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TRIUNE NATIONALISM
**Cultural, Political and Techno-Economic Discourses in
Canadian Telecommunications & Broadcasting Policy**

**Submitted by:
Tandy Kate Yull**

**A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of**

Master of Arts

School of Journalism and Communications

**Carleton University, Ottawa
April 19, 1993**

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Cultural, Political and Techno-Economic Discourses in Canadian
Telecommunications and Broadcasting Policy**

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the degree of Master of Arts

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Traditional concepts of nationalism do not allow us to fully understand the Canadian experience. It may be more useful to think about nationalism as an aggregate of three discourses -- political, cultural and techno-economic -- each of which has varying, sometimes competing, goals and strategies. An analysis of telecommunications and broadcasting policy documentation provides useful case studies of the operation of the three languages of nationalism. In this thesis, I will examine the way each discourse is privileged at certain times, and track the shifts that have occurred over time in nationalist discourses and policy making in Canada. An approach based on triune nationalism illuminates the Canadian experience and may be of interest to other nation-states striving to adjust to a post-industrial world.

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In an endeavour such as this there are always many thanks to be given. I owe large debts of gratitude to all my professors at Carleton, especially Paul Attallah, Chris Dornan, Steve McDowell, David Marshall, and Joanne Marshall for allowing me to pick their brains, or whine at them about my work, and all that other stuff. Many thanks (or maybe the exact opposite) must go to Peter Harcourt, the man who got me started on all of this two years ago. I hope I have done some justice to the ideas he helped to form. Huge heaps of thanks go to my advisor, Michael Dorland who gave my muddled thoughts coherence, provided me with much needed theoretical guidance, was a painstaking editor I much appreciated, and held my hand when I was suffering from 'existential angst'. Needless to say, a lot of the credit, but none of the blame, must be shared with these people.

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1. Introduction

Canada provides a fascinating site for the study of theories of nationalism. There are three reasons for this. In the first place, multiple domestic realities have made nationalism a topic of concern to many Canadians. These realities include the omnipresence of the United States, the distinct nationalism of French Canada, the policies surrounding multiculturalism and immigration, and the nascent nationalist sentiments of the "First Nations." Other factors that have made nationalism a somewhat tenuous concept in Canada, include the existence of a relatively small population, scattered across a vast, geographically and politically divided country. A country as dispersed as Canada has need of unifying concepts.

Secondly, the case of Canada is not only relevant to studies of nationalism because of its own long-standing consideration of the issue, but because, more than ever, Canada's responses to its extremely close contact with the vast communications system of the United States, serve as a model for policy makers elsewhere.¹ The conditions which Canada has experienced in radio and film since the 1920s and in television since the 1950s are rapidly becoming global. Canada's responses to the communications problems inherent in its interdependent relationship with the United States are therefore of great interest to policy-makers in many countries.² Canada's

¹There is much international interest in the cultural and economic impact in Canada of, for example, the cross-border spillover of television programming.

²For example, the European Community has looked into the structure and format of the CRTC and Canadian content regulations (among other Canadian policies) in the process of developing a European broadcasting policy. R. Collins, "Unity in Diversity: Broadcasting Policy in the European Community - A Case of Canadensis", lecture at Carleton University, Ottawa, November 20, 1992.

nation-building efforts through communication/information and cultural policies, represent, in Europe particularly, a model either to follow or to avoid.³

Thirdly, Canada provides a fascinating case study for those engaged in the *academic* project of theorizing about nationalism. Canada might represent, as British communications researcher Richard Collins has suggested, a pre-echo of a post-national condition. In this view, although Canada is not a nation-state in the traditional sense, it may well be a manifestation of a new form of human community - maybe better, even, than old-style nation-states. Canada's responses to its particular experiences represent a different way of organizing national communities. They therefore provide a fertile locus for scholarly research.

What makes the study of nationalism particularly relevant to *communications* research are the links that have been made throughout Canada's development between communications and national sovereignty. In Canada, communications techniques and technologies have been especially privileged as tools for the promotion and protection of sovereignty, whether political, cultural or economic. They have long been considered, at least by the country's political leaders, to be a resource of vital interest to Canadians in their attempt to bring together the disparate regions and peoples who live above the 49th parallel. From the time of Confederation, east-west communications links have been self-consciously forged, despite many geographical, cultural, and regional barriers, as the ties which bind the country together as a 'nation'.⁴

³Although official European discourses on broadcasting policy refer to the Canadian system as a positive example (according to Collins' lecture), we cannot assume that all Canadian initiatives are considered worth copying. Canada's experiment may also provide examples of what not to do. D. Hutchison, "Broadcasting Policy in Canada and the United Kingdom", p. 93.

⁴See for example, *Proposals for a Communications Policy for Canada*, p. 3.

Domestic communications policies have, therefore, been regarded as a crucial mechanism for protecting Canada from the influence of the United States, and for promoting a pan-national culture. This connection between communications and nationalism has been explicitly made throughout our history; however, it is a connection that may require more critical examination.

The case of Canada, soon makes it apparent that traditional theories of nationalism -- which, in essence, assert the necessary congruence of the political and the national or cultural unit, ie: the absolute congruence of sovereign political states and distinct nations in 'true' nation-states -- do not apply. Canada's singular circumstances -- in particular, its existence as a state of more than one nation where the second most populous national group is exceptionally and articulately aware of its distinctiveness -- compel us to reconstruct our perceptions of the concept of nationalism.

The second chapter will begin with an examination of a number of 'traditional' understandings of nationalism, represented mainly by the work of Ernest Gellner. In it, I will develop the argument that these do not have powerful explanatory value for the Canadian case, largely because Canada does not possess the required congruence of nation and state. A more appropriate theory of nationalism for Canada would take into account this country's exceptional experiences with, for example, duelling nationalisms⁵ ranged alongside one of the most powerful nations of the world.

In this chapter, I will also examine theories more relevant to Canada -- such as technological nationalism -- however, I will suggest that these have only limited explanatory value for the Canadian situation. Canadian nationalist discourses are indeed characterized by technological validations, solutions, and ideas. However, beneath this technologically deterministic discourse, there are other layers of nationalist language. For instance, we cannot ignore the power of nationalist

⁵Duelling, but not combative (as in Yugoslavia).

discourses as a mechanism for the creation of linkages in an otherwise dispersed country, or as a legitimizer of political activity.

A communications approach, which focuses on nationalism as discourse, provides a more nuanced understanding, and highlights the nature of nationalism as a unifying concept -- a perception that is obscured by traditional theories of nationalism.

Moreover, a communications theory of nationalism, based on an analysis of discourses, allows us to recognize ways in which the language of nationalism is altered to promote and protect particular goals.

Building on this analysis, I will develop an approach more suited to discerning the nature and experience of nationalism in Canada. Borrowing from American sociologist Daniel Bell's seminal work in *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*, I will offer a triune notion of nationalism. As Bell suggests that society is made up of three realms, the political, the cultural and the techno-economic, so this thesis will argue that nationalism is composed of three distinct discourses, the political, the cultural and the techno-economic, each of which possesses divergent strategies and goals and all of which are centred around the goal of building a stronger Canada.

Political nationalism is organized around the concerns and goals of the polity, the regulation of conflict, and the management of the arena of social justice and power. We can also think of it as 'official' or 'state' nationalism. It prioritizes state power and political sovereignty and uses the languages of cultural and techno-economic nationalism as legitimizers to support and promote its own interests.

Cultural nationalism is centred around the 'people' of the nation -- that collection of individuals bound together by basic common characteristics such as shared ethnicity, a distinctive culture, a common language and religion, and a history. Cultural nationalism sees itself as emanating from the people and refers to their shared system

of beliefs, ideas and symbols for its validation and legitimization. Its primary goals are cultural sovereignty through the promotion and protection of a strong national cultural identity, and the advancement of the needs and goals of the members of the democratic society.

Techno-economic nationalism is concentrated around the market and is largely concerned with the promotion of a strong international economic position, mostly through technological solutions. It prioritizes economic and technological competitiveness in the international arena, through efficient, specialized, and rationalized techniques, as the best way to promote sovereignty.

We can come to a richer and more critical understanding of Canadian nationalism, and the connection made between nationalism and communications, if we abandon traditional theories of nationalism -- including those Canadian theories that highlight only the discursive relationship between technology and nation-building -- and begin to think about nationalism as made up of these three component discourses. A communications theory of nationalism, which focuses on discourse, leads us to an examination of nationalist languages as legitimizers or as unifying concepts in a democratic society.

Because nationalism appears to invoke the people of a nation, democratic states make use of its discourses to motivate people to specific actions and/or to legitimize state activities and programmes. As a result, it is in the terrain of Government policy that the application of discourses of nationalism is most apparent -- policy documents are replete with nationalist allusions. An analysis of Government policy documents based on the triune discourses of nationalism will allow us to track shifts that have occurred in Canadian communications policy over time. In the third and fourth chapters I will present two case studies, analyzing the workings of the triune languages of nationalism in telecommunications and broadcasting policy documents.

Telecommunications, according to the act currently before Parliament is "any emission, transmission or reception of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds or intelligence of any nature by line, radio or other electromagnetic or optical system or by any similar technical system."⁶ This definition, in essence, therefore, covers the telegraph and telephone, radio and television broadcasting including cable tv, and the newer information technologies such as facsimile machines, computer communications, and communication satellites.⁷

However, broadcasting has long been recognized as a distinct form of telecommunications (developing as it did as a point-to-mass as opposed to point-to-point communication form). As such, the content of the Canadian broadcasting system has garnered close government attention and regulation since the inception of broadcasting in the early 1900's. This is particularly true in the context of the supposed capability of broadcasting to contribute to the development of national consciousness, national identity and/or national unity.

On the other hand, most of the other technologies of telecommunications, and the companies that control them, have been allowed to develop relatively free from government control. Regulation of the carriage of communications is mostly concerned with technical issues of access, efficiency, systemic integrity, and service universality, not with national consciousness.⁸

It is because the history of the development of broadcasting policy-making differs so substantially from that of telecommunications policy that the two will be treated as separate case studies.

⁶Bill C-62, An Act respecting Telecommunications, Third Session, 34th Parliament.

⁷R. Babe's *Telecommunications in Canada* provides a comprehensive historical analysis of this realm

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 239

Through an examination of telecommunications and broadcasting policy documents, the thesis will highlight examples of the operation of the distinct discourses of nationalism, and the ways in which each is prioritized and privileged at certain times. I will examine the trends in policy documentation that are shifting nationalist language from cultural to techno-economic justifications, in both broadcasting and telecommunications policy.

My examination of telecommunications and broadcasting policy will focus on the most significant advisory committee reports of these decades -- such as the Telecommission report on telecommunications in Canada,⁹ the Clyne Committee Report on the implications of telecommunications for Canadian sovereignty,¹⁰ the Applebaum-Hébert report on cultural policy,¹¹ and the Caplan-Sauvageau report on broadcasting policy.¹² I will also focus on the relevant Acts of Parliament, as well as documents from the Department of Communications that most clearly set telecommunications and/or broadcasting policy. I choose to examine only DOC documents partially as a method to limit the scope of my research, but also because the DOC is the primary institution of Government policy in respect of telecommunications and broadcasting.¹³

The time period under consideration will be from roughly 1967 to 1992. These years are partially chosen out of sentimentality as they represent Canada's 100th and 125th anniversaries, but also because they mark the adoption of two broadcasting acts (1968

⁹*Instant World*, 1971.

¹⁰*Telecommunications and Canada*, 1979.

¹¹*Report of the Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee*, 1982.

¹²*Report of the Task Force on Broadcasting Policy*, 1986.

¹³M. Raboy, *Missed Opportunities*, p. 239. E. Comor, "The Department of Communications Under the Free Trade Regime", p. 239.

& 1991) and form a convenient reference point for tracking shifts in both broadcasting and telecommunications policy.

As we move increasingly into a more integrated global information society, every nation-state in the world finds itself engaged in the process of developing policies that will allow it to maintain a degree of sovereign control over its political, economic, and cultural existence. International treaties and agreements, however, in addition to globalizing trends in, and as a result of information and communications, are also promoting greater interdependence and undermining the reality or even possibility of separateness. Many countries are affected by these processes and are preoccupied by the task of finding a balance between national self-interest and international opportunities and obligations.

If Canada's approach to communication, information, and cultural policy-making is being imitated and reproduced overseas, perhaps a Canadian theory of nationalism might also be of interest to those engaged in the dual processes of successfully adapting to the new global environment (the so-called 'information age'), while also promoting and protecting national self-interest (usually in the form of national cultural, political and techno-economic sovereignty).

As a result of this work, I hope to contribute to the debates on nationalism and communications policy in Canada and elsewhere. I believe the triune approach developed in these pages will offer not only useful insights into Canadian nationalism, but will also have applications which cannot be sufficiently or adequately supported by traditional theories of nationalism.

2. Nationalism

Nationalism has been theorized in a number of ways. It has been portrayed, on one hand, by the German romantics (for example Fichte, Schlegel, Schleiermacher) as an organic, natural phenomenon which comes into self-consciousness through historical and cultural research. According to this view, nationhood is something to be discovered in the essence of humankind. The people of the world are naturally divided into separate nations. "'Nature' itself has ordained this cultural individuality, and the proof of this is to be found in the manifest differences of language, customs, history, institutions, descent and religion."¹

It may be more useful, however, to think of nationalism as a creation, not as something to be discovered, but something to be imagined.² For those who see nationalism as a creation, it is generally agreed that the doctrine of nationalism came into being as a result of the Enlightenment, or at least as part of the project of modernity.³ With the decline of traditional religious belief and the rise of rationalist secularism, there was a need for new ways to organize society's meaning systems and structures. In this sense, nationalism was a unifying concept that could act as a substitute for religion.

¹A. D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, p. 16.

²I borrow from Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*. This notion of imagining one's community is particularly relevant for Canada as it is impossible to speak of an organic, natural Canadian nation!

³See, for example, B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, E. Gellner, *Nations & Nationalism*, or T. Nairn, *The Break-Up of Britain*.

Authors who subscribe to the creation theory of nationalism, however, differ as to whether it is a political or a cultural creation. That is to say, they differ as to whether this imagined community is a formal invention -- something fabricated by a political unit like the state -- or a creative activity, deriving from the imagination of a group of people.⁴

What further distinguishes various theorists who see nationalism as a creation is the differing emphasis that each places on the underlying concepts of state and nation. In some relationship or another, these form the foundation of all theories of nationalism. The problems of arriving at an understanding of nationalism can be simplified if we make a distinction between 'state' and 'nation' rather than thinking of and using them as interchangeable concepts.

"Nation", "State" and "Nation-State"

As is clear from Philip Resnick's book *The Masks of Proteus: Canadian Reflections on the State*, it is not easy to arrive at a simple definition of a state: "no single, overarching theory can capture [the nature of the modern state] in all its dimensions."⁵ Resnick suggests the adoption of the metaphor of Proteus, a Greek mythological figure who was able to change shape and appearance at will, to describe the nature of states.

Like Proteus, the state wears many masks -- coercive and consensual, centralized and decentralized, democratic and anti-democratic, economic and social, sovereign and dependent.⁶

With these reservations in mind, I offer a working definition of a **state** as that system of institutions which makes up a government. We can also think of it as an organized

⁴B Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 20.

⁵P Resnick, *The Masks of Proteus*, p 3

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 5.

political community which possesses powers of symbolic creation, consensus formation, and coercion.⁷ The basic interests of modern capitalist states today can be summed up in the following four points:

- * maintenance and promotion of a sound national economy,
- * maintenance of social peace and national security,
- * negotiation of a favourable international position, and
- * maintenance of legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens.⁸

It is important to recognize that all of these goals can be expressed and promoted through the language of nationalism. There are ways of using discourses of nationalism to further the goals of political entities, especially as a legitimizer of state activities.

Although it has a nebulous identity, a **nation** can be defined as a collection of individuals bound together by basic common characteristics such as shared ethnicity, a distinctive culture, a common language and religion, and a history, who imagine themselves as a community. It is a community which shares a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating. The nation is said to be made up of individuals who share common interests, concerns, and goals. These interests, concerns, and goals can also be expressed and promoted through languages of nationalism. In this sense, nationalism is a unifying concept which provides linkages allowing a dispersed country like Canada, to imagine itself as a national community.

We can make a further distinction and begin to think about a **nation-state** as that community in which the governed area, or the state, corresponds with the nation. The coincidence of these two factors in reality, however, is rather rare. We may talk

⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 255-6.

⁸Marc Raboy, *Missed Opportunities*, p. 336.

about the existence of nation-states, but there are not many cases where the shared characteristics of nationhood are surrounded by stable political boundaries and governed by a politically sovereign government in the form of a state.⁹ Canada is not the only case of a state of more than one nation, nor is French Canada the only case of a nation without the full powers of a sovereign state. However, as Anthony Smith suggests in *Theories of Nationalism*:

The nation-state is the almost undisputed foundation of world order, the main object of individual loyalties, the chief definer of a man's identity. It is far more significant for the individual and for world security than any previous type of political and social organization. It permeates our outlook so much that we hardly question its legitimacy today.¹⁰

Despite the fact that they are few and far between, nation-states are seen as both natural and necessary. Traditional notions of nationalism, characterized most directly by Ernest Gellner, suggest that the nation-state is the most satisfactory and correct arrangement possible. The opening paragraph of Gellner's book *Nations and Nationalism*, for example, describes nationalism as "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit [ie: the state and the nation] should be congruent," and that political borders should not separate ethnic populations. Anything else, according to Gellner, is held to be a violation of nationalist principles.¹¹

Similarly, in *Nationalism*, a discussion of the history of the doctrine of nationalism, Elie Kedourie also presents the argument that nationalism presupposes that the best political situation exists when a nation forms its own state. "States in which there is

⁹R Collins, *Culture, Communication & National Identity*, p 18.

¹⁰A. D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, p. 2.

¹¹E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 1.

more than one nation, on the other hand, are unnatural, oppressive and finally doomed to decay."¹² Kedourie also identifies a single national language as "the most important criterion by which a nation is recognized to exist, and to have the right to form a state on its own."¹³ He also suggests that political boundaries which separate people who share a language are arbitrary and wrong.¹⁴

How then are we to understand the continued existence of the Canadian nation-state? If these theories of nationalism are correct, Canada makes little sense as a nation at all, nor are the continuing debates over Canadian nationalism relevant. Nationalism should not be an issue in Canada. However, nationalism is, and has been, an issue of great importance to many Canadians and of significance to almost every politician since Sir John A. MacDonald. Canada's experience of nationalism does not follow these more traditional notions. In order to better understand nationalism in the Canadian case, we must develop a different approach.

