two years (McNeill, 1982). Samuel Colt had earlier demonstrated at the Great Exhibition of 1851 that the milling technology of the Springfield, Massachusetts arms plants allowed revolvers to be produced, disassembled, stored in bulk according to their constituent parts, and reassembled interchangeably. The Crimea demonstrated the tremendous utility of such techniques in modern warfare, and by 1870 Russia, Spain, Turkey, Sweden, Denmark, and Egypt had all followed England and adopted American production styles (McNeill, 1982). Prior to this period, new inventions challenged armed forces to change their hardware. From 1880 onwards, however, armed forces were planning and demanding inventions, bureaucratising the process of technical innovation and incorporating the professional interests of scientists, engineers, and technologists within the rubric of national survival.

The first extensive use of bronze and iron in production was in the casting of cannon for naval vessels. Naval demands also prompted the adoption of the blast furnace in Flanders and the Rhineland around 1380 (Iverson, 1984:8). Bessemer's process of refining steel for artillery pieces in the Crimea inaugurated a new metallurgical era, making older methods of casting obsolete in twenty years (McNeill, 1982).
During the war of 1793-1815 against France, public expenditures by the British crown increased from 22 to 123 million pounds, enabling the nation to "plunge into an unprecedented spate of production, which during the war years kept the work force fully employed, brought general prosperity, and enabled the population to surge" (Iverson, 1984:11). The demands of the navy had Great Britain smelting almost two million tons a year by 1848, more than the rest of the world combined (Landes, 1969:95). The technology associated with these rapid absorptions of resources and subsequent weapons improvements advanced at such a rate that merely "marking time" required substantial national effort and centralized coordination in what was and remains a chaotic enterprise. The guns of the early Dreadnought vessels, for example, could throw a shell twenty miles, but their range finders were worthless at any distance greater than seven miles (McNeill, 1982). There has not been stability in weapons configuration since the mid-19th century, and large, complex public and private agencies have emerged to deal with this unstable environment. Of all workers in Britain in 1913, for example, one-sixth were employed on naval contracts alone (McNeill, 1982).

The eve of the First World War is considered to be the benchmark period during which the command economy "came of age and began, in the very citadel of European liberalism, to exhibit a wayward will of its own" (McNeill, 1982:285). Political control over military budgets gradually dissolved as the goals of military and civilian organizations merged in the effort to successfully prosecute the war. Channels for the procurement of materiel developed which linked military hierarchies with civilian industrial elites. As a consequence, for example, shell production in Britain increased ten times over during 1914, while the Russians increased their capacity to produce shells in a little more than a year between 1915 and 1916 from 450,000 per month to 4.5 million per month. In 1914,
the British Army owned 100 lorries. By the end of the war in 1918 there were 60,000 of these vehicles in their inventory (Bond, 1984:102). In addition, this war "blazed the way" for technical innovations "from shell fuses and telephones to trench mortars and wristwatches" (McNeill, 1982:327).

Despite the relatively limited participation of the United States, the Gross National Product (GNP) of that nation doubled during the First World War (McNeill, 1982). The impact of the Second World War was as dramatic. Mills observes that prior to 1939, the totality of American industrial capacity had been created at a cost of $40 billion. By the end of that war, "an additional $26 billion worth of high quality new plant and equipment had been added - two-thirds of it paid for directly with government funds" (Mills, 1958:59). Further, Mills notes, in the period 1940-1945 some $175 billion in prime supply contracts were awarded to private corporations (1958:58). The Japanese war economy, considered by many a model of industrial mobilization for war, "helped to sustain a five-fold increase in heavy industrial output between 1930 and 1942" (McNeill, 1982:347).

These managed or command economies, in which state participation in the market was of a scale impossible to achieve through private venture, have built the infrastructure upon which contemporary capitalism was built and now rests. "In both capitalism and socialism", Iverson argues, "the industrializing process has advanced hand-in-glove with the growth of state power and the build-up of military power" (1984:20). Consequently, the international capitalist economy must be viewed as both an arena of political struggle and as an intense rivalry for military supremacy.
Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the portrait of sanguine vulnerability and relative powerlessness of Western armed forces fundamental to civilianization theory misses broad historical truths in the intersection of armed forces and other institutions. Central among these, it was argued, is the profound influence military institutions have had upon civil society with respect to the emergence of the nation-state system, the diffusion of bureaucracy, and in the rise of capitalist economies. From an historical point of view, institutions evolving through these transformations had origins in a fundamentally military context; a context not considered by civilianization theorists who have lately discovered that military and other institutions evidence fundamental similarities.

In the period between the early 1940’s and the mid-1980’s approximately 20% of all governments on earth "were installed as the direct result of the use of organized violence" (Hanneman, 1986:75). More than 40% of all governments had military personnel on their highest executive councils, and approximately one government in four was in fact headed by a military officer (Hanneman, 1986). It is vital, argues the work of the war and society theorists discussed in this chapter, that the power of military institutions be appropriately considered in understanding social change. On many levels, military organization has been in an unrelenting state of superficial change since the emergence of the mass army. A successful theory of civil-military relations will not only consider changes occurring within the military as a consequence of the influence of external forces, but will recognize also that this relationship is a dynamic and reciprocal one and will observe the tremendous impact of armed forces in shaping modern history. Most importantly, such a theory must seek to reveal
those dynamics of civil-military relations which remain unchanged despite the destruction of war and the exigencies of annual budgeting in time of peace.

The following chapter also critiques the civilianization model from an historical standpoint. The methodological approach adopted therein debates the validity of the interpretation of civil-military history addressed in this chapter by examining assumptions of the model in the light of long-standing military beliefs.
CHAPTER THREE:
The Enduring Military Moral Panic and Civilianization Theory

As was discussed in the first chapter of this study, the dominant paradigm in North-American civil-military relations research, civilianization theory, argues that contemporary peacetime soldiers lack the classic ethos of unlimited commitment to duty that is required by crue military professionalism. Modern troops, according to this view, no longer meet the standards set in the past by properly motivated individual military personnel. This belief in the collapse of the martial spirit, and its history, is the critical focus of this chapter.

To this point in this study, theory and evidence has been used in a critique of the validity of the interpretation of the history of civil-military relations employed by the civilianization model. The research discussed in this chapter adopted a different methodological approach. The belief itself that a state of advanced moral decline obtains among contemporary troops was examined through a qualitative exploration of ideas and attitudes expressed historically in the military discourse. It was discovered that the belief in a lost standard of true military power and in the imminence of moral collapse has long and persistent historical roots within the world-view of military forces.

This belief constitutes a "moral panic", this chapter argues, of which the assumptions of the civilianization model are a contemporary expression. The concept of the moral panic refers to the 'symbolic crusade' undertaken by a group upon the perception of a threat to its most fundamental values.

Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become
defined as a threat to social values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians, and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to.... Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way the society conceives itself.

(Cohen, 1980:9)

The moral panic is not necessarily initiated by concrete evidence of the actual depth and scope of a problematic phenomenon, it is rather a response to a condition of what Hall (et al., 1978) has called a "crisis of hegemony". Under circumstances of general anxiety, a politico-social ideology constructing modes of deviant definitions of behaviour emerges. The concept has been used primarily in explaining the apprehension of dramatically intensified criminal activity during periods of economic recession, particularly in the emergence of powerful images of deviant youth groups in Britain.

Since the emergence of the mass army in post-feudal Europe, armed forces have faced such a crisis of hegemony. The organization of violence by military means is ineluctably contrary to humanity, despite the classic texts admiring and elevating the spiritual call of duty. The constituent structural elements of military organization are bureaucratic devices serving to administer human behaviour in the production of systematic destruction and death; the values that armies demand their members respect in supporting these aims are as a matter of course opposed to, and in time of peace threatened by, those ideals manifestly guiding external social life. The historical perception within armed forces that the military "way" is at odds with the respect for human life and justice
found beyond the borders of its community has fostered a lasting fear that envelopment and ultimate dissolution is inevitable. In the context of this study, it will be argued, the concept of the moral panic is useful in understanding the abiding military suspicion that soldiers are performing their duties reluctantly and are motivated not by the desire to serve but by the material comfort and avarice valued by individuals in external social life.

The chapter is comprised of two main sections, each of which examines one of the two main types of imagery found to inform the military moral panic. The first section considers the imagery of power in history which underlies the belief that classic military institutional values of selfless dedication, and a supportive societal consensus, once engendered a true profession of arms. In the second, the imagery of spiritual weakness in contemporary military forces and materialistic decay in broader social life supporting the historically ubiquitous belief in the erosion of the martial spirit is explored. The constituent segments of the typology used to describe these images were developed for illustrative purposes and the boundaries between them in some cases overlap. The overall goal in these sections is the depiction of the congruence between the taken-for-granted models serving as the lenses through which history and social life are viewed in both civilianization theory and the wider military discourse. In the following paragraphs preceding the first section, the methodology used in developing the basis of these arguments is discussed.

**Methodology**

The theoretical framework guiding this research has been drawn from recent work which has not as yet generated a methodological tradition or a set of replicable strategies and
techniques. From Giddens and the historians working in this area comes a clear positivistic orientation, but Foucault and the disciplinary society theorists, such as O’Neill (1986, 1986a) have broadened the evidentiary scope considerably. In this chapter, a qualitative historical exploration of historically pervasive elements of the military value-system is presented through an analysis of classic military texts and the writings of central authors and soldiers. The data were gathered principally from histories, volumes on strategy and tactics, journals, and memoirs drawing on Canadian, American, and British sources; all the documents cited here are widely available. The literature connected with military organization in which evidence of the content of military beliefs might reasonably be expected to be found is, of course, vast. Initially, the decisions made regarding the actual works selected for this analysis were based on the frequency of notation of reference works in the military professional literature; from this starting point emerged a relatively clear core of sources. Subsequent identification of relevant material could not proceed in a systematic way. Confidence in the validity of the findings is derived in part by the scope of the documentation that has been used in the analysis, but comes most importantly from the voices of the authors cited. If this chapter is successful, a distinct historical pattern will be revealed to underlie the assumptions made, beliefs expressed, and positions espoused by military academics, officers, and soldiers.

The methodology employed here has been in part based upon that used by Dixon (1976) in both a technical sense and, ultimately, in the presentation of the findings. In Dixon’s study of incompetence at the highest levels of military command, he was faced with the methodological dilemma of either generating and presenting a taxonomy of recurring factors in military failures, or of producing a properly contextualized
treatment of the multiplicity of failures in military history, neither of which approaches were satisfactory. The former approach would, in his view, be hopelessly arid, while the latter would be impossible detailed. He selected instead "the uneasy compromise of attempting to précis well-known accounts" of selected historical events, in the belief that "certain common denominators of these events would become apparent" (Dixon, 1976:26). The research conducted in this study entailed similar difficulties on a much reduced scale, as it also encompassed many years and a number of complex historical events. Dixon's approach was adopted, and no pretense is made of having sampled in a representative way either the past two centuries of military writing or the history of armed conflict during that period. Rather, it is hoped that a consistent value-laden orientation is identified in the exploration of a broad range of disparate contemporary and historical military sources from Canada, the United States, and Britain, an orientation which continues to inform the beliefs of soldiers and the assumptions of civilianization theory.

Section 1: Images of Power in Military History

The following conceptual models have, among others, been used by civilianization theorists to classify historical change in Western civil-military relations: vocational-occupational, institutional-occupational, segmented-plural, isolationist-interventionist, heroic-managerial, divergent-convergent, divergent-isomorphic, disarticulated-articulated, corporative-entrepreneurial, and unlimited duty-contractual obligation. In each case, the dichotomy is used to reflect a dramatic historical shift away from military forces populated by morally committed men toward an organization similar to any other in civil life, populated largely by materialistically motivated employees. The validity of this axiom of
civilianization theory is presented as if self-evident, which is an initial indication of an assumption of shared values between the author and the intended audience for the work. The premise is treated as heuristic and ideal-typical, representing long-term trends poorly served by analytic specification. Morris Janowitz has attempted to actually identify the American period of classic military institutional power, citing the time when the Army "was located at remote frontier posts, fighting Indians" (in Segal, 1986:369). In fact, however, of all men recruited into the American Regular Army between 1867 and 1891, during the period to which Janowitz refers, all of whom were volunteers, one-third deserted (Rickey, 1963:143). When theorists in the civilianization tradition judge the quality of contemporary soldiers, they implicitly and explicitly evoke a set of standards derived from an ambiguously defined prior period of military strength. As we will see, however, not only has such a period not been found, nor has one in which the standard of history has been met.

At the heart of the imagery of power in military history are three general forms. Military units of the past are portrayed as like-minded groups of spiritually dedicated and physically robust men for whom military service is both a sanctuary and an all-encompassing way of life; they are seen to have been absolutely committed soldiers. Secondly, military forces in the past are depicted as functioning according to the dictates of pristine military principles of organization, unaffected by inappropriate political, economic, or other influences. Lastly, civilians and their institutions during periods of conflict are characterized as having been supportive and hard-working allies in the war effort, with civil social life dominated by a broad consensus that the fight is legitimate and victory crucial. It is against these standards that contemporary troops and the wider populations of Western nations are judged. In the following pages, selected
documentary evidence is employed in both illustrating and questioning the validity of each of the three central forms of the imagery of power in military history.

1) **Absolute Commitment in Military History**

The comparison of the moral quality of contemporary troops to those of the past in the civilianization literature is ordinarily effected in an oblique or latent manner. On the most general level, a myriad of modern personnel difficulties are typically described and treated as recent phenomena by authors assessing the operational effectiveness of armed forces, phenomena argued to be distinctly out of place in a true military organization. The contrast is also expressed in a direct way, as is the case in the following observation of contemporary discipline in the Canadian Forces by Colonel M.V. Langille.

One has only to glance at a photograph of a regimental parade taken 15 years ago and compare it with a similar photograph of a regimental parade taken today... the difference is dramatic. Try it with your unit. In the "before" picture, you will find a proud regiment of tough, confident, strongly disciplined soldiers ready to go to war. You will not see this in the "after" picture... a real problem exists with discipline in the army.

(Langille, 1988:39)

A common expression of this belief takes the form of a wistful sense of loss. General P.D. Manson made the following comment in an interview in 1986, while he was the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) of the Canadian Forces.

One of the things that made life so simple back in the 50's and 60's was that you could simply tell somebody that something had to be done and no questions were asked.\(^4\)

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The period to which both officers refer is fondly recalled by many. Evidence collected at that time by a team of sociologists examining the process through which civilian recruits were socialized by the infantry in Canada found, however, a familiar litany of problems. They observed a widespread perception among military personnel, on the brink of the Korean War in the early Fifties, that young soldiers were of extremely poor quality in terms of their degree of commitment to the service. In many of the interviews they conducted, the sentiments voiced by General Manson in 1988 are echoed almost exactly. One non-commissioned officer (NCO) argued that

There was a time when you told a man that something was wrong and he took it seriously. I used to be embarrassed when they found something wrong with me. But these men just don’t have any sense of personal pride. They just don’t care.
(in Hall, McKay, and Solomon, 1951:84)

An officer interviewed in the same study bemoaned the fact that "Nowadays, you just can’t give a man an order and expect him to carry it out. You practically have to explain all the reasons for everything to him and then ask him if he will do it" (1951:91). In synthesizing the overall attitudes of this officer and of the remainder of the leaders of the army who were included in the sample, the report concluded that their view was characterized in part "by a recognition that the private today is not quite the private of the pre-war Army... the NCO also seems to think that the private does not have the same degree of identification with the army system as was the case in yester-years" (1951:83).

On the most general level, this imagery of absolute commitment on the part of Canadian military forces in history pervades public memory and, more importantly, the assumptions of civilianization theorists. The historical evidence discussed
in the following paragraphs questions the validity of this selective portrayal of Canadian military history.

Other-rank personnel on three Canadian naval vessels, the destroyers Athabaskan and Crescent and the aircraft carrier Magnificent, mutinied\(^5\) during a two month period in early 1949. Mutinies had earlier occurred aboard HMCS Ontario in 1947 and HMCS Iroquois in 1943. In each case, "a number of sailors in a ship gathered together, locked themselves in a mess deck, and did not take up duties which they knew to have been assigned to them" (Audette, 1983:236). No one was punished, despite the harsh penalties provided in law. One of the three who conducted the inquiry into the events of 1949, L.C. Audette, has since observed that

The foul stench of mutiny was incapable of transforming itself into the healthy aroma of good behaviour. There was a recent history of successful and unpunished mutiny; the war had come to an end four years earlier bringing about an unpleasant metamorphosis from sparkling hero to taxpayers' burden for the uniformed serviceman.

(Audette, 1983:239)

A morale survey of personnel at five army Advanced Training Centres (ATC) in Canada (n=450) conducted in May 1943\(^6\) found low moral commitment and support for the Army. If given the freedom to choose any employment, only 15% would have remained in the Army, while 49% would have returned to civilian life. Almost half, 46%, believed that their families "would like it better if I were a civilian". When questioned about their enthusiasm for overseas service, 47% responded with

\(^5\) While these events are officially recorded as "incidents", one of the officers who conducted the original inquiry has since confirmed that the actions of the sailors were in fact mutinous and were known to be so (Audette, 1982).

