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TITLE OF THESIS/TITRE DE LA THÈSE THIRD PARTY'S ROLE IN THE RESOLUTION
OF THE CONFLICT: A CASE STUDY
OF THE TASHKENT DECLARATION

UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ CARLETON UNIVERSITY, OTTAWA

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/
GRADE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE M.A.

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE DEGRÉ 1978

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THIRD PARTY'S ROLE IN THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT:

A CASE-STUDY OF THE TASHKENT DECLARATION

by

Tahir Amin, M.Sc.

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A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in International Affairs

The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

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August 1978

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A B S T R A C T

Most of the theoretical literature on third party mediation emphasizes that a potentially successful intermediary has to be impartial between the protagonists. The assumption is that as an impartial mediator does not have his own significant interests involved in the conflict, therefore, he is acceptable to the conflicting parties and is able to carry out his functions successfully. This perspective seems to be greatly influenced by domestic conflicts.

In recent international diplomatic history, there are several instances where the third parties, even though perceived as biased were acceptable to the conflicting parties and were able to play an effective intermediary role. The Tashkent Conference (January 1966) was one such significant event. The Soviet Union was the third party which arranged the Tashkent Conference in the wake of the armed conflict between India and Pakistan in September 1965. The Soviet Union, even though perceived by Pakistan as biased towards India was acceptable to it as an intermediary. The Soviet Union played the role of a successful intermediary in the conference mainly because of its long-term interest in the South Asian region. It succeeded in achieving a limited agreement between India and Pakistan in the form of the Tashkent Declaration.

The Soviet Union did not continue further efforts to resolve the conflict because of several reasons, but the Tashkent experience shows that a great power, even though perceived as biased, may play an effective intermediary role vis-a-vis smaller powers.

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INTRODUCTION

The conflict between India and Pakistan had its origins in the process of the formation of the two states in 1947 when each gained independence. Over time, the conflict became institutionalized, and finally in the fall of 1965, India and Pakistan went to war against each other. The war lasted seventeen days. In the wake of the ceasefire, the Soviet Union acted as a mediator between India and Pakistan at a conference hosted by the Soviets at Tashkent. The Tashkent Conference met with partial success and resulted in the Tashkent Declaration of January 1966.

There are two objectives to this case study: (1) analysis of Soviet mediation in the India-Pakistan conflict of 1965, and (2) to provide a critical evaluation of the theory of mediation in light of the experience in this case. Little or no analysis has been undertaken of the Tashkent Conference, primarily because of the lack of information on behind-the-scenes actions at the conference. Recent disclosures do permit some reconstruction of events. This picture is by no means complete, and there are still many gaps. Russian, Indian, Pakistani, and Western accounts do provide sufficient evidence to make reasonable conjectures about events.

Most of the theoretical literature on mediation assumes that an intermediary has to be impartial between the protagonists in order to carry out his functions successfully. But in the context of international

politics, there are several instances where the biased intermediaries have also been able to play their role effectively. Our review of the literature on third party mediation provided in chapter one suggests the limitations of the present theoretical discussion for application to recent international history. Contrary to the assumptions of most of the theoretical literature, our hypothesis is that a great power, even though perceived as biased, may be acceptable and play an effective intermediary role vis-a-vis smaller powers.

The second chapter defines the India-Pakistan conflict. A conflict is defined when the parties are specified, their values are given and the incompatibility is demonstrated.¹ Describing the values of India and Pakistan, we have discussed the formation of the conflict, an over-view of the previous resolution efforts and the gradual institutionalization of the conflict. By institutionalization of conflict, we mean the processes of biased perceptions and misperceptions which become firmly entrenched in socio-political fabric of the nations thanks to the competitive processes involved in the conflict.² We then discuss the institutionalization of the conflict within the domestic political systems of India and Pakistan and the emergence of new incompatibilities at the bilateral and international levels between the two nations. Finally, in this chapter, we discuss the escalation of the conflict into armed hostilities in Fall 1965, the events of war and the ceasefire.

After defining the conflict, we have organized the discussion along the following questions:

- 1) What is the identity, interests and entry point of the third party into the conflict?
- 2) What are the functions of the third party in order to resolve the conflict?
- 3) What is the role of third party during the transference process?

In the third chapter, we discuss the identity, interests and the entry point of the third party into the conflict. In retrospect, we analyze the Soviet Union's involvement in the India-Pakistan conflict in an overall context of its relationship with the parties to the conflict and other significant interested parties in the region i.e. the United States and the Peoples' Republic of China.

The fourth chapter deals with the functions of the third party. We have attempted to answer the question as to how the Soviet Union, even though perceived as biased by Pakistan towards India, was able to carry out the functions of an intermediary successfully and was able to achieve a limited agreement between the decision-makers of India and Pakistan.

The fifth chapter deals with the transference process and the third party's role in it. Quite often, institutionalized conflicts are resolved through a series of efforts. In such situations when the decision-makers of states, convinced of the dysfunction of conflict arrive at an agreement on the need to resolve the conflict and decide to proceed towards the settlement stage, they have to cope with the problem of altering the perceptions of other actors in their country. Specifically, by the transference process we mean the process conducted by the decision-makers to transfer their new perceptions to significant others

in their own nation.³ In this chapter, we also discuss the aftermath of the Tashkent Declaration and the Soviet Union's role in the post-Tashkent era. We also attempt to answer the question as to why the Soviet Union did not continue its efforts in order to solve the conflict.

Finally, there is a brief post-script on the later developments on the India-Pakistan conflict, which fall outside the major focus of this paper.

Notes

1. Johan Galtung, "The Middle East and the Theory of Conflict", Journal of Peace Research 8 (1971) p. 176
2. This definition has been formulated with the help of Morton Deutsch's description of the expansion of conflict. Morton Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict (London: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 351-352
3. The idea of the transference process has been taken from an article by Herbert C. Kelman and Stephen P. Cohen. Herbert C. Kelman and Stephen P. Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop: A Social-Psychological Contribution to the Resolution of International Conflicts", Journal of Peace Research 2 (1976) pp. 79-90

CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical literature on 'Third Party intervention as a method for the resolution of conflict' involves a variety of forms ranging from military intervention to good offices. However, here we are concerned with the literature on intermediaries only. The term 'intermediaries' denotes "third-parties that intervene diplomatically in a conflict with the stated purpose of contributing toward its abatement or termination, and their intervention is accepted by the parties".¹ In general, the literature, both theoretical and empirical, on the techniques of peaceful settlement of International conflicts (including mediation) is notable primarily for its brevity and is still in the development stage.² Our objective is to show the limitations in much of the literature and to indicate the direction in which our case-study may prove helpful in the formulation of more adequate theory.

A number of attributes have been delineated in determining the identity of a potential successful intermediary. Such a third party should be 'impartial', 'independent', an established factor in the international politics (continuity), and should have a 'salient position' in the eyes of protagonists as well as a focal or noticeable position in the structure of the international system. It should enjoy respect in

the eyes of the parties to the conflict, and the personnel taking part in the mediation should have some initiative of their own and a specialized knowledge of politico-military affairs.³ Several common features of a third party's functions appear in the works of Ikle (1964), Jackson (1952), Bailey (1971), Edmead (1971), Young (1967, 1972) and Burton (1969).⁴ For our purposes, we shall discuss two central functions which encompass the salient features of third party functions described in the above mentioned works: (1) facilitating communications, and (2) facilitating concessions.

A third party may perform an important function in establishing communication between the adversaries. In the present world, because of the wide publicity given to governmental positions and to internal political debates, the adversaries do not suffer from a dearth of communication. Because of processes of misperceptions, biased perceptions and emotional rigidities, the communication channels may become unreliable and impoverished. Social-psychological approaches in particular emphasize the role of the third party in establishing effective communication between the parties to the conflict.⁵ Improvement in communication enables the adversaries to evaluate correctly each others' positions, interests and motives and to delimit an area of common interests which can serve as a basis of agreement between them.

Secondly, a third party may facilitate concessions between the adversaries. A third party may also present his own suggestions to end the disputes. There may be room for an intermediary to facilitate the achievement of a settlement by transmitting additional information.

Either the intermediary may simply provide as accurate information as possible, or he may go beyond this to select or even to manipulate the information in the interests of achieving an early settlement.⁶ A third party may help to justify and rationalize the granting of concessions and may serve as a face-saving device when concessions are offered. Jerome E. Podell and William M. Knapp have hypothesized that Parties to a conflict are less inhibited in offering concessions through an intermediary because they believe that the concessions offered through an intermediary do not arouse the adversary's expectations for additional concessions to the same degree as do concessions offered directly.⁷ Oran Young has further mentioned an important function which a third party may undertake by 'enunciation':

the setting forth of clear statements on the part of an outside party laying out its understanding of the issues involved and suggesting basic principles, procedures, or mechanisms through the use of which a solution ... might be achieved. 8

Most of the theoretical literature emphasizes 'impartiality', as an indispensable condition for two reasons: (1) as a necessary condition for the acceptability by the parties to conflict, and (2) for effective performance of functions. Oran Young claims,

...the existence of a meaningful role for a third party will depend on the party's being perceived as an impartial participant (in the sense of having nothing to gain from aiding either protagonist and in the sense of being able to control any feelings of favoritism) in the eyes of the principal protagonists. 9

He considers impartiality to be among the "basic qualities" of an inter-

mediary and observes that "A high score in such areas as impartiality would seem to be at the heart of successful intervention in many situations."¹⁰ Elmore Jackson also stresses that "It would be difficult, if not impossible, for a single mediator who was distrusted by one of the parties, to carry out any useful functions."¹¹ Similarly F.S. Northedge and M.D. Donelan also assert that "Mediation may be objected to if one or the other of the parties believes that any conceivable mediator would tend to be biased against itself and in favour of the other state."¹² Implied in the requirement of impartiality is the assumption that it is this quality which is the principal source of influence. But in the international arena, the situation may differ considerably. There are several historical examples besides the Soviet Union's role in the Tashkent Conference which show that even biased intermediaries were not only accepted by the parties, but they also played their role effectively. Some of the cases of biased intermediaries are: Anglo-American mediation in the Italian-Yugoslavian dispute over Trieste, American mediation between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and American mediation in the Middle East conflict (1970), (1973-74).¹³ In some of the above mentioned cases, the biased intermediaries were able to resolve the conflict such as in the Italian-Yugoslavian dispute over Trieste, or met with a partial success, in the sense that they were able to achieve a limited agreement between the parties, and were able to abate the level of tensions such as the Soviet mediation between India and Pakistan and American mediation in the Middle East (1973-74).

The framework provided by much of the existing theoretical literature on intermediaries is incompatible with the above mentioned cases of biased intermediaries. The theoretical literature frequently assumes that it is the impartiality of the intermediary which is his principal source of influence, for which he is acceptable to the parties and is able to play his role effectively. If we substitute the assumption of 'impartiality' by 'biased', the whole perspective changes. Two questions arise in the case of biased intermediaries: Why are intermediaries, even though perceived as biased, acceptable to the parties? Secondly, does their bias inhibit them in performing the functions which an unbiased intermediary can play?

The answer to the first question can be found in the realm of the interests, motivations, and the evaluation of other available alternatives as perceived by the conflicting parties. In view of their perceived interests and expectations from the outcomes, the parties may accept even the biased intermediaries in some situations. Touval observes,

A third party may be accepted as a mediator not because both original parties to the conflict desire the third party involvement, but rather because they consider accepting the third party in this role preferable to rejecting it.... Acceptance is a preferred alternative in a choice situation. 14

In answer to the second question, it is necessary to understand the interests of an intermediary. The theoretical literature does not treat the interests of an intermediary seriously because of the assump-

tion of 'impartiality' as an essential condition for a successful intermediary.. This assumes no predominant motives on the part of an intermediary. However, Oran Young has discussed some aspects of the incentive structure of an intermediary. In his view, third parties evaluate "the probable benefits of playing the role against the likely costs, and they will be willing to accept the role of intermediary only when the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs."¹⁵ They may receive a variety of tangible or intangible rewards. A third party would want to avoid some collateral damage to himself or to the group which he represents. He may have a direct incentive such as the raise in pay in the case of an individual, or third parties in general "may be rewarded in terms of prestige, political capital that can be cashed in at a later date, gratitude, credit..."¹⁶ The likely costs which third parties have to keep in view are expenditure of time, energy, resources, recurring sense of frustration, and most importantly, the probable effect of failure. In extreme cases,

an intermediary's activities may lead to charges of bias or such striking evidence of failure that he becomes discredited, and is unable to play the role of intermediary at all in subsequent cases. ¹⁷

Young also makes an interesting observation that if the intermediary's pay-off or reward depends directly on the achievement of the agreement, it tends to maximize his efforts to achieve an agreement.¹⁸ Young's description of interests is more inspired from the perspective of an individual mediator's cost-benefit evaluation and is not specifically

related to the case of biased intermediaries in a systematic way.

In fact, in the case of biased intermediaries, the interests of the intermediary are significantly linked to all the stages of his involvement. This suggests many answers to such questions as when a third party intervenes, how his interests affect his role, how conflicting parties view the third party's interests and overall, how their views affect the course of resolution.

The crucial point in the case of the biased intermediary is that he decides to enter in a conflict, primarily with his own interests in his mind. He decides to enter because his promotion of interests depends on the behaviour of both the conflicting parties. In this situation, the intermediary, conscious of the fact, that he is being perceived as biased, may go out of the way to show his impartiality and to adopt an even-handed approach towards the parties in view of his interest. In that case, he may facilitate communication between the parties as an impartial mediator does. But even if he is biased, this does not detract from his ability to serve as a communication channel because:

The image each antagonist has of the intermediary, his biases, his motives, and his interests will influence the interpretations of the communications received from the intermediary. If the intermediary is believed to favour the adversary, the communication received from him will be interpreted in a manner which follows from this assumption.... But such information can still be useful and may be taken into account when decisions are made. 19

In facilitating concessions, it is important to note that with the entry of a powerful third party, with his own interests, the situation becomes a three-sided relationship. Usually in "triads the outcome of the contest and the division of spoils are affected by the formation of coalitions."²⁰ In the case of biased intermediaries, "the threat that he will join in a coalition with the adversary and the actual participation in a coalition provide the mediator with the bargaining power."²¹ However,

The mediator does not possess full freedom of action. Both when he merely threatens to join a hostile coalition and when he actually participates. In one, his conduct is constrained by his need to safeguard his continued acceptability to both sides. Moreover, the promotion of his own interests depends to some extent on the behaviour of the parties to the conflict.... This implied threat of withdrawing consent to the third party's playing an intermediary role is of course one of the most important bargaining assets of the parties vis-a-vis the intermediary. 22

The principal constraint on the conduct of a biased intermediary is the promotion of his own interests, which ensures that he is likely to refrain from any activity which may alienate any one of the parties.

The conflicting parties' behaviour also changes. Keeping in view the interests of the intermediary they will also try to influence his behaviour. In this situation, the parties may grant concessions to the adversaries partly in view of satisfying the interest of the intermediary as well. Furthermore,

Each will seek to prevent a coalition being formed against him. When the intermediary is being perceived as biased, the party which considers

itself as being favoured by the intermediary will seek to prevent its relations with the intermediary from changing for the worse, or to prevent a rapprochement between him and the adversary from taking place. The party which views the intermediary as favouring its antagonist will seek to reverse the relationship and win the intermediary's sympathy, or at least it will attempt to sow discord between the intermediary and its antagonist. 23

In this three cornered situation, where a biased intermediary with his own self-interests is fully involved with a 'passive cover-up', and the parties changing their behaviour towards each other keep in view the interests of the intermediary as well, he may play an effective role in facilitating the agreement between the conflicting parties. If the intermediary is a great power and mediating between the smaller powers, it may have an added leverage of power and resources in applying a limited pressure on the parties, or granting them extra favours.

We have shown that in some situations the biased intermediaries may play an effective role towards the resolution of conflict. But the theoretical literature does not take sufficient account of the case of biased intermediaries. The theoretical literature on intermediaries needs revision in this direction. In this case-study, our hypothesis is that a great power, even though perceived as biased, may be acceptable and play an effective intermediary role vis-à-vis smaller powers.

Notes

1. Saadia Touval, "Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical Considerations", The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1 (Fall, 1975), p. 51
2. Dean Pruitt and Richard Snyder (eds.), Theory and Research on the Causes of War (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1969), p. 186
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5. Leonard W. Doob (ed.), Resolving Conflict in Africa: The Farmeda Workshop (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967)
Burton (1969)
6. Oran R. Young, "Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts on Third Parties", Journal of Conflict Resolution 1 Vol. XVI (March, 1972), p. 51-65
7. Jerome E. Podell and William M. Knapp, "The Effect of Mediation on the Perceived Firmness of the Opponent", Journal of Conflict Resolution 13 (1969) pp. 511-520
8. Young (1967), p. 53
9. Ibid., p. 81
10. Ibid., p. 309
11. Jackson (1952), p. 129

12. F.S. Northedge and M.D. Donelan, International Disputes: The Political Aspects (London: Europa Publications, 1971) p. 209
13. See for the brief description of each case in Touval, pp. 56-61
14. Ibid., p. 62
15. Young (1972)
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Touval, p. 62
20. Theodore Caplow, Two Against One (N.J.: Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall 1968) cited in Ibid., p. 68
21. Ibid., p. 64
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.

CHAPTER II

THE CONFLICT DEFINED

The nature of the past cleavages between the Muslims and the Hindus in British India provides the basis for an understanding of the formation of conflict between India and Pakistan which escalated into an armed conflict in September 1965. Because of the conflicting religious values held by the parties, relations between the two communities have always been far from cordial. Jawaharlal Nehru points out:

Hinduism as a faith is vague, amorphous, many sided, all things to all men. It is hardly possible to define it, or indeed to say definitely whether it is a religion or not, in the usual sense of the word. 1

Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi observes:

Hinduism can not be described as a particular system of thought. Rather it is a common-wealth of systems, not a particular faith but a fellowship of faiths. 2

Hindu society is highly stratified with four principal castes and some three thousand sub-castes.³ Moreover, the Hindu Pantheon comprises some 330 million gods.⁴ In contrast to this amalgamated structure of Hinduism, Islam requires its followers to believe in one all powerful God and in Mohammad as His messenger. Islam differentiates between Muslims and non-Muslims on the basis of belief, as the Quran declares

that "Believers are but one brotherhood".⁵ The exclusivist nature of these two religions contributed to the conflictual relations between the two communities in British India. One writer, reviewing the Hindu-Muslim relations during the period of 1920-1940 concluded:

It would not be much exaggeration to say that it is a record of twenty years of civil war between the Hindus and Muslims in India, interrupted by brief intervals of armed peace. 6

These differences in the religious values were further crystallized by the independence movements. The All India Congress advocated an intercommunal one-nation theory, maintaining its stress on the unity of India, while the Muslim League emphasized the two-nation theory and the division of India. The incompatibility of the political objectives can best be clarified by elaborating on these two competing objectives of the "one-nation theory" and "two-nation theory". In September 1944, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and M.K. Gandhi tried to reach an understanding but gave up in despair after eighteen days. Gandhi in a letter said:

I find no parallel in history for a body of converts and their descendants claiming to be a nation apart from the parent stock. If India was one-nation before the advent of Islam, it must remain one in spite of the change of faith of a very large body of her children. 7

Jinnah replied:

The Muslims were a nation by all canons of international law. They were 100 million strong with their own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendars, history and tradition... 8

Despite the claims of the one-nation theory and the Congress leaders' emphasis upon secularism, the strong undercurrents of Hinduism and Islam transformed the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League into mass-based organizations.⁹ Dr. Ambedkar observes:

The pity of it is that the two communities can never forget or obliterate their past. Their past is embedded in their religions, and for each to give up its past is to give up its religion. To hope for this is to hope in vain. In the absence of common historical antecedents, the Hindu view that Hindus and Mussalmans (Muslims) form one nation falls to the ground. To maintain it is to keep up an hallucination. 10

Besides the deep rooted hostilities between these two major communities, the British also left certain perennial problems between the two succeeding states. Originally they had planned to transfer power in June 1948, afterwards shifting the date to August 1947, and only seventy-two days were allowed for winding up the extensive empire and dividing it between the two successor states. Explaining their policy, Burke has aptly remarked:

... once they had decided to renounce their possession, they had no special wish to risk burning their fingers by meddling in the flaming conflict that was raging between the major communities in India. 11

Because of their hasty 'cut and run' departure from South Asia, the gigantic task of partition was executed inefficiently and this created many problems. The problems included the disposition of the property left behind by the evacuees in either country, equitable division of financial and military assets, the innumerable boundary disputes, the

Indus water dispute and the unsettled future of the princely states.