Richard Collins, in his research on Canadian national identity in *Culture, Communication and National Identity: The Case of Canadian Television*, suggests that nationalism is an ideology outside of its time, no longer relevant in a world growing more interdependent every day. Nationalism is "an ideology more and more under pressure and less and less corresponding to the unities -- economic, cultural, and, even, political -- in which people live their lives."¹⁵ This conclusion is based on his understanding of traditional notions of nationalism, which he describes as

the belief that there are 'natural' communities sharing ethnicity, location, history, belief, language and economic interest that 'naturally'

¹²E. Kedourie, *Nationalism*, p. 18.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 64.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 68.

¹⁵R. Collins, *Culture, Communication & National Identity*, p. xii.

should enjoy political sovereignty in a 'nation state.' And that nation-states are the only building blocks from which a stable and productive political order can be built.¹⁶

Using the Canadian case as his proof, Collins challenges the assumption in the theory of nationalism, as presented for example by Gellner and Kedourie, that links politics and culture. He argues that the assumption that political and cultural sovereignty are mutually dependent (a central precept of many theories of nationalism) is mistaken.¹⁷ To Collins, the case of Canada proves that political and cultural sovereignty not only can be separate but should be. Nationalist communities and sentiments exist, he says, but they are neither "necessary or optimal".¹⁸ Collins suggests, instead, that Canada represents a new form of human community that is "multilingual, multi-ethnic, and multicultural," and not debilitated by the congruency of political, cultural and economic domains, which inhibits "realization of economic efficiency, cultural pluralism, and political equality."¹⁹

Collins' analysis seems to suggest that we ought to abandon the debilitating restraints of nationalism and glorify instead in the strength of Canadian political institutions despite the weakness of Canadian culture. He is able to make this argument based on a distinction he makes between symbolic and anthropological culture.

Anthropological culture refers to legal and political structures and daily practices. Symbolic culture is generated through symbolization and self-representation. Collins argues that the strength of Canada's anthropological culture suggests that reliance on

¹⁶R. Collins, "National Culture: A Contradiction in Terms", p. 226.

¹⁷R. Collins, *Culture, Communication & National Identity*, p. 13.

¹⁸R. Collins, "National Culture: A Contradiction in Terms", p. 226.

¹⁹R. Collins, *Culture, Communication & National Identity*, p. xii.

American sources for symbolic culture,²⁰ is not something about which we should worry. Collins says that Canada's anthropological culture is strong and that Canada continues to be a "remarkably stable and successful state" despite shortcomings in our symbolic national identity. As he sees it, the important issue is not Canada's lack of national culture, but how unimportant this has been in the general scheme of things.²¹

Collins also draws a distinction between a nationalist movement and an established nation-state. A new movement lacks political instruments and institutions and must appeal to something more personal, at the level of ideas. An established nation-state, on the other hand,

needs less of the ardent commitment to a shared vocation and experience of a shared language and culture that distinguish a movement... Nations which are independent, territorially satisfied and deeply nationally conscious have no need to be nationalist any more.

Collins argues that these conditions well characterize contemporary Canada. He then asks why active nationalism still persists in this country and immediately answers his own question: "Perhaps because Canada is not a nation-state."²²

Collins provides an interesting response to the question of the continuing viability of the Canadian state despite its apparent lack of national identity and cultural sovereignty. It could be argued, however, that the conditions Collins describes as characterizing an established nation-state do not exist in Canada. Instead of territorial

²⁰Primarily in English Canada. The language 'barrier' has meant that French Canadians have more developed sources of symbolic culture on which to rely, than English Canadians.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 35. This distinction between anthropologic and symbolic culture -- for which he has been both criticized and commended -- is central to Collins thesis (that Canada proves that state and nation can be and should be decoupled). See for example, P. Attallah, "Richard Collins and His Canadian Readers: the Further Adventures of the decoupling hypothesis."

²²R. Collins, *Culture, Communication & National Identity*, p. 331.

satisfaction, independence, and national consciousness, we have the contradictions outlined by Herschel Hardin in *A Nation Unaware*. As Hardin argues, "[o]ur identity is there, in the long working out of the Canadian contradictions: French Canada as against English Canada, the regions as against the centre, Canada as against the United States."²³

As a result of these contradictions, Canada and Canadian nationalism cannot be understood without reference to a number of historical, geographical and socio-cultural realities. In the first place, we must consider the physical characteristics of the country -- its vastness and the diversity and disparities between its regions. We must also be aware of the proximity of arguably the major world power of our century, positioned just across a 4000 mile 'imaginary line'. In addition to these factors, there are ten political units²⁴ within the Canadian federation, each voicing (or claiming to) the concerns and interests of different populations and regions. Moreover, there is a separate and distinctive nationality within the borders of the country, largely centred within its own separate political unit. Finally, add to all of this an increasingly politically conscious native population, a history of large-scale immigration, and a heavily promoted and defended policy of multiculturalism.

Each of these factors, together and separately, is not only a vital part of any understanding of Canada, but also constitutes both academic and practical difficulties in the creation or imagining of a 'Canadian culture', or even Canadian nationalism.

Canada has none, or at least few, of the apparent requirements of nation-statehood. Instead, Canadians have turned to technological solutions, both materially and rhetorically in the building of national myths, to create and also to imagine the

²³H. Hardin, *A Nation Unaware*, p. 33.

²⁴Although we should not ignore the Territories which are beginning to demand powers equivalent to those held by the provinces.

Canadian nation.²⁵ In this view, Canadian nationhood is, as communications scholar Robert Babe has argued, "indelibly linked to deployment of communication devices."²⁶

Technological Nationalism

From the time of Confederation, communications and the technologies which carry it have been considered, at least by the country's leaders, to be a resource of vital interest to Canadians in their attempts to bring together the disparate regions and peoples who live north of the 49th parallel. National communications policies have been regarded as a mechanism for protecting Canada from the influence of the United States or for promoting a pan-national culture, or both. There is a long-standing tradition in Canadian policy-making (and political speech-writing) that stresses a connection between communications technologies and nation-building. This can be seen, for example, in the rhetoric which accompanied the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR). Sir John A. Macdonald's "National Policy" provides an early, stirring, example of the rhetorical linking of communication technologies and 'national development' -- railroad tracks, which would physically link the dispersed regions of Canada would also create a linkage for Canadians in a cultural sense. The *idea* of the railroad project would provide a unifying concept.

As Maurice Charland argues in his article "Technological Nationalism":

Canada is a technological state. This is not just to say that Canada's existence as an economic unit is predicated upon transportation and communications technology. In addition, the *idea* of Canada depends upon a rhetoric about technology. Furthermore, we can understand the

²⁵It is not a coincidence that some of the foremost scholars of the technological determinism school are Canadian! M. Charland, "Technological Nationalism", p. 196.

²⁶R. Babe, *Telecommunications in Canada*, p. 6.

development of a Canadian nation-state in terms of the interplay between this technology and its rhetoric.²⁷

Moreover,

[t]his rhetoric, the rhetoric of technological nationalism, is the dominant discourse of the official ideology of nation-building... It is also the dominant discourse of Canadian nationalism in anglophone Canada.²⁸

In addition to binding the country together spatially, the building and existence of the CPR also "offered those in Canada the experience of a technologically-mediated political unity as a common denominator." Because it represented a travail of epic proportions and was a state-sponsored event that indicated a political will to exist as a nation-state, the CPR provided more than just a physical link. It was a perfect symbolic event for the creation of a unifying national myth and presented an ideal symbol around which a national cultural identity could be imagined. "In sum, the CPR is significant not only as a mode of transportation and communication, but also as the basis for a nationalist discourse."²⁹

This rhetorical, mythical connection to the technology of the railroad was soon replaced with an equally mythical attachment to the technologies of communication, especially radio, and later television, because of their special capacity to contribute to the creation of a sense of nation.

As with rail service in Canada, broadcasting was consciously regarded as a means of *creating* a Canada with sufficient commonality to justify its political union, while simultaneously, it was also considered a means

²⁷M. Charland, "Technological Nationalism", p. 199.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 197.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 200.

of simply enabling Canadians to be aware of each other and their already constituted values and identity.³⁰

From the time of the Aird Commission in 1928, the goals of broadcasting, in particular, have been identified primarily in terms of their contribution to the creation of a national consciousness or national identity.

The historical link between the technologies of communication and the forging of a nation has placed Canadians in a special relationship with those technologies, with significant repercussions.

The recurring theme or myth of "nationhood through deployment of industrial devices"³¹ posits that the existence of Canada depends and has depended upon the systems of communication that stretch across the country -- the ties that bind the nation together. Technology becomes the unifying concept through which Canadian nationalism is imagined. It also structures the *discourse* of Canadian nationalism. However, this imagined relationship between technology and nationalism contains a paradox -- as Charland point out:

[c]ommunication technology, heralded as the means of promoting Canadian statehood and nationhood, paradoxically offered those in Canada a common "national" experience which included cultural commodities from the United States.³²

Despite policy pronouncements that communications technologies contribute to the project of national development, in practice, they have not done so. As Charland's

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 205.

³¹R. Babe, *Telecommunications in Canada*, p. 5.

³²M. Charland, "Technological Nationalism", p. 210. The shift from cultural to techno-economic discourses in both telecommunications and broadcasting policy -- which will be examined in the next two chapters -- may well be a response to this paradox.

article argues, and Babe's history of telephone, cable, and satellite technology in *Telecommunications in Canada*, effectively shows, communication technologies have instead contributed to continental integration.³³ There is a large gap between the discourse of technological nationalism and the reality of Canada's communications systems.

Clearly, space-binding technology has not permitted the development of an authentic Canadian culture, shared by the majority of Canadians, which is autonomous from American culture. Communication technology has perhaps offered Canadians a shared experience, but only as it has also included them in the American cultural market. If regionalism has been softened by technology, the identity or culture fostered is hardly a distinctive Canadian one.³⁴

However, although technology may have in fact hindered the creation of a distinctively and uniquely Canadian national culture, we cannot completely dismiss the connection between communication media and nation-statehood. Critics of technological nationalism appear to deny that the use to which these technologies are put is of significant concern to those interested in national development. Communication/information technologies have indeed contributed to the creation and strength of the Canadian state. They have also made the transmission and expression of unifying conceptions of Canada possible.

As Alex Adeyinka, has suggested, in a review of Babe's book,

While Babe may be right that communication media have failed in "protecting" Canadian cultural integrity and sovereignty from alien incursion, more credit should [be] given to the role of communication media in fostering cultural diffusion and integration within the country. In this respect, the role of a coast-to-coast communications system in

³³A Adeyinka, Book Review of *Telecommunications in Canada*, p.143

³⁴M. Charland, "Technological Nationalism", p 212.

Canada is as important to nation building as were railway and canals.³⁵

Communication media have not only "[o]n occasion... been purposefully and successfully deployed in aid of nation building,"³⁶ they continue to provide a mechanism for the sharing of the cultures that make up this country.

However, we must be aware of the gap that exists between the apparent potential of technology to contribute to national development and the reality that technological advances have made it more difficult to protect national sovereignty. Moreover, we must examine the gap between the *discourse* of technological nationalism and the reality of communications systems in Canada.³⁷ It is for these reasons that I propose a broader approach to the study of nationalism in Canada. Where I suggest we start is with the sociological theories presented by Daniel Bell.

Bell's Theory of Society

In his book *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*, Daniel Bell develops a theory of society in which he abandons holistic and deterministic notions, such as Marxian notions of a determining base and a determined superstructure. Instead, Bell suggests that the best way to understand society is to think of it as being made up of three realms, the technical-economic, the political and the cultural. Each realm, he argues, has its own underlying logic and goals. In Bell's words, "the different realms respond to different norms, have different rhythms of change, and are regulated by

³⁵A. Adeyinka, Book Review of *Telecommunications in Canada*, p. 144.

³⁶R. Babe, *Telecommunications in Canada*, p.7.

³⁷This is also true for other countries. Collins suggests that the European Community is afflicted with "Technopia Canadensis" -- David McDonald's description of Canada's technologically determinant approach to communications policy making. R. Collins, "Unity in Diversity: Broadcasting Policy in the European Community - A Case of Canadensis", lecture at Carleton University, Ottawa, November 20, 1992.

different, even contrary axial principles."³⁸ Moreover, he suggests that the various disjunctions, or conflicts within Western society over the past 150 years are a result of the contradictory relationships that exist between these three discordant realms.³⁹

According to Bell's approach, the political realm is concerned with the regulation of conflict, and the principle of equality for which the state steps in to redress imbalances. It is based on participation and representation.

The polity is the arena of social justice and power: the control of the legitimate use of force and the regulation of conflict (in libertarian societies within the rule of law), in order to achieve the particular conceptions of justice embodied in a society's traditions or in its constitution, written or unwritten.

Its axial principles are equality and legitimacy.⁴⁰

The cultural realm encompasses the domain of self-expression and self-gratification and is based on individual measurements of worth and satisfaction. It is about symbolic forms and the processes of sustaining and creating identity.⁴¹ Bell argues that it is just as significant an element in life and society as political and economic considerations, as opposed to Marxist definitions which tend to place culture in a secondary position to the realms of production and political power.

The techno-economic realm is based on the principles of economization, efficiency, specialization, and hierarchical, bureaucratic organization. This realm encompasses concerns about

³⁸D Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*, p 10

³⁹*Ibid*, pp xxx-xxxI & 10.

⁴⁰*Ibid*., p. 12

⁴¹*Ibid*, pp. 11-12 & 36.

the organization of production and the allocation of goods and services. It frames the occupation and stratification of the society and involves the use of technology for instrumental ends. In modern society, the axial principle is *functional rationality*, and the regulative mode is *economizing*.⁴²

We can apply Daniel Bell's triune conception of society to the theory of nationalism⁴³ and develop a framework for the theory of nationalism that will be more relevant to Canada's situation.

We can come to a richer and more critical understanding of the ways in which nationalism is imagined in Canada if we abandon unitary notions of nationalism, as presented by scholars like Kedourie and Gellner, and totalizing theories like technological nationalism, and begin to think of nationalism as articulated in three distinct discourses -- the technical-economic, the political, and the cultural. Such an approach can illuminate the nature of, and shifts in, Canadian policy-making.⁴⁴

Political Nationalism

In order to clarify the distinction between political and cultural nationalism, it is necessary to return briefly to the definitions offered above of state and nation.⁴⁵ Based on this perspective, we can describe the state as the political embodiment of a country -- in Collins' terms, the anthropological markings of a community. Discourses that are supportive of the kinds of goals pursued by states, such as the creation and promotion of particular symbols, the building of legitimacy through

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁴³Bell's theory of society is pertinent to a theory of nationalism not just as a model, but also because both nationalism and 'society' can be understood as unifying concepts.

⁴⁴I will do this for telecommunications and broadcasting policy in chapters three and four.

⁴⁵These ideas are partially shaped from readings of J. Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*; E. Kedourie, *Nationalism*; and R. Collins, *Culture, Communication & National Identity*.

consensus formation and coercion, and the goals of national sovereignty, economic viability and so on, we can term political nationalism.

Political nationalism is organized around the concerns of the polity, the regulation of conflict and the management of the arena of social justice and power. The polity, or state,

must establish the norms of justice, and enforce claims and rights. It sets forth the rules of exchange and provides for the day-to-day security of its citizens. Inevitably, it is both an arena for contending parties and an independent force -- the control systems of the society in its management of foreign policy, its stabilization of the monetary system, and, increasingly, its direction of the economy as a whole.⁴⁶

It is aided in its efforts in all of this by the use of discourses of nationalism.

We can also think of political nationalism as 'official nationalism', "something emanating from the state, and serving the interests of the state first and foremost."⁴⁷ We see this especially in revolutionary movements in developing countries. Often these movements rose up to seize state power, usually from colonial powers and did so through the self-conscious mobilization of popular or cultural nationalism.

This is why so often in the 'nation-building' policies of the new states one sees both a genuine, popular [cultural] nationalist enthusiasm and a systematic, even Machiavellian, instilling of nationalist ideology through the mass media, the educational system, administrative regulations, and so forth.⁴⁸

This mobilization of popular nationalism through official/political nationalist efforts indeed characterizes English Canada's experience but also explains some of the

⁴⁶D. Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capital*, p. 175.

⁴⁷B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 145.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 104.

anomalies of Canadian policy today, such as the apparently contradictory principles of, on the one hand, building a national identity while, on the other, promoting multiculturalism and devolving power to the provinces.⁴⁹

Political nationalism can also be thought of in terms of strategy. In this sense it can be described as an opportunistic movement, an

ideological resource kit, to be utilized by a regional intelligentsia to mobilize popular support, or to secure advantages for itself in competition with populations of other regions, and other interest groups, in the struggle for scarce and valued political resources.⁵⁰

Political nationalism, as a discourse, makes use of the languages of cultural and techno-economic nationalism as part of its 'ideological resource kit'. The languages of nationalism have a powerful ring to them which, if used well, can be turned to the benefit of those wielding power.

Cultural Nationalism

Returning once again to the definitions of state and nation, we can speak of the nation as an imagined community of like people. It "exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one."⁵¹ It is largely imaginary -- because it is impossible to know all the people in one's nation yet there is still a link⁵² -- but nations are also shaped through

⁴⁹Political entities spend a great deal of time trying to be all things to all people at all times and make use of nationalist discourses to aid them in their efforts. This is part of the reason why a triune notion of nationalism seems more relevant today.

⁵⁰P. Rawkins, "Nationalist Movements within the Advanced Nationalist State", p. 221

⁵¹B. Anderson, quoting H. Seton-Watson, in *Imagined Communities*, p. 15.

⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 37.

the sharing of a (distinctive) culture -- that system of ideas, signs, and associations, and particular ways of behaving and communicating.⁵³ As Gellner suggests,

nations are the artifacts of men's convictions and loyalties and solidarities. A mere category of persons... becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it. It is their recognition of each other as fellows of this kind which turns them into a nation.⁵⁴

If the nation is a social invention,⁵⁵ it is cultural nationalism that allows for the creation and nourishment of a common symbolic identity, a sense of fraternity or solidarity with all the people in the nation even though we do not know them all.⁵⁶ Language that is oriented towards the needs and wants of the collectivity of individuals which forms the nation, and towards the creation of a common symbolic culture, we can think of as cultural nationalism.

In his exploration of the creation of the Irish nation-state, John Hutchinson provides a thoughtful illumination of the differences between cultural and political nationalism. In *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*, he argues that political and cultural nationalists work from two very different conceptions of their project and that each has distinctive forms of organization and divergent operational strategies.

According to Hutchinson, political nationalists place their faith in reason, and work from a "cosmopolitan rationalist conception" towards a goal of a civic polity united by common laws and mores. It is essentially a modernist movement, Hutchinson

⁵³E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 7.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, p. 7

⁵⁵P. Rawkins, "Nationalist Movements within the Advanced Nationalist State", p. 224.

⁵⁶B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, pp. 16 & 37.

argues, which favours a modern, legal-rational society.⁵⁷ This is much like Collins' description of the activities of an established nation-state. It also provides an accurate description of the way in which nationalism was forged in (English) Canada -- a self-conscious mobilization of the discourses of nationalism in order to create, or maintain, the Canadian state. English Canadian nationalism was a formal invention.

Cultural nationalists, according to Hutchinson, on the other hand, down-play the state and concentrate on the creative beginnings of the more organic, living nation.⁵⁸ Cultural nationalists appeal to a community at the level of ideas, much as Collins describes the way in which a new national movement operates. This is more descriptive of the way in which French Canada, namely Quebec, developed a sense of nationalism. It was derived from the sharing of an identity through the bonds of religion and language, among others. This is not to say that cultural nationalism is completely unknown in English Canada. However, English Canadians rely more on the creative processes of imagining a national community than on 'organic' sources of national identity.

Techno-Economic Nationalism

The current international environment is one in which there is a steady increase in global interdependence, partially as a result of the transnationalization of private corporations, but also as a result of environmental concerns and the phenomenal growth in capacity and sophistication of communication and information technologies. The international context is also shaped by the internationalization of the capital market.

⁵⁷J. Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*, pp. 11-16.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*

In this new environment, states are capable of greater central control but are less able to close their borders to outside influence. Today's vast economic mobility limits the effectiveness of national economic objectives. It is increasingly difficult to turn to political and cultural nationalism as a protector of national sovereignty. This is partially due to new communication and information technologies which increase the permeability of borders and force governments to consider the potential problems of cultural spill-over.

A shift towards techno-economic nationalism is one response to the problems inherent in the new international context. Its central preoccupation is the market and the promotion of a strong international economic position, often through technological solutions. It prioritizes economic and technological competitiveness in the international arena, through efficient, specialized, and rationalized techniques, as the best way to promote sovereignty.

New information technologies (especially satellites) and processes (like digitization and miniaturization) are contributing to a movement towards an integrated international information system. Many nation-states are engaged in the development of policies that will allow them to maintain sovereignty over political, economic, and cultural existence in an increasingly integrated world.⁵⁹ At the same time, "international treaties and agreements promote interdependence and undermine the reality of separateness."⁶⁰ Every country in the world is affected by this and is trying to calculate the best possible relationship between national self-interest and international opportunities and obligations. As a result, there is growing conflict "between the political argument of those who stress the sovereignty of the nation state

⁵⁹R. Mansell, "Contradictions in National Communication/Information Policies", p. 331. The whole NWICO movement and some aspects of the EC can be seen as a form of resistance to the processes of globalization.

⁶⁰C. Maule, "The Nation State and Trade in Cultural Services, p. 89.

and the economic arguments which emphasise the welfare effects of freer trade." The problem seems to lie in the different frames of reference used by those debating between these points of view.⁶¹ They argue from two competing conceptions of the nation-state, political and techno-economic.

Bruce Doern and Brian Tomlin identify a Canadian example of this problem in their book on the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA). In *Faith and Fear*, they argue that the debate in Canada over free trade was largely between two competing views of Canadian nationalism -- in my terms, a debate between political, or state, nationalism and techno-economic, or market, nationalism. In their own words, the debate over free trade

saw the emergence in stark form of two distinct brands of nationalism. One was centred in the anti-free trade forces, founded on a defence of the powers of the Canadian state as the crucial glue for Canada's unity and independence. The other brand was a nationalism based on the market in which the pro-free trade coalition asserted a new entrepreneurial confidence in the ability of Canadians to compete with the best in the world.⁶²

Canadians were torn between these competing conceptions of nationalism throughout the free trade debate, and "had to look deeply into their national soul to decide where they would stand on the issue."⁶³

It was a battle over attitudes, involving intense efforts to define powerful images and visions of the nation in order to force Canadians off the middle ground... Pro-free traders portrayed themselves and the Canada they wanted to create as worldly and outward looking, confident, and competitive. They described their opponents as timid and protectionist, defenders of the status quo of a "little Canada." The

⁶¹*Ibid.*, p. 88.

⁶²B. Doern & B. Tomlin, *Faith and Fear*, p. 206.

⁶³*Ibid.*, p. 2.

anti-free traders accused their opponents of selling out the country, charging that they wanted to make Canada the fifty-first state and dismantle its social programs in the bargain.⁶⁴

The anti-free traders relied predominantly on cultural nationalist language to back up their position and argued forcefully that the pro-free traders were actually continentalists doing their best to join the United States. As Doern and Tomlin argue, the pro-free traders were actually "more entrepreneurial, however, and definitely more chauvinistic about Canada," than the true continentalists of, say, the 1960s.⁶⁵ They were, in fact, techno-economic nationalists who privileged the goals of efficiency and specialization as the best way to promote and protect *Canadian* interests.

Conclusion

The Canadian polity is engaged in a struggle between the janus-faced and competing goals of national sovereignty and international competitiveness. As Daniel Bell suggests, the state's enlarged tasks lead to many contradictions.

How these new tasks are met -- if they can be met -- affects everyone's immediate life. If the society is unmanageable, and if the institutions are inflexible and unresponsive, then the disintegrative tendencies -- polarization in some conditions, fragmentation in others -- become intensified. If the society can respond, through a new public philosophy that commands respect and through institutions that work,

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, p. 222.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. 206. However, in the quotation above, the pro-free traders appear to use a discourse that is more cultural than anything else, in the sense that it describes their goals in terms of Canada's image of itself. Although the pro-free trade campaign generally used techno-economic discourses to make its case, both parties endeavoured to create an *image* of Canada-after-the-deal that would convey strong *symbolic* messages. This is often most powerfully accomplished in a cultural nationalist discourse.

then there may be time for the other, slower processes of cultural reconstruction to take hold.⁶⁶

The Government is indeed grappling with large-scale problems of coping with and managing a complicated society. The disintegrative tendencies mentioned above, for example, do characterize the Canadian state today and can be seen in all three of the contradictions outlined by Herschel Hardin: French Canada against English Canada, the regions against the centre, and Canada against the United States.

These struggles are being played out in the discourses of state policy. They can also be understood within the context of the three discourses of nationalism. For example, all three conflicts can be seen, at first sight, within a cultural nationalist framework. In cultural terms, French Canadians, and other 'regional' groups like the Aboriginal people, are seeking greater autonomy from the Government to protect their distinctive ways of life, and are also hoping for constitutional recognition of their distinctiveness. In terms of Canada's relationship with the United States, many Canadians continue the battle to build a made-in-Canada culture that is distinct from that of the United States.⁶⁷

The contradictions between French Canada and English Canada, and between the regions and the centre, can also be characterized as an example of political nationalism. We have seen many examples of 'province-building' efforts in the constitutional conflicts of the last decade. Quebec's efforts, in particular, are not solely directed towards the cultural enrichment of the French Canadian people -- the

⁶⁶D. Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*, p. 176. An analysis based on triune nationalism suggests that the Canadian Government's "new public philosophy" is being framed in techno-economic terms. The question is whether this serves the interests of the Canadian people or not.

⁶⁷For example, the Friends of Canadian Broadcasting, and most notably, the CBC.

Government of Quebec is also seeking power, in political terms, as a state.⁶⁸

Furthermore, the issue of the devolution of responsibility for culture to the provinces, arguably represents a reduction of the Federal Government's power in favour of provincial political, or state, power.

It is perhaps as a response to these disjunctions that the Canadian state has moved away from a reliance on cultural and political nationalism as a legitimizing discourse in policy documents. First, the international environment is making it increasingly difficult to speak in terms of a distinctive political or cultural nationalism. Secondly, as Canada becomes more and more aware of its multicultural and multi-ethnic background, and the existence of powerful nationalist communities that differ substantially from each other, it may no longer be appropriate to promote a pan-national culture, which by definition appears to be exclusive and elitist. As the Government attempts to serve a diversifying public it may be more politically expedient to move away from legitimizing discourses that speak of Canadian culture and Canadian nationalism. The direction in which they appear to be turning is towards techno-economic nationalism -- a discourse that speaks in technical and financial terms may be less problematic to elected officials.

From the above discussion, we can see that the case of Canada provides a fascinating case for studies of nationalism -- particularly because Canada fits few of the recognized models. As Collins has argued, although

the Canadian case fits few stipulative precepts of academic studies of nationalism, Canada holds together as a state with considerable success.

⁶⁸Trudeau's notorious MacLean's article, published during the referendum campaign, eloquently points to this important distinction. Other cultural groups, like women, native people, and other ethnic communities, are not territorially defined, nor do they have their own governments. "On the other hand, when the words 'promotion of Quebec as a distinct society' are proposed for insertion either in the body of the Constitution or in the charter, they would apply to a province - that is, a constitutional entity with power to make laws, give effect to them and have the courts impose respect for them." The implications are fascinating. "Trudeau Speaks Out", p. 24.

It demands not accommodation in the existing Procrustean bed of academic theory but a revision and reworking of the theory.⁶⁹

I am proposing here such a reworking of the theory of nationalism. In these changing times, both internationally and domestically, such a critical process is important as Canadian politicians begin to set the policies and agendas that will frame Canada's existence into the next millennium. Policy discourses reflect changing Government priorities and represent the Government's public philosophy. The shift in nationalist discourses from culture to techno-economics requires examination.

As I have tried to briefly indicate, we can develop a more nuanced understanding of policy issues through a new appreciation of nationalism as being made up of three discourses -- the political, the cultural, and the techno-economic. An examination based on an awareness of their contradictions and interactions would help us to better understand and explain the complexity of policy-making in a country such as this.

For these reasons, we turn now to apply the new triune theory of nationalism to two case studies. An analysis of the three discourses of nationalism in telecommunications and broadcasting policy documents will demonstrate the value of this theory, as we come to a more subtle understanding of the shifts in policy discourses from the 1970s to the present.

⁶⁹R. Collins, *Culture, Communication & National Identity*, pp. 137-8.

3. Telecommunications Policy

In his seminal work on Canadian telecommunications, *Telecommunications in Canada*, Robert Babe outlines several myths which he claims have obscured human responsibility and the role of corporate and governmental power in telecommunications policy-making. In particular, he suggests that Canadian telecommunications policies have been dominated by the myth that Canadian nationalism is inextricably bound with the technologies of communication -- that is to say, that telecommunications policy is characterized by "technological nationalism".

Babe's analysis effectively shows that communication technologies have not necessarily contributed to the project of national development. The history of telephone, cable, and satellite technology indicates that communication media have instead contributed to continental integration.¹ It is the myth of technological nationalism that prevents recognition of this paradox. In his own words, "it may be fairly said that Canada as a nation persists *despite*, not because of, communication media."²

Babe's efforts to restore "the soiling trace of origin or choice"³ by demystifying the history of Canadian telecommunications, helps ground our understanding of policy discourse as discourse, as a mobilization of language towards certain ends -- ends that are at times conflictual. As Babe reminds us,

¹A. Adeyinka, Book Review of *Telecommunications in Canada*, p 143.

²R. Babe, *Telecommunications in Canada*, pp 6-7 Emphasis added

³*Ibid.*, p. xiii.

[d]ispelling myths, past and present, is important simply to set the record straight. But more than that, this task is vital for our future well-being because Canada's policy-makers are now preparing agendas and setting trajectories to carry us into the twenty-first century.⁴

Babe's work, therefore, draws attention to the role the language of nationalism has played in policy-makers' efforts to promulgate policies that will be accepted as legitimate by the public. However, Babe's theory prevents us from recognizing changing nuances in the nationalist discourses that appear in Canadian telecommunications policy documents, and particularly, that there have been definite shifts over time in the ways in which the language of nationalism has been used in telecommunications policy. These shifts in language also mark the way in which the priorities of Canada's policy-makers have changed.

If we look beyond the limiting notion of technological nationalism, and apply the triune theory of nationalism as outlined in the second chapter, we see a definite change in the ways in which discourses of nationalism are used today as opposed to in the 1970s. The meaning of the words supporting the goal of national development is quite different when we compare policy documents from the 1970s to those of the 1980s and 1990s.

This is to say that, when we turn to an analysis of telecommunications policy documents, we do find examples of technologically determinant language, as identified by Babe. However, if we analyze the same documents for political, cultural and techno-economic nationalist language, we find that the discourse changes considerably from one decade to the next. We arrive at a richer understanding of the ways in which nationalist language is altered to suit different purposes if we make use of the broader triune definition of nationalism.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 5.

The language contained in telecommunications policy documents from the 1970s is characterized by a concern for public, social, goals and interests, which, by our definition, are 'cultural' goals. While telecommunications technology receives a great deal of attention, it is evaluated within the context of how it can best be used to improve social and cultural conditions within the country, particularly the democratic issues of access and participation. In documents written in the 1970s, the highest priority of policy-makers is clearly the cautious pursuit of technological advance in order to guarantee the best possible conditions for the Canadian people.

However, expressions of 'nationalism' found in policy documents written in the 1980s and into the 1990s, are connected to economic, industrial and technological goals. While the importance of communication technology to Canada's development is still highlighted, in these documents the emphasis is on national development in technological and economic ways. Although homage is still paid to goals of a cultural nationalist nature, an examination of current discourse reveals particularly clearly that the government supports policies that are increasingly oriented towards objectives at continental and multinational levels, especially technological and economic development.

In 1971, it was imagined that new techniques and technologies would "offer access to information on a scale hitherto unimaginable, together with opportunities for a much wider participation in community affairs and the democratic process."⁵ This is no longer the way in which new technologies are imagined in the 1990s, as we will see later. In 1993, new technologies are praised as a way of improving profits, consumer choice, and Canada's international economic position.

This change in the orientation of the languages of nationalism reflects an over-all shift in the policy priorities of the Canadian Government. As the Government moves away

⁵*Ibid.*

from goals of a public nature towards goals more relevant to the private sector, the way in which the nationalist discourses function to legitimize policy decisions also changes. The prominent position of the democratic public, a notion that is central to cultural nationalist discourse, is lost as the language moves away from democratic towards technocratic justifications and rationalizations.

In order to demonstrate this transformation, we turn now to the analysis of several telecommunication policy documents. Before we start, however, one caveat must be made.

These are public documents written by or on the behalf of the Government of Canada. Democratic governments are generally held accountable to the people who have elected them to office. The language of nationalism is designed to appeal to the public and justify or legitimate the actions of the elected government. When examining policy documents, this legitimizing function of nationalist discourse must be kept in mind. By their very nature, these documents are characterized by *political* nationalist discourse. Nonetheless, we are still able to trace the shifts from culturally oriented nationalist language to technologically and economically oriented nationalist language. The terminology may not change very much, but the emphases do.

The 1970s

In 1969, Eric Kierans, then Minister of the newly created Department of Communications,⁶ announced plans for a comprehensive study "of the present state and future prospects of telecommunications in Canada."⁷ One of the prime objects of the Telecommission study concerned the *social* impact of telecommunications in light of new technological developments. These were said to "hold possibilities of a more

⁶I will talk about the creation of DOC more in the chapter on broadcasting policy.

⁷*Instant World*, p. i.

convenient and satisfying way of life, the satisfaction being measured in spiritual as well as material terms."⁸ This is a culturally motivated theme.

The results of this massive undertaking were published in 1971 in a general report meant to be the basis for public discussions on telecommunications policy. *Instant World: A Report on Telecommunications in Canada* is a wordy discourse on telecommunications, technology, social needs and desires, and the responsibility of the government "in the identification and protection of the public interest".⁹

Instant World is indeed characterized by technologically determinant language.¹⁰ It envisages the new world as "a society built upon and shaped by technology."

Technology has fundamentally transformed the human condition twice before [during the Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions]... How the third technological revolution will shape our ends is still far from clear but its nature and substance are already becoming familiar... It is concerned with the production and distribution of information; its technology is that of computers and communications.¹¹

As Babe notes of all Canadian telecommunications policy documents, "[o]ne finds here no hint that procedures, machines, and equipment are introduced by *people* - particularly by agglomerations (corporations and governments)".¹² However, careful analysis does reveal that the context of *Instant World* is explicitly oriented around the needs and goals of Canadian society, understood in terms of its people.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. ii.

¹⁰Babe describes *Instant World* as the "official harbinger of the Information Revolution." See "Emergence and Development of Canadian Communication: Dispelling the Myths", p. 60.

¹¹*Instant World*, p. 25.

¹²R. Babe, *Telecommunications in Canada*, p. 12. He is referring directly to the Telecommission's Report *Instant World*, p. 25.

This context is made clear in one passage that seems to summarize well the primary concern of *Instant World*'s authors: "How should society exploit the promise of technology while safeguarding against its evident dangers?"¹³ The overwhelming response seems to be that the development of telecommunications technologies must be pursued with careful consideration of their effects on society as a whole, meaning society's values, identity, and way of life.

Instant World is primarily concerned with the social implications of communications and the importance of particular values and rights in a democratic society. Its language is about mutual understanding and public participation, universal access and high standards.¹⁴ Its themes centre around the "right to communicate" and the view that "communications are of the people, by the people, for the people."¹⁵ This appeal to democratic principles is a theme of cultural nationalist discourses.

