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AN ANALYSIS OF GRENADA
AS A
SOCIALIST-ORIENTED STATE

by

GREG POELZER

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Political Science

Carleton University

Ottawa, Canada

August 1989

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ABSTRACT

Grenada (1979-1983) is a recent example of a Third World state which had embarked on a Marxist-Leninist path of development and which had developed extensive ties with the socialist bloc. A number of Western scholars have analyzed the political development of Grenada from various Western perspectives. In stark contrast, this thesis critically examines the development of Grenada from the perspective of the two principal actors--Grenada and the socialist bloc. Both actors identified Grenada as a *socialist-oriented state*. Accordingly, this thesis collates the political development of Grenada (1979-1983) with the Soviet theoretical model of the *socialist-oriented state* in order to determine to what extent Grenada conformed to this Soviet theoretical construct. And thus, we can evaluate the explanatory power of this model as framework for analysis of Third World Marxist-Leninist states.

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INTRODUCTION

AN OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS

One of the most important problems of investigation by Western scholars is the nature of the political development of Third World Marxist-Leninist states and the role of the socialist bloc in this political development. A recent example of a Third World state which attempted to develop along a Marxist-Leninist direction was Grenada between 1979 and 1983. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the political development of Grenada within the framework of the Soviet theoretical model of the *socialist-oriented state* (i.e. from the Soviet perspective.) Therefore, the events in Grenada are analyzed through Soviet eyes.

The first chapter sets the stage for analysis by focusing on the following: (1) identification of the problem for investigation, (2) the development of the model of the socialist-oriented state within the theory of non-capitalist development, (3) the importance of the national liberation movement in Soviet foreign policy, (4) the socialist-oriented state as a framework for analysis of Grenada, and (5) the sources used in the thesis.

The second chapter establishes the framework for the analysis of Grenada: the ideological paradigms upon which the socialist-oriented state is founded are analyzed, the structures and functions of the key institutions of the political system are examined, the direction of economic development is addressed, and finally, the nature of a socialist-oriented state's foreign policy is discussed.

The third chapter outlines the historical background relevant to the political events which occurred in Grenada.

The fourth chapter focuses on the development of the political system of Grenada as a socialist-oriented state; it systematically analyzes the key elements which contributed to the development of Grenada as a socialist-oriented state: (1) the state apparatus, (2) the

economy, (3) the organs of socialization (trade unions, youth groups, media), (4) the organs defending the revolution (army, militia, courts), and (5) the revolutionary-democratic party.

The fifth chapter evaluates the model of the socialist-oriented state --as a framework for analysis--in terms of its ability to explain the political development of Third World Marxist-Leninist states.

CHAPTER ONE
SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE ANALYSIS
OF GRENADA

One of the most significant developments since the Second World War has been the dramatic rise in the political and military power of the Soviet Union. This rise in power has enabled the Soviet Union to affect political developments anywhere in the world; this reality has been most evident in the Soviet Union's relations with Third World states--particularly with the emergence of self-proclaimed Third World Marxist-Leninist states. As a result, Western scholars have focussed considerable attention on these developing Marxist-Leninist states with respect to (a) the nature of their political development, and (b) the role of the socialist bloc in their political development. One such state that has been the subject of considerable Western analysis is Grenada: under the rule of the New Jewel Movement between March 1979 and October 1983.

The following significant events highlight the brief rule of the NJM. On March 13, 1979, in St. George's, Grenada, a group of 46 members of the New Jewel Movement successfully staged a near bloodless coup which toppled the dictatorial regime of Eric Gairy.¹ A new People's Revolutionary Government, headed by Maurice Bishop, was immediately established. From the beginning, it was clear that the leadership intended to steer Grenada's political development in a leftward direction. The island state became the centre of controversy in the Caribbean when it unapologetically developed close relations with Cuba, the USSR and other socialist countries: Grenada, for example, along with Cuba were the only countries in the Western hemisphere to vote

¹W. Richard Jacobs and Ian Jacobs, Grenada: The Route to Revolution (Havana: Casa de las Americas, 1980), p. 125

with the Soviet Union at the United Nations on the Afghanistan issue.¹ In addition, Cuba became very active in Grenada's domestic development: Cuba donated fishing trawlers, provided doctors,² and most notably, constructed an international airport³ (it was scheduled to be completed in 1984). In 1982, a Grenadian delegation consisting of the highest level of leadership of the New Jewel Movement visited the Soviet Union and concluded state-to-state agreements (economic and cultural) and a party-to-party agreement between the New Jewel Movement and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.⁴ By October 1983, however, a rift in the Grenadian leadership occurred which led to the execution of Maurice Bishop and his followers. A Revolutionary Military Council assumed power and quickly established martial law. Asserting that it was protecting American medical students in Grenada, and restoring political order, the United States invaded Grenada on October 25, 1983. As a result, the rule of the New Jewel Movement in Grenada came to an end.⁵

A number of articles and books written by Western scholars (after the American invasion) analyze the political development of Grenada under the New Jewel Movement. These scholars employ a variety of Western frameworks for analysis in their investigations of (a) the course of political development of Grenada during this period, and (b) the nature of Grenada's relations with the socialist community--especially with Cuba and the Soviet Union. For instance, Jiri and Virginia Valenta

¹"Grenada UN vote shows island leans toward Soviets," Christian Science Monitor, 21 January 1980.

²"Grenada Supports the Non-Aligned's Principles," Granma, 23 September 1979.

³"Grenada's revolution ripens in Cuba's shadow--raising new doubts in Washington," Christian Science Monitor, 26 March 1980.

⁴"Podpisanie sovetsko-grenadskikh dokumentov," Pravda, 28 July 1982.

⁵Tony Thorndike, Grenada (London: Frances Pinter (Publishers) Limited, 1985); Jiri Valenta and Herbert J. Ellison eds., Grenada and Soviet/Cuban Policy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986).

analyze the political development of Grenada within a "Leninist" framework¹; Tony Thorndike takes an eclectic approach by using a non-defined "Leninist model" and Caribbean political culture²; Gordon Lewis writes "without analogy, from the ideological standpoint of the tradition of European democratic socialism," and analyzes the events in Grenada in terms of colonial political culture, Marxism-Leninism, and "small-island nationalism" versus "big-power imperialism;"³ Hugh O'Shaughnessy viewed the political developments in Grenada as a struggle between democratic socialism and Marxism-Leninism⁴; and finally, Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall approach Grenada as a state representative of the Communist totalitarian model⁵. As might be expected, these different approaches lead to different conclusions concerning the nature of Grenada's political development and the role of the socialist community in this development.

Surprisingly, there has not been an analysis of the political development of Grenada from the perspective of the two principal actors: Grenada, itself and the socialist community. Although both Grenada and the Soviet Union identified the political system of Grenada (between 1979 and 1983) as *socialist-oriented*⁶, there has not yet been a systematic analysis of the political system of Grenada *within* the framework of the theoretical model of the socialist-oriented state. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to analyze the political development of Grenada within the

¹Jiri Valenta and Virginia Valenta, "Leninism in Grenada," in Grenada and Soviet/Cuban Policy, eds. Valenta and Ellison, pp. 3-37.

²Thorndike, Grenada.

³Gordon K. Lewis, Grenada: The Jewel Despoiled (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1987).

⁴Hugh O'Shaughnessy, Grenada: Revolution, Invasion and Aftermath (London: Sphere Books Limited, 1984).

⁵Paul Seabury and Walter A. McDougall eds., The Grenada Papers (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984).

⁶"Deligatsiia Grenady v Sovetskom Soiuze," Pravda, 31 May 1980; Maurice Bishop, "Grenada Has Chosen Its Road," World Marxist Review, no. 4 (1982), p. 84.

framework of the socialist-oriented state in order to determine to what extent Grenada conformed to this theoretical model.

The model of the socialist-oriented state (which was developed between the mid-seventies and early-eighties) is a Soviet theoretical construct: it outlines how an underdeveloped state can bypass capitalism--by going through the intermediate stage of non-capitalist development--in order to reach socialism. Although the theory of non-capitalist development is not strictly a product of the post-Stalin period (in fact, it originated as early as Lenin, himself), this theory received renewed interest by Soviet scholars *after* Stalin's death for two primary reasons: First, Stalin had previously considered the colonies of the Western powers as mere lackeys of Western imperialism; consequently, he felt that these colonies held little prospect for developing into allies of the Soviet Union.¹ However, Stalin's death allowed a rethinking of this policy. Second, following the Second World War, the Western colonial system began to break-up; this break-up was accompanied by the rise of the national liberation movement (this movement had an anti-imperialist orientation). Because of this orientation, the Soviet Union believed that these newly freed countries would become its natural allies. As one Soviet theorist noted, the "1960s, when the whole colonial system was falling apart, began for us as years of great hopes."²

During the 1960s, the Soviet Union was very active in fostering ties with many Third World state--especially those revolutionary regimes (for example, Egypt, Algeria and Indonesia) which the Soviet Union referred to as *national-democratic states*. Those states not only possessed anti-imperialist foreign policies, but also claimed to be building socialism or some form of it (e.g. African socialism). The USSR believed the

¹Daniel S. Papp, Soviet Perceptions of the Developing World in the 1980s (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1984), p. 8.

²Alexei Kiva, "Developing Countries, Socialism, Capitalism," International Affairs, no. 3 (1989), p. 54.

national-democratic state could bypass capitalism and eventually reach socialism. However, this model did not prove to be very successful (Cuba being the only example of a successful transition). With the reversal of political development (and loss) of several Soviet allies (for example Ghana and Indonesia) in the mid-sixties, the original optimism of the national democratic state as a path of non-capitalist development waned. In addition the national democratic state "never received full theoretical elaboration as a political system."¹

Even though the Soviet Union experienced the loss of Third World allies in the sixties, as well as the loss of Egypt and Somalia (both as allies and as states following the national democratic path) in the seventies, Soviet military and political power continued to wax. Soviet optimism regarding national liberation and non-capitalist development was renewed with the emergence of several self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist regimes in Africa (for example, Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique) and the growth of the revolutionary movement in Latin America (Nicaragua) during the mid-seventies. By this time, the Third World had become one of the most important areas in the East-West conflict for the Soviet Union: one theorist noted, "the Third World has, in effect, become one of the most important front lines in the contest between the chief social tendencies and the chief ideologies [capitalism and socialism] of our day."² Moreover, Soviet theorists believed that an alliance with the national liberation movement--especially if it had a pro-Soviet orientation--would be critical in shifting the *correlation of forces* from the capitalist system in favour of the socialist system:

In accordance with the whole course of the world revolutionary process, the question of alliance with the national liberation movement and the orientation of the development of the once subjugated countries has now acquired both

¹Sylvia Woodby Edington, "The State of Socialist Orientation: A Soviet Model for Political Development," Soviet Union/Union Sovietique 8 (Pt. 2 1981): 223.

²Karen N. Brutents, National-Liberation Movements Today, 2 vols. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), I, p. 15.

objectively and subjectively--in the light of the struggle of the two social systems [capitalism and socialism]--a largely different meaning than it had, say, in the early period of the Soviet state. At the same time, it was largely a matter of *defence* of the first socialist revolution against imperialism, whereas today it is a question of carrying on the *offensive* against imperialism and world capitalism as a whole in order to do away with them.¹

In other words, the socialist community was concerned not only with the foreign policies of newly-freed countries, but also with the direction of their political development.

Consequently, the theory of non-capitalist development continued to evolve; by the mid-seventies the concept of the *socialist-oriented state* began to take form. The socialist-oriented state was an outgrowth of the national democratic state. Although in the beginning, there was debate amongst Soviet writers as to the key features of this new model of non-capitalist development, by the late seventies and early eighties a consensus had formed regarding its essential elements. At the 26th Congress in 1981, Brezhnev highlighted some of the more salient features of the socialist-oriented state.

Let me first deal with the socialist-oriented states, that is, states that have opted for social development. Their number has increased. Development along the progressive road is not, of course, the same country to country, and proceeds in difficult conditions. But the main lines are *similar*. These include the gradual elimination of the positions of imperialist monopoly, of the local big bourgeois and the feudal elements, and restriction of foreign capital. They include efforts by each people's state to secure commanding heights in the economy and to go on to planned development of the productive forces, as well as encouragement of the cooperative movement in the countryside. They include enhancing the role of the working masses in society, and gradually reinforcing the state apparatus with national personnel faithful to the people. They include anti-imperialist foreign policy. Revolutionary political parties expressing the interests of the broad mass of the working people are growing stronger there.²

However, the socialist-oriented path of non-capitalist development had several substantive differences from the national democratic path of the 1960s. One of the most

¹Ibid., p. 16.

²L.I. Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU Central Committee on Current Tasks of the Party in Domestic and Foreign Policy," Reprints From the Soviet Press 32 (February/March 1981): 17-18.

striking differences was that the socialist-oriented state had two sub-categories: the *national democratic* socialist-oriented state (not to be confused with the 1960s model of the national democratic state), and the *people's democratic* socialist-oriented state. The national democratic type was characterized by the old model (e.g. Algeria, Burma and Iraq); the people's democratic type was characterized by the new generation of Third World states which professed to be guided by Marxism-Leninism (these states accepted only scientific socialism and rejected all other forms of socialism, including African socialism).¹

A second key difference is that the national democratic model of non-capitalist development did not require a party to guide political, social and economic transformations. In contrast, a vanguard revolutionary-democratic party, guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism, became a requisite element for the successful development of the socialist-oriented state.²

Finally, the level of relations between the socialist-oriented state and the socialist community was more highly developed than in the case of the national democratic state. Close relations with the socialist community had become a *sine qua non* for successful development along the path of socialist orientation:

The cornerstone of socialist orientation is naturally the direction of domestic development. But experience has shown that a progressive, anti-imperialist foreign policy is also an essential component. These two aspects are organically linked . . . Socialist-orientation is impossible without close friendship and cooperation with the socialist world; it is even less possible on the basis of hostility towards it.³

¹V. Chirkin and Yu. Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), pp. 25-26.

²Rostislav Ulyanovsky, Present-Day Problems in Asia and Africa (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980), p. 86-7.

³Karen N. Brutents, The Newly Freed Countries in the Seventies, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), pp. 79-80.

It is important to note the condition of close cooperation with the socialist community, as well as the linkage between foreign policy and internal development.

In addition to the differences between the national democratic state and the socialist-oriented state as models of non-capitalist development, there are fundamental differences (role of socialist bloc; rate and course of development) between the non-capitalist development which occurred in Soviet Central Asia and that which is occurring in a number of Third World states. Soviet theorists have identified three main reasons for these differences:

First, the line of bypassing the capitalist formation and creating the premises of socialist construction have been adopted by a whole group of liberated countries. Second, the switch to the non-capitalist way has been taking place outside the boundaries of the socialist camp and not even in any direct geographical proximity to it. Third, for a fairly long period, they are forced to maintain ties with the world capitalist economic system and to seek to overcome their dependence upon it.¹

These factors recognize the following: (1) the necessity for a pragmatic and flexible approach to non-capitalist development, (2) the limited economic assistance that the socialist community can provide, and (3) the limitations (geopolitical and economic) on the ability of the socialist community to help ensure the progression of a state along the path of socialist orientation. Thus, the socialist-oriented state is a *specific model* of non-capitalist development for newly freed Third World countries which recognizes the *specific conditions* under which these countries are trying to develop. As a consequence, the socialist-oriented state should not be confused with any other model of non-capitalist development, most notably, the Soviet Central Asia model of development.²

¹Igor L. Andreyev, The Noncapitalist Way, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), p. 86

²Ulyanovsky, Present-Day Problems, pp. 82-3.

Through an examination of the key elements of the socialist-oriented state--as found in the writings of Soviet theoreticians--a framework for analysis of the political development in Grenada can be established. The key elements are as follows: (1) *ideological paradigms* -- goals, ideological direction and social composition of the political system, the principle of democratic centralism, class nature of the political leadership, dynamics of political system, and place of the political system in world revolutionary process; (2) *revolutionary-democratic party* -- structures and functions of the main types (national front, transitional-vanguard, and vanguard); (3) *state apparatus* -- structures and functions of salient state institutions (head of state, government, central and local administrative organs, and highest representative organs of state power); (4) *organs of defence* -- structures and functions of the institutions defending the political system (armed forces, militia, state security, and judicial system); (5) *organs of socialization* -- the main institutions which play a role in political socialization (education system, media, trade unions, and youth and women's organizations); (6) *economy* -- the direction of economic development and the role of the public and private sectors, and the role of domestic and foreign capital; and (7) *types of socialist-oriented states*: national democratic and people's democratic. (These elements are treated in detail in the succeeding chapter).

As important as the framework for analysis is to the investigation, so too, is the selection of the sources. Primary sources will be used almost exclusively both in the analysis of the model of the socialist-oriented state and in the analysis of the political development of Grenada. Since the model of the socialist-oriented state is a Soviet theoretical construct, all of the sources used to explicate this model will be Soviet. This thesis will draw on the writings of a number of Soviet theoreticians found in Soviet monographs and in scholarly Soviet journals, such as International Affairs. However,

three authors (Karen Brutents, Rostislav Ulyanovsky and Georgii Kim) deserve special attention. Brutents and Ulyanovsky, who were both former academicians, work in the International Department of the Central Committee as the two deputy chiefs responsible for the Third World. Both have written extensively on the Third World and, because of their high positions in the Communist Party apparatus, they have had a considerable influence on the formation of Soviet foreign policy.¹ Members of the New Jewel Movement were urged to read the writings of Brutents in particular.² Kim, who has also written extensively on the Third World, is a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, a deputy director of the Oriental Institute, and editor-in-chief of the prestigious Soviet journal Aziia i Afrika Segodnia.³ He, too, has had a considerable influence on the formation of Soviet foreign policy. Finally, although these sources are published Moscow--they are printed in English: far more revolutionary-democrats can read English, than can read Russian (this is especially true in the case of English speaking Grenada). It is important to understand the model of the socialist-oriented state not only as developed by the Soviets, but also as read by the revolutionary-democrats who lead Third World Marxist-Leninist states.

Primary sources (Grenadian, Soviet, Cuban) are used almost exclusively in the analysis of the Grenadian events. The Grenadian sources are drawn both from open sources and from confidential internal documents. One important open source includes

¹Papp, Soviet Perceptions, pp. 18-19.

²"Extraordinary Meeting of the Central Committee NJM, September 14-16, 1983" in The Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 21.

³Galia Golan, The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), p. 32; Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "Revolutionary change in the Third World: Recent Soviet reassessments," in The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and The Third World, ed. Roger E. Kanet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 34.

a monograph entitled Grenada: The Route to Revolution¹; it was written by two member of the New Jewel Movement, one of whom, was the ambassador to the Soviet Union. This monograph was published in Cuba, and was cited in the Cuban newspaper Granma as one of the most significant events of 1980.² Other important open sources are the several collections of speeches by Maurice Bishop, the Prime Minister of Grenada. Further open sources consist of articles written by, and interviews given by members of the New Jewel Movement. These open sources present the official positions of the political leadership of Grenada.

The confidential internal documents used in this research are drawn primarily from The Grenadian Documents: a selection and an overview³--a selection of the volumes of documents captured by American forces in 1983 and released by the U.S. State Department in 1984. These confidential documents (treaties, letters, political reports, Political Bureau minutes and Central Committee minutes) are invaluable as they show the inner workings, problems, goals and internal assessments of the Grenadian leadership.

Soviet and Cuban sources are also used in the analysis of the political development of Grenada. The vast majority of these sources are drawn from Pravda (which is the organ of the Central Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union), and Granma Weekly Review (which is the Cuban weekly equivalent of Pravda). These are important sources for the analysis as they provide the socialist community's perceptions of the political development of Grenada.

¹Jacobs and Jacobs, Grenada: The Route to Revolution.

²"The Most Significant Events of 1980," Granma Weekly Review, 18 January 1981.

³Grenada Documents.

This chapter has set the stage for the analysis of the political development of Grenada; the next chapter proceeds to develop the framework for analysis through an examination of the key features of the socialist-oriented state.

CHAPTER TWO

ESTABLISHING THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS: THE SOCIALIST-ORIENTED STATE

Introduction

In order to investigate the development of a political system, it is essential to establish a framework for analysis. This framework is important to the investigation for the following reasons: (a) it sets the boundaries, (b) it defines the relevant concepts, and (c) it provides a systematic approach. For the political analysis of Grenada, the framework utilized is the Soviet theoretical construct--the socialist-oriented state: both Grenada, itself, and the Soviet Union identified Grenada's political system (1979 to 1983) as socialist-oriented.

The socialist-oriented state is a Soviet model of a political system (for Third World non-capitalist development); as its name implies, it strives to develop into a socialist state. The socialist-oriented state consists of the following elements: (1) the ideological paradigm (revolutionary democracy) (2) the revolutionary-democratic party, (3) the state apparatus, (4) the organs of defence, (5) the organs of socialization, (6) the economy, and (7) the type. Through an examination of each element, one can determine its structure and function, as well as the level of assistance that it receives from the socialist bloc. Thus, one establishes a framework for analysis which can be applied to the political system of Grenada. (Note: this framework is not to be critiqued, but rather --applied).

Ideological Paradigm: Revolutionary Democracy

Revolutionary-democracy--the most important element of the framework for analysis--is the ideological paradigm of the socialist-oriented state. The political goal, the ideological orientation, the principle of democratic centralism, the social basis, the political dynamics, and the relations with the socialist bloc are the key features which define revolutionary democracy; together, they dictate the political structures, functions and processes of a socialist-oriented state.

The political goal of revolutionary democracy is to reach socialism (in Third World countries) without going through capitalism. In order to build socialism (according to Marxist theory), a developed political, social, and economic infrastructure is required. These conditions, of course, do not exist in the Third World. Due to the underdevelopment of most Third World states, Soviet theorists note that "in the overwhelming majority of former colonial countries the conditions for an immediate achievement of socialist revolution does not yet exist."¹ In order to achieve socialism under these backward conditions (without going through the normal intervening stage of capitalism), a special non-capitalist political system is required to build the necessary infrastructure: the socialist-oriented state. Accordingly, the purpose of the socialist-oriented state is to create the "material and social prerequisites for socialist construction which as a result of imperialist domination are often centuries behind in their economic development."² Thus, the *ultimate* goal of revolutionary democracy is to reach socialism; the *penultimate* goal is to create the conditions to make this possible: the socialist-oriented state is not an end in itself, but rather a means to an end --attain socialism.

¹Rostislav Ulyanovsky, Present-Day Problems in Asia and Africa (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980), p. 83.

²Rostislav Ulyanovsky, National Liberation (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978), pp. 96-97.

And, (4) it also plays a preeminent role in the economic management of the country: it "determines the general economic policy . . . approves the state plan . . . and outlines ways and means of implementing it."¹

The most salient part of the vanguard party's function, however, is to exercise its leading role over the state apparatus: (1) it creates the new state apparatus, (2) it makes all major policy decisions, (3) it makes all key personnel decisions, and (4) it controls all state activities. These four aspects of this leading role function are highlighted by Chirkin and Yudin:

First, the party takes measures to create a state machine structured according to fundamentally new principles, [and] . . . also control the creation of new state organs . . . Second, the party programme defines the chief guidelines and the tasks to be tackled . . . the party takes decisions on all major questions of internal and foreign policy and gives corresponding directives concerning their fulfillment by state organs . . . State organs cannot decide any important political or organizational question without guiding instructions from the party. Third, the party takes the decisive part in the formation of state organs . . . The role of the party organs in appointing and dismissing members of the government [and military] and higher organs of justice is decisive. Fourth, the leading role of the revolutionary-democratic party manifests itself in that it systematically controls the activity of all state organs.²

To ensure its leading role over the state apparatus, the vanguard party (a) creates primary party organizations, as well as special departments and commissions to monitor state organs (e.g. economic enterprises, the armed forces, and the security forces), and (b) places party personnel in key positions within these state organs. In this way, the party can ensure the implementation of party decisions, as well as the loyalty of the institutions (military and state security) that keep the party in power. (The 1966 coup in Ghana and the 1968 coup in Mali demonstrate what happens if the party does not exercise its leading role over the state organs).³

¹Ibid., p. 129.

²Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, pp. 159-62.

³Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 160.

Linked to the acceptance of Marxism-Leninism as the guiding ideology in revolutionary democracy is the acceptance of democratic centralism as the key principle governing political institutions and social organizations. (This is the key political principle of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union). Democratic centralism is defined as follows:

first, that all leading organs of the party and social organizations, and the main state organs . . . are elected; second, that these organs have to report back to their electors (citizens and organs) and to higher organs; third, that there is strict discipline and self-discipline and subordination of the minority to the majority on the elected organs; fourth, that the higher decisions of higher party and state organs and those of social organizations are mandatory for lower ones.¹

Although revolutionary democrats attempt to implement democratic centralism, they implement this principle inconsistently since revolutionary democracy is not as politically developed as socialism. One of the most salient examples of the failure to consistently implement democratic centralism is the "ideological disagreements" which undermine party and state discipline.²

The social basis of political power is also an important hallmark of revolutionary democracy. Unlike, capitalism (ruled by the bourgeoisie) or socialism (ruled by the proletariat) which have relatively homogeneous social bases, the social basis of revolutionary democracy is broad and heterogeneous: it is a "democratic bloc that incorporates all strata interested in consolidating national independence and implementing deep social transformation,"³ and it includes "the peasantry masses, the petty bourgeoisie and semi-proletarian urban population, and radical circles of the intelligentsia."⁴ As well, because the peasantry constitute the vast majority of the

¹V. Chirkin and Yu. Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), p. 65.

²Ibid., 65-7.

³Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 11.

⁴Brutents, National Liberation Revolutions, II, p. 16.

social basis in revolutionary-democratic countries, the role of the peasantry is often emphasized; in socialist countries, the role of the worker is emphasized. As a consequence, Soviet theorists note that the "socialist-oriented state is primarily a dictatorship of the labouring strata of the population, among which the peasantry predominates."¹ In reality, however, the social basis is much more restricted, and usually "narrow political or military-political groupings" provide the "*immediate socio-political basis* of revolutionary democratic regimes."² (For example, the military in Ethiopia is the basis of revolutionary democratic power).

The political dynamics of revolutionary democracy are a direct result of its goal to reach socialism and its heterogeneous social basis. Because of this heterogeneity, there is no unanimity on socialism as *the* goal of the political system: some favour socialism; others oppose it. As revolutionary democrats strive to implement policies that favour a socialist-oriented course of development, they encounter opposition from certain segments of the population (especially reactionaries). Therefore, the "only way to promote social transformations and consolidate the popular nature of power is to strengthen the positions of the political forces that favour socialism."³ In order to strengthen the political positions of those who favour socialism, political opposition must be neutralized; as a result, "a revolutionary dictatorship consists in exercising power against all those who resist the political, economic, and social development of the . . . revolution."⁴ Because the social basis of revolutionary democracy is heterogeneous, the political dynamics are virtually unending and they are characterized by "constant political regrouping."⁵ "It can be said that this is an intrinsic feature of the

¹Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 19.

²Brutents, National Liberation Revolutions, II, p. 18.

³Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 19.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Brutents, Newly Free Countries, p. 90.

revolutionary-democratic movement."¹ Thus, this leftward radicalization of the leadership of socialist-oriented countries and the elimination of political opposition is a natural evolutionary process, fulfilling the law of inevitable class struggle. (In Burma, the "liquidation [sic] of the right-wing grouping in the Burma Socialist Programme Party"² is one example.)

However, the political dynamics of a revolutionary democracy do not guarantee successful progression along the path of socialist orientation; consequently, fraternal assistance from the socialist community is imperative to ensure the successful development of a revolutionary democracy. Regarding the nature of the development of revolutionary democracies, Boris Ponomarev, head of the International Department of the Central Committee, argues the following:

The processes, by which the positions of the liberated nations are consolidated in the anti-imperialist struggle and new societies are formed today, do not follow a straight path. In these processes one clearly discerns zig zags and, sometimes, even a reversal; they encounter considerable difficulties.³

Because socialist orientation is reversible, Brutents argues, close ties with the socialist bloc are a sine qua non for its successful development: "Socialist orientation is impossible without close friendship and cooperation with the socialist world; it is even less possible on the basis of hostility towards it."⁴ (Egypt is an example of socialist orientation being reversed when close cooperation with the socialist bloc is eroded). Moreover, the closer a state reaches its goal of building socialism, the closer are its ties

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 92.

