1

PM-1 3½"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

PRECISION^{SM} RESOLUTION TARGETS

EXPLORING NEW ALTERNATIVES FOR
CULTURAL POLICY IN CANADA:
THE CASE OF YOUTH AND CULTURAL PRODUCTION

by

Ian C. Kenney, B.P.A.

A thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts in Canadian Studies

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
May 6, 1996

© Ian C. Kenney, 1996

National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your file   Votre référence

Our file   Notre référence

The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

ISBN 0-612-13800-3

Canada

Name

Ian C. Kenney

Dissertation Abstracts International is arranged by broad, general subject categories. Please select the one subject which most nearly describes the content of your dissertation. Enter the corresponding four-digit code in the spaces provided.

Canadian Studies

SUBJECT TERM

0385

U·M·I

SUBJECT CODE

Subject Categories

THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

COMMUNICATIONS AND THE ARTS

Architecture	0729
Art History	0377
Cinema	0900
Dance	0378
Fine Arts	0357
Information Science	0723
Journalism	0391
Library Science	0399
Mass Communications	0708
Music	0413
Speech Communication	0459
Theater	0465

EDUCATION

General	0515
Administration	0514
Adult and Continuing	0516
Agricultural	0517
Art	0273
Bilingual and Multicultural	0282
Business	0688
Community College	0275
Curriculum and Instruction	0727
Early Childhood	0518
Elementary	0524
Finance	0277
Guidance and Counseling	0519
Health	0680
Higher	0745
History of	0520
Home Economics	0778
Industrial	0521
Language and Literature	0279
Mathematics	0280
Music	0522
Philosophy of	0998
Physical	0523

Psychology	0525
Reading	0535
Religious	0527
Sciences	0714
Secondary	0533
Social Sciences	0534
Sociology of	0340
Special	0529
Teacher Training	0530
Technology	0710
Tests and Measurements	0288
Vocational	0747

LANGUAGE, LITERATURE AND LINGUISTICS

Language	
General	0679
Ancient	0289
Linguistics	0290
Modern	0291
Literature	
General	0401
Classical	0294
Comparative	0295
Medieval	0297
Modern	0298
African	0316
American	0591
Asian	0305
Canadian (English)	0352
Canadian (French)	0355
English	0593
Germanic	0311
Latin American	0312
Middle Eastern	0315
Romance	0313
Slavic and East European	0314

PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION AND THEOLOGY

Philosophy	0422
Religion	
General	0318
Biblical Studies	0321
Clergy	0319
History of	0320
Philosophy of	0322
Theology	0469

SOCIAL SCIENCES

American Studies	0323
Anthropology	
Archaeology	0324
Cultural	0326
Physical	0327
Business Administration	
General	0310
Accounting	0272
Banking	0770
Management	0454
Marketing	0338
Canadian Studies	0385
Economics	
General	0501
Agricultural	0503
Commerce-Business	0505
Finance	0508
History	0509
Labor	0510
Theory	0511
Folklore	0358
Geography	0366
Gerontology	0351
History	
General	0578

Ancient	0579
Medieval	0581
Modern	0582
Black	0328
African	0331
Asia, Australia and Oceania	0332
Canadian	0334
European	0335
Latin American	0336
Middle Eastern	0333
United States	0337
History of Science	0585
Law	0398
Political Science	
General	0615
International Law and Relations	0616
Public Administration	0617
Recreation	0814
Social Work	0452
Sociology	
General	0626
Criminology and Penology	0627
Demography	0938
Ethnic and Racial Studies	0631
Individual and Family Studies	0628
Industrial and Labor Relations	0629
Public and Social Welfare	0630
Social Structure and Development	0700
Theory and Methods	0344
Transportation	0709
Urban and Regional Planning	0999
Women's Studies	0453

THE SCIENCES AND ENGINEERING

BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES

Agriculture	
General	0473
Agronomy	0285
Animal Culture and Nutrition	0475
Animal Pathology	0476
Food Science and Technology	0359
Forestry and Wildlife	0478
Plant Culture	0479
Plant Pathology	0480
Plant Physiology	0817
Range Management	0777
Wood Technology	0746
Biology	
General	0306
Anatomy	0287
Biostatistics	0308
Botany	0309
Cell	0379
Ecology	0329
Entomology	0353
Genetics	0369
Limnology	0793
Microbiology	0410
Molecular	0307
Neuroscience	0317
Oceanography	0416
Physiology	0433
Radiation	0821
Veterinary Science	0778
Zoology	0472
Biophysics	
General	0786
Medical	0760
EARTH SCIENCES	
Biogeochemistry	0425
Geochemistry	0996

Geodesy	0370
Geology	0372
Geophysics	0373
Hydrology	0388
Mineralogy	0411
Paleobotany	0345
Paleocology	0426
Paleontology	0418
Paleozoology	0985
Polynology	0427
Physical Geography	0368
Physical Oceanography	0415

HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES

Environmental Sciences	0768
Health Sciences	
General	0566
Audiology	0300
Chemotherapy	0992
Dentistry	0567
Education	0350
Hospital Management	0769
Human Development	0758
Immunology	0982
Medicine and Surgery	0564
Mental Health	0347
Nursing	0569
Nutrition	0570
Obstetrics and Gynecology	0380
Occupational Health and Therapy	0354
Ophthalmology	0381
Pathology	0571
Pharmacology	0419
Pharmacy	0572
Physical Therapy	0382
Public Health	0573
Radiology	0574
Recreation	0575

Speech Pathology	0460
Toxicology	0383
Home Economics	0386

PHYSICAL SCIENCES

Pure Sciences	
Chemistry	
General	0485
Agricultural	0749
Analytical	0486
Biochemistry	0487
Inorganic	0488
Nuclear	0738
Organic	0490
Pharmaceutical	0491
Physical	0494
Polymer	0495
Radiation	0754
Mathematics	0405
Physics	
General	0605
Acoustics	0986
Astronomy and Astrophysics	0606
Atmospheric Science	0608
Atomic	0748
Electronics and Electricity	0607
Elementary Particles and High Energy	0798
Fluid and Plasma	0759
Molecular	0609
Nuclear	0610
Optics	0752
Radiation	0756
Solid State	0611
Statistics	0463
Applied Sciences	
Applied Mechanics	0346
Computer Science	0984

Engineering	
General	0537
Aerospace	0538
Agricultural	0539
Automotive	0540
Biomedical	0541
Chemical	0542
Civil	0543
Electronics and Electrical	0544
Heat and Thermodynamics	0348
Hydraulic	0545
Industrial	0546
Marine	0547
Materials Science	0794
Mechanical	0548
Metallurgy	0743
Mining	0551
Nuclear	0552
Packaging	0549
Petroleum	0765
Sanitary and Municipal	0554
System Science	0790
Geotechnology	0428
Operations Research	0796
Plastics Technology	0795
Textile Technology	0994
PSYCHOLOGY	
General	0621
Behavioral	0384
Clinical	0622
Developmental	0620
Experimental	0623
Industrial	0624
Personality	0625
Physiological	0989
Psychobiology	0349
Psychometrics	0632
Social	0451

**The undersigned recommend to the Faculty
of Graduate Studies and Research acceptance of the thesis**

**"Exploring New Alternatives for
Cultural Policy in Canada:
The Case of Youth and Cultural Production"**

**submitted by Ian C. Kenney, B.P.A.
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts**

.....
Thesis Supervisor

.....
Director
School of Canadian Studies

**Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
April 1996**

Abstract

In this thesis, elements of cultural studies, subcultural theory, media and consumer studies are applied to the cultural lives of young Canadians. Culture is defined as the product of the interaction of cultural artifacts with the material existence of their "consumers." The process of cultural production is, thus, divided into a primary phase, consisting of the creation of artifacts by "legitimate creators," and a secondary phase, in which these artifacts are re-worked. Through this process, young Canadians create their cultural location and give symbolic expression to it. Applying this analysis to the models of cultural development currently practised by governments operating in Ottawa reveals that intervention privileges the primary phase and, thus, under-utilizes the one model which stresses the secondary phase: the community development/animation model. The thesis proposes a return to this model as a framework within which new alternatives for intervention may be identified.

Acknowledgements

I would very much like to thank Dr. John Shepherd of the School for Studies in Art and Culture for introducing me to much of the theory presented here, and for guiding me through the rocky waters of researching and writing this thesis, while still leaving the rudder firmly in my hands. I could not have hoped for a better supervisor.

Thanks are also due to Jennifer Giles of the Music Department. Your support over the last two years has been wonderful. You're the best prof I never had!

I also thank my parents who I am sure have developed their own theories on youth culture based on twenty years of close (probably closer than they would have preferred) personal observation. In particular, I dedicate the work invested in this project to the memory of my father (I wish you were here to see this!).

And last, but certainly not least, I thank my wife, soul-mate and best friend Beth whose unquestioning support of seemingly everything I do has helped me through two degrees, two fields of study, two universities and two cities, not to mention the countless crises in confidence and numerous challenges along the way. If only I had as much faith in myself as you do! I hope we can *both* be proud of what is presented here.

--- Ian Kenney

Table of Contents

<u>Abstract</u>	iii
<u>Acknowledgements</u>	iv
<u>Table of Contents</u>	v
<u>Introduction</u>	1
Youth and Culture	3
The Work of this Thesis	5
<u>Chapter One</u>	
The Study of Cultural Policy	7
The Four "Profound Forces"	10
The Political and Economic Marginalization of Youth in Canada	15
Cultural Policy Studies: The Theoretical Location	18
Conclusion: "A <i>Rapprochement</i> "	23
<u>Chapter Two</u>	
Practice: The Cultural Lives of Young People	25
Cultural Studies	32
Subcultural Theory	39
Transplanting the Model	48
The "New Existentialism"	55
Conclusion	64
<u>Chapter Three</u>	
Policy: The Approaches to Cultural Development in Canada	68
Normative Content in Public Policy	69
The Philosophies of Cultural Development in Canada	72
The Dominant Paradigm: A "Top-Down" Approach	85

Specific Objectives:	
The Privileging of the "Legitimate Creator"	90
Conclusion	98
 Chapter Four	
The Gaps: Bridging the Distance Between Policy and Practice	100
The Impact of the Paradigm on Youth	102
Applying the Lessons Learned	107
Conclusion	112
<u>Bibliography</u>	116

Introduction

In industrialized countries such as Canada, cultural production has come to be seen as a specialized task: the "creation" of culture is often seen as the job of a "cultural worker." Consequently, cultural policies tend to be preoccupied with measures aimed at professional artists, organizations and firms specializing in the production of cultural "goods," despite occasional rhetorical references to culture as a "whole way of life." These measures include patronage of many kinds, including subsidies to artists and arts groups, the creation of cultural institutions with the mandate to promote Canadian creators, and status of the artist legislation recently enacted at the federal level. In Canada, this preoccupation has been further coloured by the country's geographical, economic, political and cultural location vis-à-vis the rest of the world. This has resulted in many reactive cultural policies and programmes aimed at *correcting* what are seen as failures in the cultural marketplace; a marketplace which frequently leaves little room for Canadian "stories" or Canadian "voices." Therefore, Canadian cultural programmes also include, for example, content quotas for Canadian broadcasters, customs code regulations aimed at protecting the domestic magazine industry, and financial support to film and television productions which have been officially recognized as being sufficiently "Canadian."

In many cases, these measures have been successful in reaching their stated objectives: the creation of a space for Canadian "voices." But the effectiveness of most of these measures is now being undermined, resulting in a renewed threat to Canadian voices. Economic, political, technological

and socio-cultural changes in recent years have resulted in an undermining of the means through which the state has historically intervened in the cultural sphere. Economic changes both in government revenues and in the structure of the cultural industries have made the emphasis on domestic ownership of cultural firms largely ineffective; political changes are threatening the very legitimacy of the welfare-state and, consequently, the very existence of state support for culture; technological developments have made the regulation of the flow of cultural goods into Canada difficult, if not impossible in many cases; and socio-cultural changes, such as those commonly associated with the "postmodern condition," continue to challenge our thinking about the very purpose of cultural intervention.

However, if the role of the state is to mediate between the interests of capital and the interests of its citizens, it still has an important role to play in the cultural sphere. Otherwise, there is the risk that the inequities created in an increasingly "user-pay" society will only be extended to the cultural realm. A democratic state which claims to address the needs of all of its citizens retains some responsibility to minimize the negative effects of these changes. Accordingly, the decline in the effectiveness of cultural intervention does not necessarily suggest that there is no longer a role for the state, but suggests instead that cultural objectives need to be re-considered, and new ways of achieving those objectives need to be found in the context of a changed environment.

To determine what alternatives may exist requires a thorough understanding of the actual mechanics of culture in this new environment.

This requires analysis which is grounded in the lived cultural practices of groups and individuals in order to answer a number of important questions: for example, what significance do the products of the mass media have in the everyday cultural lives of their consumers? How are these products "consumed"? How is culture "created" from these products? Can the "production of culture" only be achieved by specialized "cultural workers"? If not, are there then new points at which state support could be directed?

Youth and Culture

While many groups could have been chosen for a "grounded analysis," young people were chosen as the focus of the thesis for a number of reasons. First, young people are thought to have a privileged relationship with the products of the mass media, placing youth at the leading edge of a society which is becoming increasingly "mediatized." Secondly, as a result of their cultural practices, a large body of literature has been generated on the specific activities of youth culture on which conclusions about the nature of cultural consumption can be based. Thirdly, many of the socio-economic problems facing Canadians as a whole are more pronounced in young people: for example, high unemployment and the "postmodern condition" (Pacom 1995). Therefore, an analysis of the impact of these problems on Canadian youth may point to some broader conclusions about how these problems may be experienced by Canadians in general.

The literature on youth culture shows that young people are enormously productive culturally, albeit in ways which do not fit our

traditional conceptions of cultural production. The products of popular culture, that is, of the mass media and the cultural industries, serve as the "raw materials" with which the cultural identity of young people is forged. As numerous examples from English subcultural theory illustrate, these raw materials are reworked to suit the particular cultural location of the "consumer," perhaps resulting in different meanings being assigned to a cultural artifact than might have been intended by the artifact's creator (Hebdige 1979, Willis 1978, Clarke 1976). Similarly, the literature reveals the enormous ability on the part of young people to be creative in their everyday lives, although in ways which do not lend themselves easily to government support (Willis 1990). Furthermore, the nature of young people's participation in many popular cultural forms illustrates that culture is not comprised solely of artifacts, but social processes as well (Frith 1981, 1988, 1992, Stith Bennett 1979, Arnett 1995, Wicke 1987). State support, therefore, is aimed at only a small part of the cultural production process.

The research into the relationship between youth and their cultural environment suggests that cultural production does not stop with the arrival of a cultural artifact in the hands of the consumer; the process instead continues well after the artifact has reached its audience. Therefore, the "consumers" of cultural goods are themselves "producers." At the very least, the literature on young people and their relationship with cultural artifacts provides justification for a closer examination of cultural production by individuals and groups *other* than specialized artists or cultural workers. Furthermore, an opportunity may exist for state intervention to be targeted at this stage in the cultural production

process, that is, after a cultural product has been delivered to its audience.

The Work of this Thesis

This thesis will argue that a response to the challenges which are currently undermining the effectiveness of cultural policy interventions in Canada may be to place less emphasis on the specialized creators of cultural works, and more on the "creative consumer." This change of emphasis could result in new forms of cultural expression, greater consideration of amateurs as "creators" of culture, and more effective means of achieving cultural development objectives. This possibility will be explored by: i) examining the nature of the cultural lives of young people, particularly their role as consumers of the products of the mass media and popular culture in general, drawing on existing research from Canada and abroad in youth culture and in subcultural theory; ii) illustrating the approaches with which various levels of government in Canada have intervened in the cultural sphere; and iii) identifying elements within the cultural practice of youth which may serve as the focus of new approaches to cultural development that place more emphasis on support to the cultural "consumer" and the active participation in cultural activities.

Because it would be impractical to examine the policies of each municipality in Canada, Ottawa was chosen as the principal focus for this research. Ottawa is the fourth largest Census Metropolitan Area in Canada with a total regional population of just under one million, making it

about average in terms of size of metropolitan areas: large enough to be in a financial position to offer support to cultural programmes at the local level, but not so large that local cultural production is dominated by large-scale, commercial productions as might be the case in Toronto, Montreal or Vancouver. Since all of these governments intervene in the cultural life of Ottawa residents, the policies of the federal government, the Government of Ontario, the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton and the City of Ottawa will be examined.

Chapter One

The Study of Cultural Policy

The term "cultural policy" is known to be quite ambiguous. Miller writes that the word "policy" is "usually taken to refer to a systematized, regularized and regulatory position statement or guide for action that has been adopted by an organization as an instrument for achieving a goal. In short, it is bureaucratic, not creative or organic" (Miller 1994:264). Similarly, Fortier and Schafer have identified two definitions: "un ensemble de principes opérationnels, de pratiques et de procédés de gestion administrative ou budgétaire devant servir de base à l'action culturelle de l'État"¹ (citing UNESCO 1970) or "un ensemble de finalités (à long terme), d'objectifs quantifiables (à moyen terme) et de moyens (en hommes, en crédits ou en dispositions juridiques) qui sont explicites et cohérents entre eux"² (citing Girard 1972) (Fortier and Schafer 1989:1). However, "culture" is among the most ambiguous of words; certainly, no discussion about cultural policy would be complete without a discussion of the various understandings of the word that can come into play. At one end of the spectrum is the "artistic" understanding which refers to the creative output of a particular individual, group or community which is then judged by aesthetic criteria. At the other is the more "anthropological" understanding which refers to how we live our

---

¹ "A group of operating principals, administrative or budgetary practices or procedures serving the state's actions in the cultural sphere."

² "A group of goals (long-term), quantifiable objectives (medium-term) and means (in people, incentives, or legal instruments) which are explicit and consistent."

lives. Thus, it is not uncommon for those engaged in a discussion of culture to be discussing very different concepts. So, while "policy" may be practical, quantifiable and systematic, there will not be a clear sense of what the ultimate objective of cultural policy should become as long as the word "culture" remains ambiguous, thus confusing any thorough understanding of what instruments should be used to reach that goal.

In Canada, the principal justification for cultural intervention has, for the most part, focused on cultural development as it relates to the construction of a national culture and a national identity. But, as Raboy *et al.* write, "public policy should rather, in our view, seek to promote cultural development because it is essential to democratic public life" (Raboy *et al.* 1994:310). However, the understanding of cultural development itself suffers from a similar ambiguity which only further frustrates efforts in an already difficult field. Cultural development means to some the development of cultural industries, whereas for others, the notion of cultural development is more consistent with the idea of social development, according to which the cultural industries may then act as "means" to an "end." Lorimer and Duxbury, in their introduction to a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Communication (Summer/Autumn 1994) devoted to the problems of cultural development in an open economy, defined cultural development quite simply as the "enhancement of culture" (1994:261). This definition, however, does not resolve the ambiguities associated with the word "culture": it could refer either to the enhancement of our "whole way of life" or, more narrowly, to the enhancement of particular artistic activities, depending on the understanding of culture that is used.

Somewhat more precisely, Raboy *et al.* (in the same volume as Lorimer and Duxbury) define cultural development as "the process by which human beings acquire the individual and collective resources necessary to participate in public life" (1994:292). The advantage of this particular definition is that it recognizes that the focus of cultural intervention should ultimately be the individual or groups which make up the public as opposed to the cultural industries or the cultural community. It reminds us that the ultimate success of cultural development must be measured not by the health of the cultural "sector" but by the health of the cultural lives of the citizens in whose interests the state claims to act.

There is now more than ever a need for an improved understanding of culture and the role of the state in cultural development, because of the serious challenges currently facing cultural policy in Canada, and indeed around the world. The traditional instruments of cultural intervention - expenditure, taxation, regulation, public ownership (see Globerman 1983, and Doern and Phidd 1983) - are all under attack in the current political and economic environment. Thus, cultural policy advocates and critics alike are calling for fundamental changes to the traditional role of the state in the cultural sphere, ranging from an increased presence by the state at one extreme to outright withdrawal from the cultural sphere at the other. There is, therefore, more than ever a need to clarify our understanding of culture, in all its aspects, in order to move towards an identification of the ultimate objectives and instruments of cultural policy. Only once the destination is identified can the discussion then turn to the manner in which to reach it. The problem, however, is that much of cultural policy-making is done without much attention being paid

to the mechanics of culture as it is understood within cultural theory (see, for example, Cunningham 1992).

The Four "Profound Forces"

The period of transition in which cultural policy-making currently finds itself is the result of four forces, all of which are seriously undermining the ability of the state to intervene effectively in the cultural sphere. These forces are technological, economic, political, and socio-cultural (Skinner and Robinson 1994). Technological change can be seen most readily in the cultural industries or the "mass media." Because the markets for the cultural industries are considered to be saturated, new technologies are seen as one of the few remaining ways for the industries to expand (Secor 1994:20). This sort of change in distribution will dramatically change how the cultural industries earn their profit, as well as undermine the existing methods available to the state to regulate their activity. The creators of a cultural artifact may soon have a direct link to the consumer, bypassing the need entirely for intermediaries such as a sound recording or film company (see, for example, Boehm 1995). Thus, relying on support to these distributors of cultural symbols to achieve cultural policy objectives may soon be out-of-date.

Economic change is found in many areas. It is particularly evident in its effect on the state's traditional role as a patron of the arts. Budgets for various arts funding agencies, such as the Canada Council and the Ontario Arts Council, have been severely cut in recent years, with even further cuts looming on the horizon as governments seek to balance

their own budgets. Economic change is apparent in the media as well: the "majors" in both the sound recording and film industries are controlled by large, multi-national corporations who are constantly merging with other companies to improve their market share or gain easier access to new markets (see, for example, Secor 1994, Laroche 1988, Peterson and Berger 1975, Pendakur 1990, Acheson and Maule 1994). Consequently, policies stressing domestic media ownership will come increasingly under pressure as the cultural industries become more internationally integrated (Acheson and Maule 1994:406). It must also be noted that as well as capital in the cultural industries becoming international, so has production. For example, to broaden potential markets, many countries have negotiated co-production agreements for their film industries. These agreements effectively double the size of the potential audience for a film, offer new financing arrangements from a larger pool of investors, and allow access to subsidies from another government. Their *ad hoc* treatment frequently results in quotas for domestic creative talent being significantly relaxed (Acheson and Maule 1994:406-407, Pendakur 1990:194-221). These co-production agreements have become an important way to compete with Hollywood, and thus are likely to continue for some time. The pursuit of international markets, however, contradicts the policy of developing strong domestic companies to ensure that Canadian stories are heard by Canadians.