The general conclusions of the Telecommission report centre around the need for the promulgation of a telecommunications policy framework whose primary objective should be to "ensure that technological innovation will not be socially detrimental."¹⁶ It argues that the Canadian people,

cannot afford to let Canada become an information-satellite of the United States, they cannot afford to deny themselves the opportunity that developing technology affords to fashion themselves a more spiritually and materially rewarding way of life. Above all, they cannot afford to wait and see how the information revolution turns out; they must start planning and taking action now.¹⁷

¹³*Instant World*, p. 23.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 3-5.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 229.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 101.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 232.

However, significantly, the Telecommission stresses that technological developments must be pursued thoughtfully and carefully. Its final summary states this explicitly:

Finally, the significant opinion emerged that the beneficial development of telecommunications in Canada requires a clear statement of national-policy dealing with the human and social values that underlie all aspects of government intervention in the provisions of telecommunications services.¹⁸

Much as we will see in the analysis of broadcasting policy in the following chapter, in the 1960s, the Government was determined to be closely involved in decision-making processes, in order to guarantee the democratic development of telecommunications technology. By the 1990s, this determination appears to have been overturned in favour of regulation by the marketplace.

The Government's 1973 Green Paper on telecommunications, *Proposals for a Communications Policy for Canada*, put forward for discussion with the provinces, is also culturally motivated. It is, however, also technologically determinant: "The existence of Canada as a political and social entity has always been heavily dependent upon effective systems of east/west communication."¹⁹ One is given the sense that it is the systems, the technologies of communications, that have made Canada's existence possible. However, although communications is discussed as a required tool of national development, the nationalist language in this document continues to exhibit an underlying theme of the importance of social and cultural goals.

In addition to its cultural nationalism, *Proposals for a Communications Policy for Canada*, is also, by its very nature, a political nationalist paper. It was part of the

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 233.

¹⁹*Proposals for a Communications Policy for Canada*, p. 3. Babe refers to this document as a prime example of "the recurring theme of 'technological nationalism.'" *Telecommunications in Canada*, p. 5.

Federal Government's efforts in the mid-1970s, to promote federal control over telecommunications regulation as opposed to provincial.

The cultural nationalist theme, with its sub-current of political intentions, is most clearly represented in the introduction to the *Proposals* which lists the following objectives of Canadian communications policy. These are said to be to:

- * safeguard, enrich, and strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada;
- * contribute to the flow and exchange of regional and cultural information;
- * reflect Canadian identity and the diversity of Canadian cultural and social values;
- * contribute to the development of national unity²⁰; and
- * facilitate the orderly development of telecommunications in Canada, and the provision of efficient and economical systems and services at just and reasonable rates.²¹

Although technological development and economic goals find their way into the discourse in this document, in terms of 'orderly development' and 'efficient, economical systems and services', they are less important than social and cultural objectives (enriching the 'fabric' of the country, contributing to exchanges of ideas and values between various regions, and developing, protecting and expressing a

²⁰As Marc Raboy points out in *Missed Opportunities*, the objective of contributing to the development of national unity is a political nationalist mandate in the sense that it promoted a "centralized vision of Canada in which the provinces were only the most evident symbols of potential counterauthority... [Moreover] broadcasting was to serve as a strategic instrument against the *internal* threat to Canada's national integrity posed by" Quebec. (p. 8). See also p. 171. However, I suggest that while this is particularly true when applied to broadcasting policy (ie. in terms of content regulation and so on), it is not as necessarily 'political' when attached to telecommunications, except to the extent that it arguably contributes to federal power.

²¹*Proposals for a Communications Policy for Canada*, p. 2.

distinctly Canadian identity that can be shared in a united nation-state). In fact, the technological and economic goals expressed in the last objective, are themselves directed towards improving social and cultural conditions in Canada. Through the extension of service across the country at 'just and reasonable rates', telecommunications can contribute to the other four, more cultural, objectives.

Proposals for a Communications Policy for Canada also argues that there must be a balance between the creative, or cultural, side of communications technologies and their technical and economic aspects. Echoing the conclusions of *Instant World*, *Proposals* commits the government to ensuring

that the future communications environment foreshadowed by this huge range of new techniques and tools should not be allowed to develop without any regard for its impact on Canadian social and cultural values and the quality of life in Canada, as well as on the Canadian economy.²²

Cultural goals are clearly paramount, although political and economic objectives can be seen as sub-texts.

The overall conclusions of this 1973 proposal return explicitly to ideas about national development and sovereignty. It argues that "[e]conomic, efficient, and adequate communications, making the best use of all available modes, are essential to the sovereignty, integrity, and defence of Canada..." but this apparently techno-economic language is still modulated by a strong cultural nationalist discourse (the quotation concludes: "and for the political freedoms, social well-being, cultural development, economic prosperity, and safety of all Canadians").²³

²²*Ibid*, p. 4.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 35.

In another position paper also written in 1973, *Computer/Communications Policy: A Position Statement by the Government of Canada*, we again see a commitment to carefully thought out technological development. This paper was intended to be,

the first steps in a continuing process aimed at ensuring that computer/communications systems, in Canada evolve... *in such a way as to emphasize the national identity, the achievement of major economic and social aims, both national and regional, and the maximization of Canadian influences and control over the key activities and services.*²⁴

The main question addressed in this discussion paper was in the same vein as those raised in both *Instant World*, and *Proposals for a Communications Policy for Canada*.

How can Canada best exploit the computer utility concept to make the potentially revolutionary benefits of computer power available to the entire public and at the same time generate effective safeguards against the unwise use of that power?²⁵

The discourse in *Computer/Communications Policy* is exemplified by culturally motivated goals and language. Its overarching concern is "that new computer/communications systems and applications evolve in socially desirable directions."²⁶

As we can see from these examples, the overwhelming issue of policy documentation from the early 1970s was a concern that communications technologies be developed with careful consideration for their potential social benefits and potential dangers. In 1975, in another Green Paper for discussion of federal objectives with the provinces, this is made most explicit:

²⁴*Computer/Communications Policy: A Position Statement by the Government of Canada*, p. 17. Emphasis as found in the document.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 1.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 6.

A primary concern of the Government is therefore to ensure that, in the field of communications, the development and the use of new technology shall be the subject of a conscious choice which establishes a proper balance between the economical employment of scarce resources and the development of effective service to the public over as wide a range as possible.²⁷

In cultural terms, the Government still sees itself as having an important role in the decision-making processes for the development of new technologies. They do so in order to guarantee the best possible conditions for the people of Canada.

The 1975 *Communications: Some Federal Proposals* is, like the earlier proposals for provincial consideration, also concerned with the political objective of developing national (read federal) control over telecommunications. This was seen as necessary then because "it is evident that means must be found to maintain the orderly development of telecommunications across Canada," despite the occasionally local (or provincial) nature of the communications undertakings.

The Government intends to give full recognition to provincial and regional objectives and priorities, while continuing to fulfil its responsibility for this essentially national dimension. Thus there is an urgent need for agreement on cooperative arrangements that will enable better account to be taken of provincial concerns while avoiding the fragmentation of Canadian telecommunications systems and protecting the interests of Canada as a whole.²⁸

Even in political nationalist discourses it is the needs of the Canadian public that are recognized as paramount. These can best be served by Government direction of technological advance. Later policy documents will argue, on the other hand, that decisions about technological advance must be left up to telecommunications

²⁷*Communications: Some Federal Proposals*, p. 2.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 3.

industries and the market to best guarantee the realization of corporate needs and interests.

In outlining their objectives for telecommunications policy in the 1970s, the Government points to the Broadcasting Act as a model.²⁹ This is discourse for political purposes at its best. Broadcasting had already been recognized as a federal responsibility -- with the exception of 'educational broadcasting', a hard-won concession to the provinces.³⁰ If it were determined that telecommunications also held the same significance to sovereignty as broadcasting, Ottawa would have significant bargaining power vis-à-vis the provinces to make telecommunications a federal responsibility, thus adding to the power of the Federal Government.

There is one further example of political discourse couched in nationalist language in this document. It can be found in the proposals that the Government have greater control over the regulatory agency, the CRTC. In the main, *Communications: Some Federal Proposals* suggests that the government

should be authorized to give formal directions to the Commission on the interpretation of statutory objectives and the means for their implementation... The purpose of this provision would be to ensure that the development of policy, would be, and would be clearly seen to be, under the control of the elected representatives of the people.³¹

This quotation also provides a classic example of the way in which political discourses make use of a cultural nationalist appeal to democracy, to further its ends. Although nothing came of these proposals for some time, they did set the tone for future discussions in this area. From this point forward, the Federal Government

²⁹As it had also done in *Proposals for a Communications Policy for Canada*. See p. 2.

³⁰For more on this, see Marc Raboy's *Missed Opportunities*, pp. 186-91.

³¹*Communications: Some Federal Proposals*, p. 11.

would pursue the political objective of giving the Cabinet power of directive to the CRTC.

The Clyne Committee Report

In 1978, Jeanne Sauvé, Minister of Communications at the time, appointed a committee to study the implications of telecommunications for Canadian sovereignty and, according to the first part of its mandate, to "produce specific recommendations on a strategy to restructure the Canadian telecommunications system to contribute more effectively to the safeguarding of Canada's sovereignty."³²

Telecommunications and Canada, the Clyne Committee's final report, stands as a turning point in telecommunications policy-making. The language itself also marks a turning point. Although social goals and needs still appear to be important in this report, they are no longer the most imperative issue. The underlying theme in the expressions of nationalist language has begun to shift, beginning the move towards the kind of language identified as techno-economic nationalism. In this document we see examples of all three kinds of nationalist language, cultural, political, and techno-economic. None seems to predominate, yet all are apparent.

As in all the documents of the 1970s, the primary policy concerns identified by the Clyne Committee Report still lie in the maintenance of an independent culture, and in the preservation of control, ownership, and development of telecommunications in Canada.³³ In addition to these cultural (and political) issues, however, a new concern is attached to those considered to be primary. In addition to Canada's traditional fear of foreign control and ownership, there is a fear of import

³²*Telecommunications and Canada*, p. i.

³³*Ibid.*, p. 2; *Instant World*, pp. 232-3; *Proposals*, p. 1; *Computer/Communications Policy*, p. 3. These last two were also explicitly concerned with jurisdictional questions which the Clyne Commission equally explicitly did not address.

dependence. There is explicit recognition that the telecommunications sector will likely form the basis of the new international economy, one in which Canada must secure a prominent position.³⁴ Although the language is still framed by expressions of nationalism, the discourse is subtly different. This shift of emphasis is anticipated in the second part of the mandate given to the Clyne Committee:

to make recommendations on the future of the Canadian telecommunications system in relation to new technologies and *the need for Canadian software and hardware resources to meet foreign competition*, with particular reference to the role of broadcasting in contributing to the preservation of sovereignty of Canada.³⁵

This marks a shift of discourse in two ways. In the first place, the first part of the statement of mandate immediately draws the commissioners' attention to issues of a technological and economic/industrial nature. As a result, these kinds of concerns are given predominance throughout the report. Instead of talking about forging east-west links within the country, as *Instant World* and *Proposals for a Communications Policy for Canada* had done, the Clyne Committee report seems more concerned with Canada's position in the world telecommunications system.

If we wish to build a Canadian presence in world industrial markets then we will be required to encourage the growth of Canadian telecommunications industries that will be competitive in world terms.³⁶

This is a clear example of one of the central themes of *Telecommunications and Canada* -- the importance of "keeping up" with other industrial nations.

³⁴*Telecommunications and Canada*, p. 1.

³⁵*Ibid.*, preface. Emphasis added.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 2. Emphasis added.

In *Telecommunications and Canada*, sovereignty is defined as "the ability of Canadians (both in government [political] and in the private sector [economic]) to exercise control over the... direction of economic, social, cultural, and political change."³⁷ Typically the ability to accomplish this is said to depend heavily on telecommunications, in terms of communications/information technology and the extension of information services throughout the country, but also in terms of broadcasting.

This apparent distinction between telecommunications and broadcasting marks the second way the Telecommission's mandate anticipated a shift in discourse.

"Particular reference to broadcasting in contributing to the preservation of sovereignty in Canada" suggests that *cultural* sovereignty is to no longer be an issue of telecommunications policy as a whole, but only of the broadcasting sector.³⁸ This becomes more apparent as the report makes distinct the separation of culture and economics.³⁹

If we wish to have an independent culture, then we will have to continue to express it through radio and television. If we wish to control our economy then we will require a sophisticated telecommunications sector.⁴⁰

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 1.

³⁸Raboy argues something quite similar in *Missed Opportunities*. He says that when telecommunications became a responsibility of the DOC, it was placed "in an industrial and economic perspective and left the 'cultural' aspects of communications with broadcasting," p. 226.

³⁹This is also part of the distinction that is made between content and carriage. 'Content' can be seen as primarily a cultural artifact while 'carriage' is technological. Moreover, there are strict rules against government control over content in telecommunications but equally explicit rights with respect to broadcasting content.

⁴⁰*Telecommunications and Canada*, p. 2.

Telecommunications policy-making, from this point forward, would be primarily concerned with technological and economic aspects, while the promotion and protection of culture would be left as a responsibility for broadcasting policy.

Although the Clyne Committee's report, similar to the earlier documents examined, continued to express the opinion that new technologies could pose either new threats or new opportunities and that they must be harnessed for the benefit of the nation, there was a subtle shift towards economic, in the sense of industrial, considerations⁴¹ that paved the way for the more significant shifts that followed. Clyne, in essence, validated the Department of Communications' privileging of technological and industrial priorities ⁴²

The 1980s

The main priority of telecommunications policy in the 1980s, following from the Clyne Committee's emphasis on the hardware or carriage of telecommunications, was the facilitation of efficient, rationalized technological development. Once the issue of 'content' was moved into the realm of broadcasting policy, it was no longer necessary for telecommunications policy to be justified in cultural terms. After Clyne, and partially as a result of changing international conditions,⁴³ telecommunications policy became concerned with primarily technical issues, and could therefore be legitimized in techno-economic terms.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 88.

⁴²The original mandate of the DOC had a 'hardware' focus. It was specifically "charged with developing a new technological infrastructure for telecommunications carriage." M. Raboy, *Missed Opportunities*, p. 183.

⁴³Not the least of which were the election of extremely conservative administrations in both the United States and Great Britain. Both Reagan and Thatcher started shifting economic policy towards liberalization, privatization and deregulation early in their terms of office. And Canada soon followed suit -- even more so after the election of an overwhelming Conservative majority in 1984.

Post-Clyne, the Federal Government was primarily concerned with the formulation of a telecommunications policy to regulate what was becoming an increasingly important aspect of Canadian cultural, economic, and political life. This could not be accomplished in a "system of bifurcated jurisdiction."⁴⁴ Another of the priorities of the 1980s was, therefore, negotiations with the provinces to secure federal control. However, accommodation was not easily found. It was not until the Fall of 1987 that the Federal Minister of Communications, Flora MacDonald at that time, was able to announce

that an 'historical agreement' with the provinces had been achieved, whereby 'for the first time, we will have a consistent set of rules from coast to coast on such matters as interconnection and the roles and responsibilities of the two levels of government.'⁴⁵

In 1987, the Government of the day was once again preparing to initiate telecommunications legislation. In July, the Department of Communications (then exhibiting the name Communications Canada) made a 'fact sheet' available called, *A Policy Framework for Telecommunications in Canada*. This statement provides a "guide to the future evolution of Canada's domestic and international networks." In this document we see the growing importance of economic and international considerations -- a language and a policy oriented towards techno-economic concerns. It is a "statement of policy respecting the future development of the telecommunications carriage industry in Canada," in light of the fact that "Canada, like all other industrialized countries, is moving toward a more information-based economy."⁴⁶ Focus on the carriage *industry* already marks this as a techno-economic document.

⁴⁴*Ibid*, p. 161

⁴⁵Quoted in R. Babe, *Telecommunications in Canada*, p. 163

⁴⁶*A Policy Framework for Telecommunications in Canada*, p. 1.

In essence, the 1987 *Policy Framework for Telecommunications in Canada* is principally concerned with the new technological and economic environment at the international level and the importance of telecommunications networks in the new international information economy. Its main thrust, contained in technologically determinant language, concerns the growing erosion of boundaries between telecommunications technologies, markets and industries, and the effects of this trend on regulatory and policy-making procedures.

As in the documents of the 1970s, there is reference to the importance of communication technologies to the goal of nation-building. However, the language of nationalism is no longer cultural -- it is techno-economic. Moreover, it claims that it has always been so.

In Canada, the general economic and social importance of communications systems, including their central contribution to nation building, has been broadly recognized for a number of years. As a result, *a fundamental objective of government policy and regulation has always been to ensure that an efficient, internationally competitive telecommunications infrastructure exists* in all areas of Canada sufficient to support the economic and social development of Canada and its regions... [A review commissioned in 1984 by the DOC] also confirmed *a growing need, especially from the business community, for efficient, high-quality, and innovative telecommunications services as a means of enhancing productivity and competitiveness within the Canadian economy.*⁴⁷

We see in this example, how economic and technological goals are couched in the language of nationalism. However, all reference to nationalism in cultural terms (or with reference to the Canadian people) has dropped out, replaced with references to economic nationalism and the 'public' of the business community. Even the word 'culture' has dropped out of the discourse!

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 2-3. Emphasis added.

As opposed to the language in the Clyne committee report, which still supported cultural goals over economic, the fact sheet views market considerations as primary. In 1979, the Clyne Committee report had argued that "as the foundation of the future society, [telecommunications] cannot always be left to the vagaries of the market."⁴⁸ In the 1987 *Policy Framework for Telecommunications in Canada*, the market, and successful economic competition, have become the principal objects and instruments of national development. According to *A Policy Framework*,

national policies and regulation must permit the continued modernization of telecommunications market structures and technology... [C]ompetition in the supply of telecommunications services and equipment helps to sustain a high level of innovation and growth in the telecommunications industry.⁴⁹

The assumption, to phrase it in a nationalist discourse, is that telecommunications will make the country stronger and more viable. However, the cultural strength of the country is no longer at issue. What matters today, according to the current discourse within telecommunications policy, is economic strength and technological sovereignty in the world system. Telecommunications policy documents today seek technoeconomic nationalist goals rather than cultural nationalist goals -- technocratic languages replaces democratic language as a legitimizer of Government policy.