³Boris N. Ponomarev, Marxism-Leninism A Flourishing Science (New York: International Publishers, 1979), p. 88.

⁴Brutents, Newly Free Countries, pp. 79-80.

with the socialist bloc: "the farther these states proceed toward their goal, the more varied and firm become the links with them."¹

The above features of revolutionary democracy constitute the ideological paradigm of the socialist-oriented state--this is the crux of the framework for analysis. The goal to reach socialism, the evolution towards Marxism-Leninism, and the close relations with the socialist bloc have a profound effect on the development of the other elements of the socialist-oriented state--especially the revolutionary-democratic vanguard party.

¹Fyodor Burlatsky, The Modern State and Politics, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978), p. 169.

The Revolutionary-Democratic Vanguard Party

The revolutionary-democratic vanguard party--a vital component of the framework for analysis--is the most important political institution of a socialist-oriented state: it is the supreme political organ charged with guiding all other institutions and organizations of a revolutionary-democratic society. The most important aspects of the vanguard party are (1) its development, (2) its composition, (3) its ideological basis, (4) its structure, (5) its function in the political system, and (6) the role of the socialist community in its development.

The Development of the Vanguard Party

Soviet theorists maintain that the progression toward socialism of a socialist-oriented state, to a significant degree, is dependent upon the revolutionary-democratic vanguard party; consequently, they stress the importance of developing this political organ. "Only a vanguard party . . . acting as a directing force and a guarantor of socialist orientation . . . [can] guarantee the stability of revolutionary-democratic regimes."¹ Moreover, Soviet theorists suggest that the vanguard party should be developed quickly: "the course of events in the countries where revolutionary democrats are in power urgently demand the creation of a vanguard party."² Evidently, revolutionary democrats share this urgency as they "become aware of the need for a vanguard party almost immediately upon assumption of power."³

How can a revolutionary-democratic vanguard party develop? Soviet theorists have identified three main ways: (1) from a national front to a transitional vanguard

¹Yu. V. Irkhin, "Analyzing New Nations' Vanguard Parties," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 34 (no. 27): 10.

²Brutents, Newly Free Countries, p. 106.

³N. Simonia, "Newly-Free Countries: Problems of Development," International Affairs (Moscow), no. 5 (1982), p. 84.

party, (2) through revolutionary-democratic forces themselves, and (3) through the merger of Marxist and revolutionary-democratic forces.

The first way is the classical route to developing a vanguard party. The national front party develops out of the struggle for national independence; as a result of the struggle, it consists of members from all strata of society, and it is ideologically pluralistic: "its social composition is broadly heterogeneous, consisting of both the supporters and adversaries of socialist orientation."¹ Consequently, the national front party is weak in terms of being able to lead a country towards socialism. In addition, it is a mass party organized strictly along territorial lines (instead of both territorial and industrial lines), thus limiting the influence of the party in society and giving the leader of the party excessive power (the rest of the party membership is almost completely impotent to form policy).² All of these factors make the national front party quite ineffective in carrying out political transformations in the state. However, the left wing of the national front party may gain supremacy over other factions and transform the party into a transition-vanguard party. (the Sandinista National Liberation Front of Nicaragua is at the transitional-vanguards stage of development).

The transitional-vanguard revolutionary-democratic party is much more effective than the national front party to ensure the progression of a socialist-oriented state toward socialism because its ideological orientation and social basis are far less heterogeneous: it accepts many Marxist-Leninist principles, it organizes along both territorial and industrial lines, it starts to form Marxist-Leninist party structures, it begins to develop inner-party democracy, and it limits the size and nature of its membership by emphasizing toiling strata of society (workers, peasants, artisans, and

¹Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 92.

²Ibid., p.92; Nikolai Kosukhin, Revolutionary Democracy in Africa (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985), p. 118.

non-exploiting urban petty bourgeoisie).¹ If the left wing of the party can attain supremacy, and if the party structures and functions develop sufficiently, the transitional vanguard party can develop into a vanguard revolutionary-democratic party. (The FRELIMO Party of Mozambique transformed this way in 1977).

Besides the above classical development, there are two other ways to form a vanguard party. First, revolutionary democrats can create a vanguard party where no party at all existed before.² This is common where the military is the principle agent of revolutionary change. (Ethiopia where the military formed the COPWE Party in 1979 is an excellent example). Second, a vanguard party can be created through the merger of revolutionary-democratic and Marxist forces.³ (In the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the Yemeni Socialist Party was created this way).

Despite the different ways of forming a vanguard party, Soviet scholars believe that none of them are superior to the others; the way chosen strictly depends upon the given conditions of a specific country.

The Composition of the Vanguard Party

The correct composition (social basis and size) of the membership is an important characteristic of the vanguard party. The size of the membership is a very important concern of the vanguard party; it can be neither too large nor too small:⁴ if the party membership is too small, the vanguard party will not have enough resources to effectively transform the society in a socialist orientation; on the other hand, if the party membership is too large, the vanguard party degenerates into a cumbersome, politically

¹Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, pp. 92-3; Kosukhin, Revolutionary Democracy, p. 118

²Irkhin, "Vanguard Parties," p. 11.

³Ibid.

⁴Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 97.

ineffective mass party. Instead, the membership should consist only of the most dedicated members sufficient in number to fulfill the political objectives of the vanguard party: a party membership "capable of assuring its influence among the people and consisting of the most conscious, active, advanced fighters."¹

Even more important than the size of a vanguard party is its social basis. The political dynamics of revolutionary democracy have a profound effect on the social basis of political power of the vanguard party. The social basis constantly changes as the vanguard party evolves towards a Marxist-Leninist orientation. "As the national-democratic revolutions intensify, social antagonisms are aggravated, and the class forces regroup . . . [resulting in a] revision of the social composition of the ruling revolutionary-democratic parties."² In other words members not sufficiently dedicated to the goal of socialism are purged from the party. As well as purges, the vanguard party selectively recruits members who are dedicated to the goal of socialism, and as a result, form the proper social basis. "Only the most class conscious and active workers, peasants, soldiers and representatives of other strata of the working people and revolutionary intelligentsia are accepted."³

The Ideological Basis of the Vanguard Party

The ideological basis of the vanguard party is an important factor as it provides a guide for political development. On the whole, revolutionary-democratic vanguard parties are ideologically similar to the communist parties of the socialist community: (1) They are guided by the principles of scientific socialism and "acknowledge

¹Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 97.

²Kosukhin, Revolutionary Democracy, pp. 119-20.

³Irkhin, "Vanguard Parties," p. 11.

Marxism-Leninism as their ideological basis."¹ (The acceptance of Marxism-Leninism is essential to reach socialism). (2) They accept the principle of democratic centralism, and "build their activity on the principles of democratic centralism."² (Thus, inner party democracy develops). (3) The party membership must assimilate and follow the principles of Marxism-Leninism: "The obligations of members of vanguard parties include the in-depth and constant study of Marxism-Leninism . . . and also the strict observance of the Marxist-Leninist political and ideological orientation of the party."³ Despite these similarities, vanguard parties differ from communist parties in that they are not as ideologically mature: they "have not completely mastered scientific communism and do not make full use of it in practice."⁴

The Structure of the Vanguard Party

Due to its Marxist-Leninist ideological basis, the vanguard party is structured along lines similar to a communist party in three important ways: **First**, the vanguard party is structured along both territorial (i.e. national, regional and local levels) *and* industrial (i.e. state enterprises, peasant collectives, educational institutions, etc.) lines.⁵ With this dual organizational basis, the vanguard party can guide the development of nearly the whole of society. **Second**, the vanguard party establishes primary party organizations as the key building block of its structure: it creates primary party organizations (the smallest organizational unit of the party) in factories, post-secondary institutions, the armed forces, and so on, in order to establish effective political control in *all* political, economic and social spheres of the state. (In reality, however, this party

¹Irkhin, "Vanguard Parties," p. 10; Kosukhin, Revolutionary Democracy, p. 122; Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 93; Ulyanovsky, Present-Day Problems, pp. 86-7.

²Irkhin, "Vanguard Parties," p. 10.

³Kosukhin, Revolutionary Democracy, p. 123.

⁴Irkhin, "Vanguard Parties," p. 10.

⁵Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 97.

structure is not well developed: "primary organizations are not very strong or active in production or in the army, and in some important spheres of the economy and public life, they are absent altogether.")¹ And third, along with the primary organizations, the higher organs of the vanguard party are also structured along communist party lines. The organs are highly centralized and consist of a central committee, which elects a secretariat (the most powerful administrative organ of the party) and a political bureau (de facto the most powerful decisions making organ of the party).² From this, one sees that the ideological basis--Marxism-Leninism--shapes the structure (which is very similar, though not as well developed, to a communist party) of the vanguard revolutionary-democratic party; a structure that is very effective for extending the influence of the vanguard party throughout the entire society.

The Function of the Vanguard Party

The key function of the vanguard party is to direct a state (including political, economic and social spheres) along a socialist oriented path. Kosukhin calls this function "the leading role of the party in the revolutionary transformation of society."³ The vanguard party performs part of this function through the following diverse activities: (1) It forms important social organizations: "trade unions, peasants' associations, committees for defending the revolution, and women's' and youth associations."⁴ (2) It educates the population regarding the principles of scientific socialism.⁵ (3) It trains personnel in areas crucial to maintaining political power: "party and administrative cadres, employees of public organizations and propagandists."⁶

¹Irkhin, "Vanguard Parties," p. 10.

²Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 98.

³Kosukhin, Revolutionary Democracy, p. 130.

⁴Ibid., p. 129.

⁵Irkhin, "Vanguard Parties," p. 10.

⁶Kosukhin, Revolutionary Democracy, p. 123.

And, (4) it also plays a preeminent role in the economic management of the country: it "determines the general economic policy . . . approves the state plan . . . and outlines ways and means of implementing it."¹

The most salient part of the vanguard party's function, however, is to exercise its leading role over the state apparatus: (1) it creates the new state apparatus, (2) it makes all major policy decisions, (3) it makes all key personnel decisions, and (4) it controls all state activities. These four aspects of this leading role function are highlighted by Chirkin and Yudin:

First, the party takes measures to create a state machine structured according to fundamentally new principles, [and] . . . also control the creation of new state organs . . . Second, the party programme defines the chief guidelines and the tasks to be tackled . . . the party takes decisions on all major questions of internal and foreign policy and gives corresponding directives concerning their fulfillment by state organs . . . State organs cannot decide any important political or organizational question without guiding instructions from the party. Third, the party takes the decisive part in the formation of state organs . . . The role of the party organs in appointing and dismissing members of the government [and military] and higher organs of justice is decisive. Fourth, the leading role of the revolutionary-democratic party manifests itself in that it systematically controls the activity of all state organs.²

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¹Ibid., p. 129.

²Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, pp. 159-62.

³Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 160.

Although the function of the vanguard party is to exercise its leading role over the state, Soviet theorists warn against the fusion of party and state activities. They argue that this fusion undermines the leading role of the party:

Revolutionary democrats in some countries are convinced that their party should be omnipotent and, consequently, the sole all embracing vehicle of political power. Accordingly, party bodies are authorized to fulfil the functions of the state organs; as a result party and state activity is consciously combined at all levels . . .

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[this] duplication of the activities of the state machine weakens the chief role of the revolutionary-democratic party--that of political leader . . . and . . . turn[s] it into an appendage of this machine.²

Instead, revolutionary democrats must clearly delineate the role of vanguard party (political leader) from the role of the state apparatus (to implement party directives).

The Role of the Socialist Community in the Development of the Vanguard Party

So far one has discussed the development, composition, ideology, structure, and function of the vanguard party; also key to understanding the progression of a socialist-oriented state is the role that the socialist community plays in the development of a vanguard party. The communist parties of the socialist bloc develop extensive ties with the revolutionary-parties (both those in and those out of power) . Brutents notes:

Links between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] and revolutionary democratic parties--both those that head progressive regimes or are carrying on an armed struggle against colonial and racist regimes, and those that are in opposition to reactionary and neo-colonialist regimes--have developed an especially broad base.³

The close cooperation with the socialist bloc enable revolutionary democrats to assimilate Marxism-Leninism and thus, to build a vanguard party based on the principles of scientific socialism; consequently, revolutionary democrats go to socialist

¹Ulyanovsky, National Liberation, p. 162.

²Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 168.

³Brutents, National Liberation Revolutions, p.185.

bloc countries to receive training in party work: "Party . . . personnel from a number of countries with a socialist orientation are being trained in the Soviet Union."¹ While in the USSR, revolutionary democrats "study the activity of the CPSU, its methods of directing political and economic life, mass organizations and ideological work."² This training gives the socialist community a tremendous opportunity to influence the development, structure and function of a vanguard party.

Conclusion

As we have seen, the revolutionary-democratic party--with its ideological basis of Marxism-Leninism, its structure similar to a communist party, its relations with the socialist bloc, and most importantly, its function of leading the society towards socialism--is not only an effective political organ, but also the most important institution to ensure the successful development of a socialist-oriented state.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

...¹ However, the political reliability of the regular personnel is also important; Brutents stresses the importance for revolutionary-democratic regimes to train "military cadres primarily from the labouring strata."² These measures, too, significantly strengthen the party's position in the armed forces.

Since the armed forces is the most important organ of defence, cooperation between a socialist-oriented state and the socialist community (in the development of the armed forces) is of the utmost importance. Simonia argues that "the success of socialist orientation . . . can be secured by the strengthening and consistent broadening of their . . . military-political ties with the countries of the socialist community."³ The willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to provide military assistance to the socialist-oriented states was indicated by Brezhnev at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, "with the help of other fraternal socialist countries, the USSR helps strengthen the defence potential of the newly independent countries when asked to do so."⁴ This military dependency on the socialist bloc gives it tremendous potential to influence the political development of a socialist-oriented state.

In conclusion, the militia, the courts, and the security and armed force, controlled by the revolutionary-democratic party are not only effective instruments in maintaining political power, but also important vehicles for extending the influence of the socialist bloc in the political development of a socialist-oriented state. Thus, the organs of defence form a key component of the framework for analysis.

¹Uiyanovsky, Present-Day Problems, p. 87.

²Brutents, National Liberation Revolutions, p. 121.

³Simonia, "Newly-Free Countries: Problems of Development," p. 86.

⁴Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU Central Committee," p. 19.

number of countries."¹ Second, they need to create new or change old structures of the state apparatus (e.g. representative organs and central ministries), and to implement new governing principles--in particular democratic centralism.² And third, they need to eliminate former state structures, especially governmental systems. (For example, the "formal bourgeois parliamentarism has been liquidated [sic] in almost all the countries where it was artificially implanted by the colonialists.")³

This leads us to explore the new state structures that are created in socialist-oriented countries.

The Highest Representative Organ of State Power

The representative organs, which form the basis of state power, function similar to the soviets in the USSR, and Soviet authors note the importance of their formation in socialist-oriented countries: "Now, priority is being given to the formation of representative organs, either people's councils or similar organs which in the future will comprise the political foundation of the socialist-oriented state."⁴ Representative organs can be formed at local and regional levels, though the most important one is at the central level--the highest representative organ (e.g. The Supreme People's Council in Yemen).⁵ While being directed by party policy, the highest representative organ performs primarily a legislative function; however, depending upon the governmental system (which is discussed later), it may also form a permanent higher standing body (i.e. presidium), and the government. Although deputies are elected to representative organs by the adult population, it is the revolutionary-democratic party that puts forth

¹Ibid., 162.

²G. Kim, "The USSR and National-State Construction in Developing Countries," p. 42.

³Ulyanovsky, National Liberation, p. 163.

⁴Ulyanovsky, National Liberation, p. 163.

⁵Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 185.

the candidates (in a number of countries only party members may be elected as deputies, e.g. Guinea).¹ As can be seen, the leading role of the party is decisive in the formation and in the function of the representative organs of state power.

The Head of State

The head of state--who, without exception, is also the leader of the revolutionary-democratic party--is the president;² and accordingly, he occupies the most powerful position in the state apparatus of a socialist-oriented country. Frequently, the president is also the prime minister of the government and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces;³ as a result of holding all of these positions, in many states, the power of the president can be termed as almost dictatorial: "In many countries the president is invested with very broad personal powers (he issues ordinances which carry the force of law, dissolves the national assembly, retires the government, etc.).⁴ Notwithstanding his powerful position in the state apparatus, the president is subordinate to the revolutionary-democratic party: he "does not stand above the party; he is obliged to be governed by its decisions and to implement party policy."⁵ Still, the role of the president is very important in a socialist-oriented country. (The subordination of the president to the party is a radical difference in the function of the head of state between the new and old state systems).

The Government

In addition to the head of state, the government is a vital component of the state apparatus; it is structured and it functions along lines similar to the Council of

¹Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 178.

²Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 210.

³Ibid., p. 211, 212.

⁴Ulyanovsky, National Liberation, p. 164.

⁵Ibid., p. 212.

Ministers of the Soviet Union (in Angola, Congo and Yemen it is also called the Council of Ministers).¹ In terms of its structure, it is composed of a chairman (prime minister) and ministers; however, the size and number of government ministries is substantially larger than a bourgeois government: this is reflective of the role of the socialist-oriented state viz to create the political, the economic and the social prerequisites for the transition to socialism. This point is noted by Ulyanovsky:

In view of the state's increased social and economic activity the number of ministries concerned with the economy [and social activity], as compared with purely administrative ones, is also increasing and their influence in the organs of the state administration is growing.²

In addition to the increase of economic ministries (planning and statistics, mining and power industry, agricultural development and the cooperative movement, etc.), ministries of a new type are created (e.g. information and propaganda).³

Forms of Government

Thus far we have discussed independently the central bodies of the state apparatus (the highest representative organ, the head of state, and the government); however, it is also important to understand how these bodies function collectively; it is imperative to look at *the form of government*: "the system, formation procedure and interrelations of the central state bodies."⁴ Chirkin and Yudin identify three different forms of government: (1) the centralist-dualist, (2) the form where the highest representative organ is supreme and, (3) the monistic. Each of these will be discussed below.

The least developed form of government is the centralist-dualist (e.g. Tanzania and Madagascar): though new institutions and principles are being introduced, old

¹Ibid., p. 214.

²Ulyanovsky, National Liberation, p. 163.

³Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 217.

⁴Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 48.

bourgeois forms still predominate; as well, the head of state (president) is the supreme organ of state power. The president, who is elected by popular vote and not by the highest representative organ, creates the government which is accountable to him. And while, the highest representative organ (parliament) exercises legislative power, the president can pass acts or decrees with the force of law, veto parliament's laws, and dissolve parliament itself.¹ This extreme concentration of power in the post of the president, who is also the leader of the revolutionary-democratic party, makes the socialist-oriented state vulnerable to political reversal should the president lose power. Thus, the centralist-dualist is the least desirable form of government for the transition to socialism.

In contrast, the Soviet theorists prefer the form where the highest representative organ is the supreme organ of state power (e.g. Benin and Yemen). (This form is essentially the same as form as the Soviet state system). Under this form of government, the sole legislative body is the highest representative organ. It also forms all other state organs, including the head of state and the government (the ministries); consequently, these institutions are directly accountable to the highest representative organ.² This form of government is required to successfully make the transition to socialism.

The third form of government--the monistic (e.g. Afghanistan)--is usually "set up after a revolutionary interruption of a capitalist-oriented development."³ It is a temporary form of government, until a highest representative organ can be established (this process occurred in Benin and Yemen). Under this form of government, the functions of head of state (executive), government (administrative) and parliament

¹Ibid., pp. 54-6.

²Ibid., pp. 52-3.

³Ibid., p. 56.

(legislative) are all combined in a single body--the revolutionary council;¹ as a consequence, the revolutionary council, as a single organ, appoints and dismisses ministers, ratifies treaties, and issues laws, adopts economic development plans and so on.² The chairman of the revolutionary council is both the president (performing the functions of the head of state), and the prime minister (holding several other key ministerial posts: defence and state security). Members of the revolutionary council hold all other key ministerial positions. The key feature of the monistic form of government is the extreme concentration of state power.

Conclusion

The representative organs as the basis of state power, the head of state and the government as instruments for implementing party policy, and the forms of government (centralist-dualist, where the highest representative organ is supreme, and monistic) as vehicles in the administration of the state were discussed as the key features of the state apparatus of a socialist-oriented country--an important element of the framework for analysis.

¹Ibid., p. 56.

²Ibid., p. 201.

The Organs of Defence

Thus far we have looked at the party and the state as key elements constituting a socialist-oriented state; another key element of this framework for analysis is the organs of defence. Lenin warned: "No revolution is worth anything unless it can defend itself."¹ Heeding this warning, revolutionary democrats develop institutions whose function is to defend--against both external and internal enemies--the revolutionary democratic regime. The most important organs of defence (the militia, the court system, the state security forces, and most importantly the armed forces) are discussed below in terms of the following: their specific function, their relationship to the revolutionary-democratic party, and their relationship with the socialist bloc (state security and armed forces).

The Militia

The first organ of defence, the militia, is a public organization (not a professional army) whose primary function is to support the main organs of defence (security and armed forces) in protecting the regime from external and internal enemies. According to Chirkin and Yudin, the task of the militia is "to assist the punitive organs in maintaining law and order, protecting public property, [and] fighting counterrevolution and foreign aggression (the people's militia in Guinea, [for example])."² The creation of the militia, however, is under the guidance of the revolutionary-democratic party which ensures its political reliability as an effective organ in the defence of the socialist-oriented state.

¹V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 28, p. 124.

²Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p.149.

The Court System

The second organ of defence is the court system. Like many other political systems, the court system in a socialist-oriented state serves a judicial purpose; unlike many other political systems, however, it also performs a political function. The court system is not politically neutral: Chirkin and Yudin argue that, "Courts, like other organs of the socialist-oriented state, come under the guidance of the revolutionary-democratic parties, the purpose of which is to ensure that they pursue party and state policy."¹ Consequently, special courts (i.e. secret police courts) are often created and function to address one specific party policy, the elimination of political opponents of the regime:

The objective conditions of the class struggle may, however, compel the state to set up extraordinary or special courts to hear cases involving particularly grievous crimes. Such, for example are the state security courts in Algeria, Guinea, Congo and the PDRY which deal with crimes against the national security, the revolutionary tribunal in Mozambique, which hears cases in accordance with the 1979 Law on the Crimes Against Security of the People and the State. In some countries (Guinea, Algeria), courts have been set up to try economic crimes . . . In Ethiopia there is a special anti-corruption court. The trial procedure for hearing such cases is usually simplified and speeded up. The sentences are final and not subject to appeal.²

The class struggle referred to above is, of course, the process of the leftward radicalization of the political system which is marked by the removal of political opposition. In this context, the political purpose of these special courts become obvious.

¹Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 232.

²Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 229.

The State Security Forces

In addition to the militia and the court system, another important organ of defence is the state security forces (the secret police). It is concerned primarily with internal political opposition, and its purpose is to find and to bring to justice individuals who actively oppose the non-capitalist course of development pursued by the regime. Because the function of the security forces is political, it is strictly controlled by the revolutionary-democratic party. Chirkin and Yudin note that, "[t]he rules of many revolutionary-democratic parties stipulate that guidance of the army and national security forces must be exercised directly by the central committee."¹ In performing its defence function, the state security organs penetrate in political, economic, and social spheres of society. The PDRY (Yemen) constitution notes, for instance, that the " ' . . . security organs . . . shall participate with considerable effectiveness in production activities and the development of the Homeland.' "² In addition, the state security organs of revolutionary-democratic regimes receive assistance from socialist bloc countries in order to perform their function:

[Cooperation with the socialist bloc] is important, too, for counteracting counterrevolution and for "neutralizing" [sic] groups within revolutionary democracy itself that are inclined to capitulate.³

Specifically, Brutents means that the socialist community will assist revolutionary democrats in consolidating their political position through the elimination of political opposition. In sum, being guided by the party, penetrating all spheres of society, and receiving assistance from the socialist bloc, the state security is an effective organ in defending the socialist-oriented state.

¹Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 165.

²Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 224.

³Brutents, National Liberation Movements, p. 184.

The Armed Forces

The most important organ of defence of the socialist-oriented state, however, is the armed forces. In performing its function, it is charged with three main tasks (external defence, internal defence, and socialization):

(1) defence of the national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country from foreign aggression; (2) defence of revolutionary gains and the revolutionary-democratic power against any encroachments by internal hostile class forces; (3) active participation in social political life, and in the creative work of the people . . .¹

These functions of the armed forces are the same as those performed by the armed forces of socialist states.

Like all of the other organs of defence, the armed forces is not politically neutral; it is strictly controlled by the revolutionary-democratic party and it is highly centralized. As in the case of the security forces, the armed forces is strictly controlled by the central committee of the party: special commissions, departments and primary party organizations are established to conduct ideological and political work in the armed forces in order to ensure that the leading role of the party in this critical organ of defence is strong. In this respect, the most important party organ is the Central Political Board, "a body set up in the armed forces of several countries in order to consolidate [the] party's positions in the armed forces."² (This board functions similarly to the Main Political Administration in the armed forces of the Soviet Union).

In addition to the party institutions, personnel reorganization is undertaken by the party to ensure the political reliability of the armed forces. Ulyanovsky emphasizes the importance to "reorganize the army and the security bodies, particularly the officer corp

¹Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 224.

²Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 166.

...¹ However, the political reliability of the regular personnel is also important; Brutents stresses the importance for revolutionary-democratic regimes to train "military cadres primarily from the labouring strata."² These measures, too, significantly strengthen the party's position in the armed forces.

Since the armed forces is the most important organ of defence, cooperation between a socialist-oriented state and the socialist community (in the development of the armed forces) is of the utmost importance. Simonia argues that "the success of socialist orientation . . . can be secured by the strengthening and consistent broadening of their . . . military-political ties with the countries of the socialist community."³ The willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to provide military assistance to the socialist-oriented states was indicated by Brezhnev at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, "with the help of other fraternal socialist countries, the USSR helps strengthen the defence potential of the newly independent countries when asked to do so."⁴ This military dependency on the socialist bloc gives it tremendous potential to influence the political development of a socialist-oriented state.

In conclusion, the militia, the courts, and the security and armed force, controlled by the revolutionary-democratic party are not only effective instruments in maintaining political power, but also important vehicles for extending the influence of the socialist bloc in the political development of a socialist-oriented state. Thus, the organs of defence form a key component of the framework for analysis.

¹Ulyanovsky, Present-Day Problems, p. 87.

²Brutents, National Liberation Revolutions, p. 121.

³Simonia, "Newly-Free Countries: Problems of Development," p. 86.

⁴Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU Central Committee," p. 19.

The Organs of Socialization

Whereas the function of the organs of defence is to maintain revolutionary-democratic power by coercive means, the function of the organs of socialization is to build support for the socialist-oriented state by persuasive means.

In order to build popular support, revolutionary democrats attempt to shape a new society that will possess new values and new political beliefs, especially Marxism-Leninism. As Andreyev comments, "socialism-oriented development entails not only social transformations, but also a remoulding of the working people's world-outlook."¹ Within this context, the task of the organs of socialization is "to shape the rudiments of the socialist consciousness and to mould a new man."² A key rudiment of this socialist consciousness is that the *interests* of the state override the *interests* of the individual (i.e. the collective over the individual). Kosukhin states: the "pressing task is that of instilling in people revolutionary consciousness and responsibility for the successful implementation of the goals set [to reach socialism]. But this is unthinkable without subjecting personal interests to those of society."³ The *interests* of the society are determined, of course, by the revolutionary democratic party.

Thus, we see that the organs of socialization change the political culture of a socialist-oriented country by inculcating new political goals, interests, and values. The principle organs performing the function of political socialization are the media, the education system, and the mass organizations.

The Media

Besides providing information, an important task of the media is to rally support within the population; consequently, the "work of of the press and the radio are

¹I. Andreyev, The Noncapitalist Way, p. 171.

²Ibid., p. 87.

³Kosukhin, Revolutionary Democracy in Africa, p. 144.

subordinated to this task."¹ The media is especially important in countries headed by vanguard parties where revolutionary democrats try to disseminate Marxist-Leninist ideas through "the explanation of the principles of scientific socialism with the help of the mass media."² In addition, revolutionary-democratic parties develop their own media organs, particularly newspapers. The development of party media organizations is often assisted by fraternal socialist states; this results in "the building of contacts between organs of the party press."³ (The use of the media to oppose the program of the government, of course, is not allowed).

