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**Conditions of Influence: An exploratory study
of the Canadian government's effect on U.S. policy
in the case of intervention in eastern Zaire**

by

John B. Hay

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

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Abstract

When the Canadian government asserted leadership of an intended intervention in eastern Zaire in 1996, it faced the problem of persuading the U.S. government to follow its lead. That problem is framed as the research question examined here: In what circumstances, and by what means, is the Canadian government most able to influence the U.S. government in cases of armed intervention? The question is addressed as an exploratory case study, informed by three theoretical approaches—propositions of asymmetry and interdependence; the metaphor of two-level games; and models of bureaucratic politics and political process. The inquiry is further situated in the complexities of multilateral bargaining. The utility of these theoretical approaches is considered, and conditions of possible smaller-state influence are identified. Canadian government influence is found to have been constrained by (*inter alia*) lack of time, the military character of the issue, and cross-cutting bureaucratic relationships.

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Chapter One

Introduction

The images that November morning were as disturbing as they were familiar—television pictures of a distant but terrible suffering, this time among Rwandan refugees caught in the squalor and violence of camps in eastern Zaire. But this time, as Canadian officials would later recollect,¹ the news on CNN counted among the forces that shocked the Canadian government into bold and immediate action. Jean Chrétien gave special attention to those latest reports of humanitarian crisis, on the TV set at the Canadian prime minister's Harrington Lake retreat near Ottawa. He reflected for a while, remembering a telephone conversation with President Clinton three days earlier, then spent the rest of that weekend in a sudden burst of telephone summitry—calling Mandela and Major, Chirac and Moi, the prime ministers of Belgium and Japan and Italy, the president of Senegal and others—all to make a case for an international intervention to rescue the refugees from catastrophe, to “prevent another Rwanda.”² By Monday (Remembrance Day, as it happened) Chrétien had summoned ministers back to Parliament Hill for an extraordinary cabinet meeting. And before the day was out, the prime minister and cabinet members were agreed: The Canadian government would attempt not just to support but actually to lead an armed intervention into the middle of Africa.

It was an initiative unprecedented in the history of Canada's foreign relations; never before had Canada led a multinational force authorized under Chapter VII of

the United Nations Charter. Equipped with the most modest of armies, defensive of its remaining reputation as a beneficent peacekeeper, cautious when it came to joining in any use of force abroad, the Chrétien government also knew that it was proposing to lead a military action that would have to be conducted mostly by others. Nor were the prospects of international agreement altogether promising. In Washington, the voices of superpower foreign policy sounded as equivocal and divided as ever: reluctant, after the U.S. experience in Somalia, to lead a multinational force in Africa—and just as reluctant to commit troops to a force led by anyone else.³ In the capitals of Europe and Africa, meanwhile, humanitarian impulse struggled with geopolitical calculation and intuitive prudence. All could agree that a fearful evil seemed about to repeat itself in the sorrows of the Zairian refugee camps; none could say for certain how to stop it.

In truth, Canada's involvement in the Central African refugee crisis of 1996 did not begin that weekend at Harrington Lake. A Canadian general had commanded a small UN peacekeeping contingent in Rwanda at the outbreak of the genocide there in 1994; Canadian missionaries and aid workers had laboured in the area for decades. Scarcely 10 days before Prime Minister Chrétien was moved to act, his diplomat-nephew Raymond Chrétien had accepted a temporary appointment as the UN secretary-general's special envoy to the Great Lakes region; a former Africa hand himself, Ambassador Chrétien had more than once confided in the prime minister about the dangerous events unfolding in Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda.⁴ Canadian and other relief agencies had reported on the rising violence, which had forced most to suspend supplies of essential food and medicine to the camps. The UN Security

Council itself, after wearying debate, had passed a blandly compromising resolution asking member states to “prepare the necessary arrangements” to restore aid to the camps afflicted by the fighting.⁵ But now, with the prime minister committed, the Canadian government was about to invest an extraordinary commitment of foreign-policy resources in its new and urgent objective—to assemble a “coalition of the willing,” governments ready and able to deploy a multinational force for refugee relief in eastern Zaire.

Above and before all else stood one requirement for a Canadian success: The U.S. government would have to support the Canadian-led enterprise. Not only did the United States hold a determining veto over the essential next decision of the Security Council; the United States alone commanded the military wherewithal to stage such a large and remote intervention.

Embedded in that objective of securing U.S. support, indeed at the core of the challenge for Canadian authorities throughout the crisis, lay a central question of Canadian foreign policy: How does a country of Canada’s middling capacities persuade the superpower to act—or refrain from acting—in matters of foreign intervention? This is not, of course, a newly discovered question. The diplomacy of constraint⁶ has been an enduring theme and fact of Canadian foreign policy since the Second World War and before. In no previous time, however, has Canadian policy turned more frequently to the work of moderating—or activating, as in this case—U.S. participation in armed interventions.

The events of this case unfolded with a speed that not only surprised the participants but also probably affected the outcome. On Nov. 9, 1996, the Security

Council adopted Resolution 1078 calling on member states to prepare for a possible military intervention. On Nov. 12 Prime Minister Chrétien publicly announced Canada's leadership of a multinational force, which the Security Council formally authorized Nov. 15 with Resolution 1080. But just as 1080 was being adopted came the startling news that several hundred thousand Rwandan refugees were suddenly crowding the roads out of Zaire and east to Rwanda. At the same time, and more alarmingly, uncounted thousands of refugees and displaced Zairians dispersed westward, into the forest and out of sight. In these changed circumstances, and despite the commitments of the United States and others, Canada was thereafter unable to persuade any other government to deploy troops to the MNF; by mid-December the intended intervention was abandoned. Except for the mass graves later discovered, and grim accounts from some of the survivors, the number and fate of the Rwandans left in Zaire remains still largely unknown.

What factors worked for and against Canada as it tried to influence the United States in this case? Canada did have influence, despite the disparity of power between itself and the United States. But it will be concluded that Canadian influence was constrained, if not entirely thwarted, by the very severe pressures of time against which Canada was acting. In a fast-changing complex emergency, lack of time curtailed the Canadian government's opportunities to encourage the formation of pro-intervention coalitions—either in the Washington policy community or with other governments. Lack of time shortened and disturbed routines of the policy-making processes in Ottawa and Washington, creating an uncertainty that eventually favoured those in both governments resisting intervention. Finally, the rush of time attenuated

transnational relationships among non-governmental actors advocating intervention, while it strengthened transgovernmental coalitions among those trying to block intervention. Humanitarian relief agencies and media coverage may have concentrated the minds of political leaders at the start, but in the course of events intervention proponents simply ran out of time; the Canadian and U.S. defence departments, by contrast, were able for that same short time to delay and ultimately avoid an MNF deployment of force.

But why did all this happen? To phrase the question again and more formally: In what circumstances, and by what means, is the Canadian government most able to influence the U.S. government in cases of armed international intervention? That is the subject of this thesis.

¹ Personal interviews. Except where indicated, attributions to government officials are derived from personal interviews conducted for this case study between October 1997 and April 1998. These officials spoke on the customary condition of anonymity. The author has relied on unattributable evidence only insofar as it has been supported by other evidence gathered in interviews or the documentary record.

² Interviews. See also *The Globe and Mail*, Nov. 13, 1996. A1.

³ Interviews; *Globe*, Nov.9, 1996. A1.

⁴ Interviews.

⁵ Resolution 1078, 9 November 1996.

⁶ Denis Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974).

Chapter Two

Theory as Explanation

... in bargaining, weakness is often strength. . .
Thomas C. Schelling¹

In what circumstances, and by what means, is the Canadian government most able to influence the U.S. government in cases of armed international intervention? The object here is to bring that question to bear on a study of the Canadian involvement in the 1996 humanitarian crisis in eastern Zaire. The purpose is to discover the facts of the case, to understand what happened, then to understand why. In Eckstein's methodological schema this is a heuristic case study, serving to find out the facts, as he put it, "in order to arrive at a preliminary theoretical construct."² In Yin's terms it is an "exploratory" case study, designed not to prove (or disprove) a proposition but to illuminate the question³—the question of how a smaller state influences a larger one. It satisfies, moreover, one of Yin's three alternative criteria for an appropriate single-case study: It is a "revelatory case," previously inaccessible to external scholarly observation.⁴

An exploratory, heuristic case of this kind, if successful, permits an "intensive analysis that does not commit the researcher to a highly limited set of variables, and thus increases the probability that critical variables and relations will be found."⁵ It is important to stress, however, that this is not a study undertaken without reference to any theoretical supposition whatsoever. On the contrary, the identification and

interpretation of the events in the case are informed by three principal theoretical approaches:

1. The propositions of asymmetry and interdependence advanced by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye;⁶
2. The “metaphor” of two-level games associated with Robert Putnam;⁷
3. The bureaucratic-politics and political-process models in the tradition of Graham T. Allison and Roger Hilsman, and as applied to a series of U.S. intervention cases by James M. Scott.⁸

As the inquiry unfolds, these three approaches will furthermore be situated in the dynamics of “complexity and uncertainty” that are the defining characteristics of multilateral negotiations;⁹ Canadian diplomacy from the start of this case was conceived and carried out as an exercise in multilateralism.

Relying on interviews with Canadian and other participants, and on references to the available documentary record, later chapters will take up a narrative of the case—the onset of the crisis in eastern Zaire, the diplomatic, political, bureaucratic and military responses, the outcomes—followed by analysis and generalization. But first, this chapter will address key elements of the three chosen theoretical approaches. Each approach in its way generates interesting explanations for the undeniable observation that “the strong do not always prevail over the weak.”¹⁰ But each raises problems as well, of internal inconsistency and cross-contradiction. The intention is that by testing the power (and the problems) of these approaches against the facts of the case, something might be learned about both theory and practice.

The Model of Asymmetrical Interdependence

A definitional problem to begin: As Keohane and Nye themselves acknowledged, “power has always been an elusive concept.”¹¹ Now, with military force practically irrelevant in daily relations among many states, and economic capacity/vulnerability at the same time so problematic and influential, a definition of power is even more elusive; recourse to formulations like the ability to get others to do something, or control over outcomes, only seems to beg the question in circular reasoning or infinite regressions. For present purposes, an asymmetry of power simply means an interstate comparison in which (practitioners and analysts can easily agree) all the capacities of one state taken together are unambiguously and significantly greater than those of the other. “Canada, whether described as a middle power, a foremost nation, a regional power without a region, or a principal power, is not a superpower. . . .”¹² The United States very much is a superpower—and in 1996 was the only superpower. The Canadian-U.S. relationship is asymmetrical (in a way that, say, the British-French relationship is not).

That said, how is it that Canada over the years has prevailed as often as it has in negotiations with the United States? After all, the conventional Realist explanation

tells us that in bilateral systems in which one country had thirty-seven times the military expenditures of its neighbor and was twelve times its economic size, the larger country would prevail in more major disputes than the smaller. Moreover, when transnational actors from the hegemonic country penetrate the small country more than vice versa, the distribution of outcomes should favor the larger country even more.¹³

Keohane and Nye answer with the hypothesis that smaller states can sometimes be expected to prevail in negotiations with more powerful states in

conditions of “complex interdependence”—that “the political processes of complex interdependence, and more particularly the role of transnational and transgovernmental actors, lead to a more equal pattern of outcomes in intergovernmental bargaining than one would predict from the overall structure.”¹⁴ Interdependence in the Keohane/Nye view means more than mere interconnectedness. “Interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries.”¹⁵ These effects result typically from flows of money, goods, people and information. “Where there are reciprocal (although not necessarily symmetrical) costly effects of transactions, there is interdependence. Where interactions do not have significant costly effects, there is simply interconnectedness.”¹⁶

With *complex* interdependence Keohane/Nye introduce an ideal type in opposition to another ideal type, that of Realism. An interstate system thus approaches complex interdependence to the extent that it exhibits three main characteristics:¹⁷

1. “Multiple channels connect societies,” among them being ties between governing elites, non-governmental elite transactions, and cross-border activities of transnational organizations like banks and corporations.
2. There is a multitude of issues in interstate relations arranged in “an absence of hierarchy.” That is to say specifically that military-security issues do not consistently dominate the agenda.
3. “Military force is not used by governments within the region, or on the issues, when complex interdependence prevails.”

None of this is to say complex interdependence inevitably works to everyone's benefit. Rather, "it is *asymmetries* in dependence that are most likely to provide sources of influence for actors in their dealings with one another. [Emphasis in the original.] Less dependent actors can often use the interdependent relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect other issues."¹⁸ Here then is the first thing their theory says about asymmetry: As a rule, a less dependent state (in Keohane/Nye terms, less "sensitive" and less "vulnerable") will use this advantage to prevail over others.¹⁹ A big and powerful state might or might not be less sensitive—less exposed to the costly effects of others' actions. But it is virtually by definition less vulnerable—that is, more capable of creating or demanding alternatives by changing internal policies and making other bargains with other states. In short, the more powerful state is the less dependent.

What intrigued Keohane and Nye, however, was the apparent anomaly in that powerful states sometimes do not prevail as predicted. "Asymmetrical interdependence by itself cannot explain bargaining outcomes. . . . Power measured in terms of resources may look different from power measured in terms of influence over outcomes."²⁰ Keohane/Nye summon up several explanations for small-state success in bargains with big states. One is the influence of regimes—"networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects."²¹ Another explanation lies in a strong (and status-quo) state's interest in maintaining the system itself.²² "Mutual awareness of potential gains and losses and the danger of worsening each actor's position through overly rigorous struggles over the distribution of gains can limit the use of asymmetrical interdependence."²³ In the

context of this case, and anticipating issues of two-level bargaining, two other Keohane/Nye explanations deserve attention.

The first of these is commitment. “One of the most important reasons” why negotiating outcomes may favour the weaker state “is that the commitment of the weaker state may be much greater than its stronger partner. The more dependent actor may be (or appear to be) more willing to suffer.”²⁴ This has evidently been true of certain coercive relationships; Keohane and Nye cite the U.S.-North Vietnam conflict. “Yet the point holds even in more co-operative interstate relations,” the Canada-U.S. relationship included.²⁵ In trade disputes, for instance, what frequently mattered was that “the deterrence value of Canada’s ability to inflict pain on the United States would depend on her will to suffer great pain herself. And she was often willing to do that because of asymmetrical salience: the relationship was more important to Canada than to the United States.”²⁶

The strategic value of commitment in bargaining has been addressed by others as well. Rubin and Zartman found in nine interstate case studies (including the U.S.-Canada free-trade negotiation) that weaker parties do not typically submit to strong-state dominating behaviour, but instead adopt countering measures. “They blustered, dawdled, appealed, borrowed power, exercised their veto temporarily (by walking out) or longer (by at least threatening withdrawal), and generally made a nuisance of themselves over an issue that mattered far more to them than to the distracted partner. . . .” Such tenacity demands commitment, but “the feisty Canadians, the ideological Indonesians and the clever Nepalese all find ways to challenge, circumvent, upstage or outmanoeuvre their supposedly stronger negotiating partners.”²⁷

There is an intuitive logic in the thought that disciplined determination (with skill) could compensate for the vulnerability of weakness—especially against a stronger party distracted, interested in preserving the relationship, or comparatively indifferent to the negotiated outcome. But we face a paradox here: Intuition also tells us that overt commitment (not to say desperate eagerness) can be a source of bargaining weakness, not strength. R. Harrison Wagner, and others, place this proposition in the mathematics of differential marginal utilities. “Need is not measured by the absolute size of the utility gains derived from the good to be divided, but by the shape of the bargainer’s utility function.”²⁸ The riddle of commitment, seemingly central to asymmetrical bargaining, will emerge again below.

The second Keohane/Nye explanatory concept to be examined here is coherence. “In particular, the smaller state may have greater political unity than the larger one. Even though the more powerful state may be less dependent in aggregate terms, it may be more fragmented internally and its coherence reduced by conflicts of interest and difficulties of coordination within its own government.”²⁹ Jacek has hypothesized that small-state coherence—“a stronger collective organizational structure for its society”³⁰—is in fact a response to the stresses of life as the smaller partner in an asymmetrical dyad. In any event, the coherence argument runs all through the Keohane/Nye analysis. Often, they say, it has “been the intensity and coherence of the smaller state’s bargaining position” that explains its success—as when big-state demands on the small state mobilize domestic groups to resist. The United States, by contrast, is seen as weakened by fragmentation.

The United States public does not consider either Canada or Australia important enough to generate broad, popular movements. As a result,

politicization from below in the United States. . . often leads to divisions between Congress—or some elements in Congress—and the executive. Thus the pressures of democratic politics usually favor the smaller state in the bargaining process, because for them, politicization from below tends to lead to tough negotiating behavior and coherent stands by government, whereas for the United States such politicization leads to fragmentation of policy.³¹

It must be said that some fragmentation in the U.S. case is a consequence of its peculiar constitutional structure, and so predates its status as superpower, or even as great power. More to the point, this dichotomy, between a fragmented (thereby weakened) United States and a generality of coherent (thereby strengthened) smaller states, finds no empirical or conceptual substantiation in the Keohane/Nye account. Some great powers, France for one, have historically exhibited impressive cohesion over long periods while smaller states have not. Still, the proposition raises issues especially relevant to this case.

First, while the U.S. polity might well be fragmented, the effect can be to fragment the efforts of external actors—be they foreign governments or other transnational players. Krasner observes that “not all states are equal: the institutional structures of the most powerful states have the greatest influence on the institutional arrangements of transnational actors.”³² There is a force of “isomorphism” at work, by which the shape and nature of the powerful state affect the shape and nature of other actors operating within it—or on it.³³

Which is to say, the divided U.S. system of government tends to divide (if not conquer) the efforts of others trying to influence it. Allan Gotlieb has described the phenomenon: “A foreign ambassador to Washington is accredited neither to a government nor even to a system. He is accredited to an unstable mass of people,

forces, and interests that are constantly shifting, aligning, and realigning in ways that can affect or damage the interests of the country he represents.”³⁴ Von Riekhoff raises what may literally be the threshold question—the problem of getting in the door: “The superpower agenda is permanently overcrowded. It is therefore difficult even for a special partner like Canada to get an adequate hearing.”³⁵

It must also be said of the Keohane/Nye coherence argument that it opposes directly a tenet of two-level bargaining theory—that the difficulties of domestic ratification in the fragmented state actually endow its negotiators with a hard-bargaining advantage. But this will be saved for later discussion.

To summarize: The Keohane/Nye model of complex interdependence, which they apply particularly to the U.S.-Canada dyad, generates several explanations for weak-state success in bargaining. Among them: strong-state interest in system and relationship maintenance; the constraints of regime-based norms and rules; the relatively intense commitment of small states in negotiations; the internal coherence that small states can organize against a big state, which may anyway find itself distracted and internally divided. The case of negotiating intervention in eastern Zaire will be examined with an eye to these explanations.

In the Afterword to the 1989 second edition of *Power and Interdependence* Keohane and Nye acknowledged that in their first edition, for the most part, “domestic politics and the impact of international relations on domestic politics. . . were ignored.”³⁶ What remained for researchers, they said, was “to concentrate now on the interplay between the constraints and opportunities of the international system, including both its structure and its process, and the perceptions of interests held by

influential actors within states.”³⁷ To understand the Level I game of interstate relations would demand an understanding of the Level II game, domestic politics.

The Two-Level-Games Metaphor

The two-level-games approach begins by assuming that statesmen [or women, it should have been said] are typically trying to do two things at once; that is, they seek to manipulate domestic and international politics simultaneously. Diplomatic strategies and tactics are constrained both by what other states will accept and by what domestic constituencies will ratify. Diplomacy is a process of strategic interaction in which actors simultaneously try to take account of and, if possible, influence the expected positions of other actors, both at home and abroad.³⁸

Thus Moravcsik spelled out the main attributes of what Putnam proposed as “a metaphor for domestic-international interactions.”³⁹ The model places the negotiator at its centre—between two tables, as it were, at the same time playing the Level I international-relations game and the Level II domestic-politics game, with moves in each game affecting play in the other. The dynamic interaction between the two games is the defining innovation in the two-level-games analysis. “By exploiting control over information, resources and agenda-setting with respect to his own domestic polity, the statesman can open up new possibilities for international accord or bargaining advantage. Conversely, international strategies can be employed to change the character of domestic constraints. . . .”⁴⁰ In other words, as Moravcsik added, “complex patterns of interdependence do not simply constrain statesmen, as the interdependence school argued, but also create new possibilities for creative statecraft.”⁴¹

It needs noting that the two-level-games metaphor is constructed in a game-theoretic framework: Win-sets, zones of agreement and sequential choices of actors are conceived on assumptions of rationality, known and stable preferences, and specifiable indifference curves. As will emerge in the discussion to come, these are not assumptions easily verifiable in the cases—or in the accounts of practitioners.

Much of the interesting detail in two-level-games analysis concerns the circumstances and bargaining techniques that determine the size of each state negotiator's win-set—the set of potential agreements ratifiable in the domestic constituency—which is “the most fundamental constraint on the statesman.”⁴² By exploiting “synergistic issue linkage,” for example, a leader can attract domestic ratification for an agreement by attaching it to a more appealing domestic measure.⁴³ This suggests the win-set-expanding potential of domestic side-payments, as explored by Mayer,⁴⁴ and of “COG collusion,” by which chiefs of government exchange political assets so as to strengthen each other (and the bargains they make) in each other's constituency.⁴⁵

But what of smaller states? At first look, two-level bargaining should open opportunities for weaker states negotiating with the strong. Nossal sees the pluralism of U.S. politics as militating against “concerted and united efforts by the United States to pursue a consistently hard line against Canada. While some Americans, both within and outside the government, may be pressing for tougher measures against Canada on some issue, one will doubtless find other groups or bureaucratic/political actors to enlist as allies of Canadian interests. . . .”⁴⁶ In the U.S.-Canada lumber dispute, to illustrate, Nossal recalls the Mulroney government enlisting the support of

the domestic U.S. housing industry for lower lumber prices and easy imports of Canadian timber; similarly, the Trudeau government sought interest alliances in the United States against the Garrison Diversion in North Dakota, a threat to Canadian environmental interests.

On balance, however, two-level-games analysis so far has proven quite unhelpful in answering the question of small-state negotiating success. And the explanation for the difficulty is contained in a dilemma at the middle of two-level logic: “Each Level I negotiator has an unequivocal interest in maximizing the other state’s win-set, but with respect to his own win-set, his motives are mixed. The larger his win-set, the more easily he can conclude an agreement, but also the weaker his bargaining position vis-à-vis the other negotiator.”⁴⁷ This dilemma follows as a corollary from two of Putnam’s propositions: first, that a larger win-set increases the space for and probability of a ratifiable agreement; but second, that a narrower win-set serves to secure a larger share of distributive gains from an agreement. Putnam’s Schelling-like insight—that the weakness implied by a narrow win-set may actually be turned to strength—has been drawn out with more precision by Mayer:⁴⁸ “When the international negotiation is variable-sum and involves great potential for realizing joint gains. . . , unresolved domestic factional conflict may be wholly unproductive”—an argument for protecting an expansive win-set in value-creating negotiations. “On the other hand, when the international negotiation is largely about dividing a fixed pie, factional blocking may facilitate commitment strategies that claim a larger share.”

