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**Measures of Moral Orientation:
Discriminant and Convergent Validity**

by

Nina E. Mosion, B.A.

**A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts**

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

September, 1995

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Measures of Moral Orientation:
Discriminant and Convergent Validity

submitted by Nina E. Mosion, B.A.
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Connie M. K...", is written over a horizontal line.

Thesis Supervisor

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Chair, Department of Psychology

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September 1995

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Abstract

Based on the responses of 105 participants, this research examined the construct and criterion validity of various scales purported to measure care and justice moral orientation, namely Stiller and Forrest's (1990) written version of Gilligan's interview procedure, Rogers (1987) Washington University Sentence Completion Task, Liddell, Halpin and Halpin's (1992) Measure of Moral Orientation, Friedman, Robinson and Friedman's (1987) measure of Moral Orientation, Yacker and Weinberg's (1990) Moral Orientation Scale. Only Liddell, Halpin and Halpin's (1992) measure displayed any evidence of construct validity in that it was related to Rogers' (1987) Washington University Sentence Completion Task, which was the Gilligan-style measure of moral orientation. In terms of convergent and divergent validity, none of the scales displayed high levels of either of these. None of the scales displayed the expected convergent validity in that they were generally minimally related to measures of the nature of the self (Singelis, 1994; Stiller and Forrest, 1990), participants' resource allocation (Rasinski, 1987), and measures of the contextualized nature of their attitudes. Of the measures, only Liddell et al.'s measure displayed evidence, albeit minimal, of construct and criterion validity. In an attempt to account for these rather disappointing findings, various explanations are considered, including the possibility, as Mednick (1989) put it, the notion of "different voices" in moral reasoning may simply be a popular 'bandwagon' rather than a psychological reality.

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Introduction

Learning to interact with others in appropriate ways constitutes a major aspect of moral development, and what is considered appropriate depends on one's perspective, or "moral reasoning." The study of moral development has had a longer history than the study of virtually any other aspect of development, dating back to prescientific periods when philosophers and theologians heatedly debated the child's moral status at birth and its implications for how the child was to be raised.

Morality, as originally defined within psychology, involved specific behaviours, ranging from helping others to resisting the temptation to cheat (Blasi, 1987). An important shift in this perspective occurred with the advent of cognitive developmentalism (Piaget, 1932). Cognitive developmental theory focuses on the rational thinking of the developing individual and on the thought processes underlying moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1959). It claims that cognitive development unfolds in a stage-like sequence, which is ordered and uniform for all individuals, and advances through our interactions with other people. Interaction serves the important functions of exposing people to others' dissimilar thinking and providing the external arena in which people can use their moral judgements. In simple terms, morality can be defined as "conscience," or a set of internalized sociocultural rules governing the appropriateness of social behaviour (Kohlberg, 1964). Moral development, then, involves the internalization and

organization of these guiding principles over time, and is directed toward the organization of priorities and values in social situations, thereby functioning as a basic framework for one's moral orientation.

A current debate in both moral psychology and philosophy concerns Lawrence Kohlberg's (1958, 1969) ethic of justice on the one hand, which takes as its guiding principle the respect for rules, rights and regulations of individuals, and Carol Gilligan's (1982) ethic of care, on the other, which takes as its central moral tenet the maintenance of relationships between people and the satisfaction of their needs and expectations. By no means is the study of moral development limited to the duelling perspectives of Kohlberg and Gilligan. They do, however, encapsulate the two overarching themes in contemporary moral development theory and research. Moreover, their perspectives form the essence of the research conducted in this thesis, which concerns the convergent and discriminant validity of measures purporting to quantify the extent to which people are focused on the ethics of justice and care. The findings and methods used to support the claims of the disciples and critics of these justice and care orientations therefore merit discussion.

Kohlberg and the Ethic of Justice

One of the first systematic attempts to study moral development was by Kohlberg (1958, 1969) who proposed a comprehensive scheme for the development of moral reasoning. Building on Piaget's (1932) work,

Kohlberg identified three major levels of moral understanding, each involving the philosophical concept of justice as the central characteristic of morality. According to Kohlberg, then, one's understanding of justice is central to one's moral perspective.

In 1958 Kohlberg began longitudinal testing of a group of 72 white, middle-class boys in Chicago, aged 10 to 16 years. In his original interviews, Kohlberg presented participants with 10 hypothetical moral dilemmas, such as the classic "Heinz" dilemma that brings the values of 'life' and 'law' into conflict. Kohlberg was not interested in whether these participants decided that Heinz should or should not steal the drug to save his wife, but in the reasons they gave for their judgments. These reasons, he believed, reflected the underlying "structures" or schemas of their moral thought. Kohlberg distinguished between three levels of moral reasoning in the responses the boys gave as they grew older, namely the preconventional, conventional and postconventional levels, each with two substages.

According to Kohlberg (1958, 1969), children up to the age of nine years function at one of the two stages of preconventional reasoning. In the first stage, moral action is determined outside the self, usually by authority figures, and is characterized as the "might makes right" phase of moral development (Clarke-Stewart, Friedman & Koch, 1985, p. 547). The second stage of preconventional reasoning involves a "market place morality,"

where one's moral actions involve making deals so that they "look out for number one" (Clarke-Stewart et al., 1985, p. 547). Moral reasoning at this level is primarily based on gaining rewards and avoiding punishment and is essentially self-serving.

At the level of conventional moral reasoning, where most adolescents and adults function, proper behaviour is seen as following society's rules and conventions, such as living up to family obligations and showing concern for others. The third stage of moral reasoning is referred to as "good boy - nice girl" because people at this stage seek the approval of others and are concerned with doing the "good" thing. In stage four, known as the "law and order" stage, what is good is seen as doing one's duty for the benefit of the social majority (Clarke-Stewart et al., 1985, p.547).

Only about 20% of adults attain Kohlberg's third level, postconventional moral reasoning, where morality is judged internally by an individual's own personal standards, rather than by the external standards of society (Clarke-Stewart et al., 1985, p.548). The ability to think abstractly and an understanding of the concept of relativism are required at this level, where the principles of social reciprocity and justice are paramount. The basic belief in the first postconventional stage is that laws are in place for the general welfare of all people, but they are subject to change if they become destructive. In the sixth and final stage, individuals make their judgments on the basis of universal ethical principles, which are brought

about through individual reflection, independent of authority figures and popular opinion (Clarke-Stewart et al., 1985, p.548).

Much research has supported Kohlberg's cognitive stage model of moral development, particularly in terms of the invariant developmental aspects involving the increase in moral stage level with advancing age. The reader is referred to Turiel (1955), Freeman and Giebink (1979), and deReimers (191) for a sample of studies whose results supported Kohlberg's early contentions. Nevertheless, following the original formulation of his theory of moral development, and in response to theoretical and empirical comments, Kohlberg revised some of his theoretical assumptions (Kohlberg, Levine & Hower, 1983) and refined the interview scoring system (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). Despite these modifications, several contentious issues remain.

Research into the cross-cultural claims, for example, has shown that the actual issue choices are often culturally patterned (Boyes & Walker, 1988; Harkness, Edwards & Super, 1981; Lei, 1980; Nissan & Kohlberg, 1982, as cited in Snarey, 1985; Snarey, 1982; Vasudev & Hummel, 1987). Although Kohlberg's interview cannot be culture free, it does appear to be reasonably culture fair provided that the content is creatively adapted and the participant is interviewed in their native language. Importantly, however, Kohlberg's scheme nevertheless fails to capture some of the "collective" values evidenced in the moral reasoning of rural folk culture and working

class communities.

Perhaps the most controversial issue pertaining to Kohlberg's work involves the extent to which his stage model of moral reasoning is sexist (Gilligan, 1982), typically evaluating "characteristically feminine concerns for welfare, caring, and responsibility" as lower forms of moral development, ones that lay beneath the more elite, and typically more "masculine values such as rationality, individuality, abstraction, detachment and impersonality" (Walker, 1984, p.677).

Evidence for Gilligan's claim that Kohlberg's scoring system discriminates against females is, however, lacking as several studies found no gender differences in stage of moral development (Gibbs & Widamon, 1982; Nissan & Kohlberg, 1982; Snarey, deReimer, & Kohlberg, 1985). A meta-analysis by Walker (1984) examined all studies (80) in which Kohlberg's measure was used to examine gender differences in moral reasoning. The pattern revealed by the review was quite apparent: of the 152 samples, a non-significant difference was reported for the vast majority (130, or 85.5%).

Because education and occupation are social experiences that affect moral development (Rest, 1979, 1986), it could be expected that in those studies where gender was confounded with education and/or occupation, gender differences in moral reasoning would be attenuated, if not eliminated, when levels of these experiences were controlled. In studies where these

variables were controlled, gender differences in moral reasoning were not observed (Baumrind, 1986; Powers, 1983; Speicher-Dubin, 1982). In summary, the overall pattern yielded by Walker's (1984) review was one of no gender differences in Kohlberg's stage structure.

Research using the Defining Issues Test (DIT), a paper and pencil measure of moral reasoning developed by James Rest (1979, 1986), has also been found trivial gender differences (Rest, 1986; Thomas, 1986). In the DIT, participants rate and rank the extent to which "stage-prototypical" issues are important in their attempt to resolve each of six hypothetical moral dilemmas. The DIT assumes that people at different developmental stages consider different issues to be important in moral dilemmas (Rest, 1983). One story in the DIT, for example, is the famous 'Heinz' dilemma, which first appeared in Kohlberg's (1958) dissertation. The specific issues that subjects consider are written to reflect elements that distinguish the various stages of moral development. A stage two item for the Heinz dilemma, for example, is "Is Heinz willing to risk getting shot as a burglar or going to jail for the chance that stealing the drug might help?" and a stage six item for this same dilemma is, "What values are going to be the basis for governing how people act toward each other?" (Rest, 1983, p.594). Finally, the DIT scores are reasonably correlated ($r = .70$) with those obtained from Kohlberg's interview techniques, although the relationship does fluctuate depending on the sample (Rest, 1983, p.585; Rest, 1986, p.102). In

research using the DIT rather than Kohlberg's interview, less than one-half of one percent of the variance in DIT scores is attributable to gender. What's more, where gender differences have been observed, females scored higher on the DIT than males (Thoma, 1986).

Gilligan and the Ethic of Care

No other aspect of Kohlberg's theory has generated as much controversy as the extent to which his model characterizes the moral development of males rather than females. In her book In a Different Voice, Gilligan (1982) argued that Kohlberg's theory and research are heavily gender-biased as his original sample included only males, and that females, because of their unique perspectives and concerns, should be included in the study of moral development. Gilligan reasons that their inclusion might produce a different perspective on moral development, for both males and females.

Interpreting data from 29 women facing an abortion decision (Gilligan & Belenky, 1980), Gilligan constructed a developmental sequence of moral reasoning that differed from the one devised by Kohlberg. In her stage model, the "youngest" reasoner considers only the pragmatic needs of the self's survival, a developmentally "older" reasoner considers issues of responsibility toward others to whom she is connected and whom she wants to avoid hurting, and the most advanced reasoner considers a more comprehensive definition of "caring" that includes caring for the needs of

the self as well as the needs of others (Tronto, 1987). The three moral perspectives revealed by the decisions of the women in Gilligan and Belenky's (1980) abortion study denote a sequence in the development of the "ethic of care."

Not surprisingly, questions about the generalizability of women's abortion decisions have been raised (Smetana, 1981). Clearly, as Gilligan (1982, 1988) has stated, research concerning justice and care moral orientations and their relations to gender must ultimately assess the reactions of both genders to a representative set of moral problems.

Going beyond her critique of Kohlberg's failure to consider women, Gilligan (1982, 1988) provided a reformulation of Kohlberg's theory based on the premise that an important voice was not present in his view, and concluded that there are two basic approaches to moral reasoning. In the justice or rights perspective, people are differentiated and seen as standing alone - the focus is on the rights of the individual. In the care or response perspective, people are viewed in terms of their connectedness with other people, and the focus is on their communication with others. From Gilligan's view, Kohlberg greatly underplayed the importance of the care perspective in the moral development of both females and males (Clarke et al., 1985, p.554).

In her discussion of orientation differences, Gilligan (1977, 1982) raised several related issues. From her original work, she proposed four

"hypotheses" concerning the moral development of women and men. First, Gilligan initially argued that the two patterns of rights and responsibilities as foci are distinct, independent approaches to moral judgement. Second, these orientations are supposedly gender-linked, with the responsibility focus more typical of women and the rights focus more typical of men. Third, women's and men's patterns of moral judgement are seen as especially closely bound to their self-concepts. Finally, Gilligan argued that women's moral judgements, anchored in concerns regarding well-being and the particular consequences of situated actions, are inherently more concrete and context-bound than the abstract, rights focused judgements of men.

The research findings, using either Gilligan's own procedure and/or various Gilligan-style methods (Donenberg & Hoffman, 1988; Galotti, 1989; Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Pratt, Golding, Hunter & Sampson, 1988; Rothbart, Hanley & Albert, 1986; Stiller & Forrest, 1990; Walker, deVries & Trevethan, 1987) or measures of care and justice developed by other researchers (Ford & Lowery, 1986; Forsyth, Nye & Kelley, 1988; Friedman, Robinson, & Friedman, 1987; Liddell, Halpin, & Halpin, 1992; Pratt & Royer, 1982; Rogers, 1987; Yacker & Weinberg, 1990), are far from consistent on the issue of gender differences.

Lyons (1983), in an empirical test of Gilligan's hypotheses, developed a coding scheme to capture a person's overall self-conception as either separate (expressing interpersonal relationships in terms of reciprocity

between separate individuals) or connected (experiencing interpersonal relationships in terms of responding to others in the other's own terms) and their overall justice or care orientation to moral reasoning. Based on open-ended interviews with 36 participants aged 8 to over 60, Lyons found that men's self-orientation tended to be separate, and their orientation to moral reasoning revolved around issues of justice and rights. By contrast, women tended to orient to the self in a connected style and to adopt a care and responsibility orientation to moral reasoning. Lyons also presented data indicating that self-orientation and moral orientation were highly related, with a separate sense of self associated with a justice/rights orientation to moral dilemmas and a connected sense of self predicting a responsibility/care moral orientation. Though males and females used both orientations in constructing, resolving, and evaluating their dilemmas, males raised significantly more justice considerations while females considered significantly more care considerations.

A study by Johnston (1987) with sixty 11 and 15 year olds produced similar results in that there were gender differences in the moral orientation used spontaneously and in the orientation chosen for the best solution, with boys preferring to use justice thinking and girls preferring to use care thinking. However, both boys and girls were able to explain the logic of their non-preferred orientation.

Rothbart, Hanley, and Albert (1986) examined the effects of both gender and dilemma content on moral orientation preference. Twenty five males and 25 females, aged 18 to 25 years, were administered three dilemmas: (1) justice-orientated, (2) care-orientated, and (3) self-generated. When participants are allowed to describe their own situations, the context may allow more freedom to follow their own orientation (Murphy & Gilligan, 1980). The dilemmas were coded as per Lyon's (1983) coding scheme. Rothbart et al. (1986) also employed a form of Lyon's coding scheme with a "twist;" this departure involved the use of double coding in cases where considerations of both care and justice were identified in one statement.

The results of this study indicated that various dilemmas pulled for predominantly one orientation, as expected. Kohlberg's Heinz dilemma produced predominantly justice responses from over 76% of the participants; the care-oriented dilemma produced the opposite effect, with 78% of participants referring to predominantly care considerations. For the self-generated, open-ended dilemma, 40% of the participants produced predominantly justice responses and 56% produced predominantly care responses. Both care and justice responses were found in the statements of both men and women. These data did not, however, support Lyon's (1983) findings of a complete absence of care responses in 36% of the males whom she interviewed, and an absence of justice responses in 37% of her female participants. Indeed, only 4% of the participants in Rothbart

et al.'s study used one orientation exclusively for any of the three dilemmas, and all participants exhibited both modes of reasoning in the course of the interviews. These researchers believed, however, that this difference may have been due in part to the fact that they coded justice and care orthogonally.

Continuing the research into the impact of dilemma content and gender on moral orientation, Walker, deVries and Trevethan (1987) administered three hypothetical dilemmas and solicited one self-generated moral dilemma from 80 family triads (mother, father and one child, from grades 1, 4, 7 or 10). Both the hypothetical and real dilemmas were scored for both stage level, as per the most recent reformulation of Kohlberg's scheme (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987), and moral orientation, following Lyon's (1983) method. To discern whether gender influences the types of dilemmas that people recount, or whether it is tied to a more basic difference in orientation to solving moral problems, content analyses were performed on the real-life dilemmas. The dilemmas were "scored" for (1) the content of the moral issue that was the focus of the dilemma (the researchers identified 30), and (2) the nature of the relationship involved in the dilemma (personal or impersonal).

