Kicking Through the Wall:
Football, Division, and Entanglement in Postwar Berlin

By

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

Carleton University

Ottawa, ON

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Abstract

Seldom is the German capital referred to as a “Fußballstadt” (“football-city”). When Berlin and football are mentioned together, themes of corruption, hooliganism, the Stasi, and scandal dominate. And yet, Berlin holds a rich footballing history that dates back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and has long played an important role in the lives of Berliners as spaces for sociability.

In the postwar period, two divergent states emerged, each with their own competing structures of football. Whereas in the Federal Republic football remained an autonomous but not apolitical space, it was explicitly politicized in East Germany. As an important form of “soft power” during the Cold War, the people’s game reveals the extent to which the Iron Curtain was much more porous and elastic than the imagery of the Berlin Wall suggests. Rather than view football as “war without the fighting”, a microcosm that interprets the German and Cold War past as simplistic, reductive, and dichotomous, this dissertation analyzes the sport’s inherent dynamism that presented Berliners on both sides of the Wall with unique spaces for social interaction.

Although both German states tried to use the sport to assert their own interests, this dissertation argues that football simultaneously provided fans with a relatively free space authorities could not effectively control, opening the opportunity for German-German interactions. Revealing these spaces of German entanglement provides a
nuanced interpretation for the ways division was experienced, constructed, and negotiated during the Cold War and after the *Wende*.
Acknowledgements

After a match between Hertha BSC and Nürnberg, I overheard a teenage son describe his thoughts of the city to his father: “Berlin ist kein Fußballstadt.” I heard this expression many times during my research trip to Berlin. Often, the comments were voiced by visiting football fans or residents of the city that were not particularly attracted to football. If I learnt anything in researching this dissertation, it is that Berlin may not be recognized universally as a “Fußballstadt”, but football has played an important role in its fascinating history. I would like to thank the many friends I met during my research stints in Berlin, with whom I could chat about all matters football until I could no more, and who showed me that Berlin could be as much as a “Fußballstadt” as any.

My journey did not begin in Berlin, however, it began on the fourth floor of Patterson Hall, between the Rideau river and the Rideau canal in Ottawa. I would like to express my thanks and sincere gratitude to the History Department at Carleton University. From the first moments I started to consider Carleton for a Ph.D, I have been struck by the kindness and support of its faculty and staff. At Carleton, first and foremost, I am severely indebted to my supervisor, Jennifer V. Evans, whose support and instruction over the years made taking my Ph.D. possible. Without her I would not be in a position to type acknowledgements on a completed dissertation.

I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to the members of my dissertation defense committee: James Casteel, Matt Bellamy, Susan Whitney, and Alan McDougall,
whose generous engagement with my project turned the dissertation defense, a nerve-racking experience, into a pleasant discussion about the importance of the history of German football. I would like to express a special thanks to Alan McDougall for his extensive and reflexive comments. I have admired Alan’s work for many years and look forward to sharing conversations about football – German and Liverpudlian, academic and lay – over a few pints in the future.

I would also like to acknowledge the many instructors and classmates that constantly reminded me why I chose to continue my education. At Carleton University: James Casteel, Mark Salber Phillips, Rob Phillips, Dominique Marshall; in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Bernhard Leistle and Brian Given. I was lucky to benefit from participating in Jan Grabowski’s course on the Holocaust at the University of Ottawa. I would like to note that Jim Opp’s Historical Theory class was particularly valuable. It introduced me to one of my favorite subjects and to a few of my favorite books. I will never forget those long Monday evening discussions (in class and at the pub afterward) that made me reflect deeply on the value of history. Finally, I am grateful to Dominique Marshall, who gave me opportunities to teach on German history and, especially, on the history of global football.

The Department undoubtedly runs as smoothly as it does because of the tireless efforts of its support staff. In particular, I must express my sincere thanks to Joan White. As much as anyone, Joan has guided me through the Ph.D. Thank you, Joan; for your help and understanding – and teaching me much about the inner functioning of higher education institutions in Ontario and Canada.
I was fortunate enough to receive the generous financial support from several donors over the years that I would like to acknowledge. I would like to thank the History Department at Carleton University, the Faculty of Graduate and Postgraduate Affairs, the European Union and Carleton’s Centre for European Studies, the Central European History Society, the German Academic Exchange Service, and Helen and Joe Connolly. Your support allowed me to conduct research at home and abroad.

Back in Berlin, I would like to express my thanks to the many archivists and football enthusiasts who shared their knowledge. Frau Seidl at the Deutsche Rundfunkarchiv; Herr Herz at the Archivgut des Deutschen Fußballverbandes der DDR; Martina Behrendt and Christina Büch, at the Sportmuseum Berlin; Gerald Karpa and Tino Czerwinski at the Union-Archiv; Harald Tragmann; Monika Schmidt at the Landesarchiv, especially for pointing me towards the Deutsches Fußballmuseum; the entire friendly staff at the Deutsches Fußballmuseum, which has unfortunately closed; and the many archivists at the Bundearchiv.

Moving closer to home, I want to thank my parents, brother, and sister. I am the product of loving, supporting parents. They formed me into who I am more than I could possibly know or care to acknowledge. They are undoubtedly in part responsible for my obsession with sport that led me to spend several years researching football. What degrees I have earnt pale in comparison to what they have taught me over the course of my life. I have called on them for help countless times and will undoubtedly continue to do so for decades. In many ways, they earned this more than I.

It pains me to leave this episode of my life behind, but I am taking with me a part of Carleton that I hope will stay with me forever. It was during my years at Carleton that
I met my partner, Erin. I cannot put into words how indebted I am to my best friend. I have since been welcomed into her family by her equally loving and supportive parents, John and Wanda.

I am now at the dawn of a new beginning and am grateful.
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*Source:* Wikicommons at the following address:  
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<tr>
<td>ATB</td>
<td><em>Arbeiter Turnerbund</em> (Workers’ Turnen Federation)</td>
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<td>ATSB</td>
<td><em>Arbeiter-Turn- und Sportbund</em> (Workers’ Turn and Sports Federation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BFC</td>
<td><em>Berliner Fußballclub</em> (Berliner Football Club)</td>
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<td>BFV</td>
<td><em>Berliner Fußball-Verband</em> (Berlin Football Association)</td>
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<td>BSC</td>
<td><em>Berliner Sport Club</em> (Berlin Sport Club)</td>
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<td>BSG</td>
<td><em>Betriebssportgemeinschaften</em> (enterprise Sport Communities)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFB</td>
<td><em>Deutsche Fußballbund</em> (German Football Association)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFV</td>
<td><em>Deutscher Fußballverband</em> ([East-]German Football Association)</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>DS</td>
<td><em>Deutsche Sportausschuss</em> (German Sport Committee [DS])</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTSB</td>
<td><em>Deutscher Turn- und Sportbund</em> (German Turnen and Sport Federation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>FC</td>
<td><em>Fußball-Club</em> (Football Club)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDJ</td>
<td><em>Freie deutsche Jungend</em> (Free German Youth)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDGB</td>
<td><em>Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund</em> (Free German Trade Union Confederation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIFA</td>
<td><em>Fédération Internationale de Football Association</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>BStU</td>
<td><em>Behörde des Bundesbeauftragten für die Stasi-Unterlagen</em> (Federal Commission for Stasi Records)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFMB</td>
<td><em>Deutsches Fußballmuseum Berlin</em> (German Football Museum of Berlin)</td>
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MfS  Miniterium für Staatssicherheit (Ministry for State Security)

NOFV  Nordostdeutscher Fußballverband (North-East German Football Association)

NSRL  Nationalistischer Reichsbund für Leibesübungen (National Socialist League of the Reich for Physical Exercise)

UEFA  Union of European Football Associations

USPD  Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Independent Socialist Part of Germany)

SBZ  Sowjet besatzungszone (Soviet zone of occupation)

SED  Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party)

SPD  Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, (Socialist Democratic Party of Germany)

SG  Sportgruppe (sport groups)

SV  Sportvereine (Sport club)

ZK  Zentralkommittee (Central Committee)
Introduction: Using Football to go Beyond the Divide

“Berlin ist kein ‘Fußballstadt’” (Berlin is not a “Football-City”)

Seldom is the German capital referred to as a “Fußballstadt” (“football-city”). The Olympiastadion— a multipurpose Olympic stadium built to coincide with the 1936 Olympics— may serve as the venue for the German cup, attracting over 80 000 on a yearly basis, but clubs from the Rhine region— Borussia Dortmund, Schalke— and Bavaria— FC Bayern München— have enjoyed much more success than Berlin’s most successful and largest club, Hertha BSC. In that regard, Berlin is like most European capitals. London’s Chelsea, Arsenal, Tottenham, may boast strong records of footballing success and attract relatively large numbers of spectators and vigorous fan-bases, but they do not rival Manchester United and Liverpool as England’s most

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5 For a history of Chelsea FC, see Rick Glanville, Chelsea Football Club: The Official History in Pictures (Headline Publishing Group, 2007)
8 For the official club history of Manchester United Football Club, see MUFC, The Official Illustrated History of Manchester United 1878-2010: The Full Story and Complete Record (London: Simon and Shuster, 2010). For an interesting cultural analysis of the club’s history, see Soren Frank, Standing on the
successful and culturally representative footballing cities. Further north, Hibernian’s victories pale in comparison to Glasgow’s two footballing giants, Rangers and Celtic.\textsuperscript{10} Paris St-Germain FC’s domination of French football built its achievements recently on the wealth of the Qatar Investment Authority; its rivals in the south, notably AS Saint-Étienne, Olympiques Marseilles and Olympiques Lyonnais, have traditionally been France’s biggest and most successful clubs.\textsuperscript{11} Italy’s most decorated clubs hail from the north – Juventus Turin, AC Milan, and Internazionale Milan– not from Rome.\textsuperscript{12} There are, of course, exceptions to the rule. Ajax Amsterdam\textsuperscript{13} has been synonymous with Dutch football since the Second World War and Spanish giants Real Madrid are rivaled only by the Catalan club FC Barcelona.\textsuperscript{14} Nevertheless, Europe’s capital cities are not synonymous with the “people’s game”.

Like many other European capitals, whose clubs went through different periods when they enjoyed varying achievements, Berlin has a rich footballing history that dates...
to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. As a large, growing urban area, the Prussian capital played an important role in the successful establishment of football in the German Reich at the turn of the century. Clubs such as FC Germannia Berlin (1888), Viktoria Berlin (1889), and Hertha Berlin Sport Club (1892) were some of the earliest clubs founded in the German Empire. Berlin’s clubs enjoyed large victorious spells in the 1910s and again in the post-World-War-One era. Viktoria Berlin won the German championship in 1908 and 1911 and were runners up in 1907 and 1909. BFC Vorwärts and Union Oberschönweide appeared in final in 1921 and 1923 respectively. Their runners’ up status preceded the establishment of a dynasty. Only a few years later, Hertha BSC’s appeared in six consecutive German championship finals behind their talismanic leader, Johannes (Hanne) Sobek, winning Germany’s top football prize on two occasions, in 1930 and 1931. From the late-nineteenth century until the 1930s, Berlin was undoubtedly a “Fußballstadt” (footballing city).15

Today, however, “Berliner Fußball” (Berliner football) is often viewed ambivalently by the general public, rival fans, and academics. Berlin’s history of footballing success on the pitch is often relegated to the margins of public interest or viewed with suspicion. Rather, the city’s divided status during the Cold War perpetuates misunderstandings and simplifications of the city’s footballing pasts. Berlin’s football cultures continue to be regarded as caricatures of the larger ideological struggle the city and its Wall symbolize. Berlin’s football history has been compromised by stories of direct political intervention (e.g. BFC Dynamo, ASK Vorwärts) or indirect ideological

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15 For information on Berlin’s football clubs, see Lutz Rosenzweig, *Fußball in Berlin: eine Zwischenbilanz des BFV an der Schwelle zum letzten Jahrzehnt des ersten Jahrhunderts* (München: Copress Verlag, 1987); Wolfgang Hartwig and Günter Weise, *100 Jahre Fußball in Berlin* (Berlin: Sport Verlag, 1997).
incentives (e.g. BFC Dynamo, Hertha BSC, Tennis Borussia) and, of course, supporter violence (e.g. 1. Union FC, BFC Dynamo, Hertha BSC) and athletic incompetence (e.g. Tennis Borussia). With its most prominent and visible clubs labelled cheats (BFC Dynamo and Hertha BSC), football in Berlin effectively lost any status it held as a “Fußballstadt” (football-city) during the Cold War. The Cold War ultimately had the dual effect of leaving football out of most historical accounts of postwar Berlin while Berlin served to symbolize political and ideological divisions in historical accounts of postwar German football.

Precisely because of its chequered and highly politicized past, football was – and remains – an important cultural product for the city of Berlin and worthy of critical, historical reflection. Its most popular club today, Hertha BSC, regularly plays in Germany’s first division and attracts over 50 000 spectators at home matches. Hertha’s cross city rival, 1. FC Union Berlin, has fostered a growing, cult-like following as Berlin’s grassroots, non-conformist club. Both clubs have officially recognized “fan clubs” that are comprised of “die-hard” supporters who attend nearly every match – home and away. Many people have been active in creating “fan-scenes” – fan-based subcultures – for years, others decades. These people might not entirely disagree with the common utterance that “Berlin ist kein Fußballstadt” (Berlin is not a Football city). All

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would admit, however, that Berliner football is often misunderstood, misconstrued, or simply disregarded because of its complicated past attached to the Cold War.\(^{19}\) A case in point are attitudes towards BFC Dynamo, whose small but not insignificant minority of hard-core supporters continue to attract the media’s attention due to their xenophobic, aggressive, and often violent displays at matches.\(^{20}\) For many of Berlin’s football supporters, football is – and has been – an important if not integral part to understanding the city, its history, and its people.

This dissertation brackets the assumption that “Berlin ist kein Fußballstadt” (Berlin is no football-city) to consider what Berlin als Fußballstadt (as a football-city) reveals about postwar Germany. Specifically, it views football as a popular cultural phenomenon that permeated the Berlin Wall to ask wider questions about how German division was experienced, negotiated, and constructed.\(^{21}\) It argues that football provided important – though generally under-appreciated in postwar German historiography – spaces for social interaction between East and West Berliners.

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\(^{19}\) There are a variety of fan-based accounts in which this attitude towards the importance to football for the city. See Frank Willmann (ed.), *Stadionpartisanen: Fußballfans und Hooligans in der DDR* (Berlin: Verlag Neues Leben, 2007); Frank Willmann (ed.), *Zonenfußball: Von Wismut Aue bis Rotes Banner Trinwillershagen* (Berlin: Verlag Neues Leben, 2011); Luther and Willmann, *BFC Dynamo*; Luther and Willmann, *Eisern Union!*; Czerwinski and Karpa, *1. FC Union Berlin*.


Beyond the Divide

The Berlin Wall has proved a powerful and resilient symbol for postwar German historiography. As the physical manifestation that separated the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), its imagery has exemplified how division has dominated interpretations of Germany’s “double past.” The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 led some contemporary commentators to confidently declare the “end of history,” since Western democracy had “defeated” communism. More reluctant to acknowledge an end to history, German historians rushed to the archives of a country that nearly overnight became history. Since, postwar German historiography has evolved in the shadow of the Berlin Wall.

The “rush to unity” that accompanied the collapse of the GDR may lead one to assume that historical research focused on uncovering and understanding commonalities between East and West German society. It was not the case. The opening of the state

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22 For a quick impression of how the theme of division has proved especially popular, see the following: Gabriele Camphausen et al.: Berlin Wall. Memorial Site, Exhibition Center and the Chapel of Reconciliation on Bernauer Strasse (Berlin: Jaron, 1999); Doris Epler, The Berlin Wall: How It Rose And Why It Fell (Millbrook Press, 1992); Thomas Flemming and Hagen Koch: The Berlin Wall. Division of a City (Berlin: be.bra, 2000); Reg Grant. The Berlin Wall (Wayland Publishers, 1998); Hans-Hermann Hertle, The Berlin Wall, Monument of the Cold War (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2007); Rainer Laabs and Werner Sikorski, Checkpoint Charlie and the Wall. A Divided People Rebel (Berlin: Ullstein, 1997); Ann Tusa and John Tusa, The Berlin Wall (Hodder & Stoughton, 1994); Gerhard Sälter, Relicts of the Berlin Wall. The Dismantling of the Berlin Wall and the Visible Remains in the Berlin City Center, second edition (Berlin: Verein Berliner Mauer 2007).

23 The imagery of the Berlin Wall goes beyond postwar German historiography. Carole K. Fink, Cold War: An International History (Westview Press, 2014) for example, makes use of the image of the Wall on its cover.

24 This tendency to view the end of the Cold War as “the end of history” was popularized by Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 2006).

archives led to the development of a historiography that followed the national paradigm, whereby the GDR was studied largely in isolation from the FRG. Some intellectuals, politicians, and academics were quick to point to the similarities between the two German “totalitarian” regimes – Nazi Germany and the GDR – rather than seek to uncover similarities between West and East German societies. Equating the GDR with the Nazi regime, however, proved problematic in two key ways. First, it simplifies one historically complex experience (that of Nazism) with another from a different period (East German communism). Second, it trivializes the specific nature of the Nazi genocide conducted against the Jews while misrepresenting the uniqueness of the victims of the SED regime. The application of the totalitarian paradigm and the equation of the SED and Nazi regimes, furthermore, had the effect of viewing ordinary East Germans as de facto victims of a morally corrupt regime, removing any agency ordinary East Germans may have insisted they had while living in “real existing socialism” in the process.

Since unification, many East Germans have insisted on the relative normalcy of their day-to-day lives under socialism, leading especially social historians who study

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28 Ibid.
29 For an overview of the Federal Republic’s attempt to come to terms with the East German past, see A. James McAdams, *Judging the Past in Unified Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). The parliamentary proceedings were published as Deutscher Bundestag (ed.), *Materialien der Erkenntnis-Kommission “Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland”* (Baden-Baden, 1995); and Deutscher Bundestag (ed.), *Materialien der Erkenntnis-Kommission “Überwindung der Folgen der SED-Diktatur im Prozess der deutschen Einheit”* (Baden-Baden, 1999).
everyday life to question the effectiveness and limitations of the totalitarian paradigm.\textsuperscript{30}

Some historians provided more critical approaches to make room for potentially positive memories of the GDR.\textsuperscript{31} Historians working at Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung (Centre for Contemporary History [ZZF]) in Potsdam, such as Jürgen Kocka, Konrad Jarausch, Martin Sabrow, and Thomas Lindenberger proposed ways to bring together histories of state and social structures under dictatorship with the experiences of the individuals who lived through socialism.\textsuperscript{32} As Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer have argued more recently, “the key challenge [to writing GDR history] appears to be the development of an analytical stance toward the [East German] regime that will clearly expose its dictatorial nature and yet do justice to the relative normalcy of people’s lives within it, thereby problematizing their mutual relationship.”\textsuperscript{33}

Whereas this intervention into GDR historiography has been useful in grappling with life under “real existing socialism”, it also resulted in an interest in the history of the GDR at the expense of that of the FRG. According to German historian Christoph Kleßmann, postwar German history cannot leave aside the “special relationship” between the two postwar German states. The “special relationship”, he writes, has “more

\textsuperscript{30} Mary Fulbrook has stressed that the GDR was not a totalitarian regime, but rather a complex, in no way monolithic or strictly centralized system of power. The relative stability of the regime was achieved, rather, via a “participatory dictatorship” as Fulbrook termed it. This is one formulation of the ways they made sense of everyday life on the ground and the functioning of power structures from the top. Mary Fulbrook, \textit{Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR 1949-1989} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) and \textit{The People's State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).


\textsuperscript{32} For a history of the ZZF, see the website: http://www.zzf-pdm.de/site/304/default.aspx

\textsuperscript{33} Jarausch and Geyer, \textit{Shattered Pasts}, 81.
relevance for society than most contemporary observers East and West realized”.34 Christoph Kleßmann, therefore, proposed a conceptual approach to studying the “special relationship” between the two German states. He suggests focusing on Abgrenzung und Verflechtung (separation and interconnection) – those processes by which East and West Germans were brought together while simultaneously being drawn apart.35 Studies that focus exclusively on the GDR or the FRG have proven limited in their ability to explain integration, belonging, and community-building after unification.36 Jarausch and Geyer agree, suggesting an “integrative” or “entangled” approach would weave together otherwise divisive conceptual binaries that have dominated the often separate historiographies of the GDR and FRG.37 As recent research on Cold War cultures has confirmed, the Berlin Wall’s impenetrability has been largely overstated in the historiography.38 States did not exist as isolated entities, unaffected by wider international and transnational currents. Official and unofficial networks of communication existed, states and non-governmental organizations negotiated, and individuals interacted. German contemporary history should seek to better understand the dynamics that permitted such simultaneous divisions and interconnection without

36 See arguments presented by historians who call for a Deutsch-deutsche approach, such as Udo Wengst and Hermann Wentker (eds.), Das doppelte Deutschland: 40 Jahre Systemkonkurrenz (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2008); Frank Bösch, “Geteilte Geschichte: Plädoyer für eine deutsch-deutsche Perspektive auf die jüngere Zeitgeschichte”, Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History 12 (2015): 98-114; Jarausch and Geyer, Shattered Past, especially their introduction.
assuming nationhood as the explanatory concept. The work conducted by historians like Kleßmann suggests that the relationship between East and West Germany is complex and at times contradictory, and, perhaps most importantly, characterised by asymmetry.

Konrad Jarausch has suggested that postwar German historiography needs to continue the trend of examining the immediate postwar years and the tumultuous events of 1989/90 while pushing to expand it to cover time periods where the physical presence of the Wall provided an image to normalize division, arguably an unusual condition for most Germans at the time. It has become increasingly clear that the “Iron Curtain”, as Churchill notably referred to it, was not fully impervious. There were also plenty of connections between East and West that speak to the need to move beyond the divide.

In her landmark study of two bordering German towns – Sonneberg and Neustadt – Edith Sheffer demonstrated the need for ongoing historical engagement on the micro level to better understand how the Cold War functioned daily. In Burned Bridge, she demonstrated how “division” was not simply a political decision that was imposed from above, but, rather, was also constructed on the ground. Division was not only a geopolitical reality, it was a social condition, continuously renegotiated by those who lived through it. By delving deep into the social past of one region, she found that “[t]he Iron Curtain was not as iron, the Cold War was not as cold, divided Germany was not as divided, and totalitarianism was not as total as our metaphors imply.”

40 See Mikkonen and Koivunen, Beyond the Divide; Lindenberger and Vowinckel (eds), Cold War Cultures.
This dissertation takes up Kleßmann’s proposed methodology to entangle the histories of East and West to go “beyond the divide”. It does so by focusing on one realm of cultural interaction that played an important role in both German states and in the lives of ordinary Germans: sport. More precisely, it focuses on the most popular sport in both the FRG and GDR: football.

Playing around the Wall: Sport in the FRG and GDR

Sport played an important role in both German states. Participation in sporting associations was encouraged by both regimes not only as a means to create “healthy” bodies and populations, but also as a way for youth to socialize. For a postwar German society that was eager to forget its immediate past, sport offered an opportunity for Germans to “retreat” back to the local and regional. For two states that were never fully independent until 1990, sport was an important, if not central, way for the GDR and FRG to integrate themselves into the international community. Sport played a role in ingraining a sense of attachment on the part of society to their respective state that also served to foster a growing sense of difference between East and West Germans. Consequently, much effort, time, and resources were put in to developing athletes, reconstituting sporting organizations and institutions, and in organizing mass and elite sport.42

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For as much as sport can serve political purposes, it also proved remarkably resilient to such pressures. Football, to provide perhaps the most conspicuous example, is truly a global phenomenon.\textsuperscript{43} From the earliest evidence of people kicking around a ball in some form of semi-organized manner, associational football – also known as soccer – has developed into the world’s most popular game. It is at once a sporting spectacle, a mass leisurely activity, and a commercial behemoth. It is an integral part of many nations’ cultural fabric and it plays a large role in the daily lives of tens of millions of people. Football was also by far the most popular sport in both the GDR and FRG. As a topic of historical analysis, therefore, it provides an excellent area of investigation to explore the ways in which it also provided spaces of relative autonomy, dissent, perceived asociality, and resistance, allowing the German public to negotiate social concerns in a variety of complex and at times contradictory ways, as this dissertation argues.\textsuperscript{44}

Although German sport has seen tremendous success on the international stage, which suggests it may prove a useful sphere to examine international and transnational

\textsuperscript{43} Some historians, however, prefer to refer to football as a “transnational” rather than “global” phenomenon, because it is not the national game nor necessarily popular across the globe. It is important to recognize these regional differences. See Alexandra Schwell et al, \textit{New Ethnographies of Football in Europe: People, Passions, Politics} (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) especially their comments in the introduction. In this context, I nonetheless prefer to refer to football as a truly “global” phenomenon to recognize its wide reach across the globe, from South America to Asia, from Africa to Europe.

phenomena, football has featured very little in postwar German historiography. Historian of British sport Tony Mason recently commented, “Of all the major cultural activities that rose to prominence in nineteenth century Britain, football has been the least well served by historians”. This statement also applies to German history. For a nation – for two states – in which sport played so clearly an important social and political role, there are few attempts to integrate German sport into wider narratives of postwar German history. The following passage from Konrad Jarausch’s After Hitler can serve as an example of both the general lack of engagement with sport in German historiography, while also acknowledging its importance. He writes, “The damaged self-confidence of Germans on both sides of the iron curtain began to recover somewhat as they experienced such successes as making progress with reconstruction and winning the 1954 World Cup.” This was the only line referring to football in the entire book, it did not contain a direct reference for readers to consult with a larger historiography, and yet, Jarausch’s words provide a powerful statement to the potential importance of a sporting event. In other words, the importance of the event is clearly recognized in the book, but its significance underexplored. Part of the aim of this dissertation is to bring football into conversation with larger themes and issues of historiographical concern.

Historians of German sport Kay Schiller and Christopher Young share this concern. In their introduction to a special themed issue of German History on the history and historiography of German sport, they aptly observed that historical accounts of

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German sport written after 1990 have for the most part followed rather than critically
generated the established interpretive paradigms. Much like GDR historiography more
generally, historical interest in German sport focused predominantly on the GDR, where
themes that reinforced the notion that the GDR was a “totalitarian” state that affected
every facet of daily life dominated. The relationship between Stasi chief Erich Mielke
and the Stasi’s parent club BFC Dynamo, the state-sanctioned and wide-spread use of
performance-enhancing drugs by East German athletes, and the constant monitoring of
athletes, coaches, and supporters are themes that have fascinated the general public and
captured the attention of academics. Historians that explored these themes have for the
most part reignited older debates built on an interpretative paradigm – totalitarianism –
that has been questions due to its simplicity and inability to explain nuances found in
GDR society. Conversely, historians of GDR sport more critical of approaches that
emphasize structures that have the effect of restraining potential individual behaviour
have seen sport as particularly rewarding in highlighting the limits of the dictatorial reach
of the regime. In this respect, the arena served as a space where East Germans probed
the “limits of dictatorship” by exterting Eigensinn (self-immunity) and successfully led
“normal” lives by safe-guarding their cultural self-interest.

47 Kay Schiller and Christopher Young, “The history and historiography of sport in Germany: social,
48 For example, during the summer of 2012 there was a special exhibit on the topic put on by the BstU-
Bildungszentrum: “Fussball für die Stasi. Der Berliner Fußball-Club Dynamo”.
49 See, for example, Hans Leske, *Erich Mielke, die Stasi und das runde Leder. Der Einfluss der SED und
des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit auf dem Fußballsport in der DDR* (Göttingen: Verlag die Werkstatt,
2005) and Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young, *German Football: History, Culture, Society* (London &
50 Jarausch, *Dictatorship as Experience*.
51 The translation of the term “Eigen-Sinn” itself is the subject of some debate. The word typically
translates as “stubbornness” or “obstinance”, but Alf Lüdke’s concept is more complex and brings together a
negotiation between the private and public spheres of life. See Alf Lüdtke, *Eigensinn: Fabrikalltag*. 
Taking a German-German approach, German sport historian Uta Balbier analyzed how sport was an important area of mutual negotiation between the two German states. Applying Kleßmann’s “Abgrenzung und Verflechtung” (separation and interconnection) approach, Balbier uncovered that sport was one unique sphere where the asymmetry Kleßmann described as characterising East-West relations was reversed. The GDR’s remarkable success at the Olympics, dubbed the “sporting miracle” by Mike Dennis and Jonathan Grix, launched a competitive response on the part of the FRG. Despite their own extraordinary sporting achievements, the FRG was unable to match the sporting prowess of their eastern neighbour. In the charged atmosphere of the Cold War, the FRG responded in kind to East German efforts at claiming sporting superiority. Sport, high performance sport in particular, was therefore one example where the West “looked East” as much as the East “looked West” for inspiration.


Football, however, was another matter. Whereas West German football propelled itself to the elite on both the international and club levels, the East German national team along with the East German clubs struggled to compete at the highest level. As much as the aim was to use football to create citizens loyal to the state, the SED was suspicious of the spaces of autonomy and self-expression that it created. In the end, the SED regime enjoyed a complicated and ambivalent relationship with football. The first and only time the East Germans qualified for the World Cup finals, football’s crowning jewel, was in 1974, the year their West German neighbors won the tournament. As Jutta Braun and René Wiese as well as Alan McDougall argue, football best demonstrates the SED’s ambivalent, problematic, and ultimately paradoxical position towards the relationship between the state and society. This dissertation builds upon their findings by exploring specifically how West German football was central to exposing the limits of the SED regime. If Olympic medal counts were opportunities to demonstrate the superiority of state socialism, elite athletic achievements were over-emphasized at the expense of more popular – and meaningful – sports like football.

**German Football History, East and West**

In the edited collection *Sportstadt Berlin*, historians of German sport Hans-Joachim Teichler and Jutta Braun argue that the “Sportstadt” (sport city) of Berlin during the Cold War is an especially fruitful area to explore how phenomena transcended the Iron curtain. The so-called “Frontstadt” (front city) of West Berlin and “Hauptstadt der DDR” (capital of the GDR) played an important role in inner-German and international relations.
throughout the Cold War. In terms of international politics, West Germany was adamant to securing its right to the city of West Berlin. As a result, Berliner sport clubs and players often found themselves with opportunities that other German cities or regions would not have had. It was crucial to the FRG to secure West Berlin’s participation into the West German leagues and Olympic committees, a symbolic function that served to increase the sense of international competition between the two states. Furthermore, sport played an important role in constructing a cultural image of both “Halbstädte” (half cities). On the one hand, East Berlin was capital of the GDR; on the other hand, West Berlin was a window to the West, and was an “Inselstadt” (island city) that despite its link to the FRG developed a distinct identity. Because both cities were regarded as especially important symbolically, taken together Berlin was a central player in the competition between the cultures, societies, and politics of both states. Building on Teichler and Braun’s work, this dissertation argues that Berlin would serve as an especially fruitful area to entangle the footballing histories of East and West.

There exist few histories of Berliner Fußball (Berliner football). The Berliner Fussball-Verband (Berlin Football Association [BFV]) has published two official accounts of the history of football in Berlin. The BFV’s Fußball in Berlin 54 and 100 Jahre Fußball in Berlin 55, unsurprisingly offer positive depictions of the capital’s relationship with football. These Zwischenbilanzen (interim appraisals), however, focus more on the institutional history of the BFV, individual clubs, and events rather than attempt to engage critically with the legacies of Nazism and the divided city.

55 Hartwig and Weise, 100 Jahre Fußball in Berlin.
Consequently, historical analysis does not often go further than integrating historical rhetoric to ease periodization (I provide a more complete reading and critique of these works in chapter 5).

More general histories of postwar German football are varied. Despite great interest on the part of the general public, relatively few works engage critically with wider historiographical concerns. Anecdotal compilations of fans’ memories, club-sponsored accounts of stars and triumphs, and predominantly statistical overviews of teams and leagues often written by club representatives or journalists dominate publications on the history of German football. Whereas histories that focus on football in the GDR have largely reopened or contributed to debates surrounding the totalitarian nature of the SED regime, those on the FRG have mostly treated histories of football as a sub-field only loosely attached to wider historiographical debates. Mirroring the trend in German historiography generally, there has been significantly less work conducted on West German than on East German football. The trend was bucked in 2006, however, when Germany hosted the FIFA World Cup.

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56 Schiller and Young, “The History and Historiography of Sport in Germany”.
58 Klaus Farin and Harald Hauswald, Die dritte Halbzeit: Hooligans in Berlin-Ost (Bad Toelz: Tilsner, 1998); Frank Willmann and Harald Hauswald, Ultras Kutten Hooligans: Fussballfans in Ost-Berlin (Berlin: Jaron Verlag, 2008); Andreas Nango and Michael Horn, Die Geschichte der DDR-Oberliga (Göttingen: Verlag die Werkstatt, 2004); Michael Jahn, Nur nach Hause geh’n wir nicht. Die Geschichte von Hertha BSC Berlin (Göttingen: Verlag die Werkstatt, 2006); Uwe Karte and Jörg Röhrig, Kabinengeflüster. Geschichten aus 40 Jahren DDR-Elf (Kassel: Sportverlag, 1993); Luther and Willmann, Und niemals vergessen; Luther and Wilmann, BFC.
59 Schiller and Young, “The History and Historiography of Sport in Germany”.

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Since, interest in the history of German football has exploded. Three main themes have dominated academic debate surrounding the recent history of German football. The first has questioned the extent to which the West German victory at the 1954 FIFA World Cup in Bern played an important part in creating a sense of national belonging after the Second World War. The unexpected victory of the West German national team in Bern led some historians to view the victory as the moment when the FRG was formed. With the tournament now passed, historians have questioned this “founding myth” interpretation. The literature, however, has focused overwhelmingly on the FRG, overlooking an opportunity to focus on the World Cup as a transnational event. As we will see in chapter 3, the moment of “collective bliss”, as Arthur Heinrich phrased the celebrations at the final whistle, was shared by citizens in the GDR. This dissertation contributes to the historiographical debate on the meaning of the 1954 World Cup victory by turning the focus away from its role in the construction of the FRG state or a West German identity. Rather, it argues that by viewing the event as part of an entangled history, 1954 reflects the uncertainty many Germans felt in the early postwar years. Their euphoria for the success of the West German national team’s victory was more reflective of a shared past and present than of enthusiasm for one system over the other.

A second theme of major interest pertains to a larger “Sports-Vergangenheitsbewältigung” (dealing with the Nazi past in the realm of sport). Yet,
historiographical debates have focused mostly on how prominent figures in the FRG’s sporting apparatus – including influential figures such as Carl Diem, but other sport bureaucrats, managers, and players – may have lived compromised lives. Concerning football more specifically, the publication of Nils Havemann’s *Fußball unterm Hakenkreuz* – a work commissioned by the DFB as an attempt to come to grips with Germany’s umbrella football association’s Nazi past – launched a wider dealing-with-the-past at every level, from the national to local clubs. As we will see in Chapter 5, historical engagement with GDR football’s past has remained largely separate from these wider debates pertaining to the history of the Nazi period. This dissertation adds to this second major area of historical interest in German football by bringing the attention to the


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GDR memory in contemporary Germany. It does so by turning to consider the many ways contemporary engagements with the GDR's footballing pasts may also contribute to discussion about memory and history making in post-wende historiography.

A third main theme is an interest bordering on obsession with spectator violence. Interest into football violence, however, is not new. Views on football violence in Western Germany were heavily influenced by the prominent sociological theory of the time. Some, such as the so-called members of the Frankfurt School, held a generally critical stance towards sport in general and deemed it unworthy of rigorous scientific investigation. Theodor Adorno, for example, referred to sport as a “ritual in which the subjected celebrate their subjection” Other German sociologists, such as Berno Rigauer, disagreed with Adorno’s position. Yet, studies of spectator violence in the FRG, such as Rigauer’s Sport und Arbeit, remained heavily influenced by Marxist social critique that tended to view sport as a mirror of society, a “superstructure”, a predictable reflection of the determining infrastructure of the economic and political

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65 On spectator violence in Germany, see Kevin Böttger, Gewalt, Fankultur und Sicherheit in deutschen Fußball; Sohrab Dabir, Hooligans, Ultras und das Gewaltproblem im deutschen Fußball; Simon Schünrch, Hooligangewalt im Kontext des Kulturphomens Fußball; Thomas Gröbner, Tatort Stadion: Wandlung der Zuschauergewalt im Profifußball.

66 Some examples of early research into football spectators are Hans Ulrich Herrmann, Die Fußballfans. Untersuchungen zum Zuschauersport (Schorndorf: Verlag Karl Hofmann, 1977); Rolf Linder, Der Fußballfan. Ansichten vom Zuschauer (Frankfurt am Main: Syndikat, 1979). Berno Rigauer, Sport und Arbeit; Schiller and Young, “History and Historiography pf German Sport,” 317; Other influential works of sport in German that were heavily influenced by the Frankfurt School are: Gerhard Vinnai, Fußballsport als Ideologie (1970) and Sport in Klassengesellschaft (1974).

spheres.\textsuperscript{68} Whereas German sociologists attempted to understand what seemed like a rise in football violence through the prism of class, representations of football supporters in the press suggest German society was concerned about the “British disease” infecting West German youth.\textsuperscript{69} The combination of concern for violent youth resulted in the division of spectators into a discursive binary. This understanding of fans as either positive or negative has persisted across temporal and geographic divides.

In the GDR, on the other hand, there was no equivalent academic approach to the study of football spectator violence until the late 1980s. Marxism provided an ideological basis upon which sport could serve in the construction of “real existing socialism” and issues of disorder were interpreted through an ideological prism. The GDR media seldom published images of violent fans from behind the iron curtain, since, according to Marxist ideology, such outbursts did not exist under socialism. When the East German press discussed the issue of fan violence, it combined violent images with socialist rhetoric to remind citizens of the propagation of social inequalities inherent to capitalist societies. Spectator violence was understood as a foreign infiltration from the West. It did not require academic study as much as it did re-education. Fans that participated in disorder became the subject of surveillance due to what authorities perceived as their potential for western proclivities.

The seemingly uncontrollable and inexplicable wave of violence that accompanied the collapse of the GDR in the early 1990s generated much academic and

\textsuperscript{68} Berno Rigauer, \textit{Sport und Arbeit}; Schiller and Young, “The History and Historiography of German Sport”, 317; Other influential works of sport in German that were heavily influenced by the Frankfurt School are: Gerhard Vinnai, \textit{Fußballsport als Ideologie} (1970) and \textit{Sport in Klassengesellschaft} (1974).

\textsuperscript{69} This provides some contrast to the expressions of anxieties over “americanization” that has been examined more prominently in the literature on youth cultures in the FRG and GDR. See, for example, Fenemore, \textit{Sex, Thugs, and Rock and Roll} and Poiger, \textit{Jazz, Rock, Rebels}.  

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public interest into the nature of East German football hooliganism. To come to grips with a phenomenon – hooliganism – that according to Marxist philosophy should not have existed in a socialist state, German historians turned to recently released documents from the MfS and East German state archives. In the process, they uncovered sources that permitted contradictory interpretations. On the one hand, sources from the apparatus of state security demonstrate the extent to which the regime’s mechanisms of repression, especially Stasi agents and IMs, infiltrated stadia and supporter gatherings. On the other hand, the reports they wrote suggest that football served to open up spaces in which East Germans could display signs of autonomy, dissent, asociality, and resistance that could not be effectively controlled by the state’s mechanisms of security. This duality has led to a resurfacing of older debates surrounding the totalitarian nature of the SED-State and the ability to live “normal” lives in the GDR. Similarly, the presence of football related violence after 1989/90, especially the seemingly uncontrolled waves from the East, ensured social histories of football remained closely attached to the controlling nature of the SED state and the rise of football hooliganism.

Though it is impossible to discuss violence in any social history of football, this dissertation does tackle spectator violence head-on. Although there was undoubtedly


72 For example, Dennis and Grix, *Sport under Communism*; Leske, *Erich Mielke, die Stasi und das runde Leder*.

73 See, for example, Markus Hesselmann and Robert Ide, “A tale of two Germany: football culture and national identity in the German Democratic Republic”, in *German Football* ed. Tomlinson and Young (London: Routledge, 2006), 36-51.
serious concern for spectator violence throughout the postwar period – and since the
Wende – historians’ and the general public’s continued fascination with spectator
violence has had the effect of drawing attention away from other important but less
appreciated aspects of football fan culture. This dissertation, particularly chapter 3,
views hooliganism and fan violence as one of other important elements of fan culture that
transcended the wall.

Sources, Methodology, and Chapter Breakdown

Nestled within communist-era community housing units at Anton-Saefkow-Platz in the
eastern district of Lichtenberg sits a small museum dedicated to the history of German
football. The little-known and seldom visited Deutsches Fußballmuseum Berlin (German
Football Museum of Berlin [DFMB]) is located on the second floor of the apartment
complex. There is little information in the public sphere about the DFMB. One can
locate a few minor articles that promoted the museum’s opening in 2005, but the
information in these one page texts is slim.

From the few tidbits of information available via the press, we learn that the
museum opened its doors in 2005 to correspond with the 50th anniversary of the 1954
World Cup finals. The museum’s holdings derive mostly from the personal collections of
a few football fans, predominantly from Johan Schlüper and a few colleagues from
Berlin. Schlüper admitted to being fascinated with the 1954 World Cup, when he
remembers listening to the match on the radio as a small child. He had collected a few
items related to the World Cup in his youth and continued amassing objects related to
Football throughout his life. In the act of collecting the souvenirs and memorabilia, Schlüper was not unlike many other regular football fans. What differentiated him from most, however, was his inability to throw much of it in the bin. As he grew older, Schlüper’s collection grew larger; eventually, he thought more seriously about the possibilities of displaying his collection to the public.

The dream finally came true when HoWoGe – a communal apartment and property leasing enterprise located in Berlin – agreed to donate one of its apartment complexes to serve as a public space for the museum. The DFMB is not only a museum. It is also an archive. It is as an archive in the sense that it is an unconventional repository of knowledge that is most interesting and unique. The type of materials found in the DFMB holds and put on display reflect a peculiar collection of artefacts that are typically not found in other “traditional” archives. Its artefacts do not quite fit the mandate of the Bundesarchiv (Federal archives) and Landesarchiv (State archives) in Berlin. Nor can they be found in the institutional archives of the German football association. Similarly, the majority of the items will not be found in the DFB’s official German football museum, which is more interested in items of prestige and authenticity. The DFB Museum, like state archives, such as the Landesarchiv Berlin and the Bundesarchiv, are not interested in the DFMB’s collections precisely because of their ordinariness, their everyday character. In Schlüper words, the stuff that was displayed in his museum is “junk”, “priceless garbage”, worthless everyday objects that he could not throw away.

74 One classic study on the need to re-conceptualize the archive is Antoinette Burton, Dwelling in the Archive: Women Writing House (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

As those who have studied cult collectors in some detail demonstrate, there are many museums and archives that share Schlüper’s anxieties and vision.76 Sport is strikingly well represented in this regard. Wray Vamplew reminds us, “nonacademic amateur sports historians should not be dismissed or abandoned as mere antiquarians”.77 For collectors such as Schlüper are often the only keepers of material, documents, statistics otherwise disregarded.78

Schlüper’s collection is especially revealing as a site where the past is not only put on display, but it also created and negotiated. His museum and its collections of objects, documents, books, artefacts, sounds, videos, and statistics reveal how the past is often a highly fractured, contentious site of discourse. It shows how the history of postwar Germany, and Germans’ perceptions and experiences of one another were often ambivalent and multifaceted.

The DFMB is a unique source because it complicates “normalized” narratives of Germany’s footballing past by integrating Berlin’s own, complicated history into the narrative. It is not a museum dedicated uniquely to the city’s football history. As the name suggests, it is a German football museum in Berlin. The narrative holds elements of German national success, such as honouring German national victories. It also attempts to integrate the element of inter-German competition directly linked to the Cold War. Though an important part of the museum, the historical narrative presented is not

78 In this regard, it may be worth looking at the special issue of the *International Journal of the History of Sport* 30 (2013) Issue 1 on “What is the Future of Sport History in Academia”; see also *Cult Collectors*. 

structured around notions of national success. Rather, the museum presents a more complicated, fractured, and entangled history of German and Berliner football.