This scarcely helps in predicting results or behaviours in conditions of asymmetry. Putnam's own seminal article had little to say about asymmetry, except for this tentative generalization:

All-purpose support for international agreements is probably greater in smaller, more dependent countries with more open economies, as compared to more self-sufficient countries, like the United States, for most of whose citizens the costs of no-agreement are generally lower. *Ceteris paribus*, more self-sufficient states with smaller win-sets should make fewer international agreements and drive harder bargains in those they do make.⁴⁹

This is a noteworthy claim, not least for the problems it raises. For one thing, there is no obvious *a priori* reason why a "self-sufficient" country like the United States, "for most of whose citizens the costs of no-agreement are generally lower," should necessarily perceive itself (or be perceived) as negotiating with a smaller win-set; it is precisely the distribution of costs and gains domestically that shapes the win-set—both in size and, as Mayer demonstrates, in location.⁵⁰ In the midst of widespread public indifference, intense mobilization even of narrow interest groups may (and often enough does) drive up the perceived cost of no-agreement for U.S. negotiators and effectively expand their win-set. Just as noteworthy is another problem: Whereas Putnam believes a big, powerful, relatively divided and indifferent country like the United States would have the advantage in asymmetrical bargaining, Keohane and Nye believe it would not—fragmentation undermining its coherence. The negotiation of intervention in eastern Zaire will be examined for signs and effects of coherence, to see whether this contradiction might be resolved.

If there is one area in which Keohane/Nye and the two-level-gamers stand together it is on the rising importance of transnational actors, governmental and non-

governmental. For Keohane and Nye they are one of the critical integrative factors in complex interdependence. And in two-level analysis, domestic actors and bureaucratic factions and the transnational alliances they create populate the matrix of domestic and international interactions. From the tradition of regime analysis, Risse-Kappen and others have considered more thoroughly the nature of these transnational relations and the special case of epistemic communities.⁵¹ Risse-Kappen has found it possible to conclude that “the more regulated the inter-state relationship by cooperative international institutions in the particular issue area, the more are transnational activities expected to flourish and the less should national governments be able to control them.”⁵²

From the logic of that conclusion arises the proposition that the advantage of powerful states over weaker states is diminished to the degree that relations are governed by international institutions and transnational activities. In cases of multilateral humanitarian intervention, for example, is a smaller state more likely to prevail if the negotiation is influenced by UN relief agencies, non-governmental organizations, international media reporting of the crisis, or by Security Council norms and procedures?

Gotlieb reports modest Canadian success in the context of transnational activity during the long 1980s argument between Ottawa and Washington over acid rain. “Persistent efforts by Canadian officials and Canadian environmental lobbyists to inform legislators, staffers, the media and public audiences of the dangers involved in acid rain contributed in some measure to the slowly evolving process of consensus-

formation in the United States. It thus reinforced the limited progress we achieved through the mechanism of special envoys.”⁵³

As Gotlieb emphasizes, however, “an ambassador must recognize that in Washington a foreign power is itself just another special interest and not a very special one at that. And his country is disadvantaged at least in one respect: it sends no congressmen or senators to Washington.”⁵⁴ To engage in Level II bargaining is to play on a field where domestic interests have in-built institutional advantages over any foreigner. Krasner observes that transnational actors can work both ways—either to “frustrate or promote the objectives of state actors.”⁵⁵ If transnational activity can either help or hinder the weaker state, any advice to search out transnational alliances is altogether contingent on the facts of each particular issue and case.

A second contribution of transnational-relations analysis is the challenge it raises against “the assumption that interactions within international institutions must be conceptualized as inter-state bargaining.”⁵⁶ Instead, these interactions are more usefully seen as “transnational and transgovernmental coalition-building of like-minded officials bargaining with other alliances. . . .”⁵⁷ Strobe Talbott has referred to the increasing practice of the U.S. government (or more properly, parts of it) of forming coalitions with non-state actors, including multinational corporations, NGOs and international institutions. In Bosnia alone, “nine agencies and departments of the U.S. government are cooperating with more than a dozen other governments, seven international organizations, and 13 major NGOs. . . to implement the Dayton Peace Accords.”⁵⁸ The point is raised here only in preparation for a later consideration of

another problem with two-level-bargaining analysis: its adequacy in accounting for the confusions and surprises of bureaucratic politics.

Having surveyed the relevant elements in these two theoretical approaches— asymmetry/interdependence and two-level games—it may now be possible to attempt a synthesis, a better understanding of what these approaches achieve and what they do not. This will lead to the third approach, the bureaucratic and political-process models.

Some Critical Issues of Fit and Consistency

1. Coherence and fragmentation: contradictions. As we have seen, it was a Keohane/Nye proposition that small states in negotiations with large states would have the advantage of their own internal coherence and of the large state's relative fragmentation. The two-level-games literature proposes something different: that democracies, with smaller win-sets, will have a harder time ratifying agreements but profit thereby in driving harder bargains. As Evans acknowledges, however, the evidence cannot carry the weight of the two-level hypothesis. "Our cases. . . question the existence of an inverse relation between scope of enfranchisement and the size of the win-set."⁵⁹

As for the Keohane/Nye proposition, whatever its consistency in explaining Canadian successes in negotiation with the United States, there is little ground to presume that small or weak states generally will be able to negotiate more coherently

than big states. To the contrary, less developed countries are characteristically divided internally with institutionally weak state structures—common conditions of small-state incoherence. Nye himself contemplates weak-state incoherence in his later *Bound to Lead*: He first reiterates that the “ability of the ostensibly stronger state may be limited by the greater organization and concentration of the small state. This difference helps to account for Canada’s surprising degree of success in bargaining with the United States.” All the same, he goes on to say, *incoherence* in small states—the risk of weak-state collapse or its incapacity to deliver on any bargain struck—also constrains the power of the strong to influence it successfully; Nye cites as examples Mexican and Caribbean incapacity to act against illegal migration or drug trafficking to the United States. “Ironically, the current neglect of weak Third World nations may reduce America’s future power to influence them on the new transnational issues.”⁶⁰

Nor, as the cases in *Double-Edged Diplomacy* demonstrate, is there much predictive value in knowing empirically whether coherence or fragmentation prevails. In the paired cases of Somalia and Jamaica,⁶¹ both lacked apparent coherence in bargaining with the International Monetary Fund; different outcomes suggest coherence was not a determining variable.

2. Commitment: too much of a good thing? We have seen the problematic implications of the Keohane/Nye hypothesis that commitment intensity contributes to weak-state success. Among other difficulties, it defies the conventional assumption that a high marginal utility for agreement (“dependence” in Keohane/Nye terms) weakens any party’s bargaining position, other things being equal. No resolution of

the problem is found in the two-level-games approach, which makes no unambiguous prediction for the effect of bargaining commitment. Presumably, a small-country government strongly motivated to find an agreement—to “settle at any price”—would show an expansive win-set and so negotiate from a weaker position. But if commitment means a disciplined determination to secure certain values (or simply avoid domestic embarrassment and unpopularity), commitment would bring with it a narrow win-set and a predisposition for hard bargaining.

Neither model sorts the issue out satisfactorily. But there is some empirical justification for the suspicion of Doern and Tomlin that the large Canadian government political commitment to the free-trade negotiations with the United States (for example) “may have worked to Canada’s disadvantage.”⁶² It would have left

little doubt in American minds that free trade was the biggest deal going in Canada. This encouraged the U.S. to play out the string as long as it did, knowing the Canadians would be reluctant to put the negotiations at risk by digging in their heels and refusing to make further concessions. The relative imbalance in the power of the two countries was another factor that fundamentally affected the outcome. . . .⁶³

Connected to the question of commitment, Doern and Tomlin went on to say, “was the plain fact that Canada was the *demandeur* in the negotiation, the party most anxious for an agreement, and both sides knew it.”⁶⁴ (Michael Hart, not unnaturally, rates the outcome higher in Canada’s favour than Doern and Tomlin do, but he nowhere denies the commitment differential.⁶⁵) All things considered, an obvious and zealous commitment may be disadvantageous to a small state facing asymmetrical negotiations. Or is it?

3. The missing linkage. Both complex interdependence and two-level-games models predict the currency of issue linkage in international negotiations. “Linkage of

unrelated issues is often a means of extracting concessions or side payments from rich and powerful states,” write Keohane and Nye.⁶⁶ In double-edged diplomacy, issue linkage by way of side payments and other measures is inherent in the business of accommodating Level I and Level II constraints and opportunities. It is therefore significant that, as Keohane and Nye recognize, the predicted linkage is generally missing from Canada-U.S. negotiations. “Ever since World War II the Canadian-American relationship has been governed by a regime based on alliance, constant consultation, and prohibition of overt linkage of issues.”⁶⁷ Except to repeat the point, Keohane/Nye leave it at that—without explanation.

The evident taboo against linkage in U.S.-Canada bargaining seems to have been remarkably persistent, as well as unpredicted by the theories. Ivan Head and Pierre Trudeau have written that, looking back, “neither of us can recall a single instance in which we were told that a Canadian posture or decision on bilateral issue ‘A’ would influence the American policy or practice on issue ‘B’.”⁶⁸ Even at the apogee of Henry Kissinger’s “widely touted practice of ‘linkage,’ Canada was consistently dealt with honourably and openly, issue by issue,” Head and Trudeau continued. “. . . We regarded this practice as firm evidence of the solid footing and unique relationship between the two countries. It was a precious asset, much envied by others.”⁶⁹ (Notice the word “honourably”—suggesting that linkage avoidance appeared, at least to Canadians, as deeply normative in origin and not simply a reflection of U.S. self-interest. The action of such normative rules is a phenomenon that both models leave largely unexplained.)

If the asymmetry/interdependence and two-level-games approaches cannot explain the taboo on linkage, what can? From the Canadian standpoint, it may look ominously easier for the bigger power to accumulate interest-related threats and promises than for the smaller party; in Keohane/Nye vocabulary, Canadian “vulnerability” always feels more exposed to linkage attempts, which should therefore be avoided. From the U.S. side, it might simply be that no U.S. administration can ever be entirely certain that a linkage threat or promise—or even a completely internal side payment—could confidently be enforced under the formal and informal rules of U.S. ratification. Just as the domestic U.S. apparatus of interest groups, Congress and bureaucracies can veto a ratification, it can also veto a threat or a promise to Canada (or anyway nullify its effect, by rendering it improbable or by raising its domestic costs prohibitively). The fact remains, however: The absence of explanation for the deliberate and reciprocal avoidance of issue linkage in U.S.-Canada relations represents a severe limitation on the power of these two analytical systems.

4. The unreasonable rationality assumption. Embedded in these two models is the games-theory requirement of rational choice—the assumption “that human activity is goal oriented and instrumental and that individual and institutional actors try to maximize their goal achievement.”⁷⁰ The Keohane/Nye model is somewhat forgiving in this respect. The two-level-games model is not: Throughout the analysis and the cases, the assumed rationality of state actors—even if not as unitary actors—is inescapable even if implicit. Here is Putnam, in his originating article, explaining the illustrative outcome of the 1978 Bonn summit: “In the end, each leader believed

that what he was doing was in his nation's interest—and probably in his own political interest too, even though not all his aides agreed.”⁷¹

Putting aside the cross-cultural barriers that obstruct negotiators (or later, analysts) from accurately detecting preferences and rational action in practice, the rationality assumption seems simply to miss the muddle, chance, personalities, exhaustion and whisky that have affected unreasonably the outcomes of negotiations. Another reading of the Bonn summit, and most others of the Group of Seven (not to speak of the Group of Eight), is that its agreement was the irrational or at least unrational product of various and complicated processes—formal and informal, organized and disorganized, inevitable and spontaneous. “To explain why a particular formal governmental decision was made, or why one pattern of governmental behavior emerged, it is necessary to identify the games and the players, to display the coalitions, bargains, and compromises, and to convey some feel for the confusion.”⁷² That is the utility of the bureaucratic-politics model: its capacity to distinguish between individual intention and collective action, and the explanations it offers for the frequent discrepancies between rationally expected and actual outcomes. System-level explanations, even when they encompass both international and domestic systems, lose descriptive reliability when they neglect the forces of stupidity, caprice, misinformation and committees.

5. Negotiating in Washington: a different game. The asymmetry/interdependence and two-level-games models are both strongly coloured by assumptions about U.S. domestic politics and U.S. foreign-policy behaviour (in the vocabulary and concepts of ratification and legislative veto, for instance). This

being so, it seems all the odder to conclude that neither model satisfactorily represents what actually goes on when a foreign government like Canada's sets out to negotiate in Washington.

"The first requirement," Gotlieb advises, "is for the diplomat to recognize that the particular process by which a decision is reached in Washington is often so complex and mysterious that it defies comprehension."⁷³ Not only does the president (or administration) fail to appear as the central actor manipulating games at the two tables, the U.S. executive branch sometimes fills no influential position of any kind.

... A more common type of dispute has come to dominate and at times to overwhelm our relationship. This is the conflict that arises when there are no major, or even minor, principles or themes of U.S. foreign policy involved. Indeed the Administration is often not a player until the last minute or at all. The disputes are generated by a special interest targeting its initiative on a congressman, congressional subcommittee, congressional staffer or regulatory official. These threats almost all arise from congressional initiatives and take the form of an amendment to U.S. domestic law.⁷⁴

This turns the two-level metaphor backwards: negotiation first between a foreign government and a congressional subcommittee, followed (in some cases) by chief-of-government ratification. Gotlieb's account does not itself apply to the intervention case at hand; Canadian authorities in this case engaged directly with members of the (divided) administration from the start. But even in the very intense free-trade negotiations, when the U.S. administration negotiated and favoured agreement, the administration remained unpredictably inactive in Level II bargaining. Gotlieb again:

Throughout the process, my impression and that of my Embassy colleagues was that on many, if not most, emerging problems, our own intelligence tended to be better than that of the administration and that, without it, the outcome of the debates might perhaps have been different. That the Administration's intelligence was weak and their presence often barely in evidence was the result, I believe, of a number of factors. . . . The White House was preoccupied by matters higher on its agenda. . . . The State

Department had no role and in any event was always a weak force on the Hill; Treasury also had other preoccupations and the U.S. Trade Representative Office was seriously undermanned. . . .⁷⁵

Virtually every modern account of negotiation in Washington echoes these themes: not of a powerful imperial presidency, or even of a two-level game of diplomacy and domestic politics interacting and managed at the centre, but of bargaining conducted with lobbyists, senators and agency bureaucrats almost as if the president—the COG—were irrelevant. Neither the metaphor of two-level games nor the theory of interdependence quite captures these more complicated observations.

The Bureaucratic-Politics and Political-Process Models

“Policy faces inward as much as outward, seeking to reconcile conflicting goals, to adjust aspirations to available means, and to accommodate to one another the advocates of competing goals and aspirations. It is here that the essence of government and policy seems to be, in a process that is essentially political.”⁷⁶

So Roger Hilsman advances his “political process model” to describe the making of U.S. defence and foreign policy. It rests on the bureaucratic-politics model of Allison and others,⁷⁷ with a significant and expanding modification. Whereas the bureaucratic model “implies that the organization is the single most important determinant of the policy,” the Hilsman model “regards the organization as only one determinant of the policy. . . and the great bureaucracies as important but not nearly the most important determinant of the policy outcome.”⁷⁸

Hilsman allows for the confusions and compromises of bureaucratic politics. But in this model, where you stand is not determined just by where you sit. In the first place,⁷⁹ the political-process model looks for alliances cutting across organizational boundaries. Second, the model assumes “that the single most important determinant of what the participants espouse is their fundamental perspective on international affairs” (however that may be discerned)—and not simply bureaucratic process. Third, “the political process model credits the participants with realistic expectations about the final outcome and intelligent choices about their strategies. . . .” by contrast, the bureaucratic-politics model “suggests that the outcome is largely the result not of the intentions of the participants but of the force diagram of their pulling and hauling.” (Here too, Hilsman is not clear how these “realistic expectations” and “intelligent choices” can be empirically verified, in policy arguments or in outcomes.) Finally, the Hilsman model “does not neglect the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy but gives it a prominent place.”

Like the bureaucratic-politics model, the political-process view puts the president at the centre of the action.⁸⁰ Indeed, because of the constitutional division of powers, the president enjoys a more powerful latitude in foreign affairs than in domestic policy, and it is a latitude quite unrestricted by the 1973 War Powers Act. Still, “in the decision-making process, as in the legislative process, presidents must work to persuade, cajole and prod those who must carry out the decision. They must enlist the support of the bureaucracies, members of Congress, the media, and through them, the general public.”⁸¹ It is within this president-centred system, Hilsman says, that foreign embassies lobby in Washington, “representing their countries’ interests

not only with the executive branch but with the legislature, the press, and other interest groups.”⁸²

James Scott, in a closely detailed study of five intervention cases in the Reagan presidency, adopts the bureaucratic-political framework—but with important and convincing alterations. Most significantly, Scott contests “the presidential preeminence image” of policy-making and execution.⁸³ In practice, “presidential leadership is a variable, not a given.”⁸⁴ Scott, of course, is observing what Gotlieb reported of his experience in Ronald Reagan’s Washington, and it is tempting to think their analyses were both formed by Reagan’s notoriously passive relationship to the hard details of his own policies. But Scott thinks otherwise:

The U.S. foreign policy setting is fragmented, and there is no clear pattern of leadership. If this was true for the Reagan Doctrine, which was formulated in the presence of the Soviet threat and the cold war, it is likely to be even worse in the post-cold war period. In fact, observers might expect Congress and nongovernmental actors to become even more involved for several reasons, including increasing interdependence between foreign and domestic affairs and the absence of consensus over the role of the United States in the world and the nature of threats to U.S. interests.⁸⁵

As a rule, “since personalities and management styles vary, and since priorities must be set and the president’s interest cannot be focused on all foreign policy issues at once, numerous instances are likely to exist in which the president is no more than a spectator.”⁸⁶ (So much again for the “chief of government” as the crucial nexus in two-level bargaining.) The circles of policy actors in Scott’s model are therefore not concentric—radiating from a presidential centre—but overlapping and more or less continually in motion: the president and chief advisers in one circle; the formal foreign-policy bureaucracy in another; Congress in a third circle; and a variable coalition of non-governmental actors in a fourth, including domestic and foreign

interest groups and foreign governments. Leadership over policy fluctuates between these circles, and rival alliances form and re-form across their boundaries as policy is iteratively decided, applied and adjusted.⁸⁷

It is a familiar observation that the bureaucratic-political models do not promise great predictive power. Policy is pictured as almost entirely contingent not on system determinants (state-power relationships) or games-theory rationality but on shifting coalitions, variable preferences among governmental and non-governmental actors, and the idiosyncrasies of personality. The foreign government seeking to influence outcomes thus becomes a participant in these coalition bargains—and subject to them.

A second alteration Scott introduces into the bureaucratic-political models is the provision for ideological or at least normative content as an explicit variable. The history of successes and failures in the Reagan interventions “suggests that both a statement of U.S. interests and an articulation of the ethical and moral bases underlying action will be necessary to develop any consensus.”⁸⁸ In fact, the history of U.S. foreign policy “doctrines” since the Second World War—Reagan’s, Carter’s, Nixon’s, Eisenhower’s, Truman’s—teaches that “doctrines require both moral and strategic justifications; while the moral end is significant, it cannot compel action without the strategic element any more than the strategic argument can succeed without the moral component.”⁸⁹ Presumably, then, a negotiation with U.S. authorities on a humanitarian intervention in Africa will raise issues (and intra-administration arguments) both about U.S. interests and U.S. moral objectives or obligations.

In sum, this chapter has canvassed three theoretical approaches that suggest answers to the question—In what circumstances, and by what means, is the Canadian government most able to influence the U.S. government in cases of armed international intervention? The asymmetry/interdependence model explicitly purports to explain how weaker states may prevail over stronger states in negotiation. Two-level-games analysis implies opportunities for weaker states exploiting transnational and domestic-political strategies in bargaining. Bureaucratic politics and political process models address the confusions and contingencies evident in almost every practitioner's account of negotiating in Washington—the fluid coalitions that make and remake foreign-policy decisions and agreements.

How useful is any one of these approaches in explaining whether a middle power like Canada can influence a superpower to intervene (or not) abroad? What measures of internal organization or of diplomacy—and of multilateral negotiation—might a Canadian government undertake to maximize its influence? And what are the characteristics of humanitarian crises that shape Canadian and U.S. policy responses? These are issues to be considered in the following pages.

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³ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994) 21.

⁴ Yin, 40-41.

⁵ Eckstein, 106.

⁶ Chiefly in Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 1989).

⁷ The terminology adopted in Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," *International Organization*, 42, 3, Summer 1988, 427-460. The metaphor is extensively examined in Peter Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam, eds. *Double-Edged Diplomacy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

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- ⁹ Fen Osler Hampson (with Michael Hart), *Multilateral Negotiations* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995) 23.
- ¹⁰ Hampson, 9.
- ¹¹ Keohane and Nye, 11.
- ¹² David Leyton-Brown, in Harald von Riekhoff and Hanspeter Neuhold, eds. *Unequal Partners* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993) 142.
- ¹³ Keohane and Nye, 179.
- ¹⁴ Keohane and Nye, 179.
- ¹⁵ Keohane and Nye, 8.
- ¹⁶ Keohane and Nye, 9.
- ¹⁷ Keohane and Nye, 23-25.
- ¹⁸ Keohane and Nye, 10-11.
- ¹⁹ Keohane and Nye, 12.
- ²⁰ Keohane and Nye, 18.
- ²¹ Keohane and Nye, 19.
- ²² A factor taken up by, among others, David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, "Interests: The Measure of Negotiation," *Negotiation Journal*, 2. 1. January 1986. 73-92.
- ²³ Keohane and Nye, 32.
- ²⁴ Keohane and Nye, 18.
- ²⁵ Keohane and Nye, 18.
- ²⁶ Keohane and Nye, 203-205.
- ²⁷ Jeffrey Z. Rubin and I. William Zartman, "Asymmetrical Negotiations: Some Survey Results that may Surprise," *Negotiation Journal*, 11. 3. October 1995. 356, 357.
- ²⁸ R. Harrison Wagner, "Economic interdependence, bargaining power, and political influence," *International Organization*, 42. 3. Summer 1988. 467.
- ²⁹ Keohane and Nye, 19.
- ³⁰ Henry J. Jacek, in von Riekhoff and Neuhold, 30.
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- ³² Stephen D. Krasner, "Power politics, institutions, and transnational relations," in Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed. *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 258.
- ³³ Krasner, 260-261.
- ³⁴ Allan Gotlieb, *I'll be With You in a Minute, Mr. Ambassador* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991) 30-31.
- ³⁵ In von Riekhoff and Neuhold, 5.
- ³⁶ Keohane and Nye, 256.
- ³⁷ Keohane and Nye, 267.
- ³⁸ Andrew Moravcsik, "Introduction," in Evans and others, 15.
- ³⁹ Putnam, 433.
- ⁴⁰ Moravcsik, 15.
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- ⁴⁵ Moravcsik, 26.
- ⁴⁶ Kim Richard, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, 1997) 82.
- ⁴⁷ Putnam, 450.
- ⁴⁸ Mayer, 797.
- ⁴⁹ Putnam, 443.
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- ⁵³ Gotlieb, 101.
- ⁵⁴ Gotlieb, 35.
- ⁵⁵ Krasner, 260.
- ⁵⁶ Risse-Kappen, 285-286
- ⁵⁷ Risse-Kappen, 286.
- ⁵⁸ Strobe Talbott, "Globalization and Diplomacy: A Practitioner's Perspective," *Foreign Policy*, 108. Fall 1997. 79.
- ⁵⁹ In Evans and others, 415.
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- ⁶⁹ Head and Trudeau, 173.
- ⁷⁰ George Tsebelis, *Nested Games*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) 6.
- ⁷¹ Putnam, 430.
- ⁷² Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 146.
- ⁷³ Gotlieb, 34.
- ⁷⁴ Gotlieb, 47.
- ⁷⁵ Gotlieb, 108.
- ⁷⁶ Hilsman, 72.
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- ⁸¹ Hilsman, 141.
- ⁸² Hilsman, 237.
- ⁸³ Scott, 9.
- ⁸⁴ Scott, 238.
- ⁸⁵ Scott, 13.
- ⁸⁶ Scott, 238.
- ⁸⁷ Scott, 12.
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Chapter Three

Crisis and Intervention

Prime Minister Chrétien's extraordinary decision—to assert Canadian leadership of a multinational force into the heart of Africa—triggered intense activity and some confusion in the government's own foreign-policy and defence bureaucracies. For all but a few specialists in African affairs, aid, or in peacekeeping/security policy, the intricate and bloody conflicts of Central Africa were remote and little understood. In the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian International Development Agency (DFAIT, DND and CIDA), only preliminary planning had been completed for a modest Canadian participation in a still-hypothetical international intervention in eastern Zaire.¹ Meanwhile, other problems and uncertainties were occupying the minds of senior Canadian officials: intra-NATO disputes over Bosnia, the contested candidacy of Boutros Boutros-Ghali for re-election as UN secretary-general, impending summit meetings of APEC and the OSCE, the reorganization and installation of the second Clinton administration in Washington, and landmines-treaty diplomacy, to name a few.

