

NOTE TO USERS

This reproduction is the best copy available.

UMI[®]

**EUROPEANIZATION OF GREEN PARTIES IN THE NEW
MEMBER STATES: THE CASES OF POLAND AND THE CZECH
REPUBLIC**

By

Anna Gora

**A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of**

Master of Arts

Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies

**Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario**

August, 2010

© 2010, A. Gora



Library and Archives
Canada

Published Heritage
Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Bibliothèque et
Archives Canada

Direction du
Patrimoine de l'édition

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file *Votre référence*
ISBN: 978-0-494-71698-4
Our file *Notre référence*
ISBN: 978-0-494-71698-4

NOTICE:

The author has granted a non-exclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distribute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or non-commercial purposes, in microform, paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright ownership and moral rights in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis.

While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis.

AVIS:

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou autres formats.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur et des droits moraux qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privée, quelques formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de cette thèse.

Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant.


Canada

Abstract

This thesis provides a descriptive study comparing the change, or lack thereof, in levels of Europeanization of the Czech and Polish Green parties between the 2004 and 2009 elections to the European Parliament. The aim is not to explain, but to observe the extent to which Europeanization has occurred and assess what, if anything, this can teach us more broadly about democracy in the European Union with a particular focus on the second-order nature of European elections. Organizing Europeanization into cooperative and communicative varieties reveals a deficit in the communicative Europeanization among the two parties. It is suggested that further communicative Europeanization of national political parties may be the key to overcome the second-order nature of the European Parliament elections.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Achim Hurrelmann, for his invaluable patience, guidance and support throughout the course of this project. Additionally, I would like to thank all of the interviewees in Strasbourg, Prague, Warsaw and Lodz, who generously lent me their time and attention. This project would not have been possible without them. These interviews were made possible thanks to a generous grant from the Centre for European Studies at Carleton University. Finally, I would like to thank Jan Kubu for the time and patience he devoted in assisting with Czech to English translation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	ii
Acknowledgements	iii
Table of Contents	v. 4
List of Tables and Figures	vi
List of Acronyms	vii
Chapter One: Introduction	1
1.1 Why Green Parties?	2
1.2 Transnational Greens: Greens in the EP and the EGP	5
1.3 Research Question	14
1.4 Methodology	15
Chapter Two: Conceptualizing Europeanization	18
2.1 Europeanization as a Concept	19
2.2 Why Europeanization Occurs	21
2.3 How Can Europeanization be Observed?	26
2.4 Europeanization and Political Parties	30
2.5 Cooperative and Communicative Europeanization	35
2.6 Definitions and Analytical Criteria	36
Chapter Three: Zieloni 2004 and Elections to the European Parliament in Poland	42
3.1 The Greens in Poland: From Right to Left	43
3.2 Zieloni 2004	49
3.3 The EP Elections in Poland	55
3.4 Adaptation to the Trajectory of Europeanization	59
3.5 Attempts to Shape the Trajectory of European integration	80
3.6 Conclusion	87
Chapter Four: Strana Zelených and Elections to the European Parliament in the Czech Republic	88
4.1 Strana Zelených: A Party in Three Stages	89
4.2 The EP Elections in the Czech Republic	100
4.3 Adaptation to the Trajectory of European Integration	104
4.4 Attempts to Shape the Trajectory of European Integration	123
4.5 Conclusion	125
Chapter Five: Zieloni 2004 and Strana Zelených: Explaining Variances in Levels of Europeanization	126
5.1 Adaptation to the Trajectory of European Integration	127
5.2 Attempts to Shape the Trajectory of European Integration	133
5.3 Cooperative versus Communicative Europeanization	136
5.4 Possible Explanations of Europeanization by National Context	138
5.5 Conclusion	143

Chapter Six: Conclusion	144
6.1 Significance of the National Cases	145
6.2 Second Order Elections and the Democratic Deficit	146
6.3 Conclusion	148
List of Interviews	150
Bibliography	152
Newspaper Articles Analyzed	158

List of Tables

Table 1: Green Representation in the European Parliament: 1984 to the Present	pg. 9
Table 2: Criteria Identifying Europeanization in Political Parties	pg. 38
Table 3: Changes in Top-Down Europeanization between (2004-2009)	pg. 128
Table 4: Changes in Bottom-Up Europeanization between (2004-2009)	pg. 133

List of Acronyms

CAP	<i>Common Agricultural Policy</i>
CEEC	<i>Central and Eastern European Countries</i>
ČSS	<i>Československá Strana Socialistická</i> (Czechoslovakian Socialist Party)
ČSSD	<i>Česká Strana Sociálně Demokratická</i> (Czech Party of Social Democracy)
DSZ	<i>Demokratická Strana Zelených</i> (The Democratic Green Party)
EFA	<i>European Free Alliance</i>
EFGP	<i>European Federation of Green Parties</i>
EGC	<i>European Green Coordination</i>
EGP	<i>European Green Party</i>
EU	<i>European Union</i>
EP	<i>European Parliament</i>
FE	<i>Forum Ekologiczny</i> (Ecological Forum)
GRAEL	<i>Green Alternative European Link</i>
KDU	<i>Křesťanská a Demokratická Unie</i> (Christian Democratic Union)
MEP	<i>Member of European Parliament</i>
ODS	<i>Občanská Demokratická Strana</i> (Civic Democratic Party)
PKE	<i>Polski Klub Ekologiczny</i> (Polish Ecological Club)
PD	<i>Partia Demokratyczna</i> (Polish Democratic Party)
PRL	<i>Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa</i> (Polish People's Republic)
SDPL	<i>Solcialdemokracja Polska</i> (Polish Social Democracy Party)
SLD	<i>Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej</i> (Democratic left Alliance)
UP	<i>Unia Pracy</i> (Workers' Union Party)

ZS

Zemědělská Strana (Agrarian Party)

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

Since the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, national parties in Europe were no longer only adapting to the participation of their executives in the European Council and the Council of Ministers, but also to the need for ‘Europeanized’ political campaigns and organized competition in European elections. Simultaneously, there surfaced a growing interest in studying the impact of this development on the organization and emergence of party groups in the European Parliament (EP) and transnational party federations, as well its impact on national party politics. These trends towards transnationalization of political parties have not corresponded with an increased interest in elections to the EP.

Among the party families to transform the most on the national and European levels have been the Greens. Existing on some level in most EU member states, whether electorally successful or still developing, the Green party family has maintained some level of transnational ideological consistency, facilitating comparative national studies between member states. There is no doubt in the value of a study of national Greens across the entirety of EU membership. However, one cannot forget the significance that the more recent development of party politics in the majority of the 2004 accession states likely has on their responses to European integration. It is only during the last twenty or so years that most of these countries have not only developed competitive party systems, but also transitioned into sovereign democratic and capitalist systems while meeting the requirements for EU membership.¹ While national parties in the EU15 adapted to Europeanization as individual member states joined the EU, party systems in the East

¹ Luciano Bardi, “EU Enlargement, European Parliament Elections and Transnational Trends in European Parties,” *European View* Vol. 3 (2006): 18.

were literally born into Europeanization and shaped in part by the West during their post communist transitions. Consequently, the limited scope of this study intends to contribute to the wider body of literature on the Europeanization of national political parties by narrowing in on the unique case of parties in Poland and the Czech Republic. Focusing on a single party family in greater detail makes the analysis more manageable² while still providing valuable insights into the effects of Europeanization on party politics in EU member states.

1.1 Why Green Parties?

As mentioned above, the Greens are ideal for national comparisons across member states due to their more-or-less consistent ideological and institutional aims³ and extensive attempts at transnationalization. To date, they represent the largest and most organized transnational party family. In addition, with the socialists, it is one of only two party families to exist across all member states.⁴ While national Green parties tend to each have their own organizational practices, they all commonly draw on some features of the alternative party model originally developed by the German greens,⁵ and share a common vision of a Green Europe “based on the concept of a Europe of the Regions.”⁶ Despite the differences that remain between national Green parties, since 1999 the Greens have been the most cohesive group in the EP with a rating of over ninety percent

² Elizabeth Bomberg, “The Europeanization of Green Parties: Exploring the EU’s Impact,” *West European Politics* 25, No. 3 (2002): 30.

³ Eric H. Hines, “The European Parliament and the Europeanization of Green Parties,” *Cultural Dynamics* 15, No. 3 (2003): 309.

⁴ Simon Hix and Christopher Lord, *Political Parties in the European Union* (St. Martin’s Press, New York: 1997): 38.

⁵ Elizabeth Bomberg and Neil Carter, “The Greens in Brussels: Shaping or Shaped?” *European Journal of Political Research* 45 (2006): 105.

⁶ Wolfgang Rudig, “Green Parties and the European Union,” *Political Parties and the European Union* (Routledge, New York: 1995: 255.

during roll-call votes in the plenary.⁷ Party cohesion, in this context, refers to maintaining a durable party composition and structure, capability to attract the largest possible number of national party delegations from individual EU member states and finally homogeneity in ideology and voting behavior.⁸ The Greens have achieved a high level of cohesion even despite the absence of any sanctioning mechanisms against non-compliance⁹ and the reality that transnational party federations tend to suffer “from the need to respect the specificities and objectives of their national components,”¹⁰ which hampers efficiency in cooperation at the European level. While national party representatives are still faced with a need to justify their actions at the transnational level to their national parties, the Greens have overcome this to a greater degree than any other European party federation. As a result of this, and of their relatively large grouping in the European Parliament, they have also been able to hold strong positions during votes in the EP. Despite coming out of the 2004 EP elections with four fewer seats than in 1999, when joining with the regionalists to form the Greens/European Free Alliance, they became the fourth largest political group in the parliament, with forty-two Members of European Parliament (MEPs); thirty-four of them Green.¹¹ Following the 2009 EP elections, the Greens/EFA continues to be the fourth largest political group with fifty-five members, forty-six of them Green. While no one group in the EP can alone control EU processes and decisions, according to some scholars (see Bomberg and Carter, 2006), their size and cohesion has given the Greens influence over ‘agenda-setting’ and the

⁷ Hines, 317.

⁸ Bardi, 14.

⁹ Hines, 307.

¹⁰ Bardi, 13.

¹¹ Neil Carter, “Mixed Fortunes: The Greens in the 2004 European Parliament Elections,” *Environmental Politics* 14, No. 1 (2005): 103.

'publicizing of issues,'¹² that is much stronger than Greens tend to play at the national level in most EU member states. While not the Union's primary concern, its competence in environmental regulation has increased over the years and environmental issues in the integration process can in many instances be seen as progressive on an international scale.¹³ In addition, as the Greens have over time become more cohesive at the European level, the numbers of EU directives and regulations on the environment have also gradually increased.

Therefore, if the Europeanization of political parties is to be expected in any party family, it is with the Greens. If it cannot be strongly observed here, chances are that among other party families it will be weaker or even non-existent. Despite the emergence of this transnational system of Europarties and a European Parliament that is progressively becoming stronger, authors continue to notice that "the connection between EU citizens and their representatives in the European Parliament is extremely weak."¹⁴ This is witnessed through very low voter turnout in the EP elections compared to elections at the national level, which despite being low in the EU15, is much lower, ranging at about twenty percent in most of the new member states. The 2004 elections to the EP saw the largest decline in voter turnout since 1979 and this was primarily a result of the accession of the new members.¹⁵ It has been noted that the low turnout, among other factors relating to the actual electoral campaign, result in the second-order nature of EP elections. This contributes to a democratic deficit in the European Parliament as an

¹² Elizabeth Bomberg and Neil Carter, "The Greens in Brussels: Shaping or Shaped?" *European Journal of Political Research* 45 (2006): 115.

¹³ Hines, 308.

¹⁴ Simon Hix, et. al., *Democratic Politics in the European Parliament* (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2007): 26.

¹⁵ Mark Franklin, "European Elections and the European Voter," in *European Union: Power and Policy Making* 3rd Edition, Ed. Jeremy Richardson (Routledge: New York, 2006): 233.

institution,¹⁶ and indirectly contributes to the greater democratic deficit of the European Union that has been at the centre of academic debate on the EU. European elections have been labeled as second-order due to their low voter turnout and the national nature of their campaigns. Campaigns in most member states are largely based on national issues, which have little to do with the competencies of the European Parliament, rather than European issues. National media coverage of the elections also follows this trend. Attempts to explain the second-order nature of the elections have suggested that European-level politics have exceptionally low salience among European citizens,¹⁷ providing little motivation for parties to run European campaigns and even less motivation for citizens to go out and vote in EP elections. Assessing cases of party Europeanization and the degrees to which it occurs in the more likely case of the Greens may prove essential to better understanding this second-order nature of elections to the European Parliament. Depending on what we learn about how and when traces of Europeanization occur, we can then determine if an increased Europeanization of political parties may potentially assist in increasing the salience of EU politics among voters and contribute to improving the second-order nature of EP elections.

1.2 Transnational Greens: Greens in the European Parliament and the European Green Party

Green parties first emerged across Western Europe in the 1980s, beginning with the British Ecology Party and German Die Grünen, and motivated by the environmental and anti-nuclear concerns that had gained prominence in the 1970s. By 1984 the first Greens had gained seats in the European Parliament, as EP elections have a tendency to

¹⁶ Simon Hix and Michael Marsh, "Punishment or Protest? Understanding European Parliament Elections." *The Journal of Politics* (69(2) 2007): 507.

¹⁷ Andrew Moravcsik, "In Defence of the Democratic Deficit; Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, No. 4 (2002): 615.

favour small parties. Pressure from existing EP regulations, that advantage organized groups over non-attached members and national parties, provided incentive for the Greens to cooperate with other parties despite initial hesitancy to adapt to the mainstream political system. Because EU rules at the time stipulated that party groups within the EP must be comprised of at least ten MEPs from a minimum of three member states (Greens on their own had only nine MEPs), they cooperated with the regionalists, Danish Eurosceptics and Italian Radicals to form the Green Alternative Europe Link (GRAEL), also known as a subgroup of the larger Rainbow Group.¹⁸ By 1989 their electoral success earned them enough seats to form the Green Group in the European Parliament¹⁹ with a membership of thirty Green MEPs from six of twelve member states. The group has since toned down much of its initial Eurosceptic and anti-institutional attitudes to embrace the EU as an agent of environmental reform.

Since their early days in the EP, the Greens have undergone much political development and change to become increasingly professionalized and institutionalized in stark contrast to their grassroots ‘anti-party’ beginnings.²⁰ By 1999, the Green Group in the EP joined a pre-existing group to form the Greens/European Free Alliance;²¹ a decision that Eric H. Hines claims is a reason behind their high levels of influence and cohesion in the EP to date. He writes that this facilitated their Europeanization and “...socialization into the ‘culture’ of the EP.”²² By joining an already existing group so early on, the Greens were able to benefit from the EFA’s institutional and organizational

¹⁸ Hines, 315.

¹⁹ Rudig, *Green parties...* 254.

²⁰ Bomberg and Carter, 108.

²¹ In 1984, the European Free Alliance was composed of seventeen parties representing ‘Europe’s stateless nations, regions and disadvantaged minorities’. Today it has the official status of a transnational ‘Europarty’ with thirty-three member parties, five of which are represented in the European Parliament.

²² Hines, 316.

experience. Elizabeth Bomberg quotes a long-serving member of the EP secretariat who said that “‘The Greens are mainstream now.’ In other words, Greens have been socialized.”²³ This analysis will assess whether the cooperation of Central and Eastern European Green parties with European level groups and organizations, such as the Greens in the EP and the EGP, may have led to similar processes of Europeanization at the national party level in the CEECs.

Today the Greens/EFA has developed a relatively hierarchical structure within its executive bureau, much like the other groups in the EP. However, unlike the other groups, it has a co-presidency typically shared between a man and a woman²⁴ to ensure gender balance, an issue that has become one of the key commonalities among national European Greens and is reflected in most national party structures. The bureau also has seven vice presidents, including a treasurer. The first vice presidency is reserved for the president of the European Free Alliance. With regards to the left-right spectrum, the Greens/EFA is currently positioned between the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe and the Socialists and Democrats in the EP.

While a remarkable degree of ideological cohesion has been accomplished through increased professionalization and compromise in order to get to this point, it cannot be ignored that internal conflicts continue to exist within Green parties on both the European and national levels. While Greens have been gaining political representation in governments at the municipal, national and the European levels over the years, an ongoing debate has consequently evolved between the fundamentalist (‘fundis’) and pragmatist (‘realos’) camps. Fundamentalist factions within Greens have been those

²³ Bomberg, *The Europeanization of...* 41.

²⁴ However, selection procedures are designed in such a way that there is also the possibility of a co-presidency shared between two women, but never between two men.

opposed to change, maintaining a more grassroots ideal of ‘deep ecology’ and calling for radical change resistant to compromise and political strategies. The pragmatic factions, on the other hand, have accepted that some compromise must be made with traditional parties to ensure influence, electoral success and access to institutions while maintaining an incremental process towards environmental and social change.²⁵ Elizabeth Bomberg and Neil Carter explain that “it is better to win and use power to achieve real, albeit incremental Green gains, than it is to maintain ideological purity outside of government but achieve nothing concrete.”²⁶ It is mainly the pragmatic or ‘realo’ Green members who have made the extent of the Greens’ electoral success and cohesion at the European level possible.

However, these factions continue to stir up internal disputes mainly at the national level, with ramifications for EP elections. In fact, the only drop in Green representation in EU elections preceding those in 2004 occurred in 1994 (see table 1) when France lost all of its Green MEPs. As a result of very public disputes between the ‘realo’ and ‘fundi’ camps of Les Verts, the party was unable to present a unified front and lost most of its electoral support damaging the general success of European Greens in the EP.²⁷ Such disputes are not only unique to western Greens but have also more recently been seen among Green parties in the new member states, especially the Czech Republic’s Strana Zelených who experienced similar internal factions with the decision to join a national governing coalition with the Civic Democrats and Christian Democrats under former prime minister Mirek Topolánek in 2007 (the coalition later collapsed due to a vote of non-confidence in March 2009). The Czech case will be discussed in greater detail in

²⁵ Hix and Lord, 38.

²⁶ Bomberg and Carter, 99.

²⁷ Hines, 311.

chapter three. However, it is important to keep in mind that the very different origins of the Greens in new member states, and especially the communist legacies of these countries, often result in a hesitancy to be associated with radical leftist ideologies once electoral success at the national level is reached. This has led to further disputes between national, particularly the Czech Greens, and the Greens at the European level.

Table 1: GREEN REPRESENTATION IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: 1984 TO THE PRESENT

1984-1989		1989-1994		1994-1999		1999-2004		2004-2009		2009 - 2014	
Green MEPs	GR-AEL	Green Group in the EP		Green Group in the EP		Green MEPs	Greens /EFA	Green MEPs	Greens /EFA	Green MEPs	Greens /EFA
9	20	30	\	23	27*	38	48	34	42	46	55

*1995: 4 new members gained with entry of Austria, Finland, Sweden

Source: European Navigator <<http://www.ena.lu/>>

Outside of the European Parliament, Greens began forming transnational European links much earlier than most other parties; starting during the late 1970s with the European Green Coordination (EGC) and followed up with the European Federation of Green Parties (EFGP) in 1993 in preparation for the upcoming EP elections.²⁸ Such early initiatives to transnationalize are likely a result of the Greens' grassroots beginnings and the transnational nature of the environmental issues that they deal with. Despite the EFGP having been created to speak with a single voice representing European Green parties during European elections, from the beginning the group was open to all European Greens, even those outside of the EU, a characteristic that made them different from other European party federations. As a result, a number of Green parties in the 2004 accession states were already active members of the EFGP even prior to the enlargement. In 1998 the EGC already included members from eight CEECs, five of which are now EU

²⁸ David Hanley, *Beyond the Nation State: Parties in the Era of European Integration* (Palgrave Macmillan, New York: 2008):168.

members: Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic.²⁹ Today, under the European Green Party, Greens continue to emphasize the importance of a wider more inclusive concept of Europe. It has also been argued that the Greens' success in achieving consensus and common positions has been possible due to an emphasis on a unity based on commonalities rather than an attempt to eliminate differences.³⁰

Given that Green parties in western Europe were born out of the environmental and social movements of the 1970's, from the very beginning they were concerned with more than just environmental issues; a trend that exists today in various degrees among Green parties in both the new and old member states. Already in 1984, organized in the EP under GRAEL, the Greens were able to develop common positions despite some national differences. These included:

...opposition to deployment of nuclear missiles in East and West Europe; a no compromise policy on the environment; equal rights for women and minorities; a new economic policy on employment and social benefits; reorganization of economic relations between Europe and the Third World; free exercise of fundamental civil rights; and ecological forums of agriculture.³¹

While remaining vague due to the group's diversity, the Greens were beginning to 'transnationalize' or in other words work their way towards common goals and the ideological cohesion that they currently display in the EP. Today the Greens develop common positions through a joint manifesto that is established in consultation with all of the parties prior to each EP electoral campaign at Campaign Congresses of the EGP. In theory, this manifesto is intended to shape the national EP electoral campaigns around common themes and in a common direction. However, in practice, the extent to which

²⁹ Thomas M. Dietz, "Similar But Different? The European Greens Compared to Other Transnational Party Federations in Europe," *Party Politics* 6, no. 2 (2000): 201.

³⁰ Hines, 319.

³¹ Elizabeth Bomberg, *Green Parties and Politics in the European Union* (Routledge, New York: 1998):104.

this makes it into the electoral campaign of national parties varies by member state and even individual candidates. While still relatively general, to balance national disparities among member Green parties, the EGP Manifesto for the 2009 European election campaign has come a long way in developing a ‘European’ perspective on the Greens’ goals. Outlined in a concise eight pages, these include: Combating climate change; investing in renewable energy sources; investing in a sustainable transport system; banning Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs); investment in education, science and research; strengthening workers’ rights; promotion of participatory democracy; gender equality; digital rights; asylum policy.³² The issues aim to be European in scope, remaining flexible to accommodate differing national needs.

The EFGP decided to form the European Green Party, in accordance with the *regulations governing political parties at European level* in Article 191 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, at its Congress in Malta in 2003. It was officially launched in Rome in February 2004, in time to participate in the EP elections in June of that same year. Differentiating it from the transnational network nature of the EFGP, the EGP has official party status within the European Union and is governed by the EU treaties. As a transnational federation, the EFGP was a relatively weak institution in terms of visibility and especially financial resources.³³ Organization into a Europarty now allows the Greens to run a transnational campaign in EP elections with the possibility of a truly ‘Europeanized’ agenda as well as receive funding and support from the European Commission. However, any financial resources received from the EU budget cannot be

³² “A Green New Deal for Europe,” *Manifesto for the European election campaign 2009* (European Green Party, Brussels: 2009).

³³ Bardi, 13.

used to fund national political parties, even if they are members of the Europarty.³⁴ Neil Carter writes that the decision to officially establish the EGP was clearly influenced by a consciousness of the challenge of securing a ‘wider and larger’ representation in the aftermath of the 2004 enlargement. This is especially clear given the youth of Greens in the CEECs who could greatly benefit from the ‘resources, organization and experience’ of the Greens in the west.³⁵ While the EGP cannot provide these parties with funding, the resources can go towards cross-border events, information and publications, and a transnational EGP campaign that can be used by the national parties. Party manifestos have been developed for the last two EP election campaigns. Each time they were used to different extents in different member states, but usually failing to mention the EGP and hence not improving its visibility.³⁶ Despite the newly formed EGP enthusiastically running its first transnational campaign in 2004 with representation in each EU member state, the environment still failed to become a major visible issue in the 2004 European election.³⁷ Their electoral success did increase in the 2009 elections where they managed to form the largest Green parliamentary group ever, with forty-six MEPs, mainly due to the tremendous success of the *Les Verts* in France.³⁸ However, the Greens still failed to secure a single seat in any of the new member states despite increases in networking initiated by the EGP, Greens in the EP and Greens in the new member states. According to Eurobarometer data, environmental issues still have especially low political salience

³⁴European Union, “Regulation (EC) No 1524/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2007 amending Regulation (EC) No 2003/2004 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding,” *Official Journal of the European Union*, Brussels, 2007: Article 7.

³⁵ Carter, 110.

³⁶ Hanley, 174.

³⁷ Carter, 105.

³⁸ *Les Verts* won fourteen seats, seven more than they had in 2004. Greece also elected its first Green MEP. Meanwhile, Italy lost both of the seats it held in 2004. Belgium’s *Ecolo* (Wallonia), Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden each gained one more seat than in the previous election.

among the CEECs. This is a challenge that is likely to be taken even more seriously by all three groups in the time leading up to the upcoming election in 2014.

The Greens suffered a minor decrease in their number of seats in the European Parliament following the 2004 elections, which were coincidentally the first European elections in the enlarged EU25. They won thirty-four seats in the EP, compared to thirty-eight in 1999. While this was not the first time the Greens have suffered such a loss (see Table 1),³⁹ this time it came as a direct consequence of the eastern enlargement. This loss can be attributed to a nine percent reduction in seats available to the EU15 due to a redistribution of seats to the new member states, coinciding with the failure of any Green Parties to be elected from among the new members.⁴⁰ Aware of the weak position of Greens in the new member states, the European Green Party (EGP) has identified the election of Green MEPs from the 2004 EU accession states as integral to maintaining the strength of the Greens in the EP following the 2009 parliamentary elections.⁴¹ There have been numerous efforts for communication with the green parties in new member states not only as initiatives of the EGP, but also coming directly from the Greens in the European Parliament. The current deputy secretary general of the Greens/European Free Alliance, Joachim Denking, emphasized that, “It is very important for us [the Greens] to become a true European Party in the post-2004 meaning or maybe even the post-2007 [meaning] after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria.”⁴² On the other hand, Greens in the new member states are reaching out to the older and more experienced national

³⁹ Despite the German Greens achieving a record vote and the first Greens being elected from Luxembourg and Ireland, the Greens lost all of their French and Portuguese MEPs in the 1994 elections to the European Parliament resulting in a loss in seats for the Greens Group in the EP. In France, this loss was related to internal disputes within the party, *Les Verts*, resulting in factions and the formation of a breakaway party.

⁴⁰ Carter, 103.

⁴¹ Carter, 110.

⁴² Joachim Denking, interview by author, Strasbourg, France July 14, 2009.

Greens in the EU15 as well as Greens at the European level. This thesis is hence concerned with the effects of this communication. It aims to assess if and to what degree there has been a Europeanization of Green Parties in the Central and Eastern European member states (mainly Poland and the Czech Republic) between the 2004 and 2009 elections to the European Parliament.

It is important to remember that while the EGP, Greens/EFA and EP elections are major outlets through which Green parties interact and are influenced by the EU, they are just three of a number of platforms through which Green parties in the new member states can experience the Europeanization process. Green parties with electoral success at the national level who end up in government are also significantly affected by participation in the European Council and Council of Ministers. As members of national executives, they experience the European Union from a much different perspective than MEPs and consequently some parties report a detachment between party executive and other party members. That is, ministers frequently become isolated from the work and concerns of MEPs.⁴³ Despite the significance of these two dynamics, this paper is primarily concerned with the formation of transnational links at the European level in the context of European elections.

1.3 Research Question

This thesis provides a descriptive study comparing the change, or lack thereof, in levels of Europeanization of the Czech and Polish Green parties between the 2004 and 2009 EP elections. It asks if there has been a Europeanization of these parties and if so, to what degree? The purpose is not to explain Europeanization, but rather to observe the extent to which it has happened and assess what, if anything, this can teach us more

⁴³ Bomber and Carter, 114.

broadly about democracy in the European Union. It suggests that the Europeanization of national political parties may be needed to overcome the second-order nature of the European Parliament elections.

1.4 Methodology

The analysis will focus on the timeframe of the campaigns preceding the 2004 European parliamentary elections, 10-13 June, to the 2009 EP elections, 4-7 June. This allows one to trace the effects of communication between transnational Greens and Greens in the new member states from approximately the founding of the EGP and EU enlargement to the most recent European election. In chapters three and four, the study narrows in on the Europeanization of the Polish and Czech Green parties, *Zieloni 2004* and *Strana Zelených* respectively, followed by a comparative analysis of the two parties in chapter five. The specific criteria defining Europeanization for the purpose of this project and how they have been measured are explained in detail in chapter two, which establishes the theoretical approach to Europeanization as it is used for this thesis. All empirical data has been accumulated through a series of interviews which took place between of 29 June to 24 July, 2009 as well as a comprehensive text analysis of national media, party manifestos and press releases. There are fourteen interviews in total including five with party members of Zieloni 2004, five with Strana Zelených and four with MEPs and administration of the Greens/EFA. The press examined covers the sixteen days prior to both the 2004 and 2009 EP elections, which is the legal period of the electoral campaign in the Czech Republic. In Poland, campaigns may begin twenty-four hours following the announcement of the election dates. However, for the purpose of consistency and equal comparisons, the time frame of sixteen days was selected for this

analysis. The consulted newspapers include Poland's *Rzeczpospolita*, the leading national centre-right daily and *Gazeta Wyborcza*, the leading national centre-left daily as well as the Czech Republic's *Lidove Noviny*, the leading right-wing national daily and *Právo*, the leading left-wing national daily. Detailed methodological steps are discussed at the end of chapter two, including a description of how the idea of Europeanization is operationalized.

