1

National Library of Canada
Bibliothèque nationale du Canada

CANADIAN THESES
ON MICROFICHE

THÈSES CANADIENNES
SUR MICROFICHE

0-315-04924-3

52818

NAME OF AUTHOR/NOM DE L'AUTEUR BOBBY C.Y. SIU

TITLE OF THESIS/TITRE DE LA THÈSE THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS IN CHINA, 1900-1949

UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ CARLETON UNIVERSITY

DEGREES FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/
GRADE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE PH.D.

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE DEGRÉ 1981

NAME OF SUPERVISOR/NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE Don Whyte

Permission is hereby granted to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

L'autorisation est, par la présente, accordée à la BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE DU CANADA de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans l'autorisation écrite de l'auteur.

DATED/DATE Sept. 1, 1981 SIGNED/SIGNÉ

PERMANENT ADDRESS/RÉSIDENCE FIXE 99 Westmoreland Ave.,
Toronto, Ontario M6H 2Z8, Canada.

National Library of Canada
Collections Development Branch

Canadian Theses on
Microfiche Service

Bibliothèque nationale du Canada
Direction du développement des collections

Service des thèses canadiennes
sur microfiche

NOTICE

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us a poor photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30. Please read the authorization forms which accompany this thesis.

**THIS DISSERTATION
HAS BEEN MICROFILMED
EXACTLY AS RECEIVED**

AVIS

La qualité de cette microfiche dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de mauvaise qualité.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, examens publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de ce microfilm est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30. Veuillez prendre connaissance des formules d'autorisation qui accompagnent cette thèse.

**LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ
MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE
NOUS L'AVONS REÇUE**

THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS IN CHINA

1900-1949

by

Bobby C.Y. Siu

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

1981

The undersigned recommended to the Faculty
of Graduate Studies acceptance of the dissertation:

"The Women's Movements in China, 1900-1949"

submitted by Bobby Siu, M.A.,
in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Dissertation Supervisor.

Chairperson, Department
of Sociology and Anthro-
pology

Carleton University

1981

ABSTRACT

This study documents women's role in social change and examines the structural conditions under which the Chinese women's movements emerged and developed in 1900-1949. The analysis is restricted to four movements --- revolutionary, suffrage, educational reform, and anti-imperialist --- their structural origins, organizational milieu, and their relationships to government policies of institutional changes and social control.

These areas of concern are based on the Smelserian frameworks. However, various Western conceptions of the sources and conditions of social (women's) movements have been utilized as guidelines in our investigation. An evaluation of these frameworks was done. Methodologically, this study focussed on the macroscopic factors of the women's movements and is based on historical documents.

It is noted that the deteriorating politico-economic conditions in China and imperialist advances provided the context in which women's movements emerged and developed. The pre-existing organizational milieu were women's schools, student clubs, and political organizations. Where these networks did not exist, the role of political parties became significant.

The development of the women's movements is contingent on government policies of institutional changes and social control. Although there is no clear cut pattern in these relationships, the movements tended to respond to waivering, contradictory, or encouraging policies

of institutional changes. The movements also pressured the governments into effecting reforms. Repression and institutionalization of the women's movements were the two key forms of government policies of social control. The former did not have lasting effects; the latter one was more effective in molding the movements.

The role of political parties in shaping the women's movements became increasingly important as time progressed. Both the KMT and CCP were interested in incorporating the movements, however their policies and methods were different. The latter explain why the KMT failed to mobilize peasant and working class women.

This study also noted that the women's movements had class components: educated women dominated the revolutionary, suffrage, and educational reform movements, and peasant (and to some extent, working class) women the anti-imperialist movement. Although the educated women were the pioneers of the Chinese women's movement, its thrust gradually shifted to peasant women.

NOTE ON ROMANIZATION

I have used the Hanyü Pinyin system of romanization in my dissertation. This system is the official system used in the People's Republic of China and Asian scholars are increasingly using it to romanize the Chinese language. The only exceptions are the names of Chinese authors previously romanized using other systems.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	i
NOTE ON ROMANIZATION	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iv
LIST OF TABLES	vii
LIST OF APPENDICES	viii
 CHAPTERS	
1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS AND METHODOLOGY	1
<div style="padding-left: 2em;">Statement of Inquiries</div> <div style="padding-left: 2em;">Nature of Social Movements</div> <div style="padding-left: 2em;">Nature of Women's Movements</div> <div style="padding-left: 2em;">Conceptual Frameworks</div> <div style="padding-left: 2em;">Areas of Analysis</div> <div style="padding-left: 2em;">Scope of Research</div> <div style="padding-left: 2em;">Research Methods and Sources of Data</div> <div style="padding-left: 2em;">Summary</div>	
2. WOMEN'S STATUS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY CHINA	32
<div style="padding-left: 2em;">Introduction</div> <div style="padding-left: 2em;">Women and the Political Structure</div> <div style="padding-left: 2em;">Women and the Educational Structure</div> <div style="padding-left: 2em;">Women and the Industrial Structure</div> <div style="padding-left: 2em;">Women and the Agricultural Structure</div> <div style="padding-left: 2em;">Conclusion</div>	
3. THE WOMEN'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT, 1900-1912	63
<div style="padding-left: 2em;">Introduction</div> <div style="padding-left: 2em;">Structural Conditions</div> <div style="padding-left: 2em;">Organizational Networks</div> <div style="padding-left: 2em;">Institutional Changes and the Women's Revolutionary Movement</div> <div style="padding-left: 2em;">Social Control and the Women's Revo- lutionary Movement</div> <div style="padding-left: 2em;">Conclusion</div>	

4. THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1900-1949	93
Introduction	
Structural Conditions	
Organizational Networks	
Institutional Changes and the Woman	
Suffrage Movement	
Social Control and the Woman Suffrage	
Movement	
Conclusion	
5. THE WOMEN'S EDUCATIONAL REFORM MOVEMENT, 1900-1949	134
Introduction	
Structural Conditions	
Organizational Networks	
Institutional Changes and the Women's	
Educational Reform Movement	
Social Control and the Women's Educa-	
tional Reform Movement	
Conclusion	
6. THE WOMEN'S ANTI-IMPERIALIST MOVEMENT, 1900-1949	175
Introduction	
Structural Conditions	
Organizational Networks	
Institutional Changes and the Women's	
Anti-Imperialist Movement	
Social Control and the Women's Anti-	
Imperialist Movement	
Conclusion	
7. WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL PARTIES	260
Policies of Mobilization	
Organizational Tactics of Women-	
Mobilization	
Approaches to Women-Mobilization	
Conclusion	
8. CONCLUSION	296
Origin and Development of the Chinese	
Women's Movements	

Roles of Women in Social Change
Evaluation of Conceptual Frameworks

APPENDICES	330
REFERENCES	387

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Percentages of Women in the Student Population at Different Levels in China	148

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendices	Page
I. Women's Revolutionary Organizations, 1900-1912	330
II. Women's Revolutionary Organizations, by Locations and Years, 1900-1912	334
III. Women's Revolutionary Periodicals, 1900-1912	335
IV. Women's Revolutionary Periodicals, by Locations and Years, 1900-1912	336
V. Overlapping Membership in Women's Revolutionary Organizations, 1900-1912	337
VI. Overlapping Membership in Both Women's Revolutionary Organizations and Periodicals, 1900-1912	338
VII. Overlapping Membership of Women in Political Organizations and Women's Organizations and/or Periodicals, 1900-1912	339
VIII. Two Routes of Politicization of Women, 1900-1912	341
IX. The Relationship of Female and Male Revolutionaries	342
X. Family Ties Among Women Revolutionaries	344
XI. Woman Suffrage Organizations, 1900-1949	345
XII. Woman Suffrage Organizations, by Locations and Years, 1900-1949	352
XIII. Woman Suffrage Periodicals, 1900-1949	353
XIV. Woman Suffrage Periodicals, by Loca- tions and Years, 1900-1949	355

XV.	Woman Suffrage Organizations Led By Students, 1900-1949	356
XVI.	Periodicals Published by Woman Suffrage Organizations, 1900-1949	357
XVII.	Woman Suffrage Organizations as Exten- sions of Former Women's Revolutionary Organizations	358
XVIII.	Overlapping Leadership of Woman Suffrage Organizations and Women's Revolu- tionary Organizations	359
XIX.	Women's Educational Reform Organiza- tions, 1900-1949	360
XX.	Women's Educational Reform Organiza- tions, by Locations and Years, 1900-1949	367
XXI.	Women's Educational Reform Periodicals, 1900-1949	368
XXII.	Women's Educational Reform Periodicals, by Locations and Years, 1900-1949	370
XXIII.	Overlapping Membership of Women in Early Women's Educational Reform Organiza- tions/Periodicals and Revolutionary Organizations and Periodicals	371
XXIV.	Women's Anti-Imperialist Organizations, 1900-1949	372
XXV.	The Structure of the Women's Guidance Committee of the New Life Movement, 1943	378
XXVI.	Examples of Women's Anti-Imperialist Organizations under the Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, 1935-1949	379
XXVII.	Women's Anti-Imperialist Organizations, by Locations and Years, 1900-1949	382

- XXVIII. Women's Anti-Imperialist Periodicals,
1900-1949 383
- XXIX. Women's Anti-Imperialist Periodicals,
by Locations and Years, 1900-1949 386

CHAPTER 1

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS AND METHODOLOGY

Statement of Inquiries

The history of China is a history of both Chinese men and women. However, in the past, many historians ignored the contribution of women to history-making. We read documents which glorify the roles of Sun Yixian in overthrowing the Manchu Dynasty, Jiang Jieshi in leading the Northern Expedition, Mao Zedong in northern China, and millions of men in anti-Japanese resistance, and so on. But we seldom hear of women's participation in these epoch-making activities. It may come as a shock to many people, historians and Sinologists included, to learn that women did engage in anti-Manchu activities, in the fight for democratic rights, in resistance to imperialist forces, etc. One of the central tasks of this dissertation is to systematically document the role of women in political struggles.

Although little is known about the activities of women in Chinese history, there is evidence that some Chinese women did participate in male-led movements and organizations: the White Lotus Movement, the Taiping Rebellion, and various peasant secret societies in the 19th century. (Zhou Gusheng, 1957; Chesneaux, 1973; Siu, 1975b) There were also anti-marriage actions in Guangdong which were carried out exclusively by women. (Topley, 1975) These struggles may be seen as prototypes of

women's movements in China.

In contrast to the movements mentioned above (with the exception of the anti-marriage activities), the women's movements in the 20th century were organized by and composed mainly of women (both leaders and members). Women's organizations were widespread and their central goals were women's rights. Their strategies for achieving their goals were mainly political. They were the first women's movements in China that we know of. The question then is: what social factors were at work in the emergence of women's movements at the turn of this century?

Social movements which undermine and challenge the status quo usually do not follow a smooth path. Not only are they faced with internal debates and factions, they also have to confront the repressive measures imposed by governments. The Chinese women's movements were no exception to this rule. Chinese women criticized government policies with respect to women's status, domestic changes, and foreign relationships, attacking not only internal institutions but also foreign powers. This resulted in government harassment, policing, spying, cooptation, intimidation, institutionalization, and military coercion. In addition, the Chinese women's movements were faced with foreign intervention. They, therefore, had to formulate a variety of strategies and tactics to combat this repression and incorporation. It is in this context that women's movements grow, prosper, wither, or decline. One of the tasks of this study is to examine the social determinants which shaped the development of women's movements during the period of 1900-1949.

In sum, three tasks are set forward in this study: (a) to document the roles of women in social change; (b) to investigate the facilitating factors giving rise to women's movements at the turn of this century; and (c) to probe the mechanisms shaping the courses of the women's movements between 1900 and 1949.

Nature of Social Movements

Although social movements are difficult to define, social scientists tend to agree on the following as a working definition: (a) activities usually involving struggle by (b) collectives over (c) a period of time on (d) a large scale to bring about (e) change, including the adoption of new organizations and symbols, whether by destroying or adding to old ones. (Blumer, 1951: 199-200; King, 1956: 27; Turner and Killian, 1957: 308; Killian, 1964: 426-55; Toch, 1965: 5; Cameron, 1966: 7; Gusfield, 1970: 2)

Social movements are a mixture of spontaneous and organized activity in which a definite pattern of development cannot be determined, but only approximated. This is because social movements are products, and simultaneously creators, of the social environment; their actions, implicit and explicit, are responsive to public definitions and to government reactions which, in turn, are affected by the movements.

This study assumes that social movements, by their very nature, are always in a state of flux. Not only are they a mixture of spontaneity and organization, they move from one stage to another. An institutionalized movement is merely one stage of development. Since institutionalization

is a process, and not an entity in itself, one may argue that a social movement in the process of being institutionalized by the government is still a social movement.

Nature of Women's Movements

Women's movements is a sub-category of social movements. However, the term "women's movements" has seldom been clearly defined in the literature. What constitutes a women's movement?

On the ideological level, most studies view women's movements as collective actions which deal with issues specific to the rights of women. Eichler (1977: 106) sees the aim of the contemporary women's liberation movement as "to eliminate unnecessary sex differences and to ensure the social, economic, and political equality of women and men." Teather (1976: 313) views a women's movement as a movement of "loosely organized women's groups" which work for "a recasting of the sex roles which would make substantial if not revolutionary alterations in the world through legislative, economic or psychological change." These definitions illustrate the fact that many social scientists see women's movements as characterized by a focus on gender differences and inequalities. However, using these foci as criteria to distinguish what are or are not women's movements is problematic because they are ethnocentric and class-biased. An examination of some empirical data will illustrate this point.

Black women in South Africa have not organized to fight for gender equality. Instead they have organized to boycott bus transport-

tation, to oppose segregation, to strike against police brutality, to reject the pass laws, etc. Their activities are anti-racist rather than anti-sexist. (Bernstein, 1975: 40-49) Without a doubt, sex segregation of jobs and differential wages exist in South Africa, but what is more important to Black women is the apartheid system which oppresses them first as non-whites, and secondly as women. They do not fight for equal rights and welfare with their Black men, since the latter are not that much better off. Similarly, Cuban women, in the 1930s and 1950s, organized themselves to get rid of dictatorial regimes and imperialism, and not to eliminate gender inequalities. (Randall, 1974) Their central argument was that, in a conquered country, their status, along with that of men, was drastically lowered to that of "colonized" people or "slaves", and under these conditions, it was difficult to improve their status and well-being.

Gender differences/inequalities are the concerns of "middle class" women. For working class women and peasant (or farm) women, survival remains their biggest concern. These women usually have little education, are in ill health, live in poor housing, and lack a job. (Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada, 1970: 316-28) The major worry of farm women is "in the area of farm economics" because their family economic situation is always precarious. (Taylor, 1976: 151-66) This situation also applies to peasant women in the Third World. As for working class women, they are struggling to provide their families with decent housing conditions, food, health care, clothing,

etc. (McCourt, 1977: 5) Fighting for survival in the environment of extreme economic exploitation or deprivation on a day-to-day basis (an experience that middle class women do not have) is very different from fighting against relative deprivation (as in gender differences in wages, fringe benefits, etc.) for the former affects the physical existence of those concerned.

Due to the fixation (implicit or explicit) on gender differences or inequalities as the criterion for distinguishing what is or is not a women's movement, many activities of Third World women, working class and peasant (farm) women are not considered to be part of women's movements. As we will see later in the study, Chinese women founded their own organizations, published their own journals, and launched campaigns and demonstrations, etc. to fight against imperialism, the Manchu dynasty, etc., however, their actions are usually regarded as part of larger political movements, not as women's movements. In their literature in the first half of this century, some Chinese women explicitly linked women's liberation with anti-imperialism, some dealt with the unequal sex structure in terms of suffrage, occupational and educational opportunities, etc. Using the criterion of the ideology of gender differences/inequality, only the latter activities are considered to be women's movements. Often, the anti-exploitation activities of women are seen as part of larger political movements, labour movements, etc. The irony is that the fight for woman suffrage, temperance, family reforms, abortion, and so on, are seldom viewed as part of a larger movement for democratic rights

or middle class movements. The contention of this study is that the exclusion of women's activities which do not conform to this class-biased and ethnocentric definition is, in itself, a distortion. To capture fully the complexity of women's concerns and actions (irrespective of their class backgrounds, nationalities, and the historical period in which they are located), one should include a variety of women's activities not conventionally defined as part of women's movements.

Operationally, "women's movements" are collective actions of women to effect social change over a period of time. These actions, as viewed by women, can promote women's conditions or status, either on a short-term basis or a long one. Organizationally, they are likely to be independent. However, due to historical circumstances or based on their own strategies, they may be submerged under other larger organizations. Similarly, their actions or publications may or may not be separate from their male counterparts.

As implied in the above paragraphs, there are, at least, two types of "women's movements" based on their ideological orientation. One is gender-oriented --- collective actions which deal with issues specifically related to women. The other is class-oriented --- those concerned with the class situation of women. These two types of women's movements are not always mutually exclusive and, depending on the historical situations, they may also merge with the larger social movements.

Gender-oriented and class-oriented women's movements have their own unique natures. The gender-oriented one tends to see men as its enemy and is composed mainly of educated women. Their bias may be readily seen in their women-only organizations, elitist approach, and educationally concentrated campaigns of mobilization. In contrast, the class-oriented women's movement tends to treat men as its allies in so far as they belong to the same class. It is composed mainly of working class or "peasant" women (using the term "class" in a loose way). The class-oriented women's movement tends to be "grass-roots" in approach and organized under class affiliated organizations. It usually uses whatever means of mobilization are most appropriate to the situation and concerns itself with the issues most urgent to women belonging to a specific class.

Conceptual Frameworks and Areas of Concerns

The dynamics of social movements may be approached in two manners: microscopic (psychological) and macroscopic (structural). The microscopic approach includes the study of the motivations of the participants and leaders, the degree of involvement and commitment to the cause, etc. The macroscopic one consists of examining the structural preconditions of social movements, class components, ideologies, organizations, strategies and tactics, responses to government policies, etc.

In many cases, micro- and macro- factors are not completely exclusive. For example, the motivations of the members and leaders are

usually related to their class backgrounds and the structural context in which the social movements develop, and the strategies and tactics of a social movement depend on, among other factors, the leadership and membership.

In the theoretical literature on social movements in general, and on women's movements in particular, there is a lack of thorough and well-articulated frameworks. Social scientists are generally interested in the origins of the movements, and are much less articulate regarding their development (and still less regarding their decline). In this study of the Chinese women's movements, we will examine both their origins and their development by linking them with the structural conditions of China, the organizational milieu in which the women's movements emerged, and the government policies of institutional changes and social control. By their very nature, these areas of analysis are macroscopic.

Structural Conditions

According to Kornhauser (1959), military invasions can devastate the base of a government. Military defeats may disintegrate the state and strengthen the collective will to resist. A major defeat in war threatens the government because its legitimacy is questioned, and as Johnson (1966) put it, a "power deflation" of the existing authority occurs. Empirical studies of this mechanism have examined Germany, Italy, Russia, and China. (Kornhauser, 1959: 168-72; Johnson, 1962; Israel, 1968)

Industrialization may also be a significant contributing factor in the rise of social movements. It may create "strains", in Smelser's (1962: 287, 289-90) terminology. New values and knowledge may gradually emerge and provide bases for defining certain social conditions as "evil", which in the past had been accepted as given. Since industrialization requires an educated population, women begin to enroll in schools which, in turn, enables them to increase their social contacts and exchange ideas. Thus, educational mobility may facilitate mental life and create a new consciousness. (Cook, 1974; Siu, 1975a) In the process of industrialization, factories are built to mass-produce goods. Certain groups of women are drawn into the labour force. They may be subjected to an exploitative factory system, especially in the beginning of industrialization. One may argue, as Lenin (1966: 110) did, that the woman issue is "part of the social, working class question" and that it is, in some ways, related to labour movements. (Henry, 1973; Boone, 1968)

In sum, several structural conditions have been suggested to explain the emergence of women's movements: military invasions and defeats as well as industrialization (with its accompanying factors, such as educational mobility and the exploitative factory system).

Organizational Networks

Kornhauser (1959) reasoned that strong intermediate structures have high integrative functions. By "intermediate structures", he meant the local community, religious, political, and other voluntary associations. They foster social attachments and loyalties between the

elites and non-elites, check and balance one another, socialize members to accept the social norms and values, enlarge the range of proximate concerns of their members (thus preventing the development of a single over-riding goal and ideology so characteristic of a social movement), sanction members who might join a social movement, instill a sense of political efficacy in their members, and can pacify their members with primary attachments so that they readily accept the status quo.

Based on the above reasoning, Kornhauser argues that the disappearance of intermediate groups between the elites and non-elites provides a situation in which individuals are free from restraint and are likely to resort to extremist politics and mass movements. This is because their life has become atomized and alienated.

Empirically, there are some studies which support Kornhauser's thesis of mass society. Wilensky's (1961) study of the work experience of urban white males, McDill and Ridley's (1962-63) examination of suburban residents in Nashville, Tennessee, Erbe's (1964) study of three small midwestern towns in the U.S., and Seeman's (1966) investigation of manual and non-manual workers in Sweden --- all seem to show that those who are not involved in organizations (other than work organizations) tend to feel alienated, and if they participate in political activities, these tend to be extremist.

However, as Pinard (1968) pointed out, the thesis of mass society fails to see that intermediate groups can also remain neutral or have mobilizing effects and may have important communicative effects for the

diffusion of a new social movement.

Although it is true that many organizations can exert restraining effects on members, all organizations under any circumstances will not do so. Certain components of the intermediate structure minimize alienation, while others are alienated from certain aspects of the society. The latter will obviously stimulate rather than restrain participation in social movements. (Pinard, 1968: 684)

Pinard noted that "organizations and social networks are excellent channels of communication, transmitting information about new ideas and practices...They enlarge their members' fields of attention and perception, as well as contributing to the development of leadership and other organizational skills..." (Pinard, 1968: 686)

Pinard argues that under severe and widespread strains, mobilizing and communicative effects will tend to predominate over restraining effects, at least in the early phases. Intermediate structures are, therefore, crucial to the beginning of new social movements in a period of severe and widespread strains. Without them, atomized individuals, contrary to what the thesis of mass society argues, would not have networks of attachments (as provided by intermediate structures) needed to build a new movement even in the context of strains.

This line of thought is echoed by Smelser (1962: 282, 284-86) who maintained that social movements usually depend on the availability of channels for transmitting grievances. These channels may include petitions, demonstrations, referenda, etc., and they, in turn, have their

basis in different types of social organizations --- political parties, social clubs, pressure groups, etc. These organizations are therefore pertinent to the formation of new social movements.

Coleman (1957) presents this perspective in another way. He saw community structure as a "configuration of attachments of individuals to one another and to groups (and the resulting interlocking of groups)." Individuals are tied to one another, and these ties act as "bridges" relating the individuals to new elements in their environments.

When an incident with a potential for creating controversy occurs in the community, certain individuals are immediately aligned on either side because of their direct involvement. For others who are attached to these initially involved individuals, there are links pulling them to action on one side or the other, or both in the incipient conflict. However, some individuals may reduce their attachments to those whose position is inconsistent with their own. New adherents are also gained primarily through their previous relations with the participants.

Coleman's thesis of attachments strongly suggests that a pre-existing network of ties among individuals is conducive to mobilization in case of conflict. By implication, such networks are essential for any social movement to grow.

Freeman (1975: 48) observed that a pre-existing communicative network or infrastructure within the social base of a movement is a primary pre-requisite for "spontaneous" activity. In response to a crisis, previously unorganized individuals may form small groups usually

along lines of informal social networks. If the communicative networks are not there, a lot of organizing has to be put in to form the social movement.

The network must also be "co-optable to the new ideas of the incipient movement", (Freeman, 1975: 48) and this means that it must be composed of "like-minded people predisposed to be receptive to the particular ideas of a new movement through their own backgrounds, experiences, or locations in the social structure." (Freeman, 1975: 48)

Empirically, there is some support for what Pinard, Smelser, Coleman, and Freeman have said about organizational networks. Using the example of the women's liberation movement in the U.S., Mitchell (1971) argues that the radical movements of the Blacks, students, and youths provided grounds for the women's movements. Stephenson (1975) noted that women activists had been ignored or rejected by their male counterparts in the political movements of the 1960s, women felt that their status was not that much better than the Blacks or students that they fought for; so they organized among themselves and formed a separate movement for women's rights. By implication, their social attachments prior to the formation of the women's liberation movement were essential.

Freeman (1975: 52-57) also noted how the activity of the federal and state commissions on women's status and the involvement of women in civil rights groups, the New Left, peace groups, and the free universities

created pre-existing communicative networks of like-minded women. Further, both the networks formed by women of the federal and state commissions and that of the radical community were co-optable because the former was immersed into "the facts of female status and the details of sex-discrimination", and the latter existed in "an atmosphere of questioning, confrontation, and change." They had fewer ideological barriers to new ideas than those organizations which viewed "the habitual performance of traditional practices as the ideal" (such as the Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs). (Freeman, 1975: 67-68)

Other studies of social movements also demonstrate the importance of pre-existing communicative networks: the civil rights movement in the U.S. was built upon the infrastructure of the southern black church. (King, 1958) Early Students for Democratic Society (S.D.S.) organizers made use of the National Student Association (Kissinger and Ross, 1968). The rapid rise of the Social Credit movement in Alberta was largely based on the popularity of Aberhart's radio program in the 1920s and early 1930s. (Irying, 1975) The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.) movement in Western Canada was based on the cooperative enterprises that developed among farmers in the early 20th century. (Sinclair, 1975)

In sum, while Kornhauser maintained that a lack of intermediate structures provides the basis for mass movements; others such as Pinard, Smelser, Coleman, and Freeman have pointed out the significance of communicative networks. There are empirical data which support both sides.

Government Policies of Institutional Changes

Referring to the relationship between social movements and govern-

ment policies of institutional change, Smelser (1959) sees a lag between the two. He argues that the dissatisfaction of some people with regard to institutions is usually related to the inadequacy of role performance and/or misallocation of resources. (Smelser, 1959: 16) This dissatisfaction may be manifested later in disturbances. In response to the latter, the authority may (a) encourage, specify, experiment and institutionalize alternative structures; (b) partially follow the above sequences; and/or (c) suppress the disturbances through various mechanisms of social control (which will be discussed in the next section).

Clark, Grayson, and Grayson (1975: 26-29) basically view the government responses to social movements in much the same way as Smelser. The government may be indifferent, accommodating, and/or obstructive to social movements. Very often, it is the last two. When social movements do not pose a threat to the government, it may simply ignore them and say that their support is small. If a social movement has some valid complaints that can be accepted without threatening the status quo, the government may negotiate with it. The government also responds when the movement has mobilized sufficient support that by ignoring it may further pose a threat to the society.

The response of the social movement to government ignorance depends on its ability to mobilize support. If it cannot mobilize support, it will either disappear or persist as a "subculture". If it succeeds, government indifference will tend to encourage it to seek a wider base by demonstrating its power, inflating its demands, and engaging in

threatening activities.

Government accommodations pose a dilemma for a social movement. On one hand, it gains the prestige of official recognition, achieves some of its aims, and attracts more support. On the other, some supporters leave the movement because they think they have achieved their aims or because the movement appears to have abandoned those demands which the government would not accept.

Clark, Grayson, and Grayson (1975: 31-34) closely examined another phenomenon in social movements, "routinization". It refers to "the establishment of consistent and stable institutional guides." A routinized movement is one in which values, norms, and leaders are "simply accepted and followed."

Routinization may take various forms: the movement may become part of the dominant structure, it may overthrow the existing structure and build a new one, or more often, some demands of a social movement are absorbed by existing institutions in the form of legislation, while the movement itself evolves into a specialized association.

In the process of routinization, almost all social movements are forced to accept a watered-down version of the institutional guides they sought to establish.

Routinization, according to Clark, Grayson and Grayson, is not a new phase in the development of a social movement. Institutionalization is a cumulative process which affects the movement as it develops. Therefore, it is not clear-cut when a social movement becomes institu-

tionalized and ceases to be a social movement.

Freeman (1975: 234-37) is more specific in the relationship between government policies of institutional change and social movements. She argues that, a movement can generate publicity and legitimize its cause, create a climate of expectation that something will be done, provide resources (information on problems, new ideas, skills, etc.) for the government, provide a constituency for those who are already within the government, exert pressure on the government by building grass-roots support, and so on.

The effects of government policies on the movement are harder to illustrate. They affect the range of alternatives for movement action, but since one can only imagine what the total range might be, one never knows exactly how policy stimulates, and it is hard to see what activity it precludes.

The adoption of some movement demands may have the following effects on the movement: it provides psychological victory for the members, encourages more rallying activities, promotes more public support, increases contact with other supportive organizations, fosters linkages between the movement and the government, etc. (Freeman, 1975: 237-40) In some cases, government accommodations can also increase the awareness of people who formerly were not concerned with the cause of the movement, and thus help to further the ideology of the movement. Adversely, government adoption of some demands may deflect the energies and human resources of the movement from more important concerns or change its organizational

structures and strategies.

Freeman (1975: 241-42) further argues that a movement's ability to adapt to government policy is limited by its resources and values. Legal strategy may be too costly for the movement, or working "within the system" may not be acceptable for many radical members of the movement.

Both Smelser and Freeman demonstrate their arguments using their own data: Smelser used British industrial (cotton textile) and family development between the 1770s and 1840s as examples, while Freeman employed the women's liberation movement in the U.S.

Government Policies of Social Control

When a social movement poses a threat to the government, the latter may exercise its social control mechanisms through certain agencies. As Smelser (1962: 17, 32, 261-68) observes, these agencies include legislatures, courts, police and military forces, the press, religious authorities, community leaders, social welfare agencies, schools, families, and informal groups.

There are two types of behaviour on the part of social control agencies which encourage a social movement: First, when political authorities provide general (rather than specific) encouragement for the cause of a social movement, it usually boosts and consolidates the latter. This can be achieved, not necessarily by officially approving the movement's proposals in their specificity, but by the patronage or endorsement of high-level officials, by including the proposals in parliamentary debates, by verbally giving support to them, or by other vague means.

Secondly, when social control agencies allow the expression of grievances within the confines of legitimacy by providing a hearing to the complainants, it generally encourages the social movement. This may be done through the establishment of committees or commissions to study the complaints or by putting the issues to lawyers. (Smelser, 1962: 307-08)

However, the social control agencies may encourage the movement to change its course if: (a) they consistently refuse to recognize the movement in which case the latter may turn violent; (b) they are inconsistent in the face of pressure from the movement; (c) they seem to close off the avenues for agitation abruptly and directly after a lengthy period of leniency, in this case the movement is likely to become more militant or go underground; (d) they appear to "take sides" openly in a controversy; or (e) they openly encourage some other types of collective behaviour (such as violence or revolutionary conspiracy). (Smelser, 1962: 308-11)

Clark, Grayson, and Grayson (1975: 26-29) are less specific than Smelser when they talk about government obstruction of a social movement. When government officials are convinced that the success of a social movement would threaten the social order in the long run, they may obstruct it. Such obstruction may demoralize the supporters. But if the social movement survives, the obstruction usually radicalizes the supporters and increases the militancy of the movement.

Eckstein (1965) has some insights into the repressive mechanisms the government uses. He argues that, by using repression, the authorities

can lessen the chance of violent attack upon themselves or even reduce it to nil. But, it may have other side effects: repression may lead to a combination of disaffection and contempt for the elite. The worst situation of all seems to arise when the authority suddenly relaxes its repression and attempts a liberal policy after a long period of suppression. This usually is part of the pre-revolutionary syndrome. In this context, repression may well both inhibit and stimulate social movements.

Another social control mechanism mentioned by social scientists is diversion. Eckstein maintained that the diversionary mechanism channels psychic energies away from radical objectives. The government engages in external wars so as to diversify popular attention from domestic problems. Again, engagement in external wars is a weapon which can cut both ways: If the country wins the wars, the government can claim credit and fragmented groups would be commended; however, if it fails, then the internal political situation would be worsened. Other kinds of diversionary mechanisms are festivals, dances, parades, circuses, and massive sports programs. They either provide outlets for popular discontent or to absorb the energies of the young.

Again, in this area of social control and social movements, there are no "iron laws". Government policies may vary in kind: encouragement, repression, and diversion. But each method has its own undesirable side-effects from the perspective of the authorities. Whether or not repression is effective seems to depend on how it is employed: consistently or inconsistently, the timing of the repression, avenues available for the

social movements to express themselves, etc. What we have outlined is necessarily vague, given the state of affairs in this field.

As we can see from the above discussion of the literature on the four major areas of analysis --- structural conditions, organizational networks, government policies of institutional change and social control --- there is little consensus. This study of the women's movements in China intends to look at the empirical data within the confines of these major areas of analysis, and come to a conclusion appropriate for the Chinese case. In the last chapter, the above mentioned theses will be evaluated.

Scope of Research

There were a variety of women's movements in China in the first half of this century, including movements for educational reforms, suffrage, anti-footbinding, anti-Manchuism, free love and marriage reforms, family and child-care reforms, women's legal rights, economic reforms, and many others. It is impossible to document all of them thoroughly in one study.

Four types of women's movements will be investigated: (a) the women's revolutionary movement (1900-1912); (b) the woman suffrage movement (1900-1949); (c) the women's anti-imperialist movement (1900-1949); and (d) the women's educational reform movement (1900-1949). The above four types were chosen because they involved large numbers of women and their impact on the larger society was tremendous. Furthermore, they illustrate the class backgrounds of the participants of the movements,

and how this factor affected their developments. It is also through these four movements that we can witness the role political parties and government(s) played.

It must be noted, however, that these four women's movements are not separate movements: they merged with one another and with larger political struggles and, at certain times were independent. (Siu, 1975b) In the following chapters, we will demonstrate this complexity.

The ideologies of the women's movements constitute an essential basis for solidarity. They usually include the rationales of the movements, their aims, and methods for achieving these aims. They outline the movements' objectives, their critiques of the status quo, the social myths they attempt to debunk, and their strategies and tactics. Very often, in their ideologies, the movements express their emotional condemnation of certain values or structures as well as their hopes and inspirations. In the beginning, the ideology of a women's movement is usually vague and, at times, ambivalent in its goals and methods of attaining them. As the movement develops, justifications are articulated and refined. Proposed strategies and tactics become more diversified and elaborated or, depending on the course(s) of its struggle, more uncompromising and rigid.

The ideology of a women's movement and the ideology of the larger society are sometimes related, as the former borrows concepts, premises, logic, and terminologies from the latter. One may be able to view the movement ideology as an offspring of the ideological currents of the

larger society and separating the two would be artificial. Similarly, "strategies" and "tactics" are interrelated, and in reality, it is hard to categorize them separately. "Strategies" usually mean policies, and "tactics", practical operations to implement policies. However, what is a strategy in one instance may be a tactic in another depending on the base(s) of analysis. For example, exerting pressure on politicians to obtain woman suffrage may be seen as a strategy, and petitioning as a tactic to implement such a strategy. However, if one sees petitioning as a strategy, then door-knocking or setting up booths on street corners may be viewed as a tactic.

In examining the ideologies of these women's movements, "women's literature" is used. By this, is meant publications (magazines, newspapers, books, etc.) written by women and for women. The circulation of "women's literature" was small (in the hundreds or thousands) and tended to be concentrated in urban areas. Since 98-99 percent of Chinese women in the first half of this century were illiterate, the ideas expounded in the "women's literature", by the latter's very nature, represented the opinions of an elite of literate women. While this literate elite may not have been the actual leaders of the women's movements, they articulated and justified their own viewpoints and those of other women involved in the movements.

The first half of this century was selected as the focus of concern for two reasons: (1) it was during this period that the Chinese women's movement first emerged and developed as a historical force.

Although there were a few sporadic struggles, individual and collective, by women in the 19th century, they were not organized and coordinated. It was only in the first decade of this century that we witnessed the growth of the first organized women's movement; and (2) this period was a period of transition for China: from a colonial-feudal-capitalist society to a socialist one. As far as contemporary Chinese history is concerned, the Republican period (1911-1949) is the least studied and understood by historians, Sinologists, and political scientists.

It is difficult to draw geographic boundaries for this study because: (a) the women's movements, which began in the coastal regions, moved inland as they expanded; (b) the political activities of the government shifted from the coastal regions to the inland cities and there were fragmented loci of power during this period. Yet another problem is the unavailability of data on women's movements. Due to the unstable political conditions in China, many documents and records were destroyed by fire and bombing. A detailed picture of the women's movements on the national scale will never be attained. It is not even possible to obtain a detailed account of regional women's movements. Consequently, this study discusses different regions at different points in time. At first, it focuses on the coastal cities and later on the countryside. There will be a concentration on two provinces: Guangdong and Jiangsu. The regional foci are dictated by the availability of data.

The four women's movements are related to the political and educational systems. Both systems underwent drastic changes during this

period: The political system was moving from a dynastic, autocratic, non-autonomous (foreign-influenced) system to a democratic, electoral, parliamentary, and autonomous (free from foreign domination) system. The school system abolished its feudal framework (in which there was no formal educational system) and adopted a formal school system (controlled by the state). Between 1900 and 1949, both systems were moving, albeit unevenly, from male-domination to a more equal participation by both sexes.

Research Methods and Sources of Data

This study is based on documentary research using both primary and secondary materials. The primary materials include Chinese newspapers, government gazettes, periodicals, yearbooks, pamphlets, and books. The secondary ones are in Chinese and English. Most of these documents cover a short period (for example, a few months). Only a few cover more than ten years.

Most of the primary and secondary data came from the Fung Ping Shan Library and Union Research Center (of Xianggong); and the Party Archives Commission of the Guomindang (Kuomintang or KMT) under the KMT Central Committee, the Institute of Modern History of the Academia Sinica, the Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of National Defence (Taiwan), the Taiwan National University Library (Graduate Library), and the National Central Library (of Taiwan). The rest came from the Main Library of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, the Library of Asian Studies in the University of British Columbia, the John Robarts Library

of the University of Toronto, the Harvard-Yenching Library of Harvard University, and the East Asian Library of Columbia University.

Our examination of this literature focuses on the four areas of concern outlined above --- structural conditions, organizational networks, institutional changes, and government policies of social control. As this research aims at documenting the development of the women's movements, every available issue of the newspapers and periodicals published by women on women was read. Data on women's organizations, leadership, membership, and activities were compiled from reading this literature. Although there was no quantitative analysis of the coverage (lengths of articles, numbers of words concerning certain topics, etc.), the women's literature was subject to qualitative analysis of the belief systems of women advocates in terms of their arguments, rationales, proposed strategies and tactics for social changes, and their self-critiques of the women's movements. These were then categorized according to their nature: for example, if the justification for obtaining suffrage was to save the country, then it was classified as a "patriotic" justification.

While this study attempts to provide a comprehensive picture of the women's movements in China, due to China's regional differences, it focuses on two regions: Jiangsu and Guangdong. The rationale for this selection will be outlined in Chapter 3. To obtain more detailed information on the activities of local women as well as on local government responses (political, legislative, or others), a systematic survey was carried out using two newspapers: Shibao (Shanghai) and Huazi Ribao

(Xianggong). Shibao was one of the largest newspapers in Shanghai and Huazi Ribao was the only newspaper available which had two sections containing news of Guangdong. A key reason why these two newspapers were selected is that both cover a relatively long period of time: Shibao covers the period from 1909 to 1937 (with 1921 and 1922 missing), and Huazi Ribao from 1898 to 1940. The first ten days of each month of all issues of these newspapers were chosen. The assumption underlining this method is that any news of major importance which occurred between the 11th and 30th (31st) of each month would likely appear again in the first ten days of the consecutive month in editorial comments or other references. Time constraints were the basis for making this decision on sampling. For the years not covered by Shibao (before 1909 and after 1937) and Huazi Ribao (after 1940), our survey relied on other primary and secondary sources.

There are a number of pitfalls in doing documentary research on historical materials. One factor which has been indirectly pointed out is the availability of the historical documents. Due to government censorship or wartime disasters, valuable documents may be destroyed forever.

Another problem is the biases in the reported news and available documents. The news reported in the newspapers or periodicals usually has to be acceptable to editorial boards and express the concerns and foci of the writers or journalists. It is quite likely that "success stories" were mentioned in the women's literature, while those of failure were not. In the case of newspapers, under repressive regimes, reported

news was screened by the government(s), and only news which did not pose a threat was printed.

To overcome these inherent problems in historical research, certain mechanisms have to be built into investigation to control the biases, validate the results, and ensure the reliability of materials. Although destroyed documents cannot be recovered, the biases of reported news can be made obvious by comparing sources of information. In the context of China, the political interpretation of certain events may vary between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Guomindang (KMT). The KMT may wish to inflate or reduce the number of CCP insurrections or the number of meetings of women's groups CCP members attended for political purposes, and so may the CCP on these matters. A comparison of their materials might reveal discrepancies; and at that point, historical circumstances can be used to evaluate the validity of the data. For example, did the CCP actually have enough members to attend all of the women's meetings mentioned? Did the CCP have the base in the village(s) or community(ies) necessary for insurrections? The research was carried out using this comparative approach along with a constant matching of historical circumstances and reported data.

Summary

The aims of this study are to document women's roles in Chinese history and to examine the structural conditions under which the Chinese women's movements emerged and developed in the first half of this century.

This chapter pointed out the special nature of social movements

and the narrow and broad definitions of "women's movements". Then, Smelser's frameworks of structural differentiation and collective behaviour were outlined, drawing from them four major areas of concern which we will undertake to study: the relationship between social movements and (a) structural conditions, (b) organizational networks, (c) government policies of institutional changes, and (d) government policies of social control. Various theoretical frameworks were outlined in relation to these areas of analysis. It appears that there are no clear-cut answers to the issues concerned. Upon inspecting the data from the women's movements in China, we will evaluate these frameworks.

Methodologically, four women's movements were selected and a historical period was chosen for data collection and analysis. Problems in delimiting the geographical boundaries of the Chinese women's movements have been discussed. Our approach is macroscopic, and primary historical documents are our data sources: government gazettes, newspapers, and women's periodicals written in Chinese.

A note on the arrangement of materials in this study: Chapter 1 deals mainly with conceptual frameworks and methodology; Chapter 2 describes the status of women and structural changes in 19th century China. In Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6, we discuss the development of the women's revolutionary movement, the woman suffrage movement, the women's educational reform movement, and the women's anti-imperialist movement respectively. Chapter 7 examines the relationship between political parties and women's movements. Chapter 8 is the final chapter which

evaluates the conceptual frameworks (outlined in Chapter 1), summarizes the findings, and discusses the role of women in social change.

CHAPTER 2

WOMEN'S STATUS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY CHINA

Introduction

In this chapter, we will examine the traditional political, economic, and educational structures in nineteenth century China and the ways in which they respond to external pressures. In this context, we will discuss the status of women.

A discussion of women's status is dictated by the availability of data, in this case it is difficult to differentiate clearly the status of women in all of the various sectors of the society. However, dissimilarities in the status of "gentry-officials-business", peasant, and working class women can be delineated to a certain extent.

It must be noted that the status of women in different geographical locations varied. This presents problems when the findings are extrapolated or generalized. Therefore, when possible, the names of regions will be explicitly stated.

Women and the Political Structure

The political structure of 19th century China was essentially an autocracy and the emperor was the absolute ruler in every sector of the regime, whether executive, legislative, religious, judicial, or intellectual. His position was justified by a belief in the "Mandate

of Heaven." (Hsu, 1970: 56; Latourette, 1964: 455) The operation of the government did not depend on a systematic constitution in which the rights, duties and functions of people were legally defined. Law in China was a matter of tradition and custom.

The political structure was a dynastic one in which the power, wealth, and status of the emperors was inherited. There were a central bureaucracy, coordination offices, provincial magistrates, and intermediate offices --- all of which stopped at the district level. At the levels of villages, cities, towns, countryside settlements and rural markets, the local residents formed their own local organizations. The imperial administration penetrated these lower levels through neighbourhood organizations which collected taxes and carried out police control.

One of the main social control mechanisms used by the government was the ideology of Confucianism. It identified the relationship among different categories of people with various rights and duties attached to each group. This ideology was carried out through the family, and with this function, the family formed the basic and vital unit in the political structure.

The Chinese family system was the political structure in microcosm. It was patrilineal, patrilocal, and partriarchal, and was located within the larger organizations of clan and sib. Since the family was patriarchal, the father was responsible for decision-making and for social control. If the father was deceased, the eldest son took over his role. The mother and daughters merely played a supportive role. This dichotomy of sexes in the familial power

structure was justified by Confucianism as witnessed in the Classics for Girls (Headland, 1895: 557):

"Girls have three persons on whom they
dependent,
All their lives they must expect, ---
While at home to follow father, who a husband
will select,
With her husband live in concord from
the day that she is wed,
And her son's directions follow if her
husband should be dead."

Since the family was patrilineal, the daughters were regarded as temporary members and peripheral to the family. Family property was transmitted to the sons only. Formal or private education was limited to the boys or men if the family could afford it. The status of women rested mainly on their ability to give birth to sons thus ensuring male progeny. (Levy, 1971: 293, 301; Queen and Habenstein, 1967: 95-96)

Landownership and education were the pre-requisites of social mobility and the inferior status of women in the family made it almost impossible for them to become part of the government bureaucracy. Women were expected to be the ruled rather than the rulers. (Lu Kun, 1927: III, 1-2):

"Women are those who subordinate themselves to other people. [They should be] soft, tender, humble, and

obedient. These are the characteristics of serving people."

Participation of women in the official political structure was rare in Chinese history. The ascendancy of the Empress Dowager at the end of the 19th century was very atypical. No women officials were found in the central or local administration. (Yang Liensheng, 1960-61: 48)

The political structure of China was undergoing severe strain in the 19th century. Prior to 1800, attempts had been made by the Western powers to relate to China, but these efforts were not successful. In the 19th century, the West practised what they called the "cooperative policy" which aimed at "snuffing without extinguishing" the Chinese government. After the Opium War (1839-42), this policy was manifested in consular jurisdiction, occupation by troops and fleets, the granting of foreign settlement areas and areas on lease, and involvement in the civil administration in China. (Wright, 1957: 22-37, 93, 101-07, 214-18)

What all this meant was that the autonomy of the Chinese political structure was greatly undermined. Furthermore, parts of the administration were controlled by foreigners who, sometimes, made the decisions for the government. Structurally, China began to crumble after a series of military attacks in the 19th century. Referring to the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), Sir Robert Hart described the effects of the imperialist advances in the following terms:

"Although it is only at a minute spot along the fringe of this big empire that the Chinese had received thrashing after thrashing, it is the shell of the egg that is cracked, and --- it seems to me a bad case of Humpty Dumpty." (Sir Robert Hart, 1967: 260)

With the repetitive imperialist interventions, the legitimacy of the Manchu government was challenged. After the Opium War, peasant rebellions became much more widespread; some were nationwide. These rebellions were usually anti-Manchu (government), sometimes anti-imperialist and anti-landlord, and very often involved stealing and looting. Some of these rebellions were of a millenarian nature. (Wakeman, 1977: 208)

Anti-government and anti-gentry protests and rebellions occupied an important part in the history of the peasantry. The Taiping Rebellion of 1850-1864 represented the most widespread peasant movement in the 19th century: it swept over the heart of China in provinces such as Hubei, Hunan, Anhui, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang. It was mainly an anti-Manchu movement as rebels constantly referred to the "Manchu demons" with their "stinking odor." (Feuerwerker, 1975: 18)

Judging from their cultural arrogance toward Western representatives, there were certain elements of anti-imperialism in the Taiping Rebellion. Many women were involved in this rebellion, and it has been estimated that more than 100,000 women soldiers were trained in the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom (1850-64). (Hsiao, 1967: 495)

Another anti-Manchu movement emerged in the 1890s, the Boxer Uprising. In its initial stage, it was explicitly anti-Manchu, but towards the end, it became clearly anti-imperialist, probably with the support of the Manchus. Its slogan in 1899 was "Support the Qing; Destroy the Foreigners". (Feuerwerker, 1975: 38-45) The rebels looted and burned churches. Throughout the 1900s, there were incidents of peasants burning missionary schools, homes, and churches. (Hubei Federation of Philosophy and Social Sciences Learned Societies, 1962: II, 680).

Anti-government activities sometimes included a refusal by peasants to pay their taxes. In 1906 and 1907, for instance, tens of thousands of peasants in Guangdong and Guangxi refused to pay taxes to the government. (Pin Xin, 1946: 68) They also resisted the government census for fear that the government might betray them to the foreigners. (Hubei Federation of Philosophy and Social Sciences Learned Societies, 1962: II, 680)

Another current of unrest was organized mainly by intellectuals such as Sun Zhongshan. They aimed at overthrowing the Manchu government and establishing a republican government based on a constitution. (Pin Xin, 1946: 35-38) While this movement was not really concerned with the raising of women's status, it did not deny the validity of the principle. Three women revolutionaries were killed in the 1899 uprising. This indicates that there was at least a handful of women participating in this movement. (Chen Dongyuan, 1975: 352)

In addition to these two types of social movements organized by people not involved in the imperial bureaucracy, certain sectors of government officials were also discontent with the status quo. Anti-imperialist feelings had already germinated during the Opium War when local gentry organized a popular militia to defend Quanzhou city from British invasion. (Wakeman, 1977: 219) The local elite sometimes led the local peasants in attacks against the missionaries and Chinese Christians. These incidents were especially rampant in the last quarter of the 19th century. (Feuerwerker, 1975: 60)

Some government officials also organized to change the Manchu bureaucracy from within. In the 1880s, they criticized the government and urged it to reform the political system by adopting the foreign (especially the Russian and the Japanese) systems. This involved the creation of a parliament and a constitution. It should be noted that this movement did not concern itself with the political equality of women and no women were involved in it. (Pin Xin, 1946: 17-26) Although there were some reforms in 1898, the Empress Dowager suppressed further constitutional activism.

This suppression by the reactionary sector of the Manchu government resulted in the union of three undercurrents --- the rebellious peasants, discontented intellectuals, and exiled officials --- by the beginning of the 20th century.

In sum, due to the patriarchal nature of the family and the ideology of Confucianism, women were deprived of the inheritance of

property and education that were necessary for political mobility. Similarly to the family system, the political structure was male-dominated. In addition, the latter was dynastic and autocratic. Due to incessant foreign intervention and military attack, the legitimacy of the traditional structure was undermined and challenged. Three currents of protest were identified --- the peasants, the intellectuals, and certain sectors of the government officials. They were either anti-Manchu, anti-imperialist, or both. With the exception of the peasants' movement, the others had little participation by women.

Women and the Educational Structure

The purpose of the traditional school system was to train filial children and loyal officials. (Gregg, 1946: 6) With the exception of the aristocratic institutes, the government and private schools were centered around the civil service examinations. (Biggerstaff, 1972: 11; Kibby, 1960: 182) The latter was supposedly the only avenue of mobility into the government, but there is evidence that the peasants were under-represented, and the gentry families over-represented, in the official ranks. Women were not permitted to participate in the examinations and this opportunity structure was closed to them. (Bodde, 1957: 68-70; Schurmann and Schell, 1967: 47-48)

Education was a luxury for both men and women in China. This is especially true of the peasants. The gentry families usually encouraged their sons to study for the examinations and their daughters were taught by private tutors. These women gentry learned to read and

write, music, calligraphy, painting, poetry, literature and history. (Lin Yutang, 1935: 154; Ayscough, 1938: 18-19) The "textbooks" used in women's education usually emphasized submissiveness and the duties of women as daughters, wives, and mothers. (Van Gulik, 1961: 98; Headland, 1895: 554; 1897: 16; Williams, 1880: 40)

Western missionaries began to arrive en masse after the Opium War and they established women's schools as early as 1852. Between 1842 and 1877, Protestant missionaries (mainly American and British) founded 347 schools, 120 of these were for women only. However, only 2,084 women and 3,833 men received an education during this period. (Gregg, 1946: 16) Although we do not have statistics on women's schools, it is expected that more women received an education after 1877, and that there were more men than women in these missionary schools. Most of the schools built by the missionaries were elementary schools. In their curricula, they introduced a variety of subjects including Biblical knowledge, geography, world history, mathematics, Chinese literature, and ethics. (Gregg, 1946: 18-24)

Most of the students in these missionary women's schools probably came from poor families in the treaty ports since the missionaries encouraged poor children to go to their schools by waiving tuition fees and providing room and board. In some cases, the students' families received subsidies from the missionaries. But towards the end of the 19th century, these early benefits were withdrawn. Thus, it could be expected that only slightly better-off women could afford to go to

these missionary schools.

The indigenous Chinese tried to raise the educational level of women as early as 1850-64 when the Taiping rebels opened the traditional examination system to women in the regions they controlled. Several women were selected as scholars and they worked in the Taiping government. However, this attempt was short-lived, and it was never institutionalized by the Manchu government throughout the 19th century.

Some officials in the Manchu government also saw the necessity for educational reforms. A series of memorials were submitted to the Emperors in the second half of the 19th century. Most urged the establishment of technical schools (related to the navy, army, mining, etc.) and some recommended sending students abroad to study. (Biggerstaff, 1972: 12-30) Only a small minority of these memorials advocated women's education. (Pin Xin, 1946: 61)

The Manchu government responded half-heartedly. Before 1900 the Manchu educational reform policy advocated that "the Chinese knowledge be used as the foundation, and Western learning for practical purposes." (Chan Qitian, 1962: 40-42) This policy resulted in the construction of a few elementary and secondary schools, and comparatively more technical schools. About 250 students were sent abroad to study from 1872 to the end of the century. One girls' school was built by some gentry with the help of foreign women before 1900, but it lasted for less than two years. (Biggerstaff, 1972: 31-70; Chen Qitian, 1962: 45-46)

The missionaries were more concerned with raising the educational status of women than the Chinese government was in the 19th century. However, despite these efforts, the illiteracy rate in China remained very high. As late as 1929-33, roughly 99 percent of women (compared with 70 percent of men) in China were illiterate. (Buck, 1956: 373)

Women and the Industrial Structure

The nineteenth century witnessed the slow transition of the cotton textile industry from the handicraft to the manufactured modes of production. We selected the development of the cotton textile industry as an illustration because (a) it was one of the key industries in China's industrialization; (b) cotton goods were the major commercial goods (with the exception of opium trade); (c) it was one of the first industries which foreigners undermined; and (d) it was a "women's industry".

In the Chinese traditional peasant economy, all the work related to production was done within the family. This included the production of cotton textile goods: the making of instruments for spinning and weaving, growing cotton, spinning, and weaving. Family enterprises were quite common throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. (Peng, 1957: I, 228-34)

In the 18th century, the self-sufficiency of the peasant economy began to crumble with the separation of agriculture and handicraft industry. Instead of remaining a secondary occupation, spinning

and weaving became the main occupation of some people, especially peasant women whose husbands were deceased. (Peng, 1957: I, 234-38) Gradually, this division of labour became further articulated and some people specialized in either spinning or weaving. This kind of specialization was later developed on the village level when some villages began to specialize in spinning, others in weaving. (Yan, 1963: 25)

The industrial revolution (which took place around 1760) in Britain accelerated in the beginning of the 19th century. During this period, India and China continued to be the world's key providers of textile goods. (Mandel, 1971: 446) However, the technological advance which Britain had over other countries created an excess of cotton textile products. Some of the surplus found its way to China. Between 1775 and 1833, the importation of British cotton textile commodities had risen almost six-fold in monetary value. (Yan, et.al., 1955: 11) By 1837, the imports of British goods surpassed the exports of Chinese goods. This led to a deficit in the Chinese balance of payments. (Yan, et.al., 1955: 16) After having suffered military defeat in different wars, China made several concessions in the 1840s to foreign powers, and China's imports of cotton textile goods increased significantly in the 1850s and 1860s. (Feuerwerker, 1969: 21)

Between 1871 and 1910, the quantity of yarn imports increased much more drastically than that of cotton piece goods. By 1910, foreign yarn constituted almost half of the yarn consumed in China, and foreign

cotton cloth one-quarter. In other words, foreign cotton goods seemed to be gradually taking over the market and edging out the indigenous Chinese ones. (Feuerwerker, 1969: 28)

At first, the Chinese consumers resisted buying these foreign products; however, when the prices of these commodities went down, more and more people began buying them. (Feuerwerker, 1969: 20) The result was obvious: the native products became less marketable, and the effects were felt as early as the 1840s in some regions. The cotton textile handicraft workers in China began to use foreign yarn instead of Chinese cotton for spinning. With more people wearing foreign clothes, the native handicraft industry began to decline. By the end of the 19th century, the cotton textile handicraft industry in many locations had been destroyed. One writer summed up the situation quite succinctly by referring to Dongguan (Guangdong):

"Sixty years ago, our women lived on spinning and weaving... Since foreign yarn was introduced, spinning has declined; and now that foreign clothes prevail, weaving has stopped." (Peng, 1957: II, 224)

The Chinese peasant economy traditionally was based on agriculture and the handicraft industry. Agriculture was usually the most important source of subsistence, and the handicraft industry played a supplementary role. Without the support of the latter, the survival of many peasant families would be threatened.

Spinning and weaving were usually regarded as women's tasks.

The Book of Poetry (Shi Jing) suggested that women should be familiar with weaving tools even in their infantile period. Banzhao's (died in 116 A.D.) Women's Precepts (Nüjie) viewed spinning and weaving as womanly skills. The same message was found in Notes on Women (Nüluanyu), Classics for Girls (Nüerjing), and Biographies of Eminent Women (Lienüzhuan). (Boggs, 1913: 17-18; Van Gulik, 1961: 100; Xie Kang, 1970: 497-530; Headland, 1895: 554-60; O'Hara, 1955: 278)

We do not know the extent to which the daughters of the gentry families practised spinning and weaving, but they generally learned to sew, weave, supervise household work, and embroider in China. (Ayscough, 1938: 18-20) Since spinning and weaving skills were significant in the ideal of Chinese womanhood, it is safe to assume that the daughters of the gentry at least knew the techniques. They probably practised them during their leisure time. Socially, the mastery of these skills made them more marriageable. One can conclude that it was likely that spinning and weaving were widely learnt and practised among the gentry daughters, but mainly for their artistic and social values.

In the case of peasant women, spinning and weaving were significant not only socially (that is making women more marriageable) but also economically. Women who knew how to spin and weave were great assets to peasant families. They could be sold at a higher price as servants, landlords and they were also more acceptable as "child-wives" ("adopted daughters-in-law" or "Tongyangxi"). Lastly, they could help to support the peasant family.

In China, poverty-stricken peasants sold their daughters to rich

gentry or landlords as part of the payment of their debts. They also gave them away as "child-wives" in exchange for some (usually financial) help. From the gentry-landlords' viewpoint, these servants and "child-wives" could be used as farm labourers or work inside the house (including spinning and weaving). From the indebted peasant viewpoint, the departure of daughters eased their financial burdens. If the peasant family was not in great debt, the skills of the daughters living at home could help support the family since farming alone was not sufficient to make ends meet. Depending on the region and the poverty-level of the peasant families, women spun and wove after completion of their heavy work in the fields, or during their spare time between housework. They did this for family consumption and/or for sale.

The collapse of the cotton textile handicraft industry in the peasant economy meant that peasants, in general, went through a process of impoverishment in the 19th and 20th centuries. Since women traditionally had played an important part in the cotton textile handicraft industry, the decline of the latter meant that the peasant women's traditional contribution to the peasant economy was eliminated.

As cheap foreign cotton yarn began to pour into China, women who used to gin, bow, and spin cotton had to give up their jobs. (Peng, 1957: II, 217-20) Towards the end of the 19th century, more and more women became "unemployed" in the countryside. A large reservoir of female labour came into existence and this contributed to the development of handicraft workshops (which had begun as early as

the first half of the 19th century) and textile factories (which began in the 1890s). (Peng, 1957: II, 233-35)

Handicraft workshops emerged as early as the first half of the 19th century, and by the end of the century, they had mushroomed. The Chinese (Manchu) government was instrumental in encouraging the formation of these workshops as a response to the deterioration of the indigenous handicraft industry. (Tang Caichang, 1902: VI, 24; VII, 3-5) Beside this, it did make some (half-hearted) attempts to modernize the cotton textile industry.

The first cotton textile manufacturing firm was built in 1890, and 25 more were founded before 1910. Most of these firms were formed in Shanghai using the money of the official gentry. (Yan, et.al., 1955: 98-99; Meng Xianzhang, 1951: 96-97) These Chinese-owned cotton textile factories were founded on small capital, located in coastal regions, in particular in the treaty port cities, and were mainly owned by government officials. (Yan, et.al., 1955: 98-99; Feuerwerker, 1968: 13-19; 1969: 33-41; Meng Xianzhang, 1951: 237)

Although in a strict legal sense, imperialist powers were not allowed to establish manufacturing firms, they nevertheless existed in foreign concessions (such as Shanghai) and other treaty ports. By 1894, there were already 88 foreign-owned industries. In 1888, through the joint-efforts of the Japanese, British, Americans, and Germans, the first foreign-owned cotton textile firm --- the Shanghai Cotton Rolling Factory (Shanghai Yahua Chang) --- was founded. (Yan,

et.al., 1955: 121)

With the Treaty of Shimonseki (1895), foreign industry in the treaty ports was legalized. Immediately, three British and one U.S. textile factories were established. Between 1895 and 1913, at least 136 additional foreign-owned industrial enterprises were formed. This figure included 40 joint Sino-foreign firms. (Feuerwerker, 1969: 32)

Thus, towards the end of the 19th century, a few manufacturing factories sprang up. The participation of women in these factories was unclear. However, the mushrooming "workshops" were dominated by peasant women who left their families. This change in their life-situations was not enviable. The Report of the Mission to China of the Blackburn Chamber of Commerce, 1896-1897 described one case in Guangzhou:

"We visited a weaving workshop which employed roughly thirty workers. All of them were women who worked 12 hours a day. Their wages were standardized according to the quality of cloth made and they were paid by piecework. The skilled ones could earn five [Chinese] dollars a month out of which two to two-and-a-half had to be spent on food." (Peng, 1957: II, 258-60)

One may conclude, without much hesitation that the status of peasant women (some of them gradually became working class women) had deteriorated with the decline of the cotton textile handicraft industry. However, the extent to which these women fought back in the 19th century appears to be minimal.

Evidence suggests that there were sporadic protests on the part of peasants against the invasion of foreign goods. As early as 1831, cases were reported in Guangdong in which the handicraft spinners protested and declared they would burn all foreign yarn that came to the villages. (Yan, 1963: 62-65) In 1847, a notice was put up in one village in Guangdong saying "determine to confront and exterminate all foreigners." The Taiping Rebellion may be interpreted as a protest by peasants whose livelihood was threatened by foreign invasion. (Peng, 1957: I, 509-17) There were only a few organized workers' protests in the 19th century. The first one was the dock workers' strike in Xiangong in 1885. Some anti-taxation protests were also documented in the treaty port of Shanghai in 1897. (Chesneaux, 1971: 126; Zhang & Bao, 1963: 52-59) Again, the participation of women workers was minimal.

So far, we have discussed the decline of the handicraft industry, the importation of foreign goods, the rise of the modern factory system, and how the above three factors affected the status of peasant/working class women as well as their political responses. There is one more important change in the Chinese industrial system which merits exploration, and that is the rise of the commercial class.

There had been a small group of merchants in China since 1122-246 B.C.: They were small storekeepers, handicraftsmen, and businessmen dealing with large scale production and distribution of goods and services (such as the salt industry). Historically, their

status was theoretically quite low, well below that of the literati, the peasants, and the artisans. Very often, merchants and their descendants were even excluded from eligibility for the civil service examinations which meant that they were denied social mobility. However, their chances of mobility were in reality higher than that of peasants through land accumulation, bribery, and corruption. In fact, the theoretically low status of the merchant was misleading as wealthy merchants could use their wealth to buy lands and their sons gravitated toward gentry roles. There was a close relationship between scholar-officials/gentry and merchants as the former needed the handicrafts of the merchants, and the merchants offered wealth in return for power and status. (Levy and Shih, 1949: 4-7)

With the growth of foreign trade in the 19th century, compradores emerged to act not only as interpreters but also to fulfill business functions (such as insurance, accounting, etc.). They were highly paid; and since foreign traders were isolated from Chinese society, compradores could take advantage of them through falsification to make huge profits. In the second half of the 19th century, they spread through all the treaty ports, and in the course of time, some became independent businessmen. (Levy and Shih, 1949: 24)

The growing separation of agriculture and the handicraft industry and the attendant specialization on the regional level necessarily implied the rise of the commercialization of agricultural and handicraft products. Cotton handicrafts were sold to merchants in

exchange for cotton, or cash, or other products. This exchange extended beyond the village level to the provincial level. Meanwhile, the importation of foreign goods also demanded people in business, and this gave rise to what we have previously discussed -- the compradore group.