Reflecting this vision of German and Berliner history, this dissertation draws on divergent sources from traditional and alternative archives. Because the SED regime was constantly worried about Western influence and relied heavily on sport to create a sense of national identity, government reports provide excellent insight into the ways Western popular culture may have permeated the Wall and how they sought to control its influence on GDR citizens. They also provide insight into the extent to which the SED regime failed to come to grips with football as a popular cultural activity, as Jutta Braun has suggested.79 The SED regime’s approach to football had the adverse effect of preventing the GDR from achieving a sense of national identity.80 The lack of success of the East German national team, the unprecedented success of the West German national team (especially in the 1970s), the perceived corruption of Mielke’s BFC Dynamo all served to fracture any sense of national identity that formed around football. While reinforcing a sense of local identity at the expense of national unity, the regime alienated local fans from the socialist variety of football promoted by the State, thereby making increasingly attractive what the authorities labelled as “deviant” alternatives from the West.

Whereas government documents from the security apparatuses of the FRG have for the most part not yet been released to the public, the BStU’s collection of surveillance

79 Jutta Braun, “The People’s Sport?”, 416-417
reports is vast. These reports provide an excellent description of the behaviors of individual supporters (East and West) and of the cultures fan groups created (chiefly in the East but also in the West). They also offer insight into the ways the regime perceived football.

Football- and sport-specific museums and archives and individual club museums and archives hold rich collections of football ephemera. Berlin is home to the Berlin Sportmuseum and the Deutsches Fußball Museum Berlin, both of which hold excellent collections of material artefacts, illustrations, video recordings, and documents pertaining to local Berlin football clubs and the East and West German national teams. These alternative archives are essential to collecting materials that otherwise would be lost in more conventional state archives, but have not yet been tapped to their fullest. Turning to items, memories, and discourses surrounding football cultures can speak to the ways networks of formal and informal exchanges allowed individuals and communities to play an active role in the ways local and national identities were constructed and negotiated.

The dissertation is divided into five chapters. The first chapter, “Berlin Fußballstadt: The Rise of the “People’s Game” in Berlin, c. 1870-1945”, is interested in explaining why football became so important to nineteenth and early-twentieth century German society. It is meant to provide some historical context to the rest of the dissertation, which focuses on the postwar period. It argues that football clubs opened important spaces for sociability. As much as they were important in constructing a civil society by breaking down denominational barriers, football clubs also had the potential to divide by implementing principles of inclusion/exclusion. As both the Weimar and Nazi government sought to take advantage of their popularity, football clubs were more
susceptible to becoming politicized organizations. In the end football proved remarkably malleable over the course of Germany’s regime changes.

The second chapter, “Rebuilding Football in Postwar Berlin, 1945-1954: “Stunde Null” (Zero Hour), Reconstruction, and the 1954 “Miracle of Bern”, focuses on German football’s “Stunde Null”. It describes how football in Germany was reconstructed following the Second World War. It focuses particularly on detailing the major institutional changes of the postwar period in the occupation zones, then in the FRG and GDR. It ends with a discussion of the significance of the 1954 World Cup victory, the so-called “Miracle of Bern”. Chapter 2 argues that football was instrumental in rebuilding German society after the war. The new realities of reconstruction ended with political division, but both state’s desire to participate in international competition ensured the two Germanys remained entangled.

The third chapter turns its attention to the years of physical division, 1961-1989. “Kicking around the Wall: Football in Divided Berlin, 1961-1989” explores the ways football offered Berliners unique spaces of interaction. As the FRG and GDR entered a phase of “détente” in the late 1960s and into 1970s, German and Berliner football were on the brink of enjoying a “Golden era”. Success coupled with new technological advancements, the commercialization of football, and the rise in popularity of the Bundesliga ensured East and West German football supporters had many ways to build connections around the Wall.

The fourth chapter, “Experiencing Football’s Liminal Moment, 1989/90”, takes the Wende as a historically important point of departure to examine how the fall of the GDR and subsequent unification affected Berliner football. It exhibits how the long-
lasting connections maintained through the years of political division ironically were not able to withstand the ambivalent experiences of the Wende.

Chapter 5, “Football’s Present Pasts” explores how institutions, fans, and clubs have constructed, negotiated, and narrated Germany’s football past since the Wende. It argues that despite German football’s tendency to construct homogenizing narratives of historical “success”, grassroots and fan-based initiatives provide a counter-narrative that do not follow normative narratives of success perpetuated by German football’s governing bodies.

Taken together, the chapters ask what Berlin’s fascinating football history can tell us about twentieth century Germany. In so doing, this dissertation complements the literature on Cold War cultures that seeks to provide alternatives to dichotomous interpretation of the divided past by using football to go “beyond the divide”. This dissertation therefore brings together the historiographies of German sport – and the history of football in particular – and “German-German” postwar history to better understand the special asymmetrical relationship that characterized postwar Germany. One of the main arguments put forward is that football provided important spaces and at times unique opportunities for social interaction. By penetrating these spaces of social interaction, we can get a better sense of the ways East and West Germans lived entangled lives despite division. This dissertation contributes to the literature that explores questions fundamental to understanding the demise of state socialism while acknowledging its influence persists. This dissertation, therefore, attempts to overcome the Cold War binary that divides the world into two camps by demonstrating how
football offers nuanced, complicated, and at times contradictory narratives of the German past.
Chapter 1. Berlin Fußballstadt (Football-city): The Rise of the People’s Game in Berlin, c. 1870-1945

With its release in 2011, Der ganz große Traum (“Lessons of a Dream”) popularized a commonly-accepted account of the origins of German football. The film tells the story of a German expatriate who spent years as a teacher in England, where he was introduced to the ball game.1 Upon his return to his native Braunschweig to teach at the local Gymnasium, protagonist Konrad Koch, portrayed in the film by the popular German actor Daniel Brühl, taught his pupils the basics of game.2 This narrative has been used in many official and semi-official accounts to explain how “the beautiful game” made it to Germany.3

The “Koch narrative”, however, offers little to explain why the game spread throughout the metropole – and later the empire. Evidence of football’s origins may lead back to Koch’s influential role in recording Germany’s first version of the game’s rules. Placing too much emphasis on one man, however, runs the risk of perpetuating a “Great Man” theory4 of German football’s history by pointing to mono-causal points of origins.

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1 Der ganz große Traum dir. by Sebastian Grobler, 2011.
2 For more information on Konrad Koch and his role in teaching German pupils in Braunschweig the English kicking game, see Kurt Wegbereiter, des Fußballspiels in Deutschland: Prof. Dr. Konrad Koch 1846-1911. Eine Biographie (Books on Demand, 2011); Malte Oberschelp, Der Fussball-Lehrer: Wie Konrad Koch im Kaiserreich den Ball ins Spiel brachte (Berlin: Verlag Die Wekstatt, 2010).
3 For example, the DFB, German football’s governing body, traces the origins of the game in the German-speaking lands to Konrad Koch. See the DFB’s official account of the origins of football in Germany on their official webpage: http://www.dfb.de/historie/.
4 The notion of a specific historical theory that emphasize the role of heroic, “great men” was most clearly expressed by Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History (New York: Frederick
Such simplistic interpretations may serve a practical purpose for the DFB, they offer little to help explain why Germans took to football in the way they did.

More important than attributing a mono-causal point of origin in explaining football’s magical grip on the German people, this dissertation’s first chapter is interested in explaining why football became so important to nineteenth and early-twentieth century German society.\(^5\) This chapter provides some historical context to the rest of the dissertation, which focuses on the postwar period. Firstly, it asks how football made it to Germany in the late-nineteenth century, then spread to Berlin. Critical of the simplicity inherent in the romantic interpretations offered by Koch-like narratives, it provides a socio-cultural approach to offer insight into why Germans became interested in football in the nineteenth century. It then explains how the game grew from relatively humble beginnings in the German-speaking lands to establish itself as the “people’s game” in the aftermath of the First World War. Rather than begin with the clichéd assumption that Germans were interested in football because it may inherit a magical grip on European’s as “the beautiful game”, this chapter explores how it became an important social activity to German society by introducing some of the main historiographical debates pertaining to the social history of football over Germany’s several regime changes.

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\(^5\) Herbert Spencer’s criticism of Carlyle’s praise for the “great men” of history was influential in emphasizing that “great men” were also subjects of specific sociological context. Many of his criticism found in \textit{The Study of Sociology} (D. Appleton and Company, 1873) remain relevant to socio-cultural history. The text is available online at the following address: https://www.questia.com/read/96277757/the-study-of-sociology .
The Origins of German Football: *Turnen*, the *Bildungsbürgertum* (Educated Bourgeoisie), and *Fußball-Vereine* (Football Clubs)

An academic debate has emerged in recent years over whether Britain “gave” modern sport to the world, a commonly accepted premise in sport studies. Critical of the so-called British model, historians Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young argue that sports like football, should be explained in terms of “polygenesis”, combining local, national, and global influences in the establishment and subsequent spread of modern, “British” sports. Such sports, they argue, should be placed alongside and in opposition to the nationalist physical culture movements that were popularized in central and northern Europe in the early- to mid-nineteenth century, such as the *Turnen* in Germany. For Tomlinson and Young, doing away with the British Model would help place the arrival of football, along with its complicated relationship with the *Bildungsbürgertum* (educated bourgeoisie) and especially the military and conservative elites, alongside a trajectory that includes the physical education and gymnastics movements that were much more popular in central and northern Europe at the time.

In Germany, a national physical culture developed during the wars of liberation against France under Friedrich Ludwig Jahn that combined elements of gymnastics and calisthenics with paramilitary drills and goals called *Turnen*. *Turnen* gained popularity

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6 See, for example, the special issue of *European Review*, “Towards a New History of European Sport” 19 (4). See the introduction by Tomlinson and Young, “Introduction” *European Review* 19 (4): 487-507.
7 Tomlinson and Young, “Introduction”.
8 Ibid., 500
9 I agree with David Imhoff who write “literally translating *Turnen* as ‘gymnastics’ omits all the term’s broader notions of calisthenics, group exercise, public presentation and general physical education. Such organizations in Germany offered a broad array of sports for members, including competitive gymnastics”. See David Imhoff, “The Game of Political Change: Sports in Göttingen during the Weimar and Nazi Eras,” *German History* 27 (2009): 374-394. For background information on the history of Ludwig Jahn and the
after the Napoleonic wars as an important site of physical exercise. Enthusiasts were primarily interested in disciplining the body to help create stronger, more self-disciplined citizens. As such, Turnen were attractive singular or plural bodily practices to both the military and political elite, since it kept the nation fit and healthy while instilling military and nationalistic values into individuals.

Other than physical exercise and helping in the construction of a national identity by participating in collective forms of bodily practice, Turnen, which were organized into Vereine (clubs), served an important social function in the development of a civil society in imperial Germany. According to historian Jürgen Kocka, along with the emergence of a capitalist economy that is highly dynamic, increasingly industrialized, and growing; a liberal system of law; arenas of public debate; a dynamic system of education; and a constitutional government with competing political parties; voluntary associations such as Turnvereine (Turnen clubs) were a “core element” of an emerging civil society that

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was intrinsically linked to the changing class structure of imperial Germany. For many nineteenth-century bourgeois liberals, as historian Molly Johnson argues, “the Turnverein was one of the central sources of an emerging and confident political and social identity.” The Bürgertum (bourgeoisie), traditionally understood to include merchants, bankers, manufacturers, industrialists, and business owners, has been more recently understood to include a wider range of individuals, including doctors, professors, ministers, lawyers, and administrators and civil servants. As a social group, they differentiated themselves from those of aristocratic privilege, religious orthodoxy, and the working classes whom they held with contempt. They also shared a common culture that included a specific type of family life and unequal gender relations and a respect for education. More importantly, an emphasis on personal autonomy, achievement, and success gave them a specific view of the world and a typical style of life in which clubs, associations, and urban communication played an important role. “Membership in a Turnverein [Turnen club],” as Johnson writes, “allowed men to cultivate influence within local associational networks and to form a collective identity that challenged conservative political authority. Furthermore, because members of Turnvereine (Turnen clubs) located throughout the German lands gathered occasionally for ‘national’ festivals, the clubs—and their festivals—became grassroots expressions of an emerging German national

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15 For more information on the German Bürgertum, see David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Oxford and New York, 1984); Matthew Jefferies, *Imperial Culture in Germany, 1871-1918* (Houndmills and New York, 2003).
unity.”¹⁷ In Imperial Germany, in other words, *Turnvereine* (Turnen clubs) were an important space of male sociability, which was central for the development of a civil society that reformed the feudal and corporate order of the late-nineteenth-century.¹⁸

The various ball-playing games that fit under the umbrella term “football” in Britain were brought to the German-speaking lands – much as it spread to the rest of the world – by British settlers, tourists, and students; in other words, it arrived as a by-product of Britain’s “informal empire”.¹⁹ As Christiane Eisenberg has demonstrated, it spread thanks to the extensive networks of financial and cultural exchange between the English and German middle classes.²⁰ An important element in its spread was the role played by English railroad engineers, who were relied upon to help the German empire construct its extensive rail system.²¹ Once introduced to the basics of football games in its various forms, the *Bildungsbürgertum* (educated bourgeoisie), who were most likely to have dealings with the British, embraced it.²² It was especially popular amongst students at liberal universities, who were also likely to participate in *Turnvereine* (Turnen clubs).

¹⁸ Some research suggests that although nineteenth century Vereine were largely a space of male sociability, football clubs differed from Turnen clubs in that women were present. See Christiane Eisenberg, “Football in Germany: Beginnings, 1890-1914,” *International Journal of the History of Sport* 8 (1991), 205-220; see also Gisela Mettele, “The City and the Citoyenne: Associational Culture and Female Civic Virtues in Nineteenth-Century Germany”, in *Civil Society and Gendered Justice*, ed. Karen Hagemann et al. (New York: Berghahn, 2008), 79-98. See also Gertrud Pfister, “The future of football is female!? “The Future is Female!? On the Past and Present in women’s football in Germany,” in *German Football: History, Politics, Society*, ed. Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006).
¹⁹ Eisenberg, “Football in Germany: Beginnings, 1890-1914; Eggers, “Die Anfänge des Fußballsports in Deutschland”; Goldblatt, *The Ball is Round*, especially chapter 2.
²² Eisenberg, “*Englisch Sport*” und deutsche Bürger.
It is worth mentioning that Football did not experience the same meteoritic rise in popularity from the late nineteenth century in the German empire as it did in England or other parts of the world, such as south-eastern South America.\textsuperscript{23} Nor was it anywhere near as popular as Turnen around the same time.\textsuperscript{24} Its spread was impressive, but it was also relatively slow and occurred relatively late.\textsuperscript{25} Though the game spread mostly to urban, industrialized centres, it attracted almost exclusively university students and some middle-class adults. The working classes are noticeably absent in the story of football’s spread in Germany, considering their British counterparts overwhelmed the game during the same period.\textsuperscript{26} What explains Germany’s slow embrace of football during the late-nineteenth century?

Eisenberg proves useful in offering explanations. First, unlike Britain, mid- to late-nineteenth century Germany did not have a strong living tradition of folk ball games.\textsuperscript{27} According to historians of the British game, what may be referred today as “football” derived from a myriad of ball-playing folk rituals from the British Empire’s

\textsuperscript{23} On the spread of football in South America, see Tony Mason, \textit{Passion of the People? Football in South America} (London: Verso, 1995); Goldblatt, \textit{The Ball is Round}, Chapter 1; Bill Murray, \textit{The World’s Game: A History of Soccer} (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1998), 21-41; for Brazil, see David Goldblatt, \textit{Futebol Nation: A Footballing History of Brazil} (London: Penguin, 2014); for Argentina, see Jonathan Wilson, \textit{Angels with Dirty Faces: The Footballing History of Argentina} (London: Orion, 2016). One can also compare the spread of football in other European states. See, for example, John Foot’s \textit{Calcio: A History of Italian Football}.

\textsuperscript{24} For a history of the German Turnen, see Svenja Goltermann, \textit{Körper der Nation: Habitusformierung und die Politik des Turnens 1860-1890} (Göttingen, 1998).

\textsuperscript{25} For a brief history of the rise of football in Germany compared to that of England, see Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, chapter 1.

\textsuperscript{26} On the spread of football to the British working class, see Goldblatt, \textit{The Ball is Round}, chapter 3.

peripheries of England, Scotland, and Wales. Pupils of Britain’s public school system, brought with them these folk-games where, codifying them, and making it easier to play with and against rivals. Though Germans may have had similar folk games dating from the Middle Ages, evidence suggests such ritual practices had died out long before the late nineteenth century.

Second, unlike the British public school system of Victorian England, German Gymnasien and universities were not based on a boarding model. Loyalties to respective schools were therefore relatively weak. German pupils did not organize leisurely pursuits as often as their British counterparts. There were few Burschenschaften (student-organized societies) as a result. German school children thus did not solidify a cohesive sub-culture that facilitated the construction of identities closely attached to the schools as did their Victorian counterparts.

Third, although associational life was an important element of late-nineteenth century German bourgeois society, the Bürgertum (bourgeoisie) represented only roughly 5-7% of the German population. Of those 5-7%, most already participated in Turnvereine (Turnen clubs), which appealed to both the conservative and liberal segments of the German middle-class. Whereas football was popular amongst the liberals, many of whom may have viewed British cultural products with interest,

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29 Eisenberg, “Football in Germany,” 206-207.
30 Eisenberg, “Football in Germany”, 207.
31 Statistics drawn from Kocka, Industrial Culture and Bourgeois Society, 282-283.
conservatives remained sceptical. In the end, only a small portion of Germans had access to the game and an even smaller number of them were interested in the British game.

Before moving on to explore an important fourth reason, it is worth following Eisernberg’s suggestion to pause to consider football’s appeal to liberal university students and white-collar workers. Eisenberg has pointed out that football’s early proponents were especially attracted to the game’s “openness”, the lack of restrictions against specific social groups, such as workers or entrepreneurs, that typically characterized the associational activities of the Bürgertum (bourgeoisie). Fußball-Vereine (Football clubs), therefore, offered the Bürgertum something slightly different but also similar to the Turnvereine (Turnen clubs): they mirrored the structure of clubs while altering the makeup of its members by not limiting participation in football matches to individual sub-groups of German bourgeois society. This “openness”, according to Eisenberg, “was a precondition for the ‘modern’, that is noncommittal and relaxed forms of sociability which in turn-of-the-century-Germany were highly appreciated not only by white-collar workers but by young[, liberal] Bürger [bourgeois] as well”.32 In other words, much like the Turnvereine, football clubs were important spaces for sociability-reforms in imperial Germany.33 They were appealing as both an alternative and a complement to Turnvereine, the nationally imbued physical culture of the nineteenth century.34

The game’s perceived foreign, British, attributes meant it was more contentious than it was popular with the less liberal-minded elements of Imperial German society, a

32 Eisenberg, “Football in Germany”, 211.
34 Ibid.
segment of the population which grew and became more powerful towards the turn of the century.\textsuperscript{35} From its earliest days, football was referred to as the “English disease” [“die englische krankheit”].\textsuperscript{36} Its main antagonists were supporters of the \textit{Turnen} movement and conservative nationalists suspicious of anything English, many of whom viewed football in particular as a foreign and potentially dangerous game. With its strong links to military exercise, \textit{Turnen}, which also includes notions of calisthenics, group exercise, public presentation, and general physical education, were regarded as the national physical activity.\textsuperscript{37} Football, in contrast, was lambasted as an inferior – and potentially dangerous – physical activity with nefarious enemy origins.

Supporters of football had to defend themselves against attacks that approximated accusations of treason. For enthusiasts, playing football did not mutually exclude them from being a patriot. To demonstrate their patriotic proclivities, they Germanised the game by ascribing German words to its rules, regulations, and describers, a legacy that persists to this day.\textsuperscript{38} Descriptive denominators were translated from their English origins to their appropriate German derivatives. Germania 1888, for example stated the following in its book of principles: “Und ‘Deutsch’ war sein Intertittel — Deutsch sollte der Club sein, frei von der englischen Sportsprache” (“And ‘German’ was its sub-title – The Club should be German, free from English sport language”).\textsuperscript{39} Whereas it is common to hear of a player winning “\textit{un corner}” in French, “\textit{ein Eckball}” is given in German. Player positions, such as “\textit{Stürmer}” (striker) and “\textit{Verteidiger}” (defender) have

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{35} See Kocka, \textit{Industrial Culture and Bourgeois Society}, 282-284.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Reference in Florian Reiter, \textit{Der Kick mit dem Ball: Die Geschichte des Fußballs} (Vergangenheitsverlag, 2009), 45
\item \textsuperscript{37} See, for example, Imhoff, “Game of Political Change”.
\item \textsuperscript{38} See Hesse-Lichtenburger, \textit{Tor!}, 28-32.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Germania 1888, 50 Jahre, 8
\end{itemize}
particular specific connotations in German that allude to the military. Likewise, club names were chosen to reflect a specifically nationalist pride. Further illustrating the point, names, such as Germania, Borussia, Allemania, Vorwärts, Wacker, and Preussen were among the favourites.\textsuperscript{40}

The fourth, and perhaps most important, reason for Germans' slow embrace of football in the late-nineteenth century does not relate to the potential animosity early footballers would have received by advocates of Turnen. Rather, it relates to Germany’s slow adaptation of football’s competitive dimension.\textsuperscript{41} Football remained couched in the tradition of the Turnen, which focused on individual rather than competitive success, until the turn of the century. Vereine were spaces for sociability, which meant that football was enjoyed without a competitive element to it. Its primary purpose was to ensure the game was played correctly, according to the correct norms of social behaviour prescribed by the association.\textsuperscript{42} Its objective was not competitive in the form of outperforming other players. Football’s main function, in other words, remained sociability rather than entertainment.

This started to change with the founding of the DFB in 1900. The DFB provided some form of standardization to the game. More importantly, it formed competitions whereby the winner was based on a league-table. Adding the league table allowed not just fellow club members to record and compare results over time, it also enabled a wider


\textsuperscript{41} Eisenberg, "Football in Germany", 212; see also Merkel, “The Hidden Social and Political History of the DFB”, 168-175.

\textsuperscript{42} On “fair play” as an important concept in the development of British sports, see Goldblatt, The Ball is Round, chapter 2, “The Simplest Game: Britain and the Invention of Modern Football".
audience to participate in the competition as outsiders by comparing the results over time and place.\footnote{See the argument on the league table in Ziemann, “The Impossible Vanishing Point,” 42-43.}

The introduction of the competitive dimension – derived from modern British sports – transformed German football from a “social game”, in which the primary function is of opening a space for sociability, to a “game of society”.\footnote{The point about the transformation of football from a game “social game” to the “game of society” is raised in Ziemann, “The Impossible Vanishing Point,” 42.} Although it is important to place football within a longer trajectory alongside the Turnen in order to explain the reasons why nationalists and conservatives were sceptical of the game, as Tomlinson and Young have recently argued, Christiane Eisenberg reminds us that there is a strategic reason for using the “British model” when examining the spread of football in Germany.\footnote{See Eisenberg’s response to Tomlinson and Young, “Towards a new history of European sport?”} It was precisely the codification of the game and its impact on sports more generally, namely the introduction of the competitive dimension, that helps explain football’s ultimate rise and, later, its social significance for much of central Europe. For Eisenberg, the spread of football in imperial Germany and its explosion after the First World War, is a case in point.

The Prussian capital proved an ideal location for the game to gain in popularity. Berlin, for popular German football writer Ulrich Hesse-Lichtenberger, was “the undisputed centre of football” in Germany from 1888 to 1909 and arguably until the outbreak of war.\footnote{Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}, 22.} At the time, the city possessed all the attributes football needed to prosper in its early days. As the capital of the German empire, Berlin was a burgeoning urban metropolis, a growing economic powerhouse, and an important military centre. Its
military parade grounds provided early football enthusiasts with a space large enough to
kick and carry a ball long distances. Berlin also provided shelter as a thriving metropolis.
It offered unusual spaces for groups of people to meet away from the lurking eyes of the
disapproving state. It housed many educated residents who were highly communicative,
with many institutions of higher learning – such as universities and Gymnasia – and one
of the richest public spheres in fin-de-siècle Europe. Berlin was ideal for the
Bildungsbürgertum to indulge in an activity important to civil society.

It is unsurprising that the capital of the German empire was home to some of the
earliest German football clubs. FC Germannia, the oldest, was founded in 1888; Viktoria
Berlin only officially a year later, in 1889; Hertha BSC followed in 1892; and FC
Tasmannia Berlin was founded in 1900 (See Figure 1.1). The first club to boast a
permanent ground was a club from Berlin: Preussen Berlin FC in 1899. A Berlin
Football association formed in 1897. One of the largest associations in the Empire, the
Berliner Fußball-Verband (BFV) sent thirteen of the 86 representative clubs to the
delegation that founded the DFB in 1900. In 1911, the DFB decided to join the
paramilitary Jungdeutschlandbund (Young German Federation), which eased the
transition and allowed it to increase in popularity. In 1904, a few years after its founding,
the DFB counted approximately 200 clubs and 10 000 members. By the outbreak of the

\[47 \text{Ibid, 22-23.}
48 \text{Ibid., 25.}
49 \text{For more information on the development of a Berliner football association, see BFV, 100 Jahre BFV, 42.}
50 \text{Ibid.} \]
First World War, only ten years later, its numbers rose steadily and impressively to 2,200 clubs and 200,000 members.\textsuperscript{51}

\textbf{Figure 1.1}: SC Tasmannia 1900 Berlin play Berlin Sportclub, 1907.

Source: made available via the GHDI website, © Bildarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz

\url{http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_image.cfm?image_id=1624}.

Available evidence might suggest that associational football was first played at Koch’s Gymnasia in Braunschweig, but it does not explain how football then spread throughout the German empire or, more importantly, why the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth

\textsuperscript{51} Eisenberg, “Football in Germany”, 205.
Bildungsbürgertum were so attracted to the “English disease”. The German middle class gained exposure to the British game and it travelled on the fast-expanding transportation infrastructure. It remained an interest of only a privileged few, who found themselves attracted to the game’s “openness”, the possibility for different segments of the middle-class to play together. Football’s growing popularity might have been impressive, but it did not match the extent to which it was taking certain areas by storm, mainly in Great Britain itself and in South-East America – Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina. It took the introduction of the competitive element of modern sports followed by the outbreak of the First World War to transform football in Germany into “the people’s game”.

The First World War and the Rise of “the People’s Game”

Upon initial reflection, war may not seem to provide the ideal conditions for football to flourish.\footnote{Histories that deal with the cost of the First World War in terms of human sacrifice are too extensive to reference at any length here. For an overview, see Roger Chickering. \textit{Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).} Large numbers of soldiers spent much of their days in trenches. Trenches – networks of dug-out ditches – are the opposite of the space needed to play a ball-kicking or ball-carrying game. Spaces that served as playing fields before the war were turned into vegetable patches to mitigate the naval blockade that starved the German population.\footnote{Goldblatt, \textit{The Ball is Round}, 172-173.} Young men were killed in the tens of thousands daily. Nevertheless, it was within the confines of the World War and the social conditions it unleashed in the years after that football exploded in popularity.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, Chapter 5.}
The romantic, enduring image of football during the war is of a British and German army officer shaking hands above a football, captured by Andy Edwards’s commemorative statue in Liverpool. This vision of football as a method of peacemaking during war was recently popularized in the 2005 film *Joyeux Noël*. The film, directed by Christian Carion, provides a dramatic recreation of the now infamous football matches that were played in no-man’s-land during the Christmas Truce of 1914. The lasting image is of one whereby football breaks down insurmountable barriers, bringing together fierce enemies in times of war.

Fraternizing with the enemy, however, does not fit in war. The Christmas Truce proved to be the last collective pause in the killing. In his seminal cultural interpretation of the Great War, *Rites of Spring*, historian Modris Eksteins asks how one explains the large exchanges and fraternization that took place during the Christmas truce. His answer suggests that the British entered 1914 in the spirit of a Victorian sport cult that saw them make sense of the war as a metaphor for competitive sport. The “spirit of the game” was of utmost importance. If the game – war – was played properly, according to the correct values, victory for all would be assured. The *Illustrated London News* published the following poem that represents the experiences of the East Surrey Regiment:

On through the hail of slaughter  
Where gallant comrades fall,  
Where blood is poured like water,

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They drive the trickling ball.
The fear of death before them
Is but an empty name;
True to the land that bore them
The Surreys play the game.57

Much of the literature from December 1914 suggests that this sort of spirit was still strong and was shared, at least among some battalions, by the Germans. For Eksteins, “it was presumably the very same set of values that they were fighting for…the notion of probity and decorum, of playing the game – leaving the enemy in peace on the holiest of days – was a central part of the British sense of “fair play”.58 For the most part soldiers used the pause in fighting as a time for reflection on the nature of mechanical warfare.59

As the fighting dragged on, viewing the war romantically as a metaphor for sport became increasingly impossible.60 There were instances reported of army officers trying to use football to rally their troops before battles. The most mythic of such instances was British Captain W. P. Neville, who dribbled a ball across no-man’s lands during the battle of the Somme in 1916. Neville’s heroics, however, did not last long. He was killed within moments. Survivors of the battle such as Roland D. Mountford explained, “We didn’t dribble footballs, neither did we say ‘This way to Berlin, boys’ nor any of the phrases employed weekly in the ‘News of the World’.”61

Although such morale boosting exploits were largely absent from German newspapers of the time, football became an increasingly important pastime as the war

57 Poem references in Goldblatt, The Ball is Round, 173.
58 Eksteins, Rites of spring, 120.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 120-126.
61 Eksteins, Rites of spring, 124.
progressed. Generally regarded as too violent and chaotic to be of any military use, army officials reluctantly permitted soldiers to play football to let off steam. As the war dragged on and military casualties increased, reserves were increasingly called upon. Millions of soldiers from all walks of life passed through recruitment centres, training grounds, and prisoner of war camps, where, for many, they first encountered the game. Its relative simplicity made it a favourite pass-time alongside cards. Perhaps the most important and long-lasting effect the war had on German sports – football in particular – was the fostering of a sense of community among its soldiers. Other than experiencing football for the first time, they did so within the confines that helped build a sense of male belonging that outlived the war.

War and revolution shattered the old order. The revolutions of 1918 led to the abdication of the Kaiser, the signing of the peace treaty, and the construction of a Republic in which social reforms solidified a more integrated civil society. Other than millions of Germans being exposed to the game for the first time, either through a quick, but highly symbolic truce in 1914, or through the daily routines of army life, the war changed many social conventions that would otherwise have kept football a past-time of

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63 Ibid.
67 Kocka, *Industrial Culture*. 
the Bürgertum. Once the fighting ended, many ex-servicemen joined clubs to continue to foster the sense of belonging they cultivated during the war. In this respect, sport, especially via participation in its sport clubs, played an increasingly important role in the lives of many Germans.68

In addition to the destruction of monarchy and the German empire, a series of important concessions were granted to the working class that had perhaps the greatest impact on the history of football in Germany. Almost immediately, Workers’ Vereine were established and grew in popularity.69 Building on the popularity of the Turnen across the empire, many Workers’ Clubs emerged as alternatives for the more bourgeois Turnvereine.

Working class intellectuals held equivocal and at times contradictory views of sport. On the one hand, they saw value in Turnen. Turnen kept workers healthy and fit and they could also be useful in breaking down class barriers and spreading revolutionary ideology. On the other hand, intellectuals were suspicious of sport generally – and football principally. Famous writer and cultural critic Siegfried Kracauer feared sport was dangerous to working-class militancy.70 For many like him, Kracauer viewed mass spectator sport as another form of “opium of the masses,” a view that continued well after the Second World War. In 1919, Heinrich Tröbel, then a member of the Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Independent Socialist Part of Germany

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provided a vivid depiction of how socialists viewed sport. For Tröbel, hiking was the sport of the future, replacing what he termed the current “passion for one-sided stupid muscle sports and the even more stupid rubberneck passion of the masses”.

Of course, he was speaking of “English sports”, namely boxing and, most hated of all, football.

After the war, a shift in attitude was laid bare. The *Arbeiter Turnerbund* (Workers’ Turnen Federation [ATB]) changed its name to include the word “Sport”, becoming the *Arbeiter-Turn- und Sportbund* (Workers’ Turn and Sports Federation [ATSB]). Membership in the ATSB skyrocketed from a few hundred thousand before the war to over a 1.2 million at its peak in 1929, despite the significant loss of life – including roughly 19% of its 1914 members – experienced by the generation of men most like to join such sport clubs during the war. Not included in these figures are the over 250 000 members of communist sport clubs that were expelled or not permitted to join the ATSB, an association closely related to the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, (Socialist Democratic Party of Germany [SPD]). This is representative of the club members’ appetite for competitive sport, especially football, despite the common views expressed by Socialist intellectuals and leaders.

Although Workers’ Sports clubs, much like their confessional and political counterparts, were immensely popular, the Workers’ Sports movement was unable to fully capitalize on providing an alternative space for workers to the bourgeois associations that viewed the working class as beneath them. Inability to unite socialists...

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71 quoted in Ziemann, “The Impossible Vanishing point,” 41, see fn 18.
and communists into a united movement weakened Workers’ sports as much as it did in politics, as they competed for similar members. As much as workers tended to join sport clubs to escape the repetition of factory life, they also enjoyed the escape clubs offered from political life. Socialist leaders tended to use the clubs as a space to further class consciousness. Many had speeches before games mandated into their club regulations. In this sense, they simultaneously over- and underestimated the power of sport as a divertissement, an opportunity for escape from the politicization of daily life. Such mandatory instruction alienated the workers from joining or remaining in Workers’ clubs.

Another main problem workers’ sports clubs faced were finances. First, there was an issue of ownership. Unlike bourgeois, confessional, or business-based clubs, Workers’ clubs generally did not own the facilities or the equipment needed to maintain sport clubs.\textsuperscript{73} Second, workers’ clubs found it difficult to secure state funding. Bourgeois clubs, for example, were six times more likely to receive state funding during the Weimar period than Workers’ Clubs.\textsuperscript{74} For clubs already strapped for cash, limited opportunities to secure financing severely limited Workers’ clubs potential to attract top working class footballers, something the bourgeois clubs would capitalize on despite their general unwillingness to socialize with those they perceived as being socially beneath them.

As football grew in popularity, it became a lucrative business enterprise as a spectator sport. In Weimar, football was big business. In competitive sports, entertainment is often directly related to success. In attempts to attract the best players to their clubs to better compete, bourgeois and business-based clubs turned to monetary

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 203.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
compensation as an incentive to attract the best players.\textsuperscript{75} Because of the general lack of financing coupled with ideological opposition, Workers’ clubs did not pay top athletes. As a result, it was relatively common for influential working class players to leave Workers’ clubs to join the more competitive clubs and leagues organized by the DFB. Workers also gravitated to the competitions put on by the so-called bourgeois clubs, many of which involved monetary prizes.\textsuperscript{76} Monetary incentive ensured that bourgeois clubs attracted the best players, even if they were from the working classes. DFB competitions attracted the biggest crowds, who came in waves to see the best teams put on display. Within the clubs and inside the stadia, football offered a unique space for the so-called “rough and respectable” elements of Weimar society to meet and interact.

Large numbers swarmed the football arenas in the interwar period, with reports of record-breaking numbers appearing on an almost weekly, if not yearly, basis. During the Weimar period tens of thousands flocked the stadia to watch matches, in sharp contrast to only the hundreds before the war. Case in point, over 50 000 tickets were sold and over 55 000 Berliners crammed the Deutschen Stadion (German Stadium), the predecessor to the Olympic stadium in Berlin, to see the first post-war international match between Germany and Hungary in October 1920.\textsuperscript{77} Surviving images from the post-First-World-War period confirm statistical reports on spectators at the time. The difference is clearly visible when one compares early images of football matches with those from the 1920s. Before the outbreak of war, images of football terraces show gatherings of hundreds of

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{76} See Merkel, “Milestones,” 223-224

\textsuperscript{77} Statistics taken from Skreutny, \textit{grosse Buch der Fussball-Stadion}, 30; see also the Olympiastadion’s official web-page on its history: \url{http://www.olympiastadion-berlin.de/en/stadium-visitor-centre/history.html}.
individuals in an open field that surrounded the rectangular football pitch. Compare, for example, the two images below. Figure 1.2 is an engraving from a painting that depicts a football match between a club from Dresden and one from Berlin in 1892. In typical fashion, spectators, sporting the fashion of the time, form a thin rectangle around the playing field.

![Figure 2: Fußballspiel Dresden gegen Berlin im Jahre 1892 (Football match between Dresden and Berlin, 1892).](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fu%C3%9Fballgeschichte_(1892).jpg)

*Figure 2: Fußballspiel Dresden gegen Berlin im Jahre 1892 (Football match between Dresden and Berlin, 1892).*

*Source: Wikicommons at the following address:*

[https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fu%C3%9Fballgeschichte_(1892).jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fu%C3%9Fballgeschichte_(1892).jpg)
Images from the 1920s, on the other hand, consistently depict gatherings of thousands and tens of thousands of people on slightly slanted hills – often surrounding a main stand – so spectators get a decent view the field despite the packed space. Figure 1.3, an image of the 1924 German cup final, provides an excellent illustration of this point. It was not uncommon to see rows of spectators cram the roof-tops when little place was left inside the stadium.78

Figure 1.3: Endspiel um die deutsche Meisterschaft, 1924. Deutsches Stadion in Berlin, 8. June 1924.

78 A similar example can be found in BFV, 100 Jahre, 47.
The football craze went beyond the stadia. The rise of football as a form of popular culture owed much to the rise of mass media, which also emerged onto the scene at this time.\textsuperscript{79} Football, much like the media, was everywhere. Berlin was unrivalled in Europe when it came to circulation of newspapers, magazines, and tabloids, a legacy they inherited from a strong public sphere that emerged prior to the First World War.\textsuperscript{80} The media reported widely on sport and football. The 1920s saw the emergence of sport reportage as a separate kind of profession related to reporting.\textsuperscript{81} Football matches were played over the radio. The local match reached the cover pages of local, regional, and national newspapers; conversations continued throughout the week. The new mass media, especially the so-called popular yellow press, ensured football’s popularity turned into a form of mass entertainment that could be consumed on a daily basis.\textsuperscript{82} As economic historian Ziemann argues, the emergence of competitive sports and the mass media represented “the emergence and stabilization of new, specific forms of addressing the social world with codes such as information/non-information and winning/losing.”\textsuperscript{83} Speaking about imperial Germany specifically, he states that “the development of the

\textsuperscript{79} Ziemann, “The Impossible Vanishing Point”.

\textsuperscript{80} On the emergence of a German public sphere, see Jürgen Habermas, \textit{The Structural Transformations of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into the Category of Bourgeois Society} (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991); For a series of criticism of Habermas’s understanding of the structural transformations, see Craig Calhoun (ed.), \textit{Habermas and the Public Sphere} (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992); and Harold Mah, “Phantasies of the Public Sphere: Rethinking the Habermas of Historians,” The Journal of Modern History 72 (2000): 153-182.

\textsuperscript{81} Sharenberg, \textit{Die Konstruktion des öffentlichen Sports}.

\textsuperscript{82} on the negative effects of the “yellow press”, see Bernhard Fulda, \textit{Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); see also Corey Ross, \textit{Media and the Making of Modern Germany: Mass Communications, Society and Politics from the Empire to the Third Reich} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

\textsuperscript{83} Ziemann, “The Impossible Vanishing Point,” 42-43
media society and of the meritocratic, achievement- and profit-oriented sports system were part of the political reality and were in many ways influenced by politics. At the same time, it becomes apparent that both systems cultivated their own social reality, the values and the rationality criteria of the monarchical authoritarian state played a subordinate role at best.  

The mass media and spectator sports became self-referential systems. There was a marked increase in sport coverage in the media. Individual clubs started their own publications to report on the clubs’ activities. Worker’s clubs reported club activities in their own press, whereas the bourgeois clubs were present in the popular press (also the cinema and radio). Though these mutually reinforcing systems emerged in the late-nineteenth century, they blossomed during the Weimar Republic. The new mass media provided clubs and individuals with a public space within which they could engage the public sphere.

The self-referential systems offered by the emergence of mass media also helped create the first German football celebrities. Athletes became central figures in the Weimar Republic. The media played a central role in enabling the representation of star athletes as “heroes”. Historian Scharenberg argues that rather than view the role of the media as an agent that simply relates information about a society back to its population, the mass press in Weimar actively created “heroes”. With its growing coverage, the media disseminated much needed symbols of local and national pride to its audience.

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84 Ibid.
85 For Hertha, see: http://www.herthamuseum.de/mu/hertha-historie/geschichte/1933-1945/page/33-115---.html#.V-rKTJMrLus.
Along with figures like Max Schmeling\textsuperscript{87}, the famous heavyweight champion boxer, football players, such as Hertha BSC’s dynamic captain Johannes Sobek, who guided the club to five straight national final appearances and winning two, were some of the first pop stars of the sporting world.\textsuperscript{88}

It is thus of little surprise that football thrived in Weimar Germany. “Weimar was Berlin, Berlin Weimar,” writes Eric Weitz in his seminal work \textit{Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy}. Berlin “was a kaleidoscope of diversity and excitement”.

With more than four million residents, the capital was by far the largest city in Germany, the second largest in Europe, a megapolis that charmed and frightened, attracted and repelled Germans and foreigners alike. … It was a city of leisure, with neighborhoods of elegant wealth and amusement parks, a zoo, and numerous lakes accessible by rail or streetcar to virtually all Berliners. Its infamous tenement blocks rivaled the slums of any great city for their darkness, congestion, and poverty.\textsuperscript{89}

What Weitz calls “Berlin modern” was “all this and more”\textsuperscript{90} In order to help the reader get a glimpse of what it would have been like to experience Berlin’s modern pulse and gain an appreciation for the importance leisure played in it, Weitz invites readers to join him by “walking the city”, as the title of his second chapter suggests.\textsuperscript{91}

Football, however, does not feature in Weitz’s stroll down Berlin’s streets, through its districts and neighbourhoods; neither do the giant sporting grounds designed to attract ever more spectators. As much as football thrived in Weimar Germany, it also

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{87} See his autobiography, Max Schmelling, \textit{Mein Leben} (Europäischer Literatur Verlag: Bremen, 2010).
\item \textsuperscript{88} For a recent account of the rivalry between Max Schmelling and Joe Louis, see Patrick Myler, \textit{Ring of Hate: Joe Louis Vs. Max Schmelling} (2013).
\item \textsuperscript{89} \textsuperscript{90} \textsuperscript{91} See his autobiography, Max Schmelling, \textit{Mein Leben} (Europäischer Literatur Verlag: Bremen, 2010).
\item \textsuperscript{88} For a recent account of the rivalry between Max Schmelling and Joe Louis, see Patrick Myler, \textit{Ring of Hate: Joe Louis Vs. Max Schmelling} (2013).
\item \textsuperscript{89} Weitz, \textit{Weimar Germany}, 77-79.
\item \textsuperscript{90} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{91} \textit{Ibid.}, chapter 2.
\end{itemize}
thrived in its cultural and political capital. As Weitz highlights in the passages cited above, all the ingredients were in place to ensure competitive football thrived as one of the most entertaining pastimes during the interwar period. Football, much like the cinema, provided an escape from the highly politicized world outside. Unlike the cinema however, or other forms of popular or artistic entertainment, football benefited from the competitive element, which provided an extra dimension to the experience. Following the First World War, large industrial areas became football powerhouses; the football stadium became a place of immense popularity; clubs became firmly entrenched as important cultural products of urban areas, cities, and neighbourhoods. Watching the match unfold in the stadium, spectators from the Kiez (neighborhood) began to identify with the eleven on the pitch. Eric Hobsbawm’s dictum seems quite apt in this case: “The imagined community of millions seems more real as a team of eleven named people. The individual, even the one who only cheers, becomes a symbol of the nation itself”. Working class neighbourhoods became football strongholds. Allegiances formed around local Football clubs and rivalries were born and ensconced. In Berlin, the working district of Wedding, referred to as “roter Wedding” (red Wedding) during the Weimar Republic, was home to two of Berlin’s most popular and successful clubs: Hertha BSC and Tasmania Berlin Union Oberschönweide, a club located in South-east of the city, emerged as some of Berlin’s premier clubs during the interwar period. In 1923, the defending champion Schlosserjungs (young metal workers), whose nickname reflected the clothing worn in the local metal factories, played HSV Hamburg in a final that broke

the German spectatorship record. Over 64 000 spectators watched the champions fall to a 0:3 defeat.⁹³

Oberschönweide’s final defeat did not spell the decline of Berlin’s footballing prowess. Between 1926 and 1931, Hertha BSC played in six consecutive national championship finals, winning the title in 1930 and 1931. As outlined above, football became the “people’s game” in interwar Germany and it prospered in Weimar Berlin. The rise of the Nazi party, however, altered the city’s thriving football cultures.