Related to economic change is the political change which has recently been experienced in Canada. As Robinson and Skinner note, this change is characterized by "assaults on the legitimacy of the social democratic state and the rise of a neo-liberal agenda." As deficit

reduction becomes the top priority for many Canadians and, as a result, most political parties, much of the discussion at the political level concerning cultural policy focuses on retrenchment rather than on bold new progressive interventions. So, while it has never been an easy case to make, the current environment makes the argument for greater state support in the cultural sphere particularly vulnerable politically. Similarly, the current emphasis on more liberalized trade between countries is also a challenge to existing modes of intervention in the cultural industries. Although the cultural industries are exempt from the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA), Article 2005 allows either country to take measures of equivalent effect in response to actions that would have been inconsistent with the agreement were it not for the general exemption of the cultural industries (Acheson and Maule 1994:409). Although both countries have slightly different interpretations of the meaning of this clause, the essential point is that if either country introduces *new* measures affecting trade related to the cultural industries, the other country could respond with "equivalent commercial effect" in either the same industry or some other area outside the cultural industries. The American film industry has interpreted this to mean that the treaty gives their government the right to "retaliate against any new cultural industry measure adversely affecting them" (Acheson and Maule 1994:409). The emphasis of the FTA, therefore, seems to be on *new* measures and not on *existing* measures. However, Acheson and Maule point out that although the exemption for cultural industries under the FTA was brought into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), expanding the number of countries covered by NAFTA will increase pressure to homogenize membership

requirements: "if a number of large Latin American countries join NAFTA a cultural products free trade area (albeit with a host of exceptions) of substantial size will emerge of which Canada is not a member" (Acheson and Maule 1994:411-412). But as Canadian companies are encouraged to pursue international markets (see, for example, Parsons 1995, Secor 1994), this exclusion will likely become impractical.

Finally, there are the myriad of socio-cultural changes which have been under way for a number of decades but which seem to have taken on new significance more recently. As Skinner and Robinson have noted, these changes include "demands from various constituencies for cultural institutions that serve not just a 'mass public', but supply a wider range of views and tastes which respond to a 'cultural pluralism' that postmodern theorists have long stressed" (Skinner and Robinson 1994:122). Thus, the more "concrete" shifts in the policy environment caused by technological, economic and political forces, which are hindering policy-making in all fields, are complicated even further in the cultural sphere because of the lingering difficulty in understanding the concept of "culture" itself. O'Connor and Wynne write:

The roots of this are multiple and complex, as the conflicts and confusions of the Post-Modernism debate testify. This latter debate centres around a broadly shared feeling that 'Culture', as it has been understood in the '40s and '50s could, by the '70s, no longer be so (for good or ill). It became clear in the '80s that under the impact of those forces identified by the theorists of 'Post-Modernity' cultural policy was in severe need of re-conceptualisation (O'Connor and Wynne 1991:465).

Therefore, while cultural policy may once have been a powerful tool for addressing the needs of the public interest, now, as Skinner and Robinson explain:

it might not be overstating the issue to say that we are approaching the end of an era in which nation-states played the central role in managing the production, distribution, and consumption of cultural products. Where once cultural policies were developed to serve a broadly defined '*public* interest', today we are witnessing the introduction of policies that are primarily geared to serve *private* accumulation. Throughout the entire global sector, the private market, not the state, is now being promoted as the preferred mode for the allocation of cultural resources (Skinner and Robinson 1994:121).

While it may be true that we are at the end of this era, it does not necessarily follow that the state no longer has a role to play. Instead, there remains in the cultural sphere an immense responsibility for the state in a democratic society. As Raboy *et al.* write, "cultural participation is increasingly a function of one's capacity to pay, thus extending existing social inequities to the cultural sphere" (Raboy *et al.* 1994:303). But the state's responsibility remains one of balancing and mediating the interests of the privately-controlled cultural industries with the needs of Canadians. "Democratic cultural development ... depends on maximizing the possibility for participation in cultural life. But in the context of an open economy, the fragile balance between citizenship and consumerism with respect to culture has been upset" (Raboy *et al.* 1994:303). It is here, then, where a role can be seen for the state which runs *parallel* to the private interests and activities of the cultural industries, "to redress the balance and see that democratic imperatives are not subordinated to industrial ones" (Raboy *et al.* 1994:303). As Skinner and Robinson argue, the "goal of cultural policy studies then is to think about these basic citizenship needs and to propose progressive interventions that can ensure that these needs are met" (Skinner and Robinson 1994:129). It is, therefore, to these cultural needs that the

debate surrounding cultural policy must now turn and, if required, challenge the existing assumptions about the role of the state in the cultural sphere and of the means with which we can achieve cultural development objectives. As Skinner and Robinson suggest, "without such interventions. ... a great many people are in danger of becoming 'culturally-illiterate'" (Skinner and Robinson 1994:129). As the following section argues, young people in Canada may be among those who are at the greatest risk.

The Political and Economic Marginalization of Youth in Canada

Young people today represent a smaller proportion of the population than they did 20 to 30 years ago. In 1991, 6.8% of the Canadian population were in the 15 to 19 age range. This is certainly a significant proportion of the total population. However, the relative numbers of young people have been steadily declining since the mid-1970s. In 1976, those in this age range made up 10.2% of the total population (Statistics Canada 1994b:5).

The economic situation facing today's young people has changed as well. Despite a higher participation rate in secondary and post-secondary education than that of previous generations, the vast majority of employed young people today work in occupations which do not require extensive education or experience (Côté and Allahar 1994:34-39). In 1992, 77% of all workers in the 15 to 19 age range worked in sales, service, or clerical jobs (Statistics Canada 1994b:5). Côté and Allahar refer to this as credentialism or educational inflationism, where increasingly higher

levels of education are deemed necessary to obtain a job, despite the fact that the work involved requires little or no education at all (Côté and Allahar 1994). It is not uncommon, therefore, for young people to see few positive connections between school and success in the job market.

While, as Wannell notes, "it might be expected that reduced labour force competition resulting from a smaller population, combined with rising educational attainment, would increase youth wages," (Wannell 1989:21) youth instead have the highest unemployment rate of any age group in Canada, with 19.7% of all labour force participants in this age range being unemployed in 1992. For those in the 20 to 24 age range, the unemployment rate was only slightly lower at 16.6%. This should be compared with an unemployment rate of "just" 9.9% among those aged 25 and over (Statistics Canada 1994b:5).³ Furthermore, those who are fortunate enough to find work are getting paid less in real wages than the generation before. The real annual earnings of men between 17 and 24 with full-time jobs declined by 25 per cent between 1979 and 1992. By contrast, the wages of men between 25 and 34 fell by only 12 per cent over the same period ("Young Workers Lose as Wages Go Down" 1995:A3).

As Pacom writes, because young people are today faced with declining relative numbers and have few job prospects, they may soon become less of a force, both politically and as consumers:

Il est important de souligner que, dans le contexte des années 1960, étant donné leur poids démographique, les jeunes avaient réussi à obtenir une certaine considération sociale, politique et économique. Par contre, les jeunes des années 90, de plus en plus minoritaires dans un monde dominé par les baby-boomers vieillissants encore forts

---

3

The definition of "youth" used throughout this work is that used by Statistics Canada: a person between the ages of 15 and 24 years of age.

de leur nombre, sont aujourd'hui plus que jamais écartés du pouvoir et de ses composantes politiques et économiques (Pacom 1995:95).⁴

The traditionally strong relationship between young people and the cultural industries may be weakened as the cultural industries follow the needs and desires of the baby boom generation as they approach their retirement years, and the changing cultural needs which are associated with people in their fifties. Meeting the needs of this swollen demographic group may occur at the expense of meeting the cultural needs of those who follow in its wake. Willis cites British research which suggests that the decline in the numbers of young adults (which was predicted in 1986 to be approximately 24% by 1996) combined with continuously high levels of youth unemployment and rising levels of disposable income in the rest of the population will result in the collapse of the youth market (Willis 1990:152, note 13). As he notes, new forms of state intervention in the cultural sphere:

may become increasingly important for young people over the next decade as the 'youth market' collapses and products and services are restyled or introduced and marketed to rising market groups: young family groups among 25- to 44-year-olds, as well as 'empty-nester' groups among the 45-to-59-year-olds (Willis 1990:146).

The Canadian data presented above suggest that a similar trend is likely here. In fact, the weakening of the Canadian youth market is already being seen in some sectors. The music industry, for example, has recently announced plans to place a greater emphasis on the "baby boom" market. The Canadian Recording Industry Association (CRIA) is considering

---

⁴ "It is important to note that, in the 1960s, the demographic weight of young people allowed them to attain a certain social, political and economic importance. However, young people of the 1990s, increasingly a minority in a world dominated by aging baby-boomers who are still strong in numbers, are today more than ever distanced from power and its political and economic elements."

a change in its approach based on a major market research program which revealed that most of the industry's sales remained concentrated in the teen and young adult market. Their research revealed that the growing, older demographic groups would buy more sound recordings if they were properly targeted (Morrow 1995). There may be, therefore, sufficient justification for serious consideration of a cultural strategy targeted at youth in Canada. But, if such a strategy were to be developed, how should the cultural needs of young people be determined? What is the nature of their relationship with cultural products?

The answers to these questions lie in cultural theory, particularly as it has developed within the "discipline" of cultural studies. A first step is then to look to cultural theory for suggestions as to where the failings in current cultural policy may be found. However, while it may seem appropriate that there should be an institutional link between cultural theory and cultural policy, especially now that many are calling for the role of the state in the cultural sphere to be fundamentally re-examined, the connection between theory and policy is not as strong as one might expect.

Cultural Policy Studies: The Theoretical Location

There has been a reluctance by those working within cultural studies to acknowledge any possible positive role for the state in cultural development (During 1993:20). As Miller writes, the "notion that theory undergirds practice by offering a renewin, or displacing critique that can be taken up by bureaucracies has often seemed misplaced in the cultural

field, where everyday academic critical practice eschews such a relationship as either insufficiently aesthetic or overabundantly co-optive" (Miller 1994:266). Similarly, Cunningham writes:

Many people trained in cultural studies would see their primary role as being critical of the dominant political, economic and social order. When cultural theorists do turn to questions of policy, our command metaphors of resistance and opposition predispose us to view the policy making process as inevitably compromised, incomplete and inadequate, peopled with those inept and ungrounded in theory and history or those wielding gross forms of political power for short-term ends. These people are then called to the bar of an abstrusely formulated critical idealism (Cunningham 1992:9).

There is, therefore, as Bennett suggests, a need to move from "cultural critique as an instrument for changing consciousness" to "technical adjustments to its governmental deployment" (Bennett 1992b:406). This could be achieved by *accepting* the role of the state: what Bennett refers to as "talking to the ISAs" (Bennett 1992a:31). This approach aims to "correct" what has been seen as a deficiency in mainstream cultural studies: the lack of attention to more practical matters - matters which could positively influence the actions of the state. Bennett thus argues that policy considerations should be "put into" cultural studies. He writes:

it is only by using the kinds of correctives that would come from putting "policy" into cultural studies that cultural studies may be deflected from precisely those forms of banality which, in some quarters, have already claimed it while also resisting the lure of those debates whose contrived appearance of ineffable complexity makes them a death trap for practical thinking (Bennett 1992a:32-33).

Bennett identifies four conditions which are necessary for the "engagement, both theoretical and practical, with the relations between cultural and power":

first, the need to include policy considerations in the definition of culture in viewing it as a particular field of government; *second*, the need to distinguish different regions of culture within this overall field in terms of the objects, targets, and techniques of government peculiar to them; *third*, the need to identify the political relations specific to different regions of culture so defined and to develop appropriately specific ways of engaging with and within them; and, *fourth*, the need for intellectual work to be conducted in a manner such that, in both its substance and its style, it can be calculated to influence or service the conduct of identifiable agents within the region of culture concerned (Bennett 1992a:23).

The difficulty, however, is that the form of "cultural policy studies" which has emerged in recent years seems divided into two poles of analysis: one economically oriented and pragmatic, and the other more theoretical (During 1993:18). The first is economically oriented because of its preoccupation with the efficient allocation of scarce resources which, in the cultural policy field may refer to the "efficient" distribution of the aggregate expenditure amount between cultural projects or, as During points out, the number of radio or television stations that can operate in the limited broadcast spectrum (During 1993:19). The primary object of criticism in this line of analysis is its emphasis on the market and the various economic arguments for state intervention in the cultural sphere. These arguments have been blamed for the "conceptual clouding" of the real objectives of state intervention. As Bianchini notes, a trend has been noticed around the world in which a shift has occurred "away from the development of policies *for* culture towards the development of policies *using* culture as a resource and an instrument to achieve a wide range of non-cultural objectives" (Bianchini 1993:18; emphasis added). This analysis is confirmed by Raboy *et al.* when they say that:

Almost everywhere, the role of the state in culture has gradually been displaced from an emphasis on cultural development towards economic development. ... In general, the 1980s were marked by a conceptual clouding of the ultimate goal of public policy in the cultural sphere: was it to promote the economic well-being of private cultural enterprise (industrial logic), or to support public participation in cultural life (democratic logic)? ... the dominant thrust is clearly towards promotion of cultural industries, *justified* in terms of support for national culture (the nationalist logic) (Raboy et al. 1994).

The second stream within this fledgling cultural policy studies is what During calls "neo-Foucauldian cultural policy theory," more closely associated with the humanities. During summarizes as follows:

In its most radical guise, the neo-Foucauldian thesis argues that culture is neither an end in itself nor the product of autonomous agents - whether individuals or communities - but a mechanism for transmitting forms of 'governmentality', for ordering how we act, think, live. Indeed, so the argument goes, cultural work and effects only exist in relation to other governmental structures (During 1993:19).

The chief criticism of this approach is that its treatment of subjectivity is somewhat simplistic. The individual, says During:

tends to be just a product of 'governmental' protocols or of 'techniques of self-formation'. This matters because questions of pleasure, corporeality, fantasy, identification, affect, desire, critique, transgression, and so on disappear - which is crippling to rich analysis of cultural work and reception (During 1993:19).

The theory is similarly reductive in its view of "policy," as it glosses over much of the detail which could have an enormous impact on its success. As During argues, "'Policy' becomes a word which, almost magically, neutralizes the more stubborn, conflictual, and critical relations between the various individuals and groups which constitute the social fields in which culture is produced, disseminated, and received" (During 1993:19-20). Furthermore, there is little effort made within this stream to carry out analysis of the many pragmatic considerations, such as

financing, efficiency, or administrative matters for example, which must be faced by policy-makers, as well as how initiatives in the cultural sphere will mix with the broader goals of the state in other policy spheres.

The current state of this emerging discipline of "cultural policy studies" can as a consequence be described as being:

dominated by an opposition of the abstracted empiricism of cultural policy in the service of the state against grand moralistic divides in the service of cultural theory, one half lacks a vision and a warrant, while the other lacks a space and a warrant. Both operate with constituencies enlisted for academic purposes ('relevance' for one and 'resistance' for the other). ... A rapprochement between the two, where policy studies is not valorized over critique and vice versa, is the polite return to a network of interlaced concerns which has always been part of culture and should always have been part of cultural studies" (Miller 1994:280).

It appears, therefore, that if intellectual work is to be "calculated to influence or service the conduct of identifiable agents" within cultural policy-making, a more moderate approach must be taken; one that recognizes the pragmatic limitations on the power of the state to correct certain identifiable pathologies in cultural life, yet one which is informed by a rigorous understanding of cultural processes as afforded by the more theoretical work done in cultural studies. Certainly, the environment of uncertainty which currently surrounds cultural policy-making requires that a process be established through which any "re-tooling" of cultural policies can be theoretically informed.

Conclusion: "A *Rapprochement*"

The object of this thesis is to approach the study of the impact of the general philosophies behind cultural development in Canada on the cultural lives of young people by "coming up the middle" - by seeking a *rapprochement* between the pragmatic and the theoretical poles described above. This *rapprochement* will come in the form of an acceptance of the role of public policy in the cultural sphere and, consequently, a reliance on more pluralistic assumptions about the state than has historically been the case in cultural studies. While this acceptance of the state may be at odds with the political orientation of cultural studies, it is arguably the most feasible manner to bridge the divide which currently exists between cultural theory and policy.

This approach will also come in the form of a comparison of the cultural lives of young people as it is understood within cultural theory with the actual policies in place which claim to address their cultural needs. In the next chapter, the salient characteristics of the cultural lives of young people will be examined through Canadian and international research. Drawing upon elements of cultural studies which have undertaken analyses of the cultural behaviour of young people in industrialized and mediatized societies, a conception of culture will be developed as the product of the interaction between the "raw materials" of consumer society and the lived, material existence of individuals and groups. This will then lay the groundwork for the following chapter which will examine the general approaches to cultural development which have been practised in

Canada. The differences between the cultural practices of young people and these approaches to cultural development will be discussed in Chapter Four, which will point to some alternative approaches to cultural development policy in Canada.

The ultimate objective of the thesis is to respond to Bennett's call for intellectual work calculated to service the conduct of identifiable agents within the cultural sphere. However, this thesis will differ from Bennett's perspective in two fundamental ways. First, Bennett's work reveals a tendency towards a structuralist and neo-Foucauldian view of cultural policy. This thesis, however, will place a greater emphasis on human agency, while recognizing the constraints on that human agency created by the various structures which act upon it. Second, the analysis in this thesis will not be as dismissive of the achievements of the theoretical work in cultural studies. Instead, it will be prepared to recognize the benefits of the fundamental understanding of culture presented in cultural studies to a more rigorous and comprehensive understanding of an enhanced role for the state in cultural development. These two approaches will be made evident in the next chapter which examines the nature of the cultural lives of young people as it is understood in cultural studies.

Chapter Two

Practice:

The Cultural Lives of Young People

An analysis of young people must first acknowledge that there has not always been such a thing as a "teenager." Prior to the 20th century, young people in Western societies moved much more directly from childhood to adulthood and to the various responsibilities and privileges associated with it. Marriage was legally sanctioned at an age much earlier than it is today; participation in the labour force was possible and expected at a much earlier age; and even military duty was expected of male individuals much earlier (Steinberg 1990). In fact, the notion of the "teenager" did not emerge until the twentieth century when social scientists used the name to refer to what was then coming to be seen as a problem (Côté and Allahar 1994:xii). Since then, various theories have emerged which seek to explain adolescence in industrialized societies.

Côté and Allahar provide an overview of these theories in their book Generation on Hold: Coming of Age in the Late Twentieth Century (1994). This book draws upon a number of theoretical traditions to describe adolescence in the North American context and the changing notion of "coming of age" in advanced industrialized societies such as Canada. It suggests that young people are today encouraged to stay young for longer periods of time, resulting in a prolonged period of economic, political and social marginalization. Consequently, young people are now targeted largely as consumers rather than as producers in society which only further marginalizes an entire generation. Côté and Allahar point to the

social costs of this continued marginalization and suggest possible policy alternatives.

Côté and Allahar group the traditional theories of adolescence and the notion of "coming of age" under the two broad headings of "nature" versus "nurture" theories. Although they do acknowledge environmental factors in adolescent development, "nature" theories are those which see the "problem" of adolescence as primarily a product of biology. As a result, "nature" theories are espoused primarily by psychologists and psychiatrists. Among "nature" theories is the concept of adolescence as a period of "storm and stress" in which the transition to adulthood triggers emotional distress which, in some cases, can be quite intense. The changes which occur in this period are seen as necessary to human development, without which a person's healthy transition into adulthood is put at risk. A number of disorders have been identified by "nature" theorists, which seek to explain the various pathologies which occasionally present themselves as a result of the biological changes which occur in this period. These disorders include "oppositional disorder," "emancipation disorder," "adolescent adjustment disorder," "identity disorder" and "specific academic or work disorder" (Côté and Allahar 1994:12).

But as Côté and Allahar point out, the problem with "nature" theories such as these is that they can easily overlook the social and cultural factors which may be underlying these disorders. They cite the example of the "specific academic or work disorder." This particular disorder is characterized by an anxiety related to examinations, an inability to write papers or reports or perform in studio arts activities, and difficulty in concentration. These are, of course, characteristics

that most young people have experienced at one time or another, thus making an overly-regimented school or work life a more likely explanation (Côté and Allahar 1994:13). In other words, the cause of the disorder may not lie in the patient, but in the social and cultural environment which places certain pressures on the individual.

The "nurture" theories of adolescent development place more emphasis on the role of social and cultural forces in adolescent development and the notion of "coming of age." Côté and Allahar identify four: functionalist theories, political economy theories, postmodern theories and subcultural theory. Functionalist theories, for example, focus on the impact of industrialization on youth. The development of industrial society has resulted in the arrival of puberty four years earlier than it did in 1850 because of improvements in health care, nutrition and sanitation (Sprinthall and Collins 1988:79). However, while people are maturing at an earlier age, the transition from agricultural society to industrial society has also lessened the dependence of the family on the labour of children. As Côté and Allahar write, "Young people have gone from being central to agricultural economies to being marginal to industrial economies; and they have gone from being economic assets to being economic liabilities for their families" (Côté and Allahar 1994:17). The transition from agricultural to industrial society has required the young person to find work outside the home, but that work has become increasingly specialized, requiring more and more time spent in training and education. Therefore, industrialization has prolonged the period in which young people are dependent on their parents (and their "agents," such as the schools) despite an earlier physical and cognitive maturation.

Hence the creation of the "teenager": a person who is physically and mentally an adult, but who is still dependent on family and is seen by society as still being "in training."

Similarly, the political economy perspective sees youth as a:

class without power, which is disenfranchised economically, politically, and socially. However, in order to mask this disenfranchisement and to ensure that young people do not mobilize as a reaction against their exploitation, it has been necessary for the state to impose a long period of indoctrination into acquiescence and acceptance of existing power structures as normal, natural, good, and benign. ... This indoctrination is accomplished mainly through the educational system, but other institutions such as the media also enter into complicity with it (Côté and Allahar 1994:25).