As more and more peasants were affected by this commercialization, the merchants gained a greater degree of control over the market. First of all, these merchants acted as "bankers" providing high-interest loan services to the peasants and handicraft labourers. (Peng, 1957: I, 239) Guilds were formed to protect the interests of weavers (and tailors) as early as 1817. (Peng, 1957: I; 186) It was not certain whether these merchants operated "workshops" or not; but what was clear is that they were not the first group which called for the building of manufacturing factories. Most factories founded between 1890 and 1910 were owned by officials, only a few were owned by compradores, merchants, and members of the gentry. (Levy and Shih, 1949: 27, 34, 40-41)

The growth of this commercial group (compradores and merchants) signifies a redistribution of wealth in the 19th century China. While the gentry and officials held on to their wealth, the accumulation of wealth by this commercial group was channelled into landownership, the purchase of titles and official positions, and the education of their descendents. It is the last item which demands our attention.

In addition to acquiring an education for their sons which was relevant for social mobility, the commercial class also provided their daughters with educational opportunities. This may be due to the

following reasons: (a) it was in the interests of the commercial class to imitate the life styles of the gentry and landowners. Since the daughters of the latter had always had the opportunity for private tuition, the commercial class followed suit; (b) by having their daughters acquire some education, the commercial class increased their chances of moving into the circles of the gentry and landowners through marrying their daughters to gentry sons; (c) the experience of working and trading with foreigners raised the awareness of the commercial class as to the importance of acquiring knowledge of the modern world and of women's education; and (d) the commercial class had the money to finance their daughters' education.

In sum, the changing economic structure of China affected the status of women in several ways : with the decline of the cotton textile handicraft industry and the accompanying collapse of the peasant economy, peasant women's contribution to the family was diminished and dislocated. Meanwhile, with the increase in internal and foreign trades, a new commercial class emerged. Its financial base and aspiration justified sending its daughters to schools.

Women and the Agricultural Structure

An ideal Chinese woman does not work outside the home. This is the message we found in many women's classics such as Words to Girls (Nüeryan), Women's Precepts (Nüjie), Classics for Girls (Nüerjing), and the House Rules of Women's Chambers (Guifan). Women were encouraged to do all sorts of housework, but not farming. As the Book of

Change (Yijing) stated, "the proper sphere for women is indoors and does not interfere with that of men." (Lu Kun, 1927: I, 11)

In reality, only a small proportion of women could follow the ideal. As Lin Xiaoqing noted, those who had some wealth could hire servants to do all the housework including "farming, animal-husbandry, spinning and weaving, and lumbering, ...etc." (Lin Xiaoqing, 1928: 56-58) This phenomenon was not restricted to Guangdong, but applied to the rest of the country as well before 1949. One may assume that women of the gentry families did not have to work in the fields.

Peasant women participated in agriculture in one way or another. The intensity of their work and the sexual division of labour varied according to region. It is impossible to list all the variations in women's work in agriculture, examples from two provinces will suffice for our purpose. In Shanghai (Jiangsu), women were seen helping men in the fields: irrigating and harvesting. They also cooperated with men in the planting of cotton during the Qing period. (Shanghai Tongshe, 1973: 601-04) In many places in Guangdong, women worked in the fields along with men. In Tiapu, for example, 70-80 percent of the women peasants worked in the fields: sowing, adding fertilizers, and harvesting. They also took care of the tobacco plants, vegetables, fruit, etc. (Jianyue, 1928: 805-23; Luo Shuhe, 1955: 4)

It must be noted that in every case in our survey, the idea of "women working along with men" was stressed. This is important in understanding the status of peasant women in agriculture. Women's farm

work was marginal to the family economy and while it provided some financial help to the family, it never allowed women to form an independent economic base. Marion J. Levy, Jr. described this more clearly:

"These nonhousehold jobs were not a threat to the family structure because they were neither of sufficient duration nor quantity to provide the women with a possible basis of economic support alternative to that afforded by the men in her family." (Levy, 1971: 153-54)

The marginal status of women in agriculture had changed somewhat in the 19th century. While the population of China continued to grow after the Taiping Rebellion (1850-64), the size of farm land did not. The man-land ration increased continuously from 1873 to 1933. (Feuerwerker, 1969: 5) The decrease in farm size does not necessarily mean a decline in productivity. While it was true that some regions suffered a drop in productivity because of infertile soil or the breakdown of the irrigation system, total crop production increased in the late 19th century in China as a whole. This was due to the fact that many peasants shifted to crops which yielded larger amounts of income per unit of land. In other words, although rice and wheat were the main staples of the Chinese, many peasants had changed to growing cash crops such as mulberry trees, peanuts, etc. (Feuerwerker, 1969: 7-13) This may explain why famine became more widespread in China (this will be discussed further later).

Land tenancy and ownership differed regionally but the general rule was that a high tenancy rate was more prevalent in the rice regions in Southern China than in the wheat regions in Northern China. (Hsiao, 1967: 383; Perkins, 1969: 101,184) If the data on the 20th century are any indication of trends, one may argue that towards the end of the 19th century, the percentage of peasants owning their own lands was decreasing, and conversely landownership was increasingly concentrated. (Yan, et.al., 1955: 276)

Due to the above factors --- shrinkage in farm size and concentration of landownership --- and the deterioration in handicraft industry, peasants were increasingly impoverished: they had to farm for their landlords and exist on farms that could not produce enough food to eat. On top of this, loan-sharking and the payment of rents were a financial drain and caused much suffering. Many peasant families ran a deficit every year. Many of these deficits were met by borrowing money from landlords or loan-sharks who, due to high interest rates, actually made the peasants poorer and more desperate.

The collapse of the cotton textile handicraft industry and other industries forced many peasant women "out of work" in their traditional fields. To supplement family incomes, more and more peasant women were seen working along with men in agriculture. Commenting on the situation of Wujang (Jiangsu), Ding Fengjia (1915: T-10) said,

"As the silk industry had not reached its heyday,
and the cotton industry had withered, the only chance

for women who were energetic and did not want to leave their villages was to help their husbands or brothers in farming... Those who did not have any fields of their own might offer their help to some farmers in order to get some money."

These women now gained a more important place in farming; but as farming itself became less and less significant in terms of overall contribution to family income and in times of flood and drought (which resulted in famines), their contribution was completely wiped out.

Peasant women were peripheral to the rural economy, at least that was how they were defined. Their status was compared to that of animals as the following quotation from folklore illustrates:

"Taking care of pigs provides meat; dogs, house-watching; cats, catching mice; as for [women], what can [they] do?"

The marginality of women in the peasant economy did not render them comfortable. For one thing, peasant families usually solved their financial and survival problems by simply killing female infants: drowning or poisoning babygirls. (Xuejian, 1928: 7-4)

Another means of getting rid of marginal girls or women was by selling them in the market or to landlords. They were sold as servants, slaves, or prostitutes during difficult times because they represented an extra mouth to feed. Their prices were usually fairly cheap. Girls between ages of three and eighteen were popular in the "woman sale" markets in northern Jiangsu. (Luo Qiong, 1935: 107-09) Since their

prices were so cheap, it was not uncommon for families of gentry, and even small shopkeepers or innkeepers to have a few maid-servants working for them.

Some women were sold as "child-wives". This was a common custom in China because from the perspective of the woman's family, getting rid of a daughter represented a saving. From the viewpoint of the family into which the woman married, the adoption of a "child-wife" was cheap, for it did not require expensive ceremonies or banquets. Upon marriage, this "child-wife" usually acted as a servant in her husband's home, taking care of the household chores as well as working in the fields if required. (Wang Yi, 1935: 119-122) The life of a "child-wife" was not easy, and has been described as "absolutely below human level", they worked as "half-starved and half-dead working slaves." Abuse of "child-wives" was quite common. (Xuejian, 1928: 1-4; Liu Quiying, 1937: 40-41).

Slightly better than being a "child-wife" was being a concubine or wife. Due to increasing economic hardship, many men were unable to support a wife. Consequently, many women from poor peasant families were willing to do anything for a man if he would marry them. (Guo Zhenyi, 1937: 150) Their jobs after marriage usually included all household works plus many field tasks. Wives and concubines did not have an easy life because of a family structure in which mother-in-laws played a dominant role. Very often, they were beaten without a reasonable cause. (Cusack, 1959: 52-63)

Due to the worsening economic situations in the countryside, many peasants left their villages and migrated to the cities. In some places, those migrating constituted eight to twenty percent of the rural population. (Chow, 1967: 381-83) Many spinners and weavers, due to the declining handicraft industry, also moved to the cityside and searched for jobs in the factories. Some women were "sold" by their parents to factory-owners or middlemen working for factories.

To some extent, the Chinese (Manchu) government realized the desperate economic situation in rural China. However, it did not do much to alleviate the hardship of the peasants. Some effort was made to help the poor regain their land or postpone their rents or taxes, but these were usually half-heartedly carried out as tax collection was an important imperial revenue and many government officials were land-owners themselves. (Hsiao, 1967: 388-405) It was not until the "Hundred Day Reform" of 1898 that the government decided to do some constructive work in agriculture, but the idea was never carried out.

The disintegration of the peasant economy did not go unchallenged by peasants: they refused to pay rent, assassinated landlords, and carried out riots. These acts were usually spontaneous or loosely organized, and on a small scale. (Hsiao, 1967: 427-53) The Taiping Rebellion was the most organized of all the peasants' protests in the 19th century. With the exception of the Taiping Rebellion, peasant women appeared to participate only minimally in these actions.

In the 19th century, although many peasant women tolerated the

poor and oppressive conditions, some apparently sought suicide as a means of protest and relief. It has been reported that, in some parts of China, young women founded secret societies and planned to commit suicide within a certain time after they had been betrothed or married. (Smith, 1900: 309)

In sum, the concentration of landownership, the decrease in farm size, the deterioration in the handicraft industry, etc. all contributed to the impoverishment of the peasantry. Although peasant women were increasingly drawn into the fields, the poverty of the peasants led to "woman slaves", female infanticide, the "child-wife" system, "concubinage", and so on --- all were oppressive to women. The peasants did rebel, but peasant women did not protest in an organized manner in the 19th century.

Conclusion

In the 19th century, the social structure of China underwent a series of change: the autocratic and dynastic political structure was greatly undermined by the increasing control of foreign powers; the male-dominated elitist, and Confucian educational system was weakened by the introduction of Western modes of learning; the indigenous handicraft industry was eroded by the importation of cheap foreign goods; and the agricultural system was plagued with concentrated landownership and diminishing farm size.

Within the government, a minority of officials urged the Manchus to form a parliament and a constitution, to reform the educational

system, to modernize industry, and make some improvement in agriculture; but the reforms were half-hearted and limited.

On the level of the masses, the peasants challenged the status quo in a variety of ways --- most of their efforts were spontaneous, loosely organized, and on a small scale with the exception of the Taiping Rebellion. The foreigners concentrated on educational reforms and established a number of manufacturing factories.

The status of women was subordinated to that of men in 19th century China. They were marginal to the family, virtually unrepresented in the political system. Rich women received some "decorative" learning, while the poor ones were illiterate. They both were excluded from the civil examination system. Peasant women's contribution to the rural economy was undermined by the decline of handicraft industry and they were increasingly drawn into farming, workshops, factories, "woman sale" markets, etc. Their conditions appeared to be deteriorating. One group of women which may have benefited from the changing economy was the women of the commercial class, as the latter's financial situation was improving.

With the exception of the Taiping Rebellion, the social movements and reforms of the 19th century paid little attention to upgrading women's status. There is no evidence that Chinese women organized their own independent movements to fight for their rights.

This lack of concern about women's positions in the 19th century requires some explanation. The following explanations are tentative

and subject to revision upon further research.

Women of long-established gentry families were fairly secure and sheltered and larger structural changes did not affect them, except for the growing illegitimacy of the Manchū government with which they were affiliated. But this illegitimacy was not an immediate threat to them since the reformist movements, rebellions, riots, etc. could be suppressed. These women certainly did not consider it necessary to organize themselves.

As for Chinese senior officials, they were only concerned with reforms that would not weaken the foundation of their wealth and power. Confucianism --- the cornerstone of the Chinese political system --- was, to some extent, questioned. But the reluctance to demolish Confucianism meant that the status quo of male-female relationships remained unchallenged.

Although the status of women in the peasantry was lower than that of peasant men, the latter were not that much better off. In addition to their poverty-stricken economic position, the peasant women's fatalistic worldview, their lack of organizational experience, their physical isolation, and their early socialization in traditional norms and values may explain the absence of protest by these women.

As China moved into the 20th century, the forces which shaped social change continued with some variation. In the following chapters, we will examine how structural changes affected three groups of women, namely those of the commercial class, the working class, and the

peasantry; how women, in turn, organized to fight for their rights; and how the governments reacted to their movements.

CHAPTER 3

THE WOMEN'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT, 1900-1912

Introduction

This chapter examines the origins and development of the women's revolutionary movement in the 12 years before the collapse of the Manchu dynasty. The term "revolutionary" is used because the act of overthrowing the dynastic order meant the end of the feudalism. We will discuss the movement in relation to the four areas specified in Chapter 1, namely structural conditions, organizational networks, government policies of institutional change, and social control mechanisms used by the government.

Structural Conditions

Military Defeats and Threats

After the defeat of China in the Opium War (1839-42), China was invaded or threatened with invasion by many Western countries. Treaty after treaty was signed, and as a result, China ran into debt, lost territories, and her self-determination was eroded through the payment of indemnities, the opening of treaty ports, the lending of territories, and the loss of the right to determine tariff-rates, postal services, financial affairs, and judicial matters. Her constant military defeat indicated the weak political position of China.

The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 shattered the myth that China

was supreme in Asia. Japan --- a small neighbouring country --- had been China's "student" for centuries, and now it had defeated its own "teacher" in a matter of months. This military conquest shocked both the Manchu government and its people.

To make the situation worse, during the Boxer Uprising in 1900, the troops of eight countries occupied Beijing; the imperial party fled just before the occupation. The consequent Boxer Protocol legitimized the stationing of foreign armies in China. This was a blow to China's security.

This was followed by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Although China was not directly involved, the Japanese victory posed a threat as well as a challenge to China because the biggest Asian-European country --- Russia --- had been defeated by Japan. Could China survive a second attack from Japan? Should China now reform and model its political system on the Japanese one? These were two of the many questions asked by the Chinese at this time.

Political Currents

Two political movements --- the revolutionary and the constitutionalist --- came up with answers. Although both originated in the last decade of the 19th century, they became much more vigorous in the 1900s. The revolutionary movement organized a series of insurrections but were suppressed by the Manchu government. In 1905, Tongmenghui unified the major revolutionary organizations and built a stronger front. (Li Wenhai, 1962: I, 179)

The constitutionalist movement wanted to build a constitutional monarchy by legal means. Various organizations and demonstrations urged the government to reform. One of the biggest demonstrations was held in July 1908 and more than 10 provinces sent representatives to Beijing to petition. The continuous rejection of these petitions by the Manchu government led to an alliance of the revolutionary and constitutionalist forces in 1911. (Pin Xin, 1946: 56; Li Jiannong, 1971: I, 282-86; Yan Jingwan, 1970: 33-40)

Although these two movements disagreed on strategies of social change, they both maintained that the Manchu government was too weak to defend China, and that the need for changes in the political structure was urgent. Their anti-Manchu feeling was also tinted with anti-imperialism. A few quotations from their literature in that period illustrates this:

"At this moment in history, China is at its weakest point... Our strong neighbours are surrounding and watching us like tigers and eagles, longing to swallow our China," (Yang Song and Deng Liqun, 1953: 560-64)

"Anti-Manchuism is the most appropriate 'ism' for China." (Ping Bingfeng, 1966: 80)

"At present,... the society is thrown in disorder, and the people are confused; powerful neighbours are pressing upon us..." (Xu Xilin, 1953: 577-78)

The anti-imperialist feeling was another growing current on the

scene at that time. This topic will be dealt with in Chapter 6. It is sufficient to say that, at this point, the anti-missionary sentiments of the 19th century were on the decline. They were replaced by resentment against the domination of foreign goods. (Feuerwerker, 1976: 92-93)

In the 1900s, the worsening rural economy pushed many peasants to the edge of starvation. There were incidents in which these peasants desperately robbed food-stores, noodle factories, grainboats, and even rich people's homes. In some cases, food-stores were burned; and when the local gentry came to suppress these vandalist acts, violence broke out. Sometimes, peasants tried to stop grainboats from moving their grains. (Wu Yuzhang, 1972: 7; Hubei Federation of Philosophy and Social Sciences Learned Societies, 1962: 68; Zhang Hui and Bao Cun, 1963: 83; Dongfang Zazhi, VII, iv, June 2, 1910: 56-57, 63)

Missionary Influence

One of the side-effects of the military defeats was the arrival of missionaries en masse. The Treaty of Tientsin (1858) legalized the freedom of movement of missionaries in China. In 1893, it was estimated that there were 1,324 Protestant missionaries in China, and by 1900, the figure had jumped to 4,628 --- an increase of roughly 350 percent over a 17 year period.

In the last quarter of the 19th century, these missionaries adopted a policy of secularizing their works, hence introducing Western knowledge and culture to the Chinese. (Gregg, 1946: 213-14) In 1887, the Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge Among

the Chinese was founded in Shanghai. Between 1875 and 1907, a famous Protestant monthly called Wanguo Gongbao (Wan Kwok Kung Pao) was published devoting itself to "the extension of knowledge relating to geography, history, civilization, politics, religion, science, art, industry, and the general progress of Western countries." The editor of the North-China Herald (April 3, 1901: 629-30) claimed that this monthly "has been sowing the seed of reform all over the empire."

Another area influenced by the missionaries was the establishment of schools. By 1902, there were 287 missionary schools in China ranging from elementary schools to colleges. Most of these were senior middle schools. There were 10,158 Chinese students in these schools, of which 4,373 (or 43 percent) were women. (Meng Ru, 1934: "Funü", 2)

The Development of Women's Schools

In response to the Western challenge, China began building schools to educate its people in the late 19th century. By 1912, 87,272 schools were founded, of which 2,389 (or 2.7 percent) were for women. Similar to those for men, most of these women's schools were at the elementary level. (Zhongguo Nianjian, 1919: IV, 731-32)

The first Chinese-run women's school was founded in Shanghai in 1898 (Chen Chongguang, 1972: 19). During the first decade of this century, at least 26 others were established in Shanghai. The most famous of these was the Wuben Women's School (Wuben Nüxue) (1901). (Wanguo Gongbao, 1899: 1-2) In Guangdong, at least nine women's schools were established by the Chinese in the 1900s, most of them in

Guangzhou. The Binhua Women's School (Binhua Nūzi Xuejiao) of Guangzhou and Peiji Two-Levels Elementary School (Peiji Liangdeng Xiao Xuetang) of Macao were the two best known. (Bao Jialin, 1974: 18)

A few women studied in the U.S. Between 1902 and 1906, roughly 70 Chinese women studied in Japan, mostly in Tokyo. (Jinzhong Ribao, June 13, 1904: 3) Some of the women who studied abroad were government-sponsored, others were self-sponsored. (Y.C.Wang, 1966: 72-73; Nūxuebao, 1902: 33-34) Most of these students were between 15 and 19 years of age, and they came from various provinces in China. (Nūzi Shijie, 1906: 99)

New Images of Women

The missionary literature provided China with images of "active" women. An examination of the articles published in Wanguo Gongbao between 1890 and 1907 (18 years) showed that the magazine had numerous articles on the status of women in Britain, the U.S., France, Germany, Greece, India, Korea, and others. Women were presented as geographers, missionaries, travellers, etc. and as actively involved in world affairs. However, articles on the political or anti-government activities of women were very limited. Only two articles in the entire 18 years of publication dealt solely with the political role of women as army nurses and soldiers. (Wanguo Gongbao, March 1894: 26; July 1905: 30) A third discussed the political rights of women at some length. (Wanguo Gongbao, June 1899: 2-3)

The missionary position on the political role of Chinese women

was made quite clear by Young, the editor of Wanguo Gongbao, when he wrote:

"(T)he weakness of China lies in its civilization [and] its status of women... If [we] know the source [of national weakness] and the raising of women's status as the foundation of civilizational reforms, it is impossible not to see the success [of the nation]."

(Wanguo Gongbao, Sept. 1903: 14)

To reinforce this argument, the Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge Among the Chinese published a book entitled Women of All Lands "to compare the status and treatment of women in various cultures and evaluate their impact on the superiority or inferiority of their civilizations." (Young, 1903: 13)

Although the image of foreign women as political women was not well-publicized, it was obvious that, in the eyes of the missionaries, active Chinese women could increase the national strength.

Although the missionary literature failed to present an image of women as political activists, the Chinese press which was closely related to both the constitutionalist and revolutionary movements did not. Chinese press such as the Jinzhong Ribao (Alarming Bell Daily News), Jiangsu, and Minhu Ribao (People's Wall) did not hesitate to urge women to participate in political struggle to save China and themselves. The reasons were fourfold: to regain national glory and welfare, to compete with the West, to avoid being enslaved by foreigners, and to fulfill

women's duties as citizens. (He Xiangning, 1903: 144-45; Chen Xiefen, 1904: 2)

In comparison with the missionary literature, the Chinese press brought the image of political women closer to the political context in China, and therefore was more relevant to Chinese women.

Summary

The structural conditions in China in the 1900s were in a state of turmoil: China was under foreign military threats and the government was unable to defend China. Political movements surfaced urging drastic reforms or revolution. An anti-imperialist feeling existed among the Chinese, and the peasants were on the edge of starvation. Meanwhile, the missionaries were preaching Western ideas and providing images of active women. Women's schools were founded by both the missionaries and the Chinese. The Chinese press urged women to participate in patriotic struggles.

Organizational Networks

In the 1900s, Chinese women established independent organizations and periodicals to promote the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty. These will be classified as women's revolutionary organizations and periodicals. However, an organization or periodical might have had various goals, concerns, and interests during the course of its development. For example, the Humanitarian Society (Gong'aihui) promoted the destruction of the Manchu dynasty, anti-imperialism, and women's education. In cases such as this, the organization will be categorized separately under the

appropriate movement. The Humanitarian Society will be classified as an organization which is part of the women's revolutionary movement, the women's anti-imperialist movement, and the women's educational reform movement.

Women's Revolutionary Organizations and Periodicals

Our survey shows that there were at least 44 organizations in the women's revolutionary movement between 1900 and 1912. Most were formed around 1911 in Shanghai and the Guangzhou (Canton) region in Guangdong. The first three --- the Humanitarian Society (1902), the Chinese Woman Students' Union (1905), and the Association for the Restoration of Women's Rights (1907) --- were all founded in Tokyo, Japan. (Appendices I and II) During the same period, at least six women's periodicals promoting the participation of women in revolutionary activities were published. The first three were the Women's Newspaper (later known as the Women's Education Monthly) (1902), Women's World (1903), and the Chinese Women's Newspaper (1906). They were all published in Shanghai. (Appendices III and IV)

Available evidence suggests that membership in these women's revolutionary organizations ranged in size from six to over 100. While the first three organizations were interested in consciousness-raising, most of the others specialized in nursing, fund-raising, military combat, food-delivery, services for soldiers' families, and spying.

Most of the women's periodicals were very shortlived, ranging from two to 14 issues (due to financial difficulty or government

censorship). Some of these periodicals claimed to have distribution in eight provinces in China and even abroad.

Some of the women involved in the revolutionary movement seemed to be very hardworking: they were involved in a number of women's organizations (Appendix V) and were editors of magazines and organizers simultaneously. (Appendix VI)

To understand the emergence of these women's revolutionary organizations and periodicals, let us examine several of the networks on which they were based:

Women's Schools

It was noted that schools for women were burgeoning at the turn of the century, and some women went to study abroad. Considering the fact that less than one percent of the women in China could read in 1906, the majority of schools were in urban settings and, with few exceptions, going to school required financial support, this small group of literate women had to have come from well-off backgrounds. The self-financed overseas women students "were probably women of wealthy families in the company of their husbands." (Y.C. Wang, 1966: 72-73) Qiu Jin's (a Chinese woman who studied in Tokyo) father and husband both belonged to the gentry. She was a merchant in China before she came to Japan in 1904. (Bao Jialin, 1973: 3-7)

For the first time in Chinese history, women studied in schools similar to those for men. These schools offered a place for women to congregate in close proximity, acted as a network drawing women together,

and provided opportunities for them to communicate their experiences.

Women's schools acted as a pre-existing network in which women revolutionaries were created. There was a significant proportion of students among women revolutionaries. Lin Weihong (1972) examined 231 of them in the period 1905-1912 and noted that 63 were students (half of whom had studied in Japan). When "doctors" and "teachers" were included in the estimate, the figure jumped to 74, roughly one-third of the sample.

Political Organizations

In addition to women's schools, political organizations formed a base from which the women's revolutionary movement emerged. This was especially true of the revolutionary organizations under Sun Zhongshan. Some of the early Chinese-run women's schools in Shanghai and Guangdong were intimately connected with revolutionary organizations through: (a) women's schools established by male leaders of revolutionary organizations such as the Patriotic Women's School; (b) women's schools founded by female members of revolutionary organizations such as Shijian Women's School (Shijian Nüzi Xuejiao); and (c) extracurricular activities such as the Saturday Forums of the Peiji Two-Levels Elementary School where members of Tongmenghui were frequently invited to speak and debate. (Bao Jialin, 1974: 20; Zhao Liansheng, 1962: 304-06; Lin Weihong, 1972: 21) Some women revolutionaries belonged to or graduated from these schools which were related to political organizations.

Students' Clubs

As Chinese began to study in Japan, they formed various social,

"provincial" and political clubs, such as the Organization for the Autonomy of Guangdong (Guangdong Duli Xiehui) and the Encouragement Society (Lizhi Hui) to promote friendship, share information, and for political causes. The Foreign Students' Center (Liuxuesheng Huiguan) established in 1902 was especially important in bringing together the Chinese students in Tokyo. (North-China Herald, Mar. 16, 1906: 569-70) Thus, when Chinese women arrived in Tokyo at the beginning of the 1900s, these students' clubs were available to them. In a small foreign student community, overlapping membership in these clubs was inevitable. Consequently, political and non-political, male and female students mingled.

Merger of Networks

There was a continuous merger of the above three networks --- women's schools, political organizations, and students' clubs --- in Tokyo in the 1900s. Mergers were especially frequent between students' clubs and revolutionary organizations. Such mergers were significant in the development of the women's revolutionary movement. For example, Sun Zhongshan was invited to join the Organization for the Autonomy of Guangdong in 1901 and students were invited to participate in the Commemoration of the 242nd Anniversary of the Manchu Conquest of China in 1902. (Y.C. Wang, 1966: 245; Ping Bingfeng, 1966: 156-58) This gradual merger had a radicalizing effect on the Chinese women students in Tokyo as can be seen from the biography of Qiujin.

On her arrival in Tokyo in 1903, Qiujin joined the Hunanese and Zhōngjiāngese students' clubs. Later, she studied the Japanese language

at the Foreign Students' Center for three months. In 1904, she organized the Humanitarian Society and joined the Tongmenghui a year later.

(Rankin, 1975: 51; Bao Jialin, 1973: 7-8)

Revolutionary organizations appeared to play an important role in politicizing women as witnessed by the connections of revolutionary organizations to women's schools and their merger with students' clubs. But their politicizing role in the origin of the women's revolutionary movement should not be over-estimated. Lin Weihong (1972) showed that at least 18 women were members of revolutionary organizations and of the women's revolutionary organizations/periodicals. Of the eight women whose biographies are available, five joined revolutionary organizations first and women's organizations later, for the rest, it was vice versa. (Appendices VII and VIII)

Family Ties and Acquaintances

While these formal networks were conducive to the rise of the women's revolutionary movement, there were other kinds of attachment which also formed the base of the movement: family ties and acquaintances.

At least 16 women revolutionaries had family ties with male revolutionaries as the latter's sisters, daughters, concubines, wives, and fathers' concubines. For example, Chen Xiefen --- the editor of the Women's Newspaper and member of the Humanitarian Society --- was the daughter of Chen Fan who was the owner of Subao (an anti-Manchu newspaper). (Lin Weihong, 1972) (Appendix IX)

In addition, it appears that there were family ties among the women revolutionaries themselves as witnessed in the families of Xu, Zhang, and Yin. (Appendix X)

Friendship and acquaintances were also networks of communication and cooperation. Yin Ruizhi and Yin Weijun were students of Qiu Jun. All three were women revolutionaries. Deng Mufen was the maid servant of Xu Mulan. It appears that the circle of women revolutionaries was small and closely-knit.

Conduciveness of Matrices of Pre-Existing Networks

The above discussion illustrates the significance of pre-existing networks in the initial stage of the Chinese women's movement. Comparing the situations in Tokyo, Shanghai, and areas of Guangzhou, we note that some matrices of networks are more conducive to the formation of an independent women's movement than others.

Our findings indicated that (1) the first women's organization was founded in Tokyo, and the first women's periodicals were published in Shanghai; (2) Tokyo and Shanghai were the centers of the women's revolutionary movement, although Tokyo declined in significance, especially after 1907; and (3) the Guangzhou region of Guangdong is not represented at all as a birthplace of pioneer women's organizations and periodicals, even though it had several of the pre-existing networks essential for the rise of a women's movement.

In Tokyo, there was no direct ownership of women's schools by revolutionary organizations, and revolutionary organizations were

relatively weak at the time the first women's organization was formed. The Humanitarian Society was founded in Tokyo in 1902, but the powerful Tongmenghui under Sun Zhongshan was not organized until 1905. Meanwhile, the students' clubs in which Chinese women students participated were beginning to merge with the revolutionary organizations and were in the process of politicization. Although this merger appeared to radicalize women, revolutionary organizations in Tokyo were not strong enough to absorb them. Independent women's organizations/periodicals emerged to actualize the political consciousness of women and to supplement the activities of the then relatively weak revolutionary organizations.

In contrast, women's schools in Shanghai and the Guangzhou region were connected with revolutionary organizations. The latter politicized women, but they also absorbed women into their own organizations before women could form their own independent ones. Since the relationship between women's schools and revolutionary organizations was an intimate one in these two areas, the extracurricular activities of students' clubs tended to be arranged by the revolutionary organizations. Again, there was little opportunity for women's political enthusiasm to be channelled into their own independent organizing. Thus, compared with the matrix in Tokyo, those in the Shanghai and the Guangzhou region appeared to be less conducive to the rise of the first independent women's movement.

Although the Chinese women's movement began in Tokyo, Shanghai was the most important center as witnessed in the predominance of

pioneer women's organizations and periodicals. The first women's periodical --- the Women's Newspaper (1902) --- was published in Shanghai as a supplement of Subao. The editor of this women's journal --- Chen Xiefen --- was the daughter of the editor of Subao. They fled to Tokyo after the Manchu government closed down Subao in 1903. Meanwhile, Japanese-trained female Chinese students were moving back to China, mainly to Shanghai, in an attempt to solve the Sino-Russian crisis in northern China. The Anti-Russian Association of Women Comrades (1904) was formed in Shanghai. In 1905, acting on the advice of the Manchu government, the Japanese government began to suppress the political activities of the Chinese students in Tokyo, and many politicized students, male and female alike, returned home. (Ping Bingfeng, 1966: 155) Consequently, after 1907, the center of the Chinese women's movement shifted from Tokyo to Shanghai.

Summary

Our survey shows that in the 1900s, women's revolutionary organizations/periodicals began to emerge. A small group of Chinese women, wealthy enough to study in schools and abroad, created an independent women's movement to actualize their political consciousness, and to supplement male revolutionary activities. They appeared to have been a closely knit group with family ties, to have studied in more or less the same schools, joined similar students' clubs, and mixed with people from revolutionary organizations. These women's schools, students' clubs, and revolutionary organizations formed their own bases for

organizing, especially when these networks began to merge; this had a radicalizing effect in the context of military intervention or threats of invasion. Based on the available data, Tokyo appeared to have the pre-existing networks most conducive to the rise of an independent women's movement; the political organizations there were not strong enough to absorb the political energy of women.

Institutional Changes and the Women's Revolutionary Movement

In addition to forming their own organizations and publishing their own periodicals, the women's revolutionary movement formulated a set of ideas which may be described in the following terms: themes, rationales, strategies, and tactics.

The theme of the movement was obvious: it is necessary to mobilize women to save China because, as one woman put it, "today China is in a most dangerous position. Not only should men be responsible, we sisters should be responsible too." (Xu Yibing, 1911: 3-4) According to the analysis of revolutionary women, the calamities of China came from two sources: the intrusion of foreign countries (Jiangsu, May 1, 1903: 148-49) and the "slavish Manchus" (Wang Canzhi, 1958: 73). The latter was by far the more serious; therefore, it was necessary, as Qiujin declared, "[to] revenge the over-two-hundred-year-old shame of being slavish Hans [to the Manchus]." (Wang Canzhi, 1958: 61-62) The proclamation of the Women's Northern Expedition Team (Nüzi Beifadui) was more explicitly anti-Manchu:

"Take up whatever weapons are available [and] wipe

out Manchu despotism. Prepare for the victory,...and the establishment of the Republic..." (Chen Dongyuan, 1975: 356-57)

Why should women be involved in revolutionary struggle against the Manchus? Women at that time viewed the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty as a means of promoting women's rights. Accordingly, China was a country with a "shameful past" and full of "old habits" of enslaving women. Women were "treated as cattle and horses". But Qiu Jin said, "sexual equality is our natural right... If you want to be my comrade, please do something to save the country." (Wang Canzhi, 1958: 57-58) Another woman echoed a similar message: How [I] wish to overthrow the corrupt society of the past, and promote women's rights, so that both of them can grow..." (Lian Shi, 1906: 1-6)

How should women engage in revolutionary work? Unity was the answer. This "unity" is a "unity of determination and...goals." (Chu Nan Nüzi, 1902: 1-6) And it was a unity of women. Qiu Jin proclaimed, "now I wish to unite 200 millions [of women] as a group, to communicate the ideas of all women in this country within a day, and act as the center of all women..." (Wang Canzhi, 1958: 73) With this announcement, she published the Chinese Women's Newspaper in Shanghai.

In overthrowing the Manchu dynasty, the women's literature suggested several tactics: maternal tactics such as joining the Red Cross and training as nurses (Xiao, 1911: 16); military tactics such as fighting on the front (Wang Jieliang, 1911: 45-56); economic tactics such as the

donation of money (Lian Shi, 1906: 1-6); political tactics such as spying (Wang Jieliang, 1911: 45-56); and educational tactics such as giving public speeches and publishing newspapers. (Wu Zhenglan, 1912: 1-11)

These ideas, although systematically presented above, were not well articulated at the turn of the century. In the context of military threats and interventions and the absence of political reforms, a few educated women developed the urge to change the country. The abortion of the Hundred Day Reforms in the late 1890s convinced them that the Manchu regime intended to maintain the status quo. The foreign occupation of Beijing during the Boxer Uprising (1900) radicalized and triggered revolutionary work among women. In one of her letters, Qiu Jin wrote:

"By 1900, I had already stopped being concerned about my own life; even if [the revolution] is unsuccessful and I die in the process, I would not regret it. Furthermore, the task of overthrowing the regime cannot be postponed. Many men died in the process of overthrowing the regime, as for women, [I] have not heard of any. This is the shame of women..." (Song Jieru, 1941: 10)

Although in 1901 the Empress Dowager had a forecast that there would be political reforms after doing some research on foreign constitutional systems, some women determined to overthrow the Manchu government, began organizing in 1902. Alarmed by the political activities of Chinese students in Japan, the Manchu government halfheartedly sent a few commissioners abroad to study foreign constitutional governments

in 1905. It had taken four years for the Manchus to take the first step toward fulfilling their 1901 promised reforms.

The formation of Tongmenghui prompted the Manchu government to effect minor reforms between 1905 and 1907: changing the structure of the newly-formed Cabinet by changing the names of some departments. (Gao Yihan, 1924: D1) But this alteration was peripheral to the central demand of the women's revolutionary movement, namely the formation of a constitutional government.

During the same two year period, the Manchu government made several gestures toward reform, first by promising a constitution by 1917, then by changing the date from 1917 to 1910 in order to calm the people's anger. (North-China Herald, Aug. 10, 1906: 301-02; Sept. 7, 1906: 571) The government also did some public relation work by distributing reports of the Travelling Commission to 20 provinces as well as encouraging the press to print these reports. (North-China Herald, Sept., 14, 1906: 637)

Meanwhile, another commission was formed to study constitutional systems in Japan, England, and Germany. (Pin Xin, 1946: 50) In the same year (1907), the Manchu government announced the Regulation of the National Assembly which gave the Emperor veto power. Toward the end of 1907, the Empress Dowager issued an edict saying that a parliamentary system and a constitution would be granted on the condition that the people "prove themselves ready". (North-China Herald, Jan. 10, 1908: 83)

Whatever had been promised by the Manchu government in 1905-07,

was betrayed by the Regulation of the National Assembly and the Empress Dowager's edict of 1907. Both showed the government refused to form constitutional government and the edict of 1907 actually postponed this formation indefinitely.

Government policy in 1908-09 was an extension of that of 1905-07, except for the fact that it further specified the steps to be taken in granting the constitution. The Regulation of the Consultation Department and the Principles of the Constitution passed in 1908 showed that only a minority of people were qualified to be members of the Consultation Department and that the Emperor's authority remained supreme. (Pin Xin, 1946: 50; Wu Yuzhang, 1972: 10)

In order to gain the confidence of the people, the Manchu government announced in 1909 that the parliament would be formed in 1913. (Pin Xin, 1946: 58) But the National Assembly was organized in such a way that almost half of its membership belonged to the royal families, and the Emperor had veto power which he did not hesitate to use in the first meeting. (Wu Yuzhang, 1972: 10; Pin Xin, 1946: 50)

In 1910 and 1911, the declared Nineteenth Principles permitted the parliament, for the first time, to restrict the Emperor's authority. In spite of this, the decisions of the Consultation Department and the New Cabinet Regulations clearly showed the domination of Manchu rule. (Li Jiannong, 1971: I, 285; Pin Xin, 1946: 50)

Throughout the first decade of this century, the Manchu government halfheartedly put into place their policy of constitutional reform

2

and vacillated --- promised reforms were not forthcoming. Constitutional government was promised in 1906 and later postponed to an indefinite date. In 1907, the government once again stated their intention of granting a constitution by 1917 and a new deadline was set for forming a constitutional government in 1913 (1909). The halfheartedness of Manchu reforms may be seen in the structure of National Assembly (1907, 1909) and in the New Cabinet Regulations (1910-11) where the government refused to give up its power. It was this vacillation and halfheartedness which made many Chinese women and men suspicious of the genuineness of the government reforms. For a while, some women may have believed in the Manchu government, especially during the period of 1908-1910 when the government specified its steps for granting a constitutional government. This may explain why there were no new women's revolutionary organizations formed or periodicals published in this period. But by 1911, the dream was over. The Hunan province declared its independence and had its own constitution. People had already given up on the Manchu reforms. Political power had to be seized. Around 1911, at least 41 women's revolutionary organizations sprang up. (Appendix I) This was the peak of the movement. United with the male revolutionaries, women overthrew the Manchu dynasty and established the Republican government.

The extent to which the government policy of political reform was affected by women's revolutionary activities is hard to estimate. (When it came to insurrection, it was unlikely that the government differentiated whether it was carried out by men or women). The

political organizing work both Chinese men and women had been doing in Japan between 1900 and 1905 appeared to have pushed the Manchu government toward implementing its forecasted political reforms, namely the sending of commissioners to do research on constitutional systems abroad. The formation of Tongmenghui prompted the government to move political reform a little further, although they did so halfheartedly. Around 1910-11, the intensified revolutionary activities certainly had something to do with the declared limitation of the Emperor's power by the parliament, at least in principle. One may conclude that the women's revolutionary movement did put pressure on the government; however, the extent to which this was successful remains unclear.

Social Control and the Women's Revolutionary Movement

As soon as Chinese women students began to organize in Tokyo, the Manchu government (aided by the Japanese) threatened to arrest anyone who engaged in political activities (1903). These threats, along with the prohibition of student participation in political activities (1905) actually radicalized women and created a feeling of solidarity among them. (Ping Bingfeng, 1966: 160)

With the merger of the women's revolutionary movement and the larger revolutionary movement in the late 1900s, the military suppression and execution usually applied to insurrections was applied to the women's movement. (Yang Yiutong, 1969: 15; Yan Jingwen, 1971: 11) In addition, the provincial governments of Guangdong and Guangxi prohibited the holding of assemblies of more than 15 persons without the authorization of the

police. (North-China Herald, March 8, 1907: 490) .As a result of state coercion, several women revolutionaries such as Qiu Jin were arrested and executed. (Chen Dongyuan, 1975: 352-53)

Throughout this period, repression remained coercive and escalated in severity. However, this did not deter women from organizing or participating in the women's revolutionary movement. In the context of minimal political reforms, such repression illustrates the unwillingness of the Manchu government to listen to the people's cries for changes. As such, it tended to have a radicalizing effect on activists. Take the transformation of the Humanitarian Society between 1902 and 1904 as an example: The Society began as a women's organization designed to raise the consciousness of women. Its involvement in anti-Russian activities led to its closure by the Manchu government. When it re-emerged under the leadership of Qiu Jin in 1904, the Society's main purpose was to overthrow the Manchu dynasty.

Even when repression was coercive and consistent, it was ineffective on a long-term basis. This may be illustrated by looking at the "ups and downs" of the women's revolutionary movement. Examining the number of organizations established in each year (Appendix I), one notes that the initial outburst of revolutionary activities (in) 1902-03 seemed to have calmed down under the government orders given in 1903 and 1905. But in the period 1905-07, another outburst of revolutionary actions occurred. After Qiu Jin was executed in 1907, the movement appeared to be under control, but it resurfaced with greater strength around 1910-11. The ineffectiveness of repression during the entire period may have

demonstrated to the people that the Manchu government was incapable and weak; this interpretation may have promoted further revolutionary action.

If the Manchu government had used coercive social control mechanisms to repress revolutionary acts and, at the same time, had encouraged peaceful and non-violent methods of protest, the women's revolutionary movement might have shifted its course. However, in the 1900s, the government constantly ignored or rejected the letter-writing campaigns and petitions employed by the constitutionalists. This discouraged the use of peaceful means of expressing grievances and violent and illegal ways were the only mechanisms that could be used by the people. By 1911, even the constitutionalists realized the futility of peaceful tactics, and thus sided with the revolutionaries in their take-over of the government.

Conclusion

In this section, we will summarize the essential findings of the study, evaluate the conceptual positions put forward by different authors (outlined in Chapter I), and link the four areas of analysis.

Structural Conditions

In light of our survey, let us examine the extent to which the factors which gave rise to the women's revolutionary movement in China, namely educational mobility, acculturation (the introduction of new values/knowledge), and military defeats.

Acculturation has been used to explain many social movements, especially in Third World countries. As Smelser put it, the introduction

of new values or knowledge can alter people's frame of reference. In the case of China, the missionaries did ~~introduce~~ foreign women as a model for social change. But, as our survey of the well-known missionary journal --- Wanguo Gongbao --- shows, there was minimal coverage of women as political activists. (Only three articles in the entire '18 year period of publication!) Although the women's periodicals did carry some items on foreign women, they did not acknowledge their source as the missionaries. Nor did the image of foreign political women occupy a significant coverage in the Chinese women's literature. To look at the impact of acculturation from another perspective: we do not have evidence showing that the early women revolutionaries belonged to or graduated from missionary schools. Most of them (on whom data are available) linked with Chinese-owned schools or schools in Japan. This further undermines the argument that it was the missionaries, who introduced the Western concept of women, facilitating the rise of women's movements in China.

The only two factors, which are appropriate in the case of the Chinese women's revolutionary movement, are educational mobility and military defeat. As our findings show, the very thought of having China fall into the hands of foreign powers due to a weak Manchu government infuriated some educated women. This theme dominated the women's literature before 1912, and it can only be explained in the context of political instability. China had had a long history of military defeats beginning with the Opium War (1839-42), and at the turn of this century,

such military precariousness was illustrated by the foreign occupation of Beijing (1900) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05).

The urgency of China's situation might well have been felt by many women, including peasant or the emerging working class women. It was, however, the educated women who took up the task of organizing other women for revolutionary work. The very fact that China opened schools for women at that time successfully brought some women into close proximity, provided them with the opportunity to learn (long forbidden by the Manchu government), and facilitated the sharing of information and experience among themselves and with others. But it was a special group of women who became the vanguard of the Chinese women's movements, these were the women students in Tokyo. The geographic distance of their place of study from the Manchu bureaucracy gave them the sense of freedom needed to do political work --- a milieu not available to their female counterparts in China. Furthermore, as noted, the merger of students' clubs and political organizations facilitated the radicalization of educated women. Thus, it was not educational mobility per se which facilitated the rise of the women's revolutionary movement rather it was the milieu in which educated women resided.

Organizational Networks

The debate between Kornhauser (1959) and Pinard (1968) on whether it is intermediate networks or the lack of them which gives rise to mass movements may be resolved by the evidence presented in this chapter.

The Chinese women's revolutionary movement was based on a set of pre-

existing networks: women's schools, students' clubs, political organizations, and primary ties (such as family relations, acquaintances).

If these networks had not existed, Chinese women would have remained isolated and unable to connect themselves with the larger political movements.

The nature of the pre-existing networks had some impact on the women's revolutionary movement in China. As Freeman (1975) has pointed out, the ideology of pre-existing networks has to be "co-optable to the new ideas of the incipient movement". The women's schools (from which the women revolutionaries came) were either affiliated with revolutionary organizations or provided knowledge not known or acceptable in old Confucian schools. The students' clubs were both political and non-political, but their members were a new brand of literati. The political organizations were geared to large political changes. The women revolutionaries' family ties and acquaintances were people in political movements. With the merger of these networks, it is small wonder that the women's movement which sprang out from them was political, non-Confucian, literate, and revolutionary. Its ideology bears this out.

Institutional Changes and Social Control

It must be noted that the women's revolutionary movement in China originated in the context of a dynastic, as opposed to constitutional system. Dissatisfaction had been felt throughout the 19th century, and there had been disturbances. Social control mechanisms had been applied to the rebels and reformers. At the turn of this century,

in the words of Smelser (1959), the stages of "encouragement", "specification", and "experimentation" in implementing a constitutional system had been reached. But with the suppression of the 1898 Hundred Days' Reform, the building of a constitutional government had to begin all over again. The women's revolutionary movement emerged in this context after the Empress Dowager had forecast some reforms in 1901.

Again, in the 1900s, the building of a constitutional system did not follow a smooth path. As noted, government promises were made but not kept; specific programs were drawn up and altered or even dropped; experimental programs were implemented in minute ways, often deviating from their specified programs, etc. Thus, according to Smelser's (1959) framework, institutional changes in that period followed a definite "zig-zag" pattern. It was this wavering policy of the Manchu government which pushed some women into revolutionary politics.

What was the relationship of government policy regarding institutional changes and social control on one hand, and the women's revolutionary movement on the other? One pattern emerged during the period of 1900-11: as the movement intensified, the policy of institutional changes became more progressive, and as the movement was suppressed, the policy regressed. An example of this may be found in the period of 1905-07. Due to the pressure of the movement prior to 1905, the Manchu government formed the Travelling Commission to study constitutional politics in 1905 and in 1906 promised to grant a constitution by 1917. These actions encouraged the movement as witnessed in the rise in

revolutionary actions in 1905-07. At the same time, the government attempted to contain the spread of revolution by repressive means; by the end of 1907, these activities were forced underground. It was also at this moment in history that the Empress Dowager announced that the granting of a constitution was postponed to an indefinite date. This illustrated to the women revolutionaries that, unless the movement became more militant, the policy of institutional changes would become regressive. Thus, what Clark, Grayson, and Grayson (1975) refer to as government accommodations had to be forced in the Chinese case.

CHAPTER 4

THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1900-1949

Introduction

The term "suffrage" refers to the right to vote and be voted for. In the context of China, this denotes election to the Presidency, the Senate, the House of Representatives, the Citizens' Conference (1920s), and Citizens' Convention (1940s) as well as to the provincial senates. At different points in time, Chinese women fought for their political rights on these levels. The movement began after the Manchu dynasty was overthrown in 1911-12, and continued well into the 1940s. We will discuss this movement, as we did the women's revolutionary movement in the previous chapter, according to the following aspects: (a) the structural conditions under which it emerged; (b) the existence of pre-existing organizational networks; (c) the relationship between government policies of institutional changes and the movement; and (d) the relationship between social control mechanisms imposed by the government(s) and the movement.

Structural Conditions

Military Interferences

The years after the overthrow of the Manchu regime were not stable ones in China. Foreign political and military aggression continued: the attacks in Qingdao (1914), the Japanese "Twenty-One

Demands" (1915), and the bloodshed in Fuzhou (1919). In the 1920s, there were bloody incidents in Tangshan, Hunan, Qingdao, Hankow, Quanzhou, Chungking, etc. These consisted of clashes between Chinese workers and foreign troops. (Yin Falu, 1957a: 28) In the 1930s and '40s, Japan launched a wholesale invasion of China beginning with the "September 18th Incident" (1931), the occupation and, subsequently, the creation of a puppet state in northern China in 1932. The Sino-Japanese War officially began in 1937 and lasted for nine years. (He Ganzhi, 1956: 247, 260) These military interventions will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

Political Struggles

The dethronement of the Manchu dynasty did not automatically mean the formation of a democratic government. There were internal struggles between the Guomindang (formerly known as Tongmenghui, abbreviated as KMT) and the military-gentry clique, especially between 1912 and 1916. The latter attempted to rebuild a monarchy. From that time onwards, China was ridden with civil wars well into 1949.

Between 1913 and 1920, there were basically two political-military divisions in China: In the north, there were three distinctive armies; and in the south, two. All of these armies were fighting for the conquest of China, consolidation and expansion of the southern forces, and the unification of China. (Jerome Chen, 1979: 40-41)

The civil wars that took place between various cliques in 1920-24 were fought over the control of the financial resources of the Beijing

government and of territories. It has been estimated that, between 1915 and 1922, there were 10 major civil wars which lasted for roughly 48 months. (Chow Tse-tung, 1960: 9; Wang Yunsheng, 1953: 796-803; Jerome Chen, 1979: 42-49) In the 1920s, the political situation was such that, the Beijing government in the north wanted to unify China, the Guangzhou government in the south opposed the Beijing government, and in central China, several provinces (such as Hunan, Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Hubei) advocated provincial autonomy and worked for a federation of autonomous provinces with the support of the KMT. (Jerome Chen, 1979: 63, 70)

The KMT was restructured in 1923-24 with the intention of re-establishing a republican government. It built up a broad base and, in the name of "anti-imperialism" and "anti-warlordism", carried out its northern expedition in 1925-27. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), since its inception in 1921, had also been working towards the building of a democratic government. It formed an "alliance" with the KMT in 1924, and since then, there had been continuous conflicts between the two parties. The northern expedition was a success, and China was more or less unified under the KMT government in 1927.

But 1927 did not signify the end of political struggle. Internally, three factions of the KMT fought for power until 1931. (He Ganzhi, 1956: 155) Meanwhile, the purge of the CCP reached its climax in 1927-34 and the CCP were driven into the mountain regions in northern China. Although the KMT and the CCP "agreed" to form a united front against the

Japanese invasion in 1937, the war between them did not cease until 1949 when the KMT was driven to Taiwan. (He Ganzhi, 1956: 234, 241, 271, & 295)

In addition to these struggles for power among warlords and political parties, there were a series of attempts on the part of the masses to fight for a constitutional government and against imperialist intervention. (Pin Xin, 1946: 243-44, 252-62; Chow Tse-tung, 1960: 91-158) In most cases, these anti-imperialist efforts were also anti-government. (Zhang Hui and Bao Cun, 1963: 203) Very often, in these struggles, the workers, business-persons, students, etc. in the urban settings formed a united front; these struggles reached a climax in the period of 1919-1925 and are commonly known as the May Fourth Movement.

The May Fourth Movement was a nation-wide urban patriotic mass movement. It began when the students pressured the government not to sign the peace treaty in Paris in 1919, and they won. (Jerome Chen, 1979: 110) It was a mass movement which aimed to eradicate feudalist and imperialist elements and attempted to build a democratic and egalitarian China. It challenged the Confucian ideology and structures, and subjected the traditional Chinese mentalities, life-styles, and government structures to trial. It questioned and evaluated the capitalist and socialist systems as well as China's position in international and historical currents. The vanguard of this movement was the intellectuals (students) who were supported by the business and working class sectors. (Pin Xin, 1946: 104-57)

The rising tide of anti-warlordism and anti-imperialism, which resulted in massive petitionings, marches, demonstrations, and strikes, was temporarily set back by the suppression of the KMT government in 1927-29. It re-emerged again in the 1930s mainly in the form of anti-Japanese protests. Again, these protests had a broad base including students, workers, and business-persons. They, for patriotic causes, united together to defend China's sovereignty and civil liberties. While overshadowed by the achievements of the May Fourth Movement, the intellectuals nevertheless revitalized the process of cultural re-evaluation. Organizations were formed to promote the new philosophies and education and, at the same time, to destroy traditional Chinese thoughts (such as superstition, Confucianism, etc.). Democracy, rationalism, liberalism, and egalitarianism were promoted. (Pin Xin, 1946: 297-305)

During the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), in order to mobilize a maximum number of citizens, the KMT government brought the people's attention to the issues of resistance and nation-building. This meant the formulation of mass mobilization and education as means to build up an anti-Japanese front and the internal reconstruction of the government, infrastructures, and mass organizations. They were interrelated. It was, however, the latter which kept the interest of the intellectuals and business sectors alive concerning the issue of the constitution and democracy. Voluntary organizations were formed to promote the discussion of constitutional matters, and this necessarily involved the issue

of civil rights and responsibilities. (Pin Xin, 1946: 347-68)

In sum, between 1912 and 1949, there were several currents on the political scene: (a) political struggles among the warlords and political parties; (b) mass movements with intellectuals as their vanguard fighting against imperialism; (c) intellectuals' movements to re-evaluate feudalist elements and promote Western thoughts and sciences; and (d) the KMT government policy of mass mobilization which sustained the drive of the educated to build a democratic government.

Ideas of Woman Suffrage in the Larger Society

In this section, we will examine what had been said on woman suffrage before 1912 in the missionary and Chinese press, and in the political movements. How the warlords, the CCP, and the intellectuals viewed the issue will also be discussed. The position of the KMT on woman suffrage will be left to the next section.

In the missionary literature, as witnessed in the Wanguo Gongbao, the issue of democracy and woman suffrage were scarcely mentioned before 1912. Only a limited number of articles in this journal dealt with democracy and suffrage; none discussed "woman suffrage" specifically. (Wanguo Gongbao, June 1899: 2-3; June 1906: 64-69) This is in line with the journal editorial contention that China's weakness lay in its culture, and in its polity. (Wanguo Gongbao, Feb. 1903: 5-9)

Before the collapse of the Manchu dynasty, the Chinese press had introduced articles such as "Drafting a Constitution Should be the Most

Urgent Issue in China" and "The Government Should Immediately Declare a Constitution so as to Calm Down the People." (Huazi Ribao, Mar. 4, 1905: 2; Sept. 1, 1906: 2) Most showed a sense of urgency concerning political reforms. They were also concerned with woman suffrage, as witnessed in an article in Jinzhong Ribao (May 3, 1904: 4) encouraging women to "capture the right to vote".

The constitutionalists were inconsistent in their orientation towards "democracy": they supported it in the early 1900s, but shifted to "constitutional monarchy" in the mid-1900s. (Qingyibao, Mar. 21, 1900: 4-5, 18; Bao Jialin, 1974: 1-22) The revolutionaries were more definite in their orientation to democracy and woman suffrage as shown in their Three People's Principles and the Proclamation of the Military Government. The latter declared that "all citizens are equal and have the right to vote." (Yang Song & Deng Liqun, 1953: 567-68; Pi Yishu, 1973: 27)

The warlords who gained power after 1912 were probably the most reactionary of all, they openly advocated that China use Confucianism as its state religion, and attempted to make Confucian studies compulsory in schools. Sichuan soldiers had a saying: "Women are like basins full of bath-water. You use them one after another." (Jerome Chen, 1979: 87, 165) Although we could not find literature with warlords referring to woman suffrage, judging from the above information, it is likely that they did not favour it.

Beginning with its establishment in 1921, the CCP adopted the

position that the liberation of women lay in national liberation from imperialism, capitalism, and feudalism, and it was very critical of the bourgeois women who fought for individual actualization (such as suffrage, education, etc.) during the May Fourth Period. (Kristeva, 1977: 2) In 1922, the CCP incorporated several policies on women into its program. For example, the CCP maintained that there should be sexual equality in law, politics and economics. (Luo Qiong, 1952: 26-28) In 1926, it passed a resolution maintaining a strategy of working with all women: educated women, working class women, and peasant women. This resolution stressed the strategy of a "united front" involving the avoidance of unnecessary conflicts with women's organizations, and respecting the viewpoints of other groups. (Wang Jiamin, 1965: 239-40)

During the period of 1927-36, the CCP continued to reaffirm its principle of woman suffrage. (Pin Xin, 1946: 33) In the Jiangsu Soviet Republic (1931), although only 2.5 percent of the Central Executive Council members were women, most of the local government had 25 percent representation by women. It was claimed that, in some places, women constituted up to 66 percent of the members in the local governments. (Jiangsu Federation of Women, 1963: 2-3) During the Sino-Japanese War and its aftermath, the CCP restated its principle of sexual equality and woman suffrage in the areas it had liberated in northern China. Thousands of women participated in local governments. One report claimed that the percentage of women participation was roughly 20 percent. (Yan'an Research Society of Current Affairs, 1940: 364, 372-73, 420, 429)

In evaluating the traditional Chinese culture, intellectuals, especially during the May Fourth Movement, criticized Confucian concepts concerning male-female relationships. In 1916, women had been called to liberate themselves from their inferior position and to actualize their autonomy and independence. As Chen Duxiu once said, "The woman suffrage movement is one aspect of modern life", and it should be supported. Intellectuals, in general, supported woman suffrage. (Pin Xin, 1946: 151)

Summary

After the collapse of the Manchu dynasty, China was not free from military intervention or from invasions by foreign powers, nor was it devoid of internal power struggles among warlords and political parties. There were mass movements to oppose imperialist powers, and currents of cultural evaluation among the intellectuals. The drive to build a democratic society was strong. With the exception of the warlords, it appears that missionaries, the Chinese press, the pre-1912 revolutionaries, the intellectuals, and the CCP were all in favour of woman suffrage.

Organizational Networks

Organizations and periodicals formed by women to promote suffrage will be defined as woman suffrage organizations and periodicals. We will classify them in the same manner as we did in the last chapter: if women's organizations and periodicals had more than one concern, they will be categorized in more than one movement.

Woman Suffrage Organizations and Periodicals

At least 65 women suffrage organizations emerged between 1900 and 1949. Most originated in Shanghai during the periods 1911-12 and 1919-25 (May Fourth Period). The Association for the Restoration of Women's Rights (1907) formed in Tokyo, the Association to Promote Woman Suffrage in China (1911) and the Shanghai Woman Suffrage Alliance (1911) formed in Shanghai were the first three woman suffrage organizations. (Appendices XI and XII) During the same period, at least 17 women's periodicals promoting woman suffrage were created. The Women's World (1903), the Chinese New Women's Magazine (1906), and the Shenzhou Tenth-Daily (1912) were the first three. Two of them were published in Shanghai and one in Tokyo. (Appendices XIII and XIV)

Information on membership is very incomplete. Of the five organizations on which we have data, one had "over 200" members, two had "several hundreds", and the other two seem to be umbrella groups which included representatives of many woman suffrage organizations. (Appendix XI) The available information also suggests that a significant proportion (roughly 25 percent) of these organizations were led by woman students. (Appendix XV)

The life spans of the periodicals which advocated woman suffrage ranged from one to 180 issues. The most well-established one was the Women's Magazine which was published from 1915 to 1932. (Appendix XIII) Some of these journals were affiliated with the woman suffrage organizations, such as the Shenzhou Tenth-Daily and the Shenzhou Women's Newspaper Monthly. Both of these were related to the Shenzhou Women's

Republican Organization. (Appendix XVI)

The Return of Politicized Women

The networks --- women's schools, students' clubs, political organizations, and family ties (and acquaintances) --- which gave rise to the women's revolutionary movement were also essential for the formation of the woman suffrage movement. We have established two facts in the last chapter: (a) there was a small number of women students in Japan, mainly in Tokyo, in the 1900s; and (b) these women, due to the merger of the above-mentioned networks, became politicized and formed their own independent organizations.

After 1905, the political activities of the Chinese students in Japan were suppressed by the Japanese government, and the Manchu government discontinued its policy of sending students to Japan for obvious political reasons. While there were roughly 12,000 Chinese students in Japan in 1902, the number dropped to less than 7,000 in 1906, and by 1912, there were only 1,400. (Chen Qitian, 1962: 160-61) Throughout the first decade of this century, there was continuous mobility of Chinese students between Japan and China for political and economic reasons. (Ping Bingfeng, 1966: 155) This pattern was repeated in 1915 as a response to Japan's policy toward China. (Chow Tse-tung, 1960: 35)

Although little is known about the mobility of Chinese women students, it is likely that they followed the above pattern. This may be shown indirectly in the shifting locations of women's organizations.

As demonstrated in the last chapter (see also Appendix I), the earliest women's revolutionary organizations were formed in Tokyo, but those formed after 1907 were all founded in China, mainly in Shanghai. Some of the leaders of women's revolutionary organizations in Japan (before 1907) were also leaders of similar organizations in China (after 1907). For instance, Tang Qunying belonged to the Chinese Women Students' Union in Tokyo, and she was one of the organizers of the Shanghai Women's Solicitation Society in China. This suggests that some women, politicized in Japan, began to move back to China after 1907, and form their own independent organizations.

Pre-Existing Women's Organizations and Periodicals

Previously existing women's organizations and periodicals are conducive to the emergence of new women's organizations and periodicals. After the establishment of the Republic in 1911-12, some of the women's revolutionary organizations shifted their concern to the issue of woman suffrage and altered their name accordingly. Three of the earliest 14 woman suffrage organizations in 1911-12 were extensions of the women's revolutionary organizations, (Appendix XVII) and six were organized by the leaders of the former women's revolutionary organizations. (Appendix XVIII) Two of the earliest woman suffrage periodicals in 1911-12 were extensions of the former women's revolutionary periodicals: Shenzhou Tenth-Daily (1912) and Shenzhou Women's Newspaper Monthly (1913).

Class Background of the Woman Suffragists

Previously, it has been argued that the Chinese women students

who were politicized in Japan returned to China and became the pioneers of the woman ~~suffrage~~ movement. As this movement developed, its participants seemed to be mainly educated women of well-to-do families.

This may be illustrated on two levels:

The woman suffrage movement was continuously criticized for its class-bias. The movement was seen as composed of "a few educated women" (Zhen Han, 1920), "a few female students who are still studying in schools of higher learning," "female students in high schools," (Meng Ru, 1934: 2-4) "a minority of educated women students", "a few women from the property class," (Wang Zuochen, 1924), "upper class women" (Cheng Benhang, 1927: 14-20). The movement was also defined as the "wealthy women's movement", (De, 1929: 83-84), and the "movement of women who came from rich families." (Hsiao Yuechen, 1935: 13-19)

In addition to these observations, women students seemed to be dominant in the activities of the woman suffrage movement, as witnessed in the militant actions (rock-throwing) against the parliament building in 1912 (Xiuzhu Xiangren, 1914: 79); the Citizens' Convention of Guangdong in 1919 (Huazi Ribao, Aug. 5, 1919: III, 1); the Federation of All Women in Hunan in 1921 (Pi Yishu, 1973: 48); the Organization to Promote Woman Suffrage in Beijing in 1922 (Zhong Guiyang, 1933: 4); the controversy in Henan in 1923 (Shibao, July 1, 1923: 2, 3); and the Federation of All Women of Guangdong in 1924 (Chinese Women or Zhongguo Funü, Sept. 1957: 22).

Summary

The woman suffrage movement was built on the pre-existing networks

of women revolutionaries. Some of the woman suffrage organizations/ periodicals were merely extensions of the formerly revolutionary ones. In some cases, leadership overlapped in both types of movement. The historical circumstances were such that the politicized women students moved back to China from Japan, and continued their revolutionary organizing. Some apparently anticipated the exercise of full political rights after the revolution. There was also a continuity in the type of women involved in both the revolutionary and suffrage movements: they were mainly educated women.

