1

**PM-1 3½"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT**

PRECISIONSM RESOLUTION TARGETS

POLITICAL PROTEST AGAINST ECONOMIC LOSS
IN MID AND LATE 20TH CENTURY CANADA:
THE ROLE OF BELIEFS REGARDING DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

by

MARY ELIZABETH TRUEMAN, M.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario

May 16, 1994

National Library
of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

ISBN 0-612-13773-2

Canada

Name Mary Elizabeth Trueman

Dissertation Abstracts International is arranged by broad, general subject categories. Please select the one subject which most nearly describes the content of your dissertation. Enter the corresponding four-digit code in the spaces provided.

Political Science, General

0615

U·M·I

SUBJECT TERM

SUBJECT CODE

Subject Categories

THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

COMMUNICATIONS AND THE ARTS

Architecture 0729
Art History 0377
Cinema 0900
Dance 0378
Fine Arts 0357
Information Science 0723
Journalism 0391
Library Science 0399
Mass Communications 0708
Music 0413
Speech Communication 0459
Theater 0465

EDUCATION

General 0515
Administration 0514
Adult and Continuing 0516
Agricultural 0517
Art 0273
Bilingual and Multicultural 0282
Business 0688
Community College 0275
Curriculum and Instruction 0727
Early Childhood 0518
Elementary 0524
Finance 0277
Guidance and Counseling 0519
Health 0680
Higher 0745
History of 0520
Home Economics 0278
Industrial 0521
Language and Literature 0279
Mathematics 0280
Music 0522
Philosophy of 0998
Physical 0523

Psychology 0525
Reading 0535
Religious 0527
Sciences 0714
Secondary 0533
Social Sciences 0534
Sociology of 0340
Special 0529
Teacher Training 0530
Technology 0710
Tests and Measurements 0288
Vocational 0747

LANGUAGE, LITERATURE AND LINGUISTICS

Language 0679
General 0289
Linguistics 0290
Modern 0291
Literature 0401
General 0294
Classical 0295
Comparative 0297
Medieval 0298
Modern 0316
African 0591
American 0305
Asian 0352
Canadian (English) 0355
Canadian (French) 0593
English 0311
Germanic 0312
Latin American 0315
Middle Eastern 0313
Romance 0314
Slavic and East European

PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION AND THEOLOGY

Philosophy 0422
Religion 0318
General 0321
Biblical Studies 0319
Clergy 0320
History of 0322
Philosophy of 0469
Theology

SOCIAL SCIENCES

American Studies 0323
Anthropology 0324
Archaeology 0326
Cultural 0327
Physical 0310
Business Administration 0272
General 0770
Accounting 0454
Banking 0338
Management 0385
Canadian Studies 0501
Economics 0503
General 0505
Agricultural 0508
Commerce Business 0509
Finance 0510
History 0511
Labor 0358
Theory 0366
Folklore 0351
Geography 0578
Gerontology
History
General

Ancient 0579
Medieval 0581
Modern 0582
Black 0328
African 0331
Asia, Australia and Oceania 0332
Canadian 0334
European 0335
Latin American 0336
Middle Eastern 0337
United States 0585
History of Science 0198
Law
Political Science
General 0615
International Law and Relations 0616
Public Administration 0617
Recreation 0814
Social Work 0452
Sociology 0626
General 0627
Criminology and Penology 0938
Demography 0611
Ethnic and Racial Studies
Individual and Family Studies 0628
Industrial and Labor Relations 0629
Public and Social Welfare 0630
Social Structure and Development 0700
Theory and Methods 0344
Transportation 0709
Urban and Regional Planning 0999
Women's Studies 0453

THE SCIENCES AND ENGINEERING

BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES

Agriculture 0473
General 0285
Agronomy 0475
Animal Culture and Nutrition 0476
Animal Pathology 0359
Food Science and Technology 0478
Forestry and Wildlife 0479
Plant Culture 0480
Plant Pathology 0817
Plant Physiology 0777
Range Management 0746
Wood Technology
Biology 0306
General 0287
Anatomy 0308
Biosciatics 0309
Botany 0379
Cell 0329
Ecology 0353
Entomology 0369
Genetics 0793
Limnology 0410
Microbiology 0307
Molecular 0317
Neuroscience 0416
Oceanography 0433
Physiology 0821
Radiation 0778
Veterinary Science 0472
Zoology
Biophysics 0786
General 0760
Medical

Geodesy 0370
Geology 0372
Geophysics 0373
Hydrology 0388
Mineralogy 0411
Paleobotany 0345
Paleoecology 0426
Paleontology 0418
Paleozoology 0985
Palynology 0427
Physical Geography 0368
Physical Oceanography 0415

HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES

Environmental Sciences 0768
Health Sciences
General 0566
Audiology 0300
Chemotherapy 0992
Dentistry 0567
Education 0350
Hospital Management 0769
Human Development 0758
Immunology 0982
Medicine and Surgery 0564
Mental Health 0347
Nursing 0569
Nutrition 0570
Obstetrics and Gynecology 0380
Occupational Health and Therapy 0354
Ophthalmology 0381
Pathology 0571
Pharmacology 0419
Pharmacy 0572
Physical Therapy 0382
Public Health 0573
Radiation 0574
Recreation 0575

Speech Pathology 0460
Toxicology 0383
Home Economics 0386

PHYSICAL SCIENCES

Pure Sciences
Chemistry 0485
General 0749
Agricultural 0486
Analytical 0487
Biochemistry 0488
Inorganic 0738
Nuclear 0470
Organic 0491
Pharmaceutical 0494
Physical 0495
Polymer 0754
Radiation 0405
Mathematics 0605
Physics 0986
General 0606
Acoustics 0608
Astronomy and Astrophysics 0608
Atmospheric Science 0748
Atomic 0607
Electronics and Electricity
Elementary Particles and High Energy 0778
Fluid and Plasma 0759
Molecular 0609
Nuclear 0610
Optics 0752
Radiation 0756
Solid State 0611
Statistics 0463
Applied Sciences
Applied Mechanics 0346
Computer Science 0984

Engineering 0537
General 0538
Aerospace 0539
Agricultural 0540
Automotive 0541
Biomedical 0542
Chemical 0543
Civil 0544
Electronics and Electrical 0545
Heat and Thermodynamics 0546
Hydraulic 0547
Industrial 0548
Marine 0549
Materials Science 0550
Mechanical 0551
Metallurgy 0552
Mining 0553
Nuclear 0554
Packaging 0555
Petroleum 0556
Sanitary and Municipal 0557
System Science 0558
Geology 0478
Operations Research 0796
Plastics Technology 0797
Textile Technology 0994

PSYCHOLOGY

General 0621
Behavioral 0384
Clinical 0622
Developmental 0620
Experimental 0623
Industrial 0624
Personality 0625
Physiological 0989
Psychobiology 0349
Psychometrics 0632
Social 0451

The undersigned hereby recommend to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
acceptance of the thesis,

**POLITICAL PROTEST AGAINST ECONOMIC LOSS
IN MID- AND LATE-20TH CENTURY CANADA:
THE ROLE OF BELIEFS REGARDING DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE**

submitted by

Mary Elizabeth Trueman, B.J., B.A.(Hons.), M.A.

in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Chair, Department of Political Science
Ackling

Thesis Supervisor

External Examiner

Carleton University
April 15, 1994

ABSTRACT

Many Canadians experienced economic loss in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly loss of economic security. Yet this loss did not give rise to political protest of the kind seen in Canada in the 1930s. It did not provoke significant numbers of Canadians to engage in political acts such as marching, demonstrating, signing a petition, or working for a party. Some scholars have sought insights into the relative quiescence of the 1980s and 1990s by comparing these years with the 1930s. They have focused on the presence or absence of various preconditions for protest, such as social homogeneity. This study accepts some of the findings of others but argues that a variable that has had insufficient attention, thus far, is beliefs regarding distributive justice.

More specifically, it argues that, while Canada's political culture has been dominated by market liberalism throughout the 20th century, it has also contained elements of populism, more pronounced in the early years of the century. In the 1930s, economic losers could press claims for redress with reference to a populist egalitarian notion of distributive justice that held that "breadwinners" willing to do "honest toil" were entitled to a "square deal." This notion formed part of several contending ideologies promoted by new parties. However, it declined over the next 50 years and its key concepts disappeared from public debate.

Economic losers in the 1980s and 1990s had no comparable strong ground on which to challenge market liberalism, in particular, the liberal worldview that situated power in global economic systems and prescribed individual "flexibility" as the remedy for persistent unemployment. Such losers had only so-called "welfare liberalism," which demanded no more of the state than that it provide financial assistance, e.g., help with training, to individuals seeking "flexibility." The decline of the honest toil-square deal notion of distributive justice is explained here in part by changing economic, social and cultural conditions, and in part by the eroding effects of two strong ideological currents, both ironically viewed as "progressive": the Social Gospel movement, and the youth protest movement of the 1960s.

To Peter Cowan

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work would not have been possible without the guidance and encouragement of Professor Kenneth D. McRae, whom it was my great good fortune to have as supervisor.

A debt of gratitude is also owed to my thesis committee members, Professor Scott Bennett and Professor Paul Rosen, for advice and support, and to examiners Professor Blair Neatby and Dr. Keith Newton, whose suggestions for revisions strengthened the final text considerably.

Though many people aided my progress through graduate school, I wish to make special mention of Professor J.W. Grove and Professor J.A.W. Gunn of Queen's and Professor Michael Dolan, Professor Linda Freeman and Professor Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone of Carleton, all of whose help was of critical importance at key junctures.

Four of my graduate school classmates also deserve thanks for their help along the way: Cynthia Alexander and Elizabeth Stayer of Queen's, Patrick Laver of Carleton, and Steve Webster of Queen's and Carleton.

My colleagues at Revenue Canada over the past four years have been a constant source of moral support. I am particularly indebted in this respect to Tom Balfour, who also proofread the final text.

I wish to thank the International Labour Organization for the opportunity to do contract research on older workers, work that ultimately provided much of the inspiration for the present study.

Finally, I wish to gratefully acknowledge that my doctoral studies were funded in part by an Ontario Graduate Scholarship and fellowships from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.

Table of Contents

	Page
Abstract	iii
Acknowledgements	iv
Table of Contents	v
List of Tables	viii
CHAPTER ONE	
The Expectation of Protest.....	1
Introduction	1
Hypotheses	6
Theoretical Assumptions	18
Literature Review	25
Grayson: Job Loss and Radicalism	26
Hueglin: Scarcity and Class Conflict	34
Baer, et al.: Decline and Class Polarization ..	39
Johnston: Insecurity and Incoherence	48
Conclusions	51
Outline of Chapters Two to Six	54
CHAPTER TWO	
Economic Loss and Political Protest, 1900 to 1939 ..	60
Economic Loss in the Early 20th Century.....	60
Protest in Response to Loss	63
Common Features of Protest Ideologies.....	67
Historical Roots, International Links	70
Wealth as a Collective Good.....	74
Honest Toil as a Basis of Entitlement	77
Equitable Reward: The Square Deal	83
The Role of Institutions	87
Popular Literature	90
Populist Notions of Distributive Justice:	
How Widespread?	92
Conclusions	94
CHAPTER THREE	
Economic Loss in the 1980s and 1990s	97
The Nature and Extent of Loss	98
The "Flexibility" Imperative	125
Public Acceptance of "Flexibility" Imperative	139
Remnants of Populist Egalitarianism	142
Conclusions	150

CHAPTER FOUR

Reaction to Economic Loss in the 1980s and 1990s ...	153
Unsuccessful Attempts to Mobilize Protest	153
Bishops' Committee Statement	156
Free Trade Debate	163
1988 Federal NDP Campaign	166
Labour Attempts at Mobilization	169
- Molson Workers' Protest	172
Successful Mobilization: Three "Atypical Cases"....	174
Pensioners' Protest	176
Reform Party	183
Confederation of Regions Party	195
Conclusions	200

CHAPTER FIVE

The Decline of a Ground of Claim	203
Explaining Change in Political Culture	204
Conditions that Supported Populist Egalitarianism...	208
Worker as Breadwinner	208
Work Predominantly Manual	209
Familiarity, Acceptance of Scripture.....	209
High School Education as Goal	210
Co-operatives	210
Conditions that Eroded Populism	211
Worker as Isolated Individual	211
Work as Predominantly Non-Manual	212
Decline of Church, Scripture.....	213
Growth of University System	215
Change in Nature of Rural Institutions	216
Ideological Currents that Eroded Populism	216
"The Social Gospel"	218
-- from square deal to basic needs	219
-- from honest toil to citizenship.....	220
-- optimistic view of technology	222
-- worker responsibility for adjustment ..	224
"The Sixties"	225
-- work as "self-fulfilment"	228
-- "middle class values" under attack	231
-- loss of faith in institutions	232
Conclusions	234

CHAPTER SIX	
Contribution to Theory of Social Action	237
General Theory of Social Action	237
Application of Findings Beyond Canada	240
Predicting Protest: Canada in the 1990s	246
Constraints on Emergence of Ground for Claim ..	246
Forces Favoring Emergence of Ground	248
Where Ground Would Most Likely Emerge	252
Directions for Further Research	257
Conclusions	262
BIBLIOGRAPHY	267

LIST OF TABLES

Table I.	Average duration of unemployment	99
Table II.	Worry about job loss	108
Table III.	Job loss in household	109
Table IV.	Job search in household	110
Table V (a).	Perception of sales clerks' salaries, by age.....	144
Table V (b).	Perception of sales clerks' salaries, by region	145
Table V (c).	Perception of sales clerks' salaries, by education	146
Table VI (a).	Attitude toward lay-off of cleaners, by education	147
Table VI (b).	Attitude toward lay-off of cleaners, by region	147
Table VI (c).	Attitude toward lay-off of cleaners, by age	148
Table VII	Religious Literacy	214

CHAPTER ONE

THE EXPECTATION OF PROTEST

Introduction

Historically, economic loss has often produced protest in Canada. Loss of wealth, income, economic opportunity or security has frequently led to some form of political mobilization directed against the perceived causes of such loss. This has not tended to be the case, however, in more recent years, specifically, the years of economic loss following the oil price increases of the mid-1970s, through the recession years of the early 1980s and 1990s. Although this period has seen a sharp decline in personal economic security, there has been relatively little mobilization of protest aimed at turning back forces seen as sweeping security away. By the early 1990s, public opinion research suggested Canadians were more concerned about the economy, and unemployment in particular, than any other issue¹ and that they tended to blame a global recession and the changing economy.² However, such research also indicated that Canadians had a tendency to accept the need for personal adjustment to such circumstances.³

¹ See, for example, The Decima Quarterly Top-Line Report/Spring 1993, p. 7, in which unemployment tops the "Canada's most important problem" list, (cited by 36 per cent of respondents in March 1993, up from 28 per cent a year earlier -- when it also topped the list.)

² Anderson Strategic Research, A Report on Qualitative Findings to Employment and Immigration Canada, August 1992, p. 2.

³ Ibid., p. 2.

Analysts such as Baer, Grabb and Johnston, J. Paul Grayson, and Thomas Hueglin have attempted to explain why economic loss has produced political protest in some periods and places in Canada yet not in others. They have developed multi-causal models that take into account a range of variables, political efficacy and class solidarity being prominent among them. However, most analysts, by their own admission, have not been able to offer compelling explanations of variance in the occurrence of protest,⁴ particularly the difference between the 1930s and the 1990s. This, then, sets the stage for exploring new theoretical directions.

Research has not generally addressed the question of whether those who experience loss have recourse to a notion of distributive justice that allows them to feel that they have been wronged and should seek redress, that they are not simply "losers" with no grounds for claim. It will be argued here that beliefs regarding distributive justice have, in fact, shifted over time in Canada and differed

⁴ See, for example, Doug Baer, Edward Grabb, and William A. Johnston, "Class crisis, and political ideology in Canada: recent trends," The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 21:1 (February 1987); J. Paul Grayson, "Plant Closures and Political Despair," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 23:3 (August 1986); and Thomas O. Hueglin, "The Politics of Fragmentation in an Age of Scarcity: A Synthetic View and Critical Analysis of the Welfare State Crisis," Canadian Journal of Political Science XX:2 (June 1987):248. These theories will be discussed in more detail later.

among regions. Further, it will be argued that some kinds of beliefs about distributive justice have been more conducive to protest of economic loss than others and that the availability of such beliefs has been an important variable in fostering protest.

In the early part of the century, though market liberal views dominated Canada's political culture, such views were frequently challenged by populist ideas. While populism had a number of variants, all of them had a common notion of distributive justice. It was a form of qualified egalitarianism that held that all good citizens who did "honest" work deserved to share equitably in society's wealth. This belief was successfully exploited by various movements and parties. It was incorporated into a number of different protest ideologies that challenged market liberalism.

In the closing years of the 20th century, populist ideas have receded, and Canadians who have lost standing economically have not been able to find another ground for claim that would allow them to mount a serious challenge to market liberal ideas. Specifically, there is no readily available ground on which to challenge the market liberal idea that individuals must accept loss and find some personal means, such as retraining, career change, moving to

another city, to make personal adjustment. The essential case to be made here is that beliefs regarding distributive justice are a key factor in determining whether economic loss will produce collective protest action.

While the protest tradition of the early part of the century will be reviewed, emphasis will be on the Great Depression of the 1930s. Protest against loss was widespread in this decade, though it was mobilized more extensively in some places than others. It is not the intention here to isolate those geographic or sectoral areas where protest was highest and compare them to areas where it was low or absent. Rather, the intention is to argue that the period overall was marked by significant mobilization in contrast to the 1980s and 1990s, which have been characterized by relative quiescence. In such a comparative context, the case to be made is that the degree to which economic losers had recourse to a clear ground of entitlement is an important variable to consider in determining why protest was greater in the early period than in the later period.

Although some analysts of Canadian political culture⁵ have emphasized the tendency of Canadians

⁵ For example, Frank H. Underhill, In Search of Canadian Liberalism (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1960), pp. 71-74.

(relative to Americans) to defer to authority, this work has not, by and large, included examination of the role of moral authority in undergirding political protest against economic loss.⁶ Essentially, the argument to be developed here is that a call to protest will tend to be more effective if it can be rooted in a perceived moral wrong, rather than just the bald self-interest of a group.

The possible usefulness of such a focus in helping to explain why protest does or does not occur is suggested by a number of theorists of social change and revolution. This work, which looks primarily at the so-called classic revolutions (Puritan, French, Russian, Chinese),⁷ gives analytical primacy to the role of ideas in the genesis of protest. It leads one to expect that where one finds shared beliefs that give those who have lost place a ground for claim,⁸ one is more likely to find political protest. Conversely, if such a relationship does not hold (the "null"

⁶ Although political economists do look at what they term the "delegitimization" of the state and other institutions of liberal democracy, as when financially strapped states struggling to promote economic recovery have to focus their support efforts on winning sectors of the economy, thus losing legitimacy in the eyes of the winners, e.g., Hueglin, pp. 245 and 247.

⁷ For a succinct survey of this literature, see Geoffrey Best, ed., The Permanent Revolution: The French Revolution and its Legacy (London: Fontana Press, 1988).

⁸ Or who, like the Jacobins, have failed to attain the place in society they feel they deserve.

hypothesis), there should be no greater tendency for political protest of economic loss to occur in those times and places where one finds such beliefs.

Otherwise stated, a protest ideology containing a notion of distributive justice that provides a ground for claim is an intervening variable⁹ between the independent variable economic loss and the dependent variable, political protest.

Hypotheses

Viewed as a series of testable hypotheses applied to Canada, these propositions may be stated as follows:

⁹ See David Nachmias and Chava Nachmias, Research Methods in the Social Sciences, 2nd. ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 508. Nachmias and Nachmias define intervening variable as: "An intermediate variable between an independent variable and a dependent variable. The independent variable affects the dependent variable through the intervening variable." An intervening variable is similar to a conditional variable, but Nachmias and Nachmias define conditional variable as "a condition necessary for the occurrence of the relationship between the independent and dependent variable" (p. 505). Grounds for claim, in the arguments to be presented here and in the following chapters, is one of a number of conditions that is conducive to protest but not, strictly, speaking necessary to it, since other conditions may also have some causal impact.

- 1) Beliefs about distributive justice¹⁰ have varied over time and place in Canada;
- 2) "Beliefs about distributive justice" can be viewed as an intervening variable which, if effectively exploited as part of a protest ideology, can increase the tendency for economic loss to produce political protest;
- 3) More specifically, those who experience economic loss will be more likely to mobilize in collective protest if they share beliefs

¹⁰ For the purpose of the arguments to be presented here, I distinguish among the terms "beliefs," "ideology" and "political culture". Beliefs are a limited set of ideas shared by at least a part of a population, ideology a comprehensive system of ideas shared by at least a part of a population, and political culture the totality of beliefs and ideologies held by members of a given population, such as the population of a nation. In support of these distinctions, I would point out that Christian and Campbell define ideology as a doctrine or a set of ideas that claims to provide an adequate explanation of political arrangements either to justify an existing state of affairs or to propose a better political system to replace the old one. William Christian and Colin Campbell, Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1990), p. 13. Van Loon and Whittington point out that there are many definitions of political culture, but "most would agree, however, that it is composed of the political values, attitudes, and beliefs of the citizens of the political system." Richard Van Loon and Michael Whittington, The Canadian Political System, 4th ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987). Political ideology, then, is a complete belief system that may be present in several polities. Political culture describes the nature of beliefs within one polity, and may be a mosaic or blending of several ideologies.

that provide grounds for such protest;

- 4) Economic loss has not produced significant protest in the 1980s and 1990s, as it did in the 1930s, for a number of reasons, but an important one is that "losers" have not had recourse to a protest ideology that provides a clear ground of claim of redress.

The key variables would be defined as follows:

1) **economic loss** as the loss of wealth, income, economic opportunity or security; 2) **beliefs regarding distributive justice** as publicly expressed views of how wealth should be divided (both "elite," expressed in public statements and public documents, and "mass," in the results of public opinion polls); and 3) **protest**, as mobilization against a perceived cause of economic loss by means of political action of some kind beyond the casting of a ballot (action such as marching, demonstrating or working for a party). This definition is essentially compatible with that of Charles Tilly as Baer, Grabb and Johnston interpret him: "Mobilization essentially is the process by which actors move from being a passive aggregation to a collective force in public life."¹¹ Violent forms of protest are not

¹¹ Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 1978, as summarized by Baer, Grabb and Johnston.

excluded from the definition, but they are not deemed to be of major interest here, since most protest in Canada has not been violent.¹²

Operationalization of these variables, i.e., choosing measures, or "indicators," that represent them, presents considerable challenge, as is always the case when one deals with complex social phenomena that can take a variety of forms. Problems present themselves in the measuring of economic loss, as broadly defined here, since one must proceed from a wealth of macro-economic trend analysis to a notion of how individuals are affected by these trends and, even more importantly, how they perceive their loss.

The operationalization of protest presents other kinds of problems. As Tilly has noted, those who study mobilization or collective action face a difficult choice between:

¹² The premise of William Kilbourn's Canada: A Guide to the Peaceable Kingdom (Toronto: Macmillan, 1970) that Canada could serve as a model of peaceful conflict resolution was challenged by events in Quebec in its year of publication and by later work by Judy Torrance, who found that "historical obscurity has helped Canadians to believe in their self-image as a peaceful people." See Torrance, Public Violence in Canada, 1967-1982 (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986), p. 41. However, Torrance did ultimately conclude that, in Canada, "peacefulness does appear to be the rule and violence the exception." (p. 66).

(a) indicators . . . which come to us in a more or less quantitative form, but are too narrow or too remote to represent adequately the range of action we have in mind, or (b) indicators derived from qualitative descriptions, which are usually discontinuous, which often vary in coverage from one group or period to another, and which are always hard to convert reliably into meaningful numbers.¹³

The present study adopts approach (b). It will sacrifice precision of measurement in the interest of encompassing the full range of phenomena that should properly be included in the examination of its hypotheses and will build a case based on persuasion by argument and evidence, rather than statistical correlations.

Beliefs regarding distributive justice, viewed here as an aspect of political culture, pose perhaps the greatest challenge. Van Loon and Whittington have noted that there are as many definitions of the term as there are political scientists".¹⁴ Approaches to the empirical study of political culture also vary. Few would disagree, however, that language is the medium of political culture and symbols and slogans key to understanding it. This is

¹³ Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978), p. 90.

¹⁴ Richard J. Van Loon and Michael S. Whittington, The Canadian Political System, Environment, Structure and Process, Third Edition Revised (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1981), p. 93.

the approach set out systematically by David Bell.¹⁵ On the kinds of source materials that are appropriate for discerning such symbols and slogans, Bell is less specific, though he does make the point that opinion surveys are not enough¹⁶ and that "our guides will be many and varied."¹⁷ He takes as acceptable evidence institutional practices in addition to stated beliefs and values. He finds this approach compatible with that of Lipset and Hartz who "look at many kinds of evidence in assessing political culture."¹⁸

Several kinds of evidence will be used here but the primary categories are 1) public debate in the form of speeches, party platforms, legislative record, letters, media reports; and 2) public opinion surveys. Secondary

¹⁵ David V.J. Bell, The Roots of Disunity, A Study of Canadian Political Culture, Revised Edition (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 1, "Without language, political culture would not exist," and p. 4, "Symbols and slogans help preserve and express political culture. They catalyze sentiments and sound the depths of communal division, telling us how deeply the community feels about a problem."

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 7, "the user of survey results must take care not to confuse a short-lived public opinion with the deep-seated, slow-changing political culture".

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Bell, p. 26, n. 11, the author refers to the work of Glenda Patrick, specifically, "The Concept of Political Culture," unpublished monograph, Committee on Conceptual and Terminological Analysis, 1976.

sources are also used, particularly historical studies of the 1930s. None of these sources is ideal and a particularly frustrating aspect of the work that has been undertaken is the lack of appropriate opinion data, even in the later period. Chapter Six sets out some approaches that would produce better opinion data. Even with ideal data, however, one would be left with the problem of a multi-causal model in which all the relevant variables may not yet have been identified. Taken alone, the key variable of beliefs regarding distributive justice would not have great predictive power. All that is claimed is that it is worth considering along with other, more widely discussed and perhaps generally recognized causal factors, such as "efficacy," and others that will be dealt with later in this chapter.

As Chapter Two will discuss in more detail, loss in the 1930s in Canada was widespread. At the depth of the Depression, it took the form of loss of farm income, loss of farms, and unemployment in the cities. Incumbent governments, for the most part, promoted the market liberal view that the Depression was a cyclical downturn and that the economy would right itself again.¹⁹ Recovery was

¹⁹ For a discussion of the politics of the period good sources are John A. Irving's The Social Credit Movement in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959); Allen Mills' Fool for Christ. The Political Thought of J.S. Woodsworth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991); and

perpetually just around the corner.²⁰

Political protest was equally widespread, taking the form of the genesis of new parties with radically reformist platforms (Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, Alberta Social Credit, Union National), and the shift toward populist beliefs by some mainstream opposition parties (such as the Ontario Liberal Party of Mitch Hepburn). H.H. Stevens' Reconstruction Party fielded 174 candidates in the 1935 federal election.²¹ Protest included labour and communist-led demonstrations in the streets in cities such as Toronto, the Oshawa strike, and the (uncompleted) march of the unemployed to Ottawa.²²

John T. Saywell's 'Just call me Mitch': The Life of Mitchell F. Hepburn (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991). These works will be used more extensively in Chapter Two.

²⁰ See examples cited by James Gray, in The Winter Years (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1966), p. 89. "On January 8, 1931, Sir Herbert Holt, president of the Royal Bank, propelled his opinion on an inattentive world: 'The present interruption in the normal trading relationships of the world is not going to persist. There are a sufficient number of reasonably favourable factors in the Canadian situation, so that the resumption of the expansion of Canada cannot be long delayed.'"

²¹ John Herd Thompson, with Allen Seager, Canada 1922-1939, Decades of Discord (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985), p. 273.

²² As recounted in Ronald Liversedge, Recollections of the On to Ottawa Trek (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1973).

An important link between loss and protest, it will be argued here, was a populist notion of distributive justice that held that good citizens willing to do honest toil were entitled to a square deal, that is, an equitable share of society's wealth. As one means to equitable division, it went so far at times to prescribe state-enforced ceilings on incomes. In this view, a system that visited extreme hardship upon such good citizens, even for limited periods of time, was a system that had to be changed.

Populist ideas were common to both early radical liberal and socialist movements.²³ This form of egalitarianism was itself underpinned by the nature of pioneer society, i.e. the powerful levelling effect of the demands of facing an untamed wilderness,²⁴ institutions

²³ Richards, *pass.m.* Also, David Laycock, Populism and Democratic Thought in the Canadian Prairies, 1910 to 1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990). Laycock cites Frank Underhill's observation that the old agrarian radicalism of the Upper Canada Grits came to life again "in a fresh incarnation among the wheat farmers of the new West" (from In Search of Canadian Liberalism, p. 1), p. 25. Using the theory of Ernesto Laclau, Laycock argues that populism never displaces liberalism, socialism, or even conservatism as the ideological backbone of a movement. "Instead it emphasizes a 'people/power bloc' antagonism, by referring to key popular-democratic traditions." (p. 19).

²⁴ Kenneth McRae, "The Structure of Canadian History," in Louis Hartz, The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.), p. 237.

such as the church,²⁵ the co-op movement,²⁶ and by the popular literature of the period.²⁷ Early in the 20th century, populist notions of distributive justice provided a ground on which "losers" could protest against the forces of modernization: rapid industrialization, concentrations of wealth, regional imbalances. In the 1930s, they provided a ground for resisting the liberal notion that market forces must prevail, even if many would-be honest workers are subjected to extreme hardship because of the market's cyclical fluctuations.

By the late 20th century, when market liberalism's message was that market forces must still prevail, even if many people lose their jobs and their very occupations (should they be rendered obsolete by technology) to structural change, populist ideas in general had declined along with the institutions that supported them. Economic losers looking for a ground for protest against the market liberal personal adjustment imperative had only the much

²⁵ Ivan Avakumovic, Socialism in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978), p. 29-30.

²⁶ John Richards, "Populism and the West," in Western Separatism, ed. Larry Pratt and Garth Stevenson (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1981), p. 76.

²⁷ Susan Jackel, "The House on the Prairies," in Writers of the Prairies, ed. Donald G. Stephens (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1973).

more limited ground provided within welfare liberalism.²⁸ As Chapter Three will discuss in more detail, welfare liberalism's notion of distributive justice was much closer to that of market liberalism. It accepted the basic premise that structural change was "transitional." During the 1980s, welfare liberalism generally supported the market liberal view that something better was waiting at the end of the transition: better jobs (as machines took over menial tasks), or perhaps more free time.²⁹ By the 1990s, welfare liberals conceded that the transition was going to be long, perhaps perpetual, and that individuals would not only have to adjust but would have to acquire the ability to continually adjust: they would have to be flexible. Welfare liberalism distinguished itself from market liberalism only in its call to governments and employers to give more assistance to individuals in their quest for flexibility. It did not prescribe radical measures to more evenly distribute the losses of structural change, or to spread the burden of adjustment. Like market liberalism, welfare liberalism was prepared to allow persons of exceptional

²⁸ "Welfare liberalism" as used here is essentially as defined by William Christian and Colin Campbell in their well-known typology of Canadian ideologies. See Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, Ryerson, 1990). "Market liberalism" as used here is essentially the ideology Christian and Campbell call "business liberalism".

²⁹ See Mary Trueman, Looking for the End of the Transition, unpublished M.A. Thesis, Queen's University, 1985.

achievement to claim an exceptional share of the pie, at the same time allowing market "losers" to be reduced to a minimal subsistence share provided by government welfare programs or, increasingly in the 1990s, the combination of welfare and food banks.³⁰ It prescribed equality only at the starting line of the race. It called for public policies and programs to help compensate for innate handicaps (such as sex, race, disability) but relatively little assistance for those with handicaps acquired during the course of the race (age, age-related-illness, skill obsolescence, the stigma of having lost a job, occupationally linked burn-out). The onus for adjustment was placed on the individual, who was urged to seek retraining, regardless of age or ability.³¹ As Chapter Three will discuss in more detail, retraining was seen as good and beneficial to the individual in itself, an argument often couched in the terms of 19th century liberal progressivism or self-development. In short, welfare liberalism provided inadequate grounds on which those hurt

³⁰ In providing a subsistence share of the social wealth pie, through a web of welfare programs, it is an ethic that includes what Roger Gibbins terms a "social insurance" underpinning. See Roger Gibbins, Conflict and Unity. An Introduction to Canadian Political Life (Toronto: Methuen, 1985), p. 140.

³¹ See Mary Trueman, "Discussion Paper No. 22, Training of Older Workers in Canada" (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1989) and "Older Workers: Conditions of Work and Transition to Retirement in Canada" (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1992).

by the economic changes of the 1990s -- mergers, changing technology and trade patterns, harsher "corporate culture"³² -- could base any claim for redress of their loss.

Theoretical Assumptions

As noted earlier, theorists who give analytical primacy to beliefs and belief systems (whether conceptualized as beliefs, consciousness, mass values, ideology, utopia, political culture or however else they may choose to conceptualize it) generally draw from various 19th and early 20th century works by such thinkers as Hegel, Emil Durkheim, Henri Bergson and Karl Mannheim. Despite its deep and variegated roots, this approach came under criticism from behavioral, systems and public choice theorists in the late 1960s and early 1970s. They argued that mass values are elusive at best, and that, in politics, they are peripheral and fluid and do not determine outcomes.³³ Mancur Olson's seminal work on the logic of collective action envisioned human action as a series of individual

³² For a discussion of the harsher corporate culture of the 1980s and 1990s, see Briar A. Grosman, Corporate Loyalty: A Trust Betrayed (Markham, Ont.: Viking, 1988).

³³ These arguments are summarized by John Shiry in "Mass Values and Systems Outputs: A Critique of an Assumption of Socialization Theory," in Foundations of Political Culture: Political Socialization in Canada, ed. Jon H. Pammett and Michael Whittington (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, Maclean-Hunter Press, 1976), p. 41.

choices, each rationally calculated on self-interest and not greatly influenced by underlying notions of justice."³⁴

Beliefs about justice have no currency in this accounting of costs and benefits. Belief systems enjoyed a resurgence in the 1970s and 1980s as theorists attempted to explain independence movements in the Third World and various ideological phenomena, such as student protests, feminism, environmentalism, the peace movement, in western industrialized countries of the 1960s. By the late 1980s, these theorists had to try to explain why protest did not occur in response to economic loss, and why market liberal governments enjoyed such success in developed countries. They focussed on analyzing the ideology of the state and its supporting institutions and elites, i.e. "dominant ideology,"³⁵ and had less to say about what might be seen as "counter"³⁶ or contending ideologies, and to the extent that they did deal with contending ideologies, the concern was with the formation of "class consciousness" (realization

³⁴ Olson argues that "unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve the common or group interests." See The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 2.

³⁵ See Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill and Bryan S. Turner, The Dominant Ideology Thesis (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1980).

³⁶ See John Goyder, Essentials of Canadian Society (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990), p. 174.

of shared interests), not an ideology per se but rather, in the political economy theoretical framework, the precondition of it. Thus, there is little current literature that attempts to locate and define variables between economic loss and protest and even less that looks at "belief system," attitudinal, or "value" variables.

As Chapter Two will discuss, the populist notion of distributive justice that provided a ground for protest in the 1930s was rooted in scripture and promoted through the church, the school system of the time, and various rural institutions. Populism itself was a broader worldview, not unique to Canada but identified by scholars as existing in many countries, notably the United States. In Canada it took a number of forms, differing slightly on issues such as the treatment of private property.³⁷ Christian and Campbell, who all but ignore populism in their widely used text on Canadian ideologies, hold that it is not an ideology in itself but an ideological "dimension" that can be discerned in the ideology of various Canadian political parties at different points in time. Categorizing populist ideas as belonging within the tradition of "radical liberalism,"³⁸ Christian and Campbell note that in the late

³⁷ The most extensive categorization scheme is contained in Laycock's Populism and Democratic thought in the Canadian Prairies, 1910 to 1945.

³⁸ Christian and Campbell, 1990, p. 66.

1950s one could see a general upsurge of radical liberalism finding expression both in Diefenbaker-style populism in the Conservative Party and in the growth of the New Party movement." Greater importance is accorded populism by John Richards, who holds that "agrarian populism" enjoyed a "cultural hegemony" within the Prairies between the two World Wars³⁹ and even during "much of the first half of this century"⁴⁰.

While it will be examined more methodically in Chapter Two, populism can be summed up here by a number of central tenets about which there is not much debate. It revered the ordinary man (usually a farmer or small property-holder) and regarded him as having a special wisdom superior to the theories of experts. It called citizens to duty, rather than emphasizing freedom. It valued custom, tradition, community and private property. It differed from market liberalism in its treatment of private property in this respect: it held that citizens had a right to private property for certain purposes, such as independence, but did not hold that possession of property in itself bestowed other rights. Progress was welcomed if it benefitted all and did not threaten basic values. Materialism was not central

³⁹ John Richards, "Populism and the West," in Western Separatism, ed. Larry Pratt and Garth Stevenson (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1981), p. 74.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 76.

and conspicuous consumption was scorned. As noted above, all good citizens who did "honest toil" were held to deserve an equitable share of society's wealth. In this sense, it had a sort of "threshold" notion of entitlement. Populism opposed those forces that worked against equitable distribution of wealth and security: bigness, elites, privilege and "vested interests." It had its dark side: anti-semitism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism.⁴¹ Of particular importance to the present study is the fact that populism was not reasoned from first principles in the manner of market liberalism or utilitarianism but, rather, was balanced on a sort of tripod of authority points: tradition, scripture, and the wisdom of the common man (such wisdom being more instinctual than rational.) These provided benchmarks of human welfare and dignity against which the impact of ever-encroaching technological and economic progress could be assessed, sometimes negatively.

⁴¹ A good survey this literature and a sympathetic examination of populism itself can be found in Margaret Canovan's Populism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1981). Also useful is Richard H. Pells' Radical Visions and American Dreams: culture and Social Thought in the Depression Years. New York: Harper and Row, 1973. A key work providing a more critical treatment of populism in the United States is Richard Hofstadter's The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. A very useful recent work is Allen Mills' Fool for Christ, The Political Thought of J.S. Woodsworth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991).

Populism has roots in the American Midwest and a large body of theory, much of it recent, looks at the American populist experience, in most cases ignoring the Canadian experience.⁴² Richards argues that the term first came into use during the agrarian revolt in the United States at the end of the 19th century to describe the ideas and supporters of the People's Party. The evolution of the United Farmers of Alberta and the birth of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation are in striking parallel, he notes, "so striking that any reasonable observer is bound to admit the fundamental unity of agrarian politics north and south of the 49th parallel."⁴³ Nelson Wiseman's analysis, using a Hartzian theoretical framework, supports this view, but only with respect to Alberta's experience with populism.⁴⁴

Until recently (specifically, the works of Wiseman, Richards, Laycock and Mills), analysts of Canadian populist parties have frequently subsumed them within the classification of "third party" (a category that takes in

⁴² Most regrettable in the case of Norman Pollack's The Just Polity, Populism, Law, and Human Welfare (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1987), an excellent analytical work that provides insights into populism's treatment of private property that Canadian scholarship has, so far, not matched.

⁴³ Richards, "Populism & the West," p. 74.

⁴⁴ Nelson Wiseman, "The Pattern of Prairie Politics," in Party Politics in Canada, pp. 242-59, 5th ed., Hugh G. Thorburn, ed. (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1985), p. 256.

populist parties but also nationalist parties such as the Parti Québécois) because of the interest of both Canadian and foreign scholars in Canadian "exceptionalism" in regard to the general rule that third parties have slim chance for success in first-past-the-post electoral systems."⁴⁵ David Laycock's recent work breaks new ground in this respect, providing a broader, more general theory, including a typology of early-to-mid-century prairie populisms: social democratic populism (as manifest, for example, in the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation), radical democratic populism (e.g., United Farmers of Alberta), plebiscitarian populism (e.g., Alberta Social Credit), and crypto-Liberalism (e.g., the Saskatchewan Liberal Party).⁴⁶

However, neither the abundant theory on populism in other countries, nor the smaller amount of new theory on the Canadian experience, provide a detailed look at populism's concept of distributive justice. Rather, it has concentrated instead on exploring populism's notions of radical, direct democracy, or its embrace of the co-operative means of production. Yet populism's concept of distributive justice could well be seen as a more central element, and a particularly interesting element in light of

⁴⁵ Alain Gagnon and Brian Tanguay summarize this literature well in "Minor Parties of Protest in Canada: Origins, Impact, and Prospects," in Canadian Parties in Transition, A. Gagnon and B. Tanguay, eds. (Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson Canada, 1989).

⁴⁶ Laycock, p. 19.

the longterm social and political implications of its eventual decline, implications that will be examined in later chapters.

Literature Review

As noted earlier, belief systems in general have not been particularly prominent in theories attempting to explain variance in the occurrence of protest in response to economic loss. The dominance of brokerage theory in Canadian political science has, as Christian and Campbell note, framed everything in the context of balancing of "competing interests".⁴⁷ Even such obviously ideological parties as the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation and Social Credit have been categorized primarily as "third" parties, as "curious and probably temporary growths on the two-party system."⁴⁸ Moreover, those approaches that have given analytical primacy to ideology or political culture, have not given much prominence to beliefs concerning distributive justice.

A review of the literature is nevertheless useful for a number of reasons. First, it is worth noting that other theorists have felt that there are reasons that one might have expected more protest in response to loss in the

⁴⁷ Christian and Campbell, p. 2.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 3.

1980s and 1990s. The authors also observe that there is a gap in the literature in this regard: that few analysts have undertaken the study of the question, and that there is a notable lack of empirical work. They point to some of the theoretical problems, such as the many ways in which different analysts have chosen to conceptualize and operationalize both economic loss and protest as well as a range of mediating factors examined. They point to the difficulty in finding data, such as attitudinal data for early historical periods.

Further, it is useful to note that the authors generally support the need to build a multi-causal model of the relationship between economic loss and protest. They identify a number of the potential elements of such a model through their own analysis of existing literature, through the hypotheses that they test and in their suggestions regarding possible directions for further research emerging from their conclusions. What follows is a brief summary of this work.