Poland and the Czech Republic provide the main case studies as a result of their large size proportionally with regards to representation in the European Parliament. Poland with fifty-four seats in the EP and the Czech Republic with twenty-four are among the largest of the 2004 accession countries. Additionally, they were among the top three countries (in addition to Slovenia), that the transnational European Green Party had singled out as being of particular significance to the success of the Greens in the 2009 EP elections. Both parties ran candidates unsuccessfully in the 2004 EP elections and both are members of the European Green Party as well as officially affiliated with the Green Group in the European Parliament.

These two countries also provide a contrasting scenario regarding the prominence and success of their Green parties at a national level. The Polish Green party, Zieloni 2004, is a recently established left-leaning political party in Poland officially registered on 23 February 2004. Despite running candidates in national, municipal and EP elections, Zieloni 2004 has not been successful in winning seats at any level. In contrast, the Czech centre-liberal Strana Zelených is one of the original parties to emerge around the time of transition in 1990 and has had some success at a national level. Until recently, it was part of a governing coalition with the Civic Democrats and the Christian

Democrats. The coalition collapsed on 24 March 2009 however, following a parliamentary vote of non-confidence in part caused by internal factions within the Greens. Although the Czech Republic is not the only 2004 CEE accession state with twenty-four seats in the European Parliament (Hungary also has twenty-four), it was the more likely for a Green MEP to be elected in the 2009 European election based on its relative success at the national level.

The theoretical framework defined further in chapter two establishes Europeanization as a two-way process in which domestic Green parties conform to the EU while simultaneously attempting to influence Green politics at the European level. This thesis will examine empirical data to determine whether there is an imbalance in this process of Europeanization whereby the two national Green parties studied are found react to European integration to a larger degree than they are able to influence it. Having taken into account the parties' different points of departure in 2004, especially that the Czech Greens are older and better established, this thesis will also assess whether the 'degree of change' with regards to Europeanization is consequently higher in the Czech case.

CHAPTER TWO CONCEPTUALIZING EUROPEANIZATION

Since the signing of the Single European Act, the European integration process has had an increasingly noticeable impact at the national level, particularly the national political arena. As more and more policy areas creep up to the European political level as they are progressively harmonized across the EU, the policy space available to political parties nationally is gradually limited.⁴⁴ Parties are now faced with a multifaceted political system where they not only compete for influence and representation in local government and national parliaments, but the European Parliament as well. For environmental actors in the new member states, including Green Parties, EU enlargement marked a shift in the key actors shaping domestic environmental policy and regulations from the national to the EU political arena.

Despite EP elections developing a reputation of being ‘second-order’ to those at the national level, the EP has become progressively more influential in EU decision-making over the years and the national parties and their executives are not oblivious to this. In addition, as EP elections can also be used as a measure of voter support in between national elections, these changes have led to a “mobilization of new political alternatives in [European] elections as well as in national [ones]”⁴⁵ among national political parties. Consequently, numerous transnational links between parties are formed at the European level and European parties and party federations continue to emerge. This is especially true of the Greens, who have consistently performed better in EP elections than nationally in most member states. European integration has also opened up

⁴⁴Peter Mair, “Political Parties and Party Systems,” in *Europeanization: New research Agendas*, Ed. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Palgrave Macmillan, New York: 2007): 159.

⁴⁵ Martin P. Vink and Paolo Graziano, “Challenges of a New Research Agenda,” in *Europeanization: New research Agendas*, Ed. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Palgrave Macmillan, New York: 2007): 11-16.

new policy arenas in the European Council and Council of Ministers for parties present in national executives. Therefore, when speaking of Europeanization, this paper refers to the changes occurring at the national level in response to the above-mentioned manifestations of European integration. The chapter first looks at Europeanization as a general concept, followed by a discussion on how Europeanization can be observed. It then moves on to examine the Europeanization of political parties in particular, followed by a proposed distinction between cooperative and communicative Europeanization. Finally, the definition of Europeanization as used in this thesis is outlined and the criteria with which it is measured are explained in detail.

2.1 Europeanization as a Concept

Before one can begin to delve into the study of Europeanization, it is essential to note that Europeanization itself is not a theory but a concept or phenomenon brought about as a reaction to European integration, that itself can be explained by various theoretical approaches.⁴⁶ Literature on Europeanization has generally fallen into one of two broad categories. The first and much older body of literature approaches Europeanization as a process involving the creation of institutions at the *European level* as a result of increased transnational cooperation or ‘integration’. This can be characterized by Risse, Cowles and Caporaso’s definition of Europeanization which sees it as:

The emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political problem-solving that formalizes interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Simon Bulmer, “Theorizing Europeanization,” in *Europeanization: New research Agendas*, Ed. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Palgrave Macmillan, New York: 2007): 56.

⁴⁷ Tanja Borzel, and Thomas Risse, “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe,” *The Politics of Europeanization*, Ed. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (Oxford University Press: New York,

These authors' work tends to look more towards the origins and development of European governance as opposed to the domestic consequences of European integration. The second, more recent, body of literature concerns itself with the impact of European integration, or more specifically, the European Union, on the *domestic* arena.⁴⁸ It is this second approach within which research into the Europeanization of national political parties and systems falls and is the main emphasis of this thesis. A number of authors have identified empirical gaps specifically with regards to the availability of comparative literature and case studies on the Europeanization of political parties and interest groups at the national level (Bomberg, 2002; Bulmer, 2007; Mair, 2007). Elizabeth Bomberg writes that because "the Europeanization of parties is neither direct, precise nor easily identifiable,"⁴⁹ studying parties is difficult and consequently there exists a lack of empirical data. This study attempts to contribute to filling these gaps.

Much has been written on Europeanization and it is certainly not a concept with a consistent and widely accepted definition or scope. Various scholars approach it in different ways across numerous disciplines including international relations, comparative politics and sociology, among others. However, the majority of this literature shares one key dynamic which Bomberg defines as "the penetration of the European dimension on the national arena."⁵⁰ The first phase of research on Europeanization of the national arena consists of a strictly hierarchical top-down approach, like that of Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, who define it simply as "a process in which states adopt EU

2003): 59.

⁴⁸ Mair, *Political parties and...*, 155-6.

⁴⁹ Bomberg, *The Europeanization...*, 29.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 32.

rules.”⁵¹ However, such definitions may risk confusion of the term with European integration itself. Additionally, it cannot be ignored that the impact of European integration has much more complex and far reaching consequences moving beyond simply the national adaptation of EU rules and directives. While these are definite *direct* consequences of integration, it is being increasingly realized that through activity at the European level and official adaptation to it at the national level, it also has vast *indirect*, yet still profound effects making it a lasting natural part of national politics. More generally, we can think of Europeanization as the impact of EU policies, processes, discourses, administrative structures and institutions on the national arena in order to explain changes in domestic actors, structures, institutions, or entire member states.⁵² Therefore, some more recent approaches to the question of Europeanization try to understand how new opportunities and constraints under the European Union affect national politics.⁵³ In other words, the changing European political and social environment is bound to have some influence on national actors’ activities and identities providing new opportunities and venues for activity on the one hand, while restricting some on the other. As the environment in which national actors operate changes, they are likely to adapt to these changes, whether or not EU legislation requires them to.

2.2 Why Europeanization Occurs

Being itself a result of European integration, numerous larger integration theories have addressed and tried to explain the results of Europeanization and why it takes place. Understanding why it occurs is important in developing criteria and a methodology for

⁵¹ Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe.” *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*. Ed. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (Cornell University Press: London, 2005): 7.

⁵² Bomberg, *The Europeanization...*, 29.

⁵³ Martin P. Vink and Paolo Graziano, 4.

how it can be observed. Among these, the rationalist and constructivist schools provide useful models explaining possible mechanisms through which Europeanization may occur. In simplified terms, a rationalist perspective sees a potential ‘misfit’ between EU and national processes, policies and institutions as providing national actors, such as political parties, with both new opportunities and constraints in order to pursue their interests. Change at the national level is hence *direct* and occurs as a consequence of formal pressures from the European arena. According to constructivists, European institutions, policies and norms all have attached ‘collective understandings’ that exert adaptation pressures and engage in discursive processes of persuasion with national actors.⁵⁴ Here, change at the national level occurs *indirectly* through a process of socialization. Despite stemming from two distinct schools of thought, these two theoretical approaches are not mutually exclusive, but must rather be seen to coexist, explaining different phases in, and motivations behind the process of Europeanization. For example, it is important to remember that to a large extent, this everyday social interaction and the communication processes between Green parties at a transnational level come about as a result of “strategic and self-interested behaviour”⁵⁵ of the national parties. These individual interests and identities however, are shaped by discourse and interaction, hence illustrating just how strongly these two approaches are intertwined. However, in discussing Green parties, the constructivist approach provides a stronger model for the mechanisms behind the Europeanization process since pressures highlighted in rationalist accounts are not as strong for political parties as they are for other national actors. Most official EU rules and regulations do not concern national

⁵⁴ Tanja A. Borzel and Thomas Risse, 58.

⁵⁵ Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Social Construction and Integration,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 6, No. 4 (1999): 546.

parties directly. Rather, European integration is able to socialize parties, gradually changing their world views and widening the scope of their activities from solely the national level to include the larger and wider European level as well.

From a constructivist view of European integration, much has been written about the emergence, or rather construction, of a European public sphere as a stage for common discourse; that is, the transnational politicization of and debate on European issues. A common public sphere and the resulting shared frames of reference and interpretation are considered by many as essential to the construction and spread of a common or at least harmonized identity. Transnational networks, like the European Green Party or Greens in the EP for example, can therefore be seen as a type of public sphere for the Green political family, or as Thomas Risse writes, “a transnational community of communications.”⁵⁶ Through communicating and interacting across national borders, European Greens are constructing their own public sphere. By participating in this new social environment, Greens in the new member states become socialized in its norms and to a certain degree this participation defines their identities. Domestic actors, including political parties can hence be thought to change or adapt in response to European integration in two general ways; one environmental and the other communicative in nature. The first, according to Tanja A. Borzel and Thomas Risse focuses on institutional isomorphism where actors (i.e. political parties) that regularly interact with one another or are located in the same or similar environments will begin to exhibit similarities over time.⁵⁷ However, to account for the differential impact of Europeanization that numerous authors have documented across different parties and member states, one must recognize

⁵⁶ Thomas Risse, “Social Constructivism and European Integration,” *European Integration Theory, Second Edition* Ed. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (Oxford University Press, New York: 2009): 150.

⁵⁷ Tanja A. Borzel and Thomas Risse, 66.

that in the case of a political party, despite acting and communicating across a common sphere, complete structural and ideological convergence is inhibited due to parties' necessity to satisfy both their European and national needs. In each case certain concessions must be made to maintain a healthy balance between both environments within which parties must now act. The second way in which actors can adapt in response to Europeanization is an agency centered version of change where actors adapt to norms and ideas in order to become members of a group;⁵⁸ in this case it could be parties opting for membership of the EGP or Green Group in the EP. Here parties are socialized towards new norms through various communicative processes, that is, discourse, including debate and social-learning among others. Discourse here refers not only to language, but to the entire communicative and interactive processes that political parties are engaged in nationally and transnationally. The Europeanization process can therefore be seen to stimulate and construct discourse, which leads to a growing interdependence between various actors and consequently socialization and national change.⁵⁹ This interdependence between the national and European levels of Greens is defined in detail by the specific criteria outline later in this chapter.

Social learning is generally more likely to occur in some situations over others. Typically, it is more likely in groups where individuals and members share common backgrounds, meet repeatedly and exhibit a high density of interaction.⁶⁰ Green party membership in increasingly more active transnational groups such as the EGP and especially MEP interaction in the Green Group in the EP exhibits prime conditions for

⁵⁸ Tanja A. Borzel and Thomas Risse, 66.

⁵⁹ Claudio M. Radaelli and Romain Pasquier, "Conceptual Issues," in *Europeanization: New research Agendas*, Ed. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Palgrave Macmillan, New York: 2007): 38-43.

⁶⁰ Checkel, 549.

the socialization of national Greens. Additionally, socialization and adaptation is more likely in cases where a particular group feels it is in crisis.⁶¹ Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda have developed a theory of party change that fits closely with this idea of socialization and social learning. They write that “environmental ‘stimuli’ may act as important catalysts for the process that ultimately results in change,”⁶² especially when these stimuli cause external shock leading parties or party groups to reevaluate their effectiveness in reaching their primary goals. Additionally, shocks can also be perceived as new opportunities provided at the EU level. For political parties, such external shocks may include environmental changes such as constitutional reforms, provisions for public funding, the birth of new relevant parties, transnational groups or party families or changes to the electoral success of a particular party.⁶³ For the Greens at the European level, such environmental shocks have included the EU’s 2004 and 2007 Eastern enlargements, the related redistribution of seats in the EP resulting in losses in the EU15, and the failure to elect any delegates from the new member states. For national Greens in the new member states, given that party growth and elected representation whether at the national or European levels is likely the primary goal, a significant shock was their great electoral failure in the 2004 EP elections. This likely had a profound effect especially on the Czech Republic’s Strana Zelených as it came in contrast to a brief successful electoral stint at the national level. This thesis and particularly the criteria selected to define Europeanization, hence focuses on the resulting communication processes between these two levels of Greens in response to European integration.

⁶¹ Checkel, 549.

⁶² Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, “An Integrated Theory of Party Change,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6, No. 3 (1994): 264-5.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 267.

2.3 How Can Europeanization Be Observed?

Some authors (Bomberg, 2002; Bulmer, 2007; Ladrech, 2002) emphasize that not only do national actors react to the impact of European integration, but they may also influence, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the direction of integration itself.⁶⁴ This introduces an additional bottom-up aspect to the concept of Europeanization. First, European integration may be seen as the independent variable with consequences at the domestic level, and secondly some subtler explanatory, independent variables may also be found at the domestic level which seek to export ideas, policies or priorities to the European arena.⁶⁵ This second bottom-up dimension differs from Risse, Cowles and Caporaso's definition of Europeanization in that it is not seen as separate, but rather as complementary and corresponding to top-down ideas of Europeanization. It simply means that through an emerging change in world views, European issues become relevant to domestic national actors, like political parties. Europeanization, however, remains for the most part driven by a top-down process that is supplemented with resulting bottom-up dynamics. In this context, any attempt to shape or influence the trajectory of European integration, whether or not it is successful, is a manifestation of Europeanization. A deeper look into these dynamics reveals that rather than a linear process of influence, it is a much more complex and multi-dimensional network of communication processes and patterns across the various levels of the European political system. Europeanization hence not only has various manifestations which may occur at different times, but its impact may also vary across different member states and political systems.⁶⁶ While

⁶⁴ Robert Ladrech, "Europeanization and Political parties: Towards a Framework for Analysis," *Party Politics* 8, No. 4 (2002): 391.

⁶⁵ Bulmer, 49.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 395.

Europeanization may very well lead to convergence or harmonization of policies, political identities or structures, this is neither certain nor predetermined. This thesis favours this interactive, multidirectional approach to Europeanization.

Additionally, Europeanization may be present to varying degrees and in various ways across different EU actors and member states. Its influence is far from being predictable and evenly dispersed in part due to national differences which condition party responses and various obstacles. In the case of political parties, unless they are present in national executives, they lack strong relationships with significant and authoritative actors at the EU level. The most direct access to the EU remains winning seats for delegates to the EP. However, within the EP, individual delegates are organized along European party lines and national party affiliation plays a secondary role. Additionally, due to official EU rules prohibiting the funding of national parties, there is very little for these actors to gain in terms of resources from the EU institutions.⁶⁷ Finally, there is the issue of EP parliamentary elections and the continuous absence of a European dimension to electoral campaigns. Despite running for representation at the European level, parties continue to campaign on the basis of national issues. Consequently, European electoral campaigns, for many parties, become a stage on which the national parties rehearse national politics. While this may be slowly changing for some parties, translating their role at the national level to the European arena remains a challenge.⁶⁸ The gradual development of a European party system may definitely have some influence over changing this; however, at this point, it does not appear to have done so. Therefore it is not surprising that the strongest influences may be those that are indirect in nature,

⁶⁷ Ladrech, *Europeanization and Political parties: Towards a Framework...*, 396.

⁶⁸ Mair, Peter, "The limited impact of Europe on national party systems," *West European Politics* 23, No. 4 (2000): 8.

meaning mainly those that change the environment that parties act in. This thesis will focus its attention more strongly on if and how parties are Europeanized rather than why they did so to begin with. However, the latter question provides a sizeable topic for further research.

At this point it also becomes important to clearly differentiate between European integration and Europeanization. As has already been mentioned, Europeanization occurs as a direct or indirect result of European integration⁶⁹ and consequently the two terms cannot be used interchangeably. It is helpful to think of European integration as the independent variable and the changes occurring as a result of it at the national, European and transnational levels (i.e. Europeanization) as the dependant variables. In addition, one must be careful not to confuse terms such as harmonization, convergence or political integration with Europeanization. Whereas Europeanization itself is a process, these terms are examples of some of its potential consequences.⁷⁰ These consequences or outcomes may also vary by actor or member state and are not necessarily always present together in each case of Europeanization. Europeanization is not only demonstrated by compatibility or convergence with the EU or European integration, but rather in terms of any reaction to it, whether negative or positive. When speaking of political parties, for example, simply because a party may disagree with certain EU policies or even the EU in its entirety does not mean that it is impervious to Europeanization. The impact does not necessarily have to be of an ideological nature, but can also be an institutional, structural or procedural one or even involve an alteration in transnational activity or the establishment of new parties altogether.

⁶⁹ Ladrech, *Europeanization and Political parties: Towards a Framework...*, 392.

⁷⁰ Maarten P. Vink and Paolo Graziano, 10.

With the complex nature and range of manifestations of Europeanization, come a number of challenges to its study both in general and, more specifically, with regards to political parties. While transnational party building and the resulting organizational adaptation of national parties may be a direct reaction to the integration process, one must also consider the possibility that it may be partially a reaction to the broader phenomenon of globalization.⁷¹ Distinguishing where the influence of globalization ends and Europeanization begins, or vice versa, presents researchers with a methodological challenge that must be addressed in the definitional criteria, as is done later on in this chapter. Bomberg acknowledges this challenge writing that:

Work which attempts to attribute to Europeanization distinctive or full-scale change may be missing the point: the result of Europeanization is far more likely to be the enhancement (or exacerbation) or current trends, rather than the establishment of new trends and practices.⁷²

However, this should in no way imply that Europeanization cannot exist in isolation from globalization. Rather, alternate forces such as globalization cannot be ignored as additional factors potentially contributing to change in national actors. This is especially apparent in the Central and Eastern European states where the process of Europeanization began alongside democratization as these countries transitioned from communism, while simultaneously working towards meeting the EU accession criteria. Both of these processes had such a strong presence among the CEECs that it becomes very difficult to disentangle them and their impacts from one another.⁷³ This project attempts to account for this by focussing on the 2004 to 2009 period following these states' accession to the EU. Additionally, Robert Ladrech proposes that political scientists also try to trace all

⁷¹ Mair, *Political Parties...*, 156.

⁷² Bomberg, *The Europeanization...*, 45.

⁷³ Lewis and Mansfeldova, 10.

changes analyzed back to an EU source, recognize the intentional use of the EU as an aid to resolve problems, or to evaluate obstacles that the EU may pose to national actors, in this case parties.⁷⁴ However, potential alternate explanations for party change still must be kept in mind when considering their origins and the influences behind their developing structures and ideologies.

2.4 Europeanization and Political Parties

In the case of the post-Communist states in Eastern Europe, political parties were developed with strong influences from the West and its party models. Transnational links to parties and organizations in the West were made and maintained from the very beginning. These early relationships with international party organizations and similar associations based on the European Parliament, as well as bilateral links between individual national parties, became “instrumental in shaping political identities and underpinning the development of the institutions [i.e. parties] that seek to represent them.”⁷⁵ It is clear that some level of Europeanization has been in progress in the Central and Eastern European countries long before the 2004 enlargement, especially in the development of their party systems. Emphasizing this, Paul G. Lewis writes that “the socialization undertaken by international party cooperation has been more successful in Eastern Europe than in other parts of the world.”⁷⁶ Because the ideology of the parties in many of the CEECs was still in the process of developing and solidifying and there was competition for funding and sponsorship, Western European parties, especially ones organized at a transnational European level, were able to have a much more profound

⁷⁴ Ladrech, *Europeanization and Political parties: Towards a Framework...*, 396.

⁷⁵ Paul G. Lewis, “The EU and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe: Questions and Issues,” *The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe*, Ed. Paul G Lewis and Zdenka Mansfeldova (Palgrave Macmillan, New York: 2006): 1.

⁷⁶ Lewis, 10.

impact in these states than the old member states. As new parties in the CEECs emerge, they tend to ideologically position themselves towards one of the existing European party families⁷⁷ like the Greens or the European People's Party which can have a powerful effect on the development of these young parties. For example, the Slovenian Youth's Party's almost random membership of the Greens played a fundamental role in consolidating their originally vague and unfocused ideological profile⁷⁸ towards the general ideology of the Greens. It can hence be assumed that political parties as organizations adapt to significant changes in their environment.

The literature on Europeanization itself is vast including a niche of authors writing on the Europeanization of political parties in general (Bomberg, 2002; Dietz, 2000; Hines, 2003; Ladrech, 2002, 2009). The theoretical concept of Europeanization was combined with the study of political parties in academic research in the 1990s⁷⁹ and now follows similar trends as those seen in the broader study of Europeanization. It has gradually been shifting from a dominant focus on parties at the European level such as transnational party organizations like the EGP or factions in the EP towards an increased interest in the impact of integration on party politics, party systems and individual parties at the national level.⁸⁰ However, as European integration progresses, the European and national political arenas become entangled and national parties become, to some degree, European parties in the sense that they now also act at the European level. This paper aims to evaluate to what degree this is happening to the green parties in Poland and the

⁷⁷ Zsolt Enyedi and Paul G. Lewis, "The Impact of the European Union on Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe," *The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe*, Ed. Paul G Lewis and Zdenka Mansfeldova (Palgrave Macmillan, New York: 2006): 236.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 238.

⁷⁹ Robert Ladrech, "Europeanization and Political Parties," *Living Reviews in European Governance* 4, No. 1 (2009): 4.

⁸⁰ Mair, *Political Parties and Party Systems...*, 156.

Czech Republic.

Robert Ladrech is one of the key authors to try to develop an analytical framework specific to the study of party Europeanization. He claims that the approaches developed to study policy and institutional change, may not necessarily work well in the case of studying national parties since the EU lacks direct and legal influence over national party structures and/or activities. Ladrech proposes, “an explicit focus on how national parties and party systems are affected by the influence of the EU”⁸¹ whether direct or indirect, where Europeanization is simply understood as the impact of the EU domestically. In this context, he associates membership in trans-national party federations or EP party groups with the purpose of improving domestic legitimacy. Ladrech proposes six general areas of the EU’s indirect impact on political parties: programmatic change, organizational change, patterns of party competition, party-government competition, relations within national parliaments, and relations beyond the nation state.⁸² He notes that there has been very little research done combining all or most of the above dimensions into a comparative study. This thesis will attempt to fill this gap in the literature. It will however disregard Ladrech’s proposal to include non-EU parties (from other European countries such as Norway) in the study as a control group to distinguish between Europeanization and globalization. It is believed that the variables as they have been defined for this thesis take into account this differentiation. In addition, Europeanization for the purpose of this project will be approached more broadly than simply measuring domestic impact of the European Union.

The EU’s domestic impact on national green parties is studied in detail alongside

⁸¹ Ladrech, “Europeanization and Political Parties...”, 6.

⁸² Ibid., 8-9.

the parties' impact on the European level by Elizabeth Bomberg and Neil Carter. In a joint article, *The Greens in Brussels: Shaping or Shaped?* they analyze these two dynamics through case studies of the German and Finnish Greens with respect to these parties' executives' participation in the European Council and Council of Ministers.

They explain that:

National actors such as political parties seek to push or export domestic policy ideas and preferences to the EU, while, alternatively, parties also 'import' policy ideas and practices from elsewhere in the EU that may suit their own political interests.⁸³

While this multidirectional dynamic of Europeanization is an insightful and useful observation, the focus on EU institutions that involve only the executive members of national parliaments leads the authors to overlook the significance of the socialization processes that do occur through membership in the European Parliament and related transnational organizations. They recognize that day-to-day engagement between the Greens and EU institutions and processes will increase national parties' familiarity with their processes and socialize them in EU norms creating greater incentives for increased transnational cooperation and change at the national level.⁸⁴ However, Bomberg and Carter suggest that this dynamic is seen much more strongly at the level of elected party elites who participate in decision making in the European Council. While such a difference may in fact exist to some extent between party elites and grassroots members at the extreme, the authors neglect the influence that elected MEPs may have on a national party. More significantly it wrongly, but perhaps unintentionally, presupposes that parties that fail to gain official representation in EU institutions are unaffected by Europeanization. In an article on *European Integration and Internal Party Dynamics*,

⁸³ Bomberg and Carter, 103.

⁸⁴ Bomberg and Carter, 110.

Elizabeth Carter et.al. clarify that while the remaining party members and parties may not necessarily be directly involved in EU institutions, they still develop and maintain regular links between the national and supranational levels. Over time, these members, like those more directly involved, are also socialized in the norms and ideas of European integration and adjust correspondingly to them.⁸⁵ With the examination of Poland's Zieloni 2004 that has never had representation at any level and the Czech Republic's Strana Zelených that has had one stint in national parliament, albeit brief, this thesis illustrates this to be true.

Bomberg, Carter and Eric H. Hines are the key authors who have worked specifically on the Europeanization of Green parties. Both Bomberg and Hines link Europeanization to the, “mellowing of Green ideology and ‘professionalisation’ of Green party politics.”⁸⁶ These trends are mainly reflective of the ‘realo’ camps within green parties that have been observed to increasingly reflect and exploit EU-related issues over time in order to improve their visibility and electoral support. This may partially be due to an increased awareness of Green issues among other parties who now compete for some of the same voters. Hines attributes an increased awareness of Green issues at the European level in part to the work of the Greens in the parliament. As the Greens have adapted to European integration and professionalized, they have become a consistent and mainstream presence in the EP⁸⁷ and actively and effectively engaged in its activities, committees and campaigns.

The above body of work mainly focuses on Green parties in Western Europe in the EU15, specifically aimed at examining how these parties have adapted to a trans-

⁸⁵ Elizabeth Carter et. al., “European Integration and Internal Party Dynamics,” *The Europeanization of National Political Parties: Power and Organizational Adaptation* Ed. Thomas Poguntke et. al. (Routledge, New York: 2007): 8.

⁸⁶ Bomberg, 29.

⁸⁷ Hines, 308.

national political arena and how they have adapted in the European Union itself. However, there appears to be a gap in the literature when it comes to the Europeanization of Green parties in the new member states, especially in the context of enlargement. In fact, there is a gap in the literature when it comes to parties in this region in general. The bulk of the literature on Central and Eastern European Green parties focuses primarily on opposition movements under communism and the aftermath of these movements during the transition period (Cinelli, 2002; Ferry and Rudig, 2002; Glinski, 1996). Little to nothing has been written on green parties in the CEECs following the nineties. Consequently, much of the foundation for this research extrapolates from work done on the Greens in Western Europe.

2.5 Cooperative and Communicative Europeanization

This thesis will illustrate that the Europeanization of political parties especially members of transnational party federations, as illustrated by Zieloni 2004 and Strana Zelených, can be divided into ideological and interactive Europeanization (cooperative varieties) and active Europeanization (communicative variety). Cooperative varieties of Europeanization are those affecting mainly the identity and internal organization/structure of the parties while communicative Europeanization refers to changes in the way parties present themselves publicly and in the nature of their electoral campaigns. This distinction has not been made in earlier literature on the Europeanization of political parties.

The cooperative and communicative manifestations of Europeanization used here are loosely based on Vivien A. Schmidt's distinction between coordinative and communicative discourse among actors in the EU. She describes coordinative discourse

as the deliberation and construction of policy through, among other things, “‘policy networks’ based on the exchange of ideas.”⁸⁸ Similarly, cooperative Europeanization occurs through the attempts at construction of common practices and ideology within a network of European Greens brought together by the EGP and the Green Group in the European Parliament. In both cases the discourse is deliberative in nature and mostly confined to political elite. Schmidt uses communicative discourse to refer to the process by which the public is informed on the ideas and policies that are developed under coordinative discourse. She emphasized that this involves informing general ‘publics,’ including citizens and better ‘informed publics,’ which include the media. In the case of EU policy-making, the key actors involved include politicians, campaign managers and party activists.⁸⁹ Similarly, communicative Europeanization involves the communication of changes at the official party level to the media and general electorate.

2.6 Definitions and Analytical Criteria

Europeanization, for the purpose of this project, is defined as a two-way process: on the one hand, it is one where domestic political parties adapt their own ideologies, strategies and organization to that of the EU. On the other, they attempt to shape European integration to suit their own interests. In other words, Europeanization is seen as, “a complex process whereby national actors (in this case, parties) adapt to, but also seek to shape the trajectory of European integration in general, and EU policies and processes in particular.”⁹⁰ In this context, the research concentrates on the communication processes being established between transnational European-level Greens

⁸⁸ Vivien A. Schmidt, *Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Politics* (Oxford University Press: New York, 2006): 253.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 254-5.

⁹⁰ Bomberg, *The Europeanization...*, 32.