\(^6\) DND Directorate of History file 113.3124003(D1), Folder 1, Vol. 1, "Morale Survey", 14 May 1943.
either "no enthusiasm at all" or "no enthusiasm but would not object to going". A total of 69% reported that they seldom or never discussed war news and the progress of the war with their officers. Further, 42% said Canada’s main job in the war should be the production of munitions rather than the provision of an armed force. It should be noted that those personnel who administered the ATC’s at which the survey was conducted may well have been "zombies" - soldiers who themselves refused to volunteer for overseas service.

Despite the assurances of Sir Robert Borden in 1917 that "no man, whether he goes back or whether he remains in Flanders, will have just cause to reproach the Government for having broken faith with the men who won and the men who died" (in Eayrs, 1964:41), other-rank Canadian soldiers returning from Europe after the First World War turned lingering resentment into anger. They rioted at their debarkation barracks in England, and several were killed in battles with military police as a result. They formed numerous associations upon their arrival in Canada which attempted to secure benefits for veterans beyond that proffered by the government; these sums were viewed as insulting to the blood spilled by their fellows and to their own sacrifices. "From 1918 onward", Eayrs observes, "loyalty and devotion to those who had formerly been his officers were not the most clearly recognizable characteristics of the Canadian soldier" (1964:42).

A plethora of organizations criticized the bias thought to be shown in favour of officers in post-war government employment, and "the creation of what seemed an over-loaded bureaucracy to deal with veterans’ affairs and discriminatory appointment of ex-officers to lucrative positions within it" (Eayrs, 1964:43-44). Of particular gravity was the dispute over the difference between officers and other-ranks provisions and health benefits (1964:43-44). Bitterness
and bloodshed among competing associations resulted in the formation of the Canadian Legion in 1925 as the official voice of veterans.

Charles Yale Harrison fought as a private soldier with the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) in the First World War. He has characterized the relationship between officers and their men in the CEF in that period as one of loathing and revulsion in the main. He noted that the worst enemies to face his battalion were lice and their own officers (Harrison, 1928:43). He further documents the murder of a Canadian officer by his own troops, as well as the indiscriminate looting of the French town of Arras by Canadian soldiers who subsequently fired on British military police and were not punished (1928:223-233).

Desertion, disciplinary difficulties, high voluntary attrition, and societal ambivalence have historically been problems more or less without respite in all Western armies, and as the previous paragraphs indicate, Canada has been no exception in this regard. There is no doubt that the catalytic stress of combat has inspired tremendous unit cohesion among innumerable groups of soldiers and active support among threatened populations, but as we have seen, these factors are not the primary significant variables to be appreciated in understanding war. Taking men out of local communities and into the barracks of the modern mass and professional armies has not occurred with the sanguine, unreflective ease portrayed by the civilianization theory, and more importantly, coordinating groups of men in the face of fire has of necessity always involved coercion and conflict in some form and measure. The relatively dispossessed men from rural areas who have populated armed forces in the past have indeed fought bravely and died in military service, but have rarely gone with the simplicity and elevated religiosity characteristic of the portrait of
spiritual commitment painted by civilianization theorists. While this kind of moral motivation no doubt has operated and continues to operate among many soldiers, particularly in all-volunteer-forces, the modal experience of military service and more importantly of actual combat is no doubt closer to Martel's description of trench warfare; the "desperate feeling of being in a situation that one is powerless to control, of being locked within a giant, horrific machine from which there is no escape" (1981:4).

2) Military Autonomy and Classic Operational Organization

The unusual and unacceptable degree of political interference in the internal affairs of contemporary armed forces contrasts sharply, civilianization theorists believe, with a time of substantial military autonomy during which commanders wielded broadly diffuse powers in the leadership of their units. During this classic period, norms guiding social action in the military are argued to have been generated indigenously by the exigencies of operational requirements and to have fostered a purely military institutional framework, unaffected by potentially contaminating exogenous influences. In other words, armies were once allowed to run the way true armies should, and the current influence of outsiders has predictably eroded the ability of armies to function properly.

Historical evidence of a preoccupation with a period of apolitical military isolation is widely found in military sources. In post-First World War America, Wood argues, "no longer was the military able to reduce itself to a small, closely knit officer corps who, in isolation, could be concerned with professionalism" (1982:20). Huntington has quoted an officer who opined that prior to the First World War American soldiers "lived apart in their tiny secluded garrisons much after the manner of military monks and they rarely came
into contact with the mass of our citizens..." (in Kellett, 1987:209). The metaphor of the religious enclave, secure from the world beyond the gates, is particularly common. A Russian infantry major described military life in the latter part of the 19th century in the following manner.

Each community has its own rules and view of life. Each is exclusive and constitutes an organic entity. In each, one withdraws up to a point from the outside world and becomes wholly absorbed in one's chosen group, which for the lonely pilgrim on this earth replaces house, friends, children, and in a way even his beloved wife. A man inclined towards contemplation chooses a monastery. More active, energetic types make their home in a regiment.

(in Keep, 1985:380)

Prior to the same dramatic penetration of political control having occurred in Canada, Cotton argues, "the military was largely unhampered by external constraints and semi-autonomous in its control over internal matters" (1973:39). Military personnel were physically removed from urban Canada by the sheer isolation of the rural training areas and bases; everyday social life "revolved around military role obligations... commanders of sub-units retained considerable latitude in decision making in... social action" (Cotton, 1973:39-41). Broadly speaking, a Kuhnian perspective of the military profession's view of its history, a military historiography, is needed. Just as Kuhn (1970) demonstrated that the path of natural science does not advance through placid evolutionary growth from simple to complex stages of knowledge, but is rather punctuated by unpredictable revolutionary changes and is fraught with political and factional conflict, so is it necessary to describe the complexity of social factors in military history. The civilianization literature and the writings of professional officers portray units of the past in a manner which elevates ideal-typical aspects of classic operational organization and misses the relevance of both the tawdry machinations of
institutional power and the cruel consequences of combat which accompany the existence of armed forces as a matter of course. In the following segments, the belief that Canadian, British, and American military history includes an initial period of classic autonomous institutionalism is questioned.

Canada

Civilian political interference in the Canadian military did not begin with the Avro Arrow debacle. Mackenzie King, who became Prime Minister of Canada on 29 December 1921, was "distinctly out of sympathy" with the "needs and aspirations of the post-war navy, as with those of the land and air forces of the Dominion" (Eayrs, 1964:168). From the outset, Eayrs argues, defence policy suffered under King’s "marked aversion to the military life and the military mind, whose workings he failed to understand and whose virtues he ignored" (1964:168). King had never served in uniform, and "no prime minister could have been more eager to find excuses for curtailing expenditure upon defence" (1964:169). After the Washington Conference, at which major naval powers resolved to reduce armaments and tonnage of capital ships, King cut the budget of the Royal Canadian Navy arbitrarily and, in the Minister’s words, "at the stroke of a pen", from $2,500,000 to $1,500,000" (Eayrs, 1964:169). The resulting shift from a permanent force to a reserve and what Arthur Meighen called a "five-trawler navy" was a direct consequence of the exercise of civilian political power in the context of military organization.

The more important aspect of autonomy concerns the internal operation of armed forces. The plans for aid and the actual raising of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) in the First World War, for example, were conducted in an atmosphere of acrimony and distrust. The "egocentric ways and unorthodox
methods" of Sam Hughes, who prepared the CEF, "caused a great deal of friction" (Haycock, 1981:14). Officers were chosen for the CEF by Hughes "for reasons other than military merit, ignoring good men allegedly because they were Liberals, were from the permanent force, or were not his friends" (Harris, 1979:163). In addition to Hughes' distaste for the permanent force, however, he also managed to alienate many in the Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM) by denying existing regiments overt representation in the CEF order of battle, creating instead new numbered battalions. Arthur Currie, later to command the CEF and be knighted at the conclusion of hostilities, said of the mobilization period in 1914 that "every squirt of a politician" was attempting to influence the military and further their own ends (in Harris, 1979:163).

The view that pure operational tenets governed Canadian military forces during the First World War is contradicted most directly when the process of materiel acquisition then employed to supply the troops is considered. No strategic or tactical doctrine held that the principal weapon of that conflict, the infantry soldier, should be sent to war in Europe with useless and dangerous equipment as a favour to particular Canadian industrialists. The infamous Ross rifle "was an exceedingly lethal weapon - albeit, it seems, more so for those firing it than for those at whom it was fired", Naylor (1981:38) observes. While an effective sporting target rifle, it was totally unreliable under the actual conditions of combat and was commonly discarded by Canadian soldiers. It has not been possible to estimate the deaths, blindings, and other injuries caused to Canadian troops using the Ross. It was not until 1917 that the dreaded rifle was exchanged for a safer and more durable weapon. It has been suggested that Sam Hughes was kept on the payroll of Sir Charles Ross so as to successfully prolong military purchases of his rifle (Naylor, 1981:38).
The boots worn by the CEF were manufactured by several firms in Quebec. Among these was Ames-Holden, the boots from which showed "a distinct tendency to disintegrate on contact with such unusual substances as muddy water, leaving the soldiers barefooted in the cold and filth of the trenches" (Naylor, 1981:38). Sir Herbert Ames was a prominent member of the Conservative Party.

Examples of the provision of sub-standard materiel and of blatant patronage in the awarding of contracts to supply the CEF are legion. Entrenching tools, offering the troops their only protection from shellfire, simply did not function. The Toronto firm of William Davies and Company was among the major suppliers of meat to the CEF, and its largest single shareholder has since been found to have been Sir Joseph Flavelle, who headed the agency that coordinated the awarding of war contracts, the Imperial Munitions Board (Naylor, 1981).

Britain

Norman Dixon’s influential examination of the psychology of incompetence in armed forces documents the role of "non-military" factors in the operations of British forces. In his view, "personal ambition, jealousy, and the relationship in men’s minds between ground and materiel, lives and reputations" (1976:82) contributed to the litany of remarkable failures and viciously unnecessary losses of modern British campaigns. Dixon identified the following as central weaknesses of British forces in the First World War.

- the plan for the disposition of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was devised three years before the actual conflict and was not modified;
- tactically, British commanders clung to the age-old practice of frontal assaults, usually against the enemy’s strongest point, despite the advantage of the new machine-gun to the defence;
- tremendous resistance to the adoption of proven technical innovations, such as the machine-gun and the tank;

- increasing reliance on massive prolonged bombardment before attacks, eliminating surprise and making ground almost impassable to the attacking infantry;

- crippling obedience and stubbornness was common; and

- readiness to accept enormous casualties - 57,000 men were lost on the first day of the attack on the Somme (Dixon, 1976:81-82).

In addition to intransigence in the face of proven technical innovations and unspeakable failure, the military integrity of British units on a more fundamental level has also been questioned. Keegan, for example, has examined the suitability of the reputation of the much-respected Kitchener battalions of the BEF for their ideal military organization, units of which in 1914 had on formation, and for many months afterwards, no knowledge of military technique whatsoever. Indeed "battalions", which implies an irreducible minimum of military organization, is a misnomer. Some "battalions" entered into military existence when a trainload of a thousand volunteers was tipped out onto a railway platform in front of a single officer who had been designated to command it. Few of these battalions, beyond those of the first two "hundred thousands", were allotted more than three officers and three regular NCO's, and many of these were often second-raters - retired Indian Cavalrymen, militia colonels, disabled pensioners. (Keegan, 1976:223)

United States

American military prowess, or its absence, has been a matter of intense protracted debate. Just as was the case in Canada and Britain, evidence indicating the operation of similarly un-military factors within the American armed forces
was found. Gabriel (1985) has identified a number of disastrous American military results, from the attempt to rescue hostages in Iran to the failed 1970 raid on Sontay prison in North Vietnam, which question the modern military reputation of American forces. Beaumont (1980) observes that history has embellished the record of the American military in the World Wars by losing sight of the fact that "careerism, factionalism and bureaucratic infighting... affects complex organizations of all kinds; business, ecclesiastical, bureaucratic, academic, as well as military" (1980:71). The bravura of victory has concealed the unremarkable and distinctly political struggles for power which underlie the successes of charismatic military figures of the past. We have forgotten, for example, Beaumont argues,

the cashiering of Grant, the blatant politicism of Taylor and Scott and the incredible infighting among general officers in the Civil War... the suppression of the armored force which threatened Eisenhower and Patton into silence... The rivalry of the March and Pershing factions racked the army for years... the command failure in Washington at the time of Pearl Harbor... The strategic bomber offensive floundered along from fad to fad... A steady struggle between Regular Army and National Guard ensued, as well as battles between the Marines and the Army, the Navy and the Merchant Marine, the Navy and the Army...

(Beaumont, 1980:70-73)

Civilization theorists in the United States have argued that an important indicator of the loss of this period of definitive military isolation has been the rising political awareness and activity of officers. When the military set its own agenda, officers are believed to have been subsumed by the process of managing violence and were appropriately alienated from the external political world. With increasing penetration by civilian institutions and values, officers’ attention is seen to have been increasingly diverted by the American political arena. Gates (1985) examined this belief through an analysis of the extra-military political content of military
journal articles written by officers in the late 19th century. He found substantial awareness of then contemporary political debates and extensive attention to topics related to national policy. He concluded that those who "urge the Army to return to a golden age of professionalism stimulated by isolation and strict attention to exclusively military matters" are generating solutions to problems which "have no basis in historical reality" (Gates, 1985:432).

Professional and mass armies have never been free of the human frailties of avarice and ignorance, of waste and mismanagement. In particular, resistance to the adoption of proven, reliable, effective, and safer technical and tactical systems in the face of undeniable evidence and enormous casualties cannot be explained with reference to the functioning of classic operational values. If an institution were rationally designed to provide optimum support to the aim of destroying the enemy, it is unlikely that such resistance would be found. Further, it is not likely that officers chosen to lead troops in such an organization should achieve their position largely through the possession of sufficient funds to purchase a commission. "If only", Winston Churchill remarked of the period now revered as one representative of the purity of operational integrity, "the generals had not been content to fight machine-gun bullets with the breasts of gallant men, and think that was waging war".

3) War and Universal Societal Consensus

"Commitment and loyalty" in modern anomie capitalist societies have become, Crook argues, "regarded as misunderstandings and rigidities of a previous era" (1975:35). Citizens in this previous era could be counted upon to rally

7 quoted in Dixon, 1976:86.
around their soldiers by embracing the call to war and offering not only their sons but their own labour, as well as by suffering a variety of privations in order to provide for the troops. One concrete contrast which is often noted is the First World War practice of young upper- and middle-class women commonly offering white feathers to young men not in uniform as sarcastic symbols of their cowardice, against that of the debacle of civil unrest during the Vietnam War, particularly among the young, the affluent, and the well-educated. The lesson which civilianization theorists believe should be learned is that civilians are now at best disinterested in defence and are in fact more likely to be actively antagonistic toward armed forces; that the enemy in part resides within our own borders. In the Canadian context, evidence of this problem is commonly argued to be found in two areas — in the decline of the part-time civilian militia, and in rising public hostility toward the soldier.

The Decline of the Militia in Canada

The decline in the influence and size of the militia in Canada is believed by many to be a significant indicator of change in the attitude of civilians toward military service. The belief in a lost quality of societal support for the militia has been expressed perhaps most clearly by Gerow (1984). In his view, the military spirit of the contemporary Canadian is of no comparison to that of the militiaman of the past, who "was of devout Christian heritage; who plowed his fields; trapped his furs; sold his wares and when the need arose, took up arms to defend his country" (1984:6).

Prior to the Korean War, the military in Canada consisted primarily of militia units staffed by part-time civilian volunteers. Willett (1980) has conducted an historical examination of Canadian militia units, concluding that they
seem to have become virtual non-entities in their communities, and their once prominent civic role has almost disappeared... ignorance and apathy are marked... the Militia is no longer a citizen force in which all sectors of the community are represented. It seems that the prestige of being an officer or senior NCO, even in old established regiments, has declined greatly since the 'Fifties.

(Willett, 1980:36)

Echoing this sentiment, a 1981 Federal Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence concluded as follows:

Until recent years, a militia unit was very much a part of the life of the community in which it resided... members came from all strata of local society; retention rates were high and the officers and senior NCO’s messes were centres of the social life of the community. At present, unit morale and unit esprit de corps is generally at a low ebb and the family spirit... has been seriously weakened.

(Canada, 1981:15)

As we have found with many problems believed to face the armed forces today, the apprehended crisis of the decline of the militia has persisted for many years. Nearly a century before the studies referred to here, the General Officer Commanding commented in 1898 that the state of the Canadian militia was "unsatisfactory in the extreme... a collection of military units without cohesion, without staff and without the military departments by which an army is moved, fed, or ministered to in sickness" (in Greenhous, 1977:135).