Grayson: "Job Loss" and "Radical Means of Change"

William Mishler's empirical work established that lower socio-economic status correlates with low political

efficacy."⁴⁹ Efficacy is key to the work of J. Paul Grayson, who explores the relationship between "job loss," specifically the loss of jobs in two Scarborough, Ontario, plants in the early 1980s, and support for "radical means of change" (e.g., violent protest and demonstrations, fighting with police, destroying property).⁵⁰ The expectation that acceptance of radical means of change could occur in response to such loss is based primarily on recent European experience.

For example, in France and Italy, employees about to be displaced by plant closures sometimes occupy their workplaces and effectively seize control of production from management. Similar actions in Canada are rare indeed.⁵¹

Grayson notes there has been insufficient research and analysis in Canada on the micro-political effects of unemployment and "as the unemployed in Canada exceed one million this neglect must be addressed."⁵² It may be that the Canadian experience of unemployment is the same as in other countries, he notes, but "we should recognize that the experience of unemployment is likely mediated by the cultural, community, and institutional context in which it

⁴⁹ William Mishler, Political Participation in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979), p. 88-95.

⁵⁰ Grayson, "Plant Closure and Political Despair."

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 333.

⁵² Ibid., p. 332.

occurs, even if the nature and extent of this mediation has yet to be analyzed fully."⁵³ From here, Grayson's work draws mainly from American and British theory, although the key mediating variable on which he chooses to focus, political efficacy, has had lots of attention in Canada, particularly through the work of Mishler. Mishler, as Grayson notes, has defined political efficacy as a concept that actually embraces two fundamental attitudes: 1) perceptions of opportunities for effective participation; and 2) a sense of personal political competence.⁵⁴

Grayson also draws from the work of Schlozman and Verba, who studied the effects of unemployment in the United States in the 1970s in an attempt to gain an understanding of "the links between economic strain in personal life and conduct in public life . . . of the process by which individual economic stress becomes -- or fails to become -- the stuff of politics"⁵⁵ Schlozman and Verba's subjects were already unemployed. Their general finding was that the lack of a job creates severe personal strain on the individual but that this strain does not translate into

⁵³ Ibid., p. 333.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 335.

⁵⁵ Kay Lehman Schlozman and Sidney Verba, Injury to Insult, Unemployment, Class and Political Response (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 1.

meaningful political activity.⁵⁶

Grayson interviews employees (and spouses of employees) who have lost jobs in two Ontario plant closures. Data is collected, in the case of one plant, before the actual closure, and several times after the closure, up to two years later. In the case of the other plant, data was collected after the closure. Comparisons were made with the findings of the York University Quality of Life study (limited to the Ontario sample because of Grayson's belief that there are important regional differences in reaction to unemployment).

Grayson's finding, was that efficacy declined:

As a result of the closures, former employees and their spouses had less faith in their ability to affect the political process than the general population⁵⁷

Grayson hypothesized that, in view of their perceived inability to influence politics, it would be expected that many would reject commonly accepted ways of initiating change.⁵⁸ But the data showed this not to be the case:

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 332.

⁵⁷ Grayson, p. 332.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 344.

. . . this loss of faith notwithstanding, those affected by the shutdowns were no more likely than the general population to opt for radical means of change."⁵⁹

Grayson's conclusions do not involve any analysis of whether the unwillingness to use radical means was due to a generalized lack of a sense of personal political competence (to use the second part of Mishler's definition) or, on the other hand, respect for the law.

Grayson notes that some studies outside Canada have suggested that community size may be an important mediating variable. In a small community, former employees of a closed plant are likely to find more social support and this may affect whether or not they feel ineffectual regarding the political process.⁶⁰ In a large metropolitan centre like Toronto, he notes, "overall community support for the victims of closures is largely absent."⁶¹ This raises some possibilities for exploring differences between the 1930s, when Canada was less urban, and the 1980s and 1990s. Grayson, however, does not take this direction himself.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 332.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 334-5.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 346.

Grayson also speculates that the drop in efficacy shown in the data may be due to the fact that workers were confronted with the reality that their unions were unable to successfully pressure governments against closure."⁶² His prescriptive conclusion seems to suggest he sees the employees as having nothing more to lose after their jobs are gone, and therefore seeing nothing to fight for. "If people are to be mobilized to save jobs resulting from closure of viable operations, they must be mobilized while they will have something to lose."⁶³

Noting the general finding in much of the existing literature that the experience of unemployment itself tends to mitigate against militancy (here, Grayson does refer to the 1930s).

Overall, despite its limitations, both the literature on sustained joblessness in the Great Depression and more recent evidence tend to suggest that unemployment is a formidable opponent of pre-existing blue-collar traditions or forms of consciousness centred on collective action to bring about change. This statement holds true even where militant unions exist.⁶⁴

Grayson's "micro" analysis arguably suffers from the fact that it does not tell us what might happen as

⁶² Ibid., p. 345.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 347.

⁶⁴ Grayson, p. 347, citing John A. Garraty, Unemployment in History (New York: Harper and Row, 1978).

"macro" unemployment increases to some critical mass⁶⁶ at which point economic losers could be expected to see themselves as part of a sizable minority and might start losing respect for the law. Also, it might be noted here that there was increasing evidence, through the 1980s and 1990s, that there was widespread loss of faith in mainstream modes of political action among great numbers of Canadians, including many of the still employed, who would be viewed by Grayson as still having something to fight for. Angus Reid's 1993 federal election campaign poll figures suggest close to half of the electorate did not actually believe any of the parties could successfully address either of the two major election issues, jobs or the deficit. Of the national sample of respondents polled about three weeks before the election, 41 per cent said they did not think that any of the parties' policies would produce a substantial improvement in the unemployment situation within five years. Fifty-seven per cent indicated they did not believe any of the parties' policies would produce a substantial reduction in the federal deficit within five years. Further, 52 per cent of the national sample of 1,502 polled said "no" to the question: "Would you say the major parties have been addressing your concerns in a meaningful way during this

⁶⁶ Although it is highly speculative, some estimate such a critical mass might be 30 per cent unemployment in Toronto, Montreal and Ottawa. Harry MacKay, senior research advisor, Canadian Council on Social Development, interview, 24 May 1985.

election campaign, or not?"⁶⁶ This would suggest that loss of faith in the mainstream political process is not, in itself, enough to produce willingness to use radical means of political change, even among those who are, for the most part, still employed, i.e., those whose general sense of efficacy might be considered to be still intact, and who still have something to fight for.

Of significance to the present study, Grayson's analysis takes no account of beliefs concerning distributive justice, that is, the rightness or wrongness of the cause. The closest he comes to this is when he looks at the former employees tendency to attribute blame for the closure to federal and provincial governments, company management, the general state of the economy, and the unions. This shows Grayson that the closure had an "external political-economic referent"⁶⁷ and further that many (about 90 per cent) said they would favour government regulation of plant closures (though this option seems to have been suggested to them by the question they were asked, leaving one to wonder how many would have thought of it

⁶⁶ All findings from Angus Reid Group, Inc., "The '93 Election Campaign," National Angus Reid Poll #3, conducted by telephone on October 5 and 6, 1993, among a representative cross-section of 1,502 Canadian adults. The results, for the national sample, are considered by Reid to be accurate within 2.5 percentage points.

⁶⁷ Grayson, p. 341.

themselves unprompted).⁶⁶ However, evidence that workers blame a government, for example, or even that they have a specific idea of what a government should do in a given situation does not say anything about the notion of distributive justice underlying their views. It does not reveal what they believe about the rights of private corporate ownership, for example, or whether such ownership can be overridden by considerations of public interest, and if so, in what kinds of cases. It does not reveal whether they believe compensation should be paid by the government to the company forced to keep open and, if so, how much, and on what grounds? The hypothesis to be explored in the following chapters is that the presence or absence, strength or weakness of such beliefs among workers could influence their tendency to mobilize -- possibly even at a relatively low level of efficacy.

Hueglin: "Scarcity" and "Class Conflict"

Thomas Hueglin looks at class conflict in western industrialized countries in the 1980s and finds it to be of a relatively limited nature, despite the economic "scarcity" which marked the decade if one compares it to the high growth decades of the 1950s and 1960s. He notes that such class conflict was, in fact, too limited to pose any threat to the state. "What is surprising now, after the deep

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 341-2.

recession of the early 1980s, is not the fragility of the capitalist state, but its apparent resilience."⁶⁹

Successfully containing "potential mobilization" through "crisis management,"⁷⁰ aided by the media with its "incantations of imminent economic recovery,"⁷¹ neo-conservative governments are enjoying electoral support.⁷² He sees conflict and confrontation continuing, but never satisfactorily resolved, perhaps leading to a kind of permanent state of economic dualism, or, in Europe, a corporatism that excludes many players from key decisions. Neither conservative theories of "ungovernability" caused by postmaterialist value change, or radical analysis of the structural contradictions of the welfare and interventionist state manage to address the complexity of the problem, he argues.⁷³

Hueglin's independent variable, "scarcity," includes lasting unemployment, growing social insecurity, poverty caused by industrial restructuring and robotization.

⁶⁹ Thomas O. Hueglin, "The Politics of Fragmentation in an Age of Scarcity: A Synthetic View and Critical Analysis of the Welfare State Crisis," Canadian Journal of Political Science XX:2 (June 1987):248.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 239.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 250.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 237.

His dependent variable "class conflict" is operationalized by strikes for shorter working hours and plant occupations. Like Grayson, Hueglin chooses a somewhat extreme manifestation of protest, as opposed to actions that might be beyond the ordinary yet still peaceful, such as the formation of new political movements and parties. His key mediating variable, accounting for the limited nature of class conflict amid scarcity is "fragmentation." Yet, underlying his analysis, at all times, are some strong assumptions about the critical role played by the state in conflict containment.

Fragmentation, or "new forms of mobilization and conflict which cut across the trenches of class conflict"⁷⁴ at first seems roughly equivalent to cross-cutting cleavages (and, in fact, one could make an argument that cross-cutting cleavages of gender, regional, linguistic, and ethnic politics, including the rise of aboriginal claims, do serve to diffuse protest energies in many directions and thus impede mobilization on purely economic, or labour-capital, issues). However, Hueglin conceptualizes it somewhat differently. He looks at several phenomena: first, the rise of environmentalism and the peace movement, both of which try to "prevent the scope of politics being reduced to the

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 236.

imperatives of national economic efficiency"⁷⁵, and secondly, polarization, i.e, while loss is quite widespread and everyone is facing a greater degree of insecurity, some are living in insecurity at a higher level of material comfort than others. The problem here is, in part, erosion of solidarity. "Trade union solidarity must decline with its capacity to speak for and defend the working force in its entirety."⁷⁶ Yet it is more complicated (and notably different from the 1930s, although Hueglin does not make this comparison) in that there is an interdependency between the "winner" and "loser" groups. Losers may work for "winning" companies or sectors, but on contract at low pay with no benefits.⁷⁷ Workers from the "loser" peripheral regions such as the Atlantic provinces are forced to migrate to the core to take jobs when jobs are available -- and to return to the Atlantic region when the core cannot provide jobs for them.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 236.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 249.

⁷⁷ The federal public service would seem to illustrate Hueglin's analysis, being composed, in the 1990s, of permanent employees with strong job security protection, term employees over six months with benefits but no job security, term employees under six months, with fewer benefits and no security, and "temporary" employees (some of whom stay in their positions many months) with no security, lower take home pay (because the placement agency takes a sizable cut), and no benefits.

⁷⁸ Hueglin, p. 259.

The cleavage lines of the dual economy do not simply run between growing and declining sectors, but between workers in weak and strong sectors, weak and strong firms, large and small businesses, competing production units, or simply between "ins" and "outs"⁷⁹

Both "sides," government and societies, capital and labour, centres and peripheries, winners and losers are "inextricably intertwined in a web of contradictions."⁸⁰ In effect, Hueglin's mediating variable "fragmentation" combines the absence of social solidarity (people are in different situations with regard to the means of production) with the presence of cross-cutting cleavages (various political causes that compete with economic protest for the political energies of the populace).

Hueglin's analysis, as noted, is strongly dependant on underlying theoretical assumptions about power, essentially that it is class power, the power of a dominant class whose interests are served by the state (and the various ideological apparatuses of the state such as the media) and used to control demands of the masses. It pays little attention to political culture or mass beliefs, other than as they reflect what might be called state propaganda or the inculcation of false consciousness, the controlling "dominant ideology" of the state as fed to and consumed by

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 264.

the masses. Moreover, his work does not involve formal empirical tests of hypothesis, as does Grayson's, and Baer, Grabb, and Johnston's (to be discussed below). Yet, as noted, he draws attention to several important ways in which the social, political and economic conditions of the 1980s differed from those of the 1930s. His concept of fragmentation could be more explicitly extended to cover a greater range of new social movements and cross-cutting cleavages. His theory of inextricably linked winners and losers could also be spelled out more explicitly with reference to the web of different employment situations arising in the 1990s, as full-time, permanent secure jobs are being displaced by a variety of part-time, temporary, contract, piece-work, freelance, and fee-for-service arrangements. Ultimately, the implications of the growth and internal dynamics of this complex web could be examined with reference to certain underlying, unstated notions of distributive justice. This will be attempted in Chapter Three.

Baer, Grabb and Johnston: "Economic Decline" and "Class Polarization"

Despite some critical differences in theoretical framework, Baer, Grabb and Johnston do share some of the assumptions informing the present study. Looking at the period following the oil price increases of 1974 (but before

the full impact of the recession of the early 1980s), they feel there should be significant protest of loss. They base their expectation of protest in part on the political radicalization that took place in Canada in the 1930s:

In Canada, the emergence of protest movements and radical political parties, such as Social Credit in Alberta, the CCF, and the Union Nationale in Québec, suggests an altered political environment and, more importantly, a transformed audience. Moreover, the clear radicalization of the political platforms and traditional political discourse, including Bennett's New Deal and Hepburn's rejuvenated Liberalism, indicates substantial shifts in popular consciousness at that time.⁸¹

Their study, like the present study, does compare the 1930s with the post-oil-increase years, to some extent, for the purpose of gaining insight into the relative quiescence of the later period (at least until 1981, the latest year of their data source). Conceding that hardship was greater in absolute terms in the 1930s, they nevertheless feel, with Huegel, that loss in the later period was still significant because it was relative loss, viewed as most economic losers would view it, in the context of three decades of post-war economic growth.⁸² Baer, Grabb and Johnston refer

⁸¹ Baer, Grabb and Johnston, p. 15.

⁸² The matter of reference point or "reference group" can be a bone of contention, in that some may argue that "economic losers" of the 1980s and 1990s were still better off, in many ways, than many of those who kept their jobs during the Great Depression. However, the theory on which much of the "relative deprivation" and "reference group" literature is based, tends to suggest that people compare

explicitly to the theory of revolution literature that holds that economic strain is most significant when it represents loss and especially loss following a period of gain."

Their independent variable is economic decline, broadly conceived to include higher inflation, higher unemployment, real income declines and slower growth." They hold "class polarization," that is, divergence in political ideology, especially between "workers" and "others," to be a critical mediating variable between economic decline and protest and they wish to measure the extent to which it has been produced by decline between 1977 and 1981.

Their analysis is explicitly based on classical

themselves with what is best known to them, their own recent experience or those of groups they feel close to. This would not include their parents or grandparents generation, whose experience of hardship would seem somewhat remote. Ted Gurr theorizes: "Most people probably choose their reference groups from among those groups they perceive to be socioeconomically similar to themselves, but, among such groups, they are most likely to set their expectations by those experiencing the most rapid increase in well-being. Thus New York City policemen justify their demands for higher salaries not by reference to the income of municipal white-collar employees, but to the salaries of city firemen. Landless Mexican peasants in the decades after the Revolution of 1910 did not demand the perquisites of urban workers, but their own land, which other peasants had seized or received in land distribution programs." See Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 107.

" They cite works by James Davies and Ted Gurr, thereby mixing classical Marxist and behaviouralists in their theoretical model, though in this case it does not, as it happens, pose problems of incompatibility.

" Ibid., p. 2.

Marxist premises:

capitalism's recurrent and increasingly serious economic problems should gradually bring about the objective conditions of class polarization necessary, if not sufficient, for proletarian class awareness, class consciousness, and the ultimate establishment of socialism¹⁵

As other authors examined here have done, they first note the shortage of relevant literature and data. Available evidence is "far from extensive," especially in Canada, where empirical analyses have not yet addressed the problem. They examine York University's Quality of Life Survey data, collected in three waves, 1977, 1979, and 1981, in search of evidence of increasing divergence in the political outlooks of different classes and, more specifically, between "workers" and others. Empirical support for their hypothesis is found to be weak. The authors interpret this result as a warning against reductionism: "the assumption, in this case, of an automatic relationship between economic context and political ideology."¹⁶

In a reformulation of sorts, they assert that "polarization appears to be a contingent outcome, arising not simply from economic circumstances but from a wider array of cultural, political, and social factors."¹⁷ They

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁷ Ibid.

note that the Depression appears to have had "a much more pronounced effect on political opinion and discourse" than the worsening economic conditions experienced during the 1970s."¹⁸ Trying out the non-Marxist theoretical framework presented in Charles Tilly's From Mobilization to Revolution they speculate that the relative stability of political attitudes in the 1970s resulted from an absence of collective action and mobilization around "class issues" such as redistribution and social welfare."¹⁹ They propose two possible explanations for this absence of mobilization: 1) The broad safety net of social services implemented since the 1930s may have reduced interest in collective action related to economic issues; 2) bureaucratization of unions may have reduced membership involvement and consequently lowered levels of popular mobilization."²⁰ Without collective action, there could be no attitude change, the authors assert, since most research into the impact of social change on attitudes shows that actions are more likely to shape attitudes than the opposite. "People do something first, then bring their attitudes into line with their behaviour."²¹

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 16.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 17.

²¹ Ibid., p. 17. The citation is from H. Triandis, Attitude and Attitude Change (New York: Wiley, 1972), 127.

Baer, Grabb and Johnston's position finds some support in more recent work by Pierce and Converse, who analyzed public opinion data collected before and after the May 1968 Paris demonstrations and argue that it shows that the protestors of 1968 gained confidence and a sense of political efficacy from the protest itself, even if they failed in most respects to achieve their goals.²² It does not address the question of how such protest is mobilized in the initial instance, though Baer, Grabb and Johnston seem to lean to the view that much onus rests with organizations and their leadership. Indeed, though the authors do not explore the subject in great detail, any comparison of the protest politics of the 1930s in Canada and the protest politics of the 1980s and 1990s points up a sharp distinction in protest organization strategy. While parties and movements in the former era depended heavily on foot soldiers, marshalling them into everything from kitchen table study groups to door-to-door canvassing to cross-country marches on Ottawa,²³ those in the latter era favored much less labor-intensive modes of political action:

²² Pierce, Roy and Philip E. Converse, "Attitudinal Sources of Protest Behavior in France: Differences Between Before and After Measurement," in Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 54, Fall 1990, No. 3, pp. 295-316.

²³ See works earlier cited, by Irving, Saywell and Gray, and Ivan Avakumovic's The Communist Party in Canada. A History (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975).

professional fundraising by contracted professionals (often using computer-generated mail-outs), and national media campaigns."⁴ The tendency for organizations to operate with fewer people, often with an overlap in leadership among protest groups,"⁵ must be attributed, in some part however, to the difficulty of recruiting activists. This brings us back to the analytical starting point of the present study - the genesis of protest from an initial instance of economic loss and what factors and the range of factors relevant to it.

Baer, Grabb and Johnston's argument that the social safety net may have reduced interest in collective action must be given serious consideration, since the hardship and personal humiliation of going on "relief" in 1930s, as recounted in the personal interviews presented by Irving,"⁶ for example, would seem, on most counts, to exceed that of going on welfare in the later period that they examine. By the 1990s, however, the growing role of charity, i.e., privately run food banks as a supplement to

⁴ Maude Barlow, Council of Canadians/Pro-Canada Network, interview, March 10, 1989. Also, see Rick Salutin, Waiting for Democracy, A Citizen's Journal (Markham, Ont.: Viking, 1989).

⁵ Barlow, March 10, 1989.

⁶ Irving, The Social Credit Movement in Alberta.

welfare," meant that the safety nets would be seen, at the very least, as having become "frayed."⁹

In focusing on the role of institutions, however, Baer, Grabb and Johnston tap into a vein of theory that has proven rich for other theorists, too, though in different ways. The authors focus on unions in particular and see their critical role as pushing people into mobilization, from which will flow attitude change (and presumably further, and more radical, collective action). This hypothesis, essentially the opposite of that held here, draws from various 19th and early 20th century theorists of consciousness and its role, including both Marx and Georges Sorel, rests on a complex set of assumptions about the relationship between consciousness and action that are not explicitly spelled out in the article at hand or tested by the authors. It could perhaps be tested by studying the case of some very active, highly participatory late twentieth century unions or possibly certain very active locals, (Canadian Auto Workers' locals in Windsor and Oshawa, for example) and comparing them to highly bureaucratized unions, to see if the workers show the

⁹ See Jillian Oderkirk, "Food Banks," Canadian Social Trends, Spring 1992: 6-13.

¹⁰ Francois Vaillancourt, economist, University of Montreal, interview, 23 April 1992.

expected divergence in political attitudes. However, regardless of whether one accepts the assumption that attitudes follow action or vice versa, the bureaucratization of institutions is a factor that has been identified by others as well and one that is worth considering.

More specifically, other theorists have looked, from a broader perspective, at a larger range of institutions and groups, and seen them serving other purposes: establishing "group bonds" that may be a precondition of collective action" providing practice in political participation. An early example of the latter is Seymour Martin Lipset's classic analysis of the genesis of the CCF.¹⁰⁰ Lipset argued that "agrarian socialism" as he categorized it, took root in Saskatchewan because of the fertile ground provided by already existing institutions. He saw the contribution these institutions made as the schooling they provided in radical democratic practice, a somewhat more mundane education-and-training version of the personally transformative role that Baer, Grabb, and Johnston attribute to collective action.

⁹⁹ Robert J. Brym, "Social Movements and Third Parties," in Models and Myths in Canadian Sociology, S. D. Berkowitz, ed. (Toronto: Butterworth, 1984).

¹⁰⁰ S.M. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

John Richards accounts for the rise of certain populist movements in the first half of the century at least partly by the co-op movement but his link is more to the beliefs these prairie institutions embodied. Richards, who divides populist movements into left and right variants, argues that left populist political organizations typically emerged as an extension of co-operative activity because of the left populist belief in co-operation as the morally just way to organize economic and political activity.¹⁰¹

There would seem to be ample grounds for considering the role of institutions in supporting belief systems, and for seeking at least part of the explanation for the decline in belief systems in the decline in the institutions that support them. This approach to understanding change in political culture will be revisited in Chapter 5.

Johnston: "Insecurity" and "Incoherence"

Richard Johnston seeks to explain the absence of protest mobilization in response to economic insecurity in the 1980s in terms of the "incoherence" of Canadian public opinion, as well as in terms of the lack of effective opposition leadership (or perhaps more accurately the lack of circumstances that would allow effective political

¹⁰¹ Richards, "Populism and the West," pp. 65-83.

leadership to mobilize opinion -- Johnston's conclusions are not very clearly stated here).

Drawing on the theories of Philip Converse, C.H. Achen, R. Erikson and J. Zaller, Johnston first looks at the difficulties inherent in trying to use attitude surveys to tap belief systems, as well as the question, first raised by Converse's work, of whether the apparent pervasiveness of political apathy and "non-attitudes" should not caution analysts from ever trying to impute systems of belief to mass publics.¹⁰² Johnston's own finding in regard to Canadians in the late 1970s and early 1980s: "Canadians' fears do not lead to a single coherent package of policy choices, at least not in response to any survey item that I could find."¹⁰³ Johnston notes, for example, that while Decima data indicate that a strong majority of Canadians expect that automation will bring more unemployment, most respondents favour government investment in high technology industry. In doing so, he speculates, these respondents may be acting on their sense of the positive effects of

¹⁰² Richard Johnston, Public Opinion and Public Policy in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), pp. 218-219. This study was published by the University of Toronto Press in co-operation with the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada and the Canadian Publishing Centre, Supply and Services Canada.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 186.

automation on product prices and quality and on the economy as a whole, and not on their fears for the quality and quantity of work. On the other hand, respondents may be reacting only to the glamour of high-technology industry.¹⁰⁴

Johnston notes, too, that the Decima data indicate a general antipathy to multinationals¹⁰⁵ and 1977 Quality of Life data shows a "stunning majority" of Canadians to feel large corporations have too much power. About 40 times as many respondents think large corporations have too much power as think that they have too little.¹⁰⁶ (To put this in context, about ten times as many people think that unions have too much power as think they have too little; for the federal government, the comparable ratio is approximately five to one).¹⁰⁷ Yet, at the same time, Canadians "seem reconciled" to the existing level of government ownership in the economy and hold unions in low esteem.¹⁰⁸ Other explanations offered by Johnston for the absence of strong protest against economic insecurity are that citizens may reason about macroeconomic policy somewhat independently of

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 235n.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 171.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 195.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., pp. 195, 198.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 145.

their personal circumstances.¹⁰⁹

Johnston also subtly implies that politicians may have blundered in their attempts to mobilize reaction to economic adversity. "Politicians can blunder in their attempts to shape opinion or to mobilize it. . . . Politicians may seek to turn to advantage economic adversity or an adventitious string of mass murders, for example, but they cannot always, or even usually, call up such external forces at will."¹¹⁰

In a way, Johnston's "incoherence" argument comes close to the argument to be put forward here. Something is missing. The emphasis here, however, will be on defining specifically what is missing, i.e., a coherent notion of distributive justice of a sort that can give losers a ground for claim.

Conclusions

Although literature that seeks to identify the critical variables between economic loss and manifestation

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 224. This is the finding of American researchers Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, in "Economic Discontent and Political Behaviour: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23, No. 3 (August 1979), pp. 495-527.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 227.

of protest (at least those that social scientists can measure), is quite sparse -- surprisingly sparse considering the persistence and widening scope of economic loss in the 1990s, such literature as does exist nevertheless helps lay the groundwork for the present study.

First, it sets out the reasons why one would look for protest to occur in Canada in the 1980s and 1990s as it did in the 1930s, even in view of the fact that the hardship caused by economic loss in the 1980s and 1990s is less dramatic, in absolute terms, than that experienced by economic losers in the 1930s. Essentially, it proceeds from the position that loss of both real and expected economic benefits including and perhaps most notably job security, was dramatic in relative terms when compared to the three decades of growth that followed the Second World War (a period of time that would be a ready reference point for most of those experiencing loss, especially the big and influential generation of baby boomers).

Secondly, existing literature points to some of the theoretical difficulties, such as determining how best to conceptualize and then operationalize the key variables, loss and protest. Loss can include a wide range of phenomena, from inflation to unemployment to general insecurity, actual loss and anticipated loss. More

problematic still is protest, since one must decide what kind, frequency, and levels are significant. Authors reviewed have used subjective variables, in some cases phenomena that would be expected to occur along the way to protest, e.g., willingness to resort to radical means of change, ideological divergence (of "workers" from "others").

The fact that theorists have used different independent and dependent variables (as well as different theoretical premises) makes it difficult to use their various premises and findings to build a comprehensive multi-variate model of the relationship between loss and protest. Nevertheless, the theory does provide a starting point. It suggests the elements of a general theory of "protest/non-protest" might include: 1) degree of social solidarity (presence/absence, strength/weakness of pre-existing group bonds); 2) number of cross-cutting cleavages (political causes that compete with protest of economic loss); 3) extent of professionalization and/or bureaucratization of opposition culture; 4) strength or weakness of sense of political efficacy; 5) attitudinal "coherence", i.e., the degree to which one finds a collective point of view, or at least a clear collective point of view on economic issues such as the distribution of wealth.

Outline of Chapters Two to Six

Chapter Two: Economic Loss and Political Protest, 1900 to 1939.

Chapter Two will discuss some of the ways that protest manifest itself earlier in the century, with emphasis on the 1930s. It will look at the role of notion of distributive justice as a key variable in the mobilization of significant numbers of people in political protest activities in response to the Depression. In looking at historical protest, it will examine rhetoric used by political movements and parties, particularly the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation and the Alberta Social Credit Party. Further, it will discuss the manner in which the populist notion of distributive justice was embodied in and supported and promoted by the frontier economy, scriptural teachings, the education system, popular literature of the day, and rural institutions such as the co-op movement.

Chapter Three: Economic Loss in the 1980s and 1990s

Chapter Three will examine economic loss in Canada in the post-1974 period. It will look at a number of economic indicators, but primarily those that can provide some sort of insight into the nature and extent of economic loss as Canadians actually experienced it. It will identify the groups that experienced loss most acutely. It will

discuss the prominence, in public debate, of the market liberal view that those experiencing economic loss must make personal adjustment of some kind, that they must make such adjustment repeatedly, as often as the changes wrought by economic "restructuring" and "transition" may require, and that they should develop "flexibility" in order to do so to best advantage. The degree to which pockets of residual populism remained (regions, rural areas, generational cohorts, occupational groups) during this period will also be examined in this chapter.

Chapter Four: Reaction to Economic Loss in the 1980s and 1990s

Chapter Four will look at various kinds of political responses to loss in the 1980s and 1990s. Noting that there has not been significant protest mobilization even though loss has been significant, it will examine various unsuccessful attempts by parties and movements to mobilize those experiencing loss, particularly attempts to articulate a justification for protest that could speak to a wide range of those adversely affected by economic trends such as changing world market conditions, automation and the harsher "corporate culture" of the 1990s.

More specifically, this chapter will look at attempts by the federal New Democratic party, by groups such as the Pro-Canada Network and the Episcopal Commission for

Social Affairs of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, and by several large unions to mobilize support for a new social vision that would more evenly distribute the impact of various changes in the market economy. The analysis will focus on the general failure of such attempts to mobilize significant support. It will be argued that these failures can to some extent be accounted for by the absence, weakness, or inappropriateness of an explicit or implicit notion of distributive justice.

Chapter Four will also look at three "atypical cases" of successful mobilization of protest in response to loss in this period, cases noteworthy not because of the success (or limited success) achieved, but because such success attests, to some extent, to the fact that they were able to engender significant participation. These cases are: 1) the 1985 seniors' protest against the proposed partial de-indexation of the old-age pension; 2) the Reform Party, from its inception as a new party with a purportedly populist platform to its election of 52 members of the House of Commons in 1993; 3) the Confederation of Regions Party, specifically its attainment of official opposition status in the New Brunswick Legislature. It will be argued that there was significant protest mobilization in these cases because leaders expressed notions of distributive justice which provided those affected by loss with a clear ground for

claim on which they could base their appeal for redress.

Chapter Five: The Decline of a Ground of Claim

Chapter Five will look at theories that attempt to explain change in political culture. It will seek to account for the erosion of populist egalitarian values and, more specifically, the populist notion of distributive justice in Canada in the latter part of the 20th century. It will review the social and economic conditions that supported populism. It will then examine the social and economic conditions that eroded it. It will look at two ideological currents that hastened the decline of the populist notion of distributive justice: The Social Gospel, and Sixties youth protest. It will be argued that, although both were, ironically, considered progressive in their time, each nevertheless contained ideas that undermined some of the key elements of populism's ground of entitlement.

Chapter Six: Contribution of Findings to Theory of Social Action

Chapter Six will consider the findings of previous chapters in terms of the contribution they might make to a general theory of social action. It will also very briefly consider the extent to which such a theory, in its current state, might be applied beyond Canada's borders, and whether

it can help predict whether significant protest of economic loss will occur in Canada before the end of the century and, if so, where and when it is most likely to occur. Chapter Six will also sets out directions for further research, specifying the kinds of public opinion data that might ultimately allow more precision in the measurement of the key variables discussed here.

CHAPTER TWO

ECONOMIC LOSS AND POLITICAL PROTEST, 1900 TO 1939

Economic Loss in the Early 20th Century

Between the 1890s and the beginning of the Second World War, Canada was hit by several waves of economic loss, with the West suffering most each time. In the early part of this period, farmers found themselves overwhelmed by heavy debts and inequitable commercial arrangements.¹ Later, during the Depression of the 1930s, misery was widespread, reaching into the city as well.² Blame fell

¹ W. L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950). Hardships of western farmers, including debts, dependence on banks, railways, and commercial middlemen are summarized on pp. 6-7. Most of the products of western agriculture were sold at prices determined by the world market, while the bulk of his purchases were made at prices sheltered from competition by the national parties, Morton notes. As Richards and Pratt sum up the farmers' predicament, he dealt in markets which initially guaranteed the bulk of economic rents would accrue to financial and corporate interests, i.e., to banks via high interest rates for mortgages and other credit, to railroads via monopoly freight rates, to Eastern manufacturing trusts selling farm equipment. See John Richard and Larry Pratt, Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979), p. 20.

² John Irving sets the scene for the growth of the Social Credit movement by noting that the farmers of Alberta had experienced every possible agricultural ordeal, they had been made the playthings of the high tariff manipulators, they had built up markets in the United States only to have them ruthlessly cut off; they had suffered drought and every agricultural pestilence from root-rot to grasshoppers they had seen prices drop to such incredibly low levels that sometimes it did not pay to haul their produce to market, they couldn't keep up the payments on their heavily mortgaged farms. In the cities and towns and villages unemployment was general, thousands were living on relief, still other thousands came close to lack adequate food, clothing and shelter (Irving, p. 4). McNaught writes of the Thirties as a "harvest time of political revolt" Thirty-eight cents a bushel for wheat, loss of land, semi-

upon phenomena as diverse as the ravages of drought and the alleged manipulation of the money system by financial institutions. These various eras of economic loss and insecurity had a common theme: large numbers of people, both farmers and workers in the cities, hit by forces they could not fully understand or control. In the 1930s, the distress was accentuated by the pattern of distribution of loss. As Creighton has noted, the depression lay over the entire country, but its weight was very unevenly distributed.³ Those who suffered most were farmers, fishermen, lumbermen, the price of whose products were left unprotected, and employees in industrial centres, laid off by the hundreds of thousands as employers struggled to reduce output rather than lower prices.⁴ While the loss was serious enough in Ontario and Quebec, it was catastrophic in Saskatchewan.⁵ Interestingly, many members of the Canadian middle class were spared. They didn't suffer the consequences of bank 2

starvation on the prairies, boys on the freight trains, soup kitchens in the cities -- all these injected into old problems a new urgency. See Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics, A Biography of J.S. Woodsworth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), p. 232.

³ Donald Creighton, Dominion of the North, New Edition (Toronto: Macmillan, 1957), p. 487.

⁴ Ibid., p. 487.

⁵ Ibid., p. 488.

failures,⁶ as did the American middle class, and some of those who were able to hold on to a steady job of some kind -- and who were free of heavy debts -- actually experienced some advantages as the cost of living dropped.⁷ Unionized workers (in 1929, a small minority of extractive, manufacturing and service workers) earned relatively higher incomes during the early 1930s than they had before -- provided that they kept their jobs.⁸

The root problems, in many cases, stretched beyond Canada's border and were arguably beyond the control of any government, federal or provincial. They were mirrored, frequently, by developments in the United States. Yet, as Creighton perceived it, the distress sharply highlighted a weakness in the Canadian federal system which had been growing since the First World War: The federal government

⁶ Michiel Horn, "People are Hurting Everywhere - Or Are They?", in Michiel Horn, ed., The Dirty Thirties, (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1972), p. 91.

⁷ James Gray recalls: "Many of those who had jobs during the depression were better off than they had been before the depression. Their food costs were down, their rent was down, the prices of everything they bought was down. Their real standard of living, ergo, must have risen. Many other, however, were still paying debts incurred in 1929 and 1930. Those who in 1929 and 1930 had bought cars and electric stoves and fur coats and radios on the instalment plan -- and who didn't? -- were in desperate straits after their salaries were cut ten and even twenty per cent." From The Winter Years (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1966), p. 35.

⁸ Horn, p. 89, summarizing observations by Paul Phillips in The Dirty Thirties.

had the greater tax and credit power, yet had not increased its responsibilities; the provinces, with weaker resources, had accepted commitments and responsibilities which "now threatened to become unbearable."

Protest in Response to Loss

Historians have used four basic kinds of indicators to illustrate the significance of protest provoked by economic loss in the 1930s: 1) the formation or election to office of reformist parties, or the shift to a reformist platform by traditional parties (Creighton, Scott,¹⁰ McNaught¹¹, Saywell¹²); 2) the prominence in Canadian political life of organizations of the extreme left, such as the Communist Party of Canada (Thompson¹³, Scott¹⁴); 3) the reaction of incumbent governments to

⁹ Creighton, p. 488.

¹⁰ F.R. Scott, "The Nineteen Thirties in the United States and Canada," in The Great Depression, Essays and Memoirs from Canada and the United States (Vancouver: Copp Clark, 1969), p. 171.

¹¹ Kenneth McNaught, The Penguin History of Canada (London: Penguin, 1988), pp. 248-250.

¹² John T. Saywell, 'Just Call Me Mitch': The Life of Mitchell F. Hepburn (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991).

¹³ John Herd Thompson with Allen Seager, Canada 1922-1939, Decades of Discord (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985), p. 222-30.

¹⁴ Scott, p. 171.

rising protest (McNaught¹⁵); 4) reports of demonstrations (especially Saywell¹⁶). The present study explicitly excludes voting from the definition of political protest. However, the election of reformist parties in the 1930s is nevertheless taken here as evidence that large numbers of people have been mobilized to carry out the necessary work to put a new party into the running (a fact supported by accounts such as John Irving's Social Credit in Alberta).

Looking at events in more detail, as Creighton viewed them, "ground-swell" of political earthquakes began in 1930 and spread over the next half-dozen years.¹⁷ In 1930, six of the nine provinces were controlled by the Conservatives; between 1933 and 1936 these "traditional" administrations were buried under a series of political "landslides" of new administrations. Though some bore the old party names, all zealously took up programmes of social betterment ranging from mild reformism to "a rather nebulous radicalism."¹⁸ These and other phenomena are well documented: The founding of the Co-operative Commonwealth

¹⁵ McNaught, "The 1930s," in J.M.S. Careless and R. Craig Brown, eds., The Canadians 1867-1967 (Toronto: Macmillan, n.d.), pp. 248-49.

¹⁶ Saywell, *passim*.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 489.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 494.

Federation in 1933, the 1934 victory of Mitch Hepburn's reformist Ontario Liberal Party, the founding and 1935 provincial victory of the Alberta Social Credit Party, and the 1936 victory of the Union Nationale in Quebec, the fielding of 174 candidates by H. H. Stevens' Reconstruction Party in the federal election of 1935. If protest appeared less dramatic in the Maritimes, it was perhaps because these small provinces had been hit by economic loss somewhat earlier, between 1919 and 1922, specifically through changes to national transportation policy that led to plant closures and relocations to central Canada,¹⁹ as well as changes in the terms of trade and the erection of tariff barriers in major external markets.²⁰ The resultant "Maritime Rights" movement arose in the 1920s, only to be later defused by Prime Minister Mackenzie King, in part by a royal commission.²¹

In many parts of the country, there were demonstrations, marches and violence in the streets, even in suburban Toronto where strikers fought with police and

¹⁹ James Bickerton, "Creating Atlantic Canada," in Alain-G. Gagnon and James D. Bickerton, eds., Canadian Politics, An Introduction to the Discipline (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 1990), p. 133.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

protestors occupied relief offices.²² Political events of all kinds drew large crowds. Graham Spry, recalling the Depression from the perspective of 1969 (a politically lively year by today's standards), summed it up this way:

These were vivid, lively days of political argument and action. At the height of the depression, almost any political meeting in Toronto was assured a capacity audience. Two or three picnics organized by the C.C.F. on the outskirts of Toronto drew more than 50,000 people. May Day parades organized by the Communists outdrew the Orangemen celebration of July 12. In West Toronto ridings like Parkdale, church halls were normally required as respectable meeting places, but east of the Don River, street corners were not thought to be disreputable.²³

Theorists analyzing protest in the earlier part of the century have looked at a broad range of explanatory factors. Some have looked at the charisma and organizational skills of the political leaders who emerged during the period,²⁴ and the ability of some parties, such as Social Credit, to "exploit the preferred group tendencies connected with economics and politics,"²⁵ and others at the

²² John T. Saywell, 'Just Call Me Mitch': The Life of Mitchell F. Hepburn (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), pp. 265-6.

²³ Graham Spry, "Politicking in Toronto: The Account of a C.C.F. Stalwart," in Michael Horn, ed., The Dirty Thirties.

²⁴ For example, John Irving's The Social Credit Movement in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959).

²⁵ Irving, p. 335.

economic relationship of the West to Central Canada²⁶.

As a general rule, belief systems have received more attention in the literature that looks at protest during the first half of the century than in the literature that looks at quiescence in the 1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, the specific aspect of notion of distributive justice has not been sufficiently explored and analyzed. Moreover, an examination of the events and circumstances of the Depression, particularly the beliefs about distributive justice invoked in the campaign rhetoric of parties that were successful in mobilizing protest, provides considerable support for according it some importance.

Common Features of Protest Ideologies

Many analysts of Canadian protest politics in the early years of the 20th century have been primarily interested in differentiating the various streams of radical thought. They have defined and classified them, grouping movements and parties together according to their tendencies to be progressive or reactionary, collectivist or individualistic, participatory or hierarchal or American or

²⁶ C. B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953).

British in their antecedents.²⁷ Other analysts have looked at the convergence of the various streams of radical thought as immigrants from different origins and backgrounds arrived in the new land and identified common enemies. For example, W. L. Morton, looking at radicalism up to the early 1920s, focuses on how various populist traditions met and reinforced one another on the Canadian prairies in the early years of the 20th century.²⁸

In contrast to most previous analyses, it is the common elements of the various streams that will be of interest here. Specifically, one finds that a common notion of entitlement was invoked by protest movements and parties. It had three parts: first, that natural resources are a

²⁷ See John Richards and C. B. Macpherson, in works cited above, for example. See also Nelson Wiseman, "The Pattern of Prairie Politics," Queen's Quarterly, 88:2, Summer 1981, 298-315; and David Laycock, Populism and Democratic Thought in the Canadian Prairies, 1910 to 1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).