**Berliner Football After the *Machtergreifung* (Nazi Seizure of Power)**

The Nazi party’s views on sport as intimately tied to racial hygiene, its usefulness in training for the military, and building the Volksgemeinschaft have been well documented.⁹⁴ Participation in sporting activities was undoubtedly encouraged by the Führer, especially its effectiveness in shaping the German body and *Volk* (nation). The Führer viewed football, however, with indifference. His indifference turned to disinterest and outright hostility after he attended his first match, a preliminary bout between Germany and Norway at the 1936 Olympics. Rather than experience a showcase of German virtues – hard work, discipline, sense of community – the German team was

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⁹³ Reiter, *Der Kick mit dem Ball*, 46.
beaten by their opponents. Hitler apparently had had enough after Norway’s second goal to make it 2:0. He did not stay until the end.  

Regardless of Hitler’s personal dislike for the game, football played an important role in turning Berlin into the new capital of Germania. Hitler never shirked from tapping football from its potential for propaganda. Emphasis, however, was firmly placed in favour of supporting the national team. The Olympiastadion (Olympic stadium) in Berlin today remains a testament to Hitler’s global ambitions, one of the few architectural structures left standing after the Nazi catastrophe. The Olympic stadium and its surrounding Haus des deutschen Sports (House of German Sports) were meant to serve as hallmarks to display to the world Germany’s power. After re-development between 1933 and 1936 in preparation for the Olympics, the new Deutschen Stadion (German Stadium) could seat over 100 000 spectators. The Nazis organized pre- and post-game marches, filled the stadia with flags and swastikas and military, and encouraged the singing of Nazi songs, all with the intention of conveying a feeling of belonging in the “Volksgemeinschaft” (People’s racial community) to the spectators. High profile international football matches were organized, such as the one at the Olympic stadium in Berlin between England and Germany in 1934 because they “offered the Nazis a way to assert national power, while also opening avenues for the infiltration of internationalist ideals and values”, as Barbara Keys has argued.  

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95 Hesse-Lichtenberger, *Tor!*, chapter “Ansluss und Angst”.
96 See the work of Rudolf Oswald on this topic. See “Tagber, Fussball in der nationalsozialistischen Gesellschaft”. On the Volksgemeinschaft, see Peter Fritzsche, *Life and Death in the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).
At the club level, the Olympic stadium continued to serve a grandiose national purpose. It continued to play host to the national championships throughout the Nazi period. The 1936 final between Schalke 04 and 1. FC Nürnberg speaks to football popularity during the Nazi period: It attracted over 101 000 spectators to a match that did not include a local team.98

Perhaps a better barometer of how the Nazis ultimately affected German football in the 1930s and early 1940s is not to focus on pre-organized spectacles construed for the purposes of propaganda, such as the ones put on regularly at the Olympic stadium, but to turn inward, towards the inner practical functioning of individual clubs. After the Nazi seizure of power, the party’s first priority was to neutralize potentially divisive institutions and political parties from the national to the local level.99 They attacked the confessional, political, and workers’ clubs, all of which were deemed “illegal”, ordered to disband, and their property was “socialized”.100 Historian of leisure Shelley Baranowski, for example, has shown that through programmes like the Kraft durch Freude (Strength Through Joy), the Nazis encouraged participation in leisurely activities organized by the state.101 Leisure, sport, and organized tourism all came together as the Nazis sought to regulate the shop floor while embedding a sense of national belonging to its Workers. The purpose of the programmes was to “beautify” workplaces to undermine class-based differences in the pursuit of a racial community. The Nazis therefore promoted organized

98 See Skreutny, grosse Buch des Fussball-Stadion, 34.
100 See Krüger, “The German workers’ sport movement,” 1102
workplace recreation as an alternative to the dismantled or attacked denominational – especially Jewish – business, worker, and traditional clubs.

Vereine, which played an important role in breaking down denominational barriers during the imperial period, would play an equally important role in dividing and politicizing the public sphere in the highly charged milieu of the late 1920s and early 1930s, since they became increasingly important spaces of associational activities in the daily lives of many ordinary Germans.\textsuperscript{102} Despite the increasing politicization on the part of certain Vereine that aligned themselves with political groups or particular denominations, recent studies show that compliance with the Nazi regime at both the national and local level had less to do with ideological than with competitive and business concerns.\textsuperscript{103} Most club members were initially more interested in their clubs results rather than Nazi ideology, which spelt a continuation from the Weimar period.\textsuperscript{104} These studies confirm what historians, such as Dietrich Schulze-Marmelling, have persuasively demonstrated that the Nazis’ policies of Gleichschaltung (coordination) did not proceed under a rigid blueprint.\textsuperscript{105} Rather, clubs adopted flexible policies to meet their own needs. In other words, as with many other areas of the Racial State, the Nazification of football clubs were not so much implemented from above as they were pushed from below. With the regime change, Vereine were presented with new

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See especially the debates launched as a result of the publication of Nils Havemann’s book \textit{Fußball unterm Hakenkreuz}.
\item Udo Merkel has also pointed out the continuities between the Nazi and Weimar regimes, see Merkel, “The Hidden Social and Political History of the DFB”, 175-185.
\item Schulze-Marmeling Dieter (ed.), \textit{Davidstern und Lederball: Die Geschichte der Juden im deutschen und internationalen Fußball} (Göttingen: Verlag Die Werkstatt, 2003); Pfiffer and Schulz-Marmelling, \textit{Hakenkreuz und rundes Leder}. Especially part 1 on “Gleichschaltung”.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
opportunities to rethink their principles. New research shows that many clubs were more than willing to alter club – sometimes founding – principles to better reflect an ideological bend more likely to attract the (financial) interest of the new government.\textsuperscript{106}

\textit{Gleichschaltung} was followed by a period of willing conformity, a trend found not just in football clubs but in other institutions throughout the country. Football clubs took the initiative in the Nazification of football. Football adapted to Nazism.\textsuperscript{107} As such, one can speak of a \textit{“Selbstgleichschaltung”} (self-coordination) of football. The interpretation that emerges from this recent research points to the relationship between the regime and the public as resting on collusion and cooperation and that the new findings are supported by findings in other spheres of current research, such as Götz Aly and Beranowski.\textsuperscript{108}

After the Nazi Olympics, a second \textit{Gleichschaltung} of German sports occurred, this time motivated more by a combination of fear and ambition than opportunism.\textsuperscript{109} Until 1936, football was granted what Nils Havemann has called “supervised autonomy”.\textsuperscript{110} The expulsion of Jews and Socialists was undertaken wilfully and without clear instruction from the top by clubs who pre-emptively pushed through policies that would be implemented later.\textsuperscript{111} In the mid-1930s, the DFB, despite its own attempts to

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{106} See Imhoff, “Game of Political Change”.
\textsuperscript{108} This argument was also made by Schiller and Young, “The History and Historiography of German Sport,” 325. See Götz Aly, \textit{Hitler’s Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War, and The Nazi Welfare State}. Translated by Jefferson Chase (Holt Paperback: New York, 2006); Baranowski, \textit{Strength through Joy}.
\textsuperscript{109} See Havemann, \textit{Fußball unter dem Hakenkreuz}; Pfeiffer and Schulze-Marmelling, \textit{Hakenkreuz und rundes Leder}.
\textsuperscript{110} Havemann, \textit{Fußball unterm hakenkreuz}, 117; McDougal, \textit{The People’s Game}, 17.
\end{flushleft}
align themselves with the Nazi regime, lost much of its influence, as the state gradually
sought to use its own organs to organize football. It was no longer responsible for youth
development, which was handed over to the Hitler Youth, for example. In 1940, the DFB
dissolved itself and placed its assets into the official sports federation of the regime, the
NSRL. On the 50th anniversary of Germania 1888’s founding, they published their
guiding principles: Und “Deutsch” war sein Untertitel — Deutsch sollte der Club sein,
frei von der englischen Sportsprache und völkisch rein in seinem Mitglieder Bestände.
(And “German” was its subtitle – The club should be German, free from any English
sport rhetoric and nationally/ethnically pure in its membership regulation.) The last
section, “völkisch rein in seinem Mitglieder Bestände”, was inserted in the anniversary
version and is not present in the club’s original guiding principles, which is indicative of
the drive to “Selbstgleichschaltung” so many clubs were all too willing to take. The last

Following the Nazi seizure of power, the Nazis sought to use football for political
purposes. Their interest in the game, despite Hitler’ own indifference toward it, was most
visibly manifested by turning Berlin – the envisioned capital of Germania – into the
centre of German national football. The Olympiastadion served to display a new
nationalism in the stands whereas individual clubs became eager to implement
ideologically driven incentives that followed Nazi ideology. As Nathaus has argued, the
politicization of the relatively free and open spaces football clubs offered began during
the Weimar period, as clubs sought to increase their revenue – and therefore their
competitiveness – by receiving funding from the state, which permitted the state to make

112 See Havemann, Fußball unterm Hakenkreuz, 173-213
113 Germania 1888, 9.
demands on club practices. As in many spheres of life under the Nazi regime, football under the Nazis shows the extent to which the relationship between the regime and the public was one of collusion and cooperation. Football clubs, which were relatively free and open spaces, willingly implemented policies of exclusion.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has argued that, firstly, Berlin firmly established itself as an important Fußballstadt (football city) during the late-nineteenth century. The capital of Prussia, then the German empire, was a rising metropolis, the Kaiserreich’s largest urban area, and a city central to the military. As such, it held many of the important elements in which football could develop. In the late nineteenth century, Berlin was an important educational city with a thriving Bürgertum, German football’s early anglophile enthusiasts, and an increasingly growing working class. Because of its importance to the military, there were many large open spaces designed for military exercises, marches, parades, and training. These offered early football players vital spaces to play. Tempelhofer Feld, for example, was the home of Berlin’s oldest football club, 1888 Germania. The formation of a regional association, the BFV, one of Germany’s first footballing associations, is proof of the game’s early popularity in the city. The BFV was a key figure in founding the DFB, Germany’s first national football association, which speaks to its position of importance at the time.

Second, sport clubs developed as important spaces for sociability. As Nathaus states: “[Sociability] works towards the stability of a political system because it provides a niche where social relations can be depoliticized and re-established across the boundaries of class, religious affiliation or party-political orientation”.\(^{115}\) Clubs took on important social roles during different political periods, adapting to the political, social, and economic context of the time. During the imperial period, Germans, especially the anglophile Bürgertum, gravitated towards the game because it could be pursued for its own sake. As an end in itself, football clubs were important social spaces “open” to individuals regardless of religious affiliation, political preference, generation, and, increasingly after the First World War, class. German Vereine offered its members largely “apolitical” spheres of social interaction, where individuals could shield themselves against the economic and political interest of the state.

After the First World War, Football’s popularity exploded. Memberships in sport clubs skyrocketed; bourgeois as well as confessional and Workers’ clubs and leagues mushroomed. Berlin’s unique culture in the Weimar Republic turned football into the “people’s game”.\(^{116}\) Once workers had more time to devote to leisurely pursuits, more people played more often and more people went to matches. Its stadia served as venues for not just local and regional matches, but attracted tens of thousands to national matches. In Weimar, football became a popular cultural phenomenon. With more time to devote to leisure, football clubs developed thriving cultures of association life that forged new senses of belonging. Combined with an equally thriving mass media industry, this

\(^{115}\) Ibid.,
chapter argues, football played an increasingly important role in the daily lives of ordinary Germans by serving as a space of popular social interaction.

Fourth, Vereine also embedded a potential for contradiction. They were often private clubs part of regional or national associations that often depended heavily or were influenced by the state. As such, they were vital organizations to both civil society as well as to the state. Though Vereine generated revenue via membership fees, they often had to call upon state funding or, because of their status as clubs with the purpose for entertainment, tax breaks. Members could decide relatively freely the conditions of membership, which made them institutions with both an integrative and exclusionary potential. They were also partly at the mercy of the state’s requirements for funding. As much as they were important in constructing a civil society by breaking down denominational barriers, they also had the potential to divide by implementing principles of inclusion/exclusion. As both the Weimar and Nazi government sought to take advantage of the clubs’ popularity, they were more susceptible to becoming politicized organizations. In the end, however, football proved remarkably malleable. Many clubs willingly adapted to the Nazi regime.

The politicization of football clubs, especially under the Nazi regime, had significant implications for the postwar years. During military occupation, clubs were affected by a paradox caused by football’s overlapping traits of being both subject to political interference and operating in a relatively “free” or a-political realm. Though initially concerned with football’s compromised past under the Nazis, the Allies turned to sport – and football – to reconstruct postwar Germany. Whereas the Western Allies regarded football clubs as representing a positive link to democratic institutions of the
German past, sport was viewed as intrinsically political in the Soviet zone of occupation, which prevented authorities from drawing on the tradition of associational life developed in the *Vereine*. In the next chapter, we will investigate how the Allies’ approached German sports in the reconstruction process.

At “Stunde Null” [Zero Hour], the name used to demarcate the end of the Second World War, the city of Berlin lay in ruin. In just fourteen days of siege by the Soviet army, Berlin was bombarded by 40 000 tons of shells that destroyed over 75% of its buildings.1 Friedrich Seidenstücker’s collection of photographs of the physical destruction continues to provide a photogenic reminder of the physical destruction.2 Portraits in Ruins captures some of the city’s most prominent buildings; Nature’s Rubble and Landscape in Ruin depicts how the natural landscape was devastated as much as buildings; and People in Rubble provides a human face to the toll of destruction. The photographs convey a visual snapshot for the extent to which daily life was spent amongst the ruins.3

This chapter explores how football was rebuilt in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. It explores how football was an outlet to meet society’s more pressing concerns – such as the need for food and shelter – during capitulation and the early days of occupation. As we will see, football, as a leisurely activity helped re-establish a sense of normalcy to daily life, forging new bonds of social belonging after so many had been severed. It builds from historiography of the early postwar years –

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2 The full series can be viewed at the GHDI website: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_image_s.cfm?image_id=1343
especially focussing on Berlin – that demonstrates the degree to which Germans carved out spaces for themselves amongst the rubble.4

The chapter then places football within the context of the emerging Cold War. For some time, historiography was dominated by questions of responsibility for the division that ensued. More recently, studies have shifted to take into account the postwar’s growing internationalism and globalisation rather than over-emphasize division. Historian Akira Iriye, for example, has stressed that the postwar years 1945-1970 was the highest period for internationalism and global cooperation.5 This chapter departs from the assumption that – on the ground at the very least – division was not an inevitability, especially in Berlin. Rather, it asks how Berliners experienced occupation and growing division. First, football was representative of the Allies’ intentions to demilitarise, de-cartelise, and denazify German society. Once the occupying powers appreciated football’s immense popularity with the locals, they tried to use the sport in their reconstruction efforts. This chapter asks how sport was used in reconstruction efforts. This chapter turns to the early reconstruction efforts to asks to what extent football was a reflection of the occupying forces diverging political and ideological ambitions. Did it reflect the growing division or did it continue to provide some sense of normalcy amidst the larger geo-political events?


Historiography has viewed sport as an important stage to exert “soft power” during the Cold War. Viewing sport uniquely through the lens of “war without the shooting” as the maxim suggests, however, provides a dichotomous and simplistic interpretation of the important role sport played in East and West German societies. The chapter examines how two divergent sporting systems emerged during the early postwar years and investigates the role played by international sporting associations in providing the competing German states with international recognition.

This chapter ends by re-examining the 1954 “Miracle of Bern”. Joachim Fest saw the victory as the beginning of a new Germany, calling it a liberation for a community weighed down by war. For social historian Erik Eggers, the victory signalled “the late birth of the Federal Republic of Germany”. Cultural historian Wolfram Pyta argues that the 1954 victory filled a symbolic void in postwar German society left by the Nazi catastrophe. From this perspective, 1954 was more important to German postwar history than 1948. Placing 1954 along a growing trajectory of division enables us to view the importance of 1954 for both East and West Germans. As such, it does not stand as a marker of West German national re-awakening as much as it points to the future importance West German footballing prowess would hold on the other side of the Iron Curtain.

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6 Literature on “soft power” during the Cold War is relatively rich. See Section III “Waging the Cold War” in Immerman and Goedde, The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War.
8 Erik Eggers, “All around the globus,” 226.
**Football at “Stunde Null”**

In April 1945, as the 55th Soviet Panzer division approached the outskirts of Berlin, 2,000 Volkssturm largely made up of Hitler Youth and men too old or physically unable to serve the army from the neighbouring districts of Charlottenburg and Spandau were ordered to defend the Olympiastadion. Those who refused to fight were executed, shot against the Waldbühne. Those who did fight also lost their lives. The stadium and its surrounding Haus des deutschen sports, which was reinforced during the Nazi period to sustain aerial bombardment, suffered significant but not total damage. Other than the iconic bell tower, which the Soviet soldiers destroyed purposefully, much of the sport facilities could be re-appropriated to serve the occupiers’ needs. It served briefly as a Soviet garrison until the German surrender. After July 1st 1945, the British military occupied the complex, since it was located in the British occupation zone, using it as a military headquarters. The facilities were repurposed into dining and dance halls; British soldiers played Cricket and football on its lawns.

The story of the Olympiastadion was largely characteristic of the last days of the Third Reich’s and the early days of occupation. Everyday life in the rubble was characterized by suffering and loss. Of the approximately 30 million Germans who lost

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12 Several works focus on experiences of Germans suffering during the war and during occupation. See also Richard Bessel, *Germany 1945: From War to Peace*; Giles MacDonogh, *After the Reich: The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation*. For a vivid first-hand account of everyday life in postwar Berlin see
their lives during the Nazi reign, Germany lost an estimated 20% of its 780,000 members of the Nationalistischer Reichsbund für Leibesübungen (National Socialist League of the Reich for Physical Exercise [NSRL]). Countless numbers of Jewish athletes perished in the Holocaust. According to Wonneberger, sports clubs lost over half their adult male members. With conscription to the army for all men between sixteen and 60, many Germans experienced the first weeks and months of the postwar period as Prisoners of War. Many of those who survived the war returned physically and psychologically disabled or unstable.

Occupation forces used what resources remained to provide or offer refuge and shelter to the millions of soldiers, civilians, survivors and refugees left over from the war. Sport stadia and playing fields served as important spaces of refuge and hospitality. The approximately 125 of 426 secondary school and sport fields that either survived bombardment and the battle of Berlin were used by the allies as makeshift hospitals, urban gardens to grow desperately needed food, or as camps for refugees and displaced

Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin: Eight Weeks in the Conquered City. For works that focus on everyday life in postwar Berlin, see Paul Steege, Black Market, Cold War; Malte Zierenberg Berlin’s Black Market, 1939-1950 ((Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Jennifer V. Evans, Life Amongst the Ruins.


14 Football also helped individuals escape the horrors of life in the camps. For survival stories that revolve around football, see Kevin E. Simpson, Stories of Survival and Resistance during the Holocaust (Lanham, Boulder, New York, London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016); Anna Hájkova, “Die fabelhaften Jungs aus Theresienstadt: Junge tschechische Männer als dominante soziale Elite im Theresienstädtcher Ghetto” in Christoph Dieckmann and Babette Quinkert, Im Ghetto: Neue Forschungen zu Alltag und Umfeld (Wallstein Verlag, 2009), 116-135. See also the account of the football match played in Auschwitz in Tadeusz, Borowski, This Way for the Gas, Ladies and Gentlemen, trans. by Barbara Vedder (London: Penguin, 1976).


16 Frank Biess, Homecomings, especially chapters 1 and 2.

17 For more information on returning PoWs, their psychological and physical state, and their effect on postwar German society, see Frank Biess, Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), chapter 4, 70-95.
persons.\textsuperscript{18} The \textit{Stadion Lichterfelde}, located in the American sector, was initially used for temporary housing.\textsuperscript{19} It then served as housing and a base for American GIs, who used its fields to play their own, American games, such as baseball but also American-rules Football.\textsuperscript{20}

Despite difficulties caused by the loss of personnel and the physical toll of destruction, including the lack of availability of resources to devote to sport, Germany’s football phoenix rose from the ashes. Football is an inherently simple sport. It has few, relatively uncomplicated rules and requires hardly any resources to play bar a large, open space, something that could be found in abundance in occupied Berlin. Any reasonably open space – even those seemingly too narrow, awkward, or full of bombed-out craters – could serve as a pitch. Any object loosely resembling a sphere that could be kicked around can be transformed into a ball; make-shift balls can be constructed with any material that could be shaped into a sphere. In occupied Berlin, the rubble itself often served the purpose. Goal posts require little else than four solid – or relatively stable – markers.\textsuperscript{21}

In postwar Berlin, “Straßenfußball” (street football), make-shift leisurely matches played by anywhere between two to 22 people in the ruins and the streets, flourished. It was an especially popular daily activity for children and youth. It could be – and was – played anywhere. It was played in the rubble, on the streets, and in the no-man’s-land-esque parks. Peter Hähnel, Gerald Iser, and Dieter Stellmacher all still remember vividly

\textsuperscript{18} McDougall, \textit{The People’s Game}, 32-33; Johnson, \textit{Training Socialist Citizens}, 48.
\textsuperscript{19} Skreutney, \textit{Grosse Buch der deutschen-Fussball-Stadien}, 42.
\textsuperscript{20} See the section “Trümmerstadien” in Skreutney, \textit{Grosse Buch der deutschen-Fussball-Stadien}, 11.
\textsuperscript{21} For an interesting anthropological history for why humans – and animals – play ball-games, see John Fox, \textit{The Ball: Discovering the Object of the Game} (Harper Perennial, 2012).
the many matches they played as children at the war’s end. Their memories of playing football in streets remain some of the few positive experiences they draw on as adults many years later.

Street football, however, was not only a child’s game. All generations could find some sense of solace in football. It served as a diversion – if only for a few minutes per week – from the hardships of daily life in the conquered city. Football was played everywhere, from the American to the Soviet occupiers’ barracks to the refugee and displaced persons (DP) camps. “The sport activities of the Jewish DPs in postwar Germany,” as Michael Brenner writes, “have sunk into oblivion today, even though they provide a particularly significant illustration of the active autonomous life of this society.” Street football remained a popular pastime until more structured leagues provided a more stable and organized space to play the game.

More organized versions of the game were arranged nearly as soon as the fighting ended. The Berliner Zeitung, which started circulation on May 21, reported on what is believed to be the first organized football match of the postwar. On 20 May 1945, only days after the official surrender, more than 10 000 spectators packed the heavily damaged Stadion Lichtenberg on Hermannstrasse to watch a football match. On 24 May, 1945, Berliner Zeitung published an invitation to all of Berlin’s youth to Neukölln to participate

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22 See the references found in Johnson, Training Socialist Citizens, 50.
24 Michael Brenner, After the Holocaust, 24.
25 See the article “Von der Straße auf den Fußballplatz” Die Neue Fußball-Woche, 14.2.1956, 11.
26 Berliner Zeitung 23 May, 1945, 4. See also grosses Buch der deutschen Fußball-stadien, 41.
in a football match. The next Sunday, 27 May 1945, another “Großkampftag” (a big-game day) would take place between representatives from Lichtenberg and the Red Army. A *Berliner Zeitung* article notified its readers that all of Berlin’s “Sportfreunde” (sport friends) were invited to a match at the Hertha-BSC-Platz near Gesundbrunnen Bahnhof on the May 27 to watch a match between a Schülermannschaft Osloerstraße and Schillerpark. Other matches were organized at Sportplatz Buschallee and Sportplatz Flughafennstrasse for the week-end. Kalorienspiele [Calorie games] were organized around the promise that necessities such as bread and other foodstuffs would be redistributed to both spectators and players alike. Such matches continued to be organized on a regular basis and were reported on by *Berliner Zeitung* daily for the first few months of the postwar period. Jewish football leagues also sprang up throughout Germany and in the DP camps. Some postwar Jewish teams also included German players. These early matches are indicative of football’s popularity during the early postwar days and the frequency with which the game was resurrected by locals, DPs, and the occupiers.

These early matches are also reflective of the realities of the early post-war days, the need for food, shelter, and a sense that things would return to normal. The will exercised by the local population to organize football matches points to the importance such leisurely activities played in the immediate aftermath of war. Other than offer a

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27 *Berliner Zeitung* 23 May 1945, 4.
29 *Berliner Zeitung* 27 May 1945, p. 4; Dirk Bitzer and Bernd Wilting, *Stürmen für Deutschland: Die Geschichte des deutschen Fußballs von 1933 bis 1954* (Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag, 2003), 167-8; McDougall, *The People’s Game*, 34.
means for physical rehabilitation, football served the important function of providing a momentary escape from the difficulties of everyday life amongst the ruins during occupation, as a meeting space for the redistribution of bare necessities to those in need; and provided a sense of a return to normalcy in daily life. Football’s ability to embody notions of masculinity (and femininity) strengthened individuals’ bonds to a sense of normalcy. Images of Jewish football clubs from the DP camps often reveal Jewish men standing tall in their football uniforms, exhibiting both pride and masculine strength. Similar photographs of German men standing tall with an expression of pride stand in stark contrast to experiences of emasculation during the immediate postwar period. As it did following the aftermath of the First World War, football – and the football clubs that sprung from the rubble – provided an important space for sociability that helped to reform relationships, new, lost, and fractured. It was an important part of the “entangled histories” that made up the everyday encounters between the locals themselves, but also between Jews, Germans, and Allies.

**Directive 23 and the Emergence of Diverging Trajectories, 1945-1948**

While football was organized to preserve some sense of normalcy in the chaotic postwar days, re-establishing old and forging new bonds of belonging in the process, the Allies confronted its compromised past. As we examined in the previous chapter, Hitler sought to use sport, including football, for political means. Though *Gleichschaltung* was

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32 Literature on masculinity and football is extensive, especially in sociological and anthropological accounts. See, for example, Eduardo Archetti, *Masculinities: An Anthropology of Football, Polo, and Tango.* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1999)


implemented unevenly, and the degree to which individual clubs “self-coordinated” along Nazi lines remains a matter of contention, all German sport clubs eventually joined the NSRL. As a result, the Allies viewed football as another institution poisoned by Nazi ideology.

The Allies’ attitudes and actions towards football over the next few months, much like most of German society, would be characterized by the Potsdam agreement’s emphasis on the three “D”s: De-Nazification, de-militarisation, and de-cartelization. 35 Sporting institutions fell under the Potsdam agreement rubric that dictated approaches for dealing with postwar Germany. On October 10, 1945, the Allies’ issued the Law for the Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training of the Allied Control Commission that liquidated the NSRL and banned all Vereine (clubs), including sport clubs. The result was effectively a complete ban on all organized sport.36

In practice, however, Law Number 2 was impractical to enforce with any regularity and proved counterproductive to the Allies’ larger plans for reconstruction. As


Heather Dichter has demonstrated, once the Allies saw the potential certain sports had to re-educate the population, they increasingly sought to actively integrate sport as part of the reconstruction process. After a few months that straddled over- and under-concern towards enforcing the ban on organized sport, the Allies issued Directive 23 of the Allied Control Commission. Directive 23, passed on 17 December 1945, stipulated that all clubs not already banned under Law Number 2 should be disbanded by the end of the year and that “non-military sporting organisations of a local character” were only permitted to compete in their own district and “with the permission of the relevant occupation authorities”.

Directive 23 affected football in Berlin in two distinct ways. First, it differentiated between “military” and “non-military sporting organizations.” This distinction was not made in Law Number 2, which effectively banned all forms of organized sport, failing to differentiate between sport as military end and as leisure. Under Directive 23, football was designated a “non-military” form of organized sport. The directive permitted clubs that were not associated with the military to re-form as “Sportgruppe” (Sporting groups [SG]), provided they represented their local district.

As such, it reaffirmed the status quo. Organized sport could continue on the local level. In doing so, it officially recognized and launched what some historians have

37 Dichter, *Sporting Democracy*, 73. See also Dennis and Grix, *Sport under Communism*, p. 30-34.
38 CORC/P(45)180(Revise) – Limitation and Demilitarization of Sport in Germany, 10 December 1945, FO 1005/391, NA [available at the following web address: http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Enactments/01LAW06.pdf]. For an in-depth account of Directive 23 implementation and implications, see chapter 1 of Heather Dichter’s dissertation, *Sporting democracy*. See also McDougall, *The People’s Game*, 32.
called the “Kommunal Ära” (local-era), whereby “traditional” football teams – those disbanded before the end of the war or before Nazi pressures forced them to close – would re-form with more regularly.\textsuperscript{41} Local football allegiances that predated the Nazi years re-surfaced under new names that defined the local administrative level or “Kreis” [neighborhood] from which they hailed. For example, the club known as SC Union Obersöneweide prior to war’s end re-formed as SG Obersöneweide; SG Wilmersdorf emerged from the club Berliner SV 92; and Berlin’s two most successful and popular clubs of the pre-Nazi period, Hertha BSC and Tennis Borussia, re-surfaced as SG Gesundbrunnen and SG Charlottenburg respectfully.\textsuperscript{42} Nordstern re-emerged as Osloerstraße; Rapide Wedding formed as Schillerpark; Alemannia Berlin was Prenzlauer Berg West whereas Wacker 04 reformed as Reinickendorf-West (See Figure 2.1). The reasoning behind these early decisions was to use sport to help foster a sense of communal, rather than national, belonging in an effort to rebuild the city and social life from the debris. As Heather Dichter argues, “by emphasising the local character of youth and sport organisations and preventing their funding from public or private bodies outside of the Kreis (neighbourhood), the Allies hoped to recreate a sense of community among Germans in marked contrast to the state-controlled organisations run by the Nazis”\textsuperscript{43}

\textbf{Figure 2.1}: Berlin Football Clubs during the “Kommunal-Ära” (local era)

\textsuperscript{41} See Braun and Wiese, \textit{Doppelpässe}, 12-16
\textsuperscript{42} Willmann and Luther, \textit{Eisern Union}; Dennis and Grix, \textit{Sport under Communism}, 31.
\textsuperscript{43} Dichter, \textit{Sporting Democracy}, 73
Second, Directive 23 had the unintended consequence of providing the Allies with a “blank slate” upon which postwar German sport would be rebuilt.\textsuperscript{44} In the immediate postwar period, none of the Allies were ready to commit to a clear plan for the restructuring of German sport, much less did they present any semblance of a unified vision for what such a restructuring might resemble. The emergence of two distinct sporting systems, one that resembled the pre-Nazi era in the West and one that was built along the Socialist model found in the Soviet Union in the East of the country, can be traced back to the lack of a mutual conceptual plan for the future of postwar German sport.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{44} I agree with Dichter’s interpretation of Directive 23 constituting a “blank slate” for the restructuring of German sport. See chapter 1 of Dichter, \textit{Sporting Democracy}.

\textsuperscript{45} For an overview of the Soviet sporting system, see Robert Edelman, Anke Hilbrenner, and Susan Brownell, “Sport under Communism” in \textit{The Oxford Handbook of Communism}, ed. Stephen A. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); James Riordan, \textit{Sport, Politics, and Communism} (1991); James Riordan, \textit{Sport under Communism: The USSR, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, China, Cuba}; James Riordan,
The Western Allies, who saw the benefit in allowing Germans to return to the democratic institutions that were immensely popular with the masses during the interwar period, such as the Vereine, were persuaded to revert back to pre-Nazi structures for inspiration. By March 1946 in addition to permitting a return to the “traditional” associational or Vereine model, the Western Allies eased the restrictions on local sport. As a result, they permitted and organized more inter-city and inter-zonal matches. The new regulations permitted clubs in the Western sectors to reclaim their traditional names if they chose. The decision proved popular with Berliners. Most clubs immediately reverted back to the old structure, reclaim their old names, attracted new members, and played matches in front of massive crowds.

The Soviets, on the other hand, were more reluctant to return to pre-1933 structures. Through the 1946 to 1948 period, authorities in the Soviet zone of occupation (SBZ) consciously distanced itself from two popular pre-existing footballing traditions: the workers’ sports movement, because of its close association to the SPD, and the Vereine alternative being developed in the West. As Johnson has demonstrated, the SED sought to avoid a return to the German Vereine and to the Workers’ Sports Clubs of pre-1933 because they were sceptical of institutions wherein Germans enjoyed freedom of association and assembly. The SED was similarly reluctant, however, to enforce centralization too rapidly. On the one hand, the SED were hesitant to organize sport via

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institutions directly attached to the party, such as the Freie Deutschen Jugend (Free German Youth [FDJ]) and Freier Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (Free German Trade Union Federation [FDGB]), out of fear that doing so would lead to suspicion on the part of sport enthusiasts who regarded or enjoyed sport because of their perceived apolitical nature. On the other hand, for the SED sport was as a means to a political end and must be inherently political. It could not therefore be left to run by its own devices.

When the Western Allies opted for a return of the Vereine model, the Soviets hesitated. They chose to bide their time and continue to enforce the local system already established while simultaneously altering club and leagues structures. They only turned to a model whereby the FDJ – who had already played an influential role in organizing sport communities through its own “Sportgemeinschaften” – and the FDGB – who could cater to adults – would share responsibilities for the re-organization in the SBZ in June 1948, two years later. By then, authorities hoped to use the FDJ and FDGB to prop up support for the SED by organizing mass-sporting activities.

Unlike in the Western zones, sports were only permitted on the local, or communal level until October 1948, when the SBZ-wide Deutsche Sportausschuss (German Sport Committee [DS]) was founded. The DS was created to oversee inter-zonal and inter-regional competitions. When the restrictions against non-local competition were finally lifted, re-organization fell to the FDJ and the FDGB. All sport equipment and facilities were centralized through the municipal governments, which

50 Dennis and Grix, *Sport under Communism*, 31.
51 Ibid., 31.
52 Ibid., 32.
53 A few remaining communal sports clubs briefly had a stake in the organization, but they were quickly phased out. See, Johnson, *Training Socialist Citizens*, 49.
were controlled mostly by the SED. The DS forced all potential clubs to register with local authorities. Licences were given to SGs and Betriebssportgemeinschaften (Enterprise Sport Communities [BSGs]), the name given to sport clubs with a direct affiliation to, or sponsored by, a particular industry. The BSG model, first introduced in 1948 but instituted comprehensively one year later, ensured that the associational model prevalent in the Western sectors was completely dissolved in the SBZ by 1949.\textsuperscript{54} Along with the introduction of BSGs, new names were mandated that reflected its new official affiliations. Names that reflected a direct lineage to the old Sportverein tradition were strictly prohibited.\textsuperscript{55} Concordia (harmony), Preussen (Prussia), Wacker (valiance), and Borussia (the latin term for Prussia), for example, were names rejected out of principal because they evoked imagery from the German Reich.\textsuperscript{56} Though the SED made a few concessions to ease tensions during the Berlin Blockade by permitting certain clubs to take their “traditional” names, such as VfB Pankow, the GDR’s sporting institutions were re-structured along the model found in the Soviet Union and its satellite states by 1948. Because licences were provided to SGs and BSGs, club names reflected the new structure: Solidarität (solidarity), Turbine (turbine), Chemie (chemistry), Rotation (rotation), Lokomotiv (locomotive), Dynamo (Greek for power), and Vorwärts (onward) remain legacies of the Soviet model. The new, Soviet-inspired structure would serve as the basis for sporting institutions until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany in 1989/90. Concordia (harmony), Preussen (Prussia), Wacker (valiance), and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{54} McDougall, \textit{The People’s Game}, 40; Johnson, \textit{Training Socialist Citizens}, 47-50.
\item \textsuperscript{55} SAPMO-BArch, DY 30 IV/2/18/3 “Richtlinien zum Aufbau einer einheitlichen Sportbewegung”. On the directive, see Johnson, \textit{Training Socialist Citizens}, 58.
\item \textsuperscript{56} Dennis and Grix, \textit{Sport under Communism}, 135-136.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Borussia (the latin term for Prussia) were rejected out of principal.\textsuperscript{57} The names resonated symbolically with the anti-fascist nature of the postwar clubs in the SBZ and GDR. The names of the clubs are significant because they symbolised the extent to which a system inspired by the model in the Soviet Union was being implemented in the GDR. They were a further reminder that the Soviet and GDR administrations missed an opportunity to draw on a strong tradition of football in Germany, if not in the form of the bourgeois clubs then of the Workers’ Sports movement that was attacked by the Nazis. By the time the SED decided to ease the restrictions on local sport, in late 1948, and offer a more centralized organization of football, the opportunity to offer an alternative to the associations prevailing in the West had passed. East German football was left with a structure in which three different organizations – the FDJ, the FDGB, and DS – competed for authority over matters pertaining to the organization of sport.\textsuperscript{58}

The impracticalities of the local system and the popular attachment to traditional sports were most evident in Berlin, where it remained possible to travel more or less freely between the different sectors. As the SED were biding their time, many Berliners who resided in the SBZ chose to join Vereine (clubs) and continued to watch the alternative put on display in the Western sectors. Hertha BSC, for example, attracted a large number of so-called supporters who resided in the eastern sector, as did Union Oberschönweide.\textsuperscript{59} This created a precedent whereby Berliners residing in eastern districts suddenly found themselves “on the wrong side of the wall” in terms of being

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{58} For an overview of the structure and organization of football in the SBZ and GDR, see Archivgut des Deutschen Fußballverbandes der DDR (DFV), I/2, edited by Günter Schneider, “Dokumentation über 45 Jahre Fußball in der SBZ/DDR” (unpublished, c. 1996).

\textsuperscript{59} Ostmitgliedern were published in Braun and Wiese, 	extit{Doppelpässe}, 80-86. For Oberschönweide supporters in the East, see Luther and Willmann, 	extit{Eisern Union!}
able to “go to the game”. During the early years of occupation, in the chaos over sporting authorities’ re-organization of football, Berliners supported clubs of their choice, with little to no after thought that doing so may have political implications in the future. In Berlin, this relative freedom lasted until 1950, a few years after both states were officially formed.

Institutionalization of Sport for international recognition and legitimacy

In 1947-1948, the SED implemented a series of policies that, according to Peter Grieder, effectively ended any possibility for a parliamentary democracy in the SBZ. By then, the SED was shifting to become a “party of a new type”, highly centralized and more authoritarian. It was during this time that the growing political division of the occupied zones turned into two irreversible divergent trajectories. With the signing of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) in 1949, the division of Germany was sealed. The Soviet Union responded by creating a separate German state, the German Democratic Republic in October 1949.

At the founding conference of the DS in October 1948, Erich Honecker, then head of the FDJ, declared that “sport is not an end in itself, but a means to an end”. His comments reveal that once political division became a distinct possibility, it became

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62 To read the Grundgesetz, see the GHDI website at the following address: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=2858
63 To read the constitution of the GDR, see the GHDI website at the following address: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=2859
64 Dennis and Grix, *Sport under Communism*, 18-19, 30.
increasingly difficult for the regime to separate sport and leisure from wider political and ideological goals. Sport was to serve as an instrument in the education, health, and construction of the “new human being.”

By the founding of the GDR in October 1949, the ideological link between socialism and sport had its own place in the constitution. Article 18 read: “Physical culture, sport, and outdoor pursuits promote, as elements of socialist culture, the all-round physical and mental development of the individual.”

Honecker’s speech to the DS in October 1948 also signalled the beginning of what historians Mike Dennis and Peter Grix have called, the GDR’s “institutionalisation of sport for international recognition and legitimacy”. Similar terminology could be used to describe the FRG’s views on sport during the second half of 1948. Following the war, Germany was banned from international sport by both the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), international sport’s two leading organizations. Both the GDR and FRG authorities saw potential in sport to reintroduce the new Germany to the wider international community. Both the Western Allies’ and the Soviets took active measures to help facilitate this return.

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65 Balbier, “How the Federal Republic learnt to take sport seriously”.
66 Article 18 can be read at the following address from the GHDI website: [http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=2859](http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=2859). See also Dennis and Grix, who also make this point, p. 20.
67 Dennis and Grix, *Sport under Communism*, p. 33. On the use of sport in the GDR, see also
As Heather Dichter has shown, the Western Allies, especially the American Military Government, organized a series of three international friendlies to be played simultaneously between clubs from Germany and Switzerland to achieve this end.\textsuperscript{70} Much like the early postwar German-German matches that were organized for similar purposes, the German-Swiss football friendlies, were immensely popular in both Germany and Switzerland. They also received support from football officials, the press, and the general public. The overall success of these matches forced football’s governing body, FIFA, to reconsider its stance over Germany’s exclusion.\textsuperscript{71} In 1952, FIFA lifted the ban against Germany, paving the way for both the FRG and GDR to become members and enter its prized competition, which happened to be held in Switzerland in 1954.

The founding of the GDR and FRG paved the way for the emergence of separate national footballing bodies that served this new international purpose. In the FRG, the \textit{Deutsche Fußballbund} (German Football Association [DFB]), which had been disbanded in 1940, was re-founded in July 1949 to oversee all matters pertaining to football.\textsuperscript{72} The DFB was established largely as it had been before its disbanding in 1940 as umbrella organization for the national game. The DFB was charged with matters pertaining to the national team, it organized its national club cup competition, and acted as the umbrella organization of the regional leagues. That same month, the DS, whose responsibilities included gaining admittance to sport’s leading international organizations, created its

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 2032
\textsuperscript{72} McDougall, \textit{The People’s Game}, 42; DFB, \textit{100 Jahre}, 40
own Sparte Fußball (football office), which similarly took on responsibilities for representing the GDR’s footballing interests internationally.\textsuperscript{73}

The SED leadership turned to sport for recognition and legitimacy for several reasons. First, somewhat ironically, the GDR, who viewed using sport as intrinsically political and therefore serving a political and ideological end, could take advantage of sport’s governing bodies’ official apolitical stance.\textsuperscript{74} The GDR constantly argued that its admittance to international sporting organizations should be granted on a-political grounds. Following the Soviet Union, which joined the IOC and FIFA in the early 1950s, the GDR gained provisional membership in FIFA in 1952, despite fierce opposition by West German sport officials.\textsuperscript{75} Two years later, the GDR, the FRG, and the short-lived Saarland Football Union became founding members of UEFA in June 1954. As such, UEFA was more of a “European” project or community than some of its political or economic alternatives, such as the European Coal and Steel Community.\textsuperscript{76} The GDR was offered full recognition by the IOC in 1968, which they put on display, as history would have it, at the 1974 Olympics in Munich. The admittance of both the FRG and GDR into UEFA and FIFA as well as the IOC presented an opportunity for continued interaction between the two states throughout the remainder of the Cold War.

Second, the GDR – as a state claiming to make a clear cut with the past – lacked a narrative provided by a cohesive “national” history or culture upon which it could stake a

\textsuperscript{73} Dennis and Grix, Sport under Communism, 33.
\textsuperscript{74} For a discussion of how the British Olympic Committee viewed the FRG’s arguments against GDR entry, see R. Gerald Hughes and Rachel J. Owen, “‘The Continuation of Politics by Other Means’: Britain, the Two Germanys and the Olympic Games, 1949-1972” Contemporary European History 18, 4 (2009): 443-474.
\textsuperscript{75} Dennis and Grix, 134.; see also McDougall, “East Germany and the Europeanization of Football”.
claim for its own recognition as an ethnically or culturally distinct group of people that is
deserving of international recognition. Their lack of a claim to distinction was especially
prominent vis-à-vis its western neighbour, whose official political stance was that it alone
could stand as a German state. Though the GDR claimed it was the only rightful
successor to the German state, it lacked the ethnic, linguistic, and cultural precedence to
distinguish itself from the FRG. The GDR struggled with this incompatible political
dilemma throughout its history.77 Second, sport could be used as “soft power” in the
struggle against its much larger and richer neighbour.78 The GDR lacked goods from
which they could attract negotiations. Its sporting success, dubbed the “sporting miracle”
was used throughout the GDR as a kind of currency in international negotiations.79

International recognition – and therefore division – relied on internationalism.
International sporting bodies played an important role in ensuring relations were
maintained when the Cold War was particularly heated. Boycotts could be launched as a
form of political protest, but they were largely ineffective. As German division became a
distinct possibility after 1947/48, and both German states were forced to seek
international recognition, they turned to sport, which had the added effect of serving as a
sphere of “soft power”, a stage upon which the systems could compete.

77 Ibid., 20.
78 Dennis and Grix, Sport under Communism, 20.
79 The “Sporting Miracle” serves as the subtitle to Dennis and Grix’s book, Sport under Communism.
From the international to the local, 1948-1950

Regional football associations were formed and fell under the umbrella of the national associations of the newly formed countries. In October, 1949, an East Berlin Football Association was created, which aligned itself with the DS. ⁸⁰ A few days later, a West Berlin equivalent was created, which set its allegiances to the West by becoming a member of the newly-formed DFB. ⁸¹

The SBZ launched its inaugural championship in 1948, but it included no teams from Berlin, who continued to play in the inter-zonal Berlin league. The tournament, judged to be controversial on account of its seemingly *ad hoc* qualification rounds, was won by SG Planitz. ⁸² A few months later, eight teams, two from each sector, entered an “*inter-zonal Deutsche Fußball-Meisterschaft*” [German championship]. Soviet functionaries denied the Soviet sector champions SG Planitz from participating in the tournament. SG Oberschöneweide, however, the club from East Berlin who had won the RIAS-Pokal in 1947 in spectacular fashion, coming from behind 0:3 at the half to claim the cup with a last minute 4:3 winner were sent as the representative from the Berlin sector. They then went on a 38-game undefeated run between February 1947 and Christmas 1948. ⁸³ As an SG, however, they were also representative of the new sporting structures found in the GDR.