The Education System

In addition to the media, political socialization also occurs through the education system. Its goals are to socialize students in the political beliefs of the system and to create a population that is mobilized to support the state. Chirkin and Yudin support this:

[public education] is a matter of vast political importance in the socialist-oriented countries and is inseparably bound up with the development of the mental outlook of the working people, [and] with invigoration of their involvement in political affairs . . .⁴

An example of this political importance is found in the Charter of the Malagasy Socialist Revolution. In the Charter, it asserts that the fourth task of its education system "consists . . . in the political and ideological education of young people in a spirit of socialist ideas, patriotism, and service to the people."⁵ Although political socialization is an important feature of the education system as a whole, at the specialized and higher educational institutions it becomes even more important, because

¹Kosukhin, Revolutionary Democracy in Africa, p. 152.

²Ibid., p. 159.

³Ibid., p. 73.

⁴Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 41.

⁵Kosukhin, Revolutionary Democracy in Africa, p. 146.

the higher education institutions are a major source of the future political leadership. Kosukhin notes: "the training of a young specialist is inseparably linked with the task of moulding a new man, a task that cannot be solved without putting the emphasis on political and labour education."¹

Given the importance of the education system as an organ of socialization, the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries give considerable assistance in the field of education. This assistance involves not only sending Soviet teachers to and establishing educational institutions in the socialist-oriented countries, but also receiving Third World students for higher education by the Soviet Union. Kosukhin notes that presently "more than 7,000 young people from almost all the African countries are studying in the USSR."² This gives the socialist community a tremendous opportunity to socialize students in Marxist-Leninist thought (though how much of this is assimilated is another question).

Thus, the education system serves as an important vehicle for political socialization, as well as an important instrument for the socialist bloc to influence the political development of a socialist-oriented state.

The Mass Organizations

In addition to the media and the education system, the mass organizations--trade unions, peasant associations, women's organizations, and most importantly youth groups--form a third organ of socialization; its function is to mobilize the population to support the regime. Brutents stresses this very important political function:

A network of mass organizations--trade union, youth, women--exist alongside ruling parties in other countries with a socialist orientation, too. Their work is based on official political and ideological guidelines. Their activity, which is

¹Ibid., p. 145.

²Kosukhin, Revolutionary Democracy, p. 151.

above all propagandistic in nature, promotes heightened political consciousness among the masses.¹

In general, mass organizations are important in political mobilization (e.g. organising political rallies), in education (e.g. fighting illiteracy and spreading Marxism-Leninism), and in the promotion of party policies.

Although the mass organizations share these general activities, each one has a specific function: First, the trade unions cooperate with the party and the state to raise industrial productivity, to carry out socio-economic reforms, and to organize strikes in foreign owned enterprises.² Second, peasant associations (the rural equivalent to urban trade unions) demonstrate the advantages of collectivization and raise the political, educational and cultural levels of the peasantry.³ Third, women's organizations function to draw women into the political activities of the state. However, the most important mass organizations are the youth groups, the equivalents of the Pioneers (ages 10 to 14) and of the Komsomol (ages 14 to 28) in the Soviet Union. Although they perform the general political socialization functions of the other mass organizations, the youth groups also perform a political elite recruitment function for the revolutionary-democratic parties. Chirkin and Yudin note that youth groups (the Komsomol type) in socialist-oriented countries are "an assistant and reserve of the revolutionary-democratic parties."⁴ Given the political importance of these mass organizations, their activities should be directed by the revolutionary-democratic party.

As in the case of the media and the education system, the development of mass organizations also provides an opportunity for extending fraternal assistance from the socialist bloc; Brutents notes this assistance (within the context of inner-party

¹Brutents, National Liberation Revolutions, II, p. 121.

²Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, pp. 105-6.

³Ibid., p. 106.

⁴Ibid.

relations) consists of personnel training of trade union and youth activists both in the Soviet Union and in the socialist-oriented countries themselves:

[These party relations are manifested] in [the] cooperation and training of . . . trade union and youth movement activists for national democratic parties . . . [Y]outh and trade union personnel from a number of countries with a socialist orientation are being trained in the Soviet Union. Soviet teachers work in party and trade union schools in the Congo, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and elsewhere.¹

The training of youth activists in the socialist bloc countries has a direct political impact on the development of revolutionary-democratic parties because the youth activists--the nascent political elite--learn Marxist-Leninist theory and party organization (as presented by the Soviet Union) which they are to apply in the socialist-oriented states.

The organs of socialization--media, education system, and mass organizations--form an important element of the socialist-oriented state, the framework for analysis: through political socialization, education, and mobilization, they help develop a population that is supportive of the political system.

¹ Brutents, National Liberation Revolutions, II, pp. 185-6.

Economic Development

An important element of the framework for analysis is the economy. One of the key functions of the socialist-oriented state is create the economic conditions for the successful transition to socialism by bypassing capitalism. Several factors make this difficult: (1) the low level of economic development in the newly-free countries, (2) the high degree to which these states' economies are still deeply tied to the world capitalist system, and (3) the limited assistance that the socialist community can afford to give to these states. Consequently, revolutionary democrats must pursue a non-capitalist path of economic development which takes these three factors into consideration; the specific features of this path will be discussed next: (1) the principle of a mixed economy, (2) the role of foreign capital, (3) the role of the private sector, (4) the role of the public sector (agrarian reform, industrial development, and nationalization), (5) the principle of central planning, and (6) the assistance of the socialist community.

Mixed Economy

In contrast to socialist states, where the economy is almost exclusively run by the state, socialist-oriented states maintain a mixed economy: the "combination of a public sector (i.e., state and cooperative) with a private sector."¹ This is a salient difference. Because of the significant underdevelopment, the shortage of skilled personnel, and the extensive economic ties with capitalist countries, revolutionary democrats cannot immediately develop a state run economy. Ulyanovsky argues that to accelerate the political development of a socialist-oriented state "and immediately to put an end to the mixed economy and concentrate all the economic resources in the hands of the state do not produce the desired results and in the long run impair the revolutionary perspective."² To successfully progress along the path of socialist orientation,

¹Ibid., p. 51.

²Ulyanovsky, National Liberation, p. 157.

revolutionary democrats must pursue a pragmatic course of development (including the utilization of the private sector); consequently, a "gradual stage-by-stage transition to socialism" is encouraged.¹

Foreign Capital

Revolutionary democrats maintain an ambivalent position concerning the role of foreign capital in the development of the economy: in the long term, revolutionary democrats strive to eliminate the presence of foreign capital, while in the short term, they employ and even attract foreign capital to help develop the economy. (Foreign capital is necessary at the early stages of development). In regards to the long term goal, (elimination of foreign capital), Soviet theorists cite numerous cases of the nationalization of foreign firms: for example, the banking system in Angola was nationalized in 1976.² However, Soviet theorists, such as Brutents, also stress the importance of using foreign capital (in the short term), though under strict state control, to help achieve economic goals.

Attracting and cooperating with foreign capital, revolutionary democrats seek to use this capital, under effective state control, for carrying out pressing economic, scientific and technological tasks.³

An example of this use of foreign capital is the cooperation of the Algerian state oil corporation and private American oil companies in developing Algeria's petroleum industry.⁴ While measures are taken to eventually eliminate foreign capital from the economy, foreign capital is utilized at the start to help develop the economy of a socialist-oriented state.

¹Kaysone Phomvihane, "The Strategy of Transition to Socialism," World Marxist Review, no. 9 (1981), p. 35.

²Brutents, Newly-Free Countries, p. 85.

³Brutents, National Liberation Revolutions, II, p.99.

⁴Ibid.

The Private Sector

In addition to foreign capital, the private sector is also utilized by revolutionary democrats to help increase the level of the economic development. Ulyanovsky supports this course of development: "the interests of economic growth call for a long-term utilization of the private sector . . ." ¹ And though a significant private sector may exist, its activities must be subordinate to the overall goals and needs of the state; if the private sector was not under state control, it could undermine the political position of revolutionary democrats. The place of the private sector in economic development was stated in the Program of the Congolese Workers' Party:

[the private sector] should be encouraged at the present stage in order to further the activity of the Party toward the achievement of the economic independence of our country. However, the development of this sector must be watched by the Party and be under the control of the state sector. ²

The economy is so vital to the development of the political system as a whole, that the party exercises its leading role not only over the public sector, but also over the private sector.

The Public Sector: Industry and Agriculture

Foreign capital and the private sector play an important role in economic development, but the *key* role is played by the public sector; this point is stressed by Brutents:

Advancing the principle of a mixed economy, revolutionary democrats at the same time insist that the public sector--principally in the person of the state as well as cooperative property--must play the leading, dominant role. ³

¹Ulyanovsky, National Liberation, p. 158.

²Brutents, National Liberation Revolutions, II, p. 51.

³Ibid., p. 52.

The preeminence of the public sector is seen as essential both for effective economic planning and for ensuring the development of the state along a socialist orientation. Through planned industrial development and agrarian reform--both of which include some degree of nationalization--a dominant public sector can be developed.

Industrial development of the economy occurs in two ways--nationalization and public funding. Revolutionary democrats can nationalize enterprises (sometimes in a compensatory manner) that are owned either by foreign capital or by indigenous bourgeoisie, and immediately begin to develop a public industrial sector: Iraq, for example, nationalized the British Petroleum Company and the Compagnie Française des Petroles in 1975¹; in Angola since 1975 the mining, textiles, metal working and food industries have been nationalized.² Nationalization is an effective way to build a public sector provided that it is neither too rapid nor too extensive. Ulyanovsky points out that, "a hasty, ill-considered nationalization . . . lead[s] to the appearance of unprofitable enterprises which weigh heavily on the economy."³ Instead, a balance between the private and public sectors is required.

The other means by which a public industrial sector can be created is through public funds: profits from both the private sector and the public sector are channelled into the development of plants and factories. Again, this cannot be pursued hastily: rapid industrialization at the expense of other sectors can result in major dislocations in the economy--especially in agriculture:

Thus, in the early 1960s, Ghana, Guinea, the Congo and some other countries launched into intensive industrial development . . . They channelled most of their capital investments into industrial construction, while agriculture, the source of all their revenue, lay outside the sphere of the radical socio-economic

¹Brutents, Newly-Free Countries, p. 81.

²Brutents, Newly-Free Countries, p. 85.

³Ulyanovsky, National Liberation, p. 157.

transformations, and its position, grave as it was, was often still further aggravated.¹

Accordingly, a balanced approach to economic development is advocated, as opposed to one that is based heavily on industrialization.

In addition to industry, a socialist-oriented state develops its public sector in agriculture; considerable attention is placed on agrarian reform. Agrarian reform is pursued in two stages: first all large land holdings are nationalized by the state (the nationalization of agricultural land occurred in Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique during the 1970s); second collective and state farms are formed from the nationalized land. Collective farms, run by the peasants under the direction of party and state officials, are created either by the amalgamation of peasant villages or by the pooling of land which is distributed by the state. In Tanzania, for example, rural villages were amalgamated to form over 5,000 *ujamaa* settlements.²

The collectivization of land (which occurred in the Soviet Union and other East European countries) has important political implications: First, it strengthens the revolutionary-democratic party's position in the countryside, as the party controls the distribution of land, fertilizer, and farm machinery. Second, it provides an excellent vehicle for political socialization because former societal arrangements and values are replaced with new ones. As Andreyev observes, "the altered conditions makes the peasants' inert psychology more receptive to ideological influences . . ."³ Since the majority of the population is usually peasantry these above reforms have a considerable impact on the development of a socialist-oriented state.

¹Andreyev, Noncapitalist Development, p. 134.

²Andreyev, Noncapitalist Development, p. 159.

³Ibid.

Central Planning

Foreign capital, the private sector, and the public sector, though necessary, are not sufficient for the successful development of the economy; central planning is required too. Brutents argues that central planning is a *sine qua non* for the successful development of any socialist-oriented state: "in all states with a socialist orientation, without exception, an obligatory element of economic policy is the drawing up of economic plans for a number of years ahead."¹ As in the case of the socialist countries, the principle of central planning supplants the market forces of the economy in favour of the political goals and needs of the state; this principle is applied not only to the public sector but also to the private sector. Chirkin and Yudin state: "the state intervenes actively in the operation of private enterprises, setting their targets, determining what they are to produce and supervising their activities."² To plan and to control the totality of economic development--in order to reach socialism--is a salient feature of the socialist-oriented state.

The Role of the Socialist Community

Because the socialist-oriented states are still deeply tied to the world capitalist system, assistance from the socialist community in economic development is crucial to the survival of these states--it serves as an economic buffer to capitalist countries. Simonia contends: "It is quite evident, however, that without the alternative of economic ties with the socialist countries, the West would purely and simply strangle the progressive states by a financial and economic blockade."³ Accordingly, the Soviet Union assists these countries both in industrial and in agricultural development; however, the assistance given is exclusively for public sector development. Tsukanov

¹Brutents, National Liberation Revolutions, p. 114.

²Chirkin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 39.

³Simonia, "Newly-Free Countries: Problems of Development," p. 86.

and Kukin state: "The assistance of the Soviet Union to newly-free countries is aimed first of all at developing and strengthening the public sector in these countries and at promoting their industrialization."¹ A large proportion of the assistance given by the socialist community is for major projects; Brutents cites the following examples: "the Aswan High Dam and the Helwan steel plant in Egypt, the Euphrates hydro-engineering project in Syria, the North Rumaila oil field in Iraq, and the Al-Hajar steel mills in Algeria."²

In addition to the Soviet Union, other CMEA³ countries (e.g. Czechoslovakia and Cuba) also provide economic assistance. For example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, Bohuslav Chnoupek, noted the planning, agricultural, and industrial assistance that his country gave to Nicaragua:

To help the people of Nicaragua, Czechoslovakia sent its experts in planning, agriculture and other spheres and also granted credits to meet primary requirements in the building of industrial enterprises and power generating capacities, in mining and in traditional agricultural production.⁴

It can be seen that the economic assistance given by the socialist bloc is not only in the form of specific projects, but also in the form of guidance in charting the course (central planning) of the economic development.

Despite the assistance given by the socialist bloc--especially in industrialization--Soviet theorists stress that the resources of the socialist community are limited; consequently, revolutionary democrats should not try to industrialize rapidly with the expectation of assistance from the socialist states, but rather they should try to increase

¹S. Tsukanov and I. Kukin, "Newly-Free Countries and Scientific and Technological Progress," International Affairs, no. 1 (1982), p. 66.

²Brutents, Newly-Free Countries, p. 257.

³Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

⁴Bohuslav Chnoupek, "Czechoslovakia and Newly-Free Countries," International Affairs, no. 3 (1982), p. 21.

(in coordination with the socialist community) their agricultural production.

Novopashin argues this point:

Today the cost of immediate industrialization is often too high . . . for the socialist countries that are helping them . . . Given the international division of labour that is developing with the world socialist systems and the food problems that exist in a number of socialist countries, there is another way for the young socialist-oriented states to eliminate their backwardness: by intensifying their traditional agricultural production and obtaining machinery and equipment through the cooperative arrangements with the developed socialist countries.¹

This type of economic relations--where the socialist-oriented countries supply agricultural products to the socialist community--places these countries in a position of economic dependency on the socialist bloc.

Conclusion

The economic development of a socialist-oriented state is one of the most important elements of the framework for analysis: it is a critical component of the socio-economic basis of the political superstructure. Although its goal is to develop a state run, centrally planned economy (in order to make the transition to socialism), the socialist-oriented state must utilize foreign capital and the private sector in the beginning to overcome its underdevelopment. In striving to eventually reach socialism, these states develop economic relations with the socialist community; however, these relations place the socialist-oriented states in a positions of dependency--economic and political.

¹Yu. S. Novopashin, "The Influence of Real Socialism on the World Revolutionary Process," Problems of Philosophy, no. 8 (1982), p. 13.

The Types of Socialist-Oriented States

Thus far the development of the individual elements of the socialist-oriented state have been discussed; however, the stages of development of the political system as a whole is just as important. Soviet theorists note that (reflecting the different levels of development) there are two types of socialist-oriented states: the national democratic type (e.g. Algeria, Iraq, and Syria) and the people's democratic type (e.g. South Yemen, Angola, Mozambique, the Congo, and Ethiopia). The national democratic type is lesser developed: it is led by either a national front or a transitional-vanguard party, its state apparatus is dominated by old forms, and its ties with the socialist bloc are not extensive.¹ By contrast, the people's democratic type is more highly developed: it is led by a vanguard party, it creates new state apparatus structures, and it maintains close relations with the socialist community. Two things should be noted concerning these types of socialist-oriented state: First, not all states progress from the national democratic type to the people's democratic type (it is unlikely, for example, that Syria ever will). Second, Soviet theorists stress time and time again that these are not socialist states; although they are similar to a socialist state in many respects, they have a long ways to go before they reach the level of development of a socialist state. (Laos is the only country to have successfully made the transition from a socialist-oriented to a socialist state). Nevertheless, the two different categories are very useful in assessing the level of development of a given socialist-oriented state.

¹Kim, "The National Liberation Movement," International Affairs, no. 4 (1981), p. 34; Chrikin and Yudin, A Socialist-Oriented State, p. 25.

Conclusion

This chapter outlined the framework for analysis of the socialist-oriented state by discussing its key elements: (1) the ideological paradigm, (2) the revolutionary-democratic vanguard party, (3) the state apparatus, (4) the organs of defence, (5) the organs of socialization, and (6) the course of economic development. There were several salient points regarding this discussion that should be restated: **First**, because its goal is to reach socialism, the socialist-oriented state tries to develop political institutions (i.e. party and form of government) which function like and are structured like those of a socialist state. **Second**, since it is a transitional political system, it develops in progressive stages, whether it be the party, the government, or the economy. **Third**, the ideological basis and the social composition of such a state is relatively heterogeneous; this is reflected in the dynamics of the political leadership (its continuous leftward development) and the maintenance of a mixed economy (instead of a complete state run economy). **Fourth**, the socialist bloc plays a significant role in the development of the political system: close relations with the socialist bloc are a sine qua non for successful development. **Fifth**, it is clear that the Soviet Union perceives the socialist-oriented state as a model for the future development of socialist states--based to a large extent on the Soviet system--in the Third World. **Thus**, the review of the model underscores its practical political utility, and underscores that models change with Soviet political needs.

With this framework we can proceed to analyze the political development of Grenada in order to determine to what extent it conformed to the model of the socialist-oriented state.

CHAPTER THREE

GRENADA: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

It is essential to outline the historical background of Grenada in order to have a proper context in which to analyze the political development of Grenada as a socialist-oriented state. The following historical periods are discussed: (1) from discovery by Columbus to the end of the 19th century, (2) from 1900 to 1950, (3) 1950 to independence in 1974, (4) from 1974 up to the revolution in 1979, (5) and finally, the revolution and aftermath.

1498 to 1900

First discovered by Columbus in 1498, Grenada was first colonized in 1650 by the French. They developed sugar plantations and introduced African slaves to work on them; by 1753 there were approximately 12,000 slaves working on the 83 estates of the French planters.¹ In the late 1700s, France and Britain directly competed in the acquisition of colonies in the Caribbean; as a result, the control of Grenada alternated several times between France and Britain, until it was finally ceded to Britain in 1783. The British imposed a new system of rule on Grenada. By 1795, discontent with British rule resulted in an uprising of French planters led by Julien Fedon, but it subsequently was crushed by the British.

Slave rebellions in the Caribbean led Britain to pass the Emancipation Act in 1833 which abolished the institution of slavery; this, coupled with the introduction of cocoa, nutmeg, and cinnamon resulted in the development of small-holders: peasants who cultivated these crops on small plots, mainly in the interior of the island. By 1881 one

¹Tony Thorndike, Grenada (London: Frances Pinter (Publishers), 1985), p. 25.

third of the male population were small holders;¹ however, the power of the plantocracy class remained strong.

In 1877, Grenada was given the legal status of Crown Colony which meant that Grenada was effectively ruled from Britain through an appointed Governor. While there was a Legislative Chamber (17 members of whom 9 were appointed and 8 were elected), the real executive and legislative power lay in the hands of the Governor. This political system continued into the twentieth century.

1900 to 1950

In the early twentieth century, dissatisfaction arose among the middle class concerning the Crown Colony system. T. A. Marryshow, supported by both the middle class and segments of the working class, attempted to reform the Crown Colony system in order to secure elected and effective local representation in Grenada;² this resulted in the creation of the Legislative Council to which he was elected in 1925. He also demanded universal suffrage and the protection of trade union activities. Marryshow founded the Grenada Labour Party in 1929 and the Grenadian Workingmen's Association in 1930-1 as vehicles to champion these causes; however, he proved to be an ineffective leader and both organizations eventually collapsed. Nevertheless Marryshow is credited with initiating the development of a Grenadian political consciousness.³

In addition to Marryshow, "Buzz" Butler made a significant contribution to the political development of Grenada. While Marryshow was interested in institutional reform, Butler was interested in the trade union movement. He was a founder of the

¹Scott Davidson, Grenada (Aldershot, England: Avebury, 1987), p. 4.

²Ibid., pp. 4-5; Thorndike, Grenada, p. 28; Reynold A. Burrows, Revolution and Rescue in Grenada (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), p. 11.

³Anothony Payne, Paul Sutton, and Tony Thorndike, Grenada: Revolution and Invasion (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1984), p. 2.

Grenada Union of Returned Soldiers and was involved in the 1920 riots (a result of the depressed economic conditions of that time) in St. George's, the capital of Grenada. Later Butler left to work in the oil fields of Trinidad and became a political activist there, founding the Oilfield Workers' Trade Union and organising a number of strikes--the most notable being the 1937 strike for which the British dispatched 2,000 troops to arrest him.¹ As a consequence, Butler's reputation as a trade union activist grew in the Caribbean, and he later was elected to the Legislative Council. His main achievement was the introduction of trade union politics to Grenada.

Despite the efforts of Marryshow and Butler, the circumstances of the majority of Grenada's predominantly agricultural working population did not improve: two-thirds of the peasants worked on smallholdings of only two acres, and less than two percent of the population owned forty five percent of the land;² this forced many of Grenada's peasants to work both on their own smallholdings and on the land holdings of the plantocracy. Consequently, the majority of the population remained impoverished.

1950 to 1970

In 1950-1, Grenada's political system underwent a radical transformation. Until that time, the plantocracy elite of Grenada had controlled the reins of political power exclusively, but with the successful development of trade union politics by Eric Gairy (who would later become the prime minister of Grenada) and with the introduction of universal suffrage, the politics of Grenada fundamentally changed. Eric Gairy, after working abroad in the oilfields and organising trade union activities, returned to Grenada in 1950. His reputation grew when he obtained compensation for several wrongly evicted farmers; following this Gairy founded the Grenada Manual and Mental

¹Thorndike, Grenada, p. 27.

²Thorndike, Grenada, p. 30.

Workers' Union in July 1950, and in February 1951, he called a general strike which was a tremendous success: the plantocracy class could no longer dictate working conditions--"the power of the old planter class had been irrevocably broken . . ."¹

The other important development in 1950, as a result of pressure from Britain, was the introduction of universal suffrage. (At that time, Britain was trying to form a West Indies Federation which required all the members' constitutions to be similar). Gairy seized this opportunity, formed the Grenada United Labour Party (GULP), and taking six out of eight Legislative Council seats won the 1951 election. The GULP electoral win (in addition to the development of trade union politics) manifested the weakening power of the plantocracy class.

With absolute power of the plantocracy undermined, Gairy won the next four of the next six general elections. His reign was marked by corruption and by mismanagement. During his first term in power (1951 to 1954), Gairy proceeded with agrarian reform; however, this reform was poorly planned and was not very successful. At the same time, Gairy began to put himself above the law; for example he refused to submit tax returns.² During his second term (1954 to 1957), Gairy was involved in a questionable land deal and other spending irregularities, and his popularity waned.

In 1957, the GULP was defeated by the newly formed Grenada National Party (GNP) which came to power under the leadership of Herbert Blaize and was backed largely by the middle class. The Blaize government did little to improve the working conditions of the working masses of Grenada, and the GULP (under Gairy) once again was back in power after the 1960 general election.

¹Thorndike, Grenada, p. 33.

²Thorndike, Grenada, p. 36.

Gairy's new term was short lived as his government was embroiled in another corruption scandal--"Squandermania."¹ As a result, Britain suspended the constitution and held new elections in 1962 which brought the GNP back to power. During the election Blaize campaigned on the unification with Trinidad and Tobago; however, he could not deliver. And by 1967, Britain, seeing that a West Indian Federation was not going to be possible, formulated the system of "Associated Statehood:" islands like Grenada would be sovereign in their domestic policy, but Britain would be responsible for foreign policy.²

The GNP's failure to unify Grenada with Trinidad and Tobago helped pave the way for the re-election in 1967 of Gairy, who campaigned to take Grenada from Associated Statehood to full independence. After his re-election, Gairy's authoritarianism and corruption began to grow again (practices which helped to create the conditions for the 1979 revolution): Gairy used the Grenadian defence force and police, as well as "an irregular force of thugs called the Mongoose Gang . . ."³ to curb the activities of the political opposition; and he used his office to benefit himself and his cronies financially. (He ruled Grenada in this way until 1979).

1970 to 1974

The greatest changes in the politics of Grenada occurred in the 1970s: Grenada received her independence, gained a new political force, and experienced a revolution.

Next to Gairy, the most prominent politician to rise during this decade was Maurice Bishop, (who would later become Grenada's next prime minister). Maurice Bishop returned to Grenada in 1970 after studying law in London. In November 1970,

¹Davidson, Grenada, p. 6.

²Ibid., p. 8.

³Hugh O'Shaughnessy, Grenada: Revolution, Invasion and Aftermath (London: Sphere Books Limited, 1984), p. 41.

he and Kendrick Radix (who later would be a leading member of the New Jewel Movement) successfully defended a group of nurses who had been arrested for protesting the deteriorating medical conditions at St. George's General Hospital; this defence of the nurses capitulated Bishop to prominence.

In February 1972 when Gairy again won the general election defeating the GNP, it became clear to Bishop and others that a new political opposition was required. Hence, Bishop and Radix formed a new political organization called the Movement of the Assemblies of People (MAP). This organization's aim was to defeat Gairy, abolish the Westminster model of democracy, and implement a system of people's assemblies based on the village organization of Tanzania (a socialist-oriented state). Its political base was mainly urban and involved such working class activists as Selwyn Strachan and George Louison¹ (both would be political bureau members of the NJM). Another opposition organization was formed by Unison Whiteman (he would also figure prominently in the NJM) called the Joint Endeavor for the Welfare, Education and Liberation of the People (JEWEL); this organization was active among agricultural workers. Both of these parties (rural and urban) later merged in March 1973 to form the New Jewel Movement (NJM). (The NJM would take power in 1979).

At the the time of its formation, the NJM was not yet a Marxist-Leninist party; however, the NJM did create a political bureau in September 1973,² and in November it did issue its *Manifesto* which clearly had a non-capitalist orientation. Among other things the *Manifesto* advocated the collectivization of agriculture and fisheries, the nationalization of the tourist industry, the abolition of "Westminster" parliamentary democracy and the multi-party system, the implementation of people's assemblies

¹Payne, Sutton, Thorndike, Grenada, p. 10.

²Thorndike, Grenada, p. 48.

(which would function like soviets in the USSR), and the pursuit of a non-aligned foreign policy based on a "nationalist, anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist position."¹

The year 1973 was critical in Grenada's march to independence. At that time, Britain wanted to alleviate herself of the responsibilities of her colonies, including those in the Caribbean, and was very receptive to Gairy's demands for independence. Both opposition parties were against Grenadian independence at that time: the GNP believed that Grenada was too economically weak to survive as an independent state; the NJM believed that Grenadian independence would result in the continuation of Gairy's authoritarian rule. In protest to Gairy's repressive rule and to the possible granting of independence, the NJM held a *People's Congress* on November 4, 1973 which was attended by 10,000 people;² it *convicted* Gairy in absentia of crimes against the people and demanded his resignation "within a fortnight or face a general strike."³ On Sunday, November 18, 1973, while organising the general strike, the NJM leadership including Bishop, Radix, Whiteman, Strachan and Hudson Austin (a future NJM political bureau member) were arrested and severely beaten by the Mongoose Gang.⁴ This day was to be known as 'Bloody Sunday.' The general strike went ahead on New Year's Day 1974 and lasted three weeks; however, on January 21, Gairy used force to suppress the strike, resulting in the shooting of Bishop's father and in the injury of several others. This day became known as 'Bloody Monday.' Despite the obvious brutality of the Gairy regime and the considerable support of those opposing the current independence plans, Britain,

¹"The 1973 Manifesto of the New Jewel Movement," in Caribbean Monthly Review, 13, no. 4 (1979), 26-53.