²⁸ W. L. Morton, p. 14-15. writes: "The radical democracy of the old Ontario Grits experienced a new birth on a frontier less constricted and less subject to conservative influence than that of early Ontario. From the mid-western and trans-Mississippi states came thousands of American farmers, bearing fresh memories of the Populist battles against monopoly and the money power. From Great Britain came trade unionists and Labour Party men. In their new environment these men found their old enemies, protection, privilege, monopoly and high finance. The ideas and prejudices they brought to the West were kept alive by the rise of the Labour Party in Great Britain, the development of the Progressive movement in the United States, and the agitation of the farmers' movements itself.

collective good owned by the "people";²⁹ second, that individuals earn their entitlement to a share by doing honest toil³⁰ (originally manual work, though by the 1930s the definition had been expanded); and third, that breadwinners (essentially, mature, married males) who do honest work are worthy of an equitable share of society's wealth -- a "square deal".³¹ An individualistic perspective, it nevertheless had a communitarian element in that it placed some obligation on the community to look after the needy through the ministrations of churches, charities, fraternal organizations and neighbours. Implied in the general notions of honest toil and square deal was a condemnation of excessive wealth. It was asserted that such wealth could not, on purely logical grounds, be earned honestly, especially when honest work meant work that a man did with his two hands and, as the frontier closed and the

²⁹ See William Irvine, The Farmers in Politics (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), p. 107.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 26.

³¹ For example, W. L. Morton argues that the essential problem confronting the farmers who flocked to the federal and provincial farmers' parties of the 1920s and 1930s was the fact that their faith in long hours and sweat was being challenged. They were going to have to be made over into managers, businessmen, and skilled technicians. In essence, honesty and effort as basic virtues were being displaced by managerial, business and technical skills. See Morton, pp. 292-3. In a similar vein, John Irving, writing about the setting in which the Alberta Social Credit Party took root, notes that in a society that had emphasized so strongly that individual effort was the key to success and respectability, many people now appeared as hopeless failures and were obsessed with feelings of guilt. See Irving, p. 170.

opportunities for Lockean appropriation of unclaimed resources diminished, excessive wealth would come to be seen as taking an unfair share and thereby denying others their due.

Historical Roots, International Links

Works dealing with populist phenomena around the world, including those in the previous century, present a number of cases of movements in which honest work is regarded as key to entitlement to an equitable share of wealth.³² Peter Wiles traces such ideas back to the Levellers, the Diggers, and the Chartists.³³ Links to the 19th century Luddites can be easily made as well.³⁴ Sometimes, the emphasis is on the virtues of the agrarian life, a romanticization of farming similar to that of Rousseau, or Sorel, or even Lionel Groulx.³⁵ Such romanticism is actually less evident in the rhetoric of prairie populism, possibly because the harshness of prairie farm life was not conducive to such lyrical fantasies.

³² A standard work is Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner's Populism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969).

³³ Peter Wiles, "A Syndrome, not a Doctrine: Some Elementary Theses on Populism," pp. 166-79, in Ionescu and Gellner, p. 170 and 178.

³⁴ See, for example, Malcolm I. Thomis, The Luddites, Machine-Breaking in Regency England (Newton Abbot, Devon, Great Britain: David & Charles, 1970).

³⁵ The Narodniks, in particular.

W. L. Morton has observed striking similarities in the populist ideas and symbols of the Progressive movements (farmers' parties) on both sides of the U.S.-Canada border. Writing of the American Progressive Movement, which peaked between 1910 and 1912, he notes: "its influence was immediate and insistent on the growth of the reform movement in the Canadian West, and its precept and example, its vocabulary and even its name, came to characterize the ferment of political life in the western provinces."³⁶

In his classic analysis of the ideas of American populism, Richard Hofstadter describes its cosmos as divided between "the people" who worked for a living and the "vested interests" who did not.³⁷ The vested interests were seen as exploiting the people, not in the classical Marxist sense of control of the means of production and appropriation of surplus value but rather through their political privileges and power to control the monetary system and to use it to their advantage.

The view that, in a just system, work should be rewarded equitably was also prevalent in American populism.

³⁶ Morton, pp. 30-31

³⁷ Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 17.

If America was to be a land of opportunity, it had not only to provide the chance to work but also the rightful reward of work: "a fair degree of prosperity."³⁸

The political rhetoric of "honest work" as a basis for entitlement often took the form of an attack on "plutocracy", a term commonly used on both sides of the Canada-United States border from the turn of the century up until the Second World War.³⁹ The attack on plutocracy was fought with a new political weapon: social and economic statistics. Such statistics were disseminated through the popular and partisan press in both Canada and the United States. For example, an essay that appeared in *Grain Growers' Guide* in 1913 suggested that "forty-two men controlled one-third of the wealth of Canada."⁴⁰ A number of books of the era, such as Gustavus Myers's History of Canadian Wealth, published in 1914, purported to establish statistically that wealth was indeed controlled by a small

³⁸ Hicks, p. 404.

³⁹ See Anthony Mardiros, William Irvine: The Life of a Prairie Radical (Toronto: James Lorimar, 1979), p. 267. Mardiros notes that Irvine and Henry Wise Wood used the term "plutocratic classes" to describe those who exploited others but did not themselves produce. The term came into use by American populists in the 1890s. See Peter H. Argersinger, Populism and Politics (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1974), pp. 149, 308.

⁴⁰ Norman Penner, The Canadian Left: A Critical Analysis (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1977), p. 173.

number of wealthy men. It argued that the rapid concentration of wealth in Canada had already reached the point where less than fifty men controlled one third of Canada's material wealth as expressed in railways, banks, factories, mines and other properties and resources.⁴¹ In 1920, William Irvine informed readers of his influential The Farmers in Politics that "in 1901 there were in Canada 46,154 families living in single rooms and in 1910 the number of families living in single rooms had increased to 80,702" and, moreover, "in the three prairie provinces there are 153,000,000 acres of tillable land, of which 16,000,000 acres only are cultivated, while 100,000,000 acres are held by speculators."⁴² This literature followed in the wake of a similar wave of literature in the United States. For example, in 1892, the New York Tribune, inspired by growing popular criticism of the wealthy, published a list of 4,047 reputed millionaires, and in 1893 a statistician of the United States Census Bureau published a study of the concentration of wealth in which it was estimated that 9 per cent of the families of the nation owned 71 per cent of the wealth.⁴³

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 173.

⁴² Irvine, The Farmers in Politics, pp. 108-109.

⁴³ In Hofstadter, p. 121. Hofstadter's source is Sidney Ratner, American Taxation (New York, 1942), pp. 136, 275. Hofstadter notes that the Tribune's list was compiled chiefly to prove to the critics of the tariff that an overwhelming majority of the great fortunes had been made in

By the 1930s, Canadians had access to statistics published by the federal government, and data collected by H.H. Stevens's Commission on Price Spreads. Avakumovic has noted that these data revealed a highly uneven distribution of national income. It drew attention to the low salaries of many workers, and the extent to which many Canadians suffered from underconsumption.⁴⁴

Wealth as a Collective Good

As noted, a key element of the populist egalitarian notion of distributive justice invoked in early 20th century protest ideologies was the idea that the natural resources of a nation belong to the people, not a small group of financiers or commercial adventurers. United Farmers of Alberta theorists Henry Wise Wood and William Irvine argued that capitalism had failed to protect resources from exploitation by the few. "It is no secret that the heritage of millions of Canadian children yet unborn has been given away to individuals, railroads, and land companies."⁴⁵ Such protection required a new political order: delegate democracy linking a pluralism of

businesses that were not beneficiaries of tariff protection. The alarm of the period over the concentration of wealth led to the first American studies of wealth and income.

⁴⁴ Ivan Avakumovic, Socialism in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978), p. 72.

⁴⁵ Irvine, The Farmers in Politics, p. 107.

organized economic group interests to a co-operative, group government.⁴⁶ As Laycock observes, Irvine spoke plainly about eliminating the capitalist basis of economic and social life.⁴⁷ In the 1935 Alberta election campaign, Social Credit leader William Aberhart effectively built on this base, even though he did not attack capitalism directly. He borrowed and adapted various parts of Major C. H. Douglas' Social Credit doctrine, developing the concept of natural resources as a "cultural heritage" for the wealth that was rightfully everyone's.

John Irving notes that the basic idea of the Social Credit dividend was that all citizens of a country own its natural resources and are entitled to a share. Important to the concept of the dividend was that it should be a matter of entitlement, not charity. It was to be "presented without any eleemosynary taint" because it was the people's right, their "cultural heritage."⁴⁸

Laycock underlines the egalitarianism inherent in the notion of cultural heritage. Aberhart, he notes, used the concept as meaning wealth on which all had equal

⁴⁶ Laycock, p. 278.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 279.

⁴⁸ Irving, p. 168.

claim."⁴⁹ In a speech to the Canadian Club in Toronto, just after gaining office in 1935, Aberhart explained it this way:

. . . the basis of cultural heritage is that the wealth of any province belongs to the citizens of that province . . . The method by which this cultural heritage will be made operative is a system of dividends . . . to provide . . . only the bare necessities of food, clothing and shelter -- no luxuries. Citizens will be asked to co-operate. If they cannot find work nothing will be said. If they can find work they will have to help out.⁵⁰

Macpherson makes the point that cultural heritage, as used by Aberhart, meant not the actual wealth of the province but, rather the potential productivity of Alberta's resources.⁵¹

For the CCF, notions of collective wealth were easily found and, in fact, inescapable, in the vast body of socialist literature from which the movement drew. The Regina Manifesto, not surprisingly, called for "a planned socialized economy in which our natural resources and the principal means of production and distribution are owned,

⁴⁹ Laycock, p. 262.

⁵⁰ William Aberhart, "Social Credit," speech to the Canadian Club, Toronto, 13 September 1935, Proceedings of the Canadian club (Toronto, 1935), pp. 47-59, in David R. Elliott, ed., Aberhart: Outpourings and Replies (Calgary: Historical Society of Alberta, 1991), pp. 153-4.

⁵¹ Macpherson, p. 149.

controlled and operated by the people."⁵²

"Honest Toil" as a Basis of Entitlement

While notions such as cultural heritage implied that "the people" had an automatic entitlement to society's wealth, there was nevertheless an "honest work" qualification that had to be met, even if it just be by virtue of willingness to work, if work was not available (as was frequently the case in the periods of economic loss under consideration here). The notion of entitlement to wealth based on work, or willingness to work, meant that the world was essentially divided into two opposing forces, locked in a rather Manichean good-and-evil struggle: on one side, those who did "honest work," on the other, those who did not work, or whose work was in some way dishonest. The various elaborations on this picture were heavy with Biblical imagery, but they also drew from the classics, using references which would have been familiar to those schooled in a system that still taught Latin. For example, there is abundant reference to the "plutocratic" classes as a general umbrella category embracing both the "parasitic" classes who did not work and the "exploitive classes" whose "work" took the form of manipulative activities aimed at cheating others out of their just reward. The parasitic

⁵² From Canadian Political Party Platforms, 1867-1968, compiled by D. Owen Carrigan (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1968), p. 124.

classes clearly included "middlemen" of all kinds.⁵³ The notion of plutocracy in Plato's original sense of rule by the rich was not always explicitly spelled out in Canadian protest rhetoric. However, analysts such as Morton, Akumovic and Penner suggest it meant one or both of two things: 1) that the rich were ruling by virtue of their control over the old-line parties,⁵⁴ or 2) that the rich were ruling through their control of vast globe-spanning industrial conglomerates⁵⁵ (linked to international finance by Major Douglas, who also added an anti-semitic dimension to the conspiracy theory).⁵⁶ The two bad classes set against those who either did honest work or wished to do it were singled out by William Irvine in his 1922 maiden speech in Parliament, a call for elimination of the exploitive and the parasitic classes.⁵⁷

⁵³ See The Farmers' Platform, as drafted by the Canadian Council of Agriculture, 29 November 1918, and accepted by the member organizations, 1919, and brought up to date in 1921. Under **Land Settlement**, Point 8 called for "Extension of co-operative agencies in agriculture to cover the whole field of marketing, including arrangements with consumers' societies for the supplying of foodstuffs at the lowest rates and with the minimum of middleman handling." From Laycock, p. 304.

⁵⁴ W. L. Morton, p. 117, and Akumovic, p. 72..

⁵⁵ Penner, p. 197.

⁵⁶ C. H. Douglas, Social Credit (Vancouver: Institute of Economic Democracy, 1979), p. 160.

⁵⁷ Mardiros, p. 147.

Honest hardworking citizens were considered to be in the majority, and often styled as "the people," which is, as Laycock observes, yet another Biblical image⁵⁸.

Plutocrats were small in number. Their precise number was often cited, though it changed from time to time, for example, from William Irvine's "twenty-three Money Kings"⁵⁹ to the Fifty Big Shots referred to in both Social Credit⁶⁰ and CCF⁶¹ literature.

Ironically, the original Social Credit doctrine of C. H. Douglas stressed that man should not have to work hard any more. "The moral theory that mankind is not entitled to material plenty except as a reward for onerous work is so widely held that men have not yet been emboldened to demand the realization of potential plenty with less work," Douglas wrote.⁶² But, as Macpherson observes, Aberhart's

⁵⁸ Laycock, p. 205.

⁵⁹ Irvine, The Farmers in Politics, p. 202.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 335.

⁶¹ The Saskatchewan CCF Research Bureau in 1934, in a booklet entitled "Who Owns Canada?", claimed: "One hundred great corporations dominate Canadian industry! Fifty Canadian 'big shots' hold within their hands the fate of these great corporations and many more, and through these companies they control the lives and fates, not only of ten million Canadians, but also of millions of Brazilians, Mexicans, Spaniards, and Frenchman." Cited by Penner, p. 197.

⁶² From C. H. Douglas, Social Credit (1924), Chapters 1 and 2. Cf. Credit-Power and Democracy, p. 11. Cited by Macpherson, p. 101.

puritanism was too strong to allow him to accept Douglas' denigration of work and praise of abundance not earned in the sweat of the brow. "It is doubtful if Aberhart ever grasped Douglas' denunciatory concept of the 'work fetish'."⁶³ Setting out his adaptation of Major Douglas' ideas in 1933, Aberhart seemed to suggest that, under Social Credit, Alberta citizens whose basic necessities were provided through their dividend would not necessarily be expected to undertake physical labour but could choose to develop their minds -- to be perpetual scholars -- if they so wished:

It is expected that all bona fide citizens of Alberta will seek employment or profitable occupation either as sought out or made by themselves or provided by the Government. Investigation and Invention, Mental Development, or any effort valuable to Society will be considered a profitable occupation.⁶⁴

In responding to a letter-writer's charge that "the Word" says that 'man must earn his bread by the sweat of his brow,' and 'if any man will not work, neither let him eat',⁶⁵ Aberhart wrote:

I . . . note that you have departed from the literal quotation of God's word. I question whether you can find any place where it is stated that "man must earn his bread by the sweat of his brow," or "if any man will not work, neither let him eat." We are living in

⁶³ Macpherson, p. 145.

⁶⁴ William Aberhart, The Douglas System of Economics (Calgary: n.p., 1933), Aberhart Papers, #70.239, PAA, in Elliott, ed., Aberhart: Outpourings and Replies, pp. 76-77.

a day of grace, not in the day of vengeance."

However, the Social Credit Manual issued by the party as the 1935 election campaign got into full swing, seemed to imply that one might be compelled by the state to work "when opportunity called for it." From "Questions and Answers":

6. What would be done if a citizen would not co-operate or refused to work when opportunity called for it?

ANSWER.--Immediately after such conduct was called to the attention of the State Credit House Inspector, the offender would be warned that if he persisted in refusing work, his dividends would be cut off or temporarily suspended. Then, as there is no relief or dole, he would be compelled to work."

Since attempts to implement Social Credit doctrine were blocked by the courts, there is no way to know now how "when opportunity called for it" would have been interpreted or what sort of latitude would have been allowed to those who might have chosen "mental development" as their preferred type of work. Major Douglas' "Draft Social Credit Scheme for Scotland" includes a similar provision for suspending the dividends of anyone who refuses to "accept employment in whatever trade, business, or vocation he was classified in

" William Aberhart to Norman H. Camp, Chicago, 24 February 1937, cited in David R. Elliott, ed., Aberhart: Outpourings and Replies, p. 174.

" William Aberhart, Social Credit Manual (Calgary: n.p., 1935), Elliott Papers, from Elliott, ed., Aberhart: Outpourings and Replies, p. 133.

the last census, under conditions recognised as suitable to that employment" but it was to apply just for the first five years after initiation of Social Credit.⁶⁷ The plan for Scotland also included cutting public servants' hours back to four hours a day (and hiring additional staff to meet the "temporary" congestion of work).⁶⁸ Major Douglas' own early critique of the Aberhart administration faults it for following too closely the path of Roosevelt's New Deal in establishing employment, as opposed to economic "emancipation," as its major objective.

The essential point to notice . . . is that President Roosevelt and his advisers did not criticize the objectives of industrial civilization in the smallest degree. This assumes that you cannot have too much industrial effort so long as it does not produce unemployment, and that it is a sound and safe policy to set the whole of an immense population permanently to the task of remaking the physical face of the earth in sublime disregard of the consequences which have already ensued from this policy and the dangers which threaten its extension.⁶⁹

Early CCF rhetoric also used the concept of honest work as the linchpin of a theory of distributive justice that provided a foundation for protest. The CCF used "anti-plutocratic" language,⁷⁰ and emphasized the importance of

⁶⁷ Douglas, Social Credit, p. 211.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 210.

⁶⁹ C. H. Douglas, The Alberta Experiment, An Interim Survey (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1937), pp. 77-78.

⁷⁰ Laycock, p. 141.

work. J.S. Woodsworth, father of the CCF had, from his earliest days in protest politics, championed the cause of workers and castigated market liberalism for denying workers both the work and wealth due to them. In his first speech in Parliament, Woodsworth stressed the obligation of the state to provide work. "I am not thinking merely of the work test which is provided in connection with charitable institutions. I mean suitable work . . . Surely, in this country, with its small amount of development, there is work, productive in character, which can be undertaken by the state . . ."⁷¹ Allen Mills's most thorough and very helpful recent analysis of Woodsworth political thought, points out that he expressed a general notion of the state's obligation to provide work in his writings around the time of the Winnipeg General Strike. The state, he felt, must accept the duty to find a job for every breadwinner, at a living wage.⁷²

Equitable Reward: The Square Deal

"Honest toil" entitled one to a "square deal."⁷³

⁷¹ Cited in Toward Socialism, Edited by Edith Fowke (Toronto: Ontario Woodsworth Memorial Foundation, 1948), pp. 31-32.

⁷² Allen Mills, Fool for Christ. The Political Thought of J.S. Woodsworth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), p. 88.

⁷³ Laycock, p. 67.

The notion that honest work should produce roughly equitable rewards relied to some extent on the common view of honest work as manual work, even though all populist political movements attempted to widen the scope somewhat to allow it to include work with the brain.⁷⁴ A man working with two hands could only be expected to do so much, the feats of mythical characters like Paul Bunyan aside.

Though science was making headway into agriculture and urban professions were of increasing importance, the egalitarian notion of distributive justice still held that no man's contribution was so great as to merit unlimited reward. William Irvine, Laycock points out, proclaimed in The Farmers in Politics that Canadians living in economic oppression were finally recognizing the connection between obsessive money-making and immorality.⁷⁵

Plutocracy was the rule of the wealthy, a corruption of government. Group government was the remedy - it would allow governments to represent all of those who practised honest toil. The farmers' focus on the ability of the rich to unduly influence government, to manipulate it into ruling in the interest of the rich against the interest

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 144, cites the 1913 Manifesto of E. A. Partridge's No-Party League.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 121.

of the whole, clearly would have left little room for acceptance of the market liberal notion of society in which private greed could lead to public good.

Protest movement programs made clear that the state would be used if necessary, to ensure the equitable distribution of wealth. For example, making the case that Social Credit initially presented itself to voters as egalitarian, Laycock also points out that William Aberhart proposed limiting Albertans' income to a certain maximum. The Social Credit Manual contains the question: "Is it the intention under Social Credit to limit the income of the citizens to a certain maximum?" Appearing to contradict an earlier denial of redistributive plans, Aberhart replies: "Yes, it is, for no one should be allowed to have income that is greater than he himself can possibly enjoy, to the privation of his fellow citizens."⁷⁶ However, this vow does not appear to have been repeated often or greatly elaborated upon.

One problem for Social Credit was that experts of sorts were needed to implement the Social Credit Plan, inspired by the theories of Major Douglas but adapted to the Alberta situation. The contribution of such experts to the new social credit society might conceivably have been viewed

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 244.

2

PM-1 3½"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

as more significant than that of the average honest manual worker and therefore deserving of higher reward. The way around the problem, Laycock notes, was for the party leadership to imply that experts in the employ of the Social Credit state would be "benevolent experts consumed by the scientific challenge of realizing plenty or administrators of the cheap credit, dividends, or just prices ensuring popular enjoyment of this abundance."⁷⁷ They would, in other words, be content with modest salaries since they would have the intellectual and moral satisfactions that would come from dealing with the challenge of implementing Social Credit, somewhat in the manner that Plato hoped his philosopher king and guardians would work selflessly for the good of his ideal Republic.

Woodsworth's view that the lack of a living wage was the essence of exploitation allowed him to hold that farmers and shopkeepers⁷⁸ could be just as exploited as industrial workers, Mills points out.⁷⁹ The farmer is not a wage earner, Woodsworth wrote in 1918, "but, as the trek from country to city shows, he is not economically as well

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 262.

⁷⁸ Mills, citing Woodsworth, writing in 1918: "When a storekeeper can get only so much goods and at such a price and must sell only so much on a fixed margin, he is little better than a 'wage slave'," p. 75.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 74.

off as the wage earner."⁸⁰ Nominally, the farmer owns the tools of production; but in reality, he is not independent but at the mercy of mortgage companies, banks, manufacturers and railroads, with the costs of production and the prices of his produce fixed by forces over which he has no control.⁸¹

The Role of Institutions

The idea that honest work entitled one to an equitable share of the pie was strongly underpinned by Christian teachings. The reasoning drew from two Biblical principles: the nobility of the humblest vocations (Christ having been a carpenter who chose fishermen as disciples), and the various admonitions in the Bible against excessive wealth, regardless of how it had been accumulated⁸² a fact

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 74.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 75.

⁸² The New Testament abounds with Christ's warnings against excessive wealth, the most familiar being Matthew 19:24: "And again I say unto you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the Kingdom of God;" and Matthew 6:19,20: "Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal, But lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal." Granted, some of Christ's teachings, such as Matthew 25:14-30, the parable of the talents, might seem to encourage profit-making, though only if taken very literally. Interestingly, the parable of the talents was used on at least one occasion by Prime Minister R. B. Bennett to respond to an Alberta lawyer who wrote in anger about "excessive profit, excessive interest charges, etc.," arguing that "every move in the monetary, and

not lost on the parties that used it. The various farmers' parties, Alberta Social Credit and the CCF all tailored their rhetoric to strike familiar Biblical themes. The church-going nature of the prairie population was such that the "argument from Christian authority" appeared to be as compelling as any the CCF could marshal, Laycock notes.⁸³ The CCF program was presented as "the embodiment of Christian ethics in the economic, political and social life of the nation," . . . because the CCF aimed to create a society of freedom, equality and economic security, a vote for the CCF contributed to creating an environment in which each human soul may have a chance to be best that its potentialities will permit.⁸⁴

Aberhart's speeches were also mixed with "frequent references to Bible prophecy."⁸⁵ Irving observes that Social Credit "attempts to establish a claim on existing institutions by emphasizing its respectability and its

commercial world is as far removed from the philosophy of the Master, as can be imagined." Bennett wrote back: ". . . as I read Scripture, the Master, to Whose sayings you refer, realized that the man who used his talent and made it productive was entitled to do so, and the man who did nothing or in doing something did not succeed as did his more fortunate fellow, was entitled to his results as well." Letter dated March 29, 1932, in Horn, The Dirty Thirties, p. 405.

⁸³ Laycock, p. 196.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 195.

⁸⁵ Irving, p. 57.

essentially Christian character."⁸⁶ That Biblical images struck a chord with Albertans seems born out by Irving's interviews in which converts typically recall the Social Credit commitment to make good on the Biblical promise that the fruits of the earth are God's gift to man.⁸⁷

The use of Christian principles to underpin populist egalitarianism was strengthened not only by the church-going nature of the population but also by the fact that so many leaders -- Woodsworth, Aberhart, and later, Tommy Douglas, to name a few -- were clergy who had decided they preferred Social Gospel activism to the traditional role of guiding a congregation.

The notion of equality of reward, or at least upper limits on acquisition, was also inherent in the co-op movement, since a co-op, by its very nature, could not be taken over and monopolized by any one person. The influence of co-operatives on prairie radicalism has been documented by Lipset⁸⁸ and John Richards has observed that populism of the left "emerged as an extension of the co-operative

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 175.

⁸⁷ Ibid., citing a farmer, p. 239, and a nurse, p. 245.

⁸⁸ Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, passim.

activity."⁸⁹

Popular Literature

The role of the popular press, and the partisan press, have been mentioned earlier. They not only provided arguments but also, in the case, for example, of the Stevens Commission on Price Spreads, compelling statistics that seemed to back up the case against plutocracy.

But there was also support in popular literature. It re-inforced the Christian messages about immorality of excessive wealth and by logical extension, the idea that wealth should be distributed according to a threshold principle: essentially, that the wealth pie should be divided roughly equally among breadwinners who met the condition of willingness to do honest work. Wealth earned by honest work should be enough to provide for security; wealth beyond what was needed for personal and family security was excessive and could be seen to represent taking part of the fair share of others (unless all others were already financially secure, which was not likely to be the case). Susan Jackel, writing about the symbol of the house in prairie literature, notes how the first house would be humble and settlers would work toward something grander. But, in the literature of the day, the achievement of a fine

⁸⁹ Richards, p. 76.

home would be accompanied by suggestions that something had been lost along the way "that perhaps there was less idealism and less unreckoning hospitality in the brick house on the hill than there once had been in the sod shack in the hollow."⁹⁰ At least up until 1940, Jackel notes, novels contained the message that a moral wrong was committed when a settler demanded from the soil wealth and grandeur, in the form of extravagant housing, instead of a modest living for himself and his family. But wealth can be permissible if it is a means to security. Jackel finds the heroes of popular novelist R. J. C. Stead, for example, to be typically led "through the temptations of Mammon to the appreciation of the finer life which financial security permits."⁹¹ In the novels of Frederick Philip Grove, "the corrupting influence of wealth is an inescapable theme."⁹² Ralph Connor and Nellie McClung "pictured the spiritual poverty of the material life," and the death of the hero of Martha Ostenso's Wild Geese "could easily be interpreted as retribution for his perverse search for wealth and power."⁹³

⁹⁰ Susan Jackel, "The House on the Prairies," in Writers of the Prairies, ed. Donald G. Stephens (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press), p. 168.

⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 165-66.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

Populist Notions of Distributive Justice: How Widespread?

Chapter One has argued that economic loss has often produced protest in Canada. This chapter has drawn links between protest, mainly in the West, and populism, also examined largely on the basis of evidence in the West. If the evidence of populism in the West is somewhat more plentiful than in other areas, this may be primarily because scholars have sought it there as part of attempts to explain protest after the fact. When one limits one's perspective to what is relevant to the present study -- not the whole range of populist ideas, from radical democratic practices to co-operative ownership, but rather the narrower area of populism's core notion of distributive justice (key concepts of the honest-work square deal equation and the disdain for bigness, wealth and privilege) there is considerable evidence that this core notion was significant in other parts of the country, even though scholarly investigations have been less frequent and less systematic in these regions.

Some potentially useful sources that have not been examined in-depth here but which could be used in future work are "oral history",⁹⁴ and memoirs.⁹⁵ A

⁹⁴ Barry Broadfoot, Ten Lost Years 1929-39 (Markham, Ont.: PaperJacks, 1973). Broadfoot interviewed 600 men and women across Canada about their experiences in the Depression. Unfortunately, like John Irving, he allows his subjects to remain anonymous. In introducing Chapter 30

scholarly study that is of particular value is historian Joy Parr's The Gender of Breadwinners,⁶ which deals with the key concepts of populism's notion of distributive justice in the process of fulfilling its primary goal of distinguishing between men's and women's roles and self-perceptions in the workplace. The author uses a wide range of documents: records of firms, newspapers, tax records, paintings, photographs and government documents to understand the effects of gender identities upon women's and men's workplace experience and economic roles on family relationships. But the key symbols, breadwinner,⁷ honest work,⁸ the "square deal," (both as an expression in use⁹

"Rough Justice," the author refers to various alleged incidents of "justice meted out with an almost Biblical intensity," typified by the tale of a group of Maritimers who tarred and gravelled a village skinflint. He links such occurrences to "the populist philosophy that the big and powerful are stepping on the necks of the poor and that the big and the powerful are always favored by the government, the laws and the courts" (p. 338).

⁶ For example, Gray and Spry, quoted earlier in this chapter and others collected by Michiel Horn, The Dirty Thirties, cited earlier, and Victor Hoar, ed., The Great Depression, Essays and Memoirs from Canada and the United States (Vancouver: Copp Clark, 1969).

⁷ Joy Parr, The Gender of Breadwinners, Women, Men and Change in Two Industrial Towns, 1880-1950 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).

⁸ Ibid., p. 188. "Men's credibility in the community was not grounded in their maleness per se, not in their market allegiances alone, but rested as well in their demonstrated responsibility as family men."

⁹ Ibid., p. 140. On his death at the age of 92 in 1936, the obituary of Hanover, Ont., furniture factory founder Daniel Knechtel praises him as one whose nature

and as an ideal of equality¹⁰⁰) work as calling/vocation¹⁰¹ and their strong religious underpinnings¹⁰² are clearly identified.

The many data sources potentially available have not been fully investigated in the present study because populist notions of distributive justice in the 1930s, as an example of a strong ground of entitlement, are primarily of interest here as an analytical tool for understanding quiescence in the 1980s and 1990s and for looking to the probability that protest will occur at some future time and place. That is, the aim here is analysis of current events, rather than original contribution to the historical record of the 1930s.

Conclusions

Federal and provincial farmers' movements and

"compelled him to be 'up and doing' even in the quarter-century when he might easily have followed the quite general practice of men who 'rest on their oars' and are satisfied to clip coupons and lead a life of ease."

" Ibid., p. 148.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 141. Knechtel was "proud that his men lived in homes as fine as his own".

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 166.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 141. Work had "intrinsic merit" but that merit was that it was a way in which man could serve God. Knechtel was German Baptist; the town of Hanover also had many Lutheran families.

parties, the Alberta Social Credit Party and the CCF were able to turn the economic insecurity of the early part of the century into political mobilization in large part because they could draw on a deep tradition of shared values that deemed that those who did honest work, or were willing to do it, were entitled to a "square deal", an equitable share of society's wealth. These shared values competed strongly with more market-oriented liberalism in the first half of the 20th century, particularly, though not exclusively, in Western Canada. Of the various theoretical works that focus on this period, John Irving's The Social Credit Movement in Alberta comes closest to focusing on shared values concerning work and wealth. As noted earlier, he saw Social Credit succeeding because it exploited the "preferred group tendencies" regarding economics and politics, more specifically, the tendency to want to attack the banking and financial system. His analysis might have gone one level deeper, however, and looked at the value system that provided the context in which banks and financial institutions were identified as the enemy, not just because of the external control of these institutions but also because of their fundamental incompatibility with an "honest work" ground of entitlement.

CHAPTER THREE

ECONOMIC LOSS IN THE 1980s AND 1990s

Radical theories of all kinds faded far into the background of Canadian public debate during the almost 30-year-long economic boom that followed the Second World War. Then, in 1974, the boom times ended abruptly as industrial countries felt the shock of rapid hikes in the price of oil. Many Canadians saw their dreams of affluence disappear. Over the next two decades, many would lose hope of maintaining even basic economic security. Yet personal adjustment, rather than collective protest, was the option most commonly prescribed -- and it was an option Canadians seemed prepared to accept.

This chapter will examine the nature and extent of economic loss in the post-1974 era. It will then look at the theme of personal adjustment and "flexibility" (readiness to adjust continually) as it developed in public debate through the late 1980s and early 1990s. It will look at public acceptance of the "flexibility" imperative, as reflected in public opinion polls. Finally, it will note pockets of populist egalitarianism.

The Nature and Extent of Loss

The late 1970s, the 1980s and early 1990s saw economic loss that was not as severe in absolute terms as that of the 1930s but which was nevertheless dramatic, especially in comparison to the economic gains of the previous two decades. It took the form of loss of real income, but more dramatically, loss of economic security, both objective and subjective.

The theme of much economic analysis of the recessions of the early 1980s and the early 1990s has been the growth of vulnerable categories: young workers, older workers, less educated workers, blue collar workers, and those whose workforce experience has put them at risk of both longterm and repeated spells of unemployment. For example, Statistics Canada analyst Miles Corak has noted that the recession of the 1990s had a deeper impact on specific groups, as measured by duration of unemployment, as shown in Table I.

Table I. Average Duration of Unemployment.

Average Completed Duration of Unemployment, in weeks	1980	1983	1989	1992
Canada	14	20	15	20
Ontario	14	18	13	22
Rest of Canada	14	20	16	19
Males	15	21	15	21
Females	13	18	14	18
15-to-24-year-olds	13	18	11	15
25-to-44-year-olds	15	21	17	21
45 +	17	23	19	26
Primary education only	16	20	18	20
Some secondary or secondary graduation	14	20	15	19
Some post-secondary or post-secondary graduation	14	19	15	20

Source: Statistics Canada¹

Corak regards duration of unemployment figures as useful in their own right as an indicator of individual welfare:

It might reasonably be argued that it is not so much becoming unemployed that affects an individual's well-being, but rather the length of time spent unemployed.²

Interestingly, Corak sees the concentration of

¹ Figures selected from Miles Corak, "The Duration of Unemployment During Boom and Bust," Canadian Economic Observer (Ottawa: Statistics Canada), September 1993, p. 4.7.

² Ibid., page 4.2.

unemployment, or "polarization" as he terms it,³ actually meaning that the "widespread fear of unemployment felt by many job-holders may be exaggerated." But it is not the probability of it happening, but rather the perceived severity -- if it should happen -- that may be the issue for many. Few people would feel so threatened by unemployment, he speculates, if they were certain it would only last a few weeks.⁴

One might also speculate, at this point, that low incidence is not comforting if there is no way to judge one's particular vulnerability at any given point in time, or to know how to protect oneself. Low incidence is not comforting if the law of one's universe is unknowable, in effect, as was often the case in the 1980s and 1990s, for employees of large corporations, who had no way to predict staffing decisions made by headquarters.⁵

Also vulnerable by the early 1990s were blue collar workers. While they represented only 30 percent of the labour force in 1993, they made up 42 per cent of the

³ Ibid., page 4.12.

⁴ Ibid., page 4.2.

⁵ See Brian A. Grosman, Corporate Loyalty. A Trust Betrayed (Markham, Ont.: Viking, 1988) for a general discussion of the tendency of large corporations to restructure first and consider staff implications later.

unemployed.⁶ Particularly hard hit were the so-called non-primary blue collar (those engaged in construction, processing, construction, transportation and materials handling). The unemployment rate among the non-primary blue-collar occupations increased by roughly 5 percentage points (from 10 to 15 per cent) between 1989 and 1993. In contrast, the rate for managerial occupations increased by only 2 points (from 4 to 6 per cent).⁷

Unemployment insurance (UI) cutbacks, which, as noted above, began in the 1980s, affected many of these groups, whose occupations were highly cyclical and who had, in some cases, become dependent on UI benefits. Corak has noted that repeated unemployment insurance claims seem to be the norm for a large fraction of claimants,⁸ raising the possibility that these people have fallen into a trap of continued reliance on the program. He theorizes there may be a "battered worker syndrome".⁹ Labour market history determines future unemployment experience. A vicious circle

⁶ Surendra Gera and David Ferguson, "Trends in Canadian Unemployment," unpublished, April 26, 1994, p. 12. Analysis based on Statistics Canada data.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ His data shows that the probability of having another UI claim increases with every past occurrence. See Miles Corak, "UI, Work Disincentives, and the Canadian Labor Market," in Unemployment Insurance, How to Make It Work (Toronto: C. D. Howe Institute, 1994), p. 131.

⁹ Ibid., p. 132.

may develop in which past unemployment insurance claims creates the preconditions for future claims. From the worker's perspective, he argues, the experience of collecting the benefits may erase a stigma that was previously attached to them; it may lead to the individual becoming more informed about the program and the ease with which benefits may be obtained. From the employer's perspective, employers may be less inclined to hire those with a history of short, intermittent employment spells and repeated bouts of unemployment. As a result, individuals, through no fault of their own, "may find themselves in marginal or insecure sectors of the labor market from which they cannot escape because access to 'good' jobs is limited."¹⁰

Statistics Canada analysts have twice explored the subsequent history of workers displaced during the 1980s.¹¹

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ See Garnett Picot and Ted Wannell, "Job Loss and Labour Market Adjustment in the Canadian Economy, Findings from a Special Survey," in The Labour Force (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, March 1987); and Garnett Picot and Wendy Pyper, "Permanent Layoffs and Displaced Workers: Cyclical Sensitivity, Concentration, and Experience Following the Layoff," Statistics Canada Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series, No. 55, 1993. Both studies used data from "recovery" rather than "recession" periods, though unemployment was higher during the earlier rather than the later period. Both studies show displaced workers to have a variety of "post-displacement" experiences. The earlier study, of 469,000 workers displaced during the 1981-1984 period, indicated that by 1986, about two-thirds (63 per cent) had new jobs. However, 17 per cent had left the

Over one million workers were permanently laid off each year during the 1980s, a decade that included both recession and expansionary periods.¹² Looking at permanent layoffs by industry and firm size, Picot and Pyper found the forestry, mining and construction industries to have experienced the highest permanent layoff rates. They also observed permanent layoffs to be fairly concentrated in small firms, which, while they accounted for only 20 per cent of employment, had 41 per cent of permanent layoffs. Of more relevance here, Picot and Pyper found that the probability of permanent layoff was higher for certain identifiable groups, such as young workers (16 to 24-year-olds), who were 1.6 times as likely to be laid off as workers in general, those with less than a high school graduation (1.4 to 1.6 times as likely) and those earning \$8 an hour or less (1.6 times as likely).¹³

Looking at the general picture of what Canadians

labour force, and 20 per cent were unemployed. Those who had jobs had spent an average of six months looking for work. Their new jobs generally paid less than their old jobs. The later study looked at workers permanently laid off from full time jobs in 1988 and found that, a year after layoff, 64 per cent were employed, 14 per cent unemployed and 22 per cent no longer in the labour force. (Interestingly, 72 per cent had found a new full-time job at some time during the year, but many had subsequently lost them).

¹² Picot and Pyper, p. 33.

¹³ Ibid., p. 17.

were earning by the 1980s, wages had not dropped dramatically but gains were smaller and wages actually dipped very slightly for many workers, a marked change from the post-war decades of major wage gains. Male workers fared less well than female workers in seeing wages improve (though they remained ahead of female workers). After rising dramatically in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, real wages (accounting for the effects of inflation) improved less dramatically (by 9 per cent) in the 1970s and only slightly (by 2 per cent) in the 1980s, actually falling by 0.4 per cent for male workers.¹⁴

By way of historical perspective, unemployment rose very rapidly from 3 per cent or less between 1927 and 1929 to a peak of between 19 and 20 per cent in 1933. By 1938 it had fallen to between 11 and 12, a level which it reached again during the recessions of the early 1980s and

¹⁴ Real average annual wages increased 12 per cent over the decade of the 1920s, 10 per cent even in the 1930s (because prices dropped), 34 per cent in the 1940s, 43 per cent in the 1950s, and 37 per cent in the 1960s. Men fared worse than women during the 1980s; their real average annual wage dropped slightly for the first time, falling 0.4 per cent to \$29,800 by 1990. Women's real average annual wages rose 14 per cent to \$17,900, partly a factor of their advancing into more highly paid positions. From Abdul Rashid, "Changes in Real Wages," in Canadian Social Trends (Ottawa: Statistics Canada) Spring 1994:18.

early 1990s.¹⁵ The method of calculation in the earlier period is less precise, the figure is estimated from census data and reports from unions on the percentage of their members that were out of work.¹⁶ However, one might argue that the later official figure underrepresents real unemployment, since it does not include discouraged workers (those who would like work but did not look for it in the four weeks prior to the Labour Force Survey because they didn't believe they could find it). This adds about 1 per cent.¹⁷ The official figure also excludes those who are forced into early retirement even when they cannot afford it¹⁸ or who go to school only because they are out of work. Moreover, it does not include underemployment of part-timers who would like to be full-time.¹⁹

¹⁵ Dave Gower, "A note on Canadian unemployment since 1921," in Perspectives (Ottawa: Statistics Canada), Autumn 1992, p. 28.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 29.

¹⁷ For example, in the first quarter of 1992, the official rate was 11.9 per cent, with discouraged workers it would have been 12.8. In the second quarter of 1992, the official rate was 11.2 per cent, including discouraged workers would have made it 12.1. A useful discussion of many of these phenomena is Mary Sue Devereaux, "Alternative measures of unemployment," Perspectives (Ottawa: Statistics Canada), Winter 1992, p. 37.

¹⁸ Hubert Frenken, "The pension carrot: Incentives to early retirement," in Perspectives (Ottawa: Statistics Canada), p.24. "Many workers still enter into retirement with inadequate resources."

¹⁹ See Devereaux, p.37.

The pattern of job loss and unemployment has been examined in some detail above because, as noted earlier, loss of job security was one of the primary forms of economic loss experienced by Canadians in the 1980s and 1990s. Macro-economic indicators are meaningful only if viewed at the level of how they affect individuals. Most public discussion of economic trends in the 1980s and 1990s did not present them in a way that would be meaningful to Canadians. Theoretically, an unemployment rate of 10 or 12 per cent might be tolerable if were spread evenly, experienced in some predictable way (at set intervals), and at least partially covered by a combination of severance pay and unemployment benefits. It might also be tolerable if it were concentrated in a limited segment of the population, if this segment lived in communities where frequent unemployment had come to be accepted and where elaborate support networks based on subsistence agriculture, barter and black market activities had grown up to help residents make ends meet. However, the work of Corak and others establishes that neither of these scenarios applied in Canada in the 1980s and 1990s. Unemployment was increasingly concentrated in vulnerable groups; it was longterm for a limited segment, rather than evenly spread. However, those who experienced such longterm unemployment were not isolated in rustic Atlantic fishing villages with

unemployment cultures and support networks. Rather, they were increasingly in Ontario. Moreover, they were increasingly in the older age categories, and, in this respect, cutting across regions and, to some extent, socio-economic categories. "Objective" loss of this kind was thus likely to produce "subjective" loss, a sense of loss, and a fear of impending loss. If the loss itself were not enough, the ample media commentary about it would certainly have helped drive the point home to many Canadians.²⁰

Indeed, by 1990, polls showed that half of all Canadians were concerned that they or the main income earner in their household might become unemployed.²¹ Those who were actually most vulnerable to loss of security were, in fact, the most negative about their personal economic prospects.²² A National Angus Reid Poll conducted during

²⁰ A typical "expert" comment: "Right now, there is no job in Canada that is secure," Jayson Myers, Chief Economist, Canadian Manufacturers Association, December 4, 1992. Quoted in Virginia Galt, "White-collar workers next to face layoffs, experts say," The Globe and Mail, December 5, 1992, p. A1.