Institutional Changes and the Woman Suffrage Movement

Ideas of Suffrage in Women's Literature

Before 1912, the women's literature carried a few articles on the woman suffrage movements in the West. (Chinese New Women's Magazine, Jan. 21, 1907: 103-04) Wang Weiqi (1905) devoted his whole book to the topic.

The women revolutionaries anticipated political equality with men after the overthrowing of the Manchu regime, and stressed the equal status of men and women in both revolution and suffrage. Some Chinese women even expected that they would be the first in the world to obtain suffrage, and would therefore excel against foreign women. (Zhang Zhujun, 1912: 45-46)

However, when the KMT failed to grant suffrage to women in 1912, the women revolutionaries felt betrayed. One woman even pointed out the illegitimacy of the new government by saying: "Our country is not

the Republic of China, it is the Male Republic of China." (Shen Jitang, 1911: 1-2) Some women felt it was unfair that uneducated and impoverished men could vote, but educated and rich women could not. (Huai Bing, 1912: 43-44)

Throughout the 1910s and '20s, various rationales for woman suffrage were expounded in the women's literature and the following six were the most common:

(a) Both Men and Women Are Human Beings and They Should Have the Same Rights

It was argued that it is the natural right of human beings, male and female, to determine their own destiny by participating in political decisions. If the legal term "persons" is considered to include only males, by implication, women are non-persons. (Huai Bing, 1912: 43-44; Gaoshan, 1929: 74-75)

(b) Men and Women Are Different

This argument maintained that since the psychological and physical components of men and women are different, men could not act as the representatives of women in voting. In order for them to express their specific demands, it was considered essential for women to have suffrage. (Zhang Peifen, 1922: 62-78) A variant of this argument was that, since men and women are different by nature, they should cooperate with and supplement one another in politics. (Qingmeng, 1912: 7-8; Xu Yasheng, 1929: 2-7)

(c) Women Are Better Than Men

This argument maintained that women are superior to men because

they are morally superior, law-abiding, perceptive, charitable, and kind-hearted. (Lu Shouzheng, 1911: 13-14) Women also have a good memory, experience in family education, political and military skills, and are efficient at work. (Li Sanwu, 1924: 143-87) With these superior qualities, women could eliminate the "brutality, anger, treachery, and hatred" in politics if they were allowed to participate. (Chen Wenqing, 1924: 4) Consequently, politics would become "pure and warm." (You Chen, 1929: 119-26)

(d) Woman Suffrage Is in Line With the Principle of Democracy

This rationale insisted that since both men and women are citizens, and democracy is based on the public opinion of the citizens, it is illegal not to grant woman suffrage. Both men and women should be responsible for national affairs in a democracy. (Wang Renlan, 1912: 13-16; Gao Yishan, 1929: 126-33)

(e) Woman Suffrage is Beneficial to the Country

It was argued that the progress of a nation depends on women having the right to vote. (Yang Jiwei, 1912: 22-24) The existing political chaos and instability was due to the lack of participation by women in political decision-making. (Wu Jing, 1924: 7-8) A variant of this justification argued that women are enthusiastic participants in religion. If women had suffrage, the same enthusiasm could be applied to raise the political consciousness of men, and make them more alert. (Lu Shouzheng, 1911: 13-14)

(f) Woman Suffrage Can Upgrade Women's Status and Power

It was maintained that if women obtained suffrage, they would no longer be the toys of men. They could use political means to eliminate their inferior status and maltreatment. (Wan Pu, 1929: 78-83)

These justifications explained why women should have suffrage, and were quite prevalent before 1930. Afterwards, the women's literature shifted its attention to the issue of how the existing political framework could accommodate women. Between 1930 and 1937, suggestions were made for improving women's rights in the Citizens' Conference and the Constitution. (Qin Jin, 1936: 4-6) With the advance of the Sino-Japanese War, the issue of suffrage was temporarily dropped, and it did not become popular again until after 1945. By then, the focus was on, — the proportion of women in the Citizens' Convention and other government departments. (Xiao Yu, 1947: 1-2)

In order to obtain woman suffrage, the women's literature suggested two key strategies:

(1) The Self-Discipline and Self-Improvement of Women: This strategy was quite persistent and was acclaimed as the "foundation of women's participation in politics". (Wang Renlan, 1912: 13-16) To implement this strategy, women were asked to modify their lifestyles, personality, morality, appearance, mannerism, speech, etc. They were to eliminate vanity, ambition, emotionality, carelessness, wastefulness, and nepotism. (Ning Lingqiu, 1927: 2-5) Women were also to upgrade themselves in intellectual, economic, and health spheres before partici-

pating in politics. This could be accomplished by going to school, working outside the home, and by physical exercise. (Yang Yuan Changying, 1923: 126-27; Yang Huilin, 1940: 1-3)

Institutional Changes

Like the women's revolutionary movement, the woman suffrage movement originated in a period in which the government paid no attention to political rights of women. Before 1911, the Manchu regime refused to grant the right to vote and/or be voted for to either men or women.

As noted, women revolutionaries expected that, after the collapse of the Manchu dynasty, the new government would institute woman suffrage in accordance with the principle of democracy. In 1912, the new government did not fulfill their dream. Three government announcements were made in that year: the Election Procedure of the House of Representatives stated that suffrage was limited to "the male members of the Republic of China". (Ye Zuying, 1973: 46); the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China denounced woman suffrage (Yang Song and Deng Ligu, 1953: 677-83); and the "sexual equality" clause in the KMT program was removed. (Zou Lu, 1965: 60) These policies contradicted the KMT's former promises, and infuriated women. They responded to these by forming an alliance of women from 18 provinces, and sending delegates to talk with Sun Zhongshan. (Xiuzhu Xiangren, 1914: 79; Shibao, Jan. 8, 1912: 5) Some sent in petitions to the new Republican government; and some were more militant --- yelling and disturbing the senate meetings, breaking windows of the parliament, and kicking policemen. (Chen

Dongyuan, 1975: 360; Bao Jiao, 1934: 1-18) The women members of Tongmenghui (now known as the KMT) also protested the removal of "sexual equality" from the party program, and furious arguments took place in KMT meetings. (Xiuzhu Xiangren, 1914: 74-75)

Meanwhile, two events related to suffrage occurred in 1912: the Provisional Constitution was drafted and the Guangdong Temporary Senate granted suffrage to the women in the province. Both tended to encourage women to pressure the national government to allow women to vote by sending petitions to senators and to the President. (Shibao, Feb. 7, 1912; Bai Jiao, 1934: 1-18; Zhi Yang, 1941: 7)

This outburst of protest energy in the first year of the Republican government died down as President Yuan Shikai took power and made it crystal clear that he wanted the abolition of the parliamentary system and the return of dynastic rule. (Pin Xin, 1946: 84-86) This occurred between 1913 and 1916. The abortion of a parliamentary system meant that the demand of woman suffrage was futile unless a republican form of government was restored. With the exception of petitioning in 1913 (Huazi Ribao, Mar. 4, 1913: 2), women resorted to illegal and violent tactics, similar to those used to overthrow the Manchu regime in the 1900s, such as assassination attempts, bombings, etc. When parliament reopened in 1916 after Yuan's death, the issue of the constitution split the KMT into factions and no progress was made. (Shibao, June 2, 1913: 7; Sept. 6, 1913: 7; Oct. 4, 1913: 7; Zhi Yang, 1941: 7)

It seemed, for a while, that the cause of suffrage was lost.

However, the events at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference came to women's rescue. The Conference was to maintain the "balance of power" after the First World War, and many Chinese hoped that China would recover some of its rights and territories. The Peace Treaty signified, to the surprise of the Chinese, the close collaboration of foreign powers at the expense of China's sovereignty. It also illustrated the weakness of China in international politics, and self-strengthening of the country was seen as the only way to save China.

The 1919 Conference became a landmark in Chinese history as it galvanized many concerned citizens --- merchants, students, labourers, women, industrialists, etc. --- to unite in strengthening China. The year 1919 may be regarded as the beginning of the May Fourth Movement (previously discussed in the chapter). The rising tide of political consciousness reignited the issue of woman suffrage; many suffrage organizations were formed and periodicals published after the establishment of the Patriotic Organization of Chinese Women in Shanghai in July 1919. (Appendices XI and XIII)

Meanwhile, on the political scene, Sun Zhongshan reorganized the KMT government in Guangdong (1918) and opened the Guangdong Citizens' Convention (1919). (Huazi Ribao, Aug. 5, 1919: III, 1; Jan. 5, 1920: III, 4; Shibao, Jan. 8, 1920: "Xin Funü") This, along with the Paris Peace Conference, pushed the suffragists into doing more political work.

At the beginning of the 1920s when the provincial autonomy movement reached its peak, the newly-autonomous provinces of Zhejiang, Hunan, Sichuan, and Guangdong drafted their constitutions. This provided an

issue for the women of these provinces to address: they founded a number of suffrage organizations, and petitioned the provincial governments to grant suffrage for women. (Pi Yishu, 1973: 48-49; Huazi Ribao, Apr. 2, 1921: III, 4)

This wave of activism among the suffragists was further boosted by the formation of the National Policy Conference and the reopening of the Parliament in Beijing in 1922. The Conference was created by citizens of 14 provinces to draft a constitution for China. The suffragists viewed these as opportunities to give their input into the political process. Some Chinese women, especially those living in Beijing, founded new suffrage organizations, organized conferences for senators to discuss constitutional matters and to hear how important it was to grant women suffrage, and delivered petitions to the Beijing government. All of these efforts were geared toward pressuring the government to include an explicit statement of "sexual equality" in the constitution. (Zhong Guiying, 1933: 4; Funiu Zazhi, Oct. 1922: 62, 124-25; Jan. 1923: 307-08)

While all of this was going on, the senate of Henan granted limited woman suffrage, but this did not satisfy the Henan women. They immediately made their position clear by sending petitions and letters urging the senate to grant full woman suffrage. The senate gave in in June 1923. (Shibao, July 1, 1923: II, 3) The news of this success encouraged the Shanghai women. They sent letters to the senate of Jiangsu and demanded the implementation of woman suffrage. No positive response came from the senate. (Shibao, Aug. 8, 1923: III, 5)

The granting of full suffrage to women of Henan showed that equal political rights with men was not an unrealistic dream. So, when Sun Zhongshan called for the support of the Citizens' Conference in 1924, the women's organizations in Shanghai immediately formed a united front to demand their full representation in it. (Pin Xin, 1946: 171) To strengthen their demand, the Shanghai women sent telegrams to various women's organizations throughout China to rally their support and, simultaneously, delivered petitions to the President. (Shibao, Jan. 4, 1925: II, 3)

But the Draft Regulations of the Citizens' Conference announced in 1925 disappointed all the suffragists. It clearly stated that only men over 25 were to have the franchise. (Liu Qingyang, 1956: 2) This denial of suffrage contradicted the very principle of sexual equality which the KMT had been advocating for years. (Fang Suzhong, 1959: 25) In response to this contradiction, new suffrage organizations were founded, petitions and telegrams sent, and massive mobilization campaigns launched. (Shibao, Mar. 3, 1925: II, 4; Mar. 7, 1925: II, 3; Mar. 8, 1925: II, 4) In this year, for the first time, the woman suffrage movement formed a united front with non-women's organizations (such as student groups and business associations) to deal with the issue of the constitution. (Shibao, Mar. 9, 1925: II, 3) Meanwhile, the women of various provinces were mobilized to participate in marches, campaigns, and demonstrations demanding woman suffrage. (Gongjiao Zhishi, Mar. 17, 1971: 21)

All of these protests pressured the government into reconsidering the Draft Regulations, but in the final version announced in April 1925, the term "men" remained unchanged. (Shibao, Apr. 1, 1925: II, 3) This was followed by further protests from women's groups, but they were not as intense as before. (Shibao, ~~May 10~~, 1925: II, 4)

The period of 1926-30 was a quiet period for the suffragists. The KMT was in its final years of the Northern Expedition to conquer the warlords and unify China. Once unified, the KMT government issued no special policy directives relating to suffrage except for 1930 when it made preparations for the drafting of the Provisional Constitution. (Shi Jiansheng, 1940: 15) The lack of women's protests on the issue of suffrage sprang, not so much from the absence of government reform gestures, but from the repression imposed by the KMT. The latter will be discussed in the next section.

In 1931, similar to the Draft Regulation in 1925, the newly announced Election Procedure of Representatives of Citizens' Conference denied the representation of women's organizations. (Pin Xin, 1946: 293) Immediately, women's groups held public meetings to promote the political rights of women, sent petitions, and organized demonstrations. (Huazi Ribao, Mar. 7, 1931: 4; Shibao, Apr. 7, 1931: 1) Finally, the government gave in, and agreed to grant a quota of ten woman representatives in the Citizens' Conference. In the same year, the Provisional Constitution of the Disciplinary Politics Period of the Republic of China was proclaimed. For the first time in Chinese history, the principle of

sexual equality before the law was written explicitly in the national constitution. (Ye Zuying, 1973: 46)

Although this principle of sexual equality was clearly stated, between 1931 and 1936, when what is now known as the May 5th Constitutional Proposal was drafted and redrafted, it was removed. In 1936, the newly announced May 5th Constitutional Draft did not have the sexual equality clause in it. The Shanghai and Nanjing women critically commented on the Constitutional Draft, and pointed out that it ignored the protection of women and the promotion of women's rights. (Pin Xin, 1946: 340, 384-85)

In the same year, the Citizens' Conference announced its Election and Dismissal Procedure for Representatives. It admitted a quota of 168 representatives from women's organizations. (Ye Zuying, 1973: 46-47) The Guangdong women were not happy with the quota. They formed an alliance with women of other provinces to publicize the issue and demanded that the quota be raised. (Huazi Ribao, July 1, 1936: II, 2; Sept. 8, 1936: III, 3) Meanwhile, quotas of women representatives were set at 10 percent and 20 percent in the Legislature and Overseer Department respectively. (Ye Zuying, 1973: 46) It seemed that the Chinese suffragists were satisfied with this arrangement.

Prior to the opening of the Citizens' Political Conference in July 1938, many women's organizations sponsored a series of meetings to allow the women representatives to give hearings to the female public. (Funü Shenghuo, July 5, 1938: 1; July 20, 1938: 16-17) In the same year, woman suffrage was granted to the senate on both the

provincial and municipal levels, however no quotas were set. (Jiang Ying, 1939: 16-17)

All of these were encouraging to the suffragists. When the government announced that the Citizens' Conference would be opened the next year in 1939, over 20 women's organizations in Chingqing sponsored forums on constitutional politics for women. Shanghai women followed suit. (Shengbao, Jan. 9, 1940: 4; Funü Shenghuo, Jan. 20, 1940: 22-23) These forums were intended to prepare women for political participation.

By 1940, it appears that there were some suffragists who were not satisfied with the system of female representation in the Citizens' Conference. This was the case with Hubei women. In 1940, the date for the opening of the Citizens' Conference approached, some suffragists demanded a quota of 50 percent women representation. (Huazi Ribao, May 7, 1940: II, 4) However, due to the escalation of the Sino-Japanese War, the Conference was postponed.

There is evidence that, as early as 1941, the KMT government tried to discourage women from getting equal political rights with men. A KMT document issued in 1941 stated that "it is harmful for every individual woman to demand full political participation." (Song Qingling, 1967c: 164) This was reflected in the Amended Organizational Procedure of the Citizens' Political Conference (1942). While it explicitly stated that both men and women were to have the suffrage, the qualifications outlined put women in a disadvantaged position in elections. (Zhou Shuyun, 1944: 16-18) Some women observed this contradiction, and sent petitions demanding a quota for women. (Tan Sheying, 1952: 62-63)

In the following year, President Jiang reassured the people that a constitutional government would be formed after the War. This announcement created a wave of enthusiasm among the suffragists and women's forums on constitutional politics mushroomed once again. (Funü Xinyun, Apr. 1944: 30)

The War ended in 1945. In the following two years, the KMT government reconfirmed the principle of sexual equality as stated in the Constitution of the Republic of China. (Gongjiao Zhishi, 1971: 10) In 1946, roughly 80 women representatives were present at the Citizens' Conference. In 1947, the quotas of women representatives in the Citizens' Conference, the Legislature, and the Overseer Department were set at 10 percent, 10 percent, and 20 percent respectively. (Pi Yishu, 1973: 83-84)

The 10 percent quota in the Citizens' Conference was at odds with the declared goal of a 33 percent quota of the Central Association of Women's Movement. (Dagongbao, Mar. 9, 1946: 3) Moreover, the 10 percent and 20 percent quotas of women in the Legislature and the Overseer Department certainly deviated from the demands of many suffragists and from the principle of sexual equality. But, protests were minimal in 1947-48; women's organizations were busy electing representatives for the Citizens' Conference. (Shengbao, Mar. 7, 1948: 1, 1) To explain this, we have to examine government policies of social control. This will be done in the next section.

Summary

In retrospect, it took Chinese women roughly 35 years to gain a

few percentage points in the Legislature, Overseer Department, and the Citizens' Conference. The principle of sexual equality had been advocated, withdrawn, promised, shelved, and finally stated in the Constitution. The reluctance of the KMT, as a party, and later as the government of China, to grant suffrage to women was obvious. Unlike the women's revolutionary movement in the 1900s, the woman suffrage movement appeared to be passive. With a few exceptions where the suffragists actually forced the government(s) to implement woman suffrage, many suffragists' activities seemed to be merely response to government policies. The suffragists appeared to wait for the government(s) to take some action before they acted. For example, in 1924, it was only after Sun Zhongshan asked for the support of the Citizens' Conference that women rallied for the full representation of women; in 1943 when President Jiang reconfirmed his intention to form a constitutional government in the post-war period, the suffragists quickly organized forums to educate women on constitutional politics. They seldom took an active role in pressuring the government(s) to create a citizens' conference nor did they systematically organize mass educational campaigns for women on government affairs.

This is not to deny the fact that the suffragists did pressure the government(s) to implement full woman suffrage, as shown in their militant actions outside the parliament building in 1912, the Henan women's success in 1923, the drive to organize and form alliances with non-women's groups in 1925, the public meetings, demonstrations, and petitions of the suffragists in 1931, the demand for a 50 percent quota

for women in the Citizens' Conference in 1940, and so on.

The suffragists usually reacted strongly when government policies sharply contradicted the principle of sexual equality in politics. The most obvious example may be found in 1925 when the Draft Regulation of the Citizens' Conference allowed only men to vote. The suffragists responded to this announcement with a nation-wide call for united actions against the KMT and supplemented it with the formation of new women's organizations, petitions, telegrams, mobilization campaigns, marches, and demonstrations. There were, however, exceptions to the pattern. For instance, the relative silence of the suffragists when they discovered that the word "men" remained in the final version of the Draft Regulations in 1925, and the relative lack of protests from the suffragists in 1947 when the quotas of female representatives were announced.

Social Control and the Woman Suffrage Movement

In the 1900s, although the idea of woman suffrage was presented in the women's literature, the women revolutionaries were too busy to fight for suffrage because suffrage could come only when the dynastic order was demolished. Since there were no protest incidents, there was nothing related to suffrage for the Manchu government to suppress.

In 1911-12, the republican government granted freedom of speech, assembly, organization, and the press to the citizens. (Chow Tse-tung, 1960: 43) But when a number of revolutionaries-turned-suffragists demonstrated against government policies both inside and in front of the parliament building, policement were called in to keep "law and order".

(Bai Jiao, 1934: 8-14) This contradiction between theory (freedom) and practice (coercion) was evident; and it may have furthered the anger of women who had already found the new government hypocritical and unfair. This might also explain the militancy of the movement in that period.

The woman suffrage movement appeared to go underground between 1913 and 1918. This was because of the strong repression in this period. Legislation was passed to curtail the freedom of the press and of association, and to increase the power of the police. Women were forbidden to join political groups or attend political forums. (Chow Tse-tung, 1960: 43; Zhonghua Xinbao, Feb. 13, 1917: 3) Meanwhile, the press launched a campaign against woman suffrage. It argued that women's sphere was the home, and that it was against women's nature to take part in politics. (Shi Bao'an, 1916: 1-10) In the context of legislative denial (of civil liberties) and counter-ideology (that is, anti-suffragism), political protests diminished.

As the tide of radicalism rose towards the end of the 1910s, the warlord governments stepped up their repression. Between 1919 and 1925, a variety of newspapers were censored, policemen and troops were sent to suppress demonstrations and marches, to tear down anti-government posters and slogans, to confiscate underground pamphlets, to arrest political activists and strikers, and to close down dangerous associations and unions. (Yin Falu, 1957a: 35; 1957b: 28; 1957c: 94-98; Chow Tse-tung, 1960: 119-60; Pin Xin, 1946: 246). The Security Police Act (1922), for example, forbade women to join political organizations or attend

political forums. It was used to prohibit the meeting organized by the Organization to Promote Woman Suffrage in Beijing in August 1922.

(Song Hua'ou, 1926: 2-8) Three years later, the same organization was prevented from meeting in one of the universities in Beijing.

(Jiaoyu Gongbao, Apr. 20, 1925: "Open Letter", 57) Interestingly, the woman suffrage movement continued to prosper in the context of coercion.

As a political party not yet in power, the KMT began to incorporate the women's movement. In 1923, it announced that a Women's Committee would be formed within the party. This committee materialized the year after. (Pi Yishu, 1973: 21) In 1925, the Women's Bureau of the KMT advised female members of the party to work for the women's movement. (Shibao, Apr. 1, 1925: II, 4) It was hoped that such a move would "expand the influence of the party", "prevent women from being used by reactionaries", and "act as the first step in generating political propaganda". The KMT Central Committee also suggested that women's bureaux be created at all levels and branches of the party.

(Jiangsu Funü, Mar. 8, 1937: 24-25) The party branches in Jiangsu and Shanghai appeared to follow these guidelines and cooperated with the existing women's organizations in the late 1920s. (Shibao, Dec. 5, 1925: II, 3; Feb. 1, 1926: II, 4; Aug. 4, 1927: 8)

Meanwhile, the KMT became more active, recruiting women and coordinating women's activities such as meetings for national representatives of women's organizations. (Shibao, Dec. 26, 1926: II, 6; Dec.

4, 1928: 6) As early as 1927, the KMT was already influencing the direction of the women's movements. (Jiangsu Minghengting Gongbao, Sept. 24, 1927: 4; Shibao, Aug. 2, 1927: 7; Aug. 5, 1927: 6)

In 1928, the former "Women's Bureau" was suddenly abandoned, and its function subordinated to the new Public Training Committee. This Committee had "women's sections" in all its provincial branches. All women's organizations had to be registered by this committee. This strongly suggested that the KMT government was interested in controlling the women's organizations, and in keeping them under surveillance. (Gongjiao Zhishi, Apr. 1971: 11-12; Shibao, July 1, 1928: 5) By 1930, the Organizational Principles of Women's Organizations were passed to regulate the activities of women.

Institutionalization was merely one of the many ways that the KMT handled the women's movements. When it came into power in 1927, the KMT used strongly repressive measures to suppress any political activities except the ones they coordinated: workers' headquarters were closed, women's groups scrutinized, laws passed to supervise public organizations, to discontinue voluntary associations, to prohibit secret organizations, to ban assemblies, marches, and the ownership of weaponry, etc. (Huazi Ribao, May 6, 1927: 11, 2; Shibao, May 7, 1927: 7; Jiangsu Minzhengting Gongbao, Jan. 27, 1928: 1-2; June 7, 1929: 2-3; Guangdongsheng Zhingfu Gongbao, July 1930: 13-14) Combined with institutionalization, this repressive force appeared to diminish the suffragists' activities.

By 1931, the KMT's incorporation of the women's movements was

furthered by passing the Organizational Principles of Women's Associations (1932). These Principles severely limited the autonomy of women's groups in their recruitment of members and the formation of alliances, and therefore were quite effective in lowering their political capacity. (Jiaoyubu Gongbao, July 26, 1930: 26; Aug. 23, 1930: 35-37; Nov. 6, 1932: 68,69) As the Sino-Japanese conflict intensified in the 1930s, the KMT government-organized national organization was formed to direct the women's movements and all independent women's groups became KMT-managed. A decade later, the KMT government was even able to dominate the election committees of the women's organizations in China --- the chairperson of each election committee was appointed by the government. (Zhonghua Minguo Guominzhengfu Gongbao, July 14, 1947: 12-13)

Since the inception of the CCP in the early 1920s, the KMT-CCP relationship was always strained. Beginning in 1926, and increasingly, after 1927, the KMT attempted to suppress the CCP and its activities. (Shibao, Dec. 8, 1931: 1, 3; Jiangsu Gongbao, Nov. 16, 1942: 12-14) Even during the KMT-CCP "united front" period, the KMT launched military attacks on the CCP areas; such anti-communist measures escalated after 1945 when a full-scale civil war broke out. As a side-effect of these purges, women's organizations were placed under surveillance and women's protests associated with communism. (Shibao, Apr. 6, 1932: "Special") Thus, after the KMT established its power in 1927, the woman suffrage movement became much less militant.

In addition to institutionalization and repression, the woman

suffrage movement had to confront the onslaught of two types of counter-ideology in 1946-49: "Back-to-the-Home" and "Anti-Communist" ideologies. The former urged women to return home and be good mothers and housekeepers. It was argued that such a move would strengthen the country. (Wu Jufang, 1945: 2-3; Longzi, 1946: 3-4) The latter argued that the elimination of the communists should take priority over woman suffrage. (Shengbao, Feb. 7, 1946: 1-2; Mar. 8, 1948: I, 1; Funü Yuekan, 1947) With the emergence of these ideologies, the suffragists had to work extra hard to raise the consciousness of women; and as noted, they failed to do so.

The experience of the woman suffrage movement reveals that before the movement was incorporated into the KMT, inconsistent or ineffective application of social control may fuel protests (as in 1911-12 and 1912-25). However, a combination of strong repression and counter-ideology (as in 1913-18) or strong repression and institutionalization (as in 1926-49) diminished the militancy of protest activities. Counter-ideology furthered this process (as in 1946-49).

Social control, however, cannot be taken out of the structural context. Take the periods of 1913-18 and 1919-25 as examples: severe repressive measures were founded in both periods, but 1919-25 witnessed widespread and intensive protests and 1913-18 none. The question then is why. It has been noted that, in 1913-18, there was an attempted restoration of dynastic rule and that some women reacted to this with military tactics similar to those used in the pre-1911 days. The issue of suf-

frage was, at that time, of secondary importance. Thus, it was mainly the changing political situation, rather than the repression per se, which put suffrage activities out of the picture. The 1919-25 situation was different: it was the aftermath of the Paris Peace Conference, the provincial autonomy movement was at its peak, the warlords were fighting among themselves, there were foreign interventions and anti-imperialist counter-actions, the May Fourth Movement (with its cultural evaluation and radical thinkings) was still vigorous, and there was a growth in political parties. The woman suffrage movement existed in the midst of these political currents, the movements reinforcing one another. Thus, even when the warlord governments exercised strong coercive measures, suffragists' protests did not die.

Conclusion

In this section, we will summarize the findings, evaluate several conceptual frameworks discussed in Chapter 1, and link the four areas of analysis together.

In the early stage of the woman suffrage movement, women revolutionaries expected to get suffrage after the overthrow of the Manchu government. However, when the new republican government was formed in 1911-12, their expectation was not fulfilled, and the movement began to take on an action-oriented approach. There was a period in which the movement was dormant, but as the political situation changed in 1919, it became re-activated with renewed vigor. However, largely due to the growing institutionalization and repression by the KMT as well as to

some political reforms, the movement became demilitantized. Women shifted their concerns from justifying their demand for suffrage to figuring out how to obtain full political participation. Toward the end of the 1940s, this was further reduced to finding women to fill the quotas acceptable to the government. Throughout the whole period, the governments showed great reluctance to grant suffrage to women. It took more than 35 years for women to gain sexual equality in principle as stated in the constitution, and limited political rights in reality.

Structural Conditions

What is relevant to the understanding of the emergence of the women suffrage movement are the following factors: educational mobility, military interventions, and political unrest.

The woman suffrage movement was made up of mainly educated women. Due to their educational mobility, the early suffragists were politicized enough to commit themselves to the revolution of 1911. As the idea of suffrage was built on the revolutionary ideology of overthrowing the dynastic order, women actively involved themselves in the political struggles, hoping that once the revolution was finished, the new government would extend democratic rights to them, one of which was the franchise. Only later did they find out that the rewards of revolutionary participation were to be denied to them. They were "squeezed out", so to speak, by men and found themselves out in the cold. This infuriated the women revolutionaries who felt that they were building the republic, similar to men. The "second generation" suffragists, who emerged in

the late 1910s, were also educated women. They viewed themselves as the vanguard of China's modernity. Strengthening China without the participation of educated women meant that China was ignoring its intellectual architects. Policy-making was within the domain of the government, and a denial of the right to enter politics (that is, the lack of suffrage) signified a refusal to let women build a democratic and strong China --- a task that was greatly needed given the political context at that time.

Military intervention and political crises were factors contributing to the woman suffrage movement. One of the aims of the early women revolutionaries was to end the feebleness of China once and for all. The persistence of military interference by foreign powers and the internal power struggles reminded them that women should be involved in politics especially after the collapse of the Manchu dynasty. Two of the six justifications presented by the suffragists throughout the period were political and patriotic: women should be responsible for national affairs and suffrage for women is beneficial to the progress of the country. Political chaos and turmoils were considered in women's literature to be the result of male political acts. If the political situation in China had been peaceful and stable, these rationales would have been meaningless.

Organizational Networks

The woman suffrage movement was an extension of the women's revolutionary movement: some of the women revolutionaries became the

early suffragists. They were also educated women. Some of the suffrage organizations were a continuation of the former revolutionary ones, and so were a few women's periodicals. These data demonstrate that Kornhauser's mass society thesis is problematic, as the pre-existing networks of the women's revolutionaries were essential for the rise of the suffrage movement.

The extension of the revolutionary groups into suffrage groups was also based on another factor, namely the cooptability of the revolutionary ideology. If one compared the ideologies of the two movements, one would note similarities: both urged women to participate in politics and viewed them as an agent of social change; both saw women as equal to men in terms of citizens' rights and responsibilities (although some suffragists argued that men were inferior to women); both maintained that by involving themselves in politics (be it revolutionary or electoral), women could save China from foreign domination and political turmoil, and build China into a strong and democratic country; and both viewed the objectives of the women's movements (revolution or suffrage) as a means to attain a higher status for women. These four similarities illustrate that the revolutionary and suffrage movements of women were compatible, and it is understandable that the revolutionary movement became the pre-existing network on which the suffrage one was built.

Institutional Changes

Our survey showed that, in the missionary literature, coverage

of women as political activists (Chapter 3) and suffragists was minimal. Thus, the extent to which the missionaries influenced Chinese women with respect to fighting for political rights is debatable. It appears that the woman suffrage movement sprang from women's realization of the contradiction between ideology and practice, that is to say, the discrepancy between what the Tongmenghui (later known as KMT) said about sexual equality before the revolution and what it did after the revolution. This is in line with what Mitchell (1971) said about the gap between the egalitarian ideology and discriminatory reality.

The process of implementing woman suffrage in China was not a smooth one. Take the KMT government policies in the post-1927 period as an example: In 1931, the KMT first denied women's organizations the right to sit in the Citizens' Conference, then changed its mind under the pressure of women. The Provisional Constitution stated the principle of sexual equality. But, five years later, when the May 5th Constitution Proposal was announced, the principle of sexual equality disappeared. Interestingly enough, the KMT allowed limited quotas of women to sit in the Citizens' Conference. In 1942, in principle, the Citizens' Political Conference admitted women, but the outlined qualifications for election put women in a disadvantaged position. Finally, in 1947, the Constitution of the Republic of China clearly stated the principle of sexual equality and quotas for various government agencies were set. The quotas were, however, between 10 and 20 percent. What this illustrates is that, the last four steps outlined in Smelser's (1959) frame-

work of structural differentiation --- encouragement, specification, experimentation, and institutionalization --- not only zigzagged, they also were not always in sequence.

It has been argued that, although the woman suffrage movement progressed on an ad hoc basis at times, it did pressure the government to reform and reacted strongly to the government's contradictory policies. The government(s) also responded to the demands of the suffragists at times; but very often, it either shelved the issues or simply ignored them. In the case of China, the KMT government also absorbed women's energy by restricting the activities of women (especially between 1927 and 1936), channelling women's attention into different events related to constitutional changes (such as the opening of the Citizens' Political Conference in July 1938), and making women its mouthpiece at times (as in the women's forums on constitutional politics in 1941). Through institutionalization of the women's movements (described previously), the KMT government could effectively incorporate the skills, talents, time, and resources of suffragists for its own ends, or change the course(s) of the movements.

In addition to the above-mentioned relationship between the suffrage movement and the government(s), institutional changes also affected the content of the suffrage ideology. As noted, prior to 1930, the suffragists' literature was dominated by discussions on why women should have the vote; however, in the 1930s and '40s, attention was shifted to the question of how women should participate in the political

process. With the exception of some newly-autonomous provinces which granted women suffrage in the early 1920s, the rising KMT was still debating whether suffrage was justifiable or not. Even the principle of sexual equality was left out of the Draft Regulations of the Citizens' Conference (1925). The quota system of women representatives was undreamt of. Thus, it was logical for Chinese suffragists to focus on convincing the public and the government of the necessity of woman suffrage.

The year 1931 changed all this. It was in that year that the KMT government, under pressure from women's groups, granted a quota of ten women to sit in the Citizens' Conference; and the Provisional Constitution acknowledged the principle of sexual equality. Although there were still some ambiguous gestures and contradictory policies put forward by the government in the 1930s and '40s, the quota system was established. The questions for the suffragists became : How to prepare women to work in the political system? How many women should be permitted to vote and in what government agencies? Who should be in these agencies?, etc. These were questions of technicalities, and not of justification. In the context of institutional changes, it is no wonder that the suffragists became fixated on these questions after 1931.

Social Control

If one inspects the activities of the suffragists before and after 1927 (the year the KMT officially unified China), one notices that the pre-1927 activities were much more militant (demonstrations, marches, petitions, etc.) than those after 1927 (public meetings, critical

comments on government policies, educational forums, etc.) It may be argued that, after the KMT took power, it set up quota systems for female representation and waiveringly accepted the principle of sexual equality, and therefore there was no need for the suffragists to be militant about their demands. This argument puts too much emphasis on the effect of institutional changes on the direction of the movement.

The fact is that, even in 1948, Chinese women still did not have full voting rights. The quota system of female representatives --- with limited percentages allocated for women --- was no substitute for full suffrage for women. The suffragists of the 1910s and '20s would have been furious about this treatment, and reacted with great militancy if they had still been around. To understand why the woman suffrage movement adopted more peaceful tactics in its later years, one has to look at the social control mechanisms used by the KMT government. As mentioned, the government used three main mechanisms almost simultaneously : institutionalization of the movement, strong repression, and inculcation of counter-ideologies. The first one was intended to redirect and control the movement, the second was to encourage the moderates and eliminate the radicals, and the third was to justify the above two. These methods, as witnessed in our data, were quite successful in deradicalizing the suffragists. When these control mechanisms were combined with minimal reforms, many suffragists saw no value in militant acts, thus the movement gradually became a sellout.

CHAPTER 5

THE WOMEN'S EDUCATIONAL REFORM MOVEMENT, 1900-1949

Introduction

This study deals with four aspects of educational reform in China: the orientation of women's education, the expansion of women's schools, co-education, and the curricula of women's education. The women's educational reform movement incorporates the activities of Chinese women which were geared to bringing about changes in these areas of education. As in our discussion of the two other movements, we will examine this movement in relation to (a) the social structures under which it arose, (b) the relevance of a pre-existing network for the formation of the movement, (c) institutional changes in education, and (d) government policies of social control.

Structural Conditions

Military Interferences and Political Crises

In our discussion of the revolutionary and suffrage movements of women, we described the political-military situations of China in great detail. It is sufficient to say here that throughout the fifty years prior to 1949, China was bombarded with military threats and foreign interventions. The most significant foreign interventions were the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) and the foreign occupation of Beijing during the Boxer Uprising (1900). In addition, there was political-military tension due to foreign aggression.

Civil wars also dominated China during this period: At first, there were wars among warlords fighting for territory and control; then, there were attacks and counter-attacks between the KMT and the CCP, which finally escalated into a civil war after the Sino-Japanese War.

This period also experienced mass movements on various fronts. In addition to the women's movements discussed in this study, there were revolutionary movements, anti-warlord movements, anti-imperialist movements, the May Fourth Movement, and so on. It was an era of radicalism and patriotism.

Ideas of Women's Education in the Larger Society

Using the Wanguo Gongbao as an example, it can be seen that the missionaries did provide wide coverage and an in-depth analysis of women's education. The literature, first of all, praised the ability of Western women and portrayed them as authors, doctors, teachers, professors, actresses, artists, and preachers. (Wanguo Gongbao, Sept. 1905: 26-27)

The missionaries criticized the traditional Chinese view of women and believed that China's weakness lay in the ignorance of women. Education, as they saw it, is the natural right of women, and a pre-requisite of national strength. They suggested several ways that women could promote their opportunity to get an education, such as petitioning and collecting donations of money. (Wanguo Gongbao, Feb. 1901: 2; Dec. 1906: 63-66; Dec. 1903: 29)

During the 1900s, the constitutionalists also related the streng-

thening of China to women's education. They reasoned that without education, mothers would be inadequate to socialize their offspring. When their children grew up, and were too ignorant to handle national affairs, the country would very likely be weak. Therefore, it was in the national interest that women be educated. To illustrate their point, China was contrasted with the U.S. and Japan. (Bao Jialin, 1974: 114; Huazi Ribao, Dec. 6, 1902: 2) The revolutionaries' position on women's education was also along this line: educated women could upgrade the intellectual capacities of their husbands and children who, in turn, would promote national status. (Chen Tainhua, 1953: 569-78)

The Chinese press also made references to women's education in the West. (Shibao, Feb. 5, 1920: "The Eastern Times Ladies Supplement") In doing so, it urged the readers to support women's education in China. Before 1912, most articles dealt with the justifications for women's schooling. Their justifications were a combination of what the missionaries and political activists had said, namely: educated women strengthen China through their socialization of children, and education could promote women's rights. (Alarming Bell Daily News, Apr. 21, 1904: 4; Jiangsu, May 1, 1903: 141-43, 155-57) In line with these, the press suggested that women's education should be oriented toward training women to be either good wives and mothers or independent women.

After 1912, as the education of women became more acceptable, the Chinese press tended to suggest methods of implementing coeducation, expanding women's schools, and changing the curricula in women's schools.

(Shibao, Nov. 8, 1915: III, 6; Chen Chongguang, 1972: 21-26;
Dongfang Zazhi, Jan. 1917: 21-22)

The cultural evaluation of intellectuals, which characterized the May Fourth Movement, also touched on women's education; the traditional ideal of women, the family system, the Confucian ethics, etc. were severely criticized. The new image of women was women of independent personality and achievement. This was to be accomplished through education. (Chow Tse-tung, 1960: 257-59; Pin Xin, 1946: 151-55)

The priorities of the warlords were military affairs and the seizure of national power. Eight percent of their revenue went to military matters. Of the small amount which was allocated to education, the warlords often illegally diverted it. (Chow Tse-tung, 1960: 260) As noted, the warlords' opinion of women was not high. Judging from these data, it is unlikely that women's education was valued by the warlords.

The CCP ideas of women's education may be seen in the journals published or affiliated with the party, such as the Liberation Magazine (Jiefang Huabao) and Women's Voice (Funü Sheng). The CCP supported sexual equality in education and saw education as the right of women. However, it gave a priority to the education of impoverished women (as opposed to wealthy women), and sought autonomy for women in the control of their education. (Zhonggong Zhongyang Makesi, Engesi, Lieling, Sidalin Zhuzuo Bianyiji Yanjiushi, 1958: II, 198, 210-11)

In sum, with the exception of the warlords, several social currents

lent support to the idea of women's education.

Organizational Networks

Women's Organizations and Periodicals

At least 63 women's educational reform organizations were founded between 1900 and 1949 (Appendix XIX), mostly in Guangdong between 1938 and 1945. (Appendix XX) The earliest three were the Humanitarian Society (1902), the Woman Suffrage Alliance of Shanghai (1911), and the Women's Association of Research on Military Affairs (1911). The first one was formed in Tokyo, and the remaining two in Shanghai. The average membership size of these 63 organizations (on which we have data) was below 100, but ranged from 12 to 400,000. (Appendix XIX)

A minimum of 22 women's periodicals promoted women's education. (Appendix XXI) These periodicals appear to be evenly distributed during the period 1900-1949. Again, Shanghai seemed to be a popular place for publication. (Appendix XXII) The first three, the Women's Newspaper (1902), the Women's World (1903), and the Women's Monthly (1906) originated in Shanghai. Most of these periodicals were short-lived; they ranged from two to 180 issues. (Appendix XXI)

Politicized Women

In Chapters 3 and 4, our discussion of the organizational prerequisites of women's organizations and periodicals promoting revolutionary activities and suffrage demonstrated that: (a) women's schools, students' clubs, political organizations, and the consequent merger of the three took place in Japan; (b) a small group of Chinese women stu-

dents studying there were politicized; (c) they formed their own independent groups and journals in promoting their causes; and (d) due to political reasons, these women moved back to China (mainly to Shanghai) in the late 1900s, and continued their organizing activities.

This small group of literate women was also instrumental in the formation of the women's educational reform movement. Four of the five women who organized the first few women's organizations promoting women's education were students (mainly in Japan): Fang Junji, Hu Binxia, Qiujin, and Zhang Mojun. The four editors of the pioneer women's periodicals were students too: Chen Xiefen, Yan Bin, Zhang Mojun, and Qiujin. (Lin Weihong, 1972)

There were connections between the women's educational reform movement and the revolutionary organizations. A number of early female educational reformists were also members of revolutionary organizations or press. Lin Zongsu, for example, who organized the Humanitarian Society, affiliated with the Tongmenghui and the Alarming Bell Daily Newspaper. (Appendix XXIII)

Class Background of Female Educational Reformists

As is apparent in the above paragraphs the early female educational reformists were students who, very likely, came from wealthy family backgrounds. (Chapter 3) In examining the activities of the educational reformists throughout the period of 1900-1949, one can note the "middle-class" bias of their participants as witnessed in the public speakers on women's education. (Huazi Ribao, Apr. 1, 1903: 2), the

protests over the restriction of women in higher learning institutions (Shibao, May 2, 1926: II, 3), and the student strike at Zhejiang University in 1947. These educational reformists were mainly educated women who had had the chance to study abroad, and at secondary schools or universities. Given the facts that most schooling in China was privately-financed and most people were too poor to send their children to school, it was unlikely that working class or peasant women would be educated. Educated women tended to be women from financially comfortable families.

Institutional Changes and the Women's Educational Reform Movement

Ideas of Education in Women's Literature

The women's literature provided considerable coverage of the activities of foreign educated women and of the Western model of education, especially in the 1900s and '10s. Foreign women were seen as intellectually superior beings: lawyers, teachers, innovators, educationalists, authors, etc. (Funü Shibao, May 1911: 26-30; Aug. 1911: 52-54) When the Western models of education were compared with that of the Chinese, the former were glorified. (Peigong, 1907: 35-44)

Almost all the articles dealing with women's education advocated that women should be literate and educated, and that schools should be built for or opened to women. (Xi Shen, 1917: 4-6; Li Guangye, 1929: 170-74) The expansion of women's education was justified on three bases:

(a) Maternal: It was argued that educated women could train better children since women are the main socializers in the family. With the exception in the 1920s, this argument was quite popular during the

first half of this century. (Yan Shuhua Nüshi Gao, 1902: 13-15; Qin Qing, 1942: 2-4)

(b) Patriotic: this rationale was usually accompanied by the maternal one. Basically, it was maintained that women's education would strengthen the country because (i) women are the foundation of the family and the latter is the base of the country; and (ii) women constitute half the citizens, and they should be fully equipped with modern knowledge and skills so that the full potential of the country could be realized. (Chen Xiefen, 1903: 7-11; Chen Huizhen, 1947: 8-9) This justification was common during the period 1900-1949. It must be noted that, the patriotic rationale borrowed its legitimacy from Confucianism. The latter viewed national and global peace and prosperity as lying in the integrity and discipline of the family and its individual members. Being the key members in terms of childcare in the family, women were important to national strength.

(c) Feminist: This justification insisted that women's education was a pre-requisite for gaining sexual equality. Only through education could women discard traditional ideas and become useful to the society. (Huanggong, 1906: 5-11; Li Guojun, 1947: 2)

Along with the above justifications, the female educational reformists proposed five main strategies to expand women's educational opportunities: (1) the self-education of women (Shi Bao'an, 1915: 1-10); (2) publicizing the issue of women's education --- it was argued that the traditional perceptions of women's roles could be changed by per-

suading both men and women to send their daughters to school (Aishi, 1924: 2-3); (3) free education for the poor and those who had passed school age (Zhen Su, 1911: 81; Tao Yi, 1924: 42-50); (4) education for rural women (Yi Lu, 1922: 29-37; Wang Minyi, 1944: 11-15); and (5) sending women abroad to study. (Fang Xing, 1923: 120-22)

These strategies seem to be historically specific, with strategies (1), (2), and (5) popular in the 1910s and '20s, and strategies (3) and (4) common in the 1930s and '40s. Of the strategies mentioned above, publicizing the issue of women's education (that is, Strategy Number 2) appeared to be the most popular, and it was also the strategy with the most clearly articulated tactics: the delivery of pamphlets (Li Shoushu, 1922: 27-29), the organization of women's publicity teams (Aishi, 1924: 2-3), the employment of liaison women and female administrators in educational departments in every county (Zhou Shihua and Zhu Wenshu, 1924: 32-42), and the formation of public forums for women. (Lu Yiming, 1922: 22-24)

In addition to proposing justifications and strategies/tactics for expanding women's education, the reformists suggested three orientations for the curricula of women's education; these orientations were in line with the three rationales mentioned above:

(a) Maternal Orientation: It was argued that women's place is in the home, and therefore their education should be geared to family-care. As such, women's curricula in the schools should include medicine (physiology), home economics, artistic skills, arithmetic, and moral

discipline. (Wang Jieliang, 1911: 1-2) Although this orientation was quite popular in the 1910s, its combination with the following two in the 1920s, '30s, and '40s made it more convincing.

(b) Patriotic Orientation: This orientation maintained that women's education should be in the service of the nation and therefore it should train women to defend the country from imperialist attack. Curricula should include political doctrine, production skills, and women-officers training courses. Further, self- or group-learning should be encouraged. Refugees' schools should be founded, and school-hours shortened so that women could spend more time in resistance work. (Luo Qiong, 1938: 6-7) As expected, this orientation was prevalent in the 1900s, 1930s, and 1940s.

(c) Feminist Orientation: This perspective was at odds with the maternal one because it insisted that women's education should train women to be human beings fully capable of actualizing themselves --- independent in thought and work. According to some, women's schools should be centers of women's movements. To achieve these goals, curricula for women should include engineering, mechanics, commerce, banking, pedagogy, physical education, and sciences. (Tao Yi, 1924: 42-50) This orientation was dominant in the 1920s, and to some extent, in the 1930s and '40s.

One of the central concerns among female educational reformists was whether women's education should be identical to or different from that of men. In the women's literature, we notice two trends.

(a) Identical Education for the Sexes: Those who belonged to

this school of thought maintained that women should enroll in universities as men did --- a theme put forward in the 1910s. In the 1920s, some women reformists argued that coeducation should be a policy in schools; academic standards and qualifications of teachers should be the same for both men's and women's courses. (Tao Yi, 1924: 42-50; Funü Zazhi, Aug. 1919: "Reports", 1-2)

(b) Different Education for the Sexes: The adherents of this school of thought did not believe in coeducation or in educating women in universities. They preferred women's schools to have different curricula from those of men's. Home economics and cooking should be included in women's schools only. (Wu Bingyun, 1915: 9-10) Most of these arguments were found in the 1910s and gradually disappeared in the 1920s as their opponents gained the upper hand.

The various perspectives held by women on the educational reforms mentioned above certainly touched off hot debates in the literature. As noted, there were battles on whether women and men should have similar or different education. In addition, there was continuous uneasiness between those who had a maternal orientation and those with a feminist one. (Funü Shibao, June 1911: 28-31; Funü Zhoubao, Nov. 1924: 2-3) Educational reformists favoured the upgrading of women's status; criticized the limited opportunities of women's education (Duanping, 1948: 1-2), and the irrelevance of women's education in the family, the occupational structure, and the society in general. (Xie Chongde, 1925: 910-17)

In sum, the female educational reformists seemed to focus on why and how women's education could be expanded, what its orientation(s) should be, and whether women should have similar or different kinds of education. There was little consensus among themselves on these issues.

Institutional Changes

Although the opinions expressed in the women's literature on women's education were diversified, the central demand of the women's educational reform movement remained the same, namely the expansion of women's education and equal opportunities for both sexes.

Similar to the fights for revolutionary changes and the suffrage, the women's educational reform movement originated in the context of a lack of government reform initiatives. Although the Manchu government granted permission to persons wishing to form women's schools as early as 1901 (Yu Qingchong, 1969: 177), it refused to take the initiative in establishing them.

Some women deplored government inaction because, as the foreign occupation of Beijing (1900) and the resultant protocol demonstrated, China was too weak to defend its people against foreign intervention. A sense of patriotic urgency was rising among the Chinese women students in Japan and China. The first article written by a woman on education asked, "Why can China not be strong?" The reason was obvious, "because China does not have qualified manpower. Why is it that China does not have qualified manpower? This is because women's education is undeveloped." (Chen Xiefen, 1903: 7-11)

In 1903, Empress Dowager founded the first school for the daughters of the aristocracy. (Huazi Ribao, Sept. 10, 1903: 2) But the Manchu government still insisted that young women should not go to school as late as 1904. (Jinzhong Ribao, Sept. 20, 1904: 2) Some local officials apparently strictly followed this government orientation and prohibited the creation of any women's schools in their municipalities. (Subao, May 20, 1903: 2-3) Others were less obedient, they built schools for women (Subao, 1903?: 3) or sent recommendations for expanding the number of schools for women to the government. The latter simply ignored them. (Huazi Ribao, July 7, 1902: 2)

There were some changes in 1906 as the cries for educational changes became louder; the Manchu government granted women's schools at the primary and teacher's school levels (that is, 1st-4th, and 5th-7th years of schooling respectively). (Chen Dongyuan, 1975: 342) And, a year later, the government made it clear that only women of 15 years or younger could attend school. (Huazi Ribao, Aug. 7, 1907: 2)

In 1908, more provincial officials recommended that the Manchu government build teachers' colleges and secondary schools for women, but the government accepted only the proposal for establishing women's teacher colleges. (Zhengzhi Guanbao, Jan. 9, 1908: "Emergency Petitions Section", 5-10) Throughout the 1900s, the issue of whether or not women's education should be expanded was far from settled. As women's schools began to emerge, backlashes, such as the closing of all women's schools in Hunan 1909, were seen in some regions in China. (Minhu

Ribao, July 13, 1909: 13)

During this period 1900-1912, women's education was still largely neglected. According to the most optimistic estimate, only one percent of Chinese women (as compared to 10 percent of men) were literate in 1906. (Wanguo Gongbao, Mar. 16: 56-57) As late as 1909, only 0.7 percent of the student population was women. (Chen Chongguang, 1972: 26-31) The ideal of an equal sex ratio in the schools was far from institutionalized before 1912. (Table 1)

This brief history of the development of schools for women illustrated the reluctance of the Manchu regime to upgrade the educational level of women. As noted in Chapter 2, the traditional ideal of women as ignorant but "good wives and mothers" was still prevalent in the 1900s. When the Manchu government was forced to develop women's education, it developed it in a traditional way. While the government insisted that there would be no education for women, it incorporated a chapter on babysitting and family education in the Revision of Regulations of Schools in 1903. Two years later, the government officially mentioned "women's education" in the category of family education. By 1907, the government had made it clear that women's education should be maternally oriented. (Chen Dongyuan, 1975: 342)

Furthermore, the Manchú government had always disapproved of the idea of co-education because it contradicted the traditional custom of sex segregation. When some officials recommended co-education, the government did not hesitate to reject it. (Zhenzhi Guanbao, Aug. 5, 1908: "Reports", 3-4)

Table 1: Percentage of Women in the Student Population
at Different Levels in China

	<u>1909^a</u>	<u>1912^b</u>	<u>1914^b</u>	<u>1916^a</u>	<u>1922-23^c</u>	<u>1943^d</u>
Elementary		4.6	4.2		6.19	32.6
Secondary		10.3	8.7	7.1 ^c	3.14	
Higher Learning		0.4*	0.5*		2.54	10.0 ^e
Teacher-Training					17.57	21.2
Vocational					7.35	
TOTAL:	0.7 ^c	4.81 ^c	4.58 ^c	4.35 ^c	6.32 ^c	

* These figures include senior teacher-training institutes, specialized schools (for example, politics, medicine, agriculture, industry, commerce, shipping, foreign languages), matriculation levels, and universities.

(Sources: a. Chen Chongguang, 1972: 26-31;
 b. Yearbook of China, 1919, 1975: IV, 754;
 c. Yu Qingchong, 1969: 184-99;
 d. Shenbao, May 6, 1946: I, 6;
 e. Diamond, 1973: 232 --- the data of 1943 is an estimation only.)

The Manchu government rejected the idea of co-education and viewed women's education as a kind of maternal training; it was consistent in not favouring identical education for both sexes. In 1903, the government had maintained that family education could only include reading, writing, arithmetic, and domestic skills. Four years later, the notion of identical education for both sexes was declared unworkable in China. The curricula in women's schools included only: self-discipline, literature, arithmetic, physical education, Chinese history, Chinese geography, art, science, and "feminine arts" (that is, sewing, spinning, weaving and embroidery). (Yu Qingchong, 1969: 181-82)

How did women react to these policies during the Manchu regime? First of all, some educated women individually gave public speeches stating the importance of developing the intellectual capacities of women. Most of these speeches took place on school occasions (Huazi Ribao, Apr. 1, 1903: 2); but some occurred in not-so-common locations. For example, a woman organized speaking campaigns among the women who travelled on inter-town boats. (Huazi Ribao, Mar. 6, 1905: 2)

Women also organized public meetings to discuss ways of developing women's education, such as the one held by Guangdong women in 1908. (Huazi Ribao, Aug. 1, 1908: 2) Others donated money or property to build schools for women. (Zhengzhuan Guanbao, Aug. 1, 1909: "Emergency Petitions Section", 17) Some poorer women who could not afford to donate money to build schools, nevertheless devoted their time to sell newspapers in marketplaces so as to maintain school necessities. (Shibao, Feb. 4, 1911: 5)

The enthusiasm of women in fighting to get their educational rights may be seen in a well-publicized will written by a 14 year old girl just before her death. She stated that after some study, she had discovered the "dark world" that women live in, and she urged women "to save our sisters from the dark world and help them reach the path of civilization..." (Minhu Ribao, June 21, 1909: 3)

With the establishment of the new Republican government, women's secondary education was officially acknowledged and the building of women teachers' colleges throughout China was encouraged. (Yu Qingchong, 1969: 192) A co-educational policy was stated and implemented on the primary school level in 1912. (Jiaoyu Gongbao, Sept. 20, 1918: "Appendix", 14-15) The women teachers of Beijing immediately sent a letter to the government thanking the president (Yuan Shikai) for promoting women's education and "extending the rights of women so that Chinese women can enjoy freedom"; so did the women in Shanghai. (Linshi Zhengfu Gongbao, Feb. 29, 1912: "Appendix", 7, 9)

The irony was that the maternal orientation in education that the Manchu regime favoured continued even after the Republican government was founded in 1912. Consequently, the curricula of men's and women's schools differed and was basically similar to that adopted by the Manchus but with one big difference: all the textbooks used by the Manchus were banned, and new textbooks following the Republic principles were adopted. (Jiaoyu Gongbao, Sept. 20, 1918: "Appendix", 14-15) However, when Yuan Shikai took over the Presidency, textbooks with Confucian teachings

were reintroduced, and the importance of domestic science and vocational courses was emphasized. (Zhengfu Gongbao, Aug. 12, 1914: "Memorandum", 827) The Yuan regime also rejected the notion of co-education, first by refusing to have male teachers in women's schools; this was followed by not permitting boys and girls to study in the same classroom. (Chen Dongyuan, 1975: 387) In addition, co-education was forbidden at the university level. (Chen Chongguang, 1972: 21-26)

Another irony was that the situation of women in education did not improve in the 1910s. The new government adopted a policy of expanding vocation schools for women in 1913 (Ren Shixian, 1972: 342) and five years later, a policy of expanding primary and secondary schools for women. (Jiaoyu Gongbao, Aug. 20, 1918: "Order", 3-4) Although these policies gave the appearance of progressive changes, the percentage of women in the school population dropped during the period 1913 to 1918 from 4.81 (1912-13) to 4.35 (1916-17). (Chen Chongguang, 1972: 26-31) (Table 1) In addition, the Yuan regime so worried about the increasing politicization of women that it refused to build political science schools for women in 1913. (Huazi Ribao, Sept. 5, 1913: 2)

Between 1912 and 1918, women continued to promote education for themselves. Shenzhou Women's School introduced vocational training for women (Shibao, July 6, 1917: III, 6), and some founded special schools for middle aged illiterate women. (Zhonghua Xinbao, Sept. 28, 1917: 3) There were also social gatherings celebrating the progress in women's education. (Shibao, Mar. 2, 1914: IV, 7)

However, two events stood out as the most dramatic of all. Students of the Beijing Women's Teacher College accused their principal of being corrupt, improperly behaved, and of devaluing education. Along with other women students in Beijing, they pressured to get rid of him by petitioning to the Department of Education and publicizing his conduct in at least one women's periodical. (Funü Shibao, Feb. 25, 1913: 49-64; May 25, 1913: 58-64; Oct. 20, 1913: 61-67)

The other event involved four women students asking the principal of Beijing University for permission to enrol in the university. At the time of their request (1918), women were still prohibited from studying in universities. The response from the principal (Cai Yuanpei) was expectedly negative. Funü Zazhi --- a women's magazine --- then presented a series of articles criticizing the view that women should not be allowed to enroll in universities and supporting a co-educational policy on the university level. (Chen Chongguang, 1972: 21-26)

After 1918 and before their 1927 consolidation of power, the KMT adopted the policy of expanding secondary schools for women and enrolling women in universities. (Jiaoyu Gongbao, July 20, 1919: "Public Letters", 21; Dec. 30, 1919: 11) But the KMT refused to raise the level of teachers' training to the university level as late as 1924. (Jiaoyu Gongbao, June 30, 1924: "Orders", 37-38) In 1926, the KMT adopted the policy of extending women's education to the working class and peasantry. (Chen Chongguang, 1972: 15-16)

Whether these policies were actually carried out in this period

is debatable. The only available statistics giving an overall picture of women's education are those for 1922-23. In this school year, women constituted 6.19 percent of the students in elementary schools, 3.14 percent in secondary schools, 2.54 percent in higher learning, 7.35 percent in vocational schools, and 17.57 percent in teachers' schools. (Yu Qingchong, 1969: 184-99) (Table 1) Although public literacy education was launched in 1919, a 1931 report shows that, in most provinces, the percentage of women in these literacy classes was less than four. As for supplementary schools for adult women (usually from poor families), there were only 299 in 1929. (Meng Ru, 1934: "Women", 2)

In its educational orientation, the KMT vacillated from a maternal one in 1919 to a more feminist one in 1927. (Jiaoyu Gongbao, July 20, 1919: "Public Letters", 9, Yu Qingchong, 1969: 180) During the same period, the KMT concentrated on putting vocational courses and home economics in the curricula for women. These were part of the curricula in women's secondary schools and teachers' colleges by 1919. (Chen Chongguang, 1972: 20-21; Jiaoyu Gongbao, Apr. 20, 1919: "Regulations", 1-5). In 1925, the KMT re-confirmed its policy of focusing on vocational courses and home economics.

As for co-education, the National Educational Association passed a motion supporting co-education in 1919, and several higher learning institutes accepted women into their programs in 1920. (Jiaoyu Gongbao, Dec. 30, 1921: 11) However, as late as 1921, co-education was still prohibited on the secondary school level. (Jiaoyu Gongbao, June 21, 1921:

"Public Letters", 4-5) A year later, this was changed: co-education was permitted in some senior secondary schools depending on the local board decisions. (Jiaoyu Gongbao, Dec. 28, 1922: "Public Letters", 13)

Throughout the 1920s, the issue of co-education remained controversial.

Towards the end of the 1910s, the issue of co-education became closely related to the expansion of women's education because universities were closed to women since co-education was not permitted. As noted, back in 1918, controversial debates were launched on these issues in women's literature. A year later, a few selected women were allowed to act as observers in Beijing University. But this did not satisfy educated women. Some educated women sent petitions to the Guangdong government in 1920 and urged them to allocate money to build women's senior teachers' colleges. (Huazi Ribao, July 9, 1920: III, 4) Later, students of all women's schools, women's organizations, and some concerned women in Guangdong formed an alliance to pressure the province to adopt a policy of co-education. Delegates were sent to see the premier. (Huazi Ribao, Mar. 1, 1921: III, 4) Due to the massive support the issue of co-education generated, other women's groups were formed for this cause and, as one newspaper report said, "they are now doing active mobilizing work, and are moving very fast." (Huazi Ribao, Mar. 4, 1921: III, 4) This movement to lift the ban on women's higher learning and co-education spread to various urban centers. For example, the woman senator of Hunan province urged that all schools be open to women and that women be sent abroad to study. (Funü Zazhi, Sept. 1922: 125) And

when in 1923 Qinghua School stopped sending female students to study in the U.S., over 160 women sent letters to the principals of all technical schools and universities in Beijing seeking their opinions, and in particular, sent a letter to the principal of Qinghua School urging him to stop the prohibition of women from higher learning. (Funü Zazhi, Feb. 1923: 30-31) Several women's organizations, including the Shanghai Women's Society and the Y.W.C.A. (Shanghai Branch), also sent letters to the English government outlining the necessity of expanding facilities for women's higher learning. (Shibao, May 2, 1926: II, 3)

To further their educational opportunities, women continued to establish schools for themselves, such as vocational schools (Shibao, Apr. 1, 1920: II, 4) or schools for poor children. If there was not enough financial support, they set up fund-raising activities (such as dances or solicitation teams) to collect money. (Shibao, June 10, 1926: II, 5; Feb. 10, 1927: 6)

Another type of women's activity relating to educational reform was protests over the "inferior" or "corrupted" qualities of principals or teachers in women's schools, such as the controversies that occurred in one women teachers' college in Guangdong in 1920. (Huazi Ribao, Feb. 1, 1920: II, 4), or those in a women's vocational school in Shandong in 1924. (Funü Zhoubao, May 14, 1924: 3) Educated Chinese women generally felt that the education they received was of a lower quality.

Subsequent to the consolidation of power in 1927, the KMT adopted various policies for expanding schools for women: vocational schools,

evening schools, and rural teachers' colleges (in 1929). Between 1929 and 1931, the KMT government confirmed and re-confirmed its principle of equalizing educational opportunity for both sexes. (Pi Yishu, 1973: 16) And, in 1933, the government announced the expansion of women's education as one of its national policies. (Jiaoyu Gongbao, Aug. 1, 1933: 23-24)

The curricula for women's education were in line with what was offered before 1927 except that vocational training was now inserted at the university level after 1930. In 1935, as the Sino-Japanese conflict intensified, the government recommended the incorporation of courses relating to military training (such as nursing, army hygiene, etc.) in women's senior secondary schools and medical schools. (Jiaoyubu Gongbao, Apr. 7, 1935: 12-13)

In 1928, despite the hot debates carried on in the women's literature (as noted in the previous section) and the vacillating orientations of the KMT (from maternal to feminist) in the early 1920s, the KMT government reinstated the maternal orientation in women's education. (Pi Yishu, 1973: 16) A year later, this approach was further articulated:

"(W)omen's education should emphasize the integrity of morality, the characteristic of maternity, and the development of good family and social life." (Pi Yishu, 1973: 16)

This orientation was in line with the Confucian principles restored by the government in the same year.

This maternal orientation persisted until 1935 when it was incorporated into a patriotic orientation:

"(E)xtend women's education, develop kindness, philanthropy, health and knowledge to integrate with maternity in order to save the race from the crises of collapse, and to lay a firm foundation for the nation."