Anti-Militarism and the Civil Consensus

Civilianization theorists deplore the apparently novel rise of pacifistic sentiments among current Western populations. As will be demonstrated in this section, however, not only have many voices been raised against war in the past, the influence and currency of contemporary peace groups are,
from an historical point of view, relatively limited⁸.

a) **Second World War**

Active and relatively influential peace movements have regularly opposed Canadian participation in war in this century. Anti-militarist views enjoyed particularly wide currency prior to 1939. George Drew published an article in *Maclean's Magazine* titled "Salesmen of Death: The Truth about War Markets", arguing in part that behind international arms competition "lies a vicious commercial competition of armament and ship building companies which seek to promote international ill-will for the purpose of preserving a ready market for the death-dealing equipment they produce..." (in Eayrs, 1964:115). Vincent Massey, president of the National Liberal Federation in 1934, demanded in a speech that we must put an end to the manufacture for private gain of weapons for the destruction of human beings... So long as we have scattered throughout the world great and powerful corporations whose interest is to make profit out of war, there will be irresistible forces working against those who are trying to organize peace.

(in Eayrs, 1964:115)


The universities in Canada were the locus of considerable anti-war activity, as Eayrs has demonstrated. He notes that debates held at McGill and the University of Toronto in 1934 concluded with motions "favouring a policy of pacifism for Canada", and further that a questionnaire with 500 student

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⁸ This is the case in North America; in Europe no simple historical comparison is possible.
respondents from McGill at that time found only 17% willing to support the government "in any war which she may declare", let alone actually serve in uniform. A full 27% asserted that they would not support the government under any circumstances, in any war (Eayrs, 1964:110-111). Canadian university students declared their support for the peace movement of the 1930's and its theoretical linkage of war and the interests of capital. It is notable that students in Oxford's debating society similarly passed a resolution between the wars explicitly denying their willingness to die for king and country.

The extent of the solidarity of civilians behind the war effort of 1939-1945 in England has been similarly debated. English society of 1939 was, in the view of Dyson, who was an operational researcher in London during that war, "just as discordant and unheroic" as America is today. No one who was young in England in 1939, Dyson argues,

had the slightest confidence that anything worth preserving would survive the impending war against Hitler. The folk memory of England was dominated by the barbarities of World War I, and none of us could believe that World War II would be less brutal or less demoralizing. It was frequently predicted that just as World War I had led to the collapse of society and the triumph of Bolshevism in Russia, so World War II would have the same effect in England. (Dyson, 1984:6)

Knightly observes that on the announcement in 1939 that England was going to war "seventy constituency labour parties demanded peace, and twenty-two Labour M.P.'s signed a manifesto calling for an early armistice" (Knightly, 1975:218). Of the workers themselves, Bond argues that their support and effort has been romanticized, noting that the days lost due to strikes rose steadily between 1942 and 1944 and at the end of the war was double what it had been in 1939 (Bond, 1984:176). Bond does not suggest, it should be noted, that civilians, and women in particular, did not make a vital contribution to the
successful prosecution of the war. He argues rather that history has imbued their labours with an inappropriately innocent and romantic hue.

b) First World War

When the Military Service Act of 1917 was passed, effectively making every male in Canada between 20 and 45 years of age a member of the military, 125,000 men in Ontario were initially conscripted. Of these, 118,000 (94%) attempted to acquire an exemption from service (Munro, 1979:79). While it is clear that Canada sent her share of troops, the great majority of whom volunteered for overseas service, the effort to extract rough recruitment quotas was extremely difficult after the initial boom, which relied heavily on recent male British immigrants. When conscription was finally used to augment the declining volume of volunteers, the resulting outrage was, of course, extremely divisive.

Socknat (1984) has examined the role and influence of liberal pacifists prior to and during the First World War in Canada. The principal voice of peace groups was the Canadian Peace and Arbitration Society, counting more than a thousand members including "such prominent Canadian academics as Professor Adam Shatt of Queen's University, Professor J. McCurdy of the University of Toronto, Sir William Mullock, Chief Justice of Ontario, and Lewis E. Hornung, Professor of Classics at Victoria College" (Socknat, 1984:32). Canadians were exhorted by the Society to "resist the growing war frenzy" and to build "a new Christian spirit to supplant war" (1984:33-34). Prominent newspapers expounded liberal ideals; editorials in the Toronto Globe protested against the effects of militarism upon society, warned against building anti-German sentiment, and implored that "no Canadian cadet should be allowed to think of a German or any other man as a target for
his marksmanship". J.A. MacDonald, then editor of the Globe, stated that the notion of preparation for defence in time of peace was "doomed to the rubbish heap of the world’s barbarism" (Socknat, 1984:33). Eminent politicians, journalists, judges, attorneys and a plethora of radical and liberal organizations engaged in spirited debate and called for the explicit denial of service to the country on the part of individuals. When the war began, however, most abandoned the cause or were slowly denied an audience.

Just as Bond found to be the case in Britain during the Second World War, union activity greatly expanded in Canada during the First World War. Total union membership climbed from 166,000 in 1914 to 374,000 in 1919 (Naylor, 1981:42). Hostile and occasionally violent strikes were relatively common in this period, particularly in the West. While Canadian industries contributed enormous quantities of materiel to the war, the imagery of broad, unproblematic public consensus in the legitimacy of the interests of those who profited greatly by the war obscures the complexity of the environment behind the battlefield.

Membership in a British military unit at the turn of the century promised privation; this was no secret to the population actually supplying the troops. During the initial six months of 1914, two million volunteers were accepted for service in Britain. This was, in Martel’s view, a remarkable achievement considering the "contempt in which the army was held by the working class, who viewed it as a last resort because it meant exile from home, low company, drunkenness, and giving up the idea of marriages" (Martel, 1981:2). Dietz and Stone similarly characterize the late 19th century British all-volunteer army as "a life of drunkenness and brutality, where only intoxication and the lash could keep order and where the prejudice of the military disciplinarians were reinforced
by the degenerate nature of the shrinking number of men who were willing to endure such a system" (1975:159).

In the United States, public resistance to military service and defence policies did not originate with the Vietnam conflict. Vocal and politically influential groups kept that nation out of both World Wars until American interests were directly threatened. As early as the War of 1812, evidence may be found indicating civil resistance to conscription. Webster argued as follows in that debate.

The people of this country have not established for themselves such a fabric of despotism. They have not purchased at a vast expense of their own treasure and their own blood a Magna Carta to be slaves. Where is it written in the Constitution, in what article or section is it contained, that you may take children from their parents, and parents from their children, and compel them to fight the battles of any war, in which the folly or the wickedness of government may engage it?

(in Pillsbury, 1987:68)

Western societies prior to the major wars of this century were singularly unprepared for battle and on the eve of combat were rife with internal conflict and seeming instability. The profession of arms may well have been and continue to be thought of as a noble calling, but as Wilson (1980) notes, this has been so primarily among military officers. Civilian populations have rarely regarded their military forces with overt respect much less enthusiastic support, and soldiers in peacetime are generally held in some contempt.

The imagery of power in history, upon which the axiom of the decline of true military professionalism and moral commitment to duty is based, constitutes a selective portrayal of the past. The evidence discussed in this section suggests both that the belief in an imminent moral crisis has persisted
among modern generations of troops, commanders, and analysts, but also that there has been no period of classic institutional organization such as that postulated by civilianization theorists. No period of isolation permitting pure operational control has been found, nor have civilian populations been as united and dedicated in the support of the effort of war as is believed to have been the case. In the following section, the second main component of the imagery informing the military moral panic is explored.

Section 2: Images of Weakness in Civil Society

Just as military history is portrayed in a selective manner, so is an abiding vision of social life outside the military environment found in the military discourse. Successive generations of officers, soldiers, and analysts have consistently seen apathy and decadence in the civilian milieu surrounding their military units and providing their recruits. The ability of the civilian population to have the courage and heart to face an enemy is regularly in doubt; the quality of contemporary recruits and the institutions which formed them regularly deplored. This appraisal is fomented by institutional insecurity in the face of a contrary civilian hegemony. The fear that outsiders have concluded that the military "way" thinly disguises systematic grinding brutality has generated a protective lashing-out against civil institutions. The moral panic of weakness in civil life takes two forms.

Firstly, civilians are seen to have become bloodless employees, interested only in material advancement, to the point that the maintenance of the spirit of the committed soldier is believed to be extremely difficult. Secondly, civil society is portrayed as morally anarchic, bereft of altruistic sentiments, respect for authority, and of a sense of
responsibility to the nation on the part of individuals. Broadly speaking, civilians and their institutions are viewed as a dangerous pathology for armed forces, the consequences of contact with which being analogous to that suffered by a healthy organism in contact with bacteria. The belief that the trend toward just such a convergence between military and civil institutions is approaching its zenith informs the prediction of imminent moral collapse and with it the end of the fragile collective willingness of citizens to face death in service to their country.

1) The Decline of the Warrior, the Rise of the Employee

In modern Canada, Crook (1975) and Cotton (1980, 1973) have argued, advanced capitalism has created an anomic "mass society" lacking unifying cultural values, central among these being dedication to the higher calling of military service, and respect for the sacrifice that such entails. Gerow has similarly noted the evolution of an "entrepreneurial value system" in Canada, with "increasing acceptance of the idea that an individual's own life style and desires are more important than commitment to others" (Gerow, 1984:3). This argument is also made in the context of other Western societies by civilianization theorists. In the contemporary United States, Segal argues, Americans "as a nation" have "lost sight of the fact that citizenship involved responsibilities as well as rights". There has been, in his view, a "redefinition, and reduction in moral valence of that responsibility" (1983:21). Dietz and Stone similarly observe that Britain since 1945 "has become more open and meritocratic", affecting attitudes toward "authority and hierarchical organizations which are seen by many young people to be defenders of the old order and bastions of the privileged elites" (1975:177). Further, Alford argues of modern England that "the values and behaviour of society at large are totally incompatible with the ‘raditional military
virtues. Discipline and unselfishness are not two qualities most apparent in the British labour force at the present time, yet they are essential if any military organization is to respond to the challenge" (1980:254).

The point which is of significance here is that during those very periods in military history now most revered for collective moral commitment to the exigencies of service, officers, soldiers, and analysts were decrying the same destructive values in civil society and among young soldiers with which the theorists cited above continue to be preoccupied. The commanders who led the troops whom we now believe were heroically selfless and suffused with the indomitable spirit of victory publicly doubted the quality of their soldiers and the will of the communities which bore them with the same frustrated warnings of imminent disaster now echoing in the civilianization literature. Illustrations of the expression of this belief are briefly discussed in the context of Canada, Britain, and the United States.

Canada

Evidence of the contemporary focus on moral dedication and martial spirit of young Canadians among civilian and military analysts of defence issues is widely found. John Gellner asserts that "any warfare short of actual defence of the homeland against invasion... will be unpopular with the majority of young people accustomed to the abundant sweetness of peace in a western democracy" (1979:55). Major-General D.C. Loomis and Lieutenant-Colonel D.T. Lightburn similarly observed as follows.

It is clear that men in modern society will not normally be prepared to risk their lives or to die for abstractions such as ideologies, or large social groups such as nations.... Terrors and brutality and the effects of injury, which used to be commonplace,
are now quite foreign to modern civilization. Close quarter violence is rare in civilian life. Society isolates modern man from battle through the climate of the family, school, and cultural life. Pacifism is more fashionable than ever.

(Loomis and Lightburn, 1980:17-18)

In the context of an article on military professionalism in Canada, Carpenter opined that the demands made by armed forces may be viewed as undesirable or actually repugnant by the relatively youthful segment of the population available for military service, particularly if society at large becomes increasingly 'non-violence' oriented, welfare-oriented, and permissive. At present, there is a trend away from restrictive rules and regulation in society... increasing levels of education and technical expertise will tend to increase resentment to an inflexible and rule-bound organization.

(Carpenter, 1973:32)

In the same volume, Motiuk concludes that "bilingualism and biculturalism, the possible demands for some form of collective bargaining arrangements, the potential impact of the women's liberation movement, higher national education levels, population growth, and increased urbanization as well as rapidly changing technology will all have a marked effect not only on the officer corps but on the whole of the Canadian Forces" (1973:38). Perhaps the archetypal statement of this sentiment is contained, however, in a piece by Colonel D.A. Nicholson.

What preoccupies me is the suspicion that the higher-rated officers are the earnest, colourless young men whose chief virtue is technical diligence; who never express boisterous exuberance in the mess, whose manners and social conduct are impeccable; and who always accord their seniors the proper degree of reverence... It has always seemed to me that those people with the greatest lust for life are the ones likely to attempt, in defiance of all logic, to achieve the impossible goal. I only hope that their enthusiasm, gaiety, and sheer zest for living have
not... become squelched by the pervasive, bloodless "man in the green flannel suit" syndrome...
(Nicholson, 1973:55)

Evidence of the acceptance of this belief is not found solely in the professional writings of senior officers. A team of sociologists examining the process through which civilian recruits became infantry soldiers in the Canadian Army on the eve of war in Korea found that young soldiers had "extremely adhesive civilian backgrounds" which resisted the acceptance of military values. "Invariably", they observed, "recruits have not been disciplined to work habits... these young people in other words have a self-conception which is inappropriate for military life". If permitted to persist, they argue, "there is a danger that the new member's activities within the army will fail to contribute to its main objectives" (Hall, McKay, and Solomon, 1951:21).

Before the Great War, Socknat (1984) observes, there was substantial fear that the currency of liberal pacifist ideas had dramatically weakened the will of the people to accept the discipline demanded of professional soldiers. A principal of University College in Toronto warned prior to the mobilization that "the air is so full of pacifism that it is necessary to urge upon the country the duty of national defence" (in Socknat, 1984:30). In fact, Socknat argues, some believed that pacifism was "sweeping the country", and it appeared that "pacifism had been pretty generally accepted, in theory, at least, by the majority of thinking persons in Canada" (1984:30). It is notable that decades earlier, during the Boer War, many questioned the apparently harsh command of the Canadian Contingent by Lieutenant Colonel William Otter. After the return of the troops to Canada, Morton has found, "The unresolved issues remained... the problems of equipment, authority, and discipline. Were Canadians natural soldiers or did they need the austere discipline and the training that
William Otter had demanded?" (Morton, 1986:45).

The uncertainty over the military will of Canadians has, as we have seen, long roots. The solemn conclusion that Canadians are an 'unmilitary people' persists in the face of voluminous evidence to the contrary.

Britain

Prior to the First World War, Kellett has found, British officers "feared that what they regarded as the traditional military virtues were being eroded in the population by such factors as excessive individualism, inadequate discipline, and the rise of unpatriotic working-class politics" (Kellett, 1982:76). Field Marshal Wolseley is said to have claimed that "the high status accorded ballet dancers and singers in Britain demonstrated that the nation was sick" (Kellett, 1982:76). Graves, who served in the Royal Welch Fusiliers in the First World War, argued that the traditional spelling of "Welch" with a "c" was necessary in order to disassociate the regiment "from the modern North Wales of chapels, liberalism, the dairy and drapery business, state mines, and the tourist trade" (in Kellett, 1986:11), none of which enterprises evidenced the martial spirit thought to be needed in a population in order to foster an aggressive armed force.

Keegan, in his seminal The Face of Battle, pays particular attention to the battles of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme. Many soldiers, officers and other-ranks alike, attended religious services at the Somme. Keegan argues that Wellington's troops had in contrast a "stylish indifference" to piety, and likely acquired their spiritual solace in the bottle. The irreligiosity of Wellington's private soldiers was, Keegan finds, "part and parcel of an altogether rougher persona
than even the most hardened old-sweat regiments of 1914 could show" (Keegan, 1976:241-242).

Reflecting on the Crimean War, Sir William Butler claimed in 1911 that "strong men were easily obtained, and no soldiers equalled ours in strength, courage, and endurance. That day is gone... the standard has to be reduced; men are now taken who would have been rejected with scorn a few years ago... I believe that a serious war tomorrow would prove to our cost that the army is not of the old stamp" (in Kellett, 1982). The farther away is the actual field of battle, the fiercer, stronger, and more courageous do the victors become.

United States

The apprehension of decline in the spirit of the warrior among civil populations is predictably more direct and vociferous in the aftermath of Vietnam in the United States. Beaumont (1980) has attempted to define the range of significant shifts in American values potentially forcing the alteration of the traditional organization of the Army officer corps in the United States.

- a sexual revolution; growing tolerance, no, enthusiasm for vulgarity and bad manners; redefinition of several varieties of what was once seen as criminal behaviour; often uncertain criteria for upward mobility; increasing dependance on government intervention and selective taxation; Watergate, Koreagate and a plethora of smaller scandals; the erosion of standards in education; increasing crime; and pollution, politics-as-usual and massive profits wrung from a system under heavy pressure from foreign competition and a declining energy base - to cite a few.

(Beaumont, 1980:66)

The preoccupation with moral decadence is more pronounced, more emotional, and more consistent historically in the United States than has been the case in Canada and Britain.
Despite the successes of United Nations forces in Korea, for example, the performance of American troops in that conflict has been reviewed unfavorably. In examining the fate of one company of American troops in Korea, Fehrenbach concludes that "What happened to them might have happened to any American in the summer of 1950. For they represented exactly the kind of pampered, undisciplined, egalitarian army their society had long desired and at last achieved" (Fehrenbach, 1963:123). More pointedly, Fehrenbach contrasted the record of American and Turkish prisoners-of-war (P.O.W.) in a large Chinese camp near the Yalu River. Approximately 50% of the American P.O.W.'s died during their internment, while the Turks did not lose a single soldier. Dismissing issues of diet, the relative conditions and treatment fostered by the Chinese captors, and of military factors (the American rank hierarchy apparently dissolved upon capture), Fehrenbach concluded that the difference in the survival rates was ultimately a consequence of the moral weakness of American society. "The disciplines, attitudes, and organization that Americans brought into captivity", he contends, "killed many of them" (1963:541). The Turks, on the other hand, were perfectly prepared for war.

the Turkish soldier who served his country’s colors was still a fanatically devout custom-ridden peasant, close to the soil and survival, accustomed to the fiercest discipline all his life, from father, state, and army... there was no God but Allah. These matters he felt no need to prove or argue; he had imbibed them with his mother’s milk, and his mind had not been cluttered with other notions since.