Therefore, young people are seen as victims of "false consciousness": where the structures of capitalist society are so firmly embedded in their awareness that they may reject any opposition to those structures, even if this rejection would be in their own self-interest.

Postmodernist theories stress the fragmentation of social, political and economic institutions and its impact on the identity formation of young people. As Pacom writes:

Les jeunes Canadiens des années 90, tout comme leurs homologues dans d'autres sociétés postmodernes, sont appelés à vivre dans cette réalité socioculturelle inédite dont les principales caractéristiques semblent être: la fragmentation, l'hétérogénéité, la discontinuité, le manque de référents fixes et l'hybridation des genres et des registres culturels (Pacom 1995:90).⁵

This fragmentation includes, for example, that created by the mass media which is increasingly replacing many institutions as mediator between

---

⁵ "Young Canadians in the 90s, like their counterparts in other postmodern societies, are asked to live in this new socio-cultural reality of which the principal characteristics seem to be: fragmentation, heterogeneity, discontinuity, a lack of fixed references and the hybridization of cultural genres and forms."

young people and society. Pacom has argued that, as a result, young people are now at the forefront of the "postmodern condition."

Ainsi les jeunes, avec leurs musiques, leurs symboles et leurs manifestations difficilement décodables, se trouvent-ils non pas rejetés à l'extérieur de nos sociétés postmodernes, mais bien campés au coeur même des incertitudes, des remises en questions, des soubresauts de créativité qui caractérisent cette fin de siècle (Pacom 1995:98).⁶

Subcultural theory focuses on "the collective reactions of young people in industrial societies who do not find meaning in their lives because of their marginalization from adult society" (Côté and Allahar 1994:20). The original form of this line of thought emerged in post-war America. After the Second World War, unemployment increasingly became a problem in the urban ghettos of the U.S., which were populated largely by Black and Hispanic families. As Brake writes "The ghettos became places of poverty, disease and crime. ... The ghettos contained cultures of poverty and violence, and this was cited as evidence that they lacked a process of adaptation to urban life, completely ignoring the role of white investment and development in creating slum conditions" (Brake 1985:32). It was out of the research aimed at explaining this phenomena that the first work in developing a subcultural theory began, which emphasized the impact of subcultures on deviant behaviour.

The American tradition of subcultural theory is rooted in symbolic interactionism (Côté and Allahar 1994:169, Denzin 1992). Symbolic interactionism is based on three assumptions: first, people will behave

---

6

"Thus young people, with their music, their symbols and their expressions understandable only with difficulty, do not find themselves placed outside of our postmodern societies, but are instead placed at the heart of the uncertainties, the questioning, the shocks of creativity which characterize this end-of-century."

according to the meanings held for them by society; second, these meanings will be the result of the process of social interaction; and third, these meanings, once established, will be further modified through negotiation and interpretation by the individual (see Denzin 1992). Accordingly, deviance among American subcultures was explained within this perspective as the manifestation of the contradiction felt by many young, urban youth between the middle-class ideal to which young people were to aspire, and the reality of their experience as members of the working-class. The subculture was then seen as the setting for the commission of delinquent acts (Brake 1985:54; see Matza 1964, 1969). As will be discussed below, this somewhat narrow view of the functioning of a subculture was seen as too limiting for a comprehensive understanding of subcultures in the English context. The English tradition assumes a much broader view and, as a consequence, provides a much more sophisticated theory. Instead of a subculture seen as a collective articulation against a single, mainstream culture, English subcultural theory stresses a more complex, double articulation against both the mainstream culture *and* the working-class culture from which it emerges.

The theories which comprise the "nurture" perspective are, therefore, quite diverse. However, it must be noted that, like "nature" theories, there are difficulties with them. For example, Côté and Allahar point out that "sociological perspectives have also been criticized because they tend to reduce all behaviour to social structural causes" (Côté and Allahar 1994:28). There may not be sufficient attention paid to human agency in adolescent development. Instead, young people are seen merely as passive receptors of the products of the various social

structures surrounding them: young people are wholly "produced," both exploited and manipulated, by the structures of the society of which they seek to be a part.

Unlike the other "nurture" theories, however, subcultural theory does provide some space for human agency. Côté and Allahaar define the period of adolescence as an "identity moratorium": "a time-out imposed on adolescents and youth during which they are supposedly expected to sort out the components that will constitute their adult identity" (1994:74). While the result of the identity moratorium is usually a stronger individual and collective identity, occasionally some adolescents are unable to successfully use this period constructively:

Consequently, this may end up being the most destructive or wasted period of their lives, something that is particularly true for those who cannot use the time to explore their identity due to limited financial resources. Clearly, many young people from racial and ethnic minorities and the lower classes cannot afford the luxury of an identity crisis that involves elaborate forms of self-exploration, such as world travel or experimenting with different schools and academic majors. Instead, their time-out, which often takes place in the same community in which they were born and will live as adults, provides little opportunity or guidance (Côté and Allahaar 1994:74-75).

So while some young people manage to use this identity moratorium to their advantage, others will have more difficulty. Some may turn to a particular subculture which will serve as a framework within which an identity can be developed. Therefore, identification with a particular subculture can be positive for many young people. "In some cases, it appears that these subcultures can foster ego development and the individual may eventually outgrow them. In other cases, though, these subcultures become a permanent life-style or even a death trap" (Côté and Allahaar 1994:75).

This theoretical approach seems appropriate for the analysis in this thesis. This thesis will, however, centre around the form of subcultural theory which has emerged within English cultural studies, as it is within this line of analysis that the symbolic expression of a particular social and cultural location experienced by youth is explained with the most sophistication. This English tradition also places an even greater emphasis on human agency than does the American tradition, as will be explained below. First, it is important to understand the intellectual tradition of cultural studies from which English subcultural theory emerged in the 1970s.

Cultural Studies

Cultural studies has focused a great deal on the question of youth and youth culture, and thus is the source of a wealth of theoretical and empirical analysis which is of considerable relevance to this study. The "discipline" of cultural studies practised today, however, is the product of the assimilation into the work of cultural studies begun in the 1950s and 60s of "structuralist" theories which emerged from France in the late 1960s and 70s. It is important to understand the nature of these two paradigms and how they came together.

Cultural studies is rooted in the work of Richard Hoggart, E.P. Thompson and Raymond Williams, all of whom undertook to explain, independent of one another, the profound social and cultural changes which occurred in British society after the Second World War. Williams' work is particularly important to this analysis as it opens the terrain for the

recognition of the power of human agency against history and ideology. As Turner explains, Williams and other theorists involved in early cultural studies "argued that determining forces could be resisted, and that history could be affected by radical individual effort" (Turner 1990:31). Williams' book Culture and Society (1966; first published in 1958) provided the definition of culture as a "whole way of life." Developed further in The Long Revolution (1975; first published in 1961), this definition thus moved away from the "high culture" perspective of culture as the "cultivation" of a civilized society which, until this time, had dominated much of cultural analysis. Most importantly, perhaps, is that the institution of "art" was distinguished as only a constituent *part* of a culture within this definition. Consequently, the study of culture must, in Williams' view, expand its focus to the relationships between the various elements which make up this whole way of life, in order to, as Hall writes, "grasp how the interactions between all these practices and patterns are lived and experienced as a whole, in any particular period" (Hall 1981:22). As Turner explains, early cultural studies thus placed considerable emphasis on the "lived network of practices and relationships that constituted everyday life, within which the role of the individual subject had to be foregrounded" (Turner 1990:69). Williams' work offers then what Hall describes as "a radical interactionism: in effect, the interaction of all practices in and with one another ... The distinction between practices is overcome by seeing them all as variant forms of *praxis* - of a general human activity and energy" (Hall 1981:23).

Although the Frankfurt School was perhaps the first to attempt a reconciliation of high culture analysis with Marxist cultural theory,

Williams' preliminary work quickly recognized the need to move beyond the base/superstructure model found in classical Marxism. This model simply categorized ideas and meanings to the superstructure, being merely *reflective* of and determined by the economic base. Consequently, early

cultural studies theorists were attracted to the work of the structuralist Althusser as it provided them with an existing model, well developed and much more sophisticated, which, by substituting its focus on "ideology" with "culture," was found to explain in great detail many of the theoretical problems with which they had struggled regarding the functioning of the superstructure.

Althusser's work is important because it recognizes the relative autonomy of the superstructure. In his essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," Althusser identified a series of "ideological state apparatuses" (ISAs) which includes religion, the educational system, the family, the legal system, the political system, trade unions, the media and cultural systems (literature, arts, sports, etc.) (Althusser 1971:143). Each of these institutions operates relatively autonomously from the economic base, but nevertheless contributes to the development and maintenance of an ideology necessary to maintain a social structure conducive to the reproduction of the means of production. Althusser's theory then was one of a network of determinations which oversees or "overdetermines" the social experience of individuals. Thus ideology in this perspective is not, as classical Marxism proposed, strictly "false consciousness," but more a conceptual framework through which, as Hall explains, "men [*sic*] interpret, make sense of, experience and 'live' the material conditions in which they find themselves" (Hall 1980:33).

Althusser's work thus moved away from an overly mechanistic model of determinacy which appealed to those working within cultural studies for, as Turner writes, "it is able to acknowledge the importance and complexity of individual, 'lived' experience: 'the concept of 'overdetermination' is more useful than any other way of understanding historically lived situations and the authentic complexities of practice'" (Turner 1990:66, citing Williams 1977:89).

Cultural studies continued in the 1970s to draw further from French-based structuralism, the theoretical model for which is Saussurean linguistic theory. Saussure developed a theory of language as a structure, thus portraying language neither as a collection of words or sounds assigned to particular objects or concepts, nor as a passive system through which information is processed, but instead as a whole, transformational and self-regulating system comprised of interacting elements. The theory continues by suggesting that language is not only structural, but "structuring" as well. Language has the power to interpret, regulate and organize our perception of the external world and to force us to understand the external world only as it can be expressed through the structure of language. As Turner summarizes:

... language is a mechanism that determines how we decide what 'constitutes' an object in the first place, let alone which objects need naming. Language does not name an already organized and coherent reality; its role is far more powerful and complex. The function of language is to organize, to construct, indeed to provide us with our only access to, reality (Turner 1990:13).

Structuralists applied this way of thinking about language to other cultural systems. Lévi-Strauss, for example, applied the Saussurean linguistic model to the analysis of myths. He argued that myth, like language, is a self-regulating system made up of constituent units.

Accordingly, he suggested that, like language, the study of meaning in myth cannot be found by examining a myth's constituent parts in isolation, but rather in studying how those elements interact with one another within the whole structure.

While Lévi-Strauss' conclusions may on the surface resemble those of Williams' outlined above, structuralism does not allow room for human agency to the same extent that early cultural studies does. As Hall writes, the "causal logic of determinacy was abandoned in favour of a structuralist causality - a logic of *arrangement*, of internal relations, of articulation of parts within a structure" (Hall 1981:28). Therefore, as Coward and Ellis explain:

... Lévi-Strauss's structuralism shows us that the human subject is not homogenous and in control of himself, he is constructed by a structure whose very existence escapes his gaze. The self-presence of the human subject is no longer tenable; instead the subject is seen as subject to the structure and its transformations (Coward and Ellis 1981:160).

For the structuralists it was these forms and structures that produced particular cultural meanings which were the centre of attention, and so, in Turner's words, "they tended to be less interested in the culturally specific, the historical, or the differences between forms than they were tracking overarching characteristics and similarities" (Turner 1990:31). As Hall writes, this "left the question of determinacy, of totality, largely in abeyance" (Hall 1981:28).

Consequently, it is in the conception of the "production" of subjectivity where "culturalist" and structuralist perspectives differ. The culturalists found structuralism to be too rigid for a comprehensive analysis of cultural practices. Thus, even Althusser's work eventually was

seen as inadequate in its recognition of the importance of "general human activity and energy," emphasizing instead how these relatively autonomous formations are necessarily subject to ideological forces rather than how they could be resisted and contested (Turner 1990:66). So while Althusser's work provided cultural studies with a sophisticated, neo-Marxist model, it nevertheless argued something very different, retaining a structuralist preoccupation with the "production" or "structuring" of the individual. As Hall so meticulously explains:

Whereas, in 'culturalism', experience was the ground - the terrain of 'the lived' - where consciousness and conditions intersected, structuralism insisted that 'experience' could not, by definition, be the ground of anything, since one could only 'live' and experience one's conditions *in and through* the categories, classifications and frameworks of the culture. These categories, however, did not arise from or in experience; rather, experience was their 'effect'. ... That is why, though Lévi-Strauss spoke only of 'Culture', his concept provided the basis for an easy translation, by Althusser, into the conceptual framework of ideology: 'Ideology is indeed a system of "representations", but in the majority of cases these representations have nothing to do with "consciousness" ... it is above all as structures that they impose on the vast majority of men, not via their "consciousness" ... it is within this ideological unconsciousness that men succeed in altering the "lived" relation between them and the world and acquiring that new form of specific unconsciousness called "consciousness"'. It was, in this sense, that 'experience' was conceived, not as an authenticating source but as an effect: not as a reflection of the real but as an 'imaginary reflection' (Hall 1981:29, citing Althusser 1969:233).

The path out of the rigid limitations in structuralist thought came in the work of Gramsci, whose contribution recognized that ideology - the values and concepts necessary to ensure that a *social* order is preserved which is conducive to the on-going stability of the *economic* order - will be freely accepted by the dominated masses. The subordinated groups will consent to their domination because they are convinced that this will serve their own interests. Furthermore, it is in the interests of the

dominant class to allow for room within its ideology for some articulation of resistance as a form of accommodation. As Turner summarizes, "Cultural domination or, more accurately, cultural leadership is not achieved by force or coercion, but is secured through the consent of those it will ultimately subordinate" (Turner 1990:66-7). But in consenting to their subordination, the masses will also negotiate the dominant ideology and mould it to suit their purposes. Thus, ideology is not simply determined by economic forces, nor are people simply determined by the superstructure. Instead, ideology is a dialectical process of negotiation, making the masses something more than simply passive receptors of ideological symbols. Ideology is thus the very *site* of the struggle between classes and the product of a much more complicated process of interaction between these ideological symbols and the material existence of the dominated classes.

By incorporating Gramscian theory, cultural theorists were able to move beyond Althusser's theory of overdetermination to an even more advanced theory of the role of the individual in resisting or contesting the dominant ideology. Again, by substituting "culture" for "ideology," culture came to be seen as the very site of the struggle between the groups and individuals which make up the "masses" and the environment in which they find themselves. While the cultural lives of groups and individuals are certainly constrained by the hegemony of the structures acting upon them, there is still an important element of negotiation, accommodation and human agency. Gramscian theory thus not only provides a more sophisticated theorization of human agency as against the production of subjects. It also provides the initial framework for the theorization

of multiple levels of the articulation of resistance. Gramscian theory is thus important to the English form of subcultural theory which stresses this multi-layered articulation.

Subcultural Theory

On the surface, it may appear unusual to begin an analysis of Canadian cultural life with the analysis of the cultural life of another country. However, subcultural theory is significant to this analysis because it provides us with a more comprehensive understanding of how culture is "produced." It shows that while resistance to the structures of society is not total, neither is a distinctive subculture *totally* the creation of the media or leisure industries. Members of a subculture are, as Gramscian theory would suggest, not wholly "spoken" by the structures of the society which surrounds them, but are instead enormously capable of "resisting" those structures on a symbolic level by actively re-working the symbolic material provided for them into a style - a culture - which will nevertheless bear a certain structural relationship with their material existence. Furthermore, English subcultural theory illustrates how the cultural lives of young people are complex, multi-layered and frequently contradictory, involving several levels of the articulation of resistance. Consequently, subcultural theory provides an analytical framework to understand how this articulation occurs.

As noted above, the focus of American-based subcultural theory on the articulation against a single force - the dominant, mainstream culture - was seen by English theorists as lacking the sophistication necessary to

explain English examples. American subcultural theory saw the subculture primarily as the setting for the commission of delinquent acts, focusing on young petty criminals and youth gangs. But as Brake writes of the English research, "Gangs have been less closely studied, and usually in the context of activities other than delinquency alone. While gangs tend to be informally structured 'near-groups' composed of a closely linked core with a looser network of peripheral members, subcultures have been seen as wider than this" (Brake 1985:58). Accordingly, the English literature takes a much wider view of subcultures, placing more emphasis on a variety of cultural habits which identify the group's oppositional relationship to both the mainstream culture and the working-class culture from which it emerges (Cohen 1972, Willis 1978, 1980, Hall and Jefferson 1976). Thus, subcultures in the English perspective go beyond deviance and the local street gang to include, as Brake continues, the entire "constellations of actions, values, style, imagery and even life styles which, through media reportage, extend beyond a neighbourhood to form a complex relationship with other large cultures, to form a symbolic pseudo-community" (Brake 1985:58).

The subcultures which were the focus of English analysis were primarily comprised of youth who grew increasingly marginalized from the political and economic life of the country. This marginalization was the result of a number of social changes which contributed to the rise of a "youth culture." Clarke *et al.* identify five of these changes: i) affluence - the increased importance of consumption and the growth of youth-oriented leisure industries; ii) mass culture - the idea that people were increasingly being subjected to ever more homogenous cultural

processes (thus the notion of the mindless teenage consumer); iii) the "cultural hiatus" precipitated by the war and the disruption of family life it caused in the post-war period (thus increased juvenile delinquency); iv) the rise of secondary education in age-specific schools, which led to a greater connection and sense of community with those of the same age group; and v) the arrival of a range of distinctive styles in dress and rock music (Clarke *et al.* 1976:18-21). These changes were further intensified by rising levels of disposable income which, according to Clarke *et al.*, led to "the growth of the 'teenage consumer' and the reorganisation of consumption and leisure provision (both commercial and non-commercial) in favour of a range of goods and services specifically designed to attract a youthful clientele" (Clarke *et al.* 1976:50).

Central to English subcultural analysis is the notion of working-class youth subcultures' "resistance" through symbolic expression. Clarke *et al* wrote:

We must note some clear structural differences in the response of the youth of the different classes. Working-class sub-cultures are clearly articulated, collective structures - often, 'near' or 'quasi'-groups. Middle class counter-cultures are diffuse, less group centred, more individualized. The latter precipitate, typically, not tight sub-cultures but a diffuse counter-culture *milieu*. Working class sub-cultures reproduce a clear dichotomy between those aspects of group life still fully under the constraint of dominant or 'parent' institutions (family, home, school, work), and those focused on non-work hours - leisure, peer-group association. Middle-class counter-culture *milieux* merge and blur the distinctions between 'necessary' and 'free' time and activities (Clarke *et al* 1976:60).

It is important to note that subcultures will continue to exist within the culture of the class (the parent culture) from which they emerge. "Members of a subculture may walk, talk, act, look 'different' from their parents and from some of their peers; but they belong to the same families, go to

the same schools, work at much the same jobs, live down the same 'mean streets' as their peers and parents" (Clarke *et al.* 1976:14). Thus, as Cohen notes, the resistance against mainstream society is joined by a resistance against the parent culture from which the subculture emerges.

Young people:

more than any other section of the working class were caught in the middle of the two dominant, but contradictory ideologies of the day: the ideology of spectacular consumption, promoted by the mass media, and the traditional ideology of production, the so-called work ethic which centred on the idea that a man's dignity, his manhood, even, was measured by the quantity of quality [*sic*] of his effort in production (Cohen 1972:21).

Consequently, the function of a subculture, according to Cohen, is to serve as a compromise solution between the two contradictory needs: "the need to create and express autonomy and difference from parents, and by extension, their culture; and the need to maintain the security of existing ego defences, and the parental identifications which support them" (Cohen 1972:25-26). There is, as a result, a double articulation: one against the parent, working-class culture from which the subculture emerges, as well as one against the institutions of mainstream society from which the members of the working-class are excluded.

The importance of the notion of resistance among working-class youth is reflected in the title of perhaps the most important collection of articles on the subject, Hall and Jefferson's Resistance through Rituals (1976). Drawing on Gramsci's work and elements of structuralism (which were by this time part of British cultural studies), the definition of culture used in this collection is indicative of the cultural studies approach. Clarke *et al.* write:

We understand the word culture to refer to that level at which social groups develop distinct patterns of life, and give expressive form to their social and material life-experience. *Culture is the way, the forms, in which groups 'handle' the raw material of their social and material existence* (Clarke et al. 1976:10, emphasis added).

This notion of "raw material" is a recurring one in this analysis. Subcultures, such as the "punks," the "teddys," and the "mods," for example, were seen to use the products of consumer society, such as dress and music, and the meanings which "came with them," as the raw materials for their own symbolic expression. "Provided" meanings were adapted or, in some cases, changed entirely to allow members of the subculture to express their resistance to the dominant, bourgeois culture and to "subvert" its ideology, albeit on a purely symbolic level. As Willis explains, they "were striking back at the heart of the whole commodity form and its detailed domination of everyday life. ...they seized control" (Willis 1978:171).

To do this, these groups appropriated a collection of seemingly dissimilar objects and gave them new meanings different from those which the same objects held in the dominant culture. This has been referred to as "bricolage" - a concept borrowed from Lévi-Strauss and structuralist theory - to describe how objects are re-ordered and re-contextualized to assume new meanings within a whole symbolic system, while retaining the objects' original, existing meanings (Clarke 1976:177). The analysis of this symbolic expression revealed a structural homology between the values, life-styles, cultural artifacts and processes of the group in question and its subjective experience. As Hebdige explains:

The skinheads were cited to exemplify this principle. The boots, braces and cropped hair were only considered appropriate and

meaningful because they communicated the desired qualities: 'hardness, masculinity and working-classness'. In this way 'The symbolic objects - dress, appearance, language, ritual occasions, styles of interaction, music - were made to form a *unity* with the group's relations, situation, experience' (Hebdige 1979:114, citing Clarke *et al.* 1976).