In a larger scale project also undertaken in 1987, the rapid growth of the international information economy is again recognized and emphasized. Using the language of nationalism, the Department of Communications' *Communications for the 21st Century* calls to the Canadian people to meet the new communications challenge, counselling them to follow the lead of other countries in the world and become involved in

⁴⁸ *Telecommunications and Canada*, p. 2

⁴⁹ *A Policy Framework for Telecommunications in Canada*, p. 6.

massive research programs, and social experiments to encourage technology diffusions and reform of laws and regulations to create a more efficient and innovative environment for the production and distribution of communications goods and services.⁵⁰

The emphasis on efficient and innovative production and distribution indicates the new techno-economic priorities of telecommunications policy in the late 1980s. Laws and regulations must be flexible to "spur" and "stimulate"⁵¹ the development of new communications technologies. As opposed to the *Proposals for a Communications Policy for Canada* of 1973, which suggested that technology must be pursued in a responsible way, under the guidance of a federal policy framework, *Communications for the 21st Century* suggests that the framework itself must permit unconstrained technological advance.⁵² The environment must be altered to achieve technological development, as opposed to *protecting* that environment from unbridled technological advance.

Of all the documents examined in this chapter, *Communications for the 21st Century* is the one most characterized by what Babe and Charland identify as "technological nationalism." True to form, it remarks upon the "central role of communications in our history" and emphasizes the importance of electronic information flows to the future. However, its apparently nationalist language focuses on technology only in terms of the possibilities for international trade and for improving Canada's global economic position.

⁵⁰*Communications for the 21st Century*, p. 7.

⁵¹Moreover, the new approach "will ensure that Canada remains at the leading edge of technological development in its most important area of high technology achievement." *Communications for the 21st Century*, pp. 56-7.

⁵²This becomes even clearer with the tabling of the *Telecommunications Act*, discussed later.

Although language reminiscent of cultural nationalism is still evident, it is submerged in the themes of political and techno-economic nationalism. The discourse in *Communications for the 21st Century* vis-à-vis the central role of communications in Canadian development has been turned on its head. It is no longer important simply for its contribution to national (cultural) development, but because it "has helped make the communications industry Canada's leading area of high technology achievement."⁵³ The protection of culture and information is no longer important for symbolic and cultural reasons but because they are "an increasingly important component of economic activity."⁵⁴ The catch phrase is no longer 'sovereignty', but its apparent equivalent in the new environment, 'future prosperity'. Canada's greatest national problem is not national identity, but "the relatively slow rate at which we are applying communications and information technology to help meet the challenges of economic and social development."⁵⁵

The document very clearly sets techno-economics as the tone for telecommunications policy in the 1990s and beyond.

In a subsequent Department of Communications fact sheet, a similar emphasis on techno-economic language and goals predominates. *The Canadian Telecommunications Policy* is of particular interest as it is the basis of the telecommunications act now before Parliament. The emphasis in this document lies once again with the importance of telecommunications in the new information economy. Examples of techno-economic discourse are numerous: "We need these new communication technologies as a strategic element in economic, social and cultural development." "Telecommunications is one of the fastest-growing areas of

⁵³*Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, p. 90.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, p. 91.

our economy." "Telecommunications is the nerve centre of the information society and one of the bases of sound economic growth. It is crucial to all those sectors of our economy which are subject to international competition."⁵⁶

As these examples illustrate, the underlying theme of the documents from the 1980s appears to be that Canada must jump on the technology bandwagon in order to remain competitive at the international level. The place of culture has undergone a significant repositioning. While *The Canadian Telecommunications Policy* pays the obligatory lip service to culture, it is now an extraneous consideration in telecommunications policy, as the following passage makes clear: "Even though the implications are mainly economic in nature, we cannot disregard the cultural aspects. *Important as they are, however, they must not be invoked to keep the Canadian government from shouldering its responsibilities and exercising its powers.*"⁵⁷

The language in policy documents in the 1980s shifted from one that prioritized cultural concerns and an appeal to democratic ideals,⁵⁸ to a discourse more concerned with technological and economic development:

The government has made known its support for maintaining an efficient and innovative telecommunication system for Canada. Nevertheless, in order to maintain Canada's leading position in this field, national policies and regulation must permit the continued

⁵⁶All of the above from, *The Canadian Telecommunications Policy*, p. 1. Interestingly, this document is also terribly concerned with *Quebec's* needs and wants! If we think about policy discourses as legitimizers, it is fascinating that it has become so important to play to Quebec's nationalist sentiments.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*

⁵⁸For example: "The immediate challenge, therefore, is to shape a set of objectives for telecommunications in Canada... which will have the support of all governments, of all sectors of the communications industry, and above all, of the Canadian people." *Proposals for a Telecommunications Policy for Canada*, p. 5. Emphasis added.

modernization of telecommunications market structures and technology.⁵⁹

These are revealing examples of the shift in federal government focus from cultural goals to economic and technological ones. The overriding concern in the 1980s is that technological development no longer be restrained but allowed to improve Canada's place in the new international market. What are the overarching concerns and the context for telecommunications in the 1990s?

The 1990s

On February 27, 1992, Communications Minister, Perrin Beatty, tabled the new telecommunications bill in the House of Parliament. According to a news release from the Department of Communications, this bill is

designed to ensure that Canada's telecommunications system can respond to rapid technological change and the demands of the market place, helping Canada remain internationally competitive and benefiting consumers.⁶⁰

The overarching concerns and the context for telecommunications policy in the 1990s revolve around Canada's international competitiveness, the flexibility of regulation to permit rapid technological growth,⁶¹ and the centrality of the market in determining telecommunications policy. Moreover, Canadians are no longer a public in the cultural or political sense. Today, Canadians are simply 'consumers'.

⁵⁹*A Policy Framework for Telecommunications in Canada*, p. 6.

⁶⁰"Beatty tables bill to modernize regulation of Canada's telecommunications system," news release from the DOC, p. 1.

⁶¹*Telecommunications: New Legislation for Canada*, pp. 5-6. Interestingly, the new Broadcasting Act is said to be "technology neutral" so that it will be "better able to adapt to changing technologies", and allow "for the optimum use of new technologies without predetermining a legislative or regulatory bias for or against a particular technology... Individual firms will be able to choose the particular technologies they wish to invest in." *Canadian Voices, Canadian Choices*, p. 9. The Government has now explicitly relinquished the right or duty, call it what you will, to determine the pace and direction of technological advance.

The objectives of telecommunications policy in 1992 are in sharp contrast to those put forward in the 1973 *Proposals for a Communications Policy for Canada*. As opposed to primarily cultural objectives found in the document from the 1970s, like the flow and exchange of regional cultures and the reflection of the diversity of Canadian values, which can be pursued, in part, through technological and economic developments,⁶² telecommunications policy will now facilitate the pursuit of technological and economic goals -- namely flexible, efficient industrial development, and growth.⁶³ Technological advance has become an end in itself.

The current discourse of nationalism has changed even in the introductions of policy documents. Where documents in the 1970s began, as a matter of course, with words that drew eloquent pictures of the cultural existence of Canada predicated on the ties of communication, documents in the 1990s begin with an outline of Canada's economic dependence on telecommunications industries. This can be seen, for example, in the preface to the Department of Communications' companion document to the new bill, *Telecommunications: New Legislation for Canada*:

Nearly half of the labour force in Canada works in occupations involving the collection, processing and dissemination of information, and almost three-quarters of Canadians work in the services sector... [D]evelopments in telecommunications and information technologies have transformed Canada into an information economy. *As a result, perhaps more than ever in the course of our history, our prosperity and well-being depend on our ability to exploit the potential of telecommunications and information technologies.*⁶⁴

The Government no longer appears to be concerned that technological development be controlled with an eye to social effects. Instead they urge that we be "ready to face

⁶²*Proposals for a Telecommunications Policy for Canada*, p. 2.

⁶³*Canadian Voices, Canadian Choices*, p. 2.

⁶⁴*Telecommunications: New Legislation for Canada*, p. 1. Emphasis added.

them"⁶⁵ when they come. Even 'traditional' demands have been rephrased to coincide with the new techno-economic environment. In 1992, these traditional demands are said to be:

ensuring the efficient and orderly operation of our telecommunications system, maintaining and promoting an internationally competitive telecommunications industry, and guaranteeing Canadians access to reliable, affordable and high-quality services.⁶⁶

I do not deny that these, or something close to them, form part of 'traditional' objectives or guides for federal responsibilities in telecommunications. In *Proposals for a Telecommunications Policy for Canada*, for example, in a list of five objectives, the "orderly development of telecommunications in Canada, and the provision of efficient and economical systems and services at just and reasonable rates"⁶⁷ was fifth. However, documents from the 1990s no longer speak of *cultural* concerns -- that telecommunications be developed in a socially responsible manner with regard to the creation and maintenance of strong east-west cultural links and the dissemination of the diverse cultures, values, identities, and perceptions of Canadians to each other.⁶⁸

And yet, politicians and bureaucrats are just as eloquent in their defence of Canada in this new discourse as they were in the older cultural nationalist language. For example, in an article by Perrin Beatty, Canada's current Minister of Communications, the government is said to

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. 3

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁶⁷*Proposals for a Communications Policy for Canada*, p. 2.

⁶⁸As can be seen, for example, in the other four objectives listed in *Proposals for a Communications Policy for Canada*.

[understand] very well the vital importance of maintaining and enhancing the competitive position of Canadian companies, both at home and abroad. Our prosperity will depend on our ability to respond creatively to the opportunities and challenges posed by rapid change in such fields as information technologies and telecommunications.⁶⁹

In the 1990s, however, Canadians are not only reduced to the status of consumers, they are also placed in a secondary position to the more important consumers, big businesses. In Beatty's own words:

We realize that, in Canada, we must have a level playing field for all consumers, *especially for those corporations which do business across the country and which must watch telecommunication costs very closely in these highly competitive times.*⁷⁰

Conclusion

Based on an analysis derived from the triune theory of nationalism, we have traced a shift in the discourses of Canadian telecommunications policy-making from cultural nationalism to techno-economic nationalism. This shift reflects, first, the changed public philosophy of the Government of Canada, and secondly, an overall shift in the trajectory of Canadian communications policy.

The Government's new public philosophy is dominated by a changed perception of the Canadian public, defined, not in the democratic sense of the people that form the nation-state, but in terms of the technological and economic market. The public that is addressed in techno-economic nationalist discourses, and therefore best served by them, is the public of the corporation. It is important to be aware of this effect of techno-economic nationalist justifications of Canadian political activities.

⁶⁹P. Beatty, "The Basis for Change", p. 21.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, p. 24. emphasis added.

The trajectory in Canadian policy-making is moving from a discourse of nationalism that was inclusive of the Canadian people to one that excludes them in favour of big corporations. The cultural nationalist goals of individual growth and identity formation are no longer served by telecommunications policy. The emphasis there is no longer on the democratic potential of new communications technologies but on their ability to contribute to Canada's international economic position.

Telecommunications, according to Canada's policy-makers, will now contribute to Canadian sovereignty in economic and technological ways. It will bolster Canada's position in the international marketplace, making the country more globally competitive and, therefore, add to the self-confidence and self-worth of the Canadian people.⁷¹ Here the Canadian public will be served in a 'trickle-down' approach.

It was suggested, earlier in this chapter, that the distinction between carriage and content, technology and programming, telecommunications and broadcasting, might have contributed to the shift from cultural to techno-economic discourse in telecommunications policy. We turn now to an analysis of the language in broadcasting policy documents, to see what place cultural nationalism holds in their discourses. Perhaps in broadcasting, which was recognized as the cultural sector of telecommunications, and which has always been regarded as the centrepiece of national cultural policy, we will find a will to protect and promote the Canadian nation, in the sense of the individuals that form the imagined community, as opposed to the Canadian technological and economic market.

⁷¹Perhaps, in this sense, contributing to Canada's 'cultural' development.

4. Broadcasting Policy

Broadcasting has long been regarded by Canadian policy-makers as a vitally important tool in the processes of national development, primarily in terms of providing cultural linkages through its content. As a result, cultural nationalist discourses dominate the history of the regulation of radio and television. However, nowhere has the gap between discourse and reality been as yawning as in broadcasting policy.

For example, in its efforts to promote and protect a distinctively Canadian cultural identity that could be communicated and shared through the broadcasting system, across Canada's vast and dispersed expanse, the Canadian Government has vigorously pursued the development of broadcasting technologies. However, despite the substantial contributions broadcasting technologies have made to the development of a made-in-Canada culture, they have also contributed to the building of a thriving continental culture.¹

As Babe reminds us in *Telecommunications in Canada*, while technological developments have decreased, to some extent, the difficulties of distance for Canadian broadcasters, they have also made it easier for American production companies, either

¹This is mostly through television broadcasting. If commercial radio broadcasting contributes to a continental culture -- in the sense that most North Americans, even, to a large extent, French Canadians, are listening to the same music -- the case of CBC-Radio, especially on the FM band, remains an exception. The discussion of broadcasting in this chapter tends to focus on television as opposed to radio.

through Canadian cable companies or directly via satellite, to provide Canadians with American television, and radio, programming.²

In spite of legislated pronouncements requiring the broadcasting system to contribute to Canadian unity and be an expression of Canadian identity, 78 percent of prime time programs diffused and rediffused by licensed Canadian television and cable undertakings originate in the United States. Indeed, foreign programming accounts for 76 per cent of prime time viewing by English-speaking Canadians.³

One of the most obvious paradoxes of the Canadian broadcasting system has been the ease of access to, and the overwhelming popularity of, American programming. Much of the discourse of Canadian broadcasting policy is ambivalent about the popularity of American programming in Canada, and appears to operate without consideration of this significant fact. It may well be that the changing emphases in the discourses of broadcasting policy documents, parallel to the trends discovered in the history of telecommunications policy, are a response to the gaps that exist between the reality of Canadian broadcasting and the system that broadcasting policy discourses imagine exists.

Where broadcasting policy documents used to be dominated by a nationalist discourse concerned with the 'cultural' goals of developing national consciousness and forging linkages across the country, and -- more explicitly after the 1968 *Broadcasting Act* -- the 'political' goals of national unity and sovereignty, they are now characterized by technologically and economically motivated goals and opportunities.⁴

²R. Babe, *Telecommunications in Canada*, p. 7. This is in addition to the steady supply of programming sold to Canadian television companies for re-broadcast.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 7-8

⁴Similar to the caveat made in the previous chapter, it is important to remember that these documents were written by or on behalf of the Government. They are, by their very nature, political discourses. Nevertheless, it is still possible to plot shifts from culturally and/or politically oriented language to discourses motivated by technology and economics.

The Early Years

In the early years of the development of broadcasting and broadcasting policy, primarily 'cultural nationalist' goals dominated the discourse. The main themes of this discourse centred around the ability of broadcasting to foster Canadian national identity in opposition to the ideals and values received from American programming.⁵ It was also assumed that such a goal could best be achieved through a public broadcasting system, overseen by the Government.⁶ However, as Raboy observes, "by the 1940s there was no question of eliminating private broadcasters."⁷ Moreover,

While policy has been directed towards the overall system, its execution has interfered precious little with the economic progress of the private sector but has hindered the social development of the public sector... The pronouncements of policy notwithstanding, no Canadian government has ever taken concrete steps to contain the profitability of private broadcasting.⁸

Although television was regarded as the prerogative of a publicly owned and operated organization -- following a similar evolution as the regulation of radio -- throughout the 1960s the Canadian broadcasting system was gradually reshaped to permit the 'participation' of private television companies. They were to supplement the services provided by the CBC. By the 1980s, the relationship had shifted again in favour of the private sector over the CBC -- the CBC now complements the private sector.

⁵*Report of the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting*, quoted in R. Bird (ed.), *Documents of Canadian Broadcasting*, p. 43.

⁶ See, for example, pp. 5-6 & 12 in *Report of the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting*, quoted in M. Raboy, *Missed Opportunities*, p. 28, and Prime Minister R.B. Bennett's historic speech to Parliament in support of the 1932 Broadcasting Act following the Aird Commission Report, quoted in the "Introduction" to *Communication Canada*, Lorimer & Wilson (eds.), p. 21.

⁷M. Raboy, *Missed Opportunities*, p. 9.

⁸*Ibid*

The growing gap between the reality of the mixed, public and private, broadcasting system, and the privileging of the notion of a single, public, broadcasting system, in the discourses of broadcasting policy, as well as the advent of television broadcasting in the 1950s and cable in the 1960s, made it necessary to rethink broadcasting policy.

The 1968 *Broadcasting Act*

It is the Fowler Committee report of 1965 and the shorter *White Paper on Broadcasting* published by the Government in 1966, that set the frames of reference for the 1968 *Broadcasting Act*. The discourse in these documents is centred primarily around the cultural themes highlighted above. The Fowler report and the *White Paper on Broadcasting* are concerned with the importance of broadcasting to the development of Canadian culture and Canadian identity,⁹ as well as with the public nature of broadcasting. The documents argue that this places certain obligations and responsibilities on both private and public broadcasting companies. Both have a duty to provide information, entertainment, and culture and to reflect the ideas and attitudes of Canadians to each other, in a distinctively Canadian way. Moreover, "all broadcasters have a responsibility for the public effects of the powerful and pervasive influence which they exercise."¹⁰ The accent on the public nature of broadcasting in early broadcasting policy reflects the same idea of the importance of the public, stressed in early telecommunications policy documents, as discussed in the last chapter. Cultural nationalist discourses situate the people as the most significant source of legitimacy in a democratic society.

⁹The general 'cultural' tone of the Fowler Committee report can be seen in the first section, "The Basic Importance of Programming": "The only thing that really matters in broadcasting is program content; all the rest is housekeeping. The provision of varied, well balanced, and excellent program services by both publicly owned and privately owned radio and television stations is the primary task of all broadcasters." *Report of the Committee on Broadcasting*, p. 12.

¹⁰*White Paper on Broadcasting*, p. 3.

In the policy documents of the late 1960s, private stations are regarded as one component of the single, public system.