(Gongjiao Zhishi, 1971: 13-14)

In this period of 1927-37, the usual activities of female educational reformists trying to develop educational opportunity continued. One new type of school warrants attention, the Women's Free Correspondence School sponsored by the Funü Yuekan --- a women's magazine. It was based on volunteer work by women and financed by donations. (Funü Yuekan, 1933: 126-27)

As in the 1920s, there were protests against the "inferior" and "corrupt" principals and teachers in women's schools, such as the protest in Tongze Women's Secondary School in Shanghai in 1931. (Shibao, July 3, 1931: 1)

During the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), the KMT government continued to expand women's schooling and in 1943, women constituted 32.6 percent of the students in elementary schools, ten percent in schools of higher learning, and 21.2 percent in teachers' schools. Statistics for secondary schools are not available. (Shenbao, May 6, 1946: I, 6) (Table 1) Although the war forced the government to expand women's vocational and supplementary education (Shenbao, Jan. 5, 1939: IV, 13),

the overall involvement of women (especially peasant women) in skill-learning and literacy classes was minimal and was probably less than two millions for the whole of China! (Funü Xinyun Yuekan, July 1944; Xinyun Funü Zhidao Weiyuanhui, 1944: 32)

As expected, as early as 1938, the government declared the patriotic orientation of women's education: "to train women so that [they] can serve the society and strengthen the force of resistance." (Chen Lifu, 1940: 70) But it did not reject the maternal orientation, for the government added:

"Female students of primary and secondary schools should place special emphasis on women's domestic education, and ensure that the school education supplements the domestic one." (Chen Lifu, 1940: 74)

The government decided that all levels of women's schools should focus on textile handicrafts and family education. (Shibao, Feb. 4, 1940: V, 20) This emphasis was in line with the combined patriotic and maternal orientations of the KMT.

As has been noted in Chapter 4, the KMT began its institutionalization of women's movements in the 1920s, and intensified this process at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war for wartime mobilization purposes. Thus, one may note that protest against government policies on women's education was minimal as the KMT had consolidated its power after 1927. The protest activities after 1927 were never as numerous or militant as those before 1927.

As the Sino-Japanese War approached, the KMT government began to make plans to mobilize women for resistance. In 1938, based on the New Life Movement organized in the early 1930s, the government formed the Women's Guidance Committee of the New Life Movement (Xinyun Funü Zhida-wei-yuanhui) to direct women's activities. The development of women's education fell naturally under its guidance: the expansion of literacy classes, vocational training classes, and women officers-training courses. (Shenbao, Jan. 7, 1939: I, 3) There was, indeed, a tremendous rise in educational activities, especially in the areas of production-training, wartime emergency skills, and political education. (Funü Shenghuo, July 20, 1938: 13-15)

After the War, in 1946-47, the KMT government decided to expand women's teacher colleges and confirmed its principle of no co-education in secondary and teachers-training schools. (Guominzhengfu Gongbao, June 13, 1946: 4-5) It also added that hygiene education should be in the curricula of women's primary and secondary schools. (Shenbao, Oct. 9, 1946: II, 8) The KMT continued its patriotic-maternal orientation in women's education.

According to reports, educated women became more organized in the post-war period in promoting women's education and cultural advancement. (Tan Sheying, 1952: 70)

Summary

During the fifty years under examination, women's education was expanding, but not as thoroughly or as fast as many women educational

reformists wanted. There were three orientations toward education expressed in the women's literature --- patriotic, maternal, and feminist --- similar to the policies of the governments. We noted however that the patriotic and maternal ones seemed to dominate, except during the 1920s, when the feminist one was on the rise.

Co-education was a big issue in China, and it was linked to the issue of school expansion. Many reformists favoured co-education, but the governments tended either to reject it or to introduce co-education only on different school levels gradually and cautiously. Throughout the 1920s and '30s, co-education as a social issue remained controversial. As for curricula for women --- should they be similar or different from those for men? Again, there was little consensus in the women's literature; and as far as government policies and practices are concerned, they tended to favour the "different education for the sexes" school of thought. Since the maternal orientation of women's education lingered on through these years, special courses such as home economics and family education remained within the domain of women's education.

The educational reform activities of women seemed to be more prevalent before the KMT consolidated its power. These activities usually consisted of public speeches, open forums, lobbying, petitioning, the solicitation of funds, and building schools for women. Their protests seemed to center around the issues of school expansion, co-education, and "inferior" or "corrupt" teachers or principals in women's schools. There was little protest over the type(s) of orientations or curricula of women's education.

As the KMT institutionalization of women's movements intensified after 1927, there were fewer educational reform activities on the part of women. It was not until the Sino-Japanese War that women were mobilized for war-time education purposes under the KMT government. In the post-war period, it was claimed that women's educational reform works were on the rise again.

Social Control and the Women's Educational Reform Movement

The education of women was a threat to the Manchu regime as the latter still subscribed to the Confucian view of women. In the 1900s, as the previous text illustrated, the female educational reformists, suffragists, and revolutionaries more or less belonged to the same group --- the women students in Japan, some of whom associated with revolutionary organizations. In the eyes of the high-level Manchu officials, educational reforms for women were revolutionary.

The Manchu government began to scrutinize student activities in Japan as early as 1901. (Huazi Ribao, Apr. 2, 1901: 2) Later, it asked the Japanese government to expell any female students who engaged in political activities. (Jingzhong Ribao, June 16, 1904: 3)

In China, the Hunan provincial government closed down all schools in 1904. (Jingzhong Ribao, Oct. 26, 1904: 2) Five years later, the Hubei provincial government censored four textbooks because they advocated, in the words of the officials, "freedom and equality". (Minhu Ribao, Aug. 9, 1903: 3)

These are but a few examples of how the central and provincial

governments attempted to contain the spread of women's right to educate themselves. As noted, it was in this period that the women's educational reform movement arose --- women's schools were built, public speeches on women's education were launched, etc. This demonstrated that the social control mechanisms that the government used were not working.

In its early days, the new republican government was quite sympathetic to the development of women's education as can be seen in the open discussion between some female educational reformists and the president. (Linshi Zhengfu Gongbao, Feb. 3, 1912: "Records", 11) But what followed was harsh for activists: laws were passed to restrict freedom of press, speech, association, assembly, etc. Women were not permitted to join any political groups or attend any political meetings, and their activities were scrutinized. (Chow Tse-tung, 1960: 43) Specifically related to women's education were the denial of building women's schools, the expulsion of women students from a school in Hunan, the dissolution of the Women's School of Political Science in Hubei in 1914, and the prohibition of co-education in schools in Guangdong. (Linshi Zhengfu Gongbao, Mar. 2, 1912: "Orders", 9; Jiaoyu Gongbao, July, 1914: "Public Letters", 61; Huazi Ribao, Jan. 9, 1917: I, 3) As noted, there were some educational reform activities on the part of women in the period of 1913-18, but there were less significant than in the period before. This drop in activities may be accounted for on three fronts: (a) the repressive measures used by the government; (b)

the republican governments taking on their role in building more schools for women; therefore some women thought it was no longer necessary to fight for women's education; (c) as mentioned in Chapter 4, a counter-ideology emerged urging women to be good mothers and wives and stay at home. (This was, to some extent, reflected in the rise of the maternal orientation in the women's literature).

Between 1919 and 1927, we witnessed a rising tide of students' activism which the warlord governments were concerned with. Restrictions were imposed on students participating in politics as early as 1919. (Jiaoyu Gongbao, Sept. 20, 1919: "Orders", 16-18 & "Announcements", 2) Other repressive measures, such as the denial of civil liberties, followed as described in Chapter 4. These measures dealt mainly with the political activities (such as strikes and demonstrations) of students; since most of the women's educational reform actions were peaceful and their concerns restricted to educational affairs, these coercive mechanisms did not affect them. Only when they became militant were the impacts of repression felt.

Similarly, between 1927 and 1937, the KMT government imposed coercive measures dismissing all "reactionary elements" and those affiliated with the CCP from schools (in 1929) and prohibiting association and strikes (in 1931-32). (Jiaoyubu Gongbao Yuekan, Mar. 1929: 38-39; Jiaoyubu Gongbao, Oct. 11, 1931: 10-11, 27-29) Again, as in 1913-18, women's educational activities were minimal. The coercive measures that the KMT government imposed certainly had some intimidating

effects on women activists. But a more important factor was the institutionalization of women's movements which was intensified after the KMT took power in 1927. One must not discount the fact that more and more women actually attended schools as time progressed, and therefore the demand for school expansion was less appealing to women than it had been one or two decades before. There were, of course, other issues (such as co-education) worth fighting for, but they were not seen as urgent when the country was increasingly under the threat of a war between Japan and China.

After the start of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the women's educational reform movement was revitalized under the leadership of the KMT government. Institutionalization of the movement took control out of the hands of women. Educated women were mobilized to organize classes or courses for other women, usually in the areas of war-time skills and literacy. The mechanisms of institutionalization will be detailed in the next chapter when we deal with the women's anti-imperialist movement.

In sum, repression during the Manchu regime was largely ineffective in stamping out women's educational reform activities. After 1912, various coercive measures were imposed mainly on political, as opposed to educational, activists. Although it might have had an intimidating effect on educational reformists, their activities continued. We noted that there was a decline in reform activities on the part of women between 1913-18 and 1927-37; it is argued that institutionalization acted as a stronger force than repression in taming the women's educational reform

movement. Other factors accounting for the "ups and downs" of the movement may include the emergence of a counter-ideology and institutional changes.

Conclusion

The women's educational reform movement emerged under similar conditions to the revolutionary and suffrage movements: political instability, foreign threats, and rising radicalism. Its pioneers were politicized students in Japan and China. Although the educational reformists believed in the expansion of women's education, they were unable to agree on the issues of co-education, orientation, and types of education for women.

The movement arose as a result of the Manchu government's reluctance to grant education for women. Women formed their own schools, made public speeches, sent letters and petitions to governments, solicited funds, etc. to express their demands. There were periods of "ups" (1919-1927; 1937-45) and "downs" (1913-18; 1928-36) in the movement, and it was argued that these were due to the institutionalization of the movement by the KMT, the rise of a counter-ideology, institutional improvements in the women's education, and to some extent, to repression.

On the whole, throughout this period 1900-1949, patriotic and maternal orientations in education prevailed. Co-education was implemented slowly and cautiously, the curricula in women's education were slightly different from those of men, and proportionately, more women attended schools than before.

Structural Conditions

There were several structural factors which were conducive to the rise of the women's educational reform movement. First of all, as noted, the missionaries had been preaching the value of women's education and were building schools for women. Our survey of Wanguo Gongbao showed that its coverage of women's education was extensive. This was quite different from its coverage of revolutionary women or suffragists, as noted in Chapters 2 and 3. There might be some "cultural borrowing" between the missionary literature on one hand, and the women's and Chinese press on the other. As described previously, both of the latter presented images of foreign women as educated women and carried news items on the educational activities of foreign women. New images of women were transmitted through this literature.

But this message of educated women was presented in the context of military interventions and political instability. Throughout the 19th century, the foreign powers had impressed the Chinese with their mastery of high-level technologies, especially the military ones (which China learnt painfully through defeat in wars). Meanwhile, the missionaries had also been telling the Chinese that through education of the people (male and female alike) a country can become strong. Some Chinese intellectuals, mixing this message with Confucianism, came up with an idea which was in line with the patriotic-maternal orientation mentioned above, namely that the strength of the country depends on the intellectual capacity of its people who are, in turn, under the care of their

mothers when they were young. If the mothers are not educated, it is unlikely that the children can be bright. Using this rationale, women's education was encouraged.

This was the rising current of thought among progressive people at the turn of the century, and some women shared these views. However, the early female educational reformists stressed the patriotic justification more than the maternal one as was seen in our previous discussion of women's literature. They also saw education as a tool to enlighten women, not only in regard to world or national affairs, but also in regard to their own status in the country. These ideas of the early female educational reformists are only understandable when they are put in the context of political turmoil and imperialism.

It was the educational mobility of women which made the educational reform movement possible. Due to this mobility, some Chinese women became politicized through the networks they became involved in and the opportunity they had to share their experience and feelings with other educated women. Studying in Japan provided an ideal situation in which educated women could advocate social changes far from the grip of the Manchu government and yet close enough to know what was going on in China and, if necessary, move back to China to carry on their reforms.

In sum, acculturation, military threats or intervention from foreign powers, political instability, and educational mobility were the factors which were conducive to the emergence of the women's educational reform movement.

Structural conditions also affected the content of the women's literature as the movement developed. We have already noted that the patriotic-maternal justifications for women's education were a product of the larger society in which the movement began. As the movement entered the 1920s, surrounded by the growing radicalism of the May Fourth Movement with its critical evaluation of Confucianism and all the traditional ways of life of the Chinese, the feminist justification and orientation gradually emerged. Women were viewed as human beings who should be fully independent, free from traditional restraints and autonomous in decision-making and choosing their own life-styles. Education, therefore, became a natural right of women and devoid of patriotic and maternal elements. The latter two, however, persisted because of the larger political context and the continuation of conservative Confucian ideology.

As the movement entered the 1930s, a patriotic justification and orientation was on the rise once again. It was dominant throughout the Sino-Japanese War. This was due to two reasons: first, the political situation of China had come to a crisis point, China's security and sovereignty were at stake with the escalation of Japanese aggression; and second, the movement had been institutionalized by the KMT government which, at the onset of the War, intended to use the movement and its literature to mobilize women for resistance work.

When the war ended in 1945, there was a slight rise in the maternal orientation in women's education as the KMT government wanted

women to return home and be good mothers and wives. The imperialist threat was over.

Organizational Networks

The women's educational movement originated in the same pre-existing networks as the other women's movements we have discussed: women's schools, student clubs, political organizations, and the merger of the above three. Some Chinese women, through association with one or more of these networks, were the pioneers in educational reforms. It is obvious that Kornhauser's mass society thesis does not apply in this case. Others, such as Pinard (1968) and Coleman (1957), who argued the significance of intermediate networks in the formation of social movements, seem to be correct in their analysis.

There was also a continuity between the networks with which the early female educational reformists associated and the new educational reform movement. It may be seen in the patriotic justification and orientation that women presented in their literature. As we have noted, the pre-existing networks were increasingly revolutionary, attempting to overthrow the Manchu dynasty and defend China from imperialism. The pre-existing networks and the new movement (at least in its initial stage) were both patriotic, and concerned with saving China.

Institutional Changes

In the area of school expansion for women, change occurred in a linear pattern with few exceptions, especially in the 1900s. The Manchus reluctantly allowed the development of women's schools without taking

much initiative. Towards the end of its regime, primary and teacher-training schools were opened for women. In 1912, secondary ones were added to the list. In the 1920s, universities were opened for women for the first time, and other types of institutes were founded to educate women, such as vocational, evening, and to a much lesser extent, rural institutes. During the Sino-Japanese War, special literacy classes and various training courses were designed to educate women for resistance purposes; and in the post-war period, teacher-training was stressed.

In other areas of women's education, there was some vacillation. The changing orientations in women's education have been noted --- waivering between the patriotic, maternal, and feminist ones. Co-education was not accepted as government policy until the Manchu regime was dethroned. In the 1900s, it was limited to the primary level, and in the 1920s and '30s, to the university level and to some secondary schools. After the war, co-education was prohibited in secondary and teacher-training schools. In the area of curricula of women's education, there were always a few courses available only to women, such as home economics and family education. However, the content had shifted from Confucian in the 1900s to "republican" in 1912. It was changed back to Confucian between 1913-18, and altered to a mixture of "republican" and Confucian content in the 1920s (depending on whether or not the women studied under a warlord or an autonomous provincial government). After 1927, there was a tendency to adopt Confucian curricula.

While the available data do not allow us to trace government

policies in all these areas of women's education according to the categories ("encouragement", "specification", "experimentation", and "institutionalization") mentioned by Smelser (1959), they do permit us to see the "zig-zagness" of the development.

The relationship between government policies of institutional change and the women's educational reform movement is less than clear. Throughout these 50 years, the pressure that women exerted on the universities and the governments had some impact on making co-education permissible in universities in the 1920s. There were also individual cases of women pressuring the governments to intervene to settle their grievances in the schools, such as by dismissing school principals. Apart from these cases, it is hard to demonstrate that the movement had a direct impact on educational policies.

In looking at the reform activities of women --- public speeches, open forums, solicitation or donation of funds for building schools, establishing classes or schools for women, writing articles on women's literature, etc. --- one notes that they were usually consciousness-raising or self-help activities. These might influence public opinion or the change in the position of the government(s), but it is difficult to pinpoint their effects. There were, however, cases where women used tactics such as petitioning, writing letters, lobbying, strikes, etc., but they dealt with specific concrete issues (such as the fight to get women in the Beijing University), rather than general issues of educational orientations or the content of curricula for women.

The problem of locating the impacts of the movement on government policies is further complicated by the KMT institutionalization of women's movements beginning in the 1920s. It becomes difficult to separate the movement's impact on government policies and what was done by the government through the movement. With the exception of war-time mobilization in 1937-45 when the KMT officially announced the mobilization work that women should do, the autonomous activities of women between 1927 and 1936 or between 1945 and 1949 were harder to specify, as there were no official statements on women's activities even though institutionalization was still in process. Under these conditions, the line between the government and the movement cannot be drawn.

Social Control

Very negative social control mechanisms were imposed on political activities throughout the entire period of 1900-1949. Various governments had different reasons for imposing social control mechanisms: the Manchus were against revolutionaries, the Yuan regime was anti-republican, the warlords were against each other, and the Jiang government was fighting against communism.

These repressive measures proved to be ineffective during the Manchu regime and educational reform activities actually prospered under these conditions. In the years after 1912, coercion was used against political activists and while it may have had an intimidating effect on the women who were interested in educational reforms, it was not aimed at them. This was due to the fact that most of the educational reform

activities sponsored by women were, as noted, consciousness-raising and self-help activities and did not pose a threat to the established power.

Institutionalization of the women's educational reform movement and the prevalence of a counter-ideology proved to be more effective in containing and changing the direction of the movement. The impact of the former mechanism may be seen in the period after 1927, especially during the war when the movement became patriotic. The latter mechanism was at work particularly between 1913-18 when reform activities declined.

Again, it is not easy to pinpoint how the movement affected government policies of social control. As in the relationship between the movement and institutional changes, this is due to the nature of educational reform tactics (usually consciousness-raising and self-help) and the institutionalization of women's movements by the government.

During the Manchu regime, when the movement was not institutionalized, even consciousness-raising and self-help (such as building women's schools) were threatening to the government for, in the eyes of the Manchus, the educational reformists were as revolutionary as the political activists, and coercive means were used to suppress their activities. However, once republican governments were formed, the demand for women's education was defined as more or less "legitimate" and since the governments had been providing certain educational opportunities for women, the mild tactics that women employed posed little

threat to the established power(s). The governments therefore saw no need to suppress them, especially since they had so many "radicals" and "communists" to deal with.

CHAPTER 6

THE WOMEN'S ANTI-IMPERIALIST MOVEMENT, 1900-1949

Introduction

In the previous three chapters, three women's movements --- revolutionary, suffrage, and educational reform --- were discussed; these were mainly educated women's movements. In this chapter, we will examine a women's movement which was composed of three classes of women --- educated, working class, and peasant, each playing an important role in anti-imperialism. Comparatively speaking, the working class and peasant women tended to be the central thrust of this movement.

In Chapter 2, the status of women in political, educational, industrial, and agricultural systems in the 19th century was examined. When we discussed the women's revolutionary, suffrage, and educational reform movements in Chapters 3-5, the status of women in politics and education was included --- the extent to which women participated in political struggles, in government agencies, and in schools; and what the government policies in relation to women in these areas were. This affected educated women between 1900-1949.

Because this chapter deals with working class and peasant women (in addition to educated women), we will closely examine the industrial and agricultural systems in the period of 1900-1949 during which the more disadvantaged women united and fought against imperialist powers.

and their activities.

As in other chapters, we will examine four aspects of the women's movement: (a) structural conditions; (b) organizational networks; (c) institutional changes; and (d) government policies of social control. Unlike the three previously-discussed women's movements whose target was the domestic government, the target group of the women's anti-imperialist movement was mainly foreign powers whose policies were largely beyond the control of Chinese governments. Consequently, our discussion of institutional changes will deal mainly with the degrees and types of imperialist advances, paying special attention to military interventions, rather than to government responses to these interferences. As in other chapters, our discussion of government policies of social control will touch on repression, counter-ideology, and the institutionalization of women's movements. Due to the special condition the existence of two rival political parties in China and their tremendous effort to incorporate the women's movements, we will carry out a detailed examination of the policies and approaches of both the CCP and the KMT in mobilizing (or demobilizing) women and an explanation in Chapter 7 of why one political party succeeded and the other failed. Therefore, our examination of the institutionalization of the women's anti-imperialist movement in this chapter will only present the key points.

Structural Conditions

Military Interferences

In the previous chapters, issues of military invasions and interventions were raised and discussed in relation to the revolutionary,

suffrage, and educational reform movements of women. Since this chapter specifically deals with imperialism, it is worthwhile to provide, once again, a general picture of the military advances of foreign powers in China.

It is well-known that beginning with the Opium War (1839-42), 19th century China was bombarded by military invasions by imperialist powers.

In the 20th century, imperialist intervention included the occupation of Beijing by the Allies (1900), the entry of the Russian forces into Manchuria during the Boxer Uprising (1900), the outbreak of Russo-Japanese War in Northern China (1904-05), the intrusion of the Japanese navy and army in Fuzhou (1919), armed interventions in various parts of China by foreign countries (1920s), the September 18th Incident (1931), and finally the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45).

This list is by no means exhaustive in documenting all the episodes of military conflict between China and foreign countries, but it does give the general picture of the Chinese military situation. The one significant difference between the military advances in the 19th century and those in the 20th century was that European countries (such as Britain, France, and Germany) played a dominant role in the former and Japan in the latter.

Of all the military advances, the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-45 was the most damaging to China, and it was during this war that the women's anti-imperialist movement reached its peak. The following describes how

military interferences, especially the Sino-Japanese War, affected women in China.

To begin with, most of the Japanese attacks were known as rice-bowl campaigns since they occurred in the rice-bowl of China, namely Central China. The Japanese army gained ground between 1939 and 1943. In January 1939, the Japanese held only 21 "xian" in 12 provinces; by October 1943, the occupied "xian" had increased to 70. (Esherick, 1974: 131-32) Although only a small number of "xian" were occupied, the areas which were touched by the Japanese were ruined as part of their policy of destitution. (Schurmann and Schell, 1967: 266)

Not only were the rural villages devastated by the "wipe-out" policy of the Japanese, the coastal urban cities were also under attack. In order to minimize the damage, the KMT government ordered a mass migration from the coastal cities inland. The journey of these hundreds of thousands of migrants proved to be disastrous because of the lack of food and shelter and the disease picked up from the dead bodies along the way. "There is no estimate of the number who died of disease, exposure, or hunger on the way..." (Schurmann and Schell, 1967: 261)

During this war, as in other wars in China, people who were not killed were treated as animals or slaves. Peasant women were treated with contempt and despised as witnessed by Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby:

"In some of the districts through which I passed, every woman caught by the Japanese had been raped

without exception." (Schurmann and Schell, 1967: 266-67)

In the cities, harassment of women workers was quite common, usually by foreign soldiers, policemen or factory supervisors who made use of the "extra-territory" clauses in treaties and escaped penalty. For example, one Sunday evening in 1901, eight French soldiers entered a house occupied by a number of women in Shanghai (?) and frightened the occupants. The reporter noted that "this is not the first time such an occurrence has seriously disturbed the Chinese..." (The North-China Herald, July 3, 1901: 27) There were also cases of foreign policemen and soldiers harassing women in the streets. (Minhu Ribao, May 22, 1909: 4) During the occupation of Shanghai in 1940, it was not uncommon for the Japanese soldiers to embrace factory women in the streets, and some of these women disappeared. (Zhujiing, 1940: 20-21) In some cases, both women and men were required to kneel down and kowtow to the Japanese soldiers in the streets after they had been captured. Those who were unwilling to do so were shot immediately. (Hui, 1938: 10)

Like their peasant counterparts, it was common for women in the cities to be killed after they had been raped. Reports showed that they were either burned to death or left hung up in trees: (Hui, 1938: 10) Some women were simply killed. For example, in Shanghai in March 1937, thousands of women and children were murdered by the Japanese. (Shibao, Mar. 7, 1937: 1) On April 14, 1938, the Japanese bombed the factories in Guangxi, killing more than 200 female child-workers. (Hui, 1938, 10)

One of the consequences of military attacks was the closing of factories which meant unemployment for the women living in the cities. After Shanghai was occupied by the Japanese on November 11, 1937, many textile mills, ~~cigarette~~ companies, etc. were ruined, and many factory women were out of a job. Over half of the 300,000 women workers in factories were unemployed by 1940. (Meng Xianzheng, 1951: 324-25). Even if they were working, the factory owners reduced their wages and lengthened their working hours as part of the "emergency measures" during war-time. In some cases, wages were reduced to half or even one-third of their pre-war-time level. Consequently, many working women were half-starved and unable to pay their rent, and they had to find shelter and food as refugees. Between August and November, 1937, there were 101,343 children and over 200,000 adult refugees in Shanghai alone. Of the adult refugees, the majority were women. (Chen Biyun, 1938: 75-78) Some of these unemployed women ended up as prostitutes. (Biyun, 1938: 52-56)

Political and Economic Turmoils

In Chapter 4, we described in great detail the political situation in China during the first fifty years of this century: there were battles among warlords and between the CCP and the KMT, civil wars, anti-Manchu struggles, anti-warlord movements, mass movements of various kinds, and so on. In other words, the political situation of China was quite unstable. Here, we will examine one fact of this instability, namely militarization.

Between 1900 and 1949, Chinese governments were preoccupied with

3

militarization. It has been noted that, towards the end of its regime, the Manchus resorted to armed force most of the time to solve its internal problems. (Chapter 3) After 1911, troop movements became much more frequent due to internal struggles for power among warlords and political parties and local uprisings of banditry. (Murphey, 1970: 30)

The consolidation of power by the KMT in 1927-29 further accentuated this trend toward militarization. Military expenditure along with loan and indemnity services accounted for 67-85 percent of the total expenditure of the KMT. As the bulk of capital was spent on army needs, money for welfare, education, and public works was minimal. (Feuerwerker, 1968: 58) The large sum of money allocated to military use was based on the KMT's fear of the communists.

The growing attacks by the Japanese in the 1930s further escalated this process of militarization. Conscription was imposed on the people, especially those coming from poor families. This created strong resentment among the peasants and the working poor. The KMT slogan "Those Who Have Money, Give Money; Those Who Have Strength, Give Strength" summarizes KMT sentiment. The impoverished, of course, realized that the class basis of conscription directly contradicted democratic ideas of universal military service. (Esherick, 1974: 62-74) They saw that rich people could avoid conscription by making payments, going to school, or by getting minor posts in local governments. (Esherick, 1974: 6)

Militarization had other side-effects such as the looting of

peasants' properties. Due mainly to low pay, the KMT soldiers were half-starved and had low morale. They stole and looted wherever and whenever they could. Army discipline was almost non-existent during the Sino-Japanese War. The people hated and distrusted these soldiers.

(Wedemeyer, 1967: 336)

The military strategies of the KMT sometimes caused more harm to the Chinese than the Japanese. For example, in June 1938, in order to stop the Japanese army from going further inland, the KMT demolished a dam on the Yellow River, and let the water flood 40 townships in Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu. As a result, over 3.7 million Chinese were drowned, 1.8 million were forced to leave as refugees, over 13 million "mu" (one "mu" = 0.1647 acres) farms were flooded, and over one million houses ruined. This tremendous loss of lives and properties created additional hardships for the peasants and certainly inflamed their hatred towards the KMT. (Meng Xianzhang, 1951: 196)

Another side effect of militarization was the deepening of famine crises. For reasons which will be elaborated later, famines in 20th century China were related to imperialism. It is sufficient here to point out that between 1937 and 1949, famines occurred on a regular basis. It has been estimated that 10-15 million peasants died of starvation in this period. (Belden, 1967: 313) As the war proceeded, more and more land and food stuffs were destroyed. The Japanese certainly shared some of the responsibility for the famines in China, but the KMT requirement that the people feed the soldiers first and their

failure to estimate production clearly indicate irresponsibility and mismanagement on the part of the KMT. Requirements for "military grains" were imposed on the already burdensome taxation and rents of the peasants. The taxation rates were based on normal harvest, rather than the actual yield for the year. The poorer the harvest, the larger the proportion which was taken away from the peasants. The latter were also asked to construct roads often without pay or food. The KMT government was interested in feeding the soldiers first, not the refugees. In many districts, when the harvest was insufficient to feed both the peasants and the soldiers stationed in these places, the peasants were left to die of hunger. (Esherick, 1974: 9-19)

A third side effect of militarization was inflation. It occurred in China in the late 1930s at a rapid rate and was beyond the control of the government. Militarization demanded money; the KMT government was unable to finance the war by selling government bonds and the taxes it obtained were minimal. Consequently, the KMT resorted to issuing paper currency to cover the cost of the war. (Bullitt, 1967: 347-48)

The issuing of paper currency began gradually, but towards the end of the war, it increased so rapidly that China had run-away inflation. To illustrate the rapid growth of this inflation, one need only compare the price indices between 1937 and 1949. During these twelve years, the index jumped from 100 (in 1937) to 237,700,000 (in 1948). (Feuerwerker, 1968: 58-62) As the price indices galloped, purchasing power dropped. For example, the worth of a one hundred dollar bill

declined to only four cents between 1937 and 1945. (Meng Xianzhang, 1951: 255-56) The decline in purchasing power can be expressed in another way. On July 20, 1945, the price of rice in Kunming was 8,000 times higher than before the war; cloth was 13,000 times; yarn, 110,000 times; pork, 9,000 times; and gold, 1,000 times. (Meng Xianzhang, 1951: 255-56) Inflation hurt many people, including the peasants and the working class; but it also hurt fixed income groups such as school teachers, professors, government employees, etc. In general, the standard of living deteriorated as purchasing power declined.

Militarization worsened the political and economic situations of China: it used much of the revenue for nation-building, widened the gap between the government and the people, induced hardship for peasants, deepened the famine crises, and heightened inflation. Most of these were also war-related, especially during the Sino-Japanese War. Thus, indirectly, imperialist military advances contributed to the deterioration of people's livelihood and the increasing delegitimization of the KMT government and foreign powers.

Changes in the Agricultural System

In Chapter 2, it was noted that concentration of landownership and shrinkage of farm-size were already in process in the 19th century. In the period of 1900-1949, these processes seemed to intensify.

A study done by the KMT on the proportion of non-tenant peasants owning land in 22 provinces shows that it dropped from 49 percent (in 1912) to 46 percent (in 1931) and then to 42 percent (in 1947) (Yan,

et.al., 1955: 276) Between 1912 and 1933, "tenant peasants" increased from 28 percent to 32 percent of all peasants. (Chow Tse-tung, 1967: 381-83) Such an increase suggests that more and more peasants were selling their lands to big landowners.

In general, half of the Chinese peasants worked with less than 10 "mu" (one "mu" = 0.1647 acres), and three-quarters of them had less than 30 "mu" in 1934. (Yan, et.al., 1955: 264, 285) And, as Chow Tse-tung (1967: 381-83) said, "it is hardly an exaggeration, however, to say that in the second and third decades of the twentieth century, half of the Chinese peasants were landless..."

The diminishing farm-size in the 20th century is also noted (before 1949). On the average, farm size dropped from 15.9 "shi mu" (in 1910) to 13.8 "shi mu" (in 1933). The decline in average farm size in Northern China was more striking than in Central and Southern China. (Yan, et.al., 1955: 286)

Another phenomenon, which was not mentioned in Chapter 2, but is of great relevance in this chapter, is the commodification of agriculture. The self-sufficiency of the peasant economy was gradually broken down by the invasion of foreign goods as well as the emergence of capitalist relationships in the countryside. The peasants found themselves gradually dependent on the larger market economy. A study of several locations in northern and central-eastern China in 1921-1925 shows that, on the average, the peasants sold slightly more than one-third of their daily necessities from the market. (Yan, et.al., 1955: 328).

The self-sufficiency of the peasant economy was also affected by China's trade with other countries. After the Opium War (1839-42), many of the foodcrop-growing lands were turned into land for the production of cash crops (planting mulberry trees for silkworms, tea, and poppy plants for opium). In the early 20th century, there was another shift in farming; this time, there was an increase in cash crops such as cotton to supply the expanding cotton textile industry in Shanghai and Tainjin. A "progressive substitution of corn, sweet potatoes, and sesame for barley, kaoliang, and millet as food crops" took place in crop cultivation. (Feuerwerker, 1969: 7)

Opium-growing is certainly worth investigating, as it was definitely on the rise in the late 19th century. Opium was the largest single item imported into China in value terms until the 1880s. Before the 1880s, 13 million pounds of foreign opium were consumed every year. The drop in foreign importation in the late 1880s suggests a steady expansion of domestic opium growing. By 1900, Chinese domestic production of opium had already surpassed foreign production.

As the number of Chinese who smoked opium continued to grow, demand increased. By 1928, 90 percent of adult males smoked; opium had become very marketable, and the peasants began to adopt it as their main crop for cultivation. By 1923, China produced 30 million pounds of opium a year. (Marshall, 1976: 20)

Thus, in the first half of this century, peasants shifted their cultivation from superior foodcrops to inferior ones, and from foodcrops

to cash crops. This shift put the peasant economy in a very precarious position. A small drought, flood, or other small-scale natural disaster could upset the balance to the extent that widespread famines occurred.

Famines were not uncommon in China, but the famines in the 20th century tended to be facilitated by the decline in the growth of essential foodcrops. The famine of 1919-1921 was described as "the worst that has ever visited China". It killed over 500,000 people and left 20 million destitute. (Murphey, 1970: 61-62). There were famines in Central China in 1925, in Shaanxi in 1928-33, and in Sichuan in 1934, and many others which affected more than 16 provinces prior to the onset of the Sino-Japanese War. The 1928 famine alone, affected over 30 million people in eight provinces. (Meng Xianzhang, 1951: 174-75)

After investigating the famine of Shaanxi in 1928, American Red Cross investigators concluded that it was mainly caused by the cultivation of the poppy. The China International Famine Relief Commission found that land, which was bought at extremely low prices by landowners during the famine of 1928-30, had been put under irrigation in order to produce poppies rather than foodcrops. It was observed that "eight out of every mou [or "mu"] of land reached by irrigation had come under poppy cultivation." (Marshall, 1976: 24)

Given this commercialization of agriculture, it is no wonder that foodcrops were always insufficient, and famines occurred regularly between 1937 and 1949. It was not uncommon for three to four members of a family of seven to starve to death. (Belden, 1967: 313) The

Sino-Japanese War, as mentioned, worsened the situation. By 1939, over half of the cultivable land was ruined and one-third of the cattle killed. As for foodcrops, the minimum loss for any location was 19 percent, and the maximum was over 80 percent. With such a high casualty rate, food had become a serious problem in China. (Esherick, 1974: 196)

If the concentration of landownership, diminishing farm size, commoditization of agriculture, and famine did not make the life of peasants hard enough, the rental mechanisms and other means of exploitation imposed upon them by the landowners and business persons ensured the peasants' entrapment in a vicious circle of poverty.

Landowners required that the tenant peasants pay rents by a variety of methods. One of the most common was "fixed rate rent-in-kind" which usually was roughly 40 percent of the harvest (with some regional differences). The other kind was "rent-in-cash" which, in 1934, constituted roughly 21.2 percent of the value of the land in 22 provinces in China. (Yan, et.al., 1955: 289, 303) A third kind was "rent-in-labour" which usually required peasants to work for an unlimited number of days without pay. Towards the end of the 1940s, rents had been increasing at rates higher than those of the prices of produce. (Meng Xianzhang, 1951: 229)

As if these rental arrangements were not exploitative enough, landlords and businesspersons instituted "price-adjustments" to further exploit the peasants. In the main, this mechanism involved lowering

the prices of peasant-produced products and raising the prices of those necessities which the peasants had to purchase. In Nancheng of Jiangxi, for example, the price indices for rice crops (sold to peasants) jumped from 24 (in 1907) to 141 (in 1932). In the same period, the price indices for salt (purchased by peasants) increased more steeply, from 17 (in 1907) to 178 (in 1932). (Yan, et.al., 1955: 337) Very often, during the process of transporting agricultural produce from the farms to the marketplaces, the middlemen (merchants and local entrepreneurs) extracted a profit. Consequently, the price paid by consumers was higher than the return received by the peasants (producers).

On the top of this, the landlords, money-lenders, usurers, bankers, etc. provided high-interest loans to peasants to pay off their debts. There were two main kinds of private loans: (a) cash loans (with an interest rate usually between 20 and 40 percent), and (b) "loans-in-kind" (which carried an interest rate of 85 percent usually). Most money-lenders demanded that the loan along with the interest be repaid within a year, and required "collateral" or guarantors. (Yan, et.al., 1955: 347-49)

During and after the Sino-Japanese War, there was a tendency for the interest rates to go up and the period of repayment to go down. In 1938, 59 percent of the loans were for a period of ten to twelve months, but by 1946, the percentage had dropped to 36. Meanwhile, those for a period of less than three months increased from nine percent of all loans (in 1938) to 41 percent (in 1946). The interest rates increased three

to five times during the nine year period between 1938 and 1946. (Yan, et.al., 1955: 349)

Due to these exploitative systems of rents, loans, and price-adjustments, along with the deteriorating structural changes, more and more peasants found themselves in greater and greater debt. This trend began as early as the 1920s. This was confirmed by a study done in Dingxian of Hebei in 1929-31 --- 33 percent of the households were in debt in 1929, by 1931, the percentage had increased to 58. (Yan, et.al., 1955: 344) We also note that more and more of the peasants who used to be debt-free before 1930, were borrowing money in the 1940s. (Yan, et.al., 1955: 343) It must be noted that most of these loans were borrowed to meet the "non-productive" needs of the family, mainly food.

All of these changes, described above, signify the deterioration in the peasant economy. As noted in Chapter 2, as each peasant household became impoverished, the position of women became more marginal: female infants were often drowned or poisoned, girls were sold in the market or to landlords as servants, slaves, prostitutes, or "child-wives". Women were taken as concubines. Some were "sold" by their parents to middlemen working for factories or to factory-owners in the cities.

Changes in the Industrial System

Chapter 2 has documented the decline of the Chinese traditional handicraft industry, the rise of workshops and factories, and how these changes, in turn, affected the status of peasant women in the 19th century. In this chapter, we will examine the development of industry in 20th cen-

tury China using the cotton textile industry as the prime example.

As noted, there were less than 25 cotton textile manufacturing firms in China before 1910. After the Republic was established in 1912, there was an increase in the number of spindles --- from 497,448 (in 1911) to 2,746,392 (in 1937) --- in six big cities. (Yan, et.al., 1955: 108-09) In Shanghai alone, the number of factories jumped from seven (in 1911) to 31 (in 1936) and the number of spindles from 165,696 (in 1911) to 1,105,408 (in 1936). (Yan, et.al., 1955: 162-63)

However, by 1911, China had reached a peak in the growth of the cotton textile industry. The growth rate for the period 1896-1910 was higher than that of 1911-1936. During the latter period, there was some acceleration in growth especially between 1914 and 1922. After 1922, the growth rate slowed down. The consolidation of power by the KMT in 1927 did not bring economic development. After 1931, the loss of the Manchurian market caused the cotton textile industry to deteriorate further.

During the Sino-Japanese War, the textile industry was relocated. Due to the shortage of raw materials, an inefficient transportation system, low morale in production, and inflation, the number of new firms and output actually declined. (Yan, et.al., 1955: 100-101) One must also mention the fact that when the Japanese attacked China in the late 1930s, 60 out of the 96 Chinese-owned cotton textile factories were bombed. As a result, there was a loss of 1,800,000 spindles and 18,000 looms. After the War, a complete breakdown in the cotton textile indus-

try in China occurred as the KMT government failed to make plans to take over Japanese industry and restore industrial output. (Meng Xianzhang, 1951: 195; Feuerwerker, 1988: 19-25)

As mentioned, Chinese-owned factories were founded on small capital, located mainly in the treaty port cities, and were predominantly owned by government officials. The last characteristic requires further elaboration. Before 1911, the proportion of gentry funding of industries was quite high; however, this phenomenon subsided in the 1910s and 1920s. On the eve of the Sino-Japanese War, the KMT-owned firms began to increase. For example, in late 1935, capital for all of the Chinese-owned firms amounted to Chinese \$250,844,098 of which Chinese \$30,199,929 (that is, 11 percent) belonged to the KMT government. By 1941, with the exception of military industry, the KMT owned 50 percent of Chinese industrial capital. (Meng Xianzhang, 1951: 237) In the cotton textile industry, the KMT-owned Chinese Textile Development (Zhongguo Fangzhi Jianshe Gongsi) is an excellent example of monopoly. After 1945, it owned 64 factories with 2,116,000 spindles and 39,427 looms which constituted 40 percent of all Chinese-owned spindles and 60 percent of the Chinese looms. (Wu Chengming, 1956: 120-28)

We have already noted the expansion of foreign-owned industrial enterprises after 1895 in Chapter 2. At the turn of the century, the imperialist powers began to invest heavily in Chinese-owned cotton textile factories, especially in the 1920s. Between 1890 and 1932, the Japanese invested in 11, the British in six, and the American in two

Chinese-owned factories. The majority of the investment took the form of loans. As a result of the Chinese inability to pay back the principal and interest on the loans, some of these factories were sold to the investors. Another method of incorporating Chinese-owned factories into foreign-owned ones was a merger of the two. Between 1897 and 1936, at least 22 Chinese-owned factories merged with foreign firms and later were owned by foreigners (mainly by the Japanese, secondly by the British and the Americans). Most of these mergers took place in the 1920s and 1930s. A third means of incorporating the Chinese-owned textile factories into the foreign ones was by simply seizing the property. This was done mainly by the Japanese between 1936 and 1938. At least 56 Chinese factories were seized in these three years. (Yan, et.al., 1955: 137-38, 144-45)

In the first half of this century, foreign-owned cotton textile factories grew, and Chinese ones declined. Foreign-owned spindles had risen in number from one-third (in 1890s) to two-fifths (in 1930s) of the total spindles in China. As for looms, foreigners did not have any before 1913, after that they acquired almost half of all the looms in China. (Yan, et.al., 1955: 136) Of the foreign-owned cotton textile industries, the British had the most spindles and looms before the 1920s. After that, the Japanese surpassed them. (Wu Chengming, 1956: 102)

Among the reasons why the Chinese-owned factories could not compete with the foreign ones was the high capital-investment of the

foreign firms (usually three or four times greater than the Chinese investment). The foreign-owned firms' assets were usually seven to 21 times those of Chinese firms. (Wu Chengming, 1956: 112-20) Due to their higher technological level and investments, foreign-owned firms reaped greater profits than Chinese firms. A study of 18 Chinese and 10 foreign cotton mills between 1905 and 1937 shows that, on the average, the rate of profit for the Chinese firms was 14.4 percent while that of their foreign counterparts was 24.8 percent. (Yan, et al., 1955: 168)

The basic source of this "imperfect competition" between the Chinese and foreign firms was the imperialist control of China's economic and political autonomy beginning in the 19th century (Chapter 2). Especially important for the purposes of our argument are tariff-control, navigation rights, rights of railway construction, mailing rights, and indemnity or loan repayments. These not only drained China's financial resources, they also stopped China from accumulating capital for economic development. This was demonstrated by the influx of cheap foreign cotton textile goods which undermined the traditional Chinese handicraft industry and at the same time, preempted China's opportunity to build up its textile manufacturing industry in this century.

This was the economic context in which peasant women, affected by the collapse of the handicraft industry and the bankruptcy of the peasant economy in general, migrated to the cities and worked in factories. This did not mean that all women working in the cities were in

factories. Some worked as waitresses, coolies, actresses, nurses, teachers, etc. Most urban women, however, did not have a job. A study of Guangzhou in 1929 shows that three-quarters of the women there did not have an occupation. Of those who did, most were clustered in the "labourer" category. (Chen Chongguang, 1972: 65-69)

The participation of women in the non-agricultural labour force had been increasing since the turn of this century. In the 1910s, women constituted roughly 30-40 percent of the labour force; in the 1930s, the percentage increased to 46-56 percent in most cities in China. (Chen Chongguang, 1972: 65-69) Most of these women workers, according to a study of cities in nine provinces in 1930, clustered in occupations categorized under "textile industry" --- a total of 337,546 women out of 363,610. Most of them were in cotton textile industry. (Li-Wang, 1934: 60; Guo Zhenyi, 1934: "Women", 1-4; Gu Bingyuan, 1929: 4-10; Biyun, 1936: 112-17)

The wages that these women workers in the cotton textile factories received were amazingly low. On the average, they earned Chinese \$0.27 a day in 1914, and \$0.54 in 1921. Their wages were roughly 10-45 percent lower than men's. (It should be kept in mind that the wages of women workers in the cotton textile industry were usually higher than those of women in other industries.) If women were recruited as apprentices, they were given no wages at all. (Gu Bingyuan, 1929: 4-10; Huang Junlue, 1927: 44)

Despite their low wages, the factory owners used various methods

to exploit women workers. Often, yawning or resting during working hours, and any disobedience regarding factory rules resulted in a wage-deduction. (Shi Jingxing, 1971: 42) In some cases, the company held back two-week's wages for each employee. If the workers were fired or left the factory, this "reserve" would not be refunded. Another method was wage-saving. The employer "saved" a certain proportion of workers' wages for them. Disobeying any of the company regulations resulted in the loss of these savings.

To understand the hardship of these women workers, we must compare their family expenditures. Single unskilled workers in Shanghai had to spend roughly Chinese \$12 a month on food, shelter, fuel, transportation, and miscellaneous items. Thus, it was almost impossible for a woman worker earning Chinese \$7.5 - 12 a month to support herself in Shanghai. They had to cut down on expenditures for food or other daily necessities to make ends meet. (Huang Junlue, 1927: 44-45)

The working hours for these working class women were usually long, they worked roughly 12 hours a day in Shanghai. A few worked more than 15 hours a day. They had hardly any breaks during their working hours, not even for meals. (Gongdu, 1929) Holidays were minimal. A study done on 31 factories in Tianjin in 1927 shows that most of women workers had one day of rest every seven days. This varied according to region. (Gongdu, 1929)

As a rule, there were no special holidays for women in the pre-natal and post-natal periods. Maternity leaves were granted only on an

ad hoc basis, and any extension usually meant the termination of a woman's job. Babies could be fed only during meal times. In fact, due to the "complications" created by married women, factory employers were usually reluctant to hire them. Consequently, most women workers were between ten and 18 years old. (Guo Zhenyi, 1937: 170-71; Hafa, 1930: 14-23)

As in other kinds of factories, the working conditions in the cotton textile factories were far from satisfactory: poor lighting, poor ventilation, high temperatures, nauseating smells, air pollution, filthy environments, etc. (Shi Jingxiang, 1971: 22-28; Zhang Shen, 1939: 10; Chen Huili, 1971: 14-21; Biyun, 1936: 101-06)

Many workers got sick after working in these conditions for a while. Sickesses such as tuberculosis, ulcers, eye problems, etc., were quite common. The death rates in cotton textile factories were high. It was reported that, in the Yufeng Cotton Mill in Shanghai, 30 percent of the workers died within three years of working there and the majority of those who did not die were sick. (Shi Jingxiang, 1971: 22-28) A study of 880 patients in an industrial hospital in Shanghai in the early 1930s showed that 66 percent of the women patients were affected by industrial or occupational diseases. The same study also showed that 44 percent of these women patients were permanently handicapped (mostly blinded). (Guo Zhenyi, 1937: 191) All of these sicknesses or diseases were related to the poor working conditions of women workers as well as to nutritional deficiency which, in turn, was due to

the cheap wages they received.

Apart from the above-mentioned forms of exploitation, women workers had to experience some rather inhumane treatment. Due to the poverty of their families, some women who lived in villages were actually "commissioned" to middlemen who came from the cities to take them to the factories. These middlemen claimed to be representatives of the cotton textile factories. The poor peasants paid them roughly Chinese \$20 - 30 to take their daughters to the factories for a period of usually three years. "Commission fees" were usually paid by installment, but there must have been some down payment. In return, the female workers were to be supplied with shelter and food while working in the factories. All the wages received by the women workers were to be confiscated by the "middlemen". In another kind of arrangement, women who applied for jobs in the factories were required to submit "guarantee fees" as well as written guarantees. They were required to unconditionally obey the regulations of the factory, refuse to join any strikes, etc. Once their applications were accepted, they had to live in the residences associated with the factories.

These residences had poor living conditions and the food provided by the "middlemen" was cheap. Women were not well or warmly clothed in wintertime. They were not allowed to talk with outsiders and they could not correspond with their parents. Punishment for disobeying any of the regulations in the factories was especially harsh for these women. Beatings and physical torture were very common. (Wang Xusheng, 1963:

14-17)

Working in foreign-owned firms sometimes made the situation worse. For example, when humiliating the Chinese workers, the Japanese factory employers required them to line up and carry Japanese flags; and they were required to bow to Japanese soldiers they met in the street. Women workers were not allowed to gather in groups of three or more persons in case they might plan anti-Japanese activities. In some cases, the Japanese soldiers harassed the women workers inside the factories or forced them to dance with them. In the evening, the soldiers sometimes climbed over the walls of the women's residence, and raped the women. If these women refused to dance or hug the soldiers or allow themselves to be raped, they might be killed, burned, or buried alive. (Hu Ziyang, 1940: 7-9)

The factory owners/managers did not trust the women workers and worried that they might steal things from the factory, so they constructed a special kind of gate that the workers had to pass through when leaving the factory. Guards were hired to search the workers. After the Japanese invaded Hangzhou, the Japanese owners became much more tyrannical in their search of workers. Women workers who were found to have stolen goods were humiliated and tortured in public. (Zhang Chuanhong, 1971: 36, 41)

The cotton textile industry had been declining since the 1930s, and many workers were forced to leave their jobs. One estimate shows that over 5,000,900 workers were unemployed in China in 1933. In

Shanghai, for example, roughly 25 percent of the workers in the cotton textile industry were dismissed in 1934, most of them as we know, were women. (Guo Zhenyi, 1937: 194-96) When the Japanese formally attacked China in 1937, the number of unemployed women increased drastically. In Wuhan, some factories dismissed over two-thirds of their employees in 1938. (Zeng Wan, 1938: 49-52)

In sum, what followed the decline of the traditional handicraft industry was a feeble attempt by China to industrialize. For a while, Chinese firms grew; but they were gradually surpassed by the foreign firms. This was due to the fact that the foreign firms had a higher level of capital investment and technology than the Chinese ones. More importantly, China had signed away much of its economic control and autonomy to foreign powers in past treaties. Peasant women, who came to work in the factories due to the collapse of peasant economy, subjected themselves to the exploitation and inhumane treatment commonly identified with early capitalist development. The growing foreign ownership of industrial firms added a political component to this exploitation and maltreatment.

Peasant and Labour Movements in the Larger Society

It has been noted in Chapter 3 that, peasants continued their sporadic and localized food robberies, riots, and tax rebellions into the 20th century. There are indications that these peasant actions were rampant in the first half of this century. Between 1922 and 1931, at least 197 incidents of rioting were reported in two Shanghai news-

papers. (Chesneaux, 1973: 68, 84). In Sichuan in 1933, peasants refused to pay taxes and destroyed the houses of rent collectors. Some of these riots were organized by secret societies, such as the Red Spear Movement in Shandong, Henan, Shaanxi, and Shanxi around 1925-30. In addition, banditry (looting and smuggling) was widespread among the peasantry in the 1920s and '30s. (Chesneaux, 1973: 86)

The formation of the CCP contributed to some extent, to the organization of peasant movements. Weak links existed between the CCP and the peasants in the 1920s as witnessed in the establishment of a school for peasant cadres in Guangzhou in 1925, the development of the Peasant Association in Hunan in 1926-27, and the formation of peasant associations in Haifeng and Lufeng in 1922-27. (Chesneaux, 1973: 94) Peasant organizations suffered a temporary setback during the White Terror in 1927.

However, peasant upsurge was far from dead: between 1928 and 1930, the CCP set up 11 major rural insurgent bases, mainly in Southern China. Between 1931 and 1934, the CCP formed the Jiangxi Soviet Republic which signified the beginning of a peasant-based revolution. But suppression by the KMT government forced the peasant rebels to take the Long March of 1934-35 to avoid complete liquidation of the movement.

In spite of great hardship, the CCP recovered during the Sino-Japanese War and established peasant guerrilla bases in Northern China especially in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxi regions. Here, the peasants organized themselves into militia, guerrilla troops, production teams,

etc. to strengthen their bases and pursued a policy of rent-and-interest reduction as well as anti-imperialism. By the end of the war (1945), the liberated areas consisted of some 950,000 square kilometres containing a population of nearly a million; the CCP's strength was spreading. (Chesneaux, 1973: 139-40) By 1949, the peasants along with the workers in the cities were able to change the agrarian movement into a socialist revolution.

Meanwhile, there was a labour movement which had begun mainly in the 1920s. Before that decade, strikes in China had been sporadic. (He Ganzhi, 1956: 12) The forerunners of the Chinese labour movement were the workers' clubs which were formed for educational, welfare, cooperative, and protective purposes. These clubs were founded in the period of 1919-1921. However, between 1920 and 1925, labour unions organized by communists began to grow. By 1922, there were 91 unions with 150,000 members. The KMT, in contrast, had little interest in organizing workers. Most of these unions were in the cities, but after 1925, local unions on the town and village levels emerged, showing the growing strength of the workers' movement. (Helen Snow, 1945: 20-21, 24, 42, 48, & 173)

After 1918, the total number of strikes appeared to increase. There were 25 strikes in 1918, but the number reached 535 in 1926. The total number of strikes in this period was 1,232. Most of these strikes occurred in the textile industry, especially in the foreign-owned factories and were due to the alleged ill treatment of the workers by the

employers. Strikes prior to 1924 were largely economic-based: workers demanded higher wages. But from 1924 onwards, more strikes took on a political and patriotic tone. (Helen Snow, 1945: 196-71)

The next wave of the labour movement began in 1925 and ended with the White Terror of 1927. During the year 1925, there were 318 strikes throughout China. Most occurred in Shanghai. Several hundred strikes occurred in 1926-27, especially in south and central China. (Helen Snow, 1945: 46-49)

In the ten years after 1927, the KMT government suppressed the labour movement. Many labour leaders were beheaded. Those who were lucky enough to save their heads joined the CCP's first Peasants' and Workers' Red Army in 1927. In the midst of repression, the Guangzhou Commune uprising took place in December 1927, but it lasted only for three days. (Helen Snow, 1945: 63, 65, & 76)

The repressive measures of the KMT did not prevent strikes, at least not in Shanghai where 517 strikes were reported between 1928 and 1932. Most of them were concerned with wages, the dismissal of workers, and violations of collective agreements. Although the CCP had some members in the KMT regions, their influence in the city-side was severely restricted. (Helen Snow, 1945: 172, 178)

Between 1931 and 1945, the labour movement was far from organized, except in the CCP areas where peasants and workers were organized for political power. Of the few labour activities taking place in urban areas, most of them had shifted from fighting for wage-increases or

better working conditions to securing what had been won in the past decade. This was due to the worsening economic conditions as well as to the repressive measures of the KMT. Although the KMT claimed that there were 872 unions in China in 1936 (with 743,764 members), they were not really unions since they were KMT-controlled organizations, and not workers' unions. (Helen Snow, 1945: 69) Meanwhile, the CCP claimed to have 300,000 men and 10,000 women in the trade unions in the central Soviet districts. (Helen Snow, 1945: 77)

With the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, the KMT intended to mobilize workers for resistance, and by 1942 it made membership in unions in the KMT areas compulsory and made strikes and picketing illegal. Consequently, strikes were reduced; for example, in 1941, there were only 57 strikes and 81 cases of unrest. By 1942, the KMT government reported that there were 4,033 labour unions with just over one million of workers. (Helen Snow, 1945: 85, 112, 122, & 185)

A strong network of workers-turned-guerrilla-fighters existed in the CCP areas after 1941. The communists claimed a membership of one million workers in their labour unions. In 1943, the North China Federation of Trade Unions was formed to organize workers. After the Sino-Japanese War, the workers became active again even in the KMT areas. For example, in 1947, workers in Shanghai organized boycotts of American goods and fought for higher wages. (Helen Snow, 1945: 88-91; Meng Xianzhang, 1951: 324-26)

In sum, between 1900 and 1949, both the peasant and labour movements moved from sporadic and localized action to systematic and nation-

wide struggles. These actions, very often, were mixtures of anti-feudalist, anti-government, anti-capitalist, and anti-imperialist sentiments. The demands of the peasants and workers usually concerned concrete day-to-day immediate issues such as higher wages or rent reductions. It was in this context of massive grass-root struggles that the women's anti-imperialist movement emerged and developed.

Organizational Networks

A minimum of 54 women's anti-imperialist organizations originated between 1900 and 1938. (Appendix XXIV) This is a conservative figure. It has been claimed that a maximum of 139 women's organizations were coordinated by the KMT in 1935. (Wu Cheng, 1937: 21-23; Tan Sheying, 1942: 5)

In July 1938, the Women's Work Committee of the New Life Movement (formed in 1934) became the Women's Guidance Committee of the New Life Movement, and it coordinated women's activities and founded bureaux, teams, and branches throughout China. (Appendix XXV) The total number of women's anti-imperialist organizations in existence between July 1938 and 1949 is not clear; the highest estimation, however, is 358 (1940). (Shiliang, 1940: 4-6; Xia Yingzhe, 1940b: 7, 22; Fu Xuewen, 1946: 21)

In addition, at least four women's anti-imperialist organizations were established by the CCP before July 1938, and 21 types of women's anti-imperialist organizations after that date. (Appendix XXVI) Some of these CCP organizations had branches, but the exact number is not

clear. Also, one cannot be certain how many CCP organizations were counted in the KMT's survey. (Shiliang, 1940: 4-6; Xia Yingzhe, 1940b: 7-8, 22) It has been estimated that in 1939 in Northern China alone, more than 8,000 locations had women's anti-imperialist organizations. (Huazi Ribao, Jan. 1, 1939: III, 2) By the end of 1945, in roughly 88 percent of the CCP's regions, there were 34,061 branches of the Federation of All-Women. (Li Baoguang, 1946: 6-9)

As noted above, most of these organizations were formed between 1938 and 1949. (Appendix XXVII) The first three, were founded in the 1900s: the Humanitarian Society (1902), the Anti-Russian Association of Women Comrades (1904), and the Women Citizens' Society for Donation (1906-?). The first was established in Tokyo and the remaining two in Shanghai.

A minimum of 44 women's periodicals promoted anti-imperialism. (Appendix XXVIII) Almost three-quarters of these were published between July 1938 and 1949. Before 1938, most were published in Shanghai; after that year, they were in many locations in China. (Appendix XXIX) The Chinese Women's Newspaper (1906), the Women's Magazine (1915) and the Green Year (1921?) were the three pioneer periodicals. All were published in Shanghai.

Data on the membership of women's anti-imperialist organizations are very scanty. It appears that it increased through time: The Humanitarian Society had only 20 members (in 1902); and the Alliance of Women's Rights Movement of Beijing had "over 300" (in 1922). In the

1930s and '40s, most organizations with available data indicated that their membership was in the thousands. The largest one was the Organization of Chinese Women for the Consolation of Soldiers whose membership reached over one million in 1941 (Appendix XXIV). The largest one in the CCP region was the Women's Patriotic Headquarters of Southern Hebei. It had 400,000 members in 1939 (?). (Appendix XXVI) According to Helen Snow (1967: 225), membership in women's organizations grew at a tremendous rate: from 130,000 in 1937 to 2,532,208 in 1943.

The life-span of the women's anti-imperialist periodicals varied, ranging from one issue (Modern Women) to 233 issues (Women's New Life Movement Weekly.) (Appendix XXVIII)

Matrix of Women's Schools, Student Clubs, and Political Organizations

It appears that the organizational networks which gave rise to the previously-discussed women's movements were also instrumental in the emergence of the women's anti-imperialist movement. The first organization and periodical of this movement were formed and produced by the women students in Tokyo. (Lin Weihong, 1972)

Women's schools, which were related to the larger anti-imperialist movement, could also give rise to a female contingent of the movement. The Anti-Russian Association of Women Comrades (1904) was based on the Anti-Russian Association of Comrades. The latter was organized by the principal of the Patriotic Women's School.

Pre-Existing Women's Organizations/Periodicals

Some women's anti-imperialist organizations/periodicals were a

continuation of previous women's groups/publications. For example, the Humanitarian Society (1902) originally founded to promote revolutionary and educational goals became anti-imperialist in 1903. (Bao Jialin, 1974: 1-22) The first two women's anti-imperialist periodicals carried revolutionary and suffrage articles in addition to anti-imperialist ones.

Class Components of the Women's Anti-Imperialist Movement

Among the four women's movements in this study, the women's anti-imperialist movement is the only one which had the participation of different classes of women --- educated, peasant, and working class women.

It has been noted that the early anti-imperialist organizations were run by women students. What needs to be stated further is the fact that many of the later women's anti-imperialist organizations were also founded by female students whose schools were affiliated with the Student Union of the Middle Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning of Beijing (1919), and later the Student Union of China (1919), and the Great League of Anti-Imperialism (1923?). (Chow Tse-tung, 1967: 123, 254; Pin Xin, 1946: 241-42)

The women's literature in 1937-1945 consistently indicated that women activists were mainly "educated women" or "educated women of the upper echelon". Some articles also said that "rural women", "working women", and "women of the lower echelon" were not represented or mobilized by the anti-imperialist movement under the leadership of the KMT govern-

ment. (Guangdong Funü, May 15, 1941: 24-25)

Educated women may well have been predominant in the women's organizations in the KMT region during the war period, but this was not the case in the CCP areas. As mentioned, millions of peasant women joined CCP-affiliated women's organizations during the war. Peasant and working class women still held a fair share of leadership positions.

A study of the North-eastern Women Representatives' Association shows that 24 were of worker or peasant origin, 30 were educated women, and the rest were working in the medical service, childcare, etc. (Zhounghua Quanguo Minzhu Funü Lianhehui, 1949: 20)

The position of working class women in the anti-imperialist movement was different from that of peasant or educated women. Since most factory women lived in the cities and the educated women's organizations (under the KMT or not) did not appeal to them, they could form their own organizations, be absorbed by the emerging CCP, or organize issue-oriented (but sporadic) protests. It appears that factory women took the last route because the CCP was driven into the countryside in the late 1920s just as the working class women were becoming militant. Their participation in educated women's organizations (increasingly under the control of the KMT after 1927) and organizations in the CCP areas in the countryside was therefore minimal. Due to the smashing of the labour movement by the KMT well before the movement could stand on its own feet and the economic hardship that working class women experienced, the latter could only protest against imperialism in relation to their

day-to-day concrete concerns of wages, job security, and fair treatment. As a result of the foreign ownership of some of the factories they worked in, women's strikes, sabotage, demonstrations, etc. had anti-imperialist overtones. In some cases, they joined the anti-imperialist protests of educated women and/or other groups. Although working class women's anti-imperialist actions constituted parts of the larger women's movement, their participation cannot be measured in terms of membership or representation in the women's anti-imperialist organizations.

Institutional Changes and the Women's Anti-Imperialist Movement

Ideas of Anti-Imperialism

Before we deal with the anti-imperialist actions of women, it is important to look at the ideological components to understand (a) how women related to the changing political and economic context, and (b) what directions they suggested for the movement. For reasons which have been mentioned in the previous chapters (such as the KMT institutionalization of women's movements), it is difficult to determine which of the publications on women (or by women) published before 1937 were affiliated with the KMT. As for the CCP influence, it could only be viewed through a variety of publications rather than "women's literature" per se. Therefore, we will discuss the ideas of women's anti-imperialism from the perspectives of both the political parties and women and, if information allows, we will specify the sources --- whether they were CCP, KMT, or women's groups.

The ideas of anti-imperialism as related to women will be

broken down into several components: themes, rationales (justifications), proposed strategies and tactics. In arranging the materials, we will first present the literature on women in general, and secondly the literature on working class and peasant women.

Themes and Rationales

Two general themes persisted in the first half of this century:

(a) Women Should Engage in Anti-Imperialist Work

There was a brief period of concern with resisting imperialism in the 1900s when the U.S. tried to renew its treaty with China on the issue of "Chinese coolies", but it seemed to decline in the late 1910s when the Paris Conference was in process.

The CCP strongly attacked the portrait of sexual inequality found in Christianity, and viewed Christianity as a mechanism for oppressing women. The CCP called for the participation of women in anti-imperialist activities, and saw women as integral part of the revolutionary process. This was the message in the 1920s.

The CCP position which associated resistance, revolution, and women's liberation was made more obvious in the 1930s when Deng Yingchao (1938: 90-98) said:

"Only in the active participation of Chinese women in the war of resistance to gain the victory of national liberation can the victory of women be attained."