Unfortunately for SG Oberschöneweide and the Soviet sector, the club did not fare well. Despite their incredible run of form over the past few months, Oberschöneweide

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⁸¹ BFV, *100 Jahre*.
⁸³ Luther and Willmann, *Eisern Union*, 35.
were humiliated 0:7 to FC St Pauli on 18 July (1948).\cite{BraunWiese}
Despite the shocking failure of the SGs in the championship, the so-called “Interzonenbegegnungen” (Inter-zonal encounter) continued until 1950, when the GDR launched another restructuring program.\cite{Doppelpasse}
Berliner SV hosted Borussia Dortmund in the quarter finals of the German championship in June 1949. They lost 0:5 in front of over 50 000 spectators. The example demonstrates the extent to which centralization and sovietisation in football, much like other sectors of GDR society, did not directly translate to effective policy or management. Throughout its existence, this lack of effective policy and management translated into a lack of success on the pitch.\cite{McDougall}

Despite its separate regional bodies with official affiliations to divergent national associations, football in Berlin represented the city’s unusual status and uncertain future. The city continued to run its Stadtliga (city league) and field a “Berliner Gesamt-elf” (a Berliner combined-eleven) until 1950, both of which were very popular.\cite{Doppelpasse}
One such match pitted a combined Sachsen-eleven against a Berlin team that included players from both the SBZ and western sectors. These matches would attract thousands. A match between Düsseldorf and a Berlin-combined eleven attracted over 55, 000 fans at the Olympiastadion.\cite{McDougall}

Despite the re-structuring along socialist lines, it remained unclear what football in the SBZ – and especially in the divided city of Berlin – would resemble.

\cite{BraunWiese} Braun and Wiese, “Mit dem Bollerwagen zum Spiel” Tagesspiegel online; Doppelpasse, p. 15; McDougall, The People’s Game, 37-38.  
\cite{Doppelpasse} Doppelpasse, 14-15; Dennis and Grix, Sport under Communism, 33-34.  
\cite{McDougall} For the SED’s views on GDR football failures and the regime’s desire to improve performance-based football for the years 1953, 1956, 1959, and 1961 see SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/18/14, “Einschätzungen, Stellungnahmen und Maßnahmen zur Erreichung hoher sportlicher Leistungen im Fußballsport der DDR; Vorbereitung der Nationalmannschaft auf die Weltmeisterschaft 1961”.  
\cite{Doppelpasse} Doppelpasse, 14.  
\cite{McDougall} See McDougall, The People’s Game, 37.
From 1948 until another wave of restructuring in 1950, East German football was a shambles. As Alan McDougall has pointed out, although football became more centralized in the SBZ in 1948, the new structures were “more indicative of the dysfunctional present than communist-controlled future.”89 In a city where Germans were more or less free to move freely between the divergent, opposing systems, inter-zonal and matches that included traditional (West German) clubs proved especially popular because they drew on positive legacies and traditions of the past while permitting an escape from the oft-over-politicized present, especially in the GDR.

“Voluntary” Reconstruction, Football Reforms, and “Republikflucht” (Fleeing the Republic) After 1950

With few resources to go around, the reconstruction of sport facilities relied heavily on volunteers. Officials from both East and West encouraged civilians to step forward and help rebuild the damaged stadia.90 In Rostock residents purportedly put in over 236,000 hours of free labour to rebuild the Ostseestadion.91 Hannover’s Niedersachsenstadion, Augsburg’s Rosenaustadion, and Ludwigshafen’s Südweststadion all similarly benefited from hundreds of unpaid labourers.92 The stadia and sport fields in West Berlin were no exception. Reconstruction of the Platz an der Rathausstraße Mariendorf, the stadium

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89 McDougall, *The People’s Game*, 38.
90 For an example of using newspapers to encourage Germans to volunteer their time, see ‘Ein dringendes Gebot der Volksgesundheit – Baut Sportplätze!’ *Deutsches Sport-Echo* 16.6.1946, 3.
91 Baingo and Horn, *Die Geschichte der DDR-Oberliga*, 53.
Blau-Weiß 90 called home, began at the end of 1950 with the help of a daily workforce of volunteers.\textsuperscript{93}

On May 20, 1950, Walter Ulbricht gave a speech in celebration of the opening of a new multi-purpose sport stadium in the GDR’s new capital. Completed in just over four months, Ulbricht claimed that the newly constructed 70,000 capacity stadium was proof that “Es gibt kein Unmöglich!” [nothing is impossible] in the GDR.\textsuperscript{94} At the time of its opening, the \textit{Walter-Ulbricht-Stadion}, named in the honour of the then General Secretary of the SED Central Committee, was the largest in East Germany. Its construction, largely on the shoulders of FDJ volunteers as East German media outlets stressed, was hailed as a remarkable feat of socialist construction and cooperation. \textsuperscript{95}

The opening of the new stadium coincided with a series of further reforms in the summer of 1950 that affected East German football, which also consequently cemented the division of Berliner football. Officially, the division was caused by a rift over the professional status of players in the Stadtliga. However, events suggest that the split was compounded by a new wave of restructuring in the GDR that began in the summer of 1950 and continued for the next few years. As of 1950/51, football clubs located in East Berlin were forbidden from playing against West German opponents. From the 1950-51 season, East Berlin’s football was integrated into the GDR’s footballing structure. Its top clubs joined the national GDR football league, the DDR-Oberliga, while those who did not qualify competed in the East Berlin regional league.

\textsuperscript{93} Skreutney, \textit{Grosse Buch der deutschen-Fussball-Stadien}, 43
\textsuperscript{94} Quoted in \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{95} Skreutney, \textit{Grosse Buch der deutschen-Fussball-Stadien}, 43-44.
The first DDR-Oberliga season of 1950-51 that included clubs from the East German capital was marred by controversy and suspicion of political interference. The new regulations directly affected Union Oberschönweide, who were currently drawn to play Hamburg in Kiel in the German championships. Players, coaches, members, and, indeed, entire clubs acted with their feet. Defying the ban, Union Oberschönweide travelled to the West to play the match in Kiel. They lost the match to Hamburg 0-6, but the result was of secondary importance in the highly charged political atmosphere. The majority of the team’s players and coaches did not return to the East. They resettled in West Berlin and founded a new club, SC Union 06.96 The team’s transfer was indicative of some of the larger issues that concerned East Germans; it is indicative of the looming migration crisis – “Republikflucht” – that worsened after the East German crackdown on the Workers’ Uprising in two years’ time.97

The 1950-1951 final between SG Dresden-Friedrichstadt – successor to the Dresden Sport-Verein – and ZSG Horch Zwickau – a new club linked to state-enterprise and representative of new GDR model – resulted in an outburst of crowd unrest following Zwickau’s 5-1 victory over the hosts.98 Both Ulbricht and Ewald, who attended the match, expressed how the victory represented proof that democratic sports were heading in the right direction. The 1950 restructuring saw BSGs incorporated into Sportvereinigungen (Sports Associations [SVs]). This led to the formation of new clubs and the re-naming of recently established ones. It also resulted in the complete overhaul

96 SC Union 06 went on to play at the Poststadion. Willmann and Luther, Eisern Union; Karpa, 1. FC Union; Dennis and Grix, Sport under Communism, 137.
98 Dennis and Grix, Sport under Communism, 136.
and transportation of teams over the next few years. The most notable was the relocation of Vorwärts Leipzig and Dynamo Dresden to Berlin, after 1949 the capital of the GDR.\footnote{Mielke, \emph{die Stasi und der runde Leder}.} From the point of view of the SED, the new structure increased centralization and uniformity, which mirrored larger efforts to centralize government in the GDR.\footnote{Dennix and Grix, \emph{Sport under Communism}, p. 135.}

From the point of view of members and supporters, however, it created confusion and disrupted any sense of continuity. In some cases, as in the example of Vorwärts Leipzig’s relocation to Berlin, it was the players who were dissatisfied with the forced move; the club was mostly disliked in Leipzig, most of whom preferred Chemie.\footnote{Dennis and Grix, \emph{Sport under Communism}, p. 138-139; see also Leske, \emph{Vorwärts}.}

Though GDR sport had the appearance of centralization, competing interest and constant interference by the Stasi and the Army constantly undermined attempts to run an effective, competitive football.\footnote{Dennis and Grix, \emph{Sport under Communism}, p. 138.} Mielke, head of the Stasi, was also the chairman of Dynamo Sports Association. Dynamo, much like the army’s alternative sport association Vorwärts, were comparatively powerful sporting associations. Both were relatively well funded and supplied and both could exert influence on organizations such as the FDJ, the FDGB, and the SED’s Central Committee Department of Sport. The result was constant interference by especially Mielke and constant competition for central authority of matters pertaining to sport throughout the GDR. The establishment of SG Dynamo Berlin was one example that demonstrates the power individuals like Mielke could have on East German sport.\footnote{For more information on Mielke’s influence in the re-structuring of Dynamo Berlin and the transfer of players from Dresden, see Leske, \emph{Erich Mielke, die Stasi und das rundes Leder}; Pleil, \emph{Mielke, Macht und Meisterschaft}. On the founding of the club, see also BStU, MfS Abt. M. 1135, Satzung der}
resulted in the forced relocation of the majority of Dynamo Dresden’s squad, including its top players, three of which also played for the East German national team: Johannes Matzen, Herbert Schoen, and Günter Schröter. The restructuring of Dynamo Berlin was interpreted by Dresden fans as more of a relocation of their club than a reorganization of another. The move did not sit well with supporters in Dresden, a city with a traditionally large contingent of football enthusiasts. SG Dynamo Dresden had enjoyed some success leading up to the 1953-1954 season. Without its best players, Dynamo Dresden found it difficult to compete. Meanwhile, Berlin went from being a city without a competitor in East Germany’s top flight to having two – Dynamo and Vorwärts – that finished in the top-half of the league table the year after. Dynamo Dresden only managed to return to the Oberliga in 1963/64. Two years’ prior to that, both Berlin clubs topped the league. As we will see in the chapters that follow, the Dynamo sporting enterprise would build itself into both one of the crowning achievements and one of the most hated sport clubs of the GDR.

The reforms also furthered suspicions of political interference on the part of the wider population, which were solidified after manipulation from the top interfered with club relegation. Two of East Berlin’s three clubs – VfB Pankow and SC Lichtenberg –
found themselves in the relegation zone at the end of the 1950-51 DDR-Oberliga season. Its third, Union Oberschönweide, were level on points with BSG Turbine Weimar.106 VFB Pankow, who finished last with only seven points, were disbanded and restructured as BSG Einheit Pankow. The new Pankow club avoided relegation, which was passed on to BSG Weimar, to the outrage of Weimar supporters. BSG Pankow finished last in the 1951-1952 season.107 Union Oberschönweide, on the other hand, were granted sympathy due to the extenuating circumstances authorities used as excuse for their abnormally poor league position.108

The construction of the Walter-Ulbricht-Stadion serves as an example of how large-scale construction projects, much like large-scale restructuring of the sporting system, while praised by the Party as exemplary demonstrations of grassroots initiative, were rarely “voluntary” and were often accompanied by much dissatisfaction.109 In the SBZ and later GDR sport facilities became a part of an extensive state-sponsored rebuilding programme. The construction of the Stalinallee in Berlin, which began in 1951 and is perhaps the best known of voluntary large-scale construction projects with a political bend, led to the creation of the Nationales Aufbauwerk (National Building Corps [NAW]), a voluntary labour organization. The NAW, and other similar voluntary labour associations, were used in the construction of sport stadia. The NAW were used in the construction of the Walter-Ulbricht-Stadion in 1950 and they were also used in the construction of the GDR’s new national stadium in Leipzig, the Zentralstadion, which

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106 See the league table at [http://www.fussballdaten.de/ddr/1951/](http://www.fussballdaten.de/ddr/1951/).
108 Dennis and Grix, *Sport under Communism*, 137.
109 Mary Fulbrook saw the constant “grumbling” of many of its citizens, but the lack of outright political protest, as a key feature of the SED-State. See Mary Fulbrook, *The People’s State*, 269-288.
was completed between March 1955 and August 1956 with the assistance of the new
volunteer organization and the FDJ.\textsuperscript{110} As Molly Johnson has demonstrated,
“volunteering”, such as was the case in the NAW, was not only expected at every level of
government and administration, it was also often mandated and compulsory in the
GDR.\textsuperscript{111} Such “voluntary” forms of labour often led to “grumbling” and discontent on
the part of the volunteers. The difference between the voluntary reconstruction of stadia
in East and West Germany, however, involves the degree to which reconstruction of sport
stadia was overtly politicized. In the GDR, rebuilding stadia was viewed as an implicitly
political act. Formal structures of free labour organizations were not so readily put
together by the Western Allies. Rather, the Western Allies approach to sport in the
postwar years was to encourage it as an apolitical space, free from political
interference.\textsuperscript{112} The re-structuring of 1950 in the GDR and suspected political
interference caused instability and distrust amongst many of the local population.

Though West Germans were still generally uncertain over the FRG, football stadia and
clubs remained spaces of relative autonomy. Coupled with the ongoing

“\textit{Wirtschaftswunder}” (economic miracle), football helped West Germans come to grips
with a future of potential German prosperity and relative success, whereas the East was
increasingly associated with disillusionment.

\textsuperscript{110} Johnson, \textit{Training Socialist Citizens}, 107.
\textsuperscript{111} See Molly Johnson, \textit{Training Socialist Citizens}, especially chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{112} Despite the DFB’s own attempts to present itself as apolitical, has a political history that is being
increasingly questions. See, for example, Udo Merkel, “The Hidden Social and Political History of the
German Football Association (DFB), 1900-1950”, \textit{Soccer & Society} 1, 2 (Summer 2000): 167-186.
East German Discontent and the 1954 “Miracle of Bern”

On June 14, 1953, Dresden played host to the East German national team’s first home match. The GDR played out an uninspiring 0-0 draw against Bulgaria in front of over 55,000 fans. Two days later, on June 16, East Berlin construction workers left their posts and marched to the House of Ministries in protest over the recent announcement that production quotas would increase. As they marched, their numbers grew in size, and East Berliners voiced a series of discontents that culminated in the call for the resignation of the government and the scheduling of free elections. The next morning, tens of thousands of East Germans joined the protest. After violence erupted between protesters and the Barracked People’s Police (Kasernierte Volkspolizei), the Soviet military command declared a state of emergency; Soviet tanks rolled into the “Hauptstadt der DDR” (capital of the GDR).113

The protests, which spread across East Germany, were the result of growing frustration on the part of the East German people that had exploded in and around the football stadia before the Workers’ Uprising. Once the tanks rolled in to the capital, many of the protesters fled down the Leipziger Straße and across Potsdamer Platz into the British sector for safety. For these refugees, the Soviet response broke any hopes they retained about the possibility of future reforms in the GDR.

The protests, often referred to as the 17th June Workers’ Uprising, worsened the refugee crisis that begun a year earlier, after the inner-German border were sealed. 185 000 people left the GDR in 1952, looking for shelter in the FRG. In the first six months of 1953 alone, the number rose to 195 700. Nearly all the refugees travelled to West Berlin, which remained a gateway to the rest of the country. Because of The Workers’ Uprising, new provisions were set in place by the government that restricted individuals from assembling in large numbers and it sought to restrict the movement of peoples. All mass spectator sports were cancelled and placed on hold until order was restored. The East German national team withdrew from the World Cup qualifiers for 1954, a short time after having gained membership to FIFA. As soon as East Germany gained international recognition and credibility through sport, it retreated back inward and eastward, much to the dissatisfaction of the population. The numbers of refugees further increased to 331 390 for the entire year of 1953 and approximately 150 000 to 300 000 people left the GDR for the West until the construction of the Berlin Wall effectively sealed the haemorrhaging border.

One year to the day later, amidst the worsening refugee crisis, FIFA opened the first postwar Football World Cup held in Switzerland. After convincingly defeating the Turkish team 4:1, the West German national team were humiliated 3:8 by then favourites

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114 For an overview of the historiographical debates that pertain to the Workers’ Uprising, see Grieder, The German Democratic Republic, 37-46; Corey Ross, The East German Dictatorship; Andrew Port, Conflict and Stability.
Hungary. After defeating Turkey a second time one week later, the West German team advanced to the Knock-out round. They narrowly defeated Yugoslavia 2:0 in the Quarter-finals before doing away with a significantly weakened Austrian side 6:1 to advance to the final.

West Germany’s surprising run in the tournament ended with a rematch against the Hungarians, a team regarded by many contemporaries as undefeatable. The match resulted in one of the most entertaining finals in World Cup history. The Hungarian team demonstrated their superiority by scoring two quick goals early in the match to take a 0:2 lead into half-time. The next 45 minutes saw one of the most unforgettable comebacks in football history. The West German team scored three unanswered goals, the last of which, the winner, came in the dying moments of the match (see Figure 2.2). At the final whistle, the crowd, which consisted mostly of Germans who were able to make the short trip to Bern, celebrated wildly with chants of “Deutschland! Deutschland!” (Germany! Germany!). As the new West German national anthem played over the loudspeakers, the crowd sung its banned first verse: “Deutschland, Deutschland, über alles”.

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117 The video was obtained and viewed courtesy of the DFMB. One can view footage of the match on YouTube at the following address: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pB9t9DQyEZo. At the end of the footage, one can hear the beginning of the rendition before the footage cuts out.
The unexpected and dramatic loss of the Hungarian national team unleashed riots in Budapest. The disgruntled masses directed their anger at the regime itself, targeting government buildings for sack and plunder. Somewhat like the 1953 Workers’ Uprising was preceded by actions in and around the football pitch that suggested discontent at the regime, some historians have interpreted the 1954 World Cup riots in Hungary as a precursor to the 1956 Uprising.

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The victory provided, to use Arthur Heinrich’s words, “a moment of collective bliss”, the first positive collective experience for Germans. At the final whistle, Germans celebrated in the streets. Though the Waldorf stadium sold out for the match and attracted tens of thousands of German fans, the 1954 World Cup was experienced in semi-public spaces. The tournament was broadcast regularly on international radio stations throughout Europe – and the world – and for the first time. Some matches were also broadcast live for the first time, including the final. Those local pubs that could afford it and were lucky enough to have procured one before the final played the match on television. The vast majority who could not procure a television settled for the radio. Television and radio permitted more people to experience the final collectively. The use of the technologies had the added effect of adding the acoustic and visual sensory dimension to the immediacy of the collective experience. The “moment of collective bliss” reproduced itself when the players returned home and toured the country as world champions.

The victory caused confusion and concern as much celebration. It was greeted with worry on the part of authorities in both the GDR and FRG. Concern over public displays of emotion was shared by both states, but was of particular concern for West German elites who were concerned such displays would lead to associations with the

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120 “Germany Upsets Hungary, 3 to 2, to capture world soccer title; 65 000 see team rally after rivals get 2 goals in 8 minutes at Bern — West Berlin Throngs Dance in streets”, NYT July 5 1954, 15.
121 The DFMB tried to provide its audience a sensory experience of the game via a combination of audio-visual technologies. The museum also built a small-scale replica of the stadium and invites visitors to purchase an avatar for 1 euro, which can then be seated in the stadium.
122 see Doppelpasse, 62-66.
Nazi regime. Part of their anxieties were proved warranted. Germans made sense of the match by turning to the imagery, metaphor, and rhetoric of the pre-1945 years. The DFB-president celebrated the victory in a Munich beer hall by referencing the “Germanic God” and the “Führer principle” as the reasons the Germans came out on top. The media echoed this in their post-match analyses. East German media outlets had a difficult time making sense of the West German victory. During the tournament, the East German media strove for neutrality as the West German national team claimed to be the sole representation of the German nation. Wolfgang Hempel, who provided the radio commentary for the tournament likewise strived for neutrality. The press was unable to contain their own emotions of joy and pride. Junge Welt proclaimed it the “greatest triumph in the history of German football”. On the other hand, Neues Deutschland labelled the victory “lucky”. They also accused the West German club of purposefully injuring the Hungarian star Puskas in their opening defeat. They were quick to pick up on and exploit such references to the Nazi past, presenting them as proof that the FRG remained a bastion of fascism and imperialism. The public singing of the national anthem, including its banned first verse, which could be heard clearly on the broadcasts.

123 On West German concern over public displays of emotion in the early postwar years, see Frank Biess, “Feelings in the Aftermath: Toward a History of Postwar Emotions” in Histories of the Aftermath, ed. Frank Biess and Robert G. Moeller, (New York: Berghahn, 2010), 30-48, 34.
126 McD, The People’s Game, 84.
127 Neues Deutschland 6 July 1954, 8.
until they were cut, was used as evidence that fascism remained in the FRG.\textsuperscript{128} Despite the best efforts to use the outburst for propagandistic purposes, East Germans seemed more enthralled with the victory of the class enemy than concerned about the perceived imperialism of their western neighbours. In addition to public displays of celebrations in the cities of the GDR – and in East Berlin – GDR citizens wrote to manager Sepp Herberger with congratulations.\textsuperscript{129}

The outburst of emotion has led some historians to view the 1954 World Cup victory as the moment the FRG was founded.\textsuperscript{130} New historical scholarship has challenged the “founding myth”. Without denying that the 1954 World Cup final provided a “strong collective experience”\textsuperscript{131}, some historians have been sceptical of the victory’s, continuous and long-lasting effect. The 1954 World Cup could be regarded as an expression of German recovery vis-à-vis the damaged self-confidence that resulted from military defeat and occupation, as Jarausch has expressed.\textsuperscript{132} What is less clear is the degree to which the victory itself played a role in actively constructing a new German nationalism. Historians are less convinced by what they see as a lack of supporting evidence in this regard. Indeed, they correctly point out how sporting events, such as the World Cup final, may serve a cultural symbolic void, whose expression of euphoric emotion can be subjected to interpretation, it is also important to note that such emotional eruptions tend to be short-lived. The World Cup victory sent people to the streets in

\textsuperscript{128} See the published report from Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv on “Missbrauchte Sportbegeisterung” Auszug aus dem Sendemanuskript von Karl Eduard v. Schnitzler 07.07.1954, also available in Doppelpasse, 63-64.
\textsuperscript{129} See the letters in Doppelpasse, 64.
\textsuperscript{131} Pyta, “Cultural History of Football in Germany,” 13.
\textsuperscript{132} Jarausch, After Hitler, 64.
celebration, but the celebrations ended. They were revived with victory parades, but fans
returned home, went to bed in the evening, and continued on with their lives in the
morning. Events such as football finals can revive emotions of collective euphoria and
bliss and in doing so can act on the cultural memory of a nation, but there is little
evidence that these memories were actually revived throughout the Cold War, or before
1990. Nevertheless, the victory had a momentous effect on postwar German history
because it had the effect of successfully re-integrating German football into the
international community, while giving instilling confidence in a distrusting population
that the future might not look so bleak in the FRG. Their dramatic victory over the
Hungarians sent a message: West Germany was an international football power. It also
sent a message to many West Germans: the FRG could be successful.

In contrast, 1954 was yet another year of restructuring for East German football in
an attempt to tackle its comparatively low standards. Reforms created sport clubs (SC)
that functioned separately from the larger BSG system. In other words, the SV were
meant to function as elite clubs that focussed on building competitive success. The State
Committee for Physical Culture and Sport, created in 1952, oversaw the activities of the
new SC system. The changes did not produce immediate results. Rather, they continued
to cause confusion and tension between the two organizations, the SCs and the BSG,
whose authority often overlapped. From the point of view of East German fans,
increased centralization came at a price and did not result in much success.

That West Germany emerged as a footballing power affected no state or sporting
nation more than the GDR. The 1954 World Cup victory served as an immediate
reminder that football held – and would continue to hold – a position of great importance
to many East Germans. East German frustrations with GDR football only made West German football more attractive. Throughout the years of division, many East German football fans identified with West German football by supporting the national team and West German clubs, as the next chapter will outline.

**Conclusion**

The Nazi quest to form a common German national identity based on race led to catastrophe. Military defeat and experiences of occupation pushed ordinary Germans inward, preferring the relative tranquility found in the home, in the local. The notion of “Heimat” revived an identity nearly lost because of the wars. “Heimat” permitted Germans to retreat in the immediate postwar period. 133 Public expressions of nationalism, much like emotions more generally, were taboo and kept hidden.134 In the days immediately following the war, football provided relief from the difficulties of life in the rubble. It provided Germans with entertainment, the sense of a temporary release from their daily suffering. Football matches in the immediate postwar period, such as the Kalorienspiel [calories games], reveal the extent to which football served to keep German bodies healthy by offering a space to conduct physical exercise and by using football matches to redistribute necessities to the local population.

As a leisurely activity, Football provided an opportunity for Germans to retreat from the difficulties of daily life under occupation. As Alan McDougall has pointed out,

“as with the ‘light cultural fare’ of Heimat practices – comedies, amateur plays, local history talks, and choral singing – the sport was a fitting pastime for a people who wanted to maintain customs of the past, while, like the eponymous heroine in Rainer Werner Fassbinder’s “The Marriage of Maria Braun”, resolutely and pragmatically turning away from the political implications, and memories, of what happened before 1945”.135 In the chaos of the early post-war years, football provided a much-needed sense of normalcy among survivors who desperately tried to restart their lives.

In the immediate postwar years, there was little to suggest there would be two, separate German states, each making an exclusive claim as the representative of the German people. The implementation of Directive 23 had the dual effect of, first, providing the Allies with a “blank slate” upon which German sport could be rebuilt, and, second, ensured sport was organized strictly along the local, or “Kommunal” level.136 Because there was no unified sense between the Allies of how German sport would be rebuilt, Directive 23 opened the possibility for divergent systems to form as the Western Allies and Soviet Union grew increasingly hostile toward one another’s vision for the implementation of the Potsdam agreement. Despite the growing division, Berlin’s unique status served, rather, as an arena of compromise in light of growing political difference in the occupation zones. It demonstrated how for many Germans the future may be difficult politically and ensure, but not necessarily divided.

Whereas the Western Allies quickly turned to reinstate the pre-1933 Vereine model, authorities in the SBZ, who consciously distanced themselves from two popular

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135 McDougall, The People’s Game, 45-46.
136 On the so-called “Kommunal-Ära”, see Doppelpasse, 12-18.
pre-existing footballing traditions in the form of the Vereine and Workers’ Football Clubs, hesitated and bid their time by continuing Kommunal football. As a result, football, in the SBZ was chaotic and disorganized as demonstrated above. Somewhat ironically, a distinct lack of centralization perpetuated the problem. Rather than having one central organization charged with restructuring sport, institutions attached to the party – the FDJ, FDGB, and DS – competed for authority over sporting matters, structuring the SBZ/GDR’s sporting institutions along their own lines. The eventual forceful implementation of a footballing system based on the Soviet model eased the complications caused by the different party organs’ competing interests, but the constant restructuring of institutions, leagues, and clubs led to widespread dissatisfaction on the part of the local population, which was reflective of larger concerns the population had with regime. The prolonged local-era in the SBZ and GDR left a legacy that ensconced regional attachments that simultaneously prevented football from building a common, lasting national identity and prevented many Germans from forming some sort of attachment to a particular club. Ironically, the initial desire of the Allies’ to prevent a return to a sense of German national identity by retreating to the regional was achieved in the East, but ultimately to the detriment of the SED state, as it prevented East Germans from building a common East German national identity. Rather, as we will see in the following chapters, GDR football offered a regional refuge for East German football fans to resist the larger project of building a national East German identity while simultaneously ensuring they kept bonds with their Western neighbours.137

137 On the limits of democratic centralization in the GDR, see Jan Palmowski, “Regional identities and the limits of democratic centralism in the GDR” Journal of Contemporary History vol. 41, no. 3 (July 2006),
Both the GDR and FRG appealed to sport’s supposed “apolitical” nature to achieve precise political objectives, namely the international recognition lent by joining FIFA and founding UEFA. 1954 saw West Germany return to the international arena with aplomb, the West German national team defeating the heavily favoured Hungary 3:2 in the first postwar FIFA World Cup. Meanwhile, East German football suffered from the Workers’ Uprising from the previous year. The East German national team withdrew from qualifications, paving the way for the West German team to claim sole representation for the German nation. Rather than benefit from sporting success, East Germany alienated many of its supporters by implementing ineffective policies of centralization and undertaking several waves of organizational restructuring. Frustration in and around the football grounds echoed larger feelings of discontent in East German society, the rumblings of which persisted throughout its existence.

With international recognition on the sporting stage, the East and West German national teams were guaranteed an opportunity for continued interaction throughout the Cold War that both cemented division and ensured interconnection. Though football was used at times as a means to ease political tensions by organized friendlies between East and West German clubs, international football competitions provided no such controlled environments. As will be explored in more depth in the following chapters, these interactions “around the wall” produced both an ambivalent attitude towards GDR football – and notably the GDR national team – and an unquenchable thirst for the version played in the West, which proved both remarkably successful, desirable and commercially marketable.

503-26.

In October 1956, 1. FC Kaiserslautern travelled to Leipzig’s Zentralstadion to play a non-competitive match against the Oberliga champions, SC Wismut Karl-Marx-Stadt. Over 100,000 East German football fans crammed inside the GDR’s national stadium to witness the West German champions, a team that included five players from the 1954 World Cup winning side, come away convincing 5:3 winners. One of the goals was later described by Der Spiegel as the “forgotten goal of the century”, a back-heel-volley by the West German captain, Fritz Walter.¹

Football’s importance to East Germans went beyond the results on the pitch. The victory of Kaiserslautern on the pitch demonstrated the superiority of the West in a cultural sphere East Germans held to heart. The astounding numbers, highly unusual for a non-competitive football match, speak to the resounding effect the 1954 World Cup victory had on the East German population. GDR citizens came in waves to see the West German team. That the West German champions fielded five of the Bern stars made the tie irresistible to many East German football fans. The Deutsches-Sport-Echo, the DTSB’s daily sports paper, reported more than 300,000 people from across the GDR placed demands for tickets.² The match proved an expression of trans-regional and inter-

German solidarity that could and would be re-awakened, a resilience that remained throughout the GDR years.³

This chapter examines football during the years of physical division, when the Berlin Wall separated East and West Berlin between 1961-1989. The early-postwar years were largely characterised by uncertainty; once the division became a reality, both states successfully turned to sport to solidify their participation in the international community. In doing so, they became not mere participants, but both built highly successful sporting societies. Sporting success in the GDR in particular was so great it permeated the minds of West German sporting officials, who were continuously obsessed with the GDR’s sporting prowess. As Uta Ballbier has shown, competitive sport was one area where the “asymmetrical relationship” Christoph Kleßmann saw as being characteristic of postwar German history was reversed.⁴ Rather than investigate how and why each state gained success in sporting competitions, this chapter focuses mainly on the sporting relationship that developed between East and West around football during the years of division.

After exploring how football fit in the wider GDR sporting apparatus, this chapter turns to explore how West Berlin’s unique status as an “island city” affected German football cultures both sides of the wall. It first investigates the degree to which the founding of the Bundesliga was attached to the Cold War. The founding of the Bundesliga has typically been presented as evolving out of purely sporting interests as a way to distance itself from potential accusations that political motivations were behind

⁴ Kleßmann, The Divided Past, 1-10; Balbier, Kalter Krieg auf der Aschenbahn
sporting decisions. Following the suggestion of German sport historian Nils Havemann, this chapter considers the founding of the Bundesliga as based on the political and economic realities that structure institutional interests.

The impact the Bundesliga has had on German football cannot be overstated. After briefly examining the professional league’s origins by placing within the context of the Cold War and German division, this chapter then examines the ways the Bundesliga affected Berliner football, East and West. It considers the importance western football played in the lives of East Germans to uncover wider questions pertaining to the nature of the SED state.

As we saw in the previous chapter, both the GDR and FRG used to sport to help gain international recognition. The GDR’s need to join international sporting institutions to gain recognition outside the Soviet bloc, however, had the paradoxical effect of ensuring Western European cultural products and practices continued to permeate the Iron Curtain. As historians of the GDR have persuasively argued, the ever-presence of Western consumer goods had the effect of destabilizing the regime by creating a demand for Western products that were viewed as undesirable by the state. Though the SED

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6 On the importance of viewing both sides of football, see Nils Havemann, *Samstags um Halb 4*, 50.
authorities repeatedly tried to limit the eastern flow of Western products, they were unable to fully control football as well as its cultural by-products from poking holes in the wall. Cultural products, such as football, kept Germans “divided, but not disconnected”, as the tile of one recent edited collection suggests.\footnote{Tobias Hobscherf, Christoph Laucht, and Andrew Plowman (eds), \textit{Divided, But Not Disconnected: German Experiences of the Cold War} (New York: Berghahn, 2010); Detlev Brunner, Udo Grashoff, and Andreas Kötzing (eds), \textit{Asymmetrisch verflochten? Neue Forschungen zur gesamtdeutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte} (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2013).} This chapter builds from this notion that football was one important cultural product that poked holes in the walls. Specifically, it turns to fan interactions that occurred between East and West German football supporters in and around matches to ask how the constant presence of West German football affected the ways East German football supporters viewed GDR football – and what does this relationship reveal about their attitudes with the SED state?

The East German people’s relationship with the SED state is perhaps best revealed in one of its greatest sporting triumphs. Although sporting competitions often brought Western football behind the East, they also forced East Germany to travel West, an act they heavily restricted to most of its citizens. In one of football history’s greatest ironies, on the only occasion the East German national team qualified for the final round of the World Cup, not only was the tournament hosted by the FRG, the two German neighbours were also drawn together in the same group. This chapter analyses the 1974 World Cup match between the FRG and the GDR as a microcosm for the ways wider concerns with GDR football often mirrored concerns towards the SED state.
Finally, while many East Germans looked to the West to get their footballing fix, the last part of this chapter asks whether some West German football fans were drawn East. In this regard, football was much like other spheres of cultural activity that reflect the asymmetry that characterized the relationship between East and West Germany. Rather than dismiss those who were interested in GDR football, this chapter explores the reasons behind their attractions, since they may speak to the unique relationship many East and West German football enthusiasts shared during the years of division.

The “Problem Child” of the “Sporting Miracle”: Sport and Ideology in the GDR

On Monday 22 August 1961, an image depicting two young men, Konrad Dorner and Christian Hofmann, handing two bouquets of flowers and a bottle of wine to a soldier, covered the front page of the *neue Fußball-Woche*. (See Figure 3.1) The soldier, Fritz Belger, stood in front of the half-built Berlin Wall, machine gun over his shoulder. A picture of the East German national football team greeted readers on page two. An accompanying letter explained that the footballers supported the government’s decision to build a wall to separate East and West Berlin. The letter, signed by the players, reaffirmed the party line that drastic measures were necessary the GDR in the face of the “provocative actions” (*provokatorischen Treiben*) of the Bonn government.⁸ (See Figure 3.2) The article, titled “Blumen der Fußballer an unsere Kämpfer!”, its accompanying image, and the published official letter of support signed by the members of the East

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⁸ “Blumen der Fußballer an unsere Kämpfer!”, *FUWO* 34/61, 2
German national team, reveals how the SED regime did not hesitate to use football and footballers to gain legitimacy for unpopular political decisions.⁹

Figure 3.1: Cover of Die neue Fußball-Woche a few days after the construction of the Berlin Wall depicts an East German soldier handing flowers to two players of the East German national football team.

Figure 3.2: Page 2 of Die neue-Fußball-Woche, including a picture of the East German national team, and their signatures, as a measure of support for the regime’s decision to build the wall.

Source: Die neue Fußball-Woche, 22 August, 1961, p. 2.

Sport in the GDR served two main functions. First, as we saw in the last chapter, it was a practical way for the new state to achieve international recognition. The second was ideological: it was meant to imbue socialist values into its citizens and, therefore, transform ordinary people into new socialist men and women.¹⁰ Until the late 1940s and early 1950s, when socio-economic recovery was the priority, the GDR’s sporting structure and its accompanying organizations were in relative states of chaos, which impeded any efforts at centralization and development.¹¹ Progress at any level, let alone in elite sport, was slow. Whereas the West German national team won FIFA’s prized possession within a few years of re-gaining its membership, the GDR only managed to win its first international football match one years later, in 1955.¹²

After embarking on several re-structuring schemes aimed at organizing sport along the Soviet state-socialist model from 1952-1956 – a plan that included introducing the State Committee for Physical Education and Sport as a governmental body tasked with implanting socialist values through the use of sport and physical education in July

¹⁰ Dennis and Grix, Sport under Communism, 20; Balbier, “A Game, an Instrument”, 540
¹¹ For example, see the DFV’s report on the “problems with GDR football” in Archivgut des DFV I/1, “Gliederung über Probleme des Fußballs in der DDR”, 20 May 1964 and “Konzeption von Vorschlägen zur weiteren Verebesserung der Arbeit im DFV”, 30 July 1964.
¹² Dennis and Grix, Sport under Communism, 28-29
1952\(^{13}\) – the SED created the German Turnen and Sport Federation (DTSB) in 1957 in an attempt to stabilize the organizational confusion that had been rampant since the end of the *Komunal-Ära* (local era).\(^{14}\) The subsection devoted to football, the Deutscher Fußballverband (German Football Association [DFV]), was founded in May 1958, taking over responsibilities from the DS.\(^{15}\) The creation of the DTSB followed wide-sweeping reforms of “de-Stalinization” throughout the Soviet bloc.\(^{16}\) With Manfred Ewald at its head from 1961 until his forced retirement in 1988, the DTSB served as the main centralized administrative body for elite sport in the GDR. As Dennis and Grix put it: “Its founding was the culmination of the long painstaking search for a suitable organiser of mass and elite sport that was committed to the political and sporting goals of the regime.”\(^{17}\)

Ewald, who also served as President of the Olympic Committee from 1973 to 1990, was a central figure in the transformation of GDR sport into an elite-sport powerhouse. His approach was cemented by 1969 when the SED Politburo and the Secretariat of the *Zentralkomitee* (Central Committee [ZK]) approved a “resolution on elite sport” (*Leistungssportbeschluss*) that laid out the plan that would define GDR sport. The resolution aimed at maximizing the proficiency of East German athletes in

\(^{13}\) *Ibid*, 34-37.


\(^{15}\) Archivgut des DFV, I/1, Satzung des Deutschen-Fußball-Verbandes im Deutschen Turn- und Sportbund, 1958.


\(^{17}\) Dennis and Grix, *Sport under Communism*, 38.
The resolution put into practice a simple but pragmatic approach to improve the GDR’s competitiveness in elite sport, often at the expense of mass sport. It divided individual sports into two distinct categories, “Sport 1” and “Sport 2”. “Sport 1” represented those sports in which the GDR had the highest chance of claiming a medal at the Olympic games. Individual sports that required relatively few resources to both compete and succeed, and especially those sports in which one athlete had the possibility of winning more than one medal, such as track and field and swimming, made up “Sport 1”. The rest fell into “Sport 2”. “Sport 1” received the bulk of funding, resources, and attention. “Sport 2”, either because these sports demanded the allocation of many resources or did not likely result in medals for the GDR, were left severely under-funded. Generally, “Sport 2” include team sports, such as basketball, Volleyball, or Handball. By maximizing their chances to win medals at the Olympics, the GDR created one of the most effective elite sporting systems in the world. By winning – and winning big – at the Olympics, the GDR could demonstrate the strength of the socialist way of life.

Elite Athletes held positions of great importance in the GDR. In addition to the pressure to do well and win medals, elite athletes were expected to serve as “ambassadors
in tracksuits”, exporting the virtues of socialism to the world. The East German sporting press provide countless examples whereby athletes are depicted serving the greater ideological cause. A caricature from Neue Fußball-Woche from 1958 illustrates a mass of East German footballers parading in celebration of May Day. The footballers, dressed in the uniforms of their respective clubs and marching under their respective club and league banners, appear united in a common cause. As they march, they are simultaneously stomping on a gathering of caricatured capitalists, military officers, and imperialists: An officer in military uniform holds in his hands a map, an indication of his aggressive imperialism; other men, dressed in suits and top-hats with embroidered dollar-sign insignia, carry sacks of cash or atomic weapons.22

Football, however, remained the “problem child” of the GDR’s sporting system. Because of its undeniable popularity, authorities had little alternative but to place football in “Sport 1”. Proving an exception to the rule, sporting authorities were unable to develop football as effectively as they did other competitive sports. East German football devoured resources that could be redistributed elsewhere, yet remained severely under-funded. Football continuously attracted the country’s top athletic talent, but the national team could only assemble a mediocre side that, ultimately, remained largely uncompetitive, to the frustration of the players and coaches, state officials, and the fans. More often than not, fans marched under regional banners rather than embraced the

22 Neue Fußball-Woche 28 April, 1958. The illustration is also available in Braun and Wiese, Doppelpasse, 28.
collective socialist cause. In his memoirs, Ewald admitted the GDR failed to come to grips with the game. 23

The decision to build the wall remained possibly the regime’s most unpopular – if not, despised – decision. Getting the national team players to publically endorse the move did little to alter the population’s perception of that. 24 The propaganda stunt was a feeble attempt to use football to reach out to East Germans. It reflected the disconnect between the state, society, and football that permeated the GDR. Whereas football could have been an effective way to help foster a new sense of national identity 25, any East German national identity centred on football could only be described as fractured and unfulfilled. Building the wall produced feelings of alienation amongst the East German population and distrust towards the regime. 26 Making the athletes endorse it turned the symbols of GDR football into an allegory for the regime’s limitations.

Structurally, the Berlin Wall did not have a profound effect on football in the GDR. Rather, football was more affected by the state’s constant re-structuring and finally decision to, first, embrace, next, maximize elite sport. Football was stuck in state-induced limbo that both sought to treat football as any other GDR sport while recognizing its uniqueness, but undervaluing it. The state turned to football as propaganda, but did

23 Manfred Ewald, Ich war der Sport: Wahrheiten und Legenden aus dem Wunderland der Sieger (Berlin: Elefanten, 1994) obtained courtesy of the DFMB.
little to turn it into an effective means by which to communicate wider ideological goals to the population. Most East Germans viewed GDR football ambivalently. There remained instances where East Germans were proud of their state’s endeavors on the football pitch. The GDR may have had its problems, but it was still nice to be a part of a collective that punched above its weight to beat a rival. The GDR had a strong record at the Olympics. Openly celebrating the West German national team’s World Cup victory in 1974 did not prevent East Germans from relishing in the GDR’s surprising upset over their rivals in the first round. Their ambivalence manifested itself in a deep rooted regionalism that formed around individual clubs, rather than, say, around the East German national team. Football in the GDR, as Alan McDougall has persuasively demonstrated, served as much as an outlet to voice frustration at the regime as it demonstrated many of the SED state’s inner contradictions and inherent problems.

The Berlin Crisis, the “Sportluftbrücke” (Sport-Airlift), and the Creation of the Bundesliga

Contrary to the GDR, football in West Germany was left to develop largely on its own, without direct political interference and manipulation from the state. Following the victory of 1954, state officials and FRG media expressed concern that celebrations might re-ignite an outburst of German nationalism. The government’s official response in the early 1950s was to view the victory apolitically, a part of a wider philosophy of viewing

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27 Hesselmann and Ide, “A Tale of two Germany’s,” 41.
sport more generally as non-political, autonomous sphere. State officials, as Uta Balbier has put it, were “ambivalent towards national self-display in sport”. When the West German team came to West Berlin, President Theodor Heuss’s explicitly rejected congratulating the team on anything but its sporting performance in his speech at the Olympiastadion. His position made clear that the victory for the team was not a national victory as well; it was only a sporting victory.

This is not to suggest that football in the FRG was completely apolitical or that larger political objectives played no part in the ways it was restructured following the war. That West German sport clubs, and the national football club in particular, claimed to be the sole representative of Germany implicitly politicized its achievements. A more apt way to characterise football’s position in West German society is as autonomous, but not apolitical, as historian Tobias Kneschke insist. Rather than the ideological goals espoused in East Germany, West German officials actively fought to divorce sport from politics. The motivation to do so derived from the need of sporting officials to distance themselves from both their Nazi past and what they viewed was an increasing politicization of sport in the GDR. West German sporting organizations, such as the DSB and DFB, operated at arm's-length and focussed on sporting and economic concerns throughout the 1950s.