²¹ Decima Quarterly Report, Winter 1990, p. 201.

²² Decima Quarterly Report/Spring 1992, p. 8. Decima analysis notes that the most negative assessments and expectations of personal prospects are registered among Canadians between 45 and 54 years of age. Studies of long-term unemployment in Canada show that the risk is most strongly correlated with age. See Surendra Gera and Syed Sajjadur Rahman, "Sectoral Labour Mobility, Unemployment, and Labour Market Adjustment in Canada: Evidence from the 1980s," pp. 117-127, in Canadian Unemployment: Lessons from the 80s and Challenges for the 90s, a compendium prepared

the 1993 federal election campaign underlined Canadians' preoccupation with unemployment. Thirty-five per cent of the national sample of 1,509 said that they or someone else in their household was currently worried about losing their job or being laid off (See Table II below.²³

Table II.

Are you, or is anyone else in your household, worried about losing your job or being laid off?²⁴

	Total	B.C.	Alta.	Man./ Sask.	Ont.	Que.	Alan -tic
Base	1,509	184	135	112	563	389	121
Yes, worried	35 %	22 %	36 %	36 %	38 %	35 %	36 %
No, not worried	65	78	64	64	62	64	64

The finding is quite consistent across the country, with the exception of relatively well-off British Columbia. Reid's own analysis of its figures makes the point that the

and edited by Surendra Gera (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada), p. 101.

²³ From Angus Reid Group, Inc. "The '93 Election Campaign, National Angus Reid Poll #2. For public release by CTV News in the week of September 20, 1993. The poll was conducted by telephone on September 15 and 16, 1993, among a representative cross-section of 1,509 Canadian adults. The margin of error for the national finding was calculated as plus or minus 2.5 percentage points. It would be larger for regions.

²⁴ Reid, p. 34.

national figure of 35 per cent represents an eight point increase over the percentage who reported this anxiety in a March 1992 Reid poll. It is even higher than the 31 per cent recorded in December 1991, roughly mid-way through the "official" economic recession.²⁵

In the same Reid election campaign poll, 27 per cent of respondents interviewed stated that someone in their household had lost his or her job or been laid off within the past two years (see Table III below), and a 24 per cent indicated that a member of their household was currently looking for work (see Table IV below).

Table III. **Has anyone in your household lost their job or been laid off in the past two years?**²⁶

	Total	B.C.	Alta.	Man./ Sask.	Ont.	Que.	Alan- tic
Base	1,509	184	135	112	563	389	121
Yes	27 %	26 %	29 %	26 %	28 %	27 %	27 %
No	72	74	71	74	72	72	73

Here, the figures are strikingly similar across the country, possibly because all regions suffered unemployment in the early 1990s, or because some of those in British Columbia may have moved there after experiencing unemployment

²⁵ Ibid., p. 12.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 34.

elsewhere.

Table IV. **And is anyone in your household out of work and looking for a job right now?²⁷**

	Total	B.C.	Alta.	Man./ Sask.	Ont.	Que.	Alan -tic
Base	1,509	184	135	112	563	389	121
Yes	24 %	17 %	24 %	14 %	26 %	29 %	21 %
No	76	83	76	86	74	70	78

This table shows regional differences again, perhaps reflecting the lower unemployment rates in the western provinces.

Though the social safety nets, e.g., unemployment insurance and welfare, were present in the 1980s and 1990s to a degree unlike the 1930s, they had become "frayed"²⁸ by the early 1980s, when the first food banks began to appear in urban centres and homelessness rose in visibility. However, since the growth of the welfare state nevertheless continues to have strong appeal to many as an intuitive explanation for quiescence, its potential significance in mitigating loss is worth examining a bit more closely.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Francois Vaillancourt, economist, University of Montreal, interview, April 23, 1992.

Most of the elements of what is today commonly thought of as the "welfare state" were put in place between World War Two and the early 1980s. In the 1940s, unemployment insurance and family allowances were introduced; in the 1950s, universal old-age pensions. In the 1960s, the system of social assistance benefits to all those in need, i.e., what is commonly thought of as welfare, was consolidated under the Canada Assistance Plan. Next came the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans and the Guaranteed Income Supplement for the elderly. In the 1970s, unemployment insurance was expanded and child and elderly benefits were enhanced.²⁹ However, by 1979, an unemployment insurance clawback provision was introduced, requiring recipients to repay up to 30 per cent of the benefits received if their total net income exceeded 1.5 times the maximum annual insurable earnings.³⁰

In the 1980s, family allowances were partially de-indexed and, together with Old Age Security benefits, were fully "taxed back" for higher-income families. Moreover, for most regions of Canada, unemployment insurance

²⁹ Economic Council of Canada, The New Face of Poverty, Income Security Needs of Canadian Families (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1992), pp. 6-7.

³⁰ Fred Lazar, "UI as a Redistributive Scheme and Fiscal Stabilizer," in Christopher Green, Fred Lazar, Miles Corak, Dominique M. Gross, Unemployment Insurance, How to Make It Work (Toronto: C. D. Howe Institute, 1994), p. 51.

eligibility requirements and benefit periods were tightened. Program-tightening trends continued into the 1990s."²¹

Despite the more recent trend to cutbacks, The New Face of Poverty, the final report of the Economic Council of Canada, argues that the expansion of income transfers did effectively offset the growing inequality in labour incomes.²² However, the report notes that "an important and disturbing feature" of the changing job market is that a growing proportion of the new employment opportunities were in "nonstandard" jobs, i.e., short-term or part-time jobs typically, though not always, offering low wages, few benefits, little security, and limited prospects for career advancement. Combining the expansion of nonstandard jobs and low-paying full-time jobs, the proportion of the labour force earning incomes below, or around, the poverty line, was growing. The report emphasized:

the difference between government financial assistance provided to people in need and the income earned from less-than-full-time jobs may not be large enough to encourage some people to work."²³

²¹ Economic Council of Canada, The New Face of Poverty, p. 7.

²² Ibid., p. 7.

²³ Ibid., p. 30. The report notes that 44 per cent of all new jobs created between 1981 and 1989 were short-term or part-time jobs. These jobs comprised about 28 per cent of all jobs in 1989.

The lack of incentive was seen as especially great for single women with young children, because of the cost of child care.

What deserves attention in this scenario, however, is the fact that "welfare" was beginning to overtake potential labour market remuneration (including benefits) at some point because the latter was falling. One of the prime manifestations of economic loss in the 1980s and 1990s was the loss of a good-paying "square deal" (or "family wage") job, and its replacement by UI, welfare or a low-paying job. It is unreasonable to think that any of these could have substantially replaced a "family wage" job, either materially or psychologically, in an era of "polarization," when many Canadians remained in well-paid jobs, able to enjoy so many more of the good things society has to offer.

In a similar way, the potential cushioning effect of the two-income family seems to many to offer an important part of the explanation for quiescence. The shift from the so-called "traditional-earner family" (two parents but only one earning an income) to the "dual-earner" family is one of the dramatic social changes that occurred between the 1930s and the 1980s-90s. Indeed, even as late as 1951, only 11 per cent of married women were in the labour force. By 1975, that proportion had climbed to 42 per cent. By 1991,

61 per cent of families were "dual-earner" families. In comparison 19 per cent were "traditional earner" families (husband as earner), 15 per cent had no earner and, in 5 per cent, the wife was the sole earner.³⁴

Not only do "dual-earner" families have another income to fall back on, they appear to be substantially better able to save for a "rainy day." Statistics Canada data comparing the two types of households, where children are present (under age 14) show that, during 1992, dual-earner households saved or invested an average of about \$4,670 (including home equity). In contrast, traditional-earner households saved or invested an average of only about \$200.³⁵

Whatever importance might be assigned to the trend to two-income families as a partial explanation for contemporary quiescence, some caution must still be exercised. Even in a two-income family, the loss of one income is the loss of 50 per cent of family income (more or less, depending on which earner loses a job), though it may be replaced in part by unemployment insurance for a time. Given the trends identified by the Economic Council of

³⁴ Jillian Oderkirk, Cynthia Silver and Marc Prud'homme, "Traditional Earner Families," in Canadian Social Trends (Ottawa: Statistics Canada), Spring 1994:19.

³⁵ Oderkirk et al., p. 23.

Canada discussed above, such lost income might ultimately be replaced by a lower income, as the earner found a new job with lower wages. Statistics Canada notes, too, that the average dual-earner family (with children under 14) spent \$48,977 in current consumption in 1992, with recreation equipment and vacation homes among the items it was more likely than the "traditional-earner family" to enjoy. The traditional one-earner family spent \$36,090, a substantial difference and indicative of the drop in consumption that the family that lost one of its two incomes would have had to face during this recession year.

Moreover, "averages," like so many aggregate statistics, do not say much about severity of loss, because they do not indicate how losses were distributed. A couple both holding part-time jobs would not have had much capacity to help support each other, even for a short period. It is also interesting to note that older males, those most likely to experience long-term employment, were also most likely to have a non-working wife or a wife who worked only part-time.³⁶ The "dual-earner" couple, while undeniably a reality by the 1980s, could not reasonably have been

³⁶ Although full-time work was very common among wives in dual-earner families looked at by Oderkirk, et al., 27 per cent of those with husbands under age 40, 29 per cent of those with husbands aged 40 to 50 and 34 per cent of those with husbands aged 55 and over worked mostly part-time in 1991.

expected to effectively blunt the pain of economic loss.

A third, quite unrelated, phenomenon that some might see as mitigating the economic loss that spurred protest in the 1930s, was the post-Depression growth of an elaborate system of marketing boards. By the 1980s, this helped even out the fluctuations of income that might otherwise have been experienced by farmers -- the group most commonly associated with historical protest, especially in the West. While the federal government had tried to regulate the marketing of agricultural commodities in the 1930s, that effort ended when the Dominion Marketing Board was declared unconstitutional by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 1937. The provinces then created their own board.³⁷ The provincial boards, i.e., devolution to the provinces of the regulatory power, along with various other farm support mechanisms, could no doubt be assumed to have a role in weakening protest sentiment. More relevant yet, perhaps, is the fact that agriculture now accounts for only a small percentage of Canada's working population³⁸ --

³⁷ Garth Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union, Canadian Federalism and National Unity, revised ed. (Toronto: Gage, 1982), p. 116.

³⁸ The employment share of agriculture was 4 per cent in 1990, down from 13 per cent in 1960. See Ernest B. Akyeampong and Jennifer Winters, "International employment trends by industry -- a note," in Perspectives on Labour and Income (Ottawa: Statistics Canada), Summer 1993, p. 34.

even if farmers and other farm workers were to suffer extreme losses, they are not as significant in numbers, and influential, as they were during the Depression. It should be noted, too, that the view that farmers fueled protest is more true of earlier decades. By the time of the Regina Manifesto, they were but one of a number of mobilized groups.³⁹ Thus, farm support and regulatory agencies and programs can provide some part but not a large part of the explanation for quiescence in the 1980s and 1990s.

As to the root causes of loss during this period, there was little disagreement: The shift in the structure of the economy, fuelled by technological change and changing trade patterns. Most significantly, it manifested itself in the shift from a traditionally unionized goods-producing sector to a largely non-union service sector. The trend mirrored a similar phenomenon in the United States, where it was more extensively analyzed, and where some analysts focussed on the fact that it affected many individuals in mid-worklife. In this, it contrasted sharply with many previous sectoral shifts, which had merely seen children follow a different path from their parents (e.g., children raised on farms going to work in factories in the city). In a landmark study in the early 1980s, Boston College

³⁹ John Herd Thompson, with Allen Seager, Canada 1922-1939, Decades of Discord (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1985), p. 232-34.

economist Barry Bluestone traced the downward progression of a group of laid-off auto-workers, finding them two years later in jobs paying an average of 43 per cent less.⁴⁰

In 1983, Robert Kuttner issued a warning about the impact of economic trends on the future of the American middle class.⁴¹ By 1985, Economic Council of Canada researchers had done some preliminary investigations but reported that they had not yet found support for the "declining middle" thesis in Canada.⁴² Evidence would soon present itself, however. An important Canadian study, one that would be cited frequently in subsequent public debate, was the Economic Council of Canada's Good Jobs, Bad Jobs which provided an account of the growth of the service sector economy in Canada and discussed its polarizing tendencies. The report noted that, although Canadian workers enjoyed significant income gains during the late 1960s and early 1970s, real compensation peaked in 1977. It

⁴⁰ Barry Bluestone, Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America (New York: Basic Books, 1982), p. 10.

⁴¹ Robert Kuttner, "The Declining Middle," The Atlantic, Vol. 252, No. 1, July 1983.

⁴² Interview with Kathryn McMullen, economist, Economic Council of Canada, 12 June 1985 (originally cited in Mary Trueman, Looking for the End of the Transition, unpublished M.A. thesis, Queen's, 1985).

had actually declined slightly a decade later."

The speed of the transition to a service economy was documented by a Statistics Canada study released in March 1992: Before the turn of the century, 31 per cent of working Canadians were employed in service industries. By 1951, it was 47 per cent, and by 1989, 71 per cent. Service industries accounted for 94 per cent of total job growth between 1980 and 1989."

" Economic Council of Canada, Good Jobs, Bad Jobs, Employment in the Service Economy. A Statement by the Economic Council of Canada 1990 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1990), p. 15. The phenomenon, also known as polarization, has been studied extensively by Michael C. Wolfson, who noted in a recent paper that Canadian data indicate it increased continually from 1967 to 1986. Among the evidence he cites is the falling proportions of workers with middle range incomes (both 75-150% and 60-225% of the median); as well as the generally widening range of incomes (as a proportion of the median) required to enclose the middle 20%, 40% and 60% of the population (i.e. 40-60, 30-70, and 20-80th population percentiles). However, he notes that polarization has remained "generally stable" over the period from 1986 to 1991. From "Divergent Inequalities - Theory, Empirical Results and Prescriptions," paper presented at the conference "Contemporary Issues in Income Distribution Research" sponsored by the Social Policy Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sidney, Australia, December 3, 1993, and the American Economic Association Meetings session on Conceptual Issues in Normative Measurement, Boston, January 5, 1994, p. 11. The paper sets out various methodological problems and cautions against confusing the fundamental concepts of inequality and polarization.

" Bruce Cheadle, Canadian Press and Carrie Mishma, Sun Business Reporter, The Vancouver Sun, "Low-paying service jobs mushroom," March 12, 1992.

Through the 1980s, some economists and politicians continued to defend the service economy as offering new kinds of opportunities and, in some cases, higher salaries.⁴⁵ However, such optimism was less frequently sounded as Canada entered the 1990s. Attention was more often drawn to the fact that service jobs have a Jekyll-and-Hyde character: an upper tier of good jobs in education, health, public administration and business services, and a lower tier of bad jobs in the retail trade and consumer services.⁴⁶ The shift from the goods-sector to the service-sector was increasingly seen as leaving unskilled Canadians without opportunity for good jobs at good pay.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ While she was federal employment minister, Flora MacDonald often asserted that disadvantaged groups, including women, might gain more access to the new high technology jobs emerging because the new technology would not require physical size, for example. "It does not matter what size you are; what colour; what religion; what sex you are, if you have the mental skills to handle the equipment you can do the job. And that job can be in the office or in the factory. Or in a steel mill or in a mine." Speech to Labour/Business Meeting with CEIC, Nov. 21, 1985. The same message was delivered to the graduating class, Fall Convocation, Acadia University, Wolfville, N.S., 20 October 1984.

⁴⁶ Harvey Krahn, quoted in "Low-paying service jobs mushroom," The Vancouver Sun, March 12, 1992.

⁴⁷ Typically, in March 1992, the Vancouver Sun quoted a British Columbia-based federal Employment and Immigration official observing that, in the old economy, an unskilled male could get a job in a sawmill or warehouse and with unionized wages could make a good living. Today, the article concluded, such options are shrinking for unskilled workers, who are finding the only jobs open to them are in the hospitality, food and retail sectors -- generally low-paying jobs.

The speed of technological change, and the average Canadian's lack of control over its impact was also noted in a limited number of critical works⁴⁸ that were nevertheless outnumbered consistently through the 1980s and 1990s by books presenting such change as a opportunity to be seized by the entrepreneurially bold.⁴⁹

Some of the impact of the trend to lower-paying jobs was softened by the increasing numbers of Canadian family members participating in the labour market -- not just wives, but children still at home, grandparents and aunts and uncles in the home -- participating in the labour market. Analyst Roger Sauve termed this phenomenon the "workaholic family".⁵⁰

⁴⁸ For example, Heather Menzies, Fast Forward and Out of Control, How Technology is Changing Your Life (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1989); Marcia Nozick, No Place Like Home, Building Sustainable Communities (Ottawa: Canadian Council on Social Development, 1992); Linda McQuaig, The Wealthy Banker's Wife, The Assault on Equality in Canada (Toronto: Penguin Books Canada, 1993).

⁴⁹ For example, Dian Cohen and Kristen Shannon, The Next Canadian Economy (Montreal: Eden Press, 1984); and the best-selling Nuala Beck, Shifting Gears, Thriving in the New Economy (Toronto: Harper Collins, 1992).

⁵⁰ Roger Sauve notes that in 1979, about 55 per cent of husband-wife families under 65 years of age had both partners earning some employment or self-employment income during the year. By 1987, the ratio had risen to 66 per cent and is now climbing to over 70 per cent. To put it differently, there are "only" one out of three husband-wife families in which both partners do not work outside of the home. More single children who are still living at home (15 years of age and over) are also working outside the home.

The euphemistic language of "transition," terms such as restructuring, dislocation, adjustment, flexibility, came into increasing use during the 1980s.⁵¹ Looking behind the rhetoric to the individuals actually hardest hit, there could be little doubt that those suffering most in this period were older workers, a category once defined as 55 and up but, by the 1990s, increasingly pegged at 45 and up. In a discussion of long-term unemployment published in 1991,⁵² two Economic Council of Canada researchers observed that the risk of long-term unemployment in Canada is most strongly correlated with age.⁵³ The probability of

In 1989, about 69 per cent were in the labour market, up from 60 per cent a decade earlier. Other relatives living with the family (such as parents, sisters and brothers of the head of the household) also increased their participation in the job market from 46 per cent in 1979 to 53 per cent in 1989). See Sauve, pp. 80-81.

⁵¹ Mary Trueman, Looking for the End of the Transition, unpublished M.A. thesis, Queen's University, 1985.

⁵² Continuous unemployment lasting 12 months or more.

⁵³ Syed Sajjadur Rahman and Surendra Gera, "Long-Term Unemployment in Canada: Its Causes and Policy Implications," pp. 99-115, in Canadian Unemployment, Lessons from the 80s and Challenges for the 90s, A compendium edited by Surendra Gera (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991). The publication carries the note: A collection of documents prepared by the Economic Council of Canada. Although this compendium is published under the auspices of the Council, the views expressed have not been endorsed by the Members of the Economic Council of Canada, p. 101. The authors also correlated long-term unemployment with sex, marital status, educational level and the industry and occupation of the last job held, all of which bore some relation. Not surprisingly, they found that there was a higher incidence of long-term unemployment among less-educated persons than

becoming unemployed for a long time increased with age, they reported, and was about three times higher for older workers (which they defined as aged 45 and over) than for younger workers.⁵⁴ The factors that worked against older workers included not only employers' preference for young workers, but also the lower educational attainment of older workers.⁵⁵ The 55-and-over population, in particular, had far fewer opportunities for education than members of the post-war baby boom who enjoyed the benefit of the rapid expansion of the post-secondary school system (not just the increase in institutions of learning but also the greater availability of grants and loans) that occurred in the 1960s. Many of those 55 and older had only grade school, since even getting to high school was often difficult in some rural areas before this expansion.⁵⁶

The economic loss experienced by many Canadians between 1974 and the early 1990s might best be summed up as

among those with greater education. They also found that workers in goods-producing industries experienced relatively higher incidence than those in service industries, p. 159n.

⁵⁴ Rahman and Gera, p. 103.

⁵⁵ See Discussion Paper No. 22, Training of Older Workers in Canada, by Mary Trueman. International Labour Office, Geneva, May 1989. Limited Distribution.

⁵⁶ John Goodes, Director of Projects, Canadian Employment and Immigration Advisory council. Interview, 13 May 1988. In Discussion Paper No. 22, Training of Older Workers in Canada, by Mary Trueman. International Labour Office, Geneva, May 1989. Limited Distribution, p. 3.

involving loss of both a comfortable level of income and a reasonable degree of job security, essentially the "square deal" of the early protest movements. The square deal, it should be recalled here, was to be the reward of honest work alone, not special skills, credentials, or willingness or ability to continually retrain. Its loss essentially meant that those offering honest work alone would be at risk of falling to the level of a subsistence allowance (unemployment insurance or welfare) or a subsistence wage (i.e., from a lower-tier service sector job with less than full-time hours and no benefits and no security).⁵⁷

The notion that some one who could offer basically just a strong back and the sweat of his brow should nevertheless have some hope of obtaining a well-paid, secure job had eroded in various ways by the 1990s. The market was a market of winners and losers, with average not having any clear meaning or, even worse, meaning "loser." Focus group research⁵⁸ by the Ontario New Democratic Party in the

⁵⁷ The Economic Council of Canada's final report notes that "non-standard work," such as short-term or part-term jobs, represented 28 per cent of all jobs in 1989. These jobs typically, though not always, offered low wages, few benefits, little security and limited prospects for career advancement. See The New Face of Poverty, p. 30.

⁵⁸ Focus groups are considered "qualitative" as opposed to "quantitative" research in that the numbers of respondents are generally too small to project results to a general population. They are commonly used by political parties and government departments to get some idea of the range of possible views and opinions on a given subject, but

spring of 1990 (in preparation for the successful NDP provincial campaign of 1990) showed that voters hated the references in earlier NDP pitches to "the little man" and "the average worker."⁵ Those terms simply hit too close to home, according to the researcher; they reinforced people's worst fears of themselves as losers. The subsequent successful campaign dropped the "ordinary people" theme that had characterized NDP rhetoric both federally and provincially during the 1980s.⁶

The "Flexibility" Imperative

As Canada entered the 1990s, acceptance of the inevitability of loss, and of personal adjustment as the only feasible response, was increasingly evident in elite opinion (the public pronouncements of so-called opinion leaders and influential organizations) and, more broadly, among mass publics. It is interesting to note that the populist "honest toil=square deal" notion of distributive justice continued to receive some formal support in public policy debate as late as 1990. For example, a report of the Canada Employment and Immigration Advisory Council defines

are not treated as having scientific validity. By uncovering attitudes previously unsuspected, they can generate hypotheses that can be tested with more scientific methodologies.

⁵ Suanne Kelman, "Consumers on the Couch," Report on Business Magazine, February 1991, p. 51.

⁶ Ibid., p. 51.

full employment as "a concept whereby anyone who sincerely wants to work should have the opportunity to do so, and should be able to earn a 'decent' standard of living."⁶¹ But, by and large it had been displaced by the much different notion of distributive justice of both market and welfare liberalism. Essentially, this was the notion that held that those who were "flexible" (possessing a number of different skills, or being willing and able to learn new ones, as well as being willing to move, geographically and among occupational categories) would be "marketable" (have some chance of finding a job or, if self-employed, a market niche of some kind). What is significant about this ground of "entitlement" is that nothing is actually guaranteed. In fact, there is no entitlement. "Flexibility" is not a threshold which, once reached, entitles one to any particular reward, in the manner that willingness to do honest work was supposed to entitle one to a "square deal." "Flexibility" is, rather, a quality purported to be likely to lead to market success. Such success, even if achieved, might actually be quite limited in terms of remuneration. Moreover, it would be only temporary. Yet, as good jobs became scarce in the 1990s, flexibility was the prescription offered not only by various commentators, particularly in

⁶¹ Canadian Employment and Immigration Advisory Council, Full employment is an achievable goal, A report presented to the Minister of Employment and Immigration, Ottawa, April 1990, p. vii.

the business press,⁶² but also by social democratic party spokesmen.⁶³ Though the need for Canadians to be flexible was frequently presented as a fresh insight into the dynamics of the new economy of the 1990s, the history of this idea can be traced back to the mid-1980s.⁶⁴ Life-long learning and perpetual geographic mobility were more and more frequently prescribed as the personal price that would have to be paid by individuals who wished to maintain a

⁶² Alain Toulin (Financial Post, 21 March 1991) thought that both business and government would soon be under pressure to develop skills training policies that would enhance the flexibility of workers at all levels (noted in Employment and Immigration Canada, Public Affairs -- Corporate Affairs, "Older Workers in the Canadian Labour Market," August 14, 1992, p. 15).

⁶³ Ontario's New Democratic Party Labour Minister, appearing on the TV Ontario program "Fourth Reading, October 18, 1992, 7:30 p.m., talked of the need to help workers achieve "flexibility" and "multi-skilling."

⁶⁴ For example, by then-senator Lorna Marsden, a sociologist, who held that Canada needed a new kind of education -- not education for specific jobs but education in how to be flexible in one's livelihood (interview, Ottawa, June 11, 1985); and Keith Newton, then project director, technological change and labour markets, for the Economic Council of Canada, who said, in a speech, that the majority of new jobs in Canada's future would not require advanced scientific and technical training, but rather that the challenge for workers (and the educational system) would be "how to acquire the characteristics of flexibility, adaptability, and versatility that will ease the pain of the various worklife transitions they can expect to face." (from "Employment Effects of Technological Change: Some Implications for Education," April 1985, p. 22). Both comments cited previously in author's unpublished M.A. thesis, "Looking for the End of the Transition," Queen's University, August 1985.

place in the labour market."⁶⁶ In Pulling Together, Productivity, Innovation, and Trade, one of the last statements by the Economic Council of Canada prior to its 1992 abolition as part of a federal cost-cutting exercise, a key theme was how Canadians and their governments should face the "hardship of adjustment" to inevitable rapid economic and technological change:

Learning to welcome change more openly entails a faster pace of adjustment. This will result in severe hardships for some people and some communities. Overcoming these hardships will require substantially increased investments in skill development, training, counselling and mobility.⁶⁶

The alternative, the Council pointed out, would be to prop up failing businesses, a course it could not recommend:

. . . when firms or industries are hurt because of international competition, the best response for government is normally to support labour adjustment, not to provide subsidies in an attempt to prop up businesses that lack long-term viability.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ For example, the view of James McNiven, dean of the faculty of management of Dalhousie University, in TIME Magazine's December 4, 1992, special report on Canada (as reported by Michael S. Serrill, in "Road Ahead, A TIME panel predicts economic changes, new regional ties -- and grounds for optimism in the 21st century," pp. 64-68). McNiven is reported as suggesting that the answer to structural unemployment is not government make-work scheme but in Ottawa's and the province's ability to develop life-long learning programs.

⁶⁶ Economic Council of Canada, Pulling Together, Productivity, Innovation, and Trade (Ottawa: Supply and Service Canada, 1992), p. 51.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 52.

The "flexibility" imperative essentially requires that workers be willing to move any number of times, not just in their youth, but in their mature years as well, even when it means leaving behind family and community. Willingness to change occupations is also required, even if this means sacrificing seniority, capital investment in tools, and the sense of self-identity and self-esteem that many get from a lifelong commitment to an occupation. By the early 1990s, the idea of an occupation as a vocation was dead, the Christian notion of "calling"⁶⁶ long forgotten. Also left behind was the notion that one had a right to remain in a job so long as one were performing well and one's employer was doing well. Companies laid off employees even during periods of growth, defending such lay-offs on the grounds of preparing for a possible tough road ahead.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ "Let every man abide in the same calling where-in he was called." I Corinthians, 7:20. Calling: Any lawful employment, or way of living. From Cruden's Complete Concordance to the Bible (Toronto: G. R. Welch, 1977), p. 71.

⁶⁷ See for example, Harvey Enchin, "Corporate productivity drive swells unemployment ranks," The Globe and Mail, January 11, 1993, p. B1. The story quotes Jim Johnston, director of corporate resources for the Great-West Life Assurance Co., which has chopped more than 200 of its almost 2,000 head office jobs. "It's not that we're in difficulty now, because we're not. We have to be in a position that when we see there's going to be snow on the road, we've got the winter tires on." A slightly more macabre example of how cutting jobs had become the corporate virtue of the 1990s, is a Globe and Mail obituary for Suncor Inc. chairman Thomas Thomson, run under the headline "Suncor boss made company lean." It eulogizes Thomson as having "invoked an aggressive streamlining and cost-cutting program that left Suncor a lean company to meet the market

Firings of individuals who were high performers, including high performers at companies still experiencing healthy profits, tended not to draw headlines or peak public curiosity except where the fired individuals were very high-profile.⁷⁰ In such cases, companies defended the firings by vague references to philosophical differences.⁷¹

The case of the Ottawa-based computer software company, Corel, provides a useful illustration. When Corel founder and president Michael Cowpland was questioned by a journalist about his firing of 50 workers over a one-year period in the early 1990s, Cowpland conceded that many of the fired workers were not only competent but actually excellent by some standards. He defended the firings, nevertheless, on the grounds that Corel's performance standard was unusually high. "We're not saying that a lot of these people aren't excellent employees elsewhere," he told The Ottawa Citizen. "It just means they haven't been

challenges of the 1990s," The Globe and Mail, November 28, 1992, p. B6.

⁷⁰ See, for example, Cathryn Motherwell and Drew Fagan, "Petrocan mum on Hopper firing, Chairman ousted despite dramatic improvements in financial picture," The Globe and Mail, January 30, 1993, p. A1.

⁷¹ Harvey Enchin, "CEOs come crashing down, Astrology, rapid change suspected in spate of firings, demotions," The Globe and Mail, January 30, 1993, p. B1.

able to meet the kind of performance standards we expect."⁷² The move was applauded by John Reid, president of the Canadian Advanced Technology Association, after being told by a reporter of the firings (but not which company was involved). "More power to them . . . That's the role model we have to send for all Canadians, because we're under-performing in all areas . . . I like the idea of a model that insists a little more on excellence and over-achieving . . . We need that for the Canadian economy, period."⁷³

While some of those fired from Corel took the company to court, they could not look forward to receiving very large settlements. Wrongful dismissal settlements in the 1990s did not grant total redress of all that the employee had arguably lost. Some economists, by this point, were publicly stating that workers over the age of 50 who have been separated from their jobs are unlikely to regain full employment, due to employers' preference for younger employees.⁷⁴ Yet settlements in the 1980s and 1990s tended

⁷² Dominique Lacasse, "'Reign of Terror' at Corel," Ottawa Citizen, 7 November 1992, p. B1.

⁷³ Ibid., p. B1.

⁷⁴ See Employment and Immigration Canada, Public Affairs -- Corporate Affairs, "Older Workers in the Canadian Labour Market" (Public Environmental Analysis Report, August 14, 1992), which draws together a number of comments on older workers' prospects. It notes that the director of current analysis at Statistics Canada told the Globe and Mail (22 February 1992) that "If you've lost your job and you're 50 years old, you're toast in this economy." (p. 14).

to be a year for every ten year's service"⁵, except in "the upper echelons of the executive stratosphere," where they could be more variable.⁶ Even in the case of a worker with 30 years experience with the same firm (a rarity in today's mobile workforce), this is not enough to compensate for loss of up to 15 years of anticipated employment. Moreover, court action was not an option for most dismissed employees -- the cost of going to court was too high.⁷

By the 1990s, there was a growing sense that workers 55 and up who had lost their jobs should be entitled to "bridging benefits" (government support at a level somewhat higher than welfare, but less than unemployment insurance benefits). There was a limited federal program in place, but such benefits were far from available to all needy persons in this age group. For a discussion of this issue, see Joseph A. Tindale, Older Workers in an Aging Workforce (Ottawa: National Council on Aging, 1991), p. 10.

⁵ This rule would seem to hold in the field of journalism, for example, based on several cases of which I have personal knowledge. Many cases are settled out of court with the condition that the terms not be made public. The one-year-for-ten standard roughly accords with the observations of lawyer Brian Grosman, a specialist in wrongful dismissal cases, e.g., "a general manager thirty-six years of age, four years with a computer company, terminated for economic reasons, is likely to achieve a maximum of six months' notice if he proceeds to trial in an action for wrongful dismissal." See Fire Power (Markham, Ont.: Viking, 1984), p. 73.

⁶ Grosman, Fire Power, p. 75.

⁷ Grosman writes: "The lower the employee is on the management scale, the more difficult it is for him to assert the leverage required to obtain a good settlement on termination. His lack of financial resources means that the company can out-wait him, anticipating that he will either be re-employed or will be unable to finance lengthy legal proceedings. The company, by playing tough, will usually find that it can settle for a small amount when the employee realizes that he will wait approximately two years before he get to trial and that he must, in the interim, either find

Another significant point: In contrast to the courts' attitude towards those who had property stolen or wrongfully expropriated, the courts' treatment of those who had been found to be wrongfully dismissed rarely included restitution in the form of reinstatement in the job," except where it was specifically provided for in statute, for example, under the Canada Labour Code, which had a provision added in 1978 (in keeping with similar provisions in Britain, Germany, France, India and Australia) that gave employees in federally regulated industries, such as banks and interprovincial transportation and telecommunications companies fairly strong powers to fight unjust dismissal."

Corel's policy in effect held that the company had a right to fire anyone who at any time failed to meet a performance standard that was not only beyond competence, but was, in fact, beyond excellence as excellence might be understood by many other companies. Theoretically, this meant that the company reserved the right to fire anyone at the moment when it became apparent that some one capable of

another job to support his family or lose whatever damages are coming to him because of his lack of initiative in not attempting to do so." See Fire Power, p. 75.

" Margot Gibb-Clark, "Fired workers often confused about rights," The Globe and Mail, November 30, 1992, p. B4.

" Too strong for some critiques. See Diane Forrest, "Guess whom you can't fire?" Canadian Business, November 1991, p. 98.

higher performance was available to be hired to replace them.

By the 1990s, media coverage of the growing scarcity of secure, full-time jobs sometimes expressed sympathy for workers travelling the country to pick up short-term jobs⁸⁰ but just as often presented a highly optimistic picture of a coming world of "freelancers" thriving on "non-standard work".⁸¹ Articles presented positive exemplars of the new breed, e.g., a Vancouver woman who "used to hold down a 9-to-5 job as a legal secretary and executive assistant" but who, for the past decade, has "pursued a succession of projects that have pushed her to higher levels of challenge and reward".⁸² Such positive articles also quoted management theorists suggesting that the concept of career is being re-examined, with many skilled people seeing their working lives as "a string of adventures," rather than one long haul.⁸³ From this perspective, those who would shun adventure for security, structure, rules and certainty could be viewed not only as

⁸⁰ Bertrand Marotte, Southam News, "Latest layoffs leave Hamilton's steel workers glum about prospects for recovery," The Ottawa Citizen, 4 October 1992, p. E5.

⁸¹ See for example, Robert Williamson, "Tradition giving way to the world of freelancers," The Globe and Mail, January 15, 1993, p. B1.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

faint-hearted but also as unable to face reality."

Echoing the theme that there were those who actually preferred a string of adventures, an advertisement in The Globe and Mail solicited applications from "senior managers and professionals" for appointments to various firms "on an interim basis":

The marketplace has changed dramatically from the days when executives accepted roles with new organizations only on a permanent or long-term basis. Increasingly, mergers, acquisitions, insolvencies and turnarounds are providing challenges and opportunities for successful executives who prefer interim assignments on a contractual basis."

Career advice articles in popular Canadian magazines repeated the themes. As one summed up the change:

. . . the traditional concept of job security and corporate loyalty has gone the way of the steno pad and the liquid lunch. Get ready for the new working order . . . Ten years from now, it's possible that you and your co-workers will be free agents, united only to do a specific job, for a specific time -- before moving on to the next team, the next task, the next company. You'll be independent contractors, continually upgrading and marketing to sell a product: you."

" "Not all employees can make the psychological leap from a large organization to the status of independent worker. They like security, structure and rules. The uncertainty of self-employment scares them. Yet as the wave of layoffs suggests, the corporate workplace is no safe place either." Williamson, p. B4.

" Peat Marwick Stevenson & Kellogg, "Interim Executives," a classified advertisement carried in The Globe and Mail, December 16, 1992, p. B23.

" Linda Aisenberg-Lewis, "The New Working Order," FLARE, September 1993, pp. 147-148.

Readers were not invited to ponder the morality of this new order or ask themselves if it should be resisted and, if so, how. Rather, they were simply told that "the experts" said "it's inevitable."⁸⁷ One such expert, self-employment consultant Kevin Hood, warned:

If your perspective is, "I need a job which is a long-term, stable career and I only want to work nine-to-five," then God help you . . . "⁸⁸

The flexibility theme was reflected in public sector employment by the early 1990s as well. The Workforce Adjustment Policy negotiated by federal public service and its 17 unions (affecting just under 200,000 permanent public servants -- not including higher management categories) held that no civil servant, regardless of merit or seniority, had a proprietary right to any job, or to any duties. Should a position be eliminated, the policy provided entitlement to continued employment in the federal public service only if the worker was both "mobile" and "retrainable" (capable of learning another job within two years).⁸⁹ Specifically,

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 148.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Work Force Adjustment Directive, 1.1.14:
 "Departments shall guarantee every affected or surplus employee who is both mobile and retrainable a reasonable job offer during the surplus period, and shall extend any such surplus period until at least one such offer has been made . . . lay-offs shall normally only occur where an individual has refused a reasonable job offer, or is not mobile, or cannot be retrained within two years, or is laid off at his or her own request." However, the policy, hammered out in the collective bargaining process, has an inconsistency:

those who expressed willingness to train and/or move to another geographic location had the right to a "reasonable offer" of another job, though it might not be in the same occupational category or at the same level. This might seem to have implied that the more education a worker had the better. However, such was not always the case. In practice, the least specialized employees, e.g., clerks, were among the most easily placed; among those who tended to have the most difficulty are highly specialized research scientists.⁹⁰

The "flexibility" imperative was increasingly promoted by governments, business leaders, economists and various experts and consultants through the 1980s and early 1990s. Naysayers were rare, though not totally absent from public debate. Even as early as the early 1980s, some analysts did sometimes ask whether retraining was the panacea that many seemed to think it was.⁹¹ The question

those who lose their job as a result of privatization of a government function do not have to be "mobile," i.e., they have a right to a "reasonable offer" within the geographic area in which they have been working.

⁹⁰ Interview with A. Zajchowki, negotiator, Professional Institute of the Public Service, May 13, 1994.

⁹¹ For example, sociologist Monica Townsend, speaking at the federal government's 1983 Canada Tomorrow Conference, told the gathering that, at a Couchiching Conference devoted to the human consequences of the new technology, (52nd Annual Couchiching Conference, The Age of Microchips: The Next Five Years, July 28--August 1, 1983) almost all speakers stressed the need for retraining for workers whose

of what would happen to those whose intellectual abilities were simply not adequate to allow them to become competitive in an increasingly high technology world was also raised, but only by the occasional lonely voice." By 1992, newspaper articles occasionally quoted job trainees wondering whether the courses they were taking would really lead to jobs." However, such articles focused on the difficulty of identifying where the jobs of the future will be. They did not question the reasonableness or legitimacy of a social order that demanded that everyone continually retrain. Nor did they raise the issue of limited human capabilities in regard to retraining. Nor did they raise quality of life questions, such as how the burden of going back to school, or going to night school, would affect personal or family life. Nor did they speculate about the

jobs were being affected by new technology. Yet, when pressed, none of the speakers could identify specific occupations for which trained workers would be needed. See Monica Townsend, "The Impact of Technological Change on Women," in Canada Tomorrow Conference, Commissioned Papers (Ottawa: Supply and Services, Canada, 1984), p. 51.

" University of Montreal economist Francois Vaillancourt, a research co-ordinator for the Macdonald Commission on the economy in the early 1980s, wrote an internal memo asking that the Commission address the question of what might happen if the technological revolution were to progress to the point where there would be people who were simply not bright enough to do any job. But the question was not answered, he said, during the course of the Commission's work. Interview with Francois Vaillancourt, July 3, 1984.

" See, for example, Virginia Galt, "New skills, but for what? Unemployed retrain, but no one knows where new jobs are" The Globe and Mail, January 11, 1992, p. A1.

impact on community life of significant numbers of workers being forced to keep taking upgrading courses, often on their own time, i.e., what other community activities this might detract from, be it volunteer charity work or coaching of minor sports teams. These issues were not raised by the once-populist New Democratic Party, nor by the Reform Party, despite its populist self-identification.

Public Acceptance of the "Flexibility" Imperative

Public opinion research provides some indication that the "flexibility" imperative was gaining broad public acceptance by the 1990s. In the fall of 1991, such research indicated that almost half the Canadian population felt personally in need of more education or job training.²⁴ The degree of acceptance of this message by Canadians is suggested by Decima's commentary on these research findings:

Whether intuitively or intellectually, the Canadian public seems to have come to an understanding that a fundamental change has to take place both in training and retraining people already in the workforce, and in ensuring that young people coming out of the education system are prepared to enter a workplace that will be radically altered in the next decade. Whether this understanding has resulted from recognition of the impact of the recession, free-trade and global competitiveness on Canada, or is simply a highly personal response to anxiety about unemployment and the future of the country is, for the most part, irrelevant. In a rare convergence of government, business and public thinking, everyone seems to be approaching the problem from a similar, or at least

²⁴ Decima Quarterly Report, Fall 1991, p. 135.

compatible angle."

In a survey commissioned by Employment and Immigration Canada, 52 per cent of a national sample of 1,500 agreed with the statement "Most unemployed people will not find a job unless they get training first" and 55 per cent agreed with the statement "The unemployed lack the skills needed for today's labour market."⁵⁵ In another part of the same survey, respondents were asked to choose between two points of view:

Some people say that it is important to constantly upgrade their skills while they are employed. Others say that people do not need to upgrade their skills until they become unemployed and need the training to get a job. Which one of these two points of view best represents your own?