Before the 1930s, the KMT did not pay much attention to anti-imperialist work. As the Sino-Japanese conflict intensified, the mobi-

lization of women in the anti-imperialist war became the central theme in its literature. Women were urged "to work hard in patriotic work", and the KMT claimed that "the anti-war and anti-fascist struggles and the struggle for women's rights are inseparable." (Song Qingling, 1967: 137-41)

There was a sense of urgency in the women's literature in the 1930s as witnessed in what Zhang Xiuxia (1933: 12-13) said:

"We cannot tolerate anymore the multiple slaughters of imperialism and the increasing brutality, exploitation, and oppression imposed upon us. We can no longer sheepishly and quietly allow them to slaughter [us]. We can only unite and struggle in the name of freedom and equality, and earnestly fight back all evil power under the banner of life-fulfillment and women's liberation."

Although the women's literature called for the mobilization of women in general for resistance, there was little attempt to speak for peasant women (or working class women as a matter of fact).

(b) Men and Women Should Unite to Defend China

Based on the assumption that (a) revolution is a gigantic task which requires maximum (wo)manpower to tackle it; and (b) the oppression of women is more severe than that of men, the CCP argued that men and women should join forces in national liberation and revolution.

(Jiefang Zhoukan, Mar. 20, 1939: 40) This was the position that the CCP held from its inception. With respect to the peasantry, it was more

explicit between 1946 and 1949. The CCP argued that both men and women in the countryside were oppressed by feudalism. (Li Baoguang, Aug. 1946: 1-3)

This theme was also prevalent in the women's literature in the 1930s and '40s. Tao Fen (1936: 10-12), for example, maintained that "the combined efforts of the male and female compatriots throughout the country" are necessary for the defence of China.

Why did Chinese women have to fight against imperialism and unite with men? Three arguments (justifications) were presented in the literature:

(a) Argument I: Women as Citizens

Like men, women are members of a country and should fulfill their duties as citizens. (Baishuang, 1938: 7-8) These responsibilities include the protection and defence of the country in times of crises and foreign invasion; and the building of the society in times of peace. (Shang Mu, 1927: 2-6)

(b) Argument II: Women as Human Beings

Women are "human beings", and they "should take up their responsibilities as 'human beings'. Beside demanding self-liberation, [they] should demand national liberation." (Ye Chusheng, 1937: 10-12) Although the concept "human beings" was used, it was never clear why "human beings" should be patriotic and work for the liberation of the country.

(c) Argument III: Women's Liberation Lies in Anti-Imperialism

Along with warlordism and feudalism, imperialism was seen as

blocking the path of women's liberation. "Only when the nation is liberated can the women who belong to the nation be liberated." (Si Ding, 1940: 24-25)

After the 1920s, this position was strongly favoured by the CCP which had been consistently urging women to demand "human rights" and "citizens' rights" before asking for "women's rights". (Jingyu, 1924: 28-32) For the CCP, the elimination of imperialism and the consolidation of the socialist revolution were the prerequisites of women's liberation.

In the women's literature, some articles specifically addressed the topic of the relationship of working class and peasant women to national liberation. Guixiu (1938: 11-12), for example, remarked:

"We believe that without the victory of the national liberation, the victory of women's liberation is not attainable."

Proposed Strategies

Two basic strategies were suggested in the women's literature: economic, and educational.

These strategies were concerned with mobilizing women for resistance purposes and improving the welfare of women.

(a) Economic Strategies

The idea of having women involved in economic production for the benefit of the country was proposed towards the end of the Qing Dynasty. This idea was picked up by some women in the early days of the Republic.

Towards the end of the 1920s, some women argued that it was important for women to learn skills which would allow them to be employed. (De'en, 1929: 19-23) In 1933, Chen Yubai (1933: 5-7) stressed the significance of production in the salvation of the country.

When the Sino-Japanese War began, concern for the development of the Chinese economy deepened. Women were urged to produce army clothing, to construct, to transport, to nurse, etc. (Ye Yuying, 1938: 11-12; Huang Suxin, 1938: 4-5, 8)

There was hardly any work written on peasant women before the War except for a few articles which encouraged women to "work in agriculture" and other farm work. (Zhou Jingchu, 1913: 5-7) As the War intensified, women's literature began to show greater concern with the declining peasant economy: the disintegration of the handicraft industry and with agricultural production. Peasant women were asked to renew their work in embroidery, spinning, weaving, etc., and urged that small-scale handicraft workshops, cooperatives, and so on be built to revitalize the peasant economy. (Zuo Songfen, 1940: 3-4; Ying, 1941: 5) The desire to have women work in agriculture and handicraft production was common among women, the KMT, and the CCP. Considering the vast amount of articles written on the issue of women, relatively little of it referred to working class and peasant women.

(b) Educational Strategies

Educating working class women was not suggested until the late 1920s and early 1930s when some women began to note that the current

women's movement was too middle-class and that learning skills was essential for women's economic independence. (De'en, 1929: 19-23) This proposal was dropped until the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War when Jiang Yixiao (Jihong, 1937: 37-43) reminded women that:

"Henceforth, the women's movement should not [only] be a middle-class movement, but [should] know how to educate [and] to awaken those working class and peasant women who are most oppressed."

As in the case of working class women, interest in educating peasant women was short-lived in the late 1920s. (Xu Yasheng, 1929: 5-12) Again, it was not until the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War that some concern with educating peasant women arose.

In both the working class and peasant women cases, education meant publicizing wartime events, including patriotic sentiment, teaching skills related to wartime production, etc.

Proposed Tactics

We will examine two tactical areas: organization and recruitment of women for anti-imperialism.

(a) Organizational Tactics

Only a few articles in the women's literature dealt specifically with the organizational tactics of working class women. Most dealt not with developing structures for recruiting working class women, but with the formation of alliances between the middle class and working class women, the working class and women, and men and women of the working class, and strengthening the working class organizations. (Seiu,

1921: 1-5)

As in the case of working class women, the women's literature gave little indication of how to organize peasant women. There were two suggestions: one was to organize peasant women through the established channels (such as the KMT party branches) and mobilize them for education or skill-training. (Xu Yasheng, 1929: 5-12) or, as the CCP suggested during the war, recruit women through existing defence committees, solicitation teams, consolation groups, etc. (Zhenhong, 1937: 29) There were, however, other proposals. After the War, the CCP felt that in mobilizing peasant women, the different strata of peasant women had to be considered. (Deng Yingchao, 1947: 40-46)

(b) Recruitment Tactics

Based on the scanty data available, the women's literature suggested two main ways of approaching working class and peasant women: mass-line and elitist.

For the working class, the mass-line approach maintained that:

"In order to expand the working class women's movement, we must begin with their basic needs first; in other words, we must begin by solving their poverty, sadness, bitterness, and anxiety..." (Yuan, 1938: 9-10)

The elitist approach insisted that educated women should set an example for working class women and/or educate them. There was little regard for working class women's basic needs or concerns. The basic assumption was that due to their ignorance, poor working women were not involved in

resistance efforts. (Jihong, 1937: 37-43)

With regard to peasant women, the mass-line approach suggested that women cadres "go to the countryside and mix with the villagers as well as to get intimate with the countryside environment." (Shijin, 1937: 3-4) Furthermore, it was suggested that when one teaches peasant women, one should avoid using abstract language and "draw from their daily existence examples and questions" and link them to wartime situations. (Deng Yingchan, 1938: 9-10)

Another way to approach peasant women was the elitist way: one writer suggested that before women cadres go to the countryside to mobilize women, they should contact local governments or administrators. (Huang Suxin, 1938: 7-8) Women cadres were usually trained in a short period in cities or towns and assigned to work in the countryside. They were asked to set up literacy classes, seminar groups, etc. without really understanding the local customs and economic conditions. (Lu Yunzhang, 1942: 21-22)

In sum, one may note from the above discussion that (1) both the CCP and the KMT as well as the women's literature expounded on the two themes; (2) in terms of justifications expressed, the KMT and the women's literature seemed to favour the positions of women as citizens and human beings, while the CCP was convinced of the inseparability of women's liberation and anti-imperialism; (3) the themes and rationales of women's anti-imperialism were most predominant in the 1930s, followed by the 1920s and '40s; (4) there were two major strategies for mobilizing

women for anti-imperialist actions: the involvement of women in production and their education; (5) there were two ways of organizing women (through the existing government channels or grass roots groups), and two approaches (mass-line or elitist); and (5) on the whole, there were only a limited number of articles on working class and peasant women in our survey, and the CCP was more concerned with them than the KMT.

Institutional Changes and Imperialist Advances

In addition to presenting anti-imperialist ideas in their literature, women also took strong action against the advance of imperialist powers or government policies which made these advances possible.

Beginning with the Humanitarian Society, which was founded in 1902 in Tokyo to raise the consciousness of women on various issues including educational rights and anti-Manchuism, women reacted quickly to hints of foreign domination. When the news of the Russian manoeuvring in northern China reached Tokyo, in 1903, the members of the Humanitarian Society quickly organized nursing teams to serve in the front. (Bao Jialin, 1974: 1-22) It also telegraphed women's schools in Shanghai urging the students there to join the Red Cross Societies and help the Anti-Russian Courageous Troop. (Ju-E Yiyongjun). (Jiangsu, May 1, 1903: 149)

Meanwhile, the women students also organized themselves into anti-Russian groups. The Anti-Russian Association of Women Comrades was founded in Shanghai. Some anti-Russian women troops were formed in 1903, and some women participated in anti-Russian public meetings.

(Subao, May 9, 1903: 1; Zhongguo Ribao, Apr. 24, 1904: 2)

Towards the end of 1904, the U.S. government wished to renew a treaty with China concerning the migration of Chinese workers, and suggested modifications of the treaty which would allow further discrimination against and exploitation of the Chinese in the U.S. This request angered Chinese women as well as men, and women participated in a series of protests and boycotts of American goods. (Zhang Hui & Bao Cun, 1963: 72-78)

In 1907, the Manchu government announced its intention of borrowing loans from foreign countries to build railways. Such an intention, if carried out, would have put more Chinese economic assets in the hands of the imperialist powers. At least two women's organizations were established to protect the interests of Chinese merchants on this issue. Some women raised funds for the merchants, and it was reported that even prostitutes delivered pamphlets and solicited shares for the railways. (Bao Jialin, 1974: 13-14)

In the same year, a debate occurred on granting foreign powers the right to search and arrest Chinese in the area of Xijiang in Guangdong. There was fear that such rights were about to be given to foreign powers. Several hundred women living in that area held a public meeting and recommended that foreign powers should not have the rights to search and arrest Chinese. (Zhongguo Ribao, Oct. 22, 1907) In Guangzhou (?), a "national shame meeting", called in the following year, was attended by over one thousand women. (Huazi Ribao, Apr. 6, 1908: 2)

In 1909, Japanese ships were found smuggling gunpowder into China and the Guangdong provincial government was about to hire foreign hydraulic engineers. In response to this news, students and teachers at women's schools called demonstrations and public meetings to protest. (Wright, 1968: 33; Huazi Ribao, Sept. 1, 1909: 2)

In 1911, the Manchu government's re-announcement of its policy of nationalizing the railways and taking loans from the U.S., Germany, Britain, and France created so much anger among women and men that they joined forces and brought down the government.

Thus, in the 1900s, we witness Chinese women first organizing independently for anti-imperialist purposes. It seems that these women were largely educated women from well-off families. At this stage in history, working class women were still unorganized.

Peasant women, on the other hand, appeared to be organized, at least locally. But their protests were different in nature from those of the educated women and tended to be based on the starvation and poverty forced upon them by a mixture of feudal relationships and imperialist impacts. In the 1900s, peasant women's actions seemed to be restricted to food robberies and tax evictions. (The North-China Herald, Mar. 28, 1907: 679; Minhu Ribao, July 6, 1909: 3)

The period of 1913-1918 was a relatively quiet one. Due to the escalation of repression (which will be discussed later), the acceptance of the Twenty-One Demands of the Japanese (1915) failed to elicit any women's anti-imperialist protests. However, in this period, some working

class women began to organize as witnessed in the militant acts of ten women workers in a cotton mill in Shanghai in 1917. (Zhonghua Xinhao, Aug. 15, 1917: 3)

The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 re-ignited women's activism. This is because the resolution of the Conference showed the collaboration of imperialist powers at the expense of Chinese sovereignty. At least 14 patriotic anti-imperialist organizations of women were founded during this period. Strong nationalist sentiments prevailed among educated women who formed most of these groups. In this year, many "national shame" meetings were organized in women's schools in Shanghai, as well as patriotic lectures and boycotts of Japanese goods. (Shibao, May 10, 1919: III, 3) They also organized strikes, demonstrations, petitions, telegrams, etc., in opposition to the Japanese and the Beijing warlord government which supported the Japanese. (Shibao, July 2, 1919: III, 3)

Military interventions by Japan and the landing of Japanese soldiers in Fuzhou further activated women's anger. The Federation of All-Shanghai Women immediately sent protests to the Fujian government. (Shibao, Dec. 7, 1919: III, 3) Along with their male counterparts, women students demanded the abolition of the Military Agreement for Sino-Japanese Mutual Defence (signed in 1918) and freedom of association, assembly, and publication. (Zhongguo Funü, 1959: 3) Their demand was followed by a mass demonstration in Beijing. Over 10,000 male and female students participated in this demonstration. (Shibao, Feb. 1, 1920: I, 2)

The close collaboration of the Beijing government and the Japanese called for military intervention by the KMT, and the women of various provinces, especially Guangdong, Sichuan, and Hebei formed their own "Northern Expedition Armies" and/or solicited funds for the KMT. (Huazi Ribao, July 1, 1921: III, 4)

Throughout the 1920s, the imperialist powers (such as Japan and Britain) continued to use their military resources to repress the strikes in their factories; this usually resulted in casualties among the workers. Women students formed an alliance with workers on these issues and organized petitions, telegrams, and demonstrations. There was a sense of heightened solidarity among students and workers when foreign powers were involved in strikes. The exploitation of Chinese workers by foreign employers was defined as illegitimate and an infringement of Chinese sovereignty.

While the actions of educated women carried a mixed sense of nationalism and anti-imperialism, working class women were motivated by a desire to satisfy their immediate needs (such as working conditions, wages, job security, ...) and a sense of anti-imperialism. The first women workers' strike which took place in 1919 illustrates this point: in February, the workers of the Shanghai Sino-Japanese Cotton Mill remained off their jobs demanding a better wage system, job security, dismissal of supervisors, and better treatment of child labour. (Ma Chaojun, et.al., 1959: I, 129-31)

A year later, a series of strikes by women in both Chinese and

Sino-Japanese factories occurred. Most of them dealt with wages and job security. The most spectacular one occurred in mid-June when more than 4,000 workers refused to go to work in the Shanghai Textile Company. (Ma Chaojun, et.al., 1959: I, 141-42)

In 1921, apart from their usual demands of higher wages, better working conditions, etc., women, along with men workers demanded political power. They were aware of the intimate relationship between warlords and foreign powers. The Wuhan Textile Mills Union organized a demonstration of tens of thousands of workers to show their strength to the warlords. They carried flags bearing the slogans: "Workers Unite", "Power Comes from Unity", etc. They yelled slogans such as "Raise the Political Status of Workers" and "Improve Workers' Lives". (Ma Chaojun, et.al., 1959: I, 169-70)

The CCP began to organize women in 1922. Spearheaded by Xiang Jingyu and the party devoted some of its resources to educating women workers, especially textile workers. According to Helen Snow, many women participated in the 100 and odd strikes which took place in 1922. (Leith, 1973: 58) One of the most impressive women's strikes involved more than 20,000 women workers of 44 silk filatures. (Landy, 1974: 15)

Two years later, the women workers of the silk filatures went on strike. Their determination encouraged other workers, and 14 other silk filatures in Shanghai became involved in the strike making a total of 140,000 workers on strike. Although the only demand they secured was the right to associate, the strike clearly indicated that the women working

in factories had begun to see strength in cohesiveness. A central theme in women's strikes in 1924 was the condemnation of the maltreatment of women and the brutality of their supervisor. (Funü Zhoubao, May 7, 1924: 6)

Beginning in 1925, women's demands began to take on an anti-imperialist tone. After the "May 30th Incident" (1925) in which many student demonstrators shouting slogans such as "Down With Imperialism" and "All Chinese Unite" were killed, the workers of the Japanese Yuda Cotton Mill staged a sympathy strike and also organized in Beijing and Guangdong. (Ma Chaojun, 1959: II, 397-98) More and more people joined the students and workers and a general strike was called in various parts of China, notably in Beijing, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Fuzhou, etc. Tens of thousands of workers, students, businesspersons, etc. took to the streets to protest.

In 1925 and 1926, in the midst of these anti-imperialist struggles, women workers continued to strike for higher wages, better treatment, and improved working conditions. Most of these strikes occurred in the textile industry. In 1927, for reasons which will be elaborated on further, the number of strikes dropped. (Landy, 1974: 17)

Throughout the period 1919-1927, it was obvious that labour actions by women were on the increase. They moved from being sporadic fights to cohesive strikes. The KMT ignored the task of mobilizing women workers for anti-imperialist purposes. The CCP, through the pioneer effort of Xiang Jingyu, was conscious of the need to organize

women workers. It worked with women's organizations such as the Organization of Chinese Women in Shanghai to demand special rights for working class women. (Shibao, Jan. 3, 1927: 4) During the Guangzhou Commune of December 1927, the CCP mobilized the women workers. (Wu Naiyin, 1962: X, 16)

Although peasant women were not quite as well organized as the men, certain incidents indicate that they were beginning to feel the need to organize to overcome their economic difficulties. Some 30 Guangdong women went as delegates to see President Sun Yixian in 1921, complaining of their local gentry's robbery of peasant properties. (Huazi Ribao, Nov. 4, 1921: III, 4) As in the previous decades, there were incidents of rice-robberies in the 1920s. (Shibao, July 1-3, 1926: II, 3)

The KMT made little attempt to mobilize peasant women. In contrast, the CCP did try to organize them, but were not successful until the mid-1920s when the peasants of Haifeng and Lufeng in Guangdong rose up. A few peasants were in the Red Army. In the Hailufeng Soviet in 1927-28, tens of thousands of peasant women joined the Congress of Armed Peasant Women and were organized into "Pink Rifle Teams"; every woman was armed. Apart from this short-lived soviet, most peasant women in China remained unorganized.

As we will discuss in great detail in Chapter 7, the KMT began the process of institutionalizing the women's movement in the mid-1920s. Increasingly after 1927, educated women helped the KMT government ward off imperialist advances by providing nursing services to the soldiers, collecting food, clothes, and funds for the frontal armies, and helping

the refugees. Some even attempted to join the armies. (Shibao, Oct. 2, 1931: II, 6)

There were, however, some activities that the KMT government frowned upon. For example, anti-imperialist protest speeches, demonstrations, and petitions; boycotts of Japanese goods, the burning of Japanese stores and storage space, the forming of alliances among anti-imperialist organizations (such as the Great Alliance of Patriotic Women of Shanghai in 1931), and the merger of other non-women organizations with women's groups in resistance in 1932. (Shibao, May 9, 1929: 6; Jan. 1, 1934: 4; Huazi Ribao, Mar. 9, 1937: II, 2)

An upsurge of women's organizations occurred in the period 1928-1937 in response to the growing imperialist advances --- at least 26 organizations were founded. As a part of its policy of institutionalization, the KMT created two important women's organizations to coordinate activities: (1) The Women's Work Committee of the New Life Movement in Nanchang (1934), and (2) the Headquarters of Chinese Women for the Consolation of Self-Defence and Resistance Soldiers in Chongqing (1937). The first was created to promote traditional moral values among women, but later became a national coordinator of resistance work among women. The second was formed in response to the increasing Japanese attacks.

The strength of the women workers' movement was on the decline after the 1927 White Terror (which will be discussed later). The number of women strikers dropped from 195,000 in 1927 to 31,263 in 1929. (Landy, 1974: 17-18) There was also a general shift in concern from

anti-imperialism and/or socio-economic improvement to simply job security. This shift was largely due to the economic recession that China had to confront in the 1930s --- factories were closed and workers were laid off.

There were a few militant strikes in the period of 1927-36, such as the strike of 400 workers in a Shanghai cotton mill in 1929. (Shibao, Feb. 1, 1929: 2) The most spectacular strike took place in 1932, involving more than 13,000 women in the silk filatures in Shanghai, and in 1936 when 15,000 workers of mainly Japanese-owned cotton mills in Shanghai went on strike demanding higher wages and better treatment for women. (Ma Chaojun, 1959: III, 1066-67, 1110-12, & 1269-74)

Beside organizing strikes, women workers held public meetings for educational purposes; created teams of women to search for Japanese goods in the streets as part of a campaign to boycott Japanese goods; and formed family service teams to investigate the welfare of women workers, provide women with hygienic knowledge and teach them how to care for their children. (Shibao, Mar. 10, 1928: 5; Sept. 8, 1928: 6)

There is some evidence that the CCP was involved in the mobilization of working class women, especially for the anti-Japanese front. For example, the Great Alliance of Patriotic Women of Shanghai was directed by the CCP. It had six branches and actively mobilized women, including working class women, to work as nurses at the front. (Zhang Hui & Bao Cun, 1963: 165)

As for peasant women, their food-robberies, which had occurred in

previous decades, continued. (Shibao, July 4, 1935: 4) In addition, it appears that peasant women were finally organized by the CCP. They were especially active militarily in the Jiangxi Soviet in 1931-34. Thousands joined the Women Guards which was a local defence force. They also formed propaganda teams to encourage their husbands or brothers to join the Red Army. (Guo Zhenyi, 1937: 144-45)

After the Long March, when the CCP began to consolidate its power in the border regions, women were mobilized into political, military, and economic work. In northern Shaanxi in 1937, for example, there were 130,000 women engaged in productive work, and 7,000 active members of the CCP. (Davin, 1976: 35-36)

In response to an intensification of Japanese attacks between 1937 and 1945, the KMT government designated the Women's Guidance Committee of the New Life Movement as the chief coordinator of women's anti-imperialist actions on July 1, 1938. Meanwhile, the CCP created four umbrella women's anti-imperialist organizations before 1938: the Patriotic Federation of Shanghai Women (1935), the Patriotic Federation of Jiaodong Women (1937), the Federation of All-Women (1938), and the Federation of All-Northern-Shaanxi Women (1938). During the period of 1938-45, there was a tremendous increase in the number of Chinese women participating in these women's organizations. (Helen Snow, 1967: 225) The women's anti-imperialist efforts were highly incorporated into the two parties: the KMT and the CCP. This, of course, was the continuation of what had been happening since the 1920s.

One may summarize the resistance work of women in the KMT region

under the following headings (Funü Xinyun, July 1944: 19-44):

(1) Officers-Training --- between 1938 and 1943, 1,111 women were trained to work in the countryside, to serve disabled soldiers, to assist in production, and in educational, political, and medical work.

(2) Life-Guidance --- this involved providing educational services for women, publicity work, and soliciting funds.

(3) Consoling Soldiers --- women provided services for the wounded and disabled soldiers including writing letters, cleaning clothes, and education.

(4) Child Welfare --- one day-care centre and roughly 15 children groups were formed to help the Wartime Childcare Headquarters.

(5) Cultural Affairs --- six women's journals and a variety of pamphlets and books were published. The Funü Xinyun published 6,000 copies each month, most of which circulated in Sichuan. Owing to the illiteracy of the working class and peasant women, this service did not benefit them.

(6) Surveys and Statistics --- the KMT compiled data on the amount of work which had already been done so as to project what needed to be done in the future.

(7) Rural Service --- these services included publicity, officer-training, organizing women, and wartime activities. Between 1938 and 1939, the KMT focussed its attention on the war districts in Hubei and Hunan. After the fall of 1939, it shifted to a few districts in Sichuan for experimentation. Although the KMT plan seemed ambitious,

the actual work done in this area was minimum. For example, between July 1938 and December 1943, only 242,883 women in the countryside became literate.

(8) Production --- the KMT intended to promote handicraft work among women by forming production cooperatives, handicraft-skill training classes, and factories. Unfortunately, the results were minimal. For example, in 1942, only three counties in Sichuan had production cooperatives. Similar results were found in agricultural production.

Apart from their feeble attempt to mobilize peasant women, the KMT tried to mobilize working class women for anti-imperialist purposes. The extent to which it actually recruited factory women for resistance is problematic. For example, only 11 workers from three cotton mills in Wuchang attended the panel for working class women organized by the Association of Funü Shenghuo in 1938. (Jihong, 1938: 7-10) It was, however, claimed that some factory women had managed to organize "wartime staff members" service teams: in factories to wash clothes, bedsheets, etc. for soldiers. Literacy classes for women workers were also formed in which knowledge of war and resistance efforts were introduced. (Qiufang, 1938: 21) In addition, the KMT tried to promote production among working class women as there was a shortage of products, especially of textile goods during wartime. A factory for making wartime clothing was created for the refugee women in Changsa. (Luo Shuzhuo, 1938) Women were encouraged to learn textile handicraft production and do it at home. (Shi Renru, 1941: 40)

Like the KMT, the CCP mobilized women, especially peasant women, for resistance. According to one claim, in the central Hebei, 80 percent of women worked for the liberation army, mostly as nurses in hospitals. (Luo Qiong, 1952: 26-28) Women also participated in self-defence armies. In an inconclusive 1940 study, it was stated that, of the 70 million women in the CCP areas, 1,386,780 joined the self-defence armies. These self-defence armies were organized to trace traitors and robbers, and protect the region. At least 3,000 women foot soldiers participated in the liberation army and worked as guerilla fighters, especially in southern China. (Luo Qiong, 1952: 26-28; Yan'an Research Society of Current Affairs, 1940: 385)

As part of their war efforts, the CCP mobilized women to solicit food and weapons for the soldiers. A patriotic food and weapon donation campaign was launched in the countryside. In addition, many women prepared gift packages for the soldiers. Behind the front, women cultivated the farms, washed the clothes, prepared food for, and generally took care of the concerns of the soldiers' families, especially families with elderly persons or babies.

Of all the tasks that women engaged in, agricultural production and textile handicraft work were considered the two key ones in the CCP regions. Due to the blockage of the KMT and general wartime conditions, the CCP areas had great difficulty in providing enough food and essentials for the population.

To alleviate this situation, the CCP launched a land reform move-

ment to provide men and women with their own land. The CCP strongly recommended that women work in the fields because many men had left to join the armies and if the fields were left unploughed, all the people left behind might starve to death. Consequently, the participation of women in farming was of great benefit to the women themselves. In the beginning, households were grouped together to help each other out. Where household work and childcare were obstacles to the participation of women in outside work, a certain division of labour was designed: mothers-in-law were encouraged to stay at home and do the housework and childcare, while their daughters-in-law worked in the fields; or there was a rational division of labour in which women alternated between work at home and work outside. Income based on production was shared among them. For the first time, peasant women earned a living that could support the whole family.

"Self-sufficiency" became very important in the CCP areas and, in addition to agricultural work, women learnt how to work in handicraft industries. This was difficult in the beginning due to the lack of spinning wheels or weaving looms and northern women seldom knew how to spin, weave, or sew. But, simple technologies of textile production were set up and women gradually learned the skills.

After the Sino-Japanese War, the KMT Women's Guidance Committee continued to coordinate women's activities. But its tasks were reduced to cultural affairs, child welfare, social welfare, and so on. The KMT had relaxed its effort to bring about the liberation of women. In fact,

it launched a campaign to push women back to the home, as noted.

Meanwhile, in the cities, women turned to anti-U.S. activities. More than 3,000 male and female students protested against the alleged assault of a female student by American soldiers in Hangzhou in 1947. (Situ Yan, 1947: 12) Strikes, which had been uncommon during the war, emerged again in the context of the worsening economic crisis (inflation). The treatment received by workers and wages became the two key issues in labour disputes.

The anti-imperialist actions of peasant women had shifted to a war against the KMT government (which was pro-landlord and pro-U.S.) under the CCP. (Qi Yun, Ji Qian, 1949: 26-31) Continuing its policy of concentrating on production as a supplement to warfare, the CCP utilized the land reform movement as well as the rent-and-tax-reduction movement to mobilize peasant women to help eradicate landlords and the patriarchal relationships between men and women. Speak-bitterness meetings of women were formed to raise the consciousness of women. The majority of women joined peasant unions or women committees. In fact, women formed the core of the land reform movement. In the land reform movement, every woman obtained a piece of land which provided them with an income for their family.

Women also participated in industrial production especially in the textile handicraft industry. This was merely a continuation of the work they had done in the wartime period. Women continue to work as nurses, transportation service workers, spies, etc. for the armies who

were now fighting against the KMT government.

The participation of rural women in production continued to be the focus of CCP concern after the War. However, it was decided to unite women's organizations in the countryside with women in the KMT areas who favoured anti-U.S. imperialism. In April 1949, CCP attention shifted to urban women. (All-China Democratic Women's Federation, 1950: 1)

In towns, such as Zhangjiakou, street production groups and street representative groups were formed to mobilize women for a variety of purposes, including production, education, re-forestation, etc. These grass-roots women's organizations were quite useful in linking the central body of the CCP with the women in local districts, ensuring production, carrying out political work, and ensuring the continuation of the land reform movement.

Summary

The women's anti-imperialist movement urged the unity of men and women in defending China against imperialism and called for women's activism in resistance work. This was justified in terms of women being citizens and human beings, and as an integral part of women's liberation. Proposed strategies of education and production as well as methods for recruiting and organizing women had been presented in the women's literature. We note, however, that the concern with mobilizing peasant and working class women was minimal.

During the first two decades of this century, educated women emerged as an anti-imperialist force. They were joined by working class

women in the 1920s, and by peasant women in the 1930s. Although the last organized, peasant women played a leading role in fighting against imperialism. Educated women and working class women supplemented their efforts in the late 1940s.

The anti-imperialist movement of women was a movement which was extensively incorporated into the KMT and the CCP beginning the 1920s. During the Sino-Japanese War, the KMT appeared to mobilize only the educated women for resistance purposes. It had little momentum among the women workers and peasant women. In contrast, the CCP was quite successful in mobilizing peasant women.

Anti-imperialist actions of women seemed to be a response to: (a) the "sell out" policies of the existing government (such as the borrowing of money from foreign powers announced by the Manchu government in 1907); (b) the "sell out" agreements or treaties signed between China and foreign countries (such as the Sino-Japanese Military Agreement of 1918 or the Paris Peace Treaty of 1919); (c) the foreign harassment of the Chinese (such as the alleged assault of a female student by an American soldier in 1947); (d) economic conditions which were seen to be related to imperialist domination (such as the growing unemployment situation in the 1930s); (e) political interference by foreign powers (such as the formation of a puppet government in Manchuria by Japan in the early 1930s); (f) military interventions by foreign powers (such as The May 30th Incident in 1925); and (g) full-scale military invasions (such as the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-45).

Compared with other women's movements, the anti-imperialist actions of women appeared to be most colourful --- the educated women used telegrams, public meetings, boycotts of foreign goods, education, fund-raising, demonstrations, joining the armies, helping refugees, food-collection, training officers, childcare, etc. The peasant women, engaged in food robberies, tax evasions, sending delegations, joining the armies, forming soviets, production, education, guerrilla warfare, land reform, the rent-and-tax deduction movement, etc. The working class women used strikes, sabotage, demonstrations, education, etc. In general, working class women stressed strikes as the key weapon; educated women, education and maternal means (such as soldiers-consolation, childcare, etc); and peasant women, production, military operations, and maternal means similar to those used by educated women.

Social Control and the Women's Anti-Imperialist Movement

In 1903-04, when Chinese women in Japan were busy organizing anti-Russian activities, the Manchu government advised the Japanese government to prohibit these activities, and tried to discourage such activities in China proper, (Bao Jialin, 1974: 13-14) The Manchu government also issued an order in 1904 to stop women from organizing a boycott of American goods. (Zhang Hui and Bao Cun, 1963: 72-78) When women of Guangzhou (?) protested over foreign rights to search and arrest Chinese in 1907, the government was afraid that their protest would spread, and issued an order prohibiting students from assembling or engaging in public speeches. Soldiers were sent to the National

Shame Meeting. (Huazi Ribao, Apr. 3, 1908: 2) Government control over peasant women's activities seemed to intensify: both the food robbery in 1907 and the protest march and picketing over the maltreatment of peasant children in 1909 were met with military force and threats of coercion by the local governments. (Minhu Ribao, July 6, 1909: 3)

During this period, the government (both at the local and national levels) was uneasy about the protests of women, and threatened the women with prohibitive legislation (mainly the educated women) and military force (mainly the peasant women). They hoped this would intimidate the women. Due to the lack of systematic organization among peasant women, their protests were largely suppressed. Well-organized, educated women survived the repressive episodes.

In 1913-1918, the early women's anti-imperialist movement suffered a severe set-back. Yuan Shikai passed a series of laws restricting the freedom of the press, free speech, association, assembly, etc. Women were not allowed to join any political groups or attend any political meetings. (Chow Tse-tung, 1967: 43) The newly-formed KMT was dissolved. These measures were meant to prohibit any revolutionary activities which could jeopardize the regime. Women's activities were closely monitored. The death of Yuan Shikai in 1916 did not end the repressive controls: in 1917, an order was issued by the Department of Education prohibiting students from joining any political group. In these circumstances, women's resistance efforts were forced under-

ground. (Zhonghua Xinbao, Feb. 12, 1917: 3)

Generally, the warlord government of Beijing countered these protests by imposing severe military repressions and prohibitive orders. However, these measures were not carried out consistently, this was especially the case in 1919 and the early 1920s. In response to the anti-imperialist activities of educated women, the Beijing government sent police and troops to beat and arrest the students. Tight police patrols were used at every public protest meeting. But in some cases, the government gave in to public pressure and released the arrested students. In addition, the government issued an order restricting and suppressing student activities and stated that students had no right to interfere in government policies. (Chow Tse-tung, 1967: 134-37) On top of this, the government prohibited marches, public speeches, and the delivery of pamphlets, dissolved student organizations, etc. In some cases, students were arrested. For example, more than 1,000 students were arrested in 1919 between June 1st and 3rd to contain the spread of radicalism. The government arrested women representatives during their trips to Beijing to petition and ordered an end to campaigns to boycotts of Japanese goods. (Zhongguo Funü, 1954: X, 9) When women organized rallies, or public meetings, policemen were found attending the meetings. (Shibao, May 3, 1920: II, 4) In the 1920s, it became illegal for women to attend political meetings or join political groups.

The imperialist powers did not remain neutral in these incidents; the U.S.-British representatives issued orders forbidding walking in the

streets and sent troops to tear down all the protest (anti-imperialist) posters on the walls in Shanghai. (Yin Falu, 1957: 27)

While the warlord government expressed disapproval of protests and demonstrations by educated women, they were brutal in their treatment of working class women. The arrest of strikers, especially the leaders, was common practice and was used to intimidate the women workers. For example, in 1922, a strike of the silk filature workers in Shanghai was called off because the women workers were afraid that the five arrested leaders would be executed if the strike continued. (Landy, 1974: 15) In some cases, execution after arrest did occur: two leaders arrested during the strike of Huashi Cotton Mill in 1922 were executed within two hours of their arrest. (Ma Chaojun, et.al., 1959: I, 196-97)

Military troops and policemen were often sent to the strike scenes not just to keep "order", but to kill striking workers. During a strike by textile workers in Shanghai in 1922, policemen came into the factories in armoured vehicles, throwing tear bombs, and shooting. More than 200 women were arrested at gunpoint. In this case, it was alleged that the police department actually used "provocateurs" to create violence to justify police use of gunpower. More than 160 provocateurs threw stones at the workers, sprayed them with water, and even rolled burning oil tanks at the workers.

It appears that the policemen became more cold-blooded over time. In 1925, when the workers of Dakang Cotton Mill in Qingdao were on

strike, the police force was sent in by the provincial government and eight workers were killed while ten were wounded. (Ma Chaojun, et.al., 1959: II, 397-98) When the women workers of the Japanese Yuda Cotton Mill were on strike, soldiers were sent to deal with the crisis. On one occasion, when 6,000 workers protested in front of a factory, 5,000 soldiers were sent in to contain the crowd. On this occasion, 20 persons were killed and 60 were drowned when they jumped into the water trying to escape. Similar incidents happened in 1926 and 1927. (Ma Chaojun, et.al., 1959: II, 397-98; Guo Zhenyi, 1937: 211)

Sometimes, the police and military were sent to strike scenes to put the striking workers under siege. Since many industrial workers lived in dormitories provided by the company, a siege meant that the workers had problems obtaining food and communication from outside sources. A siege was a way of starving the workers to death. (Ma Chaojun, et.al., 1959: I, 196-97)

As the KMT began to consolidate its power in 1927 during its Northern Expedition, it decided to smash the CCP. Any political activities not under the coordination of the KMT were suspect. Several women's organizations in Shanghai and Guangzhou were scrutinized. (Huazi Ribao, May 6, 1927: II, 2) By the end of 1927, orders were issued prohibiting the public from assembling, associating, or marching, especially in Jiangsu. The Jiangsu government also prohibited the public from forming teams to search people for Japanese goods and restricted the types of assemblies and associations allowed in Jiangsu.

(Jiangsu Minzhengting Gongbao, Dec. 1, 1927: 1)

Beside prohibitive legislation, the KMT used strong, coercive measures. By April 1927, many unions were closed down and dissolved. Just before the onslaught of terror, the CCP adopted the motion that all union members should give up their rights; this rendered the workers defenseless. Then came the White Terror: gangsters were hired to destroy unions, police and military soldiers broke up picket lines, workers on strike were dismissed or forced to pay huge fines and people were put in prison without a trial. Consequently, in 1927 alone, it has been claimed that 32,316 persons were sent to jail and 37,985 were executed, "25,000 died in open struggle, and 13,000 were 'executed barbarously'". (Helen Snow, 1945: 56, 182)

This policy of wiping out the communists hurt the women's movements too. The Central Executive Committee directed the Women's Bureau "to purge Communist members or those with communist connections from the Central Women's Bureau." (Collins, 1976: 620)

After the KMT army smashed the Guangzhou Commune, at least 200-300 women were reported murdered because they had bobbed their hair --- a symbol of liberation. In 1927 alone, over 1,000 women leaders were killed by the KMT, many of them were not communists at all, although they had been quite active in the women's movements. Women were sometimes tortured before they were executed: their breasts were cut off, their bodies were wrapped with cotton and burned using oil, etc. (Collins, 1976: 620)

Two things ought to be remembered: First, during the 1920s, the KMT tried to incorporate the women's movements as will be elaborated on in Chapter 7. Competition from the CCP forced the KMT to recruit women, but it succeeded only in mobilizing educated women, not working class and peasant women. Once the KMT consolidated its power in 1927, the women's movement was crushed, showing the true lack of concern on the part of the KMT for women's causes. Secondly, both the KMT and the warlord government had used repressive measures to discourage, control, and exterminate women's anti-imperialist efforts or anti-capitalist activities throughout the period of 1919-1927; the women's movement suffered setbacks under those attacks but nevertheless recovered itself each time. In fact, there was growing militancy and mobilization among the educated and working class women in the 1920s as repression escalated. Even the formerly unorganized peasant women had an uprising (along with men) under the leadership of the CCP whose efforts to mobilize working class women in the cities had been curtailed. However, of the repression that women experienced in the 1920s, the 1927's White Terror was the most severe blow, and it took a number of years for women to recover.

After 1927, the KMT government continued to institutionalize the women's movement. (A topic which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7.) In addition, in the beginning of the 1930s, the KMT launched the "New Life Movement" to discipline modern women who cut their hair, used cosmetics, danced or wore short sleeves and trousers. For example, in 1936, the provincial government of Shandong arrested 450 "modern women"

for violating the regulations of the New Life Movement. (Landy, 1974: 19) These regulations affected educated women more than their working class or peasant counterparts.

The KMT also regulated the types of assemblies and associations which could be held in the provinces. It sought to eliminate communist gatherings. The KMT government prohibited students from petitioning in Beijing, or forming patriotic armies to defend the country from the Japanese. (Shibao, Apr. 6, 1932: "Special") When more than 8,000 male and female students petitioned in Beijing urging the government to fight against Japanese imperialism, the government sent armed police to beat, whip, and arrest the students. More than 200 students were wounded in that incident. (Pin Xin, 1946: 320-21)

The KMT government had been issuing orders since 1927 warning workers to be wary of "trouble-makers". But the KMT also used dirtier methods. Using Hitler's secret police as their model, the KMT secret police terrorized workers. Beside controlling unions, the KMT sent spies and provocateurs into the labour movement, and used gang leaders as the "arbiters" of labour disputes or strikes. (Helen Snow, 1967: 76) These gangsters, not only blackmailed the workers, but also cooperated with the police department. Labour leaders were framed, kidnapped, disappeared, or were killed; or they were arrested and charged with communism, usually on the basis of false evidence. Armed soldiers or police with sub-machine guns were used to contain strikes. (Helen Snow, 1967: 73)

Due to these KMT tactics, more than 100,000 workers and peasants

were reported killed in the first eight months of 1928. In October of the same year, it was claimed that 17,200 were in jails. (Helen Snow, 1967: 72) Brutality and killings were a very common part of the strike scene. For example, when the Shanghai Yong'an Cotton Mill locked the workers out in 1932, more than 6,000 workers (men and women) broke through the gate of the factory only to find policemen waiting for them. Three workers were killed in this incident. Foreign policemen were sometimes used if the factories belonged to foreigners.

During the Sino-Japanese War, the KMT's desire to wipe out the communists remained strong. Although the government was busy fighting the Japanese, it kept an eye on the movements of radical women. For example, in the capital of Guizhou, the KMT accused the Y.W.C.A. and the local women's New Life Movement of being communist. It broke up a meeting of Y.W.C.A. on "What Is Democracy?" and prohibited further meetings of this kind unless they were approved by the KMT and a KMT representative acted as chairperson. (Landy, 1974: 20) Women's magazines were scrutinized. For example, issues of the Contemporary Women (Xiandai Funü) had to be sent to KMT inspectors before they could be published and distributed. Very often, articles were censored. Even March 8th celebration meetings were suspect. In 1945, one of these meetings in the KMT area was disturbed by KMT officials who cut off the microphones. (Cao Mengjun, 1957: 12) In the countryside, there had been clashes between the KMT and CCP troops since 1941. After 1941, the CCP areas of northern China were blockaded by the KMT troops. This

illustrates the extent to which the KMT intended to smash the communists. (Helen Snow, 1945: 80). It is rather ironic that the KMT, which had tried so hard to stamp out the struggles of peasant and working class women and to contain and incorporate women's movements, was overthrown at the end of the Sino-Japanese War when the resistance efforts of peasant and working class women turned into revolutionary acts.

Summary

Women engaging in anti-imperialist activities had to deal with repressive measures, similar to those used against women revolutionaries in the 1900s. Throughout this period, legislative prohibition of freedom of speeches, marches, assembly, association, and other civil liberties seemed to be quite common. Closely related to these were the censorship of "controversial" articles in women's magazines, the sending of police or soldiers to meetings for intimidation purposes, and the restriction on boycotts of foreign goods. The scrutinization of organizations and unions, arrests, provocateurs, the hiring of gangsters, secret police, executions, and sieges were especially common after 1927 when the KMT government was consolidating. It appears that there were few differences in the application of these repressive measures across class lines --- educated, peasant, and working class women encountered a similar fate if they engaged in anti-imperialist activities not endorsed or approved by the existing government(s).

But, as our data suggested, although these coercive methods, in some cases (especially in the 1910s), worked in coping with the rising

tide of anti-imperialism, they could not diminish women's activism in the long run. The anti-imperialist current which germinated at the turn of the century, was temporarily blockaded in the 1910s, re-emerged again in 1919 and swelled into a strong tidal wave which was forced underground around 1927. But it arose once again in the 1930s as imperialist advances escalated. The movement had been coopted by the KMT government during the War, and efforts had been made to de-radicalize it immediately after the War, but they failed, as the revolution approached.

Conclusion

The women's anti-imperialist movement arose in the context of a changing economic structure, political turmoils, and imperialist advances. The traditional peasant economy was collapsing; in addition to the decline of handicraft industry (which was eroded by foreign goods), peasants were getting poorer because of the greater concentration of landownership in fewer hands, decreasing size of farms, and commercialization of agricultural goods. The last phenomenon accounted for the precarious situation of peasants in times of famine.

Meanwhile, due to various advantages accumulated by foreign powers through treaties in the 19th century and their apparent superiority in finance and technologies, the infantile Chinese industry failed to compete with foreign industries. Consequently, China remained at an early stage of capitalist industrialization which was characterized by brutal exploitation and harsh treatment of labourers.

Wars and political turmoils aided the deterioration of Chinese

life. In this period, there were a series of military interferences by imperialist powers in China of which the Sino-Japanese War was the most severe. The devastation was tremendous in social, political, and economic terms. Due to China's internal political conflicts, militarization was a pattern of life in China. It drained the already limited financial resources, created inequality through conscription, destroyed peasants' properties and lives, deepened the famine crises, created and perpetuated inflation, and resulted in other consequences detrimental to the well-being of the Chinese.

Under these conditions, women, especially those of peasant and working class backgrounds, became more miserable than before. Apart from the general effects of imperialist military advances which were felt by both men and women, the latter experienced more: harassment, rape, and humiliation. The disintegrating peasant economy forced many women to leave their homes and work in factories in the cities. Their working conditions were far from enviable: low wages, different methods of super-exploitation (such as "wage-deduction"), long working hours, minimal holidays, unsanitary and poorly ventilated workplaces, brutal treatment, and insecure employment.

In this context, a labour and peasant movement gradually emerged in this century. In the first two decades, peasants were quite localized and sporadic in their protests against food shortage, high taxes, maltreatment, etc. Beginning in the 1920s, there were some attempts on the part of the CCP to organize peasants, but they did not make much

headway. It was not until the Long March and its aftermath that the CCP became capable of organizing peasants. The labour movement did not begin until the late 1910s and early 1920s; with the help of the CCP, it expanded. The KMT's systematic repression of the labour movement in and after 1927 undermined the effectiveness of workers' unions, although there were still strikes and sabotages during the KMT reign. In the CCP areas, there were signs that workers were working with peasants in fighting against imperialism and the KMT government.

Thus, the women's anti-imperialist actions were part of the larger political currents in China. The movement began in the same milieu as other women's movements: the student communities in Tokyo, and later in Shanghai. The pre-existing women's organizations and periodicals helped to further the movement. Although the women's anti-imperialist movement was composed of educated, peasant, and working class women, the actions of the latter two "classes" remained sporadic in the 1900s. Only the educated women became organized.

After some setbacks due to intensified repression during the 1910s, the educated and working class women emerged as strong anti-imperialist forces, and on many occasions in the 1920s, formed alliances among themselves and with other organizations. The peasant women did not emerge as an organized anti-imperialist force until the 1930s.

Based mainly on the women's literature, we noted that women were urged to unite with men to fight against imperialism and defend China. This was justified on the basis that women are human beings and

citizens, and their participation in resistance is part of women's liberation. Education and production were proposed as key strategies, and tactics of recruiting and organizing women were presented. However, the topic of mobilizing peasant or working class women was not popular in the literature.

Women's actions against imperialism were reactions to the "sell out" policies and agreements which the existing government adopted or signed, the harassment of Chinese, the economic conditions which were seen as related to imperialism, foreign political and military interventions, and a full-scale war.

Both the KMT and the CCP were highly interested in incorporating the women's movement. It appears that, the KMT was more successful in mobilizing educated women than the others; and the CCP in mobilizing peasant women. During the Sino-Japanese War, both the educated and peasant women showed great imagination in their resistance efforts.

The movement had met great opposition right from its beginning during the Manchu regime. Strong repressive measures (such as arrest, execution, jailings, etc.) were imposed on women throughout the decades under examination, with the exception of the Sino-Japanese War period. But repression failed to stop this tidal wave of women's anti-imperialism, although it did hamper it in the short run, such as during the few years following 1912 and 1927.

In the following paragraphs, we will evaluate the applicability

of the conceptual frameworks (mentioned in Chapter 1) to the case of the anti-imperialist movement of women, and attempt to link various aspects of the movement together.

Structural Conditions

There are three structural arguments which seem to be of some value in explaining the rise of the women's anti-imperialist movement in China. The first one is the "educational mobility" argument. As noted, it was the educational mobility of some women which put them into a milieu where politicization was facilitated. The student community in Tokyo (and to some extent, that of Shanghai) was conducive for women's organizing. However, this argument cannot be applied to peasant or working class women who did not have the chance to attend school. Their radicalization was largely due to the historical and sociological situation of China as well as to the efforts of the CCP (especially among the peasantry).

The military advances of imperialist powers appear to be the most relevant factor in the emergence of the women's movement. First of all, in the women's literature, we noted a strong emphasis on the danger of imperialism and how it might affect the status of women. Secondly, the actions of women were a response to the military advances of foreign powers, the "sell out" policies of the governments, and other factors related to imperialism.

As an explanatory variable, political and economic turmoils (such as militarization, inflation, etc.) further strengthened women's

drive to oppose foreign powers in China. In the literature published by women, these turmoils were usually related to imperialism, for women saw them as consequences of foreign domination and military invasions.

Having discussed all these frameworks, it is important to explore further the relationship between the ideas expounded in the women's literature and the military context of China. First of all, it appears that the themes and rationales of women's resistance were most predominant in the 1930s (especially before 1937), followed by the 1920s and '40s. This may be due to the fact that, in the 1930s, the intensification of the Japanese invasions increased the urgency of persuading women to join the resistance movement. (However, the CCP was already concerned with mobilizing women for anti-imperialism in the 1920s.)

Without getting entangled in statistical data on the frequencies of the occurrence of these themes, rationales, strategies, and tactics, one can argue that these themes and rationales occurred frequently prior to 1937; and that strategies and tactics were proposed mainly after 1937. Such a pattern suggests that the idea of women participating in anti-imperialist activities was not yet generally accepted and that women's journals were launching a campaign promoting the involvement of women. The Sino-Japanese War made the participation of women (especially working class and peasant women who constituted the majority of the women in the population) a necessity, and the focus of the articles shifted to a discussion of strategies and tactics for mobilizing women.

It now appeared to be generally accepted that women should become involved in the fight against imperialism, the question of "why" was replaced by "how" in the general movement to build women's resistance.

However, the ideas of "women's anti-imperialism" as a system of ideas did not really emerge until the 1920s, and became popular only in the 1930s and 1940s. The question that must be asked is: why did "women's anti-imperialism" as an idea system not arise in the 19th century and in the first two decades of this century?

The absence of women's anti-imperialism in the 19th and early 20th centuries was not due to a lack of imperialist invasions. This phenomenon must be explained by other factors. One of them is the changing ideological current. In the 1900s, the ideologies of the revolutionary and constitutionalist movements maintained that the weakness of China lay not in imperialist intervention, but in the backwardness of indigenous political and economic process. Influenced by this ideology, women tended to blame the weak Manchu regime rather than imperialist powers. Consequently, all their actions were geared toward the abolition of the dynastical system.

In the 1910s, the former ideological current began to lose support because the new republican regime proved to be no better than the old Manchu one. Furthermore, the KMT did not keep its promise of sexual equality and the repressive regime disenchanted women activists.

Meanwhile, China joined the Allies in the First World War. The Paris Conference of 1919 greatly disappointed the Chinese people since

their demands were largely ignored. The conference made some Chinese men and women realize the close ties among imperialist powers and the true nature of imperialism. The old ideology of indigenous structural weaknesses as the reasons for China's problems rather than imperialist manipulation was shattered. The sending of troops by the imperialist powers to "protect" their factories and properties in the 1920s and 1930s reinforced this new awareness. The idea of resistance became much more prevalent among women and as the Sino-Japanese conflicts escalated to a total war in 1937-45, "anti-imperialism" became the dominant topic in women's literature.

Organizational Networks

Our examination of the women's anti-imperialist movement shows that a pre-existing communicative network is pertinent to its emergence. The networks in Tokyo (and to some extent, Shanghai) in which women students were situated were conducive to their political organizing. Furthermore, the pre-existing women's organizations and periodicals could also be used for anti-imperialist purposes. These findings confirmed the arguments of Pinard (1968) and others, namely that intermediate networks are important for the rise of social movements.

We noted also that political parties could play an important role in building a social movement. In the 1900s, revolutionary parties had a politicizing impact on educated women in Tokyo and cities in China. The role of political parties seemed to be of great signifi-

cance when women were not organized. Although our data on the CCP impact on women in the early 1920s are scanty, it does appear to have played a role (through the organizing work of Xiang Jingyu) among textile factory women. The mobilization of peasant women in the Hailufeng Soviet in 1927-28 is an example of the CCP role among the peasantry. While the KMT was still a political party in the early 1920s, it mobilized women of various provinces to join the "Northern Expedition".

The difference between the organizational networks in the 1900s and those of political parties in the 1920s is that the former promoted an independent structure for women's movements, the latter tended to absorb them into their own political machineries.

The class component of the organizational networks may also account for the content of the women's literature. Although "anti-imperialism" had become the dominant theme in women's literature in the late 1930s, our survey indicated that there was not much written on working class and peasant women. To explain this pattern, one must consider the fact that women's literature was written and read mainly by educated women living in the cities. These privileged women did not work in the factories or in the countryside; when they spoke of "women", they actually meant educated women. The position of working class women and peasant women was considered peripheral in the eyes of the women's literature. Even when the Sino-Japanese conflicts intensified in the 1930s, the coverage of working class and peasant women remained

minimum. Since educated women had little contact with their underprivileged counterparts, they had difficulty in articulating their life-chances; although they may have recognized the importance of mobilizing these women, they did not know how to do it. It is no wonder that the coverage of working class and peasant women was so limited in the women's literature.

Institutional Changes

As noted, the anti-imperialist actions of Chinese women were a response to the "sell out" policies of the existing governments, the "sell out" agreements or treaties signed between China and foreign countries, the harassment of Chinese by foreign agents, the perception of the economic situations as related to imperialist domination, political interference, and military interventions (small- or large-scale) by foreign powers.

The extent to which women's activism had an impact on government policies and/or imperialist powers is harder to estimate. What we know for sure was that the combined efforts of both men and women in protesting against the decision of the Manchu government to borrow money from foreign countries to nationalize Chinese railroads resulted in the overthrow of the Manchú regime. The other success story was that the anti-imperialist movement of peasant women, along with working class and progressive educated women, did manage to stop the Japanese imperialism in 1945, and to kick the KMT government (which favoured U.S. imperialism) out of the mainland in 1949.

But the situation in China in 1900-1949 was quite unusual. None of the Chinese governments were strong enough to refuse to bow to the imperialist demands and to penalize imperialist interventions. The warlord and KMT governments were especially supportive of foreign demands (with the key exception of the KMT government in 1937 when it realized that Japanese imperialism was a threat to China's own security). Some warlord governments had been created by foreign powers as puppet states to further divide China and increase foreign economic gains.

In this context, as we have already noted, it was in the interest of the governments to suppress the anti-imperialist actions of women. Although the mass movements of women and other sectors of the society were, at times, quite large in number and militancy, foreign harassments or interventions were not stopped. The very fact that foreign powers could legitimately use military force in certain areas in Chinese territories posed further difficulties for women (and men) struggling against the advance of imperialism. Due to this relationship between existing governments and foreign countries and the judicial legitimacy of foreign military forces in China (and other political and economic factors), Yuan Shikai government, in spite of massive protests from women and other groups, continued to sell out China, the warlord governments did nothing to alleviate their ignorance of the working conditions of women, and the KMT government continued to collaborate with foreign powers. It was not until the nation (and indeed the government itself) began to face the question of survival.

that the KMT government decided to incorporate the anti-imperialist efforts of women.

In light of this, Clark's et.al. (1975) idea that indifference and accommodation on the part of the government are contingent on the strength of the mass movements becomes problematic. Here, we are dealing with external forces (foreign powers) which, very often, in the context of China, lie beyond the control of the Chinese governments. The situation was that the existing governments were ready to sacrifice the lives of the Chinese people to make sure that they, as governments, remained in power. Once imperialist advances became threatening to the existing governments, the latter opposed advances such as the Japanese attacks in the 1930s. From this perspective, Smelser's (1959) thesis of structural differentiation (which argues that reforms are contingent on the "dissatisfaction" and "disturbances" of the people) can be interpreted, not as a response to internal unrest, but as a reaction to external forces in this case.

Social Control

Repression was characteristic of the government policies of social control in relation to the women's anti-imperialist movement. However, it failed to diminish the intensity of women's activism. The close linkage between foreign powers and Chinese governments and foreign interventions in a military sense were quite obvious and, in order to defend the country, women refused to become less militant. The governments did not want to ruin their relationship with foreign

powers, and therefore did not direct anti-imperialist actions toward other channels or directions. This was because it was anti-imperialism per se that the governments were trying to eliminate. Both the governments and women remained deadlocked, without much choice.

The situation was further complicated by the KMT obsession with fighting communism. Very often, women activists were mistaken as communists, and were dealt with as such. Many of the arrests and slaughters of women were unnecessary. These coercive measures should have forced women into taking much more legalistic means of expressing their anti-imperialist feelings, if one follows Smelser's (1962) framework of collective behaviour. Since anti-imperialism was part of the CCP program, even if women had used "legitimate" channels to air their opinion of anti-imperialism, they would have been labelled as communists. Consequently, there were not many choices for women other than militant action.

CHAPTER 7

WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL PARTIES

In the previous discussion of the four women's movements, it has already been noted that both the CCP and the KMT had been trying to incorporate them since the 1920s. The CCP had more luck with peasants (and to some extent with the working class) women in the countryside, and the KMT with educated women in urban areas. The question is: why?

Policies of Mobilization

The members of the New Educational Association (Xinmin Xuehui) --- the prototype of the CCP organized by Mao Zedong --- appeared to be concerned with the training of women cadres and they believed that "the best of women cadres are quite reliable". (CCP Central Committee's Editorial and Translation Department -- Research Branch of the Writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin; 1958: I, 155-56). When the CCP was founded in 1921, it adopted a policy of mobilizing peasant and working class women. The CCP viewed women's liberation as lying in national liberation from imperialism, capitalism and feudalism, and criticized existing women groups as being coopted by the bourgeois political structure. (Kristeva, 1977: 116)

A year later, the CCP acknowledged basic civil liberties for women and sexual equality in various aspects of life, and drafted legislative proposals to protect working class women. (Luo Qiong,

1952: 26-28) In 1926, while the CCP recognized the class distinction among women, it passed a resolution to work with all women: educated, working class, and peasant. In its view, educated women, though coopted by the bourgeois system, nevertheless were one "instrument" of the women's movement. Working class women remained the backbone of the movement, and the CCP planned to train women cadres to mobilize women in the countryside, especially in Guangdong and Hunan. (Wang Jiamin, 1965: 239-40)

In contrast, the KMT did not show any interest in mobilizing women until 1925. In fact, in 1912, the KMT abolished the sexual equality clause in its political program. (Gongjiao Zhishi, Apr. 1971: 18) It was not until 1924 that such a clause was reinstated. (Fang Suzhong, 1959: 25) A year later, the Women's Bureau of the KMT (formed in 1923) advised the women members of the Party to work for the women's movement. (Shibao, Apr. 1, 1925: II, 4) The rationale behind such drastic changes in the KMT policy towards women was hinted at a year later in the KMT's "The Organization, Development, Rights, and Freedom of the Women's Movement" (1926):

◆ "(1) To expand the influence of the Party; (2) to prevent the female population from being used by reactionaries; and (3) to act as a first step in political propagandizing." (Jiangxi Funü, Mar. 8, 1937: 24-25)

The same document suggested that the women's bureaux of the KMT should observe the development of various women's organizations already

in existence and encouraged women party members to participate in these organizations as well as to train women for further women's actions. (Jiangxi Funü, Mar. 8, 1937: 24-25) This document indicates that, as early as 1926, the KMT incorporation of women's movements had begun.

The KMT activities between 1925 and 1927 indicated a concern with controlling the activities of educated women (female students and career women). The KMT actively cooperated with the existing educated women's organizations in the cities and recruited female students. (Shibao, Dec. 5, 1925: II, 3) It is debatable that the KMT was genuinely interested in promoting women's rights or even in mobilizing women for their liberation, since they scrutinized many women's activities and women's organizations in Shanghai and Guangzhou. (KMT Central Committee's Editorial Committee of the Party Data, 1964: 90; Huazi Ribao, May 6, 1927: II, 2)

The purge of 1927 drove the communists into the countryside, and from that time onwards, the CCP focussed its attention on the mobilization of peasant women. Mao recognized the difficulty of abolishing the old sexual morality in peasant society, for such an act would destroy peasant relationships and create hostility and fragmentation among them. In light of this, the CCP began a policy of marriage and land reform.

With respect to land redistribution, the Land Laws of Jinganshan (December 1928) and Xinguo County (April 1929) as well as those promul-

gated by the Chinese Military Revolutionary Council (1930), and the Chinese Soviet Republic (November 1931) all advocated sexual equality in land allotments, so that peasant women could become economically independent. A pragmatic reason for the land reform was the necessity for women to work in the fields to free men to join the Red Army of the CCP. (Davin, 1976: 22, 26)

Although the CCP policy on women was based on the socialist principle of sexual equality, the "liberation" of peasant women in the early 1930s actually meant the mobilization of peasant women in the resistance against the KMT. This was evident in the First Women's Meeting in Xinguo County (Jiangxi) in 1933 in which the first topics on the agenda for discussion were "aid to the Red Army", "enlarge the Red Army", and "looking after the dependents of Red Army soldiers". These could be achieved, suggested the CCP, by having women learn how to plough, to sell women's jewelry, etc. (Davin, 1976: 26) The 1933's resolution of the Jiangxi Provincial Committee of the Women Representatives' Congress viewed these as "the core of woman-work". (Davin, 1976: 26)

As for marriage reform, the two Marriage Laws of the Jiangxi Soviet (1931 and 1934) established freedom of choice in marriage, divorce, and the abolition of the "child-wives" custom. It appears, however, that these were not thoroughly implemented. (Davin, 1973: 73-92)

The 1927 purge and its repressive aftermath made it difficult

for the CCP to recruit working class women. But KMT raids on CCP branches or cells usually discovered documents urging members to "recruit the masses of working class women", to absorb young women, and to strengthen women's work in general. (Guangdongsheng Zhengfu Gongbao, July 18, 1929: 29-32) This policy conformed to the general principle announced by the CCP on June 11, 1930 which viewed women as "a significant force in revolutionary struggle", and stated that the party "should be more active in absorbing them into the revolutionary route". (Wang Jiamin, 1965: 51) In line with its concern with working class women, the CCP passed a resolution in December 1927 to promote the interests of working class women: limiting working hours, improving sanitary conditions, etc. (Wang Jiamin, 1965: 418)

During the Long March, peasant women played a supportive role. They did the production work or work related to communications, transportation, and public health. Only in those villages where men were largely absent were women trained as guerrilla fighters. As late as 1934, Mao Zedong still insisted that peasant women should be encouraged to "do farm work" and not to fight in the front. (Union Research Service, May 1, 1970: 113)

Due to the intensification of the Japanese invasions, the CCP adopted the Popular Front line policy in 1935 which required CCP cooperation with the KMT in the fight against the Japanese. Consequently, compromises were made by the CCP with regard to mobilizing women. (Collins, 1976: 645) It discarded some of its principles

regarding marriage reform and land redistribution and stressed that the key role of women in the anti-Japanese effort was to participate in production; the slogans "Abolition of the Feudal Family", and "Freedom of Divorce" were abandoned. (Curtin, 1975: 31)

While the CCP concentrated on mobilizing peasant women through marriage and land reform and production work and in general called for mobilizing working class women between 1927 and 1937, the KMT merely depoliticized the existing urban women's movements by further institutionalizing them during this period. Although the Guangdong branch of the KMT resolved in 1927 that peasant women should be educated, not much action followed this announcement. (Huang Xiaomin, 1927: 6) It should be noted that the KMT's strategy for mobilizing peasant women began with "education" rather than land redistribution or marriage reform.

