FOOTNOTES PERTAINING TO CHAPTER 1

Pages 1 to 11

- (1) Charles A. McClelland "On the Fourth Wave: Past and Future in the study of the International System" in James Rosenau, Vincent Davis, and Maurice East (eds.). Analysis of International Relations (New York; 1972) pp. 15-39.
- (2) Johan Galtung "A Structural Theory of Aggression". Journal of Peace Research 1, 1964, p.95
- (3) McClelland, loc. cit., p. 32.
- (4) Manus I. Midlarsky, Status Inconsistency and the Onset of International Warfare. Ph.D. Dissertation, (Northwestern University, 1969), pp. 104-105.
- (5) East used the term "Status Discrepancy" as a synonym for status inconsistency. The term "Status Crystallization" has been used by other authors, most notably Gerhard C. Lenski, as a synonym for status consistency. See Gerhard C. Lenski "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status" in S.M. Lipset and N.J. Smelser (eds.) Sociology: The Progress of a Decade, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1961) p. 486.
- (6) Maurice A. East, Stratification and International Politics: An Empirical Study Employing the International Systems Approach. Ph.D. Dissertation, (Princeton University, 1970), pp. 191-192.
- (7) It is common statistical useage to refer to the amount of variance "explained" by one or more predictor variables. This does not signify a causal link between the predictor and dependent variables, only that the two are related. Amount of variance "explained" is derived by the statistical procedure of squaring the correlation coefficient of the predictor and dependent variables.
- (8) Michael David Wallace, Status Inconsistency, Verticle Mobility and International War: 1825-1964. Ph.D. Dissertation, (University of Michigan, 1970), Abstract pp. 1-2. A condensed version of this work may be found in "Power, Status and International War" Journal of Peace Research 1, 1971, pp. 23-25.

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STATUS INCONSISTENCY AND INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION:

A CASE STUDY OF JAPAN: 1890-1940

BY

TERRANCE JAMES CURTIS

©(TJC)

(B.A., B.A. (HONS.))

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in International Affairs

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Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

Canada

April, 1977

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The undersigned hereby recommend to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research acceptance of this thesis, submitted by
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the degree of Master of Arts.

Philip E. Uren, Director,
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

H. von Riekhoff, Supervisor.

- 1 -

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between status inconsistency and international aggression below the threshold of war at the level of the nation state. A sub-system of eight nations active in the Far East between 1890 and 1940 is isolated, and one nation, Japan, selected for case study.

Status inconsistency is operationalized in two ways. Firstly, as a compensatory model wherein the differences of all pairs of status variables across a selected six variable status profile are aggregated and meaned; and secondly, as a non-compensatory model wherein the aggregate score of five achieved status dimensions are meaned and subtracted from, respectively, two indicators of ascription: diplomatic importance and race. Simple bi-variate analysis follows relating the resultant status inconsistency scores to Japanese aggression operationalized in terms of colonial area, colonial population, and occupational force size.

Japan is found to be a negatively status inconsistent actor throughout the historical period, with higher ascribed than achieved status. The strongest relationships appear with a five and seven year time lag, respectively, when the 1890-1913 and 1918-

1940 sub-periods are examined. When race is selected as a measure of ascription the strongest relationships appear slightly earlier or later depending on the sub-period. The similarity of the result leads to the deletion of race as a measure of ascription.

Three explanatory variables are operationalized: frustration, as the gap between the mean aggregate score of the achievement dimension of the top four nations of the system, and the Japanese score for each dimension; desired capability as the gap between the mean of the imperial holdings of four colonial nations, and Japanese imperial holdings; and threat as the amount of change in the military spending per capita of the Powers designated as the main enemy of Japan for certain periods between 1890 and 1940.

Partial correlation, stepwise multiple regression and path analysis follow. Frustration is found to be an independent explanatory condition which may be overruled if either of the conditions desired capability or threat became significant. The strongest indirect paths occur in both sub-periods with time lags of five years or less, the strongest being through desired capability with time lags of zero to three years for the 1918-1940 sub-period. The strongest direct

relationships between negative status inconsistency and international aggression occur with a seven and ten year time lag for the sub-period 1890-1913, and a fifteen year time lag for the period 1918-1940. These direct relationships cannot be explained by the theoretical structure of the study and warrant continued investigation.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Harold von Riekhoff, my supervisor, for his patience and guidance, particularly in the final stages of my research which involved reading and interpreting many computer printouts. I also owe my thanks to Professor Robert Bedeski who offered comments and criticisms on the historical section of the paper. To my sister-in-law, Andrea Olsen, who typed two lengthy drafts of poor handwriting, and to Rita Baker, who typed corrections and revisions, I also owe my gratitude.

I find it difficult to convey in one brief sentence my appreciation to my wife, Carol, who has sacrificed her enjoyment while I have been involved in research and writing. To her I dedicate this work, for without her encouragement and support, it would not have been completed.

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TO CAROL

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STATUS INCONSISTENCY AND INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION:
A CASE STUDY OF JAPAN: 1890 - 1940

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since Johan Galtung published his "Structural Theory of Aggression" in 1964, several empirical studies have been undertaken to determine the effects of status inconsistency on the international system. Coming during the transitional phase of what Charles McClelland has called the third and fourth waves in international relations theory and research, ⁽¹⁾ the studies reflected the desire to utilize both the conceptual and theoretical tools of a broad spectrum of the social and physical sciences, and the first generation of cross-national data collection. That collection, generated in connection with the Correlates of War Project, focused primarily on the phenomenon of war. Thus war, the most violent form of organized aggression known to man, became the dependent variable, and aggression, which Galtung had defined simply as "a drive toward change even against the will of others" ⁽²⁾ was discarded as "a somewhat misleading descriptor of the theory". ⁽³⁾

Despite the fixation on war, however, in the main the studies confirmed that if there are wide discrepancies between two or more status rankings within individual nations in the system, that is, nations which are status inconsistent, there is a tendency toward greater international aggression than when the status rankings within all nations in the system are balanced, or are status consistent. Manus I. Midlarsky, in his Status Inconsistency and the Onset of International Warfare, for example, found a "significant" relationship between the status inconsistency and the war experience of nations during the period 1870-1945. (4) Maurice A. East in his Stratification and International Politics: An Empirical Study Employing the International Systems Approach found a "positive relationship between status discrepancy (5) and the amount of conflict in the system over the years 1946-1964". (6) Michael David Wallace in his Status Inconsistency, and International War, 1825-1964 found that with a fifteen year time lag, status inconsistency in combination with other status variables, "explained" (7) as much as 72 percent of the variance in nation months of war begun in the system during certain periods between 1824 and 1964. (8) In his 1972 work, "Status Formal Organization, and Arms Levels as Factors Leading to the

Onset of War 1820-1964", Wallace found that status inconsistency was a critical intervening variable between national mobility and war. He also found that the degree of formal alliance commitment was an important factor linking status inconsistency with the onset of war.⁽⁹⁾ James Lee Ray in his "Status Inconsistency and the War Involvement Among European States: 1816-1970" confirmed the Wallace results by finding a positive relationship between the amount of status inconsistency in the system, and the amount of war in the system.⁽¹⁰⁾ Similarly Harold von Riekhoff in his "Status Inconsistency and the War Behavior of the Major Powers, 1815-1965" found a relationship between status inconsistency and the outbreak of war which was strongest when the two phenomena were separated by five years or less.⁽¹¹⁾

While these findings are suggestive, and provide excellent empirical justification for continued study of the concept of status inconsistency and its relationship to international aggression, the focus on war in each study imposed severe operational and conceptual limitations: conceptual because the effects of status inconsistency need not be as severe as international warfare, and operational because wars occur too infrequently and are too dichotomous in nature to adequately reflect varying intensities of international

aggression. The significance of these limitations requires some elaboration.

Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North have postulated that war occurs in the international system when the interest parameters of national actors intersect or collide or more specifically when an aggressor nation attempts to overcome, push aside, or dominate an equally high capability state or empire.⁽¹²⁾ Accordingly, interstate warfare becomes a final act of aggression only when the opponent is prepared to forcibly resist. When the two contending states or empires are of roughly equal capability, considerable losses are to be expected and the risk is likely to be great. Wars against lesser capability states or empires on the other hand are undertaken with little risk to the higher capability state (barring the intervention of a third state), and therefore might be expected to occur when lesser amounts of status inconsistency are present. Neither form of warfare is undertaken without some losses, however, and therefore wars have not occurred often enough to provide enough examples to formulate a sensitive frequency indicator. Not only does war occur too rarely but we can have unresisted forms of aggression which remains aggression just the same, even though appeasement prevents the inclination to war (Munich).

Each of the war-oriented studies attempted to overcome the problem of the "missing n's" in different

ways: Wallace and East by focusing on the systemic level of analysis and including all wars entered into by all nation states in a global system over an extended period of time; Midlarsky by collapsing time series data into single status inconsistency and war experience indicators; and Ray and von Riekhoff by concentrating on the European and Major Powers subsystems respectively, which had a relatively higher war experience per nation than non-European nations. Despite these methods and statistical manipulations, however, none of the war-oriented studies found evidence of a relationship between status inconsistency and the frequency of war involvement.

Significantly in each of the war-oriented studies, the author was compelled to look to the magnitude of nation months of warfare, and to the severity of war battle deaths to find a "fit" between the predictor and outcome variables. As von Riekhoff has pointed out, these latter indicators are not as intuitively satisfying as that of war frequency.⁽¹³⁾ Indeed, severity and magnitude are more a reflection of the size of the opponents' forces, and the mode of fighting than they are the amount of aggression directed by one state or empire toward another. These indicators are even more confusing when more than two actors are involved.

Admittedly, some of the difficulty in relating status inconsistency to war frequency may be attributable to the rigorous coding procedures utilized in the Correlates of War Project. Not all international (violent) conflicts qualified as wars according to Correlates of War criteria, for example. To qualify as a war a conflict had to involve at least one protagonist which was a member of the international system. At the same time, to qualify as a member of the international system, a nation had to satisfy two rigorous requirements: firstly, at the time of the conflict it had to have a population in excess of half a million; and secondly, de jure recognition by Great Britain or France, the so-called legitimizers of the international system.

By these criteria, civil wars, for example, were excluded entirely by the requirement of a declaration of war between the participants, even though internationally recognized foreign states may have abetted, or indeed sent, participants to the conflict. Similarly colonial wars were omitted by the additional prerequisite that at least one of the two sides in the conflict be a completely sovereign state.

Other restrictions regarding participation in battle also reduced the number of nations engaged in warfare. Even though a nation might have declared

war, and been recognized by one of the two legitimizers in the system, it could have been excluded if it did not actually send its forces into the combat zone and suffer battle related casualties. Despite the fact that virtually all of the South and Central American nations declared war on the Axis Powers during the Second World War, for example, only two, Brazil and Mexico, sent troops to the combat zone and thus qualified as belligerents. Most blatantly omitted were Denmark and Albania which were not coded as belligerents in World War II because of their relatively unopposed occupations by the conquering armies of Germany.

In addition to these obvious inadequacies of Correlates of War coding, there were other difficulties of equal significance. To qualify as a war, for example, a conflict had to have had in excess of one thousand deaths of military personnel directly related to combat related afflictions like wounds, gas, starvation under siege, accidents, disease or exposure. Military personnel who were wounded or diseased but did not die, were not counted as casualties.⁽¹⁴⁾ This arbitrary threshold point, based on collected data of dubious origin, eliminated a conflict with nine hundred ninety-nine dead, but included another with one thousand dead. This forms hardly an intuitively appealing base on which to undertake a study to determine the

sensitivity of predictor to outcome variables.

Given the constraints of the Correlates of War coding, each of the war oriented studies excluded the very essence of international aggression: that which occurs against a recipient state or territory which is unable, for reasons of capability, to respond with violence.

Aside from the data, the war oriented studies had to grapple with the problem of labelling an aggressor for each conflict under analysis. As the difficulties encountered by the League of Nations and the United Nations engaged in attempting to define "aggression" since 1923, has demonstrated, labelling a single state as the aggressor in an international war is not easy.⁽¹⁵⁾ When such labelling must be consistent with both history and operational definition the problem becomes doubly difficult. Von Riekhoff, for example, labelled a nation the aggressor if it was the first to make a formal declaration of war, first to fire the first shot, first violated a recognized boundary line or a party which joined a state which committed these acts.⁽¹⁶⁾ Ray, on the other hand, labelled a nation the aggressor if it fired the first shot and/or moved troops onto disputed territory before its adversary.⁽¹⁷⁾ Despite the striking similarity in the findings of these two studies, there were

some discrepancies resulting from labelling procedures.

Lastly, the war oriented studies faced the level of analysis problem. Ray and von Riekhoff attempted to resolve the problem by concentrating on the level of the nation state. Neither traced a clear linkage between nations which were status inconsistent and those which aggressed. East and Wallace simply omitted the problem and assumed that the status inconsistent nations of the system were in fact those which aggressed. None of the results could therefore be considered as conclusive.

The purpose of this work is to set forth a research design and test for a relationship between status inconsistency and international aggression which is relatively more conclusive. Unlike the von Riekhoff and Ray studies which utilized a sub-system to analyse aggression between states, this work concentrates solely on the aggression directed to the international system by a single state, Japan. Unlike all of the war oriented studies which operationalized aggression as "war", with all of the inherent difficulties that involves, this study operationalizes aggression in a manner which is consistent not with the concept of war, but the philosophy underlying Karl von Clausewitz's now classic purpose of war "to compel our opponents to fulfill our will" (18). No actual battle deaths need have resulted, nor the

capability of the recipient state to respond with violence measured. In other words, this work returns to Galtung's original definition of aggression, "a drive toward change even against the will of others" to test the efficacy of Galtung's own theory in quantitative terms.

The work begins by isolating a closed system, called the East Asian sub-system, which is defined as being the nations most active in the Far East between 1890 and 1940. Japan, one state in the sub-system, is selected for a case study. There are two advantages in utilizing the "case study" approach. Firstly, it allows for a close historical examination of the goals of a single society during a given temporal period, and the selection of dimensions viewed as significant to those goals. Thus arbitrary selection of dimensions thought to be of importance to all societies or a system of national actors is avoided. This advantage is significant to a study which seeks to determine and quantify perceived inconsistencies across a number of status dimensions. Secondly, the "case study" approach eliminates the level of analysis problem, and allows for a clear relationship to be traced between the

status inconsistent state and aggression by that state toward other members of the international system. No assumptions need be made and labelling the aggressor state is unnecessary.

In this thesis, Chapter 2 outlines an historical overview of Japan and the East Asian sub-system between 1890 and 1940, and isolates certain dominant dimensions of Japanese society. Chapter 3 presents a discussion of the concept of status inconsistency and the theoretical orientation of the study. Chapter 4 discusses the spatial domain, the selection of variables, operational definitions, and hypotheses to be tested. Chapter 5 discusses the reliability and the validity of the data, and the results and conclusion follow in Chapters 6 and 7, respectively. Data collected for the study are contained in appendices, or the text, and the bibliography is provided.

FOOTNOTES PERTAINING TO CHAPTER 1

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- (1) Charles A. McClelland "On the Fourth Wave: Past and Future in the study of the International System" in James Rosenau, Vincent Davis, and Maurice East (eds.). Analysis of International Relations (New York; 1972) pp. 15-39.
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- (9) Michael David Wallace "Status, Formal Organization, and Arms Levels as Factors Leading to the Onset of War: 1820-1964" in Bruce M. Russett (ed.) Peace, War and Numbers (Beverly Hills, London: 1972), pp. 50-69.
- (10) James Lee Ray "Status Inconsistency and War Involvement Among European States: 1816-1970". Unpublished paper presented to the Eleventh North American Peace Science Conference of the Peace Research Society, 1971.
- (11) Harold von Riekhoff "Status Inconsistency and the War Behavior of the Major Powers: 1815-1965". Unpublished paper presented to the Conference on International Relations Theory held at York University, December 8, 1973.
- (12) Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, "The Determinants of International Violence" Peace Research Society Papers, XII Cambridge Conference, 1968, pp. 33-63. See also Robert C. North and Richard Lagerstrom, War and Domination: A Theory of Lateral Pressure, (New York, 1971).
- (13) Harold von Riekhoff, loc. cit., p.6
- (14) J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of War: 1815-1945". Quantitative International Politics, J. David Singer (ed.) (New York: 1968) pp. 258-261.
- (15) The United Nations General Assembly formally adopted without vote a definition of the term "aggression" on December 5, 1974. Eight articles were contained in the definition. Article I defines a state; Article II the use of armed forces against a state as prima facie evidence of aggression; Article III defines acts of aggression with or without declaration of war, including invasion, bombardment, use of armed forces within the territorial area of another state without permission, use of a third nation to launch aggressive attacks, sending of volunteers or mercenaries to participate in an armed conflict; Articles IV, V, VI, VII and VIII regard interpretation. London Times, December 6, 1974.
- (16) Von Riekhoff, op.cit., p.32
- (17) Ray, op.cit., p.13
- (18) Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831). On War (London: 1911) Volume 1, pp. 121-122.

- (19) Galtung "A Structural Theory of Aggression"
op.cit. p.2

CHAPTER 2

Status Inconsistency and the Nation-State - Japan: An Historical Perspective

Introduction:

While the empirical studies of war discussed in Chapter 1 focussed primarily on a system of national actors, most earlier studies tended to concentrate on the nation-state as the principal unit of analysis. Pitirim Sorokin (1937), for example, tended to explain war in terms of internal changes such as rapid population increase and economic growth.⁽¹⁾ Quincy Wright in his classic studies of war (1942 and 1964) referred to tensions arising when changes in elements internal to the nation-state become inconsistent with elements in the international system.⁽²⁾ As recent as 1960 Lewis F. Richardson developed a mathematical theory of arms race around the premise that the "state as actor" is a preferred unit of analysis.⁽³⁾ By focusing on particular dyads of nations, Richardson was able to conclude that historically aggressive actors like Japan, Germany and Italy, were rebels against the "public law" of their time, and that their rebellions constituted a challenge to the powers which ultimately led to war. Such conclusions rarely emanate from system level

studies or studies which draw data from a lengthy time span of one hundred or more years duration. Generalizations based on nation-state examples of relatively short duration, on the other hand, are useful to policy makers and scholars alike.

The purpose of this chapter is to historically isolate certain internal dimensions of the nation-state, Japan, for the period 1890-1940 and discuss their importance relative to the other nations of the East Asian system - Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, the United States, Italy and China.

Representative indicators for each dimension will constitute the data for quantitative analysis in subsequent chapters. Before outlining particular dimensions and their significance as status indicators, however, it is well to illustrate the overall role of status in the Japanese social ethic.

A. Status and National Character: The Japanese Case

If we want to make our country equal to other countries and independent in the world, we must go overseas, fight and make conquests. When we are comparable in strength to Europe and America we will be able to take our proper place among the nations of the world.

The significance of "status" and "place" in Japanese culture is best illustrated through the prism of the unique theological dogmas that have emerged during the evolution of Japanese society. Though, strictly speaking, there is no Japanese counterpart to the "church" in the Western sense, certain ethical maxims have guided Japanese affairs, both domestic and foreign, since the "Constitution of 17 Articles" was promulgated by Prince Shotoku in A.D.604. "The management of State affairs", Shotoku is alleged to have stated, "cannot be achieved unless it is based on knowledge, and the powers of knowledge are Confucianism, Buddhism and Shinto." (5)

Shinto, literally the "way of the gods", is a name of Chinese origin, which describes a faith indigenous to Japan composed of primary deities which personify natural elements like the moon, sun and storm. Central to the faith is the worship of the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu, and her direct descendants, the Japanese Royal Family, and in particular the holder of the Japanese throne. Accordingly, Shintoism placed the emperor at the head of the Japanese social hierarchy as "essentially a high priest in the worship of the sun goddess and other national deities." (6)

Confucianism, and to a lesser extent, Buddhism, added to the social ethic the notion that status distinctions were requisites if social propriety and order were to be maintained. Implicit in this notion was the view that stability and morality within the state demanded a proper ordering of society on the basis of birth, age and sex: "Upon all of the governed lay stern injunctions to live with status and to obey superiors in unswerving fashion."⁽⁷⁾

The Japanese view of the international order was predicated on similar status precepts. Kirino Toshiaki, for example, viewed the international order of his time much as Thomas Hobbes had conceived of human society in an original state of nature: "The situation in the world today is such that nations swallow up one another, some rise, others fall, but all struggle for great power."⁽⁸⁾ In a world of great and lesser powers two stark alternatives were viewed as present for Japan. As Professor Maruyama Masao has commented: "...when the premises of national hierarchy were transferred into the international sphere, international problems reduced to a single alternative; conquer or be conquered."⁽⁹⁾

These alternatives led, within a decade and a half of the (unwelcome) arrival of the American Commodore Perry, to the casting aside of the three hundred year old

feudal Tokugawa political structure, and in 1868 restoration of centralized government under the emperor. The achievements of the Japanese under Emperor Meiji were significant. By 1890 Japan bore most of the trappings of a modern (Western) state: a universal system of education open to most children; a conscript army and navy with general staffs; a civil service recruited and promoted on the basis of merit rather than birth; an industrial infrastructure, and an Imperial Diet with elected representatives and constitutional authority to allocate resources and collect taxes.

Though sovereignty remained incomplete until 1899,⁽¹⁰⁾ the Japanese took pride in these achievements. Indeed, education, industrialization and military modernization were viewed as predeterminants to "....establishing the national honour."⁽¹¹⁾ To "establish a new European style nation on the edge of Asia",⁽¹²⁾ as Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru put it. in 1887, however, Japan required two elements. Foremost were the raw materials for industry: natural resources which could be acquired only from abroad; and, secondly, markets for manufactured commodities either through an expansion of the indigenous demographic level, or through acquisition of foreign markets. Emphasis,

in fact, was placed on export trade, particularly cotton manufactures, and Japan was in direct competition for markets with the industrially developed nations of Europe.

B. Inequality and Education: The Acquisition of Technology

In the absence of a Japanese counterpart to the church, education took on politico-religious significance in Japan.⁽¹³⁾ Professor J.W. Hall has argued that of all single elements which contributed to Japan's remarkable modernization, education holds the key. Education was central to the Japanese sense of identity, and culture; Hall went so far as to characterize the Japanese as a race of "the most conspicuous learners".⁽¹⁴⁾

The religious connotation placed on education in Japan was present even during the Tokugawa period.⁽¹⁵⁾ The late Mito scholars, who wrote in the Confucian tradition of loyalty brought to Japanese history by Chu Shun-Shui (1600-1682), for example, originated the thesis that Japan had a "unique position" among the nations of the world: "a devine land where the sun rises and where the primordial energy originates."⁽¹⁶⁾ It is this thesis, proselytized by Shinto theologians, that Robert J. Pollard claims is the genesis of the Japanese "messianic complex":

the sense of divine destiny and the conviction that as a nation Japan was superior in the family of nations. The discovery during the mid-nineteenth century, that Japan was not equal, much less superior to European nations, led to the amazing Japanese transformation after 1873. (17)

Significantly, Japan entered the Meiji period with the highest literacy rates of any non-industrial society. (18) Throughout the Meiji era, social philosophers like Fukuzawa Yukichi and other samurai scholars, including Kirino Toshiaki, legitimized even further the pseudo-religious character of education. They added one element: education for national rather than individual fulfillment. Yamagata, perhaps the most revered of Meiji statesmen, coupled education in the arts of peace and war and deemed education as essential to national safety. As he put it when he returned from Europe in 1870 "...public education is the essential foundation for a strong army." (19) Another Japanese elder statesman of the time highlighted education as the means by which Japan would attain "...the leading position among all countries in the world." (20)

The preamble of the 1872 Fundamental Law of Education began with the rejoinder that "education is the key to success in life and no man can afford to neglect it....there should be no community with an illiterate family and no family with an illiterate person." (21)

The Fundamental Law of Education was one of the most enlightened educational enactments of its time, and provided a national system of education open to most children. Pride in educational achievement in the "sciences, commerce, national wealth and armament", (22) remained constant factors at least until the outbreak of World War II. cursory examination of enrolment figures between 1890 and 1940 shows consistent growth, with few fluctuations for Japan, while data from the remaining great powers in the East Asian system shows frequent fluctuations largely corresponding to the economic cycles of the period.

C. Inequality and Military Modernization: The Struggle for Great Power Status

Significantly, samurai, or warrior status, had a special significance during the Tokugawa period. The "Great Daimyo" system which existed throughout the

Tokugawa feudal period placed the Kashkin or military retainers of the daimyo immediately below that of the daimyo and his family. Samurai were given an education similar to that of daimyo children, and themselves became educationalists, artists and political philosophers as well as warriors.⁽²³⁾ By the mid-nineteenth century the samurai were but a mere five or six per cent of the population, but had an influence far greater than their number would indicate.⁽²⁴⁾ As a military elite, samurai officers readily understood the potential of the military threat from the West.⁽²⁵⁾ Within two years of the restoration, samurai advisors like Yamagata successfully obtained a mandate from the Emperor to emulate Western military methods and build a modern army and navy. The Japanese army was patterned on the French model, and the navy was patterned on the British model, both considered the most advanced of the time.⁽²⁶⁾

The French method of military conscription was adopted in 1872, and the first Japanese conscripts were called by the Tokyo garrison a year later.⁽²⁷⁾ French advisors were commissioned, and within three years were successful in forming an embryo Japanese land force. For political as well as military reasons, by the mid-1880's the Japanese turned to the German model;

in uniforms modelled on those of Prussia, samurai and peasant were drilled side by side; German military strategy became part of the curriculum in military colleges, and independent general staffs on the German model were created. (28) As in the German system, staff officers ranked higher than line officers, and acted independently of the ministers of the army and navy. These changes readily coupled with the traditional Bakufu (29) system of military administration. Similarly the influence of Fascist Germany also bore on the Japanese military structure for after 1930 military Chiefs of Staff were appointed to cabinet posts. But whereas the German military drew its intellectual impetus from the doctrine of Nazism, Japanese warriors drew inspiration from the ancient creeds like Zen Buddhism. Nationalist in orientation, Zen had special appeal for the fighting man for it fortified the two supreme ideals of the samurai - fidelity and indifference to physical hardships. (30) Thus, while the Japanese military structure took from the West the best features of each power's military administration, methods and theory, a uniquely Japanese element was retained.

The Japanese military machine was singly the most important element in the rise of Japan to major power status during the half century between 1890 and 1940.

The transition to major power status had effect not only on the behaviour of the Japanese, but also on the other nations of the East Asian system, for each had to defer to the pre-eminence of Japan in East Asia. For the Western powers deference was particularly traumatic, for the Japanese were an Asian race, the first non-white nation to challenge Western (white) supremacy in modern times, on the basis of competitive industrial power.

Though the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) had brought Japan a large indemnity and enhanced status in Asia, for example, illusions of major power status were dispelled by the Triple Intervention of Russia, France and Germany which followed to prevent Japan from obtaining territorial possessions on the Asian Mainland. The Japanese response was predictable. Unanimously approved after the intervention were bills to triple the size of the army, and increase defence expenditure by 500 per cent before 1900. A naval program was established in 1896 which provided for the construction of battleships, cruisers and destroyers to quadruple the Japanese fleet by 1904. (31)

Similarly, the Boxer Uprising (1900) gave Japan an opportunity to participate in an international police action as an equal of the Western powers in Asia.

Japan dispatched some 12,000 troops to the Asian mainland, the largest single national force of the total expeditionary group of 23,000. Regardless of proximity, however, Japanese statesmen carefully obtained the concurrence of all of the Powers before interceding. The "gentlemanly" attributes of the Japanese soldiers, their efficiency and effectiveness earned Japan the title of "the policeman of East Asia",⁽³²⁾ and allayed the skepticism of the British, who sought and obtained a Japanese military alliance in 1902. The alliance had benefits for Japan beyond the military arena; Japan gained de facto great power status in Asia at the very time when its citizens were being subjected to racial prejudice in the United States, and in other English speaking British colonies.