In terms of dilemma content, children's dilemmas more commonly focused on issues concerning friendship, honesty, theft and fighting (76.3% vs. 30.6% for adults), whereas adult's dilemmas clustered around family-

related, work versus family, and work-related issues. A gender difference also appeared in that women raised family-related issues more often than did men (26.3% vs. 10.0%) and men raised work-related issues more often than did women (32.5% vs. 6.3%). Work-related issues were, however, particularly prevalent among women who worked outside the home as opposed to homemakers (32.7% vs. 16.1%). Other analyses revealed that most individuals used a mixture of both orientations, with no clear preference or focus, and that responses to real-life and hypothetical dilemmas were similar, although adults tended to use care and response considerations more with real-life situations and more so than did children. Finally, although the results indicated no gender differences in stage of moral reasoning, both gender and dilemma type interacted with age. Among adults, women displayed higher care and response scores than did men (52.7% vs 44.1%), as Gilligan maintained. The content of the dilemmas was also found to have an effect, with the hypothetical dilemmas eliciting a significant pull on the orientation that the individual evidenced, in other words, care-oriented hypothetical dilemmas tended to elicit care-oriented responses, while justice-oriented hypothetical dilemmas tended to elicit justice-oriented responses. However, significant overall gender differences were observed in regard to the real-life dilemmas.

Thus, the results of this study and others like it (Pratt et al., 1988; Rothbart et al., 1986) indicated that various dilemma contents pulled for

predominantly one orientation, as was expected, and that most individuals use a mixture of both orientations when discussing self-generated dilemmas. Gender differences in self-generated moral orientation preference were observed in both the Walker et al. (1987) and Pratt et al. (1988) studies, but not in the Rothbart et al. (1986) study. However, this may have been an artifact of the different coding methods used in these studies.

Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) conducted a series of three studies, searching for evidence for the existence of both perspectives in people's actual moral dilemmas, and whether there was an association between moral orientation and gender. All participants described a real-life moral dilemma, and their responses were analyzed using Lyons' (1983) content analysis scheme. Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) observed that most people, regardless of gender, displayed both moral orientations (69% compared to 31% who used Care or Justice only). Further, a full two thirds of the reported dilemmas were in the Focus categories (Care Only, Care Focus, Justice Only, Justice Focus) with only one third in the mixed Care-Justice category. Finally, although both men and women presented dilemmas in the Care-Justice category, a Care Focus was more likely in the moral dilemmas of women and a Justice Focus was more likely in the dilemmas of men.

The findings presented by Gilligan and Attanucci suggest that people know and use both moral orientations yet, in support of Gilligan's (1982) proposition that (a) men and women resolve moral dilemmas differently and

(b) care and justice are independent dimensions of moral reasoning, they also report that women tend to use the care orientation predominantly, while men prefer the use of the justice orientation, thereby supporting Gilligan's contention that these moral orientations are gender-related, albeit not gender-exclusive.

In a study of secondary school children, Donenberg and Hoffman (1988) observed, as suggested by Gilligan, two distinct modes of moral thought, justice and care, and while males and females used both strategies in making their moral choices, there was a propensity for the two voices to be differentially related to gender. However, in a study of undergraduates' responses to the question "When faced with a moral dilemma, what issues or concerns influence your decision?," Galotti (1989) found that the essays of men and women were not distinguishable when analysed for the use of six feminine and six masculine "themes."

Further research by Stiller and Forrest (1990), employing a written version of Gilligan's (1982) original verbal interview, revealed no differences between males' and females' having a separate sense of self, but that females had a more connected sense of self than did men. In addition, men used the justice/rights mode more often than did women while women used the care/response mode more frequently than did men. In general, the results of this study suggest that there are differences between women's and men's self-descriptions and their moral reasoning.

In sum, research on moral orientation that has used Gilligan's suggested open-ended method of measuring moral orientation has produced results which have tended to support Gilligan's original hypotheses. The two patterns of responding have been found to be independent and distinct approaches to moral reasoning (Donenberg & Hoffman, 1988; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988). These orientations seem to be gender linked, with the responsibility focus more typical of women and the rights focus more typical of men (Donenberg & Hoffman, 1988; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Stiller & Forrest, 1990), although both women and men were observed to use both care and justice in the resolution of their moral dilemmas. Third, women's and men's patterns of moral judgement appear to be closely bound to their self-concepts, with women orientated to the self in a connected style and adopting the care orientation, whereas men are orientated to the self in a separate manner while adopting the justice orientation (Lyons, 1983). Finally, in terms of dilemma content, the findings (Pratt et al., 1988; Rothbart et al., 1986; Walker et al., 1987) indicated that various dilemma contents can pull for predominantly one orientation, as was expected, and that most individuals use a mixture of both orientations when discussing self-generated moral dilemmas.

Measures of Care and Justice Moral Reasoning

The plethora of research examining care and justice moral reasoning came about, in part, as researchers developed alternative paper and pencil

measures purporting to measure these constructs, constructs that had, until then, been constrained to more demanding interviews for their measurement. These measures include Forsyth, Nye and Kelley's (1988) Ethic of Caring Scale; Friedman, Robinson and Friedman's (1987) Care and Justice Measure; Yacker and Weinberg's (1990) Moral Orientation Scale Using Childhood Dilemmas; Ford and Lowery's (1986) Justice and Care Scale; Rogers' (1987) Washington University Sentence Completion Test; Pratt and Royer's (1982) Altered DIT; and Liddell, Halpin, and Halpin's (1992) Measure of Moral Orientation.

Forsyth et al. (1988) examined the relationship between Gilligan's (1982) theory of moral thought and Forsyth's (1980) two dimensional model of personal moral philosophies. One dimension, idealism, involves a person's concern for the welfare of others. The second dimension, relativism, refers to the extent to which individuals base their personal moral philosophies on universal ethical rules. Gilligan's ethic of care therefore appears to be conceptually similar to the idealism dimension identified in Forsyth's studies of individual differences in moral thought (Forsyth, 1980, 1981, 1985; Forsyth & Pope, 1984). When individuals adopt an ethic of caring, they base their judgements and actions on their relationships with, and responsibilities to, other individuals. Similarly, idealistic individuals agree with such items as "A person should make certain that his (or her) actions never intentionally harm another even to a small degree." The ethic

of care may also be inversely related to relativism if individuals regard caring for others as a fundamental, universal moral principle.

These researchers (Forsyth et al., 1988) examined the relationship between these two models of individual differences in moral thought by developing a brief 10-item, self-report measure of Gilligan's ethic of care and observed that individuals who adopted an idealistic moral philosophy also tended to espouse an ethic of caring. Although relativism and idealism were not correlated ($r = -.06$), both scales were significantly correlated with an ethic of caring ($r_s = .53$ and $-.13$, $p_s < .001$ and $.05$, respectively), individuals who were both high in idealism and low in relativism were particularly likely to endorse an ethic of caring. However, consistent with Forsyth's previous work (1980, 1981) but contrary to Gilligan's (1982) original and more recent research (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988), men and women did not differ in their endorsement of idealism, relativism, or an ethic of caring.

Pratt and Royer (1982) attempted to assess the role of gender, sex-roles (Bem Sex-Role Inventory, BSRI, Bem, 1975), dilemma content, and ideal and actual self-concept in the distinctions between rights and responsibility focused moral reasoning. Participants were males and females aged 14 to 40 years. To assess individual differences in the tendency to prefer one orientation or the other, the researchers rewrote four of Rest's (1979) 12 DIT dilemmas to reflect Gilligan's two hypothesized

orientations. In addition, two of these four dilemmas were rewritten to include a familiar person as the protagonist rather than the usual hypothetical character of the standard dilemma.

Following Gilligan (1977, 1982), Pratt and Royer (1982) predicted that the rights- and responsibility-focused responding would be distinct; that the rights focus would be more typical of males and the responsibility focus would be most representative of females, and that variations in sex-role related aspects of the self-concept would be related to moral orientation, with greater femininity associated with a greater orientation toward concerns about responsibility and well-being.

The results of these studies revealed that, for college-aged males and females, the correlations between moral orientation and sex-role self-concept were positive and substantial ($r_s = .46$ and $.81$, $p_s < .01$, respectively). These correlations, however, were non-significant for the older males and females ($r_s = .01$ and $.24$, respectively). Gilligan's (1977, 1982) hypothesis that justice and care moral orientations are distinct, therefore, was supported by the older, but not the younger, age group. A stepwise regression analysis also revealed that a more feminine ideal self predicted a greater responsibility orientation for women, but not for men. Overall, these findings are quite consistent in indicating that there are individual differences in preferences for responsibility-focused and rights-focused moral reasoning, especially among women. However, these differences appear to be more

closely linked to ideal sex-role conceptions than to gender. In addition, the results suggest that the two moral orientations are only moderately distinct.

Like Pratt and Royer (1982), Friedman et al.(1987) developed a series of DIT-like items to measure care and justice orientations and found that male and female college students did not differ in their endorsement of these items. In addition, respondents' masculinity and femininity scores, as assessed by Spence and Helmreich's (1978) Personal Attributes Questionnaire, were unrelated to their Justice and Care scores. Overall, then, neither gender nor sex-differentiated personality attributes were reliably associated with individuals' scores on Friedman et al.'s (1987) measure of moral orientation.

Yacker and Weinberg's (1990) quantitative measure of adult moral reasoning, The Moral Orientation Scale Using Childhood Dilemmas (MOS), is a short, objective measure that presents adults with a series of twelve dilemmas frequently faced by children, and requires the participant to respond as if they were the parent. Each dilemma is followed by two care- and two justice-orientated responses to the dilemma. Used with undergraduates aged 20 to 42, the MOS showed males to be more justice-orientated in their reasoning than females, who were more care-orientated.

In the development of their care and justice scale, Ford and Lowery (1986) had college students complete a self-report questionnaire on three moral dilemmas they had experienced, and then rate their use of both justice

and care orientations in resolving those dilemmas, as well as the importance and difficulty of each conflict. Participants' sex-role was also assessed using the Interpersonal Disposition Inventory (Berzins, Welling, & Wetter, 1977).

The results of Ford and Lowery's study indicated that there were different reliability patterns for men and women on the justice and care ratings. For women, the care ratings for the three conflicts were significantly more stable across the questionnaire than were the justice ratings, while for men, the reverse was true. It seems, then, that the care orientation is a consistent consideration for women, and the justice orientation is a consistent consideration for men. Although men and women tended to differ in the predicted directions in their use of care and justice reasoning, these differences were small and non-significant. Both women and men apparently consider questions of relationship, care, and responsibility, as well as questions of fairness, justice, and rights, and they considered them fairly equally. Ford and Lowery's results also showed that for both men and women, their more important and more difficult moral decisions were more related to issues of care than to issues of justice.

Rogers (1987) introduced a new measure of the justice and care orientations using the Washington University Sentence Completion Test (WUSCT) and a scoring system based upon Gilligan's (1982) and Lyons' (1983) descriptions of the moral orientations. Data from a sample of male

and female high school students and a sample of male and female college students (from Loevinger, Cohn, Bonneville, Redmore, Streich, & Sargent's, 1985, longitudinal college sample) indicated that these two moral orientations were relatively independent rather than mutually exclusive categories or types. For the high school sample, justice scores were higher for boys for girls, and conversely, care scores were higher for girls than boys. Though the gender differences were also observed a second time in the college sample, the differences were relatively smaller for this sample than for the high school sample. Overall, Roger's findings demonstrated that males and females can and do use both moral orientations as they mature, but that girls (and women) rely more on care reasoning than do boys (and men).

More recently, Liddell, Halpin and Halpin (1992) introduced yet another paper and pencil instrument, the Measure of Moral Reasoning, to assess both care and justice constructs. The measure was found to have adequate psychometric properties regarding internal consistency and convergent and discriminant validity (see Method section), however data were not provided as to gender differences.

Overall, several studies have supported Gilligan's assertion that women tend to resolve moral dilemmas using a care approach while men use a justice orientation (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Lyons, 1983; Pratt, Golding, Hunter & Sampson, 1988; Rothbart et al., 1986; Stiller & Forrest,

1990; Walker et al., 1987). Each of these studies followed Gilligan's suggested method for the investigation of moral orientation: the examiner elicited descriptions of dilemmas from the respondents' own real-life experiences. When Gilligan's suggested procedure has not been used and a standardized hypothetical dilemma has been presented instead, gender differences in moral orientation usually have not been observed (Pratt et al., 1988; Rothbart, Hanley & Albert, 1986; Walker, 1989). Further, evidence suggests that dilemmas with personal relevance or intimate personal content may elicit higher levels of care responding than dilemmas with impersonal or highly abstract content (Ford & Lowery, 1986; Galotti, 1989; Rothbart et al., 1986; Stiller & Forrest, 1990; Walker et al., 1987).

When alternative, fixed-format rather than interview-based measures of care and justice have been employed, conflicting results have been found. Some researchers have found evidence for gender differences using their own measures (Johnston, 1987; Rogers, 1987; Yacker & Weinberg, 1990), while other researchers have not (Ford & Lowery, 1986; Forsyth et al., 1988; Friedman et al., 1987; Pratt & Royer, 1982).

In terms of the nature of the self-concept, studies have found that sex-role self-concept and moral orientation are positively and substantially correlated, primarily for young adults and less so for older adults (Pratt & Royer, 1982). Friedman et al. (1987), however, reported that neither gender nor gender-role self-concept were reliably associated with the

participant's scores on their measures of moral judgement.

In addition to the mixed findings regarding gender and gender-role differences in moral reasoning, another issue that continues to divide both theoreticians and empirical researchers is the extent to which these two processes, care and justice reasoning, are orthogonal. Unfortunately, the orthogonality of these processes is usually not examined explicitly in research, and therefore cannot be fully assessed. Moreover, none of the studies that has assessed the orthogonality of care and justice reasoning has used the same measure of moral orientation.

Originally, Gilligan (1982) maintained that a person is either care- or justice-orientated. Currently, she (Gilligan, 1988; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988) is more moderate in her construal of care and justice reasoning, conceding that they can co-exist in the moral reasoning of both males and females. Her contemporary stance is therefore similar to the integrated perspective advocated by moral philosopher Paul Crittenden (1990, p.92), who stated that "care for others in any ordinary sense includes a concern for justice in their regard, where justice is also taken in any ordinary sense of concern for what is fair. At the very least, care for others would exclude unjust action in their regard in any serious way." In other words, although Kohlberg argued that justice subsumed care, others (Crittenden, 1990; Tronto, 1987) have claimed that care may subsume justice. According to Kristiansen and Hotte (1993, p.26), "given that the majority of people

display both care and justice reasoning (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988), it is likely that most people also balance or integrate the two extremes of the independent and interdependent selves." On the other hand, Friedman et al. (1987), Rogers (1987), and Liddell et al., (1992) continue to maintain that these constructs are orthogonal.

Conclusions

Since Gilligan's (1977, 1982) germinal work, there has been a proliferation of measures purporting to measure care and justice moral reasoning. As is evident from this review, however, the results across studies using various measures of care and justice reasoning are anything but consistent. Because researchers have used different measures of moral orientation, sometimes based on an interview or sometimes a new paper and pencil measure, and applied different coding systems, it is conceivable that some of these discrepancies stem from differences in the operationalization and measurement of justice and care reasoning.

Currently, the primary method of measuring care and justice constructs is Gilligan's (1982) interview method, using Lyons' (1983) coding scheme. (See Appendix I, for a description of interview and coding scheme.) The available research on moral reasoning is limited as a result of the fact that the main method is an interview, which is both time consuming and tedious to analyse, in addition to the related fact that sample sizes are usually small.

This thesis research therefore attempted to validate at least one of the various paper and pencil measures purporting to measure justice and care reasoning. To be considered valid, the various new measures should produce results which correlate with the results produced by Gilligan's interview. According to Gilligan's original hypotheses, and subsequent research, a valid measure of care and justice should produce care and justice scores that are independent of one another, or which can co-exist within the same response. Women should be more responsibility focused than men and men should be more rights focused than women, yet both care and justice themes should be present in the reasoning of men and women. In addition, because men's and women's moral judgements are likely bound to their self-concepts, participants who are care-orientated should have more interdependent self-concepts, while participants who are justice-orientated should have more independent self-construals. Further, individuals who are care-orientated should theoretically distribute resources according to the principles of equality and need, whereas individuals who are more justice-orientated should be more likely to distribute resources according to the principle of equity. Finally, to the extent that a care orientation involves contextualized reasoning (Gilligan, 1982), one would expect care-orientated people's attitudes to be more variable across situations than the attitudes of more justice-orientated reasoners. In sum, then, this study examined the convergent and discriminant validity of measures of care and measures of

justice reasoning in regard to various theoretically relevant outcomes, including gender, the nature of the self, the distribution of resources, and the contextualization of attitudes.

Method

Participants

In return for course credit or \$15.00, 78 Introductory Psychology students participated in a study concerning "Problem Resolution." To increase the diversity of the sample, an additional 27 individuals from a volunteer organization in the National Capital area also participated. The "volunteer" sample was recruited by means of a poster placed in the volunteer common area, soliciting interested persons to sign their name on a list. Prospective participants were then contacted by the primary researcher and a test package was mailed to their home. The package included the Informed Consent form, the measurement instruments, a stamped return envelope, and a note thanking the volunteer for their participation. An envelope for the participant to address was also included in the package so that a written debriefing and summary of the findings of the study could be sent separately to the participant. Please note that all of the research materials appear in Appendix II.

Most (73.3%) participants were students in an Introductory Psychology course in the summer of 1995, while the remaining respondents (26.7%) came from a volunteer organization within the National Capital area.

As summarized in Tables 1 and 2, in Appendix III, which present the descriptive statistics for participants' demographic characteristics, participants were on average 25.4 years old and had 15.4 years of formal education, indicating that many had completed more than one year of college or university. Most participants were female (63.8%) and most were single (72.4%). Tables 1 and 2 also display the results of statistical tests indicating that, compared to students, participants in the volunteer sample were older, had more years of formal education, and were more likely to be married/cohabitating, widowed, or divorced, and less likely to be single.