(Fehrenbach, 1963:542)

Huntington, one of the principal theorists of the civilianization tradition, extended his critique of the ability of American society to produce good soldiers to the Korean context, and concluded in consonance with Fehrenbach that the private soldier serving in that theater was not sufficiently motivated by patriotic sentiment.
The aim of the soldier was simply to endure his nine months at the front and then get out. The war was a necessary evil, and he acquiesced and accepted it as such... for the first time in American history the common soldier fought a major war solely because he was ordered to fight it and not because he shared any identification with the political goals for which the war was being fought.

(in Uyecki, 1968:187)

While Huntington's identification of the Korean War as the "first time in American history" that American soldiers were motivated not primarily by patriotism may have been rhetorical, it is interesting to note the same moral problem has been identified as having started during earlier conflicts by many, including Huntington.

Prior to the work of both Janowitz and Moskos, Stein argued that American troops in the Second World War "regarded military service as an impersonal job, not a calling" (in Segal, 1986:368). Similarly, Huntington found that American military officers in the 'Twenties and 'Thirties saw the United States as "a country abandoning its moral anchor", swept by "insidious doctrines", "loose living", "sensuous publicity", "crime and rackets", "all resulting from carrying in an extreme the ideas of equality and democracy" (1957:310). This "hostility of liberal society" led the Army Chief of Staff to complain in 1927 that "the military spirit and its element of discipline have been neglected" (Huntington, 1957:309). Bullard saw in American soldiers of 1905 "a spirit rebellious and insubordinate to authority", a "deficient sense of the seriousness and the obligation of the enlistment oath", "intemperate criticism of superior authority", and selfishness and contempt. Bullard observed of turn-of-the-century America that "there have come to the people through the workings of politics, unions, and societies, great taste, feeling and conceit of personal power that has turned the head of everybody" (1905:105).
The American military penchant for self-evaluation has been the object of some attention. Segal has noted that evidence of concern on the part of commanders for the self-interested attitudes of American soldiers may be found as early as George Washington (Segal, 1986:389).

There is no pretense here to have surveyed a century of military writing. It is hoped, however, that the selected evidence demonstrates that the belief in moral weakness in social life has long been part of the world-view of the soldier, and that this sentiment can be found at the core of the assumptions upon which much military thinking, most notably the civilianization thesis, is built. Clausewitz, perhaps the most influential of the philosophers of war, saw his own 19th century Prussian society in the same dim light in which many see the modern West.

The mentality of the Germans seems to become more and more deplorable, one sees manifested everywhere such a lack of character, such a weakening of the spirit that it nearly brings tears to the eyes. I write this with infinite sadness; for there is no man in the world who values more than me the honour and dignity of his nation; but one cannot delude oneself about a phenomenon that no one could deny.

(in Aron, 1983:20)

2) Moral Anarchy in the Civil Milieu

The weakness of civil life is derived, according to the military discourse, not only from the decadence described in the previous section, but also from its state of anarchic moral relativism. The following passage from Huntington’s The Soldier and the State is perhaps the clearest statement of the schism believed to obtain between the moral climate of armed forces and that of the populations they manifestly exist to serve and protect.
being similar at 50% of men and 33% of women in favour of a draft (DND, 1986:93-95).

In 1973-74, the federal department of Manpower and Immigration\(^\text{10}\) examined the work ethics of a national sample of Canadians, attempting to assess the way individuals approach their work and its demands in terms of productivity, selectivity, and conscientiousness. When choosing the most important of the factors identified — friends, work, church, family, and union affiliation — 89% of respondents placed work in the first three, second only to family in frequency. Overall, when all the findings of the study were considered, the analysts concluded that Canadians in liberal democratic society are committed to work, not merely to collecting a wage, and obtain personal satisfaction from doing a meaningful job well. The definition of success at work was found to be not simply a function of material wealth, and the great majority of Canadians (97%) were found to prefer working to collecting unemployment insurance benefits (Burstein, et al., 1973:21-25).

The assumption that the enlistment motivation of young soldiers in the United States is firstly pecuniary has been questioned by Burk (1984) on the basis of an analysis of data from the National Longitudinal Youth Survey of 1980. Opportunities for pay or for valuable skills training are, as we have seen in this study, believed to be the most important factors informing enlistment decisions in the United States. Burk argues, however, that "the neglect of patriotic motivations in models of military manpower analysis is... unjustified" (Burk, 1984:229). Using a form of clustering technique with the data generated by the survey of young Americans already enlisted and those waiting to enlist, Burk found that normative motivations in general and a patriotic

\(^{10}\) Now "Employment and Immigration".
in Western values, it is argued, core military psychological factors are increasingly fostered among civilian populations.

Of particular note amid the litany of threatening societal trends is that of the changing role of women as wives: Moskos noted in 1977 the "burgeoning resistance of military wives... to participating in customary social functions" (1977:45) that once served to make an important contribution to the maintenance of military units, and reiterated the claim in 1986. He further reported in 1986 that there were now "fewer wives with either the time or the inclination to engage in the volunteer work that underlies much of the social life of military installations" (Moskos, 1986:381). In this argument and in others of its kind, no data are ever employed in a comparative or even cross-sectional manner in support of the assertion. Had this example regarding the propensity of wives to do volunteer work been examined rigorously, it is likely that the increased participation of women in the labor force might largely explain a decline in the time devoted to volunteer work by military spouses. The significance of this point is Moskos' assumption of a shared value-orientation; it is not necessary to prove something which is a common-sense truth within the context of the military discourse. The military and civilian defence community to whom the work of civilianization theory is largely directed share Moskos' beliefs with respect to the changing willingness of service spouses to support institutional practices in military organization, just as they share the fundamental assumptions of civilianization theory in the broadest sense.

As we have seen, sociologists of Canadian military organization see a similar range of the divisive and militarily destructive trends as that found in America to be operating in Canadian society as well. The willingness of Canadians to strike for material enrichment (Hauser, 1980), their tendency
to challenge the legitimacy of authority and to attack respected institutions (Broadbent, 1982), lack of self-discipline and deficient sense of responsibility (Canadian Infantry Association, 1980), unwillingness to risk their lives much less sacrifice themselves for abstractions (Loomis and Lightburn, 1980), and so on have been seen as increasing contemporary threats to Canada's military prowess.

The imagery of weakness employed in Canada differs in one notable way, however, from that found in American military sociology. Canadians are viewed as a contented and complacent group; they are satisfied with their wealth and long years of peace have inured them to the idea that others will do their fighting in NATO. The average Canadian, according to McLean, is fully preoccupied with "language differences, baby seals, and a host of similar pressing issues" (McLean, 1977:1) and cares little for defence, save to oppose measures to strengthen it.

**Public Attitudes and Defence Issues**

In evaluating the claim that the martial spirit has eroded among Canadians, the best available indicators of the attitudes of Canadians toward defence issues do not support this central assumption of civilianization theory. In the remainder of this section, evidence suggesting greater support for defence and non-materialistic work ethics among Canadians and Americans than is permitted by civilianization theory is briefly reviewed.

A recent study by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security argues that the attitudes of Canadians with respect to defence are commonly misunderstood. While most have consistently abhorred the prospect of modern nuclear warfare and have strongly opposed a nuclear role for Canada, support for conventional forces and the traditional
European focus of Canadian military policy is strong. According to their analysis, some 49% of Canadians believe that the current complement of Canadian Forces personnel in Europe should continue, while an additional 23% believe that the European commitment should not only continue but should actually increase in size (Munton, 1988:33). In more general terms, a large majority believe that the Canadian Forces should be increased in size (63%), with approximately one-third finding the current size acceptable. Just a small minority of 5% believe the Canadian Forces should be reduced in size (Munton, 1988:32)⁹.

A recent analysis of public opinion conducted for the Department of National Defence (DND, 1986) examined the willingness of Canadians to serve in the armed forces in the event of a national emergency. The methodology recognized that queries regarding willingness to join the military when Canadian territory was directly threatened would generate artificially high willingness results, as Canadians are more likely to be actually called upon to serve outside the country in support of an ally. Despite this, 53% of male respondents in the targeted 17-24 age group indicated some willingness to volunteer for service. Females in the same cohort were less positive, with 34% indicating some willingness. By region, overall willingness in the targeted age group varied from a high of 64% in the Maritimes to 11% in Ontario and the Prairies (DND, 1986:16,33). In addition, 48% of men and 32% of women in the target age cohort supported a system of compulsory military service, with support in the wider population (17-40 years).

⁹ While only a more sophisticated analysis than is possible here, based on data over an appropriate long-term period, would effectively adjudicate this debate, these findings contradict the assumption that variance has occurred solely in the direction of declining support for defence issues. Cross-sectional data is employed in this manner throughout this segment.
being similar at 50% of men and 33% of women in favour of a draft (UND, 1986:93-95).

In 1973-74, the federal department of Manpower and Immigration\textsuperscript{10} examined the work ethics of a national sample of Canadians, attempting to assess the way individuals approach their work and its demands in terms of productivity, selectivity, and conscientiousness. When choosing the most important of the factors identified - friends, work, church, family, and union affiliation - 89% of respondents placed work in the first three, second only to family in frequency. Overall, when all the findings of the study were considered, the analysts concluded that Canadians in liberal democratic society are committed to work, not merely to collecting a wage, and obtain personal satisfaction from doing a meaningful job well. The definition of success at work was found to be not simply a function of material wealth, and the great majority of Canadians (97%) were found to prefer working to collecting unemployment insurance benefits (Burstein, \textit{et al.}, 197\textperiodcentered.

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\textsuperscript{10} Now "Employment and Immigration".
motivation in particular were more important in the enlistment decision process than were factors of immediate and long-term economic gratification. While all the findings discussed in this regard have been drawn from survey data, we might reasonably expect that had transformations of such import as those believed by civilianization theorists to have eroded the national will actually occurred, some indication might be found through evidence drawn from these sources.

The central concern of civilianization theorists who evaluate the potential operational effectiveness of contemporary combat units is the moral quality of the troops. This preoccupation, as we have seen, is by no means a new one. When Allied units failed to accomplish objectives during operations in the First World War, an inquiry was often conducted. The blame for the failure was frequently placed upon the soldiers themselves, their NCO’s, and their junior officers. Their lack of courage, of moral fibre, of martial enthusiasm, was the official explanation for many fiascos (see Dixon, 1976). It is this same focus on the individual, and a concomitant avoidance of structural or systemic factors within military organization, which is employed by civilianization theorists. We have seen that this concern is found throughout modern history on the part of commanders, soldiers, and analysts alike. From the perspective of the garrison, young soldiers, civilians, and exogenous institutions are perceived as unbearably disordered and potentially unable to contribute to national defence. The most extreme form of the sentiments discussed in this section are found in the work of Gabriel and Savage (1978). They argued of Vietnam that

the record is absolutely clear on this point: the officer corps simply did not die in sufficient numbers or in the presence of their men often enough... the army had begun to develop and adopt a new ethical code rooted in the entrepreneurial model of the business corporation.

(Gabriel and Savage, 1978:16-17)
Conclusion

The unavoidably brutal reality of combat can neither be denied nor adequately portrayed here. It may be shown, however, that the imagery of moral strength in military history which in part informs the moral panic of civilianization theory ignores such ruthless truths, creating a sanguine standard of unreflective faith in the dictates of traditional institutional elements of military service for contemporary troops. The imagery of strength was discovered to take three forms. Military units in history are portrayed as being populated by the spiritually and physically strong; these units are seen to have operated with a remarkable degree of autonomy, allowing them to function according to the dictates of classic institutional principles; and civil society is viewed as having been united in support of the military in time of conflict. This vision of innocent moral dedication, against which contemporary soldiers and citizens are judged, is essentially romantic. Many Canadian soldiers, particularly those in the line, actively despised the aristocratic authority vested in their officers in both World Wars. They viewed them with great hatred and suspicion and killed them in a number of cases (see Harrison, 1928; Broadfoot, 1974), just as they were also rightly feared by the enemy for their atrocities, which included the execution of unarmed prisoners. The romantic representation of soldiers in the past should most appropriately be viewed as part of a moral panic, serving to demand the moral acquiescence of contemporary soldiers in a climate in which military personnel believe their institution to be increasingly anachronistic.

This chapter has further sought to demonstrate that the imagery of weakness in civil society found in civilianization theory is also a reflection of the moral panic which has persisted for generations among armed forces. The
imagery of weakness was found to take two forms. Firstly, the civil milieu is believed to have lost the characteristics necessary for the maintenance of the martial spirit. Secondly, civilian social life is concomitantly portrayed as morally anarchic, bereft of benchmarks of honour and service to the country. This enduring prediction that fundamental military values supporting the means of violence are on the brink of extinction, because they are despised by the surrounding and dominating civilian world, has served to foment the military moral panic.

Civilianization theory, this chapter has argued, is based on assumptions appropriately viewed as reflections of the belief-system of military organization. At the heart of these assumptions is a normative prescription; soldiers must love the service, mere obedience and fulfillment of contractual obligations is not sufficient. This demand that individual soldiers recognize and enthusiastically embrace the moral superiority of the military profession has emerged in consonance with the rise of bureaucratic discipline, the power of which rests heavily upon the loyalty of individual members and decreasingly upon the effects of coercive punishment. The soldier in the bureaucratic army on the fragmented and confusing modern battlefield must be trusted to fight independently, and so must be motivated by an internalized will, a spirit which is not fostered by the simple fear of punishment. Just as the paternalistic regimental system offers a "home" to soldiers and demands their loyalty as spiritual payment, so do civilianization theorists and bureaucratic commanders evoke a selective imagery of professionalism in exhorting the troops to link themselves inextricably with their units; in processual terms, these factors work toward the same end. It is in the context of the rise of democratic principles manifestly respecting life and the freedom of the individual that these material changes in the nature of warfare and of the
shape of military forces designed to prosecute it that the moral panic of civilianization developed. Subsequently, it has served to assist in the production of disciplined military populations by demanding that the soldier adopt the army as the central focus of his existence. In peacetime, the critical focus of the moral panic is on the group least capable of influencing the direction of the military, the same group paying the highest price as a consequence of their military service in both peace and war, the young soldiers.

To this point, this study has examined the historical validity of the civilianization model. In the following chapter, which concludes this study, the utility of the model in explaining contemporary transformations in civil-military relations is evaluated.
CHAPTER FOUR:
THE "HEARTS AND MINDS" OF SOLDIERS IN CANADA -
CIVILIANIZATION THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The critical focus of this study has hitherto been the historical validity of assumptions of civilianization theory. In this chapter, the usefulness of the model is examined in the contemporary context. As we have seen, evidence of the erosion of military institutions is often assumed to be self-evident, and there have been few attempts at specifying the nature and scope of the changes believed to have occurred. This study attempted to discover if empirical evidence could be found to support a key specific tenet of the model. The view that the contemporary primacy of remunerative and normative compliance strategies in the maintenance of military units has dissolved the traditional reliance on coercion\textsuperscript{11} in military discipline as a consequence of liberal expansions of civil rights in Canadian society was subjected to a range of tests. This study asks, in other words, if the military in Canada has lost its traditional methods of generating obedience, having adopted civilian techniques of monetary incentives and moral persuasion, has the experience of military authority by the soldier changed as a result in the direction that would be expected.

If truly fundamental change in the direction posited by civilianization theorists has occurred, then evidence must be found at the heart of that which has most served to distinguish the military institution from others. This central factor is disciplinary control. Military law and discipline define, in both a legislative or regulatory sense and in terms of concrete applications of mechanisms of control, the authority relations

\textsuperscript{11} This typology of organizational compliance strategies was originally developed by Etzioni, 1961.
between officers and other-ranks. It is around this most fundamental relationship that all other factors in the "military way" revolve, and it is here that it is most appropriate to look for evidence of a profound shift. Armies have been in a perpetual state of change in terms of physical appearance, armament, and tactical organization since the earliest known modern mass army took the field in what is now Italy during the 14th century. At the heart of all armies, however, is the control of the many by the few, and the examination of this factor is the true test of the belief that a fundamental change has occurred in civil-military relations in Canada.