(i.e. the Green Group in the European Parliament and the EGP) and the national Green parties in the Central and Eastern European EU member-states. Criteria selected to identify and measure the extent of Europeanization are hence reflective of these two dynamics (or directions) of Europeanization. Additionally, they are sensitive to the common goals of political parties; that is, the pursuit of office, votes and policy and the ways parties are known to change to achieve these. By shaping increasingly more policies at the national level, the European Union correspondingly shapes national politics and the environment in which national parties operate.⁹¹ Parties can therefore undergo various forms of change that normally are ideological, structural or organizational in nature. These changes, or results of Europeanization, are used to identify it and judge the extent to which it has occurred. This project identifies and analyzes the presence and impact of Europeanization based on a set of eight specific criteria (See Table 2). The analysis additionally takes seriously a suggestion made by various authors (Checkel, 1999; Risse, 2009) that comparative researchers of Europeanization should ideally consult primary documentation and conventional methods of text analysis as a cross check on interview data.

First, national party platforms and ideologies are observed and analyzed with regards to their convergence to those of the European Green Party (criterion 1). A comparative analysis of the party platforms as available for the 2004 and 2009 EP elections is undertaken in addition to extensive interviews with Green party members and candidates from both Strana Zelených and Zieloni 2004 as well as with Ulrike Lunacek, the spokesperson for the EGP. This is then followed by an investigation into the addition of national Green party interests into the EGP manifesto and positions of Greens in the

⁹¹ Carter et. al., 2.

Table 2: CRITERIA IDENTIFYING EUROPEANIZATION IN POLITICAL PARTIES

A) Adaptation to the trajectory of European Integration	B) Attempt to shape the trajectory of European Integration
<p>1. Adaptation of national party platforms/ideology to that of the EGP.</p> <p>2. Establishment of institutional links to the EU level parties (EGP and Greens in the EP)</p> <p>3. Procedures of candidate selection (basis on domestic political procedures vs. influenced by European level greens)</p> <p>4. Development of institutions within national party structures to address issues of EU politics.</p> <p>5. Adaptation of media statements to the shared principles of the EGP, as well as increased mention of European versus national issues.</p>	<p>1b. Attempts to add national green party interests into the EGP manifesto and positions of the Greens in the European Parliament.</p> <p>2b. Establishment of institutional links at the supranational level to the national green parties from the accession states.</p> <p>4b. Development of institutions within European level green party structures to address issues important to the greens in the accession states.</p>

European Parliament (criterion 1b). Once again, this is based on interviews with active members of Zieloni 2004 and Strana Zelených. This includes both active candidates as well as members with active administrative roles, especially those pertaining to transnational cooperation and contact with the European level. Interviews were additionally conducted with a handful of Green MEPs representing other national Green parties that are also members of the EGP as well as members of the secretariat for the Greens/European Free Alliance. The progression of the development of institutional links to the EU level organizations, namely the EGP and Greens in the EP is then examined for both countries (criterion 2) followed by a similar analysis of the establishment of institutional links at the supranational levels to the national Green parties from the accession states (criterion 2b). Procedures of candidate selection are then examined to evaluate if they have been altered for the purpose of European elections (criterion 3). There is no equivalent criterion in the second dimension of Europeanization because neither the EGP nor the Green Group field their own candidates in elections. Candidates always first represent their national parties. Next, the development, or lack thereof, of institutions within national party structures to address issues of EU politics is addressed to account for internal structural change (criterion 4). Similarly, the development of institutions within European level green party structures to address concerns of green candidates to the EP from the 2004 and 2007 accession states is also included to address internal structural changes at the European levels (criterion 4b).

The final criterion departs from the heavily interview-based approach and provides in depth textual content analysis. Media statements by, and coverage of the two Green parties are compared to the shared principles of the EGP (criterion 5). An

increased mention of European versus national issues in media statements and press releases is also considered. This involves a media analysis of national newspapers in both countries, in comparison to the EGP platform for the 2004 EP elections. The newspapers analyzed have been selected to reflect a balanced image of the national media presence in each country. In Poland this includes *Gazeta Wyborcza*, the leading national centre-right newspaper and *Rzeczpospolita*, the leading national centre-left newspaper. Similarly, in the Czech Republic it includes *Lidove Noviny*, the leading right-wing national daily and *Právo*, the leading left-wing national daily. The papers are examined during the periods of the 2004 and 2009 electoral campaigns. Ideally, such an analysis would also move to the second dimension of Europeanization to address the potential adaptation of EGP media statements and press releases to reflect interests and concerns of national green parties. However, because archived EGP press releases are not available dating back to 2004, this was not possible.

In the literature, particularly the work of Elizabeth Bomberg (see Bomberg, 2002), structural change or the ‘professionalisation’ of political parties is also suggested as a measure of ‘Europeanization’. During the past two to three decades Western European green parties have made a move away from their grassroots structures and approaches, towards those of mainstream political parties. On the one hand, it would be interesting to examine to what extent this is seen among Green parties in the new Central and Eastern European member states. However, as this was likely a natural progression from a social movement to political party in the case of the Western European greens, it is difficult to assess to what degree similar changes in the new member states can be considered ‘Europeanization’ based on a learning-type model, and to what extent they are

simply a more general social phenomenon. To avoid possible misrepresentation of the issue and misguided extrapolation, the idea of professionalisation, meaning a move away from more radical party structures, will be addressed in the body of the thesis, but will not be included as one of the variables through which the levels of Europeanization will be measured and assessed.

CHAPTER THREE

ZIELONI 2004 AND ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN POLAND

It is not a coincidence that the year 2004 is found in the name of the party; the year of accession into the EU. A part of the program is global thought, wider than simply at the level of narrowly understood national horizons.

Katarzyna Partuszko
"Polityczne Zamieszanie na Zielono"
Angora. November 9, 2003

Not only the Green movement but also Green parties have a surprisingly active recent history in Poland. Despite being only seven years old now and the first and only Polish party to become a member of the European Green Party (earlier the EFGP), Zieloni 2004 is certainly not the first nor the only 'Green' party or politically active environmental group to exist in Poland. The Polish environmental movement, like in other former communist countries, played an important role in the opposition movements during the 1980s. It is also not the first group to communicate and interact with Greens in the EU15. Therefore, despite being established only as Poland was entering the EU, just in time to participate in the first elections to the EP, the formation of this party can be seen as a step in an already existing process of the Europeanization of the Polish 'Green' movement. The conflicts, successes and failures of the political parties, organizations, activists, and informal grassroots groupings making up the history of Poland's Green movement mark the precursors who established a foundation for Zieloni 2004, and helped it to begin defining its identity. This identity, as will become clear later on in this chapter, is also intimately linked to Poland's role in the European Union and the broader transnational ideals that unite the European Greens. To what extent Polish membership in the EU resulted in an actual 'Europeanization' of this party is the main question

thoroughly analyzed in this chapter. The chapter, therefore, begins with an overview establishing the historical context within which we can place the emergence of Zieloni 2004. This is followed by a short history of the party itself. Next, the nature of the campaigns in Poland for the 2004 and 2009 elections to the European Parliament are discussed followed by a detailed analysis of the pre-established criteria for Europeanization for the two periods. Criteria relating to Zieloni 2004's adaptation to the trajectory of Europeanization will be evaluated first, followed by criteria relating to its attempt to shape the trajectory of Europeanization.

3.1 The Greens in Poland: From Right to Left

The Polish environmental movement gained momentum in the 1980s and 1990s as a political opposition to the communist regime. Consequently, contrary to the environmental movement in the West, the Polish movement tended to be more right to centre-right wing in nature to differentiate it from the Communist regime. Under Communism, in the Polish People's Republic (PRL) and elsewhere in Eastern and Central Europe, environmental problems were rampant; especially air and water pollution. In the 1980s the conditions became so bad that it led the area along the eastern German, Czech and Polish borders to be coined the 'Black Triangle.' The extensive environmental devastation has been linked by some authors (see Dingsdale and Lóczy, 2001) to not only the heavy industries and other sources of contamination and toxic waste that were concentrated in the area, but most significantly to the socialist system and its policies. They emphasize that "[t]o avoid the mistrust of the population, pollution

statistics were kept secret.”⁹² However, despite the environment being close to a state of disaster and an existing lack of transparency regarding the extent of the damage, environmental politics was one of a few areas of political action that was tolerated by the communist regimes in Europe. For this reason, it “often became attractive to opponents of these regimes.”⁹³ Publicizing the state of the environment became the focal point of these groups’ resistance. Therefore, it is not surprising that in Poland, the environmental movement’s roots are found in the mass wave of anti-communist protests that followed the establishment of the Solidarity Trade Union in 1980.⁹⁴

Among the most active organizations in the demonstrations of the 1980s was *Polski Klub Ekologiczny* (The Polish Ecological Club, PKE). Founded in Krakow in September 1980, the group brought together many environmental experts, academics, lawyers, physicians and teachers to analyze and bring to light the state of the environment in the Polish People’s Republic,⁹⁵ and became more radical in its actions in the 1990s. This was the first legally established non-profit NGO in the former Communist states and quickly became the largest and most influential environmental group in Poland. By 1995, PKE had between 4-5000 members and was increasingly cooperating with other pro-environmental groups such as the Green Federation, which was a voluntary federation of registered environmental groups, and the Anarchist Federation.⁹⁶ The group eventually gained enough respect among the opposition community that five of the

⁹² Alan Dingsdale and Dénes Lóczy, “The Environmental Challenge of Societal Transition in East Central Europe,” in *East Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union: Environment and Society*, Ed. David Turnock (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): 187

⁹³ Martin Ferry and Wolfgang Rüdig, *Sofa Parties, Factions and Government Participation: Greens in Poland*, Paper presented at the 52nd annual conference of the UK Political Science Association, University of Aberdeen: 5-7 April 2002: 2.

⁹⁴ Ferry and Rüdig, 4.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁹⁶ Piotr Gliński, *Polscy Zieloni: Ruch Społeczny w Okresie Przemian* (Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Instytutu Filozofii i Sociologii PAN: 1996): 240.

twelve Solidarity representatives on the Ecological Committee participating in the round table talks in 1989 were in fact also members of the PKE. This included Radosław Gawlik who was then the leader of the PKE, a member of an independent anti-war movement called “Freedom and Peace,”⁹⁷ and coincidentally in 2003 also among the founding members of Zieloni 2004.

Towards the end of the 1980s, the environmental movement began to move toward initiatives to form organizations more similar in character to political parties, which has been associated with the gradual liberalization of socio-political life in the PRL.⁹⁸ By 1989, there were 135 ‘independent, formal and informal environmental organizations’ active in Poland and about dozen ecological foundations.⁹⁹ In 1991 members of the PKE, including Gawlik, founded the Ecological Fraction at a Congress of the post-Solidarity party, Democratic Union. When the Democratic Union joined the Liberal-Democratic Congress to form the Freedom Union party in 1994, the Ecological Fraction became the Freedom Union’s Ecological Forum (FE). It defined itself as the “only parliamentary lobbying group, possessing its own parliamentary network, which maintains contacts with the Green movement.”¹⁰⁰ The Freedom Union entered parliament and government after the 1997 elections, providing a number of FE members with official government posts. Gawlik held the post of minister of environment from 1997 to 2000. Despite not being officially an independent political party, the FE was granted observer status with the EFGP and became the first Polish group to ever be

⁹⁷ Ferry and Rudig, 4.

⁹⁸ Glinski, *Polscy Zieloni...* 198.

⁹⁹ Piotr Glinski, “Polish Greens and Politics: A Social Movement in a Time of Transformation,” in *Environmental Protection in Transition: Economic, Legal and Socio-Political Perspectives on Poland*, Ed. John Clark and Daniel H. Cole (Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1998):130.

¹⁰⁰ Ferry and Rüdig, 9-10.

officially associated with the federation. This was also the first time that just a faction of a party had been granted this status. In fact, one of its members was even elected to the EFGP committee.¹⁰¹ Polska Partia Zielonych (the Polish Green Party, PPZ), which was founded a few years earlier, also applied as a member of the EFGP and was declined.

Polska Partia Zielonych was the first official 'green' party to be registered in Central and Eastern Europe and was shortly followed by numerous others. It was founded in Krakow on 10 December 1988 by sixty members representing twenty-three environmental/ecological centres in Poland. The party was started with the intention of running in local elections as well as elections for the Sejm (Polish Parliament) where it hoped to start an environmental lobby.¹⁰² However, the party became fragmented and broke into three separate groups after only two months following allegations of infiltration by the secret police. Its membership included former functionaries of the Communist Party and other individuals suspected of secretly working with the Communist Secret Service.¹⁰³ Concerned primarily with competition amongst themselves, the three resulting parties quickly lost all of their support from the environmental movement¹⁰⁴ which began to see them as politically opportunistic rather than genuinely concerned about the environment. In the end, not one of these parties participated in the first free elections following years of socialist rule. Such an absence of trust among political and social actors at the time of democratic liberalization was common and the environmental movements were certainly not immune. Author Daniel H. Cole links the 'emergence of democratic pluralism' to powerful divisions that

¹⁰¹ Martin Ferry, "The Polish Green Movement Ten Years After the Fall of Communism," in *Environmental Politics 11*, No. 1 (Spring 2002): 176.

¹⁰² Glinski, *Polscy Zieloni...* 198.

¹⁰³ Glinski, "Polish Greens..." 142.

¹⁰⁴ Glinski, *Polscy Zieloni...* 200.

appeared not only between the apolitical environmental groups and their former allies in opposition of the government, but also to ideological and political splits among the groups of the movement themselves.¹⁰⁵ The appearance of democratic pluralism created increased opportunities to pursue individual interests. Under the communist government, many environmental groups had banded with each other and other non-environmental groups in opposition of the regime. The eventual loosening of the regimes in many of the CEECs, influenced by Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost reforms, provided an opportunity for the formation of independent environmental groups and non-governmental organizations.¹⁰⁶ By 1991, Polska Partia Zielonych tried to once again present a united front in order to apply for membership to the EFGP. However, the federation was unconvinced and without the support of the mass Polish environmental movement, they were refused. A large gap began to emerge in Poland between the continuously popular environmental movement and the green parties "which were seen as dominated by self interested autocrats with no interest in green issues."¹⁰⁷

However, 'green' parties of all sizes and 'colours' continued to emerge since the 1990 Party Law in Poland made it very easy, requiring the support only fifteen people to register a political party. Many of these new parties, coined 'sofa parties' consisted of very small numbers of people (small enough to fit on a single sofa!), who were often not even directly associated with the environmental movement itself. By mid 1995, there were seventeen registered environmental political parties in Poland,¹⁰⁸ none of which had any significant political influence or support even remotely approaching that of the FE.

¹⁰⁵ Daniel H. Cole, *Instituting Environmental protection: From Red to Green in Poland* (London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998), 215.

¹⁰⁶ Dingsdale and Lóczy, 189.

¹⁰⁷ Ferry and Rüdig, 7.

¹⁰⁸ Glinski, *Polscy Zieloni* ...210.

Most of these were founded in preparation for the first free parliamentary elections in 1991 where they experienced little to no success. They also included two factions of the former PPZ, neither of which even approached enough votes to meet the necessary five percent threshold. A new party called *Polscy Zieloni* (Greens of Poland) emerged in the 1998 municipal elections. It continues to run on a platform that combines environmental themes with a Catholic, nationalist agenda. Not long before the establishment of Zieloni 2004, another ‘green’ party was formed, calling itself *Partia Zielonych Rzeczpospolitej Polski* (Green Party of the Polish Republic). Similar to earlier parties, it does not have any explicit links to the environmental movement¹⁰⁹ and is gaining a reputation of corruption among the Polish Green community. There have even been allegations that *Partia Zielonych RP* copied elements of the Zieloni 2004 manifesto.¹¹⁰ In addition, neither of these parties has participated in either national or European level elections.

It is clear that Polish ‘green’ movement has had a very active, yet fragmented and often disorganized development with few, but significant successes when elements of the movement did manage to come together effectively such as the PKE and FE. This is the context into which Zieloni 2004 was born. Despite not developing the post-materialist ideology common to Greens in the West from the beginning, many of the groups that began to cooperate with the Greens throughout the 1990s reflected this mindset and without knowing it at the time, would later come together to form the first and only Polish political party ever to be granted full membership in the EFGP (now the EGP). Magdalena (Magda) Mosiewicz, a well known Polish feminist was actively involved in numerous groups of the Green movement in Poland during the 1990s which she describes

¹⁰⁹ Ferry and Rüdiger, 14.

¹¹⁰ Bartłomiej Kozek. Secretary General, Zieloni 2004. Co-Chair Leader, Zieloni 2004 Warsaw Circle. Interview by author. Warsaw, Poland. July 5, 2009.

as a mixture of alternative culture and ecology. She explains, “I was organizing festivals and events and a big meeting of NGOs in Krakow – people from many movements that were not linked before in Poland – all part of the Green movement although it was not evident at the time.”¹¹¹ Many members of these alternative movements would later come together to form Zieloni 2004. Magda Mosiewicz became the party’s first Co-president alongside environmental activist Jacek Bożek.

3.2 Zieloni 2004

From the very beginning, Zieloni 2004 established itself as political party with a European outlook inspired by the greens in the EU15, especially Germany. The wide variety of backgrounds among its founding members is a testament to the ‘post-materialist’ ideology in addition to environmentalism that is prevalent in the Western European and Global green movements. For the first time, a Green party in Poland opened its doors beyond just strictly environmental circles. The party was founded at the Founding Congress held between September 6 to 7, 2003. The almost 100 founding members included members of political parties and groups such as the FE, the former Freedom Union party, the Freedom and Peace Movement,¹¹² as well as environmental, feminist, human rights and LQBT activists and members of various NGOs. This included Radosław Gawlik and Jacek Bożek, well known environmental activists, as well as Magda Mosiewicz, Kinga Dunin and Kazimiera Szczuka, well known Polish feminists.¹¹³ Some founding members were also previously involved in a referendum group that campaigned for a positive result in the EU accession referendum in the context of

¹¹¹ Magdalena Mosiewicz. Committee Member, European Green Party. National Council, Zieloni 2004. Interview by author. Warsaw, Poland. July 6, 2009.

¹¹² The former democratic opposition and pacifist group: *Wolność i Pokój*.

¹¹³ Dulko, 54.

ecological change. This illustrates a certain degree of European outlook from the very beginning.

The Ecological Forum, which can to an extent be seen as the historical predecessor to the current Zieloni 2004, differed from the mass Green movement in the West in that it was “essentially environmental in outlook,”¹¹⁴ focusing narrowly on purely ecological issues without linking them to the broader ‘New Left’ or ‘post-materialist’ political agendas that were picked up by Greens in the west. Based on its structure, mandate and membership at the time of its formation, the establishment of Zieloni 2004 in and of itself presents a clear example of adaptation to Western Green ideology. While this ‘post-materialist’ agenda is not unique to European Greens, given the large levels of communication and interaction with Greens in the old member states, especially Germany’s *Die Grünen* and the European Federation of Green Parties, the Zieloni 2004’s establishment can be seen as not only as Europeanization itself but also as evidence of its eagerness to take the Greens in the EU15 as models for its own development. In a short history of the party written for a publication on European Greens by the Heinrich Böll foundation, the party’s current co-presidents, Agnieszka Grzybek and Dariusz Szwed write that when it was created, Zieloni 2004 was consciously positioned according to Joschka Fischer’s¹¹⁵ vision of Greens as, “neither to the left, nor to the right, but ahead.”¹¹⁶

It has also been suggested that there may have also been practical motivations in opening up to a broader political agenda. While it was well organized politically, by

¹¹⁴ Ferry and Rudig, 17-18.

¹¹⁵ Joschka Fischer is a leading figure in Germany’s *Die Grünen* (Green Party) and influential figure among European Greens. He served as the Foreign Minister and Vice-Chancellor of Germany between 1998 and 2005.

¹¹⁶ Agnieszka Grzybek and Dariusz Szwed, “Zieloni 2004 – Scenes from a Long March” in *Green Identity in a Changing Europe* (Brussels: Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2008): 84.

2003 the FE could only count on about 200 supporters. In order to start a political party in Poland, it is now necessary to find a minimum of 1000 citizens to support party formation which would have made registering as a party very difficult for the FE alone.¹¹⁷ However, speaking to members of Zieloni 2004, including some involved in the party from the beginning, it is clear that initiative to form a Western-inspired Green party came from many sources and actors, not the FE alone. Hence it is unlikely that this was a major motivation behind broadening the scope of issues dealt with by Polish Greens.

Zieloni 2004 came together in 2003 just as Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (the Democratic Left Alliance, SLD)¹¹⁸ was losing much of its support due to allegations of internal corruption and failure to fulfill electoral promises. The crisis within the party and a weak Polish economy eventually led the SLD leader, Leszek Miller to resign as prime minister. Current members of Zieloni 2004 say that the party had lost much of its credibility when it decided to deny certain social and women's rights. It was at this point that members from the numerous NGOs, social movements and environmental groups decided to come together and establish a party that would change the political situation by filling in what they felt was a void on the left side of the political spectrum. Despite claiming to be neither left nor right, many of the issues pushed by Zieloni 2004 are placed on the left side of the political spectrum in Poland and attract voters who position themselves on the left. This gap in ideology and practice is also visible in Western Green parties, who are more likely to ally with the left, despite claiming not to fit on either end of the spectrum. This is in contrast to many of the environmental movements in the 1980s

¹¹⁷ Ferry and Rudig, 15.

¹¹⁸ *Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej*, SLD is a Polish social-democratic party with some minor electoral success in the past at the parliamentary level. In 2003 it was in a coalition with the Labour Union and Polish People's Party and had 40 seats in the Sejm.

and 1990s that had a strictly environmental agenda and placed themselves toward the right or centre-right. A number of Polish environmental groups under communism were also linked to the re-born Catholic movement during the years of Solidarity. While these groups were not politically active, but rather focused on conservation, they too ideologically leaned to the right.

The Green Manifesto that was adopted at the party's Founding Congress reflected a party linking people with shared values of respect for human rights and principles of sustainable social, environmental and economic development. The program of action decided on at the Congress was clearly reflective of the diverse interests of the founding members and approached the 'post-materialist' ideology of Greens in the EU15. It was organized into four pillars as follows: (1) sustainable economic and social growth; (2) human and in particular women's rights; (3) protest against war; and (4) participatory democracy.¹¹⁹ These pillars made Zieloni 2004 not simply another Polish ecological party but potentially the first true Polish 'Green' party in the Western European and global sense. Much of this may be a result of the early engagement of actors from the EU15. The Heinrich Böll Foundation was involved from the beginning, providing some grants, resources and expertise. Additionally, representatives of the German 1968¹²⁰ movement, including some experts on women's rights, attended initial meetings from the early planning stages as well as members from Germany's Die Grünen on which some Zieloni 2004 members claim their party is roughly based.

¹¹⁹ Grzybek and Szwed 81-2.

¹²⁰ Also known as the German Student Movement, this was a protest movement in Germany during the 1960s that escalated following the shooting death by a police sergeant of a student protesting the 1967 visit of the Iranian Shah. The movement is linked to an upsurge of left politics, women's emancipation and anti-war movements.

The interaction with the west during the planning stages for the party, and experience with the EFGP of some of its founding members likely motivated the European outlook of the party name. Due to the number of pre-existing ecological parties in Poland, Polish courts insisted that the name Zieloni (Greens) alone was too generic and could easily cover an already existing political party. Dariusz Szwed, the party's current co-president, suggested adding the year 2004 to the name for two reasons that act to emphasize the party's European and especially EU outlook: the first is the year of Poland's accession to the European Union, and the second, the establishment of the EGP, the first European party, in Rome. Reflecting the two dimensions of Europeanization discussed in this thesis, he recalls: "We think that the EU is a good political tool to solve many problems that we think should be solved in Poland. We thought that accession to the EU in many ways was positive but we also thought that we need to join the EU to change it."¹²¹




Figure 1
Poster featuring Magda Mosiewicz, the party's first female co-president, with her red sneakers that became infamous with journalists who took interest in the Polish Greens. Poster reads: Greens – We don't pollute.

¹²¹ Dariusz Szwed. Co-President, Zieloni 2004. Interview by author. Warsaw, Poland. July 6, 2009.

Candidates for the 2004 European Parliament election, the first ever election that Zieloni 2004 participated in, were announced at a press conference held at Le Madame, which was then a popular Warsaw LGBT-friendly night club and the party's official headquarters until it was closed down in May 2006. It is therefore unsurprising that the party started out with media coverage limited to a number of alternative lifestyle and clubbing magazines and a perception, especially by many older environmentalists, that the party is predominately concerned with gender rights. Magda Mosiewicz recalls that when some media took interest in the party and asked her for an interview, they seemed to be more interested in lifestyle habits of the members and photographing her red sneakers, than with the party's program. Zieloni 2004 managed to run independently in the 2004 EP elections. However, following disappointing results, they decided to run as a coalition with Polish Social Democracy¹²² (Solcialdemokracja Polska, SDPL) and Workers' Union (Unia Pracy, UP) in the 2005 parliamentary elections to have a greater chance to be elected to the Sejm. Despite not getting the top spots on the coalition's election lists, this time around they were able to have some sort of presence, however minor, in almost all electoral districts. In the EP elections they were only able to secure enough signatures to run candidates in three districts. The party continues to struggle to gain enough support for representation in all Polish electoral districts and ran in a coalition again for the 2009 EP elections, this time the Centre Right coalition with SDPL and the Polish Democratic Party (PD). The coalition campaigned with the slogan "understanding for the future."

¹²² The Polish Social Democracy Party was founded in March, 2004 and legally registered in April, 2004 by a number of former members of the fractioned Democratic Left Alliance.

3.3 The EP Elections in Poland

The problem with European elections in Poland is that there are no European issues here. Campaigns are dominated by the big parties in the parliament. They have the money and they fight with each other not for policies, but for individual satisfaction.

Bartłomiej Kozek
Zieloni 2004 (2009)

While 2009 saw a growth of Green MEPs from thirty-four in 2004 to forty-six, despite the reduction of the European Parliament by forty-nine members following the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty that following December, there were still no new members elected from among the new member states, including Poland. The EGP ran a common campaign in both the 2004 and 2009 elections, and despite national campaigns continuing to emphasize issues relevant to their respective countries, there is some evidence to suggest that Greens in many member states utilized the common program and campaign, especially the posters and television clips, to a greater extent in 2009.¹²³ This section will examine Zieloni 2004's campaign efforts and results in the two EP elections as well as the specificities of Polish electoral law as is relevant to party participation.

The 2004 EP elections, held on 13 June, saw Zieloni 2004 running on their own list in only three electoral constituencies. According to Polish electoral law, ten thousand signatures of voters living permanently in that constituency are necessary in order to register a list of candidates. This must be completed at least forty days before the election.¹²⁴ A separate list of candidates may be proposed for each constituency and can have anywhere between five and ten people. Initially Zieloni 2004 campaigned in nine

¹²³ Neil Carter, "The Greens in the 2009 European Parliament Election," in *Environmental Politics* 19, No. 2(2010):295-6.

¹²⁴ Wojciech Cwalina et. al., "Advertising Effects: Polish Elections to the European Parliament," in *Campaigning in Europe - Campaigning For Europe*. Ed. Michaela Maier and Jens Tenscher (Lit Verlag: Berlin, 2006): 372.

out of thirteen constituencies, however only secured enough signatures to run a list of candidates in four. In one of these, there was a question regarding the authenticity of some signatures and in the end Zieloni 2004 ran lists of ten candidates each in three electoral districts: Warsaw, Silesia and Lower Silesia. The elections concluded leaving Zieloni 2004 with a disappointing two percent of the overall vote. In the 2009 EP elections they managed to run candidates in all thirteen constituencies due to the coalition with SDPL and PD. Zieloni 2004 had twenty six candidates dispersed with at least one on each of the thirteen lists. Of these, nine were placed among the top 3 candidates on their list. Candidates who did not get the top spots on the lists in any of these constituencies had little chance to be elected as MEPs even if the coalition made it past the five percent threshold in any of the constituencies. Following the election, the coalition secured 2.4 percent of the vote, only a small increase from what Zieloni 2004 secured on their own despite running in only a fraction of the constituencies in the previous election.

Despite being Poland's first, the 2004 European Parliament elections were not subject to any information campaigns and did not pique the interest of major media outlets. When the campaigns were covered by newspapers, national papers tended to cover the elections and campaigns generally and local newspapers focused more closely on specific candidates.¹²⁵ Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that the turnout rate for the elections was just over twenty percent, the second lowest turnout in Europe. This has been attributed in part to Poles not entirely understanding the purpose of the elections or the role of the European Parliament as well as feeling they lacked adequate

¹²⁵ Cwalina et. Al., 375-7.

information in choosing who to vote for.¹²⁶ The party campaigns for the most part gave European issues a secondary role or did not address them at all with parties often failing to take the campaign seriously to begin with. A mere three of the nine major campaigns (this does not include Zieloni 2004) had slogans or mottos explicitly referring to Europe. These included: the SLD-UP coalition, “Europe for development – development for Poland;” the Law and Justice party, “Honourable representation in Europe;” and Zieloni 2004’s future coalition partner, SDPL, “Let’s take advantage of the European opportunity.”¹²⁷ In the 2009 EP elections, voter turnout in Poland grew marginally to just over twenty-four percent. While European issues still failed to gain a high profile in party electoral campaigns, Aleks Szczerbiak notes that ‘Europe’ was “actually featured as a more important sub-theme in the main party campaigns,”¹²⁸ than it had in 2004. However, he notes that only small, radical parties and fringe parties gave EU issues a high profile in their electoral campaigns.