Similarly, in the case of the punks:

... there was a homological relation between the trashy cut-up clothes and spiky hair, the pogo and amphetamines, the spitting, the vomiting, the format of the fanzines, the insurrectionary poses, and the 'soulless', frantically driven music. The punks wore clothes which were the sartorial equivalent of swear words, and they swore as they dressed - with calculated effect, lacing obscenities into record notes and publicity releases, interviews and love songs. ... The safety pins and bin liners signified a relative material poverty which was either directly experienced and exaggerated or sympathetically assumed, and which in turn was made to stand for the spiritual paucity of everyday life (Hebdige 1979:114-115).

The concepts of homology and *bricolage* were brought together into a single, systematic explanation of why a particular style should appeal to a subculture, through the concept of "stylization" (Hebdige 1979:113-114). Stylization - the active organization of objects and activities which are made 'homologous' with their focal concerns, activities, group structure and collective self-image - then became the focus within subcultural theory (see Hebdige 1979; Willis 1978). The analysis centred on the homologous relationship between the style created by the re-ordering of these objects and practices, and the group's social and cultural location (either real or perceived) in society.

Stylization emphasizes the *polysemic* nature of various "texts," whereby, as Hebdige writes:

each text is seen to generate a potentially infinite range of meanings. ... Such an approach lays less stress on the primacy of structure and system in language ('langue'), and more upon the *position* of the speaking subject in discourse ('parole'). It is concerned with the *process* of meaning-construction rather than with the final product (Hebdige 1979:118).

Hebdige argues that this meaning construction, relying as it does on the re-ordering of signs and symbols into a new, unified whole, can be thought of as a form of signifying practice in a manner similar to our traditional notions of "art." He quotes Culler who writes:

... aesthetic expression aims to communicate notions, subtleties, complexities, which have not yet been formulated, and, therefore, as soon as an aesthetic order comes to be generally perceived as a code (as a way of expressing notions which have already been formulated), then works of art tend to move beyond this code while exploring its possible mutations and extensions. ... Much of the interest of works of art lies in the ways in which they explore and modify the codes which they seem to be using (Hebdige 1979:129, citing Culler 1976).

Thus, as Hebdige continues:

If we are to think in formal terms at all, subcultural styles are more usefully regarded as mutations and extensions of existing codes rather than as the 'pure' expression of creative drives, and above all they should be seen as *meaningful* mutations. Sometimes these forms will be disfigured and disfiguring. At such times, no doubt, this will be their 'point'. They are counterposed against the symbolic order of structured appearances - the syntax which positions the producer over and against that which he or she produces. In the face of such an order, they are bound on occasion to assume monstrous and unnatural features (Hebdige 1979:131).

What makes this aspect of subcultural theory particularly interesting is that this construction of meaning occurs not as a direct result of the effort of the original designers of the boots, or the braces, or the clothes which were eventually trashed or cut-up, or even the music for that matter, but is instead *the result of an intense, active process of the "consumption" of these and other goods.*

There have been a number of criticisms of subcultural theory. McRobbie has taken subcultural theorists to task for failing to consider the role of young women in the subcultures they were studying. Consequently, she writes, subcultures are characterized and portrayed according to the experiences of its male members. To the extent that young

women are mentioned at all in these early works. they are treated merely as extensions, or even possessions, of the male members, and are frequently referred to as such (McRobbie and Garber 1976, McRobbie 1991). This denied a closer examination of the multiple marginalization of young women: once as a youth, once as a member of the working-class, and then once again as a female in a male-dominated subculture. Clearly, the cultural expression of a sense of marginalization is likely to be much more complex in young women, warranting a closer examination than what was provided in early subcultural analysis.

Similarly, the notion of "raw materials" in its purest form has a tendency to produce somewhat naive accounts of the power relationship held by the interests of capital over the lower classes. To argue that a group's oppression can be subverted, even symbolically, by simply re-working what has been provided for them by the dominant class, may seem to some as being somewhat optimistic. It neglects the fact that the original purpose of these raw materials is to reinforce an ideology necessary to maintain the established order. Resistance is, therefore, not total. As McRobbie writes, their "'raw materials' may be material but they are never completely 'uncooked'" (McRobbie 1991). Instead resistance becomes part of the hegemony of capitalist ideology, for if the dominant class is to exercise cultural leadership, it "has to engage in negotiations with opposing groups, classes, and values - and that these negotiations must result in some *genuine* accommodation" (Turner 1990:211). There is thus insufficient room in subcultural theory for the fact that it may be the *subculture* which is, at least to a certain extent, being subverted through the exploitation by the media and leisure industries.

However, these are only challenges to the *limits* of subcultural theory and not the premises on which it is based, as these criticisms argue simply for a correction in the *application* of its theorization - not its rejection. Subcultural theory remains valuable because it provides us with a more comprehensive understanding of how culture is "produced": resistance is not total, nor is a distinctive subculture *totally* the creation of the media or leisure industries. A firm in these industries could never hope to totally "create" a subculture with a style consistent with its marketing strategy. Just as Gramscian theory suggests, members of a subculture are not wholly "spoken" by the structures of the society which surround them, as Althusser and the structuralists would argue, but are instead capable of resisting those structures on a symbolic level by re-working the symbolic material available to them into a style which bears an homologous relationship to their social and cultural location. As Clarke explains, when "the *bricoleur* re-locates the significant object in a different position within that discourse, using the same overall repertoire of signs, or when the object is placed within a different total ensemble, a new discourse is constituted, a different message conveyed" (Clarke 1976:177).

What makes the various characteristics of a subculture distinctive, then, are the results of an active and creative process of re-working, which occurs within the group itself - by the consumer and not wholly by the producer. It can then be said that the process of "cultural production" continues well beyond the point at which a cultural artifact or cultural symbol is delivered to its audience. Indeed it may continue in directions never anticipated by the artifact's "creator," in order to

better reflect the cultural experience of those who are using it. But what about those young people who never choose to identify themselves with a subculture? How can the model of subcultural theory seek to explain their particular relationship with "raw materials"? Is it only members of a spectacular subculture which have the ability to be creators of a particular style or producers of culture? Answers to these questions are particularly important for the application of subcultural theory within Canada, where the character of the activity of subcultures is markedly different.

Transplanting the Model

The strength of English subcultural theory lies in its historical specificity. As noted above, the economic and social changes which occurred in the post-war period produced subcultures and subcultural activity which were relatively unique to England. Accordingly, the nature of subcultural activity in Canada, which has its own unique historical and cultural specificity, will be markedly different. On the surface, this appears to limit the usefulness of English subcultural theory to explaining the Canadian situation. However, the general analytical approach used in English subcultural theory can be transplanted to produce a description of the process through which raw materials are re-worked to suit the needs of young Canadians in their particular context. In other words, while the end *result* may be different, the actual *process* of re-working raw materials will remain largely the same. Nevertheless, the

differences between the two countries must be considered if the model is to be properly transplanted.

The most obvious difference between the English and Canadian contexts is in their respective political cultures. As a result, references to Canadian subcultures tend to emphasize the weakness of a working-class, political identity in Canadian youth relative to their counterparts in England. This is largely due to the relative weakness of class-identity within Canadian political culture. Before discussing Canadian political culture, however, it must first be noted that it is tremendously difficult to describe because of the enormous linguistic and regional divisions in the country. Thus, as Taylor writes:

remarks about political ideology in Canada obviously require considerable qualification. The impact of conservatism and Liberalism has varied enormously across the country: the impact of bourgeois political ideology is different in provinces like British Columbia, where there is an oppositional labour tradition, to the impact felt in a province like Newfoundland or New Brunswick, where there is a much more secure ideological hegemony of the bourgeois parties. The importance of regional variations in Canada cannot be overlooked (Taylor 1987:212).

In English Canada, and particularly Ontario (in keeping with the geographical focus of this thesis), the political culture is dominated by a relatively unique form of liberalism, deeply rooted in the pioneer past of Upper Canada. As Taylor explains:

It is an expression of the real strength of the kind of bourgeois family and community that successfully survived the tempestuous early period of settlement in order to establish homesteads, villages, and towns in the rural waste. It is an image of the strong resilient Canadian family settling the land (Taylor 1987:211-212).

Although identity in Canada is certainly shaped and constrained by one's membership in certain social groups, it is not as pre-determined by class membership to quite the same degree as seems to be the case in

England. While individuals are still, of course, born into a particular socio-economic location, the dominant political culture in English Canada emphasizes and romanticizes the ability of the individual from any class background to achieve the bourgeois "ideal." This emphasis on individualism contributes to an English Canadian political culture which can be, in the words of Shepherd and Giles, "characterised by its unmitigatingly bourgeois nature, in which the state governs ... in a distanced fashion with less reference to the lived experiences and legitimate interests of its citizens than is customary in Western Europe" (Shepherd and Giles 1989:117). This "unmitigatingly bourgeois nature" of English Canadian political culture explains the presence of a strong form of liberalism able to withstand and accommodate any challenges to its ideology. Accordingly, as Taylor explains, the "inescapable feature of the present conjuncture in Canada is the relative absence of political polarization" (Taylor 1987:200). In fact:

One of the striking features of the almost unprecedented collapse in the Canadian labour market during the 1980's is that it has not resulted in any serious challenge in any part of the country to familiar bourgeois politics: it may even have been accompanied by a generalized *strengthening* of these forms of politics (Taylor 1987:199; emphasis added).

The difficulty in transplanting English subcultural theory to the analysis of youth culture in Canada is due then to the fact that class identities are muted, as are any oppositional politics which may emerge out of class divisions. As Brake explains:

The location of youth cultures in Canada is a more complex question than the situation in either Britain or the United States. In Britain the presence of a clear historical class situation, with its accompanying culture of class resistance, delineates fairly clearly to youth indicators concerning their class history, present and future. ... In the United States, whilst there is a general (yet

locally specific) high school culture, the complexities of ethnic, working-class and minority group subcultures have a strong presence. ... The situation is more diffuse in Canada for reasons which may be traced to complexities in the culture of Canada itself (Brake 1985:144).

Indeed, the confused sense of national identity in Canada is *reflected* in its youth culture. Brake continues:

It [youth culture] is largely derivative, and uses elements of *borrowed* culture, and any oppositional force is highly muted. The liberalism which is genuinely found in Canada, with its very different traditions of conservatism, based on small town and rural communities, has engulfed opposition amongst youth. ... There is no distinct national flavour to youth cultures, which are usually based on the styles of a borrowed tradition, rather than built on the indigenous forms of local traditions. *If there is a tradition of resistance in Canadian youth culture, it is at an individualistic rather than a collective level* (Brake 1985:145; emphasis added).

A working-class identity, therefore, does not exist in Canada in the same way and to the same degree that it does in England, making any class-based analysis problematic. Accordingly, an understanding of youth cultures in Canada requires that the subcultural model be modified.

One way of looking at the Canadian situation may be to view Canada as a subculture reacting within a larger, North American (dominated by the United States), "parent" culture (Kingsman 1990, Straw 1987). Kingsman argues that youth subcultures are thus homologous to Canadian culture and its diverse, indigenous social realities. Kingsman writes, "Canada's cultural mappers have, for the most part, been preoccupied with the question of our 'difference'; what is it, they have asked, that makes us different from Americans or Europeans or anyone else? What is the distinction that makes us truly ourselves?" (Kingsman 1990:122). Thus, Canadian cultural concerns can largely be seen as a matter of defining "us" as opposed to "them," not unlike the reaction of a youth subculture.

The characterization of Canadian culture against some set of external standards may explain the reactive approach to cultural policy-making which has historically occurred in Canada: cultural institutions and state agencies are to encourage the production of "a national vision of culture which must also be palpably different from American culture" (Kingsman 1990:128).

Furthermore, viewing Canada as a subculture suggests that the strong degree to which foreign cultural products enter the country need not be seen as a threat to our national (or regional) cultural identity. As has been illustrated in the work on subcultural theory in England, members of the "Canadian subculture" will simply treat the symbols and products from other countries as "raw materials," re-working and re-organizing them until they reflect the social and cultural realities of Canadians. Thus, as Hampson suggests, consumers will:

actively manipulate and utilize the texts of cultural production in order to create their own popular culture. In this sense, these imported materials constitute 'our' (Canadian) popular culture. Limiting analysis to domestically produced material denies the empirical reality of Canadian popular culture consumers. Moreover, addressing popular culture at the site of consumption, rather than solely through production, may be the first step towards countering the problems caused by the heavy importation of foreign cultural material (Hampson 1994:4).

The very fact that those texts are consumed in Canada by Canadians will have a profound effect on the meanings that those texts will ultimately represent. As Shepherd and Giles write of music, "the logic of the English Canadian experience can bear a different set of relationships to mass mediated transnational musics, even when produced by Canadians, than the experiences of those born and raised in the United States can" (Shepherd and Giles 1989:122).

However, for this line of analysis to be complete in the Canadian context, it must consider more deeply the nature of consumption, as it is here where a difference is found between North America and Europe (Kingsman 1990). Although consumerism is a tool for the construction of identity in both England and North America, the nature of the construction and the resulting identity is different in the North American context. As Kingsman explains:

Most North Americans tend to differentiate social and economic status not in terms of specific class membership but on the basis of the consumption of particular commodities and participation in particular activities. In a society which is ever-increasingly consumer and service oriented, differences in social and economic position take expression through, and are perceived in terms of, hierarchies of taste cultures (Kingsman 1990:92-93).

Thus, consumerism affords an affirmation of status in North America, rather than the reinforcement of an identification with a particular social class, as may be the case in England. As noted above, this is a result of the emphasis in North American political culture on individualism and achieving a sort of "bourgeois ideal" which is only further reinforced by the media. As Kingsman writes:

undoubtedly, this is one of the products of a mass mediated society, in view of the media's role in the widespread dissemination and subsequent democratization of culture in North America. Indeed, inasmuch as the media have provided a common culture, they have tended both to homogenize us and to sharpen distinctions amongst us. On the one hand, the sharp distinctions between high and low culture are not operative in the common media culture of North America: everything is virtually equally available to everyone and the marketplace, along with factors such as stardom or celebrity, rather than social status, tends to determine which cultural artifacts are widely distributed and prized and which are not. On the other hand, it is also the very commonality of our shared media culture which opens the door to sharpened individualization and distinction. Indeed, in a context of vastly shared references, to which all have virtually equal access, *questions of personal style in the manipulation of the references become extremely noticeable* (Kingsman 1990:93; emphasis added).

This democratization of culture in North America contributes to a more populist culture than is the case in class-based English society. In addition to the relative weakness of class identity, the sharpened individualization in North America results in a somewhat different relationship with the products of consumer society. Consequently, the elements of style of a particular subculture operate in a much different manner among young people in Canada. There is instead, as Straw observes, "the often paradoxical result that those elements of music and fashion and culture which are real symbols of resistance in their foreign country of origin become markers of cultural distinction among the middle class in Canada" (Straw 1987:25). This suggests that the various elements of style associated with a particular subculture are seen as simply another set of consumer products - more "raw materials" - made available to young Canadians to be used in their affirmation of status and personal identity.

Thus, the products of consumer society do not serve any less as the "raw materials" for the expression by young Canadians of their particular social and cultural location than they do for young people in England. This does, however, imply that the purpose and perhaps the ultimate final result of the re-working of "raw materials" will be different in Canada than in England. The important point is that this difference is rooted not in a different process of re-working those materials, but in the different social and cultural context in which the process occurs. While this perspective makes the use of subcultural elements in Canada less radical and thus, as Straw writes, "less heroic," it nevertheless allows for the assumption that the media is *not* completely homogenizing, and that culture has the ability to adapt to a particular social location. "It suggests

that the media have a function again as emblems of distinction and as markers of social location and that their use is subordinate to these sociological factors" (Straw 1987:25). Accordingly, the question now must move away from subcultural theory and turn to how the products of the media are used by young people in societies such as Canada to identify their particular social and cultural location.

The "New Existentialism"

A recent trend in cultural studies has been referred to by Laermans as the "New Existentialism," which has focused primarily on mass media and consumer culture (Laermans 1993:153). Although, as will be noted later, there are some important difficulties which limit the usefulness of this line of thinking, the work remains significant as it illustrates that the active re-working of provided "raw materials" is not only found among members of a spectacular subculture, but is also a feature of the cultural lives of young people who remain *outside* of spectacular subcultures. This is particularly important for an analysis of the Canadian situation because, as has been noted, the functioning of subcultures in Canada is markedly different from that in England, as the elements of a particular spectacular subculture function primarily as additional raw materials in the affirmation of status and as markers of a social location. Furthermore, this work illustrates how the active re-working of raw materials can actually "create" a social location rather than simply express it. This is particularly important for a description of the Canadian context, as it is this creation of social and cultural location

which is the purpose of the re-working of raw cultural materials by young Canadians. Finally, this work is vital because it focuses further on the moment where cultural artifacts meet with the experience of the individual which, as will be explained, appears to be critical in the "creation" of culture yet is largely overlooked by policy intervention.

Fiske figures prominently in this line of analysis. He has argued that everyday practices are undoubtedly shaped by constraints such as income, socio-economic class, education and what the mass media ultimately offers to its consumers, but that individuals are enormously adept at creating their own cultural identity around these constraints (See Fiske 1989a, 1989b and 1992). Consumers, in his view, are not just "dupes" of the advertising, identity and leisure industries, but are cultural producers themselves, capable of resistance to and subversion of any attempt at manipulation by the producers of cultural goods.

Similarly, Willis has introduced the concept of "grounded aesthetics": "the creative element in a process whereby meanings are attributed to symbols and practices and where symbols and practices are selected, reselected, highlighted and recomposed to resonate further appropriated and particularized meanings. ... Grounded aesthetics are the yeast of common culture" (Willis 1990:21). Thus, "grounded aesthetics" refers to the reworking of the meanings provided for young people as raw materials through the mass media, the cultural industries, the fashion industries, and advertising, for example, into artifacts and practices bearing new meanings which better reflect their own personal cultural realities. This is, as Willis calls it, "creative consumption":

We are thinking of the extraordinary symbolic creativity of the multitude of ways in which young people use, humanize, decorate and

invest with meanings their common and immediate life spaces and social practices, personal style and choice of clothes; selective and active use of music, TV, magazines; decoration of bedrooms; the rituals of romance and subcultural styles; the style, banter and drama of friendship groups; music-making and dance (Willis 1990:2).

Willis goes further to describe what he calls "necessary symbolic work," which "is necessary simply because humans are communicating as well as producing beings. ... Whilst all may not be productive, all are communicative. *All*" (Willis 1990:10). Symbolic creativity "transforms what is provided [the raw materials] and helps to produce specific forms of human identity and capacity" (Willis 1990:11). The main point in this perspective is then that:

we are all cultural producers in some way and of some kind in our everyday lives. ... There is now a whole social and cultural medium of interwebbing common meaning and identity-making which blunts, deflects, minces up or transforms outside or top-down communication. In particular, elite or 'official' culture has lost its dominance. It has certainly always been honeycombed with subterranean resistances and alternatives but now the very sense, or pretence, of a national 'whole culture' and of hierarchies of values, activities and places within it is breaking down (Willis 1990:128).

This "existentialist" brand of cultural thinking has been frequently criticized as being overly simplistic in its romantic portrayal of the subversive capabilities of the young consumer, and for its contribution to what some may refer to as a naive form of cultural populism. Certainly, Willis' conclusions do appear to provide an overly simplistic and, perhaps naive perspective of populism, as he dismisses too easily any notion of cultural quality. Similarly, some of the conclusions Willis offers in Common Culture go unsupported by the evidence he presents. And, as Buckingham notes, his "insistent emphasis on 'creativity' runs the risk of understating the *routinised* nature of cultural activity, and the extent to which a great deal of media use is casual and uncommitted" (Buckingham

1993b:205). Not all media consumption need be designed for subversive purposes. Furthermore, its emphasis on the creativity of working-class culture runs the risk of "underestimating the ways in which it has been formed by its relation to the dominant culture - and of ignoring, both at an individual and a social level, the 'hidden injuries of class'" (Buckingham 1993b:206). In essence, Fiske and Willis may place *excessive* faith in human agency, ignoring the theoretical contribution of structuralism altogether and the actual, although never total, *structuring* of the individual.

However, this work remains valuable because it challenges our existing assumptions about how culture is produced in a consumer society such as Canada. The meanings provided by consumer products are important, but the production of meaning continues well after the product is delivered to the consumer. Furthermore, it illustrates that this not only applies to members of a subculture, but to those who remain outside of subcultures as well. Indeed, the research into media and consumer studies reveals that the essential elements of the re-working of "raw cultural materials" is present in the consumption of the products of the media by *all* young people. So, while the answers provided by Fiske and Willis and other researchers working in this "existentialist" line of analysis may be problematic, and somewhat naive in their romantic portrayal of the "necessary symbolic work" of young people, they at least expand our traditional notions of who the cultural producers are in industrialized society.

In a similar vein, a number of ethnographic studies have examined how the products of the mass media are used in the everyday lives of

consumers (for example, Arnett 1995, Buckingham 1993a, Finnegan 1989, Frith 1981, Gillard 1990-91, Larson 1995, Pronovost 1990, Roe 1990, Walkerdine 1993, Willis 1990). The results of this research show how young people are able to actually create their own particular social and cultural location. Interestingly, this literature is dominated by work on the involvement by young people in activities centred around popular music. As Frith notes, music for young people is:

perhaps above all, an expression and celebration of *sociability*. ... The music both creates and articulates the very idea of community. ... There is such a thing as society and it is through music more than any other cultural activity that people become part of it (Frith 1992:177).

Furthermore, popular music is the first framework in which young people, both performers and listeners alike, can interpret the world around them. It is how many of them learn the skills necessary to become more complete human beings. As Frith continues:

Young people use music to situate themselves historically, culturally, and politically in a much more complex system of symbolic meaning than is available locally, and Finnegan usefully describes different genres as 'pathways' to the wider world - the wider world of taste and identity, commerce and expertise. ... The point is that for young people, at least, music probably has the most important role in the mapping of social networks, determining how and where they meet and court and party (Frith 1992:177, citing Finnegan 1989).

There is then a strong degree of human agency in their involvement: popular music is used by young people as an effective instrument or vehicle for *personal* cultural development. They take elements of what is provided by popular music culture to construct their own location within youth culture and society in general. So while the sound recording is at the heart of popular music culture, the real value to youth culture is in the rituals that flow from popular music that contribute to individual and

collective identity. The involvement of young people in popular music is very much a social practice rather than simply the consumption of an industrial commodity: the recording is a "means" to a much broader "end."