Fully 86 per cent chose the first statement."⁵⁶

These data should, however, be viewed in the context of the fact that Canadians' actions did not seem to fully reflect their expressed beliefs. Decima research in the fall of 1991 indicated a significant percentage of Canadians, 24 per cent, were taking part in some type of educational or training program in order to improve job

⁵⁵ Decima Quarterly Report, Fall 1991, p. 149.

⁵⁶ Decima Research, "A Report on the Labour Force Development Strategy," for Employment and Immigration Canada, Ottawa, April 1990, p. 19.

⁵⁷ Decima, A Report on the Labour Force Development Strategy, p. 53.

skills. Yet this percentage was well below the percentage who said, in the same survey, that they personally needed more education or job training (47 per cent of the national sample)."⁹⁸ Even more interesting is the fact that some of the demographic groups with the lowest training participation rates were the very ones usually identified as being most in need of training -- manual labourers (only 9 per cent participation), persons 50 to 59 years of age (14 per cent), persons with only elementary school education (5 per cent)."⁹⁹ Those who would seem to be least in need had some of the highest participation rates: persons with post-secondary school (35 per cent), those earning \$70,000 or more (35 per cent), those in supervisory and managerial jobs (38 per cent).¹⁰⁰

By the early 1990s, there was anecdotal evidence, at least, that some unemployed Canadians were beginning to accept mobility as a personal imperative, even if grudgingly.¹⁰¹ A more extensive picture could be expected to

⁹⁸ Decima Quarterly Report/Fall 1991, p. 151.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ See, for example, Bertrand Marotte, Southam News, "Latest layoffs leave Hamilton's steelworkers glum about prospects of recovery," The Ottawa Citizen, October 4, 1992, p. E5. Job-hungry Hamilton workers are quoted: "'It sucks,' says Brian Zoskey, a 40-year-old millwright who hasn't worked in 11 months. He was lucky to find a one-week stint overhauling machinery at Kimberly-Clark Canada's pulp mill

emerge from a major survey conducted by Statistics Canada, comparing Canadian workers to those in Sweden on a number of the dimensions of "flexibility."¹⁰²

Remnants of Populist Egalitarianism

Richards, writing in 1981, saw prairie populism surviving "as the glowing embers of a spent fire,"¹⁰³ with certain hot spots remaining, especially among the small mixed farms of the Prairie parklands and ranchers of the open plains.¹⁰⁴ (Interestingly, Richards uses tendency to vote NDP as a measure of populism, but admits that this is an imperfect measure.) Richards also suggests a degree of right-wing populism remains in the Prairies in the early 1980s, as witnessed by organizations (presumably West Fed and Western Canada Concept, precursors of the Reform Party of Canada) defending free enterprise against "big government," the traditional family virtues against "elite liberal" morality, and "an affinity for evangelical Christianity."¹⁰⁵

in distant Terrace Bay, Ont. 'You have to be a gypsy,' he says, getting into his beat-up station wagon loaded with gear and fishing tackle for the trip north."

¹⁰² Results of the Survey on Technological Change were originally promised for September 1993 but had still not been released by late December 1993.

¹⁰³ Richards, "Populism and the West," p. 76.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 76.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 83.

Indeed, despite what seemed, by the 1980s, to be an almost pervasive belief that honest work alone was not enough for a "square deal", there was some evidence that a pure market economy was not totally accepted as late as the 1980s, especially among some age groups and regions, perhaps because other grounds of entitlement, either populist egalitarianism, or some other notion of entitlement, had survived in some residual form. For example, there was evidence that Canadians felt some workers were paid too much and some too little, even in some occupational categories where compensation was purely market-determined. Gallup public opinion research conducted in 1989 indicated that 78 per cent of Canadians believed hockey players in general earned too much money and that 57 per cent believed sales clerks earned too little.¹⁰⁶ While it may risk inferring too much from these data, one could look with some interest at the demographic breakdowns in the findings, which indicate that egalitarianism, measured by attitudes toward the income levels of sales clerks, was strongest in the interwar generation, those 50 to 64 at the time of the survey.¹⁰⁷ See Table V (a) below.

¹⁰⁶ Gallup Canada, Inc., "Public say hockey players and lawyers are paid too much," News Release, Toronto, July 27, 1989.

¹⁰⁷ I looked at the answers regarding sales clerks, since sales clerks are not in the public sector, where respondents' answers might be colored by knowing that their wages are paid out of tax dollars. What I have called the interwar generation, persons 50 to 64-year-olds at the time

Table V (a). Perception of Income Level of Sales Clerks.

	TOTAL	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65 +
Unweighted	1,029	214	262	173	196	176
Weighted	1,029	292	234	154	183	158
Paid too little	57 %	54 %	56 %	58 %	70 %	50 %
Paid right amount	27	36	29	24	15	26
Paid too much	2	2	2	4	2	2
Don't know	13	8	13	14	13	22

The interwar generation is the generation which would have come into the workforce during the years when Canada's actual move toward equality was greatest.)¹⁰⁸

of the survey (and thus born between the two world wars), were most likely to believe that sales clerks were paid too little (70 per cent gave this response; in other age groups, the percentage ranged from 50 to 58 per cent). Results were based on 1,029 personal interviews with adults, 18 years and older, conducted June 7-10, 1989. Gallup considers a sample of this size accurate within a four percentage point margin, 19 in 20 times.

¹⁰⁸ The New Face of Poverty, one of the last studies produced by the Economic Council of Canada before it was abolished by the federal government in late 1992, notes that, while consistent national data on the distribution of the market incomes of Canadian families are available only from the early 1970s onward, "indirect evidence -- including the high prevalence of two-adult, one-earner families and of low levels of unemployment, as well as a broadening base of collective bargaining in the period following the Second World War -- suggests that the distribution of private income in Canada tended towards greater equality over the early postwar decades . . . the earnings of Canadians have become more polarized since the early 1970s.

Table V (b). Perception of Income Level of Sales Clerks.

	TOTAL	Atlantic	Quebec	Ontario	West
Unweighted	1,029	95	275	364	295
Weighted	1,029	92	275	373	289
Paid too little	57 %	68 %	54 %	61 %	52 %
Paid right amount	27	19	23	28	32
Paid too much	2	3	1	2	4
Don't know	13	10	21	10	12

Looking at regional breakdowns, Table V (b) above, it was strongest in the Atlantic region.¹⁰⁹ Differences by educational attainment, Table V (c) below, were the most significant however, with those with high school or community college higher in egalitarianism than those with only public school, and sharply higher than those with university.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ Looking again at sales clerks' income levels, 68 percent of respondents in the Atlantic region said they believed they are paid too little. Of the national sample, 57 per cent gave this response, with the Prairies, interestingly, registering the lowest percentage, 49.)

¹¹⁰ Among those with high school and community college, 61 and 62 per cent respectively said they believed sales clerks to be paid too little. The comparable figure for those with public school was 52 percent, and with university, 47 per cent.

Table V (c). Perception of Income Level of Sales Clerks.

	TOTAL	Public	High	Comm. College	Univ.
Unweighted	1,029	141	462	213	213
Weighted	1,029	132	469	218	209
Paid too little	57 %	52 %	61 %	62 %	47 %
Paid right amount	27	22	24	24	41
Paid too much	2	3	2	3	2
Don't know	13	24	13	11	10

In November 1985, results of a Gallup survey question commissioned by the Public Service Alliance of Canada, showed differences according to education on another dimension of populism: job security. The question read as follows:

The Federal government has announced the lay-off of 270 long service¹¹¹ building cleaners.

In your opinion, should the government lay-off these employees and replace them with cleaning companies, or not?

What is noteworthy in these results is that the percentage of university educated respondents who answered "No, Should Not," was significantly lower, 54 per cent, than the percentage of those with public and high school educations

¹¹¹ The use of "long service" may seem to load this question, but the technical term "indeterminate" would have been unfamiliar to most of those polled.

giving this response, 63 per cent. See Table VI (a), below.

Table VI (a). Attitude toward lay-off of cleaners.

	TOTAL	Public	High	Univ.
Unweighted	1,040	169	675	192
Weighted	1,040	161	687	189
Yes, should	21 %	15 %	21 %	26 %
No, should not	61	63	63	54
Don't know	17	22	15	20

In terms of regional breakdown (bearing in mind that the sample size was somewhat small to place great faith in this breakdown), respondents in the Atlantic provinces were most likely to find the lay-off unacceptable, with 70 per cent saying the cleaners should not be laid off. See Table VI (b), below.

Table VI (b). Attitudes toward lay-off of cleaners.

	TOTAL	Atlantic	Quebec	Ontario	West
Unweighted	1,040	100	279	371	290
Weighted	1,040	101	280	372	288
Yes, should	21 %	21 %	22 %	22 %	19 %
No, should not	61	70	56	62	63
Don't know	17	9	22	16	18

However, looking at generations, responses did not differ significantly. See Table VI (c), below.¹¹²

Table VI (c). Attitudes toward lay-off of cleaners.

	TOTAL	18-29	30-49	50 +
Unweighted	1,040	243	432	357
Weighted	1,040	323	369	340
Yes, should	21 %	25 %	22%	17 %
No, should not	61	63	59	63
Don't know	17	12	19	20

One might argue that the somewhat less generous attitude of the more educated reflected self-interest, in that those with an investment in education may have been more accepting of a system in which the less skilled experience low pay and insecurity. However, there is also room to infer that higher education erodes populist egalitarianism for other reasons, such as the more rational, fully market liberal worldview it may encourage. Some recent Decima data is interesting in this regard. A national sample was asked how they feel about the statement: "Society is relying far too much on machinery and technology -- we should rely on people more." Respondents were told to assign a number between minus 5 and plus 5 to the statement,

¹¹² Gallup tables provided to the author by the Public Service Alliance of Canada.

with minus five meaning total disagreement and plus five meaning total agreement. Results differed markedly by education level, with elementary, secondary and post-secondary groups assigning average scores of 2.9, 2.7 and 1.5 respectively. This statement could serve as a reasonable operationalization of an important dimension of populism: the view that there is a human welfare and dignity benchmark against which technological progress can be measured and found wanting. Those with the highest education level would seem, by these data, to be closest to the fully liberal view that accords greatest importance to progress and finds no rational ground for relying on "people" more.¹¹³ It is noteworthy, too, that there were significant regional differences as well, with respondents in the Maritime provinces of Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island assigning scores of 3.0 and 3.1 respectively to the statement, and those in the more industrially and commercially advanced provinces of Ontario and Manitoba assigning an average of 1.8 and 1.4 respectively. Support for the statement is also highest among older respondents, with the 55-to-64-group and those 65 and over both assigning average scores of 2.7 (In comparison, 18-to-24 year-olds

¹¹³ Decima Quarterly Report/Summer 1993: Decima Quarterly reports are based on interviews conducted with representative national samples of 1,500 voting age Canadian citizens. According to Decima, results can be projected to the entire population within plus or minus 2.6 percentage points 95 out of 100 times.

assigned an average score of 1.8; 25-to-34-year-olds 2; 35-to-44-year-olds 1.9, and 45-to-54-year-olds 2.1). In this respect, there seems to be a consistent pattern of what might be viewed as "populist" pockets of opinion in eastern provinces, among older age groups, and among those without post-secondary education.

Conclusions

To sum up, many Canadians experienced economic loss, particularly loss of job security, during the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Opinion data showed significant consciousness of this loss, coupled with widespread fears of further loss. What is important, for purposes of the present study, is that many Canadians appeared to have accepted the view that they should strive to make some personal adjustment to economic loss, a view that would serve to mitigate against collective action, such as political protest. In short, the "flexibility" imperative promoted in public debate, not only by business and business-oriented governments but also by public sector and social democratic party elites, could be seen to have been widely accepted. Populist egalitarian views appeared to have greatly declined. Yet pockets of populist views remained, especially in the Atlantic provinces, and among those without university education, and arguably, too, the interwar generation whose early socialization during the

1930s may have left a strong imprint.

CHAPTER FOUR

REACTION TO ECONOMIC LOSS IN THE 1980s AND 1990s

Chapter Two looked at protest of economic loss in the 1930s and at the role of populist egalitarianism in its mobilization. Chapter Three discussed economic loss in the post-1974 period. It argued that there was widespread public acceptance of the necessity of personal adjustment, rather than collective action. This chapter will carry the analysis further. It will look first at some unsuccessful attempts to mobilize protest against actual or threatened economic loss in the 1980s and 1990s. It will argue that the absence of populist egalitarianism -- or any equivalent clear ground of claim -- can partly explain this failure to mobilize. It will then look at three "atypical" cases where mobilization did, in fact, occur. It will demonstrate that an effective ground of entitlement was present in some way in these "atypical" cases.¹

Unsuccessful Attempts to Mobilize Protest

By the 1980s, most political activists seeking to mobilize Canadians against the economic hardships they were experiencing urged them to band together in coalitions. However, there would soon be compelling evidence that such

¹ The inspiration for this approach comes partly from Dale Hathaway's "The politics of deindustrialization: An explanation of worker quiescence based on responses to the decimation of Pittsburgh's steel industry in the 1980's," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, August 1990. However, Hathaway's analysis of three "atypical" protest initiatives which mobilized unemployed Pittsburgh steelworkers tends to be broad-ranging, rather than focusing in on one or two critical causal variables.

an approach had many problems. Notably unsuccessful in mobilizing Canadians were the coalitions of farmers, women's groups, native groups and labour that formed in the late 1980s and 1990s.²

The divergent and even conflicting interests in such rainbow coalitions³, e.g. supporters of native self-government versus feminists concerned about implications of self-government for native women, auto workers versus environmentalists, have been dealt with adequately by others, (in particular, Thomas Hueglin, whose analysis is discussed in Chapter One). What has not had adequate attention is the difficulty of articulating a notion of entitlement that all the members of such broad-ranging groups can find meaningful. Typically, such coalitions use some form of basic needs theory, positing that secure employment and minimum income levels are prerequisite for human well-being. For example, "A Time to Stand Together, A Time for Social Solidarity," a 1987 policy statement by a major church-labour-feminist-educator group, the Working Committee for Social Solidarity, states:

² See Ann Shortell, "Labor at Crossroads," The Financial Post Magazine, November 1991, p. 24.

³ The term is the name of an organization founded by American politician Jesse Jackson's but has come to be used generically for any coalition that pulls together poor people's groups, feminists, labour organizations, ethnic minorities, etc., for concerted political effort of some kind.

The devastating social impact of unemployment is negative proof that work, and not just income, is an essential condition of well being in society. Through the activity of human work in all its forms, people should be able to realize their human dignity and self-expression, participate in social and economic life, secure decent personal and familial incomes, and contribute to the building of a more just world.⁴

In articulating such a principle, the committee has at least made an attempt to do what has been argued here is a key task of anyone trying to mobilize protest: It has set out a ground of entitlement on which the unemployed can feel that they are not just unfortunate losers but, rather, people who have been wronged and have some ground of claim. However, there is an important difference between the ground set out here and the honest toil=square deal ground discussed in Chapter Two. The honest toil=square deal ground was rooted in Biblical (and, occasionally, classical) principles that were well-known to average people of the day. The Working Committee's ground comes from a body of academic theory, specifically, human needs theory,⁵ which would be

⁴ The Working Committee for Social Solidarity, "A Time to Stand Together, A Time for Social Solidarity," A Declaration on Social and Economic Policy Direction for Canada by Members of Popular Sector Groups (Toronto: Our Times, November 1987), p. 11.

⁵ For example, the work of Christian Bay, e.g. "Needs, wants, and political legitimacy," Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 1 (September 1977), pp. 241-60. Also, Kai Nielsen, "True needs, rationality and emancipation," in Ross Fitzgerald (ed.) Human Needs and Politics (Sydney: Pergamon, 1977), pp. 142-56. A seminal work was Abraham Maslow's Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper, 1954). For a broad review and critical analysis of this literature, see Patricia Springborg, The Problem of Human Needs and the Critique of Civilization

unfamiliar to most of those whom the coalition is trying to reach, and which cannot be linked in any meaningful way to familiar or respected institutions, principles, or symbols. The problems of such a ground of entitlement will be examined in more detail by looking at a more recent case in which it is used: the April 1993 statement by the Episcopal Commission for Social Affairs of the Canadian Catholic Bishops Conference.

Bishops' Statement

The Episcopal Commission for Social Affairs' claimed to be speaking "from a Gospel imperative" in its April 1993 statement, "Widespread Unemployment: A Call to Mobilize the Social Forces of our Nation."⁶ The statement was given prominent play in the Canadian media.⁷ Following in the path of the Social Gospellers of the 1920s and 1930s, the bishops essentially deliver a call for Christians to lead a more authentically Christ-like life, caring for the poor in their communities:

(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981).

⁶ Episcopal Commission for Social Affairs, Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, "Widespread Unemployment: A Call to Mobilize the Social Forces of Our Nation," April 14, 1993, distributed by the Conference head office, Ottawa.

⁷ For example, Eric Beauchesne, "Bishops assail own church, Conference demands more concern for unemployed," Ottawa Citizen, April 15, 1993, p. A1. The paper ran a supportive editorial (p. A10) and partial text of the statement (p. A11) the same day.

Jesus Christ made just and loving treatment of our poor and oppressed neighbour an essential dimension of preaching his Gospel and promoting the Reign of God among us.⁸

Although it inveighed against the gap between rich and poor, the statement tended to use the morally neutral language of the social sciences, "marginalized groups"⁹ and "social polarization"¹⁰ rather than populism's "poverty in the midst of plenty".¹¹ In like manner, in discussing excessive power and wealth that must be curbed, it identified such excesses with "transnational corporations"¹² rather than "plutocrats" or "big shots" or "money kings." The "goods of creation"¹³ replaced the "fruits of the earth". They were "destined for all people"¹⁴ rather than the people's "heritage." The square deal had no equivalent. The statement noted that "our middle class is being weakened, if not destroyed" but its problem focus was not so much equality as poverty. It called not for the equivalent of a

⁸ Episcopal Commission, p. 3.

⁹ Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 10.

¹¹ Originally C. H. Douglas's term, as Laycock points out. See David Laycock, Populism and Democratic Thought in the Canadian Prairies, 1910 to 1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 134.

¹² Episcopal Commission, pp. 6, 11.

¹³ Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁴ Ibid.

middle class lifestyle for everyone but "basic human needs and rights."¹⁵ The use of such a standard would seem to leave open the possibility that what was sought was no more than a subsistence level of support, such as welfare. There was some attempt in the bishops' statement, however, to establish a benchmark that would be more than subsistence, something closer to economic independence in the populist sense and, further, the statement attempts to root it in scripture:

In Old Testament history, the prophet Isaiah repeatedly warned the people of Israel that "unfriendly" markets were undermining and destroying their socially just order in which every family had the right to its own plot of land.¹⁶

The difficulty here is how to translate the plot of land of Old Testament times into an income benchmark in a 1990s predominantly urban, market economy.

The bishops did make it clear that the basic needs package they envision was more than just a welfare hand-out. It must include work:

Work is perhaps the most important means by which people are able to exercise their creative spirit and realize their dignity in society.¹⁷

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 8.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 9.

The statement then made an attempt to link this principle to scripture, but could not do so directly, only inferentially and, even then, with some difficulty. The value and dignity of human work "derives from that special dignity bestowed on every person, for we are all created in the image of God."¹⁸ In fact, although work was dignified as a "calling" in the New Testament, in the Bible as a whole it was more a burden than a reward. God, expelling Adam from the lush abundance of the Garden of Eden, condemned him to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow.¹⁹ It was this notion of work as a burden, as a curse, in fact, that supported its use as a ground of entitlement earlier in the century. The crux of the problem here is that, by the 1990s, Canadians were in a confusing period with regard to the meaning of "work" and whether it should be viewed as ground of entitlement or as a reward in itself. John Kenneth Galbraith has argued that it is actually both. The problem is that the concept "work" is stretched to cover two very disparate phenomena.

There is no greater modern illusion, even fraud, than the use of the single term work to cover what for some is . . . dreary, painful or socially demeaning and what for others is enjoyable, socially reputable and economically rewarding. Those who spend pleasant, well-compensated days say with emphasis that they have been "hard at work," thereby suppressing the notion

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁹ Genesis 3:19.

that they are a favored class. They are, of course, allowed to say that they enjoy their work, but it is presumed that such enjoyment is shared by any good worker. In a brief moment of truth, we speak, when sentencing criminals of years at "hard labor." Otherwise we place a common gloss over what is agreeable and what, to a greater or lesser extent, is endured or suffered.²⁰

In treating work as a basic human need, the bishops' were forced to find some other ground of entitlement to both work and income. That ground was Canadian citizenship, to some extent, although, ultimately, it became membership in the human community. The statement called upon Canadians to look beyond their own borders to the needs of broader humanity:

How are we to adopt social policies and standards adequate for protecting our own citizens, without thereby hurting the peoples of other nations, especially those who live in utter poverty in Third World countries? There are no simple answers. In the final analysis, a just and peaceful world can be built only on the twin pillars of respect for the human dignity of every person on the planet, and global solidarity which takes seriously the fact that we are one human family.²¹

Like much of the 1920s Social Gospel literature, the bishops' statement was a call to the relatively privileged to be their brothers' keepers. However, in establishing humanity as the ground of entitlement for "basic human needs

²⁰ John Kenneth Galbraith, The Culture of Contentment (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992), p. 33.

²¹ Episcopal Commission, p. 10.

and rights" it slipped into a dangerous area identified by Michael Ignatieff. As a call to the wealthy to be more charitable, it sounded enlightened and progressive. It transcended narrow nationalism. However, when the statement is turned around into a doctrine of entitlement for the poor, it rings somewhat more hollow. Specifically, in a pluralistic world, a world in which people are defined and divided by ethnicity and religion, it risks leaving the individual with a very weak ground -- mere humanity -- on which to appeal to his fellow humans for help.²² In fact, some of the words in the very title of the bishops' statement "A call to mobilize the social forces of our nation," suggest the bishops' own awareness that contemporary society is indeed divided into such forces. The very danger to which Ignatieff's work alludes, the danger of finding oneself "on the heath," to use his Shakespearean image, is signalled in the statement by the fact that it ignores the needs of at least one major disadvantaged group: older workers. In noting that as the

²² Michael Ignatieff, The Needs of Strangers (New York: Viking, 1985), p. 51. "Think of the millions upon millions of hands outstretched to receive the milk from the pitchers, the cup of grain from sacks that come from the rich countries. Their states are unable to feed them; their tribes have been smashed by famine . . . they have, at the very end, only one claim to make: . . . that because they are human they deserve to live. . . . This last claim . . . is the weakest claim that people can make to each other; it is the claim addressed to anyone, and therefore to no one. When there is no family, to tribe, no state, no city to hear it, only the storm hears it."

number of part-time, low-paying jobs rises, "it is women, youth and 'visible minorities,' including native peoples and other non-white persons, as well as new Canadians, who are the most likely candidates for uncertain, poorly-paid, part-time employment,"²³ the bishops overlook the plight of older workers. In fact, most available evidence points to older workers as the group most disadvantaged in the job market. As Chapter Three noted, the risk of long-term unemployment in Canada is most strongly correlated with age.²⁴ However, older workers, for a variety of reasons,²⁵ are not a "social force" in the sense of being organized or visible.

Not surprisingly, given its lack of a meaningful notion of individual entitlement, the statement's policy prescriptions emphasize the importance of worker adjustment to advancing technology.

In a rapidly changing world of work, priority must be

²³ Episcopal Commission, pp. 5-6.

²⁴ Syed Sajjadur Rahman and Surendra Gera, "Long-term Unemployment in Canada: Its Causes and Policy Implications," pp. 99-115, in Canadian Unemployment, Lessons from the 80s and Challenges for the 90s, A compendium edited by Surendra Gera (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991), p. 101.

²⁵ The reasons are discussed in Mary Trueman, "Discussion Paper No. 22, Training of Older Workers in Canada") Geneva: International Labour Office, 1989); and "Older Workers: Conditions of Work and Transition to Retirement in Canada" (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1993).

given to new forms of educating and training present and future employees."²⁶

Ultimately, there is nothing in the statement to give workers any convincing reason to believe that they have a right to more than state help (such as assistance in paying tuition for upgrading courses) in their endless quest for "flexibility."

The 1988 Free Trade Debate

In 1988, a coalition of groups attempted to mobilize Canadians against the federal Conservative government's plan to conclude a free trade agreement with the United States. It was a time of persistent high unemployment in many parts of the country with many workers in declining industries facing the prospect of losing their jobs if free trade were to be implemented. Supporters of the deal argued that it would create "more jobs" and "better jobs" in Canada.²⁷ The anti-free trade forces focussed on the possibility of job losses and American pressure to bring Canadian social programs into line with less generous American programs.²⁸ The government called a federal

²⁶ Episcopal Commission, p. 11.

²⁷ The Canadian Alliance for Trade and Job Opportunities, "Straight Talk On Free Trade," newspaper advertisement, pp. A9 to A12, The Globe and Mail, November 11, 1988, p. A11.

²⁸ Pro-Canada Network, "What's the Big Deal?" Cartoon booklet distributed October 11, 1988, as a paid supplement in Canada's major daily newspapers.

election on the issue. On election day, more people (52.3 per cent) voted for parties opposed to free trade than for the Conservative Party (43 per cent) but the Conservatives nevertheless formed a majority government. More significantly, for the purposes of this study, it appeared that the debate had not, in the end, served to mobilize Canadians into a more active role in politics. Despite some signs to the contrary -- hecklers and demonstrators at many election meetings²⁹ -- most Canadians restricted their participation to voting. A Parliament Hill rally to protest the implementation of the free trade deal on January 1, 1989, drew only 15 people.³⁰ Rick Salutin, writing of his role as a central player in the anti-free trade campaign frequently referred to it as a popular movement. But his diary-style account offers little evidence of mass involvement, and in fact some evidence to the contrary. Relating the events of October 13, 1988 (two days after the coalition's major initiative, the distribution of a cartoon booklet through major newspapers), Salutin wrote:

the coalition movement has had a far greater reach than the business groups who support the deal -- the organizations in the coalitions represent millions of people -- but the actual numbers involved in coalition

²⁹ Charles Gordon, "Hecklers make good TV but is it good reporting?", The Ottawa Citizen, Thursday, November 17, 1988, p. A5.

³⁰ Charles Lynch, "Protest coverage reveals media's questionable news judgment," The Ottawa Citizen, January 3, 1989, p. A4.

work are still relatively few. The grass roots activities against free trade reach deeper into communities and ordinary life but are also small in comparison to the mass of the population, citizens reduced for the most part to mere voters. From the response to the booklet, you start to sense what it would be like for isolated individuals, who don't belong to coalitions, movements or anything else, to become part of decisions in their society. It's sort of a hint, no more; the connection is minimal. They read a booklet, tape on a loonie and scribble a note. Then what?"¹¹

After the election, Salutin reflected that:

the breadth and inclusiveness of the popular opposition against free trade was unprecedented in Canadian political history, but it was only a beginning. It never became a mass movement. Some of its constituent organizations -- the labour movement and the women's movement in particular -- did reach out and involve large chunks of their memberships, but other elements, like the churches, did less to actually activate their members."¹²

Though Salutin blames some coalition elements for not activating members, the explanation for the low mobilization might instead be found in the difficulties inevitably encountered in trying to find a ground of claim adequate to mobilize an extremely broad coalition. The coalition against free trade was even broader than most labour-church-social action coalitions; it included cultural groups and many others."¹³ Both sides in the free trade

¹¹ Rick Salutin, Waiting for Democracy. A Citizen's Journal (Markham, Ontario: Viking, 1989), p. 76.

¹² Ibid., p. 298.

¹³ The anti-free trade cartoon book, the coalition's main piece of campaign literature stated that almost everybody was against the deal. "All the major

debate acknowledged that there would be free trade winners and free trade losers. Some people would not know which they would be, but others, by virtue of their occupation or industry, could be reasonably sure of being losers. On what grounds could these people appeal to others to help them block the deal? As long as there would be more winners than losers, the deal was defensible on utilitarian grounds. The coalition opted for trying to convince Canadians that almost everyone risked being a free trade loser. Because of the uncertainties surrounding the deal, it was a hard case to sell.

Federal New Democratic Party Campaigns

A similar fate befell the federal New Democratic Party's hopes of significantly improving its share of the vote in the 1988 campaign. The NDP, with its traditional concerns for economic welfare of individuals, wished to be the beneficiary of growing economic fears. However, it did not put forward a clear ground of entitlement that would

environmental groups say it's terrible for the environment. Practically the entire women's movement says it's the worst thing for women. The teachers' organizations all say it's a menace to education. Artists' groups say it's deadly for culture. Peace groups say it's bad for peace. The unions say it's rotten. The United Church is against it. The Anglican church, the Presbyterian church, and the Catholic bishops are all very worried about it. Farmers, poor people, consumers, and seniors' groups across the country are opposed." From "What's the Big Deal?" distributed October 11, 1988, as a paid supplement in Canada's major daily newspaper.

have given economic "losers" a sense that they had a strong claim, that they should feel moral outrage, rather than just insecurity, and that they should mandate the NDP to represent their interests. Seeking to appeal to the same broad "popular sector" coalition that made up the anti-free trade forces, the party produced campaign material that talked about a fair deal for Canadians but never defined fairness in terms of what Canadians are entitled to."³⁴

Leader Ed Broadbent echoed the themes of the 1979 and 1980 campaigns: that the NDP represents average Canadians on Main Street, while Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Liberal Leader John Turner represented Wall Street and Bay Street respectively."³⁵ As noted in Chapter Three, Canadians (in Ontario at least) had begun to see "average" as equivalent to "loser". Moreover, the vague references to Wall and Bay streets lacked the evocative power of populism's "parasitic classes". As in previous federal campaigns, Broadbent did not convey a clear, succinct idea of why the control of wealth by persons associated with these streets was wrongful or illegitimate.

The federal party's 1993 campaign, under the

³⁴ New Democratic Party, "A Fair Deal for Canada," campaign brochure, 1988.

³⁵ Daniel Drolet, " 'You blew it,' White tells NDP," The Ottawa Citizen, December 7, 1988, p. A1.

leadership of Audrey McLaughlin, followed a similar pattern. McLaughlin charged that the incumbent Conservative government had "changed the rules" to support corporate shareholders and rich investors at the expense of middle-class Canadians "who must work for a living."³⁶ The implication of this statement was that shareholders and investors did not work, but this was never made explicit or hammered home to voters. Nor were these groups referred to as "parasitic classes" or anything comparably pejorative. McLaughlin, in a message to Canadians contained in the party's major campaign pamphlet, declared that her party wished to "protect all the people who are being swept aside by the wealthy and powerful."³⁷ But she did not provide any basic principles of distributive justice by which it could be deemed illegitimate for the wealthy and powerful to sweep others aside. In an open market economy (which the NDP was not attacking, per se), so long as those swept aside received some sort of state subsistence, what ground would they have to ask for more? The same brochure later charged that some profitable companies paid no taxes by "using the system" and because of "loopholes."³⁸ Again, the charge lacked the power of an earlier era, when the judgemental

³⁶ New Democratic Party of Canada, campaign pamphlet, "Canada Works When Canadians Work," 1993, p. 2.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 7.

language of the Old Testament was readily applied to big business and the governments who favoured business. While the party used television ads showing what appeared to be typical Canadians speaking in outraged tones, the ads, it turned out, featured actors. Canadians were not outraged, nor did the New Democrats give them any good reason to be. The New Democrats fared worse than ever, returning with only nine seats.

Labour Attempts at Mobilization

As Chapter Three points out, economic loss in regard to job security, benefits and wage levels has occurred largely as a result of the replacement of good blue collar jobs with less desirable service sector jobs. Attempts by unions to address the problem of low wages and low benefits in the expanding service sector have generally failed. There are some exceptionally notable cases of failure, such as the attempt to unionize Eaton's workers in Toronto in the mid-1930s.³⁹ There are no notable success stories, even minor ones, that can be examined as "atypical cases" for clues as to what critical variables may have to

³⁹ Explanations generally tend to focus on the amount of power in the hands of the employer. See, for example, Susan Jane McClelland, "The impact of capitalist restructuring on women workers in the contemporary Canadian political economy: a study of the Eaton's organizing campaign, 1983 to 1985," unpublished M.A. thesis, Queen's University, 1989.

be present for such attempts to succeed.⁴⁰

Most Canadians are not union members and do not enjoy the relative job security that union membership brings, even in the 1990s. Perhaps in part because of this, labour unions have consistently received among the lowest confidence ratings of any institution examined in Decima's Quarterly Reports.⁴¹ In 1992, 45 percent of a sample of the Canadian public polled by Decima had "hardly any" confidence in "the people who run labour unions," 44 per cent had "only some" confidence, and a mere 9 per cent had "a great deal."⁴² To put this in context, however, most major institutions have suffered loss of public confidence, the churches being a noteworthy example.⁴³

No longer having recourse to the honest toil=square deal equation, unions in conflict with management have attempted to use a wide variety of grounds

⁴⁰ Interview with Kevin Hayes, economist, Canadian Labour Congress, September 28, 1992.

⁴¹ The Decima Quarterly Report/Winter 1992, p. 58

⁴² Ibid., p. 72.

⁴³ See Reginald Bibby, Unknown Gods (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), p. 73. Bibby's analysis of a longitudinal opinion study indicates that in 1980, 60 per cent of Canadians had "a great deal" or "quite a bit" of confidence in religious leaders, virtually unchanged from the early 1970s. By 1985, the confidence level had dropped to about 50 per cent. As of 1990, the level of confidence had plummeted to 37 per cent.

for claim when appealing for public support. For example, workers in North Sydney, Nova Scotia, who began a dramatic blockade of a rope factory in September 1992, argued the injustice of the closure and planned sale of the factory's assets on grounds of private benefit from public interest, as well as American benefit from Canadian public dollars. The plant had been heavily subsidized by government, yet the assets were now to be sold to an American buyer.⁴⁴ At Yellowknife's Giant gold mine, scene of a violent strike that cost nine lives in September 1992, workers blamed the conflict on the company's request wages be tied to the price of gold, introduction of strict disciplinary policies, and general treatment of miners not as people but as "production numbers."⁴⁵ The common underlying element in these cases is that public support is sought by attempting to make common cause with the broader Canadian public, by tapping into anti-American sentiment, or the resentment felt by people forced to work in conditions they consider dehumanizing for one reason or another. The weakness of this approach is that it lacks a meaningful concept of individual entitlement equivalent to the honest toil=square deal equation. It does not provide any benchmark of entitlement against which to measure the workers'

⁴⁴ Kevin Cox, "At Rope's end, defiant workers stage rebellion," The Globe and Mail, September 28, 1992, p. A6.

⁴⁵ David Staples and Greg Owens, "A loss of innocence," The Gazette (Montreal), September 27, 1992, pp. A1 and A4.

conditions. It does not provide a clear reason why rope factory workers or miners should not be subject to the same harsh market pressures as everyone else.

Molson Workers' Protest -- Limited Success

Threatened with lay-off due to corporate restructuring in the summer of 1989, unionized employees at a Molson Brewery in Toronto ran newspaper advertisements urging a consumer boycott of Molson products. The ads touched on several themes, including some classic populist themes, in an attempt to present the workers' case as an instance of injustice deserving the support of the wider public. But the dominant theme, and the most ingenious, was a play on the symbols of environmental responsibility, which by the late 1980s had become a popular, mainstream political cause, one that had certainly made inroads in the Canadian consciousness to the point where environmental practices were fast becoming part of average family life. The ad pictured a typical worker and family in a bottle -- father, mother with babe-in-arms, son with Blue Jays sweater, and dog. "Treat us like beer bottles," it said. "That's all we want Molson to do." The text continued:

Re-use us. Re-cycle us. Put us to work again doing what we do best. But they won't. They'd rather fire us. They'd rather trash us. They'd rather discard us and our families like so much used up garbage. But we're not garbage. And we are not used up. We are hard working men and women. We deserve better. . . . We've put years of our life -- some of us our entire

working life -- into that plant. . . . even though we worked hard, even though Molson made vats of money, even though we helped Molson make history by winning first place in the Ontario beer market, we and our families are to be sacrificed to satisfy the money-lust of Molson and their foreign masters."

The ad campaign did not succeed in bringing about a significant consumer boycott, but the union feels it forced the company to spend more money on advertising itself, and, more importantly, to ultimately ensure that every bargaining unit employee of the plant who wished to continue working for Molson was offered a job at one of Molson's other plants.¹⁷ It is an interesting case study, even though not a total success, in that it made an impressive attempt to do what has been argued here is key to mobilization: It set out a ground on which Molson workers had entitlement to continued employment. By pointing to Molson's corporate responsibility in the re-use of bottles (something the public had come to expect by 1989), it underlined its irresponsibility in the way it used workers. It drew attention to what the public might perhaps have seen as the most wrongful aspect of the relationship between corporate power and workers by the close of the 1980s: that workers

¹⁶ Brewery Workers Local 304, "Do Not Re-cycle," advertisement appearing in The Ottawa Sun, July 21, 1989, p. 19.

¹⁷ John McNamee, first vice president, Brewery General and Professional Workers Union (Ontario), interview, December 5, 1993.

were disposable, that employers wanted only the best workers and, moreover, that they wanted only the best years of the best workers (not their learning years, and not their less productive mature years). The ads also invoked the classic populist themes of deservedness rooted in hard work, long service, breadwinner status, stability, community. If the ads failed to provoke a significant boycott, it may be because they were slightly ahead of their time in invoking environmentalism (not yet fully accepted in all respects and perhaps less so in the home of the average beer drinker than in the homes of those who designed the ads), and slightly behind their time in calling for public sympathy on the old populist grounds.⁴⁸

Successful Mobilization: Three "Atypical" Cases

Significant mobilization of protest has been rare in the 1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, three instances of successful mobilization readily suggest themselves. The first is the mobilization of senior citizens and their sympathizers against the Conservative federal government's attempt to partially de-index old age pensions in 1985. The

⁴⁸ Undergraduate political science students whom I was teaching at the time were singularly unimpressed by the ad, particularly its attempt to invoke populism. They argued that, unlike the farmers of the early part of the century, the brewery workers were not producing a product that was essential to society. They could thus not accord them any special status or feel they deserved special protection from market pressures.

fact that the mobilization was successful in getting the government to reverse its policy is not primarily what is of interest here, but rather the strong evidence that many Canadians were spurred into political action, such as working with others in organizations and sending letters and telexes to politicians.⁴⁹ The second is the Reform Party of Canada, which claimed 100,000 members by the early 1990s,⁵⁰ and which elected a Member of Parliament and a senator in 1989 and then 52 Members of Parliament, almost enough to achieve official opposition status, in 1993. The third is the Confederation of Regions party, born in Alberta but more successful electorally in New Brunswick, where it gained Official Opposition status by electing eight members of the Legislature in September 1991. As has been noted earlier, protest, as defined in the present study, does not include voting. It focuses, rather, on political activities that require a higher degree of involvement. However, the success of new parties at the polls can be taken as evidence that many people have, in fact, been persuaded to get involved in such higher level activities, such as running as a candidate for a new party, or working for such a

⁴⁹ The mobilization of many seniors is well documented in media accounts, for example, Anthony Wilson-Smith, "A growing budget backlash," Maclean's, June 17, 1985, pp. 8-9; Marc Clark, "Pointing the index finger," Maclean's, June 24, 1985, pp. 40-41.

⁵⁰ In Preston Manning, The New Canada, Author's Preface, (Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1992), p. x.

candidate.

In examining these mobilization efforts, it will be argued that, in each case, there was a notion of entitlement that provided a ground for claim to those who were suffering economic loss or the threat of it.

Pensioners' Protest

In May 1985, the federal government introduced a budget that included a number of measures intended to reduce the federal deficit. One of these measures was partial de-indexation of old-age pensions.⁵¹ Prime Minister Brian Mulroney conceded that the budget broke one of his 1984 election campaign promises. He had promised the elderly that he would protect their Government pensions (Old Age Security) fully from the ravages of inflation.⁵²

The Canadian Council on Social Development calculated that the partial de-indexing would reduce each senior's income by approximately \$100 in 1986 and by \$500 per year by 1990. This represented a loss of \$1,500 to \$2,300 per senior in the course of the next five years. It would have increased the number of seniors living below the

⁵¹ Bruce Little, "How Ottawa gains millions now, billions later," The Globe and Mail, May 28, 1985, pp. 1-2.

⁵² "Budget breaks Tory promises, Mulroney says," The Globe and Mail (CP-Staff), May 30, 1985, p. 4.

poverty line from 650,000 to 750,000.⁵³ Once the impact of the proposal became apparent, outrage grew quickly and many seniors and their organizations mobilized. On June 27, 1985, the government backed down. Finance Minister Michael Wilson announced to the House of Commons that old age security payments would remain fully indexed to the Consumer Price Index. To allow the government to meet its deficit reduction goal, the Minister announced two compensating tax measures: an extension to the period of a temporary surtax on large corporations and an increase in the excise taxes on gasoline and other motor fuels.⁵⁴

Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon and Gretta Riddell-Dixon, in an impressively thorough analysis of the successful protest against the proposed partial de-indexation, identify a great many factors which they feel contributed to the mobilization of seniors. For example, they theorize that the seniors who mobilized did so in part because they had been educated to stand up for themselves during the 1960s and 1970s; they were the products of consciousness raising

⁵³ Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon and Gretta Riddell-Dixon, "Seniors Advance, The Mulroney Government Retreats: Grey Power and the Reinstatement of Fully Indexed Pensions," pp. 277-292 in Contemporary Canadian Politics, Robert J. Jackson, Doreen Jackson and Nicolas Baxter-Moore (eds.) (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1987), p. 279.

⁵⁴ Commons Debates, June 27, 1985, p. 6271.

and political education.⁵⁵

Seniors are standing up to fight for their rights in a way that their predecessors did not. This shift in attitude is partly the result of better education, less geographical isolation and improved health. They, like many minority groups, have had their consciousness raised by the civil rights movement of the last 20 years. Many of them also have experience in trade unions and professional associations which have taught them the advantages of effective organization and collective bargaining.⁵⁶

As was the case with the anti-free trade movement, the seniors' protest drew together a coalition of interest groups. It was not just seniors and their organizations who were mobilized; rather, "the fight was carried out by institutionalized interest groups which had already had experience, although limited success, in lobbying the federal government"⁵⁷ Among those who joined the fight was the highly influential Business Council on National Issues, which as the Riddell-Dixons speculate, may have been motivated by business' interest in making sure seniors continued to have lots of disposable income to spend on its products and services.⁵⁸ The seniors' cause was strongly supported by the media, the opposition parties in the House of Commons, and the governments of Quebec, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Newfoundland. The Canadian Mental

⁵⁵ Riddell-Dixons, p. 278.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 278.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 282.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 285.