Zieloni 2004 entered the 2004 EP electoral race with hints at a broad European scope and strong communication with the EGP at the centre of their campaign. A press release was published on the party’s website announcing their participation in the election with the following quote by then co-president Magda Mosiewicz:

These elections are a great calling for a green vision for Europe – Europe of tolerance, democracy and ecology. A Europe that is close to the idea of balanced growth. A Europe of Solidarity. Simply, a Europe for people and not just capital.¹²⁹

¹²⁶Alex Szczerbiak, *2004 European Parliament Elections Briefing No 1: The European Parliament Election in Poland, June 13, 2004* (European Parties Elections and Referendums Network: Sussex European Institute, 2004):8.

¹²⁷ Szczerbiak, *2004*... 5.

¹²⁸ Aleks Szczerbiak, *European Parliament Elections Briefing No 36: The European Parliament Election in Poland, 7 June, 2009* (European Parties Elections and Referendums Network: Sussex European Institute, 2009) :6.

¹²⁹ Bartosz Lech, “Warszawscy Zieloni prezentują kandydatów na posłów Parlamentu Europejskiego,” Zieloni 2004, <http://www.zieloni2004.pl/news-6.htm> (accessed June 10, 2009).

Additionally, a few days later at a press conference held at the party headquarters at the Le Madame nightclub, an extensive program was revealed specifically designed for the European Parliamentary elections. It was stressed that this program was created with careful attention to staying true to the European EGP common manifesto and EP election campaign. Claiming to remain loyal to the EGP in 2009, Zieloni 2004 released a much more modest and condense program as the main campaign was run by the coalition's electoral committee. However, the scope remained one that emphasized European issues, as well as national ones of concern to Polish citizens.

According to Polish law, the President must announce the date of the elections to the European Parliament at the latest ninety days prior to the election itself. The date must be during an allotted timeframe established by the European Union to accommodate voting traditions in various member states (i.e. in some countries elections are always on a weekend; in others on a Friday, etc.).¹³⁰ Parties can campaign immediately as soon as the date is announced and must bring the campaigns to an end twenty-four hours before the election. The press releases and newspaper articles analyzed in the following sections of this chapter cover the final sixteen days of this period. With regards to funding the campaigns, funds may only come from the electoral committee of the individual party or of the group of parties forming a coalition.¹³¹ This means that while Zieloni 2004 could utilize the content of the EGP common campaign or the published materials, TV spots and posters created to represent all European Greens, the EGP cannot provide Zieloni 2004 with funds for the national EP campaign in Poland. In Poland, party election

¹³⁰ Wojciech Peszynski, *Pierwsze Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego w Polsce* (Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek: Toruń, 2007): 29.

¹³¹ Peszynski, 33.

committees can broadcast their programs on national television and radio during the campaign period, free of charge. However, this is only applicable to parties running lists in a minimum of nine constituencies¹³² which would have meant that Zieloni 2004 had very little money and opportunity to use television or radio in their campaigns in 2004. Running in a coalition made national broadcasting of the party program, in the form of radio or television commercial, possible during the campaign for the 2009 EP elections. However, because Zieloni 2004 was a more minor member of this coalition, the national broadcast campaign was not entirely reflective of how the party would have wished to represent itself had they run on their own. The party did campaign individually in addition to the coalition's campaign. However, due to limited resources, volunteers and funds, these efforts did not reach a significant number of people. However, for the purpose of this thesis, the nature of those initiatives, however small, is still significant. Prior to continuing on to the analysis of Zieloni 2004's levels of Europeanization, it is important to emphasize that there is no assumption that all Greens in the EU15 are themselves entirely or even significantly Europeanized and they are not seen as a scale against which to compare the Greens in the new member states. Rather, growth is measured with regards to change within the domestic party and European level Greens between 2004 and 2009.

3.4 Adaptation to the Trajectory of European Integration

Adapting to European integration, which refers to a party being influenced to modify its ideology, behaviour and organization resulting from contact with the European Union and EU level Greens, is the first of the two dimensions framing Europeanization in this thesis. Cooperation with the EGP, Greens in the EP and participation in European

¹³² Cwalina et. Al., 372.

elections may both stimulate change for practical and logistical purposes as well as become central to the contribution of the party's developing identity. The purpose is to determine if there has been a change between the 2004 and 2009 elections to the European parliament. *Adaptation of national party platforms and ideology to that of the EGP* is the first of five criteria within this dimension, developed in the previous chapter to identify Europeanization.

Because it was established with the extensive cooperation of Western European Greens, one can expect that Zieloni 2004 was Europeanized to some extent from the very beginning with inspiration especially coming from Germany. A former MEP candidate for Zieloni 2004 explains that there is a political theory among some people in Poland that the country should step after its democratic predecessors: "we are trying to follow democratic patterns and there is such a pattern in Western Europe, especially in Germany, which is the Green Party, and we just have to repeat the same pattern...because it would change politics in the direction that we need."¹³³

Zieloni 2004's Party program for the 2004 elections to the European Parliament clearly acknowledges its cooperation with European Greens. Right in the opening, it mentions that if any representatives are elected, they hope to implement a common campaign in the European Parliament along with the other European Greens. The EGP's common election manifesto for 2004, *Europe can do better. You decide!*, is organized into five main objectives: (1) Safeguarding the Environment; (2) Greening the Social Dimension; (3) Developing Democracy; (4) Strengthening the Peace Policy; and (5) Promoting Grass Roots Globalization. Although brief, at only four pages in length, the

¹³³ Izabela Despererek, Candidate for EP in 2009/Non-member, Zieloni 2004, Interview by author, Lodz, Poland, July 20, 2009.

manifesto covers a broad array of issues, yet remains general enough to allow for national differences. A key vision of Europe in the manifesto sees it as a “prime actor working for peace in the unstable international situation.”¹³⁴ The manifesto suggests scrutiny of weapons exports and the formation of a peace corps. However, the remainder of the section on peace policy remains general and ideological, versus providing practical solutions. Another key theme crosscutting the environmental and social objectives involves what the EGP terms ‘safe, healthy and tasty food’ which involves supporting development of organic and GMO-free farming methods through a restructuring of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) among other methods. Specifically how CAP should be reformed is not elaborated. Human rights are emphasized in the manifesto, especially women’s, gender and minority rights as well as rights for seniors and disabled peoples. Finally, the Manifesto puts strong emphasis on supporting animal rights, the introduction of eco-taxes (which are also not explained in detail) as well as the elimination of nuclear power in exchange for sustainable energy sources.

Zieloni 2004’s Program for the 2004 EP elections is divided into just three major objectives: (1) Human Rights (includes everything from empowerment of NGOs, democracy, and security to traditional human rights), (2) Bio-Diversity: Polish Nature as European Wealth (very similar the EGP’s environmental objectives), and (3) Sustainable Development (includes social issues, CAP reform and taxation). These three objectives are further divided into numerous detailed subsections that basically cover all of the same objectives listed in the common EGP Manifesto. However, this reorganization into three more general umbrella objectives suggests a prioritization of which issues are of the

¹³⁴ European Green Party, “Europe Can Do Better. You Decide!” *European Elections Manifesto 2004: Common Preamble* (European Federation of Green Parties Council: Luxembourg, 2003): 1.

greatest priority to the Greens in Poland. While maintaining a European outlook, utilizing common ideas from the EGP, the program attempts to bring these broader themes into a more national context for Polish voters. While the changes may indeed happen at the EU level, the program recognizes that Polish voters are most concerned with how these changes will affect them at home.

Placing democratic issues and peace issues under the broader human rights categorization, immediately suggests that they are not of equal priority to the national party, as they are to the EGP as a whole. The general objectives in these areas remain the same. However, a greater emphasis appears to be placed on social human rights, for instance the rights of women, minorities, disabled persons and especially issues of gender equality. The views are reflective of those in the EGP manifesto. However, the greater attention placed towards them is likely reflective of the particular state of these rights in Poland, which Zieloni 2004 recognize as requiring more attention than in the EU15. In an interview, one Zieloni 2004 member recalls a meeting of the EGP where a number of delegates representing Green parties in some of the EU15 member states are debating about the quality of their national daycare facilities, while she sits back thinking only about how Poland does not even have any government funded daycare facilities to begin a debate about.¹³⁵ Such detachment towards issues seen as ‘problems’ in some of the Western European states explains the higher attention placed towards certain issues at the expense of others. However, it is important to note here that no aspect of the EGP manifesto is excluded from the Zieloni 2004 program. Some issues are simply emphasized over others whereas in the EGP manifesto they may have been given equal

¹³⁵ Mosziewicz, Personal Interview, Committee Member, European Green Party. National Council, Zieloni 2004. Interview by author. Warsaw, Poland. July 6, 2009.

weight.

Another difference, albeit not an ideological one, is the meticulous detail with which Zieloni 2004 explains each of its objectives. For example, acknowledging the importance of small family farms to many Polish communities and of the need for rural development, the program suggests CAP reform where current agricultural subsidies are replaced with funds aimed at sustainable rural development and supporting smaller farms. While not directly mentioning it, this coincides with the EGP's suggestion that CAP reform should support small organic farms. Despite placing their program into a relatable Polish context, Zieloni 2004 still reflected the ideological perspective of the EGP as a whole and unlike most other parties in Poland, addressed those issues that EU policy making does in fact have at least some jurisdiction over.

A change from the very general approach in 2004, the EGP's common manifesto for the 2009 elections to the European Parliament, *A Green New Deal for Europe*, caters to Europe's economic situation which was deep in economic and financial crises at the time. It begins by stating that this financial situation should be seen as an 'opportunity' to transform Europe's economic and social policy. This time, the program is organized into three main objectives: (1) A real alternative for Europe: Securing our energy and environmental future (i.e. climate change, renewable energy, organic farming, and animal rights), (2) Social justice and globalization: Fighting for a fairer Europe (i.e. Regulation of financial markets, investment in education and science research, workers rights, living standards), and (3) Democracy and human rights: a responsible EU that listens and is heard (i.e. participatory democracy, equality minority rights, and asylum). While the main ideological aspects of the previous manifesto remain, priority is given to issues

relating to quality of life and the financial situation.

Because Zieloni 2004 ran in a coalition in these elections, it was expected to adjust its campaign to that of its coalition partners. The 500,000 zloty budget (approx \$156,000 CA) allotted to the coalition campaign paid for things such as television spots which Zieloni 2004 would not have been able to afford on its own. Most of the money allotted towards candidates' own campaign initiatives went to the two much larger coalition partners, SDPL and UP. Due to this shared campaign initiative, Zieloni 2004 did not release an official program for the 2009 EP elections. However, in the end, party executives did not accept the resulting campaign strategy proposed by the coalition partners which was too vague to accommodate the views of three distinct parties (liberals, socialists and Greens). Zieloni 2004 hence decided to make use of materials provided by the EGP. Despite not developing an electoral program, the party did issue a press release on Zieloni 2004's national council's position on the elections. This statement, titled *The Greens: Europe Needs New Political Leadership*, although brief, stayed loyal to the EGP manifesto, with several references to the document itself. Like the EGP, Zieloni 2004's national council emphasize Europe's recent geo-political situation. The statement, which remains general and focused on the EU, argues that due to the overlap of the 'financial, economic and ecological crises' with the escalation of armed conflicts in certain parts of the world, the EU must redefine its role. Additionally, it goes on to mention the importance of improving the EU's efficiency, transparency, democratic quality, and citizen participation. These are all issues that also gained higher priority in the 2009 EGP electoral manifesto. Finally, toward the end, the statement mentions the fight against the many forms of discrimination still existing in the EU. Unlike the party's electoral

program for 2004, little effort is made to tie these issues in to a Polish context. Additionally, Zieloni 2004 also translated an EGP economic paper on the financial crisis to use towards its campaign.

Despite there not being an electoral program for the party as a whole, the party's secretary general, who ran in the Sub-Carpathian constituency, developed an electoral program specifically for the region, which he says offers 'European themes' and explains how they can be used to change the region locally. In an interview, he explained that locally it is difficult for people to see more global or European issues addressed by the EGP, such as climate change, so as a candidate he tries to make references that people can relate to, for example, 'solar panels will mean lower energy bills.'¹³⁶ His electoral program for the Sub-Carpathian region was posted on the party's online election page and was hence free to be accessed by people from across Poland and candidates in other constituencies. However, it is difficult to trace to what extent it was used as such. The program is organized into six major priorities, again loyal to the general priorities of the 2009 EGP manifesto, but this time with an even stronger and more issue- and policy-specific local contextualization. The six priorities include: (1) regional sustainable development; (2) green transportation; (3) new sustainable energy sources; (4) human rights; (5) unity in diversity;¹³⁷ and (6) healthy lifestyle. Throughout the program there is reference to the creation of new green jobs, better infrastructure and better living standards in tune with the EGP's acknowledgement of the financial crisis. Comparing this program and the statement from the national council to the 2004 program with regards to its compatibility with the EGP's electoral manifestos, it becomes clear that the

¹³⁶ Bartłomiej Kozek, Secretary General, Zieloni 2004, Co-Chair Leader, Zieloni 2004 Warsaw Circle, Interview by author, Warsaw, Poland. July 5, 2009.

¹³⁷ This is also the European Union's official motto.

development of official key campaign issues for Zieloni 2004 are very much in line with the changes in priorities for the EGP in this time period (i.e. from more general to more practical issues). Additionally, while in 2004 the Zieloni 2004 program was loyally compatible with the EGP manifesto, the 2009 program and statement are clearly based directly on the EGP's *Green New Deal for Europe*. While these observations appear to reveal a definite growth in official ideological compatibility with the EGP, it is important to consider Zieloni 2004's situation in the 2009 election. Having decided the party does not support the coalition's proposed campaign strategy, there would be little time remaining to develop an entirely new campaign and program for Zieloni 2004. It is plausible that making use of the materials and manifesto provided by the EGP provided a quick solution to moving on with a different campaign strategy than that of the other coalition partners. However, the willingness of Zieloni 2004 to adapt to the EGP campaign against that of its coalition, does illustrate the existence of a great identification with and trust of EGP ideology. In interviews, members of Zieloni 2004 insist that there are no conflicts between their own ideologies and those in the EGP manifesto due to the nature of drafting the manifesto in which delegates of all member parties are present and contribute. Additionally, Magda Mosiewicz is a member of the EGP governing committee, providing Zieloni 2004 with additional influence in the European party. Mosiewicz notes that problems only arise when some national parties choose to sign the EGP manifesto only to remain on good terms with the European Greens and then go on to act against it. This happened in the case of the Latvian Greens who were later accused by the EGP of taking homophobic action at the national level.¹³⁸ Such issues, however, have not been a problem in Poland.

¹³⁸ Mosiewicz, Personal Interview...

While the party's programs may have been keenly consistent with that of the EGP, albeit placed into a national Polish context, the electoral campaigns themselves and how these programs were used in practice tell a different story and reveal inconsistency between party executives and the wider campaign itself. Since Green issues remain very utopian to the Polish electorate, a disconnect appears to exist between Zieloni 2004's official statements and publications, and how these are put into practice during electoral campaigns. Magda Mosiewicz explains that "the Western Greens' opinions sound like a utopia to Eastern Greens. It's a cultural difference." This became evident in the party's actual campaign efforts.

In 2004, Zieloni 2004 had the program developed and ready to use. However, being such a small party with few volunteers and this being its first election, there was trouble organizing the actual campaign. What little campaigning did exist was mostly grass roots in nature and does not appear to have made extensive use of the campaign program. Efforts included used posters of candidates on bicycles, eco-friendly picnics, handing out eco-friendly and organic food items to the public, garbage cleanup and a press conference on the beach with a few well known Polish feminists. Not surprisingly, most of these efforts were centered in and around Warsaw and the party's co-presidents and other executive members. Individual candidates received little instruction. Mosiewicz, who was party co-president at the time, recalling her own campaign efforts explains, "We didn't really have a campaign so we kind of just gave up."¹³⁹ Despite the comprehensiveness of the campaign program, the actual campaigning centered on citizens' fears with regard to entering the European Union. The posters that were printed did to some extent relate to issues in the party program, arguing that the EU is a project

¹³⁹ Mosiewicz, Interview by Author...

for peace and will bring Poland a guarantee of peace and stability, environmental norms and money to fulfill them, and a guarantee of equality and tolerance. However, when campaigning on the ground and speaking to prospective voters, Mosiewicz said the issues discussed were almost always national because it is the local and national situations that are changing and that voters most relate to. Many of the party's Europe-oriented policy ideas were of little interest to voters and even less interest to the media. Some EGP publications were used and distributed, but overall the campaign lacked sophisticated organization.

The EGP's campaign materials and resources were far better utilized in the 2009 EP election. This was most likely partly a result of much better campaign organization on the part of the EGP who recognized the challenges of an election with ten new member states and a decrease of seats available to the EU15. The campaign strategy was discussed extensively at the meetings of the EGP political council which included representatives of all member parties. Additionally, Zieloni 2004 was now more experienced with a number of local and national elections behind them. Not having their own program, the party adopted the EGP manifesto and made extensive use of their other resources, including materials on the EGP's *Stop Barroso* campaign. The party also translated some EGP publications for distribution among potential voters. The layout and motif of billboards placed in Warsaw and Lodz were based directly on EGP banners and campaign materials. The EGP campaign video was personalized for each candidate and used in online campaigns. The Zieloni 2004 website included the EGP's campaign widget to emphasize the image of the party being a member of a larger European party. Additionally, all candidate posters used the same layout, which adopted the motif from

the EGP's campaign posters and materials. The EGP *Think Big. Vote Green* Slogan was also featured in the campaign, which made use of EGP stickers bearing this logo. Campaign posters mostly featured Europeanized slogans in line with the EGP manifesto such as: 'A Green New Deal – New Energy and Jobs,' and 'Green Europe – Ecology and Solidarity.' However, some candidates also used more national slogans with no European context, such as: 'Neither Krzaklewski, nor Kaczynski.' Overall however, the official campaign was highly Europeanized and in line with the EGP's campaign initiatives.



Figure 2

On the left: an EGP poster featuring a black and white image of children with a white border and green background. On the right: a poster for a Zieloni 2004 candidate. It also features a black and white image of the candidate with a white border and green background. Both posters feature similar font in black and white. Also, notice the European Greens logo beneath the candidate's name.

Individual candidates on the other hand, handpicked national issues that they saw fit and applied them to the campaign since there was no time to discuss which issues should be picked up in campaigning on the ground. Bartłomiej Kozek addressed the debate on the Polish shipping industry and how its problems are related to Jose Manuel Barroso's leadership of the European Commission. However, he says that the anti-Barroso campaign and other issues he tried to address, related to sustainable energy sources and social policy, failed to grab the attention of the media. Zieloni 2004 co-president, Dariusz Szwed, started a debate on energy policy and women's and minority rights in his constituency of Pomorze (Gdansk). He says these issues were not decided by the EGP or the party, but that he picked them up last minute as there was no time to plan

ahead. His campaign also included producing thirty thousand issues of a newspaper promoting all of the Zieloni 2004 candidates in all constituencies. Since candidates were essentially responsible for their own campaigns, inconsistencies in adaptation to EGP ideology becomes clear as one moves away from those Zieloni 2004 members closest to the party executive and with contacts to the EGP.

It is not surprising that it is those candidates who attended meetings of the EGP and were close to Zieloni 2004's executive, who had the most comprehensive familiarity with the EGP manifesto and ideology. For those who did not have firsthand knowledge of the manifesto and campaign initiatives, an email newsletter was sent out providing information on plans for the common campaign. Occasionally candidates were also forwarded English-language bulletins from the EGP, despite not everyone sharing the same proficiency in English. Izabela Despererek, a professor at Lodz University who is not a member of Zieloni 2004, was selected to run for Zieloni 2004 for the EP elections in Lodz. She and the other candidates in Lodz received very little instruction regarding how to campaign and in an interview revealed that she was not even aware of the existence of an EGP Green manifesto being used by Zielono 2004. At press conferences journalists would come prepared with the manifesto and other materials from Zieloni 2004 in Warsaw that she and the other candidates had never seen.¹⁴⁰ It is therefore not surprising that there were some inconsistencies between the party's official views and the views campaigned by some of the candidates. Similarly, the EGP manifesto was not widely used outside of the executive circle of candidates. Only after some candidates gave views contradicting Zieloni 2004 and the EGP in interviews with local media, were more detailed instructions distributed by the party. One such candidate told the local press that

¹⁴⁰ Despererek, Interview by Author...

he supports nuclear power, while another gave an interview on labour issues entirely contradicting party ideology. Many times, candidates entered local televised debates with almost no resources from the party and simply their own personal research. This may have been less of a problem in 2004 when Zieloni ran in only three constituencies and were hence able to be more centralized. Despererek observes that “the Polish Greens’ activity is meant to be a part of wider European political activity, but you can only see this in their writings.”¹⁴¹ Resulting is a disconnect, not only between the party executives and local party members, but also between official ideology and how it is implemented in practice. While the coherence of Zieloni’s 2004 official policy with that of the EGP is clearly increasing, at the local level candidates and party members are remain poorly connected to these trends.

The second criterion established to measure Europeanization in this thesis is the *existence or establishment of links to the EU level parties*, including both the EGP and Greens in the EP. The greater the frequency that contact with these parties takes place and the stronger the official institutional bonds to them, the greater the visible efforts of Zieloni 2004 to adapt to Poland’s EU membership and their participation in European Parliament elections. During the party’s early days, institutional links to the EGP were limited to its membership, and ability to send delegates to the biannual EGP council meetings. There were no party members exclusively assigned to deal with the EGP and delegates sent to the meetings normally included the party co-presidents and other additional members who would be rotated in an attempt to allow as many Zieloni 2004 members as possible to get exposure the EGP. By 2009, there were three people officially appointed to maintain communication with the EGP. These include: Dariusz

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

Szwed, who attends council meetings regularly as the party's official delegate, Beata Maciejewska who coordinates the EGP's Baltic Green Network and Magda Mosiewicz who sits on the EGP's governing board. Mosiewicz admits that her work on the EGP board has made her closer to European issues than perhaps others in the party who lack these same connections to the European level Greens.¹⁴² By 2009, Zieloni 2004's ties to the EGP had grown to the extent that when the council of the EGP decided that the Green Group in the EP should have a working group on energy and climate, Dariusz Szwed was invited to travel to Brussels to help Green MEPs shape some of the group's documents on the subject. He has also been actively involved in the EGP's working group on the economy. Also, Agnieszka Grzybek (party co-president from 2008-2010) is the only member from the CEECs on the board of advisors for the transnational European Green Foundation. While separate from the EGP and Greens/EFA, the foundation is affiliated with the groups and is sponsored by EU funds. It is clear that Zieloni 2004 is making institutional connections with EU level Greens to the greatest degree possible and the great extent to which these links have increased since 2004 is evidence of these efforts.

Zieloni 2004 has no official links to the Green Group in the European Parliament. However as an affiliated party, if any members would be elected to the EP, they would join the Greens/EFA. Zieloni 2004 is also the only Polish Green party listed on the Greens/EFA website. Unofficial cooperation with the group existed from the early days of the party who received 'Green Ambassadors' sent by the Green Group in the EP to assist with certain national and European events. For example, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, then a German MEP, came to Poland to assist Zieloni 2004 with its campaign for the parliamentary elections in 2005. Such contact with Green MEPs has been growing

¹⁴² Mosiewicz, Interview by Author...

consistently. Following the poor results for Greens in the new member states during the 2004 EP elections, Zieloni 2004 member Bartek Lech was hired by the Greens/EFA as a liaison with Green parties in the CEECs. He was one of three people selected by Zieloni 2004 to travel to the European Parliament on an initiative of the Heinrich Böll Foundation to send Green members from various countries to connect with the Greens/EFA. Later when the Green Group in the EP was organizing a Green summer university in Frankfurt-Oder on the border of Poland and Germany, it hired Bartek Lech to assist. He obtained the position with the Greens/EFA in Brussels on his own initiative. However, Zieloni 2004 has made extensive use of this internal link to the EP and uses him as a contact if it needs any assistance from Green MEPs. As a result, the availability such assistance has rapidly increased. In 2007, Zieloni 2004 was actively involved in protest against the development of the Rospuda Valley wetlands in north-eastern Poland. David Hammerstein, a Spanish Green MEP came to Poland to assist with the campaign. During the 2009 elections to the EP, Dutch Green MEP Kathalijne Buitenweg came to Poland to help with the campaign and was involved organizing a press conference and debate about Polish equality law. Magda Mosiewicz notes that if there is an issue in Poland that Zieloni 2004 needs assistance with, it is almost always possible to unofficially coordinate something with Greens in the EP. For example, the Green Group in the EP issued a statement on homophobia following homophobic actions in Poland. Zieloni 2004 then used this to exert some pressure over the government to take action despite the statement being legally non-binding.

Additionally, the contact with the Green Group influenced issues tackled by Zieloni 2004 candidates in the 2009 EP elections. A number of interviewed candidates

mention finding a publication that the group distributes listing the achievements of Greens in the EP during the last presidency influential in determining the issues they felt were appropriate to cover during their campaigns. Additionally, interviewed members consistently note that cooperation with the Green Group and EGP has grown stronger over the past five years. Such un-institutionalized contacts with EU level Greens, in addition to the growing institutionalized links, appear to be important factors in the increasingly 'Europeanized' outlook of Zieloni 2004 members. The growing efforts to maintain these links and develop new ones illustrate the party's increased European consciousness. Additionally, they provide a clear sign of the Europeanization of the party.

In addition to party ideology and levels of contact with European level Greens, a factor that may be influenced by European Integration, and the resulting increase in contact with European level Greens discussed above, is the party's *set of procedures of candidate selection*. These procedures may be based entirely on domestic political procedures or context or they can be inspired by European level greens and participation in European Parliament elections. For Zieloni 2004, the procedures for candidate selection are identical for both national and European elections. Candidates are typically discussed regionally and then proposed to the national party council where they must then be accepted by a vote. The national council consists of sixteen members representing various regions of Poland. Based largely on the small membership of the party, the same candidates run in national and European elections. However, there are also initiatives to search for and recruit candidates who may be particularly compatible with a certain constituency or a certain campaign. These candidates are not always required to be

members of the party and are typically recruited for a particular election but have also been known to stay on with the party afterwards. In February prior to the 2009 elections Zieloni 2004 organized a focus group of experts on numerous issues at the party headquarters in Warsaw. This was also an opportunity for the party to find some knowledgeable and well spoken potential candidates, and a number of participants, including Izabela Despererek were later invited to run in the 2009 EP elections. There is an attempt with candidates, as with the national party council, for proportional representation of the constituencies. However, this is not always possible given the limited pool of candidates, and especially when running on a coalition list with other parties. Consequently, candidates often run in a different constituency in each election. The above procedures are not influenced by and EU level Greens but are rather a result of the party's current situation with regards to size and expertise.

According to party members, neither the EGP nor the Green Group in the EU has provided any instructions or suggestions with regards to candidate selection procedures. However, Zieloni 2004 have been influenced by European Greens, particularly the French and German Green parties, to enforce a set of gender parity regulations to both the internal party structure, and to the organization of candidate lists. From its establishment, Zieloni 2004 always has two co-presidents, a man and a woman. This co-presidency system is also seen in the organization of the European Green Party, the Green Group/EFA, and a number of other Green parties in Western Europe. Some parties will also allow for a co-presidency of two women, but never two men. The national council is composed of half males and half females, another trend common to Western European Greens and the European Green Party congresses. In 2004 and 2005, when Zieloni 2004

was participating in its first elections, it promoted the 'zip' or 'zebra' pattern to their candidate lists where candidates alternate down the list between male and female. Additionally, the top positions on the lists were always given to women. However, as the party encountered problems recruiting an ideal number of female candidates, the system was changed to ensure that at least forty percent of the candidates on each list are women and that some level of alternation exists, even if it is not perfect. In the most recent EP election, gender parity was attempted with the candidate lists. However, it was difficult to achieve while negotiating candidates within a coalition. The adoption of gender parity into the parties' organization and structure illustrates that acute attention is paid to Greens in the West. Despite gender parity having little to do with the influence of EU membership itself, the resulting cooperation with parties in the EU15 and the EGP from the very beginning was immensely influential in inspiring party structure and the organization of candidate lists. The changes in the approach to the 'zip' pattern of candidate distribution do not expose an increase or decrease of Europeanization, since the approach to gender parity, although common to all European Greens in the EU15, is present in various manifestations.

The *development of institutions within national party structures to address issues of EU politics* is another potential manifestation of Europeanization. This includes the establishment of committees, working groups or positions within the party to specialize in EU issues. In Zieloni 2004 the national council is responsible for researching and discussing general political issues with regards to how the party should approach them, or if a particular campaign, initiative or protest should be initiated. However, nobody in the party is responsible specifically for specializing in EU-level

politics. By default, the co-presidents of the party do most of the work in this area. However, it is not officially established that they are assigned to deal with these issues. The arrangement is a result of limited available manpower. No progress has been made in developing structures specializing in EU politics within the party between 2004 and 2009.

The final criterion which may help to identify the top-down dimension of the Europeanization of political parties is the *adaptation of media statements to the shared principles of the EGP*. It has been suggested by numerous scholars that media coverage and of political campaigns, as well as other forms of publicity such as advertisements or participation in debates have significant influence over voter preferences,¹⁴³ as well forming people's impression of the party. For this reason, press releases and the impression the party gives to the media are equally as important to this study as the official campaign itself. This section looks at two national daily newspapers, *Rzeczpospolita* and *Gazeta Wyborcza*. While the coverage of the election and especially Zieloni 2004 is very limited, these are two of the most widely read newspapers in Poland and reach the largest number of people. Some local campaigns did provide more extensive coverage of individual campaigns, such as local newspapers in Gdansk following Dariusz Szwed in 2009. However, systematic analysis of all significant local newspapers in the thirteen electoral constituencies would have been beyond the scope of this project.