Two research strategies using quantitative techniques were employed. Firstly, a re-analysis of data gathered by Cotton (1979) in his examination of the attitudes of military personnel toward military service was conducted. Findings based primarily upon factor analysis tests of attitudinal data gathered in that study indicate that a normative component operates in the generation of order among contemporary soldiers. Secondly, a set of hypotheses apprehending decline in traditional military coercive disciplinary control mechanisms were tested using longitudinal empirical data. These hypotheses, based upon the civilianization model, were not supported by the findings. Overall, the chapter concludes that contemporary military compliance is generated by normative moral demands, combined with reliance on coercive strategies. When soldiers fail to accept the behavioral dictates of the "calling" of military professionalism, they experience the traditional sharp-end of military discipline to a degree which has not only not declined, but has in important respects significantly increased in recent years.
Section 1: The Military Ethos Scale (MES) and Moral Professionalism

C.A. Cotton's empirical test of Charles Moskos' Institution/Occupation model of commitment to duty by military personnel in Canada (Cotton:1980,1979) has been very influential in military sociology, and is widely known within the Canadian military. In addition, his work has lately attracted media attention and has focused criticism on the moral quality of Canadian soldiers. Based in large measure on the statistical findings generated through the use of the MES, he concluded in consonance with civilianization theory that in the peacetime army in Canada "the majority are reluctant soldiers" who prefer "the greener pastures of static settings where they can work at their trade" (Cotton, 1979:10) to the all-encompassing demands of the operational combat role environments. In this study, a critical appraisal of the statistical construction of the MES through the use of factor analysis techniques was conducted with Cotton's original dataset. The findings discussed in this section indicate both that there is limited evidence to support Cotton's broad condemnation of the commitment of Canadian soldiers, and that the military extracts strong adherence to the classic military professional ethos of unlimited liability to duty.

The goal of identifying significant factors in the psychological motivation of soldiers, so as to utilize that motivation to achieve desired ends, has preoccupied many since the First World War. With the recent work of Moskos and subsequently others, notably Cotton, analysts have sought to generate empirical models classifying the constituent elements of human motivation in war. The value of this type of research has been its avoidance of what Kellett calls the "operationally tempting" tendency to "identify a single source of motivation - God, Queen and country, the Party, the regiment, the group, comrades, or whatever" which poorly reflects the complexity of
human motivation in the experience of war (Kellett, 1986:13). The problem of employing empirical techniques on this level, and of survey data in particular, however, is the difficulty of creating measurement tools that can be used with confidence. Many, of course, argue strongly that human social and psychological factors cannot be "captured" and meaningfully reduced to equations. The debate over the broader validity of such measures aside, techniques exist for evaluating certain types of statistical fitness in this area. One of these techniques, factor analysis, was used in this study in examining the validity of the construction of the MES. In addition to the implicit critique of Cotton's conclusions, factor analysis permits a more accurate representation of the attitudes of military personnel toward their service.

The impact of Cotton's work and of civilianization theory in general has been, as we have seen, considerable. Articles on military professionalism and leadership ordinarily deplore the erosion of classic dedication to service and its replacement by the self-interested individualism of modern society, as was discussed earlier in this study. Cotton's MES was recently used, for example, in an analysis of the values of officer cadets at the military college in Saint-Jean (Maillet, 1988). The extent to which Cotton's MES has influenced the military at all levels is little appreciated. At the Combat Training Centre at CFB Gagetown a common topic among junior officers in infantry phase training participating in discussions on leadership is the difficulty of leading troops more interested in being paid than doing their duty. More pointedly, during one session in the summer of 1987 several spoke ominously about a report (which they themselves had not seen) proving that "more than half" of Canadian combat soldiers have said they would not go to war if called upon to do so. Cotton's conclusions reinforced strongly held military beliefs about the historical decline in the military commitment of
Canadians.

The results of this diagnostic factor analysis test are presented in this section in the following manner. Firstly, salient details related to the conduct of Cotton's original data collection are briefly reviewed, and the process used in preparing the original data set for the tests completed in this study are briefly described. The main body of the section is devoted to the factor analysis findings. It is concluded on the basis of these tests that the selection of attitudinal variables in the construction of the MES generated an inappropriately dark appraisal of the way in which army personnel in Canada view their military service. When examined through factor analytic techniques, a very different assessment of the attitudes of the respondents emerges from the data, one chiefly characterized by broad respect for the principles of moral professionalism that the armed forces expects military personnel to observe.

Cotton's Original Data Collection (1978-1979)

A 68-item survey was administered at selected major bases across Canada to army personnel of all ranks and trades or classifications. The questionnaire initially addressed basic socio-demographic variables such as educational attainment, age, marital status, primary language, and so on as well as such variables specific to military life as rank, years of service, specialized training completed, and type of current employment. The remaining body of the survey was devoted to attitudinal items about military service, asking the respondents to indicate their degree of support for a variety of military customs and traditions which demand greater involvement of military members than do civilian occupations of their employees. Most of these were measured with 5-point Likert scales. This portion of the survey included an existing
military are their own business, while a full 90.5% (n=48) of senior combat officers insist that it should not be? Or, further, that 73.7% (n=183) of junior other-rank support personnel think that badges of rank should not have lawful authority after working hours, and 74.5% (n=32) of senior support officers believe that they should? In the case of five of the six variables, young soldiers uniformly expressed dissatisfaction for military practices concretely affecting their lives, while their superiors and officers strongly supported them. The data show, in other words, that the people most accountable to the dictates of military traditionalism are least enamoured of them. There was no such split in the responses to the remaining variable, however. Only a minority of personnel in every rank and trade group set their own interests in the broadest sense ahead of the operational requirements of the armed forces. This was also the case across other variables in the set; a majority of personnel in every rank and trade group expressed loyalty to the military and supported the belief that the military can never be just a job. A total of 66.2% (n=225) and 71.2% (n=242) respectively of junior other-rank combat troops responded in a positive manner to these issues, for example. Cotton’s finding that attitudinal barriers obtain across rank and trade sectors is true within particular variables, while others indicate relatively broader consensus along important dimensions. As we will see later in this section, these results are indicators of an important distinction which has to be drawn in evaluating the attitudes of soldiers as they are measured by this data. Factor analysis was selected as the appropriate technique to address both general problems found to be connected with the construction of the MES.

Factor Analysis Findings

Factor analysis is a statistical technique used to
consequences of war and his participation in it; this is particularly so in the absence of comparative data with which to make sense of the findings.

The second main pillar of Cotton's findings was the Military Ethos Scale (MES). A group of fourteen questions in the survey asked the respondents to indicate their reaction to statements regarding a range of service issues. The statements are listed in Table 1. Cotton selected six of the fourteen variables and combined them in constructing the MES, which he believed measured "individuals fundamental beliefs about appropriate norms for participants in military organizations" (Cotton, 1979:60). A review of the actual patterns of the responses revealed two problems with this strategy; the first concerns the logic underlying the selection of theoretically pertinent variables and the rejection of others, and the second is the ascription of an equal weighting to each of the variables selected to comprise the scale measure.

The six variables Cotton selected measured attitudes toward postings, conflicts between duty and family, the primacy of military operational demands over the interests of individual members, control over off-duty hours, differences in rank after working hours, and the role of superiors in private life. While the rationale of the process used to exclude the remaining variables has not been provided, Cotton asserted that the first three variables listed above each measured an element of the "primacy" of military duty over all other demands, while the remaining three addressed acceptance of the traditional 24-hour "scope" of military service. This particular set of assumptions with respect to the underlying measures captured among the variables will be examined later. Of initial interest were the rejected variables.

13 Variables 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 in Table 1.
of these revisions to the sample population used in the data set for analysis, the tests conducted by Cotton were replicated with the smaller sample. No significant differences were found in the results. It should be noted that the data have been stored for a lengthy period, and it is impossible to verify that no deterioration has occurred. Also, a more sophisticated data analysis software package (SPSSX) is employed in this study than was available to Cotton when the original research was completed.

The Military Ethos Scale in Retrospect

The initial impetus for this analysis emerged from a review of the main findings upon which Cotton based his conclusions. Firstly, of course, was his discovery that 18% of junior combat other-ranks personnel would try to avoid going to war, or would refuse to go if ordered at some time in the future. From an initial research point of view, it is unlikely that an issue with implications so potentially horrific can be meaningfully addressed without great difficulty through the use of any technique, and a survey is likely among the least effective measurement techniques that might be employed. Without any consideration of the context under which such a decision would be made, including almost certainly the invasion of Western Europe and tremendous pressures from a number of powerful sources to serve, it is difficult to have confidence in this finding. Even assuming that the survey had elicited a meaningful measure of the soldiers' inclination to go to war, it is impossible to determine if the fact that fewer than one in five young combat soldiers expressed some degree of unwillingness is cause for alarm. This is the most vulnerable of all military rank and trade groups, and they are experienced enough to anticipate what will wait for them and their obsolete equipment on the modern battlefield. It is not reasonable to assume that a young soldier should ignore or be unaware of the
consequences of war and his participation in it; this is particularly so in the absence of comparative data with which to make sense of the findings.

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\[13\] Variables 1,2,5,6,7, and 8 in Table 1.
TABLE 1
ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES IN THE COTTON SURVEY

*1. "No one should be compelled to take a posting he or she does not want"
*2. "What a member of the Forces does in his or her off-duty hours is none of the military's business"
3. "Putting people on charge is a thing of the past"
4. "Military commanders and supervisors should only have operational control over their personnel, with specialists on base having administrative control"
*5. "Military personnel should perform their operational duties regardless of the personal and family consequences"
*6. "Differences in rank should not be important after working hours"
*7. "What a member does in his private life should be no concern of his supervisor or commander"
*8. "Personal interests and wishes must take second place to operational requirements for military personnel"
9. "The Forces should encourage military personnel to live on a base rather than in civilian accommodation"
10. "Military service is a way of life and can never be just a job"
11. "I feel very little loyalty to the Forces"
12. "I could just as well be working for a different organization as long as the type of work was similar"
13. "It would take little change in my present circumstances to cause me to leave the Forces"
14. "Often, I find it difficult to agree with Forces' policies on important matters relating to its members"

* - included in the original MES.

One of the variables not included in the MES, item 10 in Table 1, asked respondents to respond to the following statement: "Military service is a way of life and can never be just a job". The sentiment manifestly measured by this variable goes to the heart of the civilianization debate, and appears to be among the only items to do so directly. Its exclusion, and thus its theoretical irrelevancy, is all the more problematic when the distribution of the responses are considered (see Table 2). Of the overall sample, only a minority of 15% (n=201) disagreed with the view that military service is a way of life, and is thus fundamentally distinct from the civilian
TABLE 2

RESPONSE FREQUENCY OF ATTITUDINAL ITEM 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>1313</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

environment. A similar result was found in the responses to item 11, in which just 15% (n=190) agreed that they felt little loyalty to the military. It became apparent that several of the excluded variables tested issues of theoretical relevance to the civilianization debate, and that the responses to some of these excluded items evidenced a clear pattern contrary to the pessimistic findings identified by the MES.

In the original construction of the MES, the six selected variables were each coded so that a high score meant high support for traditional vocationalism, and the reverse. The responses thus ranged from a minimum score of 1 to a maximum score of 5 within each variable. The equation assigning each respondent an MES score summed the six variable scores, creating a scale variable with values ranging from 6 to 30. The MES assumes, as a result, that each of the constituent variables are equally important in contributing to the overall measure; that the degree to which a service member believes symbols of rank should matter when he is not at work is as significant as the extent to which he believes his life should be secondary to the operational demands of his unit. The problem with this assumption becomes more apparent when the actual distributions are examined in detail. Is it relevant, for example, that 70.9% (n=241) of junior other-rank combat soldiers stubbornly insist that their private lives outside the
military are their own business, while a full 90.5% (n=48) of senior combat officers insist that it should not be? Or, further, that 73.7% (n=183) of junior other-rank support personnel think that badges of rank should not have lawful authority after working hours, and 74.5% (n=32) of senior support officers believe that they should? In the case of five of the six variables, young soldiers uniformly expressed dissatisfaction for military practices concretely affecting their lives, while their superiors and officers strongly supported them. The data show, in other words, that the people most accountable to the dictates of military traditionalism are least enamoured of them. There was no such split in the responses to the remaining variable, however. Only a minority of personnel in every rank and trade group set their own interests in the broadest sense ahead of the operational requirements of the armed forces. This was also the case across other variables in the set; a majority of personnel in every rank and trade group expressed loyalty to the military and supported the belief that the military can never be just a job. A total of 66.2% (n=225) and 71.2% (n=242) respectively of junior other-rank combat troops responded in a positive manner to these issues, for example. Cotton's finding that attitudinal barriers obtain across rank and trade sectors is true within particular variables, while others indicate relatively broader consensus along important dimensions. As we will see later in this section, these results are indicators of an important distinction which has to be drawn in evaluating the attitudes of soldiers as they are measured by this data. Factor analysis was selected as the appropriate technique to address both general problems found to be connected with the construction of the MES.

**Factor Analysis Findings**

Factor analysis is a statistical technique used to
identify underlying sets of relationships among variables. In many instances, a complex phenomenon cannot be measured adequately with a single item; factor analysis permits the identification of groups of disparate variables which independently measure constituent elements of the same phenomenon. In this analysis, the technique was employed in discovering both the appropriate grouping of the variables into broader measures and the relative contribution of each variable to the resulting scale measures.

In the initial output of the test results, there was high communality among all items, with the exception of item 9 regarding military and civilian housing (at .17) which was dropped from the remainder of the test as a result. The factor analysis procedure identified three core factors among the remaining 13 items, explaining 52.4% of the variance. The rotated factor matrix is shown in Table 3, with the core factors found to be contained within the data grouped together. Variables loading together highly may be considered to be measures of constituent elements of a single broader factor.

Three factors were revealed by the principal components analysis output, indicating that three attitudes toward distinct phenomena were captured by the thirteen attitudinal items. Upon examination, an immanent logic to the actual factor loading is identifiable and is discussed in the following paragraphs.

Factor 1

The variables loading significantly on the first factor were 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7. Each of these specific items refers to a concrete aspect of military life. All involve issues with which most if not all respondents will have had actual experience; unwanted postings, the intrusion of military norms and authority into non-working hours, awareness of or
### TABLE 3

**ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF ATTITUINAL ITEMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Unwanted postings</td>
<td>* .615 *</td>
<td>.207</td>
<td>.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Control of off-duty hours</td>
<td>* .745 *</td>
<td>.136</td>
<td>.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Military charges anachronistic</td>
<td>* .639 *</td>
<td>* - .007</td>
<td>.193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Diffuse authority of superiors</td>
<td>* .668 *</td>
<td>.169</td>
<td>.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Duty before family</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>* .763 *</td>
<td>.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Rank after work</td>
<td>* .778 *</td>
<td>.116</td>
<td>.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Superiors in private life</td>
<td>* .785 *</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Primacy of the combat role</td>
<td>.182</td>
<td>* .751 *</td>
<td>-.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Military is a way of life</td>
<td>.226</td>
<td>* .520 *</td>
<td>.216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Loyalty to the military</td>
<td>.216</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>* .670 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Forces work same as other jobs</td>
<td>.219</td>
<td>.227</td>
<td>* .515 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Likelihood leave the Forces</td>
<td>.193</td>
<td>.211</td>
<td>* .704 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Reject Forces policies</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>-.102</td>
<td>* .696 *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participation in a military trial, the endurance of the wide-ranging powers of superiors in both life and career, and the prolonged loss of control over off-duty time are all universal military experiences. These six items independently measure aspects of the wider issue of the conflict between military role obligations and individual autonomy. More specifically, this factor is a measure of how individual service members feel about the effect military demands have had on their own rights and autonomy along common experiential dimensions. This factor
will be referred to as the "military life satisfaction scale". Individuals scoring highly on this factor view their military life experiences positively, while those with a low score express dissatisfaction with the extent to which military service has demanded more than is ordinarily expected by an employer.

**Factor 2**

The second factor extracted by the test comprised variables 5, 8, and 10. Each of these items refers to a broad moral prescription for the military profession as a whole. The respondents were asked by these items to identify their support for traditional professional norms of sacrifice and unlimited liability to duty; of service as distinct from mere work, and performance of duty as an absolute necessity regardless of the needs or wants of individuals or their families. This factor measures the attitude of personnel toward the classic principles of military vocational professionalism, which as we have seen demand that individuals accept that the execution of orders, regardless of their cost, is an absolute moral imperative. This factor will be referred to as the "moral professionalism scale". Individuals scoring highly on this factor indicate relative support for the view that the classic model of professionalism is appropriate for members of the contemporary Canadian Forces.

**Factor 3**

The third core factor comprises items 11 through 14. All four of these variables measured an aspect of loyalty to service, of normative commitment to the military. The four items were in fact taken by Cotton from a standardised organizational commitment scale and their emergence as a clearly identifiable factor lends substantial confidence to this analysis. Henceforth, this factor will be referred to as the "military commitment scale". Personnel scoring highly on
this factor express loyalty for the armed forces, an unwillingness to leave military service, and support for military personnel policies.

These results indicate that in addition to the pre-established military commitment scale, there are empirically identifiable and intuitively agreeable discrete measures contained within the attitudinal data Cotton has used to construct the MES. In sum, rather than singularly measuring the degree to which service members respect the classic notion of unlimited liability to duty in terms of its primacy and scope, Cotton has measured the respondents feelings about the demands and sacrifices military service has required of them, their belief regarding the value of an abstract professional moral ideal of traditional sacrifice for the military as a whole, and the extent of their commitment to the military. What the data show, in other words, is both what members attitudes toward the professional values of which the military traditionally demands observance, and also what they think about how those very values have affected their own lives. While in terms of simplicity and clarity this is a less satisfying appraisal of the data than that generated by combining the variables unsystematically, it is a more valid representation of the responses.