Predictor Variables

Four measures of participants' care and justice moral orientations were included in the questionnaire package. These were: (1) Stiller and Forrest's open-ended Measure of Moral Reasoning, (2) Rogers (1987) Washington University Sentence Completion Task, (3) Liddell, Halpin and Liddell's (1992) Measure of Moral Orientation, (4) Friedman, Robinson and Friedman's (1987) Measure of Moral Reasoning, and (5) Yacker and Weinberg's (1990) Moral Orientation Scale. These measures were selected because they included multiple items and use a fixed, paper and pencil, format. Hence, scales that did not rely on a fixed-format paper and pencil measure were excluded from this study (e.g., Donenberg & Hoffman, 1988; Galotti, 1989; Johnston, 1987). In addition, Pratt and Royer's (1982)

Altered DIT measure and Ford and Lowery's (1986) justice and care scale were not included because it was not possible to obtain copies.

Stiller and Forrest's (1990) open-ended Measure of Moral Reasoning is a written modification of the in-person interview format developed by Gilligan (1980) and Lyons (1983). In addition to generating information about the mode of self-description used by each participant, this questionnaire all elicits information about the mode of moral reasoning used by each participant to construct, resolve, and evaluate a self-generated real-life moral dilemma. The latter are assessed by three questions asking for (a) the construction of a real-life moral dilemma experienced by the participant, (b) the resolution of that dilemma, and (c) an evaluation of the resolution. In addition, the scoring system represents a modification of the scoring system developed by Lyons (1983), and the response sheets were scored independently by two scorers. The responses to the questions were categorized or "chunked" into ideas expressed by the respondent. A chunk is a word, a sentence, or a paragraph depending on whether or not it represents a complete idea. When the chunks were scored independently by two coders, Stiller and Forrest (1990) observed an inter-rater reliability of .94 and the degree of agreement for total number of self-description chunks was 97%. The overall inter-rater reliabilities for the total number of moral dilemma chunks categorized as either justice or care were .96 and .97, respectively, and inter-rater agreements were 96% and 99%, respectively.

Rogers' (1987) Washington University Sentence Completion Test (WUSCT) is a modified version of Loevinger's (1979) measure of ego development, known to have substantial construct validity. Rogers' version contains 20 of the original 35 item stems, and uses Lyons' coding scheme to analyse the content of the stem completions. In order to identify justice and care thinking as "voices" within ego development, justice and care frameworks are considered as personality orientations identifiable by particular uses of moral language. As a projective test, the WUSCT is considered to be well suited to measuring Gilligan's orientations because the item stems allow an individual to respond freely rather than having to choose among a fixed set of response alternatives. Further, Rogers developed her WUSCT coding manuals using Lyons' (1983) format (see Appendix I), a format used by Gilligan herself. And finally, research (Rogers, 1987) indicates that sufficient intercoder agreement can be achieved for content analyses of justice and care reasoning (87% and 88%, respectively).

The third measure used to assess participants' care and justice reasoning was Liddell, Halpin and Halpin's (1992) Measure of Moral Orientation. This measure consists of 10 moral dilemmas, with response options reflecting either a care orientation (e.g., "I don't want to do anything that would jeopardize my relationship with my roommate") or a justice orientation (e.g., "I should not interfere with the natural course of events"), which participants rated on a four-point scale ranging from (1) strongly

disagree to (4) strongly agree. Liddell et al.'s Measure of Moral Orientation was pilot tested on 64 undergraduates, where internal consistency estimates were adequate ($\alpha = .61$ to $.84$) and the intercorrelation between justice and care ($r = .22$) was considered low enough to suggest that justice and care reasoning were being measured independently. In addition, when field testing was conducted with 366 college students, the Measure of Moral Orientation showed the expected pattern of convergent and discriminant validity with students' scores on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers & McCaulley, 1985) of individual differences in 'thinking' versus 'feeling' personality.

The fourth measure of moral orientation included in the questionnaire package was one designed by Friedman et al. (1987), and is based on Rest's (1979) DIT, using the same instructions, format and scoring for each of four dilemmas (Heinz, Doctor, Prisoner and Newspaper)¹. Following each dilemma, participants' orientation toward the resolution of the dilemma is assessed using six justice items derived from Kohlberg, Colby, Gibbs and Speicher-Dubin's (1978) Moral Orientation Interview, (e.g., "Whether Heinz has a right to make a decision based on his own system of values"), and six items developed to assess an ethic of care based on Gilligan's (1977, 1979, 1982) descriptions (e.g., "Does Heinz have a responsibility to care for his

The Doctor's Dilemma was unfortunately omitted from the questionnaire package. In addition, participants were asked to describe and rate any other issues they deemed relevant to their resolution of each dilemma. Participants generally failed to do so, however.

wife?"). Friedman et al. (1987) reported that a sample of participants correctly matched the 12 statements with descriptions of the appropriate moral orientation 92% of the time, on average. They also reported internal consistency alphas of .78 and .85 for the justice and care scales, respectively.

The final measure of moral orientation was Yacker and Weinberg's (1990) Moral Orientation Scale Using Childhood Dilemmas (MOS). This scale was developed as a short, objective measure of preference for justice and care orientated moral thinking, and is based on the two modes of moral thinking proposed by Gilligan. The measure presents adults with a series of 12 dilemmas frequently faced by children, each followed by two care and two justice orientated responses to the dilemma. Participants read each dilemma and rank the four accompanying response alternatives in order of preference. The total score a respondent receives is equal to the number of care responses selected as first choices, and may vary from 0, indicating a strong justice orientation, to 12, indicating a strong care orientation. Limited data presented as part of the pilot study (Yacker & Weinberg, 1990) indicated that gender and experience were related to preferred modes of moral thinking, as measured by the MOS, and were in the direction postulated. In addition, the MOS displayed good test-retest reliability, and an alpha of .

Criterion Variables

Criterion validity refers to "the degree to which the test or questionnaire correlates with one or more outcome criteria" (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991, p.60). The three criterion variables assessed in participants' questionnaires included the nature of the self, indices of participants' resource distribution propensities, and their contextualized attitudinal reasoning.

The nature of the self. According to Markus and Oyserman (1989), the self-concept governs one's perception of reality. It is an important mediator and regulator of thoughts, feelings and actions. There is also a growing awareness of the possible fundamental differences in how men and women perceive themselves and their worlds, in how they take meaning, and in how they come to know or reason (Belenky, Clinchy, Goldenberger & Tarule, 1986; Gilligan, 1982).

In many western cultures, there is a belief in the inherent separateness of distinct persons, and that people should discover and express their unique attributes. Achieving this goal requires an individual whose behaviour is organized and made meaningful primarily by reference to their own internal repertoire of thoughts, feelings, and actions, rather than by reference to the thoughts, feelings and actions of others. The essential aspect of this view involves a conception of the self as an autonomous, independent person, referred to as the independent self. While the

independent self must be responsive to the social environment, this responsiveness is in the service of asserting the internal attributes of the self. Others are important to the independent self, but only insofar as they affirm the inner core of the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Singelis, 1994).

In contrast to the prevailing western and androcentric notion of the self, many non western cultures insist on the fundamental connectedness of human beings to each other, and it is an imperative within these cultures to maintain this interdependence. Being interdependent, an individual sees themselves as part of an encompassing social relationship and recognizes that one's behaviour is determined by and contingent on what the individual perceives to be the thoughts, feelings and action of others in the relationship (Singelis, 1994). (For a more comprehensive discussion of the nature of the self, see Kitayama & Markus, 1994; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Markus & Oyserman, 1989).

According to various researchers (Lyons, 1983, 1988; Markus & Kitayama, 1991), both the interdependent self and care-orientated persons are connected and responsive to others, and would therefore be more likely to respond to the expectations and needs of others. Thus, as Kristiansen and Hotte (1995) suggest, it is conceivable that people with an interdependent self-concept will adopt a care orientation when resolving moral dilemmas, and that their moral decisions will be a function of the needs and expectations of the people involved in the dilemma. In addition,

like Kohlberg's justice-orientated person, the independent self is an autonomous and rational moral agent, who expresses values that transcend self-interest and social norms. Hence, one would expect people who are justice orientated to have an independent sense of self.

Research by Lyons (1983, 1988) demonstrated that care-orientated persons are more connected and responsive to others, and therefore more likely to respond to the expectations of others, while justice-orientated individuals are more autonomous. Thus, because the very nature of the self in terms of interdependent and independent self schemas appears fundamental to care and justice moral reasoning, the nature of the self was selected as a criterion variable in this study.

Participants completed two measures of the self. One was Stiller and Forrest's (1990) open-ended measure which asked participants "How would you describe yourself to yourself ? Is the way you see yourself now different from the way you saw yourself in the past ? What lead to the change ?"

Singelis' (1994) fixed format measure of Independent and Interdependent Self-Construals was also included in the questionnaire package. The items in this measure were gathered from a number of previously validated measures, with the final instrument containing 24 items (12 independent, e.g., "I act the same way no matter who I am with"; 12 interdependent, e.g., "I will sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of the

group I am in") that respondents rate on 7-point scales ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). The two dimensions were found to be orthogonal, and alphas for the independent and interdependent scales were acceptable at .69 and .73, respectively. No test-retest reliability scores were provided in Singelis' study. Construct validity was assessed by comparing Asian Americans and Caucasian Americans where differences were consistent with Markus and Kitayama's (1991) characterizations of Asians as interdependent and North Americans as independent. Predictive validity was also indicated by findings that Asian Americans and those with higher interdependence scores tended to attribute more influence to the situation than did Caucasian Americans and those with lower interdependence scores (Miller, 1984; Shweder & Bourne, 1984).

Distributive justice. A measure of 'distributive justice' was also included to assess the criterion validity of the various measures of care and justice reasoning. Not surprisingly, several studies have shown that people's conceptualization of fairness is an important mediating factor in conflict resolution and resource allocation. Rasinski (1987), for example, distinguished between proportionality and egalitarianism. Proportionality involves societal concerns about equity and economic individualism, and egalitarianism represents societal concerns about social equality and need. Rasinski (1987) found that people who endorsed proportionality were more likely to judge equity-based policies as fair, whereas those who endorsed

egalitarianism were more likely to judge equality and need-based policies as fair. In addition, Rasinski (1987) reported that men tended to endorse proportionality more often than did women, although there was no relation between gender and egalitarianism.

In view of the above, participants completed Rasinski's (1987) measure of Fairness-Related Principles. In this measure participants used scales ranging from (1) Agree Strongly to (5) Disagree Strongly to indicate their endorsement of six items assessing "proportionality" in the distribution of social resources and a sentiment toward rewarding individual contribution to society and withholding benefits to individuals who do not contribute (e.g., "There are too many people getting something for nothing in this society"), and six items measuring "egalitarianism" in the distribution of resources and the sentiment of equal access to basic services, equal treatment of all members of society, and the redistribution of wealth (e.g., "In Canada, everyone should be treated equally because we are all human beings").

Contextualized reasoning. If care reasoning is essentially "contextualized" moral reasoning, then one would expect care orientated persons to display attitudes that are contextualized in the sense that they vary as a function of the parameters of the situation, in particular the needs and relationships of the people affected by an issue. If justice reasoning, on

the other hand, involves the imposition and evaluation of personal goals and values, one would expect less cross-situational attitude variability.

To measure the extent to which situational parameters affect attitudes, participants' rated their favourability toward a set of 12 situational variations of each of three attitude issues. The situational parameters were varied in regard to the people's needs, expectancies, and relationships. For example, in regard to the issue of abortion, participants rated the extent to which they personally believe that abortion is acceptable or unacceptable in various circumstances. An example of a 'need' parameter is "When a 47 year old mother of four has conceived as a result of birth control failure and feels that she can't cope with another baby at this stage of her life". An example of an 'expectancies' parameter is "When a woman is worried that another mouth to feed will stress her husband far too much but she knows he would expect her to have the child anyway". An example of a 'relationship' parameter is "When the pregnant woman wants an abortion but the father of the child disagrees and is willing to assume all responsibility for the child". Participants completed comparable situation-specific attitude measures for the issues of incest and euthanasia, as shown in Appendix II.

Socially desirable responding. As a measure of participants' inclination to give socially acceptable responses, Paulhus' (1988) Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) was included in the questionnaire package. The BIDR measures two constructs, namely, self-deceptive

positivity (SDE; the tendency to give self-reports that are honest but positively biased) and impression management (IM; deliberate self-presentation to an audience). The 40 BIDR items are stated as propositions and respondents rate their agreement with each statement on a seven-point scale. In studies reported by Paulhus (1988) and Quinn (1989), the alpha coefficients ranged from .68 to .80 for the SDE and .75 to .86 for the IM scale. When all 40 items were summed as a measure of Socially Desired Responding (SDR), the alpha was .83 (Paulhus, 1988).

Finally, participants completed the measures of the predictor and criterion variables in a counter-balanced order in an attempt to rule out possible order effects. The measures of the predictor and criterion variables were also presented in random orders within each set. In addition to the variables listed above, respondents' age, gender, marital status, and years of formal education were assessed.

Results

The data were analyzed in three sections. Preliminary analyses first examined the reliability of the various measures and the descriptive statistics for participants' scores on the predictor and criterion variables. The main analyses examined the construct and criterion validity of the measures of care and justice reasoning, and then additional analyses examined the potential of alternative explanations to account for the observations concerning construct and criterion validity.

Preliminary Analyses

Reliability of measures. Indices of the internal consistency of the measures of the predictor variables used in this study, as reported in Table 3, were satisfactory. It should be noted that four items were deleted from Liddell's care scale (items: 59, 61, 63, 64) and 11 items were deleted from Liddell's justice scale (items: 14, 16, 17, 23, 25, 27, 29, 37 46, 53 54) because their item-total scale score correlations were less than .10.

Although all of the predictor scales had items removed in order to improve internal consistency (Heinz #5 and Escaped Prisoner #10 were removed from Friedman et al.'s (1987) overall justice scale, and item Heinz #1 and Escaped Prisoner #11 removed from their overall care scale; and items 3 and 7 were removed from Yacker and Weinberg's (1990) scale), Liddell et al.'s (1992) justice scale constituted the greatest loss in items. In view of this internal consistency, scale scores for the predictor variables were calculated from the mean across items so that higher scores indicated more of the attribute in question.

The internal consistency of the criterion and other variables, as reported in Table 4, were also sufficiently high to allow calculating the mean of participants' responses across items as an index of each construct. For these variables, only the attitudes to abortion scale had two items deleted (items 2 and 7) to improve reliability.

Two people independently coded 80 participants' responses to the 20

sentence stems in Roger's (1987) Washington University Sentence Completion Test measure of justice and care reasoning and participants' responses to Stiller and Forrest's (1990) open-ended measure of the self. The inter-coder reliabilities for the Justice and Care scales of Rogers' Sentence Completion test were .93 and 1.00, respectively, and for Stiller and Forrest's measures of the Connected and Separate Self Concept they, were .86 and .98, respectively.

Finally, during the course of the data scoring, it became clear that the Stiller and Forrest's (1990) measure of moral orientation was unreliable. Participants' responses to the open-ended questions were difficult to score according to the researchers' scoring guide because the respondents did not provide sufficient information for the coders to accurately discern the perspective of the respondent. For example, without further clarification within the text, it was difficult to know whether one respondent's statement of "wanting to sponsor my mother to come to Canada" was motivated by care sentiments to maintain his relationship with his mother or justice sentiments grounded in a sense of duty. Because this was the norm rather than the exception, participants' responses to Stiller and Forrest's (1990) open-ended measure of Moral Reasoning were not considered further. As a result, and because Rogers' measures of moral orientation were coded using Lyon's (1983) framework, Rogers' indices of care and justice reasoning were taken as the criterion against which to compare the other measures.

Descriptive statistics. The means and standard deviations for participants' scores on the predictor, criterion and other variables are listed in Tables 5 and 6. The means attained on the various indices of care and justice reasoning, shown in Table 5, indicate different levels of care and justice reasoning. On Rogers' measure, participants' care and justice scores were moderately low, suggesting that they did not strongly endorse either orientation. Participants did, however, indicate more care than justice reasoning, $t(104) = -2.94, p < .01$, whereas on Friedman's measure, participants' scores indicated that they, on average, engaged in more justice than care reasoning, $t(100) = 7.58, p < .001$. On Liddell's measure, participants' scores indicated that they engaged in both modes of reasoning, although they were again more care oriented, $t(101) = 2.38, p < .02$. Finally, participants' scores on Yacker and Weinberg's unidimensional measure indicated that, on average, they were justice orientated.

In regard to the criterion variables, and as shown in Table 6, participants' scores on Singelis' measure of self-construals indicated that participants were, on average, more independent than interdependent, $t(102) = 5.06, p < .001$. On Stiller and Forrest's open-ended measure of the self-concept, on the other hand, participants were more connected than separate, $t(101) = -2.87, p < .01$. Participants' scores on Rasinski's measure of proportionality and egalitarianism indicated that they adopted

proportionality more than egalitarianism in resource distribution, $t(97) = 8.54, p < .001$. Finally, when attitude variance scores were formed by calculating the variance of participants' attitude scores across the situational variations for incest, euthanasia, and abortion, participants' displayed different levels of attitudinal variance across these issues, $F(2,200) = 27.76, p < .001$. Post hoc comparisons ($ps < .01$) showed the most variation occurring in participants attitudes toward euthanasia ($M = 3.39$), followed by their attitudes toward abortion ($M = 2.76$), and then their attitudes toward punishing incest perpetrators ($M = 1.46$).