30 Balbier, “How the Federal Republic Learnt to Take Sport Seriously”. 
31 Balbier, Kalter Krieg auf der Aschenbahn, 32-39. 
32 For a discussion critical of the DFB’s own stance as an agent that successfully kept politics at arms length, see Merkel, “The Hidden Social and Political History of the DFB”. 
33 Tobias Kneschke aptly described the situation of football in West Germany as “Autonom, aber nicht unpolitisch”. See Doppelpasse, 21. 
34 Balbier, “A game, an instrument”, 540 
35 Ibid.
Unlike the rest of the country that was enjoying the fruits of the
_Wirtschaftswunder_ (West German economic miracle), the economic situation in West
Berlin remained precarious throughout the 1950s. The city’s economic difficulties were
mirrored on the pitch. Results displayed a growing discrepancy in quality between West
Berlin’s football clubs and those of the rest of the country as well as those in East
Germany. This discrepancy grew to alarming levels throughout the 1950s, reaching its
zenith when Hertha BSC was humiliated 14:1 by 1. FC Kaiserslautern in 1957.36

Beginning in 1948, a series of policies were implemented aimed at assisting the
development of West German sport in the city by keeping it firmly attached to the rest of
the newly created FRG. Through financial incentives and using Berlin as a venue for
important, high quality matches, the FRG ensured West Berlin remained an important
“Fußballstadt” (Football city) via what German sport historians Jutta Braun and René
Wiese have termed a “Sportluftbrücke” (Sport-Airlift). To ease reconstruction efforts,
15% of betting revenue was offered to help rebuild sport stadia and clubs. Next to
turnstile profits, the additional assistance represented the most important source of
revenue for most West Berlin clubs.37 After the 1953 Workers’ Uprising worsened an
already chaotic refugee crisis, the _Bundesministerium für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen_
(Federal Ministry for inter-German affairs [BMiB]) provided the city with 50 000
DM/year to organize elite sporting events. Football matches featured prominently on the
programme. 45 000 were on hand to watch the West German national team defeat a
combined “Berlin-elf” (Berlin-eleven) 4:1 at the Olympiastadion sometime in early

36 See the section on “Berliner Kosmos” in _Doppelpässe_, 48-61.
37 _Doppelpasse_, 38.
1961. 30 289 fans witnessed what the West German football weekly *Fußball-Woche* termed the “Tor des Jahres” (goal of the year), an 84th minute Lutz Steinert “sensational” overhead kick that saw the combined “Berlin-elf” (Berlin-eleven) defeat FC Barcalona at the Olympiastadion. 39 Similarly, the DFB organized a series of international matches – typically big-ticket events that easily attracted tens of thousands of spectators – that were played at the Olympiastadion. The earliest international event played between the West German national team in Berlin occurred in 1951, when the FRG played Turkey. Two matches were organized for Berlin in 1955/56, one against Norway. The biggest match was played in 1956, when the Olympiastadion played host to England. 40

Berlin’s tense political circumstances saw displays of moral support from the rest of the FRG. After the Berliner Wall was erected, *Poststadion*’s announcer took to the microphone to acknowledge that “unserer Ostberliner Freunde” (our East Berlin friends) could no longer attend matches. 41 The 25 000 spectator-strong greeting could easily be heard across the divide. 42 As part of the *Luftbrücke* (airlift), the DFB agreed to continue to hold its biggest event, the cup final, at the Olympiastadion regularly during the 1950s and 1960s. 43 The DFB-Pokal (the German cup) could attract often 80 000 – 90 000 spectators. 44 The final provided West Germans with an occasion to visit West Berlin.

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38 *Fußball-Sport* 7/61, 7
39 See the cover page of *Fußball-Woche* 25 September, 1961; “Spanischer als die Spanier spielten Schinmöller und Steinert”, *Fußball-Woche* 25 September, 1961, 11.
40 See the cover of *Fußball-Woche* 8 August 1955; see also DFB presidents, Peco Bauwens comments in the programme of the 62 cup final, *Doppelpasse* 40
41 “25 000 grüßten Ostberliner Freunde”, *Fußball-Woche* 37 (39) 25 September, 4.
43 *Doppelpasse*, 40.
Over 91,000 were in attendance to watch FC Köln take on Nürnberg in 1962. Some took the opportunity to voice their solidarity with the “island city”. Fans of 1. FC Kaiserslautern raised a banner that read “Die Pfalz grüßt Berlin” (The Palatinate greets Berlin) at a final match between Kaiserslautern and Preußen Münster in early summer of 1951 following the first Berlin Crisis. In this case, a seemingly “normal” fan greeting to the island city, venue for the German cup final, may be read as a sign of solidarity with West Berlin during a time of political uncertainty.

Krushchev’s suggestion that occupation forces should leave Berlin and the city should become “neutral” in November 1958 launched a second “Berlin crisis” which resulted in the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. Many western nations decided to boycott UEFA’s inaugural European Nations’ cup, the first European football tournament of national clubs, because the GDR, one of UEFA’s founding members, was included in the tournament. Presented with an opportunity to display its football prowess at the international level, East Germany were defeated 0-2 at the Walter Ulbricht Stadion on 21 June 1959 in their first qualifying match against Portugal. Reports suggested 25,000 spectators experienced the poor display. They fared somewhat better in the return leg, which they lost 2-3 at the Estádio das Antas in Porto. The final, hosted by France, only included four teams – France, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union – and went ahead without perennial footballing powers, the UK, Spain, Italy, and West Germany, which staged protest. It was the Soviet Union, in the end, that took

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46 *Doppelpasse*, 42.
47 McDougall, “East Germany and the Europeanization of Football”.
advantage of the political crisis it created by winning the tournament. Because of the protest, the GDR were provided with an opportunity to claim to represent all of Germany in an international competition. The Khrushchev “ultimatum”, however, did little to halt the Sportluftbrücke (sport air lift).

Perhaps the biggest unintended consequence the “ultimatum” had on German football – East and West – was the acceleration of the creation of a Bundesliga, a West German professional league, which followed two years later. Historical accounts have pointed to two key factors that led to the decision to approve the founding of the league in 1962: the growing professionalization of West German football and the desire to strengthen the national team.

Discussions over the establishment of a unified German league have a long history. The first plans to form a state-wide league derive from DFB president Felix Linnemann, who served as president of the DFB from 1925-1945. Linnemann suggested the DFB form a “Reichsliga” to bring together the best teams of the individual regional leagues. The regional associations [Regionalverbände], however, voted overwhelmingly against the idea because they were unwilling to hand over administrative power to a centralized organization. Even the preferences and pressures by the Nazis for highly centralized forms of administration never resulted in the creation of a single, national league. This preference for a regionally based administration, as we saw in chapter 2,

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48 For a brief history of the UEFA Cup, see UEFA’s website: http://www.uefa.com/uefaeuropaleague/history/.
49 On the long history of the Bundesliga, see Havemann, Samstags um halb drei; Schulze-Marmeling, “Der lange Weg zum Profi” http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/sport/bundesliga/160779/geschichte-der-bundesliga
50 For an overview of the founding of the Bundesliga, see Grüne, 100 Jahre Deutsche Meisterschaft. See also the official account of the founding of the Bundesliga on the league’s official website:
continued immediately following the Second World War at the insistence of the occupying powers. The limitations of the “Kommunal” and later “Oberliga” systems (locally- and regionally-based leagues) became increasingly apparent into the 1950s when the increased competition for income through which clubs could effectively manage a professional team resulted in producing a correlation between effective management, economic policy, and club success. Each regional league (Oberliga) developed into a two-tiered system, whereby the more financially stable clubs found themselves at the top of the league table. As a result, fewer teams fielded squads that could compete at the top of the league. In each league, a few teams predictably dominated the table.

The problem was most acute in the financially strapped city of West Berlin. Briefly in the late-1950s, two of its most successful clubs, Hertha BSC and Tasmannia Berlin, both located in neighbouring localities of Wedding and Gesundbrunnen, considered a merger to ease the financial burden and increase its competitive potential. In the end, the Kiez (neighbourhood) rivalry proved insurmountable and the plan was abandoned. The proposed merger between two rivals that dominated the West Berlin regional league in the 1950s, however, serves to demonstrate the degree to which West Berlin clubs had fallen behind their West German counterparts in a system that relied increasingly on economic strength. The growing discrepancy in quality of the West German leagues clearly displayed by Hertha BSC’s thumping at the hand of Kaiserslautern in 1957 14:1. The defeat represented the growing inability of West Berlin

http://www.bundesliga.de/de/historie/1960/0000116490.php. Interestingly, there is a noticeable gap of the entire Nazi period on the official website. More on how the DFB deals with its past in chapter 6.

51 McDougall, The People’s Game, 178.
clubs to compete for the country’s top talent. The problem was furthered as local clubs both lost the region’s top athletes as players left the island for more lucrative professional contracts in other parts of the FRG and were unable to attract top players to the “island city”, who also preferred more desirable destinations further West.

Formal discussions over the possibility of forming a national league that brought together the best clubs from the individual regional leagues began at the DFB-Tagung in Frankfurt/Main in 1958. Franz Kramer, former president of 1. FC Köln who lobbied for a unified league from at least 1949, secured the support of the Bundestrainer (coach of the national team) Sepp Herberger as well as Hermann Neuberger, who served as President of the Saarländischen Fußballbundes (Saarland Football Association [SFB]) between 1951-1969 and who later became president of the DFB from 1975-1992. Herberger saw in a unified league the opportunity to strengthen the national team. He, as well as many others, feared the ability of the German national team to compete against the likes of England, Spain, Italy, and the teams structured under a socialist system. The fear stemmed from the argument that individual players who would make up the national team would benefit from playing against the best teams in the country on a routine basis and from the extra time to train otherwise taken up by everyday work duties. In other words, players from a national league would benefit from more training and playing in a more competitive system. It would also be easier for the manager to scout potential players to represent the national team. No longer would the manager need to travel to

far-off small communities to see some of the unheard of best talents. Rather, the best talents would make their way up through the leagues as they are scouted by individual teams representing their region.53

Herberger’s fears that German national football was falling behind their competition seemed to come true at Chile 1962. The team’s hopes for a second World Cup championship in eight years came to a surprising halt on June 10 in Santiago, when the West German national team were defeated by Yugoslavia 1:0 in the quarter finals. According to the official narrative offered by the DFB, it was the disappointment of the West German team at Chile ’62 that played the decisive role in persuading the league representatives it was time to move forward.54 It mattered little that the two national teams frequently referenced as examples of the need for a unified professional league did as poorly in Chile. The English exited the tournament at the same stage via a 3:1 defeat to Brazil. The Italian team fared even worse; they failed to advance past the group stages. According to this interpretation, the decision to form a Bundesliga emerged purely out of sporting rather than political reasons.

Placing the events that led to the founding of the Bundesliga with an eye on Berlin presents an alternative that speaks to the DFB’s greater political aims. The 13. DFB-Bundestages was held in West Berlin, at the Schöneberger Rathaus.55 The main topics of discussion was the establishment of a unified professional league in light of the ongoing Berlin crisis. A proposal was put forth to form a Bundesliga. The status of

53 Herberger’s biography. List also different official accounts of Bundesliga.
54 See the chapter “Na endlich – die Bundesliga” in BFV 100 Jahre Fussball in Berlin, p. 124-125. See also the account available at their website: http://www.bundesliga.de/de/historie/1960/0000116490.php
Berlin featured as a main concern during the negotiations over the establishment of the Bundesliga. Due to its position of symbolic political influence to the FRG, Berlin was placed in an advantageous position throughout the Cold War. Politicians from the West jumped at opportunities to remind the Soviet Union and the GDR that West Berlin was not a “free city”, but was a part of the FRG.\(^{56}\) Officials from the West German football association, the DFB, agreed that the league should ensure West Berlin be included. They went one step further than allowing teams to be eligible for promotion to the league and guaranteed a representative from Berlin would automatically qualify for the league, thereby bypassing the qualification procedures needed from clubs coming from other West German regions. The negotiations came to an end at the 14. Bundestag in the Goldsaal der Dortmunder Westfalenhalle on 28 July 1962. After years of rejection, the Berlin Wall provided the incentive for the proposal to pass. The vote was overwhelmingly in favour: 103 “Ja” to 26 “Nein”.\(^{57}\)

Once the founding of a unified league was agreed upon, the next item on the table was deciding how many clubs would make up the league and who would represent each region in the inaugural season. Sporting criteria was the main factor considered in determining who would compete in the Bundesliga’s first season. But, there was also evidence of economic and infrastructural concerns.\(^{58}\) Officials agreed that a city would have no more than one team participate. Five places would be allotted to clubs from


Oberliga West and Oberliga Süd; Oberliga Nord would have three; Südwest two; and the city of Berlin was ensured one team. To decide which teams from each Oberliga would gain a spot, league officials wanted to emphasize both recent success with long-term stability. DFB officials developed a system, whereby Oberliga seasons from 1951/2 through to 1962/63 were separated into three sets, with each set being worth more than the last. Points were collected from each of the periods 1951/52 to 1954/55, 1955/56 to 1958/59, and 1959/60 to 1962/63. The period 1959/60 to 1962/63 would count for the most, three times that of 1951/52 to 1954/55, and the period 1955/56 to 1958/59 would count for double that of the early seasons. Additional points were given for “Meisterschaftsendrunden” (final rounds of championship) and “Pokalendspielen” (Final cup matches). The system incorporated tradition – in the form of winning league cups – in addition to economic and sporting criteria for promoting clubs to its federal league.

The system, meant to be an objective way of determining eligibility, was hotly contested by individual clubs, who were quick to recognize the economic potential the Bundesliga could have (See Figure 3.3). In Berlin, of the 44 clubs eligible for promotion to the Bundesliga, Hertha BSC and Tasmania were the main contenders.\textsuperscript{59} Paul Dinter, Vorsitzender (chairman) of Tasmania, fought tirelessly for his team’s inclusion, continuously referring to the club’s powerful support base, economic stability, and tradition of excellence. When the position was awarded to Hertha BSC, Dinter accused its arch-rivals from Gesundbrunnen of cheating. He alleged that Hertha’s management had been unfaithful in their dealings with the DFB-Komission, accusing them of manipulating their finance accounts to paint a rosier picture of their success than was

\textsuperscript{59} BFV, 100 Jahre, 124.
actually the case. The two team’s heated rivalry over the past few years on the pitch continued in the boardrooms. Dinter’s reactions are illustrative of the perceived economic impact participating in the Bundesliga would have for West Berlin’s football clubs.

**Figure 3.3**: Bundesliga teams from each region for the inaugural Season

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oberliga Nord</th>
<th>Hamburger SV, Werder Bremen, Eintracht Braunschweig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oberliga West</td>
<td>FC Schalke 04, Borussia Dortmund, 1. FC Köln, Meidericher SV, SC Preußen Münster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oberliga Süd</td>
<td>1. FC Nürnberg, Eintracht Frankfurt, Karlsruher SC, TSV 1860 München, VfB Stuttgart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oberliga Südwest</td>
<td>1. FC Saarbrücken, 1. FC Kaiserslautern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stadtliga Berlin</td>
<td>Hertha BSC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hertha BSC enjoyed a relatively successful spell in the Bundesliga during its first few years. Its success, it turned out, was highly contentious. In February 1965, the club became entwined in a complicated scandal with several other clubs regarding abnormal account activity. Speaking in front of a live audience on a national televised programme,

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Hertha officials admitted to paying over 192 000 DM in illegal transfer fees to help lure players to the largely unpopular “island city”.\textsuperscript{61} Club representatives thought admitting their faults on national television would demonstrate the pressure the Cold War put Berlin’s clubs under. Unfortunately for Hertha, though the league sympathised with the city of West Berlin, the scandal hurt the league’s popularity. Attendance across the country plummeted. The East German media took the opportunity to remind its citizens of the corruption inherent in professional sports. Rather than being given amnesty, Hertha BSC were automatically relegated.\textsuperscript{62} The league adhered to its policy of maintaining one representative from Berlin in the top tier of West German football. Tasmannia, who won the regional Berlin league in 1964/65, were promoted to replace Hertha as West Berlin’s representative.

Tasmania’s promotion was met with criticism from the start. Clubs complained that Hertha’s relegation presented the league with a problem. According to Bundesliga rules, the bottom two clubs at the end of the season are automatically relegated. Having finished above the relegation zone in 1963/64, Hertha represented a third relegated club from the same season. This offered a potentially non-deserving club from taking the third vacated position. In this case, the club in question was the highest-ranking club from Berlin, rather than, say, the club that finished third, behind the top two clubs in the regional league that are awarded with automatic promotion. In addition to the general scepticism on the part of many clubs that Tasmannia was able to compete at the highest

\textsuperscript{61} See Fischer and Nachtigall, \textit{Skandale ohne ende}. Claire Colomb, \textit{Staging the New Berlin: Place Marketing and the Politics of Urban Reinvention Post-1989} (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012) discusses at some length the city of West Berlin’s marketing campaign aimed at attracting people to the city.

\textsuperscript{62} On the 1965 Bundesliga skandale, see \textit{100 Jahre BFV}, 124-128.
level, the two clubs slighted for relegation that season, Karlsruher SC and FC Schalke 04, argued that, due to the unusual circumstances, they should avoid relegation. The league eventually agreed. Unwilling to do away with a representative from West Berlin, they decided to increase the number of participants in the Bundesliga from 16 to 18 clubs.

Tasmania’s inaugural season in the Bundesliga could not have started more positively. The stage seemed set to prove doubters wrong. In a season that saw low attendance records, their home opener attracted 80,000 to the Olympiastadion. The crowd watched in amazement as the underdogs upset Borussia Dortmund by a score of 2:0. Their initial success, however, was very short lived. Two weeks later, they lost the away match in Dortmund 0:2. As defeat followed defeat, interest plummeted. Only 2,000 spectators watched Tasmania lose 0:2 to Braunschweig and a mere 1500 attended the 0:2 defeat to Borussia Münchengladbach.63 The 1965/66 Tasmania squad collected a pathetic 2 victories out of 38 matches, scoring only 15 goals while conceding 108 in the process. To this day, the now infamous 1965/66 squad hold the dubious record of worst season by a club in the Bundesliga.64 One running popular joke summed up the general disappointment of Tasmania’s season: “Was ist der Unterschied zwischen einen Marienkäfer und Tasmania? Der Marienkäfer hat mehr Punkte” (What’s the difference between a ladybug and Tasmania? The ladybug has more points).65

Tasmania’s relegation left West Berlin without a participant for the next two seasons, when Hertha BSC recovered sufficiently to win promotion to the Bundesliga via the Regionalliga playoff. Upon their return to the Bundesliga, Hertha enjoyed a long

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63 BFV, Fußball in Berlin, 52
64 Leske, Tasmannia.
65 quoted from Kicker, 50 Jahre, 19.
spell of relative success, remaining in the Bundesliga until the 1979/80 season. Throughout the mid-to-late 1970s, Hertha succeeded in securing a place in Europe’s international club competitions. Hertha’s own “golden age” was matched by a golden era across West German football, including West Berlin. In 1974/75, the same year West Germany won the FIFA World Cup as hosts, Hertha BSC were joined by Tennis Borussia Berlin, marking the first time the city of West Berlin fielded two clubs in Germany’s top division. Though Tennis Borussia were immediately relegated, they succeeded in gaining promotion several years later, in the 1976/77 season.

Tasmania’s difficulties in fielding a competitive team for their inaugural season is demonstrative of football in Berlin in the early to mid-1960s. After an initial wave of enthusiasm, excitement waned as promise was undermined by economic difficulties fuelled by the Berlin crisis and the construction of the Berlin Wall. The “island city” of West Berlin, now sealed off in the heart of the GDR, proved an unattractive destination to most West German footballers. In order to compete, Berlin’s clubs added additional – sometimes illegal – incentive to encourage top players to transfer to the border town in the heart of the GDR. In the end, Tasmania’s record spoke to the degree to which Berliner football had fallen behind the rest of the country.

Yet, their participation in the Bundesliga reveals the extent to which the DFB remained sympathetic to West Berlin. The opportunity for West Berlin to include a representative in the Bundesliga ensured the “island city” remained connected to the rest of the FRG’s footballing community. As we will see, Hertha BSC found its stride in the 1970s, qualifying to participate in Europe’s club competition, bring them – and their fans – to the East.
Hertha BSC’s Ostmitgliedern (East-Members)

In late-December, 1961, Kicker, a popular West-German weekly football magazine, published a short article on Der Plumpe, as local fans affectionately referred to it. Der Plumpe was located off the S- and U-bahn station Gesundbrunnen. It stood only meters away from the inner-German border in the working-class district of Wedding, just north of the city centre district of Mitte. Drawing on its success during the early 1930s, Der Plumpe served as the home ground of Berlin’s most popular club, Hertha BSC.

The article, “Wählen Sie mit: Die Mannschaft des Volkes” demonstrates the extent to which Berlin’s football clubs could attract supporters from both sides of the wall. Written shortly after the Berlin Wall went up, the article speaks of the “jener unnatürlichen Grenze” (unnatural border) that separated the city. More than a source with which to view how the West German media viewed the development of the Cold War, it also provides insight into how football fandom in the late-1950s and early-1960s was a “local” phenomenon. In 1961, local identification with a club was not bound by geo-political boundaries. Hertha BSC’s support, the article points out, went beyond the Kiez (neighbourhood) of Gesundbrunnen. Der Plumpe attracted spectators from neighbouring districts, some of which were theoretically in a different country. Before the construction of the Berlin Wall, many Berliners who resided in the Prenzlauer Berg, Mitte, and Pankow regularly crossed the Millionen and Behm bridges to spend their

66 “Wählen Sie mit: Die Mannschaft des Volkes” Kicker 59/61, 4-5.
67 See map of the stadia in Doppelpasse.
68 For more information on the history of Der Plumpe, see Skreutny, Das grosse Buch, 53-55.
69 “Wählen Sie mit: Die Mannschaft des Volkes” Kicker 59/61, 4-5.
Saturdays, “bei Wind und Wetter” (through wind and weather) at Der Plümpke, in West Berlin.70 “Kein Verein in Berlin” (No other clubs), the article points out, “hat so viele Zuschauer aus dem Ostsektor wie Hertha (has as many spectators from the East as Hertha)!"71 As Berlin's most popular club located directly on the border, Hertha drew a sizable amount of supporters from both sides of the wall.

Although the construction of the Berlin Wall severely limited fans’ ability to cross the border to watch their club on Sundays, fan interest did not wane. Given Der Plümpke’s proximity to the border – only meters away – fans were not completely cut off from the action. Some got as close as possible to the border to try and catch a glimpse of the events. Others found higher ground close by, climbing trees to watch matches. Others still contented themselves with the clearly audible roars of the crowd, which they used to decipher scores.72

East German authorities were not overly concerned about local interest in West Berlin football matches in the immediate aftermath of the construction of the wall. Evidence of surveillance on the activities of East Berlin football supporters of West German football emerges only in 1966.73 The Berlin crisis focused their attention on restricting free movement to the West, which resulted in permanent migration, so-called Republikflucht (fleeing the republic). It is especially revealing that some East Germans were not restricted from traveling to the West, such as pensioners, who were permitted to travel more or less freely between the two states. Some older football fans continued to

70 “Wählen Sie mit: Die Mannschaft des Volkes” Kicker 59/61, 4-5. For an excellent illustration of the proximity of the Plumpe to the border, see Skreutny, Das grosse Buch, 53-55.
71 “Wählen Sie mit: Die Mannschaft des Volkes” Kicker 59/61, 4-5.
73 Stasi reports on football fans can be found in Abteilung XX of the BStU, MfS files.
cross the border on Saturdays to watch the match. Since materials such as newspapers and magazines were more difficult to control and intercept than humans, East Berlin fans supplemented their weekly dose of football with materials smuggled in from the West.74

Some Hertha fans went to greater lengths to follow their club. Many years before supporters’ groups were a common part of football culture, Helmut Klopfleisch, a Hertha fan who resided in East Berlin when the Berlin Wall went up, established a “Hertha-Gemeinschaft” (Hertha Society) to follow the exploits of his club.75 The fan-club met on a roughly monthly basis at various pubs in Prenzlauer Berg and Pankow to exchange match reports and newspapers and to tell stories and debate the club’s recent performances.76 These societies are an early indication of a phenomenon – fan clubs – that used the pub and similar public venues as semi-private spaces where fans could gather to discuss the week’s football news. Since the Bundesliga was popular, the conversation often revolved around this cultural product from the West.

Hertha, in turn, learnt of the fan-clubs that started propping up behind the wall and started to acknowledge their continued support despite the political circumstances. In solidarity with their supporters, Hertha BSC’s head office decided to draw up a list to keep track of their so-called “Ostmitgliedern”.77 The list presented the club with both a practical way to acknowledge the indebtedness the club felt towards its fans-base, a footballing act, and served as an act of political opposition to the construction of the Wall. To express their appreciation for the continued support, the club published

74 For visual examples on the materials smuggled at the border, see the exhibit “Tränenpalast”, the Friedrichstraße crossing.
75 See Wiese’s account of Klopfleisch “Wie Löcher in die Mauer schuss”.
76 Wiese, “Hertha BSC”.
77 The list is available in Doppelpässe, 80-86.
regularly on the activities of Hertha fans from East Berlin in their match-day programmes. The club encouraged fans East and West to write to one another as fans.\textsuperscript{78} The club also promoted the yearly ritual of sending “Westpackete” to their “Ostmitgliedern” as a Christmas presents and organized Christmas parties in East Berlin.\textsuperscript{79} These gestures had the long-lasting effect of keeping fans both sides of the wall connected to the club.

The East German authorities eventually grew concerned about the activities of Hertha-Gemeinschaften and the Stasi started reporting on the cross-border behaviour of East German fans.\textsuperscript{80} Stasi reports on football supporters started to appear increasingly from this point onwards. Consequently, open support for West Berlin football clubs diminished. Official numbers of “Ostmitgliedern” dropped drastically.\textsuperscript{81}

Nevertheless, East German Hertha fans continued to find ways to evade the watchful eyes of the Stasi and follow Hertha’s weekly exploits. Hertha Fans found ways to carve out semi-private niches to catch the latest West German football actions. Klopfleisch’s Hertha-Gemeinschaft, for example, was disguised as a pool or bingo club.\textsuperscript{82} Football magazines continued to make it past the wall. As radio and television broadcasts of West German football increased into the 1960s and 1970s, with the broadcast of shows such as \textit{Sportschau} – which aired weekly roundups and highlights of

\textsuperscript{78} René Wiese, who wrote about the Ost-mitgliedern, published the letters in \textit{Doppelpasse}, 80-86. Reading their contents provides insight into elements of football culture that transcended the Wall.
\textsuperscript{80} For example: BStU, MfS, HA XX/2, Nr. 1286, Analyse zum Stand der bearbeitung des negative Anhangs des 1. FC Union – Spielserie 1983/84 – Tendenzen / Schwerpunkte, 16 July, 1984, obtained courtesy of Union-Archiv.
\textsuperscript{81} Numbers are available in \textit{Doppelpasse}. 82
\textsuperscript{82} Wiese, “Hertha BSC”
the week-ends Bundesliga matches – and Das Aktuelle Sport-Studio – which discussed the weekend's football news late on Sunday evenings on ZDF – East German fans would catch the week’s news on illegal western devices.83 Football became a part of the regular consumption of West German and West European programming, which severely limited the authority’s ability to completely control East German consumption of West German football. In this way, consuming West German football was not unlike other Western cultural products that were procured relatively easily on the black market in East Berlin, such as pop or punk music or films or literature.84

The Teddy-Affaire: West German Football as Cultural Product

On 26 April 1978, Hertha BSC travelled to the GDR for the first time since the construction of the Berlin Wall to play a non-competitive match against Dynamo Dresden. This was part of a “Kalendar-Spiel” (calendar match), a sporting attempt at Willi Brandt’s wider policies of Ostpolitik aimed at bringing the two German states closer together. Despite any good intentions present in the political rhetoric of both states to ease the tensions between the two Germanys, German-German sporting encounters were inevitably highly charged, political affairs. The match was referred to as an “internationaler Fußballvergleich” (international football competition) in official, state-sanctioned media in the GDR, because the term “Freundschaftsspiel”, more commonly used to describe non-competitive matches between football clubs, was forbidden when

84 See Fenemore, Sex, Thugs, and Rock n’ Roll; Poiger, Jazz, Rock, Rebels.
referring to competitions against the class enemy. “Friendlies” were only played against states with whom the GDR had “friendly” relations, or in other words, countries that shared the socialist ideal. Despite official policies of rapprochement between the two states, rhetoric continued to suggest a hard line of division.

The preparations for the match, both on and off the pitch, reflected the suspicions both states held for one another, regardless of the political efforts to bring about rapprochement. Both regarded such events as an opportunity to demonstrate the ideological superiority of their sporting system. East German sporting authorities chose one of the GDR’s most successful clubs and defending DDR-Oberliga champion Dynamo Dresden as Hertha’s adversary for the match. Dynamo’s training sessions were reportedly long and meticulous. Although Hertha’s manager Klötzer promoted the club’s ambassadorial rather than competitive role in East Germany – he infamously, and to the eyes of the East German media, arrogantly, proclaimed his team would train only lightly at the hotel on the day of the match, since “We’re only bringing two to three balls along with us (Wir bringen zwei bis drei Bällen mit)” – not all his players shared his attitude. Karl-Heinz Granitza disagreed with his manager that the match was not viewed as a “Prestige-Spiel” (prestige match): “If we lose, it is worse than losing to Italy”.

The meticulous planning of the East German outfit on the pitch was mirrored off of it. Of the over 900 West-Berliners who applied for Visas to travel with the club, the majority were left frustrated. Only 378 were issued. Given the regime’s need for hard currency to boost their increasingly lagging economy, the low numbers of Visas issued

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85 Wiese, “Als Hertha Teddys brachte”.
86 See the article report on the match from Fußball-Woche 54 (20) 8 May 1978, 23
87 “Keine Teddybären für die Fans” Die Zeit 5 May 1978.
served as an indication of the degree to which West Germans were perceived as a threat to the East German population. At an inflated cost of 79.50 Marks per person, the West Germans experienced first-hand the extent of the East German concern. The fan coach departed West Berlin at 5.53am to ensure plenty of time for border patrol. Once they arrived in Dresden, they were served lunch, only after which would they received their match-day tickets.88

Unsurprisingly, the West German media used the event to comment on the non-democratic, totalitarian nature of the SED regime. The popular West German newspaper Die Zeit, for example, published an article, whose opening line remarked upon the barrage of police officers and security agents that greeted the West Berlin club at the border. The escort service to Dresden was “[as if they expected] a dangerous red-terror brigade rather than a harmless football club”.89 Once in Dresden, the media reported, only a few ordinary East Germans citizens, who shied away timidly, greeted the team coach. Inside the stadium, the security was ever present. Men in leather jackets roamed around continuously.90

The East German authorities wanted to ensure a semblance of sporting culture normalcy by putting up posters advertising the match in Dresden’s city centre the day before the West Germans arrived, but the posters were a smokescreen for their attempt to control spectatorship. Despite not advertising the match until the eleventh hour, news of the match spread rapidly, and tickets sold out the 40 000 capacity stadium. Thousands from across the country made it to the match, including over one thousand from the

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88 “Keine Teddybären für die Fans” Die Zeit 5 May 1978; Wiese “Als Hertha Teddys in der DDR brachte”.
89 “Keine Teddybären für die Fans” Die Zeit 5 May 1978.
90 “Keine Teddybären für die Fans” Die Zeit 5 May 1978.
capital, East Berlin. In the end, the East German outfit’s meticulous planning paid dividends: Dynamo won 1:0. The victory may have served its official function of demonstrating the superiority of the socialist sporting system over the class enemy, but events off the pitch highlight how realities on the ground did not always reflect ideological rhetoric closely.91

The match further demonstrates the SED regime’s many shortcomings and inner contradictions. After the match, a crowd of East Germans stormed Hertha’s coach to get a glimpse of the departing West German stars. Hertha players and coaches handed out small Teddy bears they had smuggled into the country. The East German authorities were furious. They had warned the West German club that their practice of distributing small teddy bears amongst the crowd, some of which contained a grand prize of a free trip to a Hertha home game – a prize of significant economic and emotional value for any East German – a practice Hertha had used as a PR-stunt at all away games since 1977, would be seen as “thorn in the flesh of the GDR (Stachel im Fleisch der DDR)”92. No grand prize was awarded and only a few Teddies made it to the hands of GDR citizens, but the Teddies contained significant cultural capital. The Teddies, sponsored by the Verkehrsamt West-Berlin (Ministry of Transportation of West-Berlin) and the Kaufhaus des Westens (Shopping Centre of the West [KaDeWe]), were not only the mascot of the West Berlin professional club. The bear was also the traditional symbol of the city of Berlin. The small plush animals, tokens of Western consumer society in and of

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91 “Keine Teddybären für die Fans” Die Zeit 5 May 1978.
92 “Keine Teddybären für die Fans” Die Zeit 5 May 1978.
themselves, was one way East Germans consumed West German football, despite the authorities’ best attempts to limit such consumption.

The Teddies also represented the opportunities sporting events, and notably football matches, unlocked for East-West interactions. It demonstrates that the SED regime was never able to fully control such exchanges. The Teddy affair also shows how the SED simultaneously over- and under-appreciated the symbolic power football had over fans. On the one hand, authorities over-valued a victory on the pitch, since it could be spun as representing a victory for socialism over capitalism. On the other, they underestimated what really mattered to the local population. In the end, the result on the pitch mattered little. The experience of watching a West German club, representing a much better cultural product, was far more important to the average German. The match was an opportunity to display political superiority of an ideological system, but, more importantly, as a popular cultural phenomenon, it played an important role in opening spaces for actions that differed from those promoted and ensconced by the state authorities. Football matches presented Germans with a rare occasion for East-West interaction. It was a “normal” activity that was not permitted under the SED regime, thereby demonstrating its ultimate failings in understanding the desires of their own citizens.

**Hertha BSC’s “Golden Years” and Friendships Around the Wall**

In addition to being able to consume football in private or semi-private spaces, football matches – from international and European club competitions to weekly Oberliga fixtures
– continuously provided unique opportunities for East Germans to gather in public spaces to consume Western products right under the noses of authorities. The consumption of football as a Western product was made more readily available and immediately present to East Germans during the 1970s, when West German football established itself as a perennial powerhouse on the global stage and West Berlin football entered its own footballing golden age. After winning the World Cup in 1954 in Bern, the West German national team entered a bit of a dry spell, finishing fourth at the 1958 World Cup and reaching the quarter-finals in 1962. In 1966, FRG’s national side played in a memorable final against the hosts, England, where they lost 2:4 largely thanks to a controversial “Wembley-Tor” (Wembley goal) scored by Geoff Hurst in extra time. The “ghost goal”, as many refer to it, continue to loom large in the collective consciousness of many Germans. Despite the loss, the West German team gained some revenge by beating England in the 1970 World Cup, eventually losing to Italy in yet another highly publicized and memorable match. A constant threat throughout the 1960s, the national team reached its zenith as it entered the 1970s. Under the leadership of a young Franz Beckenbauer, West Germany won the European Football Championship in 1972 – the first time they participated in the tournament – and the 1974 World Cup, which they hosted. They were runners’ up in the European Championship of 1976 and won the tournament a second time in 1980.

Similarly, as we will see below, Berliner football entered its own golden age, exemplified by Hertha BSC’s extraordinary run in European cup competitions. In Dresden, East Germans arrived for the match showing signs of support for the West
German side. They brought home-made blue-and-white flags that they unravelled in the stadium. Patches with the Hertha logo were proudly displayed on their jackets or caps.

The Stasi estimated that 120 supporters of 1. FC Union Berlin bought tickets to the match in Dresden to demonstrate their sympathies with the West German club. West German post-match reports commented on the remarkable, unexpected sight of Trabbis – the iconic East German car – driving along the highway from Berlin to Dresden with Blue and White and Red and White flags out the windows. A few East German fans made the trek to Dresden by train. They arrived at Dresden’s Hauptbahnhof (Central station) dressed “to resemble West German Hertha fans”, with football badges, including badges of Hertha’s insignia. They met with a crowd of Hertha supporters before the match and sat with them in the ground. According to Stasi reports, a group of about 50 East German fans, along with a few Hertha fans, started chants of abuse directed against the Dresden team and against the referees:

“Hängt ihn auf, das schwarze Schwein, er soll nie mehr glücklich sein.”
(Hand the black pig up
he is not going to be happy/satisfied anymore.)

The abuse, along with the pyrotechnics that followed soon afterward, was a typical example of common fan behavior at matches in both East and West Germany. The common medium of chant and song, however, turned to reflect not the situation on the

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pitch, but the symbolic friendship that was taking place amongst certain supporters in the stands:

“Ja wir halten zusammen
wie der Wind und das Meer,
die blau-weiße Hertha und der FC Union”\textsuperscript{94}
(We stick together
through mind and sea
the blue-white Hertha and FC Union.)

Despite the defeat in Dresden in April, the late 1970s turned out to be very successful for Hertha. They reached the German Cup finals twice, in 1977 and 1979. In 1977/78, they finished third in the Bundesliga, only eight points behind eventual winners FC Köln. By finishing third, they qualified to participate in the following year’s UEFA CUP competition. Though they struggled in the German league during the next season, finishing 14\textsuperscript{th} with only nine victories, they went on a run to the semi-finals of the European Cup competition. Their third-place finish in the league in 1977/78 and their semi-final cup run the following year capped a “Golden era” for West Berlin’s main football club.\textsuperscript{95}

Hertha’s qualification in the European cup competition provided them with the opportunity to play clubs behind the Iron Curtain. As luck would have it, Hertha drew several teams from countries in the Soviet Bloc in the tournament. Though very stiff regulations against travel to the West remained in place until 1989, East Germans were

\textsuperscript{95} Jahn, \textit{Blau-weiß Wunder}, 115-125.
relatively free to travel to fellow countries of the Eastern Bloc in the 1970s and 1980s. The coincidence of having to play several teams from the East opened further opportunities for East and West Berliners to interact and maintain the connections they formed around football. Hertha defeated Botev Plovdiv of Bulgaria in the first round. Then, they played Dynamo Tbilisi from Georgia. Evidence is scarce on East Berliners making it to these matches. More likely than not, many East Germans could not travel to these early-round match-ups since they were played on weeknights and were relatively far to travel to. In the quarterfinals, Hertha drew the Czechoslovak army club, Dukla Prague, which had defeated the West German outfit Stuttgart in the previous round. The match-up was heavily anticipated. 23,000 packed into the Olympiastadion to witness the first of the two-leg matchup on 7 March, a large number for the relatively unpopular cup competition.96 Prague took the league shortly after the break. Hertha equalized six minutes later via Brüssig. The game ended in a 1:1 draw, setting the conditions for an interesting second leg in Prague.97

Prague, already a popular destination amongst East German tourists, provided a unique opportunity for East German football fans to experience another Hertha match and fraternize with West Germans that shared an interest in football. According to reports, including reports from the East German secret police (Stasi), over half of the 30,000 spectators at the match were from the GDR, a large percentage of which from its capital,

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96 The cup was not popular in Berlin. For example, the official attendance at the Olympiastadion for the previous rounds’ match-up against Esbjerg Idrætspark from Denmark was 3,300. The cup was more popular in eastern Europe, especially since it provided the opportunity to watch professional clubs from western Europe. For example, official attendance for the match at the Dynamo stadium in Tbilisi was 80,000. For statistical information on Hertha BSC’s UEFA Cup run in 1978/79, see [http://www.rsssf.com/tablesd/duitec-hertha79.html](http://www.rsssf.com/tablesd/duitec-hertha79.html) [accessed 20 May, 2015]
East Berlin. West Berlin Hertha fans arranged to meet with other East Berlin fans at Friedrichstraße and Zoologischer Garten so they could travel to Prague together. Once in the Czech capital, Hertha fans successfully convinced a number of locals to either sell them their tickets or exchange them for sought-after Western goods. After amassing a not-insignificant amount of tickets for the match, the West German Hertha fans gave them to their fellow East Berliners, thereby ensuring a decent support for Hertha inside the stadium. There were several large Hertha flags (4 m long and 2.5m high) and banners around the stadium that the Czech police tried tirelessly to remove. Chants encouraged the away team. In interviews given after the match, players, rather amazed and bewildered, remarked how they were encouraged by the unique atmosphere in the stadium that felt like a “home match”, with large sections of the crowd cheering on the West German club. Such comments echo those from Uli Hoeness in the lead up to the 1972 Europa Cup semi-finals, when he spoke of his hope his FC Bayern draw East Berlin. He commented that he had played in Leipzig several years before and was truck that more spectators supported the West Germans, “obwohl wir schlecht abgeschnitten haben. (regardless of how badly they played).”

100 Interview with Union fan in Luther and Willmann, Eisern Union, 109-110
Dukla took the lead midway through the first half. Hertha equalized a few minutes later to give themselves hope – and the comeback and the upset was completed 57th minute for the visitors. Hertha booked their ticket to the semi-finals with a 3:2 aggregate win. Hertha defeated Prague to reach the quarterfinals, not least, according to the players, due to the remarkable atmosphere in the stadium. The fans’ celebrations, bordering on euphoric inside the stadium, continued outside after the final whistle. As in Dresden, fans played their favourite punk tracks from the Sex Pistols on “Ghetto-Blasters” while drinking Kistenweise beer, another example of how some western goods became part of the fan consumptions experience. Others gathered in the local pubs, where Hertha and Union fans continued to sing songs. One Hertha fan remarked that on that day Union and Hertha fans were inseparable. A group of Hertha and Union fans chanted “Hertha und Union – eine Nation!” (Hertha and Union – one nation!). Another group paraded a Berlin flag down the streets of Prague.

Individual East and West German fans captured the mood by snapping photographs. In addition to taking images of their favorite East and West German football stars, fans turned the lens on themselves. (See Figure 3.4 and 3.5) Two fans have red and white scarves around their neck. The fan on the far left, red and white scarf around his neck, proudly displays a blue and white flag of Hertha BSC; on his left arm, a Union badge. The individual on the far right sports a Hertha badge on his chest.

Figure 3.4: three union fans in Prague.

Source: 1. Union FC Archiv.
Figure 3.5: Union fans in Prague. Note the Hertha emblem on the back of the individual on the left’s Jean jacket

Source: 1. Union FC Archiv

As history would have it, Hertha drew another club from the East, Red Star Belgrade, for the semi-finals. For those East Berliners who could afford it, they made the trip to Yugoslavia, where 100,000 Belgrade fans overwhelmed them. A very strong Red Star club won the first match 1:0. During the return leg of the match in Berlin, a remarkable 75,000 Berliners nearly sold out the Olympiastadion. Hertha equalized within the first couple minutes and took the lead a few minutes later. Throughout the match, chants of
“Union, Union, eisern Union!” (Union, Union, Iron Union) the main chant of Union supporters, could be heard alongside those of “Ha Ho He, Hertha BSC”! The greeting to their friends in the East was clearly audible on Berlin television stations (SFB-Fernsehen) broadcasting the match. Other chants, such as:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Wir halten zusammen,} \\
\text{Wie das wind und das Meer} \\
\text{Die Blau-weiss Hertha under der 1. FC Union – Union, Eisern Union} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(We stick together 
through mind and sea
the blue-white Hertha and FC Union – Union, Iron Union.)

which was sung by Hertha and Union fans at Dresden, clearly demonstrated a new sense of solidarity that had formed between the clubs. The gesture – a remarkable sign of support for the small, largely unknown East Berlin club – was strongly felt by those watching the match illegally via the West German broadcast. Unfortunately, the 2:1 home win was not enough to see Hertha through: Belgrade advanced on the away goal rule. Fans were typically devastated by the result, but Hertha’s run to the UEFA Cup semi-finals provided an opportunity for supporters further ensconce friendships around the wall.

Hertha BSC’s relative spell of success in the Bundesliga in the late 1970s saw them participate in European football’s cup competition. As we saw in the previous chapter, such competitions, while essential for both the GDR and FRG to establish themselves as members of the international community, provided a space for East-West
interaction. Berlin football’s golden age presented unique opportunities for West German football to travel to the East. Just as the authorities could do little to prevent Hertha players from distributing Teddies to East German football fans, the SED could not prevent friendships from forming that crossed the border. The limits of the SED’s reach were demonstrated as hidden loyalties and friendships between East and West Berliners manifested themselves prior to, during, and after the 1978 Dresden match in and around the stadium and re-emerged throughout Hertha’s cup run. These friendships lasted throughout the years of division. Friendships that formed “around the wall” are particularly noteworthy examples of the allure West German football had as a cultural product to many East Germans. For East German football fans, it served as both a supplement and alternative to GDR football. The SED, who interpreted football friendships as signs of political dissent, ultimately failed to come to grips with how football fans were attracted to the game put on display on the other side of the Wall.