Similarly, Arnett has investigated the use of media products by adolescents using the "uses and gratification" approach. This approach "emphasizes the role of social and psychological factors in mediating (and mitigating) individuals' media consumption," and "stresses individual choice and how 'people intentionally participate and select media messages from communication alternatives ... what people do with the media, instead of what the media do to the people'" (Arnett 1995:520-521, citing Rubin 1994:421). His investigation revealed five of the most common uses of the media: entertainment, coping, high sensation, identity formation, and youth culture identification.

Like their elders, young people use the products of the media to divert themselves. Pop music, for example, allows young people to forget about responsibilities and just relax. Music is not only fun, but is also a "release from the pressure and stress our young people are currently experiencing" (Gillard 1990-91:7). Television viewing similarly offers diversion from the routine of life or personal problems (Arnett 1995, Larson 1995). A related use identified by Arnett is merely "coping," where media serves as relief from negative emotions. Listening to music and watching films or videos is frequently mentioned as the means through which young people sort out particular challenges which are making them angry or unhappy (Arnett 1995, Gillard 1990-91, Pronovost 1990). In "the course of early adolescence, when there is an increase in the amount of problems, conflict, and stresses at home, at school, and with friends,

there is also an increase in time spent listening to music" (Arnett 1995:523) and so this function of media consumption is particularly well-suited to young people. Hence the frequent references to music in the ethnographic research, such as it "makes me relate to life in a happier way," and it "helps me relax ... It's a cruel world out there" (Gillard 1990-91:7). A third use has been referred to as "high sensation." Adolescents have a tendency to require higher levels of stimulation in their environment than might be the case for the average adult (Arnett 1994). This might offer an additional explanation as to why young people are drawn to heavy metal or rap music, action films or fast moving music videos. Adolescent boys and young men are the highest sensation seeking group, so it is not surprising that the principal audience for heavy metal, rap, and action films are also adolescent boys and young men (Arnett 1994, 1995).

The two final media uses refer to identity. The first - identity formation - refers to the "cultivation of a conception of one's values, abilities and hopes for the future" (Arnett 1995:522). If adolescence is, as Côté and Allahaar have defined it, an "identity moratorium," young people will draw upon the signs and symbols which surround them to help them create an identity compatible with their personality. While much of the raw materials required for this identity formation come from institutions such as schools, universities and family, a significant amount also comes from popular culture. The content of music, films, television programmes and magazines, for example, will be used by the young consumer to establish a notion of what it means to be an individual in the society around them (Arnett 1995, Walkerdine 1993). This is

particularly so for gender identity, where the proper behaviour, dress, and gender "role" is largely communicated through the images provided by the media (McRobbie 1994, Buckingham 1993a, Côté and Allahar 1994:84-100). Occupational information and political views are all communicated to young people through the media - information which is then used as the "raw material" for the development of a personal identity.

But this information also contributes to *group* identity formation - the second usage of the media relating to identity. The media are used to create a feeling of connectedness to a larger network of peers with its own values and interests (Arnett 1995:524). Discussions about the new film with a well-known movie star, or a group's latest album or new video, may serve as the common denominator in the social relations between people who feel a sense of community toward one another:

Peer group pressure, and the need to feel accepted by your peers, is a crucial part of adolescent behaviour. Contemporary popular music is a means of achieving this. Some students who listed heavy metal as their favourite did so because 'All my friends listen to it and said it is really cool' (Gillard 1990-91:9).

This identification may either be with youth culture in general [and, thus, with youth around the world in the context of a highly internationalized media which disseminates much of the symbols of youth culture (See Campbell Robinson *et al.* 1991)], or with a particular subculture.

Thus, as Arnett concludes:

A common theme in the five uses of media specified here is that, in all of these respects, adolescents draw materials from media that contribute to their socialization. When they seek entertainment or high sensation from media, when they use media materials toward identity formation or for coping, when they participate in a media-based youth subculture, adolescents are also, in a larger sense, participating in activities that are part of their socialization.

That is, media are part of the process by which adolescents acquire - or resist acquiring - the behaviours and beliefs of the social world, the culture, in which they live (Arnett 1995:525).

These conclusions have been echoed in other research, as well, including that done in Canada. Pronovost (1990), for example, interviewed over 2,000 people⁷ across Canada about their music listening habits and produced much the same results as those of Arnett, illustrating that the media serves as a sort of vehicle for sociability. He writes:

À titre d'illustration on peut mentionner qu'il est bien connu que la sociabilité occupe une place primordiale chez les jeunes; l'écoute de la musique tout particulièrement, mais le cinéma également, traduisent explicitement cette importance des groupes des pairs. Ainsi, particulièrement pendant les week-ends, les jeunes sont majoritairement orientés vers des pratiques que nous avons qualifiées de sociabilité musicale, et ce, de manière très marquée; de même, domine l'importance de se retrouver entre amis à titre de motivation pour l'écoute de la musique. Chez les jeunes, «la consommation musicale tend effectivement à fonctionner comme un attribut et un indice d'appartenance à un groupe spécifique» (Pronovost 1990:26; citing Bouillon-Dartevelle 1984:161).

The products of the mass media, therefore, are used by young people in a consumer society such as Canada as part of their process of negotiating a social and cultural space within the broader society and as a medium through which a personal and collective identity is created. It is here where the principal difference lies between Canada and England.

---

⁷ This sample included people of 15 years of age or more; thus not only young people within the ranges of 15 to 24 years old. The results are, however, illustrative.

⁸ "By way of illustration, one should mention that it is well-known that sociability assumes an important role among young people; listening to music in particular, but also film, explicitly translate this importance of the peer-group. Thus, especially during weekends, young people are largely oriented towards what we call musical sociability, and this, in a particularly marked manner; in the same way, there is the importance of finding oneself among friends which serves as the motivation for listening to music. Among young people, 'the consumption of music effectively serves as a quality and a marker of belonging to a specific group.'"

English subcultural theory suggests that the re-working of raw cultural materials by English youth is designed to symbolically *express* their particular social and cultural location within the mainstream culture and the working-class parent culture from which subcultures emerge. However, because of the greater emphasis on individualism, and the relative weakness of class identity as a "pre-determined community" to which one will belong, this same process of re-working by young people in the Canadian context is designed less to *express* a social and cultural location than it is to actually *create* that location. It may then be argued that human agency is even more important and complex in the Canadian context.

Conclusion

As is suggested in the early work of Williams and further confirmed by subcultural theory, culture is then the result of the tremendously complex interaction of the "raw materials" provided by society, either in the form of the products of the mass media or consumer society in general, and the output of the various institutions and structures of society with the everyday, lived, material existence of groups and individuals "on the ground." Thus, the output of the media industries is only part of a whole way of life characterized by the interaction between the various practices and constituent parts of which it is comprised. This process of interaction will thus be shaped by the particular social, cultural and historical location in which the entire process occurs. Rather than a single articulation of resistance, there is instead an intricate

networking of multiple articulations within this whole way of life, many of which will be contradictory.

As illustrated in the examples of English subcultural theory and in the media usage of young people in mediatized societies such as Canada, the various cultural artifacts made available to young people will be drawn upon as "raw materials." Unlike the English examples, however, young Canadians will draw on these raw materials to actually create a social location rather than simply give it symbolic expression. The character of a culture is, as a result, determined not wholly by the raw materials, but by the choices from the various materials available and how these materials are then used by their users. While many of the elements of youth culture may be a creation of the media, and the final outcome will be significantly shaped and constrained by what the media ultimately offers, the actual production of culture nonetheless occurs through the active selection and re-working of those selections by the young people themselves. The consumer, then, is very much an "active" participant in the negotiation or "production" of culture in order to shape it to their own particular interests, as the work of Gramsci suggests.

Unlike Althusser and structuralist theories then, media and cultural artifacts do not "overdetermine" but merely contribute to the cultivation of a personal and collective conception of values and attitudes concerning the society in which young people live. There is, therefore, an enormous amount of human agency involved in the "production" of culture. To argue, then, that young people are only passive receptors of cultural symbols, or passive consumers of the products of popular culture, is oversimplifying an enormously intricate, and frequently contradictory process of cultural

"production." As noted by Corrigan and Frith in Resistance through Rituals:

There is no doubt that the symbols of commercial leisure (pop music, fashion) have a crucial role within youth culture and the left have responded to this with a number of variations on the theme of 'the corruption of the innocent'. ... Certainly the agencies of pop culture (record companies and teenage magazines and clothes shops and so on) *exploit* young people (hardly a surprising aspect of capitalism); *the question is to what extent they manipulate them* (Corrigan and Frith 1976:237, emphasis added).

The process of the "production" of popular culture, therefore, includes what happens after a product is delivered to its market. In this perspective, it may be appropriate to divide popular cultural production into two phases: primary and secondary (see, for example, Stith Bennett 1979). The primary, or "legitimate" phase is that where the centralized producer creates a cultural good and it is then distributed to the public. The secondary phase occurs in the period after the "legitimate" production in the primary process is complete, treats the results of the primary phase as "raw materials," and modifies the meanings associated with these "raw materials" to better reflect the lived experience of the consumer. While it must be recalled that these raw materials are never completely "uncooked" and continue to determine the culture of those who consume them to a significant degree, the actual "production" of culture is the result of the dialectical relationship between the primary or legitimate phase of production and this secondary phase rather than simply the output of the primary phase alone.

Accordingly, young people are actively involved in the process of cultural production. As the principal agents of the secondary phase of production, young people may indeed be seen as partners - although not

equals - in the production of culture with the media and other cultural industries. But as will be illustrated in the next chapter, cultural policy focuses almost exclusively on primary production - few programmes are in place to assist production at this secondary level. While such assistance would no doubt challenge the traditional means of programme delivery, the challenges currently facing cultural intervention in the primary production phase may force policy-makers to consider the secondary phase more seriously.

Chapter Three

Policy:

The Approaches to Cultural Development in Canada

If, as Chapter Two has demonstrated, culture is the result of the interaction between the "raw materials" in society with the lived, material experience of a group or individual, how is it affected by cultural policy? If the cultural "production process" can be seen as beginning with the primary or "legitimate" phase, followed by "consumption" and a "secondary" phase, at what point in the process does cultural policy intervene? What is the dominant thinking behind the decision to intervene at this point? At what other points in the process is intervention possible? May these other points of intervention not serve as possible alternatives, then, to the existing approaches to cultural development? If so, why has intervention not been considered at these points?

A clearer understanding of the connection between policy and practice is possible by adding to the analysis provided in the previous chapter an examination of the general philosophies behind the actions taken by various levels of government in the cultural sphere. This examination allows for a greater understanding of some of the possible policy alternatives which may have been neglected because of the dominance of a particular set of ideas about how cultural policy objectives should be reached. What such an examination also reveals, however, is that much of the process of the creation of culture described in the previous chapter is excluded from the principal focus of cultural intervention. While this may not be exceptionally surprising, and may have much to do

with practical considerations in implementing public policy, a closer look at the traditional assumptions about how cultural policy should be designed in Canada may reveal some interesting alternatives to the *status quo*.

Normative Content in Public Policy

Before beginning any analysis of state policies and programmes, a conceptual framework must be established to clarify our understanding of how public policy is formulated and how certain decisions are taken rather than others. As Doern and Phidd write in their influential book on Canadian public policy:

In examining any public policy field or public policy in general it is essential to look for and attempt to differentiate different levels of normative content, ideologies, dominant ideas and objectives. This three-level typology begins at the most general level with ideologies and ends with more specific objectives. ... What are the central ideas in the policy field in question? Where do they conflict and how have these ideas changed, if at all? In respect of all policy fields, how and why do some ideas and proposals gain acceptance and stay on the public priority list of governments while others do not get there at all, or emerge only for a brief period of time? (Doern and Phidd 1983:51).

Doern and Phidd thus identify three levels of what they call "normative content" in public policy: ideology, ideas and specific objectives. Ideology is, of course, the broadest category. As Doern and Phidd note, it can be said that "ideologies can help foreclose certain policy options or reduce levels of commitment to particular courses of action and to particular ideas" (Doern and Phidd 1983:53).

Flowing out of these ideologies, therefore, are the dominant ideas which guide more concrete policy actions. Among the dominant ideas

identified by Doern and Phidd as being present in Canadian political culture are the notions of efficiency, individual liberty, redistribution and equality, equity, regional diversity and, perhaps of greatest relevance to Canadian cultural policy, national identity, unity and sensitivity (Doern and Phidd 1983:54). In addition to these ideas are "policy paradigms": "a series of principles or assumptions which guide action and suggest solutions within a given policy field" (Doern and Phidd 1983:57). These paradigms are significant because they can easily become entrenched in the thinking surrounding a particular policy field. Change, therefore, occurs very slowly because these paradigms are tied to the education and socialization of the professionals or experts involved in its development, as well as the thinking of the general public.

The third and final level involve what Doern and Phidd call "specific objectives." These refer to the more specific proposals for action within a particular policy field which arise from time to time. This would include, for example, the objective within economic policy to keep inflation within a particular range of fluctuation or lowering the unemployment rate to a particular target level. This category, therefore, includes specific actions which emerge out of the dominant ideas or policy paradigms of the day which, in turn, emerge out of the dominant ideology. Thus, as Doern and Phidd suggest:

the study of public policy must begin with an appreciation of the broader levels of normative content and the purposeful nature of democratic political life. It does not begin with a search for 'objectives' only. The three levels ... should be the first three items in one's mental checklist as one carries out the task of studying public policy formulation (Doern and Phidd 1983:59).

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the dominant ideas and paradigms of normative content as they relate to the cultural sphere and

how they have resulted in certain objectives being emphasized more than others. What are the dominant ideas and policy paradigms in cultural policy? Are these paradigms still relevant? Are there not alternatives available which may have been "closed out" because of the dominance of certain ideas about culture and the state in Canada? With this mental checklist established, the analysis will now turn to the specific field of cultural policy to search for answers to these questions.

It must first be noted that the research revealed relatively few programmes which target young people directly. While there are a number of state-supported organizations which address the cultural needs of young people in various artistic disciplines, other programmes supported by the state tend to include young people only as part of the broader public. Consequently, the ideologies and paradigms influencing cultural policy as they relate to young people can only be grasped and understood within the broader content of cultural policy as a whole.

The remainder of this chapter will discuss the principal philosophies of cultural development which are present in the Canadian context, which will then suggest the dominance of a particular means - or policy paradigm - to achieving cultural development objectives in Canada. The chapter will examine the impact of this dominant paradigm on the more specific objectives outlined in the programmes administered by the key cultural agencies of each level of government operating in the Ottawa area: Federal, Provincial, Regional (the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton), and the City of Ottawa.

The Philosophies of Cultural Development in Canada

The guiding philosophy - or paradigm - in Canadian cultural policy, at all levels of government, appears to be that of supporting, through a number of means, the production of cultural symbols by what will be defined as "legitimate cultural producers" - i.e., the professional artists, organizations or firms within the cultural industries, which have dedicated themselves to cultural production, which make up the primary or "legitimate" phase of cultural production as described in the previous chapter - as opposed to other, "non-specialized producers" - i.e., the "consumers" of the products of the media, amateurs within recognized artistic disciplines, and otherwise "ordinary individuals" which make up the secondary stage of cultural production. It is within this second group which the vast majority of young people - and people generally - would be categorized. The dominance of this paradigm was made evident in an examination of various documents published by the key departments and agencies at all four levels of government. Of the various models of cultural development which have historically been practised in Canada, the one used the least is that which places the most emphasis on the *active* participation in cultural activities by the public. As a result, the other, more "top-down" models of cultural development are relied upon much more heavily. Consequently, cultural development in Canada is preoccupied with "bringing culture" to Canadians rather than developing a naturally emerging culture.

Lorimer and Duxbury recently carried out an extensive literature review of cultural development. They located a considerable body of

international literature from the fields of cultural philosophy, development, planning, and communications development. Much of this literature has been sponsored by UNESCO and carried out by a handful of researchers around the world. Not surprisingly, however, the Canadian contribution to this body of literature is "not extensive and is somewhat sporadic in its generation in that it emerges as a side-effect of commissions of inquiry into culture..." (Lorimer and Duxbury 1994:264-5). They did nonetheless identify four models of cultural development that have been used in Canada. These models are the cultural development model, the public service model, the market model, and the community development/animation model.

The cultural development model in its original form was designed to favour the creation of works which enrich a community's cultural heritage and to ensure that the widest possible audience has access to these works. The principal policy instrument of this model is public expenditure, focusing as it does on direct financial support in the form of subsidies, grants, and other fiscal measures which ensure that a strong cultural production sector will emerge. Based on this model, governments have supported through financial means a wide variety of cultural projects. The quintessential example of this model in practice is found in France, where the national government has relied on these means to increase the attractiveness of private investment in the arts and culture, as well as increasing its own budget for cultural expenditures. Since the early 1960s, when cultural centres were seen as "modern-day cathedrals" (Andrault and Dressayre 1987:28), France has embarked upon a large number of grandiose and prestigious cultural projects. In fact, there may have

been a *preference* for large-scale projects over smaller, less expensive ones. For example, the subsidies for the Pompidou Centre in Paris were, at one time, three times higher than that for all other *maisons de culture* and other cultural centres combined, and represented more than 15% of the entire budget of the French Ministry of Culture (Andrault and Dressayre 1987:28-9). Consequently, the French government spends 1.4% of its total budget on cultural pursuits, far from the standard set by Canadian governments which to date have only expressed a *commitment* to meet a target of cultural spending equal to 1% of the total government *operating* budget.⁹

This model is, however, one of the most heavily relied upon in the Canadian context, particularly in state support to the arts. The role of the Canadian state in the arts has been interpreted as being, as Lemieux writes, "to support artistic activity, to provide creators with conditions favourable to the practice of their art, and to ensure access to their work by the general public" (Lemieux 1995:2), which fits exactly the definition of this particular model. Consequently, agencies such as the Canada Council and the Ontario Arts Council (OAC) have been established and continue to play a crucial part in Canadian cultural policy. The Canada Council, for example, made available over \$86 million in 1995 for approximately 40 programmes aimed at supporting theatre, music, writing and publishing, dance, media arts and visual arts, as well as additional programmes such as the Art Bank, various Arts Awards programmes, the

---

9

See, for example, Arpin (1991) and Ottawa (1992) for official recommendations that Canadian government spending be increased to 1% of the total operating budget.

Explorations programme (for new, developing artists), and the Touring Office which assists with the expenses of performing arts groups (Canada Council 1995). Similarly, the Ontario Arts Council, was established to "promote the development and enjoyment of the arts across the province" (Ontario Arts Council 1994b:1). Its 85 funding programmes, which totalled over \$34 million in the 1993-94 fiscal year (Ontario Arts Council 1994a), are available to "all artists of talent and commitment" and organizations working in the disciplines of crafts, dance, design arts, film, folk art¹⁰, holography, literature, mime, music, photography, puppetry, theatre, video and visual arts (Ontario Arts Council 1994b:5).

It is also the cultural development model which is perhaps most obvious at more local levels of government. The Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton (RMOC), for example, offers funding for artistic activities in the region through two procedures. The Art in Public Spaces programme is designed to integrate "art and the creative input of artists in the development of a quality work and living environment for the public it serves" (Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton 1990). Similarly, the Regional Arts Grants Policy allows for funds to be distributed to established arts organizations in the region, to special projects in the creation or presentation of works of art, or to strengthen the region's arts infrastructure (Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton 1991). Likewise, a Citizen's Task Force On Culture reporting to the City of Ottawa released its report in 1992 which included the recommendation that the City commit to reaching by 1995 a target of cultural spending equal to

---

¹⁰ The OAC defines Folk Art as the "creative expression which reflects both the preservation of tradition, as well as innovation and individual creation" (Ontario Arts Council 1994b).

1% of the gross municipal operating budget (Ottawa 1992:17).¹¹ Consequently, the City has adopted a number of funding programmes aimed at artistic production in the city. Its Public Art Programme has the mandate to "develop, manage and exhibit a collection with [a] focus on local artists, acquired by purchase or commission, which is to be made of permanently fixed and moveable works of art which should be displayed throughout the community" (Ottawa 1995c). Similarly, the City's Festival Assistance Programme is designed to assist major local cultural festivals such as the Carnival of Cultures, the Buskers Festival, Italian Week, Lebanese Week, the Lesbian and Gay Film and Video Festival, the Odawa Pow-wow, and the Ottawa Valley Book Festival, for example (Ottawa 1995e). Finally, the Cultural Assistance Programme is designed to support the city's cultural community through core grants to arts or heritage organizations, project funding to arts or heritage organizations or collectives for a specific work, or seed funding for a new programme which is to be an annual or on-going event (Ottawa 1995e).

The cultural development model is therefore one of the most widely used in the Canadian context, particularly in state support to the arts. The heavy reliance on various juried funding programmes allows for the state to be seen as contributing to cultural life while still maintaining its arm's length from actual creative decisions. These decisions as to

¹¹ This goal was, in fact, reached and surpassed in 1995, with 1.09% of the gross city operating budget being spent on culture. However, this was due to the fact that City responsibilities for police services and waste disposal were transferred, along with their corresponding budgets, to the RMOC. Since then, the city's Cultural Leadership Committee has recommended that this yardstick be changed to a per capita figure, with \$6.00 per capita as the new objective for the Cultural Assistance Programme, rather than for all cultural spending (i.e. including libraries, etc.). See Ottawa 1995b.

which artist or group of artists receives funding is frequently delegated within this model to a panel of "experts" or "peers," thus removing much of the political risk to politicians and policy-makers.