²Jacobs, W. R. and Jacobs R. I. Grenada: the Route to Revolution (Havana: Casa de las Americas, 1980), p. 100.

³O'Shaughnessy, Grenada, p. 49.

⁴Thorndike, Grenada, p. 46.

desperate to get rid of her colonies, proceeded to grant Grenada its independence on February 7, 1974.

1974 to 1979

After independence, the NJM, led by Bishop, evolved towards Marxism-Leninism. Prior to independence, the NJM had concentrated on organising mass rallies in order to achieve political objectives; however, with the failures to stop the granting of independence and to remove Gairy from power, the NJM decided to build a vanguard revolutionary-democratic party based on Marxism-Leninism. Bishop noted this evolution of the NJM:

From then on [after February 7, 1974], we understood that along with mobilization of the masses we had to think about the organization of the party and training and preparation of the cadres. That is, to try to build a party with the characteristics of a vanguard party.¹

The leftward evolution of the NJM was further strengthened with the addition of Bernard Coard, a devoted Marxist-Leninist. Coard received an economics degree from Brandeis University and later worked at the University of Sussex where he was closely involved with the British Communist Party.² In 1976, he joined the NJM, along with his wife Phyllis, and quickly became the chief ideologist of the party. At the same time, Coard formed the Organization for Education and Liberation (OREL) which was a Marxist study group within the NJM.³ OREL attracted younger members of the NJM (such as Liam James, Ewart Layne, Leon Cornwall, Chris Stroude, and John Ventour⁴ who would all later become either central committee or political bureau members of the

¹Maurice Bishop, "The Struggle for Democracy and Against Imperialism," in Maurice Bishop Speaks, eds. Bruce Marcus and Michael Taber (New York: Pathfinder, 1983), p. 18.

²O'Shaughnessy, Grenada, pp. 70-1.

³Thorndike, Grenada, p. 50.

⁴O'Shaughnessy, Grenada, p. 71.

NJM) around which Coard began to develop a following. The strength of this following threatened many members of the NJM; as a result, these members threatened Coard with expulsion from the party unless he disbanded OREL. Although Coard disbanded OREL in 1977, his following remained strong. (Coard built a faction in the NJM based on former OREL members and later ousted Bishop as leader in 1983). Nevertheless, Coard's addition to the NJM considerably strengthened its Marxist-Leninist character.

With its party organization strengthened and its ideological position established, the NJM decided to contest its first election in December 1976 (in order to raise its national profile, if not to defeat Gairy). The NJM formed an alliance with Blaize's GNP party, and the United People's Party (UPP) to fight the GULP. Despite electoral fraud, the opposition won 48% of the vote and 6 of 15 seats: the NJM 3, the GNP 2, and the UPP 1. As a result, Bishop became the leader of the official opposition, the NJM.¹

Although the NJM had significantly raised its profile and had gained a new political platform, it was clear that with Gairy in power, the NJM would never obtain power electorally--Gairy's repression of any political opposition was unrelenting. For example, in June 1977 during a general assembly of the OAS in Grenada, about 500 people began demonstrating; the Grenadian Defence Force opened fire on the crowd, wounding dozens and killing one.² This mounting repression led to the significant strengthening of the Leninist character of the NJM--especially its decision (in July 1977) to take power through armed struggle. Richard Jacobs and Ian Jacobs, both members of the NJM, point this out in their monograph, Grenada: The Route to Revolution:

Persecution forced the development of a more sophisticated political organization based on the strictest principles of democratic centralism. It also led to the development of a clandestine wing of the NJM, trained in insurrectionary activity,

¹Jacobs and Jacobs, Route to Revolution, p. 114.

²"The Long Road to Freedom," Granma Weekly Review 12 July 1981.

which was to become the nucleus of the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA).¹ This clandestine wing eventually overthrew the Gairy regime in March 1979.

The formation of ties between the NJM and Cuba was another salient political development following the 1976 election. Because they saw Cuba as an example of successful non-capitalist transformation to socialism, members of the NJM began travelling to Cuba to see how socialism could be built in Third World Caribbean states. This was noted by Bishop in 1977 during an interview in Havana with the Cuban weekly Bohemia:

But unquestionably, through the Cuban experience we got to see scientific socialism close up. This . . . has been teaching us, on the practical level of day-to-day political struggle, the relevance of socialism as the only solution to our problem.²

Close relations between the NJM and Cuba (originating as early as 1977) was to continue until the collapse of the NJM regime in 1983).

During the first five years of independence under Gairy, Grenada's political, economic and social conditions worsened: Politically, Gairy became more repressive: he even received military equipment and training for the Grenada Defence Force from the Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet.³ Economically, Grenada was rapidly deteriorating: by 1979, "50% of the workforce was unemployed," and the island's infrastructure (roads, water, electricity) had "all but broke down."⁴ And socially, for instance, functional illiteracy rose in Grenada to 40%.⁵ These worsening conditions helped increase the conditions for the Grenadian revolution in 1979.

¹Jacobs and Jacobs, Route to Revolution, p. 117.

²Bishop, "The Struggle for Democracy," in Maurice Bishop Speaks, p. 22.

³O'Shaughnessy, Grenada, p. 70.

⁴Scott Davidson, Grenada, p. 10.

⁵Payne, Sutton, Thorndike, Grenada, p. 14.

The Grenadian Revolution and Aftermath

In the very early hours of March 13, 1979, while Gairy was absent from Grenada visiting the United Nations, 46 members of the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) successfully attacked and captured the army barracks at True Blue (in St. George's). Only the police station held out resistance to the PRA, and then, only until late afternoon. (During the one-day revolution there were only three deaths one of which was accidental). After that, the NJM under Bishop (who also became Prime Minister) was in full control of Grenada and remained so, until the American invasion in 1983.

Foreign recognition of the new Bishop government followed shortly: By March 22, 1979 Jamaica, Barbados, and Guyana had all recognized the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG);¹ the United States and Britain immediately followed. The socialist states' recognition of the new Grenadian regime came somewhat later. Cuba and Grenada established diplomatic relations on April 14, 1979,² though Cuba had been publicly supportive of the new Bishop government from the start;³ diplomatic relations were established with the USSR on September 7, 1979.⁴

After the revolution, Grenada and the socialist bloc quickly strengthened and diversified their relations. On April 12, 1979, the Cuban vessel, The Matanzas, delivered military equipment to Grenada for defending the revolution;⁵ this Cuban military assistance within a few weeks of the revolution was acknowledged by Bishop a

¹It was called the Provisional Revolutionary Government for a brief period immediately following the revolution.

²"Cuban Ambassador to Grenada Presents Credentials," Granma Weekly Review, 22 April 1979.

³"A victory for the people," Granma Weekly Review, 25 March 1979.

⁴"Ustanovlenie diplomaticheskikh otnosheniyi mezhdu USSR i Grenadoyi," Pravda, 13 September 1979.

⁵"New Grenadian Government Opens Relations With Cuba," Miami Herald, 17 April 1979.

year later.¹ In June 1979, Cuba actively supported Grenada's bid for membership in the Non-Aligned Movement during its 6th Summit Conference (held in Havana in September).² Grenada clearly demonstrated its political leanings in foreign policy when, at the United Nations in January 1980, it voted with the Soviet Union on the Afghanistan issue.³ In May of 1980, a NJM delegation, headed by Coard, visited the Soviet Union.⁴ However, the construction of a new international airport in Grenada at Point Salines (for developing tourism) was the most salient example of the expansion of ties between Grenada and the socialist bloc. Cuba provided most of the financing, the heavy equipment, the technicians, and about 300 construction workers in order to build the airport; once built, it would have a 9,000 foot runway capable of accommodating wide-bodied jets.⁵ The relations between Grenada and the socialist bloc continued to strengthen as the years progressed.

Grenada's strengthening ties with the socialist bloc, however, had an adverse effect on its relations with the United States. As early as April 1979, through an official statement by U.S. Ambassador Frank Ortiz, the United States indicated its reservations concerning the development of ties between Grenada and Cuba : "We would view with displeasure any tendency on the part of Grenada to develop closer ties with Cuba."⁶ Grenada, however, was not prepared to forfeit its relations with the socialist bloc: it strengthened them. As a result, the United States took measures to counter the course

¹"We will do what we want to do with our lives in our countries," Granma Weekly Review, 11 May 1980.

²"Speech by Cuban Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca," Granma Weekly Review, 17 June 1979.

³"Grenada UN vote shows island leans toward Soviets," Christian Science Monitor, 21 January 1980.

⁴"Delegatsia Grenady v Sovyetskom soyuze," Pravda, 31 May 1980.

⁵"Gulliver's Travells Through Eastern Caribbean," Granma Weekly Review, 15 May 1983.

⁶"U.S. vs. Cuba on Caribbean Isle of Grenada," Washington Post, 27 April 1979.

of development of Grenada. One measure was to block financial aid to the Bishop government--especially aid for the international airport. In the spring of 1981, the United States successfully persuaded EEC not to give assistance to Grenada for airport construction.¹ (The United States asserted that the international airport was a serious threat to its security: it argued that the length of Grenada's airport runway was far too large for its tourist needs, and that the airport was being built for Soviet and Cuban military purposes).² Another measure taken by the U.S. was to conduct military manoeuvres in the Caribbean. One of these manoeuvres (in 1981) consisted of a mock invasion of a "mountainous Caribbean island" whose authoritarian regime was backed by country "orange" (Cuba) and country "red" (USSR). It was code named--Amber and the Amberines--which is very similar to--Grenada and the Grenadines. As well, Amber is a district in Grenada near the site of the airport. It was quite clear for whom the manoeuvres were intended;³ this caused the NJM leadership considerable anxiety. Two years later, on October 25, 1983, U.S. marines invaded Grenada, ending the rule of the NJM.

Although the succeeding chapter will focus on Grenada's political development, one salient event should be discussed briefly first--the removal of Bishop from power. For virtually the entire period that the NJM governed Grenada (1979 to 1983), there was little indication, on the surface at least, that Bishop's power was in peril. However, a split in the NJM became public on October 12, 1983: Coard's faction had gained a majority in the NJM and was able to remove Bishop from power; Bishop was then placed under house arrest. Bishop remained in detention until October 19, 1983 when

¹"U.S. Presses EEC to Refuse Aid for Leftist Grenada," Washington Post, 20 March 1981.

²"Gulliver's Travells," Granma Weekly Review, 15 May 1983.

³Thorndike, Grenada, p. 129.

hundreds of Grenadians freed the popular Bishop from house arrest; subsequently, the crowds, led by Bishop, attempted to take up defensive positions in Fort Rupert in St. George's. The Coard faction, which controlled the Grenadian armed forces, sent armed detachments to put down the resistance; as a result, there were many casualties among the Grenadian citizens, and Bishop and his closest advisors were executed.¹ A Revolutionary Military Council was established and it ruled Grenada until U.S. forces invaded Grenada on October 25, 1983.²

With this historical background, this thesis will now turn to analyze the political development of Grenada under the NJM.

¹"Statement by the Party and the Government of Cuba on the Events in Grenada," Granma Weekly Review, 30 October 1983.

²"K Sobytiyam na Grenade," Pravda, 22 October 1983; "Amerikantsy, von s Grenady," Pravda, 29 October 1983.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ANALYSIS OF GRENADA AS A SOCIALIST-ORIENTED STATE

Introduction

With the framework for analysis the political development of Grenada (between 1979 and 1983) can be critically examined by collating its political development with the model of the socialist-oriented state; thus we can determine to what extent Grenada conformed to this Soviet theoretical construct. The following questions concerning Grenada will guide the investigation: What were the structures of the key components of the political system? How did they conform to the model of the socialist-oriented state? What functions did these components fill? Did they succeed in fulfilling these functions? How did these functions compare to the functions described in this model? Did the Grenadian political leadership consciously strive to conform to this model? What were the dynamics of the political leadership? And finally, what role did the socialist bloc--especially the Soviet Union and Cuba--play in the political development of Grenada? Guided by these questions, the following key components will be systematically analyzed: (1) the state apparatus, (2) the course of economic development, (3) the organs of socialization, (4) the organs of defence, and (5) the revolutionary-democratic party.

The State Apparatus

The creation of a *new revolutionary-democratic* state apparatus and the elimination the *old bourgeois* state apparatus is a critical factor indicating the socialist orientation of a country; in Grenada, this process was apparent. Bishop argued that, ". . . we must build a new grass-roots, people-oriented democracy . . . to ensure their [Grenadians'] participation on a daily basis in this revolutionary democracy."¹ As a result, the NJM set out to abolish the former British parliamentary system and establish a new state apparatus. Through an examination of the key elements of the state apparatus--the representative organs, the head of state, the government, and the form of government--one can determine the extent to which Grenada's new state apparatus conformed to the model of the socialist-oriented state.

The Representative Organs of Power

In Grenada, there were two main representative organs of state power: the Parish Council and the Zonal Council. These Parish and Zonal Councils were structured on a similar basis to the representative organs of state power in the USSR called Soviets: the seven larger Parish Councils were similar to the regional level Soviets; the smaller Zonal Councils (there were six in each Parish) were similar to district level Soviets. The Zonal and Parish Councils also functioned like the Soviets in the USSR; they were the vehicles for participation in the legislative process at the grassroots level. For example, the annual budget of Grenada was discussed at the Parish and Zonal councils before it was formulated; this legislative function was noted by Bishop:

This year [1981] the budget discussion is being taken to the people--our national budget will be debated and shaped not by a handful of men sitting in an exclusive

¹"We'll Always Choose to Stand Up," Granma Weekly Review, 12 July 1981.

"Parliament," but by our organized people in their thousands, in their community groups, their zonal councils, their parish councils.¹

Even though the Parish and Zonal Councils served as vehicles for mass participation, these councils were strictly controlled by the NJM party. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union also exercises this control over the Soviets.²

There were two important contrasts, though, between the representative organs in Grenada and in the Soviet Union: In Grenada, the Parish and Zonal Councils were appointed; in the USSR, the Soviets are elected. As well, the USSR has a highest representative organ of state power, the Supreme Soviet; Grenada did not. But this is characteristic of a country just embarking on the path of socialist orientation.

Nevertheless, the formation of the Parish and Zonal councils clearly indicates the socialist-orientation of Grenada, as Bishop notes, "[they are] real proof of our people's revolutionary democracy."³

The Head of State

One of the most interesting contradictions between the model of the socialist-oriented state and the pattern of development in Grenada occurred in the head of state. According to the model, the head of state is the president; however, in the case of Grenada, which remained a Commonwealth country, the head of state was Queen Elizabeth II;⁴ the Governor-General, Paul Scoon, acted as her representative. (It is quite interesting that a British monarch was the head of state of a country that was pursuing an anti-imperialist course of development). And whereas the president is invested with broad personal power, the Governor-General was completely powerless:

¹Maurice Bishop, "Grenada is Not Alone," in Forward Ever (Sydney: Pathfinder Press, 1982), p. 237.

²Bishop, "Line of March for the Party," in The Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 23.

³Bishop, "Three Years of the Revolution," Forward Ever, p. 279.

⁴"About Grenada . . .," Granma Weekly Review, 12 July '981.

in one of the Political Bureau meeting minutes, the following was noted: "He [Scoon] cannot contradict Government's line. Periodic sessions should be held with him by Cde. Bishop so that he would be in line."¹ As far as the head of state is concerned, Grenada did not correspond to the model of development.

The Government

In contrast to the head of state, the government of Grenada--the Cabinet--was considerably more reflective of a socialist-oriented state.² Because the state plays a much greater role in the society of a socialist-oriented country, there are considerably more ministries as compared with a bourgeois government; this difference was strikingly evident in Grenada: whereas under Gairy there were only twenty-four ministerial portfolios, under Bishop there were as many as thirty-four.³ Moreover, a socialist-oriented state has many more economic ministries; this was also clear in Grenada: the fifteen economic ministries in the Bishop government is a stark contrast from the mere eight in Gairy's.⁴ The socialist-oriented character of the Grenadian Cabinet was also manifested in the creation of new ministries that were similar to those of a socialist state (i.e. planning, information, national mobilization, and construction).

¹"Minutes of the Political Bureau Dated 20th April, 1983," in Grenada Documents, p. 2.

²Initially the Cabinet consisted of seven ministers, but this number increased to ten by 1982: (Maurice Bishop) Prime Minister, Information, Defence, and Interior; (Bernard Coard) Deputy Prime Minister, Finance, Industry, Trade, and Planning; (Unison Whiteman) Tourism, Civil Aviation, and Foreign Affairs; (Hudson Austin) Communications, Works, Construction, and Labour; (Selwyn Strachan) National Mobilisation; (George Louison) Agriculture, Forestry, Lands, and Fisheries, Co-operatives and Rural Development; (Kenrick Radix) Attorney-General, Legal Affairs, and Agro-Industries; (Jacqueline Creft) Education, Women, Youth, Sport, Culture, and Social Affairs; (Chris DeRoggs) Health; and (Norris Bain) Housing. Several portfolio changes occurred between 1982 and 1983, the most notable being the transfer of Defence from Bishop to Austin. See Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, 15, No. 9 (1981), 14-15; *Ibid.*, 16, No. 7 (1982), 13.

³*Ibid.*, 13, No. 4 (1979), 12.

⁴*Ibid.*

And finally, in a socialist-oriented state, the revolutionary-democratic party strictly controls the composition of the government; this control was clearly evident in Grenada: nine of the ten ministers were NJM members, and seven of these nine ministers were members of the NJM Political Bureau. These characteristics of the government are strong indicators of Grenada's socialist orientation.

The Form of Government

Of the three forms of government (where the highest representative organ is supreme, centralist-dualist, and monistic), the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) of Grenada appears to be the most similar to the monistic form of government in terms of its structure, function and temporary nature.

In terms of its structure, Grenada did not have a highest representative organ, but rather it had a revolutionary council; this is the key feature distinguishing the monistic form of government from the other two.¹ Moreover, as would be expected of a socialist-oriented state, the ruling NJM dominated the revolutionary council, accounting for sixteen of twenty members. The chairman of a revolutionary council is both the president (performing the functions of the head of state) and the prime minister (performing the tasks of the head of government). Because there was no presidential office in Grenada, both the roles of prime minister and of president (de facto) were combined in the office of Prime Minister: For instance when Prime Minister Bishop went abroad, he was received like a head of state (president).² (Even though Paul Scoon

¹The original number of members on the revolutionary council of the PRG was fourteen; shortly after, it was increased to twenty-three; and by 1982, it had been reduced to twenty members. In 1982, the members of the PRG included Maurice Bishop, Bernard Coard, Unison Whiteman, Vincent Noel, Selwyn Strachan, George Louison, Kendrick Radix, Hudson Austin, Bernard Cittens, Lyden Ramdhanny, Norris Bain, Sydney Ambrose, Caldwell Tylor, Fitroy Bain, Basil Gahagan, Leon Cornwall, Liam James, Gellineau James, Simon Charles, and Claudette Pitt.

²"S Of 'sial'nym Vizitom," Pravda, 27 July 1982.

was officially the Queen's representative as the head of state, he had no real power). In addition to his presidential role, Bishop's socialist-oriented prime ministerial role was evident in his holding of other critical ministerial portfolios (i.e. Information, Defence and Interior). As well, for the first two years of power, the PRG compared exactly to the model of the monistic government whereby all ministers were also members of the PRG; however, in 1981 (Jacqueline Creft) and in 1982 (Chris De Riggs), the PRG deviated slightly from the model by adding two ministers to the Cabinet who were members of the NJM, but who were not members of the revolutionary council (PRG).

Turning to the functions of the PRG, Bishop noted that the "legislative and executive functions are right now institutionalized in the People's Revolutionary Government;" the concentration of these functions in a single political body is highly reflective of a monistic form of government. As a result of this high concentration of power, the PRG, like a revolutionary council, was the only organ that passed laws, added ministers, and so on; the following examples of the "Peoples' Laws" formulated by the PRG demonstrate its immense power: Peoples' Law No. 25 appointed Caldwell Taylor to be the Secretary in the Department of Information and Culture;¹ Peoples' Law 81 forbid the operation of a newspaper company if any one individual owned more than four percent of the company.²

Another hallmark of a monistic government is that it is temporary; in Grenada, the temporary nature of the PRG was seen in the nascent efforts, cut short by the American invasion, to establish a new form of government. In July 1983, the Minister of National Mobilization announced that a National People's Assembly would replace the PRG: new Village Assemblies would be elected, which in turn would elect Parish

¹ Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, 13, No. 5 (1979), 4.

² Bishop, "A Permanent Standing Commitment to Freedom of Worship and Religion," Forward Ever, p. 107.

Assemblies, which in turn would elect the National Assembly.¹ Thus, Grenada was to have a highest representative organ, and probably was to have a form of government where the highest representative organ is supreme.

Thus, in terms of its structure, functions, and temporary nature, the PRG highly corresponded to a monistic form of government.

Conclusion

As we have seen, the creation of the new state apparatus is a strong indicator of Grenada's socialist-orientation: the Parish and Zonal Councils were organized and functioned very similar to the representative organs in the USSR; the number and types of ministerial portfolios of the Cabinet highly corresponded to the government of a socialist-oriented state; the structure, function, and temporary nature of the PRG fit closely the pattern of a monistic form of government; and the NJM was clearly in control of the state apparatus. The only significant exception to the socialist-oriented nature of Grenada's state apparatus was the head of state, which formally remained Queen Elizabeth II.

¹Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, 17, Nos. 7-8 (1983), 34-35.

Economic Development

Non-capitalist economic development is a fundamental characteristic of socialist-oriented states. These states strive to build a public sector dominated economy, but they must utilize both foreign capital and private enterprise (at the beginning) in order to foster economic development; consequently, socialist-oriented states maintain a mixed economy. Did Grenada pursue a similar pattern of economic development? To answer this question, its *pattern* of economic development will be examined in context of the following hallmarks of non-capitalist development: (1) the principle of the mixed economy, (2) the role of foreign capital, (3) the role of the private sector, (4) the role of the public sector, (5) the principle of central planning, and (6) the assistance of the socialist community.

Mixed Economy

In correspondence to the model of non-capitalist development, the Grenadian leadership clearly endeavored to maintain a mixed economy. The NJM argued for two main reasons that a mixed economy was a necessity: the private sector could be utilized to meet economic development objectives and the state apparatus was not capable of running the economy by itself. Richard and Ian Jacobs note: 'It is in this context that the P.R.G. has committed itself in the first instance to a mixed economy. The private sector, which is well entrenched, is capable of serving the national interests and the existing bureaucracy in its present underdeveloped state is incapable of operating a nationalized economy.'¹ Grenada maintained a mixed economy during the entire rule of the NJM.

¹Jacobs and Jacobs, Grenada: The Route to Revolution, p. 129.

Foreign Capital

Like a socialist-oriented state, Grenada under the NJM held an ambivalent position towards foreign capital. On the one hand, the NJM endeavored to eliminate foreign capital from Grenada as a long term goal. This was clearly demonstrated in the nationalization of two Canadian banks: in 1979, the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce sold its operation to the PRG and became the National Commercial Bank; and in 1983, "as part of an effort to rationalize its . . . operations," the Royal Bank of Canada sold its operations to the PRG and became the Grenada Bank of Commerce.¹ On the other hand, the NJM sought and utilized foreign capital for badly needed economic development. For example, private firms from several different capitalist countries had important contracts in the construction of the new Grenadian international airport: Plessey Airport Ltd. (Great Britain), METEX (Sweden), and Layne Dredging Ltd. (United States).² This evident ambivalence towards foreign capital is reflective of a socialist-oriented state.

The Private Sector

In countries of socialist orientation, the private sector plays a vital role in economic development; in Grenada, the role of the private sector was decisive: it accounted for three-quarters of Grenada's economic activity (predominantly in agriculture and tourism). Moreover, according to Bishop the private sector outperformed the public sector: "it is generally true to say that our private sector has, over the years, achieved greater skill levels in economic and managerial organization than

¹"Latin America Report," Foreign Broadcasting Information Services, 21 January 1983.

²"Gulliver's Travels Through Eastern Caribbean," Granma Weekly Review, 15 May 1983; "Latin America Report," Foreign Broadcasting Information Services, 6 April 1983.

we have presently in our public sector."¹ Consequently, the NJM went to great lengths to encourage the private sector's development and this was expressed in a number of speeches by Bishop:

So comrades from the private sector, we are asking for your contributions and your advice and suggestions, for you are and always have been, in the mainstream of creation in our country, and would certainly want this to continue.²

Further demonstrating the importance of the private sector to the NJM was the assertion that "over 70 percent of their [private sector] suggestions were incorporated in the 1982 budget."³

The Public Sector

Although foreign capital and private enterprise play an important role in economic development, the *key* role is played by the public sector. This *key* role was also stressed by Bishop during an interview with World Marxist Review:

Another problem is to disengage the economy from the clutches of imperialism. And in this process the role of the state is quite crucial. The government is taking steps to rapidly build a state sector in the economy for the first time.⁴

Given that Grenada had no public sector prior to the revolution, the development of public sector which accounted for twenty-five percent⁵ of the country's economic activity--only three years later--is a strong indicator of Grenada's socialist orientation.

The development of Grenada's public sector was concentrated in three areas: tourism, fisheries, and most important, agriculture/agro-industries. For the purpose of this analysis, tourism is considered to be industrial development, and fisheries and

¹Bishop, "Fight Unemployment Through Production," in In Nobody's Backyard, p. 166.

²*Ibid.*, p. 167.

³"Latin America Report," Foreign Broadcasting Information Services, 1 March 1983.

⁴Maurice Bishop, "Grenada Has Chosen Its Road," World Marxist Review, no. 4 (April 1982), p. 84.

⁵Bishop, "Line of March," p. 28.

agriculture/agro-industries is considered agricultural development. (This is consistent with how the NJM separated these three branches of the economy).

Industrial Development

The level of conventional industrial development in Grenada was virtually nil (ranging between two and three percent of Grenada's economic activity).¹ However, Grenada did possess a significant tourism industry (it was second in importance only to agriculture). Following the pattern of non-capitalist development, the PRG sought to develop its tourism industry infrastructure through both nationalization and public funding. In terms of nationalization, the PRG created the Grenada Resorts Corporation which nationalized one large hotel (Holiday Inn) and several other small ones.² The acquisition of the Holiday Inn was very significant because it had approximately sixty percent of the bed space;³ consequently, this nationalization strengthened considerably the public sector in the tourism industry. In terms of public funding, Grenada invested heavily in the building of a new international airport--by far the largest industrial project --capable of handling wide-bodied jets. The NJM leadership felt that unless such an airport was constructed Grenada would not be able to fully develop its tourism industry.

Agricultural Development

Grenada also built up its public sector through agricultural development--fisheries and agriculture/agro-industries.

Prior to the revolution, there was almost no fishing industry in Grenada and what did exist was fairly primitive, as Bernard Coard notes:

¹Leon Cornwall, "Grenada: A New Sense of National Dignity," Tricontinental (Havana), no. 88 (1983), p. 46.

²Bishop, "Grenada Has Chosen Its Road," p. 85; Tony Thronidike, Grenada, p. 97.

³"Revolution in Grenada: An Interview with Maurice Bishop," The Black Scholar, no. 1 (January-February 1980), p. 57.

Right now, the fishing technology that we use is the technology of the Old Testament--a little row boat, a fishing rod, line and a little hook at the bottom, and if the guy is really technologically advanced he might have three hooks at the bottom of the line instead of one.¹

Therefore, when the PRG created the National Fishing Company it immediately created an industry that was both new and completely public sector dominated. The extensiveness of its development was also evident: by 1981, Grenada maintained a fleet of eleven fishing trawlers (given by Cuba)² and operated a fish processing plant.³ Building a state enterprise based on a country's need and its resource capabilities reflects a pragmatic approach to public sector development--indicative of a socialist-oriented pattern of development.