Between the Boxer Uprising and the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in February 1904, Japanese force size continued to grow. At the outbreak of the latter conflict, Japanese standing forces numbered in excess of 195,000 men. The rapid succession of Japanese victories, both on land and at sea, won the respect of Europe and America alike. President Theodore Roosevelt expressed the sentiment on both sides of the Atlantic when he noted that "Japanese soldiers and sailors have shown themselves to be terrible foes. There can be none more dangerous in all the world."⁽³³⁾

Though highly regarded as the preeminent military power in East Asia by 1914, by this time Japan was preparing a program of imperial expansion designed to transform recognition to political reality. Japanese leaders from the time of the first Korean crisis in 1884-85, had viewed their nation as "the natural leader of Asia". The European conflict was but a timely turn of events. In November 1914, after the fall of the German fortress at Tsingtao to Japanese forces, Premier Okuma made the following statement in the newspaper Shin Nippon:

Those who are superior will govern those who are inferior. I believe that within two or three centuries the world will have a few great governing countries, and others will be governed by them, pay homage to their might...For instance, England, Russia, Germany and France may be such countries. We should from now on prepare ourselves to become a governing nation. (34)

The Japanese seizures of the German possessions in Shantung, and the occupation of the German holdings in the South Pacific expanded the Empire of Japan without large losses. Apart from aiding their allies to suppress a mutiny by an Indian regiment in February 1915, the Japanese fought no battles outside of its East Asian environ.

Nonetheless the utility of maintaining large standing forces was highlighted during 1918 when Japan dispatched 72,000 troops to Vladivostok and two points in Siberia to oppose Bolshevism. (35) That the Japanese withdrew in 1922 was due not to their purpose being realized, but to the strong representations of Great Britain and the United States who viewed with alarm what was obviously Japanese aggression on the Asian mainland.

Though only a peripheral participant in the Great World War, Japan was one of the five Great Powers at the Versailles Peace Conference. Japanese delegates to the Conference sought but two objectives, both of which rested on Japan's military capability: de jure recognition of Japan as a Major Power, and formal acceptance of the principle of racial equality among nations. Perhaps unfortunate was the fact that the acceptance of Japan's claim to Major Power status was more symbolic than real; even more unfortunate was the refusal of the Powers to accept formally the principle of racial equality, for it left with the Japanese a sense of isolation from the Great Power grouping, a feeling which could only be overcome by further demonstrations of worthiness. (36)

The inequities of Versailles were soon demonstrated to the Japanese: the principle of self-determination, for example, was applied to China, even though it was not applied to any other territorial entities outside of Europe. The new international norms regarding armaments control, and the peaceful settlements of disputes were applied first in the Far East. It was Japan which was asked to reduce armaments at the Washington Conference in 1921-22 in the interests of "collective security" for the Pacific. And it was Japan again which was constrained from erecting fortifications through the Five Power Naval Treaty in February 1922. (37)

These political compromises were viewed with suspicion and apprehension by the Japanese. Nonetheless, Japan did reduce land force strength in conformity with the international demobilizations. Not all elements in Japan were satisfied with a mere maintenance of the status quo during the interwar period, however. Right wing elements constantly criticized the "Party Cabinets" who were "subverting" the great power status of Japan by "weak diplomacy". Adding to this growing resentment against "collective security" controlled by the "Powers",

was the growing power of the Soviet Union, and the increased strength of the reorganized Kuomintang army of China. Peter Duus sketched the atmosphere prevalent in Japan thusly:

By the late 1920's many elements in the army, as well as a number of civilian politicians and officials began to fear that areas like Manchuria and Mongolia might soon fall under Chinese or Soviet domination. They were convinced that Japan had to move in these areas in order to maintain its status as a power...(38)

The indignation caused by a bombing of a section of track at Mukden, the northern terminus of the South Manchurian Railway, led to the collapse of the moderate Japanese cabinet on December 5, 1931. The new cabinet of Inukai Tsuyoshi authorized the Kwantung army to march on northern Manchuria. By March 9, 1932 Japan extended formal recognition to its satellite state, Manchukuo. The Manchukuo army, which claimed responsibility for the final suppression of loyal Chinese forces, was composed officially of Chinese regular troops, and Japanese staff officers "...either retired or still belonging to the Japanese army." (39)

Between 1932 and 1936 governmental defense expenditures rose by three-fifths, and almost immediately

after the Manchurian campaign Japan withdrew from the "collective security" of the League of Nations. (40) At the same time official statements began propagating the notion of a "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere", which implied the creation of an East Asian economic region under the leadership of Japan.

The Japanese military again gained primacy and Japanese strategists concentrated on development of a scenario of war. Japan embarked upon its crusade to gain its place among the nations of the world on December 8, 1941.

D. Inequality and Trade: Competition with the West

As important as the year 1890 was to the Japanese, the mid-point in the long reign of the Emperor Meiji and the achievements that signified paled to insignificance when compared to the repercussions to East Asia that flowed from the fall of Otto von Bismarck from the Chancellory in Germany. With Bismarck's fall began the disintegration of the great alliance system which had governed European diplomacy since the Franco-German War, and from the deadlock that emerged between the Triple Alliance

(Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy), and the newly formed Franco-Russian Accord, sprang a renewed European interest in the Far East that centered largely on trade. (41)

Trade represented for Great Britain and Germany a virtual matter of life and death; Asian trade was viewed as being of crucial importance by British and German economists like Adolf Wagner and Gustav Schmoller. Even Max Weber commented that:

With terrifying rapidity we are approaching the time when the provision of the half civilized Asiatic peoples will have reached its greatest expansion. Then nothing but might, nothing but naked force will decide the question of foreign markets. (42)

Offsetting the mercantile interest of Great Britain and Germany were the French and Russian interests of wealth and national prestige which certain of their statesmen and ambitious adventurers felt would flow from the acquisition of captive markets in the Far East. Sentiment was stirred in these countries by the lure of untold riches and appeals by men like Prince Henri of Orleans, a famous and popular traveller in Asia:

It is in Asia....that will be decided the destinies of the world. In Asia will be founded and will increase great empires, and whoever succeeds in making his voice heeded in the Far East will be able also to speak in dominating accents in Europe. Far seeing men understand the interest France had in planting herself upon the flanks of China. They seized, at the extremity of the old continent, a strip of land which they might set up as a box for the French sentinel at the gates of the Celestial Empire....It was at the head of the line heading directly to the most populous and one of the most productive empires of the world....We held all the trumps. We still hold them, and we may win the game with the products of our national industry in the great market of China.(43)

Offsetting the combined European interests were the ambitions of American businessmen who had viewed the Orient from an economic perspective from the time of Perry. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, against the economic might of Europe and America, Japan seemed little more than an anxious spectator.

The fact is, however, that Japan too was emerging as a trading nation. Between 1860 and 1897 Japan's trade with China rose from nothing to two per cent while American trade with China dropped from three per cent to less than two per cent of the total.(44)

The rapid expansion of the Japanese textile industry during the late nineteenth century is illustrated particularly by the volume of cotton imports. In 1883 Japan imported less than three million pounds of cotton. By 1893, just one decade later, Japan imported one hundred fifty-four million pounds of cotton.⁽⁴⁵⁾ Even Great Britain, the trading nation par excellence, could not compete with Japanese manufactured cotton goods in the East Asian market. In Singapore, for example, Japanese cotton manufactured products sold at one-half the price of the British. By 1912 the British were completely forced out of the textile market in China.

Outside of the United States, few countries of the West had established firm business ties in the Far East before the Sino-Japanese War. Japan on the other hand had developed an extensive trading relationship with Korea, with China and with the offshore islands annexed by Japan since Perry.⁽⁴⁶⁾ By 1894, for example, fully ninety per cent of Korea's foreign trade was with Japan.⁽⁴⁷⁾ Additionally, there were considerable Japanese settlements in all of the larger towns of Korea, and the Japanese were tightening their economic hold on the country through the operation of banks,

concessions and trading establishments. According to Professor W.L. Langer there were no less than 10,000 Japanese engaged in trade in Korea at the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894. (48)

Despite the Japanese victory, however, it was Russia and the other Western nations which gained economic inroads in China. Russia gained not only a long term (80 year) leasehold for a railway right-of-way through Manchuria, but through the Russo-Chinese Bank, the right to coinage, tax collection, management of local finances, payments of interest on public bonds and control of all commercial concessions in Manchuria. Additionally, in return for a fifteen year defensive alliance Russia gained access to all of China's ports "should emergency arise", and the right to establish a railway guard to protect rolling stock along its newly acquired Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) concession line. (49)

Germany, after a tacit agreement between the German Emperor and the Tsar, seized the port of Tsingtao and much of Shantung province, ostensibly to avenge the death of two murdered German Catholic missionaries. By a formal convention, signed on March 6, 1898, China

ceded to Germany the entire enclave of Kiaochow, including the port facility and occupied areas of Shantung province. In addition to the lease China granted two railway concessions in the province to Germany. (50)

Following the German seizures Russia occupied Port Arthur and Darien, ostensibly to protect the port and peninsula, and obtained a further concession to construct a railroad south from the CER mainline at Harbin to Port Arthur.

Great Britain, already locked in a struggle for Chinese concessions with France in the Yangtze Valley, Kuangsi and Yennan provinces in southern China, acquired a leasehold on the Chinese port of Wei-hai-wei, the island of Kuikungtao and a strip of land ten miles wide around the bay "for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia." (51)

France received as compensation, a ninety-nine year leasehold on the Port of Kwang-chau-wan in Indochina, and Italy, which had earlier attempted to obtain coaling stations in New Guinea and Malaya, attempted to obtain a similar leasehold on the port at San Men Bay in Chekiang province.

These actions by the Powers precipitated further claims against China. As direct compensation for the cessation of Kwang-Chau-wan to France, Great Britain obtained a ninety-nine year lease on the whole of the Kowloon Peninsula from Deep Bay to San Men Bay, and a future railway concession for a railway from Hong Kong to Canton. Additionally, on May 21, 1898, an Anglo-Italian syndicate obtained the "sole right to open and work coal and iron mines, and petroleum wells in the districts of Fukien and Pengtingchou, and the prefectures of Luanfu, Isechoufu, and Pinguangfu" (52) in the province of Shansi. Additionally, there were the so-called "declarations on nonalienation".

The first "declaration of nonalienation" was requested and granted to France on March 15, 1897 for the island of Hainan. China declared that it would not "alienate" or cede the island to any other foreign Power, either as a final or temporary cession, or as a naval coaling station or depot." In April 1898 the French asked for similar assurance for the provinces bordering on Tonkin; and in January 1900 an abandoned concession of 358 acres at Hankow: both were granted.

In February 1898 the British asked for a "declaration of nonalienation" for territory and provinces adjoining the Yangtze: it was granted. Other concessions were granted Germany and the United States, the latter being "awarded" rather than requested for the construction of the Peking-Hankow Railway. (53)

The Japanese were less than happy with these arrangements for captive markets. Not only had Japan been denied the fruits of victory in China, it had been forced to acquiesce while the Powers carved up the Chinese melon. What is more, as a result of Japanese defeat, Russia had gained inroads into Korea which hitherto they had not known. Korean King Yi, secreted in the Russian Legation at Seoul from February 1896 to February 1897, had awarded Russia concessions for coal and other resources, while Russian administrators and advisors filled virtually every important post in the Korean administration.

By March 1898, however, the rapidly declining fortunes of Russia in Korea, forced a meeting between the Russian Minister in Tokyo, Baron R.R. Rosen and Baron R. Nishi, the Japanese Foreign Minister.

On April 25, 1898 to an Accord known as the Nishi-Rosen Convention, was signed which contained a pledge that Russia would "...not obstruct the development of the commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea." (54) This was the first formal recognition of Japanese commercial interests in Korea by a Western nation.

While Japan gained no formal concessions in China prior to the Boxer Uprising, Japan's military participation in that conflict yielded both status and economic benefits. The United States, for example, implicitly recognized a prior Japanese claim to preponderance in Fukien in 1901. The other Powers followed the U.S. example and granted Japan de facto control over concessions at Amoy and Fsochow. Additionally as a direct participant in the Boxer Settlement negotiations, Japan gained a lump sum payment of 450,000,000 teals from the Chinese treasury by way of reparations. (55)

The concessions, and after the Russo-Japanese War, control of Southern Sakhalien, added greatly to Japan's economic well being. The increased size of the markets for Japanese manufactured cottons provided

the impetus for continued expansion of the cotton manufacturing industry.

Throughout the period of the First World War, Japanese cotton goods continued to thrive in aid of the allied war effort in Europe. The war in turn created a need for Japanese iron and steel industry.

The brief decline in export markets brought on by the world Depression of 1929, was reversed by the devaluation of the Japanese yen in 1931. By 1935 Japan surpassed in volume the cotton manufacturers of Lancashire on the world market. Indeed of goods exported from Japan, cotton goods amounted to 26.6% of the total in 1935, and were 43.8% of the total textile goods exported during that year.⁽⁵⁶⁾ Even the international indignation caused by Japan's move in Manchuria did not detract from Japan's ability to market cotton products. Germany and Italy were particularly sensitive to the importance Japan placed on export markets, and went out of their way to create markets to appease their Far Eastern ally, a situation which remained stable until the outbreak of World War II.

E. Inequality and Population: Relative Strength
in Numbers

In 1967, A.F.K. Organski effectively argued the importance of population as a determinant of power even during the nuclear age: "....all of the world's major powers have more than fifty million people, and the superpowers exceed two hundred million!" (57)

In 1893 Charles H. Pearson expounded a similar proposition in relation to the highly populated Chinese mainland.

The Chinese would be less dangerous than they are if they were as warlike as the Turks in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, because in that case they would waste their reproductive forces in arms...With civilization equally diffused, the most populous country must, ultimately, be the most powerful; and the preponderance of China over any rival - even over the United States of America - is likely to be overwhelming. (58)

Despite the obvious backwardness of China, the Japanese tended to view that country with both dismay and caution. Early in the reign of the Emperor Meiji, for example, Japanese statesmen approached their Chinese counterparts to obtain a mutual defense treaty. Until amended at the suggestion of the American Envoy in Tokyo,

the Sino-Japanese Treaty that was formally signed in 1873 included an article providing for "mutual assistance" in the "event of any other nation acting unjustly or treating either of the two high contracting powers with contempt." (59)

Between the time of that treaty and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, Japan came to view its Asian neighbour with much the same contempt as the Western Powers. China could not be simply transformed into a modern warlike nation, or assist the Japanese to turn back the tide of Western encroachment despite its vast resources and overwhelming numbers. Once this realization had been made the Japanese had a profound interest in making sure that China did not attain the potential its numbers, size and wealth in resources, suggested it should have had.

Perhaps the best statement to this effect is that of the Japanese Foreign Minister, Viscount Ishii, to the British, French and Russian Ambassadors who sought Japan's lobby to persuade China to join the allied war effort:

Japan could not regard with equanimity the organization of an efficient Chinese army such as would be required for her active participation in the war, nor could Japan fail to regard without uneasiness a liberation of the economic activities of a nation of four hundred million people. (60)

The Japanese from the time of the Meiji Restoration were aware of the limitations of their island nation, both in terms of resources and population. Saigo Takamori (1827-1877), for example, had viewed the acquisition of Korea as essential to the defense of Japan:

"....Japan now claims Hokkaido. Can Japan stand up to Russia with only Hokkaido? We shall settle the Korean question and expand from Possiet Bay to Nikolaevsk. We should definitely advance into Korea and so protect our own country." (61)

At the time of the Manchurian invasion in 1931, the official explanation was to defend Japanese commercial interests, yet other interests were clearly in mind. Kawakami, a Japanese scholar in 1933, justified the creation of Manchukuo in terms of population and not economics:

Manchukuo is here to stay with her population of 32,000,000 strong, and her vast territory of 448,975 square miles. (62)

Japanese scholars and statesmen alike referred to the creation of the Japan-Manchukuo bloc as the "Kingly Way", the way toward an East Asian confederation able to withstand the encroachment of the West. Japanese leaders called the confederation the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere but viewed that sphere as an extension of the island kingdom in terms of both wealth and population. It was not accidental that the Japanese government encouraged emigration to the Pacific Mandate Islands after World War I, or to the Asian mainland and Korea. On the contrary, immigration to these areas was designed to lead toward an Asian Empire ethnically akin to that in Japan. The Japanese Empire was viewed as an essential prerequisite to Great Power status.

F. Inequality and Industrialization: The Machinery of Independence

The growth of industry in Japan was in striking contrast to the evolutionary development of industry in Europe and North America. Encouraged and subsidized from the beginning of the Meiji era, by 1890 Japanese industry could boast its first 2000 miles of railway, its first 100,000 tons of steam vessels, and its first 4000 miles of telegraph lines. Additionally, Japan had shipyards, arsenals, foundaries, machine shops, technical

schools and a series of experimental factories producing cement, sugar, beer, glass, chemicals and a variety of Western-type goods. The most important feature of Japanese industry during the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, was the silk filature and cotton manufacturing industries.⁽⁶³⁾

The cotton mill industry, like other Japanese industry, built rapidly in the decade of the 1890s. The assimilation of machine technology, the accumulation of banking and industrial capital, and the expansive influences of world prosperity, all facilitated a rise in industrial output.

After World War I the Japanese textile industry continued to grow, and by 1929 Japanese cloth exports reached one-half of the exports of Lancashire. The silk industry also grew and by 1929 represented 36% of all Japanese commodity sales abroad. Between 1930 and 1936 the volume of these sales nearly doubled six times and by 1936 Japan had become the prime exporter of cotton goods in the world. At the same time Japan was heavily reliant on foreign and colonial imports for iron and steel materials, and for raw cotton, wool and rubber.

During the early years of the Meiji era the home output of iron and steel was insignificant. By 1896 home output of pig-iron amounted to 26,000 tons, about 40% of consumption.⁽⁶⁴⁾ In 1901 the modern Japanese iron and steel industry was launched by the opening of the government owned Jawata Iron Works. Despite the inadequacy of domestic supplies of iron ore and coking coal, by 1913 pig-iron output had increased to 243,000 tons; steel production to 255,000 tons.⁽⁶⁵⁾ Despite these impressive gains Japan became increasingly dependent on foreign suppliers of iron and steel; metal production rose only 16% between 1919 and 1929.

Despite the reliance on foreign sources the ratio between combined supplies of raw and processed metals shifted dramatically during this period with greater emphasis being placed on ores and concentrates from Korea and Manchuria. Steel production reached 203,400 tons in 1929, 8 times the output of 1913. The Japanese ability to manufacture machine tools including electrical apparatus, railway equipment, bicycles and industrial machinery, placed the heavy

manufacturing industries second only to the textile industry by 1929. Japanese businessmen actively engaged in overseas marketing of industrial commodities after 1925 and reduced industrial imports from 50% of all Japanese imports to 25% of all Japanese imports. Some foreign investment was allowed in the Japanese manufacturing industry and Ford and General Motors assembly plants opened during the period 1918-1929. In the main, however, emphasis was on domestic self-sufficiency, which tended to promote the growth within the country.

The aims of state policy in Japan were primarily to couple state and private funds to build enterprises essential to military preparedness and colonial development. One large scale state sponsored industry which grew rapidly before World War I was the merchant marine. In 1896 the government undertook a general subsidy of ocean shipping. In 1899 a differential subsidy was provided which favoured Japanese shipbuilding; by 1913 the Japanese merchant marine had expanded to 1,500,000 tons which carried one-half of all Japan's overseas trade. During the War Empire shipping increased from 41.2 million yen in 1914 to 381.4 million yen in 1919. (66)

Victory in the First World War gave additional impetus to the banking and strategic industries. Wherever possible Japanese trade favoured the colonial territories and China; until World War I, for example, three-quarters of Japan's cotton goods were exported to Hong Kong and the Kwantung Leased Territories. During the 1920s the Japanese government actively developed the mining and lumber industries of Karafuto (southern Sakhalin Island) and agricultural and mineral production in Korea and Formosa. By 1929 Korea and Formosa supplied 80% of Japanese rice imports, two-thirds of Japanese sugar imports and a large percentage of the Japanese imports of oil bearing materials, lumber and pulp, fish products and coal. These figures increased sharply after 1931 when Manchukuo became the prime supplier of the Japanese pig-iron and steel industry. Preferential tariffs and subsidies played a large role in encouraging the development of the vast Manchurian mineral resources in an effort to establish "yen bloc self-sufficiency" in the region of occupied Manchukuo and China and the Japanese Empire. The prime goal of the Japanese government after 1931 was the creation of the "Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere" which placed the heavy industry center of the region in Japan Proper and the manufacture of consumer goods in the Empire and on the Chinese continent.

As Japan moved closer toward a quasi-wartime economy further ad hoc measures were introduced by the government for strategic industries. In 1934 the Japan Iron Manufacturing Company was created by the state amalgamation of six large private iron and steel companies with the state owned Yawata Iron Works. By this one amalgamation the government secured control over almost the entire Japanese pig-iron output and more than half of the steel output. Similar controls were achieved over the other "strategic" industries by the passing of various industry laws after 1934.

G. Inequality and Race: Ascription by the West

While it is relatively easy to select achieved status dimensions like those above from a national historical profile, it is invariably more difficult to select ascribed status dimensions peculiar to single national actors or even sub-systems of national actors in an historically compatible setting. The historical development of Japan in this sense is unique, for such a dimension, reflecting the status ascribed to Japan by other nations in the system, is obvious. Before concluding this chapter and moving on to discuss the theoretical orientation of the study, it is well to

consider "race" as an historical alternate to "number and quality of diplomatic missions received", which was selected in all of the war-oriented studies as the indicator of ascribed importance. Clearly any reference to racial prejudice against the Japanese in this period must include a discussion of racial discrimination in America, for it was in the United States and not in Japan that racial prejudice against the Japanese was reflected.

Early Japanese leaders readily believed that by becoming "civilized", Japan would be accepted on the basis of equality by the white nations of Europe and America. Fukuzawa Yakuchi, a noted Meiji scholar and opinion leader, had done much to foster this mistaken view; indeed he championed the "enlightenment" in the belief that "civilization", and not race was the key to high status:

I am Japanese. I wished that sometime in the future I should be able to glorify the national strength, treating the natives of India and China not only the way the English had been doing, but even taking power from the English in East Asia to monopolize it for Japan. (67)

In the political essay "Gakumon" in 1875, Fukuzawa wrote after a section entitled "men are equal", a section called "countries are equal". His theory ran this way: "A country is a gathering of people. Japan is a gathering of Japanese and England a gathering of Englishmen. Japanese and Englishmen alike are members of a common humanity; they must respect each other's rights." (68)

The English, however, had quite a different view of the rights of Asians. Until 1895 few Englishmen distinguished between Chinese, Japanese and other Asiatics. In 1893, for example, Charles H. Pearson spelled out one view of the Asiatic races whose very numbers presented a threat to the world order:

We are struggling among ourselves for supremacy in a world which we thought of as destined to belong to the Aryan races and to the Christian faith... We shall wake to find ourselves elbowed and hustled, and perhaps even thrust aside by peoples whom we looked down upon as servile and thought of as bound always to minister to our needs. (69)

The mission of the white man in Asia was viewed by Americans and Europeans alike as one of spreading

"civilization" to the "backward peoples of the world". (70) As a rationale for increased American power in the Pacific, for example, President Roosevelt also pointed to the white man's burden to justify his imperial designs on Hawaii, and the Philippines. Acquisition of these territories brought the American President not only an added strategic burden, but also increased racial difficulty at home. Notions of "yellow peril" popularized by the German Emperor and Russian Tsar found fertile ground in America, California particularly. (71)

The first orientals to immigrate to the United States began arriving in California to work the goldmines and railroads around 1848. These Chinese "coolies" were badly treated, and segregated from the outset on social, moral, economic and political grounds. Unlike European immigrants, the Chinese immigrant would not integrate into Californian society, preferring instead to remain apart in groups. He was, moreover, satisfied to work for lower wages and live with lower standards than his white counterparts.

The first major Japanese immigration to California took place in 1885, and increased steadily until the turn of the century. Despite the fact that

the United States reserved the right to limit the flow of immigrants from Japan as early as 1895, by 1900 there were 12,628 Japanese immigrants in California alone.⁽⁷²⁾ After the annexation of Hawaii even more Japanese immigrated to the mainland; fully 24,326 arrived during the year 1900 alone.⁽⁷³⁾

To stem the tide President Roosevelt appealed to the Japanese government, and by August 1900 successfully concluded the first of the so-called "gentlemen's agreements" with that country. By it the Japanese agreed to discontinue issuing passports to Japanese labourers who indicated intention to work in the United States. The agreement was ineffectual; the law was not enforced and prospective immigrants easily circumvented its restrictions by travelling to Canada and Mexico where they could enter without restriction. So acute was the problem that in 1902, 5000 Japanese circumvented all controls; in 1904 the figure rose to 8000.⁽⁷⁴⁾

The fear of racial inundation in California became so prevalent by this time that open acts of lawlessness began to take place against individual Japanese labourers. By March 1905 Both Houses of

the California State Legislature unanimously passed a resolution calling the Japanese "immoral, intemperate, quarrelsome men bound to labour for pittance." (75)

The resolution went on to call upon the Congress of the United States to make representation to the President to limit Japanese immigration to California.

The tone of the resolution did not go unnoticed in Japan. Even on the battlefields of Manchuria, individual Japanese soldiers made their sentiments known to the limited number of Americans present. "They hate us", wrote one war correspondent, "all of them, officers and men. They have been the underdog till now, they have been the scholars, we the masters and now they are going to show us a thing or two if it can be done. They hate us. God knows the feeling is mutual." (76)

The correspondent, Williard Straight, went on to outline to the readers back home a scenario of disaster for California: The "...uncultured, uneducated, uncouth" Japanese would "invade"

California creating all varieties of problems ranging from labour competition to sexual crimes. The result would be a "complete Orientalization of the Pacific coast" which would cease to be truly American. (77)

Roosevelt personally viewed the Japanese as a courteous and proper people and was humiliated by the resolution of the California State Legislature; nonetheless the damage had been done. As George Kennan confided to the President from the vantage point of Japan:

It isn't the exclusion of a few emigrants that hurts here....its the putting of Japanese below Hungarians, Italians, Syrians, Polish Jews and degraded non-descripts from all parts of Europe and western Asia. (78)

Until August 1905 when the Portsmouth Treaty was concluded, the Japanese were restrained and proper in their relationships with America. To Secretary of State Taft, who travelled to Japan in the Spring of 1905 to discuss the Japanese position on the Philippine Islands, Prime Minister Katsura was particularly gracious:

Taft: Certain pro-Russian influences in the United States are spreading the theory that a Japanese victory would be a certain prelude to her aggression in the direction of the

Philippine Islands. But Japan's only real interest in the Philippines would be to have them governed by a strong and friendly power such as the United States. Japan did not desire to have the islands governed either by nations unfit for the task, or by some unfriendly European power.

Katsura: This is absolutely correct - Japan had no aggressive designs whatever on the Philippines and the insinuation of a "Yellow Peril" was only a malicious and clumsy slander circulated to damage Japan. (79)

By the end of the Russian-Japanese war most Americans had lost their fervour for the underdog Japanese. Roosevelt, too, did not wish to see Russia destroyed as a Pacific power, and made representations to the Japanese to modify some of their peace demands. When the final peace document was signed a wave of anti-Americanism spread through Japan: the United States President was personally blamed for what was generally regarded as bad terms of peace. But even as indignation swept the Japanese, further racial incidents occurred in California. Between May and November 1906, fully 290 cases of assault occurred against Orientals, most of whom were Japanese. (80)

In the same year, after the Japanese Red Cross donated \$244,960 to the victims of the San Francisco earthquake, the Board of Education in that city passed an ordinance requiring Japanese children to go to "oriental" schools. This was a blow to the elitist Japanese. As Ueda Mannen

wrote in 1904 "....even though we belong to the same yellow race, we Japanese are a civilized people and are not to be treated like the Chinese, Koreans and other East Asians". (81)

In the two years following the San Francisco action the United States President was authorized by Congress to prevent further Japanese immigration from Hawaii, Mexico and Canada, even though the latter two nations erected their own immigration restrictions on Japanese during this time. The President's crowning achievement before stepping down was to negotiate a second "gentlemen's agreement" with the Japanese setting greater restrictions on the issuance of passports. The second gentlemen's agreement did little to stop the agitation against the Japanese on the Pacific coast, however, bill after bill was passed by the legislature of the State of California: in 1913 the Alien Land Act was passed despite the warnings of President Wilson's cabinet. By this Act aliens ineligible for citizenship in the United States were prohibited from owning land in California, a three year lease being the limit of tenure.