The public service model is also widely used in Canada. It uses chiefly public ownership methods to provide services that would not *ordinarily* be provided by the private sector. This model is at work in Canada in the form of the various publicly-owned cultural institutions, such as the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), the National Film Board (NFB), the National museums and National Gallery, the National Archives and National Library, the National Arts Centre and its Orchestra, various festivals and awards programmes, as well as more regional and local institutions such as TV Ontario, the provincial museums and galleries and Ottawa's Billings Museum, for example. As this list of institutions suggests, actions which emerge from this model tend to be primarily restricted to the preservation of a cultural heritage, whether in the form of artifacts or values, as well as the notion of "human betterment," rooted, as Lorimer and Duxbury note, in "the ideals of a British style of civil service, a class-based society, and an elitism typified by an Arnoldian sense of culture" (Lorimer and Duxbury 1994:267). However, this model has both significant advantages and disadvantages, particularly as it applies to the media:

On the one hand, it allows for the state to provide opportunities, which would not otherwise arise, for straightforward articulation by individuals and groups, for self-articulation aimed at enhancing distinctiveness, or, more generally, for individual and social betterment according to some set of ideals. On the other hand, while it lacks an authoritarianism and a potentially broadly-controlling function of the state which characteristically arise from an intensively applied cultural development model, once a monopoly is granted for the provision of public service, such as the CBC or the

NFB, it may be difficult to extinguish this monopoly after its time of maximum value has passed. The existence of the monopoly may thus retard the growth of an independently owned domestic production sector (Lorimer and Duxbury 1994:267).

Lorimer and Duxbury suggest that the view of culture which tends to emerge from this model is frequently narrow. While private sector actors may be inclined to broaden their field of vision in order to capture new markets, a common criticism of public sector institutions is that they frequently develop a restrictive institutional structure both in its management style and artistic expression (Lorimer and Duxbury 1994:267). The monopolistic nature of the public institution, combined with its need to adhere to a publicly-sanctioned mandate, often translates into the public institution being slower to respond to change than might be the case with a private sector institution. Yet, the public service model fits comfortably within Canadian political culture and its style of civil service (which is quite similar to that of the British) and has figured prominently in the history of cultural policy in Canada at all levels. At the federal level, it serves as an effective instrument towards national unity objectives, and at all levels this model allows governments to provide cultural programming which would not normally be provided by the private sector (e.g., some large-scale museums), or to provide the additional infrastructure and employment opportunities for professional cultural workers.

The market model, as its title suggests, privileges individual choice about cultural decisions through the marketplace over that of government agencies. It has two poles: the "current global market" and the "cultural market." The *current global market* can be referred to as the

free market because, "although market laws and policies are continually in flux, they are directed towards a free global market ever less hampered by governments" (Lorimer and Duxbury 1994:268). These are, therefore, market forces as they are defined by current law and practice. The other pole, which can be referred to as the *cultural market model*, includes corrective or augmentative measures taken by governments to address an inadequacy in what the global cultural market, or free market, is providing.

As Lorimer and Duxbury note, the current global market model is used most extensively in the United Kingdom and the United States (Lorimer and Duxbury 1994:268). The U.K., for example, has adopted a current global market model in its policies towards publishing, film and sound recording. The United States too tends to favour the current global market model in its policies towards the broadcasting and entertainment industries. However it is not universally applied, as seen in the Public Broadcasting System and the National Endowment for the Arts, both of which resemble most closely the cultural market model (Lorimer and Duxbury 1994:268).

The Canadian economy, however, is very much an open one which, combined with its physical proximity to the U.S., requires the cultural market model to be among the most commonly used. This is especially the case in the mass media where the market is deemed to be inadequate in providing Canadians with the type of cultural products they require. As Fortier and Schafer observe: "La motivation fondamentale demeure encore la souveraineté culturelle et la primauté du contenu canadien, reflet de notre identité et qui, possiblement, pourrait nous unir et contrer l'influence

américaine (Fortier and Schafer 1989:77).¹² This model has, therefore, assumed a prominent position in the thinking of the federal government towards cultural development. As Globerman writes, cultural nationalism has served as the primary justification for federal cultural intervention because "'Canadian content' in domestic cultural expression is required to strengthen and preserve the 'Canadian identity'" (Globerman 1983:39). State intervention is thus seen as desirable in order to achieve cultural objectives, and is justified on the grounds of Canadian culture being a "merit good" and thus subject to market failure¹³ - which constitutes a large part of the thinking behind the cultural market model (Rotstein 1988:268, Lorimer and Duxbury 1994:268).

As a consequence, the Canadian approach has been one of "plugging the holes" using a variety of policy instruments in what the global free market offers in order to resist continentalization and to create a space for Canadian voices (Kingsman 1990:122). This remains an important tension in cultural policy: Canadian cultural development versus the incorporation of Canada into a single Canada-U.S. cultural and communications market. This is particularly evident in the marked degree to which the federal government intervenes in the media, which must compete with large amounts

¹² "The fundamental motivation still remains that of cultural sovereignty and the primacy of Canadian content, the reflection of our identity and of what possibly could unite us and counteract the American influence."

¹³ Globerman defines a merit good as one which possesses certain positive externalities - "uncompensated benefits ... that are bestowed ... on third parties by the consumption or production activities of any economic agent". Market failure "may be said to exist when one or more conditions are present that preclude the efficient allocation of resources by private transactions". Failure occurs, therefore, when the market allocates a resource without proper consideration of these externalities. See Globerman 1983.

of foreign products entering Canada, produced in countries who enjoy greater economies of scale. For example, the magazine industry has been protected since Confederation by a number of policy measures: a postal subsidy was made available to domestic publishers if they met certain criteria (Keachie and Pittaway 1994:15); the Income Tax Act (Section 19) disallows deductions of advertising expenses incurred by Canadian firms for advertising in publications not 75% Canadian owned or consisting of more than 80% of foreign material; and Schedule C of the Customs Code restricts entry of foreign publications with more than 5% of advertising content directed at Canadians, preventing the passage into Canada of "split-run" editions of American magazines such as Reader's Digest, Time or, more recently, Sports Illustrated (see Anderson and Hennes 1994; and O'Callaghan and Tassé 1994). This protection against "split-run" editions was recently reinforced in the federal government's Bill C-103 (See Canadian Conference of the Arts 1995a). Similarly, the music industry has been protected by a number of comparable measures. These measures include a high tariff on imported recordings (which resulted in all of the American "majors" establishing subsidiary operations in Canada, which focussed primarily on manufacturing records, tapes and CDs for domestic consumption, using foreign mastertapes - usually American or British artists) (Wright 1991:307); the now famous Canadian content or "Cancon" regulations which, beginning in 1971, required all AM stations (and later FM stations) to play a minimum of 30% Canadian content as a condition of the renewal of their licenses¹⁴; and the adoption in 1986 of the Sound

---

¹⁴ The definition of Canadian content is that which meets two of the following criteria: i) the instrumentation or lyrics were principally performed by a Canadian; ii) the music was written by a

Recording Development Program (SRDP), which, as Laroche and Straw observe, was designed to address claims that "the domestic industry suffered from under-capitalization and a lack of distribution facilities, but also the argument that the size of the domestic market for recordings made international success an economic necessity" (Laroche and Straw 1989:165). Finally, the film and television industries have also been singled out for protection under the cultural market model. The most effective in terms of spurring film production in Canada has been the various forms of Capital Cost Allowance (CCA) programmes made available to Canadian investors (See Pendakur 1990). Support, however, is now more project-based through the federal film and television funding agency, Telefilm Canada. Telefilm makes capital available through a number of funds aimed at production and distribution with the explicit objective of promoting "the production, by the Canadian private sector, of high quality, culturally relevant Canadian dramatic feature films with high Canadian content" (Telefilm Canada 1994).

The final model of cultural development - the community development/animation model - has as its foundation the belief in the value of information and self-knowledge, particularly in its media form. The animation model has been defined generally as:

that stimulus to the mental, physical and emotional life of people in an area or community which moves them to undertake a range of experiences through which they can find a greater degree of self-realisation, self-expression, and awareness of belonging to a community over the development of which they can exercise an influence. A stimulus of this kind seldom arises spontaneously in modern urban or even rural societies, and it has to be contrived as something additional to the normal circumstances of daily life (Simpson 1972:1).

Canadian; iii) the lyrics were written by a Canadian; and/or iv) the live performance was wholly recorded in Canada. See Wright 1991:307.

Fundamental to the animation model is the assumption that it is not only minorities conventionally regarded as socially deprived, but, as Mennell explains, "the mass of the people who are culturally impoverished" (Mennell 1979:245). The targets of animation should include those who, by other standards, may be living in relative comfort or even prosperity.

This model places considerably more emphasis on "community" and the "cultural will of the people." The traditional form of cultural animation involves *animateurs* who work to involve people *actively* rather than just as *spectators*.¹⁵ What is explored or created is a decision not left to policy makers, professional cultural workers or even the *animateur*, but instead to the community itself. The task of the *animateur*, therefore, is to:

involve people actively, not just as spectators, and in trying to find out what most appeals to people, modify their activities accordingly, whether or not that conforms to prior cultural standards. Emphasis is placed on 'creativity' (or, at any rate, on 'spontaneity'), 'communication' and self-expression (Mennell 1979:246).

The media version of this model has resulted in the development of a few television, radio and video policies aimed at ensuring that the community is able to represent itself to its constituents. Examples of this may include Canada's National Film Board, which operates studios for film production by women (see Scherbarth 1986) and First Nations (see Task Force on Professional Training for the Cultural Sector in Canada 1991:81). Similarly, the animation model *may* be seen in the Canadian Radio-

---

¹⁵ This is from the French word *animation*, which is defined in Robert's *Dictionnaire de langue française* as the "*méthodes de conduite d'un groupe qui favorisent la participation de ses membres à la vie collective*". Hence an *animateur* is defined as "*une personne qui dirige certaines activités culturelles*."

television and Telecommunications Commission's (CRTC) regulations requiring cable companies to provide resources and broadcast time to groups or individuals to produce community programming (see Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission 1971, 1974).

Although it has been used extensively in France, Belgium and Italy (Mennell 1979:245), the animation model is currently the least used of the four models of cultural development in Canada (even in Quebec where it was particularly important to that province's cultural policy during the 1970s). In fact, it is now rarely mentioned in the Canadian literature, except in the context of various marginalized groups (Lorimer and Duxbury 1994:265) as is illustrated by the NFB example.¹⁶ Even at more local levels of government this model receives little attention. If it is used at all, it is at a very minimal level and targeted primarily at marginalized groups. In Ottawa, for example, this model is used as part of a community outreach programme aimed at street youth in the downtown core. Through its Public Art Programme, the City of Ottawa recently contracted a professional photographer to work as an animateur with local street youth, to enable them to document their lives through photography. With the assistance of two local organizations who work with street youth, and with some limited funding from the City's Public Art Programme and a sponsorship from a large photography company (providing cameras, film and paper), this project allowed street youth to produce several photos of their lives on Ottawa streets. Some of these photos will be produced as postcards for sale as a fundraising item, with the entire collection being

---

¹⁶ It was recently announced that the NFB intends to close Studio D. See "D in Film Board's Studio D Now Stands for Disbanded" 1996.

shown as an exhibition in a prominent downtown store window. A review of the programme is currently being undertaken, and the hope is that the project will be tried again in the near future (Ottawa 1995d). Although this is a particularly exciting example of the animation model at work, it is targeted very narrowly at street youth and is very limited in scope, with only very few participants.

The Dominant Paradigm: A "Top-Down" Approach

While it may be difficult to determine which of the four models of cultural development is relied upon the most, it is *not* difficult to determine which is relied upon the *least*. As noted above, the animation model is used only in very limited circumstances. Lorimer and Duxbury explain:

Although Canada is known internationally for the application of this philosophy of cultural development it has faded from the mainstream both in research and writing about culture, in cultural programs and in cultural policies. Before it faded it generated considerable attention and led to debates on control over the process of cultural development, authenticity, appropriate technology, the nature of animation and so forth. These debates are still very much alive; however, they are found not within the literature on "cultural development" but in such areas as adult education, rural studies, and the study of marginalized groups, such as Native peoples and racial minorities (Lorimer and Duxbury 1994:265).

Furthermore, the three models which are emphasized the most in the Canadian context - the cultural development, public service and market models - appear to privilege what Mennell refers to as the "democratization of culture" rather than "cultural democracy." The "democratization of culture" refers to the "attempts made over many years by local, national and international agencies to spread to wider sections

of the population knowledge and enjoyment of the good things which constitute 'culture'" (Mennell 1979:235). These three models, which emphasize methods of disseminating cultural symbols among the population, can be seen as a "top-down" approach to cultural development, where the role of policy is to "bring" these cultural symbols to the people.

Alternatively, those advocating "cultural democracy" would argue that cultural policy should promote the "active use and development of their native culture, of experience and practice of the arts according to their own conception, and the evolution of life-styles of their own choice" (Mennell 1979:236, citing Simpson 1976:1). Thus, if "'democratization of culture' represents a policy of *popularization*, 'cultural democracy' in its shriller forms borders on *populism*, for some of its proponents have gone so far as to express hostility to the support given to traditional 'high culture'" (Mennell 1979). Undoubtedly, it is the animation model which is most closely associated with "cultural democracy," and which stresses a more "bottom-up" approach to cultural development - the very design of the animation model is to involve groups and individuals *actively* in the development of *their own* culture.

Why would this particular model receive less attention in Canadian cultural policy-making? The answer is found in Mennell's discussion of cultural "needs." Building on a model used in the discussion of political power, Mennell identifies three views of cultural needs. The first, a "one-dimensional view," is the most common in cultural policy-making. This involves the consideration of "only those political interests which find overt expression in active involvement in politics and decision-making. Passivity and non-involvement is implicitly taken to indicate political

contentment" (Mennell 1979:238). In other words, needs are defined as those which are articulated to policy-makers through the political process. Frequently serving as the justification for this one-dimensional view is a reliance on public opinion research. But, as Mennell states, "opinion research generally fails as a means of obtaining information about 'needs' useful in policy-making" (Mennell 1979:243). The reliance on statements by organized interests, and on questionnaires which ask people to define their cultural needs, "takes account only of those 'needs' which have already found overt expression in active involvement." ... They "assume that people are subjectively aware of their unmet but *manifest* needs - even if they have no experience of the objective means by which these might be met" (Mennell 1979:245).

To compensate for the limitations of this one-dimensional view, the two-dimensional view "entails the recognition that if people do indeed possess more latent cultural 'needs', these will not become manifest simply through asking questions. Rather the exposure to *new* cultural experience is necessary to make people aware of them" (Mennell 1979:247). This two-dimensional view of cultural needs is most consistent, therefore, with the animation model, particularly as it emerged in Europe in the 1970s. As noted above, a stimulus of this kind seldom arises spontaneously and thus has to be offered as something additional to the ordinary events of daily life. To draw out these latent cultural needs, the animation model, through the *animateur*, places considerable emphasis on involving people actively in cultural production rather than only as spectators, and moulding their activities to suit their cultural needs rather than any predetermined cultural standard. The animation model and the two-

dimensional view of cultural needs are indeed more concerned with developing a *naturally* emerging culture (cultural democracy) rather than *imposing* a particular interpretation of culture (democratization of culture).

However, even the two-dimensional view may be unable to truly draw out the cultural needs deeply embedded within individuals. Consequently, a three-dimensional view is required. The three-dimensional view maintains the possibility that people may be "so conditioned by their life in existing society that they fail to recognize and may even actively reject their own latent needs" (Mennell 1979:239). This view sees these latent needs as being more deeply rooted than does the two-dimensional view. The difficulty with the three-dimensional view is that it may have little empirical status, which makes it of little practical use for policy-making: a need which cannot easily be seen in a manifest form is not easily defended in the battle for scarce public resources. Similarly, individuals seldom organize to defend deeply embedded needs and interests in the political process which they themselves are unaware even exist. Further, even if it could be argued reliably that such needs were present among citizens, it would remain uncertain as to how those needs could be addressed. Therefore:

It is scarcely surprising if practical men [*sic*] and policy-makers think mainly in one and two-dimensional terms, since the 'three-dimensional' view locates the formation of 'cultural needs' in broader social structural processes which can scarcely be changed significantly by limited and short-term initiatives (Mennell 1979:253).

The one-dimensional view is the least adequate of the three models as it only takes account of needs which have already overt expression in

active involvement. Yet, despite its inadequacies, it is the one-dimensional view which is most frequently relied upon in cultural policy-making. This is strikingly evident by examining the list of intervenors in the various studies and commissions of inquiry into culture which have occurred at all levels of government in recent years in Canada, most of which have been groups which represent the interests of cultural workers (see, for example, Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee 1982; Canada 1995; Ekos Research Associates 1988). At best, this one-dimensional view places enormous faith in the pluralistic nature of interest representation in the policy-making process; at worst, it amounts to little more than administrative and bureaucratic convenience rather than a serious method of analyzing the needs of a particular constituency.

Consequently, the dominant paradigm in Canadian cultural policy-making is one which sees the "development of culture" as occurring from the "top-down," either through the production of cultural symbols encouraged through public subsidies, through cultural services provided by numerous public institutions, or through the production and distribution of cultural symbols through the media, all of which privilege agents within the primary phase of cultural production identified in Chapter Two. Within this paradigm, the public (in whose interest the state is assumed to act in a pluralist, democratic society) are seen within this paradigm merely as "consumers" of these symbols. Little room is, as a result, provided for the development of culture by the public, despite the fact that it is their culture which is to be developed, and that these policies are supposedly implemented in their broader interests.

2 of/de 2

PM-1 3½"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

PRECISION^{SM} RESOLUTION TARGETS

Specific Objectives: The Privileging of the "Legitimate Creator"

This "top-down" approach to cultural development is further reinforced by the more specific policies and programmes which flow out of this paradigm. Consequently, virtually all the programmes made available by the state in the cultural sphere are reserved exclusively for what can be referred to as "legitimate creators" - artists or creators of cultural goods who usually create as a profession, but who, at the very least, have undergone significant professional training in their field and are preparing for a professional career. Similarly, these "legitimate creators" may also include organizations (either for profit or non-profit) which specialize in the presentation of cultural programming or representing the interests of legitimate creators, and firms within the cultural industries which employ legitimate creators or may be themselves considered as legitimate creators of cultural goods.

This tremendous emphasis on the legitimate creator in Canadian cultural policy can certainly be explained by the dominance of the "one-dimensional" approach to cultural policy-making. But it is also attributable to Canadian political culture. In the previous chapter it was noted that English Canadian political culture is dominated by a relatively unique form of liberalism, rooted in its pioneer past. The result today is a political culture which can be characterized as being bourgeois in nature, with the state governing in a somewhat more distanced fashion than might be the case elsewhere. Consequently, there is an impact on the method with which and the degree to which the state in Canada governs in

the cultural sphere. As the foregoing analysis suggests, the state prefers to govern in the cultural sphere in a similar distanced fashion.

But the emphasis on legitimate creators is also deeply rooted in Western *economic* culture. The modern, industrialized era has transformed "art" and the notion of the "artist" as social objects with very specific and unique characteristics. Ryan writes that both art and the artist were constituted through a social and then a technical division of labour in the cultural sphere, becoming fundamental objects in the new structures of signifying relations being erected within modernising societies in Europe (Ryan 1991:37). "Art" then came to exist:

tangentially to the society to which it referred and was instituted around relations between a group of expert practitioners (artists) and non-expert, non-participants (audiences) mediated by the exchange of objects (works of art). Equally, under the influence of Renaissance humanism from the 15th century onwards and most crucially that of Romanticism in the 18th and 19th centuries, the cultural practices and institutions which developed positioned 'the artist' at the centre of the world of art, inscribing these individuals as the source of cultural value (Ryan 1991:38).

Thus the intrusion of capitalism and its emphasis on the "commodification" of cultural goods, transformed cultural production from being part of everyday life, and thus "unproductive," to being a unique division of labour making it more suitably "productive." The expressive skills of the artist were thus regarded as specialized, giving him or her a particular position of status within society.

Although the modes of cultural production have changed significantly, the role of the "artist" remains very much a specialized one. The capitalist mode of cultural production, as Garnham describes, is that which at some point is found "the use of capital-intensive, technological means of mass production and/or distribution, highly

developed divisions of labour and hierarchical modes of managerial organization with the goal, if not of profit maximization, at least efficiency" (Garnham 1991:25-26). It is within this capitalist mode of cultural production that cultural labour is made "productive" as it creates surplus value. The finished product may take the form of a reproducible material good (e.g., a recording or receiving equipment), or of a reproducible object integrating the work of an artist (e.g., a record which reproduces the performance of a singer, composer or orchestra, a book, or the work of a writer, for example) (Miège 1989:25). Thus, the capitalist forms of cultural production, including film and sound recording production, journalism, and design, for example, have incorporated the specialized "artist" into its process of production, frequently as part of a creative team. For example, the rock group, the screenwriter, the actor, the author, all retain their status as a result of the possession of an expressive skill developed through a lengthy period of either formal or informal training, but this expressive skill is incorporated within a broader production process which takes their output and transforms it through marketing, advertising, and distribution into a final cultural good. But as Ryan notes:

To a greater or lesser extent, cultural workers employed in the creative phase of production are treated by employers, managers, their co-workers and publics - and most of all by themselves - as artists, as talented individuals with rare expressive skills and unconventional personalities (Ryan 1991:40-41).

The role of the corporation in the capitalist forms of cultural production is then one of bringing the work of the creator to market: a mediator between the creative talents of the "artist" and the fulfilment of the cultural needs of the consumer.

The privileging of "legitimate creators" is obvious in the public service and market models, as both public sector cultural institutions and the individual firms operating within the cultural industries fit the definition of a legitimate creator. It is, perhaps, even more evident in the cultural development model and in support to the arts which assume an important place within Canadian cultural policy. However, the emphasis on legitimate creators neglects the more active nature in the relationship young people seem to have with the arts. For example, in a 1992 survey of time use and cultural activities, Statistics Canada revealed that:

Creating art, photography, music or craftwork is, presumably, a somewhat different form of cultural participation [from spectatorship] - requiring a greater commitment of time and, perhaps, a different level of expressiveness. However, it is certainly not reserved to a select few. One out of every two Canadians applies his or her hand to produce music or art at least occasionally. ... *Engaging in the practice of an art, craft or music on an individual basis appears to be a favourite form of cultural participation for the 'average' Canadian* (Statistics Canada 1994a:7; emphasis added).