However, the most important branch of the economy in which the PRG attempted to build up the public sector was agriculture/agro-industries: agriculture accounted for forty percent of Grenada's gross domestic product and fifty percent of its foreign exchange earnings.⁴ One of the most interesting endeavors to develop the public sector was the creation of an agro-industry in Grenada. Through public funding the Grenadian Agro-Industrial plant was created which produced such things as Paw Paw slices, Nutmeg Jelly, etc. and which provided income to 800 small farmers and 18 state farms.⁵

However, through the creation of collective and state farms, Grenada's attempts to build public sector agriculture highly corresponded to the model of non-capitalist economic development. By 1982, the PRG had created "31 state farms with some

¹Chris Searle, "Grenada's revolution: an interview with Bernard Coard," Race and Class, XXI, 2 (1979), p. 180.

²"Ambassador from Grenada stresses achievements made in only two years," Granma Weekly Review, 22 March 1981.

³"Grenada: Three Years of a New Dawn," Tricontinental (Havana), no. 80 (1982), p. 26.

⁴Bishop, "Freedom of Worship and Religion," p. 101.

⁵Ibid., p. 103.

4,000 acres of land"¹ and "20 agricultural co-operatives with almost 200 members."² When compared with the 40,000 acres of total agricultural holdings and the 7,000 Grenadians employed in agriculture,³ it is evident that the size of the public sector in agriculture was relatively small; at the same time however, it is a strong indicator of the nascent efforts to build a dominant public sector in agriculture.

Like a socialist-oriented state, the creation of state and collective farms served a political function: it strengthened the NJM's position in the countryside (because it controlled the distribution of fertilizer and farm equipment), and it provided an excellent vehicle for political socialization. The strengthened position of the NJM in the countryside was manifested during the First Plenary Session of the NJM Central Committee: it was decided that the party "organises a massive recruitment programme [for collective farms] linked to the provision of material benefits to the farmers."⁴ In addition, the role of the collective farms as vehicles for political socialization was also quite evident when the Central Committee decided that, "the ideological work among the farmers to be stepped up immediately."⁵

Central Planning

Grenada also corresponded highly to the model when it introduced annual plans to guide the economic activity of the country. These annual plans (one-year, five-year, etc.) are a hallmark of a socialist state. In 1982, during a party-state visit to the Soviet Union Bishop stated:

Besides this, in our programme of economic development we stipulated the policy of national planning. For the first time in 1982 we have an annual plan worked

¹Bishop, "Grenada Has Chosen Its Road," p. 84.

²Bishop, "Fight Unemployment," p. 155.

³Ibid., pp. 69, 101.

⁴Central Committee Report on First Plenary Session 13 - 19 July, 1983," in Grenada Documents, p. 16.

⁵Ibid., pp. 16-17.

out, and already work has begun on working out our first three-year plan for 1983--1985.¹

This development of central planning along the lines of a socialist state is a strong indicator of socialist orientation.

The Assistance of the Socialist Community

The socialist-oriented character of Grenada's pattern of development was saliently manifested in the economic assistance that it received from the socialist community. Like the assistance given to a socialist-oriented state, the assistance given to Grenada from the USSR, Cuba, and other socialist states was aimed at strengthening Grenada's public sector. In terms of developing Grenada's tourist industry, Cuba was heavily involved in the construction of the new international airport: Cuba provided most of the financing, all of the equipment, and over six hundred construction workers and technicians.² The assistance in the construction of the international airport--a "monumental project"--is also indicative of non-capitalist development. Grenada also received considerable assistance in the development of its state-owned fishing industry: Cuba donated eleven fishing trawlers and provided training for Grenadian fishermen; Bulgaria gave free of charge an ice plant;³ and North Korea agreed to provide tuna fishing boats.⁴ Besides tourism and fisheries, Grenada received important assistance in its agricultural development: Cuba provided 40 tractors and other agricultural equipment;⁵ Bulgaria assisted in the construction of the Agro-Industrial plant;⁶ and the Soviet Union furnished Grenada with four million dollars worth of agricultural

¹"V Druzhestvennoyi Obstanovke," Pravda, 28 July 1982.

²"Ambassador from Grenada stresses achievements," Granma Weekly Review, 22 March 1981; "Grenadian dream comes true," Granma Weekly Review, 3 July 1983.

³"Ambassador from Grenada stresses achievements," Granma Weekly Review, 22 March 1981.

⁴"Latin America Report," Foreign Broadcasating Information Services, 21 April 1983.

⁵"Latin America Report," Foreign Broadcasating Information Services, 7 January 1983.

⁶"Latin America Report," Foreign Broadcasating Information Services, 25 June 1980.

equipment.¹ It should be noted that there was no assistance in heavy or medium industrial development; but, this is consistent with the economic strategy of non-capitalist development --building the agricultural potential of a socialist-oriented state, first and foremost.

In addition to this extensive assistance to Grenada from the socialist bloc, the Soviet Union also provided assistance in the critical area of central planning. In May 1983, a ten-man delegation left for the Soviet Union for training in central planning. This demonstrates the NJM's desire to develop Grenada's economy along similar lines to those of a socialist state.

Conclusion

As one can see, Grenada's pattern of economic development strongly correlated to the model of the socialist-oriented state: (1) it maintained a mixed economy, (2) while beginning to eliminate the decisive role of foreign capital in the economy, the PRG still utilized foreign capital to pursue economic development, (3) the private sector--the largest sector--was encouraged to develop, (4) significant efforts were made to create a dominant public sector in the tourism, fisheries, and agricultural branches of the economy, (5) the PRG began to implement the principle of central planning, and (6) Grenada received considerable assistance from the socialist community in the developing its public sector.

¹"Ambassador from Grenada stresses achievements made in only two years," Granma Weekly Review, 22 March 1981.

The Organs of Socialization

Although a revolutionary democracy strives to maintain power through coercive means (organs of defence), it also endeavors to build support through persuasive means by creating strong organs of socialization. In Grenada, Bishop stressed the importance of these organs, which he called the "cultural army," in developing a revolutionary-democratic consciousness in the population:

In our view, there are at least two armies, the military army and the cultural army. The revolution must be defended; but we cannot train young comrades in the use of weapons to create and defend a revolutionary struggle unless we can also make it clear to them what is the meaning, the true nature of that struggle. This task of defending and clarifying the meaning and context of a revolutionary struggle must be the task of our cultural army. And it is indispensable.¹

The key components of the Grenadian "cultural army," were the media, the education system, and the mass organizations. What were the functions of these components? And what role did the socialist community play? We now turn to explore the answers to these questions.

The Media

The main tasks of the media in a socialist-oriented state are to rally support for the regime within the population and to disseminate Marxist-Leninist ideas. In Grenada, there were two principal vehicles used to accomplish these tasks: Radio Free Grenada and the state-owned newspaper, The Free West Indian. Radio Free Grenada frequently rallied support for the Bishop government by urging Grenadians to stay vigilant against counter-revolutionary activity. In March 1983, Bishop warned Grenadians: "We have to step up our vigilance, therefore. During this period, we have to be conscious of the fact that one of the things imperialism always does is to try to find local elements to

¹Bishop, "For the Cultural Sovereignty of the Caribbean People," in In Nobody's Backyard, p. 200.

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help them achieve their dirty ends."¹ In addition, Radio Free Grenada disseminated Marxist-Leninist ideas; however, this dissemination was not overly blatant: the actual terms Marxism-Leninism or scientific socialism were not explicitly used, but concepts such as the "leading role of the working class," were frequently employed. Bishop drew attention to the leading role of the working class in the defence of Grenada: "We are particularly happy that the working class, the leading class (words indistinct) has in fact taken the lead in this area. It is quite clear that to us that our [sic] workers are in the forefront at this time."²

The Free West Indian (FWI) also performed the functions of rallying the masses and of disseminating the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. But in addition it helped to foster a revolutionary-democratic consciousness by frequently publishing poetry that was highly political--an interesting mania of revolutionary Grenada. An example of the type of poetry, published in the FWI is the final stanza of "I Militia:"

You can't leave us to suffer
Is the heavy roller for you, Mr. Exploiter
Ah pick up me A.K., oppressor³
To fight you counter⁴
To free the worker
To build Grenada
I Militia will never surrender!⁵

The Marxist-Leninist ideas embodied in this poem are quite obvious.

Despite this socialization effort on the part of the state-owned media, the NJM believed that the ideological content, especially in term of the media's emphasis on the

¹"Latin America Report," Foreign Broadcasting Informations Services, 16 March 1983.

²"Latin America Report," Foreign Broadcasting Informations Services, 31 March 1983.

³A.K. means AK-47, a type of Soviet automatic rifle that was given to Grenada.

⁴Counter means counter-revolutionary.

⁵Chris Searle, Words Unchained: Language and Revolution in Grenada (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1984), p. 161.

working class of Grenada, needed to be improved. This was noted by Bishop at an address to state-employed journalists:

He [Bishop] said that "if the working class is the most important class in our country as it is, then we have to report the struggles of the working class" . . .
 "We have to ensure that what the workers are doing and the progress they make in the areas of production and productivity

Like a socialist-oriented state, Grenada received considerable assistance in the development of its mass media from the socialist community: in 1981, East Germany provided Grenada with a printing machine for the FWI, as well as two engineers to help run it;¹ in 1983, Cuba agreed to provide assistance in terms of training press cartoonists, technicians for designing billboards and posters, and so on,² and in 1982, Cuba helped build a new powerful 50-kilowatt Radio Free Grenada broadcasting system;³ the Soviet Union began to provide assistance to the development of a state communications system--according to Radio Free Grenada, "the planned state communication system will enable Grenada to receive telephone, radio, telegraph and television communications, especially from the socialist countries;"⁴ in early 1983, Radio Free Grenada announced that Grenada's media would start receiving news from TASS (the Soviet official news agency).⁵ This level of cooperation provided considerable opportunity to the socialist community to shape the development of the media as an organ of socialization.

¹"Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting Held on Wednesday, 3rd June, 1981," in Grenada Documents, p. 4.

²"Cooperation and Exchange Agreement between the Communist Party of Cuba and the New Jewel Movement of Grenada, for the 1983 Period," in Grenada Documents, p. 5.

³"Three Years of Revolution Filled with Joy," Granma Weekly Review, 28 March 1982.

⁴"Latin America Report," Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, 17 June 1983.

⁵"Latin America Report," Foreign Broadcasting Information Services, 26 January 1983.

The Education System

The education system is a vital organ of political socialization because it is an excellent vehicle for developing revolutionary consciousness and for mobilizing support for the regime. These too were goals of Grenada's education system: In terms of developing a revolutionary consciousness, Bishop argued: "Our people must develop in the new year a mental grasp on the true nature of the international capitalist crisis which is holding back the progress of our revolution . . . They must clearly see the link between politics and economics, between imperialist exploitation and persistent poverty . . ."1 It is quite evident that this consciousness would have a Marxist-Leninist outlook. In terms of mobilizing support for the regime, Bishop contended that, "with their political consciousness raised and broadened our people will better understand the necessity to join and strengthen those mass organizations and trade unions that already exist."2

Like a socialist-oriented state, political socialization and mobilization were intrinsic features of Grenada's education system, both at the grade school level and at the adult literacy program level. The political goals (in addition to the educational objectives) of Grenada's grade schools were clearly manifested in the government booklet, Teachers Speak, and included the following "teachers' suggestions" for Grenada's education system:

Political education as a significant part of the school curriculum, so as to fully understand the situations we're faced with . . . so that we might develop the kinds of attitudes that would help us solve the problems we face. . . .
Develop in children an alertness to the possibility of infiltration and destabilization. Children should know the power and the tactics of the CIA and

1Maurice Bishop, "In the Spirit of Butler, Unionise! Mobilise! Educate! Democratised." in Forward Ever, pp. 276-7.

2Ibid., p. 277.

other multi-national operations. Build up the consciousness in our children so that no subversive elements will be able to influence them easily.¹

These political objectives of the educational system of Grenada--to develop a revolutionary-democratic consciousness and to foster support for the regime--correspond highly to those of a socialist-oriented state.

In addition to grade schools, political socialization also occurred in literacy programs for adults; the most important literacy program was the Centre for Popular Education (CPE). Bishop stated that the main educational task of 1983--the Year of Political and Academic Education--was the further development of the CPE "because of its fundamental relevance to the social, political, and economic development of the masses."² This clearly shows the important role that the education system played in the political socialization of Grenada--a strong indicator of socialist orientation.

Although the strong commitment to political socialization is unquestionable, its success is not. For example, during the First Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the NJM, the "present unsatisfactory disposition of the students to the Revolution, especially secondary students" was noted.³ Had the Grenadian revolution continued, however, the results of its political education efforts might have been different.

Because the education system is such an important organ of socialization, the socialist community extends considerable assistance to its development. This assistance too was evident in the case of Grenada; it involved not only training Grenadian students in the socialist bloc countries, but also teaching by socialist bloc instructors in Grenada, as the following example illustrate: In 1979, there were 38

¹Brenda Jensen, Educational Change in Revolutionary Grenada, Master's Thesis, University of Alberta, 1987, pp. 98-9.

²Maurice Bishop, "The Year of Political and Academic Education," in Bishop Speaks, p. 277.

³"Central Committee Report on First Plenary Session, 13 - 19 July, 1983," in Grenada Documents, p. 22.

students studying in Cuba at the university level;¹ by 1981 this number had increased to over 200 students--100 at the post-secondary level;² and by 1983 over 300 students were studying in Cuba.³ In addition to Grenadian students going to socialist countries for education, teachers from the socialist countries also came to Grenada: in 1983, sixteen teachers came to Grenada from the Soviet Union.⁴ This assistance provided considerable opportunity for shaping the political outlook of Grenadian students. (However, there is no evidence showing whether or not this in fact occurred).

The Mass Organizations

Along with the media and the education system, the mass organizations are crucial to the political socialization and mobilization efforts of a revolutionary-democratic regime. In Grenada, the most important mass organizations fulfilling these political socialization functions were the trade unions, peasant associations, the women's organization, and youth organizations.

The Trade Unions and Peasant Associations

Grenada conformed to a large degree with the model of the socialist-oriented state in terms of its urban and rural trade unions. Grenada's most important urban trade union--formed directly by the NJM--was the Bank and General Workers' Union (BGWU). (Its membership swelled from several hundred at the time of the revolution to nearly 3,000 by 1981).⁵ In conformity with the model, the activities of the BGWU

¹Jacobs and Jacobs, Grenada: The Route to Revolution, p. 133.

²"Grenadian Students to Study in Cuba," Granma Weekly Review, 18 October 1981; "Ambassador from Grenada stresses achievement made in only two years," Granma Weekly Review, 22 March 1981;

³Cornwall, "Grenada: a New Sense of National Dignity," p. 44.

⁴"Latin America Report," Foreign Broadcasting Information Services, 17 June 1983.

⁵Bishop, "In the Spirit of Butler," p. 251.

were guided by the NJM (through the Worker's Committee of the NJM), and included most importantly the mobilization of the Grenadian working class: for example, it organized workers for the May Day celebrations. (Political mobilization is also a key function of trade unions in socialist countries). In addition, the BGWU was an important vehicle for political education. However, the quality of this work did not always meet the expectations of the Central Committee of the NJM,¹ but this is consistent with the level of political development of a socialist-oriented state.

Along with the urban based BGWU, Grenada also had two strong rural trade unions (or peasant associations): the Agricultural and General Workers' Union (AGWU) and the Productive Farmer's Union (PFU). (The AGWU consisted of 2,300 agricultural workers, and the PFU consisted of 1,000 small and medium sized landowning farmers).² Guided by the NJM, the AGWU and the PFU functioned very similarly to peasant associations of a socialist-oriented state: they mobilized farmers and agricultural workers for mass political rallies; they participated in ideological education efforts among rural workers;³ they demonstrated the advantages of co-operative farming;⁴ and finally, they conducted strikes against large land owners.⁵

The socialist oriented character of Grenada's trade union and peasant associations was further manifested by the assistance in development that they received from the socialist community. For instance, a 1983 agreement between the Communist Party of Cuba (CPC) and the NJM included cooperation in the development of Grenada's trade unions: in cooperation with the Worker's Central Union of Cuba and the Association of

¹"Minutes of the Political Bureau, 4th May, 1983," in Grenada Documents, pp. 5-6.

²Bishop, "In the Spirit of Butler," p. 251; Bishop, "Grenada is not alone," in Forward Ever, 237.

³"Central Committee Report on First Plenary Session, 13 - 19 July, 1983," p. 16.

⁴"Minutes of Central Committee Special One-Day Meeting on 26th April, 1981," in Grenada Documents, pp. 1-2.

⁵Bishop, "In the Spirit of Butler," p. 254; Bishop, "Line of March," pp. 25-26.

Small Farmer, Grenada would receive personnel training, as well as organizational assistance in order to strengthen Grenada's urban and rural trade unions.¹

The Women's Organization

Another important mass organization that corresponded favorably to the model was the National Women's Organization (NWO); its primary function was to draw Grenadian women into the political process. (By 1982, it claimed a membership of 8,000).² The activities of the NWO, which were guided by the Women's Committee of the NJM, included participating in the legislative process (e.g. helping form the 1980 Maternity Leave Law),³ and "setting up of pre-primary schools and daycare centres."⁴ In congruence with the model of the socialist-oriented state, the NWO received assistance from the the socialist community: in May 1981, a member from the Cuban Federation of Women assisted the NWO in its development;⁵ and in October 1981, a NWO delegation travelled to Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria to see how the women's organizations were built in those countries. It is also clear from a report concerning this trip, submitted by the NWO/Women's Committee to the NJM Political Bureau, that the NWO sought to construct itself similarly to women's organizations in the socialist countries.⁶ This clearly shows that the socialist community had direct influence on the development of the NWO--reflective of a socialist-oriented pattern of development.

¹"Cooperation and Exchange Plan Between . . . Cuba and . . . Grenada, For the 1983 Period," in Grenada Documents, p. 3.

²Cornwall, "Grenada: a New Sense of National Dignity," p.45.

³Bishop, "In the Spirit of Butler," p. 254.

⁴Ibid., p. 40.

⁵"Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting on Wednesday, 13th May, 1981," in Grenada Documents, pp. 1-2.

⁶"Report to Political Bureau, NJM, World Congress of Women . . . Prague and Visit to Bulgaria," in Grenada Documents, pp. 1-4.

The Youth Organizations

Because they are a reserve for future party members, youth organizations play a critical role in a socialist-oriented state; in Grenada the two principal youth organizations were the Pioneers and the National Youth Organizations (NYO). It is clear, in the case of Grenada, that the NJM not only made great efforts to develop the Pioneers and the NYO, but also strove to build these two organizations along identical lines as those of the socialist bloc countries.

The Pioneers in Grenada (which numbered about 9,000) were modelled directly after the Pioneers in the USSR.¹ The key functions of the Pioneers both to socialize youths in a revolutionary spirit and to groom youths for leadership role in the political system (from an early age) was readily acknowledged by the NJM:

Likewise, the NJM Young Pioneers, another creation of the revolution, has done excellent work in helping to organize the children of the nation and in beginning the process of instilling in them the necessary qualities of discipline, self-confidence, creativity, commitment, leadership, patriotism, and so forth.²

To facilitate the performance these functions, such activities as Pioneer Camps were organized.

More important than the Pioneers, however, was the NYO (which numbered about 8,000).³ The NYO like the Komsomol serves both a political socialization and a political recruitment function. Political socialization occurred during study sessions, meetings, and camps where Marxist-Leninist literature was read. According to a memorandum written by the head of the NYO, this socialization was fairly successful: "The thirst for Marxist-Leninist ideas is very intense among our Youth, we are unfortunately far from being able to satisfy this positive demand [due to a lack of

¹Bishop, "One Caribbean," In Nobody's Backyard, p. 189.

²"We'll Always Choose to Stand Up," Granma Weekly Review, 12 July 1981.

³Cornwall, "Grenada: A New Sense of Dignity," p. 45.

Marxist-Leninist literature¹. The NYO was also vital for elite recruitment; to ensure that the highest calibre of youth were recruited into the NYO, several important measures were taken: (1) cadres of the highest calibre were used in recruiting NYO members, (2) political bureau members were scheduled to speak at NYO courses, and (3) NJM party organs (for example, the Worker's Committee) were used to coordinate the recruitment activities of the NYO.²

Like the other mass organizations, the socialist bloc played a key role in the development of the Pioneers and the NYO. In order to develop Grenada's youth groups along the lines of the socialist countries, two leading NJM members were sent to East Germany, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union in 1981 "to learn from their past and present experiences, tactics, forms and methods."³ After this trip, the ties between the socialist bloc and Grenadian youth groups began to grow: in 1982, two Grenadian Pioneers and a guide attended a Pioneer Camp in the USSR;⁴ and in 1983, ten youths from the NYO left to the Soviet Union, Cuba, and East Germany for one-year leadership training courses.⁵ In addition, the NYO concluded agreements with both the Soviet Komsomol and the Socialist Union of Youth of Czechoslovakia, which provided for the training of Grenadian NYO members and for the dissemination of Marxist-Leninist literature. Such a highly developed relationship between the youth groups of Grenada and the socialist states is a very compelling indicator of Grenada's socialist orientation.

¹Issues For Discussion Between Leninist Komsomol and the . . . NJM-NYO," in The Grenada Papers, eds. Paul Seabury and Walter A. McDougall (San Fransisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984) p. 108.

²"Minutes of Central Committee Special One-Day Meeting on 26th April, 1981," p. 2; "Central Committee Report on First Plennary Session 13-19 July, 1983," p. 18.

³"Minutes of Central Committee Special One-Day Meeting on 26th April, 1981," p. 2

⁴Issues For Discussion Between Leninist Komsomol and the . . . NJM-NYO," p. 108.

⁵"Latin America Report," Foreign Broadcasting Information Services, 16 September 1983.

Conclusion

In Grenada, as we have seen above, the organs of socialization--the media, the education system, and the mass organizations--played a key role in both the development of a revolutionary consciousness and the mobilization of popular support for the regime; in addition, they received considerable assistance from the socialist community. Thus, it is clear that Grenada's organs of socialization conformed to a large degree with the model of the socialist-oriented state.

The Organs of Defence

The organs of defence-militia, court system, state security forces, and armed forces--play a very significant role in a socialist-oriented state by protecting the revolutionary-democratic regime from both external and internal enemies; this also appears to be the case in Grenada. Through an examination of their functions, relationship to the NJM, relationship with the bloc, one sees that the organs of defence of Grenada corresponded to those of the model of the socialist-oriented state.

The Militia

The People's Revolutionary Militia (PRM) of Grenada, like the militia of a socialist-oriented state, was a mass organization, and it was composed of Grenadian civilians of whom approximately 3,500 had received training between 1980 and 1983.¹ The primary function of a militia is to assist the armed forces in protecting the state from external enemies; according to Bishop, this too was the primary function of the PRM:

Likewise, a people's militia has been established, which is extremely important. It's come about partly as a result of our recognition that we cannot rely solely on the full-time army in a situation of external invasion, but that we must be able also to count on the people themselves to act as a reserve . . . that can be mobilized at a second's notice to defend the country.²

The primary function that the militia performed--assisting the armed forces in the defence of Grenada--was even more saliently demonstrated in a draft resolution of the Central Committee of the NJM issued in March 1983. (At that time, the NJM leadership genuinely believed that an American invasion was imminent). The draft

¹Tony Thorndike, Grenada (London: Frances Pinter (Publishers), 1985), p. 88.

²"We'll Always Choose to Stand Up," Granma Weekly Review, 12 July 1981.

resolution stated: "The first and most important task is the immediate and total mobilization of all patriots into the militia."¹

Another vital function the PRM performed which corresponded highly to that of a militia of a socialist-oriented state was assisting the security forces to protect the state from internal reactionary elements. While noting the role of the security forces in finding and arresting counter-revolutionaries, Bishop also noted that the "militia today is involved in an active way in this process . . ."²

Finally, the socialist-oriented character of the PRM was also reflected by the NJM's control over it. The NJM not only created a special Militia Committee to oversee the PRM,³ but also placed party members in leading positions of the PRM.⁴ With this control, the NJM directed the activities of the PRM; the Political Bureau of the NJM, for example, determined such things as the PRM's parades and military manoeuvres.⁵

The Court System

As a result of the leftward political dynamics of revolutionary democracy, political opposition naturally arises; to develop successfully, this opposition must be neutralized. Bishop openly acknowledged that this process was occurring in Grenada, as well:

Everyone knows, and even reaction and imperialism when they choose to be honest will admit, that a necessary consequence of a revolution is political detainees.⁶

¹"Our Country is in Danger," in Grenada Documents, p. 3.

²"We'll Always Choose to Stand," Granma Weekly Review, 12 July 1981.

³"Central Committee Resolutions," in Grenada Documents, p. 3.

⁴"Central Committee Report on First Planry Session 13 - 19 July, 1983," p. 14.

⁵"Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting Held on Wednesday, 26th August, 1981," in Grenada Documents, p. 3.

⁶"We'll Always Choose to Stand Up," Granma Weekly Review, 12 July 1981.

As in the case of a socialist-oriented state, Grenada created a special court to deal with political opponents of the revolution. Political opponents were detained without trial and were held for an indefinite period of time (by order of Peoples' Law No. 21); consequently, a Preventative Detention Tribunal was established (by order of Peoples' Law No. 8) to periodically review the cases of the detainees in order to decide who was to be released.¹ This special court clearly performed a political function: according to Bishop, political detainees were only released when it was "consistent with the interests of the revolution and particularly national security considerations . . ."² As well, the direct guidance that the NJM gave to the Preventative Detention Tribunal further demonstrates the socialist-oriented character this special court: the Political Bureau minutes of the NJM show that the Political Bureau determined which detainees were to be released and which were to be detained.³

The State Security Forces

A common theme of Marxist-Leninist governments is that "counter-revolutionaries and agents of imperialism" are ever present; thus, the security forces are required to counter these internal enemies of the revolution. This was also a salient theme of the PRG and it was ubiquitous in Bishop's speeches:

But, we must never forget that there are those in and out of Grenada who would wish to see the revolution derailed, to see our efforts turned back. These counter-revolutionaries, these saboteurs, these destabilizers are without doubt *among us* . . . Let me say at this point that we simply wish to advise all such persons that the full weight of the Revolution will be brought to bear on them.⁴

¹Caribbean Monthly Bulletin, 13, No. 4 (1979), 12.

²"We'll Always Choose to Stand Up," Granma Weekly Review, 12 July 1981.

³"Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting Held on Wednesday, 30 September 1981," in Grenada Documents, p. 2; "Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting on Monday 28th December, 1981," in Grenada Documents, p. 2.

⁴Bishop, "Beat Back Destabilisers," Nobody's Backyard, p. 26; italics are added; underlining is in the original.

Grenada complied fully with the model of the socialist-oriented state by creating the State Security Forces (which fell under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior) whose principal function was to protect the state from these internal enemies. This principal function is the same as the one performed by the Committee for State Security (KGB) in the USSR.

Moreover, by penetrating all spheres of society in order to find counter-revolutionaries, Grenada's State Security Forces performed their function precisely as the model dictates. The following tasks of the State Security Forces, as found in the documents of the Ministry of the Interior, demonstrate the high level of this penetration: monitoring "all sermons by the various parish priests and preachers in the society;"¹ applying special control over technicians of essential services "who are not very firm and cannot be replaced;"² and assigning intelligence agents to work in critical areas (e.g. government departments, trade unions, and churches).³

Like the state security forces of a socialist country, the Grenadian State Security Forces were particularly active in curbing political dissent-- especially individuals involved in spreading rumors, according to Bishop, "the greatest threat to the Revolution."⁴ This activity was noted by Havana International Service:

Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop has said that his government will act vigorously against those who seek to carry out slander campaigns to undermine the Grenadian revolution.

Gen (Hudson Austin), a member of the Political Bureau of the New Jewel Movement added that the security forces have already identified nine local agents who are responsible for false rumors that are designed to cast doubt on the revolutionary integrity of cabinet ministers,⁵

¹"Plan of G.I. Operations," in Grenada Documents, p. 2.