Despite the tremendous Japanese industrial growth during World War 1, the victory of Japanese forces on the Chinese mainland against Germany, and

the Japanese Siberian intervention against the New Bolshevik government, Japan was unsuccessful in getting a racial equality clause written into the Charter of the League of Nations. The Japanese viewed the refusal of the Powers to incorporate the clause as a point of honour. As the Japanese representative pointed out: "a citizen of any state holding membership in the League of Nations would be called upon to share military expenditure for the common cause and, if need be, sacrifice his own person. In view of these new duties....arising before him....each national would naturally feel, and, in fact demand, that he be placed on an equal footing with the people whom he undertook to defend with his own life".⁽⁸²⁾

The footwork surrounding the refusal by the Powers is worth comment in detail. The British delegates, for example, agreed that equality of states was a long standing principle of international law, but felt unable to support the Japanese position. Lord Robert Cecil indicated that he was "personally entirely in accord with the idea advanced by the Japanese delegation", but pointed out that the provision in the Covenant for Japanese membership on the Executive Council of the League placed Japan "in a situation of complete equality with the other great powers;" thereby making it possible at

any time for her representatives to raise her questions of equality of races." (83) The issue was, however, viewed as far too important by the Japanese to be put aside so lightly. Viscount Chinda demanded that the Japanese resolution be voted upon. If the amendment were rejected, it would be an indication to Japan that the equality of members of the League was not recognized and as a consequence the new organization would be most unpopular: "...public opinion in Japan is very concerned over this question, and certain people have even gone as far as to say that Japan would not become a member of the League of Nations unless she is satisfied on this point", he threatened. Eleven of the seventeen nations present supported the Japanese amendment. President Wilson of the United States indicated that the agreement had to be unanimous; it therefore was not included in the League Covenant. (84)

This blow was followed by several others which came in rapid succession. From the United States, the country with the most liberal immigration policy in the world, came a request on March 1, 1920 the emigration of Japanese picture brides be stopped by the Tokyo government. In December the same year, by act of Congress, the Japanese lost the right to lease land in the United States, to act as guardians

to their American born children, who, as U.S. citizens might own land, and the right to be shareholder in American controlled companies. In 1923-24 the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the constitutionality of certain of the California and Washington anti-Japanese laws. In 1922 the decision in the case of Ozawa vs. the United States made Japanese ineligible for citizenship in the United States. (85)

In 1924 the final and most serious blow came. The Immigration Quota Act was passed which contained a clause denying the right of entry into the United States of any person not eligible for citizenship. According to Morse and McNair "It was a moral affront to the pride of the Japanese, who, since 1873, had been punctilious in demanding for themselves, in their dealings with other Orientals and with Europeans, a position superior to that of other Asiatics. Ambassador Hanihara fortold the conclusion would "bring.... grave consequences upon the otherwise happy.... relations between the two countries". (86)

The American action barring Japanese immigrants did bring rapid changes in the foreign policy of Japan. In July 1924, Viscount Kato announced a readiness to negotiate with Russia. By January 20, 1925, diplomatic

and consular relations were established and other treaties for commerce and navigation were signed. The Soviet government granted "to Japanese subjects, companies and associations, concessions for the exploitation of minerals, forests and other natural resources in all its territories". Japan agreed to withdraw from northern Sakhalin by May 15, 1926, and for the pledge received an oil concession on the island and an apology for Russian behaviour toward the Japanese in Vladivostok in 1918. Despite these concessions, however, the rapprochement with Soviet Russia did not make up for the action of the United States Congress. Kawakami, writing in the early thirties, saw the problem as one of clear discrimination:

They tell us that England solved her population question, not by emigration, but by industrialization. That is not true. When England's population increase was at its height, her sons and daughters emigrated to the United States and her own overseas dominions by the hundred thousands. Before the American Immigration Act of 1924 restricted immigration by the quota system, most European countries especially Italy counted on emigration to America as a means of allaying economic ills.

Ever since the United States and the British overseas dominions raised a barrier against Japanese immigration, our Government to be polite and "gentlemanly" handled the knotty problem with kid gloves. It pretended that Japan was interested, not in emigration, but in the academic question of equality. As Viscount

Ishii, one-time Ambassador to Washington and Paris, puts it, "Our primary concern in this respect is not whether or not a few thousand or a few hundred Japanese immigrants shall be accorded the courteous treatment which is due to her as one of the civilized powers of the world. To us it is a matter of ideals rather than a question of material interest." (87)

Until racism was demonstrated to Japan by the Anglo-American Powers, the Japanese sought openly to interact with the Western nations and gain a position of equality with them. After these demonstrations, however, Japan reverted to a racist policy of its own. Japan began to foster a policy of Asia for Asiatics. A "Monroe Doctrine" for East Asia was formally announced in 1932-33: "In a word" a Japanese newspaper stated, Japan must "advance with a policy of Asia for the Asiatics - an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine." The Japanese Imperial Declaration of War in December 1941 similarly had racial overtones. As stated by Tokutomi Iichiro shortly after its declaration:

We must show the races of East Asia that the order, tranquility, peace, happiness and contentment of East Asia can be gained only by eradicating the evil precedent of the encroachment and extortion of the Anglo-Saxons in East Asia by effecting the real aims of the co-prosperity of East Asia, and by making Nippon the leader of East Asia. (88)

Thus, while race as an indicator can best be determined as a significant status variable for Japan outside of the Japanese Empire, clearly racial discrimination or perceived discrimination had a significant effect on Japanese behaviour. It is with race as a significant indicator of international as well as interpersonal status that we turn to the theoretical orientation of this study.

FOOTNOTES PERTAINING TO CHAPTER 2

Pages 15 to 63

- (1) Pitirim Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, Volume Three (New York: 1937) p. 364
- (2) Quincy Wright, A Study of War, (Chicago: 1942) pp. 380-382 and Quincy Wright, A Study of War, (Chicago: 1964), pp. 89-92
- (3) Lewis F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity, (Chicago: 1960) pp. 12-36 focused on a nation's reaction to a rival's armaments increase. Armaments expenditure is a property of the nation-state, and as such Richardson's theory is centered on the "state as actor."
- (4) Cited in Oka Yoshitaki, "Prologue", Marlene I. Mayo (ed.), The Emergence of Imperial Japan: Self Defence or Calculated Aggression? (Lexington, Mass: 1970) p. 3
- (5) Richard Storry, A History of Modern Japan, (Baltimore: 1960) p. 31
- (6) John Whitney Hall, "A Monarch for Modern Japan" Political Developments in Modern Japan, Robert E. Ward (ed) (Princeton, New Jersey: 1968) pp. 28-29
- (7) Robert J. Scalapino, "Ideology and Modernization: the Japanese Case", David E. Apter (ed), Ideology and Discontent (New York: 1964) p. 45
- (8) Cited in Iriye Akira, "Imperialism in East Asia", James B. Crowley (ed), Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation (New York: 1970) p. 35
- (9) Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics (London: 1963) p. 140
- (10) An agreement, abolishing the unequal clauses of the treaty with Great Britain was signed in London in 1894. It came into force five years later. Similar agreements were signed soon after with other nations. Storry, op. cit., pp. 125-126
- (11) Albert M. Craig citing Fukuzawa Yukichi, a noted Japanese educationalist. "Fukuzawa Yukichi: The Philosophical Foundations of Meiji Nationalism", Robert E. Ward (ed) Political Development in Modern Japan (Princeton, New Jersey: 1968) p. 104

- (12) Inoue Kaore, cited by Marius B. Jensen, "Modernization and Foreign Policy in Meiji Japan" in Ibid. p.174
- (13) John Craiger, "The Aims and Content of School Courses in Japanese History: 1872-1945", Edmund Skrzypezak, Japan's Modern Century (Tokyo and Rutland, Vermont: 1968) p. 8
- (14) J.W. Hall, "Education and Modern National Development" Twelve Doors to Japan (New York: 1967) J.W. Hall and R.K. Beardsley, (eds) p. 387
- (15) R.P. Dore, Education in Tokugawa Japan, (Berkeley: 1965) pp. 295-301
- (16) Theodore William de Bary, Sources of Japanese Tradition, (New York: 1958) P.595
- (17) Robert J. Pollard, "Ancient Dreams and Present Fears" in Mayo, op.cit., p.13
- (18) Marius B. Jansen, "The Meiji State" in James B. Crowley, (ed.) Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy (Princeton, New Jersey: 1966) p.105
- (19) Cited in Ibid., p.105
- (20) Cited in Herbert Passin, (ed.) Society and Education in Japan, (New York:1965) p.8
- (21) Cited in Edmund Skrzypezak, Japan's Modern Century, (Tokyo:1968) p.8
- (22) Ibid., p.8
- (23) The Great Daimyo system is described fully by John Whitney Hall, "Tokugawa Japan: 1800-1853" in Crowley, op cit., pp.62-94
- (24) Craig, in Ward, op.cit., p.100
- (25) Jiro Numata, "Acceptance and Rejection of Elements of European Culture in Japan", Journal of World History, III (1965), especially pp.240-241
- (26) Cited by Ernst L. Presseisen, Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army, (Tucson:1965) p.396 Also Paul E. Eckel, The Far East Since 1500, (New York:1948) p.235 and Claude A. Buss, The Far East, (New York: 1955), p.177

- (27) Edward M. Earle (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy, (Princeton: 1943) pp. 208 and 215. See also Imazo Nitohe, Western Influences in Modern Japan, (Chicago: 1931) pp. 382-383
- (28) The official version of this transformation differs from the facts. The Japan Times Yearbook, 1932, states on this point that "Marshal Yamagata carried out in 1884 minute investigations into military systems of the leading Powers of Europe, and as a result of this memorable tour of inspection of Europe the military organization of the country was remodelled on the Prussian system." p.51
- (29) Bakufu, literally "camp office", was a system of national administration originated in the twelfth century in connection with the rise of the Shogun Minamoto Yoritomo. Bakufu was designed primarily to regulate the affairs of the military men who owed allegiance to the Minamoto family. Kamakura Bakufu lasted for about 150 years and was a much more effective administrative and judicial system than that provided by the nominal government. Despite its demise as a system of administration after the Mongol invasions, it was revived the seventeenth century by Tokugawa Ieyasu. Tokugawa Bakufu remained until the collapse of the Tokugawa feudalism in 1868.
- (30) Storry, op.cit., p.42
- (31) William L. Lager, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 2nd Edition, (New York: 1960) p.405 and W.D. Bird, Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War, (London: 1914) pp. 16-17
- (32) Jujii Soichi, "Capitalism, International Politics and the Empire System" in Mayo, op.cit., p.79 See also I.H. Nish, "Japan's Indecision During the Boxer Disturbances," Journal of Asian Studies, Volume 20, 1964., p.450
- (33) Cited in Iriye Akira, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations, (New York: 1967) p.10
- (34) Cited in Hosea Ballou Morse and Harley Farnsworth McNair, Far Eastern International Relations, (New York: 1959) Volume 2, p.847.
- (35) Ibid., p.929

- (36) The refusal is elaborated upon below in this chapter.
- (37) The document included provision for fortifications on "any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire" subject to approval by the ratifying nations. The effect was to limit the size and number of Japanese fortifications in the Pacific. Ibid., pp. 989-992
- (38) Peter Duus, "The Era of Party Rule", in Skrzypezak, op.cit., pp. 200-202.
- (39) William L. Newman, America Encounters Japan, (Baltimore: 1963) pp. 161-162. See also L. Jerold Adams, Theory, Law and Policy of Contemporary Japanese Treaties, (New York: 1974) pp. 6-7, and Nakutaki Ike, "War and Modernization", Political Development in Modern Japan, Robert E. Ward, (ed.) (New Jersey: 1968), p. 206
- (40) This is the official version Japan-Manchukuo Yearbook, 1933, p. 67
- (41) Crowley, op.cit., p. 242
- (42) Langer, op.cit., p. 3
- (43) Ibid., p. 46
- (44) Ibid., p. 393
- (45) Morse and McNair, op.cit., p. 625
- (46) Japan annexed the Riukiu Islands in 1875, the Bonin Islands in 1878 and the Kurile Islands were gained in a treaty with Russia in 1875. Kenneth Scott Latourelle, A Short History of the Far East, 3rd. Edition (New York: 1959) p. 416
- (47) Langer, op.cit., p. 170
- (48) Ibid., p. 170
- (49) Morse and McNair, op.cit., p. 605
- (50) Terms of the Sino-Russian Agreement of 1895 are contained in P.H. Clyde, International Rivalries in Manchuria: 1689-1922 (Ohio: 1926) pp. 36-37, and K. Asakawa, The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Causes and Issues, (Westminster: 1904) pp. 83-85
- (51) Morse and McNair, op.cit., p. 620
- (52) Ibid., p. 605
- (53) Ibid., p. 605

- (54) Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904, with Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1958) pp. 90-91
- (55) Morse and McNair, II, op.cit., pp. 1780-1781
- (56) Kerzo Seki, The Cotton Industry of Japan, (Tokyo: 1956) pp. 2-5.
- (57) A.F.K. Organski, "The Power of Transition" International Politics and Foreign Policy, J.N. Rosenau (ed.) (New York: 1957) p.144
- (58) Charles H. Pearson, National Life and Character: A Forecast, (London: 1893) (University Reprints: 1974), pp. 95-96
- (59) Cited in Payson T. Treat, "Early Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations," Pacific Historical Review, Vol I, (1932) p.19
- (60) Morse and McNair, II, op.cit., p.865
- (61) Cited by Oka in Mayo, op.cit., pp. 2-3
- (62) Kawakami, op.cit., p.29
- (63) William W. Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan, (Princeton, New Jersey: 1968) p.16
- (64) G.C. Allen, A Short Economic History of Modern Japan: 1867-1937, (London: 1946) p.73
- (65) Ibid., p.74
- (66) Lockwood, op.cit., pp. 39-41
- (67) Cited in Skrzypezak, op.cit., p.13
- (68) Cited by Craig, in Ward, op.cit., p.118
- (69) cited by Langer, op.cit., p.387
- (70) Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power, (Baltimore: 1956) p.176
- (71) William II exaggerated the Yellow Peril nightmare, especially to his cousin Tsar Nicholas II whom he wanted to keep occupied in Asia. David J. Dallin, The Rise of Russia in Asia, (London: 1950) pp. 42-44, and Richard E. Pipes, "Domestic Politics and Foreign Affairs," Russian Foreign Policy, Ivo J. Lederer (ed.) (New Haven: 1962) p.152
- (72) Payson J. Treat, Japan and the United States: 1853-1921, (New York: 1970) pp. 251-252

- (73) Ibid., p.252
- (74) Raymond A. Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan,
(Seattle and London: 1967) p.129
- (75) Ibid., p.129
- (76) Cited by Iriye, op.cit., p.103
- (77) Ibid., p.105
- (78) Cited by Esthus, op.cit., p.130
- (79) Cited in Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William
Howard Taft, (Hamden, Connecticut: 1964) p.286 & 298
- (80) Esthus, loc.cit., p.132
- (81) Cited in Oka, op.cit., p.11
- (82) Citing Baron Makino in Morse and McNair, op.cit., p.889
- (83) Ibid., p.889
- (84) Morse and McNair, op.cit., p.887
- (85) Ibid., pp. 980-982
- (86) Ibid., p.981
- (87) K.K. Kawakami, Manchukuo: Child of Conflict, (New York:
1933) pp. 38-39
- (88) Cited by de Bary, op.cit., p.800

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

Although Galtung's "Structural Theory of Aggression" was published in 1964, significantly the notions of status and of status inconsistency are not new to social science researchers. At the turn of the century, Max Weber wrote in "Class, Status, and Party", and "Ethnic Segregation and Caste" of the importance of wealth, prestige and power to any society.⁽¹⁾ Writing on the relationship of status to international politics Weber noted that:

Experience teaches that claims to prestige have always played into the origin of wars. Their part is difficult to gauge; it cannot be determined in general, but it is obvious. The realm of "honour" which is comparable to the "status order" within a social structure, pertains also to the interrelationship of political structures.⁽²⁾

In his now classic writings on social mobility and war Pitirim Sorokin wrote in 1927 of the "uncrystallized" structure of social differentiation and stratification.⁽³⁾ Ralph Linton as early as 1936 singled out what he referred to as ascribed and achieved status rankings:

Societies have.... developed two types of statuses, the ascribed and the achieved. Ascribed statuses are those which are assigned to individuals without reference to their innate differences or abilities. They can be predicted and trained for from the moment of

birth. The achieved statuses are, as a minimum, those requiring special qualities, although they are not necessarily limited to these. They are not assigned to individuals from birth but are left open to be filled through competition and individual effort. (4)

Linton also postulated on the possible effects of what is now referred to as status inconsistency:

"The achieved status is....desired by the individual both because of the rewards which it brings and because it offers him an alternative to the ascribed status which he finds uncongenial". (5) Failure to achieve may lead to "discomfort" and "maladjustment" Linton added, because the maladjusted person "has difficulty in assuming the status personality which his society requires." (6)

From these modest beginnings Emile Benoit-Smullyan set the foundation in 1944 for an integrated theory of status inconsistency. There is a "tendency for the different types of status to reach a common level", (7) he theorized. This condition, which he called "status equilibration", if continually blocked or repressed by institutional barriers, could result in tension and frustration, both being a function of social mobility and rising social expectations: "Unless men expected power and prestige to accord with wealth, there would be no frustration involved in a disequilibrated status structure." (8)

A year later Everett C. Hughes wrote of the dilemmas which accompany contradictions of status: "for the white colleagues of the Negro professional men the dilemma is severe....The dilemma arises from the fact that, while it is bad for the profession to let laymen see rifts in their ranks, it may be bad for the individual to be associated in the eyes of his actual or potential patients with persons, even colleagues, of so despised a group as the Negro".⁽⁹⁾

Other sociologists and psychologists, notably Fenchel, Monderer and Hantley (1951),⁽¹⁰⁾ Landecker (1952 and 1960),⁽¹¹⁾ Lenski (1954, 1956 and 1964),⁽¹²⁾ Merton (1957),⁽¹³⁾ Goffman (1957),⁽¹⁴⁾ Lipset and Benedix (1959),⁽¹⁵⁾ Shils (1960)⁽¹⁶⁾ and Jackson (1962)⁽¹⁷⁾ essentially picked up where these pioneers of status theory left off. All have pointed to the differential treatment accorded to actors, be they individuals, groups, or nations, which rank high on one status dimension and low on another, viz. are status inconsistent. These scholars traced relationships between status inconsistency and numerous unrelated social phenomena. Fenchel, Monderer and Hantley, for example, found that status inconsistency led to unstable self-images; Lenski, social ambiguity, isolation and a tendency toward political liberalism;⁽¹⁸⁾ Lipset and Benedix rewards out of line with aspirations; and Jackson, increased psychophysiological symptoms and bodily

expressed reactions to stress.

Johan Galtung, writing in 1964, drew heavily upon the findings of Jackson, and the significant body of status theory and research dating back to Weber. But while each of these earlier studies had focused on a specific level of social organization, Galtung's work did not. His "Structural Theory of Aggression" was thus not only an integration of what had gone before, but a conceptual fusion of levels of analysis. For the first time a status theorist had linked the notion of status inconsistency and international relations. Having applied a single theory to explain behaviour at all levels of analysis, a theory of "general conflictology", as Galtung called it, was born.

Galtung's conceptual fusion elicited a favourable response from international relations scholars. Indeed the general popularity of the Galtung approach has led to the incorporation of status theory into such divergent international relations approaches as field theory as conceived by R.J. Rummel and the Dimensionality of Nations Project. DoN Project researchers first incorporated status theory into field theory as status-field theory in 1970.⁽¹⁹⁾ Since then it has been found a valid explanatory tool by Nels Petter Gleditsch (1970),⁽²⁰⁾ Sang Woo Rhee (1970, 1971 and 1972),⁽²¹⁾ and by R.J. Rummel himself (1971).⁽²²⁾ According to Gordon Hilton,

who reviewed the DON Project, "Status-field theory is possibly a fruitful step for DON....Work on status-field theory is comparatively new and, given more extensive exercise may prove substantially rich".⁽²³⁾ But while DON researchers attempted to integrate and test a host of propositions based on Galtung's innovations in status theory, other scholars attempted to empirically test individual propositions from Galtung's basic explanation of aggression: that the differential treatment accorded to actors who are status inconsistent leads to frustration, the intervening condition which actors find themselves uncomfortable with, and aggression which actors display to remove the source of the discomfort. This explanation of aggression, which is central to this work, should be elaborated upon here.

As Galtung saw it, aggression did not occur randomly in the social system, but rather was a function of certain types of social stratification. Inasmuch as stratification is a phenomenon common to all types of social systems, be it a system of individuals found in a group, a system of groups found in a nation, or a system of nations found in the international system, Galtung argued, the same general characteristics are present: "All we are saying by this is that stratification seems to be a universal phenomenon",⁽²⁴⁾ Galtung wrote.

While Galtung may be right in substance, it can be argued that there is a qualitative difference between the international system and an interpersonal system. One critical difference which may be argued is that the "anarchy of the international system renders meaningless any concept of hierarchy or stratification".⁽²⁵⁾ In dealing with the levels of analysis question Wallace conceded that indeed there is no hierarchy among nations in the sense that there is a hierarchy among groupings of individuals at the interpersonal level. That nations do not assume roles like doctors or lawyers, labourers or fishermen, and do not have mechanisms to punish lawbreakers who do not conform with social norms.⁽²⁶⁾ Having made these concessions, however, Wallace went on to point to the similarities of nations to individuals. Nations like individuals tend to compete for status, he argued, and where there are such competitions rankings will exist. Karl Deutsch had made the same point in 1968:

Power, most simply and crudely put, is the ability to prevail in conflict....who will get his way and who will have to give in? Such questions as these, when asked about many possible encounters among a limited number of competitors, lead to rank lists - such as the ranking of players in tennis or chess tournaments, of baseball clubs in the World Series, of chickens in the peck order of a chicken yard, and of great powers in world politics.⁽²⁷⁾

The general acceptance of "rankings" among European states, according to Manus Midlarsky, dates back at

least as far as the 1504 dual list of sovereigns attributed to Pope Julius II. The list refers first to the order of European monarchs and then to the rankings of princes and republics.⁽²⁸⁾ Other evidence cited by Midlarsky included incidents between Spanish and French diplomats competing for the place of honour in foreign courts during the 16th and 17th centuries. After one incident in London, Midlarsky related, Louis XIV demanded that Spanish ambassadors yield places of honour to the French at all foreign courts and "In case of a refusal, a declaration of war was to be notified."⁽²⁹⁾

While the ranking squabbles of Louis XIV and other European monarchs of this period were predicated on a highly personalized notion of prestige which linked the personal and systemic levels, nationalism and the advent of the nation-state gave rise to new international ranking criteria based on universally recognized notions such as racial, cultural, industrial, military or trading supremacy. Such notions as these which tend to define dimensions inviting comparison between nations are still evident in commentary which ranks national actors; and the evidence pointing to rankings of nations in the international system cannot be ignored. The United Nations, for example, despite its avowed equalitarianism, makes in its constitution a distinction between ordinary state members and the major powers which make up the permanent membership of the Security Council. Also in international alliance systems the major power is always awarded the post of supreme commander of military forces.

In the historical overview it was made very clear that the Japanese perceived the international system as a hierarchy of nations much like the individuals in the social hierarchy in their own country. Thus despite the qualitative differences between the interpersonal level and the international system level, there is no doubt that for this case study at least, we are on firm ground in applying status theory. There are of course other areas of Galtung's theory which should be examined.

After noting the general similarities between all levels of social organization, the theoretical problem as Galtung saw it was "where in the system (and) for what social types is aggression most likely to accumulate and express itself?"⁽³⁰⁾ To answer this question, Galtung examined a hypothetical five dimensional stratification system, the "Ts" indicate "top dog", in Galtungian terminology, and the "Us" indicate "underdog", as outlined in figure 1 below.

FIGURE 3:1

Johan Galtung's Multidimensional Stratification System

		Dimensions of Stratification				
		<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
Actors in the Social System	1	T	T	T	T	T
	2	T	U	T	T	T
		.	.	.	.	.
		.	.	.	.	.
		.	.	.	.	.
N		U	U	U	U	U

In Figure 3:1, actor 1 is "topdog" on all five dimensions, actor 2 is "topdog" on four of the five dimensions and "underdog" on one of them. Actor N is "underdog" on all five dimensions. The behaviour of each actor, Galtung postulated, is a direct function of its status set or status profile. There are three possible outcomes of behaviour possible: aggression may originate primarily from actor 1, the complete "topdog", or from actor N, the complete "underdog", or from actor 2, the mixed profile actor.

Galtung theorized that the complete "topdog" may become aggressive for two purposes: to defend its favoured position in the system from those actors which seek to obtain the rights built into the system for the complete topdog, or to increase its favoured position even more, this being a function of man's propensity toward rising expectations. The complete "underdog" N actor on the other hand is not likely to become aggressive for several reasons. First, the complete "underdog" has become socialized into its role. Knowing no other it will accept the status quo. Secondly, the complete "underdog", being fully equilibrated, would not be subjected to differential treatment, and would therefore find itself comfortable. Thirdly, the complete "underdog" lacks the resources, or capability to be able to change the system and could be reasonably expected to seek accomodation rather than confrontation.

As stated by Galtung:

...the underdog is deprived of the resources that make revolutions possible: ideas, visions, acquaintances, weapons, social experience, empathy, courage necessary to imagine oneself as a ruler, etc. What the underdog does not have he can get, but he gets it, we believe, precisely by changing one of his (underdog) statuses into a (topdog) status.... (30)

The mixed profile actor 2 poses a different situation. This actor unlike actor N is receiving differential treatment from other actors in the system as a result of its single underdog dimension. Its capabilities unlike actor N are almost equal to that of actor 1, and therefore actor 2 may be successful in challenging actor 1, provided that all other things are equal. It may therefore be expected to be the most aggressive actor in the system, seeking to change its one underdog status to that of a topdog status.

Galtung's theory of aggression parallels in many respects the theoretical postulations of the so-called "power theorists" in international relations, Hans. J. Morgenthau (1967),⁽³¹⁾ G. Lagos (1963),⁽³²⁾ and A.F.K. Organski (1968).⁽³³⁾ All of these authors have theorized that the most aggressive nation in the system is that occupying the second power position. According to Organski:

....the major wars of recent history have all

been wars involving the biggest power in the world and its allies against a challenger (or group of challengers) who had recently risen in power thanks to industrialization. One could almost say that the rise of such a challenger guarantees a major war. (34)

But while the power theorists argued that all national goals in international relations can be reduced to one, the goal of national power, (35) Galtung argued that there are many facets of status and difference between nations which can scarcely be subsumed under the rubric of power. (36) Indeed he listed eighteen dimensions of status which could have a bearing on a nation's international behaviour. (37) A complete "topdog" would then be expected to be a "topdog" on all eighteen status dimensions; a complete "underdog" would similarly be expected to be a complete "underdog" on all status dimensions.

One of the difficulties with the application of Galtung's theory to international relations is that nations are seldom either complete topdogs or complete underdogs. Great Britain during the latter part of the nineteenth century, though commonly thought of as being a topdog in the European "great Power" system, did not in fact have the largest standing army, or indeed the largest population of any country in Europe. (38) Similarly, such nations as Siam, which barely survived the colonial ambitions of the European powers, still could not be considered a complete underdog, because

it had a reference group, or sub-system as a referent point, in South East Asia which was made up of territorial entities which did not survive as politically independent regimes. On this basis then, the "topdog"- "underdog" dichotomy must be viewed in international politics not as polar opposites but rather as opposites along a continuum, with each nation possessing at least some "middledog" statuses and possibly some "topdog" statuses as well.

In this context it is well to refer to what Galtung has described as status "compensation". Status compensation is possible when actors stress their higher rankings to compensate for lower status rankings. By introducing the dimension of "middledog" one can easily see how this applies. An actor could be a "middledog" on say three of Galtung's original five dimensional system, an "underdog" on one and a "topdog" on the other, thus making in sum an overall status profile of a nation equilibrated at the "middledog" level. Theoretically a nation possessing this status profile would not be as aggressive as a nation which possessed in the aggregate, a total which was greater or less than that of an equilibrated nation.⁽³⁹⁾ From this theoretical argument it is possible to make the first hypothesis to be tested in this study.

Hypothesis 1.

The greater the degree of status inconsistency in the status profile of a given nation in the system, the greater will be the amount of aggression which that nation will direct toward the system.