It is important to understand the original perceptions of the decision-makers of both the parties because elite images are decisive inputs in decision-making. Joseph Frankel has rightly observed:

... once a statesman has formed an image of an issue, this image acts as an organizing device for further information and as a filter through which this information must pass. Images, not detailed information govern political behaviour. 12

The past cleavages between the two religious communities; the political controversy of one-nation and two-nation theories; mutual bitterness; fears and personality clashes which marked the relationship between leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League; all these factors help in understanding the perceptions held by the decision-makers of India and Pakistan towards each other. The Congress accepted the partition because they thought that "the acceptance of Pakistan would teach the Muslim League a bitter lesson. Pakistan would collapse in a short time and the provinces which had seceded from India would have to face untold difficulty and hardship".¹³ The Indian leaders perceived the viability of Pakistan as doubtful and its reunion with India inevitable. The wording of the Congress resolution accepting the partition reads:

The picture of India, we have learnt to cherish will remain in our minds and hearts. The All India Congress earnestly trusts that when present passions have subsided, India's problems will be viewed in their proper perspective and the false doctrine of two nations in India will be discredited and discarded by all. 14

The resolution of Hindu Mahasabha put the same thought in a more

militant words, "India is indivisible and there will never be peace unless and until the separated areas are brought back into the Indian union and made integral parts thereof."¹⁵ Other important decision-makers also viewed the creation of Pakistan in the same light. Krishna Menon thought:

My belief is that the Pakistani leaders looked upon Pakistan as a first installment... they never seem to have accepted the partition as final, as we did. Their main approach to the problem was that India was theirs; India was a Muslim country historically; the British had taken it away from them; now the British had gone away and it should be handed over to them. ¹⁶

Some Indian authors continue to cite Nehru's speech: "If today by any chance, I were offered the reunion of India and Pakistan, I would decline for obvious reasons. I do not want to carry the burden of Pakistan's great problem. I have enough of my own."¹⁷ But the very next sentence shows the Indian leader's belief in some form of amalgamation: "Any closer association must come out of a normal process and in a friendly way, which does not end Pakistan as a state, but makes it an equal part of a larger union with which several countries might be associated."¹⁸ However a large number of neutral observers confirm that many Indian leaders perceived Pakistan's creation as an "ad hoc political arrangement bound to disappear".¹⁹ Six weeks after the partition, the Supreme Commander Claude Auchinleck reported to the British Prime Minister Attlee that "the present Indian cabinet are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the establishment of the Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis..."²⁰

Pakistan was faced with grave obstacles. In light of the hostile perception of its neighbour which also had a relatively more stable governmental structure and was vastly superior in resources, defence became the foremost priority of the new state. Pakistani decision-makers clearly perceived Indian decision-makers' objectives as a threat to their survival. Pakistani leaders' nagging fear of their security can be seen in Liaquat Ali Khan's (Pakistan's first Prime Minister) telegram to Nehru:

It is a matter of deep regret that even to-day responsible members of the Government of India, including yourself, openly declare their intention or hope of bringing Pakistan back into the Indian union, well knowing that this could be done only through conquest of arms... in other words, Pakistan's very existence is the chief 'casus belli' so far as India is concerned.... India never wholeheartedly accepted the partition scheme, but her leaders paid lip-service to it merely in order to get the British out of country. 21

Alastair Lamb has summed up these attitudes as follows:

The argument between 'one-nation' and two-nation' theories is really concerned with the problem whether Pakistan has a right to exist at all.... The one-nation theory did not prevent Pakistan from coming into being -- it did, however, guarantee that the relations between Pakistan and India would be subject to constant stress and strain. 22

Keeping in view the psycho-milieux of the decision-makers of India and Pakistan, the initial moves of the decision-makers are indicative of their deep mistrust and suspicions of each other. The origins of the various disputes which arose soon after the partition

have to be viewed in this perspective.

The problem of the unsettled future of the princely states left by the British was the most perennial one between India and Pakistan.

The British had maintained 'Paramountcy' relationship with 584 princely states of India, regulating their foreign affairs and defence matters.²³ On the eve of the transfer of power the British advised these princely states either to accede to India or Pakistan, keeping in view the wishes of their masses. Three princely states did not make their choice on 15 August 1947 -- Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir. The Muslim ruler of Junagadh despite the predominant majority of Hindu population decided to accede to Pakistan in September 1947. With the opposition among the populace to this move, the Indian army entered the state and conducted a plebiscite which favoured its union with India. Similarly in Hyderabad, a Muslim Nizam wanted to remain independent but the majority Hindu population did not approve his plan. In September 1948, the Indian army entered into Hyderabad and secured its accession to India.

Kashmir was one of the largest and most populous princely states of British India. It is situated in the extreme north-western corner of the south Asian Sub-continent, sharing borders with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China and the Soviet Union. The state has the area of 84,471 square miles and comprises five distinct regions: the vale of Kashmir, Jammu, the region of Ladakh and Baltistan, Poonch and Gilgit. Its total population according to the census of 1941 was

4,021,616. Of these seventy-seven percent were Muslims, twenty percent were Hindus, three percent Sikhs and other minorities. Historically Kashmir people have suffered under the oppressive rule of Moghul, Afghan, Sikh, British and Dogra families. The state as it existed in 1947 was put together by a Dogra ruler, Gulab Singh, through a combination of conquest and diplomacy. The vale of Kashmir was sold to him by the British East India Company for 75,000,000 Rupees, and he accepted the paramountcy relationship with the British crown in terms of their suzerainty in all matters pertaining to defence, foreign affairs and communication.

On the eve of the partition, there were three main political forces in Kashmir: the National Conference, the Muslim Conference, and the Dogra Dynasty. The All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference founded by Sheikh Abdullah in 1931 was renamed All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference on 13 June 1931. Sheikh Abdullah believed in secularism and was very much close in his thinking to the All India National Congress. The Muslim Conference was revived by Ghulam Abbas after the Muslim League started advocating the concept of a two-nation theory and the demand for Pakistan independence. The Dogra dynasty was more interested in preserving its power by playing one group against the other and through repressive measures. At the time of independence, the Maharaja had put all the leaders of the National Conference and the Muslim Conference behind bars.

The motive of the Maharaja, as seen in a letter written to Mountbatten, the last British viceroy to India, was to remain independent of both India and Pakistan, because "he knew that accession to India

would eventually have meant the substitution of responsible government for his absolute autocracy and he may have thought that being a Hindu, accession to Pakistan would probably have involved the loss of his throne".²⁴ However, the Maharaja offered a standstill agreement to both India and Pakistan in order to maintain communication and supplies. Pakistan entered into the agreement, while India did not. In that emotionally charged atmosphere, communal riots broke out in Poonch, and these led to an estrangement of relations between Pakistan and Kashmir. The Maharaja's government charged Pakistan with aiding the rebels and establishing an economic blockade to force accession. The Pakistanis saw a plan by the Hindu Maharaja to exterminate the Muslim majority. The Pakistanis were further alarmed by the frequent contacts of the Indian leaders with Maharaja, the speedy construction of the road linking India to Kashmir, replacement of the Prime Minister of Kashmir Pandit Kak who had signed the standstill agreement with Pakistan by Mehr Chand who openly sided with India, and the sudden release from jail of Sheikh Abjullah whose policy was decidedly anti-Pakistan. All these events convinced the Pakistanis of the Maharaja's long term plan to accede to India.

The Maharaja decided to accede to India in the wake of Pathan tribesmen's invasion on the state on 22 October 1947. The Pathans had entered from the North-west Frontier of Pakistan to aid their Muslim co-religionists. Indians' received the Maharaja's accession and quickly dispatched their forces who countered the tribesmen. India accused

Pakistan of complicity in the tribesmen's invasion, while Pakistan maintained that the invasion was a spontaneous reaction to the Muslim suppression. What appears to be case is that Pakistan's central government did not initiate the invasion, but the Prime Minister of the NWFP, himself a Kashmiri, and his officials did provide help to tribesmen locally.²⁵

Mountbatten in reply to Maharaja's letter of accession wrote:

...in consistence with their policy that in the case of any state where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the state. It is my government's wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invaders, the question of the state's accession should be settled by a reference to the people. 26

Similarly on 2 November, Nehru declared,

...we have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge we have given and the Maharaja supported it, not only to the people of Kashmir but to the world. We will not and cannot back out of it. We are prepared, when peace and law and order have been established, to have a referendum held under international auspices like the United Nations. We want it to be a fair and just reference to the people, and we shall accept that verdict. I can imagine no fairer and juster offer. 27

On 1 January 1948 India under articles 34, 35 of the Chapter 6, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" of U.N. Charter, complained to the U.N. of Pakistan's aggression on a territory which had acceded to India legally.

From this background we can identify the basic Indian and Pakistani position on the dispute, the stakes of each party in it, and the basic issues in the conflict.

Why is Kashmir important to India? The attitude of the Indian decision-makers is determined by a composite of factors: strategic factors, politico-economic considerations and the personality factor. The unique strategic location of Kashmir has been one consideration in Indian decision-makers' eyes. Nehru told P.M. Attlee in a cable on 25 October 1947:

Kashmir's northern frontier, as you are aware, run in common with those of three countries, Afganistan, the U.S.S.R. and China. Security of Kashmir is vital to the security of India.... Especially since part of southern boundary of Kashmir and India are common. Helping Kashmir, therefore, is an obligation of national interest to India. 28

Michael Brecher states that India's main concern regarding Kashmir also arose in regard to its position as a central Asian power.²⁹ Nehru, himself a Kashmiri, never hid his personal interest in Kashmir. He declared in the Parliament, "I was intensely interested, apart from the larger reasons which the government have, for emotional and personal reasons; I do not want to hide this: I am interested in Kashmir."³⁰

Pakistan claims that Kashmir is vital to its security because the two main strategic roads and the railway system of West Pakistan run parallel to Kashmir. Occupation of Kashmir would be a direct threat to Pakistan. Economically, Pakistan is linked to Kashmir as the headwaters of three major rivers which are the backbone of West Pakistan's

agricultural system are in Kashmir. Zafarulla Khan, Pakistan's

Foreign Minister, presented the case in the following words:

The possession of Kashmir can add nothing to the economy of India or to the strategic security of India. On the other hand, it is vital for Pakistan. If Kashmir should accede to India, Pakistan might as well, from both the economic and strategic point of views, become a feudatory of India or cease to exist as an independent sovereign state. 31

Apart from these economic and strategic rationalizations and justifications the main motives behind the policies pursued by the parties which led to the origins and evolution of this dispute seem to be the clash of the one-nation and two-nation theories. This clash in objectives underlay the conflict. Nehru himself had expressed it eloquently:

It is not Kashmir, therefore, but rather a much deeper conflict that comes in the way of friendly relations between India and Pakistan and the situation is a grave one. We can not give up the basic ideal which we have held so long and on which the whole concept of our state is founded. 32

This emotional and personal attachment of Nehru is seen also in the account by J. Korbél, an Indian nominee in the United Nations' Commission for India and Pakistan:

I attempted to appeal to his inspiring leadership and suggested that India might be in a position to make a gesture of concession to Pakistan. Pandit Nehru reacted vehemently. In a flash of bitterness he leaped onto a chair, shouting 'You seem not to understand our position and our rights. We are a secular state which is not based on religion. We give to everyone freedom of conscience.

Pakistan is a mediaeval state with an impossible theocratic concept. It should never have been created, and it would never have happened had the British not stood behind the foolish idea of Jinnah. 33

Krishna Menon's forthright reaction in response to Michael Brecher's question on Kashmir issue was, "Pakistan not Kashmir is the key here".³⁴ Joseph Korbel has aptly remarked:

... the real cause of all the venomous speech, the recalcitrance and the suspicions that have characterized the Kashmir dispute is in the uncompromising and perhaps uncompromisable struggle of two ways of life, two concepts of political organization, two scales of values, two spiritual attitudes that find themselves locked in a deadly conflict, a conflict in which Kashmir has become both symbol and battle-ground. 35

Between 1947 and 1964, there were two processes simultaneously going on, the resolution efforts and the institutionalization of the conflict. We shall discuss each of these separately.

The Resolution Efforts

It is necessary to understand the asymmetric nature of the India-Pakistan conflict in order to understand the orientations of the parties towards the resolution efforts. Pakistan had inherited an extremely weak, disarrayed and disorganized army, mainly dependent upon a British officers' corps.³⁶ Similarly the administrative structure was also non-existent. Comparatively, India was in a vastly superior position militarily and administratively. The Indian forces during the limited-war of 1948 had held the bulk of Kashmir, and Pakistani

forces remained in possession of relatively unimportant mountainous regions of Kashmir. Originally, considering the nature of accession as temporary, India maintained that the future status of Kashmir would be subject to an impartial plebiscite under international auspices, later shifting the position to the claim that it was an integral part of India. However Kashmir retained a special status under article 370 of the Indian Constitution. The Azad Kashmir government was formed on the territory which Pakistan held, but this government remained under the de facto control of the Pakistani government. As the significant political sections of Kashmiris have been siding with Pakistan or India, therefore, they can not be treated as a separate party to the conflict..

Pakistani decision-makers, because of their fear and distrust of India, were desirous of an active third party's intervention. In 1947, when the dispute arose, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the first Governor General of Pakistan had requested Britain to intervene the conflict in order to "help settle differences between the members of the Commonwealth."³⁷ The Pakistani Foreign Minister, Sir Zafarullah Khan in his very first statements in the U.N. had proposed among other things, stationing Commonwealth troops in Kashmir.³⁸ On the other hand, Indian decision-makers, perceiving their military superiority and strategically better position in Kashmir were not ready to let any powerful third party intervene and change the status quo.

India raised the Kashmir question in the U.N. under Article 35 of the U.N. Charter in the form of complaint against Pakistan. The Indian spokesman concentrated his attention on the tribal invasion of Kashmir and accused Pakistan of complicity in it, thus committing aggression against India insofar as Kashmir had acceded to India on 26 October 1947. The Indian argument was based on the validity of the Maharaja's accession to India. The Indian representative also reiterated Jawaharlal Nehru's offer of a plebiscite under U.N. auspices.³⁹

The Pakistani representative presented his case in a broader context. He considered Kashmir as a part of a wider Indian project to strangle Pakistan and undo partition. Challenging the legal validity of the Maharaja's accession to India, he presented the situation in Kashmir as essentially one of popular revolt against the oppressive regime of the Maharaja. He also compared Junagadh's accession to Pakistan, which India set aside, and Kashmir's accession to India which was accepted. In both cases, it was pointed out, the ruler was of a different religion than his subjects.⁴⁰

The Security Council's resolution of 21 April 1948 was of cardinal importance. It outlined the Security Council's stand on the Kashmir conflict, recommended the method of its solution and became the principal term of reference for various U.N. representatives. Instead of taking a judicial view of the complaints and counter-complaints of the parties, the Security Council adopted a political solution and tried to reconcile two extreme positions. It proposed a

package deal, comprising three sections; withdrawal of forces, plebiscite, and interim government in Kashmir. On the withdrawal of troops, Pakistan was asked to withdraw all the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals from Kashmir and India was permitted to retain a 'minimum' force to aid the government of Kashmir in the maintenance of law and order. After the demilitarization, the interim government would be formed representing all the major political groups in Kashmir during the plebiscite. On the matter of the plebiscite, the U.N. favoured international control.⁴¹ Both the parties rejected the resolution for different reasons.

We shall delineate the main areas of disagreements between Indian and Pakistani proposals which continually figured in the U.N. debates and were never resolved.

- (1) To India, the issue of accession was between itself and the people of Kashmir, and to Pakistan the issue of accession was open and on which Pakistan and India had equal standing.
- (2) Pakistan would entrust the U.N. with the authority and responsibility as well as the functions of holding, organizing and supervising the plebiscite. India would have the plebiscite under the advice and observation of U.N.
- (3) To India, the primary need was stopping the fighting and restoring normal conditions and to Pakistan, this would be achieved essentially as part of the preparation for the plebiscite.
- (4) To Pakistan, the withdrawal of troops must be complete and simultaneous; to India, the bulk of its troops should remain there.

- (5) India would like to have Sheikh Abdullah's administration, Pakistan would have a U.N. administration.

The motivations of the parties can be assessed from their proposals. India, while making the proposals was anticipating the results of plebiscite in its favour, if the bulk of the Indian troops remained there and Sheikh Abjullah's administration conducted the plebiscite.⁴² Pakistan, deriving from its core values, believed that as the basis of the partition was communal, so Kashmir with a predominant Muslim majority would join Pakistan.

Because of these fundamental differences, both parties had different aspirations in the U.N. India wanted to have Pakistan condemned as an 'aggressor' and was reluctant to accept Pakistan's 'locus standi' in the dispute. Pakistan's efforts were directed to gain 'equality' and to convince the members of their security-fears from India. In sum, these attitudes did not help solve the issues and the United Nations merely became a debating platform for showing oratorial skills.

All the U.N. mediatory attempts, the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, Canadian General A.G.L. McNaughton's mediation, Owen Dixon's proposals, Gunnar Jarring's efforts and Frank Graham's attempts failed to resolve the differences. India was more adamant on the plebiscite question as Mr. Dixon concluded that he was convinced in the end that no scheme of plebiscite could meet India's approval.⁴³ Pakistan was adamant in not accepting any partition scheme

which meant the acceptance of the status quo with minor adjustments. In the last attempt, Dr. Frank Graham noted that "with respect to plebiscite, the chief remaining obstacle is the difference over the number and character of forces to be left at the end of demilitarization".⁴⁴ And yet, he noted in his statement to the Security Council on 10 October 1952, "the narrowing of the differences to one main point, upon which the whole plan depends emphasizes the depth of the differences on this point.... It is related to the differing conceptions of the government".⁴⁵ In fact, the resolution of conflict did not hinge upon one technical problem of demilitarization. It was only of symbolic importance. Michael Brecher, an authority on the subject, observed,

Whether India should be allowed to retain 28,000 troops in Kashmir after demilitarization or 21,000.... Pakistan should retain from 3,000 to 6,000 troops... is not really the basic obstacle to a plebiscite. The crux of the dispute is far more profound than these arithmetic differences. Underlying them is the fundamental disagreement between India and Pakistan over the origin, evolution and meaning of the Kashmir dispute. 46

Joseph Korb, accounting for the reasons of the failure of resolution efforts, noted that,

... in the background of dispute, lay deep mutual suspicions as to the motives of each party's policy... on both sides, there was an absence of that which is the paramount pre-requisite for negotiations among any group of countries, a semblance of good will. 47

The U.N. efforts to mediate or arbitrate generally ended with the conclusion that the only possible solution must be direct bilateral negotiations. India and Pakistan have conducted such negotiations in 1953, 1955, 1960, and 1962-63. But the hostile perceptions, deep mistrust of each other and the power differences between the parties marred the negotiations.

One paramount fact, which stands out of this analysis is that the United Nations' efforts were mainly concentrated on the issues per se, but not on the perceptual disharmony among the decision-makers, which was mainly the result of different ideals held by the decision-makers of India and Pakistan.

It is important to note that the goals of the parties have been changing with the rising costs of the conflict and the passage of time. India, which claimed the whole territory of Kashmir by legal right was prepared to have a status quo in Kashmir with the minor adjustments, leaving the portion which Pakistan had in its possession. Pakistan's goals remained relatively more rigid however, it also agreed to discuss a partial division of Kashmir in 1955 but continued to insist that there be a plebiscite in the crucial vale of Kashmir. Again during 1962-63, when Pakistan under the Ayub regime was able to resolve many smaller disputes with India, particularly, the Indus water dispute, the partition was discussed seriously, but the tactical differences over the vale of Kashmir persisted. It shows that the parties' goals, which originally appeared quite incompatible started changing with rising costs over time.