Sparwasser Tor! (Goal): East German Ambivalence and GDR Football

The friendships that developed between fans of Hertha BSC and 1. Union FC has led to a tendency to over-simplify the relationship East German football fans had towards East Berlin’s other club, BFC Dynamo. One fallacy perpetuated is that all Union supporters were also fans of Hertha. Markus Hesselmann and Robert Ide, for example, take issue with the image presented in Simon Kuper’s *Football Against the Enemy*, that to them are characteristic of common misconceptions of football in East Germany more generally
and are reminiscent of a simplistic interpretation of the past. “When Union met Dynamo”, Kuper writes, “the ground would be full with everyone supporting Union”. Kuper’s account gives the impression of universal support for Union, whereas its rivals played in empty stadia. Another, derivative misconception concerning BFC Dynamo is that, as the club of the MfS, only members of the party, the Stasi, and their children supported the club. Dynamo, in other words, had come to represent the State, which is firmly pitted against Society, represented by Union.

It is worth asking from where these misconceptions derive, since they do speak to the ambivalence with which many East Germans experienced GDR football. On a practical level, BFC Dynamo was a football club like any other. They attracted fans mostly from their Kiez (neighbourhood), but their success meant they represented the country’s talent and often put on the best display on the pitch. As such, they attracted many fans who were not part of the apparatus of state security. The famous novelist and playwright Thomas Brussig, for example, admitted that he supported BFC Dynamo “at least in my childhood”. Brussig is an example of how people like to watch “the beautiful game” for its aesthetic appeal. Successful teams, clubs with the best players, tend to embody the best – most successful style – of football at any given time. Dynamo was attractive to many, especially youth, because they were the most successful.

103 Hesselmann and Ide, “A Tale of Two Germanys,” 36-51.
105 See especially books on BFC Dynamo from the GDR-era that report on a range of activities not dissimilar to those of other clubs, such as BFC Dynamo, Berliner Fußballclub Dynamo (Ostsee-Druck Rostock: Wismar, 1986); see also the series of information booklets on the club’s seasons in Archivgut der DFV, XV/93/3.
106 Quoted in Hesselmann and Ide, “A Tale of Two Germanys”, 38.
The reason Brussig cites for why he lost interest in BFC Dynamo can serve as a microcosm for why many East Germans felt decidedly ambivalent about GDR football. East German football was dominated by BFC Dynamo in the 1980s and whereas Dynamo “won everything, the national team won nothing”. Dynamo’s ten successive titles came with their share of accusations. Dynamo seemed to regularly secure the services of the country’s best athletes and were rewarded by suspicious refereeing decisions, typically late in close games. Its success, rather, reflected what was wrong and alienating about the game as a spectator sport in the GDR.

As the GDR’s top club, Dynamo participated regularly in Europe’s competitions. Typically, a rare opportunity to see some of the best football West of the border, authorities sought to control the much-coveted occasions. There was an active policy on behalf of the SED regime to provide tickets to “politically reliable” citizens when Dynamo played matches that opened possibilities for “subversive negative decadent forces”. One such example was the “Aktion Cup” of 15 September 1982, as the Stasi dubbed it. The match was a European Cup draw between BFC Dynamo and

107 Kuper, Football Against the Enemy, 16-26.
HSV Hamburg. Tickets were limited to members of the party to ensure no public displays of anti-regime sentiment would be present at the match.\textsuperscript{109}

Like in other instances described above, the authorities repeatedly failed to exert full control over the situation. In theory, it was virtually impossible for Union fans – targeted by the Stasi as subversive due to their regular displays of hostility towards Dynamo in league and cup matches – to attend such high-profile events. Many fans, otherwise denied tickets because of their political unreliability, simply purchased or bartered tickets off those less invested in the match.\textsuperscript{110} Despite the authorities’ best attempts to prevent such people from participating in the event for fear of public displays of anti-regime sentiment or potentially subversive behavior, no such manifestations occurred.\textsuperscript{111} Again, many East German football supporters were less interested in using


\textsuperscript{111} There were reports of a group of supporters that chanted un support of the West German outfit, but these were in response to abusive and derogatory chantings from BFC Dynamo fans, such “Scheiß-HSV” and “Haut den HSV”. See BStU, MfS HA XX 1577 “Presseberichte. 11. Und 17. September 1982”, 227, 276, obtained courtesy of the Aktenauszüge “Aktion Cup’-Die Absicherung Spieles BFC Dynamo gegen Hamburger Sportverein (HSV) am 15. September 1982” at the special exhibit “Fußball für die Stasi”, BStU Bildungszentrum, Berlin 2012.
the match as a political platform than they were eager to watch a West German team, an experience denied to them due to travel restrictions.

The 1974 World Cup in West Germany provided a unique opportunity for East-West entanglement. In addition to the FRG serving as tournament hosts, Berlin’s Olympiastadion as one of its main venues, the GDR, who qualified for its first and only World Cup, was drawn against the hosts in the final match of the first round. The FRG-GDR match, to be played in Hamburg, was a highly anticipated match on both sides of the wall. It provided a rare – indeed the only – occasion for the two German teams to face one another on football’s world stage. East German press followed the tournament’s every move closely and broadcast matches to its residents, who supplemented the information with accounts from the other side of the wall.

The 1974 World Cup provides another vivid illustration of the ambivalent attitude toward GDR football many East Germans had. Unlike the so-called “Aktion Cup” against Hamburg where East Berliners could find ways to attend the match, regardless of whether they supported or not, football fans, even some of the regime’s supporters were often left frustrated when it came to the national team. Fans were often left frustrated with the performance on the pitch. In international competitions, the GDR failed to qualify in all but one occasion, the 1974 World Cup. They enjoyed better success at the “amateur” level, in particular at the Olympic games. They shared a bronze medal at the 1972 Munich games, finished runners’ up at the 1980 games in Moscow, and won gold in Montreal in 1976. Their relative success, however, comes a caveat. As a socialist

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112 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV B 2/18/02, “Gesamteinschätzungen und Analysen zur Sportpolitik der SED”, 7
country that officially had no professional athletes, the GDR national team did not suffer the same restrictions on athlete availability as did the FRG, for example, whose best players were deemed ineligible due to their professional status.

Fan frustrations went beyond the pitch as well. East Germany carefully chose to send “delegates” serving as GDR fans to West Germany for the event. Those selected, however, represented a small minority of citizens who had the privilege of being permitted to travel to the West, whether they were football fans or not was secondary. As with other domestic problems, such as housing or the lack of availability of consumer goods, even the regime’s most loyal supporters – middle-ranking SED members – were excluded from such sought-after privileges.\(^{113}\)

Attitudes towards the national team could be condensed into one match at the 1974 World Cup. The shock victory of the East German team over West Germany in the final match of the opening round, scored by Jürgen Sparwasser, in the 78\(^{th}\) minute, is especially revelatory of the complicated relationship many East Germans had with GDR football and the SED regime. More generally\(^{114}\) It was undoubtedly GDR football’s high

\(^{113}\) This remained a problem throughout the GDR years. “Trousit” delegations were chosen carefully for all major sporting competitions. See, for example, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3/ 1063, “Entsendung einer Touristengruppe zum Besuch des Fußball-Länderspieles DDR-Österreich am 25. April 1965 in Wien”, which provides the details on the 327 “tourists” who attended the match, included organizational information for transport and accomodations, as well as costs. It mentions, for example, who was charged with booking arrangements, when exactly the trip would take place, and differentiates the number of people traveling by plane (267) and those having to stay overnight on a “Sonderschlaftwagen” (special sleeper cart). Similar information can be found for a world cup qualifying match to Nepal in 1969 in SAPMO-BArch, DY/ J IV 2/3 1575, Protokoll Nr. 86/89, “Entsendung einer DDR-Touristen-Delegation zum Weltmeisterschafts-Qualifikationsspiel im Fußball nach Neapel”.

It represented the team’s best result, beating the defending European champions on their home soil. The 1:0 final, however, was reflective of a relatively uneventful match, the visitors happy to contain the West German side. The victory nonetheless ensured the GDR topped their group, but they were unable to progress further, finishing sixth in the tournament.

The Sparwasser Tor and the 1974 World Cup more generally is also revelatory of entangled and overlapping – though asymmetrical – identities West and East Germans shared. The legacies of these complicated entangled identities remains evident through its embeddedness in the collective memory of many Germans – East and West, a topic investigated further in Chapter 5.

The Pull Eastward: West German fans in the “Wild East”

Though East Germans were eager consumers of another West German product in the form of the West German football, especially the West German national team and the Bundesliga, transfer was not entirely unidirectional. The cultures of football developing in the GDR and throughout the Soviet bloc caught the interest of many West German fans. This side of East-West interactions – West German interest into GDR football – has been a topic left largely unexplored by historians. Though there may have been far more interest in western football in East Germany than vice versa, studying the opposite side of the interaction may be revelatory in uncovering what common interests East and West

Germans shared that does not presuppose a homogenizing effect of Western consumer products.

Because travel restrictions were less severe against West Germans travelling to the East than vice versa, it was relatively common to find West German spectators at DDR-Oberliga games. Some West German Hertha fans first encountered GDR football quite by accident, usually while visiting family or friends, and some found themselves intrigued by what they experienced. Hertha-Fan “Franco” reckons his first Oberliga game was in 1975 or 1976. He went to a match at the Stadion an der alten Försterei to see 1. FC Union Berlin. He did not remember much of the game in question, but it did not matter to him. Discussing his experience several years after attending his first match, he stressed how the atmosphere in the stadium “war voll, alles war rot-weiß, und die Stimmung war ziemlich geil. Ich habe auch ziemlich schnell über die Leute, mit denen ich zusammen rübergefahren war, Kontakt zu Union-Fans bekommen.”¹¹⁶ ([The stadium] was full, everything was red and white and the atmosphere was pretty great. I made contact with Union fans pretty quickly with the people I went over with.)

The quality of the product might be important in attracting fans to football matches, but it was not the sole attraction. Though the quality of the football on the pitch rarely matched that of the professional West European leagues, the atmosphere in the terraces offered Hertha fans a different experience to that in the Olympiastadion in the 1970s and 1980s. The Stadion an der alten Försterei (The stadium by the old forester’s house) was located, as the name suggests, in a forest in the neighbourhood of Köpenick. It is a compact, though not small, single-purpose football stadium. Its 16 000 capacity,

¹¹⁶ See “Franco’s” account in Luther and Willmann, *Eisern Union*, 98.
later increased to 20,000, was very close to the pitch, the players, and the action, which made for an exceptionally loud and vibrant atmosphere.\textsuperscript{117}

An unusual DEFA documentary film, \textit{Und Freitags in die grüne Hölle}, provides a vivid, honest depiction of what it would have been like to attend Union matches at the Stadion an der alten Försterei.\textsuperscript{118} For several weeks during the 1987/88 Oberliga football season, the Ernst Cantzler film crew followed BSV Prenzlauer Berg, a fanclub of Union. The film, which unsurprisingly never saw the light of day in the GDR, depicts young, articulate East Berlin fans as they describe the appeal of a club like Union in the late 1980s. These images help explain the attraction of supporting Union in the 1970s and 1980s for both East and West Berliners alike.

In contrast, when Hertha BSC were promoted to the Bundesliga in 1963, they moved from their beloved football-specific stadium, affectionately referred to by Hertha fans as the \textit{Plumpe}, to the Olympiastadion, an 80,000 multi-purpose behemoth that rarely came close to selling out. The track that separated the pitch from the fans meant the atmosphere suffered as a result. Carnivalesque atmospheres tended to produce themselves in specific sections of the stadium, in particular in the Ostkurve. The sort of ease with which “Franco” met, spoke, and befriended fellow Union fans stands in contrast to the experience of attending matches at the Olympiastadion.\textsuperscript{119}

Other individuals recall being drawn to the East German football via the Berlin derby between Union and cross-city rivals BFC Dynamo. Stasi interest in hooliganism

\textsuperscript{117} Skreutny, \textit{Das grosse Buch}, 38-40.
\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Und Freitags in die grüne Hölle}, dir. Ernst Cantzler.
\textsuperscript{119} For descriptions of Hertha’s fans, see Jahn, \textit{Blau-weiße Wunder}, 299-375.
increased when Union Berlin earned its first promotion to the Oberliga in 1970-1971.\footnote{Mike Dennis, “Soccer Hooliganism in the German Democratic Republic,” in German Football: History, Culture, and Society, ed. Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young. (London: Routledge, 2006), 56.} Founded only a few years earlier in 1966, Union was meant to serve the industrial, working class South-East district of Köpenick. Despite not proving especially competitive compared to their cross-city rivals, BFC Dynamo, supporters of 1. Union Berlin embraced an image of the “underdog” fighting against the odds. As Berlin’s second football club, Union became an attractive alternative site of support to BFC Dynamo.\footnote{Luther and Willmann, \textit{Eisern Union!}; Czerwinski und Karpa, \textit{Die reihe Sport-Archiv}; Gerald Karpa, \textit{40 Jahre 1. FC Union Berlin}.} Much like most local derby matches, when the two East Berlin teams met, the atmosphere in the stadium was intense, highly charged, and very emotional. The East Berlin derby was such a heated, violent, and emotional affair that the authorities moved all matches to a neutral venue – the Stadion der Weltjugend – between the two clubs after an encounter in the early 1970s led to widespread fan violence.\footnote{BSItU, MfS, HA VIII, Nr. 41/70, “Vorläufiger Maßnahmplan”, 10 November 1970, obtained courtesy of Union-Archiv, provides detailed information on security measures to be implemented in and around the Stadio der Weltjugend. Of specific concern were the fans of 1. Union Berlin. See also BStU, MfS ZOS, Nr. 3210, Vorkommnisse im Zusammenhang mit dem Fußballspiel im Achtelfinale um den FDGB-Pokal 1. FC Union Berlin – BFC Dynamo am 4. November 1978, obtained courtesy of Union-Archiv.} Displays of anti-Dynamo sentiment and chants, such as, “bent champions”, “Jewish Pigs”, “Berlin Jews”, and “leaders of Turks” or even “Cyanide B for BFC”, were common during derby matches.\footnote{Luther and Willmann, \textit{Eisern Union!}, 57.} The thrill of the emotional encounter, and the possibility for violence between sets of fans proved very attractive to young men.

Hertha “Super-fan” “Pepe” Mager, is a remarkable figure that embodies West German fans’ attraction to East German football. Pepe was a difficult figure to miss at the football ground. He wore a white cap and sported a thick, dark moustache. A long
Hertha scarf around his neck, patches filled his cut-off jean jacket, tokens of the hundreds of football matches he attended over the years, the Hertha emblem always the largest and holding a central position, but often alongside Union, his second club (see Figure 3.6).\footnote{See the accounts on Pepe Meger in Jahn, \textit{Blau-weiß Wunder}, 315-332.}

\textbf{Figure 3.6}: Hertha BSC Fan “Pepe” Mager in Prague, 1981

\textit{Source}: Bild 643 Pepe 1981Prag mit Hertha 10, 1 F.C. Union-Archiv
Pepe seldom missed a Hertha match. The many badges that fill his jean jacket tell the story of his role as a central figure in the “travelling supporter” (*Schlachtenbummler*) phenomenon that developed in West Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, which continues to be an important part of football fan cultures. He organized travel arrangements for himself and about 20 friends to attend Hertha matches across the FRG. Some groups of supporters advertised potential travel arrangements and accommodations at the host destination in football magazines and newspapers. Away matches provided fans with excuses to travel in organized manners along with other supporters, thereby sharing in a collective experience that turned football stadia across West Germany – and also Europe and the world – into “*Errinerungsorte*” (places of memory). The historiography of travelling cultures often references the connections between airlines, such as Lufthansa, and the State Tourist Office to emphasize how the state encouraged Germans to travel within the Federal Republic. *Schlachtenbummlern* (traveling supporters) like Pepe, however, demonstrate that traveling cultures were also made on the ground, through grassroots initiatives taken by fans organized trips to away destinations. As part of a developing *Schlachtenbummler* (traveling supporter) culture, Pepe, like many other football enthusiasts, connected West Berlin to the rest of the FRG and as a supporter who

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125 “Unsere Schlachtenbummler spielen jeden Morgen Fußball” *Kicker* 30/66, p. 2 provides relatively early commentary on the emerging culture of German traveling supporters.

126 A list of such advertisement can be found in from the 1970s and 1980s. See the magazine *Fußball-Woche* as an example.

127 The term derives from Pierre Nora’s work on “lieux de mémoire” *Rethinking France: Les Lieux de Mémoire*, vol 1-3. For recent literature that investigates German places of memory, see Étienne François and Hagen Schulz (eds), *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte* vol 1-3 (Munich: Beck, 2009). For literature that deals specifically on German sporting cultures of remembrance, see Hübner and Krüger (eds), *Erinnerungskultur im Sport*; Herzog, *Memorialkultur im Fußballsport*.

travelled to the East, he connected West Berlin – and West Germany – to the GDR as well.

GDR Football fans likewise developed *Schlachtenbummler* (traveling supporter) cultures throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Some historians have pointed to two distinct waves of East German *Schlachtenbummlern* (travelling supporter) cultures. The first developed in the 1960s and 1970s largely on its own via the grassroots initiatives taken by some groups of football fans who travelled to East German and eastern European cities to watch football matches. Officially, “fan clubs” in the GDR emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s via registration with a particular football club in order to gain eligibility to participate in club organized activities, such as club-organized football tournaments. For example, Union Berlin fan clubs, such as VSG Wuhlheide ’79 (01.04.1979), Potsdam Sanssouci¹²⁹ (27.08.1981), Ludwigsfelde 79 e.V. (01.03.1979)¹³⁰, Köpenicker Bären (05.04.1985), FSV Karlshorst (01.04.1981) all point to official documents issued by the club, and therefore also approved by the State, as evidence for the fan clubs’ founding.¹³¹ Despite official documentation, many, if not most, however, trace their history further behind these official measures of registration. These fan-club histories insist the clubs emerged via grassroots initiatives to organize social activities around football matches, such as transportation and accommodations for Union’s away games and to organize social events loosely attached to the match, such as post-match dances or meetings in the local pub.

¹²⁹ See the club’s webpage for a brief history: http://www.fc-potsdam-sanssouci.de/geschichte.html
¹³⁰ See the club’s account on its webpage: http://www.ufc-ludwigsfelde.de/pages/history
¹³¹ see full list of officially organized Union clubs: http://www.fc-union-berlin.de/fans/fanclubs/offizielle-fanclubs/
Like many other travelling fans around Europe at the time\textsuperscript{132}, Pepe collected souvenirs from his trips. He was an active participant in an emerging market for everyday football memorabilia that included beer mugs and ashtrays with club’s logos that went along with the fan favourite scarves, shirts, hats, and patches.\textsuperscript{133} Such paraphernalia became intimately attached to the fans travelling experience. The Jean jacket in particular, a staple of German football fandom, served as an homage to a travelling fans’ experiences at away grounds. Having travelled to away grounds, fans would collect, trade, and sew patches they collected during their travels.

In addition to seldom missing Hertha matches, whether home or away, Pepe was also a regular at the \textit{Stadion an der alten Försterei} in the late 1970s and 1980s. There, he was of great interest to Union supporters, partly because he was a “die-hard” football fan that had much in common with enthusiastic and passionate Union supporters. He was also very popular with Union supporters because he was a source through which East German fans could get their hands on much-wanted football paraphernalia that included, above all else, the much-prized Hertha emblem. Those Union fans who did not have a Hertha scarf, flag, or badge, tried desperately to get their hands on them. If they could not reach or persuade Pepe to help them, they constructed their own.

Into the 1980s, the numbers of Hertha fans who attended Union matches increased – and the symbolic connection between Hertha and Union fans grew stronger. By the late-1980s, clothing from the West was so popular and widely available to East Berliners that it could be at times difficult to differentiate West from East German

\textsuperscript{132} On the emergence of European travelling cultures, see David Goldblatt, \textit{The Ball is Round}, chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{133} See, for example, the running series “Wunsch-Ecke” in \textit{Kicker} magazine in the 1970s and 1980s, which presented fans with a “wish corner” whereby they could list items they sought as souvenirs.
citizens at the Stadion. Stefan Hupe notes that one hardly knew who was a “Wessi” until they spoke. Otherwise, for the most part, their dress and behaviour was like everyone else.134 “Franco” agrees. He reckons there were hundred of West Berliners who travelled to Union matches that wore similar style jeans and clothing.135 The lack of distinction between East and West German fans at the Stadion an der alten Försterei is evocative of the extent to which fan culture transcended the wall.

The direction of the exchange, however, was not one-way. Hertha BSC’s fan cultures were similarly influenced by Union’s. In the late 1980s, Pepe produced a vinyl record titled “Freunde hinter stacheldraht” (Friends around barbed wire) to commemorate the symbolic friendship the two clubs’ set of supporters cultivated. One side of the Vinyl is the Hertha-Hymn, “nur nach hause” (Only home); on the other, Achim Mentzels’ tribute “Stimmung in der Alten Försterei” (Voice at the old forester’s house).136 Pepe’s album cover later served as inspiration in the construction of patches for fans desperate to get their hands on paraphernalia that displayed the bond between that developed between the two clubs. (See figure 3.7).137

134 Willmann and Luther, *Eisern Union*, p. 103.
135 *Eisern Union*, p. 104.
Figure: 3.7: “Freunde hinter Stacheldraht” Hertha BSC – 1. Union FC Friendship patch from the 1980s.

Source: e-Bay.

The patch is sewn in the shape of the city of Berlin. A red dash, representing the Berlin Wall, separates East and West Berlin. The eastern part of the city is covered by the insignia of the Union Berlin, whereas Hertha’s is superimposed in the West. The text “Freunde hinter Stacheldraht” (Friends around barbed wire) is found above the Hertha emblem. “Eisern Berlin” (Iron Berlin) – a play on one of Union fan’s token chants, “Eisern Union” (Iron Union) – is written below. Pepe’s album and the patch based on its cover-image displays not only that West Berlin’s football fan cultures were an important,
integral part of East Berlin football fan culture, but that cultural exchange between the two went both ways.

These grassroots initiatives to organize transport and after-match social events were sometimes accompanied by a more nefarious undertone. The second, a much more aggressive, macho, rowdy, and potentially violent groups of predominantly – but not exclusively – young men who took to football to express bouts of aggression, gained inspiration from the “hooligan” and “Ultra” fan movements prevalent throughout Europe in the 1980s. The “Hertha-Frösche”, an infamously rowdy and raucous Hertha fan-club with Pepe as one of its founding members, proved especially inspirational to East Berliners that wanted to add more aggression to their football week-ends.138

The “official” founding dates attached to the individual fan-clubs point to the state’s desire to better control fan activities already causing them concern. Once the fan clubs were registered, the state also played its part in encouraging and aiding these activities because it helped them monitor potentially subversive or violent fans while promoting what they regarded as acceptable forms of social behaviour.139 Somewhat unsurprisingly, the tactic did not always work. Many fan clubs registered with their respective clubs. Other fan groups did not, preferring to remain “unofficial” fan-clubs and therefore “illegal” in the eyes of the state. These “unofficial” fan-clubs became the subject of surveillance but the Stasi proved largely powerless in their attempt to control

138 For a fan-based online discussion of the Hertha-Frösche, see http://www.hertha-inside.de/forum/viewtopic.php?f=28&t=9334. See, in particular “Gront”’s interesting and rather lengthy posting in which he discusses right-wing sentiment of the group and German history.

139 For an example of the ways the East German press reported on the desired behaviour of fans, see “DDR-Schlachtenbummler und Zuschauer feierten unsere Mannschaft enthusiastisch” Neue Fußball-Woche 43/66, 3.
the behaviour of fans. As late as a 1989, the Stasi reported that 1. Union Berlin had 48 registered fan-clubs and another approximately 30 non-registered clubs.

Stasi reports into the behaviour of East German football fans throughout the 1980s reveals the degree to which the authorities were concerned about the rise of drunken, rowdy, and potentially violent young men who used football matches as opportunities to let off steam. Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, Stasi reports often describe the actions of predominantly – but not exclusively – young men in and around football stadia across the GDR. Accompanying regular acts of vandalism to public transportation, the stadium, and the city centre – favourite targets of football rowdies – were threats and acts of violence towards rival fans. This “anti-socialist” activity – as the Stasi interpreted hooliganism – was also accompanied by “Angriffen gegen die sozialistische Staatsmacht” (attacks against the socialist state). In particular, the Stasi noted anti-state chanting, such as

“Die Mauer muss Weg!”

“Stasi raus!”


\[141\] BStU Abteilung XX/2 Einschätzung zum jugendlichen Anhang des 1. FC Union Berlin und zur Erhöhung von Sicherheit und Ordnung bei Fußballspielen der 1. Halbserie 1988/89, obtained courtesy of Union-Archiv.

\[142\] BStU Abt. XX/2 Bericht zur Sicherung des Anhangs des 1. FC Union Berlin beim Spiel gegen Dynamo Fürstenwelle am 24.3.1985 um 15.00 Uhr in Fürstenwalde. These documents provide an excellent description of a typical away match for an aggressive group of young Union fans. On the association between alcohol and aggressive football fans, see BStU Abteilung XX/2 Einschätzung zum jugendlichen Anhang des 1. FC Union Berlin und zur Erhöhung von Sicherheit und Ordnung bei Fußballspielen der 1. Halbserie 1988/89, obtained courtesy of Union-Archiv.

\[143\] BStU, MfS, Abt. XX/2, Schlussfolgerungen zur wirksamen Bekämpfung und Verhinderung rowdyhafter Ausschreitungen bei Sportveranstaltung, insbesondere bei Fußballspielen (11.8.1982), obtained courtesy of Union-Archiv.
Interpreting terrace behaviour becomes especially complicated when incorporating clubs that were attached to the state and its hated apparatus for state security. Cross-city rivals, BFC Dynamo, often became the target of grievances that led to what authorities interpreted as “unsportlich” (unsports-like) chants:

“Mörder” (murderers)

“Nieder mit der Bullen-elf” (Down with the cop-eleven)

“Nieder mit dem BFC” (Down with BFC)

“bum, bum, bum – Haut die Bullen um” (Boom, boom, boom – Knockout the cops/pigs)

“Haut immer in die Schnautze” (Knock always on the snout)

“Stasivieh” (Stasi cows)

“Diese Stasischweine, das ist doch kein Wunder, die sind ja alle bei der Stasi.” (The Stasi-pigs. It’s no wonder, their all part of the Stasi)

“Ihr Dynamoschwein” (Your Dynamo-pigs).144

The Stasi similarly reported on the connection between rowdy supporters and wearing undesirable or “anti-socialist” clothing and symbols, such as those containing emblems of West German football clubs. Another patch from the late 1970s or 1980s demonstrates how the friendship also held political currency. The hand-made patch that similarly includes the emblems of Union and Hertha as well as the slogan “Eisern Berlin” also

holds a much more provocative and politically infused statement: “Auch die Scheiss Mauer kann uns nicht trennen” (even the shit wall can’t keep us apart). This patch demonstrates that the friendship with West Berlin fans could have political meaning.

According to the Stasi, such chants and symbols were meant “um die Schutz- und Sicherheitsorgane unseres Staates zu diffamieren, feindliche Parolen zu verbreiten und politisches Provokationen und Schmähungen zu inszenieren.” (to defame the protection and security organs of our state, to spread hostile rumours, and to incite provocative and diatribes).145 They led the Stasi to conclude that those who participated in chanting at football matches were “negative-decadent” youth that were influenced by the West.

Some groups of rowdy fans actively sought connections to like-minded groups from the West. By the early 1980s, the Stasi created a working group called “Rowdyhafter Fußballanhang” (rowdy football support) in which they concentrated on “die Einflussmöglichkeiten des Hertha BSC e.V. (WB) im Anhang des 1. FC Union zurückzudrängen” (driving back Hertha BFC’s potential influence on Union support).146 A group of about 20 informers infiltrated the union stands to monitored the activities of about 2500 “negativ auffälige” (conspicuously negative) fans. The Stasi discovered that some connections between Hertha and Union fan groups were deeply rooted. One wing of Union clubs had the intention of founding a “central Hertha fan club”.147 The Stasi uncovered the names of Hertha-specific fan clubs and their

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145 MfS - HA XX/AKG, Letter to Ewald (no date) from the Ministry of State Secruity.
146 Contact with like-minded fans from West-Berlin was a major concern in the document: BStU, MfS, HA XX/2, Nr. 1286, Analyse zum Stand der bearbeitung des negative Anhangs des 1. FC Union – Spielererie 1983/84 – Tendenzen / Schwerpunkte, 16 July, 1984, in Union-Archiv.
147 See Wiese, “Hertha und Union – eine Nation”.

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connections to Union fan-clubs. The connections such fans fought to develop with like-minded football supporters in the West seemed to vindicate the state’s interpretation of attributing the negative behaviour of football fans to nefarious, “anti-socialist” foreign agents. The SED never came to grips with a phenomenon – hooliganism – that according to Marxist philosophy should not have existed under socialism. Ideology provided the authorities with an interpretation that prevented them from studying causes for violent football fandom that might involve discontent with the state.

Much like anti-Dynamo chants, read by the Stasi as expressions of anti-Stasi and anti-state predilections, interaction or interest in the West, and Hertha BSC in particular was regarded as de facto decadent behaviour and continuously concerned East German authorities. As early as 1966, the Stasi created a sub-section to monitor East-West interactions, in which interactions between East and West German Hertha supporters were prominent. Their concerns never subsided. The Stasi continued to report on the increasingly displays of support for FRG football. They noted the constant increase in postage to fans from the other side of the wall. Measures were introduced to try to halt the support for West German football. They forbade the population from displaying West German football symbols and tried to tightly control who could watch which

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150 BStU, MsS, Ministerrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Ministerium für Staatssicherheit Der Minister, Dienstanweisung Nr. 5/66, Berlin, den 10. August 1966
151 Abteilung XX/2, Einschätzung zum jugendlichen Anhang des 1. FC Union Berlin und zur Erhöhung von Sicherheit und Ordnung bei Fußballspielen der 1. Halbserie 1988/89
games. Such attempts to control why East Germans were attracted to and how they consumed football was never carried out with any degree of success.

The Stasi’s reports on fan behaviour speaks not only to the state’s increased concern of drunken, rowdy, and potentially violent young men. They also reveal the extent to which football fan cultures were transnational phenomena that crossed the wall with relative ease. Football hooliganism in the East may have looked West for inspiration, as they did in many other popular cultural spheres, but football violence in the GDR was not imported. It reflected wider grievances young men both sides of the border shared.

The persistent “problem child” of the GDR’s “sporting Miracle” perhaps best embodied by the young, rowdy football fans, but the rise of aggressive East German fan groups is further illustrative of the inability of the SED state to fully come to grips with football on a number of levels. First, continued interaction between fans from the West along with the persistent presence of West German emblems and anti-state chanting at matches is evidence that despite their best efforts, the SED could not control football. Second, the fan clubs that emerged in the late 1970s represented the regional tribalism many football supporters maintained that prevented the formation of an East German national identity. In Berlin, the capital of the GDR, the presence of a shared regionalism with the West was exceptionally problematic for a state that sought to prevent such cross-

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152 See also, for example, the Stasi’s monitoring of symbols associated with the West in BStU, MfS, ZOS, Nr. 3211, Vorkmmnisse im Zusammenhang mit dem Oberligapunktspiel 1. FC Union Berlin – FC Vorwärts Frankfurt (Oder) am 13.5.1978 in Union-Archiv.
border interaction as much as possible. Finally, since ideology served as interpretation, the SED relied ever more on mechanisms of control and repression to combat what they perceived to be “anti-socialist” behaviour, some of which was otherwise “normal” sporting behaviour. Their reliance on mechanisms of repression to control behaviour had the effect of silencing problems much more deeply rooted in GDR society.

**Conclusion**

The Berlin Wall had an equivocal effect on the city’s football cultures. Structurally, it affected West Berlin far more than East Berlin. First, West Berlin was more greatly affected by the larger context of the Cold War. From 1953 onward, West Berlin benefited from a “Sportluftbrücke” [sport air-lift] through increased financial assistance and increasing the amount of West German sporting competitions, literally by flying players and clubs to the island city to play matches against West Berlin squads. Khrushchev’s suggestion that occupation forces should leave Berlin and the city should become “neutral” in November 1958, pushed DFB officials to found the Bundesliga, the FRG’s first, country-wide professional league.

More importantly, the political circumstances around the founding of the Bundesliga ensured the “island city” of West Berlin was a constant representative in the new FRG-wide professional league. The act of keeping Berlin teams in the Bundesliga had long-lasting effects. Conversely, the construction of the Berlin Wall had little effect on the structure of East German football. Rather, it was the structural changes in the
West that helped West German football become an increasingly attractive cultural product to East Germans. East German authorities could not effectively make use of football’s cultural capital and continuously underestimated the East Germans’ attraction to West German football. As a dynamic cultural phenomenon, football generally, but West German football in particular, remained a constant thorn in the side of the SED leadership. As Manfred Ewald admitted, authorities, including himself, never quite came to grips with football. As the “problem child” of the GDR’s sporting system, authorities often viewed the game with contempt and its fans viewed the product on display with ambivalence.

The SED also mis-valued football in two crucial ways: They recognized that football was an important sport for the GDR people. But, they were unable to appreciate quite how it fit within their greater sporting objectives. The GDR has been described as a “Sportwunderland”, but football, the GDR’s “problem child” did not quite fit. In other words, they were unable to come to grips with the extent to which football was important to everyday life, not just in terms of competitive results on the pitch. As a result, they continuously but simultaneously over- and under-appreciated results on the pitch and the behaviour of fans in the stands. They recognized football was loved by the East German population, but were never able to turn East German football into a true competitor. This is especially important as the West German national team became a footballing power.

The SED over-emphasized the result on the pitch only when faced with their class enemy, but they did so when it mattered less to people – i.e. in friendlies meant to eased tensions between the two. By over-valuing positive results on the pitch against their class
enemy, they often under-valued what really mattered to fans. The GDR earned the
nickname of “champions of friendlies”.

West Germany’s desire to keep ties with the “island city” meant that West Berlin
benefited from a “Sportluftbrücke” (sport air-lift) until the 1980s, when sporting interest
in the city began to wane. Nevertheless, the encouragement, namely founding of the
Bundesliga and Berlin’s continued presence in the FRG-wide professional league served
to keep connections between the FRG and the rest of the country alive.

Theoretically opposed to the idea that athletes could earn professional wages to
play a game, the East German government reacted to the DFB’s decision to construct a
West German professional league as further evidence of its inherent capitalist,
imperialist, and American tendencies. The Hertha scandal only provided tasty
ammunition for the East German press to attack West German football. But taking
advantage of the scandal to attack the Bundesliga as an illegitimate – i.e. professional –
league speaks to the SED’s inability to fully come to grips with football’s westward pull.
Frustrated by GDR football’s own lack of success and dissatisfaction among many
supporters for perceived political interference led many East Germans to follow the new
Bundesliga – including Berlin’s corrupt and largely uncompetitive teams – with much
interest. The Bundesliga offered East Berliners an outlet to consume a highly desirable
Western product. Whether the founding of a professional league in the FRG was
contrary to the values of amateurism supposedly fundamental to football, as the East
German state argued, missed the point for many fans. The Bundesliga was a popular
league that displayed some of the world’s best football. As a spectator sport, the cultural
product successfully and continuously “poked holes” in the Berlin wall, providing East
and West Germans with unique opportunities for interactions during the years of division.\textsuperscript{155}

Football, however, is not always about the quality of the product on the field. Football fandom offered West and East Germans important outlets of expression. Much as across the eastern bloc and under other dictatorial regimes – be it in Moscow, Budapest, or Brazil – the football stadium was a space of relative freedom in the GDR.\textsuperscript{156}

Where spaces to freely voice one’s opinion were hard to come by, actions and voices in the terraces and the presence of football paraphernalia could be ambiguous, difficult to interpret, and charged with political meaning. The terraces were a space where young East Germans dissatisfied with state and society could voice their frustrations. They were also spaces where seemingly “normal” fan behaviour could take on unintended political meaning.

Taken together, behaviour on the terraces along with objects such as scarves, flags, and patches of western clubs, are testament to an unusual friendship that developed between East and West Berlin-football fans during the 1970 and 1980s. These sorts of friendship, this chapter argues, complicates any dichotomous interpretations of the Cold War that focuses on the ways ideology divided East and West Germans. Football opened up dynamic, ambiguous, and multi-layered spaces for East-West interactions. Common interest in football generally, and in clubs provided common points of interest for East

\textsuperscript{155} Wiese, “Wie der Fußball in der Mauer schuss”.
and West Germans that led to friendships, some of them long-lasting. The football
ground was area of social interaction and cultural exchange during match day. The
interdependencies and other forms of interconnectedness that formed around football
fandom create a dynamic and nuanced interpretation of the ways individuals experienced
division on the ground.\textsuperscript{157}

In the East, the football terraces were vibrant, potentially dangerous, relatively
free spaces where people could voice their discontent against the regime. In the West,
East-German football offered an alternative or a supplement to the version in the West.
Especially into the 1980, young male fans were attracted to the atmosphere created in the
terraces, including the potential for violence. Once the GDR collapsed, so too did the
structures that kept East German football hooligan cultures in check. Amidst the wave of
euphoria that swept East and West German, images of football fan violence from “the
wild East” shocked the soon-to-be reunited nation.

\textsuperscript{157} Kleßman, Divided Past; Jeffrey Herf, \textit{Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys}
Chapter 4. Experiencing Football’s Liminal Moment, 1989/90

On 9 November in an oft-referenced speech, Günter Schabowski, mistakenly announced that the East German government would remove travel restrictions for its citizens travelling to the West. When pushed to answer when the new measures would take effect, “Das tritt nach meiner kenntnis … ist das sofort,” (as far as I know… effective immediately) he said, “unverzüglich” (without delay). The news, broadcast that evening on West German television, quickly spread throughout the GDR. Nearly instantaneously, East Germans flocked to the West German border demanding to be let through. After a brief stalemate of confusion, border guards, who repeatedly asked the authorities for directives so as to avoid an incident similar to that which had occurred on Tiananmen square earlier in June, finally opened the floodgates at 22.45. That night, thousands of East Germans made their way to the West for the first time, the majority of whom travelled to West Berlin. For most, the first physical encounter with family members, friends, and unknown West Germans proved highly emotional. Less than one year later, East Germany formally joined the FRG to form a united Federal Republic. By October 1990, a country that had existed for over 40 years with its own economic system and social structures distinct to those of the West suddenly found itself relegated to the dustbin of history. The GDR was no more.

1 The footage of the press conference can be viewed on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GhlKynAtguE < accessed 18.4.2016 >.

2 Konrad Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) summarizes the political events leading to and following the opening of the German-German border.
Historian Jan Palmowski described the *Wende* as a “liminal moment”, full of optimism and disappointment.³ Daphne Berdahl, Ina Merkel, and Edith Sheffer have argued that such moments of liminality are most vividly expressed in the borderlands, where inter-German contact was most pronounced.⁴ However true, Berlin was an extraordinary place in 1989. The role the Berlin Wall played as the physical manifestation of the division between East and West caused by the Cold War ensured that the media’s gaze zoomed in on the divided city during the night of 9 November. There, where the emotions were heightened, people constantly filmed, and the images broadcasted around the globe, largely to the disbelief of the onlookers. Berlin, therefore, is an excellent place to examine how the moment was experienced and how the legacy of division and reunification has affected experiences since.

German historical theorist Reinhard Koselleck’s suggestion that historians remain sensitive to the ways the expectations affected past experiences is especially useful when examining the Wende. Immediately following Schabowski’s mistakenly spoken words, enthusiasm fueled expectation. This chapter turns to investigate how the “liminal moment” of the Wende affected German – and Berliner – football. First, it explores how German football’s institutions were affected by the opening of the fall of the Berlin Wall by investigating the rush to football unity between the DFV and the DFB. Much of the literature on post-*Wende* institutions suggests that East German institutions were


absorbed into the FRG. Mergers were negotiated in a way that reflected the asymmetry of the larger process of unification. If sport was one area where the asymmetrical relationship between the two states was reversed during the Cold War, as Uta Balbier has suggested, how did such a reversed asymmetry affect East Germany’s footballing institutions, the so-called “problem child” of the GDR’s “sporting miracle”?

Second, this chapter explores how the “friendship” between Union and Hertha supporters that formed during the years of division – analyzed in the previous chapter – progressed after the Wende, once East German fans were free to consume West German football. The “friendship narrative” – a themed elaborated on in Chapter 5 – circulated widely in the press in the years following the fall of the wall. However, the West German media tended to depict the “friendship match” – a friendly played between Hertha BSC and Union Berlin in early 1990 – as a triumphant manifestation of the jubilance many East and West German football fans felt with the fall of the GDR. Rarely do articles reveal how the friendship continued or dissipated after the “friendship match”, and the lasting friendship between Hertha and Union supporters has not been investigated in any depth by scholars. This chapter explores the little-known series of “friendship matches” the two clubs played in the early years of reunification to analyze what the relationship between the two sets of fans reveals about the experiences with the Wende.

Third, this chapter turns to East Berlin’s most notorious club, BFC Dynamo. By exploring the trials and tribulations of BFC Dynamo during the post-Wende years, this chapter explores the ways fans tried to reconcile their support for a club that represented many of the shortcomings of GDR football and was part of a nearly universally hated institution, the MfS.
Finally, this chapter explores the West German national football team’s victory at the 1990 World Cup in Italy, which occurred a few months after the fall of the Wall and a few months before official unification. The 1990 World Cup, though it tends to play an important role in collective memory\(^5\), is often overlooked in the historiography. The euphoria expressed by East and West Germans alike on the night the Wall fell was revived when Germans in both the FRG and GDR celebrated the victory at Italia ‘90. The final part of this chapter explores whether the World Cup played an important role in maintaining enthusiasm for unification. It also analyses how celebrations in the city are revelatory of the ambivalent ways Berliners – and Germans more generally – experienced the *Wende*.

**Football’s Coming Home: Merger of The DFV and DFB**

On 17 November 1990 Hermann Neuberger, President of the DFB presented a Trabant, the iconic East German vehicle, to Hans-Georg Moldenhauer to congratulate him on his new position, President of the *Nordostdeutscher Fußballverband* (North-East German Football Association [NOFV]). That day, Neuberger and Moldenhauer had officially recognized the merger of the *Deutscher Fußballverband* (German Football Association [DFV]) into the DFB. A few weeks after celebrating the official unification between the GDR and the FRG, the two men posed for a picture to commemorate the unification of

\(^5\) For many spectators, Italia ‘90 went down in the history books as one of the least memorable World Cups. For many Germans, however, the tournament was closely followed by both East and West Germans and remains strong in German collective memory. As an example, two recent films, *Goodbye Lenin!* And *Heimat 3*, that centre the theme of unification portray the celebrations in the streets of Berlin. The celebrations also make up fan-based accounts of 1989/90.
German football (see Figure 4.1). In it, the two smiling men shake hands above the car, which adorned the logos of the DFV and DFB respectively.⁶

Figure 4.1: Hans-Georg Moldenhauer receives a Trabant from Herman Neuberger on the occasion of the merger between the DFV and DFB. November 1990.

Source: Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-1990-1121-007 / CC-BY-SA 3.0

The image has since been used in nearly every history of German football as a visual representation of the friendly cooperation that made possible unification.⁷ Though the image has taken on iconic importance in narratives of German football’s past, it conceals

⁶ Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-1990-1121-007
⁷ See, for example, DFB, Spiel ohne Grenzen: 20 Jahre Fußball-Einheit (DFB, 2010).
as much as it reveals. The DFV, its logo superimposed by that of the DFB on the hood of the car, was no more from that point on. Moldenhauer, former President of a national football association, accepted a position in a new, regional North-East Football Association. Much like the unification process as a whole, negotiations that led to the merger of the DFB and DFV, however noble the intentions of those who negotiated it, were defined by asymmetry.

The road to football unification formally began on 10/11 January 1990, when representatives from the footballing associations of East and West Germany met to discuss past experiences and to increase the amount of participation between clubs from both associations.8 Almost one year to the day before the photo was taken, Uwe Piontek, then president of the DFV, declared the launch of an action programme to “democratize” GDR football on 11 November.9 Piontek, swept up in the wave of enthusiasm from the night before, launched the programme without appreciating the full extent of its consequences. The GDR’s footballing institutions, like the rest of the country, embarked on a path towards revolution, change, and unification. Plans were drafted a few weeks after to organize an international friendly between the GDR and BRD national teams, to be held in Leipzig.10 The gesture was meant to be a symbolic indication of the future cooperation between the DFV and DFB. For the first time, the national teams of the GDR and FRG would meet to play an international “friendly”. Little did the organizers know, less than a month later, in early February, in yet another ironic twist in German football history, the national teams of the GDR and the FRG were drawn in the same

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8 BFV, Fußballeinheit in Berlin, 33-34.
9 BFV, 100 Jahre, 164.
10 see DDR-Fußball-Chronik from NOFV-online.de; Chronik der Sporteinheit, 21.
qualifying group for the upcoming European Championship qualifiers, along with Belgium, Luxemburg, and Wales. Perhaps the draw was a sign of things to come. Even in legitimate attempts to coordinate well-intentioned matches between the two different countries, fate forced their hand, drawing them into competition rather than cooperation. Despite the best intentions of both sides to bring each organization closer together in due time, factors largely outside the control of the DFV dictated the pace of change.