Health Association and the Registered Nurses' Association of Ontario were on side. Before the fight was over, thousands of individual Canadians had sent letters and telexes to Ottawa protesting the partial de-indexation proposal.⁵⁹

The Riddell-Dixons, in fact, examine this widespread mobilization from a great many angles, seeming to leave no stone unturned in their search for factors explaining its unusual success. They speculate that non-seniors may have actually seen a personal material interest in the outcome of the battle in that parents and grandparents who fall below the poverty line can represent a threat to the prosperity of their children. Families have a moral sense of responsibility toward parents and grandparents and are, in fact, required to help them under the Family Law Reform Act in Ontario.⁶⁰ Although they touch on many such causal factors, the authors emphasize that outrage was fuelled primarily by the fact that the move appeared to be a betrayal of an earlier government commitment to maintain the level of seniors' benefits.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 286.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ As the Riddell-Dixons point out: "The government's statements on the issue and its direct responses to the seniors' groups all indicated an ongoing commitment to universal and fully indexed pensions. For example, in January 1985, the government announced in its discussion paper on child and elderly benefits that 'no change is required in the Old Age Security/Guaranteed Income

The Riddell-Dixons do not examine the rhetoric of the seniors' battle with a view to determining whether there was a clear notion of distributive justice informing the arguments of the seniors and their supporters. Their study was primarily intended to lay a ground work for later comparative work that might shed light on the relative lack of success of certain other public policy interest groups, "in particular, those in the peace movement."⁶²

The Riddell-Dixons argue: "The victims were easily recognized members of society who were already experiencing economic hardship . . . the government could not have chosen a more vulnerable group."⁶³ Thus the issues, to the Riddell-Dixons, were hardship (worse off than others in society) and vulnerability (helpless to do anything about their situation because their productive years were behind them). The authors also note that, during the course of the debate, the public had occasion to compare the situation of seniors to that of a particularly well-off reference group: big business. Commentary in The Globe and Mail notes:

Supplement payments system.' In stark contrast to this assurance, Finance Minister Michael Wilson announced in his budget speech of May 23, 1985, that increases in the Old Age Security (although not the Guaranteed Income Supplement) would be limited to three percent below the rate of inflation. The move was intended to reduce the deficit by \$260 million by March 1987, p. 279.

⁶² Ibid., p. 278.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 284.

By coincidence, the amount the Government hopes to take from seniors -- \$1.6 billion -- is only slightly more than it will forego with its capital gains tax giveaway -- \$1.25 billion . . . By one reputable estimate, only 4 percent of taxpayers claimed capital gains last year. Put that 4 percent against the 10 percent of the population which is over 65 years of age, and you've got a political problem.

Such contrasts made the hardships facing many seniors seem all the more unfair,"⁴⁴ the Riddell-Dixons conclude. Their analysis of the issue of the seniors' perceived deservedness stops there. However, they might have carried it further. The debate indeed reflected the public perception that most seniors had worked very hard all their lives, harder than the generations that followed. For many seniors, that work had included fighting in a war. In a way, it was possible to reinvoké the populist "honest toil" ethic of earlier years. A Maclean's account of the debate quotes Jean Woodsworth, Ontario division president of Canadian Pensioners Concerned, as arguing that by attacking pensioners, the Conservative budget hit people "who have worked hard and contributed to this country's well-being."⁴⁵ In arguing against the proposed partial de-indexation in the House of Commons, opposition politicians

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 284.

⁴⁵ Anthony Wilson-Smith, "A growing budget backlash," Maclean's, June 17, 1985, p. 8.

referred to hard work⁶⁶, war service⁶⁷, and, specifically, work of a kind that contributed to the betterment of society⁶⁸.

Seniors' obvious financial need and their vulnerability were issues. However, without the additional element of deservedness, based on the general perception that seniors had contributed a lifetime of honest toil⁶⁹, mobilization of protest may not have been quite so dramatic.

⁶⁶ Commons Debates, remarks by NDP member Neil Young (Beaches), p. 5443: "I say to the Prime Minister that Canada's seniors have paid, and paid handsomely. He says that the Budget rewards those who get up half an hour earlier. That is a cruel joke to play on Canadians who have worked hard all their lives."

⁶⁷ Commons Debates, remarks by New Democratic Party Leader Ed Broadbent (Oshawa), p. 5267; NDP member Neil Young (Beaches), p. 5443; and NDP Member Nelson Riis (Kamloops-Shuswap), 5455.

⁶⁸ Commons Debates, remarks by Nelson Riis (Kamloops-Shuswap), p. 5455: "We all know that we must reduce the deficit. However, there is a more appropriate way to do that than on the backs of those people who built this country."

⁶⁹ The perception, rather than the reality, is what is important in terms of mobilization of protest. Whether or not the generation over 65 in 1985 had actually worked harder than those still in the workforce could be debated from a number of perspectives. On one hand, there was less generous unemployment insurance, work was of a more physically demanding nature, women working in the home had larger families and fewer labour saving devices. But pressures in workplaces of the 1980s and 1990s may be arguably more severe. Such points were never discussed, however, in 1985, the assertion that seniors had worked hard went unchallenged.

3

PM-1 3½" x 4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

PRECISIONSM RESOLUTION TARGETS

The Reform Party

The Reform Party of Canada was one of a number of protest organizations⁷⁰ to grow out of the "western separatist" sentiment fuelled by the National Energy Program announced as part of the 1980 federal budget. The program was attacked by various western politicians and journalists as giving an undue share of oil wealth to the East.

This was a situation where economic loss took the form of loss of anticipated earnings. The West was in the middle of an oil boom. Westerners, particularly those linked to the oil industry, perceived that they were going to be denied part of the high earnings, in some cases windfall earnings, that they had been planning on.

The movement's early supporters were "mostly middle-aged or elderly" and, in terms of occupation, tended to be small businessmen, farmers, accountants, and federal government clerks. Oil-well-servicing businessmen, consultants, and drilling contractors, feeling hit in the pocketbook by the Liberal budget of 1980, also joined. The

⁷⁰ Others were the Western Canada Concept Party, founded by Victoria lawyer Doug Christie, and West Fed, a movement rather than a party, founded by Edmonton tractor dealer Elmer Knutson; and the Confederation of Regions Party, which grew out of West Fed.

movement's hardcore supporters were rural residents.⁷¹ The movement relied heavily on the populist rhetoric of the early Alberta Social Credit movement and even attracted some of its former activists. However, it borrowed selectively from the arsenal of early populism, railing not so much against banks and big business as against eastern vested interest, mostly the federal government, though occasionally the attack ranged to other eastern interests, such as Toronto-based Southam News, owners of Alberta's two largest and most influential dailies, The Calgary Herald and The Edmonton Journal.⁷² It also blended populism with nostalgia for a British dominated pre-bilingualism Canada and, at the fringes, took in communist conspiracy theories and bordered on racism. The Union Jack, rather than the Maple Leaf was displayed at rallies.⁷³

The Western Canada Concept Party, an early entrant in the race to harvest western discontent, gained a seat in the Alberta Legislature through a by-election in February 1982. However, its victory was short-lived. It failed to gain any seats in a subsequent general provincial election.

⁷¹ Denise Harrington, "Who are the Separatists," pp. 23-44 in Western Separatism. The Myths, Realities & Dangers, Larry Pratt and Garth Stevenson (eds.) (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1981), p. 33.

⁷² The author's observations, as a political reporter for the Edmonton Journal, 1981-82.

⁷³ Ibid.

The erratic behaviour of the party's leader, Doug Christie, alienated many people and the party failed to attract influential western elites.⁷⁴

The Reform Party was founded by Preston Manning, son of former Socred Alberta Premier Ernest Manning, in 1986, following what was known as the CF-18 affair, the awarding of a federal government contract for the maintenance of Canada's fleet of 136 CF-18 fighter aircraft to a Montreal-based firm, rather than the Winnipeg-based firm westerners perceived as deserving of it. Manning alleged that Quebec cabinet ministers had intervened in the tendering process. Treasury Board President Robert de Cotret argued that the decision was in the national interest in that the winning firm, Canadair, could better use technology transfers resulting from the contract to develop the country's industrial base. Manning would later write:

For many westerners, the CF-18 decision had the same odour as the NEP (National Energy Program), only this policy was instituted not by the Liberals but by the new Conservative government, which was supposed to be introducing more regional fairness and balance into national decision-making.⁷⁵

Describing the birth of the Reform Party in his book, The New Canada, Manning says a number of influential

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Preston Manning, The New Canada (Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1992), p. 127.

western business and political leaders began to feel that the time was ripe for a new, moderate, western-based federal political party to demand, in the words of one "a fair deal for the hinterland regions of the country."⁷⁶

Early support for the party came from small-town elites, such as those who owned the leading businesses in the smaller towns.⁷⁷ As the party grew, they would continue to provide the core of support. In the spring of 1982, one journalist characterized Reform Party members as "people who are not only middle-aged but drive mid-sized North American cars and earn mid-sized incomes."⁷⁸ Sydney Sharpe and Don Braid, authors of a book on the party, pointed out that the people it attracted were pretty much the same no matter where Manning found them: mainly white, male, middle class, and pushing the far side of middle age. "Non-white faces are rare enough to be an event. At three meetings in Ontario, attended by a total of at least 9,000 people, there were fewer than 10."⁷⁹ In early 1990, a

⁷⁶ Manning, quoting Ted Byfield, publisher of Alberta Report, in The New Canada, p. 129.

⁷⁷ Marjorie Nichols, "Reform Party intends to 'stick it' to Tories," The Ottawa Citizen, Thursday, October 13, 1988, p. A3.

⁷⁸ Andrew Nikiforuk, "The Manning Reformation," pp. 46-58, The Globe and Mail Report on Business Magazine, May 1992, pp. 53-54.

⁷⁹ Sydney Sharpe and Don Braid, Storming Babylon (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1992), p. 31.

party poll leaked to the Edmonton Journal showed that 72 per cent of the party members were men, 48 per cent were over 60 years old, and 38 per cent were retired.⁸⁰

The party's ability to mobilize protest sentiment is evidenced by what would appear, from public events, to be a sizable membership (its claim to have 100,000 members cannot be verified), the fact that it was able to elect a member, schoolteacher Deborah Grey to the House of Commons,⁸¹ and to elect Canada's only elected senator (retired military officer Stan Waters, who died in office),⁸² and the election of 52 members to the House of Commons in 1993.

Analyses of the movement's success have often portrayed it as fanning the flames of a still smouldering prairie populism.⁸³ Yet farmers are not a big part of

⁸⁰ Sharpe and Braid, p. 31.

⁸¹ Grey won a by-election in the Alberta riding of Beaver River on March 13, 1989. She captured 11,154 votes, the Conservative candidate got 6,912, the Liberal 2,756 and the New Democrat 2,081. The seat had been left vacant by the death of a Conservative MP-elect just five days after the November 21, 1988, federal general election.

⁸² Waters won Canada's first Senate election, held in Alberta on October 16, 1989. About forty per cent of the province's eligible voters cast ballots. Waters received 257,523 votes, about 42 per cent of the total.

⁸³ John Howse, "On the March," cover story, pp. 26-28, Maclean's, October 29, 1990.

Reform's membership base" (though it should be noted that they are no longer as big a part of the population as they were in populism's heyday, even in the West).

The Reform Party is a difficult "atypical case" to analyze, because it is full of contradictions. However, there can be little doubt that it represents a case where political protest was mobilized against a perceived source of anticipated economic loss. It is also clear that mobilization occurred through the promotion of a particular worldview, one that provided those experiencing loss with notion of distributive justice giving them a ground for claim.

The ground for claim was not the early populist "honest toil" ground used by Preston Manning's political forebears, even though it wore the rhetorical trappings of it and even though, by a stroke of luck for the party, its only elected Member of Parliament did in fact personify the classic populist virtues, in a way quite untypical of party rank and file.⁸⁵ For example, Manning did not defend

⁸⁴ Murray Dobbin, Preston Manning and the Reform Party (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1991), p. 119.

⁸⁵ Media coverage of Deborah Grey inevitably stressed her simplicity of lifestyle, lack of materialism, work ethic, and sense of duty to community. See, for example, Suzanne Zwarun, "Women and the Reform Party," Chatelaine, March 1992, p.132. "Grey personifies the virtues of simple living and hard work. 'You should see me hauling garbage to

market losers against the harshness of a social order that had divested them of their jobs, as early CCF and Socreds had. He defended market "winners" against a federal government that would take too big a share of their winnings in order to shore up its own political power by spreading the wealth around the country. Manning nevertheless referred to his movement as populist, as seeking to represent "ordinary grassroots westerners."⁸⁶ Such rhetoric, after all, carried a certain cachet in the west, linking Reformers to a proud tradition of parties that had fought for westerners. Manning did, in fact, draw on many of populism's traditional radical democracy elements, calling for more accountable political institutions and, in particular, for an elected senate. Reform's "Blue Book," setting out the party's basic principles, gives prominence to constitutional and political reform, calling for a number of direct democracy measures including referenda, initiative and recall (against a Member of Parliament whom constituents feel has violated his or her oath of office).⁸⁷ Most of all, the party emphasized the need for an elected Senate.

the dump,' she says with a laugh, 'admitting she didn't even own a television set until after her election.' The article also notes that Grey, before her election, had been a schoolteacher, cared for foster children, and been active in her church.

⁸⁶ Manning, The New Canada, p. 130.

⁸⁷ Building New Canada, Reform Party of Canada Principles and Policies, The Blue Book, 1991, p. 11.

However, populism's defense of the average "honest worker" against financiers, plutocrats, and profiteers is not to be found in Manning's rhetoric, in The New Canada, or in the "Blue Book." His book dwells extensively on western grievances such as the National Energy Program and the CF-18 affair -- sins of an arrogant government which enjoys too much power by virtue of a flawed political system.

Reform's broader program, designed to appeal to Canadians in other parts of the country, thins out into a general defence of the marketplace against undue government interference and a defence of individuals against an overtaxing, insufficiently accountable, spendthrift federal government. Thus, Reform's link to early prairie populism is ultimately little more than the fact that it is a western-based party attacking the federal government.

Interestingly, in one attempt to build the case that Reform does speak for little people, Manning presents what purports to be a letter from such a person in his book. The writer, never identified by name, is said to be a young woman living in central Alberta. She describes difficult economic circumstances, including the fact that she is a student, her husband makes only \$9.50 an hour, and the two have a child. She tells Manning:

I am writing to you because I want you to know how much

some of us little people need your Reform movement . . . We are well below what the current government is calling the "poverty line," but we are pretty well off compared to people fifty and sixty years ago. We have never, ever accepted any kind of welfare or government subsidy. We live within our means and we demand as young, broke Canadians that our governments live within theirs.

We work very hard, and we just want to live in a country where hard work can mean something, and a person can "make it" without government handouts, unfair taxation, supporting a pregnant bureaucracy, unreasonable interest rates, and an inequitable federal system where the concerns of my region are ignored."

Manning clearly intends the letter to illustrate the injustices ordinary westerners are suffering. It is worth noting, however, that original 1930s populism would have questioned whether \$9.50 an hour is a fair wage, while Manning's populism concerns itself only with unfair tax on this wage (the letter implying, though never explicitly stating, that the young family is itself overtaxed.)

It is worth noting, too, that Manning is a supporter of free trade and, further, some analysts have noted that his agricultural policies would kill many of the rural communities Reform purports to represent."⁹ Moreover, corporate elites are not attacked in Reform rhetoric, not even eastern-based ones. What is perhaps all the more remarkable about this is that the supporters that

⁹ Manning, The New Canada, p. 338.

⁹ Nikiforuk, p. 48.

Reform does attract, the middle-aged, mid-sized car driving western smalltown elites, might logically blame at least part of their economic woes on eastern-based corporate giants. Canada's growing concentration of economic power, and the devastating effects on small players of takeovers and various market controlling manoeuvres by conglomerates and wealthy families have not been kept secret but are in fact well documented in the media and such best-sellers as Diane Francis' Controlling Interest.⁹⁰ If Manning sees any such divergence of interests between his core small-town support and corporate Canada's elite, he has not admitted to it, let alone tried to exploit it. In fact, he has sought the support of Bay Street. As he recounts in his book, in September 1990 he spoke to a group of Toronto financiers, including Conrad Black and Hal Jackman, at the elite Toronto Club. He writes of delivering his "basic talk" on "the Reform approach to getting Canada's fiscal and constitutional houses in order,"⁹¹ of following up with thank you notes to the guests, and of subsequently receiving "a few financial contributions". That the financial yield from this foray was only minimal came as no surprise to him, he notes, since:

senior business executives, with a few rare exceptions,

⁹⁰ Diane Francis, Controlling Interest (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1986).

⁹¹ Manning, The New Canada, p. 252.

are not in a position to identify openly at the outset with a populist, bottom-up political movement dedicated to 'changing the system.'⁹²

Moreover, he adds, they are accountable to shareholders from a variety of political persuasions who would frown on such activity "until the new movement has proven itself competent and successful."⁹³ Further, all large companies are forced to get along with governments in power:

Senior executives simply cannot afford, regardless of their personal political inclinations, to 'get on the wrong side of the governing party' for long, nor can they risk identification with political innovations that may turn out badly."⁹⁴

Manning goes on to conclude that any breakthrough in Ontario is thus more likely to happen through the efforts and support of ordinary Canadians and organizers who "rarely dine at the Toronto Club."⁹⁵ What is significant in this analysis is that at no time does Manning suggest that the Reform Party has, or will have, any policies that might drive the corporate elite away. Perhaps even more significantly, he does not seem to feel that support of this elite would compromise his party, or the direction in which he wishes to take it.

⁹² Ibid., p. 252.

⁹³ Ibid., pp. 252-3.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 253.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

When one looks at the more substantive parts of Manning's analysis of Canada's problems, one finds less of the language of populism -- "grass roots" and "ordinary" -- and more of the language of pluralism and conflict resolution theory -- fair deals for regions, working out a system that will serve the needs of all. Moreover, if one digs a bit deeper, the regional rhetoric seems to be just a veneer, too. Manning's philosophy, at its core, is market liberalism. Reform's underlying notion of distributive justice is essentially the liberal "flexibility" imperative, in a particularly pure form. As the Blue Book states, under the heading, Industrial Development and Diversification:

The Reform Party supports the long-term removal of all measures which are designed to insulate industries, businesses, financial institutions, professions, and trade unions from domestic and foreign competition . . .

The Reform Party supports giving greater priority to the development of skills, particularly those that provide future job flexibility (such as literacy and computer education). As well, such training should be made more flexible in terms of the type of institution providing the training. We would encourage cooperative training in industry.⁹⁶

What is key here, however, is that, in the wake of western disappointment with the federal Conservative government of Brian Mulroney, Manning was able to present westerners with what passed as a ground of entitlement to a better deal. He was able to convince sizable numbers of

⁹⁶ Reform Blue Book, p. 14.

them that the federal government was taking too much of their share of the pie, and that it was doing so illegitimately. The party continued the same themes through the 1993 federal election campaign, with noteworthy success.

The Confederation of Regions Party: New Brunswick

The Confederation of Regions Party was originally yet another attempt to harvest Western discontent. It was founded by Edmonton-based tractor parts dealer Elmer Knutson, following an unsuccessful bid to channel protest through a non-partisan western rights organization.⁹⁷ In the early 1980s, Knutson thought it unlikely that a new political party could gain a foothold, so he devised the West Fed organization as an instrument to infiltrate mainstream party riding organizations, the Alberta Conservatives being a main target. The idea was to get such parties to nominate candidates favoring western rights and a peculiar form of reconfederation (although Knutson claimed it would be the first confederation, the current one never having been legal, according to his personal research in Britain). The new confederation was to have four regions, an arrangement that was supposed to lessen the power of Quebec. This was Knutson's formula for a fairer deal for

⁹⁷ In the manner of the anti-abortion group, Right to Life.

the West. Gaining control of nominations in existing party riding associations proved more difficult than Knutson had envisioned and, besides, the fledgling Western Canada Concept Party had meanwhile managed to elect a member to the Alberta Legislature in a by-election. Given WCC's ongoing internal strife, Knutson decided he could form his own party and do better. He founded that Confederation of Regions Party. The party ran candidates in the western provinces in the 1984 federal election but failed to win any seats. Railing against central Canadian vested interests, the new party soon reached eastward to find support in other hinterland regions. In 1986, a loose association of New Brunswick voters opposed to high taxes joined with members of two fringe movements, the fundamentalist Christian Heritage Party and the Association for the Preservation of English in Canada, forming a Maritime chapter of C.O.R.⁹⁸ The party found resonance in New Brunswick among disaffected anglophones who had nowhere to turn to vent their resentment of bilingualism, particularly as it affected access to coveted federal and provincial government jobs in a province with chronically high unemployment. Given its origins, the party was not surprisingly tarred early with charges of racism, and rumours of links with the Ku Klux Klan continued

⁹⁸ "Anger at the Core," Maclean's, October 7, 1991, p. 17.

to dog it for some time."

Nevertheless, in September 1991, the party became New Brunswick's official opposition, with eight seats. It ran second in 18 other ridings and, in fact, captured 30 per cent of votes cast by English-speaking voters. The six ridings around the provincial capital, Fredericton, heavily populated by civil servants, elected five of the C.O.R. members.¹⁰⁰ Analysts attributed the C.O.R. victories in part to voter unhappiness over the Liberal government's spring budget, which froze public service salaries.¹⁰¹ C.O.R. promised to lift the freeze, arguing that the government had behaved badly in failing to honor the contract that it had signed with the unions and declaring, in its platform statement, that the free collective bargaining process is "one of the cornerstones of our present western society."¹⁰² However, an equally powerful factor may have been the area's resistance to the Liberal government's policy of increasing the number of provincial jobs designated as bilingual. An article in Maclean's on

"Don Richardson, "C.O.R. wants to end rumors of link with KKK," The (New Brunswick) Telegraph Journal, Saturday, October 24, 1992.

¹⁰⁰ Maclean's, October 7, 1991, p. 17.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² "A Fair Deal for New Brunswickers," The C.O.R. - New Brunswick 1991 Election Platform, p. 36.

the mood of the campaign presented the viewpoint of a unilingual anglophone civil servant who had decided to join C.O.R.

No matter how many years' experience you have, you don't have a chance for promotion because the number of bilingual positions has escalated in the past four years.¹⁰³

C.O.R. promised to repeal New Brunswick's 1969 official Languages Act as well as other legislation making New Brunswick officially bilingual. Other policies were presented but not very well developed and never really stressed, according to some observers of the campaign.¹⁰⁴

In general, C.O.R.'s 1991 election platform document contains more echoes of 1930s populism and more repudiations of the 1990s market liberal "flexibility" imperative than does Reform's Blue Book.¹⁰⁵ C.O.R.'s platform reflects notions of wealth-sharing and entitlement to work that are markedly at odds with liberal "flexibility." It represents a return to more traditional grounds of entitlement, such as seniority and longservice.

¹⁰³ Maclean's, "Anger at the C.O.R.," October 7, 1991, p. 17.

¹⁰⁴ Philippe Doucet, political scientist, Université de Moncton, in an interview with The Financial Post Magazine. See Gord McLaughlin, "Thunder from the Right," November 1991, p. 35.

¹⁰⁵ Building New Canada, Reform Party of Canada Principles and Policies, The Blue Book, 1991.

Also, community and right to a job are once again linked. Being a resident of New Brunswick, under C.O.R.'s platform, bestows priority for public service employment (though residency is very broadly defined as having lived in the province for six consecutive months, not counting residency for the purpose of post-secondary education).¹⁰⁶

C.O.R. departs markedly from Reform, not just in its support for civil servants (no talk of bloated bureaucracy in the C.O.R. platform) but also in its willingness to attack large corporations:

The share of corporate taxes paid by corporations operating in New Brunswick, as a percentage of total taxes paid is at too low a level. By contrast, New Brunswick working people and small businesses pay too high a share.¹⁰⁷

The 1991 C.O.R. platform presented a strange assortment of policies, some of which appeared to be at odds with the party's right-wing roots. What is significant here, however, is the fact that C.O.R. was able to present a notion of entitlement that could be used by a group that felt economically threatened (by wage freezes, by bilingualism, by outsiders taking provincial public service jobs, by a tax regime taking too big a bite of income). C.O.R. offered those experiencing loss, or the threat of

¹⁰⁶ C.O.R. 1991 Election Platform, p. 10.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 12.

loss, the chance to feel moral outrage, to feel that they had been wronged and deserved redress, that they were not simply unfortunate "losers" with no ground for claim.

The party's success in mobilizing enough protest to secure official opposition status might also be attributed in part to the fact that it was able to tap into a certain degree of pre-existing populist sentiment. Chapter Three discussed residual "pockets" of populism remaining in some parts of the country, notably Atlantic Canada, among those with high school but not university, and among the interwar generation, whose political socialization began in the 1930s when populist rhetoric was at its peak and who came of age in a day when Canada was experiencing gains in economic equality. The C.O.R. Party had the advantage of having a "target population" that conformed quite well to the profile of those in whom residual populist values would be expected to be strong.

Conclusions

To sum up, the vast majority of attempts to mobilize protest against economic loss in the 1980s and 1990s were largely unsuccessful. In general, these efforts failed to give "losers" a meaningful ground of entitlement to redress. Clearly, broad coalitions of groups with

different interests have particular difficulties in finding such a ground. However, it appeared that even relatively homogeneous groups of workers had problems finding grounds on which to appeal to the broader general public for support. Without common principles, symbols and benchmarks to invoke, loss was only loss -- not injustice. In the three "atypical" cases of successful mobilization of protest against real or threatened economic loss, a ground for claim was provided, even if it was not always clear, coherent or well-articulated. As has been noted earlier, the relative success, electoral or otherwise, achieved in these cases is not primarily what is of interest here (success being a function not just of the strength of one's own forces but also of the strength or weakness of one's opponent), but the fact that large numbers of Canadians were motivated to engage in political activism of various kinds in response to real or threatened economic loss.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE DECLINE OF A GROUND OF CLAIM

As Chapter Four has demonstrated, the key terms of populist egalitarianism had all but disappeared from public debate by the 1930s and, in most cases, the concepts were gone too. Not only did one not hear terms such as "heritage" or "honest toil," one did not hear any identifiable equivalent. "Square deal" was no longer mentioned, nor had anything comparable replaced it. The decline of the middle class was an acknowledged phenomenon, but "middle class lifestyle," as a term invoking the good life, did not carry the moral weight of "square deal". Further, the "plutocratic" and "parasitic" classes were not railed against in the House of Commons or elsewhere in public debate (with some occasional interesting exceptions).¹ The wealthy and powerful were attacked with nothing more potent than oblique references to "Bay Street" and "Wall Street".² "Poverty amidst plenty" had come to be known by more morally neutral terms such as polarization and

¹ For example, when Diane Francis' in a 1986 Canadian bestseller on corporate concentration, argued: "Instead of building world-class contenders, corporate Canada is preoccupied with collecting unrelated assets back at home and gobbling up the accomplishments of other players in unrelated fields, through the cunning use of tax avoidance and the games only paper entrepreneurs can play. It is a parasitical game that will not make the economic pie grow. It will shrink, as the pieces change hands and workers are thrown out of jobs because of duplication." See Controlling Interest (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1986), pp. 5-6.

² See "Broadbent no longer talking of victory," Ottawa Citizen, November 14, 1988, p. A4.

marginalization. How had such changes occurred? This chapter will look briefly at some theories of how political culture changes -- or does not change. It will then propose a broad approach to explaining the change that occurred in Canada between the 1930s and the 1980s.

Explaining Change in Political Culture: Approaches

There are various ways of theorizing about ideological change. Christian and Campbell, authors of a widely used text on ideologies (and parties) in Canada, use a Hartzian approach to explain, for example, how the society of European settlers that formed the nucleus of modern-day Canada came to have an initial political culture, one that was predominantly liberal:

a distinctive political society developed in the northern half of North America, a society which by necessity and by choice shared in the liberalism of the United States, but did not accept it wholly.³

Hartzian theory allows that new ideologies can develop in response to the disintegration of older ideologies. However, it holds that, once engendered, ideologies have a life of their own. They may be exported from one country to another through waves of immigration. Once rooted in a new country, they may prove hardy enough to crowd out all others. Or, on the other hand, they can be weak. They can decline. For Hartz, such weakness and

³ Christian and Campbell, p. 287.

decline would be in part attributable to "internal contradictions." Hartz argued that because liberalism came to America as the ideological baggage of European settlers, and that this liberalism somehow unfettered itself of the remnants of feudalism during the trans-Atlantic voyage, it was a particularly hardy form of liberalism. "A liberalism so absolute that it could not see its relative self."⁴ It was so hardy that it dominated all challengers and became so closely identified with the country itself that it was "Americanism" for all intents and purposes. Hartz explained the failure of socialism to establish a significant foothold in the United States largely by its inability to compete against the all-pervasiveness of liberalism and because socialism, as Hartz saw it, was the product of the tension between liberalism and feudalism's heritage, toryism. Since the tory element was missing from American political culture, socialism could not be born. Hartz looked at populism in the United States, as manifest in the Progressive movements of the American farmers of the mid-west, as something different, a waystation between liberalism and socialism. Like socialism, populism could not gain a permanent foothold in the presence of hardy American liberalism. But it had another problem, too. It had "internal contradictions." It purported to be radical,

⁴ Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1955), p. 270.

he noted, in attacking capitalism. However, it really just attacked trusts. Once trusts were smashed, populism could easily "stay at home with Locke." A truly competitive market system would be acceptable to it.⁵ (An argument that has some merit, though it involves an oversimplification of populism, which opposed not just trusts but also middlemen and various kinds of parasitic activities, and, generally, the use of property as a means of making money as opposed to a means of independence.) Hartz further ridiculed populism for contemplating that capitalism could be overthrown not by a propertyless proletariat (as Marx envisioned) but by farmers who were capitalists themselves.⁶ Hartz' views on populism's internal contradictions are supported by later analysts of American populism, such as Pells, who sees it as:

Constantly hovering between the desire to break up the monopolies and restore laissez faire on one hand, and the need to make corporate capitalism function more effectively on the other, the progressives remained ambivalent in their analysis and contradictory in their legislation.⁷

Thus, for Hartz, who viewed ideologies as very hardy, as

⁵ Hartz, p. 239.

⁶ Ibid., p. 125.

⁷ Richard H. Pells, Radical Visions and American Dreams: Culture and Social Thought in the Depression Years (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 8.

having a life of their own once entrenched in a polity, change was possible but basically only as a result of internal contradictions within the ideology itself.

Granting that a certain amount of ambivalence and internal contradictions did exist, within Canadian populism as well as American, the explanation offered by the present study for the decline in populist egalitarianism in Canada over the last 50 years will be more broadly grounded. Essentially, it will accept, with Hartz, that political culture may migrate from one country to another, as the ideological baggage of immigrants. Yet it will see it to be also a function of economic, social, and cultural conditions in its host country. Further, it will look at currents of change in the form of ideological movements, two of which had great influence on both Canada and the United States. Specifically, these were the Social Gospel movement of the early part of the century, and the student protest movement of the 1960s. Both were, ironically, viewed as progressive in their day (though the latter's reputation has suffered somewhat through recent retrospective critical examination). The final part of this chapter will examine the eroding effects of both these movements on the populist egalitarian values.

Social and Economic Conditions that Supported Populist Egalitarianism

The conditions that supported populist egalitarianism have been touched on in Chapter Two, but are reviewed briefly below:

Worker as Breadwinner. In the earlier part of the century, most of those who worked outside the home were male and, by virtue of being male, were breadwinners or breadwinners-to-be. So widely respected was this role that it was considered quite acceptable for employers to pay married men not only more than women but also more than single men. In fact, women could be asked to leave the workforce upon marriage in some professions, such as teaching and the civil service,^{*} partly because their rightful place was believed to be in the home but also because, during hard times, jobs had to be preserved for breadwinners. In pre-limits-to-growth days, in a country still full of open spaces, all children were considered an invaluable contribution to society and even the most humble worker-as-breadwinner had a status within his community on this ground. He was not just earning money for himself but to raise the next generation of Canadians. It was thus somewhat difficult to justify

^{*} John Herd Thompson and Allen Seager, Canada 1922-1939, Decades of Discord (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985), p. 152.

giving him less than the square deal, or terminating his employment abruptly without just cause. Community outrage would have been a likely result.

Work Predominantly Manual. The fact that most work was manual in the early part of the century was helpful in making the case that excessive wealth could not have been earned "honestly". A man working with two hands could only do so much, it was argued. In his influential 1920 book The Farmers in Politics, William Irvine actually extended this argument not only to mental work but also to the output of the private business firm:

(The general public) has discovered that no man, however brainy, that no company, however well-managed, can make millions unless permitted by a vicious privilege to reap where others have painfully sown."

The logical inference was that all honest workers should have roughly the same share of the wealth pie, the "square deal."

Familiarity and Acceptance of Scriptural Principles.

Scriptural principles permeated daily life in the first half of the century. Some of them, as has been noted, were especially important to populist egalitarianism: From the Old Testament, equality of all men before the law, and work

⁹ William Irvine, The Farmers in Politics (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), p. 25.

as a curse and burden; from the New Testament, wealth as an impediment to getting into heaven. Such principles were strongly promoted and supported by the church, the most influential institution in many small communities. In some parts of the west, the church was itself non-establishment and served to promote populist ideas as a contending ideology, as a challenge to the dominant liberal values of the day.

High School Education as Goal. Graduation from high school was the standard educational achievement to which most Canadians aspired in the first half of the 20th century. Significantly, in the days before a wide range of elective courses was available, those who finished high school finished it with a fairly uniform education, an education rich in Biblical and classical concepts. This supported populist egalitarianism in two ways: 1) it reinforced common principles and symbols (many of which were also inculcated by the church), 2) it undergirded the notion of equality.

Co-operatives. Fairbairn et al. note that co-operatives in Canada embodied egalitarianism "in the sense that control is not supposed to depend on the amount of capital or number of shares owned by any individual; each member is to have one

vote."¹⁰ The co-operative movement in Canada developed rapidly at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century among farmers anxious to counteract the power of central Canadian financial and political elites.¹¹

Conditions that Eroded Populist Egalitarianism:

Between the beginning of the Second World War and the mid-1970s, the changing nature of the Canadian economy, the distribution of Canada's population, and various newly emerging social phenomena, wrought major changes to the country's basic institutions. These changes, in turn, had wide-ranging ramifications for populist values.

Worker as Isolated Individual. With the entry of women into the paid labour force, and the drop in the birth rate after 1960, the concept of breadwinner began to lose meaning. As noted in Chapter Three, by the 1980s, many more members of the family, grandparents in the home and even young people were working. Moreover, children had ceased to be viewed as a contribution to the greater society and more as a private

¹⁰ Brett Fairbairn, Christopher S. Axworthy, Murray Fulton, Lou Hammond Ketilson and David Laycock, "Co-operative Institutions: Five Disciplinary Perspectives," pp. 13-38, in Co-operative Organizations and Canadian Society: Popular Institutions and the Dilemmas of Change, Murray E. Fulton, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 15.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 33.

pleasure. Workers were thus isolated individuals, as opposed to men with special, important responsibilities to family and community. They could be paid subsistence wages with relative impunity. They could also be laid off somewhat more readily, on the assumption that other working family members, together with the social safety nets, could see them through rough patches.

Work Predominantly Non-manual. The shift of the economy away from primary industry and -- a trend that had begun somewhat earlier -- the closing of the frontier, had major impact on the kind of work that Canadians did. The decline in manual work as a percentage of all work has been discussed in Chapter Three. It contributed to the erosion of populist egalitarianism in two ways: 1) Non-manual work, whether in the professions, bureaucracy or service sector, entailed the demand for a host of educational credentials, from secretarial diplomas to doctorates, which, by virtue of the time, effort and ability necessary to obtain them, seemed to legitimize gradations in pay; 2) the predominance of non-manual work made it difficult to separate "honest toil" from the various "fast-buck" schemes and "parasitic" activities that constituted non-honest work. Jobs took on such a variety and complexity that it became most difficult to judge whether one's neighbour's occupation merited the amount of income he earned, or whether it was "honest" in

Irvine's sense of not using privilege of some kind to profit by the work of others.

Decline of the Church and Influence of Scripture. As noted above, populist egalitarianism rested largely on a scriptural foundation. That scriptural foundation lost support as the church declined dramatically in influence, in both English and French Canada, particularly in the 1960s. The percentage of Canadian adults attending church on a typical Sunday dropped from two-thirds in 1946 to one-third by the late 1980s.¹² The decline in scriptural knowledge, most striking among younger adults, is noted by Reginald Bibby in his most useful work based on survey research conducted in Canada over a number of years. He observes that even as church attendance has declined, there are some "functional alternatives" that have picked up some of the slack in religious education, specifically, Roman Catholic schools and private schools have grown in number and religious studies programs at universities expanded after 1970. However, "the net effect for the population as a whole is hardly a religiously literate nation."¹³ Bibby reports that, by the 1990s, "the answer to the simple 'Who

¹² Reginald W. Bibby, Fragmented Gods, The Poverty and Potential of Religion in Canada (Irwin Publishing, Toronto: 1987), p. 11.

¹³ Reginald Bibby, Unknown Gods (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), p. 167.

denied Jesus' question still eluded large numbers of Canadians, both old and young, with the numbers of those in the dark up significantly from the mid-1970s."¹⁴ (See Table VII below.)

Table VII. Do you happen to know who denied Jesus three times?¹⁵

National Sample: Percent correct.		
	1975	1990
TOTAL SAMPLE	51	43
18 to 34-year-olds	50	34
35 to 54-year-olds	48	44
55 years of age and over	55	52

Bibby's work suggests there is as yet no viable alternative to traditional religion. Although "New Age" thought appears to be on the rise, judging by popular books selling in bookstores, surveys indicate New Age thought "seems to function as a supplement rather than a substitute for traditional faiths."¹⁶ Less than 1 per cent of Canadians are exclusively involved in New Age thought. The

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 166. Data is from the Project Canada Survey Series, self-administered questionnaires sent by mail with follow-up reminders. Return rates of 52% in 1975 and 60% in 1990 resulted in 1,917 cases being gathered in 1975 and 1,472 in 1990.

¹⁶ Bibby, 1993, pp. 51-52.

vast majority of people most interested in New Age thought -
 - 81 per cent -- continue to identify with Roman Catholicism
 (53%) or Protestantism (28%).¹⁷ Moreover, as Bibby points
 out, New Age thought has tended to be "ideationally eclectic
 and organizationally diffuse."¹⁸ As such, it does not
 provide a either common set of symbols or a source of
 authoritative views on distributive justice.

Growth in the University System. As a result of a veterans' rehabilitation program, 53,000 ex-soldiers entered the universities between 1944 and 1951. By the mid-1950s, places vacated by veterans had been filled by high school graduates. Demands for university expansion continued, but the full force of this pressure came in the 1960s, when enrolment rose from 128,600 in 1960 to 323,000 in 1971-72.¹⁹ In 1988-89, there were 500,000 full-time students in Canadian universities. This comprised 17.3 per cent of the population aged 18 to 24, more than double the proportion of 1960. In addition, there were 306,000 part-time students registered in degree programs.²⁰ A workforce that, in the 1930s, had once been quite homogeneous, was by the late 1980s, segmented by its differing educational credentials

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 49.

¹⁹ Statistics Canada, p. 122.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 124.

and commensurate salary expectations. The square deal had lost meaning.

Change in the Nature of Rural Institutions. Richards points out that the advent of labour-saving farm technology increasingly pushed the rural population into the cities, eroding many rural institutions, with their populist underpinnings.²¹ As Fairbairn et al. recount, co-operatives did not so much decline as change in nature. As large organizations, co-operatives had to develop complex bureaucratic structures, supervised by professional and full-time managers. "Internal decision-making is thus left to managers, whose politics (according to the model provided by the corporate sector) are assumed not to be public or inherently political, but private and politically neutral."²²

Ideological Currents That Eroded Populist Ideas

Populist parties, once in power, failed to deliver on many of their promises. For Laycock, the Aberhart government, on balance, came up short on its promise of egalitarianism. "Limiting incomes within the province was

²¹ John Richards, "Populism and the West," in Western Separatism, ed. Larry Pratt and Garth Stevenson (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1981), p. 77.

²² Fairbairn et al., p. 35.

not, and was never attempted."²³ Further, the Social Credit "dividend" ran aground on practical difficulties and federal intervention.²⁴ Similarly, Lipset's analysis of the early legislative record of the Saskatchewan Co-operative Commonwealth Federation finds it wanting as agrarian "socialism." As Lipset has recorded, legislation that would have restricted the size of individually owned farms and placed discriminatory taxes on absentee-owned farms was suggested by some of the more radical CCF leaders but voted down by Saskatchewan's CCF government and the majority of the legislative caucus because the party leaders feared that any proposals that affected land tenure would be regarded by many farmers as steps leading to nationalization of land. Secondly, most of the CCF rural leaders were among the more prosperous farmers in their regions -- owners of large farms.²⁵

The fact that not all policies linked to the egalitarian notion of distributive justice were implemented does not belie its importance as an element of Canadian political culture which radical parties were able to exploit

²³ David Laycock, Populism and Democratic Thought in the Canadian Prairies (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) p. 263.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Seymour Martin Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, rev. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 275.

for a period of time. It could speak, rather, of the problems of governments in power and their tendency to become conservative, to be forced into accommodations with established interests. These tendencies have been examined elsewhere, notably by Macpherson in the case of Social Credit in Alberta²⁶ and Lipset in the case of the Saskatchewan CCF²⁷. Nevertheless, there are important reasons to believe that the parties themselves ultimately helped erode populist egalitarian values, despite their frequent invocations of them.