The prime minister's decision, relayed to deputy ministers and others Saturday Nov. 9, refocused those energies. Departmental managers ordered up urgent briefings and policy options in preparation for meetings Sunday and Monday with Chrétien and ministers. Those briefings necessarily went to the basics of Zairian geography, ethnography and recent political history—the underlying facts of what

was an undeniably complicated situation on the ground. As one DFAIT officer recalled, “there were some minutes actually spent teaching the management how to say Banyamulenge.”²

As the crisis unfolded, the demands grew considerably more sophisticated. There were problems understanding what was happening in the refugee camps and jungles of eastern Zaire; problems of creating and enforcing a coherent policy response inside the Canadian government; problems of forming and managing a coalition of states participating in the proposed intervention; problems of negotiating with the U.S. government. And when the crisis was over, less than two months later, there were problems of comprehending its disappointingly ambiguous conclusion.

Onset

The origins of the conflict in eastern Zaire in 1996 can be found in the Rwandan genocide of 1994—itself a fiercely complex phenomenon of ethnic division earlier exacerbated by German and Belgian colonial administration, post-colonial authoritarian misrule, economic hardship and persisting social inequalities.³ Although readily and popularly depicted at the time as a chaotic “tribal” or ethnic bloodletting between majority Hutu and minority Tutsi communities, what happened in Rwanda was something even more sinister. “The planned, deliberate effort to eliminate the Tutsi population of Rwanda that culminated in the massive slaughter of April-July 1994 fully meets the definition of genocide” as articulated in the 1948 Genocide Convention.⁴ In that slaughter, an estimated 500,000-800,000 people were killed (out

of a population no larger than seven million). Nearly all the victims were minority Tutsi—the rest generally described as “moderate” Hutus insufficiently active in the killings or otherwise objectionable to the *génocidaires*. When Tutsi forces ultimately prevailed, more than two million people fled as refugees to neighbouring countries, and perhaps half as many remained internally displaced inside Rwanda.⁵

For Canadian decision-makers in late 1996 the Rwandan catastrophe retained a haunting relevance in at least two respects. First, of the mostly-Hutu refugee population, as many as 1.1 million⁶ settled in camps in eastern Zaire (with about 144,000 refugees from Burundi). Among them lived at least 10,000 and as many as 40,000⁷ soldiers of the Forces Armées Rwandaises, the so-called ex-FAR, the army of the former and now defeated Hutu regime in Rwanda. As well in the camps there was an uncertain number of Hutu militiamen, and a still less certain number of civilian directors of the genocide. But these ex-FAR soldiers, militias and other *génocidaires* were not simply mixed into the Hutu refugee population; they were, in effect, governing it. The UNHCR, pursuing its standard practice, had facilitated aid distribution in the camps by leaving governance to the refugees themselves.⁸ And in practice, this meant the genocidal Hutu regime of 1994 was replicated in the camps in Zaire along Rwanda's border. Any aid to the refugees would likely aid the ex-FAR and militias, known chiefly as Interahamwe; indeed, aid agencies acknowledge that at least some of the aid distributed to the camps from 1994 to 1996 was seized by ex-FAR and militia groups.⁹ Moreover, it was not long after the refugee influx of 1994 that armed Rwandan Hutu were in violent conflict with indigenous Zairian Tutsis—another dimension of the crisis that erupted in 1996.

The second relevance of the 1994 Rwandan genocide for Canadian authorities lay in their conviction that the tragedy had been preventable—that the West specifically could and should have acted to save lives, and was therefore culpable.¹⁰ An authoritative post-mortem of the Rwandan case, led by the Danish aid agency Danida (and including Canadian representation) concluded that “through hesitations to respond and vacillation in providing and equipping peacekeeping forces, the international community failed to stop or stem the genocide, and in this regard shares responsibility for the extent of it.”¹¹ The Danida report reached the “highest levels” of the Canadian government when it was released in March 1996; the prime minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy were thought by officials deeply committed to the belief that the catastrophe of Rwanda must not be repeated—and that the international community bore an obligation to prevent such a repetition.¹² The belief was held all the more acutely because a Canadian had commanded the inadequate UN force in Rwanda in 1994. “We have all seen the disturbing images from eastern Zaire in recent days,” the prime minister said at a news conference announcing the Canadian initiative Nov. 12, 1996. “Innocent men and women and children are dying, human beings going without food and water for days and days. None of us can be blind to the consequences. If the world does not act, more than a million lives are at stake.”¹³ So the moral significance of the 1994 crisis—as it was understood in Ottawa—imposed a normative obligation to act in 1996.

The prime minister was not exaggerating; the prospects in eastern Zaire seemed appalling. Sadako Ogata, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, warned in late October of “a catastrophe greater than the one we knew in

1994.”¹⁴ Emma Bonino, humanitarian co-ordinator for the European Union, reportedly found that one million people could die in Zaire, and accused the world of standing aloof from the conflict.¹⁵ Stephen Lewis, a former Canadian ambassador to the UN with a long personal knowledge of Africa, foresaw the possibility of “the worst human disaster on the continent.”¹⁶ Care Canada, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Médecins Sans Frontières and other NGOs active in Zaire mounted intense media-lobbying campaigns agitating for armed intervention. (MSF, for example, issued a news release Nov. 15 “urgently” appealing “to the international community to deploy a multilateral military force, which would allow protection, safe zones and humanitarian access for the population.”)

Violence in eastern Zaire had been escalating throughout 1996.¹⁷ The identities and objectives of the combatants could sometimes bewilder even close observers, but the rough outlines of the several conflicts were slowly emerging. There was, first of all, the recurring conflict between the undisciplined Zairian army (and its kleptocratic political leadership in Kinshasa) and local Tutsi populations, which had been in eastern Zaire for some 200 years. In September and October 1996 local Zairian officials threatened Zairian Tutsis with early expulsion to Rwanda; their insecurity was all the greater because Zairian authorities had denied them Zairian citizenship, notwithstanding the community’s presence in Zaire over several generations.¹⁸ There was also rising violence between Hutu militias and ex-FAR soldiers in the refugee camps and local Zairian Tutsis—with indigenous Tutsis (some known collectively as Banyamulenge) retaliating with increasing force against the Hutu refugees. Finally (to simplify), there was an alliance of forces led by the career

guerrilla Laurent Kabila, who enlisted the Banyamulenge in the rebellion that ultimately overthrew the regime of President Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997.

By mid-October, thousands of refugees had been forced by the fighting (and by the intimidation of Hutu gunmen) to flee the UNHCR camps under the rule of the gunmen.¹⁹ At the same time, UN and non-governmental humanitarian agencies were forced to withdraw personnel and suspend deliveries of food, water and medical help. By the end of October, hundreds of thousands of refugees—some in makeshift camps, some hiding in the hills—were cut off from all aid. One by one, Zairian towns (and airports useful for delivering aid) fell to the Kabila rebels. The Zairian government, fighting the uprising of the Banyamulenge and Kabila, described itself in a state of war with Rwanda, which it accused of attacking and occupying Zairian territory in fraternal support of the Tutsis.²⁰ “Now we are confronted by a new genocide,” declared Boutros-Ghali on Nov. 8. “I call it a genocide by starvation. . . . So we must act, and we must act immediately.”²¹

In Ottawa, members of DFAIT and DND had been expecting trouble in the African Great Lakes region—but at first in Burundi, not Zaire. “I must say we were actually following Burundi much more closely,” recalled an army colonel later. The analysis at Foreign Affairs was the same, as one diplomat acknowledged: “When people were looking at the next crisis they were looking at Burundi.” Several memos had even been sent up to Axworthy, focused not on Zaire but on Burundi’s July 25 coup, and on its deep-seated Hutu-Tutsi conflict that brought to mind Rwanda’s ghastly past.²²

But if DFAIT was energetically searching out a possible Canadian role in Central Africa, DND was not. On May 10, 1996, DFAIT's Africa and Middle East Bureau sent a cable off to the Canadian High Commission in Nairobi with instructions that "Canada will explore feasibility of contributing to the operation of the OAU military observer mission in Burundi." Attached to a copy of that cable in DND files is a May 13 note, handwritten and initialled by Kenneth Calder, DND's assistant deputy minister for policy, addressed to his director-general of policy operations. Its two sentences read: "You should go back to DFAIT and express our displeasure (up to an including the DM level) at not being consulted. You can also tell them we are not interested."²³ This would not be the last disagreement between Foreign Affairs and National Defence (and CIDA, come to that)—and it spoke to a dissonance in Canadian policy-making that would later become more apparent.

The Crisis Acknowledged

Interested or not, DND would soon find itself fully engaged in the crisis of eastern Zaire. On Oct. 26, a Saturday, Canadian Ambassador Robert Fowler at the UN took a phone call from Boutros-Ghali; the secretary-general wanted to appoint a "special envoy" to Africa's Great Lakes region—someone preferably of ministerial rank, fluent in French and English, free of any imperial associations in area.²⁴ Fowler called Gordon Smith, deputy minister at DFAIT; Smith called Axworthy and Axworthy called the prime minister—who immediately recommended his nephew

Raymond Chrétien. The name of Canada's ambassador to the United States was relayed through Fowler back to Boutros-Ghali, who quickly agreed. The prime minister spoke personally with Boutros-Ghali about the appointment Oct. 27.²⁵ On Thursday, Oct. 31, at UN headquarters, Ambassador Chrétien and Boutros-Ghali agreed to terms: a short assignment lasting at most until Christmas, high-profile with full media coverage, no interference from Secretariat bureaucrats—and an airplane, security and secure fax and phones provided by the Canadian Forces. Chrétien left Washington Nov. 5 (U.S. election day) for the South of France, there to start his mission by meeting Mobutu who was then recovering from prostate surgery. The Canadian government was now directly involved in the Zairian conflict. "Canada is pleased to be entrusted with this vitally important role," said a DFAIT news release Oct. 30. "As former Ambassador to Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire, Mr. Chrétien possesses extensive knowledge of the region, which will help him assess the situation and make sound recommendations to the Secretary-General."²⁶

Ambassador Chrétien's UN assignment bears on questions of Canadian policy-making in two ways.²⁷ First, his almost-daily faxes to Boutros-Ghali were at the same time routed to Ottawa, and examined with care by senior officials at DFAIT as they formulated Canadian responses to events; he spoke with Deputy Minister Smith almost every day. Second, Ambassador Chrétien several times spoke by telephone with the prime minister—not to recommend Canadian leadership of an MNF (he later said he would not have imagined such a thing), but to impress on the prime minister the desperate urgency of international action to prevent a disaster in eastern Zaire. The ambassador spoke to his uncle at least twice on Nov. 8 and 9, as

the prime minister was deciding on the Canadian initiative. The two men were personally close; separated in age by only about eight years, friends describe them more as brothers than as uncle and nephew. Any explanation of the prime minister's otherwise uncharacteristic boldness in asserting Canadian leadership in the Zaire crisis must acknowledge the effect of the energetic and self-confident Raymond on his proud and admiring uncle—who was anyway moved by the TV images of suffering from the Zaire-Rwanda border country.²⁸

But there were other and more formal pressures working on Canadian decision-makers. At 2 a.m.²⁹ Saturday, Nov. 9, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1078. "Determining that. . . the present humanitarian crisis in eastern Zaire constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region," (but without expressly citing Chapter VII) the Council called on UN members "to prepare the necessary arrangements" to allow the immediate return of humanitarian agencies and the safe delivery of aid to refugees and displaced persons. States were urged as well "to help create the necessary conditions for the voluntary, orderly and secure repatriation of refugees." Finally, the resolution asked the secretary-general to "draw up a concept of operations and framework for a humanitarian task force, with military assistance if necessary," with the objectives of delivering short-term aid; assisting the UNHCR with the protection and voluntary repatriation of refugees and displaced persons; and "establishing humanitarian corridors for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to assist the voluntary repatriation of refugees. . . ."³⁰

Resolution 1078 bore all the marks of a compromise, which indeed it was. France (with a few others) had bargained vigorously for a Security Council

authorization to deploy a multinational force; the United States refused. What was agreed, sometime after midnight, was an invitation to the willing to mount an operation if they could—and if the Security Council later approved. Canada, by all accounts, had virtually no part in the argument or the outcome in New York that week.³¹

On Nov. 6, however, the prime minister raised the crisis in Zaire in a phone conversation with Clinton, drawing the president's attention to his own concern and to Canada's role in the person of Ambassador Chrétien. The next day the subject was discussed in a phone conversation between Jim Bartleman, assistant cabinet secretary for foreign and defence policy, and Anthony Lake, Clinton's national security adviser. Lake told Bartleman during that conversation that the only country the Clinton administration "might conceivably" allow to command its troops would be Canada; this seems to have been the first mention by anyone in authority of a Canadian leadership of a multinational force in eastern Zaire.³² Then, on Nov. 8, as the Security Council was negotiating 1078, Deputy Minister Smith at DFAIT got a phone call from Peter Tarnoff, undersecretary of state for political affairs in Washington. In the course of that call Tarnoff asked Smith, "would you fall off your chair if you were asked, if Canada were asked, to lead this force?" Smith replied that he would report the question immediately to the prime minister, which he did. Smith took the Tarnoff remark as more than just thinking out loud, but less than a formal proposal; it was a serious feeler. "I think this all comes back to the American reluctance to go to the party," Smith reflected in an interview with the author. "I think that the Americans were concluding that there was tremendous pressure on them to

do something. They sure didn't want to lead it. Who could they find to lead it they could trust?" And did Smith suspect the Americans were also looking for someone they might manipulate? "Yes, of course," Smith answered. "Yes, exactly."³³

These seem to have been the factors influencing the prime minister November 9 at Harrington Lake: Telephone conversations with Raymond Chrétien in Africa; knowledge of the Lake and Tarnoff feelers; the inconclusive irresolution of the Security Council; evident lack of international leadership to address the crisis; and the awful pictures of refugees dying in eastern Zaire (their condition made more visibly dismal by a seemingly endless rain). By then too, Ambassador Chrétien was discovering that French leadership of a multinational force would be unacceptable to key actors in the region, including Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda.³⁴ By Sunday, when the prime minister had assembled Axworthy, Smith, Deputy Defence Minister Louise Fréchette, along with the president of CIDA (Huguette Labelle), the acting Chief of the Defence Staff (Vice-Admiral Larry Murray) and others, he had decided to assume leadership of the MNF that was only hinted at in Resolution 1078. Chrétien did not ask for advice when he went into that meeting; there was no canvassing the pros and cons of leadership, or the costs and benefits of action or inaction. "He had made his mind up when he walked in. . . . There was no holding him back."³⁵

The belief at DFAIT was that the attempt to lead the MNF was risky but achievable. Fréchette and Murray, on the other hand, left that first meeting shaking their heads and wearing expressions that others read as terror.³⁶ (Defence Minister Doug Young, out of town, did not attend that Sunday meeting but was present Monday.) To Axworthy—eager to act—and some others at Foreign Affairs, it would

sometimes seem in the days to follow that DND and the Canadian Forces were simply trying to do nothing, in hopes that in due course nothing would be done. Remembered one official in a later interview: “I wondered whether they were in cahoots with the American military to try to do that. . . .”³⁷ In truth, DND was already under stress, heavily deployed in Bosnia and Haiti and experiencing the cautionary and demoralizing effect of the televised Somalia hearings then under way; on Oct. 8 the prime minister had announced the (forced) resignation of Gen. Jean Boyle as Chief of the Defence Staff.

On Monday, Nov. 11 (the prime minister now having been encouraged by more calls to heads of government around the world, and to Boutros-Ghali), the cabinet formally decided to advance Canada as the leader of the coalition to manage an intervention in Zaire with command of the MNF itself. The decision was communicated to the UN and to various capitals—but with conditions attached.³⁸ There would have to be a satisfactory chain of command; adequate funding; a clear mandate; a finite timetable for completion of the mission; solid commitments from coalition partners to contribute 10-12,000 troops; and, of course, Security Council authority under Chapter VII. Beyond these conventional provisos, however, there was little certain about the Canadian government’s plan or intentions. Above all, it remained quite unclear what exactly the MNF would do when it arrived in Africa. What it would *not* do—and this was insisted by Canadian and other military officers from the start—was try by force to separate the “intimidators” in the camps from the rest of the refugee population. In fact, unresolved issues of operational mandate and purpose would persist throughout the crisis.³⁹

Then began a week of very busy diplomacy. In Washington Nov. 12, Smith, Bartleman, Fréchette and Murray, with Lt.-Gen. Maurice Baril (the prospective MNF commander), gathered for a meeting in the White House chaired by Lake. Representatives of the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff also attended, but it was Lake who led the questioning and discussion on the U.S. side—and who dominated what Canadian participants remember as several painful hours of grilling the Canadians about their plan.⁴⁰

In an interview with the author, a former senior U.S. government official described the multiple U.S. objectives that Lake was pursuing: prevent an escalation of violence in Rwanda and Burundi by way of “blowback” from the conflict in Zaire; contribute to Rwandan security, which the United States had earlier concluded meant arranging for the successful repatriation of Rwandan refugees; head off military violence in Zaire; preserve Zaire as a single state, if possible; avoid U.S. military intervention; avert a humanitarian catastrophe.⁴¹ It was this mix of U.S. interests and objectives that seemed to Canadian officials to drive U.S. conduct throughout the coming weeks. But it was an unstable and variable mix, with different elements apparently determining U.S. actions at different moments of the crisis.

The leading issue for Lake and the Americans at that first White House meeting was command and control, and the recurrent U.S. reluctance to placing U.S. troops under foreign command. As usual, this was in part a constitutional question for U.S. authorities, and in part a political/bureaucratic problem of aggregating domestic consent for U.S. military action abroad. (A spokesman for Senator Jesse Helms, Republican chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee, would a day later

mutter that “this smells like Somalia all over again.”⁴²) The U.S. side at one point startled the Canadians by proposing that a U.S. general command the MNF for the first month, then turn it over to a Canadian. Smith and the others refused, but it took more hours (and more than one call by Bartleman to the prime minister in Ottawa) to work out command and control details. In any event, Canadian officials thought the issue was largely resolved that evening (the Americans ordered in pizza to keep the meeting going) by simulating the NATO-Bosnia command formula. At U.S. insistence, the Canadian side agreed to the creation of a Steering Group of major troop-contributing and MNF-financing countries which would give political direction to the MNF (and in which all participants, including specifically the United States, would hold a veto on decisions). The Steering Group would oversee an MNF commanded by Gen. Baril, who would have operational control; a U.S. deputy commander would be interposed between Baril and U.S. forces, who would remain as always under the national command of the president. But that left other matters unsettled—rules of engagement; specifying a mandate that would not include fighting the intimidators (or anyone else); the problematic mission of opening “safe corridors” between camps and the Rwandan border; imposing a time limit (ultimately set at four months); and designs for a follow-on program of peacekeeping and a long-term regional political settlement.

In Ottawa, meanwhile, Prime Minister Chrétien was holding his news conference to announce the Canadian initiative and his intentions.⁴³ He was frustrated, he said, to hear excuses instead of action from the international community, and he was ready to contribute Canadian leadership to an international

intervention in Zaire. “*Nous avons le devoir moral d’intervenir avant qu’il ne soit trop tard. Nous avons le devoir moral de ne pas rester passif devant ce drame humain. Nous avons le devoir d’agir.*” He was asking the Security Council “to pass a resolution mandating a Canadian-led international military force to take action as soon as possible,” the prime minister said. “Canada may not be a superpower but we are a nation that speaks on the international scene with a great moral authority. Now is the time to use that moral authority to stop suffering, to avert disaster.” (A Canadian diplomat in Washington later recalled that some U.S. officials seemed to take particular offence at this invocation of moral authority, an authority the United States routinely claimed as its own; the prime minister’s words, when they became known to the U.S. delegation at the White House meeting, did not ease the negotiation.⁴⁴)

By the time the Canadian delegation boarded the government Challenger for the late-night flight back to Ottawa, Lake and the Americans had made two facts plain. First, the Americans were yet unconvinced that Canada was ready and competent to take command of an intervention in Zaire—an intervention the United States could join. A “White House official” was quoted in the *Times* the next morning describing the Canadian plan as “rudimentary” and saying that “the United States was still looking for firm answers on how a mission would be undertaken, what the command and control structure would be, and what the objectives would be on the ground.”⁴⁵ But the second plain fact was that U.S. authorities, Lake specifically, placed the highest importance on securing those answers from Canada. As evidence of that U.S. perception of importance, it was Lake himself who travelled to New York

for a meeting with Canadian, P5 and other officials Nov. 14, and to Ottawa the following week, all to press personally for answers the U.S. administration wanted to hear. It was considered on both sides extraordinary for the national security adviser to venture outside Washington to take direct part in negotiating with foreign governments on such a matter.⁴⁶

On Nov. 13 (after another Chrétien-Clinton phone conversation that morning) the White House greatly encouraged the Canadians when Press Secretary Mike McCurry announced⁴⁷ the two governments had reached “general agreement on the mission definition, command and control arrangements, and duration of the mission.” “Officials” were quoted the next day as saying U.S. deployment would amount to as many as 4,000 troops, 1,000 in Zaire and up to 3,000 in nearby countries. As a result of the White House meeting Nov. 12 and Clinton’s talk with Chrétien, McCurry said, “the President has decided that the United States is willing, in principle, to participate in a limited fashion in this mission under certain conditions.” McCurry then set out six conditions:

First, “we must be able to validate our core assumptions, including those regarding the threat environment, the availability of other properly trained and equipped forces, and the consent of concerned countries in the region.”

Second, the MNF mission must be to facilitate aid and voluntary repatriation. “The force will not separate or disarm militants, conduct forced entry, or police operations in the camps.”

Third, the MNF would have “robust rules of engagement” and operate under Chapter VII, “but will not be a UN blue-helmet mission.”

Fourth, troop contributors would pay the costs but other states would be invited to finance participation of African countries.

Fifth, the mission would likely last four months, with a “follow-on presence” to be discussed.

Sixth, “the potential contribution of the U.S. would consist of airport security at Goma airfield, assistance in airlifting deploying forces, airfield services, and the provision of security along approximately a three-mile corridor from Goma to the Rwandan border. We anticipate a significant number of those U.S. troops deployed would be based outside of Zaire in neighboring countries.”