In the early days, as much as “democratization” was perceived as an opportunity for positive change, it also spelt vulnerability for most of the GDR’s institutions. On 19 March, Hans-Georg Moldenhauer, an advocate for democratization and change, replaced Prof. Dr. Günter Erbach as President of the DFV, beating conservative rival Günter Schneider by 10% of the vote. Moldenhauer, sensitive to the vulnerabilities the DFV faced in the wake of revolutionary change, immediately promoted the merger of the DFV and the DFB. His attitude could be summarized using the words he used to describe how he would judge his own success: “Je besser ich arbeite, um so kürzer bin ich im Amt” (The better I work, the shorter I stay at my post).11 DFB President Herman Neuberger, however, resisted a hasty merger of the two footballing associations on “sport-technischen und –rechtlichen Gründen” (technical and legal grounds). The earliest the two organizations would merge, he warned, would be in 1992.12

The situation became increasingly precarious for the DFV as time passed. East German football, much like many of the SED’s state-funded institutions, went into

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11 Chronik der Sporteinheit, 34.
12 FAZ 21.5.1990; Chronik der Sporteinheit, 34
economic collapse.\textsuperscript{13} By the summer of 1990, the GDR could do little as 20,000 of its citizens left for new opportunities in the West. The exodus was mirrored in the footballing world. \textit{Neue FuWo} reported over 250 GDR footballers left their clubs for more lucrative opportunities in the West by the 23\textsuperscript{rd} of January.\textsuperscript{14} West German business viewed revolutionary change in the GDR as an attractive business opportunity. The structure of the East German sporting press was quickly disbanded and merged into that of West Germany. A few days after the fall of the wall, on 15 November, ARD took over a popular East German 4-minute sport segment from reporters Heiz Florian Oertel and Knobloch.\textsuperscript{15} On 31 January, the \textit{Neue Fußballwoche}, was no longer the official organ of the DFV. Its editorship passed on to \textit{Sportverlag Berlin}, a popular Berlin publishing house that specialised in sport.\textsuperscript{16} In 1991 the \textit{Deutsches Sportecho}, official organ of the \textit{Turn und Sportbund}, and parent organ of \textit{neue FuWo} was taken over by the popular and successful West German media conglomerate Springer. Ufa secured the rights to East German stadia in Dresden, Karl-Marx-Stadt, Jena, and Erfurt. Other companies swooped to sponsor the Oberliga’s top clubs. The automotive, drink, and insurance companies and industries were suddenly features of Oberliga club kits and dugouts. The West Berlin cleaning company Brauer was the first to sponsor a GDR club, 1. FC Union.\textsuperscript{17} The famous and largest travel and tourism company TUI ironically sponsored the GDR’s most successful yet also controversial club, BFC Dynamo. Early excitement at the

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Kicker} magazine described GDR football as being in a perpetual state of crisis. See “Ein Triumph und viele Tränen” \textit{Kicker} (12) 5 February, 14-15. On how unification has affected the German economy since unification, see Hartmut Berghoff and Uta Andrea Balbier, \textit{The East German Economy, 1945-2010: Falling Behind or Catching up?} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

\textsuperscript{14} BFV, \textit{100 Jahre}, 164.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Chronik der Sporteinheit}, 11.

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid.}, 21

\textsuperscript{17} Luther and Willmann, \textit{Eisern Union}, 164-169.
prospect of democratic re-structuring was vanishing quickly as the increasing realities of revolutionary change only made more visible the asymmetrical power relations that defined the relationship between the DFB and DFV.

Witness to the impending collapse of East German football, Moldenhauer continuously demanded an increase to the “Vereinigungstempo” (pace of unification) of German football, fearing if it did not occur sooner, then GDR football might implode.18 The DFB, however, would not budge. Their position vis-à-vis East German football seemed uncompromising. Their attitude was articulated well in the words of Egidius Braun: “Wir wollen das Gebäude vom Keller an aufbauen” (We want to build the building from the basement up).19 Moldenhauer’s frustration to the rigid, dismissive, and what he took to be naïve stance on the part of the DFB could be summed up by his expression of disbelief (on?): “Haben Sie gesehen, wie die Mauer gefallen ist!” (Have you not seen how the Wall has fallen!).20 Moldenhauer’s reaction to the DFB is representative of the ways Wende was quickly turning into a crisis for East German football.

His negotiating power largely, but not entirely, compromised by the quickly deteriorating status of GDR football, Moldenhauer agreed to a compromise with Neuberger on the conditions for merger. The DFV agreed to withdraw the East German national team from the EURO ’92 qualifying campaign and the Olympic qualifiers. It also agreed that the champion of the DDR-Oberlina and the runner up of the 1990/1991

19 Chronik der Sporteinheit, 58
20 Ibid, 34.
season be included in the Bundesliga for the 1991/1992 season. Clubs finishing in places three through six would join the 2. Bundesliga. The DFV joined the DFB as a restructured, regional football association, the NOFV. Moldenhauer served as its first president. The NOFV in turn would be divided into six \textit{Landesverbände} (regional associations): Thüringer Fußballverband, Sächsischer Fußballverband, Fußballverband Sachsen-Anhalt, Fußball-Landesverband Brandenburg, Landesverband Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, and Berliner Fußballverband.\footnote{See the \textit{Kicker} report on football unification: “Spielvereinigung Deutschland” \textit{Kicker} (58) 16 July 1990, 1, 14; “Sechs Grundsätze zur Einheit” \textit{Kicker} (58) 16 July 1990, 18; “Zusammenschluß von DFB und DFV” \textit{Kicker} (58) 16 July 1990; “Mehr Freude als Streit” \textit{kicker} (60) 23 July, 17-18. See also BFV, \textit{100 Jahre}, 168.} GDR football, like the GDR itself, was turned into a region of the FRG.

Fan reactions in the West largely mirrored the position of the DFB. On the one hand, many fans were sympathetic to the East German position. Some called for more teams from the DDR-Oberliga be included in the Bundesliga and 2. Bundeliga. Others, however, took a position similar to Neuberger, finding it difficult to accept that East German clubs were in a position to compete with the best the Bundesliga and 2. Bundesliga had to offer.\footnote{See, for example, the letters to the editor in response to “Zusammenschluß von DFB und DFV” \textit{Kicker} (58) under “Solidarität mit den Klubs der DDR” \textit{Kicker} (60) 23 July 1990, 41.} The majority, however, were in favour of a quick unification of East German football, mirroring the sentiment towards unification more generally.\footnote{“Mehrheit für schnelle Vereinigung” \textit{Kicker} (58) 16 July 1990, 18.} In a survey conducted by \textit{Kicker} magazine, 48\% of the approximately 1 000 who answered replied they thought a merger of the two German football leagues should occur.
before the suggested 1992 the DFB suggested. 19% agreed that 1992 seemed a correct date for a merger.\(^\text{24}\)

It took the unlikely victory of the West German national team at Italia ’90 and the subsequent euphoric celebrations that accompanied the win to finally convince the DFB to change their position regarding a merger with the DFV. Recognizing the opportunity the World Cup victory brought to their cause of hastening the “\textit{Vereinigungstempo}” (pace of unification), the DFV cleverly arranged a press conference five days after the World Cup victory to formally suggest the two associations merge in order to coincide with the beginning of the next full season, 1991/1992.\(^\text{25}\) The DFB responded less than a week later in agreement on 19 July. It seemed the DFB were convinced by arguments such as those articulated by Franz Beckenbauer a few days later: “Germany will now be invincible”.\(^\text{26}\)

Two weeks after agreeing the official date for football unity – 12 September, 1990 – East Germany played their final match in Belgium. Captain Matthiaus Sammer, who had already fled the GDR a few months ago to play for Bundesliga outfit Stuttgart, scored both goals in a 2:0 victory. Much like GDR football’s history as a whole, the match provided an appropriate curtain call to the so-called “champions of friendlies.”

The new, unified German national football team played their first match on 19 December. The new-look German squad dominated a decent Swiss team. Former GDR captain Matthias Sammer, who scored both goals in the GDR’s final match, started in the

\(^{24}\) Interestingly, 29% answered with “ist mir egal” (don’t care), which is also suggestive of a larger apathetic sentiment towards football unification.  
\(^{25}\) \textit{Chronik der Sportseinheit}, 59.  
\(^{26}\) \textit{Ibid.} ?
Indeed, the defending champions looked unstoppable with the addition of the pool of talent the incorporated states provided.

After 40 years of division, German football, it seemed, was coming home. Leipzig, where the DFB was founded 100 years previous, served as the perfect location to hold a “Fest des Fußballs” (celebration of football) to commemorate the merger of the DFV and DFB. The friendly match between the GDR and FRG organized in January to symbolize future cooperation between the DFV and DFB was pushed forward several weeks to coincide with the large commemorative proceedings surrounding the merger. The image of unity and harmony, however, was anything but.

Old Friends, New Enemies: Fan-Freundschaftsspiel (Fan-friendly-match) Hertha BSC vs 1. FC Union

In many ways, the pace of unification was set on the ground and outflanked political formalities. In the wake of the lifting of the travel bans, plans were already in place to increase inter-German competition and cooperation. In Chapter 3, we saw how fans of Hertha and Union consolidated a friendship “around the Wall”, despite the limited opportunities to do so. Hertha BSC took immediate action in the days following 9 November to build on this history of cross-border football friendship. Recognizing the club’s cross-city support in the East, Hertha made 10 000 tickets available for East Germans to attend Hertha’s next home match. On 12 November, two days later, the tickets sold out as East Berlin football fans flocked to Berlin’s Olympiastadion to watch

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27 BFV, 100 Jahre, 165.
28 DFB, Spiel ohne Grenze, 10-34.
Hertha BSC play SG Wattenscheid in an otherwise unremarkable 2. Bundesliga match. The over 52 000 strong crowd that crammed the Olympiastadion was highly unusual for a 2. Bundesliga match. It was representative of the euphoria many East Germans felt with the new-found liberties.

10 000 tickets were allocated to East German citizens to attend a Bundesliga match between 1. FC Köln and Kaiserslautern. Blau-Weiße 90 Berlin provided their neighbours from the eastern part of the city free admission to several of their matches, a feat reciprocated by Berlin-Neukölln and Berlin-Willmerdorf.29 The BFV played their role by organizing matches between clubs from both sides of the border, predominantly between the youth and amateur leagues.30 BSG Turbine, Einheit Pankow, and Lichtenburg 47 heeded the invitation of BFV president Uwe Hammer to play in West Berlin.31 A friendly was arranged between Motor Ludwigsfelde and Hertha 03 Zehlendorf on 7 February.32

Over the next few days after the Wattenscheid match, West German media circulated a photo that shows two spectators hoisting a homemade banner that read: “Hertha und Union. Das ganze Welt feiert schon”. The image served as a symbol of the collective euphoria surrounding the events of early October 1989 in Berlin. Read as a symbol of the potential for East-West unity, it is also a testament to a long-lasting and enduring friendship Hertha and Union supporters cultivated during the years of division,

29 Chronik der Sporteinheit, 11; Doppelpasse, 132-140.
30 Barsuhn, “Die Wende und Vereinigung im Fußball 1989/90”; BFV, 100 Jahre, 164.
31 Chronik der Sporteinheit, 13
32 Ibid., 20
an example of how football “poked holes” in the Wall by serving as an area for cultural exchange during the Cold War. 33

After viewing the wave of euphoria that greeted the match between Hertha BSC and Wattenscheid, the wheels were set in motion to organize an event symbolic of this unique friendship that developed around the Wall.34 Post agreed to sponsor the match. General Admission was set at 5 Marks – West- or Ostmarks – to replicate an atmosphere in the stands similar to that experienced at the Olympiastadion on 12 November. The media built up to the game referred to the event as a “Volksfest” (celebration of the people), a “Freundschaftsspiel” (friendship match) that rather paradoxically was also a “Berliner Fußball-Derby” (Berlin football derby). As expected, the Olympiastadion, the home stadium of Hertha BSC, greeted a large crowd of over 51 000 spectators on 27 January.35 Inside the stadium, a mixture of white, blue, and red scattered East and West Berliners indecipherably throughout the stands, an image that caught the media’s gaze, who were accustomed to policies that encouraged the segregation of home and away supporters. As the match day programme insisted, the so-called “Freundschaftsspiel”, which functioned in both senses of the term – as a non-competitive match and one between “friends” – served as an opportunity to celebrate the dawn of a new era.36 The sheer number of fans, both East and West, that were present at the match combined with their festive exuberance spoke to the euphoria that greeted many Berliners and Germans in the early days after the fall of the Wall. The match served as an emotional release, a

33 Wiese, “Wie Fußball Löcher in die Mauer schuss”.
34 Willmann and Luther, Eisern Union, 164-167.
35 “Über 50 000 sahen das Match Hertha – Union” Neue Deutschland 29 January 1990.
celebration of the newfound liberties and freedoms that greeted East Germans. The choice of venue, the Olympiastadion in West Berlin served as a symbol of the freedom of movement to the West. The festive atmosphere and the mixing of the two crowds, the displays of banners red and white next to blue and white highlight the freedom to watch, follow, and support the team of their choice without fear of repercussion as partaking in non-conformist behaviour.

The Freundschaftsspiele was a microcosm of the liminal moment that would characterize East-West experiences of the Wende. The Freundschaftsspiel simultaneously suggests a different, more complicated side to the realities of unification. For as much as the match-day programme and West German media celebrated the optimism the moment embodied, a special reportage of Jugendnachmittag, a weekly television program for youths that ran a couple days later, continues to have an eerie prognostic element to it.37 In the Jugendnachmittag report, depictions of the “Fruendschaftsspiel” suggests that the match celebrated a “divided, but not disconnected” past, on the one hand, but it also forecasted some of the socio-economic realities that would ensure new “walls in the mind” would develop in the New Berlin. An indifferent concession vendor responded to the question: what exchange rate do you use to convert Ost to West marks: “10/1”.38 When asked what one can purchase for 10 Ostmark, the vendor responds: “not much!”

Inside the stadium, moreover, the majority of the spectators were from East Berlin. The reporter points out that “everyone here knows of Hertha, but not everyone has heard of

37 For more information on television in the GDR, see Heather Gumbert, Envisioning Socialist. For information specifically on Jugendnachmittag, see http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/medien/deutsche-fernsehgescichte-in-ost-und-west/142937/die-1980er-jahre < accessed 5.3.2016 >.
Union”. To exemplify the point, a police officer is asked who was playing, to which he replied: “Hertha and … um …” the shot cutting out at that point, emphasizing the fact the security personal who presumably should have known who was playing in the Olympiastadion was not sure he knew who this club was, or even where they were from.\textsuperscript{39} The image the news report produced was one of unfamiliarity and indifference towards the team from East Berlin and their fans.

The experiences of Union in the early post-Unification years was similar to that of most ex-GDR clubs. It was characterized by falling attendances at matches, near economic collapse, and spectator violence. The fate of 1. FC Union is largely representative of the (few) highs and (many) lows that characterized East German football after the \textit{Wende}, but with a local twist. Despite benefiting from early sponsorship by Brauer, that guaranteed some form of external income to the club, and being able to draw on the long-standing relationship they held with Hertha for emotional and financial support, Union, like most clubs from the former GDR, barely survived the \textit{Wende}. After nearly going bankrupt in the early-1990s, Union begged the city, many different private businesses, and their friends at Hertha for financial assistance without success. After the initial euphoria and the symbolic credence lent to it by the \textit{Freundschaftspiele}, many Unioners felt abandoned by those who just a few years previous seemed eager to welcome them to the new Germany.

Like most GDR clubs, whose stadiums were left in differing states of disrepair due to a lack of funding from government offices throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Union were caught by surprise at the DFB’s strict regulations for licensing. The DFB threatened

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
to revoke licenses if clubs did not comply. Union’s license was revoked due to financial irregularities in 1993. One banner captivated the mood of many “Union: Loved by the people, feared by the Stasi, destroyed by the DFB”\footnote{McDougall, \textit{The People’s Game}, 482; Willmann and Luther, \textit{Eisern Union}, 178-182.} The banner articulated a narrative that had a sense of familiarity to many Unioners. Regarded by the Stasi as a \textit{de facto} non-conformist club, the role of an oppressive authority figure quickly transferred to the DFB. In the DFB, they found a new enemy.

In the image published and broadcast to the world by the German media of fans of both clubs and the \textit{Jugendnachmittag} reportage that ran three days later, we have two if not three conflicting or competing than overlapping representations of the meaning of the \textit{Freundschaftsspiele}.\footnote{See also the postmatch report: “Ein Fußball-Januar-Knüller im Olympiastadion. Über 50 000 sahen das Match Hertha-Union” \textit{neues Deutschland} 29.1.1990.} Whereas the former caught the early headlines and represented the wave of enthusiasm that greeted the many watching around the world, the latter spoke of the differing attitudes West and East Germans had towards one another that lingered.

Whereas most contemporary accounts tend to view the \textit{Freundschaftsspiele} as the end of the story (a theme explored in more depth in the next chapter), what happened to the \textit{Fanfreundschaft} after this initial encounter is revealing of the ambivalences and ambiguities East and West Berliners would face throughout the \textit{Wende}. Despite how the event is portrayed in contemporary media, as a fitting end in a story of wrongful division between Germans, the \textit{Freundschaftsspiel} was but the first in a series of similarly festive encounters between the two clubs. Rather than emphasize the \textit{end} of a narrative, emphasis was placed on the \textit{new beginning} it symbolized for supporters of both clubs, Berliners, and Germans. A rematch a few months’ later contrasts heavily with the one
played at the Olympiastadion. After the Freundschaftsspiel, the Fanfreundschaft between Hertha and Union supporters immediately lost momentum. The second, return leg, scheduled for August 1991 at Stadion an der alten Försterei attracted only 3,800 spectators. The two teams continued to meet for ceremonial matches until the mid-1990s, but fan interest had all but vanished. The next five matches, scheduled between 1991 and 1994, were all played at Union’s ground, with no more than 1,800 in attendance. No games were held between the two clubs until 1999. The Friendship match did not end with a bang. Rather, it petered off as fans lost interest. The friendship, in many ways, had lost relevance amidst revolutionary change.

One Wochenschau news report on a match between Union and Türkiyemspor from February 2nd 1992 further demonstrates how this renegotiation of allegiances at times had more explicit underlying racist and xenophobic undertones. Match footage focuses on events both on and off the pitch. After Union take a 1:0 lead, a large contingent of Unioners can be heard chanting “Wir sind in Deutschland. Ausländer raus!” [We are in Germany. Foreigners out!] The reaction by the several hundred-strong Türkiyemspor supporters after Türkiyemspor draw level, however, is equally revealing. The footage captures the wave of euphoria that greeted the largely male contingent. Dozens, if not hundreds, are shown jumping and screaming with excitement, waving flags of the club crest and the Turkish flag. Union fans’ disappointment turned to aggression. Riot police were called to the Union section of the ground, where they tried to restore some order to the quickly escalating, explosive atmosphere. Several Union

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42 Statistics available on Union’s official website: http://hertha-union-freun.de
supporters were escorted out of the stadium; others, visibly enraged by the events, cussed at rival supporters, players, and police. The match ended in a 1:1 draw and relied on penalties to force a winner. Despite the abuse by Union supporters directly behind the goal, some of which stood behind the goal on the pitch, the Türkiyemspor players kept their composure and prevailed. As they celebrated their victory, they headed towards their ecstatic fans, who embraced their players with chants of “Ausländer rein!” [Foreigners in]. This match between Union and Türkiyemspor forshadowed the difficult relationship between the visible minorities of the FRG and the new citizens from the newly incorporated eastern territories.

The Friendship match demonstrates how connections between East and West, cultivated during the Cold War, dissolved nearly instantaneously in the New Republic. Union’s experiences with *Wende* further point to the ways old enemies – Dynamo – were replaced with new ones – the DFB and Türkiyemspor. Power was negotiated asymmetrically during the Wende and most East German clubs struggled to remain relevent. Most of those that survived the chaos of the *Wende* years did so because of great efforts by individual fans. The survival of clubs such as Union point to the degree to which East Germans saw football as an important space to preserve in a time of change.

**From BFC Dynamo to FC Berlin**

As historian Margaret Myers Feinstein argues, symbols played an important role in the state’s attempts to gain legitimacy both internationally and domestically in the early years
of the Cold War. Just as the battle over symbols was heated during the few years after the founding of each state, the destruction of the symbols of state symbolism was carried out with enthusiasm in the early days of the GDR’s demise. During the Wende, the FRG sought to deface the GDR of its socialist past. Policies were enacted that abolished the national anthem, the flag, emblems, uniforms, and holidays. Likewise, GDR bank accounts, passports, and license plates were made invalid. Janet Ward views the symbolic erasure of the past as reaching its zenith on June 22, 1990, when a staged removal of the American checkpoint symbolized the end of the Cold War. The wave of euphoria that greeted the fall of the Wall was accompanied by a kind of historicide.

Acts of historicide were not only committed by the West German state. The East German population also participated, especially when it came to the SED-State’s most hated institutions. The most controversial, divisive, and hated symbols of the GDR were those associated with the infamous Stasi. The Stasi headquarters was ransacked by the East German mob dissatisfied with the Modrow government’s proposal to transform the MfS into a smaller Office for National Security (ANS) on 15 January. No other club embodied the difficulties East German clubs faced during the Wende more fully than BFC Dynamo. Immediately following the opening of the Iron Curtain, Dynamo sought to distance itself from its associations with the MfS. Within months they held their first democratic elections and members voted to change the club’s name from BFC Dynamo to the more neutral FC Berlin. A complete change of the club’s emblems accompanied...
the name change. They moved away from the tradition D above wheat laurels that stood for the Dynamo sporting behemoth and opted for a simplistic two-dimensional view of the Brandenburg gates, an image more appropriate for the times. The Brandenburg gates represented the optimism of an open, new Berlin.  

Like most clubs from the GDR, Dynamo barely survived the *Wende*. The loss of their best players, the most cherished of which was star forward Andreas Thom, to the West – part of a larger, new *Republikflucht* that accompanied the *Wende* – was met with economic collapse. The exodus of Dynamo’s best players was met with drastic cuts to state funding that had been guaranteed throughout the GDR years. In the newly competitive market for talent, Dynamo found it impossible to replace its main assets on the pitch. The end result was a steep drop in performance. As performance on the pitch dropped, so too did the numbers in the stands. Average home attendance in the 1989-1990 season dropped to just under 800 spectators per match. Dynamo’s spectator downfall surpassed their own miraculous rise to be East Germany’s most successful club. Within only a few years, Dynamo went from ten-time champions to the insignificance of the lower regional leagues.

The new FC Berlin presented the rougher, more violent sections of football supporters a new space within which they could unleash their emotions. The club’s attempt to erase their Stasi past and focus on generating a new identity centred on the new Berlin opened a space in which a rise in rowdy and violent spectators could be

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48 Luther and Willmann, *Der Meisterclub*. 

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accommodated. Frequently referred to as the dark 80s, football terraces around Europe—along with city parks and other public spaces—could be very dangerous, violent places.49

FC Berlin, who tried desperately to distance itself from the most violent, right-wing sections of their support, became plagued by the wave of images and television reports of its supporters engaging in violent acts of football hooliganism.50 The youth television programme Elf99 ran a special report on FC Berlin/BFC Dynamo’s hooligan problem in August 1991. The report followed a group of self-confessed hooligans that traced their violent activities to the 1980s. One hooligan, “Hens-Uwe”, suggested that there was little violence under the SED regime. The fall of the wall provided hooligans with the “freedom” to express themselves freely.51 This version of the roots of football hooliganism stems from the “wild East” during the Wende reiterates one point that historian Mike Dennis has argued, namely that the rapid demise of state socialism was accompanied by a collapse of the security structures that kept such violence in check.52 A crumbling security apparatus coupled with increasing social insecurity provided the conditions for football hooliganism to thrive. Once the border became more porous, a wave of football-related violence was unleashed. Though it is slightly incorrect to suggest that there was little violence in the GDR, the Wende, accompanied by the

49 See also David Goldblatt, The Ball is Round, chapter 14.
50 DRA AD6440 | 038775 | Der Jugendnachmittag, 05 June, 1990 in provides a special report on “hooligans in Berlin”; DRA AD 6485 | 038777 | Der Jugendnachmittag, 22 June, 1990, includes a 10-minute segment on hooliganism; There are similarly a large number of articles that focus or cover incidents of violent and rowdy behaviour of FC Berlin fans. See, for example, “Rowdies prügeln mit Polizei” Kicker (30) 9 April 1990;
52 Dennis, ““Soccer hooliganism in the German Democratic Republic,” 52-72
collapse of the infrastructure that kept violent proclivities in check, certainly made “the wild East” more visible.

The association between violent supporters and the club was solidified when tragedy struck. After a violent outburst between fans of FC Berlin and Leipzig, 19-year-old Dynamo fan Mike Polley was shot to death by police.\(^{53}\) The optimism that accompanied the historicide in FC Berlin in the early days of the Wende quickly turned to disappointment. In the words of Andreas Gläser, a former Dynamo supporter, FC Berlin attracted those who “sought out a club on the basis of its riot potential”.\(^{54}\) FC Berlin, who consciously tried to embrace the possibilities of the new Berlin and a new Germany offered, had come to embody the football equivalent of its shortcomings. Though the club tried to purge itself of its past association with the GDR, in particular its hated Ministry for State Security, FC Berlin did little but offer the most violent segment of its support a space to let loose.


\(^{54}\) Gläser, Der BFC war schuld, 103-104.
“Wir sind Weltmeister”! (We are World Champions!): Italia ‘90

On 7 July 1990 Berliners and Germans across the country celebrated their third World Cup victory. In Goodbye Lenin! Wolfgang Becker depicted the city of Berlin erupting with joy and celebration after the West German team defeated Argentina in the finals.55

Such images of East and West mutual celebration have dominated the discourse around Italia ’90. Much like the Miracle of Bern served as a founding myth upon which the Federal Republic finally found its voice and its identity, Italia ’90 fittingly could be used to proclaim the birth of a new post-division Germany. Football book-ends postwar German history.

It is somewhat difficult to explain with any certainty the extent to which the remarkable World Cup triumph of 1990 inspired the unification movement. As it is difficult to find sustained evidence that proves the 1954 Miracle of Bern was the moment the FRG truly found its identity. However, the world cup victory seemed to help the DFV convince the DFB to merge more quickly. If the West German victory at Italia ’90 injected a renewed dose of optimism and enthusiasm in the unification process, it simultaneously provides evidence for the uncertainties and fears that were both being experienced and which lay ahead. The event showcased the ambivalent yet highly emotional nature of the Wende.

Much as the hegemonic assumptions about the fall of the wall have been questioned, as Paul Cooke has emphasized in post-Wende literature,56 so too have hegemonic assumptions about the night of 7 July. While victory in the final unleashed a

55 Goodbye Lenin! directed by Wolfgang Becker.
56 Paul Cooke, Representing East Germany: From Colonization to Nostalgia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)
wave of celebrations in both East and West Berlin, with many East and West Germans celebrating together, the celebrations turned to chaos, looting, rioting, and violence, at times with West and East Germans pitted against one another.\(^57\) *Berliner Zeitung* reported a series of disturbing incidents of extreme patriotism and neo-Nazism at a public gathering of approximately 5000 at the Lustgarten.\(^58\) Thomas Krüger, the *Stadtrat für Inneres*, permitted a screening at the Lustgarten. There were twelve arrests; three people were severely injured. After the whistle, the rampage continued into Alexander Platz, then Prenzlauer Berg.\(^59\) It was not the first time, either. Similar rioting and violence broke out at the public viewing at the Lustgarten during the Semi Final match.\(^60\)

In this respect, Edgar Reitz’s more ambivalent depiction of the World Cup experience is more revealing and representative of the inter-German interaction of the summer of 1990.\(^61\) In *Heimat 3 – Chronik einer Zeitenwende*, Reitz dedicates one episode to the fall of the Wall and subsequent unification, covering the summer of 1990.\(^62\) His narrative places the World Cup at the centre of East and West Germans’ social interactions during the 1990 World Cup. As Reitz depicts in “Die Weltmeister”, the tournament brought East and West Germans closer together. They watched matches together at local pubs and in individual homes, both private and public, personal and emotion spaces. In doing so, both provided East and West Germans with a collective

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\(^57\) “Gedanken zum Wochenende – Umsicht und Rücksicht” *neue Zeit* 7.7.1990.


\(^60\) “Feuerwerk nach Tor” *BZ* 3.7.2016

\(^61\) I am cautious to say “East German experience”, since it does depict both. The protagonist in the episode is an East German, but there is a story of interaction.

experience of success and optimism. Union chairman Henry Berthy described the feelings of unity he experienced during Italia '90 as “Wenn man ihnen zugejubelt hat, hatte man das Gefühl dazuzugehören.” (When one cheers together, one gets a feeling of togetherness)\(^63\) Reitz’s account reminds us that the liminal moment was as much a continuing negotiation or experience of enthusiasm and optimism mixed with disillusionment, disbelief, and difficulty.\(^64\)

Reitz’s account also demonstrates the ways adaptation was going to be asymmetrical, the frustrations of East Germans falling largely on deaf ears. The passing from optimism to disappointment, much like the passing from future pasts to present pasts, was not experienced in a clear, linear fashion. It was spontaneous, recurrent, and uneven. West Germans saw in East Germany opportunity, but also concern. Their optimism was found in the expectation that “German” football – West German football – would benefit from the pool of talent and the economic opportunities from East, either in the form of talent, spectators and fans, or business opportunities. The footage of the friendship match demonstrates the general indifference many had towards East German football. Programmes spoke of “righting a wrong”, but the act itself was translated into western dominance over the East. The narrative offered by the West and Hertha focuses on how East German Hertha fans could once again follow their team as they pleased. Such understandings of the future potential of East German football would later fuel criticism by GDR citizens that terms of unification were dictated rather than negotiated.

Reitz also depicts the blistering pace of unification, encapsulated by the pull of the World Cup. The connections East and West had cultivated nearly instantaneously dissolved in the New Republic. At this time, we appreciate the instantaneousness with which borders were taken down and new ones put up again. In the character of Udo, his dirty and decaying West German football shirt serves as a symbol from the hope to which he clanged to amidst revolutionary change, while his worth was being devalued. Udo, wearing a dirtied West German shirt, a shirt of the Weltmeister, is reduced to chipping away at the Wall and sell the bits as a commodity of a past that no longer is, like an East German eating away at its old self to try to make life possible, to adapt to life in the new, West Germany. The image of Udo, sporting an old, soiled shirt of the West German national team chipping away at the Wall brilliantly demonstrates the intersection of historicide, the fading euphoria, and the social and economic difficulties that would characterize many East Germans’ experiences of the Wende.

Conclusion

The Wende was a “liminal moment” for Berliner – and German – football. It was a moment full of excitement and optimism, but it was also a moment full of uncertainties and disappointments. By bringing West German perspectives to debates that have been largely centered on East German experiences of the Wende, this chapter argues that hope was coupled with apprehension and fear by both East and West Berliners. Though East and West Germans shared optimism and anxiety over the change that was accompanying
revolution, the “liminal moment” was experienced asymmetrically, a reflection of the asymmetry that defined the years of division.

Unlike many of the GDR’s former institutions, East German sport found itself in a position of relative privilege during the Wende. Sport played a large role in helping both the FRG and GDR gain international recognition. It was likewise used by both regimes to gain legitimacy both at home and abroad.65 Perhaps most surprisingly, it was one of the few areas where the asymmetrical relationship that characterized the relationship between the FRG and GDR was reversed.66 West Germans obsessed over the East German sporting miracle. As such, it was one of the few East German institutions the West German government could not only absorb, but benefit from.

East German football, on the other hand, what Mike Dennis referred to as “the problem child” of the East German sporting miracle, once again found itself in a complicated position.67 In addition to state interference in all levels of the game, the nature of football as a team sport requiring a combination of great technical abilities did not lend itself to the scientifically driven training and doping programmes that characterised other high performance based sport in the GDR.68 The West German football federation were unsure what, if anything, could be learnt from East German football and were apprehensive about an East-West merger. As such, GDR football was an oddity of the East German sporting regime.69 Because of the limited success GDR

65 Balbier, “Zu Gast bei Freunden”.
66 See especially Balbier, Kalter Krieg auf den Aschenbahn.
67 Dennis and Grix, Sport under Communism, chapter 6.
68 Dennis and Grix, Sport under Communism, 156.
69 Reflective of the larger unification process, and attitudes towards East Germany since the Wende, is the notion of East German football serving as an asterisk super-imposed upon another asterisk, GDR sport. The
football experienced throughout the years of division, especially when considered vis-à-vis its West German neighbour, much of its negotiating power was compromised compared to the rest of the East German sporting apparatus, which was more readily incorporated into the West German sporting machine.70

Its dubious, unofficial status as the champion of friendlies, however, was not without its merit. East German football, some have argued, was entering a kind of Golden era in the late-1980s, producing some talented international players, the most recognizable of whom would be Michael Ballack. East German football was another East German institution caught up in the liminal moment that was the Wende. The end result was a “rush to unity” in the form of an unbalanced compromise the DFV readily accepted that was largely dictated rather than negotiated on the DFB’s terms.71 Whereas president-elect of the DFV Moldenhauer was all too aware that any negotiating power the DFV held diminished as time pressed, and therefore pushed for a quick union, DFB president Neuberger was much more hesitant. In football, the attitude towards unification was one of ambivalence. The DFB was sceptical of the pace of unification. They continuously resisted attempts to force a merger between the different footballing associations. It took the unlikely victory of the West German national team at Italia ’90 and the subsequent euphoric celebrations that accompanied the win to finally convince the DFB to change their position regarding a merger with the DFV. Somewhat ironically given GDR football’s relative lack of success, enthusiasm for unification ultimately

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71 Konrad Jarausch, Rush to German Unity.
materialized in the form of the availability of “useful” resources – East German players. It permitted the DFB access to East Germany’s best footballers, but relegated East German football to a marginalized regional league.

The blistering pace of unification on the ground, meanwhile, outflanked political formalities. The rush to unification was pushed as much, if not more so, from below than above. Experiences on the ground proved as volatile, if not more so, than the one-sided nature of negotiations that characterised the merger of football’s umbrella organizations. The Friendship match organized to celebrate the divided, but not disconnected history of fans of 1. Union Berlin and Hertha BSC petered out after the initial burst of excitement.

Union and Dynamo’s financial collapse and social difficulties, as evidenced through the wave of football-related violence emerging in the “wild East”, are representative of the post-Wende status of East German football generally, but is also reflective of the state of East German society as a whole that suffered greatly from the demise of the SED-state and the disintegration of its structures of social security.

How Union and Dynamo reacted to the difficulties, however, differed partly due to the ways the individual clubs spoke to the different ways identities were asserted and reinterpreted after the Wende. DFB Dynamo’s attempt to purge itself of its complicated association with the MfS was an example of the historicide that accompanied euphoria, only to be renegotiated and revived once disillusionment surfaced. The old East German identities returned almost as soon as they were seemingly left behind in 1989/90. How these re-negotiations and re-articulations of identities persist through historical engagement will be explored further in the next chapter.
In 2013/14, a wave of popular and “official” publications on German football were released to coincide with the Bundesliga’s 50th anniversary. They followed a similar wave of publications that commemorated the DFB’s and BFV’s 100th anniversaries, in 2000 and 1997 respectively. The celebratory tone of many of these titles reveal how German football can offer an alternative narrative to a German historiography dominated by themes of responsibility for the Second World War and the Holocaust or of victimhood faced by civilians, especially women and POWs during occupation. Football is one of the few areas of German history that evokes largely positive memories and is one of the few activities that produces public displays of national pride. Kicker magazine was one of many to commemorate the anniversary of the Bundesliga by releasing a book, the title of which, 50 Jahre Bundesliga. Eine deutsche Erfolgsgeschichte (50 years of the Bundesliga: a German success story), exemplifies this emphasis on German football history as a tale of success.

1 Udo Merkel also picks up on the celebratory tone of many official histories, see Merkel, “The Hidden Social and Political History of the DFB”, 167-168.
These narratives, however, stand in stark contrast to Konrad Jarausch and Martin Geyer’s warning against writing such “self-congratulatory” histories of German triumphalism. Speaking of German historiography more generally, they wrote in *Shattered Past*: “The danger of post-Cold War triumphalism is a myopic self-congratulation that assumes that the victorious western system is perfect as it presently exists and that it no longer needs serious reform.”⁴ “At stake,” they argue, “is the very framing of the German past as a narrative of national development, emphasizing political unity, or as a set of competing counter-stories, stressing social diversity” that is replicated in different engagements with football’s past.⁵ German football’s narratives of “success”, rather, perpetuate and posit a “master narrative” of the German past rather than create a space in which a multiplicity of experiences can be articulated.

This chapter moves past the “liminal moment” of the *Wende* to investigate football’s “present pasts”. It explores the various ways German and Berlin football’s authoritative institutions – the DFB, the BFV, and individual clubs – and the wider public – especially fans, collectors, and non-official, “amateur” historians – have engaged with football’s past in recent years. This chapter approaches different sites of history making⁶ – both public and private – from “official” books commissioned and written by Germany’s various football institutions, such as the DFB and BFV, to public exhibits and

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⁴ Jarausch and Geyer, *Shattered Past*, 84
museums to the World Wide Web and fan-led publications and Fanzines. It does so to investigate how the past is constructed, negotiated, and narrated in contemporary Germany. It departs from Jarausch and Geyer’s critique of master narratives, which can be applied to histories of German football that are being articulated with homogenizing effect on the part of Germany and Berlin’s football authorities, to uncover alternative sites that contest such narratives.

First, this chapter analyzes several histories of Germany’s and Berlin’s footballing past that were published in the past decade. It is especially sensitive to the ways the GDR has been portrayed in accounts that otherwise provide a “positive” perspective on German football. It explores accounts commissioned by Germany’s Federal and State institutions of football governance – the DFB and BFV in particular – to investigate how the GDR is integrated into the official history of German football. By focusing on official accounts published by the DFB the chapter asks whether Berlin’s unique footballing history mirrors or deviates from wider national narratives.

This chapter then questions the various ways clubs, fans, and Germany’s institutions of memory have engaged with the GDR’s footballing past. Building on FC Berlin’s attempt to distance itself from its Stasi past, this chapter explores the reasons why the club and its fans chose to return to its name and symbols of old, though the decision to revive BFC Dynamo was met with controversy. This chapter then analyzes the difficulty in dealing with the GDR’s legacies in the new, reunified Germany. These

7 There has been a growth in “alternative archives” available online. See, for example, the Hertha BSC Museum 1892 at the following address: http://www.herthabscmuseum1892.de .
8 Jarausch, “Beyond the National Narrative”.
difficulties were put on display with the exhibit Fußball für die Stasi (football for the Stasi), which is particularly revelatory of the ways issues of historical interpretation reflect the peculiar dynamics of different repositories of knowledge. At the heart of debates surrounding conflicting interpretations of GDR football are complaints of marginalization that do not follow normative narratives of success perpetuated by German football’s governing bodies. After investigating how the Stasi archive might affect interpretations of the GDR, this chapter turns to consider how individual clubs’ archives might complicate or perpetuate problematic interpretations of the past. It revisits how the “friendship narrative” has been viewed since the Wende and how it has been used differently by Hertha and Union and their fans. The last section investigates Hertha and Union’s complicated relationship since the Wende. It explores Union’s recent rise as a popular cult-club that successfully built a reputation as German football’s leading voice against “modern football” by building on its history of non-confirmity that is traced back to its GDR days.

**German Football’s Master Narratives and (Forgetting) the GDR Past**

If the history of German football can be told as a story of national success, where does that leave Germany’s “double burden” of its two dictatorships? Whereas dealing with the Nazi past has seen a spike in interest by football’s national institutions\(^\text{10}\), local clubs\(^\text{11}\),

\(^{10}\text{On the DFB’s attempts to deal with the Nazi past, see Nils Havemann, Fußball unterm Hakenkreuz.}\)

\(^{11}\text{Hertha BSC have released their own history that examines the club during the Nazi years, see Daniel Koerfer, Hertha unterm Hakenkreuz.}\)
and academics\textsuperscript{12}, placing the GDR within reunited Germany has proven a challenge for historians, one replicated in histories of German football.\textsuperscript{13} Contrary to the wave of interest the GDR has attracted on the part of academic historians, Germany’s official football bodies have chosen to relegate it to the margins of history. One trope commonly found in such accounts has been to view the GDR’s footballing past as “strange” or “weird”, an unusual blip in the larger narrative of German footballing success. Hesse-Lichtenberger’s subtitle for his chapter on the GDR in his history of German football \textit{Tor!}: “The Strange World of German Football” is an example of this tendency.\textsuperscript{14} In the DFB’s own authoritative history of German football, which was commissioned to commemorate the association’s 100\textsuperscript{th} anniversary, Christoph Dieckmann’s chapter not only separates the GDR’s history from the rest of German football’s, it also represents a separate chronological period.\textsuperscript{15} Dieckmann’s chapter, moreover, is placed immediately after Karl Adolf Scherer’s chapter on football in the Third Reich, which is also viewed as largely separate from the larger history of German football as an oddity. Placing these two chapters next to one another, along a different temporal axis equates the two periods by assuming they are defined by their totalitarianism.

Perhaps the most telling and representative example of how the GDR’s footballing history has been conceived is Hardy Grüne’s \textit{100 Jahre Deutsche}

\textsuperscript{12} Academic literature on football and Vergangenheitsbewältigung has grown significantly in recent years. See, for example, Krüger “Historiography, Cultures of Memory”.
\textsuperscript{13} On some of the challenges of placing the GDR within a larger history of re-united Germany, see Thomas Großböltig, “Die DR im Vereinten Deutschland” \url{http://www.bpb.de/geschichte/zeitgeschichte/geschichte-und-erinnerung/39840/erinnerung-an-die-ddr}.
\textsuperscript{14} Hesse-Lichtenberger, \textit{Tor!}.
\textsuperscript{15} DFB, \textit{100 Jahre}.
Meisterschaft: Die Geschichte des Fußballs in Deutschland.\textsuperscript{16} In this authoritative, chronological, 550-page account of the history of German football, not only is the GDR allocated only one, separate chapter, the chapter is bookended between the years 1980 – 1989 and 1989 – 2003, giving the impression that GDR football breaks the linear trajectory of German football’s “natural”, teleological chronology. These accounts provide a sense of the GDR’s footballing history as a chapter separate from and incompatible with the story of German football.

Post-Wende Berlin suffers from the similar problem of not quite fitting into the larger narrative of German “success” constructed by such accounts. Though West Berlin arguably enjoyed a “golden age” in the 1970s and BFC Dynamo Berlin emerged as the perennial East German powerhouse of the 1980s, the city’s image as a “Fußballstadt” has been tarnished by its numerous scandals that accompanied success on the pitch. In the words of one popular football writer, Berlin’s footballing history is best defined as a Skandale ohne ende (scandals without end).\textsuperscript{17}

As this dissertation argues, unlike histories of German football more generally, histories of Berliner football cannot so easily overlook the degree to which those of the FRG and GDR overlap. The BFV’s official history of football in Berlin is representative of the difficulties in constructing narratives of success that incorporate the GDR. On the one hand, the BFV’s 100 Jahre includes one chapter, devoted to the GDR, in which football is depicted as a political instrument in the wider context of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{18}

Titled, “Erst Füseliere, dann Fußballer” (first executers, then footballers), it portrays

\textsuperscript{16} Hardy Grüne, \textit{100 Jahre deutsche Meisterschaft}.
\textsuperscript{17} Fischer and Nachtigall, \textit{Skandale ohne Ende}.
\textsuperscript{18} See “Erst Füseliere, dann Fußballer” in BFV, \textit{100 Jahre}, pp. 152-161.
GDR athletes as soldiers for the socialist cause reminiscent of the regime’s own propagandistic coverage (See figures 3.1 and 3.2, for example, below). On the other hand, another chapter engages directly with the “Gesamtberliner” league of the early years of reconstruction. Its title, “Nur fünf Jahre gemeinsam” (only five years together), however, suggests a common connected history, though GDR football eventually broke away until it is brought back again in 1989/90.¹⁹ The BFV’s version of the city’s footballing history, though calling out for a more nuanced engagement with East German football, replicates – or rather seeks to replicate – the DFB’s vision of German football as a success story.