Institutionalization of the Conflict

Gradually, the scope of the conflict started widening. The institutionalization of the India-Pakistan conflict can be discussed at three levels; the domestic level, the bilateral level and the international level.

The process of institutionalization of perceptions through mass-media may take two forms. First, as Karl Deutsch suggests, the decision-makers may manipulate the mass-media to influence the national images.⁴⁸ Second, the decision-makers may share the already existing 'folk image' as suggested by Boulding.⁴⁹ Davison enumerates various functions of the mass-media in the national political system:

They help to set the agenda for political leaders; as they do for the general public; they provide these leaders with much of the information on which decisions are based; they likewise influence the experts and elites who in turn influence the decision-makers; they affect public opinion on specific issues and public mood in general, thus limiting or expanding the alternatives political leaders can realistically consider. 50

In the case of India and Pakistan, as the socio-political structures of both the states were in the making, the processes of hostile perceptions, the mistrust and ill-will harboured by the decision-makers towards each other were perpetuated among the masses through the communication media. In the case of India, it appears that Nehru's personal preference and idealistic attachment to Kashmir was a crucial factor in the gradual inculcation of a strong public opinion in

India. In fact, rigid Hindus never felt so personally attached to Kashmir. Patel's view at the time of dispute was that India's efforts to retain Muslim majority areas against the will of the people was a source not of strength but of weakness to India.⁵¹

Folk image played a larger role in the case of Pakistan. Deriving inspiration from their core values, the masses felt strongly about Kashmir, and Pakistani elites have used popular religious slogans such as Jihad (holy war) to consolidate their own power position.⁵²

Newspapers, journals, textbooks and speeches have played up the sufferings of the partition. Accounts of the communal riots and the villainy of the other side, characterize political culture in each country. Stereotypes regarding Hindu cowardice and cunningness exist in Pakistan, and Muslim cultural inferiority, inefficiency and aggressiveness are still commonly cited in India. Sisir Gupta observes:

Conflicting images and self images were held in India and Pakistan of the two states and the two peoples. There were many in India to whom Pakistan could never become a viable state, and to whom Pakistanis were incapable of managing their affairs. There were many in Pakistan to whom the Indians were traditionally incompetent as rulers, and India was too unwieldy and divided to become a strong state. 53

Gradually, the structure of public opinion became an important factor in the domestic political systems of both the states. A correspondent asked Krishna Menon, the Indian Defense Minister why India has consistently refused to agree to carry out the U.N. Plebiscite. Krishna Menon replied, "Because we would lose it. Kashmir would vote to

join Pakistan and no Indian government responsible for agreeing to the plebiscite would survive."⁵⁴ Similarly, Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister of India, in response to a similar question remarked:

Appeasement of Muslims prompted the assassination of Gandhi...what will happen if we weaken over Kashmir or if a plebiscite is decided against us and one million Hindus are driven out? Not only the assassination of Nehru, but also reprisal against Muslim in India. 55

This statement of Patel led Mr. Lionel Fielden to comment that "I think, is the real crux of India's position.... This question of eventual repercussions and reprisals will have to be very carefully considered."⁵⁶ Similarly public opinion developed in Pakistan, strongly advocating a militant policy towards India. Sardar Ibrahim, then Prime Minister of Azad Kashmir government threatened in the summer of 1951 that the Kashmir issue would not be settled at Lake Success, "but will be decided only on the battlefield".⁵⁷ Sir Zafarullah Khan, former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, once remarked that while Pakistan was not thinking in terms of war, "we do not know what India might force us or the peoples of Pakistan into by its intransigence."⁵⁸ Although, it is possible that decision-makers may exaggerate the pressure of public opinion, yet there is no denying the fact that both the nations had been gripped by the respective psycho-milieux originally held by their decision-makers.

At the bilateral level, new incompatibilities arose between the two countries, such as an intense propaganda war, problems of the equitable distribution of financial assets, evacuees' property disputes,

canal water disputes, economic war and minorities' problems. India and Pakistan also became an important factor in each other's foreign policies. Both countries' foreign policies were directed to undermine each other's positions. Lamb rightly observes that: "Pakistan could only see Indian policy as a threat to its existence; and India had become obsessed with the fear that Pakistan was planning some military invasion of territory of the Republic."⁵⁹ An Indian writer remarks:

Involvement with Pakistan can rightly be regarded as the Achilles' heel of Indian diplomacy. Flexibility, claimed to be a virtue of non-alignment, is often denied to the Indian diplomacy largely on account of the involvement in Kashmir. ⁶⁰

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Mutual suspicions and fears grew, troop movements along the borders and occasional skirmishes once brought both the countries almost to the brink of war in 1951. The militant voices started growing in intensity in both countries.

The India-Pakistan conflict was drawn into the vortex of the cold war when Pakistan entered into the mutual defence agreement with the United States in 1954 and subsequently joined CENTO and SEATO (1955). The primary motive of the Pakistani decision-makers was certainly fear for their security and 'Indian intransigence' over Kashmir.⁶¹ Muhammad Ali Bogra, Prime Minister of Pakistan, argued that the Kashmir problem could not be settled in a just manner because India's military superiority made Nehru uninterested in such a settlement, and that the chance of a settlement would increase in case of a power-parity between India and Pakistan.⁶² At SEATO conference in 1954, Pakistan's Foreign

Minister Zafarullah Khan insisted that the treaty should be directed against all varieties of aggression, communist as well as non-communist thereby implying Indian aggression as well.⁶³

The Indian representative at the United Nations, invoking the principle of the rebus-sic-stantibus, declared that as the whole context of Kashmir had changed, the offer of plebiscite no longer remained open for Pakistan.⁶⁴ Since then, the alignment patterns of both the parties have been changing in response to changes in their power position. India's leaning towards Soviet Union for diplomatic and military support on the Kashmir question was a direct consequence of Pakistan's alignment with U.S. India's shift from non-alignment to 'bi-alignment' in the wake of 1962 Sino-Indian war led Pakistan to develop relations with China. Both parties started acquiring arms from their allies, thus preparing themselves for an eventual military showdown.

The original conflict became much larger, involving more issues, and a greater number of parties on each side.

Escalation of the Conflict

The cold war which had been simmering between India and Pakistan since 1947 escalated into a full fledged hot war in September 1965. What led to the armed conflict? We shall observe this escalation process through the psycho-milieux of the decision-makers of India and Pakistan. According to the Sprouts, the concept milieu denotes "the whole spectrum of environing factors; human as well as in-human, in-

tangible as well as tangible".⁶⁵ The psycho-milieu is the milieu as "it is perceived and reacted to by a particular individual".⁶⁶

Let us first examine the psycho-milieu of Pakistani decision-makers.⁶⁷ Domestically Ayub Khan's star was at its zenith. On 3 January 1965, he won a presidential victory in the elections which gave him the mandate to tackle the Kashmir problem as well. Public opinion was strongly insisting on a military solution of Kashmir. Algerian-type guerrilla warfare as a model for action was suggested by the President of Azad Kashmir.⁶⁸ The economic situation was highly stable, and Pakistan was often cited as the model for the developing countries. In view of the massive military aid to India by the Western powers in the wake of Sino-Indian border war in 1962, Pakistani military officials were estimating that the overall Pakistani military strength compared with that of India had declined from a one to five ratio in 1962 to a one to eight ratio in 1965.⁶⁹ Although in the short-run Pakistan was in a relatively better position because of the Indian preoccupation with Chinese, yet in view of the new Indian defence plans to raise ten additional mountain divisions, Pakistan would not be able to match Indian military position in the future.⁷⁰

On 21 December 1964, an Indian Presidential order tied Kashmir closer to India by enabling the President to govern Kashmir directly if he thought the constitutional machinery of the state had failed. Before that, Kashmir had a separate constitutional status, indicating its disputed position. Furthermore, in January 1965, the Indian

National Congress decided to establish a state organization.⁷¹ Pakistani decision-makers perceived Indian actions as final attempts to integrate Indian-held Kashmir both constitutionally and politically and to show to the world that Kashmir was a 'closed chapter'. It was also feared by the decision-makers that if Pakistan did not take notice of these developments, it might be taken as a sign of Pakistani weakness and might therefore provoke an Indian attack on Pakistan itself. Externally, Pakistani decision-makers perceived the environment quite favourably. Pakistan had been successful in normalizing relations with the Soviet Union. Disillusioned by the U.S. aid to India in the wake of the Sino-Indian border war (1962), Pakistan had remarkably improved relations with China. The Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement, signed on 2 March 1963, re-delineated the 300 miles border between Sinkiang and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. In February 1964, Chou En-lai visited Pakistan-Kashmir, and this was the first indication of Chinese support on the Kashmir issue in favour of Pakistan. The joint communique issued at the visit of Ayub Khan to China in March 1965 confirmed Chinese open support for Pakistan.

What was the Indian decision-makers' psycho-milieu? In the wake of Nehru's death, Lal Bahadur Shastri had succeeded as the Prime Minister of India. Shastri had normally been considered as a weak and moderate personality among the Indians. So, Shastri had to establish himself as a capable leader in the wake of Nehru's towering personality. The country was going through a demoralized phase in the wake of its

defeat in 1962 Sino-India border war. Internally, India was facing growing economic hardships, political troubles and communal riots. Pakistan was perceived as helping and encouraging popular revolt in Kashmir resulting in the serious riots in December 1963 and 1964, which meant the possible secession of a territory claimed as an integral part of India. Externally, Pakistan's growing friendship with China was perceived with alarm and fear. It was strongly believed that 'Sino-Pakistan collusion' was primarily aimed against India. Friendly Soviet Union was adopting a neutral position in order to woo Pakistan. It was also believed in India, as Selig Harrison observed, that "the United States is in a position to frustrate any sustained Pakistani military adventure through its intimate ties with the military, its control of spare-parts, and petroleum imports" to Pakistan.⁷²

Against this background, the Rann-of-Kutch crisis started in April 1965. It is not clear who initiated the crisis. The Rann-of-Kutch is a desolate territory of 8,400 square miles and of little strategic or economic value, either to India or to Pakistan. Both sides charged each other with intervening into its territory. The Indians perceived it as a part of larger Sino-Pakistani scheme against India, and Pakistani decision-makers perceived it as an Indian attempt to escalate the borders' problem in order to divert world's attention from 'illegally annexed Kashmir'. However British mediation made a ceasefire possible on 30 June 1965, and an agreement was signed by India and Pakistan, which brought an end to the Rann-of-Kutch crisis. Some observers

strongly suspect that Pakistani decision-makers had tested Indian morale to fight, which they thought was extremely low in the wake of 'humiliating defeat of 1962 war with China'. Pakistan's minor tactical victory in Biarbet (Rann-of-Kutch) gave it a false sense of superiority and left India dangerously frustrated. Dupree observes:

The jubilant Pakistanis saw the Indian withdrawal as a sign of continued erosion of Indian morale and unwillingness to fight. Possibly, the whole Rann-of-Kutch was simply a Pakistani test of Indian strength and stamina. 73

In the meanwhile another crisis started brewing in Kashmir. The growing discontent in Kashmir which began after the theft of a holy relic and the arrest of Sh. Abdullah in May 1965, took on new dimensions in July and August in the form of a civil-disobedience movement against the process of the incorporation of the Indian controlled portion of the state into the Republic of India and the end of Article 370, a process which had been going on steadily throughout the first half of 1965.

Presumably, keeping in view the internal public pressures, 'favourable' external environment and situation in Kashmir, the enemy's low moral and reluctance to fight, Ayub Khan decided to permit the infiltration of 3,000 to 5,000 guerrillas.⁷⁴ Pakistani decision-makers misperceived a number of things; they misperceived the level of civil violence and the loyalty of the population to Pakistan; they misperceived the level of Indian forces, which had been increased from 100,000 to 150,000;⁷⁵ they misperceived the level of Indian commitment to Kashmir, whose strategic significance had increased many fold in the eyes of

Indian decision-makers after the 1962 war, and they underestimated the Indian threat advanced by Nehru in 1951 that if Pakistan ventured into Kashmir, India might attack Pakistan, choosing its own place and time.⁷⁶

Shastri, under heavy public pressure and the army generals' influence, refused to let Kashmir become another 'Rann-of Kutch'. The Indian army captured Kargil, Tithwal, Uri-Poonch in Azad Kashmir. India also shelled the Pakistani village of Awan (Punjab) on 24 August. With the failure of guerrilla strategy in Kashmir and India's offensive, Pakistan deployed its regular troops in Chamb Sector on 1 September.

There was a serious possibility that Pakistan could threaten the vital road over the mountains linking Sirinagar with the plains of India. India, facing a set-back in Kashmir, escalated the conflict further by invading across the international borders towards Lahore on 6 September 1965, without any declaration of war.

It is important to note that initially both sides had limited objectives. Pakistan wanted to boost the guerrillas and to confine the war to Kashmir only. But viewing through their perceptual screens, the Indians considered Pakistan's a deliberate plan to break 'the integral part of India'. Pakistanis considered the Indian offensive as a campaign for the total conquest of Azad Kashmir, which might eventually culminate in the annihilation of Pakistan.

The military conflict between the two countries raged all along the India-Pakistan border in Lahore, Sialkot, Kashmir, and Rajasthan Sectors. Extensive air battles and a limited naval battle were fought.

Mostly, the military conflict was confined to West Pakistan. There was no major fighting on the East Pakistan - West Bengal border, probably because of Indian fear of Chinese intervention. Pakistani military commanders also did not want to fight there because most of the forces had been concentrated in the West Pakistan as their defence strategy had always been that the 'defence of the East lies in the West'.⁷⁷ By mid-September, it was clear to the military commanders on the both sides that the war was stagnating, and both sides were not able to achieve their objectives. India failed to break-through to Lahore and Pakistan, failed to advance significantly in Kashmir. The military conflict lasted for about seventeen days. During the conflict the outside interested parties, the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and the U.K. confined their actions to diplomatic measures. Only China threatened to intervene in the conflict militarily. On 16 September, China delivered an ultimatum to the Indian government, warning of 'grave consequences' if the Indians did not dismantle their military structures and withdraw to their own side of the Sinkiang-Tibet border within three days.⁷⁸ Although some of the Pakistani authors assert that the threat was not that of a 'paper tiger', the Chinese were reluctant to intervene, as they extended the period of their ultimatum further, until the conflict de-escalated.

The military situation at the time of the ceasefire was as Hanson Baldwin wrote that "neither side can claim any clear-cut victory or even any decisive advantage".⁷⁹ Neither side had been able to move in deep, or maintain a protracted war. India held some important terri-

tory near the Pakistani cities of Lahore and Sialkot and controlled a number of mountain passes along the ceasefire line in Kashmir. Pakistan held some significant ground in the Chamb, Akhnur and the Khem-Karan areas. Observers do not agree on the exact amount of costs, but the general consensus seems to be that both sides lost a large part of their strike potential. Hanson Baldwin estimated that Pakistan lost between two and three hundred tanks⁸⁰ and Dupree guessed about two hundred.⁸¹ As regards the Indian losses, Baldwin puts the Indian losses at 150 to 200 tanks. Heiman wrote that they had lost 114 tanks and fifty-seven armored cars.⁸² Reports of aircraft losses are also contradictory. India claimed to have destroyed sixty-four Pakistani aircrafts, while losing thirty-two of its own. Pakistan put its own losses as fourteen, and claimed to have shot down 111 Indian aircraft.⁸³ On the whole, it appears that it was a drawn match.

Failure of either side to win any decisive victory, international pressure, the depletion of military resources and U.N. efforts brought the ceasefire between India and Pakistan on 23 September 1965.

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20. Alstair Lamb, The Kashmir Problem (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966), p. 41

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23. The following historical and factual account is based on these books:

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25. Korbel, p. 23

26. P.L. Lakhapal (ed.), Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute (Delhi: International Books, 1965), p. 57

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., p. 61

29. Brecher, p.46
30. Ibid., p. 44
31. Ibid., p. 48
32. Ibid.
33. Korbelt, p. 130
34. Brecher (1968), p. 265
35. Korbelt, p. 32
36. When Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Quaid-i-Azam) received the news of the arrival of Indian troops in Kashmir, he ordered General Gracy to deploy Pakistani troops immediately, but Gracy refused on the basis that he was subservient to General Auchinleck's orders, the Supreme Commander of India-Pakistan troops.
Mr. Jinnah had to rescind his orders under the pressure from the British commanders as they had threatened that all the British officers would resign from the Pakistan army in case of war.
See Lamb, p. 49
37. M.A. Jinnah's interview with BBC in The Pakistan Times, 20 December 1947. Cited in Gupta, p. 225
38. Ibid.
39. Lakhanpal, pp. 96-131
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Gupta, p. 113
43. See Dixon's report in Lakhanpal, pp. 191-228
44. Cited in Michael Brecher, "Kashmir: A Case Study in U.N. Mediation", Pacific Affairs (September, 1953), p. 202
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52. For example, one reason of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's popularity among the matter was his slogan of "One Thousand Year War Against India".
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The material consulted includes the CADIC project objectives list prepared on India-Pakistan conflict.
68. Louis Dupree, "First Reflections on the Second Kashmir War", American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, South Asia Series IX (December, 1965), p. 14
69. Barbara Field Collins, "The Kashmir War of 1965" (unpublished Masters' thesis, Columbia University, 1967), p. 23
70. Asian Recorder (New Delhi), Vol. XI, 1-7 January 1965, p. 6229
71. Collins, p. 28
72. Selig S. Harrison, "Troubled India and Her Neighbours", Foreign Affairs XIII (January, 1965), p. 322
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CHAPTER III

THE THIRD PARTY INVOLVEMENT

The Soviet Union was the third party which offered its 'good offices' to India and Pakistan with the stated objective of helping to resolve the conflict between the parties. The other significant interested parties were the United States and the Peoples' Republic of China. We shall discuss the identity, interests and entry point of the third party in an overall context of its relations with the parties to the conflict and the other interested parties in the South Asian region.

Impact of the Interested Parties' Policies on the India-Pakistan Conflict

Broadly outlining the general trends of the interested parties' policies in the region, we shall note the impact of their policies on the India-Pakistan conflict. For analytical purposes, we can delineate three phases; between 1947 and 1953, 1954 and 1960, 1961 and 1965.