McCurry added these three sentences at the end of this statement: “As always, U.S. troops would remain at all times under U.S. command. While serving under the operational control of the Canadian commanding officer, the U.S. would provide the deputy force commander, and all U.S. troops in Zaire would operate under U.S. commanders. A final decision on U.S. participation will depend on the findings of the military assessment team sent to the region yesterday; its view of the utility and viability of a humanitarian mission; and whether the mandate, rules of engagement, exit strategy, and other essential aspects of the mission can be defined satisfactorily and agreed among the key participants in a potential force.”

This was not an unconditional commitment. But winning U.S. participation in the intervention was now urgent. The prime minister himself had acknowledged in his Nov. 12 news conference that “the United States is vital to the success of any mission.”⁴⁸ Indeed, military commanders in Canada and abroad were adamant that a U.S. troop contribution was a *sine qua non* of their own deployment.⁴⁹ As a DND

briefing note—labelled SECRET (CANADIAN EYES ONLY)—stated flatly at the time: “We need USA ground troops.”⁵⁰ Practically alone among prospective contributors, the United States commanded the aircraft, communications, intelligence production and forces judged necessary for an intervention of 10,000 troops in eastern Zaire. More than that (and having in mind U.S. performance in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia) other governments wanted tangible, physical proof of a reliable U.S. political commitment. As Gordon Smith has pointed out, however, these demands for U.S. collaboration also invested the United States with a veto over the whole project: If the United States did not go, nobody would. (Another Canadian official saw a different danger—that a U.S. refusal to join an intervention would tempt the French to launch their own operation, if only to recover political ground lost in their own controversial *Opération Turquoise* in Rwanda in 1994; more of that below.)

Such considerations simultaneously influenced negotiations at the UN to craft a Security Council resolution authorizing a Canadian-led MNF in Zaire. These negotiations—unlike those over 1078 a week earlier—found Canadian diplomats among the key players; the Canadian mission at the UN produced the first drafts (based on Haiti and Bosnia precedents) and led the process of bargaining and agreement, with U.S. British and French delegations in particular.⁵¹ The Lake visit to Manhattan was part of the exercise.

And when members of the Permanent Five delegations met at the Canadian mission on Second Avenue, the novelty of the experience was apparent to all; the great powers were unaccustomed to someone else designing a Chapter VII military

operation. Canadian participants in those meetings sensed a complex set of P5 responses to the Canadian initiative: the French skeptical of leadership by (North American) Canadians and suspicious of U.S. motives but advocating an intervention; the British unhelpful and unforthright; the United States trying to be constructive and to push the project forward without actually committing itself; Russia and China largely passive.⁵² As the analysis in the next chapter will suggest, the complicated dynamics of these multilateral negotiations over several weeks affected Canadian capacity to influence U.S. actions.

Intervention Decided

U.S. reservations about the Canadian plan were answered sufficiently on Nov. 14-15 at least to achieve Security Council consensus on Resolution 1080, passed unanimously Nov. 15 after 3 ½ hours of discussion. Resolution 1080 (this time citing Chapter VII) determined again that the situation in eastern Zaire constituted “a threat to international peace and security in the region;” welcomed members’ offers to establish “for humanitarian purposes. . . a temporary multinational force to facilitate the immediate return of humanitarian organizations and the effective delivery by civilian relief organizations of humanitarian aid. . . and to facilitate the voluntary, orderly repatriation of refugees. . . as well as the voluntary return of displaced persons;” and it authorized member states “to conduct the operation. . . by using all necessary means. . . .”⁵³ The cost would be borne by the participating states “and

other voluntary contributions.” Participants in the operation would report through the secretary-general at least twice monthly. The resolution specified that the operation “shall terminate” March 31, 1997, unless the Council decided otherwise. The resolution also expressed the Council’s intention to authorize “a follow-on operation” to succeed the MNF, but no more was said of that.

Resolution 1080 was conspicuously silent on the ground-level operations of the proposed MNF, except to specify its double objective of facilitating the resupply of aid and the refugees’ voluntary repatriation. Madeleine Albright, then U.S. ambassador to the UN, left no doubt that these details remained unresolved when she spoke in the Council meeting preceding the vote. “The United States strongly supports the initiative of the Canadian Government,” she said. “The United States is working closely with the Canadian and other Governments. . . to determine precisely the humanitarian requirements and how we might usefully participate in these humanitarian efforts. . . . Although considerable progress has been made, some outstanding questions concerning the organization and operation of the mission remain to be worked out.”⁵⁴

Canadian Ambassador Fowler was emphatic that the MNF would carry out only its two objectives, “no more and no less.” But he was more explicit about what the MNF would not do than what it would do:

“We do not, therefore, envisage disarmament or interposition as elements of the force’s mandate. Indeed, disarmament cannot be part of this mandate. If it were, we would require a much larger and more robust force and would need to engage in a war with those who most evidently do not wish to be disarmed. Such a war would bring enormous and immediate harm to the very people we are trying to save, as the elements with guns continue to find sanctuary within the refugee population that they continue to hold hostage.”⁵⁵

As it was, Fowler said that more than 10,000 troops had already been committed by over 20 countries. "While the main body of troops committed to date are from France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada, we now have firm offers from Europe, North America, Africa and Latin America, as well as expressions of interest from Asia."

The reliability of those commitments would soon be tested. But the carefully negotiated rationale of Resolution 1080 was already being overtaken by a dramatic change of fortunes along the Zaire-Rwanda frontier. It was left to the Rwandan representative at that Security Council meeting to oppose the MNF as "no longer relevant," and to declare that whatever humanitarian aid might flow should be sent to Rwanda, not Zaire.⁵⁶ In fact, the whole logic of the Canadian initiative was now challenged by a new confusion of facts on the ground.

Just as the Security Council was completing the terms of 1080, an enormous and astonishing migration of refugees formed on the roads out of Zaire to Rwanda. Literally within hours, hundreds of thousands of Rwandans were reported streaming toward the border.⁵⁷ The Kabila/Tutsi forces, it seemed, had attacked refugee concentrations and successfully separated the Hutu ex-FAR and militias from the mass of the refugee population. No longer under the rule of their "intimidators," the refugees were suddenly free to head home. And so, in growing numbers, they did.

The political effects were immediate. In Washington, officials were quoted as "reassessing" the need for an MNF and for U.S. participation in it. At the UN, Rwanda (for one) quickly withdrew its pre-Nov. 15 support for the MNF as envisaged in 1080 and argued for a redirection of resources to Rwanda to aid refugee re-

integration. In eastern Zaire, Kabila himself was telling reporters he didn't "think the international community has any reason. . . to come here. We have fulfilled the will of the international community peacefully."⁵⁸

It was hardly peaceful, but Kabila was half-right: The long-standing UN objective of releasing the refugees from the Hutu gunmen to allow their repatriation did appear to be occurring. And humanitarian assistance, denied for so long, seemed likely to be accessible to most of the refugees once back inside Rwanda. But how many refugees were actually returning to safety? How many instead were walking west, deeper into the Zairian jungle? And of those, how many were in fact not so much refugees as fugitives, *génocidaires* hurrying away from the justice (or retribution) they might get in Rwanda? The future of the Canadian-led intervention in some degree was shaped in the grim and inconclusive arguments over these numbers.

By Nov. 17 attitudes were clearly shifting. That day on *Meet the Press*, U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry sounded even more unconvinced than before about a U.S. deployment. "We have not made a decision on that yet," he said. "We are not the Salvation Army."⁵⁹ The next day he told Pentagon reporters that if the trend of refugee repatriation continued "it will change substantially the nature of the humanitarian problem in the region." He added, however, that "we have not made, at this point, a change in our plans. We are standing by in a ready mode to move forward with humanitarian support, and just as soon as we get the detailed information from our survey team. . . then we will make our decision and move, and we will tell you when that happens."⁶⁰

Reporting from Africa, Ambassador Chrétien detected an abrupt loss of enthusiasm for the MNF—which was anyway suspect in some African capitals as an unwanted intrusion. The Rwandan government, as its UN delegate had said, now expressed doubt for the need of the MNF. The Zairian government (such as it was, Mobutu still convalescing at his Riviera villa) was now ambivalent about an MNF deployment inside Zaire; Zairian authorities were hostile to any *tractations* between the MNF and the Kabila rebels. Burundi authorities held that the MNF's objectives were already being accomplished, and were trying to exchange their approval for the MNF for relief from the economic sanctions imposed on it months earlier by several neighbouring countries.⁶¹

Nevertheless, at this point Ambassador Chrétien remained convinced that an MNF deployment was necessary—if only to rescue the masses of displaced Zairians who had joined the refugees in flight from rebel-government fighting.⁶²

In Ottawa on Nov. 18 the Commons returned from a week's recess. Leading off a one-day debate on the Zaire crisis (which demonstrated general all-party support for the government), Axworthy began by attributing the sudden return of so many of the refugees at least partly to the triggering effect of the Canadian initiative. "The international community's presence that would soon be felt became a strong and compelling influence in terms of that massive movement that we now witness daily."⁶³ There was no way of knowing, Axworthy said, whether the rest of the refugees would join the march to Rwanda. "We must be prepared to do what we can," he said.

At the present moment we are gathering the information intelligence, working with our allies, working with the African states, the Europeans and the

Americans to ensure that in Eastern Zaire itself that as the problem begins to be resolved, we also do not see remaining pockets where there is still continued violence, insecurity or instability. . . . We are beginning to look at how we can meet the objectives but perhaps use a different mix of tools.⁶⁴

Defence Minister Young, for his part, told the Commons it was “much too early to say the crisis is over. . . . We believe there are still approximately 500,000 refugees in Zaire. There are still people in need.”⁶⁵ But in Young’s phrasing, what had once been an urgent mission was now a “possible deployment.” By the end of that day, he said, the Canadian Forces would have about 250 personnel in theatre, with four Hercules and one Airbus aircraft, along with other equipment and vehicles.⁶⁶ “But any decision to participate in a humanitarian relief effort. . . will be based on specific guidelines.” The minister went on to list five:⁶⁷ Acquiescence to the MNF by all governments in the region; agreement on “a clear and achievable mandate;” agreement on a “limited duration;” “robust rules of engagement;” and “a clear and effective command and control structure.” Young was still more specific about what an MNF would not do. It would “not conduct forced entry operations.” It would “not be responsible for overall repatriation or integration of refugees.” It would “not intervene in factional or local conflicts.” It would “not deal with territorial disputes.” It would “not separate the intimidators from the refugees, nor. . . disarm the intimidators.” It would “not secure the perimeter of refugee camps.” It would “not provide police functions within the camps.”⁶⁸ Taken together, of course, Young’s recitation bore striking similarity to that of the Clinton administration.

Young’s own list also struck some Canadian participants in the decision-making process as surpassingly comprehensive. (CIDA officials were becoming particularly dissatisfied, as the next chapter will consider.) But it faithfully reflected

the military and civilian advice Young was getting from his own department.⁶⁹ And it might have gone some distance in answering the concerns of Anthony Lake, who was in Ottawa the same day. Again Lake was obviously (to Canadian negotiators) trying to restrict the reach of the MNF's mandate, to clarify its operational objectives, to put in place a mechanism for political direction and accountability—and perhaps simply to delay, while realities evolved on the ground.⁷⁰

A short note here about the nature of Canada's own military commitment to the MNF. By Nov. 18, when DND officers briefed members of Parliament, the planned Canadian deployment of 1,500-1,600 people consisted of the following: a task force headquarters, drawn primarily from the First Canadian Division headquarters and signals regiment at Kingston, Ont. (Gen. Baril arrived in Africa Nov. 19); personnel from Air Transport Group headquarters at Trenton, Ont.; the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), mainly medical and engineering staff; an air transport flight of up to three Hercules freighters from Trenton; and various support elements.⁷¹ It was an admittedly humble contribution for the lead government in an MNF originally conceived as requiring at least 10,000 troops, to which the United States had been contemplating a contribution of up to 4,000. The modest size underlined the necessity of recruiting far greater commitments from the "coalition of the willing" that the Canadian government was trying to assemble.

That attempt resumed in New York Nov. 20, when Canadian officials led by Deputy Minister Smith convened a "consultative meeting" of troop-contributing and other interested governments and agencies. Smith's prepared objectives⁷² were to remind coalition members of the 1080 mandate—to facilitate aid delivery and

voluntary repatriation—and to persuade other governments that the mandate remained valid despite changed circumstances. It was too soon to conclude that a military intervention was not required, Smith maintained; what was needed was to gather better intelligence about what was happening in Zaire. In Washington, however, the Clinton administration was already scaling back the provisional U.S. contribution from 4,000 to fewer than 1,000—none to be deployed in Zaire itself.⁷³ With consensus apparently dissolving, the critical military issues were again put off; senior military commanders and diplomats were to meet on the U.S. airbase at Stuttgart in two days to refine the possible options.

The negotiation in Stuttgart, which eventually stretched into three days, remains in the memories of Canadian officials and NGO observers as a crucial turning point in the crisis—difficult, acrimonious and ultimately disappointing.⁷⁴ Much of the difficulty, and the acrimony, were rooted in continuing disputes over the numbers, intentions and whereabouts of refugees still in Zaire. Aid agencies put the total still in need of rescue at up to 700,000; the United States government estimated 150-200,000.⁷⁵ The number accepted at the end of the meeting was “at least” 250,000. But that left unresolved the contentious issue of what to do. The United States (backed by Britain) resisted deployments of almost any kind—yet, at least. The French (with Spanish, Belgian and Senegalese support) sought a deployment directly to eastern Zaire itself. For Canadian participants—including the Canadian chair of the meeting, Lt.-Gen. Armand Roy—the argument generated only frustration. “The commitments didn’t add up to a hill of beans,” one Canadian colonel later said.⁷⁶ And in the end the only country to keep its commitment to assign troops to the MNF

command was Canada. “Clearly the instructions that were given by the various countries to their militaries were: Be involved in the discussions, find out what’s going on, but don’t commit yourself to anything.”⁷⁷ To a very senior Canadian diplomat in the meeting this was insupportable. “Bullshit,” he interjected at one point, “we’re the only ones there. If this is so goddam important, where are you all?”⁷⁸

This was to no avail. What emerged from Stuttgart were five options for governments:⁷⁹

- A) Hold to the status quo (reconnaissance, planning, intelligence gathering);
- B) Establish MNF headquarters in the region;
- C) Facilitate aid and repatriation “in a permissive environment,” including an airlift into eastern Zaire;
- D) The same as C, but in a non-permissive environment using required force for protection;
- E) Redeployment—i.e. withdrawal.

It was moreover made clear that the U.S. and British delegations would accept nothing stronger than option B, establishment of a headquarters (in Uganda).

To the prime minister and officers in Foreign Affairs, option B was “unacceptable to us as the only response of the international community. . . because it does not allow for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, if required, to the approximately 300,000 legitimate Rwandan refugees still in eastern Zaire.”⁸⁰ On that basis, and after a conference call from the prime minister who was then in Asia, Canadian officials elaborated a “B+” option of their own—a headquarters in Uganda, plus preparations for airdrops of relief supplies into Zaire or (if possible) escorted

convoys. It was this proposal that the Canadians took to the next meeting of the troop contributors, Nov. 26 in New York.⁸¹

From Africa, meanwhile, came disturbing accounts of further complications. There was still no reliable accounting of the number or locations of refugees or displaced persons in eastern Zaire. (The rain clouds that followed the refugees like a curse impeded aerial and satellite surveillance.) And Ambassador Chrétien was describing hardening attitudes in both the Zairian and Rwandan governments. While the United States was opposing deployment of U.S. troops in Zaire, some officials in Kinshasa were now insisting that the MNF set up its headquarters on Zairian territory; they evidently saw the MNF as an instrument for stopping the rebel advance. Officials in Kigali, on the other hand, were pressing for a refocus of the mission to finance resettlement of refugees already back in Rwanda. The ambassador believed these Rwandan authorities were using delaying tactics, "*manoeuvres dilatoires*," to prevent any MNF deployment (which they regarded as threatening an untimely interruption of the Kabila-Tutsi successes in eastern Zaire). Ambassador Chrétien was also reporting that there was clear evidence of Rwandan army participation in the Kabila offensive against the refugee camps around Nov. 15. Furthermore, he had warned that while a large-scale war between Zaire and Rwanda was not imminent, there was some danger the Zairian army would try to retake by force the territory it had lost to the Kabila rebels. The atmosphere of sabre-rattling was not hospitable to any MNF deployment, he wrote—but the remaining refugees would be exposed to any intensification of fighting.⁸² Also visiting African capitals during these days was Christine Stewart, the Canadian minister responsible for Africa; she encountered

similar divisions and doubts as she sounded out regional opinion both about short-term intervention prospects and longer-term peace initiatives.⁸³

Nor was the Department of Foreign Affairs reassured by the news from Washington. Defence Minister Young, briefing journalists with Defence Secretary Perry at the Pentagon Nov. 25, remarked that, “at this stage, there’s been no definitive decision on whether or not there should be” a military deployment in Africa. “Whether or not we have to do something militarily in the traditional sense of peacekeeping or humanitarian support is difficult to tell at this point.” When a reporter asked, “What do you want from the U.S.?”, Young replied: “. . . I don’t think it’s anything specific to the U.S. at this point other than the fact that they’re there and we’re still talking, and that there may be some need in terms of that humanitarian aid for airlift capacity.”⁸⁴ Axworthy, when he learned of this exchange, was later described as apoplectic. At a moment when Canada’s minister of foreign affairs was applying all his energies to securing a U.S. military commitment (at least for “B+”), Canada’s minister of defence was allowing that maybe nothing at all was needed—or wanted—from the U.S. government.⁸⁵

It was in the context of these tensions that delegates of interested governments met again in New York Nov. 26—Paul Heinbecker, an assistant deputy minister at DFAIT, in the chair. Represented were about 25 governments, 11 UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the OAU. Heinbecker began by condemning Stuttgart’s option B as inadequate, and advanced what amounted to an ultimatum to the other governments: Inform Canada within 36 hours of your commitment to an MNF headquarters and participation in airdrops, and maybe later

in protected convoys. Canada would then decide, within another 24 hours, whether there was enough support to proceed; if so, the envisaged Steering Group would be established.⁸⁶ There was some dissent. Humanitarian agencies raised questions about the efficacy and safety of airdrops, while African governments reiterated dissatisfaction with the level of African participation in the unfolding plan (their participation would be diminished further if the operation were limited to air drops). Still, Canadian officials returned to Ottawa believing progress had been made. Axworthy and Prime Minister Chrétien, if not Young, were determined to press on.⁸⁷

On Nov. 28 Axworthy and Young held a news conference to announce that “more than 20 nations” had offered support—including the United States, France, Belgium, South Africa, Malawi, Senegal, Denmark and Japan (offering money, not troops), among others. “The international community has agreed to set up a multinational headquarters in the region and to put in place the capability to carry out air drops of food into eastern Zaire,” their news release said. As well, a Steering Group of “the major participating nations” would “take responsibility for providing political direction and co-ordinating the efforts of the international community. . . . Decisions on next steps will be taken by this body. Canada will be chair, but this group will work by consensus.” By now, the news release added, more than 600 Canadian Forces personnel were assigned to the mission, “Operation Assurance,” including just under 300 in the Great Lakes region itself.⁸⁸

The ministers were surely putting the best possible light on things. The British in fact remained so obdurate against airdrops (or any alternatives) that a senior Canadian diplomat at one point asked them not to bother attending any more

meetings if they didn't plan to be helpful; they seemed startled by the suggestion, and continued attending.⁸⁹ The U.S. government had notionally endorsed the concept of airdrops—but expressed so many reservations in public that the *New York Times* reported “the possibility that even this more modest relief operation might not take place.”⁹⁰ Among those U.S. conditions: the coalition planes must not be fired upon, and approval must be secured from all parties including the Rwandan government and the Zairian rebels. As the *Times* reported in the same story, the Rwandan government strongly criticized the “B+” plan and objected to the use of Entebbe airport as the operational base. The White House in a statement said the United States would work with Canada and others to draft airdrop plans. “Once that planning is complete, we expect to make a final decision as to what can be accomplished effectively and what precise role the U.S. will play.”⁹¹

This was a remarkably non-committal “commitment,” and it did not sound any firmer when the new Steering Group held its first meeting Nov. 29 in Ottawa. Besides Canada, 13 governments were represented (Belgium, Cameroon representing as well the OAU, France, Ireland for the European Union, Italy, Japan, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Uganda, United Kingdom and the United States); the Netherlands joined the Group at its second meeting. But the Nov. 29 meeting agreed to little more than to establish an MNF headquarters and await more information from Gen. Baril. Said Heinbecker to reporters at the end of the day: “Gen. Baril and his people are going to be on the spot and they are going to make an assessment.”⁹² In Washington Dec. 3, State Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns described the operation as “still in the planning stage.” The airdrop option was still under

discussion in the Steering Group, he said, but the Group “operates on a consensus basis, and there is. . . no consensus” yet.⁹³

In Africa, circumstances were not growing easier. On Nov. 28, so that he could more accurately gauge the potential for aid deliveries, Gen. Baril met the rebel leader Kabila in Goma, Zaire. Baril won Kabila’s tentative approval for airdrops in rebel-held territory—but in meeting Kabila he had alienated the Zairian authorities in Kinshasa, whose hostility to airdrops became all the stronger.⁹⁴ With every day that passed, more Zairian towns came under Kabila’s control and the Zairian army retreated westward.⁹⁵ At the same time there were distressing accounts of atrocities committed by Kabila’s forces—and just as troubling, the disappearance of refugees and displaced persons by the hundreds and even thousands.⁹⁶ Paradoxically, these disappearances were used by some governments as evidence that airdrops and other measures were unnecessary; when a British surveillance airplane returned from a sortie with photographs of empty roads, British military officers offered them in argument against airdrops.⁹⁷ There was still no consensus on the population of refugees and displaced persons now in Zaire; estimates ranged from fewer than 200,000 to more than 700,000.

In a Nov. 29 report to the Security Council Boutros-Ghali was similarly uncertain. “. . . It is difficult at the present stage to provide. . . a comprehensive concept of operations for a humanitarian task force,” he wrote. “Indeed, it is still unclear what the scope of such a force’s tasks would be, especially when the nature, strength and modus operandi of the multinational force. . . have yet to be finalized.”⁹⁸ Of 1.1 million Rwandans who had been in Zaire, Boutros-Ghali reported, his

estimates now put the number remaining at “between 300,000 and 700,000” as of Nov. 25. He went on to say that the policy of the Zairian government now was “that refugees must repatriate and international assistance should no longer be made available in Zaire but in their countries of origin.” The secretary-general concluded, however, that he still believed “that a practical way to avoid a humanitarian disaster is the establishment of some form of military presence in the region.” It was left again to the Council, and now the Steering Group, to negotiate the means to that end—if they could.

In Cap-Martin, on the Riviera coast, Ambassador Chrétien paid one more call on President Mobutu. Chrétien urged on Mobutu the value of opening a dialogue with Rwanda—notwithstanding that Rwandan forces had quite obviously participated in the ascendant Kabila rebellion. But before leaving, Chrétien also left Mobutu a letter noting that Zaire recently had made statements contrary to its earlier support for the MNF. The Canadian government, his letter said, would greatly appreciate a public statement by the president dispelling all ambiguity and reaffirming his government’s support for this humanitarian intervention.⁹⁹ There is no trace on the public record that Mobutu ever acceded to Chrétien’s request.