The final sixteen days of the 2004 EP electoral campaign saw just two articles referencing Zieloni 2004 in *Gazeta Wyborcza* and only one in *Rzeczpospolita* with several more articles briefly mentioning the Green Group in the EP but making no

¹⁴³ Cwalina, 376.

reference to Polish Greens. Only one article, published 1 June, 2004 in *Gazeta Wyborcza*,¹⁴⁴ is entirely devoted to the Greens. The piece covers Zieloni 2004's campaign efforts involving the distribution of pamphlets about pesticides and genetically engineered foods, two issues strongly emphasized by the European-level greens. More significantly, the piece mentions that Zieloni 2004 plan to cooperate with Greens in the European Parliament to increase funds for small organic farms. Already in 2004, this newspaper is picking up on the party's emphasis of Europeanized issues and cooperation with EU level greens. The second article in *Gazeta Wyborcza* covers a candidate's debate in Warsaw where Radosław Gawlik represented the Greens.¹⁴⁵ However, despite this being a debate for the EP electoral campaign, the only reference to Zieloni 2004 is in reference to Gawlik's protest against the banning of a gay pride parade. Despite equality rights being emphasized in the EGP's manifesto, the reference in this article is strictly referring to a national event and fails to reference the relevance of this to European level policy or participation in the European Parliament. This may have likely been a result of the nature of the campaign itself, as no reference is made to any other participants discussing any issues of European relevance either. The single article in *Rzeczpospolita*¹⁴⁶ covers various campaign events across Wrocław and very briefly mentions Zieloni 2004 painting bicycles green and distributing organic foods in the Royal Castle Square. However it appears these efforts failed to get across to the media any of Zieloni 2004's actual campaign objectives in a way that would pique their interest. Despite the coverage in 2004 being brief and very limited, when the media managed to get past the novelty of a new Green party in Poland, there was some reference to not only policy interests shared

¹⁴⁴ Kampania Zielonych do Parlamentu Europejskiego, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, June 1, 2004.

¹⁴⁵ Debata z Kandydatami do PE na Uniwersytecie Wrocławskim, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, June 3, 2004.

¹⁴⁶ Latające Torty i Koguty, *Rzeczpospolita*, June 11, 2004.

with the EGP, but also to the party's attempt at fitting into a stronger European context.

Surprisingly, the coverage of Zieloni 2004 during the 2009 EP electoral campaign is limited to just one article in *Rzeczpospolita*¹⁴⁷ which more specifically focuses on the Green Group. This may partially be a consequence of the party's decision to run in a coalition. While references to the coalition itself are also brief, they are usually very general or refer only to candidates from the SDPL. While some of these references feature European references, they have little in common with views held by the European Greens. The only reference to Greens is one listing the Polish parties' affiliations with groups in the EP. This absence of Europeanized references to Zieloni 2004 in 2009 cannot be taken as a sign of decreased Europeanization of its publicity campaign as it is likely a result of the party's decision to run in a coalition, resulting in it receiving less media attention. However, examining Zieloni 2004's press releases does reveal evidence of an increase in Europeanization. In 2004, four out of a total of seven press releases (just over half) during the campaign period contain references to EU level policies and reflect shared ideology with the EGP. One of these lists a series of questions on views concerning the EU for Poland's Citizens' Platform party. These questions also work to reveal Zieloni 2004's stance on these issues. The remaining 'European' level press releases relate to shared concerns with the EGP, such as the increase of genetically modified foods, and suggest that the solution must come from the EU. In 2009, exactly half of the total fourteen press releases published during the campaign are directly referring to EU-level policy and EGP campaigns. The focus on shared campaigns with the EGP is stronger than in 2004 with press releases specifically devoted not only to shared single policy objectives with the EGP, but also to the EGP's Stop Barroso

¹⁴⁷ Tam, Gdzie Decyduje się o Prawie UE, *Rzeczpospolita*, June 6, 2009.

campaign and the details of the Green New Deal. While it appears Zieloni 2004 has not come across to the media as a serious European-policy oriented party worth taking an interest in, its press releases have over time revealed a growth in interest in the work of the EGP and a stronger emphasis on its affiliation with the European Greens.

3.5 Attempt to Shape the Trajectory of European Integration

The second dimension of Europeanization relevant to this thesis is bottom-up in nature. This includes attempts or successes of national Green parties to shape Greens at the European level, or even European integration in general. In this case, signs that the EGP and Green Group in the European parliament have made changes to adapt to the 2004 accession of ten new member states reveals both the pressure on EU level parties to adapt to EU enlargement, and also the Europeanization of national parties if any if these changes were stimulated on the national green parties' initiative. The first of these criteria consists of *attempts to add national green party interests into the EGP manifesto and positions of the Greens in the European Parliament*. Adapting to their membership in the European Union, participation in European elections and cooperation with European Greens, one would expect national parties would not only modify themselves to accommodate these changes but also attempt to make European Greens more reflective of their own interests. In the case of Zieloni 2004, the period between the 2004 and 2009 EP elections saw numerous attempts to mobilize European-level Greens. However most of these efforts were concentrated towards the latter part of this period, suggesting an increased awareness to the benefits of stimulating interest in its issues among EU-level Greens. This is also linked to increased ability to influence resulting

from the presence of one of the party's members on the secretariat of the Greens/EFA.¹⁴⁸ Surprisingly, despite lacking official representation at the national and EU levels, Zieloni 2004 has not only attempted but also achieved a fair amount of influence. In 2008 members of Zieloni 2004 lobbied the Green Group in the EP to organize a press conference in Brussels on the Nord Stream pipeline project proposal. The Green Group took interest in this issue and published a shared press release with Zieloni 2004 prior to organizing the conference. The attempt to influence at the European level, despite the absence of official representation in the EU, also moves beyond just EU level Greens and the European parliament. For example, in 2009 Zieloni 2004 with a number of Polish feminists sent an open letter to the Polish Commissioner, Danuta Hubner, claiming that equality law is not being implemented in Poland, asking for intervention. This initiative was also supported by the Greens/EFA who contacted the Commission to inquire how it intends to ensure the implementation of the EU's gender equality regulations. Following Zieloni 2004's failure to win any seats in the latest European Parliament elections, the party's executive members are developing an action plan to find ways to shape the Greens/EFA to a greater extent and become more involved in European Union policy making. Currently, the party has limited capacity to follow and monitor the work of the EP, something co-president Dariusz Szwed says he wants to change.¹⁴⁹

With regards to EGP ideology, common documents, including the election manifestos, are developed with the input of all parties, including those not represented in the EP and even parties from outside of the EU. All final documents are voted on by representatives of the member parties. Zieloni 2004 receives just one vote, while parties

¹⁴⁸ This refers to Bartek Lech's position as official liaison with Central and Eastern European Green parties.

¹⁴⁹ Szwed, Interview by Author...

with elected representatives receive more votes proportionally. This essentially means that while all parties have an opportunity to influence the ideology and objectives of these documents, currently the French and German Green parties maintain the strongest influence. Because Green parties in the EU15 tend to generally have better electoral success, the EGP's agenda is often oriented towards these parties' priorities. Additionally, the EGP is also largely influenced by the Greens/EFA as many MEPs are members of the European Greens' governing council and on EGP committees. Zieloni 2004 has made two major attempts to increase its influence in the EGP. The first is Magda Mosiewicz's election to the EGP governing board in 2006, where she is able to have greater influence over the European Greens' agenda since the board is active on a daily basis. The EGP council on the other hand, which involves participation of all member parties, only meets twice a year. Secondly, Dariusz Szwed actively participates on numerous EGP working groups where issues are discussed and planned prior to the debates at the biannual council meetings. He says that at this point the party is less concerned with influencing the EGP's political agenda and focusing more on influencing its structure, which works to the disadvantage of Zieloni 2004 and other parties, particularly those in the new member states, who have little to no elected representatives.¹⁵⁰ Politically, one issue that Zieloni 2004 has tried to push to be more heavily emphasized in the EGP is that of nuclear energy. Overall, the party's has become increasingly more active in its attempts to be more influential at the European level, whether with European-level Greens or beyond.

In addition to national Green parties from the new member states attempting to influence the European level, the EGP and the Greens/EFA show signs that they have

¹⁵⁰ Szwed, Interview by Author...

recognized the importance of cooperation with Green parties in the new member states to proper representation of European interests in an enlarged European Union. The *establishment of institutional links at the supranational level to the national green parties from the accession states* is therefore second criterion reflecting national Greens' influence over the trajectory of Europeanization. Increasing and institutionalizing contact with Greens in the new member states was one of the EGP's proposals as well as a major objective following the 2004 enlargement which preceded the new member states' first participation in European Parliament elections. The Green Group and the EGP together have had three major initiatives to improve contact with Green parties in new member states. Among these, the first major initiative following the disappointing results in the 2004 elections was the development of internships with the Greens/EFA for young Green party members from the CEECs. These are intended to improve the cooperation and understanding between the parliamentary group and unelected Greens in the east with the hope of improving chances of future electoral success. Additionally, they ensure that the Greens/EFA are more in tune with the needs of Greens in all EU member states, as opposed to only those with elected MEPs. In addition to these internships, the Green Group has also occasionally been organizing its meetings in CEE member states where it meets to do its regular parliamentary work and also holds events and conferences that are open to the public and participation of the local Green parties. Inviting local Greens and members of the civil society to these conferences gives Green MEPs an opportunity to develop a feeling for the political situation in the new member states. The aim is to have one such meeting outside of Brussels or Strasbourg each year. The group met in Poland just prior to the 2004 enlargement, with the cooperation of the EGP, to discuss accession

and the constitutional treaty. It also met in the Czech Republic in 2007 and is continuing this initiative into the 2009-2014 Parliamentary Session. Thirdly, together with the EGP, the Green Group has been organizing an annual free Green European Summer University since 2008. The first of these was held on the border of Poland and Germany. Half of the events took place in Poland, and half in Germany. Outside of these officially organized meetings, a Green MEP meets with someone from a Green party from the new member states on average once every one to two months.¹⁵¹ While these are certainly conscious reactions to enlargement, there is little evidence that national Green parties have themselves had any active involvement in pushing for them. Therefore, while very telling of EU-level Greens' own responses to European integration, they are not direct evidence of Europeanization of the national parties.

With the 2009 elections to the European Parliament, attempts at increased communication from the European end were amplified. The Green Group together with the EGP organized a network of former MEPs and national MPs whom they called 'Green Ambassadors' who were sent to events namely in countries with no Green representation in the EP. These 'ambassadors' offered to provide national Green parties with knowledge and expertise gained through their political experience and to assist with national campaigns. Additionally, recognizing that voters in the new member states may not feel as attracted to issues such as climate change in a political campaign, the EGP released a common paper on the economy to provide resources on more practical political issues that Greens can campaign on.¹⁵² Ulrike Lunacek, the EGP's spokesperson, says

¹⁵¹ Joachim Denking, Deputy Secretary General of the Greens/European Free Alliance, Interview by author, Strasbourg, France. July 14, 2009.

¹⁵² Ulrike Lunacek, European Green Party Spokesperson and MEP (*Die Grünen*, Austria, 2009) Interview by author. Strasbourg, France. July 15, 2009.

that following another unsuccessful EP election for Greens in the CEECs, the EGP plans to shift its focus to aim at getting Greens elected at the local and municipal levels in these countries: “What is clear is that we have to start building at the local and municipal level, and the regional and national and then European.”¹⁵³ For example, during the 2009 EP electoral campaign, some Slovenian-speaking Austrian Green candidates were put in contact with the Slovenian Green party which had split up into a number of fractions, to help them get reorganized. In the future, the EGP hopes to organize more of these partnerships between Green parties in the old member states with those in the new. This network will build on already existing weaker networks such as those between the German Greens and the Polish and the Czech Greens, Austrian Greens with Hungarian and Slovakian Greens, and Finnish Greens with the Greens in Estonia, and so on. While these links are already active, the EGP’s next move is to develop a common umbrella connecting them to a larger and better organized network. European-level Greens are keenly involved in trying to increase contact and communication with Greens in the new member states, and the momentum at which this takes place appears to increase with each subsequent failure for these parties to win seats to the European Parliament. However, as before, none of these projects appear to have been pushed by initiatives stemming from Greens in the new member states and they therefore fail to illustrate Europeanization in this case.

The third criterion reflecting national Greens’ influence over the trajectory of Europeanization is closely related to the above mentioned initiatives. It examines the *development of institutions within European level Green party structures to address issues important to the Greens in the accession states*. Following the European Union’s

¹⁵³ Ibid.

2004 enlargement, it is reasonable to expect that Greens at the EU level were not simply interested in increasing contact and communication with Green parties in new member states, but also developing expertise on these new members and the issues that are of greatest importance to Greens in them. The development of new posts, positions, or committees within the Green Group or the EGP would provide the clearest manifestation of this criterion. The EGP, preceded by the EFGP, was never restricted to just Green parties from EU member states. Greens from a number of the 2004 accession states were members of the federation long before the 2004 enlargement and some were even involved as founding members. For this reason, the EGP was already structured to allow parties from these states to exert some level of influence and has not undergone any organizational institutional changes to accommodate the enlargement. However, following the failure to elect any Greens in the new member states, the Green Group in the European Parliament created a new two year post called the liaison with the green parties of Central and Eastern Europe. Members of the group claim that this was not only the biggest organizational change following the 2004 EP elections but also the biggest visible shift in MEP's attitudes.¹⁵⁴ The group's deputy secretary general explains that:

It's a serious problem that we're not represented and we don't have deputies in the East. This is one of the main reasons why we also decided to improve our links by having a person to make the link to what's happening in the countries where we have no representation.¹⁵⁵

However, following Bartek Lech's two-year term, this position was not renewed. Therefore, while there has been some attempt at changing the Green Group's institutional structure as a reaction to the existence of these parties and their absence in the parliament, this change was not permanent. Additionally, there is little evidence that Zieloni 2004

¹⁵⁴ Lunacek, Interview by Author...

¹⁵⁵ Denkinger, Interview by Author...

had any influence in the development of this post. Rather, it is an example of the Green Group's own reaction to its loss of seats in the EP in 2004. The Group's future plans seem to be increasingly focused on pursuing contact with the parties themselves, something that was likely facilitated during the two years this post was active.

3.6 Conclusion

Being a young party, it is not surprising that that it emerged in 2004 already largely Europeanized. This chapter has illustrated that Zieloni 2004's small size and relative youth has encouraged the party to make much use of the resources available to it at the European level leading to closer cooperation with EU-level Greens. However, the rather high level of change towards closer cooperation has not been reflected equally across both the top-down and bottom-up levels of Europeanization. It is clear that while Zieloni 2004 can benefit greatly from cooperating with EU level Greens and changing itself as a reaction to this cooperation, there is still little that it is able to influence or change the European level. While there have been several relatively successful attempts at doing so, these are restricted to just one of the three possible criteria.

CHAPTER FOUR

STRANA ZELENÝCH AND ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

As we were developing and also trying to emancipate ourselves at the national level here, we tried to get the maximum expertise from the EGP and this helped to shape us into the standard Green party. I think we can call ourselves a standard Green party these days,

Ondrej Mirovsky
Strana Zelených (2009)

A direct product of the collapse of the socialist regime, Strana Zelených (SZ), the Czech Green Party, has gone through extensive challenges and internal conflicts that have clearly shaped the way it has reacted to European integration and the development of European level Greens. Like Poland, Czechoslovakia saw a strong overlap between the environmental and anti-Communist protest movements in the decade leading up to the Velvet Revolution. From the founding of the Charter 77 dissident movement and onward, cooperation between these two groups steadily increased.¹⁵⁶ Also, as was the case with its northern neighbours in Poland, these groups and organizations, mostly conservationist in nature, played a pivotal role in the opposition to the Communist regime. However, following the revolution and the ‘Velvet Divorce’ of Slovakia and the Czech Republic, it was Strana Zelených who became the “champion” of the Czech environmental cause, while the grassroots groups and activists composing the formerly very active environmental movement slowly faded into the background,¹⁵⁷ a trend very different from that which was seen in Poland. Strana Zelených was founded on a top-

¹⁵⁶ Adam Fagan, “Environment and Democracy in the Czech Republic: The Environment Movement in the Transition Process” (Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., Northampton, MA: 2004): 64.

¹⁵⁷ Petr Jehlička, “The New Subversives – Czech Environmentalists after 1989” in *Pink, Purple, Green: Women, Religious, Environmental and Gay/Lesbian Movements in Central Europe Today*, ed. HELENA Flam (Columbia University Press, New York: 2001): 85.

town hierarchical basis rather than by the bottom-up approach common in Western Europe, resulting in a party which, from its early days, had very little in common with the wider European ‘Green’ movement. This chapter, like the previous, asks and thoroughly analyzes to what extent EU membership has resulted in a ‘Europeanization’ of this party. Due to the absence of an historical connection to the environmental movement, the chapter commences with a brief historical overview of the SZ itself, covering its emergence, fall and reappearance. Next, the nature of the Czech campaigns during the 2004 and 2009 elections to the European parliament are discussed following a detailed analysis of the eight criteria for Europeanization for the two periods. As in the previous chapter, criteria relating to Strana Zelených’s adaptation to the trajectory of Europeanization will be examined first, followed by the criteria relating to its attempt to shape the trajectory of Europeanization.

4.1 Strana Zelených: A Party in Three Stages

The history of the Czech Green Party, up to 2009, can be organized into three distinct phases. The first marks its initial appearance on to the Czech political scene, which is characterized by isolation from NGOs and the grassroots environmental movement and sees little in common with other European Green parties. The second phase marks the rebirth of Strana Zelených, who is moving toward stronger post-materialist values and developing solid contacts with national NGOs. The final phase follows Martin Bursik’s takeover of the party’s presidency resulting in national electoral success followed by mass internal conflict. Currently, the party has entered what can be seen as the fourth phase of its existence, characterized by its attempt to recover from its most recent crisis, beginning with Bursik’s stepping down as president. However, as

these events are beyond the temporal boundaries of this case study, this chapter will mainly focus on the first three.

Stage one: the rise and fall of SZ

As we have seen in Poland, and as was witnessed among many of the Czech Republic's other Eastern neighbours, the Green parties that emerged following the collapse of the socialist regime were composed of the environmental dissidents who were active and rose to notoriety during the years leading up to the fall of the regime. The Green party that emerged during this same time in the Czech Republic, on the other hand, did not include any of these former environmental dissidents, nor anyone known among the national environmental movement. Curiously, while this party appeared to flourish, the once vibrant environmental movement was diminishing. Strana Zelených was founded as the first political party to emerge in the Czech Republic following the collapse of the previous regime, just four days after the student demonstration in Prague on 17 November 1989 that marked the start of the Velvet Revolution. At the time of its foundation, the party reported 5,200 members and eleven thousand signatures supporting its establishment.¹⁵⁸ Its immediate success, visibility (despite including no known members of the environmental movement) and acquisition of an office space and supplies at a time when other parties were still struggling and working out of people's homes, eventually led to the suspicions that it was connected to the former regime's secret police. These factors also led to national NGO's persistent refusal to cooperate with the party. Strong roots in the environmental protest movement and extensive cooperation with national NGOs is a major characteristic of Greens in the West, which for a long time differentiated them from other mainstream parties. Most new Green parties that arose out

¹⁵⁸ Jehlička, *The New Subversives...*, 85.

of the former European Socialist regimes followed this pattern. However, the Czech greens were not among them. During the first free elections in 1990, despite its apparent popularity placing it at around eleven percent in the polls, the party failed to pass the five percent threshold. Since party funding depends on electoral performance, SZ entered a period of financial decline and quickly fell towards obscurity.

It was later publicized that most of the founding members, and those who joined the party immediately after its establishment, did indeed have ties to the previous regime. They consisted mostly of “[Communist] party veterans who sought political refuge from the new political elite.”¹⁵⁹ Despite reporting fifteen thousand members at its founding council in January 1990, and eighty thousand just one month later, it was later revealed that just under half of the membership by 1993 had joined in the party’s first month of existence. The members originally tied to the communist regime were eventually expelled, but their association with Strana Zelených stuck in people’s minds and as of 1991 SZ was continuously losing members.¹⁶⁰ Additionally, the party retained a left-oriented mentality from its initial socialist establishment that did not sit well with many of its members due to its association with the Czech Republic’s Communist past. In the 1992 parliamentary elections, SZ leadership allied the party with the Agrarian Party (Zemědělská Strana, ZS) and the Czechoslovakian Socialist Party (Československá Strana Socialistická, ČSS). The coalition campaigned under the name ‘Liberal Social Union’ and gained 6.5 percent of the votes electing three Green members to the Czech National Council. Since just under half of the party members placed themselves centre-right on the political scale, two thirds of the members walked out in protest leading to the

¹⁵⁹ Fagan, 84.

¹⁶⁰ Petr Jehlička and Tomas Kostecky, “Czech Greens in the 2002 General Election: A New Lease on Life?” (*Environmental Politics* 12(2) 2003): 134.

coalition's collapse.¹⁶¹ Due to trouble securing funding and poor internal financial management, by 1996 the party did not even have enough funds to field any candidates in the parliamentary election. At this time, the leading figures in what remained of the party consisted mainly of medical and veterinary doctors and polytechnic graduates concerned with local pollution and its impact on public health.¹⁶² Lacking post-material values dominant in the environmental and human rights movements of the 1980s, the party had little in common with Greens in the West.

Following its failure to field candidates in the 1996 election, SZ elected a new executive board it hoped would help revive the party by improving transparency and restoring its reputation. A year later, SZ joined the EFGP hoping that the association with European level Greens may improve its credibility at the domestic level. However these efforts did not pay off and in the 1998 parliamentary election the party received only 1.2 percent of the overall vote. This not only failed to secure party funding but also did not meet the electoral threshold necessary to secure the reimbursement of campaign expenses, bringing Strana Zelených into even deeper financial debt. The party desperately tried to revive itself again at its national congress in March of the following year; this time not only with a newly elected executive board, but also with changes to its organization and internal structure. The new structure of the executive included a president, four vice-presidents and fourteen additional elected party members. Each member, it was established, would be responsible for a particular policy area and the party's activities in a specific region. However, this proved to be too heavy of a

¹⁶¹ Karl Cordell, and Zdenek Hausvater, "Working Together: The Partnership between the Czech and German Greens as a Model for Wider Czech-German Cooperation?" (*Debatte* 14(1) 2006): 52.

¹⁶² Jehlička, 86.

commitment and by 2001 only about half of the executive members were still active.¹⁶³ By this time Strana Zelených's membership fell to just 239 individuals and the party was twelve million Czech Crowns (€ 400,000) in debt.¹⁶⁴

Stage two: the Brandys Initiative and the return of the Greens

The second phase of Strana Zelených's existence begins with two men, both with the aim of bringing NGOs and civil society closer to Czech politics: Jan Beranek, a well known former environmental activist and Petr Stepanek, a former member of Prague's city council and former spokesperson for the Ministry of Environment. Combined, their initiatives led to a rebirth of Strana Zelených in a direction much more familiar to that of Western European Greens. In the autumn of 2001, Stepanek brought together a coalition of various NGOs who shared the common goal of increasing civil society's power and influence with the government. Then prime minister, Vaclav Klaus, was dismissive of civil society in general and especially environmental groups which made it difficult for NGOs to gain any access to the government.¹⁶⁵ This group was organized into a loose lobby platform called the Brandys Forum which negotiated with representatives of political parties to open spaces on their electoral lists for members of civil society. The main target at this time was a coalition of the People's Party, Freedom Union, Civic Democratic Alliance and the Democratic Union. The coalition, however, rejected the Forum's proposal.¹⁶⁶ Around this same time, SZ had elected a man named Miroslav Rakos as president in preparation for the 2002 elections. Rakos was intent on finally getting NGOs to cooperate with the party and potentially even run their members on SZ's

¹⁶³ Cordell and Hausvater, 53.

¹⁶⁴ Jehlička and Kostecky, 136.

¹⁶⁵ Stephen Deets and Karel Kouba, "The Czech Greens Revived" (*Environmental Politics* 17(5) 2008): 816.

¹⁶⁶ Jehlička and Kostecky, 137.

electoral lists. Having heard of the Brandys Forum, he approached Beranek to ask if any Brandys activists would be interested in running for Strana Zelených. A number of activists accepted Rakos' proposal and many ran in the top positions on SZ's lists. However, since the party was still relatively weak and had not yet recovered financially, limiting its campaign, it only managed to receive 2.36 percent of vote. Despite this being an improvement from the previous election, it still failed to cross the five percent threshold needed to elect a candidate. This failure led many NGO and civil society activists to see SZ as a party "full of opportunists, communists, and people with sound beliefs but who could still not change the party."¹⁶⁷ However, it was finally beginning to catch the attention of the youngest generation of voters and voters in urban areas, the groups that other Green parties in Europe rely on for a large part of their support.

While Stepanek was still working on the Brandys forum, another man, Jan Beranek, the acting vice-chairman of the Party for Open Society, had plans to build his party up and eventually merge it with Strana Zelených. The party was a successor of the Free Democrats and attracted numerous former dissidents and environmentalists, among them Stepanek himself. Additionally, its three main policies: sustainable development, support for civil society, and developing international awareness, had strong parallels to the ideals of European Greens. Sharing some similar goals, Beranek reached out to Stepanek and the Brandys Forum.¹⁶⁸ In spring 2002 he brought together people, namely activists, intellectuals and journalists interested in joining and reforming Strana Zelených into a group he called The Green 50. The group published a document titled 'The Deep Green Call' which assessed the state of the party and what needs to be changed. Building

¹⁶⁷ Cordell and Hausvater, 54.

¹⁶⁸ Fagan, 164.

off of the Brandys initiative, it also asked people to join the party in an attempt to reform it. It called for better transparency, NGO support and prioritizing environmental issues. As a result, many NGO activists and environmentalists, who formerly would have nothing to do with the Greens, finally joined the party and became active members. The Green 50 quickly grew to about 150 individuals who simultaneously joined the party in June of that same year in an attempt to flood it with a new majority who would push for change.¹⁶⁹ Among these new members were Stepanek of the Brandys Forum and Beranek himself.

For the first time, Strana Zelených's membership included large numbers of environmentalists, civil society activists, and the party maintained close ties with national NGOs. Ironically, the initiative for these changes was not internal, but had to come from the outside. However, Strana Zelených was finally beginning to look more like a Green party in the west. Shortly following these changes, it received visits from Die Grünen's Renate Kunast and Les Verts' MEP, Daniel Cohn-Bendit,¹⁷⁰ signifying that Greens in the West were finally becoming interested in the party. From there, the party entered a brief period of stability. The new members did surprisingly well in the November municipal elections and entered a number of local governments across the country. Just a year later, at the national party congress, a new executive was elected entirely of former members of the Green 50 and other prominent NGO activists, including Beranek as president, which gained SZ much media attention. As president, Beranek stressed SZ's similarities with Germany's Die Grünen and worked on centralizing power within the party to improve its organization. Authors Cordell and Hausvater observe, "In many of the speeches of

¹⁶⁹ Cordell and Hausvater, 54.

¹⁷⁰ Fagan, 165.

successful candidates you could hear clearly how they regarded the wider European dimension as being crucial to their future activity.”¹⁷¹ This was likely a result of increased interaction with other European Green parties. However, this honeymoon period was short-lived and Strana Zelených soon entered a period of ongoing internal conflict and infighting.

Stage three: Martin Bursik’s rocky leadership and SZ in government

By 2004 the party executive had shifted SZ back toward the left. Once again, this made some members uncomfortable. The first signs of an oncoming internal crisis came during the months preceding the Czech Republic’s first elections to the European Parliament that summer. Stepanek, who had close ties with Martin Bursik of the Christian and Democratic Union (KDU), mobilized a growing faction of the party that wanted Bursik to replace Beranek as president. Beranek was then hit with a barrage of criticism regarding the process in which candidates were selected and ranked for the party’s national EP election list. Petr Uhl, a prominent former anti-Communist dissident, along with Stepanek mobilized a criticism of this list, which Uhl insisted be headed by Bursik. From this point on the party was overcome by personal rivalries that extended beyond the Czech borders, as Cohn-Bendit, who has ties to Uhl, publicly demanded that Beranek rework the list and rewrite the party constitution.¹⁷² Beranek refused and the party faction that favoured Bursik continued to grow. While Beranek managed to retain his position following the party congress, many of his rivals, including Stepanek and Bursik, who had now joined the party, were elected to the executive board. By autumn 2005 he was ousted from leadership and Bursik took his place.

¹⁷¹ Cordell and Hausvater, 55.

¹⁷² Deets and Kouba, 817.