To this point, it has been shown that the construction of the MES did not reflect the latent attitudes measured by the survey. In the following segment, the consequences of the use of the MES in understanding the attitudes of military personnel toward their service is critically compared with that gained from the scale constructions identified through factor analysis.
The MES and the Moral Quality of Soldiers

Each of the three scales resulting from the factor analysis was constructed so that the constituent items were weighted and combined according to the respective contribution of each variable to each scale identified by the factor analysis test. For comparative purposes, a multiplier was generated for each scale so that the response scores in each would range from a minimum of 6 to a maximum of 30, as is the case with the MES. When the data are examined in this way, a very different portrait of the attitudes of army personnel than that derived by Cotton emerges. Two main conclusions may be drawn from this comparison of the scale distributions. Firstly, the MES significantly exaggerates the dissatisfaction respondents expressed for their military service. Secondly, the MES significantly under-represents the extent to which personnel support classic norms of vocationalism and commitment to duty.

The MES is used, as we have seen, as a tool to measure the quality of the moral linkage extant between individual soldiers and the military. Factor analysis has shown that the MES combines distinct attitudinal measures; military life satisfaction and support for traditional principles of professionalism. A third attitudinal variable, commitment, was also measured in the original survey. This segment examines the propriety of the use of the MES in measuring and understanding the overall attitude of soldiers toward their military service, by comparing the conclusions it indicates with those drawn from the scales measuring more specific attitudinal dimensions. In other words, this analysis asks, when we consider these more precise measures of satisfaction with the exigencies of military life, support for traditional professionalism, and intensity of commitment to the armed forces, do we reach a different conclusion with respect to the moral quality of
### Table 4
**Summary of Scale Distributions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Ethos (MES)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>5.57</td>
<td>1305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Life Satisfaction</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>1305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Professionalism</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>1309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Commitment</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>1307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Canadian soldiers than when we rely on the more ambiguous MES measure. When the construction of the scales was completed using the variable weights illustrated earlier and the appropriate multipliers, the distributions of the comparable scale ranges described in Table 4 were found.

The mean score of all respondents on the MES within the scale range minimum of 6 and maximum of 30 was 17.6. On the broadest level, the magnitude of the score within each scale indicates the direction of the respondents' attitude toward the military; the higher the score, the more positive the attitude. The mean MES score of 17.6 was significantly lower than all three of the more specific attitudinal measures, with the mean military life satisfaction scale score at 18.4 (t=3.625, p<.01), the mean moral professionalism scale score at 20.4 (t=12.667, p<.01), and the mean military commitment scale score at 19.4 (t=8.647, p<.01).

The finding that the MES on the broadest level suggests a larger concentration of negative attitudes toward the military than is found in any of the more precise scales is reflected in the actual proportional distribution of the scores. Each of the items contained in the scales had 5-point response categories, the third point of which in every case offered a neutral response. The mid-point of all the scales, at
18, is a neutral benchmark. Scores falling below the mid-point indicate a relatively negative attitude toward military service, while those above it concomitantly indicate a relatively positive attitude. A slight majority of the respondents, 50.4% (n=658), scored below the mid-point on the MES, suggesting a broad rejection of classic military values. Within each of the more specific scales, however, a significantly lower proportional minority scored below the mid-point. On the military life satisfaction scale, 45.7% (n=596) were found to express a relatively negative attitude toward their experience of classic military authority. One in three personnel, 33.8% (n=442) conveyed a relatively negative view of traditional principles of sacrifice. In terms of the intensity of their commitment to military service, 34.3% (n=448) indicated an orientation at odds with the vocationalism traditionally expected of soldiers. The use of the more ambiguous MES significantly exaggerates the proportional currency of negative attitudes toward military service along all three of the attitudinal dimensions revealed by the factor analysis tests\textsuperscript{14}.

In examining the relative utility of the scale measures in greater detail, each was grouped into low, medium, and high categories by dividing the possible range of scale scores into equal thirds. Scores between 6 and 13.32 were treated as low, between 13.33 and 21.66 as medium, and those from 21.67 to 30 as high\textsuperscript{15}. When this is calculated, as is illustrated in Table 5, a clear pattern is revealed.

\textsuperscript{14} Military life satisfaction scale - Z=2.403, p<.01  
Moral professionalism scale - Z=8.595, p<.001  
Military commitment scale - Z=8.327, p<.001

\textsuperscript{15} This method of categorizing the responses was selected over the use of the median and standard deviation within each scale, as that more common technique does not allow cross-scale comparison on a proportional level.
TABLE 5

TRICHTOMIZED ATTITUDINAL SCALE DISTRIBUTIONS (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Med</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>n=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Ethos (MES)</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Life Satisfaction</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Professionalism</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Commitment</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The proportional distribution of the trichotomized MES scores is significantly different from that found across the other scale measures. In portraying the concentration of personnel with a highly positive moral connection with the armed forces, the MES underestimates the proportion of the respondents scoring highly on the more precise attitudinal measures. While 27% score highly on the MES, 35.6% did so on the military life satisfaction scale, a full 42.3% were highly supportive of traditional professionalism, and 36.1% expressed a high intensity of commitment to the armed forces. In each case, the proportion scoring highly on the MES was significantly lower at the .001 level\(^\text{16}\).

At the lower third of the scales, reflecting the least support for traditionalism, the largest proportion of personnel clustered in a low category was in the MES at 25.9%. Significantly fewer personnel were found at this level in the moral professionalism and commitment scales at 12.3% and 12.9% respectively\(^\text{17}\). Proportionately fewer were also found at the lowest level of the military life satisfaction scale, at 25.1%, but this difference was not statistically significant.

\(^{16}\) \(Z=4.737\), \(Z=8.219\), \(Z=5.004\); \(p<.001\) respectively.

\(^{17}\) \(Z=8.846\), \(p<.001\); \(Z=8.402\), \(p<.001\).
These findings demonstrate that the selection of items for inclusion in the MES served to misrepresent the attitudes of military personnel in its attempted evaluation of the moral quality of members of the armed forces. Soldiers are more satisfied with their lot, are more highly supportive of traditional professional principles of sacrifice to duty for the Canadian Forces, and are more committed to their service than is indicated by the MES. Its ambiguity obscures the attitudes of respondents, combining measures of distinct factors in an unsystematic way and generating an inappropriately bleak assessment of the moral quality of soldiers.

Based on the analysis outlined in this section, it is concluded that Cotton's original findings did not adequately represent the attitudes of Mobile Command personnel. The original MES construction excluded items of theoretical relevance to the civilianization debate. The conclusion that the majority of Mobile Command personnel in peacetime are "reluctant soldiers" is not supported when attitudinal measures with more precision than the MES are considered. When viewed in the light of factor analysis tests, Cotton's data more appropriately should be seen to demonstrate that the army in Canada believes in the importance of a traditional ethos of sacrifice; of unlimited liability to duty regardless of the consequences. Despite this, however, many have significant reservations about the actual costs of a sacrificial ethos in terms of individual autonomy which they have paid during their own peacetime service. In sum, Mobile Command personnel support the maintenance of a traditional military ethos for the army in Canada, but a substantial minority view the demands made upon them as a consequence of this very ethos as having been great.

In sum, soldiers stand firmly by the ethos that separates them from civilian life, but many are dissatisfied
with the extent that military demands have reduced their control of their own lives. The implications of this finding are unclear; is it enough that soldiers believe that traditional organizational norms are necessary, or must they also find spiritual fulfillment in their actual observance? A healthy disregard for aristocratic authority and a relatively utilitarian approach to the relations between officers and other-ranks has been characteristic of Canadian soldiers historically (see Eayrs, 1964; Harrison, 1928), notably during periods for which their performance under fire is now much admired. That the ethos of sacrifice, and indeed military service in general, be viewed as important and necessary but not necessarily worthy of admiration and unreflective faith should thus not be a source of surprise. It is unrealistic to expect that institutionally elevated norms connected to the honour and dedication of vocational military service will extinguish utterly the revulsion of many soldiers for their potential participation in war, or eradicate the desire of individual members to foster the well-being of themselves and their families. The data reveals, and this is most important for the overall study, that soldiers accept the principles that they are expected to observe. The depth and breadth of the support for the traditional ethic of military moral professionalism among soldiers suggests that the military not only relies upon normative compliance strategies in maintaining disciplined units, but is successful in doing so.

In the following section, which concludes this chapter, the results of a range of tests with respect to the contemporary role of traditional military means of discipline and punishment are discussed.
Section 2: 
Martial Disciplinary Mechanisms of Control 
And the Expectation of Decline

The discussion of civilianization theory to this point in the study has referred of necessity to the relatively abstract level. A wide variety of specific outcomes, however, are believed to have occurred as a consequence of the broader shifts identified by civilianization theorists. This section evaluates the effect that civilianization is thought to have had in one these most important outcomes, that seem to have impacted on military discipline. The following passage from the work of James B. Jacobs\textsuperscript{18} extends the civilianization model into change in this specific institutional context.

Since World War II, military criminal law has imparted many, if not most, of the rights and protections offered to criminal defendants in civilian courts. There has been a steady momentum toward greater and greater due process and toward a contractual model of military service. All this demonstrates that contemporary military institutions are deeply embedded in a national legal culture, despite ever-present concerns about discipline and command and control.

(Jacobs, 1986:2)

In the attempt to examine this belief in military institutional decline in a systematic way, hypotheses based upon the general civilianization model and its more direct applications by Jacobs and others with respect to military legal change were constructed. Tests were conducted using data from courts-martial, summary trials, periods of military and civil custody accumulated by military personnel, and appeals to the Courts Martial Appeal Court and the Supreme Court of Canada in the post-Korean War period. Discipline is the central

\textsuperscript{18} While Jacobs ordinarily examines the American military experience, in this segment he argues within the context of the broader civilianization debate. As he captures the relevant central issues, his work is employed for illustrative purposes.
institutional element which has distinguished membership in the military order from that of broader civil life, and it is to this factor that it is most appropriate to look for evidence of fundamental change.

If, as civilianization theorists believe, the disciplinary core of Canadian military organization has eroded in the face of liberal influences from civil institutions, then the following will be true:

1) the incidence of the usage of martial mechanisms in the control of military personnel is declining, while the role of civil courts in the control of military personnel has been enhanced;

2) the rate at which martial mechanisms are employed in disciplining members of the armed forces is increasingly diffused across service trades and ranks, as administrative "policing" has eroded the traditional focus of military justice on the control of other-rank ground combat troops; and

3) the growing power of civilian legal checks and balances over the decisions of military courts and the expanding awareness of military personnel of their civil rights has decreased the authority of military courts, reflected by declining conviction rates in military trials, increasing willingness to appeal a military decision, and the escalating success of these appeals.

These three hypotheses refer, respectively, to the incidence of the usage of martial mechanisms, the dispersion of the incidence of these mechanisms, and to the role of external civil factors in mitigating their effects. Empirical data were gathered from a range of sources in testing these three hypotheses, and are presented consecutively in the following pages. Overall, the resulting findings do not support the explanation provided by the civilianization model. That approach does not appropriately explain the direction of change identified by the data, which suggest that shifts in the disciplinary core of the military institution in Canada have
occurred since the Korean War in the context of internal institutional turbulence rather than external influence, and that recent years have seen a significant strengthening of traditional martial mechanisms of control. Details of the data collection are provided in notes to each table. The analysis was limited to the post-Korean war period as valid comparative peacetime data prior to that period could not be located.

Hypothesis 1:
The Incidence of Martial Mechanisms of Control, 1957-1986

Martial mechanisms refer, for the purposes of this study, to the formal legal devices available to military commanders in disciplining troops. These traditional devices consist of the court-martial and summary trial. A range of powers and sanctions operate below the level of the formal trial which will not be considered here. While the incidence of informal sanctions cannot be examined rigorously over time, there are close links between the formal and informal levels. In ordinary circumstances, formal disciplinary means are utilized only after a regular pattern of informal mechanisms have been applied unsuccessfully. The frequency of formal means is thus an indicator of the overall incidence of disciplinary mechanisms. Empirical data with respect to formal martial mechanisms were gathered to test the hypothesis that the penetration of civilian legal influences has reduced their frequency in the disciplining of Canadian military personnel, to the extent that remuneration has replaced coercion in extracting compliance to orders on the part of soldiers.

It is necessary to discuss two related points before considering the findings. Firstly, the penetration of civilian legal norms is believed by civilianization theorists to have depressed the incidence of traditional disciplinary devices by both narrowing the range of criminal actions which may be tried
in a military court, and by diminishing the confidence of commanders in their ability to resort to such devices. Secondly, the incidence of military trials over time is as a result used in this study as a measure of the willingness of commanders to apply traditional devices, not as a reflection of the quantity of criminal activity extant among military personnel. Military crime is socially constructed; the Code of Service Discipline contains sections defining all unlawful activity, and its ambiguity is legendary. Section 119(1), for example, states:

Any act, conduct, disorder or neglect to the prejudice of good order and discipline is an offence and every person convicted thereof is liable to dismissal with disgrace from Her Majesty's Service or to less punishment.

"Less punishment" includes imprisonment for two years less a day and a fine of three months pay. This section establishes in law the ability of the commander to identify and punish under all circumstances any behaviour which in his judgement threatens the integrity of a unit. Any act may be so designated, depending upon its context. As anyone who has experienced basic military training knows, the most minute aspects of behaviour, appearance, demeanour, and performance become the subject of intense scrutiny and frequent sanction. The rate at which such devices are employed is thus a reflection of the conviction of commanders; of both their confidence in their authority and their desire to affirm traditional values, rather than of the concrete occurrence of military crime. This distinction will be significant throughout this section, as it might be argued that changes in the incidence of formal disciplinary mechanisms reflect the quantity of criminal activity occurring in the military and may be evidence, in consonance with civilianization theory, of unrest, dissatisfaction, and decreasing commitment to the military on the part of individual service members. In addition
to the "constructed" nature of military crime, however, in considering this potential criticism, is the fact that active rejection of military traditionalism through criminal activity would not be likely from the kind of personnel whom civilianization theorists believe now populate the military. People who serve in uniform because of the monetary advantages it accrues, who lack "the spirit of the warrior", may not reasonably be expected to resort to crime in expressing dissatisfaction with their careers.

Courts-Martial

The court-martial is, in an historical sense, the classic ultimate disciplinary device vested in military organizations. It is the most powerful of the legal mechanisms employed by commanders. There are several types of court-martial in Canada, which vary by the relative severity of the offence and the maximum punishment available. The frequency of these trials has declined in the post-Korean War period, argue theorists accepting the assumptions of the civilianization model, including the military historian Brereton Greenhous19.

In testing the validity of this belief, data were collected from the records of the Judge Advocate General's (JAG) office of the Canadian Forces for the thirty-year period from 1957 to 1986. In that period, as is shown in Table 6, the incidence of courts-martial increased both absolutely and relatively when the total military population is held constant.

The total enrollment of the Canadian Forces has been in decline since the Korean War. At the same time, the number of courts-martial held annually has increased substantially,

19 This point was made in a personal interview with Dr. Greenhous.
TABLE 6

COURTS-MARTIAL BY YEAR, BY TOTAL CANADIAN FORCES POPULATION, AND PER 1000 PERSONNEL - 1957 TO 1986\textsuperscript{20}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Courts-Martial</th>
<th>C.F. Population</th>
<th>Courts-Martial Per 1000 Pers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>86,171</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>83,786</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>83,508</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>81,577</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>82,091</td>
<td>1.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>81,747</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>80,269</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>79,950</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>80,545</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>80,546</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>79,655</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>79,535</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>79,811</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>82,015</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>82,874</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>89,563</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>93,353</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>98,340</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>101,676</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>105,721</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>107,467</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>114,164</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>120,781</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>123,694</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>126,474</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>120,055</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>119,597</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>120,412</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>119,038</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>117,092</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

from 54 in 1957 to 124 in 1986. It is of course most appropriate to consider this variable in terms of population, and when the annual frequency is expressed per 1000 personnel, we see that the rate at which military personnel were tried by court-martial quadrupled between the late 1950's and early

\textsuperscript{20} Courts-Martial data were provided by the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Canadian Forces. Military enrollment figures were supplied by the Directorate of Personnel Information Statistics (DPIS) of DND (see Flemming, 1989).
Figure 1: Courts-Martial per 1000 C.F. Personnel - 1957 to 1986

1980's from approximately .45 trials per 1000 personnel to approximately 1.9 trials respectively (see Table 6).