Among the other variables assessed in the study, participants' BIDR scores indicated that they were more strongly motivated by self-deception than image maintenance, $t(102) = 3.74, p < .001$. Participants' attitudes toward punishing incest perpetrators, euthanasia and abortion were, in general, slightly positive, and not different from each other, $F(2,200) = 0.51, ns$.

Main Analyses

The main analyses involved assessing the construct and criterion validity of the measures of justice and care reasoning.

Construct validity. Construct validity refers to the degree to which a questionnaire score is a measure of the psychological characteristic of interest, and Campbell and Fiske (1959) proposed two kinds of construct validation evidence: (1) testing for the convergence across different

measures or manipulations of the same trait or behaviour and (2) testing for divergence between measures or manipulations of related but conceptually distinct behaviours or traits. Because the multitrait-multimethod matrix procedure (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Jaccard, Weber & Lundmark, 1975) provides tests for both types of construct validity, it was used to ascertain the interrelations between the various measures of care and justice reasoning. The rationale underlying the use of multiple methods to measure the same and different traits is that this method provides information about whether observed correlations are due to their common basis in the same method of measurement rather than convergent or discriminant validity (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991).

Convergent validity. The four measures of participants' care and justice reasoning were correlated, resulting in the multitrait-multimethod matrix presented in Table 7. The main diagonal of this matrix, the reliability diagonal, contains the values of the Cronbach alpha coefficients reflecting the internal consistency of each of the measures, or, in the case of Rogers' measures, the degree of intercoder correspondence. As stated earlier, with the exception of Yacker and Weinberg's measure where the alpha was .46, the values of all of the indices were satisfactory.

Four aspects of this multitrait-multimethod matrix bear upon the question of validity. Before addressing these aspects, however, the decision was made to exclude Yacker and Weinberg's measure from further analyses

because of its relatively low alpha coefficient and because, as shown in Table 7, it failed to converge with any of the other measures of care and justice, with the exception of a small, but significant, correlation with Friedman et al.'s justice scale.

Because the correlations between different measures of the same mode of moral reasoning indicate the degree of convergence among the measures, the first requirement for construct validity is that these correlations be reasonably large. As shown in Table 7, and as listed more readily in Table 8, these 'same trait-different method' correlations among the three measures of care ranged from $-.052$ to $.264$, however only the relation between Rogers' and Liddell et al.'s care measures differed significantly from zero. The convergence among the three measures of participants' justice reasoning ranged from $-.05$ to $.22$, but again only the relation between Rogers' and Liddell et al.'s measures of justice reasoning was statistically reliable, although the relation between Rogers' and Friedman et al.'s justice measures approached significance. On the whole, then, there was little convergence among the measures of care and justice reasoning, and what little existed was between Rogers' and Liddell et al.'s measures of care and justice reasoning.

Any convergence among the measures of care and justice reasoning noted above must, as Jaccard and his colleagues (1975, p.152) put it, "be interpreted in light of the correlations between the same method - different

... [modes of moral reasoning], which indicate the extent to which correlations among measures in the matrix are artifacts of the specific measuring device. The difference between these correlations and the respective convergence correlations are indicants of the divergent validity or the degree to which methods distinguish between different" modes of moral reasoning. Table 8 displays the results of Hotelling's t -tests that were used to compare the size of convergent correlations with those observed between the same measures of different modes of reasoning. Only the convergence of Liddell et al.'s and Rogers' measures differed significantly from their same methods-different reasoning correlations in the appropriate direction and hence only these measures exhibited any evidence of divergent validity.

Finally, extracting from the multitrait-multimethod matrix in Table 7, Table 9 presents the values of the correlations between different measures of different modes of reasoning, the heterotrait-heteromethod correlations. One would expect these correlations to be near zero because they share neither trait nor method variance. As listed in Table 9, these correlations ranged from -.044 to .186, with only one being marginally significantly different from zero (Rogers' care with Liddell et al.'s justice). However, and as shown in Table 9, when Hotelling's t -tests were used to compare the size of these different trait-different method correlations with that of the same trait-different method correlations, only Liddell et al.'s measures of care and justice showed the requisite validity. These analyses of the construct

validity of the various measures of care and justice reasoning revealed little evidence of either convergent or discriminant validity. In fact, of the four measures, only Liddell et al.'s measure displayed any evidence of construct validity, and even this evidence was minimal.

Criterion validity. Criterion validity refers to "the degree to which the test or questionnaire correlates with one or more outcome criteria" (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991, p.60). Ideally, to be regarded as valid, a paper and pencil measure of care and justice reasoning should be correlated with the criterion variables in the same way as the Rogers' measures of care and justice reasoning. Further, if the care scales are all measure the same uniform construct of care reasoning, they should all produce similarly high correlations with criteria with which they are theoretically and intuitively linked. Hence one would expect greater care reasoning to be associated with more interdependence and less independence on the self scales (Singelis, 1994; Stiller & Forrest, 1990), greater egalitarianism in resource distribution (Rasinski, 1986), and more contextualized or situation-specific attitudes. Similarly, if the justice scales are all measuring the same concept of justice, then they should all produce similarly high correlations with criterion variables with which they are theoretically and intuitively linked, including the two independence scales (Singelis, 1994; Stiller & Forrest, 1990), proportionality in resource distribution (Rasinski, 1986), and less attitudinal contextualization.

As shown in Table 10, a number of significant correlations were observed between the predictor and criterion measures. Of the 18 correlations calculated for Rogers' measures, participants with higher justice scores had marginally higher scores on Stiller and Forrest's open-ended measure of the separate self and participants with higher care scores had significantly higher scores on Stiller and Forrest's measure of the connected self as well as marginally greater attitude variance scores with regard to the issue of euthanasia

In regard to the measures of Liddell and her associates, participants with higher justice scores had marginally higher scores on Singelis' independent self-concept measure and significantly lower scores on Rasinski's proportionality scale, whereas participants with higher care scores had significantly lower scores on Stiller and Forrest's measure of the separate self-concept, significantly higher scores on Singelis' measure of the interdependent self-concept, and lower egalitarianism scores on Rasinski's measure of resource distribution.

Finally, in regard to Friedman et al.'s measures, participants who had higher justice scores were more independent and less interdependent on Singelis' measures of the self and had higher proportionality and lower egalitarianism scores on Rasinski's measures of resource distribution. Participants' scores on Friedman et al.'s measure of care, however, as well as on Yacker and Weinberg's unidimensional measure of moral reasoning,

were independent of all nine criterion variables.

In sum, all of the correlations between the predictor and criterion variables were in the expected direction, with the exception of the negative correlations between participants' scores on Liddell et al.'s care measure and egalitarianism, and Liddell et al.'s justice measure and proportionality².

The intercorrelations between the criterion measures of the self, resource distribution and attitude variance are summarized in Table 11. Among these variables, intercorrelations among the four measures of the self-concept were notably absent.

For Rasinski's measure of resource distribution, the intercorrelation between proportionality and egalitarianism was both high and in the hypothesized negative direction. As expected, egalitarianism was also negatively correlated with an independent self-construal, and proportionality was negatively correlated with participants' interdependence scores. Finally, participants' attitude variance scores were generally independent, with the exception of the correlation between the variance in participants' attitudes toward euthanasia and abortion. Overall then, the finding that only six of

The relations between participant's justice and care scores and the criterion variables were also examined with a series of Justice (high-low) by Care (high-low) ANOVAs, where groups were formed using median splits. Because these analyses produced virtually the same main effects as those observed in the correlation matrix and because only one of the nine justice by care interaction terms that were assessed for each measure was statistically significant, these analyses were not considered further.

the 36 correlations among the criterion variables was significant may, to some extent, explain the mixed findings concerning criterion validity.

Sample Characteristics and Alternative Explanations

The last set of analyses examined the relations between participants' demographic characteristics and their scores on the predictor, criterion and other variables to look for confounded variables that might provide potential alternative explanations for the present findings. The first of these analyses, concerning gender, was also relevant to the substantive hypotheses regarding gender differences in moral reasoning.

The results of *t*-tests examining the relationship between gender and the study variables are summarized in Tables 12 and 13. In regard to the predictor variables, the only significant difference was the finding that females were significantly more care orientated than males on Liddell et al.'s measure. With respect to the criterion variables, females scored marginally higher than males on Stiller and Forrest's measure of the connected self and Rasinski's proportionality scale. The only other gender difference of note was the finding that, compared to females, males displayed more favourable attitudes toward punishing incest perpetrators.

As shown in Table 14, which displays the correlations between the continuous demographic variables and the predictor variables, older age was associated with less care orientated reasoning as assessed by Rogers, Liddell et al.'s and Friedman et al.'s measures, and less justice reasoning as

assessed by Friedman et al.'s scales. Participants with more education also demonstrated greater levels of care reasoning on Yacker and Weinberg's measure.

In regard to the criterion variables, and as displayed in Table 15, older participants had lower interdependence scores on Singelis' measure, made marginally more use of proportionality in resource allocation, had less variability in their attitudes to abortion across contexts, and on average expressed more favourable attitudes toward allowing abortion. Participants with more education also had a more connected sense of self as indicated by their scores on both Singelis' and Stiller and Forrest's measures, displayed marginally less variance in their attitudes to abortion, and generally had more favourable attitudes toward euthanasia and abortion.

Given the different demographic characteristics of the student and volunteer samples, analyses also examined the relationship between the sample and the study variables, the results of which appear in Tables 16 and 17. The only predictor variable associated with any significant sample difference was Liddell et al.'s care scale where the student sample was more care orientated than the volunteer sample. Among the criterion variables, students had higher scores on Singelis' measure of interdependence and displayed more contextualized attitudes toward abortion, whereas volunteers had higher scores on Stiller and Forrest's measure of the connected self and Rasinski's measure of proportionality. Finally, volunteers displayed more

positive attitudes toward each of the three social issues, namely punishing incest perpetrators, allowing euthanasia and allowing abortion.

One-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) that examined the relation between marital status and the study variables revealed significant effects of marital status on participants' scores on Rogers' ($F(3,100) = 2.99, p < .05$) and Liddell et al.'s ($F(3,97) = 3.81, p < .05$) care scales, the variability in their attitudes to incest ($F(3,97) = 3.51, p < .05$) and abortion ($F(3,97) = 5.42, p < .01$), and their attitudes to abortion ($F(3,97) = 4.33, p < .01$) and image maintenance scores ($F(3,98) = 5.17, p < .01$). Scheffé's comparison's among the means failed to identify any marital group differences in Rogers' care scores or the variability and favourability of participants' attitudes to abortion. In regard to scores on Liddell et al.'s care scale, divorced participants reported less care reasoning than single participants, while the care reasoning of both of these groups did not differ from that of married or widowed participants. Widowed participants also displayed more variability in their attitudes toward incest perpetrators compared to single and married participants, while divorced participants displayed variability that was comparable to all groups. Finally, the image maintenance scores of single, married and widowed participants did not differ from each other, while divorced participants were less concerned with image maintenance than single and widowed participants.

Examining the above findings concerning demographic correlates together with the substantive correlations observed between the predictor and criterion variables revealed only two instances where demographic variables were correlated with both the predictor and the criterion variables that were involved in a statistically significant relationship. The first instance involved sample differences in scores on Singelis' measure of interdependence and Liddell et al.'s care scale, which suggested that sample might account for the finding that participants who were more interdependent were also more care orientated. To assess the feasibility of this alternative explanation, participants' scores on Liddell et al.'s care scale were regressed first onto sample and then onto their Singelis' interdependence scores. This analysis showed that participants' interdependence scores ($\beta = .217$, R^2 change = .044, $t(99) = 2.21$, $p < .05$) continued to account for a significant proportion of the variance in Liddell et al.'s care measure.

The second instance of potential confounding stemmed from the finding that older participants displayed less care orientated reasoning on Rogers' and Liddell et al.'s measures, measures that were expected and observed to be interrelated. When a hierarchical regression analysis examined the significance of the scale intercorrelations after participant's age was accounted for, participants' with higher scores on Liddell et al.'s care measure continued to have higher scores on Rogers' care measure ($\beta =$

.235, R² change = .055, $t(97) = 2.52$, $p < .05$).

Finally, because participants' scores on the measures of social desirability (SDE) and image maintenance (IM) (Paulhus, 1988) were not systematically correlated with the variables observed in any significant relations, socially desirable responding is an unlikely explanation for any of the present findings.

Discussion

Overall, the measures of moral reasoning examined in this thesis generally had poor construct validity. Perhaps the most significant evidence of this was the fact that two of the original five measures that were examined were dropped from further analysis. Stiller and Forrest's (1990) self-generated measure, for one, was rejected because participants' responses were difficult to code according to the coding manual and much of what the participants related on the moral reasoning questions was predicated on their interpretation of what was being asked of them. Indeed, the responses ranged from saying that they couldn't recall a moral dilemma that they had experienced, to recounting the specifics of a moral dilemma resolution process but providing scant or no detail as to the reasoning underlying their actions. Because this reasoning forms the basis for scoring, most of the participants' responses were unscorable. Thus, it seems that Stiller and Forrest's (1990) written version of Gilligan's (1982) interview procedure fell prey to the lack of prompts, questioning, and clarification that

constitute part of any interview process. In Gilligan's (1982) interviews, participants' inner thoughts can be probed whenever an interviewer is unclear as to the perspective of the participant. In Stiller and Forrest's (1990) measure, that added dimension was absent, and consequently the information provided was not as rich as it could have been.

Yacker and Weinberg's (1990) measure of moral reasoning was also excluded from the bulk of the analyses for two reasons. Statistically, it proved to have poor internal consistency, as evidenced by its low alpha coefficient. In addition, when it was considered, it was not related to any of the nine criterion variables. Moreover, because Yacker and Weinberg's (1990) Moral Orientation Scale is unidimensional in nature, and hence justice is construed as the absence of care, it was not especially well suited for these analyses (e.g., for assessing the orthogonality of care and justice reasoning).

The remaining three scales, namely those of Rogers (1987), Liddell et al. (1992) and Friedman et al. (1987) generally failed to prove themselves as valid measures of moral reasoning. For one, participants' scores on neither the care nor justice were highly correlated with one another, as was expected. The sole exception to this was the convergence displayed by Rogers' (1987) and Liddell et al.'s (1992) measures of care and justice moral orientation. One might speculate that the general lack of convergence was a result, in part, of the different roles participants' were asked to assume, as

they completed the measures - as either an actor or an observer. Jones and Nisbett (1972, p.80) stated this actor-observer hypothesis as follows: "...there is a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situational requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute the same actions to stable personal dispositions". Friedman et al.'s measure, for example, requires participants to act as a consultant and give a recommendation as to what the person in the dilemma should do (i.e., the observer role). Other measures of moral reasoning, including Liddell et al.'s, required participants to act as if they were the person in the dilemma (i.e., the actor role). Given the observation that the actor/observer perspectives have a profound effect in other domains of social behaviour (Goldberg, 1978; Nisbett et al., 1973; West, Gunn & Chernicky, 1975), one may speculate that the actor-observer effect may to some extent account for the lack of convergence observed among the measures of justice and care reasoning in this study.

In addition, these researchers (Rogers, Liddell et al., and Friedman et al.) have all maintained that these constructs are orthogonal. In the present study, by comparison, only Rogers' (1987) measures of justice and care were orthogonal whereas Friedman et al.'s (1987) indices of care and justice reasoning were correlated substantially. The correlation observed between Liddell et al.'s (1992) indices of care and justice reasoning was interesting given that higher justice scores were associated with lower care scores.

This finding is unlikely a result of shared method error because of its negative direction. Rather, according to Liddell et al.'s measures, justice and care reasoning are somewhat oppositional processes, although less oppositional than orthogonal.

Further to the poor scale construct validity that was observed, these measures of moral orientation also exhibited surprisingly poor criterion validity. Essentially, this amounted to Rogers' (1987) justice and care scales displaying significant correlations with only Stiller and Forrest's (1990) indices of the separate and connected self-concept, respectively. Rogers' (1987) measures were not related to any of the remaining criterion variables. Friedman et al.'s (1987) justice scale demonstrated significant correlations with only Singelis' (1994) independent and interdependent self-construal scales and the proportionality and egalitarianism dimensions of Rasinski's (1987) resource distribution scale. Liddell et al.'s (1992) care dimension produced the predicted significant correlations with Stiller and Forrest's (1990) separate self-concept scale and Singelis' (1994) interdependence scale. In addition, Liddell et al.'s care scale was significantly related to Rasinski's (1987) egalitarianism scale. The direction of the latter relationship was, however, not in the direction expected. Finally, Liddell et al.'s (1992) justice scale was marginally related to Singelis' (1994) independence scale, and significantly related to Rasinski's (1987) proportionality and egalitarianism scales. The direction of the correlations

with Rasinski's resource distribution scales was again opposite to what was expected. Once again, however, Liddell et al.'s (1992) care and justice scales evidenced the best overall criterion validity of the variables utilized.