Bursik's leadership tried to emphasize the party's identity as 'neither left, nor right, but ahead,' in line with other European Green Parties, especially Die Grünen with whom SZ was developing increasingly closer ties. Their campaigns and program targeted middle class and upper middle class urban voters and portrayed the party as more flexible than the under the previous leadership. This paid off and SZ's Jaromir Stetina, a journalist and war correspondent, was elected to the senate for the Prague 10 constituency in November 2005. He beat the candidate from the Civic Democratic Party with 55.3 percent to 44.7 percent in the second round of votes. Around the same time, two different candidates became the first Greens ever elected to the Moravian regional council with just over five percent of the votes.¹⁷³ By the time the 2006 national elections came around, the party had gained confidence and experience. While a European outlook had been used and spoken of in the past, this was the first time that the party attempted to insert European issues into a national context during a parliamentary electoral campaign.¹⁷⁴ Throughout the campaign, Strana Zelených positioned itself against the euro-sceptic parties campaigning on issues of quality of life, good governance, and greater rights for women and minorities. However, it stayed away from calls for the deeper 'Green' societal change emphasized by the EGP.¹⁷⁵

These elections brought Strana Zelených its first national success with 6.3 percent of the vote, which earned the party six seats in the parliament. Strana Zelených suddenly caught the interest of Greens in the West and it was not long before the EGP announced it represented one of the Greens' biggest chances of winning a seat to the EP. Bursik

¹⁷³ Cordell and Hausvater, 55.

¹⁷⁴ Ondrej Mirovsky. Candidate to EP in 2009, Vice Chair and foreign affairs expert, Prague Circle, Strana Zelených. Interview by author. Prague, Czech Republic. July 1, 2009.

¹⁷⁵ Jehlička, 3.

entered the party into a centre-right governing coalition with the Civic Democratic Party (ODS, *Občanská Demokratická Strana*) and the KDU under Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek. That ODS prepared a eurosceptic 'Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism' during the 2004 EP elections,¹⁷⁶ while SZ ran a pro-European campaign, seemed of little concern to the party executive. The coalition secured SZ with four of the eighteen available ministerial posts: environment, foreign affairs, education, and equal opportunity. Bursik also received the post of deputy prime minister. This coalition immediately caused tensions as a large minority within the party was opposed to it and insisted instead on a coalition with the Czech Party of Social Democracy (ČSSD, *Česká Strana Sociálně Demokratická*). However, this coalition would also require cooperation with the communists, something Bursik stubbornly opposed, in part due to their legacy in the Czech Republic and their influence on SZ's beginnings. Bursik was intent on publicly confirming Strana Zelených as a centrist party. Despite bringing the party success in the 2006 elections and having good relations with other European greens, Bursik was quickly developing a strong opposition within the party. Making matters worse, Vaclav Klaus who was the former leader of the ODS was widely known (not only in the Czech Republic) for repeatedly calling global warming a hoax, making the association with the ODS even more embarrassing for some SZ members. In response to this coalition, thirty-five members from the Ostrava region, including a couple of members from the electoral list, published a statement titled the Left Manifesto condemning the party's move right and refusal to cooperate with the ČSSD. Bursik

¹⁷⁶ Markéta Rulíková, *European Parliament Elections Briefing No 9: The European Parliament Election in the Czech Republic, June 11-12 2009* (European Parties Elections and Referendums Network: Sussex European Institute, 2004) :7.

responded by replacing the two members on the list.¹⁷⁷ From then on, the party was plagued by constant infighting, made worse by the need to for compromises necessary for maintaining the coalition, which was something common to many Green parties who have entered government.

In 2007, Strana Zelených's executive went against both the EGP and much of its membership and made a compromise with Topolánek in support of the U.S. Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence shield. The party released a statement that it will support the shield if it is approved by NATO and the EU and is additionally controlled by one of these two bodies alongside the United States. This initiated a major crisis within SZ since the decision was made undemocratically, meaning without an internal party debate.¹⁷⁸ In 2009, during the Czech Presidency of the European Council, the rapidly escalating internal conflict led to two of SZ's MPs publicly criticising Bursik in parliament and to the media, claiming that the party was making too many compromises at the expense of being Green.¹⁷⁹ Both MPs left the coalition and were suspended from the party in March 2009.¹⁸⁰ A week later, they voted to bring down the government during a non-confidence vote in parliament. These two former MPs, along with their allies within SZ, went on to form a new 'Democratic Green Party' that competed against Strana Zelených in the upcoming EP, and later the national elections. Strana Zelených's fractionalization, ongoing internal conflicts and the collapse of the government in which the Greens participated lost it the trust and confidence of the electorate. It did not help

¹⁷⁷ Deets and Kouba, 818.

¹⁷⁸ Giuseppe Maiello. Party Member and Candidate to the European Parliament (*Strana Zelených, Czech Republic, 2009*). Interview by author. Prague, Czech Republic. July 1, 2009.

¹⁷⁹ Ondrej Mirovsky, *Interview by author...*

¹⁸⁰ Niel Carter, "The Greens in the 2009 European Parliament Election" (*Environmental Politics* 19(2) 2010): 300.

that this took place during the European Council presidency, when all eyes in Europe were on the Czech Republic. Despite support from former Czech president Vaclav Havel, the SZ performed miserably in the 2009 elections to the European Parliament and Bursik stepped down as party president. Andrej Like, the former minister of education, has since replaced him. The party, however, has not yet recovered.

4.2 The EP Elections in the Czech Republic

As the previous chapter already established, despite a growth in Green MEPs, the 2009 elections to the European Parliament presented a major disappointment for the EGP and Green Group in the EP given that not one representative was elected from the new member states. Taking this a step further in his review of the Greens' performance in the elections, Neil Carter writes that the main disappointment for European Greens was Strana Zelených's fragmentation and the resulting disastrous outcome in the elections.¹⁸¹ This section examines Strana Zelených's campaign efforts and results in the 2004 and the 2009 elections to the European Parliament, as well as the specificities of Czech electoral law as are relevant to the discussion.

The 2004 EP elections in the Czech Republic were held on two consecutive days, 11 and 12 June, and like in Poland did not feature an organized information campaign. Campaigns officially began on 26 May, sixteen days prior to the date of the election. Media coverage was unsurprisingly limited and emphasized the electoral contest at the expense of the key issues of the campaign programs, and lacked a significant 'European' dimension.¹⁸² In the end, while the results were dominated by the victory of mainly

¹⁸¹ Carter, 300.

¹⁸² Petr Kopáček, "More or Less Europe: Media Coverage of European Parliamentary Elections in the Czech Republic," *Campaigning in Europe – Campaigning For Europe* Ed. Michaela Maier and Jens Tenschler (Lit Verlag: Berlin, 2006): 226-7.

Eurosceptic parties,¹⁸³ according to Petr Kopáček's review of the campaign, people voted for these parties, "not because of [their] attitudes and opinions linked to the EU, but in spite of them."¹⁸⁴ Not only the media, but also the electorate had little interest in the relevant 'European' issues, or even the European Parliament elections in general. Despite this being the Czech Republic's first elections to the EP, voter turnout was only twenty-eight percent, the lowest turnout in the country since 1989.¹⁸⁵

Nevertheless, Strana Zelených is remembered as commencing its campaign with the rejection of the term 'national interest,'¹⁸⁶ and members who have been in the party since 2004 claim SZ had the most 'European' program and approach of the campaign. However, likely due to the infighting at the time of the elections, regarding the electoral list and the ideological position of the party executive, it was impossible to track down the full program for these elections. Consequently, collection of information regarding the program for this thesis relied on personal interviews and an archived interview with Jakub Patocka, who headed the electoral list, dating back to the time of the election. The archived interview includes several quotes taken directly from the program itself. The campaign during the 2004 EP electoral race adapted the national program to fit the EP context. This program however, is also unavailable.

The EP elections in the Czech Republic have one major difference from national ones which, it has been argued, has some influence over the construction of the electoral lists. Rather than fielding separate lists of candidates in a number of individual constituencies, voters are presented with a single national list for each party, which may

¹⁸³ The Civic Democratic Party (ODS) came out with 30 percent of the vote, followed by the Communist Party of the Czech Lands and Moravia with 20.3 percent.

¹⁸⁴ Kopáček, 220.

¹⁸⁵ Rulíková, 1

¹⁸⁶ Markéta Pitrová, "Populism in the First European Elections in the Czech Republic," *European Integration Online Papers* Vol. 11 No. 2 (2007): 7.

include up to thirty-two names. Consequently, well known personalities and recognizable names play a much greater role in developing the lists and in promoting the campaigns.¹⁸⁷ Individual candidates are required to pay 15,000 Czech Crowns (approx. 500 Euro) to register. This makes it affordable for many marginal parties to run and in 2004 there were thirty-one lists competing for just twenty-four seats in the European Parliament.¹⁸⁸



Figure 3
Campaign tent for 2009 EP elections with slogan reading “Europe changes only for those who are for Europe.”
Photo Credit: Matthieu Minart

Whereas the infighting during the 2004 EP elections was enough to secure a poor outcome, the internal crisis in 2009 resulted in electoral and political catastrophe. Following the party’s split, three separate parties competed for seats to the EP: Strana Zelených, The Democratic Green Party, and the Green Movement. Strana Zelených was the most successful of these, winning a mere 2.1 percent of the vote and leading to Bursik’s resignation as president. The Democratic Green Party (DSZ), created by about fifty former members of SZ including the two ousted MPs, Věra Jakubková and Olga Zubová, ran a very expensive and well-publicized campaign opposing the direction of

¹⁸⁷ Rulíková, 5.

¹⁸⁸ Rulíková, 4.

Following Spain. this was the second highest number of parties and coalitions competing in the 2004 EP elections.

Bursik`s environmental politics.¹⁸⁹ It is now clear that the party executives knew they did not stand a chance of winning a seat to the EP, but rather participated in these elections to damage Strana Zelených`s performance. By this time, the months of internal disputes preceding the elections caused enough damage on their own, to bring Strana Zelenych out of the running for any seats. The Democratic Green Party received only 0.6 percent of the vote. Once again the electorate favoured the ODS with thirty percent of the vote and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia with 20.3 percent.¹⁹⁰ Among a majority of nationally dominated campaigns, the Green campaign in 2009 labelled itself as the most pro-European in the Czech Republic and attempted to paint over all national issues with both a European and Green context. While SZ did use some elements of the common campaign from the EGP, for the most part the campaign was organized chaotically with many candidates preparing their own materials, lacking continuity even among the national party. During the sixteen days of the official campaign, Czech electoral law guarantees each party or coalition running in the EP elections twenty-eight hours of free political advertising on public television and national radio.¹⁹¹ In the end both voters and the media were more interested in the quarrels between party executives and with the Democratic Green Party than with the party`s slogans or program.¹⁹² Actual campaign efforts slipped into the background. Before moving on to the detailed analysis of the party`s levels of Europeanization, one should note that the multitude of internal problems within the party might have influenced and sometimes even limited how it responded to European integration. It is impossible to predict how and if its integration with the

¹⁸⁹ Vít Hloušek and Petr Kaniok, *European Parliament Elections Briefing No 29: The 2009 European Parliament Election in the Czech Republic, June 5-6 2009* (European Parties Elections and Referendums Network: Sussex European Institute, 2009):3

¹⁹⁰ Hloušek and Kaniok, 1.

¹⁹¹ Kopáček, 221.

¹⁹² Hloušek and Kaniok, 10.

European level may have been more consistent or different had the party seen greater stability.

4.3 Adaptation to the Trajectory of European Integration

I think the party has changed, I mean the whole topic on the environment is changing. There is more focus on the climate, the relationship between the economy and the environment: Green recovery. This is the direction overall in Europe and it is the direction of the Czech Green party.

Jan Dusik
Strana Zelených (2009)

As in the previous chapter, this section will examine five criteria to determine to what extent Strana Zelených has modified its ideology, behaviour and organization in response to European Integration, and to what extent this has, or has not changed since 2004. The first of these examines the *adaptation of national party platforms and ideology to that of the EGP*. By 2004, Strana Zelených had been revived with the cooperation of NGOs, which piqued an interest in the party among European Greens and resulted in increased contact with the European level Greens. Even before this, there was some incoming influence from Germany, where Czech national and SZ member Milan Horáček was also among the founding members of Die Grünen. Therefore, while its increased significance at the EU level many have triggered improved cooperation with, and interest in, the EGP, this was balanced by influence coming from SZ's close bilateral ties to the German Greens. Therefore, as was already suggested earlier, one can expect that 2004 saw an upsurge in interest in European issues and convergence with Greens in the EU-15, especially now that the Czech Republic had become an EU member. Unfortunately, due to the internal disputes at the time, especially regarding the electoral list for the EP elections, the campaign was not organized as well as it could have been

and many of the European elements picked up by the program were lost in the background.

What we know of the program developed for the 2004 elections to the European Parliament is that while it aimed for a European dimension, it often leaned more to the left in its views than the EGP's Common manifesto. As we have seen, the EGP prepared a brief and general document centred on five main objectives that national parties could elaborate on and adapt to their national contexts.¹⁹³ SZ responded to the elections with a specially adapted and revised thirty-two-page version of its own national program¹⁹⁴ and there is evidence suggesting that the EGP provided some inspiration. While there are regular references to the EU, there appears to have been no reference to the EGP itself. More so, the program seems to have been prepared to position SZ strongly against the Eurosceptic parties in the elections. An interview with Patocka at the time of the elections lists a number of the party's key EU-related environmental proposals, which include repealing the EURATOM Treaty, adopting the REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorization of Chemicals) Policy, and using EU funds to strengthen regional economies to extend rail transportation and reduce traffic.¹⁹⁵ While these proposals, in a general sense, fit within the larger themes set out by the EGP, they are much more detailed and specific about how the party plans to behave. The EGP makes no mention of proposals for anything as extreme as repealing EURATOM. However, in a questionnaire filled out by the main parties participating in the elections for the national newspaper *Lidove Noviny*, the Green Party answers that it supports references to Christianity in the

¹⁹³These objectives include: (1) Safeguarding the Environment, (2) Greening the Social Dimension, (3) Developing Democracy, (4) Strengthening the Peace Policy, and (5) Promoting Grass Roots Globalization. See previous chapter for details.

¹⁹⁴ "EP Elections: The Green Party Program Prioritizes Ecology" *Interview with Jakub Patocka, Leader of the Green Party List* <<http://www.ecolist.ca/zprava.shtml?x=182368>>.

¹⁹⁵ "EP Elections: The Green Party Program Prioritizes Ecology..."

European constitution, something that would not be supported by the EGP. Answers to other questions regarding issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage are in line with the EGP's ideology. It is unclear who from the party was responsible for filling out this questionnaire. Most likely, it was Patocka or someone else from the party executive.

Rather than a general program of goals and objectives, Patocka's archived interview and the excerpts from the program suggest it was much closer to a concrete list of exactly how the party plans to take action if it wins seats to the European Parliament. Many of the points list specific local Czech cases and examples to illustrate the proposals' impact at a national level. Environmental issues seem to outnumber others such as social issues or those related to democracy, while the EGP aimed for a balance. There are a few overlapping themes that strongly suggest Strana Zelených was indeed aware of, and receptive to, the EGP's Green Manifesto. A strong emphasis on reform of the CAP, replaced by an emphasis on organic farming, participatory democracy and support for the EU Constitutional Treaty closely parallels the ideas in the manifesto. However, these ideas appear to come after the key environmental focus. Additionally, the program addresses the EGP's call for 'strengthening peace policy' by supporting the development of a 'reasonable' Common Security and Defence Policy to be used for peacekeeping.¹⁹⁶ This section includes a small reference to human rights, but the issue does not receive the same priority as it does in the EGP's manifesto. While it is evident that Strana Zelených's EP electoral program has not entirely used the EGP manifesto to the same extent that Zieloni 2004 had during these elections, there is a definite convergence across numerous general themes and ideas, the main difference being a much stronger emphasis on the environment versus a wider selection of Green issues.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

This includes sections on issues such as recycling, waste disposal, and compost, which are not touched on in the Green manifesto, but are also not in opposition to it. The areas where the programs do conflict are on issues such as Christianity, which are not directly related to the party's 'ecological' identity.

As expected, Strana Zelených made greater use of the EGP's Common manifesto for the 2009 EP elections, a *'Green New Deal for Europe'*, albeit not extensively. Šádí Shanaáh, who worked on drafting the program for SZ notes that many parts of it came directly from the EGP's policy documents and from the German Greens' program, since the party lacks expertise in every field it wanted covered.¹⁹⁷ However, the EGP's manifesto itself was not translated or distributed with the other campaign materials. Although it was available on the website, it was not promoted since the party executive found certain parts to be too leftist. While Shanaáh did not elaborate which sections these were, they likely included those to do with the future of nuclear energy, an issue on which SZ and the EGP do not fully agree. This conflict will be discussed later in further detail. While some main chapters were taken directly from the EGP, others were entirely excluded. The remaining parts of the program came from party resources that SZ had prepared for the Czech European Council presidency and during its term in parliament. Differing from the national program, this one tried to emphasize those issues that the Greens can actually influence through the EP, how Europe contributes to green topics and why Greens are needed in the EP.¹⁹⁸ Once again the program's focus was on the

¹⁹⁷ Šádí Shanaáh, Candidate to EP elections in 2009 (*Strana Zelených, Czech Republic, 2009*) and former advisor to Czech Minister of Education, Interview by author, Prague, Czech Republic. June 30, 2009.

¹⁹⁸ Jan Dusík, Czech Deputy Environment Minister and candidate for EP in 2009 (*Strana Zelených, Czech Republic, 2009*) Interview by author, Prague, Czech Republic. June 30, 2009.

environment and climate protection with other the topics taking an environmental spin whenever possible. To a certain extent, this is seen in the EGP's manifesto as well.

The SZ program, *Green Route out of the Crisis*, like that of the EGP is designed to catch the attention of voters concerned with the European and Czech economies. This can be seen right in its title. In fact, five of the thirty-four brief sections of the program directly address Green solutions to helping the economy recover from the financial crisis. In the opening, the program lists the party's main priorities as environmental protection, climate, human rights and vulnerable groups. These and their corresponding chapters in the program would fall under two of the three broad priorities in the 2009 EGP manifesto: (1) energy security and the environment; and (2) democracy and human rights. Further into the program, there are six chapters corresponding to issues discussed by the EGP under its third subtopic, democracy and human rights. These include migration, regulating arms trade, promoting the Lisbon treaty and more power for the European Parliament. The issues are dealt with much more comprehensively than by the EGP, and in greater detail, but that is not surprising given that the program itself is significantly longer. Most of the issues dealt with have some sort of European dimension. The SZ program itself is divided into thirty four sections that can be further organized into about eight main themes: environmental protection and climate change, energy, safe and healthy food, the economy, social policy, human rights, security, and democracy. Missing in the 2009 program are more extreme proposals from 2004, such as the calls to repeal EURATOM. The EGP begins its manifesto with a discussion on energy alternatives. Energy issues are also found toward the beginning of the SZ program following brief general introductions to the EP elections, climate change and Green investment. Both

documents support the promotion of renewable sources of energy to replace the use of nuclear power. While the EGP manifesto clearly states, “nuclear energy cannot be part of the solution to climate change,”¹⁹⁹ Strana Zelených’s stance is not so clear. The party’s official position is that under the current levels of knowledge and research on nuclear reactors, their safety and waste solutions, it is not possible to build any new reactors. However the party is open to discussing this option in the future if and when new research makes it relevant to do so.²⁰⁰ Additionally, the Czech program puts emphasis on the need to reduce energy dependency on Russia before the discussion on renewable energy sources. In contrast, the EGP contextualizes its own energy section around how ‘Green’ energy sources are good for business and the economy as well as the climate. There is no reference to Russian energy dependence, unsurprisingly as this is a more serious problem for some member Green Parties than others. While there has been a convergence here between 2004 and 2009, it is not as strong as that witnessed with Zieloni 2004 and is most visible in ideas on the environment, climate change and other ecological issues.



Figure 4

Van painted to promote the top two candidates on Strana Zelených’s EP electoral list, Jan Dusik and Katerina Jacques. It borrows the motif from the common EGP campaign. However, note the absence of the EGP logo. Photo Credit: Matthieu Minart

¹⁹⁹ European Green Party, *A Green New Deal for Europe: Manifesto for the European election Campaign 2009* (European Greens: Brussels, 2009): 3.

²⁰⁰ Dusik, *Interview by author....*

There is little information on how the program itself was used during the 2004 electoral campaign. Various candidates distributed brochures on the street and gave interviews to the media, but the campaign itself was disorganized and lacked clear direction, stemming from the internal conflicts. Like that of the Polish Greens, this campaign mostly took place at the grass roots level, highlighted by a demonstration in front of the headquarters of the television station, Prima, in protest of being excluded from the national candidates' debate. Based on media coverage and other written accounts of these elections more generally in the Czech Republic (see Kopáček, 2006), Vaclav Havel's public statements in support of the party, and the party's activist antics were by far the most noticed part of the campaign, while the program fell into the background.

The implementation of the 2009 campaign sees some of the same discrepancies between theory and practice, and between the executive and other party members, as occurred in Poland. Ondřej Mirovský, who held the last spot on the list, notes that:

Assistance from the EU level was welcomed by the top leaders, but this wasn't really seen because of structural and communication problems within the party. Much information that was drafted within the leadership did not get out to the rest of the party.²⁰¹

While materials provided by the EGP were used to some extent, the campaign prioritized national SZ motifs and campaign materials. The executive suggested that promotional graphics may be aligned with those of the EGP. However, there was no obligation to do this. The centrally organized campaign used these motifs to some extent (see figure 4), however not extensively. Individual candidates, on the other hand, were free to organize their campaigns as they wished and most of the continuity with the EGP was lost. Even

²⁰¹ Mirovsky, *Interview by author...*

among the top five candidates on the list around whom the general campaign was centred, there was no consistent motif in the promotional posters (see figure 5). In fact, the EGP logo was not even present. The print version of the electoral program also failed to include any traces of the EGP logo. Shanaáh reveals that so few of the EGP's resources were used prior to the elections, that there were tensions regarding the financing of the European campaign. The EGP expects all members to contribute financially to the development of the common campaign. Those parties with members in parliament are expected to contribute more than those who do not. Because Strana Zelených did not take advantage of most of these resources, some members were unhappy with the financial commitment that they required. Of the resources available to the party, the EGP's campaign video clip was translated and posted online on Strana Zelených's YouTube channel. Unlike with Zieloni 2004, it was not personalized for individual members. An additional video created by the party itself, using its own campaign funds, took priority and received much broader use. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, who already had a relatively good relationship with SZ, made an appearance in Prague as a Green Ambassador, to give the party some publicity and to assist with the campaign. Additionally, Milan Horacek, a former MEP for Die Grünen, chose to run for the Czech Greens in the 2009 EP elections to both share his experience and improve communication with European Greens. While the EGP does organize the Green Ambassadors, neither of the above initiatives belonged to the official common campaign.

The main campaign efforts consisted of local nation-wide appearances of the top five candidates, street level stands and distribution of brochures, and an online campaign through the party website, YouTube, Facebook and other networking websites. The

remaining candidates were on their own to approach the campaign as they pleased and inconsistencies in adaptation to not only EGP ideology, but also even Strana Zelených's own program became greater the further the candidate was from the executive council. Giuseppe Maiello, an Italian national who held the tenth spot on SZ's electoral list, admits that while campaigning he did not even know the difference between the national and the European programs. The program was available on the website for whoever needed it, but it was not distributed. He says that he received no specific instructions on how to run the campaign from neither the EGP, nor from his own party. Promotion of polyamory, the practice of having multiple spouses, became a big part of his personal campaign. Neither the national nor the European programs address this concept and he admits that following the elections, a number of the party members disapproved.²⁰² Mirovský on the other hand, who held the last position on the list but who works on the party's foreign affairs committee, said that he was strongly inspired by the recommendations in the EGP's common manifesto and felt close to the European issues it represented. Speaking to people while campaigning on the street, he did his best to promote these European issues.²⁰³ All candidates interviewed note that despite efforts to promote the issues important to the program, the electorate is simply uninterested and the discussion tends to diverge away from the European context. Dusik, who held the top position on the list, states, "of course as the EP elections are about European issues, we tried in our group to be as close to European issues as possible, closely working with the EGP program."²⁰⁴ However, it is clear that as in Poland, there exists a sharp disconnect in

²⁰² Giuseppe Maiello, Party Member and Candidate to the European Parliament (*Strana Zelených, Czech Republic, 2009*). Interview by author, Prague, Czech Republic. July 1, 2009.

²⁰³ Ondrej Mirovsky. *Interview by author...*

²⁰⁴ Dusik, *Interview by author...*

such discourse that comes from the top, and how it is actually implemented at the practical level.



Figure 5

On the left: Promotional poster for Ondřej Liška (now party president) and Sadi Shanaah reading, “Politics do not have to smell.” On the right: Promotional poster for Katerina Jaques, who held the second position on the electoral list and co-candidate Giuseppe Maiello. Notice the lack of continuity in motif between the two posters themselves and with the EGP motif seen in figure 2. Also, note the absence of an EGP logo.

Overall, similar to the Polish case, the adaptation of national programs and campaigns to the EGP’s common manifesto presents a disconnect between the official adaptation among the party’s governing board and how it is put into practice by individual MEPs with little to no experience with European-level Greens. Overall, in the background of internal crises within the party and changes in leadership, while a moderate increase in signs of Europeanization has been observed, the levels of change have not been extensive. Additionally, much of the convergence here is lost as it is translated into individual candidates’ electoral campaigns.

The second criterion used to measure Europeanization in this thesis is the *existence or establishment of links to the EU level parties*, whether the EGP or Green Group in the European Parliament. Like before, the greater the frequency of contact and the stronger the institutional bonds, the greater the effort to adapt to European integration. Like Zieloni 2004, Strana Zelených’s contacts with Greens at the European level in 2004 were also limited mainly to its membership in the EGP and the group’s biannual council

meetings. The party had the advantage of ongoing well-developed informal bilateral links with several Green MEPs, namely Horáček and Cohn-Bendit. Horáček, a Czech national, began cooperating with Strana Zelených as early as 1990 when he worked as the director of the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Prague. Despite his close ties to SZ of whom he was also a member, Horáček ran for Die Grünen in the 2004 elections to the EP knowing that the Greens did not have a chance at winning a seat in the Czech Republic.²⁰⁵ Winning a seat to the European Parliament, he brought what experience and advice he could to assist and inspire the Greens in the Czech Republic during the period preceding the 2009 election. As the main bridge between the Czech and German Greens, who have their own experiences with the conflict between fundis and realos members, he also opened communication between the two parties on how to overcome the ongoing internal fighting.²⁰⁶ Daniel Cohn-Bendit, who has close ties to SZ member (now the party president) Ondřej Liska, has also been influential in assisting the party with internal structural changes towards greater transparency. He also came to Prague to assist the party with the EP elections in both years. Overall, there have been few changes in the dynamics of communication with European-level Greens since 2004.

Communication with the European Green Party is typically the responsibility of the party president who takes care of the more technical relations and the central governing committee member responsible for foreign affairs, who deals with the European Greens at the political level. This committee member therefore represents Strana Zelených as its voting member in the EGP. In 2009, Ondřej Liska held this responsibility. Unlike Zieloni 2004, SZ does not have a permanent member on the EGP's

²⁰⁵ Horáček, *Interview by author...*

²⁰⁶ Shanaah, *Interview by author...*

governing board. The party president flies to Brussels for meetings with the EGP approximately every two to three months. Other members may be sent to communicate with the European Greens as needed. For example, as Liska's former advisor, Shanaáh would accompany him to EGP meetings where he was responsible for reviewing the common proposals and resolutions. The remaining contact with the European Greens outside of the scheduled congresses occurs largely on an ad hoc basis between party members and their personal contacts in the EP or EGP. The one major exception is during the formation of the common campaign when the party president is in much more frequent contact through regular phone conferences.

Regarding the Green Group in the European Parliament, there are no official ties, and contact remains informal or centred on personal relationships with no regular channels of information. Usually when necessary, SZ will contact members through email. In the past, the party executive has communicated with individual members, mainly Horáček and Cohn-Bendit to provide suggestions on how the Green Group can better supply them with information. However, there has been no effort to influence happenings in the EP itself. Party members admit that outside of the informal communication with some members of the European Parliament, they have no capacity to monitor the Green Group's voting behaviour, and even much less so try to influence it. When asked who SZ's main contact people are in the EGP and the EP, Dusik admits, "Quite frankly I have a difficulty to distinguish the Group of Greens in the European Parliament and the European Green Party – who goes where."²⁰⁷ Likely, due to the party's own internal problems and its resources having been diverted to its role in the national parliament, influence at the level of the European Greens was not a priority. It is

²⁰⁷ Dusik, *Interview by author...*

important to remember that as Minister of Environment, Bursik could influence the European Union through his participation in Council of Ministers, as could the three remaining Green MPs with ministerial posts. While attempts at exerting influence through participation in the Council of Ministers are beyond the scope of this thesis, one cannot discount that they may exist. Relations with both the EP and the Green Group might also have been strained following Strana Zelených's support of the U.S. anti ballistic missile defence system, which the European Greens steadfastly oppose. This decision resulted in some tensions in SZ's relationship with the EGP who instigated a series of communications with the party to understand why it took this position. In the end, Bursik had to phone the European Greens to negotiate a resolution that would acknowledge the right for Strana Zelených to have a different opinion on this one issue.²⁰⁸ Overall, the institutional bonds with the European Greens have not drastically changed since 2004, nor does there appear to have been great effort to change this. Additionally, communication with European level greens is for the most part confined to the executive level of the party, further illustrating disconnect between the various levels of party members in their access to EU level Greens.