From the global perspective, South Asia has been a low-priority area in strategic terms, however, its political importance is immense because of its nearly 700 million population. Because of geographic proximity, its politico-strategic significance has increased relatively for the Soviet Union and China after the appearance of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

In 1947 when India and Pakistan gained their independence, the Soviet decision-makers' global perspective was conditioned by the 'two camps' doctrine.¹ As a Soviet document stated, "the struggle of two camps determines now the fate of the whole world, the fate of mankind".² The general posture of the Soviet foreign policy at that time was 'a total conduct of foreign policy against the West'. Because of his preoccupation with Europe, Stalin, in line with his rigid doctrine approach, considered the independence movements in Asia as 'illusory'.³ The partition scheme of the sub-continent was perceived by the Soviets as a part of British imperialists' policy of 'divide and rule' in order to perpetuate their control over India, by creating two hostile states and acting as an arbiter between them.⁴ They also characterized the acceptance of the partition plan by the Indian political parties as a "deal between the Indian bourgeoisie and British imperialism".⁵ Because of its religious rationale, Pakistan was considered still worse, because "the reactionary elements in Pakistan were stronger than in Hindustan".⁶ The Nationalist leaders of India and Pakistan were termed as the "stooges of imperialism".⁷

Pakistan and India both adopted a non-aligned path in their foreign policies in the beginning. Pakistani elites were markedly pro-Western.⁸ Some of them openly declared that Pakistan was ideologically aligned with the West.⁹ They also genuinely feared communism as a hostile and aggressive ideology incompatible with their own religious values. Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan's first Prime Minister, believed that

Russia's policy is "quite definite. It is one of expansionism, to create troubles; even to promote a revolution because communism thrives on chaos".¹⁰ Ayub Khan, the President of Pakistan, feared the 'dangers from the north' and once predicted,

I foresee China moving south through Burma, and Russia through Afghanistan and Iran. These moves need not necessarily be military; ideological penetration with communist-backed regimes would do. ¹¹

Furthermore, "the Soviet Union was looked upon by the intellectuals in Pakistan as a country, far behind the West, in the field of economics, science and technology".¹² In marked contrast to the Pakistani decision-makers' view of communism and the Soviet Union, Nehru's image is worth-noting. It is also important because he was the only dominating personality in the foreign policy-making of India. Michael Brecher observes that "... so overwhelming is his influence that India's policy has come to mean in the minds of people everywhere the personal policy of Pandit Nehru.... [He] has impressed his personality and his views with such overpowering effect that foreign policy may properly be termed a private monopoly".¹³ Nehru, the architect of India's non-alignment policy was impressed by the 'new civilization' of the Soviet Union, and considered it as "the one real and effective bulwark against Fascism in Europe and Asia", and saw the "Soviet type of Socialist economy (with certain variations)" as a panacea to India's economic problems.¹⁴

The United States was the first outside party which started taking an active interest in South Asia. The main concern of the United

States government in the immediate post-World War II era was the 'containment' of 'expansionist communism'. The U.S. decision-makers' attention was more concentrated on the defence of Europe and West Asia, and they showed little interest in South Asia. Presumably, with the Soviet Union becoming an atomic power and the establishment of the Peoples' Republic of China in 1949, the U.S. interest was aroused in South Asia. India, with forty percent of the population of the non-communist underdeveloped world and five times larger than Pakistan, was certainly a preferable choice for the U.S. as a counterpoise to the communist bloc in the region. They tried to cultivate India and extended an invitation to Nehru in 1949 to visit the U.S. In reaction to the U.S. move, the Soviets extended an invitation to Liaqat Ali Khan, though U.S.S.R. till then had not even exchanged ambassadors with Pakistan.¹⁵ Liaqat Ali Khan accepted the invitation, but could not visit the U.S.S.R. due to the strong opposition by the pro-Western elites in the foreign policy decision-making group in Pakistan.¹⁶ Rather, some observers believe that this invitation was utilized to manoeuvre the U.S., which made no delay in extending an invitation to Liaqat Ali Khan as well.¹⁷ Liaqat Ali Khan's speeches in the U.S. were welcomed more, which were thought closer to the Western outlook than Nehru's exposition of non-alignment, which was considered as an 'immoral' concept in the 'free world',¹⁸ Pakistan's pro-Western attitude on Korean crisis and the Japanese peace treaty also attracted the attention of the U.S. decision-makers, while India's 'non-aligned' role was perceived more as 'pro-Soviet'.

In the wake of the Korean war, the U.S. Secretary of State, Dulles, feared a repetition of a Soviet inspired initiative in South Asia.¹⁹ Washington also recalled what had been revealed in the Nazi-Soviet documents, "a long term Russian interest in the Persian gulf area".²⁰ Since the closing days of the Truman administration, the U.S. decision-makers had been exploring the possibility of military alliances in the 'Northern tier countries'. In the global strategic considerations of the United States, Dulles stressed Pakistan's geographic position in the following words: "Communist China borders on northern territories held by Pakistan and from Pakistan's northern border one can see the Soviet Union. Pakistan flanks Iran and the Middle East and guards the Khyber Pass, the historic invasion route from the north into the sub-continent."²¹ Furthermore, Dulles considered Pakistan as 'dependable bulwark against communism'.²² Pakistan, in an extremely weak military and economic position, more fearful of an immediate 'Indian threat' than the distant 'communist threat' was eagerly looking forward to this opportunity. Pakistan entered into the Mutual Defence Agreement (1954) with the United States, Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) and SEATO with the predominant motive of countering India. Wayne Wilcox summarized this convergence of interests by noting that "Pakistan was seeking security and freedom from India's superiority at the same time the United States was seeking Asian allies and bases in its struggle against communism."²³

Between 1947-1953, it is important to note that the great powers because of their little understanding of the depth of the India-Pakistan conflict, were relatively unconcerned over the Kashmir dispute. U.S. decision-makers were more preoccupied with their policy of 'containment' in South Asia, and the Soviets, though watchful of the U.S. moves, were greatly disinterested in the region. However, the establishment of U.S. sponsored alliance system had significant consequences for the region. It eroded the then on-going bilateral India-Pakistan talks on Kashmir and aroused India's concern for its defence. Furthermore, it proved to be a catalyst to the Soviet Union's active interest and the clear South Asia policy for its security concern as well.

Since Stalin's death at the end of 1953, the Soviet Union began appreciating the non-alignment policy of India, and started adopting a flexible attitude towards the Asian countries. Pakistan's joining of the U.S. sponsored alliance system led the Soviet Union to forge closer relations with India and Afghanistan in the South Asian region. India became important for the Soviets in a number of ways. India, friendly to the Soviet Union "would serve as an entry point" for Soviet relationships with the non-aligned countries in general, would help to keep Pakistan preoccupied within the sub-continent, and prevent the U.S. sponsored alliances (CENTO and SEATO) from becoming geographically continuous and mutually reinforcing".²⁴ Similarly to India, the Soviet friendship was desirable in many ways; the promise

of economic and military aid; the diplomatic support in the U.N. on Kashmir, the promotion of India's status in the world and the use of Soviet influence in order to bring the "pro-Soviet communists of India into the constitutional framework".²⁵ Strategically, Afghanistan was also important for the Soviet Union, which shared 1,200 miles border with the Soviet Central Asia. Furthermore, Afghanistan was also not on good terms with Pakistan because of its claim on Pakistan's North West Frontier Province, known as 'Pakhtoonistan dispute'. The Soviets gave complete support to Afghanistan on this issue. During his visit to Afghanistan in 1955, the Russian Premier said in Kabul, "We have sympathy for Afghanistan's attitude to the Pakhtoonistan problem and think that Pushto [people] should be consulted on the solution of the problem."²⁶

The United States' relationship with Pakistan, and the Soviet Union's relationship with India grew at a remarkable pace between 1954 and 1960. The total assistance extended to Pakistan by the U.S. in terms of military hardware from 1954 to 1965 amounted to between U.S. \$1.2 billion and U.S.\$1.5 billion, and economic assistance amounted to U.S.\$3 billion.²⁷ The Soviet assistance to India during the same period was estimated by Selig Harrison at slightly more than U.S.\$1.0 billion, and credits for military aid at about U.S.\$300 million.²⁸ However, the United States also continued supplying substantial economic aid to India in view of its 'enlightened interests' in order to prevent it from completely aligning with the communist bloc.

Between 1954 and 1960, regarding Kashmir, the Soviet Union alleged that Britain and U.S. wanted Pakistan to get Kashmir, because they "aimed to convert Kashmir into a link in the chain of military bases with which they are doing their best to surround the Soviet Union."²⁹ Apart from this pretence of a security concern, Geoffrey Hudson pointed out in 1955 that "the Soviet Union appears to have perceived more clearly than the British or Americans have done that antipathy to Pakistan is the pivot of India's foreign policy."³⁰ The Soviet Union provided complete political and diplomatic support to India on Kashmir. Whenever the Western powers tried to settle the Kashmir dispute in the U.N., by introducing the draft resolution for the demilitarization of Kashmir, preparatory to the holding of a plebiscite, India relied on Soviet help. The Soviet Union twice vetoed the Security Council resolutions on the Kashmir dispute in the U.N. in India's favour; once in 1957 and again in 1962. During their visit to India in 1955, Khrushchev and Bulganin in a number of speeches declared that Kashmir was an integral part of India. In one of his speeches in Srinagar, Bulganin declared that he regarded "Kashmir as the northern part of India and the people of Kashmir as part of the Indian people".³¹ In this period, the United States and the Western powers tried hard to settle the Kashmir dispute in view of their global interests. Averell Harriman recommended to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:

We ought to use our influence towards setting both countries to direct their military efforts more towards common defence of the sub-continent

and less against each other. I think it is of vital importance to both of them that they work together without a pact. 32

Similarly Defence Secretary McElroy also emphasized "the need for a focussing of the attention of both these countries (India and Pakistan) on their problems in the north."³³ U.S. efforts resulted in the settlement of one very thorny issue, the Indus water dispute between India and Pakistan, but on Kashmir, there was no headway. It is important to note that the U.S. has been lukewarm in its support to Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute in comparison to Soviet support to India. This factor has always been a source of great irritation to Pakistanis.

There were three major changes in the international system in the early sixties. The emergence of the inter-continental and seaborne missiles reduced the importance to the West of the advanced bases to thwart communist aggression. Secondly, Kennedy made a reappraisal of U.S. policy to court non-aligned countries. Thirdly, China emerged as a powerful contender in South Asia in the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The group around Kennedy was favourable to India and thought the policy of military alliances as 'Pactitis'.³⁴ A strong pro-India lobby in the Kennedy administration thought, as Harrison observed, "India is the great power of South Asia. It is not the business of the U.S. to subsidize Pakistan as a permanent garrison state with a military capability swollen out of all proportions to her size".³⁵ Naturally, this attitude had an adverse effect on the U.S.-Pakistan relations. In May 1960, a U.S. U-2, flown from Peshawar (Pakistan)

base over Soviet territory for espionage purposes was shot down by the Russians, and Khrushchev threatened to annihilate the Peshawar base with rockets.³⁶ Ayub Khan, already dissatisfied with the U.S. policy to court India and now worried over the Russian threat, started making probing overtures to the Soviet Union and China. The Soviets responded favourably, and Pakistan signed its first oil agreement with the Soviet Union in February, 1961. The Sino-Indian border war further complicated the situation. It is interesting to see the Russian attitude towards this war. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the Sino-Indian border war occurred simultaneously. Initially the Soviets, in the face of direct confrontation with the U.S., feeling the need of its communist ally, supported the Chinese position by urging India to accept Chinese proposals, but as the Cuban missile crisis defused, the Soviets shifted their position in favour of India.³⁷ The Western powers rushed massive military aid to India during and after the war with China. Pakistan got alarmed and annoyed with the West. Ayub Khan wrote that "we apprehend that after India has settled her dispute with China, she would revert to her traditional intimidation to Pakistan."³⁸

The new policies of the United States and the Sino-Indian border war had a great impact on the alignment patterns of the region. In view of India's intransigence, the Western powers started considering the Kashmir issue as a status quo one. During the Sino-Indian border war, Kennedy wrote a letter to Ayub suggesting that he assure Nehru that Pakistani troops would do nothing to India.³⁹ Simultaneously,

India was asked to reopen the negotiations on Kashmir. Nehru, under Western pressure and facing the Chinese threat, reopened the bilateral India-Pakistan negotiations on Kashmir. As expected, the negotiations failed when the war ended.⁴⁰ Pakistan was extremely dissatisfied with the military aid plans of the West to India. Ayub Khan urged the Western powers that "if the security and welfare of the Indian sub-continent are the objective, then what is needed is not the injection of massive doses of military aid into India but a rapprochement between India and Pakistan."⁴¹ The United States would have preferred that India and Pakistan jointly confront China in Asia but, if that was not feasible and a clear choice had to be made between larger India and smaller Pakistan, India obviously would be a weightier counterpoise and must be preferred.

Ironically, Ayub Khan, who always feared 'the danger from the north', himself turned to the north, perceiving the imminent rising spectre of Indian military strength. He opted for a broad-based policy of bilateralism and decided to walk on a 'triangular rope', a strategy of setting up "bilateral equations with each one of them (U.S., U.S.S.R. and China), with the clear understanding that the nature and complexion of the equation should be such as to promote our mutual interests without adversely affecting the legitimate interests of third parties."⁴²

Right from the beginning, the Chinese decision-makers had been quite shrewd in handling their relations with Pakistan. They had correctly perceived Pakistan's predominant motive in joining the mili-

tary alliances and never reacted as bitterly and as vehemently as the Soviet Union did. In the Bandung Conference of 1955, Chou En-lai was reported to have assured Pakistani Premier Muhammad Ali that the Chinese would not let Pakistan's membership in the SEATO pact come in the way of the friendship between the two countries.⁴³ Many years later, Chou En-lai also revealed in an interview granted to a Pakistani correspondent that, "The Pakistani government often declared to the Chinese government that its participation in that organization was not for the purpose of being hostile to China, and would not prejudice Pakistan's friendship with China."⁴⁴ Now Pakistani decision-makers sought to improve their relations with China. The Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement was signed on 2 March 1963, redelineating 300 miles of border between Sinkiang and Pakistan controlled Kashmir. Trade relations also grew and China became the largest buyer of Pakistani cotton by the end of 1963.⁴⁵ China had maintained a neutral position on Kashmir. Now, it openly supported Pakistan against India. Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto declared in the Parliament:

If India, were in her frustration to turn her guns against Pakistan, the International situation is such today that Pakistan would not be alone in the conflict.... An attack by India on Pakistan involves the territorial integrity and security of the largest state in Asia. 47

The joint communique issued at the end of the visit of Ayub Khan to China in March 1965 further confirmed Chinese open support for Pakistan.⁴⁶

Pakistan's development of relations with China was a very complicating factor. It further strained India-Pakistan relations. The Indians suspected Sino-Pakistan collusion against India. They also charged that Pakistan surrendered 2,500 miles of territory which legally belonged to them.⁴⁸ Pakistan, maintaining the disputed nature of the territory, claimed that it had gained 750 square miles.⁴⁹ Most impartial observers agree that Pakistan fared well.⁵⁰ U.S.-Pakistan relations were also aggravated. Howard Wriggins remarks that acting on the 'Kutaliyan Principle' of international politics, 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend', Pakistan developed its relations with China, and "Pakistan's major ally (U.S.), acting on the same principle, saw India as its principal friend on the sub-continent, since it was directly opposing Washington's enemy -- China."⁵¹ Johnson cancelled Ayub's visit to the States scheduled in April 1965, and then Shastri's visit to U.S. was also cancelled in order to maintain a semblance of equality between India and Pakistan.

Keeping in view Pakistan's dissatisfaction with the West, the Soviets had started wooing Pakistan since the early sixties. The new Soviet policy was friendly gestures towards Pakistan, simultaneously keeping a warm friendship with India and an apparent neutrality on the two nations' quarrel. The exit of Khrushchev in 1964, and the coming of the Kosygin-Brezhnev regime made this policy more pronounced, because one of the specific charges against the outgoing Premier was an 'ostentatious arming of India'.⁵² First signs of a changing attitude

from complete favour for India to balancing policies appeared, when during his visit to India in June 1964, U.S.S.R. President Mikoyan suggested directly to Shastri that it was time for India and Pakistan to seek a settlement of their disputes.⁵³ The Soviet Vice-Premier Kirill Mazurov remarked in New Delhi that the Soviet Union should not be expected to allow its relations with India and Pakistan to be governed by the mutual relations of these two countries.⁵⁴ During the Indian President Radha Krishnan's visit to U.S.S.R. in September 1964, the joint communique made no mention of Kashmir, unlike the previous high-level visits.⁵⁵ When Ayub Khan visited Moscow in April 1965, the joint communique stated that both sides "declare resolute support for the people waging a struggle for national liberation and independence", an implicit reference to the existence of the Kashmir dispute.⁵⁶ During Shastri's visit to the Soviet Union in the Spring of 1965, the Soviets were more more cautious in avoiding Kashmir or the Rann-of-Kutch, and urged instead that ways must be found leading to a political settlement of these questions.⁵⁷

There were a number of reasons for a change in the Soviet policy. The Soviets wanted to exploit Pakistan's increasing relationship with China. In fact the Soviets were astonished at the Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement and their concern was increased, because the Chinese had got direct access to the strategically important territory of Kashmir.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the Soviets were also concerned over the increasing public voices in India, clamouring for a more pro-Western

policy, in view of the Western powers' 'open hearted' military support during and after the 1962 border war. The Soviets presumably might have thought in terms of broadening their alternatives in South Asia. However, it is important to note that the Soviets, while wooing Pakistan, were highly cautious in not risking their friendship with India, where they had invested so long. Kosygin had assured Shastri that "When the Soviet Union is striving to improve its relations with a third country, this does not have to be at the cost of Soviet-Indian friendship."⁵⁹ Pravda's policy statement makes it more clear that:

... striving for a further development of relations with Pakistan, the Soviet Union considers that good neighbourliness between our states does not contradict our friendship with any other third state. The strengthening of ties between the U.S.S.R. and Pakistan should be viewed as part of a general policy, which is directed for securing peace in Asia and the whole world. We would like that Soviet-Pakistan relations like our traditional friendship with India, become a stabilizing factor for the situation in Asia and facilitate the normalization of relations between India and Pakistan. 60

The first official Soviet comment on the Rann-of-Kutch crisis noted that the Soviets found the India-Pakistan conflict 'deplorable' and called upon the two governments to resolve the conflict.⁶¹ During the course of the September conflict too, the Soviets adopted a strictly impartial posture. The Soviet media refrained from carrying any reports allocating blame for the Kashmir conflict on any side. During the conflict, when the Chinese delivered an ultimatum to India, the Soviet

Union did not come up with any public declaration in favour of India despite the Indian government's insistence. However, privately the Soviets assured the Indians that they would make some response in the case of Chinese attack.⁶²

In historical perspective, we have noted that the India-Pakistan conflict had in no way been in the global interests of the United States and the Western powers. United States and Britain immediately cancelled their arms aid and their economic aid to both countries, and made it conditional that the aid would only be resumed on the restoration of peace.⁶³ The United States also warned China not to intervene in the conflict.⁶⁴ The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. both followed identical policies. Probably, it was because of some measure of detente achieved between the United States and the Soviet Union that both wanted to contain China. The clearest indication of co-operation were the Security Council resolutions on September 4, 6, and

20. The United States and the Soviet Union agreed on the need for a ceasefire and withdrawal of troops before anything else in Kashmir. Many observers agree that it was mainly because of the fear of Chinese involvement that both powers cooperated with each other. Drew Middleton observes that the United States and the Soviet Union followed parallel policies in the Kashmir war because both had a "national interest in restoring peace and limiting Chinese communist adventures in an unstable, war-exhausted India".⁶⁵ Donald Zagoria notes that "the American and Soviet governments have the

common interest in Asia of isolating China and of preventing violence which could force either of them into an unwanted confrontation in support of their supposed friends."⁶⁶ The Western powers' attitude towards the Soviet mediation offer was also very favourable. Because, in the past, it has been noted that they had tried their best to settle this dispute, but could not succeed, mainly due to the Soviet Union's firm backing to India. Now, when the Soviets themselves desired to settle the dispute, they kept their long-term interests in view and were prepared to let the Soviet Union do the job. The U.S. not only let the Soviets offer of mediation stand, but W.W. Rostow has revealed recently that the mediation was conducted with the inconspicuous involvement of the U.S. President, Lyndon Johnson.⁶⁷

The only interested party which was to benefit from the conflict was China. The Chinese decision-makers had kept a close liaison with the Pakistani decision-makers. We have noted in the previous chapter the Chinese ultimatum to India. It appears that Chinese had tacitly made it clear to the Indians that they would intervene if the Indians opened a front on the side of East Pakistan where Pakistani defence was considerably weak.⁶⁸ It was revealed recently that Ayub Khan himself had visited China during the war and, before agreeing to the ceasefire, had sought their approval.⁶⁹ As it was not in Chinese interest that the conflict be settled through Soviet 'good offices', their reaction to the Tashkent offer was one of an extreme dismay and full fledged propaganda attack against both, the 'modern revisionists'

and the 'U.S. imperialists'. In referring to Kosygin's September 7 offer of 'good offices' to Ayub and Shastri, New China News Agency on 14 September questioned the Soviet Premier's sincerity by noting that he took care "not to mention that it was India which committed aggression against Pakistan and made no distinction between the aggressor and his victim".⁷⁰ In a lengthy editorial on 17 September, Peoples' Daily declared that "the Soviet leaders dream of using this opportunity to start another anti-China campaign in the world"⁷¹ and appealed to Pakistan:

It is easy enough to imagine the kind of 'good offices' that would be offered by those who have all along supported India in annexing Kashmir... what the Soviet leaders intend to do is in the name of good offices to aid the Indian aggressors to force Pakistan to accept India's annexation of Kashmir as legitimate. ⁷²

The Chinese were also vocal in criticising the United States. They declared that "on the Kashmir question, the United Nations has once again proved to be a tool of U.S. imperialism".⁷³

The Third Party's Identity

We had noted in the evaluation of the theoretical literature an emphasis on the mediator to be perceived as 'impartial' by the antagonists as a necessary condition in determining the identity of a potential successful mediator. Contrary to the assumption of the theoretical literature, our proposition is that in the situation where a great power plays the role of an intermediary vis-a-vis smaller powers,

even though perceived as biased by one party towards the other, may yet be acceptable to the parties. In our case study, first we shall establish that the Soviet Union had not acquired the condition of impartiality in the eyes of Pakistani decision-makers and secondly, we shall turn to the question why it was acceptable to Pakistan even then.