²*Ibid.*, p. 4.

³"Special Branch Areas of Work," in Grenada Documents, pp. 1-2.

⁴Bishop, "Beat Back Destabilisers," p. 28.

⁵"Latin America Report," Foreign Broadcasting Information Services, 1 March 1983.

As well, the state security forces of a socialist country operate by eliciting the support of the general population to inform on reactionary elements: as Castro noted, "we can say that every citizen of our country is a member of the Ministry of the Interior."¹ According to Bishop, the Grenadian State Security Forces operated on the identical basis:

In fact, the evidence shows that every occasion . . . of counter-revolutionary activity was discovered not by the security forces in the first place, but by the masses. Acting on their information, our security forces were able to move in and make arrests, and ensure that the activity was crushed . . .²

The involvement of the masses to help the State Security Forces arrest counter-revolutionaries is very similar to the role of the masses in a socialist country; and consequently, it is a strong indicator of Grenada's socialist orientation.

Because of their political role, the security forces must be strictly controlled by the revolutionary-democratic party, particularly by the Central Committee. In Grenada, this high level control by the NJM of the State Security Forces was clearly evident: (1) the Central Committee of the NJM created a National Security Committee to oversee the activities of the security forces,³ (2) the Ministry of the Interior, the state organ that oversaw the State Security Forces, was headed by Maurice Bishop, the leader of the NJM, (3) NJM members controlled the leading positions in the State Security Forces,⁴ and (4) a "command post" was established in the security forces "for analyzing all information that are coming in, in order to pass on to members of the Central

¹"An unequal battle, a feat, a victory," Granma Weekly Review, 9 December 1979.

²Ibid., 12 July 1981.

³Maurice Bishop, "Line of March for the Party," p. 24.

⁴For example, Major Keith Roberts (Head of Special Branch), Valdon Boldeau (an officer), and Lieutenant Colonel Liam James (Director of Security and Internal Order) were all leading member of the NJM.

Committee."¹ This high degree of control exercised by the NJM over the State Security Forces is completely consistent with the model of socialist-oriented development.

Finally, the security forces of a socialist-oriented state receive assistance from the socialist bloc in performing their functions; this was also true in the case of Grenada. For example, (according to a letter from the Cuban Ministry of the Interior) the Democratic Republic of Germany agreed to give free of charge a variety of equipment to Grenada's security forces, including pistols, binoculars, etc.² In addition to equipment, Grenada also received training in state security affairs from other socialist bloc countries: Vietnam's Ministry of Defence and Interior agreed to train twenty Grenadian personnel in a number of areas including, "re-education of anti-social and counter-revolutionary elements;"³ in 1982 Grenada also requested aid from Yuri Andropov (then head of the KGB) for the training of four Grenadian personnel in the USSR by the KGB (this request was a follow up from discussion between Bishop and Soviet official attached to the Soviet Embassy in Jamaica);⁴ finally, at the time of the American invasion, according to Cuban sources, there were as many as nine personnel from the Cuban Ministry of the Interior working with Grenada's State Security Forces.⁵ These examples of high level socialist bloc assistance to the security forces of Grenada compellingly suggest a socialist-oriented pattern of development.

¹"Plan of G.I. Operation," p. 1

²"Letter from the Ministerio del Interior," in Grenada Papers, pp. 1-2

³"Letter from the Grenadian Ambassador to Cuba Concerning Vietnamese Assistance," in Grenada Documents, p. 1.

⁴"Letter to Commander Andropov," in Grenada Documents, pp. 1-2.

⁵"Statement by the Cuban Party and Government on the Imperialist Intervention in Grenada," Granma Weekly Review, 30 October 1983; "This was the Cuban Personnel in Grenada," Granma Weekly Review, 6 November 1983.

The Armed Forces

In contrast to the very specific roles of the militia, court system, and the state security forces, the role of the armed forces is much broader: it defends against both external *and* internal enemies, and it participates in the social and economic life of society. The role of the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) of Grenada corresponded exactly to this model. The most important function of the PRA was to defend Grenada against a foreign invasion. In order, to fulfill this function, the Bishop government quickly built up the PRA from 1,100 (1980) to 2,000 (1983);¹ Gairy's Defence Force of 65 men was miniscule by comparison. However, this tremendous size of the PRA relative to Grenada's population is consistent with the relative size of the armed forces of the socialist countries. Moreover, from the numerous speeches by Bishop and other NJM leaders, as well as from the internal NJM documents, there is little doubt that the NJM leadership believed that an invasion was inevitable whether from mercenaries backed by Gairy or from the United States; Bishop specifically cites the American naval exercise "Amber and the Amberines" to support this belief.² And on October 25, 1983, the PRA actually performed its external defence function when United States' forces invaded Grenada.

In addition to external defence, the PRA was also concerned with defending the revolution from internal enemies of the state; this is also a salient function of the armed forces of socialist countries (as the crushing of the student movement in China graphically demonstrate). In public speeches, for example, Bishop urged Grenadians to contact the PRA and to report any counter-revolutionary activities: "Anyone caught spreading malicious rumors or attempting to engage in other acts of sabotage or arson

¹Thorndike, Grenada, p. 121.

²Bishop, "Every Grain of Sand is Ours," in In Nobody's Backyard, p. 223.

must be reported immediately to your nearest PRA Camp . . ."¹ However, the most demonstrative example of the use the PRA by the NJM to maintain power against internal opposition was during the critical events on October 19, 1983: the PRA was used to crush the mass popular support and to physically eliminate Bishop and his closest followers. This internal defence function was further manifested by the "Bulletin of the Main Political Department," released on October 20, 1983:

Comrades, today Wednesday 19th October, history was made again. All patriots and revolutionaries will never forget this day when counter-revolution, the friends of imperialism were crushed. The victory today will ensure that our glorious Party the N.J.M. will live on and grow from strength to strength leading and guiding the Armed Forces and the Revolution.²

It is clear that the PRA served not only an external, but also an internal defence function; and thus, conformed significantly to a socialist-oriented pattern of development.

Besides defending the revolution, the armed forces of a socialist-oriented state are active in the social and economic life of the society. The PRA also performed this function through its work in mass education, repair and maintenance work, and agricultural production; this was noted by Bernard Coard:

. . . they [PRA] are engaged through many hours each day, in literacy programmes, adult education programmes, mechanical work--particularly in getting government vehicles repaired. . . . Quite a large number are engaged in direct agricultural production, and many more will be. The army is also renovating roads all over the country . . . So while we have people who are able to defend the country against external aggression, at the same time every single one of them has to be engaged on a daily basis in directly productive work.³

This extensive socio-economic activity of the PRA is a strong indicator of Grenada's socialist orientation.

¹Bishop, "Beat Back Destabilisers," p. 30.

²"Bulletin From the Main Political Department, 20/10/83, Their Heroism is an Example For Us," in Grenada Papers, p. 344.

³"Grenada's revolution: an interview with Bernard Coard," Race and Class, XXI, 2 (1979): 183-4.

In socialist-oriented countries the armed forces is strictly controlled by the revolutionary-democratic party; in Grenada, this same control was exercised by the NJM: first, Bishop--the leader of the NJM--was the Commander-in-Chief of the PRA, as well as the Minister of Defence; second, all leading personnel in the PRA were NJM members;¹ third, the Central Committee exercised direct control over the PRA through the Main Political Department, which functioned along the same lines as the Main Political Administration in the USSR;² and fourth, the NJM, like a Marxist-Leninist party, established primary party organizations in the armed forces.³

In order to ensure its political reliability, socialist-oriented armed forces replace both the regular personnel and the officer corps with new cadres drawn from the labouring strata of society: a process which occurred in Grenada, as well. During a speech to the NJM membership, Bishop noted the following:

... look at the composition of our army and militia. We don't have any upper Petty-bourgeoisie or bourgeoisie in our army or militia. When you look at the officers in the army it is Working Class comrades or petty-bourgeois revolutionary democrats or communists who are the officers in the army - that's the situation in the army.⁴

Grenada also conformed to the model of the socialist-oriented state in that the PRA received considerable assistance from the socialist community. To this end, several socialist bloc countries (Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Cuba, and the Soviet Union) provided substantial assistance both in terms of equipment and training, as the following examples illustrate. According to a letter from the Grenadian Embassy in Cuba, Czechoslovakia agreed to provide (3,000) 7.62mm automatic rifles, (50)

¹ For example, General Hudson Austin, Lt. Colonel Ewart Layne, and Major Leon Cornwall (all Political Bureau members), and Major Einstein Louinson, Captain Chris Stroude, Captain Lester Readhead were all leading members of the NJM.

² "Bulletin From the Main Political Department, 20/10/83, Their Heroism is an Example For Us," p. 344.

³ "Central Committee Report on First Plenary Session 13 - 19 July, 1983," p. 14.

⁴ Bishop, "Line of March," p. 24.

bazookas, and ammunition for both.¹ North Korea and Grenada signed an agreement in April 1983 whereby Grenada was to receive "in 1983-1984, the free military assistance subject to weapons and ammunitions covering US \$ 12,000,000 indicated in the Annex to this Agreement."²

Like Czechoslovakia and North Korea, Cuba supplied military hardware to Grenada; but in addition, Cuban assistance also included the training of Grenadian military personnel and the direct involvement of Cuba in the organization and structure of the PRA--a strong indicator of socialist orientation. One military agreement specified that Cuba would provide twenty-seven permanent and twelve to thirteen temporary advisors to Grenada for this purpose;³ at the time of the invasion in 1983, there were 43 personnel from the Cuban Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces in Grenada.⁴ In October 1979, Castro publicly acknowledged this military cooperation between Cuba and Grenada: "We offered this collaboration at the beginning, after the triumph of the Revolution."⁵ And in 1980, Bishop also acknowledged this assistance: "Certainly, we in Grenada will never forget that it was the Military assistance of Cuba in the first weeks of our Revolution that provided us with the basis to defend our Revolution."⁶

¹"Letter From Grenadian Embassy in Grenada Concerning Arms Agreement with Czechoslovakia," in Grenada Papers, p. 1; "Bill of Lading for Czechoslovak Military Equipment," in Grenada Documents, pp. 1-2.

²"AGREEMENT between the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea . . .," in Grenada Documents, pp. 1-9.

³"Protocol of the Military Collaboration Between the Government of the Republic of Cuba and the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada," in Grenada Documents, pp. 1-7.

⁴"This was the Cuban Personnel in Grenada," Granma Weekly Review, 6 November 1983.

⁵"Press Conference with Fidel, September 28," Granma Weekly Review, 7 October 1979.

⁶"We will what we want," Granma Weekly Review, 11 May 1980.

But by far the largest contributor to Grenada's defence potential was the Soviet Union. In terms of equipment, in October 1980 the USSR agreed to give free of charge 4 million rubles worth of military supplies including (2,500) 7.62mm automatic rifles, (2,000,000) rounds of ammunition, (18) anti-aircraft mounts, and (33) military vehicles;¹ another agreement in July 1982 provided the PRA with an additional 10 million rubles worth of military supplies including more sophisticated weaponry.² As in the case of Cuba, the USSR also extended assistance to the training of Grenadian military personnel; in early 1983, there were twenty-five PRA officers taking five month course in the Soviet Union.³ This high level of assistance not only in supplying military equipment, but also in training PRA officers strongly reflects a socialist-oriented pattern of development.

Conclusion

In Grenada the organs of defence--the People's Revolutionary Militia, the Preventative Detention Tribunal, the State Security Forces and the People's Revolutionary Army--played the key role in protecting the Bishop government from both external and internal enemies, were strictly controlled by the NJM, and in the case of the security and armed forces, received considerable assistance from the socialist bloc. This shows Grenada had a high conformity to a socialist-oriented pattern of development.

¹"AGREEMENT . . . on deliveries from the Union of SSR to Grenada of special and other equipment [1980 to 1981]," in Grenada Documents, pp. 1-12.

²"AGREEMENT . . . on deliveries from the Union of SSR to Grenada of special and other equipment [1982 to 1985]," in Grenada Documents, pp. 1-37.

³"Meeting with the Ministry of Defence, DATE: 24th November 1982," in Grenada Documents, pp. 1-2.

The Revolutionary-Democratic Party

The New Jewel Movement was the most important institution in the political development of Grenada. It is clear from its historical background that the NJM evolved towards Marxism-Leninism. Accordingly, the classical method of revolutionary-democratic party development, that is, the progressive development in three successive stages--national front party, transitional-vanguard party, and vanguard party--towards a Marxism-Leninism will be used as the framework for analysis of the development of the NJM. The ideological basis, the structures, the functions, the elite dynamics, and the role of the socialist bloc are critically examined at each stage of development in order to determine whether or not the NJM conformed to this model, and if so, to what extent.

The National Front Party Stage

Ideological Basis

One of the hallmarks of a national front party is its heterogeneous ideological basis. In its early beginnings the NJM showed this heterogeneity; this is apparent when one looks at its *Manifesto* (created in November 1973): On the one hand, it advocated left-leaning policies such as the collectivization of agriculture and fisheries, and the abolition of Westminster-style democracy; on the other hand, it advocated the cooperation of all political forces pursuing reform whether they be left-leaning NJM, centre-leaning GNP, or right-leaning UPP members. In addition, the NJM contested the December 1976 general election in an alliance with GNP and UPP members; thus, further demonstrating the NJM's heterogeneous ideological basis.

Notwithstanding having a heterogeneous ideological basis, a national front party *begins* to evolve towards Marxism-Leninism. This phenomenon occurred in the development of the NJM, as early as April 1974. Bishop confirmed this *beginning*

development in an interview given in 1977: "Our party *began* to develop along Marxist lines in 1974, when we *began* to study the theory of scientific socialism."¹ However, Bishop also noted, a number of years later, that while the NJM began to develop along Marxist lines, it did not actually create a Marxist-Leninist party for some time: "... we decided in theory and in principle that we should build a Leninist Party. That decision was taken in April '74 but in practice that decision was not implemented for many years."² This evolution towards Marxism-Leninism, albeit limited, is reflective of the national front party stage.

Structure

Like the structure of a national front party, the nascent party structure of the NJM was both underdeveloped and strictly territorially organized. Its underdevelopment was reflected in the number of different party organs. It had only two types: a political bureau--the only central party organ (created in September 1973),³ and approximately 50 primary party organizations (created between 1974 and 1976). Also, these primary party organizations (PPOs) were organized territorially in the towns and villages of Grenada.⁴ However, the creation of these organs is important because it is evidence of the Marxist-Leninist orientation of the NJM.

Function

Although the functions of a national front party cannot be analyzed per se since there are no set functions for such a party in theory, it is, nevertheless, interesting to see how the operations of the organs of the NJM compare with those of a Marxist-Leninist

¹Maurice Bishop, "The Struggle for Democracy," p. 22. Italics are mine.

²Bishop, "Line of March for the Party," p. 40.

³Thorndike, Grenada, p. 48.

⁴Trevor Munroe, Grenada: Revolution, Counter-Revolution (Kingston: Vanguard Publishers Ltd., 1983), p. 16; Jacobs and Jacobs, Grenada: The Route to Revolution, p. 80.

party. The NJM political bureau operated, to a certain degree, similarly to that of a Marxist-Leninist party: it formulated major party policy and supervised major party personnel matters. However, the operations of the political bureau of the NJM differed from that of a Marxist-Leninist party in the following way: Because it was the only party organ, the political bureau developed *all* party policy, supervised *all* party personnel matters, and directed *all* party activities. In a Marxist-Leninist party, these functions are performed by a number of different party organs. By conducting propaganda and agitation at the grassroots level of Grenadian society, the NJM PPOs operated in a similar manner to those of a Marxist-Leninist party. Together, the operations of the political bureau and of the PPO indicate that the initial development of the NJM was toward Marxism-Leninism at the national front party stage.

Elite Dynamics

Another key feature of the development of the national front party stage is the elite dynamics--the leftward radicalization of the party leadership. This process was clearly evident in the changing composition of the membership of the NJM: as the NJM started to evolve toward Marxism-Leninism, a number of former NJM members, such as George Brizan (in 1975)¹ who was liberal-leaning, left the party; at the same time, a number of new NJM members, such as Bernard and Phyllis Coard (in 1976) who were committed Marxist-Leninists, joined the party. This leftward radicalization continued throughout the development of the NJM.

Role of the Socialist Bloc

There is no evidence that the socialist bloc countries played a role in the development of the NJM at that time; this, however, is not inconsistent with the national front party stage.

¹Thorndike, Grenada, p. 49.

Conclusion

It is evident that, the initial stages of development of the NJM (April 1974 to June 1977) conforms to a large degree with the characteristics of a national front revolutionary-democratic party: The NJM was beginning to develop towards Marxism-Leninism and a leftward radicalization of the party leadership was occurring, but it was still quite heterogeneous ideologically and underdeveloped structurally.

The Transitional-Vanguard Party Stage

Ideological Basis

In contrast to a national front party, a transitional-vanguard party is considerably more homogeneous in its Marxist-Leninist ideological basis. This increased homogeneity became evident in the NJM after mid-1977 when the NJM's ideological basis began to consolidate around Marxism-Leninism. At that time Bishop noted, "the party did make a qualitative leap forward in terms of its Leninist standards and principles."¹ A key policy decision taken by the NJM demonstrating the party's ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism was its decision to take up an armed struggle to seize power from Gairy. In a feature report on Grenada in Granma Weekly Review, the following was noted:

Given the mounting repression and political persecution and the impossibility of making changes peacefully, the organization [NJM] resorted to armed struggle. The NJM began to develop a clandestine wing trained in armed insurrection.²

The use of armed struggle to determine the outcome of the class struggle, of course, originated with Lenin.

Even though the NJM was consolidating around Marxism-Leninism, it still had a degree of heterogeneity in its ideological basis--a feature of the transitional-vanguard

¹Bishop, "Line of March," p. 40.

²"The Long Road to Freedom," Granma Weekly Review, 12 July 1981.

party. A clear example of this heterogeneity is seen in the organization of opposition to Gairy, prior to the revolution, an opposition that included "the participation of elements from different political organizations."¹

After the NJM took power on March 13, 1979, however, its Marxist-Leninist ideological basis became significantly more homogeneous. The NJM leadership's strengthening commitment to Marxism-Leninism was clear within the first years of power. In September 1980, Richard Jacobs, NJM member and Grenadian ambassador to Cuba, wrote an article in the journal World Marxist Review (a journal published in Prague, reflecting Soviet positions concerning the International Communist Movement) which highlighted the Marxist-Leninist ideological basis of the NJM:

The ruling New Jewel Movement comprises advanced elements of Grenada's society. The party adheres to the ideas of scientific socialism and the principles of democratic centralism. The NJM is now the sole organized force with real influence over the masses.²

The assertion made by the NJM that it adhered to both scientific socialism and democratic centralism, as well as the fact that the assertion was published in a socialist bloc journal indicates the NJM's high level of commitment to Marxism-Leninism--a key feature of a highly developed transitional-vanguard party.

The monograph, Grenada: The Route to Revolution, co-authored by Richard and Ian Jacobs further exhibits the NJM's strong Marxist-Leninist ideological basis. This monograph analyzes the development of the revolutionary process in Grenada from a Marxist-Leninist perspective: it notes not only that the ideological basis of the NJM is scientific socialism, but also that the NJM is leading Grenada on the path of non-

¹Bishop "The Struggle for Democracy," p. 21.

²W. Richard Jacobs, "Grenada: on the road to people's democracy," World Marxist Review, no. 9 (1980), p. 67.

capitalist development--as outlined by Soviet theorists, including Ulyanovsky and Brutents.

Structure

Ideological consolidation around Marxism-Leninism, precipitates important structural developments which strengthen the transitional-vanguard party. In Grenada, these structural developments started prior to the revolution and accelerated after the NJM took power.

Party organization along both territorial and industrial lines is a key feature distinguishing a transitional-vanguard from a national front party. After July 1977, the NJM began to organize along these lines: While the NJM continued to create territorially based PPOs throughout Grenada, it also started to develop along industrial lines through trade unions. Bishop noted for example, that in August 1977 "... the party directly formed the Bank and General Workers' Union [BGWU]."¹ Trade unions are normally independent institutions, even where they are directly controlled by communist parties in socialist countries, but in the case of Grenada, the BGWU was essentially a NJM party organ!

As a transitional-vanguard party progresses in its development, its organization along both territorial and industrial lines becomes increasingly inveterate; this structural evolution was clearly evident in the NJM: After the revolution, the territorial organization of the NJM was strengthened immensely through the formation of Parish Coordinating Bodies (PCBs): there was one PCB for each of the six parishes on the island of Grenada (based on the geographic administrative units used by the Catholic Church) and one PCB for the island of Carriacou. The PCB compared to a large degree

¹Bishop, "The Struggle for Democracy," p. 21; Richards and Richards, Grenada: the Route to Revolution, p. 116.

with a Regional Committee of the CPSU (*Obkom*): it was responsible for the administration of party policy over a large territorial sub-division of the country (i.e. a parish); it was headed by leading members of the party (for example, Raymond Layne, brother of Central Committee member Ewart Layne, was the head of St. George's PCB);¹ and it was directly responsible to the Central Committee of the party (the PCBs, for instance, were required to submit reports to the Central Committee concerning party building).² Unlike a Regional Committee of the CPSU, however, the internal structure of a PCB was poorly developed.

In addition to the territorially based PCBs, the NJM also strengthened its structure--on an industrial basis--through the creation of a number of important committees (Worker's, Farmer's, Rural Worker's, Teacher's, Youth, and Women's). These committees reflect the progression towards Marxism-Leninism because they are organized along industrial lines. However, these committees do not compare with any specific organs of the CPSU: On the one hand, these committees, through their organization, agitation, and propaganda work, function like industrially based PPOs in the USSR. (For example, like large PPOs in the CPSU, the Worker's Committee played an instrumental role in the recruitment of worker's into the NJM party).³ On the other hand, these committees, which participated in NJM Central Committee meetings (through their respective committee heads) and which played a significant role in the development of NJM party policy, function like Central Committee departments of the CPSU.

¹Minutes of Political Bureau Meeting on Wednesday 10th June 1981," Grenada Documents, p. 4.

²"Central Committee Resolutions," in Grenada Documents, p. 3.

³"Minutes of the Central Committee Meeting on Wednesday, 27th May 1981," in Grenada Documents, p. 1.

Besides party organization along territorial and industrial lines, the formation of central party organs is also essential for the development of a transitional-vanguard party.

In addition to the Political Bureau, the NJM began to form other central party organs, the most important of which (headed by Bernard Coard) was the *Organising Committee*. It was important because it fulfilled vital party organising functions which were similar to those of an *Organizational-work Department* of the CPSU.¹ Bishop noted this salient structural development of the NJM:

That is the period [July 1977 to August 1978] too when the Organising Committee of the Party was formed, thus taking some of the strain off the Political Bureau and leaving matters of discipline, party organization and so on, for the Organising Committee to handle - a critical step forward.²

After the NJM took power in March 1979, the structural development of central party organs of the NJM clearly accelerated, as the following examples illustrate.

The most important party organ developed after the revolution was the Central Committee (in September 1979). The Central Committee of the NJM was largely similar to that of a communist party, but it also had differences. Composing the most powerful members of the NJM the Central Committee (normally about 18),³ creating all other central party organs (including the Political Bureau and the Organising Committee), and formulating key party policy, the Central Committee of the NJM compared very similarly to that of a Marxist-Leninist party. However, in not having candidate members in contrast to the Central Committee of the CPSU which has

¹Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

²Bishop, "Line of March," p. 40.

³As of April 1981, the Central Committee was composed of the following members: Maurice Bishop, Bernard Coard, Selwyn Strachan, Chalkie Ventour, Leon Cornwall, Fitzroy Bain, Vincent Noel, Hudson Austin, George Louison, Tan Bartholomew, Phyllis Coard, Liam James, Unison Whiteman, Ewart Layne, Ian St. Bernard, Chris DeRiggs, Kaumau Barnette, Kenrick Radix, and Caldwell Taylor.

candidate members, and in meeting on a monthly basis rather than twice annually as is required by the Central Committee of the CPSU, the NJM Central Committee differed from that of the CPSU model.

The fact that it took six months after the revolution to create this crucial party organ indicates the "transitional" stage of party development; at the same time, however, the development of the Central Committee--an intrinsic organ of a fully developed Marxist-Leninist party--signified the strengthening "vanguard" structural character of the NJM.

In addition to the Central Committee, another salient central party organ created by the NJM further manifested the transitional-vanguard character of the party: the *Secretariat*. The development of this vital party organ--which, in terms of power, is second only to the political bureau in a communist party--demonstrates the strengthening Marxist-Leninist character of the NJM; yet, the fact that it took more than two years after taking power to form the Secretariat also indicates the lower level of party development of the NJM, when compared with a communist party. Moreover, unlike the Secretariat of a communist party which plays a pivotal role in the functioning of the party, the Secretariat of the NJM was relegated to performing menial party tasks: one of the "major" tasks of the Secretariat was to inform individuals about upcoming meetings.¹

Along with the establishment of the Central Committee and the Secretariat, the establishment of other crucial party committees (Airport, National Security, Militia, and Disciplinary) and departments (International Relations and Propaganda) also reflect the transitional-vanguard party stage of the NJM. These committees and departments,

¹"Minutes of Political Bureau Meeting Held on Wednesday, 3rd June, 1981," Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection, p. 7.

which were directly accountable to the Central Committee, and which oversaw the tasks that their respective names state, functioned like departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The only two departments (often called committees, as well) of the NJM Central Committee that *corresponded* to the CPSU were International and Propaganda departments.

What is important to note is the increasing allocation of the party functions from the Political Bureau to other central party structures; this is a significant difference between the national front party and transitional-vanguard party stage of development.

Function

One of the most significant differences between the transitional-vanguard and the national front parties is the increased leading role of the party at the transitional vanguard stage. In the case of Grenada, it is impossible to determine whether the leading role of the NJM increased, since it appears that the NJM took power at the transitional-vanguard party stage of development. It is possible, however, to determine the extent to which the NJM exercised its leading role.

The most salient leading role function that the NJM played in the political development of Grenada was the seizure of power through arms. The fact that this was a party directed function was stated by Richard Jacobs in his World Marxist Review article:

By its intensive educational campaign, its advocacy of a revolutionary ideology, and its efforts to unite its own ranks, the NJM helped to create the subjective conditions for that situation's [revolutionary] development. Armed detachments led by the NJM Political Bureau rose in revolt on March 13, 1979.¹

This seizure of power through arms corresponds, in general, with the Soviet and Cuban historical models of party development.

¹Jacobs, "Grenada: on the road to people's democracy," p. 66.

Once in power the NJM clearly exercised its leading role function in the governing of Grenada in terms of both directing the political development of the country and controlling the appointment of personnel in the state apparatus. Through an examination of the Political Bureau and Central Committee minutes of the NJM, it is quite evident that the Political Bureau and the Central Committee (although the Political Bureau was the more powerful) made the key decisions concerning the political development of Grenada: foreign policy, national economic strategy, and so on. In this regard, the NJM functioned like a communist party. Unlike a communist party, the NJM Political Bureau, besides making key decisions, also made decisions on matters which were comparatively trivial, such as whether someone could bring a truck into Grenada without paying duty.¹ In addition, it is evident that the Secretariat played little or no part in the leading role of the NJM; this is in clear variance with the model of the CPSU.

The NJM demonstrated its leading role function not only in directing the political development of Grenada, but also in controlling the appointment of leading personnel in the state apparatus. This was evident in the formation of the Revolutionary Council of the People's Revolutionary Government: eight out of the original fourteen members of the Revolutionary Council were NJM members.² The leading role of the NJM in controlling state personnel was even more evident when the composition of the Cabinet is examined: Norris Bain, an elected GNP member, was the only non-NJM member in a cabinet of seven.

¹"Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting, Wednesday, 29th April, 1981," in Grenada Documents, p. 2.

²The NJM members included Maurice Bishop, Bernard Coard, Unison Whiteman, Vincent Noel, Selwyn Strachan, George Louison, Kendrick Radix, Hudson Austin and Lloyd Noel.