This "hands-on" cultural participation is particularly evident among Canadian youth. The study further revealed that among the 15-19 year old group:

... 25% undertook art activities such as painting and sculpting and 33% played a musical instrument at home in the previous year. For 20-24 year olds, the percentage was a little lower (16% for art activities and 24% for playing musical instruments), and for other age groups much lower again (Statistics Canada 1993:5).

In fact, slightly more people in the 15-19 age range played a musical instrument than attended a professional performing arts presentation (31%) or visited a museum or art gallery (30%) in the last year (Statistics Canada 1993:4). This data suggests that active cultural production is at

least as important in the cultural lives of young people as some forms of cultural "consumption."

Yet the emphasis in Canadian cultural policy-making on "legitimate creators" neglects this active dimension. For example, grants from the OAC are reserved for "professional artists, arts organizations, and community organizations that employ or present the work of professional artists" (Ontario Arts Council 1994b:8). A professional artist is defined as:

an artist whose arts practice has assumed career significance through a combination of individual competence, reception by the community, and economic return. Typically, professional artists have completed basic training in their fields, devote a significant proportion of their energies to practising their art, seek remuneration for their work, and are acknowledged as peers by others working in the field (Ontario Arts Council 1994b:8).

All three categories - professional artists, arts organizations and even community organizations - must "employ or present the work of professional artists" in order to be considered for OAC grants (Ontario Arts Council 1994b). The OAC is, therefore, above all a funding agency for professional artists.

Similarly, the RMOC makes funds available through development grants, achievement award grants, project grants and operating grants. Project grants are primarily reserved for either artists who have "several years experience ... in a professional context" or for artists who are "in the early stages of their professional career, but have exhibited a commitment to a career in the professional arts" (Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton 1991). Likewise, achievement award grants are designed to "recognize the work of an *established* artist or ... a significant artistic achievement," as determined by a jury of peers (Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton 1991; emphasis added). Development and operating grants

are made available to non-profit arts organizations, but only those which have "demonstrated a consistent high level of artistic quality, achievement and fiscal responsibility" and "have an established record of public funding from at least one other government source" (Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton 1991).

The City of Ottawa also has a strong tendency to focus on the needs of legitimate creators, despite the common assumption that more local levels of government should be relatively more concerned with amateur arts (see Ekos Research Associates 1988:18). Its Cultural Assistance Programme does make some room for support to amateur participation within both arts and heritage organizations. Within the arts component, the programme's mandate is to "produce, present, distribute, educate and/or encourage the appreciation of and the creation of work in the literary, performing or visual arts" (Ottawa 1995a:1). As noted above, it offers three types of funding: i) core funding, to organizations which have demonstrated consistent artistic merit, and consistent levels of achievement and viability; ii) project funding, to organizations or collectives for specific artistic works that are to be completed within a specified time frame; and iii) seed funding, which is available for start-up costs relating to a new or newly-expanded programme (Ottawa 1995a:3). There are several categories of applicants, including category "A" applicants, which refers to amateur and community arts organizations or collectives, and category "B" applicants, which include professional and developmental arts organizations or collectives. Other categories include major professional arts or heritage organizations or collectives (Ottawa 1995a). A category "A" applicant is that which is "community-oriented" and exists primarily

for the "enjoyment and self-actualization of its members" (Ottawa 1995a). Activities are, however, directed by accredited and qualified professionals in the arts (Ottawa 1995a:3). A category "B" organization is one which employs at least one full-time staff member, either in an artistic or administrative capacity, with the remaining employees being comprised of professional, apprentice and/or amateur artists, administrators and technicians.

The City does, therefore, provide some opportunity in its programmes for amateur participation in artistic creation. However, in keeping with the one-dimensional view described above, the emphasis remains on established organizations or collectives. Furthermore, support to amateur and community groups constitutes only a small portion of the total funding made available by the City. When the 1995 list of recipients of funding under this programme is examined, it is revealed that only 8% of the total grants made available under the Cultural Assistance Programme went to amateur/community arts organizations.¹⁷ Moreover, of those groups who did receive funding under this category, many are community organizations established to represent the interests of marginalized groups in the Ottawa area, such as ethnic minorities and the gay and lesbian community, for example, or larger-scale annual events such as the Kiwanis Music and

---

¹⁷

This figure was determined using the statistics provided by the City of Ottawa (Ottawa 1995e). Total funding for both the Cultural Assistance Programme and the Festival Assistance Programme is stated as being \$1,029,830 for 1995. Of this amount, \$309,000 comes under the Festival Assistance Programme (Ottawa 1995e:11), leaving \$720,830 for the Cultural Assistance Programme. The total of the amounts allocated to groups within the amateur/community category within the Cultural Assistance Programme is \$57,407 (Ottawa 1995e:4-8), which represents 7.96% of the total funds provided by this programme.

Dance Festival, which is the largest single recipient of funding under the amateur/community organization category of the Cultural Assistance Programme (see Ottawa 1995a). Certainly, organizations such as these will have a "trickle-down" effect on the participation of amateurs in various cultural activities, but the emphasis on recognized, established organizations excludes many cultural activities which may be more "spontaneous" in nature, or the more latent cultural needs within certain groups of individuals who may not identify with or belong to any of the organizations which are the target of programme funding.

The emphasis on the legitimate creator thus has an impact on the scope of activities which are considered by policy. This explains the degree to which the institution of art is so central to cultural policy, as it is within the sphere of art where it is easiest to target these legitimate creators. As the work of Fiske and Willis shows, there are several ways in which one's cultural location can be expressed. Certainly there are a number of forms and activities which have been "closed out" of our traditional thinking about culture yet are enormously expressive of the society from which they emerge. Activities such as football matches (either as amateur players or spectators of professional matches) bingo games, pub life, etc. all are activities which have much to say about the culture in which these activities occur, as they will bear certain homologies with the structures of the society in which people of that time and location find themselves (see, for example, Hall 1986, Malcolmson 1973). Thus, as Watson writes, "the canoe trip, the summer cottage, the curling club, the Grey Cup game, the 6/49, the Stanley Cup playoff pool, and, yes, the CBC, the National Film Board, and the Royal Winnipeg Ballet

... all help define Canada's distinctiveness" (Watson 1988:4-5), but challenge our conceptions of "cultural" institutions. Therefore, all of these "institutions" deserve mention as expressions of "ways-of-life" and, perhaps, should be considered more closely in policies which seek to "develop" culture.

Conclusion

The dominant paradigm or idea in Canadian cultural policy then is to meet cultural development objectives by supporting legitimate cultural producers and by bringing the fruits of their work to the public through an approach similar to what Mennell has referred to as the "democratization of culture." The three models of cultural development which are more "top-down" in nature are given greater emphasis over the more "bottom-up" approach in the animation model. As a consequence, professional creators, established cultural organizations and institutions or firms within the cultural industries are given priority in much of what the state does in the cultural sphere. This also results in a relatively narrow view of what is to be considered a cultural activity, thereby excluding many forms and activities which may serve as excellent targets for cultural development initiatives.

But, as was identified in the previous chapter, culture is the result of the interaction between the output of these legitimate creators, along with the output of other institutions or structures in society, with the lived experience of the "consumer." In this sense, the consumer is just as actively a producer of culture as is the legitimate creator. By

limiting its focus to the legitimate phase of cultural production, and the well-being of the legitimate cultural producer, cultural policy may be neglecting the most important part in the process.

The objective of this chapter, however, is not to question the need for programmes aimed at these legitimate creators, or the need to "bring culture to the people," but is instead to question the relative emphasis given to these approaches over others which may involve the public more actively in cultural development initiatives. The next chapter will pursue this further by drawing together the major elements of this chapter and juxtapose them against the results of Chapter Two, to identify more clearly the gaps which exist between the cultural practices of youth, as they are understood in cultural theory, and the cultural policies of the Canadian state. From this assessment, some conclusions about how policy should respond to the cultural needs of youth will be possible which, in turn, will lead to some suggestions concerning how these results may be applied to cultural policy targeted more widely at the Canadian population as a whole.

Chapter Four

The Gaps:

Bridging the Distance Between Policy and Practice

As illustrated in Chapter Two, the relationship between young people and the cultural products and symbols which surround them is a complex, and even contradictory one. As the theoretical developments within cultural studies have shown, individuals are indeed capable of resisting, at least to a certain extent, the various determining forces which are acting upon them and are, as a result, capable of making their own culture. Subcultural theory and research has demonstrated how this occurs within certain segments of the youth population. Through the process of stylization, subcultures act as *bricoleurs* re-working and re-ordering provided meanings into a style which bears a certain structural homology with the material existence experienced by that group.

But this is not to say that a similar expression of one's social and cultural location is not the feature of the cultural lives of young people who remain, for whatever reason, outside of these spectacular subcultures or for those whose engagement with the stylistic elements of a particular subculture is calculated for reasons other than symbolic resistance against a class-based domination. As is illustrated Chapter Two, the primary characteristic of the function of subcultures in Canada is the manner in which their elements are worn as "badges of distinction" and as markers of a social location among middle-class youth. This is explained by the dominance of a unique form of liberalism within (English) Canadian political culture which results in a strong bourgeois identity among much of the population and thus a relative weakness of a working-class

identity. Consequently, the style of a particular subculture which may have emerged in another country is used not for the articulation of resistance against elements of parent, working-class culture, but as additional raw materials upon which young people can draw in creating their own cultural identity and interpret their historical, cultural and political situation. While this makes the use of subcultural elements less heroic, it nevertheless suggests that these materials are not totally homogenizing and are thus adaptable to different social and cultural locations and can be used for different purposes.

The common denominator, then, between the use of the raw materials by those within a spectacular subculture and that of those who remain outside of the subculture remains the human agency with which these materials are adapted to the purpose of their consumers. Thus, culture should be seen as the site of a complex interaction and negotiation between the structures of society, including the "raw materials" of cultural symbols provided by the various cultural institutions, such as the media and the institution of "art" for example, and the everyday lived experience of the receivers or "consumers" of these symbols. The true strength and vitality of a culture is determined by how various artifacts are used by those who comprise a culture, and not solely by the artifacts provided for them. In this perspective, the "production" or "creation" of culture is not only the task of the creators of these raw materials - what has been referred to in Chapter Three as "legitimate creators" - but is instead the task of all who are "receptors" of these symbols. Consequently, the process of cultural production could be conceived as comprising of two phases: the "primary" or "legitimate" phase,

characterized by the work of legitimate creators, and the "secondary" phase, characterized by the interaction process described above.

But as Chapter Three has shown, cultural policy at all levels of government focuses almost exclusively on the primary phase and the "legitimate creators" of the raw materials of culture, with little attention paid to the interaction phase of the process. Indeed the dominant paradigm in Canadian cultural policy-making appears to be one which favours a "top-down" approach to "bringing culture" to the people, rather than recognizing the contribution to the culture by many of those who live within it. Even if the more narrow definition of culture is accepted - the "artistic" definition which emphasizes the creative *expression* of a particular culture - it is seen that the task of expressing a culture symbolically remains assigned within policy initiatives to "legitimate creators." Art remains the task of the legitimate artist.

The Impact of the Paradigm on Youth

How, then, does the dominance of a "top-down" paradigm in cultural development and the resulting specific objective of emphasizing state support to legitimate creators colour the impact of cultural policies and programmes on young people? First, as noted above, the "top-down" paradigm in cultural policy-making ignores the "interaction" or "secondary" phase of the cultural production process in which young people are key participants. It thus neglects the active nature of the relationship between young people and the products of the media, and of popular culture

in general. There is little room provided for more "bottom-up" reactions to the products of the primary phase and the interaction between the two. Thus, programmes aimed at youth tend to be more concerned with the "democratization of culture" than "cultural democracy," achieved typically through the institutions of high culture.¹⁸

Second, the more concrete measures which emerge out of the "top-down" paradigm tend to privilege "legitimate creators," thus neglecting active, amateur participation by young people within even more traditional forms of cultural expression. This neglect is despite evidence provided by Statistics Canada (cited in Chapter Three) which suggests that young people may prefer active participation in cultural activities on an amateur level. Instead, when young people *are* considered, it is as potential audiences for the output of a particular set of cultural producers rather than as producers themselves¹⁹, or as potential professionals within a particular discipline. For example, the National Ballet School has stated its aim to be to "provide excellence in the training and education of ballet professionals in Canada"; the National

---

¹⁸ It must be noted that this does not necessarily apply only to programmes targeting youth. Among the stated objectives of the RMOC's Art in Public Spaces programme is the desire to expose the public to "artistic and design excellence" (Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton 1990). Similar objectives are found in the mission statements of agencies at all levels of government.

¹⁹ This is also seen in the attitudes of private cultural organizations. For example, Youth and Music in Canada states its mission as one of promoting "the growth of Canadian musical life by *developing a taste* for music in young Canadians and the abilities of the best young Canadian musicians, singers and composers", and the Canadian Institute of the Arts for Young Audiences has adopted the mission of presenting and promoting "quality arts programming for young audiences" (Canadian Conference of the Arts 1995b; *emphasis added*).

Theatre School similarly strives to provide "professional training" first, with a secondary objective being the development of "active playwriting, scenography and technical production"; and the National Circus School is "an institution of advanced studies whose mission is to train future professional circus artists" (Canadian Conference of the Arts 1995b). Similarly, the Canada Council's "Grants to Aid the Development of Young Canadian Musicians" focuses on "nonprofit music societies and organizations which, through their activities, contribute significantly to the career development of young musicians" (Canada Council 1995:63; Task Force on Professional Training for the Cultural Sector in Canada 1991). Even at more local levels, the emphasis is on the professional development of young creators or performers, as seen in the City of Ottawa's support to the School of Dance under the "major professional arts organization" category of the Cultural Assistance Programme (Ottawa 1995c).

Third, the view of culture and of cultural producers which tends to emerge out of this paradigm is relatively narrow, excluding many expressive activities which may be particularly important to young people. The preoccupation with "legitimate creators" necessarily limits the range of cultural activities which could serve as the focus of policy intervention. As a result, many cultural forms and activities which may be equally effective in communicating symbolically the cultural experience of a group or individual are neglected from the purview of policy. This explains the emphasis within cultural policy on support to the arts, as it is here where legitimate cultural creators are most obviously found. Bennett *et al.* identify some of the cultural forms and activities which

are important to the cultural lives of young people as active cultural creators, yet remain outside of the scope of policy:

murals, graffiti, poster design, screen printing, fashion choice and design, club, street and ethnic dancing, making musical tapes, D.J.'ing and mixing, playing instruments, jamming and forming bands, busking (whether music, mime, juggling etc.), crafts and hobbies, computer graphics and game design, creativity in sports, such as surf/skateboard riding and design and so on. These cultural forms should be placed against a backdrop of everyday leisure activities which are focused around watching television/listening to music/going out (Bennett *et al.* 1990-91:148).

Despite the fact that many of these activities involve elements of considerable creativity and symbolic communication among those who participate in them, there are few resources made available by the state to enhance the ability of young people to use these activities as part of their own cultural development initiatives.

The results in Ottawa seem to resemble those of other countries. The relevance of cultural policies to the cultural lives of young people has been most seriously questioned in the United Kingdom and Australia, although with particular emphasis on the arts. The Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation of Great Britain commissioned a study of the relationship of cultural institutions and British youth, the results of which form the basis of Willis' Common Culture (1990). The overall conclusion is that "most young people's lives are not involved with the arts and yet are actually full of expressions, signs and symbols through which individuals and groups seek to establish their presence, identity and meaning" (Willis 1990:1). Thus, there is frequently little connection between the cultural policies and institutions promoted by the state and the cultural reality of young people. As Willis summarizes:

There seem to be hidden questions behind even those arts initiatives and policies which genuinely seek cultural democratization - not 'What are their cultures?' but 'Why are their cultures not like ours?', 'Why are their cultures not as we think they should be?' ... The search for new or expanded publics has started from the wrong end of the social process - from objects and artifacts, not people (Willis 1990:5).

A similar study was carried out in Australia in the late 1980s for the Australia Council. Its overall conclusions were the following:

First, youth arts are usually defined as encompassing visual arts, music, literature, dance, drama, design, and media. Typically, however, the media are accorded the lowest policy priority.

Second, the major policy objectives of agencies involved in this field (the Australia Council, State arts ministries) have been to secure young people's active participation in those art forms, whether as producers or audiences.

Third, that in pursuing such objectives, these agencies have chiefly done so by working through or with (i) the major art institutions of official high culture (art galleries, theatre, opera, etc.), (ii) the education system, or (iii) in the case of community arts programmes, via the welfare agencies of government which provide access to young people 'at risk' in various ways - through long-term unemployment, drug-abuse, or other forms of social disadvantage.

Fourth, that the conceptions of art which have governed youth arts programmes have been, broadly, of two sorts: (i) in which the arts of high culture are viewed as a prospectively improving and civilising influence which should be made available to all young people as a superior alternative to commercial culture, or (ii) the view, evident in some forms of community arts, that artistic involvement serves as a means of social therapy or community identity formation and empowerment for socially disadvantaged groups (Bennett 1990/91:194-195).

So even if the more narrow, "artistic" definition of culture is accepted, we find that the remarkable cultural lives of young people are still excluded from many of the cultural policies and programmes which are designed to promote the development of culture.

Applying the Lessons Learned

What the analysis of the cultural lives of young people suggests, therefore, is that the proper policy response may not be to *limit* the focus of policy intervention to a few, selected forms of culture or means with which cultural development objectives are attained, but instead to somehow *broaden* the focus of policy intervention. As Fearn argues:

culture occurs when people who are free to find each other (constitutional and political commitments achieve this) themselves keep culture alive (contact and interaction achieve this). The role of communications policy and regulation ... generally should be to encourage recurring opportunities for such enculturating activities. In brief, *public policy should encourage public reflection of all kinds* (Fearn 1993:128, emphasis added).

In this perspective, the focus of intervention must include the secondary phase of cultural production - where groups and individuals interact with the cultural signs and symbols around them - in order to enhance their abilities to mould these signs and symbols into something new which represents their particular social and cultural reality. Cultural policy could then prove more effective in reaching the particular cultural needs of those who participate, and in supporting more directly the true producers of culture, the people who inhabit it.

This echoes the suggestion made by Lorimer and Duxbury. They define cultural development simply as the "enhancement of culture," which:

comes about first in a spontaneous fashion by the desires, actions and interpretations of members of a culture as they are encouraged or constrained by that culture. Secondly, cultural enhancement comes about by conscious or deliberate intervention of agents such as artists, interest groups, governments, foundations, or "ordinary" individuals (Lorimer and Duxbury 1994:263).

While the terminology is somewhat awkward, Lorimer and Duxbury succeed in reminding us that a culture can be developed by agents other than legitimate creators. Certainly, state intervention which privileges "top-down" approaches and emphasizes "legitimate creators" can easily be said to come under the deliberate enhancement category. But as Lorimer and Duxbury suggest, the focus on deliberate enhancement only further reinforces the "democratization of culture":

Culture, when viewed through the lens of deliberate cultural enhancement, focuses on the activities of a certain set of artists and cultural workers engaging in producing analysis, ideas, symbols, or images and bringing them and the results of their labours to the attention of audiences (Lorimer and Duxbury 1994:264).

Consequently, Lorimer and Duxbury suggest that alternative means of cultural enhancement need to be located. For example:

The role of spontaneous enhancement must be emphasized. This emphasis is needed because spontaneous enhancement of culture is far greater in extent and in the range of activities it encompasses than any amount of government funded or any other directly funded deliberate enhancement could ever be. Spontaneous enhancement derives automatically from public behaviour because in being seen, heard, smelled, tasted, lived, and taken in, public behaviour can be copied and adapted in different circumstances, and spread throughout the land. In being derived from public behaviour, not only does spontaneous enhancement fully encompass the culture of which it is a part but also is continually nuanced by the constraints and opportunities provided by that culture (1994:262).

It seems appropriate to argue, then, that if the objective of cultural development is, as it was defined in Chapter One, to provide the resources necessary to participate in public life, cultural development strategies must be designed to consider more closely the particular realities of those it is trying to reach. However, even if the objective of cultural development remains one of constructing a national (or regional or local) identity, a more effective focus of intervention would be those cultural forms and activities which emerged from the "bottom-up."

McMullin argues that by focusing on cultural forms and activities which are located at a lower position on a "continuum of culture" the chances are greater that what will emerge will be more truly representative of the community than might be the case at higher positions. He explains:

National critics in the university disciplines and funding agencies in Canada accept a hierarchy of value with international standards at the top followed by national standards and then regional or local standards. On this continuum from national to local, it appears that a line is drawn dividing the culture into high, or elitist culture, and low, or popular culture. Serious study of cultural artefacts requires that they move up the scale to national significance. Regional art is either ignored or left to the folklorists - marginal scholars within the traditional university system. It is true, however, that if one is concerned with understanding a national culture, then the lower on the continuum of culture one moves, the more concrete become the references to the Canadian phenomena. That is to say, the more local the art the more Canadian will be its references. It is also true that as one moves up the continuum of culture from local to international, one moves back in time and the references in the pieces become more international in reference (McMullin 1994:116).

In this perspective, the traditional Canadian approach of "deliberate enhancement" targeting domestic legitimate creators with potential as artists of international calibre seems misguided. How does assisting domestic film production companies to access international markets achieve domestic cultural development objectives? Similarly, while Canadian content regulations may ensure a space for Canadian voices, how do these voices reflect Canadian stories and the Canadian experience? Are there more Canadian references in the work of Bryan Adams than there are in that of John Mellencamp; in the work of Alanis Morissette than in that of Joan Osborne?

While increasing the amount and range of raw cultural materials made available to Canadians may be consistent with a cultural development strategy, it is not in the amount and range of available material where

the process is deficient. There is an ever increasing array of cultural artifacts made available as a result of new technologies. Thus, a policy which focuses solely on increasing the production of legitimate creators will also be misguided. Furthermore, with the rapidly changing environment in the primary phase of cultural production, it is impossible for policy-makers to accurately anticipate its future needs.