In New York on Dec. 5, in accordance with the requirements of Resolution 1080, Ambassador Fowler submitted a progress report¹⁰⁰ on the MNF. The return of “a large number” of refugees was welcome, he said, but it was “possible there might be an appreciable number of refugees and displaced persons in eastern Zaire who still require assistance.” The MNF was undertaking aerial and ground reconnaissance “to obtain a clearer picture of the location, number, needs and intentions of the remaining

refugees and displaced persons.” Aside from a short account of the creation and first meeting of the Steering Group, there was no more to report. To the regret of Fowler and (some of) the other Canadians engaged in the enterprise,¹⁰¹ the endgame had begun.

Standing Down

One effect of the uncertainties was to open still wider the existing divisions among Steering Group governments. In Europe, and especially in France, there were continuing pressures on Canada to activate the MNF at least with airdrops. In Washington there was increasing resistance—and suggestions that perhaps the Canadians in their enthusiasm for their leadership role simply did not know when to stop. Canadian missions in Europe and Africa were at the same time cabling Ottawa with warnings against a premature or unprepared end to the intervention that would damage Canada’s reputation for dependability. At DFAIT, officials by early December were scripting various exit scenarios.¹⁰²

But there were analogous divisions inside the Canadian government itself.¹⁰³ Axworthy remained committed to the utility and the possibility of mounting an MNF operation—by willing countries even without Steering Group consensus, if consensus were unobtainable. Officials at CIDA were similarly convinced that intervention was necessary and practical, with a strong preference for convoys over airdrops; CIDA’s NGO partners vigorously insisted that refugees and displaced Zairians urgently

needed help, but in the main opposed airdrops as dangerous and inefficient. Members of DND, by contrast, showed ever more open willingness to stand down Operation Assurance now that conditions had so significantly changed in Zaire. Young himself voiced his distaste for the prospects of a military operation in a scrum with reporters in Ottawa Dec. 5.¹⁰⁴ Was it at the point now, he was asked, “where you don’t need the multinational headquarters?” “Well, I’m not sure,” he replied. “We’re still there, we’re mounting it and General Baril is continuing with his discussions. There is certainly a lot less need for military support for humanitarian aid than there was because the situation has changed so dramatically. . . . And if the humanitarian aid can be delivered by NGOs in a relatively acceptable environment then that is what will happen.” Young also said that DND’s DART disaster response team, which had been on stand-by at Trenton, had returned to base in Edmonton.

On Dec. 10, in a lengthy report (26 pages including five annexes, and a three-page covering letter),¹⁰⁵ Gen. Baril made a decisive recommendation to withdraw the MNF and abandon the intervention. “It is my assessment that the MNF mission has largely been accomplished and therefore the mandate should come to an end,” he wrote in his covering letter—noting that his views had “been discussed with the US and UK contingent commanders in Kampala and there is general agreement at this level on the conclusions reported.” Baril said the objectives had “mostly been met” by the voluntary return of Rwandan refugees. “For those Rwandan refugees who remain in eastern Zaire, and who may not want to return for security concerns, needed assistance can be provided by the humanitarian relief agencies in cooperation with local authorities, in due course, and as the security situation permits.” The general

commented in his covering letter that “reports received from outside the mission area indicate that some HRAs [humanitarian relief agencies] persist in their attempt to paint a continued humanitarian crisis in the making and deny the factual information made available to them at the local level.” He continued: “We do not and cannot claim to have accurate information on the location and condition of all refugees left in eastern Zaire since several thousands have moved west out of our observation zone of 100 km from the Zaire/Rwanda border. We must be prepared for criticism of a Steering Group decision that would end the mission and have a communication strategy in place and coordinated.”

As for Canada’s own contribution: “Canadian Forces resources deployed with MNF are unique national resources and should only remain with MNF if these capabilities can not be provided by the humanitarian agencies. They should be withdrawn as soon as possible in order to be available for other real humanitarian emergencies.”

Baril went to some trouble in his report to analyse the problem of numbers. Starting with a (widely accepted) estimate of 50,000 Interahamwe and other Hutu militias blamed for most of the 1994 genocide, and adding 40,000 ex-FAR soldiers and another 10,000 people who were otherwise accomplices in the killing, Baril calculated that almost 100,000 “may have a strong wish not to return to Rwanda.” That meant, “given the average Rwandan family size,” that it was “not unreasonable to conclude that there may be as many as 250,000 refugees who would resist repatriation.” To derive the total number of refugees still in Zaire, Baril began with the UNHCR pre-November figure of 1.1 million, and reduced it to 900,000 to take

account “of possible over-estimates. . . based on generous food distribution and over-registration.” Some 640,000 were known to have returned to Rwanda in recent weeks—leaving (if all this was true) about 260,000 in Zaire. If 250,000 were avoiding repatriation, that left only perhaps 10,000 refugees still in Zaire involuntarily.

Needless to say, these calculations have since been strenuously and even angrily disputed. But the impact of Baril’s recommendation was irresistible. And it was reinforced by his political observations—that neither the government of Rwanda nor the “new authorities” (Kabila) in eastern Zaire favored an MNF deployment in eastern Zaire. “. . . It is now increasingly clear that regional support for the continued presence of the MNF is rapidly eroding. It is therefore time to cease operations and redeploy from the region.” Nor was there any comfort in his observation that “no nation other than Canada has authorized the transfer of authority of their elements deployed at Entebbe and Kampala to the MNF.”

Two days later, on Dec. 12, Boutros-Ghali sent Ambassador Chrétien’s final report on to the Security Council.¹⁰⁶ *Inter alia* (the ambassador’s negotiating and exploratory work touched subjects far beyond the MNF), Chrétien observed that with the return of 600,000 or more refugees, “the need for the deployment of a multinational force. . . has changed.” He also acknowledged that the massive flow back into Rwanda “caused Rwanda to question publicly the rationale for the multinational force.”

Ambassador Chrétien rather soberly observed that fighting between Zairian and Ugandan troops on Nov. 30 did “not bode well for peace and stability in the region.” And he pointed out that, “while the immediate humanitarian crisis may have

eased somewhat, the underlying political and military causes of instability in the region have yet to be addressed.” On the whole, however, there was nothing here to dissuade those ready to stand down the MNF—or to strengthen the hand of those who would stay.

In Washington the same day, the Pentagon announced it had withdrawn half of the 450 U.S. soldiers deployed (under its own command) to Central Africa in the crisis. “The momentum seems to be moving away from an international mission there,” a spokesman told a news conference.¹⁰⁷ At about the same hour the State Department issued a statement to say “the United States Government remains deeply concerned by the situation in eastern Zaire”—specifically by the fighting and by the refugees unaccounted for. “We urge all parties to enter into negotiations,” the statement said, and called for “dialogue” between Zaire and Rwanda and within Zaire itself. The statement, running to 540 words, made not a single reference to the MNF.¹⁰⁸

The Canadian position, it is fair to say, was now in flux—if not in a muddle. The prime minister, who had conceived of the operation as a moral duty, was getting conflicting advice from the two ministers pre-eminently responsible: Axworthy determined to carry on, Young for a prompt withdrawal. The conflict had not truly been resolved even as the Steering Group gathered in New York Dec. 13 for its second meeting (and, as it turned out, the last).¹⁰⁹ This naturally represented a problem for Heinbecker, again in the chair and Canada’s chief delegate. The problem was made no easier by the message Heinbecker got from Ottawa just before calling the meeting to order: Your prime minister wants the MNF wound up now, he was

told, and your minister of foreign affairs says to keep it going; good luck.¹¹⁰ In the event¹¹¹—and after Baril had personally briefed the Steering Group with his own recommendation—Heinbecker told the meeting that Canada agreed with Baril's assessment and intended to end its own involvement in the MNF Dec. 31.

What followed was for the most part a recitation of familiar views. The French delegate argued for a continued effort, that several hundred thousand refugees (1.1 million minus 600,000 returned) might still need aid. Britain accepted Canada's recommendation, emphasizing the urgency of organizing a political settlement in the region. Belgium sided with France. South Africa was equivocal. The Dutch believed the MNF headquarters at least was still useful, and that other approaches must be found if the MNF were closed down. UNHCR and the World Food Program strenuously argued for maintaining the MNF.

The U.S. representative, George Moose of the State Department, began by accepting the Canadian recommendation; conditions on the ground had changed and the MNF of Resolution 1080 was no longer appropriate. But Moose then surprised the Canadians by suggesting that some element of the MNF headquarters stay in place to monitor events and permit a military response if necessary. Heinbecker's quick response was that Canada after all was the only country with forces under MNF command and Canada was leaving.¹¹² No other government took up Moose's suggestion. Ambassador Fowler then thanked all present and undertook to report the decision of the Steering Group to the secretary-general. The meeting was adjourned. In Ottawa, the Prime Minister's Office issued a news release announcing the end of the MNF. "Those attending the meeting agreed that the remaining problems in eastern

Zaire and Rwanda can best be addressed through a coordinated international effort under civilian leadership,” the statement said. “The focus needs to be on providing support to the humanitarian agencies and on addressing the political problems that are at the root of this crisis.”¹¹³

In a brief letter to Boutros-Ghali dated the same day, Fowler wrote:

After consulting with our partners in the Steering Group, Canada has now concluded that, with the return to Rwanda of the majority of refugees, the dispersal of the remaining number over large areas of eastern Zaire and the growing access of international humanitarian agencies to the remaining refugees, displaced persons and civilians at risk, the multinational force at the current authorized force level has very little utility.

Canada will therefore withdraw its command and Canadian elements of the multinational force by 31 December 1996. . . . Canada recommends that the Security Council terminate the mandate of the multinational force, effective 31 December 1996.¹¹⁴

Baril left his African headquarters for the last time Dec. 20, and all the Canadians were out by early January.¹¹⁵

On January 6, 1997, the Zairian mission at the UN wrote to the Security Council bitterly denouncing the outcome of Resolution 1080: The force was never deployed; Baril “established contact with the aggressors and their illegal administrations;” no safe corridor had been established; the policy of providing humanitarian aid did not achieve its objective; Rwanda attacked the refugee camps to pre-empt the MNF’s deployment; and the number of refugees still in Zaire “exceeded 800,000.”¹¹⁶

Prime Minister Chrétien, in a year-end television interview, had put it differently. “We woke up the international community, we triggered the movement for these people to go back,” he said. “And it is the biggest movement of human

beings with no violence, you know, probably for ever. . . . The goal was to give them food, medication and help them return home. And that's exactly what happened."¹¹⁷

It had been, in truth, a mysterious and worrying episode. How many lives had been saved by the Canadian action? How many people were abandoned to suffering and death by the result? What could explain the course and outcome of these negotiations? Can a middle power like Canada initiate and manage a large-scale humanitarian intervention?

In this case, as in others, the decisions and actions of the U.S. government were determinative. How, in such cases, can the Canadian government influence the U.S. government? To explore this question, the case of the attempted intervention in eastern Zaire will now be subjected to some propositions of theory.

¹ Interviews with the author.

² Interview.

³ The most convincing and thorough history is Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis* rev. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). See also Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Watch World Report 1997* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1996) 46ff and 60 ff.

⁴ Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, "Synthesis Report," *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*. Copenhagen, March 1996. 9.

⁵ "Synthesis Report."

⁶ By UNHCR estimates; all these numbers inspired continual disputes, never fully resolved with certainty.

⁷ *The New York Times*, Nov. 13, 1996. A8. An uncertain but conventionally accepted number, adopted for example by Lt.-Gen. Maurice Baril, Canadian commander of the multinational force. See "MNF Commander's Assessment," Dec. 10, 1996, released under the Access to Information Act by DND in 1998 as case (A) 96-1168, at pages 00097 ff. References to documents released in this case are hereafter cited as Access, followed by page numbers.

⁸ Interviews.

⁹ Interviews at CIDA.

¹⁰ Gordon Smith, interview.

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- ¹¹ "Synthesis Report," 11.
 - ¹² Smith, and other interviews.
 - ¹³ Prime Minister's Office. Transcript, Nov. 12, 1996.
 - ¹⁴ *The Globe and Mail*, Oct. 29, 1996. A13.
 - ¹⁵ *Globe*, Oct. 30, 1996. A13.
 - ¹⁶ *Globe*, Nov. 1, 1996. A14.
 - ¹⁷ Eg. *New York Times*, June 16, 1996. I3.
 - ¹⁸ *Globe*, Oct. 9, 1996. A14; Oct. 14, 1996. A8.
 - ¹⁹ *New York Times*, Oct. 25, 1996. A8; Oct. 26, 1996. I7.
 - ²⁰ *New York Times*, Oct. 29, 1996. A3.
 - ²¹ *Globe*, Nov. 9, 1996. A16.
 - ²² Interviews. Other governments were also concentrating on Burundi. For this and a British practitioner's analysis of the region's conflicts see Glynne Evans, "Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes," *Adelphi Paper* 311. August 1997.
 - ²³ Access, 00281-282.
 - ²⁴ Interviews with Gordon Smith and others.
 - ²⁵ Interview.
 - ²⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Canadian ambassador chosen as UN special envoy to the Great Lakes Region." News release no. 200, Oct. 30, 1996.
 - ²⁷ Interviews.
 - ²⁸ Interviews.
 - ²⁹ Telegram from Canadian mission at the UN to DFAIT in Ottawa. Access, 00348-352.
 - ³⁰ Resolution 1078, Nov. 9, 1996.
 - ³¹ Interviews; see also *Globe*, Nov. 9, 1996. A1, A16.
 - ³² Interviews.
 - ³³ Interview with Smith.
 - ³⁴ Interviews.
 - ³⁵ Interview with Smith.
 - ³⁶ Interviews.
 - ³⁷ Interview.
 - ³⁸ Interviews.
 - ³⁹ Interviews.
 - ⁴⁰ Interviews.
 - ⁴¹ Interview, supported by interviews with Canadians familiar with the negotiations.
 - ⁴² *New York Times*, Nov. 14, 1996. A1.
 - ⁴³ Prime Minister's Office. Transcript, Nov. 12, 1996.
 - ⁴⁴ Interview.
 - ⁴⁵ *New York Times*, Nov. 13, 1996. A1.
 - ⁴⁶ Interviews.
 - ⁴⁷ United States Embassy, Ottawa. "White House Press Secretary on Eastern Zaire," text of statement by the press secretary, Nov. 13, 1996. See also *New York Times*, Nov. 14, 1996. A1.
 - ⁴⁸ Transcript.
 - ⁴⁹ Interviews.
 - ⁵⁰ Access, 00231.
 - ⁵¹ Interviews.
 - ⁵² Interviews. See *New York Times*, Nov. 15, 1996. A7.
 - ⁵³ Resolution 1080, Nov. 15, 1996.
 - ⁵⁴ United Nations, Security Council, 3713rd Meeting, 15 November 1996, Provisional Record.
 - ⁵⁵ 3713rd Meeting.
 - ⁵⁶ 3713rd Meeting.
 - ⁵⁷ For example, *New York Times*, Nov. 16, 1996. I1; *Globe*, Nov. 16, 1996. A1.
 - ⁵⁸ *New York Times*, Nov. 16, 1996. I1.
 - ⁵⁹ *New York Times*, Nov. 18, 1996. A6.
 - ⁶⁰ United States Embassy, Ottawa. "Transcript: Perry Points to Positive Developments in Zaire," Nov. 18, 1996.

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- ⁶¹ Accounts of African positions are drawn chiefly from interviews with several Canadian and U.S. officials. See also Ambassador Chrétien's final report to the UN, contained as an annex to the secretary-general's letter to the Security Council Dec. 12, 1996. Security Council document S/1996/1036.
- ⁶² Interviews.
- ⁶³ Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, Nov. 18, 1996. 6345.
- ⁶⁴ *Debates*. 6346.
- ⁶⁵ *Debates*. 6354.
- ⁶⁶ *Debates*. 6355.
- ⁶⁷ *Debates*. 6355.
- ⁶⁸ *Debates*. 6355.
- ⁶⁹ Interviews.
- ⁷⁰ Interviews.
- ⁷¹ Access, 00193.
- ⁷² Access, 00572, 00762.
- ⁷³ *New York Times*, Nov. 20, 1996. A1.
- ⁷⁴ Interviews.
- ⁷⁵ *New York Times*, Nov. 23, 1996. I7.
- ⁷⁶ Interview.
- ⁷⁷ Interview.
- ⁷⁸ Interview with the interjector.
- ⁷⁹ Interviews.
- ⁸⁰ Access, 00778-780, a fax from the Zaire Interdepartmental Task Force to Deputy Defence Minister Louise Fréchette, Nov. 25, 1996.
- ⁸¹ Interviews.
- ⁸² Interviews.
- ⁸³ Interviews.
- ⁸⁴ Access, 00467, a U.S. Department of Defence transcript of the joint briefing 10 a.m. Nov. 25.
- ⁸⁵ Interviews.
- ⁸⁶ Access, 00736, 00779 ff; interviews.
- ⁸⁷ *New York Times*, Nov. 27, 1996. A12; interviews.
- ⁸⁸ Government of Canada, news release no. 96/51, Nov. 28, 1996.
- ⁸⁹ Interview.
- ⁹⁰ *New York Times*, Nov. 28, 1996. A1.
- ⁹¹ *New York Times*, Nov. 28, 1996. A1.
- ⁹² *Globe*, Nov. 30, 1996. A1; interviews.
- ⁹³ United States Embassy, Ottawa. "Evidence of Atrocities in Eastern Zaire Mounting, U.S. Says," a U.S. Information Agency account of the Burns briefing, Dec. 3, 1996.
- ⁹⁴ *New York Times*, Nov. 29, 1996. A1.
- ⁹⁵ See various *New York Times* reports Dec. 3, 4, 5, 9, 11.
- ⁹⁶ See, for example, "Evidence of Atrocities. . ." and, for a summing-up, *Human Rights Watch World Report 1997*. 62 ff.
- ⁹⁷ Interviews; remarks of Col. George Young, military adviser to the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations, at the "Conference on Peace Support Operations and Humanitarian Action," Halifax, N.S., Aug. 7-10, 1997.
- ⁹⁸ United Nations, Security Council. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Resolution 1078 (1996)" Nov. 29, 1996.
- ⁹⁹ Interviews.
- ¹⁰⁰ The report was attached to a letter sent to the Security Council by the secretary-general Dec. 5, 1996. Texts of both provided by the Canadian Mission to the United Nations.
- ¹⁰¹ Interviews.
- ¹⁰² Interviews.
- ¹⁰³ Interviews.
- ¹⁰⁴ Access, 00462-466, transcript.
- ¹⁰⁵ Access, 00096-00125.

¹⁰⁶ United Nations, Security Council, text of the secretary-general's letter Dec. 12, 1996. S/1996/1036.

¹⁰⁷ *New York Times*, Dec. 13, 1996. A16.

¹⁰⁸ United States Embassy, Ottawa. "U.S. Remains Deeply Concerned by Situation in Eastern Zaire," text of a statement by Nicholas Burns, Dec. 12, 1996.

¹⁰⁹ Interviews.

¹¹⁰ Interviews with Gordon Smith and others.

¹¹¹ Access, 00086-095, a summary of the meeting prepared by a Canadian Forces officer present and text of Baril's statement.

¹¹² Interviews. Access, 00083.

¹¹³ See *Globe*, Dec. 14, 1996. A20. Prime Minister's Office. "International Steering Group agrees that Zaire multinational force no longer needed," Dec. 13, 1996.

¹¹⁴ United Nations, Security Council, text of the secretary-general's letter to the Security Council Dec. 16, 1996, containing as an annex Fowler's letter. S/1996/1046.

¹¹⁵ Interviews. *Globe*, Dec. 21, 1996. A14.

¹¹⁶ United Nations, Security Council, text of the letter of the deputy permanent representative of Zaire to the Security Council Jan. 6, 1997. S/1997/13.

¹¹⁷ Global Television Network, transcript of the interview broadcast Dec. 25, 1996.

Chapter Four

Theory in Practice

Having now described the facts of the case, it remains to submit those facts to some of the theoretical propositions raised in Chapter Two. This analytical phase will proceed in three stages: first, a concise account of the multilateral context in which Canadian policy was conducted; second, a consideration of declarative Clinton administration foreign policy on the generic issue of intervention at the onset of the crisis in eastern Zaire; and third, a testing application of the three theoretical approaches—asymmetry/interdependence, the metaphor of two-level games, and the bureaucratic-politics/political-process models. The attempt in this chapter is to understand what happened in this case in a way that illuminates the question at the core of this thesis: In what circumstances, and by what means, is the Canadian government most able to influence the U.S. government in cases of armed international intervention?

The Multilateral Context

The chief obstacles to multilateral negotiations are complexity and uncertainty: complexity created by the large number of parties to the negotiation and issues on the table, uncertainty heightened by the difficulties of communicating preferences and exchanging information among a large number of participants.¹

It is not for nothing that these are called complex emergencies. In the degree of uncertainty and complication of the conflict on the ground, in the number and heterogeneity of state and nonstate actors, in the difficulty of interest-accommodation and decision-making, in the deadliness of potential consequences, the humanitarian crisis in eastern Zaire confounded understanding—not to speak of peaceful resolution. From the onset of the crisis and throughout, however, Canadian policy was formulated and executed in multilateral terms; it was never doubted that success, if possible at all, could only be achieved by co-ordinated multilateral action. If multilateralism was an impediment to early and effective intervention, it was also a necessary instrument.

This is not the place for a complete reading of the abundant literature on multilateral negotiation. It is enough here to notice a number of the suggestive propositions, as navigation aids to exploring the dynamics of multilateral bargaining in this case. The first is that crisis can make agreements or break them, sometimes quite unpredictably. The crisis of impending famine and slaughter served to create a Security Council consensus sufficient for the adoption of Resolution 1080, the decision to intervene. Crisis of a different kind—the startling and at first unexplained refugee movement back toward Rwanda—was a decisive turning point and served as a pretext at least for hesitation and defection by some states from the earlier (apparent) consensus. A second proposition points to the important phase of problem definition, or the development of shared perceptions, preparatory to negotiating an agreed solution. If the problem was identified in this case in Resolution 1080, it was suddenly “dis-identified” by changed and differently perceived facts on the ground.

Canadian negotiators were never able afterward to assemble a lasting consensus among Steering Group states on what the problem was, much less on a solution. In a sense, because events and perceptions never stabilized, bargaining took on the nature of a continual recycling back into prenegotiation and problem-redefinition.

A third proposition deserving attention is that confusion has characteristic effects—two to be mentioned here. For one thing, “issues marked by high levels of uncertainty and risk. . . tend to reinforce ideologically motivated, as opposed to problem-solving, approaches in multilateral negotiations.”² In this case the effect of uncertainty was to reinforce resorts to formulaic imperatives—“do something” (anything), as against recitals of the normative and prudential arguments opposed to intervention. For another thing, uncertainty draws decision-makers to the reassuring advice of experts—to epistemic communities.³ And in this case, the transnational community of shared knowledge with the most influence on governments was the military community. Here, especially among NATO governments, were experts with a shared knowledge (even a claimed monopoly of knowledge) with by and large a shared reluctance to deploy forces in Central Africa. The Canadian military counted itself part of this epistemic community, which did not ease the work of Canadian diplomats trying to negotiate an intervention.

To see the significance of these complexities, it is worth summarizing some of the interests and objectives attributable to actors in the eastern Zaire case—and one or two of the mysteries still unsolved. The concentration here is on states, in this case the chief actors and sole deciders of intervention policy. But it needs acknowledging that UN agencies, NGOs and media coverage all coloured state-actor perceptions of

events, and affected those events themselves. Some implications will be discussed below.