Just as it is important to note the preponderance of NJM members in the central state organs, which is like a Marxist-Leninist party, so too is it important to note that the NJM domination of positions was not complete, which is unlike a Marxist-Leninist party. This limitation on the leading role of the party is consistent with the transitional-vanguard stage of development. Bishop gives two reasons for this limitation on the leading role of the party: First, non-NJM members were included in the state apparatus to give Grenada a pluralistic face to the outside world, especially the United States: "this was done deliberately so that imperialism won't get too excited and would say 'well they have some nice fellas in that thing; everything alright.' And as a result wouldn't think about sending in troops."¹ (The deliberate inclusion of non-party people in the Grenadian state apparatus is extremely similar to the national front governments which were temporarily established in the East European countries immediately after the Second World War in order to give these governments legitimacy). Second, there was neither a sufficient number of highly trained personnel nor a sufficient level of state economic development to allow for the complete control of the state by the party; "We need the alliance [with the bourgeoisie], comrades, because we don't have enough managers, because we don't have enough capital, because we don't have enough international markets . . ."² This is not inconsistent with the transitional-vanguard party stage of development.

Elite Dynamics

During the transitional-vanguard party stage of development, the process of the leftward radicalization of the party membership continues. In Grenada, this process clearly continued after the revolution through both the addition of new party members

¹Bishop, "Line of March," p. 18.

²Ibid., p. 19.

and the change of leading party personnel. At the time that the NJM took power in March 1979, there were only 45 full party members.¹ Subsequently, the NJM leadership strove to push the party leftward by increasing its membership of committed Marxist-Leninists; as a result of these efforts, by 1982 there were 80 full members in the NJM.² Changes in the Political Bureau and the Central Committee further indicated a leftward shift in the party: In July 1981, Vincent Noel--a strong Bishop supporter--was purged from both the Political Bureau and the Central Committee;³ at the same time, non-Political Bureau member Liam James--a hard core Marxist-Leninist and a strong Coard supporter--began attending Political Bureau meetings on an irregular basis.⁴ (Eventually he became a Political Bureau member). The increase in Marxist-Leninist party members, as well as the removal of a Bishop supporter and the inclusion of a Coard supporter in the party leadership are strong indicators of the leftward progression of the elite dynamics of the NJM; this is reflective of a strengthening transitional-vanguard party.

The Role of the Socialist Bloc

A key element to the successful development towards Marxism-Leninism of a revolutionary-democratic party is close cooperation with the socialist community; moreover, the level of cooperation between a revolutionary-democratic party and the socialist community is an excellent indicator of the level of development of a revolutionary-democratic party, itself: the higher the level of development, the closer are its relations with socialist community. The development of close relations between

¹O'Shaughnessy, Grenada: Revolution, Invasion, and Aftermath, p. 83.

²Thorndike, Grenada, p. 79.

³"Central Committee Minutes Held on 22nd July, 1981," in Grenada Documents, p. 4.

⁴"Minutes of Political Bureau Meetings on Saturday, 27th June, and Wednesday, 1st, July, 1981," in Grenada Documents, p. 1.

the NJM and the socialist bloc played a pivotal role in the development of the NJM party towards Marxism-Leninism, as the following examples will illustrate.

The development of relations between the NJM and Cuba, which appears to have started as early as the summer of 1977, coincides with the "qualitative leap forward" in the Marxist-Leninist basis of the NJM. From Bishop's 1977 interview in Havana, it is clear that Cuba did have a substantial influence on the ideological development of the NJM:

. . . unquestionably, through the Cuban experience we got to see scientific socialism close up. This . . . has been teaching us, on the practical day-to-day struggle, the relevance of socialism — the only solution to our problems.¹

The development of relations between the NJM and Cuba, and the impact of these relations on the ideological development of the NJM were important in changing the nature of the NJM from a national front party to a transitional-vanguard party.

Cuban influence on the development of the NJM seems to have been a factor in the party decision to take up the armed struggle--the most salient Marxist-Leninist function that the NJM would perform. In the summer of 1977, in order to perform this function, a clandestine wing of the party began to be trained in armed insurrection. However, since none of the NJM members had any military training, it must have come from an external source, most likely, Cuba. Cuban assistance to the NJM in performing this Marxist-Leninist function of *seizing power* was even foreshadowed in 1977 by Bishop:

The victory of socialism in our country will be possible only through firm ties with the socialist world and with close cooperation of the most advanced governments of the region [Cuba].²

¹Bishop, "Struggle for Democracy," p. 22.

²Ibid.

One and a half years later the NJM successfully performed this vital party function: a key characteristic reflecting the transitional-vanguard nature of the NJM.

After the Grenadian revolution, the ties between the NJM and Communist Party of Cuba (CPC) consolidated.

The most demonstrative evidence that the strengthening ties between the NJM and the CPC were helping to guide the development of the NJM towards Marxism-Leninism was in a speech given by Bishop in December 1980 to the 2nd Congress of the CPC.

Cuba has been a beacon for us in Grenada. It has both taught and reminded us of many important lessons. It has reminded us of the central role of the Party in building the Revolution. It has reminded us of the critical importance of being the genuine vanguard of the people . . .¹

Again, as in 1977, the role of Cuba in the development of the NJM was readily acknowledged by Bishop.

Further evidence demonstrating that the development of ties between the the NJM and the CPC (which Bishop referred to as "those of brothers and sisters")² had considerable influence of the development of the NJM is revealed in the Political Bureau minutes of April 29, 1981. Cuba party workers not only made assessments of the NJM, but also helped directly in its development:

Such discussions [with the Cuban ambassador to Grenada concerning the state of the NJM] should take place on a Party-to-Party basis at the appropriate levels of the two parties. This discussion should not take place now, since we are in the process of reorganization and must wait until sister Isabelle [a Cuban party worker] has done an assessment with us.

A sister [from Cuba] is coming in the middle of May to do ideological development with the Party.³

¹"Speech by Maurice Bishop," Granma Weekly Review, 18 January 1981.

²"The People of El Salvador can Count on Our Fullest Support," Granma Weekly Review, 11 January 1981.

³"Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting, Wednesday, 29th April, 1981," p. 2.

The development of such close relations between the NJM and the CPC is indicative of a highly developed transitional-vanguard party.

In contrast to Cuba, the development of party-to-party relations between Grenada and the Soviet Union proceeded on a much more cautious basis. This stems largely from the conservative Soviet evaluation of the NJM. For example, up until May 1980, the Soviets never referred to the NJM as a *party* per se, but rather as a *movement*.¹ Accordingly, up to that date there was no cooperation between the NJM and the CPSU. This is important to stress, as it shows that the Soviets perceived the NJM not to be a well developed revolutionary-democratic party, at that time.

However, an official visit to the USSR of a Grenadian delegation headed by Bernard Coard between May 23 and May 30, 1980, both signalled a change in official Soviet perceptions of the NJM and initiated the development of official relations between the NJM and the CPSU. The NJM was referred to as "the ruling party of Grenada," and Grenada was recognized--for the first time--as being "on the course of socialist orientation."² Further manifesting the higher Soviet assessment of the NJM was the Grenadian delegation was the meeting of the candidate-member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Boris Ponomarev.³ (Ponomarev is also head of the International Department of the CPSU). At the same time, however, the Soviets did not mention that Coard was either a Political Bureau or a Central Committee member, still indicating Soviet caution in their assessment of the

¹"K Sobytiyam na Grenade," Pravda, 15 March 1979; "Pravda o 'Bananovom Rae,' Pravda, 6 June 1979; "Grenada: Stroya Novuyu Zhizn'" Pravda, 14 April 1979.

²"Delegatsiya Grenady v Sovetskom Soyuze," Pravda, 31 May 1980; Grenada was also recognized as being on the path of socialist orientation in Soviet Military Review; see N. Katkov, "A True Ally of Struggling Countries," Soviet Military Review no. 3 (March 1981), p. 46.

³Ibid.

NJM. Nevertheless, the development of relations on this high, though cautious, level would be expected of a transitional-vanguard party.

After the May 1980 visit, relations between the NJM and the CPSU began to take root, albeit slowly. In March 1981, for example, a delegation from the NJM again headed by Bernard Coard participated in the 26th Congress of the CPSU;¹ in May of that year, the CPSU extended two sets of five invitations each to members of the NJM Central Committee--one set for vacation and the other set for an 18 day "working visit;"² and finally, the USSR pledged \$150, 000 (U.S.) worth of construction materials for a NJM party head quarters.³ While together these steps were important indicators of the increasing ties between the CPSU and the NJM, the level of involvement of the CPSU was still relatively limited as compared with the CPC.

Although the Soviet Union and Cuba were the principal countries with whom the NJM was developing party-to-party relations, the NJM also began to develop relations with other socialist bloc countries: The NJM sent Political Bureau member Hudson Austin to the Mongolian Party Congress in May 1981;⁴ Bulgaria extended offers, for June and December 1981, to train 24 NJM members at their party school.⁵ The development of party-to-party relations with a variety of socialist bloc countries is a strong indicator of the increasing level of development of a transitional-vanguard party.

The development of close relations between the NJM and socialist bloc countries appears to be a complex process. In the case of Cuba, the NJM developed relations with that country even before it assumed power in 1979; it is also clear that Cuba played a significant role in the Marxist-Leninist development of the NJM. By contrast,

¹"Molodoe Serdtse Grenady," *Pravda*, 13 March 1981.

²"Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting on Wednesday, 13 May, 1981," pp. 2-3.

³"Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting on Wednesday, 3rd June, 1981," p. 2.

⁴"Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting on Wednesday, 6th May, 1981," p. 2.

⁵"Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting on Wednesday, 3rd June, 1981," p. 2.

the Soviet Union was much more cautious in its development of relations with the NJM; only after 1980 did the CPSU start to develop relations--in a limited manner--with the NJM. Finally, the NJM began to develop relations with other socialist bloc countries. The development of these party-to-party relations are reflective of the transitional-party stage of development.

Conclusion

The NJM is conforms to a very large degree with a transitional-vanguard party in its development between July 1977 and June 1981. Ideologically, the NJM consolidated strongly around Marxism-Leninism; by 1980, it publicly asserted that the NJM was based upon the principles of scientific socialism and democratic centralism. Structurally, the NJM began to develop not only territorially and industrially based party organs, but also central party organs similar to a Marxist-Leninist party. In terms of its function, the NJM clearly exerted its leading role; however, it was also noted that this leading role had limitations. In terms of its elite dynamics, there was a clear leftward progression of the NJM. Finally, the NJM began to develop party-to party ties with a number of socialist bloc countries, most notably, with Cuba and the USSR.

The Vanguard Party Stage

Ideological Basis

The ideological basis of a vanguard is the most similar of all revolutionary-democratic parties to that of a Marxist-Leninist party; however, it too is not *fully* developed. The Marxist-Leninist ideological basis of the NJM, which already had developed to a large degree during the transitional-vanguard party stage, continued to strengthen; this was reflected in the following ways: (a) its adherence to scientific socialism and to socialist orientation, (b) its implementation of the principle of

democratic centralism, and (c) its assimilation of Marxism-Leninism by party members through party study.

The most important document demonstrating the NJM's commitment to scientific socialism and socialist orientation was Bishop's "Line of March for the Party" speech given at the General Meeting of the NJM Party on September 13, 1982. This document is a vital piece of evidence because it was, in essence, the party programme of the NJM and it outlined the ideological and political basis of the NJM. The NJM's vanguard ideological character was manifested in its unequivocal commitments to Marxism-Leninism and to building socialism in Grenada.¹ Through a Marxist-Leninist analysis of Grenada's low level of political, social, and economic development, however, Bishop stresses that socialism cannot immediately be built in Grenada.² Instead, Grenada must follow the path of *socialist orientation*:

. . . we cannot proceed straight away to the building of socialism but must first pass through a stage where we lay the basis, where we create the conditions, including socio-economic and political conditions, for the building of socialism and the creation of the socialist revolution . . . What we are speaking about now is not socialist construction . . . we are speaking about socialist orientation.³

The fact that Bishop sets out socialist orientation--a Soviet theoretic construct--as the official programme of political development is important: it demonstrates not only that the NJM is committed to Marxism-Leninism, but also that the NJM accepts the Soviet version of scientific socialism. This unequivocal acceptance of Marxism-Leninism by the NJM is an important indicator of a vanguard revolutionary-democratic party.

Linked to the acceptance of scientific socialism, the vanguard nature of the NJM is also reflected in its implementation of democratic centralism. The development of inner party democracy, which is a key indicator of democratic centralism being

¹Bishop, "Line of March," p. 4.

²Ibid., p. 9.

³Ibid., pp. 9-10.

practiced by a vanguard party, was clearly evident in the minutes of the meetings of the Central Committee. For example, during a Central Committee meeting held in April 1982, even members of the Coard faction (Liam James and Phyllis Coard) argued with each other, from a Leninist perspective, over the direction of development of the NJM.¹ In addition it is clear from the NJM Central Committee minutes that decisions were made on a collective basis--Bishop did not exercise dictatorial powers. However, the principle of democratic centralism was not consistently implemented. For example, the minutes reveal that the decisions of the Central Committee were not always implemented by the lower party organs.² This inconsistency in the implementation of democratic centralism by the NJM is a characteristic of a vanguard party.

Finally, the assimilation of Marxism-Leninism by the party membership is another important way that reflected the vanguard party nature of the NJM's ideological basis. The Central Committee minutes of the NJM continuously stressed the need for increasing the ideological level of the party membership through socialism classes and workshops.³ Moreover, in order to build a strong vanguard party, the NJM leadership consciously strove to assimilate the Soviet version of Marxism-Leninism as is evidenced in the materials chosen for these courses: Lenin on the Transformation of Agriculture, Dialectics and Foundations of Leninism by J. V. Stalin (the works of Stalin were required reading in Coard's study classes),⁴ the history of the CPSU, Standards of

¹"Meeting of the Central Committee of the New Jewel Movement: Held on the 21st April 1982," in Grenada Documents, p. 7.

²"Minutes of the Central Committee Meeting Held on Wednesday, 30th December, 1981," in Grenada Documents, p. 3.

³"Minutes of the Central Committee Meeting on Saturday, 26th June, 1982," in Grenada Documents, p. 3; "Minutes of the Central Committee Meeting Held on Friday 27th August, 1982," in Grenada Documents, p. 2.

⁴"Minutes of Extraordinary Meeting of the Central Committee of the NJM From Tuesday 12th - Friday 15th October, 1982," in Grenada Documents, p. 8.

Party Life by Pronin,¹ and the works of Soviet theorist *Karen Brutents*.² Although it is clear that the NJM leadership endeavored to develop a Marxist-Leninist ideological basis through the assimilation of Soviet theoretical works, this assimilation was not completely successful. It was noted in the Central Committee minutes that ". . . the Path of Socialist Orientation was not fully understood by all comrades."³ This incomplete mastery of scientific socialism is a key distinguishing feature between a vanguard party and a Marxist-Leninist party.

It is clear in terms of its adherence to scientific socialism, its implementation of democratic centralism (though inconsistent), and its assimilation of Marxism-Leninism (though imperfect) that the NJM's ideological basis conformed to a large degree with that of a vanguard party.

Structure

As a result of its firm commitment to Marxism-Leninism, the NJM continued to build a party structurally along the lines of a communist party. As opposed to the transitional-vanguard stage of party development in which many key NJM party organs were being constructed (e.g. Central Committee and Secretariat), in the vanguard stage of party development, most key organs already exist and operate similarly to those of a communist party. However, in terms of its structure a vanguard party is still quite underdeveloped as compared with a communist party; this, too, was the case with NJM.

A vanguard party is structured on a territorial and industrial basis. Even though significant steps were taken to build the NJM on a territorial and industrial basis during

¹"Minutes of Emergency Meeting of NJM Central Committee Dated 26th August, 1983," in Grenada Documents, p. 7.

²"Extraordinary Meeting of the Central Committee NJM 14 - 16 September, 1983," p. 21.

³"Minutes of the Central Committee Meeting Held on Friday 27th August, 1982," in Grenada Documents, p. 4.

its transitional-vanguard party stage, the NJM continued to strengthen its organization on this basis in line with a vanguard party. The most important territorial structural change to the NJM (starting in July 1983) was the creation of the *Village Coordinating Bodies* (VCBs); they appear to be based on territorial sub-divisions of the Parish Coordinating Bodies (PCBs).¹ Thus, whereas the PCBs were structurally similar to the Regional Committees (Obkoms) of the CPSU, the VCBs were similar to the smaller District Committees (Raikom) of the CPSU. Since the VCBs were just beginning to develop before the American invasion, there is little information as to how they operated. Nonetheless, the creation of the VCBs is significant as it indicates a more complex territorial organization of the NJM--reflective of a vanguard party.

In contrast to the territorial party development, the NJM did not develop any new industrial based party structures. However, the industrial based committees it had previously developed (Worker's, Farmer's, Rural Worker's, Teacher's, Youth, and Women's) clearly demonstrated that the NJM was structured along industrial lines, characteristic of a vanguard party.

A key difference between the transitional-vanguard and the vanguard parties is that the vanguard party consciously strives to develop primary party organizations (PPOs) in state enterprises, in the armed forces, and so on, whereas as a transitional-vanguard party does not. This hallmark of vanguard party organization was evident in the NJM, particularly in its attempts to establish PPOs of the armed forces. However, a major difference between a communist party and a vanguard party is that the PPOs, if they exist, often operate poorly in a vanguard party. This poor development was evident in the PPOs in the Grenadian armed forces and was a subject of concern at the First Plenary Session of the NJM Central Committee:

¹"Central Committee Report on the First Plenary Session 13 - 19 July, 1983," p. 9.

The CC [Central Committee] concluded that . . . dormant [sic] and defunct Party cells in the Armed Forces should be revived and a weekly report should be sent to the O.C. [Organising Committee] . . .¹

It should emphasized that the development of these PPOs in the armed forces (even though they did not operate well) is a strong indicator of the vanguard character of the NJM.

The vanguard nature of the NJM is further demonstrated in the structure of its central party organs (Political Bureau, Secretariat, Central Committee, Organising Committee, etc.).

The NJM Political Bureau was very similar to that of the CPSU: it was composed of the most powerful members (normally about eight) of the NJM², it was the supreme decision-making organ of the party, and it was accountable to the Central Committee (which removed and added members to the Political Bureau). Unlike the CPSU, the NJM Political Bureau did not have candidate members.

In contrast to the Political Bureau, the Secretariat appears to be similar to that of the CPSU in name only. Whereas the Secretariat of the Central Committee is the second most powerful party organ in the CPSU and it is most powerful administrative organ, the Secretariat of the NJM had no power and played almost no role in the functioning of the NJM: it existed on a sporadic basis, its functions were ill-defined, and it did not have a specified membership. In fact, as late as September 1983, Political Bureau member, Ewart Layne noted that "we do not have a C.C. [Central Committee] Secretariat."³ Because there was no properly functioning Secretariat, there

¹"Central Committee Report on the First Plenary Session 13 - 19 July, 1983," p. 14.

²In October of 1981, the Political Bureau was composed of the following NJM members: Maurice Bishop, Bernard Coard, Selwyn Strachan, George Louison, Hudson Austin, Kenrick Radix, and Unison Whiteman.

³"Extraordinary Meeting of the Central Committee NJM 14 - 16 September, 1983," p. 20.

was no General Secretary or First Secretary of the NJM; this is in stark contrast to the CPSU party structure. (Bishop was simply called the leader of the NJM).

The lack of a well developed Secretariat was due largely to the existence of the very powerful Organising Committee. As noted earlier, during the transitional-vanguard party stage of development, the Organising Committee functioned like the Organizational-Party Work Department of the CPSU. However, the Organising Committee quickly assumed more and more responsibility to the point that it became de facto the Secretariat of the NJM. Like a communist party Secretariat, the Organising Committee of the NJM had considerable control over party and state personnel appointments (for example, it had the power to appoint the heads of PCBs),¹ as well as the primary responsibility to ensure that the decisions of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee were implemented.² An interesting contrast existed between the CPSU. In the CPSU, the head of the Secretariat (General Secretary) is ipso facto the head of the party. But in the NJM, the head of the Organising Committee (de facto the Secretariat) was not the head of the party. (Coard was the Chairman of the Organising Committee;³ Bishop was the leader of the NJM Party). Nevertheless, it is evident that the NJM had a structure which performed the functions of a communist party Secretariat.

Another key central party organ (as discussed earlier) which was similar to that of a Marxist-Leninist party was the NJM Central Committee; it continued to function like

¹"Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting Held on Wednesday, 9th September 1981," in Grenada Documents, p. 2.

²"Minutes of Central Committee Meeting Held Wednesday, 30th December, 1981," in Grenada Documents, p. 2; "Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting, 17th November, 1982," in Grenada Documents, p. 4.

³The Deputy Chairman of the Organising Committee was Selwyn Strachan, a strong Coard supporter.

a Central Committee of a Marxist-Leninist party: composing the most powerful members of the NJM, creating all other party organs, and formulating key party policy.

One of the most important organs created by the NJM Central Committee, similar to a Marxist-Leninist party and reflective of the vanguard party stage of development, was the Main Political Department of the Grenadian Armed Forces.¹ The Main Political Department was identical to the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy (essentially a department of the Central Committee of the CPSU): Both ensured party dominance over their respective organs of defence. Like the CPSU, the Chief of the Main Political Department was a Central Committee member.²

In addition to the Main Political Department, by 1983 the Central Committee of the NJM had created approximately two dozen central party organs, almost all of which were committees.³ Some of these committees, not unlike CPSU practice, were of a temporary nature; yet they were very important (e.g. Party Constitution and Fundraising committees). Despite the attempt to build a strong vanguard party structure, it was noted in the Central Committee minutes of the NJM, that many of these committee (both permanent and temporary) were not fulfilling their tasks: "The CC [Central Committee] realized that most of the committees have not been functioning on preset agendas . . ."⁴ The underdevelopment of these NJM party

¹"Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting Held on Wednesday, 23rd Sept. 1981," in Grenada Documents, p. 1; "Central Committee Report on the First Plenary Session 13 - 19 July, 1983," in Grenada Documents, p. 14; "Bulletin from Main Political Department," pp. 340-44.

²The Chief of Main Political Department was Leon Cornwall, a prominent Coard supporter.

³The committees of the NJM Central Committee included the following: Worker's, Airport, Festival, Disciplinary, Fundraising, Women's, Publication, Land Reform, Farmer's, Economic, Teacher's, Youth, Socialism Tutor's, Party Constitution, Rural Worker's, Student, Militia, National Security, Visitor's, Editorial.

⁴"Minutes of the Central Committee Meeting Held on Wednesday, 30th December, 1981," p. 1.

committees is reflective, however, of the differences between a vanguard party and a highly developed Marxist-Leninist party.

Function

In contrast to the function of a transitional-vanguard party, the *leading role* function of a vanguard party, that is to lead the socialist-oriented political development of a country, is well defined: it controls the organs of socialization, it controls the organs of defence, it educates the population in scientific socialism, it trains party and state personnel, it guides economic development, and most importantly, it exercises its leading role over the state apparatus. This *leading role* function was also evident in the NJM. Bishop, during his "Line of March," notes that the *leading role* function is the premier characteristic of the party:

First, it means control by the Party and the working people. So we have to be guided by that at all times. The Party and the working people; the Party acting in the name of the working people and particularly, of course, the working class must control, guide and direct the process [socialist-oriented political development] - must rule.¹

The *leading role* function of the NJM was manifested in several salient ways.

First, like a vanguard party, the NJM formed and controlled the organs of socialization (trade unions, and women's and youth organizations). By 1982, the NJM directly controlled the majority of Grenada's trade unions; this point was stressed by Bishop in his "Line of March" speech: "Consider the trade unions in our country, five of the eight leading trade unions are under the direct leadership and control . . . of our Party."² For example, the Agricultural and General Workers' Union, which was formed by the NJM, was headed by Central Committee member Fitroy Bain.³ In addition, the

¹Bishop, "Line of March," p. 26.

²Bishop, "Line of March," p. 24.

³"Extraordinary Meeting of the Central Committee NJM 14 - 16 September, 1983," p. 22; Bishop, "Freedom of the Press versus CIA Destabilisation," in Forward Ever, p. 170.

NJM directly controlled the National Women's Organization; it was headed by Phyllis Coard who was also the Chairperson of the Women's Committee of the Central Committee.¹ Finally, the National Youth Organization and the Young Pioneers were lead by NJM members; again, these youth organizations were under the guidance of a Central Committee member, in this case, Tan Bartholomew.² Not only did the NJM control the organs of socialization, the NJM also directed their activities; it is clear from the Political Bureau minutes, for instance, that many of the activities of the organs of socialization (e.g. mass rallies) were guided by the Political Bureau.³ This guidance further demonstrated the vanguard nature of the NJM.

Second, the vanguard nature of the NJM was reflected in its control of the organs of defence. The NJM exercised its leading role through (1) controlling the key positions of these organs with NJM personnel, and (2) creating specific party organs to oversee the defence organs. The NJM held all key positions in the armed forces and the militia: Bishop was the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA), the Minister of the Interior and, for most of the NJM's rein, the Minister of Defence; Hudson Austin, a Political Bureau member, was the General of the PRA and succeeded Bishop as Minister of defence; finally, all leading officer positions in the PRA and the militia were held by NJM members. Besides placing NJM members in key positions, the NJM also created party organs to oversee the organs of defence. The

¹Letter from Women's Committee to Political Bureau, in Grenada Documents, pp. 1-3; "Extraordinary Meeting of the Central Committee NJM 14 - 16 September, 1983," p. 22.

²"Extraordinary Meeting of the Central Committee NJM 14 - 16 September, 1983," p. 22.

³"Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting Held on Wednesday, 23rd Sept. 1981," in Grenada Documents, pp. 2-3; "Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting of Wednesday, 21st October 1981," in Grenada Documents, p. 2; "Minutes of Political Bureau Meeting on Monday 28th December, 1981," in Grenada Documents, p. 2. "Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting Wednesday 12th January, 1983," in Grenada Documents, p. 5.

most important organs were the Main Political Department and the PPOs; they functioned in a similar manner to their respective CPSU organs. As Bishop noted, the NJM had "hegemony" over the organs of defence¹--reflective of the leading role function of a vanguard party.

Third, the leading role of the NJM corresponded to that of a vanguard party in its endeavor to disseminate the principles of scientific socialism among the Grenadian population. During its vanguard stage of party development, Bishop noted that this was the most important task of the NJM:

The first task is sinking the ideas of Marxism/Leninism among the working class and the working people. The main vehicle for this is socialism classes. The Committee feels very strongly that this is the Number One task.²

To fulfill this task, the NJM conducted a number of socialism classes; however, the thrust of this education in scientific socialism seems to be aimed at the Grenadian working class as opposed to the general population. The Worker's Committee was the main party organ responsible for conducting socialism classes, thus demonstrating the vanguard leading role of the NJM.³

Fourth, the NJM also exercised its vanguard leading role in the training of party (which was discussed earlier) and state personnel. Socialism classes, which met some resistance by state workers, eventually became compulsory:

SOCIALISM CLASSES IN THE BUREAUCRACY--Cde. Strachan said that according to reports given by the tutors taking those classes there has been some resistance from some students. He is therefore proposing a letter from his Ministry be sent to all Permanent Secretaries, stating that the classes are compulsory and must be attended by all workers.⁴

¹Bishop, "Line of March," p. 23.

²Bishop, "Line of March," p. 35.

³"Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting Wednesday 5th January, 1983," in Grenada Documents, p. 5.

⁴"Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting Held on Wednesday, 9th September 1981," p. 2.

The scope encompassed by the socialism classes--all state workers--reveals the depth of the vanguard leading role of the NJM; however, the difficulties encountered by the NJM in exercising its leading role shows an important difference between a vanguard party and fully developed Marxist-Leninist party.