The measures of contextualized attitude reasoning were associated with the most disappointing results, demonstrating no relationship with any of the predictor variables, the lone exception being the finding that participants' who displayed more care reasoning as assessed using Rogers' (1987) scale displayed more variance in their attitudes to euthanasia across situations. The measures of the contextualization of participants' attitudes, however, were designed exclusively for this thesis, and have not been validated. As a result, these measures may not have assessed what they were designed to assess.

One explanation for the general lack of criterion validity stems from the fact that the criterion variables, which should have, theoretically, been correlated with one another, appeared to be independent. In the case of Singelis' (1994) measure of independent and interdependent self-construals and Stiller and Forrest's (1990) open-ended measure of the separate and connected self, this independence may have been an artifact of their different assessment methods. Singelis' measure, for example, uses preset statements that respondents simply rate, and these statements are clearly focused on the self. Stiller and Forrest's (1990) measure, on the other hand, requires respondents to 'describe' themselves. As a result, like

Stiller and Forrest's measure of moral reasoning, their measure of the self was again open to interpretation by the respondents, and their responses to this question were quite varied, ranging from describing their physical characteristics to self-psychoanalysis. Thus, while Singelis' (1994) measure is very concrete and specifically focused on the level of connection individuals feel they have to the world around them, Stiller and Forrest's item seemed to pull for a more abstract self-conceptualization. A further distinction between these two measures is that scores for Singelis' (1994) measure were derived from the mean of participants' responses to all the questions, whereas for Stiller and Forrest's (1990) measure, participants' responses were individually coded. This was complicated by the fact that much of what the respondents relayed did not fit very well with the examples of statements reflecting connected and separate self-concepts defined in the scoring manuals. As a result, many of participants' responses were unscorable.

Among the other criterion variables, the indices of resource distribution were significantly related to one another and in the direction hypothesized. The measures of attitude variance, however, were largely independent with only one of the three correlations achieving significance.

As reviewed in the introduction, one of the issues around which there are continuous debates in the literature on moral reasoning regards gender differences. Researchers using Gilligan's measure have typically found

gender differences (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Lyons, 1983; Pratt, Golding, Hunter & Sampson, 1988; Rothbart et al., 1986; Stiller & Forrest, 1990; Walker et al., 1987), whereas researchers using measures employing a standardized hypothetical dilemma have typically not found these differences (Pratt, Golding, Hunter & Sampson, 1988; Rothbart et al., 1986; Walker, 1989). And when alternative fixed-format measures have been used, these results have been mixed at best, with some measures finding gender differences in moral reasoning (Johnston, 1987; Rogers, 1987; Yacker & Weinberg, 1990), and others not (Ford & Lowery, 1986; Forsyth et al., 1988; Friedman et al., 1987; Pratt & Royer, 1982). One of the biggest problems with these studies, regardless of their results, is that none of the measures of care and justice reasoning has ever been validated against any 'standard' measure of moral reasoning, typically considered to be Gilligan's (1982) interview procedure with Lyons' (1983) coding scheme. As a result, the findings of these studies are not readily comparable. Nevertheless, despite the diversity of the measures employed in the present research, the gender differences hypothesized by Gilligan were observed only for Liddell et al.'s measure of care reasoning.

It is also possible that lack of convergence and findings generally, at least with regard to the student sample, occurred because the reimbursement for their participation was not predicated on their completing the study seriously. In addition, the rate of tests not being completed or

appearing to be completed in a haphazard manner was significant within the student sample. The volunteer sample, on the other hand, appeared to be more diligent in their completion of the package and consistently provided comments about how they enjoyed participating and how these measures had made them think about things that they didn't usually think about. Unfortunately, there were more students than volunteers. Future research, however, might endeavour to ensure that only people who are sincerely interested participate. In addition, a more heterogeneous sample, particularly in regard to socioeconomic status and political ideology, variables that are potentially relevant to moral reasoning, might be considered.

Finally, it is possible that the lack of significant results regarding the measures of moral reasoning may stem from the fact that this research suffered from one of the pitfalls attributed to other researchers - it did not use Gilligan's (1982) standard interview to obtain measures of care and justice reasoning. And unfortunately, Stiller and Forrest (1990) open-ended measure was dropped as a result of coding difficulties. As a result, the remaining measures were validated against Rogers' (1987) measure with its less flexible format acting as the new standard. It is therefore conceivable that, in light of the results found here, Gilligan's interview procedure is the only reliable and valid way to measure moral orientation. If so, future research might consider attempting to validate Liddell et al.'s (1992)

measure against scores obtained using Gilligan's interview procedure.

In spite of these generally disappointing findings, Liddell et al.'s (1992) measures of care and justice reasoning appeared to be the best of the lot, at least when the items with low item-total correlations were removed. Overall, their fixed-format questionnaire provided the most significant convergence with Rogers' (1987) measures of justice and care reasoning, which were taken as the 'Gilligan standard' for the purposes of this thesis. Further, their measures had some criterion validity in that they were correlated significantly with validated measures of the self and the predicted gender differences were observed. In addition, although Liddell et al.'s measures of justice and care reasoning were somewhat correlated, the fact that this correlation was negative suggests that this convergence was not due to common method variance. Rather, these data suggest that care and justice reasoning may well be largely independent processes, contrary to the assumptions of some, such as Yacker and Weinberg (1990).

These results, particularly in regard to Liddell et al.'s measure, are also contradictory to Critenden's (1990) perspective that care reasoning subsumes justice reasoning, and Kohlberg's theory that justice reasoning subsumes care reasoning. If their various theoretical perspectives were correct, one would have expected a positive correlation between care and justice. Here, a small negative correlation was observed, thereby once again suggesting that care and justice reasoning are independent, albeit somewhat

oppositional, processes

Conclusions

In closing, it is useful to contextualize the present findings within the realm of research on moral reasoning more generally. In regard to this literature, Kristiansen and Hotte (in press) wrote that "Blasi's (1980) review found that moral stage accounted for less than one percent of the variance in moral behaviours such as honesty. Similarly, Rest (1986; Thoma, Rest & Davison, 1991) reported at best a moderate relation between Kohlberg's postconventional principled reasoning, as determined by his Defining Issues Test (DIT) P-scores, and moral behaviour. Indeed, Rest (1979) himself is searching for moderating variables and recognizes the potential role of alternative, non-justice orientated, routes to morality". Perhaps because misery loves company, especially miserable company, such weak findings in the mainstream literature provide some degree of solace, at least at first glance. Perhaps individual differences simply cannot be expected to predict specific actions in particular circumstances. Indeed, Cohen (1988) said that 'small' effect sizes accounting for about one percent of the variance are representative of personality, social, and clinical psychology. However, the consistency of such observations across different domains and in regard to different modes of moral reasoning also call the very issue of 'moral reasoning' into question.

Although there is still much social and political support for Gilligan's (1982) concept of a "different voice", the empirical evidence for it's existence has been curiously lacking. As a result, Mednick (1989) described the notion of a "different voice" as part of a popular "conceptual bandwagon" in which ideas, such as the notion of women's different voice, fear of success and androgyny, are offered as all-encompassing, simplistic solutions to the understanding of what are essentially complex phenomena - the workings of a human being. Further, and as articulated by Bem (1993), such unidimensional, simplistic views of human nature, be it for men or women, tend to produce the gender polarization that underlies androcentrism. Delimiting the range of human experience into masculine and feminine traits restricts human potential in a number of ways. First, gender polarization homogenizes men and women into distinct categories, when the reality is that men and women do not tend to exist as gender caricatures. Second, gender polarization dichotomizes not only people, but it also differentiates ways of relating to the world into masculine and feminine modes, further delimiting a person's full range of potential. Despite these limitations, concepts such as gender differences in moral reasoning continue to survive because of their intuitive resonance.

At the time of it's development, Gilligan's (1982) notion of a different voice offered a possible explanation for some of the political and social battles women were waging. It appeared as a symbol for a cluster of widely

held social beliefs arguing for women's intrinsic difference. Gilligan's original thesis for the different voice hypothesis, however, was examined not only with women, but with women considering whether or not to terminate a pregnancy, inarguably a notion men would not comprehend in the same way. It could be argued, as Mednick (1989) did, that Gilligan failed to consider, or underestimated, the role of the situation as a determinant of a person's behaviour and overestimated the importance of personal or dispositional factors. In other words, like so many others, she may be a victim of what Ross (1977) referred to as the "fundamental attribution" error, which is the tendency to overemphasize internal causes and underemphasize external causes. Stated somewhat differently, the fundamental attribution error holds that the average person is more of a personality psychologist than a social psychologist; in our everyday thinking, most of us attribute behaviour more to traits in the person than to situations or environmental pressures.

When reviewing the literature on moral reasoning, on the other hand, a factor that proved to be significant in the mode of moral reasoning, regardless of gender, was the level of the personal relevance or the amount of intimate personal content in the dilemma. Higher levels of these two factors produced greater levels of care responding than that associated with more abstract dilemmas. It is therefore conceivable that it is not gender, but rather the personalization or intimacy of the dilemma that accounts for

the way people endeavour to resolve such issues. Again, then, future research might wish to pursue this aspect of moral reasoning.

In conclusion, this research yielded a distinct lack of support for the ideas set forth by Gilligan. Men and woman generally did not differ in their use of care and justice moral orientation, these constructs were not always orthogonal, and participants' responses were generally not related in any systematic way to most of the various criterion measures. Viewing the results obtained here in light of Mednick's (1989) bandwagon hypothesis and Bem's (1993) contentions regarding the relationship between rigid sex role categories and the problems of gender polarization raises the question of whether the constructs of care and justice reasoning actually exist. Indeed, Sanders, Lubinski and Benbow (1995) recently reported findings from two studies that suggest that Rest's (1979) Defining Issues Test, one of the most frequently used measures of justice reasoning, may simply measure individual differences in verbal ability. Even if the constructs of care and justice reasoning do exist, however, one wonders whether it is really all that important to be able to categorize people's behaviour as care- or justice-orientated. The reality is that these still very popular concepts may not exist in the form in which Gilligan originally presented them. People tend to take their cues from both the context of the situation at hand and their own deep-seated beliefs about the issue under consideration, beliefs which are intimately tied to the multitude of factors that have shaped their lives. Thus,

it may be more constructive to view care and justice not as two separate categories into which we can slip people, but two more factors which we can add to the list of factors that make up the diversity of human personality and human perspectives.

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Appendix I
Description of Lyons'
Coding Scheme

The data for Lyons study consisted of responses of individuals to a five-part, open-ended interview which included:

1. A general introductory question, "Looking back over the past year/five years, what stands out for you?" (from Perry, 1968);
2. Hypothetical, moral dilemma questions -- the Heinz dilemma, the classic Kohlberg justice dilemma; and, a hypothetical "responsibility" or caring dilemma;
3. A real-life dilemma generated by the individual in response to a question about personal moral conflict and choice. The question was asked in several ways: Have you ever been in a situation where you weren't sure what was the right thing to do? or Have you ever had a moral conflict? or, Could you describe a moral conflict?

These questions eliciting a conflict were then followed by a more consistent set of questions: Could you describe the situation? What were the conflicts for you in that situation? What did you do? Did you think it was the right thing to do? How did you know it was the right thing to do?

4. A set of self-descriptor questions: How would you describe yourself to yourself? Is the way you see yourself now different from the way you saw yourself in the past? What led to the change?
5. General questions asked within the interview: What does morality mean to you? What makes something a moral problem for you? What

does responsibility mean to you? When responsibility to self and responsibility to others conflict, how should one choose?

The interview is conducted in an open-ended clinical manner, proceeding from structured question to a more unstructured exploration and clarification of a person's response. The purpose is to understand how the individual constructs the experience of self and the domain of morality. The interview typically lasts from one to one and one half hours.

In this method, a "score" is determined by counting the number of considerations of "rights" or "response" within a participants' responses. In the original study (Lyons, 1983) intercoder reliability was established independently by three coders (A, B & C) for identifying each consideration within real-life dilemmas (step 1) and also for categorizing considerations as those of "response" (e.g., Crime and delinquency could be halted if: people loved, cared about or understood others) or "rights" (e.g., I feel sorry: when I, or other people, do not live up to a moral standard) within the "construction," the "resolution" and the "evaluation" of moral choice/conflict (step 2). Agreement for step 1, identifying each consideration, was 75% (A & B) and 76% (B & C), and agreement for step 2, categorizing considerations, was 84% (A & B) and 78% (B & C). Reliability was also established independently in a two step process of reliability coding for the self-description data. At step 1 agreement was determined for identifying each characterization of the self within the response to the Describe

Yourself question as 75% (A & B) and 76% (B & C). Then agreement was determined for categorizing self-characterizations including relational characterizations within the "separate/objective" or "connected" categories as 74% (A & B) and 82% (B & C).

Appendix II

Questionnaire and Debriefing

**INFORMED CONSENT FORM
MORAL ISSUES STUDY**

The following people are involved in this research project and may be contacted at any time. Nina Mosion (Principal Investigator, 565-2114), Dr. C. Kristiansen (Faculty Sponsor, 788-2600, ext. 2674). Should you have any ethical concerns about this study then please contact Dr. Lise Paquet (Chair, Department of Psychology Ethics Committee, 788-2600, ext. 2692) or Dr. W. Jones (Chair, Department of Psychology, 788-2600, ext. 2648).

The purpose of this study is to seek out your opinions and beliefs regarding various moral issues. For this research to be valid, it is important that you answer each question thoughtfully and as honestly as possible. It is also important that you answer ALL questions, if possible, because the statistical procedures that will be used require this.

Before beginning, you should realize that your participation in this study is entirely voluntary, and you may withdraw from the study at any time.

Once you have read this information, please complete the questions below. You will be presented with a series of questionnaires which require you to write a brief text or to rate your opinion about an issue on a rating scale. The length of time required to complete this study is approximately 1.5 to 2.0 hours total. Please note that it is not necessary for you to complete this study in one sitting, however, it is important that you complete the questionnaires in the order in which they are presented.

Please note that there are no potential physical or psychological risks in this experiment. The data collected in this experiment is confidential. All data is coded such that your name is not associated with the data. The coded data is made available only to the researchers associated with this project.

I have read the above description of the **Moral Issues** study and understand the conditions of my participation. My signature indicates that I agree to participate in the experiment.

Participant's Name:

Participant's Signature: _____

Researcher's Name:

Researcher's Signature: _____

Date: _____

SUBJECT NUMBER: _____ (Researcher generated)

YEAR OF BIRTH: _____

NUMBER OF YEARS OF FORMAL SCHOOLING: _____

MARITAL STATUS(circle): Single Married or Widowed Divorced
cohabitating

Please describe your current occupation or occupation when last employed.
Be as explicit as you can. (For example: painter in an auto garage, sales
manager in a clothing store, 6th grade science teacher)

(Stiller and Forrest)

The purpose of this questionnaire is to help us understand a bit about yourself. You will be asked four questions, ranging from describing yourself to yourself to describing a personal moral problem and how you resolved it. It is essential that you answer the questions as honestly as possible, providing as much detail as you think necessary to describe the situations to us. There is no fixed length of answer that is appropriate and there are no right or wrong answers. You will be provided with a page for your responses to each question. Please feel free to continue your response on the back of each page if necessary.

1. How would you describe yourself to yourself? Is the way you see yourself now different from the way you saw yourself in the past? What lead to that change?

2 of/de 2

PM-1 3 1/2" x 4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
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PRECISIONSM RESOLUTION TARGETS

2. We have all been in situations of moral conflict where we have had to make a decision but weren't sure what was the right thing to do. Could you describe a situation that you have been in? What were the conflicts for you in that situation?

3. What did you do? How did you resolve this dilemma?

4. Do you think it was the right thing to do? How did you know it was the right thing to do? Was there another way to resolve this dilemma?

(WUSCT: ROGERS)

In the following measure of moral reasoning, please complete the sentence stems as if you were making the statements based upon your own beliefs. There are no right or wrong answers. Please feel free to write beyond the line.

1. Raising a family
2. When a child will not join in group activities
3. Being with other people
4. The thing I like about myself is
5. My mother and I
6. When people are helpless
7. A good father
8. A girl has a right to
9. A wife should
10. Rules are
11. Crime and delinquency could be halted if
12. I am
13. My main problem is
14. A good mother
15. My conscience bothers me if
16. If my mother
17. What gets me into trouble is
18. Women are lucky because
19. Men are lucky because
20. I feel sorry

(Friedman et al., Care and Justice Scales)

OPINIONS ABOUT MORAL ISSUES

The purpose of this questionnaire is to help us understand how people think about moral issues. Different people have different opinions about questions of right and wrong. Unlike math problems that have right answers, there are no "right" answers to such moral issues. We would like you to tell us what you think about several moral issues.

To give you an idea of what we want you to do, we have an example. Although this example is not really a moral issue, it will illustrate our instructions. After you read the story, the first thing you will be asked is to indicate what you recommend that the person should do. If you tend to favour one action or another (even if you are not completely sure), you can select the "can't decide" choice.

After you make your decision, read all of the items which follow. Think of the issue that each item is raising. If that issue was important in making your decision, one way or another, then put a tick in the "great importance" box. If the issue was not important or doesn't make sense to you, tick the "no importance" box. If the issue was relevant to your decision, but not critical, mark "much importance," "some importance," or "little importance" depending on how important that issue was in your opinion. You may mark several items as of "great importance" (or any other level of importance); there is no fixed number of items that must be marked at any one level.