Although the Soviet Union had started changing its posture on the Kashmir dispute, yet as we have noted Soviet policy was to maintain simultaneously good relations with both India and Pakistan. More importantly, the U.S.S.R. did not want to sacrifice its 'traditional friendship' with India for its 'newly forged relationship with Pakistan'. It is evident by the fact that the Soviets had not cut the arms aid to India during the war and had announced on 17 September that they have no intention to do so.⁷⁴ Another confirmation of this policy came, when during the late September Security Council deliberations, the Soviet delegate urged that a resolution take note of the fact that India, but not Pakistan, had accepted a ceasefire.⁷⁵ There were even some reports of a September meeting in New York between Rusk and Gromyko in which the later declared that his government supported India's case against Pakistan.⁷⁶ That is why, when Shastri declared on 22 September his acceptance of Kosygin's Tashkent offer, President Ayub Khan virtually rejected the offer and declared that a Tashkent meeting would not yet be fruitful and suggested that the Soviet Union should instead use its influence in the Security Council towards getting "a meaningful resolution that can lead to an honorable settlement of the Kashmir dispute".⁷⁷

The Pakistani decision-makers were hesitant to accept the Soviet offer because of the past history and even the current policy of supporting India. Dawn, in an editorial, recalled that Pakistan had not forgotten the Khrushchev era when the Soviets had completely favoured India.⁷⁸ In fact, Pakistan desired that the United States should play the mediatory role. Ayub Khan, during the conflict on 15 September, had called on the United States to use its enormous influence to bring about the settlement of Kashmir dispute.⁷⁹

It is clear that the Pakistani decision-makers had considered the Soviet Union as biased towards India. The question arises then why Pakistan accepted the Soviet offer of mediation finally. The answer has to be found in terms of available alternatives and interests. Pakistan had four probable alternatives: (1) renewal of fighting, (2) invitation to some other party, (3) continuation of efforts at the U.N. and, (4) acceptance of the Tashkent offer. The renewal of fighting was out of question, because the military resources had been almost depleted, and U.S. and British governments had already cut arms shipments. As the Pakistan army was completely U.S. equipped, the arms-ban had hit Pakistan harder than India. The second alternative was also not feasible, because no other party was in a position to mediate. China was openly in favour of Pakistan and therefore, was unacceptable to India. The U.K. was also unacceptable to India because Harold Wilson had denounced India as an aggressor. The U.S. was reluctant to intervene because of domestic considerations. Pakistan tried the third alternative of the

U.N. during September and October, but India had categorically refused to accommodate any U.N. initiative to reopen the Kashmir issue. Having tried all three alternatives, Pakistan finally accepted the Soviet offer on 25 November. Pakistan might have perceived several interests in accepting the offer. Firstly, it would have helped them to keep the Kashmir issue alive diplomatically. Secondly, they were eager to attain the Soviet neutrality over the Kashmir dispute, because the Soviets had been the main power in the Security Council, blocking the U.N. resolutions on a plebiscite in Kashmir. Thirdly, keeping in view the general trend of the Soviet foreign policy in South Asia, they might have expected the erosion of special India-Soviet relations in the long-run.

India's willingness to accept the Soviet mediation was based on a belief, confirmed by years of Soviet action on India's behalf in the U.N. and elsewhere, that it would favour India's case. The Indians were also concerned over growing Soviet-Pakistan relations, which might lead to the Soviet neutralization on the Kashmir issue in the U.N. Furthermore, India was under serious economic pressures and was eager to have United States' aid resumed.⁸⁰ So, here we see that the biased intermediary was acceptable to the parties because of their interests and the assessment of other available alternatives.

The Third Party's Interests

What were the Soviets' interests in holding the Tashkent Conference? Pravda declared that "Guided by the interests of peace and

the desire to further the improvement of relations between India and Pakistan, the Soviet government has offered the government of these countries its good offices towards a peaceful settlement of the Indian-Pakistani conflict."⁸¹ Real motives are often not revealed and are difficult to ascertain. However, keeping in view the broader historical perspective, we can make reasonable conjectures.

At that time, the situation in South Asia was that the United States was gradually disengaging itself from active involvement in South Asian affairs. A shift from the military alliances policy to an even-handed approach towards the sub-continent was taking place. Annoyed and worried over the United States' new policy, Pakistan, considering its security risks, had opted for a policy of bilateralism. Pakistan had started developing its relations with both China and the Soviet Union in order to strengthen its position against India. As long as Pakistan was aligned with the West, India received total support from the Soviet Union on the Kashmir issue as the counter to Western influence in the region.

Now, with the weakening of the U.S. relationship with Pakistan, the Soviets started making favourable gestures towards Pakistan and showing a neutral attitude on Kashmir. The Chinese had adopted the same role of taking advantage of the India-Pakistan conflict by supporting Pakistan in order to check Soviet influence in the region. This was the same strategy which the Soviets had adopted against the United States over the Kashmir issue. In such a situation, the immediate Soviet

objective was to restrain both influences in the region, the traditional influence of the United States and the growing influence of China. A Tass Statement of September 14 refers to both the parties:

However there are also forces trying to derive advantages for themselves from exacerbation of Indian-Pakistani relations. Through their inflammatory statements, they are instigating a further heating up of the military conflict. [The conflict]... profit(s) the forces of imperialism and reaction, only those who would again like to yoke the liberated peoples to colonialism and new colonialism. Even now American imperialism is trying to take advantage of the military clashes between India and Pakistan to distract the peoples' attention from the U.S. aggression in Vietnam. 82

The Soviet media also widely propagated that the West had been responsible for the origin and the evolution of the India-Pakistan dispute.⁸³

As the Chinese had directly threatened to intervene in the conflict, the Soviets were greatly concerned over their actions. A Tass Statement was more pointed towards China. "Those whose inciting statements, whose policy help fan the conflict must be warned by the entire world that they thereby assume a heavy responsibility for such a policy."⁸⁴ In fact, the Soviets feared that if the Chinese intervened in the conflict, India would look for Soviet help. They did not want an open confrontation with China over the India-Pakistan issue. There was also a great possibility that India might have leaned towards the West, as it had done in 1962 Sino-Indian war, and this development would certainly have adversely affected their relations with India. Pravda admonished China:

...certain bellicose circles in certain countries, specialists in kindling conflicts and in striving to warm their hands at the bonfire, these circles made every attempt to push the parties to the conflict that had erupted towards further intensification of military operations, which would ultimately have led to large-scale war. 85

Criticising China's attitude towards Tashkent Conference, Pravda remarked "... these circles did everything in their power to prevent the Tashkent meeting and attempted to compromise it...." 86

Beside checking the influence of other parties in the region, the Soviets also harboured certain long term interests. Certain observers have suspected that the Soviets' objectives in holding the Tashkent Conference were limited, and that they did not want to settle the Kashmir problem. 87 But the evidence appears contrary to this notion. We have already referred to a number of statements by the Russian leaders, where they had specifically adopted a neutral position on Kashmir, contrary to their earlier position that 'Kashmir is an integral part of India'. Furthermore, in his 4 September appeal, Kosygin pointedly suggested to India and Pakistan settlement of all disputes "including questions connected with Kashmir" through Soviet good offices. 88 Similarly Pravda termed the Tashkent Conference as the "First Step". 89 The Tashkent Conference appears to be the part of Soviet Union's new Asia policy in order to establish an exclusive sphere of influence in South Asia. If the Soviets were to succeed in composing the differences between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, that could have been an important prelude to Kosygin's proposed regional economic grouping consisting

of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, which appeared in 1968. Finally it could also have paved the way for the Asian collective security plan presented by Brezhnev in 1969.⁹⁰ Some authors have also emphasized the strategic importance of the solution of Kashmir problem for the Soviet Union. Geoffrey Jukes thinks that "A permanent solution of Kashmir problem would considerably strengthen India's position vis-a-vis China by freeing most of the Indian army along Pakistan borders for the deployment along the Sino-Indian border."⁹¹

There were a number of other secondary objectives. The Soviet Union wanted to assert its claim as an Asian power as well. The Chinese had contested the Soviet's proposed participation in the Algiers conference of the Afro-Asian countries (1965) on the basis that the Soviet Union was not an Asian power. In all his statements and letters addressed to Shastri and Ayub, Kosygin always drew attention to the proximity of the Soviet borders to the area of conflict, indicating the Soviet claim as an Asian power.⁹² Even the selection of Tashkent was an indication of the Soviet claim. The New York Times wrote,

Tashkent, the largest city of the Soviet Central Asia was selected as the site for the meeting. The choice of Tashkent only 300 miles from the Chinese frontier seemed to Soviet official to emphasize the Asian character of the Soviet Union. 93

The Soviets also wanted to gain prestige as a peace-maker in the world in general and in the Afro-Asian countries in particular. That is why the Soviets had taken unusual measures to publicize the

conference. As it was established later, the propaganda value of the Tashkent agreement was immense for the Soviet Union. The Russian press-media were flooded with articles projecting the image of the Soviet Union as peace-maker vis-a-vis other parties after the conference.

Entry Point

The interests of the Soviet Union and its development of a new policy towards India and Pakistan also explain the raison d'être of the entry point into the conflict. As long as Pakistan was the 'most allied ally' of the United States in Asia, the Soviets had played a negative role in the U.N. on blocking the resolution efforts on the Kashmir issues. However, with the change in the United States' policy and the consequent shift of Pakistan to a practically non-aligned policy, the Soviets, in view of their long-term interests of establishing an exclusive sphere of influence in South Asia, decided to play a positive role. The Chinese active intrusion into an area, strategically important to the Soviet Union, was a matter of further concern. The Soviets sent their first message to Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan and L.B. Shastri the Prime Minister of India on 20 August 1965, when the new Kashmir crisis was brewing. Diplomatic sources in Karachi disclosed on 23 August that the Soviets had offered to mediate on the "Kashmir Issue" between India and Pakistan.⁹⁴ The Soviets repeated their offer on September 4, 11, and 17, urging the governments of India

and Pakistan to settle their conflict through the 'good offices' of the Soviet Union. The non-zero sum outcome of the armed conflict also helped the Soviets, as no party had been able to score any decisive victory over the other. Furthermore, the political and economic constraints upon the decision-makers of India and Pakistan also facilitated the Soviet entry. Pakistan had almost depleted its military resources and India was facing serious economic difficulties and the prospects of food crisis. Both parties were not in a position to fight the war further and were looking for a face-saving posture. Finally the tacit approval of the United States for such a move made the Tashkent meeting certain. Prime Minister Shastri announced his acceptance on 22 September 1965 and President Ayub Khan announced on 16 November 1965. It was agreed that meeting should take place on 3 January 1966 at Tashkent, the largest city of the Soviet Central Asia.

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CHAPTER IV

THE THIRD PARTY'S FUNCTIONS

The Pre-Conference Positions of the Parties

The Tashkent Conference started on 3 January 1966 and continued for seven days. The Tashkent Declaration was signed on 10 January 1966. Before we proceed to analyze the third party's functions during the conference, it seems necessary to briefly recapitulate the conflicting parties' positions, and the third party's approach towards them immediately prior to the conference.

The Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, had made it clear that "Kashmir is an integral part of India and would not be discussed at the proposed Tashkent meeting."¹ He had declared that "Kashmir was not a negotiable issue, and India was not going to budge an inch from that stand".² However, he was interested in exploring the possibility of a 'limited agreement' over the issues arising from the armed conflict. These included the stabilization of the ceasefire line, resumption of the normal diplomatic relations, restoration of communications, exchange of prisoners and cessation of hostile propaganda. Above all he was interested in securing a no-war declaration from Pakistan, implying that it would not disturb the status quo in Kashmir.³

The Pakistani President Ayub Khan declared that "Kashmir was the root-cause of the conflict between India and Pakistan".⁴ The Pakistani press projected Kashmir as 'the most important issue' to be discussed at Tashkent. Ayub Khan declared before his departure for Tashkent that Premier Kosygin would earn the gratitude of 600 million people of the India-Pakistan sub-continent, "if he succeeds in cutting the Gordian knot of the problem of Jammu and Kashmir".⁵

It appears that the Soviets had deliberately kept an ambiguity over their actual role in the Tashkent Conference. The Indian press emphasized that the Soviets were merely offering 'good offices' and would not participate actively in the conference. On the other hand, the Pakistani press was stressing that the Soviets would be actively mediating on the Kashmir issue. It appears from the statements of Ayub Khan that the Soviets had given an indication to Pakistan that the Kashmir problem would also be taken up at the Tashkent Conference. In a broadcast to the nation, Ayub Khan declared on 2 January 1966 that his forthcoming meeting could prove "a turning point in the history of the sub-continent", and that he was going to Tashkent because "the Soviet Union have indicated that they too want a settlement of the Kashmir dispute".⁶ On his way to Tashkent, Ayub Khan declared in Kabul, "It is the first time that Soviet Union had taken a direct hand in resolving a major problem".⁷ Analyzing the Soviet Union's interests in the previous chapter, it has been noted that the solution of Kashmir problem was in the long-term interests of the Soviet Union and therefore Ayub

Khan's statements seemed correct that the Soviets also wanted to tackle the Kashmir question as well. It is further indicated by the fact that the Soviets immediately called Swaran Singh, India's Foreign Minister, to Moscow on 24 December, probably because of the Indian leaders' categorical statements that Kashmir would not be a topic at Tashkent.⁸

The Times of India also reported Swaran Singh's statement after his visit that the Soviet leaders felt that there should be a certain amount of 'flexibility' in the discussion at Tashkent.⁹ The Soviets had opted for a 'step-by-step approach' towards Indian-Pakistani problems. Therefore, they declared the Tashkent Conference as "the First step" and conveyed their thinking to the parties, that they planned to hold a series of meetings.¹⁰ Pravda, elaborating the Soviet approach, declared that instead of judging the cases of both the parties on their merits, their main concern at Tashkent would be to "find a path" for "ending the conflict".¹¹

The three delegations which participated in the conference consisted of the following members:

- (1) India; the Prime Minister, Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri,
the Foreign Minister, Mr. Swaran Singh,
the Defence Minister, Mr. Y.B. Chavan,
the Foreign Secretary, Mr. C.S. Jha.
- (2) Pakistan; the President, Mr. Ayub Khan,
the Foreign Minister, Mr. Z.A. Bhutto,
the Commerce Minister Mr. Ghulam Farooq,
the Information Minister, Mr. Kh. Shahab-ud-din,
the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Aziz Ahmad.
- (3) U.S.S.R.; the Prime Minister, Mr. Alexie N. Kosygin,
the Foreign Minister, Mr. A.A. Gromyko,
the former Chief of Staff, Marshall Sokolovsky,
Mr. Nickolai Furyabin, an Asian Specialist, and
Russian ambassadors to India and Pakistan.

The Preliminary Arrangements

This was the first time that the Soviet Union had played the role of an intermediary between two non-communist countries.¹² The Russians had taken an extra care to make this attempt a success. The selection of the meeting place was important in this connection. Tashkent was carefully chosen to make the Indians and Pakistanis feel at home as well as to emphasize the Asian character of the Soviet Union.¹³ The saliency of the conference was created by giving an exhaustive coverage on the Soviet television, radio and press. Unusual arrangements were made by the government to assure coverage and fast transmission of reports by 300 journalists from all over the world.¹⁴

As we have noted in the previous chapter that the Soviet Union was regarded as a biased intermediary by Pakistani decision-makers, it was not surprising that the Soviets, presumably conscious of their image, had shown a remarkable symmetry towards the adversaries. The banners, flags and slogans draped across streets and from public buildings proclaimed with perfect impartiality, "Salute to the People of Pakistan", "Welcome to Shastri" and "Long Live Peace in the Sub-continent" in Hindi, Urdu and Russian languages.¹⁵ Pravda published equal sized photographs of Lal Bahadur Shastri and Muhammad Ayub Khan, and the brief biographies of the two leaders were also of identical length. The caution in demonstrating symmetry can also be noted by the fact that the villas placed at the disposal of the two leaders were also similar.¹⁶ These preliminary arrangements had considerable psycho-

logical effect on both the decision-makers. Both Shastri and Ayub expressed their feelings of gratitude to the Soviet Union during the plenary session and specifically mentioned 'Tashkent' and their welcoming arrangements.

The Opening Session

Before the opening session, Kosygin was anxious to persuade Shastri and Ayub Khan to hold exclusive bilateral talks, because as Dawn noted, "If this bid succeeds, it may prove a diplomatic master-stroke in taking some of the heat out of the situation even before the conference starts."¹⁷ Mr. Kosygin wanted to establish personal rapprochement between both the decision-makers.

The opening session was held on 4 January 1966. Kosygin's welcome speech was remarkable.¹⁸ He welcomed both the leaders as "the outstanding statesman of Two Great Asian countries" and expressed the Soviet Union's feeling of friendship for the "peoples of India and Pakistan". Drawing the participants' attention towards the geographic proximity of the Soviet Union towards the conflict arena, he tried to pick up the common values by recalling the 'heroic struggle' of "the peoples of India and Pakistan against foreign domination". Stressing the future-oriented approach, he said that "the tasks confronting them coincide in many respects. The peoples of both countries are striving to solve major economic problems upon which the welfare of the population and further progress depends."

Recognizing the complexity of task, Kosygin stressed that "What is important is to chart the path... to create a climate of trust and simultaneously to resolve those questions, which today constitute an obstacle to the normalization of relations".

He was performing the function of 'enunciation', as termed by Young, "setting forth clear statements" on his part "and suggesting basic principles, procedures or mechanism; through the use of which a solution or termination might be achieved". He was providing a "frame of reference" (as suggested by Burton), urging the parties to "reperceive conflict", where he said:

Facts show that when governments coolly and objectively consider outstanding issues, taking mutual interests into account, not only are conflicts ended, but the sources from which they spring are largely eliminated.

It is important to note that Kosygin's main emphasis in his speech was on the 'interests of the Peoples of Pakistan and India', but in rather guarded language he had expressed his own interests as well in the end, viz. that normalization of relations between India and Pakistan "will be conducive to still greater development of friendly ties of the Soviet Union with Pakistan and India and will lead to the further economic and cultural cooperation..." It was an implicit reference to Kosygin's regional economic grouping plan, as proposed later. He also indicated Tashkent conference as the first step and declared that, "Naturally, it may prove difficult to find the solution of all existing problems in the course of one meeting. However, it is important to locate the ways leading towards their settlement..."

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The speeches made by both Shastri and Ayub were relatively mild in tone, but the positions of both the parties were wide apart. Shastri thought that "the question which we have both to face is whether we should think of force as a method of solving them [disputes] or whether we should decide and declare that force will never be used."¹⁹ He was essentially interested in maintaining that Kashmir was a 'closed chapter' because it had become an integral part of India and hence non-negotiable, and Pakistan should give some sort of 'no-war declaration', [implying that it should not disturb the status quo] while Ayub declared that "Semblance of peace is no real substitute for peace". Recalling his No-War Pact offer with India during his speech at the U.N. General Assembly, he said that Pakistan was prepared to enter into a pact with India, "once the basic problem confronting us was resolved", obviously a reference to Kashmir.²⁰ It has been reported that, at the request of the Soviet Prime Minister Mr. Kosygin, the two leaders did not mention specifically in their speeches what they considered to be the basic issue between India and Pakistan.²¹

Facilitating Communications
and Concessions

After giving a factual account of behind-the-scene proceedings of the Tashkent Conference, we shall turn to an analytical view of the biased intermediary's functions.