Consequently, locating a new paradigm seems appropriate, one which encourages cultural interaction on a more spontaneous level. Unfortunately, most of the calls for more democratic cultural policies and alternative methods of public reflection stop short of offering realistic proposals as to how policy could be modified to respond to these demands. The analysis presented in this thesis, however, clearly indicates that the first step towards a more concrete solution may lie in the community development/animation model. Of the four models of cultural development identified by Lorimer and Duxbury in Chapter Three, only this model is properly suited to such an engagement with the secondary phase of cultural production. The very design of this particular model of cultural development places considerable stress on the active participation by the public in cultural activities without necessarily conforming to any predetermined cultural standard. Instead, the focus is on creativity, expressivity and spontaneity. Furthermore, by removing any predetermined notions of culture or art, the animation model greatly facilitates an expanded notion of culture, beyond simply the institution of "art." The goal of the animation model is to allow art to be whatever the community involved wants it to be. Similarly, the animation model facilitates a related expansion of our conception of the cultural producer, beyond the

"legitimate creators" described in Chapter Three to include each individual or group which together comprise a culture. In many important ways, it could facilitate a return to the recognition of what Raymond Williams had proposed in The Long Revolution. He wrote:

A vital imaginative life, and the deep effort to describe new experience, are found in many others besides artists, and the communication of new descriptions and new meanings is carried out in many ways - in art, thought, science and in the ordinary social process. ... The emphasis that matters is that there are, essentially, no 'ordinary' activities, if by 'ordinary' we mean the absence of creative interpretation and effort. Art is ratified, in the end, by the fact of creativity in all our living (Williams 1975, cited in Buckingham 1993a:202).

Perhaps most importantly, the animation model would allow groups and individuals to participate *actively* in cultural activities rather than merely as *spectators*. It would thus allow for an exploration of the more latent cultural needs which may exist among various groups and individuals and within the community as a whole.

As noted in Chapter Three, the animation model is not new. It was popular in the 1970s, particularly in Europe but in North America as well, albeit to a lesser extent. Certainly, any renewed consideration of the animation model must include an analysis of the reasons why it fell out of favour. But what makes the animation model attractive once again in the current context is its ability to contribute to cultural development while circumventing many of the obstacles to cultural intervention outlined in Chapter One. While all four of the models of cultural development described in Chapter Three necessarily make use of the expenditure instrument of public policy, the three "top-down" models of cultural development - the cultural development, public service and market models - also rely heavily on the instruments of taxation, regulation (market and

cultural development models), and public ownership (public service model). All of these instruments were identified in Chapter One as being particularly vulnerable in the current economic and political environment. For example, domestic ownership requirements in the cultural industries, Customs Code regulations prohibiting "split-run" editions of foreign magazines, and exemptions within international trade agreements for the cultural industries - all targeting legitimate creators - are coming under increasing pressure. Focusing efforts at the site of consumption, as the animation model is most suited, rather than solely at the site of production may then be part of a new approach to cultural development in this new environment. From the perspective of the effectiveness of policy intervention, therefore, it appears that it may now be appropriate to examine more closely support to the secondary phase of production through the animation model as a more viable model of cultural development than is presently the case. It is for this reason that the title of this thesis refers to the return to the animation model as a "new" alternative.

Conclusion

The analysis provided in this thesis reveals that the real meaning and significance attached to cultural artifacts is not solely the creation of legitimate creators within the primary phase of cultural production, but is also the creation of the groups and individuals who comprise the culture into which the artifact is inserted. Consequently, it is appropriate to argue that a cultural development strategy which focuses exclusively on the primary phase of cultural production and the interests

of only "legitimate creators" of culture is neglecting a significant, if not the most critical, moment in the process. Instead, policy intervention, if it is to be truly effective in "developing" a culture must be conceived more broadly to include the secondary phase of cultural production. It is within this phase that the true strength and vitality of a culture is created and where the truly defining characteristics of that culture are found.

There have been many calls from several different authors in many countries for more democratic cultural policies. Unfortunately, these calls frequently romanticize the creative abilities of ordinary citizens without fully recognizing the determining nature of the products of the mass media, as the work of Fiske and Willis so clearly illustrates. More generally, these calls also stop short of any concrete recommendations as to how policy could be designed to achieve these democratic objectives. What is offered here, however, is a developed framework within which further research may be carried out into alternative methods of cultural development. The analysis in this thesis suggests that a "bottom-up" approach to cultural development which acknowledges the structuring capabilities inherent in cultural artifacts, yet emphasizes the re-ordering and re-working aspect of the critical secondary phase of cultural production, is best achieved with the community development/animation model. Consequently, the animation model should be considered more closely and returned to the vocabulary of professionals working within cultural policy-making and academics working within cultural policy studies. The animation model provides policy professionals with the first step toward

a well-developed response to local cultural development in the current context of the globalization and transcontinentalization of culture.

While the suggestion that cultural policy should return to the notions of the 1970s may appear to also be a return to the naive and overly romantic portrayal of the ability of the individual to resist his or her cultural domination, it is not the intention of this thesis to make such a case. Instead, the analysis presented here is intended to suggest that we must be reminded of the human agency involved in the creation of culture and that the ultimate objective of cultural development is the enhancement of the cultural development opportunities available to the public and not simply to the cultural community or "legitimate" creators.

As Ferguson and Devereaux Ferguson write:

The museums, theatres, concert halls, and galleries of Prague, London, Amsterdam, Florence, and Berlin do not make these cities cultured. The reverse is the case. It is because there is a rich culture that the products of culture are apparent, and building concert halls and art galleries is not the same thing as developing culture. What results from this approach may well be a collection of culture zoos to house exotic cultural artifacts. ... Laudable though the efforts of all concerned may be, such programs are dealing with symptoms, rather than systems. Culture in its holistic sense is systemic, whereas art is an end product (1979:236).

At a more basic level, the analysis presented in this thesis illustrates the benefits of a greater connection between cultural theory and cultural policy. By examining closely the nature of the relationship between culture and the groups and individuals who are engaged with it, new alternatives for policy initiatives become apparent. Avenues which may have been "closed-out" of the dominant thinking on the role of the state in the cultural sphere may be visible. While some of these initiatives may not survive some of the pragmatic realities of policy-making in the current context, the ultimate decision will be based on a more accurate,

theoretically-informed understanding of the subject at hand.

Bibliography

- Acheson, Keith and Christopher J. Maule (1994). "International Regimes for Trade, and Labour Mobility in the Cultural Industries" in Canadian Journal of Communication V.19 n.3-4.
- Althusser, Louis (1969). For Marx. London: Allen Lane.
- (1971). Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Anderson, C. Leigh and David Hennes (1994). "The Swimsuit Edition on the Shore of Hudson's Bay: Magazines, Culture and Technology" in Susan D. Phillips (ed). How Ottawa Spends 1994-95: Making Change. Ottawa: Carleton University Press.
- Andraut, Marianne and Philippe Dressayre (1987). "Government and the Arts in France" in Milton C. Cummings Jr. and Richard S. Katz (eds). The Patron State: Government and the Arts in Europe, North America, and Japan. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Arnett, Jeffrey Jensen (1994). "Sensation Seeking: A New Conceptualization and a New Scale" in Personality and Individual Differences. V.16 n.2.
- (1995). "Adolescents' Uses of Media for Self-Socialization" in Journal of Youth and Adolescence V.24 n.5.
- Arpin, Roland (1991). Une politique de la culture et des arts. Québec: Gouvernement du Québec.
- Bennett, Tony (1990/91). "Toward a Youth Arts Policy: Rationales, Objectives and Strategies" in Culture and Policy V.2 n.2/V.3 n.1.
- (1992a). "Putting Policy into Cultural Studies" in Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson and Paula A. Treichler (eds). Cultural Studies. New York: Routledge.
- (1992b). "Useful Culture" in Cultural Studies V.6 n.3.
- Bianchini, Franco (1993). Urban Cultural Policy in Britain and Europe: Towards Cultural Planning. Brisbane: Institute for Cultural Policy Studies.
- Boehm, Eric (1995). "London Calling" in Shift (Sept./Oct.).
- Bouillon-Dartevelle, Roselyne (1984). La génération éclatée: Loisirs et communication des adolescents. Brussels: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles.
- Brake, Michael (1985). Comparative Youth Culture: The Sociology of Youth Cultures and Youth Subcultures in America, Britain and Canada. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

- Buckingham, David (1993a). "Boys Talk: Television and the Policing of Masculinity" in David Buckingham (ed). Reading Audiences: Young People and the Media. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- (1993b). "Conclusion: Re-Reading Audiences" in David Buckingham (ed). Reading Audiences: Young People and the Media. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Campbell Robinson, Deanna, Elizabeth B. Buck and Marlene Cuthbert (1991). Music at the Margins: Popular Music and Global Cultural Diversity. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Canada. Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage (1995). "Appendix C" of The Future of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in the Multi-Channel Universe: Report of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage. Ottawa, Parliament of Canada.
- Canada Council (1995). 38th Annual Report 1994-95. Ottawa: Canada Council.
- Canadian Conference of the Arts (1995a). "Bulletin: Passage of C-103 a Welcome Move by the Government of Canada". Ottawa, December 19.
- (1995b). Directory of the Arts 1995-1996. Ottawa: Canadian Conference of the Arts.
- Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (1971). Policy Statement on Cable Television, CRTC Announcement. Ottawa: CRTC, July 16.
- (1974). A Resource for the Active Community. Ottawa: CRTC, Broadcast Programmes and Research Branches.
- Clarke, John (1976). "Style" in Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson (eds). Resistance through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-war Britain. London: Hutchison and Co.
- Stuart Hall, Tony Jefferson, and Brian Roberts (1976). "Subcultures, Cultures and Class" in Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson (eds). Resistance through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-war Britain. London: Hutchison and Co.
- Cohen, Phil (1972). "Subcultural Conflict and Working-Class Community" in Working Papers in Cultural Studies. V.2 (Spring). Birmingham: Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham.
- Corrigan, Paul and Simon Frith (1976). "The Politics of Youth Culture" in Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson (eds). Resistance through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-war Britain. London: Hutchison and Co.
- Côté, James B. and Anton L. Allahar (1994). Generation on Hold: Coming of Age in the Late Twentieth Century. Toronto: Stoddart.

- Coward, R. and J. Ellis (1981). "Structuralism and the Subject: A Critique" in Tony Bennett, Graham Martin, Colin Mercer and Janet Woollacott (eds). Culture, Ideology and Social Process: A Reader. London: Batsford.
- Culler, J. (1976). Saussure. London: Fontana.
- Cunningham, Stuart (1992). Framing Culture: Criticism and Policy in Australia. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
- "D in Film Board's Studio D Stands for Disbanded" in The Ottawa Citizen. March 15, 1996, C16.
- Denzin, Norman K. (1992). Symbolic Interactionism and Cultural Studies: The Politics of Representation. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.
- Doern, G. Bruce and Richard W. Phidd (1983). Canadian Public Policy: Ideas, Structure, Process. Toronto: Methuen.
- During, Simon (1993). "Introduction" in Simon During (ed). The Cultural Studies Reader. London: Routledge.
- Ekos Research Associates (1988). Toward a More Complete Culture: The Arts and Culture Study of Ottawa-Carleton. Ottawa, August 31.
- Fearn, Gordon (1993). "The Role of Communications Policy in Modern Culture" in Evan Alderson, Robin Blaser and Harold Coward (eds). Reflections on Cultural Policy: Past, Present and Future. Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press.
- Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee (1982). "Appendix B" of Summary of Briefs and Hearings. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.
- Ferguson, Stewart and Sherry Devereaux Ferguson (1979). "Policy for Cultural Development: The Philosopher's Stone" in Jiri Zuzanek (ed). Social Research and Cultural Policy. Waterloo: Otium Publications.
- Finnegan, Ruth (1989). Hidden Musicians. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fiske, John (1989a). Reading the Popular. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- (1989b). Understanding Popular Culture. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- (1992). "Cultural Studies and the Culture of Everyday Life" in Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson and Paula A. Treichler (eds). Cultural Studies. New York: Routledge.
- Fortier, André and D. Paul Schafer (1989). Historique des politiques fédérales dans le domaine des arts au Canada: 1944-1988. Ottawa: Communications Canada.

- Frith, Simon (1981). Sound Effects: Youth, Leisure and the Politics of Rock 'n' Roll. New York: Pantheon.
- (1988). Music For Pleasure. New York: Routledge.
- (1992). "The Cultural Study of Popular Music" in Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson and Paula A. Treichler (eds). Cultural Studies, New York: Routledge.
- Garnham, Nicholas (1991). "Concepts of Culture: Public Policy and the Cultural Industries" in Cultural Studies. V.1 n.1.
- Gillard, Sue (1990-91). "Music and Young People" in Culture and Policy V.2 n.2/V.3 n.3.
- Girard, Augustin (1972). Développement culturel: expériences et politiques. UNESCO.
- Globerman, Steven (1983). Cultural Regulation in Canada. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy.
- Hall, Stuart (1980). "Cultural Studies and the Centre: Some Problematics and Problems" in Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe and Paul Willis (eds). Culture, Media, Language. London: Hutchinson.
- (1981). "Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms" in Tony Bennett, Graham Martin, Colin Mercer and Janet Woollacott (eds). Culture, Ideology and Social Process: A Reader. London: Batsford.
- (1986). "Popular Culture and the State" in Tony Bennett, Colin Mercer and Janet Woollacott (eds). Popular Culture and Social Relations. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- and Tony Jefferson (eds) (1976). Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain. London: Hutchison and Co.
- Hampson, Keith C. (1994). Consumer Culture and Social Relations: White Middle Class Nostalgia. M.A. Thesis, School of Canadian Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa.
- Hebdige Dick (1979). Subculture: the Meaning of Style. London: Methuen.
- Keachie, Catherine and Kim Pittaway (1994). "Federal Policy and Canadian Magazines" in Policy Options V.15 n.1 (January-February).
- Kingsman, Caroline (1990). High Theory... No Culture: Or De-colonizing a Canadian Cultural Studies. M.A. Thesis, Institute of Canadian Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa.
- Laermans, Rudi (1993). "Bringing the Consumer Back In" in Theory, Culture & Society. V.10.

- Laroche, Karyna (1988). The Sound Recording Development Program: Making Music to Maintain Hegemony. M.A. Research Essay, Institute of Canadian Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa.
- and Will Straw (1989). "Radio and Sound Recording Policy in Canada" in Australian - Canadian Studies. V.7 nos.1-2.
- Larson, Reed (1995). "Secrets in the Bedroom: Adolescents' Private Use of Media" in Journal of Youth and Adolescence V.24 n.5.
- Lemieux, René (1995). The Arts and Canada's Cultural Policy. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.
- Lorimer, Rowland and Nancy Duxbury (1994). "Of Culture, the Economy, Cultural Production, and Cultural Producers: An Orientation" in Canadian Journal of Communication V.19 n.3-4.
- Malcolmson, R. (1973). Popular Recreations in English Society, 1700-1850. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Matza, D. (1964). Delinquency and Drift. New York: Rand McNally.
- (1969). Becoming Deviant. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- McMullin, Stan (1994). "A Matter of Attitude: The Subversive Margin in Canada" in Culture and Policy V.6 n.1.
- McRobbie, Angela (1991). "Settling Accounts with Subcultures" in Feminism and Youth Culture: From 'Jackie' to 'Just Seventeen'. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- (1994). "Shut Up and Dance: Youth Culture and Changing Modes of Femininity" in Angela McRobbie. Postmodernism and Popular Culture. London: Routledge.
- and Jenny Garber (1976). "Girls and Subcultures" in Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson (eds). Resistance through Ritual: Youth Subcultures in Post-war Britain. London: Hutchison and Co.
- Mennell, Stephen (1979). "Theoretical Considerations on the Study of Cultural Needs" in Sociology V.13 n.2 (May).
- Miège, Bernard (1989). The Capitalization of Cultural Production. Bagnolet, France: International General.
- Miller, Toby (1994). "Culture with Power: The Present Moment in Cultural Policy Studies" in Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science V.22.
- Morrow, Martin (1995). "Music Industry to Target Baby Boomers" in The Ottawa Citizen. Wednesday, August 16.

- O'Callaghan, J. Patrick and Roger Tassé (1994). A Question of Balance: Report of the Task Force on the Canadian Magazine Industry. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.
- O'Connor, Justin and Derek Wynne (1991). "The Uses and Abuses of Popular Culture: Cultural Policy and Popular Culture" in Society and Leisure V.14 n.2.
- Ontario Arts Council (1994a). Annual Report 1993-94. Toronto: Ontario Arts Council.
- (1994b). Guide to Grants, Awards and Services, 1994. Toronto: Ontario Arts Council.
- Ottawa, City of (1992). Citizens' Task Force on Culture: Final Report.
- (1995a). Cultural Assistance Programme 1996: Application Form and Guide to the Municipal Financial Support of Not-for Profit Arts and Heritage Organizations and Collectives.
- (1995b). Cultural Leadership Committee 1994-95 Annual Report. (Ref. ACS1995/1211-017 RC1D0379).
- (1995c). Municipal Arts and Heritage Policies. (Ref. ACS1995/1211-020).
- (1995d). Public Art Programme - Fall and Winter 1995-1996. Ottawa.
- (1995e). Summary of 1995 Cultural and Festival Assistance Programme. Ottawa.
- Pacom, Diane (1995). "La fragmentation postmoderne de la culture et son impact sur les jeunes des années 90" in Journal of Canadian Studies V.30 n.1.
- Parsons, Vic (1995). "Heritage Minister Won't Build Walls to Protect Canada" in The Ottawa Citizen. December 5, B7.
- Pendakur, Manjunath (1990). Canadian Dreams and American Control: The Political Economy of the Canadian Film Industry. Toronto: Garamond Press.
- Peterson, Richard A. and David G. Berger (1975). "Cycles in Symbol Production: The Case of Popular Music" in American Sociological Review. V.40 (April).
- Pronovost, Gilles (1990). "Les usages sociaux des médias: temps, espace et sociabilité" in Communication Information V.11 n.2.
- Raboy, Marc, Ivan Bernier, Florian Sauvageau and Dave Atkinson (1994). "Cultural Development and the Open Economy: A Democratic Issue and

- a Challenge to Public Policy" in Canadian Journal of Communication V.19.
- Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton (1990). Art in Public Spaces Policy. Ottawa.
- (1991). Regional Arts Grants Policy. Ottawa.
- Roe, Keith (1990). "Adolescents' Music Use" in Keith Roe and Ulla Carlsson (eds). Popular Music Research. Göteborg, Sweden: Nordicom-Sweden.
- Rotstein, Abraham (1988). "The Use and Misuse of Economics in Cultural Policy" in R. Lorimer and D. Wilson (eds). Communication in Canada. Toronto: Regan and Woo.
- Rubin, A. M. (1994). "Media Uses and Effects: A Uses-and-Gratifications Perspective" in J. Bryant and D. Zillman (eds). Media Effects: Advances in Theory and Research. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Ryan, Bill (1991). Making Capital from Culture: The Corporate Form of Capitalist Cultural Production. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Scherbarth, Chris (1986). Studio D of the National Film Board of Canada: Seeing Ourselves through Women's Eyes. M.A. Thesis, Institute of Canadian Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa.
- Secor, Groupe (1994). Canadian Government Intervention in the Film and Video Industry: Final Report. Ottawa, Groupe Secor for the Department of Canadian Heritage.
- Shepherd, John and Jennifer Giles (1989). "The Politics of Silence: Problematics for the Analysis of English Canadian Musical Culture" in Australian-Canadian Studies. V.7 nos.1-2.
- Simpson, J.A. (1972). Socio-Cultural Facilities: Animation-Innovation. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
- (1976). Final Report of the Project on Socio-Cultural Animation: Audit and Legacy. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
- Skinner, David and David C. Robinson (1994). "Re-thinking Cultural Policy: Critical Approaches in the Era of Privatization" in Alternate Routes V.11.
- Sprinthall, Norman A. and W. Andrew Collins (1988). Adolescent Psychology: A developmental View, second edition. New York: Random House.
- Statistics Canada (1993). Focus on Culture. Catalogue no. 87-004. Autumn. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.
- (1994a). Focus on Culture. Catalogue no. 87-004. (Winter). Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.

- (1994b). Youth in Canada. Catalogue no. 89-511. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.
- Steinberg, Lawrence (1990). "Pubertal Maturation and Parent-Adolescent Distance: An Evolutionary Perspective" in Gerald Adams, Raymond Montemayor and Thomas Gullotta (eds). Biology of Adolescent Behaviour and Development. Beverley Hills: Sage.
- Stith Bennett, H. (1979). "Secondary Popular Culture" in Symbolic Interaction. V.2 n.1.
- Straw, Will (1987). "Popular Culture and Youth Culture in a Canadian Context". Occasional paper, Youth Policy, Research, Action, Canadian Council for Social Development.
- Task Force on Professional Training for the Cultural Sector in Canada (1991). Art is Never a Given: Professional Training in the Arts in Canada. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.
- Taylor, Ian (1987). "Theorizing the Crisis in Canada" in R.S. Latimer and John L. McMullan (eds). State Control: Criminal Justice Politics in Canada. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- Telefilm Canada (1994). Action Plan 1994-95. Montreal: Telefilm Canada.
- Turner, Graeme (1990). British Cultural Studies: An Introduction. London: Routledge.
- UNESCO (1970). Réflexions préalables sur les politiques culturelles. Paris.
- Walkerdine, Valerie (1993). "'Daddy's Gonna Buy You a Dream to Cling to (and Mummy's Gonna Love You Just as Much as She Can)': Young Girls and Popular Television" in David Buckingham (ed). Reading Audiences: Young People and the Media. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Wannell, Ted (1989). "Losing Ground: Wages of Young People, 1981-86" in Canadian Social Trends (Summer).
- Watson, William G. (1988). National Pastimes: The Economics of Canadian Leisure. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute.
- Wicke, Peter (1987). Rock Music: Culture, Aesthetics and Sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Williams, Raymond (1966). Culture and Society: 1780-1950. London: Penguin.
- (1975). The Long Revolution. London: Penguin.
- (1977). Marxism and Literature. London: Oxford University Press.
- Willis, Paul (1978). Profane Culture. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

----- (1990). Common Culture: Symbolic Work at Play in the Everyday Cultures of the Young. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Wright, Robin (1991). "'Gimme Shelter': Observations on Cultural Protectionism and the Recording Industry in Canada" in Cultural Studies. V.5 n.1.

"Young Workers Lose as Wages Go Down" in The Ottawa Citizen. September 27, 1995. A3.

END

2011-96

FIN