The BFV, interested in reviving Berlin as a Fußballstadt and in so doing claiming a place in the wider narrative of German football, have sought to reproduce narratives of football success perpetuated by accounts such as the ones above. In the BFV’s account of history of football in Berlin, East-German football, is not treated as a “footnote” to the wider story of Berlin football, but is seen as an integral part to the city’s success. In this account, the East Berlin’s exploits on the pitch are appropriated as part of the city’s history of football success. The scandals that accompany the results on the pitch, in this narrative, are the footnotes rather than the success.

Taken together, accounts published to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Bundesliga and histories commissioned by Germany’s football institutions offer a largely monolithic, positive interpretation of Germany’s football past. Unlike the Nazi period, GDR football developed alongside its more successful neighbour. Fitting the GDR into the wider narratives of success has proved difficult. To write the story of Germany’s

¹⁹ “Nur fünf Jahre gemeinsam” in Ibid.
footballing success, however, requires marginalizing and silencing more difficult elements of its past. Though many East Germans participated in “historicide” against symbols of the GDR during the *Wende*, as we saw in the previous chapter, many have turned to the past to come to grips with life in the new, re-united Germany.

**From FC Berlin Back to BFC Dynamo**

Confronted with the difficulties of doing away with the image as a haven for football violence, newly elected president of FC Berlin Phillip Wanski started petitioning to have the name restored in the late 1990s. He argued that the club had little – if nothing – to do with the Stasi or Erich Mielke. Dynamo, rather, was a symbol of athletic prowess that should be remembered and embraced. Despite some initial resistance from club members, he decided he would change the name back to Dynamo if supporters returned to the stadium. He set himself – and the club – the goal of 2000 spectators. It worked. Dynamo reclaimed their old name and emblems in 1999.20

After reclaiming their traditional name and logo, Wanski went one step further. In summer 2004, he petitioned the DFB to recognize Dynamo’s slightly altered new crest, which included three stars above the “D”. The stars represented league championships won per the German Football League’s (DFL) regulations mandating the use of such symbols of recognition. According to the DFL, a club could add a star above their crest for three league championships won, two stars for five, and three for ten. Dynamo’s

three stars, in other words, referred to the ten Oberliga titles BFC Dynamo won in succession. Corresponding to DFL’s rules, however, championships won in the GDR were not eligible for official recognition. Club officials took matters into their own hands when their calls fell upon deaf ears.

Dynamo’s attempt to launch their new shirts and crests launched a debate on Dynamo’s own legacy, specifically the legitimacy with which their ten Oberliga championships were won. Rivals argued that BFC had too chequered a past to claim to have won the championships legitimately. Criticisms of Dynamo’s past as illegitimate continue to resonate amongst Dynamo’s GDR rivals. Fan forums from any number of clubs provide evidence that many fans disagreed Dynamo should be permitted to add stars of recognition to their crest. Such debates highlight that many fans continue to view the Oberliga-champions with a great amount of disdain.

The star controversy also launched a debate surrounding the ongoing “walls in the mind” of East and West Germans. Dynamo press spokesman insert name “For the people of the former GDR, this is without question a further symbol of a matter that merits discussion, namely the very real triumphant attitude [of West Germany] that cuts down traditions and achievements without any consideration”. The need to reconsider the star question was supported by DFB Vice-President Moldenhauer, who advocated for pre-1963 championships as well as those from the GDR to be included. The tension can also be found in fan-forums, whereby fans from rival clubs admit they are opposed to Dynamo’s star plans, but admit that GDR football ought not be written off by the DFB

and DFL so willingly either. Bernd Heynemann, a former referee in the GDR, and Member of Parliament in 2005, pointed out that German football was highly selective of what it decided to recognise and value in East German football. For instance, the DFB recognized individual player caps along with FC Magdeburg’s UEFA Cup Winners’ Cup. The DFL, however, admits that the measure was used mainly for marketing purposes. DFL spokesman Tom Bender, for example, used the example of Victoria Frankfurt/Oder, who won six leagues titles in the GDR, would have to be granted two stars, inflating the quality of the product on display.

The league suggested to Dynamo a compromise in the form of a new logo, whereby three stars stood horizontally alongside rather than above the D inside a crest. After much to-and-froing on the matter, somewhat of an ironic compromise was reached. Dynamo agreed to the suggestion that one star with the number 10 written within it serve as a substitute to the three stars typically reserved for Bundesliga champions. The compromise echoes Heym’s assessment of general attitudes towards the history of the GDR, which warned it would become a “footnote in world history”. The star above the new crest acts as a footnote or asterisk next to the club’s claim to success in a new, integrated Germany. Regardless of intentions to treat East and West as equal partners in the reunified Germany, the star controversy provides a reminder how legacies of asymmetry continue to affect Germans from the incorporated eastern lands.

FC Berlin hope to return to the past by reclaiming the Dynamo name and colours, and to draw attention to their success in the GDR years, however, were short-lived.

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22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
Whereas changing the club’s name required the approval of club members, re-appropriating their old emblem proved more complicated in the new Germany. Football-paraphernalia collector, Hertha-Superfan, and Union supporter of old, Pepe Mager had secured the rights to the Dynamo crest a few years previously, which prevented Dynamo from publicly displaying their emblem without paying compensation for the rights of use. The result was a long, drawn-out battle over the ownership of the Dynamo logo, which, eventually, led Dynamo to settle for yet another compromise.24

In 2009, Dynamo unveiled yet another logo. The club chose the black bear, symbol of the city of Berlin, as its mascot, which stands, in a pose reminiscent of the city’s crest, on its two hind legs in the middle of a circle of wine-red and white, the traditional colours of BFC Dynamo. BFC Dynamo have adopted a new motto: “Aus Tradition in die Zukunft” (From tradition into the future). The motto underpins the ambitions of the new current owners to bring Dynamo out of the obscurities of the lower regional leagues and close to the 2. Bundesliga. It aims to do so, as the motto suggests, by building on elements of a successful past to ensure a prosperous future. The new owners have continued Wanski’s initial calls to build on Dynamo’s tradition of sporting prowess by focusing much of their efforts on the excellent youth development programme Dynamo built in the 1970s and 1980s in the GDR, a youth development programme that could rival the best in Europe.

Focusing on youth has also enabled Dynamo to redirect the public’s attention to the familial nature of the club, in opposition to the burdened image of a haven for violent hooliganism that has burdened them over the years. Dynamo has found it difficult to rid

the club of a small but violent contingent of supporters who have embraced the more absurd elements of post-Wende Dynamo fan culture: a new xenophobic, right wing nationalism and GDR Nostalgia. It was not uncommon in the 1990s and 2000s to see the arms of Dynamo fans outstretched in the Roman salute accompanied by chants of “Wer soll unser Führer sein? Erich Mielke!” (Who should be our Führer? Erich Mielke!). Nor was it uncommon to see banners and T-Shirts marked with racist, xenophobic, and GDR slogans in German script. In a 2012 cup match against Lichtenberg 49, Dynamo fans embraced the absurd by circulating a controversial poster advertising the match. The poster depicted Stasi chief Erich Mielke in the stands of the Sportforum. A caption read: “Mielke also had to come this way”. The text refers to Mielke’s well-known presence as an active supporter of the club. It is a caricature of images widely circulated throughout the GDR whereby Mielke stands in the section of the Sportforum reserved for top officials. The text plays on the location of the Stasi headquarters in Berlin, on Hermannstrasse, which linked to the Sportforum, where BFC Dynamo often played home matches. The poster was met with outrage. Dissenters accused its creators of being insensitive to the injustices Mielke perpetuated. Dynamo fans responded by insisting the poster was meant to be humorous, harmless banter. The outcry surrounding the poster is a reminder of how sensitive images of the GDR past

25 Willmann, Ultras cutten hooligans.  
26 Willmann, Meisterclub, 240.  
remain, especially those of the Stasi. By turning to gallows humour BFC fans have staked a claim for the right to appropriate the more troubled elements of its past with its visions for the possibility of a successful future.

BFC Dynamo’s Complicated Past – and Present

More than ten years in the making, the exhibit Fußball für die Stasi, opened its doors in 2013 in Berlin.28 A relatively small, special exhibit that focused on BFC Dynamo and explored its links to the MfS and Stasi chief Erich Mielke, Fußball für die Stasi was put on by the BStU’s Bildungszentrum. It presented the history of the club’s founding, as part of the wider Dynamo sport apparatus. The exhibit explored Dynamo’s institutional ties to the apparatuses of state security, in particular the MfS. It also displayed some of the more striking – and therefore also popular – elements in BFC’s history. One example is the focuses on themes, such as the Republikflucht (fleeing the republic) of several of Dynamo’s athletes. The exhibit also provides exposés on Stasi and IM surveillance of athletes and fans alike. The exhibit ended its narrative in 1989/90, with the fall of the GDR.

As much as the exhibit was informative and should be applauded for exposing these important issues to the wider public, it is also representative of some of the difficulties present when dealing with the GDR’s legacy. Other than primarily focusing on issues that view the SED-State as a “totalitarian regime”, in taking a Stasi-centered interpretation of the GDR, the exhibit highlights an implicit interpretive problem with

28 Special Exhibit “Fußball für die Stasi. Der Berliner Fußball-Club Dynamo” hosted by the BStU Bildungszentrum, Berlin, 2012.
chronology. Ending the exhibit in 1989/90 with the collapse of the GDR provides a convenient demarcation between the past and present. Ending the narrative in 1989/90, however, has the effect of presenting the fall of the Berlin Wall as the “end of history”. It also presents the curators with the opportunity to conveniently leave aside the problematic and entangled legacies of the SED state, the asymmetrical nature of the years of division, and the many social issues that followed the Wende. For BFC Dynamo, these complicated legacies were expressed vividly in the “absurd” combination of the aggressive, right-wing, and xenophobic sensibilities coupled with an nostalgic embrace of the GDR and its symbols of a section of its fanbase.

Part of what is at stake involves the role “archives” play as institutions of state power that homogenize discourses of the past. Materials for the exhibit derived predominantly from the BStU. Documents from the BStU reveal the extent to which the Stasi attempted to control all segments of everyday life in the GDR. They also reveal the extent to which ideological rhetoric peppered interpretations of events. Football supporters who sought to interact with fellow fans from the FRG, sported Hertha scarves or emblems, or chanted abuse at opposition players, behaviour that might be deemed “normal” in another sporting setting, were de facto subversive in the eyes of the State. Reconstructing histories based on the materials from the Stasi archives, however, tends to present interpretations that follow the institution’s own ideology and logic.

Since 1989, literature that places the Stasi at the centre of historical narratives of the GDR has been matched by a marked increase in grassroots accounts in the form of fan-driven historical engagement through published compilations of fan memories; magazines managed, edited and written by fans; and through divergent platforms of
social media. Such grassroots football writing represents a certain dissatisfaction with the state of football histories currently available. Growing out of the “Fanzine” phenomenon that spread to the continent from England in the 1970s and 1980s, these texts serve fans’ desires for football discourses outside the mainstream. 29 East German football has been a prominent theme in many German – especially eastern German – fanzines. The Bibliothek des deutschen Fußballs, is a new series of books “for fans, by fans” includes new releases of histories of popular East German football clubs, such as BSG Chemie Leipzig, 1. Lokomotiv Leipzig, FC Energie Cottbus, BFC Dynamo, SV Babelsberg FC, and 1. FC Union Berlin. 30 These accounts make up but a small portion of the fan-driven literature whereby East German football supporters stake a claim in the current conversation about the ways the East German footballing past is being conceived. Many of these fan-based writings are relatively lucrative, which speaks to the demand. They are also important historical sources in that they cover various themes of interest to fans. 31 Though difficult to measure with any certainty, grassroots accounts available via blogs or social media dwarf “official” histories that claim authenticity because of their direct support by official organs of the football leagues or its various stakeholders. The more successful fan-based writings can be found in bookshops, offering shoppers a counter-narrative to the official, league-based, club-based, and academic historical accounts. Fan-led writings have moved beyond the page to include various digital media made available via the World Wide Web, making fan perspectives more widely

29 For a brief history of the “Fanzine” and its spread to Europe, see Goldblatt, The Ball is Round (chapter 8).
30 See the description of the series on the Culturcon Medien website: http://www.culturcon.de/shop-produktdetails.html?tx_tproducts_pi1%5BbackPID%5D=4&tx_tproducts_pi1%5Bproduct%5D=496&cHash=9f5f2c5efa < accessed 21.2.2016 >.
31 One such popular German football fanzine, to provide an example is 11 Freunde.
accessible. These fan-based writings can provide a widely divergent take on football’s history and fans’ memories – it can be understood as an alternative archive – that counters the homogenizing effects of official state archives, such as the BStU.

Historian Hans Leske, however, has been particularly vocal in launching critiques of such fan-based works of history. He argues that these representations of the GDR past are a form of East German nostalgia – often referred to as Ostalgie – that is problematic and dangerous. Leske takes particular aim at East German journalists and writers Jörn Luther and Franck Willmann survey of BFC Dynamo, which Leske criticizes for selectively fronting positive aspects of the club’s history at the expense of trivializing the role Mielke and Stasi informants played in the club. While there is some merit to the caution of trivializing crimes perpetuated by the SED, Leske’s criticism embodies the position of many East German fans that see West German interpretations dominating and speaking for the experiences of individuals’ who lived through the regime. Leske’s extensive work in the BStU has largely reproduced a “Stasi-centred” view that reduces the GDR into a simplistic binary relationship between collaborators and resisters.

Sometimes mistakenly called the Union-Fan-Archiv, the Union-Archiv is currently run by a fan, with the active support of other supporters. Because supporters run the archive, it holds a significant amount of material on both the state’s perceptions of the fans and on fans’ experiences, not least of which the constant surveillance they withstood by the Stasi. The Union-Archiv is reflective of a history of close engagement between the club and its fan base. The result is an archive that permits the construction

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33 McDougall, The People’s Game, 191-195
of narratives that forcibly combines Stasi documents detailing the repression of individual fans, and thereby providing a peek into the totalitarian side of the regime, next to fan-accounts that cannot be found in the BStU. The archive then demonstrates both how the authoritarian nature of the regime affected individuals on a daily basis, but also how ordinary citizens who had to live with the regime found ways to express Eigen-Sinn, express their views in the relative safety of the terrace, and safeguard many of the cultural practice they held dear.34

The differences in these two widely differing views hark back to earlier debates in GDR historiography and are reflective of the ways interpretations can reflect the homogenizing power of the archive. BFC Dynamo has no “club archive”. As the sporting club associated with the MfS, materials concerning Dynamo’s past are stored in the BStU, creating a unique, static, repository of documents related to matters of football that present an ideological interpretation of the club’s past. It is unsurprising that a history of BFC Dynamo constructed mainly from sources found in the BStU will present a Stasi-centred view, neither is it surprising that the history end in 1989/90, when the MfS was dissolved. Luther and Willmann’s works, on the other hand, especially Willmann’s column on GDR football presents the other side of GDR football, one that reveals how vibrant and complex football fan cultures in the GDR were. They have been useful in uncovering alternative, private, fan-collections, and oral histories. Many other alternative archives are kept private, meant only for the eyes of an accepted few. The reluctance on the part of contemporary fans to open their doors or of BFC Dynamo to provide a space for a club archives remains a reflection of the difficult efforts of coming

34 Fulbrook, The People’s State
to terms with Dynamo’s complicated past – and present. They offer a multiplicity of perspectives and take into consideration contradictory or overlapping experiences that exist within the structures of the SED regime and its MfS, thereby providing insight into the ways ordinary East Germans experienced and negotiated dictatorship.

**Constructing, Negotiating, and Altering the Course of a “Friendship Narrative”**

As we have seen in chapter 3, Hertha and its fans developed a close relationship with fellow fans on the other side of the Iron Curtain. How does Hertha, with its unique friendship with Union, engage with its GDR past? Hertha BSC’s club archive, the Hertha-Archiv, covers mostly the history of the administration of the club, key matches, statistics, and has some material concerning its members. The archive, like any other repositories of the past, has its limitations. It is not an archive with strong ties to, nor does it claim to effectively or systematically speak for, its fan base. Fan engagement with the archive was and has been minimal. Although it does not treat its supporters in any systematic fashion, it did keep records of club-*Mitgliedern* (members), its official members. Notably, it kept lists of so-called Ost-mitgliedern as well as correspondence between them and the club. The archive does not offer a comprehensive repository of fan experiences that goes beyond their records of the Hertha-*Ostmitgliedern* (members in the East). Consequentially, club-sponsored histories interact with the GDR by focusing on the small, but significant number of Hertha-members that resided in East Germany, and the fan friendship some of them formed with Union Berlin in the 1980s.

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Historical narratives of the “Fan-friendship” found in “official” club accounts represent the archive’s limited holdings. The online Hertha-Museum, for example, makes no mention of the Ostmitgliedern, the GDR, or Union Berlin until one enters the virtual section for the period of 1980-1990. Then, in a few sentences, it acknowledges how a “stark Fanfreundschaft” [strong fan-friendship] between supporters of Union and Hertha served as a “protest” against the Wall and barbed wire that prevented East German Hertha fans the freedom of enjoying Hertha football. This account is replicated by longer, full-length books on the club’s history that either do not mention Union supporters at all, or mentions them only in passing, as a manifestation of how there were Hertha’s fans behind the Wall. The “Fanfreundschaft” (fan-friendship) appears, in passing, when chronological accounts reaches 1989/90, at which point images of Hertha and Union supporters, arm in arm at the Olympiastadion, allow for an introduction of a hidden Fanfreundschaft (fan-friendship). The appearance of discussion, or even mention, of the GDR in Hertha interpretations, despite having these close ties with Union, only in 1989/1990 suggest that Union, and therefore the GDR, was not a part of the wider narrative. They are presented as a footnote to the history of the West German club. This description is read as a triumphant manifestation that East Berlin Hertha fans could once again support their club freely after years of suppression. Hertha narratives, therefore, read as an account of support for their East German neighbour, who found themselves behind the Iron Curtain, subject to an oppressive regime. The club’s narratives depictions have in other words largely followed that offered by the DFB and BFV in

36 http://www.herthamuseum.de/
37 For example, see Michael Jahn, Blau-weiße Wunder.
38 Michael Jahn, Blau-Weisse Hertha.
placing the GDR as a “footnote” in their larger story of success, presenting a triumphalist interpretation of 1989/90 in the process.

The “friendship” as resistance and protest is a portrayal that has been reproduced in the wider public. Wikipedia’s rather sloppily wrought entry on Hertha BSC sums it up nicely by demonstrating that a friendship with Union supporters developed after the fall of the wall.39 The popularization of Helmut Klopfleisch’s story – not least through the likes of Simon Kuper’s *Football Against the Enemy*, but also in the popular press – has come to dominate Hertha’s engagement with the GDR past.40 Klopfleisch, a character we met in chapter 3, fills a void in many club and fan-based accounts of Hertha’s past. He was an East Berlin Hertha supporter and central in organizing an illegal Hertha-Gemeinschaft (community) behind the wall during the years of division.41 His story focuses on the constant harassment and surveillance he endured at the hands of the Stasi, who feared his pre-disposition towards the West German club was impacting his socialist attitude. Klopfleisch emerges in these depictions defiantly, as a resister to the regime who continued to support his club despite the risks.42

The proliferation of Klopfleisch’s remarkable account tends to popularize potentially problematic interpretations of the past. Viewing the GDR past as predominantly a narrative of resistance runs the risk of reiterating the Stasi’s own ideologically-infused interpretations of the actions of ordinary Germans. As Jutta Braun has importantly stressed, the behavior of East German football fans in activities, such as

40 Kuper, *Football Against the Enemy*.
41 See Wiese’s account of Klopfleisch in Weise, “Hertha BSe im kalten Krieg”.
42 On Klopfleisch, see Paul Joyce, *WSC* 289; Wiese; McDougall]. Ministerrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Ministerium für Staatssicherheit Der Minister Dienstanweisung Nr. 5/66, Berlin, den 10. August 1966
illicit chanting, wearing emblems of western European football clubs, and supporting the West German national team, arose out of overwhelmingly “sporting motivations”, rather than explicitly political ones: “The football fans viewed their support of Bundesliga football [as well as the West German national team] as a completely normal, everyday activity. It was the SED and its apparatus of repression that would have the sports enthusiasts believe that their activities were deviant or abnormal, and that they were a danger to the state”. East Germans were susceptible to cultural influences from the West, but it was the fact that these same influences were deemed deviant by the state that turned these otherwise “normal” cultural everyday activities deviant in nature. This interpretation over-determines everyday, sporting behaviour politically. Klopfleisch’s action, viewed problematically by the SED-authorities as ideologically driven, are re-interpreted post facto as resistance due to its implicit deviance.

This dissertation suggests viewing Klopfleisch as an agent of entanglement between East and West that embodies the very real consequences leading seemingly normal lives could have in the GDR while not turning him into an agent of resistance. Klopfleisch’s everyday actions were not determined by the Stasi, but they had very real consequences. Moreover, viewing Klopfleisch as an agent of entanglement pushes us to move past the 1989/90 divide to consider him as a figure that continuously engages the past. In other words, pushing him past 1989/90 helps uncover the ways his experiences and memories have been used to construct a normalized narrative of the GDR past, one that relies on a simplistic dichotomous view of the GDR, state, and society.

“Sicheres Stadionerlebnis”: Football Nostalgia and Common Concerns of Contemporary Football Fans

Union has experienced a notable turn-around in its fortunes since the early 1990s. Over the past ten years, the club’s devotion to their emotional fan-base has produced a stable, enjoyable football experience that transcends the successful performances on pitch. Over the 2000s Union enjoyed some good form on the pitch to solidify their position in the 2nd division of German football, the 2. Bundesliga. Their success has been attributed to finding a balance between the growing commercialism found in football and maintaining a positive – i.e. approved by fans – experience in the terraces to run the club. Their relative success on the pitch has dovetailed the rising numbers in the arena.

Fans and club officials alike point to a combination of lasting legacies that spilled over from the GDR years to explain their success. Union has embraced an image as a non-conformist, grass-roots club that locates itself somewhere between a “traditional” and “modern” football club, a football club that seems to have found a balance between the commercialism of the game and remaining closely grounded to its local fan base. In club accounts, the Fanfreundschaft with Hertha is used to underline Union’s non-conformist attitude vis-à-vis the GDR, especially its mechanism of state repression. As such, hatred for Dynamo is as present – if not more –in club accounts than discussions of inter-German exchange. There is a tendency to turn friendship with Hertha and hatred of Dynamo into a simplistic binary that views all Dynamo supporters as “Stasikind” and all Union supporters as resisters.44 Though they continue to view the history of the

44 Kuper, *Football Against the Enemy*.
Fanfreundschaft positively, their relationship with Hertha BSC and its fans became ambivalent on the ground. Rather, it was used as a kind of identity currency. To adapt to the post-Wende period, Unioners have cultivated an image of non-conformity that dates back to the GDR-years.

A series of fan-based initiatives since the turn of the millennium has help to forge a new Union identity by connecting the club to its fans, its fans to its stadium, and its stadium to the wider community. In 2003, a small group of local fans arranged to meet at the stadium over the Christmas holiday. 89 fans jumped the gates packed with Glühwein to sing Christmas carols and Union songs at the stadium. It has since become a yearly event; fans packed the stadium, lit with candles, to sing Christmas carols. Similarly in 2014, Union transformed their football stadium into a giant “living room” for football fans to come and watch the World Cup. Dubbed the Weltmeisterschaft Wohnzimmer (World Cup Living-Room), local fans were encouraged to bring their sofas to the stadium so they may watch the World Cup and feel at home. Both events caught the attention of the international media.

Fans of many clubs regard their own stadium as a sacred space. For Union, the attachment between the club, the stadium, and fans runs deeps. In 2008, fans took it upon

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45 On the relationship between memory and identity, see Jan Assmann, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity.” In: New German Critique, No. 65 (Spring/Summer 1995), 125-133
48 On memory, fans, and stadia, see Nicholas Piercey, “The Football Stadium and Ground as a Historical Resource: Football Grounds, Memory, and Cultural History in Amsterdam and Rotterdam from 1910 to 1920” in Herzog, Memorialkultur, 287-309.
themselves to “modernize” their stadium in an attempt to remain competitive in the upper tiers of German football by rebuilding their main stand and adding a roof. Strapped for cash to undergo significant renovations, over 2500 supporters put in over 140 000 hours of voluntary labour to complete the tasks without incurring significant debt or limiting their finances devoted to other club activities. The decision by some to donate the cash stipend they received for giving blood at the local blood drive ensured it was the blood of fans that built the stadium, a statement of pride for the symbolic attachment between the fans, their club, and the stadium. During the renovations, Union made the decision to listen carefully to what fans wanted the new stadium to be. They agreed to keep the arena’s “throwback” terraces – referred to as “safe standing” spaces in modern vernacular – to ensure a “positive” fan experience. For these supporters, a “positive” fan experience often refers to the raucousness and chaos that characterized fan experiences in stadia in the 1970s and 1980s.

After the DFB released a document that outlined new regulations clubs were expected to follow to ensure a “safe stadium experience” in 2012, which drew on the practices implemented in England after the Hillsborough disaster of 1989, Union has been regarded as a leading voice in the critique of “modern football” that has drawn the attention of supporters both within Germany and abroad, when Union were the only club to vote against the measures. Because Union, like all German clubs since a 1998 ruling that referred to as the 50 + 1 rule that demands club decisions be made by a majority of its members, Union’s representatives felt they did not have the authority to agree in principle without the prior approval of its members. After refusing to sign the plan, Union replied to the DFB with their critiques of several of their planned changes.
Wrought by the fans, Union’s response criticized what they perceived to be integral features of the match-day experience and a vital part of fan culture. The banning of pyrotechnics and standing spaces for fans may seem trivial to some. For fans that view these objects and spaces as integral to creating a unique and emotionally charged match-day experience, the DFB’s “safe stadium experience” reflect a tension between the autonomous “free” space the football stadia and terraces offer Berlin football fans and the authorities’ desire to control elements of fandom it views as unsafe or unsecure.

Since, Union has gained an international reputation for being a “cult” club, whose tradition of non-conformity has remained an important part of their identity. The club’s attitude towards the relationship between football and its supporters has resonated with supporters critical of the perceived driven actions of “modern football”, which is demonstrative of a larger transnational angst concerning the relationship between commercialism that dominated the game from the 1970s onward but reached new limits since the 1980s. The increased commercialism of football has left many supporters feeling powerless, distant from their clubs and their heroes.

Leske’s criticism also views “nostalgia” as a fundamentally negative concept, because it distorts the objective realities of the past. More recent work has criticised this de facto dismissal of nostalgia by asking more seriously how the concept of nostalgia might help us understand the past.49 Rather than view nostalgia – especially of the GDR – as an flawed manifestation of experiences that cannot be trusted as a historical source.

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because it includes forgetting and mis-remembering, it is revealing to analyze it as a manifestation of contemporary social concern. Moreover, nostalgia is not unique to East Germans. Research has pointed to a particular kind of West German nostalgia that appears to have evolved alongside – if not in opposition to – Ostalgie. Understood as wider phenomena shared by East and West Germans, football nostalgia reveal concerns West and East football supporters in contemporary Germany have in common.\(^{50}\)

Hertha BSC fan-blogs are full of posts that are nostalgic for the 1970s and 1980s.\(^{51}\) This suggests that the fan-led and fan-based historical engagement are part of a wider phenomenon that demonstrates what East and West Germans may have had in common. Grassroots engagements with memory on these fan blogs are peppered with what has been referred to as *Westalgie*, but many more are yearning for a specific kind of football, which has much in common with those who hold nostalgic sentiments for football the GDR. This is a wider contemporary complaint at the global commercialisation of the Bundesliga and the perceived encroachment on football fan culture by the authorities, specifically the DFB, but also UEFA and FIFA and of course extends to security forces in and around the stadia on matchday.

The few fans that continue to celebrate a Hertha-Union friendship formed an official club dedicated to the friendship.\(^{52}\) Some of their recent demonstrations point to common grievances that reflect something more than celebrating a historical friendship around the Wall. They share common grievances against what fans referred to


\(^{51}\) To get a sense of the type of discussions found on fan-forums, see [http://www.hertha-inside.de/forum/viewtopic.php?f=28&t=9334](http://www.hertha-inside.de/forum/viewtopic.php?f=28&t=9334), which provides a discussion regarding the history of Hertha-Frösche.

\(^{52}\) see the group’s webpage at the following address [http://www.hertha-union-freun.de/](http://www.hertha-union-freun.de/);
pejoratively as “modern football”, the highly commercialized, global, sanitized, and neo-liberal product encountered in Bundesliga stadia today. Alan McDougall has likewise pointed to this wider articulation of discontent on the current status of the game: “East Germans’ almost mocking affection for GDR football, and distance from what has succeeded it”, McDougall writes, “are not only microcosms of their mixed feelings about the GDR and reunited Germany. They also reflect the complex, sometimes contradictory feelings among fans in many countries about what has been won and lost since their game became an integral part of the global capitalist economy and post-modern consumer society”. Fan opposition to Red Bull Leipzig representing the current embodiment of “modern football” *par excellence*. Their position is clearly indicated on their webpage, which displays the common protest slogan: “*Nein zu Redbull. Für euch nur Marketing – Für uns Lebensinn!*” (No to Redbull. For you, only marketing – for us, the meaning of life). The collective voices are clearly stated on the webpage section “*Positionen und Forderungen*” (positions and demands).

These common grievances against “modern football” are not shared by all Hertha and Union fans, however. In some instances, complaints about “modern football” have been used to differentiate the two clubs and their supporters. Union fans recently taunted Hertha supporters at a match at the stadium by unfolding a banner that read: “*ein stadion* 


55 see the group’s webpage at the following address [http://www.hertha-union-freun.de/](http://www.hertha-union-freun.de/); See also the wider campaign, “*Nein zu Redbull*”, against Red Bull that brings together fans from various clubs across the country: [http://www.nein-zu-rb.de/ueber-uns/](http://www.nein-zu-rb.de/ueber-uns/). See also the campaign’s official Facebook page, “Deutschland sagt Nein zu RB Leipzig” at the following address: [https://www.facebook.com/deutschlandsagtneinzurbl/](https://www.facebook.com/deutschlandsagtneinzurbl/).
mit seele und kein Kolz aus Beton” (A stadium with soul and not a concrete monstrosity). Hertha’s recent success on the pitch coupled with its commercialization has led some union fans to view the club as Berlin’s own embodiment of “modern football”, highly commercial and without “soul”. Much as Union became an alternative to Dynamo in the 1970s and 1980s, Union presents an alternative for those critical of the modern game’s perceived sterility and neo-liberal attitudes soe supporters claim are embodied in Hertha BSC and its Olympiastadion.

**Conclusion**

These museums, archives, books, and online activity of football clubs and are an example of what German Egyptologist and Cultural Studies scholar Aleida Assmann has called the “democratization” of cultural memory”.

In speaking about the dissemination of Holocaust memory, Assmann argues “that the embodied experience of the survivor’s present past gives way to a pure past which is disconnected from sensuous experience,” she writes, the experiential reality that is tied to Holocaust is not “passing into the custody of professional historians”, as Kosseleck thought it would, but is “reclaimed by society”. What is occurring at present is a facing, reconstructing, and discussing new forms of memory that open up an access to the past that is distinct from and complementary to that which is provided by historical scholarship. Living memory thus gives way to a cultural memory that is underpinned by media – by material carriers such as memorials,

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56 See “David” Union gegen “Goliath” Hertha. Berlin ist im Derby-Fieber” *n-tv*, 17.9.2010
57 Assmann, *Cultural Memory*, 4-5
58 Assmann, *Cultural Memory*, 4-
monuments, museums, and archives. While individual recollections spontaneously fade and die with their former owners, new forms of memory are reconstructed within a transgenerational framework, and on an institutional level, within a deliberate policy of remembering and forgetting”.

Rather than view it as uniform or hegemonic, Assmann reminds us that it is important to understand memory as a part of a debate, where it is contested, used, and abused. This chapter argues that it is at the intersection of various media of the past that we get a better glimpse how history and memory are contested, and how the past is understood – and used. Much as technological advancements of the 1960s and 1970s enabled East and West Germans to interact with one another during the Cold War, new social technologies of communication and social media has enabled a larger “democratization” of historical practice. This chapter has argued that sites of history making, which have become increasingly democratized, are important spaces in which fans construct, negotiate, and contest German football’s pasts.

The direct interjection of fans into historical debates is an articulation of their dissatisfaction with what they perceive to be the increasing politicization of Germany’s footballing past. The growing politicization of football’s history in Germany is having the effect of reproducing homogenizing narratives of success that have the effect of marginalizing voices that do not easily fit in such portrayals, especially the GDR’s complicated legacy and positive memories of East German fans.

59 Ibid., 6.
60 Ibid.
61 Also Christopher Young, “Kaiser Franz and the Communist Bowl: Memory in Munich’s Olympic Stadium,” American Behavioural Scientist 46 no.11 (2003): 1476-90 on the importance of the body in how we remember as a collective.
62 Assmann, Cultural Memory, 6.
We see through the example of Union’s recent popularity a clash between the “normalizing” narratives of German football success and the postmodern impulse that is highly critical of the perceived encroachment by neo-liberal practices into football’s autonomous spaces. Union’s contemporary complicated relationship with Hertha is representative of a greater re-positioning that is ongoing in contemporary Berlin – often referred to as the Berlin Republic – as different groups negotiate the lasting legacies of the divided past.
Conclusion

Seldom is the German capital referred to as a “Fußballstadt” (“football-city”). When Berlin and football are mentioned together, themes of corruption, hooliganism, the Stasi, and scandal dominate. And yet, Berlin holds a rich footballing history that dates back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Berlin als Fußballstadt (Berlin as a football-city) has long played an important role in the lives of Berliners as spaces for sociability.

This dissertation has asked what Berlin’s fascinating football history can reveal about twentieth century Germany. It argues that football, viewed as popular cultural phenomenon, demonstrates how the Iron Curtain was much more porous and elastic than the imagery of the Berlin Wall leads us to believe. This dissertation’s more nuanced interpretation of the border complicates simplistic, reductive, and dichotomous narratives of the German and Cold War past.¹ The sport’s inherent dynamism presented Berliners both sides of the Wall with unique spaces for social interaction that played an important role in the ways they experienced, constructed, and negotiated division during the Cold War and after the Wende.

The opening chapter of this dissertation provided historical context for the rest of the dissertation. It introduced the reader to current debates surrounding how and why football spread from Britain to the German lands – and why it became the “people’s

¹ Sheffer, Burned Bridge; Mikkonen and Koivunen, Beyond the Divide; Lindenberger and Vowinckel, Cold War Cultures.
game” in Germany following the First World War. It showed how football proved attractive to the – especially anglophile – Bildungsbürgerburgertum (educated bourgeois middle class) of imperial German society, who saw the sport as both an alternative to and a supplement for the more nationalistic German Turnen movement. More importantly, Fußballvereine (Football clubs) offered an important “open” and relatively free space of bourgeois sociability.

Football, however, remained the privileged pastime of the few until approximately the turn of the century. The addition of the competitive element, the formation of the DFB, and the inclusion of a league table turned football from a “social game” to a “game of society”. The impact the First World War had on the spread of the game in Germany cannot be over-emphasized. The War introduced the game to the German masses, as soldiers of all ranks and classes passed through the Reich’s recruitment centres, training grounds, and prisoner of war camps. The 1918 revolution, the abdication of the Kaiser, and the proclamation of a republic shattered the old order. Many of the social conventions and practices in place that prevented the lower – and upper – classes from participating in leisurely activities such as football were removed. Nearly instantly, football attracted the masses. The First World War turned the “game of society” into the “people’s game”.

Berlin, the rising capital of Imperial Germany, turned into a modern metropolis following the War. Its large urban population flocked to the expanding stadia. Football’s growing popularity saw the formation of new teams, leagues, and organizations. In addition to the more traditional bourgeois clubs and its national umbrella organization, the DFB, Weimar Berlin saw a steep rise in confessional, business, and Workers’ sports
clubs and leagues that competed for the city’s best talent. It was during the Weimar period, however, that Fußballvereine’s potential for contradiction revealed itself. As clubs increasingly called on the state to help achieve financial stability, and were becoming increasingly important spaces for associational activities in the daily lives of many ordinary Germans, they opened themselves up to politicization.

The increasing politicization of German football continued after the Nazi seizure of power. The politicization of German football was at times overt. The Nazis immediately turned against confessional and especially Workers’ football clubs, ordered they disband, and seized their assets. Instead, the Nazis encouraged participation in leisurely activities organized by the State. The Nazification of football, however, was not implemented from above as it was pushed from below, with many clubs more than willing to alter their (at times founding) principles to better reflect the ideological bend of the regime. Under the Nazis, Fußballvereine (Football clubs), initially important as spaces of free sociability, became equally important in enacting social policies of exclusion based on political ideology.

Football proved remarkably adaptable to revolution and political change. It also emerged from the ashes of the Second World War to play an important role in rebuilding German society, as we saw in chapter 2. Initially concerned over its politicized pasts, the Allies’ liquidated and banned all German sport clubs. Despite the ban, football was played in the immediate postwar period to reclaim some semblance of normalcy to everyday life. Like it was following the First World War, football emerged as an important space of sociability by strengthening and rebuilding relationships, new, lost, and fractured.
Once the occupation forces recognized football’s popularity with the local population, they tried to use in their reconstruction efforts. Once reinstated, the Allies restricted sport to the local level to help foster a sense of communal rather than national identity. The implementation of Directive 23, however, had the added effect of providing a blank slate for the reconstruction of German sport. It provided an opportunity for the allies to leave aside the necessity for compromise toward the re-structuring of a unified sporting system. Rather than a unified vision, the occupation forces implemented policies separately that increasingly reflected their ideological predispositions. The Western Allies returned to pre-Nazi structures and permitted football clubs to reform along the traditional “associational” or *Verein* model. The Soviets, more reluctant to return to bourgeois structures, bid their time. By the time the SED decided to ease restrictions on local sport in late 1948, the opportunity to offer an alternative to the model regaining its popularity in the West – especially in Berlin, where individuals could move more or less freely and easily between the two states to watch football matches – had passed. The result was a chaotic and disorganized shambles, whereby three different organizations attached to the party – the FDJ, the FDGB, and the DS – competed for control over the organization of sport in the SBZ and GDR. Those East Berliners who travelled West to get their football fix did so because of a dissatisfaction already present in GDR football.

By 1947-1948, as the SED shifted to become a “part of the new type”, the growing political divisions solidified into two irreversible divergent trajectories that resulted in the founding of two German states with two different sporting structures. The two new states turned to use sport’s bodies – especially the IOC, FIFA, and later, UEFA
– as a way of achieving international recognition. Ironically, the need for recognition by
the international community would later ensure both nations were provided a space in
which they could interact. One of this dissertation’s main arguments is that international
competition, typically analyzed as a microcosm for viewing the Cold War as “war
without the guns”, provided unique opportunities for entanglement. It thereby
differentiates itself from such historiographical tendencies to view sport as a mechanism
for social interaction rather than or in addition to viewing sport as a microcosm for the
Cold War. For the GDR, which sought to control interactions with the outside world, the
need for international recognition, achieved largely through participation in international
sport, had the ironic effect of ensuring connections across the border. The 1954 “Miracle
of Bern” signaled to the world that Germany was an international footballing
powerhouse. That the victory was celebrated in both the FRG and GDR spoke to the
extent to which both East and West Germans connected over German football success.

Chapter 3 argued that the celebrations that followed the 1954 victory of Bern
demonstrated how West German football had a long reach that had the ability to re-
awaken inter-regional and German-German solidarity throughout the years of physical
division. Whereas the GDR achieved tremendous success in high performance
competition after undergoing several major restructuring efforts aimed at maximizing
medal counts at Olympic games, they were never fully able to come to grips with
football. The so-called “problem child” of the GDR “sporting miracle” could never
match the success of its western neighbour on the pitch. The relative inferiority on the
football pitch, the chapter argued, affirmed the “asymmetrical relationship” between the
two German states.
The GDR’s overt politicization of sport meant the regime viewed their athletes as “ambassadors in tracksuits”, charged with the task of spreading socialism. In contrast, the FRG left sport to develop largely at arm’s length. Football’s position in West German society was autonomous but not apolitical. West Berlin unique status as an “island city” meant it both benefited from – as the Sportluftbrücke and the founding of the Bundesliga demonstrate – as much as it was affected by – as in the example of Tasmannia’s maiden season in the Bundesliga – tensions that arose as a result of the Cold War. Berlin’s regional identity and the gravitas of the Bundesliga coupled to ensure entanglements around football continued despite the presence of the Berlin Wall. As GDR authorities tried desperately to control the movement of western goods and people, they could never quite control football. East Berliners continued to find ways to follow, support, and consume West German football. They listened to and watched matches and highlights on illegal Western radio and television stations; they organize secret clubs to share weekly gossip and newspapers and magazines that may have been smuggled over the border. But football, as an international sport, also provided unique opportunities for East Germans to go to West German matches and interact with travelling fans from both sides of the Iron Curtain. The football stadium proved remarkably resilient as a space of relative freedom despite the authority’s best attempts to control fan behaviour. The GDR authorities lack of success in ensconcing values and behaviours apt of socialist citizens manifested itself on a weekly basis in and around the football ground. Many East Germans’ ambivalence towards GDR football in general, but the East German national team in particular is testament to the regime’s inability to successfully use football to help foster a sense of national belonging in keeping with the state’s ideals. The 1974
Sparwasser Tor (Sparwasser goal) the embodiment of the ambivalent relationship East Germans had with GDR football – and the SED state – and also demonstrative of entangled and overlapping identities.

Chapter 3 also argued that transfer was not unidirectional. It draws attention to the other direction of engagement and exchange, instances whereby West Germans were interested in GDR football. By the 1980s, travelling fan groups were prominent enough to ensure regular in contact on both sides of the Wall. Fans exchanged gifts of football ephemera – badges, scarves beer steins – they gathered along the way or fabricated themselves, objects that remain a testament to the friendships they formed around the Wall. West German football enthusiasts of GDR football found themselves attracted to its chaotic, largely emotional, and violent attributes. In the GDR, where avenues to express dissatisfaction with the State were hard to come by, football terraces provided a space of relative freedom that proved especially attractive to predominantly – but not exclusively – young men eager to let out frustration.

Football opened dynamic, ambiguous, and multi-layered spaces for East-West interaction. The SED-State’s reliance on ideological interpretation, however, led them to turn seemingly “normal” fan behaviour – as incongruous as wearing a self-knitted scarf or a patch from a West Berlin football club – into “deviant” behaviour the authorities obsessively tried to control, but in the end could not. The regime’s inability to come to grips with football’s inner dynamism further represented many of the GDR’s shortcomings.

Chapter 4 argued that the Wende was experienced asymmetrically. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the GDR was in crisis. Its football clubs on the verge of economic
collapse, East Germany’s footballing institutions rushed to merge with those of the FRG. As time passed, the situation worsened. The DFB, apprehension of a quick merger with the East, were finally convinced to speed things up as the backdrop of the 1990 World Cup convinced them of the untapped potential behind the Wall. Meanwhile, the so-called “friendship match” between Hertha BSC and Union Berlin and experiences of the Italia ’90 on the ground showcased the ambivalence that accompanied Wende, for both East and West Germans. On the one hand, East and West Germans had an opportunity to celebrate together. On the other hand, eruptions of violence at the public viewing near the East Berlin city centre was reflective of the wider, deep-rooted social problems that followed the collapse of the GDR.

Chapter 5 argued that the GDR might be gone, but it is not forgotten. Despite the recent politicization of German football in favour of a homogenizing account built on “success”, different sites of history making, which have become increasingly democratized, are important spaces in which fans construct, negotiate, and contest the past. The direct interjection of fans into historical debates is an articulation of their dissatisfaction with what they perceive to be the increasing politicization of Germany’s footballing past and its homogenizing tendencies. Union Berlin’s status as a non-conformist cult-club embodies the incompatibility between the “normalizing” narratives of German football success with the postmodern impulse that is highly critical of the perceived encroachment by neo-liberal practices into football’s autonomous spaces. Such grievances against the “modern game” were shared by West German fans attracted to GDR football before the fall of the Wall. That Union and Hertha BSC’s current relationship is complicated, fractured, and often ambivalent reflects a greater re-
positioning that is ongoing in contemporary Berlin – often referred to as the Berlin Republic – as different groups negotiate the lasting legacies of a divided past.
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