Finally, after you have made your marks along the left hand side of each of the items, you will be asked to choose the item that was the most important consideration out of all the items. Pick from among the items provided even if you think that none of the items are of "great importance." Of the items presented pick one as the most important (relative to the others), then the second most important, third, and fourth most important. Write your answers at the bottom of the page.

In order to illustrate how we would like you to answer, consider the following example story.

FRANK AND THE CAR

Frank Jones has been thinking about buying a car. He is married, has two small children and earns an average income. The car he buys will be his family's only car. It will be used mostly to get to work and drive around town, but sometimes for vacation trips also. In trying to decide what car to buy, Frank Jones realizes that there are a lot of questions to consider. For instance, should he buy a larger used car or a smaller new car for about the same amount of money? Other questions occur to him.

What do you think Frank should do? (Check One)

_____ buy new car _____ can't decide _____ buy used car

IMPORTANCE:

Great Much Some Little No

				✓	1. Whether the car dealer was in the same block as where Frank lives.
✓					2. Would a used car be more economical in a long run than a new car.
		✓			3. Whether the colour was green, Frank's favourite colour.
				✓	4. Whether the cubic inch displacement was at least 200.
✓					5. Would a large, roomy car be better than a compact car.
				✓	6. Whether the front connibiles were differential.

From the list above, select the four most important:

Most important 5

Second most important 2

Third most important 3

Fourth most important 1

Note that in this example, the first item was considered irrelevant; the second item was considered as a critical issue in making a decision; the third item was considered of only moderate importance; the fourth item was not clear to the person responding, so it was marked "no"; the fifth item was also of critical importance; and the sixth item didn't make any sense, so it was marked "no".

Note that the most important item comes from one of the items marked on the far left hand side. In deciding between item #2 and #5, a person should reread these items, then put one of them as the most important, and the other item as second, etc..

Once you are sure you understand these instructions turn to the next page for the first story.

HEINZ AND THE DRUG

In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost to make. He paid \$200 for the radium and charged \$2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about \$1,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and began to think about breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. Should Heinz steal the drug? (Check One)

_____ Should Steal _____ Can't Decide _____ Should not steal

IMPORTANCE:

HOW IMPORTANT WAS EACH OF THE FOLLOWING BE IN MAKING YOUR DECISION.

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
					A. Is Heinz likely to risk getting shot as a burglar or going to jail for the chance that stealing the drug might help.
					B. Whether the druggist, in exercising his individual rights, infringes on the rights of others.
					C. How old are Heinz and his wife, and do they have children who could help them raise money.
					D. Whether Heinz has a right to make a decision based on his own system of values.
					E. Whether there is a moral code to which all individuals should adhere.
					F. Does Heinz have a responsibility to care for his wife.
					G. Whether the value of life and the equality of human rights are prior to law.
					H. What values are going to be the consistent basis for governing how people act toward each other.
					I. Heinz's willingness to substitute himself for his wife and bear the brunt of society's laws.
					J. Is this likely to weaken or strengthen the relationship between Heinz and his wife.
					K. Which outcome will cause the least hurt to all the people involved.
					L. The relative weights of life and property.

FROM THE LIST OF QUESTIONS ABOVE SELECT THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES:

Most important _____

Third most important _____

Second most important _____

Fourth most important _____

ESCAPED PRISONER

A man had been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he escaped from prison, moved to a new area of the country, and took on the name of Thompson. For eight years he worked hard, and gradually he saved enough money to buy his own business. He was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and gave most of his own profits to charity. Then one day, Mrs. Jones, an old neighbour, recognized him as the man who had escaped from prison eight years before, and whom the police had been looking for.

Should Mrs. Jones report Mr Thompson to the police and have him sent back to prison? (Check One)

☐ Should report him ☐ Can't decide ☐ Should not report him

IMPORTANCE:

HOW IMPORTANT WAS EACH OF THE FOLLOWING BE IN MAKING YOUR DECISION.

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
					A. Whether or not human dignity is served by the law.
					B. Whether liberty is the most fundamental value.
					C. Is there a universal moral principle at stake.
					D. Were Mr. Thompson and Mrs. Jones good friends.
					E. Is returning to prison going to undermine Mr. Thompson's rehabilitation.
					F. Whether Mrs. Jones as a former neighbor has an obligation to exercise care for Mr. Thompson.
					G. Whether or not society's responsibility to carry out its punishments is consistent with a rational moral principle.
					H. Who will suffer the most if Mrs. Jones turns in Mr. Thompson.
					I. Would it be selfish of Mrs. Jones to place greater importance on her peace of mind than on Mr. Thompson's well being.
					J. Would Mr. Thompson's going to prison protect anyone's rights.
					K. What sort of person was Mr. Thompson and what crime did he commit.
					L. Does Mrs. Jones have a right to decide on the basis of her own values.

FROM THE LIST OF QUESTIONS ABOVE SELECT THE FOUR MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES

Most important _____

Third most important _____

Second most important _____

Fourth most important _____

NEWSPAPER

Fred, a senior in high school, wanted to publish a mimeographed newspaper for students so that he could express many of his opinions. He wanted to speak out against the use of the military in international disputes and to speak out against some of the school's rules, like the rule forbidding boys to wear long hair.

When Fred started his newspaper, he asked his principal for permission. The principal said it would be all right if before every publication Fred would turn in all his articles for approval. The principal approved all of them and Fred published two issues of the paper in the next two weeks.

But the principal had not expected that Fred's newspaper would receive so much attention. Students were so excited by the paper that they began to organize protests against the hair regulation and other school rules. Angry parents objected to Fred's opinions. They phoned the principal telling him that the newspaper was unpatriotic and should not be published. As a result of the rising excitement, the principal ordered Fred to stop publishing. He gave as a reason that Fred's activities were disruptive to the operation of the school. Should the principal stop the newspaper? (Check one)

☐ Should stop it ☐ Can't decide ☐ should not stop it

IMPORTANCE:

HOW IMPORTANT WAS EACH OF THE FOLLOWING BE IN MAKING YOUR DECISION

Great	Much	Some	Little	No	
					A. Which decision will cause the least hurt to the people involved.
					B. Does the principle of freedom of speech outweigh the opinion of the majority of parents.
					C. Whether Fred was in any way violating the rights of others in publishing the newspaper.
					D. Is the principal obliged to exercise care for the well being of students.
					E. Is the principal willing to sacrifice his position with the parents in order to allow Fred to print the newspaper?
					F. If the Principal stopped the newspaper would he be preventing full discussion of important ideas.
					G. Is the Principal likely to lose his job if he allows Fred to continue publishing the newspaper.
					H. Would discontinuing publication ruin the rapport between Fred and the principal.
					I. Whether individual rights are more important than the school rules.
					J. Whether or not there is a higher moral principle at stake.
					K. Whether students have a right to independent views apart from their parents.
					L. What sort of person is Fred, and does he have the best interests of the school at heart in publishing the newspaper.

FROM THE LIST OF QUESTIONS ABOVE SELECT THE FOUR MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES

Most important _____

Third most important _____

Second most important _____

Fourth most important _____

YACKER & WEINBERG: MOS

This scale is a measure of moral reasoning style for adults using 12 dilemmas encountered by children between the ages of 8 and 10 years. In completing the scale it is important that you imagine yourself to be the parent of an 8- to 10-year old child. As you respond to each dilemma, think about how you would help "your child" decide what to do. That is, what would you most want your child to consider when deciding what to do.

After each dilemma, there are four issues you might consider when helping your child decide what to do. Please rank then from 1 to 4 in order of your preference. Specifically, assign the ranking of 1 to that issue which comes closest to your own thinking on the matter, the one you would most likely want "your child" to consider. Assign a ranking of 2 to that issue you would next want your child to consider, and so on. The ranking of 4 would be assigned to that issue you would least likely want your child to consider.

Please place the ranking directly on the scale on the line to the left of each issue. Even if none of the issues matches exactly what you would say or do, please rank them to fit your thinking as closely as possible. Be sure to rank each issue. Of course, there are no right or wrong answers for any question.

1. You child is having a birthday party and wants to invite most of the children in he class. One classmate, who lives down the street, is not popular with your child or the other children in the class. Your child does not want to invite the neighbour's child.

— Since the other child lives on the block, I would explore how my child would feel when s/he saw the child in the future if the child were not invited to the party and how the other child would feel after being left out.

— I would explain to my child that if most of the class is invited, the unpopular child must be as well. It is not fair to leave out one or two.

— I would remind my child that there are times when neighbours help each other. Especially because the child is unpopular, it would be best to be friendly with the neighbour child and invite him/her to the party.

— I would want my child to consider the reasons why the child is not popular. If the child is just shy, s/he should be invited. If the child is out of control, or abusive, it would be unfair to the other children to include the child.

2. Your child accidentally broke a toy that belonged to another child. No one saw your child do this and your child does not wish to confess.

— I would explain to my child that honesty is the best policy and that the thing to do is to admit having broken the toy.

— I would want my child to consider that by not confessing, someone else might get blamed and punished for breaking the toy.

— I would discuss how difficult it might be for my child to play with the other child in the future, having to live with the guilt about the toy.

— I would want my child to know that in this case there are no questions. If you break it, you offer to replace it.

3. Your child and another child were misbehaving in school while the teacher was out of the room. When the teacher returned, your child was caught misbehaving, but the other child was not. Your child wonders what to do.

— I would want my child to be concerned about his/her own behaviour only and to understand that this would not have happened if my child had behaved properly in the first place.

— I would expect my child not to tattle. As for the other child, it is a matter between that child and the teacher.

— I would help my child understand that it would be unkind to get the other child in trouble and that the upset and anger at the other child for not being caught will not last long.

— I would explore with my child what would happen to their relationship if my child told on the classmate.

4. Your child agreed to participate in an extra-curricular event which requires after-school preparation. As the day of the event nears, the weather becomes more conducive to outdoor play. Your child no longer wishes to participate in the event or to help in its preparation.

— I would want my child to consider the potential disappointment of others, as they are depending on her/his participation in the event.

— I would help my child understand that a commitment is a commitment and that one must honour responsibilities that one agrees to.

— My child made a promise. I would want my child to consider how s/he would feel if someone broke her/his word to my child.

— I would want my child to be concerned with the selfishness of her/his wishes and I would point out that acting this way can make a person feel bad about herself/himself later.

5. Your child often plays with two other children and all three are close friends. For some reason, one of the friends becomes unhappy with the other and wishes your child to break off relations with that friend also. Your child feels caught in the middle and wonders what to do.

— I would encourage my child to remain friends with both children, even if all three do not play together at the same time.

— I would want my child to consider whether the two children could become friends again by helping my child understand what went wrong.

— I would want my child to consider whether it is fair for someone else to determine who his/her friends should be.

— I would want my child to consider how s/he would feel if s/he were in the position of the third friend. I would want my child to treat others the way s/he wants to be treated.

6. Your child agrees to pay for a relatively inexpensive household item that s/he broke despite warnings "not to touch". Your child is saving a portion of her/his allowance to do this. As the savings increase, your child wishes very much to spend the money on something she has wanted for a long time.

— I would explain to my child that life is like this sometimes; we often have to do things we don't want to do. It's not always easy to play by the rules.

— I would want my child to know that we can accommodate each other. I would allow a small portion of the saved money for his/her own purchase, even though it will take a little longer to pay back the broken item.

— I would want my child to consider the importance of priorities and to understand that the prior obligation must be satisfied before her/his wishes.

— I would impress upon my child that even though the item was small, it was important to me and that for the sake of my feelings, I would like him/her to replace it before making his/her own purchase.

7. Your child admires a toy that belongs to a friend. The friend accidentally leaves the toy at your house. Because the friend does not seem to miss the toy or ask for its return, your child wants to keep the toy.

— I would want my child to consider how the child who owns the toy feels about not having it. I would point out that just because the other child doesn't seem to care about the toy, this may not be the case.

— I would want my child to consider how s/he would feel if someone kept a toy that was his/hers. The principle of not doing to others what you would not want them to do to you is key in this case.

— I would want my child to consider who own the toy. Regardless of the circumstances, the toy still belongs to someone else and the important thing is to return it.

— I would want my child to consider the good feeling s/he would get from returning the toy and the problems that might occur between the children if the friend remembers the toy later and it wasn't returned.

8. An afternoon has been set aside for the whole family to give the home a thorough cleaning. On the appointed day, your child wishes to watch a special program on television. (There is no VCR in the household).

— I would want my child to realize that watching the T.V. show would not be very considerate to the other members of the family, and to imagine how they might feel.

— I would want my child to understand that s/he is no more privileged than any other member of the family and that therefore, s/he has to participate in the family chores.

— I would stress all the important aspects of responsibility, togetherness and belonging that go with "family", as well as the need to be able to depend on one another.

— I would want my child to consider that a commitment has been made to the family in an almost contractual way and that it would not be fair to change his/her mind at the last minute.

9. Your child finds on the street a pocketbook containing some small items that intrigue her/him. Your child wishes to keep some or all of the contents of the bag.

— I would want my child to understand that ownership is an important concept. People have a right to their belongings, even though kids often say, "Finders keepers, losers weepers."

— I would remind my child of the "Golden Rule", do unto others as you would have them do unto you.

— I would want my child to consider that if s/he kept the pocketbook without trying to locate the owner, s/he might feel guilty about keeping something that somebody else might need.

— I would remind my child that these items are probably considered special to the person they belong to and that that person would want them back.

10. Your child promises another child to help him/her with a school project due the next day. When your child tells you this, you remind your child that this was the day the family had planned to visit with friends who live in a town an hour away. Your child does not know what to do.

— I would want my child to consider that promises made are promises kept unless good reasons prevent you from keeping your word. Since the commitment to the family was made first, it takes precedence.

— I would want my child to consider that membership in the family is important and that when the parents make plans, I would like for all of us to be together.

— I would discuss the problem of an individual's freedom within the group and that when the family makes plans, one family member doesn't have the right to make separate plans.

— I would want my child to consider the predicament of the other child. If the friend really needs the help, I could see where my child might have to stay home and help the friend.

11. Your child has made long standing overnight plans with a good friend who moved out of town and who your child sees infrequently. On the afternoon of the appointed evening, a neighbour calls to say that there is an extra ticket to the Ice Capades (or other special event) and invites your child to attend. Your child does not know what to do.

— I would want my child to consider that not only is the friend looking forward to the visit, the adults in the families had to make special plans for the overnight.

— I would want my child to consider the friend's feelings and find out if it might be possible to change the overnight plans without upsetting the friend.

— I would want my child to understand that the first commitment takes precedence.

— I would want my child to consider her/his priorities. Which is more important - friend or event?

12. Your child was scolded by one of the teachers in the school for a perceived misdemeanour that your child really did not commit. Your child wishes to explain, but fears being further scolded for "talking back."

— I would want my child to understand that justice is justice and that taking blame unnecessarily need not be tolerated.

— I would want my child to consider how important it is to communicate with the teacher, not only to clear himself/herself, but to maintain integrity and self esteem.

— I would want my child to consider that teachers are human beings and they sometimes make mistakes. Unless my child were very upset, I would advise her/him to leave things alone this time.

— I would want my child to consider the importance of having the truth be known even when you think people don't want to hear it.

(LIDDELL, HALPIN & HALPIN)

Please read each of the following dilemmas and assume the role of the person in the dilemma. Rate each response which follows the dilemma as to whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with that response. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. Your responses to these statements will help us determine how difficult decisions are made.

Read each statement carefully, but don't spend too much time debating your responses. Usually our initial reaction is the most accurate one.

STUDENT CLUB

It is recruitment time for my student club. All new members must be approved by a vote of 90% of the membership. I have been a member for one year and I am considered being groomed for a leadership position. My roommate wants to join. After the introduction party where members meet those who want to join, I heard several older members making fun of my roommate.

- 1 - strongly agree
- 2 - somewhat agree
- 3 - somewhat disagree
- 4 - strongly disagree

- ___ 1. I don't want to do anything that would jeopardize my relationship with my roommate.
- ___ 2. The members are entitled to their opinions.
- ___ 3. I should not interfere with the natural course of events.
- ___ 4. In order to avoid hurting my roommate, I should try to talk my roommate out of joining.
- ___ 5. I should try to be objective about this situation.
- ___ 6. I feel conflicted because I care about my friends, but I also care about my roommate.

PLAGIARISM

I work for the student newspaper and have laboured for several weeks on a series of articles on violence and the media. My articles are due to be published in two weeks. This morning I saw my roommate's term paper on the kitchen table. As I glanced through the paper, I recognized parts of it and realized that my roommate had copied word for word a sizable portion of my article. If my articles are published, my roommate's plagiarism will be discovered and his/her graduation will be jeopardized.

1 - strongly agree

2 - somewhat agree

3 - somewhat disagree

4 - strongly disagree

- ☐ 7. I am hurt that my roommate did this, but I don't want to make it bad for him/her.
- ☐ 8. Regardless of the consequences the article was mine and I have a right to have it published.
- ☐ 9. I should be objective and rational about this, and not let my relationship cloud my judgement.
- ☐ 10. I know how important graduation is and I don't want to do anything that will keep my roommate from graduating.
- ☐ 11. I would not do anything to harm my relationship with my roommate.
- ☐ 12. My roommate deserves whatever happens to him/her.
- ☐ 13. I would look for a compromise situation so that no one would get hurt.
- ☐ 14. Regardless of the reasons for doing so, my roommate violated principles.
- ☐ 15. I am worried about hurting my friendship with my roommate.