"The Social Gospel"

Faced with alarming poverty and hunger, protest parties of the 1930s moved away from early populist ideas, even as they continued to invoke their symbols. Their aims, very early on, became those of the highly influential Social Gospel movement. Essentially, they shifted their efforts away from trying to secure the square deal. Instead, they 1) called for measures aimed at mitigating the worst aspects of poverty, specifically measures to meet basic needs, rather than provide the square deal, 2) grounded entitlement to basic needs in citizenship or in membership in a caring Christian and/or socialist community, rather than in honest

²⁶ C. B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), pp. 219-20.

²⁷ Agrarian Socialism, see particularly p. 277.

toil; 3) promoted the belief that science and technological advancement would ultimately create a better world for all; 4) promoted worker self-improvement through education, thereby a) opening the way for honest toil alone to be considered inadequate as entitlement to anything, b) placing an onus on the individual to adjust to the workplace, rather than vice versa, and c) creating new skill and education gradations in the workforce, thus laying the basis for further inequalities of reward on the basis of credentials.

1) From Square Deal to Basic Needs

Aberhart campaigned not for the square deal, per se, but for an end to "poverty in the midst of plenty" and the social dividend was not for an equitable share of the wealth pie, but rather for "bare necessities" not an equitable share of the wealth pie.²⁸ Similarly, Mills points out that Woodsworth "avoided prescribing a levelling account of equality."²⁹ "He simply said that Canadians should receive 'enough,' enough of the means of material survival, and left it at that."³⁰ In large part, this

²⁸ William Aberhart, The Douglas Systems of Economics, in William Aberhart, Outpourings and Replies, David R. Elliott, ed. (Calgary: Historical Society of Alberta, 1991), p. 72.

²⁹ Allen Mills, Fool for Christ, The Political Thought of J.S. Woodsworth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), p. 155.

³⁰ Ibid.

shift can be linked to the "Social Gospel," the evangelical Christian movement that contributed to the ideological formation of Woodsworth and other important figures in the CCF, as it is recalled by participants and documented by Richard Allen and other social gospel historians.³¹ Its ultimate emphasis was on addressing poverty, not equality (a shift some would say marks the essential shift from social democracy to liberalism³²),

2) From Honest Toil to Social Citizenship

The ideology of the Social Gospel movement proceeded from the perspective of people of privilege who would choose to practice Christian "brotherhood" by concerning themselves with the needs of the poor, as Christ did, therefore leading more authentically Christian lives. The Young Men's Christian Association, the Student Christian Movement were among the vehicles. The moving force was not

³¹ Richard Allen, The Social Passion. Religion and Social Reform in Canada 1914-28 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971); and Richard Allen, ed., The Social Gospel in Canada, Papers of the Interdisciplinary Conference on the Social gospel in Canada, March 21-24, 1973, at the University of Regina (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1975).

³² "... poverty is the main welfare problem to social liberalism while inequality is the main problem to social democracy," Robert Erikson, contrasting Swedish democracy with the liberalisms of other Western nations, cited by Martha Nussbaum, in "Aristotelean Social Democracy" in Liberalism and the Good, eds. R. Bruce Douglass, Gerald R. Mara and Henry S. Richardson (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 242.

so much belief in equality as in brotherhood, in being one's brother's keeper, as Christ would wish. In this, the Social Gospel movement had, one might argue, the "corporatist-organic-collectivist" element that theorists such as Horowitz would link to "toryism."³³ A 1927 quote from the general secretary of the United Church Department of Evangelism and Social Service illustrates:

As a corporate experience the individual must recognize himself bound up with all others, so that the wrong in the life of every other individual is acknowledged to be his. Exponents of the Social Gospel have persuaded us of this. It is unquestionably the feeling that we and all others have not acted as our brother's keeper. When this comes with its searching implications, we are driven to identify ourselves with the efforts of Holiness to remedy that which is wrong.³⁴

The CCF focus on honest toil was, from the beginning, in danger of being eclipsed by other notions of distributive justice, not just because of the Social Gospellers within its ranks but because of the influence of British Fabian socialism, more specifically the socialist thought of urban intellectuals which, as McNaught has observed "imposed itself upon a reluctant agrarian movement

³³ Gad Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science XXXII, no. 2, May 1966, p. 144.

³⁴ D. N. MacLachlan, general secretary of the United Church Department of Evangelism and Social Service, Annual Report, 1926-27, United Church Department of ESS, p. 25, cited by Allen, The Social Passion, p. 291.

with limited economic aims".³⁵ In 1938, Laycock notes, voters were told that a CCF government would work toward a new social order in which "the principle regulating production, distribution and exchange will be the supplying of human needs."³⁶

3) Optimistic View of Technological Advancement

As Chapter Two noted, W. L. Morton saw the farmer's parties of 1920-1935 responding in large part to farmers' discomfort with a society that was becoming increasingly technologically advanced. Such could not be said of the Alberta Social Credit Party, which held that advancing technology was a great boon to mankind. Laycock cites a 1943 speech in which Premier Aberhart declared: ". . . as these vast power-driven machines make it possible to produce more and more, with less and less effort, everybody should be better off. The people generally should be better off. The people should reap the benefit."³⁷ Indeed, such a technologically driven leap forward would be necessary for the transition to an age of plenty since, as Laycock points out, Social Credit, according to the Social Credit Manual,

³⁵ Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics. A Biography of J.S. Woodsworth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), p. 53.

³⁶ Laycock, p. 170.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 204.

was not to be based on any confiscation scheme of taking the wealth of the rich or well-to-do to give to the poor."³⁸

Abundance, not redistribution, would solve the problem of poverty in the midst of plenty.

Similarly, Woodsworth, speaking as early as 1926, would welcome the typewriter for bringing freedom to women:

There are tens of thousands of neatly-dressed girls, more or less efficient, taken out from housework, drilled in business methods, made to feel independent, given at least some training in co-operation."³⁹

Mills notes that Woodsworth felt that sober-minded socialists grasped how indispensable were science and technology as means to equality's attainment.⁴⁰ For example, in 1928, Woodsworth pointed out that activities traditionally done in the home -- weaving, spinning, cooking, laundry, teaching, health-care -- were increasingly carried out in specialized institutions. He felt women should leave the home, in large part because they had to:

We are -- women as well as men -- living in a new and rapidly changing world. There is an inexorable law of nature -- "Change or die!" This is as true in the social as in the physical realm. It is at our peril that we fail to adapt ourselves to new conditions."⁴¹

³⁸ Ibid., p. 244.

³⁹ Mills, p. 160.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 158.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 159.

4) "Self-Improvement" as Workers' Right/Responsibility

Evidence of welfare liberal as opposed to populist ideas becomes even more apparent as one examines the objectives of the Social Gospellers. They wanted to find remedies for crime and poverty,⁴² to develop a new non-judgemental social work using "morally neutral" language,⁴³ to provide opportunities for adult education for workers, not only to help them read "a sacred book" but also to equip them for "agriculture, business and industry."⁴⁴ What seems to have been envisioned is that the time was coming when honest toil alone might not be enough to secure employment, and further that workers should be ready to adjust to this changing workplace, with its advancing technology. What may or may not have been envisioned, but what was an inevitable consequence of the process set in motion, was that, as workers studied, they would acquire credentials (eventually degrees through institutions such as the Social-Gospeller inspired Sir George Williams College of

⁴² Allen notes that, in 1917, when the Canadian Conference of Charities and Corrections altered its name to the Canadian Conference on Public Welfare, the new name was felt to betoken a new view of "crime and poverty as pathological conditions which may be largely removed by a readjustment of social forces," The Social Passion, p. 286.

⁴³ In which actions were described as "unwise" or "deleterious" but not "wrong" or "reprehensible," Allen, The Social Gospel, p. 290.

⁴⁴ J. R. Kidd, "The Social Gospel and Adult Education in Canada," in Richard Allen, ed., The Social Gospel in Canada, p. 234.

the Young Men's Christian Association) which would introduce previously non-existent gradations of reward in the workplace. The burden for training that had previously been born by employers (though various apprenticeship and on-the-job training schemes) was subtly shifted onto the individual (supported to some extent by the larger society through the subsidies of the state). Not surprisingly, the CCF Party platform of 1935 also shows a tendency to shift away from the notion of all vocations, however humble, being deserving of roughly the same share of the social pie. It states:

A labour code must be developed which will include state regulation of all wages, equal reward and equal opportunity of advancement for equal services irrespective of sex.⁴⁵

The implication here is clearly that all services are not equal and that some may justly be rewarded more generously than others, provided all who do them are as generously rewarded, regardless of sex.

"The Sixties"

Like the Social Gospel movement, the "youth movement"⁴⁶ of the 1960s was a social movement whose

⁴⁵ From Owen D. Carrigan, Canadian Political Party Platforms, 1867-1968, (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1968), p. 124.

⁴⁶ This term is the one commonly used to describe the movement, for example, by Kenneth Westhues in an excellent analysis of its manifestation in Canada. See "Inter-Generational Conflict in the Sixties," in Samuel D. Clark, J. Paul Grayson and Linda M. Grayson, eds., Prophecy and Protest: Social Movements in Twentieth-Century Canada (Toronto: Sage, 1975), p. 387. It might be more accurate,

ideology and organization was not limited to Canada. As Westhues notes, its basic ideology of popular democracy and of resistance to bureaucratic institutions drew some measure of support in most western industrialized countries.⁴⁷

Moreover, most adherents recognized the same symbolic⁴⁸ leaders, who for Westhues, were exemplified by the Beatles (presumably the late Beatles and, more specifically, John Lennon), Joni Mitchell, Allen Ginsberg, or Herbert Marcuse.⁴⁹ Membership was not accomplished by joining an organization or carrying a card but simply by "expressing

however, to call it the "student movement" as does Jack Quarter in The Student Movement of the Sixties, A Social-Psychological Analysis (Toronto: The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1972).

⁴⁷ Westhues, p. 388.

⁴⁸ Symbolic in the sense that they did not lead parties or even organized action to any great extent, as Westhues has noted (p. 389). Moreover, they did not craft complex theories in the manner of Major Douglas nor, with a few exceptions, such as Marcuse and McLuhan, did they leave bodies of theoretical works. Rather, their ideological expression tended to slogans and songs: Don't trust anyone over 30; Turn on, Tune in; Drop out; Give Peace a Chance.

⁴⁹ Westhues, p. 388. Abbie Hoffman, Timothy Leary, Bob Dylan, Joan Baez, and Marshall McLuhan should arguably be added to this list. A good compendium of excerpts of influential writings of the era can be found in Gerald Howard, ed., The Sixties (New York: Washington Square Press, 1982). McLuhan is the sole Canadian included. Canada's youth movement also had a number of minor indigenous leaders, such as Steven Langdon, president of the University of Toronto Students' Administrative Council in the late 1960s, and later, the 1980s and 1990s, a New Democratic Party Member of Parliament. Westhues also notes that, in Canada, the leader of a student uprising would, in many cases, be a young professor, not infrequently American, who voiced the ideology of student power and became a guru for campus activists (p. 392).

commitment to the movement's amorphous goals."⁵⁰

Sixties protest, taking the form of demonstrations, sit-ins, "happenings," guerilla theatre, and rock festivals, was not protest of economic loss but, on the contrary, protest of economic excess characterized as shallow materialism. As the Social Gospellers, two generations before, had been shocked by the abject poverty of the Depression, Sixties activists were revulsed by symptoms of affluence such as "the cult of consumer goods."⁵¹

The Sixties protest movement was primarily a student movement, and despite its high profile on a great many campuses, only a minority of university students were activists.⁵² Yet, significantly, the values espoused and promoted by this minority received so much attention that the movement is now inextricably linked with the decade. There is also some evidence that the values were, to some degree, adopted by a segment much larger than the activist population.⁵³ Further, they would have longstanding impact

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 389.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 388.

⁵² Quarter, p. 1.

⁵³ After analyzing national survey data, the results of 3,500 interviews conducted in 1973, and studies conducted in 1967, 1969, and 1971, American researcher Daniel Yankelovitch concluded that certain new values associated with the counterculture in the 1960s, especially with upper-

because of their importance in the political socialization of the "big generation" of post-war baby boomers. For Westhues, the impact of the movement, which he situates between 1964 and the early 1970s, was that it "left behind a variety of new norms and folkways in the western world."⁵⁴ Significantly, for this study, these values included the notion of "self-fulfilment," which extended to the idea of choosing work that would be "meaningful;" the rejection of materialism; and decline in respect for authority, including the authority of institutions.⁵⁵ Each of these values will be examined below in terms of the specific ways in which it helped to erode populist egalitarianism.

Work as Self-Fulfilment. "Self-fulfilment" meant finding one's own path one of freedom and authenticity, instead of entering the rat race where one would be required to sell

middle-class college students, had subsequently spread to the entire youth generation, i.e., middle-, lower-middle, and working-class youth, and thence to older upper-middle-class urbanites. These values included: more liberal sexual mores; lessening of compliance with and respect for established authority in the form of the law, the police, the government, and one's boss; waning influence of organized religion and churches on moral behaviour; waning of traditional uncritical attitudes of patriotism; lessening loyalty to the work ethic, marriage and family, and the value of money as a measure of success; increasing concern with life as a search for self-fulfilment as opposed to pursuit of economic security. Cited in Steven M. Tipton, Getting Saved from the Sixties (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1982), p. 309.

⁵⁴ Westhues, p. 389.

⁵⁵ See Tipton, p. 309; also Westhues, p. 388-89.

out. Among the various changes in American attitudes wrought by the Sixties, Yankelovitch notes "increasing concern with life as a search for self-fulfilment as opposed to a pursuit of economic security."⁵⁶ For some, this search meant delaying decisions about careers, in the search for something sufficiently authentic and meaningful. In one of the few empirical studies of Canadian student "radicals"⁵⁷ of the era, Jack Quarter found that activists differed from non-activists in tending to be undecided about their careers and to pick non-professional courses of study:

The most radically oriented were likely to select the social sciences and humanities, whereas those with the most conservative orientation selected professional and business programs.⁵⁸

Quarter speculates that indecision about a career "may be most manifest among students who do not find the standard career options appealing."⁵⁹

Any career (with the exception of professional revolutionary) implies a commitment to society and its values. Those who are undecided may be experiencing a conflict between their values and society's; the options available are to compromise themselves or to

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 309.

⁵⁷ Quarter distinguishes radical from activist. "Among those with radical attitudes only a small number became activists. Not every radical is an activist, or interested in student politics." The Student Movement of the Sixties, p. 90.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 90.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 91.

attempt to change society.⁶⁰

However, other accounts of the Sixties suggest that professional revolutionary was not the only ideologically acceptable career, that one might also be a rock musician, or a rock music critic, or that one might write for the underground press.⁶¹ Film schools and journalism schools burgeoned during this era. Even Quarter concedes that becoming an academic was at least half-way acceptable because, even though it involved a commitment to society, "academics tend to have a critical orientation toward society."⁶² Moreover, cult figures of the era, such as Marcuse, helped popularize the Marxist notion of work as a necessary creative expression and as man's defining attribute. Westhues observes that one of the ways in which youth protest was contained was through federal programs such as Opportunities for Youth, by which students could be invited to devise innovative projects and then be paid from federal funds to work on their projects.⁶³

The problem of work as creative, self-fulfilling activity has been discussed in Chapter Four, with reference

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Westhues, p. 393.

⁶² Quarter, p. 92.

⁶³ Westhues, p. 403.

to the Catholic Bishops' commission's "call to mobilize." Once work has become an end in itself, it can no longer be used as a ground of entitlement to some other end, such as the square deal. This problem was compounded when the square deal itself came into disrepute in the Sixties.

Middle Class Lifestyle Under Attack. The only approximation of the square deal discernable in public debate during the second half of the 20th century was the "middle-class lifestyle." But, as has been noted earlier, it did not have the same emotional power. In part, this is because, during the 1960s, symbols of middle class affluence were made objects of derision and condemnation.⁶⁴ ("Lifestyle," a 1970s word, came later, during the partial rehabilitation of middle classness.) Middle class was Sixties' shorthand for the sins of consumerism and materialism and undue concern with social status and respectability. Some critics would find great hypocrisy in the fact that the Sixties' generation preached against materialism and consumerism while remaining prosperous consumers "thanks to parental allowances and grandparental trust funds"⁶⁵. However, the

⁶⁴ S. D. Clark, "Movements of Protest in Postwar Canadian Society," in Samuel D. Clark, J. Paul, Grayson and Linda M. Grayson, eds., Prophecy and Protest: Social Movements in Twentieth-Century Canada (Toronto: Gage, 1975), p. 417.

⁶⁵ Norman Podhoretz, cited by Gerald Howard, in "Introduction," The Sixties.

attack was real and the damage suffered longlasting. It is interesting to note, in the context of the economic loss experienced by many Canadians in the 1980s and 1990s, that the concept of a middle class lifestyle, by this period, had a strong component of economic security, the idea of not living too close to the edge. According to Yankelovitch, economic security was one of the aspects of the middle class dream that was eroded by the Sixties shift to finding self-fulfilment.⁶⁶ Yet economic security, as a term or as an idea, appears almost nowhere in the many reminiscences of the Sixties and writings of the period in works cited here.⁶⁷ "Dropping out" meant the rejection of middle class comfort and respectability. If it did not mean taking the risk of losing everything one has, or falling into frightening poverty, it could be because that risk did not seem real to people who were at an age when they had not yet accumulated houses, cars, furniture and savings accounts, and children who had to be educated. Nevertheless, the longterm impact of the Sixties was a devaluation of economic security that, twenty years later, would make its widespread loss very difficult to protest.

Loss of Faith in Institutions. The Sixties marked the

⁶⁶ Tipton, p. 309.

⁶⁷ Nor does the author recall it from her own 1960s student days at Sir George Williams and Carleton universities.

beginning of a period that would see loss of faith in institutions of all kinds (although, in Canada, as some of Reginald Bibby's work suggests, the impact became apparent somewhat later). This occurred even while many institutions were renewed, with broader representation in their governing bodies, with greater participation by youth, women and minorities. It was a loss of faith that was never to be fully regained by the baby boom generation. Yankelovitch perceived it as a shift in several "moral norms," including "lessening of compliance with and respect for established authority in the form of the law, the police, the government, and one's boss;" "waning influence of organized religion and churches on moral behaviour;" and "waning of traditional uncritical attitudes of patriotism."⁶ Twenty years later, now-mature student radicals would tend to still distrust the old institutions and to find meaning in small political groups, such as neighbourhood action committees.⁶

The problem of the absence of common grounds of authority, in institutions or in scripture, has been touched

⁶ Yankelovitch, p. 309.

⁶ Lawrence Kaagan, Lawrence Kaagan Associates, New York, and Michael Adams, Environics, Toronto, Presentation to a group of federal Communications managers and officers, Public Opinion Research Office, Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, March 25, 1993. Findings based on quantitative and qualitative public opinion research in Canada and the United States, early 1990s.

on briefly in previous chapters. Without commonly accepted moral principles and symbols, and institutions embodying and promoting them, those seeking to mobilize protest against economic loss in the 1980s and 1990s would have little to work with in their attempts to craft "calls to mobilize" that would strike common chords and pull together disparate groups.

Conclusions

The populist egalitarian notion of distributive justice that had fuelled protest in much of the first half of the century was seriously eroded by 1974, when a new era of economic loss began for Canadians. Changing economic, social and cultural conditions, such as the changing nature of work, contributed strongly to this erosion. However, ideological currents worked against it as well. It is somewhat ironic that the Social Gospel movement and the Sixties protest movement, both considered progressive in their day, contributed to the undermining of the honest work=square deal equation. The Social Gospel movement, by shifting the focus from the square deal to basic needs, and ground of entitlement from honest toil to social citizenship, undermined the honest toil=square deal equation and left nothing in its place. By viewing technological advance as a boon and requiring that individuals make personal adjustment, it left no solid ground of entitlement,

no threshold notion of how much effort or how much adjustment would be enough. The Sixties protest movement further undermined "honest toil" as a ground of entitlement by redefining work, albeit meaningful work, as personal fulfilment. It disparaged the square deal, now "middle class values," as a shallow and unworthy goal. In questioning authority, it undermined authority on all fronts and left no accepted authority, such as scripture, to which individuals could refer in pressing a case for distributive justice. Ultimately, the baby boom generation, the "most idealistic in history"⁷⁰ would be the generation that would accept the view that repeated job losses should be enthusiastically embraced as a "series of adventures."

⁷⁰ Gerald Howard, "Introduction," in Gerald Howard, ed., The Sixties, p. 7. ". . . the generation once hailed on the front pages of the newsmagazines as "the most idealistic in history".

CHAPTER SIX

CONTRIBUTION OF FINDINGS TO THEORY OF SOCIAL ACTION

If, as previous chapters have attempted to demonstrate, the relative weakness of protest against economic loss in the 1990s can be partly explained by the absence of a strong ground of entitlement, it is now worth considering what contribution this finding can make to a general theory of social action. Chapter One, in reviewing attempts by others to explain quiescence in the face of loss in Canada in the 1980s and 1990s, suggested a number of variables that might make up a theory of "protest/non-protest." The variables can now be combined with the findings here. This chapter will also make some attempt at determining whether the findings of the present study are of value in explaining political phenomena beyond Canada's borders. Finally, it will look at the implications of the findings in terms of predicting future protest in Canada, i.e., when and where it is most likely to occur. In closing, the chapter will set out some directions for further empirical research, particularly research to provide more support for conclusions regarding the role of beliefs regarding distributive justice.

General Theory of Social Action

Previous chapters have presented shared beliefs regarding distributive justice as just one variable that may foster protest against loss or, alternatively, hinder it, depending on whether such beliefs are conducive to

mobilization or not. Thus, it is not argued here that it has predictive power in itself but, rather, that it can contribute to a general theory of social action, specifically, a theory of protest (or non-protest). In such a theory, it would be combined with other factors, for example, some of the explanatory variables identified in previous analyses of political quiescence in the 1980s and 1990s. To recap briefly, these variables included:

- 1) degree of social solidarity (pre-existing group bonds);
- 2) number of cross-cutting cleavages (political causes competing for the political energies of a population);
- 3) extent of professionalization and/or bureaucratization of opposition parties and movements;
- 4) political efficacy;
- 5) attitudinal "coherence", i.e., the presence or absence of a clear collective point of view.

One could now add:

- 6) presence or absence (or strength or weakness) of a ground for claim, i.e. a collective notion of distributive justice giving losers some sense of entitlement to redress.

There is some potential for overlap between the fifth and sixth variables, since the absence of a clear collective point of view could include the absence of a ground for claim. However, the sixth can pertain to situations where there is a clear collective point of view but one that is not conducive to protest, i.e., the view that wealth is most justly distributed through unrestrained market forces

(Mandeville's private greed leading to public good).

These variables are in some cases derived from hypotheses not empirically tested. For example, the fifth is offered only speculatively by Richard Johnston. Moreover, simply combining them does not produce an integrated model, since they are not necessarily interconnected, nor are they all essential determinants of protest or quiescence. Any one of them alone may be sufficient to impede or advance the emergence of protest.

This "theory" of protest/non-protest, in being multi-causal, has some similarities to Clark, Grayson and Grayson's theory of why social movements arise (or, conversely, do not arise)¹ though their theory was formulated at a time when social scientists were trying to explain protest rather than the lack of it. Criticizing the tendency of some social scientists to search for the one single factor that can explain all social movements, the authors argued that "the conditions that generate social movements are numerous and varied".² They identify four

¹ Samuel D. Clark, J. Paul Grayson, and Linda M. Grayson, "General Introduction," in Prophecy and Protest: Social Movements in Twentieth-Century Canada (Toronto: Gage, 1975), p. 7.

² Ibid., p. 7.

conditions.³ However, they consider all of them to be necessary. The theory presented here, in suggesting a number of impediments to protest, would serve rather as a kind of checklist of conditions to look for when one is attempting to determine the protest potential in a situation of economic loss. Though its predictive power may be modest, it at least provides a viewpoint from which to critically analyze claims that protest may be imminent.

Application of Findings Beyond Canada

Recent analysis of the 1992 American presidential race has presented it as an example of significant protest mobilization in response to economic loss, fueled by populist ideas.⁴ However, despite the evocativeness of the titles of works such as Germond and Witcover's Mad as Hell and Kevin Phillips' Boiling Point, it is not self-evident that this was in fact the case, at least in the sense in which significant protest and populist ideas are defined in the present study.

³ The four conditions are: The perception of institutional deficiency; an ideology on which potential members can be united; willing and able leadership; channels for communication and a network of co-operative relationships. Clark, Grayson and Grayson, pp. 7-18.

⁴ See, for example, Jack W. Germond and Jules Witcover, Mad as Hell: Revolt at the Ballot Box, 1992 (New York: Warner, 1993) and Kevin Phillips, Boiling Point, Republicans, Democrats, and the Decline of Middle-Class Prosperity (New York: Random House, 1993)

That there had been escalating economic loss in the years leading up to the election there can be little doubt. Such loss was quite evident to average Americans, many having experienced it first hand. By 1991, survey data indicated 63 per cent saw America as in decline.⁵ It had been prominently analysed in the media, the popular press, and academic works.⁶ The work of Barry Bluestone and Robert Kuttner on loss experienced by American blue collar workers and by the middle class in the 1980s has already been cited in earlier chapters. Phillips' book provides a wealth of more recent data on the nature of economic loss affecting the middle class.⁷ There can also be little doubt that the 1992 presidential race played on this loss.

⁵ Phillips, p. 6, citing an NBC poll.

⁶ A particularly interesting and very recent example is Richard J. Barnet, "The End of Jobs," Harper's, Vol. 287, No. 1720, September 1993.

⁷ For example, Phillips interprets U.S. Census data to indicate that middle-income ranks had thinned by 8 to 15 percentage points of the nation's population since the days of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, "an unprecedented decline." He holds that median U.S. family income of \$35,000 in 1990 "no longer assured the middle-class status and life-style that median earnings had brought ordinary households twenty or thirty years earlier . . . Household purchasing power was eroding more than federal inflation statistics acknowledged. For more and more families, educational and medical costs were climbing faster than incomes, and together with rising federal, state and local taxes, they ravaged nominal earnings figures and turned the middle-class "squeeze" into something worse: a slow, economic retreat that most of its victims could not comprehend." Boiling Point, p. 3-4.

Bill Clinton announced his candidacy for the office in October 1991, declaring that:

Middle-class people are spending more hours on the job, spending less time with their children, bringing home a smaller paycheck to pay more for health care and housing and education.⁸

This theme dominated the Clinton campaign. Putting People First, Clinton's platform book, opened by accusing recent Republican administrations of betraying the values that make America great: providing opportunity, taking responsibility, rewarding work.⁹ It charged that:

While the rich got richer, the forgotten middle class -
- the people who work hard and play by the rules --
took it on the chin. They paid higher taxes to a
government that gave them little in return.¹⁰

Independent contender Ross Perot also sought to mobilize "apprehension, frustration, fear and anger".¹¹ He exhorted citizens to preserve their children's future. He demanded that the United States take care of American interests and American jobs and worry less about the rest of the world.¹²

"We're the owners of this country. . . The guys in

⁸ Cited in Germond and Witcover, p. 99.

⁹ Bill Clinton and Al Gore, Putting People First (New York: Times Books, 1992), p. 3.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 3.

¹¹ Germond and Witcover, p. 514.

¹² Phillips, p. 244.

Washington work for us. They are our servants"¹³

For Phillips, both candidates demonstrated populist tendencies. Clinton "used reasonably strong populist language" in talking about taking the country back for middle-class and working-class Americans.¹⁴ But "the most surprising trumpet of anti-Washington outsiderism and economic populism" in 1992 was the emergence of "the first billionaire populist in U.S. political history Ross Perot" ¹⁵ Recounting Perot's populist assaults on power, Phillips notes that he "openly labelled" George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker "country clubbers" and "preppies."¹⁶

Germond and Witcover and Phillips all feel the 1992 election represented an unusual degree of protest mobilization. They use several different ways of measuring the significance of this mobilization. Germond and Witcover stress the fact that, in electing Bill Clinton and denying George Bush a second term, Americans posted the largest percentage turnout since the election of John F. Kennedy.¹⁷

¹³ Germond and Witcover, p. 219.

¹⁴ Phillips, p. 243.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 77.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Germond and Witcover, p. 508.

Yet they have to admit that the 55.24 per cent turnout "paled in comparison with voter turnout in nearly all other Western democracies."¹⁸ They also cite Perot's surprising showing. "His effort, though failed, was remarkable considering his inexperience in politics and the dismal history of third-party politics in America."¹⁹ Phillips also cites Perot's achievements -- moving ahead of both Bush and Clinton in public opinion polls in June before he withdrew in July, and ultimately taking 19 percent of the vote.²⁰ Phillips also states that "angry middle-class voters mobilized in record numbers" to defeat a man "whose approval rating they had cut from an extraordinary 90 per cent in the spring of 1991 to a ghostly 30 percent in mid-1992."²¹

The measures of protest used by the authors are not those of the present study. Moreover, they are arguably less than satisfactory. Voting does not indicate real political engagement. It is not really protest in the strictest sense. Moreover, voter turnout in November 1992 was not dramatic, even if somewhat above average. The most visible symptom of traditional protest politics took the

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 509.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 514.

²⁰ Phillips, p. 77.

²¹ Ibid., p. xii.

form of the thousands of Perot "volunteers". But did the 1992 campaign see more Americans playing activist roles than previous campaigns? Germond and Witcover and Phillips do not present hard evidence that it did. Perot's temporary lead in the polls, and his 19 per cent of the vote may indicate positive response to his message, but not protest as it has been treated in previous chapters. Genuinely angry citizens could reasonably be expected to do more -- as they did in the 1930s in the United States as well as Canada. The 1992 American presidential race actually demonstrated continuing relative quiescence in the face of economic loss.

Looking at the actual messages of the "populist" presidential candidates, they do not actually present a populist ground of claim to economic losers. Nor do they present any other clear ground of claim. Clinton's charge that Americans are spending more hours on the job but bringing home smaller paychecks, and that they are paying more taxes and getting less in return did not provide any benchmarks, even symbolic ones, to suggest how many hours they should be working, how big their paychecks should be, how much they should be paying in taxes, or what they should be getting in return. Since it did not cite any kind of "square deal" it could not state what a ground of entitlement would be, or cite any kind of authority for that

ground. To some extent, one can say that the absence of a clearly articulated ground of claim for losers might be one of a number of factors accounting for relative quiescence in the United States in 1992.

Predicting Protest: Canada in the 1990s

As a generalization based on the findings here, one might predict that significant protest is not likely to occur in the present decade, even if economic loss widens and deepens. To explore this generalization in more detail, one has to look at 1) constraints on the emergence of such grounds, 2) forces favoring the emergence of such grounds, 3) where, specifically, one might expect such emergence.

Previous chapters have argued that grounds of claim for redress are supported by a society's major institutions and may wax and wane with the growth and decline of such institutions. One can thus view the current absence of a strong ground for claim at least partly in terms of the absence of support for such a ground in contemporary institutions -- business, government, educational institutions.

Constraints on Emergence of a Grounds for Claim

In the 1990s, contemporary Canadian institutions, by and large, support a market liberal worldview and the

flexibility imperative. Of those institutions that do purport to uphold egalitarian values, some, such as unions, seem unable to promote them within the general population or even among the families of union members and, in some cases, among union members themselves. There seems little prospect for change in the institutions that dominate Canadian society. Institutions actively promoting market liberal values would appear to be increasing in strength, not declining, when one considers both their control of wealth and their control of means of communication.²² Institutions that traditionally encouraged the honest work ethic are either severely weakened or greatly changed. There is currently no evidence of a long-term reversal of the ongoing decline in church attendance. A short-term reversal has been noted by some in recent years, linked to the return to church of the baby-boomers while their children were young. Reginald Bibby's analysis discounts the possibility of this having a long-term impact. Some boomers are coming back, he reports, but they are not coming back in sufficient numbers to replace the more active

²² See for example, Rheal Seguin, "Journalistic autonomy at heart of strike at Quebec newspaper," The Globe and Mail, November 12, 1992, page 1, which argues convincingly that management of Le Soleil in Quebec City has moved to shift control of what appears in the paper from journalists to management. In particular, this has been done through a plan to increase the number of freelance writers who would not have access to the grievance procedure to protect their professional autonomy.

members of prewar generations, who soon will be gone.²³

The net picture, based on Bibby's research, shows a steady downturn in church attendance nationally -- from 31 per cent in 1975 to a current level of some 23 per cent.²⁴

Forces That Could Favour the Resurgence or Emergence of a Grounds for Claim

Forces that could promote emergence of a ground for claim that would support protest might be divided into two categories: 1) those that would attack the "flexibility" imperative; and 2) those that would present a contending notion to challenge and possibly displace it. In the first category, one might place attacks on the feasibility of the option of retraining in high-demand fields. By the late 1980s, attention was being drawn to the fact that such training was available to only a small percentage of those who wanted it. Many of those wishing post-secondary education could not get into the institution of their choice or the programs of their choice, particularly in the case of occupational or professional programs.²⁵ By the spring of 1992, a Toronto area

²³ Bibby, Reginald, Unknown Gods (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), p. 16.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ See, for example, "Higher marks needed to enter universities," The Globe and Mail (wire story, Canadian Press), June 28, 1989, p. A25. The story notes that a student with an 87 per cent grade average was rejected from the commerce program at Queen's University. Officials of the student's Kitchener high school were appealing the

community college reported that more than 1,000 applicants had applied for places in its 100-space ambulance program and that 661 had applied for 85 positions in the child and youth worker program. Another college reported that it expected to reject about 2,000 applicants in total.²⁶

Moreover, some media articles did touch upon the difficulties of retraining for older workers, especially those who came to retraining with a low initial educational attainment, including those facing the problems of illiteracy or innumeracy, but such stories often had an upbeat twist, focussing on innovative adult educational programs to help even illiterate workers gain the basic skills necessary to undertake training²⁷ or on business-government-union co-operation in making such training available.²⁸ Stories challenging the efficacy of retraining as a route to a new job were appearing more frequently by 1992,²⁹ even though their appearance did not

decision.

²⁶ Canadian Press, PM-College-Enrolment, filed from Toronto on May 5, 1992 (from CP Newswire).

²⁷ David Johnston, "Weston helps workers learn how to read," The Toronto Star, July 8, 1991, p. D5.

²⁸ Michael Davie, "Training for castoff steelworkers provides chance for better jobs," The Ottawa Citizen, June 1, 1991, p. J2.

²⁹ As cited in Chapter 3, Virginia Galt, "New skills, but for what? Unemployed retrain, but no one knows where new jobs are," The Globe and Mail, January 11, 1992, p. A1. See also Dave Rogers, "Jobless say UI changes just make things worse," The Ottawa Citizen, December 4, 1992, p. C1.

diminish the number of voices calling for retraining as a solution to growing unemployment.³⁰ Similarly, the efficacy of flexibility's other major element, mobility, was beginning to be questioned in stories of unemployed skilled workers picking up and moving across the country only to move back again when no work was to be found.³¹

The story quotes Carlo Cuglietta, 21, of Sault Ste. Marie, who is upset at the coming changes in unemployment insurance and skeptical about the value of job training. "I spent \$1,500 on a truck driving course, but didn't get the job I was promised. Then I took a bricklaying course, thinking I could get a good job. Afterwards, the employers told me I would have to start at the bottom anyway. Why pay money to take a course and end up unemployed?" See also Stuart McCarthy, "Gov't, not charity, key to ending poverty," The Ottawa Sunday Sun, December 20, 1992, p. 41. The Sun reports that Katherine Mephram of Ottawa is trying hard to get a job but still unsuccessful despite a masters degree in education from the University of Ottawa and more government training programs under her belt than she cares to count. See also Virginia Galt, "Jobless youth looming problem, Lost generation being spawned," The Globe and Mail, August 10, 1992, p. B1-2. The Globe quotes Canadian Auto Workers president Buzz Hargrove: "You can't train the Newfoundland fishermen for Ontario factory jobs, because the factories aren't hiring . . . I can't look anywhere today and see any industry that is going to be hiring."

³⁰ See, for example, Alan Toulon, "Union's plan reveals gap between labor, business," The Financial Post, December 12, 1992, p. S2, which discusses the National Union of Public and General Employees proposal for national economic revival and its call for substantial public spending on retraining (the gap refers to the amount that should be spent on retraining, not the idea of retraining itself, which governments and business support). See also, David Crane, "So why don't we make training a national priority," The Toronto Star, October 4, 1992, p. H4.

³¹ Southam (from The Vancouver Sun), "Dying towns, broken dreams," The Ottawa Citizen, November 14, 1992, p. B2. The story quotes Marlon MacMillan, a former scoop operator who, having lost his job in a mine closure, took his family from Ontario to Cassiar, B.C., then back to Ontario again just over a year later. "There's nothing

As for a new "contending" notion of distributive justice, as discussed in Chapter Four, it has occasionally been possible for a group suffering economic loss in the 1980s or 1990s to find a ground of claim, rooted in some notion of entitlement -- for a particular share of the pie, or for job security. Populist egalitarianism remains in a residual form, stronger in some segments of the population than others. There is ample anecdotal evidence that people still have expectations of job security based on a range of grounds, not only some of those mentioned above.¹² The liberal notion of contributing value to a property or corporation emerges frequently as a grounds for claim emerges in media coverage of unjust firings. For example, as discussed in Chapter Four, this was the ground that fueled the outrage of many of the high-performing employees fired from the Corel Corp. Their claim was that they had contributed to the company's growth and profitability."

nowhere," he says.

¹² See Dominique Lacasse, "'Reign of terror' at Corel," Ottawa Citizen, November 7, 1992, p. A1 and B1. The stories discuss Ottawa-based Corel Corp.'s firing of about 50 people over a period of a year, many because they lacked "corporate fit". Ten of the fired employees talked to The Citizen and, according to the reporter, "the ex-employees say performance was not the issue, and that the dismissals were unwarranted since Corel had never been healthier. And they believed they had contributed to that success."

¹³ Lacasse, "'Reign of Terror' at Corel," p. B1.

However, while cases such as those cited above do indicate the presence of contending grounds of claim in the minds of many Canadians, the evidence is not sufficient to conclude that such grounds are resurgent, or on the rise in any respect.

Where a ground for claim that would support protest is most likely to emerge

Chapter Four presented three "atypical" cases where a ground for claim emerged. In the case of the pension protest, it was a re-invocation of the populist work ethic. For the Reform Party, an appeal to traditional western notions of being an exploited hinterland. In the case of the Confederation of Regions Party, residual populist notions of hard work and longservice. The basic question at issue here is not whether any of the protest groups discussed in Chapter Four can win the hearts and minds of Canadians at large. What needs to be looked at is: 1) how much more strength they can garner, i.e., how much more protest they can they generate, maybe even just within their own limited constituencies; and 2) what other groups are in the process of articulating some grounds for claim that may speak to, and perhaps eventually mobilize, some of those who are not currently responding to the protest movements discussed in Chapter Four.

In the case of the pension protest, seniors can continue to hold fast to the view that they cannot be expected to meet the demands of the flexibility imperative. Seniors as a group will grow as the baby boom ages and further, and their insistence on limits on what can be expected of them may have some benefit on a slightly younger segment, "older worker" who may now be in their mid-50s and even mid-40s (particularly in physically demanding occupations). This has not been the case so far, as has been discussed in Chapter Three, in that the position adopted by advocates of older workers has been the optimistic view that they can do anything.

Looking at the Reform Party of Canada's hinterland-versus-central-Canadian vested interests scenario, and setting aside for the moment the oddly incongruous tendency of the party's leader to want to woo Bay Street even while expounding upon the hinterland theme, Reform has a grounds for claim that, in the 1980s, could conceivably have been meaningful in parts of Canada other than the West: the Atlantic region and even northern Ontario. By the early 1990s, hard times in what was once Ontario's central industrial heartland tended to undermine the contrast between a rich centre and exploited core. Reform's surprise impressive showing in the 1993 election was due to unexpected strength in the West. Yet Reform's

ability to make Canadians focus on their tax burden, rather than insecurity of jobs or income, has potential for opening up new political markets for the party in other parts of Canada.

In the case of the Confederation of Regions Party, its message, that hard work, longservice and British heritage are things that carry some entitlement to economic security is aimed not so much at a geographic region but at a particular ethnic and socio-demographic group, one who feels its privileges are disappearing. However, this group is fairly well contained within a particular generational cohort, the generation that preceded the baby boomers. As such, its numbers are limited; it is a far smaller generation than the one which followed it.

In the 1980s and 1990s, aboriginal groups have also managed to mobilize considerable protest by invoking shared beliefs concerning distributive justice, or beliefs that at least have implications in the area of distributive justice. They have put forth economic claims rooted in notions of rights that have existed since ancient times and which have been relinquished; or through treaties signed with colonial powers. These rights are unique to aboriginal peoples of Canada and, as such, do not provide grounds upon which wider segments of the Canadian population could base

economic claims. However, as events of the 1990s, from the protest at Oka to the rise of aboriginal bargaining power at the constitutional table demonstrate, they are strongly held beliefs and a powerful motivating force that could be expected to intensify protest sentiment among native communities during the 1990s.

As a protest movement, feminism has ranged widely over a number of issues and, in the 1980s and 1990s, has tended to focus on issues of domestic violence. When attention does turn to the workplace, it often centres on sexual harassment on the job.³⁴ Issues of economic advancement, particularly professional advancement, were held in some disregard during the 1970s and 1980s. They were held to be the issues of middle-class, privileged women and those who espoused them were could find themselves accused of being insensitive to the more severe problems of working class women in situations of domestic and workplace harassment.³⁵ Yet, by the 1990s, pressure for pay equity had made some significant gains and some women

³⁴ For example, a Public Service Alliance of Canada conference for women scheduled for February 1993 listed various workshop sessions, most of which dealt with non-economic issues such as sexual harassment in the workplace and homophobia.

³⁵ This observation is based on casual conversations with various Canadian feminists, including several members of the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, during the late 1970s.

professionals, particularly in fields such as law and media, had begun to protest the so-called "glass ceiling" more vociferously.³⁶ They grounded their claims in liberal notions of having paid their dues in the professions, essentially, their grievance was one of having paid the same dues as men, but not receiving the same rewards in terms of advancement. Although the shortfall in reward may be said to be partly one of status -- the status enjoyed by a senior partner of a law firm, or a columnist, foreign correspondent or senior editor of a newspaper -- there are substantial financial considerations as well. The fact that these issues are forcing their way onto a crowded feminist agenda carries some possibility that feminism may provide a significant vehicle for mobilization against economic loss by the mid-1990s.