Moving on in the analysis, the third criterion measuring the degree to which Strana Zelených has adjusted due to its participation in EP elections and cooperation with European level Greens looks at changes in its *set of procedures of candidate selection*. These may be inspired by the need to adjust for participation in the European Parliament elections, or inspired by the habits of EU-level Greens. For Strana Zelených, the only major difference between the national and European elections is that due to Czech electoral law, the elections to the European Parliament treat the entire country as one

²⁰⁸ Shanaah, *Interview by author...*

constituency, and therefore require only one list of candidates. As noted earlier, this puts an extra pressure on the party to select candidates who are better known or are easily related to. For Strana Zelených, priority has been given to carefully selecting the top five candidates and the main campaign is based on these individuals. These must be people who are capable of representing the entire nation and who are well known publically. The remaining candidates have the option of running and funding their own campaigns or working on those of the top five. In 2004, the top spot was given to Jakub Patocka, who was known for bringing the party much publicity during the changes resulting from the involvement of NGOs in 2002. In 2009, it went to Jan Dusik, the deputy minister of environment. During both elections, Vaclav Havel, nationally-known public figure with whom people could associate the party, chose to publicly support Strana Zelených.

In 2004, it was likely this increased pressure on the selection of ideal top candidates, combined with internal disputes that resulted in a party list that many felt was selected undemocratically and unfairly prioritized some candidates, leading Cohn-Bendit to come in and demand it be changed. In 2009 these same problems did not arise. However, it is speculative to credit Cohn-Bendit with this change since the party situation itself had changed. With a new constitution, and under new leadership the recently split party was left with little internal opposition to dispute the list. The pressure to prioritize high-profile candidates is indeed a symptom of the nature of the EP elections and felt by other parties in the Czech Republic as well. The procedure for candidate selection involves two rounds. First, candidates are nominated and selected at the regional level and then nominated again in the republican council. One can only become a candidate

after securing nominations from five of the fourteen regions to qualify for one of the top five spots on the list, or two regions to qualify for the remaining spots.

While the procedures for candidate selection are based on a revised version of those for the national elections, with no influence from European level Greens, the electoral lists are organized according to a toned-down version of the of the ‘zip’ pattern common to the Green Group in the EP, the EGP and most national European Green parties. This practice was introduced sometime following the 2004 elections to the EP. While it ensures that fifty percent of the candidates on the list are women, there is no requirement for the spots on the list to alternate genders. Additionally, SZ does not follow the pattern of dual leadership by a man and woman. However, a woman currently holds the party vice-presidency, maintaining a certain level of gender parity. While the actual procedures of candidate selection show little influence of European integration, the practice of gender parity is undeniably inspired by the same trend across European-level and western European national Green parties.

As described earlier, institutional links to the EU level Green bodies bring the party closer to the direct influence of Europeanization and efforts to expand them suggest a conscious desire for convergence. On the other hand, the *development of institutions within national party structures to address issues of EU politics* is another criterion that may be used to measure a party’s internal adaptations aimed at better engagement in the European arena. In 2006, roughly around the same time that it gained representation in the Czech parliament, Strana Zelených developed what it calls ‘expert sections.’ These small committees within the party are open to anyone who takes interest in a particular policy topic. While they are not necessarily a direct response to European integration

itself but more likely to the party's sudden national electoral success, one committee was specifically dedicated to foreign affairs. This committee deals with issues related to the European Union, whether this involves questions about the EU, such as whether or not to support a particular treaty, or more general issues and proposals that fall under the EU's policy jurisdiction. Local units of the party may also have their own smaller versions of these committees, such as the one Mirovský chairs in for the Prague Greens. Since he is a member of the local government in Prague, this committee can assist in working out how to deal with local issues that may have a European element to them, or overlap with EU jurisdiction. Additionally, Shanaáh, who holds a degree in European studies and has formerly worked with the European Commission, became unofficially responsible for numerous tasks relating to the European Union, such as drafting the first copy of the 2009 electoral program to the European Parliament. Officially, he worked as the advisor on the EU to Ondřej Liska, who at the time was the Minister of Education. While the desire to seek out expertise on the EU is clearly a reaction to European integration, one should keep in mind that the SZ did not seek out this expertise until it gained electoral success at the national level.

The final criterion examining potential signs of top-down Europeanization in political parties is the *adaptation of media statements to the shared principles' of the EGP*. This section examines references to Strana Zelených in two national Czech newspapers: *Právo*, the largest left wing oriented daily and *Lidové Noviny*, the largest right wing oriented daily, during the sixteen-day period of the official campaigns for the EP elections in 2004 and 2009.²⁰⁹ However, unlike with Zieloni 2004, this analysis does not include an examination of SZ's press releases, as the party does not keep an archive

²⁰⁹ This includes May 26 to June 10th in 2004 and May 20th to June 4th in 2009.

of statements predating 2010. Unlike the previous chapter, since all campaigns for the EP occurred at a national level, omitting local newspapers from the analysis should not cause any major discrepancies.

The course of the official 2004 electoral campaign in the Czech Republic saw just three articles referencing Strana Zelených in *Lidové Noviny* and no references to the party in *Právo*. This may be a symptom of SZ's poor organization during the campaign due to its internal conflicts as well as a symptom of the media's general disinterest in the elections. However, Petr Kopáček's article, which begins its analysis a bit earlier, on May 17th, reveals that there was in fact coverage of the party in *Právo*,²¹⁰ but this likely came prior to the official start of the campaign. The three articles in *Lidové Noviny* take a neutral approach to the party and include an account of SZ's protest in front of the television station, Prima;²¹¹ a profile of, and interview with Jakub Patocka;²¹² and a general party questionnaire.²¹³ While coverage of the demonstration is neutral, it portrays this demonstration as a major campaign effort and entirely disregards Strana Zelených's political views with respect to the elections. The remaining two articles, being in the form of interviews and questionnaires, allow SZ to voice its opinion. Patocka's interview consists of three questions regarding whether he agrees with past decisions of the European Parliament. These include a decision to ban politicians from owning significant shares in the media, the refusal to exchange flight passengers' personal information with U.S. authorities, and a recommendation for a maximum allowed blood alcohol level for drivers. He answers all three questions affirmatively, which is likely the

²¹⁰ Kopáček, 229.

²¹¹ Voliče mají nalákat i známí zpěváci, *Lidové Noviny*, June 5, 2004.

²¹² Strana zelených, *Lidové Noviny*, June 7, 2004.

²¹³ Dotazník, *Lidové Noviny*, June 7, 2004.

same reaction these questions would have received from the EGP. The second article also leads SZ through a series of contextually ‘European’ themed questions. Once again, for the most part, the answers are ideologically consistent with those of the EGP. However, there are a few inconsistencies. First, the party agrees to the formation of European armed forces. While the EGP manifesto supports the idea of a European Peace Corps, the European Greens would be unlikely to support a full European army whose role exceeds that of simple conflict prevention. Additionally, SZ agrees to the inclusion of Christianity in the EU constitution. While the EGP does not specifically address this issue, one can assume it would not support this idea based on the party’s secular nature and emphasis on equality for minorities, including religious minorities. However, it is interesting to note that here SZ unquestionably opposes nuclear energy in the EU, whereas by 2009 this becomes a more contested issue. Generally, Strana Zelených’s media statements from 2004 are indeed thematically Europeanized. Because in both cases these quotes were taken in the context of pre-established questions, the newspaper guided the thematic direction of the quotes provided.

Compared to the 2004 coverage of Strana Zelených’s campaign which contained some EU-related content, both *Právo* and *Lidové Noviny*’s coverage in 2009 revealed a major shift in the other direction. While the party’s coverage grew to seven articles in *Lidové Noviny* and nine in *Právo*, the media seemed entirely uninterested in SZ’s program and almost none of the coverage takes a European angle. While this is in part a content-related decision of the newspapers, it is also very reflective of which of the party’s actions were most visible during the campaigns. *Lidové Noviny* includes a single article that takes an interest in Strana Zelených’s actual ideology with respect to these

elections.²¹⁴ Explaining what each major party can bring to the European Parliament, the article lists SZ as planning to fight the discrimination and violence against minorities. While this is completely in line with EGP ideology, it is unusual that it should be listed as the party's number one priority given that it is the top priority in neither the EGP manifesto nor SZ's program. The coverage gives no indication that Strana Zelených has a detailed and extensive EU-oriented program for the EP elections. *Právo*'s coverage makes a brief reference to the slogan 'truth and love will conquer lies and hatred' being projected onto the Prague castle followed by a message from SZ to vote in the EP elections.²¹⁵ This is the only coverage in 2009 that indicates the party's pro-European stance. The remaining coverage in both newspapers is dominated by accounts of Vaclav Havel's support for SZ, its competition with the Democratic Green Party, and a controversial political commercial. The commercial portrays President Vaclav Klaus as a rooster who is about to be beheaded by a 'Green' axe if he refuses to sign the Lisbon Treaty. Several references to this metaphor from the commercial make an indirect reference to Strana Zelených's pro-Europeanism and support of the Lisbon Treaty. However, this coverage fails to suggest that the Czech greens made a good effort to project themselves as the Europeanized party they claim to be in the electoral program. Rather, it reveals that the fight with the Democratic Green Party and national political issues dominated most of the official campaign, as opposed to issues close to the EGP and SZ's own electoral program. Instead of a growth in their projection of European issues to the media, there appears to be a decline. As the 2004 coverage was based on answers to pre-established questions while 2009 did not feature any such questionnaires,

²¹⁴ Eurovolby začínají. Jak volit?, *Lidové Noviny*, June 4, 2009.

²¹⁵ Zelená dřina, *Právo*, June 4, 2009.

it can be assumed that there was almost no Europeanization of Strana Zelených's media coverage.

4.3 Attempts to Shape the Trajectory of European Integration

While the previous chapter described numerous efforts by the EGP and the Green Group in the European Parliament to reach out to national Greens in the new member states, there is little to suggest that Strana Zelených has done anything to influence this. This implies that Europeanization at the bottom-up level has occurred minimally in this case. There are three possible criteria to suggest progress in this area. While the leadership and party members support their existence, there is no evidence that SZ made any effort to push forward the *establishment of links at the supranational level to national green parties in the new member states*. The party appears to have a priority of maintaining good bilateral contact with individual MEPs and members of Green parties in other member states, especially Germany. The same can be said for attempts at influencing the *development of institutions within European level Green party structures to address issues important to national Greens in the new member states*. However, there have been a few attempts to influence by Strana Zelených falling under the third criterion: *attempts to add national party interests into the EGP manifesto/ideology and positions of Greens in the EP*. The major example here occurred when Bursik initiated contact with the EGP in order to negotiate some sort of agreement allowing Strana Zelených to hold a different position on the U.S. anti ballistic missile defence system, based on its national scenario. A part of the anti-missile system was to be located in Czech Republic where there was a high level of support for the project among the electorate. In addition, Topolánek's coalition government supported

the project and had already approved it. However, Strana Zelených did manage to secure a number of promises for environmental conditions that must be met prior to the installation of the base, which may have mildly eased tensions with the EGP. While this case did not succeed in changing the EGP's views, Strana Zelených did manage to influence the party to allow an exception for them in this one case. Attempts to influence the EGP's program are limited to the specially designated congresses where all national parties, including the Czechs, have a chance to negotiate and vote on the manifesto. Ondřej Liska participated as the voting member on behalf of Strana Zelených. However, in general the party does not seem particularly eager to either extensively use or influence this manifesto. Shanaáh, who attended the congresses with Liska, explains: "Although in the end we voted for it and supported it, we didn't so much promote it in the Czech environment. The manifesto is there to be found but we found in some parts of it are more leftist than our program."²¹⁶ Finally, one party member revealed that he has contacted particular MEPs in the past in order to provide advice on how the Green Group can better inform SZ on certain issues and activities in the parliament. There are no known attempts however, to influence the group's behaviour in the EP. Asked what issues they would ideally like to encourage the EP to push harder, one member answered the environmental impacts of transportation. Another member would like to see a greater emphasis on ecological modernization and creating green jobs. However, there is no evidence that there has been any effort to pursue these issues in the EP. Overall, while there is some evidence to suggest that Strana Zelených has attempted to influence the trajectory of European Integration through one of the three criteria, these attempts have not been extensive nor made a great impact.

²¹⁶ Shanaah, *Interview with author...*

4.4 Conclusion

The above observations on Strana Zelených show us that while there was some change in the level of Europeanization, it was to a lesser degree than what was experienced by Zieloni 2004, contrary to the initial hypotheses. While the party started out less Europeanized than Zieloni, national circumstances played out in a way that SZ did not feel a ‘need’ for cooperation with EU-level Greens to the same extent that the Polish Greens did. The much weaker Europeanization observed on the bottom-up dimension mirrors similar observations from the previous chapter. Once again, the benefits of cooperating with EU-level Greens on a top-down basis appear more valued and more easily accessible than bottom-up influence. In fact, Strana Zelených exhibited almost no signs of Europeanization in this dimension. The one case when it did attempt to influence, it involved gaining an exception to an aspect of EGP ideology and was clearly in the party’s national interest.

CHAPTER FIVE ZIELONI 2004 AND STRANA ZELENÝCH: ASSESSING VARIANCES IN LEVELS OF EUROPEANIZATION

In developing an analytical framework for the Europeanization of Political parties Robert Ladrech writes that the “evidence of Europeanization will vary across and within political systems.”²¹⁷ Comparing the case studies from the previous chapters reveals that not only is this the case, but as originally predicted, the variance in parties’ levels of Europeanization and the criterion the evidence falls under are also largely affected by the party history and internal dynamics. However, the initial hypothesis that the ‘degree of change’ would be higher in the Czech case, while the Polish Greens would start out more ‘Europeanized,’ but then experience less change during the 2004-2009 period, proved untrue. In fact, while the Polish Greens did start out with a higher degree of convergence with the ideology and practices of the EGP and Green Group in the EP, they also exhibited a higher degree of change in both the top-down and the bottom-up dimensions of Europeanization examined in the previous chapters. The Czech Greens were less Europeanized both at the start and the end of the period studied. This chapter will examine these discrepancies in greater detail. First, observations for the two parties will be compared and analyzed along the top-down dimension of Europeanization; the *adaptation to the trajectory of European Integration*, followed by a similar comparative analysis along the bottom-up dimension; *attempts to shape the trajectory of European Integration*. The analysis will then commence with a discussion supporting the initial proposal that the Europeanization of political parties that belong to transnational federations can be further divided into cooperative and communicative varieties.

²¹⁷ Ladrech, *Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework...*395.

Before moving on to the analysis, it is useful to review the definition of Europeanization as a two-way process, as established for this thesis. The evidence in support of Europeanization that was collected and discussed in the two case studies looked for signs that national parties were adapting their own ideologies, strategies and organization to that of the EU, on the one hand, and attempting to shape the direction of European integration on the other. The emphasis was on national parties' direct and indirect communication processes with the EGP and Green Group in the EP, as well as their reactions to these.

5.1 Adaptation to the Trajectory of European Integration

Examining the observations outlined in the previous two chapters, it is clear that while it occurred in different areas, both Strana Zelených and Zieloni 2004 underwent some degree of change resulting both directly and indirectly as a reaction to the European integration process. Reviewing the simplified data in table 3, however, shows that Zieloni 2004 experienced greater Europeanization of the two parties. Of the five criteria, three exhibited signs of change in levels of Europeanization as opposed to only two in the Czech case. Among these, the second criterion, *'the existence or establishment of links to EU-level parties,'* exhibited the greatest degree of change, growing from low to high levels of Europeanization. The low level in 2004 is unsurprising, given that the party was still in its early stages and participating in its first ever elections not only to the EP, but as a party in general. Hence, the party had little time to develop any extensive connections beyond the official correspondence with the EGP

Table 3: Changes in Top-Down Europeanization between (2004-2009)

CRITERION	LEVEL OF EUROPEANIZATION					
	Zieloni 2004			Strana Zelených		
	2004	2009	Δ	2004	2009	Δ
1 Adaptation of national party platforms and ideology in line with those of the EGP.	moderate	moderate/high (ideology at local level inconsistent)	visible growth at official level	low/moderate	moderate	some growth at official level (significant inconsistencies remain)
2 Existence or establishment of links to EU level parties.	low	high	visible growth	moderate	moderate	no change
3 Procedures of Candidate Selection	moderate	moderate	no growth	moderate	moderate	some change (insignificant)
4 Development of Institutions within party structures to address issues of EU politics	low	low	no growth	low	high	visible growth
5 Adaptation of media statements with shared principles of the EGP as well as increased mention of European versus national issues.	moderate	moderate/high (more visible in press releases vs. media)	visible growth	low	low	no change

and Green group in the EP. As a small party that had not yet received much attention or gained much influence at the national level, reaching out to the European Greens and increasing official venues of communication aided Zieloni 2004's own political interests to not only gain some influence but also potentially recognition and credibility at the national level. As the European integration process has shifted the jurisdiction over some policy issues to the EU level, the EGP and especially contact with the EP that occurs through it, presented parties like Zieloni 2004, who have no national representation, with an outlet for some political influence. In the case of Strana Zelených, it is important to note that while the levels of Europeanization under this criterion did not change, the party was already to some degree Europeanized in 2004, whereas Zieloni 2004 was not. First, the Czech Greens had the advantage of their longstanding ties to Die Grünen, which has connected the party bilaterally with various MEPs and Green party members in the EU15. Additionally, when the party entered the government in 2006, there was a less urgent need for exterior influence at the European level. It is also important to consider that even before then, SZ had various elected representatives scattered across regional councils, while Zieloni 2004 has yet to hold an elected position. This means that the desire for influence at European level was likely much greater for Zieloni 2004 and explains the high degree of change under this criterion.

Despite exhibiting a growth in Europeanization in fewer criteria than Zieloni 2004, Strana Zelených experienced an equally high level of change from low to high levels of Europeanization²¹⁸ under the fourth criterion, '*the development of institutions within party structures to address issues of EU politics.*' Once again, this can be explained by the unique needs and interests of the party at a national level, which is

²¹⁸ As compared to Zieloni 2004 under criterion No. 2.

shaped and influenced by the European level. Once Strana Zelených won not only seats, but also ministerial positions in the Czech parliament, it became necessary to develop a better, more knowledgeable expertise on various issues, including those related to the EU. Participation in the European Council, especially at the time of the Czech Republic's hosting of the Council presidency made the gathering of EU-related expertise even more important. During the presidency, Strana Zelených prepared a number of small publications on EU-related issues such as the presidency itself and SZ's views of the Lisbon Treaty and why it should be passed. As a member of a governing coalition, the significance of such communication with the electorate increases. Therefore, establishing 'expert sections' of individuals to consult on issues of European significance, and hiring EU consultants for individual ministers, was a logical step in this direction. Because Zieloni 2004 has yet to be elected to any position, the areas which are most likely to be Europeanized are those more relevant to building repertoire and electoral support than in effective governance. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the party is still largely un-Europeanized in this area. For its purposes, unofficially relying on the expertise of a select few executive members who have closest ties to European Greens is enough.

For the same reasons mentioned above, Zieloni 2004 displayed growth in the *adaptation of media statements with shared principles with the EGP and increased reference to the EU*, while Strana Zelených remains almost entirely un-Europeanized. Reflective of the party's desire to not only increase visibility on a national scale, but also benefit from the appearance of a shared solidarity with the stronger and better established Greens in the EU15, the growing ideological convergence of media statements parallels the similar, but slightly stronger, Europeanization of the party program and ideology. In

the campaign to the European Parliament, the visibility of this ideological convergence becomes just as important as the ideological convergence itself. The EGP has a stronger public presence than Zieloni 2004, and this can be used to the Polish Greens' advantage in gaining media attention during the campaign. In the case of Strana Zelených, minor political success at the time of the 2004 elections and the collapse of national success just prior to the 2009 elections resulted in the necessity to resolve national and internal issues. These issues in return overshadowed the campaigns and marked the party's public image leading up the elections. An increased Europeanization of its public image via the media would have done little to help regain voters' trust in SZ following its internal splits and contribution to the collapse of the Czech government; an occurrence that much of the electorate found embarrassing at a time when the EU's attention was centred on the Czech Republic during the Council Presidency. Regaining electoral support at the national level is the key to the party's recovery and this is clearly seen in the focus of its electoral program and campaign.

Finally, while there has been no growth for either party under the third criterion, *procedures of candidate selection*, one should note that this is likely because in both cases it is already largely Europeanized. Change in this area is an indirect consequence of EU-inspired changes at the national arena in response to the needs of competition in the EP elections. Therefore, in order to compete, the parties have no choice but to conform to the national electoral laws that have been developed to govern these elections. There is a second dimension, regarding both parties' adherence to some form of gender parity in the development of the electoral lists. This is clearly inspired by the European Greens and Greens in the EU15 and Green ideology more generally. However, national

needs once again override ideological convergence with the European level as we have seen in the case studies. Both parties are willing to make a compromise for better chances at electoral success. Zieloni 2004 compromised its influence over the formation of the electoral list in 2009 in order to run in a coalition with the Polish Social Democracy and Workers' Union parties. Strana Zelených, on the other hand, while adhering roughly to the policy, does not require a strict alteration between male and female candidates. This leaves space to push better candidates higher up the list, irrespective of gender.

Overall, when reviewing the data on the adaptation to the trajectory of European integration in table 3, two major trends become clear. *First*, while the areas where growth occurred and the degrees to which they changed vary, by 2009 both parties are to some degree Europeanized under the first three criteria. The adaptation of national party platforms and ideology, and the formation of official links to the European level are the two most basic ways a party can adapt without greatly altering its own national political situation. As seen above, a party has little choice but to adapt its methods of candidate selection if it is to participate in EP elections. Both parties are roughly Europeanized on four of the five criteria, the first three of which are shared. However, for Zieloni 2004 three of these exhibit high levels of Europeanization, while for Strana Zelených, a high level is only seen under the fourth criterion, meaning the Polish Greens are more Europeanized overall.²¹⁹ *Second*, the main difference between the two parties by 2009 comes with respect to the final two criteria. Whereas Strana Zelených experienced high numbers of new institutional changes within the party to address issues of EU politics, adaptation of its media statements was very low. For Zieloni 2004, these observations are completely reversed. As outlined above, this variance in the target areas affected by

²¹⁹ Refer to table 3: Development of Institutions within party structures to address issues of EU politics.

Europeanization are directly tied to the parties' national internal and political scenarios rather than influenced by the European level.

5.2 Attempts to Shape the Trajectory of European Integration

This thesis initially suggested that the case studies may reveal an imbalance in how much parties adapt, and the degree to which they are able to influence. Reviewing the data collected on both Strana Zelených and Zieloni 2004 illustrates that this is accurate. In contrast to the relatively Europeanized state of their adaptation to the trajectory of European integration, both parties fail to show much growth on the bottom-up dimension. Chapter three exposed numerous attempts by EU-level Greens to reach out and help Green parties in the new member states. However, those initiatives all illustrate European Greens' own reactions to the European integration process, rather than a conscious effort to influence by the national parties in new member states.

Table 4: Changes in Bottom-Up Europeanization between (2004-2009)

CRITERION		LEVEL OF EUROPEANIZATION					
		Zieloni 2004			Strana Zelených		
		2004	2009	Δ	2004	2009	Δ
1b	Attempts to add national green party interests into the EGP manifesto and positions of the Greens in the European Parliament.	low	high	Visible growth	low	moderate	Visible growth
2b	Establishment of institutional links at the supranational level to the national green parties from the accession states.	low	low (no evidence that changes were pushed for by Zieloni 2004)	no change	low	low	no change
4b	Development of institutions within European level green party structures to address issues important to the greens in the accession states.	low	low	some change (not significant)	low	low (no evidence that changes were pushed for by SZ)	no change

Reviewing the summarized data in table 4 above, we see that in 2004, both parties started out basically un-Europeanized. While influence over the EGP manifesto was not absent, attempts to influence it were primarily restricted to official venues open to all regular EGP members. Interestingly, *attempts to add national party interests into the EGP manifesto and positions of Greens in the EP* is the only criterion in this dimension that exhibited any significant growth. By 2009, the Polish Greens' levels of Europeanization in this area were high, while the Czechs had jumped from low to moderate. This criterion was likely the only one to exhibit significant amounts of change. Having sway over the actions and ideologies of the EGP and members of the Green Group in the EP provides national parties with another venue for political influence. It therefore makes sense that Zieloni 2004 would have increased its efforts to a greater degree than Strana Zelených. Recalling the efforts summarized in chapter three, the Polish Greens not only lobbied the EGP and Green Group to take on Europe-wide issues such as protesting the Nord Stream project, but also actively reached out for assistance on issues of national interest. Despite lacking national representation, Zieloni 2004 was able to put pressure on the government regarding its implementation of EU equality legislation by actively reaching out for help from the European level. Already able to exert some influence on the national level through representation in the parliament and local governance structures, SZ had a lower incentive to do so through the transnational European venues available to it. It is hence unsurprising that while there was growth, it was lower than that of Zieloni 2004. Additionally, it is interesting to note that even when an attempt was made to influence the EGP, it was to obtain a national exception to the common position on the US missile defence project. The observations up to this point

suggest that the more active a party is in national governance structures, or pre-occupied with internal issues, the more nationally oriented it will be in how it changes and evolves, even with respect to the European integration. However, the fact that it was still considered important for SZ to ease tensions and reach a compromise with the EGP suggests that the party is indeed Europeanized.

The remaining two criteria, as seen in table 4, exhibit very little to no change with either party. Once again, while there were numerous efforts at the EU level to establish institutional links to the Greens in the new member states, there is no indication that either of two the parties studied made any effort to push for these changes. As before, progress is indicative of these EU-level organizations' adaptation to integration, as opposed to that of the individual parties'. The same can be said of the development of institutions within the EU level parties to deal with issues relevant to Greens in the new member states. The formation of the liaison post for eastern and central Europe within the Greens/EFA appears to have been initiated solely by Greens at the European level. However, there is evidence that Zieloni 2004's Bartosz Lech was already cooperating with the EGP and Greens/EFA at the time when the post was being developed and that he pursued this position on his own initiative with support from Zieloni 2004. However, this alone does not provide enough evidence to support the assumption that Polish Greens' had a significant influence over these institutional changes in the Greens/EFA.

The lack of incentive on behalf of Strana Zelených, and to some extent Zieloni 2004, to pursue institutional or organizational changes at the EU level may be explained by the existence of more pressing national issues. Establishing an approach to study the Europeanization of political parties, Ladrech argues that a party's main goals are to win

elections and gain office. Everything else comes second to these.²²⁰ This explains why the bottom-up dimension of Europeanization is weaker in general. Parties will only become greatly concerned with changing the European level, when elections have been won and positions in office secured, or when it assists in meeting these goals. Attempts to influence the Greens at the European level ideologically may occasionally present an exception when a party strives to pursue an issue that it does not have the means to pursue nationally, or when it involves resolving a conflict at the national level. While integration with the EU-level Greens does not appear to be a priority for SZ, the party has been documented pursuing closer communication in order to maintain an image of membership of a united European front to its electorate, and to benefit from the resources this relationship provides when they are needed. In the case of Zieloni 2004, a greater attempt to influence the European level was observed likely because the party is realistically still far from electoral success in the Polish arena and may benefit from the assistance and influence of the better organized European Greens. Overall, convergence along the top-down dimension of Europeanization provides better opportunities for political benefit and is unsurprisingly the more Europeanized of the two.

5.3 Cooperative versus Communicative Europeanization

Taken as a whole, the data collected from the Polish and Czech case studies reveals one other significant trend. In general, both parties were more likely to adapt to European integration and converge with EU-level ideology officially, than they were to actually put these changes into practice. While some level of ideological convergence occurred in both parties with respect to the electoral programs, in each case it is significantly less visible in action during the campaigns to the EP. Similarly, the parties'

²²⁰ Ladrech, *Europeanization and Political Parties*...12.

media statements reflect much lower levels of Europeanization than the programs for the corresponding elections. Finally, this thesis has also observed a level of disconnect in Europeanization between the party elite and those working closely with them, and the more grassroots levels of the two parties. Such a dynamic may help to partially explain where and how ideological cooperation and convergence is being lost when parties put their campaigns to action. These observations are similar to the trends documented in Bomberg and Carter's study of the German and Finnish Greens. Integration-related processes are most likely to have an effect on those party members who deal with them directly.²²¹ These discrepancies can be linked to a weakness among the party executive to effectively communicate the level of cooperation that has occurred, whether intentional or not.

The above observations are better understood when we separate Europeanization further into the cooperative and communicative varieties developed in chapter two. Parties can react to European integration in two ways: by cooperation or communication. Evidence of cooperative Europeanization can be observed primarily in the adaptation of official party ideology to the dynamics of European integration as well as other criteria such as the use of gender parity in developing party lists. These are official changes and the deliberations preceding them are mostly confined to the executive levels in both parties. Evidence of communicative Europeanization can be seen in Zieloni 2004 and SZ's everyday promotional activities including both the campaigns to the EP as well as media statements and press releases.

²²¹ Elizabeth Bomberg and Neil Carter, "The Greens in Brussels: Shaping or Shaped?" *European Journal of Political Research* (vol. 45 special issue. 2006): 105.