Concerned with the CCP's infiltration into women's groups, the KMT sped up its incorporation of the existing women's organizations by legalizing only those organizations which followed the "Three People's Principles". The Organizational Principles of Women's Organizations (1930) clearly emphasized the moralistic, non-political and non-economic nature of women's groups:

"[The] improvement of knowledge and skills, the germination of morality and a health [and] maternal ethics and citizenship so that social progress will be accelerated." (Jiaoyubu Gongbao, July 26, 1930: II, 26)

These organizational principles severely limited the autonomy of women's groups in recruiting members and forming alliances among themselves. (Jiangsu Sheng Minzhenting Gongbao, Feb. 25, 1930: 1-3)

Two years later, the Organizational Principles were revised and women's organizations were further restricted and depoliticized by the KMT. (Jiaoyubu Gongbao, Nov. 6, 1932: 68-69) To supplement its efforts at incorporation, the KMT decided to unify "all" women's organizations. (Shibao, Oct. 5, 1931: II, 6)

The KMT passed a resolution to promote women's rights in factories by setting regulations to protect women and girls from working in dangerous conditions, by limiting their hours of work, etc., in 1929. This had been translated into the Factory Act, but it remained a formal piece of paper which the KMT did not and could not enforce.

During the Sino-Japanese War, the CCP's great drive to bring peasant women into production created a backlash. In 1942, a number of women in the CCP area criticized the CCP for its failure to deal with issues specific to women. But the CCP countered these critiques and insisted that "full sex equality had already been established", and that their feminism was outdated and harmful. (Davin, 1973: 73-91)

Despite this brief episode of criticism, production remained the main object for mobilizing women in the CCP area throughout the 1930s and '40s. Handicraft industries (especially textiles) were revived and agriculture was improved through the efforts of peasant women. Throughout the war period, the CCP constantly reminded women

that economic work was essential. It held the position that the "feudal oppression of women" lay in women's lack of participation in production. (Davin, 1973: 76) The resolution of the CCP on women's work in 1943 clearly de-emphasized the participation of women in other campaigns, so that "they could participate in production en masse".

(Funü Yundong Wenxian, 1949: 2-3)

The same resolution (1943) also specified that integrating women into production was the key task of the Women's Federation. The latter must "penetrate into villages, educate and help peasant women to solve the problems of engaging in work on the production line".

(Zhongguo Quanguo Minzhu Funü Lianhehui Xuanchuan Jiaoyubu, 1953: 1-3)

Centered around the issue of production were issues such as education, the war effort, and family-consolidation. In 1939, the CCP declared that the education of women was one of their tasks. Through production, peasant women learnt different production skills and raised their level of literacy. The CCP also sought to raise the political consciousness of women with respect to imperialism. This was advocated in 1940 in the notice the central committee of the CCP sent to all its branches. But this political knowledge was to be transmitted through production. (Funü Yundong Wenxian, 1949: 2-3)

The CCP encouraged peasant women to join the war effort not only by recruiting and encouraging men to join the army, but also by organizing themselves into militia, such as the Women's Detachment of the Eight Route Army. (Zhongguo Quanguo Minzhu Funü Lianhehui

Xuanchuan Jiaoyubu, 1953: 1-3)

As the war proceeded further inland, the CCP reversed its former policy of marriage reform. Instead of talking about "equality of the sexes" or "free-choice marriages", the CCP began to use slogans such as "Save the Children", "A Flourishing Family", and "Nurture, Health, and Prosperity". (Davin, 1973: 76) However, the CCP had not forgotten completely about raising the status of women. During the war, women had to take responsibility for the economic needs of the family when men began to join the armies.

Although the CCP concentrated on peasant women during the Sino-Japanese War, it called for the unity of all women irrespective of their party-affiliation and class positions. (Jiefang Zhoukan, Mar. 8, 1939: 2-5) The direction given by the CCP in 1940 made this point especially clear:

"Try hard to absorb the progressive educated women and progressive working class and peasant women into the party and increase the number of women party members..." (Jiefang Zhoukan, Mar. 8, 1940: 1)

Between 1941 and 1942, a political campaign was launched to involve as many women as possible in the election, both as electors and candidates. (Davin, 1976: 36) Throughout the whole war period, the CCP tried to recruit as many women cadres as possible. (Jiefang Zhoukan, Mar. 8, 1939: 1)

Although the CCP called for the mobilization of all women, it

actually was only able to concentrate on peasant women. This was due to historical circumstances and the regional isolation of the CCP as well as to the KMT purges of radicals in the cities. But the record of the KMT in mobilizing peasant and working class women is far from satisfactory. It continued to neglect both groups of women during the war; it concentrated mainly on coordinating women's (read: educated women's) activities in the urban settings. (Huazi Ribao, Nov. 9, 1937: II, 4)

In 1938, the KMT announced that its most urgent task was "to train women to serve in social affairs so as to increase the strength of resistance". (Zou Lu, 1965: 205) Between then and 1942, a few more programs had been designed, all aiming to escalate efforts to mobilize women. (Tan Sheying, 1952: 44-45)

In mobilizing women during the Sino-Japanese War, the education of peasant women was emphasized. The KMT stated in 1938: "We should...emphasize...propaganda work in the countryside." (Funü Gongming, Apr. 5, 1938: 5-6) Educational meetings were concentrated in Hubei and Hunan in 1938-39 and two districts in Sichuan after 1939. They included literacy classes, putting up propaganda notices and posters, giving speeches, organizing dramas and home-visits. As mentioned, the KMT also mobilized women in the areas of recreation, production, and other war efforts. (Chapter 6) Although the KMT was concerned with the production of textile goods, it could only mobilize 52,282 women between 1938 and 1943. This figure is quite insignificant in

light of the size of the female population in China. (Funü Xinyun, July 1944: 19-44)

The extent to which the KMT succeeded in mobilizing working class women was also minimal. The project of producing textile goods mentioned above involved such a small number of people, it did not reduce the unemployment rate among working class women. The KMT launched an educational campaign in the factories to raise the literacy rate of factory women, but only six factories were involved in this project. Between 1943 and 1944, only 5,366 working class women were involved in the educational project. Judging from the small scale of these educational efforts, it is doubtful that the KMT's mobilization of working class women was effective. (Funü Xinyun, July 1944: 26-27)

Although the KMT claimed to be mobilizing all women, it ended up just dealing with educated women. This neglect of working class and peasant women was criticized in the Chinese press during this period. The Eastern Miscellany (Dongfang Zazhi), for example, was very critical of the KMT's inattention to women in the "lower strata". (Mo Yan, Jan. 1938: 71-75) Women's journals such as the Women's Life (Funü Shenghuo), United Voices of Women (Funü Gongming), and Guangdong Women (Guangdong Funü) consistently pointed out the class-bias in the KMT-led women's movements: the members and leaders of the movements were educated women, and there was a lack of support among peasant and working class women. (Xiong Zhi, Mar. 8, 1937: 12-14) The women's literature urged greater mobilization of poor women. (Liang Ying, Apr.

5, 1938: 11-13)

At the end of the Sino-Japanese War, several drastic changes occurred in the CCP policy regarding the mobilization of women. Land reform was re-introduced with great vigor. Peasant women were urged to join mass meetings to decide the division of land, the reduction of rents and interests, the disposal of landlords' properties, and the treatment of landlords. Peasant women could now have a share in the land, and sometimes separate land deeds were issued to men and women. (Davin, 1973: 83)

The integration of peasant women into production continued to be the central policy of the CCP during this period. It has been claimed that by 1949, 50-70 percent of women in the liberated areas were working in the fields, and as many as 80 percent in the best organized locations. (Davin, 1976: 47)

Apart from involving women in production and re-introducing land reform, the CCP made a special effort to raise the status of women by changing the thinking of both men and women, and simultaneously advocated the abolition of foot-binding, infanticide, purchase marriages, and the system of "child-wives", educational rights, etc. These reforms paved the way for the Marriage Laws of 1950, but between 1945 and 1949, they were not pushed very hard. (Davin, 1976: 82)

As early as 1946, the CCP began to shift their mobilization campaigns from the countryside to the cities. By 1949, this policy was clearly stated in the All-China Women's Congress:

"Contemporary work with women, while ensuring that work with peasant women is not jeopardized, should treat the urban women's movement as its focus of concern."

(Quanguo Minzhu Funü Lianhehui, 1950: 1)

Consequently, the CCP strategy in 1949 was to mobilize women of all classes. The CCP decided that in the previously liberated area, women should continue production, attack feudalist ideas, and improve levels of political education and hygienic knowledge. In the newly liberated areas, women should engage in interest-and-rent reduction campaigns, land reforms, production, and anti-warlord movements. (Zhongguo Funü Divici Quanguo Daibiao Da Hui, 1949: 87-91)

As the focus of the CCP in 1945-1949 began to shift to the urban settings, its concern with mobilizing working class women increased. This was revealed as early as 1946 when a new women's journal was published in Zhanjinkou (Kalgan) which carried articles related to working class women. (Davin, 1976: 155) The resolution adopted in 1949 by the First National Congress of the Women's Federation advocated working class women as the base and uniting them with the intellectual and professional women in the towns. (Davin, 1976: 156-57):

"Within the national boundary, [we] have to strengthen, expand, [and] penetrate into the working masses of women, [and] mobilize and unite them with the oppressed masses of women of various classes all over China, to

construct and expand the united front [of the forces] which oppose American imperialist invasion, the reactionary regime of the KMT, feudalism, and capitalism, together [we] struggle and build a united and democratic people's republic in China." (Zhongguo Funü Diyici Quanguo Daibiao Da Hui, 1949: 2-3)

While the CCP's mobilization of working class women and peasant women reached its peak after the Sino-Japanese War, the KMT tended to relax its campaign. In fact, increasingly, women were encouraged to go back home and taking care of children and doing household tasks were glorified. (Guangdong Funü, Oct. 1945: 2-3) Peasant and working class women were ignored by the KMT. The class bias of the KMT-led women's activities in this period was revealed in an article in Dagongbao (Shanghai). Peng Lan argued that the urban women who spent most of their time organizing meetings and giving speeches to women were neglecting "those who really needed to be liberated --- the peasant women". (Peng Lan, Mar. 8, 1948: 7)

Summary

The above discussion illustrates the distinction in policies between the CCP and the KMT. From its inception, the CCP was interested in mobilizing peasant and working class women. In contrast, it is doubtful that the KMT was genuinely enthusiastic about mobilizing women in general, let alone working class and peasant women. As noted,

before the Sino-Japanese War, the KMT policies indicated that it intended to depoliticize the women's movements.

While the CCP did not have a specific policy in mobilizing working class women, it had articulated strategies in mobilizing peasant women. The CCP followed the strategies of marriage reform, land redistribution, and production. The last one was the one most persistently pursued during the period under examination. In contrast, the KMT employed education as a means of mobilizing women. Evidence shows that through production, the CCP influenced peasant women more significantly than the KMT did through its educational campaigns (which only took place in a few locations). The CCP did not deny the importance of educating peasant women, but claimed that education was secondary to production, land redistribution, and the removal of feudal family relationships. The CCP maintained that women could be educated through production.

The failure of the KMT to mobilize both working class and peasant women was due to (a) its lack of concern for these women; and (b) its policy of educational reform.

Peasant women constituted the majority of the female population in China, and factory women were a significant part of the urban population. Ignoring them as the KMT did meant restricting its power-base and for any political party or social movement this is suicidal. The KMT admitted this error after its defeat in Taiwan. Pi Yishu (1950: 8-9) commented on this mistake, especially with respect to the neglect

of peasant women:

"From the beginning and up to now, the Chinese women's movement...has concentrated in the cities. [It is] a career for a minority of women intellectuals, and most of the women in the countryside remain unmobilized... In fact, this majority of women are suffering the most; at the same time, they constitute the most powerful...force,...[and] women's movements cannot be totally successful without them. Previous work in the women's movements on the mainland has already given us many precious experiences and lessons."

The second reason for the KMT's failure was its strategy of education. In a period in which there were natural disasters, economic crises, starvation, and poverty, it was meaningless and futile to teach peasant and working class women how to read or to tell them about the brutality of the Japanese. The exploitation and oppression that the working class women in the cities had to experience everyday was enough to make them sick and die. For these women, the enemy was not the Japanese who invaded the country, rather it was the supervisors or owners of the factories. The Japanese invasions meant extra hardship for these women workers, but educating them did not solve their anxiety about unemployment and poverty, or the workplace brutality. For peasant women, destitution and hunger were their two main concerns. Food

was the major issue of concern, and the CCP realized this. Instead of merely educating the peasant women, the CCP concentrated on production and land redistribution which, in both the short and the long runs, could solve the problems confronting peasant women. It is obvious that the KMT's educational strategy had missed the target.

In a world of feudalist and authoritarian relationships within the Chinese peasant family system, illiteracy and ignorance of world affairs did not oppress women. The confessions of peasant women in "speak-bitterness meetings" testify to this. (Cusack, 1959: 52-53) The KMT miscalculated in employing educational campaigns to mobilize peasant and working class women. The CCP, in contrast, clearly analyzed the specific milieu of peasant women (and to some extent, working class women) --- economic dependence, restriction within the family, and desperation. Land redistribution, marriage reforms, and increased production were certainly favoured by peasant women.

Organizational Tactics of Women-Mobilization

Only one year after its formation, the CCP established a ministry of women and a special bureau to mobilize women. (Kristeva, 1977: 112) Xiang Jingyu was selected as the first leader of the women's bureau in 1922.

The CCP's mobilization of women was based on the existing networks of women, such as women's organizations, women's bureaux, and adult schools. (Leith, 1973: 49) The CCP members formed the leadership of the militant National Women's Association which had 300,000

members. (Curtin, 1975: 26) Women cadres were trained to mobilize peasant women in Guangdong in 1926. (Wu Naiyin, 1962: 15) The CCP recommended that the peasant women's movement should be based on the existing peasants' unions. The "Emergency Notice" of the Hubei Peasants' Union (June 1927) testifies to this format: "Organizationally, ...peasant women should be actively absorbed into the unions." (Wang Jiamin, 1965: I, 428) In the same year, the CCP branch in Wuhan further specified that peasant schools and cooperatives be constructed to absorb women in the movement. (Wang Jiamin, 1965: I, 435)

Throughout the 1910s, the KMT abandoned its policy of mobilizing women as noted. It was not until 1923 that the first Women's Bureau was formed by the KMT. (Shibao, Apr. 1, 1925: II, 4) By 1926, the KMT had constructed "women's bureaux" in every branch of the Party and at all levels. This was to facilitate the KMT's incorporation of the existing women's movements and to pre-empt the CCP's efforts to mobilize women. (Jiangxi Funü, Mar. 8, 1937: 24-25)

By 1931, the mobilization of peasant and working class women had become an integrated part of the CCP party-work at every level of the Party in the Soviets, and in the Poor Peasants' Unions. During the Long March, the CCP still maintained a "Women's Work" bureau to organize women's activities. (Edgar Snow, 1957: 138)

There were some changes in the organizational structure of the KMT's mobilization work after 1927. As soon as the KMT consolidated its power, it removed "women's bureaux" from its party structure, and

4

subordinated their functions under the newly-formed Public Training Committee in 1928. Under this new Committee and its provincial branches, "women's sections" were created. (Gongjiao Zhishi, Apr. 1971: 11-12) This structural alteration implied that the mobilization of women ceased to be one of the central "training" programs. It also meant that KMT underestimated as well as undermined the significance of women-mobilization. To further take control of the direction of the existing women's movements, the KMT demanded that all women's organizations be registered under the new Public Training Committee. (Shibao, July 1, 1928: 5)

Between 1934 and 1938, three national women's organizations were created: the Women's Working Committee of the New Life Movement (1934), the Headquarters of Chinese Women for the Consolation of Self-Defence and Resistance Soldiers (1937), and the Wartime Childcare Headquarters (1938). The first was formed to promote Confucian moral principles among Chinese women, but it expanded in July 1938 to coordinate all women's resistance work. (Funü Shenghuo, Aug. 20, 1938: 19) The latter were formed in response to the escalating attacks of the Japanese.

The distinction between the CCP and the KMT in the 1920s and early 1930s were: the mobilization of women was still party-work in the case of the CCP, but the KMT gradually abandoned such a venture, and subsumed it under the category of "public training". Since women were still recruited through peasants' unions instead of independent

women's organizations in the CCP's areas, the CCP tended to view women in "class" terms (and not as a distinct "gender" group). In contrast, the KMT saw women as a separate group in which "gender" certainly was the key element. With the exception of the KMT after 1934, both parties did not rely heavily on separate women's organizations for the task of mobilization.

During the Sino-Japanese War, the CCP followed the "Popular Front" line with the KMT. There were some structural mergers of the CCP and the KMT in the mobilization of women. But the "cooperation" of these two parties was actually quite limited with the exception of the Wartime Childcare Association in which the women's organizations of both parties closely cooperated. (Collins, 1976: 645)

For the CCP, the mobilization of women was directed by the Women's Committee of the Central Committee. The CCP also established the Village Women's Representatives' Organization and the All-Women's Federation above the village level as early as 1938. (Wang Yiwei, 1938: 22-23) Special women's groups were also formed to promote resistance activities, such as work teams, service teams, sisters' associations, patriotic organizations, national salvation teams, resistance teams, etc. (Yan'an Shishi Wenti Yanjiu Hui, 1940: 382-83) By 1939, more than 8,000 locations in northern China had already established women's national salvation teams. At the end of the War, 88 percent of the villages in the CCP's Border Regions had village women's organizations. (Li Baoguang, 1946: 6-9)

Membership in these organizations had been increasing since the declaration of the Sino-Japanese War. An estimated 130,000 members belonged to these mass organizations of peasant women in 1937, and by 1943, the number had risen to 2,532,208. (Helen Snow, 1967: 225) By 1945, these mass organizations in Shaan-Ningxia and seven other liberated areas had 7,100,000 members. (Davlin, 1976: 43)

Although these organizations played a coordinating role, peasant women were actually mobilized through the "grass-roots" structure of production cooperatives, literacy classes, peasant unions, mutual help teams, youth organizations, etc. within each village. There were no "grass-roots" women's organizations below the village level.

(Zhongguo Funü Dafanshen, 1949: 4-6)

In 1938, the Women's Guidance of the New Life Movement (formerly known as the Women's Working Committee of the New Life Movement established in 1934) was designated as the KMT-organizer of women's war efforts. Meanwhile, the "women's bureau" of the KMT was finally reinstated in the party structure in 1938. (It was abolished in 1928.) It was claimed that the party branches had "women's associations" in every county and province. (Tan Sheying, 1962: 62) The new women's bureau was later known as the Women's Movement Committee. It was subordinated to the KMT's Central Organizational Bureau in 1941, and a year later, it unified the provincial women's organizations under its management. (Guangdong Funü, July 15, 1941: 19-21)

During the Sino-Japanese War, the Women's Guidance Committee

as had been increasing since the
 an estimated 130,000 members
 peasant women in 1937, and by

(Helen Snow, 1967: 225) By
 Ningxia and seven other
 (Davlin, 1976: 43)

played a coordinating role, pea-
 gh the "grass-roots" structure
 sses, peasant unions, mutual
 thin each village. There were
 below the village level.

the New Life Movement (formerly
 the New Life Movement esta-
 T-organizer of women's war
 of the KMT was finally rein-
 It was abolished in 1928.)

d "women's associations" in
 1962: 62) The new women's
 ement Committee. It was subor-
 l Bureau In 1941, and a year
 organizations under its manage-

of the New Life Movement was the main coordinator of women's activities. The organization had 12 provincial branches and 34 women-work teams (one in each government department). (Funü Xinyun, July 1944) (See Appendix XXV)

The distinction between the CCP and the KMT activities during the war are not obvious on the formal organizational level. Both were centrally organized except for the fact that the KMT had separate national women's organizations to coordinate all work at a fairly high level of its administration. The CCP, however, had only one separate women's organization (that is, the All-Women's Federation) just above the village level. The other difference was that women were mobilized through a branch (or sub-branch) of a national women's organization under the KMT's administration, but in the CCP's areas, peasant women were mobilized through the existing grass-roots peasant's (and not specifically women's) organizations. The latter feature is not trivial considering the persistent priority of class over gender in CCP's framework, and that of gender over class in the KMT's.

After the war, the CCP continued to mobilize peasant women in the pre-existing poor peasants' unions, cooperatives, mutual-help teams, and literacy classes according to their social (class) backgrounds. (Zhongguo Funü Dafanshen, 1949: 4-6) In its initial stage of land reform, the CCP mobilized peasant women who worked as "hired-labour", gradually it began mobilizing "middle-peasants". The extensiveness of this mobilization may be seen in Ding Xian of Hebei; by the end of

1947, 84 percent and 74 percent of the peasant women who were "hired-labour" and "middle-peasants" respectively were incorporated into existing peasants' unions. (Quanguo Minzhu Funli Lianhehui Choubel Weiyuanhui, 1949: 17-21)

Mobilizing based on pre-existing peasants' groups was criticized by some CCP members for its neglect of unorganized peasant women and the overlapping of memberships and of the work carried on by the various organizations. More importantly, the pre-existing organizational structures failed to concentrate on problems specific to women such as childcare, family disputes, love and marriage, etc.

In 1949, the CCP published a report showing the usefulness of special organizations for women. It was argued that the mobilization of women was best done in two organizations: one for both sexes, the other exclusively for women. The latter could hold small meetings so that women could speak their minds; and these meetings would not last too long so as to avoid interfering with familial obligations. (Davin, 1976: 43-44)

Consequently, after some debate on this issue, the CCP announced in 1948 that "a separate women's mass organization" is a must. The basic unit of women's organizations changed from peasants' groups to the Women's Representatives Congress. There were women's representatives' congresses in factories, departments, voluntary associations, schools, hospitals, and workers' residences in all neighbourhoods, villages, districts, counties, and regions. These congresses were

organized under the Women's Federation of the Liberated Areas. (Cusack, 1959: 199-200) Congresses were to be held periodically to discuss the lessons, experiences, and directions of women's mobilization. The women representatives' congresses were hierarchically arranged. Representatives were elected from each neighbourhood, village, district, and county to represent the viewpoints of women in their own areas. These representatives elected leaders to attend congresses to the higher levels. For example, the leaders of the village representatives attended the district women's congresses, and so on. (Zhongguo Funu Diyi Quanguo Daibiao Da Hui, 1949: 69-74)

In the cities, the organizational structure focussed on the occupational groups or the residences of women. It was claimed that, through this organizational structure, working class women as well as other career women could best be mobilized. (Zhongguo Funu Diyi Quanguo Daibiao Da Hui, 1949: 69-74) Two types of organizations were set up: dependents' associations and residents' committees (or street committees). The former were set up in factories or firms and its members were mainly housewives in workers' families. These organizations were directed by trade unions. The latter were mainly composed of women living in the same residential area or on the same street. These women --- working class and residential --- met periodically to discuss the experiences and problems they confronted as women. (Davin, 1976: 157) The special task of the residents' committee was to organize "housewives" or unemployed women and introduce them to various

occupations or literacy classes. (Quanguo Minzhu Funü Lianhehui, 1950: 19-23)

In the KMT's areas, the Women's Guidance Committee of the New Life Movement remained a national coordinator of women-work. During this period, the CCP competed with the KMT by forming a separate national women's organization in the liberated areas.

The organizational structure of the CCP and the KMT were quite different: Although the CCP did not have a separate top-level women's organization until 1948, the KMT had developed three by 1934. The CCP continued to mobilize women through grass-roots, usually peasant-oriented, organizations and the KMT carried out a limited mobilization through branches of the central national women's organizations. Although the CCP consistently maintained a "women's committee" within its party structure, the KMT dropped such a committee between 1928 and 1938. The KMT did not have special organizations for each "class" of women; the CCP had several groups or organizations to mobilize peasant women most of the time. This comparison of organizational structures suggests that the CCP focussed on class, while the KMT thought gender to be more important than class. These modes of analysis and organizational structures were mutually reinforcing and were related to the mobilization methods used by the two parties.

Approaches to Women-Mobilization

CCP

The approach used by the CCP throughout this period may be

labelled a "mass line" approach. (Ilpynong Kim, 1970: 79-98) As Mao Zedong declared in 1934:

"The central task of [the Soviet government] is to mobilize the broad masses to take part in the revolutionary war, overthrow imperialism and the Kuomintang [or Guomindang] by means of such war, spread the revolution throughout the country, and drive imperialism out of China... For revolutionary war is a war of masses; it can be waged only by mobilizing the masses and relying on them." (Ilpynong, 1970: 79-80)

Following the "mass line" politics, the mobilization of women, according to Mao, has to:

"(G)rasp firmly the issues of immediate benefit to the women masses, mobilize [women] according to these issues [and] relate [them] to full-scale political mobilization." (Quanguo Minzhu Funu Lianhehui, 1950: iii)

This "grass-roots" approach became the central technique for mobilizing women. As early as 1926, the CCP resolved that when party-members mobilized women, they must "become one with the masses, and should not separate themselves from the masses," because the CCP's "central responsibility is to recruit and gain support from the masses". In addition, the CCP advocated popularizing women's publications by "describing the immediate suffering and concrete demands

of women, so that every woman can see and feel" that these publications represent their voice and experience. (Luo Qiong, 1952: 26-28)

This approach was again re-instated during the Sino-Japanese War and after:

"All the women-mobilization cadres [should] penetrate deeply into the working class women, and blend with the poor women as one." (Zhongguo Funü Dafanshen, 1949: 4-6)

In concluding a panel on women-mobilization in 1946, one CCP cadre commented on this approach:

"In conclusion, the principle of what [one should] do is begin with the demands of the masses according to the concrete circumstances, and determine the things that we should do. In the past, we have had some comrades who formulated a whole set of plans, and then went to the masses so as to 'fulfill the plans'; this tendency should be radically changed now... We should be determined to follow this principle: join those people whom [we] serve. To serve working class women, [one] has to go among working class women and join their production, and mix with them in their daily life, [so that] their demands can be deeply understood. What they want determines what [we will] do [for them]. Move one step forward

in helping and educating them. [We] should demolish the attitude that we are acting as political cadres outside the masses." (Shidai Funü, July 1946: 10-11)

This approach was facilitated by the specially trained cadres of the CCP. It had been a persistent policy of the CCP to train cadres for the mobilization of women since 1926, especially after 1937. The CCP resolved in 1939 to mobilize all women cadres and women members within the party to take up the responsibility of mobilizing women and to try their best to recruit more women for this task. (Jiefang Zhoukan, Mar. 8, 1939: 1)

In response to this resolution, the women's groups of northwestern Shanxi determined to train one-third more cadres in three months on the village level, and to form cadre-training classes on the county level to train at least 60 cadre-leaders in three months. (Lan Feng, 1939: 19-20) The same resolution could be found during the civil war period. (Zhongguo Funü Diyici Quanguo Daibiao Da Hui, 1949: 58-59)

Through "mixing" with the masses and finding out what they wanted, the women cadres were able to approach women in a friendly way. In fact, the CCP made sure that the whole party was friendly to the masses of women. The armies were instructed to treat the villagers with respect wherever they went. (Guangdong Sheng Zhengfu Gongbao, Dec. 31, 1930: 28-29) During the Long March, when the Red Army fought its way through eleven provinces, it made sure that it did not loot or plunder the vil-

lages it passed through. Especially important was the regulation that the army could not "take liberties with women". This was very different from the armies of the warlords or the KMT, and this is one of the reasons why the Red Army was acceptable to the villagers. (Palk, 1972: 107)

Another approach that the women cadres took was the "small group" speak-bitterness technique. Usually, a woman cadre gathered a few women together in a village, a production unit or a cooperative group, and simply invited them to talk about their lives and experiences. The cadre encouraged them to find a means of solving their immediate problems, and attempted to politicize them by linking their experiences with the larger political context. (Tarvis, 1974: 49)

In the countryside, it was quite common to find women working together: spinning, weaving, reeling, etc. This was encouraged by the CCP since it allowed the women to communicate among themselves. The women cadres usually lived and worked with other peasant women. If they were mobilizing destitute women who did not have work, these cadres followed their life-styles: begging for food or looking for employment. By actually living and working with their fellow women, they were able to gain the confidence and support of these women. These cadres paid special attention to peasant women's immediate demands, such as the care of children or household tasks. Mutual help teams were organized especially at harvest time. The cadres introduced songs or rhymes related to production or politics to peasant women, and later to working class

women; and also taught them how to read and write elementary words related to their daily life. Women were encouraged to talk about their familial or marriage problems. They might talk about bitter experiences with their masters, etc. The whole idea behind this approach was that "bitterness will elicit more bitterness"; the task of the women-cadres was to politicize them through such confessions and link their experiences with the landlords or male-chauvinism to the larger political situation. (Zhongguo Funü Dafanshen, 1949: 9-11)

Of course, there were no standard blue-prints for the mobilization of women, and the CCP did not prescribe any. It constantly cautioned women cadres that they must take into consideration the objective circumstances of the villages in which they worked and mobilize women accordingly. However, it appears that the above approaches mentioned were general enough to apply in quite a number of places, peasant women able to obtain food (thus solving their immediate problem), and also to come to the realization that marital problems, poverty, and starvation were all related to feudalism, imperialism and male chauvinism. (Liu Zhi, 1949: 17-21)

These mobilization approaches were used also in the towns and cities after the CCP's shift in policy in the late 1940s, but they were tailored to suite regional specificities.

KMT

If the CCP approach was a "mass line" one, the KMT's was an "elitist" one. Unlike the CCP cadres, the KMT women officers contacted

the educated youth and/or well-known officials in a few selected districts or villages. Once they received their approval or acceptance, these women-officers began their mobilization work in the countryside. (Chi Zhenchao, 1938: 78-84) In contrast, the CCP started off with the peasant women rather than with the "elite" in the villages.

The KMT cadres then organized literacy classes and propaganda campaigns. Peasant women were encouraged to join the literacy classes and to learn how to read, write, and sing. Speeches were made, dramas presented, and posters and cartoons posted to promote anti-Japanese sentiment, knowledge of hygiene, etc. In some cases, welcoming parties, family-visits, sanitary competitions, and discussion forums were carried out to promote publicity. These campaigns were expected to raise women's consciousness with respect to women's repression, war, etc. (Ma Jin, 1938: 24-25) Unlike the CCP, the KMT designed "education" and "propaganda" materials prior to mobilization, and they were used mechanically in the rural areas irrespective of local conditions. (Chi Zhenchao, 1938: 78-84) Often, literacy classes were not linked to production skills or daily necessities, and it appeared useless to peasant women to join them. The high turnover rate in participation testifies to this.

During the harvest season, literacy classes were sometimes abandoned in favour of building childcare centers and carrying out surveys and censuses. Skill-training was only marginally carried out. (Ma Jin, 1938: 24-25; Guixiu, 1938, 19-20)

Although the KMT gave lip service to mobilizing working class women, and in its literature urged women officers to "penetrate into the masses of women" and "actively and intimately relate to the masses of women", their actions were "formalistic, official, and separate from the masses". (Funü Shenghuo She, 1939: 24) Although the KMT provided a number of services for working class women, such as counselling, literacy classes, entertainment, etc., they failed to use these services illustrating their lack of appeal. Women officers responsible for encouraging working class women to educate themselves often found this task "difficult", and reported that there were a number of "stubborn" workers who refused to be educated. (Funü Xinyun, July 1944: 29)

In summarizing the weaknesses of the women-mobilization campaigns of the KMT, one writer noted in 1940:

"Most of the women's organizations lack a foundation in the masses mainly because the organizations themselves fail to fit the needs of the masses. [They are run by] a few women with ambitions for leadership [and] temporary enthusiasm; [they] do not recognize their [limited] strength, or understand the needs of the masses. Since their formation, the [women's] organizations have been managed and run by a small number of people. Their recruited members usually come on the invitation of several people [in the organizations]. The members still fail to feel that these organizations are theirs.... Consequently, with paper

membership and empty-headed leadership, organizations separate from the masses have been formed. These organizations have failed to appropriate the needs of the masses and therefore have little chance to expand their work." (Shiliang, 1940: 4-6)

Thus, in mobilizing working class women and peasant women, the KMT adopted the mentality of urban educated women (who had not experienced life in the countryside or in the factories or unemployment) while neglecting completely the concrete and immediate needs of working class and peasant women. It is not surprising that these "elitist" approaches mobilized only a limited proportion of peasant women. (Funü Xinyun, July 1944: 19-44)

The failure of the KMT's approach was criticized in a letter to the editors of the Funü Shanghuo (Women's Life):

"If the government does not improve the lives of the poor masses, then mobilizing [them] is impossible. As long as their immediate daily needs remain unsolved, they will not be impressed by flowery speeches or statements that the country is in great peril and how painful it would be if their country is defeated." (Fùnù Shenghuo, Sept. 16, 1939: 29)

Conclusion

The activities used to mobilize women by both the CCP and the KMT were similar, especially during the Sino-Japanese War: officer-training, education, production, soldiers-consolation, child-welfare, military

training, nursing and medical care, etc. But a comparison of the types of activities sponsored by the CCP and the KMT does not tell us why the CCP was successful in enlisting peasant women in resistance, and why the KMT failed. It can explain why the KMT could mobilize some educated women. What matters most in the mobilization of peasant women is not what they were mobilized to do but how they were mobilized. The cases of the CCP and the KMT in China bear this out.

Its lack of concern with women, especially working class and peasant women, and its fixation on educational campaigns show that the KMT was distant from the masses of women. The CCP, in contrast, made the mobilization of peasant women and, to a lesser extent, working class women part of its program right from its beginning. In addition, their policies of marriage reform, land redistribution, and most important of all, production clearly show the CCP's familiarity with the poverty and oppression experienced by peasant women.

Organizationally, the KMT mobilized women from the top down through highly centralized women's organizations established to carry out the policies of the KMT. Peasant women were mobilized through teams of women-officers who entered villages, gained the approval of the village-elite or local gentry, and introduced educational (read: propaganda) materials developed by central women's organizations in the cities. Similarly, factory women were encouraged to learn or join the government campaigns to defend the country. Little attempt was made to understand these women on a grass-roots level. In contrast, the CCP

worked its way up beginning with peasant women and, to some extent, working class women. Peasant organizations were used to recruit women. The CCP tried to understand the experiences of peasant women by living and working with them and relating their experiences to the larger political structure through small "speak bitterness" meetings or small productive units. It paid attention to their general welfare and their individual immediate needs. No blueprints for mobilization were offered by the CCP, and mobilization tactics were tailored to regional or local specificities after a long period of observation and experiences on the part of the women cadres. Since the CCP's strategies were more relevant to the peasant women, its "mass line" approach further reinforced the impetus of mobilization. The irrelevant "educational" policy and "elitist" approach of the KMT simply turned the peasant women and working class women away.

The differences in policies, organizational structures and approaches between the CCP and the KMT are largely related to their frameworks of analysis. Throughout this period (1912-1949), the CCP perceived "class" as cutting across "gender" lines, but the KMT insisted that "gender" cut across "class" lines. This is witnessed in the KMT's selection of "educational" policy as opposed to the CCP "economic" one, their organizational structures, and the selection of an "elitist" approach as opposed to a "mass line" one advocated by the CCP. The KMT's class-biased framework assumed that peasant and working class women suffered from the same weakness as their urban educated counter-

parts, namely a lack of understanding, education, and occupational skills, and so in mobilizing peasant and working class women, they formulated their strategy with an urban middle class bias. The CCP, however, saw that there are different "classes" of women --- bourgeois women differ from peasant and working class women in their relation to the means of production, life-experiences, mentality, needs, and concerns. Based on this analysis, the CCP wisely used "economic" policies in mobilizing peasant women and after 1945, working class women, instead of educational ones. Their organizational patterns also demonstrate their analysis: the KMT mobilized peasant women through women's organizations, and the CCP mobilized them through peasant organizations or working class (unions) organizations.

Since the KMT did not think in "class" terms, the concerns of the women who ran the national women's organizations were perceived to be the concern of all women. This "universalization" of the experiences of one class blinded them from realizing that the application of their approaches to peasant and working class women had an "elitist" bias. In contrast, the CCP viewed women in a "class" framework and classified peasant women into different strata. These women were then regarded as having different life-experiences, concerns, mentalities, etc, based on their position in the peasantry. The grass-roots approach the CCP used to understand working class and peasant women and to mobilize them was more successful than the KMT's "elitist" approach.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

In this final chapter, we will (a) present a summary of the major findings; (b) discuss the role of women in social change; (c) evaluate the relevance of several theoretical frameworks of social (women's) movements to our case study; and (d) outline areas of future research.

Origin and Development of the Chinese Women's Movements

As stated in Chapter 1, this study aims at accomplishing three tasks: (a) to document the roles of women in social change; (b) to find out which factors facilitated the rise of women's movements at the turn of this century; and (c) to examine the mechanisms which affected the development of the women's movements between 1900 and 1949. In this section, we will deal with (b) and (c), leaving the roles of women in social change to be discussed later.

We have examined four women's movements in this study, all of them germinated at the turn of this century, and developed throughout the period before 1949. It was in the context of military threats and interventions, economic deterioration, and political turmoil that the women's movements developed. Throughout the 19th century, China suffered a series of military defeats, and consequently, China's political autonomy and economic independence were gradually undermined by foreign powers which imported cheap goods into China, gained judicial privileges

in many politico-economic spheres, maintained their security forces, and obtained many other benefits. With this background, more and more Chinese (women included) came to the realization that the Manchu regime needed to be overthrown towards the end of the 19th century.

At the turn of this century, the tide of constitutionalist demands and revolutionary activities was on the rise. The occupation of Beijing by eight foreign powers (1900) seemed to galvanize the consciousness of some men and women. Two years after the episode, the first women's organization was established. In the first decade of this century, Chinese women founded several organizations and published magazines and newspapers advocating the liberation of women and the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty. Ideas of equal democratic rights for women in education and politics as well as anti-imperialist sentiments were intertwined in the articles of these publications. Women, however, appeared to focus on anti-Manchuism, although anti-imperialist and educational reform activities were not ignored. In the 1900s, educated women played a leading role in the rising radicalism.

While the educated women were the vanguard of the women's movements in the 1900s, the peasants and working class women's fights for equality and survival remained sporadic and localized. The declining peasant economy and the deteriorating working conditions in factories began to affect the peasants and the working class. With the help of the CCP --- a topic to be discussed later --- the women workers and peasant women began to organize in the 1920s. One must note that this

decade was also a period of intense radicalism with anti-imperialism, anti-warlordism, cultural evaluation, anti-feudalism, and anti-capitalism occurring on all fronts. It was a period in which we find the emergence of the CCP, the provincial autonomy movement, the Northern Expedition of the KMT, internal fights among warlords, escalating foreign interventions in China's politics and economy, the May Fourth Movement, the rise of trade union movements, general strikes, and student activism. As in the 1900s, this period was sparked by the Paris Peace Conference (1919) when the Chinese realized that imperialist powers were closely collaborating at the expense of China.

It was obvious that the women's movements of the educated, working class, and peasant women developed in the context of political activism (1900s and 1920s), and were galvanized or further escalated by events which related to foreign powers (the occupation of Beijing in 1900 and the Paris Peace Conference in 1919). The women's movements were part of larger political movements to gain national liberation and to strengthen China.

In terms of organization, the women's movements did not arise in a vacuum. The special conditions in Tokyo at the turn of this century were conducive to the formation of women's groups. The expansion of education for women drew some Chinese women to the women's schools in Tokyo where, due to the interconnection between student clubs and political organizations, women became more politicized. Since the revolutionary organizations were not strong enough to absorb the politicized women students, the latter formed their own independent groups. While

places like Shanghai and Guangzhou had a similar mixture of women's schools, political organizations, and student clubs, the political organizations were more connected with the schools where women studied, as such they were able to channelize women's activism into the political organizations.

A pre-existing network was important in the rise of the Chinese women's movements. In the 1900s, we note that women's organizations advocating revolution, educational reform, and anti-imperialism emerged from the above-mentioned network. These pioneer women's groups constituted the pre-existing network for the woman suffrage movement in 1911-1912. Our data suggest that the revolutionary organizations and periodicals later became woman suffrage ones.

For women who were not involved in this network, such as the working class and peasant women, the impact of political parties became decisive in their organization. We noted that, in the 1920s, the CCP was trying to organize working class women in factories and the peasant women in the countryside. This resulted in a series of strikes in the cities and in a few short-lived and localized soviets in the countryside. When the CCP was driven into the rural areas after 1927, it continued its organizing work among peasant women with increased vigor, especially during and after the Sino-Japanese War. In organizing peasant women, the CCP utilized the existing peasant unions, cooperatives, etc. and incorporated women into them. This further strengthens the argument that pre-existing networks are necessary for the formation of women's

movements, in this case, the latter were facilitated by a political party.

The above discussion suggests that the role of political organizations in the formation of women's movements was significant --- the politicization of educated women through the work of Tongmenghui and the organization of peasant (and to a lesser extent, working class) women by the CCP. In addition, political organizations also played an important role in the development of women's movements in China. This may be seen in the efforts of the KMT and the CCP in directing women's activism toward their own ends.

Since its inception in 1921, the CCP had been actively recruiting women for revolutionary purposes. There were set-backs due to KMT suppression after 1927, but the exodus of the CCP into the countryside turned out to be its blessing because it escaped KMT dominance. Consequently, the CCP was able to do some organizing among peasant women. The onslaught of the Sino-Japanese War forced the KMT government to focus on war efforts in the coastal regions and later in central China. In its northern border regions, the CCP was more or less isolated in its mobilizing work among peasant women. The radical ideology of the CCP channelized peasant women's frustration and anger into a positive and vigorous force in overthrowing the feudal landlord-tenant system, patriarchal family relationships, imperialist dominance, the KMT government and the capitalist system it represented. Under the CCP's down-to-earth "mass line" approach, peasant women were mobilized into the existing peasant associations to carry on revolutionary as well as anti-imperialist

work.

Although the position of the KMT was ambivalent towards women in the 1910s and early 1920s, it became increasingly concerned with incorporating the existing women's movements in the mid-1920s. After the White Terror of 1927, the KMT continued to incorporate the existing women's organizations but, this time, aimed at de-militantizing them. This may be seen in the suppression of women's activism in 1927-28, the reorganization of "women's work" within the government bureaucracy, and the creation of a conservative counter-ideology urging women to follow the Confucian tradition. Such KMT actions slowed the development of the women's movements and de-radicalized women's activism. This lasted for roughly eight years. Beginning in 1934, the KMT government saw the need to remobilize Chinese women to engage in anti-Japanese wartime efforts. A few national women's organizations were established to coordinate this task. But, due to its top-down "elitist" approach, the KMT was unable to reach the working class or the peasant women. Apart from a few token gestures at recruiting these women, the KMT focussed on mobilizing urban educated women. Since the KMT was not interested in radicalizing women, its mobilizing work relaxed after the Sino-Japanese War. Simultaneously, its conservative counter-ideology emerged once again shifting the direction of the existing women's movements.

Differences between CCP and KMT policies and approaches in incorporating Chinese women explain why the activities of women in the countryside and the cities varied in substance and militancy, and why the women's

movements in the cities had their "ups and downs". They further explain why the KMT could only recruit educated women, and the CCP peasant (and to some extent, working class) women. Since the majority of women in China were predominantly peasants, the CCP-KMT difference suggests an explanation for why the CCP was able to use the peasant women's movement for revolutionary purposes.

While the incorporation of the women's movements by the KMT government was able to de-radicalize and change the direction of women's movements, repression could not. One of the characteristics of the Chinese women's movements was that they grew and developed in periods of strong government suppression. The activism of women in the 1900s was met with severe repressive measures by the Manchus. After that, in the period under examination, the women's movements existed side by side with the repression of the Yuan's regime, the warlord governments, and the KMT government. It was noted that repression had the short-term effect of driving the movements underground as witnessed in the years immediately following 1912 and 1927. In some situations, such as the periods of 1919-27 and 1945-49 when the politico-economic conditions were intolerable to many people, women's movements actually flourished under repression. This means that repression has a radicalizing effect on women. However, when repression was carried along with government incorporation (when a counter-ideology was adopted), the suppression of women's movements became more effective, as witnessed in the period of 1927-34. In examining the history of the Chinese women's movements, one

may generally argue that government incorporation tends to be more effective than repression in controlling the women's movements.

The educated Chinese women's movements have volumes of literature documenting their conceptions of revolution, suffrage, education, and imperialism. These conceptions were well articulated as the movements developed. Themes, justifications, strategies, and tactics were proposed and elaborated on in different areas of concern --- overthrowing the Manchus, suffrage and educational reforms for women, and fighting against imperialism. Two features in the ideas of the women's movements are outstanding: First, the liberation of women and the upgrading of women's status were used as a rationale for all four movements under consideration. While suffrage and educational reforms can be easily identified as connected with women's liberation, overthrowing the Manchu dynasty and anti-imperialism are less obviously linked in the eyes of the Western scholars. But, Chinese women repeatedly argued that women's rights could be promoted only when the corrupted Manchu dynasty and imperialism were ousted. In other words, the issue of women's liberation and larger political goals cannot be separated.

Secondly, permeating the women's literature concerning the four different types of women's activism --- revolution, suffrage, education, and anti-imperialism --- was patriotism. The justification for involvement in women's movements centered around the issue of saving, strengthening, and defending China. The involvement of women in overthrowing the Manchu regime, in gaining political and educational equality, and

fighting against imperialist powers was considered to be beneficial to the country.

While the women's literature was articulate in its expression of women's ideas and feelings, it spoke only from the perspective of the educated women who, according to statistics, were numerically in the minority. The lack of concern in the literature for working class and peasant women testifies to this. Since working class and peasant women were largely illiterate, their input into the women's literature was almost nil.

Judging from the nature of the women's movements and their class components, it appears that each class of women had its own interest. The revolutionary, suffrage, and educational reform movements were largely dominated by educated women. The anti-imperialist movement combined the efforts of educated, working class, and peasant women. But even so, their activities were not integrated: apart from some cooperation between educated women and factory women in the 1920s, the activities of these two classes of women and peasant women were separate.

This separation of women into different movements and within the same movement (that is, the anti-imperialist movement) was a reflection of their divergent concerns and interests. The educated women at the turn of this century represented a well-to-do upwardly mobile group whose only obstacle was the existence of the Manchu dynasty. They, therefore, participated in anti-Manchu revolutionary actions as much as men did. Once the dynastic order was overthrown, the ideology of democracy and citizenship (which had justified their activities before

1911) propelled them toward fighting for political and educational equality. Their upward mobility was blocked by the reluctance of governments to allow them full citizenship. In the 1920s, when the educated women began to participate more actively in anti-imperialist actions, they were partly motivated by their desire to get rid of the warlords so that China could be strengthened and unified. Their efforts to build a strong nation were further undermined by the aggression of the Japanese in the 1930-40's, this resulting in their resistance work.

The interests of working class and peasant women were vastly different from those of their educated counterparts. The deteriorating economic situations in the countryside and the exploitative and oppressive working conditions in the factories pushed peasant women and factory women into putting their survival first. It is, therefore, not surprising to find factory women engaged primarily in strikes demanding higher wages, better working conditions, and the fair treatment of women at work. Similarly, peasant women were interested in food production. The issues of revolution, suffrage, and education were secondary to them. Anti-imperialism was meaningful only in relation to their day-to-day needs (of adequate wages, physical well being, and survival). Thus, the fight against imperialist powers interested working class and peasant women only to the extent that it could end the exploitation and oppression by their bosses at work or starvation at home. Nation-building and full citizenship, which were so precious to educated women, were secondary to them.

Comparing the four women's movements under consideration, the anti-imperialist movement was the most widespread and mobilized most women. The proliferation of women's organizations and periodicals to serve this end testifies to this. In contrast, the revolutionary movement was probably the most localized and restricted to a minority of women. The suffrage and educational movements lay somewhere in between the above two and were limited to educated women in the cityside. In terms of militancy, if one may generalize on the basis of the activities of women (whether they were military acts, demonstrations, lobbying, petitioning, etc.), the women's anti-imperialist and revolutionary movements stood out as the most militant, followed by the suffrage movement, and lastly by the educational reform movement. This may be due to differences in the seriousness and urgency of the causes, as overthrowing a government and fighting in a war are more serious and urgent than demanding educational reforms and gaining the franchise.

Roles of Women in Social Change

In the previous section, we have dealt with the structural context under which the women's movements emerged, their organizational prerequisites, their relationship with political organizations (parties), the impacts of repression and incorporation on women's movements, the ideas and activities of the women's movements, and the class factor in the movements. The question remains: did the women's movements have any impact on social change?

The women's movements in China consisted of active organizing work based on the self-initiative of women around certain issues as well as

reactions to government policies of institutional change or the actions of foreign powers.

On their own initiative, women engaged in revolutionary actions in Tokyo (1902-05), promoted women's education through public meetings or the solicitation of funds (1900s), or formed alliances of women's groups to pressure the government into adopting coeducational policy (1921). These are a few examples of how women played an active role in social change.

There are, however, cases where women's actions were merely a response to events such as the announcement of government policy or news of foreign encroachment. For examples, when Sun Zhongshan asked for support for the formation of the Citizens' Conference in 1924, women rallied for full participation; when President Jiang reconfirmed his intention to form a constitutional government in 1943, women responded by organizing educational forums on constitutional politics; when Qinghua School stopped sending women to study in the U.S. in 1923, women reacted by petitioning; and when women heard of Russian manoeuvres in northern China in 1903, they immediately sent telegrams to women's schools and organized anti-Russian groups.

Examples of self-initiated acts and responses to events by Chinese women abound. But, were they effective in pressuring the government(s) into changing its policies or eradicating the situations at stake? In each of the four women's movements under consideration, there were successes and failures. The intensive political activities of women in

the late 1900s did cause the Manchu government to restrict the power of the emperor in the proposed parliament in 1910-11. The petitions and organizing work of women around the issue of co-education in universities had some bearing on the implementation of co-education in universities in the mid-1920s. The granting of full suffrage for women in Henan in 1923 took place in the context of active petitioning by women. The organizing activities of women in 1907 did cause the Manchu government to reconsider the issue of borrowing loans from foreign countries for building railways.

But then there were incidents in which women's actions were ignored by the government(s) or foreign powers. The unfulfilled promises of the Manchu government in forming a parliament was a good example. Women's petitions and telegrams attempting to ensure that the Draft Regulations of the Citizens' Conference included franchise for women in 1925 clearly had little impact on the government. Despite the insistence on co-education and curriculum changes for women, Yuan Shikai reintroduced a Confucian curriculum and rejected co-education as a policy. Strong opposition by women towards the increasing Japanese military aggression in China did not deter the Japanese from attacking China in full force.

These successes and failures of the women's movements in effecting social change do not tell us the whole story. In order to evaluate the efforts of women, it is important to investigate the overall changes in the political and educational status of women, and their impact on

the larger society.

Although statistics on this area are incomplete, we can get some idea of the changes in the educational status of women. Table 1 (in Chapter 5) provides a glimpse of the changing status of women in formal schooling. While these statistics are not perfect, they nevertheless demonstrate that, with the exception of women in secondary schools (up to 1922-23), there was some improvement on both the elementary and higher learning levels. But it is difficult to attribute this advance of women's status solely to the work of the women educationalists. There are other factors such as the economic capacities of China, its stage of development, and so on, which need to be considered.

It is, however, clear that this advance in women's education was found in the context of active educational reform work by Chinese women. One needs only to look at the period of 1912-15 to realize the significance of the women's movement in reforming education. It was a period in which women's activism was at its lowest ebb while at the same time, the percentage of women students in the total student population dropped from 4.81 (in 1912) and 4.58 (in 1913) to 4.34 (in 1914) and 4.21 (in 1915). (Meng Ru, 1934: "Funü", 3) This was also a period in which Yuan Shikai reintroduced Confucian content into curriculum and prohibited co-education in schools.

The women's educational reform movement performed another function in social change and that is, the legitimization of women's presence in

schools. The reluctance of the Chinese to have their daughters get an education was obvious in the 19th century (see Chapter 2). Even in the first two decades of this century, the topic of women's education was still controversial. Women's organizations were founded and journals were published to convince people of the necessity of women's literacy on maternal and patriotic grounds. (Chapter 5) As it became more acceptable to have women studying in schools along with men, the women's literature spent more time covering other issues such as co-education instead of justifying women's education. Towards the second quarter of this century, it became more popular to talk about the orientations or curriculum of women's education, and there was less discussion of why women should go to schools.

While the impacts of the women's educational reform movement on government policies and on the status of women are hard to pinpoint and measure, based on the above evidence --- the increase in the proportion of women in the student population, the decline of women enrolled in a period of low activism among women, the shift in focus in the women's literature --- we may tentatively conclude that the women's movement did play a role in educational change.

In politics, Chinese women were involved on three fronts: the overthrowing of the Manchu dynasty, the demand for equal political rights with men, and the opposition to imperialist advance. We will evaluate these individually.

The women's revolutionary movement in the 1900s was a central

component in the larger revolutionary movement. Although the identifiable number of women revolutionaries was small --- 231 (Lin Weihong, 1972) --- they nevertheless played key roles in the whole process. As Lin Weihong (1972) documented quite well, these women engaged in propaganda and educational works, solicited funds necessary for the revolution, participated in medical teams, made banners, prepared meals, did secretarial work, provided hiding places for revolutionaries, acted as "floaters" in carrying messages and weapons, formed women troops engaged in uprisings, acted as assassins and spies, and carried out many other revolutionary works. All of these activities contributed significantly to the building of a revolutionary force capable of overthrowing the Manchu dynasty.

The woman suffrage movement also constituted a central thrust in building a democratic system in China. If the women had given up fighting for their political rights when the KMT dropped the principle of "sexual equality" from the party program and prohibited women from voting between 1912 and 1914, the restrictions on women in politics may well have been permanent. Chinese women first sat in the parliament during the experimental parliament of Guangdong in 1912. However, only 1.8 percent of its members were women, and this parliament did not last long. Considering the traditional political status of women, this episode was precedential.

In the 1920s, when the KMT was a political party not yet consolidated as the government of China, its policies denied women political

power in spite of their protests. For example, it has been reported that only three women participated in the KMT's First National Representatives' Conference in 1924.

When the KMT became the government in 1927, such undemocratic policies persisted. It was only through the intensive campaigns of women (during a period of repression) that the government finally gave in in 1931, and agreed to a quota of ten women representatives in the Citizens' Conference, and explicitly stated the principle of sexual equality. But the reluctance of the KMT government to grant suffrage to women was revealed when the May 5th Constitutional Proposal was announced in 1936 --- the sexual equality clause was not part of it! Again, women protested and managed to force the government to raise the number of representatives from women's organizations in the Citizens' Conference. During the Sino-Japanese War, there were indications that the KMT was attempting to restrict the political rights of women in spite of their protests.

Women's greatest achievement came between 1945-49 when the 1947 Constitution guaranteed certain quotas of women representatives in the Citizens' Conference, the Legislature, and the Overseer Department.

The history of the woman suffrage movement shows that, although there were no positive correlations between government policies and the intensity of the movement, women's protests helped to push the government into changing its mind. The persistent reluctance of the KMT government in implementing woman suffrage throughout these years illustrates that, without the insistence of Chinese women, the government would not have

built a more democratic political system.

The women's anti-imperialist movement appears to be a most significant force in changing the course of Chinese history. Chinese women organized themselves to fight against imperialist invasions by protesting against government "sell out" policies, by providing essential services behind the fronts, by joining medical teams on the fronts, by slowing down or stopping production processes in the factories, by educating others with wartime information and skills, etc. Most of the work done by women was, admittedly, behind the front. But, without the production in the fields, sewing, mending, making, and washing of soldiers' clothes or belongings done by women, the Chinese armies would have been unable to survive throughout the nine war years. Without the demonstrations, protests, and sabotages by women in the cities, the government would have continued their "sell out" acts and the imperialist powers would have intensified their exploitation of the workers and their humiliation of the Chinese.

Due to their active organizing work, Chinese women elevated themselves from a state of passivity concerning political involvement to one of activism. As noted in Chapter 2, the political involvement of women was minimal in the 19th century. The fact that, in the 20th century, educated women were organizing anti-imperialist protests and forming alliances with other groups, working class women had engaged in strikes and demonstrations, and peasant women in military combat, service work, pertinent to the war, and production during the emergency period meant

that they were politically active and contributing in their own ways to the national liberation movement.

In conclusion, judging from the activities (as well as the ideologies) of the women's movements, the latter were instrumental in changing China from a dynastic society to a more democratic one, from an imperialist-dominated society to one with more political autonomy, and from a sexually unequal country to one which was more equal. In the first half of this century, these changes occurred. One may argue that, even without the movements of women, Chinese men might still have been able to bring about these social changes. However, considering the reluctance of Chinese governments to elevate women's educational and political status and the immense contribution of women to political work (in revolutionary action and wartime efforts), it would be unlikely that Chinese men alone could force the governments to effect changes in women's status or resist the anti-imperialist powers with success.

Evaluation of Conceptual Frameworks

Structural Conditions

Military threats, invasions, interventions, and defeats have been mentioned as key factors in the development of the Chinese women's movements. While Kornhauser (1959), Johnson (1962), and Israel (1968) talked about the effects of military invasions and defeats, they forgot to mention military interventions and threats. Our study shows that these are equally important. Constant threats and interventions by imperialist powers raised the question of the legitimacy of these powers

and of China's political autonomy. Military threats and interventions also undermined the base of the existing government(s).

Accompanying the state of alert regarding the foreign military powers were political movements aimed at eradicating the situation. This current of larger radicalism created a fertile ground for the women's movements in China. Larger political movements provided reinforcement (support) and opportunities for alliances for the women's movements. It goes without saying that they also strengthened the bargaining power of the women's movements.

Several factors which accompanied industrialization also had some impact on some women's movements. As shown in the previous chapters, the introduction of western values through missionary activities found its strongest influence in the women's educational reform movement as compared with other women's movements under examination. The engagement of working class women in strikes, trade union movements, and general anti-imperialist struggles seems to support the argument that the exploitative system of the factories does contribute to the rise of working class women's radicalism. This argument apparently does not apply to the experience of educated or peasant women.

The mobility of Chinese women in the educational system appears to play a significant role in the rising activism of educated women in revolution, suffrage and educational reforms. It is, however, insignificant when it comes to working class and peasant women's movements. The latter were determined by the changing political situation of China,

rather than by the mobility afforded by the school system, since disadvantaged women were not educated.

Organizational Networks

The history of the four women's movements in China demonstrated quite clearly the necessity of a pre-existing network for their formation in the 1900s. The network of women's schools, student clubs, and political organizations in Tokyo provided fertile ground for Chinese women to interact and become politicized. The women's groups formed in the 1900s provided further networks for the later formation of other women's organizations. Among working class and peasant women, the role of political parties (organizations) was important in bringing forward women's movements.

These findings strongly confirm the arguments of Pinard (1968), Smelser (1962), Coleman (1957), and Freeman (1975) but they also put Kornhauser's (1959) thesis of mass society in doubt.

Kornhauser is correct when he says that intermediate networks can foster social attachments and loyalties, socialize and sanction members, instill a sense of political efficacy, expand members' concerns, or pacify them. This, apparently, is also the argument of Coleman. However, the very same networks which bring the non-elites (to use Kornhauser's terminology) closer to the elite, can also play a role in mobilizing the non-elites (as argued by Pinard). This mobilizing role is accentuated in crises and is crucial in the formation of new social movements.

If schools were not instituted for women in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Chinese women would have remained isolated in their homes. An amalgamation of women to form a social movement would then have required some active organizing work by like-minded women (or men) in order to create a network of women. This might not have been impossible, but it certainly would have delayed the formation of a social movement. As women's schools mushroomed at the turn of this century, they acted as a network drawing women in.

Women's schools, by themselves, may or may not generate the forces to form a social movement. In Tokyo, as a result of the influx of Chinese students, student clubs were founded to help the incoming students to adjust as well as to build friendships. These student clubs were less common in China itself because most students came from the surrounding areas of the schools and there was no need to have these clubs. Thus, the situation of Tokyo was unique.

These two types of organizations --- women's schools and student clubs --- were closely integrated in Tokyo as women who went to these schools also joined these clubs. But these organizations may have had a restraining effect on the students, as Kornhauser has argued. Incidentally, some of these student clubs had certain political leanings and political organizations which advocated the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty also existed in Tokyo. As these political organizations began to merge with the student clubs, a process of politicization occurred. Thus, contrary to Kornhauser, these networks extended their mobilizing

effects to women.

If these networks had existed in China, their mobilizing effects might have been retarded by the repressive measures of the Manchus. Since they existed in Tokyo (which is far from Beijing and lay outside the direct control of the Manchu regime), these networks became fertile grounds for revolutionary work. As mentioned, the revolutionary organizations were not strong enough to absorb the revolutionary enthusiasm of women, the latter formed their own movement.

What Kornhauser failed to see and Pinard and Coleman forgot to point out is that there can be a variety of intermediate networks. Some networks "teach" their members to adjust to the status quo and be loyal to the elite, but others do not. Revolutionary organizations are examples of the latter, and their role in mobilizing women is demonstrable. The politicization of educated women by revolutionary organizations in Tokyo has been documented. In the 1920s and '30s, the role of political parties in mobilizing working class women and peasant women cannot be underestimated. Although these parties made use of the existing organizations --- factories, trade unions, neighbourhood networks, and peasant associations --- in mobilizing women, without the active work of the parties, there would have been less chance of having factory and peasant women form movements.

In sum, it appears difficult for new social movements to emerge out of an organizational vacuum. They need an organizational base to transmit their causes, connect with potential members, extract potential

leaders from existing networks to become leaders in the new movements, pull the available material resources together, and strengthen the political forces of the movements.

Government Policies of Institutional Changes

The relationship between social movements and government policies of structural changes is probably the most complicated area in the study of social movements. This is because the changes in government policies and in the development of social movements are contingent, not only on each other, but on a variety of factors: the government changes in policy may be due to internal factional struggles, financial restraints, threats from external powers, the stage of economic development, etc. The pressure from the social movement may be only one of the factors. Changes in a social movement's course of development may be due to a change in leadership, factional struggles, organizational resources, compromises made in forming alliances with other movements, shifts in membership, changes in the political and economic conditions of the society, repressive measures on the part of the government, and so on. Government changes in policy is only one of the many factors involved. It is difficult to separate out these factors and evaluate them one by one because, usually, these factors occur simultaneously. Besides, separating out these factors and examining them, may distort reality since the combinative and interactive effects of these factors are ignored.

As pointed out in the last section, there are, however, cases where pressure from the women's movements did effect changes in the

government policies, and vice versa. But some cases are more ambivalent and it is harder to pinpoint the exact linkages between the women's movements and government policies.

In general, one would say that Smelser (1962) is correct in saying that the government may respond to social movements (or "disturbances", in Smelserian terminology) by partially or fully following the sequence of encouraging, specifying, experimenting, and institutionalizing alternatives advocated by the movements, and/or exercising social control mechanisms to contain them. What Smelser failed to do (and this study could only partially do) is to specify the relationship among these factors, namely social movements, government policies of structural changes, and social control.

The Smelserian framework of collective behaviour has several weaknesses in addition to the above mentioned: the vagueness of its concepts (such as "conduciveness"), the failure to relate the variables to each other (such as "strategies" and social structures), and the all-encompassing nature of the term "generalized belief" which is a cure for all kinds of "strains". Our study of the Chinese women's movements rectifies some of these problems by substantiating vague concepts --- discussing "military advances" instead of Smelserian "strains" and "pre-existing networks" instead of "structural conduciveness"; relating the ideologies of the women's movements with the changing social structures; and linking the strategies of the movements with government policies.

Clark, Grayson, and Grayson's (1975) views on the relationship

between social movements and government responses are useful as guidelines. Again, similar to the Smelserian framework, they lack substance, and require some modifications. The experience of the Chinese women's movements shows that indifference to the women's movements was not the pattern of Chinese government response, even when the movements were in their initial stages. Accommodating the demands of the women's movements was also rare except perhaps those of the educational reform and suffrage movements. The revolutionary and anti-imperialist movements were simply too much of a threat for the existing governments to accommodate them. Routinization of some demands of the women's movements occurred only after long fights with the women's movements as in the educational and suffrage spheres. The overthrowing of the Manchu government and the "routinization" of a more democratic government system were mainly due to the efforts of women and men, and not of the existing government. The routinization of women's anti-imperialist activities by the KMT government was due largely to the growing external military advances.

The observations of Freeman (1975) on the relationship of women's movements to government policies were not fully "tested" in our study. However, her observation that women's movements generate publicity, legitimize their causes, and exert pressures on the government can be easily identified in the Chinese women's movements. The provision of resources to the government and the creation of a constituency in the government by the women's movements was obvious in the woman suffrage movement when

women representatives were drawn into the government.

Freeman's argument that government adoption of some movement demands may publicize and further the development of the movements, or in some cases, deflect the energies of the movement from more important concerns is confirmed mainly in our study of the woman suffrage movement and, to some extent, the women's educational reform movement. The demands of the revolutionary movement were never adopted by the Manchu regime; and the main thrust of the anti-imperialist movement of women (especially the actions of the working class and peasant women) was, in fact, obstructed by the government.