The trend indicated when population is controlled is shown in Table 6 and expressed graphically in Figure 1. An ordinary least-squares regression equation was calculated in confirming the long-term trend toward increasing usage of courts-martial in disciplining Canadian military personnel. A line of best fit is included in the graph, based on the following resulting regression equation.

\[ y = -114.03 + .058x \]

The coefficient of the regression line at .058 was
significant at the .01 level. The goodness-of-fit statistic, at \( r = .75 \), was also strong. Aside from illustrating the significance of the rise in the incidence of courts-martial over the thirty-year period, the area falling below the fitted line from 1963 to 1969 serves to suggest that the frequency is related to organizational turbulence. The mid-1960's was the period during which the Canadian Forces endured the unification of the previously distinct elemental services. The army, navy, and air force were administratively consolidated, a common uniform was adopted, a centralized base system was created, and a variety of long-established units were dissolved. In this climate of uncertainty, during which a range of traditional institutional elements disappeared or were altered, the court-martial rate fell to its lowest level in the thirty-year period examined here.

The subsequent rise in the rate indicates a gradual return to confidence in this martial mechanism, and an adaptation to the disruption of unification. Evidence of an adaptive response is found in other areas. Units which lost distinctive articles of identification when a common uniform was instituted, particularly army regiments in Mobile Command, have slowly introduced new unique insignia indicating unit-specific membership for their personnel. Perhaps most importantly, units clung tenaciously to their regimental associations and the attendant formal lobbying influence they provided. The recent re-introduction of distinctive uniforms for each service may be viewed as evidence of the effectiveness of this adaptive process.

It may be argued that as unification was imposed upon the armed forces by the Government of Canada, the fluctuation

\[^{21}\text{ } T=9.347,\ p<.01.\ \text{While the plotted points and the residuals suggest a cyclical rather than linear relationship, post-1986 data are needed to confirm the downward trend.}\]
in the incidence of courts-martial was the result of civilian influence. This is so only indirectly, as the reorganization did not involve the consolidation of civil and military legal principles. Further, while the exercise of civilian political power in imposing unification may have ultimately been the impetus to a depression in the incidence of courts-martial, there was no long-term effect and subsequent years have seen a significant strengthening of the confidence of commanders in this device through an increasing willingness to use it in disciplining military personnel.

Summary-Trials

While the court-martial is the most visible of martial mechanisms, the summary trial is the principal legal device employed by commanders in the conduct of military discipline in Canada. It is a trial adjudicated by a commanding officer, or an officer he appoints in the case of offenders of the rank of sergeant and below, or by a superior commander in the case of offenders of the rank of warrant officer and above. To call the summary a "trial" obscures its essential nature as a tool of discipline. Its conduct is similar to that which might ordinarily be considered a trial, insofar as an accused individual faces a judge, evidence is heard, a judgement found, and punishment awarded. However, there is no right to counsel for the accused, nor is it necessary that anyone involved, including the officer trying the case, have any legal training whatever. A range of more subtle and similarly fundamental distinctions clearly distinguish the summary from other trials along procedural and processual dimensions. The maximum punishments available to an officer adjudicating a summary are currently ninety days detention\textsuperscript{22}, reduction in rank, 

\textsuperscript{22} A sentence of detention of this length must, however, be confirmed by a higher authority in the military chain of command.
forfeiture of seniority, and a variety of "minor" punishments including a fine not exceeding a months pay.

Discussions of legal minutiae with respect to the summary do not consider that which is most essential in its actual execution. To be "on charge" and to experience a summary trial is to endure a carefully constructed theatrical ritual, intended to result in humiliation of a particularly military sort. The central outcome is the awe of the offender for the bearing and seemingly sweeping powers of the commanding officer. Those charged are often held under some form of arrest, which may involve actual detention. The accused is deprived of uniform articles connecting him with his unit, articles which are ordinarily earned through intensive training and are prized symbols of membership, and is "frog-marshed"\textsuperscript{23} to the commander's office. In the summary proper, the commander wields dramatic patrimonial authority. While a well-established pattern is followed, the officer conducts the entire process from a position of absolute control. Finally, having pondered the relevant circumstances, the commander announces the judgement based upon these deliberations after consultation with no one and appearing to do so while unencumbered by the plethora of regulations governing ordinary jurisprudence. He can do this, of course, and generate an extremely intimidating persona, because the trial has been carefully prepared in its entirety. The word "summary" essentially means arbitrary, in the sense that it is the exercise of traditional patrimonial powers vested in commanders in supporting their mandate to maintain highly disciplined units in all environments, under whatever conditions the troops are required to serve.

The summary is thus an extremely important martial

\textsuperscript{23} Marched at excessive speed and with absurdly exaggerated drill motions.
mechanism, aside from its obvious punitive power. Its use is also evidence of the maintenance of the traditionally diffuse authority of commanders. In attempting to examine the historical incidence of this device, valid long-term data could not be found. However, data from recent years generates some useful findings. If the hypothesis tested in this section is true, then we would not expect to find a relatively large number of trials in recent years; this is particularly so for the summary, which does not withstand the most rudimentary investigation in terms of the civil rights of individuals.

The Canadian Forces conducted 33,336 summary trials in the four-year period of 1981 through 1984. The annual distribution of summary trials by year by type and degree of punishment imposed is recorded in Table 7. In all, 3,677 personnel were sentenced to a period of detention and 18,904 received a fine. In determining if a mean of more than 8,300 such trials per year constitutes a relatively strong frequency of this martial mechanism in the regrettable absence of long-term findings, there are two ways of looking at the data. Firstly, the total trials held in one year does not adequately

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24 Summary trial and punishment statistics were provided by the Directorate of Personnel Legal Services (DPLS) of DND (see Flemming, 1989). Data for years 1981 and 1982 were collected cumulatively by DPLS; the figures shown are mean scores.
represent their actual distribution within the Forces. In 1983, for example, just one-half of one percent (.49%, n=34) of the 6,871 trials that were held involved the prosecution of an officer\textsuperscript{25}. In that particular year, 20.5% (n=16,711) of all personnel were officers. It can be seen, then, that there were in fact 6,837 summary trials among 64,866 other-ranks, or approximately one summary trial for every 9.5 personnel\textsuperscript{26}. Secondly, it is important to note that the annual totals do not include exonerations. For reasons already discussed, such an occurrence is immeasurably rare. The important point here is the extensive period of investigation which precedes a summary. Essentially, the evidence is weighed and guilt largely assessed prior to the trial, and commanders who determine that there has been no criminal offence dissolve the process and no record is kept. Thus, while a mean of more than 8,300 trials were actually held annually, an indeterminate number of others were initiated but not completed. The continuing strength of this process which determines whether a summary is conducted is in itself evidence of the maintenance of the traditional patrimonial autonomy vested in the hands of commanders. Based on these factors, it is concluded that the frequency of trials identified in Table 7 does not support the contention that a dramatic shift away from the use of that martial mechanism in disciplining troops has occurred in recent years.

Two related factors support this conclusion. From an historical perspective, the summary or arbitrary disciplinary powers of commanders over other-rank personnel have not rapidly

\textsuperscript{25} This proportion is in fact slightly inflated, as the trials of some senior other-ranks personnel (warrant officers) are included with those involving officers by DPLS, who collect this information for the Canadian Forces.

\textsuperscript{26} This is true, but it is important to note that it is impossible to control for the extent of multiple trials experienced by individuals in any one year.
declined as is widely believed. Commanders today possess greater summary powers of punishment than have officers at any time in Canadian history. Immediately after Confederation, in 1868, the maximum summary punishment available to a militia unit commander was 14 days detention. When a permanent standing force was established at the turn of the century, the maximum punishment allowed in the regulations taken from the British regimental system was increased to 21 days detention. Additionally, officers were reluctant prior to the turn of the century to impose even those relatively nominal coercive punishments as were available to them and preferred instead such normative techniques as parading offenders before the battalion in shame, and in publishing their names in unit orders (Kellett, 1985:30-37). The powers of summary punishment vested in commanders have subsequently expanded incrementally to the current level of 90 days detention provided by the Code of Service Discipline.

Lastly, it might be argued that while these summary powers have expanded, avenues of appeal open to those so charged have been correspondingly augmented. The chief instruments involved are the election to court-martial and the redress of grievance. Personnel charged and facing a summary trial have the right to choose to be tried by court-martial instead, so as to avail themselves of the greater legal representation that trial allows. Commonly, however, personnel considering such an election are actively appraised of the dramatically increased powers of punishments in a court-martial should they be convicted. As will be seen later in this section, the great majority who do face a court-martial are convicted, and this reality must serve to depress the extent to which this avenue is selected. In any case, most of those who actually elect a court-martial have their cases handled at a lower level. In 1984, for example, 787 personnel elected a court-martial. Even if all the courts-martial heard from 1984
through 1980 were elections from a summary trial, and this is of course impossible, the disposition of more than 400 of the elections in 1984 is unexplained.

The redress of grievance is available for many purposes, but is primarily seen as a recourse for those questioning the outcome of a summary trial. The grievance must be heard by a military authority above the unit level. In actual practice, important factors hinder the potential mediating effect of this device. As Kellett has observed, this strategy is rarely used (1985:39). Considerable revulsion is reserved for the "barracks lawyer" who complains about his military lot, and the notion that filing such a grievance ineluctably marks one as such a creature and does irreparable damage to prospects for promotion is widely held. The most important factor which diminishes the efficacy of these checks on the summary powers of commanders is, however, the definition of the "good soldier". Military personnel are expected to accept punishment in a very precise way, and can ironically acquire substantial status by behaving appropriately while in the grip of the disciplinary process. Those who face the demeaning ritual of the summary trial and subsequent punishments in a stoic, defiant, detached manner which states, in a symbolic way, that one's spirit is immune to such a test, are often accorded tremendous respect. Those senior other-ranks personnel who have been tried on numerous occasions and have repeatedly lost and regained rank levels are viewed with awe and garner reputations across the armed forces. The honourable acceptance of punishment without hint of complaint is a moral duty for the soldier; in this milieu, the effects of mediating devices on the summary powers of commanders are limited.
The Role of Military and Civil Disciplinary Agencies

In this final test of Hypothesis 1, the view that the role of civil policing agencies in the disciplining of military personnel has expanded in recent years relative to the role of internal martial mechanisms is examined. Military personnel are accountable to all of Canada's civil statutes, as well as to military law. Under most circumstances, when an act contrary to a civil or military statute is alleged to have been committed by a member of the armed forces, that member's commanding officer and the Forces in general have substantial discretion in determining if the case is tried within the military or is released into civilian jurisdiction. While a range of circumstances influence this decision, the civilianization model suggests that the broad trend is toward greater civilian involvement, as the disciplinary powers of military courts have declined and their legal scope of authority has narrowed.

No direct record has been kept of cases which are referred by military officials to civilian courts. However, cumulative data has been maintained regarding the experience of both martial and civil custody by military personnel over time. This data allows a comparison of the extent to which martial and civil legal devices were used throughout the careers of all those personnel serving in 1972 with all those serving in 1986, reflecting the relative contribution of the legal mechanisms of each sector in the disciplinary control of military personnel. The data from this test are contained in Table 8.

When the population of the Forces is held constant, the mean period accumulated during military service in some form of legal custody, either military or civil, almost tripled from 270 days per 1000 personnel in 1972 to 763.7 days in 1986. Contrary to the predicted direction of change, the mean accumulated period of military detention per 1000 personnel was
TABLE 8
TOTAL CAREER DAYS OF MARTIAL AND CIVIL CUSTODY
ACCUMULATED PER 1000
CANADIAN FORCES PERSONNEL - 1972 AND 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Custody</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1986</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Days of Military Detention</td>
<td>189.7</td>
<td>737.7</td>
<td>+288.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days of Civil Custody</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>-67.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>270.0</td>
<td>763.7</td>
<td>+182.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

higher by a factor of 3.9 in 1986 than it was in 1972, while the accumulated experience of civilian cells dropped by more than half. Most importantly, the relative contribution of each legal sector to the overall rate was similarly altered. In 1972, approximately one of every three days (29%) military personnel had spent in custody in their careers had been in a civil cell, while in 1986 just one in every thirty days (3.4%) was in civilian custody. These findings do not support the contention that the role of civil police agencies within military organization has expanded relative to that of internal military disciplinary mechanisms in recent years.

Three tests were conducted in examining the first hypothesis, which argued that traditional coercive mechanisms of military discipline are in decline in the face of greatly expanding civil rights protections and the increasing preference of commanders for normative and remunerative compliance strategies, with a concomitant enhancement of the role of civil policing agencies in disciplining military personnel. Support for this argument was not found; the incidence of formal martial mechanisms has not declined in

27 Data provided by DPIS. It is important to note that some weaknesses have been identified by DPIS in their early data collection practices. It is likely that the 1972 figures under-represent actual total military detention (see Flemming, 1989).
recent years, while the number of courts-martial held annually has increased significantly since the period of disruption which accompanied unification in the mid-1960's. As well, evidence was found which suggests that internal military devices play an increasingly dominant role relative to external civil agencies in disciplining personnel.

Hypothesis Two:
The Diffusion of Martial Mechanisms

The notion that the traditional focus of military discipline on the control of other-rank ground combat role troops has changed in the direction of civilian administrative "policing", toward a maintenance-of-order enforcement of law without specific focus within the organization was tested along two dimensions. The extent to which dispersion has occurred by type of service and by rank was considered. In each test, the utility of the civilianization model in predicting the observed dispersion of disciplinary experience accumulated by personnel serving in 1972 and 1986 was evaluated.

Diffusion by Type of Service

Military personnel serve in one of five types of trades or classifications. Three of these are the elemental combat roles; land, sea, and air operations. The remaining two are support roles, comprising the land communications and engineering group and the personnel, supply, and logistics group. This typology is commonly employed by social scientists, and appropriately represents the main distinctive role environments in which military personnel in Canada serve. The diffusion of the application of formal disciplinary mechanisms across these role environments was tested by examining the period of military detention accumulated per 1000 personnel in each sector in 1972 and in 1986. The resulting data are
TABLE 9

ACCUMULATED CAREER DAYS OF MILITARY DETENTION
PER 1000 PERSONNEL BY TYPE OF SERVICE - 1972 AND 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Service</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1986</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Operational</td>
<td>467.4</td>
<td>1557.2</td>
<td>+233.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Operational</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>418.3</td>
<td>+1378.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Operational</td>
<td>393.3</td>
<td>422.3</td>
<td>+7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Comm, Engineering</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>818.5</td>
<td>+747.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel, Supply, Log</td>
<td>170.9</td>
<td>600.1</td>
<td>+251.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Canadian Forces</td>
<td>189.7</td>
<td>737.7</td>
<td>+288.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Service</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1986</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Operational</td>
<td>227.1</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>-93.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Operational</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>-30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Operational</td>
<td>120.6</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>-31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Comm, Engineering</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>-59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel, Supply, Log</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>-69.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Canadian Forces</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>-67.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

contained in Table 9.

As the data contained in Table 9 demonstrate, support for the contention that the application of military disciplinary devices has shifted away from a focus on land combat personnel is not found. The average land combat soldier in 1986 had experienced almost twice as many days of detention (n=1.58) as had a member of the role environment with the next highest rate of incarceration, the closely related land communications and engineering group (n=.82). While every group had a higher accumulated incidence of detention in 1986 than in 1972, the proportion of all detention served by land combat personnel remained constant. Of the 15,720 days of custody accumulated by all members serving in 1972, 35.9%

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28 DPIS data – see note to Table 8 (Flemming, 1989).
(n=5,638) were acquired by the land combat group. In 1986, of the 63,571 overall days accumulated, 33.6% (n=21,337) were amassed by those serving in land combat trades and classifications. It is important to further note that land combat personnel made up just 14.6% of the total Forces population in 1972 and 15.9% in 1986, indicating substantial and undiminished over-representation in the application of disciplinary devices. The traditional focus of martial mechanisms on disciplining land combat soldiers has not diffused over the period examined in this test.

**Diffusion by Rank**

Dramatic expansions of the civil rights of military personnel are argued to have had a levelling or "democratizing" effect on the Forces, in which the once wide chasm between officers and the other-ranks has been significantly bridged. Rather than executing military justice, which seeks to maintain well-disciplined units, this view argues, contemporary military law establishes rules of behaviour to which all personnel are similarly accountable. As is shown in Table 10, however, no redistribution has occurred in the realm of actual punishment when rank is considered.

More than 98 of every 100 days of detention accumulated by all personnel in 1972 and in 1986 was acquired by the other-ranks. Even if some decline in the proportion of the overall incarceration experienced by other-ranks personnel has occurred since some point in history, the change could not have been significant. It is reasonable to conclude that officers and other-ranks continue to be subject to wholly separate systems of disciplinary control.

An unexpected finding was revealed by Table 10. A significant diffusion in the experience of detention by rank
TABLE 10
DISTRIBUTION OF ACCUMULATED DAYS OF MILITARY DETENTION
BY RANK LEVEL - 1972 AND 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank Level</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1986</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Officers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Officers</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Officers</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1,018</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Other-Ranks</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>16,300</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Other-Ranks</td>
<td>15,126</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>46,253</td>
<td>72.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Other-Ranks</td>
<td>15,475</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>62,553</td>
<td>98.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Canadian Forces</td>
<td>15,720</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>63,571</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

occurred within the other-rank level. Senior other-rank personnel, sergeants and above, had been subjected to 2.2% (n=349) of the detention accumulated by all personnel serving in 1972, while they had amassed fully one-quarter (25.6%, n=16,300) of that acquired by those serving in 1986. Some of this is likely explained by rank inflation, in which personnel are promoted faster and a greater proportion of positions are maintained at higher rank levels. While it is impossible to determine what proportion of the detention experienced by senior other-ranks personnel was accumulated prior to promotion to that rank level, the magnitude of the shift suggests that commanders are applying formal mechanisms at an increasing rate in disciplining senior other-ranks personnel. It has been argued by civilization theorists that rank inflation has had the effect of shielding increasing numbers of soldiers from traditional martial mechanisms because legal protections increase with promotion, thus further dulling officer/other-rank distinctions. This finding suggests that rank inflation has not had this effect.