MORGAN

I have been married to Morgan for two years. We are both in university and do not have children. Three months ago Morgan was diagnosed as having cancer. The recommended treatment was intensive chemotherapy. Luckily, our insurance covers the medical bills. Morgan has asked me not to tell his/her parents about the cancer because Morgan feels that they would interfere with the course of treatment and demand that Morgan come home. I promised not to tell Morgan's parents but the treatments are creating mood swings that are very hard to deal with. Morgan's parents are hurt by this erratic behaviour and blame it on our marriage, of which they were never very supportive.

1 - strongly agree

2 - somewhat agree

3 - somewhat disagree

4 - strongly disagree

- ___ 16. This is a matter of conflicting rights: Morgan's parents have a right to know, but Morgan also has a right not to tell them.
- ___ 17. I made a promise and I should not break that promise no matter what.
- ___ 18. I don't want to hurt Morgan but we can't continue to overlook Morgan's parents' feelings; they feel hurt too.
- ___ 19. I have to think in terms of what is fair regardless of the consequences.
- ___ 20. The primary issue would be to look for a compromise position which would keep both Morgan and Morgan's parents from being hurt.
- ___ 21. I am concerned about maintaining my relationship with Morgan's parents.
- ___ 22. We all need each other right now; no one should go through this alone.

KAREN

My friend Karen and I are in a class together. This class is required for graduation, and this is the only time it is being offered this year. Karen flunked the first test, but made an "A" on her paper and midterm. I have been working very hard in this class but have made only "Bs" so far. Last night Karen confided in me that the professor had taken a "personal interest" in her and that he had asked her to spend the night with him in exchange for an "A" in the class.

1 - strongly agree

2 - somewhat agree

3 - somewhat disagree

4 - strongly disagree

- ___ 23. This is none of my business and I should stay out of it.
- ___ 24. I want to tell the department head, but that would ruin Karen's grade, and I don't want to hurt her.
- ___ 25. Karen has a right to her own business.
- ___ 26. The most important thing is that Karen not get hurt.
- ___ 27. It is against the student code for a professor to do this. Regardless of the consequences, I should turn him in.
- ___ 28. Going public would ruin Karen's reputation, and would hurt both her and her parents.
- ___ 29. This is really about conflicting rights: Karen and the professors' right to do what they want, and the rights of the other students in the class to not be disadvantaged.
- ___ 30. I don't want to do anything to jeopardize my relationship with Karen.

ADMINISTRATOR

As the editor of the university newspaper, I decide which stories are published. One of our reporters has just turned in a story about a university administrator who has been diverting student fees for his own personal use. I assume that the story is accurate. I called the administrator's house to speak to him about the discovery and to tell him we were going public with the story. His wife informed me that he was at the hospital with their child who is terminally ill. The deadline to run the story is midnight.

1 - strongly agree

2 - somewhat agree

3 - somewhat disagree

4 - strongly disagree

- ___ 31. Whatever he did, he probably did so with his child in mind.
- ___ 32. In order to hurt the least number of people, I should drop the story and tell the administrator what I know and ask him to correct it quietly.
- ___ 33. In spite of what we know, I just could not ruin his life.
- ___ 34. Regardless of the consequences, I am concerned about the principles involved.
- ___ 35. I would treat the administrator like everyone else, regardless of his personal circumstances.
- ___ 36. I would do what I thought was fair, regardless of the consequences to myself or others.
- ___ 37. This is an issue of conflicting rights: the students have a right to know about the man's actions, but he has a right to privacy.

CAR

Last week while I was shopping at the mall I accidentally left my keys in my car. When I came out to get into the car, it was gone. The police recovered the car and arrested a suspect. While I was at the police station I met the suspect - and 18 year old woman who was abused by her parents and kicked out of her parents' house. She told me she was desperate to get a job and was using the car to try to find a job after which she would have left the car where she found it. She does not have a police record and apparently has not been in trouble before.

The decision to press charges against her is really up to me.

- 1 - strongly agree
- 2 - somewhat agree
- 3 - somewhat disagree
- 4 - strongly disagree

- ___ 38. Even though I don't know her, I think I would want to help this woman.
- ___ 39. I would want to talk with her and find out more about her life before making a decision.
- ___ 40. Going to jail would only make her life worse and leave her alone in the world.
- ___ 41. It is my duty to society to press charges.
- ___ 42. She really needs to learn a lesson. If she doesn't pay for this, she will keep doing it.
- ___ 43. In spite of what she did, if I sent her to jail I would feel terrible.
- ___ 44. This is a legal issue. It is simply not my problem.

RICHARD

My brother Richard has been going with Amy for two years. We all go to the same university. Early this morning I saw Amy coming out of my neighbour's apartment. Obviously Amy had spent the night at his place.

- 1 - strongly agree
- 2 - somewhat agree
- 3 - somewhat disagree
- 4 - strongly disagree

- ___ 45. The most important thing to me is that Richard not get hurt.
- ___ 46. Amy has a responsibility to tell Richard what is going on.
- ___ 47. I would tell Richard because if I were in his situation I would want him to tell me.
- ___ 48. My reaction would depend upon how Richard really feels about Amy.
- ___ 49. Amy violated the rules of their relationship and Richard should know.
- ___ 50. I don't want to be the one to hurt Richard with the news.
- ___ 51. I am afraid that telling Richard would really jeopardize how close Richard and I are.
- ___ 52. I would do what I thought was fair, regardless of the consequences.
- ___ 53. Amy has the right to do what she wants, but Richard has rights, too.
- ___ 54. Richard has a right to know that Amy is cheating.

PARENTS

My parents, after 30 years of a somewhat rocky marriage, are going through a divorce. My mother has been involved with another man for several years and has decided to leave the marriage. She seems very happy with her decision.

Each of my parents wants me to spend semester break at his or her particular home, but my father will be very upset if I go to my mother's because her "friend" will be there.

- 1 - strongly agree
- 2 - somewhat agree
- 3 - somewhat disagree
- 4 - strongly disagree

- ___ 55. I have the right to spend time with whomever I want.
- ___ 56. I have an obligation to both my parents now.
- ___ 57. What I wish more than anything is to make everyone happy and not hurt them.
- ___ 58. I don't want anything to come between my parents and me.
- ___ 59. What I did would depend on how much I thought each parent needed me.
- ___ 60. Everyone has the right to happiness, even if the consequences are sometimes hurtful to others.
- ___ 61. In spite of what my mother did, I would not do anything to hurt her.
- ___ 62. I will do the objective thing - split my time between both of them.

ROOMMATE

I have been living in the residence hall for a whole year. My roommate and I have become very good friends. The other day I was looking through my roommate's desk for a textbook. There on the desk was an envelope from the Student Health Center. I opened the letter and couldn't believe what it said: "The students with AIDS Support Group will meet on Monday nights this quarter. We hope that you will be able to join us."

I know that I am not at risk of contracting this;is disease by casual contact.

- 1 - strongly agree
- 2 - somewhat agree
- 3 - somewhat disagree
- 4 - strongly disagree

- ___ 63. How I felt would depend on how close I really was to my roommate.
- ___ 64. This is a terrible disease; my roommate needs me and I will be there.
- ___ 65. I have to think in terms of what is fair to everyone regardless of the consequences.
- ___ 66. My roommate should not be abandoned.
- ___ 67. Everyone deserves what happens to them; this is no exception.
- ___ 68. My relationship with my roommate is the most important thing; I would not do anything to hurt the relationship.
- ___ 69. I think I have a right to know about my roommate's condition, although my roommate does have a right to privacy.

- | | Strongly
Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly
Agree |
|-----|----------------------|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------------|
| ___ | 14. | Speaking up during a class is not a problem for me. | | | | | | | |
| ___ | 15. | Having a lively imagination is important to me. | | | | | | | |
| ___ | 16. | I am comfortable with being singled out for praise or rewards. | | | | | | | |
| ___ | 17. | I am the same person at home that I am at school. | | | | | | | |
| ___ | 18. | Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me. | | | | | | | |
| ___ | 19. | I act the same way no matter who I am with. | | | | | | | |
| ___ | 20. | I feel comfortable using someone's first name soon after I meet them, even when they are much older than I am. | | | | | | | |
| ___ | 21. | I prefer to be direct and forthright when dealing with people I've just met. | | | | | | | |
| ___ | 22. | I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects. | | | | | | | |
| ___ | 23. | My personal identity independent of others, is very important to me. | | | | | | | |
| ___ | 24. | I value being in good health above everything. | | | | | | | |

(RASINSKI: RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION)

The next questions have to do with different social attitudes and opinions people have. Please tell us if you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or disagree strongly with each of the next statements. Mark your choice on the left hand side.

- | | Agree
Strongly
1 | Agree
Somewhat
2 | Disagree
Somewhat
4 | Disagree
Strongly
5 | Don't
Know
8 |
|-----|---------------------------------|--|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| ___ | 1. | Most poor people don't do anything all day. | | | |
| ___ | 2. | The taxation system is difficult to understand. | | | |
| ___ | 3 | It's difficult for everybody to get ahead these days. | | | |
| ___ | 4. | Work gives people a sense of dignity and self-respect. | | | |
| ___ | 5. | There are too many people getting something for nothing in this society. | | | |
| ___ | 6. | Many poor people simply don't want to work hard. | | | |
| ___ | 7. | In Canada, everyone should be treated equally because we are all human beings. | | | |
| ___ | 8. | Anybody receiving welfare in this country should be made to work for the money they get. | | | |
| ___ | 9. | Those who are well off in this country should help those who are less fortunate. | | | |
| ___ | 10. | Basic services such as health care and legal assistance should be provided to everyone by the government, free of charge. | | | |
| ___ | 11. | Maybe its not their fault, but most poor people are brought up without ambition. | | | |

Agree Strongly 1	Agree Somewhat 2	Disagree Somewhat 4	Disagree Strongly 5	Don't Know 8
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- ___ 12. If the government should go deeper in debt to help people it should do so.
- ___ 13. Compassion for others is the most important human value.
- ___ 14. Most poor people don't have the ability to get ahead.
- ___ 15. It is not right for people to go hungry in our country.
- ___ 16. All things considered, most people get just what they deserve out of life.

CONTEXTUALIZED REASONING ABORTION

To what extent do you personally believe that abortion is acceptable or unacceptable in each of the following circumstances?

1. When the pregnant woman wants an abortion but the father of the child disagrees and is willing to assume all responsibility for the child. (R)

Completely Unacceptable	-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3	Completely Acceptable
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2. When it is extremely likely that the child will be born with severe disabilities, but sufficient resources are available to the woman as the mother of a disabled child. (R)

Completely Unacceptable	-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	---------------------------------	--------------------------

3. When a woman is worried that another mouth to feed will stress her husband far too much but she knows he would expect her to have the child anyway. (E)

Completely Unacceptable	-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	---------------------------------	--------------------------

4. When a 47 year old mother of four has conceived as a result of birth control failure and feels that she can't cope with another baby at this stage of her life. (N)

Completely Unacceptable	-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	---------------------------------	--------------------------

5. When it is extremely likely that the child will be born with severe disabilities, and the mother is not interested in raising a disabled child. (R)

Completely Unacceptable	-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3	Completely Acceptable
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6. When a teenage girl becomes pregnant as a result of rape, but she knows that her family vehemently opposes abortion under any circumstance and would expect her to continue the pregnancy. (E)

Completely Unacceptable	-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	---------------------------------	--------------------------

7. When the couple has learned that the child is not of the desired sex.
(N)

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	----	----	----	---	----	----	----	--------------------------

8. When a woman is worried that another mouth to feed will stress her husband far too much and she knows that he wouldn't expect her to have another child. (E)

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	----	----	----	---	----	----	----	--------------------------

9. When the pregnant woman wants an abortion but the father of the child disagrees, although he isn't willing to assume responsibility for the child. (R)

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	----	----	----	---	----	----	----	--------------------------

10. When a teenage girl becomes pregnant as a result of having unprotected sex with her boyfriend and her family would not expect her to continue with the pregnancy if she chose not to. (E)

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	----	----	----	---	----	----	----	--------------------------

11. When a 23 year old married mother of one doesn't want another baby at this stage of her life because she wants to spend more time travelling. (N)

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	----	----	----	---	----	----	----	--------------------------

12. When a woman's life and health are definitely at risk, due to a medical condition. (N)

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	----	----	----	---	----	----	----	--------------------------

7. When the family's reputation in the community will be jeopardized by this situation being made common knowledge.
(R)

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	----	----	----	---	----	----	----	--------------------------

- 8. When the daughter was an infant and 'couldn't defend herself'. (E)**

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	----	----	----	---	----	----	----	--------------------------

- 9. When the father refuses to apologize and his daughter seeks justice and public acknowledgement of the years of abuse.**
(N)

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	----	----	----	---	----	----	----	--------------------------

- 10. When the daughter's sense of self will be damaged further if the father is not held accountable for his actions. (R)**

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	----	----	----	---	----	----	----	--------------------------

11. When the incest occurred when the daughter was 16 and could have said 'no'. (E)

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	----	----	----	---	----	----	----	--------------------------

- 12. When the daughter says the guilty verdict is sufficient to help her in her healing process, and that sentencing is unnecessary. (N)**

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	----	----	----	---	----	----	----	--------------------------

EUTHANASIA

To what extent do you personally believe that euthanasia (mercy killing) is acceptable or unacceptable in each of the following circumstances?

1. When an elderly woman who is dying asks for euthanasia because she can no longer bear the loss of dignity, while her husband cannot bear the thought of living without her.

(N)

	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	
Completely Unacceptable								Completely Acceptable

- 2. When a spouse enters a vegetative state as a result of illness, and the family knows that they can no longer carry the financial responsibility of paying for care. (R)**

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
-------------------------	----	----	----	---	----	----	----	-----------------------

- 3. When the person HAS indicated in a "living will" that if they were to enter a vegetative state they did NOT want to be maintained on life support, but their family disagrees.**

(E)

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
--------------------------------	-----------	-----------	-----------	----------	-----------	-----------	-----------	------------------------------

4. When an elderly woman who is dying asks for euthanasia because she can no longer bear the loss of dignity, and her family is ready to "let her go". (N)

Completely Unacceptable -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 Completely Acceptable

- 5. When an individual enters a vegetative state as a result of illness and has no family. (R)**

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	----	----	----	---	----	----	----	--------------------------

6. When the person HAS indicated in a "living will" that if they were to enter a vegetative state they did NOT want to be maintained on life support, and their family agrees.

(E)

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
-------------------------	----	----	----	---	----	----	----	-----------------------

- 7. When a person has entered a vegetative state as a result of a suicide attempt, after the breakup of their marriage. (N)**

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	----	----	----	---	----	----	----	--------------------------

8. When a person is in the final stages of living with AIDS and they know there is no cure. (E)

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	----	----	----	---	----	----	----	--------------------------

- 9. When a person has entered a vegetative state as a result of a suicide attempt after learning that they have a terminal illness. (N)**

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	----	----	----	---	----	----	----	--------------------------

10. When a person is living with cancer and the prognosis for their recovery is 50/50. (E)

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	----	----	----	---	----	----	----	--------------------------

- 11. When a spouse has entered a vegetative state as a result of an automobile accident, and their partner knows that their relationship with their spouse will never be the same. (R)**

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
----------------------------	----	----	----	---	----	----	----	--------------------------

12. When a spouse has entered a vegetative state as a result of an illness, the prognosis of which is unknown, and their partner doesn't know if they will ever be the same again. (R)

Completely Unacceptable	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	Completely Acceptable
------------------------------------	-----------	-----------	-----------	----------	-----------	-----------	-----------	----------------------------------

The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding

Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how true it is.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	not true		somewhat				very true
___	1.	My first impression of people usually turns out to be right.					
___	2.	It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits.					
___	3.	I don't care to know what other people really think of me.					
___	4.	I have not always been honest with myself.					
___	5.	I always know why I like things.					
___	6.	When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking.					
___	7.	Once I've made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.					
___	8.	I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit.					
___	9.	I am fully in control of my own fate.					
___	10.	It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.					
___	11.	I never regret my decisions.					
___	12.	I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough.					
___	13.	The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference.					
___	14.	My parents were not always fair when they punished me.					
___	15.	I am a completely rational person.					
___	16.	I rarely appreciate criticism.					
___	17.	I am very confident of my decisions.					
___	18.	I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.					
___	19.	It's alright with me if some people happen to dislike me.					
___	20.	I don't always know the reasons why I do things.					
___	21.	I sometimes tell lies if I have to.					
___	22.	I never cover up my mistakes.					

- ___ 23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.
- ___ 24. I never swear.
- ___ 25. I sometimes try to get even rather than to forgive and forget.
- ___ 26. I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught.
- ___ 27. I have said something wrong about a friend behind his/her back.
- ___ 28. When I hear people talk privately, I avoid listening.
- ___ 29. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.
- ___ 30. I always declare everything at customs.
- ___ 31. When I was young I sometimes stole things.
- ___ 32. I have never dropped litter on the street.
- ___ 33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit.
- ___ 34. I never read sexy books or magazines.
- ___ 35. I have done things that I don't tell other people about.
- ___ 36. I never take things that don't belong to me.
- ___ 37. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn't really sick.
- ___ 38. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it.
- ___ 39. I have some pretty awful habits.
- ___ 40. I don't gossip about other people's business.