The Tashkent talks were planned in such a way that the dis-

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evade the issue.²⁶ Both the decision-makers agreed to refer the agenda tangle to a committee of ministers and senior officials of the two delegations. The ministerial meeting was held on 5 January in Gromyko's presence. The Indian ministerial group suggested the agenda under two headings:

- (1) Amity and friendship between India and Pakistan; and
- (2) Questions arising out of the India and Pakistan conflict.²⁷

The Pakistani delegation, presenting its own agenda, insisted on the central issue of 'Kashmir' and regarded other problems as 'peripheral'.²⁸ The ministerial meeting got bogged down on the Kashmir issue. Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto persisted that Kashmir was the root-cause of all the trouble between the two countries, therefore, "we must address ourselves to finalizing a solution of Kashmir problem".²⁹ The Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh restated Indian position that "Kashmir is an integral part of India" and argued that Kashmir "roused even stronger emotions in India".³⁰ The meeting ended in a deadlock.

Faced with the deadlock, Kosygin moved to the central position between the parties, and he preferred to continue his efforts at the summit level between the two decision-makers only. A high Soviet official was quick to declare that the Tashkent meeting was essentially a summit meeting between the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan and not an India-Pakistan conference in the general sense.³¹ Kosygin persuaded Shastri to let Kashmir figure on the talks. There was a change in the Indian stand, and Indian Foreign Secretary informed

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evade the issue.²⁶ Both the decision-makers agreed to refer the agenda tangle to a committee of ministers and senior officials of the two delegations. The ministerial meeting was held on 5 January in Gromyko's presence. The Indian ministerial group suggested the agenda under two headings:

- (1) Amity and friendship between India and Pakistan; and
- (2) Questions arising out of the India and Pakistan conflict.²⁷

The Pakistani delegation, presenting its own agenda, insisted on the central issue of 'Kashmir' and regarded other problems as 'peripheral'.²⁸ The ministerial meeting got bogged down on the Kashmir issue. Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto persisted that Kashmir was the root-cause of all the trouble between the two countries, therefore, "we must address ourselves to finalizing a solution of Kashmir problem".²⁹ The Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh restated Indian position that "Kashmir is an integral part of India" and argued that Kashmir "roused even stronger emotions in India".³⁰ The meeting ended in a deadlock.

Faced with the deadlock, Kosygin moved to the central position between the parties, and he preferred to continue his efforts at the summit level between the two decision-makers only. A high Soviet official was quick to declare that the Tashkent meeting was essentially a summit meeting between the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan and not an India-Pakistan conference in the general sense.³¹ Kosygin persuaded Shastri to let Kashmir figure on the talks. There was a change in the Indian stand, and Indian Foreign Secretary informed

the newsmen that "Mr. Shastri was willing to discuss Kashmir, but not to negotiate it,"³² Ayub Khan was also willing to accept Kosygin's step-by-step approach, and to soften his stand on Kashmir.³³ Thanks to Kosygin's efforts, both the parties were able to bypass the impasse over the agenda question and started discussing the other issues simultaneous to the issues, which they considered as basic.³⁴

The discussion took place on the other issues such as the restoration of diplomatic relations, re-establishment of the frontier, the exchange of prisoners and the troops withdrawal. But difficulties emerged on the withdrawal of troops. India was holding relatively strategic terrain in Kashmir, therefore, Ayub Khan was anxious to have the troops withdrawal immediately. Shastri made it clear that India would agree to withdraw its troops only if Pakistan provided some sort of guarantee that it would not permit infiltration of guerrillas to Kashmir again.³⁵ Implicit in this Indian attempt was to secure Pakistan's commitment on some sort of a no-war declaration. It was impossible for any Pakistani leader to agree to any such commitment without some progress towards the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Once again, the basic issue confronted the decision-makers. The official representatives of both the parties declared the failure of talks on 8 January and announced that their delegations were going to leave Tashkent on 10 January. A Pakistani representative declared that a 'Joint communique is not a ticket to leave Tashkent'.³⁶ The Indian representative said that "We can no longer impose ourselves on the hospitality

of our hosts."³⁷

The Soviet spokesman acknowledged that the "difficulties between India and Pakistan were "very complicated and very intricate".³⁸

Kosygin concentrated his efforts mainly to find a solution to some of the peripheral problems at least in order to "end the current tragic drift in the relations between the two countries".³⁹ Kosygin acted

promptly as a bridge builder, canvassing rival views, explaining one leader's thoughts to the other, trying to narrow down the differences.⁴⁰

The New York Times depicted his role in the following words:

On the personal level, Mr. Kosygin, driving back and forth between the villas of Indian and Pakistanis late at night, talking to each other when each was not interested in talking with the other, demonstrated the tact and agility of a hardened labor mediator. 41

Kosygin's efforts had two purposes, to bring a personal rapprochement between the two decision-makers and to find a solution to the problem of the withdrawal of troops. On the question of troop-withdrawal from the strategically important passes of Kashmir, Kosygin along with his Defence Minister Rodion Malinovsky was reported to have impressed on Shastri that the best guarantee against repeated incursions was military capability to deal effectively with such a situation whenever it arose.⁴² Probably this impressed Shastri's military advisors and he agreed to the troop withdrawal.⁴³ Kosygin also convinced Ayub Khan that he should accept the outcome of negotiations at Tashkent and lay the groundwork for more contacts later, because it was to his advantage

to disengage the troops.⁴⁴ Gromyko was more specific to point out to Bhutto that "Pakistan occupied the desert lands of India in Rajasthan, while India held strategic areas in Kashmir".⁴⁵ But the crux of the achievement at Tashkent was Kosygin's success in bringing the two leaders together and to help them in order to develop a rapprochement between them in the last three days of the conference. The talks were bilateral in nature and both Ayub and Shastri did not want the presence of their chief aides.⁴⁶ Perhaps, the presence of aides would have made it difficult for them to come to an understanding. The Christian Science Monitor noted, "Mr. Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub have met and reportedly have been getting along together reasonably well. The same can not be said of the delegations."⁴⁷ All Pakistani, Indian, Russian and Western sources confirm that "Ayub and Shastri had begun a dialogue of understanding and trust".⁴⁸ Presumably, both had arrived at a broad understanding on the Kashmir problem, because "the personal equation established between Ayub and Shastri proved to be the foundation of the agreement and the Soviet leaders were around to help the process".⁴⁹

In the final stage, there were differences in drafting over the wording of the Tashkent Declaration. The Pakistani draft stated that "all disputes should be settled through peaceful means" and Pakistan did not want the phrase "not resorting to force" to be included in the Declaration.⁵⁰ The Indians insisted on including the emphatic wording on the "renunciation of force".⁵¹ The main effort of the Soviet

Premier and his Foreign Minister was to evolve a formulation of words, in consultation with Mr. Shastri and President Ayub, which would have taken into account the Pakistani position on Kashmir without offending India, and also evolve a new no-war definition acceptable to both the countries. Kosygin and his advisors came forward with an idea that the U.N. charter to which both India and Pakistan were signatories offered an appropriate basis in this context for them to reaffirm their obligations to each other not to have recourse to force in settling their disputes.⁵² Kosygin helped both the parties to match phrases even the words of intent.⁵³ The Tashkent Declaration was finalized an hour before the signing ceremony on 10 January.

How was the Soviet Union, though a biased intermediary, able to play an effective role towards the achievement of a limited agreement between India and Pakistan? It appears that the Soviet decision-makers, in view of their long-term interests and plans to hold more conferences, tried to establish their credentials as the true friends of India and Pakistan by demonstrating complete impartiality in the Tashkent Conference. The preliminary arrangements had a considerable psychological impact on the decision-makers. The Soviets were so cautious in maintaining the impartiality that observers noted that Kosygin in his opening speech mentioned the names of India and Pakistan twelve times each.⁵⁴ After his initial meetings with Kosygin, President Ayub told his colleagues that he had been deeply impressed by the "sympathy, patience and the understanding displayed by Mr. Kosygin".⁵⁵

Kosygin's approach was different from a traditional mediator's approach. Instead of hammering on the solution of the issues, he concentrated his efforts more in removing the perceptual disharmony among the decision-makers and to building a trust between Ayub and Shastri. From the start of the conference till the end, he diverted most of his time in developing a rapprochement between Ayub and Shastri. He shifted his attention to the decision-makers exclusively, when the ministerial conference failed to solve even the agenda problem. To some extent, he was able to change the situation from one where parties saw themselves in a bargaining situation to a 'mutual problem-solving' atmosphere. Ayub was so impressed by Kosygin's sincerity of purpose that he revealed after his retirement that he "had to seek the help of the Soviet Premier to overcome the obstacles to agreement imposed by his own foreign minister."⁵⁶ Kosygin's approach was very similar to the social-psychological approaches which emphasize the perceptual aspects of the conflict.⁵⁷

There are some indications of an implicit bargaining type situation on the withdrawal of troops issue in particular. Kosygin made it clear to Shastri that, in the absence of agreement in Tashkent, the Soviet Union would support any step that the Security Council would take in implementing its resolution on the unconditional withdrawal of forces by the two sides.⁵⁸ He also suggested that the Soviet Union might not always be on India's side on the Kashmir problem in future.⁵⁹ In the triad, this was an implied threat that the Soviet Union might

support Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, because even if the Soviet Union remained neutral in the U.N. on the Kashmir issue, that would have been of a considerable help to Pakistan. The fear on the part of Shastri that the Soviets might develop a rapprochement with his adversary might be a factor in achieving his agreement on the withdrawal of the troops. Later Shastri confided to Indian journalists that, in the face of Kosygin's stand, the Security Council would have gone to the extent of imposing sanctions against India. "I did not have much choice", he said.⁶⁰

It is also possible that Shastri might have projected the Soviet pressure before the journalists in order to justify his position, and the Soviets might not have dropped such clear hints, because the Soviets certainly could not afford to alienate India for Pakistan. Rather there is more possibility that Shastri agreed to the withdrawal of troops in view of the basic Soviet interests which depended on the achievement of some agreement. Ayub Khan had also indicated that he "accepted Kosygin's suggestions only to avoid embarrassing the Soviet Union."⁶¹ This shows that the parties also granted concessions to each other, partly in view of the intermediary's interests.

Kosygin, being the Premier of the Soviet Union, was also in an advantageous position to facilitate the agreement. In view of Ayub's conciliatory approach, Kosygin made an unambiguous and significant remark at the 9 January meeting that "... the Soviet Union appreciates that a dispute exists in Kashmir.... of course there is a dispute."⁶²

Ayub thanked him, as it was a significant change if seen in the historical perspective of the Soviet Union's complete support to India on the Kashmir issue. It has also been suggested that Kosygin quietly withdrew the Russian support on Pakhtoonistan issue to Afghanistan as an extra concession to Pakistan.⁶³

Young had observed that if the intermediary's pay-off or reward depends directly on the achievement of the agreement, it tends to maximize his efforts to achieve an agreement.⁶⁴ In this case, we see the clear illustration of Young's proposition. When the talks had almost broken down, Kosygin's hectic efforts and fervent appeals to the decision-makers of India and Pakistan revived the talks and made the agreement possible.

Besides Kosygin's psychological approach, the tactful handling of the situation, the parties' changing behaviour, the advantageous position as a representative of the great power, it was predominantly the interests of the intermediary which facilitated the agreement between the adversaries.

The Tashkent Declaration : An Appraisal

The Tashkent Declaration was signed on 10 January 1966. Both parties declared their "firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between their countries" in the interests of the "welfare of 600 million people of India and Pakistan".⁶⁵ "In accordance with the United Nations Charter", India and Pakistan reaffirmed:

their obligation... not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. They considered that the interests of peace in their region and particularly in the India-Pakistan sub-continent and indeed, the interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries. It was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed and each of the sides set forth its respective position.

It was agreed that "all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than February 25th 1966, to the position they held prior to August 5, 1965, and both sides shall observe the ceasefire terms on the ceasefire line". India and Pakistan also "agreed to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other". They agreed to the cessation of hostile propaganda against each other, reestablishment of diplomatic relations, restoration of economic and trade relations and cultural and communication exchanges, and to take measures to implement the existing agreements between India and Pakistan. They agreed to the exchange of the prisoners and settlement of minor refugees problems. It was also agreed that both sides would continue meetings both at the highest and at other levels on matters of direct concern to both countries. Both sides also recognized "the need to set up joint Indian-Pakistani bodies which will report to their governments in order to decide what further steps should be taken".

First, we shall observe how this declaration was interpreted in India and Pakistan and then we shall turn to its impartial interpretation and significance. In India, it was interpreted as an end to

India-Pakistan hostilities, and a pledge on the part of Pakistan to renounce the use of force in all matters including Kashmir in return for India's agreement on the withdrawal of troops. The Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh declared,

...the basic issue at Tashkent was whether India and Pakistan were to remain in a perpetual state of conflict and tension or whether they were to live in peace and to have good neighbourly relations. It was only when Mr. Shastri had satisfied himself that Pakistan wanted to follow the later course then he had signed the agreement.... If India had to withdraw its forces from Haji Pir and Kargil, it was not without purpose. 66

The Hindustan Standard commented, "India would have to give Haji Pir Pass and Kargil— but in return, she got an assurance that Pakistan would not interfere in her internal affairs."⁶⁷ Mr. Frank Moraes, an influential Indian journalist wrote that it "is the acceptance by Pakistan to renounce the use of force in settlement of disputes to which she was earlier reluctant to subscribe. The settlement of the Kashmir issue is not made conditional on this mutual renunciation of force".⁶⁸ The Indians mainly projected clause one and clause three of the declaration, which provided the "resolve not to recourse to force" and the principal of non-interference, thereby considering them the central points of the Declaration.

In Pakistan, it was interpreted as a beginning towards the settlement of the Kashmir problem. Ayub Khan termed the Tashkent Declaration as a "good start".⁶⁹ Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto declared that,

the U.N. Charter in Article 51 recognized the ultimate right of a nation to wage struggle for freedom. It is precisely in this context that in the Tashkent Declaration we have reaffirmed our obligations under the Charter. The fact that we were unable immediately to come to a settlement at Tashkent does not detract an iota from our resolve to secure a just settlement under this very Charter or even outside its framework. 70

Dawn wrote:

Noteworthy from the Pakistan's view point is the inclusion in the Tashkent Declaration of reference to discussion on Jammu and Kashmir.... Although inconclusive, these discussions constitute an advance on the previous Indian position that the Kashmir dispute should not be discussed at Tashkent.... The agreement opens three avenues for a peaceful solution of Kashmir problem; (1) Implementation of Clause 4 of the U.N. Security Council resolution of September 20; (2) Direct negotiations under Clause 9. (3) Continuing good offices of the Soviet Union, which emerged as the key factor in the success of the Tashkent Conference. 71

Pakistanis mainly emphasized the reference to Kashmir and the continuing future talks between India and Pakistan. Pakistani spokesman made it clear that the Soviet mediation would continue, because "that is our understanding". 72

In fact, the clauses of the Tashkent Declaration were very ambiguous and subject to various interpretations. It appears to be an incomplete document in the sense of an attempted compromise between two extreme positions at least to give a semblance of peace. The Kashmir issue was very briefly touched on. The 'No-War Declaration' was carefully garbed under the United Nations' Charter. Ambiguity seems to

have been deliberately left, so that the parties might justify the concessions before the public. Kosygin, well recognizing the limitations of the document, remarked: "The implementation of the Tashkent Declaration will hinge on the skill and statesmanship of those who will translate it into life."⁷³ Very cautiously, he said that "...one can be safe in saying that they have done their best to find a constructive approach to the solution of questions which are of interest to both the Indian and Pakistani people."⁷⁴ But surprisingly, the Tashkent Declaration was silent on the continued role of the Soviet Union. It may be because the Soviets might have realized the complexity of the issues and the hardened postures of the parties. They were able to bring about a change in the principal decision-makers' attitudes towards each other, but not the entire India-Pakistan delegations. In concrete terms, it was a status quo ante. It merely restored pre-war positions between the parties. It is an achievement in the context that the Tashkent talks had nearly broken down as a result of the parties' rigid postures. The Soviets had lost hope, as the Times of India reported:

Mr. Alexei Kosygin made a fervent appeal to the Indian and Pakistani leaders to conclude the Tashkent talks with at least some semblance of success... there was an atmosphere of an anti-climax.... With the Soviet leaders apparently having some second thoughts over the wisdom of convening the conference without proper preparatory work to ensure some measure of success. 75

In this context, the Soviets were able to achieve a rapprochement at least between the two decision-makers, and therein lies the significance

of the Tashkent Declaration.

There is a fair amount of evidence available which shows that Ayub and Shastri had established compatible images and mutual trust of each other during the private talks. A Russian analyst wrote, "The two parties underlined more than once during the meeting that their delegations were eager to put aside the mutual distrust resulting from the prolonged conflict and negotiate without prejudice."⁷⁶ An observer of the conference noted, "The Tashkent Declaration as this eye witness correspondent reads it, also is the result of personal equation. Mr. Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan clicked, as President Ayub never had with Mr. Nehru."⁷⁷ Furthermore, "Not all the understanding and equation which President Ayub and Mr. Shastri had achieved at Tashkent was written into Tashkent Declaration. A considerable follow-up action was verbally agreed by the leaders, and Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin is believed to know of it."⁷⁸

There is also indirect evidences which confirm the change in the decision-makers' images and attitudes towards each other. Shastri had planned to stay in Kabul, and to have a meeting with Abdul Ghaffar Khan, [the leading proponent of Pakhtoonistan's claim] on his way back to India. But after the agreement, he cancelled the meeting and told the Indian journalists at the farewell that he was not going to Kabul, because that might be considered an "anti-Tashkent" act.⁷⁹

Unfortunately, Shastri died from a heart attack in Tashkent on 11 January 1966, few hours after signing the Tashkent Declaration.

Shastri's death had very significant repercussions for the Declaration. Most importantly, the personal equation between him and Ayub Khan which could prove the basis for a follow-up action was destroyed. The Times (London), commenting upon Shastri's death wrote, "From these talks, it seems that a fresh trust was built up, and on this trust the future of Mr. Kosygin's mediation would largely have depended. The sad loss of the one member of the trio cuts the personal relationship which had promised to offer some hope."⁸⁰ Ayub Khan was genuinely grieved at Shastri's death. Looking at the dead body of Shastri, he said, "Here is a man of peace, who gave his life for amity between India and Pakistan."⁸¹ Ayub told Pakistani journalists that Shastri was one person with whom he had "hit it off well". "Pakistan and India might have solved their problems if he had lived."⁸² Some Indian journalists have also claimed that certain partition schemes of Kashmir were discussed between the two decision-makers.⁸³ Pakistan's Commerce Minister, Mr. Ghulam Farooq, who was a participant in the Tashkent Conference remarked, "Mr. Shastri and President Ayub Khan had arrived at an excellent equation with each other at Tashkent. A pity it was... this would not be fully exploited because of Mr. Shastri's death."⁸⁴ An observer rightly summed up the significance of the Tashkent Declaration that, "Important though the document is that resulted from those vital talks in Tashkent, what was of still greater significance was the personal confidence and faith that grew between the two leaders during their free and frank exchange of views on issues that caused rift between the two

countries. It was this understanding between the two leaders that constitute the guiding spirit behind the Declaration."⁸⁵ Indeed, the importance of the Tashkent Declaration was largely symbolic, as it primarily depended on the personal equation between Ayub Khan and Shastri.

Notes

1. The Times of India, 6 December 1965
2. Ibid., 8 December 1965
3. Ibid., 1 January 1966
4. Dawn (Karachi), 2 January 1966
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Dawn (Karachi), 4 January 1966
8. Ibid., 2 January 1966
9. The Times of India, 27 December 1965
10. Ibid., 3 January 1966
11. Pravda, 7 January, cited in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XVIII No.1 (1966)
12. The New York Times, 3 January 1966
13. Tashkent is the largest city of Asian part of the Soviet Union, and is only 250 miles away from the Chinese disputed border (Uzbek-Shinkiang). The New York Times, 9 January 1966
14. Ibid.
15. The New York Times, 3 January 1966
16. Bhargava, Success or Surrender, p. 36
17. Dawn, 4 January 1966
18. See the text of the speeches appendix
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.