In sum, the arguments presented by Smelser, Clark, et.al., and Freeman are, by and large, applicable to the Chinese women's movements. There are, however, some major exceptions: our study substantiated Smelser's framework with more precise arguments and more exact variables; and the revolutionary and anti-imperialist movements of women in China did not follow the general patterns outlined by Clark, et.al., and Freeman.

Government Policies of Social Control

Smelser's (1962) views on government encouragement of social movements --- endorsement, inclusion in parliamentary debates, etc. --- may be readily applied in the woman suffrage movement and the women's educational reform movement. The endorsement of woman suffrage by the KMT, however vague and wavering, was generally encouraging to the movement. So were the debates on suffrage at the top-level of the KMT, the endorsement of co-education by some high-echelon educationalists, etc.

However, Smelser was vague when he dealt with the role of the government in discouraging social movements. Repression was not clearly mentioned, although it was the key method of coping with women's movements in China. Equally vague is the observation of Clark, et.al. (1975) on obstruction. It is true, as Eckstein (1965) pointed out that repression is a double-edged sword. It can either suppress the movements or inflame them. The question is under what circumstances does repression become effective or ineffective; this was not addressed by any of the above social scientists.

Our study of women's movements suggests that repression is most effective when it is accompanied by institutionalization of the social movements. With the exception of the period of 1913-18, repression by itself seemed to infuriate women and militantize the movements. However, when the government began to institutionalize the women's movements, repression did effectively suppress the radical elements, and as part of the process of institutionalization, the moderates were incorporated by the government. Smelser has hinted that consistency or inconsistency of repression may be related to its effectiveness. Our study shows that although inconsistent repression tended to be ineffective in inhibiting the women's movements, consistency did not do the trick either.

Our findings suggest that institutionalization of women's movements is a more effective way of controlling and containing a social movement compared with other methods. Smelser hinted that by openly encouraging the movements to follow other types of collective behaviour, the move-

ments might be induced to change their courses. Chapter 7 is devoted to examining the incorporation process by political parties, and the message is clear: institutionalization of the women's movements by the government can change the nature, intensity, militancy, direction, and components of the women's movements. This was best illustrated by the example of the women's anti-imperialist movement.

Areas of Further Research

In studying a social movement, one may use a macroscopic or microscopic approach. A macroscopic approach was used in this study and the relationship between the women's movements on one hand, and social structures, organizational networks, and government policies of institutional changes and social control on the other was stressed. However, several areas have been neglected or have not been thoroughly examined in this study, and they may be looked at in greater depth in any future study.

One of the areas which demands further investigation is the treatment of women's issues by the KMT and the CCP. The class-orientation of the CCP led women's movements and the gender-orientation of those led by the KMT have been discussed. It was noted that the failure of the KMT to mobilize women was due to its gender-orientation, but what was left unanswered were the pitfalls of the CCP's class-orientation in terms of mobilizing women. To what extent did the CCP deal with issues specifically related to women as women (such as family reforms) before 1949? What were the feminist undercurrents in the CCP areas in the 1930s

and '40s? In what ways did the CCP deal with these undercurrents? Why did the CCP refuse to resolve women-specific issues? What were the consequences of this neglect on the status of women? In what ways did the CCP use the women's movements for its own ends? How were they similar to those used by the KMT?

With respect to the working class women, why did the CCP fail to make them the central thrust of the women's movements? Apart from the historical explanation (that is, the CCP was forced to withdraw from the urban settings), what other structural factors were at work? Our study focussed on factory women in the cotton textile industry. How did factory women in other industries (for example, the tobacco industry) respond to imperialist powers, exploitation, and women's issues? To what extent did the CCP actually organize working class women? How did factory women in various industries form alliances; and to what extent?

There are two areas which have been neglected in our study, and more data are needed. One is the nature of the women's movements during the period of 1912-1918. This study depended on newspapers and women's journals; and the lack of information on the women's movements in this period according to these sources may indicate that (a) the governments censured the information on women's movements; (b) women's movements went underground or declined in significance; or (c) historical documents on women's movements in this period were destroyed.

The other is the women's activism under warlord regimes in the 1920s. Were there women's movements in the warlords' territories? Did

they go underground because of coercion by the governments? Did they manifest themselves in different forms? What were the relationships between women in the warlords' territories and those in non-warlords' areas?

Our study has treated the family structure marginally. Any further examination of the Chinese women's movements should probe into their relationship to the family. We noted, in our research, changing economic context of the peasant family, and how it affected the status of peasant and working class women. Did urban family patterns change as well; if so, in what directions? How did they affect the status of working class and wealthy women? What about the power structure within the family --- did it change in relation to the changing status of women in the larger society? How did this change, in turn, affect the women's movements? In what ways did the lack of day-care facilities, the persistent power of mothers-in-law, and the traditional extended family system influence the development of the women's movements.

Our study of the women's movements in China is a case study. It may be worthwhile to compare these movements with those in different parts of the world. One might compare the Chinese ones with those in the Third World (underdeveloped) countries, in the capitalist countries during their different phases of development, or in the socialist societies. In our research, we noted that several key phenomena: political crises and military threats, strong pre-existing intermediate networks, institutionalization and repression, etc., had a great impact on the

development of the Chinese women's movements. The question is: can one extrapolate these factors, and apply them to other cases? How far can one generalize the patterns found in our study? What are the historical and cultural factors which are unique in each case?

Although this study did not completely ignore micro-factors (such as the family connections of revolutionary women), it rendered them secondary in importance. Examining the development of the Chinese women's movements using a microscopic approach could be done in several ways. One is by posing the problem in terms of biographic factors. Is there a relationship between the biographic experiences of individual women organizers and participants and their involvement in the women's movements? If so, what kinds of experiences are essential for their engagement in social actions? Do the women share similar experiences? What kinds of relationship are there between biographies and women's activism? In this respect, one of the neglected areas in our previous discussion of the influence of the West on the women's movements in China is the extent to which the Chinese women who had studied abroad (France, U.S.A., and Russia) were instrumental in the formation or revitalization of women's movements in China. Did the overseas experiences of Chinese women affect their perceptions of reality?

Other questions using this approach are: Are there any family connections among the women activists? Did they know each other on a friendship level before their involvement in the women's movements? How do family and peer group pressures work? In what ways do parental atti-

tudes regarding male-female relationship affect their daughters? How do husbands' attitudes and behaviour affect their wives? Do they affect them at all? In this respect, in-depth case studies of several women --- activists and non-activists --- might be worthwhile.

In addition to a biographic approach, microscopic studies of women's movements may concentrate on their organizational structures and linkages. Our study of the Chinese women's movements has focussed on their relationship to the school system, political organizations, and voluntary associations. But one may go further in this approach. One may ask, for example, how does the size of the women's organizations affect their actions? In what ways are women related to one another in small, medium, and large organizations? What kinds of organizational structures (for example, democratic or authoritarian) are most conducive to the mobilization of women? How are the four women's movements --- revolutionary, suffrage, educational reform, and anti-imperialist --- which we have examined connected to other women's movements in China in that historical period (for example, the anti-footbinding movement, the temperance movement, etc.) in terms of leadership and membership?

One may also examine government policies of institutional changes in a microscopic manner. As noted in our study, some actions on the part of women succeeded in pressuring the government into acting, and some did not. The question is "why"? The decision-making process within the government in response to the women's movements is worth investigating, apart from the politico-economic factors which were at work. What kinds

of decisions were made and at what levels of the government? Who made what decisions? What motivations lay behind a particular kind of decision? Similarly, the decision-making process within women's groups may also be insightful. In looking into the dynamic relationship between leaders and members in the decision-making process, one may find out why certain strategies and tactics were more prevalent than others, why new organizations emerged from the old ones, and why some organizations prospered while others declined.

In retrospect, our study of the Chinese women's movements did not encompass every factor (and it was not intended to). For further research, one might stress microscopic factors (such as biography, family connections, organizational structures and linkages, and decision-making processes). On the macroscopic level, further research might focus on the changing family system, the treatment of women's issues by the political parties, the warlords' regimes, and the period of 1912-1918 in China. It would also be worthwhile to put the Chinese women's movements into a cross-cultural and cross-historical perspective.

APPENDIX I: WOMEN'S REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS, 1900-1912

<u>Organizations</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Places</u>	<u>Leaders</u>	<u>Members</u>
Humanitarian Society (Gong'aihui)	1902 1904	Tokyo Tokyo	Hu Binxia Qiujin	20
Chinese Women Students' Union (Zhonghua Liuri Nuxueshenghui)	1905	Tokyo	Li Yuan	Over 70
Association of Restoration of Women's Rights (Nüzi Fuguanhui)	1907	Tokyo	He Zhen	Over 100
Shanghai Women Student's Suicidal Team (Shanghai Nuxuesheng Gansidui)	Ca. 1911	Shanghai		
Women's Dare-to-Die Team (Nüzi Juesidui)	Ca. 1911		Xin Suzhen	
Women's Revolutionary Alliance (Nüzi Gemingtongmeng)	Ca. 1911			
Women Citizens' Troop (Nüguominjun)	Ca. 1911		Xin Suzhen	
Zhejiang Women's Troop (Zhejiang Nüzijun)	Ca. 1911		Yin Ruizhi	
Tongmeng Women's Military Training Team (Tongmeng Nüzi Jingwu Xiuliandui)	Before 1911	Shanghai	Wu Mulan	
Women's Association of Research on Military Affairs (Nüzi Junshi Yanjiuhui)	1911	Shanghai	Xu Yibing	
Chinese Women Detective Team (Zhonghua Nüzi Zhentantuan)	Ca. 1911			
Women's Assassination Team (Nüzi Anshadui)	Ca. 1911		Xin Suzhen	

Hubei Women's Northern Expedition Team (Hubei Funü Beifadui)	Ca. 1911		
Anhui Women's Northern Expedition Team (Anhui Nüzü Beifadui)	Ca. 1911		
Women's Northern Expedition Team (Nüzü Beifadui)	Before 1911	Hangzhou	Chen Wanyan
Women's Military Team (Nüzü Junsütuan)	Before 1911	Shanghai	Ge Jinghua Ca. 100
Women's Restoration Troop (Nüzü Guang- fujun)	1911	Shanghai	Lin Zongxue
Women's Military Group (Nüzü Juntuan)	Ca. 1911	Shanghai	Shen Jinguin
Northern Jiangbei Women's Northern Expedition Troop (Jiangbei Nüzü Beifajun)	Ca. 1911	Shanghai	Guo Jianren Ca. 100
Women's Suicidal Team (Nüzü Gansidui)	1911	Guangdong	Yin Weijun
Guangdong Women's Northern Expedition Team (Guangdong Nüzü Beifadui)	1911	Guangdong	Zoulu Ca. 20
Guangdong Women's Northern Expedition Grenade Team (Guangdong Nüzü Beifa Zhadandui)	Ca. 1911	Guangdong	Xu Mulan Ca. 100
Association of Patriotic Women Comrades (Funü Aiguo Tongzhihui)	Ca. 1911		
Republican Women's Charity Association (Gonghe Nüzü Bojihui)	1911		Madam Zhang Jingjiang

Chinese Patriotic Women's Association (Zhongguo Aiguo Funühui)	Ca. 1911	Xu Rixin	
Assistance Team of the Northern Expedition Troop (Beifajun Jiuqidui)	Ca. 1911		
Women's Solicitation Society (Nüzi Quanyuanhui)	Ca. 1911	Zhu Yongji	6
Women's Assistance Society (Nüzi Houyuanhui)	1911	Shanghai	Tang Qunyíng
Guangdong Temporary Nursing Team (Guangdong Línshí Jíushangduì)	1911	Guāngdōng	Xu Jianhuan Over 11
E Yuan Women's Solicitation Society (E Yuan Nüzi Zhengku Chouxianghui)	1911	Shànghai	Madam Wu Tinggang Over 12
Suzhou Women's Solicitation Society (Suzhou Nüjie Xiezanhui)	Ca. 1911	Suzhou	
Zhenjiang Women's Solicitation Society (Zhenjiang Nüjie Xiezanhui)	Ca. 1911	Zhenjiang	
Wuxi Women's Solicitation Society (Wuxi Nüjie Xiezanhui)	Ca. 1911		
Jiaxing Women's Solicitation Society (Jiaxing Nüjie Xiezanhui)	Ca. 1911	Jiaxing	
Changshu Women's Solicitation Society (Changshu Nüjie Xiezanhui)	Ca. 1911	Changshu	
Changzhou Women's Solicitation Society (Changzhou Nüjie Xiezanhui)	Ca. 1911	Changzhou	

Zhejiang Women's Solicitation Society (Zhejiang Nüjfe Xfezanhui)	Ca. 1911	Zhejiang	
World Solicitation Society (Shijfe Xie- zanhui)	Ca. 1911	Shanghai	
Red Cross (Hongshizihui)	Ca. 1911		Shen Zhongli
Chinese Red Cross (Zhongguo Chishizihui)	Ca. 1911	Shanghai	Zhang Zhujun
Red Cross Team II: Women's Association (Chishizihui Diertuan Nüzixiehui)	Ca. 1911	Shanghai	Madam Zhang Shanpu
Five Races Women's Red Cross (Wu Da Minzu Nüzi Hongshizihui)	Ca. 1911	Shanghai	
International Red Cross Society of Shanghai	Ca. 1911	Shanghai	

54 females
69 males

APPENDIX II: WOMEN'S REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS, BY LOCATIONS
AND YEARS, 1900-1912

<u>Years</u>	<u>Locations</u>	<u>No. of Organizations</u>	
1900-10	Tokyo	3	
1911-12	Shanghai (Jiangsu)	14	
	Suzhou (Jiangsu)	1	
	Zhenjiang (Jiangsu)	1	
	Wuxi (Jiangsu)	1	
	Changshu (Jiangsu)	1	
	Changzhou (Jiangsu)	1	
	Hangzhou (Zhejiang)	1	
	Jiaxing (Zhejiang)	1	
	Unknown (Zhejiang)	1	
	Unknown (Guangdong)	5	sub-total: 27
	Unknown	14	
TOTAL:		44	

APPENDIX III: WOMEN'S REVOLUTIONARY PERIODICALS, 1900-1912

<u>Periodicals</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Places</u>	<u>Editors</u>	<u>Issues</u>
Women's Newspaper (Nübao)	Monthly	1902	Shanghai	Chen Xiefen	3-4
Women's Education Monthly (Nüxuebao)*	Monthly	1903 nd	Tokyo	Chen Xiefen	
Women's World (Nüzi Shijie)	Monthly Monthly	1903 1905	Shanghai Shanghai	Ding Chuwo Chen Yun	
Chinese Women's Newspaper (Zhongguo Nübao)		1906	Shanghai	Qiujin	2
Chinese New Women's Magazine (Zhongguo Xinnüjie Zazhi)	Monthly	1906	Tokyo	Yanbin	6
Shenzhou Women's Newspaper** (Shenzhou Nübao)		1907?	Shanghai	Tang Guoli	14
Natural Law Newspaper (Tianyibao)	Bi-weekly	1907	Tokyo	He Zhen	
Women's Times (Funü Shibao)**		1910	Shanghai		12
Shenzhou Tenth-Daily (Shenzhou Xunkan)	Tenth-day	1912	Shanghai	Tang Guoli	

* This was an extension of the Women's Newspaper.

** This was an extension of the Chinese New Women's Magazine.

APPENDIX IV: WOMEN'S REVOLUTIONARY PERIODICALS, BY LOCATIONS
AND YEARS, 1900-12

<u>Years</u>	<u>Locations</u>	<u>No. of Periodicals</u>
1900-10	Tokyo	2
	Shanghai	3
1911-12	Shanghai	1
TOTAL:		<hr/> 6

APPENDIX V: OVERLAPPING MEMBERSHIP IN WOMEN'S REVOLUTIONARY
ORGANIZATIONS, 1900-1912

<u>Names of Women</u>	<u>Memberships in Women's Revolutionary Organizations</u>
Xin Suzhen	Women Suicidal Team Women Citizens' Troop Women's Assassination Team
Yin Weijun	Zhejiang Women's Troop Women's Dare-to-Die Team
Deng Mufang	Guangdong Women's Expedition Team Guangdong Women's Expedition Grenades Team Guangdong Temporary Nursing Team
Tang Qunying	Chinese Woman Students' Union Women's Assistance Society Shanghai Women's Solicitation Society
Chen Wanyan	Association of Anti-Russian Women Comrades Women's Expedition Team
Wu Zhiying	Woman Citizens' Solicitation Society Republican Women's Charity Society

APPENDIX VI: OVERLAPPING MEMBERSHIP IN BOTH WOMEN'S REVOLU-
TIONARY ORGANIZATIONS AND PERIODICALS
1900-1912

<u>Names of Women</u>	<u>Editors in Periodicals</u>	<u>Organizers in Organizations</u>
Yan Bin	<u>Chinese New Women's Magazine</u>	Chinese Woman Students' Union
Yang Jiwei	<u>Shenzhou Tenth-Daily</u>	Shanghai Women's Solicitation Society
Tang Guoli	<u>Shenzhou Tenth-Daily</u>	Shanghai Women's Solicitation Society

APPENDIX VII: OVERLAPPING MEMBERSHIP OF WOMEN IN POLITICAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS
AND/OR PERIODICALS, 1900-1912

<u>Names of Women</u>	<u>Membership in Political Organizations</u>	<u>Leadership in Women's Nationalist Organizations/Periodicals</u>
Wu Ya'nan	Tongmenghui	Chinese Women Students' Union
Chen Xiefen	Sandianhui; <u>Subao</u>	Women's Newspaper; Humanitarian Society
Qiujin	Tongmenghui; Restoration Society; Sandianhui	Humanitarian Society, <u>Chinese Women's Newspaper</u>
Xu Mulan	Tongmenghui	Guangdong Women's Northern Expedition Bombing Team
Liang/Guoti	Tongmenghui	Guangdong Women's Northern Expedition Bombing Team
Zhuo Guo- xing	Tongmenghui	Guangdong Women's Northern Expedition Bombing Team
Song Ming- huang	Tongmenghui; Chinese Assassination Team (Zhi'na Ansha- tuan)	Guangdong Women's Northern Expedition Bombing Team; Guangdong Temporary Nursing Team
Zhang Mojun	Tongmenghui <u>Jiangsu Dahanbao</u>	Shanghai Women's Solicita- tion Society; Shenzhou Women's Republican Organization; Shenzhou Woman Suffrage Alliance
Chen Hongbi	<u>Jiangsu Dahanbao</u>	Shanghai Women Solicitation
Zhang Yibao	Tongmenghui	Women's Expedition Team
Zhang Hong- han	Tongmenghui	Women Revolutionary Alliance
Jiang Ku	Tongmenghui	Women Revolutionary Alliance

Yin Weijun	Restoration Society	Zhejiang Women's Troop Women's Suicidal Team
Yin Ruizhi	Restoration Society	Zhejiang Women's Troop
Lin Zongsu	Tongmenghui <u>Alarming Bell Daily</u> <u>(Jingzhong Ribao)</u>	Humanitarian Society; Association of Comrades for Woman Suffrage
Wu Mulan	Tongmenghui	Tongmeng Women's Military Training Team
Tang Qun- ying	Tongmenghui	Chinese Women Students' Union; Shanghai Women's Solicitation Society; Women's Assistance Society
Zhang Zhu- jun	Tongmenghui	Chinese Red Cross

APPENDIX VIII: TWO ROUTES OF POLITICIZATION OF WOMEN, 1900-1912

Women's Organizations First,
Political Organizations Later*

Qiujin
Chen Xiefen
Lin Zongsu

Political Organizations First,
Women's Organizations Later**

Zhuo Guoxing
Zhang Mojun
Wu Mulan
Tang Qunying
Chen Hongbi

- * Lin Zongsu was one of the organizers of the Humanitarian Society in 1902; three years later, she joined the Tongmenghui when it was newly-founded. Qiujin re-established the Humanitarian Society in 1904, and a year later, she joined the Tongmenghui. Chen Xiefen was the editor of the Women's Newspaper in Shanghai in 1902. Due to the suppression of Subao, she came to Japan and joined the Humanitarian Society as well as the Sandianhui in Kobe.
- ** The case of Tang Qunying is ambiguous because it is not sure whether she organized the Chinese Women's Student Union first before she joined the Tongmenghui, or vice versa. But the cases of Zhang Mojun and Chen Hongbi clearly demonstrated the second route of politicization of women in 1900s: they worked in the organization which published Jiangsu Dahanbao in September 1911 before they organized the Shanghai Women's Solicitation Society in October of the same year.

APPENDIX IX: THE RELATIONSHIP OF FEMALE AND MALE REVOLU-
TIONARIES

Women Revolutionaries

<u>Names</u>	<u>Organizational Affiliation</u>	<u>Relation to the Male Revolutionaries</u>	<u>Organizational Affiliation of the Male Revolutionaries</u>
Shi Jingran	Xingzhonghui	Daughter of Shi Jianru	Organizer of Xingzhonghui
Wu Ruonan	Tongmenghui	Wife of Zhang Shizhao	Editor of <u>Subao</u>
Chen Xiefen	<u>Women's News-paper;</u> Humanitarian Society; Sandianhui	Daughter of Chen Fan	Owner of <u>Subao</u>
Chen Xiang-fen	Sandianhui	Concubine of Chen Fan	Owner of <u>Subao</u>
Xu Baosi	Patriotic Education Society (Aiguo Xueshe)*	Daughter of Xu Jingwu	Propagandist of revolution during the "Case of <u>Subao</u> "
Lin Zongsu	Humanitarian Society; <u>Alarming Bell Daily Newspaper</u>	Sister of Lin Beiquan	Organizer of <u>Qingyibao</u>
He Xiangning	Tongmenghui	Wife of Liao Zhongkai	Tongmenghui
Wang Zhenhan	Restoration Society (Guangfuhui)	Wife of Xu Xilin	Served in the Uprising of Anqing, 1907
Li Ziping	Tongmenghui	Wife of Feng Ziyou	Organizer of the Association for the Autonomy of Guangdong
Lu Guiping	Unknown	Fathers' concubine of Feng Ziyou	same as above

Chen Shuzi	Tongmenghui	Wife of Hu Hanmin	Writer of <u>Minbao</u>
Hu Ningyuan	Tongmenghui	Sister of Hu Hanmin	same as above
Cui Zhenhua	Tongmenghui	Wife of Zhang Ji	Editor of <u>Minbao</u>
Chen Bijun	Unknown	Wife of Wang Jingwei	Sponsor of <u>Minbao</u>
Liang Guoti	Tongmenghui	Wife of Zoulu	Tongmenghui
Zheng Yuxiu	Tongmenghui	Wife of Wei Daoming	Educator, took part in the 1911 Revolution

APPENDIX X: FAMILY TIES AMONG WOMEN REVOLUTIONARIESThe Family of Xu

Xu Zonghan
Xu Peiyao -- sister of Xu Zonghan
Xu Mulan -- sister of Xu Zonghan
Li Peishu -- sister-in-law of Xu Mulan

The Family of Zhang

Zhang Mojun
Zhang Xiahun -- sister of Zhang Mojun

The Family of Yin

Yin Ruizhi
Yin Weijun -- sister of Yin Ruizhi

APPENDIX XI: WOMAN SUFFRAGE ORGANIZATIONS, 1900-1949

<u>Organizations</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Places</u>	<u>Leaders</u>	<u>Members</u>
Association of Restoration of Women's Rights (Nüzi Fuquanhui)	1907	Tokyo	He Zhen	Over 100
Association to Promote Woman Suffrage in China (Zhonghua Nüzi Canzheng Xiejinhui)	1911	Shanghai	Zhang Zhao-han; Madam Wu Tingfang; Tan Sheying; Liu Wang Liming	
Original known as: Shanghai Woman Suffrage Society (Shanghai Nüzi Canzhenghui)				
Also known as: Shenzhou Woman Suffrage Alliance (Shenzhou Nüjie Canzheng Tongmenghui)				
Shanghai Woman Suffrage Alliance (Shanghai Nüzi Canzheng Tongmenghui)	1911	Shanghai		
Hunan Woman Suffrage Alliance (Hunan Nüzi Canzheng Tongmenghui)	1911	Hunan	Zhang Han-ying	Several hundreds
Woman Suffrage Group (Nüzi Canzhengtuan)	1911	Hunan	Ding Lan	
Association of Comrades for Woman Suffrage (Nüzi Canzheng Tongzhihui)	1912	Shanghai	Lin Zongsu	
Shenzhou Women's Republican Organization (Shenzhou Nüjie Gonghe Xiejieshe)	1912		Zhang Zhao-han; Madam Sun Yixian	

Shengli Women's Military Society (Shengli Nūzi Shangwuhui)	1912	Shanghai	
Women's Military Society (Nūzi Shangwuhui)	Ca. 1912	Shanghai	Shen Pei- zhen; Shu Hui- zhen
Organization to Promote the Republic of Chinese Women (Zhonghua Nūzi Gonghe Xie- jinhui)	Ca. 1912	Shanghai	
Women's Republican Society (Nūzi Gonghe- hui)	Ca. 1912		
Organization to Promote the Republic of Women (Nūzi Gonghe Xiejinhui)	Ca. 1912		Madam Wu Tingfang; Madam Zhang Jingiang
Women Citizens' Society (Nūguominhui)	Ca. 1912		
International Woman Suffrage Organiza- tion (Wanguo Nūzi Canzhenghui)	Ca. 1912		
Organization to Maintain Sexual Equality (Nannū Pingquan Weichihui)	Ca. 1912		
Patriotic Organization of Chinese Women (Zhongguo Nūzi Jiuguehui)	1919	Shanghai	
Organization to Promote Woman Suffrage of Shandong (Shandong Nūzi Canzheng Cuchenghui)	Ca. 1919	Shandong	

Federation of All Guangdong Women (Guangdong Nüzi Gejie Lianhehui)	1920	Guangdong	Several hundreds
Alliance of Chinese Women For Woman Suffrage (Zhonghua Nüzi Canzheng Tongmenghui)	1920	Shanghai	Wang Ruizhu; Qian Jian- qiu; Li Jitujun
Federation of Zhejiang Women (Zhejiang Nüjie Lianhehui)	1920	Zhejiang	Wang Bihua; Chen Su; Hou Ming
Shanghai Women's Society (Shanghai Funühui)	1920	Shanghai	Zhu Hu Binxia
Alliance for Women's Rights Movement of Sichuan (Sichuan Nuquan Yundong Tongmenghui)	1921	Sichuan	
Federation of All Women of Hunan (Hunan Nüjie Lianhehui)	1921	Hunan	Chen Shu; Wu Jian; Li Zuohan; Hu Zhongmin
Organization to Promote Woman Suffrage of Shanghai (Shanghai Nüzi Canzheng Xiejinhui)	1922	Shanghai	
Federation of Chinese Women (Zhonghua Nüjie Lianhehui)	1922	Shanghai	
Research Institute of the Question of Chinese Women (Zhongguo Funü Wenti Yanjiuhui)	1922	Shanghai	Li Zhongwu; Shen Yanbing

Organization to Promote Woman Suffrage of Liyang (Liyang Nüzi Canzheng Xiejinhui)	1922	Jiangsu		
Bureau of Women's Rights, Society of Comrades of Tienjin Students (Tienjin Xuesheng Tongzhahui, Nüquangu)	1922	Tianjin		
Organization to Promote Woman Suffrage of Beijing (Beijing Nüzi Canzheng Xiejinhui)	1922	Beijing	Ge Pu; Zhou Heng	
Alliance of Woman Suffrage (Nüzi Canzheng Tongmenghui)	1922(?)	Hubei		
Organization of Woman Suffrage Movement (Nüzi Canzheng Yundonghui)	1922(?)	Zhejiang		
Alliance of Women's Rights Movement of Beijing (Beijing Nüquan Yundong Tongmenghui)	1922	Beijing	Zhou Min	Over 300
Women's Rights Petition Group of Tianjin (Tianjin Nüquan Qingyuantuan)	1923	Tianjin		
Federation of All Women of Sichuan (Sichuan Nüjie Lianhehui)	1923(?)	Sichuan		
Women's Great Alliance of the Sichuan Civil Rights Movement (Sichuan Minquan Yundong Nüjie Datongmeng)				
Working Committee of the Women's Movement, New Students' Union of Guangdong (Guangdong Xinxueshengshe, Funü Yundong Gongzuo Weiyuanhui)	1924	Guangdong		

Guangdong Yizhong Youth's Educational Society (Guangdong Yizhong Qingnian Xueshe)	1924	Guangdong
Public Society of Sichuan Women (Sichuan Funü Gonghui)	1924	Sichuan
Legal and Political Society of Sichuan Women (Sichuan Nüzi Fazhenghui)	1924	Sichuan
Women's Group of Shanghai University (Shanghai Daxue Nüshengtuan)	1924(?)	Shanghai
Organization of Consoling Warriors of Shanghai Women (Shanghai Nüjie Zhanshi Weilaohui)	1924(?)	Shanghai
Society of Women's Self-Repentance (Nüzi Ziwushe)	1924(?)	Shanghai
Committee of Women's Movement of Shanghai (Shanghai Funü Yundong Weiyuanhui)	1924(?)	Shanghai
Women's Group of Daxia University (Daxia Daxue Nüxueshengtuan)	1924(?)	Shanghai
Women's Group of Nanfang University (Nanfang Daxue Nüshengtuan)	1924(?)	Shanghai
Women's Group of Oriental Art Special School (Dongfang Yishe Zhuanmen Xuexiao Nüshengtuan)	1924(?)	Shanghai
Students' Union of Jingping Women's School (Jingping Nüxue Xueshenghui)	1924(?)	Shanghai

Women's Group of Zunzhi University (Qunzhi Daxue Nüshengtuan)	1924(?)	Shanghai	
Women's Temperance Organization of Northern Shanghai (Hubei Funü Jiezhihui)	1924(?)	Shanghai	
Organization to Promote the Citizens' Conference of Shanghai Women (Shanghai Nüjie Guominhuiyi Cuchenghui)	1924	Shanghai	Li Jianqiu 21 organiza- tions and 6 independent representa- tives
Organization to Promote the Citizens' Conference of Tianjin Women (Tianjin Funü Guominhuiyi Cuchenghui)	1924(?)	Tianjin	
Organization to Promote the Citizens' Conference of Beijing Women (Beijing Nüjie Guominhuiyi Cuchenghui)	1924(?)	Beijing	Liu Chunyi
Organization to Promote the Citizens' Conference of All Women of China (Quanguo Funüjie Guominhuiyi Cuchenghui)	1925	Beijing	Representatives of women's organizations
Organization to Promote the Citizens' Conference of Nanjing Women (Nanjing Nüjie Guominhuiyi Cuchenghui)	1925	Jiangsu	
Women's Citizens' Organization of Shanghai (Shanghai Nüguomin Dahui)	1925	Shanghai	
Organization of Tianjin Women (Tianjin Funü Xiehui)	Ca. 1929	Tianjin	
Great Alliance of Women's Rights Move- ment of Guangdong (Guangdong Nüquan Yundong Datongmeng)	Ca. 1931	Guangdong	

Great Alliance of Women's Rights Movement of Huiyang (Huiyang Nüquan Yundong Datongmeng)	1931	Guangdong	Huang Ding-ming
Organization to Help the Chinese Women (Zhongguo Funü Xiejiehui)	1931	Shanghai	
Charity Organization of Nanjing Women (Nanjing Funü Jiujiuhui)	1931(?)	Jiangsu	
Committee for the Preparation to Compete in the Citizens' Convention of Guangdong Women (Guangdong Funü Guomindahui Jingxuan Choubai Weiyuanhui)	1936	Guangdong	
Organization to Promote Constitutional Government of Shangdong Women (Shangdong Funü Xianzheng Cujinhui)	1940	Shangdong	
Committee to Compete for the National Representatives of Women in the Citizens' Convention (Guomindahui Quanguo Funü Daibiao Jingxuan Weiyuanhui)	1940		
Research Institute of Constitutional Government of Chinese Women (Zhongguo Funü Xianzheng Yanjiuhui)	1944		
Research Institute on Politics of Chinese Women (Zhongguo Funü Zhengzhi Yanjiuhui)	Ca. 1947		
Society of Political Science of Chinese Women (Zhongguo Funü Zhengzhi Xuehui)	Ca. 1947		

APPENDIX XII: WOMAN SUFFRAGE ORGANIZATIONS, BY LOCATIONS AND YEARS, 1900-1949

<u>Years</u>	<u>Locations</u>	<u>No. of Organizations</u>	
1900-10	Tokyo	1	
1911-12	Shanghai	6	
	Hunan	2	
	Unknown	6	sub-total: 14
1913-18	---	0	
1919-25	Shanghai	18	
	Sichuan	5	
	Beijing	4	
	Guangdong	3	
	Tianjin	3	
	Jiangsu	2	
	Zhejiang	2	
	Shandong	1	
	Hubei	1	
	Hunan	1	sub-total: 40
1926-30	Tianjin	1	
1931-49	Guangdong	3	
	Shanghai	1	
	Jiangsu	1	
	Shandong	1	
	Unknown	3	sub-total: 9
TOTAL:		65	

APPENDIX XIII: WOMAN SUFFRAGE PERIODICALS, 1900-1949

<u>Periodicals</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Places</u>	<u>Editors</u>	<u>Issues</u>
Women's World (Nüzi Shijie)	Monthly	1903 1906	Shanghai	Ding Chuwo; Chen Qin	
The Chinese New Women's Magazine (Zhongguo Xinnüjie Zazhi)	Monthly	1906	Tokyo	Yan Bin	
Shenzhou Women's Newspaper* (Shenzhou Nübao)		1907(?)	Shanghai	Tang Guoli	14
Shenzhou Tenth-Daily (Shenzhou Xunkan)	Tenth-Daily	1912	Shanghai	Tang Guoli	
Shenzhou Women's Newspaper Monthly (Shenzhou Nübao Yuekan)	Monthly	1913	Shanghai	Tan Sheying; Yang Jiwei	4
Women's Times (Funü Shibao)*		1910-13	Shanghai		12
Republican Women's Magazine (Minguo Nübao)		1912	Shanghai		
Women's Magazine (Funü Zazhi)	Monthly	1915-32	Shanghai		180
Women's Political Science Newspaper (Nüzi Zhengxuebao)	Bi-weekly	1917	Shanghai		
Chinese Women Daily Newspaper (Zhongguo Nüzi Riri Xinwen)	Daily	Ca. 1919	Beijing		
Women Citizens (Nüguomin)	Monthly	1922	Shanghai	Liu Wang Liming	1

Women's Movement Special (Funü Yundong Hao)	1922	Wuhan	
Women's Rights Movement Special (Nüquanyundong Tenao)	1922	Beijing	
Women's Weekly (Funü Zhoubao)	1923-26	Shanghai	
Women's Life (Funü Shenghuo)	1932(?) 1940(?)	Chongqing	Chen Yiyun
Women's New Life Movement Monthly (Funü Xinyun Yuekan)	1940-43	Chongqing	
Chinese Women (Zhongguo Funü)	1941	Shanghai	
Women's Monthly (Funü Yuekan)	1941	Chongqing	
Fujian Women (Fujian Funü)	1942	Fujian	

*This was an extension of the Chinese New Women's Magazine.

APPENDIX XIV: WOMAN SUFFRAGE PERIODICALS, BY LOCATIONS
AND YEARS, 1900-1949

<u>Years</u>	<u>Locations</u>	<u>No. of Periodicals</u>	
1900-10	Tokyo	1	
	Shanghai	1	sub-total: 2
1911-12	Shanghai	2	
1913-18	Shanghai	3	
1919-25	Shanghai	2	
	Beijing	2	
	Wuhan	1	sub-total: 5
1926-30	---	0	
1931-49	Chongqing	3	
	Shanghai	1	
	Fujian	1	sub-total: 5
TOTAL:		17	

APPENDIX XV: WOMAN SUFFRAGE ORGANIZATIONS LED BY STUDENTS,
1900-1949

<u>Periods</u>	<u>Names of Organizations</u>
1900-10	(1) Association for the Restoration of Women's Rights
1911-12	(2) Association to Promote Woman Suffrage in China (3) Hunan Woman Suffrage Alliance (4) Association of Comrades for Woman Suffrage (5) Shenzhou Women's Republican Organization
1913-25	(6) Bureau of Women's Rights, Society of Comrades of Tianjin Students (7) Organization to Promote Woman Suffrage of Beijing (8) Alliance of Women's Rights Movement of Beijing (9) Working Committee of the Women's Movement, New Students' Union of Guangdong (10) Guangdong Yizhong Youth's Educational Society (11) Women's Group of Shanghai University (12) Women's Group of Daxia University (13) Women's Group of Nanfang University (14) Women's Group of Oriental Art Special School (15) Students' Union of Jingping Women's School (16) Women's Group of Qunzhi University
1926-49	Unknown

APPENDIX XVI: PERIODICALS PUBLISHED BY WOMAN SUFFRAGE
ORGANIZATIONS, 1900-1949

Woman Suffrage Periodicals

Shenzhou Tenth-Daily

Shenzhou Women's Newspaper
Monthly

Chinese Women Daily Newspaper

Women's Rights Movement Special

Women's Weekly

Woman Suffrage Organizations

Shenzhou Women's Republican
Organization

Shenzhou Women's Republican
Organization

Organization to Promote
Woman Suffrage of Beijing

Alliance of Women's Rights
Movement of Beijing

Research Institute of the
Question of Chinese Women

APPENDIX XVII: WOMAN SUFFRAGE ORGANIZATIONS AS EXTENSIONS OF
FORMER WOMEN'S REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS

Woman Suffrage Organizations

Association to Promote Woman
Suffrage in China

Shanghai Woman Suffrage
Alliance (1911)

Shenzhou Women's Republican
Organization (1911)

Former Organizations

Women's Northern Expedition
Team (Hankou) (Ca. 1911)

Tongmeng Women's Military
Training Team (Ca. 1911)

Shanghai Women Solicita-
tion (1911); and
Women's Assistant Society
(1911)

APPENDIX XVIII: OVERLAPPING LEADERSHIP OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE
ORGANIZATIONS AND WOMEN'S REVOLUTIONARY
ORGANIZATIONS

<u>Woman Suffrage Organizations</u>	<u>Leadership</u>	<u>Women's Nationalist Organizations</u>
Hunan Woman Suffrage Alliance (1911)	Zhang Hanying	Women's Assistant-Society (1911)
Association of Comrades for Woman Suffrage (1912)	Lin Zongsu	Humanitarian Society (1902)
Shenzhou Women's Republican Organization (1912)	Zhang Zhaohan	Women's Assistant Society (1911)
Women's Military Society (Ca. 1912)	Shu Huizhen	Shanghai Women's Solicitation Society (1911)
Organization to Promote the Republic of Women (Ca. 1912)	Madam Wu Tingfang; Madam Zhang Jingjiang	Shanghai Women's Solicitation Society (1911); Republican Women's Charity Association (1911)
Association to Promote Woman Suffrage in China (1911)	Zhang Zhaohan; Madam Wu Tingfang; Tan Sheying	Shanghai Women Solicitation Society (1911); Shenzhou Women's Newspaper (1907)
Shanghai Women's Society (1920)	Zhu Hu Binxia	Humanitarian Society

APPENDIX XIX: WOMEN'S EDUCATIONAL REFORM ORGANIZATIONS, 1900-1949

<u>Organizations</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Places</u>	<u>Leaders</u>	<u>Members</u>
Humanitarian Society (Gonggaihui)	1902	Tokyo	Fang Junji; Lin Zongsu; Hu Binxia Qiu Jin	20
Women's Association of Research On Military Affairs (Nüzi Junsht Yanjiuhui)	1904	Tokyo	Xu Yibing	
Woman Suffrage Alliance (Nüzi Canzheng Tongmenghui)	1911	Shanghai(?)		
Association of Comrades for Woman Suffrage (Nüzi Canzheng Tongzhihui)	1911	Shanghai		
Shenzhen Women's Republican Organization (Shenzhen Nüjie Gonghexiejie She)	1912	Shanghai	Lin Zongsu	
Organization to Promote the Republic of Women (Nüjie Gonghexiejie Hui)	Ca. 1912		Zhang Mojun; Madam Sun Zhongshan Madam Wu Tingfang; Madam Zhang Jingjiang	
Shengzhou Woman Suffrage Alliance (Shengzhou Nüjietecanzheng Tongmenghui)	1911	Shanghai	Zhang Mojun; Madam Wu Tingfang; Tan Sheying	
Alliance of Chinese Women for Woman Suffrage (Zhonghua Nüzicanzheng Tongmenghui)	1920	Shanghai	Wang Ruizhu; Qian Jianqiu; Li QiuJun	

Shanghai Women's Society (Shanghai Funü-hui)	1920	Shanghai	Zhu Hu Binxia	
Alliance for Women's Rights Movement of Sichuan (Sichuan Nūquan Yundong Tongmenghui)	1921	Sichuan		
Federation of All Women of Hunan (Hunan Nūjie Lianhehui)	1921	Hunan	Chen Shu; Wu Jian; Li Zuohan; Hu Zhongmin	
Temperance Organization of Chinese Women (Zhonghua Funü Jiezhī Xiehui)	1922	Shanghai	Liu Wang Liming	10,000
Federation of Chinese Women (Zhonghua Nūjie Lianhehui)	1922	Shanghai		
Research Institute of the Question of Chinese Women (Zhongguo Funü Yanjiuhui)	1922	Shanghai	Li Zongwu; Shen Yanbing	
Bureau of Women's Rights, Society of Comrades of Tianjin Students (Tianjin Xuesheng Tongzhihui, Nūquangu)	1922	Tianjin		
Organization to Promote Woman Suffrage of Beijing (Beijing Nūzicanzheng Xiejinhui)	1922	Beijing	Ge Po; Zhou Heng	
Alliance of Women's Rights Movements of Beijing (Beijing Nūquan Yundong Tongmenghui)	1922	Beijing	Zhou Min	Over 300
Federation of All Women of Sichuan (Sichuan Nūjie Lianhehui)	1923(?)	Sichuan		

Women's Great Alliance of the Sichuan Civil Rights Movement (Sichuan Minquanyundong Nūjie Datongmeng)	1923	Sichuan	
New Students' Society of Guangdong: Committee of Work on Women's Movement (Guangdong Xinxuesheng She: Funü Yundong Gongzuo Weiyuanhui)	1924	Guangdong	
Guangdong Yizhong Youth's Educational Society (Guangdong Yizhong Qingnian Xueshe)	1924(?)	Guangdong	
Organization to Promote the Citizens' Conference of Tianjin Women (Tianjin Funü Guominhuiyi Cuchenghui)	1925	Tianjin	
Guangdong Women's Liberation Organization (Guangdong Funüjiefang Xiehui)	1925	Guangdong	Qu Mengjue
Organization of Tianjin Women (Tianjin Funü Xiehui)	1929	Tianjin	
Great Alliance of Women's Rights Movement of Huiyang (Huiyang Nüquan Yundong Datongmeng)	1931	Guangdong	Huang Dingming
Alliance of Chinese Women for Nation-Building (Zhongguo Funü Jianguo Tongmenghui)	1932	Shanghai	
Women's Guidance Committee of the New Life Movement (Xinshenghuoyundong Funü Zhidao Weiyuanhui)	1934	Nanchang	Zhang Aizhen

Women's Organization of Nanjing Special City (Nanjing Tebieshi Funü Xiehui)	1937	Nanjing	
Women's Organization of Tianjin Special City (Tianjin Tebieshi Funü Xiehui)	1937	Tianjin	
Women's Patriotic Society of Jinglexian (Jinglexian Funü Jiuguohui)	1938	Shanxi	Over 4,300
Women's Patriotic Society of Chunxiang (Chunxiang Funü Jiuguohui)	1938	Shanxi	Over 6,000
Association of Resistance Comrades of Longchuan Women (Longchuan Funüjie Kangdi Tongzhihui)	1938-39	Guangdong	
Anti-Japanese Patriotic Society of Women (Funü Kangrijuguohui)	1938-39	Northern China	
Women's Patriotic Society of Xingxian (Xingxian Funü Jiuguohui)	1938-39	Shanxi	
Resistance Federation of Kaiping Women (Kaiping Funü Kangdi Lianhehui)	1939	Guangdong	Deng Biyan; Tan Guose 300
(Kaiping) Yangang Women's Literacy Class (Kaiping Yangang Funü Shiziban)	1939	Guangdong	Chen Huizhen 40
(Kaiping) Ruliang Women's Training Class (Kaiping Ruliang Funü Xunlianban)	1939	Guangdong	Lin Caike 54
(Kaiping) Heng'an Women's Training Class Term I (Kaiping Heng'an Diyiqi Funü Xunlianban)	1939	Guangdong	15

(Kaiping) Heng'an Women's Training Class: Term II (Kaiping Heng'an Dierqi Funü Xinlianban)	1939	Guangdong	26
(Kaiping) Women's Resistance Officer- Training Class (Kaiping Fukang Ganxunban)	1939	Guangdong	30
(Xinhui) Tianjinxiang Women's Literacy Class (Xinhui Tianjinxiang Funü Shiziban)	1939	Guangdong	100
(Qingyuan) Hetong Literacy Class of Qing- yuan Women's Patriotic Society (Qingyuan Funü Jiuwanghui, Qingyuan Hetang Shiziban)	1939	Guangdong	120
(Luodong) Situngaocun Women's Class (Luodong Situngaocun Funüban)	1939	Guangdong	22
(Luoding) Qinggang Women's Class (Luoding Qinggang Funüban)	1939	Guangdong	34
(Gaoming) District III Xiulixitou Women's Literacy Class (Gaoming Sanqu Xiulixitou Funü Shiziban)	1939	Guangdong	45
(Gaoming) District III Xiulifuli Women's Literacy Class (Gaoming Sanqu Xiulifuli Funü Shiziban)	1939	Guangdong	50
(Heshan) Zhufuxiang Women's Literacy Class: Term I (Heshan Zhufuxiang Diyiqi Funü Shiziban)	1939	Guangdong	72
(Heshan) Zhufuxiang Women's Literacy Class: Term II (Heshan Zhufuxiang Dierqi Funü Shiziban)	1939	Guangdong	64

(Yunfu) Northwest Dashaixiang Women's Literacy Class (Yunfu Xibei Dashaixiang Funü Shiziban)	1939	Guangdong	Mai Guixiang	60
(Yunfu) Beihexiang Women's Literacy Class (Yunfu Beihexiang Funü Shiziban)	1939	Guangdong	Gui Ruixi	80
(Xinxing) Tiantang Sanmin Women's Literacy Class (Xinxing Tiantang Sanmin Funü Shiziban)	1939	Guangdong	Zhou Meilian	72
(Xinxing) Tiantang Shisanxiang Women's Literacy Class (Xinxing Tiantang Shisanxiang Funü Shiziban)	1939	Guangdong	Yu Zhenzhen	12
(Xinxing) Tiantang Ershisixiang Women's Literacy Class (Xinxing Tiantang Ershisixiang Funü Shiziban)	1939	Guangdong	Su Mei	34
(Xinxing) Dongli Women's Literacy Class (Xinxing Dongli Funü Shiziban)	1939	Guangdong	Zhou Buoyi; Zhou Lianfang	22
(Wengyuan) Zhoupo Women's Literacy Class (Wengyuan Zhoupo Funü Shiziban)	1939	Guangdong		60
Jinnan Women's Patriotic Headquarters (Jinnan Funü Jiuquo Zonghui)	1939	Shanxi		
Jinan Women's Patriotic Society (Jinan Funü Jiuquohui)	1939	Henan		400,000
Young Women's Team (Nüqingnian Zongdui)	1937-45		Chen Biyun	

Shandong Women's Patriotic Society (Shandong Funü Jiuguohui)	1937-45	Shandong
Qiongya Women Resistance Comrades' Society (Qiongya Funü Kangdi Tongzhihui)	1937-45	Guangdong
Qiongya Women's Patriotic Federation (Qiongya Funü Jiuguo Lianhehui)	1947	Guangdong
Chinese Women's Political Research Society (Zhongguo Funü Zhengzhi Yanjiuhui)	1947	
Chinese Women's Political Science Society (Zhongguo Funü Zhengzhi Xuehui)	1947	

APPENDIX XX: WOMEN'S EDUCATIONAL REFORM ORGANIZATIONS, BY
LOCATIONS AND YEARS, 1900-1949

<u>Years</u>	<u>Locations</u>	<u>No. of Organizations</u>	
1900-12	Shanghai	4	
	Tokyo	1	
	Unknown	2	sub-total: 7
1913-18	---	0	
1919-37	Shanghai	6	
	Tianjin	4	
	Guangdong	4	
	Sichuan	3	
	Beijing	2	
	Hunan	1	
	Nanchang	1	
	Nanjing	1	sub-total: 22
1938-45	Guangdong	23	
	Shanxi	4	
	Northern China	1	
	Henan	1	
	Shandong	1	
	Unknown	1	sub-total: 31
1946-49	Guangdong	1	
	Unknown	2	sub-total: 3

TOTAL: 63

APPENDIX XXI: WOMEN'S EDUCATIONAL REFORM PERIODICALS, 1900-1949

<u>Periodicals</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Places</u>	<u>Editors</u>	<u>Issues</u>
Women's Newspaper (Nǚbao)	Monthly	1902	Shanghai	Chen Xiefen	3-4
Later known as: Women's Educational Monthly (Nǚxuebao)	Monthly	1903	Tokyo	Chen Xiefen	
Women's World (Nǚzishijie)	Monthly	1903	Shanghai	Ding Chuwo	
Women's Monthly (Nǚjie Yuekan)	Monthly	1906	Shanghai	Chen Qin; Ding Chuwo	
Beijing Women's Newspaper (Beijing Nǚbao)	Daily	1905-07	Beijing	Zhang Zhanyun	(2 years)
Chinese Women's Newspaper (Zhongguo Nǚbao)	Irregular	1906	Shanghai	Qiu Jin	2
Chinese New Women's Magazine (Zhongguo Xinnǚjie Zazhi)	Monthly	1906	Tokyo	Yan Bin	6
Later known as: Shenzhen Women's Weekly (Shenzhen Nǚbao)	Weekly	1907	Shanghai	Tang Guotai; Yang Jiwei; Zhang Mojun	14
Women's Times (Funǚ Shibao)		1910-13	Shanghai		12
Republican Women's Newspaper (Minguo Nǚbao)		1912	Shanghai		

Women's Magazine (Funü Zazhi)	Monthly	1915-32	Shanghai	180
The Green Year (Nüqingnian)	Monthly	1921(?)	Shanghai	
Women's Weekly (Funü Zhoubao)		1923-26	Shanghai	
United Voices of Women (Funü Gongming)	Bi-weekly	1931-42	Chongqing	Chen Yiyun; Tan Sheying
Family Weekly (Jiating Zhoukan)	Weekly	1932-33	English Settlement in Tianjin	
Women's Life (Funü Shenghuo)	Monthly	1932-40	Chongqing	Chen Yiyun
Women's Monthly (Nüzi Yuekan)	Monthly	1933	Shanghai	
Women's Circle (Funüjiejie)	Bi-weekly	1938	Shanghai	
Women's New Life Quarterly (Funü Xinyun Jikan)	Quarterly	1938 1947		10
Guangdong Women (Guangdong Funü)	Monthly	1939 1945	Guangdong	
Guangxi Women (Guangxi Funü)		1940(?)	Guangxi	
Modern Women of China (Zhongguo Funü)		1941	Shanghai	
Fujian Women (Fujian Funü)		1942(?)		
Hong Kong Women's Voice (Xianggang Nüsheng)	Monthly	1947(?)	Hong Kong (Xianggang)	
Modern Women (Xiandai Funü)	Monthly	1948(?)	Shanghai	

APPENDIX XXII: WOMEN'S EDUCATIONAL REFORM PERIODICALS,
BY LOCATIONS AND YEARS, 1900-1949

<u>Years</u>	<u>Locations</u>	<u>No. of Periodicals</u>	
1900-12	Shanghai	5	
	Tokyo	1	
	Beijing	1	sub-total: 7
1913-18	Shanghai	1	
1919-37	Shanghai	3	
	Chongqing	2	
	Tianjin: English settlement	1	sub-total: 6
1938-45	Shanghai	2	
	Guangdong	1	
	Guangxi	1	
	Fujian	1	
	Unknown	1	sub-total: 6
1946-49	Shanghai	1	
	Hongkong	1	sub-total: 2

TOTAL: 22.

APPENDIX XXIII: OVERLAPPING MEMBERSHIP OF WOMEN IN EARLY
WOMEN'S EDUCATIONAL REFORM ORGANIZATIONS/
PERIODICALS AND REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS
AND PERIODICALS

<u>Names</u>	<u>Women's Organiza- tions/Periodicals</u>	<u>Political Organiza- tions/Periodicals</u>
Lin Zongsu	Humanitarian Society Association of Comrades for Woman Suffrage	Tongmenghui <u>Jingzhong Ribao</u>
Qiujin	Humanitarian Society <u>Zhongguo Nübao</u>	Tongmenghui Guangfuhui Sandianhui
Zhang Mojun	Shenzhou Women's Republic Organization Shenzhou Woman Suffrage Alliance	Tongmenghui <u>Jiangsu Dahanbao</u>
Chen Xiefen	<u>Nübao</u>	<u>Subao</u>

APPENDIX XXIV: WOMEN'S ANTI-IMPERIALIST ORGANIZATIONS, 1900-1949

<u>Organizations</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Places</u>	<u>Leaders</u>	<u>Members</u>
Humanitarian Society (Gong'aihui)	1902 1904	Tokyo Tokyo	Hu Binxia Qiu Jin	20
Anti-Russian Association of Woman Comrades (Duf'e Tongzhi Nühui)	1904	Shanghai	Zheng Suyi Chen Wanyan	Over 30
Women Citizens' Society for Donation (Nüzi Guominjuan She)	1906(?)	Shanghai(?)	Wu Zhiying	
Changzhou Women's Society for the Protection of Railways (Changzhou Nüjie Baoluhui)	1907	Changzhou		
Suzhou Women's Society for the Protection of Railways (Suzhou Nüjie Baoluhui)	1907	Suzhou		
Women's Association for the Promotion of National Products (Nüzi Tichangguohuo Hui)	1913			
Women's Association of Salvation (Funü Jiuwanghui)	1919	Beijing	Yang Yujie	
Tianjin Patriotic Women Comrades' Association (Tianjin Nüjie Aiguo Tongzhihui)	1919	Tianjin	Guo Longzhen	
Federation of Beijing Educated Women (Beijing Nüxuejie Lianhehui)	1919	Beijing		

Federation of All-Shanghai Women (Shanghai Gejie Funü Lianhehui)	Ca. 1919	Shanghai		
Federation of Shanghai Female Teachers, (Shanghai Nüjiaozhiyuan Lianhehui)	Ca. 1919	Shanghai		
Alliance for Women's Rights Movement of Sichuan (Sichuan Nüquanyundong Tongmenghui)	1921	Sichuan		
Federation of Chinese Women (Zhonghua Nüjie Lianhehui)	1922(?)	Shanghai		
Alliance of Women's Rights Movement of Beijing (Beijing Nüquanyundong Tongmenghui)	1922	Beijing	Zhou Min	Over 300
Alliance of Women's Rights Movement of Shanghai (Shanghai Nüquanyundong Tongmenghui)	1922	Shanghai	Tang Guoli	
Guangdong Yizhong Youth's Educational Society (Guangdong Yizhong Qingnian Xueshe)	1924	Guangdong		
Organization to Promote the Citizens' Conference of Shanghai Women (Shanghai Nüjie Guominhuiyi Cuchenghui)	1924	Shanghai	Li Jianqiu	21 organiza- tions and 6 independent representatives
Organization to Promote the Citizens' Conference of Tianjin Women (Tianjin Funü Guominhuiyi Cuchenghui)	1924(?)	Tianjin		
Organization of Chinese Women (Zhongguo Funü Xiehui)	1925	Shanghai	Zhang Mojun Shu Huizhen	

Alliance of Women's Organizations (Funü Tuanti Tongyifhui)	1927	Shanghai	12 organi- zations
Association of Women to Promote National Products (Funü Tichangguohuo Hui)	1931(?)	Shanghai	
Philanthropic Association of Shanghai Women (Shanghaishi Funü Jiujihui)	1931(?)	Shanghai	
Philanthropic Association of Women of Yingdexian (Yingdexian Funü Jiujihui)	1931	Guangdong	
<p>Later known as: Great Alliance of Women's Rights Movement of Yingde (Yingde Nüquanyundong Tatongmeng)</p>			
Patriotic and Courageous Anti-Japanese Team of Nanjing Women (Nanjingshi Funü Kangrijiguo Yiyongtuan)	1931	Nanjing	Meng Shushi
Great Alliance of Patriotic Women of Shanghai (Shanghai Funü Jiuguo Tatong- menghui)	1931	Shanghai	Ding Shu- jing; Liu Wang Liming
Courageous Troop of Women (Nüjie Yiyongjun)	1931	Shanghai	Shao Xiang- ting
Patriotic Anti-Japanese Organization of Minhang (Minhang Nüjie Kangrijiguo Hui)	1931	Shanghai(?)	
Women's Nursing Team (Nüzi Jiujihui)	1931	Nanjing	
Organization of Chinese Women For the Consolation of Soldiers (Zhongguo Funü Weilaofiangshi Hui)	1931		Madam Jiang Jieshi
			58 branches, & 54 sub-branches Over 1 million members.

55

OF / DE

Association of Women in Capital for the Promotion of National Products (Shoudu Funü Tichangguohuo Hui)	1931	Nanjing	Tao Xuan
Organization of Guangzhou Women for the Care of Refugees (Guangzhou Funü Jiujinamin Hui)	1932	Guangdong	
Organization of All-Henan Women for the Cooperation of National Crises (Henan Quansheng Funü Kunnangongjihui)	1932(?)	Henan	
Alliance of Chinese Women for Nation-Building (Zhongguo Funü Jianguo Tongmeng)	1932(?)	Shanghai	
Federation of Chinese Women for the Salvation of the North-eastern Comrades (Zhonghua Funü Jiuji Dongbei Tongbao Xiehui)	1933(?)		
Patriotic Alliance of Beijing Women (Beijing Funü Jiuguo Tongmenghui)	1933	Beijing	Lu Yunzhang
Women's Work Committee of the New Life Movement (Xinshenghuo Yundong Funü Gongzuoweiyuanhui)	1934	Nanchang	Zhang Aizhen
Committee of Shanghai Women for the National Products Year Movement (Shanghai Funü Guohuonian Yundong Weiyuanhui)	1934	Shanghai	
Patriotic Federation of Shanghai Women (Shanghai Funüjie Jiuguo Lianhehui)	1935	Shanghai	He Xiangning; Shi Liang

Philanthropic Association of Chaoyang Women (Chaoyang Funü Jiujihui)	1936	Guangdong		
Organization of Jiangxi Women for Life Improvement (Jiangxisheng Funü Shenghuo Gaijinhui)	1936	Guangxi	Wang Minyi	
Association of Shanghai Women for the Consolation of Bandits-Suppressors in Suiyuan (Shanghaiishi Funüjie Suiyuanjiaofei Weilaohui)	1936	Shanghai	Hu Lan	
Guangxi Women's Military Troop (Guangxi Funüzhandoudui)	1937(?)	Guangxi		
National Defence Committee of Guangdong Women (Guangdongsheng Funü Guofanggongzuo Weiyuanhui)	1937		Min Xiangru	
Headquarter of Chinese Women for the Consolation of Self-Defensive and Resistant Soldiers (Zhongguo Funü Weilao Ziweikangzhanjiangshi Zonghui)	1937	Chongqing		42 branches & 54 sub-branches
Patriotic Federation of Jiaodong Women (Jiaodong Funü Jiuguo Lianhehui)	1937	Jiaodong		
Organization of Shanghai Women for the Care of Refugees (Shanghai Funü Nanmin Jiujihui)	1937	Shanghai		
Formerly known as: Alliance of Chinese Women for Woman Suffrage (Zhonghua Nüzicanzheng Tongmenghui)				

Federation of All-Women (Gejie Funü Lianhehui)	1938	Northern China		
Women's Patriotic Team (Funü Jiutuan)	1938		Huo Qiu	
Federation of All-Shanbei Women (Shanbei Gejie Funü Lianhehui)	1938	Shanxi		193,878
War-time Children Headquarter (Zhanshi Ertongbaoyuhui Zonghui)	1938	Hankou		14 branches
Shanghai Women's Committee for the Mobilization of Morale (Shanghai Shi Jingshen Zongdongyuan Funü Weiyuanhui)	1938	Shanghai	Qian Jian- qiu	
Patriotic Association of Jingle Women (Jinglexian Funü Jiuguoahui)	1938	Shanxi		4,300
Patriotic Association of Chun Women (Chunxian Funü Jiuguoahui)	1938	Shanxi		6,000
Women's Guidance Committee of the New Life Movement (expanded)* (Xinyun Funü Zhidao Weiyuanhui)	1938-48	Chongqing	Jiang Jieshi; Madam Jiang Jieshi	

* Its organizational structure is illustrated in Appendix X.

APPENDIX XXV: THE STRUCTURE OF THE WOMEN'S GUIDANCE COMMITTEE OF THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT, 1943 (Source: Funu Xinyun, July 1944)

1. Administrative Department
2. Training Department
3. Department of Cultural Affairs
4. Department of Life Guidance
5. Counsellors
6. Department of Productive Affairs:
 - (a) Songgai Experimental Textile District (Songgai Fangzhi Shiyuanqu)
 - (b) Leshan Experimental Silk District (Leshan Cansi Shiyuanqu)
 - (c) New Life Movement Women's Handicraft Society (Xinyun Funu Gongyishe)
 - (d) New Life Movement Textile Factory (Xinyun Fangzhichang)
7. Consolation Department: nine teams
8. Department of Child Care
9. Department of Rural Services
10. Coordination Committee
11. Provincial Women's Guidance Committee of the New Life Movement (12 provinces): Fujien, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Henan, Zhejiang, Gansu, Suiyuan, and Jilin
12. External Women's Guidance Committee of the New Life Movement: 10 branches in the U.S.A.
13. New Life Women's Working Teams: 34 teams

APPENDIX XXVI: EXAMPLES OF WOMEN'S ANTI-IMPERIALIST ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE
LEADERSHIP OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, 1935-49

Organizations	Dates	Places	Leaders	Members
Patriotic Federation of Shanghai Women (Shanghai Funüjie Jiuguo Lianhehui)*	1935	Shanghai	He Xiangning Shi Liang	Over 1,000
Patriotic Federation of Jiaodong Women (Jiaodong Funü Jiuguo Lianhehui)*	1937	Jiaodong		
Federation of All-Women (Gejie Funü Lianhehui)*	1938	Northern China		
Federation of All-Shanbei Women (Shanbei Gejie Funü Lianhehui)*	1938	Shanxi		193,878
Xiang Women Representatives' Association (Xiang Funü Daibiaohui)	1938	Northern China		
Women's Anti-Japanese Patriotic Associa- tions (Funü Kangri Jiuguo)	1938-45	Shanxi; Gansu; Ningxia;		Shanxi, Gansu, & Ningxia had 21,000 (in 1939)
		Hebei;		Hebei had 400,000 (in 1939)
		Shanxi		Shanxi had 200,000 (in 1940)

Societies of Sisters (Zimeihui)	1938	Guangdong; Hebei	
Societies of Aunts (Shenmuhui)	1938	Guangdong	
Women's Literacy Classes' (Funü Shiziban)	1938	Guangdong	
Women Classmates' Societies (Nütongxue Hui)	1938	Guangdong	
Women's Organizations (Funühui)	1938	Guangdong	
Associations of Women Comrades for Resistance (Funü Kangdi Tongzhihui)	1938-39	Guangdong; Fujian; Jianxi	
Women's Consolation Societies (Funü Weilaohui)	1938-39	Guangdong; Fujian; Jiangxi	
Xian Women's Organization (Xian Funühui)	1939	Zhejiang	
Women's Working Teams (Funü Gongzuodui)	1939	Zhejiang	
Women's Service Teams (Funü Fuwudui)	1939	Zhejiang; Hebei; Fujian; Jiangsu; Guangdong	
Women's Security Associations (Gongan Funühui)	1939	Hebei	Over 50
Women's Camps (Funüying)	1940	Zhejiang	
Women's Supervisory Teams (Funü Jiuchadui)	1940	Zhejiang	Over 800

Women's Troops (Nǚbīngduì)	1940	Zhejiang
Women Guerrillas (Nǚ Yǒujīduì)	1940	Southern China
Women's Self-Defence Teams (Nǚ Zìwéidui)	1940	Southern China
Societies of Mothers (Māmātuan)	1940(?)	Northern China
Women's Struggle Societies (Fūnǚ Dǒuzhēnhuì)	1940	Shanxi; Gansu; Ningxia
Federation of All-Democratic Women of China (Zhōnghuà Quánguó Mǐnzhǔfūnǚ Liánhéhuí)	1949	Beijing(?)