To sum up emerging trends, by the 1990s two new economic protest parties, Reform and Confederation of Regions, and various configurations of native and women's rights groups had demonstrated considerable potential for growth and, further, for intensification of their supporters' sense of moral outrage and for more wideranging, possibly radical (in Grayson's sense) political activities. The problem for such groups is that they were divided, at

³⁶ See Chris Cobb, "Female journalists vow to fight for greater role in management," The Ottawa Citizen, November 16, 1992, p. A4.

their very root, and thus in competition with one another, by their different interpretations of the cause of loss, and by different notions of ground of entitlement to redress.

Directions for Further Research

Further insights into whether protest is likely to occur during the remainder of the decade, and where and when it is most likely to emerge, will require more extensive public opinion research. Current public opinion research into attitudes toward "adjustment" and "flexibility" has not opened up questions of distributive justice or quality of life. In asking about attitudes toward training, for example, it has not made it clear whether training would mean paid training on work time, at any easy pace, with no home work (on the model of language training in the federal public service), or training on a workers' own time, with lots of homework (on the model of night class training for the Certified General Accountant designation). Attitudes cannot be accurately measured unless such factors are made explicit.

There are many other issues to be explored, particularly in ways that go beyond the standard questions (used by academic, government and commercial researchers) such as who is responsible for maintaining employment levels, and does everyone who wishes to work have the right

to a job? Questions about whether the government should provide a job for everyone who wants one³⁷ reveal little about Canadians' values concerning entitlement to economic security, since one can assume that, for many Canadians, the image conjured up is of a paternalistic state providing make-work jobs, not the little-known European model of a more interventionist state managing a mixed economy with laws, regulations and economic and monetary policies designed to ensure full employment. Similarly, questions that ask people to whom they would turn with a community problem, or to whom they look most often to look after their economic interests, are not a good measure of notions of distributive justice. What they tap is notions about the efficacy of particular institutions or levels of government.³⁸ Questions which ask respondents to select priorities from a range of government policies offer more possibilities for measuring how Canadians feel the wealth pie should be divided, but not if the policy option range is

³⁷ See, for example, Decima Quarterly Report/Fall 1989, p. 188: "On the whole, do you think it definitely should be, probably should be, probably should not be, or definitely should not be government's responsibility to . . . provide a job for everyone who wants one." Interestingly, the response pattern differs markedly by province/ethnicity of respondent, with 84 per cent of French Quebecers agreeing that it should probably or definitely should be government's responsibility, and only 53 per cent of those of British ethnic origin in the national sample and only 56 per cent of French outside Quebec giving these responses.

³⁸ See for example, Maclean's/CTV Poll, "Voices of Canada," conducted by Decima Research, results reported in Maclean's, January 4, 1993, p. 42.

severely limited, failing to include significant policy innovations or changes in direction." Questions that ask for degree of agreement with statements such as "There is too much of a difference between rich and poor" or "People with high incomes should pay a greater share of the total taxes than they do now"⁴⁰ give rough measures of perception of inequities, but do not reveal the underlying value criteria that have led respondents to conclude that inequities exist, i.e., the notion of distributive justice by which some are judged to have too much or too little. Statistics Canada's forthcoming Survey on Technological Change⁴¹ goes farther towards this goal than most. It asks

³⁹ Decima Research's 1992 year-end poll of Canadians' attitudes on a range of public issues includes such a question. "There has been a lot of discussion over the past few years about the most important role of government. Which of the following do you personally consider the most important? Is it to: invest in areas like education that provide Canadians with the skills they need to help themselves; create an environment where business can prosper and create jobs; provide the services and support for people which they cannot provide for themselves; or control public spending and reduce the deficit?" Maclean's/CTV, "Voices of Canada," p. 43. This question carries a number of implications: one is that skills will actually allow Canadians to help themselves (presumably to get jobs), another is that businesses that prosper will create jobs. Among the options not offered as an option is direct government job creation.

⁴⁰ Quality of Life Studies, York University, Question L6. Also, National Election Study.

⁴¹ A survey commissioned by a group of researchers from McGill and Concordia Universities and two Swedish universities, with results originally promised by September 1993 but still not available in late December 1993.

some of the standard questions about government policy options, but branches out into areas that allow measurement of acceptance of the "flexibility" imperative, and even, to some extent, grounds of resistance. Yet it stops short of seeking to tap underlying value positions. For example, it asks:

When employers say that they have to down-size their workforce, do you think this is almost always due to economic problems, or do you think that the purpose is often to make their employees more cooperative?

The range of responses to this question is arguably too limited, since public debate in Canada, discussed above and in Chapters Three and Four, has already raised the possibility that downsizing of a workforce can be a way to maximize return on investment, or a way to get rid of older employees and replace them later with younger ones.

Moreover, it does not seek to tap any broad notion of the employer-employee relationship and under what circumstances it can legitimately be terminated and with what sort of compensation. Another question in the same survey seeks to measure degree of agreement with the statement that those who cannot find work in their field should retrain for another field. Respondents are also asked whether the government should try to save jobs by temporarily subsidizing companies that are having economic difficulties. However, these questions also force choices within limited parameters and do little to provide insight into underlying

notions of how wealth should be shared in the respondent's ideal society.

The kinds of survey questions that could provide more useful insights into Canadians' beliefs about distributive justice would be ones that present respondents with specific instances of economic loss (or failure to achieve expectations) -- among older workers, among professionals with obsolete credentials, among young workers unable to gain entry into the job market. Such questions could probe respondents' feelings about the moral issues involved, the degree to which respondents feel that these situations are unjust and, more relevant here, the grounds on which they deem them to be unjust. Questions could thus probe underlying theories of value that provide grounds of entitlement to both share of wealth and security of income. Such research could, for example, look at the extent to which Canadians still believe that willingness to do honest work equals the right to a square deal and, for those groups of population segments for whom this notion is long lost, it could explore what, if anything has replaced it. It could attempt to determine who, if anyone, Canadians feel has the right to a reasonable expectation of secure employment.'

Attitudes on "flexibility" -- retraining and

mobility, both geographic and occupational -- could be explored in many new ways. Current research on retraining, discussed in Chapter Three, tends to enquire, for example, into whether respondents personally feel the need for retraining in order to maintain job security. It does not ask the broader moral questions, i.e., do respondents feel that a society in which people have to continually retrain is a good society? It does not ask respondents whether they feel that they personally, or most Canadians, especially older Canadians, are capable of infinite retraining (or at least retraining until retirement age). Further, if it can be determined that Canadians, or at least some groups of them, put limits on the amount of retraining they feel one should have to undergo in order to remain in the job market, then research might also be used to find out what those limits are.⁴²

Conclusion

It has been argued here that the absence of significant protest against economic loss in Canada in the 1980s and 1990s can be partly explained by the lack of a strong shared notion of distributive justice among the major "loser" groups, more specifically, one that could have given

⁴² In looking at limits, the argument here may sound oddly reminiscent of the views of George Grant. Grant's critique of unchallenged technological progress is certainly relevant here.

losers the sense that they had been wronged and had a right to redress. This explanation of quiescence remains only partial because "notion of distributive justice" has been treated here as only one variable in a multi-causal "model" of protest/non-protest. Two distinct lines of argument and evidence have been presented. The first has taken the form of a comparison of the 1980s and 1990s to an earlier era, the 1930s. Specifically, it has been shown that those who experienced economic loss in the 1930s did, in fact, have recourse to a strong ground of claim and, further, that significant protest mobilization did occur in this period. The second has proceeded from an examination of "atypical" cases of protest against economic loss in the 1980s and 1990s. These cases were demonstrated to be characterized by the presence of a notion of distributive justice providing a ground for claim. Such a ground was either effectively articulated by the leadership of a protest party or movement, or was present latently in a population, as a residual of an earlier time.

In the course of looking at notions of distributive justice, this study has investigated the effects of both a dominant belief system, market liberalism, and of some, though not all, of the other belief systems that may be considered noteworthy elements of Canadian political culture. While an ideal approach would have been

one in which each key variable was operationalized by indicators capable of measurement so precise as to permit statistical analysis, the evidence at hand at the present time is not adequate for such an approach. This is particularly true in the case of the variables that essentially represent subjective states, such as perception of loss, experience of insecurity, and notion of distributive justice. In the absence of quantifiable indicators, the presentation of more qualitative evidence will serve to identify the central issues and advance the discussion.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abercrombie, Nicholas, Stephen Hill, and Bryan S. Turner. The Dominant Ideology Thesis. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1980.
- Aberhart, William. Aberhart: Outpourings and Replies. Edited by David R. Elliott. Calgary: Historical Society of Alberta, 1991.
- Appleby, Joyce. Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.
- Akyeampong, Ernest B. "Older Workers in the Canadian Labour Market." The Labour Force (November):85-134. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada.
- Ailen, Richard. The Social Passion, Religion and Social Reform in Canada 1914-28. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971.
- Alt, James E. and K. Alec Chrystal. Political Economics. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
- "Anger at the Core," Maclean's, 7 October 1991, p. 17.
- Angus Reid Group. "The '93 Election Campaign, National Angus Reid Poll #2, September 1993.
- Archer, Keith. "The Failure of the New Democratic Party: Union, Unionists and Politics in Canada." This Journal 18 (1985):353-66.
- Argue, Robert, Charlene Gunnage, and D. W. Livingstone (eds.) Working People and Hard Times. Canadian Perspectives, Toronto: Garamond Press, 1987.
- Argersinger, Peter H. Populism and Politics. Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1974.
- Avakumovic, Ivan. Socialism in Canada. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975.
- The Communist Party in Canada. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1975.
- Baer, Doug and Edward Grabb, and William A. Johnston. "Class, crisis, and political ideology in Canada: recent trends. The Canadian Review of Sociology and

- Baker, John. Arguing for Equality. London: Verso, 1987.
- Ball, Robert. "Endangered Middlemen." TIME, 31 August 1992, p. 33.
- Beauchesne, Eric. "Bishops assail own church, Conference demands more concern for unemployed, Ottawa Citizen, April 15, 1993, p. A1.
- Beck, Nuala. Shifting Gears. Toronto: Harper Collins, 1992.
- Bell, David V. J. The Roots of Disunity. A Study of Canadian Political Culture. Revised Edition. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Best, Geoffrey, ed. The Permanent Revolution: The French Revolution and its Legacy 1789-1989. London: Fontana Press, 1988.
- Bibby, Reginald W. Fragmented Gods, The Poverty and Potential of Religion in Canada. Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 1987.
- . Unknown Gods. Toronto: Stoddart, 1993.
- Birch, Anthony H. "Political Authority and Crisis in Comparative Perspective," In State and Society: Canada in Comparative Perspective, 87-130. Research co-ordinator: Keith Banting. Toronto: United of Toronto Press, 1986. Published by the University of Toronto Press in co-operation with the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada and the Canadian Government Publishing Centre, Supply and Services Canada.
- Bluestone, Barry and Bennett Harrison. The Deindustrialization of America. New York: Basic Books, 1982.
- Borooah, Vanik and Frederick van der Ploeg. Political aspects of the economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Breckenridge, Joan. "Canada suffering bad case of blues, Hard times cause stress, depression," The Globe and Mail, 1 October 1992, A1.
- Brinton, Crane. The Anatomy of Revolution; Revised and Expanded Edition. New York: Vintage Books, 1965.

- Broadfoot, Barry. Ten Lost Years 1929-1939. Markham: Paperjacks, 1975.
- Brodie, Janine and Jane Jenson. "The Party System." In Canadian Politics in the 1980s, pp. 261-64. Second Edition. Edited by Michael S. Whittington and Glen Williams. Toronto: Methuen, 1984.
- Brym, Robert J. "Social Movements and Third Parties." In Models & Myths in Canadian Sociology, pp. 29-49. Edited by S. D. Berkowitz. Toronto: Butterworth, 1984.
- "Budget breaks Tory promises, Mulroney says." The Globe and Mail (CP-Staff), 30 May 1985, p. 4.
- Cameron, Duncan and Daniel Drache. "Outside the Macdonald Commission: Reply to Richard Simeon." Studies in Political Economy 26 (Summer 1988):173-180.
- Canadian Employment and Immigration Advisory Council. Full employment is an achievable goal. A report presented to the Minister of Employment and Immigration, Ottawa, April 1990.
- Canadian House of Commons, Commons Debates, 1985.
- Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Human Rights. Human Rights and Aging in Canada. Ottawa: House of Commons, 1988.
- Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Labour, Employment and Immigration. A Review of the Canadian Jobs Strategy. Ottawa: House of Commons, 1988.
- Canadian National Election Studies, 1984 and 1988.
- Canadian Press, PM-College-Enrolment, filed from Toronto 5 May 1992 (from CP Newswire).
- Canovan, Margaret. Populism. New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1981.
- Carrigan, D. Owen. Canadian Political Party Platforms, 1867-1968. Toronto: Copp Clark, 1968.
- Chantraine, Pol. The Last Cod Fish, Life and death of the Newfoundland way of life. Montreal: Robert Davies, 1993.
- Cheadle, Bruce, Canadian Press and Carrie Mishma, Vancouver Sun business reporter. "Low-paying service jobs mushroom." The Vancouver Sun, 12 March 1992.

Christian, William and Campbell, Colin. Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada. Third Edition. Toronto: McGraw-Hill, Ryerson, 1990.

Clark, Marc. "Pointing the index finger." Maclean's, 24 June 1985, pp. 40-41.

Clark, S.D., J. Paul Grayson and Linda M. Grayson, eds. Prophecy and Protest. Toronto: Gage, 1975.

Clarke, H. D., J. Jenson, L. Leduc, and J.H. Pammett. Absent Mandate. The politics of Discontent in Canada. Toronto: Gage, 1984.

----- Political Choice in Canada. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979.

Clinton, Bill and Al Gore. Putting People First. New York: Times Books, 1992.

Cobb, Chris. "Female journalists vow to fight for greater role in management." The Ottawa Citizen, 16 November 1992, p. A4.

Cohen, Dian and Kristin Shannon. The Next Canadian Economy. Montreal: Eden, 1984.

Confederation of Regions Party of New Brunswick. "A Fair Deal for New Brunswickers." The Confederation of Regions Party - New Brunswick 1991 Election Platform.

Corak, Miles. "The Duration of Unemployment During Boom and Bus." Canadian Economic Observer (September 1993): 4.1-4.20.

----- "UI, Work Disincentives, and the Canadian Labour Market." In Unemployment Insurance How to Make It Work, pp. 86-159. Edited by John Richards and William G. Watson. Toronto: C. D. Howe Institute, 1994.

Cordell, Arthur. The Uneasy Eighties. Science Council of Canada Background Study No. 53. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1985.

Couchiching Conference, 52nd Annual, The Age of Microships: The Next Five Years, July 28 - August 1, 1983.

Cox, Kevin. "At Rope's end, defiant workers stage rebellion." The Globe and Mail, 28 September 1992, p. A6.

- Crane, David. "So why don't we make training a national priority?" The Toronto Star, 4 October 1992, p. H4.
- Dafoe, John. "Anti-elite, populist trend may be overplayed in the public imagination." The Globe and Mail, 31 October 1992, p. D2.
- Davie, Michael. "Training for castoff steelworkers provides chance for better jobs." The Ottawa Citizen, 1 June 1991, p. J2.
- Davies, James C. "The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfaction as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion." In The History of Violence in America, pp. 690-731. Edited by Graham and Gurr. New York: 1969.
- Decima Research. Decima Quarterly Reports, Fall 1989, Fall 1990, Winter 1990, Fall 1991, Spring 1992, Summer 1992.
- "A Report on the Labour Force Development Strategy" Prepared for Employment and Immigration Canada, Ottawa, April 1990.
- Delacourt, Susan. "The Answer is No." The Globe and Mail, 27 October, 1992, p. A1.
- Deutsch, Karl W. "Social Mobilization and Political Development." American Political Science Review (September 1961):494.
- Devereaux, Mary Sue. "Alternative Measures of Unemployment." Perspectives on Labour and Income (Winter, 1992):35-41.
- Dobbin, Murray. Preston Manning and the Reform Party. Toronto: James Lorimer, 1991.
- Douglas, C. H. Social Credit. Vancouver Institute of Economic Democracy, 1979.
- The Alberta Experiment, An Interim Survey. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1937.
- Douglass, R. Bruce, Gerald R. Mara and Henry S. Richardson, eds. Liberalism and the Good. New York: Routledge, 1990.
- Drolet, Daniel. "'You blew it' White tells NDP." The Ottawa Citizen, 7 December 1988, p. A1.

Eagleton, Terry. Ideology, An Introduction. London: Verso, 1991.

Economic Council of Canada. Making Technology Work, Innovation and Jobs in Canada. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1987.

----- . Good Jobs, Bad Jobs, Employment in the Service Economy. A Statement by the Economic Council of Canada. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1990.

----- . Pulling Together, Productivity, Innovation and Trade. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1992.

----- . The New Face of Poverty. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1992.

Emberley, Peter, ed. By Loving Our Own, George Grant and the Legacy of Lament for Nation. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1990.

Employment and Immigration Canada, Public Affairs - Corporate Affairs. "Older Workers in the Canadian Labour Market" (Public Environment Analysis Paper), 14 August 1992.

Enchin, Harvey. "Industry pessimism no more than a paper tiger." The Globe and Mail, 23 November 1992, pp A1 2.

----- . "Corporate productivity drive swells unemployment ranks." The Globe and Mail, 11 January 1993, B1-2.

----- . "CEOs come crashing down, Astrology, rapid change suspected in spate of firings, demotions

Episcopal Commission for Social Affairs, Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, "Widespread Unemployment: A Call to Mobilize the Social Forces of Our Nation," April 14, 1993, distributed by the Conference head office, Ottawa.

Erickson, Lynda. "CCF-NDP Popularity and the Economy." Canadian Journal of Political Science XXI:1 (March 1988):99-116.

- Fairbairn, Brett and Christopher S. Axworthy, Murray Fulton, Lou Hammond Ketilson and David Laycock. "Co-operative Institutions: Five Disciplinary Perspectives." In Co-operative Organizations and Canadian Society: Popular Institutions and the Dilemmas of Change, pp. 13-38. Edited by Murray E. Fulton. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990.
- Forsey, Eugene. A Life on the Fringe. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Fowke, Edith, ed. Toward Socialism. Toronto: Ontario Woodsworth Memorial Foundation, 1948.
- Francis, Diane. Controlling Interest. Toronto: Macmillan, 1986.
- Freeman, Alan. "New Brunswick hits books after years of hard knocks." The Globe and Mail, 16 January 1993.
- Frenken, Hubert. "The pension carrot: Incentives to early retirement," in Perspectives on Labour and Income (Autumn 1991):18-27.
- Frizzell, Alan, Jon H. Pammett and Anthony Westell. The Canadian General Election of 1988. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989.
- Fulton, Murray E., ed. Co-operative Organizations and Canadian Society: Popular Institutions and the Dilemmas of Change. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990.
- Gagnon, Alain and Brian Tanguay. "Minor Parties of Protest in Canada: Origins, Impact, and Prospects." In Canadian Parties in Transition, pp. 220-48. Edited by A. Gagnon and B. Tanguay. Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson Canada, 1989.
- Gallup Canada, Inc. "Public say hockey players and lawyers are paid too much." News Release, Toronto, 27 July 1989. (More detailed demographic breakdowns on the findings of this study were made available by Gallup).
- Galt, Virginia. "New skills, but for what? Unemployed retrain, but no one knows where new jobs are." The Globe and Mail, 11 January 1992, p. A1.
- "Jobless youth looming problem, Lost generation being spawned." The Globe and Mail, 10 August 1992, pp. B1-2.

- . "White-collar workers next to face layoffs, experts say." The Globe and Mail, 5 December 1992, p. A1.
- Garraty, John Arthur. Unemployment in History. New York: Harper and Row, 1978.
- Gera, Surendra and Syed Sajjadur Rahman. "Sectoral Labour Mobility, Unemployment, and Labour Market Adjustment in Canada: Evidence from the 1980s." In Canadian Unemployment: Lessons from the 80s and Challenges for the 1990s, pp. 117-27. Edited by Surendra Gera. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1992.
- Gera, Surendra and David Ferguson. "Trends in Canadian Unemployment." Unpublished paper, April 26, 1994.
- Germond, Jack W. and Jules Witcover. Mad As Hell. New York: Warner, 1993.
- Gibb-Clark, Margot. "Fired workers often confused about rights." The Globe and Mail, 30 november 1992, p. B4.
- Gibbins, Roger. Conflict and Unity, An Introduction to Canadian Political Life. Toronto: Methuen, 1985.
- Goodes, John. Director of Projects, Canadian Employment and Immigration Advisory Council, Ottawa. Interview, 13 May 1988.
- Gordon, Charles. "Hecklers made good TV but is it good reporting?" The Ottawa Citizen, 17 November 1988, p. A5.
- Gower, Dave. "A Note on Canadian unemployment since 1921." Perspectives on Labour and Income (Autumn 1992):28-30.
- Goyder, John. Essentials of Canadian Society. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990.
- Grant, George. Technology and Empire. Toronto: House of Anansi, 1969.
- Gray, James H. The Winter Years. Toronto: Macmillan, 1966.
- Grayson, J. Paul. "Plant Closures and Political Despair." Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 23, 3 (August, 1986):331-49.

- Grayson, L. M. Grayson and Michael Bliss, eds. The Wretched of Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971.
- Grosman, Brian A. Fire Power. Markham: Penguin Books, 1984.
----- Corporate Loyalty: A Trust Betrayed.
Markham, Ont.: Penguin Books Canada Limited, 1988.
- Gurr, Ted. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Gwyn, Richard. "Don't Tell Us What to Think." Toronto Star, 25 October 1992, pp. B1 and B7.
- Hamilton, Richard F. and James P. Wright. The State of the Masses. New York: Aldine, 1986.
- Handy, Charles. The Future of Work. London: Basil Blackwell, 1984.
- Hardin, Russell. Collective Action. Baltimore: Jones Hopkins University Press, 1982.
- Harrington, Denise. "Who are the Separatists?" In Western Separatism: The Myths, Realities & Dangers, pp. 23-44. Edited by Larry Pratt and Garth Stevenson. Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1981.
- Hartz, Louis. The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1955.
- The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1964.
- Hathaway, Dale. "The politics of deindustrialization: An explanation of worker quiescence based on responses to the decimation of Pittsburgh's steel industry in the 1980's." Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, August 1990.
- Hayes, Kevin. Economist, Canadian Labour Congress, Ottawa. Interview, 28 September 1992.
- Heilbroner, Robert. The Nature and Logic of Capitalism. New York: Norton, 1985.

- Hicks, John D. The Populist Revolt. A History of the Farmers' Alliance and the People's Party. University of Nebraska Press, 1961.
- "Higher marks needed to enter universities," The Globe and Mail, 28 June 1989, p. A25.
- Hoar, Victor, ed. The Great Depression. Essays and Memoirs from Canada and the United States. Vancouver: Copp Clark, 1969.
- Hofstadter, Richard. The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968.
- Horne, Michiel. The Dirty Thirties. Toronto: Copp Clark, 1972.
- Horowitz, G. "Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation." In Party Politics in Canada, pp. 41-59. Edited by Hugh G. Thorburn. Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1985.
- Howard, Gerald, ed. The Sixties. New York: Washington Square Press, 1982.
- Howse, John. "On the March." Maclean's, October 29, 1990, pp. 26-28.
- Hueglin, Thomas O. "The Politics of Fragmentation in an Age of Scarcity: A Synthetic View and Critical Analysis of the Welfare State Crisis." Canadian Journal of Political Science XX:2 (June 1987):235-64.
- Ignatieff, Michael. The Needs of Strangers. New York: Viking, 1985.
- Inglehart, Ronald. "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in the Post-Industrial Societies." American Political Science Review, 65 (1971):991-1017.
- Ionescu, Ghita and Ernest Gellner, eds. Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969.
- Irving, John. The Social Credit Movement in Alberta. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959.
- Irvine, William. The Farmers in Politics. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976.

----- . Co-operative Government. Ottawa: Mutual Press, 1929.

Jackel, Susan. "The House on the Prairies." In Writers of the Prairies, pp. 165-74. Edited by Donald G. Stephens. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1973.

Johnson, Chalmers. Revolutionary Change. Second Edition. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982.

Johnston, David. "Weston helps workers learn how to read." The Toronto Star, 8 July 1991, p. D5.

Johnston, Richard. Public Opinion and Public Policy in Canada. Questions of Confidence. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986. Published by the University of Toronto Press in co-operation with the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada and the Canadian Government Publishing Centre, Supply and Services Canada.

Kelman, Suanne. "Consumers on the Couch." Report on Business Magazine, February 1991.

Kielty, Frank, Clara Hatton, and Peter Munsche. Canadians Speak Out: The Canadian Gallup Polls, 1980 Edition. Toronto: The McNamara Press, 1980.

Kinder, D. and Kiewiet, P. R. "Economic discontent and political behaviour." American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979):495-527.

Kuttner, Robert. "The Declining Middle." The Atlantic, Vol. 252, No. 1 (July 1983):60-72.

Lacasse, Dominique. "'Reign of terror' at Corel." Ottawa Citizen, 7 November 1992, pp. A1 and B1.

Laslett, Peter. The World we have lost. London: Methuen, 1971.

Lau, R. P. and Sears, D. O. "Cognitive links between economic grievances and political responses." Political Behaviour, 3 (1981):279-302.

Laycock, David. Populism and Democratic Thought in the Canadian Prairies, 1910 to 1945. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990.

Leithner, Christian. "The National Progressive Party of Canada, 1921-1930: Agricultural Economic Conditions and Electoral Support." In Canadian Journal of Political Science XXVI:3, September 1993, XXVI:3, pp. 435-53.

Leontief, Wassily and Fay Duchin. The Future Impact of Automation on Workers. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Lerner, Sally. "A Critical Examination of Policy Proposals for Dealing with the Effects of New Technologies on the Nature and Distribution of Work." Paper presented to the Conference on Technology and the Labour Force held at Carleton University July 16, 1987.

Lipset, S.M. Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan. A Study in Political Sociology. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.

Little, Bruce. "How Ottawa gains millions now, billions later." The Globe and Mail, 28 May 1985, pp. 1-2.

Liversedge, Ronald. Recollections of the On To Ottawa Trek. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973.

Lynch, Charles. "Protest coverage reveals media's questionable news judgement." The Ottawa Citizen, 3 January 1989, p. A4.

MacDonald, Flora (speaking as Canada's federal minister of employment and immigration). Fall Convocation address, Acadia University, Wolfville, Nova Scotia, 20 October 1984.

----- . Speech to Labour/Business Meeting with Canadian Employment and Immigration Commission, Ottawa, 21 November 1985.

Macridis, Roy C. and Bernard E. Brown (eds.) Comparative Politics, Notes and Readings. Fifth Edition. Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1977.

Macpherson, C. B. Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953.

----- . The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.

- MacPherson, Ian. Each for All: A History of the Co-operative Movement in English Canada, 1900-1945. The Carleton Library No. 116. Toronto: Macmillan, 1979.
- Magnusson, Warren and Rob Walker. "De-Centring the State: Political Theory and Canadian Political Economy." Studies in Political Economy 26 (Summer 1988):37-71.
- Manning, Preston. The New Canada. Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1992.
- Mardiros, Anthony. William Irvine: The Life of a Prairie Radical. Toronto: James Lorimar, 1979.
- Marotte, Bertrand, Southam News. "Latest layoffs leave Hamilton's steelworkers glum about prospects of recovery." The Ottawa Citizen, 4 October 1992, p. E5.
- Martin, James. Technology's Crucible. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1987.
- McBride, Stephen. Not Working. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992.
- McCarthy, Stuart. "Gov't, not charity, key to ending poverty." The Ottawa Sunday Sun, 20 December 1992, p. 41.
- McClelland, Susan Jane. "The impact of capitalist restructuring on women workers in the contemporary Canadian political economy: a study of the Eaton's organizing campaign, 1983 to 1985." Unpublished M.A. thesis, Queen's University, 1989.
- McLaughlin, Gord. "Thunder from the Pight," The Financial Post Magazine, November 1991.
- McMurdy, Deirdre. "Falling Expectations: In an era of slow growth, Canadians are learning that the future is not what it used to be." Commentary on findings of Maclean's/CTV poll (conducted by Decima Research) in Maclean's, January 4, 1993, pp. 34-5.
- McNaught, Kenneth. The Penguin History of Canada. London: Penguin, 1988.
- A Prophet in Politics, A Biography of J.S. Woodsworth. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959.

- McQuaig, Linda. The Wealthy Banker's Wife. Toronto: Penguin, 1993.
- McRae, Kenneth. "The Structure of Canadian History." In The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia. Edited by Louis Hartz. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964.
- Menzies, Heather. Fast Forward and Out of Control. Toronto: Macmillan, 1989.
- Milbrath, Lester. Political Participation. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965.
- Miliband, Ralph. Marxism and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
- Mills, Allen. Fool for Christ, The Political Thought of J. S. Woodsworth. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991.
- Mishler, William. Political Participation in Canada. Toronto: Macmillan, 1979.
- Mittelstaedt, Martin. "The greying of the community colleges." The Globe and Mail, 19 October 1997 p. A6.
- Monro, Kristen and Lynda Erickson. "The Economy and Political Support: The Canadian Case." Journal of Politics 48, 3 (August 1986):616-47.
- Morton, Desmond. Working People. Third Edition. Toronto: Summerhill Press, 1990.
- Morton, W. L. The Progressive Party in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950.
- Motherwell, Cathryn and Drew Fagan, "Petrocan mum on Hopper firing, Chairman ousted despite dramatic improvements in financial picture." The Globe and Mail, 30 January 1993, p. A1.
- Murphy, Brian B. and Michael C. Wolfson. "When the baby boom grows old: Impacts on Canada's public sector." Statistical Journal of the United Nations ECE 8 (1991):25-43.
- Nachmias, David and Chava Nachmias. Research Methods in the Social Sciences. Second Edition. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981.

4 of 4

PM-1 3½"x4" PHOTOGRAPHIC MICROCOPY TARGET
NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

PRECISIONSM RESOLUTION TARGETS

National Joint Council of the Public Service of Canada.
Workforce Adjustment Directive, December 1991.

Neatby, H. Blair. The Politics of Chaos, Canada in the Thirties. Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1986.

New Democratic Party of Canada. "Canada Works When Canadians Work," campaign brochure setting out general principles of election platform. Autumn 1993.

----- . "A Fair Deal for Canada." Campaign brochure setting out general principles of election platform. Summer 1988.

Newman, Peter C. Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963.

Newton, Keith, Economic Council of Canada. "Employment Effects of Technological Change: Some Implications for Education." Speech delivered in Ottawa, 1985.

Nichols, Marjorie. "Reform Party intends to 'stick it' to Tories." The Ottawa Citizen, 13 October 1988, p. A3.

Nikiforuk, Andrew. "The Manning Reformation." The Globe and Mail Report on Business Magazine, May 1992, pp. 53-54.

Norrie, K. H. "Some Comments on Prairie Economic Alienation." Canadian Public Policy, Vol. 2 (1976):211-24.

Nozick, Marcia. No Place Like Home, Building Sustainable Communities. Ottawa: Canadian Council on Social Development, 1992.

Oderkirk, Jillian, Cynthia Silver and Marc Prud'homme. "Traditional Earner Families," in Canadian Social Trends (Spring 1994):19-25.

Offe, Claus. "The Future of the Labour Market." Telos 60 (Summer 1984):81-96.

Olson, Mancur, Jr. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, reprinted with a new app., 1971.

Paldam, Martin. "A Preliminary Survey of the Theories and Findings on Vote and Popularity Functions." Europe in Journal of Political Research 9 (1981):181-99.

- Panitch, Leo. "Capitalist Restructuring and Labour Strategies." Studies in Political Economy 24 (Autumn 1987):131-49.
- Papoe, Bob (Toronto Star.) "Downsizing puts middle managers on endangered list." The Ottawa Citizen, 14 November 1992, p. J1.
- Parr, Joy. The Gender of Breadwinners, Women, Men and Change in Two Industrial Towns, 1880-1950. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990.
- Peat Marwick Stevenson & Kellogg. "Interim Executives." A classified advertisement carried in The Globe and Mail, 16 December 1992, p. B23.
- Pells, Richard H. Radical Visions and American Dreams: Culture and Social Thought in the Depression Years. New York: Harper and Row, 1973.
- Penner, Norman. The Canadian Left: A Critical Analysis. Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1977.
- Penniman, Howard R. (ed.) Canada at the Polls, 1979 and 1980: A Study of General Elections. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981.
- Phillips, Kevin. Boiling Point. New York: Random House, 1993.
- Picot, Garnett and Ted Wannell. "Job Loss and Labour Market Adjustment in the Canadian Economy, Findings from a Special Survey." The Labour Force (March 1987). Social and Economic Studies Division, Statistics Canada. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada.
- Picot, Garnett and Wendy Pyper. "Permanent Layoffs and Displaced Workers: Cyclical Sensitivity, Concentration, and Experience Following the Layoff." Statistics Canada Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series, No. 55, 1993.
- Pierce, Roy and Philip E. Converse. "Attitudinal Sources of Protest Behavior in France: Differences Between Before and After Measurement." In Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 54/Fall 1990/No. 3, pp. 295-316.
- Pinard, M. "Poverty and Political Movements." In Canadian Society: Sociological Perspectives, 3rd ed. Edited by B. R. Blishen et al. Toronto: Macmillan, 1968.

----- . The Rise of a Third Party. A Study in Crisis Politics. McGill-Queen's University Press, 1975.

Pollack, Norman. The Just Polity. Populism, Law and Human Welfare. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987.

Pro-Canada Network. "What's the Big Deal?" Cartoon booklet distributed October 11, 1988, as a paid supplement in Canada's major daily newspapers.

Rashid, Abdul. "Changes in Real Wages." Canadian Social Trends (Spring 1994):16-18.

Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971.

Reform Party of Canada, Building New Canada. Reform Party of Canada Principles and Policies (The Blue Book), 1991.

Richards, John. "Populism and the West." In Western Separatism, pp. 65-84. Edited by Larry Pratt and Garth Stevenson. Edmonton: Hurtig, 1981.

Richards, John and Larry Pratt. Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979.

Richardson, Don. "C.O.R. wants to end rumors of link with KKK." The Telegraph Journal (New Brunswick), 24 October 1992.

Ricoeur, Paul. Lectures on Ideology and Utopia. Edited by George H. Taylor. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.

Riddell-Dixon, Elizabeth and Gretta Riddell-Dixon. "Seniors Advance, The Mulroney Government retreats: Grey Power and the Reinstatement of fully Indexed Pensions." In Contemporary Canadian Politics, pp. 227-92. Edited by Robert J. Jackson, Doreen Jackson, and Nicholas Baxter-Moore. Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1987.

Rogers, Dave. "Jobless say UI changes just make things worse." The Ottawa Citizen, 4 December 1992, p. C1.

Safarian, A. E. The Canadian Economy in the Great Depression. The Carleton Library No. 54. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970.

- Sainsbury, Diane. "The Electoral Difficulties of the Scandinavian Social Democrats in the 1970s: The Social Bases of the Parties and Structural Explanations of Party Decline." Comparative Politics 17 (1985):1-19.
- Salutin, Rick. Waiting for Democracy, A Citizen's Journal. Markham, Ontario: Viking, 1989.
- Saywell, John T. Saywell. 'Just call me Mitch': The Life of Mitchell F. Hepburn. Toronto: University of Toronto Press for the Ontario Historical Society, 1991.
- Schier, Steven E. and Norman J. Vig. "Economic Performance and Mass Support: The Thatcher and Reagan Regimes." In Political Economy in Western Democracies, pp. 257-83. Edited by N. J. Vig and S. E. Schier. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985.
- Schlozman, Kay Lehman and Sidney Verba. Injury to Insult, Unemployment, Class and Political Response. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.
- Scott, F. R. "The Nineteen Thirties in the United States and Canada." In The Great Depression, Essays and Memoirs from Canada and the United States, pp. 169-85. Edited by Victor Hoar. Vancouver: Copp Clark, 1969.
- Skocpol, Theda. "Political Response to Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal." Politics and Society 10 (2) (1981):155-201.
- Seguin, Rheal. "Journalistic autonomy at heart of strike at Quebec newspaper." The Globe and Mail, 12 November 1992, p. 1.
- Serrill, Michael S. "Road Ahead, A TIME panel predicts economic changes, new regional ties -- and grounds for optimism in the 21st century." TIME, 4 December 1992, pp. 64-68.
- Sharpe, Sydney and Don Braid. Storming Babylon. Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1992.
- Shiry, John. "Mass Values and System Outputs: A Critique of an Assumption of Socialization Theory." In Foundations of Political Culture: Political Socialization in Canada. Edited by Jon H. Pammett and Michael S. Whittington. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, Maclean-Hunter Press, 1976.
- Shortell, Ann. "Labor at the Crossroads." The Financial Post Magazine, November 1991.

Southam News (from The Vancouver Sun). "Dying towns, broken dreams." The Ottawa Citizen, 14 November 1992, p. B2.

Springborg, Patrica. The Problem of Human Needs and the Critique of Civilisation. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981.

Stackhouse, Reginald. "Battling recession in the churches." The Globe and Mail, 21 August 1992, p. A17.

Staples, David and Greg Owens. "A loss of innocence." The Gazette (Montreal), 27 September 1992, pp. A1 and A4.

Statistics Canada. Survey of Displaced Workers Questionnaire, in The Labour Force (January 1986). Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada.

----- . Canada Year Book, 1988. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1987.

----- . Canada Year Book, 1992. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991.

----- . Survey on Technological Change, 1992. Questionnaire.

Stein, Michael. The Dynamics of Right-Wing Protest: a political analysis of Social Credit in Quebec. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973.

"Stelco to begin job talks, Workers vote to ease seniority, classification rules." The Financial Post, 17 November 1992, p. 9.

Stevenson, Michael. Review of The State of the Masses. Canadian Journal of Political Science XIX:4 (December 1986):861-62.

"Suncor boss made company lean." The Globe and Mail, 28 November 1992, P. B6.

Tenszen, Michael. "Become miners or face layoffs, Inco tells women." The Toronto Star, 14 December 1992, p. A1.

Thomas, Paul. "The Administrative Machine in Canada." In Politics: Canada, pp. 465-75. 7th ed. Edited by Paul W. Fox and Graham White. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1991.

Thomis, Malcolm I. The Luddites. David & Charles: Newton Abbot, Devon, Great Britain, 1970.

- Thompson, John B. Studies in the Theory of Ideology. Oxford: Polity Press, 1990.
- Thompson, John Herd with Allen Seager. Canada 1922-1939. Decades of Discord. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985.
- "Thou shalt not, Updated catechism includes new sins." The Ottawa Citizen (Los Angeles Times News Service), 17 November 1992, pp. A1-2.
- Tilly, Charles. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978.
- Tindale, Joseph A. Older Workers in an Aging Workforce. Ottawa: National Council on Aging, 1991.
- Tipton, Steven M. Getting Saved from the Sixties. Berkely: University of California Press, 1982.
- Toulin, Alan. "Union's plan reveals gap between labor, business." The Financial Post, 12 December 1992, p. S2.
- Townsend, Monica. "The Impact of Technological Change on Women." In Canada Tomorrow Conference, Commissioned Papers. Ottawa: Supply and Services, Canada, 1984.
- Treasury Board of Canada. "Ratification of Revised Public Service Work Force Adjustment Policy Recognizes Federal Government's Right to Contract Out." News Release, 9 December 1991.
- Trueman, Mary. "Looking for the End of the Transition." Unpublished M.A. thesis, Queen's University, August 1985.
- . "Discussion Paper No. 22, Training of Older Workers in Canada." Geneva: International Labour Office, 1989.
- . "Older Workers: Conditions of Work and Transition to Retirement in Canada." Geneva: International Labour Office, to be published in 1993.
- Underhill, Frank H. James Shaver Woodsworth. Untypical Canadian. Toronto: Ontario Woodsworth Memorial Foundation, 1944.
- . In Search of Canadian Liberalism. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1960.

Vaillancourt, Francois. Economist, University of Montreal.
Interviews, 3 July 1984 and 23 April 1992.

Van Loon, Richard and Michael Whittington, The Canadian Political System. 4th ed. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987.

Watson, William. "Referendum not the best way to get the job done." 29 October 1992, p. 19.

Weber, Max. Basic Concepts in Sociology. Translated from the German and introduced by H. P. Secher. London: Peter Owen, 1962.

Whitaker, Reginald. The Government Party: Organizing and Financing the Liberal Party of Canada, 1930-58. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.

Whittington, Michael S. and Glen Williams, eds. Canadian Politics in the 1980's. Toronto: Methuen, 1981.

Wild, Stevens. "From middle class to outcast." The Winnipeg Free Press, 19 May 1992, p. B21.

Wiles, Peter. "A Syndrome, not a Doctrine: Some Elementary Theses on Populism." In Populism, pp. 166-79. Edited by Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969.

Williamson, Robert. "Tradition giving way to the world of freelancers." The Globe and Mail, 15 January 1993, p. B1.

Wilson-Smith, Anthony. "A growing budget backlash." Maclean's, 17 June 1985, pp. 8-9.

Winn, Conrad and John McMenemy. Political Parties in Canada. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976.

Wiseman, Nelson. "The Pattern of Prairie Politics." In Party Politics in Canada, pp. 242-59. 5th ed. Edited by Hugh G. Thorburn. Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1985.

Wolfson, Michael C. "Divergent Inequalities - Theory, Empirical Results and Prescriptions." Paper presented at the conference "Contemporary Issues in Income Distribution Research" sponsored by the Social Policy Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sidney, Australia, December 3, 1993, and the American Economic Association Meetings session on Conceptual Issues in Normative Measurement, Boston, January 5, 1994.

----- "Stasis Amid Change, Income Inequality in Canada 1965-1983." Review of Income and Wealth, December 1986:337-69.

Wong, Fred. "A Review of Employment and Earnings Data, 1983-1986." The Labour Force (August 1987):87-113. Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Service Canada.

Working Committee for Social Solidarity "A Time to Stand Together, A Time for Social Solidarity." A Declaration on Social and Economic Policy Direction for Canada by Members of Popular Sector Groups. Toronto: Our Times, November 1987.

York University, Quality of Life Study.

Zajchowski, A., negotiator, Professional Institute of the Public Service. Interview, May 13, 1994.

Zwarun, Suzanne. "Women and the Reform Party." Chatelaine, March 1992.

END

1 | 9 - 1 1 - 9 6

FIN