Galtung went beyond what might be referred to as a general status inconsistency proposition, however, and included in his theoretical framework discussion of particular kinds of status profiles, and particular forms of aggressive behaviour. To do so he collapsed his five dimensional status ordering into Linton's classic ascribed-achieved dichotomy, and theorized that regardless of whether an actor was higher on the achieved dimension (referred to in this study as positive inconsistency), or higher on the ascribed dimension (referred to in this study as negative inconsistency), the outcome would be aggression: outer directed if positive and inner directed if negative. (40)

Ascribed status, it will be recalled, is that which is assigned to actors by other members of the social system (race, ethnicity, etc.), and is thus not controllable by an actor's own behaviour or skills. Achieved status on the other hand is that requiring special skills, and is largely within the control of the actor (education, wealth). According to Galtung's theoretical argument, the actor who is a positive

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inconsistent will tend to blame society, or the other members of the social system, for constraining him, that is, for not ascribing the status to him which his achievements would indicate he should have. The positive inconsistent, unlike the negative inconsistent, is unable, by his own efforts, to change his low ranking ascribed dimension without changing the system. Thus, according to Galtung, "he will have to fight like an educated negro, not for white status, but for the elimination of race as a rank dimension".⁽⁴¹⁾ In our historical overview of Japan, evidence was adduced to show that indeed the Japanese looked upon the international system in much the same way. When it became apparent that the Japanese would not be welcomed to the select group of great power states during the 1920's, and that the system could not be changed by Japanese efforts, the alternative was to fight to change the system to favour regionalism where Japan could become the "topdog" power. Until the outbreak of World War Two, the Japanese viewed the international system from this regionalist perspective.

Perhaps the most positive proof of this type of behaviour, however, is the work of Nathan G. Caplan and Jeffrey M. Paige "A Study of Ghetto Rioters". Caplan and Paige* found typical rioters higher on the achieved dimension, having more education than their white colleagues, but unable to find a job commensurate to

In hypothesis form this may be stated as,

Hypothesis 5:

Aggression will be directed toward the system by a negative status inconsistent state only, if that state is experiencing frustration, and possesses either a desire for increased capability or perceives a threat to be emanating from the system.

While this composite hypothesis clearly satisfies Galtung's theoretical arguments regarding the relationship between negative status inconsistency and international aggression, it is of some value at this point to challenge the theoretical validity of this pure Galtungian model in relation to the earlier noncomplete Model "A" depicted in Table 3:2. Clearly the causal connections posited in Model "B" challenge common sense: would a negative status inconsistent state experiencing a threat from the system necessarily be experiencing frustration as well? Would a negative status inconsistent actor possessing a desire for increased capability which is successfully aggressing to satisfy its desires necessarily be experiencing frustration as well? Indeed, would a negative status inconsistent actor, which is receiving rewards from the system in excess of what it should deserve based on its achievements necessarily be experiencing frustration at all? This analysis will attempt to determine, empirically, whether the element "frustration" is a necessary intervening condition between negative

this study.

Hypothesis 2.

The greater the degree of positive status inconsistency of a nation in the system, the greater will be the amount of aggression which that nation will direct toward the system.

The effect of negative status inconsistency on international aggression is much more difficult to theorize and hypothesize; Galbraith was particularly vague in his theoretical utterings on negative inconsistency. To begin with, it will be recalled, the proposition that negative status inconsistency would lead to internally directed aggression had been made by Jackson in his 1962 study "Status Inconsistency and Symptoms of Stress". (44) Jackson pointed out that there are many reasons why an individual might display aggression if he is negatively status inconsistent. First, he is by definition an underachiever, possessing a high status ascribed to him by other members of his social system, but at the same time is unable to reach the level of achievement his ascribed status would warrant. Such an actor might tend to blame himself for his failure, and depending on the degree of the status discrepancy might display inwardly directed aggression like psychophysical symptoms of stress, or other more violent manifestations of intrapunitive behaviour, like suicide.

In addition to Jackson, other social scientists had examined the problem of negative status inconsistency and related it to intrapunitive behaviour. Lenski in his 1956 work "Social Participation and Status Crystallization", (45) for example, found negative status "crystallization" to be correlated with withdrawal from society. Since the Galtung study, S.J. Fairman in his 1968 work "Status Crystallization and Interracial Attitudes", and Donald J. Treiman in his 1966 work "Status Discrepancy and Prejudice" (46) found negative status inconsistency to be correlated with racial prejudice, and S.D. Eitzen and J.H. Blair in their 1972 work "Types of Status Inconsistency and Schizophrenia" (47) found negative status inconsistency to be a positive factor influencing the incidence of schizophrenia. Studies relating negative status inconsistency to suicide, both before and after the Galtung work, have encountered methodological difficulties, and therefore have not been conclusive. (48)

At the national level of analysis one would expect, according to the theoretical postulations, such intrapunitive behaviour as internal unrest, or revolution, if a nation is experiencing negative status inconsistency. (49) Egil Fossum in his "Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Military Coups d'Etat in Latin America" (50) found such a relationship to exist: the incidence of military coups d'etat being higher in nations of the "big poor" variety than in nations of the

"small rich" variety.

While no quantitative studies have been made to determine if this relationship holds at the systemic level of analysis, there is vague historical evidence to suggest that individual nations within the great power system have indeed experienced internal stress when national behaviour on the battlefield during war has not been consistent with the ascribed reputation of the nation in the international system. One example might be that of the 1905 revolution in Russia. Tsarist Russia had entered the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) as a white nation, and a member of the major power system of Europe. Japan on the other hand was widely viewed in Russia as a second rate yellow Asiatic nation. After experiencing defeats in several battles, and suffering inordinantly high losses in manpower and material, civil unrest followed. The tsar thus brought the conflict to a premature conclusion, despite the fact that continuation might have led to better peace terms.

While such historical examples are always highly speculative, on the basis of theoretically predicted relationships, one would expect that a nation in the international system experiencing negative status inconsistency to manifest greater internal unrest and thus less externally directed aggression than a nation

experiencing status equilibrium. From this theoretical postulation our third hypothesis may be formulated.

Hypothesis 3.

The greater the degree of negative status inconsistency of a nation in the system, the lesser will be the amount of aggression which that nation will direct toward the system.

On the other hand, as Galtung has pointed out, under certain conditions, a negatively inconsistent actor may in fact become outwardly aggressive. One condition might be aggression due to a desire to maintain what it has, perhaps against the attacks of a positively inconsistent actor which is seeking the status ascribed improperly to the underachiever. Another form of extrapunitive aggression which might be engaged in by the negative inconsistent is that designed to promote its own mobility insofar as achievement is concerned.

Studies conducted at the individual level of analysis have shown relationships between negative status inconsistency and extrapunitive aggression to exist. James W. Vander Zanden in his "Race Relations in Transition: The Segregation Crisis in the South" (51) found that individual members of the Klu Klux Klan were generally status inconsistent during periods at which they manifested outwardly aggressive behaviour. Vander

Zanden showed that Klu Klux Klansmen were higher on the ascribed status dimension because they belonged to the white race, while their occupations and/or incomes were relatively low, viz. were negatively inconsistent. Similarly, Doris Y. Wilkinson in her "Political Assassins and Status Inconsistency: A Sociological Interpretation" (52) and James F. Kirkham, Sheldon C. Levy and William Crotley in their "Assassination and Political Violence: A Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence" (53) also found relationships between negative status inconsistency and outwardly manifested aggressive behaviour, viz. political assassinations in the United States.

This leads to some conceptual confusion. Von Riekhoff for example, did not go beyond hypothesizing that nations experiencing negative status inconsistency would be expected to engage in less war than nations which were equilibrated. His reasoning was that nations, particularly great powers, would be desirous of maintaining the status quo, and, therefore, be reluctant to enter a war which would expose its inferior capabilities or rupture its inflated status myth. "Being satisfied powers" he argued "they will be less tempted to initiate war and being non-assertive they will not provoke others to launch war against them". (54)

While this line of argument would seem to apply

to war against a higher capability state, it does not readily apply to a defensive war engaged in by a negative inconsistent state when its high ascribed status is threatened. Nor does it apply to aggression against low capability states which could, if acquired in whole or in part, augment the capabilities of the negative inconsistent state. 55.

Galtung vaguely addressed the possibility of aggression as a defensive mechanism in his "Structural Theory of Aggression". Noting that Jackson in his 1962 work had suggested that outwardly aggressive behaviour was less probable for the negative inconsistent actor he remarked,

...we disagree with Jackson that outwardly directed aggression should necessarily be less probable for the underachiever, only that it may come as a reaction to the aggression of the overachiever and be less spontaneous. 56.

In his 1971 article "Rank and Social Integration: A Multi-Dimensional Approach", Galtung added a second reason a negative inconsistent state could manifest externally directed aggression: to increase its achieved capability.

...we have the underachieving nation.... Jackson predicts psychological stress, and one may extend this to some kind of collective neurosis in the nation concerned. Again the outcome may be external aggression motivated by a desperate need to extricate itself from the humiliation, and a charismatic leader who can redefine the dimensions or lead the people to equilibration by exploiting new avenues of achievement, will have great chances. 57.

From these arguments then one may theorize that a negative status inconsistent state will manifest aggressive behaviour toward the system only if one or both of the elements "perceived threat" and "desired capability" are present. Yet clearly each of these elements poses conceptually different problems. Presumably a nation aggressing to meet or preempt a perceived threat from the system would be aggressive regardless of whether it was a positive or negative status inconsistent. Thus while perceived threat may be a valid explanatory variable in the case of an internationally aggressive negative status inconsistent state, perceived threat need not be an artifact of negative status inconsistency; on the contrary, theoretically it must remain an exogenous variable, possibly acting upon and explaining aggression while remaining independent of negative status inconsistency.

The element "desired capability" on the other hand should theoretically appear as a function of negative status inconsistency, while independently, or in tandem with "perceived threat", explaining the internationally aggressive behaviour of a negative status inconsistent state. Desired capability should also appear as a dynamic element acting upon international aggression

while being acted upon by international aggression as international aggression is rewarded - either positively or negatively - by the other nations of the system. Successful aggression should theoretically reduce desired capability, and unsuccessful aggression increase even further the amount of desired capability present. These relationships, referred to hereafter as Model "A" may be depicted as shown in figure 3:2.

Figure 3:2

Model "A"

Diagrammatic Model of Relationship Between Negative Status Inconsistency and International Aggression, as explained by either the Desire for increased capability or as a Response to a Perceived Threat from the System.

These relationships may be expressed in hypothesis form as,

Hypothesis 4:

The negative status inconsistency of a nation in the system relates to its aggressive behaviour toward the system by the amount of increased capability desired by the nation and/or the amount of threat it perceives as emanating from the system.

In addition to positing possible explanatory conditions which might be present when a negative status inconsistent state displays aggressive behaviour toward the system, in the second quotation above, Galtung referred to "collective neurosis" and to "humiliation" as possible outcome variables of negative status inconsistency. One would expect, given the framework of Galtung's theory of aggression that "humiliation" and "collective neurosis" would be analogous to "frustration" in the chain differential treatment - frustration - aggression.

Clearly, we must move beyond assuming frustration to be present when a status inconsistent condition is present within a nation, particularly when, according to Galtung's theoretical postulations frustration is a necessary intervening condition between status inconsistency and aggression. Unfortunately little is to be found in Galtung's theoretical postulations regarding "frustration". While not dismissing out of hand arguments which posit that aggression originates "in the minds of men", Galtung dismissed most "in the minds of men" psychological theories, like the Dollard frustration-aggression theory, as empty-barrel on the grounds that they overlooked stratification: "The difficulty with these theories is that they are non-structural; they do not take the social context sufficiently into consideration."⁵⁸.

Significantly, recent applications of the Dollard frustration-aggression theory have not disregarded the social context, nor have they disregarded social stratification.⁽⁵⁹⁾ But where Galtung's "Structural Theory of Aggression" begins and ends with structural variables, social psychology does not, but instead looks "in the minds of men" for perceptions which lead to frustrations.

A basic theoretical tenet of social psychology is that a psychological variable, relative deprivation, is the basic precondition to aggression of any kind.⁽⁶⁰⁾ Relative deprivation like status inconsistency, is expected to produce frustration which in both the Dollard frustration-aggression theory, and in Galtung's structural theory, must result in aggression. As Dollard wrote, or as Galtung could have written, "aggression is always a result of frustration."⁽⁶¹⁾

Relative deprivation is defined in social psychology as actor's perceptions of discrepancy between value expectations (conditions of life to which the actor believes he is justifiably entitled), and value capabilities (the amount of those conditions which the actor thinks he has. What would be expected if this

tenent is applied to the case of a negative status inconsistent national actor is a perception of discrepancy between what exists in terms of national achievement on such dimensions as wealth, industrialization, literacy rate, technological and military skills et cetera, and what might be reasonably expected given the high status ascribed to that nation by the other nations in the system, or aspired to by a nation seeking a status position equal to or above the higher capability actor in the system. Failure to achieve the higher value expectation would conceivably result in frustration, which in effect would become a third (necessay) condition between negative status inconsistency and international aggression. When combined with desired capability and threat the explanatory model "B" would appear as depicted in Table 3:3.

Figure 3:3

Diagrammatic Model of Relationship Between Negative Status Inconsistency and International Aggression as explained by Frustration, the Desire for Increased Capability and/or Responding to a Threat from the System.

In hypothesis form this may be stated as,

Hypothesis 5:

Aggression will be directed toward the system by a negative status inconsistent state only, if that state is experiencing frustration, and possesses either a desire for increased capability or perceives a threat to be emanating from the system.

While this composite hypothesis clearly satisfies Galtung's theoretical arguments regarding the relationship between negative status inconsistency and international aggression, it is of some value at this point to challenge the theoretical validity of this pure Galtungian model in relation to the earlier noncomplete Model "A" depicted in Table 3:2. Clearly the causal connections posited in Model "B" challenge common sense: would a negative status inconsistent state experiencing a threat from the system necessarily be experiencing frustration as well? Would a negative status inconsistent actor possessing a desire for increased capability which is successfully aggressing to satisfy its desires necessarily be experiencing frustration as well? Indeed, would a negative status inconsistent actor, which is receiving rewards from the system in excess of what it should deserve based on its achievements necessarily be experiencing frustration at all? This analysis will attempt to determine, empirically, whether the element "frustration" is a necessary intervening condition between negative

status inconsistency and aggression as Galtung
predicted.

FOOTNOTES PERTAINING TO CHAPTER 3

Pages 70 to 97

- (1) These essays are contained in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, (Trans. and eds.) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, (New York: 1946), pp. 180 - 188 and 188 to 190.
- (2) Max Weber, "The prestige and Power of the "Great Powers", in Ibid., p.160
- (3) Pitirim Sorokin, Social Mobility, (New York: 1927), pp. 11-12. See also Sorokin's Society, Culture and Dynamics, (New York: 1947) p.289 and Social and Cultural Dynamics, (Boston: 1957) pp.440-444
- (4) Ralph Linton, The Study of Man, (New York: 1936) p.115
- (5) Ibid., p.480
- (6) Ibid., p.482
- (7) Emile Benoit-Smellyan, "Status, Status Types and Status Interrelationships", American Sociological Review (1944) p.160
- (8) Ibid., p.160ff
- (9) Everett C. Hughes, "Dilemmas and Contradictions of Status", American Journal of Sociology, 50, (1944-45) p.358
- (10) G.H. Fenchel, J.H. Monderer and E.L. Hartley, "Subjective Status and the Equilibration Hypothesis", The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 46, (October 1951) pp.476-479
- (11) Weiner S. Landecker, "Class Stratification" and "Stratification in the Urban Society", in Ronald Frudmar, et al. Principles of Sociology, (New York:1952) pp.228-239, and 449-463 and "Class Crystallization and Its Urban Pattern", Social Research, 27, (Autumn 1954) pp.308-320
- (12) Gerhard Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-verticle Dimension of Social Status", American Sociological Review 19/4 (August 1954), pp. 405-413, and "Social Participation and Status Crystallization", American Sociological Review, 21/4 (August 1956), pp.458-464 and "Comment" Public Opinion Quarterly, 28 (1964) pp.326-330
- (13) Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, (Glencoe, Illinois: 1971)

- (14) Irwin W. Goffman, "Status Consistency and Preference For Change in Power Distribution", American Sociological Review 22 (June: 1957) pp.275-281
- (15) Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society, (Berkeley: 1959)
- (16) Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States," World Politics, 12/3 (April 1960) pp. 329-368
- (17) Elton F. Jackson, "Status Inconsistency and Symptoms of Stress", American Sociological Review, 27/4 (August 1962), pp.469-480
- (18) Lenski has received limited support for his findings regarding "liberal political tendencies". See David R. Segal, "Status Inconsistency and Party Choice in Canada: An Attempt to Replicate", Canadian Journal of Political Science 3/3 (Sept-1970) pp.471-474 and Leonard Broom and F. Lanchester Jones, "Status Consistency and Political Preference" American Sociological Review, 35/6 (December 1970) pp. 989-1001
- (19) R.J. Rummel, "U.S. Foreign Relations: Conflict, Cooperation and Attribute Distances", DON Research Report published in R.M. Russett, (ed.) Peace, War and Numbers, (Beverly Hills, London: 1972), pp.71-113
- (20) Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Rank Theory, Field Theory and Attribute Theory: Three Approaches to Interaction in the International System", DON Research Report, October 1970.
- (21) Sang Woo Rhee, "Communist China's Foreign Behaviour: an Application of Field Theory Model II" DON Research Reports August 1970, July 1971 and China's Cooperation, Conflict and Interaction Behaviour viewed from Rummel's Status-Field Theoretic Perspective", DON Research Report April 1972
- (22) R.J. Rummel, "Status Field Theory and International Relations" DON Research Report, August 1971
- (23) Hilton, op.cit., p.39
- (24) Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression", op.cit., p.96
- (25) Wallace, "Status Inconsistency, Vertical Mobility and International..." op.cit., p.4

- (26) Ibid., pp. 4-5
- (27) Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 1968) p.29
- (28) Midlarsky, op.cit., pp.11-12
- (29) Cited in Ibid., p.14
- (30) Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression", op.cit., p.97
- (31) Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th Edition (New York: 1967) pp.25-27
- (32) G. Lagos, International Stratification and Underdeveloped Countries, (Chapel Hill: 1963)
- (33) A.F.K. Organski, "The Power of Transition" in J.N. Rosenau, (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy, 42, Volume 1 (New York: 1968) Also printed in Organski's World Politics, (2nd. Edition) (New York: 1968) pp. 338-376
- (34) Ibid., World Politics, p.361
- (35) Morganthau, op.cit., pp.25-26
- (36) Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression", op.cit., pp.116-118
- (37) Ibid., pp. 116-118
- (38) Great Britain drew its Great Power status largely on the strength of its naval force, a feature which complicates comparison on a cross-national basis for although naval forces do not require large standing forces they are extremely capital intensive.
- (39) It will be noted here that Galtung's theory suggests an additive, not a multiplicative relationship. Galtung apparently did not see the connection between his notion of compensation and its obvious operationalization ramifications. In his "Reply to Gudmond Hernes", Journal of Peace Research, 6/1 (1969) p.75 he notes "Does he have any rationale other than simplicity for preferring an additive model to a multiplicative one?" The additive model is essential to the construction of a compensatory model.
- (40) Galtung's "Structural Theory of Aggression", op.cit., was not explicit on this point. In it he indicated that frustration leads to 1) Stress (intra-punative) if low status more ascribed; and 2) Radicalism (extrapunative) if low status more achieved. He is somewhat more

explicit in his "International Relations and International Conflicts: A Sociological Approach" in Joseph Berger, Morris Zelditch Jr. and Bo Anderson, Sociological Theories in Progress, (Boston: 1966) pp.142-143. Proposition 2,1 states "If efforts to obtain rank-equilibrium are frustrated, aggression will result." Proposition 2,1,1 "The aggression will be directed to self if ascribed ranks are higher than achieved ranks;" Proposition 2,1,2 "The aggression will be directed to others if ascribed ranks are lower than achieved ranks."

- (41) Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression", op.cit., p.103
- (42) L.R. Sayles, Behaviour of Industrial Work Groups: Prediction and Control, (New York: 1958)
- (43) J. Stacey Adams, "Wage Inequities, Productivity, and Work Equality," Industrial Relations, Volume 3 (1963), pp.9-16
- (44) Jackson, op.cit., pp.329-368
- (45) Gerhard Lenski, "Social Participation and Status Crystalization," American Sociological Review, 21/4, August, 1956, pp.458-464
- (46) S.J. Fauman, "Status Crystallization and Interracial Attitudes" Social Focus, 47/1 (September 1968) pp. 53-60. Donald J. Treiman "Status Discrepancy and Prejudice", American Journal of Sociology, 17/6 (May 1966) pp.651-664
- (47) D.S. Ectzen and J.H. Blair, "Types of Status Inconsistency and Schizophrenia" Sociological Quarterly, 13/1 (Winter 1972), pp.61-73
- (48) Jack Gibbs and Walter Martin, "A Theory of Status Integration and its Relationship to Suicide", American Sociological Review pp.275-281. See the criticisms of William J. Chambliss and Marion F. Steele regarding methodology "Status Integration and Suicide: An Assessment", American Sociological Review, 31/4 (August 1966) pp.524-539
- (49) Galtung specified this type of behaviour: "The extremes are, as mentioned, called crime in the individual case, and revolution or internal war in the group case..." "A Structural Theory of Aggression", op.cit., p.104
- (50) Egil Fossum, "Factors Influencing the Occurance of Military Coups D'Etat in Latin America", Journal of Peace Research, (1964) pp.95-119

- (51) James W. Vander Zanden, Race Relations in Transition, The Segregation Crisis in the South (New York: 1965)
- (52) Doris Y. Wilkinson, "Political Assassins and Status Inconsistency: A Sociological Interpretation", The British Journal of Sociology, 21/4 (December: 1970) pp.400-412
- (53) James F. Kirkham, Sheldon C. Levy, and William Crotley, (eds.) Assassinations and Political Violence: A Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Washington, D.C. 1969
- (54) von Riekhoff, op.cit., p.9
- (55) Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, "The Determinants of International Violence", Peace Research Society Papers, XII, Cambridge Conference 1968, pp.33-63. See also Robert C. North and Richard Lagerstrom, War and Domination: A Theory of Lateral Pressure, (New York: 1971)
- (56) Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression", op.cit., p.96
- (57) Galtung, "Rank and Social Integration: A Multidimensional Approach", op.cit., pp.142-143
- (58) Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression", loc.cit., p.96
- (59) There are several recent applications of social psychology utilizing social stratification. See Paul Friedrich, "Political Homicide in Rural Mexico", Psychiatry XXV (November 1962) pp.315-327 and Bryant Wedge, "The Case Study of Student Political Violence: Brazil, 1964 and Dominican Republic, 1965" World Politics, XXI (January 1969) pp.183-206 Standard works on the subject are those written by Leonard Berkowitz: Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis, (New York: 1962) and Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 2 (New York: 1965). See also Aubry: Z. Yates, Frustration and Conflict, (New York: 1962). Empirical works relating social structure to the frustration-aggression hypothesis include Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Fierrabend, "Aggressive Behaviour within Politics, 1948-1962: A Cross National Study", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10 (September 1966) p.249-271 and James M. Russett, "Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics," World Politics, 16 (April 1964) pp. 442-454.
- (60) John Dollard, et. al., Frustration and Aggression, (New Haven: 1939) pp.1-3

CHAPTER 4

OPERATIONALIZING THE VARIABLES

In the historical overview in Chapter Two, several dimensions of Japanese society were examined in some detail, as was the importance of five achieved status dimensions to Japanese society. In this Chapter each of these dimensions will be operationalized to allow for a close examination of relationships within the Japanese status profile, as well as relationships between that profile and the dependent variable, international aggression. However, additionally, two dimensions of ascribed status will be operationalized, as will three intervening variables. Before going on to discuss operational definitions it should be remembered that the spatial domain includes Japan, the United States, China, Russia, Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy, all of which played significant roles in the economic and political development of the Far East between 1890 and 1940; and that the temporal domain was selected in deference to an historical era during which attitudes toward major power imperialism changed little. This selection should enhance the validity of the variables selected substantially.

1. Achieved Status: The Manipulable Variables

The so-called "power theorists" have long postulated as to the variables most appropriate to determine a nation's power and status within the international system. Hans Morgenthau, for example, included within the definition of power a nation's geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy, and the quality and type of government. (1) A.F.K. Organski included size of territories, geographical location, the possession of natural resources, population size, age structure of the population, rate of population growth, industrial development, education, geographic and social mobility among the population, family structure, intellectual attitude toward innovation, religious beliefs, political development, skill in diplomacy and propaganda, military strength, military and civilian morale and political ideology. (2)

Johan Galtung, more concerned with status than solely with power, included age of nation, alliances ('good' vs 'bad'), doyan in a group of nations,

dominant culture, central vs peripheral nation, education structure, occupational structure, social structure, dominant ideology, stage of economic growth, size of GNP, national resources, utilization of resources, political structure, legality, medical structure, cognitive culture, technical culture, ethnical culture, and esthetic culture, each theoretically able to be singled out by a national entity as a compensatory mechanism to offset lower status dimensions.

Clearly no single status variable may be used as the indicator of a nation's power or its achievement or potential. What we are concerned with in this study however, is not a measurement of power, but rather a measure of discrepancies in the status profile on certain "dimensions" within nations. We are concerned, moreover, with particular dimensions of achievement or ascription with which the Japanese readily identified. In the historical overview, five achievement and two ascribed dimensions were identified and discussed.

A. Education: While education is not usually considered a dimension of "power", in the Japanese case it clearly was considered an indicator of achievement. There are of course many forms of education, including trade schools and apprenticeships, primary, middle and high schools and advanced education. Selecting an indicator of education is therefore not as easy as it first might appear.

The historical overview of education showed, however, that only initially, after the promulgation of the Fundamental Law of Education in 1872, were Japanese elites concerned merely with illiteracy. After 1890 the focus on education was viewed as a means to achieve the spreading of national power through improvements in the sciences, commerce and national wealth. Therefore all education was viewed as important, whether it be elementary, post-secondary or in trade schools or apprenticeship programs.

The indicator of education selected for this study was therefore all enrollment in educational institutions per capita. Japan's ranking on the

education indicator was determined by calculating Japanese educational enrollment in educational institutions per capita as a percentage of the total enrollment in educational institutions in all nations of the system. The percentage scores were then standardized to provide a basis of comparison to other dimensions, and are reported in Table 4:1.

B. Military Potential: Unlike education, military capability is cited by all power theorists as being a key variable in the determination of a nation's power. The Japanese were no exception to this maxim, and tended to rank their nation by comparing its military potential to the military potential of the nations in the East Asian system. Two measures of military capability are possible, one, the size of the force budget, either in relation to the total budget, or to the force spending of the other nations in the system; or two, the size of the standing forces, or a combined score of standing and available reserve forces. /

The size of military spending does, however, have its drawbacks when it comes to cross-national comparison, first because exchange rates do not actually reflect the purchasing power in each country, and secondly because national wage scales and living conditions vary greatly between countries, making similar defense spending by two nations mean totally different things. This is particularly true of the East Asian system where both Japan and China tended to have extremely low wage scales in relation to the European powers and the United States. For these reasons military expenditure was avoided as a measure of capability.

Instead what was chosen was the size of the standing military forces. Admittedly there are problems using this indicator also. First, because it does not take into account the prestige that naval weapons bestow, and secondly, because ill equipped forces of considerable size are often no match for well equipped and trained professional soldiers; thirdly, because it tends to penalize those nations which relied heavily on reserve or irregular forces through a conscription system in relation to those

which relied on a relatively larger professional standing force. And lastly, it tends also to depreciate the power of a naval force which, although being very capital intensive, does not usually require the high numbers of men that a land force would have.

These shortcomings of the indicator are, however, only partly valid. Status does flow to a nation with a large number of men under arms, and reserves are seldom if ever tallied with standing force strength when contending armies are compared. While for comparative purposes numbers of naval vessels for each country could also have been compared, the relative importance of naval forces to each country in the East Asian system varied with the distances involved to a home port. Thus comparing the strength of naval forces as well as manpower would probably tend to bias the data to favour the European members of the system.

The actual operationalization of the variable is similar to that of the education variable, the size of Japanese military forces is taken as a

percentage of the size of the military forces of the nations in the system. The percentage scores are then standardized to allow for cross-dimensional comparison, and are reported in Table 4:1.

C. Industrialization: All of the war oriented studies utilized the indicator of iron and steel production to reflect the degree of industrialization actually present in each country of the system. Unfortunately, the production of iron and steel was not viewed as a major priority by the Japanese until 1935. The Japanese had neither the resource base nor the energy supply to produce iron and steel, and thus relied largely on imports of either machinery or processed steel. What the Japanese did identify with, however, was the manufacture of textiles, particularly cotton manufactures. Thus the use of textile production as an indicator of industrialization is preferable to that of iron and steel production. Unfortunately again, however, not all nations in the system produced textiles or relied on textile production as heavily as Japan. In a comparative sense, therefore, the use of textile production as an indicator of industrialization would be a little misleading and tend to give Japan inflated achievement figures.