Interests and Objectives

“Although the conflicts within Burundi and Rwanda, and later Zaire, provoked major international concern, they were difficult for outsiders to understand and even more difficult for them to deal with. Political and economic, military and humanitarian facets folded into one another in kaleidoscopic fashion.”⁴ Even with hindsight, the motives and purposes of the parties to the conflicts in Central Africa remain contentious and elusive. On the other hand, in the minds of Canadian and other officials active in the case itself, hindsight now justifies some careful speculation on the salient points.⁵

Begin with the government of Rwanda. It is now uncontroverted that the Rwandan government, and specifically Vice-President and Defence Minister Paul Kagame, had aided and probably stimulated the Kabila/Tutsi uprising in eastern Zaire in late 1996.⁶ Kagame and the Tutsi regime in Kigali saw the 1.1 million Rwandan Hutu refugees in eastern Zaire as a chronic security threat to Rwanda; they accused the Zairian government of harbouring Hutu gunmen who had launched quick attacks into Rwanda. Kagame has since told the *Washington Post* that in October 1996 he learned of a plan by the Hutus in Zaire to attack the Banyamulenge and invade Rwanda.⁷ In pre-emption, Kagame armed and contributed troops to Zairian Tutsi assaults on the Hutu camps. The assaults succeeded; entire towns fell under rebel control.

Then came talk of a U.S.-backed UN intervention, a deployment of foreign troops that threatened to stop Kabila and the Zairian Tutsis just as they were gaining ground. To forestall the MNF's arrival, Kagame says, he triggered the Nov. 15 Kabila/Tutsi attack on the huge Mugunga camp outside Goma. With the Hutu ex-FAR and militias in flight, the Hutu refugees then began the walk to the Rwandan border. Rwandan objectives then became relatively clear-cut and apparent to Ambassador Chrétien and other Canadian officials: Rwanda would not support any MNF deployment that might interrupt the Kabila/Tutsi rebellion, which was now turning its sights toward Kinshasa away to the west. Rwanda would resist any use of its territory as an operations base for the MNF, and it would insist that international resources be spent on reintegrating Rwandan refugees back in Rwanda, not on the stragglers and fugitives still in Zaire.⁸

Two further factors shaped Rwandan attitudes.⁹ One was the profound hostility of the Tutsi leadership in Kigali against the UN, which had failed so comprehensively to prevent or respond to the 1994 genocide of at least 500,000 Tutsi men, women and children. The other factor was their even more active animosity toward the French government—and toward any French leadership in an MNF. The animosity was partly the outgrowth of a long geopolitical struggle in Central Africa, where France was identified as pro-Hutu and anti-Tutsi. But it was more immediately the result of the (UN-authorized) French military intervention in Rwanda in 1994, *Opération Turquoise*, one effect of which was to secure southwest Rwanda as a Hutu safe haven—and then to allow the escape into Zaire of the *génocidaires* among the refugees.

Finally, there was in Kigali a growing affinity with Washington. Kagame, with earlier army training at Fort Leavenworth,¹⁰ had visited Washington in August 1996; in 1994 he had led a relief force to victory over the French-backed Hutus in Rwanda. Many of the new leadership in Kigali had become self-consciously anglophone, and anglophile, during years of exile in Uganda and abroad. (More than one francophone Canadian diplomat was struck by the incongruity of negotiating in the old Belgian colonial capital with both sides speaking in accented English.¹¹)

The affinities of the *Zairois*, on the other hand, were distinctly French. Until the very end of this crisis Mobutu remained in the South of France in sumptuous convalescence. Mobutu's increasingly urgent objective—and that of Prime Minister Kengo in Kinshasa—was to arrange the deployment of an MNF strong and credible enough to arrest the alarming progress of Kabila and his Tutsi allies. Whereas Rwanda came to oppose any intervention that would stop the rebellion, Zaire opposed any intervention that would fail to stop it.¹²

The distinguishing features of the Zairian government, however, were its corruption and decrepitude. It was never obvious that a commitment made by any authority in Kinshasa, or on the Riviera, was a commitment that could be kept. Ambassador Chrétien, for example, took pains to meet twice with Mobutu during his mission, and at least three times with Kengo in Kinshasa, as well as with others in the Zairian political system. But the weakness and unreliability of Zairian undertakings were always evident—and damaged the cause of forming a Steering Group consensus.¹³ As the rebellion in eastern Zaire spread, and the political/military capacity of the Zairian government deteriorated, those in the Steering Group who

resisted deployment saw multifarious reasons to become more resistant. Their reluctance was strengthened, of course, after Gen. Baril met Kabila Nov. 28 and was told that rebel forces would not accept an MNF on territory they held under any circumstances;¹⁴ Kabila, like his Rwandan government allies, had no interest in an MNF interfering with his military campaign.

These subregional complexities were compounded by the diversity of other state interests across Africa. As noted in Chapter Three, President Museveni of Uganda was a close ally of the Tutsi government in Rwanda; Kagame had been Museveni's intelligence chief during Museveni's winning campaign to seize control of Uganda in the mid-1980s.¹⁵ Kagame, Museveni and Prime Minister Meles of Ethiopia formed the core of what had become known in the region (and in Paris) as the "anglophone axis"—states associated with Anglo-U.S. interests.¹⁶ Zambia, meanwhile, was regarded in Ottawa as a source of arms for Hutus in the camps in Zaire.¹⁷ Burundi, bordering both Rwanda and Zaire, suffered Tutsi-Hutu conflict similar to Rwanda's. More than that, the Burundi government tried to barter its support of any regional peace effort (including MNF deployment) in return for relief from the economic sanctions imposed on Burundi by neighbouring governments after its July 1996 coup.¹⁸ This was just another complication in constructing an African consensus. Then there was South Africa: potentially influential regionally, but hesitant and diffident throughout this crisis. Canadian officials were surprised and disappointed by President Mandela's passivity.¹⁹

Interacting with the interests and objectives of African states were those of outsider states critical to the organization of an intervention—principally Britain,

France and the United States. Again only to suggest the “complexity and uncertainty” of the multilateral context in which Canada was trying to affect U.S. conduct, it is worth briefly summarizing British, French and U.S. attitudes as these events unfolded.

First the British, whom Canadian diplomats in the field and officials in Ottawa found to be unhelpful and even obstructive as negotiations proceeded. Several senior Canadians remarked in interviews with the author that the British (or rather, British negotiators at successive stages) seemed to doubt Canadian capacity to lead the intervention as much as they doubted the wisdom of the intervention itself. Glynne Evans, a former head of the UN department in the British Foreign Office, echoed this attitude in her *Adelphi Paper*: “Guilt about the events in Rwanda, and lack of familiarity with the complexities of the area and with the characteristics of such conflicts led to a series of ill-conceived and impracticable proposals born of desperation, which died as the publicity surrounding them died.”²⁰ If the British had any effect at all on U.S. actions or attitudes it was probably by way of strengthening Pentagon reluctance. (A former very senior State Department officer, when asked by the author about the British role, replied: “The British—I don’t remember much.”) Canadian diplomats and military officers remember their British counterparts as generally seeking to minimize both the necessity and the probable success of an intervention.²¹

The French, *au contraire*, pursued an altogether different and no less complicating policy. As Prunier has observed: “Alone among the former colonial powers that once ruled Africa, France has kept the will and the political breathing

space, both at home and on the African continent, to use military power whenever it feels the need to add muscle to its policies.”²² France had buttressed the Hutu regime with arms and French troops in the country’s 1990-91 civil war. And in June 1994, as the monstrous dimensions of the Rwandan genocide became apparent, France with Security Council authority had deployed *Opération Turquoise*—sheltering Hutus on the run from the victorious Tutsis. Then and later, “. . . France was suspected by many of acting in bad faith. . . . Many individuals and groups, especially humanitarian aid organizations, accused France of seeking to intervene in order to reinforce the armed forces of its client state, which was losing the war [to the Tutsi army]. This seems to have been the perception of the two warring factions as well.”²³ *Turquoise* had the mixed result, just mentioned, of protecting more than a million people from a possible slaughter while facilitating the flight of killers to refuge in Zaire.

Successive French governments have treated Africa as a serious national interest; the presence of a special unit, the *Cellule Africaine*, of the president’s office in the Elysée Palace is “a reflection of the very peculiar status Africa enjoys in the French political landscape.”²⁴ It has been a French tendency, moreover, to frame conflicts in Africa and elsewhere as contests between France and the United States. As a result, conflict between French-supported Hutus and anglophone Tutsis was readily defined in Paris as a collision of U.S. and French interests. (Suspected U.S. complicity in the Rwandan-Kabila offensive ran as a theme through much French commentary on these events; see, for example, *L’Express*, 22-28 Mai, 1997, in a cover story.) By 1996, however, French relations in Africa were scarred by old

battles. President Museveni, Kagame and others strenuously opposed any leading role for the French in an intervention in eastern Zaire; France, in *Turquoise* and all that had gone before, was perceived by key actors as an enemy. This was one reason Ambassador Chrétien kept frequent contact with President Chirac's office during his mission—both for the benefit of French intelligence and insight, and to dissuade the French delicately from harmful intrusion into the crisis.²⁵

As a member of the Security Council and the Steering Group, therefore, France was a vigorous proponent of prompt military intervention whose participation was nonetheless constrained by African attitudes. In the words of a high-level U.S. State Department official: "The French, I must say, after some tense and difficult moments, I think understood that they were at least temporarily not going to play a central role."²⁶

Still, the French role in this case remains something of a riddle in the minds of many Canadian, U.S. and UN diplomats. As a patron of Mobutu and for the sake of its well-known geopolitical interests in Africa, the Chirac government might have been expected to apply every effort to keep the United States out of any intervention in Zaire. Yet the French seem to have made no such effort—and in fact urged the intervention right to the last. At least one Canadian ambassador explains the anomaly as an outcome of division inside the French government, a contest between old-guard Realpolitik and a newer (post-genocide) humanitarian concern for saving refugees and maybe redeeming sins of the past.²⁷ At some point there might also have been a calculation in Paris that the only way the Mobutu regime could be saved was by the deployment of a U.S.-backed MNF to block the Kabila rebellion. In any event,

French activism created another tension in the Steering Group where the Canadians were trying to fashion a consensus: The French government was openly suspicious of U.S. (and by association, Canadian) motives in eastern Zaire, while simultaneously pressing for an intervention that it argued must include a U.S. deployment.

As for the United States, a fuller account of policy and conduct follows below; it will suffice in this section to identify one question that further complicated Canada's multilateral diplomacy in this case. This is the question of U.S. objectives in Central Africa—a confusion of declared and undeclared purposes that Canadian officials more than a year later say they still have not fully resolved with certainty.²⁸

Inside the White House (as described in Chapter Three) Anthony Lake's purposes were primarily security-related and interest-based—prevention of conflict escalation in Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire; preservation of Zaire as a single state; avoidance of a U.S. military deployment. At the bottom of Lake's list was the humanitarian purpose of averting another humanitarian catastrophe. A former very senior State Department official put things the other way round when asked what U.S. objectives were: "Primarily humanitarian. We were concerned that on the ground there was a development leading to a possible human tragedy. . . . That was above all our overriding concern."²⁹ The point here is not that the U.S. government exhibited mixed motives and intentions, an issue to be explored below. The point is that ambiguities in the U.S. position helped generate suspicions in other governments of ulterior U.S. objectives. "Certainly the French were persuaded there was an American game going on," as one Canadian official later said.³⁰ Simply summarized, at least some French and African officials believed the U.S. government was manipulating its

qualified support of the intervention in Zaire in an attempt to promote Rwandan interests and do nothing to rescue the discredited Mobutu (a former but now quite worthless U.S. ally). That might explain why, as the Kabila rebellion advanced, the United States appeared to become less enthusiastic for intervention. But U.S. equivocation, whatever the cause, greatly complicated the work of multilateral consensus formation in the Steering Group.

A last note on the multilateral context for this case. Historically and frequently, Canadian decision-makers have conceived of the UN as an instrument for enlarging middle-power influence—especially in cases of intervention. Stairs in his landmark study of the Korean case identified three reasons for Canadian policy-makers to maximize UN authority: the “idealistic” purpose of developing the principle of collective security; the political purpose of legitimizing Canadian government decisions domestically; and the “diplomatic and military reason. . . that a dominant United Nations role would have the effect of strengthening Canadian influence over the conduct and purposes of the hostilities and thereby reduce. . . the danger of uncontrolled military escalation.”³¹ Similarly, von Riekhoff detected “three broad foreign policy objectives” behind Canadian government behaviour in the 1990-91 Gulf crisis: “the central goal” of promoting collective security; “the desire to get the United States firmly intricated in UN activities and to place US actions within a UN framework;” and to secure Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait peacefully rather than by war.³²

As in the Gulf case, however, enmeshing the United States in the constraints of UN norms and procedures invites the danger that UN decisions themselves are

driven by U.S. objectives and energies. In the Gulf crisis, “the US agenda and military-driven timetable became part and parcel of the UN’s *modus operandi*, sometimes with prejudicial consequences for diplomacy.”³³ In the eastern Zaire case, the *de jure* U.S. Security Council veto, with its *de facto* political veto (created by others’ definition of U.S. deployment as essential to intervention) combined to magnify U.S. power over collective decisions. In the event, no coalition that Canada could assemble in the Steering Group could outweigh the legal and political power of the U.S. government to say No. It bears repeating as well that Boutros-Ghali’s organizational authority in this case was dissipated by his losing contest to stay in office, and by the coincidence that his chief and successful rival was his deputy responsible for peacekeeping operations, the U.S.-backed Kofi Annan.

As emphasized in Chapter Three, securing a U.S. contribution to the MNF was for Canadian authorities an urgent priority from the start: The United States owned intelligence and airlift capabilities vital to the intervention, and other governments made their own contributions conditional on an actual U.S. troop deployment. So it is relevant now to mark out the U.S. policy that presumably guided U.S. responses to the crisis in eastern Zaire.

Intervention Policy in the Clinton Administration

Bill Clinton did not win the presidency in 1992 with any prominent or tightly reasoned platform of foreign policy. But in that campaign he did advocate a more interventionist policy to improve human-rights performance in China, restore the

elected government in Haiti, and reverse the horrendous course of “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia, along with support for a strengthened UN.³⁴ And there was a reinforcing consistency of logic between his foreign and domestic agendas; multilateral burden-sharing in pursuit of international order would free scarce resources for domestic purposes. Still, as the Clinton administration took over the U.S. government in early 1993, “there remained one crucial constituency that was less enamored with the prospect of greater U.S. involvement in multilateral peace operations, and that was the American military.”³⁵

What followed, therefore, was a long and arduous struggle in Washington over the definition of U.S. policy on intervention and what was called “multilateralism,” formally triggered by Presidential Review Directive 13 in February 1993. The intensity and acrimony of the argument was aggravated by the degeneration of the U.S. intervention in Somalia, where four U.S. servicemen were killed in August 1993 and 18 more in October. “My experiences in Somalia,” Clinton said at an Oct. 14 news conference, “would make me more cautious about having any Americans in a peacekeeping role where there was any ambiguity at all about what the range of decisions were which could be made by a command other than an American command, with direct accountability to the United States here.”³⁶

The Somalia experience, with the congressional and media criticism it inspired, was already having its effect on declarative policy. In September 1993 Lake delivered a speech—“From Containment to Enlargement”³⁷—in which he both defended the principle of humanitarian intervention and limited its application. Public

pressure for humanitarian engagement would be increasingly driven by television pictures, he said.

But we must bring other considerations to bear as well: cost, feasibility, the permanence of the improvement our assistance will bring, the willingness of regional and international bodies to do their part, and the likelihood that our actions will generate broader security benefits for the people and the region in question.

While there will be increasing calls on us to help stem bloodshed and suffering in ethnic conflicts and while we will always bring our diplomacy to bear, these criteria suggest there will be relatively few intra-national ethnic conflicts that justify our military intervention. Ultimately, on these and other humanitarian needs, we will have to pick and choose.

These conditions and qualifications ultimately found formal expression in Presidential Decision Directive 25, a public version of which emerged as “The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Operations.”³⁸ In its 14 ½ single-spaced pages PDD-25 purports to define with fastidious care the conditions the United States would place on its support for, or participation in, any future multilateral intervention; it goes to particular lengths to explain rules under which U.S. forces might serve under the “operational control” of a foreign commander. The conditions of U.S. support or participation ran to two full pages and will not be repeated here, except to say they include all the familiar U.S. criteria: that participation “advances U.S. interests;” that U.S. participation is necessary for the operation’s success; “an endpoint for U.S. participation can be found;” command and control arrangements are acceptable; “domestic and congressional support exists or can be marshalled;” etc. “It is not U.S. policy to seek to expand either the number of UN peace operations or U.S. involvement in such operations,” the paper declares.

“Instead, this policy. . . aims to ensure that our use of peacekeeping is selective and more effective.” [underline in original]

As Alexander George has observed, “if the restrictive guidelines set forth in PDD-25 are taken literally, the result would be to exclude participation of American military forces in most situations requiring peacekeeping, peacemaking, and even intervention for humanitarian purposes in unstable, chaotic situations.”³⁹ But as George also pointed out, PDD-25 did not stop Clinton from intervening (eventually) in Haiti—and later in Bosnia. And it does contain this passage in justification of U.S. intervention:

While the President never relinquishes command of U.S. forces, the participation of U.S. military personnel in UN operations can, in particular circumstances, serve U.S. interests. First, U.S. military participation may, at times, be necessary to persuade others to participate in operations that serve U.S. interests. Second, U.S. participation may be one way to exercise U.S. influence over an important UN mission, without unilaterally bearing the burden. Third, the U.S. may be called upon and choose to provide unique capabilities to important operations that other countries cannot.

By 1996, as David Malone has suggested,⁴⁰ the Clinton administration may also have been somewhat encouraged by the outcome of the 1994 intervention in Haiti: The credible threat of an imminent Chapter VII invasion had removed the junta and restored the Aristide presidency, followed by a Chapter VI peacekeeping presence led by Canada. In other words, although the United States held both procedural and practical vetoes over intervention in eastern Zaire, it was reasonable to believe the Clinton administration might be persuaded not to use them.

So these were some of the circumstances in which the Canadian government tried to influence the U.S. government to join the intervention in eastern Zaire: a

complicated multilateral context full of uncertainty and change, a U.S. policy on intervention that reflected profound reluctance and division in the Washington policy community, and an understanding among virtually all actors in the negotiation that U.S. participation in the intervention was necessary to the enterprise. But how do we account for the course of these events—for the exercise of Canadian influence on U.S. actions, for the limits on that influence, for the ultimate abandonment of the intervention?

Specifically, how helpful in explaining these events are asymmetry and interdependence, the metaphor of two-level games, or the bureaucratic-politics/political-process models? That is the question for the remainder of this chapter.

The Model of Asymmetrical Interdependence

A fact of this case not to be taken for granted—indeed, to be emphasized—is the recognition in the U.S. and Canadian governments of the asymmetry in the relationship. As the documentary evidence, behaviour and interviews demonstrate, the disparity of power (particularly military power) was acutely felt on both sides and at all levels. Nor was the effect of the asymmetry notably lessened by the shared knowledge that it was the United States that had raised the idea of Canada's leadership of the coalition. As one former very senior official of the State Department recalled it, with a chuckle to lighten the cynicism: "We believed it would be easier and more efficient if the operation were led by someone else [namely Canada]. And then, of course, once there was agreement in principle, we came back and tried to

dictate pretty much exactly how it would be organized and where Americans would be in the hierarchy and what the mission would be.”⁴¹ A Canadian government post-mortem report on this case,⁴² prepared by an official of DFAIT and a civilian member of DND, stressed the disparity in several dimensions. “Canada did not have the influence to direct the MNF in ways its ‘larger’ partners did not want to go,” it said. “Canada had few levers, beyond moral suasion, to pressure larger nations, a problem made worse because some of those nations had national agendas and geopolitical interests. . . which were often in opposition to Canadian intentions.” Moreover, and to re-emphasize, “almost all troop-contributing nations, including Canada, made the presence of US ground forces a condition of their participation.” In short, it was understood that Canada was expected to be a compliant leader—as indicated by Gordon Smith’s observation reported in Chapter Three. Only the United States commanded the military resources that the coalition needed, and everybody knew it.

Keohane and Nye propose that to the degree that military force prevails in a relationship, complex interdependence does not;⁴³ this is virtually an axiom of their asymmetry/interdependence model. They acknowledge, however, that the Canada-U.S. relationship (an exemplar of complex interdependence) has often enough been about military-security issues. In this kind of bargaining—negotiations *about* military force, but not negotiated *with* military force—do the rules of asymmetry and interdependence apply? *Power and Interdependence* presents no unambiguous answer. What about the case in hand? How might the Keohane/Nye explanations for smaller-state bargaining success apply to the intervention in eastern Zaire?

- Regimes—the rules, norms and procedures that can constrain big states from fully exploiting their advantages over smaller states. It is fair to say that in the realm of humanitarian intervention the rules, norms and procedures of government action are in a state of contradiction, ambiguity and perhaps transformation; the evidence abounds in the literature and in the declarations of decision-makers.⁴⁴ There is an obvious and unstable tension between norms of humanitarian intervention and those of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Clinton, like Chrétien, referred to moral obligation as justification for intervention in eastern Zaire. “The world’s most powerful nation must not turn its back on so many desperate people,” the president said.⁴⁵ But U.S. policy and action have been infused with strictly traditional Westphalian concepts of the state system and state interests, and an express skepticism about the rightness of military intervention except in unusually demanding circumstances. Nor, in 1996, was there a developed or routinized procedure for organizing and managing an international intervention of the type imagined for eastern Zaire.

In the absence of any fixed rules and procedures, the United States demanded and Canada agreed to the creation under Resolution 1080 of the Steering Group to oversee the MNF. It was based on the prototype of the Bosnian case. But it is not clear how this embryonic regime (if that is what it was) might have advantaged Canada in its asymmetrical negotiation with the United States. In general, institutionalizing or multilateralizing U.S. intervention probably favours smaller partners where the smaller state’s objective is to contain U.S. action (as in Korea and the Gulf). It seems not to favour the smaller state where the object is to stimulate U.S.

action. Rules, norms and procedures in the present era work more as brakes than accelerators.

- **System maintenance**—a big state’s recognition that over-rigorous struggles on one issue jeopardize its own interests in other aspects of a relationship and in the system as a whole. This was plausibly a factor in U.S. thinking. These were the same weeks in which the Clinton administration was executing the removal of Boutros-Ghali as secretary-general; the United States vetoed his renomination in the Security Council Nov. 2, and the Security Council chose Kofi Annan Dec. 14. This was done purportedly to improve UN administration, and certainly to appease congressional critics, and probably both. Strengthening UN capacity for humanitarian intervention was declared U.S. policy—and the humanitarian objective was one factor shaping U.S. policy in this case. As for the U.S. preference for Canada as coalition leader, “quite frankly, with the possible exception of the British, no one came to mind who could have been more compatible, more proficient, for such an operation than Canada,” as one former U.S. official remembers it.⁴⁶

Withal, it is difficult to find in the plain facts of this case evidence that the United States altered its preferred course, in Canada’s favour, in order to secure some longer-run or over-arching system-maintenance benefits. And returning to the point: This factor did not noticeably enhance Canada’s influence as it tried to win a U.S. MNF deployment in Central Africa.