The Canadian broadcasting system has two main sectors -- the publicly owned and supported Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and the many private radio and television stations. The latter are 'private' only in the sense that station facilities are owned by individuals or companies which operate them for profit. They are 'public' in the sense that they receive the right to use public assets, are subject to public control, and have the responsibility to perform a public service.¹¹

Moreover, private broadcasters have obligations, equal to those of the public broadcaster, to serve both the public and the national purposes of broadcasting in Canada.¹² However, private broadcasters, as part of the single system, play a *complementary* role to the preeminent public broadcaster, the CBC, which is recognized, rhetorically, as the most important component of Canada's broadcasting system.¹³ As opposed to documents, which will be examined later in this chapter, which are highly critical of the CBC, and downplay its importance in the broadcasting system, the Fowler report and the *White Paper on Broadcasting* both highlight the primacy of the national public broadcaster. It "has the primary responsibility and must be paramount in creating and maintaining a broadcasting system that is distinctively Canadian."¹⁴

The simple fact -- the crucial fact -- which must be clearly understood is that the CBC is the *essential* element of the Canadian broadcasting

¹¹*Report of the Committee on Broadcasting*, p. 8

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹³*White Paper on Broadcasting*, p. 4.

¹⁴*Report of the Committee on Broadcasting*, p. 12.

system and the most important single instrument available for the development and maintenance of the unity of Canada.¹⁵

Both the Fowler Committee report and the *White Paper on Broadcasting* also emphasize that Canada's broadcasting system must be publicly controlled.¹⁶

The need for public control of the broadcasting system is, we believe, beyond question... Because the number of available radio frequencies and television channels is limited, every nation in the world has found it necessary to exercise control over broadcasting... For thirty-five years the decision in Canada has been that State control should go farther than the simple issuing of licenses to broadcasters with minimal legal restrictions on the way they are used. Having decided to permit the creation of these new media, the Canadian choice has been to regulate their use in the national interest... [We] believe that the choice was a wise one and should be continued. The State should not restrict its participation in broadcasting to the essential grant of frequencies and channels, but should control, supervise, and encourage an excellent performance in the use that broadcasters make of the public assets they have been granted.¹⁷

The emphasis on public control and on the primacy of the public broadcaster becomes particularly interesting in light of the changed language in broadcasting policy documents later. In the 1980s, there is a distinct effort to downplay the role of the state, and to decrease direct state involvement in broadcasting. There have also been attempts to downgrade the public broadcaster.

Although both the Fowler report and the *White Paper on Broadcasting* speak about technology and about technological advance, their approach is cautious. The Fowler Committee report highlights a number of potential problems that may arise with new

¹⁵*Ibid*

¹⁶*White Paper on Broadcasting* argues that public control is the fundamental issue of broadcasting policy pp 1 & 3 See also, *Report of the Committee on Broadcasting*, p. 6.

¹⁷*Report of the Committee on Broadcasting*, pp 6-7

technologies such as cable and satellite, and emphasizes that a "fascination with new technology may obscure the essential attention that must be given to television programming in the future." As opposed to the push for technological advance characteristic of broadcasting policy in the 1980s and into the 1990s, the Fowler Committee report argued that technological advances could be put to good use only if broadcasters and Canadian policy-makers did not lose sight of the programming that these new technologies would carry.¹⁸ "The future of Canadian television does not greatly depend on how the signals are produced and transmitted; it is what the signals carry that really matter." It is television programming that "will determine, in large measure, the future quality and unity of the Canadian community as a whole."¹⁹ Similarly, the *White Paper on Broadcasting* argued that high quality Canadian programming must be the principal objective of broadcasting policy, and advocated a cautious approach to technological developments.²⁰

The discourse of the *White Paper on Broadcasting* is more clearly nationalist than that of the Fowler Committee, whose main concern was with the programming or content of the broadcasting system. The *White Paper on Broadcasting* sets out the national objectives of broadcasting policy in its introduction: "The determination to develop and maintain a national system of radio and television broadcasting in Canada is an essential part of the continuing resolve for Canadian identity and Canadian unity."²¹ The final words of the *White Paper on Broadcasting* point to the political nationalist purpose to be attached to broadcasting in the late 1960s. In addition to promoting and

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 263. Unfortunately, in practice, broadcasters and broadcasting policy makers have done the opposite, concentrating on the technological quick fix while ignoring the problems of content -- greater channel capacity has tended to be filled with American programming, much as the Fowler Committee predicted.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 243.

²⁰*White Paper on Broadcasting*, p. 4

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 1.

protecting a Canadian identity (to counter American culture), the Canadian broadcasting system must also be able to "contribute powerfully in the future, as it has in the past, to the *essential goal of Canadian unity*."²² The CBC is also charged with the operation of the national broadcasting service such that it serves the goal of national unity.²³

Following the initiatives of both the Fowler Committee report and the *White Paper on Broadcasting*, the *Broadcasting Act* was introduced to Parliament by then Secretary of State, Judy LaMarsh, in October 1967, and was passed into law at the beginning of the following year. In essence, the act placed broadcasting policy squarely in both a cultural and political nationalist discourse. The two intertwined languages can be seen most clearly in the act's often quoted Section three, which spells out a "Broadcasting Policy for Canada."

Following the tone of both the Fowler Committee report and LaMarsh's *White Paper on Broadcasting*, section three emphasizes the main cultural nationalist themes of broadcasting policy discourse. First it refers to the public nature of broadcasting in Canada, declaring, in the opening statement, that the Canadian broadcasting service is a single system, made up of both public and private elements,²⁴ that should be "owned and controlled by Canadians so as to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada."²⁵ Secondly, it points to the importance of content, asserting that programming (from both public and private

²²*Ibid.*, p. 19. It is explicitly this national unity mandate, that Raboy points to as an example of 'state' broadcasting -- an ideological effort to combat growing nationalist sentiments in Quebec. *Missed Opportunities*, p. 8.

²³*White Paper on Broadcasting*, p. 15.

²⁴*Broadcasting Act*, 1968, s. 3(a) -- suggesting that the private sector is also bound to the objectives of the Government's broadcasting policy.

²⁵*Ibid.*, s. 3(b).

broadcasters) "should be varied and comprehensive... and of high standard, using predominantly Canadian creative and other resources"²⁶ and should be made available in both "English and French as public funds become available."²⁷

One of the most important aspects of the 1968 Broadcasting Act was the mandate for the national broadcasting service contained within Section 3. Accordingly, the CBC must provide a balanced service of information, entertainment and enlightenment for a whole range of tastes across the country,²⁸ while "serving the special needs of geographic regions, and actively contributing to the flow and exchange of cultural and regional information and entertainment."²⁹ Significantly, the CBC is legislated as the essential element of Canada's broadcasting system. Any conflicts between public and private broadcasting interests "shall be resolved in the public interest but paramount consideration shall be given to the objectives of the national broadcasting service."³⁰

The political nationalist aspect of the 1968 *Broadcasting Act* lies within the CBC's new mandate to "contribute to the *development of national unity* and provide for a continuing expression of Canadian identity."³¹ This represented an official

²⁶*Ibid.*, s. 3(d)

²⁷*Ibid.*, s. 3(e). Bilingual service can be seen as both a cultural and a political discourse -- cultural in the sense that it addresses the French-Canadian public, and political in the sense that it addresses the French-Canadian electorate.

²⁸*Ibid.*, s. 3(g)i.

²⁹*Ibid.*, s. 3(g)iii.

³⁰*Ibid.*, s. 3(h).

³¹*Ibid.*, s. 3(g)iv.

declaration of the Government's willingness, in 1968, to direct the content of the public broadcasting corporation.³²

There is reference to techno-economic themes in the *Broadcasting Act* but they are not the highest priority in 1968. The last objective listed in the broadcasting policy section of the act, declares that "the regulation and supervision of the Canadian broadcasting system should be flexible and readily adaptable to scientific and technical advances."³³ This is the only place in which technological matters are mentioned.³⁴

The 1970s

The year following the passage of the *Broadcasting Act* saw the establishment of the Department of Communications, with an explicit responsibility to oversee and promote the development of telecommunications carriage technology. The creation of the DOC established the administrative separation of broadcasting (content) and telecommunications (carriage) -- broadcasting remained under the portfolio of the Secretary of State.³⁵ One of the priorities of the 1970s was, therefore, the formulation of a communications policy to cover both telecommunications and broadcasting. For this reason, the evolution of the discourses in broadcasting policy

³²The statement, "contribute to the development of unity," arguably changes public broadcasting into "state" broadcasting. M. Raboy, *Missed Opportunities*, p. 171.

³³*Broadcasting Act*, 1968, s. 3(j).

³⁴Before moving away from the 1968 *Broadcasting Act*, I should mention that this act also established the Canadian Radio-Television Commission to "regulate and supervise all aspects of the Canadian broadcasting system with a view to implementing the broadcasting policy enunciated in section 3 of this Act." S. 3(j).

³⁵In the words of its first minister, Eric Kierans, the newly created DOC would be concerned "with the medium not the message", that is to say with carriage, not content. This included oversight of the technical (carriage) aspects of broadcasting. M. Raboy, *Missed Opportunities*, p. 193.

in the 1970s must be understood in the context of the broad evolution of telecommunications policy, as outlined in the last chapter.³⁶

Briefly, however, broadcasting policy did serve as a guide to telecommunications policy. As discussed in the previous chapter, in both the 1973 *Proposals for a Communications Policy for Canada* and the 1975 *Communications: Some Federal Proposals* -- which are characterized by cultural nationalist discourses³⁷ -- there is specific reference to the 1968 *Broadcasting Act* as a model for the formulation of a telecommunications policy. For example:

Some of [the objectives outlined for telecommunications] are already embodied in the *Broadcasting Act* but are of equal relevance to all forms of telecommunications. The Government is concerned to maintain the objectives underlying the structure of the Canadian broadcasting system as a whole, with particular emphasis on the provision of the national broadcasting service, in both official languages, by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.³⁸

Communications: Some Federal Proposals was also part of the Government's efforts to reunite the content and carriage aspects of broadcasting and telecommunications. However, the process of joining content and carriage, instead of making telecommunications cultural, began the process that eventually shifted the discourse of broadcasting policy into techno-economics.

³⁶Broadcasting, along with "traditional arts and culture activities," was placed under the authority of the DOC in 1980. As a result, it was, more than ever, a sub-set of communications policy and concerns about communications technology and industrial development. P. Audley, "The Agenda for Broadcasting Policy", p. 204. E. Comor, "The DOC Under the Free Trade Regime", p. 239. See also M. Raboy's chapter "From 'Broadcasting' to 'Communications'", *Missed Opportunities*

³⁷*Communications: Some Federal Proposals*, for example, echoes the tone of the *Broadcasting Act*, reiterating the importance of state involvement in broadcasting to ensure that it contributes to national cultural development, p. 8.

³⁸*Ibid.*, p. 2.

Part of the efforts to bring the carriage and content of telecommunications and broadcasting together, included altering the responsibilities of the CRTC. In the mid-1970s, the CRTC (renamed the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission) became responsible for overseeing both the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors.

The uniting of regulatory responsibility for broadcasting and telecommunications was an important step in Ottawa's consolidation of communications activities under the authority of the DOC... Anything specific to the CBC or private broadcasting was dealt with directly by the CRTC (although with the commission's new responsibilities in telecommunications, there was some concern over the amount of attention that broadcasting would continue to attract). But overall political orientation came increasingly from the minister of communications, the main spokesman for federal policy.³⁹

This would have significant consequences for later broadcasting policy. First, the CRTC had already demonstrated its partiality to the private sector.⁴⁰ Secondly, as mentioned already, the DOC's original mandate led it to focus on technological development and other technical, economic and industrial matters. The DOC's already established technological/economic orientation would now greatly effect the direction of broadcasting policy. And thirdly, as a result of these changes, broadcasting policy would now follow, even more closely, the discursive shifts of telecommunications policy.⁴¹

Later trends in broadcasting policy would not be surprising in the context of the altered responsibilities for the regulation of broadcasting and telecommunications. The discourse in broadcasting policy essentially follows the trends of

³⁹M Raboy, *Missed Opportunities*, p 239

⁴⁰*Ibid* , p 235

⁴¹Audley, "The Agenda for Broadcasting Policy", p. 204, and Parker, "Options in Telecommunications Regulation", p. 35, argue much the same thing.

telecommunications policy from this point. The Clyne Committee Report, therefore, marked an important historical preface to later broadcasting policy documents.

The Clyne Committee Report and Broadcasting

The Clyne Committee report, as discussed in the previous chapter, marked the beginning of the shift in the nationalist discourses of telecommunications policy, towards an industrial and economic perspective, leaving cultural concerns to be worked out in broadcasting policy.⁴² In *Telecommunications and Canada*, telecommunications was recognized and promoted as a necessary element for the improvement of the country's economic situation and international position. "This Committee's argument is that we must be leaders in this field in the future... or we will fall calamitously behind as an industrial nation." On the other hand, an independent *culture* would be expressed and maintained through radio and television.⁴³ As a result, the discourse of broadcasting policy would focus on the ability of radio and television to contribute to the preservation of cultural sovereignty.

Because broadcasting was the centrepiece of cultural policy, and because it had become the guardian of culture within telecommunications policy, the shift in the languages of nationalism noted in the case of telecommunications policy, is not as marked. However, it is possible to find embryonic references in the Clyne Committee's report, to the idea that broadcasting, as an industry, carries potential economic benefits.

Although *Telecommunications and Canada* raises a number of questions about new telecommunications technologies and Canada's ability to compete in the international

⁴²Raboy provides a good summary of the shift in *Missed Opportunities*, p. 226. The separation of broadcasting and telecommunications appears in the Clyne Committee's mandate (reprinted in the preface) and with the sharp distinction that the report made between economic and cultural concerns. See *Telecommunications and Canada*, p. 2.

⁴³*Ibid.*

arena, the area of broadcasting, in particular, continued to raise cultural nationalist issues -- which can be seen, for example, in concerns about the disproportionate amount of American programming avidly consumed by Canadian viewers. "The impact on Canadian social and cultural life is there for all to see."⁴⁴ The Clyne Committee's main recommendations for altering Canadians' dependence on American television content, centred around the promotion of "production, programming and marketing" of Canadian television productions, as opposed to any restriction of imported programming.⁴⁵

We also see explicitly political goals in the committee's ideas about governmental direction of CRTC decisions.⁴⁶

The absence in the Broadcasting Act of any general authority for the Governor-in-Council to give guidance to the CRTC in the implementation of the statutory broadcasting policy for Canada has had the effect of leaving the Commission to determine policy through an interconnected series of *ad hoc* decisions, with little regard for what our federal and provincial government may deem to be in the public interest.⁴⁷

Although the Canadian broadcasting system is still referred to as a single system in which both public and private sectors have responsibilities under the *Broadcasting Act*, the two sectors are treated separately, as the report attempts to answer why the "system as a whole is not fulfilling our expectations, and not achieving the broad policy objectives set forth in the Broadcasting Act."⁴⁸ Was this inquiry perhaps an

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 37-40.

⁴⁶A longstanding issue in broadcasting policy debates. See Raboy, *Missed Opportunities*.

⁴⁷*ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

implicit recognition of the gap between the reality of the broadcasting system and policy discourse?

The answer to this question would not be that the discourse of broadcasting policy should change, but that reality must. *Telecommunications in Canada* fully endorses the CBC. In a discourse entirely supportive of the cultural and political nationalist mandate of the public broadcaster, the view is expressed that the CBC's particular activities are absolutely necessary for the promotion, preservation and protection of a Canadian identity and culture. Furthermore, the Clyne Committee explicitly recommends that the CBC be given the resources to fulfil its broad mandate.

The Committee is unanimous in its belief that the CBC is an absolutely essential factor in the development and maintenance of a Canadian identity, and in the fostering of a regional and national Canadian culture that is the principal defence of the social and cultural sovereignty of Canada... [W]e believe it is an institution that should be supported to the fullest possible extent by Canadian governments and citizens alike. It is obvious that the corporation, even if impeccably managed and administered, can fulfil its mandate only to the extent that it is given the resources to do so.⁴⁹

Therefore the Committee made the following recommendation:

The broadcasting services provided by the CBC are the main national instruments for the preservation of Canadian social and cultural sovereignty, and should be recognized as such. The CBC should be afforded whatever means may be required to reinforce its function in that regard.⁵⁰

Because the discourse of broadcasting policy was still dominated by cultural nationalism, the way to improve the record of the broadcasting system is said to lie in the continued and *increased* support of the national public broadcaster. As mentioned

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 31.

earlier in this chapter, this is particularly interesting in light of future recommendations -- policy documents of the 1980s recommend the downsizing of the CBC and cut-backs of its Federal allocations.

In terms of the privately owned and operated stations and networks in Canada, *Telecommunications and Canada* recommended that they be given a broader role in the realization of the *Broadcasting Act*'s 'Broadcasting Policy for Canada', believing "that the mandate for the private sector in the Broadcasting Act is inadequate."

During [debate about the Act] there was strong pressure to impose on the private sector, as well as the CBC, a responsibility to contribute to the development of national unity, but this pressure was resisted on the ground that this was a job for the CBC and to impose it on the private broadcasters as well might restrict the opportunities for "the expression of differing views on matters of public concern." The same argument would not apply, however, to the imposition of responsibility to "provide for a continuing expression of Canadian identity" and an active contribution "to the flow and exchange of cultural and regional information and entertainment."⁵¹

Private broadcasters would not be expected to contribute to the political nationalist goals contained in the broadcasting policy's national unity clause. However, they were expected to contribute to the cultural nationalist mandate of expressing Canadian identity and maintaining the channels of communication between regional cultures.

The 1980s

It is the 1982 *Report of the Federal Cultural Review Committee*, chaired by Louis Applebaum and Jacques Hébert, that most clearly marks the changing emphasis in broadcasting policy, away from cultural to techno-economic concerns and issues.

⁵¹*Ibid*, p 34 The references are to the *Broadcasting Act*, 1968 -- part of s 3(d), the second halves of the CBC subsections s 3(g)iv. and s 3(g)iii

Because the Applebaum-Hébert report was explicitly concerned with issues of Canadian culture, it is difficult to analyze it in terms of the triune languages of nationalism. Much as policy documents use languages of cultural, political or techno-economic nationalism as a legitimizing discourse, so techno-economic priorities are phrased, in broadcasting policy documents, in cultural nationalist terms. As a cultural form, broadcasting is almost always talked about in an apparently cultural language -- discursive shifts are, therefore, subtle. However, as Richard Collins points out:

Applebert is a document of transition, marking a shift from the traditional conception of Canadian media policy as a matter of struggling for the achievement of Canadian cultural goals through public sector institutions, to an emerging new conception of communication policy at the leading edge of national, industrial and economic policy.⁵²

In a sense, the idea that germinated in Clyne, vis-à-vis telecommunications, seems to blossom in the Applebaum-Hébert report with respect to broadcasting. In the Review Committee's report, broadcasting, indeed the arts,⁵³ begin to be valued as significant Canadian industries.⁵⁴ Much as the Clyne Committee document marked the shift in telecommunications policy, from cultural nationalist discourse to techno-economic nationalist discourse, so Applebaum-Hébert, and the documents it engendered, mark a shift in broadcasting policy away from cultural to techno-economic discourses of nationalism.