To overcome this problem, a compensatory approach was adopted and is reflected in the selection of trade indicators. Because Japan did produce some iron and steel from 1896 on, and all other nations in the system also produced iron and steel, iron and steel production was selected as an indicator for industrialization despite the historical evidence concerning Japanese industrial development. The third indicator of achievement is thus the amount of iron and steel production in Japan as a percentage of the iron and steel production for all nations in the system. This study, therefore, does not deviate from other studies which virtually all select iron and steel production as an industrialization indicator.⁽³⁾ The scores are of course standardized to allow for cross dimensional comparison, and are reported in Table 4:1.

D. Trade: To compensate for the selection of iron and steel production as an indicator of industrialization cotton manufacturers with which Japan readily identified was selected as the trade indicator. Again it should be noted that the selection of trade as an indicator of achievement at all was in deference to the significance placed on trade by the Japanese. Trade was not merely an economic dimension but rather another indicator of

international status. The ability to compete favourably with the West in foreign markets was what was important to the Japanese. Driving the British out of the Chinese textile market for example, was seen as a significant achievement by Japan. What was selected as a measure of trade was the amount of cotton manufacturers exported by Japan as a percentage of cotton manufacturers exported by the nations of the system. This indicator again was chosen on the basis of its importance to Japan, and should tend to offset the rather artificial indicator of industrialization. The actual figures for this variable were monetary rather than commodity based, and thus exchange rate tallies had to be utilized. More will be said of this below. The scores are standardized to allow for cross dimensional comparison, and are reported in Table 4:1.

E. Population: This indicator, unlike other indicators above, is difficult to justify as an achievement variable as indeed the state as a whole does not normally regulate the birth rate. At the same time, however, it does have something to do with the death rate, through such means as better health care, improved agricultural methods, and of course, more marketable industrial goods to exchange.

TABLE 4:1
Achieved Status Variables: Japan 1890-1940 *

	<u>Education</u>	<u>Industrialization</u>	<u>Trade</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Population</u>
1890	- 1.6296	- .7699	- 1.4302	- 1.5170	- 1.3048
1891	- 1.6143	- .7606	- .9764	- 1.5239	- 1.2889
1892	- 1.6449	- .7560	- .9705	- 1.5100	- 1.2411
1893	- 1.5562	- .7514	- .9705	- 1.4996	- 1.1932
1894	- 1.4858	- .7467	- .9676	- 1.4996	- 1.1454
1895	- 1.3879	- .7560	- .8475	- 1.4163	- 1.1135
1896	- 1.2686	- .7560	- .4874	- 1.3260	- 1.0657
1897	- 1.2136	- .7652	- .8551	- 1.2461	- 1.0178
1898	- 1.1922	- .7699	- .6894	- 1.2287	- 1.0019
1899	- 1.0484	- .7745	- .7246	- 1.0759	- 1.9700
1900	- .8190	- .7745	- .7831	- .9297	- .9541
1901	- .6446	- .7467	- .8329	- .7634	- .9222
1902	- .5988	- .7236	- .8446	- .5724	- .8584
1903	- .6875	- .7236	- .8592	- .3953	- .7946
1904	- .6783	- .6958	- .6602	- .2043	- .7628
1905	- .5926	- .6958	- .7802	- .1765	- .7468
1906	- .5437	- .7097	- .7626 ^B	- .1522	- .7149
1907	- .4825	- .7143	- .6016	- .1870	- .6830
1908	- .3632	- .6866	- .5606	- .3120	- .6511
1909	-	- .7190	- .7304	- .4092	- .6033

	<u>Education</u>	<u>Industrialization</u>	<u>Trade</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Population</u>
1910	- .1675	- .7236	- .7451	- .1314	- .5714
1911	- .0145	- .5893	- .8007	.7506	- .5236
1912	.0099	- .5106	- .5313	1.8445	- .4917
1913	- .0176	- .4505	- .6748	2.8759	- .4439
1919	- .0329	- .2283	.3000	1.0840	.2417
1920	.5727	.2283	- .1332	.4659	.2895
1921	.7073	- .1635	- .4318	.8895	.3214
1922	.7562	- .0986	.3732	1.0423	.4171
1923	2.3376	- .1727	.0307	1.0389	.4490
1924	1.8329	- .0662	.1566	.7506	.4968
1925	.9979	- .3440	.4377	.8583	.5765
1926	1.0315	.0262	.3498	.5492	.6722
1927	1.0621	.1562	.2561	.2992	.7519
1928	1.0438	.1562	.2854	.1950	.8476
1929	.9183	.2531	.2239	.0839	.8954
1930	.9122	.5447	1.3687	.3513	.9592
1931	.9092	.7854	2.1328	.5978	1.1346
1932	.8755	1.1095	.8651	.8479	1.1665
1933	.7960	1.9890	1.5209	1.0666	1.2781
1934	.7287	1.9612	1.0495	1.2924	1.3418

	<u>Education</u>	<u>Industrialization</u>	<u>Trade</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Population</u>
1935	.6583	1.8455	1.3482	.7992	1.4534
1936	.6277	1.4983	1.6000	.4277	1.5332
1937	.5482	1.5863	1.5092	.2888	1.5491
1938	.5757	2.5630	1.3599	.0006	1.5651
1939	.5757	1.9335	2.3504	- .1661	1.5651
1940	.6033	1.9705	2.1474	- .1661	1.5651

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* Standardized scores

for food to support a higher population. While over-population may be taken more as a sign of weakness than of strength, it should be remembered that this is only one of five achievement variables, and over-population would most certainly result in low scores on the other dimensions. The fifth indicator of achieved status then is the amount of population of the home territory of Japan as a percentage of the population of the home territories of the nations of the system. The scores are standardized to allow for cross dimensional comparison, and are reported in Table 4:1.

11. Ascribed Status: The Non-Manipulable Variables

Unlike the achieved status variables which are manipulable by the national actor, the ascribed status variables reflect the amount of status that is assigned to each nation in the system by the other nations in the system. As this study is concerned with a sub-system of the international system, rankings based on the hierarchy of nations within the whole system will of course contain each of the nations in the sub-system; thus two indicators are possible: one based on the rankings within the sub-system, and one on the rankings of the international system as a whole.

A. Diplomatic Importance: There are several variables that could be selected as a measure of diplomatic importance. The numbers of international treaties in force, and the greatest benefactor in each treaty could be one indicator. This variable was indeed considered and would have been particularly useful up until 1894 when Japan succeeded in re-negotiating all of the "unequal" treaties it had entered into with other nations in the system immediately following the opening of the country. This variable was not selected, however, because of the massive problem of coding from untranslated documents.

Another possible indicator of diplomatic importance would be International Government Organization and Alliance membership. This variable was not selected for two reasons: first, because of the differing interpretations which arise as to when IGO or alliance participation actually ceased to be functional. Membership in an IGO, for example, could be taken and last for generations in a nominal capacity with no active participation by one or more members. Secondly, there is some question whether IGO or Alliance membership is an asset or a liability to

international status. The case of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance after 1922 would be such an example. Great Britain though an ally of Japan, had entered a clause in the Five Power Treaty which precluded it going to war with the United States as an ally of Japan. From the Japanese perspective at this point, the alliance with Great Britain became a deficit, and the original purpose of the alliance - war with Russia - had long since passed.

Another method of measuring diplomatic importance would be the construction of an index by year based on content analysis of historical writings or by questionnaires circulated to noted diplomatic historians of the period. These methods were rejected because of the difficulties in selecting an adequately representative sample of either historical writings or historians of the period.

The operational indicator actually selected is virtually identical to that used in the war oriented studies: the number of diplomatic missions received by Japan as a percentage of diplomatic missions received by the other nations of the system. The composite status scores of diplomatic rankings as collected by J. David

Singer and Melvin Small were utilized. It should be noted that this indicator, according to its inventors is a valid indicator of status distinctions between nations only until 1940.⁽⁴⁾ Because the research design calls for yearly rather than quinquennial scoring of ascribed status, the Arthur S. Banks yearly averaged computations for the Singer and Small composite scores were utilized rather than the original scores published in 1966.⁽⁵⁾ Standardized scores for diplomatic importance are contained in Table 4:2.

There are, however, difficulties associated with using the Singer and Small index. One is the sensitivity of various cultures toward diplomatic status. Wallace points out, for example, "Latin American nations are alleged to place a great deal of emphasis on formal diplomacy, and thus may be prone to send - and receive - rather more nations than one would normally expect for nations of their size and influence".⁽⁶⁾ In addition, as Wallace suggests, to some nations - China and possibly Japan - "diplomatic recognition appears often to be not merely an indicator of attributed status, but its very substance".⁽⁷⁾

Another difficulty stems from the fact that nations, for reasons of convenience, located their trade representatives in a centrally situated capital, rather than a capital of higher ascribed importance. For example, if a great volume of trade were to flow say from southern China during this period, one would expect representatives in Canton rather than Peking.

Another problem of the diplomatic index is its questionable sensibility to race. While a nation may receive a large number of foreign missions because of its location, or military or trading importance, it may rank very low on race criteria. Because racial discrimination was of particular importance to the Japanese, a second variable reflecting race or ethnicity was added.

B. Racial Importance: This variable is indeed difficult to operationalize meaningfully. Again a questionnaire could be circulated to diplomatic historians of each country in the spatial domain asking them to rank the races for each of the years in the temporal domain. The problems associated with this approach, as with the content analysis approach were discussed above and need not be repeated here.

What was chosen as the operational indicator was immigration to the United States. This selection was made for several reasons. First, all nations in the system, with the exception of the United States, had some immigration to the United States during the temporal period of this study. Not all immigrants to that country were welcomed equally, however, and despite the attempts of national political leaders like Theodore Roosevelt to discourage racial discrimination and bigotry against certain ethnic groups in America, in the end public pressure was the determining factor. The discriminatory immigration policy of the United States was particularly humiliating to the Japanese because of its status implications. The Japanese were a yellow Asiatic race attempting to compete for status in a white dominated America and a white dominated East Asian system. For this reason, the United States policy probably reflected not only the sentiment of white America, but also the sentiment of the other white nations in the system. Regardless of whether or not it actually did reflect public sentiment outside of the United States, it clearly was thought to do so by the Japanese and Japanese perception is what is important here. Because perception is the key element no effort was made to control the size of the populations which sent immigrants to the United

TABLE 4:2
Ascribed Status Variables: Japan 1890-1940 *

	<u>Diplomatic Importance</u>	<u>Race</u>
1890	- 1.4675	- .5726
1891	- 1.3348	- .5534
1892	- 1.3786	- .5491
1893	- 1.2496	- .5125
1894	- 1.1665	- .4081
1895	- 1.0426	- .5556
1896	- .9661	- .5107
1897	- .8809	- .4102
1898	- .8095	- .3013
1899	- .6295	- .1689
1900	- .8270	.8184
1901	- 1.0208	- .1346
1902	- 1.1104	.4060
1903	- 1.2962	.5278
1904	- 1.3873	.3825
1905	- 1.1447	- .1090
1906	- .9166	- .0235
1907	- .5741	.5620
1908	- .3584	.3526
1909	- .0655	- .4316
1910	.0701	- .4850
1911	.1605	- .3889
1912	.2603	- .2756
1913	.3484	- .2607
1919	1.9238	1.7371
1920	2.3509	.2051
1921	1.8736	- .2115
1922	1.4218	.2714
1923	.9955	- .1752
1924	.6384	- .1944
1925	.3798	- .5513
1926	.4147	- .5577

	<u>Diplomatic Importance</u>	<u>Race</u>
1927	.4388	- .5513
1928	.4439	- .4915
1929	.4672	- .4487
1930	.4533	- .4274
1931	.4089	- .3248
1932	.4315	.0427
1933	.4534	- .4850
1934	.4752	- .5043
1935	.4789	- .4915
1936	.6290	- .4957
1937	.8264	- .5256
1938	.9620	- .5833
1939	1.1601	- .5919
1940	1.1601	- .5987

* Standardized scores

States. Statistically the same procedure was used. All immigration to the United States from the nations in the system (excluding the United States) was aggregated, for each case year, and Japan's immigration to the United States for that year was taken as the simple percentage. The results are reported in the standardized form in Table 4:2.

111. International Aggression: The Dependent Variable

For the purposes of this work, Galtung's definition of aggression - "drives toward change even against the will of others"⁽⁸⁾ - will be utilized. "Against the will of others" will be considered to mean "consent" or "agreement" as defined in the United Nations definition of aggression:

The use of armed forces of one state which are within the territory of another state without the agreement of the receiving state, in contravention of the conditions providing for armed forces in the agreement on any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement.⁽⁹⁾

Where, by historical evidence, there is good reason to believe that an aggressor nation forced a

change in the government to provide "agreement" for occupation, or for other forces to maintain presence on the territory of that state or territory, consent will be considered not present. For example, the Japanese Minister in Seoul on July 19, 1894, presented a note to the Korean court demanding that Chinese troops be told to withdraw. When the Korean reply was somewhat vague and accompanied by a request for a joint Japanese and Chinese withdrawal, Japanese troops forcibly took control of the Korean palace, incarcerated King Yi, and placed a pro-Japanese Minister in charge of Korea's foreign affairs. He, in turn, abrogated all Sino-Korean treaties in the name of the Crown, and formally asked Japan to expel Chinese troops.⁽¹⁰⁾ Such means of obtaining "consent" for Japanese troops to occupy Korea, would not be legitimate reason for the forces of Japan to enter upon Korean soil, thus "consent" would be considered in this and similar cases as not present.

"Drives toward change", or the mobility aspect of aggression, will be defined in terms of structural interaction. The characteristics of any interaction between individuals or entities were outlined by Galtung

in his "Violence, Peace and Peace Research":

In all....systems there is interaction, and where there is interaction, value is somehow exchanged. It then makes very much sense to study what the value distribution is after the system has been operating for some time, and the gross distinction has been made between equalitarian and inequalitarian distributions. (11)

Interaction thus may be equalitarian or inequalitarian, the former being an equal exchange, or an exchange between equals, wherein no structural aggression will have occurred, or it may be an unequal exchange between parties highly unequal in capabilities, in which case structural aggression will have occurred. As stated somewhat differently by Galtung elsewhere concerning structural violence:

....any effort to explore structural violence will lead to awareness of asymmetrical conflict between parties highly unequal in capabilities.... (12)

Integrating these aspects of interaction and consent, aggression will be defined as having occurred when any interaction between two or more nations assumes

asymmetrical, that is unequal, characteristics without consent. The aggressor nation(s) will be defined as the dominant participant(s) in the interaction. The dominant participants(s) will be defined as the nation whose nationals or troops go beyond the borders of the home territory of their native state without consent. In a war, for example, the aggressor nation would be that nation whose forces were engaged in battle beyond the home territory. In peacetime, similar rules would obtain. This operational definition eliminates the need to determine which nation declared war first or fired the first shot, and allows for the use of data reflecting aggression below the level of international warfare, although warfare itself could be included.

Aggression is nominally defined as, firstly, the square mileage of territory occupied or otherwise in possession of an aggressor state beyond the territorial regions of the home territory, as a percentage of the home territory. Secondly, the number of people inhabiting those territorial areas of occupation or control, as a percentage of home population; and thirdly, the number of troops or military forces occupying those territorial areas under control as a percentage of standing land force strength. The military forces will include territorial

or regional gendarmes or police, who are trained, supplied or otherwise equipped by the military units of the home army, naval or air forces. Local police, whether indigenous or from the home area, are not included as a measure of aggression on the grounds that such police are required to maintain order whether or not the area is occupied or under the control of a foreign power.

It should be noted that these indicators of aggression are qualitatively different from the indicators magnitude and severity of war chosen as indicators of aggression in the war oriented studies, as they distinguish between the aggressor and the recipient state. There can be no question that all forces engaged beyond the borders of the aggressor state without consent are engaged in aggressive activity. This cannot be said of battle connected deaths which may result from either offensive (aggressive), or defensive fighting, nor can it be said of nation months of war which are the same for both defender and aggressor states.

What is operationalized is the amount of forces actually used for coercive purposes aggregated with the number of people and the amount of territory actually suppressed by that coercion. By using percentage scores for each of these indicators rather than total scores, the size of the population, territory and armed forces of the aggressor state are also taken into consideration. This use of percentage scores is made on the assumption that a commitment to aggress, which involves a large percentage of the resources of the aggressor nation, will have a greater likelihood of being a reflection of the national perceptions and will to aggress than a relatively small amount of resources.

A highly populous and territorially large state like Russia, for example, could conceivably aggress against a small state, Holland, for example, without a great commitment of resources, and thus could reflect only the aggressive intent of a small percentage of the population. Aggression against a larger state, China, for example, on the other hand would involve much greater resource commitment, and theoretically a proportionately higher will to aggress.

Studies of internal revolutions tend to support the rationale for the use of percentage rather than actual raw scores. Chalmers Johnson in his Revolutions and the Social System,⁽¹³⁾ for example, found that the amount of civil disturbance varies inversely with the amount of coercive forces available. The reverse of this finding is what is posited herein that high percentage of military involved in occupation duties will also reflect a high will to aggress on the part of the population.

As a final safeguard against measuring aggression which does not conform to the national will to aggress, spontaneous, irrational, or positive occurrences of aggression are eliminated. This is accomplished by adding a caveat to the operational definition of aggression: international aggression will be defined as having occurred only five months after the cessation of warlike hostilities, and averaged over the temporal span of the war as if war had not occurred. For example, the number of troops stationed in Korea

until February 1904 is used as part of the aggression score for 1904 rather than the number of troops in Korea and other parts of the Asian mainland during the hostilities of the Russo-Japanese War. Similarly, only the number of troops remaining in these areas in December 1905, five months after the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth, is used as part of the aggression score for 1905. The entire five year period of the first World War is omitted entirely.

There is both theoretical and historical justification for this caveat. Firstly, we are concerned with aggression which occurs as a result of status inconsistency only. There is a large body of evidence which supports the contention that status inconsistency does not result in spontaneous acts of aggression. Lenski (1954)⁽¹⁴⁾, for example, concluded that differential treatment accorded to individuals who are status inconsistent causes them to rationally select a course of behaviour which will lead to social change; they join liberal political parties or activist groups, for example, or vote for political parties which advocate change.⁽¹⁵⁾ This is particularly true of positive inconsistencies. Jackson (1962)⁽¹⁶⁾ noted for example that:

all forms of status inconsistency are stressful for the individual, but persons whose inconsistency is due to high racial-ethnic

status and low occupational status, tend to respond to their stress psysiologicaly while persons of the opposite patterns of inconsistency respond politically.

Seymour Lipset also found a linkage between status inconsistency and political rather than spontaneous acts of aggression. (17)

These individual level findings may be expected to be doubly true at the national level which does not deal with irrational individuals who might engage in suicide, assassination or riotous behaviour; particularly when aggressive behaviour is measured over an extended time frame, through numerous changes in government, and generations of demographic change. If aggression occurs over an extended period during which aggression during time of war is omitted, it would necessarily become an element of the national psyche, or will, which is exactly what this study is concerned with.

In the historical case of Japan this seems particularly true. Indeed there is a large school of historians on Japan who refute irrationality as a motive for Japanese aggression during the temporal frame of this study. Some maintain that Japan's international behaviour during this temporal period was a consequence of calculated planning which had

the support of the majority of the Japanese population: (18) as a single people, linguistically united, socially homogeneous and undivided by strong religious or political antagonisms, it is reasonable to assume, based on historical evidence, that most Japanese had similar overarching goals in mind for the Japanese Empire even if the means of obtaining these goals differed slightly between individuals and ruling parties. The standardized aggression scores for Japan between 1890 and 1940 are reported in Table 4:3.

Having operationalized our dependent and independent variables, it is possible to go on to apply historical evidence to learn what those goals were. The historical overview and the operationalization of the achieved status dimension listed the five dimensions upon which the Japanese tended to place importance. In the case of negative inconsistency, based on Galtung's theoretical postulations, one would expect an achievement oriented society and a general desire on the part of the population to upgrade their achieved status. Similarly in the case of positive inconsistency, one would expect that the society would seek to upgrade its lower ascribed status to equilibriate its status profile upward. From these expectations it is possible to draw an indicator of frustration, the intervening variable

TABLE 4:3
International Aggression
Japan 1890-1940 *

1890	- .8913	1925	- .0468
1891	- .8539	1926	- .056863
1892	- .8274	1927	- .0817
1893	- .8052	1928	- .1160
1894	- .1326	1929	- .1295
1895	1.2935	1930	- .1595
1896	- .5154	1931	.3701
1897	- .5471	1932	1.3952
1898	- .5672	1933	1.1765
1899	- .5874	1934	1.0704
1900	- .6219	1935	1.0412
1901	- .6188	1936	1.0221
1902	- .7008	1937	1.0390
1903	- .7277	1938	1.0750
1904	- .3588	1939	1.0832
1905	- .2338	1940	1.0918
1906	- .2709		
1907	- .2851		
1908	- .2801		
1909	- .3106		
1910	- .0693		
1911	- .2275		
1912	- .2300		
1913	- .3471		
1919	- .0858		
1920	.1072		
1921	.1599		
1922	- .0247		
1923	- .0954		
1924	- .0497		

* Standardized scores computed from the aggregate (mean) percentage scores of three indicators of international aggression, population, territory and occupation forces.

* Standardized scores computed from the aggregate

between status inconsistency and international aggression.

IV. The Intervening and Explanatory Variables:
Frustration, Desired Capability and Threat

A. Frustration

The notion of frustration, while an integral part of Galtung's "Structural Theory of Aggression", is not defined by Galtung either in this pioneer work or in subsequent works. In Chapter 3, the notion of frustration as defined in social psychological theory was discussed. Frustration was defined in social psychological theory as being a result of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation in turn was defined as an actor's perceptions of discrepancy between value expectations and current value capabilities. In the case of a negatively inconsistent national actor this may be operationalized as the gap between what the nation has in terms of achievement and what the nation may reasonably aspire to in relation to the achievement of the other nations of the system. In the case of a positive inconsistent national actor the reverse would obtain and the gap would be in terms of what the nation has in terms of ascription and what the nation may reasonably feel it may aspire to in terms of ascription from other members of the system.

For the purposes of this analysis, frustration has been operationalized as the gap between the mean aggregate score of the achievement dimension of the top four nations in the system - Great Britain, United States, Germany, and France - and the Japanese score for each achievement dimension according to the following formula;

$$F = \frac{Z_1 + Z_2 + Z_3 + Z_4 + Z_5}{5}$$

Where: F = Frustration by case year

$$Z_1 = \frac{\sum C_a}{n} - J_a$$

C = Countries

a = Standardized population achievement score

n = Number of countries

J = Japan

~~Z₂~~ = As above for Z₁, substitute b for a where
b = standardized military achievement score

Z₃ = As above for Z₁, substitute c for a where
c = standardized trade achievement score

Z₄ = As above for Z₁, substitute d for a where
d = standardized educational achievement score

Z₅ = As above for Z₁, substitute e for a where
e = standardized industrial achievement score

The standardized frustration scores are reported in Table 4:4.

B. Perceived Threat

The notion of perceived threat also requires

assumptions regarding the Japanese policy and a close examination of the history of the period. Firstly, it must be assumed that the threat would be a military threat. That is, would be an actual threat of aggression against Japan or against Japanese interests abroad. Secondly, that the national decision makers would react to that threat in a rational way; that is, by preparing to defend its interests against the threat presented. Thirdly, as the presence of a threat from the system changed over time, that is the adversary increased or its national military potential, the amount of the threat would increase or decrease proportionately.

These assumptions find support in the work of Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, who have found that changes in the budgetary allocation to defense were perceived by adversaries in the great power (war) systems of Europe and responded to by the adversaries either within the same year or the year following the increased allocations. The non-central power (peace) systems of Europe, on the other hand, which did not perceive themselves as either a threat to another nation or threatened by other nations did not respond in a similar way, and tended to vary their budgetary allocations to defense little from year to year. (19)

Following on these findings, perceived threat will be defined as the percentage of change in military spending per capita of powers perceived as adversaries during each year under analysis. These adversaries are designated as: China from 1890 to 1895; Russia from 1896 to 1905; and the United States from 1906 to 1940. The standardized scores

for threat are reported in Table 4:4.

C. Desired Capability

The last of the explanatory variables, desired capability, will be operationalized in terms of territorial and colonial holdings. The choice of territorial holdings again is based on historical evidence. Japan's closest rivals in the Far East, Great Britain, France, United States and Russia had extensive imperial holdings. Not only were these nations a focus for Japanese emulation, but their holdings were also coveted by Japan. To become an equal of the Powers, the Japanese desired and indeed acquired territorial holdings. Desired capability is thus operationalized as the gap between the mean of the colonial areas under control of the United States, Great Britain, France and Russia and Japan. This may be expressed as:

$$D \text{ Cap} = \frac{\sum \text{Colonial Areas of MP}}{N} - \text{Colonial Area of Japan}$$

Where:

MP - Major Powers

N - Number of MP

TABLE 4:4
Explanatory Variables Frustration,
Desired Capability and Threat:
Japan 1890-1940 *

	<u>Frustration</u>	<u>Desired Capability</u>	<u>Threat</u>
1890	.8656	.2316	-
1891	.8022	.3745	- .2290
1892	.8181	.5173	- .20
1893	.8082	.6602	- .1870
1894	.8080	.8069	- .062
1895	.77885	.89537	- .26
1896	.7785	1.0386	- .208
1897	.8242	1.1814	- .274
1898	.8966	1.4324	- .151
1899	1.1341	1.5714	- .169
1900	.9382	1.7027	- .246
1901	.9374	- 1.0270	- .218
1902	.9547	- .8957	- .196
1903	.8851	- .5096	- .216
1904	1.0462	- .8108	- .1480
1905	1.1513	- .5714	1.16
1906	1.2471	- .5714	- .8150
1907	1.3954	- .6718	3.071
1908	1.8502	- .6718	- .08
1909	2.1162	- 1.0038	.154
1910	2.6504	- 1.4131	.036
1911	2.0206	- 1.4131	- .54
1912	- 1.1345	- 1.4131	- .281
1913	1.8235	- 1.2200	- .175
1919	- 1.9992	- .6640	-
1920	1.8529	.1003	- .754
1921	1.6177	.8880	.258
1922	1.6408	1.0540	- .449
1923	1.7395	1.0270	- .246
1924	1.1252	1.0270	- .237
1925	.7382	1.0231	- .247

	<u>Frustration</u>	<u>Desired Capability</u>	<u>Threat</u>
1926	.7069	1.0231	- .184
1927	.6273	1.0231	- .2370
1928	.6133	1.0231	- .198
1929	.5032	1.0231	- .168
1930	.8242	1.0193	- .226
1931	1.0654	.9652	- .3090
1932	.8815	- .9768	- .146
1933	1.1430	- .9768	- .114
1934	1.0417	- .9768	-
1935	.9661	- .9768	- .533
1936	.8591	- .9768	.31
1937	.7922	- .9768	- .128
1938	.8285	- .9768	- .783
1939	.7751	- .9768	5.251
1940	.7538	- .9768	.6020

* Standardized scores

FOOTNOTES PERTAINING TO CHAPTER 4

Pages 103 to 140

- 1) Morgenthau op.cit. p.67
- 2) A.F.K. Organski World Politics (New York: 1968) p.189
- 3) Wallace "Status Inconsistency, Verticle Mobility and International....", op.cit., makes this clear. pp. 73-74.
- 4) J. David Singer and Melvin Small "The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System: 1815-1940". World Politics January 1966, Volume XVIII #2 pp. 236-284. For an explanation of composite status scores see pp. 253-277.
- 5) Arthur S. Banks "The Suny-Binghamton Cross National Time Data Archive". Centre for Comparative Political Research, State University of New York, Binghamton, New York, 1972.
- 6) Wallace "Status Inconsistency, Verticle Mobility and International....", op.cit., p.81
- 7) Ibid., pp. 81-82
- 8) Galtung "A Structural Theory of Aggression", op.cit., p.95
- 9) Article 111(e) As quoted in the London Times, December 16, 1974.
- 10) Conroy, op.cit., p.257
- 11) Johan Galtung "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", Journal of Peace Research, 6, No.3, 1969, p.176
- 12) Ibid., ff.35
- 13) Chalimar Johnson, Revolutions and The Social System (Stanford: 1964) pp. 14-22
- 14) Gerhard Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status". American Sociological Review 19/4 (August 1954) pp. 407-408
- 15) Gerhard Lenski, "Status Inconsistency and the Vote: A Four Nation Test" American Sociological Review 32/3 (April 1967) pp. 298-301

- 16) Elton F. Jackson "Status Inconsistency and Symptoms of Stress" American Sociological Review 27/4, (August 1962), p. 476
- 17) Seymour Martin Lipset, "Social Stratification and Right Wing Extremism" British Journal of Sociology 10/4 (December 1959) pp. 1-38
- 18) See for example Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea 1868-1919: A Study in Realism and Idealism in International Relations (Philadelphia: 1960) The works of Marlene J. Mayo deal specifically with this question. See the pros and cons of the argument in the articles in Marlene J. Mayo (ed.), The Emergence of Imperial Japan: Self Defense or Calculated Aggression (Lexington, Mass. 1970). Tatsuyu Takuwichi in his War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (Garden City, New York: 1935) points to Japan's need for territory to provide it with the national resources needed to change its status position in the international community. K. Asakawa The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Causes and Issues (Westminster: 1904) essentially says the same thing.
- 19) Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North "In Search of Peace Systems: Scandinavia and the Netherlands; 1870-1970". In Peace, War and Numbers, Bruce M. Russett, (ed) (Beverly Hills, London: 1972) pp. 239-274.