The results of the case studies clearly show that these two varieties of Europeanization do not occur simultaneously, but rather cooperative Europeanization is generally followed by communicative Europeanization, if the communicative variety manifests itself at all. The data analyzed in this chapter reveals that this is the case with both the Polish and Czech Greens. Additionally, the results illustrate that both parties exhibit much higher degrees of cooperative Europeanization. While it could be said that communicative Europeanization has simply not yet caught up, this is unlikely. Both parties developed some level of a Europeanized program specifically for the EP elections. There is therefore no temporal explanation to support the weak efforts to communicate these Europeanized ideas to the public. Referring back to the constructivist discussion in chapter two, Europeanization takes place through the ongoing discourse within and between national and European actors, creating what Thomas Risse calls, "a transnational community of communications."²²² The above evidence suggests that the Europeanized Green public sphere still does not exist, or if it does it is very weak and plays an insignificant role in shaping the campaigns to the EP. If one is to assume that similar trends may be observed across national European Green parties in general, then it becomes clear that a deficit in the communicative Europeanization of political parties may be the key to understanding the inability of EP elections to move beyond nationally-charged campaigns.

5.4 Possible Explanations of Europeanization by National Context

Ladrech argues that Europe does not necessarily 'hit' political parties directly but rather, it changes the national environment in which these parties operate, forcing them to

²²² Thomas Risse, "Social Construction and European Integration," *European Integration Theory, Second Edition* Ed. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (Oxford University Press, New York: 2009): 150.

adapt.²²³ In the EU15, the progressively closer integration of Europe inspired Greens and other party families to unite in transnational party federations, and later transnational political parties. When the EU enlarged into the east, the EFGP was already active and its existence, for this thesis, has been included among the changes to the political environment of Green parties in the new member states. As observed in a 2007 article by Zsolt Enyedi, “parties in Eastern Central Europe do not simply adapt to the process of Europeanization: they are part of it from the start.”²²⁴

The changes observed in the Polish and Czech case studies back up Ladrech’s argument. Each one of the listed criteria can in essence be a reaction to some level of domestic change that is the consequence of European integration. Adapting ideologically to the European Greens, for example, as illustrated both in the Czech and Polish cases, may have been an attempt to gain higher credibility at the national level. Therefore in Poland, where the Greens are younger, smaller and less established, there is more emphasis on including the EGP logo and making the link with the broader European Greens more visible. Establishing links to EU-level Green actors and developing institutions to deal with EU issues are two logical reactions to a changing policy environment where parties must now think beyond just representation in national and local governance structures in order to influence the many areas that have been shifted over to the EU’s jurisdiction following enlargement. Whereas influencing these policy areas has on the one hand become more difficult nationally, on the other, many new venues of influence have been opened. The observed procedures of candidate selection

²²³ Ladrech, *Europeanization and Political Parties*...8.

²²⁴ Zsolt Enyedi, “The Europeanization of Eastern and Central European Party Systems,” *epsNet Kiosk Plus: The Net Journal of Political Science* 5(1) 2007: 65.

are results of the national electoral law developed in response to the needs of the European Parliament elections. This is clearer in the Czech Republic where candidates must run on only one country-wide list as opposed to numerous regional constituencies as in the national elections. In Poland, the electoral procedures for national and EP elections are much more similar and consequently, so are the procedures of candidate selection. However, the decision to maintain gender parity on the electoral lists probably fits better under the first, ideological criterion than as a response to changes in the electoral system. Finally, the adaptation of media statements with shared EGP values is likely the manifestation of convergence on the first criterion dealing with ideology. Why evidence of Europeanization is much weaker here than with regards to the adaptation of official programs and ideology, it is a direct symptom of party interests at the national level and ties into the question of cooperative versus communicative Europeanization.

A probable explanation of the discrepancy between cooperative and communicative Europeanization is that while a Europeanized program and ideology works well to tighten links with European Greens, the EP campaigns in general, are guided by national issues and concerns. The discourse with the public takes on a form that will be most likely to achieve electoral success, even if it means a failure to accurately promote official ideas and ideology. Additionally, both parties have demonstrated a challenge in the communication of official decisions of the elite to more local party levels and members. Together, these factors contribute to weaker communicative versus cooperative Europeanization and reflect the national focus of EP elections across Europe. Ladrech summarizes that, "...each political system represents a

bundle of national-specific factors that condition party responses.”²²⁵ Again, while weaker than its cooperative Europeanization, Zieloni 2004 still demonstrates a higher level of communicative Europeanization than Strana Zelených. The reasons for this have already largely been discussed. As the Polish Greens are much smaller and less established than their Czech counterparts, a visible relationship with EU-level Greens is valuable in establishing the party’s reputation as a serious political group, versus its association as fringe party.

Although discussed in chapters three and four, non-EU related changes to Strana Zelených and Zieloni 2004 have not been extensively analyzed, as that is beyond the scope of this project. However, it is appropriate to look at them briefly in the context of the perceived connection between them and how the party has dealt with European integration, before moving on to generalizing potential hypotheses for further research. The non-EU factors that shaped Strana Zelených have been especially strong. The debates and infighting among the Czech Greens are to a large extent caused by the same Realo versus Fundi debates that have rocked most Green Parties in the old member states, splitting France’s Les Verts and leading to ideological changes in Germany’s Die Grünen. Resulting adjustments are part of a larger trend among Green parties and cannot be directly linked to Europeanization. However, this does not mean that European integration has had no impact. Recall that Europeanization is more likely to occur when it “connects with achieving the party’s main goals and objectives namely winning elections and gaining office.”²²⁶ Under such circumstances, adapting to European integration takes a priority. On the contrary, it appears that when the party is rocked by

²²⁵ Ladrech, *Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework...*401.

²²⁶ Ladrech, *Europeanization and Political Parties...*8.

internal crises that risk its survival at the national level, adapting to European integration is set aside, and emphasis shifts to amending the national scenario, unless the European realm can somehow be brought in to assist. This was the case with Strana Zelených when several members reached out to French MEP, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, to come in and demand change to the party constitution and leadership on behalf of European Greens.

This may not only explain why Zieloni 2004 experienced greater and more consistent signs of Europeanization, but also why cooperative Europeanization was less explicitly followed up by the communicative variety in the Czech case. The Polish Greens have yet to gain the practical political experience from an elected post that typically results in the necessity for coalitions or compromise leading up to the realos versus fundis debates. Additionally, because the Polish political and electoral systems make it tough for new and smaller parties to emerge onto the public radar and gain political representation, Zieloni 2004 may have been more prone to search for other venues of political influence and resources to improve its national image. In the new member states, the socialist legacy and delayed emergence of a post-materialist mentality make it more difficult for the emergence of strong left-leaning parties, especially Greens.

Following the above reasoning, one can hypothesize that among the new member states, it is those parties who are less electorally successful and politically active nationally, who are more likely to reach out to the European level and become active in the EGP. It is those same parties that reflect higher levels of communicative Europeanization. Unfortunately, because these parties tend to be less influential nationally, they make little difference in Europeanizing the electoral campaigns more

broadly and therefore fail to contribute significantly to amending the second-order status of EP elections.

In the end, we can hypothesize that a party's ultimate goal is national electoral success with electoral success to the EP always in second place. If it cannot achieve this, then there is very little that adapting to most criteria under the two dimensions of Europeanization can do to help, aside from providing an alternate venue for political influence, albeit a much weaker one. Motivations to adjust in favour of European integration are restricted to those that will improve the party image and/or success nationally, as Strana Zelených's Jan Dusik indirectly implied when he said, "Our themes are European themes and we can be much stronger if we can be part of the whole European movement."²²⁷

5.5 Conclusion

Europeanization, as a result of adaptation to the ongoing process of European integration exposed in this chapter, is multidimensional in nature. Its manifestations, while following rough patterns, exist in various forms and intensities. The studies of Zieloni 2004 and Strana Zelených illustrate that Europeanization cannot be studied in a vacuum. Experiences straddling the top-down and bottom-up dimensions, as well as cooperative and communicative varieties of Europeanization are not simply occurring through a two-way communicative process between national and European Greens. Rather, it is possible that all changes experienced by these political parties, including how they react to the integration process, may ultimately be conditioned by what is going on in their immediate environment, be it nationally or internally within the party.

²²⁷ Jan Dusik, *Interview with Author...*

CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION

As domestic politics in any country are ever-changing and internal party politics are never as calm as they may appear on the outside, so political parties themselves change, evolve and adapt. This is as true for parties in the EU member states as it is for those on the outside. What this thesis attempted was to look at European integration as one external dimension of many that can bring about change, and to evaluate what impact it has had on these parties leading to new change, or the accentuation of that which was already bound to happen.

In a review of research on the Europeanization of political parties, Robert Ladrech notes that there have been few studies that have attempted to combine multiple dimensions and criteria of Europeanization into a single comparative project.²²⁸ Most research has focused on a single aspect or criterion of Europeanization, or just a single party. This thesis has contributed to filling this gap in the literature. Green parties in the new member states were selected to study the changes that occurred from their initial official participation in European Union politics in 2004. Additionally, this allowed for the inclusion of the EU-level Greens themselves as a part of the integration process, rather than a response to it as it is in the case of Greens in the EU15. Green Parties were selected due to their comparatively sophisticated transnational organization and relatively streamlined ideology, facilitating the comparison. Based on these qualities, the Greens provide the most likely scenario for party Europeanization to take place. However, the criteria and theoretical approach may be extended to any party family within the EU that

²²⁸ Robert Ladrech, "Europeanization and Political Parties," *Living Reviews in European Governance* (4(1) 2009): 9.

has made efforts to organize into a transnational network, or to form a transnational 'Europarty'.

6.1 Significance of the National Cases

Zieloni 2004 and Strana Zelených were both subjected to great external shocks stemming from European Integration while in the midst of their development. While most Greens in the EU15 had already been well established when direct elections to the EP were introduced, these two parties emerged onto a political scene marked by their member states' accessions to the European Union and the launch of the European Green Party. The two case studies examined in this thesis illustrate not only how each party has reacted to Europeanization, but also how Europeanization has influenced the parties' own development up to 2009. Zieloni 2004 was born out of numerous Polish social movements with assistance from and consultation with the EFGP, various Greens from the EU15, and a number of individual MEPs. The toleration of these outside influences at the key moments when the party was developing its initial objectives, structure and constitution, was a result of both the recognition of the oncoming EU enlargement and a desire to belong to the larger network of like-minded parties already strong in the old member states. Because its establishment was framed by the encroaching Polish accession to the European Union, Zieloni 2004 emerged as a party well versed in Europeanized discourse and keen to pursue old issues in a newly available political arena. While Strana Zelených experienced much different beginnings, far removed from the transnationalization process occurring among Greens in the EU15, one cannot disregard the impact Europeanization has had on its development. Despite exhibiting fewer signs of Europeanization than Zieloni 2004 in 2009, the party has changed dramatically

towards closer relations and ideological convergence with EU-level Greens over the years as it joined the EFGP and increased bilateral ties with Die Grünen. Considering the ongoing internal disputes and fractionalization of the party that have marked its development, SZ still emerged as the most Europe-oriented party on the Czech political scene.

These case studies, taken together, teach us that the Europeanization of political parties occurs at different rates and appears at different intensities on a case-to-case national basis. European integration does not influence national parties on its own, and future research may benefit from evaluating how intervening variables, especially at the national level interact to influence the Europeanization process.

6.2 Second Order Elections and the Democratic Deficit

In the previous chapter, organizing Europeanization into cooperative and communicative varieties suggested that the key to the second-order nature of European Parliament elections may lie in a deficit of communicative Europeanization of national political parties. Communicative Europeanization has essentially referred to the adaptation of the party's public discourse to the trajectory of European integration. This includes the public electoral campaign, television clips, billboards, posters and statements to the media as well as press releases, as opposed to official party ideology and matters of internal structure and organization. Essentially the Europeanization of these particular elements would theoretically contribute to a complementary Europeanization of the currently nationally-oriented electoral campaigns and debates for the European Parliamentary elections. Chapter two addressed the idea that the transnationalization of communication networks among national parties has led, in this case, to the development

of a public sphere for national European Greens leading to a Europeanized Green discourse. However, while empirical data does indicate that such a Europeanized discourse exists among Green parties in Europe, and therefore possibly among other parties, it is not translating into an equally Europeanized public sphere in which the elections to the European parliament could take place. Without the emergence of such a public sphere, it is unlikely that elections to the European Parliament will take place in the context of a Europeanized campaign, or that people will start to feel closer to European issues and the EP, leading to greater voter turnout.

Observing a shortage of communicative Europeanization among the Greens, the party group where it was most expected, indicates that there is likely a discrepancy between cooperative and communicative Europeanization across party families more generally. This observation's main contribution to further research aiming at investigating the second-order nature of EP elections is the suggestion that a Europeanization of national political parties, in general, does not necessarily result in a Europeanization of national EP electoral debates and increased salience of European issues among the electorate. While scholars have noted in the past that the emergence of a transnational party system, a form of party Europeanization, has not resulted in strengthening the connection between EU citizens and the European parliament,²²⁹ this has not yet been connected to the weakness of a particular form of Europeanization of parties at the national level. Essentially, what this research proposes is that despite the emphasis on national issues during EP electoral campaigns, leading to the election of MEPs on the basis of issues with little significance to the role of MEPs in the European

²²⁹ Simon Hix, et. al., *Democratic Politics in the European Parliament* (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2007): 26.

Parliament, it is presumptuous to assume that national political parties are not Europeanized. Rather the variety of intervening variables inhibiting the significant emergence of communicative Europeanization, in parties that do show signs of cooperative Europeanization, should be examined more closely. It is plausible that a transformation of the nature of EP elections must come from larger societal and environmental changes at the national level, unless changes occur at the EU-level that can alter the national environment in such a way that it pushes national parties in a direction which results in greater communicative Europeanization. While it was beyond the scope of this thesis, which aimed only to observe the dynamics of Europeanization as it occurred in two particular parties, further research explaining these intermediary variables affecting Europeanization may hold the key to amending the extent of the second-order nature of European elections and solving one of the challenges accused of contributing to a democratic deficit in the European Union.

6.3 Conclusion

In the end, what this thesis revealed is that changes as a result of Europeanization and those occurring outside of it cannot be studied in isolation. Evolving internal dynamics, changes to the national political arena, and the globalization of certain policy areas, for example, take place side-by-side simultaneously with the European integration process. How a party reacts and adapts to its environment, takes into account all of these factors. The vast differences in the degrees of Europeanization experienced by the Polish and Czech Green parties are a testament to this. It is a mistake to study any of these instigators of party change without keeping in mind that the others exist. The way a party adapts to national problems may just as likely be influenced by the opportunities

presented to it at the European level, as its reaction to European integration is influenced by national political dynamics. This thesis has repeatedly emphasized this throughout its examination of the Polish and Czech case studies.

Rationale for the differing intensities of Europeanization and the varying criteria under which it appears is found in the parties' own environments, marked by very different combinations of external and internal intervening variables. While the Polish and Czech cases represent two pieces of a much larger whole, the vast discrepancies in occurrences and intensities of Europeanization between the two parties warn future Europeanization research against hasty generalizations that study the new member states as a homogenous whole. Despite sharing similar communist legacies, Green parties in these countries have not reacted to European integration in the same ways and further research would likely prove this is the case for other party families as well.

List of Interviews

- Denkinger, Joachim. Deputy Secretary General of the Greens/European Free Alliance. Interview by author. Strasbourg, France. July 14, 2009.
- Despererek, Izabela. Candidate for EP in 2009/Non-member, Zieloni 2004. Interview by author. Lodz, Poland. July 20, 2009.
- Drhova, Zuzanna. Member of SZ executive board. Member, Strana Zelených, Prague circle. Interview by author. Prague, Czech Republic. July 1, 2009.
- Dusik, Jan. Czech Deputy Environment Minister and candidate for EP in 2009 (Strana Zelených, Czech Republic, 2009). Interview by author. Prague, Czech Republic. June 30, 2009.
- Grzybek, Agnieszka. Co-President, Zieloni 2004. Interview by author. Warsaw, Poland. July 7, 2009.
- Horáček, Milan. Former MEP (Die Grünen, Germany, 2004) and candidate to European Parliament (Strana Zelených, Czech Republic, 2009). Interview by author. Strasbourg, France. July 15, 2009.
- Kozek, Bartłomiej. Secretary General, Zieloni 2004. Co-Chair Leader, Zieloni 2004 Warsaw Circle. Interview by author. Warsaw, Poland. July 5, 2009.
- Lech, Bartek. Liason Green Parties in Central and Eastern Europe for the Greens/European Free Alliance. Member Zieloni 2004 and candidate to European Parliament (Ecolo, Belgium, 2009). Interview by author. Strasbourg, France. July 14, 2009.
- Lunacek, Ulrike. European Green Party Spokesperson and MEP (Die Grünen, Austria, 2009). Interview by author. Strasbourg, France. July 15, 2009.
- Maiello, Giuseppe. Party Member and Candidate to the European Parliament (Strana Zelených, Czech Republic, 2009). Interview by author. Prague, Czech Republic. July 1, 2009.
- Mirovský, Ondřej. Vice Chair and foreign affairs expert, Prague Circle, Strana Zelených and Candidate to European Parliament (Strana Zelených, Czech Republic, 2009). Interview by author. Prague, Czech Republic. July 1, 2009.
- Mosiewicz, Magdalena. Committee Member, European Green Party. National Council, Zieloni 2004. Interview by author. Warsaw, Poland. July 6, 2009.

Shanaáh, Šádí. Candidate to EP elections in 2009 (Strana Zelených, Czech Republic, 2009) and former advisor to Czech Minister of Education. Interview by author. Prague, Czech Republic. June 30, 2009.

Szwed, Dariusz. Co-President, Zieloni 2004. Interview by author. Warsaw, Poland. July 6, 2009.

Bibliography

- Bardi, Luciano. "EU Enlargement, European Parliament Elections and Transnational Party Trends in European Parties." *European View* Vol. 3. 2006. 13-19.
- Bomberg, Elizabeth. *Green Parties and Politics in the European Union*. Routledge: New York, 1998.
- Bomberg, Elizabeth. "The Europeanization of Green Parties: Exploring the EU's Impact." *West European Politics* 25(3) 2002. 29-50.
- Bomberg, Elizabeth and Neil Carter. "The Greens in Brussels: Shaping or Shaped?" *European Journal of Political Research*. vol. 45 special issue. 2006. 99-125.
- Borzel, Tanka A and Thomas Risse. "Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe." *The Politics of Europeanization*. Ed. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli. Oxford University Press: New York, 2003. 57-80.
- Burchell, Jon. *The Evolution of Green Politics: Development and Change within European Green parties*. Earthscan Publications Limited: London, 2002.
- Bulmer, Simon. "Theorizing Europeanization." *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*. Ed. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink. Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2007. 46-58.
- Carter, Elizabeth et. al. "European Integration and Internal Party Dynamics." *The Europeanization of National Political Parties: Power and Organizational Adaptation*. Ed. Thomas Poguntke et. al. Routledge: New York, 2007. 1-27.
- Carter, Niel. "Mixed Fortunes: the Greens in the 2004 European Parliament Election." *Environmental Politics* 14(1) 2005. 103-111.
- Carter, Niel. "The Greens in the 2009 European Parliament Election." *Environmental Politics* 19(2) 2010. 295-302.
- Checkel, Jeffrey T. "Social Construction and Integration." *Journal of European Public Policy* 6(4) 1999: 545-60.
- Cole, Daniel H. *Instituting Environmental Protection: From Red to Green in Poland*. London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998.
- Cordell, Karl and Zdenek Hausvater. "Working Together: The Partnership Between the Czech and German Greens as a Model for Wider Czech-German Cooperation?" *Debatte* 14(1) 2006: 49-69.

- Cwalina, Wojciech et. Al. "Advertising Effects: Polish Elections to the European Parliament." *Campaigning in Europe - Campaigning For Europe*. Ed. Michaela Maier and Jens Tenschler. Lit Verlag: Berlin, 2006. 371- 386.
- Ćwiek-Karpowicz, Jarosław. *The Polish Members of the European Parliament: Their Activities and Impact on the Polish Political Scene*. Fundacja Instytut Spraw Publicznych: Warsaw, 2007.
- Deets, Stephen and Karel Kouba. "The Czech Greens Revived." *Environmental Politics* 17(5) 2008: 815-821.
- Dietz, Thomas M. "Similar But Different? The European Greens Compared to Other Transnational Party Federations in Europe." *Party Politics* 6(2) 2000. 199-210.
- Dingsdale, Alan and Denes Lóczy. "The Environmental Challenge of Societal Transition in East Central Europe." *East Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union: Environment and Society*. Ed. David Turnock. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 187-199.
- Enyedi, Zsolt. "The Europeanization of Eastern and Central European Party Systems." *epsNet Kiosk Plus: The Net Journal of Political Science* 5(1) 2007: 65-74.
- Enyedi, Zsolt and Paul G. Lewis. "The Impact of the European Union on Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe." *The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe*. Ed. By Paul G. Lewis and Zdenka Mansfeldova. Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2006. 231-249.
- Fagan, Adam. *Environment and Democracy in the Czech Republic: The Environmental Movement in the Transition Process*. Edward Elgar Publishing Inc.: Northampton, MA, 2004.
- Ferry, Martin. "The Polish Green Movement Ten Years After the Fall of Communism." *Environmental Politics* 11(1) 2002: 172-177.
- Ferry, Martin and Wolfgang Rudig. *Sofa Parties, Factions and Government Participation: Greens In Poland*. Paper presented at the 52nd Annual Conference of the UK Political Studies Association, University of Aberdeen, 5-7 April 2002.
- Franklin, Mark. "European Elections and the European Voter." *European Union: Power and Policy Making* 3rd Edition. Ed. Jeremy Richardson. Routledge: New York, 2006: 227 - 246.

- Glinski, Piotr. "Polish Greens and Politics: A Social Movement in a Time of Transformation." *Environmental Protection in Transition: Economic, Legal and Socio-Political Perspectives on Poland*. Ed. John Clark and Daniel H. Cole. Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1998: 129-153.
- Glinski, Piotr. *Polscy Zieloni: Ruch Społeczny w Okresie Przemian*. Wydawnictwo Instytutu Filozofii i Sociologii PAN: Warsaw, 1996.
- Graziano, Paolo and Maarten P. Vink. "Challenges of a New Research Agenda." *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*. Ed. Maarten P. Vink and Paolo Graziano. Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2007. 3-20.
- Grzybek, Agnieszka and Dariusz Szwed. "Zieloni 2004 – Scenes from a Long March." *Green Identity in a Changing Europe*. Brussels: Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2008: 80-87.
- Hanley, David. *Beyond the Nation State: Parties in the Era of European Integration*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2008.
- Harmel, Robert and Kenneth Janda. "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6(3) July 1994: 259-287.
- Hines, Eric H. "The European Parliament and the Europeanization of Green Parties." *Cultural Dynamics* 15(3) 2003. 307-325.
- Hix, Simon, et. al. *Democratic Politics in the European Parliament*. Cambridge University Press: New York, 2007.
- Hix, Simon and Michael Marsh. "Punishment or Protest? Understanding European Parliament Elections." *The Journal of Politics* 69(2) 2007: 495-510.
- Hix, Simon and Christopher Lord. *Political Parties in the European Union*. St. Martin's Press: New York, 1997.
- Hloušek, Vít and Petr Kaniok. *European Parliament Elections Briefing No 29: The 2009 European Parliament Election in the Czech Republic, June 5-6 2009*. European Parties Elections and Referendums Network: Sussex European Institute, 2009. <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/1-4-2-2.html>
- Holmes, Michael and Simon Light Foot. "The Europeanization of Left Political Parties: Limits to Adaptation and Consensus." *Capital and Class* (93) 2007: 141-158.

- Jehlička, Petr. "The New Subversives – Czech Environmentalists after 1989." *Pink, Purple, Green: Women's, Environmental and Gay/Lesbian Movements in Europe Today*. Ed. Helena Flam. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001: 81-94.
- Jehlička, Petr and Tomas Kostecky. "Czech Greens in the 2002 General Election: A New Lease on Life?" *Environmental Politics* 12(2) 2003:133-8.
- Kopáček, Petr. "More or Less Europe: Media Coverage of European Parliamentary Elections in the Czech Republic." *Campaigning in Europe – Campaigning For Europe*. Ed. Michaela Maier and Jens Tenschler. Lit Verlag: Berlin, 2006: 219 - 236.
- Ladrech, Robert. "Europeanization and Political Parties." *Living Reviews in European Governance* 4(1) 2009: 1-21.
- Ladrech, Robert. "Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework for Analysis." *Party Politics* 8(4) 2002. 389-403.
- Ladrech, Robert. "Europeanization and National Party Organization: Limited But Appropriate Adaptation." *The Europeanization of National Political Parties: Power and Organizational Adaptation*. Ed. Thomas Poguntke et. al. Routledge: New York, 2007.
- Lewis, Paul G. "The EU and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe: Questions and Issues." *The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe*. Ed. By Paul G. Lewis and Zdenka Mansfeldova. Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2006. 1-19.
- Mair, Peter. "The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems." *West European Politics* 23 (4) 2000: 27-51.
- Mair, Peter. "Political Parties and Party Systems." *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*. Ed. Paulo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink. Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2007: 154-166.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. "In Defence of the Democratic Deficit; Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40 (4) 2002: 603-24.
- Pedersen, Morgens N. "Euro-parties and European Parties: New Arenas, New Challenges and New Strategies." *The European Union: How Democratic is it?* Ed. Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen. Sage Publications: London, 1996. 15-39.

- Peszynski, Wojciech. *Pierwsze Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego w Polsce*. Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek: Toruń, 2007.
- Pitrová, Markéta. "Populism in the First European Elections in the Czech Republic." *European Integration Online Papers* 11(2) 2007.
- Poguntke, Thomas et. al. Ed. *The Europeanization of National Political Parties: Power and Organizational Adaptation*. Routledge: New York, 2007.
- Radaelli, Claudio M. and Romain Pasquier. "Conceptual Issues." *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*. Ed. Maarten P. Vink and Paolo Graziano. Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2007. 35-45.
- Raunio, Tapio. "The EP Party System After the 2004 Elections." *The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament*. Juliet Lodge Ed. Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2005: 33-44.
- Risse, Thomas. "Social Constructivism and European Integration." *European Integration Theory 2nd Edition*. Ed. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez. Oxford University Press: New York, 2009. 144-160.
- Rovna, Lenka. "Czech Republic." *The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament*. Juliet Lodge Ed. Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2005: 201-209.
- Rüdiger, Wolfgang. "Green Parties and the European Union." *Political Parties and the European Union*. Ed. John Gaffney. Routledge: New York, 1996: 254-272.
- Rüdiger, Wolfgang. "Is Government Good for the Greens? Comparing the Electoral Effects of Government Participation in Western and East-Central Europe." *European Journal of Political Research* 45. 2006: 127-154.
- Rulíková, Markéta. *European Parliament Elections Briefing No 9: The European Parliament Election in the Czech Republic, June 11-12 2009*. European Parties Elections and Referendums Network: Sussex European Institute, 2004. <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/1-4-2-2.html>.
- Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier. "Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe." *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier Ed. Cornell University Press: London, 2005.
- Schmidt, Vivien A. *Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Politics*. Oxford University Press: New York, 2006.
- Szczerbiak, Aleks. *2004 European Parliament Elections Briefing No 1: The European Parliament Election in Poland, June 13, 2004*. European Parties

Elections and Referendums Network: Sussex European Institute, 2004.
<http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/1-4-2-2.html>

Szczerbiak, Aleks. *European Parliament Elections Briefing No 36: The European Parliament Election in Poland, 7 June, 2009*. European Parties Elections and Referendums Network: Sussex European Institute, 2009.
<http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/1-4-2-2.html>

Szczerbiak, Aleks. "Poland." *The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament*. Juliet Lodge Ed. Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2005.

Newspaper Articles Analyzed

Gazeta Wyborcza

Kampania Zielonych do Parlamentu Europejskiego, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, June 1, 2004.

Debata z Kandydatami do PE na Uniwersytecie Wrocławskim, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, June 3, 2004.

Rzeczpospolita

Latające Torty i Koguty, *Rzeczpospolita*, June 11, 2004.

Tam, Gdzie Decyduje się o Prawie UE, *Rzeczpospolita*, June 6, 2009.

Lidové Noviny

Voliče mají nalákat i známí zpěváci, *Lidové Noviny*, June 5, 2004.

Strana zelených, *Lidové Noviny*, June 7, 2004.

Dotazník, *Lidové Noviny*, June 7, 2004.

Dopisy Redakci, *Lidové Noviny*, May 21, 2009.

Lemur, nebo Hájek na Googlu? *Lidové Noviny*, May 22, 2009.

Zelení si na Klause brousí sekyru, *Lidové Noviny*, May 23, 2009.

Ohrozil šéf ČT volby? *Lidové Noviny*, May 25, 2009.

Strany hledají viníka, *Lidové Noviny*, May 29, 2009.

Jak ČSSD objevuje internet, *Lidové Noviny*, June 3, 2009

Eurovolby začínají. Jak volit? *Lidové Noviny*, June 4, 2009.

Právo

Paroubek: Havel by se měl omluvit škodovákům, *Právo*, May 20, 2009.

Jacques jezdí traktorem a žertuje o biomase, *Právo*, May 20, 2009.

Z povinnosti k Havlovi, *Právo*, May 20, 2009.

Zelení brousí sekyru na kohouta Klause, *Právo*, May 23, 2009.

Železný: Klausovy postoje nám pomáhají, přestože je zesměšňován a vystaven útokům,
Právo, May 23, 2009.

Bursíkovi zelení jdou po Klausovi i Janečkovi, *Právo*, May 25, 2009.

Průzkumy: zelení by do europarlamentu neprošli, *Právo*, May 27, 2009.

Politici na Facebooku: jsme free jako vy, *Právo*, June 3, 2009.

Zelená dřina, *Právo*, June 4, 2009.