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29 DPIS data - see note to Table 8 (Flemming, 1989).
Two tests were conducted in the examination of the second hypothesis, which stated that the traditional focus of military justice on maintaining disciplined land combat units has been eroded by the penetration of a civilian administrative "policing", resulting in a diffusion of the application of martial mechanisms across service environments and rank sectors. Evidence gathered with respect to accumulated periods of detention by all serving personnel in 1972 and 1986, controlling for type of service role environment and rank, did not support this contention. Rather, other-rank personnel in the land operational trades continue to be subjected to the most concentrated disciplinary effort of all role and rank sectors.

Hypothesis 3:
Conviction Ratios and Appeals to Civil Powers

The belief that the burgeoning power of civil checks and balances over military law has diminished the authority of military courts is tested in this section. Two tests were conducted in attempting to establish if a concrete effect could be identified. In the first, conviction ratios in courts-martial over time were examined. In the second, the rate at which personnel have appealed court-martial decisions from 1960 until recent years was considered, as well as the relative success of those appeals over the same period. Limited support for the hypothesis was found.

Courts-Martial Conviction Rates

The likelihood that an individual accused of a crime by a military court be convicted has been used as an indicator of the authority of military courts in the context of the British and American armed forces, where annual conviction rates as high as 95% have been found (Sherrill, 1969:62; Stapp,
TABLE 11

COURTS-MARTIAL CONVICTIONS BY YEAR -
1982 TO 1984 AND 1958 TO 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Courts-Martial</th>
<th>Convicted n</th>
<th>% Convicted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>83.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>85.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>87.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1982-1984</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>85.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>86.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>89.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>74.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>80.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>85.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>81.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1958-1967</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>80.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1970:88-89). If, as is hypothesized, civilian legal procedural and processual principles offering enhanced protections to the accused have penetrated the Canadian Forces in a fundamental way, it is expected that there will be a diminishing likelihood of conviction over time in courts-martial.

Comparative data were found for two time periods; from 1982 to 1984 and from 1958 to 1967. The data are summarized in Table 11. As the total number of trials conducted over both periods is similar, n=410 in 1982-1984 and n=434 in 1958-1967, a good basis for comparison is provided.

Change did not occur in the direction predicted by

---

30 Data generated from JAG court-martial record sheets and annual summaries (see Flemming, 1989). Some cases could not be included in the analysis as files were unavailable, were under review, or involved civilians tried in military courts in Europe; 1984 n=24, 1983 n=21, 1982 n=23.
the hypothesis. Members of the armed forces who faced a court-martial in the more recent period were significantly more likely to be convicted than those tried twenty years earlier. Of the 410 trials in 1982-1984, 85.4% (n=350) resulted in a guilty finding, while 80.4% (n=349) of all those tried in the 1958-1967 period were convicted. The annual rate has also become more stable; the standard deviation for the recent period is .02; the standard deviation of the rate over the earlier period is .05, during which time the rate ranged from 71.4% to 89.3% convicted. As the number of trials held annually has increased dramatically, this was in part to be expected.

Appeals to Civil Courts

The authority of military courts have also diminished, it is hypothesized, due to both the increasing awareness of civil rights on the part of military personnel and to the augmented powers of civilian courts established to apply a second voice to the decisions of military courts. Data from the Court-Martial Appeal Court (CMAC) of the Federal Court of Canada and from the Supreme Court of Canada examining the 26 year period of 1960 to 1985 were gathered in testing the belief that military personnel convicted by a court-martial are increasingly successful in challenging the authority of a military judgement through recourse to civilian agencies, and that service members are increasingly disposed to make this challenge. The results of appeals to the CMAC from 1960 to 1985 are presented in Table 12.

The data indicate no significant change in the likelihood of successfully appealing a court-martial decision over that period. The low totals in most of the earlier years do not permit sophisticated analyses. When the results over the

31 Z=1.909, p<.01


### TABLE 12

**COURT-MARTIAL APPEAL COURT DECISIONS**  
**BY YEAR - 1960 TO 1985**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Appeal Abandoned</th>
<th>Appeal Rejected</th>
<th>Partial Success</th>
<th>Complete Success</th>
<th>Total Appeals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1974</td>
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<td>1973</td>
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<td>1972</td>
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<td>1971</td>
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<td>1962</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>69</strong></td>
<td><strong>115</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
<td><strong>233</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Years 1980 to 1985 are compared with the previous twenty years, however, it is shown that exactly the same proportion, 28.6%, resulted in a partial or total reversal of the original decision (1980-1985: 22/77, 1960-1979: 24/84), while the remaining majority were dismissed. Despite large increases in

---

32 Data were generated through review of the judgments in all CMAC decisions. Figures do not include cases from 3 missing files, 5 civilian appeals, 2 convictions quashed before a CMAC hearing, and 1 dissolved by the death of the appellant.

33 Appeals abandoned by the appellant prior to a CMAC hearing were excluded in determining this figure.
TABLE 13

APPEALS TO THE C.M.A.C. BY TOTAL COURTS-MARTIAL CONVICTIONS ANNUALLY - 1982 TO 1984 AND 1960 TO 1967\(^{34}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Courts-Martial Convictions</th>
<th>Total C.M.A.C. Appeals</th>
<th>Appeals Ratio (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of total annual appeals to the CMAC, the likelihood of having a court-martial decision overturned has remained relatively constant at approximately three chances in ten.

Contemporary military personnel are relatively well aware of the avenues of civil law which afford redress against the armed forces, civilianization theorists argue. Recent years, it is believed, have seen greater willingness on the part of service personnel to challenge courts-martial decisions. This has in fact been the case, as is evidenced by the data summarized in Table 13, comparing the willingness of convicted personnel to make an appeal to the CMAC during the period 1982 to 1984 with the willingness of those convicted during the period from 1960 to 1967.

\(^{34}\) Data from CMAC and JAG record sheets (see note to Table 11). Appeals are those occurring in each calendar year, and some will originate from a conviction in the previous year. The analysis as a result compares the overall ratio of the two periods rather than among specific years.
Personnel convicted between 1982 and 1984 were more than twice as likely to initiate an appeal to the CMAC than were those convicted twenty years earlier between 1960 and 1967. Of the 350 convictions over the more recent period, one in five (19.1%, n=67) resulted in an appeal to civil powers, while just 8.6% (n=21) of the 245 decisions of guilt in the earlier period were similarly challenged. This difference is significant at the .01 level.

Finally, the Supreme Court of Canada offers an ultimate avenue of appeal from a court-martial decision. Over the 26 year period of 1960 to 1985 for which data were available, a total of nine cases were appealed from the CMAC. None of these were successful; all were dismissed or refused a hearing by the Court. The same results have been found by those who have examined the proclivity of Congress and the Supreme Court in the United States to question military decisions. Generous (1973) and Fine (1971) have found that those agencies scrupulously avoid applying principles of civil law to the military justice system. In most cases, the United States Supreme Court reaffirms the validity of the unique legal requirements of the armed forces in limiting ordinary rights of citizenship. The ultimate civilian check on military mechanisms of disciplinary control in Canada has been similarly reluctant to interfere with military institutional traditions.

Limited support was found for the third hypothesis. No evidence of a decline in the authority of military courts in terms of the ratio of convictions to total trials over time could be found. Support could also not be found for the contention that external civilian appeal courts increasingly undermine military decisions; the CMAC continues annually to reject completely approximately 70% of court-martial appeals.

\[ Z = 3.575, p < .01 \]
while the Supreme Court did not support a single appeal over the 26 year period for which data were collected. Convicted personnel were found, however, to be increasingly willing to challenge the authority of a court-martial decision by appealing to a civilian court. This supports the belief that contemporary military personnel are relatively more cognizant of civil rights provisions and the avenues of protection they offer than has been so in the past. There is no evidence, however, that this knowledge has improved their success in the face of a formal military trial.

While limited support was found for the third hypothesis, the weight of the evidence gathered in the tests presented in this section did not support the prediction by the civilianization model of dramatic institutional decline. Despite the many changes to civil legislation and concomitant amendments of military regulations governing jurisprudence, evidence of fundamental change in the application and execution of military discipline could not be found. Rather, on the most general level, the findings discussed in this section indicate remarkable institutional-level tenacity and an adaptive capability in response to organizational turbulence on the part of the military in Canada. While manifold and important changes may have occurred within military organization in Canada, these data suggest, the threat to the processes operating on that fundamental level serving to distinguish the military from other institutions is greatly exaggerated.

Conclusion

A fundamental tenet of the civilianization model asserts that contemporary armed forces have adopted the compliance strategies of the corporation, relying primarily on remunerative incentives and secondarily or normative persuasion in extracting obedience from soldiers. Concomitantly, it is
believed, traditional military coercive discipline has weakened. This chapter evaluated the validity of this assumption.

It was found through a re-analysis of Cotton’s (1979) data examining the attitudes of military personnel that soldiers in Canada embrace the formal traditional principles of military professionalism emphasizing sacrifice to the exigencies of duty. The depth and breadth of support for this doctrine across the army is evidence, this chapter has argued, of the maintenance and success of normative compliance strategies operating to foster support for that set of beliefs among the military population.

Assuming hypothetically that traditional military discipline had suffered the decline apprehended by civilianization theorists, a range of tests were designed to elicit evidence for the transformation on the level of the experience of discipline by soldiers. Contrary to the expectations of the civilianization model, data drawn from the post-Korean War period demonstrated that the incidence of the usage of traditional martial mechanisms has not only not declined, but has in many respects increased and strengthened. The traditional focus of discipline within the military on land combat troops was found to be maintained, despite the notion that a civilian administrative "policing" had dispersed the application of military law across trade and rank groups. Finally, the perception that civilian legal checks and balances have decreased the authority of military courts was not supported, as decline in the ratio of convictions to total military trials over time could not be found and no increase in the rejection of military trial convictions by civil appeal courts was identified. Military personnel were found, however, to be increasingly willing to appeal a military judgement, supporting the view of civilianization theorists that soldiers
are increasingly cognizant of legal procedures. In sum, it was not possible to conclude that traditional military coercive discipline has eroded in the post-Korean War period.

The analyses conducted in this chapter depict the Canadian military to be relying on a system incorporating both normative and coercive compliance strategies in the maintenance of disciplined units. The soldier who rejects the military creed in the contemporary armed forces is amenable to punitive action consistent in fundamental respects with the traditional military "way", to an extent that is incompatible with the view that remunerative incentives have come to the fore. While the original assumptions of the civilianization model examined in this regard did anticipate the role of normative compliance strategies, it is not likely that their use is, as is assumed, a recent development. The following review of the main findings of the overall research concludes this study.

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36 The theory and evidence examining the history of bureaucratic control mechanisms in armed forces discussed in Chapter Two of this study suggests that the normative demand that soldiers make military goals their own has lengthy historical roots.
CONCLUSION

This study has attempted to critically examine the validity of central assumptions of the dominant paradigm in the sociology of military organization in North America, civilianization theory. Acceptance of these key assumptions within that discipline is wide. Essentially, a set of crucial changes are believed to have linked the military with, and subordinated it to, increasingly dominant civil institutions. Starting from that initial position, the pragmatic debates in the field revolve around the identification of an appropriate response to the apprehended dilemma generated by this transformation. The main problematic outcomes for which a response is needed are, according to this view, the adoption of bureaucratic techniques of organization by armed forces on an institutional level, and, on the level of the individual, the epidemic adherence by soldiers to the values fostered by the anomic materialism of external civil life. The penetration of bureaucracy is seen to have inaugurated the triumph of management and administration over leadership and preparation for war, while the submission of soldiers to the prevailing wage-labour remunerative definition of success is seen as a betrayal of the military "calling" to service as a vocation. This study subjected these assumptions to critical evaluations guided by war and society theory, an emerging paradigm built upon an implicitly contrary model of historical change in civil-military relations. Three research strategies were employed in this regard.

The interpretation of history upon which civilianization theorists rely accords insufficient weight, this study has argued, to the influence of armed forces across institutional boundaries. Theory and evidence established by war and society theorists were used in demonstrating that a
model of civil-military relations incorporating change in one direction only, that caused within armed forces by external institutions, is not sufficient. A valid model cannot ignore the impact of the mass army on the political consolidation of the nation-state in Europe, the military initiation and propagation of bureaucratic systems of rational administration, and the catalytic contribution of war and military forces to the emergence and international dispersion of capitalist enterprise. When civilianization theorists decry the contemporary similarity of military and civil institutions, particularly with respect to their common reliance on bureaucracy, they miss the initial historical role of armed forces in the genesis of central civil institutions. The administration of the means of violence through bureaucratic mechanisms of control has not been a harbinger of modern military decline, it has rather been the most important factor permitting the transition from the man on horseback to the brutal machinery of the fully mobilized nation at war.

The fear that modern soldiers no longer embrace military moral professionalism in a manner which could once be anticipated as a matter of course is an enduring moral panic, this study has argued. It was found through reference to historical documentary evidence drawn from the military discourse that the prediction of a imminent moral collapse has persisted throughout the history of mass and professional armies. The maintenance of the facility by an armed force to go to war necessarily elevates values in all ways incompatible with those respected by the surrounding civil community; this "crisis of hegemony" has historically beset military organizations in peacetime, and as a result convictions both describing an imminent threat to the military "way" and demanding its protection have emerged in response. The immediate enemy in the perpetual peacetime symbolic crusade to preserve the martial spirit is the military's own troops, and
tremendous effort has been expended in closely observing minute
elements of their behaviour and attitudes. Seemingly minor and
unsurprising aspects of these are regularly found to be
contrary to the creed and are interpreted as evidence of the
onset of the consequences predicted by the panic, eliciting
relatively intense retribution. That the soldiers have forsaken
other paths for their military service and agreed to endure
relatively substantial privations, is not sufficient. The moral
panic has established an heroic standard of behaviour which
cannot be satisfied in peacetime. Modern soldiers and citizens
are judged by the military discourse against a romantic imagery
of military prowess and solidly supportive citizenry in a vague
period in the past which has not been concretely identified.
Civilization theory, and its prescriptive demand that
soldiers link themselves inextricably with their units, is
itself part of the disciplinary system which has emerged as a
modern manifestation of the moral panic.

The third research strategy employed in this study
considered the utility of the civilianization model in the
contemporary Canadian context. A central tenet of the model was
the subject of quantitative scrutiny. The view that civilian
remunerative compliance strategies have become the primary
techniques used by armed forces in extracting obedience, with
normative strategies being of secondary importance and
traditional coercive strategies having eroded as a result of
liberalizing civilian legal influence, was tested along two
dimensions. A re-analysis of the data generated by Cotton’s
(1979) attitudinal survey of soldiers in Canada was conducted
in determining the extent to which personnel accepted the
formal principles of moral professionalism advocated by the
army. Contrary to the conclusions of the original study, which
were found to be based in part on an ambiguous scale measure,
broad and deep support was found across the army for the
classic principles of unlimited liability to duty, indicating
both the operation, and success of, normative compliance strategies in Canadian military organization. As well, a set of hypotheses seeking to substantiate the decline of traditional coercive disciplinary measures were tested using data from the post-Korean War period. The null hypotheses of these tests could not be rejected; these disciplinary mechanisms were found to have not only not been in decline, but to have increased in frequency and been strengthened in some fundamental respects. The findings indicated by this research portray discipline in the contemporary Canadian military as contingent upon a combination of normative and coercive measures. Soldiers not meeting behavioral demands face traditional compliance mechanisms to a degree which does not allow the conclusion that remunerative strategies have eroded the military "way" with respect to discipline. The actual experience of military authority by soldiers has not changed in the expected direction had this transformation occurred. On the broader theoretical level, this study concludes on the basis of the findings discussed throughout these paragraphs that the historical foundations of the assumptions guiding war and society theory offer a superior initial understanding of civil-military relations than that which is provided by civilianization theory.

Charles Sorley has called the innumerable forgotten soldiers killed in modern war the "pale battalions". Despite the oft-noted development and use of weapons and tactics in the destruction of civilian targets and populations, the principal victim continues to be the young soldier. In war, they are the first and most frequent to die, while those who survive endure incalculable suffering. In peace, they submit to demands made upon no other occupational group and do so with relatively limited legal protections. The most influential paradigm in the sociology of military organization monitors, as its primary critical focus, the degree to which young soldiers embrace the
formal trappings of military organization while deploring their resistance to joining the ranks of the pale battalions. It is this preoccupation with the moral quality of the soldier, in concert with limited attention to historical and systematic factors, which most restricts the utility of civilianization theory in advancing understanding of the uneasy relationship between armies and civilian populations.
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