CHAPTER 5

THE DATA: RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

Data for the empirical testing have been drawn mainly from the Suny-Binghamton Cross-National Time Series Data Archives. The Archive, compiled since 1968, draws on the data resources of other data collections, like the Correlates of War Project, and the Dimensionality of Nations Project. It is assembled in machine readable form, in longitudinal format, and includes data from 1815 (the Congress of Vienna) to 1972. The tape version of the Archive has 210 variables for 167 independent countries.

In addition to the data drawn from the other projects noted above, data have also been collected from other sources, such as the Stateman's Yearbook and the United Nations Yearbook. Additional data for this analysis for the size of military forces stationed beyond the borders of Japan, have been drawn from the Almanac de Gotha, Stateman's Yearbook, The Japan Times Yearbook, The Japan Manchukuo Yearbook, The League of Nations Yearbook and Japan: de Statistique de L'Empire du Japon.

Data for cotton manufactures exported have been drawn from The Statistical Abstract for the Principal

and Other Foreign Countries, volumes from 1890 to 1913, and Statistical Tables Relating to British and Foreign Trade and Industry, volumes from 1924 to 1930. International Trade Statistics, League of Nations (1945), and Hoiao Liang-lin China's Foreign Trade Statistics: 1864-1949.

Immigration statistics have been drawn from Walter F. Wilcox (ed) International Migrations (New York: 1929) and Statistical Abstracts of the United States.

Wherever possible these sources were checked against each other and against the Archive data. By and large the figures were found to be relatively consistent. Data not in the Archive is contained in the appendix.

Aside from the problems associated with data collection are the questions of data reliability and validity.

The problems associated with cross national data collections are manifold. Oskar Morgenstern has pointed out that "a significant difference between the use of data in the physical and social sciences is that in the former the producer of the observations is usually also their user".⁽¹⁾ Using the Suny-Binghamton Cross National Time Series Data Archive as the source of much of the data employed in this analysis has severe reliability limitations. As the compilers of the Archive have themselves admitted, some of the data which was originally assembled was done so "under quite non-rigorous circumstances that do not admit of replication".⁽²⁾

In defense of the compilers, however, it is to be noted that the various sources such as statistical yearbooks (particularly for the nineteenth century) tend to report contradictory information and often carry over data from one year to the next without any indication as to which years the original entries refer. The compilers in such cases made reasonably current estimates. Similarly, for the data utilized in this analysis which was not drawn

from the Data Archive, similar procedures obtain. Human error for both the Archive data and the non-Archive data is a constant problem, as are machine errors involved in the transformation of data to hard copy form. The only means of reliability checking that could be conducted was that of "eye-balling" the data and comparing it with other data along the longitudinal span. As indicated above, the Suny-Binghamton data was "spot-checked" against other sources while the additional data was being researched. Reasonable accuracy was found to be present.

One significant problem of data reliability is that of missing data. The Data Archive has been "filled in" with estimated and computed data scores when data was missing or could not be located. Unfortunately the compilers of the Archive did not indicate those scores which were "filled in" and those which were obtained from hard sources. Similarly, they did not indicate the particular source for each data point. The margin of error estimated by the compilers of the Archive is in the vicinity of plus or minus five percent, although they indicate that for the first portion of the nineteenth century (which does not apply here) the percentage could be as high as ten or even twenty percent.

Problems of comparability arising out of monetary exchange rates are also present in the data selected for this study. One variable in particular, cotton manufactures exported, presented some difficulties.

For the period 1890 to 1914 the exchange rates cited by Haiao Lian-lin were utilized. For the period 1918 to 1940 computed exchange rates cited in Urs Luterbacher's PhD. Thesis "Dimensions Historiques de Modeles Dynamiques de Conflict: Application Aux Processus de Course aux Armements: 1900-1965" were utilized, and are contained in the attached appendix.

Analytic validity, associated with sampling a sufficiently representative sample of a larger population do not apply to the present study.⁽³⁾

While there are difficulties inherent in any data set which must be mentioned, at the same time some mention should also be made of the benefits in terms of reliability in the selection of a particular system and temporal domain for study. It should be noted, for example, that the operational definition of aggression, and the data selected were made on the basis of historical evidence. The entire temporal period was one in which the relative importance of the variables selected changed little.

This cannot be said of longer temporal domain studies where the importance of variables selected alter significantly, particularly those which tend to reflect technological innovation or political change. One ascribed status indicator, the number and quality of diplomatic representation, for example, is valid, according to the compilers of the index, only until World War Two when a strong inflationary trend set in, with the result that the previously clear and meaningful distinctions between classes of diplomatic representatives accredited to members of the international community became obscured by major power attempts to win favour with minor and non-aligned, but strategically important, nations. (4)

Other examples are those of industrial capability, military capability, and population as achieved status dimensions. The indicators selected in this study are valid only for the period proceeding the nuclear age, and apply most readily to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These considerations are notably lacking in the war oriented studies where the temporal domains stretched over one hundred fifty years. Thus while there are data difficulties in this study, at least the variables selected are fairly reliable indicators for the temporal period selected.

The unavailability of a single source of data also created some reliability problems. The Suny-

Binghamton Cross National Time Series Data Archive only became available to researchers in 1973. While it is a valuable source for the period from 1815 to 1972, it did not contain all of the variables selected for this study. Japanese force size data were particularly difficult to acquire, especially for the early period of this study. While standing force size data were available in the Data Archive, the size of garrison strength outside of the home territory involved mixing data from various sources, and computing unavailable data from that which was available. The probability of error is estimated at around ten percent.

Force and garrison strength during periods of war was unavailable. While this absence of data had no effect on this study, future applications of the methodology employed in this study to periods of war could be seriously impaired by the unavailability of data.

Unlike the studies employing only Correlates of War Project data, the data for this study had to be collected for yearly rather than quintennial periods. This caused some reliability problems, because invariably some years were computed scores. This is compensated for, however, by the rise in the number of observations. This study employs

substantially more observations than the war oriented studies, and thus should increase the reliability of the findings proportionately. The East findings, for example, were based on seventeen observations, the Wallace and von Riekhoff studies twenty-nine observations, and the Ray study thirty-two observations. This study is based on forty-six observations over a fifty year period.

Another benefit of the spatial domain selected is the use of the same actors over the entire period of the temporal domain. No substitutions or deletions were necessary which would tend to distort the reliability of the findings. Moreover, no thresholds of battle deaths, etc. had to be arbitrarily set and this should also contribute to the validity of the findings.

FOOTNOTES PERTAINING TO CHAPTER 5

Pages 143 to 150

- 1) Oskar Morgenstern, On the Accuracy of Economic Observations 2nd ed. (Princeton 1965) p.14
- 2) Arthur S. Banks, The Suny-Binghamton Cross National Time Series Data Archives: Variable Definitions and Sources. Technical Report #2, Binghamton, New York, December 21, 1972, p.41
- 3) For greater detail concerning data reliability and validity problems associated with the Archive, the reader is invited to consult ibid. pp. 41-47
- 4) J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "The Composition and Status Ordering in the International System: 1815-1940". World Politics (January 1966), Volume XVIII #2, p.241 ff.

CHAPTER 6

DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

The testing of each hypothesis involves different analytic procedures which should be clarified here. There are four analytic techniques used in this study including simple bivariate analysis, partial correlation analysis, stepwise multiple regression and dependence analysis. These procedures are introduced ad seriatim in this Chapter as each hypothesis is tested. As each procedure is introduced, the rationale for its use is argued, test results reported, and interpretations given. The testing of some hypotheses involves one or more of these analytic techniques, and where this is the case movement between forms of analysis will be related to the theoretical premises outlined in Chapter 3. Additionally, all results are reported for the entire temporal period under analysis, and for each of two sub-periods: that preceding World War I and that following World War I, in an effort to determine conformity or nonconformity to the historical trends evident in Chapter 2. Additionally, squaring procedures are operationalized to enable comparisons to be made between this study and the results of the war oriented studies. The general assumption predicated lagging procedures in this

and the war oriented studies is that the effects of status inconsistency need not be immediate, but explain behaviour at a later point in time.

With one exception, that dealing with determination of the direction of the status inconsistency - positive or negative - all data used in this study has been normalized into standard Z form according to the following equation:

$$Z = \frac{X_1 - \bar{X}}{S.D.}$$

where Z = Standardized Score

X_1 = Raw score for each data point

$\bar{X}$ = Mean of total number of scores

S.D. = Standard deviation of scores

The rationale for using standardized scores rather than raw scores is to compensate for exponential growth over the fifty year span of the analysis. Standard (normal) data are generally between +.1 and -.1, however, some data used in this study, when normalized, do not conform to these limits and therefore are not "normally" distributed. Because the data is not normally distributed certain difficulties arise even for simple bivariate analysis, and the selection of

analytical techniques. Before moving to test hypotheses, therefore, clarification should be made for the choice of product moment over rank order statistics.

While the crucial assumption of product moment statistics is normally distributed values, the benefits of using rank order statistics like the Kendall Tau B and Tau C, or Somer's D, or Spearman's rank order statistics, are not at all clear. As has been pointed out, the second crucial assumption for product moment statistics, that of interval data, has been met for all variable indicators in this study. Rank order statistics provide neither the sensitivity of product moment statistics, nor fulfill the requirements needed for later multivariate and dependence analysis. Nor can rank order statistics be utilized in determining the amount of variance "explained" or accounted for. Product moment statistics on the other hand may, and the correlations need only be squared to determine the amount of variance present in each case. Additional justification for the use of product moment over rank order statistics may be found in the Wallace 1970 study "Status Inconsistency, Vertical Mobility,

and International War, 1825-1964". Despite Sidney Siegal's apprehensions of serious bias from the use of product moment statistics and non-normal data,⁽¹⁾ Wallace found that the results of testing non-normal data using rank order and product moment statistics were roughly the same.⁽²⁾ If anything, Wallace noted, the results using rank order coefficients were generally somewhat lower. Having made these observations, the testing of which is not repeated here, Wallace chose to avoid the redundancy of dual testing and report only product moment values. Given Wallace's findings only product moment statistics are reported here.

A. Hypothesis 1.

The greater degree of status inconsistency in the status profile of a given nation in the system, the greater will be the amount of aggression which that nation will direct toward the system.

Hypothesis 1 is concerned with status inconsistency across the entire status profile of a nation, and the effects of inconsistency between all status pairs within that profile. A crucial assumption must be made to justify testing the hypothesis: that all status dimensions within the profile are perceived as being of equal significance. While this assumption may be difficult to justify

in system level studies, it may more easily be justified in a single nation study. Surprisingly, no quantitative analyses have been published to confirm or refute the efficacy of Galtung's notion of compensation which is central to his structural theory of aggression. This analysis is thus a pioneering effort.

Several methods may be selected to test the compensatory model. Before moving on to examine the alternatives, the problem of measuring status inconsistency should be outlined in general terms.

Both Lenski (1954) and Jackson (1962) measured status inconsistency as threshold level concepts. The analysis simply dichotomized each of the status indicators into "high" and "low", or "medium", "high", "low" scales, and attributed inconsistency to actors having one status ranking which falls in one scale, and another status ranking which falls in another. By using scaling it is possible to simply count the number of times a single actor scored highly and subtract the number of times it scored lowly or vice versa to attain in the aggregate an overall status inconsistency measure based on rank compensation. There are, however, several reasons for not wishing to operationalize status inconsistency in this way. Firstly, thresholds are

not always clear and therefore are always somewhat arbitrary, especially when the thresholds across several indicators must conform. Secondly, dichotomization creates ordinal scaling of data which limits the selection of statistical methods to those created for ordinal data. Multiple regression and dependence analysis, for example, both require interval data. Thirdly, and perhaps most important, ordinal scaling from interval data, which is available for all status indicators selected, results in the loss of valuable information, information which may be more sensitive to the effects of slight shifts in status profile.

A second method of measuring status inconsistency is that of scaling each dimension or indicator of status according to the ranking a particular actor has in relation to the other actors in the system (Wallace: 1970). A nation may rank fourth on one status indicator, for example, and eighth on another, thus making an inconsistency or discrepancy on that indicator total four. By adding or subtracting the difference between indicators across the status set, it would be possible to create a compensatory model.

What is lacking in this methodology, again, however, is the loss of potentially valuable information

by scaling. A second problem is limited domain. In a system of only eight nations, only six data points may separate actors on any single dimension.

The third method of measuring status inconsistency, which is employed in this study, is based on the compensatory model outlined by Johan Galtung in his 1973 work "International Relations and International Conflicts: A Sociological Approach". Its advantage is that it allows for the use of interval data, as well as a method of determining central tendency or deviance from the mean, in aggregate rather than single dimension scores.

Galtung's formula is reproduced as follows:

Rank disequilibrium:

$$\frac{\text{Sum of all distances for all pairs of ranks}}{\text{Number of Pairs} = \frac{(N)}{(2)}}$$

For N dimensions there are $\frac{N}{2}$ comparisons to make, or in other words, there are only the differences of the pairs to add up, thus making the amount of inconsistency equal to the average value of the differences. If all ranks are equal, all differences will equal 0, which means that the rank disequilibrium must equal 0, ⁽³⁾ indicating that no inconsistency is present. Any discrepancy or deviance from 0

indicates the inconsistency score which may then be related to the appropriate aggression indicator.

It should be noted that this procedure has been criticised by Martin D. Hyman and others⁽⁴⁾ because it allows different status dimensions to cancel each other out, that is a high negative inconsistency score would tend to cancel out a high positive status score or another dimension, while two highs or two lows would give an inordinately high or low reading. Hyman's criticisms are well taken, if what we are looking for is a non-compensatory model. If on the other hand, we are seeking a compensatory model, as we are for the testing of hypothesis 1, the criticisms clearly do not obtain.

The Results

Table 6:1 reports the product moment correlations between status inconsistency (compensatory model) across all the achieved status indicators and the ascribed status dimension, diplomatic importance. The strongest relationships between status inconsistency (compensation model) and international aggression occur at periods of less than five years, the best correlations being at one and five years respectively. The break after five years is dramatic, establishing a clear threshold effect. What is surprising in the

correlations, however, is the meaningful inverse relationships shown for the whole period. As the amount of inconsistency becomes greater, the amount of aggression becomes smaller, exactly the opposite of the relationship predicted in hypothesis 1. Table 8:2 reports the results for the same analysis repeated for the sub-period 1890-1913. While the relationship is positive, as hypothesized, no overall conclusions can be drawn: the correlations are too small to be meaningful, and the level of statistical significance is well in excess of the generally accepted .05 level.

TABLE 6:1
Status Inconsistency (compensation model)
and International Aggression - Japan 1890-1940
(Diplomatic Indicator of Ascription)
(Pearson Product Moment Correlations)

International Aggression

Status Incon-
sistency

Lag=0	Lag=1	Lag=2	Lag=3	Lag=4	Lag=5	Lag=6	Lag=7	Lag=8	Lag=9	Lag=10	Lag=15
-.3784	-.3359	-.3290	-.3291	-.3360	-.0015	-.0055	-.0290				
S=.005	S=.012	S=.015	S=.016	S=.011	S=.496	S=.487	S=.437				
N= 46	N= 45	N= 44	N= 43	N= 41	N= 40	N= 38	N= 32				

Where S = level of statistical significance
N = number of valid observations

Despite these shortcomings it is interesting that the break-point is again established at the five years level, where the relationship again reverts to being inverse.

TABLE 6:2
Status Inconsistency (compensation model)
and International Aggression - Japan 1890-1913
(Pearson Product Moment Correlations)

Status Inconsistency
(Diplomatic Indicator
of Ascription)

International Aggression							
Lag=0	Lag=1	Lag=2	Lag=3	Lag=5	Lag=7	Lag=10	Lag=15
-.0572	.1028	.1167	.1117	.2057	-.1546	-.1778	-.2120
S=.395	S=.316	S=.294	S=.302	S=.167	S=.241	S=.227	S=.224
N= 24	N= 24	N= 24	N= 24	N= 24	N= 23	N= 20	N= 15

Where S = level of statistical significance
N = number of valid observations

As may be expected from the results reported in tables 6:1 and 6:2, a strong relationship again appears for the sub-period 1918 to 1940 as shown in table 6:3. Only with a five year time lag does inconsistency predict positively to international aggression, all other lag years show a strong inverse relationship to be present, the strongest being at seven and ten years respectively. Nonetheless, the relationship is significant with status inconsistency accounting for thirty-seven per cent of the variance in Japanese aggression during the interwar period.

TABLE 6:3
Status Inconsistency (compensation model)
and International Aggression - Japan 1918-1940,
(Pearson Correlation Coefficients)

Status Inconsistency
(Diplomatic Indicator
of Ascription)

International Aggression							
Lag=0	Lag=1	Lag=2	Lag=3	Lag=5	Lag=7	Lag=10	Lag=15
-.3403	-.2775	-.2556	-.2450	.3644	-.6074	-.5813	-.3622
S=.061	S=.112	S=.138	S=.156	S=.069	S=.004	S=.005	S=.070
N= 22	N= 21	N= 20	N= 19	N= 18	N= 18	N= 19	N= 18

Where S = level of statistical significance
N = number of valid observations

Applying the same compensatory model to the same three temporal periods using race as the indicator of ascription rather than diplomatic status, the results become even more significant.

TABLE 6:4
Status Inconsistency (compensation model)
and International Aggression - Japan 1890-1940
(Pearson Correlation Coefficients)

Status Incon-
sistency (race
indicator)

International Aggression							
Lag=0	Lag=1	Lag=2	Lag=3	Lag=5	Lag=7	Lag=10	Lag=15
-.5392	.0659	.0343	..0293	.0411	.0266	.0280	.0332
S=.001	S=.334	S=.412	S=.429	S=.399	S=.435	S=.434	S=.428
N= 46	N= 45	N= 44	N= 43	N= 41	N= 40	N= 38	N= 32

Where S = level of statistical significance
N = number of valid observations

The strongest relationship when the entire time span is examined (Table 6:4) shifts from five years and less to a prediction of international aggression

at no lag, that is instant (same year) reaction to racial discrimination. Again, however, the relationship is inverse and opposite to that hypothesized. Two explanations are suggested by the result: one, that as greater racial discrimination was experienced by Japan, lower aggression resulted, and two, that as Japanese aggression increased, lower racial discrimination was experienced. Historically, the second explanation seems more plausible. As in the case of the diplomatic indicator, the racial indicator does not show a pattern of relationship between status inconsistency during the sub-period 1890 to 1913 (Table 6:5): the signs, however, remain negative. Consistent with the result of the first testing using the diplomatic indicator, the racial indicator also predicts best after World War I with a five to ten year lag, the strongest relationship being at seven years: again, however, the relationships are negative. On the basis of these findings, hypothesis 1 is disconfirmed in the Japanese case.

While the hypothesized relationship between status inconsistency, (compensatory model), and international aggression is disproved for the Japanese case, there is an explanation possible to account for the strong inverse relationship present between status inconsistency and

international aggression. That is, that Japan was a generally negative status inconsistent nation throughout the temporal period, and was being attributed greater status than it actually deserved. This being the case, Japan would be expected to become less aggressive as status inconsistency increased. Indeed it would become progressively more status quo oriented to prevent exposure of its inferior capabilities or the rupture of its inflated status myth.

But while this argument is intuitively satisfying, it clearly does not explain the variance in Japanese aggression when the lagging procedure is introduced. Table 6:4, for example, indicates almost an instant response, though inverse, between status inconsistency and international aggression. Table 6:5 shows no

TABLE 6:5
Status Inconsistency (compensation model)
and International Aggression - Japan 1890-1913

(Pearson Correlation Coefficients)

International Aggression

Lag=0 Lag=1 Lag=2 Lag=3 Lag=5 Lag=7 Lag=10 Lag=15

-.1815	-.1288	-.0856	-.0870	-.0445	-.0445	.0518	.0708
S=.198	S=.447	S=.345	S=.343	S=.418	S=.420	S=.404	S=.401
N= 24	N= 24	N= 24	N= 24	N= 24	N= 23	N= 20	N= 15

Where S = level of statistical significance
N = number of valid observations

Status Inconsistency
(race indicator)

relationship at all while table 6:6 shows the strongest relationship to be with a five to fifteen year time lag, which is consistent with the findings using diplomatic importance as the indicator of ascription. While it appears certain that status inconsistency is related to international aggression, particularly for the interwar period, it is clearly impossible to explain from these preliminary results why this should be the case.

TABLE 6:6
Status Inconsistency (compensation model)
and International Aggression - Japan 1918-1940

(Pearson Correlation Coefficients)

International Aggression

Lag=0	Lag=1	Lag=2	Lag=3	Lag=5	Lag=7	Lag=10	Lag=15
-.3520	-.3002	-.3001	-.3057	-.4522	-.6722	-.5504	-.4223
S=.054	S=.093	S=.099	S=.102	S=.030	S=.00	S=.007	S=.040
N= 22	N= 21	N= 20	N= 19	N= 18	N= 18	N= 19	N= 18

Where S = level of statistical significance
N = number of valid observations

Two conclusions may be made from the testing of hypothesis 1: firstly, that the explanatory power of the compensatory model is weak inasmuch as it does not allow for a determination of the type of inconsistency present; and, secondly, that factors other than status

inconsistency may be more important predictors of Japanese aggression for the pre-war period. A sub-analysis to determine the direction of the inconsistency is warranted from the test result.

Determining Positive and Negative Inconsistency

Determining the direction of the status inconsistency found to be present during the testing of hypothesis 1 is relatively simple, and involves no assumptions regarding compensation. To avoid misinterpreting the data, a reversion to unstandardized scores (which are all positive) was made and the analysis repeated by manual methods which allow for visual inspection of results at every stage of the computations. Because of the time required for manual computations, only the three most consistently used indicators of achieved status - percentage of population, industrial development, and military potential - were utilized, and only one indicator of ascribed status, percentage of diplomatic importance, was selected. Computations of status inconsistency were done using the following formula:

Status Inconsistency =

$$\frac{\text{Sum of achieved status dimensions}}{\text{Number of dimensions}} - \frac{\text{The ascribed status dimension}}{1}$$

Significantly, Japan was found to be a negatively status inconsistent actor throughout the entire temporal span under study. This result is consistent with the von Riekhoff (1973) and Wallace (1970) findings, and negates the possibility of testing hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 3

The greater the degree of negative status inconsistency of a nation in the system, the less will be the amount of aggression which that nation will direct toward the international system.

While the results of testing this hypothesis should confirm or refute the explanation offered for the reversed findings from the testing of hypothesis 1, certain methodological changes are made to create a non-compensatory model. Theoretically, a nation experiencing negative status inconsistency would be expected to experience intrapunitive behaviour, and therefore be less likely to display aggression toward the international system.

The procedure selected for testing hypothesis 3 is virtually identical to that employed in the Ray (1973), von Riekhoff (1973), and the Wallace (1971 and 1973) studies.

The achieved status dimension, composed of the five status indicators industrialization, education; military capability, trade and population, are simply aggregated, averaged and subtracted from the ascribed status indicators, diplomatic importance and race. The amount of the gap constitutes the amount of status inconsistency for each case-year.⁽⁵⁾ As noted in Chapter 4, the aggression indicator has been computed using similar methodology. All computed scores are of course standardized.

While the methodological procedure selected is consistent with past practice, it has been severely criticized by Hubert M. Blalock, because it fails to control for the effects of multicollinearity between variables.⁽⁶⁾ Despite the criticisms of Blalock, use of the procedure is at least partly justified by the fact that the validity of Blalock's criticisms is questionable. There have been no attempts to determine empirically whether Blalock's criticisms in fact would produce significantly different results. Indeed no methodology has been devised to satisfy all of the arguments he has raised. The relative independence of the variables selected is established in this work through correlation analysis. Although some autocorrelation remains, minor distortions are

compensated for when the results are interpreted.

Results of the bivariate analysis testing hypothesis 3 are reported in Table 6:7; race and diplomatic indicators of ascription are treated as separate indicators rather than a single combined indicator to facilitate comparative analysis. Significantly, the result using the racial indicator of ascription does not sharply diverge from the findings when the compensatory model was used. Both analyses showed a sharp reaction time ($-.5392$ as opposed to $-.5981$) for the lag=0 case. Moreover the direction of the signs remains unchanged. On the other hand the result using the diplomatic indicator of ascription varies completely. If the compensatory model showed the strongest correlations with a time lag of between one and five years ($-.3290$ and $-.3784$), the non-compensatory model shows the diplomatic indicator of ascription being in complete conformity with the racial indicator (to within $.041$ for the lag=0 case), again showing sharp reaction time.

The variance between the results using the compensatory and non-compensatory models, which theoretically represent perception of inconsistency, suggests that rank compensation tends to mitigate and postpone aggressive behaviour, whereas more obvious distinctions between two significant dimensions as with ascription and achievement, tend to result in more rapid manifestations of aggressive behaviour. Table 6:7 shows the same rapid response for both racial and diplomatic indicators of ascription when the whole period is examined, whereas when the sub-period 1890 - 1913 is examined different pattern emerges as outlined in Table 6:8.

TABLE 6:7
Status Inconsistency (Non-Compensatory)
and International Aggression - Japan 1890-1940

(Diplomatic and Racial Indictors of Ascription)

(Pearson Product Moment Correlations)

Status Incon- sistency (dip- sistency indica- tor)	International Aggression							
	Lag=0	Lag=1	Lag=2	Lag=3	Lag=5	Lag=7	Lag=10	Lag=15
Status Incon- sistency (dip- sistency indica- tor)	.5569	.0717	.0809	.0852	.0695	.0615	.0647	.0782
	S=.001	S=.320	S=.301	S=.794	S=.333	S=.354	S=.350	S=.335
Status Incon- sistency (racial) indica- tor)	N= 46	N= 45	N= 44	N= 43	N= 41	N= 40	N= 38	N= 32
Status Incon- sistency (dip- sistency indica- tor)	.5981	.0717	.0769	.0822	.0714	.0608	.0643	.0777
	S=.001	S=.320	S=.310	S=.300	S=.329	S=.355	S=.351	S=.336
Status Incon- sistency (racial) indica- tor)	N= 46	N= 45	N= 44	N= 43	N= 41	N= 40	N= 38	N= 32

Where S = level of statistical significance
N = number of valid observations

TABLE 6:8
Status Inconsistency (non-compensatory model)
and International Aggression - Japan 1890-1913

(Diplomatic and Racial indicators of Ascription)

(Pearson Product Moment Correlations)

Status Incon- sistency (dip- sistency indica- tor)	International Aggression							
	Lag=0	Lag=1	Lag=2	Lag=3	Lag=5	Lag=7	Lag=10	Lag=15
Status Incon- sistency (dip- sistency indica- tor)	.0334	-.1587	-.1396	-.1023	-.0844	.3581	.5544	.6682
	S=.438	S=.235	S=.268	S=.330	S=.366	S=.072	S=.016	S=.017
Status Incon- sistency (racial) indica- tor)	N= 24	N= 23	N= 22	N= 21	N= 19	N= 18	N= 15	N= 10
Status Incon- sistency (dip- sistency indica- tor)	.0470	-.2669	-.2460	-.2052	-.0467	.2928	.3869	.5934
	S=.414	S=.609	S=.135	S=.186	S=.425	S=.119	S=.077	S=.035
Status Incon- sistency (racial) indica- tor)	N= 24	N= 23	N= 22	N= 21	N= 19	N= 18	N= 15	N= 10

Where S = level of statistical significance
N = number of valid cases

For both the diplomatic and racial indicators of ascribed status, the relationship to aggression moves to a positive one after seven years, with the strongest predictions being at fifteen years for the 1890 to 1913 sub-period. Whereas for the entire period 1890 to 1940 racial importance predicted best, for the sub-period 1890 to 1913 diplomatic status predicts best and with positive rather than negative signs. That is, as the rate of negative status inconsistency increased, so did Japan's aggressive behaviour. The fifteen year lag prediction suggests aggression in 1905 would have been the result of an inconsistency which occurred in 1890 and was perceived and responded to ten to fifteen years later. This type of finding clearly supports those historians of Japan who argue that Japan's aggressive behaviour was the result of calculated planning. Clarification of this result should be possible when regression and path analytical techniques are applied to trace the casual relationship.