⁵²R. Collins, "Between Two Broadcasting Acts", p. 333.

⁵³The report was not solely concerned with broadcasting, but with "the shape and future of cultural policies for Canada" in the areas of artistic creativity such as literature, painting and music, but also in the preservation of a Canadian 'heritage' and the "cultural industries of broadcasting, publishing, film and sound recording." *Report of the Federal Cultural Review Committee*, p. 3

⁵⁴The word 'industry' has significant consequences for cultural policy, especially in light of free trade deals

The main themes that mark the Applebaum-Hébert report as a document of transition, centre around the discussion of the arts, including broadcasting as industries. Speaking of broadcasting, and other artistic, cultural forms as industries or commercial products, has significant ramifications. This kind of designation immediately ties broadcasting into an industrial framework, leading it to be judged in terms of profitability, productivity, efficiency, and other industrial, techno-economic yardsticks. Moreover, in the context of free trade deals with the United States and negotiations on services at GATT, designating culture as a commodity has profound consequences.⁵⁵

The shift away from cultural nationalist themes can also be seen in the Applebaum-Hébert report's stunning critique of the CBC, in its suggestions that the CBC's funding be cut, and in its recommendation that the CBC get out of everything but news and public affairs production.

With the exception of its news operations, the CBC should relinquish all television production activities and facilities in favour of acquiring its television program materials from independent producers.⁵⁶

This proposal would have essentially emasculated the CBC. In it we can identify an abrupt turning away from the 1962 *Broadcasting Act's* insistence that the CBC be the primary instrument of Canada's broadcasting policy. This is a major reversal of cultural policy. In essence the Applebaum-Hébert Committee was recommending

that the ossified public sector institutions should be asset stripped... and the CBC's distribution capacity be used to support independent

⁵⁵According to American economic policy, cultural industries and cultural products, just like any other commodity, should not be specially promoted or subsidized by governments. See E Comor, "The DOC Under the Free Trade Regime", and V. Mosco, "Toward a Transnational World Information Order. The Canada-US Free Trade Agreement" for discussions of the ramifications of the FTA and the designation of culture as a commodity

⁵⁶*Report of the Federal Cultural Review Committee*, p. 292.

productions. The *grandes dames* of the public sector were to act as surrogate mothers to the growing infants of the private sector.⁵⁷

Moreover, Applebaum-Hébert suggested that the notion of a single system of balanced programming is no longer necessary in an environment in which there is greater channel capacity and therefore greater consumer choice. In this environment, the CBC no longer needs to provide balanced programming, but should instead become "an *alternative* to private broadcasting."⁵⁸

The Applebaum-Hébert report also heavily criticized the CBC as a secretive, quasi-monopolistic body that does not have to respond to changing times and tastes because it is shielded by the financial support of the government.⁵⁹ The new yardstick for broadcasting is profitability, a techno-economic value.

The Applebaum-Hébert report's critique of public sector institutions like the CBC,⁶⁰ and its endorsement of the market as a regulator of public policy, set the tone for a series of policy papers which came out of the Department of Communications in the early 1980s. *Towards a New National Broadcasting Policy* and *Building for the Future: Towards a Distinctive CBC*, in combination with the Applebaum-Hébert report, made the Government's new intentions for broadcasting policy in the 1980s -- and into the 1990s -- obvious. They

articulated a major new theme in broadcasting policy -- substitution of a market for an administered regime in which there were three minor themes: the substitution of the carrot for the stick (financial inducements to achieve required ends rather than regulation to prevent

⁵⁷R. Collins, "Between Two Broadcasting Acts", p. 333.

⁵⁸*Report of the Federal Cultural Review Committee*, p. 273. Emphasis added.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 276-7. This kind of language gives authority to the CBC cutbacks that followed.

⁶⁰It was also highly critical of the National Film Board

undesired ends); a critique of the public sector (and proposals that achievement of Canada's desired cultural and industrial goals be sought through the fostering of private sector initiatives and not public sector institutions); and the subordination of cultural to industrial/economic priorities.⁶¹

In *Towards a New National Broadcasting Policy* and *Building for the Future*, we see a new emphasis on the market as a means of determining the shape of the broadcasting system in Canada and an increased concern, not with the creation of Canadian identity or voicing of regional identities to each other, but the goals of audience and profit maximization. A second measure of broadcasting in the new environment would be based on viewers. The measurement of audience size is more often than not a typically commercial, or market oriented concern, and not necessarily a cultural issue.⁶²

Both *Towards a New National Broadcasting Policy* and *Building for the Future* are technologically deterministic. Contrary to the concern expressed in, for example, the Fowler Committee report of 1965, that capacity not overtake content, these documents from the 1980s argue that Canadian broadcasters must respond to the new technological environment.

Although some of the discourse in both *Towards a New National Broadcasting Policy* and *Building for the Future* still comes across as cultural -- this can be seen in the

⁶¹R. Collins, "Between Two Broadcasting Acts", p. 332. Collins also refers to the *National Film and Video Policy* (1983).

⁶²J. McNulty says that *Towards a New National Broadcasting Policy* was much more deterministic than usual in Canadian broadcasting policy making. "The emphasis was more on individual consumer choice than on serving the collective social or cultural goals espoused in the Broadcasting Act," p. 20. It is important, however, to point out that the direction that these reports were setting for broadcasting policy was a response to the gap between the cultural nationalist discourse of policy, and the reality of the popularity of American programming and relative unpopularity of the CBC. See, for example, P. Attallah, "Trends and Developments in Canadian Television."

overwhelming importance that is attached to Canadian programs and the need for greater programming choice (*Towards a New National Broadcasting Policy* argues that "'choice' for Canadians is meaningless unless it also includes programming which reinforces the cultural heritage of all Canadians") -- it is also increasingly concerned with the techno-economic themes of technological advance and economic development, and, centrally, Canada's international economic position. ("... steps must be taken to help the broadcasting industry in this country become more competitive")⁶³

The competing languages of culture and techno-economics can even be seen in the sub-titles of the documents, which serve as slogans of the new orientation: In *Towards a New National Broadcasting Policy*: "New policies and initiatives to provide Canadians with greater programme choice, and make the Canadian broadcasting industry more competitive; A response to new technologies and the changing environment." The CBC strategy echoes the same emphasis: "New policies and initiatives to assure the strengthened performance and improved accountability of the national broadcasting service as a crucial component of an identifiably Canadian broadcasting system and as an essential instrument of Canadian cultural development."

Communications, and in particular, broadcasting, are still regarded as vital Canadian resources, as are communications/information technologies, but no longer in a primarily cultural sense.

National governments are only now beginning to understand this new environment and to develop the strategies and arrangements needed to secure the benefits of this technology for their citizens. People around the world are only learning now how to strengthen their economies through the development of these technologies. And they are also only

⁶³F. Fox, message from the Minister in the *Towards a New National Broadcasting Policy* package.

now beginning to grasp how to reinforce the uniqueness of their national cultures in the face of the burgeoning number of messages transmitted from innumerable sources around the planet.⁶⁴

In *Building for the Future*, although the CBC is widely praised as the centrepiece of the national broadcasting system, its importance is no longer solely in the provision of Canadian cultural artifacts. Under the heading, "An essential instrument of Canadian cultural development," this report highlights the importance of the CBC for the creation of jobs. It is commended as "the largest single employer of creative Canadians:"

about 15,000 Canadian musicians, actors, singers and other performers, as well as writers, editors, composers, directors and many others. Indeed virtually since its inception, the CBC has been a financial mainstay for Canadian symphonies, composers, musicians and performing arts groups across the country... Clearly the CBC is an essential instrument of Canadian cultural development, and without it our cultural life would not be as rich as it is today.⁶⁵

Although the report seems to reiterate the central role of the CBC in the preservation and promotion of Canadian cultural identity, what is significant is what is not said:

The CBC board and management is responsible for ensuring that the corporation reflects and interprets as fully, fairly, and accurately as possible Canada's cultural, social, political, economic, linguistic and regional reality and diversity, as well as contributing to the flow and exchange of information and entertainment between regions and Canada's two official language-groups. The phrase in the CBC mandate, 'contribute to the development of national unity,' is deemed to mean being 'consciously partial to the success of Canada as a united country with its own national objectives, independent from those of

⁶⁴*Towards a New National Broadcasting Policy*, p. 4. The reinforcement of the uniqueness of cultures is an afterthought to the strengthening of economies

⁶⁵*Building for the Future*, p. 5.

other countries,' while maintaining the highest standards of professional journalism.⁶⁶

Two things come out of this. First, we see the watering-down of the political nationalism of the national unity clause, from the 1968 *Broadcasting Act*. Secondly, we do not see a concomitant expression of the role of the private sector in promoting and protecting Canadian identity.

The new role envisaged for the CBC in 1983 becomes extremely clear in *Building for the Future*. "As an essential instrument of Canadian cultural development, the CBC has a special responsibility to play in developing Canada's *independent program production industry*."⁶⁷ That is to say, the CBC is only one participant in Canada's broadcasting system, and, more importantly, it must begin to contribute to the vibrancy of the private production industry. Although the CBC had begun to lose its discursive primacy in Applebaum-Hébert, the process was carried through to its logical conclusion in *Building for the Future*. Here the CBC is supplementary to the private sector. In the future, the CBC "will be expected to provide a satisfying *complement* to the private sector, both Canadian and foreign."⁶⁸

The key words in the policy documents of the early 1980s are, "choice", "new technological environment", and "competition". They argue, in essence, that Canadian culture and Canadian broadcasting content will only be guaranteed through the pursuit of a new 'Broadcasting Strategy' that will "enable the broadcasting system to respond to the challenges and seize the technological opportunities which are before

⁶⁶*Ibid*, p. 16

⁶⁷*Ibid*, p. 3. Emphasis added.

⁶⁸*Ibid*, p. 12. emphasis added. The Caplan-Sauvageau Report also draws attention to (and criticizes) this new role for the CBC, p. 694.

Canada at this time." The best way to advance Canadian needs and ideals, in this environment, is through the provision of new and competitive *services*.

Action must be taken now to ensure that Canadian content is maintained and strengthened in the distribution of new services. Steps must be taken now to help Canadian broadcasters to become more competitive. With new policies for this technological environment, Canadian viewers will be able to receive greater program choice, including a steady and reliable supply of programming which reflects Canadian cultural values.

There is general agreement that, in order for these cultural values to retain their vibrancy in the face of increased programming received from the United States and elsewhere, the government, in co-operation with the broadcasting industry, must ensure that our own programming and broadcasting capabilities, -- both public and private -- remain competitive.⁶⁹

Competition is a word belonging to techno-economic discourses and the language of the marketplace.

The Caplan-Sauvageau Report

Significantly, one of the most important broadcasting documents of the 1980s is the one least representative of the discursive trends of that decade, despite its mandate which was more in line with the language of the 1980s. The Task Force on Broadcasting Policy was created to make recommendations for

an industrial and cultural strategy to govern the future evolution of the Canadian broadcasting system through the remainder of this century, recognizing the importance of broadcasting to Canadian life... [and taking into account the] challenges and opportunities in the increasingly competitive broadcasting environment presented by ongoing technological developments.⁷⁰

⁶⁹All of the above from a poster-sized insert included in the package that makes up *Towards a New National Broadcasting Policy*

⁷⁰J. McNulty, "Broadcasting Policy in the Canadian Context," p 21.

The Task Force's overall perception of the condition of Canadian broadcasting in the mid-1980s was best summarized by Gerald Caplan in an interview given the year after the report was published. The language he uses is reminiscent of the kinds of discourse one would expect from documents of the 1970s.

The Task Force judged that there was a serious imbalance in Canada's broadcasting system. That imbalance had grown and the private sector had become too dominant with its emphasis on American programming. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) was becoming less powerful and less central to the overall broadcasting system and the government was cutting CBC's money. Since we all agreed there was a lack of Canadian programming, a better financed CBC seemed important.⁷¹

The *Report of the Task Force on Broadcasting Policy*, published in 1986, represents the last cry of cultural nationalism in broadcasting policy documents. The Caplan-Sauvageau report, much as the Caplan quotation above, also sounds more like the 1965 Fowler Committee report than a policy document of the 1980s.

The *Report of the Task Force on Broadcasting Policy* pointed out that it was time for a new broadcasting act. They did this on the basis of a neat synopsis of the condition of the broadcasting system in 1986, which points to a number of gaps between the reality of the broadcasting system in Canada, and the way it was presented in policy discourse.

The 1968 Act created the framework within which the broadcasting system has operated for the past 18 years. Invariably, the operations of all the players have been made to seem to be in harmony with the wording of the Act. Over the years, the CRTC has significantly diluted the notion of a 'predominantly Canadian' broadcasting system. While the private sector acknowledges its responsibility to the national obligations implied in the Act, realistic commercial goals dictate maximum allowable American programming in prime-time. The CBC attempts to be all things to all people, with resources sufficient only to

⁷¹Quoted in R. Collins, "Between Two Broadcasting Acts", p. 334.

be some things to some people. The Department of Communications and the CRTC have tried to determine how technological change could be accommodated within the confines of an Act passed before some of the new technology had even been conceived. The cable industry has sought justification for its own massive expansion in an Act in which it was a mere afterthought.⁷²

The *Report* therefore made three major recommendations: that the CBC be strengthened (and launch an all-news network), that the private sector be required to make a greater contribution to the goals of the *Broadcasting Act* and to Canadian programming, and that a new public broadcasting network (TV Canada) be created, one which could pool the creative resources of the provincial 'educational' broadcasters, thereby bringing regional cultures to each other.

The Caplan-Sauvageau Task Force *Report* speaks of a return to the public sector not only as the main instrument of cultural nationalism, but also as the primary component of Canada's broadcasting system.

Our recommendations call for the CBC to continue playing a central role in assuring that Canadians have a truly Canadian broadcasting system. For us the CBC is not a complementary broadcasting agency; it is the central one. It must be the main Canadian presence on television. The role of the private system is to complement the CBC in the area of quality Canadian programming and to supplement it by providing American programming.⁷³

Reminiscent of policy documents from the 1970s, Caplan-Sauvageau places private broadcasters in a supplementary position to the CBC, and argues that the private sector must also be made to contribute to the principles of the *Broadcasting Act*.

⁷²*Report of the Task Force on Broadcasting Policy*, p. 14. The issue of cable is very complex. It is cable technology that makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish between telecommunications and broadcasting as it can carry both kinds of service. Moreover, cable seems to be primarily a carriage industry and yet it carries a large proportion of the broadcasting content received in Canadian homes.

⁷³*Ibid.*, pp. 694-5.

Although primary responsibility still falls upon the public broadcaster, the Task Force argues that the private sector cannot be exempted from "a significant role; it must carry a fair share of these obligations."⁷⁴

In the end, according to the Task Force report, it would be up to Canada's policy-makers to "determine how serious they themselves are about demanding a substantial contribution from the private sector to the goals of the new Broadcasting Act that we hope to see introduced." Canada's future, or at least the future of a 'Canadianized' broadcasting system, depended on these decisions.⁷⁵ Ultimately, however, the Government, and other policy-makers asked the private sector to do very little.

Caplan-Sauvageau was out of tune, not only with the Mulroney government but with the whole trajectory of Canadian broadcasting policy in the 1980s, whether that of Liberal or Conservative governments.⁷⁶

The time for this kind of discourse had passed. Very little of this cultural language would survive in the prevailing leitmotifs of economics and technology.⁷⁷

However, within a year, policy documentation had returned to a nationalist discourse of techno-economics more characteristic of the 1980s. In 1987 the Department of Communications produced an analysis of Canada's 'cultural industries'.

Although, according to great big letters on the first page of *Vital Links*, culture forms the essential links necessary to Canadian society, in the information-age, identity is to

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, p. 627.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, p. 699.

⁷⁶R. Collins, "Between Two Broadcasting Acts", p. 335.

⁷⁷The Caplan-Sauvageau report indicates that policy texts by different groups can often contradict the official discourse. However, it is significant that they do not always change it.

be preserved by the strength of Canada's arts *industries*. "Culture is the very essence of our national identity. Nourishing that identity are the cultural industries."⁷⁵

Although the importance of culture to the creation and sustenance of a national identity is stressed throughout the report, it is the technical and economic aspects of the Canadian cultural world that gain primary attention.

Apart from its cultural and social significance, the [broadcasting] system is important in industrial terms. In total, radio and television broadcasting and the cable-television industry earned commercial revenues of \$2.3 billion in 1985, and directly employed 36,000 persons. In addition, broadcasters paid millions of dollars to freelance musicians, actors, writers, etc., and indirectly created many jobs in the advertising and program production industries."⁷⁶

What appears to concern the authors of this document most is an apparent inconsistency in the Canadian broadcasting system:

Judging by the amounts of time and money Canadians devote to culture, the country should be able to sustain more viable cultural industries. It is a paradox that although Canadian consumption of cultural products represent a substantial market, Canadian cultural industries generally exist in a state of financial weakness and vulnerability, unable to become self-financing from market revenues."⁷⁷

In an environment bounded by techno-economic discourses, we are to measure the success of Canada's cultural artifacts in terms of the market. As a result, Canadian cultural products must be competitive and must find better ways to present themselves for sale. "When Canadian cultural products are better represented in the market, the public will determine which of these products will succeed, just as they do in any

⁷⁵*Vital Links*, p. 5

⁷⁶*Ibid* p. 59

⁷⁷*Ibid* , p. 21 Here too is an effort to address the gap between reality and discourse

market."⁸¹ Culture, and by extension, the content of the broadcasting system, are primarily commodities to be bought and sold in the economic marketplace.⁸²

Although the companion document to the 1988 *Broadcasting Act*, *Canadian Voices, Canadian Choices* (published in 1987), suggests that this is not the case -- broadcasting is "more than just another industry" -- it is apparent that the Government has become more concerned with the success of Canada's broadcasting system in technological and industrial terms than in cultural terms.