- **Commitment**—the smaller state’s greater willingness to inflict pain, and suffer itself, in negotiation with a more powerful state. This was one of the few theoretical propositions that found appeal among the practitioner-participants interviewed for

this study; the Canadian officials, when asked, affirmed their sense that the Canadian side had and showed more determined commitment to intervention than the U.S. side. The prime minister had raised the eastern Zaire crisis personally with Clinton Nov. 6, and after a busy weekend of telephone diplomacy Nov. 9-10 he could claim to have raised a willing coalition of about a dozen heads of government ready to send perhaps 10,000 troops. The speed and success of the Canadian initiative “astonished” Lake in the White House, according to a senior Canadian official close to the prime minister.⁴⁷ “Now they had to bite the bullet.” The Canadian government’s zeal, and its willingness to exploit its political and the prime minister’s personal relationships around the world (combined with other attributes of competence, compliance and acceptability in Central Africa) do seem to have brought the issue quickly to a head in Washington.

Still, there are problems with the commitment explanation for smaller-state influence—and with its application in this case. First of all, this is not a case in which the larger party, as the Keohane/Nye argument suggests, was somehow distracted or relatively indifferent to the negotiated outcome. On the contrary, U.S. decision-makers including the president seem to have been seriously and even obsessively concerned with negotiating an agreement that would resolve the crisis in Zaire without a deployment of U.S. troops: That was the nub of the disagreement in what proved for Canadians to be four frustrating weeks of negotiation. If Canada showed a high marginal utility for intervention, the United States no less adamantly showed a high marginal utility for avoiding intervention with its own forces.

Neither does this case give much guidance in solving the paradox that high commitment (in Wagner's calculation) might well amount to weakness in bargaining, not strength. Hypothetically, once U.S. decision-makers perceived that the Canadians were so committed to agreement in the Steering Group, and so dependent on U.S. collaboration, there would be little need perceived by the U.S. side to make concessions in the form of deployment commitments. Overt Canadian commitment may have weakened, not strengthened, Canadian bargaining power.

But there is another problem with the commitment explanation for outcomes in asymmetrical negotiation—the operational problem of measuring commitment in practice. In this case, for example, the Canadian commitment might have been judged (by the Americans) according to the very small number, and low-risk rear-guard nature, of Canada's own proposed military contribution. If so, the apparent disjunction between Canada's high-level rhetorical commitment and low-level troop commitment might have been seen on the U.S. side as weakness—or hypocrisy.

- Coherence—the “political unity” a smaller state can bring against a fragmented larger state. This is the second factor that resonates most in the accounts of practitioners as a source of Canadian bargaining strength, their sense that the Canadian side was more cohesive, organized and politically united than the U.S. side. An official who worked directly with the prime minister cited the structural advantage of the parliamentary system; once the prime minister himself had decided policy he could execute that policy and demonstrate his purpose credibly to other governments more readily than Clinton could. When Smith, Bartleman and the rest of the Canadian delegation flew to Washington Nov. 12 to start negotiations at the White House, they

were aware of arriving on the same plane, with the same plan. The Americans, by contrast, appeared at the White House “with major, major problems among themselves and with us,” a Canadian official said.⁴⁸ Lake repeatedly adjourned the meeting to check proposals with the president, or to caucus with his own interagency delegation.

It is also true that whereas Clinton could count on congressional resistance to any U.S. deployment, Chrétien had an obedient majority in the Commons; whatever slight discontent developed on the opposition benches as the crisis unfolded, it was inconsequential in determining Canadian policy.⁴⁹ No media content analysis was attempted for this thesis, but media reporting and editorial comment in Canada was closely monitored by officials at the time and regarded by them generally as neutral or positive.⁵⁰ U.S. media coverage and editorial comment appears anecdotally to have been more heterogeneous. The *New York Times*, which on Nov. 15⁵¹ had editorialized in favour of a U.S. contribution of the MNF, advised a careful reassessment on Nov. 19,⁵² something already under way in Washington.

As noted in Chapter Two, Keohane and Nye attempted no empirical substantiation of small-state coherence as an explanation for successful negotiating outcomes. And there is none apparent in this case. Instead, the fragmentation of the U.S. polity—such as it was—probably operated to frustrate Canadian objectives more than to facilitate them. This may in part reflect the very short time period of the eastern Zaire case: Lacking time to exploit the fissures in the U.S. political system and develop transnational coalitions, the Canadian government seemed to carry all the disadvantages of U.S. fragmentation and none of the supposed advantages; as

frequently as they reported their own cohesion, Canadian participants reported the frustrations of negotiating with a U.S. administration that “could never get its act together.” This case also calls to mind Krasner’s isomorphism effect—institutional structures of the U.S. polity shaping the ways foreign actors operate in it, and on it. More of this below.

In all, the Keohane/Nye model of asymmetrical interdependence seems weak in explaining the course and outcome of this case. Consistent with the terms of the model, the military-security element of the issue itself may have diminished the model’s applicability; complex interdependence counts for less in military-security matters. Canada’s weakness—that is to say, pliability—may have been a strength in the eyes of Lake and Tarnoff when it came to recruiting a reliable “leader” for the MNF, but this weakness did not translate into strength in any observably obvious way in the events that followed. Nor did commitment, coherence or the other explanations of smaller-state success operate in ways that appear empirically testable.

The Two-Level-Games Metaphor

“The way to move the Americans, if there is a way to move the Americans, is probably through the media.”⁵³ This observation, from a Canadian diplomat of long experience in Ottawa and Washington and centrally involved in the eastern Zaire case, nicely expresses the two-level metaphor. Indeed, this case starts out as a powerful demonstration of two-level interaction—Chrétien and Clinton strongly affected by transnational media and NGOs, which are (presumably) working on their respective public opinions, and responding with policies directed both at domestic

politics and to international relations. And as the case proceeds, the metaphor becomes conceptually suggestive in several respects.

Take the media. As that diplomat went on to say, the Canadian government in the past has tried, and maybe successfully, to influence U.S. publics by applying media strategies; landmines lobbying is the recent example often offered. But in the short space of the eastern Zaire episode, “there was no time for a very clever media strategy.”⁵⁴ This is a crucial and recurring factor in the analysis of Canadian influence in humanitarian interventions: Time is almost always short in these emergencies, depriving Canada of some of the instruments that theory would recommend for smaller states negotiating with the more powerful.

Two other qualifications need to be placed on assumptions of media influence—assumptions that diplomats and politicians seem to hold with great conviction. The first, argued by Nik Gowing and others, is that the effect of vivid and gruesome media coverage of human disaster may be much more superficial than real. Frequently, Gowing concludes, “the result is a government decision to commit itself publicly to the *appearance* of action by way of palliative humanitarian operations, rather than through a firm political commitment to do everything possible to prevent or end a conflict, using military force if necessary.”⁵⁵ The second qualification is that media coverage (especially U.S. media coverage of foreign-policy stories) typically does not cause policy decisions so much as it follows policy arguments. Strobel reports TV coverage of crises like Somalia and Rwanda intensified *after* U.S. intervention decisions, not before.⁵⁶ Burnett similarly finds Washington reporters following, not leading, foreign policy discourse: “Thus the public continues to hear

mainly what the elites choose to make public, but the range of policy debate expands when the elites, themselves, are in more open disagreement. . . .”⁵⁷

Even if the dynamics of media coverage and comment are more complicated than politicians and diplomats often assume, however, they are at least acknowledged as variables in the two-level-games metaphor. And they are undoubtedly relevant in this case. Participants familiar with these events said in interviews that both Chrétien and Clinton were affected by media coverage of the condition of refugees in the Zairian conflicts (and by remembered images of the corpses in Rwanda in 1994). Participants on both sides (Smith among them) were also aware of frequent media replays of the dead Americans dragged through Mogadishu streets in 1993. But there was another part of the dynamic: Just as TV pictures strengthened NGO lobbying in favor of intervention in October and early November (with reports of refugees dying in the warfare and cut off from aid), TV pictures undermined NGO lobbying in the later phase, with images of reasonably healthy-looking refugees safely crossing back into Rwanda by the hundreds of thousands. This seeming reversal of the “CNN effect” was cited by several U.S. and Canadian officials as influential in discouraging military intervention after Nov. 15. (It also encouraged thoughts among some Canadian officials that some NGOs exaggerated the peril to refugees while promoting their own self-interest and importance.)

Another conceptual contribution of the two-level metaphor lies in the analysis of win-sets, the sets of potential agreements ratifiable in each domestic constituency. One of the explanatory phenomena in this case would seem to be the very narrow win-set exhibited by Lake and the other U.S. negotiators in bargaining over U.S.

participation in the MNF. The Pentagon's hostility to deployment, and Lake's apparently high preference for avoiding it in order to secure Pentagon and congressional consent to the administration's action, plainly constricted the scope for agreement with the Canadian government. Typical or not, therefore, the case tends to confirm Putnam's supposition that "more self-sufficient states with smaller win-sets should make fewer international agreements and drive harder bargains in those they do make."⁵⁸ But the case seems to leave unconfirmed Mayer's proposition that internal factional conflict will be unproductive in variable-sum negotiations (by precluding joint gains) but will serve to extract larger shares of the pie in distributive bargaining.⁵⁹ The reason Mayer's interesting distinction avails little here is that it is operationally difficult to distinguish the sequential negotiation in the eastern Zaire case as variable-sum or zero-sum. Positive-sum, maybe, insofar as the negotiation of Resolution 1080 influenced the hoped-for repatriation of several hundred thousand refugees. Zero-sum insofar as pro-deployment states never overcame the U.S. refusal to deploy with the MNF.

There is no evidence in the record or the interviews here of the linkage strategies that the two-level theorists predict. This may only say that no linkage possibilities offered themselves to either side, but the finding tends to verify the taboo on linkage generally honoured in U.S.-Canada negotiations. It testifies also to the very short time-span: There was simply no time for the ratification/logrolling opportunities that can open up in longer-running and iterated bargaining.

Practitioners in both governments agree that Canada was disadvantaged in this case by the impracticality of exploiting cleavages and conflicting interests in the U.S.

domestic polity.⁶⁰ Time was too short to foster alliances in congressional committees or NGOs interested in Africa or humanitarian affairs. A former senior State Department official contrasted this case with that of landmines, which showed “first of all the ability of a friendly power—and I emphasize friendly, because that helps immeasurably, that it’s Canada—able to deal not only with the administration. . . but with congressional and public opinion in the United States. And once that happens, a foreign country finds itself in the bloodstream of the political body that is making the decision. . . .”⁶¹ Even though the administration in the end did not embrace the Canadian position on landmines, he said, “there was a much more responsive attitude in Washington than if Canada had not taken the lead.” (The author here expresses no opinion on the reciprocal influence in the landmines case between the Canadian government and U.S. NGOs.)

In a fundamental sense, however, Canada’s leadership in this case reflected a basic two-level calculation in the State Department and the White House: By all accounts in the interviews, Lake and Tarnoff concluded that a Canadian leadership role would allow the Clinton administration to contribute to an intervention (if ultimately necessary) without incurring the domestic controversy and opposition that U.S. leadership would provoke. Their belief was never fully tested by an actual deployment in the MNF. “But we were prepared to make that case,” a former senior State Department official recalled. “And the alternatives were doing nothing, which was intolerable for historical and moral reasons, or taking it over ourselves. We thought that despite the questions that would be asked, of the three it was by far the

most preferable alternative.”⁶² Lake secured agreement on the strategy from important members of Congress.⁶³

So the two-level metaphor seems clearly to organize valuable insights into negotiating processes and outcomes. But this case also reveals some of the deficiencies in two-level-games analysis: deficiencies in the rationality assumption; in coping with the complex and fluid preferences characteristic of large-N multilateral negotiations; and in framing two-level games as played by “chiefs of government” at the centre of the action.

The assumptions of rationality are inescapable in the two-level-games analysis—assumptions of known and stable preferences, identifiable indifference curves, and complete if not perfect information. Moreover, as in games theory generally, the analysis demands some constant measure—a common currency—of costs and payoffs, an accounting of utility functions and bargaining results. Rarely if ever do the facts of cases in international relations (except, possibly, in some financial transactions) satisfy these requirements; whatever value such analysis brings to system-level behaviours and experimental research, the assumptions of complete information and rational, utility-maximizing actors may well never be fully realized in the particulars of case studies. (Hence the inclination to *ex post facto* rationalizations in games-theory applications: Leader X *must* have acted rationally and according to preference because that is what leaders do; the analyst then infers the preference from the observed action, demonstrating the rationality and completing the tautology.)

In any event, the assumptions are not satisfied in this case. It is impossible to overstate the extent of confusion, ignorance, misunderstanding and cross-purposes that went into decisions and judgements in the case of intervention in eastern Zaire—or the frequency with which those factors are recollected by participants. Without a single exception, diplomats, military officers, international civil servants, NGO field workers and reports of journalists all speak of muddle and missed signals on the ground and in the diplomacy. Information was incomplete and unreliable (intelligence actually or presumedly skewed by the provider); actor preferences were inscrutable, untrustworthy, and/or unstable; motives were mixed; intentions changed; events surprised. Some indicative observations from people who were there:

- A high-level Canadian diplomat, on divining U.S. objectives: “I never had the impression that they really wanted to agree. Which led back to the question, Why not?”
- A CIDA executive: “What I never fully understood was what the U.S. was really trying to achieve. And that remains to this day a mystery.”
- A former very high-ranking Canadian military officer: “To this day it is not clear to me what was the situation on the ground. How many starving people were there?”
- A Canadian ambassador: “The situation was not only confused on the ground but confused in the minds of diplomats and political leaders. Overnight there were experts on Central Africa.”

To assume rationality, in the manner of Putnam assessing the Bonn summit, misses the defining reality of crises—and perhaps of bargaining generally. As the Evans chapter concluding *Double-Edged Diplomacy* concedes, many of the

stratagems predicted by the two-level-games metaphor simply do not emerge empirically. To execute them would require of COGs a much more confident knowledge of the beliefs and expectations of other COGs (and of their own circumstances) than is possible.

The games-theoretic approach displays this weakness especially in applications to complicated multilateral negotiations. “. . . The simplifying assumptions. . . are difficult to sustain when the number of players involved is large, coalitions do not have a monolithic structure, and noneconomic and nonobjective tradeoffs between different issues are involved.”⁶⁴ By way of example, here is a Canadian negotiator remembering the complexities of understanding French and U.S. geopolitical intentions: “We were very conscious of the dangers of a *Turquoise* on the one hand, and some kind of American thing going on, on the other. And we were trying very hard to make sure that we did not lend ourselves to any of these kinds of things. That’s part of the overall picture that seems to have escaped a lot of people. We had some fairly difficult allies.”⁶⁵ The metaphor of canny manipulations in Level I and Level II games loses force when the games grow complicated—and when the costs of failure are great and literally incalculable.

A third deficiency demonstrated in this case is the two-level metaphor’s image of a chief of government seated at two tables and playing at both according to an integrated utility function. As argued in Chapter Two, this does not correspond to the daily routines of diplomacy in Washington; sometimes the president is not the negotiator but the ratifier, and sometimes hardly an actor at all.

In the case of eastern Zaire the president was an actor, and from time to time acted decisively. Clinton approved of Lake's negotiated procedural agreement with the Canadians at the White House Nov. 12. But he was not the only actor, sometimes not the main negotiator, and only indirectly the decider of U.S. positions as circumstances changed from day to day, hour by hour. Nor, in Canada, can what happened be fully explained by a prime minister determining the government's conduct through the crisis. Much of the crucial bargaining that affected outcomes in this case occurred within governments in Ottawa and Washington (and in Paris and Kinshasa) rather than between governments—and often between departments of governments, through informal cross-border alliances based on long-standing associations.

The metaphor of two-level games, for all the useful questions it generates, does not capture these intra-government bargains and transborder coalitions. To explain these, to convey in Allison's phrase "some feel for the confusion," means turning to the processes of bureaucracies and politics.

The Bureaucratic-Politics and Political-Process Models

It has been a continuing lament of Canadian participant-officials—at the time and after—that U.S. interests and objectives were never fully intelligible, stable or mutually compatible. Neither was the U.S. decision process wholly transparent to outsiders. (Clinton, like Chrétien, was travelling abroad through much of this period, which may have contributed additionally to the Canadian perception of an unorganized or at least unreliable U.S. policy process.)

Within this setting, Canadian officials in charge of negotiating with the U.S. government felt pressed and often disadvantaged by the dominating U.S. negotiating behaviour, which was to ask and re-ask questions: about MNF mandate and operations, about developments on the ground, about political management of the MNF through the Steering Group, about the changing (and diminishing) need for deployment. Especially galling to the Canadians was the strong suspicion that, in operational matters of large-scale military deployments, the Americans already had the answers. “You knew that they probably had great books with all this stuff,” as a top-level Canadian official put it.⁶⁶ Another Canadian noticed an organizational asymmetry between the U.S. and Canadian sides: Canadian delegations would usually be led by senior DFAIT officials at the assistant deputy minister rank or higher, all extremely capable generalists; the U.S. side sent experts in the problem at hand, armed with specialist questions (and, often, little apparent authority). When the agenda was to question Canadian competence and readiness, the Canadians were disadvantaged.⁶⁷ What the Canadian negotiators did not know for sure was whether the U.S. side was genuinely seeking information and reassurance—or playing for time. And when Canadian officials reversed this Socratic dialogue and pressed for U.S. objectives and policy explanations, they were generally rebuffed. Said one Canadian assistant deputy minister: “I never got a straight answer.”⁶⁸

The bureaucratic-politics/political-process models suggest promising approaches to this problem—and help explain the interaction of Canadian and U.S. responses to the crisis in eastern Zaire. The next few pages will look to policy

processes in Washington, and to the dynamics between them and the bureaucratic responses in Ottawa.

Drawing on his own studies of five intervention cases in the Reagan years, Scott derives “three broad lessons about American foreign policy making.”⁶⁹ First: Policy emerges from the interaction of four circles of actors, namely the president and chief advisers; the formal foreign-policy bureaucracies; Congress; and a variable group of nongovernmental actors, including foreign governments. Second: The power and importance of these circles varies; the process is “complicated and messy” as policy is bargained; presidential leadership “is a variable, not a given;” and implementation (or its obstruction) can shape policy as much as formulation. Third: rival alliances develop across the overlapping boundaries of the policy circles; these cross-cutting alliances can include foreign governments, NGOs and international agencies, and other transnational actors. “Policy, if it emerges, occurs as a result of a vast array of executive, legislative, and public interactions, but it is also quite possible that dissenting alliances will simply block efforts to create and apply policy, creating a stalemate.”⁷⁰

Even in the Reagan era, with a “doctrine” in place and the (putative) Soviet threat compelling, “the debilitating effects of bureaucratic conflict took a frequent toll on U.S. policy.”⁷¹ These effects will likely become even more apparent without the Cold War, Scott argues,⁷² as a result of increasing issue complexity, penetration of transnational ties, erosion of domestic policy consensus, and institutional fragmentation of foreign-policy responsibilities.

Peter Schraeder finds in the bureaucratic-politics/political-process models a useful explanation specifically for U.S. policy toward Africa—in part because of generally rare and episodic presidential attention to Africa, and a relative public/congressional indifference to African affairs.⁷³ “The net result of bureaucratic influence within the policymaking process is that African policies of the United States become fragmented, interpreted differently according to the established organizational missions of each bureaucracy. . . .”⁷⁴ Crises, on the other hand, may command White House attention—and open opportunities for the president “to shape public opinion, and to make the parochial policies of individual bureaucracies more consistent with each other.”⁷⁵ As for U.S.-Zaire relations, Schraeder records the tension within U.S. policy in the 1990s between a (congressionally supported) dissociation from Mobutu and the preference of the “national security bureaucracies” to avoid chaos in a very large African country; with the Cold War’s end, it has become even easier for Washington bureaucracies to treat Africa generally and Zaire-Congo specifically as an infrequently important backwater.⁷⁶

All of these observations serve to explain why, in Canadian eyes, U.S. policy responses to the refugee crisis seemed incoherent, confusing and contradictory. As Gordon Smith and others remarked in interviews, Canadian negotiators sensed that they were witnesses throughout to U.S. domestic interagency negotiations. It was Lake’s role from the start of these negotiations to accommodate interdepartmental interests in Washington while at the same time negotiating agreeable terms with the Canadian and other governments.

Lake, however, had his own preferred outcome.⁷⁷ It was his belief—or hope, perhaps—that a credible threat to deploy an MNF in eastern Zaire would by itself provoke the Kabila/Tutsi rebels to attack the Rwandan Hutu soldiers and militias in such force that the mass of refugees would be released from the gunmen's control. It was therefore consistent with Lake's preference that Canada succeed in securing commitments, that the Security Council adopt a convincing resolution for intervention—but that no U.S. deployment actually take place. Lake would not want a U.S. deployment to occur not only because of Pentagon and congressional opinion against it, but because a deployment big enough to have effect would also be big enough to freeze the status quo in eastern Zaire. This would frustrate the Rwandan government, because it would leave a large and hostile armed Hutu population just across its border. And it might also save the unattractive Mobutu regime.

These last two effects were results that senior officials in the State Department wanted to avoid.⁷⁸ The State Department was fostering closer relations with Rwanda and Uganda; Vice-President Kagame had met Tarnoff and others in Washington in August 1996, and the United States was aiding friendly forces in the southern Sudan with arms sent through Uganda.⁷⁹ To the State Department, the old Cold War alliance with the fumbling and corrupt Mobutu was becoming obsolete. State had been trying to negotiate with Mobutu to arrange some peaceful transition in Zaire, without success. At the same time, however, nobody in Washington wished to see Zaire broken apart in civil war. Finally, it must be said that the State Department itself did not speak with one mind on the subject of intervention. Madeleine Albright (U.S. ambassador to the UN, nominated by Clinton in the midst of this crisis to be secretary

of state) was known as much more activist than Christopher or the Pentagon—and commonly impatient with generals who refused to put their forces at risk of being used.⁸⁰

“In the debate over policy alternatives, each unit will tend generally to oversimplify, to overstate the anticipated benefits of the option it prefers, and to exaggerate the hazards in rival options.”⁸¹ Nowhere was this tendency more pronounced than in the U.S. Department of Defence. Throughout the crisis, the Pentagon and Secretary Perry took every opportunity to question, challenge, and block the deployment of U.S. forces in the MNF.⁸² The U.S. military, like Canada’s, had reconstituted its experience in Somalia as a warning against peace operations in confused African conflicts; dire outcomes were invariably predicted. As a bare minimum condition, the Pentagon refused any participation in an intervention against armed opposition: U.S. forces would deploy only in a “permissive environment.” But even when that was agreed, as it quickly was, U.S. military officers balked, tested, demanded more intelligence, and seized every new development as reason for delay, reconsideration and withdrawal. As the civil war in eastern Zaire spread, and as the number of refugees needing protection declined, the Pentagon redoubled its arguments against deployment: The risks were rising as the necessity was falling.

U.S. interests and objectives were therefore diverse and to some degree contradictory: Invite Canada to lead, but avoid (unless necessary) following with deployment; threaten deployment (to activate Kabila) but avoid action that the Pentagon and congressional critics opposed; achieve the humanitarian purpose, without risking body-bags; secure the removal of Mobutu, without breaking Zaire

apart; reassure Rwandan authorities, without inciting more ethnic bloodshed in Rwanda or Zaire; contend with the French. These were all interests advanced and contested in the activity of bureaucratic politics and political processes.