Oddly, the second sub-period between 1918 and 1940 also predicts strongly to aggression at a fifteen year time lag as may be seen in Table 6:9. However, after World War I the relationship moves from a moderate inverse prediction ($-.32$ to $-.36$) to a very strong positive prediction ($.64$) for both

the diplomatic and racial indicators of ascribed status. These results say a good deal for the validity of Singer and Small's indicators of diplomatic importance, in that they also clearly take race into consideration. The lengthy time lags and the direction of the relationships, at the same time point to confirmation of Wallace's findings that aggression is strongest with a fifteen year time lag. The direction of the relationship - positive at lags 5 to 15 - disconfirms hypothesis 3 when sub-periods are examined, but confirms hypothesis 3 when the temporal period is examined as a whole.

TABLE 6:9
Status Inconsistency (non-compensatory model)
and International Aggression - Japan 1918 to 1940

(Diplomatic and Racial Indicators of Ascription)

(Pearson Product Moment Correlations)

	International Aggression							
	Lag=0	Lag=1	Lag=2	Lag=3	Lag=5	Lag=7	Lag=10	Lag=15
Status Incon- sistency (dip- lomatic indica- tor)	-.3275 S=.070 N= 22	-.2858 S=.105 N= 21	-.2275 S=.167 N= 20	-.1681 S=.246 N= 19	.2658 S=.143 N= 18	.1680 S=.253 N= 18	.3178 S=.092 N= 19	.6461 S=.002 N= 18
Status Incon- sistency (racial indica- tor)	-.3574 S=.051 N= 2	-.3345 S=.069 N= 21	-.2989 S=.10 N= 20	-.2588 S=.148 N= 19	.2654 S=.144 N= 18	.1678 S=.253 N= 18	.3171 S=.092 N= 19	.6461 S=.002 N= 18

Where S = level of statistical significance
N = number of valid observations

This somewhat contradictory result leads to testing of hypotheses 4 through 7 and to consideration of other explanations for Japanese aggression during this period. While there is no intention to repeat the theoretical justification for the inclusion of explanatory variables, it should be remembered that according to Galtung's theoretical postulations there can be only two reasons why a negative status inconsistent actor would display extra punitive aggressive behaviour: one, because the nation perceived a threat from the system and responded, or two, because the nation wished to increase its capability to achieve more by gaining material and human resources. One or both of these explanatory variables should also be connected to frustration, the third explanatory variable operationalized in this analysis.

The introduction of explanatory variables complicates the model, and the methodology considerably. The analysis begins by determining the interrelationships between predictor, explanatory and dependent variables. The relationships are determined first by the simple statistical technique of partial correlations and are reported in Table 6:10.

(Pearson Product Moment Correlations)

	Inconsistency (diplomatic)	Inconsistency (race)	Frustration	Desired Capability	Threat
Inconsistency (diplomatic)	1.00				
Inconsistency (race)	.9924 S=.001 N= 51	1.00			
Frustration	-.0091 S=.476 N= 46	-.0609 S=.344 N= 46	1.00		
Desired Capability	.2038 S=.087 N= 46	.1819 S=.113 N= 46	-.1411 S=.175 N= 46	1.00	
Threat	-.0330 S=.416 N= 46	-.0302 S=.423 N= 46	-.0889 S=.283 N= 44	-.1411 S=.175 N= 46	1.00
Aggression (Lag=0)	-.5569 S=.001 N= 46	-.5981 S=.001 N= 46	-.0644 S=.335 N= 46	-.3312 S=.012 N= 46	.1416 S=.180 N= 44

TABLE 6:10 (Continued)

Lag	Inconsistency (diplomatic)				Inconsistency (race)			Frustration		Desired Capability		Threat		Dependent Variables
Lag=1	.0717 S=.320 N= 44	.0717 S=.320 N= 44			-.0548 S=.362 N= 44	-.3238 S=.016 N= 44	.1475 S=.170 N= 44							
Lag=2	.0809 S=.320 N= 45	.0769 S=.310 N= 44			-.0518 S=.372 N= 44	-.2649 S=.045 N= 42	.1340 S=.199 N= 42							
Lag=3	.0852 S=.294 N= 43	.0822 S=.300 N= 43			-.0076 S=.481 N= 40	-.1998 S=.108 N= 40	.1582 S=.165 N= 40							
Lag=5	.0612 S=.354 N= 40	.0608 S=.355 N= 40			-.0554 S=.374 N= 36	.1569 S=.184 N= 35	-.0379 S=.416 N= 34							
Lag=7	.0612 S=.354 N= 40	.0608 S=.355 N= 40			-.0431 S=.403 N= 35	.1562 S=.184 N= 35	-.0372 S=.416 N= 34							
Lag=10	.0647 S=.350 N= 38	.0643 S=.351 N= 38			-.0467 S=.398 N= 33	.1986 S=.134 N= 33	-.0411 S=.412 N= 32							
Lag=15	.0782 S=.335 N= 32	.0777 S=.336 N= 32			-.0572 S=.388 N= 27	-.0512 S=.402 N= 26	-.3321 S=.045 N= 27							

The relationship between the status inconsistency measures appears to be very high for the entire period under observation suggesting redundancy in the use of two measures of ascribed status. Interrelationships between predictor and explanatory variables are small with the best relationship .20 between status inconsistency and desired capability. Relationships between explanatory variables and dependent variables are very low with the exception of threat at lag 15 and desired capability at no lag and lag 1. Table 6:11 reports the same analysis for the period 1890 to 1913. Again the relationship between the two measures of ascription is high, with interrelationships between both measures of inconsistency showing high scores for both frustration and desired capability. The relationship between frustration and desired capability is relatively low and negative, however, suggesting an independent effect by these two explanatory variables. The strongest relationship shown is for desired capability at the lag 10 and lag 15 periods with desired capability explaining as much as 68% of the variance in Japanese aggression with a fifteen year time lag, which essentially repeats the earlier bivariate findings.

Table 6:12 reports the same analysis for the 1918-1940 sub-period. Again the interrelationship

TABLE 6:11
Interrelationships Predictor, Intervening and Dependent Variables
Japan 1890-1913

(Pearson Product Moment Correlations)

	Inconsistency (diplomatic)	Inconsistency (race)	Frustration	Desired Capability	Threat	Predictor Variables
Inconsistency (diplomatic)	1.00					
Inconsistency (race)	.9337 S=.001 N= 24	1.00				
Frustration	-.5235 S=.001 N= 24	-.5690 S=.002 N= 24	1.00			
Desired Capability	.8175 S=.001 N= 24	.7865 S=.001 N= 24	-.2462 S=.123 N= 24	1.00		
Threat	-.1055 S=.316 N= 23	-.0255 S=.454 N= 23	-.0360 S=.435 N= 23	-.1402 S=.262 N= 23	1.00	
Aggression (Lag=0)	.0334 S=.438 N= 24	-.0470 S=.414 N= 24	-.0056 S=.490 N= 24	-.0431 S=.421 N= 24	.0650 S=.384 N= 23	Dependent Variables

TABLE 6:11 (Continued)

	Inconsistency Inconsistency			Desired			Threat
	(diplomatic)	(race)	Frustration	Capability			
Lag=1	.1587 S=.235 N= 23	-.2669 S=.109 N= 23	.0868 S=.347 N= 23	-.0547 S=.402 N= 23	.0383 S=.431 N= 23		
Lag=2	-.1396 S=.268 N= 22	-.2460 S=.135 N= 22	.0928 S=.341 N= 22	-.0076 S=.487 N= 22	-.0008 S=.499 N= 22		
Lag=3	-.1029 S=.330 N= 21	-.2052 S=.186 N= 21	.1801 S=.217 N= 21	.0601 S=.398 N= 21	.0152 S=.474 N= 21		
Lag=5	-.0844 S=.366 N= 19	-.0467 S=.425 N= 19	.0851 S=.365 N= 19	.1536 S=.265 N= 19	-.1411 S=.282 N= 19	Dependent Variables	
Lag=7	.3581 S=.072 N= 18	.2928 S=.119 N= 18	-.0642 S=.400 N= 18	.2223 S=.188 N= 18	-.0669 S=.396 N= 18		
Lag=10	.5544 S=.016 N= 15	.3869 S=.077 N= 15	-.0777 S=.392 N= 15	.4370 S=.052 N= 15	-.0821 S=.386 N= 15		
Lag=15	.6682 S=.017 N= 10	.5934 S=.035 N= 10	-.1200 S=.371 N= 10	.8264 S=.002 N= 10	-.1318 S=.358 N= 10		

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TABLE 6:12
Interrelationships-Predictor, Explanatory and Dependent Variables
Japan 1918-1940

(Pearson Product Moment Correlations)

	Inconsistency (diplomatic)	Inconsistency (race)	Frustration	Desired Capability	Threat	Predictor Variables
Inconsistency (diplomatic)	1.00					
Inconsistency (race)	1.00 S=.001 N= 0	1.00				
Frustration	.3212 S=.072 N= 22	.2392 S=.142 N= 22	1.00			
Desired Capability	.1745 S=.219 N= 22	.1923 S=.196 N= 22	.0815 S=.467 N= 22	1.00		
Threat	-.0131 S=.477	-.0479 S=.418	-.1451 S=.265	-.2298 S=.158	1.00	
Aggression (Lag=0)	-.3257 S=.070 N= 22	-.3574 S=.051 N= 22	-.1213 S=.295 N= 22	-.8985 S=.001 N= 22	.2338 S=.154 N= 21	Dependent Variables

TABLE 6:12 (Continued)

Lag	Inconsistency Inconsistency (race)			Desired		Threat	Dependent Variables
	(diplomatic)	(race)	Frustration	Capability			
Lag=1	.2858 S=.105 N= 21	-.3345 S=.069 N= 21	-.1999 S=.192 N= 21	-.9252 S=.001 N= 21	.2577 S=.130 N= 21		
Lag=2	-.2275 S=.167 N= 20	-.2989 S=.100 N= 20	.1056 S=.329 N= 20	-.8289 S=.001 N= 20	.2352 S=.159 N= 20		
Lag=3	.1681 S=.246 N= 19	-.2588 S=.142 N= 19	-.1470 S=.274 N= 19	-.7185 S=.001 N= 19	.2871 S=.117 N= 19		
Lag=5	.2658 S=.143 N= 18	.2654 S=.144 N= 18	-.2110 S=.208 N= 17	-.4913 S=.022 N= 17	.3214 S=.104 N= 17		
Lag=7	.1680 S=.253 N= 18	.1673 S=.253 N= 18	-.2386 S=.178 N= 17	-.2521 S=.164 N= 17	.6381 S=.004 N= 16		
Lag=10	.3178 S=.092 N= 19	.3179 S=.092 N= 19	.0638 S=.401 N= 18	.0411 S=.436 N= 18	-.0914 S=.364 N= 17		
Lag=15	.6461 S=.002 N= 18	.6460 S=.002 N= 18	-.1021 S=.348 N= 17	-.7109 S=.001 N= 17	.1797 S=.253 N= 16		

between the two measures of ascription is shown. In view of the similarity of the correlations using the racial and diplomatic indicators, the former indicator will be discontinued as a measure of ascribed status.

Significantly for the 1918 to 1940 sub-period desired capability predicts well but negatively to aggression at all time lags with the exception of the seven and ten year lags. Threat predicts well at seven years on the other hand giving rise to speculation about the possible results of causal modelling. Relationships between frustration and inconsistency are moderate on the other hand, and the relationship between frustration and desired capability and frustration and threat are insignificant.

Having determined the relative independence of predictor, explanatory and outcome variables, each of the explanatory variables is introduced separately. The analytic procedure of multiple correlation analysis allows for each of the explanatory variables to be controlled for individually, and/or jointly. Multiple correlation analysis, in fact, begins with partial correlations for each of the independent

variables. The effect of the control (explanatory) variable(s) is assumed to be linear throughout the range of the control variable, and once the linear relationship has been determined (as reported in Tables 6:10 to 6:12) between the independent, dependent, and explanatory variables, partial correlations are constructed statistically making new independent and dependent variables with the effects of the control variable(s) removed. The same procedure is repeated for each step of the partial correlation analysis depending on the number of explanatory variables that are introduced or removed. Table 6:13 reports the relationship between inconsistency (diplomatic indicator) and aggression for the period 1890 to 1940 controlling for the explanatory variable, frustration.

TABLE 6:13
Status Inconsistency and International
Aggression Controlling for Frustration
Japan 1890-1940

(Partial Correlation Coefficients)

Inconsistency (diplomatic indicator)

Aggression							
Lag=0	Lag=1	Lag=2	Lag=3	Lag=5	Lag=7	Lag=10	Lag=15
-.5586	.0713	.0805	.0851	.0691	.0609	.0644	.0778
S= .001	S= .325	S= .308	S= .303	S= .347	S= .366	S= .363	S= .353
N= 43	N= 41	N= 39	N= 37	N= 33	N= 32	N= 30	N= 24

When S = level of statistical significance
N = number of valid observations

Frustration has little effect on the explanation of Japanese aggression over the entire temporal span. However, when the first sub-period is examined, controlling for frustration as shown in Table 6:14, the fit is improved by seven and eight per cent more when a ten and fifteen year time lag is introduced.

TABLE 6:14
Status Inconsistency and International
Aggression Controlling for Frustration
Japan 1890-1913

(Partial Correlation Coefficients)

Aggression

Lag=0	Lag=1	Lag=2	Lag=3	Lag=5	Lag=7	Lag=10	Lag=15
.0358	-.1334	-.1073	-.0095	-.0469	.3817	.6047	.7156
S=.436	S=.277	S=.322	S=.484	S=.427	S=.065	S=.011	S=.015
N= 21	N= 20	N= 19	N= 18	N= 16	N= 15	N= 12	N= 7

When S = level of statistical significance
N = number of valid observations

Similarly, when the sub-period 1918 to 1940 is examined (Table 6:15) the fit is improved by ten per cent when a fifteen year time lag is introduced.

TABLE 6:15
Status Inconsistency and International
Aggression Controlling for Frustration
Japan 1918-1940

(Partial Correlation Coefficients)

Aggression

Status Inconsistency
(diplomatic indicator)

Lag=0	Lag=1	Lag=2	Lag=3	Lag=5	Lag=7	Lag=10	Lag=15
-.3051	-.2398	-.2056	-.1290	.3603	.2661	.3146	.7207
S=.089	S=.155	S=.199	S=.305	S=.085	S=.160	S=.109	S=.001
N= 19	N= 18	N= 17	N= 16	N= 14	N= 14	N= 15	N= 14

Where S = level of statistical significance
N = number of valid observations

The variable frustration clearly adds to the explanatory power of the model. Table 6:16 contains the results of the same three periods controlling for the effects of the intervening variable, desired capability.

TABLE 6:16
Status Inconsistency and International
Aggression Controlling for Desired Capability
Japan 1890-1940, 1890-1913 and 1918-1940
(Partial Correlation Coefficients)

		Aggression							
		Lag=0	Lag=1	Lag=2	Lag=3	Lag=5	Lag=7	Lag=10	Lag=15
Status Inconsistency (diplomatic indicator)	1890	-.5797	.1404	.1319	.1230	.0863	.0332	.0292	.0434
		S=.001	S=.185	S=.205	S=.228	S=.311	S=.426	S=.437	S=.417
	1940	N= 43	N= 41	N= 39	N= 37	N= 33	N= 32	N= 30	N= 24
	1890	.1194	-.1981	-.2316	-.2633	-.3689	.3142	.3806	-.0228
		S=.294	S=.188	S=.156	S=.131	S=.066	S=.110	S=.090	S=.477
	1913	N= 21	N= 20	N= 19	N= 18	N= 16	N= 15	N= 12	N= 7
	1918	-.3090	-.3328	-.1505	-.0623	.4117	.2225	.3157	
		S=.040	S=.076	S=.269	S=.403	S=.057	S=.204	S=.109	
	1940	N= 19	N= 18	N= 17	N= 16	N= 14	N= 14	N= 15	

Where S = level of statistical significance
N = number of valid observations

Again the fit is improved when the variable, desired capability, is controlled, particularly when a ten and fifteen year time lag is introduced. The threat indicator on the other hand adds little to the explanatory power of the model as may be seen in Table 6:17. If anything, controlling for the threat indicator detracts, which

suggests an independent effect, particularly for the sub-period 1918-1940 when a fifteen year time lag is introduced.

TABLE 6:17
Status Inconsistency and International
Aggression Controlling for Threat
Japan 1890-1940, 1890-1913 and 1918-1940

(Partial Correlation Coefficients)

		Aggression							
		Lag=0	Lag=1	Lag=2	Lag=3	Lag=5	Lag=7	Lag=10	Lag=15
Status Inconsistency (diplomatic indicator)	1890	-.5581	.0775	.0861	.0916	.0746	.0600	.0634	.0766
		S=.001	S=.311	S=.296	S=.290	S=.335	S=.370	S=.367	S=.358
	1940	N= 41	N= 41	N= 39	N= 37	N= 33	N= 31	N= 29	N= 23
	1890	.0406	-.1556	-.1405	-.1013	-.1008	.3539	.5506	.6638
		S=.429	S=.245	S=.272	S=.335	S=.345	S=.082	S=.021	S=.026
	1913	N= 20	N= 20	N= 19	N= 18	N= 16	N= 15	N= 12	N= 7
	1918	-.3319	-.2923	-.2310	-.1715	.2851	.2292	.3179	.6592
		S=.076	S=.106	S=.171	S=.248	S=.142	S=.206	S=.115	S=.004
	1940	N= 18	N= 18	N= 17	N= 16	N= 14	N= 13	N= 14	N= 13

Where S = level of statistical significance
N = number of valid observations

The inclusion of more than one explanatory variable using partial correlation methods is difficult inasmuch as the signs for the variables are different, and when aggregated would tend to cancel each other out.

Multiple Regression Analysis

The purpose of using multiple regression

analysis is to gain a predictive capability. It is possible, for example, that the effects of the explanatory variables are quite separate from the effects of status inconsistency, or that a combination of status inconsistency and one or more of the explanatory variables are interdependent. If a degree of interdependence exists, the explanatory power of the independent and one or more of the explanatory variables taken together will be greater than any single indicator by itself. To determine which of the many combinations maximize the amount of variance explained in the dependent variable, stepwise multiple regression techniques are employed.

Stepwise multiple regression techniques explain the amount of variance in the dependent variable by using the principle of least squares, that is, prediction to the dependent variable is made as a function of all of the prediction variables. In standard regression form this relationship may be written:

$$Y = A_1X_1 + A_2X_2 + \dots + A_kX_k + C + e$$

Where Y is the dependent variable, $A_1, A_2, \dots, A_k$ are the regression coefficient, (or the amount of change in the independent variables $X_1, X_2, \dots, X_k$

required to produce a unit of change in Y , holding all other variables constant), C is the constant or intercept, and e is the "error" or residual term (standing for that portion of the variation in Y not explained).⁽⁷⁾ The added advantage of using stepwise multiple regression is that the result of the inclusion of each new independent variable in the analysis is reported independently. That is, a two variable equation is constructed first using the independent variable which accounts for the greatest percentage of the variance in the dependent variable. The equation is then enlarged to three variables by inclusion of the independent variable which explains the next largest amount of variance et cetera, until all independent variables are included in the equation or the tolerance limits set by the analyst are exceeded. For this analysis the tolerance limit is set at .05, an acceptable error in social science research, and is reported in the tolerance or F probability reported with each result. The regression procedure is repeated using each of the time lags to remain consistent with the findings reported earlier in this Chapter.

The results of the stepwise regression analysis for the period 1890 to 1940 are reported in Table 6:18.

TABLE 6:18
Stepwise Multiple Regressions Predicting From
Status Inconsistency (diplomatic indicator), Frustration, Desired Capability
and Threat to International Aggression: Japan 1890-1940

Period	Time Lag	Independent Variables Entered				Multiple R^2	F-level (tolerance)	Beta Weight
		Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4			
1890- 1940	0	Inconsis.	Frustration	Des. Capab.	Threat	.79 .86 .89 .91	58.09* 46.01* 37.94* 31.23*	-.90 -.29 -.17 .12
	1	Inconsis.	Frustration	Des. Capab.	Threat	.84 .89 .92 .93	80.54* 59.78* 50.52* 41.60*	-.92 -.25 -.16 .11
	2	Inconsis.	Frustration	Des. Capab.	Threat	.86 .90 .93 .94	94.75* 67.09* 60.33* 47.83*	-.93 -.23 -.17 .08
	3	Inconsis.	Threat	Des. Capab.	Frustration	.75 .77 .78 .80	44.73* 23.16* 15.81* 12.23*	-.87 .13 -.15 -.13
	5	Inconsis.	Threat	Frustration	Des. Capab.	.46 .48 .49 .51	12.56* 6.38* 4.20* 3.08	-.68 .13 -.14 .12

TABLE 6:18 (Continued)

Period Time Lag	Independent Variables Entered					Multiple R^2	F-level (tolerance)	Beta Weight
	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4				
1890- 1940	7	Inconsis.	Threat	Frustration	Des. Capab.	.40 .53 .54 .54	9.55* 8.02* 5.02* 3.50*	-.65 .38 -.04 .03
	10	Des. Capab.	Inconsis.	Frustration	Threat	.12 .18 .23 .25	2.01 1.55 1.27 .98	.31 -.26 -.20 .14
	15	Inconsis.	Des. Capab.	Frustration	Threat	.09 .17 .21 .21	1.46 1.47 1.17 .83	-.29 -.33 -.20 .06
	0	Frustration	Des. Capab.	Inconsis.		.21 .46 .54	1.82 2.57 1.98	-.23 -.67 .49
1890- 1913	1	Des. Capab.	Threat	Inconsis.	Frustration	.24 .29 .30 .34	2.22 1.22 .72 .51	-.30 -.21 -.37 -.31

TABLE 6:18 (Continued)

Period	Time Lag	Independent Variables Entered				Multiple R ₂	F-level (tolerance)	Beta Weight
		Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4			
1890- 1913	2	Des. Capab.	Inconsis.	Threat	Frustration	.30 .31 .31 .32	2.96 1.34 .76 .46	-.50 -.21 .07 -.09
	3	Des. Capab.	Frustration	Inconsis.	Threat	.39 .54 .60 .62	4.42 3.49 2.41 1.64	-.72 .65 .36 .19
	5	Des. Capab.	Frustration	Threat	Inconsis.	.89 .90 .91 .92	55.65* 27.14* 16.91* 11.09*	-.91 -.20 -.12 .15
	7	Inconsis.	Frustration	Des. Capab.		.85 .96 .96	38.35* 68.33* 38.16*	-1.32 -.52 .02
	10	Des. Capab.	Threat	Frustration	Inconsis.	.24 .26 .26 .29	2.25 1.03 .59 .41	.51 .14 -.29 -.30

TABLE 6:18 (Continued)

Period Time Lag Independent Variables Entered Multiple R₂ F-level (tolerance) Beta Weight

1918-1940	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4	Multiple R ₂	F-level (tolerance)	Beta Weight
	Des. Capab.	Frustration	Inconsis.				
	3				.63 .70 .71	10.20 * 6.05 * 3.26	-1.01 - .66 - .31
	5			Threat	.15 .84 .88 .91	1.05 13.20 * 9.75 * 8.02 *	- .73 -4.10 -3.32 - .34
	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4	Multiple R ₂	F-level (tolerance)	Beta Weight
	Des. Capab.	Frustration	Des. Capab.	Inconsis.			
	7				.37 .46 .59 .71	3.52 2.15 1.97 1.86	- .06 3.16 -1.01 4.26
	10			Frustration	.38 .80 .81 .81	3.75 * 10.06 * 5.57 3.30	1.40 -2.02 .21 - .97

TABLE 6:18 (Continued)

Period Time Lag	Independent Variables Entered				Multiple R ₂	F-level (tolerance)	Beta Weight
	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4			
1918- 1940	15	Des. Capab.	Frustration	Threat	.64 .64 .65 .66	10.48 4.53 2.44 1.44	- .89 1.32 - .21 1.36
				Inconsis.			

Key to Table 6:18

Index Designations

- Des. Capab. = Desired Capability
- Frustration = Frustration
- Threat = Threat
- Inconsis. = Inconsistency (diplomatic indicator of ascription)
- * = Statistically significant to .05

Before going on to discuss the results it is of benefit to point out that there are some difficulties and changes in assumptions when one moves from bivariate to multivariate analysis. Firstly, it is assumed that all independent variables are not highly intercorrelated. If they are, and there were some very high correlations reported for certain periods between predictor and intervening variables (Tables 6:10 to 6:12), then a condition called multicollinearity develops in the equation and it becomes difficult to distinguish between the effects of the separate variables and the R^2 value becomes artificially inflated. For these cases in particular, the effects of each explanatory variable are not distinguishable at all, with observed differences between variables being accounted for entirely by error variance (F level tolerance). Thus the decision to include all time lags, even when the correlations between independent variables is high, has resulted in some rather heavy and difficult to interpret Beta (standardized) regression weights; that is, beta weights in excess of 1.00. Where this is the case, it is wise not to draw too large an inference from the results.

Secondly, and perhaps more important, assumptions must be made in multiple regression analysis regarding

the residuals, or the difference scores between the actual values of the data points and their values as estimated in the regression equation. In multiple regression analysis it is assumed that the residuals are not related to each other. As Wallace (1970) has pointed out, this is equivalent to saying that there is no relationship between aggression at lag 0, and aggression at lag 1, or 2 or 3 et cetera. If this assumption is violated, as it is for the data used in this study, the regression equation will invariably yield higher amounts of variance explained, and lower amounts of residuals, thus the results will tend to be higher than those reported using bivariate methods. While these assumptions severely limit the interpretability of regression results, it should be remembered that this analysis seeks not only the amount of variance explained, but also probable casual relationships.

The Results

What indeed does appear when the whole period is examined is a good fit between status inconsistency and aggression at all time lags with the exception of lag 10 case where the fit between all predictor variables becomes moderate to low. Frustration is the next variable entered into the equation for the first three years, after which

either threat or desired capability play the greatest role in explaining the variance in Japan's international aggressive behaviour, the remaining two variables in the equation adding little or nothing after the first two steps, exactly as predicted in the theoretical framework of this study.

As table 6:18 shows, status inconsistency continues to predict negatively to international aggression for all time periods, confirming the results of bivariate testing. Statistically, this phenomenon seems to be explained by greater threat, as is the case from five to seven years, and/or desire for greater capability as is the case from zero to three years.

Significantly, the explanatory variable desired capability remains generally negative throughout, that is, an inverse relationship is shown between desired capability and international aggression. The direction of the signs confirm that indeed Japan's aggression toward the system was rewarded by territorial acquisition, and that, in dynamic terms, the Japanese desire for greater capability was being reduced rather than aggravated.

The results of the first sub-period from 1890 to 1913 tend to reinforce the explanatory value of the desired capability variable. With the exception of the lag 7 case, desired capability predicts to international aggression better than status inconsistency: the dynamic element in the variable signifying successful aggression during the period with a concomitant reduction in desired capability present. In almost every case the addition of other explanatory variables add little to the equation. The "necessary" condition "frustration" does not have significant effect on either aggression or desired capability, which tends to reinforce the efficacy of the modified Galtung model A.

Thus, the analysis tends to explain the results of earlier bivariate testing which showed little relationship between status inconsistency and aggression during this time period. The best fit occurs between desired capability and international aggression five years after the desire for greater capability is observed, thus allowing adequate time for military build-up to take place.

The findings for the sub-period from 1918 to 1940 are even more dramatic. Again desired capability registers highly for all but the lag 7 period where it is superceded by threat. In each case the second variable to be entered into the equation is either status inconsistency or frustration, which add considerably to the variance explained; this is particularly true at the lag 3, lag 5, lag 7 and lag 10 periods. The lag 15 period, which registered the highest during bivariate analysis, is explained almost totally by desired capability but must be interpreted with caution because of the low levels of statistical significance present.