* These four organizations had been included in Appendix IX.

APPENDIX XXVII: WOMEN'S ANTI-IMPERIALIST ORGANIZATIONS, BY
LOCATIONS AND YEARS, 1900-1949

<u>Years</u>	<u>Locations</u>	<u>No. of Organizations</u>	
1900-12	Shanghai	2	
	Tokyo	1	
	Changzhou	1	
	Suzhou	1	sub-total: 6
1913-18	Unknown	1	
1919-38(Jun)	Shanghai	18	
	Guangdong	5	
	Nanjing	3	
	Beijing	3	
	Guangxi	2	
	Shanxi	2	
	Tianjin	2	
	Sichuan	1	
	Henan	1	
	Nanchang	1	
	Jiaodong	1	
	Shanxi	1	
	Hankou	1	
	Chongqing	1	
	Northern China	1	
	Unknown	4	sub-total: 47
1938(Jul)-49	Unknown	34,419*	
TOTAL:		34,473	

* This figure accepted the Xia Yingzhe (1940b)'s statistics of 358 women's anti-imperialist organizations under the KMT in 1940, and the Li Baoguang's statistics of 34,061 branches of the Federation of All-Women in the CCP's areas in 1945. When these two figures were added together, they amounted to 34,419.

APPENDIX XXVIII: WOMEN'S ANTI-IMPERIALIST PERIODICALS, 1900-1949

<u>Periodicals</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Places</u>	<u>Editors</u>	<u>Issues</u>
Chinese Women's Newspaper (Zhongguo Nubao).	Irregular	1906	Shanghai	Qin Jin	2
Women's Magazine (Funü Zazhi)	Monthly	1915-32	Shanghai		180
The Green Year (Nüqingnian)	8 times a year	1921(?)	Shanghai	Zhang Caipin	
The Women's Voice (Funüsheng)	Bi-weekly	1921	Shanghai		
Women's Weekly (Funü Zhoubao)	Weekly	1923-26	Shanghai		
United Voices of Women (Funü Gongming)	Monthly	1931-42	Chongqing	Chen Yiyun	
Women's Life (Funü Shenghuo)	Monthly	1932-40	Chongqing	Chen Yiyun	
Women's Monthly (Nüzi Yuekan)	Monthly	1933	Shanghai		
Jiangxi Women (Jiangxi Funü)	Monthly	1937	Jiangxi		
Women's Culture (Funü Wenhua)	Monthly	1938-39	Hankou		
Women's Circle (Funüjie)	Bi-weekly	1938	Shanghai		
Women (Funü)		1938	Shanghai		
Women's New Life Movement Quarterly (Funü Xinyun Jikan)	Quarterly	1938			

Women of War-District (Zhanqu Funü)	Bi-weekly	1939(?)		
Guangdong Women (Guangdong Funü)	Monthly	1939		
Women's Front (Funü Zhanxian)	Weekly	1939-41	Hongkong	Tan Shaying
Modern Women (Shidai Funü)		1939	Hunan	
Zhejiang Women (Zhejiang Funü)		1939	Zhejiang	
Women's New Life Movement Weekly (Funü Xinyun Zhoukan)	Weekly	1939	Chongqing	233
Frontal Women (Qianxian Funü)		1939	Zhejiang	
New Women (Xinfunü)	Monthly	1939	Guangdong	
Women's New Life Movement Newsletter (Funü Xinyun Tongxun)	Bi-weekly	1939	Chongqing	54
Xinming Women (Xinming Funü)		Wartime*	Hunan	
Hunan Women (Hunan Funü)	Monthly	Wartime*	Hunan	
Woman Wind (Fufeng)		Wartime*	Zhejiang	
Woman Guerrillas (Funü Tuji)		Wartime*	Zhejiang	
Lanzhou Women (Lanzhou Funü)	Monthly	Wartime*	Lanzhou	
Yuehan Women (Yuehan Funü)		Wartime*	Hunan	
Woman Patrol (Funü Qianshao)	Weekly	Wartime*	Shandong	
Female Monthly (Funü Yuekan)	Monthly	Wartime*	Anhui	

Anhui Women (Anhui Funü)	Monthly	Wartime*	Anhui	
Zhejiang Women (Zhejiang Funü)		1940-42	Zhejiang	12
Women's New Life Movement Monthly (Funü Xinyun Yuekan)	Monthly	1940-43	Chongqing	54
Guangxi Women (Guangxi Funü)		1940	Guangxi	
Women's Light (Nüguang)	Bi-weekly	1941	Hongkong	
Modern Women of China (Zhongguo Funü)		1941(?)	Shanghai	
Women's Work (Funü Gongzuo)		1942	Guizhou	
Gansu Women (Gansu Funü)		1942(?)	Gansu	
Fujian Women (Fujian Funü)		1942	Fujian	
Women's New Life Movement Bi-weekly (Funü Xinyun Shuangzhoukan)	Bi-weekly	1943		20
Guizhou Women's Movement (Guizhou Fuyun)	Bi-monthly	1944	Guizhou	
Women's Culture Monthly (Funü Wenhua Yuekan)	Monthly	1944		6
Contemporary Women (Shidai Funü)	Monthly	1946	Zhangia-kou	
Women Nowadays (Xiandai Funü)		1947-48	Chongqing	

* Wartime = 1937-45.

APPENDIX XXIX: WOMEN'S ANTI-IMPERIALIST PERIODICALS, BY
LOCATIONS AND YEARS, 1900-1949

<u>Years</u>	<u>Locations</u>	<u>No. of Periodicals</u>	
1900-12	Shanghai	1	
1913-18	Shanghai	1	
1919-38(Jun)	Shanghai	6	
	Chongqing	2	
	Jiangxi	1	sub-total: 9
1938(Jul)-49	Zhejiang	5	
	Hunan	4	
	Chongqing	4	
	Guangdong	2	
	Hongkong	2	
	Anhui	2	
	Guizhou	2	
	Lanzhou	1	
	Shandong	1	
	Gansu	1	
	Guangxi	1	
	Fujian	1	
	Zhang Jiakou	1	
	Shanghai	1	
	Hankou	1	
	Unknown	4	sub-total: 33
TOTAL:		44	

REFERENCES

Aishi.

- 1924 "The Women's Movements Should Note Several Points,"
(Funü Yundong Yingzhuyide Jidian,) Funü Zhoubao,
62 (Nov. 12): 2-3.

All-China Democratic Women's Federation Preparation Committee
(Quanguo Minzhu Funü Lianhehui Choubai Weiyuanhui)

- 1949 A sketch of the peasant women's movement in the Chinese
liberated areas (Zhongguo jiegangqu nongcun funü dafangshen
yundong sumino). Xianggang, Xinminzhu chubanshe.

All-China Democratic Women's Federation
(Quanguo Minzhu Funü Lianhehui)

- 1950 Concerning the urban-rural women representatives conference
(Guanyu chengxiang funü daibiao huivi). Beijing, Zhongguo
Quan'quo Minzhu funü lianhehui.

Ayscough, Florence.

- 1933 Chinese Women. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.

Bai, Jiao.

- 1934 "The Pioneer Voices of the Woman Suffrage Movement in the
Republic" (Minguo Nüzi Canzheng Yundong) Renwen Yuekan,
5, 4 (May): 1-18.

Baishuang.

- 1938 'Sincerely unite, express democratic spirit', ('Jincheng
tuanjie, fahui minzhu jingshen'), Funü Shenghuo, VI, viii
(August 20): 7-8.

Bao, Jialin.

- 1973 "Qiu Jin and the Late Qing Women's Movement" (Qiu Jin Yu Qing
Mo Funü Yundong), Report of the 31st Academic Discussion
Meeting (Xueshu Taolinhui Jilu) The Center of Research on
Historical Materials of the Republic of China (Zhonghua
Minguo Shiliao Yanjiu Zhongxin).

- 1974 "The Trend of Women's Thoughts During the Period of 1911's
Revolution" (Xinhaigeming Shiqi de Funü Sixiang, 1898-
1911), Zhonghua Xuebao, 1, 1 (Jan.): 1-22.

Belden, Jack.

- 1967 'The land problem', Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell.
Republican China. New York, Vintage Books: 310-316.

Bernstein, Hilda.

- 1975 For Their Triumphs and For Their Tears. London: International Defence and Aid Fund for South Africa.

Bernstein, Irving.

- 1960 "Union Growth and Structural Cycles", in W. Galenson & S.M. Lipsét (ed.) Labour and Trade Unionism. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

Biggerstaff, Knight.

- 1972 The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China. New York: Kennikat Press.

Biyun.

- 1936 'The misfortunes of contemporary career women' ('Xiandai zhiye funü de eyun'), Dongfang zazhi, XXXIII, xv (August): 112-17.
- 1936 'An examination of the contemporary women's labour issues' ('Xiandai funü laodong wenti zhi jianshi'), Dongfang zazhi, XXXIII, xxiii (December): 101-06.
- 1938 'The situation of women in the island' ('Gudao shang de funü shenghuo'), Dongfang zazhi, XXXV, xiii (July): 52-56.

Blumer, Herbert.

- 1951 "Social Movement", in A.M. Lee (ed.) New Outline of the Principles of Sociology. New York: Barnes and Noble.

Bodde, Derk.

- 1957 China's Cultural Tradition: What and Whither? Toronto: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

Boggs, Lucinda P.

- 1913 Chinese Womanhood. Cincinnati, Jennings and Graham.

Boone, Gladys.

- 1968 The Women's Trade Union Leagues in Great Britain and the United States. New York: AMS Press.

Buck, J.L.

- 1956 Land Utilization in China. New York: The Council on Economic and Cultural Affairs.

Bullitt, William C.

- 1967 "Report to the American People On China", in Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell; Republican China. New York: Vintage Books, 347-48.

Bunch-Weeks, Charlotte.

- 1970 "Asian Women in Revolution", *Women: A Journal of Liberation*, I, 4 (Summer): 6-9.

Cameron, William B.

- 1966 *Modern Social Movements*. New York: Random House.

Cao, Mengjun.

- 1957 'Secure the obtained democratic rights' ('Baowei yide de minzhu quanli'), *Zhongguo funü*, (September): 12.

CCP Central Committee's Editorial and Translation Department ---
Research Branch of the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin
(Zhonggong Zhongyang Makesi Liening Sidalin Zhuzuo Bianji Bianyi ju Yanjiushi)

- 1958 The introduction of the periodicals of the May Fourth Movement era (Wu-Si Shidai qikan jieshao). Beijing, Renmin chubanshe.

Chen, Biyun.

- 1938 'The sufferings of women and children of Shanghai under the Japanese invasion' ('Rijun qinlue xia Shanghai furu suo zao shou dao de jienan'), *Dongfang zazhi*, XXXV, i (January): 75-78.

Chen, Chongguang.

- 1972 "The Change of Women's Status in Early Republican China" (Minguo Chuqi Funü Diwei de Yenbian) M.A. Thesis. Graduate School of History, the Private College of Chinese Culture (Sili Zhongguo Wenhua/Xueyuan Shixue Yenjiusuo).

Chen, Dongyuan.

- 1975 *History of the Life of Chinese Women*. (Zhongguo Funü Shenghuo) Taipei: Shangwu Press.

Chen, Huili.

- 1971 'Apprentice' ('Yangcheng gong'), Li Yuqing, *The calamity of the old China* (Ku'nan de jiu Zhongguo). Xianggang, Zhaoyang chubanshe: 14-21.

Chen, Huizhen.

- 1947 "Women's Education and Democracy" (Funü Jiaoyu Minzhuzhengzhi), *Nüqingnian*, 10 (Feb. 10): 8-9.

Chen, Jerome.

- 1979 *The Military-Gentry Coalition: China Under the Warlords*. Toronto: University of Toronto-York University, Joint Center on Modern East Asia.

Chen, Lifu.

- 1940 Strategies of Western Education. (Zhanshi Jiaoyu de Fangzhen).
Taibei: Zhengzhong Shuju.

Chen, Qitjan.

- 1962 The History of Chinese Education in the Last Thirty Years.
(Zuijin Sanshi Nian Zhongguo Jiaoyu Shi) Taibei: Wen Xing
Shudian.

Chen, Tianhua.

- 1953 "Repent Immediately" (Meng Hui Tou) in Yang Song & Deng Liqun
(ed.) Selection of Materials on Chinese Modern History (Zhongguo
Jindaishi Ziliao Xuanji). Beijing: Classical Documents
Publications Co. (Dian Wen Zhubanshe): 569-78.

Chen, Wenqing.

- 1924 "The Chinese Politics and the Woman Suffrage" (Zhongguo Zhenzhi
yu Nüzi Canzheng) Funü Zhoubao, 40 (May 28): 4.

Chen, Yubai.

- 1933 'Production for the salvation of the country' ('Shengchan
jiuguo'), Nüzi yuekan, I, ii: 5-7.

Chen, Xiefen.

- 1903 "Exert an Effort" ("Jinli"), Nüxuebao, 2, 2: 7-11.

- 1904 "The Danger of Women" (Nüjie Zhi Kewei) Zhongguo Ribao
(Apr. 26): 2; (Apr. 27): 2.

Cheng Benhang.

- 1927 "My Opinion on Women's Liberation" ("Funü Jiefang de Wojian"),
Funü Zazhi, 13, 7: (July): 14-20.

Chesneaux, Jean.

- 1971 Secret societies in China in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Xianggang, Heinemann Educational Books, Ltd.

- 1973 Peasant revolts in China, 1840-1949. London, Thomas and Hudson,
Ltd.

Chi, Zhenchao.

- 1938 'The situation of women's work in Jiangxi' ('Jiangxi funü
gongzuo de shikuang'), Dongfang zazhi, XXXV, xvii (September):
78-84.

Chow, Tse-tung.

- 1960 The May Fourth Movement. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press.

Chu, Nan Nüzi.

- 1902 "The Future of Chinese Women" (Zhongguo Nüzi de Qiantu)
Nüxuebao, 1, 4 (Sept.): 1-6.

Clark, Samuel, D., J. Paul Grayson, and Linda Grayson (ed.)

- 1975 Prophecy and Protest. Toronto: Gage Educational Pub. Ltd.

Cleverdon, Catherine L.

- 1974 Woman Suffrage Movement in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Coleman, James S.

- 1957 Community Conflict. New York: Free Press.

Collins, Leslie E.

- 1976 'The new women: A psycho-historical study of the Chinese feminist movement from 1900 to present', Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University.

Cook, Ramsay.

- 1974 "Introduction", in Catherine L. Cleverdon. The Woman Suffrage Movement in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Curtin, Katie.

- 1975 Women in China. Toronto: Pathfinder Press.

Cusack, Dymphna.

- 1959 Chinese women speak. Sydney, Halstead Press.

Davin, Delia.

- 1973 'Women in the liberated areas', M.B. Young, Women in China. Ann Arbor, Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan: 73-92.

- 1976 Woman-Work. Oxford, Clarendon Press.

De.

- 1929 "The Workers and the Woman Suffrage Movement" ("Gongren ji Funü de Xuanju Yundong"), in Meisheng, Zhongguo Funü Wenti Taolunji (Discussion Papers on the Question of Chinese Women). Shanghai: New Culture Bookstore (Xinwenhua Shushe): 83-84.

De'en.

- 1929 'Elementary education and training and women of our country' ('Qianshi beji yu woguo funü'), Funü zazhi, XV, i (January): 19-23.

Deng, Yingchao.

- 1938 'Anti-Japanese invasion and Chinese women' ('Fandue rikou qinlue yu Zhongguo funü') Zhou Enlai and Deng Yinchao (Zhou Enlai yu Deng Yingchao). Hankou, Yixing shuju: 90-98.
- 1938 'How to organize peasant women [?]' ('Zenyang zuzhi nongcun funü [?]', Funü shenghuo, V, xii (April 16): 9-10.
- 1947 'Land reform and the new tasks of women's work' ('Tudi jaige yu funü gongzue de xin renwu'), Documents of the women's movements (Funü yundong wenxian). Xianggang, Xin minzhu chubanshe: 40-46.

Diamond, Norma.

- 1973 "The Status of Women: One Step Forward. Two Steps Back", in M.B. Young (ed.) Women in China. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan: 211-42.

Ding, Fenjia.

- 1915 'From what I observed on the life-styles of women in this place' ('Wo suojian zhi bendi funü shenghuo xianzhuang'), Funü zazhi, I, ix (September): 1-10.

Eckstein, Harry.

- 1965 "On the Etiology of Internal Wars", History and Theory, 4, 2: 133-163.

Eichler, Margrit.

- 1977 "Leadership in Social Movements", Sociological Inquiry, 47, 2: 99-107.

Erbe, William.

- 1964 "Social Involvement and Political Activity: A Replication and Elaboration", American Sociological Review, 29: 198-215.

Esherick, Joseph.

- 1974 Lost chance in China. New York, Vintage Books.

Farnham, M.F.

- 1947 "Battles Won and Lost", in Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, 251 (May): 113-19.

Fang, Suzhong.

- 1959 'The national father's idea of women's rights' ('Guofu de nüquan sixiang'), Revolutionary ideas Monthly (Geming sixiang yuekan), VI, iii (August): 25.

Fang, Xing.

- 1923 "The Strategies that Our Contemporary Women's Movement Should Take" (Woguo Muzian Funüyundong Yingqude Fangzhen) Funü Zazhi, 9, 1 (Jan.): 120-22.

Feuerwerker, A.

- 1968 The Chinese economy, 1912-1949. Ann Arbor, Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan.
- 1969 The Chinese economy, ca. 1870-1911. Ann Arbor, Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan.
- 1975 Rebellion in the nineteenth century. Ann Arbor, Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan.
- 1976 The foreign establishment in China in the early twentieth century. Ann Arbor, Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan.

First National Representatives Congress of Chinese Women. (Zhongguo funü diyi ci quanquo daibiao da hui).

- 1949 Xianggang, Xin minzhu chubanshe.

Freeman, J.

- 1975 The Politics of Women's Liberation. New York: David McKay Co. Inc.

Fu, Xuewen.

- 1946 Contemporary Women. (Xiandai Funü) Shanghai: Shangwu Yinsheguan.

Gaoshan.

- 1929 "The Implication of the Women's Movement for Suffrage" (Funü Canzheng Yundong Zhi Zhongyao) in Meisheng, Discussion Papers on the Question of Chinese Women (Zhongguo Funü Wenti Taolunji) Volume 1. Shanghai: Xinwenhua Shushe: 74-75.

Gao, Yihan.

- 1924 "Twenty-Years of Chinese Political Parties," (Ershi Nian lai Zhongguo de Zhengdang) Dongfang Zazhi, 21, 1 (Jan.): D1.
- 1929 "The Question of Women's Participation in Politics" (Nüzi Canzheng Wenti) in Meisheng (ed.) Discussion Papers of the Question of Chinese Women (Zhongguo Funü Wenti Taolunji) Shanghai: Xinwenhua Shushe: 126-133.

Gongdu.

- 1929 'The issue of Chinese women workers' ('Zhongguo nügong wenti'), Funü zazhi, XV, ix (September).

Gorham, Deborah.

- 1976 "The Canadian Suffragists", in Gwen Matheson (ed.), *Women in the Canadian Mosaic*. Toronto: Pater Martin Assoc. Ltd.

Gregg, Alice H.

- 1946 *China and Educational Autonomy: The Changing Role of the Protestant Educational Missionary in China, 1807-1937*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press.

Grimshaw, Patricia.

- 1972 *Women's Suffrage in New Zealand*. New Zealand: Auckland University Press.

Gu, Bingyuan.

- 1929 'The issue of Shanghai women workers' ('Shanghai nügong wenti'), *Nüqingnian*, VIII, v (May): 4-10.

Guixiu.

- 1938 'How to go about with the education of peasant women's education during wartime' ('Zenyang jinxing zhanshi xiangcun funü jiaoyu'), *Funü shenghuo*, VI, iii (June 5): 11-12.

Guo, Zhenyi.

- 1934 'The greater Shanghai plan should note a few issues on women' ('Da Shanghai jihua zhong ying zhuyi de jige funü wenti'), *Dongfang zazhi*, XXXI, v (March) section on 'women' ('fu'), 1-4.

- 1937 *The issue of women in China*. (Zhongguo funü wenti). Shanghai, Shangwu yinshuguan: 152-55.

Gusfield, Joseph.

- 1970 *Protest, Reform, and Revolt*. Toronto: John Wiley and Sons.

Hart, Robert.

- 1967 "The Tragedy of China's Defeat", in Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, *Imperial China*. New York: Vintage Books: 260.

He, Ganzhi.

- 1956 *The Revolutionary History of Modern China*. (Zhongguo Xiandai Geming Shi) Beijing: Gaodeng Jiaoyu Chubanshe.

He, Xiangning.

- 1903 "Warning Our Sisters Compatriots" (Jianggao Wo Tongbao Zimei) *Jiangsu*, (May 1): 44-45.

Headland, Isaac T.

- 1895 "The Nü Erk; or Classic for Girls: Translated from the Chinese," *The Chinese Recorder*, 26, 12 (Dec.): 554-560.

Heberle, Rudolf.

- 1949 "Observation on the Sociology of Social Movements", American Sociological Review, 14: 346-57.

Hefa.

- 1930 'The labor legislation and the protection of women' ('Laodong lifa yu nūgong-baohu'), Nūqingnian, IX, viii (October): 14-23.

Henry, Alice.

- 1973 The Trade Union Women. New York: Burt Franklin.

Hsiao, Kung-chuan.

- 1967 Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Hsiao, Yue-chen.

- 1935 "The Final Analysis of the Question of Women" ("Funū Wenti Zhongjitepo"), Xin Zhonghua, 3, 3: (March 10): 13-19.

Hsu, Immanuel C.Y.

- 1970 The Rise of Modern China. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

Hu, Ziyang.

- 1940 'Industrial women workers of Chongqing' ('Chanye nūgong zai Chongqing'), Funū shenghuo, VIII, x (February 20): 7-9.

Huai, Bing.

- 1912 "The Rationales of Women's Political Participation" (Shuo Nūzi Canzheng Zhi Liyou) Funū Shibao, 7, (July 10): 43-44.

Huanggong.

- 1906 "The Grand Soul" (Da Hun Pian) Zhongguo Nūbao 1: 5-11.

Huang, Junlue.

- 1927 'The wage system of China' ('Zhongguo gongqian zhidu'), Dongfang zazhi, XXIV, xviii (September): 44.

Huang, Suxin.

- 1938 'Expanding the wartime women's work into the villages' ('Kuoda zhanshi funū gongzuo dao nongcun'), Funū gongming, VII, vii (April 5): 7-8.

- 1938 'How to carry on the tasks of women's movement in the war districts --- through the industrial cooperative movement to proceed the tasks of women's movement' ('Zenyang zai zhanqunet jinxing fuyun gongzuo --- tongguo gongye hezue yundong tuijin fuyun gongzuo'), Funū gongming, VIII, v-vi (October 15): 4-5, 8.

Huang, Xiaomin.

- 1927 'On women's movements and Guangdong women' ('Lun funü yundong yu Guangdong de funü') Funü zazhi, XIII, iv (April): 6.

Hubei Federation of Philosophy and Social Sciences Learned Societies (Hubei Sheng Zhexue Shehuikexue Xuehui Lianhehui)

- 1962 A collection of papers celebrating the 50th anniversary of the 1911 revolution. (Xin-Hai qeming wushi zhounian jinian luwei ji). Beijing, Zhonghua shuju.

Hui.

- 1938 "Another Bloody Account" ("Youshi Yipian Xuezhang"), Funü Shenghuo, 6, 1 (May 5): 10.

Irving, John A.

- 1975 "The Evolution of the Social Credit Movement", in Samuel D. Clark, Paul Grayson, and Linda Grayson (ed.), Prophecy and Protest. Toronto: Gage Educational Pub. Ltd.: 130-152.

Israel, John.

- 1968 "Reflections on the Modern Chinese Student Movement", Daedalus, (Winter): 229-53.

Jackson, M., et.al.

- 1960 "The Failure of an Incipient Social Movement", Pacific Sociological Review, 3 (Spring): 40.

Jiang, Ying.

- 1939 "Mobilization of Women in Northern Shanxi --- An Interview With Ms. Kao Minzhen, the Woman Senators" (Shan Bei Funüde Dongyuan --- Nü Canzhengyuan Kao Minzhen Nushi Fangwen Ji), Funü Shenghuo, 7, 3 (Mar. 16): 16-17.

Jiangsu Federation of Women

(Jiangxi Sheng Funü Lianhehui)

- 1963 The stories of Jiangxi women's revolutionary struggle (Jiangxi funü geming douzheng gushi). Beijing, Zhongguo funü zazhishe.

Jianye.

- 1928 'Xingning women' ('Xingning de funü'), New Women (Xin nüxing), III, vii (July): 805-23.

Jihong.

- 1937 'An interview with Jiang Yixiao, a woman reporter' ('Nü jizhi Jiang Yixiao fangoren ji'), Funü zazhi, IV, ii (February 1): 37-43

- Jihong.
1938 'The Wuhan women workers in the wartime' ('Kangzhan zhong de Wuhan nügong'), Funü shenghuo, VI, i. (May 5): 7-10.
- Jingyu.
1924 'The future of Chinese women's citizen revolutionary movement' ('Jinhou Zhongguo funü de guoming geming yundong'), Funü zazhi, I, x (January): 28-32.
- Johnson, Chalmers.
1962 Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945. California: Stanford University Press.
1966 Revolutionary Change. Boston: Little and Brown.
- Kibby, E. Stuart (ed.)
1960 Contemporary China. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Kilian, Lewis.
1964 "Social Movements", in R.E.L. Faris. Handbook of Modern Sociology. Chicago: Rand McNally: 426-55.
- King, C. Wendall.
1956 Social Movements in the United States. New York: Random House.
- King, Martin Luther, Jr.
1958 Stride Toward Freedom. New York: Harper and Row.
- Kim, Ilpynong J.
1970 'Mass mobilization policies and techniques developed in the period of the Chinese Soviet-Republic', A. Doak Barnett, Chinese communist politics in Action. Seattle, University of Washington Press: 79-98.
- Kissinger, C.C. and Bob Ross.
1968 "Starting in '60s: Or from SLID to Resistance", New Left Notes, (June 10): 16.
- KMT Central Committee's Editorial Committee of Party Historical Data (Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyuanhui Dangshi Shiliao Biansuan Weiyuanhui)
1964 The year-chart of seventy years of important events of the KMT (Zhongguo Guomindang qi shinian dashi nianbiao). Taipei, The KMT Central Committee's Editorial Committee of Party Historical Data.
- Kornhauser, W.
1959 The Politics of Mass Society. Glencoe: Free Press.

Kraditor, A.S.

1968 Up From the Pedestal. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.

1971 The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920. New York: Anchor Books.

Kristeva, Hulia.

1977 About Chinese women. London, Marion Boyars.

Landy, Laurie.

1974 Women in the Chinese revolution. Highland Park, International Socialist Pub. Co.

Lang, Kurt and G.E. Lang.

1966 Collective Dynamics. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co.

Latourette, Kenneth S.

1964 The Chinese: Their History and Culture. New York: The MacMillan Co.

Leith, Suzette.

1973 'Chinese women in the early communist movement', M.B. Young, Women in China. Ann Arbor, Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan: 47-72.

Lenin, V.I.

1966 The Emancipation of Women. New York: International Publications.

Levy, Marion J. (Jr.)

1971 The family revolution in modern China. New York, Octagon Books.

Levy, Marion J. (Jr.) and Kuo-heng Shih.

1949 The Rise of Modern Business Class. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations

Li, Baoguang.

1946 "One Step Ahead" (Geng Qianjin Yibu!) Shidai Funü, 1, 1 (July): 6-9.

1946 'Women should enthusiastically join the liberation movement' ('Funü yao ralie canjia fanshen yundong'), Shidai funü, 1, ii (August): 1-3.

Li, Guangye.

1929 "The Future of Women's Education" (Jinhonde Nüzijiaoyu) in Meisheng, Discussion Papers on the Question of Chinese Women (Zhongguo Funüwenti Taolunji) Volume 1. Shanghai: Xinwenhua Shushe: 170-174.

Li, Guojun.

- 1947 "Self-Strengthening and Independence in Gaining Liberation --- A Farewell Letter to the Young Women Comrades of Guangdong" ("Ziqiang-Sili Zhengqu-Jiefang --- Gaobie Guangdong Nütongzhi Shu") Nüqingnian, 10 (Feb. 10): 2.

Li, Jiannong.

- 1971 The Political History of Modern China. (Zhongguo Jin Bainiang Zhengzhi Shi) Volume 1. Taipei: Shangwu Press.

Li, Sanwu.

- 1924 "Research on the Women's Movement of Political Participation" (Funü Canzheng Yundong Yanjiu) Women's Yearbook (Funü Nianjian) Shanghai: Xinwenhua Shushe. Volume 1, Book 1: 143-87.

Li, Shoushu.

- 1922 "The Salvation of Uneducated Women" (Shixue Funü de Jiuji) Funu Zazhi, 8, 3 (Mar.): 27-29.

Li, Wenhai.

- 1962 "The Revolution of 1911 and Political Parties" (Xinhai Geming Yu Huidang) in Federation of Philosophy & Social Sciences Associations of Hubei (Hubei Sheng Zhexue Shehui-hexue Lianhehui). Memorial Essays of Fifty Years Anniversary of 1911's Revolution. (Xinhai Geming Wushi Zhounian Luwen Ji). Volume 1. Beijing, Zhonghua Shudian.

Li, Yuzhong.

- 1923 "The Strategies that Our Contemporary Women's Movements Should Take" (Woguo Muqian Funü Yundong Yingqude Fangzhen) Funü Zazhi, 9, 1 (Jan.): 126-27.

Li-Wang, Limeng.

- 1934 The Chinese women's movements (Zhongguo funü yundong). Shanghai, Shangwu yinshuguan.

Lian, Shi.

- 1906 "On Women's Rights" (Nüqin jingyi) Zhongguo Xin Nüjie Zazhi, 1 (Dec.): 1-6.

Liang, Ying.

- 1938 "Expanding wartime women's work into the countryside" ('Kuoda zhanshi funü gongruo daonongcun'), Funü gongming, VII, vi (April 5): 11-13.

Lin, Weihong.

- 1972 "The Activities of the Women Revolutionaries in Period of Tongmenghui, 1905-1912" (Tongmenghui Shidai Nü Gemingzhishi de Huodong). M.A. Thesis. Graduate School of History, The

National University of Taiwan. (Guoli Taiwan Daixue
Lishixue Yangjiusuo.)

Lin, Xiaoping.

- 1928 'The situation of women of Meixian' ('Meixian de funü shenghuo'), Funü zazhi, XIV, i (January): 56-58.

Lin, Yu-tang.

- 1935 My Country and My People. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock.

Liu, Hengjing.

- 1946 "On the Political Participation of Women" (Tan Funü Canzheng) Funü Yuekan, 15, 2 (Nov.): 3-7.

Liu, Qingyang.

- 1956 "Sun Zhongshan Gave Me the Encouragement" (Sun Zhongshan Xian-sheng Gei Wo de Guwu), Zhongguo Funü, 12: 2.

Liu, Quiying.

- 1937 'The sufferings of child-wives' ('Tongyangsi de tongku'), Jiangxi funü, 1, i (March): 40-41.

Liu, Zhi.

- 1949 'The standing up of women in Dingxian' ('Dingxian funü da fanshen'), All-China Democratic Women's Federation. A sketch of the peasant women's movement in the Chinese liberated areas (Zhongguo jiegangqu nongcunfunü da fanshen yundong sumino). Xianggang, Xin minzhu chubanshe.

Longzi.

- 1946 "Madam Jiang's View on the Question of Women" (Jiang Furen Tan Funü Wenti) Jia (Apr.): 3-4.

Lu, Shouzheng.

- 1911 "Women Should Have the Suffrage" (Lun Nuzi Yingyou Xuanjuquan) Funü Shibao, 5 (Dec.): 13-14.

Lü, Kun.

- 1927 The house rule of women's chambers (Guifan). Ming keben duplicate copy (Yingyin Ming keben).

Lü, Yiming.

- 1922 "Long-term Methods to Save the Illiterate Women" (Jiuji Shixue Funu de Genben Fangfa), Funü Zazhi, 8, 3 (Mar.): 22-24.

Lü Yunzhang.

- 1942 'How to organize peasant women's movement [?]' ('Zenyang zuo nongcun yundong [?]', Funü gongming, XI, iii (May): 21-22.

Luo, Qiong.

- 1935 'The rural working women in northern Jiangsu' ('Jiangsu beibu nongcun zhong de laudong funü'), Dongfang zazhi, XXXII, xiv (July): 107-09.
- 1938 "The New Enlightenment Movement and the Mobilization of Women" ('Xin Qimeng Yundong Yu Dongyuan Funü'), Funü Shenghuo, 6, 5 (July 5): 6-7.
- 1952 'The basic rules of the development of the Chinese women's movements' ('Zhongguo funü yundong fazhan de jiben guilu'), New Chinese women (Xin Zhongguo funü), (December): 26-28.

Luo, Shube.

- 1955 'The situation of women of Tainpu' ('Tainpu nǚzi zhi zhuangkuang'), Funü zazhi, I, vii (July): 4.

Luo, Shuzhuo.

- 1938 'The materialization of an ideal refugee women's factory' ('Yige lixiang nǚ nanmin gongchang de shishi'), Funü shenghuo, VI, v (July 5).

M.A.

- 1914 The Economic Foundation of the Women's Movement. (Fabian Women's Group Series, No. 4) London: The Fabian Society.

Ma, Chaojun, et.al.

- 1959 The history of labour movement in China (Zhongguo laogong yundong shi). Taipei, Zhongguo laogong Fuli chubanshe: vol. 1, 129-31.

Mandel, Ernest,

- 1971 Marxist economic theory. London, Merlin Press.

Marshall, Jonathan.

- 1976 'Opium and the politics of gangsterism in nationalist China, 1927-1945', Bulletin of concerned Asian scholars, VIII, iii: 19-48.

McCourt, Kathleen.

- 1977 Working Class Women and Grass Root Politics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

McDill, Edward L. and J.C. Ridley.

- 1962 "Status, Anomie, Political Alienation, and Political Participation," American Journal of Sociology, 68: 205-13.

McLaughlin, B.

1949 Studies in Social Movements: A Social Psychological Perspective. New York: The Free Press.

Meng, Ru.

1934 "Women's Illiteracy in China" (Zhongguo Zhi Funü Wenmang) Dongfang Zazhi, 31, 1 (Jan.): "Funu", 2.

Meng, Xianzhang.

1951 Teaching materials for the history of Chinese modern economy. (Zhongguo jindai jingji shi jiaocheng). Shanghai, Zhonghua shudian.

Mitchell, Juliet.

1971 Women's Estate. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd.

Mo, Yan.

1938 'How do women learn and join the resistance' ('Funü zenyang renshi kangzhan yu zenyang ganjia kangzhan'), Dongfang zazhi, XXXV, i (January): 71-75.

Murphey, Rhodes.

1970 The treaty ports and China's modernization: what went wrong? Ann Arbor, Center for Chinese studies, University of Michigan.

Ning, Lingqiu.

1927 "The Capacities and Consequences that Our Women Who Participate in Politics Should Have" (Woguo Funü Canzheng Yingyoude Nengli he Chengji) Funü Zazhi, 13, 6 (June): 2-5.

O'Hara, Albert R.

1955 The position of women in early China. Xianggang, Orient Pub. Co.

O'Neill, William L.

1969a Everyone Was Brave. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.

1969b The Woman Movement. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.

Palk, Douglas.

1972 China: The sleeping giant. Don Mills, Greywood Pub. Ltd.

Parsons, Talcott.

1954 "McCarthyism and American Social Tension", Yale Review, 44 (Dec.): 226-45.

Peigong.

1907 "The Necessity of Sexual Equality" ("nannupingdeng Zhi Biyao"), Zhongguo Xinnu jie Zazhi, 2: 35-44.

Peng, Lan.

- 1948 'I suggest: March 8th should go to the countryside' ('Wo tiyi: Sanyue bari yingdao xiangcun qu'), Dagongbao (Shanghai), (March 8): 7.

Peng, Zeyi.

- 1957 Materials on the modern Chinese handicraft industry, 1840-1949. (Zhongguo jindai shouqongye ziliao, 1840-1949). Beijing, Zalian shuju.

Perkins, Dwight H.

- 1969 Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968. Edinburgh: University Press.

Pestieau, Caroline.

- 1976 "Women in Quebec", in Gwen Matheson, Women in Canadian Mosaic. Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, Ltd.: 57-69.

Pi, Yishu.

- 1973 The Chinese Women's Movement. (Zhongguo Funü Yundong) Taipei: Zhonghua Funü Fangong Kang'e Lianhehui Shukanshe.

- 1950 'An attempt to discuss the contemporary women's movement in Taiwan' ('Shilun dangqian Taiwan de funü yundong'), Zhongguo funü, I, 1 (July): 8-9.

Pin, Xin.

- 1946 The History of the Chinese Democratic Constitution Movement. (Zhongguo Xianzheng Yundong Shi) Shanghai: Jinbu Shuju.

Pinard, Maurice.

- 1968 "Mass Society and Political Movements: A New Formulation", American Journal of Sociology, 73: 682-90.

Ping, Bingfeng.

- 1966 The Debate Between the Revolutionaries and the Constitutionalists in Late Qing. (Qing Mo Geming yu Junxian de Lun Zheng) Taipei: Zhongguo Xueshu Zhuzuo Jiangsu Wei'yuanhui.

Publicity and Education Department of the All-China Democratic Women's Federation

(Zhongguo Quanguo Minzhu Funü Lianhehui Xuanchuan Jiaoyubu)

- 1953 Important documents of the Chinese women's movements. (Zhongguo funü yundong de Zhongguo wenjian). Beijing, Renmin chubanshe.

Qi, Yun and Ji Qian

- 1949 'Women of Jiaodong enthusiastically support the people's liberation war' ('Jiaodong funü relie zhiyuan renmin jiefang

zhanzheng'), All-China Democratic Women's Federation (Quanguo Minzhu Funü Lianhehui), Women's movement for participation in war in the liberated areas of China. (Zhongguo jiefanggu funü canzhan yundong). Xianggang, Xin minzhu chubanshe: 26-31.

Qin, Jin.

- 1936 "The Question of Women Representatives in the Citizens' Convention" ("Guomendahui Zhi Fuxuan Wenti"), Funü Shenghuo, 3, 3 (Aug.): 4-6.

Qin, Qing.

- 1942 "On the Women's Education in Our Country" (Lun Woguode Nüzijiaoyu) Guangdong Funü, 3, 8 (Apr. 24): 2-4.

Qingmeng.

- 1912 "Research on the Political Participation of Women" (Duiyu Nüzi Canzhengde Yanjiu) Funü Shibao, 8 (Sept. 25): 7-8.

Qiufang.

- 1938 'The obstacles in work' ('Gongzuo zhong de zhang'ai'), Funü shenghuo, VI, ii (May 30): 21.

Queen, S.A. & R.W. Habenstein.

- 1967 The Family in Various Cultures. New York: J.B. Lippincott Co.

Randall, Margaret.

- 1974a Cuban Women Now. Toronto: The Women's Press.

- 1974b "Women in the Cuban Revolution", Women: A Journal of Liberation, 3, 4: 2-4.

Rankin, Mary B.

- 1975 "The Emergence of Women At the End of the Qing: The Case of Ch'iu Chin", in Margery Wolf & R. Witke (ed.) Women in Chinese Society. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press: 39-66.

Ren, Shixian.

- 1972 The History of Thoughts on Education in China. (Zhongguo Jiaoyu Sixiang Shie) Taipei: Shangwu.

Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada.

- 1970 Ottawa: Information Canada.

Schurmann, Frank & O. Schell.

- 1967 Imperial China. New York: Vintage Books.

Schurmann, Franz and Orville Schell.

1967 Republican China. New York, Vintage Books.

Seeman, Melvin.

1966 "Alienation, Membership, and Political Knowledge: A Comparative Study", Public Opinion Quarterly, 30, 3 (Fall): 351-67.

Selu.

1921 'The international women labour union and the Chinese women' ('Guoji funü laodonghui yu zhongguo funu'), Funü zazhi, VII, xi (November): 1-5.

Shang, Mu.

1927 'The foci of women's liberation' ('Funü jiefang zhi zhuolidian'), Funü zazhi, XIII, v (May): 2-6.

Shanghai Tongshe.

1973 Materials for the research on Shanghai: Supplement (Shanghai yanjiu ziliao xuj). Taipei, Zhongguo chubanshe.

Shen, Jitang.

1911 "The Wind" (Tianlai) Shenzhou Nübao, 2 (Dec.): 1-2.

Shi, Bao'an.

1915 "The Speech Given on the Graduate Day of Henan Women Teachers' School" (Henan Nüzi Shifan Xuexiao Biye Xunci) Funü Zazhi, 2, 1 (Jan.): 1-10.

Shi, Jiansheng.

1940 "The Retrospect and Perspects of the Chinese Constitutional Movement" (Zhongguo Xianzheng Yundong Zhi Huigu yu Qianzhan) Dongfang Zazhi, 37, 5 (Mar.): 15.

Shi, Jingxiang.

1971 'Indentured workers' ('Baoshen gong'), Li Yuqing. The calamity of the old China (Ku'nan de Jiu Zhongguo). Xianggang, Zhaoyang chubanshe: 22-28.

1971 'The deduction of wages' ('Fa gongqian'), Li Yuqing, The calamity of the old China (Ku'nan de jiu Zhongguo). Xianggang, Zhaoyang chubanshe.

Shi, Renru.

1941 'The training situation of spinning-research classes' ('Fansha yanjiuban xunlian gaikuang'), Guangdong funü, II, 11-12 (July 15): 40.

- Shijin.
1937 'Wish this association can pay more attention to peasant women' ('Yuan benhui due zhuyi xiangcun funü'), Jiangxi funü, I, i (March 8): 3-4.
- Shiliang.
1940 "My Opinion on the Present Organization of Women in the Country" (Quangue Funü Zuzhi Xianzhuang yu Wojian) Funü Shenghuo, 8, 10 (Feb. 20): 4-6.
- Si, Ding.
1940 'The liberation of women and the revival of nation' ('Funü jiefang yu minzu fuxing'), Zhongguo funü, II, i (December): 24-25.
- Sinclair, Andrew.
1965 The Emancipation of the American Women. New York: Harper and Row, Pub.
- Sinclair, Peter.
1975 "The Saskatchewan C.C.F.", in Samuel D. Clark, Paul Grayson, and Linda Grayson. Prophecy and Protest. Toronto: Gage Educational Pub. Ltd.: 186-99.
- Situ, Yan.
1947 'The student unrest in the University of Zhejiang' ('Xuechao zai Zheda'), Xiandai funü, IX, iii (June): 12.
- Siu, Bobby.
1975a A Sociology of American Feminism. Hong Kong: Revomen Publications Co.
1975b Fifty Years of Struggle. Hong Kong: Revomen Publications Co.
- Smelser, Neil J.
1959 Social Change in the Industrial Revolution. Chicago: University Press.
1962 Theory of Collective Behaviour. Illinois: Free Press.
- Smith, Arthur H.
1900 Village life in China. London, Oliphant, Anderson and Ferrier.
- Snow, Edgar.
1957 Random notes on Red China, 1936-1945. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.
- Snow, Helen.
1945 The Chinese labour movement. New York, John Day Co.

Snow, Helen.

- 1967 *Women in modern China*. The Hague, Mouton & Co.

Song, Hua'ou.

- 1926 "The Pre-requisites of the Women's Rights Movement --- Declaring War to the Law" (*Nüquan Yundong de Xianjue Wenti --- He Falu Xuanzhan*) *Funü Zazhi*, 12, 2 (Feb.): 2-8.

- 1967 "The Chinese Women are Struggling for Freedom" (*Zhongguo Funü Zhengqu Ziyou de Douzheng*) in *Song Qingling Xuanji*. Hong Kong: Zhonghua Shuju: 164.

Song, Qingling.

- 1967 'Concerning the call for assisting guerrilla fighters --- the speech made in the international day meeting in Xianggang' ('*Qanyu yuanzhu youjidui zhanshi dehuyu --- zai xianggang quoji funüjie jihui shang xuozue de yanshuo*'), The collected work of Song Qingling (*Song Qingling xuanji*). Xianggang, Zhonghui shuju: 137-41.

Stephenson, Marylee.

- 1975 "Being in Women's Liberation" Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Vancouver, University of British Columbia.

Strauss, A.

- 1947 "Research in Collective Behaviour: Neglect and Need", *American Sociological Review*, 12: 352-54.

Tan, Sheying.

- 1942 "A Brief History of the Chinese Women's Movement" (*Zhongguo Funü Yundongshi Gaiyao*) *Funu Gongming*, 11, 1 (Mar.): 5.

- 1952 *Forty Years of Women's Movements*. (*Fuyun Sishi Nian*) Taipei: Publisher unknown.

Tang, Caichang.

- 1902 *A reader of Xiangbao* (*Xiangbao leizuan*). Shanghai, Zhongguo bianyi yinshuguan.

Tao, Feh.

- 1936 'The women's question and men' ('*Funü wenti he nanzi*'), *Funü shenghuo*, III, iii (August 16): 10-12.

Tao, Yi.

- 1924 "The Long-term Plan of Women's Education" (*Funüjiaoyu de Yougjiu Jihua*) *Funü Zazhi*, 10, 1 (Jan.): 42-50.

- Tavris, Carol.
1974 'The speak-bitterness revolution', *Psychology Today*, VII, xii (May): 49.
- Taylor, Norma.
1976 "All This for Three and a Half a Day: The Farm Wife", in Gwen Matheson (ed.), *Women in the Canadian Mosaic*. Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, Ltd.: 151-66.
- Teather, Lynne.
1976 "The Feminist Mosaic", in Gwen Matheson (ed.), *Women in the Canadian Mosaic*. Toronto: Peter Martin Pub. Ltd.: 301-46.
- Toch, Hans.
1965 *The Social Psychology of Social Movements*. New York: The Bobbs-Merill Co. Inc.
- Topley, Majorie.
1975 "Marriage Resistance in Rural Kwangtung", Margery Wolf (ed.) *Women in Chinese Society*. California: Stanford University Press.
- Touraine, Alain.
1977 *The Self-Production of Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Turner, Ralph and L.M. Killian.
1972 *Collective Behaviour*. N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc.
- Van Gulik, A.H.
1961 *Sexual Life in Ancient China: A Preliminary Survey of Chinese Sex and Society Ca. 1500 B.C. till 1644 A.D.* Leiden: E.J. Brill.
- Wakeman, Frederick.
1977 "Rebellion and Revolution: The Study of Popular Movements in China", *Journal of Asian Studies*, 36, 2: 201-38.
- Wallace, Anthony F.C.
1956 "Revitalization Movement", *American Anthropologists*, 58 (Apr.)
- Wan, Pu.
1929 "The Political Participation of Women and the National Question" (Nüzi Canzheng yu Juejia Wenti) in *Meishang: Zhongguo Funü Wenti Taolunji*. Shanghai Xinwenhua Shushe: 78-83.
- Wang, Canzhi.
1958 *The Collected Works of Qiu Jin the Female Knight*. (Qiu Jin Nüxia Yiji) Taipei: Zhonghua Shuju.

Wang, Jiamin.

- 1965 A draft of the history of the Chinese communist party (Zhongguo gongchandang shiguo). Taiwan, self-published.

Wang, Jieliang.

- 1911a "The Proclamation of Women Enlisting as Soldiers" (Nüzi Congjun Xuanyan Shu) Funü Shibao, 5, (Dec.): 45-46.
- 1911b "The Creation of Women's Supplementary Schools is the Most Urgent Matter of Today" ("Lun Jinri Jiye Chuangshe Funü Buzhu Xueshu"), Funü Shibao, 2 (June): 1-2.

Wang, Minyi.

- 1944 "The Issues of Adopting Constitutional Politics and Rural Women's Education" (Shishi Xianzheng yu Xiangcun Funüjiaoyu Wenti) Funü Xinyun, 6, 6 (June): 11-15.

Wang, Renlan.

- 1912 "Women Who Fight for the Right of Political Participation Should Treat Self-Discipline As Its Foundation" (Funü Zheng Canzhengquan Dangyi Zixiu Wei Jichu) Funü Shibao, 7 (July 10): 13-16.

Wang, Weiqi.

- 1905 The History of the Development of Women's Rights in the World. (Shijie Nüquan Fadashi). Shanghai: Wenming Shuju.

Wang, Xusheng.

- 1963 'Textile women workers talked of the past and present' ('Fangzhi nügong hua jinxi'), Zhongguo funü, (January): 14-17.

Wang, Y.C.

- 1966 Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 1872-1949. Chapel Hill: University of Carolina Press.

Wang, Yi.

- 1935 'The situation of child-wives' ('Tongyangxi de shenghu'), Dongfang zazhi, XXXII, xv (August): 119-22.

Wang, Yiwei.

- 1938 'Women in the resistance mobilization of special districts' ('Tequ kangzhan dongyuan zhou de funü'), Funü shenghuo, VI, ii (May 20): 22-23.

Wang, Yunsheng.

- 1953 "Agreement of Lanxin Zhijing" (Lanxin Shijing Xieding) Yang Song & Deng Liqun. Selections of Materials on Chinese Modern History. (Zhongguo Jin Bainian Ziliao Xuanji) Beijing: Dian Wen Chubanshe.

Wang, Zuo-chen.

- 1924 "A Critique on the Contemporary Chinese Women's Movements for Political Participation" ("Zhongguo Xianzai Nüzi Canzheng Yundong Zhi Pipan"), Funü Nianjian, Shanghai: New Culture Bookstore, I, 1: 187-203.

Wedemeyer, Albert C.

- 1967 'Summary of remarks...before joint meeting of State Council and All Ministers of the National Government, August 22, 1947', Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell. Republic China. New York, Vintage Books: 334-39.

Wilensky, Harold L.

- 1961 "Orderly Careers and Social Participation: The Impact of Work History on Social Integration in the Middle Mass", American Sociological Review, 26: 521-39.

Williams, S.W.

- 1880 "Education of Women in China", China Recorder, 11, 1 (Jan.-Feb.): 40-53.

Women's Life Society
(Funü Shenghuo She)

- 1939 Women's wartime handbook (Zhanshi funü shouce). Chongqing, Shenghuo sheju.

Wright, Mary C.

- 1953 The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The Tung-chih Restoration, 1862-1874. California: Stanford University Press.
- 1968 'Introduction: The rising tide of change', China in revolution: the first phase, 1900-1913. New Haven, Yale University Press.

Wu, Bingyun.

- 1915 "Women's Education Should Emphasize Sewing and Cooking" ("Nüxue Yi Zhuzhong Fengren Pengtiao Lun"), Funü Zazhi, 1, 4 (Spring): 9-10.

Wu, Cheng.

- 1937 Women Under Emergency Period. (Feichangshiqi de Funü) Shanghai: Zhonghua Shuju.

Wu, Chengming.

- 1956 The investments of imperialist powers in old China (Diquozhuyi zai jiu Zhongguo de touzi). Beijing, Renmin chubanshe.

Wu, Fang.

- 1924 "The Necessity of Women's Organizations to Gain the Citizens'

Conference" (Funü Tuanti Jiaru Guominhuiyi Biyao) Funü
Zhōubao, 65, (Dec. 21): 7-8.

Wu, Jufang.

1945 "March on the Road of Nation-Building" (Xiang Jianguode Dadao
Maijin) Guangdong Funü, Renewed (Fukan) No. 1 (Oct.): 2-3.

Wu, Naiyin.

1962 "In memory of martyr Chen Tiejun" ('Ji Chen Tiejun Tieshi'),
Zhongguo funü: X, 16.

Wu, Yuzhang.

1972 On 1911's Revolution. (Lun Xin-Hai Geming) Beijing: Renmin.
Chubanshe.

Wu, Zhenglan.

1912 "Women and Revolution" (Funü yu Geming) Funü Shibao, 6 (May 1):
1-11.

Xi, Shen.

1917 "Women and Technical Knowledge" (Funü yu Zhuanmende Zhishi)
Funü Zazhi, 3, 3 (Mar.): 4-6.

Xia, Yingzhe.

1940a "On the National Women's Movement at the Third Anniversary of the
July 7th Day of Resistance and Nation-Building" (Qiqi Kangjian
San Zhounian Shilun Quanguo Fuyun) Funü Shenghuo, 9, 1 (July 1):
2-4.

1940b "A Preliminary Note on the Overall Evaluation of the National
Women's Work" (Quanguo Funügongzuo Zongjianqingde Xiansheng)
Funü Shenghuo, 9, 3 (Sept. 16): 7-8, 22.

Xia Zhen.

1915 "My Advice to Female Students" (Yu Zhi Zhonggao Yu Nüxuesheng)
Funü Zazhi, 1, 4 (Apr.): ?

Xiao.

1911 "The Most Serious Advice" (Zuida de Jing Gao), Funü Shibao, 4
(Dec.): 16.

Xiao, Yu.

1947 "The Guaranteed Quota of Elected Women" ("Baozhang Xia de Funu
Dangxuan Ming'e), Funü Yuekan, 6, 2 (July): 1-2.

Xie, Chongde.

1925 "Women's Education and Human Life Henceforth" ("Jinhoude
Nüzijiaoyu Yu Rensheng"), Funü Zazhi, 11, 6 (June): 910-17.

Xie, Kang.

- 1970 'The traditional views on women's education in Chinese families' ('Zhonghua jiating chuantong de nüjiao guannian'), Journal of Zhongshan Academy and Culture (Zhongshan xueshu wenhua jikan), VI, (November): 497-530.

Xinyun Funu Zhidaowei Yuanhui.

- 1944 The Rural Service of Women. (Funü Xiangcun Fuwu) Chongqing: Xinyun Funü Zhidaowei Yuanhui.

Xiong, Zhi.

- 1937 '"March 8th" women's day' ('"San-Ba" funu jie janyan'), Jiangxi funü, I, i (March 8): 12-14.

Xiuzhu Xiangren.

- 1914 The Charming History of the Republic. (Minguo Yanshi) Shanghai: Wenxue Shushe.

Xu, Xilin.

- 1953 "Announcement of Restoration Army" (Guangfujun Gaoshi) Yang Song & Deng Liqun. Selections of Materials on Chinese Modern History (Zhongguo Jindaishi-Ziliao Xuanji). Beijing: Dain Wen Chubanshe.

Xu, Yasheng.

- 1929 'Peasant women's elementary education and training' ('Nongjia funü de qianshi boji xuelian'), Funü zazhi, XV, i (January): 5-12.
- 1929 "The Question of Women's Participation in Politics in Our Country" (Lun Woguo Nüzi Canzheng Wenti), Funü Zazhi, 15, 9, (Sept.): 2-7.

Xu, Yibing.

- 1911 "The Origin of Organizing the Institute of Women's Research on Military Affairs" (Zuzhi Nüzi Junshi Yangjiuhui Yuanqi) Funü Shibao, 2 (June): 3-4.

Xuejian.

- 1928 'The situation of Haifeng women and their movement' ('Haifeng funü de shenghuo jiqi yundong'), Funü zazhi, XIV, xii (December): 1-4.

Yan, Jingwen.

- 1970 "The Constitutionals and the Revolution of 1911" (Lixiandang Ren yu Xin-Hai Geming) Ming Bao Yuenkan, 5, 2 (Feb.): 33-40.
- 1971 "Points of Doubts and Hidden Corners in the Revolution of 1911" (Xin'Hai Geming de Yidian he Anjiao) Ming Bao Yuekan, 6, 10 (Oct.): 6-14.

Yan Shuhua Nushi Gao.

- 1902 "Family Education is the Foundation of Citizenship" (Jiating-jiaoyu Shi Zaojiu Guomin de Jichu) Nüxuebao, 1, 4: 13-15.

Yan, Zhongping.

- 1963 A draft on the history of the Chinese cotton textile, 1289-1937 (Zhongguo mianfangzhi shigao, 1289-1937) Beijing, Kexue Chubanshe.

Yan, Zhongping, et.al.

- 1955 Selection of statistical materials on the history of the modern China (Zhongguo jindai jingjishi tongji ziliao xuanji). Beijing, Kexue Chubanshe.

Yan'an Research Society of Current Affairs.

(Yan'an Shishi Wenti Yanjiu Hui).

- 1940 Chinese wartime politics (Kangzhan zhong de Zhongguo zhengzhi). Yan'an, Jiefangshe.

Yang, Huilin.

- 1940 "How to Extend the Constitutional Movement?" (Zhenyang Zhankai Xianzhengyundong) Funü Shenghuo, 8, 9 (Feb. 5): 1-3.

Yang, Jiwei.

- 1912 "A Letter Addressing to the Reporters of a Newspaper" (Zhi Moubao Jizhe Shu) Funü Shibao, 6 (May 1): 22-24.

Yang, Liensheng.

- 1960 "Female Rulers in Imperial China", Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 23: 47-61.

Yang Song & Deng Liqun.

- 1953 Selection of Materials on Chinese Modern History. (Zhengguo Jindai Shi Ziliao Xuanlu) Beijing: Dian Wen Zhubanshe.

Yang, Yitong.

- 1969 The History of Political Parties. (Zhongguo Zhengdang Shi) Taipei: Shangwu Press.

Yang Yuan Changying.

- 1923 "The Destiny of the Chinese Women's Movements for Political Participation" (Zhongguo Funü Canzhengyundong Zhi Jiantu) Funü Zazhi, 9, 1 (Feb.): 23-29.

Ye, Chusheng.

- 1937 'A short history of "March 8th"', ('"San-Ba" jianshi'), Jiangxi funü, 1, 1 (March 8): 10-12.

Ye, Yuying.

- 1938 'May 1st labour day and the future of the issue of women's labour' ('Wu-yi laodongjie yu funü laodong wenti zhanwang') Funü gongming, VIII, viii (April 20): 11-12.

Ye, Zuying.

- 1973 "The Evolution of the Women's Rights of Political Participation" (Funü Canzhengquan Zhi Yanjin) Ziyouqingnian, 49, 3 (Mar.): 46.

Yi, Lu.

- 1922 "The Application of Rural Women's Education" (Nongcun Funüjiao-yude Shishi) Funü Zazhi, 8, 3 (Mar.): 29-37.

Yin, Falu.

- 1957a "Narratives of the Political Struggles of Workers in the May Fourth Period" (Wu-Si Yundong Shiqi Gongren Jinxing Zhengzhi Douzheng de Jishu Duanpian) Huazhong Gongxueyuan Makesi-Liening Zhuyi Ziliao Shi: Essays on May Fourth Movement (Wu-Si Yundong Wen Ji) Wuhan: Renmin Chubanshe.

- 1957b "The Direct Destructive Impacts of Imperialism on the May Fourth Movement" (Diguo zhuyi Dui Wu-Si Yundong de Zhijie Puhuai) Huazhong Gongxueyuan Makesi-Liening Zhuyi Ziliao Shi: Wu-Si Yundong Wenji, Wuhan: Renmin Chubanshe.

- 1957c "The Destruction of Progressive Literature by the Northern War-Lords" (Beiyang Junfa Dui Jinbu Kanwu de Cuican) Huazhong Gongxueyuan Makesi-Liening Zhuyi Ziliao Shi: Wu-Si Yundong Wenji. Wuhan: Renmin Chubanshe.

Ying.

- 1941 'The issue of women's farming in the fields' ('Tan funü xiatian gengzhong wenti'), Funü gongming, X, v (July): 5.

You, Chen.

- 1929 "The Relationship of Women and Politics" (Funü yu Zhengzhi de Guanxi Meisheng) in Meisheng. Discussion Papers on the Question of Chinese Women (Zhongguo Funü Wenti Taolunji) Volume 1. Shanghai: Xinwenhua Shushe: 119-26.

Young, Allen.

- 1903 "Women of All Lands: Introduction", Wanguo Gongbao, 176 (Sept.): 13.

Yuan.

- 1938 'How to expand the working class women's movement?' ('Zenyang kaizhan laodong funü yundong?'), Funü gongming, VII, vii (April 20): 9-10.

Yu, Qingchong.

- 1969 "Thirty-Five Years of Chinese Women's Education" (Sanshiwu Nian Lai Zhongguo Zhi Nüzijiaoyu) Cai Yuanpei, et.al. Thirty-Five Years of Chinese Education Since Late Qing. (Wanqing Sanshiwu Nian Lai Zhi Zhongguo Jiaoyu) Hong Kong: Longmen Shudian.

Zhang, Chuanhong.

- 1971 'The body-search system' ('Chaoshen zhi'), Li Yuqing, The calamity of the old China (Ku'nan de jiu Zhongguo). Xianggang, Zhaoyang chubanshe: 36-41.

Zhang Hui & Bao Cun.

- 1963 The Modern History of Revolution in Shanghai. (Shanghai Jin Bainian Geming Shi Hua) Shanghai: Renmin Chubanshe.

Zhang, Peifen.

- 1922 The Women's Question. (Funü Wenti) Shanghai: Shangwu Yinsheguan.

Zhang, Shen.

- 1939 'The voices of women workers' ('Nügong de hua'), Funü shenghuo, VII, vi (May 1): 10.

Zhang, Xiuxia.

- 1933 'Awake! Dear women compatriots!' ('Xingxingba! Qin'aide funü tongbao!'), Nüzi yuekan, I, viii (October 15): 12-13.

Zhang, Zhujun.

- 1912 "On Organizing Women's Armies" (Lun Zuzhi Nüzi Jundui) Funü Shibao, 6 (May 1): 45.

Zhen, Han.

- 1920 "The Critique of 'The Women's Movement for Political Participation'" ("Fei 'Nüzi Canzheng Yundong'"), Jiefang Huabao, 6 (Nov. 30): ?

Zhen, Su.

- 1911 "The Salvation of the Degenerating Women of Suzhou" (Jiuji Suzhou Nüzi Zhi Duoluo) Funü Shibao, 2 (June): 81.

Zeng, Wan.

- 1938 'The improvement of women's situation during the war' ('Kangzhan qi zhong funü shenghuo de gaishan'), Dongfang zazhi, XXXV, xiii (July): 49-52.

Zhennong.

- 1937 'Organize the large masses to the anti-Japanese front line' ('Zuzhi guangda de qunzhong dao kangri zhanxian shang lai'), Jiefang zhoukan, I, xii (August 15).

Zhi, Yang.

1941. "The Political Activities of Women in Late Qing and Early Republic" (Dingmo Minchu Zhi Funü Zhengzhi Huodong) Zhongyang Ribao, (Aug. 15): 7.

Zhong, Guiyang.

- 1933 "Twenty Years of the Chinese Woman Suffrage" (Ershi Nian Lai Zhongguo de Funü Canzheng Yundong) Nüqingnian, 12, 1 (Jan.): 4.

Zhonggong Zhongyang Makesi Engesi, Lieling, Sidalin Zhuzhuo Bianyiju Yanjiushi

(The Research Room of the Translation of the Writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party)

- 1958 Wu-Si Shiqi Qikan Jieshao (The Introduction to the Periodicals in the May Fourth Period). Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe.

Zhongguo Funü Dafanshen.

(Chinese Women Stand Up.)

- 1949 Xianggong: Xinminzhu Chubanshe.

Zhonghua Quanguo Minzhu Funü Lianhehui

(Federation of All-Democratic Women of China)

- 1949 Xinhongguo de Xinfunü (New Women in China). Shanghai: Xinhua Shudian.

Zhou, Gucheng.

- 1957 The History of China. (Zhongguo Tongshi) Shanghai: Renmin Chubanshe.

Zhou, Jinchu.

- 1913 'Women and agriculture' ('Furen yu nongye'), Funü shibao, XI, (October 20): 5-7.

Zhou, Shihua & Zhu Wenshu.

- 1924 "The Reconstruction of Women's Education in the Future" (Jinhou Funüjiaoyude Gaizao) Funü Zazhi, 10, 1 (Jan.): 32-42.

Zhou, Shuyun.

- 1944 "The Question of Women Representatives in the Citizens' Convention" (Guomindahui Zhong Funü Daibiao Wenti) Funü Xinyun, 6, 6 (June): 16-18.

Zhujiang.

- 1940 'The Shanghai women workers are in struggle' ('Shanghai nügong zai douzheng zhong'), Funü shenghuo, IX, iv (October 16): 20-21.

Zou, Lu.

- 1965 A Brief History of the Guomindang in China. (Zhongguo Guomindang Shi Lue). Taipei: Shangwu Press.

Zuo, Songfen.

1940 'The two key issues of the work among rural women' ('Xiangcun funü gongzuo zhong de liang da wenti'), 'Funü shenghuo, VIII, viii (January 20): 3-4.

END

0	7	H	0	9	H	8	2
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

FIN