21. The Times of India, 5 January 1966
22. G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1975), p. 50
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Kuldip Nayar, India: The Critical Years (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971), p. 56. See also The Times of India, 5 January 1966.
27. Dev. Sharma, Tashkent: A Study in Foreign Relations (Varanasi: Gandhian Institute, 1966), pp. 13-14
28. Ibid.
29. Choudhry, p. 51
30. Ibid.
31. The Times of India, 7 January 1966
32. The New York Times, 5 January 1966
33. Choudhry, p. 50
34. The Times of India, 8 January 1966
35. The Times of India, 9 January 1966
36. Dawn (Karachi), 10 January 1966
37. The Times of India, 10 January 1966
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Dawn, 9 January 1966
41. The New York Times, 12 January 1966
42. Bhargese, p. 31

43. Ibid.
44. The Christian Science Monitor, 10 January 1966
45. Choudhry, p. 53
46. Ibid.
47. The Christian Science Monitor, 8 January 1966
48. Michael Edwards, "Tashkent and After", International Affairs (London), July 1966, pp. 381-389

See The Times (London), Editorial, 11 January 1966
49. L. Stpanov, "Indo-Pak Accord", New Times (Moscow), 19 January 1966
49. The Christian Science Monitor, 14 January 1966
50. Choudhry, p. 54
51. The Times of India, 10 January 1966
52. Ibid.
53. The Christian Science Monitor, 11 January 1966
54. The Times of India, 4 January 1966
55. Dawn, 7 January 1966
56. Choudhry, pp. 50-60
57. W.J. Burton, Conflict and Communication (London: Macmillan Co., 1969),
58. Nayyar, pp. 200-210
59. Russel Brines, Indo-Pak Conflict, p.178
60. Nayyar, p. 209
61. Choudhry, pp. 52-54

62. Ibid., p. 54
63. K.B. Sayeed, "The Capabilities of Pakistan's Political System",
Asian Survey (February, 1967), p. 103
64. Young (1972),
65. See the text of the Declaration Appendix.
66. Cited in Sharma, p. 21
67. Hindustan Standard, 11 January 1966, cited in Ibid., p. 23
68. Ibid.
69. Dawn (Karachi), 11 January 1966
70. Cited in Sharma, p. 24
71. Dawn (Karachi), 11 January 1966
72. Ibid.
73. The Times of India, 11 January 1966
74. Ibid.
75. The Times of India, 10 January 1966
76. L. Stepanov, "Indo-Pak Accord" New Times (Moscow), 19 January 1966
77. The Christian Science Monitor, 14 January 1966
78. Ibid.
79. Nayyar, p. 207
80. The Times (London), 11 January 1966
81. Ibid., p. 203
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Statesman (Delhi), 13 January 1966
85. Dawn, Editorial, 12 January 1966

CHAPTER V

THE TRANSFERENCE PROCESS

When the resolution of conflict is attempted through a series of meetings, the stage during which the decision-makers change their perceptions after a limited agreement and pursue their efforts to resolve the conflict is called the transference process. In this context, by transference process we mean the process conducted by the decision-makers to transfer their new perceptions to significant others in their respective nations. A transference process is highly complex and delicate, because a decision-maker has to confront a particular psycho-milieu long nurtured by the mass-media in his nation. The institutionalization of misperceptions and biased perceptions at various levels get firmly entrenched in the socio-political fabric of the society. The vested interests of the various political forces in the society get attached to the institutions of the conflict, and any attempt to resolve the conflict meets serious resistance.

We shall discuss the transference process under four headings; Shastri's death, the consequences of the Tashkent Declaration, disappearance of the Tashkent spirit, and the follow-up by the third party.

Shastri's Death

Immediately after signing the declaration both Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub characterized it as a "victory of common-sense".¹ Shastri added, "If there had been no agreement, the tension would have been much more acute."² Shastri was enthusiastic about the agreement. He told his Defence Minister, "... we fought this war with all our strength. Now we must fight equally for peace with all our strength."³

Unfortunately, Shastri's death in Tashkent changed the whole scenario and "injected a certain element of uncertainty into the situation."⁴ It has been explained in the appraisal of the Tashkent Declaration that the personal equation and the mutual trust established between Ayub Khan and Shastri was the basis of the resolution process achieved at Tashkent. The importance of the Tashkent Declaration was more in spirit than in words. This personal trust between the decision-makers is the essential pre-condition for the transference process because the actual conduct of the process is reciprocal in nature. Both parties need each others' help to come out of their self-made national impasses. Although the care-taker Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nanda, had immediately declared that India would implement the Tashkent Agreement "fully and faithfully", and reaffirmed by the succeeding Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, that "India will honour the pledge given by the late Prime Minister",⁵ yet the loss of one very important member of the trio proved to be an irreparable loss. The fact that the personal

equation between Shastri and Ayub was the basis of agreement was so paramount in the minds of both the parties that several newspapers of India and Pakistan stressed the need for similar meetings between the Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi and President Ayub Khan.⁶ Keeping in view the subsequent events, it is no exaggeration to say that Shastri's death proved to be the demise of the Tashkent spirit as well.

Consequences of the Tashkent
Declaration

The positive consequences of the Tashkent Declaration were very limited. It proved to be a short pause in the hostile India-Pakistan relations. Both parties quickly started implementing the explicit clauses of the Tashkent Declaration mainly pertaining to the problems arising out of the armed conflict. Hostile propaganda was stopped against each other. The sincerity of purpose on the part of Ayub Khan was noted by The Amrit Bazar Patrika that "President Ayub's keenness on the success of Tashkent Declaration will be apparent from the fact that within hours of its being signed, Radio Pakistan's usual anti-Indian propaganda ceased."⁷ Similarly the Pakistani newspapers noted that the Indian embassies had stopped circulating anti-Pakistan propaganda material.⁸ The normal diplomatic relations between the two countries were restored on 12 January, the bulk of the withdrawal of the troops was completed by 25 February, exchange of prisoners and internees was carried out by 15 March and communication links were

restored. Most of the clauses dealing with the peripheral problems were implemented.⁹ The parties reverted to their pre-war positions.

Now we shall turn to the political processes generated as a result of the Tashkent Conference within the political systems of India and Pakistan. An observer, analyzing the trends of public opinion in the two countries had remarked, "Neither Mr. Shastri nor President Ayub have the political strength to sell in their respective countries any solution, which may even remotely look like a compromise."¹⁰ Partly, because of Shastri's death, the political reaction in India was relatively milder, but not insignificant. However, the observers agree that had Shastri lived, he would have been the target of great criticism in general.¹¹ The extreme right wing Hindu Janasangh party and the Praja Socialist Party (PSP) which represented twenty percent strength of the electorates in India, immediately denounced the agreement. Mr. A.B. Vaj Payee, leader of the Janasangh group in Rajiya Sabha described the news from Tashkent as 'shocking' and a 'betrayal'.¹² He said that,

the Prime Minister had repeatedly assured the country that India would not withdraw from Haji Pir Pass, Kargil and Uri Poonch Sectors, unless Pakistan withdrew the infiltrators and gave guarantees that it would not send them again. That assurance had not been adhered to. 13

Mr. Surendra Nath Divedy, leader of the P.S.P. group said that,

the communique represented a victory for the Soviet Union whose entry into South-East Asian politics would create a new situation in the

world. The Prime Minister had virtually succumbed to Soviet pressure just as he had agreed to a settlement in Kutch following British intervention. What Pakistan has failed to get in the Security Council, it has achieved through the Soviet Union. 14

A Congress Parliament member, Mr. Mahavir Tyagi, also resigned as a protest against the withdrawal clause of the Declaration.¹⁵ But overall, the political reaction was not unfavourable. According to one public opinion survey based on the letters to editor in eleven English language dailies published in India between 11 January and 31 January 1966, sixty-six percent approved the Tashkent Agreement while thirty-four percent disapproved.¹⁶ Furthermore, there were also some voices emphasizing that India should adopt imaginative approaches in order to preserve the Tashkent spirit and make unilateral gestures to Pakistan towards the solution of existing problems including Kashmir.¹⁷

In Pakistan, the situation was entirely different. There was an immediate violent political reaction against the Declaration in West Pakistan. East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was relatively calm and more favourable to the Declaration. In West Pakistan during the war public opinion adhered to the view "Now that the showdown has come, let us see it through to a conclusion."¹⁸ The ceasefire was extremely unpopular in the masses. There took place violent and hysteric demonstrations in the cities of West Pakistan against the ceasefire. Between the ceasefire and the Tashkent Conference,

... the entire propaganda machinery of the government and the bulk of the press in the country were solely devoted to reiterating

the Pakistan government's traditional view on Kashmir that there could be no accord between India and Pakistan at least unless effective machinery was set up to resolve the deadlock.... This did little to prepare their readers for an agreement along new lines. 19

Ziring has reported on how the news was received in West Pakistan:

The news of the agreement in Tashkent shocked the Pakistanis, who had expected something quite different. Virtually everyone believed the talks would fail, and preparations were underway to welcome Ayub back as a hero of the people. But when the news was relayed over Radio Pakistan, there was only surprise and dismay. 20

Ayub and the government officials did not explain to the nation why he signed the Agreement. Ayub Khan went into seclusion. Some authors have conjectured that he was deeply affected by Shastri's death and wondered what would happen to the agreement.²¹ Violent students' demonstrations broke out in all important cities of West Pakistan. "One theme explained every thing," wrote an observer, "the President... had sold Kashmir to the Hindu Babus and warlords."²² The demonstration in Lahore depicted the general mood of the nation. The demonstrators shouted "Give us back Kashmir", "We did not surrender in the war, then why did Ayub surrender in Tashkent?" Ziring's following account helps in understanding the psychological atmosphere at that time: "The students were joined by veiled women, who carried children said to be dependents of men killed in war; 'Give us back our husbands, fathers and brothers' pierced the air, and the crowds became more difficult to manage."²³ Four persons were dead, many injured and several hundreds were put

behind bars. Most impartial observers agree that the violent reaction was spontaneous expression of mass feelings.²⁴ The politicians were slow to respond. Ayub Khan in an unscheduled broadcast on 12 January 1966 explained to the nation that, "the Declaration in no way detracted from or damaged our national view point of Kashmir. Their right to choose their future remains inviolate".²⁵ He also said that "Personally, I had a feeling that the Indian Prime Minister was agreeable to what I said but he wanted that we should first normalize our relations and then grapple with the basic issue."²⁶ Appreciating the Soviets' impartiality, he hoped that their continuing interest would also "facilitate the task".²⁷

It was widely believed among the masses that Bhutto was opposed to the Declaration and that he showed true patriotism by standing up to the Indians. There were also rumours that Bhutto asked the President that he be permitted to publicly disassociate himself from the Declaration and that he insisted on resigning from the cabinet. The picture of the final ceremony at Tashkent in which Bhutto looked grim-faced and sad was seen as convincing proof of his 'real patriotism' by the masses. Factually, Bhutto was opposed to the Declaration in the beginning, but finally he himself took an active part in drafting the Declaration as well as in defending it inside and outside the National Assembly.²⁸

The people in East Pakistan felt less emotionally attached to the Kashmir problem. The war enhanced their sense of frustration as

they realized that they were left defenseless, because the bulk of the defence forces were concentrated in West Pakistan. An East Pakistani member of National Assembly raised the question why the security of fifty million people of East Pakistan was endangered for the sake of five million Kashmiris.²⁹ As the movement for regional autonomy was developing roots in East Pakistan, the major political parties in the eastern wing either remained indifferent to the Declaration, or favoured it, declaring that it was in the best interests of the country.³⁰

The causes of Ayub Khan's subsequent down-fall in 1969 were deep-rooted and numerous such as economic injustices, political suppression and the regional disparities. But most observers agree that the Tashkent Declaration marked the fall of Ayub's regime and it was one of the basic "seeds" of his political demise.³¹ Many latent political forces came into the open in order to capitalize on the aroused feelings of the masses. Among the rightist political parties, Nizami-Islam, the Council Muslim League and Jammat-i-Islami outrightly condemned the Tashkent Declaration. Their appeal to the masses had a religious orientation. The opposition parties convened a national conference on 5 February 1966 in order to condemn the Tashkent Declaration and to coordinate their political campaign against the regime.³² Among the seven hundred delegates, only twenty-one represented East Pakistan.³³ The political parties remained sharply divided on coordinating their strategies and the conference ended merely by passing a

resolution, urging the government to abrogate the Tashkent Agreement. On 17 February the government arrested the leading opponents of the Tashkent Agreement. Because of the massive use of police force, the propaganda machinery, the closure of the academic institutions and notably the absence of any dynamic leadership in the opposition, the government was able to weather the storm in the short run. Ayub Khan declared that,

...the miasma of misunderstanding created about the Tashkent Declaration in the country is gradually clearing up. Emotions are yielding place to self assurance and unity in national thought and action.... Patriotic elements have come to appreciate the need and purpose of the Tashkent Declaration. 34

But in fact, he had lost legitimacy as a leader in the eyes of the masses. For example, one writer contrasted the image of Chou En-lai and Ayub in Pakistan in the following words, "Whenever Chou En-lai appeared on news reels in local cinemas there was a loud and prolonged applause; on the other hand, when Ayub's face was seen, there were catcalls and volleys of down-to-earth Punjabi abuse."³⁵

It was Bhutto's opportunity to take advantage of his 'patriotic image' and the peoples' feelings against the Tashkent Declaration. After being dismissed from the cabinet by Ayub Khan (allegedly under the U.S. pressure) in summer 1966, he started his campaign against Ayub Khan. He formed his own political party, the Pakistan Peoples' Party in December 1967. Among many other issues, the threat to disclose the secrets of Tashkent was his most powerful propaganda weapon

against the Ayub regime. He attracted huge crowds everywhere on the pretext of disclosing the 'Tashkent Drama', but never revealed anything.³⁶ He exploited every opportunity to gain popularity. When he was arrested on 13 November 1968, he stated in the court that the true reason of his arrest was that the government feared that he might take the Tashkent affair to the people for their verdict.³⁷ An Urdu daily Kohistan criticizing Bhutto wrote,

Mr. Bhutto is adopting such a mysterious attitude towards the Tashkent Agreement as if he has got some significant secret, the disclosure of which would create havoc. Many a time, he has employed this secret in his public meetings to influence the audience but despite repeated proclamations he has not dared to disclose it.... it is generally believed that either Mr. Bhutto is afraid of placing his character before the people and like a traditional thief he is trying to detract the attention of people from his guilt by shouting thief! thief! or for establishing his own importance he is threatening to disclose a secret which has no existence. 38

Eventually, Ayub Khan had to resign in March 1969, and the Tashkent Declaration proved to be one of the significant factors in undermining his regime.

Disappearance of the Tashkent Spirit

The euphoria of India-Pakistan amity subsided within three months after the Tashkent Declaration, and the Tashkent Spirit, whatever it had been at the time of Shastri's death, faded away completely. The ministerial meeting between India and Pakistan held in March 1966 proved

to be a "miniature Tashkent meeting without Soviet intervention".³⁹

The Indian Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, was evasive on discussing the Kashmir issue, while Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto gave 'the basic issue of Kashmir' the top-most priority. The joint communiqué issued at the end of the ministerial meeting was as ambiguous as the Tashkent Declaration itself.⁴⁰

As admitted by many Indian writers as well, the initiative on the Kashmir dispute lay with India.⁴¹ But Mrs. Gandhi succeeded as Prime Minister in a very unstable political situation and probably was not in a position to take any step on the Kashmir issue. Furthermore, she did not have any personal understanding with Ayub Khan, as Shastri had. The Tashkent Declaration in words was nothing more than a status quo ante bellum, and this purpose had been fulfilled. Mrs. Gandhi announced in Lok Sabha on 24 February 1966 that "India would not have any talks on the status of Kashmir".⁴² Mr. Jagjivan Ram, Union Cabinet Minister said that, "If India and Pakistan can agree on making the 1948 (sic) ceasefire line in Kashmir the international boundary of Kashmir, it will reduce much tension."⁴³

The Indian leaders' statements on Kashmir probably convinced many Pakistanis of the merits of opposition parties' struggle against the Tashkent Declaration and put Ayub Khan in a precarious position. As an architect of the Tashkent Declaration, Ayub Khan had sincerely tried to reduce the level of tension at the expense of his own political position. But the ministerial meeting in March convinced him

that India had no intention of settling the Kashmir issue. Ayub Khan ~~blatantly~~ admitted in a broadcast to the nation on 1 April 1966:

During the ministerial meeting it seemed to us that there was no change of heart on the part of India which was essential for the settlement of disputes and for ushering in an era of peace. The Indian delegation insisted that issues arising out of the war be discussed first. Whilst agreeing with them we said that it was essential to discuss the dispute that had been the root-cause of the conflict i.e. Jammu and Kashmir.... The Indian delegation did concede that there was need to settle the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. But they qualified this by saying that the atmosphere was not yet congenial for this. It is of course not a question of atmosphere but of intention and of desire. How can a congenial atmosphere be created if Indian leaders continue to say that Kashmir is an integral part of India? India should educate her people on the realities of the situation if she wants to prepare public opinion for the settlement of Jammu and Kashmir dispute. 44

Both parties returned to their stereotyped postures. The arms race once again started at a maximum possible speed. Pakistan's defence budget for 1966-67 was U.S.\$473 million, 19 percent of government revenues and 3.1 percent of the Gross National Product.⁴⁵ India's defence build up for 1966-67 was U.S.\$1,171 million, some 17 percent of the revenues and 3.8 percent of the Gross National Product.⁴⁶ India turned towards the Soviet Union and the East Europe countries for arms purchase, and Pakistan mainly relied on China, and later the Soviet Union. By August 1966, both sides accused each other of acquiring new arms. The Indians claimed that Pakistan had doubled its strength since 1965,

as China had promised to deliver 270 tanks and 125 Mig-19 planes.⁴⁷

They also claimed that Pakistan had purchased 50 F-86 jets from western sources.⁴⁸ The Indian Defence Minister declared that Pakistan poses "a long-term and grave threat to India's security. It may suit China to try to attack India through the agency of Pakistani forces. We have to and are taking the necessary steps for the defence of our country."⁴⁹ Pakistan's Foreign Minister alleged that India had purchased 600 tanks, 400 heavy guns, 200 supersonic missiles carrying fighters and 50 naval craft.⁵⁰ He said that India intended to build up an army of twenty-one divisions facing Pakistan and India will soon have a "formidable array of armed forces".⁵¹

The Tashkent Spirit did not last more than three months, and the cold-war resumed with almost the same repeated patterns.