The Government wants to continue to encourage Canada's tradition of innovation in communications technology. The new Broadcasting Bill allows for the optimum use of new technology without predetermining a legislative or regulatory bias for or against a particular technology. By allowing the broadcasting system to adopt and adapt to changes in technology, the policy is designed to stimulate the system to become as competitive as possible. Individual firms will be able to choose the particular technologies they wish to invest in.⁸³

We can see the language of economics operating in the way in which *Canadian Voices, Canadian Choices* discusses, for example, the different problems faced by French and English language program producers. Immediately the difference is defined in market terms:

The French-language market is much smaller and more concentrated than the English-language market. Consequently advertising revenues and, therefore, program production budgets are smaller. The French-language market is also extremely competitive which, combined with the small, concentrated audience, creates market conditions and an

⁸¹*Ibid.*, p. 78.

⁸²Although it appears to be addressing the gap between policy discourse and reality, this discourse ignores the reality that market conditions favour American products. See P. Attallah, "Trends and Developments in Canadian Television" and E. Comor, "the DOC Under the Free Trade Regime."

⁸³*Canadian Voices, Canadian Choices*, p. 9.

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industrial structure substantially different from those in English Canada."⁸⁴

Although *Canadian Voices, Canadian Choices* seems to be characterized by a cultural nationalist discourse (in the sense that it talks about the importance of broadcasting in providing a shared experience for as many people as possible,⁸⁵ and about the significance of broadcasting to the creation and protection of a national identity⁸⁶), the bill it presaged has definitely moved into the techno-economic realm.

The 1991 *Broadcasting Act*⁸⁷

The new Act presents a number of significant changes from the "venerable and internationally influential, 1968 Broadcasting Act."⁸⁸ It redefines the nationalist goals that were part of the CBC's 1968 mandate; it decreases the responsibilities of the private broadcasters vis-à-vis the social and ideological goals of the 1968 Act, moving away from the notion of a single system; it reflects a shift away from the official discourse of bilingualism of the 1960s, to the official discourse of multiculturalism of the late 1980s, calling for a pluralistic broadcasting system and placing greater obligations on it to serve regional needs and interests;⁸⁹ and, it creates important new procedural regulations for the CRTC.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁸⁷I owe much of my discussion of this bill to R. Collins' "Between Two Broadcasting Acts", pp. 320-322.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, p. 320.

⁸⁹In this discursive shift, we can see a representation of the use of discourse for legitimization of the democratically elected polity. After the passage of the Charter, correct political behaviour demands an awareness of many minority groups. In addition, a decade of constitutional struggle with the provinces also makes it important to recognize the needs and interests of regions in discourse.

if we turn to an analysis of Section three in the 1991 *Broadcasting Act*, we are immediately struck by a number of changes. It is now legislated that the broadcasting system "be readily adaptable to scientific and technological change,"⁹⁰ and contribute to the well-being of the (private) independent production industry.⁹¹

Notably, the CBC is no longer required to contribute to national unity, but "contribute to shared national consciousness and identity." It also no longer true that "paramount consideration shall be given to the objectives of" the CBC in any conflict between the CBC and private broadcasters.⁹² In 1991, only "where the public interest would be *equally served* by resolving the conflict in favour of either, it shall be resolved in favour of the objectives" of the CBC.⁹³

The down-playing of the notion of the 'national' role of the CBC -- and in particular its national unity mandate -- represents a political usage of discourse as a legitimizer. First, it addresses the gap between the 'national public' supposedly served by the public broadcaster and the viewing public the CBC actually serves. Secondly, it moves away from the political objective of unifying a culturally diverse community into a 'state' nationalist identity. Culturally speaking, according to the new mandate for broadcasting, and in particular the mandate for the CBC, the diverse cultures of Canada will be allowed to imagine the community of Canada in their own way(s).

The new act also no longer declares that broadcasting undertakings are part of a single system comprising public and private elements.⁹⁴ In the opening section of

⁹⁰*Broadcasting Act*, 1991, s. 3:1(d)iv.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, s. 3:1(i)v.

⁹²*Broadcasting Act*, 1968, s. 3(h).

⁹³*Broadcasting Act*, 1991, s. 3:1(n). Emphasis added.

⁹⁴*Broadcasting Act*, 1968, c.25, s. 3(a).

the 1991 *Broadcasting Act*, it is declared only that "the Canadian broadcasting system shall be effectively owned and controlled by Canadians."⁹⁵ The act does go on, however, to say that the system is made up of public, private and community elements that provide "a public service essential to the maintenance and enhancement of national identity and cultural sovereignty."⁹⁶ And there is still an attempt to hold on to the mythical notion of the single system. In sub-section two it is

further declared that the Canadian broadcasting system constitutes a single system and that the objectives of the broadcasting policy... can best be achieved by providing for the regulation and supervision of the Canadian broadcasting system by a single independent public authority.⁹⁷

Despite this, the reality is that Canada's broadcasting system is a 'single system' only to the extent that both private and public broadcasters are regulated by the CRTC.⁹⁸ Moreover, despite legislative pronouncements to the contrary, like Collins I would argue that "it is the shared reliance on advertising revenue, and the shared interest in audience maximization, of public and private sectors, that binds the CBC and commercial broadcasters into a single system, not a shared commitment to ideological goals."⁹⁹

The changes in broadcasting policy and in its discourse, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, must be understood against a broad background of fiscal austerity affecting public sector funding since the 1960s. Throughout these years there have been huge

⁹⁵*Broadcasting Act*, 1991, s. 3:1(a).

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, s. 3:1(b).

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, s. 3:2.

⁹⁸Even the discourse in the quotation above, suggests this relationship -- to paraphrase: the single system is achieved by the regulation and supervision of the CRTC.

⁹⁹R. Collins, "Between Two Broadcasting Acts", p. 325.

budget cuts for the CBC, and also the CRTC, the two agencies charged with the task of protecting and promoting the public's interest in broadcasting.¹⁰⁰ We must also take into account the neo-conservative policies of the Mulroney Government -- following trends in the United States and Great Britain -- which are inspiring a commitment to deregulation and privatization. As well, as part of the changing background to broadcasting policy, we must be aware of past and current free trade negotiations. The Free Trade Agreement, and the North American Free Trade deal which will supersede it, have some startling implications for Canadian communications policy-making.¹⁰¹ All of these trends, which will shape Canadian broadcasting into the 2000s, are both reflected in, and in turn shaped by the discourses in broadcasting policy.

Conclusion

There are essentially two reasons that make it particularly important that we examine broadcasting policy discourses. In the first place, the discourse reflects the new reality of broadcasting in Canada -- namely, the decreased funding of the national public broadcaster, the shift towards commercial and industrial goals, and the increased reliance on the market for the regulation of broadcasting in Canada.¹⁰² In such a context, the resulting emphasis on technological and economic development redefines the broadcasting system as an industry, not as a cultural form. Furthermore, the broadcasting industry's *raison d'être* is profitability and competitiveness in the world market. As Communications Minister Perrin Beatty describes it,

Canada's television industry recognizes that it needs an industry-wide approach to future competition. The various elements should not

¹⁰⁰*Ibid*, p. 322

¹⁰¹See E. Comor, "The DOC Under the Free Trade Regime", p. 241.

¹⁰²P. Attallah, "Trends and Developments in Canadian Television", manuscript, p. 1.

struggle against each other, but rather act as allies in a larger fight to conserve a unique Canadian system and a profitable share of the growing and highly competitive world markets.¹⁰³

According to the discourse of broadcasting policy in the 1990s, the market is the primary regulator of broadcasting policy and activity. The issues that are now central to policy-makers are those that have guided the commercial broadcasting sector all along -- profitability and, its close relative, especially for the broadcasting sector, audience maximization -- as well as the goal of the advanced development of broadcasting technologies. The goals of profit and audience maximization, and technological development, however, may be inimical to cultural or social objectives for broadcasting in Canada.¹⁰⁴ The pursuit of such instrumental goals have contributed, in large part, to the flooding of Canadian channels with American programming. This hinders not only the pursuit of cultural goals for broadcasting in Canada, but also frustrates Canadian efforts to promote economic objectives.¹⁰⁵

The second reason that study of broadcasting discourses is important, is the revealing picture they provide of the way in which public policy debates are structured, as this chapter has demonstrated. Interestingly, the broadcasting policy debate is now being framed in such a way that the only alternative to the primacy of the private sector is a 'public' sector which has become synonymous with the CBC and with the national objectives of the Federal Government, as opposed to that broadcasting "space in

¹⁰³P. Beatty, "The Basis for Change", p. 18.

¹⁰⁴Goals of profit and audience maximization can, and have paralysed the Government's ability to pursue cultural nationalist goals. The current hearings by the CRTC (re the American Direct Broadcast Satellites expected to go into orbit next winter) are, in effect, an instance of the Government's policy uncertainty as regards future social or public service objectives in broadcasting policy.

¹⁰⁵Various economic realities make it cheaper to show American programs than to produce made-in-Canada programs. Also, the price of buying American programming is inflated as Canadian broadcasters bid against each other for the same show. See P. Attallah, "Trends and Developments in Canadian Television", especially p. 9.

which [social groups] could democratically advance their interests."¹⁰⁶ As Raboy remarks in his conclusion to *Missed Opportunities*,

the dominant alternative to letting the market economy determine social relations has been a managerial, bureaucratic form of state intervention, to such an extent that even disinterested representatives of the public interest are often hard pressed to imagine any other possible alternative... The case of Canadian broadcasting is revealing in this respect.¹⁰⁷

The discursive structuring of broadcasting policy as a choice between the "state" or the "market" prevents an imagining of alternatives to both state and market conceptions of the Canadian public.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, there are significant differences between discourses which promote a public broadcasting system serving the social and democratic goals of cultural nationalism, and discourses that support a public broadcasting system serving the goals of political nationalism.

An analysis of broadcasting policy based on the triune discourses of nationalism helps us to make the necessary distinction between political nationalist notions of the public invoked by the state for legitimization, techno-economic notions of the public as consumers and audiences, and cultural nationalist notions of the public which refer to the people of Canada.

Broadcasting policy discourses demonstrate how the Canadian Government has defined and is now redefining Canada. An analysis of broadcasting policy discourses reveals that Canadians are now faced with public rhetoric that emphasizes Canada

¹⁰⁶M Raboy, *Missed Opportunities*, p. 337.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, p. 335. For instance, an alternative conception of the public based in cultural nationalism, defined in terms of the nation, where the "nation" refers to the people in a democratic polity.

primarily as a market, just as earlier policy discourse had defined it as a state and/or as a nation. However, as broadcasting policy discourses become increasingly technoeconomic, they refer less and less to cultural and democratic objectives. This may not necessarily be the best way to serve the needs and interests of the most important aspect of Canada -- its people.

5. Conclusion

Although the ideology of nationalism is under pressure in an increasingly integrated and interdependent world,¹ the theory has not lost its relevance.

Almost every year the United Nations admits new members. And many 'old nations,' once thought fully consolidated, find themselves challenged by 'sub'-nationalism within their borders -- nationalism which, naturally, dreams of shedding this sub-ness one happy day. The reality is quite plain: the 'end of nationalism,' so long prophesied, is not remotely in sight. Indeed, national-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time.²

Nationalism, as both a concept and a program, continues to thrive, although in more complex forms than traditional theories allow. Instead of abandoning the theory of nationalism, we have to recognize that there are problems with the way in which it has been theorized, and begin to think about it in new and more open ways.

Canada provides a fascinating case study for the reworking of the theory of nationalism. First, Canadian policy makers have long been concerned, at least rhetorically, with national identity and with the relationship between communications and nationalism. Secondly, Canada's communication/information and cultural policies are *de facto* models for the world -- in the sense that other countries are now compelled to face an interdependent global environment that makes it increasingly difficult to protect and promote national sovereignty and national goals and priorities. Thirdly, Canada does not fit in to "the existing Procrustean bed of academic theory",

¹R. Collins, "National Culture: A Contradiction in Terms", p. 229.

²B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 12.

and therefore demands the reexamination of traditional conceptions of nationalism.³ Furthermore, Canada's particular form of nationalism -- one which accommodates many different cultural imaginings, and one which is characterized by competing nationalist discourses -- may also provide a template for a new way of organizing and thinking about national communities and ways of life.

In this thesis, I have examined 'traditional' theories of nationalism, primarily represented by Ernest Gellner, arguing that they do not apply to the Canadian case because Canada has never exhibited the apparently necessary congruence of state and nation. Instead, we have the numerous realities and contradictions of the Canadian case.

Because they have not been able to imagine themselves as a nation in any traditional sense, Canadians have often turned to technology as a unifying influence, both materially and rhetorically. Many scholars have pointed to the special relationship that Canadian nationalist ideology has with technology -- in particular, the myth that communication technologies have contributed to the creation and maintenance of a Canadian national identity and consciousness. However, technological nationalism overlooks the paradox that communication technologies have predominately offered Canadians a national experience in common with the United States.⁴ Technological nationalism also obscures the existence of different discourses in the Canadian experience.

³R. Collins, *Culture, Communication, and National Identity*, pp. 137-8.

⁴M. Charland, "Technological Nationalism", p. 210. Canadians already experience American culture directly, through broadcasting technologies. However, under the Free Trade Agreement, and as a result of the opening up of the Canadian telecommunications sector to competition, Canadians will also experience American (corporate) culture in less obvious ways, as Canada's way of doing things approaches the United States'. See E. Comor "The DOC Under the Free Trade Regime", pp. 253-6 and V. Mosco "Toward a Transnational World Information Order", pp. 50-6.

Since neither traditional theories of nationalism, nor theories which posit an affirmative relationship between technology and identity, seem to adequately explain the Canadian case, I have endeavoured to derive an understanding that is more relevant to Canada's experience of nationalism. The communications theory of nationalism presented in this thesis -- based on Daniel Bell's triune theory of society in *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* -- is better equipped to explain and discern the nature and experience of nationalism in Canada.

Instead of an exclusive, monolithic national identity, or an imperfect technologically mediated nationalism, there are three nationalist discourses -- cultural, political and techno-economic -- which have in turn defined Canada as a nation, a state, or a market.⁵ These three discourses operate, sometimes in concert and other times in opposition, in complex inter-relationships.

Political nationalism is centred around the state and is oriented towards the concerns and goals of governments. In a democratic society, political nationalist discourses make use of all languages of nationalism, to promote the state's interest in a way that will be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the public. **Cultural nationalism** focuses on the nation. It is intent on providing an environment in which members of the imagined community can pursue goals of individual growth and identity formation. Cultural nationalist discourses are also directed towards promoting and protecting a strong and viable national identity which is the sum of the community's imaginings. **Techno-economic nationalism** has at its heart the market and the importance of economic and technological development and advance. Its primary objective is securing a favourable position in the international marketplace.

Thinking of nationalism as composed of these three discourses allows us to develop a more nuanced and more critical understanding of nationalism and of its role in

⁵There are also, of course, variations *within* each discourse.

Canadian communications policy. A communications theory of nationalism, which focuses on nationalism as discourse, reminds us of the unifying power of nationalist discourses -- to create linkages in an otherwise dispersed country -- and of the function of nationalist language as a legitimizer of political activity. It also reveals the way in which policy discourses are structured to suit particular state goals -- for example, in the way in which "public" is defined. Additionally, an analysis of nationalism as discourse also exposes the changing priorities of policy-makers, as they imagine Canada alternately as nation, state, or market.

The triune theory of nationalism proved useful in an analysis of Canadian telecommunications and broadcasting policy documents, demonstrating changes in the languages of nationalism, from the 1970s to the present. The shifts in policy discourses, primarily from cultural nationalism towards techno-economic nationalism, reflect the Government of Canada's changing public philosophy and reveals the current trajectory for communications policy in Canada away from cultural considerations to a prioritization of technological and industrial development.

While the pursuit of technological development has long been a priority of the Government of Canada, which argued that it was the means to an end -- the diffusion and exchange of regional and national identities and ways of life, and the creation and sustaining of a Canadian culture -- it is now focused on technological and economic mechanisms as would-be promoters and protectors of Canada's sovereignty. However, techno-economic nationalism allows technological development to become an end in itself.

As this thesis has shown, the pursuit of technological and industrial development in the field of communications, has not necessarily contributed to the creation or protection of Canadian sovereignty, be it political, cultural, or techno-economic. Paradoxically, Canadian hardware, the carriage side of the communications equation,

has most often been filled with foreign software, or content. The privileging of techno-economic nationalist discourses in communications policy has contributed to a prioritization of the development of technologies, which have, in effect, become pathways for American programming. Furthermore, the tendency for techno-economic discourse to operate mainly in the interests of profit, makes it increasingly difficult to promote cultural nationalist goals.

The lesson to be drawn from this is not that techno-economic nationalism is inherently bad -- it is a way of thinking that has contributed to the extremely high technical quality and wide penetration of communications services throughout the country, and has made Canada a world leader in the telecommunications sector⁶ -- but that no one nationalist language should monopolize policy discourses.

Techno-economic nationalism, with its focus on the market, does not provide an adequate site for the realization of individual, social or national goals. However, a prioritization of political nationalism has the potential to serve only the interests of the state, and cultural nationalism, taken to its extreme, will promote only an elitist culture and exclusive notions of the nation's identity. In a democratic society there must be interplay among the discourses of nationalism in order to promote political equality, cultural pluralism, and economic efficiency.⁷

It may well be that the three discourses of nationalism, and their competing and complementary nature, have provided Canada with a novel way to exist as a nation-state. Just as Canadian communications policies are becoming models for a

⁶Canada leads OECD countries in telephone and cable penetration. 99 per cent of Canadian homes have at least one telephone, 98 per cent have at least one television. Cable companies supply service to 66 per cent of Canadian homes and, because it is a subscription service, one assumes that it has the capacity to serve even more. See for example, R. Babe, *Telecommunications in Canada*, pp. 22-4 & 210, and the DOC's *The Information Society: New Media . New Choices*, pp. 22-5.

⁷R. Collins, *Culture, Communication & National Identity*, p. xii

globalizing world, so the triune theory of nationalism may be of interest to other nation-states as they grapple with the problems of the post-industrial age, striving to find a position for themselves in the new international environment.

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