DEBRIEFING

The MORAL ISSUES study you have just completed has been designed to examine the factors which influence people when they are attempting to resolve moral dilemmas in their lives.

Currently, there is no convenient, fixed format paper and pencil measure to assess moral reasoning and moral orientation. The main method is an interview procedure that is tedious and time consuming to score. Also, as a result, the amount of research generated, using the interview procedure, is limited.

The basis of this study was the attempt to validate at least one fixed format, paper and pencil measure of MORAL REASONING and MORAL ORIENTATION.

If you would like to make further inquiries into this area of Social Psychology the following references may be of interest:

Gilligan, C. (1982). In a Different Voice:

Gilligan, C. (1986). Mapping the Moral Domain:

Finally, if you would like to discuss this study in more detail, please contact Nina Mosion, at 565-2114 or Dr. Connie Kristiansen at 788-2600 ext. 2674. If you have any concern about the way you were treated in this study, please contact Dr. Lise Paquet, Chair of the Psychology Department Ethics Committee, at 788-2600 ext. 2692, or Dr. Bill Jones, Chair of the Department of Psychology, at 788-2600 ext. 2648.

Further, it is the intention of the researchers in this study to offer a participant gathering at the completion of this study, to provide participants with feedback as to the results of this study, and to answer any questions they may have.

Appendix III

Tables

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables by Sample

Variable	Sample						t (101)
	Total		Students		Volunteers		
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	
Age	29.4	12.8	25.4	8.2	40.0	16.5	-4.52***
Education	15.4	2.1	15.2	2.0	16.1	2.3	-2.1*

* $p < .05$. *** $p < .001$. (Two-tailed)

Table 2

Frequencies for Discrete Variables by Sample

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Sample</u>		
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Students</u>	<u>Volunteers</u>
	<u>N</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>N</u>
<u>Gender</u>			
Male	38 (36%)	30 (39%)	8 (28.6%)
Female	67 (64%)	47 (61%)	20 (71.4%)
$\chi^2(1) = 0.56, ns$			
<u>Marital Status</u>			
Single	76 (72.4%)	66 (85.7%)	10 (35.7%)
Married/Cohab	20 (19.1%)	7 (9.1%)	13 (46.4%)
Widowed	3 (2.9%)	1 (1.3%)	3 (7.1%)
Divorced	5 (4.8%)	2 (2.6%)	3 (10.7%)
$\chi^2(3) = 0.56, ns$			

Table 3

Internal Consistency of Predictor Variables

<u>Variables</u>	<u>Range</u>	<u># Items Used</u>	<u># Items Del.</u>	<u>Mr</u>	<u>α</u>
Liddell Care	1 - 4	31	4	.116	.81
Liddell Justice	1 - 4	23	11	.106	.73
Friedman Care	0 - 4	16	2	.163	.76
Heinz	0 - 4	5	1	.214	.58
Escaped Prisoner	0 - 4	5	1	.251	.62
Newspaper	0 - 4	6	0	.236	.65
Friedman Justice	0 - 4	16	2	.136	.72
Heinz	0 - 4	5	1	.236	.61
Escaped Prisoner	0 - 4	5	1	.156	.48
Newspaper	0 - 4	6	0	.224	.62
Yacker/Weinberg	0 - 1	10	2	.079	.46

Table 4

Internal Consistency of Criterion Variables

<u>Variables</u>	<u>Range</u>	<u># Items Used</u>	<u># Items Del.</u>	<u>Mr</u>	<u>α</u>
Self-concept					
Independent	1 - 7	12	0	.153	.68
Interdependent	1 - 7	12	0	.173	.72
Resource distribution					
Proportionality	1 - 4	5	0	.303	.68
Egalitarianism	1 - 4	6	0	.362	.76
Social desirability					
Self-deception	1 - 7	20	0	.140	.76
Image maintenance	1 - 7	20	0	.200	.84
Attitudes					
Incest	0 - 7	12	0	.761	.97
Euthanasia	0 - 7	12	0	.522	.93
Abortion	0 - 7	10	2	.479	.90

Table 5

Descriptive Statistics for Participants' Scores on the Predictor Variables

<u>Predictor Variable</u>	<u>Potential Range</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>t (105)</u>
Rogers' Justice	0 - 20	4.78	2.24	-2.94**
Rogers' Care	0 - 20	5.74	2.56	
Liddell Justice	1 - 4	2.82	0.348	2.38*
Liddell Care	1 - 4	2.95	0.322	
Friedman Justice	1 - 5	3.25	0.56	7.58***
Friedman Care	1 - 5	2.81	0.59	
Yacker & Weinberg	1 - 12	4.58	1.93	

Note: Scales were scored so that higher scores indicated greater Justice and Care reasoning.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$. (two-tailed)

Table 6

Descriptive Statistics for Participants' Scores on the Criterion and Other Variables

<u>Criterion</u>	<u>Potential</u> <u>Range</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>t</u>
Singelis				
Independent	1 - 7	5.06	0.75	5.06***
Interdependent	1 - 7	4.47	0.83	
Stiller & Forrest				
Separate Self	0 - 4	0.51	0.91	-2.87**
Independent Self	0 - 6	0.91	1.14	
Resource Distribution				
Proportionality	1 - 5	3.32	0.99	8.54***
Egalitarianism	1 - 6	2.06	0.77	
Attitude Variance				
Incest	0 - 8.78	1.46	1.87	F(2,200) = 27.76***
Abortion	0 - 7.34	2.76	2.02	
Euthanasia	0 - 7.84	3.39	1.97	
Balanced Inventory				
Self deception	1 - 7	4.37	0.89	3.74***
Image maintenance	1 - 7	3.77	0.95	
Attitudes				
Incest	-3 - +3	0.66	2.17	F(2,200) = 0.51, ns
Euthanasia	-3 - +3	0.53	1.51	
Abortion	-3 - +3	0.41	1.57	

Note: All scales were scored so that higher scores indicated more of the attribute in question.

** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$. (Two-tailed)

Table 7

Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix of Correlations among Measures of Moral Reasoning

<u>Predictors</u>	<u>RJ</u>	<u>RC</u>	<u>LJ</u>	<u>LC</u>	<u>FJ</u>	<u>FC</u>	<u>YW</u>
RJ	(.93)						
RC	.03	(.93)					
LJ	.22*	-.20*	(.73)				
LC	-.12	.27**	-.23*	(.81)			
FJ	.18†	.08	-.05	.04	(.72)		
FC	.16	.14	-.07	.16	.47***	(.76)	
YW	.09	.16	-.16	.14	.21*	.17†	(.46)

Note: Ns range from 97 to 105.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .001$. (Two-tailed)

RJ, RC = Rogers' Justice and Care

LJ, LC = Liddel et al.'s Justice and Care

FJ, FC = Friedman et al.'s Justice and Care

YW = Yacker and Weinberg's Care

Table 8

Measures of Convergent Validity Among Measures of Moral Reasoning

<u>Types of Convergence</u>		<u>Divergent Validity Test</u>
<u>Monotrait-Heteromethod</u>	<u>Heterotrait-Heteromethod</u>	<u>Hotelling's t-test (97)</u>
RC - LC = .264**	RC - RJ = .029	t = 1.78*
RC - FC = .141	RC - RJ = .029	t = 0.86
RJ - LJ = .215*	RJ - RC = .029	t = 1.20
RJ - FJ = .177†	RJ - RC = .029	t = 1.09
LC - RC = .264**	LC - LJ = -.230*	t = 3.31**
LC - FC = .161	LC - LJ = -.230*	t = 2.73**
LJ - RJ = .215*	LJ - LC = -.230*	t = 3.06**
LJ - FJ = -.052	LJ - LC = -.230*	t = 1.29
FC - RC = .141	FC - FJ = .473***	t = -2.64**
FC - LC = .161	FC - FJ = .473***	t = -2.41*
FJ - RJ = .177†	FJ - FC = .473***	t = -2.46**
FJ - LJ = .074	FJ - FC = .473***	t = -3.29**

Note. Ns range from 97 to 105.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .001$. (one-tailed)

RJ, RC = Rogers' Justice and Care

LJ, LC = Liddel et al.'s Justice and Care

FJ, FC = Friedman et al.'s Justice and Care

Table 9

Measures of Divergent Validity Among Measures of Moral Reasoning

<u>Heterotrait-Heteromethod</u>	<u>Monotrait-Heteromethod</u>	<u>Hotelling's t-test</u>
RC - LJ = -.200*	RC - LC = .269**	t = 3.10**
RC - FJ = .081	RC - FC = .141	t = 0.58
LC - RJ = -.119	LC - RC = .269**	t = 2.87**
LC - FJ = .044	LC - FC = .160	t = 1.12
FC - RJ = .155	FC - RC = .141	t = -0.10
FC - LJ = -.07	FC - LC = .160	t = 1.47
RJ - LC = -.119	RJ - LJ = .216*	t = 2.14*
RJ - FC = .155	RJ - FJ = .177†	t = 0.22
LJ - RC = -.20*	LJ - RJ = .216*	t = 3.04**
LJ - FC = -.07	LJ - FJ = -.05	t = 0.19
FJ - RC = .081	FJ - RJ = .177†	t = 0.68
FJ - LC = .044	FJ - LJ = -.22***	t = 0.60

Note: Ns range from 97 to 105.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .001$. (one-tailed)

RJ, RC = Rogers' Justice and Care

LJ, LC = Liddel et al.'s Justice and Care

FJ, FC = Friedman et al.'s Justice and Care

Table 10

Correlations between Predictor and Criterion Variables

<u>Pred</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Con</u>	<u>Ind</u>	<u>Int</u>	<u>Prop</u>	<u>Egal</u>	<u>InVAR</u>	<u>EuVAR</u>	<u>AbVAR</u>
RJ	.20†	.13	.10	-.08	.03	.03	.03	-.03	.05
RC	-.05	.30**	.01	-.10	.11	-.10	-.05	.17†	.11
LJ	.12	-.11	.18†	.04	-.24*	.19*	.02	-.01	.06
LC	-.19*	.07	-.13	.26**	.00	-.33***	.03	-.06	.12
FJ	.11	.12	.28**	-.27**	.21*	-.22*	-.08	.13	-.04
FC	-.15	-.09	-.14	-.05	-.12	-.03	.04	.01	.11
YW	-.03	.12	.00	-.04	.10	-.08	-.10	.12	.02

Note. Ns range from 97 to 105

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$. ** $p < .001$. (two-tailed)

RJ, RC = Rogers' Justice and Care

LJ, LC = Liddel et al.'s Justice and Care

FJ, FC = Friedman et al.'s Justice and Care

Sep/Con = Stiller & Forrest's Separate/Connected Self Concept

Ind/Int = Singelis' independent/Interdependent Self Construal

Prop/Egal = Rasinski's Proportionality/Egalitarianism in Resource Distribution

In/Eu/AbVAR = Attitudinal Variance towards Incest, Euthanasia, and Abortion

Table 11
Intercorrelations between Criterion Variables

<u>Criterion</u>	<u>Criterion</u>							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Separate	---							
2. Connected	.05	---						
3. Independent	.11	-.01	---					
4. Interdependent	-.12	-.03	-.12	---				
5. Proportionality	.06	.01	.13	-.30**	---			
6. Egalitarianism	.02	-.01	-.27**	-.17†	-.36***	---		
7. InVAR	-.14	-.10	-.16	.01	-.12	.06	---	
8. EuVAR	.03	.17†	.10	-.20*	-.05	.01	.06	---
9. AbVAR	.02	.04	.01	.23*	-.15	.12	-.01	.30**

Note. Ns range from 97 to 105.

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .001$ (two-tailed)

Table 12

Results of t - tests Examining the Relationship between Gender and the Predictor Variables

<u>Predictors</u>	<u>Gender</u>				<u>t values</u>
	<u>Males</u>		<u>Females</u>		
	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>	
Rogers					
Justice	4.63	2.43	4.87	2.13	-0.51
Care	5.29	2.32	6.00	2.66	-1.37
Liddell					
Justice	2.84	0.37	2.82	0.34	0.30
Care	2.86	0.29	2.99	0.33	-1.99*
Friedman					
Justice	3.26	0.56	3.24	0.56	0.21
Care	2.77	0.61	2.83	0.59	-0.45
Y & W Care	4.03	1.84	4.89	1.92	-1.99*

Note Degrees of freedom ranged from 99 to 103.* $p < .05$ (Two-tailed)

Table 13

Results of t-tests Examining the Relationship between Gender and Criterion and Other Variables

<u>Criterion</u>	<u>Gender</u>				<u>t values</u>
	<u>Males</u>		<u>Gender</u>		
	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>	
Singelis' self					
Independent	5.16	0.71	5.00	0.77	0.99
Interdependent	4.53	0.79	4.44	0.86	0.55
Stiller & Forrest					
Separate	0.63	1.08	0.44	0.79	1.04†
Connected	0.66	0.94	1.06	1.22	-1.76
Resource distribution					
Proportionality	3.10	0.92	3.46	1.03	-1.73
Egalitarianism	1.96	0.73	2.12	0.79	-0.96
Attitude Variance					
Incest	1.36	1.75	1.52	1.95	-0.42
Euthanasia	2.58	1.98	2.86	1.98	-0.68
Abortion	2.99	2.05	3.62	1.98	-1.50
<u>Others</u>					
Balanced Inventory					
Self deception	4.55	0.80	4.30	0.93	1.55
Image maintenance	3.83	0.89	4.20	1.22	-1.61**
Attitudes					
Incest	0.99	2.19	0.98	2.12	-2.00*
Euthanasia	0.78	1.44	0.39	1.55	1.24
Abortion	0.25	1.71	0.49	1.49	-0.76

Note: Ns range from 99 to 103.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed)

Table 14

Correlations between Continuous Demographic Variables and Predictor Variables

<u>Predictor</u>	<u>Demographic variable</u>	
	<u>Age</u>	<u>Education</u>
Rogers		
Justice	0.07	0.13
Care	-0.21*	0.07
Liddell et al.		
Justice	-0.08	0.01
Care	-.033***	-.016
Friedman et al.		
Justice	-0.21*	0.00
Care	-.17†	-.011
Yacker & Weinberg		
Care	-0.11	0.22*

Note: Ns range from 99 to 103.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed)

Table 15

Correlations between Continuous Demographic Variables and Criterion and Other Variables

<u>Criterion</u>	<u>Demographic Variables</u>	
	<u>Age</u>	<u>Education</u>
Singelis' self		
Independent	0.03	0.03
Interdependent	-0.19*	-0.27**
Stiller & Forrest		
Separate	0.04	-0.01
Connected	-0.01	0.25*
Resource distribution		
Proportionality	0.18†	-.02
Egalitarianism	0.15	-0.03
Attitude Variance		
Incest	0.16	-.014
Euthanasia	0.00	0.10
Abortion	-0.29**	-0.18†
Others		
Balanced Inventory		
Self deception	-0.01	0.10
Image maintenance	0.09	-0.09
Attitudes		
Incest	0.16	-0.02
Euthanasia	0.11	0.29**
Abortion	0.29**	0.17†

Note: Ns range from 99 to 103.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed)

Table 16

Results of t-tests Examining the Relationship between Sample and Predictor Variables

<u>Predictors</u>	<u>Sample</u>				<u>t values</u>
	<u>Students</u>		<u>Volunteers</u>		
	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>	
Rogers					
Justice	4.60	2.20	5.29	2.31	-1.40
Care	5.92	2.43	5.25	2.86	1.19
Liddell et al.					
Justice	2.85	0.37	2.75	0.29	1.28
Care	2.99	0.30	2.83	0.35	2.28*
Friedman et al.					
Justice	3.22	0.55	3.31	0.59	-0.67
Care	2.85	0.60	2.69	0.55	1.26
Y & W					
Care	4.60	1.92	4.56	2.01	0.09

Note: Ns range from 99 to 103.

* $p < .05$. (two-tailed)

Table 17

Results of t-tests Examining the Relationship between Sample and Criterion and Other Variables

Criterion	Sample				t values
	Students		Volunteers		
	M	SD	M	SD	
Singelis' self					
Independent	5.01	0.74	5.19	0.79	-1.11
Interdependent	4.58	0.84	4.14	0.73	2.44*
Stiller & Forrest					
Separate	0.43	0.83	0.74	1.09	-1.55
Connected	0.75	1.12	1.37	1.08	-2.51*
Resource distribution					
Proportionality	3.10	0.98	3.99	0.69	-4.40***
Egalitarianism	2.04	0.73	2.11	0.89	-0.37
Attitude Variance					
Incest	1.57	1.98	1.15	1.50	1.01
Euthanasia	2.73	1.98	2.12	1.99	-0.19
Abortion	3.70	1.98	2.44	1.88	-2.80
Others					
Balanced Inventory					
Self deception	4.13	0.73	4.05	0.74	0.47
Image maintenance	3.84	0.97	3.56	0.85	1.34
Attitudes					
Incest	0.29	2.17	1.76	1.81	-3.41***
Euthanasia	0.29	1.50	1.24	1.33	-2.86**
Abortion	0.05	1.47	1.49	1.39	-4.33***

Note: Ns range from 99 to 103.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed)

END

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FIN