Fifth, a vanguard party exercises its leading role through guiding the economic development of a country; this function was also performed by the NJM. For example, the Central Committee formulated a Land Reform Document which outlined how land reform was to be undertaken in order to improve Grenada's agrarian based economy.¹ During the First Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the NJM, considerable attention was addressed to the course of Grenada's economic development, particularly in the areas of Agriculture, Agro-Industries, Fisheries, and Tourism.² The NJM's guidance of the economy included not only the public sector, but the private sector, as well: "The private sector must be encouraged to explore investment opportunities offered by the CBI [Caribbean Basin Initiative]. However, this area must be closely monitored by the Party in keeping with our strategic objectives."³

The most salient function of a vanguard party, however, is to exercise its leading role over the state apparatus--this was very true of the NJM. Like a vanguard party, the NJM continued to create: for example, the number of cabinet ministries was greatly expanded and zonal councils were created. In addition, the NJM controlled any changes to the state apparatus. For example, it was noted in the Political Bureau

¹"Central Committee Minutes Held on 22nd July, 1981," in Grenada Documents, pp. 1-2.

²"Central Committee Report on First Plenary Session 13 - 19 July, 1983," pp. 10-12.

³*Ibid.*, p. 12.

minutes that in July 1981 the Ministry of Health and Housing was split at Bishop's initiative.¹

Besides creating the new state apparatus, the NJM exercised its leading role (like a vanguard party) by placing leading party personnel in the leading positions of the state. The dominance by the NJM in both the Revolutionary Council and the Cabinet of the People's Revolutionary Government became evident: by September 1982 the NJM accounted for sixteen of the twenty members of the Revolutionary Council and for nine of the ten Cabinet positions. Moreover, all the Cabinet positions held by the NJM were held by all the Political Bureau members (the only exceptions were Chris DeRiggs who was a Central Committee member and Jacqueline Creft who was only a NJM party member).² This increased domination of the state apparatus demonstrates the increased leading role of the NJM, further indicating the vanguard party stage of its development. As well, this overwhelming domination of the state apparatus by the NJM follows the practice of a communist party, although in a communist party this domination tends to be complete.

Another way in which a vanguard party exercises its leading role over the state apparatus is by determining the domestic and foreign policies to be implemented by the state apparatus. From the "Line of March" speech and the "Central Committee Report on First Plenary Session," it clearly evident that the NJM controlled the agenda for Grenada's domestic development: In the political sphere, it dealt with the problems of building a Marxist-Leninist party and ensuring that party's leading role. In the economic sphere, the NJM assessed Grenada's economic achievements and formulated

¹"[Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting Held on] 8th July. 1981," in Grenada Documents, p. 1.

²Incidentally, Jacqueline Creft was a graduate of political science from Carleton University.

objectives for its further development. In the social sphere, the NJM dictated the direction of development in health care, housing, education, sports, and culture.¹ It is also clear from the various Political Bureau and Central Committee minutes that the NJM consciously endeavored to strengthen Grenada's political, economic, and social relations with the socialist community through a variety of political and economic treaties and agreements. Given the fact that almost all the ministers of the Cabinet were also the members of the NJM Political Bureaus, the NJM had little difficulty ensuring that its policies were implemented by the state. Thus, in terms of formulating policy, the NJM strongly corresponded to a vanguard party in exercising its leading role over the state.

Thus, through its control of the organs of socialization, its control of the organs of defence, its education of the population about the principles of scientific socialism, its training of party and state personnel, its guidance of economic development, and most importantly, its dominance of state apparatus, the NJM exercised its leading role exactly like a vanguard party.

Elite Dynamics

The process of the leftward radicalization of the NJM, which began in the national front stage and continued during the transitional-vanguard stage, intensified during the last two years of the NJM's rule. In this regard, the NJM almost mirrored the model of the development of a vanguard party. The leftward radicalization of the NJM political elite was manifested in the shifts the number of party members, as well as in the changes of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee. In 1982, there were eighty full members of the NJM; however, a purge of the party membership appears to

¹Bishop, "Line of March;" "Central Committee Report on First Plenary Session 13-19 July, 1983."

have occurred since by the fall of 1983 the number of full party members had dropped to seventy-two. This conscious effort to build a party consisting only of the most committed Marxist-Leninists (meaning less committed individuals must be removed from the party) was stressed by Bishop in his "Line of March Speech:" "As Lenin told us a long time ago 'better fewer but better.' Immortal words that we must never forget."¹

However, the leftward radicalization of the NJM was most graphically demonstrated in the elimination of the Bishop faction (which was more moderate) and the ascendancy of the Coard faction (which was hardline in commitment to Marxism-Leninism). In December 1981, Bishop's faction held seven of the eighteen positions on the Central Committee, but held five of the seven Political Bureau positions.²

In October 1982, the dominant position of Bishop was shaken. The Central Committee assessed its members according to such criteria as discipline and ideological level; as a result of this assessment, two Bishop supporters (Kenrick Radix and Caldwell Taylor) were forced to resign their Central Committee positions, and (in the case of Radix) one was forced to resign from the Political Bureau, as well. At the same time, the Central Committee added three Coard supporter to the Political Bureau (Chalkie Ventour, Ewart Layne, and Liam James).³ And in a tactical move, Bernard Coard resigned (for one year) from the Political Bureau and the Central Committee. These changes resulted the Bishop faction holding only five of the fifteen positions on the Central Committee, but more significantly the Bishop faction lost control of the Political Bureau holding only four of eight positions.

¹Bishop, "Line of March," p. 42.

²"Minutes of Central Committee Meeting Held Wednesday, 30th December, 1981," p. 1; "Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting on Monday 28th December, 1981," p. 1.

³"Minutes of Extra-Ordinary Meeting of the Central Committee of the NJM From Tuesday 12th - Friday 15th October, 1982," pp. 1-9.

With the Coard faction holding equal power (with the Bishop faction) in the Political Bureau and controlling the Central Committee and the powerful Organising Committee, the Coard faction moved to remove Bishop and his supporters from power in September 1983. Under the pretext that the NJM led by Bishop was on "a path of right opportunism,"¹ the Coard dominated Central Committee decided to ask Coard to rejoin the Central Committee and Political Bureau, and approved a proposal for joint leadership between Bishop and Coard. However, in October 1983, Bishop, finally seeing the challenge to his position, changed his mind. On October 12, 1983, the Central Committee, dominated by Coard's faction, responded by removing Bishop from the Political Bureau and the Central Committee and placing him under house arrest. (The Coard faction ruled Grenada until the American invasion on October 25, 1983).

Thus, we see the terminus of the process of the elite dynamics of a the NJM; this process of the leftward radicalization of the NJM, through all three stages of party development (national front, transitional-vanguard, and vanguard), fully corresponds to that of a revolutionary-democratic party.

The Role of the Socialist Bloc

The vanguard character of the NJM was keenly evident in its continued development of party-to-party relations with the socialist community. In contrast to the transitional-vanguard stage, relations between the NJM and the socialist community, especially between the NJM and the CPSU, became much stronger and more complex; this stems largely from the socialist community's higher appraisal of the NJM as a revolutionary-democratic party. During the vanguard party stage of development, there should be evidence not only of the forging of closer ties between the vanguard party

¹"Extraordinary Meeting of the Central Committee NJM 14 - 16 September, 1983," p. 4.

and the Marxist-Leninist parties of the socialist bloc, but also of the influence of the socialist bloc on the ideological, structural, elite dynamics, and so on development of a vanguard party; this was evident in NJM-CPC and NJM-CPSU relations.

Although relations between the Communist Party of Cuba (CPC) and the NJM were quite strong during the transitional-vanguard stage of development, there was a marked strengthening during the vanguard stage. This strengthening was signalled in July 1981 by a 16 page feature report on Grenada under the NJM, including a nine page interview with Bishop, in Granma Weekly Review.¹ As well, the report particularly emphasized the vanguard role of the NJM. The depth of this coverage given to Grenada clearly demonstrates the CPC's higher assessment of the NJM.

Reflecting a vanguard party stage of development, this higher assessment of the NJM by the CPC lead to increasing cooperation between the NJM and CPC as the examples illustrate: One of the most demonstrative examples of close cooperation between the two parties was the assistance given by the CPC in addressing the "religious question" in Grenada. In 1982, the America Department of the CPC visited Grenada and prepared a thirty-five page report, which was submitted to the NJM, and which included a detailed analysis of the religious conditions and recommendations on dealing with Grenada's churches. In order to control the activities and the influence of Grenada's churches--especially the Catholic church--the CPC report strongly recommended the following:

a comrade responsible for the attention to the religious problems be appointed by the New Jewel Movement . . . [and] should spend 15-20 days in Cuba so as to be able to know our experiences, be trained in the tasks of information on the subject, and exchange ideas on the most controversial aspects of the work.²

¹"We'll Always Choose to Stand Up," Granma Weekly Review, 12 July 1981; "The Long Road to Freedom," Granma Weekly Review, 12 July 1981.

²"Report of the Delegation Sent to Grenada by the America Department . . .," in Grenada Documents, p. 8.

This clearly shows that the CPC had significant influence on the function of the NJM.

Further manifesting the development of close relations between the CPC and the NJM was the 1983 "Cooperation and Exchange Plan." This plan was extremely comprehensive and provided for Cuban technical and organizational assistance to the NJM not only for the development of the NJM party and party personnel, but also for the development of non-party institutions (guided by the NJM), such as mass organizations and the media. In fulfillment of this agreement, in 1983, approximately thirty NJM members and candidate members were trained at the CPC party school.¹

A final piece of evidence demonstrating that the CPC played a key role in the development of the NJM is found in the NJM Political Bureau minutes of December 22, 1982: the NJM's party programme (de facto), the "Line of March for the Party," was analyzed by Cuban party members; their "suggestions and comments" concerning the "Line of March" were submitted to the NJM:

Report from Cde. Cornwall [Grenadian Ambassador to Cuba] re Line of March: Suggestions and comments on the Line of March were received from members and candidate members in Cuba. This to be reproduced and distributed for consideration to CC and Education Committee members. Response to be sent to comrades acknowledging receipt of the document and the Party's appreciation for the obvious hard work and thought put into the document.²

Such high level cooperation between the CPC and the NJM, as well as the enormous influence of the CPC on the development of the NJM is a profound indicator of the NJM's vanguard party stage of development.

A final note should be made concerning the elite dynamics of the NJM: there is no evidence which suggests that Cuba played any role in the removal of Bishop from power by the Coard faction. Rather, it appears Castro was extremely upset that Bishop

¹Report from the Grenadian Embassy in Cuba, May 7th, 1983," in Grenada Documents, pp. 1-4.

²"Minutes of the Political Bureau Meeting Wednesday, 22nd December, 1982," in Grenada Documents, p. 2.

was ousted from power and subsequently executed. In fact, during a speech in November 1983, Castro referred to the Coard faction as the "Pol Pot group."¹

Like Cuban-Grenadian party-to party relations, ties between the CPSU and the NJM became closer after the summer of 1981; again this appears to be a result of the Soviet Union's reassessment of Grenada. This favorable assessment of the NJM by the CPSU was signalled in a Pravda article in 1981; this article acknowledged--for the first time--several vanguard features of the NJM: (1) the Soviet Union called the NJM a *revolutionary-democratic party*; (2) the NJM was referred to as playing a *vanguard* role: "Progressive social transformations in the country are being realized under the leadership of the political vanguard of the working people of Grenada--the New Jewel Movement Party;" (3) the *Marxist-Leninist* character of the NJM was acknowledged by the Soviets: "It [NJM] is based on the principles of democratic centralism, sets high standards for the admittance of new members and at the same time strengthens its ties with all strata of the population, first of all with the working people;"² (4) the Soviets acknowledged the NJM had a *Political Bureau*. Thus, the Soviets recognized the NJM as a vanguard revolutionary-democratic party.

The most cogent evidence of the forging of closer ties between the CPSU and the NJM was the party-state visit (between July 26 to July 31, 1982) by a Grenadian delegation headed by Bishop³ to the Soviet Union. Bishop was met by high ranking party and state officials including members Political Bureau N. Tikhonov, and M. Gorbachev. This clearly indicated the rising status of Grenada, as well as the closing

¹"[. . .] People's of Latin America and Turn Their Feelings Against the Aggressor," Granma Weekly Review, 20 November 1983.

²Peremeny na Ostrove Pryanosteyi," Pravda, 17 August 1981.

³The Grenadian delegation also included Political Bureau members--Whiteman, Radix, and Louison, and Central Committee members--Layne and James; see "Sovetsko-Grenadskie Peregovory," Pravda, 28 July 1982.

of NJM-CPSU relations. These close relations also produced an "agreement on cooperation between the CPSU and the New Jewel Movement Party signed . . . by B. Ponamarev; . . . K. Radix."¹ This agreement stated "that inter-party cooperation is a most important basis for the development of friendly relations between the peoples of Grenada and the Soviet Union;"² and included the following articles as the basis of relations between the NJM and the CPSU:

1. Steadfastly to extend and deepen their cooperation at all levels.
2. Continuously to exchange experience in party work and party guidance of the social, economic and cultural development of their countries, including regular exchange of information and materials on the aforesaid topics.
4. To promote cooperation in the training of party and government cadres in furthering their political competence.³

The most demonstrative evidence of the implementation of this agreement was the training of fourteen NJM members at the CPSU party in Moscow in 1983.⁴

Like the development of a vanguard party, the strengthening of close relations between the NJM and the CPSU had an influence on the development of the NJM. This influence was most graphically demonstrated (1) in the ideological development of the NJM through the assimilation of Marxism-Leninism by party members, and (2) in the elite dynamics of the NJM which resulted in the ouster of Bishop.

During the Extraordinary General Meeting of the Full Members in September 1983, it was evident that those NJM party members who were sent to the USSR for ideological training did assimilate Marxism-Leninism. For example, Anslem Debourg arguing in favour of joint leadership between Bishop and Coard stated that, "the

¹Podpisanie sovetsko-grenadskix dokumentov," Pravda, 28 July 1982.

²"Agreement on cooperation between the New Jewel Movement of Grenada and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, " in The Grenada Papers, p. 1.

³Ibid.

⁴"Report of the meeting with Acting Rector of the CPSU party school Gaidum Oleg P. 23rd, May 1983," in Grenada Documents, p. 1.

question of collective leadership is a fundamental of Marxism-Leninism."¹ This assimilation of Marxism-Leninism also was reflected in the comments of another CPSU party school graduate, Ronnie Spooner: "He stated that Cde. Bishop as the leader of the party should be the first person to abide by and uphold democratic centralism. His failure to do so is nothing but a petit bourgeois manifestation."² This clearly demonstrates that the CPSU played a role in the ideological development of the NJM--reflective of the vanguard party stage of development.

From the Grenada documents and from Soviet newspapers, it is also apparent that the Soviet Union--in sharp contrast to Cuba--played a role in the elite dynamics of the NJM which resulted in Bishop losing power. There are several pieces of evidence suggesting this. **First**, the Soviets expressed their displeasure with not being informed of a visit by Bishop to the United States in the spring of 1983 and with being told that the nature of the meetings between Bishop and American officials was confidential.³ **Second**, after the decision was made to create joint leadership between Coard and Bishop, Bishop left on an official visit to Eastern Europe. However, his reception in Moscow on September 27-28, 1983 was considerably downgraded (as compared with other visits, including his most recent visit in April 1983 where he met with Political Bureau member and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko). Conspicuously, Bishop was not received by any high ranking members of the CPSU, but, instead, met with deputy ministers of the Soviet government.⁴ In addition, Bishop's visit received only a small mention in Pravda.⁵ Thus, it would appear that Bishop had lost favour

¹"Extraordinary General Meeting of Full Members, Date. sunday 25th September, 1983," in Grenada Documents, p. 17.

²Ibid., p. 20.

³"Grenada's Relations with the USSR," in Grenada Documents, p. 4.

⁴"Proezdom v Moskve," Pravda, 29 September 1983.

⁵Ibid.

with Moscow. **Third**, all of the NJM members who were trained at the CPSU party school and who participated in the NJM meetings concerning joint leadership sided with Coard and against Bishop on the leadership issue.¹ **Fourth**, a letter from Vincent Noel to the Central Committee and the NJM Party raised, with concern, the issue of a possible "Afghanistan Solution" to eliminate Maurice Bishop from power (in Afghanistan, two successive leaders who had lost favour with Moscow, Taraki and Amin, were murdered and replaced by the more suitable candidate Karmal):

While Maurice was out of the country De Bourg [a Coard supporter who was trained in Moscow] had said to me [Noel] one day that Chalkie [Ventour, a strong Coard supporter and a Political Bureau member] had told him that there would be a solution like Afghanistan if the Chief fucked around on the question of joint leadership.²

The significance of the *Afghanistan Solution*---which eventually occurred---is further seen in light of Ewart Layne's (Layne studied in the USSR and was a Coard supporter) criticism of the NJM under Bishop that the party has failed to "[t]ighten our relations with the World Socialist Movement, especially Cuba, S.U, G.D.R, [sic]."³ **And fifth**, Soviet reaction to the removal of Bishop from power was in complete contrast to Cuban reaction. Whereas Cuba referred to Coard's faction as the "Pol Pot group," the Soviet referred to the Coard faction as "Grenadian patriots."⁴ And instead of acknowledging that Bishop was murdered, as Cuba had, the Soviets have consistently stated that he died tragically as a result of an armed clash.⁵ From these pieces of

¹"Extraordinary General Meeting of Full Members, Date: sunday 25th September, 1983," in Grenada Documents, pp. 6-7, 12, 17, and 20; "Report on the meeting of PB and CC held on Oct. 12th given by Cde. Strachan," in Grenada Papers, pp. 1, 3, and 4.

²"Letter from Vincent Noel to the Central Committee and Party," in Grenada Papers, p. 3.

³"Extraordinary Meeting of the Central Committee NJM 14 - 16 September, 1983," p. 4.

⁴"Absolyutnoe Bezzakonie," Izvestia, 12 January 1984.

⁵"Grenada--Zhertva Agressii Imperializma SShA," Kommunist, no. 16 (November 1983), p. 110; "Sobytiia v Grenade," Pravda, 21 October 1983.

evidence, it is clear that the CPSU had a role in the elite dynamics of the NJM--an integral part of the development of a revolutionary-democratic party.

Thus, it is clear from this examination that that the NJM had developed very strong and comprehensive ties with both the CPC and the NJM; it is also clear that these ties had a direct and a profound influence on the development of the NJM--characteristic of a vanguard revolutionary-democratic party.

Conclusion

This chapter critically analyzed the political development of Grenada under the NJM by collating this development with the framework for analysis--the socialist-oriented state. It is strikingly clear from the analysis of the state apparatus, economic development, the organs of socialization, the organs of defence, and the revolutionary-democratic party, that Grenada corresponded--to a very high degree--with the model.

We have seen that the creation of the new state apparatus is a strong indicator of Grenada's socialist-orientation: the Parish and Zonal Councils were organized and functioned very similar to the representative organs in the USSR; the numbers and the types of the ministerial portfolios of the Cabinet highly corresponded to the government of a socialist-oriented state; the structure, function, and temporary nature of the PRG closely fit the pattern of a monistic form of government; and the NJM was clearly in control of the state apparatus.

Grenada's pattern of economic development also strongly correlated to the model of the socialist-oriented state: (1) it maintained a mixed economy, (2) while beginning to eliminate the decisive role of foreign capital in the economy, the PRG still utilized foreign capital to pursue economic development, (3) the private sector-- the largest sector-- was encouraged to develop, (4) significant efforts were made to create a dominant public sector in the tourism, fisheries, and agricultural branches of the economy, (5) the PRG began to implement the principle of central planning, and (6) Grenada received considerable assistance from the socialist community in the developing its public sector.

In Grenada, as we have seen, the organs of socialization-- the media, the education system, and the mass organizations--played a key role in both the development of a revolutionary consciousness and the mobilization of popular support for the regime: in addition, they received considerable assistance from the socialist

community. Thus, it is clear that Grenada's organs of socialization conformed to a large degree with the model of the socialist-oriented state.

In Grenada the organs of defence-- the People's Revolutionary Militia, the Preventative Detention Tribunal, the State Security Forces and the People's Revolutionary Army--which played the key role in protecting the Bishop government from both external and internal enemies, were strictly controlled by the NJM, and in the case of the security and armed forces, received considerable assistance from the socialist bloc. This shows Grenada had a conformity with a socialist-oriented pattern of development.

It is evident from the critical examination of the development of the New Jewel Movement Party that *this* party corresponded very highly to the three stages of the classical route of vanguard revolutionary-democratic party formation. First, the initial stage of development of the NJM (April 1974 to June 1977) conforms significantly with the features of a national front revolutionary-democratic party: The NJM was starting to develop towards Marxism-Leninism and a leftward radicalization of the party leadership was occurring, but it was still quite ideologically heterogeneous and structurally underdeveloped. Second, the NJM (between July 1977 and June 1981) conforms to a very large degree with a transitional-vanguard party in its development. Ideologically, the NJM consolidated strongly around Marxism-Leninism; by 1980, it publicly asserted that the NJM was based on the principles of scientific socialism and democratic centralism. Structurally, the NJM began to develop not only territorially and industrially based organs, but also central party organs similar to a Marxist-Leninist party. In terms of its functions, the NJM clearly exerted its leading role; however, it was also noted that this leading role had limitations. In terms of its elite dynamics, there was a clear leftward progression of the NJM. Finally, the NJM began

to develop party-to-party ties with a number of socialist bloc countries, most notably, with Cuba and the USSR. And third, the NJM (between July 1981 and October 1983) mirrored a vanguard revolutionary-democratic party. Ideologically, the NJM consolidated firmly around Marxism-Leninism, it implemented the principle of democratic centralism (though in consistently), it assimilated Marxism-Leninism (though incompletely). Structurally, the NJM strongly resembled a Marxist-Leninist party in terms of its territorial-industrial organization and central party organs, but the lack of a well developed secretariat was an important difference. This *nearly* structural development of the NJM is characteristic of a vanguard party. Functionally, the NJM exercised its leading role like a Marxist-Leninist party: it controlled the organs of socialization, it controlled the organs of defence, it educated the Grenadian working class about socialism, it trained party and state personnel, and it directed the work of the state apparatus. In terms of its elite dynamics, Grenada continued to evolve as demonstrated most saliently by the removal of Bishop from power. And finally, the NJM's relations with the socialist bloc became considerably more involved as evidenced in the training of NJM party personnel in Cuba and the Soviet Union, as well as the involvement of the Soviet Union in the elite dynamics of the NJM.

From this extensive analysis we can determine the type of socialist-oriented state to which Grenada corresponded. Because it had developed a vanguard party, created a new state apparatus (almost entirely replacing the former British parliamentary system), and forged very close relations with the socialist community, Grenada corresponds completely with a *people's democratic socialist-oriented state*.

CHAPTER FIVE

EVALUATING THE MODEL OF THE SOCIALIST-ORIENTED STATE AS A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

In the previous chapter we saw that Grenada corresponded to a very high degree with the model of the socialist-oriented state. But, how powerful is this framework for analysis in explaining the political development of a Third World "Marxist-Leninist" state?¹ By examining several salient phenomena of Grenada's development (its political elite dynamics, its relations with the socialist bloc, and its leftward progression) we will seek to answer this question.

One of the most significant differences between the model of the socialist-oriented state and other approaches is evident in their explanations of the elite dynamics (during September and October of 1983) of the NJM, that is, the removal of Bishop from power. Every other approach has concluded that an unnatural, possibly avoidable *split* occurred within the NJM, a split, many argue, which led to the collapse of the NJM and which resulted in the disintegration of the revolution. Is this assessment correct? According to the model of the socialist-oriented state, the elite dynamics of a political system is a natural evolutionary process whereby the leftwing of the leadership grows stronger as the revolution progresses; this process is a result of the heterogeneity of revolutionary democracy and of the goal to reach socialism. In Grenada, this exact process occurred: starting as early as the mid-seventies, the NJM

¹Some of the more prominent approaches include the following: (1) Leninist framework (Jiri and Virginia Valenta); (2) undefined "Leninist model" and Caribbean political culture (Anothony Payne, Paul Sutton, and Tony Thorndike); (3) colonial political culture, Marxism-Leninism, small island nationalism versus big power imperialism (Gordon Lewis); (4) a struggle between democratic socialism and Marxist-Leninism; and (5) communist totalitarian model (Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall).

became increasingly Marxist-Leninist in its composition--NJM members who were not ideologically committed were either purged or left voluntarily; as well several Central Committee and Political Bureau members were replaced by more hard core Marxist-Leninists. The dramatic events which occurred in Grenada in September and October of 1983 were a continuation of this process as the NJM consolidated increasingly around Marxism-Leninism. Thus, in contrast to the conclusion arrived at by the other approaches--that a split occurred within the NJM-- this model suggests that the removal of Bishop from power was a natural evolutionary process of the elite dynamics of a socialist-oriented state--those who are more strongly committed to the goal of building socialism will strive to attain political supremacy.

Another important problem for investigation is assessing the nature of relations between the socialist bloc and the Third World "Marxist-Leninist" states. One of the strengths of the model of the socialist-oriented state is that it can accurately assess the nature of these relations. First, the model views the relations between the socialist community and a socialist-oriented state comprehensively: it examines the role of the socialist community in every aspect of the development of a Third World revolutionary political system--the party, the economy, organs of defence, and the organs of socialization; it does not, for example, treat military relations as the decisive indicators of the strength of relations between a socialist-oriented state and the socialist bloc. This is a critical difference. In Grenada, the development of *comprehensive* ties with the socialist community was a strong indicator of its socialist orientation, rather than that it received substantial military assistance. Even though Grenada received substantial military assistance from the Soviet Union at a very early stage, it did not develop significant party-to-party relations until much later.

In addition, the model of the socialist-oriented state is powerful in accounting for Soviet behavior *towards* Third World "Marxist-Leninist" states: Because of their progressive orientation, the Soviet Union recognizes developing Third World "Marxist-Leninist" states as being part of the world revolutionary movement; and consequently, the Soviet Union extends considerable assistance to their development (as we have seen in the case of Grenada). At the same time, however, because of their much lower level of political development (as compared with a socialist state), the Soviet Union excludes these states from the socialist community. This exclusion has critical ramifications for Third World "Marxist-Leninist" states--the most salient is defence: because socialist-oriented states are not fully developed the Soviets argue that their orientation is reversible; consequently, although the Soviet Union may aid the defence potential of a revolutionary state, it has no obligation to guarantee its defence. In other words, the Brezhnev doctrine does not apply to socialist-oriented states. (In addition to failure of either the Soviet Union or Cuba to defend Grenada, the recent Soviet pull-out from Afghanistan serves as an excellent example).

The most powerful attribute of the model of the socialist-oriented state is its ability to explain why Third World "Marxist-Leninist" states evolve leftwards. Because the model of the socialist-oriented state focuses on the internal development of the political system, first, and the role of external influences (predominantly the socialist bloc), second, the leftward radicalization of Third World "Marxist-Leninist" states is much better understood. Western scholars tend to argue that this leftward radicalization is either a result of hostility on the part of U.S. administrations (in other words, these regimes are pushed into the Soviet's arms by the United States), or a result of active and direct influence on the part of the Soviet Union (in other words, the Soviet Union transforms these revolutionary states into Soviet satellites). The major

community. What is clear in the case of Grenada is that the NJM intended to follow a non-capitalist path of development and eventually to build socialism in Grenada even prior to attaining power. Thus, the principal impetus for the leftward radicalization was the NJM leadership, itself. Whether the United States or the Soviet Union existed or not would not have changed the direction of political development--these external actors only influenced the pace at which the Grenada strove to reach its goal. If the United States had any influence on the pace of Grenada's advancement towards socialism, it was to slow it down: Bishop noted that a major reason why petty bourgeois individuals were part of the PRG was to appease the United States so that it would not invade.

The analysis of Grenada in the previous chapter demonstrated that its political development conformed completely with the model of the socialist-oriented state. And although the central purpose of the thesis is not to evaluate the model of the socialist-oriented state as a framework for analysis, the above examples have served to highlight the cogency of this model. Because this model focuses on the political system (structures and function), as a whole, as well as its developmental telos, i.e., socialism, it appears that it can explain political phenomena more accurately and more fully than other approaches. As a result, it may serve as a useful framework for the comparative analysis of other Third World "Marxist-Leninist" states.

However, an outside observer cannot help being struck by the lack of congruity between the Soviet paradigm and the NJM efforts to approximate this paradigm, and the reality (i.e. its relevant applicability to Grenada.) This is especially true in light of the developments since Gorbachev and the current withdrawal in Soviet foreign policy from overseas adventures, and the even greater caution in the Soviet approach to Third World countries.

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