The bureaucratic-politics/political-process models introduce a number of variables that might also help explain whether and how a smaller state influences U.S. policy in particular cases. One of these variables is time. Schraeder posits that “the longer an African crisis continues, the greater is the likelihood that more factions outside the executive branch will become involved. . . .”⁸³ It has been stressed above that time in this case was very short—perhaps eight weeks in all, and four weeks for the critical decisions to be made. As an actor in Scott’s fourth policy circle, the Canadian government was therefore disfavoured because the scope for creating pro-intervention coalitions was sharply restricted by lack of time; there was little opportunity, for example, to exploit the kind of congressional support for U.S. intervention that influenced Clinton administration conduct in the Haiti case.⁸⁴

A second variable, identified by Burnett, is the degree of openness or closedness in the policy debate. An open debate, rich with detail and time for reflection, will be described and amplified in the media—creating access for more circles and perhaps altering congressional and public opinion, or expanding the menu of options. In a closed debate, “there is little ground established for evaluating policies or holding officials accountable, and the lack of much historical reference within the debate leaves officials free to reinvent history and make untested claims about policies.”⁸⁵ In this case, in which facts from the field were few and controversial and time was limited, opponents of intervention were free to make

untested claims about the operational risks in Zaire and about what the U.S. public would or would not tolerate in a U.S. participation. Moreover, objectors were free to define Somalia as the telling historical precedent (rather than, say, the successful intervention in Haiti). Here again, any Canadian effort at coalition-formation was constricted by the relatively closed circles of influential players in the debate.

But coalition-formation was not entirely absent from the dynamics of Canada-U.S. interaction. DND, with its decades-long experience of collaboration with the Pentagon, its shared culture, and its shared apprehension about any deployment in Africa, had a strategic advantage in Washington's bureaucratic politics that other factions of the Canadian government did not. More than one Canadian ambassador, and other officials in Ottawa and Washington, detected the reinforcing effects of Canada-U.S. military consultation; even in Africa, diplomats perceived that when the advance units of Canadian soldiers had messed for a few days with their U.S. opposite numbers in Rwanda or Uganda, whatever small enthusiasm for the mission the Canadian soldiers might have brought was soon depleted. At the command level, Gen. Baril began his mission on the MNF with several hours in the Pentagon. The U.S.-Canada soldiers' coalition was further strengthened by the sympathetic animosity of British military officers to any deployment in Central Africa. When British surveillance flights returned with photographs of empty Zairian roads, they were soon circulated by Canadian and U.S. officers as evidence that refugees were too dispersed to help and too small in number to worry about. It was not by chance that the first cabinet-level officials to speak openly of withdrawal from the intervention were Perry and Defence Minister Young.

It was proposed above that the asymmetry of power in the U.S.-Canada dyad would be particularly perceptible, to Canada's disadvantage, in military-security matters. From the standpoint of Canadian ministers and officials who wanted an intervention, this disadvantage was exacerbated by this unique coalition DND was able to form with DOD.

The Canadian government, partly to facilitate its negotiations with the United States and others, and partly to mitigate its own bureaucratic-political frictions, took unusual organizational measures at the onset of the eastern Zaire crisis. These measures will be described briefly, and only as they relate to Canadian influence on U.S. policy and action.

The first organizational response to the crisis was the creation inside DFAIT of a special task force, under the joint leadership of two assistant deputy ministers and reporting to the deputy minister. (Two other ADMs often attended task force meetings, chiefly because of their African experience and the frequent absence of one of the co-chairmen.) The formation of the task force effectively flattened the hierarchy in Foreign Affairs for the duration of the crisis, drawing desk officers in regional (African) and functional (peacekeeping/security) areas directly into daily contact with the deputy minister and sometimes the minister. Its other effect—and main purpose—was to assemble all of DFAIT's rather scarce expertise on Central Africa and military operations in the same enterprise. The significance for the subject of this thesis is that this organizational measure may have strengthened DFAIT's influence in the interdepartmental bargaining that transpired in the ensuing weeks.

The second organizational response was the formation in the first week of the crisis of the Zaire Interdepartmental Task Force—known to all at the time as the ZIT. Consisting of eight officials (from DFAIT, DND, CIDA and the Privy Council Office) the ZIT was led by James Judd, who had then just left DFAIT as an assistant deputy minister to become an ADM at Finance. His career path was relevant: Judd was chosen, by the clerk of the Privy Council and others, because he was acceptable to the deputy ministers at DFAIT and DND and to the president of CIDA; he had served as deputy cabinet secretary for foreign and defence policy, was a career foreign service officer, and was known at DND as sympathetic to military concerns. Judd also brought a reputation for hard-nosed frank speech and a readiness to confront senior-most officials face to face.⁸⁶

The ZIT was originally conceived as a co-ordinating body, without operational roles in diplomacy or in the field; as well, “we had no intention of making our existence known to the media, or responding to the media.”⁸⁷ But those two principles were soon amended. The ZIT before long was faxing media lines twice daily to its constituent departments and ministers’ offices—guidance on how to answer questions and explain policy. And on operations, “we ended up quickly managing policy.”⁸⁸ Judd would usually chair a morning interdepartmental meeting (departments represented by ADMs or equivalent), often followed by meetings between Axworthy and Young. “Axworthy and Young were not kindred spirits,” and the ZIT’s chief objective sometimes was to resolve differences between the two.⁸⁹ The differences were severe and personal enough that “neutral ground” needed to be found for these meetings, generally in the cabinet room or the Privy Council Office

boardroom; Judd would chair. The process of composing press lines and preparing ministers for the Commons question period became an instrument of conflict resolution. Judd also briefed each minister for almost-daily conference calls with the prime minister, travelling in Asia and Europe; Judd and Bartleman (with the prime minister) would sit on extension phones as silent listeners and direct follow-up action. The ZIT also faxed a “Daily Report” to constituency departments (“Secret—Canadian Eyes Only”) which usually would summarize events on the ground in Central Africa, some of the diplomatic developments of the past 24 hours, and sometimes the tone of media coverage.⁹⁰

Judd’s role seems to have been crucial in resolving interdepartmental strife. CIDA’s interest in the crisis was to restore access to refugees for NGO and UN-agency aid deliveries, and to facilitate the refugees’ safe repatriation. CIDA was regarded by some in the ZIT as the best informed about refugee conditions, with intimate field contacts in the NGOs and agencies and well-practised plans for humanitarian relief operations. Foreign Affairs was less endowed with hard information and less certain of its objectives as conditions changed; one CIDA official said in an interview she found DND easier to deal with than DFAIT, if only because DND and CIDA were both more concerned with practicalities and less with diplomatic/political ephemera. But DFAIT executives knew they were working with the full personal authority of the prime minister—and so did executives in the other departments. DND, by every account, was profoundly reluctant to become involved in Central Africa and raised a succession of reasons not to. As officials at DFAIT laboured in the first days of the crisis to create an operational strategy and answer

U.S. demands, they found their DND colleagues almost mutely unhelpful. The televised Somalia hearings were proceeding just down the street from DND headquarters; rancorous fault-finding was erupting in Paris, Brussels and Ottawa as a fuller understanding of the Rwanda genocide emerged; and DND civilian and military authorities keenly felt their lack of intelligence, airlift and other capabilities for leading an intervention. They also had few soldiers to spare, with deployments then in place in Bosnia and Haiti.⁹¹ Judd used two arguments with DND.⁹² First, “the PM has got us so far out on this one that we cannot let him hang in the wind.” And second, DND success in eastern Zaire would begin to win back reputation and morale lost in Somalia. (This last was an argument reported in press accounts at the time, as a reason DND would welcome the Zaire operation. The author found no evidence that anyone in authority at DND held this belief; it was an artifact created outside the department.) These arguments had to be renewed when refugee repatriation encouraged DND officials to propose a fast withdrawal. “The generals started saying, it’s a done deal, we’re out of here,” one participant reported in an interview. “There was a sharp set of discussions,” in which DND was told that Canada could not “walk away” from the problems of resettlement in Rwanda or of Rwandans still lost in Zaire. Nonetheless, a former top-level military officer told the author that the sudden mass repatriation of refugees without an MNF military action “was one of the happiest moments of my military career.”

The ZIT also negotiated directly with U.S. officials on some occasions. More than once Judd telephoned Lake, whom he had known from his earlier PCO days. But in large part the structural divisions in Washington reflected themselves in the

conduct of policy from Ottawa: Specifically, Young and Perry met several times on their own and so did Canadian and U.S. military officers at various ranks.⁹³

In the view of Canadian practitioners involved, the ZIT successfully contributed to interdepartmental co-ordination in Ottawa and so made the most of scarce organizational resources. These things are difficult to verify, but the ZIT does seem to have minimized bureaucratic conflict without eliminating it. Smith and others interviewed report their own perceptions that Canadian diplomacy was more orderly than U.S. diplomacy, and thereby more effective than it would have been otherwise.

A factor emphasized by almost all participants in this case—"a dominating factor" in the words of one very senior official—was the personal role of the prime minister, and his personal relationship with Clinton and other heads of government. It was Chrétien who decided on Canadian leadership in the first place, and imposed it on ministers. "He didn't know and didn't want to know all the details. . . . It was a top-down decision, and we were told to do it, to find a way of making it happen."⁹⁴ The prime minister spoke often with Clinton throughout the crisis; they were together at the APEC summit in Manila in November. Pre-existing personal relationships also allowed him to telephone other leaders around the world and get a hearing. Officials found the prime minister's activity striking, given his record for cautious incrementalism in foreign policy; the fact that this was an exception generated a certain urgency of its own. It must be added, however (as several participants did), that heads of government made commitments to the prime minister that were never ultimately delivered by their defence ministers. Once negotiations on the MNF began,

promises made by presidents and prime ministers tended to lose value with disappointing speed.

What can be said in summary of the application of theory to this case? The model of asymmetrical interdependence advances useful concepts for exploring U.S.-Canadian relations—not least, the recognition that strength does not always prevail in relationships characterized by the interplay of transnational actors in and out of government. (As we have seen, however, in this case the transgovernmental coalition between DND and the Pentagon tended to operate *against* declared Canadian policy.) The metaphor of two-level games usefully directs attention to the truth that chiefs of government do consider moves in both international and domestic realms, each of which shapes preferences in the other. Bureaucratic-politics/political-process models engage the detail of decisions and the dynamics of negotiations in Washington—even if they are notoriously weak in the power to predict.

The asymmetry of power in this case was intensified by the salience of military-security issues; asymmetry was not unambiguously mitigated by the factors proposed by Keohane and Nye. Two-level phenomena are apparent in the case, but did not favour Canada insofar as coalition-building at Level II was prevented by the short and closed nature of the Washington policy debate. Bureaucratic politics are scribbled all over the record of this case, in the Washington interagency negotiations and in the factional alliances formed between bureaucracies in Washington and Ottawa. Finally, it can be repeated that the influence Canada could bring to bear on

U.S. policy and conduct was constrained as much as it was enhanced by the multilateral pressures affecting the negotiations and the circumstances in eastern Zaire.

¹ Hampson, 23.

² Hampson, 31.

³ Sebenius, 323-365; Hampson, 37.

⁴ Evans, 9.

⁵ Interviews.

⁶ See Prunier, 356 ff; Evans, 62 ff; *L'Express*, 22-28 Mai, 1997. 98-102; *Washington Post*, July 6, 1997. A1; *Post*, July 9, 1997. A1.

⁷ *Post*, July 9, 1997. A1.

⁸ Interviews. The Rwandan position was expressed in the Nov. 15 Security Council meeting.

⁹ Interviews; Kagame in the *Post* July 9, 1997.

¹⁰ *Post*, July 9, 1997. A1.

¹¹ Interviews.

¹² Interviews.

¹³ Interviews.

¹⁴ *New York Times*, Nov. 29, 1996. A1.

¹⁵ Evans, 12.

¹⁶ Evans, 48; Prunier, 104 ff.

¹⁷ Interview.

¹⁸ Interviews.

¹⁹ Interviews.

²⁰ Evans, 50.

²¹ Interviews.

²² Prunier, 102.

²³ J. Matthew Vaccaro, "The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Rwanda," in William J. Durch, ed. *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996) 385.

²⁴ Prunier, 100-101.

²⁵ Interviews.

²⁶ Interview.

²⁷ Interviews.

²⁸ Interviews.

²⁹ Interview.

³⁰ Interview.

³¹ Stairs, 94.

³² In David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown, eds. *Canada's International Security Policy* (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, 1995) 243.

³³ Von Riekhoff, 243.

³⁴ Ivo H. Daalder in Durch, 39-40.

³⁵ Daalder, 41.

³⁶ Quoted in Daalder, 56.

³⁷ U.S. Department of State, *Dispatch*, 4. 39. Sept. 27, 1993.

³⁸ U.S. Department of State, May 1994.

³⁹ In Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, with Pamela Aall, eds. *Managing Global Chaos* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996) 220.

⁴⁰ In "Haiti and the International Community: A Case Study," *Survival*, 39. 2. Summer 1997. 126-146.

⁴¹ Interview. His account conforms completely with Canadian perceptions.

⁴² James Appathurai and Ralph Lysyshyn, "Lessons Learned from the Zaire Mission," June 1997. The preface declares the views contained "are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect" those of DFAIT, DND or the Canadian government.

⁴³ Keohane and Nye, 25.

⁴⁴ A small sample: Malone; Adam Roberts and Barry M. Blechman in Crocker, Hampson and Aall; Bert A. Rockman in David A. Deese, ed. *The New Politics of American Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994) 59-74; James Mayall, ed. *The New Interventionism, 1991-94* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robert H. Jackson, "Armed humanitarianism," *International Journal*, XLVII. Autumn 1993. 579-606.

⁴⁵ *New York Times*, Nov. 16, 1996. I6.

⁴⁶ Interview.

⁴⁷ Interview.

⁴⁸ Interview.

⁴⁹ Interviews.

⁵⁰ Interviews. Several "Daily Reports" of the Zaire Interdepartmental Task Force can be found in the Access file and generally confirm the impression of neutral or positive media coverage of the government's actions.

⁵¹ Page A32.

⁵² Page A24.

⁵³ Interview.

⁵⁴ Interview.

⁵⁵ In "Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention," a report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997. Downloaded from the Carnegie website at: www.ccpdc.org/pubs/media/mediaframe.htm

⁵⁶ Walter P. Strobele in Crocker, Hampson and Aall, 360 ff.

⁵⁷ W. Lance Burnett in Deese, 173.

⁵⁸ Putnam, 443.

⁵⁹ Mayer, 797.

⁶⁰ Interviews.

⁶¹ Interview.

⁶² Interview.

⁶³ Interviews.

⁶⁴ Hampson, 12.

⁶⁵ Interview.

⁶⁶ Interview.

⁶⁷ Interview.

⁶⁸ Interview.

⁶⁹ Scott, 7 ff.

⁷⁰ Scott, 12-13.

⁷¹ Scott, 229.

⁷² Scott, 247-248.

⁷³ Peter J. Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 12 ff.

⁷⁴ Schraeder, 16.

⁷⁵ Schraeder, 31.

⁷⁶ Schraeder, 51-113.

⁷⁷ Interviews.

⁷⁸ Interviews.

⁷⁹ Interviews.

⁸⁰ Albright's nomination was announced Dec. 5, along with Lake's doomed nomination to the CIA and other bureaucratic realignments. On Albright's vigorously expressed attitudes, see for example Joe Klein, "Diplomacy Without Tears," *The New Yorker*, Oct. 13, 1997. 40-47.

⁸¹ Donald L. Hafner in Deese, 44.

⁸² Interviews, and newspaper accounts cited above.

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- ⁸³ Schraeder, 37.
⁸⁴ See Malone.
⁸⁵ Burnett, 175.
⁸⁶ Interviews.
⁸⁷ Interview.
⁸⁸ Interview.
⁸⁹ Interview.
⁹⁰ Several of these can be found in the Access file.
⁹¹ Interviews.
⁹² Interview.
⁹³ Interviews.
⁹⁴ Interview.

Chapter Five

Conclusion

This research began with a question: In what circumstances, and by what means, is the Canadian government most able to influence the U.S. government in cases of armed international intervention? The case of the intended intervention in eastern Zaire was then explored with an eye to finding answers to that question. The facts of the case were subjected to propositions from three leading theoretical traditions, and the utility of the propositions themselves was assessed.

One case is not a universe. There is no assumption imposed here that the case of eastern Zaire was altogether characteristic of other intervention cases—although it does exhibit the confusions and surprises that seem typical of such episodes. With that disclaimer, and without reformulating all the conclusions and hypotheses that have gone before, it might be possible to advance an additional five-part answer to the question that guided this inquiry.

1. The Canadian government's influence on U.S. policy and conduct is maximized when time is sufficient to allow coalition-formation with actors inside the U.S. policy community. Likely coalition partners can be found, contingent on the facts of the case, in the White House; the foreign-policy bureaucracies; Congress; other non-U.S.-government actors including other foreign governments, international agencies and NGOs; among others. But creating coalitions takes time, especially in cases where public and congressional opinion has not been mobilized significantly in Canada's favour.

2. Canadian influence is maximized to the extent that the policy debate in Washington is open. Closed debate means ownership of an issue remains with those in the bureaucracies best placed to “rewrite history” and frame the policy issue to their own advantage. NGO activity, congressional interest (as in the Haiti case) and prolonged media coverage (echoing and amplifying intra-bureaucratic dissent) opens opportunities for Canadian government influence and brings domestic-level bargaining into the game.

3. Canadian influence is maximized when Canadian negotiators—including the prime minister—can demilitarize the intervention question. To the extent that a policy problem is defined in Washington as a problem of military security and troop deployment, the first U.S. response will be one of reluctance and/or unilateralism: Pentagon and some congressional interests will lean against deployment, and against other actors trying to engage the administration in multilateral intervention. This suggests that Canada might increase its influence by appealing to normative obligation (as in this case), and by infusing the intervention with non-military, political content. It was never clear or agreed in the eastern Zaire case what the intended or even expected political outcome of intervention would be. Revolution in Zaire? Ethnic peace in Rwanda? Regional peace in Central Africa? This recommendation is counter-intuitive: U.S. decision-makers these days resist burdening military operations with elaborate political/social objectives. But a policy problem defined operationally as strictly military (even, as in this case, supposedly without combat) will become the privileged property of DND and DOD. In demilitarizing the definition of an intervention problem, Canadian government

influence will also be maximized by enlisting the full support of DND—or by minimizing DND's capacity and opportunity to block negotiated agreements.

4. The Canadian government's influence is maximized when it can create or participate in an international "coalition of the willing" capable of mounting an intervention without a U.S. contribution, and strong enough to survive a U.S. defection. In this case, overt expressions from DND and other defence departments that U.S. deployment was a *sine qua non* of MNF formation bestowed a veto on the United States—which everybody understood. If a coalition without U.S. airlift, intelligence and political collaboration had been able credibly to prepare an intervention, it is at least possible that the United States would have shown more eagerness for the enterprise. Without the fall-back of its *de facto* veto, U.S. decision-makers might—just might—have recalculated their interests as better served by being in on the deployment, shaping the outcome, than outside and left behind.

5. Canadian government influence would be increased by UN agreement to strengthen international capacity for Chapter VII operations. Rapid-reaction capabilities, or creation of an operational standby "high-readiness" brigade, could accelerate deployment times in crises, enhance middle-power competence, and reduce reliance on *ad hoc* U.S. contributions. It is probably true that some U.S. military role will often be politically valuable in Chapter VII intervention cases; U.S. consent in any event is necessary to win Security Council authority. But if operational, procedural and political-management issues of the kind that filled the early days of this crisis could be addressed and even resolved in advance, the disadvantage of time that Canada carried in this case would be diminished in future. Regime formation of

this sort could favour Canada in attempting to influence the United States—quite apart from the lives it might save in future emergencies.

To conclude, a short methodological note: In a wise and practical-minded essay on the conjunction of scholarly knowledge and statecraft,¹ Alexander George has written of the necessity “to study what goes on in the ‘black boxes’ of decision making and strategic interaction, and not simply to make assumptions about them, as do rational choice and game theories.” That describes the object of this case study—to look behind the assumptions, to discover how decisions were made and how they interacted. But there was another object too: an attempt to understand, in the form of generalizations, how the Canadian government might influence superpower conduct in cases of armed intervention. This is what George in his article called “generic knowledge”—“knowledge of the generic problems that arise repeatedly in the conduct of foreign policy”—knowledge that can reach the distance between theory and practice. The value of generic knowledge, George continued, is not that it provides “detailed, high-confidence prescriptions for action.” It does not. Rather, it can “contribute to the diagnosis of specific problematic situations with which decision makers must deal. . . .”

George derived several implications from these thoughts. One is that generic knowledge need not “satisfy the high degree of verification that science attempts to achieve.” This is not a slippery excuse for inadequate research and analysis. It is only to say that “when scientific knowledge is not attainable, we can at least strive to produce ‘usable knowledge.’”

Another implication is that practitioners will get more out of “rich” theories with more variables than parsimonious ones—especially if they are variables on which the practitioners have some leverage. That is simply because practitioners, as in the case of eastern Zaire, confront problems with many variables. “Such theories and generic knowledge serve at the very least as a sophisticated checklist that reminds policy specialists of the numerous conditions and variables that can influence their ability to achieve desired outcomes,” George wrote. “But when more fully developed, such ‘rich’ theories of generic problems identify the conditions that favor—although they do not guarantee—the success of a policy option.”

That has been the purpose of this study, to identify some of the conditions that might favour the successful saving of lives.

¹ Alexander L. George, “Knowledge for Statecraft,” *International Security*, 22. 1. Summer 1997. 44–52.

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A Note on Documents

Much of the documentary record of this case remains classified and secret in the files of government departments, notwithstanding the release noted above of some DND files under the Access to Information Act. Future researchers will no doubt derive useful material from the following in particular, which were not public as of May 1, 1998: a history of DFAIT and the Zaire crisis, drafted by John Hilliker, Hector Mackenzie and Greg Donaghy, Historical Staff, Corporate Communications Division, DFAIT; a study of the management of the Great Lakes crisis, prepared in the Office of the Inspector General, DFAIT, and dated April 1997; and a collection of faxes from Ambassador Chrétien to Secretary-General Boutros Ghali in November-December 1996.

Interviews

To assemble the facts of this case, and to elicit interpretations of events from participants, 31 open-ended interviews were conducted with 27 present and former officials of the Canadian and U.S. governments, the United Nations Secretariat, and CARE Canada. The interviews took place between October 1997 and April 1998. Two were by telephone; the others were conducted personally in Ottawa, New York and Washington. With one exception, participants submitted to interviews on the condition that material would not be attributed to them by name. The exception was Gordon Smith, former deputy minister at DFAIT, who participated in a series of

conversations as we collaborated on a chapter for a forthcoming anthology of case studies to be published by the United States Institute of Peace.

Several of the interview subjects agreed to participate in this study only on a guarantee of complete anonymity. The guarantee was given, with reluctance: Anonymity impedes any thorough attempt at replication, and (as journalists understand) it can give defensive cover for various forms of self-promotion, evasion and score-settling. In the end, these contributions—when tested against other evidence—have been used where their value has been judged to outweigh the risks and disadvantages of anonymity.

What follows, therefore, is a partial list of those interviewed for this case study:

Jim Bartleman, assistant secretary to the cabinet for foreign and defence policy, Ottawa.

Raymond Chrétien, Canadian ambassador to the United States, Washington.

Edward Goldenberg, senior policy adviser, Prime Minister's Office, Ottawa.

Andrew Hurst, food security and emergency response unit, CARE Canada, Ottawa.

Anthony Lake, former U.S. national security adviser, Washington.

Larry Murray, former acting chief of the defence staff, Ottawa.

Gordon Smith, former deputy minister, DFAIT, Ottawa.

Peter Tarnoff, former U.S. undersecretary of state, San Francisco.

Detlef Wilke, Department of Political Affairs, UN Secretariat, New York.

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