Follow-up by the Third Party

Having achieved a limited agreement between India and Pakistan, the Soviets scored an impressive diplomatic victory in the region. At least in the short-term, they were able to maintain good relations with both India and Pakistan without being partisan on the Kashmir dispute. The propaganda value of the Tashkent Declaration was also immense for the Soviets to project their role as a peace-maker in the world. The United States and Britain welcomed the Agreement and perceived the Soviet Union as a 'mature' and 'status quo' power, more interested in stability than chaos in the world.⁵² The Chinese did their best to

sabotage the conference. On 6 January 1966, they had delivered a strongly worded note to Indians threatening to "resolutely strike back" in response to alleged Indian provocations on the border.⁵³ The Chinese immediately condemned it as a 'neo-colonialists' gathering and 'a product of U.S.-Soviet conspiracy'.⁵⁴

The question arises why the Soviets did not continue their mediatory efforts on Kashmir in view of their long-term interests. There are several possible explanations for that. With the change of the decision-makers in India, the India-Soviet relations came under strain. The Soviets suspected Mrs. Gandhi as a 'figure head' behind whom strong reactionary elements were leading India towards the West.⁵⁵ Mrs. Gandhi's domestic policies such as the flexible policy on the role of the private sector in the industrial development, the invitation to U.S. private capital into public industry, devaluation of the rupee in 1966 (allegedly under U.S. pressure) and increasing food dependence on U.S., aroused the Soviets' concern.⁵⁶ Reportedly, the pro-Russian wing of the Communist Party of India started adopting a militant and destructive posture on the advice of Moscow.⁵⁷ These were presumably pressure tactics. The Radio Peace and Progress established at Tashkent started a vehement propaganda against the right wing elements of the Congress.⁵⁸ Several Indian newspapers criticized the Soviet's maneuvering in the domestic politics of India. Furthermore, there was a growing irritation in India on the Soviets' continuous references to the necessity of settling the Kashmir dispute.⁵⁹ The Statesman correspondent in Moscow reported that,

... the Soviet Union has veered to a neutral stance between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. If some in India still have illusions about Soviet support to New Delhi on Kashmir, they have only themselves to blame. The writing on the wall is there for all to see. 60

When the Soviet Union, in line with their even-handed policy, decided to supply arms to Pakistan in 1968, the Indians strongly reacted. Charles B. McLane observed that "conservative Hindu leaders both in and outside the Congress Party were incensed by what appeared to them to be Moscow's defection from their just cause in Kashmir."⁶¹ At that time there was another dispute going on between India and Pakistan on the Farraka Barrage. Prime Minister Kosygin urged India to settle the Farraka Barrage dispute with Pakistan and to open negotiations on Kashmir.⁶² Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared that India "would not brook any third party interference in Farraka and also announced that the Russian decision to supply arms to Pakistan was fraught with danger".⁶³

The Soviets had also kept a close watch on the domestic politics of Pakistan. They were well aware of the fact that their Tashkent policy was very unpopular in Pakistan. V. Lugovskoy wrote, "In Pakistan the leaders of the right-wing parties, Jamaat-i-Islami, Nizami-Islam, and the Awami League have pooled efforts against the ruling Muslim League, led by President Ayub Khan. They are so hostile to the decisions reached at Tashkent that they say Pakistan will not survive unless she pursues a policy of confrontation with India."⁶⁴ However, the Soviets

developed their relation with Pakistan quickly. This was also partly because of Chinese overtures to Pakistan. By the end of 1967, the Soviet Union had promised to provide assistance in twenty-one heavy projects, amounting to Rs. 875 million.⁶⁵ President Ayub visited the Soviet Union in October 1967 and insisted on arms aid to Pakistan. In April 1968, Kosygin reciprocated by his visit to Pakistan and hoped that "India and Pakistan would resolve their outstanding disputes in the spirit of the Tashkent Declaration".⁶⁶ In May 1968, when Pakistan closed the U.S. strategic communication base, the Soviets finally agreed to provide the arms. According to Indian sources, the arms aid to Pakistan included one hundred 30MM medium guns, two hundred and fifty T/54 tanks, radar and aircraft spare parts.⁶⁷ The Soviet decision to supply arms to Pakistan was affected by several reasons such as Pakistan's increasing reliance on China as an arms supplier in the wake of the United States' continuing arms embargo, the political importance of the army in the country, and to maintain a balance with Indian military strength.

It seems from the above mentioned account of the pattern of the Soviet Union's relationship with India and Pakistan that in view of Mrs. Indira Gandhi's reluctance to discuss Kashmir, Ayub Khan's loss of mass support, and the unpopularity of the Soviets' Tashkent policy in both India and Pakistan, they might not have thought it proper to embark upon another riskier adventure which would have all the probability of failure. Instead, in view of their short-term

interests, they opted for a policy of bilateralism i.e. keeping simultaneously good relations with both the countries. They started providing arms aid to both the countries and thus indirectly supplemented the new cycle of mistrust and hate between the parties to the conflict.

The Soviets kept their neutral policy towards India and Pakistan until the internal crisis of East Pakistan spilled over to an international crisis in 1971. They formally bade good-bye to their Tashkent policy when they entered into a twenty-year treaty of friendship with India in 1971.

Notes

1. Sharma, p. 2
2. Ibid.
3. The Times of India, 11 January 1966
4. The Christian Science Monitor, 14 January 1966
5. Bhargava, Success or Surrender, pp. 26-27
6. The Pakistan Times, 13 1966, The Amrit Bazar Patrika, 15 January 1966. For other references, see Sharma.
7. The Amrit Bazar Patrika, 14 January 1966
8. Dawn, 14 January 1966
9. See the details of the implementation of the Declaration "Operation of the Tashkent Agreements", New Times (Moscow) 12 March 1966
10. The Hindustan Times, 26 November 1965
11. See Sharma, p. 30, Stein, p. 170
12. The Times of India, 11 January 1966
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Sharma, p. 72
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era (N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1971), p. 63
19. The Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 January 1960
20. Ziring, p. 62

21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. See the text of Ayub's speech in Sharma, p. 109
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Choudhry, p. 55
29. See the text of Pakistan's National Assembly debates in Sharma, p. 123
30. See Nurul Amin, Leader of the Opposition Parties' statement in the National Assembly, Ibid.
31. H. Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis, Pakistan 1962-69 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 160
32. Ziring, p. 64
33. Ibid.
34. See the text of Ayub's speech in Sharma, p. 110
35. Tariq Ali, Pakistan Military Rule or Peoples' Power (London: Jonathan Cap, 1970), p. 134
36. At Rawalpindi on 9 March 1969, in the course of his political campaigning, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said at a public meeting that he fought tooth and nail against the Tashkent Declaration and told the Indian delegates that he would not discuss anything unless the Kashmir issue was also discussed. Thereafter, according to him, Ayub Khan took everything into his hand. See Feldman, p. 105
37. N.C. Sahni, Political Struggle in Pakistan (Jullunder: New Academic Publishing Co., 1969), p. 60
38. Kohistan (Lahore), 4 March 1969, cited in Ibid., p. 62
39. Brines, p. 417

40. See the text in Sharma, p. 121
41. See the opinions of various Indian writers; "Let Not Tashkent Spirit Purtrify" in Sharma, p. 35
42. Sharma, p. 139
43. Ibid.
44. Sharma, p. 119
45. Brines, p. 425
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., p. 415
50. The New York Times, 11 August 1966
51. Ibid.
52. For example, the British Prime Minister Mr. Harold Wilson told the House of Commons on 8 February 1966, "The Tashkent Agreement between India and Pakistan showed that Russia had become in economic terms a senior and mature power, more and more with a vested interest in seeing peace and stability and less and less with a vested interest in seeing disturbance and insecurity created." Statesman (10 February 1966), cited in Sharma, p. 48
53. The Christian Science Monitor, 9 January 1966
54. Simon, p. 186
55. Jukes, p. 34, Seth, p. 618
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.

59. The Soviets had continued urging India to settle Kashmir dispute in the post Tashkent period.

See Dawn, 28 August 1966, Indian Express, 26 August 1966

60. An Indian correspondent, "India: Disenchantment with the Soviet Union", Round Table (London), January 1969, p. 87
61. Charles B. McLane, Soviet-Asian Relations (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 56
62. Burke, p. 190
63. Ibid.
64. V. Lougovskoy, "The Anniversary of Tashkent Declaration", International Affairs (Moscow), 1, 1967. p. 91
65. Hasan Zubeida, "Pakistan's Relations with the U.S.S.R. in the 1960's", The World Today, (January, 1969), p. 36
66. Ibid., p. 33
67. India News (Washington), 30 October 1970

CONCLUSION

Analyzing the role of the third party in our case-study, we have shown that a great power, even though perceived as biased, may be acceptable and play an effective intermediary role vis-a-vis smaller powers.

India accepted the Soviet Union's offer because the Indian decision-makers believed that the Soviets would favour them against Pakistan and would help them in maintaining the status quo in Kashmir. The Soviet Union was not an impartial intermediary in the eyes of Pakistani decision-makers because of its complete diplomatic support to India on the Kashmir dispute in the past and continued military support to India during the course of the conflict. But still Pakistan accepted the Soviet Union as an intermediary. Pakistan's acceptance of the Soviet offer was based on the perceived alternatives, interests and expectations from the outcome of the Tashkent Conference. Pakistan's major interest at that time was to keep the Kashmir issue diplomatically alive. For that purpose, Pakistan had tried other available alternatives such as the invitation to other interested parties and the efforts at the United Nations but could not succeed. Pakistan accepted the Soviet offer finally in order to achieve Soviet neutrality on the Kashmir issue, which could have undermined India's main plank of support at the United Nations and might lead to the resolution of the Kashmir

dispute in the long-run. This shows that the impartiality of the intermediary is not a necessary condition and the conflicting parties may accept even a biased intermediary in view of their broader considerations.

The interest of the biased intermediary explains the reasons for its entry into the conflict. It was because of the Soviet Union's long-term interest to establish an exclusive sphere of influence in South Asia that it started adopting a neutral posture on the Kashmir dispute and decided to enter the conflict. However, the Soviet offer was not accepted until the conflicting parties' interests also converged with the third party's interests in the wake of the non-zero sum outcome of the armed conflict. The United States' tacit approval also facilitated the Soviet entry into the conflict.

It was also predominantly because of the Soviet Union's interests that the Soviet Premier, Mr. Kosygin, performed his role effectively and was able to achieve an agreement between India and Pakistan. Mr. Kosygin showed complete impartiality between the conflicting parties in order to establish his credentials for further meetings. As the interests of the Soviet Union depended on the achievement of the agreement, Kosygin worked very hard to bring a rapprochement between the decision-makers of India and Pakistan. Both Ayub and Shastri also granted concessions to each other in view of the Soviet Union's interest as well. Moreover, as a representative of a great power, Kosygin had additional leverage in applying limited pressure and

granting concessions in order to facilitate the achievement of agreement.

Another important characteristic of Kosygin's mediation was that his approach was different from a traditional mediator's approach. Instead of solely concentrating on the solution of the issues, he diverted most of his attention to the perceptual disharmony between the decision-makers. His strategy was two-pronged, to find a solution to at least some small problems and to build a personal trust between the two decision-makers. Finally he succeeded in his efforts in bringing personal rapprochement between Shastri and Ayub, and this proved to be the foundation of the Tashkent Declaration. Kosygin's approach was closer to the social-psychological approaches in the respect.

Shastri's death proved to be the death-knell for the Tashkent Declaration as well. With the succession of the new decision-makers in India, the whole situation changed. During the transference process, Ayub Khan at the expense of his own political career tried to normalize Pakistan's relations with India. But there was no reciprocation from India on the Kashmir issue and consequently Ayub Khan quickly lost his legitimacy as a leader. The Soviets had watched the consequences of their Tashkent policy carefully. There was a growing irritation in India to the Soviets' references to the necessity of settling the Kashmir dispute and there was no gain in Pakistan either, where the Tashkent Declaration had met with strong public disapproval. Moreover, Mrs. Gandhi was an uncertain figure in Moscow, while Ayub Khan was

losing his mass-base. Therefore, presumably, in terms of their cost-benefit evaluation, the Soviets decided not to hold further meetings between India and Pakistan, but opted for the policy of bilateralism, i.e. maintaining simultaneously good relations with India and Pakistan.

POST SCRIPT

There were far reaching political consequences of the war of 1965 for Pakistan. In the post-Tashkent period, many latent political forces appeared on the political horizon, challenging Ayub Khan's 'constitutional autocracy' effectively.¹ Within few months after 1965 war, Sh. Mujib-ur Rahman's Awami League expounded the six-point program for the regional autonomy of East Bengal.² Mr. Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples' Party began dominating the political scene in West Pakistan. Ayub Khan resigned in March 1969 and handed over power to Yahya Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army. In the General Elections held in December 1970 Sh. Mujib's Awami League swept the polls in East Pakistan and Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples' Party won an overwhelming majority in West Pakistan.³ Lack of political compromise between the two regional leaders led General Yahya Khan to seek a military solution of the political problems. The suppression of East Pakistanis escalated into an international crisis and eventual India-Pakistan war of 1971.⁴

In the beginning the Soviet Union watched the brewing political crisis in East Pakistan with caution and restraint. However, Pakistan's efforts to use the Sino-U.S. detente as a counterweight to India changed the whole scenario. The Soviet Union had no hesitation

in supporting India against Pakistan. India, apprehensive of emerging Sino-Pakistan-U.S. detente also hastened to seek firm Russian support and entered into a twenty-year treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. During the war, the Soviet Union fully supported India, while China and the United States supported Pakistan lukewarmly.⁵

The India-Pakistan war of 1971 was a turning point in the history of the India-Pakistan conflict. Unlike the wars of 1948 and 1965, which had resulted in political and military stalemates, India emerged as a clear victor in the war of 1971. The drastic change in the power balance in South Asia also led towards a change in the psycho-milieu of the decision-makers of India and Pakistan. An Indian scholar observed that it was the first time since independence in 1947 that the Indian policy-makers were able to get rid of their obsession with Pakistan.⁶ Perceiving the clear superiority of the 'enemy', Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the new President of Pakistan, also opted for a policy of bilateralism with India.

The Simla Agreement was concluded on 2 July 1972 between India and Pakistan on a bilateral basis without the interference of any third party. In Simla, India wanted to have a 'package deal' with Pakistan including the settlement of the Kashmir question, but Pakistan insisted on a step-by-step approach. The positions of both the parties at Simla were just opposite to their positions taken at Tashkent where India was opting for a step-by-step approach and Pakistan was insisting on a 'package deal' including the Kashmir issue.⁷ In Simla, India demanded

that the ceasefire line in Kashmir be converted into an international boundary, thereby settling the Kashmir dispute on the status quo basis, but Pakistan did not want to bargain on Kashmir from a position of weakness. However, in return for the concessions made by India concerning the withdrawal of troops from Punjab, Pakistan made an important concession to India on Kashmir. Pakistan agreed to the new line of control in Kashmir resulting from the ceasefire of 17 December 1971.⁸ According to the line of control, India retained the area it recaptured at Kargil, Tithwal and Poonch in Azad Kashmir, while Pakistan kept the stretch of land which it overran in Chamb in Indian-held Kashmir. This left India in possession of some strategic points in Kashmir and tactically in a better military position.⁹ According to some Indian sources, Bhutto privately assured Mrs. Indira Gandhi during the Simla meeting that he would not disturb the status quo in Kashmir.¹⁰ It was also interpreted by the Indians that by agreeing to redelineate the Kashmir ceasefire line in Simla, Pakistan has acquiesced in delinking Kashmir from the United Nations. Pakistan, however, does not accept this Indian interpretation.

Bhutto during his regime (1971-1977), tried to defuse the India-Pakistan conflict greatly. He followed the policy of maintaining a status quo in Kashmir. He took many steps to integrate Azad Kashmir with Pakistan, thus undermining Pakistan's traditional stand on the right of self-determination of Kashmiris.¹¹ His policies were parallel to the Indian policies concerning Indian-held Kashmir.¹² But he con-

tinued paying lip-service to Pakistan's traditional stand on Kashmir.

Following the formation of the Janata Government in India, in April 1977, the Indian government has taken new initiatives to settle the Kashmir problem. The Indian Foreign Minister A.B. VajPayee said on 4 April 1977 that Pakistan and India should sign a no-war pact.¹³

Mr. Bhutto declared on 8 April 1977 that Pakistan could consider the proposal only if the Kashmir question was settled.¹⁴ On 17 July 1978, Mr. Desai, the Prime Minister of India, told Pakistani journalists that he was prepared to settle all problems with Pakistan through negotiations including Kashmir.¹⁵ On 5 July 1977 there came a military coup d'état in Pakistan. The care-taker military government in Pakistan is presently in no position to respond to the Indian initiatives because of its preoccupation with the internal political problems.

Apparently the India-Pakistan conflict seems frozen, but in fact the conflict continues because of the institutionalization. The Indian military victory in the 1971 war has enhanced the worst Pakistani fears that India is out to destroy Pakistan. Pakistan's present military strength is equal to its pre-1971 war position.¹⁶ After the nuclear explosion by India in 1974, Pakistan is making frantic efforts to attain nuclear parity with India.¹⁷ The conflict continues in one form or the other. There are no prospects of further mediation on Kashmir currently, as India would not accept any third party's interference into the conflict because of its superior position in the sub-continent. However, there is a possibility that India, in view of its long-term

interests in stabilizing its leadership in the sub-continent, may
propose some partition scheme of Kashmir favourable to Pakistan and
the conflict may be ended.

Notes

1. See for the detailed description of Ayub Khan's political system.
Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967)
2. M. Ayoob, "India and Pakistan: Prospects for Detente", Pacific Community (October 1976), p. 151
3. See the details of the election results in Craig Baxter, "Pakistan Votes", Asian Survey (March 1971)
4. See the two books which deal with the events of 1971 India-Pakistan war:
Robert Jackson, The South Asian Crisis (London: Chatto & Wind, 1975)
G.W. Choudhry, Last Days of the United Pakistan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974)
5. See for a brief account of the Soviet Union and China's policies during 1971 India-Pakistan war and afterward. Sheldon W. Simon, "China, the Soviet Union and the Sub-Continental Balance", Asian Survey (July 1973)
6. Ayoob (1976), p. 155
7. See for a comparative account of the Tashkent and Simla Agreements from an Indian point of view. G.S. Bhargava, Success or Surrender? the Simla Summit (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Ltd., 1972)
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 60
11. Mr. Bhutto implemented a new constitutional arrangement in June 1974 under which Azad Kashmir was integrated with Pakistan through a joint council headed by Pakistani Premier.

12. See for the account of parallel Pakistani and Indian policies on Kashmir in Ayooob (1976).
13. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1978), pp. 29013-29018
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ayooob (1976), p. 155
17. Pakistan's recent deal with France on the Nuclear Reprocessing Plant is notable example. The public opinion in Pakistan strongly favours the government's nuclear policy.

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APPENDIX

TEXT OF THE TASHKENT DECLARATION

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, having met at Tashkent and having discussed the existing relations between India and Pakistan, hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between their countries and to promote understanding and friendly relations between their peoples. They consider the attainment of these objectives of vital importance for the welfare of the 600 million people of India and Pakistan.

(1) The Prime Minister and the President agree that both sides will exert all efforts to create good-neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

(2) They reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. They considered that the interests of peace in their region and particularly in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent and, indeed, the interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan, were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries.

(3) It was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each of the sides set forth its respective position.

(4) The Prime Minister and the President have agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than February 25, 1966, and both sides shall observe the cease-fire terms on the Cease-Fire Line.

(5) They have agreed that relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.

(6) They have agreed that each side will discourage any propaganda directed against the other country, and will encourage propaganda which promotes the development of friendly relations between the two countries.

(7) The Prime Minister and the President have agreed that the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and the High Commissioner of Pakistan to India will return to their posts and that the normal functioning of diplomatic missions of both countries will be restored. Both Governments shall observe the Vienna Convention of 1961 on diplomatic intercourse.

(8) They have agreed to consider measures towards the restoration of economic and trade relations, communications, as well as cultural exchanges between India and Pakistan, and to take measures to implement the existing agreements between India and Pakistan.

(9) They have agreed that they will give instructions to their respective authorities to carry out the repatriation of prisoners of war.

(10) The Prime Minister and the President have agreed that the sides will continue the discussion of questions relating to the problems of refugees and evictions of illegal immigrants. They also agreed that both sides will create conditions which will prevent the exodus of people. They further agreed to discuss the return of property and assets taken over by either side in connection with the conflict.

(11) They have agreed that the sides will continue meetings both at the highest and at other levels on matters of direct concern to both countries. Both sides have recognized the need to set up joint Indian/Pakistani bodies which will report to their Governments in order to decide what further steps should be taken.

(12) The Prime Minister and the President record their feelings of deep appreciation and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and personally to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. for their constructive, friendly and noble part in bringing about the present meeting which has resulted in mutually satisfactory results.

(13) They also express to the Government and friendly people of Uzbekistan their sincere gratitude for their overwhelming reception and generous hospitality.

(14) They invite the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to witness this declaration.

Source: Louis Dupree, "Further Reflections on the Second Kashmir War" pp. 21-22. Cited in Collins, pp. 150-151.

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