It appears clear from the results of the multiple regression analysis that status inconsistency and desired capability are closely associated with increases in Japan's international aggression. It also appears clear that the two explanations of Japan's aggressive behaviour are supplemented by a third explanation, threat, after a seven year time lag for the sub-period 1918-1940, this latter explanatory condition being almost totally irrelevant for the earlier sub-period 1890-1913.

Regardless of what the multiple regression analysis clarifies, however, it still does not provide the answers to three vital questions: first, it will not reveal if these three explanations for Japan's aggressive behaviour are independent, or are artifacts of negative status inconsistency as hypothesized. Secondly, it does not allow determination of whether or not frustration is an intervening variable between status inconsistency and either one or both of the other explanatory variables, or thirdly, it does not clarify whether one or all of these variables are exogenous and influence aggression only indirectly, perhaps at some later point in time. Since all variables were entered into the regression equations independently, these questions may only be answered by examining the relationships jointly through dependence analysis.

Dependence Analysis

Dependence analysis allows for the tracing of causal relationships between variables, and is thus often referred to as path analysis. Being an extension of the path analytical techniques developed by Sewell Wright,⁽⁸⁾ its purpose is to decompose bivariate correlation coefficients into dependence coefficients,

or standardized partial regression coefficients. According to Wright (1934) standardized partial regression coefficients are "the fraction of the standard deviation of the dependent variable....for which the designed factors are responsible"⁽⁹⁾ when all other variables in the model are held constant. Dependence analysis allows therefore for a determination of the exact direct effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable.⁽¹⁰⁾

Thus it is possible to write in normal regression form the following equations regarding the relationships between our independent and dependent variables:

$$(i) \quad X_2 = A_{12}X_1 + E_2$$

$$(ii) \quad X_3 = A_{13}X_1 + A_{23}X_2 + E_3$$

$$(iii) \quad X_4 = A_{14}X_1 + A_{24}X_2 + A_{34}X_3 + E_4$$

$$(iv) \quad X_5 = A_{15}X_1 + A_{25}X_2 + A_{35}X_3 + A_{45}X_4 + E_5$$

Where X_1 equals the amount of aggression Japan displayed toward the East Asian sub-system, X_2 equals the amount of negative status inconsistency present, X_3 equals the amount of desired capability present, X_4 equals the amount of frustration present and X_5 equals the amount of threat.

present; the A's are the unstandardized regression co-efficients, and the E's are the error terms.

In order to convert A's into standardized partial regression coefficients (B's) we divide through by the ratio of the appropriate standard deviations (S) and obtain: (11)

$$(v) \quad X_3 = B_{13}(S_3/S_1)X_1 + B_{23}(S_3/S_2)X_2 + E_3$$

$$(vi) \quad X_4 = B_{14}(S_4/S_1)X_1 + B_{24}(S_4/S_2)X_2 + B_{34}(S_4/S_3)X_3 + E_4$$

$$(vii) \quad X_5 = B_{15}(S_5/S_1)X_1 + B_{24}(S_4/S_2)X_2 + B_{34}(S_4/S_3)X_3 + B_{45}(S_5/S_4)X_4 + E_5$$

Although indiscriminant analysis of this type is not necessary at this point in the analysis because of the relationships already discovered in earlier bivariate and multivariate analysis, the tracing of causal pathways linking the independent variables for the period 1890-1940 would not be complete without inclusion of the intervening variable threat which, because of its minimal contribution, could have been dropped from the equation, making unnecessary Step vii.

Similarly other variables could have been excluded for other periods, leaving a much simpler three of four variable model, but again not without loss of clarity. All assumptions and limitations that obtain to multiple

regression, it might be added, are unchanged for dependence analysis.

The Results:

The results of dependence testing differ little from the multivariate findings; status inconsistency does not predict directly to aggression except for the lag = 0 case, when the period 1890-1940 is examined as a whole. What the multivariate testing fails to show, however, is that the relationship between status inconsistency and aggression for the zero to lag = 3 cases is clearly mediated and enhanced by the Japanese desire for greater capability, as reported in table 6:19. Similarly the multivariate testing did not show both frustration and threat to be a function of desired capability rather than status inconsistency as hypothesized. Nor did it show that the only significant paths between status inconsistency and aggression when the entire 1890-1940 period is examined as a whole is with a time lag of three years or less, and even for these cases the path coefficients are low to moderate.

The results of dependence analysis for the sub-period 1890-1913 (reported in table 8:20) however, clearly show a close relationship between status inconsistency and desired capability for the first sub-period, the latter accounts for almost all (.94 or eighty-

Table 6:19

Dependence Analysis Predicting from Status Inconsistency (Diplomatic Indicator), Frustration, Desired Capability, and Threat to International Aggression: Japan 1890 - 1940

Where:

Incons	Status Inconsistency
Dcap	Desired Capability
Frus	Frustration
Threat	Threat
Aggress	International Aggression
Lag	Time Lag in Years

eight per-cent) of the former for every case year under analysis. While the indirect causal path to aggression - Status Inconsistency and Desired Capability - and - Status Inconsistency, Frustration and Desired Capability - is clearly evident as hypothesized, interestingly what is striking is the fact that there is a direct causal path shown between Status Inconsistency and Aggression for the entire period lag = 0 case, and very strong direct paths shown (1st sub-period) for the lag = 10 (.94) and lag = 7 (.78) case years.

Thus while status inconsistency contributes to the Japanese desire for greater capability, and ultimately to Japanese aggression (strongest with a lag = 3, 5, and 15 year time lag), it also contributes directly to international aggression (strongest with a seven to ten year time lag), and inversely to frustration, as indicated and explained during the partial correlation analysis. Significant also in the dependence analysis of the 1890 - 1913 sub-period is the fact that threat played little or no part in Japanese aggression despite the historical arguments to the contrary, and Japanese pronouncements of the period.¹⁴

Significantly, dependence analysis of the sub-period 1918 - 1940 (reported in table 6:21)

Table 6:20

Dependence Analysis Predicting from Status Inconsistency (Diplomatic Indicator), Frustration, Desired Capability, and Threat to International Aggression: Japan 1890 - 1913.

Where:

Incons	Status Inconsistency
Dcap	Desired Capability
Frus	Frustration
Threat	Threat
Aggress	International Aggression
Lag	Time Lag in Years.

similarly shows strong direct relationships for the five to fifteen year lag cases, the strongest being at lag = 15, but unlike the 1890 to 1913 sub-period, there is no direct relationship between status inconsistency and aggression for the lag = 0 to lag = 3 cases.

These findings are highly consistent with the findings of earlier multivariate results, but clarify the differences in Japanese perception before and after World War I, particularly insofar as motivation to aggress is concerned. Whereas desired capability had a direct effect on Japanese aggression before World War I, it indeed had an inverse effect on Japanese aggression after World War I, particularly for the lag = 3 to lag = 7 cases. Significantly, threat replaced desired capability as a motivator for Japanese aggression after World War I, particularly for the lag = 3 to lag = 7 cases. Thus, while status inconsistency was shown to have an effect on Japanese aggressive behavior for both sub-periods, dependence analysis has allowed a discrimination to be made, from which an explanation emerges not only of the type of inconsistency present, but also why that inconsistency resulted in aggression, and indeed

Table 6:21

Dependence Analysis Predicting from Status Inconsistency (Diplomatic Indicator), Frustration, Desired Capability, and Threat to International Aggression: Japan 1918 - 1940

Where:

Incons	Status Inconsistency
Dcap	Desired Capability
Frus	Frustration
Threat	Threat
Aggress	International Aggression
Lag	Time Lag in Years.

what motivated that aggression.

At the same time the results offer some basis from which to discuss the theoretical framework of this study. In the main the results confirm the efficacy of Galtung's theoretical postulations linking status inconsistency to international aggression, and clarify a relatively obscure segment of Galtung's Structural Theory of Aggression dealing with negative status inconsistency.

The first and perhaps most significant finding is that regarding the condition "frustration". Striking from the result of the dependence analysis for the entire period 1890-1940 (table 6:19), particularly, is the independence of the variable frustration. Indeed there is no significant causal path either to or from frustration and the other variables in the model. Though there is a clear and significant linkage reported in tables 6:20 and 6:21 between frustration and other elements in the model, the relative independence of the variable is maintained and no direct causal paths traced from status inconsistency to aggression as required by hypothesis five, referred to in this study as model B.

In the case of a negative status inconsistent actor, therefore, frustration is not a necessary intervening condition between status inconsistency and aggression: hypothesis five is disconfirmed.

On the other hand, the results of dependence analysis when the period is broken down into two sub-periods show that in the main either the explanatory condition desired capability and/or perceived threat is present for all cases, and time lags examined. Further, that one or both of these conditions acts upon or is acted upon by frustration while frustration is, in turn, being acted upon either directly or inversely, by negative status inconsistency. Thus, while the relationships in hypothesis four (Model A) are partly confirmed the frustration element of Model B must be retained, though as an explanatory and not necessary condition. Indeed from the results of the dependence analysis, it appears as if when either of the conditions desired capability or threat is significant, the element frustration is overruled, and may or may not form part of the explanatory equation.

At the same time a third path must be added to the model which is not explained by the theory, that being directly from status inconsistency to international aggression. The results of dependence analysis for the two sub-periods indicate that the strongest relationships between status inconsistency and international aggression occur directly with a seven and ten year time lag for the sub-period 1890-1913, and a fifteen year time lag for the sub-period 1918-1940. These results are consistent with those of the East (1971) and Wallace (1971) studies respectively. On the other hand, the strongest indirect (explained) relationships between negative status inconsistency and international aggression occur in both sub-periods with time lags of five years or less, the strongest being through desired capability with time lags of zero to three years for the 1918 to 1940 sub-period. This result is in full agreement with the results of the von Riekhoff (1970) finding.

Footnotes Pertaining to Chapter 6

Pages 152 to 211

1. Sidney Siegal, Non parametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (New York:1956)
2. Wallace, Status Inconsistency op.cit. pp. 104 - 105
3. Johan Galtung, "International Relations and International Conflicts: A Sociological Approach", Transactions of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology
4. Martin D Hyman, "Determining the Effects of Status Inconsistency" Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 30, 1966-67 pp. 120-129. See also Robert Edward Mitchell "Methodological Notes on a Theory of Status Crystallization" Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol 28, 1964 pp. 315 - 325 and N.J. Demerath III "Status Descrepancy and Verticle Status: Criticisms and Suggested Remedies", paper read to the American Sociological Association Meetings, Washington, D.C., 1962.
5. It should be noted that some authors have squared the inconsistency score (Ray: 1973) to predict a curvilinear relationship, that is exaggerating high levels of inconsistency and reducing low levels of inconsistency. Lenski (1956) op.cit. also used squared scores but for entirely different reasons. Lenski's procedure involved using the square root of the sum of the squared deviations form the mean of the variable scores, which he subtracted from 100.
6. Herbert M Blalock, "Causal Inferences, Closed Populations, and Measures of Association", H.M. Blalock (ed.) Causal Models in the Social Sciences (New York: 1971) pp. 139 - 152 and 335 - 347. See also H.M. Blalock "Evaluating the Relative Importance of Variables", Americal Sociological Review 261 (December) 1961 pp. 866 - 874; "Theory Building and the Statistical Concept of Interaction", American Sociological Review 30, 3 (june) 1965 pp. 374 - 380; "The Identification Problem and Theor Building: The Case of Status Inconsistency", American Sociological Review 31 (February) 1966 pp. 52 - 61.

7. A more detailed explanation of multiple regression analysis may be found in Carl F. Christ, Econometric Models and Methods (New York: 1966) Chapter 9.
8. Sewell Wright, "The Method of Path Coefficients" Annals of Mathematical Statistics, Vol. 5, (1934) pp. 161-215.
9. Ibid. p. 162.
10. Wallace, loc.cit. pp. 140-143.
11. Ibid. See also Wallace's 1972 work "Status Formal Organization" op.cit. p.59.

Chapter 7:

Summary and Conclusion:

The purpose of this final chapter is to give an overall summary of this work and make some assessment of the findings. Attention will be given to the historical issues involved, and the utility of using the case study approach to test what is basically a sociological, or group based theory.

Substantive Findings:

The objective of this work was to set forth a research design to test for a relationship between status inco-sistency and international aggression at the level of the nation state. This proposition was tested using two analytic procedures. The first established a compensatory model based on Galtung's notion of status compensation. Two measures of ascription, diplomatic importance, and race, were tested separately. The findings indicated that when the compensatory model was utilized, that is, when all dimensions within the status profile were equally weighted and the diplomatic indicator of ascription chosen, the strongest relationships appeared when a time lag of less than five years was introduced, the best correlations being at one and five years respectively for the whole period, and sub-period 1890-

1913. The best correlations for the sub-period 1918-1940 were found present when a seven year time lag was introduced. All significant correlations from this preliminary analysis were inverse, suggesting the presence of negative status inconsistency.

When the same model was utilized and the race indicator of ascription chosen, the strongest relationships remained when a time lag of five years or less was introduced for the whole period and sub-period 1890-1913. The results of bi-variate analysis for the 1918-1940 subperiod were similar to those using the diplomatic indicator of ascription, again inverse and strongest when a seven and fifteen year time lag was introduced. Because of the similarity of the results, race was deleted as an indicator of ascription.

A brief divergence was made to determine the direction of the inconsistency present in the Japanese case. Japan was found to be a negative inconsistent actor throughout the period under study. Hypothesis 3, which posited reduced international aggression when negative status inconsistency was present, was thus confirmed. Hypothesis 2 which posited a direct relationship between positive status

inconsistency and international aggression could not be tested.

✓ The presence of negative status inconsistency allowed for detailed and comprehensive examination of what is a rather vague area of Galtung's theory. Three explanatory conditions were adduced from Galtung's theoretical framework to explain why Japan, a negative inconsistent actor, would manifest externally directed (international) aggression.

The inclusion of the three explanatory conditions, frustration, desired capability and perceived threat, not only complicated the original bivariate model, but brought into question one of Galtung's crucial theoretical assumptions: that frustration is a necessary intervening condition between status inconsistency and aggression. Two models were formulated: Model "A" posited relationships in which frustration was not included as a necessary condition between negative status inconsistency and international aggression; Model "B", a pure Galtungian model, included frustration as a necessary condition between predictor and outcome variables.

Subsequent partial correlation results

showed that when the intervening variable frustration was controlled the fit between status inconsistency and international aggression was improved regardless of whether the temporal period was examined as a whole or as two sub-periods. Similarly, when desired capability was controlled the fit was enhanced by ten per cent for the sub-period 1918-1940 when a fifteen year time lag was introduced. The direction of the signs were both positive and negative, thus complicating the interpretation.

Having ascertained the relative independence (and relevance) of the explanatory variables, multiple regression techniques were employed to determine their relative significance - to each other, and to the predictor and outcome variables. The regressions showed that when the period was examined as a whole, status inconsistency predicted best, followed by frustration and desired capability or threat depending on which time period or lag year was being examined.

The strohgest correlations between desired capability and aggression occurred for the sub-period 1890 to 1913 with a time lag of five years and between threat and international aggression for the sub-period 1918-1940 with a time lag of 7 and 10 years.

These results still failed to answer three vital questions: first, were the explanatory variables acting independently upon Japan's aggressive behaviour, or were they a function of status inconsistency; secondly, was frustration a necessary intervening condition between status inconsistency and international aggression as hypothesized in Model B; and thirdly, was one or all of these explanatory conditions exogenous, and influencing aggression only indirectly, perhaps at some later point in time outside of the general model?

Dependence or path analysis showed that while frustration was not a necessary intervening condition between status inconsistency and aggression, it was present for most case years when the sub-periods were examined, and, in addition to being acted upon by one or both of the explanatory variables, desired capability and threat, was causally related directly or inversely

to negative status inconsistency. For the sub-period 1918-1940, for example, 77% of Japanese frustration was accounted for by negative status inconsistency. At the same time, however, there were no significant causal paths to or from frustration from desired capability or threat, and no direct causal paths from negative status inconsistency to aggression as required by Model "B".

When the whole period was broken down into two sub-periods, however, in the main, either the explanatory condition desired capability and/or perceived threat was found to be present. Further, that one or both of these conditions acts upon or is acted upon by frustration while frustration in turn is being acted upon directly or inversely by negative status inconsistency. Thus while Model "B" was disconfirmed, frustration must be retained as an explanatory though not a necessary condition between negative status inconsistency and international aggression. From the result of the dependence analysis it appears as if when either of the conditions desired capability or threat is significant, the element frustration is overruled, and may or may not form part of the

explanatory equation. This is particularly obvious when the direction of the signs is examined. Frustration acts inversely for the sub-period 1890-1913 for example, but directly for the sub-period 1918-1940. Frustration also appears as causally related to desired capability during the first sub-period, but is not related whatever to Japanese frustration during the interwar period.

Coupling this with the direction of the signs for the causal linkage between desired capability and aggression it becomes apparent that threat, not desired capability becomes the main direct cause of Japanese international aggression for the second sub-period. The relationship is strongest between perceived threat and international aggression when a seven year time lag is introduced (.57). It is also significant that the threat indicator is almost completely exogenous, being acted upon only marginally and inversely by frustration. The direct paths between negative status inconsistency and international aggression, which appear as significant when a seven year time lag is introduced for the 1890-1913 sub-period, and when a ten and fifteen year time lag is introduced for the 1918-1940 sub-period, are beyond the theoretical premises of this study but

will be commented on below.

On the whole, however, the results of quantitative analysis are consistent with the history of Japan. As pointed out in Chapter 2, the sub-period 1890-1913 was one in which Japanese statesmen and opinion leaders alike spoke of establishing the national honour through achievements in science, education, the arts of war, trade and fiscal growth. Imperial expansion was viewed as necessary, and desirable. Military force expenditures were increased, particularly after Japan was denied territorial acquisitions on the Asian mainland by the triple intervention of Russia, France and Germany in 1895. Territorial expansion for increased capability remained desirable at least until 1922 when Japan was forced to withdraw from Siberia by pressure from Great Britain and the United States.

After the frustrations of the diplomatic failure on the racial equality clause, the discriminatory immigration legislation in the United States, and the growth of a military threat from the United States, Soviet Russia, and the revitalized Kowmintang army of China against Japanese interests on the Asian main-

land, however, the desire for territorial acquisition likely became tempered by the threat from the system. The seizure of Manchuria and creation of Manchukuo in 1932 could well contribute to the inverse relationship between desired capability and international aggression shown in the dependence analysis. It seems highly likely that the desire for increased capability through territorial acquisition would be reduced following the seizure and that this could have had a negative effect on Japanese aggression.

Though, historically, Japanese aggression continued after the Manchurian seizure, the results of the dependence analysis suggest that that aggression was at least partly in response to a perceived threat from the system, and partly through some other artifact(s) of status inconsistency not explained by the theoretical structure of this study. One may only speculate what the artifact(s) may be, but "loss of face", a "pure" status notion not considered in this study seems a most likely alternative, particularly in view of the long time lag involved (ten to fifteen years). The discrimination of 1922, Versailles, and Siberia could well have reflected on Manchukuo and later acts of Japanese aggression, for it should be remembered, status inconsistency is a

systemic concept which in international relations is concerned with a whole population. A generation socialized to rebel from youth to demonstrate systemic injustice could well respond ten to fifteen years later with violence. Such systemic injustice must have appeared obvious in Japan following World War I, and Japanese aggressive behaviour ten to fifteen years later based on that socialization is not beyond the realm of speculation.

Without resort to plausible unprovable postulations however, the results of this study are both historically and intuitively satisfying. On the whole they signify a potentially fruitful, though now seldom used approach in international relations: the case study. They also highlight the relative explanatory power of Johan Galtung's "Structural Theory of Aggression", and point to other areas of potentially satisfying research. While some of the variables selected for this study are of particular relevance to Japan, and would not apply equally to other nations, the basic methodology could be readily applied to other temporal and spatial domains. When blended, a number of case studies such as this could yield significant insight into man's aggression against his fellow man.

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Appendix I

Monetary Exchange Rate Conversion Tables: 1890-1913⁽¹⁾ & 1918-1940⁽²⁾

Year	China	U.S.	Russia	Germany	Japan	U.K.	France	Italy
1890	0.85	0.80	0.08	0.80	0.74	0.85	0.85	0.84
1891	0.85	0.79	0.08	0.80	0.74	0.85	0.85	0.84
1892	0.85	0.84	0.08	0.80	0.74	0.85	0.85	0.84
1893	0.85	0.85	0.08	0.80	0.74	0.85	0.85	0.84
1894	0.85	0.86	0.08	0.80	0.74	0.85	0.85	0.84
1895	0.85	0.86	0.08	0.80	0.74	0.85	0.85	0.84
1896	0.85	0.89	0.08	0.80	0.74	0.85	0.85	0.84
1897	0.85	0.83	0.82	0.82	0.74	0.85	0.85	0.84
1898	0.85	0.88	0.82	0.84	0.74	0.85	0.85	0.84
1899	0.85	0.81	0.82	0.86	0.74	0.85	0.85	0.84
1900	0.85	0.80	0.82	0.88	0.74	0.86	0.84	0.84
1901	0.85	0.79	0.84	0.82	0.72	0.83	0.84	0.84
1902	0.84	0.84	0.81	0.82	0.72	0.83	0.81	0.81
1903	0.84	0.85	0.78	0.81	0.75	0.83	0.81	0.81
1904	0.84	0.86	0.81	0.84	0.80	0.84	0.77	0.77
1905	0.84	0.86	0.84	0.87	0.86	0.84	0.80	0.80

Year	China	U.S.	Russia	Germany	Japan	U.K.	France	Italy
1906	0.84	0.89	0.91	0.89	0.84	0.87	0.83	0.83
1907	0.85	0.93	0.96	1.00	0.90	0.91	0.90	0.90
1908	0.85	0.90	0.92	0.94	0.90	0.88	0.97	0.87
1909	0.92	0.97	0.94	0.93	0.87	0.89	0.88	0.88
1910	0.91	1.01	0.94	0.91	0.89	0.93	0.88	0.88
1911	0.89	0.93	0.96	0.96	0.93	0.94	0.95	0.95
1912	1.02	0.99	1.02	1.08	0.99	0.99	1.03	1.03
1913	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
1919	1.91	0.90	-	4.15	2.49	2.49	4.50	4.50
1920	1.70	1.00	-	14.86	2.59	3.07	5.90	5.90
1921	1.04	1.40	-	19.11	2.00	1.97	3.45	5.41
1922	1.14	1.38	-	342.00	1.96	1.59	3.27	5.45
1923	1.15	1.44	1.34	-	1.99	1.59	4.18	5.50
1924	1.10	1.41	1.72	-	2.06	1.66	4.89	5.47
1925	1.14	1.48	1.82	1.42	2.02	1.59	5.50	6.13
1926	1.20	1.43	1.90	1.34	1.79	1.48	7.02	6.25
1927	1.35	1.37	1.83	1.38	1.70	1.42	6.16	5.26
1928	1.40	1.39	1.79	1.40	1.71	1.40	6.19	5.08
1929	1.53	1.36	1.75	1.37	1.66	1.37	6.10	4.85

Year	China	U.S.	Russia	Germany	Japan	U.K.	France	Italy
1930	-	1.24	1.71	1.25	1.37	1.20	5.32	4.34
1931	8.40	1.04	1.71	1.11	1.16	1.05	4.52	3.79
1932	1.60	0.93	1.73	0.96	1.22	1.02	3.99	3.54
1933	5.40	0.94	2.21	0.93	1.36	1.02	3.81	3.22
1934	5.42	1.07	2.66	0.99	1.35	1.05	3.59	3.15
1935	5.42	1.15	2.71	1.01	1.40	1.06	3.40	3.46
1936	5.42	1.16	3.57	1.04	1.50	1.13	3.96	3.88
1937	5.42	1.24	3.93	1.06	1.81	1.30	5.52	4.53
1938	5.42	1.13	4.04	1.06	1.90	1.21	6.27	4.84
1939	5.42	1.10	4.29	1.06	2.17	1.23	6.58	5.05
1940	5.42	1.13	4.75	1.10	2.37	1.63	8.64	5.89

Exchange Rate in Dollars: 1913

1.00 dollar = 0.21 pounds = 5.25 francs = 5.32 lira = 4.30 marks
 = 2.04 yens = 1.99 rubles = 1.37 teals

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Appendix II

Cotton Manufactures Exported in British Pounds Standardized to 1913 value								
Year	U.S.	U.K.	France	Germany	Italy	China	Japan	Russia
1890	3412500	88941176	5190964	10294716	298571	215482	693163	721727
1891	3616519	93058823	4795011	8994746	319428	194332	909183	860985
1892	3306500	89176470	4493270	9640260	511476	231100	812496	1127840
1893	2917518	89882352	4727388	9462635	705666	214002	1191730	1213302
1894	3501872	85529411	5320046	8702890	798571	291810	1391433	909877
1895	3367325	78823529	5563364	11288436	970619	231776	1162229	1200582
1896	3972775	81055231	6185647	10213621	1209666	146117	1670270	1218867
1897	5322867	83529411	5615435	10617821	1110904	218823	2275743	1539973
1898	4162545	84705882	6058305	10542660	1850428	221294	2755945	1540102
1899	4062545	84705882	6058305	10594266	1850428	221294	2755945	1540102
1900	5372629	82941176	8457176	11783018	2020428	217235	3270945	1336603
1901	5388759	86024096	8397571	13164567	2522142	215470	3965642	2160254
1902	8026999	79518072	8658370	15524096	2458518	175714	3838037	2251387
1903	7959246	76867469	8913037	18288130	3326765	174607	5490622	2840120
1904	7912604	79285714	10885714	19688433	4688935	255892	4985457	2752597
1905	12127744	75833333	12693900	21457494	4179500	272142	5669311	2589176
1906	12492046	79770114	14745445	21641648	5187421	421964	6703338	2891700

Year	U.S.	U.K.	France	Germany	Italy	China	Japan	Russia
1907	7294677	70329670	15631822	21169911	5154933	208235	5639593	2371639
1908	5874866	73750000	12903678	18253334	4204459	226235	4227463	2359536
1909	6901639	75842696	15066136	16949100	5130272	292336	6021948	2638836
1910	6943930	75053763	14877408	19661869	6321909	318131	8471460	2837078
1911	9224645	78404255	14038147	19984760	7516757	452190	8970671	3312500
1912	11125969	73232323	14939805	19137222	7457514	342352	9305581	3924390
1913	11028990	73600000	15420000	21875000	9947000	389250	10774222	4652870
1919	6372566	85578310	6951395	-	10270435	616649	16932470	-
1920	8442861	118340050	13590908	-	12658847	621970	19381498	-
1921	17585849	81754822	28513646	-	6855831	1071057	14643561	-
1922	21106520	111152630	25192917	-	8349836	991710	12442767	-
1923	20489583	106918230	18232500	-	8905454	1020652	14159135	1423880
1924	21193615	120000000	15342331	-	8745886	995454	13711599	2218604
1925	21170270	125408800	17054545	11118028	10792822	919342	14813133	2213186
1926	20412587	104256750	15754985	13712680	12206400	922999	20139664	2231578
1927	20846715	104788730	18506493	14158510	13688120	830988	22114705	2548633
1928	20341899	103785710	18777246	14901179	14669291	895939	22915662	2946740
1929	20845588	98102189	17796138	15211817	15241237	797745	27426045	2946497
1930	15072580	73000000	16135338	14033600	12682027	926097	21709994	2888654
1931	12115384	53904761	12513274	16686486	10448548	885714	18557758	2876257

Year	U.S.	U.K.	France	Germany	Italy	China	Japan	Russia
1932	10387096	61666666	9734335	6890625	8214689	2953125	26340983	3051329
1933	8712765	22450980	10141732	5910175	7527950	1749999	30369852	1429321
1934	8439252	56285714	9058496	4009090	6171428	911400	39521481	928496
1935	7121739	52075471	8447580	3687128	5028901	537600	39360714	629741
1936	6788793	47061150	7171718	2921153	3958762	527100	36118666	1823080
1937	6977419	58000000	5826087	3975471	9624724	350700	35964640	1936590
1938	8362831	74381650	5741626	3744339	8123966	882000	24177894	2203960
1939	744554	48780487	6686930	3651886	5900990	840000	16612903	2174350
1940	7619468	19631901	3240741	3474545	6689303	735000	13037974	2008421

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